Globalisation and Ideology in Britain: Neoliberalism, free trade and the global economy 9781847794208

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Globalisation and ideology in Britain

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Globalisation and ideology in Britain Neoliberalism, free trade and the global economy

Craig Berry

Manchester University Press Manchester and New York Distributed in the United States exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan

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Copyright © Craig Berry 2011 The right of Craig Berry to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Published by Manchester University Press Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9NR, UK and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk Distributed in the United States exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA Distributed in Canada exclusively by UBC Press, University of British Columbia, 2029 West Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for

ISBN 978 0 7190 8488 1 hardback First published 2011 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Typeset by 4word Ltd, Bristol Printed in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

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To Mum, Dad and Laura

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We are in the presence of a holistic ideological contender. Whether this will turn out to be an ideological pretender or a new ideological family is an empirical question that will be resolved by the manner in which its discourse is institutionalized and broadly adopted, and the degree to which it can provide satisfying answers to the basic political questions. Michael Freeden, Ideological boundaries and ideological systems, 2003

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Contents

Preface and acknowledgements

page viii

List of abbreviations

x

Introduction

1

1

Globalisation studies, the materialist bias and the ‘third wave’

11

2

Political economy and ideology

40

3

Competition and change: the case of New Labour

69

4

Serving the ‘offshore’: the case of International Financial Services, London

99

5

The free trade dilemma: the case of the Liberal Democrats

120

6

Trade justice and development: the case of Oxfam

144

7

Capitalism’s final phase: the case of the Socialist Workers’ Party

164

Conclusion: towards a new understanding of globalisation in the ideological landscape of British politics

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Index

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Preface and acknowledgements

This book has its origins in my doctoral thesis, which I undertook in the Department of Politics at the University of Sheffield. While the book is an updated and revised version of the thesis, the analysis remains the same. By the late 1990s, the term ‘globalisation’ had become ubiquitous in British politics, especially in New Labour’s discourse. While this itself was not unknown to political scientists, I was convinced that precisely why the concept of globalisation in particular had become so important had not been fully explored. Many argued that the term was a mask for neoliberalism; but if so, why this mask rather than some other? Moreover, could it be the case that the idea of globalisation led actors like New Labour to neoliberal policies, rather than vice versa? What was left under-investigated, in my opinion, was how the concept of globalisation related to extant ideas in British politics such as those associated with the socialist and liberal traditions. Among many political economists, the ‘why’ question has in fact been answered fairly decisively: political actors talk about globalisation because it is shorthand for the massive economic changes the world has experienced in recent decades. Of course, few have expressed this argument so clinically. The silent assumption is essentially a product of a tendency to reduce the ideas upheld by agents to their experience of structure and their associated material interests. This is an analytical hierarchy I intuitively reject, not least because I think it fails to demonstrate how structural changes (such as global economic change) come about. So my research set out to explore what globalisation really means to British political actors, whether it means different things to different actors and how these meanings are implicated in the political actions – including policy-making – that contribute to the transformation and reproduction of structure. The support and advice of my PhD supervisor Michael Kenny during my research was invaluable. His thoughts on my work were always challenging, yet expressed with genuine kindness and humour. A great many others have helped me along the way, including Sarah Cooke, John Hobson, Colin Hay, Ben Rosamond, Matthew Watson, Andrew Gamble, Kees van der Pijl, Nicola

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Preface and acknowledgements

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Phillips, Kevin Gillan, Clive Gabay, Adam White, Ben Richardson, Andrew Mumford, Colin Wray, Chris Atkinson, Laura McLeod, James Simpkin, Antony Ou, Richard Dunne and Ursula Le Guin. I am also grateful to the University of Sheffield for funding my doctoral research, Manchester University Press for their support throughout the writing of this book, the anonymous reviewers for many helpful suggestions and the many individuals and organisations that participated in my fieldwork. I owe a large thank you to my family for all their support over the last few years, particularly Mum and Dad, and to my wife’s parents Colin and Mary. My greatest debt, however, belongs to my best friend and guardian angel, Laura White.

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List of abbreviations

BERR CAP CCP CMI DDA DfID DTI EU FDI G8 G20 GATS GATT GDP GR IFSL IMF IOU IPE IR IST LOTIS MDG MPH OECD PPP PWC SDP SDT StWC SWP

Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform EU Common Agricultural Policy EU Common Commercial Policy commodity management initiative Doha Development Agenda Department for International Development Department of Trade and Industry European Union foreign direct investment Group of Eight Group of Twenty General Agreement on Trade in Services General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs gross domestic product Globalise Resistance International Financial Services, London International Monetary Fund ‘I owe you’ international political economy international relations International Socialist Tendency Committee on Liberalisation in Trade in Services UN Millennium Development Goals Make Poverty History Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development public-private partnership post-Washington consensus Social Democratic Party special and differential treatment Stop the War Coalition Socialist Workers’ Party

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List of abbreviations

TNC TRIPs UN WTO

transnational corporation Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement United Nations World Trade Organization

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Introduction

Globalisation and British politics The concept of ‘globalisation’ has become ubiquitous in British politics, as in many countries of the world. The main political parties all subscribe to the view that globalisation is happening and that it matters. Gordon Brown’s speech to the Labour Party conference in 2008 – amid a worldwide financial crisis originating on Wall Street and intense political pressure on his position as prime minister – proclaimed that each generation believes it is living through changes their parents could never have imagined – but the collapse of banks, the credit crunch, the trebling of oil prices, the speed of technology, and the rise of Asia – nobody now can be in any doubt that we are in a different world and it’s now a global age. (Brown, 2008) Such statements are extremely common in British politics – particularly it seems among New Labour leaders. The five concerns attributed here by Brown to the ‘global age’ can be added to a very long list of events and processes that have been linked to globalisation and its conceptual relatives. The globalisation concept can be deemed to have given rise to a relatively distinct and novel ‘globalisation discourse’ in British politics, defined in a broad sense as political dialogue concerning the nature and effects of globalisation, and including within it appeals to a process of globalisation by political actors as the context of – and rationale for – their actions and decisions. Crucially, while globalisation discourse in Britain is invariably associated with the late 1990s and the rise of New Labour under Tony Blair, Brown’s statement suggests that it is surviving and perhaps evolving. If its deployment continued despite the onset of a financial crisis which threatened to undermine the perceived efficacy of an integrated world economy, then the evidence mounts that the idea of globalisation, rather than going out of fashion, has become entrenched in the ideological landscape of British politics.

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Globalisation and ideology in Britain

It is precisely this ideological landscape that this book surveys. The survey is conducted through the empirical lens of foreign economic policy. While there are few policy areas which have been insulated from the spread of globalisation discourse, it is arguably in the area of foreign economic policy, where Britain’s relationship with the global economy is forged, that the idea of globalisation has had greatest purchase and therefore received most attention. Although rules on international trade are a central feature of this policy area, foreign economic policy encompasses but extends beyond what has traditionally been conceived as ‘trade policy’ – perhaps because of the role of globalisation in blurring the international/domestic dichotomy. In terms of its empirical focus, therefore, the book can to some extent be seen as a sequel to the historian Frank Trentmann’s Free Trade Nation (2008), which surveys the British polity’s traditional attachment to ‘free trade’. Trentmann demonstrates how support for free trade evolved from a predominantly left-wing campaign to a mainstay of centre-right perspectives. Albeit using a different analytical framework, this book updates Trentmann’s analysis by documenting the impact of globalisation and the rise of ‘global governance’ mechanisms on the status of free trade, and its traditional alter-ego ‘protectionism’, within British political debates on economic policy. Clearly, as Trentmann intimates, the rise of neoliberalism has transformed the context of British trade policy, and it remains to be seen whether the idea of globalisation is a continuation of or departure from this recent trend. The book deals with the period from 1997 to 2009. In political language, it covers the period from the election of New Labour, which heralded a new era in British politics, to the recent recession, where the various premises of globalisation discourse came under public scrutiny. However, it is not simply about New Labour, but rather, the political and discursive contexts of the New Labour era. While it will examine New Labour’s perspective, and as such its foreign economic policy practices in government, it also looks more widely at an array of other political actors who contributed to the ideological contours of foreign economic policy as an issue area in British politics during this period. This wider scope is important for several reasons. It is too easy to rationalise post hoc that, because globalisation now appears to be a dominant concept in debates on British foreign economic policy, its emergence as a dominant concept was somehow inevitable. But why globalisation and not some other idea or some other term? While certain influential figures helped to cement its place in Britain’s and the world’s political consciousness, the concept was not invented by Tony Blair or indeed by Anthony Giddens, Bill Clinton or Kenichi Ohmae. We need to look more widely to extant traditions of thought and discourses to discover why globalisation resonates in British politics. It is also only through this wider inquiry that we can more fully appreciate the meaning of globalisation as an idea. Often, because it is associated with certain policy prescriptions,

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its meaning is inferred through an implicit and highly unscientific process of reverse engineering. Yet different actors will employ the concept in different ways in different political contexts. Its multidimensional identity has to be appreciated before we can establish what it really means. It may be, for instance, that the idea of globalisation leads actors like New Labour to neoliberal policy outcomes, rather than vice versa.

Globalisation and ideational analysis As suggested above, and discussed at length in Chapter 1, insofar as political economists have examined the idea of globalisation in any detail, they tend to view it as a mask or shorthand for neoliberalism (whether depicted as an ideology, a doctrine, an episteme, a governmentality etc.) or the social forces associated with this worldview. Even within this school of thought, however, opinion varies between those that argue the globalisation concept refers to actual changes brought about by neoliberal economic policies (see Gill, 1995) and those that argue globalisation has not occurred or is highly exaggerated by political elites in order to justify neoliberal policies as a response to change (see Hay & Marsh, 2000). This book does not intend to directly challenge such analysis. It does not question whether the real-world material changes supposedly referred to by globalisation have occurred and does not deny that the (perceived) interests of powerful political and economic actors are complicit in the terms of political discourse and ideological debate. Yet it upholds that we cannot understand the idea without looking directly at it. Moreover, we fail to fully understand neoliberalism and its status in British politics if we neglect to consider the meaning of the language through which it is supposedly expressed. It must be acknowledged that it is Colin Hay’s work on New Labour’s globalisation discourse which creates the analytical space for this book (see Hay, 1997, 1998; Hay & Rosamond, 2002; Hay & Smith, 2005; Hay & Watson, 1998). Hay’s work will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 1 and 2. While the book eschews the orientation of Hay’s earliest work in this regard, that is, that globalisation discourse is used (often duplicitously) to mask the Labour Party’s accommodation with Thatcherism, it builds upon Hay’s analysis in three key regards: firstly, by inquiring into how ideas about globalisation shape apparent ‘responses’ to the process; secondly, by relating globalisation discourse to particular actors, therefore relating ideas about globalisation to particular policy agenda; and finally, by demonstrating that a variety of understandings of and approaches to globalisation are possible and discernible. Yet it introduces into this analytical agenda the concept of ideology, used only superficially by Hay. Although ideology, as an analytical concept, is not

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alien to political economy, its use here owes more to the way it is understood in political theory. Chapter 2 will discuss ideology in more detail, in particular the work of Michael Freeden. By way of explicating the book’s theoretical framework, it is worth noting from the outset the key elements of how ideology is understood and used here. An ideology is treated as a relatively coherent collection of concepts which provide a guide to what the world is like (ontology), what the world should be like (ethics), how the world can be made better (agency) and, finally, who is and is not included in one’s ideological cohort (identity). These elements are what Matthew Festenstein and Michael Kenny (2005) call the four ‘structural or syntactic features’ of all ideologies. Together they provide a bridge between the essential contestability of reality and the need for human beings to act upon their reality politically in meaningful ways. Some concepts are intrinsic and foundational to the ideology, whereas others are more peripheral or ephemeral and derive their meaning from the ineliminable core. It should be recognised, however, that ideology is used here as an analytical device. There are other concepts through which ideational analysis can be conducted in political economy. Although many real-world political actors see large ideological families (such as liberalism, social democracy and anarchism) as themselves actually existing ‘things’, this is inevitable due to the inherent reflexivity of political thought – contemporary politicians are equally likely to present their beliefs and ideas as unideological. In this study, it is firmly upheld that ideology is not the only analytical lens through which to study ideas – although it is a particularly good one. Much analysis of globalisation by political economists, as will be argued in Chapter 1, is overtly materialist and structuralist. It is posited here, however, that only by looking at the ideas about globalisation upheld by actual political actors can the nature of globalisation as a material phenomenon, and the course of structural formation and transformation, be fully understood. While this book is not alone in such arguments, it argues that, as an analytical concept, ideology is uniquely able to contribute such a perspective to the study of globalisation. For both political economists and real-world actors, globalisation is a term which refers to change in the material circumstances of social reality. The understanding of ideology upheld here is designed to show how agents’ perceptions of reality are intertwined with their views of what the world should be like and how it should be acted upon etc. Furthermore, ideologies are traditions of thought: the way that agents interpret change is influenced by the ideological meanings within which their political consciousness is situated. Finally, the concept of ideology allows the book to demonstrate that – contra Hay’s analysis – while the globalisation concept can be employed in multiple settings in variable ways by different political actors, this does not mean

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that it is entirely malleable. Like every influential political concept, its core may be multidimensional and not easy to place on a left/right ideological spectrum – but nevertheless it is a source of meaning which colours almost every utterance of the term.

Key aims A disclaimer: this book is not centred on the question ‘Is globalisation an ideology?’. While ostensibly an interesting question, this would undervalue the strength and flexibility of ideology as an analytical concept and in fact would provide for a narrow and probably fruitless empirical inquiry. Instead, the book investigates the ideological character of globalisation discourse. This broader focus encompasses the narrower question while recognising that ideas about globalisation can influence and be influenced by a range of ideological perspectives without being established as a distinct perspective in its own right. However, the book is interested in whether globalisation can be said to have an ineliminable meaning. If so, it will be possible to ponder whether the concept of globalisation stands alone in ideological terms or instead is dependent on meanings conferred on it by other ideological perspectives. Related to this, the book is interested in the genealogy and evolution of globalisation as an ideational phenomenon: from which traditions of thought does it spring, how is their influence on globalisation manifested, and is the concept now on its own evolutionary path? The book also aims to determine whether the globalisation concept is employed differently at different points on the traditional left/right ideological spectrum – and if so, why? This is essential to establishing the role of the idea of globalisation in reshaping the ideological landscape of British politics. More specifically, the book aims to reflect on the relationship between globalisation discourse and neoliberalism. In order, therefore, to set up the empirical inquiry that follows, the nature of neoliberalism as it is understood here requires further exposition. ‘Neoliberalism’ is understood as an ideological perspective which prescribes limited state intervention in the economy. It therefore favours privatisation of state-owned enterprises, deregulated labour markets and the use of the private sector or market mechanisms to deliver public services. Most crucially for foreign economic policy, it favours liberalisation of barriers to international economic activity, in terms not only of trade in goods, but also services, and capital flows. It can of course be conceived as an ideology, and as such is often likened to classical liberalism, given its emphasis on the individual as the primary unit of human organisation, the efficiency and moral primacy of markets, the importance of economic freedoms and of course free trade (see Gamble, 2001).

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It is impossible to fully equate one particular agent or political programme with an ideology, but in Britain the rise of this perspective, at least on economic policy, is associated with Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative government elected in 1979. Given that globalisation discourse is most associated with the New Labour era, it may be possible to divorce neoliberalism and the idea of globalisation analytically. The growing importance of the globalisation concept may indeed represent a left-wing response to neoliberalism – although we must be careful not to assume any idea is wholly functional rather than constitutive of agency in its own right. It is precisely for these reasons that an empirical scope which extends beyond New Labour is necessary – as such the book examines the ideas of actors ranging from supposedly diehard neoliberals to those on the far left that share an ideological ancestry with the Labour Party. The book argues, then, that the globalisation concept inherently connotes the notion that the spatial foundations of human organisation have been transformed – in particular that we are experiencing the emergence of one-worldness. This connotation may be said to be logically implied by the term itself – yet it has been largely overlooked in the existing literature. The second main meaning inherent in globalisation discourse is that the nationstate has become anachronistic. This is not necessarily logically implied by the term, but rather is conferred on globalisation by its genealogy and its ideological context. Although much of the existing scholarship has identified the second meaning in some form, it has usually only done so by reducing to the idea to neoliberalism. This book will demonstrate that, for some groups, scepticism about the state’s viability or efficacy is based on the notion of spatial change, as well as or instead of neoliberal assumptions. Crucially, the idea of globalisation contains major elements that have traditionally enjoyed positive associations on the left, complicating the ideological significance of the decline of the state in the British political imaginary. It is worth reiterating, however, that the ostensible focus on foreign economic policy partially qualifies these findings. Before discussing methodology, a final disclaimer: answering theoretical questions is not one of the book’s chief aims. It asserts that ideas matter and that agents matter. While the discussion in Chapters 1 and 2 is intended as a contribution to ontological, epistemological and disciplinary debates, the main purpose of these chapters is to explicate the book’s theoretical framework in more detail. It is hoped that readers can find some value in the primary research even if they do not agree with this framework. That said, it is also hoped that through the book’s empirical analysis the importance of ideational analysis and of ideology as an analytical concept can be demonstrated.

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Methodology

Case selection The book presents five case studies of actors engaged in making and contesting foreign economic policy in Britain (although what this issue area means differs according to the group in question). The cases are: • • • • •

New Labour International Financial Services, London (IFSL) The Liberal Democrats Oxfam The Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP).

The cases were selected to represent a broad spectrum of opinion of foreign economic policy. Clearly, there are a number of methodological issues that need to be addressed. Firstly, these groups vary in power, size and popularity. Therefore, it could be said that some have significantly more sway than others over the ideological meanings replete in globalisation discourse. Secondly, these groups comprise a mixture of governmental, party, business and campaigning organisations which may not be commensurate. Thirdly, many of these groups are not unitary actors with a single ‘corporate’ voice. In response, it must be pointed out that in general the five case studies should in fact be treated as a single study. These groups will house multiple discursive trends which overlap as much as they conflict. The case studies were prepared and are presented separately for mainly logistical reasons and, although comparison is a useful analytical tool, the research does not systematically employ comparative analysis. Similarly, the cases are not deemed to ‘represent’ distinct ideological perspectives. These groups inevitably house various currents of thought which have come together for political, historical and institutional reasons as well as ideological reasons. Therefore, while individual chapters will address the above concerns where relevant and they will be taken into account when conclusions are presented, they are not insurmountable obstacles. New Labour (Chapter 3) is the most important case study, given that the Labour government was responsible for determining and implementing British foreign economic policy during the period in question. The Labour Party’s move to ‘the right’ is of course one of the most important changes in the ideological landscape of British politics in recent years. What role have ideas about globalisation played in this transformation? The policy focus will be on the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and its main successor the Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), and to a

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lesser extent the Department for International Development (DfID), as the bodies responsible for foreign economic policy. Inevitably HM Treasury, in setting the framework for economic policy in general, will also feature. Yet this focus is contextualised by an examination of the thoughts and views of New Labour leaders. IFSL (Chapter 4) is obviously closely associated with neoliberal ideology. It is a membership organisation for financial service providers – the focus here is on its leadership and secretariat. IFSL is strongly committed to trade liberalisation and valorises an open global economy. Is there evidence that this orientation is due to the ideological resources of globalisation discourse rather than, or as well as, neoliberalism? The Liberal Democrats (Chapter 5) case study enables inquiry into whether liberalism in general, rather than its neoliberal offspring, is a stronger influence on globalisation discourse. Again, the focus is on its Westminster-based national leadership. Oxfam (Chapter 6) occupies an ostensibly similar intellectual territory but was chosen precisely because it upholds the importance of transnational political action, and because its core campaigning focus is international trade rules. Related to this, it appears to maintain a stronger commitment to Kantian or cosmopolitan values than the other cases. The SWP (Chapter 7) is arguably the most politically marginal group studied in this book. However, it enables insight into how far from the centre of British politics the dominant meanings of globalisation discourse have travelled. Moreover, despite Labour’s rightwards shift, the SWP’s discourse is born to some extent of the same ideological gene pool as its social democratic relations. As such this contrast will also enable insight into globalisation’s relationship with left-wing staples such as the state. Before discussing methods, it is necessary to justify why the Conservative Party has not been included in this study. In addition to the limitations of space and resources, there are two specific reasons: firstly, there is little evidence that, in the period 1997–2009, the Conservative Party offered a distinctive approach to foreign economic policy within British politics. There existed significant, or even absolute, consensus between the party and the Labour government in this regard. This is not to say, of course, that the Conservative Party discourse on globalisation around its foreign economic policy position did not contain meanings more or less absent from New Labour discourse. However, it is fair to say that the Conservatives ostensibly conformed to neoliberal ideology in this issue area. Crucially, the IFSL chapter enables a comparison between New Labour and an ostensibly neoliberal group. Moreover, given that, unlike the Conservatives, IFSL is primarily focused on foreign economic policy, the comparison in this regard will be much more clinical. Secondly, it was deemed important that the study contained several different types of political organisations. There are three political parties among the cases studied; it was therefore necessary to ensure that groups involved in other forms of political activity were included, to better reflect the varied nature of British political life.

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Methods and sources By necessity the study adopts qualitative methods. To reiterate, its research subject is globalisation discourse. This means the way that politicians present in public their views on globalisation and related issues. As such, it examines communicative rather than coordinative discourses (see Schmidt, 2007), that is, the way that politicians present their ideas and policies, and justify and debate their decisions, rather than the language or vocabulary by which policy is made. Both forms of political discourse are important, but it is in communicating with wider audiences that political actors’ discourse is most usefully understood as ‘ideological’ (hereafter ‘globalisation discourse’ and terms such as ‘communicative discourse of globalisation’ are treated as synonyms). As such, the book’s originality in analysing globalisation discourse lies in its treatment of communicative discourse, that is, in seeking to indentify the ideological meanings replete within discourse. This means looking for the role played by political concepts in discourse and how these concepts are defined in relation to each other. In this sense, discourse is treated as more than simply argument or rhetoric, and as more than a functional representation of power relationships and material interests. These things certainly matter in accounting for the content and purpose of political discourse, but the focus here is on how Festenstein and Kenny’s ‘structural or syntactic’ features of ideology serve to dictate the terms of political discourse. Some forms of discourse analysis assumes that discourse simplifies political thought; on the contrary, it is assumed here that discourse houses manifold complexities, not least ideological compromises between competing objectives and conflicting values. The act of simplification for the purpose of communication is a highly ideological act. The study’s main sources are therefore documents: white papers, manifestos, media articles, monographs, websites, pamphlets, reports etc. These types of public documents are, generally speaking, the main forms of publicly consumable output for the groups studied here. Crucially, they provide a forum for political actors to outline their approaches in the greatest detail. This does not mean they are perfect sources for identifying ideological meanings – but they are the best available. Individual chapters evaluate specific issues arising from the use of certain documentary sources. The book also utilises a small number of politicians’ speeches – necessary for connecting the strategic leadership of collective political actors to their policy-related documents, especially in complex cases such as New Labour. The primary research also involved a large number of interviews with representatives of the groups adopted as case studies. In all cases interview data are secondary to documentary data. They were conducted primarily to facilitate a deeper understanding of an actor and its political action, to enable more clinical documentary analysis. However, it is also the case that interviews were able

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to supplement analysis of the documents, where documentary evidence on particularly pertinent issues was not available or sufficiently detailed, for various reasons. It is fair to say that most of the interviewees treated the interview as a public performance so could be said to have been contributing to their group’s communicative discourse on globalisation. However, given the mediating role of the interviewer, they have to be treated as at most semi-public. They are therefore incorporated into the case studies in a qualified manner. Individual chapters evaluate specific issues arising from the selection, undertaking and use of certain interviews. The research also involved a small amount of participant observation, although the data generated has not been utilised directly.

References Brown, G. (2008) ‘Speech to the Labour Party conference’, 14 October 2008, accessed at www.labour.org.uk/gordon_brown_conference on 15 October 2008. Festenstein, M. & Kenny, M. (2005) (eds) Political Ideologies (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Freeden, M. (2003) ‘Ideological boundaries and ideological systems’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 8:1, pp. 3–12. Gamble, A. (2001) ‘Neo-liberalism’, Capital and Class, 75, pp. 127–34. Gill, S. (1995) ‘Globalization, market civilization and disciplinary neoliberalism’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 24:3, pp. 393–422. Hay, C. (1997) ‘Anticipating accommodations, accommodating anticipations: The appeasement of capital in the “modernisation” of the British Labour Party’, Politics and Society, 25:2, pp. 234–56. Hay, C. (1998) ‘Globalisation, welfare retrenchment and “the logic of no alternative”: Why second-best won’t do’, Journal of Social Policy, 27:4, pp. 525–32. Hay, C. & Marsh, D. (2000) ‘Introduction: Demystifying globalization’, in C. Hay & D. Marsh (eds), Demystifying Globalization (Basingstoke: MacMillan), pp. 1–20. Hay, C. & Rosamond, B. (2002) ‘Globalization, European integration and the discursive construction of economic imperatives’, Journal of European Public Policy, 9:2, pp. 147–67. Hay, C. & Smith, N. J. (2005) ‘Horses for courses? The political discourse of globalisation and European integration in the UK and Ireland’, West European Politics, 28:1, pp. 124–58. Hay, C. & Watson, M. (1998) ‘The discourse of globalisation and the logic of no alternative: Rendering the contingent necessary in the downsizing of New Labour’s aspirations for government’, in A. Dobson & J. Stanyer (eds), Contemporary Political Studies, Vol. 2 (Nottingham: PSA), pp. 812–22. Schmidt, V. (2007) ‘Trapped by their ideas: French elites’ discourses of European integration and globalization’, Journal of European Public Policy, 14:7, pp. 992–1009. Trentmann, F. (2008) Free Trade Nation: Commerce, Consumption and Civil Society in Modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

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Globalisation studies, the materialist bias and the ‘third wave’ In surveying globalisation discourse, this book’s main purpose is to analyse the idea of globalisation and its invocation by real-world political actors. As such, the term itself is appraised as an ideological concept. However, the idea of globalisation has a second life; that is, in the less-real world of academic research. In the social sciences, globalisation functions as an analytical concept, whether as shorthand for something discovered in the socio-economic universe, or as something that must itself be sought, tested, theorised and so on. This has given rise to what has been termed narrowly as ‘globalisation theory’, more broadly as ‘globalisation studies’ or more diplomatically as ‘the globalisation debate’. It is arguable whether this book falls within any of these analytical realms; indeed, there are ideational analyses of globalisation which engage reflexively with this body of work, constructing a ‘wave thesis’ to demonstrate theoretical progression. Yet the purpose of engagement here is not simply to valorise this book’s approach. Instead, the main aim is to explain why the ontological foundations of globalisation studies curtail the analysis of ideas in political economy through a bias towards materialist and structuralist explanations. And even where structuralism is mitigated with reference to actual political actors, materialism tends to remain. This counts against the analysis of globalisation as an ideational phenomena: agents may influence their structural context and may even have ideas about it, but globalisation is the macro-context of their actions, not an ideological resource used to provide meaning to their experiences of material life. After a brief note on the wave thesis, this chapter considers the main articulations of globalisation as a material structural reality. It argues that neoclassical and Marxist political economists converge around this orientation – but so too do a range of ostensibly more nuanced ‘spatial’ approaches to globalisation. It then assesses a range of political economy approaches to globalisation that seek to uphold structure/agency synthesis by ‘reclaiming the state’ analytically, arguing that, unless materialism is also eschewed, agency remains beneath structure in the analytical hierarchy. The discipline of international political economy (IPE) – one of the main disciplinary homes of

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globalisation studies – is most culpable in this regard, although other forms of contemporary political economy also exhibit a materialist bias. Finally, the chapter turns attention to the ‘third wave’ of globalisation theory, that is, analysis of globalisation as a discursive phenomenon conducted or inspired by Colin Hay. Other theorists, such as Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan, have also associated their work with the third wave label. This body of work, which implicitly or explicitly eschews the materialist bias, is discussed to outline the book’s most immediate intellectual context, but also for critical review; while third wave theorists contribute much to globalisation studies, in different ways they do not fully overcome its materialism and/or structuralism.

A note on waves There are two main ways of categorising different approaches to globalisation theory in the social sciences. The main cross-disciplinary textbook, Global Transformations, written by David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton (1999), posits three approaches: hyperglobalisation, the sceptical thesis and transformationalism. Hyperglobalisation is characterised by theorists that believe the world economy has been rapidly globalised, undermining the capacity and legitimacy of states. The sceptical thesis argues that the hyperglobalisation viewpoint is inaccurate or exaggerated and that the nationstate retains power in the economic sphere. Transformationalism argues that there has been significant change on a global scale, albeit across multiple dimensions – such as geography, as well as economics – and that this has both empowered and undermined the state in contradictory ways. For what it’s worth, Held et al. are fully paid-up members of the transformationalist club. The main alternative is Colin Hay’s wave thesis (see in particular Hay & Marsh, 1999). It is worth noting that the wave thesis was first concocted by Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs (1996), although they posit only two waves. Hay’s ‘first wave’ is largely commensurate with hyperglobalisation – although he includes theorists such as Anthony Giddens, classified as a transformationalist by Held et al., because he does not focus exclusively on economics. The ‘second wave’ is largely commensurate with the sceptical thesis. The third wave, of which Hay is the main inspiration, ostensibly adds to the second wave by arguing that although the first wave’s understanding of globalisation and the state is exaggerated, governments now actually use first wave depictions of change to bring about the reality it describes. Both approaches are problematic. They uphold the view that globalisation theory has proceeded in a linear fashion, with each subsequent approach building upon and correcting its predecessor in important ways – the wave thesis does this explicitly. They also both radically over-simplify globalisation

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studies. For instance, not only does neither approach find a distinctive home for the other’s main arguments about globalisation, they also both fail to acknowledge neo-Gramscian scholarship as one of the most important contributors to globalisation studies. Below, I will group neo-Gramscianism with other Marxist approaches in an overview based on ontological foundations. Yet the neoGramscian position on globalisation is distinctive from Marxism in general – in classification systems based on the notion of competing ‘theses’ about globalisation, silently marginalising neo-Gramscianism is not plausible. Luke Martell (2007) has offered an alternative thesis which presents transformationalism as the third wave. While arguably far more plausible than grouping transformationalists with a first wave/hyperglobalisation thesis, Martell actually defines Hay as a transformationalist. Nicola Smith (2005), whose work is heavily influenced by Hay, moves away from a classification system based on different views about the extent of globalisation’s impact on the state. Instead she defines different theoretical viewpoints according to what globalisation is for different scholars. As such, she provides a thorough and credible run-through of globalisation studies. Yet the approach here is slightly different. While accepting that some form of classification is necessary for logistical reasons, this book eschews all chronological connotations and the notion of theoretical progression. As suggested above, it groups various approaches to globalisation according to key issues of ontology. Therefore, it first reviews presentations of globalisation as a material structure. It then reviews the various forms of analysis that have sought to mitigate structuralism and therefore ‘reclaim the state’. Finally it looks at approaches that attempt also to overcome materialism under the ‘third wave’ banner.

Globalisation as material structure There are several identifiable political economy approaches which treat globalisation as a material structure. Whereas most reviews of globalisation studies assume that this is synonymous with globalisation as an economic structure, this section also includes ‘spatial approaches’ which treat globalisation as a transformation of our experience of space. Before discussing these approaches, however, it first discusses approaches influenced by neoclassical political economy and then those associated with the Marxist tradition. More than any other approach discussed here, neoclassical political economy has been associated with the views of globalisation of real-world political actors. As such, neoclassical political economy is strongly associated with neoliberalism, in terms of both policy prescriptions and a priori assumptions (see in particular the work of Martin Wolf, 2005). This is not to say that its relationship with neoliberalism disables its capacity to contribute to theory (as

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claimed by some critics), but it nevertheless must be noted. While critiquing the neoclassical position is a regular departure point for other studies of globalisation, the influence of neoclassical political economy probably abides more than its critics are willing to acknowledge. Neoclassical theory is based on the presumption of perfect markets. Commodities are exchanged, and capital is invested, via market mechanisms. The ontological and epistemological bases of neoclassical theory rest upon the atomistic, rational individual, endowed with pre-ordained material interests in an environment of scarce resources. Markets both exist because of and operate according to this human nature. The neoclassical approach to globalisation, then, assumes the realisation of a global competitive marketplace, or rather argues that the realisation of such an economy is inevitable and that its emergence is now apparent. This conception has led to the charge that the neoclassical approach has an unnecessarily simplistic view of the economic processes associated with globalisation. However, although relatively straightforward, the way that neoclassical globalisation theorists understand the operation or emergence of the global marketplace is not necessarily simplistic. The main progenitor of the neoclassical approach is Kenichi Ohmae. Ohmae’s work – particularly his book The Borderless World (1993) – more so than the work of any other theorist, seemed to encapsulate much of the thinking that had occasioned the rise of globalisation as an analytical concept. Ohmae’s most familiar argument, then, concerns the redundancy of national borders. In short, countries are becoming less different or, more precisely, differences between countries matter less. Economic activity has become global and much less susceptible to the interventions of nation-states. This activity is assumed to constitute a marketplace, and it is the inexorable logic of market competition that has caused economic processes to transcend national or local circumstances. Essentially, however, Ohmae’s work is a narrative about the transformed nature of corporate organisation – Ohmae worked for 23 years as a management consultant and business strategist before entering the academic arena. It is therefore transnational corporations (TNCs) in particular, embodying the norms of post-Fordism, that are deemed to have become global. TNCs are the exemplary institutions of the global marketplace, as both architects and architecture of globalisation. The extent to which the transformation of TNCs is the essence of globalisation, or merely epiphenomenal of the development of a global economy, is open to interpretation, but this perspective has certainly been fleshed out beyond Ohmae’s original narrative – not least by Ohmae himself (1995) – to comprise the more general argument. There is some room within the neoclassical approach for reference to non-market or non-economic factors in explaining globalisation. Theodore Levitt (1986), for instance, believes that technological change is a determining vector of globalisation, or more precisely the post-Fordist business model that produces globalisation, and that it is this,

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alongside market logic, that has contributed to the redundancy of differences between countries. Of course, it is global competition which necessitated the shift towards post-Fordism. This is not an uncommon argument among theorists influenced by neoclassical political economy; indeed, it is present to a lesser extent in Ohmae’s work. Economics, as conceived by neoclassical theory, is still the central driving force of globalisation, but neoclassical globalisation theory argues, additionally, that factors such as corporate organisation and technological development help to give contemporary market relations their specifically global character. The neoclassical approach to globalisation theory is obviously strongly biased in favour of both structuralist and materialist explanations. The global or globalising economy is presented as a structure with determining force, exogenous to agents, reproduced by its own logic; that is, the logic of the competitive marketplace. Agents are not conceived as possessing any significant capacity to author, control or even alter its constraints; the marketplace and rationality are universal notions, assumed not to be variegated at the micro- or meso-levels. Even nation-states lack instrumentality beyond conforming to a mode of behaviour determined by the logic of material structure. Above all, agents are not conceived as having different conceptions of their structural environment or of change within that environment (that is, of globalisation) – only different interests derived from different material circumstances. Ironically, the neoclassical approach has no capacity to understand the agency to which it contributes seemingly more than any other theory of globalisation. It would be unfair to imply that the neoclassical approach has a large number of adherents among contemporary political economists. However, its influence remains strong, particularly in the United States, where the boundary between academia and policy-making institutions is not as rigid as in countries like Britain (see Phillips, 2005b, and Watson, 2005, for important critiques). As such, we see labels such as ‘the American school’ or ‘the IO school’ (after the leading IPE journal in the United States, International Organization). As Nicola Phillips (2005a) has argued, much of the influence of neoclassical theory is now sedimentary; rather than explicating what globalisation is, scholars influenced by neoclassical theory concentrate on how to address the outcomes of globalisation, without considering whether their view of the process and its inherent utility is at fault (see for example Bhagwati, 2004). In contemporary social science, classical Marxism exists largely as caricature; most Marxist theorists can be more appropriately classified as neo-Marxist. Defined broadly, neo-Marxism is a densely populated intellectual territory among today’s political economists. However, as perspectives on the meaning of globalisation as a material process of structural change, the differences between neo-Marxism and classical Marxism are not large. Nevertheless, whereas Held et al.’s assessment of the Marxist position on globalisation is

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based on the work of classical Marxist Alex Callinicos (see 2001, 2002), here the assessment is based on a range of neo-Marxists, such as William Robinson (2001), Barry Gills (2005), Peter Burnham (Burnham & Elger, 2001), Kees van der Pijl (1984, 1998) and Stephen Gill (1995). Callinicos is actually a leading member of the Socialist Workers’ Party in Britain, and therefore his perspective will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. The Marxist and neoclassical approaches are strikingly similar in some regards, particularly in that they both maintain that globalisation is primarily the realisation of a global economy and that this economy has a determining effect upon subsequent social and political changes. They both also point to the emergence and power of global corporations as a key element of globalisation; this argument is probably the central feature of Marxism’s approach to globalisation. Of course, Marxists conceive of the global economy as a system of capitalism, rather than a marketplace. A crucial difference between the neoclassical and Marxist approaches is their conceptions of agency, or of who exercises power in capitalist societies/economies. Marxists refer almost exclusively to agency in terms of class. Therefore, one’s agency is a product of one’s location in the material structure of capitalism, in relation to others. However, the Marxist assumption that political action can be examined using the same conceptual lens as economic action resembles neoclassical theory – in both cases this serve to reinforce the charge of structural determinism. There has of course been a debate in Marxist theory about how much independence political action (in terms of power), particularly that of states, has from the economic structure or, in other words, the extent to which superstructure functions independently of base. Nevertheless, Marxists generally relate agency only to given material interests. Ideas are seen as either functional of those interests or, for some theorists, devices employed in service of those interests. Marxists disagree on a range of propositions, such as the extent of variegation within the global capitalist system and, importantly, the extent to which nation-states are complicit in globalisation. But there is fairly widespread consensus that there exists a global elite which incorporates the (neoliberal) leaders of nation-states, institutions of ‘global governance’ and TNCs, and which acts to reproduce and entrench the globalisation as the expansion and entrenchment of capitalism. And crucially, despite the variety among different empirical accounts of globalisation, the ontological foundations of analysis are fairly uniform. In conjunction with the emergence of a global elite, Marxists tend to interpret resistance to globalisation as the emergence of a global proletariat. Most neo-Marxists tend to uphold a highly nuanced view of the responses of labour and other disadvantaged groups to capitalist globalisation, yet agree that it is the experience of the material structure of global capitalism that provides the main rationale for these responses (see Robinson, 2001). However, the actual or potential instrumentality of these class-based actors in opposing global

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capitalism does not mean that Marxism accepts structure/agency synthesis. Marxist theorists generally imagine that such agents are destined to form projects of collective action due to their location in the global system of production, and not on the basis of their subjective interpretations of their material structural context. Arguably a form of neo-Marxism, neo-Gramscianism offers a slightly different theoretical perspective to others influenced by the Marxist tradition among contemporary political economists. Ostensibly neo-Gramscians, inspired by Italian revolutionary Antonio Gramsci, offer greater analytical weight to ideational phenomena. As such, it will be discussed in more detail on the next chapter, with a particular focus on apparent attempts to analyse the ideational dimension of globalisation. However, it warrants discussion here, precisely because its analysis of globalisation is generally regarded as its main contribution to political science. In this way, neo-Gramscian scholarship has been instrumental in establishing IPE as a distinct discipline within political science. Despite this introduction, it is not clear that neo-Gramscian theorists offer an ontological advance on their neo-Marxist relatives. Stephen Gill’s article ‘Globalisation, market civilisation and disciplinary neoliberalism’ (1995) is a seminal statement of neo-Gramscianism. Gill argues that a (variegated) global class elite, in possession of the ideology of ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’, has established a ‘market civilisation’ which favours its own interests by rendering elements of neoliberalism normal or legitimate: The structure and language of social relations is now more conditioned by the long-term commodity logic of capital. Capitalist norms and practices pervade the gestes répétés of everyday life in a more systematic way than in the era of welfare-nationalism and state capitalism (from the 1930s to the 1960s), so that it may be apposite to speak of the emergence of what I call a ‘market civilisation’. (Gill, 1995: 399) Crucially, however, the material structural change – globalisation – comes first: These representations are associated with the cumulative aspects of market integration and the increasingly expansive structures of accumulation, legitimation, consumption and work. They are largely configured by the power of transnational capital ... this supremacist bloc can be conceptualised as commensurate with the emergence of a market-based transnational free enterprise system, which is dependent for its conditions of existence on a range of state-civil society complexes. (Gill, 1995: 399–400)

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The terminology is ambiguous – perhaps necessarily. Most neo-Gramscians, like Gramsci himself, do not provide definitive answers on the ontological question of the material/ideational relationship, not least because of the difficulties of reconciling contemporary analysis with the Marxist tradition (see Germain & Kenny, 1998). But the implication of Gill’s work is that the transnational capitalist class comes to exist before disciplinary neoliberalism, at least in its globalist form. The meaning of agency is therefore determined by analysis of material phenomena; ideational phenomena constitute – using Gill’s term – representations of class-based agency. Thus terms such as ‘neoliberal globalisation’ are ubiquitous in neo-Gramscian scholarship. Neo-Gramscians accept that agents can affect material structure, in this case globalisation, to the extent that they can refashion the process in their own image. In doing so they also affect future instances of agency. However, the assumption is that ideational phenomena arise within political action based on the relationship of agents to material structure. Responding to Randall Germain and Michael Kenny’s argument that neo-Gramscian analysis retains the classical Marxist notion that agency is determined ‘in the last instance’ by material structure, leading neo-Gramscian Mark Rupert instead says that structure governs agency ‘in the first instance’; that is, it conditions but does not determine (Germain & Kenny, 1998; Rupert, 1998). However, the distinction Rupert makes between ‘the last instance’ and ‘the first instance’ is not as useful as it may initially appear. The first instance may not invoke the notion of material life as an ultimately non-negotiable constraint, but we must still ask how long the first instance is supposed to last. How extensive is its influence, and how is it experienced? The implication is that the ideas of agents matter, but within limits strictly set by material conditions (see also Morton, 2006). Chapter 2 will show how this ontological orientation colours Rupert’s analysis of globalisation as an ideational phenomenon. A variety of closely related approaches eschew economic determinism and instead emphasise spatial change as the core part of globalisation. However, while one form of materialism is forgone, it seems that the spatial approaches still conceive of globalisation as a material structure which imposes itself on agents and their ideas. The core proposition of this perspective is that changes in spatial ‘structure’ and the human experience of the world’s geography are deemed to have underpinned changes in other spheres. In practice, few political economists would consciously adopt this classification of their perspective. Some would choose the more ambiguous ‘transformationalist’ tag, discussed above. However, at the centre of the transformationalist argument is a belief that globalisation is essentially a spatial change, and as such a change in the world’s primary material structure. This understanding of globalisation is evident among theorists that identify with transformationalism, but also far more widely. As noted above, ‘transformationalism’ was christened by Held et al. in Global Transformations. The inference is that there has been a transformation

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of the old rather than simply a replacement of the old with the new. Transformationalism is therefore apparently less deterministic than the ‘earlier’ theories, in upholding that the new interacts with the old. However, it will be suggested here that this is not necessarily the case. Scholars influenced by the various spatial approaches, including Held et al., are clearly more eager to identify the activity of agents in the process of globalisation, but this does not mean that agency is a significant aspect of their explanatory schemes. This applies principally, of course, to explanations of globalisation but, as such, biases explanation in general where globalisation is treated as the context of political action. The definition of globalisation provided by Held et al. employs the term ‘time-space compression’, and accordingly refers to the ‘stretching’ of social relations once hindered by territory and distance (1999: 2–3). A global social space is said to exist and to have transformed previous forms of social, political and economic activities, and therefore to have shaped change within the global political economy. In Global Transformations, Held et al. detail empirically the multifarious nature of social, political and economic changes associated with globalisation. They also note explicitly the debt transformationalists owe to the sociology of Anthony Giddens and Manuel Castells. Giddens’ and Castells’ analyses are different in many ways, but converge around the notion that globalisation is a spatial transformation. Giddens’ conception of ‘high modernity’ and Castells’ conception of ‘network society’ are both, essentially, narratives about the emergence of the global, transnational or supraterritorial social space (Castells, 1996, 1997, 1998; Giddens, 1990). Although Giddens, Castells and transformationalists in general may accept that various manifestations of globalisation, high modernity or the network society are contested and contestable, what makes the process global is the spatial dimension of change – and, crucially, the nature of the global space is not conceived as contestable. The most prominent proponent of a spatial approach to globalisation among contemporary political economists is probably Jan Aart Scholte (although see also Rosenau, 1997). Scholte’s work best typifies the strengths and weaknesses of the spatial argument. Scholte uses the term ‘supraterritoriality’ to denote his understanding of the material structure of globalisation. This refers to the development of a social space not bound by territory and distance, with concomitant social, political and economic activities whose nature is determined by the nature of the supraterritorial space. Globalisation, then, is a process of ‘respatialisation’ (Scholte, 2005). Crucially, Scholte does not believe that the spatial change is the only structural change to have occurred in the late twentieth century within the global political economy; he refers also to changes within production, knowledge, governance and identity structures. What is more, change within these structures has occurred partially independently of the spatial change and has interacted dynamically with respatialisation (Scholte, 2005: 22–3). However, it is clear from Scholte’s work that the spatial ‘structure’

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has primacy over the others; space, in the last instance, directs social, political and economic forms. Furthermore, the process of respatialisation or supraterritorialisation is the only one to which no agents are attached by Scholte. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Scholte’s understanding of globalisation enables him to accentuate the open-ended nature of change in the global political economy. Theorists of the economic approaches imagine that certain economic forms necessitate specific political forms, but transformationalists, for example, understand the effect of space in a different way: the creation of supraterritorial space is imagined as a universal, existential change to which all other structures and agents must adapt, but specific instances of adaptation entail path dependency and an element of contingency. The fact that these theorists see globalisation as a spatial structural change rather than an economic one means that their work contains a different account of agency; that is, they are less inclined to argue that structure determines agency. Supraterritorial space is primarily the context of agency rather than a force that agents must cope with. Of course, the spatial approaches’ depiction of the economic and political processes that geographical change has necessitated is similar to depictions within the other perspectives, particularly the neoclassical approach (see, for instance, Giddens’ later work, 1998 and 2002, and in particular Peter Dicken’s Global Shift, 1998 and 2003). However, there is some room for agency, in that political and economic processes that result from globalisation can be embodied in various different social forms, which can be influenced by various ideological perspectives and result in differential outcomes. As such, theorists of spatial approaches acknowledge the importance of the ideational realm in responding to globalisation. The relationship between transformationalism and political philosophy illustrates this: David Held and Anthony McGrew, for example, straddle political economy and political theory; their account of globalisation is intertwined with their ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ perspective on how to respond to globalisation. However, although spatial approaches differ from the neoclassical approach in that they recognise the role of agents in shaping the global economy, this is on the basis of an alternative reading on what globalisation is. Once globalisation is redefined, the same force as a material structure is ascribed to it, as in the neoclassical approach. Therefore, there is no room within approaches such as transformationalism for the notion that agents are responsible for the construction of the material structure of globalisation and, moreover, that they may have been motivated by different conceptions of globalisation when engaging in political action. The ideas of agents matter in producing (normative) responses to globalisation, but ultimately any social, political and economic formations that result are epiphenomenal of an exclusively material process of change. Even neoliberalism, for instance, is seen exclusively as a response to globalisation, not as an influence upon the trajectory of globalisation nor the governance arrangements that have

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emerged at the global level (see Held et al., 1999: 144–50; Scholte, 2005: 39–41) – a clearly anachronistic proposition. The account of global governance upheld by spatial approaches illustrates the argument here. Scholte and Held et al., alongside other theorists within this camp such as James Rosenau, assume that international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and World Trade Organization (WTO) represent a global political system. This system occupies the supraterritorial space; it exists to regulate the social, political and economic activities that derive from globalisation, which traditional nation-states have been unable to contain or manage. This argument is essentially functionalist. It is assumed that, for instance, increases in world trade are a (largely inevitable) product of globalisation and that the WTO has been created to manage these increases (Held et al., 1999: 50–1, 175– 6, 182–7; Rosenau, 1997; Scholte, 2005). Bureaucracy and regulation are assumed, following Giddens, to be essential features of modernity, so if a new global space exists within which modernity is experienced, there must be regulatory institutions equivalent to the state’s traditional role within national spaces. The possibility that governance arrangements are neither global nor regulatory is seemingly not considered by transformationalists. The influence of the spatial approaches is clearly evident even in the most popular ‘critical’ works on international institutions. Rorden Wilkinson and Stephen Hughes, for instance, preface their account of the development of global governance by stating that ‘the intensification of global political, economic and social interaction has generated pressures for a concomitant system of governance’ (2002: 10). ‘Intensification’ is of course a key transformationalist concept: it signifies a greater incidence of cross-border activity resulting from the development of supraterritoriality as an important development in its own right, while rendering the actual content of this activity subservient in explanations of outcomes in the global political economy.

Reclaiming the state Many of the most important contributions to globalisation theory take the form of attempts to reinstrumentalise the supreme agent of political science, that is, the state. Yet the significance of these contributions lies principally in an argument about ontology more so than empirical findings about the state, and they collectively offer far more nuance than the ‘sceptical’ label suggests. As such, it is unfair to reduce these contributions to an argument about the state – even if the contributors themselves comply with this narrative. Indeed, the reclamation of the state has varied theoretical origins, including realist international relations (IR) theory, historical and sociological institutionalisms, critical theory and comparative political economy. The summary provided here is by necessity brief,

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but extensive enough to suggest that, while many of the theorists discussed here reject overt structuralism, they do not eschew materialism. Therefore they maintain the notion that the agents acting upon structure are governed by their material reality – whether defined as globalisation or not – and that this reality is objectively knowable by academic observers irrespective of the ideas that agents have about it. The most well-known statement of the sceptical argument is Paul Hirst and Graeme Thompson’s Globalization in Question (1996). The book is explicitly premised on the objective of rediscovering agency within political economy analysis. In questioning empirically the reality of a single, global economy, Hirst and Thompson shatter the illusion that globalisation necessitates certain outcomes, like a transfer of power from states to economic actors. The empirical evidence provided by Hirst and Thompson has proved extremely important to the development of IPE as a discipline, which aims to discover the interplay of states and markets in the global arena. However, it is not the case that they successfully restore agency as an explanatory factor to political economy. They dispute the reality of globalisation as structural change – but principally from a realist theoretical perspective, meaning that the system of states is itself treated as a structural phenomenon. States, as political actors, are clearly present in the global structure; this does not mean Hirst and Thompson have demonstrated that states have the power or autonomy to mitigate, let alone author, sui generis structural constraints. Furthermore, asserting the hypothetical agency of certain actors does not mean that the integral part actually played by agents in the global political economy – whether or not depicted as globalised or globalising – is being appreciated, let alone explained. Despite the notoriety of Globalization in Question, it is probably fair to say that it is quite unrepresentative of the state’s reclaimers. Contemporary political economists tend to follow Susan Strange’s advice that states versus markets is not a case of either/or (Strange, 1988). Specifically, accounts of globalisation that emphasise the role of both states and global or transnational economic forces, which reject realism as a theoretical approach, are now more prevalent. Perhaps the most significant attempt to conceptualise the state’s role in conditions of globalisation is Philip Cerny’s work on ‘the competition state’. In advancing his thesis, however, Cerny drifts fairly close to neoclassical theory. Cerny accepts the edict of some globalisation theorists that the state has become ‘structurally problematic’. The traditional exercise of power by states, domestically and internationally – typified by the notion of sovereignty – is no longer evident, as state institutions have become internationalised, orienting their activities around the need for countries to compete in the global economy (Cerny, 1990, 1995). In later works, especially, Cerny is adamant that nationstates remain ‘a crucial building-block’ of globalisation (2000: 456). Cerny has claimed that his state theory is ‘structurationist’, in that it permits both structure

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(globalisation) and agency (states) a place in its analytical framework. Several criticisms of Cerny’s work are possible. First, he is generally too close to a ‘hyperglobalisation’ or neoclassical account (Phillips, 2005c; Watson, 2005). His reading of global economic structure is primarily economistic and, while he accepts the persistence of nation-states, he argues that state institutions have been transformed almost beyond recognition by exogenous market forces. Second, he does not actually devote much time to detailing the creative capacity of states; the thrust of his work is detailing how states have reacted to economic change. While perhaps sufficient to demonstrate that states still matter, and perhaps a fairly accurate description of some instances of state behaviour, this surely does not amount to a synthesis of structural and agential explanations (see Hay, 2002a: 384–5). Third, Cerny assumes that states and agency are synonymous. Fourth, assuming that Cerny’s approach is able to identify meaningful state action, Cerny’s explanations for such action are excessively materialist. Given that he does not investigate the ideas and perceptions of agents, his only answers to why agents behave in certain ways rely on his own account of their material structural context. His work does not allow for the possibility that different agents possess different conceptions of globalisation, or structural change in the global political economy, and act on the basis of these conceptions, and of ideas not derivative of their location in the material structure of globalisation. John Hobson and M. Ramesh’s alternative ‘structurationist’ approach refers more to the creative role of agents than Cerny’s. Hobson and Ramesh (2002) argue that ‘globalisation makes of states what states make of it’. They explicitly reject any association with the realism of Hirst and Thompson (2002: 7), but nevertheless offer an account which emphasises the state’s capacity to shape international economic processes. Hobson and Ramesh criticise the theorising of their contemporaries on the state and globalisation – whether structuralist or agent-centric – for three main reasons: first, a zero-sum conception of power, where either domestic or international forces are deemed to be powerful at the other’s expense; second, a latent reductionism, whereby structural change, or the lack of it, is explained with reference to one principal factor; third, a spatial separationism, whereby the national and international or global realms are assumed to be distinct. For Hobson and Ramesh, this feature contravenes the solution to the ‘levels of analysis’ problem that the concept of globalisation is supposed to offer (2002: 7). Hobson and Ramesh offer a ‘both/and’ logic in place of binary ‘either/or’ logic when addressing which has more power: state as agent or transnational socio-economic forces as structural context. States are themselves socio-economic forces and therefore work through structure, refining their capacities, strategies and even their objectives as they encounter supposedly exogenous phenomena, and in return helping to shape the process of globalisation partly

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in their own image. It is on this basis that agency matters to explanations of outcomes, including structural change. They describe the ‘spatially promiscuous’ state, which is embedded in and shaped by both domestic and international social forces. Crucially, they are happy to endorse the view that international social forces are increasingly prominent and to apply the term globalisation to this phenomenon as a descriptive concept. They actually associate their reading of globalisation with the spatial change argument and Scholte’s ‘supraterritoriality’ concept in particular – while avoiding reducing any explanation of change to supraterritoriality. States, for Hobson and Ramesh, have ‘reflexive agential power’. Whether successfully or not, they work ‘through’ rather than ‘against’ domestic and international social forces; these forces necessarily restrict certain forms of agency, but are ultimately permeable. The strategies chosen by states will accordingly shape their context – including the global architecture or the process of globalisation – and their ability to shape their context. Closely related to Hobson and Ramesh’s perspective is the work of Linda Weiss. The most complete statement of her views, The Myth of the Powerless State (Weiss, 1998), demonstrates that Weiss probably belongs in the same wing of sceptical theorising as Hirst and Thompson, as she rejects what she calls ‘the globalisation hypothesis’ precisely because she disputes the assumed impact of global market forces on state capacity. However, Weiss’s account is more nuanced. For Weiss, although there has been significant change on a global scale, change has come in a multiplicity of forms; its variability means that its effects are more limited and less immutable than we think (2006: 533). Like Hobson and Ramesh, Weiss abandons the generalised notion of ‘state capacity’ and argues instead for capacities (1998: 3–4). In some ways, therefore, the processes associated with globalisation may contain ‘an enabling logic’; that is, they serve to encourage the expansion of some functions of the nation-state, as Weiss outlined in a 2006 article: Enablement implies that in the face of relatively similar globalisation pressures, there are countervailing pressures on government and, often, political incentives to intervene. One can therefore explain the state’s room for manoeuvre in terms of the dual logics of global capitalism – not simply limiting, but offering scope for policy choice by virtue of the pressures felt by particular social constituencies, the corresponding demands they place on governments, and the political incentives for policy responses. (Weiss, 2006: 534) Whether the above passage really characterises what states are doing is debatable; there is obviously a danger with any generalisation, including those from the sceptical perspective – Weiss acknowledges this. The major point is that

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states must be seen as active, not passive. This line of argument was present in a more limited form in The Myth of the Powerless State, in which Weiss suggested states may be acting as ‘midwives’ or ‘catalysts’ for globalisation, either through pursuing liberalisation of economic border controls or by using collaborative power arrangements to increase real control of their economies (Weiss, 1998: 204–11). Weiss actually contrasts her work with Hirst and Thompson’s in this regard. Whereas Hirst and Thompson maintain the viability of sovereignty and therefore dismiss the importance of supranational political organisations, Weiss shows that some instances of supranationalism increase the power of states even whilst undermining their sovereignty (1998: 10–11). Not all so-called sceptics have sought simply to argue that the state retains power over or despite the global economy. Some have instead sought to repudiate globalisation by ‘socialising’ economics. Peter Hall’s comparative institutionalist approach showed that national-level structures determine the nature of a national economy’s interaction with international economic activity (see Hall, 1986). Economist John Helliwell’s studies of economic activity in North America argue along similar lines, demonstrating that national borders still impact upon the extent and nature of international trade even where policy barriers are removed (see Helliwell, 2000; also Zysman, 1996). Governments, therefore, may have greater power than they realise. Finally, Winfried Ruigrok and Rob van Tulder (1995) conducted research on industrial restructuring, concluding that the notion of globalised, borderless firms is too simplistic; instead we have firms shaped by their origins and their relationships with nation-states. Taking inspiration from the broader comparative and institutionalist literature, the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature also provides an important contribution to globalisation studies. The argument of theorists such as David Coates is that there is not a single global capitalist system, but rather various models of capitalism grounded in the evolution of national economies. In fact, capitalism itself is not a universal process, but rather a complex set of social and economic processes that operate differently in different countries and regions. Of course, these models are not hermetically sealed, and in ‘globalisation’ we see the latest form of interaction between economic systems (Coates, 2000; see also Coffey & Thornley, 2009; Hall & Soskice, 2001). The perspectives discussed in this section represent a broad spectrum of political economy approaches to globalisation. Whether any are deemed successful in achieving certain theoretical or empirical objectives, what is clear is that none attempt to eschew the materialist bias. The reinstrumentalisation of agency and the discovery of homogeneity essentially involves identifying the fact that states act, or have the power to act, within the global structure, however defined. Some scholars will attribute more power to political actors than others, on the basis of different approaches to who the most relevant agents are, how

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power is exercised and how material, structural conditions are experienced (i.e. whether mediated by institutions). Yet in accounting for the action that agents actually undertake in relation to globalisation, material structural context remains a more important explanatory variable than factors relating to the agent’s subjectivity or perceptions of their context. Myriad attempts to refute or reconceptualise globalisation, or even replace the concept with some other reading of material, structural change offer an important set of challenges to the globalisation orthodoxy, but do not challenge the materialist bias of globalisation studies. It would be impossible to determine which came first: the pervasive view that globalisation is a material structure or a tendency towards materialism which shapes the emergence of a new analytical concept for understanding change. For disciplines like IPE, the two are mutually reinforcing. Among political economists more generally and certainly across the social sciences as a whole, ontological heterodoxy is more common. Yet globalisation seems as yet largely impervious to material/ideational synthesis.

The third wave While the chronological connotations of the wave thesis are rejected here, the ‘third wave’ label is vital for understanding Colin Hay’s contribution to globalisation studies. Like Hirst and Thompson’s work – that is, the ‘second wave’ – Hay believes that the extent of globalisation is an empirical question. Yet he goes further by also asking how the idea of globalisation is used by certain actors in order to justify or legitimise change. This narrow focus has, however, been significantly broadened since Colin Hay’s original work on globalisation discourse in British politics; the work of Hay, and others, now appears to constitute a more comprehensive attempt to document the role of the concept of globalisation in how agents interpret their material structural environment and how different understandings of globalisation give rise to different policy decisions. In addition to Hay’s work, this section will discuss the work of Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan.

Discourse and duplicity Hay’s work has provided valuable counter-evidence to the notion that global economic forces constrain national governments or lead to policy homogenization (Hay, 1998, 2002c; Hay & Watson, 1998, 1999; Hay & Smith, 2005). He has argued in fact that economic trends suggest Britain is undergoing ‘de-globalisation’ or at least ‘Europeanisation’, in contrast to globalisation (Hay, 1998; Hay & Smith, 2005: 128). In addition, like much of the work discussed above, Hay’s work is premised on restoring agency to the globalisation debate.

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Globalisation is too often presented as ‘a process without a subject’, that is, a process of structural change exogenous to any particular instances of political agency (Hay, 2002a). With David Marsh, he has attempted to ‘put the “P” back into IPE’. This includes rejecting the structuralism of realism as an analytical framework as well as the economism of the ‘first wave’ of theorising on globalisation (Hay & Marsh, 1999). Furthermore, Hay believes the ideational realm is a key factor in successfully synthesising structural and agential explanations. Agents’ ideas about the material structural environment shape their political action. As such, ‘ideas about globalisation may come to exert a powerful causal effect independent of the process they purport to represent’ (Hay, 2002a: 380). Hay therefore rebukes the materialist and ‘empiricist’ orientation of both the first and second waves: something quite significant is lost in this overly restrictive emphasis upon material indices of globalisation ... rigorous empiricism leads [the sceptical approach] to fail adequately to consider the way in which globalisation comes to inform public policy-making. (Hay & Rosamond, 2002: 148) Hay’s initial contribution to the globalisation debate came in the form of demonstrating that New Labour upheld inaccurate ideas about globalisation; that is, he contrasted New Labour’s reading of globalisation with his own, more sceptical analysis. Whether true or not, however, the globalisation thesis has ‘truth effects’ as agents remake their world through policies they believe they are compelled to adopt: It is the political discourse of globalisation rather than globalisation per se ... that summons the inexorable ‘logic of no alternative’ in terms of systematic welfare retrenchment, wholesale labour market deregulation and fiscal conservatism writ large ... it is the political deployment of the discourse of no alternative ... that is the most significant factor in restricting the parameters of that considered politically and economically acceptable. (Hay & Watson, 1998: 812; see also Hay, 1997, 1998, 1999) Although not necessarily entirely absent in his earliest contributions to the globalisation debate, Hay has moved towards a broadly constructivist approach to ideas, particularly in collaboration with Ben Rosamond (Hay & Rosamond, 2002; see also Hay, 2002a; Rosamond, 1999; and Chapter 2 of this book). Agents are shown to genuinely believe that globalisation is true; what they believe is therefore more important for understanding outcomes than determining whether their beliefs are in fact true.

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This perspective has led to a large amount of valuable empirical research on globalisation discourse. The main focus has been the British government but, in collaboration with, firstly, Rosamond and, secondly, Nicola Smith, the globalisation discourse of the European Union (EU) and several other West European governments has been examined. The main thrust of Hay’s work in this regard has been detailing New Labour’s acceptance of ‘the logic of no alternative’, or globalisation as a non-negotiable, external economic constraint, reflected in the power of global market forces and perfect capital mobility. Globalisation, therefore, is an idea which depicts a social reality in which, firstly, the predominant line of causation runs unequivocally from the economic to the political. Politics must always follow where the market leads. And secondly, following logically, the state must not, or cannot, interfere with the perfect function of the global market (Hay & Watson, 1998: 817; see also Hay, 1997, 1998). With Ben Rosamond, in 2002, Hay looked in more detail at how different agents (in this case, national governments) articulate globalisation and its effects. Again, they found that the dominant discourse in Britain was one which depicted globalisation as an exogenous economic phenomenon, a constraint upon public policy at the national level. It is also deemed an unambiguously positive development. Hay and Rosamond say that this discourse is found principally in the Blair government’s discourse in relation to domestic economic policy. However, they also discovered a range of alternative discourses. Most importantly, they found that the Blair government upheld a different view of globalisation in relation to foreign economic policy. Here, in order to justify trade liberalisation (which will produce further globalisation), globalisation is depicted as positive but also contingent upon the political choices made in forums such as the WTO. Additionally, Hay and Rosamond found that globalisation was often presented as negative (principally in France), in that it produces homogeneity, thereby damaging national cultures. In this way the globalisation concept is associated with Americanisation, in a cultural sense, in addition to global market forces. Throughout Western Europe, including France, Hay and Rosamond also found the economic process of globalisation associated with negative consequences, and contrasted with the more benign process of Europeanisation. In each of these discourses, the notion of ‘what globalisation is’ is fairly stable; the differences concern immutability, or whether the process has negative implications. Hay and Rosamond conclude by suggesting the political conditions in which government are most likely to appeal to globalisation. Chief among them is: Where left or centre-left administrations are engaged in a process of reforming popular social democratic or social market institutions the appeal to external economic constraints is more likely. (Hay and Rosamond, 2002: 163)

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This is an intriguing possibility: globalisation discourse may be a product of the left or, perhaps more precisely, the left’s perceived need to find accommodation with neoliberalism. The point is slightly undermined, however, by a further hypothesised condition: Where globalisation has positive associations and connotations (as in Britain and Ireland). (Hay and Rosamond, 2002: 164) Hay and Rosamond do not ponder where such positive connotations might have come from in the first place. Is this another discourse of globalisation, antecedent to the globalisation discourse upheld, for instance, by the Blair government? This is essentially an empirical question, but it seemingly lies outside the scope of Hay’s inquiry. With Nicola Smith, in 2005, Hay compared the globalisation discourse of the governments of Britain and Ireland. Their most important finding was a third discourse articulated by the Blair government. In addition to the dominant discourse, related to domestic economic policy, and the secondary discourse related to trade liberalisation, Hay and Smith found that, in relation to aid and development policy, globalisation’s positive nature was called into question. Globalisation, they argue, was treated as potentially positive for all countries, but it needs to be made positive through socialisation or better management in developing countries. This discourse seemingly concurs, therefore, with the World Bank’s post-Washington Consensus and the ‘good governance’ agenda. The Irish government was also shown to uphold a range of discourses of globalisation, relating to a range of policy settings. Hay’s opinion on why different agents have different ideas about globalisation, or why different agents present different ideas at different times, is dependent on his view of strategy. He refers consistently to the strategic context within which the agent is operating. At the national level, for instance, the Blair government needed to present globalisation as irresistible to justify policy positions such as reducing corporation tax. At the international level, however, globalisation needed to be presented as in jeopardy in order to justify liberalisation, which would maintain the trajectory of globalisation (see Hay & Smith, 2005). Assuming Hay and his co-authors are right about the strategic imperatives faced by the Blair government, some questions remain: first, does this mean that any discourse of globalisation is simply strategic – and if so, from where do the policy objectives served by discourses of globalisation arise? Are they separable from the discourse? If not, at what point does strategy influence the agent’s ideas – in other words, is there an extra-strategic element to the invocation of the concept of globalisation? There is plenty of evidence, in both his theoretical and empirical work, to suggest that Hay does not accept the materialist notion of economic interests as the source of ideational phenomena,

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but these are questions never systematically addressed by Hay’s contributions to the globalisation debate. Moreover, the emphasis on strategy appears to problematise the argument, frequently put by Hay, that agents such as New Labour genuinely believe that globalisation is happening, and that it is both inevitable and positive. As such, some references to globalisation are deemed ‘disingenuous’ or ‘duplicitous’ (Hay, 2002b). Hay and Rosamond argue that some references to globalisation are merely ‘useful’; in this sense globalisation discourse helps ‘in legitimating strategy pursued for quite distinct ends’ (Hay & Rosamond, 2002: 148). Given Hay’s earlier work in demonstrating the empirical inaccuracy of the globalisation thesis, it appears that, for Hay, agents such as New Labour are at least to some extent aware that their discourse refers to myth rather than reality. While this is intuitively sound – agents have ideas but present them in different ways in different contexts, partly influenced by strategic considerations – Hay’s concentration on this possibility means that the third wave does not adequately consider what the idea of globalisation actually means. To explore this further we need to assess exactly what kind of idea globalisation is for Hay. He and his co-authors refer almost exclusively to globalisation as a ‘discourse’. However, the term is rarely defined. The meaning of ‘discourse’ is briefly discussed in the article with Ben Rosamond. It is defined as ‘a structured set of ideas, often in the form of implicit and sedimentary assumptions, upon which actors might draw in formulating strategy’ (Hay and Rosamond, 2002: 151) and similarly ‘a cognitive filter frame or conceptual lens through which social, political and economic developments might be ordered and rendered intelligible’ (2002: 157). These definitions seem to contradict the notion that a discourse can ever be deliberately duplicitous, yet Hay and Rosamond maintain that discourse can be consciously selected, depending on the political setting. Of course, some ambiguity on the nature of the ideas being studied does not necessarily undermine the value of Hay’s empirical ideational analysis, and it would be naive to suggest that politicians’ communicative discourse is not influenced by strategy. The problem, perhaps, is Hay’s over-reliance on discourse as an analytical concept. Indeed, Hay has also argued consistently that New Labour is an adherent of neoliberalism (see Hay, 1997, 1999). He appears not to have systematically analysed the relationship between globalisation discourse and neoliberalism – though it seems likely that Hay is treating neoliberalism as an ideology. We can presume, therefore, that New Labour selects different globalisation discourses in different settings in order to justify different aspects of the neoliberal agenda. Hay and Smith (2005) explicitly say this is the reason for the apparent leftwards shift in New Labour’s globalisation discourse in relation to development policy. It is tempting to conclude, here, that the reason Hay privileges discourse at the expense of ideology is that he never entirely divorces the third wave from

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the objectives of the second wave, that is, the argument that globalisation is an erroneous reading of change. This does not mean that Hay is not right to maintain that some accounts of globalisation may be empirically inaccurate. However, it is surely necessary to distinguish analytically the analysis of globalisation as a material phenomenon, and the analysis of the ideas used by real-world political actors in producing outcomes in political economy (even where these ideas are themselves are influenced by the analyses of social scientists). Hay’s work produces significant insights into the real-world life of the idea of globalisation, but does not fully develop a theoretical framework for its systematic analysis – perhaps due to the third wave’s lingering concern with criticising real-world political actors for believing in globalisation in the first place.

Imagined economies Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan are associated, loosely, with post-structuralism. Cameron is a geographer, while Palan identifies strongly with IPE. Their 2004 book The Imagined Economies represents a major attempt to broaden the third wave. It is not difficult to see the similarities between Hay’s and Cameron and Palan’s contribution to the globalisation debate. Cameron and Palan are interested, like Hay, in assessing the ‘truth effects’ of globalisation discourse. The Imagined Economies opens with the story of Michael Bonsignore, then chief-executive of technology conglomerate Honeywell, who attempted in 2001 to merge his firm with General Electric (the merger was eventually blocked by the EU). Such mergers are for some scholars the ‘proof’ of globalisation – yet they are motivated by a belief in globalisation’s immutability. Agents such as Bonsignore, therefore identify a ‘meaning’ for globalisation from which they then extrapolate implications for the strategic futures of their respective organisations. They employ armies of analysts and consultants to help them predict and then prepare for a world yet to come into existence. (Cameron and Palan, 2004: 2) Cameron and Palan explicitly praise the work of Hay for demonstrating that ‘however over-simplified and dubious business globalisation theories may appear to the academic observer, they have nonetheless played ... an important role in shaping the institutional manifestations of globalisation’ (Cameron and Palan, 2004: 29). They credit the third wave with ‘a more reflexive and critical understanding of the nature of historical change’ and say, of The Imagined Economies, that ‘this book itself probably falls within the ambit of the third wave’. However, they are reluctant to fully identify themselves with Hay’s perspective. They note,

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in particular, Hay’s belief that it is possible to ‘demystify’ globalisation (see Hay & Marsh, 2000). Cameron and Palan elect not to adjudicate upon the material reality of globalisation, since any allusion to an ‘objective’ reading of material structure contrasts starkly with their opinion that representations of exogenous context are as important (within certain limits) as the real-world experience they supposedly represent. In keeping with the influence of post-structuralism, Cameron and Palan primarily depict globalisation as a ‘narrative’ rather than a discourse. The narrative is not constructed by agents; rather, it acts upon them. As such, the narrative ‘performs’ (Cameron and Palan, 2004: 84). Narratives are myths, associated not with objective fact but rather the subjectivities of the powerful. However, this does not make narratives any less real; in fact narratives give meaning, and therefore reality, to the exercise of power (Cameron and Palan, 2004: 3, 40–1). It is not the case, for Cameron and Palan, that reality is entirely discursive. Some narratives are more real than others, in the sense that they are more influential upon the social universe. Narratives must satisfy the partially extra-discursive criterion of ‘plausibility’: there must be some correspondence with actual human practice, so that the narrative may play a ‘mediatory’ role between our subjective thought-processes and the world around us (Cameron and Palan, 2004: 8–9, 88). As such, it may be that Cameron and Palan are in fact more forgiving of hyperglobalisation or transformationalist theorising on globalisation than Colin Hay. Indeed, they deny that their work attempts to ‘invalidate approaches to globalisation as an analytical or descriptive construct’. Instead, they simply contend that, contra earlier analyses of globalisation, ‘the more fundamental significance of the concept is the role it is playing in rewriting the collective imagery of society’ (Cameron and Palan, 2004: 6–7). It is its success as mediator, for certain groups, that accounts for its ubiquity. How do Cameron and Palan characterise the globalisation narrative? In other words, what are their empirical findings? It is important to note, initially, that the empirical scope of their inquiry is never specified. It is related only anecdotally to specific arenas or instances of political action. It is implied, however, that they are referring principally to the discourse of British and American political elites. Cameron and Palan’s central finding is an interesting echo of the spatial approaches discussed above. They of course do not argue that globalisation is a process of geographical change; rather, they argue that the globalisations narrative’s primary function is the reframing of space and time (Cameron and Palan, 2004: 57–9). All narratives entail a particular understanding of space and time. Accordingly, the globalisation narrative ‘opens up a multiplicity of spatial domains each characterised by different modes of social being and identity’. Globalisation therefore redraws the social map by depicting the emergence of new spaces with a unique social terrain, in which new

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forms of organisation are required (Cameron and Palan, 2004: 7–8). In terms of time, globalisation marks out an intelligible progression through time with universal resonance. The future figures prominently: globalisation is something which is ongoing, and a coherent image of the future therefore structures our present (Cameron and Palan, 2004: 9–10). Cameron and Palan’s main focus is not images of human geography but in fact images of economic change. A specific orientation to space and time helps to constitute the globalisation narrative, but its main implication, as for Hay, relates to our perceptions of economic compulsion. As the title of their book suggests, they argue that notions of economic space have been re-imagined by the globalisation narrative. As such the economic imaginary is matted with the geographical. Globalisation means the predominant imaginary of the Westphalian era, that of a binary distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ economic space, has been replaced. Not simply, however, by a single global economy – that is, an extension of the ‘inside’ – but rather three new economies occupying distinct spatial domains. First, ‘a placeless globality, the offshore or virtual economy, global in scope and instantaneous in effect. Second, ‘a near globality’, the national or private economy, where most people imagine that they actually live. This economic form is subservient to the first, as national economies aim to become competitive in serving the global economy, through discipline and flexibility. Finally, ‘an anti-globality’, the peripheral economy and realm of the socially excluded. The exclusion zone has become cut off from the operation of the global economy, and thus its dehumanised inhabitants must be retrained so they may join the realm of competition; providing sustenance for their current way of life is not in their own interests (Cameron and Palan, 2004: 15–22). For Cameron and Palan the discourse of social inclusion and social exclusion has as such become constitutive of the globalisation narrative – perhaps further evidence in support of Hay and Rosamond’s suggestion that globalisation has most connotation for centre-left political actors. Overall, globalisation narrates the arrival of post-national economics. It is not happening in other countries, it is at once everywhere but nowhere. As such it matters that it is global, as this evokes the notion that the global market is intangible to any political jurisdiction. Hay and his co-authors did not explore the connotations of globality seemingly inherent in globalisation discourse. Perhaps the most striking element of Cameron and Palan’s empirical analysis of the globalisation narrative is the new role prescribed to the state. This issue is of course also important to Hay’s analysis, but is explored in greater depth by Cameron and Palan. They argue that the image of the bounded, sovereign, territorial space of the state which equated to the imagined community of the nation is being replaced by

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a fundamentally different image of the state whereby the relationship between state, citizen, economy and polity is redrawn. To put it differently, the imagined community of the territorial nation-state, the dominant and perhaps constitutive imagery of political life in the past two centuries, is very rapidly giving way to a series of imagined economies which maintain the fiction of the state but situate it within a radically different set of boundaries and notions of social space. So the state continues to play a role: but it is a very different state. (Cameron and Palan, 2004: 17) The redrawing of the relationship between state, citizen, economy and polity they refer to here is the apparent relocation of the state into the economic realm. The state, in a material sense, has always been an economic actor or institution; now, however, it is exclusively economic, subject to economic logic rather than capable of reflexively shaping the economic realm from a partially independent vantage point, and able to relate to its citizens in only economistic terms. The development of global governance mechanisms such as the WTO is accounted for in a similar fashion. The WTO, among other international institutions, is not divorceable from the economy, and more specifically the global, offshore, state-less economy. As such ‘the purpose of the WTO as a whole is less to regulate trade per se than to regulate the behaviour of states engaging in trade’ (Cameron & Palan, 2004: 124; original emphasis). It is merely an institutional representation of the immutable, global economic space. This point goes beyond simply arguing that the WTO is hostage to corporate interests. Cameron and Palan are fully aware that, although the globalisation narrative has ‘very quickly taken a concrete form in institutional structures outside the state’, the state itself is implicated in these structures. It is therefore ‘seen to survive’, even to have been ‘rejuvenated’. Nevertheless it is left ‘profoundly altered’ (Cameron and Palan, 2004: 124–5). This argument about the WTO is extremely interesting, given that the Doha round of multilateral liberalisation has subsequently stalled, albeit with little or no effect on the UK government’s trade policy agenda – perhaps suggesting the disposability of the WTO to the globalisation narrative. A further empirical finding worth noting here is that the globalisation narrative, according to Cameron and Palan, has additional ‘covert’ narratives as well as the dominant narrative they concentrate on empirically. Multidimensionality is an innate feature of narrative construction. Specifically, the concept of globalisation has appeared in other guises within communal stories that predicted different futures. As the discourse has developed, we have witnessed a compression and repression of the history of globalisation itself, as ele-

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ments of previous stories subside or disappear altogether to make way for a new story that renders the current presentation of globalisation coherent with its past. But the institutional effect of the previous predictions is not lost; it is still with us in some way. (Cameron and Palan, 2004: 10) It is for this reason that seemingly new developments, like the rise of China or the challenge of radical Islam, can be incorporated into the globalisation narrative, as they echo previous elements of the infant globalisation narrative regarding the rise of Japan and the Soviet threat (Cameron and Palan, 2004: 11). Cameron and Palan recognise that there are a range of political perspectives on globalisation, yet note that there is a significant degree of ‘conceptual commonality’ regarding ‘what globalisation is’ among different perspectives (they do not refer to ‘agents’). In fact, they have not systematically investigated any perspective on globalisation other than the vaguely delineated elite discourse. Cameron and Palan accept of course that, in practice, the operation of narrative is variegated, subject to resistance, and that it has emerged slowly and changed over time. However, it is still treated as entirely dominant, and assumed to have itself been instrumental in transforming the political landscape of politics in Britain and the United States. The presence of ideational phenomena separate to the globalisation narrative is not investigated empirically. Take, for instance, the concept of ‘the market’. Obviously, this idea has a long, contorted genealogy; an implicit recognition of this enables Hay – among many others, as we will see below – to depict the idea of globalisation as related to liberalism or neoliberalism. Even if Cameron and Palan are right about the globalisation narrative, in order to appreciate how it is effective upon social reality, it may be that we need to account for the role of ideas antecedent or exogenous to the narrative – even where they are deemed complementary. From the perspective if this book, Cameron and Palan’s contribution to the third wave is constrained by the fact that references to the ideas of actual agents are sparse and anecdotal. In fact, we could say – albeit using terminology Cameron and Palan would never use – that agents appear only as ‘proof’ of the hypothesised globalisation narrative. This does not necessarily mean that Cameron and Palan’s empirical analysis is not extremely valuable: they discover the operation of large political imaginaries that may be missed by a focus on how ideas are used in strategic political action.

Conclusion This chapter has argued that the prevailing analyses of globalisation uphold the view that globalisation is primarily or exclusively a material phenomenon. Of

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course, some approaches to globalisation argue that agents are vital to understanding the globalisation process, yet do not fully consider that agency is often based on ideas about globalisation rather than simply the agent’s relationship to material structures. Moreover, for IPE in particular, rediscovering agency is too often synonymous with detailing the instrumental role of the state. The final section introduced analyses which have focused on the ideational dimension of globalisation, that is, work undertaken and inspired by Colin Hay, and Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan’s post-structuralist approach to globalisation. Chapter 2 will investigate in more detail the theoretical underpinnings of this empirical work. It can be noted here, however, that while each generates several crucial insights into globalisation as an idea, Hay does not develop a systematic approach to studying the meaning of ideas in practice (in part because he is motivated by critiquing the real-world actors that employ the idea of globalisation), and Cameron and Palan do not sufficiently concentrate on the instrumental role of agents.

References Bhagwati, J. (2004) In Defence of Globalization (New York: Oxford University Press). Burnham, P. & Elger, T. (2001) ‘Labour, globalization and the “competition state”’, Competition and Change, 5:3, pp. 245–67. Callinicos, A. (2001) Against the Third Way (Cambridge: Polity). Callinicos, A. (2002) ‘Marxism and global governance’, in D. Held & A. McGrew (eds), Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance (Cambridge: Polity), pp. 249–66. Cameron, A. & Palan, R. (2004) The Imagined Economies of Globalization (London: SAGE). Castells, M. (1996) The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell). Castells, M. (1997) The Power of Identity (Oxford: Blackwell). Castells, M. (1998) End of Millennium (Oxford: Blackwell). Cerny, P. (1990) The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency and the Future of the State (London: SAGE). Cerny, P. (1995) ‘Globalization and the changing logic of collective action’, International Organization, 49:4, pp. 595–625. Cerny, P. (2000) ‘Political agency in a globalizing world: Toward a structurational approach’, European Journal of International Relations, 6:4, pp. 435–63. Coates, D. (2000) Models of Capitalism: Growth and Stagnation in the Modern Era (Cambridge: Polity). Coffey, D. & Thornley, C. (2009) Varieties of Capitalism: New Labour, Economic Policy and the Abject State (Basingstoke: Palgrave). Dicken, P. (1998) Global Shift: Industrial Change in a Turbulent World (London: Sage). Dicken, P. (2003) Global Shift: Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the 21st Century (London: Sage).

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Dickins, A. (2006) ‘The evolution of international political economy’, International Affairs 82:3, pp. 479–92. Germain, R. & Kenny, M. (1998) ‘Engaging Gramsci: International relations theory and the new Gramscians’, Review of International Studies, 24:1, pp. 3–21. Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity). Giddens, A. (1998) The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (Cambridge: Polity). Giddens, A. (2002) Runaway World: How Globalisation is Reshaping Our Lives (London: Profile). Gill, S. (1995) ‘Globalization, market civilization and disciplinary neoliberalism’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 24:3, pp. 393–422. Gills, B. (2005) Globalization and Global History (Routledge: London). Hall, P. A. (1986) Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (Cambridge: Polity). Hall, P. A. & Soskice, D. (2001) (eds) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Hay, C. (1997) ‘Anticipating accommodations, accommodating anticipations: The appeasement of capital in the “modernisation” of the British Labour Party’, Politics and Society, 25:22, pp. 234–56. Hay, C. (1998) ‘Globalisation, welfare retrenchment and “the logic of no alternative”: Why second-best won’t do’, in Journal of Social Policy, 27:4, pp. 525–32. Hay, C. (1999) The Political Economy of New Labour: Labouring under False Pretences (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Hay, C. (2002a) ‘Globalisation as problem of political analysis: Restoring agents to a “process without a subject” and politics to a logic of economic compulsion’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 15:3, pp. 379–92. Hay, C. (2002b) ‘Globalisation, “EU-isation” and the space for social democratic alternatives: Pessimism of the intellect: A reply to Coates’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 4:3, pp. 452–64. Hay, C. (2002c) Political Analysis (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan). Hay, C. & Marsh, D. (1999) ‘Introduction: Towards a new (international) political economy?’, New Political Economy, 4:1, pp. 5–24. Hay, C. & Marsh, D. (2000) ‘Introduction: Demystifying globalization’ in C. Hay & D. Marsh (eds), Demystifying Globalization (Basingstoke: MacMillan), pp. 1–20. Hay, C. & Rosamond, B. (2002) ‘Globalization, European integration and the discursive construction of economic imperatives’, Journal of European Public Policy, 9:2, pp. 147–67. Hay, C. & Smith, N. J. (2005) ‘Horses for courses? The political discourse of globalisation and European integration in the UK and Ireland’, West European Politics, 28:1, pp. 124–58. Hay, C. & Watson, M. (1998) ‘The discourse of globalisation and the logic of no alternative: Rendering the contingent necessary in the downsizing of New Labour’s aspirations for government’, in A. Dobson & J. Stanyer (eds), Contemporary Political Studies, Vol. 2 (Nottingham: PSA), pp. 812–22. Helliwell, J. F. (2000) Globalization: Myths, Facts and Consequences (Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute).

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Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. & Perraton, J. (1999) Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polity). Hirst, P. & Thompson, G. (1996) Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge: Polity). Hobson, J. & Ramesh, M. (2002) ‘Globalisation makes of states what states make of it’, New Political Economy, 7:1, pp. 5–22. Kofman, E. & Youngs, G. (1996) Globalization: Theory and Practice (London: Pinter). Levitt, T. (1986) The Marketing Imagination (London: Free Press). Martell, L. (2007) ‘The third wave in globalisation theory’, International Studies Review, 9:2, pp. 173–96. Morton, A. D. (2006) ‘The grimly comic riddle of hegemony in IPE: Where is class struggle?’, Politics, 26:1, pp. 62–72. Ohmae, K. (1993) The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Global Marketplace (London: HarperCollins). Ohmae, K. (1995) The End of the Nation-State: How Regional Economics Will Soon Reshape the World (London: Simon & Schuster). Phillips, N. (2005a) ‘Globalization studies in international political economy’, in N. Phillips (ed), Globalizing International Political Economy (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 20–54. Phillips, N. (2005b) (ed) Globalizing International Political Economy (Basingstoke: Palgrave). Phillips, N. (2005c) ‘State debates in international political economy’ in N. Phillips (ed), Globalizing International Political Economy (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 82–115. Pijl, K. van der (1984) The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (London: Verso). Pijl, K. van der (1998) Transnational Classes and International Relations (London: Routledge). Robinson, W. I. (2001) ‘Transnational processes, development studies and changing social hierarchies in the world system’, Third World Quarterly, 22:4, pp. 529–63. Rosamond, B. (1999) ‘Globalisation and the social construction of European identities’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6:4, pp. 652–68. Rosenau, J. N. (1997) Along the Domestic–Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Ruigrok, W. & Tulder, R. van (1995) The Logic of International Restructuring (London: Routledge). Rupert, M. (1998) ‘Re-engaging Gramsci: A response to Germain and Kenny’, Review of International Studies 24:3, pp. 427–34. Scholte, J. A. (2005) Globalization: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan). Smith, N. J. (2005) Showcasing Globalisation: The Political Economy of the Irish Republic (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Strange, S. (1998) States and Markets (London: Continuum). Watson, M. (2005) Foundations of International Political Economy (London: Routledge). Weiss, L. (1998) The Myth of the Powerless State (Cambridge: Polity). Weiss, L. (2006) ‘Michael Mann, state power, and the two logics of globalisation’, Millennium: Journal of International Relations, 34:2, pp. 529–39.

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Wilkinson, R. & Hughes, S. (2002) (eds) Global Governance: Critical Perspectives (London: Routledge). Wolf, M. (2005) Why Globalization Works (New Haven: Yale Nota Bene). Zysman, J. (1996) ‘Myth of a global economy: Enduring national foundations and emerging regional realities’, New Political Economy, 1:2, pp. 157–84.

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Political economy and ideology

This chapter moves the book’s focus to theoretical approaches specifically oriented around the analysis of ideational phenomena. It argues, however, that none is fully able to consider the meaning and implications of the emergence of new ideas such as globalisation. The analytical concept of ideology, especially as understood by political theorists such as Michael Freeden, may be able to help political economy in this regard. Simply, most forms of ideational analysis influential within political economy fail to recognise the ideational realm as a sphere of agency. The chapter will argue that ideology enables this approach. First, however, it surveys the main forms of ideational analysis influential within political economy: constructivism, post-structuralism and neoGramscianism. Constructivism is an interpretivist approach. Its origins are in sociology; it became influential among political economists following John Ruggie’s work on the liberal norms embedded in the Bretton Woods institutions. Post-structuralism can also be classified as interpretivist, although not as straightforwardly as constructivism; as a perspective on ontology and epistemology post-structuralism has had an impact across the social sciences. More than any other approach which has influenced contemporary political economy, post-structuralism emphasises the primacy of the ideational or discursive realm over the material. Neo-Gramscianism was discussed in the previous chapter, but warrants a closer look here. It belongs more definitively to IPE and in fact was influential in establishing the sub-discipline. Neo-Gramscianism is not an interpretive approach but, through its emphasis on the role of ideas and culture in the conduct of hegemonic/counter-hegemonic struggle, it has acted as one of the main conduits for ideational analysis in political economy. In particular, the chapter will address attempts by neo-Gramscian theorists Mark Rupert and Andreas Antoniades to conduct ideational analyses of globalisation. While new ground for neo-Gramscian scholarship, these studies resist identification with the third wave of globalisation theory. To preview the argument in more detail, constructivism and poststructuralism consciously seek to eschew materialism. Yet, whereas many

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political economy approaches eschew structuralism but leave in place the materialist bias, constructivism and post-structuralism remain tied, generally speaking, to a structuralist ontology. This leaves post-structuralism unable to determine how ideational change occurs. Many constructivists, on the other hand, seek to detail the origins of change – and actually resort to materialist explanations as a result. Neo-Gramscians are keener than others discussed here – and their Marxist relatives – to demonstrate that ideas have an interactive relationship with agency. This may be the reason that neo-Gramscians are more willing to adopt ideology as an analytical concept. However, it remains an avowedly materialist approach, particularly in relation to what globalisation is. Therefore, neo-Gramscian analysis of the idea of globalisation remains significantly constrained by its view of globalisation as a process of material change.

Constructivism Constructivism is a relatively distinct body of theory – distinguishable not only from materialist or rationalist approaches, but also other forms of interpretivism – with a large number of adherents among contemporary political economists. Moreover, many scholars would endorse a general constructivist ontological position without necessarily consciously upholding a constructivist analytical framework. Here the focus is the fully fledged version, and as such the section will refer to the work of Emmanuel Adler, John Ruggie and Mark Blyth. However, it will also discuss Colin Hay’s attempt to re-articulate constructivism on the basis of a critique of the main thrusts of constructivist political economy. Constructivists generally cling to the middle ground within the so-called third debate of international theory between positivist and postpositivist approaches (see Lapid, 1989). They are distinguishable from other approaches critical of positivism, mainly due to their acceptance of a material reality which is at least partly separable from the ideational realm. Less appreciated, however, is constructivism’s insistence on the importance of agency, or structure/agency duality. Constructivism rejects the behaviouralism of positivist approaches but refuses, unlike post-positivist approaches such as post-structuralism, to ‘decentre the subject’. However, the authenticity of this orientation will be questioned here, and the section will argue that constructivism’s problematic position on the material/ideational relationship hinders its ambition of providing synthesis between structural and agential explanations. Among the first and most comprehensive statements constructivism raison d’être as a form of political analysis is probably Emmanuel Adler’s 1997 article ‘Seizing the middle ground: Constructivism in world politics’. The article refers

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principally to the discipline of IR, but the ontological and epistemological position described has been extremely influential within IPE. It is surely no coincidence that constructivism emerged within IR as the (artificial) boundaries of the discipline were under attack from various perspectives derived from a range of social science disciplines (see Blyth, 2003; Ruggie, 1998). Adler states that constructivism’s most basic proposition is that reality is socially constructed by cognitive structures that give meaning to the material world. For Adler, the most urgent ontological task is distinguishing constructivism from post-structuralism. Whereas the complete independence from the material realm afforded to ideas by post-structuralism could be construed to mean that the material realm has no ontological reality – it is whatever we interpret it to be – for constructivism ideas are necessarily interpretations of something and therefore must relate to some material experience – not directly knowable without the mediation of ideas and perception, but which is nevertheless ‘real’. The notion of a material realm separable from the ideational realm in which structures and institutions are located is fundamental to constructivism. Adler says that ‘collective understandings provide people with reasons why things are as they are and indications as to how they should use their material abilities and power’ (1997: 322). For Adler, structures and institutions (like, say, anarchy and states, or capitalism and the class system) are socially and discursively constructed, but the material realm is not. It has an essential nature irrespective of our beliefs about it, which only determine our experience of material conditions, not material conditions themselves. John Ruggie’s approach is extremely similar, and more directly relevant to political economy. In detailing the post-war ascendance of ‘embedded liberalism’, notable especially in Bretton Woods institutions, he distinguishes a realm of ‘brute facts’ (e.g. warheads, population sizes, market shares, mountains) as separate from the ideational realm, made up of ‘shared facts’ and ‘subjective facts’. It is possible, according to Ruggie, for these ‘brute facts’ to act as ‘direct causal factors’ on human action: the point of a constructivist approach is to show how ideas created the conditions in which we allow our interests and intentions to be defined by these brute facts (Ruggie, 1998: 12–13, 22). So constructivism achieves material/ideational synthesis by maintaining the separateness of the two realms, while arguing that both contribute to outcomes. For post-structuralists like Marieke de Goede, this means that for constructivism, while human beings may discursively construct structures and institutions, thereby giving meaning to reality and their place within it, they do so based on impulses derived from material experiences (see de Goede, 2006: 6–8; see also, 2003). The problem is probably not as clear-cut as de Goede suggests, but the point about agency should be explored. Agency clearly matters to constructivists; Adler argues that it is ‘the innovators, the carriers of collective understandings who socially construct the alternatives, and the “proofs” that

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legitimate their choices’ that give meaning to material life by ‘producing’ structures and institutions (Adler, 1997: 338). Ruggie’s analysis of embedded liberalism is replete with conscious and purposeful agents, clearly bucking the apparent structural logic of international anarchy. However, it is possible that it is material factors which initially ‘produce’ agency, at least to some extent. In fact, Adler argues that, while the material realm ‘offers resistance’, the world socially constructed by human beings ‘is not entirely determined by physical reality’ (1997: 324). It is not clear, however, precisely how a social reality ‘determined’ by ‘physical reality’ to any extent is consistent with constructivism’s own professed ontological position on cognition. An assessment of Mark Blyth’s work on institutional change would aid the discussion on this point. Blyth is one of the main advocates of constructivism in contemporary IPE. His work is particularly important for demonstrating when agency matters; as such, Blyth concentrates on moments of structural crisis, in which agency becomes highly instrumental. This in fact concurs with the work of Ruggie, as Blyth recognises, in that Ruggie emphasises the instrumentality of agents in the aftermath of the Second World War. Blyth’s most important work Great Transformations (2002) assesses the role of economic ideas in institutional change – specifically the changing role of the state – during the twentieth century in the United States and Sweden. He is particularly concerned with the rise of neoliberalism as a distinct set of economic ideas. Of economic ideas, Blyth says: Economic ideas provide agents with an interpretive framework, which describes and accounts for the workings of the economy by defining its constitutive elements and ‘proper’ (and therefore ‘improper’) interrelations. Economic ideas provide agents with both a ‘scientific’ and ‘normative’ account of the existing economy and polity, and a vision that specifies how these elements should be constructed. That is, economic ideas also act as blueprints for new institutions. In sum, ideas allow agents to reduce uncertainty, propose a particular solution to a moment of crisis, and empower agents to resolve that crisis by constructing new institutions in line with these ideas. (2002: 11) Complementing this is the argument that actors’ interests are not given, that is, derived rationally from material structural context, but rather perceived in light of the age’s prevailing economic ideas. Interests are something to be explained through ideational analysis before they can be used to explain action (Blyth, 2002: 9). Blyth clearly adds to constructivism in several regards. Through the concept of ‘economic ideas’ he provides an analytical framework for constructivist political economy. He also successfully conjoins constructivism with comparative

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institutional analysis. His particular argument that interests are socially constructed also goes further than some constructivists in challenging rationalist or positivist assumptions. However, the dependence of Blyth’s work on the notion of crisis appears to create a number of analytical contradictions. He defines crises as moments when the economic ideas that sustain particular forms of state action no longer pertain. At such moments, uncertainty reigns and agents simply do not know how to act: The economic ideas upon which they have defined their interests have been invalidated. Accordingly, new economic ideas emerge, re-articulating the state’s proper relationship with the economy and restoring stability. However, Blyth seems to rely on material factors in order to account for where these new ideas come from. He identifies the agency of ‘key economic agents’, arguing that ‘in periods of economic crisis, it is imperative to attend to the economic ideas that key economic agents have’ (Blyth, 2002: 10; original emphasis). Blyth’s convincing empirical analysis shows that it is powerful, resourceful and organised business actors that play such a role. Although Blyth may be right about the distribution of power in capitalist societies, the implication of Blyth’s argument is that, with perceptions of interest overturned or invalidated by the crisis, the agency of these agents (which would include the promotion and dissemination of new ideas) is based solely on their objective interests, which are ontologically prior and exogenous to the ideational realm of perception. So the post-crisis paradigm, where ideas once again appear to be crucial determinants of interests, is in fact based ultimately on the material realm. Agents are therefore, for Blyth, able to render actionable their own, real self-interest when in certain conditions the opportunity arises. The implication for constructivism is that, when agents are shown to act instrumentally to transform their ideational context, they appear to be acting based purely on material factors. The possibility, also, that the structural crisis itself originates exclusively in the material realm is left open by Blyth’s analysis. Blyth’s work has been criticised by Colin Hay (2002), based partly upon Hay’s own work on economic crisis. According to Hay, despite showing the role of ideas in diagnosing the nature of, and solutions to, a particular crisis, Blyth maintains that exogenous material changes may help to explain why a particular institutional order becomes unstable. In contrast, Hay seeks to show how agents mobilise perceptions of crisis in order to justify particular courses of action (see Hay, 1999). He therefore wonders that, if Blyth is right about both the sources and resolutions of crises, ‘then won’t a materialist explanation of the rise of neoliberalism in the United States in the 1970s or Sweden in the 1980s suffice?’ (Hay, 2002c). Hay’s own contribution to constructivism will be discussed shortly. We have seen that, for constructivists, ideas – and particular ideational change – may be explained primarily by material factors. However, while this

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clearly has implications for constructivism’s position on the structure/agency problem within the ideational realm, it does not appear to lead logically to a structuralist position, which I suggested above may explain constructivism’s failure to adopt ideology as an analytical concept. It would be useful to refer again to Adler’s perspective here to explore this further. Adler ponders that, ‘if ideas affect physical reality and do not merely reflect it, is cognition grounded in the individual level or the social level?’, or, in other words, are the ideas upon which human behaviour is based merely a function of structural forces? (1997: 324– 5). His answer is that ideas – understood more generally as collective knowledge, institutionalized in practices – are the medium and propellant of social action; they define the limits of what is possible and impossible for individuals. Concurrently, knowledge-based practices are the outcome of interacting individuals who act purposively on the basis of their personal ideas, beliefs, judgements and interpretations. (Adler, 1997: 325) So, for constructivists, agents contribute to the ideational structures of which they and their contexts are constituted. It is for precisely this reason that the concept of ‘intersubjectivity’ is important to constructivism. For Adler, ‘the concept of intersubjectivity neither assumes a collective mind nor disavows the notion that individuals have purposes and intentions’; that is, intersubjective ideas have structural properties, but agency – and therefore ‘individual’ subjectivities – are fundamental to their composition (Adler, 1997: 327). However, this synthesis is difficult to uphold in light of the constructivist position on when agency matters. In distinguishing between the ‘shared facts’ (intersubjective or structural) and ‘subjective facts’ (agential) of the ideational realm, Ruggie is adamant that the principal focus of constructivism is the former. Adler, who referred to agents as ‘innovators’, says that innovation is most possible when agents are empowered by existing ideational structure, and indeed most effective when it serves to produce structural balance (1997: 322); therefore, the process of ideational structural change may be carried out by agents, but is best understood primarily as conforming to some logic based on existing and prospective structural order. Clearly, as Blyth’s work on economic ideas also shows, if ideational structure is deemed stable, the causal line runs from structure to agency. Only as innovators and post-crisis pioneers – that is, in abnormal political circumstances – can the line be reversed. Different explanatory factors of course assume varying degrees of significance over time, but surely the nature of reality – and thus an approach’s ontology – does not change. The fact that the subjective ideas of agents only really matter at times of structural breakdown, like the decline of Keynesianism for Blyth, suggests a

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structural bias. An ontological synthesis between structure and agency in the ideational realm would require the recognition that agents are never more or less active in the processes of creating, reproducing and transforming ideational structure; they may only appear so depending on the empirical vantage of the observer. So while constructivists recognise agents and their ideas, explanatory force belongs with ideational structure. In ‘normal’ political conditions, only ideational structure matters. Yet the struggle over ideas, by agents, is surely a key aspect of normal political life. However, by way of defending constructivism, it should be acknowledged that the approach emerged as a form of political analysis in order to emphasise the importance of ideas, which were being ignored or poorly treated, particularly in international studies. It could perhaps be argued that constructivist research agendas will inevitably concentrate on re-reading, as ideational constructs, the existing rationalist accounts of material structure which they find so unconvincing. This was the explicit purpose of Ruggie’s work, which was founded on a critique of regime theory, and also the related work of Alexander Wendt (1999), who spectacularly denounced the notion of anarchy as a material structure in international politics. It therefore may not be the job of constructivists to analyse the exercise of power by agents, only how this exercise of power is shaped by ideational structure, and thus agency only becomes part of the story of ideational structure (and the explanation of outcomes) in periods of structural transformation. Nevertheless, while no approach can be comprehensive, this orientation means that although constructivism may account for the role of ideas in many important regards, it seems inappropriate for studying the process by which an idea like globalisation has emerged, evolved and been contested in specific policymaking arenas. Colin Hay, whose work on globalisation as an ideational phenomenon was discussed in Chapter 1, is a critical friend of constructivism. Hay’s position on ontological issues is encapsulated by his ‘strategic-relational’ approach to the structure/agency problem. The strategic-relational approach upholds that action is strategic in that it is ‘intentional conduct oriented towards the environment in which it is to occur’, constrained and aided by a ‘strategically selective context’ which favours certain strategies over others (Hay, 2002c: 129). Hay also, however, deems the ideational realm as crucial to his strategic-relational approach or, in other words, to overcoming the structure/agency problem: While the language of structure and agency might at first appear to suggest an idea-free realm, a moment’s further reflection reveals that this is far from the case ...[S]trategy – in and through which an actor engages with the environment in which she finds herself – is an irredeemably perceptual matter, relating both to the extent and quality of the actor’s

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information about, and the normative orientation of the actor towards, the context in which she is situated. (Hay, 2002: 194) It is precisely for this reason, then, that he endorses constructivist institutionalism (see Hay, 2006). Other forms of institutionalism do not offer the same opportunities: rational choice institutionalism is materialist, and sociological institutionalism (emphasising that behaviour is driven by exogenous norms) is excessively structuralist. The same applies to historical institutionalism. Historical institutionalism is too concerned with institutional genesis, and assumes that the subsequent behaviour of agents is – through ‘path dependency’ – determined by the ideas constitutive of the institution’s formation. Constructivist institutionalism, in contrast, is concerned equally with institutional genesis and post-formative institutional change. However, Hay points out that existing constructivist research either reverts to materialism in accounting for institutional change or over-emphasises the extent to which ideational structure and therefore path dependency constrains agents. As such, Hay bases his own constructivism on a critique of particular tendencies within constructivist theory. For Hay, although constructivists do recognise post-formative institutional change, they tend to believe that change comes about through crisis. It is during crisis, so the argument goes, that agents become more powerful than the ideational (and institutional) structures which ‘normally’ govern their behaviour. Hay is insistent that the ideas of agents are as important as ideational structures at all times and that a full account of the social and discursive construction of reality must recognise this. Agents rely on subjective perceptions of their context and, furthermore, are orientated normatively towards their environment. Their desires, preferences and motivations are not a contextually given fact – a reflection of material or even social circumstance – but are irredeemably ideational, reflecting a normative (indeed moral, ethical and political) orientation towards the context in which they will have to be realised. (Hay, 2006) It seems, therefore, that Hay takes the ‘subjectivity’ part of intersubjectivity more seriously, ontologically, than is evident in the work of other constructivists. In fact, in Political Analysis, Hay distinguished between ‘thin’ and ‘thicker’ constructivism. Alexander Wendt, for example, is a thin constructivist, because of his ‘structural idealism’. Thicker constructivism differs because of its focus on subjectivity, enabling it to emphasise the open-ended nature of reality. In its thicker formulation, ‘constructivism ... despite Wendt’s “structural idealism”, both seeks and serves to restore politics and agency to a world often constituted

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in such a way as to render it fixed and unyielding’ (Hay, 2002: 201). Related to this, according to Hay, constructivist institutionalism too often ‘falls back on an essentially materialist appeal to notions of real or genuine interest’ (Hay, 2006). Often, of course, this is done in order to critique certain ideational structures, that is, to demonstrate their contingency rather than immutability. Nevertheless, it is an important argument. For Hay, there is a material world, but it is not extradiscursive, and it does not itself give rise to any interests prior to the meanings conferred on material experiences by the (subjective and intersubjective) ideational realm.

Post-structuralism Post-structuralism’s principal purpose is to demonstrate the ontological significance of ideational structure, that is, to demonstrate that ideas have causality through the way they influence or constrain human behaviour. The analytical focus of post-structuralism is, therefore, discourse, identities, representation, norms, myths, imagery etc. As such, post-structuralists explicitly seek to contribute the ideational analysis of structure to political science, in conjunction with a distinctive ontological position. Marieke de Goede, one of the leading advocates of post-structuralism in IPE, explains that ‘the questions of how certain meanings are fixed at the expense of others, how certain representations dominate alternatives, how the limits of political discourse are constituted, go to the heart of post-structural politics (de Goede, 2006: 5–6). The work of Michel Foucault is particularly important to post-structuralism. In addition to the concept of ‘governmentality’ (which will be discussed below), Foucault’s contribution to linguistics provides the initial impetus to post-structuralist ontology. Foucault questioned the notion that language is representative of ‘the real world’, arguing instead that meaning arises within language. It is systems of meaning that shape human behaviour, not experiences of material conditions (de Goede, 2006: 4). Clearly, this also provides fertile grounds for feminist scholarship, in line with the common argument that gender roles are discursively constructed rather than determined by biology – as such feminism overlaps with post-structuralism far more than any other approach (see Butler, 1990). De Goede has consistently stated (following David Campbell) that the purpose of post-structuralism is not to argue that the material realm does not exist, but rather to collapse the distinction between the material and ideational (2003: 80; 2006: 5). It is a point echoed by V. Spike Peterson. Peterson explicitly argues, however, that the point of collapsing material and ideational is not simply to arrive at a synthesis, but rather to privilege the analysis of ideas in understanding human organisation and thus outcomes:

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Post-structuralists understand language not as referential (words, signs name pre-existing ‘real’ categories or ‘things’) but as producing the meaning of categories and ‘things’ through processes of signification (involving stabilizations) that are embedded in power relations. As a condition of their actualization, language and social relations require some ‘ordering’ – some stabilization of the infinite possibility of differences, meanings and practices – that will afford mutual intelligibility and sustainable patterns of social activity. (Peterson, 2006: 121; original emphasis) As such, it is ideas that ‘produce’ reality, including material conditions. Collapsing material and ideational therefore privileges the causal significance of the ideational. De Goede denounces IPE for a materialist bias, both ontologically and epistemologically: Many authors still take the economic and financial domains as unproblematic or material starting points to their enquiries, and fail to enquire how financial knowledge, including statistics and indices, has been historically developed. Much of IPE thus remains wedded to a profound separation between the realm of the ideal and the realm of the real. (de Goede, 2003: 80) It is a critique she also levels at the discipline of International Relations, for which state sovereignty is a material structure, existing independently of the ideas and perceptions of human beings. As such, post-structuralism is certainly an important contribution to political economy. It directs attention to the ideational realm in ways not permitted by other approaches. Of particular interest is the growing body of work concerned with neoliberalism and the concept of ‘governmentality’. Wendy Larner, one of the leading advocates of such work, describes it as ‘neo-Foucauldian’ and explicitly contrasts it with a neo-Marxist analysis of neoliberalism. For post-structuralists, neoliberalism is a form of governmentality and therefore not simply ... a form of rhetoric disseminated by hegemonic economic and political groups, nor ... the framework within which people present their ‘lived experience’, but rather ... a system of meaning that constitutes institutions, practices and identities in contradictory and disjunctive ways. (Larner, 2006: 206) Simply, the ‘governmentality’ concept enables us to demonstrate how our lives are governed, even where ‘government’ functions are retracted or disabled, as

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prescribed by neoliberalism. De Goede notes that governmentality is the means by which interests and not just institutions are determined (2006: 9). What is becoming clear is that post-structuralists do not reject structuralism as an ontological position. The approach’s designation is therefore extremely misleading. Instead, what post-structuralists reject is actually materialism. They argue that material conditions do not cause behaviour, because our experience of the material realm is determined by emotion, culture, norms and discourse. Whether ‘post-materialism’ or perhaps ‘post-rationalism’ would therefore be a more appropriate designation is subject to debate. The main implication, however, is post-structuralism’s slightly awkward relationship with agency. As Wendy Larner actually confesses, ‘the governmentality literature has not paid sufficient attention to the politics surrounding specific programmes and policies’ (2006: 207). In rejecting the causal significance of material structure, as independent from ideational structure, post-structuralists also downplay the importance of agency as it is normally understood in political economy; that is, as the exercise of power. Although this is a simplification, post-structuralists do not locate power in agents, but rather in systems of meaning (or ideational structures), which in turn constitute agents. De Goede argues, following Judith Butler, that ‘[i]nstead of assuming a prior political agent that (individually or collectively) wields power (and discourse!) to serve its particular interests, it becomes imperative to enquire into the discursive construction of agency and interests themselves’ (de Goede, 2006: 9). As such, another important post-structuralist concept is ‘performativity’, referring precisely to the notion that discourse itself acts or performs (Butler 1997: 7– 13; de Goede, 2006: 10–11). Another way of conceptualising post-structuralism’s approach to agency is in terms of ‘decentring the subject’. According to post-structuralists, most (materialist) theoretical approaches entail rational, intelligent, interest-pursuing subjects. It is a view of human organisation that places human action at the centre, even if such action is deemed entirely determined by structural context (Gammon & Palan, 2006: 98). As suggested above, post-structuralists are concerned with how interests are constructed, and indeed how ‘the self’ is constructed, by ideational structure or discursive performativity. Thus the subject is ‘decentred’ analytically; itself an outcome, rather than a producer of outcomes. However, approaching post-structuralism’s relationship with agency from this direction allows us see that post-structuralism reintroduces the subject, albeit a ‘post-Cartesian subject, unlike his [sic] predecessor ... anchored no longer in rational understanding and self-consciousness, but in a dimension of himself that he cannot grasp’ (Newman, 2005: 119). Agency is therefore not abandoned, but the focus of inquiry is elsewhere. Post-structuralism is clearly extremely valuable as a form of ideational analysis. Gammon and Palan are surely right that there is ‘more to political

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economy than meets the eye’, and that post-structuralism has a crucial role in reaching parts of reality other approaches cannot reach (2006: 99). In relation, however, to post-structuralism’s treatment of agency, Jan Selby (2007) has offered a fascinating argument. He argues that post-structuralists have misappropriated Foucault by using his work to focus on ‘the “why” of modern power’. According to Selby, Foucault was not a ‘why’ theorist of power – in other words, he did not believe that analysis of systems of meaning in language or discourse (or ideational structure) determined why power is exercised in certain ways. Rather, Foucault principally understood his work as a critique of the liberal approach to analysing what power is, and how it is exercised, and therefore the liberal ideology founded on this approach. As such, his focus was ‘the “how” of modern power’. Selby argues, therefore, that Foucauldian analysis needs to be ‘situated within a theoretical framework that allows equally for analysis of the “why” of power’ (2007: 240). Selby offers Marxism, thereby suggesting that an account of material structure is required to appreciate the economic and political interests and the strategies and decisions related to the exercise of power. It does not necessarily follow that a re-evaluation of Foucault affects contemporary post-structuralism significantly – contemporary post-structuralists may well believe that analysing ideational structure is synonymous with asking ‘why’ questions of power, in accordance with their ontology, irrespective of what Foucault may have really meant. Nor does it necessarily follow, as Selby would surely accept, that Marxism is the only legitimate partner to Foucauldian analysis in this regard. However, the possibility that Foucault did not imagine that he was asking ‘why’ questions, if this terminology is appropriate, does suggest certain limitations in work based on his analysis.

Neo-Gramscianism Neo-Gramscianism is derived from Antonio Gramsci’s reinterpretation of Marxism, particularly his conception of ‘hegemony’. As we will see, neoGramscians do occasionally employ ideology to refer to ideational phenomena, albeit not systematically, and often interchangeably with a range of alternative terms. Essentially, Gramsci gives greater prominence than classical Marxism to ideational phenomena in his account of class struggle by showing how the capitalist class maintains its position through the legitimation of its power through civil society and culture; it is here where ideology operates, complementing the monopolisation of state power. Civil society is also therefore a crucial arena for ‘counter-hegemony’: The point is not to capture only the state, but also to create ideological legitimacy. One of the distinguishing marks of neo-Gramscian ideational analysis, therefore, is that the ideational realm is a sphere of agency –

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constructivists and post-structuralists tend to see ideas as simply structural. Yet they are also distinguished by their maintenance of the materialist bias, as discussed in Chapter 1. The interest of neo-Gramscians in ideas as upheld and expressed by actual political actors is demonstrated by the theoretical perspective of Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy (1997). They actually attribute Gramsci’s initial interest in the ideational realm to the social theory of Georges Sorel. Sorel developed a theory of social mythology, which according to Augelli and Murphy underpinned Gramsci’s historicist approach. Gramsci used Sorel’s analysis to show that human action is not rational in an ahistorical sense; rather, the very nature and purpose of agency is transformed over time in accordance with social myths (Augelli & Murphy, 1997: 26–7). Therefore, neo-Gramscian theorists are able to demonstrate that collectivities bound together historically by particular myths – and the individuals within them – are, themselves, transformed, that their ‘interests’ change, and that, as a result, collective actions that would have been predicted before the advent of the new collective identity often become less and less likely. (Augelli & Murphy, 1997: 28) It is not difficult to find similarities between such a perspective and that of constructivism or even post-structuralism. Augelli and Murphy thus argue that ‘motivating myths and ideologies’ are central to neo-Gramscian inquiries (1997: 28). The motivational function of ideas is very prominent within neoGramscianism. Augelli and Murphy state: We have analysed ‘myths’ in the course of examining the way in which social movements that could be considered ‘political parties’ have gone about a central part of their business. This is in keeping with Gramsci’s own use of the concept. Gramsci sees ‘myth’ as central to part of the business of political parties, an initial and fundamental phase of the formation of collective will, of making ‘I’, ‘we’. (1997: 29; original emphasis) They are referring to their own work on potentially counter-hegemonic actors – in the context of Gramsci’s concept of the political party, the principal agent of class struggle in civil society. Myths matter, therefore, because agents use them. The theorist who receives most credit for resurrecting Gramscian theory, and calling forth a neo-Gramscian approach within IPE and IR, is Robert Cox (1981). Cox’s historical structures approaches presents social reality as a fit between ideas, institutions and material capabilities; he argues that each must be understood to understand outcomes in political economy. However, Cox has

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actually distanced his work from the neo-Gramscian tag – concerned by, among other things, an excessively materialist ontology (Berry, 2007; Germain 2007; see also Cox, 2002). Although neo-Gramscians clearly do recognise the importance of ideas, the ideational phenomena in question rarely receive systematic attention, due to its materialist bias. Although the importance of agency and therefore the ideas possessed by agents is upheld, ultimately it is exogenous material conditions that create agency and the ideational realm. Agency is therefore assessed through a particular lens; that is, the extent to which it reproduces or challenges the established material order. It is not therefore the content or the carriers of ideas that matter, even when conceptualised as ideologies, but rather their status as hegemonic or counter-hegemonic. This is demonstrated by the main ideational analyses of globalisation by neo-Gramscians, discussed below. In short, these studies show how various ideas and political perspectives are involved in contesting the course of globalisation – but not how the idea of globalisation itself is variegated among different actors. Ian Bruff actually presents neoGramscianism as an advance upon the third wave of globalisation theory. He argues that the third wave is too reliant on a sceptical approach to globalisation (i.e. that of Colin Hay) or otherwise too close to the argument that ‘all is narrative’ (as presented by Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan). While Bruff thankfully resists temptation to declare a ‘fourth wave’, he concludes therefore that ‘neo-Gramscian theory can overcome the shortcomings of the otherwise praiseworthy third wave’ (Bruff, 2005: 261). However, if globalisation studies is categorised according to ontology rather than simply what globalisation is or perspectives on the state, neo-Gramscianism actually belongs to the first wave. Mark Rupert’s Ideologies of Globalisation (2000) is the most well known neo-Gramscian ideational analysis of globalisation and interesting for this book in particular due to its use of ideology as an analytical concept. The study is concerned primarily with American politics – although Rupert refers extensively to international institutions too. His contention is that different social forces within the United States attach different ‘meanings’ to the process of globalisation. He argues, however, that globalisation is happening or has happened in the sense that a single, global capitalism system has emerged. He employs ‘ideology’ as an analytical concept in order to describe the ideas upheld by these social forces. The Gramscian concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony are employed to classify different perspectives on globalisation. The hegemonic ideology is what Rupert calls ‘liberal globalisation’. The central meaning it attaches to the process of globalisation is the emergence of a single, global marketplace, in line with that ‘predicted’ by Ricardian free trade theory, and based ontologically and epistemologically upon an antistatist abstract individualism. According to Rupert, the reliance on free trade theory marks out the hegemonic ideology as ‘liberal’ – as such it is a slight

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departure from the hegemonic ‘neoliberal’ ideology of the 1980s. Potentially, this is an important finding; however, it is not explored, and in fact is contradicted by several references to ‘neoliberal globalisation’ elsewhere in the book. Nevertheless, Rupert certainly delves into the nature of the hegemonic perspective more than neo-Gramscians such as Stephen Gill. He argues that globalisation as a material process of change exogenous to agents is an objective fact, but demonstrates that the precise (albeit incorrect) ‘meanings’ attached to the process by agents are extremely important. However, Rupert does not in fact relate the hegemonic ideology systematically to any particular agents (this perhaps explains his carelessness regarding the liberal and neoliberal tags). Instead, he concentrates on detailing how this worldview is deposited into the fabric of organisations such as the WTO and the North Atlantic Free Trade Association. He does not specify how the ‘social forces’ of capitalism are represented in political action, at least not in relation to the maintenance of the hegemonic ideology. Showcasing the actual ideas used in the construction and maintenance of hegemony therefore comes at the expense of detailing the agents to which they belong, other than the reference to abstract social forces. The main counter-hegemonic ideology discussed by Rupert is what he calls ‘global democratisation’. He refers to various forms of left-wing resistance to liberal (or neoliberal) globalisation. As such, specific agents become more visible in Rupert’s analysis of counter-hegemony. However, Rupert does not actually demonstrate what ‘meaning’ advocates of global democratisation attach to globalisation. He notes that many place great significance on the emergence of global social movements and the possibility of reforming international institutions. We can perhaps infer that, in the view of these actors, globalisation is seen as social and political as well as economic, and that it is therefore possible to reshape the global economy on the basis of progressive values. However, Rupert does not provide any detail on this counterhegemonic perspective – and surely not enough to describe it as one of several ‘ideologies of globalisation’, except perhaps that it is a response to the material process of globalisation from a non-elite social force. Rupert also discusses farright political groups. His association of this perspective with globalisation is actually highly original (although see Robertson & Khondker, 1998: 37). Moreover, in this case he demonstrates that the agency of far-right political actors is related to a specific meaning attached to globalisation, distinct from the liberal/neoliberal meaning; that is, the threat to the American way of life from a tyrannical world government. However, this perspective is still treated primarily as a response to material globalisation. Ideologies of Globalisation is an extremely valuable study of contemporary American politics, but it is not a systematic study of ideologies. Moreover, although Rupert’s materialism is not necessarily problematic, his failure to clearly distinguish between globalisation

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as material reality and globalisation as a political concept with contested meanings means that his study does not in fact provide a systematic analysis of the ‘ideologies of globalisation’. Andreas Antoniades cites Colin Hay’s contribution to the third wave and claims that his neo-Gramscian analysis of globalisation discourse in Greece and Ireland ‘builds on and extends this earlier research’. However, he states explicitly that his work is not concerned primarily with ideas. Instead, his research concerns the political effects of globalisation discourse and, secondarily, the material factors that explain these effects (Antoniades, 2007: 311). For Antoniades, globalisation is a ‘hegemonic discourse’. As such it aims to define the common sense of society and thereby shape both agents and their environments. Like many neo-Gramscian theorists, Antoniades is influenced by post-structuralism, but clearly belongs in the Marxist tradition. He argues that globalisation, as a material process, is happening, exogenous to ideas about the process. However, Antoniades wants to show how ‘it is experienced differently in different countries and by different social actors’. He wants therefore to detail the different ‘translations’ of globalisation. Yet the meaning of globalisation discourse remains quite rigid. It is essentially a policy agenda, involving advocacy of privatisation, liberalisation of capital accounts, deregulation, labour market flexibility and corporate tax reform (Antoniades, 2007: 306–7). Antoniades is therefore not principally interested in the concept of globalisation and how it is used by agents – although this does form part of his empirical inquiry. Rather than investigating globalisation discourse itself, Antoniades instead seeks to assess how this discourse is ‘materialised’ in different political settings; that is, the extent to which the policy agenda is accepted, and more generally whether it succeeds in reshaping the nature of the polity. ‘Materialisation’ as an analytical concept originates in fact from Foucault’s work. Essentially it refers to the role of agents in producing or reproducing globalisation, since they actualise, through policy, the agenda prescribed by globalisation discourse (Antoniades, 2007: 307). The concept ‘materialisation’ is intended to signify that globalisation exists as a discourse exogenous to particular settings and requires the support of particular actors for reproduction. Antoniades’ research generates a large number of important findings. Having studied political parties, trade unions, business groups and the media, he found that in Greece globalisation discourse produced multi-level societal struggle. Globalisation acquired a heavily politicised and contested character. In contrast, in Ireland, globalisation was apolitical and became one of the fundamental ‘givens’ of political life. In practice, it appears that Antoniades’ research is highly concerned, perhaps even primarily, with how the globalisation concept is actually employed by agents, in relation to the policy agenda outlined above – especially in the case of Greece. To some extent, this undermines his research.

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He treats globalisation discourse monolithically and expects to find only different patterns of materialisation. Yet he finds agents not only shaping the material process, but the ideational dimension too – in ways that do not fit comfortably, we could say, in a neo-Gramscian framework of hegemony versus counterhegemony. Nevertheless, Antoniades is able, in relation to the concept’s use, to generate impressive insight. For instance, perhaps supporting one of Hay’s arguments, he found that left-wing actors in Greece associated globalisation with a loss of autonomy and control, and contrasted negatively with the more benign process of Europeanisation. He also argues that the concept itself was largely absent from Irish politics until 2000. He suggests that the concept is more visible when the process is contested – as it was in Greece, and only in Ireland after 2000 (Antoniades, 2007: 319). In this way he argues that Nicola Smith, from Colin Hay’s branch of globalisation studies, ‘over-emphasised the role and importance of the concept of globalisation in the Irish public discourse’ (Antoniades, 2007: 319; see Smith, 2005; also Hay & Smith, 2005). In this way he attempts to explain his otherwise contradictory focus on the concept in the case of Greece. On the basis of his profiles of the contrasting experiences of materialisation in Greece and Ireland, Antoniades then asks which material factors explain the differences. He considers ‘domestic structures’ (that is, institutions of government) and ‘political economy’ (that is, the relationship between state, capital and labour at the national level). He also considers a combination of these two sets of factors. Ultimately, by his own admission, his answers are inconclusive. He argues that three factors lying outside his explanatory scheme appear to resonate more than anticipated: 1) the contingent nature of agency, 2) path dependence, and 3) specific, ephemeral material circumstances – such as Ireland’s economic boom. These possibilities surely open interesting, if contradictory, lines of further inquiry. Yet Antoniades’ profound ontological commitment to materialism – as with neo-Gramscianism in general – appears to close other alternative paths, trodden by the likes of Colin Hay, and Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan. Again, overall Antoniades’ analysis emphasises the importance of agency. The ‘hegemonic discourse’ does not automatically find expression in policy outcomes but is established variably by political actors involved in political struggle – who go on to shape the material conditions from which the discourse derives. This is of course valuable in itself; but it does not represent analysis of the ways in which agents’ perceptions of material change actually serve to constitute the process of change. In this regard, Antoniades’ research clearly encounters significant intellectual boundaries. In the case of Greece he clearly discovers that agents have different perceptions of globalisation, rather than simply different approaches to materialisation, yet he elects not to investigate this finding further. Having forgone the superficial use of ideology as an analytical concept exhibited by some neo-Gramscians, seemingly in

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search of a more clinical form of ideational analysis, studying ideology would surely complement Antoniades’ research into this aspect of the process of globalisation and the operation of hegemony.

Ideology The argument here is that making the concept of ideology central to analysis enables an approach which balances ideational and structural explanations, and structural and agential explanations. Of course, ideology alone does not guarantee such an orientation – we have seen that others employ the concept even while asserting a materialist ontology. Similarly, it does not mean that this book seeks to incorporate all four types of explanation into its empirical analysis. The most effective use of ideology as an analytical concept is to document and assess ideas, obviously, but specifically how particular agents uphold and employ certain ideas. Crucially, however, it enables such a focus without necessitating the assumption that ideas trump material factors or that agents are more important that structures (whether ideational or material structures). Moreover, the understanding of ideology upheld here may in fact allow researchers to show with more precision how changes in material structural environments are interpreted by actual political actors and translated into action upon their environment. As argued in the Introduction, it is necessary to borrow from political theory in this regard. The definition of ideology offered by Matthew Festenstein and Michael Kenny (2005) suggests that ideologies marry interpretations of the world to views of how the world should be changed. Of course, ideational phenomena take many forms, or more precisely, could be viewed through various conceptual lenses, and it may not be necessary to employ ideology to demonstrate this relationship within agents’ perspectives. However, the most common definition of an ideology, that is, a suite of beliefs, points to the concept’s real value. Michael Freeden’s ‘conceptual approach’ to ideologies conceives of ideologies as ‘distinctive configurations of political concepts’ (Freeden, 1996). Concepts are ‘essentially contestable’ in a philosophical sense, but provided with ‘decontested’ meanings by ideologies. Crucially, for Freeden, different types of concepts serve different functions. Some may be critical to the ideology’s ethical standpoint, some may serve to locate the ideology in a given political context and some may provide an interpretation of socio-economic context. Within a given political context, ideologies will generally share a limited range of concepts. As such, it appears that ideologies overlap: temporally and spatially determinate arenas of political thought display the presence of most fundamental political concepts, while exhibiting

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variation and contention – and hence differentiating possibilities – over the specific mixture of the conceptual ingredients, and over the positioning vis-a-vis each other. (Freeden, 1996: 52) This commonality is also the main source of ideological struggle, a key ingredient of political life. Concepts will have an ‘ineliminable’ definition, but also a range of ‘quasi-contingent’ features, which specify exactly what the concept entails. It is the indeterminacy of the latter that makes concepts essentially contestable. The way these concepts are configured, their positioning, is the key to the meaning of an ideology: Political concepts acquire meaning not only through accumulative traditions of discourse, and not only through diverse cultural contexts, but also by means of their particular structural position within a configuration of other political concepts. Hence ideologies are none other than the inevitable macroscopic consequence of attributing such meanings to a range of interrelated political concepts. (Freeden, 1996: 4) According to Freeden, ideologies will invariably have a single core concept, providing ideologies will have a principal, foundational source of meaning. The ideological core is crucially necessary in the political sense of providing a protected and reinforced site in which to anchor a set of regulatory propositions about the social world. A core is consequently screened from indeterminacy and from being regressively undermined and it comes ... in the guise of non-negotiable assertion, or a logical ‘a priori’, an ‘if ... then’ type of statement that effectively transforms the ‘if’ into an indisputable fact or value. (Freeden, 2005: 5) The core gives rise to ideological ‘morphology’ through links to a series of adjacent concepts – adjacency is provided for by both logic and the cultural norms of the spatial and temporal context within the ideology is situated. Furthermore, and crucially, Freeden’s view on the relevance of ideology to politics and political action is illuminating: The political sphere is primarily concerned by decision-making... Thus while the very nature of political concepts lies in their essential contestability, the very nature of the political process is to arrive at binding decisions that determine the priority of one course of action over another... Ideologies serve as the bridging mechanism between contestability and determinacy, converting the inevitable variety of options

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into the monolithic certainty which is the unavoidable feature of a political decision. (Freeden 1996: 77; original emphasis) The relevance of this understanding of ideology for this research is clear. Globalisation is a concept used by an array of political actors in British politics, not least to explain what is happening in the world, to justify certain policy decisions or positions. Its meaning therefore seems to have become a key battleground in the politics of foreign economic policy. The subject of this research, of course, is globalisation discourse. As such it is necessary to reflect, albeit briefly, on the relationship between communicative discourse and ideology. The two are indistinguishable in that discourse is the product of political conversation between ideology-wielding actors; it is only separable from ideology analytically. However, ideology is similarly unidentifiable without discourse, in that to function ideologies must be communicated within the political community within which they exist. Globalisation discourse is a set of discursive practices related to the concept of globalisation (and its conceptual relatives). Some ideologies will have more influence over this discourse than others, especially if the concept in question is a core part of their conceptual structure. In engaging with globalisation discourse, it may be that other ideologies import meanings which originate in their ideological rivals. Yet concepts are never entirely the possessions of single ideologies. Other perspectives may attribute other meanings to the globalisation concept, which will be reflected in the discourse. Communicative discourse can of course be studied from various perspectives for innumerable analytical purposes. To study discourse using the concept of ideology is to investigate the wider meanings contained in the words and syntax employed, in particular how seemingly simple or innocuous language houses views of ontology, ethics, identity and agency. Freeden’s approach is particularly useful for showing how new ideas come to influence political action. Examples of neo-Gramscian analysis of ideology have been discussed above. Yet the concept of ideology is a noticeable absence from the main expressions of the constructivist and post-structuralist approaches. Constructivist methodology is extremely varied, leading to a lack of consistency regarding the analytical concepts utilised. This is surely due, at least in part, to the fact that constructivism’s identity as an approach derives from a (basic) ontological position far more so than any specific analytical framework. As such constructivism is a very broad church, appealing even to its critics, such as Colin Hay. It may be possible, however, to explain constructivism’s general treatment of ideology with reference to the ‘level of analysis’ at which constructivism operates as a form of ideational analysis. Theorists such as John Ruggie and Mark Blyth are clearly assessing ideas at a higher level of abstraction than the level at which this study operates, in that they do not inquire

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systematically into particular agents present in particular policy arenas. As discussed above, ideologies may form large families, but ultimately they are sets of beliefs and values upheld by political actors. Only by analysing these constitutive units can we generalise in order to posit the existence and influence of ‘an ideology’. As such, assessing an idea or concept’s ideological character helps us understand how it becomes relevant to policy-making. Constructivists are less interested in specific actors and instead seek to show how a particular idea (or ideas) shapes the context within which agents act. As forms of institutional analysis, therefore, Blyth’s and Ruggie’s work seeks to demonstrate the importance of extra-institutional ideas which, once established, serve to constrain political possibilities. Such ideas may be said, therefore, to shape ideological commitments. Blyth and Ruggie occasionally use the term ‘ideology’, albeit superficially. They also employ widely recognised ideological labels such as ‘liberal’ and ‘neoliberal’ to describe certain ideas, but essentially do not consider these ideational phenomena to be ‘ideological’ in any meaningful sense. Analysing ideas at a higher level of abstraction is not in itself problematic. Not all ideational phenomena can be classified as ideological, and there are a range of conceptual lenses by which ideational phenomena can be studied. However, it is possible that constructivism’s neglect of ideology derives from the ontological tendencies discovered above. A materialist ontology does not necessarily preclude the study of ideology, yet constructivism’s position on the material/ideational relationship appears to produce a structural bias. Although ideologies can be deemed to constitute (idealised) ideational structures from some analytical vantages, the point of studying ideas qua ideology is to demonstrate the importance of agency. Constructivists tend to argue that agents only become instrumental at times when ideas cease to matter, and material factors intervene to provide the rationale for new ideational structures. The concept of ideology encourages us to discover how the ideas upheld by agents evolve, as agents introduce new concerns to an ideological tradition, without discovering sudden ruptures in political culture. Agents do not abandon their existing beliefs and values when confronted with a new structural master, but instead incorporate new ideas in traditional systems of meaning. This is in part an empirical assessment, which may or may not be supported by the research undertaken in this study. Yet, at the risk of circularity, it is also an ontological position which at least partly necessitates a priori the adoption of ideology as an analytical concept. Post-structuralists rarely employ the term ‘ideology’, particularly in a meaningful sense. Wendy Larner has outlined the reasoning behind this neglect. For Larner, Marxist and neo-Marxist scholarship uses terms like ‘ideology’ rather than ‘governmentality’ precisely because they seek to portray prevailing ideas as merely representative of the material interests of a hegemonic political and economic elite. She sympathises with the ‘more capacious Gramscian conception

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of ideology’, in distinction to other forms of Marxism, but asserts that, in order to move definitively away from materialism, we are required ‘to move from Gramsci to Foucault, and from neo-Marxism to post-structuralism’ (Larner, 2006: 207, 209). Larner is obviously right about the materialism of Marxism and neoMarxism, and also that in political economy ideology is usually used as an analytical concept in accordance with classical Marxism – and therefore the ideational realm is too often treated as merely a veneer for objective, material interests. However, it may not necessarily be the case that theorists that uphold a materialist ontological perspective cannot study ideational phenomena, whether employing ideology as an analytical concept or not. Even on the understanding of ideology offered in the Introduction, it is possible to maintain that the origin of ideas, and the rationale for agents choosing particular ideas, resides in some ways in the material realm. Moreover, even if poststructuralists are justified in eschewing materialism, this does not mean the concept of ideology must be abandoned. Alternatives to the Marxist conception of ideology are possible. The reason post-structuralism rejects ideology is therefore not simply because of its association with materialism, but also because of post-structuralism’s structuralist bias. As demonstrated above, for post-structuralists the ideas of agents are not considered instrumental, but rather epiphenomenal of ideational structure. The concept of ideology is an imperfect fit onto this ontological perspective. There are examples of ideational analyses of globalisation inspired by Michael Freeden’s conceptual approach to ideologies. The most important has been undertaken by Manfred Steger (2002). Steger’s work on the ideational dimension of globalisation is centred on the proposition that there now exists, in the Anglo-American world, an ideology of globalism. Accordingly, Steger argues that globalisation, as a political concept, has assumed a crucial role in Anglo-American political culture. Yet it is unwieldy and essentially contestable – different ideologies will decontest the concept in different ways, by endowing it with peripheral ideational components, in order to interpret the world and determine how it should be acted upon in a comprehensible fashion (Steger, 2005b: 12, 14–15). Steger posits ‘globalism’ as the main ideology which has decontested globalisation for public consumption. However, it is not clear that Steger entirely succeeds in bringing ideology analysis into globalisation studies. For Steger, globalism constitutes the dominant, hegemonic perspective on what globalisation is. Steger actually describes globalism as a ‘market ideology’. Its purpose is to legitimate the notion of the free market. As Steger repeatedly asserts, it is actually entirely indistinguishable from neoliberal ideology. He defines globalism as ‘a free-market doctrine that endows the relatively new concept of globalisation with neoliberal norms, values and meanings’ (Steger, 2002: x). He adds: ‘But I wrote this study out of a firm conviction that globalisation

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does not necessarily have to mean or be what globalists say it means or is’ (2002: x). This seems problematic. The problem is not necessarily that Steger upholds a materialist view of globalisation, or employs the Gramscian concept of hegemony. Rather, the presentation of the ideology of globalism is logically inconsistent. How can there be many possible decontestations of ‘globalisation’, yet only a single ‘globalism’, as ideology? What about globalism gives it an unimpeachable claim to ‘the global’ or ‘globality’ – which is what the word logically entails – that is not present in other (potential) representations of globalisation? Steger is arguing that globalisation is the defining idea of globality and that the ideology of globalism is the regressive element. At the very least, this seems linguistically illogical. It is not the case that globalism cannot exist as a distinct ideology, in the way Steger suggests; but if it does then it alone ‘owns’ the derivative notion of globalisation. Other ideologies may seek to share globalism’s conceptual terrain, which may in time result in a transferral of ownership – but the argument that globalism derives from globalisation is implausible. The truth, of course, is that Steger does not actually treat globalism as an ideology, in the way understood by Freeden and other political theorists. Rather, he is referring to neoliberalism. He outlines the relationship between neoliberalism and globalism in a section of his book Globalism titled ‘Pouring old philosophical wine into new ideological bottles’. For Steger, neoliberalism is an ideology premised on a market utopia: individualism, free trade, the moral and economic benefits of competition, ‘greed is good’, scepticism of state action and so on. According to Steger, these are actually old ideas rejuvenated by the elite in the 1970s and 1980s. In contemporary politics, by associating globalisation with the market, neoliberals have ‘marshalled their considerable resources to expand the neoliberal project into a full-blown globalist ideology’. Globalism therefore ‘offers few new political or economic insights. Largely, it constitutes a gigantic repackaging exercise’ (Steger, 2002: 11). It is possible that Steger has uncovered a potentially important finding here. As noted above, Mark Rupert (almost) suggests that globalisation derives from liberalism rather than neoliberalism, and that therefore ‘liberal globalisation’ is the new hegemonic ideology. In detailing the influence of Adam Smith and David Ricardo on ‘the new market ideology’, Steger seems to be following the same kind of argument. In fact, he draws no philosophical distinction between the laissez-faire perspective of Smith and Ricardo and later thinkers such as Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, and actually presents all as advocates of neoliberalism. In addition to this empirical problem, Steger’s argument here demonstrates the problems with his view of ideology. Steger says that the only original element of globalism is ‘an innovative connection between quaint free market ideas and cutting-edge global talk’ (2002: 11; emphasis added). Inverting Colin Hay’s approach to ideational phenomena, Steger actually employs the

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analytical concept of ideology while treating globalism as a strategically selected discourse: My focus on the ideological dynamics of globalism as it unfolds in the public arena permits me to explore in more detail the discursive strategies of neoliberal forces as they attempt to harness the concept of globalisation to their material interest. (Steger, 2002: 14) Leaving aside the reference to ‘material interest’, there is nothing inherently problematic about this outlook. However, it surely contradicts phrases such as ‘full-blown globalist ideology’, which was cited earlier. Steger barely investigates the idea of globalisation beyond its rhetorical use by neoliberals, yet still classifies it as ideological. This problem does not necessarily invalidate Steger’s empirical analysis, even if reconceived as a study of the way that neoliberals deploy globalisation discourse strategically. Steger argues that there are ‘five central claims of globalism’; that is, representations of globalisation: first, ‘globalisation is about the liberalisation and global integration of markets’; second, ‘globalisation is inevitable and irreversible’, because markets are ultimately irresistible; third, ‘nobody is in charge of globalisation’ – this claim evokes the retreat of the state, again with reference to a neoliberal view of the economy; fourth, ‘globalisation benefits everyone’; finally, ‘globalisation furthers the spread of democracy in the world’, because political freedom follows economic freedom and increasing interaction with liberal democratic countries. Whatever the empirical value of these findings, Steger is probably inferring too much in concluding that ‘[t]he five globalist claims ... show that globalism is sufficiently comprehensive and systematic to count as a new ideology’. He has already admitted that he sees globalism as the work solely of neoliberal ideologues. If globalism is therefore an ideology, Steger seems to have a quite contradictory understanding of what an ideology is. In terms of agency, Steger claims that his empirical focus is ‘the advocates of globalism’, and says that such people ‘usually reside in wealthy Northern countries and include corporate managers, executives of large TNCs, corporate lobbyists, journalists and public relations specialists, intellectuals writing to a large public audience, state bureaucrats, and politicians’ (2002: 46). Subsequently he quotes liberally from all, with a particular fondness for journalists and politicians. He makes no systematic attempt to show how these actors or their ideas relate to the exercise of power in particular policy-making contexts. The difficulties within Steger’s work are compounded by his work on the aftermath of 11 September 2001 (hereafter ‘9/11’) and the rise of neoconservatism. Essentially he argues that globalism now has a sixth claim; that is, ‘globalisation requires a war on terror’ (Steger, 2005a, 2005b). Apparently, its

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ability to adapt to new circumstances only further established globalism’s status as an ideology (Steger, 2005b: 24–6). In fact, contrarily, the sixth claim demonstrates the fallaciousness of Steger’s work. Steger accepts that the sixth claim creates logical contradictions within globalism. For instance, it acknowledges that many parts of the world are resisting globalisation, or not becoming democratic, and that massive state power is required to steer globalisation or at least switch its auto-pilot device back on (Steger, 2005a). However, it is not apparent that this is a problem internal to globalism. Steger’s own analysis shows that globalism is not an ideology – it is a strategic discourse deployed by neoliberal ideology. He makes some sense of this by constructing the term ‘market globalism’ to describe the neoliberal perspective on globalisation. Neoconservative ideology, the author of the sixth claim, is depicted as ‘imperial globalism’. But these remain distinct ideological perspectives. No doubt there are particular actors that value both the neoliberal and neoconservative approach to globalisation, which created logical contradictions in their own perspectives. Yet even then, it would not be accurately depicted as a contradiction within globalism. By positing the existence of different globalisms, Steger actually undermines the basis upon which a globalist ideology was originally hypothesised. In Steger’s own terms, neoliberalism and neoconservatism may have come to share hegemonic status, but they do not inhabit the same ideological space. Rather than revisiting his original analysis and pondering whether the concept of globalisation is now subject to a range of different decontestations from a range of ideological vantages, because of the influence of 9/11, Steger instead fixates on whether globalism can survive as a single ideology, when the logic of his own analysis dictates that globalism is an ideology that never was – a politicalstrategic compromise mistaken for morphology.

Conclusion This chapter has considered several examples of ideational analysis within political economy. While the approaches discussed here are extremely valuable, the chapter has argued that, in general, none achieve synthesis on material and ideational factors in a way that enables explanations of how ideas about globalisation are complicit in the material change that the concept ostensibly represents. Constructivism provides an extremely useful contribution by separating material and structural factors. Most IPE scholars, for instance, may seek to show that agents influence their material structural context, but constructivism is far more successful in this regard, because it demonstrates that agents are actually involved in authoring structures. Structures, therefore, are the ideational constructs of agents. However, constructivism is not able to account for why certain actors uphold certain ideas – and how certain actors attained

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influential roles regarding structure in the first instance – without relying on material explanations. Colin Hay’s critique of ‘thin’ constructivism shows that, while constructivists discover agency in the process of structural change, they do not sufficiently recognise actual agents, instead reducing their subjectivity to material impulses. Post-structuralism, on the other hand, discovers neither agency nor agents. In entirely collapsing the material into the ideational, it sees agents and structures as little more than the expression of all-encompassing ideational phenomena. As such, its only focus is the ideas themselves, however conceived, rather than the agents that uphold them. Among other things, this leaves poststructuralists unable to account for where ideas come from and how they evolve over time. A neo-Gramscian analytical framework, in contrast to both constructivism and post-structuralism, does enable inquiry into agents and how agents use their ideas in practice. However, in addition to the charge that this renders ideas simply functional of agency, neo-Gramscians are blind to the idea of globalisation. The approach is founded on a materialist ontology and a particular view of material change, meaning that globalisation is something that agents respond to rather than an idea they uphold. The analytical concept of ideology was upheld as a means to achieving synthesis of material and ideational in understanding agency more successfully. As such, the analysis of ideas in political economy could learn from political theory in terms of both theoretical frameworks and the empirical study of the meanings replete in political discourses. An ideology is a relatively coherent set of ideas, which together perform certain functions that enable agents to make sense of and act upon their reality. The process of globalisation is interpreted by ideology-wielding actors, but also attributed meaning by them as they draw upon extant ideas to respond to novel circumstances. Michael Freeden’s approach to ideology is therefore crucial for showing how ideas evolve as their constituent concepts interact, but also how agents’ perspectives and motivations evolve as their existing raison d’être is confronted by an apparently new context. This complexity makes it impossible to say definitively, contra post-structuralists, that certain ideas have inevitable impacts. Yet we can locate the core meaning of a political concept. While the implications of a certain concept – and certainly complex and relatively novel concepts such as globalisation – may be essentially contestable because different agents will interpret and utilise them in different ways, the term itself will have a core definition which in reflected in every utterance. Manfred Steger has attempted to analyse globalisation discourse (in the United States) using Michael Freeden’s approach to ideology. However, he treats globalisation discourse as little more than window-dressing for neoliberalism. This is not necessarily invalid; yet to then claim that globalisation discourse derives from an ideology of ‘globalism’ is implausible. The

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value of ideology as an analytical concept is that empirical findings on ideational phenomena need not be ‘all or nothing’. It is possible to show that the idea of globalisation impacts upon the ideologies upheld by agents without claiming that has entirely replaced certain other perspectives or indeed functions as a rhetorical device for more concealed hegemonic perspectives. The remaining five chapters will examine the discourses surrounding the political actions and policy decisions of key actors in British foreign economic policy, in order to ascertain the ideological meanings complicit in various groups’ apparent ‘responses’ to globalisation, therefore demonstrating how the material and ideational interact in producing certain policy outcomes.

References Adler, E. (1997) ‘Seizing the middle ground: Constructivism in world politics’, European Journal of International Relations, 3:3, pp. 319–63. Antoniades, A. (2007) ‘Examining facets of the hegemonic: The globalization discourse in Greece and Ireland’, Review of International Political Economy, 14:2, pp. 306–32. Augelli, E. & Murphy, C. (1997) ‘Consciousness, myth and collective action: Gramsci, Sorel and the ethical state’ in S. Gill & J. H. Mittelman (eds), Innovation and Transformation in International Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 5–24. Berry, C. (2007) ‘Rediscovering Robert Cox: Agency and the ideational in international political economy’, Political Perspectives, 1:1, accessed at www.politicalperspectives .org.uk/General/Issues/CIP-2007–1/CIP-2007-01-08.pdf on 1 March 2009. Blyth, M. (2002) Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Blyth, M. (2003) ‘From comparative capitalism to economic constructivism: The Cornell Series in Political Economy’, New Political Economy, 8:2, pp. 263–74. Bruff, I. (2005) ‘Making sense of the globalisation debate when engaging in political economy analysis’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 7:2, pp. 261–80. Butler, J. (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (London: Routledge). Butler, J. (1997) Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (London: Routledge). Cameron, A. & Palan, R. (2004) The Imagined Economies of Globalization (London: SAGE). Cox, R. W. (1981) ‘Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations theory’ in Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10:2, pp. 126–55. Cox, R. W. (2002) The Political Economy of a Plural World: Reflections on Power, Morality and Civilisations (London: Routledge). Festenstein, M. & Kenny, M. (2005) (ed) Political Ideologies (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

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Freeden, M. (1996) Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Clarendon). Freeden, M. (2005) ‘What should the “political” in political theory explore’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 13:2, pp. 113–34. Gammon, E. & Palan, R. (2006) ‘Libidinal international political economy’ in M. de Goede (ed), International Political Economy and Poststructural Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 97–114. Germain, R. (2007) “‘Critical” political economy, historical materialism and Adam Morton’, Politics 27:2, pp. 127–31. Gill, S. (1995) ‘Globalization, market civilization and disciplinary neoliberalism’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 24:3, pp. 393–422. Goede, M. de (2003) ‘Beyond economism in international political economy’, Review of International Studies, 29:1, pp. 79–97. Goede, M. de (2006) ‘International political economy and the promises of poststructuralism’, in M. de Goede (ed), International Political Economy and Poststructural Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 1–20. Hay, C. (1999) The Political Economy of New Labour: Labouring under False Pretences (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Hay, C. (2002) Political Analysis (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan). Hay, C. (2006) ‘Constructivist institutionalism … or, why ideas into interests don’t go’, paper presented at the APSA Annual Convention, Pennsylvania Convention Centre (United States), 31 August 2006, accessed at www.asu.edu/clas/polsci/cqrm /APSA2006/Hay_Constructivism.pdf on 16 November 2007. Hay, C. & Smith, N. J. (2005) ‘Horses for courses? The political discourse of globalisation and European integration in the UK and Ireland’, West European Politics, 28:1, pp. 124–58. Lapid, Y. (1989) ‘The third debate: On the prospects of international theory in a postpositivist era’, International Studies Quarterly, 33:2, pp. 235–54. Larner, W. (2006) ‘Neoliberalism: Policy, ideology, governmentality’ in M. de Goede (ed), International Political Economy and Poststructural Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 199–218. Newman, S. (2005) Power and Politics in Post-Structuralist Thought (London: Routledge). Peterson, V. S. (2006) ‘Getting real: The necessity of critical post-structuralism in global political economy’, in M. de Goede (ed), International Political Economy and Poststructural Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 119–38. Robertson, R. & Khondker, H. H. (1998) ‘Discourses of globalisation: Preliminary considerations’, International Sociology, 13:1, pp. 25–40. Rosamond, B. (1999) ‘Globalisation and the social construction of European identities’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6:4, pp. 652–68. Ruggie, J. G. (1998) Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (London: Routledge). Rupert, M. (2000) Ideologies of Globalisation: Contending Visions of a New World Order (London: Routledge). Schmidt, V. (2006) ‘Give peace a chance: Reconciling four (not three) “new institutionalisms”’, paper presented at the APSA Annual Convention, Pennsylvania

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Convention Centre (United States), 31 August 2006, accessed at http://people.bu.edu/vschmidt/publications.html on 23 November 2007. Schmidt, V. (2007) ‘Trapped by their ideas: French elites’ discourses of European integration and globalization’, Journal of European Public Policy, 14:7, pp. 992–1009. Selby, J. (2007) ‘Engaging Foucault: Discourse, liberal governance and the limits of Foucauldian IR’, International Relations 21:3, pp. 324–46. Steger, M. B. (2002) Globalism: The New Market Ideology (Oxford: Bowman and Littlefield). Steger, M. B. (2005a) ‘From market globalism to imperial globalism’, Globalizations, 2:1, pp. 31–46. Steger, M. B. (2005b) ‘Ideologies of globalization’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 10:1, pp. 11–30. Smith, N. J. (2005) Showcasing Globalisation: The Political Economy of the Irish Republic (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

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3

Competition and change: the case of New Labour The ideological significance of the rise of New Labour and its conduct in office is often reduced to the question of whether the Labour Party abandoned social democracy and moved to ‘the right’, towards Thatcherism and neoliberalism. Yet the role of the idea of globalisation in these apparent changes – a concept largely absent from the discourses of the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s – has not been fully explored. This chapter examines the communicative discourse surrounding New Labour’s foreign economic policy in government. The department most responsible for foreign economic policy was the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), subsequently replaced by the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) in 2007 (incorporated into the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills in 2009). The chapter will also focus to a lesser extent on the Department for International Development (DfID) and the Treasury, both of which had some (formal or informal) involvement in foreign economic policy. Of course, these departments embody longstanding institutional structures and cannot be assumed to be synonymous with New Labour as an ideological actor. This is an analytical problem associated with studying any government actor. However, the focus here will be the ministers, who are assumed to be representative of New Labour in government rather than the institutions of state, although it will be necessary to assess departmental products as well as the discourse specifically produced by ministers, to determine how ideological meanings are located in actual policy practice. The research is based primarily on documentary analysis, including texts of ministerial speeches, but also interviews with two former trade ministers and three senior DTI officials, who were treated ostensibly as sources of information on New Labour in government rather than subjects in their own right. The chapter is shaped, however, by an analysis of the discourse of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, who, it is assumed, determined the broad contours of New Labour’s perspective on globalisation. Beyond this, the chapter avoids questions of power within New Labour; instead it is assumed that many actors contributed to and embodied the discourse on globalisation produced by New Labour,

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as a complex agent engaged in a conversation about globalisation in British politics. The chapter seeks to generally profile the discourse surrounding New Labour’s foreign economic policy. However, several specific concerns will be addressed, such as definitions of globalisation, the extent to which it was treated as an economic phenomenon, whether it was deemed inevitable or contingent, whether it was deemed positive or negative, implications for the state’s role, and the nature and role of global governance. Underpinning each of these concerns is the extent to which New Labour can be associated with neoliberal ideology. The chapter will first discuss the New Labour leadership, and then more specifically how globalisation was depicted in foreign economic policy. It will then look at the objectives of New Labour foreign economic policy, and finally at New Labour’s perspective on multilateral policy-making. It will argue that New Labour’s discourse on globalisation in relation to foreign economic policy demonstrates its abandonment of the state as a legitimate and purposeful economic actor. However, this is not quite synonymous with neoliberalism, as New Labour’s discourse remains replete with allusions to progressive ideals. On the one hand, globalisation is treated as an epochal change with roots in spatial, technological and cultural change as well as economic – albeit one which privileges private economic actors. An alternative perspective treats globalisation as the emergence of a competitive global marketplace and actually seems to owe an intellectual debt to classical liberalism.

Blair and Brown In 1998, Blair described New Labour as ‘a new model for government in the twenty-first century that works with the grain of globalisation’. This meant, primarily, maintaining macro-economic stability (at all short-term costs) and building a mutually beneficial ‘partnership with business’. There was room for ‘fairness’, but only on the basis of growing national prosperity. Globalisation was presented primarily as an economic phenomenon, which entailed a challenge to New Labour’s stewardship of the British economy. Crucially, although globalisation is not explicitly defined, it is precisely ‘the grain of globalisation’ that requires a stable macro-economic framework, an increased reliance on the private sector and a circumscribed version of social justice. In 2004, Blair outlined six ‘economic fundamentals’ relevant to the work of government ‘in the era of globalisation’. In order, these were macro-economic stability, a competitive tax regime, flexibility in labour and capital markets, openness to globalisation, long-term investment in skills and scientific research and, finally, eradicating poverty. He added that each of these was needed to make any of the others successful. The fourth priority, ‘openness to globalisation’, is slightly

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contradictory, in that it suggests it is possible to be closed to globalisation, despite living in ‘the era of globalisation’. If so, the urgency of the other objectives is undermined. However, the phrase seems in this regard to be synonymous with trade liberalisation (a bundling which we will find again in the specific foreign economic policy discourse). Elsewhere, Blair has specifically stipulated that liberalisation, through the WTO, is a priority for New Labour’s economic policy (2000, 2001). What is most interesting, perhaps, is not the apparent circularity or contradiction in Blair’s thoughts, but rather his depiction of globalisation as entirely exogenous: globalisation defines the era, but it is still possible to choose to be open or closed to it. Blair invariably referred to globalisation as ‘ferocious and far-reaching’ in nature (2000). In referring to the reforms necessary, even after seven years in power, Blair (2004) claimed that ‘these are the rules by which globalisation is played ... they are the only way for a nation like Britain to succeed’. Gordon Brown’s references to globalisation were slightly more clinical than Blair’s, principally in that they focused far more on specific notions of economic activity. Where Blair talked about ‘massive global economic forces’, Brown concentrated on depicting globalisation as the emergence of a competitive marketplace (see Brown, 2000). Although macro-economic stability was important to Blair, it was far more important to Gordon Brown’s adjudication on the role of government. Brown’s speech on globalisation to the CBI National Conference in 1998 pronounced that monetary and fiscal stability was his main priority as Chancellor. The need for the British economy to be more productive was another consistent theme, suggesting New Labour’s vision for exactly how the British economy must respond to globalisation – but Brown was consistently adamant about the fallacy of government directly intervening to bring this vision to life. Stability, as such, was the ‘precondition’ of achieving productivity and always treated as the first priority in relation to globalisation. In a speech to the Chamber of Commerce in 2000, Brown described macro-economic stability as ‘the only sound platform for an enterprise culture in the global economy’. Upon this platform, government has a significant role in generating the conditions within which business can increase productivity. Brown listed the key priorities as welfare reform, ‘rewarding entrepreneurship’, assisting innovation through supporting scientific research, ensuring the proper function of competition laws, engendering a flexible labour market, and tax and regulatory reform. Most of the time, according to Brown (2000), the best thing government can do for business is to ‘get out of the way’. This is precisely how productivity is achieved: the Treasury report Skills in the Global Economy declared that stability had been achieved, and that the priority must become flexibility through labour market reforms and a skilled workforce, in order to allow the private sector to become more efficient, thus succeeding in the global marketplace (HM Treasury, 2004: 1–3).

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Tony Blair’s speeches, in discussing the context of economic policy, consistently employed ‘change’ as a motif. Blair pronounced in 1998 that: This is a world of change: massive global economic forces, social change and diversity, a cultural and technological revolution in travel, communications and innovation. No one nation can stand still when the world is turning. (Blair, 1998) References to change were usually accompanied by references to its speed. For example: It is not the scale of change alone that is remarkable, but its pace[...] I am sometimes asked what I think has changed about myself in seven years of being Prime Minister ... the answer is a growing sense of the speed of change. (Blair, 2004) The same references were present in Gordon Brown’s output. For both, however, there is a lingering ambiguity regarding whether globalisation itself represents rapid change or whether rapid change is a feature of conditions of globalisation or globality. It is important to note that change, for New Labour, was not exclusively economic. Blair often referred to technological and social change as part of the government’s constraining context. However, it is not clear whether such phenomena were deemed constitutive of globalisation. He argued in 2004 that: Globalisation is transforming the world economy; not just because of changes in methods of production and technology but because mass popular culture, communication, customer preferences mean a perpetual revolution in new business opportunities and challenges. (Blair, 2004) Therefore, it seems that for Blair non-economic dimensions of globalisation were important insofar as they related to the operation of the global economy. They were a part of globalisation, but they were only fully recognised in relation to the economy. Blair also referred endlessly to ‘the long term’. In 1998, he stated that ‘[w]e are in this for the long term. For the first time in years, Britain has a government with a long-term vision, taking the hard decisions necessary’, adding that ‘we will not be deflected by short-term considerations ... we are the real long-termists now.’ On the one hand, Blair is arguing that the economic benefits of globalisation may take many years to be realised, yet he is also asking specifically that his political project must be assessed in the long term too – albeit

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precisely because the project is hinged on a positive outlook on globalisation. This ties Blair’s argument in this regard closely to the notion of exogenous constraint. If economic intervention, by definition, is motivated by short-term considerations, a government with a long-term perspective accepts its emasculation while waiting steadfastly for globalisation to come good. There does not appear to have been the same emphasis on the long term from Gordon Brown. In general, Brown also appeared to refer less to non-economic aspects of globalisation. It may be possible to relate this to Brown’s more clinical prescriptions for economic policy. With a narrower argument about the rise in global competition, coupled with a more precise account of what Britain needs to do to prosper, the case in favour of globalisation was easier to construct for Brown. Intriguingly, Brown also used the term ‘globalisation’ with less frequency than Blair. It is impossible to infer a great deal from this – in any case establishing it definitively would require further research – but it is perhaps related to Brown’s more economistic approach. New Labour leaders did not reflect extensively on multilateralism as a form of policy-making. Blair often invoked internationalism in his speeches on globalisation, which might indicate he favoured a priori multilateralism. He was undoubtedly consistently positive about both the EU and the WTO, although he was relatively quiet on the specific subject of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP). Interestingly, however, Blair’s support for the WTO – in particular the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) (see Young and Peterson, 2006) – did occasionally lead him to criticise the EU. The general charge was that too many EU member-states lacked the mental strength and long-term vision to see that the process of globalisation, advanced by trade and investment liberalisation, would be a good thing. He said to the EU in 2004: Globalisation presents us with a choice: embrace it and make it work for us, or try to thwart it. This is the choice hanging over the WTO round. Without hesitation, we believe in embracing globalisation and making it work... Globalisation is not our enemy but our friend, if and only if we are prepared for the journey it will take us on. (Blair, 2004) As such he chose to support the DDA instead of the EU’s position – although he did so due to his support for globalisation (as he saw it) rather than the principle of multilateralism. In fact, it is likely that the process of globalisation itself, rather than any multilateral response to globalisation, was seen as positive from an internationalist perspective. Brown referred surprisingly little to the WTO, or the DDA in particular. He did, however, offer a sustained critique of the EU’s approach to globalisation. For Brown, ‘the issue is not just how Europe integrates from fifteen to twenty-five, but how all twenty-five reach out to the rest of the world’ (2005). In rejecting the notions of a federal Europe and a

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European trade bloc, Brown outlined instead a vision of ‘global Europe’ in which individual member-states co-operate to ensure every nation has the opportunity to compete globally. He argued that ‘Europe must itself become more global: more open, more outward-looking, and then more flexible, more competitive and more committed to reform to enable us to compete worldwide’ (Brown, 2005; see also, 2004). As Chancellor, Brown seemed to have little inclination towards multilateralism as a political form, and rather believed that it was the content of economic policy rather than the structure of policy-making which was most vital. For New Labour, in general, the notion of the EU as a means of governing globalisation, or indeed a means by which globalisation might be made more positive for Britain, seems to be absent. The EU is instead treated as a potential hindrance, entreated to reform so that the full impact of globalisation may be experienced. While it is impossible to say the same orientation existed towards the WTO, it is perhaps indicative that Blair seemed to believe that supporting the WTO is synonymous with supporting globalisation or an open global economy. There were obviously various elements to the New Labour leadership’s understanding of and approach to globalisation, only briefly surveyed here. Blair and Brown treated globalisation primarily as an economic process, perceiving it as the growth in power and importance of global markets. The question of whether globalisation was inevitable or contingent, or inherently positive, remained relatively open. However, it is possible to identify different forms of argumentation within the discourse here. Brown appeared to propound a narrower argument about the rise of a competitive global marketplace – easier to associate with a positive narrative and perhaps not as reliant on the notion of constraint. Blair referred more often to non-economic aspects of the globalisation process – particularly when the term itself was invoked – therefore muddying the economistic argument. In a sense, globalisation is treated as an epochal change rather than simply a market outcome; it is no less positive, but its benefits are more opaque. These two arguments about and understandings of globalisation (i.e. ‘epochal change’ and ‘global competition’) are important to understanding the contours of foreign economic policy-making. Ostensibly, given its greater emphasis on non-economic factors, the former is furthest from neoliberal ideology. However, Brown’s perspective appears to owe more to a classical liberal understanding of the marketplace than the neoliberalism of the 1980s. Blair’s argument on globalisation has non-economic referents, but actually emphasises individual business decisions as a key driving force of globalisation, rather than abstract market mechanisms, and may therefore share more intellectual territory with neoliberalism. It is of course necessary to discuss the particular impact of the financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing recession in 2009 on New Labour’s discourse on globalisation. Given that, by this time, Gordon Brown had ascended to the

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premiership, logic suggests that the version of globalisation he favoured would become more prominent in New Labour’s discourse; it is equally logical, however, to assume that the financial crisis curtailed some of the boldest claims contained within New Labour’s discourse on globalisation. However, neither of these assumptions hold true in a straightforward sense. Globalisation certainly did not cease to feature in Brown’s discourse as Prime Minister. For Brown, globalisation had happened, and cannot and should not be reversed. In terms of trade policy, Brown maintained that protectionism would be a futile and inappropriate response to crisis. Furthermore, depictions of the nature of the crisis, and the necessary response, show the imprint of the idea of globalisation. At the Global Economic Forum in Davos in 2009, Brown said: This is the first financial crisis of the global age. And there is no clear map that has been set out from past experience to deal with it. There is implicit protectionism I’m afraid in what is happening at the moment... This is a global banking crisis and you’ve got to deal with it for what it is, a global banking crisis. (cited in Hennessy, 2009) Similarly, the communique from the London Group of Twenty (G20) summit, supposedly orchestrated by Brown, again stressed the global nature of the crisis and the need for specifically global solutions (G20, 2009). At the summit, he told finance ministers that ‘to help ensure there is a smooth transition path to what one might call the mature phase of globalisation we need the world now to come together with careful and co-ordinated action’. He added: Today I want to propose to you a global compact for durable growth. I also want to propose some clear principles: financial systems based on responsibility, transparency and integrity – that serve the needs of families and businesses not of the bankers; sound macroeconomic policies which deliver balanced global growth; open economies without harmful protectionism; environmentally sustainable production and consumption that accelerates the transition to a low carbon economy; and a fair distribution of the benefits of growth between and within countries. This, taken with the renewal of our global institutions that I will talk about, amounts to a twenty-first century approach to governing our international economy. (Brown, 2009) One implication of the crisis is obvious: Brown bestows legitimacy on the mechanisms of global governance. In practice, he has not proposed significant extensions in power for existing international institutions; his emphasis has been on global co-ordination of policy among states, which utilises the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and UN where necessary. In this way,

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the response advocates a new level of technocracy, rather than democracy. In this way, Brown has moved towards a vision of global governance upheld consistently by Oxfam, as Chapter 6 discusses. He also moved, however, decisively towards the epochal change view of globalisation upheld by Tony Blair. He was clearly much more comfortable with invoking notions of globality and spatial change, rather than simply depicting globalisation as the emergence of a single competitive marketplace based on the economic logic of the ‘invisible hand’. The global marketplace may have faltered, but there is no going back, because the contours of the social universe have also changed. Alistair Darling – Brown’s successor as Chancellor – stuck to largely the same script, despite the political disparity that emerged between the two (see Darling, 2009).

Depictions of globalisation in foreign economic policy This chapter will focus predominantly on the DTI/BERR, as the main home of foreign economic policy during the period in question. However, it also refers to the Treasury, especially in response to the financial crisis. The international nature of the crisis brought the Treasury – ostensibly responsible for the financial system – into the sphere of foreign economic policy. According to the DTI’s website, on both the homepage and the ‘About the DTI’ section, the DTI’s main function was to ‘help the UK respond to the challenge of globalisation’ (DTI, 2005a, 2005b). This was a focus sustained by BERR from 2007 onwards. Globalisation is the overarching context which New Labour foreign economic policy was operating within and reacting to. This was confirmed by interviews with former ministers. Simply, globalisation was the raison d’être of the New Labour’s foreign economic policy; moreover, globalisation impacted upon all areas of the DTI’s and BERR’s work, spanning both domestic and international economic issues. This section looks first to definitions of globalisation, showing how the DTI and relevant ministers projected the main themes found in the discourse of New Labour leaders, as outlined in the previous section. It then considers whether New Labour understood globalisation as positive – it is here that the financial crisis is discussed.

What is globalisation? In statements of its purpose, the DTI usually added to the reference to globalisation by referring to the department’s relationship with the private sector (DTI, 2005a). The DTI’s role, therefore, was ‘to create the conditions for business success ... in a world of competition and change’ (DTI, 2005b). This was slightly altered by BERR, for whom the focus was ‘to help ensure business success in an increasingly competitive world’ (BERR, 2007). As such the explicit reference to ‘change’ is removed. We may be able to relate this to Gordon Brown’s leadership (before the onset of the financial crisis), although, as we will

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see, there is some evidence that the rise of China and India had encouraged a higher emphasis on competition as a feature of globalisation rather than the more nebulous notion of change. For the most part, however, the piercing ambiguity of the phrase ‘a world of competition and change’ seems to perfectly express New Labour’s understanding of globalisation, as upheld from 1997 onwards, and its importance to foreign economic policy. Primarily, globalisation was understood as an economic phenomenon. More specifically, it is being perpetrated by private economic actors, competing with one another. It is a belief in the inexorably expansionist logic of the competitive market economy that gave globalisation a large degree of inevitability. Yet its discourse was ambiguous enough to house both the epochal change and global competition perspectives, and positions between these two, without sacrificing coherence. The question of whether globalisation was external to Britain is particularly interesting. While some of the actors involved in advancing globalisation may be British, the image of globalisation offered was one of economic forces exogenous to the country. A DTI economics paper defined globalisation as ‘the increasing integration of the international economy’. It talked about the (actual and potential) ‘impact’ of this on Britain, and of the need for the government to develop a coherent ‘response’ (DTI, 2006). This is consistent with the definition provided in the Labour government’s most comprehensive statement of its perspective on foreign economic policy, in the 2004 Trade and Investment White Paper, Making Globalisation a Force for Good. The document argued that [g]lobalisation brings ever increasing movement across national boundaries of goods, services, investment, people and information, binding people and nations more closely together... This has profound implications for the UK and for the rest of the world. (HM Government, 2004: 6) As such, globalisation was presented as an external phenomenon which affects but is not affected by Britain or any other country. In such narratives the driving force of globalisation was usually deemed the logic of the market economy, despite some references to non-economic phenomena. This is what Alan Johnson, in his time as Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, was referring to when he declared globalisation as ‘unstoppable’, and said that it had ‘been coming for centuries’ (Johnson, 2006). Note, also, the term ‘ever increasing’ in the quote above from the White Paper: New Labour did not expect globalisation to cease or even slow down, presumably irrespective of whether Britain acquiesces. The growing quantity of cross-border mergers and acquisitions – as well as the straightforward internationalisation of individual firms’ activities – is assumed to be an inevitable consequence of globalisation, as firms need to be

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able to draw upon expertise in different sectors and markets in order to produce goods and services efficiently. Interviews with former ministers confirmed this specific point (see also DTI, 2006: 16, 32–3). Globalisation was also said to have engendered ‘structural change’, a lasting transformation impacting upon all parts of the world. The effects of businesses competing against one another in an expanding and integrating marketplace are the development of new, more efficient production techniques, rapid technological development (particularly in information and communication technologies), the birth of new markets, an unprecedented intensity of competition and the decline of manufacturing in advanced capitalist economies (see HM Government, 2004). It is possible that ‘structural change’ lends support to the notion of globalisation as epochal change, involving non-economic elements in a more significant sense, rather than simply the natural advancement of marketplace logic – it therefore contradicts the more straightforward narrative on increasing global competition. It is perhaps possible, also, to see frequent references to ‘knowledge’ in this light. Patricia Hewitt, who was Secretary of State for Trade and Industry from June, 2001 to May, 2005, referred consistently to the notion of a ‘global knowledge economy’ within which firms needed to be more innovative and highly skilled, and to develop a global mindset, in order to prosper (see Hewitt, 2000). While the term ‘knowledge economy’ appears not to be in vogue anymore, the growing dependence of the British economy on knowledge-intense services was a recurrent theme – even cases where manufacturing is surviving are explained with references to the high-tech, highly skilled nature of such activity, leading in fact to a blurring of the division between manufacturing and services (Hewitt, 2000; Pearson, 2005a). One of the strongest themes accompanying such arguments was an emphasis on the speed of change: the fast pace of technological and economic change in conditions of globalisation is more challenging than the extent of change. There would appear to be no a priori reason to associate an emphasis on the speed of change and knowledge-based social and economic activity with neoliberal ideology. Of course, any ideological perspective may collect additional ideas and concepts, particularly when used by real-world political actors in strategic settings. Nevertheless, the association of such things with notions of a virtual or supraterritorial space opens the possibility that their presence in globalisation discourse is owed to some meaning inherent in the idea of globalisation and, logically, external to neoliberalism. Clearly, the extent to which increased competition alone was the defining characteristic of globalisation for New Labour’s foreign economic policy discourse is questionable. The internationalisation of firms can be explained through the logic of the competitive market, with competition producing the innovative techniques and business practices which were constitutive of globalisation. But there was also a sense in which increased global competition is a

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product of globalisation; as such, the essence of the process itself is more nebulous and defined only tentatively through terms such as ‘global knowledge economy’ and ‘structural change’. This takes us back in the direction of the epochal change perspective. As such, the notion of competition was important to epochal change, but it was not treated as the motor of globalisation as it is by the global competition perspective. For instance, the 2004 White Paper’s discussion of the global economy certainly suggests a narrative within which the internationalisation of firms, creating a global production system, is the inexorable core of the globalisation process, and that efforts to increase competition within the globalised economy (although already taking place) are the most appropriate response. In these circumstances, determining the ideological character of either form of argument is extremely difficult. The notion of a marketplace as a universal ideal can be associated with classical liberalism. And the joint DTI/Treasury paper Trade and the Global Economy, explicitly criticises export processing zones as ‘anti-competitive’ (HM Treasury/DTI, 2004: 30) – although these zones are associated indelibly with a neoliberal model of economic development. There is a convoluted but fascinating train of thought operating here: the universal marketplace, an older ideal, was championed as an alternative to the excesses of neoliberalism’s pro-business agenda; yet with constant references to the ‘global’, it is couched in a discourse of newness. There may have been an element of classical liberalism here, but there was also convergence between the epochal change and global competition perspectives around the notion of globality, seeming distinct from (albeit related to) universality. It should be noted here, however, to add to the complexity, that it is precisely the more nebulous argument about epochal change, in which the term ‘globalisation’ is more likely to be cited, which most privileged the role of private firms – the more economistic argument appears to attribute change to market processes rather than market actors. Although no individual states were credited with creating globalisation, towards the end of New Labour’s second term there was a surge in references to the rise of China and India as economic powers in ministers’ speeches and statements. China and India (particularly China) provided concrete examples of intense global competition and the imperative for Britain to adapt. As such, although these relatively new issues were integrated in to the DTI’s existing approach to globalisation, they appear to have bolstered the depiction of globalisation as an ever-expanding marketplace. As such, while imbuing globalisation discourse with a further sense of economic insecurity, they ultimately serve as examples of the positive aspects of globalisation, as China and India are shown to be achieving economic development through global integration – this will be discussed more later (see Pearson, 2005b; McCartney, 2006). The general reaction to the rise of China and India is summarised in the 2004 White Paper:

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One more job in India does not mean one less job in Britain. More growth in China does not mean less growth in Britain ... as people in the developing world become richer, we will all buy more from each other. (HM Government, 2004: 10) So China and India represent competition – but this, as will be explored below, is a good thing. Indeed, the Treasury published a joint paper on globalisation with the Chinese government in 2005 titled Responding to Global Economic Challenges.

Positive or negative? Generally speaking, New Labour’s foreign economic policy depicted globalisation as a good thing, albeit not always straightforwardly. The dominant prognosis derived from a belief in the merits of competition. Both the epochal change and global competition perspectives seemed to include this kind of argument. The DTI argued that ‘[t]he power of market forces and entrepreneurial business dynamism [is] the primary driver of rising level of prosperity and prosperity’, and more specifically that global competition encourages firms to be more innovative and thus ultimately more successful (see DTI, 2006: v–vi). The DTI actors liked to associate support for global competition with Adam Smith’s analysis of free markets. In a DTI Economics Paper, ‘The benefits from competition’ (DTI, 2004a), Smith’s assessment that competition pushes prices down, pushes standards up and increases productivity is invoked. Irrespective of whether Smith is right, the fact that New Labour applied such arguments to the process of globalisation is revealing. Globalisation reduces market distortions, producing a more level playing field on a global scale and the firms equipped to compete on this scale. Classical liberalism’s broader, moral argument about the positive outcomes of competition also play a part in New Labour’s justification of globalisation. Adam Smith (1950; orig. 1776) argued in the Wealth of Nations that the pursuit of economic liberty civilises individuals. Ministerial speeches sometimes put forward an approximate version of this thesis. However, the focus of the argument in this regard was that international trade minimises the prospect of conflict between states. Patricia Hewitt said, for example, in 2001: Those who oppose world trade would deny us all the best way of enhancing security and preventing conflict. Countries with strong economic ties settle their differences peacefully. Countries that trade together do not go to war against each other. (Hewitt, 2001b; see also DTI, 2005c) The imprint of 11 September 2001 on Hewitt’s speeches at this time was undeniable. The chapter will return to ‘free trade’ theory in the next section. The

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notion of competition was clearly crucial to the argument that globalisation is positive. However, it remains unclear whether increased market competition was the defining feature of globalisation. The key Treasury paper on globalisation – Globalisation and the UK (2005) – said: The global economy is undergoing a profound transformation, involving fundamental changes in trading patterns and in the use of technology, and bringing radical changes to economies across the world. Globalisation has the potential to increase global output, income and wealth in all economies, whether advanced, industrialising or developing. This potentially brings new opportunities for businesses and individuals, a better deal for consumers, and could lift millions out of poverty, but it also presents new challenges. (HM Treasury, 2005: 15) This seems to carry the logic of the global competition argument in terms of demonstrating why globalisation is positive, yet also invokes the nebulous imagery of epochal change. Of course, it must be noted that the Treasury paper is referring to globalisation in a domestic economic context. The epochal change argument, as demarcated here, also entails upholding the inherent benefits of the internationalisation of private corporations, irrespective of whether these firms are located in a globally competitive environment. Such arguments are of course largely absent from the classical liberal canon, and may owe more to neoliberalism. Internationally oriented firms were deemed by the DTI as more productive, more innovative and more growth oriented. These features give them a particularly important role in the economy’s ability to respond dynamically to changing patterns of opportunity and challenge in the international economy. (DTI, 2006: 16) They were credited, specifically, with enabling the diffusion of technology, know-how, and managerial techniques; benefiting individual firms, but also bringing important spillover effects. This applied where firms are ‘international’ in the sense that they trade across borders, invest directly into foreign countries or have partner and subsidiary organisations in foreign countries. The latter two arrangements were to become more common, which would be a positive development, since it is firms with an organisational presence in various parts of the world that are the most successful (see DTI, 2004b: 30–3). The 2004 White Paper described outward investment as ‘a virtuous circle’ for the home country: being within reach of larger markets helps firms to expand, making innovation more affordable. More innovative firms are more productive, leading to a greater capacity to expand and to sell higher quality goods at lower costs across

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the world (HM Government, 2004: 22). Former ministers endorsed this particular logic in interviews, although, it should be noted, ministers’ speeches rarely directly commend the virtues of TNCs. The politically sensitive nature of such a stance made this a less public aspect of New Labour’s approach to globalisation. Clearly, this argument is distinct, albeit related, to an argument about the merits of competition. In fact, in the economics paper ‘Liberalisation and globalisation: Maximising the benefits of international trade and investment’ (DTI, 2004b), the DTI appeared to recognise that some forms of ‘internationalisation’, that is, some examples of foreign direct investment (FDI) may have anticompetitive outcomes for some national economies. The solution was threefold: to have firmer competition laws, to establish even more lenient rules on FDI so that there will be more competition between global firms (both nationally and at the global level), and finally, to assess change in the long rather than short term. In such circumstances the epochal change and global competition arguments appeared to mutually support the notion that globalisation is positive, although the former – at least in terms of the internationalisation of business activity – was primary. In conjunction with the benefits of global competition and internationalisation, the other major theme of New Labour’s justification of globalisation in relation to foreign economic policy was an emphasis on the long term. There are repeated references to ‘transition’ and ‘adjustment’ in policy documents. These processes can be painful in the short term – producing ‘winners and losers’ – but the long-term benefits of globalisation are nevertheless ‘dramatic’ (see DTI, 2004b; also Pearson, 2005a). One senior civil servant argued that the main problem with globalisation, for the government, was the fact that many people outside Britain failed to recognise that it was in everybody’s long-term interest. Indeed, Patricia Hewitt often ‘reached out’ to the so-called antiglobalisation movement, much more so than other ministers – yet only to preach that globalisation had to be assessed on a long-term basis (see Hewitt, 2003b). Generally, references to the long term demonstrated recognition of ongoing problems with the process of globalisation – they tended to accompany the broader structural or epochal change argument rather than the more clinical global competition argument. However, the more recent integration of China’s and India’s economic development into New Labour’s globalisation discourse did seem to suggest a subtle shift: references to the long term used in conjunction with depictions of globalisation as increasing market-based competition. The Chinese and Indian ‘markets’ represented new competitive pressures, but it was seemingly more difficult to depict this competition as immediately beneficial, so the long term became important discursively (see McCartney, 2006). It is not clear that the financial crisis made any difference to whether New Labour treated globalisation as positive or negative. In terms of economics, as

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late as 2008 the Treasury was urging us to ‘embrace financial globalisation’ (HM Treasury, 2008). The Budget report of 2010 acknowledged the challenge of the global financial crisis but put the emphasis on ensuring that the response is as global as the crisis itself (although it advocates co-ordination rather than new supranational institutions): Given the global nature of financial markets, and the ease with which banks and financial institutions can transfer internal resources, any country acting alone is unlikely to be very effective. It is essential, therefore, that governments work together to deepen their understanding of domestic and global financial markets and to develop policy tools to mitigate risks from pro-cyclical behaviour. (HM Treasury, 2010) Similarly, UK Trade and Investment (a quango then governed by BERR) said in 2009, in a paper titled Financing Globalisation: The Credit Crunch and Its Impact on Expanding Multinationals, that [e]ven in times of economic stress, capital can find its way to profitable investments and that applies particularly to genuinely entrepreneurial companies seeking new opportunities. For them, emerging markets still offer unprecedented opportunities and the long march East has only just begun. Peter Mandelson, responsible for foreign economic policy as Secretary of State at BERR, struck a resolute tone in a speech to the City in 2009: I believe that, over the last decade, in our fundamentals, the UK has overwhelmingly made the right choices. In our openness to trade and investment. In our competition regime and flexible product and labour markets. In the research and development policies that have helped innovative firms grow and prosper here... I believe that the UK’s fundamentals will be borne out when the global economy returns to growth. We will restore and rebuild, and we will emerge stronger and better. (Mandelson, 2009) He spoke, also, of a ‘huge opportunity’, and added that [t]he global economy will double in size in the next two decades, driven in large part by India and China. For all of their current problems, both the US and to an even greater extent our European hinterland will remain prosperous markets full of commercial opportunity. A

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competitive exchange rate will provide a real opportunity for UK exporters. So long as we can keep those markets open – and this is absolutely critical – then they are ours to compete in. (Mandelson, 2009) This continued insistence on the positive implications of globalisation relied, to some extent, on the notions of ‘challenge’ and the ‘long term’ already wired into New Labour’s globalisation discourse before the crisis.

Foreign economic policy objectives New Labour’s main foreign policy objective was liberalisation, in terms of trade and investment. It was an objective pursued in the context of a more general aim to increase the productivity of the British economy on the basis of enabling innovation and supporting the services sector, as explained in the DTI report ‘Competing in the global economy’ (2003; see also HM Government, 2004). The rationale for liberalisation is explored with reference predominantly to the DTI/BERR. The section also surveys New Labour’s approach to international development – which was often claimed to endow New Labour’s foreign economic policy with a progressive dimension – with reference to both DTI/BERR and DfID, the department responsible for aid and development policy.

Liberalisation The liberalisation of trade and investment rules was said to engender innovation, and therefore productivity, precisely because it engendered globalisation. Patricia Hewitt spoke about innovation mainly in the context of ‘the knowledge economy’. The prevailing assumption was that Britain could only be prosperous if it completed this transition to a knowledge-intense service sector (Hewitt, 2000; see also Pearson, 2005a, 2005b). It is in knowledge-intense services sectors that Britain can be most competitive. Then trade minister Liz Symons (2002a) argued, furthermore, that the services sector, more than any other, requires the private sector to provide leadership. Simply, liberalisation created competitive pressures which enabled Britain’s transition – but also created opportunities for the British services sector in other parts of the world. The DTI’s ‘Competing in the global economy’ (2003) makes several key points in this regard: first, intense competition forces economic actors to take more risks, improve efficiency, become more adaptable etc.; second, internationally oriented firms are more innovative, because they are closer to, or part of, technology-transfer (and technique-transfer) networks, and because they have access to larger end-markets – making the rewards of innovation greater than national firms. This applies to British-based or foreign firms with a presence in several countries; thirdly, increased foreign investment into Britain is necessary because it improves the country’s capital intensity (knowledge industries being

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more capital-intense). The availability of capital for investment is considered a requirement of innovation. Paradoxically, therefore, it is not simply that liberalisation supports globalisation, but also that it is required precisely because of the demands of globalisation and indeed is the only appropriate foreign economic policy response in an age of globalisation. It is interesting that ‘trade’ is the term by which international economic activity was conceptualised by the DTI, and indeed throughout the government, despite the recognition of internationalised business activity, negating at least to some extent the notion of arms-length, cross-border exchanges. Obviously, New Labour was not alone in this conceptualisation, but it is significant nonetheless. For one thing, it allowed the government to endorse David Ricardo’s notion of ‘comparative advantage’, which states that, if countries are open to trade, their economies will specialise in producing the goods they are able to produce most efficiently. For the DTI, in particular, this logic remained applicable: Trade allows countries, and the firms and individuals within them, to specialise in economic activities which best allow them to exploit their relative strengths, abilities, resources and expertise, and to buy from and sell to other countries doing likewise. (DTI, 2005c) Ricardo put forward the principle of comparative advantage two centuries ago, and it still remains at the core of arguments for trade liberalisation. (DTI, 2004b: 17–18) Essentially, the theory of comparative advantage was deployed to justify New Labour’s vision for Britain as a globally integrated service economy. This is despite acknowledging that the forms of trade studied by Ricardo – that is, the arms-length exchange of finished products – no longer apply to the contemporary world economy. Transnational corporations have become extremely significant and, moreover, ‘intra-industry trade’ accounts for the most of the recent growth in world trade, challenging the most basic premise of countryspecific specialisation. Indeed, the DTI argued that economic growth was dependent on cross-border transfers of technology and expertise, rather than simply finished products (DTI, 2004b: 11–12). Essentially, New Labour seemed to accept and welcome the growing mobility of capital, or the ability of firms to move ‘offshore’, and concluded that many firms ‘would not be able to fulfil their potential without being able to exploit overseas opportunities effectively’ (DTI, 2006: viii). Yet ‘Liberalisation and globalisation’ (DTI, 2004b) maintained the relevance of comparative advantage resolutely: [I]t has been argued that offshoring ... invalidates Ricardo’s analysis of comparative advantage and the gains from trade. They suggest that

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modern factor mobility means that mutual gains from trade can no longer be assumed and that, with offshoring, some countries win and others lose forever. They are mistaken. Offshoring illustrates comparative advantage rather well. The natural concern that they highlight is about the distribution of the gains from trade, but Ricardo’s theory refers to the long-run and assumes full employment. In the short-run there will be winners, losers and adjustment costs. In the long-run displaced labour will be redeployed, complementing the short-run consumer gains from lower prices. (DTI, 2004b: 53–4) Supporting the UK’s comparative advantage appeared to enjoy even greater prominence within BERR, the DTI’s successor; in fact it was depicted by BERR as one of the chief raisons d’être of the department (see BERR, 2007). Of course, New Labour was not necessarily wrong to maintain that comparative advantage still applies, or to use the theory to justify trade liberalisation and/or globalisation. However, it is necessary to ascertain with more precision the role of the idea of globalisation in the resurgence of comparative advantage. As such, globalisation – the supposed outcome of the market processes championed by classical liberal political economists such as Ricardo – is depicted as the thing which has finally empowered a classical liberal view of the economy. This transformation is dependent on (ongoing) trade liberalisation, or is more likely to produce prosperity (in the long term) if accompanied by further trade liberalisation. It forces Britain to move towards knowledge-intense service industries; but this is good, because these industries are appropriate to the epoch. The forces of globalisation have transformed the context of liberalising trade rules but made the objective more, not less, imperative. Trade liberalisation did not simply mean opening national borders to products from other countries, even where this included services as well as goods. The objective also incorporated investment liberalisation. New Labour argued that where firms are permitted to invest in foreign countries without restrictions, more TNCs and networks will develop, which will ultimately raise productivity levels throughout the world (see DTI, 2004b, 30–3). One senior civil servant said that government policy was based on the belief that investment liberalisation naturally follows trade liberalisation. New Labour was seeking to advance the process of globalisation, rather than simply respond to it. The increasing mobility of capital was an inevitable product of market forces – investment liberalisation is desirable because capital mobility is a good thing and should be further entrenched. Clearly, the two main strands of thought on globalisation and foreign economic policy intertwine here. A perspective that upholds the immutability of the marketplace and the merits of competition is conjoined to a clearly defined sense of Britain’s competitiveness, based on a reading of a new economic ‘epoch’ based on knowledge and globality.

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According to the logic of classical liberalism, particularly trade theory, competition should precede competitiveness – but New Labour reversed this logic. While New Labour’s support for liberalisation was in many respects a continuation of the Conservative government’s neoliberal foreign economic policy orientation, and therefore involved an eschewal of social democracy’s support for interventionism, New Labour’s vision for the state in trade policy was slightly more nuanced. For New Labour, liberalisation was not simply about the state getting out of the way; rather, it was redefined as a new form of intervention, necessitated by the nature of globalisation. As such, Stephen Byers, Hewitt’s predecessor as Secretary of State, associated liberalisation with ‘active government’ in an age of globalisation and decreed that New Labour’s statecraft rejected the ‘destructive individualism’ of laissez faire (Byers, 1999b, 1999c). Hewitt concurred, arguing that, while government could not alter globalisation, it could ‘attract mobile capital and, increasingly, mobile talent’ (Hewitt, 2000). Successive DTI ministers treated liberalisation as a form of ‘market-framing’, simply because it involved reinforcing competition at the expense of vested interests – this was confirmed by the interviews.

Development The creation of DfID in 1997 marked a major statement of intent by New Labour regarding its commitment to international development. The next section will look in more detail at the DDA and the policies designed to bring about development. The aim here is to document the main tenets of New Labour’s understanding of development as a facet of its foreign economic policy. There were slightly conflicting versions of development within New Labour’s trade policy. While not necessarily incommensurate, development seemed to be attached to different policy programmes at different times. In ‘Liberalisation and globalisation’, the DTI presented development, for poor countries, as largely synonymous with liberalisation. Development required, therefore, a removal of restrictions on transnational economic actors even further, with measures including strict competition rules, a ‘predictable’ fiscal and regulatory regime and resolve to ‘avoid the temptation’ of industrial subsidies and macro-economic intervention (DTI, 2004b: 7). This is liberalisation in its widest possible sense, that is, as integration into the global economy (assumed to be occurring exogenously to poor countries). This, for the DTI, is primarily what development meant – because it is primarily what trade and investment liberalisation, in an age of globalisation, is designed to achieve. More specifically, however, a development agenda was also frequently associated not simply with signing up to the world trade regime, but also with measures designed to make integration easier. The DTI consistently argued that agriculture should be brought into the regime, that is, trade in agriculture should be liberalised, and that poor countries should benefit from ‘special and

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differential treatment’ (SDT). This essentially refers to the possibility that designated poor countries can delay implementing aspects of WTO agreements. Although the DTI actually argued in ‘Liberalisation and globalisation’ that the DDA, discussed below, should involve the abandoning of some SDT measures agreed at previous rounds, it also argued that many of the agreements emanating from the DDA should involve SDT measures, to ease transition for poor countries (DTI, 2004b). Of course, SDT does not alter the general path that the DTI expects development to take. It is by definition short-term, and these specific development policies are designed to make the more general model of development proceed more effectively. Crucially, development was understood in exactly the same way in the discourse produced by DfID and its inaugural Secretary of State Clare Short – despite the fact that Short was often depicted as a more radical member of the Labour Government. This may apply to foreign policy (Short resigned following the invasion of Iraq in 2003), but not foreign economic policy. It is certainly fair to say that New Labour brought about a significant transformation in foreign economic policy-making by creating DfID and placing international development alongside trade policy at Cabinet level. However, the vision of development offered by DfID actually complemented New Labour’s broader understanding of globalisation. Clare Short (1998) argued that globalisation is positive, and its ‘meaning’ for development policy is actually a unique opportunity to bring about a win-win development model between developed and developing countries. She emphasised the need for ‘trade integration’. The 2000 DfID White Paper Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor detailed the risks of rapid exposure to the global economy for poor countries and emphasised that sustainable development required concerted action by developed and developing countries, but stated clearly that the UK Government believes that, if well managed, the benefits of globalisation for poor countries and people can substantially outweigh the costs, especially in the longer term. The rapid integration of the global economy, combined with advances in technology and science, is creating unprecedented global prosperity. And this has helped to lift millions of people out of poverty. With the right policies, many millions more people can benefit in the years ahead. (HM Government, 2000: 19) DfID (2005) also explictly challenged the notion that development required a protectionist trade policy – arguing instead that ‘trade matters for the poor’, because it enabled everybody to benefit from globalisation. The 2000 White Paper shows that DfID placed emphasis on state capacity in poor countries. This could be viewed as a departure from the anti-state

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orthodoxy of trade policy in the hands of the DTI. However, state capacity was understood not in a traditional social democratic sense, but rather in the sense upheld by the World Bank’s post-Washington Consensus. As such the governments of poor countries needed to reform themselves in order to benefit from globalisation; they required power to enforce policies like competition law, and resources to educate their population, but had to resist the short-termist urge to protect their economies from global competition.

The DDA and the role of multilateralism This section will briefly survey New Labour’s approach to the DDA, where trade and development policy objectives combined. It will also reflect on New Labour’s understanding of the nature of the WTO and supranational institutions more generally. Again, it focuses most on DTI/BERR, given the department’s responsibility for trade negotiations. However, DfID is also referred to.

The WTO After the failure of the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle in 1999 – famed for the accompanying ‘anti-globalisation’ protests – to launch a new WTO negotiating round, New Labour remained committed to the WTO and a new round, arguing that this was the best way of making globalisation work for the entire world (Byers, 2000; Hewitt, 2001b). The sentiment was echoed at 2000’s World Economic Forum by Tony Blair (Blair, 2000). This approach was translated into support for the launch of the DDA in 2001. Security and the threat of terrorism became, for Patricia Hewitt at least, a further rationale for the new round (Hewitt, 2001a), but in general DTI ministers placed emphasis, again, on the DDA as a way of making globalisation work, or of showing that globalisation can work for everybody. For Hewitt, the WTO’s basis in ‘mutual obligation and advantage’ made it the best place for supporting or showcasing globalisation – and no place for protectionism (Hewitt, 2001b). It was certainly the case under Hewitt’s stewardship that championing the WTO process was a key element of foreign economic policy. However, support was not unconditional; it was offered on the basis of a particular understanding of the WTO as a pro-free trade institution. Moreover, it seems as if supporting free trade and multilateralism through the WTO were synonyms for New Labour. If a policy was not pro-globalisation, it was not appropriate as a multilateral measure. Despite the allusion to ‘development’, and indeed to free trade as a universal good, New Labour actively pursued a perceived British interest throughout the DDA. As one senior civil servant explained, the DDA ‘was never going to be a round for free’. Britain, seemingly with the support of the EU, insisted on

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the inclusion of a further agreement on services (following the General Agreement on Trade in Services, GATS, which was agreed as part of the previous negotiating round). As the consultation document Liberalising Trade in Services explained: A key part of the Doha agenda will be negotiations on trade in services. For the UK these negotiations are especially important. International trade in services is undeniably a major contributor to the UK’s economy. (DTI, 2002: 1) As discussed earlier, the DTI identified the service sector as key to Britain’s future prosperity. Of course, the proposal was also presented as positive for poor countries, as outlined in the previous section: development requires investment into key service sectors such as financial services and telecommunications – if Britain is permitted to exploit its ‘comparative advantage’ in these sectors, both Britain and the recipient countries will benefit (see DTI, 2002; Symons, 2002a). New Labour also continued to push for the inclusion of ‘the Singapore issues’ in the DDA, even as late as 2004 (DTI, 2004b: 103–9). The failure of another WTO ministerial meeting, in Cancun – lauded as a success in the media due to the agreement on ‘clarifying’ WTO rules on access to medicines – was caused principally by the EU and the United States’ insistence on the inclusion of the Singapore issues in the Doha agenda. The Singapore issues refer to the agenda outlined for the WTO’s future at its first ministerial meeting, in Singapore in 1996. This agenda has been consistently rejected by most poor countries. The issues are investment, competition, trade facilitation and government procurement. Taken together, they stipulate an economic model in which TNCs have no significant barriers to entering a foreign country and in fact must be treated by the state in question exactly as if they were a domestic firm. For New Labour, Britain’s prosperity was partially dependent on the ability of British-based firms to relocate aspects of their business abroad – interviews with former ministers confirmed this. The 2004 White Paper on trade and investment, looking back at the Cancun deadlock, claimed that ‘all four of the Singapore issues could have made a valuable contribution to trade and development’ (HM Government, 2004: 81). The priority, for the DTI at least, was investment. Of course, the DTI argued that an agreement on investment rules would benefit poor countries too, by creating a more perfect marketplace, and therefore a more efficient allocation of resources throughout the world (DTI, 2004b: 106). Opposition was explained by the lack of a longterm perspective by some WTO members (Symons, 2002b). The proposed WTO rules on harmonising competition rules, again opposed by most countries, were justified in the same way (DTI, 2004b: 10).

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Conversations with ministers seem to confirm that New Labour never considered Britain to have been at fault at all for the repeated DDA failures. The guilty party was always some protectionist nation – even where this included close allies (the United States, on steel) and EU partners (France, on agriculture) as well as developing countries. One particular minister interviewed presented this view quite belligerently. Other than the clarification on rules regarding medicine, perhaps the single most newsworthy episode in the DDA for the British media was Patricia Hewitt’s insistence in 2003 that New Labour was motivated by more than simply a British national interest. She wrote in the Guardian that: We will not accept or agree to any trade proposal that will damage the prospects of developing countries trading themselves out of poverty. We are not in these negotiations merely to promote UKplc. We are pursuing the new trade round because it is morally the right thing to do. We will act even if there is no direct benefit to the UK, although the reality is that we all benefit from the increase in markets that comes from the rise in global prosperity. (Hewitt, 2003a) This created minor headlines, but Hewitt’s words are deliberately ambiguous. She may have been prepared to sacrifice British interests, but ‘the reality’ means she does not need to. In fact, Liz Symons was so confident that globalisation and liberalisation were good for the development of poor countries, that in a speech in 2002, she acknowledged that poor countries were unlikely to accept the Singapore issues, and argued that as such these countries were acting against their own interests. More specifically, they were acting against the (long-term) interests of the poor in their own countries (Symons, 2002b). So New Labour knew what the world’s common interest was, even if poor countries did not. This is obviously a difficult argument to make explicitly. In 2005, then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Alan Johnson actually failed to mention Britain’s pursuit of further services liberalisation to the House of Commons. His parliamentary statement on the WTO talks in Hong Kong referred only to market access for poor countries in agriculture and cotton, SDT and aid-for-trade. Although it seems the Singapore issues were firmly off the agenda by 2005, following the failure at Cancun, services liberalisation was not – as confirmed by the DTI’s own publications. Yet Johnson did not report this crucial aspect of his department’s policy agenda (see Johnson, 2005).

Multilateral policy-making The status of multilateralism as a principle of trade policy for New Labour was fairly complex. As already argued, New Labour consistently supported the DDA, and the WTO more generally, as the best means to implement its agenda

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for trade and investment liberalisation. Yet it is true that bilateralism became more acceptable as the DDA stalled. Liberalisation and globalisation stated that the DTI was fully prepared to pursue its agenda bilaterally, although the multilateral route was much preferred. The reason for this preference was that WTO free trade agreements are more likely to produce an ‘undistorted’ global market or a ‘level playing field’ for all (DTI, 2004b: 85–6). Multilateralism, then, but only if it was the right kind of multilateralism; that is, only if it coincided with free trade. In 2003, then Minister for Trade Mike O’Brien described the shift towards bilateralism as an ‘inevitable’ result of the disappointing outcome at Cancun, albeit adding that ‘we continue to believe that the multilateral system should be the cornerstone of world trade rules’ (O’Brien, 2003). Indeed, the economistic vision of a global competitive marketplace as the most effective economic form was important to New Labour’s justification of both multilateralism and bilateralism; either could represent appropriate responses to globalisation if they led to liberalisation. Precisely what kind of institution did New Labour imagine the WTO was? It appears not to have fully bought the argument that the WTO is a political organisation, necessary to provide public scrutiny and supervision of the economic process of globalisation – in other words, that the WTO is an instrument of global governance. Obviously, New Labour welcomed the fact that international trade is conducted in accordance with rules upon which all parties are agreed and that the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism exists to enforce these rules (DTI, 2004b: 82). As such, the WTO can ‘frame’ the global market. But there is a crucial distinction that must be noted here: the principal reason for investing in the WTO was that measures such as global free trade, which the institution embodied, assisted the economic process of globalisation. For New Labour’s foreign economic policy agenda, the WTO did not govern globalisation or the global economy, but rather supported it. Stephen Byers argued in 1999, in fact, that the reason a new round was so important was that it would lead to ‘a stronger international structure to make globalisation work in harder times as well as easy ones’ (Byers, 1999a). The political was relegated below the economic in justifications for multilateralism. Thus the purpose of the WTO was to entrench the long-term process of liberalisation, in effect to prevent supposedly short-termist political interference in the process of globalisation. The EU was also a crucial international institution for New Labour’s foreign economic policy; the EU bargains as a single entity at the WTO. Although the Singapore issues were taken up by the EU, Britain was their strongest supporter. It is also largely in a European context that New Labour’s perspective on agriculture must be understood. It identified agriculture as an important aspect of comparative advantage for many poor countries. However, the unwillingness of the EU to significantly reform the Common Agricultural

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Policy (CAP) meant that agricultural trade liberalisation was never likely to be an outcome of the DDA. Thus, while agriculture is undoubtedly a significant aspect of New Labour’s approach to the WTO and the DDA, generally reflecting its support for free trade theory and an export-led development strategy, what the issue signifies about New Labour’s approach to the EU is even more significant. As noted above, New Labour blamed the protectionism of some rich countries for the DDA’s failure. According to one former minister interviewed, the government believed that the CAP was an inappropriate – and even illegitimate – measure in conditions of globalisation. EU trade politics was depicted as a contest between liberal and protectionist states, with agriculture and (to a lesser extent) textiles as the main battle ground. The content of policy was of far greater significance than the forum through which it was constructed. A joint Treasury/DTI paper published in 2007 on the EU and globalisation was extremely critical of EU structures and the economic performance of Europe in general. Yet this did not prevent New Labour leaders valorising the principle of multilateralism. This was particularly the case regarding Tony Blair’s forays into foreign economic policy, supported discursively by Patricia Hewitt and Clare Short, amongst others. Global institutions were seen as a hallmark of the global epoch – although it is clear that appropriate economic policy outcomes could be achieved without them. As suggested in the first section, responses to the financial crisis may impact upon New Labour’s understanding of and approach to multilateral policy-making. The emphasis here has been on the WTO, and to a lesser extent the EU, the only supranational organisations to have received sustained attention in New Labour’s discourse on foreign economic policy. Indeed, while the WTO was valorised to some extent, the EU was fairly consistently demonised. An examination of BERR’s discourse after 2007, or even DfID’s discourse throughout the period in question, suggest inaccuracies in the portrayal here. BERR placed far less emphasis on the WTO than the DTI, generally speaking, and DfID seemed never to have placed particular significance on any multilateral policy-making mechanisms, other than the WTO during the DDA. Of course, the crisis brought an issue other than trade liberalisation and international development into New Labour’s foreign economic policy discourse, that is, finance. But even here, the approach seems to have replicated New Labour’s approach to the WTO. While multilateralism was championed rhetorically, the actual content of policy was far more important, to the extent that no government department advocated any new multilateral mechanisms. The Treasury, and Gordon Brown, placed most emphasis on co-operation between nation-states rather than subservience to supranational authority. Global policy was necessary, but not global policy-making.

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Conclusion In relation to foreign economic policy, New Labour understood globalisation in predominantly economic terms. Furthermore, for New Labour the process was being perpetrated fundamentally by private economic actors: globalisation both demonstrates and enhances the power and importance of business organisations. Within this broad understanding, however, different approaches existed. This chapter has identified two related but distinct forms of argumentation present within New Labour’s globalisation discourse: firstly, global competition, an argument about the power and universalising force of market processes; secondly, epochal change, an argument which identified a more nebulous set of changes to the technological and geographical infrastructure of human relations and, as such, placed emphasis on individual firms rather than abstract market processes as the primary carriers of these changes. There is ambiguity within this argument over whether non-economic changes were causal or rather constitutive of globalisation as an economic process. For both forms of argument, however, the fact that change is ‘global’ was crucial to its meaning. The main policy orientation with which globalisation discourse was associated was New Labour’s support for trade and investment liberalisation. New Labour upheld free trade theory and the notion of comparative advantage – suggesting that, for New Labour, the idea of globalisation led to a renewed interest in classical liberalism. Liberalisation was depicted not only as the most desirable form of foreign economic policy, but also as the only appropriate policy response, due to it both empowering private economic actors and recognising the utility of private economic activity, the key to productivity increases. Liberalisation was itself treated as an inevitable process – or, at least, as the only alternative to economic ruin – precisely because of its association with globalisation. Crucially, liberalisation was already underway; business had forged a system of comparative advantage through the sheer force of economic logic. To be clear, New Labour’s support for free trade theory was not only related to the argument in a global marketplace; equally, it was intimately bound up with the notion of a ‘knowledge economy’. This notion dictates that productivity increases for Britain lie in knowledge-intense service sectors – more associated with the argument on epochal change, which places more emphasis on the importance of new technology. Discourses of competition and competitiveness combine, somewhat illogically, to justify liberalisation in a context of globalisation. New Labour’s foreign economic policy was also associated with an emphasis on international development. However, as we have seen, while New Labour’s understanding of development was not straightforward, it was entirely consistent with its views on liberalisation in the context of globalisation. Despite the allusion to classical liberalism, New Labour’s foreign economic policy certainly seemed to continue the neoliberal policies of its predecessors in

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government. The question is whether New Labour’s discourse on globalisation suggests that the neoliberal accommodation thesis is too simplistic. Certainly, New Labour’s discourse suggests an aversion to the Keynesian or social democratic state. Given the dependence of globalisation upon the private sector, traditional macro-economic instruments are depicted as futile and anachronistic. Yet the notion of the ‘active state’ remained important – if only, for foreign economic policy, to bring about a progressive form of globalisation. And there existed within New Labour’s discourse a fairly consistent rejection of neoliberalism. This could of course be seen as a rhetorical necessity given the Labour Party’s social democratic heritage – it does not alter the fact that New Labour policies bore the hallmarks of neoliberal assumptions and prescriptions. On the other hand, perhaps globalisation discourse itself carried more significance. Globalisation discourse undoubtedly emerged during an era of neoliberal ideological dominance, but its seemingly supreme status within the New Labour ideology may represent an ideological evolution – a move away from neoliberalism in favour of alternative ideas, whether old or new. It is certainly the case that many of the ideas to which the epochal change argument referred, such as technology, spatiality and the speed of change, are logically unrelated to neoliberalism as an ideology. It is obvious that the relationship between neoliberalism and globalisation discourse – even in the perspective of a single actor – is multidimensional. The different approaches to globalisation present within New Labour discourse both allude to neoliberalism, either by upholding an economistic view of the social universe and problematising state intervention, or by emphasising the role and importance of the individual (global) firm. Clearly, there is not a single ideological interface; rather, different parts of the neoliberal conceptual scheme (which itself is extremely contested) interact with the various logical and political connotations of globalisation and its conceptual relatives. It is possible therefore that the confrontation of modernist universalism with the view of economic change associated with globalisation discourse represents a new ideological formation. This is not to suggest that it is possible to divorce the idea of globalisation from neoliberal ideology in the New Labour discourse, as there are clearly elements of the definitions of globalisation upheld that necessitate ostensibly neoliberal foreign economic policies. Reversing Colin Hay’s logic, therefore, it is not that globalisation discourse expresses New Labour’s faith in neoliberalism, but rather that neoliberal policies express its faith in globalisation. It may be the case, therefore, that New Labour can uphold a policy agenda consistent with neoliberalism while rejecting neoliberalism’s ontological assumptions, and looking instead to traditions such as liberalism and social democracy within which to couch an otherwise novel perspective.

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References BERR (2007) ‘About us’, accessed at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/aboutus/index.html on 30 October 2010. Blair, T. (1998) ‘New Britain in the Modern World’, speech delivered to the EU/Japan Summit, 9 October 1998. Blair, T. (2000) ‘Speech to the World Economic Forum’, speech delivered to the World Economic Forum (Switzerland), 18 January 2000. Blair, T. (2001) ‘Helping People through Change’, speech delivered to the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce’, 2 February 2001. Blair, T. (2004) ‘Speech to Goldman Sachs on the Economy’, speech delivered at Goldman Sachs, 22 March 2004. Brown, G. (1998) ‘Speech to the CBI’, speech delivered to the Confederation of British Industry National Conference, 2 November 1998. Brown, G. (2000) ‘Speech to the Chamber of Commerce’, speech delivered to the Chamber of Commerce National Conference, 5 April 2000. Brown, G. (2004) ‘Competitiveness in Europe Post-enlargement’, speech delivered to Confederation of British Industry National Conference, 12 April 2004. Brown, G. (2005) ‘Global Britain, Global Europe: A Presidency Founded on ProEuropean Realism’, speech delivered at Mansion House, 22 June 2005. Brown, G. (2010) ‘Speech to the G20 London Summit’, speech delivered to the G20 London Summit, 2 April 2010. Byers, S. (1999a) ‘Address to the Opening Plenary Session of the WTO Ministerial Meeting’, speech delivered to WTO ministerial meeting (United States) on 30 November 1999. Byers, S. (1999b) ‘Speech at Mansion House’, speech delivered at Mansion House, 2 February 1999. Byers, S. (1999c) ‘Speech at the Chamber of Commerce’, speech delivered to the Chamber of Commerce National Conference, 3 June 1999. Byers, S. (2000) ‘Globalisation and Free Trade’, speech delivered at the London Business School, 4 August 2000. Darling, A. (2009) ‘Speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer at Mansion House’, speech delivered at Mansion House, 17 June 2009. DfID (2005) Trade Matters in the Fight Against World Poverty (London: The Stationery Office). DTI (2002) Liberalising Trade in Services: A New Consultation on the WTO GATS Negotiations (London: The Stationery Office). DTI (2003) ‘Competing in the global economy: The innovation challenge’, DTI Economics Paper 7, (London: The Stationery Office). DTI (2004a) ‘The benefits from competition: Some illustrative UK cases’, DTI Economics Paper 9 (London: The Stationery Office). DTI (2004b) ‘Liberalisation and globalisation: Maximising the benefits of international trade and investment’ DTI Economics Paper 10 (London: The Stationery Office). DTI (2005a) ‘Homepage’, accessed at www.dti.gov.uk on 1 December 2005. DTI (2005b) ‘About us’, accessed at www.dti.gov.uk on 1 December 2005.

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DTI (2005c) ‘Trade policy and the EU’, accessed at www.dti.gov.uk on 1 December 2005. DTI (2006) ‘International trade and investment: The economic rationale for government support’, DTI Economics Paper 18 (London: The Stationery Office). G20 (2009) ‘Global plan for recovery and reform’, accessed at www.londonsummit .gov.uk/resources/en/news/15766232/communique-020409 on 30 October 2010. Hennessy, P. (2009) ‘Brown calls for global co-operation to beat economic slump’, Telegraph, 31 January 2009. Hewitt, P. (2000) ‘Creating Competitive Advantage in the Knowledge Economy’, speech delivered to Oxford University, 21 November 2000. Hewitt, P. (2001a) ‘Building a stronger World Community through Trade’, speech delivered to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 25 October 2001. Hewitt, P. (2001b) ‘Free and Fair Trade for Peace and Prosperity’, speech delivered at the Foreign Press Association, 11 June 2001. Hewitt, P. (2003a) ‘Progressive Globalisation: Achieving Global Justice through Trade’, speech delivered to Fabian Society Conference, 23 June 2003. Hewitt, P. (2003b) ‘Progressive Globalisation: Achieving Global Justice through Trade’, speech delivered to TUC Globalisation and Gender Conference, 5 November 2003. HM Government (2000) Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor (London: The Stationery Office). HM Government (2004) Trade and Investment White Paper: Making Globalisation a Force for Good (London: The Stationery Office). HM Government/People’s Republic of China (2005) Responding to Global Economic Challenges (London: The Stationery Office). HM Treasury (2004) Skills in the Global Economy (London: The Stationery Office). HM Treasury (2005) Globalisation and the UK (London: The Stationery Office). HM Treasury (2008) Embracing Financial Globalisation (London: The Stationery Office). HM Treasury (2010) Budget 2010: Securing the Recovery (London: The Stationery Office). HM Treasury/DTI (2004) Trade and the Global Economy: The Role of International Trade in Productivity, Economic Reform and Growth (London: The Stationery Office). HM Treasury/DTI (2007) The Single Market: A Vision for the 21st Century (London: The Stationery Office). Johnson, A. (2005) ‘Parliamentary Statement on the WTO Talks in Hong Kong’, speech delivered to the House of Commons, 20 December 2005. Johnson, A. (2006) ‘The Impact of Globalisation’, speech delivered to the BCC Annual Conference, 3 April 2006. Mandelson, P. (2009) ‘How Does Britain Fight Its Way Back?’, speech delivered at Mansion House, 5 March 2009. McCartney, I. (2006) ‘Open Letter on Trade Policy’, accessed at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file4138 2.pdf on 30 October 2010. O’Brien, M. (2003) ‘World Trade post-Cancun’, speech delivered to SITPRO Conference, 21 October 2003.

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Pearson, I. (2005a) ‘Globalisation and the Evolution of the Midlands Economy’, speech delivered to Birmingham Chamber of Commerce, 14 October 2005. Pearson, I. (2005b) ‘The Challenge of the International Trading System’, speech delivered in London on 5 July 2005. Short, C. (1998) ‘The meaning of globalisation for development policy’, Social Policy and Administration, 32:5, pp. 456–63. Smith, A. (1950) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London: Methuen). Symons, L. (2002a) ‘New Partnership on a Global Stage’, speech delivered at CBI Seminar on Mexico, 11 November 2002. Symons, L. (2002b) ‘Trade and its Role in Sustainable Development’, speech delivered on 13 May 2002. UK Trade and Investment (2009) Financing Globalisation: The Credit Crunch and Its Impact on Expanding Multinationals (London: The Stationery Office). Young, A. R. & Peterson, J. (2006) ‘The EU and the new trade politics’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13:6, pp. 795–814.

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Serving the ‘offshore’: the case of International Financial Services, London International Financial Services, London is a not-for-profit lobbyist organisation for City-based financial services providers (known as British Invisibles until 2000). Its membership is drawn from the largest private sector organisations operating in the City of London, but includes also the Bank of England and the City of London Corporation. The organisation was in fact first established in 1968 by the Bank of England as the Committee on Invisible Exports. It formalised relationships between governmental and private sector (primarily City-based) actors, evolving into the Committee on Liberalisation of Trade in Services, which today forms a distinct portion of the IFSL structure. The Committee on Liberalisation of Trade in Services is chaired by senior IFSL figure John Cooke, a government official for three decades until 1997. In addition to its relationship with the British establishment, IFSL’s main lobbying activities are at the international level. IFSL lobbies EU policy-makers, including the governments of member-states, and representatives of WTO member-states in Geneva, in order to push for further multilateral agreements on services liberalisation. Although it represents its members’ interests on a wide range of issues, IFSL’s main agenda from 1997 to 2009 was the liberalisation of the national and international rules governing financial services trade. According to its website, all of its lobbying activity concerned trade policy. IFSL also undertook research and analysis on the nature and role of financial services in the British or European economy and provided a ‘networking’ route into international financial markets for financial service providers. Crucially, IFLS does not only represent ‘British’ firms, but rather also international and internationalised firms based in London. The empirical concerns of this case study conform broadly to those outlined in the Introduction. More specifically, they are similar to those of the previous chapter: whether globalisation was treated as exclusively economic – and if so, precisely what economic activities define the process – and whether it was deemed inherently positive or otherwise dependent on certain policy options. The IFSL’s presentation of the spatial connotations of globalisation discourse

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will also be a key issue. However, the primary empirical concern is the role of neoliberal ideology. The main purpose of the IFSL case study is to ponder what it means to be neoliberal in a context in which the globalisation concept has achieved ascendancy – and indeed to question whether neoliberalism as such remains a viable ideological category. The argument is that IFSL was ostensibly the archetypal neoliberal trade policy actor; it treated a wide-ranging liberalisation agenda as natural response to, and constituent element of, global economic change. Yet there were certainly images of spatiality present within IFSL’s discourse that did not correspond unproblematically with neoliberal ideology. For example, IFSL placed considerable emphasis on ‘the offshore’, and seemed to treat financial services as a predominantly offshore activity within a globalised or globalising economy. While offshore economic activities may have arisen under the auspices of neoliberalism, this does not mean the concept itself must be valorised. The case study is based primarily upon IFSL’s research papers and policy statements. The written evidence provided by IFSL to a recent House of Lords inquiry is also utilised extensively. In addition, two personal interviews with two senior members of staff at IFSL’s headquarters in London were undertaken. The chapter does not begin with a discussion of the meaning of globalisation for IFSL – the idea was rarely discussed in detail in documents. Instead it begins by discussing IFSL’s main agenda in support of an ‘outwardoriented economic policy’, which includes trade liberalisation, particularly for financial services, and privatisation. The second section looks at IFSL’s understanding of development, trade rules and multilateralism. The third section looks directly at the concept of globalisation and asks what can be inferred from IFSL’s use of the term in relation to various issues and policies, focusing in particular on spatial connotations. The implications of the financial crisis upon IFSL’s discourse will be considered throughout – yet it appears not to have brought about significant change in IFSL’s outlook on financial services and the global economy.

Outward-oriented economic policy IFSL defined its main agenda as promoting an ‘outward-oriented economic policy’ (2005c: 1). This has three key elements: first, support for trade liberalisation; second, specific support for financial services liberalisation, and other measures that will promote the expansion of the financial services sector – impacted upon recently, of course, by the financial crisis; third, support for the privatisation of state-owned industries, and the delivery of public services by the private sector. Each of these policy areas had ramifications for IFSL’s understanding of globalisation and related concepts.

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Liberalisation The most important statement of IFSL’s commitment to liberalisation was the paper Trade Liberalisation and Privatisation: Challenging the Sceptics (2005c). Two items worth noting initially are that the paper argued explicitly that liberalisation has ‘contributed substantially to economic development in many countries’ (2005c: 1), and that liberalisation works best in conjunction with ‘outward-orientated moves to attract foreign investment and promote competition’ (2005c: 9). The paper was organised around four ‘key facts’ which support the utility of trade liberalisation. One or more of these facts were referred to consistently in other IFSL documents published around 2005. Firstly, referring specifically to 2003, ‘30 percent of world exports of goods, equivalent to £2,275bn, was attributable to the WTO/GATT’s [General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs] role in facilitating growth in trade over the past fifty years’. Liberalisation is valued precisely because ‘it generates trade’, which is ‘a major driver of economic growth’ (IFSL, 2005c: 1–2). In Trade Liberalisation and Privatisation, it is said to follow logically that IFSL should be sceptical of the WTO’s SDT provisions, precisely because they impede trade: The growth of exports has been mainly concentrated in industrial countries, where trade has been boosted by 68 percent [since 1995], because developing countries have been largely exempt from the GATT/WTO mission of lowering import barriers under the principle of special and differential treatment. (IFSL, 2005c: 2) This statement appeared to attempt to mask a contradiction within IFSL’s discourse. Import barriers, in the form of SDT, are criticised, but it is export growth which is implied to lead to gross domestic product (GDP) growth. Clearly, the actual trading profile of particular countries was of only secondary significance. What really mattered is that they were trading, one way or another. In the related document Impact of Liberalising Financial Services, IFSL suggested that it is ‘irrational’ that more countries had not undertaken unilateral liberalisation, given that it is always the country that liberalises that gains more than any other party (2002: 4). This is consistent with IFSL’s general opposition to protectionism, which is deemed to have no economic rationale (Cooke, 2008: 4; IFSL, 2005b). One interviewee argued that, with the onset of globalisation, protectionism is only supported by ‘emotive arguments’ and added crucially that ‘the world is more interconnected now whether we want it to be or not ... slamming down borders can’t insulate countries from that’. As such, globalisation – presumably indicated by increased trade – demands liberalisation in order to increase trade.

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The second key fact in Trade Liberalisation and Privatisation is: ‘More globalised developing countries generated growth averaging 5 percent a year in the 1990s against 1.4 percent for less globalised countries’ (IFSL, 2005c: 1). Leaving aside, for the moment, what it means to be ‘more globalised’, the most direct implication is that liberalisation enables integration into the global market, which itself produces growth. Later in the document, this fact is re-articulated as: ‘Openness is directly linked to higher economic growth over the long term’ (IFSL, 2005c: 3). There was little attempt to expand upon the theory of causation: the fact of correlation between ‘more globalised’ or simply ‘openness’, and economic growth is assumed to demonstrate that the latter is caused by the former – overlooking the possibility that openness and growth are both effects of an alternative causal factor. Additionally, the silent assumption is that liberalisation is the only route to integration with the global economic system. Thirdly, liberalisation encourages foreign direct investment. Again, correlation was assumed to imply causation. The countries that trade most also receive the most FDI. While IFSL acknowledged that liberalised countries do not necessarily trade more than more closed economies, they argued that liberalised countries were more likely to trade more. FDI was itself supported on incongruous grounds: Attracting investment by foreign companies is a key component of creating a favourable climate for investment. (IFSL, 2005c: 2) So, investment is good because it leads to investment. It was also noted that FDI leads to export growth – because foreign investors will export from the host country into world markets – which is deemed a priori positive. The emphasis within New Labour’s discourse on FDI as a vehicle for knowledge transfer was less evident in IFSL’s discourse. The final and fourth key fact is that more globalised countries have less ‘extreme poverty’, as a result of the economic growth occasioned by liberalisation (IFSL, 2005c: 1). Of course, references to extreme rather than relative poverty are typical of, although obviously not exclusive to, neoliberalism. Indeed, we learn later in the document that the link between reduced extreme poverty and liberalisation applied incontrovertibly only to Asia. IFSL admitted that reductions in Latin America have been only ‘moderate’, and that level of extreme poverty in Africa remained ‘virtually unchanged’. However, these continents are not qualitatively different to Asia, they are merely making ‘slower progress’. Generally speaking, IFSL associated globalisation with the notion of progress, although probably less than New Labour. Overall, IFSL’s view on liberalisation was that it enables integration into a global economy, of which increasing trade is the main indicator. Global economic integration increases export markets and the availability of capital for investment – yet it

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was specifically trade which was seen as the hallmark of integration, which enabled the critical link to liberalisation as a trade-enabling measure.

Financial services IFSL’s understanding of financial services has important connotations for its approach to globalisation. Giving evidence to the House of Lords’ European Union Sub-Committee, John Cooke outlined IFSL’s belief that financial services is a massive contributor to economic growth in Britain, and Europe more generally. He explained that ‘[t]his has been achieved since a “big bang” in the mid-1980s, by conscious recourse to liberal and open policies for trade and investment in financial services’. As such, liberalisation has allowed Britain to develop a comparative advantage in financial services (Cooke, 2008: 3). Cooke added that the world economy is now dependent on financial services and that Europe is dependent upon the City of London in particular. He also noted IFSL’s demonstration that, where financial services liberalisation has a negative impact on growth in developing countries, it is best countered by further (albeit ‘properly sequenced’) liberalisation (Cooke, 2008: 5). Impact of Liberalising Financial Services argued that further liberalisation would enable the sector to grow more, and thereby help all sectors grow through providing ‘support for business’, and provide ‘access to capital’ through enabling stock market flotation (IFSL, 2002). It was specifically this argument that enabled one interviewee to conclude that ‘globalisation is more opportunity than constraint’. In reaction to the perceived charge that liberalisation had harmed manufacturing, IFSL offered the defence that financial services were more important to the global age and therefore that a liberal trade policy orientation was justifiable. While acknowledging that manufacturing contributed more to UK GDP, IFSL argued that financial services were more productive, because the sector employed less people per unit of value created. Furthermore, and crucially, manufacturing may currently contribute more to GDP, but it is now in terminal decline (IFSL, 2005b: 8; also, 2006c). Obviously, manufacturing is not in decline, from a global perspective – and its decline in Britain has been at least to some extent contingent on policy. Yet the imagery of declining traditional industries contrasted with globally relevant financial services is important do IFSL’s discourse on economic policy – the historical, political foundations to economic change were again airbrushed out. When discussing this topic, one interviewee responded that ‘economic reality’ meant the government must ‘pay special attention to’ the interests of the City. IFSL’s specific understanding of currency exchange, in which its members are highly involved, is fascinating. In their 2004 report on currency exchange, in a section titled ‘Speculation versus investment’, they attempt to defend the fact that 95 per cent of foreign exchange trading is speculative; yet their only noteworthy argument in this regard was that speculation is far more lucrative than investment

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(IFSL, 2004a: 3). The report also contains an illuminating ‘historical overview of the currency market’: Many centuries ago, the value of goods were expressed in terms of other goods. Eventually forms of metal like bronze, silver and gold came to be used to facilitate the exchange of merchandise. Coins were eventually minted from metal in stable political regimes. During the late Middle Ages, a variety of paper IOUs [sic] started gaining popularity as an exchange medium and there formed the basis for the development of currencies. Eventually most countries supported their currencies with convertibility to gold. This was the basis of the gold standard... This came under increasing pressure as national economies moved in different directions during the 1960s. In 1971, President Nixon suspended convertibility to gold and in 1973 the group of ten industrialised nations allowed their currencies to ‘float’ against each other. (IFSL, 2004a: 3) Note the second use of the word ‘eventually’, covering many centuries of history between paper ‘IOUs’ (an IOU is a written promise that ‘I owe you’ goods or services) in the Middle Ages and the gold standard of the mid-twentieth century. This overview was essentially an attempt to naturalise contemporary currency speculation, as if it were inevitable since the first ever coin was used. The growing status and profitability of the financial services sector appears to have led IFSL to Ricardian free trade theory, with financial services growth lauded as an example of comparative advantage. John Cooke informed the House of Lords that The classical Ricardian economic arguments for the role of a liberal external trade regime in promoting domestic welfare and wealth-creation are well-known [sic]. The recent expansion of UK financial services through an open market is emblematic of the practical effect of these arguments when they are allowed free play to operate. (Cooke, 2008: 3) One interviewee said, when asked about comparative advantage, that the success of liberalisation made it ‘difficult not to believe these arguments’. However, it is interesting that free trade theory was rarely talked about in relation to liberalisation in general, at least not without prompting. Seemingly, it was related only to the specific experience of financial services. In fact, IFSL undermined the very foundations of the theory by arguing that liberalisation generates diversification and that this is a good thing (IFSL, 2002: 2). Furthermore, IFSL’s vision for financial services provision hardly qualifies as cross-border trade at

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all; generally speaking they presented an image of London-based firms serving other international or internationalised firms operating in the City (see IFSL, 2004b, 2006b). In other words, London was thought of as an ‘offshore’ location where firms throughout the world could source financial services (the final section will return to this issue). Organisations on both sides of this equation may be international, but the notion that they are trading with each other is tenuous, and in fact IFSL does not consistently make this claim. New Labour struggled with a similar equation, that is, how to utilise comparative advantage and free trade theory while acknowledging the reality of global economic integration, rather than simply cross-border trade. For New Labour, it seems, support for free trade was a corollary of support for a global marketplace, and as such was associated mostly with the economistic global competition perspective on globalisation within New Labour’s discourse on foreign economic policy. For IFSL, references to free trade appear not to coincide with references to the market, but rather references to the impotence of the state – which will be discussed further below. It seems that although Ricardian theory had its place in IFSL’s arsenal – and one clearly related to the place of globalisation – IFSL’s perspective did not contain enough ideological ingredients to offer full support to the theory. Instead, it was used occasionally to justify a particular focus on financial services in foreign economic policy – but, in the main, IFSL presented financial services as a key part of a globally integrated economy, representing the offshore far more than the specialisation of any particular geographical entity. Until the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, very little in IFSL’s discourse suggested a belief that greater regulation of financial services was necessary. Yet a 2009 press release in response to plans by the Financial Services Authority to implement stricter regulation on financial services broadly accepted the proposed changes. However, this support was slightly duplicitous. In response to calls for greater international regulation, it welcomed moves towards ‘global coordination’ (similar to New Labour), but did not advocate any new institutional mechanisms – this will be discussed further below. Moreover, it included a plea for policy-makers at the European level to recognise the value of the City to the wider European economy and pushed for further financial services liberalisation through the WTO (IFSL, 2009a). Regarding liberalisation, IFSL’s annual report on banking in 2010 bemoaned the fact that ‘numerous barriers to international trade in financial services remain in place’, and suggested bilateral efforts should continue in the absence of progress at the WTO. Interestingly, IFSL seems never to have referred to the crisis as a ‘financial crisis’ – it is always referred to either narrowly as ‘the credit crunch’ or more broadly as a ‘global economic crisis’. Even more so than in New Labour’s discourse, there is no suggestion that the process of globalisation precipitated the crisis; it is presented as a result of the specific practice of selling on sub-prime mortgage debt rather

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than the nature of the financial system in general (see IFSL, 2010). The brochure Key Facts about the City of London reported that [i]nternational co-ordinated action by governments and central banks has continued to rebuild confidence in the global financial system with downside risks diminishing. Prospects for some firms and markets in London that were deeply affected by the crisis are improving. Banks are recapitalising and hedge funds have been generating substantial returns this year. (IFSL, 2009c) Generally speaking, IFSL was content to return to business as usual once recapitalisation had been achieved through co-ordinated international action.

Privatisation and the role of the state Privatisation is less directly related to the IFSL’s main policy agenda. However, for IFSL, the growth of the global financial services industry would require some privatisation by the governments of developing countries; it therefore lobbied national- and supranational-level authorities to this end. Nevertheless, privatisation in general was a surprisingly prominent aspect of IFSL’s perspective. IFSL’s general understanding of privatisation and its value is discussed here in order to provide insight into the organisation’s view of the state. It is in this regard that IFSL can be associated with a neoliberal perspective. Privatisation was associated with a range of direct and indirect benefits (for developed and developing countries), chiefly that privatised companies are run more efficiently due to competitive pressures, therefore making more profit and ultimately paying more tax (again this is not empirically verified). Privatisation was also said to enable capital market development, through its attractiveness to foreign investors (IFSL, 2003a, 2003b). At the root of these supposed benefits were assumptions about the inherent utility of the private sector, in contrast to state intervention. On a research paper on public–private partnership (PPP), IFSL argued that PPP allows each partner to concentrate on activities that best suit their respective skills. For the public sector the key skill is to procure services that are consistent with long-term policy priorities, while for the private sector the key skill is to deliver those services at the most efficient costs. (2003b: 4) The terminology in use here, particularly the concept of ‘skills’, is quite odd, yet it achieves the obvious intent of clearly demarcating the proper functions of state and market. Despite this, one IFSL official interviewed argued explicitly that IFSL does not lobby on privatisation, stating that ‘IFSL is not in the

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business of telling foreign governments what to do... But we do seek to make the intellectual argument for a free and open economy, of which privatisation is a part.’ The statement is again somewhat duplicitous, given that some privatisation measures are necessitated by GATS, which IFSL seeks to expand (without SDT). Yet this is not an unexpected aspect of any political discourse. The main conclusion drawn here is that, for IFSL, that openness to international or transnational economic processes and actors was significantly entwined with IFSL’s understanding of economic freedom. Privatisation was seen as key to openness. This represents a valorisation of private sector organisations that we can associate with neoliberalism. However, the association of openness with global economic integration is not necessarily, in a logical sense, derived from neoliberal ideology. The fact that IFSL’s position on the state is linked so closely to its ‘outward-orientation’ is suggestive of broader intellectual horizons.

Development and international trade rules Development and liberalisation As indicated in the previous section, much of IFSL’s support for liberalisation was couched in terms of the benefits that will accrue to developing countries. IFSL’s specific support for financial services was highly relevant to some of the most controversial aspects of the DDA. This sub-section therefore examines IFSL’s understanding of development in greater depth. There appeared to be little equivocation on the possibility of development through liberalisation and the entry of foreign financial service providers – certainly less than was evident in the DTI’s discourse. In his evidence to the House of Lords, John Cooke actually reported that IFSL claims no special expertise in this area, beyond taking the view that trade and development are inherently interlinked, given that longterm, sustainable development in poorer countries is virtually impossible without effective access to the global trading system... [Developing countries] stand to accrue disproportionate benefits should the Doha Round be successfully concluded. (2008: 4) The question asked by the committee was ‘What should be the relationship between European trade policy and policies on development?’; the admission of ‘no special expertise’ is surely due to the fact that, for IFSL, the notion of any distinction between increasing trade through liberalisation and development was unpalatable. IFSL conceived of economic development as entirely synonymous with economic growth and therefore rejected the premise of the question. Interestingly, despite repeated references to ‘development’ and to the WTO’s

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Doha round, the Doha negotiations were rarely defined in the IFSL literature as a ‘development agenda’. For IFSL, every negotiating round is a development agenda, since all previous rounds had also been intent on producing development, in that they had been intent on producing economic growth throughout the world. Therefore development was synonymous with becoming competitive in global markets; the policy document Capacity Building and Competitiveness in Developing Countries (IFSL, 2005a) used the phrases ‘development strategy’ and ‘competitiveness strategy’ interchangeably. Inevitably development was therefore used as rationale for financial services liberalisation, especially given that IFSL deemed financial services provision as central to ‘capacity building’. The relationship between development and financial services was further detailed in the policy document Benefits to Emerging Economies of Liberalising Financial Services and Promoting Access to Finance. The document argued: Financial services have a crucial role to play in accelerating the development of emerging economies. This is because properly functioning financial markets help to connect businesses with lenders and investors with funds to put into ventures along with sharing of risks... [I]nadequacies in finance create barriers to opportunity and increase costs for small and large enterprises. (IFSL, 2006a: 1) Development is based on investment in the private sector, which requires financial services, which requires liberalisation. However, although the document outlined the necessity of a large and competitive financial market, it did not provide the specific link between liberalisation and the entry of foreign financiers into developing countries in order to constitute such a marketplace. It is not clear whether this is a case of ideological reticence, akin to the DTI’s silence on the Singapore issues, or rather an oversight arising from an assumption that such a phenomenon would be entirely incontrovertible. Both interviewees offered the example of China in relation to the relationship between financial services and liberalisation, by way of demonstrating that IFSL’s agenda was not simply in the interests of IFSL members, but rather the entire world. One interviewee argued that IFSL expected liberalisation to lead, eventually, to growing competition from indigenous service providers in countries like China, but that this was a good thing for the world in general. The other argued it is precisely because China is achieving rapid development that financial services liberalisation is necessary. Despite allusions to China, IFSL consistently upheld that development required a lesser role for the state in the economy – only privatisation could generate ‘access to finance’ (2005c: 9). While Impact of Liberalising Financial Services says ‘it is vital to strengthen the supporting the supporting institutional framework, particularly the supervisory and regulatory functions of the state’

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(IFSL, 2002: 4), interviewees were unable to offer a single example of where IFSL believed developing countries needed to increase state capacity. New Labour was cautiously supportive of SDT as part of trade and investment liberalisation, which enabled temporary opt-outs from the world trade regime for poor countries. IFSL offered the same support, rhetorically, to SDT, although related the agenda only to the sequencing of implementation. One interviewee explained that ‘it’s mainly a matter of avoiding dogmatism’. In practice, IFSL referred far less to development in the period following the financial crisis – no doubt related to the suspension of the DDA and therefore the institutional decoupling of trade liberalisation from a formal development agenda.

Multilateralism IFSL’s opinion on the WTO is obviously a key component of its approach to liberalisation and ultimately globalisation. The IFSL website offered support for the multilateral trade regime: IFSL believes that trade agreements are most effective when negotiated on a multilateral basis. Multilateral agreements offer the opportunity to secure genuine trade liberalisation on the basis of legal and binding provisions that apply to all. (IFSL, 2008) John Cooke told the House of Lords that: the existence of the GATT and the WTO, and the multilateral rulesbased system underpinning both, has brought order and stability to international trade relations... The further development of the multilateral trade framework will be a key factor in building global prosperity. (Cooke, 2008: 1–2) He added that the WTO has [l]ong-standing legitimacy as the guardian of the multilateral rulesbased system for international trade, backed by a dispute settlement mechanism that has few if any equals among international treaty organisations. (Cooke, 2008: 7–8) Yet contained within this seemingly strong support for the WTO’s ‘abiding role’ is doubt about the extent to which IFSL valued the institution. Its legitimacy appeared to be solely outcomes-based. IFSL welcomed the WTO’s ability to ‘lock-in genuine liberalisation’ (Cooke, 2008: 2) and its near-universal coverage. Multilateral rules are therefore the best form of trade agreements, but, as with some aspects of New Labour’s discourse, there is ambiguity concerning whether

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the WTO mechanism itself was bestowed with any political authority, exogenous to economic processes. As such, other forms of free trade agreements were acceptable. The website stated that ‘[w]hile traditional, negotiated, liberalisation of trade barriers remains the most important channel for trade policy, we continue to pursue complementary activities’ (IFSL, 2008). The main ‘complementary activity’ is bilateral agreements. Cooke says it would be ‘irresponsible’ not to pursue such agreements, given the gains that accrue from liberalisation: As long as it remains necessary to seek further liberalisation to unlock the full economic potential of the UK financial services sector, it would be irresponsible not to seek all avenues where progress can be made, and IFSL therefore sees an important role for bilateral negotiations. (2008: 3) He also pointed out that, if countries were to embark on unilateral reform, formal international agreements may be entirely unnecessary (Cooke, 2008: 6– 7). This is a position upheld by IFSL throughout the global economic downturn. So it seems the WTO was supported primarily because it gives leverage to the pro-liberalisation argument. The notion that unilateral reforms could negate the need for the WTO altogether proves that IFSL’s view of the WTO is contingent upon its policy outcomes. The view is suggestive of Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan’s argument that institutions such as the WTO are viewed as economic rather than political entities. They are part of a global economic system that would exist even if they did not. Therefore, IFSL’s references to the WTO were always fairly superficial. If the value of liberalisation is established, then the value of the WTO follows. There was no suggestion within the IFSL literature that the WTO’s basis in multilateralism constitutes an ideological dilemma – a key difference to New Labour’s discourse. As noted in the previous section, it seems IFSL’s approach to multilateralism altered slightly following the financial crisis. Regarding financial regulation, they seemed to accept that international regulation was necessary. However, the (small-c) conservative nature of this regulation is summed up by IFSL’s Director of Economics Duncan Mackenzie’s statement that IFSL believes that more convergence of the world’s regulatory and supervisory regimes is desirable, and that development of market structures should promote competition and openness as well as providing scope for innovation. Overall, regulation should reinforce the role of financial services as a key enabler of social and economic development. It should also facilitate progress towards easier market access and growth in international trade. (cited in IFSL, 2009b)

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In terms of liberalisation, IFSL pushed for greater trade and investment liberalisation through the WTO in response to the crisis, but seemed equally comfortable with bilateral or unilateral reforms.

Globalisation and the IFSL agenda Although the globalisation concept (and related concepts) was cited frequently by IFSL, it was rarely discussed. This is interesting in-itself. In relation to the two dominant strands of thinking within New Labour’s foreign economic policy, IFSL did not refer at all to non-economic aspects of globalisation, in contrast to the epochal change perspective. But in slight contrast to the global competition perspective, it did employ notions of globality extensively. It could be argued that, because IFSL did not put forward a classical liberal argument about the marketplace and competition, it made use of the ideological resources of globalisation discourse to justify ‘outward-orientation’ – despite not fully supporting the non-economic connotations inherent in the globalisation concept as used by the epochal change argument within New Labour’s discourse. This section will attempt to test this argument by looking more closely at IFSL’s use of the globalisation concept. It also considers notions of spatiality and representation in IFSL’s perspective, which will surely be complicit in some way in any genuine role for the globalisation concept in the organisation’s ideological morphology.

Globalisation In interviews, globalisation was defined by IFSL employees as ‘interconnection’ or ‘interdependence of economies’. When prompted about the content of such connections, one interviewee cited ‘market integration’. The other interviewee expanded on the nature of the constraint, declaring that globalisation ‘is a fact’, and as such is ‘irreversible’. They argued that globalisation was ‘an inexorable process’ which had begun with the Spanish Empire in the sixteenth century, concluding ‘so these things are of long-standing’. Throughout these conversations, there was of course an implicit assumption that technological development had enabled interconnection or integration, yet, from discussions about contemporary ‘globalising’ technologies such as the internet, it is clear that IFSL conceived of the profit motive as the genesis of technological development. Of course, IFSL’s public persona is this chapter’s main concern. In the policy document Impact of Liberalising Financial Services (IFSL, 2002), it is argued that: moves towards globalisation since the early 1980s have been spurred by technical advances in transport and communication technologies and

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by the choice of larger developing countries to improve their investment climates and open up to foreign trade and investment. (IFSL, 2002: 1) Although the inevitable implication is that it is Western corporations taking advantage of technological change and creating interdependence by investing in the developing countries that have liberalised, this was not presented as the core aspect of the globalisation story. The core seems to exist as unsaid: some eternal global economic creature which can be more or less enabled by technology, or more or less supported by political decisions. If any particular political actors were responsible for the negative results of globalisation, it was actually developing countries – yet, since they were seeking only to develop their economies (in the only way they can), this behaviour could not be criticised. Like New Labour, IFSL used circular logic to naturalise, and therefore legitimate, the reality of the liberal trade regime, by incorporating existing liberalisation measures into its account of globalisation. For instance, the policy document Capacity Building and Competitiveness in Developing Countries argued that, due to globalisation the global business environment is becoming increasingly competitive as a result of falling trade barriers, technology-driven developments in products and services and more exacting standards. If firms are to respond effectively to these demands and take advantage of the opportunities offered by new markets, technologies, skills and financial sources they need to operate in a liberal but appropriately regulated business environment. (IFSL, 2005a: 1) This passage demonstrates IFSL’s employment of ‘falling trade barriers’ as one of the reasons why countries must liberalise – as if there has always been a ‘global business environment’, within which the reduction of trade barriers is a naturally occurring phenomenon which we can no longer ignore. In this context, it would be worth considering again the notion found in Trade Liberalisation and Privatisation that ‘more globalised’ countries have higher growth rates than ‘less globalised’ countries (IFSL, 2005c). The notion that countries may be more or less globalised is a logical contradiction – although these are frequently found in ideologies in practice. The thesis was first stated in Impact of Liberalising Financial Services: During the 1990s a considerable gap opened up between those countries that have become more globalised and those that are less open to liberalisation. According to a World Bank report more globalised

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developing countries generated growth averaging 5 percent a year against –1 percent a year for less globalised countries. (IFSL, 2002: 1–2) The term ‘globalised’ has an interesting function here. For one thing, there was ambiguity regarding causality: being more or less globalised may lead to more or less growth, but does globalisation create growth? The language was slippery but it seems that such a claim was not central to IFSL’s understanding of globalisation. The term ‘globalised’ depicts a particular relationship with global markets, which is why it is so often synonymous for the IFSL with ‘liberalised’ or ‘open’. Becoming globalised (or not), therefore, is what happens when a country liberalises (or not) and thus selects a mode of interaction with the global economy: ultimately it is liberalisation which assumes causality in relation to economic growth. Yet precisely what is it that a country is opening itself up to through liberalisation? How can a country become ‘globalised’ simply by liberalising? Surely this depends on the status of all other countries in the world, unless globality is something exogenous to all political units. Given that the entire planet is covered by some form of political authority, we have to assume that globalisation is a feature of something contained within these units, but not constituted by it. This is precisely how IFSL legitimated and valorised narrowly defined economic activity with globalisation discourse. Colin Hay’s analysis of globalisation discourse would probably point to duplicity in IFSL’s language, in that IFSL uses the notion of globalisation to justify a political decision, that is, liberalisation – therefore rendering a political contingency an economic necessity. However, if one genuinely sees the context of any choice over liberalisation as a choice over whether to accept or oppose some fundamental law of human organisation, then ‘the logic of no alternative’ is not merely rhetorical or discursive but rather internalised through ideology. The argument here resembles Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan’s finding that the globalisation concept can primarily connote spatiality while maintaining that its main implication is in the economic realm, or perceptions of the economic realm. Cameron and Palan also point to the notion of ‘offshoring’ or ‘the offshore’ in support of their argument; it would be interesting therefore to refer again to IFSL’s understanding of and approach to offshoring. Offshoring was in fact justified by IFSL because it is more efficient for firms, which is a priori good. All countries will inevitably benefit as a result: Companies have strong motives for offshoring, such as cost reduction, as well as procurement objectives, location quality and ability to tap new markets... Overall offshoring contributes to enhancing the competitiveness and profitability of companies while generating faster economic growth and leading to a structural economic shift into higher value added activities in the countries that are outsourcing. (IFSL, 2005b: 1)

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The policy orientation implied here is in line with the rest of IFSL’s platform. What is interesting is that the offshoring concept was used so flippantly. A British Invisibles document of 2000 on the banking sector in fact describes Britain as ‘an offshore location’ (2000: 4). It appeared not to matter where or what the offshore is; indeed any space can become an offshore location if they are hospitable to economic forces ultimately independent from any territorial anchor. Not only were the negative connotations of offshoring not considered, the concept seems to reinforce the power of business over politics, which was welcomed by IFSL. Consider IFSL’s reference to this fact, supposedly accurate as of 2005: The broader economic gains to be obtained have been measured at a net $0.47 for every $1.00 that is offshored: $0.33 to the country where the offshored operation is located and $0.14 to the home country. (2005b: 1) Obviously, this is a highly generalised account of the benefits of offshoring. A more thorough assessment of offshoring surely requires a breakdown of the host countries – especially if countries like Britain are to be designated as offshore – and the operations in question. Furthermore, IFSL elected not to speculate on how much return is garnered by every $1.00 not offshored. We can assume that it is less than 47 per cent, but it is surely more than 14 per cent for the ‘home’ country. It is the interests of the private firms, however, that were the principal consideration. The financial crisis appears not to have altered IFSL’s stance on offshoring. Defining the process as ‘cost containment’, a 2010 report acknowledged that offshoring had slowed since the onset of the crisis, but it was still presented as a normal and potentially lucrative aspect of business strategy (IFSL, 2010).

In whose interest? One of the most interesting aspects of IFSL’s discourse is the ambiguity over the territorial unit to which the organisation pertained. This sub-section looks at IFSL’s association with London in the context of its policy agenda and its understanding of globalisation. We could see IFSL’s understanding of spatiality and representation as indicative of its understanding of globalisation, but it is probably also the case that its unique experience of the financial services sector in London encouraged a certain view of the global economy. The name ‘International Financial Services London’ could be described as merely a better representation of IFSL’s membership, with British firms having undergone ‘internationalisation’ and a large number of ‘foreign’ firms now based in Britain. The IFSL website stated that ‘[o]ur wide-ranging membership reflects the UK’s position as the leading marketplace for global financial business,

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irrespective of nationality’ (IFSL, 2008). The most immediate connotation, it would appear, was the naturalisation of the internationalisation of business. By stating baldly that IFSL represents internationalised firms, it legitimated their nature. The most interesting issue, however, is the related question of IFSL’s territorial remit: it does not represent any internationalised firm in any sector, but rather only City-based firms in the financial services sector. In what terms, then, did it imagine the remit? Despite the reference to Britain or the UK on the website, IFSL would include many firms with headquarters outside the country in its membership, and would exclude British firms which operate in different markets. Nevertheless, there were elements of Britishness in IFSL discourse. IFSL did occasionally refer to a ‘British interest’, usually in relation to the recognition that the financial services sector in Britain is far stronger than most other countries, and in particular Britain’s large (and growing) trade surplus in financial services (see 2003d, 2006e, 2007). John Cooke’s evidence to the House of Lords is again illuminating in this regard. He argued that financial services ... are an area of special interest for the UK. This sector represents 10.1 per cent of the UK economy, a far larger proportion than any of the UK’s EU counterparts... No other EU member state has a financial services sector (wholesale or retail) which is close to being as prominent or successful as that of the UK. (Cooke, 2008: 2) However, he also said: Much of this is concentrated in the City of London: as a financial centre, London provides a market for investors in the 692 international companies listed in the UK. London also accounts for 79 per cent of European hedge fund assets, 75 per cent of worldwide Eurobond trading, 70 per cent of the global secondary bond market, 66 per cent of global turnover in internationally traded insurance and reinsurance services, 53 per cent of cross-border equity trading, 50 per cent of private equity in Europe, 43 per cent of over-the-counter derivatives trading, 34 per cent of all global foreign exchange turnover, and 20 per cent of cross-border bank lending. (Cooke, 2008: 2) We see here that the City of London qua the City of London was extremely central to IFSL’s political imagination. Cooke actually makes no attempt to show this economic activity translates into specific gains for Britain, beyond the implication that it is good for Britain that the City of London as an economic resource is based within Britain’s borders. In fact, one interviewee disputed the notion that any of IFSL’s members are British, by arguing that there is no such thing as a ‘British firm’ anymore. Clearly this resonates with the idea that the

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global economy exists beyond any country, even where it operates, necessarily, within nation-states. Clearly, the City of London is not simply a resource for Britain, but rather the world in general. Cooke made the argument that the City is an invaluable resource for Europe in particular – London allows Europe to compete with New York in North America and Tokyo in Asia (2008: 2–3) – but far more often than not, London was depicted as a specifically global centre. The prevailing imagery was that of London as a precious global resource that needs to be protected, so to speak. Cooke says that ‘London is now the world’s premier financial services centre, and the location of choice for multinational companies seeking to raise capital for global business’ (2008: 3). The notion of London as a global centre pervaded IFSL publications (see 2003d, 2004a, 2004b, 2005b, 2006b, 2006e, 2007). This was a sentiment that survived the financial crisis, as Duncan Mackenzie explained: While recovery in financial markets remains tentative, the UK has a broad and deep financial services market on which to build. The structural strengths – diversity of markets, strong skills base, global orientation and legal system – that underpin London’s status as a global financial centre remain in place. London’s instinctive internationalism and openness to global business provides a base for expanding markets. (cited in IFSL, 2009b) London was even lauded, for instance, as ‘the world’s leading educator in financial services’, with IFSL claiming that ‘London’s status as a leading financial centre gives a cutting edge to the qualifications and professional development offered by institutions and other training providers’ (2006d: 1). What IFSL upheld, then, was the symbiosis of local and global. Supporting London is necessary to support globalisation; in fact London is globalisation, due to its integral role in global economic integration and interconnectedness. Yet it is for all intents and purposes an offshore location – the economic centre of the global economy that is not literally ‘virtual’, but was nevertheless depicted as independent of territorial anchorage. The missing link is of course the national level, where sovereign states reside.

Conclusion IFSL rarely explained its understanding of or approach to globalisation in depth. Whereas New Labour often organised its approach to a given issue around a particular view on globalisation – or global economic change more broadly – and indeed used the concept in defining its ideological perspective, IFSL cited the concept regularly without defining it. However, this does not

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necessarily mean that the concept of globalisation was any less important to IFSL’s worldview. In fact, the opposite could be true. IFSL was not unsettled by globalisation discourse; it was ingrained. Ostensibly, globalisation could be seen as simply synonymous with liberalisation for IFSL. To ‘globalise’ is to liberalise, and a globalised world is one in which free trade theory reigns. This, in itself, would be an interesting finding. It suggests the replacement of being open to trade flows with being open to something far more significant (and irresistible); that is, some form of global economic system. Nevertheless, the situation is more complex than this: what is it about the globalisation concept or the notion of a global economy than enables such a replacement to take place or that allows the context of liberalisation to be presented as irresistible? There is evidence in IFSL’s discourse of the view that the global economy is placeless. It is a space of human existence where only economic laws apply, devoid most importantly of the political interference permitted by territorial attachment. The global economy will interact with earth-bound economic activity, but any significant sites of the global economy itself are depicted as offshore – referring to global centres such as London rather than simply tax havens. ‘Development’ meant to attune ‘local’ economic activities to the global economy – which invariably supports the conclusion that financial services liberalisation is crucial to the development process. Recall that, although Ricardian theory was cited by IFSL, it seems to have been far less important to IFSL than it was to New Labour. This suggests that although IFSL had not entirely moved away from the language of free trade and protectionism, the reality of globalisation as understood by IFSL means the notion of a liberal trade regime is slightly anachronistic. It would be useful to ponder again exactly how IFSL’s approach to globalisation compares with New Labour’s, as evident in discourses around foreign economic policy. IFSL’s approach is not quite akin to the ‘global competition’ perspective within New Labour. Strangely, perhaps, IFSL did not apply concepts such as market or marketplace, or even competition, extensively – it was used in relation to specific sectors such as currency exchange, but rarely in an abstract sense. Global economic change is not presented as the extension of the inevitable (and efficient) forces of market competition. IFSL more regularly referred to the private sector as a physical entity rather than set of abstract processes. As such, it is the internationalised firms which are the carriers and architecture of globalisation. This is more similar to the epochal change perspective within the New Labour discourse. However, whereas New Labour pointed to non-economic phenomena which had enabled internationalisation (synonymous with modernisation), the IFSL’s discourse remained almost exclusively economistic. The fact that notions of globality were regularly cited, as in the epochal change perspective, but rarely explained seems to support the

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finding that IFSL’s understanding of globalisation rests somewhere between the two strands of thinking within New Labour’s discourse. However, to view ideologising around the idea of globalisation as a spectrum is probably misleading, as later chapters will demonstrate. Furthermore, there are other important differences to New Labour. Firstly, the sense of novelty attributed to the process of globalisation. New Labour consistently presented the global economic context as new – correlating with rhetoric in New Labour’s presentation of its ideological perspective. Even where the origins of globalisation were presented as old, the manifestation of the phenomenon was new. It seems, however, that IFSL was more eager to present globalisation as a long-standing process. IFSL did, of course, refer also to ‘change’ fairly extensively, which might contradict this; yet ambiguity is not necessarily a sign of ideological confusion. The point is, although there has been economic change, the process of globalisation is not a novel phenomenon. Whereas New Labour saw globalisation as something that has happened to capitalism quite recently – requiring social democratic reorientation – the IFSL saw globalisation as produced by ever-present features of capitalism. Of course, this does not mean IFSL had ‘predicted’ globalisation, but rather that this meaning has been applied post hoc. Secondly, while both IFSL and New Labour accepted bilateral in place of multilateral free trade agreements (in terms of policy outcomes and in that they were legitimised as pro-globalisation), New Labour’s discourse exhibited tensions surrounding this orientation. IFSL portrayed no such tension, only expressing a preference for multilateralism where possible. The most important analytical issue regarding IFSL is whether the organisation’s ideological perspective can be described as neoliberalism. Clearly, it would be imprudent to divorce IFSL from neoliberalism entirely. IFSL supported the inherent utility of business activity, in contrast to state intervention. Yet it is not business per se or capitalism per se that alone attracted its support. The supranational or global nature of economic activity was a crucial part of IFSL’s support. Although it is tempting to say that such emphases represent not neoliberalism but indeed classical liberalism, which is seemingly more attuned to the universalism inherent in Enlightenment ideologies, IFSL’s discourse lacked (relatively speaking) trademark liberal concepts such as market. So the references to globalisation and globality appear to represent somewhat novel ideational phenomena. It would be impossible to adjudicate any more firmly than this at this stage: ideologies evolve, and ideas that start life at the margins of a given tradition of thought may acquire a higher status over time (or in relation to different issues), eventually gaining independence from the parent tradition.

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References British Invisibles (2000) Banking (London: British Invisibles). Cooke, J. (2008) Evidence to House of Lords European Union Sub-Committee Inquiry into European Trade Policy, accessed at www.ifsl.org.uk on 1 February 2009 (London: IFSL). IFSL (2002) Impact of Liberalising Financial Services (London: IFSL). IFSL (2003a) Privatisation: UK Expertise for International Markets (London: IFSL). IFSL (2003b) Public–Private Partnerships: UK Expertise for International Markets (London: IFSL). IFSL (2003c) UK Financial Sector Net Exports 2003 (London: IFSL). IFSL (2004a) Foreign Exchange (London: IFSL). IFSL (2004b) International Financial Markets in the UK (London: IFSL). IFSL (2005a) Capacity Building and Competitiveness in Developing Countries (London: IFSL). IFSL (2005b) Offshoring of Services: Impact and Implications (London: IFSL). IFSL (2005c) Trade Liberalisation and Privatisation: Challenging the Sceptics (London: IFSL). IFSL (2006a) Benefits to Emerging Economies of Liberalising Financial Services and Promoting Access to Finance (London: IFSL). IFSL (2006b) Commodities Trading (London: IFSL). IFSL (2006c) Economic Contribution of UK Financial Services 2006 (London: IFSL). IFSL (2006d) Financial Services Education and Training: UK Expertise for International Markets (London: IFSL). IFSL (2006e) UK Financial Sector Net Exports 2006 (London: IFSL). IFSL (2007) UK Financial Sector Net Exports 2007 (London: IFSL). IFSL (2008) ‘IFSL website’, accessed at www.ifsl.org.uk on 1 December 2008. IFSL (2009a) ‘IFSL response to the Turner Review and the FSA discussion paper’, accessed at www.ifsl.gov.uk on 30 October 2010. IFSL (2009b) International Financial Markets (London: IFSL). IFSL (2009c) Key Facts about the City of London (London: IFSL). IFSL (2010) Banking (London: IFSL).

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The free trade dilemma: the case of the Liberal Democrats Among the political groups discussed in this book, the Liberal Democrats were the most likely to consciously associate themselves with a particular ideological tradition, that is, liberalism – indeed interviewees claimed to uphold an explicitly liberal approach to globalisation. Of course, this self-identification should not be taken at face value. It does mean, however, that it is necessary to preface a discussion of the Liberal Democrats’ discourse on foreign economic policy and globalisation with a discussion of how the party presented its fundamental values and beliefs. The chapter’s empirical focus is exclusively the Westminster-based party, that is, members of Parliament and national leadership. Although this involves overlooking possible problems regarding the representativeness of the Westminster-based party, it focuses attention on the individuals most influential on the party’s foreign economic policy stance and on British political culture more generally. It is also the case that most relevant documents were published and indeed authored by the party headquarters in Westminster. One of the main issues that emerged in the previous two chapters was the potential role of classical liberalism – or a classical liberal approach to international trade – in globalisation discourse. A study of the Liberal Democrats’ discourse will enable further reflection on this emerging finding. While the chief focus is the Liberal Democrats’ understanding and presentation of globalisation, the party’s understanding of free trade is a significant concern. The role of internationalism is also a key part of the empirical inquiry in this chapter. Internationalism has always been an important tenet of liberalism, derived from the universality of abstract liberal ideals. It would be interesting to discover whether this inherent universalism was empowered by globalisation discourse or, more specifically, the view that there exists supranational social and economic processes. As such, in terms of both definitions of globalisation and the evolving meaning of free trade, the role of notions of spatiality will be a further crucial aspect of the empirical inquiry. The chapter will show that the globalisation concept clearly resonated with many of the Liberal Democrats’ commitments in relation to foreign

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economic policy – particularly free trade, economic freedom and the marketplace, and multilateralism. For instance, globalisation is cited in describing changes to the real-world context of these commitments. However, it will argue that, whereas the globalisation concept seemed to strengthen New Labour’s attachment to these ideas, it seems to disrupt the Liberal Democrats’ attachment to them. There is no uniform outcome of this disruption, and it may be political as well as intellectual. It could perhaps be due to tensions between liberalism and its neoliberal offspring. Interestingly, the Liberal Democrats’ response to the financial crisis seems entirely consistent with its pre-crisis approach to globalisation. While it struggled to reconcile, in an intellectual sense, its ideological support for free trade with the version of globalisation offered by New Labour and other elites, the party’s nuanced and more cautious pro-globalisation offered resources through which to construct a distinctive position on the crisis which clearly resonated in British politics from 2008 onwards. Of course, there is not space to investigate these trends in detail here. The focus on post-1997 ideological change means this chapter spans the leadership of left-leaning Charles Kennedy, the rise of the rightleaning ‘Orange Book’ brigade, the ineffective leadership of compromise candidate Menzies Campbell, the eventual victory of the right following Nick Clegg’s election as leader and then an apparent return to the left as the party’s Treasury spokesman Vince Cable led the Liberal Democrat response to the financial crisis. This chapter is based primarily on the party’s policy papers and reports, but also books and media article by leading members, including The Orange Book. It also utilises Nick Clegg’s writing on international trade from his time as an MEP. While Clegg was not strictly a Westminster politician at the time of these publications, their use is justified on the basis that they represent the party’s main engagement with foreign economic policy; moreover, the national leadership seemingly considered trade policy a European-level issue, to the extent that Clegg as MEP could have been considered the party’s dominant national voice in this area. Additionally, the influence Clegg went on to wield within the Westminster party means a genealogy of his thoughts on globalisation would be useful to this inquiry. Interviews with five Liberal Democrat MPs were also conducted: each interviewee was, at the time (summer 2006), a member of the party’s front bench team; some have since returned to the backbenches, while some have subsequently achieved greater prominence within the party. As suggested, the chapter starts by discussing the Liberal Democrats’ ‘liberal values’. It then discusses the party’s discourse on globalisation in more detail and finally the representation of globalisation in policies on trade, development and multilateral institutions.

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Liberal values Individualism and freedom The most important value present in the Liberal Democrats’ discourse was clearly individualism. They considered that both their defence of the rights of individuals and their expansive view of the capabilities and potential of the individual is what distinguishes them in Britain as a political party. The links between the Liberal Democrats’ expansive, positive conception of individualism and the thoughts of J. S. Mill have been acknowledged by the Party (Liberal Democrats, 2002). One interviewee argued that the Liberal Democrats’ assessment of policies and outcomes was based fundamentally on whether or not they permitted individuals to ‘flourish’. Individualism was not simply a value, but also a cognitive lens. Liberal Democrats saw individuals as the primary units of humanity. They of course recognised the importance of groupings such as nation, race, gender, family and (to a lesser extent) class, but regarded these, existentially, as secondary to the individual. The possibility that the Liberal Democrats’ perception of the nature of globalisation was related to this individualist lens will be explored below. Despite the commitment to individualism, the Liberal Democrats’ rhetoric often portrayed freedom (or liberty) as the party’s – and liberalism’s – main preoccupation. The Working Group on Liberal Democracy, charged after the 2001 election with defining the political philosophy of the Liberal Democrats, declared ‘it’s about freedom’ in the title of an important statement of the party’s principles (Liberal Democrats, 2002). One interviewee described freedom as the great ‘clarion call’ of the party. The titles of every substantive chapter of Charles Kennedy’s book The Future of Politics (2001) began with the words ‘freedom from’ or ‘freedom to’ (expect for one, which is titled ‘Freedom without borders’), clearly reflecting the importance of the concept of freedom and a commitment to both negative and positive conceptions. In practice, the two terms cannot be easily untwined. It’s About Freedom declared that Liberal Democrats start from the autonomy and worth of the individual. Any interference with the freedom of the individual to live as he or she chooses requires to be justified, if it can be, by reference to a system of values drawn from the primary recognition of individual freedom. (Liberal Democrats, 2002) The importance of freedom for Liberal Democrats should not be understated; discursively, it was their most prominent value. In practice, however, the concept generally expressed a deeper commitment to individualism. The terms ‘freedom’ and ‘individual freedom’ appear to have been used interchangeably.

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Economic freedom and the state For the Liberal Democrats, freedom extended beyond the social and political spheres to the economic – as explicitly argued by all interviewees. Individuals have rights over what to consume and how to provide for their livelihood, and in fact economic systems that empower individual choice will be the most effective. In this way, the Liberal Democrats articulated a much stronger justification of capitalist economic processes than New Labour or IFSL – although this is not to say they were necessarily more pro-capitalist. As we shall see, there may be ways in which, for the Liberal Democrats, contemporary capitalism undermines economic freedom. Inevitably, economic freedom and individualism led to the concept of the marketplace, again important to both how the Liberal Democrats perceived the world and how they wished to change it. The concept of the market or marketplace was identified as crucial to parts of New Labour’s globalisation discourse, particularly as it related to free trade. This concept also served as an important value for the Liberal Democrats. The party clearly recognised that markets do not and must not stop at national borders, and as such that free trade is an important aspect of economic freedom. The 2005 manifesto described free trade as ‘a liberation of individuals’ talents’ (Liberal Democrats, 2005d). This will be discussed more later, but at present it suffices to say that free trade was assumed by the Liberal Democrats to be a necessary and desirable aspect of a supranational marketplace. Free trade appears to have been more intimately related to a priori fundamental ideals by the Liberal Democrats than by New Labour and was less often justified with reference to practical considerations. It must be noted, however, that where free trade actually conflicted with the pursuit of individual freedom, economic or otherwise, its contingency was often recognised, and Liberal Democrats’ commitment to it was therefore diluted. The Liberal Democrats’ valorisation of the market was obviously related to the party’s approach to the role of the state in framing or correcting the exercise of economic freedom by individuals and, in turn, private economic actors. Much of their discussion of such issues, for the domestic agenda, involved cutting regulations and taxation on corporations and generally reducing the state’s interference in the economy. Malcolm Bruce, then spokesman on trade and industry, was quoted in the 2005 manifesto as saying ‘most people I meet don’t want subsidies, they just want government off their backs’. The manifesto promised that, if elected, the Liberal Democrats would actually have scrapped the DTI. However, while we can associate such policies with the promotion of economic freedom, this does not mean that the state has no legitimate economic role for the Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democrats (2002) supported what they called ‘the enabling state’, explicitly billed as part of ‘promoting freedom’. This idea incorporated measures which would obviously have involved some infringement of negative freedom, for the sake of individual autonomy. It had

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three main components. First, markets (where economic freedom is exercised) need to be established or framed by institutions external to the market itself. The most blatant example given by the Liberal Democrats was competition law, which prevents markets becoming less free through the development of monopolies, but the approach can be identified in all attempts to create a ‘level playing field’. Second, there needs to meaningful protection of individual rights, which some economic practices tend to abuse. This enables individuals to fully participate in the marketplace, without unduly restricting the participation of others, which is of course a requisite of optimal market performance as well as of positive individualism. Of particular interest here, because of the issue’s marginal place on the broad WTO agenda, is the Liberal Democrats’ support for international labour rights. Third, there is a need for redistribution, on the basis of progressive taxation. To a large extent, this component existed to support the other components – if the state is going to be able to properly support the market, and meaningfully protect individual rights, it requires resources. One interviewee argued in 2006: Markets are not natural... They are the constructs of governments because [governments] create the law around it, create the courts and tax system around it. Regulations, be they for employment or consumer safety or health and safety ... or whatever shapes the market... [Markets] are incredibly useful tools for humans and the world, if designed in an optimal way. Additionally, we can speak specifically of the need for people to collectively support a social security system which enables individual freedom in myriad ways. One thing that must be noted here is that the enabling state was not applicable only in the British context. It was intended not only to apply to other nations, but also to signify a general approach to governance, at whichever level it takes place. This notion will be explored throughout the chapter.

Democracy It is probably fair to say that the party’s conception of democracy was fairly limited. There was little attempt among Liberal Democrats to associate democracy with an affirmation of individual autonomy; that is, of an individual’s capacity to exercise power, rather than simply their right to do so, at various critical moments. The more negative conception of democracy was prominent in the 2005 manifesto (Liberal Democrats, 2005d). It was claimed in this document that democracy is about ‘trust’ in our institutions and leaders, which may have some radical ramifications but nevertheless has only an indirect relationship with individual freedom. The paper It’s About Freedom included this telling passage:

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Individuals and groups have the capacity, by their actions, to take away the liberty of others. Therefore there has to be a system of law and institutions which protect individual freedom. Anarchy cannot protect freedom. Democracy is the best known means of achieving that protection through collective institutions, but if it produces simply the tyranny of the majority it is not Liberal Democracy. (Liberal Democrats, 2002) The Liberal Democrats’ opinion on what ‘level’ democratic institutions should reside at follows logically from this opinion. If the decisions taken by democratic institutions are to be fully accountable, and therefore legitimate, they must be taken at the lowest possible level – as close to the affected individuals as possible. Obviously this was referred to frequently as a localisation agenda, a way of giving power back to local communities (Liberal Democrats, 2002, 2005d). However, where an issue affects a larger group of people, the democratic processes used to decide upon it should be inclusive of everybody that it affects. The implications of such an approach were often ‘localising’, but also in many cases involved political power and coercive mechanisms being transposed upwards, to regional and global institutions. Ed Davey (2004) suggests as much in his contribution, titled ‘Liberalism and localism’, to The Orange Book. Interestingly, the same argument was used by Nick Clegg and Chris Huhne in their respective chapters on Europe and global governance (a similarity Paul Marshall actually noted in his introduction to the collection (2004: 4–7)). It’s About Freedom stated, definitively, that: Experience of the way in which politically threatening power accumulates leads Liberal Democrats to argue that democratic processes should operate as locally as possible. In many cases the lowest possible level for a decision is the level of the individual, and we seek to keep decision-making at that level if possible... Equally, because some decisions have to be taken at the national, European or global level in order to be effective ... there needs to be democratic institutions capable of taking decisions at that level. (Liberal Democrats, 2002) The next section will explore what exactly it is about globalisation that requires this transposition of political power upwards. It is clear from this discussion of values alone, however, that there exists a slight conflict between the desires – both derived from individualism – to devolve power to the lowest possible level, while respecting the legitimacy of market-based economic processes, even where they ‘occur’ on a planetary scale. Globalisation discourse, for the Liberal Democrats, seems to settle precisely within this zone of internal intellectual conflict. Before discussing globalisation, however, it is first necessary to discuss

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whether the Liberal Democrats’ commitment to certain liberal ideals have an inherently internationalist element.

Liberalism and internationalism Given their abstract form, and the importance of individualism, liberal ideals are by nature universal. Does this mean that the Liberal Democrats attempt to articulate their values from an internationalist perspective? In The Orange Book, David Laws stated that the basic philosophical and practical foundations of British liberalism have been a belief in personal, political, economic and social liberalism, combined with a strongly international approach to extending these self-same freedoms across the world. Liberalism is, by every instinct, an internationalist creed. (Laws, 2004: 19) The party was strongly committed to ‘human rights’, which could be said to represent individualism, and important aspects of freedom. But it is not clear that the set of universal rights promoted under the banner of human rights are the ‘self-same freedoms’ promoted for British citizens. For some within the party, this is clearly the case. One interviewee praised the considerable inter-relation between the Liberal Democrats and the so-called world development movement and claimed this as a mark of distinction for the party. They clearly portrayed a global consciousness when it came to the application of their principles. Another interviewee declared that the need to articulate political principles universally was one of the things that brought them into politics and, more pertinently, made them become a Liberal Democrat. Yet, in both cases, globalisation discourse was used to provide practical as well as principled grounds for internationalism. As such, the party’s principles in this regard were not formed independently of its experience of actual global conditions, given that its leading members focus on globalisation and its mis-management as the reason that liberal values needed to be applied universally. The sixth chapter of Charles Kennedy’s 2001 book The Future of Politics, ‘Freedom without borders’, began with a startling quote from radical eighteenth-century liberal Thomas Paine which states: ‘My country is the world, and my religion is to do good’. Yet the predominant perspective of the chapter was that it was globalisation, rather than simply morality, which compelled international action and organisation. Therefore, it is not immediately apparent that the Liberal Democrats would have been as eager to define their apparent values as universal were there no supranational social and economic processes which impinge upon individual freedom at the national level, or which make realistic the pursuit of universal freedoms and rights. There was an interesting attempt to manage this ambiguity in It’s About Freedom:

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A focus on the UK is clearly important for a British political party, but Liberal Democrats regard rights and freedoms as international, and we believe that many problems faced by people in the UK cannot be solved unless problems throughout the world are addressed. That is why we need to consider the modern international context before we can turn to the situation within the UK today. (Liberal Democrats, 2002) ‘Freedoms’ are declared international (that is, universal), but the specific rationale given for political action beyond the nation-state is that ‘problems’ are international. And obviously even the rationale for international problemsolving, as explicated here, is the beneficial effect on Britain domestically. For a genuinely internationalist party, which believes in promoting social, political and economic freedom worldwide, it may be that policies such as free trade and European integration are a priori positive. But as we shall see, these policies were rarely articulated without reference to globalisation. There is obviously no straightforward formula by which the extent of the Liberal Democrats’ internationalism can be determined. Clearly, differences of emphasis exist. Some Liberal Democrats are comfortable articulating their values as universalist. Some policy areas – such as eradicating poverty, as we shall see – were replete with references to the universalism of individual rights. Yet some leading members, and some of the party’s publications, showed little genuine commitment to an internationalist agenda unless processes such as globalisation created an imperative to do so. These issues will be returned to throughout the chapter, in relation to the globalisation concept, and specific policies on trade, international development and the EU.

Globalisation This section will begin by assessing definitions of globalisation within the Liberal Democrats’ discourse on foreign economic policy, noting in particular the importance of the concept of free trade, and whether globalisation was deemed positive. It will then consider the potential role of political change within the Liberal Democrats’ view of globalisation. It will then reflect in more detail on the relationship between globality and universalism.

Globalisation and free trade The Liberal Democrats were consistent in the opinion that globalisation is real and significant, and requires novel forms of political action. Their perspective on what globalisation is, in the first instance, was fairly straightforward. It was essentially seen as the deepening and complexification of interdependence between countries, on the basis of transnational activity, resulting in identifiably ‘global’ social, political and economic phenomena and processes. The

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main feature is a single global economy, characterised as an expanded marketplace – it is mainly through this system that countries have become interdependent. There was more ambiguity, however, concerning what the main driving force, or cause, of globalisation is. There were two prevailing explanations within the Liberal Democrats’ discourse. The most important was probably that globalisation is the result of technological change. The second explanation was more economistic, focusing upon the free market’s global impulse: increases in transnational trade and investment flows have accumulated to the extent that the economic infrastructure has been transformed, that is, globalised. In fact, both explanations intermingle: this is seen in the Liberal Democrats’ policy documents and was replicated in the interviews. The economic explanation was probably the dominant perspective among the Orange Book brigade. It is interesting to note that the Liberal Democrats seemed not to associate globalisation with the rise of a global financial system, contra New Labour and IFSL. The question of the role of political change will be addressed in the next sub-section. However, one political phenomenon was actually included by the Liberal Democrats in their economistic causal argument; the decision by political authorities to liberalise tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade: One of the principal reasons for this expansion of cross-border economic activity has been the steady removal of government-imposed barriers to international trade and investment... This process has proceeded furthest and fastest in the area of trade in goods, where the world-wide removal of barriers has been co-ordinated and promoted under the framework of ... the GATT, overseen since 1995 by the WTO. (Liberal Democrats, 2004b: 3) Logically, if the economic process of globalisation is dependent on trade policies, then it is in fact contingent upon politics and not economically immutable. Global rules made by politicians and lawyers may have been able to thwart its progress, had agreements such as GATT not been established. This is not, however, a possibility that seems to have been contemplated. Several interviewees referred to ‘the breakdown’ of trade barriers, as if certain policies had somehow changed themselves. In the quote above, the barriers were depicted as ‘government-imposed’, yet there is no reference to the role of governments in the ‘steady removal’. A more sincere recognition of contingency would probably warrant different terminology. The Liberal Democrats’ discourse was extremely similar to the globalisation discourse of New Labour and IFSL in this regard. The naturalisation of already-existing trade liberalisation delegitimises the state, despite the obvious role of governments in bringing about globalisation. There are two explanations in the Liberal Democrats’ discourse for this apparently

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self-imposed mental constraint: first, obviously, the argument that technology is the main motor for globalisation, so there is less need to compute the various alternative paths trade policies may have tread. It is technological change that gives globalisation its irreversible property. This argument was much more prominent here than in New Labour’s or IFSL’s discourse; second, the fact that Liberal Democrats considered ‘the breakdown’ overwhelmingly positive. Reversal may not be impossible – but the Liberal Democrats elect not to engage with this possibility ideologically. Chris Huhne’s management of this ambiguity in his Orange Book chapter was sublime. His summary of ‘why globalisation happens’ states that ‘[t]he first and necessary condition is the development of communication and transport technology. The second is the political will, in the countries affected, to remain open to world opportunities’ (Huhne, 2004: 104–5). As such, technology was treated as the primary cause of globalisation. But its main feature is ‘world opportunities’, inevitably economic (and positive) in nature – beyond the initial reference to technology, Huhne’s argument is almost exclusively economistic. World opportunities refer to the general efficiency and distributive outcomes inherent in joining a global marketplace. Note, again, that the leaders of nationstates were charged with ‘remaining open’, but are not credited with creating these ‘world opportunities’ in the first place. Clearly, there were ambiguities within the Liberal Democrats’ understanding of globalisation. It is worth noting that there was little affection within the Liberal Democrats for the epochal change argument discovered in New Labour’s discourse, which identified the importance of spatial change, but also the notion of individual firms (rather than the market process) as the architects of globalisation. It seems the Liberal Democrats were unanimous on the opinion that globalisation is positive. It reduces the relevance of nationality on individuals’ lives and of course produces a more efficient economic system. Either way, the relationship between globalisation and individualism was clearly crucial. As such, the Liberal Democrats conceived of no significant divergence of interests between Britain and the rest of the world, and often state this explicitly (see the Liberal Democrats, 2005d; Kennedy, 2001). Although definitions of globalisation did not emphasise its affect on the state, it is possible that one of the reasons globalisation was deemed positive is precisely the way it undermines the power of nation-states. It’s About Freedom states that Liberal Democrats welcome globalisation – insofar as it helps to break down barriers between cultures and peoples, and can significantly boost economic prosperity... Globalisation can assist in diminishing the capacity of the state to control or persecute its people, and so helps extend the reach of universal human rights. (Liberal Democrats, 2002)

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We saw in the first section that Liberal Democrats were sceptical of state power and assumed that the state, in general, encroaches upon individual freedom – this does not mean they did not promote state action in some regards. Yet globalisation seems to have represented the ultimate check upon such action, by creating a more efficient economy and further empowering individuals. However, this point was not made extensively by the Liberal Democrats – it seems to have come into conflict with the notion of an ‘enabling state’ to some extent. Unlike New Labour and IFSL, although the Liberal Democrats challenged the authority of nation-states, they did not present states as anachronistic with reference to the development of a global, virtual economic space. Note that the above quote also refers to the ‘reach’ of human rights, not their enforcement. The fact of globalisation challenges states, yet in an economically positive way, and therefore is good for the rights of individuals. This is not to say that Liberal Democrats did not support human rights being institutionalised at the global level (this will be discussed more, below), but it is fair to say here that the Liberal Democrats were optimistic that globalisation was doing the job of protecting and promoting individual freedoms, without excessive political interference. The financial crisis seems not to have impacted significantly upon the Liberal Democrats’ globalisation discourse in relation to foreign economic policy. The party published in 2009 the policy paper Thriving in a Globalised World: A Strategy for Britain. It maintains that globalisation is positive. It is probably fair to say that there is a greater recognition of globalisation’s downsides. For example: Globalisation has brought enormous benefits to the UK, but we also recognise its challenges... Unless government develops effective solutions to these challenges, many people may come to see globalisation as a threat, rather than the opportunity that it should be – particularly in the midst of a major recession. [...] Particularly in the midst of severe recession, British citizens may often feel themselves to be the victims of international forces which they seem unable to influence. This helps to turn public opinion against the whole basis of globalisation and open borders, and threatens a lurch towards protectionism... Government therefore needs to demonstrate that it is not helpless in the face of globalisation; rather, it has a duty to ensure that the UK is well placed not only to take advantage of the benefits of globalisation but also to respond to its challenges. (Liberal Democrats, 2009: 4, 7) Clearly, however, the danger is not that globalisation has negative implications, but rather that its essentially positive nature will be misinterpreted.

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Globalisation must therefore be nurtured by the enabling state. Yet in terms of foreign economic policy, the only substantive prescription is to undertake further trade liberalisation. Interestingly, the Liberal Democrats rarely, if ever, referred to the financial crisis as a ‘global’ crisis. Vince Cable, for instance, was consistent in his position that the British government could and should have done more to regulate financial services and the banking sector. New Labour seemed to resort to a more nebulous epochal change argument when its more economistic argument was problematised by the financial crisis. But the Liberal Democrats never assumed that finance, or the City, was central to the process of globalisation. As such, its support for globalisation (and free trade) remained largely unaffected by crisis imagery.

Political globalisation Despite the above argument that the Liberal Democrats had a relatively settled position on what globalisation is, wider cleavages within the party are apparent if the role of political (or institutional) change is considered as part of the globalisation process. One vital aspect of how Liberal Democrats thought the challenge of globalisation must be met, and its opportunities realised, is through mechanisms of global governance. Global governance, for the Liberal Democrats, was one dimension of a wider reconception of the levels at which public authority must reside, for the sake of individual freedom, which is protected by democratic mechanisms. Liberal Democrats tended to argue that political power should reside at the lowest possible level. However, they also believed that often the lowest possible level is the global level. They argued consistently that there were limits to national sovereignty. Many interviewees argued therefore that a more powerful global governance system is required. Yet it is not clear whether this system is necessary because there are some problems which are inherently global; that is, are the limits to national sovereignty inherent in the relationship between sovereignty and universality, or are they created by the social and economic processes associated with globalisation? Several policy documents referred to the existence of ‘global public goods’, which institutions of global governance should be compelled to uphold (see Liberal Democrats, 2004b, 2005a). In contrast, Huhne’s articulation of global governance stated ‘globalised benefits also bring globalised costs’ (2004: 127– 8). He further explained the three ‘guiding principles’ of global governance: The first is that the institution in question should be able to cope with the cross-border problem it is designed to tackle. The second is that the institution in question should be as democratically accountable as possible, and at the very least should be open and transparent. The third is the old Liberal [sic] principle that decisions should be taken as

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closely as possible to the people affected by them... Any liberal international system will apply these principles to achieve a balance between competition and order. (Huhne, 2004: 127) It is interesting to note that Huhne’s chapter in The Orange Book, which was actually titled ‘Global governance, legitimacy and renewal’, did not actually contain any reform proposals – its primary aim was seemingly to provide a liberal interpretation of supranational institutions that already exist. Huhne’s argument suggested global governance is in fact the governance of globalisation, or more precisely economic globalisation, whereas the recognition and enforcement of ‘global public goods’ could be seen as constitutive of globalisation. It is necessary to look in more detail at what kind of global governance system Liberal Democrats envisaged (the WTO in particular will be addressed in the next section). Generally speaking, the Liberal Democrats were extremely positive about the UN, and would have liked to see its role and authority expanded. This meant, primarily, strengthening the UN Security Council’s ability to enact humanitarian intervention, but also bringing existing international institutions such as the World Bank more firmly into the UN system, and even creating a framework within the UN for regulating foreign direct investment and currency exchange (Cable, 2004; Liberal Democrats, 2004a, 2005c). Limited reforms of the IMF and Organisation for Economic and Co-operation and Development (OECD) enforcement mechanisms are also proposed by the policy document Wealth for the World (Liberal Democrats, 2004b). Some Liberal Democrats were obviously more radical than others in regard to global economic governance. As expected, arguments about ‘universal rights’ and ‘global problems’ intermingled in Liberal Democrats’ national policy documents in relation to these reforms. More interesting is how the nature of institutions such as the UN was conceived by the Liberal Democrats. The UN, in theory and practice, is a multilateral organisation. New Labour seemed to be fairly comfortable with the notion of multilateralism as a form of global governance: globalisation or the global economy was itself ungovernable, but it did require countries to co-operate in order to fully benefit. Yet the Liberal Democrats’ silence on multilateralism seems to suggest an awkwardness regarding the UN’s constitution in national sovereignty. It should be pointed out that the term ‘multilateral’ was used by some interviewees, although not extensively, and interchangeably with terms such as global governance. To be clear, there was little support within the Liberal Democrats for a comprehensive system of global governance. For some leading members, global governance was a response to globalisation – but globalisation did not require extensive governance. For others, there existed global public goods irrespective of empirical realities which necessitated global governance. Nick

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Clegg and Vince Cable seemed to have resided somewhere in the middle, whereby economic globalisation was the main driver of global governance mechanisms, yet the way the process interacts with a certain public goods means economic governance at the global level was slightly more stringent than envisaged by Huhne. Nevertheless, there seems to have been no attempt to articulate a coherent set of global public goods within the Liberal Democrats’ specific discourses on either globalisation or global governance. However, as later sections will demonstrate, the idea of global public goods did become more important in relation to specific policy agendas. This applies, firstly, to the eradication of poverty, but more importantly to free trade. Yet the designation of free trade as a global public good was obviously complicated by the awkward relationship between globalisation and free trade. As suggested above, the Liberal Democrats had already advocated limited regulation of finance at the global level before the onset of the financial crisis. Crucially, the crisis did not lead to stronger recommendations on global economic governance. In this vein, Vince Cable’s proposals on banking reform were presented alongside a significant, albeit highly nuanced, discussion of multilateral regulation: The City is almost by definition, a cross border industry. While Britain can try to regulate separately, many financial services activities require global – or EU – regulation... There is a danger however that a reasonable concern about ‘level playing fields’ would prevent action necessary to safeguard banks at a national level. The UK has an exceptionally big banking sector in relation to the economy and therefore relatively large systemic risks. There are areas – like regulation of bonuses, the breakup of banks and an insurance levy – where global agreement is desirable but unlikely to happen within the foreseeable future. Unilateral action must therefore be better than no action at all. A multilateral approach is, obviously, optimal. And we need to be alert to the weasel words of politicians and bankers who promote inaction in the name of multilateralism... I hope I am not being too cynical in believing that much of the rhetoric about new global rules is so much camouflage for keeping the unstable, dangerous, status quo. Sensible and safe bank regulation has to begin, like charity, at home. And I say that as someone who has preached, and written about, the importance of multilateral trade rules for decades. (Cable, 2010) Cable insisted that multilateral is his preferred option. Yet he offered no actual institutional solution (despite having done so previously). His strongest emphasis was that national-level regulation is both necessary and desirable. This seems to have been more than simply a pragmatic compromise in response to the

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difficulties of international negotiations; additionally, it is also the case that the national level is the most appropriate for the type of response advocated by Cable. Indeed, he advocated a more local form of banking (see also Liberal Democrats, 2009). The speech cited above concluded with Cable responding to a hypothetical charge, therefore, that he is eschewing multilateralism. He answered the criticism by stating that he is a long-standing advocate of multilateral trade rules. The point is that finance does not require global rules akin to the WTO regime. Trade is by necessity global – but finance is not. Moreover, the WTO exists to promote free trade, therefore epitomising freedom. The same cannot be said about financial regulation, which would curb freedom in some regard. This issue housed a delicate balance within the Liberal Democrats’ slightly awkward approach to the global economy. Yet ideological balancing acts are neither unusual nor necessarily damaging for their advocates; indeed, the compromise upheld by the Liberal Democrats seems to have resonated within British politics in the post-crisis era. The relationship between globalisation and internationalism within the Liberal Democrats’ ideology was obviously somewhat muddy. It could be said, logically, that globalisation enabled Liberal Democrats to sidestep ideological dilemmas regarding universal obligations, in providing an empirical rather than philosophical rationale for supra-state political action. However, the opposite could also be true: that is, that globalisation discourse forced the Liberal Democrats to confront the universalism inherent in its abstract ideals. Clearly, it is impossible to adjudicate definitively in this regard. At times, the Liberal Democrats welcomed the opportunity to present their pro-globalisation stance as internationalist, yet equally welcomed the opportunity to more substantively include internationalist commitments, such as strengthening the UN, in the party’s political agenda. One issue that the Liberal Democrats were relatively silent on is the nature of globality. Whereas New Labour’s, and in a different way IFSL’s, discourse relied on images of ‘global-ness’ to demonstrate the novelty, immutability or value of current or emerging economic conditions, the Liberal Democrats referred regularly to globalisation with far less consideration of what it means that change is ‘global’. As already suggested, although they saw technological development as a cause of globalisation, their discourse did not resemble New Labour’s epochal change perspective in a significant sense. And they did not perceive the financial crisis as global in nature. While the concept of globalisation seems to sit logically alongside the Liberal Democrats’ commitment to liberal ideals like individualism, economic freedom and internationalism, ideological meanings are as messy, even contradictory, as they are logical. It could therefore be that the globalisation concept derives important aspects of its meaning from the liberal tradition, but is in fact independent of liberalism in practice. The Liberal Democrats could be said to have moved towards newer ideas in some ways, yet at the same time retained a core, if

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ultimately squeezed, commitment to traditional liberalism by eschewing the notions of spatial change seemingly inherent in the globalisation concept.

Trade rules and development The Liberal Democrats’ understanding of and approach to multilateral trade policy typified many elements of the party’s globalisation discourse. Crucially, we will find that the Liberal Democrats’ perspective in this regard was fairly complex, with different emphases in various forms of argumentation, largely commensurate with the different emphases on globalisation itself, noted above. This section first looks at the Liberal Democrats’ support for trade rules instituted at the global level, and to a lesser extent its perspective on the EU as a trade policy actor. It then looks in more detail at the relationship between trade and development in the party’s discourse, with reference to the DDA.

Globalisation and multilateral trade policy The Liberal Democrats’ support for the WTO derived, principally, from its support for free trade – although this does not mean it was straightforward. One interviewee described the WTO as ‘an organisation that promotes free trade’. In Liberal Democrat policy documents, free trade and WTO mechanisms were often treated as synonymous. However, it was also often the case that WTO rules were justified without reference to the free trade concept. Duncan Brack and Nick Clegg’s pamphlet Trading for the Future applied arguments normally reserved by liberals for supporting free trade directly to the WTO. For example, the WTO, in terms of the institution and its constitutive agreements, was deemed to prohibit wars, enable the self-development of individuals since their lives are open to a wider range of experiences and, most importantly, enable a more ‘perfect’ form of global competition, undistorted by political interference, which enables an optimum allocation of global resources (Brack & Clegg, 2001). In other words, the WTO was associated directly with liberal ideas on the marketplace and economic freedom. However, it has to be stated that these arguments were seemingly always made with reference to globalisation. The interviewee cited above premised their definition of the WTO with the statement that globalisation is ‘why we need things like the WTO’. Although free trade and globalisation were of course often used in conjunction, there was also a sense of conflict between the two concepts. The argument found in the IFSL discourse, and part of the New Labour discourse – that is, that globalisation is precisely the reason free trade is so important – was never put forward quite as clinically by the Liberal Democrats. Despite the party’s support for the WTO in principle, it did suggest reforms and additions to existing trade rules. There are two main bunches of policy reforms that the Liberal Democrats would have liked to see introduced

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at the WTO. The first can be described as ‘market access’ reforms. Agriculture was by far the biggest concern (see Liberal Democrats, 2004a, 2004b, 2005d), as confirmed by interviews. In fact, one interviewee made the startling statement that ‘the WTO is pretty much a disaster’. Further interrogation, however, unearthed the more nuanced opinion that it was merely recent developments in trade negotiations had been disastrous, in that they had not produced greater market access for poor countries. Brack and Clegg’s pamphlet also advocated the global free movement of labour. Having noted that the global free movement of financial capital has further enriched individuals and countries that were already wealthy, they say that the people and countries whose advantage is their social capital should be allowed the chance to ‘catch up’ by selling their labour to the highest bidder, wherever they are in the world. This was depicted as an assault on privilege in favour of individual freedom (Brack & Clegg, 2001: 10). Policy documents did not specifically endorse this proposal, but nevertheless it does appear to have been part of the Liberal Democrats’ long-term agenda for trade rules (see Liberal Democrats, 2004a; and 2004b, where the idea is referred to). Also related to market access is Brack and Clegg’s (2001) insistence that anti-dumping rules be reformed so the rich countries cannot use them, unjustifiably, to block imports from poor countries. There is obviously a difference of emphasis here; Brack and Clegg worried about the ‘uneven distribution’ of globalisation’s benefits and sought more free trade, or more globalisation, to rectify this. The MP interviewed who referred to the WTO as a disaster ultimately shared this opinion in terms of policy, but arrived at their position via the argument that globalisation has inherent problems and needs to properly managed – even if management equals simply greater trade liberalisation. Another interviewee attempted to manage such conflict by acknowledging that although globalisation is ‘a good thing’, because it increased trade, its growth and spread had to be supervised or ‘we are in serious, serious trouble’. The second batch of reforms concerned the need for poor and rich countries to be treated differently by existing trade rules. Brack and Clegg actually expressed scepticism about the utility of ‘special and differential treatment’, and the notion had no presence within their reform proposals. In general, however, there was recognition among Liberal Democrats that dispensations for poor countries were required. There was little genuine enthusiasm for East Asian tiger-style protection within policy documents (although some endorsement among interviewees), but Liberal Democrats were passionate about implementation and sequencing issues, that is, special measures by which poorer countries have more time to comply with WTO rules. This was one of Brack and Clegg’s main proposals and was the main aspect of SDT according to Wealth for the World, the policy paper on international trade and investment published in 2004, and the 2005 election manifesto (Liberal Democrats, 2004b, 2005d).

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Concerns about implementation surfaced mostly in regard to the more controversial aspect of British trade policy, such as further investment and services liberalisation (see Liberal Democrats, 2004b: 23). In fact, although the party generally supported these measures, it was not eager to publicise it. Given the fact that New Labour and IFSL invariably associated these measures with globalisation, this suggests a significant difference in ideological perspectives on what globalisation is. Although the Liberal Democrats’ discourse upheld that free trade should be the norm in every economic sector, it also upheld a need for other public policies that may prohibit specific instances of trade. Preventing environmental damage was the most pertinent public policy objective, but many Liberal Democrats also argued that rules on things like child labour should be brought into the WTO’s remit. There was dispute about exactly how far the WTO’s authority should extend: Brack and Clegg were opposed to the introduction of WTO rules on labour standards, which contradicted Wealth for the World. Liberal Democrats also argued that aid and support should be given to poor countries to allow them to more effectively participate in negotiations, and undertake more research and analysis on exactly what is in their best interests – a policy referred to as ‘technical assistance’. There was clearly no coherent ‘vision’ for the WTO as a mechanism of global governance beyond its management of free trade. The Liberal Democrats appeared to want to invest more authority in the institution to curtail free trade in certain instances, but were reluctant to challenge what they see as the generally beneficial process of globalisation to do so. Free trade itself delivers many of the party’s liberal ideals, and although the party recognised in principle the need for market-framing, there remained uncertainty about exactly what this should look like at the global level – evidenced also by reactions to the financial crisis. This uncertainty was surely derived not from major differences on what globalisation is (which was the main cleavage within New Labour’s discourse), but rather the meaning and extent of internationalist commitments in a globalising world. The Liberal Democrats represented a strong pro-European position within British foreign economic policy. Despite this, ‘Europe’ as a continental entity did not seem to matter fundamentally to the party. It was recognised as a site of socio-economic processes, but not valorised in itself. The EU was seemingly always related to the process of globalisation by the Liberal Democrats. Charles Kennedy stated that ‘Europe is a positive development because, in an age of globalization, nations can only retain control of their destinies if they share sovereignty and work together’ (Kennedy, 2001: 179). Fundamentally, it is globalisation that must determine, for the Liberal Democrats, what the EU looks like and how it functions. The general approach to the EU taken by Liberal Democrats is that Europe-level institutions and policies are a necessary tenet of Britain’s response to globalisation. For Nick Clegg, the case in favour

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of EU integration was ‘simple and overwhelming’ – an opinion derived from his belief that political authorities must be located at the lowest possible level (2004: 70). In an article titled ‘Less is more’, Clegg argued that ‘[a] glance at the EU’s present powers suggests that something is amiss’. He continued: The EU will become unworkable if it attempts to remain on such a broad front of policy areas as at present, in a future union of almost five-hundred million citizens. Policies ranging from tourism and sports to the bulk of social policy and third world development could usefully be removed from the EU’s remit. There is plenty to do, where significantly strengthened EU action is overdue ... an enlarged EU requires a greater focus on priorities and a greater disregard for peripheral policy activism. (Clegg, 2000) Crucially, Clegg stated in The Orange Book that that ‘[f]ar from being outdated, such supranational EU governance represents the most fitting response to the modern challenges of globalisation’ (2004: 73). The argument that EU institutions help to make globalisation work in the interests of individual freedom was consistently made by Liberal Democrats: The inability of the UK’s political institutions to influence the forces of globalisation is a primary reason for domestic political alienation. A great many people do not feel that the main decision-making institutions reflect their needs or concerns. Liberal Democrats attach such importance to the difficult task of making the international institutions which have to make these decisions more effectively democratic, open and responsive, whether at European level or at the level of world-wide bodies. (Liberal Democrats, 2002; see also, 2005b) In the party’s approach to the EU, internationalist sentiments were almost entirely marginalised. The main thread of argument was Europe as a site where the real-world process of globalisation must be responded to. It was in this context that the Liberal Democrats’ support for EU trade policy was pitched. Europe is recognised as a trading entity, and it was deemed legitimate that sovereignty is forgone so that trade policy can be made at this particular level (see Brack & Clegg, 2001: 34–7). In fact, Brack and Clegg were extremely critical of the EU’s ‘133 Committee’ – the Council of Ministers committee, named after Article 133 of the EC Treaty, where trade policy is mainly decided – due to its intergovernmental nature. Instead, the EU Commission was judged to be best placed to determine a common European interest. Brack and Clegg blamed the 133 Committee for the EU position on agricultural trade. Beyond this, the Liberal Democrats seemed to be content with the EU’s

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negotiating platform – although they rarely offered explicit support to the incorporation of the Singapore issues.

Development and the DDA Many of the reform proposals present in the Liberal Democrats’ discourse were part of the broad Doha agenda, but failed to come to fruition. A World Free from Poverty introduced ‘the Liberal Democrat commitment to international development’ by asserting the Liberal Democrats’ commitment to the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with targets on things such as absolute poverty, education, child mortality and HIV/AIDS. Achieving the MDGs is the way in which the world’s poor will be helped (Liberal Democrats, 2004a: 8). On a more abstract level, the document went on to describe development as synonymous with the pursuit of freedom. Obviously, escaping poverty and disease relate to the achievement of individual freedom. Yet the invocation of freedom also had another important implication, given the link the Liberal Democrats make between economic freedom and the utility and proprietary of the marketplace. The market was therefore part of the Liberal Democrats’ development ideal. The MDGs will not be achieved simply by acts of charity, but also by ‘pro-poor economic growth’ (Liberal Democrats, 2004a: 10). This is partially dependent upon the political framework within which the economy functions, which is presumably why the document referred also to the need for governance capacity, a rule of law and a system of individual rights. But it is essentially the product of the market. As one interviewee argued, ‘you can achieve far more through trade than you can through development assistance and aid’. A World Free from Poverty went further by talking about the gains that can be made if poor countries receive foreign direct investment or allow TNCs into their economies. One idea proposed was a set of measures to support the growth of private sectors in the poorest countries, so they may develop an indigenous capacity to participate in the world economy. This is why trade liberalisation was a pillar of the Liberal Democrats’ approach to development; the reason previous rounds of liberalisation have not produced pro-development results is that rich countries have failed to liberalise key sectors like agriculture (Liberal Democrats, 2004a). There is still a role for economic aid, but its function is highly circumscribed: the deregulation and privatisation that often accompanies trade and investment liberalisation opens up developing country economies to new stresses and new requirements for government regulation and enforcement for which they would benefit from capacity-building assistance. Development assistance should be designed, therefore, to enable developing countries to benefit from open markets and new investment opportunities. (Liberal Democrats, 2004a: 11)

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One interviewee argued: When markets are opened up, some countries can be badly hit. This doesn’t mean it’s wrong to open up to free trade. What it means is you have to help economies that have become over-dependent on one cashcrop or raw material of some sort. The truth is the gains from trade are so big, you can still have a very big positive-sum game, even if you compensate and assist the poorer countries to adapt their economies. Liberal Democrats clearly believed that aid, and special provisions on the implementation of WTO rules, are important to ensure that states in poor countries have market-framing capacities. But integration into the world trading system is, ultimately, the only path that development can take. Yet while it seems possible to articulate this model of development without reference to globalisation, A World Free from Poverty did employ the concept. Globalisation was treated as a challenge to poor countries, but also an unprecedented opportunity – globalisation means opening up markets to trade and investment has higher pay-offs, because market processes are more perfect and therefore efficient. The Liberal Democrats of course recognised that the DDA had stalled, and indeed that many of the party’s proposals seemed to have become marginalised within the negotiating agenda. Interestingly, Liberal Democrats generally blamed the self-interest and short-sightedness of politicians for the ongoing failure of Doha – as if their own proposals were free of political considerations. Wealth for the World actually expresses relief that the ministerial meeting in Cancun produced only further deadlock, due to the conservativism of the deal on offer (Liberal Democrats, 2004b). Such an opinion is suggestive of how far apart the Liberal Democrats were from New Labour on trade issues, despite significant similarities in policy agenda. Nevertheless, the Liberal Democrats were very positive about the idea of the DDA: the agenda fits extremely well within the party’s conception of free trade, development and global governance in the context of globalisation. Yet its legitimacy has been undermined the influence of political interests. The general orientation was that progress depended on politicians being persuaded that giving up national sovereignty is in their longterm interests, because of the worldwide benefits of free trade.

Conclusion There were occasions in which the Liberal Democrats appeared to welcome globalisation precisely because it is a process which supports internationalism; however, it is more likely that the idea of globalisation, by connoting a world in which the international and domestic divide no longer pertains, actually confused the party’s internationalist commitment. Generally, the Liberal Democrats

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welcomed globalisation not primarily because they saw it as supportive of internationalism, but rather because of its association with free trade. The Liberal Democrats saw the development of free trade as a core part of the globalisation story. As such, globalisation represented the emergence of a global marketplace and in fact valorised the market mechanism – the party not only welcomed the effect of this on the power of nation-states, they also assumed that nation-states had no choice but to liberalise trade rules, such were the power of the forces at the heart of globalisation. They did not go as far as New Labour in suggesting that nation-states had become anachronistic; on the other hand, the state is obviously not as significant to the liberal as it is to social democracy, where New Labour generally located its heritage. As such, it is arguable that for the Liberal Democrats globalisation simply transposes the state/market relationship to other levels of authority, whereas for New Labour it necessitated a more qualitative shift in its approach to the state. That said, however, this is not to suggest that the Liberal Democrats had a settled view on the global economy and the role of the state – it may in fact have been that globalisation exposed an irreconcilable conflict within the party’s intellectual foundation. At times the party’s leading members seemed to argue that global governance is necessary to protect global public goods from economic change, or that the process of globalisation is an opportunity to promote universal goods. Others maintained that the process of globalisation itself largely promotes global public goods without extensive political interference. In the middle, a space seemingly occupied by Nick Clegg, was the view that an extensive system of global governance is not necessary, but globalisation cannot be left to manage itself. Rather, free trade (but not trade per se) must be managed at the global level, both as a global public good and as a way to support globalisation’s inherently positive characteristics. The financial crisis, and Vince Cable’s growing prominence, seemed to bolster this position. The party did advocate stronger regulation of finance at supranational levels, but it was seemingly pragmatic rather than principled position and suggested reforms were fairly limited. Instead, much stronger national-level regulation was advocated. This not only further explicates the party’s position on global governance, but also adds weight to the finding that the Liberal Democrats did not consider finance as part of the globalisation story – surely because it did not correspond with their classical liberal view of free trade. The party did reconcile global economic change with free trade to present a pro-globalisation position, but it was certainly not the same intellectual space occupied by New Labour’s foreign economic policy. This is not to say they offered opposition to the government’s trade policy agenda. In general they supported New Labour’s activities on foreign economic policy within both the WTO and the EU. Yet the differences are clear. The Liberal Democrats very rarely referred to Ricardian ‘comparative advantage’

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theory. This adds to the finding, noted above, that trade liberalisation was often justified using the idea of the market, and economic freedom, without reference to free trade. For New Labour, free trade was a crucial concept – even though their policy justifications strayed significantly from free trade theory. In Chapter 3, it was suggested that the global competition perspective within New Labour resembled a classical liberal approach to trade policy. However, the blurring of the international and domestic realms designated by the idea of globalisation logically undermines comparative advantage. It may therefore be that the Liberal Democrats’ approach to globalisation was more loyal to classical liberal than the worship of Ricardo evident in New Labour’s discourse, by fully recognising the power and importance of the market mechanism, and its universality, without reliance on a narrative about the British economy’s insertion into the global market. Another aspect of both New Labour’s and IFSL’s discourse on globalisation relatively absent from the Liberal Democrats’ discourse is notions of spatiality. Although global-ness is obviously a characteristic of economic change for the Liberal Democrats, there is little sense (although the marketplace is worldwide) that specific economic activities exist in some post-national, deterritorialised space. This was a core part of the epochal change perspective within New Labour, in terms of the depiction of the identity of private economic actors, and implicated in IFSL’s association with ‘the offshore’. Yet it also seemed to be important to New Labour’s global competition perspective too; the reason for liberalisation was so ‘global’ capital could be invested most efficiently anywhere in the world. The Liberal Democrats’ discourse eschewed this understanding and placed more emphasis on the interdependence and integration of economies, to form a marketplace, rather than a mutual subservience to either a global economy or independent global economic actors. It is not yet clear which of these, if any, represents the core meaning of globalisation. Paradoxically, the Liberal Democrats put more emphasis on technology as a cause of globalisation. Parts of New Labour’s discourse incorporated technological change as constitutive of globalisation, but it had more explanatory weight in the Liberal Democrats’ approach. The issue of whether or not the Liberal Democrats’ discourse on globalisation exhibited the influence of neoliberalism is obviously extremely complex. While eschewing some of the spatial imagery found within the discourse of New Labour and IFSL – used specifically to justify trade and investment liberalisation – it may be that the Liberal Democrat approach to liberalisation is more authentically neoliberal. However, the party’s response to the financial crisis suggests that this is not the case. It seems more plausible that the party’s traditional commitment to liberalism is problematised by the set of challenges presented by both neoliberalism and the idea of globalisation discourse. In articulating a pro-globalisation position, the Liberal Democrats clearly uphold

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many aspects of an erstwhile neoliberal foreign economic policy agenda, but also make the claim that their position can correct certain aspects of the Labour government’s laissez faire approach.

References Brack, D. & Clegg, N. (2001) Trading for the Future: Reforming the WTO (London: Centre for Reform). Cable, V. (2004) ‘Liberal economics and social justice’, in P. Marshall and D. Laws (eds), The Orange Book: Reclaiming Liberalism (London: Profile), pp. 132–73. Cable, V. (2010) ‘Speech on Banking’, speech delivered at Reuters, 23 February 2009. Clegg, N. (2000) ‘Less is more’ Prospect, issue 58, accessed at www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=3404 on 30 October 2010. Clegg, N. (2004) ‘Europe: A liberal future’ in P. Marshall and D. Laws (eds), The Orange Book: Reclaiming Liberalism (London: Profile), pp. 69–103. Davey. E. (2004) ‘Liberalism and localism’ in P. Marshall and D. Laws (eds), The Orange Book: Reclaiming Liberalism (London: Profile), pp. 43–68. Huhne, C. (2004) ‘Global Governance, legitimacy and renewal’, in P. Marshall and D. Laws (eds), The Orange Book: Reclaiming Liberalism (London: Profile), pp. 104–31. Kennedy, C. (2001) The Future of Politics (London: Harper Collins). Laws, D. (2004) ‘Reclaiming liberalism: A liberal agenda for the Liberal Democrats’, in P. Marshall and D. Laws (eds), The Orange Book: Reclaiming Liberalism (London: Profile), pp. 18–42. Liberal Democrats (2002) It’s About Freedom: The Report of the Liberal Democracy Working Group (London: Liberal Democrats). Liberal Democrats (2004a) A World Free from Poverty: Policies on International Development (London: Liberal Democrats). Liberal Democrats (2004b) Wealth for the World: Policies on International Trade and Investment (London: Liberal Democrats). Liberal Democrats (2005a) A Balance of Trade (London: Liberal Democrats). Liberal Democrats (2005b) Making Europe Work for Us (London: Liberal Democrats). Liberal Democrats (2005c) Prosperity at Home and Abroad (London: Liberal Democrats). Liberal Democrats (2005d) The Real Alternative: Manifesto for the General Election of 2005 (London: Liberal Democrats). Liberal Democrats (2009) Thriving in a Globalised World (London: Liberal Democrats). Marshall, P. (2004) ‘Introduction’, in P. Marshall & D. Laws (eds), The Orange Book: Reclaiming Liberalism (London: Profile), pp. 1–16.

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6

Trade justice and development: the case of Oxfam Oxfam is one of the largest non-governmental organisations in the world. While it has an organisational presence in many countries, it is a predominantly British-based actor. Whereas IFSL, for instance, provided representation within Britain for predominantly transnational actors, Oxfam enables a transnational political platform for British activists. This orientation may itself say something significant about the organisation’s approach to globalisation. Given Oxfam’s principal focus on trade policy and the WTO in recent years (its high-profile campaigns Make Trade Fair and Make Poverty History both have ‘trade justice’ as their main objective), it is one of the loudest voices within the issue area of foreign economic policy. Broadly speaking, Oxfam belongs to the liberal tradition. In promoting free trade, help for poorer countries and some form of multilateral governance, it can be associated with a Kantian liberal cosmopolitan perspective (see Berry, 2006). Yet its inception was more influenced by the Christian socialist tradition. Oxfam started life in 1942 as the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, the brainchild of prominent clergyman Canon Theodore Richard Milford. It has moved away from this orientation and, although it still undertakes famine relief operations, its main campaigning impulse is as a ‘development’ pressure group, part of a worldwide ‘development movement’ (see Berry & Gabay, 2009). Of course, the ideological character of this wider movement is contested, and what it means for an organisation like Oxfam to be classed as Kantian, cosmopolitan, internationalist etc. is far from straightforward. Clearly, the idea of globalisation – as well as experience of economic change – interacts with these traditions of thought in complex ways. In the period between 1997 and 2009, Oxfam was strongly supportive of free trade and, in principle, the WTO. While it opposed many of the policies or negotiating positions of the Labour government and the EU, it seemingly accepted the liberal trade regime while upholding a pro-globalisation stance, without exhibiting any of the ideological awkwardness apparent in the Liberal Democrats’ discourse. One of this chapter’s main concerns, therefore, is whether it is possible to support, and provide legitimacy for, the contemporary

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world trade regime without straying into the intellectual territory of neoliberalism. Is there something about liberal internationalism or cosmopolitanism that made Oxfam different to the Liberal Democrats in this regard? The understanding and utilisation of the idea of globalisation has a pivotal role here. The chapter will argue that Oxfam was in fact much keener than the Liberal Democrats to forgo an active economic role for the state, and much more attuned to spatial imagery evident in the New Labour and IFSL discourses, producing a coherent pro-globalisation position reminiscent of New Labour. But the idea of globalisation was argued to be capable itself of bringing about justice and individual freedom – Oxfam did not see nationstates supporting this process (as New Labour argued, in relation to foreign economic policy), but rather getting in the way. Anti-politics was therefore a major theme of Oxfam’s discourse. Of course, the financial crisis problematised this perspective to some extent – Oxfam seemingly found it much more difficult than the Liberal Democrats to sustain their pro-globalisation in the wake of the crisis. The chapter is based predominantly on Oxfam’s policy papers and ‘campaign reports’ (foundational statements on the objectives of key campaigns). It also utilises press releases and web articles on specific issues and events regarding which Oxfam’s response was ideologically significant, and newspaper articles written by senior Oxfam employees. Several interviews were also undertaken with representatives of Oxfam; that is, two senior employees based at the Oxford headquarters and four local organisers. Generally, interviews were used to further clarify some of the issues discussed in published documents. However, since Oxfam publications are usually written from the perspective of a single corporate voice, interviews were used to highlight nuances and potential differences of opinion not immediately evident in the organisation’s communicative discourse. The chapter begins by discussing Oxfam’s understanding of globalisation and its broadly pro-globalisation perspective. It then discusses in more detail Oxfam’s support for free trade and development, as typified by its approach to the WTO. Finally it discusses Oxfam’s understanding of politics, in terms of its own agency, political institutions and the role of the state.

Globalisation What is globalisation? Oxfam referred to globalisation in principally economic terms. For instance, the process was primarily demonstrated by increases in international trade. The campaign report Rigged Rules and Double Standards – Oxfam’s key publication of the past decade – therefore treated increasing trade and globalisation as

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largely synonymous (2002b: 5, 20, 32). Debates about globalisation, fought between so-called globaphiles and globaphobes, were described as a debate ‘about trade’ (2002b: 7); the growth in trade is the reason we now have ‘an integrated global economy’ (2002b: 31). Rigged Rules included a few references to the global economy as a ‘marketplace’, albeit one which operates ‘imperfectly’ due to its governing rules. It was never made clear, however, what exactly about increases in trade is ‘global’. It should be noted that the liberalisation of trade – a political process – was never treated as a cause of globalisation, despite the emphasis on increasing trade. Regarding causation, Rigged Rules referred to both technological change and, more nebulously, market forces. Crucially, interdependence between nations – of which, logically, increased trade is epiphenomenal – was not treated as part of the definition of globalisation. Rather, interdependence was presented in Oxfam’s discourse as an effect of globalisation. As such, globalisation, whether driven by technology or abstract market forces, was separated from any particular political entity or entities. There was, however, an important secondary discourse within Oxfam’s ideology on what globalisation is, most evident in interviews rather than published documents. Several interviewees referred to the phenomenon of transnational or global social interaction, and concomitant political organisation, as a significant dimension of globalisation. Such socio-political processes were also judged to be caused by technological development and to contribute to conditions of interdependence. One local organiser said ‘while it might be about economics it’s also about great big global communications and communities, great big global organisations. Technology, culture’ (cited in Berry & Gabay, 2009: 11). This quote is suggestive of a perspective within Oxfam whereby globalisation is a sociopolitical as well as economic or technological phenomenon. However, published documents rarely, if ever, referred to globalisation in these terms. Nevertheless, the final section of this chapter will show how the changing nature of politics was, for Oxfam, a crucial part of the globalisation story, even if not strictly part of its definition. The somewhat contradictory statements from interviewees in this regard therefore suggest nuances – or even tensions – within Oxfam’s approach. Within the economic process of globalisation, Oxfam’s discourse upheld a slightly peculiar account of the role of TNCs in the process of globalisation. For instance, Oxfam’s report into the coffee market, Mugged (2002a), demonstrated that the so-called globalisation of coffee production has been engendered by the growing power of the TNCs that bring coffee from producer countries to Western markets. Yet it maintained that globalisation is primarily a system of trade (2002a: 6). Rigged Rules suggested why: Increased trade within companies has been one of the most powerful forces behind the expansion of world trade ... approximately two-thirds of all trade takes place within companies. (Oxfam, 2002b: 8)

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Such a characterisation of transnational intra-firm transfers was, of course, not unique to Oxfam. But it is nevertheless surely ideologically significant that Oxfam upheld the view that these transfers can be understood primarily as instances of trade. For Oxfam, the enrichment of TNCs is an inevitable product of the world’s increasing capacity to trade, given the forms of rules that have governed world trade for several decades. Technology remained the driving factor of globalisation; yet technology has been able to increase trade ‘[u]nder the auspices of TNCs’ (Oxfam, 2002b: 8). In other words, ‘[t]echnological change has made globalisation possible. Transnational companies have made it happen. Through their investment, production and marketing activities, TNCs bring the world’s economies and people more closely together’ (Oxfam, 2002b: 14). This passage was not critical of TNCs, but merely identified them as the carriers of the inexorable force of technological development, the logical outcome of which is increased trade.

Positive or negative? Oxfam’s discourse consistently upheld a pro-globalisation position. While the emphasis, of course, was on the specific challenges created by the global economy, support for globalisation in general was an underlying theme. When asked directly, interviewees argued that it is a priori good that the world’s population is becoming more interconnected via transnational processes. Oxfam believed, however, that the promise of globalisation lies principally in the economic realm. Integration into a single global marketplace was assumed to have had significant benefits for the world as a whole. Rigged Rules explicitly associates globalisation with ‘unprecedented opulence’ (Oxfam, 2002b: 22). There was obviously a critical, even sarcastic, element within such terminology, suggesting a world of greed and inequality. Yet they maintained that, while wealth should be distributed more equitably, nevertheless it was precisely globalisation that had created unprecedented wealth. One interviewee argued: If we take the best aspects of globalisation, the best results of globalisation ... if we can use the forces of globalisation to create a baseline around the world so that everyone has a choice, everyone has access to a doctor, a school, these real baseline Millennium Development Goalstype aspirations, I do think globalisation can deliver. (cited in Berry & Gabay, 2009: 13) More specifically, Oxfam often related the benefits of globalisation to the utility of market economics – predominantly in relation to its support for free trade, as the next section will show. None of this is to suggest that Oxfam did not recognise some of the downsides of globalisation. Its stated raison d’être was that conditions of poverty

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persist in many parts of the world. However, there was ambiguity over whether globalisation was seen as a cause of poverty. The emphasis in documents was that globalisation is a good thing, although too many people are excluded from its benefits. Those excluded generally reside in poor counties, which justifies Oxfam’s identity as a pro-development organisation. The overriding assessment of Rigged Rules was that ‘the vast potential of trade to act as a force for economic growth, human development and shared prosperity is being lost, not because trade is inherently opposed to the interests of the poor, but because it is being managed in a way that concentrates wealth and undermines freedom’. The result was that ‘wealth is trickling down to many developing countries far too slowly’ (Oxfam, 2002b: 22). Globalisation has not yet delivered, yet nevertheless it is within increasing trade that the possibility of economic growth resides. Clearly, this is a difficult position to maintain. When pressed, interviewees reiterated that globalisation was a good thing, but some said that it was ‘failing’, or that it had ‘further squeezed’ the world’s poor in some ways. Another underlying theme of Oxfam’s discourse in this regard was that globalisation was neutral, rather than intrinsically positive. For instance, Rigged Rules stated that ‘[i]n itself, trade is not inherently opposed to the interests of poor people. International trade can act as a force for good, or for bad (Oxfam, 2002b: 24). While there is little evidence in Oxfam’s discourse, it may be that globalisation is not straightforwardly positive or neutral; rather, it is best considered as existentially distinct. Globalisation exists independently of actual societies, and even economies. It may be quintessentially good, but its benefits depend on how we choose to interact with it. This view of globalisation as exogenous seems to echo New Labour’s discourse in some ways. It is evident in Oxfam’s view that globalisation can be managed, but not altered – and therefore management must take certain forms. Oxfam and New Labour differ on what forms management must take, but not on the underlying logic of responding to globalisation. It does appear, however, that the term ‘globalisation’ disappeared from Oxfam’s discourse circa 2008. The financial crisis is surely related to this change (the interviews were conducted before the onset of the economic downturn). Invariably, like New Labour, the crisis was depicted as a ‘global’ phenomenon, and also like New Labour, nothing in Oxfam’s discourse on foreign economic policy suggested that they had foreseen the crisis (see Oxfam, 2010). This obviously presented intellectual difficulties for Oxfam. As the remainder of this chapter will explore, Oxfam saw economics as transnational, and as such the crisis was interpreted in these terms. Yet globalisation was supposed to be a positive economic development, something that robbed power from the vested interests located at the national level. Therefore, while New Labour seemed to some extent to rearticulate a pro-globalisation position, or at the very least maintain images of globality within its discourse in a positive or neutral way

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(because nation-states still had a role in making globalisation more or less positive), it seems that Oxfam largely abandoned references to globalisation. They did not, however, come to criticise the notion of a global market. Their ‘response’ focused on detailing the impact on various countries and regions, and in particular women in poor countries, rather than tackling systemic problems.

Free trade and development This section considers Oxfam’s main policy agenda, expressed mainly under the Make Trade Fair banner, and its rationale. It looks at this agenda first via Oxfam’s view of free trade and then via the meaning Oxfam attributed to development. Finally it looks at Oxfam’s approach to the WTO and therefore the DDA.

Free trade and the global marketplace Oxfam strongly supported the principle of free trade and as such supported measures to liberalise trade rules, believing that a more ‘level playing field’ would enable market integration on a more equitable basis. It is worth reiterating that trade liberalisation, as a political phenomena, was rarely defined by Oxfam as one of the causes of globalisation. Oxfam’s principal ambition was the extension of trade liberalisation into sectors hitherto protected by rich countries, such as agriculture and textiles. This is what ‘double standards’ meant: free trade is good, but rich countries do no uphold free trade, even though they claim that they do. It seems that, given its association with the politics of rich countries, Oxfam was slightly reticent about free trade. The following passage captures Oxfam’s distinctive style of support for free trade: Today, the doctrine of free trade reigns supreme. So pervasive is the belief, so absolute the conviction of its adherents, that it has emerged as the economic religion of globalisation. But it is a curious religion. Throughout history its followers have applied the creed to their own behaviour on a selective basis. (Oxfam, 2002b: 25) As such, Oxfam seems to reject the free trade ‘doctrine’. However, it is not free trade, but rather governments’ duplicity in support for free trade that is the problem. Free trade would be perfectly acceptable were it not applied selectively. For instance, Oxfam advocated comprehensive trade liberalisation in agriculture and textiles – not in place of other trade regimes, but to ensure consistency. This policy area was defined as ‘market access’. Although there is a danger of inferring too much from such terms, this concept seems to have implied that a global market exists, but something is preventing all countries of the world from engaging in it. That thing was not perceived as some aspect of

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the capitalist economic structure, but rather the protectionism of rich countries. Oxfam’s strong support for trade liberalisation and integration into the global market survived the financial crisis, even if references to globalisation did not. However, there did seem to be more emphasis on the global economy itself as a barrier to integration, rather than simply the behaviour of rich countries within the global economy (see Oxfam, 2010). Interestingly, Oxfam’s discourse does not engage at all with free trade theory or notions of comparative advantage in particular. While Oxfam’s discourse portrays none of the awkwardness regarding the free trade/ globalisation relationship seen in the Liberal Democrats’ discourse, Oxfam prefers to talk about the global marketplace rather than couching their approach in free trade. In this way, they are similar to Liberal Democrats. Related to this, they also talk about the global marketplace as both morally and economically superior, and consistently associate free trade with individual freedom (that is, freedom from state control). For Oxfam, the creation of a more perfect marketplace meant there was no contradiction between the interests of rich and poor countries over the long term. As such, the main aim of Oxfam’s seminal Make Poverty History (MPH) campaign was ‘trade justice’ (see Make Poverty History, 2007). Integration is (inevitably) taking place; it should do so on a more just basis. Yet terms such as ‘trade justice’ implied that it is primarily or exclusively trade rules which are the means to justice. Crucially, it is principally from this agenda that the WTO, for Oxfam, drew its legitimacy. Where its rules benefited certain members rather than the organisation as a whole, its legitimacy was undermined (Oxfam, 2002b: 6). This will be discussed more below. In this context, it would be interesting to note Oxfam’s opinion on agreements such as the GATS and the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPs), which were justified by their advocates as free tradesupporting measures. Unlike many of its world development movement partners, Oxfam was not inherently opposed to GATS, which opens service sector markets to foreign competition. Interviewees confirmed that, from Oxfam’s perspective, international trade in services is a good thing. However, Oxfam was opposed to provisions within GATS that require the provision of public goods like health and education to be liberalised – it was this argument, rather than the broader support for services liberalisation, that was most consistently found in Oxfam’s discourse. Yet for ideology, absence is often as important as presence. It would be unfair to claim that Oxfam did not conceive of health and education as goods in themselves, but nevertheless Oxfam’s discourse suggests a strong link between such services and the optimal operation of markets: The challenge of extending opportunity at the national level goes beyond the narrow confines of trade policy. Inequalities in health and

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education services, and in the ownership of assets, are a formidable barrier to making markets work for poor people. (Oxfam, 2002b: 17) It is on the basis, then, that GATS takes away the ability of the relevant public authorities to provide these services that it was opposed by Oxfam. The briefing paper A Recipe for Disaster adds water and electricity to the services that must be excluded from GATS and argues that poor countries should maintain the right to ensure universal telecommunications coverage – ‘an irrefutable necessity for development’ – even if the service is provided by foreign firms (Oxfam, 2006a: 20–5). As such, Oxfam opposed parts of GATS, and prospective extensions to GATS – but precisely because they may have undermined the possibility of equitable integration into the global market (in other words, development). If they had supported equitable integration, logic suggests Oxfam would have supported these measures. It had no quarrel with most services in poor countries being provided by foreign firms, so long as public authorities retained the freedom to set standards. Similarly, although there was virtually no discussion in Oxfam documents, most interviewees argued that Oxfam was not fundamentally opposed to any of the Singapore issues – the problem was that they opposed the extension of free trade (as they saw it) into new areas before sectors such as agriculture had been liberalised. It should be noted here, however, that for both GATS and the Singapore issues, Oxfam strongly supported special and differential treatment. This is seen as part of a development package, and will be discussed in the next sub-section. In contrast to GATS and the Singapore issues, however, Oxfam was fundamentally opposed to TRIPs. This is seemingly not because Oxfam rejected the notion of international intellectual property rights, but rather because the WTO is not the correct forum for rules on these rights. TRIPs was depicted by Rigged Rules as ‘institutionalised fraud’; we can speculate that in this phrase, the word ‘institutionalised’ was as important as the word ‘fraud’. The protection of intellectual property rights is the job of the World Intellectual Property Organisation, and it should not be brought into the trade regime (Oxfam, 2002b: 15). More generally, TRIPs was distinguished from GATS because TRIPs by necessity serves as a check upon market integration, by denying access to the technological and knowledge infrastructure required for development. This was not a reason to oppose the rules per se, but rather a rationale for far greater levels of SDT than currently permitted.

The meaning of development Oxfam’s understanding of development in conditions of globalisation was not straightforward. Its policy agenda, premised on facilitating development, was designed to alleviate poverty: ostensibly, the extent of poverty was the benchmark against which policies like trade agreements are judged. As such, poverty

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alleviation was the main, specific definition of development offered by Oxfam. In other words, development is an outcome rather than a process. There is a lingering ambiguity, of course, about whether poverty simply coincided with, or was caused by, globalisation – evident in documents and interviews. There was also ambiguity over whether the alleviation of poverty was a means to an end or an end in itself. Was it more important that poverty (as a product of the global economy) curtailed the freedom of individuals or that poverty prevented integration into the global economy (the path to development)? Obviously, these two arguments were rarely presented as contradictory in practice: Oxfam wanted to make globalisation work, but specifically to make it work for the poor. The issue, it seems, is how development is achieved; this complicated Oxfam’s outcome-based definition of the concept. For instance, Oxfam strongly supported the DDA, and seemed to believe its designation as a ‘development’ round was meaningful. It was not simply that certain measures on the Doha agenda would alleviate poverty, but rather that increasing global economic integration through trade liberalisation was an appropriate and sustainable way of achieving development. In this sense, Oxfam’s understanding of development incorporated elements of process as well as outcome: poverty could or should only be achieved in a certain fashion. In interviews, development was often referred to specifically as a (potential) outcome of trade. Assessed in abstract terms, Oxfam’s approach to development seems to have been close to a neoliberal approach and shared features with the World Bank’s post-Washington Consensus. Clearly, however, more detail is required on exactly what Oxfam wanted to be done in the name of development before such a prospect can be more fully addressed. As noted above, Oxfam believed that poor countries required SDT measures as part of free trade agreements, given that ‘rapid import liberalisation in developing countries has often intensified poverty and inequality’ (2002b: 12). It was clearly the course of liberalisation rather than the content which was culpable for anti-development outcomes. The solutions advocated, therefore, were a slower pace of reform, more sensitivity to how reform is sequenced and more technical assistance so that policy changes could be properly implemented. Developing countries warranted some dispensation because – as argued in Rigged Rules – ‘in international trade ... the weakest athletes face the highest hurdles’ (Oxfam, 2002b: 25). SDT instead brings about a level playing field. Crucially, Oxfam did not expect SDT to be a permanent feature of the trading system; its discourse on SDT was replete with references to time. Once SDT had taken effect, its recipients could be weaned off. In fact, one interviewee argued that the most important component of SDT could be negotiating capacity: if the poorest countries had more resources to make the best decisions in trade negotiations, they could secure for themselves the time and freedom required to gain as much as possible from liberalisation.

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Oxfam also advocated a system of ‘aid for trade’. The basic philosophy of aid for trade was, as stated consistently by Oxfam, that poor countries should be given the opportunity to ‘work themselves out of poverty’. Of course, this correlated with the assumption that trading is synonymous with integrating into the global marketplace; an Oxfam briefing note said that the ‘essential aim’ of this form of aid ‘is to help countries adapt to the global trading environment’ (2005c: 2). Ostensibly, aid for trade was not a campaign for free trade. Its objectives included enhancing workers’ skills, modernising customs systems, building roads and ports, improving agricultural productivity and export diversification. However, aid for trade clearly did not contravene a general system of trade liberalisation, and was seen as market-reinforcing, in that it helped to correct imbalances in the global market which, for Oxfam, derived from the privileged position enjoyed by rich countries prior to the onset of the current, advanced phase of globalisation. Furthermore, the very association of aid for trade with ‘the global trading environment’ implicitly draws attention to the position of free trade as an appropriate response to globalisation. It may be possible for adherents of liberalism to justify aid for trade as a just redistribution of resources. However, Oxfam actually preferred the pragmatic argument about economic benefits. Also, crucially, aid was expected to cover the ‘adjustment costs of implementing trade agreements’ (Oxfam, 2005c: 2). There was a clear overlap between SDT and aid for trade here. Both aimed to increase market access over the long term. One idea proposed in 2002 seems, in this regard, to contradict SDT and aid for trade: commodity management initiatives (CMIs) to manage prices of certain commodities (Oxfam, 2002a). A CMI would involve various interested parties co-operating to fix commodity prices at a level above market value. This would require reform of some WTO rules, that is, a reversal of some aspects of liberalisation in commodity-producing countries. Yet CMIs were not seen by Oxfam as infringements of free trade, insofar as a system of free trade in Oxfam’s understanding was equivalent to a global marketplace. They were market-framing mechanisms, required in order to make markets work more effectively. The presumption was that the price for certain commodities had fallen so low that their production was becoming unviable, thereby threatening the market’s operation. It is of course possible to interpret this proposal as a challenge to the free market, based on development objectives. Where it was deemed there was too much freedom for powerful TNCs, Oxfam reminded us of the need to curtail certain freedoms. Since the benefits of free trade were couched in terms of trade integration and making the most of globalisation, this reasoning was not required in this instance given that commodity-producers are already integrated into the global marketplace via trade, or what Oxfam understood as trade. The crisis of coffee prices, for instance, was principally described as a ‘development disaster’, and not as a disaster for the global coffee trade, even

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though the two outcomes were usually co-constitutive for Oxfam (2002a: 6). Clearly, measures such as a CMI cannot be deemed to represent neoliberal ideology, in that it would have significantly constrained the business practice of TNCs. While both SDT and aid for trade fit conceptually in within New Labour’s agenda, Oxfam’s seemingly more stringent and authentic attachment to these ideas should be taken into account. Of course, none of these measures were conceived by Oxfam as contravening market principles. One way or another, they enabled poor countries to make the most out of integration of their economies into the global market.

The WTO and the Doha round Oxfam believed that the WTO was fundamental to the prospects of development. Integration into the global market leads to development; yet it is the WTO which enables this integration. Its specific function for Oxfam was managing free trade rules. This can be seen as market-framing, given that the WTO is therefore allocated the task of managing the global marketplace. But its primary role was seemingly conceived by Oxfam as market-founding; the WTO helps to engineer the integration of poor countries into the global economy on an equitable basis. Without the WTO, anarchy reigns. While recognising that the institution was multilateral in nature, Oxfam actually emphasised the role of ostensibly supranational organs like the Secretariat and the Dispute Settlement Mechanism as key to the organisation’s future capacity to manage globalisation and free trade. The WTO was viewed as an authoritative institution, at least partly independent, in a position to determine the future of globalisation and, more precisely, poor countries’ relationship to the process of globalisation. Moreover, while Oxfam at times argued that the WTO should be brought more firmly into the orbit of the UN (which was argued by the Liberal Democrats), the prevailing opinion was that the precise institutional arrangements do not matter. One interviewee said, for instance, that ‘a rules-based system is necessary. If you got rid of the WTO you’d have to replace it with something that looked quite like the WTO’ (cited in Berry & Gabay, 2009: 11). Oxfam was far more concerned with what they saw as rich countries’ ‘abuse’ of the WTO. Oxfam therefore wanted the WTO to have further power – but it is not clear how. The yielding of sovereign powers by nation-states would be the logical means, as seen in institutions like the EU. But Oxfam appeared to imagine WTO authority to be less tangible than this. What Oxfam seems to have envisaged, instead, is that countries simply come to respect the norms embodied by the WTO, principally free trade but also more nebulously the supervision of free trade in conditions of globalisation. This is what Duncan Green (2006) meant when he argued ‘what’s needed is a new mindset, not a new institution’. Political legitimacy, of course, is never entirely formal, but in the case of Oxfam’s discourse on the WTO’s purpose, the institution’s ideal source of legitimacy was

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largely if not wholly informal or, in other words, outside the normal legitimisation structures stipulated by norms of sovereign statehood and representative democracy. It seems the institution existed, for Oxfam, in some global space unattached to any nation-state or the state system. This is surely related to New Labour’s and IFSL’s discourse on where the global economy is ‘located’. It seems Oxfam held a similar opinion on the separateness of global space. Related to this is Oxfam’s general disdain of regional and bilateral free trade agreements – in contrast to New Labour and IFSL. A press release of August 2006 quoted Celine Charveriat, the Head of Oxfam’s Make Trade Fair campaign, as saying: Developing countries have less bargaining power in regional negotiations and are more susceptible to bullying. They are not guaranteed special treatment as they are at the WTO, and some of the issues most important for poverty reduction, like the reduction of agricultural subsidies, are not addressed. Free trade deals deprive developing countries of the space they need to use trade policies as a tool for development. (cited in Oxfam, 2006b) But why was Oxfam so vehemently opposed to such arrangements, when the WTO process seemingly produced similar sub-optimal results for poor countries? Moreover, even the WTO’s more universal coverage does not guarantee that sectors like agriculture will be brought into its regime. The WTO remained (at least partially) legitimate to Oxfam, while bilateral and regional agreements were seen as an illegitimate form of policy-making (see Green, 2006; Oxfam, 2007). The real difference, surely, is that the WTO was deemed by Oxfam to contain the potential for these policy outcomes. This may be because of the collective bargaining enabled, or even necessitated, by WTO procedures. However, despite what Charveriat suggests, Oxfam’s discourse suggested full recognition of ‘bullying’ within the WTO, and the difficulties of collective bargaining (see Oxfam, 2005a, 2005b, 2005d). This may have been due to some cosmopolitan impulse within Oxfam that certain policies must apply to the entire world – for better or worse. It would be unfair to dismiss this notion, as it was occasionally voiced in interviews. The best explanation, however, is that Oxfam only really trusted the WTO to enact any trade policy due to its opinion on what forms of economic governance were required in conditions of globalisation. It is worth noting that New Labour, for instance, was for the most part a reluctant supporter of bilateral agreements for precisely this reason. The economy has to be global; for Oxfam, development must be globalised too. Oxfam’s discourse suggested the view that the DDA actually did represent this form of governance agenda. In terms of both process and outcomes, the DDA contained the implicit understanding of an international institution

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escaping its foundation in agreement between sovereign states to bring about a public goods on a universal basis, that is, development (through free trade) (Oxfam, 2005a: 8–11). Importantly, the process is steered by the institutions rather than its member-states (see Oxfam, 2005b; Stuart, 2006). It is difficult to determine whether this optimistic account of the prospects for global governance was affected by the financial crisis. As suggested above, globalisation itself became less important to Oxfam’s discourse. However, the failure of the Doha negotiations seemingly had a more significant impact on Oxfam’s discourse on the WTO. The liberal trade regime was still supported, but Oxfam grew increasingly critical of the capacity of WTO members to implement prodevelopment measures. To a large extent, this spared Oxfam the need to comment on the impact of the financial crisis on the future of free trade rules.

Oxfam and politics Oxfam’s understanding of politics, and its opinions on the actions of various political actors, has been noted several times throughout this chapter, particularly in relation to the WTO and the DDA. This section explores this aspect of Oxfam’s perspective in more detail, firstly by assessing Oxfam’s view of nation-states, then its view on the appropriate forms and spheres of foreign economic policy-making and finally Oxfam’s understanding of its own agency. It argues that Oxfam’s understanding of politics and political behaviour, particularly by states, was intimately related to the meanings attributed in Oxfam’s discourse to globalisation.

The role of nation-states Oxfam invariably presented the leaders of nation-states as parochial and Machiavellian. Its discourse suggests a profound aversion to the realm of formal politics (generally referred to as ‘power-politics’). Such opinions could, of course, have been based on their experience of dealing with or simply observing particular actors; they could also have been influenced extent of policy disagreement between Oxfam and the leaders of some countries. However, there is evidence to suggest that a form of anti-politics was in fact a significant aspect of Oxfam’s perspective on foreign economic policy. As we have seen, Oxfam believed that globalisation is positive, and represented an extremely important transformation affecting all parts of the world. Yet it was difficult to manage, precisely because nation-states were interfering in the process. Oxfam’s criticism of national politicians appears to have been based on a very narrow understanding of what politics is, that is, a self-interested pursuit of power. There was also a peculiar disregard for the importance of representative democratic processes. Indeed, Oxfam did not solely criticise politicians from affluent nationstates. Rigged Rules and Double Standards argued:

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Not all of the problems can be traced to international rules and the behaviour of Northern governments. Developing countries have much to answer for. Southern governments rightly condemn rich countries for denying them the opportunities that trade can provide. They call for policies to redistribute wealth and opportunity. Yet the vast majority are loathe to apply the same principles at home. Trade policies reinforce other policies that perpetuate inequality and injustice. (Oxfam, 2002b: 22) Oxfam did not expend much energy on such arguments; the policies and politics of governments in poor countries were obviously not central its core campaigns. However, these views are certainly interesting, when seen in light of the fury directed at Northern governments. Development is primarily being hampered by the political interference of rich countries in the WTO’s mission – but also by the actions of the governments of poor countries in relation to their own populations. Oxfam seemed to accept that states are necessary for development, yet it favoured a depoliticised form of statecraft, ignoring sources of legitimacy such as democratic elections at the national level. It is possible that one of the reasons Oxfam supported free trade is that it may emasculate national-level politicians. None of this is to suggest that Oxfam did not work with government and the processes of policy-making at the national level. However, as the next sub-section will explore, it appears to have done so on the basis of a technocratic view of what public authorities are for.

Multilateralism Oxfam advocated several mechanisms by which authority may be exercised on a worldwide scale by way of regulating global economic activity. For example, Oxfam would have liked to see more stringent standards imposed upon TNCs. It was not clear which public body may be employed with this task – it appears that several organisations would have participated – but it would be a task undertaken at the global level. Generally speaking, despite making several policy suggestions in this regard (see Oxfam, 2003), it does not actually offer a coherent vision for global governance. First, Oxfam seemed to place more emphasis on the content of policy than the form of policy-making. Second, Oxfam did not profess a strong interest in democratising transnational or international governance mechanisms – unlike the Liberal Democrats. The management of globalisation was more likely to be presented as a technocratic application of certain norms. This is certainly evident in Oxfam’s approach to the WTO. Oxfam was entirely comfortable with professed purpose to promote a certain form of trade regime, rather than regulate trade per se. Indeed, Oxfam’s discourse on the WTO typified its anti-politics orientation. Oxfam offered little evidence that

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any WTO members were contravening the actual rules of the organisation they created – but consistently accused them of manipulating the WTO agenda. From a logical perspective, the WTO is its member-states. From Oxfam’s perspective, however, it seems the WTO was its Secretariat and Dispute Settlement Mechanism. The ideal WTO, for Oxfam, was essentially a technocracy. Global trade policy or, more specifically, the transition to free trade, should be managed by experts, independent of ‘realpolitik’. As already indicated, such a perspective was relevant to various aspects of Oxfam’s foreign economic policy positions. Oxfam believed that there are common, global interests. Where policy-makers’ actions diverged from this, they were necessarily acting selfishly, foolishly or callously. As such, several interviewees argued that the WTO had been ‘skewed’ by politics. Understandably, there is not a large amount of evidence on this perspective in Oxfam’s papers and reports. However, some of the language used is interesting in this regard; references to ‘rigged rules’, ‘fraud’ and ‘robbery’ in relation to WTO rules indicated Oxfam’s opinion. Oxfam described their opposition to the actions which produce, from their perspective, meagre beneficial outcomes for poor countries in terms which invoked images of unlawfulness and dishonesty. The briefing paper Blood on the Floor: How the Rich Countries Have Squeezed Development Out of the Doha Negotiations was, ostensibly, a report on developments on the WTO during 2005, detailing the lack of progress made across several areas considered crucial for development. However, its second section, on ‘Doha’s double standards’ contained a lot of violent imagery when referring to rich countries and their actions, using terms such as ‘war of attrition’, ‘full arsenal’ and ‘arm-twisting’ (Oxfam, 2005a). Oxfam presented the DDA as an opportunity for politicians to abandon self-interest in favour of global public goods. But as Liz Stuart, Oxfam’s head of relations with the World Bank and IMF, explained: The Doha talks were going to be different from previous rounds of trade negotiations. Instead of delivering liberalisation and nothing else, they would instead unlock the potential of poor countries to use the profits of trade to lift themselves out of poverty... They also promised that poor countries would have to do less than them, and have longer to do it... But the poison in the system has been politics. (Stuart, 2006) Stuart also claimed specifically that the EU could have supported liberalisation in agricultural trade, had it not been ‘hostage to politics of member states’. For Stuart, acting politically was the opposite of acting ethically. Interestingly, Oxfam thought that what existed within the DDA before the return of selfinterest was not simply a ‘focus on development’, but also a more nebulous ‘spirit of reform’, embodied not by any particular country but by the DDA itself

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(Oxfam, 2005b). This is clearly consistent with with the notion that the WTO, especially as represented by the DDA, exists or should exist at least partially outside the realm of international politics, and would be more successful or legitimate were it not for political interference or indeed manipulation. According to Blood on the Floor, ‘power politics turns upside-down the promises made in Doha’ (2005a: 12).

Globalisation and transnational agency The first section noted the ambiguity within Oxfam’s discourse on whether increased transnational social interaction, and ultimately transnational political organisation, was a part of globalisation. In relation to economics, globalisation was seen as the result of abstract market logic, to which socio-political organisation is a response. Yet there were references to technology as a cause of globalisation, and it seems that a ‘sense of interconnectedness’ is to some extent responsible for driving change in information and communication technologies. Indeed, one interviewee argued that ‘the fact that groups like Oxfam realise that [the world] isn’t fragmented and that you do need a world voice is part of [globalisation]’ (cited in Berry & Gabay, 2009: 15). Given Oxfam’s overriding pro-globalisation perspective, in associating their own activity and organisation with the process of change, they seem to be using globalisation discourse to legitimise their perspective. They are not simply responding to change; rather, the nature of change makes their response more valuable. Again, there is little in Oxfam’s published documents to support this conclusion firmly. But in discussion about politics in interviews, Oxfam employees strongly defended the notion that Oxfam is a progressive political actor. Adjacent, therefore, to Oxfam’s anti-politics view is the argument that groups like Oxfam now constitute a global public sphere, and that this motivated interviewees to work for Oxfam rather than a political party. Indeed, one local organiser disputed the difference between non-governmental organisations and political parties by declaring that Oxfam was no different to a party. Oxfam was therefore exemplary of a new politics. Yet we have seen that Oxfam did not want to reconstitute the formal power of nation-states at the global level. Its approach to global governance is largely technocratic. Oxfam does not conceive that it, or any organisation, represents particular groups or interests. Rather it simply offers policy expertise and imagines that, through the WTO system, policy expertise could and should prosper above vested interests. Interestingly, Oxfam never referred to the concept of ‘global civil society’ (see Berry & Gabay, 2009). The notion of a civil society existing alongside a formal political realm within a global public sphere was rejected by Oxfam. As such, MPH was offered as an example of Oxfam’s new style of politics appropriate to conditions of globalisation. But it was valorised precisely because of the message it promoted (and the policy means to achieve

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its goals) rather than because of its coalition structure. Indeed, while dozens of groups ‘signed up’ to MPH, it was led predominantly by Oxfam without a formal organisational structure and has left no organisational legacy. The MPH coalition was technically a member of a worldwide coalition, that is, the Global Call to Action on Poverty – to which there were seemingly no references in any of Oxfam’s published documents during the period in question. Moreover, Oxfam constantly lauded MPH as a success – despite the fact that virtually none of its policy aims had been achieved. Changing the minds and behaviour of actual policy-makers is therefore not conceived as one of Oxfam’s objectives as a political organisation. Presenting the right policy solutions is an end in itself; if they are not implemented, self-interested politicians, acting in an illegitimate fashion, are to blame.

Conclusion Oxfam’s discourse on foreign economic policy from 1997 to 2009 appears to have been based on a coherent, albeit complex, approach to and understanding of globalisation. The idea of globalisation played an extremely important role within Oxfam’s policies on trade and development. Of course, it may have been Oxfam’s campaigning focus on foreign economic policy which encouraged this discursive engagement, or it may have Oxfam’s inherently pro-globalisation view which encouraged this campaigning focus – an intractable ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma which cannot be resolved here. Oxfam saw globalisation as the emergence of a global marketplace, created by both market logic and technological change. TNCs ‘carried’ these forces of change, but did not initiate them. Crucially, the economic and ethical merits of free markets were the main source of globalisation’s positive connotations. The socio-political dimensions of social interaction and political organisation were also part of the globalisation story for Oxfam, but its narrative on the causal role of these phenomena varied. Essentially, Oxfam’s discourse seems to have resided somewhere in between the two prevailing discourses within New Labour. Like the ‘global competition’ argument, it placed emphasis on the global marketplace, but, like the epochal change argument, it saw globalisation as more than simply economic change. Like New Labour, Oxfam exhibited strong support for trade liberalisation in principle (notwithstanding some practical differences in terms of policy outcomes), but did not refer to free trade theory at all and seemed to have a slightly awkward relationship with the concept of free trade – supporting free trade while criticising rich countries’ support for free trade. This awkwardness was not present on the same scale, however, as evident in the Liberal Democrats discourse of foreign economic policy. The concept of globalisation appears to have marginalised the free trade concept within the Liberal Democrats’ discourse – or, viewed in another way, there is a degree of

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consternation about globalisation because of its conflict with free trade. Oxfam appeared to uphold a much more optimistic view of the symbiotic nature of the relationship between globalisation and the liberal trade regime embodied by the WTO. It would be useful to dwell on the ideological genealogy operating here: it is possible that Oxfam was more able to accept globalisation seamlessly into its ideological schematics due to a stronger pre-existing commitment to Kantian internationalism or cosmopolitanism – a cause potentially served by the integrative effects of globalisation. Yet ironically it seems Oxfam’s approach to globalisation made it less reliant on Kantian arguments – Oxfam’s support for supranational mechanisms was derived logically from an empirical account of globalisation rather than an ethical impulse. In contrast, the Liberal Democrats seemed to struggle with the implications of globalisation for their internationalist values. What it meant to be an internationalist party located at the national level was called into question by globalisation. The irony, however, is that the financial crisis seems to have strengthened groups like the Liberal Democrats at the expense of Oxfam, reversing any apparent ideological awkwardness. Whereas the Liberal Democrats more cautious approach has to some extent been vindicated, Oxfam has seemingly abandoned the concept of globalisation – and with it many of the discursive resources it had employed to justify its policy perspectives and campaigning activities. Oxfam did not reflect to any great extent on the notion of globality, or more generally the notion that globalisation represented a process of spatial change – despite the references to technological change, and the (potential or emerging) universality of the marketplace. Yet the same logical progression existed for Oxfam as for New Labour and IFSL between the emergence of a global economy and the anachronism and inappropriateness of national-level economic policy. The best example is the WTO: Oxfam located this institution and its internal mechanisms in some global space, beyond the reach of nation-states. Interference in its agenda by nation-states was seen as illegitimate. New Labour obviously did not share this opinion and indeed wanted to use national government to work through the WTO for progressive foreign economic policies. But there is a clear similarity: whereas New Labour believed national governments should not tamper with the economic fundamentals of globalisation, Oxfam believed nation-states should not tamper with the liberal trade regime, despite the fact that the WTO is essentially a membership organisation. In this regard, the depiction of global space as an inappropriate sphere for nationallevel policy activism was the same for New Labour and Oxfam; they simply understood this space differently. Of course, it must be recognised that Oxfam supported a more ‘radical’ agenda in support of international development and poverty alleviation than New Labour. But whether Oxfam was actually more radical than the Liberal Democrats on foreign economic policy is arguable. In responding to the financial

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crisis, Oxfam came to a support a levy on currency speculation, and stronger regulations on tax havens (see Oxfam, 2010). Yet, before 2008, these policy goals had barely featured in Oxfam’s discourse. In terms of foreign economic policy specifically, these policies were seemingly much higher up the Liberal Democrat agenda than Oxfam’s. Trade and aid, for instance, were the focus of MPH; finance was hardly mentioned. If we consider the fact that Oxfam, as an agent, is primarily focused on supporting international development, and unhindered by electoral considerations (both in contrast to the Liberal Democrats), it would be easy to conclude that Oxfam sat to the right of the Liberal Democrats on foreign economic policy. Clearly, the impact of the idea of globalisation has complicated the notion of left and right: Oxfam certainly spent more capital on standing up for the (perceived) interests of poor countries than the Liberal Democrats did, yet in doing so seemed to accept larger chunks of neoliberalism in terms of a pro-liberalisation foreign economic policy stance. It would be interesting to consider Oxfam’s anti-politics orientation in this light. From Oxfam’s perspective, its discourse on politics seems to have involved a radical stance. As a challenge to the perceived causes of poverty and under-development, it was inherently critical of elite behaviour. It was a direct challenge to New Labour and similar actors. However, it also represented a delegitimisation of politics and the state, akin to neoliberalism. National-level action was deposed, but not subsequently transposed to the global level. The state is not recreated in global space. Instead a narrow set of norms were stipulated as the ideal form of governance; the value of democracy was eschewed. The norms are ostensibly liberal in nature, but importantly globalisation is deemed implicitly to have achieved large parts of a traditional liberal agenda without further need for political interference. Oxfam, it seems, upheld a highly sophisticated version of ‘the logic of no alternative’ in relation to globalisation. Of course, Oxfam did challenge neoliberalism, in terms of both policy content and its view of globalisation – suggesting that globalisation discourse contained for many actors a set of meanings beyond neoliberalism, but which recreated many of the key tenets of neoliberal ideology.

References Berry, C. (2006) ‘Cosmopolitanism, liberal globalization and the global governance project’, paper presented at Assuming Cosmopolitanism: Critical Encounters between Cosmopolitanism and Development, University of Manchester, 23 November, accessed at www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/events/conferences /assuming-cosmo.htm on 1 February 2007. Berry, C. & Gabay, C. (2009) ‘Transnational political action and “global civil society” in practice’, Global Networks, 9:3, pp. 339–58.

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Green, D. (2006) ‘Not yet at the crematorium’, Guardian, 26 July. Make Poverty History (2007) ‘Make Poverty History website’, accessed at www.makepovertyhistory.org on 30 October 2010. Oxfam (2002a) Mugged: Poverty in Your Coffee Cup (Oxford: Oxfam). Oxfam (2002b) Rigged Rules and Double Standards (Oxford: Oxfam). Oxfam (2003) Iraq’s Reconstruction and the Role of the United Nations (Oxford: Oxfam). Oxfam (2005a) Blood on the Floor: How the Rich Countries Have Squeezed Development Out of the WTO Doha Negotiations (Oxford: Oxfam). Oxfam (2005b) From Development to Naked Self-Interest: The Doha Development Round has Lost Its Way (Oxford: Oxfam). Oxfam (2005c) Scaling Up Aid for Trade: How to Support Poor Countries to Trade Their Way Out of Poverty (Oxford: Oxfam). Oxfam (2005d) What Happened in Hong Kong? Initial Analysis of the WTO Ministerial, December 2005 (Oxford: Oxfam). Oxfam (2006a) A Recipe for Disaster: Will the Doha Round Fail to Deliver for Development (Oxford: Oxfam). Oxfam (2006b) Oxfam Warns of Threat from Regional Trade Deals for Poor Countries (Oxford: Oxfam), accessed at www.oxfam.org/en/news/pressreleases2006/pr060804 _wto on 30 October 2010. Oxfam (2007) Signing Away the Future: How Trade and Investment Agreements Between Rich and Poor Countries Undermine Development (Oxford: Oxfam). Oxfam (2010) ‘The global economic crisis: Oxfam’s response’, accessed at www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/issues/economic_crisis/introduction.html# on 30 October 2010. Stuart, L (2006) ‘Doha Delay is Not Good for Anyone’ in Guardian, 25 June 2006, accessed at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/jul/25 /dohadelayisnotgoodforany on 30 October 2010.

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Capitalism’s final phase: the case of the Socialist Workers’ Party The Socialist Workers’ Party is the largest far-left organisation in Britain. It is also the dominant member of the International Socialist Tendency (IST), a partnership with similar parties in several Western countries. The SWP is usually identified as a Trotskyist party. It is probably more accurately described as neoTrotskyist, given its origins in Tony Clift’s ‘state capitalism’ thesis (his reinterpretation of the Soviet Union) and subsequent split from the (Trotskyist) Fourth International. Clift eventually established the SWP in its present format in 1977, having evolved through various incarnations. Throughout the 1990s the SWP was established as the dominant player on the far-left of British politics, following the waning of the industrial unrest of the 1970s and 1980s and the eventual failure of entryist projects. Although often described enigmatically as the ‘anti-globalisation’ movement by commentators and many of its practitioners, the transnational protest movement during the 1990s was seen by the SWP as an ‘anti-capitalist’ movement – a generalised opposition to national and international policies and agreements designed to remove constraints upon capital accumulation. In the minds of many activists, particularly the SWP, the movement finally coalesced in protests accompanying the WTO’s ministerial meeting in Seattle in November 1999. The SWP launched Globalise Resistance (GR) soon after, to augment its status within the movement. On 11 September 2001, however, the context of the SWP’s agency was transformed by the commencement of an aggressive ‘War on Terror’ by the United States and its allies, and the emergence of a perceived new threat to the security of liberal democracies in the West in the form of Islamic fundamentalism. Also, the launch of the DDA by the WTO in November 2001 co-opted many of the anti-capitalist movement’s members with the promise of delivering real benefits to poor countries. The SWP’s focus turned to opposing the invasion of Afghanistan, having been instrumental in the formation of the Stop the War Coalition (StWC) ten days after the 9/11 attacks. The anti-war movement ultimately reached further down into British society than the anti-capitalist movement had, especially as the United State’s attention turned to Iraq, and led to the formation of alliances

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with a host of Muslim groups. Eventually this alliance led to the formation of a new political party, the Respect Coalition. The Respect Coalition was spearheaded by George Galloway MP following his expulsion from the Labour Party, but essentially represented an attempt by the SWP to convert support for the StWC into electoral success with the help of Muslim voters. The Respect Coalition quickly fell apart, although Galloway maintained the brand without the SWP’s support. This chapter performs a vital role within the overall study. As a selfconsciously radical, indeed revolutionary political group, it would be interesting to ascertain the extent to which it shared the discursive territory of the more mainstream groups. Did the SWP uphold a distinct meaning of globalisation, and a separate set of adjacent concepts, in support of is radical agenda – or was it possible to articulate revolutionary socialism with the same conceptual resources used throughout British foreign economic policy debates? There is also a fascinating direct comparison with New Labour. The Labour Party and the SWP shared an ideological heritage to some extent, given that they have both been influenced historically by parts of the socialist tradition. Were there any similarities between the globalisation discourse of New Labour, an ostensibly ‘elite’ actor, and the SWP, the archetypal ‘outsider’ group, particularly in terms of the state’s role? Furthermore, the SWP is of course an intrinsically interesting case. Trotskyism is an inherently internationalist perspective; Trotsky argued socialists must pursue revolutions throughout the world, based on the common experience of workers everywhere. How did this orientation interact with the depiction of a world now subject to a single socioeconomic system? It is possible that ethical appeals to solidarity were marginalised in favour of the practical necessity of international mobilisation. Similarly, if the capitalist process is now global, does this contradict some aspects of Marxist economics or indeed provide new forms of ideological buttress? The chapter will show that the meanings contained within globalisation discourse have clearly travelled far beyond the elite level. The SWP sought intellectual refuge in a reinterpretation of Karl Marx’s work, but interpretations of globalisation found in the other cases can also be found in the SWP’s discourse. A dominant perspective which implied the state’s inevitable decline suggests a fascinating parallel with New Labour’s discourse – suggesting that the idea of globalisation did not simply disrupt a social democratic view on the state/capital relationship, but rather the notion of the state itself, within a broader socialist tradition. However, the financial crisis, while superficially vindicating the SWP’s perspective, seems to have disrupted the party’s approach to globalisation. The chapter profiles the SWP discourse on the basis of articles from the SWP’s weekly newspaper Socialist Worker, monthly magazine Socialist Review and quarterly journal International Socialism, and books written by the SWP’s

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leading members. Interviews with national figures and local activists were also undertaken. Although none of the party’s secretive Central Committee were interviewed, several National Committee (from which the Central Committee is elected) members were. The chapter will first assess the relationship between the globalisation concept and the SWP’s pre-existing commitment to Marxism, noting in particular the complex role of the notion of ‘imperialism’ in the SWP’s perspective. The second section looks at the party’s approach to foreign economic policy, noting the impact of the financial crisis on SWP discourse in this regard. Finally, the third section looks at organisational issues such as the relationship between anti-war and anti-capitalism, and the SWP’s role in and understanding of the wider transnational movement.

Marxism and globalisation This section will discuss the main statements of the SWP on globalisation. It will first look at the meaning(s) ascribed to the process by the party and then at the notions of imperialism, class struggle and anti-globalisation. It will show that the concept was extremely important to the SWP – yet there is no coherent approach. There are three related but distinct trends of thought on globalisation within the party: globalisation is the emergence of a global capitalist system, superseding nation-states; globalisation is the final phase of capitalism; globalisation is a project orchestrated by certain states. These different meanings found different expressions in debates on imperialism, class and whether globalisation is ultimately positive. That said, these trends did not necessarily conflict; whereas some can be associated with specific individuals, different forms of argumentation were often present in a single statement, and some individuals applied different meanings at different times.

What is globalisation? The concept of globalisation was extremely prominent within SWP discourse. Essentially it is used to describe their view that the processes of competitive accumulation have expanded to encompass the entire world. Colin Barker, then editor of Socialist Worker, wrote a weekly column for the newspaper throughout, 2003 and 2004 under the theme of ‘What we stand for’. It has been seen as the most comprehensive statement of the SWP’s perspective in the period being studied, approved by the Central Committee (that is, the party leadership), and is therefore used extensively throughout this chapter. One column described globalisation as ‘the formation of a world market’, and as ‘capitalism’s historic achievement’ (Barker, 2004e; see also Callinicos, 2003). John Rees (SWP Central Committee member and StWC’s national organiser) argued that we are, as a result of the expansion of capitalism, ‘living in an age of globalisation’, claiming that, despite a long history of international economic history, ‘[t]he

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East India Company in all its long history is a mere market stall beside a single year’s trading by a single modern multinational’ (Rees, 2006: 4). The chief implication was the redundancy of the nation-state. In outlining what globalisation is, the SWP almost always referred to Marx’s ‘prediction’ of globalisation. For instance, a National Committee member explained in a personal interview that ‘Marx understood that it was in the logic of capitalism to expand globally and remake the world in its own image and therefore predicts this very eloquently in The Communist Manifesto’. As will be shown below, Marx and Engel’s The Communist Manifesto was extremely important to the SWP between 1997 and 2009. A local activist described globalisation as ‘something we have to go through’. A leading national figure described this notion in their interview as – referring to the party – ‘our raison d’être’. Before inquiring into these arguments in more detail, it is worth presenting the SWP’s view on what capitalism is. Barker’s first column in 2003 dealt with the nature of capitalism as an economic system. The core feature of capitalism, for Barker, was competitive accumulation: because economic power is individual rather than collective, individuals must compete with one another to make a living, through selling the goods they produce. This translates into the need to make profit, and the system of competitive accumulation. If profits are not constantly re-invested as capital into procedures to improve efficiency or new profit-making ventures, more profitable enterprises will be in a position to undermine the original sources of accumulation. The system developed as individuals began to claim economic power from feudal lords, but was fully implemented as bourgeois revolutions upheld the notion that the individual was the sole legitimate holder of economic power, and established political institutions organised around this idea. This understanding of capitalism obviously derived from the work of Karl Marx. Perhaps the most important aspect of Marx’s work upheld by the SWP, however, was the labour theory of value. A good’s value is the amount of labour that goes into its production: the SWP argued that the source of profits in a capitalist economy is the ‘surplus value’ extracted from workers, as they are paid less for their time than its true value, determined by the ‘exchange value’ of the product. This, for Marx and for the SWP, is an exploitative arrangement. SWP consistently argued across all of its publications that the entire world is divided into two social classes: those that own the means of production (the bourgeoisie/middle-class) and the workers that actually create value (the proletariat/working-class). All social, political and economic conflict was related by the SWP to this master relationship (this will be discussed further below). The work of Karl Marx most cited by the SWP was The Communist Manifesto (Marx & Engels, 1967). It was described by Alex Callinicos (Central Committee member) as his main inspiration in An Anti-Capitalist Manifesto (Callinicos, 2003: 19). Although the SWP did not necessarily agree with the

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implication found within The Communist Manifesto that socialist revolution is inevitable, they did generally argue that the creation of the conditions of revolution are inevitable. As outlined in the text, capitalism must go through several phases before revolution is possible – the SWP interpreted globalisation as the final phase. Specifically, for some this translates into the belief that the development of a global working-class is inevitable. In general, The Communist Manifesto, especially when re-evaluated in light of the experience of the Soviet Union, ordains that it is only following the global expansion of capitalism, based on market expansion fuelled by competitive accumulation, that socialism can succeed. Crucially, ‘phases’ terminology was used frequently by the SWP to demonstrate that globalisation represented a ‘crisis’ of capitalism. For instance, Chris Harman (Central Committee member) said that ‘globalisation means global economic crisis, a global war drive, global environmental destruction and all the social convulsions that come in the train of such things’ (Harman, 2007c). Imagery of crisis and instability were extremely common in the SWP’s globalisation discourse. Harman was actually a slightly more ‘sceptical’ voice within the SWP on globalisation. In his 1996 article ‘A critique of a new orthodoxy’, Harman argued that national borders had not yet entirely surrendered to capitalism, in contrast to the claims of ‘the globalisation orthodoxy’. He restated this position in 2007, saying that capital ‘cannot be as footloose as people often suggest’ (Harman, 2007a). Elsewhere in the same pamphlet, however, Harman argued that the world is experiencing globalisation, and that it represented the final phase of capitalism predicted by Marx. If there is a distinction here, it is that Harman was comfortable with the concept when couched in Marxist ‘phases’ terminology, but not when used in terms of the creation of a single global marketplace. Most of the time, the SWP did not present these ideas as contradictory. Jonathan Neale (National Committee member) had an interesting perspective on globalisation. In his book You Are G8, We Are Six Billion (2002), he argued that globalisation has two distinct meanings. The first is the inevitable expansion of capitalism, with the ultimate destination of a single global marketplace and production system – explained, according to Neale, by ‘basic Marxist economics’. In other words, ‘an attempt by the corporations ... to do something about their declining profits’, and as such ‘an attempt to restructure the whole global economy in the interests of corporations’, resulting in ‘an attack on all capitalist owners and managers together on workers’ (Neale, 2002). This argument rejected Harman’s point by combining the closely related arguments about capitalist expansion (vis-à-vis nation-states) and Marx’s ‘final phase’. The second is the deliberate strategy employed by the United States, in support of its own corporations, to open new market opportunities and subjugate other countries – therefore globalisation represented ‘an increasing competition between US capital and other corporations’ (Neale, 2002:

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197–212). We will find that both of these interpretations were present in the SWP’s espousal of imperialism.

Imperialism The SWP’s understanding of globalisation was reflected in its use of the term ‘imperialism’. The SWP often defined itself as ‘anti-imperialist’. The distinction between neo-imperialism and what the SWP called ‘the new imperialism’ is helpful here. The notion of neo-imperialism suggests a world system within which powerful states impose their will upon large parts of the world’s territory, albeit without formal conquest or colonisation. The argument rests, of course, upon the growth of TNCs and the neoliberal policy prescriptions of international economic institutions, but would suggest, among other things, that the process we know as globalisation is a function of neo-imperialist strategies by countries like the United States. The SWP’s main approach did not explicitly eschew this understanding of imperialism; Barker (2004b) noted ‘the close interdependence of big corporations and big governments’. However, it seemed the main thrust of ‘the new imperialism’ argument was slightly different, relegating the role of nation-states. As such, globalisation was clearly said to come before imperialism. The term ‘imperialism’ was used to describe the recent return of major warfare and conquest – that is, to suggest the return of imperialism in its original form, as documented by Vladimir Lenin. Yet the master process is globalisation, as a phase of capitalism. As Chris Bambery (2006) (Central Committee member) argues, imperialism – under the banner of ‘the War on Terror’ – is part of ‘the general strategy of globalisation’. The position was best articulated by John Rees in his book Imperialism and Resistance. Rees clearly separated ‘the power of nation-states’ and ‘the globalised economy’. He argued that states were not creating globalisation, but rather fighting over the spoils: the international nature of market competition drives the state beyond its boundaries bringing it into conflict with other states who are likewise impelled beyond their borders. To stay within borders is to invite competitive defeat. (Rees, 2006: 3) Thus ‘the new imperialism’ was reduced to globalisation. Imperialism is required principally to maintain supplies of globalisation’s main fuel, that is, oil. The SWP’s view on the relationship between states and globalisation was clearly crucial to the SWP’s use of the imperialism concept. John Rees argued, ostensibly in contrast to a mainstream globalisation thesis, that the state had not been weakened. States continue to interfere in the economy, to support the private sector, and most states have enhanced their military and police functions. As such the state ‘remains indispensable in underpinning the activities of

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multinationals’ (Rees, 2006: 94). This concurred with Alex Callinicos’s perspective (see 2001a). Yet Rees and Callinicos did not describe states, even powerful states like the United States, as architects of globalisation. The marketplace, the logic of capital accumulation as stipulated by Marx, is the architect. In fact, it was suggested on more than one occasion by Rees that, from the perspective of nation-states, globalisation has happened by accident. States are fundamentally reactive to the interests of capital. In general, then, the SWP did not look to nation-states to reverse capitalist globalisation. While this approach was obviously coloured by the perceived undesirability of reversing globalisation, Rees also argued that states in poor countries no longer have the power – or crucially the legitimacy – to challenge capitalism: It is precisely the ‘gale of creative destruction’ which has undermined the ability of weaker states to control their own destiny, develop their own welfare systems and, therefore, undermined their legitimacy in the eyes of their populations. (2006: 110) With the state redundant, classic imperialist theory and neo-imperialism were significantly undermined. The ‘new imperialism’ connoted the return of warfare – yet sometimes international conflict is articulated without any reference to imperialism. Instead, the globalisation concept itself retains centrality. Callinicos has referred to the war on terror as ‘armed globalisation’ (2003: 18), and an article in Socialist Worker in 2002 titled ‘Globalisation’s death squads’ referred to various military and police actions, principally in Latin America, used to impose the interests of the United States and allow capitalism to advance unhindered (SWP, 2002b). In Socialist Worker’s ‘What’s in a word?’ series, National Committee member Judy Cox (2003) described imperialism with delicate ambiguity as ‘the other side of globalisation’. As such, the SWP’s approach to imperialism was clearly dependent on its approach to globalisation. Yet how was this affected by the different meanings of globalisation found in the SWP’s discourse? In referring to the global class elite (to be discussed further below), Chris Harman said: These few individuals decide what to do produce and where, who will have jobs and who will be condemned to poverty. Their economic power gives them enormous political power in countries where they operate, and they pressure states to fulfil their desires – through bodies like the IMF, World Bank and WTO, and by direct military means. It is capitalism that produces this imperialism, with the ruling classes of a handful of countries – led by the US – prepared to use any barbarity to get their way. (2007c: 11)

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This is not quite neo-imperialism. But in maintaining that states have a role in the imperialist system – they have not been completely eradicated by globalisation – Harman seemed to offer a far more ambiguous view of the nature of imperialism. Furthermore, the second meaning of globalisation applied by Jonathan Neale, noted above, emphasised the role of the American government and competition between states over the spoils of global economic processes. This is much closer to a straightforward neo-imperialist perspective – yet Neale’s main published works do not employ the term.

Class struggle The SWP’s version of socialism emphasised the role and status of the working class, despite the fact that the SWP’s actual links to the contemporary workingclass in Britain are relatively weak. Colin Barker’s first ‘What we stand for’ article is actually titled ‘The working class at the centre’ (Barker, 2003). Central Committee member Chris Harman said: Revolutionary socialists believe the working-class is the key to transforming society. This follows from the character of capitalist society. Capitalists cannot survive without making profits, but they cannot do that without bringing workers together to exploit and thus creating discontent. This is what Marx meant when he wrote that capitalism creates its own ‘gravedigger’... Capitalism ... concentrates those it exploits in giant cities, in workplaces where improved conditions can only be obtained through collective struggle. In order to exploit workers to the maximum, capitalists demand a level of literacy and numeracy higher than that among most of the exploited classes of the past. In doing so, the system creates a class with the capacity to organise against it and the potential to turn society on its head. (2007a: 47) There are obviously a number of important elements in this passage. Harman’s emphasis on working-class power – created by capitalism and quintessential to socialism – is widely endorsed within the SWP. Barker (2003) argued that ‘[a]s the key exploited class in capitalism, the working-class also possesses immense potential power, not just to halt capitalist production, but to transform society. That power is the key to the possibility of socialism’. Having renounced the institutions of liberal democracy, working-class power is exercised, ultimately, through revolution. The notion that the working-class is growing in size and strength (through urbanisation in poor countries and the emergence of a ‘whitecollar’ working-class in rich countries), and as a result becoming more radical, was also widely upheld within the SWP. Central Committee member Chris Bambery wrote in Socialist Review in 2002: ‘There is a growing radicalisation among workers in Britain... It is now time to pinch ourselves and to realise that...

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Britain suddenly looks a very exciting place.’ There were two main obstacles to the achievement of socialism by the working-class: first, the problem of false consciousness. Barker (2004c) said that ‘[t]here is a constant war within the working-class. On one hand are divisive ideas, that tie us to our rulers and leave us feeling weak, hopeless and afraid. On the other are ideas of solidarity and hope for change.’ Second, the conservatism of trade union leaders – usually said to be produced by bureaucratism (see Barker, 2004h). Crucially, the working-class was also said to be becoming globalised. Central Committee member John Rees wrote extensively on this subject. He described ‘the power of the working people’ as one of ‘the three titans’ of the modern world: The workforces drawn into mills and workshops in London, Manchester and the Northern industrial towns in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were the first of their kind in a world still dominated by agricultural labour performed by peasants. Now billions in every corner of the globe have inherited their fate. (2006: 3–4) It is an inheritance that Rees attributed explicitly to globalisation: ‘Globalisation has created an international working-class bigger than at any time in the history of capitalism’ (2006: 239). In general, the SWP’s justification of the notion of a global working-class alternated between references to the common experiences of workers throughout the world, and references the emergence of a single, global production system within which all workers have the same status – as this passage from the Socialist Worker’s ‘news’ section in August, 2002 demonstrated: The main divide in the world is not between rich and poor countries, but between a multinational elite versus the rest of us. In the richest countries, like the United States and Britain, millions of people face poverty and increasing exploitation. In Britain one in three children live in poverty. Millions of workers face long working hours, increasing workloads, unsociable shifts and low pay. Look at the pictures of strikers from Inverclyde Royal Hospital in Scotland... These workers are paid a pittance for doing vital work in hospitals. They have far more in common with the black women in South Africa raging against poverty and injustice outside the Earth Summit than they do with any fat cat boss in Britain. And both are part of the same struggle as the Indonesian workers who marched against job cuts imposed by the multinational Nike last week. (SWP, 2002a) To emphasise the common experience of workers would suggest an internationalism or universalism, applicable irrespective of whether the world is

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organised into one capitalist system, or distinct national capitalism. The concept of globalisation supplemented this argument, but perhaps also undermined its ethical force. The certainty presented by Rees’ s view of the globalisation of the workingclass was not necessarily upheld by all SWP members. Several interviewees questioned the emergence of a global working-class. However, the optimistic view of the development of global class struggle, as espoused by the other interviewees and throughout their literature, has remained dominant within the SWP. In any case, the scepticism of some members was based on the extent of class consciousness among the world’s working-class, not the objective status of workers throughout the world as a single working-class.

Anti-globalisation The SWP’s understanding of globalisation raises the question of whether they are opposed to the process. Simply, while the party would not have argued that globalisation is positive, the SWP did argue that globalisation is necessary: One of capitalism’s historic achievements has been the formation of a world market. If we think about our own everyday lives, it is immediately apparent that we depend on the products of the world ... For the first time in history capitalism has created a genuinely world society, where all our lives are entwined together in a common history and a common fate. Materially, socialism will build on that achievement, extending and developing our mutual solidarity with working people in every corner of the globe. (Barker, 2004e) One interviewee explained that: ‘We are not opposed to globalisation. We are totally in favour of globalisation, as the creation of a global political and economic system.’ These opinions clearly derived from the ‘phases of capitalism’ argument. Globalisation discourse has not created this argument, but empowered it. This meant, among other things, that the term ‘anti-globalisation’ is inaccurate. One interviewee argued that the term ‘alter-globalist’ was preferable to ‘anti-globalisation’ as a designation for the transnational protest movement. Interviewees were, in fact, virtually unanimous in describing ‘anti-globalisation’ as a misnomer. Alex Callinicos has written at length on this subject: What should we call this new movement? The name usually applied to it – the anti-globalisation movement – is plainly an absurd appellation for a movement that revels precisely in its international character and that has been able to mobilise effectively across national borders in all five continents... In my view the movement is best described as anticapitalist. This is not because a majority of activists think it is possible

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or even desirable to replace capitalism altogether... [However] it does not simply campaign over specific grievances or issues – say, to do with free trade or the environment or third world debt – but is motivated by a sense of the interconnection between an immense variety of different injustices and dangers... It is this developing consciousness of the system that, more than anything else, characterises the movement. (2003: 13) So, for Callinicos, the movement could not be opposed to globalisation because it, at least to some extent, embodied globalisation. Chris Bambery (2002) argued along similar lines: ‘No country is exempt from protest, just as none can close its borders to a marauding international capital.’ In a similar way, StWC Convenor and SWP Central Committee member Lyndsey German (2004) argued in several articles and speeches that, although globalisation has harmed the social and economic status of women throughout the world, additionally ‘[g]lobalisation has produced a trend of uniting women from different countries and backgrounds’. The differential roles of the globalisation concept and a preexisting internationalism and universalism are seemingly impossible to decipher. This analytical problem is typified by Alex Callinicos’s comment that if we do live in one world, as we are constantly being told, then the normative principles that govern how we live together should be operative at the global level’ (Callinicos, 2001b). While he seems here to make global political action and values contingent upon whether we actually live in ‘one world’, the caveat ‘as we are constantly being told’ implies that passing this empirical test was not strictly necessary; the idea of globalisation is enough. Yet the SWP did generally believe that the capitalist process has been globalised – and that this is the source of the idea. The SWP’s general pro-globalisation position creates dilemmas regarding left-wing, interventionist political leaders such as Hugo Chavez in Venezuela or Evo Morales in Bolivia (see Harman, 2007b). This relates also to the party’s view of the state. Unlike others in the transnational protest movement, the SWP did not endorse Chavez and Morales without significant caveats. The main argument was that they are not radical enough, but there is also the implication that, even where democratically elected with huge support from the poor, Chavez and Morales cannot possibly represent the interests of the working-class, which are bound up with challenging capitalism as a global system. Thus Chavez, for instance, was dubbed a nationalist or a populist, but not a socialist. Of course, the SWP’s critique of Chavez and Morales was complex and cannot be reduced entirely to this issue. Yet it seems that to have been proglobalisation, as a phase of capitalism, the SWP needed to denounce statist perspectives which saw the power of nation-states as a way of resisting globalisation. However, it never articulated this perspective unambiguously. The

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SWP lacked a coherent outlook on how actually existing states should behave – none of my interviewees were able to speak in any detail on the question of the state, particularly in abstract. This may have been due to some perceived strategic imperative to maintain co-operation with supporters of the Bolivarian movement. Equally, however, it may be due to some ideological conflict – not between different individuals or groups, but rather between the way different ideas within the socialist tradition interact with globalisation.

Global governance and foreign economic policy This section discusses the party’s positions on various aspects on foreign economic policy. However, the party’s discourse did not contain a large amount of detail on its policy positions. Indeed, its critique of the Labour government’s foreign economic policy tended to focus on political issues rather than actual policies. The SWP believed that major nation-states and global governance institutions formed part of a single, global capitalist superstructure, and as such its discourse on foreign economic policy focused on deriding its institutional manifestation rather than explaining policy outcomes. However, this enabled the SWP to develop a related narrative on global governance as a sphere of political conflict. This section also notes the impact of the financial crisis on the SWP’s discourse.

Global governance institutions The SWP’s account of global governance generally reflected the ambiguity on the state and imperialism within the SWP’s globalisation discourse. Colin Barker’s ‘What we stand for’ column argued that ‘[n]o longer do the most powerful states seek direct colonial control, with their own officers and governors in charge. Now it is the imperialism of finance that rules – through the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO and the “Washington Consensus”’ (Barker, 2004d). This seems to suggest an instrumental role for states in creating global governance mechanisms. Yet to then depict an ‘imperialism of finance’ suggests that capital is in control. Which is the imperialist – the states or the financiers? Generally, however, the SWP’s approach to global governance was consistent with its ‘new imperialism’ perspective; that is, the existence and activities of global governance architecture are reduced to the process of globalisation. As John Rees argued: globalisation has accelerated the trend for states to attempt to control the development of the system through international and intergovernmental organisations. The WTO, the IMF, the EU, NATO and a host of similar bodies were mostly set up to underwrite the US-led post-1945 system, but they have gained renewed prominence because of globalisation. (2006: 95)

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These institutions are therefore said to ‘police’ the global economy, in order to ‘enforce the complex relationships between trade, investment and economic growth’ (Middleton, 2005). Crucially, however, states have been compelled to endow international institutions with such an orientation due to globalisation, and their constitutive dependence on the activities of TNCs. The institutions in their current form are created by rather than creative of globalisation. Global governance institutions were also routinely described as ‘sites of conflict’, as well as instruments of coercion (see Bambery, 2006; Rees, 2006: 95). The WTO, for instance, polices globalisation, but does not actually govern or manage it. There is an important distinction, therefore, between opposing the current functions of international institutions and denouncing their existence. The SWP adopted the latter orientation: the existence of global governance, made necessary by the need for rich countries to appropriate the spoils of globalisation and therefore hugely valuable to the legitimation of the current world order, may be precursory to an alternative globalisation. It is perhaps for this reason that the SWP placed so much emphasis on the Battle of Seattle as the birth or coalescence of the transnational protest movement – this will be discussed further below.

Trade policy and development The SWP said relatively little about the content of trade policy, including trade liberalisation measures, enacted by the WTO. There was a sense of fait accompli within the party’s discourse regarding globalisation, correlating perhaps with the view that globalisation is ‘something we have to go through’. Barker argued: The WTO has a simple policy. Nothing must hinder corporations making profits, wherever and however they like. Everything must be ‘privatised’, so that the rich can make profits from it – water, health services, railways, schools, it makes no difference. (2004d) Beyond this general perspective, little detail was offered by the SWP’s leading members. The WTO stands for the free market, and socialism stands for economic planning. As will be discussed below, trade as a form of economic exchange would remain a huge part of the planned global economy – not all units within the system would produce the same goods, but all goods would be available to people throughout the world. This commitment to a global economy, eschewing the implicit localism of the anti-globalisation movement, may also have tempered the SWP’s criticism of liberalisation. There were of course differences within the SWP regarding trade policy and liberalisation – specifically in relation to the DDA. The SWP did not utilise the concept of development in its discourse to any significant extent, and as such regarded the premise of the DDA as duplicitous. Leading member Jacob

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Middleton (2005) defined the SWP’s alternative as ‘planned, globalised economic development’, although this is a conceptual conflation not widely upheld. In the run-up to the launch of the DDA, Socialist Worker published two sister articles written by Theresa Bennett (2001) and Paul McGarr (2001) (both former parliamentary candidates for SWP front organisations). Bennett’s article, titled ‘The economic counterpart to Bush’s war’, depicted the WTO as the home of free trade and argued that ‘[r]ich countries have sought to stitch up the agenda of the WTO’ and ‘rig’ trade rules, undermining the free trade norm. The ‘economic counterpart’ was not the WTO, but the actions of the United States and its allies at the WTO. This is obviously extremely similar to Oxfam’s discourse on the WTO. McGarr’s article, titled ‘WTO: their system kills poor across the globe’ had a different tone. It depicted the WTO itself as neoliberal, rather than as a liberal system abused by neoliberals: The WTO was set up in 1995 to push for neoliberal economic policies across the world. It can give states the go-ahead to impose sanctions against any country that stands in the way of its ‘free trade’ rules. Multinational corporations control 70 percent of a world trade now worth £11.5 billion a day. Yet WTO rules don’t deal with regulating those corporations. Instead they restrict what governments can do to stand in their way. (McGarr, 2001) In a later article, McGarr (2003) criticised Oxfam’s support for a ‘level playing field’ in international trade, noting Oxfam’s own analysis of the coffee market as evidence that such an approach does not reduce poverty (Chapter 6 noted this apparent contradiction in Oxfam’s agenda). McGarr’s view appears to have prevailed within the SWP as the DDA has stalled. The SWP’s documents were replete with references to the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle, November 1999, or more precisely the accompanying protests. For the SWP they ‘signalled something of enormous importance. Almost ten years earlier the fall of the Berlin Wall had been presented as the end of socialism, leaving capitalism in apparently unchallenged control of the world for the rest of humanity’s existence. Seattle was the eruption of a new challenge’ (Harman, 2004). All of the interviewees agreed with this. In a column titled ‘Internationalism: Workers of all countries unite’, Colin Barker said: ‘In the last major act of the twentieth century, a brilliant new spirit of internationalism was reborn in the demonstrations against the WTO. Seattle brought together a host of quite disparate campaigns and issues.’ (2004a). It was a sentiment shared by Alex Callinicos: Since the demonstration that caused the collapse of the WTO ministerial meeting at the end of November 1999, there has crystallised in the

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advanced capitalist countries a politically active minority that sees global capitalism as the source of the world’s ills ... there can be no doubt of the scale of the movement. Nor is there any sign of it having lost its impetus ... the anti-capitalist movement is becoming a political reference point even for struggles whose immediate driving force lies elsewhere. (2001b: 8) Callinicos was writing before 9/11 and the birth of the anti-war movement, but was equally emphatic again in 2005: Last week [sic] the sixth anniversary of the protests in Seattle passed without much notice. The passage of time has, however, if anything underlined the importance of the challenge that demonstrators mounted to the WTO summit on 30 November 1999. It marked the beginning of a new wave of political radicalisation that continues to find expression in events last summer as diverse as the protests at the G8 summit in Scotland, the defeat of the European constitution in the French referendum, and the rising in Bolivia for the renationalisation of the country’s hydrocarbon reserves. The notion that the Seattle protest has directly led to further revolts against capitalism reoccurred frequently in SWP discourse. It enabled the SWP to posit a unity of aims between the transnational protest movement and industrial and political unrest throughout the world. John Rees, writing in 2006, described it as a ‘revolt from below’, adding: This revolt stretches from the strikes and protests against privatisation, like the struggle against water privatisation in Bolivia, through the general strikes in Africa, the near-insurrectionary movements that overthrew Milosevic in Serbia and Suharto in Indonesia. It is a revolt that is far from homogenous in methods or aims. Its subjects would not necessarily recognise each other as allies nor agree on strategy or tactics. But for all its variegation this revolt has gradually taken on an increasingly widespread and self-conscious form in the last ten years. The emergence of a global anti-capitalist movement since the great Seattle demonstrations of 1999 has provided a common language and identified a common enemy. (2006: 111–12) As such, the symbolic centrality of Seattle to anti-capitalism, which the SWP perceived as its own triumph, is assured. It is surely significant that the Battle of Seattle is closely associated with the WTO. The WTO’s importance to global capitalism, and its potential importance to an alternative globalisation, helped

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to make the protests a key reference point. This is not to suggest that Seattle was not a significant event. However, the fact that it was glorified so extensively within the SWP’s discourse illuminates the party’s understanding of the WTO’s role in globalisation, and the nature and focus of the response.

Finance Colin Barker’s conception of ‘an imperialism of finance’ was noted above. Despite this, there remains a lack of detail on what this looks like in practice – and on the elite policies at the core of the party’s critique. Of course, the SWP saw the movement of capital across borders as integral to globalisation and the creation of a single, global capitalist economy (unlike Oxfam, for instance, which talked predominantly of trade as the defining activity of globalisation). Yet the SWP did not often specify beyond this general argument, and referred variably to the creation of TNCs, foreign direct investment, currency exchange and the growth of cross-border financial services. Unlike others on the far left within the transnational protest movement, however, the SWP generally speaking did not emphasise the role of finance in the global economy; in fact, as noted above, they consistently argued the global economy had to be judged holistically as part of an anti-capitalist perspective, in contrast to a narrower anti-neoliberal perspective. The IMF and the World Bank were referred to in the SWP discourse, but their specific function in financing development projects was not. Despite this, however, the role of finance was crucial to the SWP’s foreign economic policy discourse in terms of imagery of impending crisis. The global financial system was presented as inherently unstable. This argument was present before the onset of the crisis, displaying pertinence relatively absent from the other groups studied in this book. As such, the party’s discourse on the global economy from 2008 onwards argued that the SWP’s approach had been vindicated (see Harman, 2009; Callinicos, 2008). However, beyond the celebratory rhetoric, the impact of the crisis on SWP’s discourse was not straightforward. Its argument on financial instability had been bolstered, and the decision of most rich countries to ‘bail out’ the banks at domestic and international levels – through co-ordinated action – also seemed to bolster the SWP’s understanding of imperialism, as governments were criticised for using the crisis to their own advantage. However, the crisis appears to have disrupted the party’s discourse on globalisation to some extent. Socialist Worker’s coverage of the financial crisis has concentrated primarily in the consequences for the British economy, arguing consistently that the Labour government should be concentrating on supporting struggling British workers rather than rescuing the banks (see Bambery, 2009; SWP, 2009a, 2009b). It would be unfair to argue that a focus on the British economy was not present before the financial crisis, yet nevertheless it would seem logical that crisis presented the ideal opportunity to offer an alter-globalisation argument. The opportunity was not taken; instead,

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the concept of globalisation – and images of globality more generally – seemed to disappear from the party’s discourse. This is true even of the longer analysis offered in the journals International Socialism and Socialist Review. Surprisingly perhaps, the crisis was not deemed to precipitate the final crisis of capitalism, in line with the argument that globalisation represents capitalism’s final phase. Chris Harman (2009) and Alex Callinicos (2008) both admitted that, in fact, Marxist analysis could not predict what the outcome of the crisis would be. Some leading members offered a Marxist analysis of why finance had come to occupy such an important status in the global capitalist system – but with reference primarily to Marx’s theory on the tendency of the rate of profit (from productive activities) to decline, but largely avoided references to The Communist Manifesto’s phases terminology (see Choonara, 2009). It is difficult, and perhaps too soon, to determine the reasons for this development. It is possible that the G20’s swift action to ‘save’ global capitalism undermined the SWP’s determinist logic: capitalist globalisation was supposed to lead to global socialism; capitalism should not have been able to tame itself, becoming perhaps less ‘global’ in the process. It is also possible, however, that, despite the apparent opportunity to interpret the financial crisis in line with the party’s existing perspective, its discourse was affected by a wider malaise surrounding the idea of globalisation in British political culture, in the wake of the economic downturn. There was much rhetoric on the need to seize the moment to present a socialist alternative to capitalism, but it was no longer couched in the need to build a global response (see Harman, 2008).

Globalisation and the movement This section looks at how the globalisation concept was incorporated into the SWP’s views on party organisation and whether globalisation discourse transformed the party’s pre-existing internationalist outlook. It argues that the SWP justified its own status within the transnational protest movement not simply by its anti-capitalist orientation, but also its pro-globalisation stance.

Anti-war and anti-capitalism The SWP’s campaigning energies from 2001 onwards were focused mainly on opposing the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq – culminating in the Respect Coalition, the failed electoral alliance with various Muslim groups and George Galloway MP. Despite the multi-dimensional nature of opposition to the war, the SWP always presented it as a natural extension to the anti-capitalist movement apparently crystallised at Seattle. For the SWP, ‘the anti-capitalist movement has moved virtually seamlessly into the anti-war movement’ (Bambery, 2002). Their belief in the compatibility of the two campaigns was

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expressed immediately after 9/11 (see Ovenden et al., 2001). Alex Callinicos (2003) argued that ‘9/11 and the “war on terrorism” – appalling and unwelcome developments though they were – produced a deepening of the anti-capitalist movement’. John Rees explained that ‘it is the renewed ferocity of international competition between multinationals which is driving the military extensions of the nation-states into the vacuum created by the end of the Cold War’, and that ‘the generalised nature of the [anti-war] movement is in the first instance a result of the long and generalised nature of the neoliberal offensive’ (2006: 217). Most interviewees argued that the anti-capitalist argument was stronger now that it also encapsulated the anti-war movement – so long as groups like the SWP were present to ‘make the links’. Some disagreed, arguing for instance that ‘the anti-capitalist movement was deeply split by the war’. Some believed that the anti-capitalist core of the original movement had been diluted by the alternative motives of many of the SWP’s anti-war allies. One of the most important aspects of the anti-war movement for the SWP was its globality, mirroring the abstract universalism of the war against terrorism. Yet the SWP discourse, and in particular Alex Callinicos’s views on anti-globalisation, discussed earlier, suggest an acknowledgement within the party that not all members of the transnational protest movement are as radical as the SWP. Simply by being global, however, the movement was inherently anti-capitalist. This will be further explored in the next sub-section.

Vanguardism and globality That there exists a global movement which is not fully conscious of its radicalism is actually crucial to the SWP’s conception of its own agency: it justified the SWP’s status as the movement’s ‘vanguard’. Chris Harman justified the notion that a revolutionary socialist party must form a vanguard in a wider anticapitalist revolt in abstract and traditional Leninist terms: Many people are suspicious of self-proclaimed vanguard organisations. But the reality is some workers have a clearer idea of what capitalism is and the need to fight it than others ... they are ahead of others in political consciousness and need to organise together to win others to fight against the system effectively. (Harman, 2007a: 78) Generally, however, vanguardism was justified in less intellectual terms, and rather with reference to the (global) protest movement. The SWP website’s ‘About us’ section read: We believe the anti-war movement is stronger because of the antiimperialism at its core. The movement for global justice is stronger for its anti-capitalism and stronger still when it links to working-class

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resistance. We strive to be the anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist voice of the movements we build. We want to win fellow activists to these ideas... The SWP aims to bring together activists from the movement and working-class. A revolutionary party is necessary to strengthen the movement, organise people within it and aid them in developing the ideas and strategies that can overthrow capitalism. (SWP, 2007) This passage suggests an alternative justification to Harman’s. First, it does not proclaim (although it does not deny this either) that the SWP are ‘workers’ or representative of the working-class. Second, it couches vanguardism in the (perceived) context of the actually existing transnational anti-capitalist/anti-war movement. It is this approach which, in general, prevails. In abstract terms, Colin Barker shows how important the notion of ‘movements’ became to the SWP’s pursuit of revolutionary socialism: it is movements from below that can change the world. They draw their power from their capacity to mobilise large numbers of people. Movements provide most of the energy and creativity involved in great challenges to our rulers. The overthrow of capitalism will involve an immense movement from below. It will engage the self-transforming activity of millions of working people, struggling for economic, political and cultural power... However, there is a problem. Such movements are mixed and contradictory in their character. Great movements are not composed of people who all think and act in the same way... That’s why revolutionary socialists need to organise themselves into a party to argue their case within movements. If they don’t, other tendencies or parties will prevail – and hold the movement back, or lead it to defeat. (2004h) In more concrete terms, Rees argued that it is the very success of the current movement that made vanguardism a requirement: The anti-capitalist movement and the anti-war movement have recreated an activist, oppositional mass culture. A movement on such a scale can only arise if it has tapped into something deep in the social structure. These movements would be unthinkable if they did not rest on the wider and more diffuse rejection of the neoliberal model, the fat-cat culture and the privatisation mania of the last twenty-five years. It is this deep resonance in the wider society that has given these movements their durability. It is also what gives them their ability to combine breadth of involvement with radicalism in ideology... Another world is possible – but what does it look like and how do we get it?

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These questions can be and are debated in broad movements. But they can only be answered by political organisations that are more precise and defined than the movement as a whole. (Rees, 2003) Vanguardism was important, then, not only in terms of party organisation, but also ideologically – and particularly the ideological character of the SWP’s globalisation discourse. Clearly, for the SWP, it was ‘movements’ that oppose capitalism in conditions of globalisation. However, such movements were by definition inarticulate; their strength was their diversity, their ability to represent manifold discontents with a mere handful of common reference points and a general mood for change. Capitalism on a global scale confronting the sheer diversity of local struggles cannot be opposed in any other way. Yet global capitalism can only be challenged on a global basis – and it is in this contradiction that the contemporary justification of vanguardism is found. Today’s vanguard, therefore, is not only the people who know (in Harman’s words) ‘what capitalism is’, but rather those who know that it is global, and that globalisation is a necessary, final phase of capitalism.

Internationalism Another issue arising from the SWP’s pro-globalisation stance is the extent to which it can be associated with an inherent internationalism within the socialist tradition. We have seen that, in addition to accepting the reality of globalisation, the SWP appeared to welcome the process of globalisation, even in capitalist form. Specifically, they believed that it heralded the emergence of a global working-class. The process of capitalist globalisation enabled and necessitated a global response, permitting the advocacy of a radical internationalist perspective; change is only legitimate if orchestrated at the global level. Colin Barker’s columns are illuminating in this regard. He referred, quite fleetingly, to the Soviet Union’s so-called socialism in one country as justification for internationalism (Barker, 2004h). Somewhat surprisingly, this is hardly found anywhere else in the SWP’s discourse. He also endorsed internationalism in more negative terms; that is, by denouncing nationalism as ‘false consciousness’, but partly contradicts this by declaring the SWP’s support for the national liberation struggle in Palestine (Barker, 2004b, 2004f). But Barker’s main statements on internationalism were fairly unambiguous: Now, more than ever in history, capitalism is a global system. It can only be transformed into a different world through international solidarity among workers. (2004b) A later column stated that the reason socialism must be international

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is very simple and material. One of capitalism’s historic achievements has been the formation of a world market. If we think about our own everyday lives, it is immediately apparent that we depend on the products of the world... For the first time in history capitalism has created a genuinely world society, where all our lives are entwined together in a common history and a common fate. Materially, socialism will build on that achievement, extending and developing our mutual solidarity with working people in every corner of the globe. (Barker, 2004g) Yet despite the apparent dependence, therefore, of the SWP’s internationalism on the concept of globalisation, and the apparent necessity to couch internationalist commitments in globalisation discourse, the SWP routinely located its internationalism in the work of Karl Marx. The Communist Manifesto’s rallying cry is, after all, ‘Workers of the world, unite!’. It is best thought of as a Trotskyist interpretation of Marx, although this was never acknowledged within the contemporary SWP. For example, Mike Gonzalez has argued: It is imperative that we are as global, as co-ordinated and as centrally organised in our struggle as the capitalists are in their pursuit of wealth and power. We are international, or we are nothing. If we can draw together the interests of all those who have no stake in the system and connect our anti-capitalist conviction with our power as workers then we have a world to win. (Gonzalez, 2005) This is a fairly typical call to internationalism, clearly prefaced by a belief in globalisation. Without global economic power and co-ordination, the imperative has less force. However, it was intriguingly described by Gonzalez as ‘Marx’s message’. There was another form of argumentation within the SWP on internationalism. This is typified by the comment of one local activist that ‘we are pro-globalisation because we are internationalists’. As such, the debate is not simply ethical internationalism versus an internationalism compelled by empirical evidence. It may be that the SWP accepted globalisation precisely because they are internationalist. Perhaps to bring together the disparate interpretations of internationalism, Barker referred several times to a ‘new internationalism’: At huge international forums, a brilliant new generation of activists have joined to debate the way forward for movements of emancipation. They take international solidarity for granted. They identify global capitalism as the key enemy... A new era has opened, with immense revolutionary potential. The anti-capitalist and anti-war demonstrations, and the international forums, prefigure a new internationalism

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from below that will grow in ways we can, as yet, barely imagine. (2004b) Elsewhere, Barker wrote that ‘[i]n the new “globalised” world, the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre and Mumbai symbolise a new internationalist struggle against the destructive power of world capitalism’ (2004f). The addition of the adjective ‘new’ was seemingly crucial. The parallel to ‘the new imperialism’ in seeking to provide coherence to different interpretations is striking. The United States and its allies are new imperialists because they fight wars compelled by globalisation; the new generation of young, anti-capitalist activists are new internationalists because they engage in transnational protest compelled by globalisation. The SWP were not the same as the new internationalists, because they did not ‘take international solidarity for granted’; in fact, the implication is that they had been waiting for globalisation to unleash the material forces of internationalism, to sustain their intellectual case. But they fundamentally required globalisation to, as they see it, prove Marxism. One interviewee summed up this perspective perfectly with the argument that the SWP has always been internationalist, but globalisation had made internationalism ‘more urgent than ever’. One concept notable by its absence in this regard is the state. Trotskyist internationalism required the co-ordination of nation-states – this does not seem to have applied to the new internationalism. But nor does the SWP make the case for a global state.

Conclusion There were three slightly different approaches to globalisation within the SWP’s discourse: first, globalisation as the creation of a single, global, capitalist economic system; second, globalisation as the final phase of capitalism (in line with Marx and Engels ‘prediction’ in The Communist Manifesto); third, globalisation as a political project orchestrated by the United States. There was in fact a fourth approach, evident in some earlier documents but seemingly forgone now: scepticism about globalisation (or more precisely, on the retreat of the state visà-vis globalisation). The three main positions were, on the whole, not contradictory. Rather, they represented different emphases placed on the concept of globalisation in different intellectual contexts. This applies principally to the first and second approaches, which together formed the dominant understanding present within the SWP’s globalisation discourse – and formed the basis of a pro-globalisation position. The older, fourth approach actually fed into the third approach: globalisation was accepted as a reality, but state actions are constitutive of the process rather than simply reactive. This argument was more amenable to the anti-globalisation label, even though all individuals that espoused it insisted that they were not against globalisation in principle.

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The different meanings of globalisation also fed into the concept of imperialism within the SWP’s perspective. The concept was extremely important for the SWP in that it allowed for the conjoinment of the anti-capitalist and antiwar campaigns into a single intellectual framework. Yet the concept of globalisation, in the dominant interpretation, superseded a Lenininst understanding of imperialism; in re-emphasising economics over politics, there is a clear ancestry between the contemporary SWP’s perspective and Marx’s original work. However, the recurrence of major warfare, and the more marginal interpretations of globalisation, necessitated the retention of the imperialism concept to some degree. John Rees’ s ‘new imperialism’ seems to have provided a generally accepted compromise. Often the SWP referred to warfare without citing imperialism. This is evidence not only of the strength of the globalisation concept within SWP discourse, but also its flexibility in general. Another crucial aspect of the party’s globalisation discourse was the role of internationalism. A commitment to a socialist universalism was a key element of the SWP’s Trotskyist perspective, based on the common experience of workers throughout the world. This argument was present within the party’s globalisation discourse. Yet the SWP called for international or global action on the basis of globalisation. Globalisation has created a single system, which necessitates a global response. Related to this was the notion that there is now a global working-class – negating the need to establish common experience. However, the two approaches did not necessarily exist in opposition. The SWP may welcome globalisation not simply because they see it as capitalism’s final phase, but because they believed that the creation of a single global economy empowers internationalism. Again, the SWP bridged any potential divide by depicting a ‘new internationalism’. In Chapter 5 it was suggested that the globalisation concept had created various sites of ideological conflict within the Liberal Democrats. Unlike New Labour and Oxfam, for instance, for the Liberal Democrats globalisation discourse appeared to have undermined its understanding of free trade. A similar phenomenon could be said to have taken place within the SWP. While the party presented a relatively distinctive understanding of globalisation, the party was seemingly compelled to conform to a new ideological landscape, making its ideas consistent with the globalisation concept. It is not that such an imperative led to internal political conflict between different individuals and factions, but rather that the idea disrupted an existing ideological order. The differences on the state’s role in globalisation, and therefore the role of imperialism, typified this process. However, equally, globalisation appears to have afforded a new resonance to the SWP’s perspective, in enabling the construction of a narrative on the development of capitalism. Although globalisation discourse may have muddied the intellectual waters regarding internationalist commitments and the working-class, it does seem to have strengthened the party’s arguments in these

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regards. Globalisation discourse, for the SWP, offered a new relevance to Marx’s work and therefore provided legitimacy to the SWP. There are two important caveats: first, globalisation was not a concept used by Marx, despite his ‘phases of capitalism’ theory. By accepting globalisation, and an apparent new resonance for Marxist ideas, the SWP may have legitimised meanings that derived principally from other sources or in fact contributed to the creation of a new ideological paradigm, which was as equally supportive of a neoliberal agenda as it was a revolutionary socialist agenda. Second, the financial crisis seems paradoxically to have undermined the SWP’s understanding and response to globalisation. While the crisis fits the SWP narrative on financial instability, it seemingly makes the positive case for globalisation more difficult to make, even for radical anti-capitalist groups. The ‘global’ financial crisis – especially if its severity had intensified, as some in the SWP seemed to have believed – could perhaps have been interpreted as validation of the party’s understanding of globalisation. However, the problem is that an alterglobalisation has not appeared, and shows no sign of appearing, in place of capitalist globalisation. Capitalism survives, and in some ways is now less global or transnational – undermining the party’s narrative on an inevitable path to a globalised socialism. Logically it could be argued that we remain on this path. However, ideologies exist in the real world of political debate rather than a sphere of unmitigated logical inquiry – in this real world, the ideological meanings attached to the globalisation concept by the SWP have been undermined. There was a telling silence with the SWP’s discourse on globalisation, that is, on the role of the state. One of the effects and intentions of trade liberalisation, and neoliberalism more generally, is to undermine the power and authority of states. The SWP opposed capitalism, which it saw as the source of both agendas, but accepted at least in the short term the damage inflicted upon the state’s ability to mitigate the effects of capitalism. Of course, we could conclude that the SWP was not anti-state, but rather opposed simply to nation-states. However, it is worth reiterating here that there is no evidence the SWP had any plans for a global state, beyond reforming the supranational institutions that already exist. This may be indicative of a much more serious implication for the SWP’s ideological perspective: a new awkwardness regarding the term ‘socialism’ itself. The term was marginalised within all of the party’s main campaigns and organisational innovations within the wider transnational protest movement, such as Respect, Globalise Resistance and the StWC. Even if this can be judged principally as a strategic move to avoid alienating potential allies, it would mean that the SWP accepted the delegitimisation of socialism in British political culture. It may be this which connects the SWP to New Labour. Although the two organisations were influenced by different parts of the socialist tradition, it may be that globalisation discourse challenged the socialist ideological family in general by undermining the capacity and legitimacy of nation-states. In accepting globali-

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sation, the Labour Party moved closer towards liberalism, and perhaps by necessity neoliberalism. The SWP’s socialism has been undermined, but it sought to articulate its perspective with reference to the original work of Karl Marx, claiming to discover within Marx a globalist perspective more resonant now than ever before – although it seems the financial crisis has diluted its resonance.

References Bambery, C. (2002) ‘Labour and the unions: United we stand’, Socialist Review, February, accessed at www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=7842 on 30 October 2010. Bambery, C. (2006) ‘Ideas that can lead to a breakthrough’, Socialist Worker, issue 1983, 14 January 2006, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=8077 on 30 October 2010. Bambery, C. (2009) ‘Gordon Brown’s bid to save the world falls flat’, Socialist Worker, issue 2145, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=17489 on 4 April 2010. Barker, C. (2003) ‘The working-class at the centre’, Socialist Worker, issue 1881, 13 December, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=1891 on 30 October 2010. Barker, C. (2004a) ‘Internationalism: workers of all countries unite’, Socialist Worker, issue 1888, 31 January, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=651 on 30 October 2010. Barker, C. (2004b) ‘Against imperialism’, Socialist Worker, issue 1890, 28 February, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=830 on 30 October 2010. Barker, C. (2004c) ‘What is racism and why must we fight it?’, Socialist Worker, issue 1892, 12 March, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=937 on 30 October 2010. Barker, C. (2004d) ‘Supporting national liberation struggles’, Socialist Worker, issue 1894, 26 March, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=1061 on 30 October 2010. Barker, C. (2004e) ‘Can there be socialism in one country?’, Socialist Worker, issue 1895, 3 April, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=570 on 30 October 2010. Barker, C. (2004f) ‘How was the Russian revolution defeated?’, Socialist Worker, issue 1896, 10 April, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=535 on 30 October 2010. Barker, C. (2004g) ‘We need a party of leaders to change the world’, Socialist Worker, issue 1901, 15 May, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=332 on 30 October 2010. Barker, C. (2004h) ‘Rank and file organisation is vital in the trade unions’, Socialist Worker, issue 1906, 19 June, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php ?id=715 on 30 October 2010. Bennett, T. (2001) ‘The economic counterpart to Bush’s war’, Socialist Worker, issue 1771, 20 October, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=1663 on 30 October 2010. Callinicos, A. (2001a) Against the Third Way (Cambridge: Polity).

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Callinicos, A. (2001b) The Anti-Capitalist Movement and the Revolutionary Left (London: SWP). Callinicos, A. (2003) An Anti-Capitalist Manifesto (Cambridge: Polity). Callinicos, A. (2008) ‘System failure: economic turmoil and endless war’, Socialist Review, October, accessed at www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=10545 on 30 October 2010. Choonara, J. (2009) ‘Marxist accounts of the current crisis’, International Socialism, issue 123, Summer, accessed at www.isj.org.uk/?id=557 on 30 October 2010. Cox, J. (2003) ‘What’s in a word? Imperialism’, Socialist Worker, issue 1847, 19 April, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=3583 on 30 October 2010. German, L. (2004) ‘The system that keeps women in chains’, Socialist Worker, issue 1886, 23 October, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=3009 on 30 October 2010. Gonzalez, M. (2005) ‘Marx’s message to the global justice movement’, Socialist Worker, issue 1943, 19 March, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=6042 on 30 October 2010. Harman, C. (1996) ‘A critique of the new orthodoxy’, International Socialism, issue 73, Winter, accessed at http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/-isj73/harman.htm on 30 October 2010. Harman, C. (2004) ‘Spontaneity, strategy and politics’, International Socialism, issue 104, Autumn, accessed at www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=12 on 30 October 2010. Harman, C. (2007a) Revolution in the 21st Century (London: Bookmarks). Harman, C. (2007b) ‘Venezuela, Hugo Chavez and permanent revolution’, Socialist Worker, issue 2035, 27 January, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/article.php?article_id=10538 on 30 October 2010. Harman, C. (2007c) ‘Why did Capitalism go Neoliberal?’ speech delivered at Marxism 2007, 6 July. Harman, C. (2008) ‘Market madness’, Socialist Review, October, accessed at www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=10546 on 30 October 2010. Harman, C. (2009) ‘The slump of the 1930s and the crisis today’, International Socialism, issue 121, Spring, accessed at www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=506&issue=121 on 30 October 2010. Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1967) The Communist Manifesto [orig. 1848] (Harmondsworth: Penguin). McGarr, P. (2001) ‘World Trade Organisation: Their system kills poor across the globe’, Socialist Worker, issue 1771, 20 October, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art .php?id=12016 on 30 October 2010. Middleton, J. (2005) ‘Trading on poverty’, International Socialism, issue 107, Summer, accessed at www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=118issue=107 on 30 October 2010. Neale, J. (2002) You Are G8, We Are 6 Billion (London: Vision). Ovenden, K., Harman, C., Mahmdallie, H., Simons, M. & Kimber, C. (2001) No to Bush’s War: The Military Face of Globalisation (London: SWP). Rees, J. (2003) ‘Socialism in the 21st century’, International Socialism, issue 100, Spring, accessed at http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isj100/rees.htm on 30 October 2010.

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Rees, J. (2006) Imperialism and Resistance (London: Routledge). SWP (2002a) ‘Links in the global chain’, Socialist Worker, issue 1815, 31 August, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=4805 on 30 October 2010. SWP (2002b) ‘Globalisation’s death squads’, Socialist Worker, issue 1809, 20 July, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=5229 on 30 October 2010. SWP (2007) ‘About us’, accessed at www.swp.org.uk on 15 December 2007. SWP (2009a) ‘The rich want me to pay for their crisis’, Socialist Worker, issue 2145, 4 April, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=17520 on 30 October 2010. SWP (2009b) ‘Will G20 bailout work?’, Socialist Worker, issue 2146, 11 April, accessed at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=17561 on 30 October 2010.

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Conclusion: towards a new understanding of globalisation in the ideological landscape of British politics The preceding five chapters have demonstrated the pervasiveness and importance of the globalisation concept in debates on foreign economic policy within British politics, in the period 1997 to 2009. The idea of globalisation played a crucial role in how the actors studied here interpreted the context of their actions, how they formed policy agendas and how they constructed arguments in support of their agendas. In most cases – in fact, in all cases to some extent – the globalisation idea was weaved into a tapestry of both traditional and novel ideas and policy proposals, creating distinctive approaches to globalisation in line with the groups’ political objectives. These discourses therefore both contributed to a relatively discernible ‘globalisation discourse’ which, although founded on common conceptual territory, was varied and conflictual. The concluding chapter will argue, however, that despite the inevitable continuation of political and ideological conflict, globalisation discourse contained a core set of meanings; all actors which employed it, especially in a positive sense, to articulate their perspective necessarily imported these meanings into their ideologies. Moreover, these meanings were not dependent on any particular ideological tradition, including neoliberalism. However, perhaps the more interesting finding is that, although the globalisation concept was, at least to some extent, novel and independent, it has meanings that by necessity favoured some policy positions on foreign economic policy in British politics over others. Furthermore, it offered more support to certain normative and hermeneutic aspects of some ‘older’ ideologies (such as neoliberalism, albeit not exclusively) than it did others (such as socialism). And it disrupts traditions such as classical liberalism in a way that provides it with both a new resonance and at the same time a set of new dilemmas. In summary, globalisation connoted, firstly, a sense of one-worldness, or more generally the notion that the spatial foundations of human organisation have been transformed. This finding may be said to be logically implied by the term ‘globalisation’. Nevertheless, these meanings are too often overlooked by the existing scholarship on the ideational dimension of globalisation. More

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interestingly, globalisation also connoted, secondly, a sense that the nationstate had become anachronistic – this is not logically implied by the term, but rather represents a meaning conferred upon the term by political culture (as discussed in Chapter 2, political concepts are by definition products of political culture to some extent). This has significant implications for the ideological character of globalisation discourse. Although much of the existing scholarship has, to some degree, identified the second connotation, it has usually only done so by reducing globalisation discourse to neoliberal ideology. This is understandable and not wholly inaccurate. Yet this study has demonstrated that for some groups scepticism about the state’s viability or efficacy was based on the notion of spatial change, as well as or instead of neoliberal assumptions. Crucially, these meanings have become sedimentary in British politics. Globalisation (and certain conceptual relatives) cannot be uttered without evoking these meanings, and moreover, even where the term itself is not used, the interpretation of the world implied by the term seems to have become a key ideational tenet across the ideological spectrum in Britain. This is an important prospect in its own right, but particularly in light of the financial crisis which seemed to confer doubt upon the progressive nature of globalisation. Discourse and their constituent concepts recede, but when ideological families incorporate and nurture new meanings, they retain a presence over time as political actors come to interpret and act upon their reality through an ideological lens. In order to delineate the nature and value of these findings, that is, to contextualise the book’s original contribution, this chapter will first reflect briefly upon the relationship between ideology and discourse, and theoretical questions regarding the analysis of ideas and agency in political economy. It will then summarise the empirical chapters, before presenting in detail six major themes and analytical issues which arise from this study. They are: definitions of globalisation, the status of neoliberalism, images of the state, images of spatiality and the status of universalism, globalisation discourse across the left/right spectrum, and whether globalisation is itself an ideology. A final section considers issues beyond the temporal and geographical borders of the book, that is, the evolution of the ideological landscape of British politics following the 2010 general election, and the incidence of the idea of globalisation in other national contexts.

Agency, ideology and discourse One of the key propositions of this book in terms of theoretical framework is that ideational phenomena help to shape agency, that is, the real-world political action of actual individuals, groups, institutions etc. Specifically, the book upholds that ideas about globalisation help to shape the apparent processes of

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material change associated with the term. While ultimately answers to these questions cannot be divorced from fundamental ontological positions – and therefore differences may be intractable – the empirical study has generated evidence in support of the notion that ideas are not simply instrumental of agents’ apparent material interests. The commonality of meanings attached to the globalisation concept by different agents – even those clearly occupying opposite ends of the left/right spectrum – surely shows that the idea itself has some influence. Radically different political objectives do not produce radically different ideas about what globalisation is. This cannot be dismissed as an example of marginal groups converging around the dominant meanings created by so-called elite actors, because, equally, each case study has shown that the globalisation concept has (one way or another) been incorporated into the discourses of agents through the lens of pre-existing ideological commitments. Furthermore, there are clearly differences among elite groups. The ideological commitments through which the idea of globalisation is consumed are antecedent of the material changes associated with the term ‘globalisation’; as such, it is not simply that the idea of globalisation has shaped agency as well as vice versa, but also that extant ideological traditions have operated in conjunction with novel ideas to shape actual political action and policy decisions. Chapter 1 showed that political economists have established satisfactorily that agents help to author and mould the process of globalisation – to this we must clearly add that ideas about globalisation are complicit in the way agents elect to interact with their material context. This of course does not mean we have to accept that only ideas, and not material phenomena, shape agency or that ideas about globalisation are not influenced by material experience. But to ignore ideational phenomena is to forgo the prospect of fuller explanations of outcomes in political economy. The book has also sought to demonstrate the value of ideology as an analytical concept. Ideology allowed the thesis to show that there are a range of intellectual influences on globalisation discourse rather than neoliberalism alone, as some theorists have assumed. Michael Freeden’s approach to ideologies encourages a focus on concepts, which has enabled me to show that the globalisation concept has a core ideological meaning, applicable to different issues and processes, which is not entirely pliable to strategic imperatives. Again, this does not mean that the globalisation concept must necessarily be viewed as ideological in nature. Ideational analysis can and must take multiple forms. However, there is enough evidence to suggest that, firstly, the idea of globalisation was not simply a rhetorical device to obscure or soften less forthcoming ideas, and, secondly, that analytical concepts such as narrative and governmentality do not highlight adequately the existence of significant nuances within discourses on globalisation. The book suggests, therefore, that globalisation went some way to matching the ideological status of concepts like liberty

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and democracy – valorised by most political groups, on the basis of a core definition, but interpreted and employed in different ways. Moreover, globalisation appears to be a particularly important type of concept. It provides a lens by which agents can perceive their (changing) material environment. Ideologies are able to incorporate new concepts that appear to signify something significant about their environment, without surrendering traditional values, assumptions or commitments. Thus the notion of ideology helps show how agents are influenced by material context. It is worth reiterating, for clarity, the relationship between ideology and communicative discourse upheld here. Discourse is in a sense created by ideology, in that it is the product of political conversation between actors which embody and wield certain ideological meanings. Of course, as ideational phenomena, discourse and ideology (or the various lenses through ideas could be viewed) are only separable in an analytical sense – they are hermeneutic devices rather than elementary ‘things’. Equally, therefore, ideology is similarly unidentifiable without discourse in that, to function, ideologies must be communicated within the political community within which they exist. Globalisation discourse is a set of discursive practices related to the concept of globalisation (and its conceptual relatives) which agents both engage with and create. Some actors, and therefore ideologies, will have more influence over this discourse than others – and some will be more influenced by the discourse. By engaging with globalisation discourse, agents import as well as shape its constitutive ideological meanings. Which agents have most influence over globalisation discourse is a legitimate and necessary inquiry, but not one undertaken here. The book has been concerned with how and why agents utilise the globalisation concept rather than questions of power. Clearly, neoliberal ideology has played a pivotal role in the genesis of globalisation discourse in British political culture, but other sets of meanings are undoubtedly present – indicating that agents have some flexibility in the development of their discursive practices in the context of wider discourses on globalisation.

Globalisation across the British ideological landscape This book has presented profiles of various political groups involved in making and contesting British foreign economic policy in distinct chapters. While it is of course the case that political organisations often, generally speaking, form around a shared set of ideological commitments, it is important to reiterate that this study does not consist of a comparison of a range of hermetically sealed approaches to globalisation. Differences are evident within cases, as well as between them, and they are presented here separately for hermeneutic purposes. New Labour’s discourse on globalisation presented the process as inevitable, immutable and inherently positive. Liberalisation was treated as part of the

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process, yet as an inevitable product of the same forces that created globalisation rather than as a result of political choice. There were different tendencies within New Labour’s discourse. Two main forms of argument can be discerned (loosely correlated to differences between Gordon Brown and Tony Blair): first, globalisation as the emergence of a global marketplace, created by abstract market forces; second, a more nebulous argument about epochal change. This argument emphasised the role of technology, but also stresses the role and power of TNCs. In both cases, the discourse was predominantly economistic. Specifically, New Labour treated globalisation as the product of private economic actors. Crucially, also, New Labour emphasised the globality of change: the global operation of either TNCs or market forces, for instance, is crucial to why they are important. The financial crisis, of course, dampened the positive associations of globalisation within New Labour discourse. Yet there was seemingly no less faith that the process has taken place, and will prove beneficial over the long term. Generally speaking, longstanding foreign economic policy commitments such as the Singapore issues and the expansion of the liberal trade regime were maintained. A commitment to international development was one of the hallmarks of New Labour foreign economic policy – it maintained a vision of development based on global economic integration throughout the period studied. Stronger regulation of the financial sector was advocated towards the end of New Labour’s administration, although on the basis of international co-ordination rather than a more robust supranational institutional architecture. The global space was an economic realm, not suited to political institutions akin to the national level. Interestingly, from 2008 onwards, Gordon Brown’s government frequently cited images of globality in response to criticism of its economic policy. This is despite the fact that the term ‘globalisation’ seemed to fade in significance – and also that Gordon Brown had hitherto been associated with the more clinical global competition argument, rather than the epochal change argument which had emphasised the changing nature of space. IFSL’s discourse on globalisation also emphasised the role of private economic actors. TNCs embody globalisation; they populate the global economy, unconnected to particular nation-states. IFSL recognised technological change but saw the activities of TNCs as the primary cause of change. Even more so than New Labour, IFSL treated globalisation as synonymous with liberalisation – and development was treated as little more than an acceptance of trade and investment liberalisation. Again, a liberal trade orientation was not treated as a policy choice but rather as an inevitable product of economic forces. Although IFSL was slightly less likely than New Labour to refer to globalisation and notions of globality, a sense of spatial change was equally important: the global economy was deemed to exist in a novel space, epitomised by the intangible financial services sector. As such, the concept of ‘the offshore’ was important to IFSL discourse – applied not only to tax havens or countries with

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low production costs, but also global financial centres such as London. As in New Labour’s discourse, the global space was seen as an economic realm. Institutions like the WTO were conferred with only outcomes-based legitimacy – bilateral and unilateral liberalisation measures were valorised where the same outcomes could be achieved. The Liberal Democrats’ discourse emphasised technological change and business innovation as features of globalisation. These phenomena had created a global marketplace, which was presented as positive. Yet the Liberal Democrats’ discourse suggested more unease about the relationship between globalisation and free trade than the other cases. While generally supportive of government policy, the party was relatively silent on, for instance, the Singapore issues. Whereas New Labour and IFSL saw globalisation as the embodiment of free trade (even if not always articulating this view explicitly), there was a stronger sense within the Liberal Democrats’ discourse that the global economy is a product of free trade. Of course, this does not mean (at least not in a straightforward sense) that globalisation is a result of political initiative; both free trade and globalisation were deemed derivative of individual energies channelled through market mechanisms. There were different emphases within the party, related to the ambiguity on free trade, but also the extent of internationalist commitments derived from liberalism’s inherent universalism. One current of thought presented globalisation as the pinnacle of liberalisation, and therefore the process itself epitomised liberal ideals. Another presented the global marketplace as potentially undermining some aspects of liberal ideals, so public authority must be transposed to the global level. This view is least likely to associate globalisation with free trade. Finally, pitched somewhere between the other two, was a current of thought which saw globalisation as positive, so long as organised in accordance with free trade principles, at the global level. The financial crisis appeared to confer a greater resonance upon the Liberal Democrat approach. Leading figures such as Vince Cable were able to develop a coherent response to the financial basis on the basis that the party had long been sceptical that the global financial system epitomised a progressive version of globalisation. Oxfam’s discourse on globalisation suggested causes of globalisation similar to the other cases. Yet although it referred to economic forces, it did not offer as much detail on the nature of these forces. Oxfam recognised the creation of a single, global economy, populated by TNCs; it pointed to significant problems with the global economic order, but implied that its globality makes it quintessentially positive. The potential for the global economy to be organised according to market mechanisms (Oxfam, in contrast to the Liberal Democrats, understands this without reservation as free trade) is also a good thing. In fact, it was deemed the main way to achieve liberal principles – hence Oxfam’s conception of ‘trade justice’. There are certainly similarities to parts of

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the Liberal Democrats’ discourse, but on free trade Oxfam was actually closer to New Labour intellectually. There was very little disquiet in Oxfam’s discourse on the ‘deep’ trade agenda embodied by GATS and the Singapore issues, with the exception of TRIPs. The disjuncture, however, is that existing free trade agreements were not seen as appropriate or sufficient, precisely because of nation-state interference – including the New Labour government. The activities of nation-states at the global level contravene the individual energies potentially embodied by globalisation. The DDA was deemed to embody a progressive globalisation, in terms of its objectives, but also in that it was seen as steered by the WTO process rather than nation-states. The financial crisis seemed to present a significant intellectual challenge to Oxfam. Its policy agenda did not change a great deal – although it began to advocate stronger curbs on international financial transactions – but the couching of its agenda within a pro-globalisation perspective seemed to cease entirely. However, the underlying meanings within Oxfam’s understanding of globalisation, such as the creation of a global space where interference by nation-states was anachronistic and inappropriate, were seemingly maintained. There existed within the SWP’s discourse an argument about globalisation which depicted it as a political project, orchestrated by (some) nation-states. However, this viewpoint was marginalised and evidently never articulated without reference the dominant perspective. The dominant perspective was economistic; it depicted globalisation as the creation of a single, global capitalist system. This was presented as ‘the new imperialism’, in contrast to a neo-imperialist perspective. The global economy is typified, indeed organised, by TNCs, and its globality is crucial to its nature. The SWP of course opposed capitalism, but welcomed globalisation, interpreting it as the culmination of Marx’s phases of capitalism supposedly outlined in The Communist Manifesto. The SWP saw that its activity embodied a progressive response to globalisation; this fuelled much of its campaigning activity. Interestingly, the party’s discourse offered little detail on actual foreign economic policies – it focused more on international institutions as zones of political conflict. The financial crisis augmented the SWP’s longstanding emphasis on instability and crisis, yet also seemed to undermine its ‘phases’ terminology by discrediting the party’s depiction on globalisation as ultimately positive in that it creates a single, global economic system.

The ideological character of globalisation discourse The book’s concern is not simply mapping different interpretations of and approaches to globalisation. In seeking to assess the ideological character of globalisation discourse, it is concerned with globalisation discourse in British politics as a single subject. Clearly, various ideological traditions were present,

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to some extent, within discourses on globalisation around foreign economic policy. The ideological genealogy and horizons of globalisation discourse will be explored through discussion of several issues which cut across the various groups studied.

Definitions of globalisation The main hermeneutic faultline on definitional issues, according to the existing scholarship, is whether globalisation was understood primarily as an economic phenomenon. Of the approaches discerned here, IFSL and the dominant interpretation within the SWP were probably closest to treating globalisation as exclusively economic, in that they emphasise, respectively, business innovation or capital accumulation as the core feature of globalisation. Yet only the more marginal SWP interpretation suggested that non-economic factors were primary – it emphasised that globalisation is a political project (although it should be remembered that the rationale for the political project is derived from economic interests). The main finding here, then, is the significant extent to which economistic understandings were dominant across the British ideological landscape. The epochal change argument within New Labour and Oxfam emphasised change in technology and spatiality (giving rise to a new epoch or the creation of a new post-state global space), yet it is clear that these changes could not occur without economic phenomena – and also that the main implications of globalisation are economic. Other, more predominantly economistic understandings such as IFSL and the ‘global competition’ perspective within New Labour also upheld the creation of a new global space, but this space is exclusively economic. The ontological privileging of the economic realm could be said to be a product of neoliberalism, yet this perspective is itself dependent upon meanings derived from libertarianism, neoclassical economics and indeed classical liberal arguments about the marketplace. Moreover, socialists influenced by Marx are surely equally likely to privilege economics, albeit understood in a different way. Clearly, there were many different forms of both economistic arguments. There were different views on whether economic compulsion makes globalisation inevitable or immutable, and whether transnational economic interaction is a priori good in normative terms. What should be noted here, therefore, is that, whether the causes of globalisation were deemed economic or non-economic, the huge majority of approaches designated the causes as global in nature. Partly this was due to the causes of globalisation being defined in abstract terms, such as the market mechanism or the profit motive. In most cases, however, the main drivers of globalisation were deemed global in actuality, such as TNCs, the internet or the liberal trade regime. The only (partial) exceptions are: firstly, the marginal discourse within the SWP, which identifies certain nation-states as drivers of globalisation – although the reason this approach is neo-imperialist rather than imperialist is precisely that it recognised

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pre-existing supranational economic processes; and, secondly, the various approaches within the Liberal Democrats’ discourse tend to portray the world as moving towards globality, rather than arguing that economic activities are already global. Oxfam thought that free trade, for instance, was a global reality, albeit hindered by nation-states, while the Liberal Democrats treated it as an objective not yet fully achieved.

Neoliberalism There is a large literature on the importance of neoliberalism in contemporary British political culture, often pitched like this book at the intersection of the academic disciplines of IPE, British politics and political theory. Referring to neoliberalism, Andrew Gamble has argued that ‘[m]ost political arguments are now conducted within a framework set by it’ (Gamble, 2009: 4). He portrays neoliberalism as the heir to liberal political economy and the harbinger of the ultimate (global) victory of Western modernity. Although the idea of globalisation is not disregarded by Gamble, he argues that ‘it is not a new perspective, it is not a new discourse ... the promotion of openness has always been a central concern of liberal political economy’ (2009: 10). Gamble therefore does not reflect at length on how neoliberalism might have conceded ideological space to a broader perspective centred on the concept of globalisation. Yet this study has clearly demonstrated that not only are there novel elements of contemporary globalisation discourse, it is also true that non-neoliberal but pro-globalisation perspectives are possible. Colin Hay, whose work has been cited throughout this book, has also outlined the nature and importance of neoliberalism in British politics. Building upon his third wave analysis, Hay (2004) portrays a ‘business school globalisation thesis’ as crucial to the institutional embedding of neoliberal assumptions. Therefore Hay places emphasis only on globalisation discourse’s functional role in the hegemony of neoliberalism – without considering any reverse functionality, or indeed whether globalisation discourse now has broader horizons than the ‘business school’ thesis. Philip Cerny (2004), from a more mainstream IPE perspective, has mapped ‘varieties of neoliberalism’. Cerny’s work in this regard surely represents a growing recognition of the importance of ideational factors within mainstream IPE. However, its rationale is to demonstrate that neoliberalism’s hegemony over the process of global economic change is pluralistic (and therefore the process is at least partly contingent upon ideas); Cerny does not go as far as suggesting that the differences between varieties of neoliberalism are based on different understandings of globalisation. Throughout the empirical chapters, this book has considered the relationship between neoliberalism and globalisation discourse. It is certainly the case that some of the key tenets of neoliberalism – the importance of private economic actors as expressions of individuals pursuing utility, the profit motive as

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a source of general human welfare etc. – were part of the (progressive) nature of globalisation for many actors. The apparent delegitimisation of the state, from various angles, can also be associated with neoliberal assumptions. Of the approaches summarised in this chapter, only the SWP advocated a system of economic planning in place of the free market; none of the discourses studied advocated any significant form of intervention by public authorities in the economy. New Labour portrayed no appetite for Keynesianism; its brand of intervention extends only to ‘micro-economic policy’. Despite eschewing laissez faire rhetorically, the state’s role is reduced to extra-market functions. The Liberal Democrats were seemingly more interventionist on foreign economic policy than New Labour (and perhaps even Oxfam), yet policy was contingent on stronger mechanisms of global governance. However, it is not necessarily the case that a policy orientation which resembles a neoliberal policy agenda is derived from neoliberal ideology – just as it may be possible for a group such as Oxfam to import some aspects of neoliberal ideology without supporting a neoliberal policy agenda. It may be more useful to refer instead to a resurgence of classical liberalism – especially given that, arguably, the concept of the marketplace and a commitment to universality are less important to neoliberalism than to the liberal tradition more generally. Chapter 2 noted Mark Rupert’s vagueness on whether globalisation was neoliberal or liberal and Manfred Steger’s opinion that the ideology of globalism was ‘pouring old philosophical wine into new ideological bottles’. Many of the approaches that apparently advocated neoliberal policies do so because they believed that economic change has created a more perfect marketplace – because it is finally global. Or they believed that by supporting free trade in contrast to neoliberalism a more perfect marketplace will be created. It is entirely logical to suggest that even if the globalisation concept’s emergence in British politics is a product of the ideational and material changes occasioned by neoliberal ideological hegemony, the idea has given rise to a discourse containing a wider set of meanings. In fact its popularisation may be the product of other ideologies contesting a neoliberal version of globalisation, in favour of other approaches.

The role of the state There is also a large literature on the relationship between globalisation and the state, as discussed in Chapter 1. What this research has contributed is evidence of what the political actors acting as custodians of the state, or who wish to replace or influence those custodians, actually think about the state’s role in relation to globalisation. As discussed above, only the more marginal approach within the SWP’s discourse upheld that the state authors the globalisation process. The Liberal Democrats were more likely than New Labour, for example, to refer to trade liberalisation as a choice – and liberalisation contributes to

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globalisation. However, the choice was not to shape globalisation (defined as market forces), but rather to get out of its way. Where non-economic causes were alluded to by any group, they were invariably as discrete from the state as market forces and capital accumulation were. The previous sub-section (Neoliberalism) showed that many actors forwent the possibility of state intervention in the economy. This sub-section is more concerned with the state’s role in creating globalisation. But even from this analytical perspective, a similar finding resonates. In empowering TNCs, or creating a global marketplace, globalisation involves the forging of a new global socio-economic space in which nation-states cannot exist (at least not legitimately). The state is only able to act at the national level – which is why macro-economic policy is redundant. Perhaps the most surprising paradox of globalisation discourse in British politics is the fact that the SWP, despite advocating a planned economy, offered no detailed perspective on the state. They seemed unable to articulate a global state. Of the case studied here, only Oxfam was consistent in advocating global governance mechanisms. However, this cannot be conceived as a new form of state, at least not as understood by the liberal or socialist/social democratic traditions. Oxfam’s global governance was entirely technocratic, and would not ‘intervene’ in the market to any significant extent. Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan’s work on the imagined economies of globalisation appears to be highly relevant here. They argue, similarly, that the imagined economy (globalisation) had replaced the imagined community (nation) where states formerly resided; defined as economy rather than community, the new global space is infertile territory for new forms of public authority. Cameron and Palan’s findings are slightly too simplistic: among other things, they fail to recognise substantively that, even within the imagined economy, political conflict persists, at national and global levels. However, this may be due to their structuralist theoretical framework rather than any analytical failure. In terms of foreign economic policy, protectionist trade policies were of course universally discredited. This applied even after the financial crisis had dampened some of globalisation’s positive associations. It was not only that protectionism produced sub-optimal outcomes; it was an illegitimate way for countries to relate to the global economy. The WTO, for instance, by definition could not regulate trade, but existed to enable free trade. Interestingly, the financial crisis led to calls for greater national-level regulation of cross-border financial transactions. The huge majority of trade would, of course, be unaffected. Such measures would be designed not to ‘protect’ individual economies but rather to stabilise the single, global economy. Furthermore, the fact that these measures would be enacted at the national level (on the basis of co-ordination but not supranational regulation), paradoxically, demonstrates the imprint of the understanding of the global economic space detailed here. Although the problems are defined almost unanimously as global, global-level regulation is ruled out.

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Spatiality and universalism Political action or organisation at the global level was advocated by many of the case studies – Oxfam, the SWP and, to a lesser extent, the Liberal Democrats and the epochal change argument within New Labour’s discourse. In each case, it was seemingly justified by a mixture of empirical and ethical reasons – there is obviously no clear way of determining which was more important or genuine. On some occasions, discourse suggested that global action is required to mirror the process of globalisation. At other times, discourse suggested that globalisation has enabled global action. In either case, we cannot say without significant caveats that such action was inspired by universalist (or Kantian) ethics. However, it could be that some form of universalism encouraged the recognition of globalisation in the first place and certainly contributed to the process being viewed as progressive by many. There were discourses that did not advocate any significant forms of global action, such as IFSL’s approach, New Labour’s ‘global competition’ argument and parts of the Liberal Democrats’ discourse. Even these approaches, however, generally claimed universalism or internationalism as one of the main reasons for promoting globalisation (IFSL is a partial exception). This is how New Labour was occasionally able to claim to represent social democracy despite eschewing state intervention. Universalism is not anathema to neoliberalism in some senses, but it is certainly a mode of thought beholden to much older ideological traditions. The universalism of globalisation discourse was clearly not simply about recognising that the world is a single place. It was also that the constituent parts of human organisation (individuals, firms etc.) are not disaggregated, normatively, at sub-global levels. This means there exists a global (virtual) space where individuals or firms – or more abstract things like the market process – are constituted. Existing forms of organisation, such as nation-states, are not part of this space, but rather subservient to it. Actors like IFSL, New Labour and the SWP would generally have argued that this is the system by which we are already governed, because they conceived the global space as economic. Actors such as Oxfam would have argued that this system could or should exist, if nations-states accepted their subservience; the global space is not exclusively economic; there is room for a norms-based technocracy, although it has not yet fully emerged. To some extent, the epochal change perspective within New Labour was similar to Oxfam on the latter point – although it upheld, again, that this system already exists. This brings the argument extremely close to a core meaning of the globalisation concept: a global space, predominantly economic – either in nature, or because it is currently populated mainly by TNCs. It is possible, as Oxfam and to a lesser extent New Labour argued, to institute rules at the global level to ensure that the economic activities located within the global space operate more in accordance with its logic. One of the most important aspects of Colin Hay’s

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empirical analysis of globalisation discourse is that globalisation is always treated as exogenous. This is a crucial finding: other scholars have too quickly overlooked this possibility and concentrated on identifying ideas about the nature of globalisation. Ideas about its location are equally important to understanding the core meaning of the globalisation concept: the notion of globalisation as exogenous to all nations is central to the ideological character of globalisation discourse. It is worth reiterating that the Liberal Democrats’ discourse is partly exceptional in this regard. Of course, aspects of the party’s discourse took it close to the approaches of both New Labour and Oxfam. But it seems the globalisation concept created tension with other ideas within the party’s perspective, such as free trade and the proper relationship between state and market. If social democrats and socialists allowed the concept of globalisation to displace the concept of the state, globalisation discourse offered new ideological resources by which to present their perspectives as modernisation rather than capitulation. Similarly, groups like Oxfam, more strongly influenced by cosmopolitanism, found that globalisation strengthens their traditional outlook in certain ways. But groups more closely attached to the liberal tradition, as articulated at the national level, found it more difficult to accept the global marketplace without pointing to new forms of market-framing mechanisms. Similarly, because they are traditionally more attached to the notion of free trade as arms-length exchange between nations (the cosmopolitan tradition had always supported interdependence rather than arms-length trade), they found it more difficult to reduce free trade to a merely rhetorical role in service of a single, global economy.

The left/right political spectrum By now, it has become obvious that there were different approaches to and understandings of globalisation – but that these differences do not necessarily map easily onto the (traditional) left/right political spectrum. It is certainly the case that those normally located in ‘the centre’ (Oxfam, the Liberal Democrats) were more likely to refer to non-economic causes or features of globalisation, in contrast to ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. Yet the left/right spectrum does not seem to explain differences between these two case studies. Most commentators would accept that New Labour has ‘moved’ to the right – although it would be unwise to claim that this explains their discourse on globalisation, given that we could argue that the idea of globalisation has actually pushed them to the right, by diminishing the state’s efficacy and legitimacy. It would also be unable to explain why different aspects of New Labour’s discourse placed different levels of emphasis on economic and non-economic causes of globalisation. This is worth exploring in more detail, given that Colin Hay and Ben Rosamond argued (as noted in Chapter 1) that the idea of globalisation was most resonant for the centre-left. It may be that we can see a complicated

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ideological negotiation at work within New Labour’s discourse, which informs us about the ideological character of globalisation discourse in general. During the 1980s and early 1990s neoliberalism had legitimised the transnational or global nature of economic activity. In order to compete on this ideological territory, New Labour took it upon itself to accept this development, while retaining links to progressive traditions. Concurrently, in an intellectual sense, social democracy had been delegitimised by neoliberalism’s perspective of the private sector and its expansion of corporations to the transnational or global level. The ‘solution’ offered by New Labour was not a reinvention of social democracy, but a dual move towards classical liberalism – claiming to be the real supporters of the free market – and a new ideological space, created by supplementing neoliberal globalisation with a universal/spatial logic, and millennial motifs. Discourses around foreign economic policy exemplified these developments. It seems Hay and Rosamond are right that globalisation is particularly resonant for the centre-left, but only on the basis of, firstly, a generation of success for the right, during which the foundations of globalisation discourse were constructed, and secondly, a recognition of the traditional ideological dependence of the centre-left on the concept of the state.

An ideology of globalisation? The book has demonstrated that globalisation discourse in British politics from 1997 to 2009 had a complex ideological heritage, but seemed to contain distinctive and novel meanings which were inflected in most uses of the globalisation concept and its conceptual relatives. There were elements of globalisation discourse, especially as articulated by elite actors, which resembled neoliberalism. The idea of globalisation is in an important sense the product of a neoliberal hegemony, but is not entirely derived from it. Actors involved in making and contesting foreign economic policy had to come to terms with a changing material context, which can be associated with the ascendance of a neoliberal policy agenda. Yet there was space for innovation as well as accommodation: globalisation discourse transformed the ideological landscape in this issue area, but the globalisation concept, like any concept, was permeable to alternative meanings. Oxfam, for instance, has converged upon a neoliberal policy agenda; yet it is precisely its employment of the globalisation concept which seemed to give its perspective a new resonance as an opponent of neoliberal globalisation. If not neoliberalism, it is possible globalisation discourse represented the resurgence of classical liberalism. The marketplace and free trade, for instance, were important concepts, hermeneutically and normatively, for ostensibly progressive actors – part of a way of arguing that the global economy should be (or is) more rules-based than neoliberalism assumes. Having said this, it is not the case that these concepts were more influential than neoliberal meanings, especially within an actor like

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New Labour. We could point to a sense of universalism as evidence of classical liberalism in globalisation discourse, but equally we could claim that universality belongs to all Enlightenment-era ideological families; social democrats and socialists, for example, would also claim that the universality of globalisation provides a rationale for a pro-globalisation stance. Clearly, the idea of globalisation can be incorporated into different ideological structures, with its ultimate meaning dependent on adjacent concepts. Michael Freeden’s notion of a hybrid ideology may be an apt description of globalisation’s ideological status (Freeden, 1996, 2001, 2006). For New Labour, given that traditional social democratic meanings are largely absent and not straightforwardly replaced by liberalism or neoliberalism, it may be that the globalisation concept formed the core of a new ideological formation. The difficulty is that, whereas some actors may have embodied a globalisation-centred ideology, others merely incorporated the concept into existing ideological structures (albeit in a disruptive manner). At the very least, it is possible to say that globalisation enjoyed for most of the period studied the status of a concept such as liberty or democracy: an arena of ideological conflict, but containing a core meaning all actors located in a given political culture must confront. However, whether or not this status will be maintained following the financial crisis is uncertain. Yet it certainly seems that, even where the financial crisis has disrupted emerging ideological trends within the discourses studied here, interpretations of and responses to the crisis have been influenced by the meanings contained in globalisation discourse, even if the term itself has been marginalised.

And finally... The future of the term ‘globalisation’ is obviously moot. It has been argued here, however, that ideologies are constantly evolving; this is how the idea of globalisation has been able to impact upon the political action and policy decisions of the groups discussed here, as novel ideas have been incorporated into existing systems of meaning, in more or less disruptive manners. By necessity meanings will continue to evolve as agency occurs and material and structural environments are transformed and reproduced. This final section will briefly consider the future of the British ideological landscape, but also the impact and nature of globalisation discourse beyond the British context. This will help to place the study within its temporal and geographical contexts, but also point towards areas where future research would be useful. The inconclusive general election result in 2010 is perhaps indication of an ideological confusion in British politics following the financial crisis. Notwithstanding their actual result in terms of seats won and votes received, the Liberal Democrats’ election campaign was widely regarded to have resonated with the public, particularly on the issue of banking reform. This is surely related

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to the more cautious approach to globalisation discovered in this study. However, the electoral system resulted in the party forming a coalition government with the Conservative Party. The ideological ramifications of this are of course unknown – the party’s acquiescence with the Conservatives’ strategy to reduce the size of the public sector could mean that its pre-election heyday proves to be an apex in the party’s development. All of the groups studied in this book are in disarray to some extent, none more so than New Labour – a political project that indeed seems to have been abandoned by the Labour Party. Of course, the most important development in British politics has been the election of a Conservative-led government; part of the reason the Conservatives were not included in this study was that from 1997 to 2009 they seemed not to offer a distinctive position on globalisation and agreed entirely with groups such as New Labour and IFSL on foreign economic policy. While the financial crisis may have produced some disquiet about the Labour government’s policies, the ideological trajectory of the Conservatives in this regard is unknown. We can be certain, however, that the future will be different. The excessively optimistic view of globalisation found, for instance, in New Labour and Oxfam discourses will not be seen again in the foreseeable future. But the core meanings contained within globalisation discourse will surely be maintained; that is, the notion that we live in one world and that the state is increasingly illegitimate. Indeed, the interpretation of the financial crisis as an inherently global phenomenon, and the implications of the fiscal deficit, mean that these meanings may in fact be becoming more sedimentary in British politics, even if the term ‘globalisation’ has to some extent faded from view or even come to be seen in more negative terms. It remains to be seen, however, whether the idea of globalisation actually generated these meanings or indeed whether globalisation discourse was epiphenomenal of a deeper-lying intellectual movement against the nation-state. While the term ‘globalisation’ (but not ‘global’ and ‘globality’) has become less popular, efforts to reduce the state have accelerated. From an analytical perspective, this question does not matter. For the agents discussed in this book, the idea of globalisation was of primary significance. Whether in hindsight we determine that they carried, perhaps only semi-consciously, more significant intellectual trends does not change the fact that, in the period studied, their agency was motivated by the idea of globalisation. Although this book has not undertaken cross-country comparison, it is apparent that discourses of globalisation around British foreign economic policy are very much products of British ideological traditions and British political life. This is not to say that ideologies and systems of meaning respect national borders, but they are influenced by the dominant intellectual trends of their immediate political hinterland. That this seems to apply even in relation to a discourse which depicts the emergence of a single, global socio-economic system – and indeed delegitimises the nation-state – is an intriguing possibility.

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Research on globalisation discourse in other European countries shows clear differences to the dominant themes found in Britain. Vivien Schmidt’s work on discourses on globalisation among French elites shows that in France the idea of globalisation is bound up with the process of Europeanisation. She argues that two main discourses prevailed: firstly, the argument that Europeanisation was complementary to globalisation, enabling France to prosper in a global age; and secondly, the argument that European integration provides a defence against the process of globalisation (Schmidt, 2007). Colin Hay and Ben Rosamond’s comparison of several countries found similar themes throughout Europe and, in addition, the notion that in some countries globalisation has become synonymous, in negative terms, with Americanisation (Hay & Rosamond, 2002). Interestingly, writing in 2007, Schmidt shows that the globalisation/Europeanisation bargain in France had already started to unravel – citing France’s rejection of the EU’s constitutional treaty in support of this finding. Nicola Smith’s work on globalisation discourse in Irish politics finds Ireland somewhere between Britain and Europe. Globalisation was invariably treated as positive, but also depicted as an exogenous economic constraint (Smith, 2005). One novel aspect of Irish discourse, however, is that European integration was also treated as an exogenous constraint akin to globalisation, contra continental Europe – and, as in Britain, this constraint was sometimes seen as contradictory to globalisation. Manfred Steger’s research on globalisation discourse in the United States suggests that the predominant discourses on globalisation found in Britain may have more in common with the United States (Steger, 2002, 2005). Mark Rupert’s (2000) and Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan’s (2004) work also suggests this commonality. However, Steger has also argued that, after 11 September 2001, the state re-entered globalisation parlance among the elite of the United States. George W. Bush’s administration, for instance, presented its foreign policy as necessary to defend globalisation. This is an interesting finding; moreover, while Britain supported American policies on Afghanistan and Iraq, there was little evidence that the Blair government utilised globalisation discourse to this end in any significant sense. This suggests divergence between Britain and the United States on the meanings attached to globalisation after 9/11, related to the role of the state. However, Tom Nairn and Paul James’ work on images of ‘globalism’ in American politics suggests that this meaning had long been present. Bill Clinton’s understanding of and approach to globalisation generally presented the process as an American product, and key to American economic recovery in the 1990s. It may be, therefore, that globalisation discourse in the United States places greater emphasis not on the state, but more precisely the nation (Nairn & James, 2005). Indeed, the post-Clinton neoconservative perspective may have emphasised the state, but certainly not the notion that the state had any significant macro-economic functions.

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It may be possible to conclude, therefore, that whereas British globalisation discourse differed from continental Europe by not associating the process with Europeanisation, it also diverged from the United States by not associating globalisation with nationalism. There is an intriguing possibility, however, that globalisation discourse in Britain represented a renewal of the national purpose detailed in Frank Trentmann’s book Free Trade Nation (2008). Trentmann demonstrated that notions of Britishness were invariably wrapped up in the sense that Britain housed an open, internationally oriented economy. He hypothesised, however, that this phenomenon was beginning to wane due to the abandonment of an orthodox, liberal free trade agenda among British elites in favour of a neoliberal agenda. While Trentmann is perhaps correct about this trend in some ways – the group most associated with liberalism studied here, the Liberal Democrats, were paradoxically the group most reticent about the virtues of the contemporary liberal trade regime. However, Trentmann’s study did not recognise the survival of some aspects of classical liberalism within globalisation discourse or, perhaps more accurately, the revival of this perspective as Britain moved to a post-neoliberal era. More importantly, it may be that globalisation discourse represents a new way of articulating a traditional British commitment to an open, global economy, one more appropriate to the actual economic activities undertaken in the modernday British economy. The financial crisis has of course further complicated this prospect, yet it may be that a pre-existing positive outlook on the global economy means that Britain maintains this commitment even if other countries, including the United States, begin to move towards stronger regulation on international economic activity.

References Cameron, A. & Palan, R. (2004) The Imagined Economies of Globalization (London: SAGE). Cerny, P. (2004) ‘Mapping varieties of neoliberalism’, IPEG Papers in Global Political Economy, no.12, accessed at www.bisa-ipeg.org/ipegpapers.htm on 25 May 2009. Freeden, M. (1996) Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Clarendon). Freeden, M. (2001) ‘Ideology: Balances and prejudices’, in M. Freeden (ed), Reassessing Political Ideologies (London: Routledge), pp. 193–209. Freeden, M. (2006) ‘Ideology and political theory’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 11:1, pp. 3–22. Gamble, A, (2009) ‘The Western ideology’, Government and Opposition, 44:1, pp. 1–19. Hay, C. (2004) ‘The normalizing role of rationalist assumptions in the institutional embedding of neoliberalism’, Economy and Society, 33:4, pp. 500–27.

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Hay, C. & Rosamond, B. (2002) ‘Globalization, European integration and the discursive construction of economic imperatives’, Journal of European Public Policy, 9:2, pp. 147–67. Nairn, T. & James, P. (2005) Global Matrix: Nationalism, Globalism and State-Terrorism (London: Pluto). Rupert, M (2000) Ideologies of Globalisation: Contending Visions of a New World Order (London: Routledge). Schmidt, V. (2007) ‘Trapped by their ideas: French elites’ discourses of European integration and globalization’, Journal of European Public Policy, 14:7, pp. 992–1009. Smith, N. J. (2005) Showcasing Globalisation: The Political Economy of the Irish Republic (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Steger, M. B. (2002) Globalism: The New Market Ideology (Oxford: Bowman and Littlefield). Steger, M. B. (2005) ‘From market globalism to imperial globalism’, Globalizations, 2:1, pp. 31–46. Trentmann, F. (2008) Free Trade Nation: Commerce, Consumption and Civil Society in Modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

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Adler, Emmanuel 41–2, 45 Antoniades, Andreas 55–7 Blair, Tony 1, 70–3, 89, 93 Blyth, Mark 43–4 Colin Hay’s critique 44 Brown, Gordon 1, 71–5, 93, 195 Byers, Stephen 87, 92 Cable, Vince 131, 133–4, 141, 196 Callinicos, Alex 22, 167–8, 170, 173–4, 177–8, 180, 181 Cameron, Angus 31–6, 201 Cerny, Philip 22–3, 199 Clegg, Nick 121, 125, 132–3, 135–9, 141 Conservative Party 8, 206 constructivism 41–8 Colin Hay’s contribution 46–8 neglect of ideology 59–60 Cooke, John 99, 103, 107, 109 Darling, Alistair 76 Davey, Ed 125 de Goede, Marieke 42, 48–50 Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 76, 83–4, 86, 93 Department for International Development 87–9, 93 Department of Trade and Industry 76–83, 84–8, 89–93 discourse 9, 29–31 relationship with ideology 59, 194 see also ideational analysis; third wave European Union 73–4, 92–3, 137–9, 207 Festenstein, Matthew 4, 57

financial crisis 74–6, 105–6, 110–11, 130–1, 133–4, 141, 148–9, 156, 161–2, 179–80, 187–8, 195, 196, 197, 201, 205, 206 foreign economic policy 2, 5, 201 International Financial Services London 100–6, 107–11 Liberal Democrats 131, 135–40, 141–2, 195–6 New Labour 84–93, 94–5, 195 Oxfam 149–56, 196–7 Socialist Workers’ Party 175–80 see also trade policy; international development policy Foucault, Michel 48, 51 Freeden, Michael, 57–9, 65, 193, 205 free trade 2, 8, 54–5, 62, 200, 201, 203, 208 International Financial Services London 104–5, 117 Liberal Democrats 123, 127–31, 135, 137, 140–2, 196, 199 New Labour 84–7, 89–90, 92, 93, 94 Oxfam 149–51, 154, 160, 196–7, 199 globalisation studies 11–39 wave thesis 12–13 Harman, Chris 168, 170–1, 181 Hay, Colin 3–4, 26–31, 31–2, 199, 203–4, 207 constructivism 46–8 New Labour 27, 28–9 wave thesis 12–13 see also third wave Held, David 12–13, 18–19, 20–1 Hewitt, Patricia 78, 80, 82, 89, 91 Huhne, Chris 125, 129, 131–2

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Index ideational analysis 3–5, 26–7, 40–68, 192–4 see also discourse; ideology ideology 3–4, 5, 53–5, 57–66, 65, 193–4, 204–5 conceptual approach 57–9, 65, 193, 205 see also ideational analysis international development policy 87–9, 107–9, 139–40, 151–6, 195 Doha Development Agenda 89–91, 107–8, 139–40, 152, 154–6, 158–9, 176–7, 197 International Financial Services London 8, 99–119 financial crisis 105–6, 109 financial services 103–6, 108, 154–7 foreign economic policy 100–6, 107–11 free trade and comparative advantage 104–5, 117 international development 107–9 liberalisation 101–5, 107–10, 112–13, 117, 195 London and the City 99, 103, 104–5, 114–16 multilateral institutions 109–11, 196 neoliberalism 100, 106–7, 118 offshore 100, 105, 113–14, 117, 195–6 state, the 106–7, 108–9 understanding of globalisation 149–60, 195–6 Johnson, Alan 77, 91 Kennedy, Charles 121, 122, 126, 137 Kenny, Michael 4, 18, 57 Laws, David 126 Liberal Democrats 8, 120–43 coalition government 206 financial crisis 130–1, 133–4, 141, 196 foreign economic policy 131, 135–40, 141–2, 200 free trade and comparative advantage 123, 127–31, 135, 137, 140–2, 196, 199 international development 139–40 internationalism 126–7, 131–5, 140–1 liberalisation 131, 136–7, 139, 143, 196, 200–1 liberalism 122–7, 134–5, 142, 196 multilateral institutions 125, 131–5, 137 neoliberalism 142–3

211

state, the 123–4, 129–30, 140–1 understanding of globalisation 127–35, 140–3, 196, 203 liberalisation 5 International Financial Services London 101–5, 107–10, 112–13, 117, 195 Liberal Democrats 131, 136–7, 139, 143, 196 New Labour 84–7, 89–90, 91–2, 94, 194–5 Oxfam 149–51, 153, 160 Socialist Workers’ Party 176–7, 187 liberalism 74, 79, 95, 122–7, 134–5, 142, 161, 196, 198, 200, 203, 204 McGrew, Anthony 12–13, 18–19, 20–1 Mandelson, Peter 83–4 Marxism and neo-Marxism 22–6, 68, 198 see also Socialist Workers’ Party material and ideational 3–5, 25–6, 42–6, 48–50, 52–3, 192–4 Colin Hay’s critique of materialism 26–7 materialist structuralist approaches to globalisation 13–21 see also ideational analysis; third wave nation-state 6, 33–4, 130, 140–1, 156–7, 167, 192, 197, 201, 206, 207 see also state, the neoclassical political economy 14–15, 198 neo-Gramscianism 13, 17–18, 51–7 Cox, Robert 52–3 neoliberalism 5–6, 53–4, 62–3, 74, 79, 87, 94–5, 100, 106–7, 118, 142–3, 162, 177, 187, 198, 199–200, 202, 204 neoconservatism 63–4, 207 New Labour 7–8, 27, 28–9, 69–98 financial crisis 74–6, 195 foreign economic policy 84–93, 94–5, 195 free trade and comparative advantage 84–7, 89–90, 92, 93, 94 international development 87–91, 195 liberalisation 84–7, 89–90, 91–2, 94, 194–5 liberalism 74, 79, 95, 204 multilateral institutions 73–4, 75–6, 89–93, 195 neoliberalism 74, 79, 87, 94–5, 204 social democracy and the state 87, 88–9, 95, 200, 202, 204

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New Labour (continued) understanding of globalisation 70–84, 94, 194–5 Ohmae, Kenichi 14–15 Oxfam 8, 144–63 financial crisis 148–9, 156, 161–2 foreign economic policy 149–56 free trade and comparative advantage 149–51, 154, 160, 196–7, 199 international development 151–6, 158–9 liberalisation 149–51, 153, 160 liberalism 161 multilateral institutions 154–6, 157–9, 197 neoliberalism 162, 200 understanding of globalisation 145–9, 160–2, 196–7 Palan, Ronen 31–36, 50–1, 201 post-structuralism 48–51 neglect of ideology 60–1 Rees, John 169–70, 172, 175, 178, 181–3 Respect Coalition 164, 180 Rosamond, Ben 27–30, 203–4, 207 Rupert, Mark 18, 53–5, 200 sceptical approach 31 Scholte, Jan Aart 19–20 Short, Clare 88, 93 Smith, Nicola 13, 29, 207 socialism and social democracy 87, 89, 95, 141, 144, 165, 168, 171, 175, 176, 182, 183–4, 186, 187–8, 198, 202, 205 Socialist Workers’ Party 8, 164–90 anti-globalisation 165, 173–5, 177–9, 181–3 anti-war movement 164–5, 180–1 class struggle 171–3 financial crisis 179–80, 187–8, 197 foreign economic policy 175–80 liberalisation 176–7, 187 Marx and Marxism 167–8, 170, 180, 184, 185–8, 197 multilateral institutions 175–6 neoliberalism 177, 187 socialism 165, 168, 171, 175, 176, 182, 183–4, 186, 187–8

state, the 167, 169–70, 185, 187, 201 understanding of globalisation 166–75, 185–90, 197 space and spatiality 6, 18–21, 31–5, 94–5, 99–100, 113–16, 134–5, 142, 161, 191–2, 195–6, 197, 198, 202–3 globality 33, 94, 111, 117–18, 131, 155, 179–80, 183, 195, 196, 197, 198–9, 202–3, 206 one-worldness 6, 191–2 spatial approaches 18–21 see also transformationalism state, the 6, 21–6, 33–4, 192, 200–1, 206 International Financial Services London 106–7, 108–9 Liberal Democrats 123–4, 129–30, 140–1 New Labour 87, 88–9, 95, 200 Oxfam 156–7 Socialist Workers’ Party 167, 169–70, 185, 187 see also nation-state Steger, Manfred 61–4, 200, 207 structure and agency 4, 20–1, 41, 42–5, 50–1, 52–3 globalisation and the state 21–6 Colin Hay’s approach 27, 46–7 third wave 26–35 trade policy 84–7, 88–91, 94, 101–6, 107–11, 135–40, 141–2, 149–56, 176–9, 195, 196–7, 201 Singapore issues 90, 91, 92, 138–9, 151, 195, 196, 197 see also foreign economic policy transformationalism 18–9 see also spatial approaches Treasury, HM 71, 79, 80, 81, 82–3, 97 Trentmann, Frank 2, 208 UK Trade and Investment 83 World Trade Organization 89–94, 101, 109–11, 135–7, 139–40, 150–1, 154–6, 157–9, 161, 175–9, 197, 201 Battle of Seattle 89, 177–9 Doha Development Agenda 89–91, 107–8, 139–40, 152, 154–6, 158–9, 176–7, 197 see also trade policy