Global Security Watch--Japan : Japan 9780313381393, 9780313381386

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GLOBAL SECURITY WATCH

JAPAN

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GLOBAL SECURITY WATCH

JAPAN Andrew L. Oros and Yuki Tatsumi Foreword by Rust Deming

Copyright 2010 by Andrew L. Oros and Yuki Tatsumi All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Oros, Andrew. Global security watch—Japan / Andrew L. Oros and Yuki Tatsumi. p. cm. — (Global security watch) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–313–38138–6 (hard copy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978–0–313–38139–3 (ebook) 1. Japan—Foreign relations. 2. Japan—Military policy. 3. Japan—Strategic aspects. 4. National security—Japan. 5. Japan—Foreign relations—United States. 6. United States—Foreign relations— Japan. I. Tatsumi, Yuki. II. Title. III. Title: Japan. DS845.O64 2010 2010018652 3550 .033052—dc22 ISBN: 978–0–313–38138–6 EISBN: 978–0–313–38139–3 14 13 12 11 10

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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. Praeger An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

Contents Foreword by Rust Deming

vii

Preface

xiii

Acronyms

xvii

Chapter 1: Historical Overview: The Rise and Fall (and Rise?) of a Global Military Power

1

Chapter 2: Civilian Institutions for the Defense of Japan

27

Chapter 3: Uniformed Institutions and Capabilities

47

Chapter 4: The Japan-United States Security Relationship

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Chapter 5: Japan’s Regional Security Environment

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Chapter 6: Democratic Politics and Japan’s Evolving Security Role

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Appendix A: Biographies

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Appendix B: Chronology

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Appendix C: Documents

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Glossary

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Bibliography

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Index

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Foreword The alliance between Japan and the United States, one of the great “success stories” of the postwar world, has come under considerable academic scrutiny in the last decade, particularly in the United States but also in Japan. Kenneth Pyle’s Japan Rising, Richard Samuel’s Securing Japan, Kent Calder’s Pacific Alliance, Mike Green’s Japan’s Reluctant Realism, and Yoichi Funabashi’s Alliance Adrift are just a few of the books and articles that have analyzed the shifting currents between Japan and the United States. This academic attention has been stimulated by the rapidly changing regional environment, most notably the rise of China and the North Korean nuclear program; and by the evolving political scene in Japan, most importantly the activist and iconoclastic leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi. The recent collapse of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the inauguration a Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government under Prime Minister Hatoyama with a different vision of the Japan-U.S. alliance and Japan’s role in the world has launched a new round of journal articles, many challenging some of the assumptions of the earlier analysis about the likely evolution of Japan-U.S. relations and Japan’s foreign policy. Most of the recent analysis of the alliance and Japan has been focused on the broad political, economic, and demographic trends that are shaping the external and internal environment. There has been little examination of the institutional changes in Japan that both reflect the evolution in Japan’s security policy to date and provide new capabilities and legal flexibility for Japan to take on an expanded military role in the future. This volume by Andrew L. Oros and Yuki Tatsumi admirably fills this void by their comprehensive and multidimensional analysis that links the historical evolution of Japan’s security policies to its current capabilities and prospects.

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In their first chapter, the authors examine the historical context of Japan’s defense policies, going back to the rise of militarism in the 1930s that led to World War II; the postwar shift toward “minimal self-defense” capabilities under tight constitutional and political constraints; the slow growth of Japan’s military during the Cold War, largely in response to pressure from the United States; the reorientation of the Japan-U.S. alliance toward regional security in the 1990s after the Gulf War “failure” by Japan and in response to the growing challenge from North Korea; and Koizumi’s unprecedented decision to deploy Japanese Self Defense Forces to the Indian Ocean and Iraq after 9/11. The chapter does not break new ground, but it pulls together in a very coherent manner the external and internal forces that shaped these transitions and sets the stage for the subsequent analysis. The second chapter does break new ground in the thoroughness with which it examines the civilian Japanese institutions and their evolution that are responsible for defense policy. Japan is unusual in that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has played a dominant role in security policy by virtue of its stewardship of the Japan-U.S. alliance. The authors describe the shifting balance of power within MOFA as the Foreign Policy Bureau has challenged the traditional dominance of the North American Affairs Bureau, resulting in a broader and more strategic driven policy process. The authors next examine an institution that seldom appears in studies of Japan’s security policy: the National Police Agency (NPA), the key player in domestic security and liaison with foreign intelligence services. The authors note appropriately that the influence of the already powerful NPA has been expanded as traditional law enforcement issues such as terrorism, drug trafficking, piracy, and smuggling are increasingly seen as national security issues. The authors give extensive treatment to the evolution of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), particularly its recent transformation into the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and analyze clearly the many internal and external challenges that remain to be overcome if MOD is to achieve the stature and influence of other major defense ministries. One of the most informative sections of the book is the examination of the critical and little-known role of the Cabinet Secretariat in the coordination of national security policy and intelligence collection and analysis, another area that is rarely treated by Western or even Japanese scholarship. The chapter concludes with a well-thought analysis of the many remaining challenges to effective national security policy coordination and development, challenges that must be overcome if Japan is to make its full weight felt on the international stage. The third chapter examines the evolution, roles and capabilities of the uniformed institutions in Japan, not only the Ground, Air, and Maritime Self Defense Forces, but also the Japan Coast Guard and Japan’s “first responders” (Fire, EMS, and local police). The authors describe in detail the shifting missions

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of the three military services as Japan’s security environment has evolved and discuss the remaining challenges of joint operations and the increasingly severe fiscal constraints to acquiring new capabilities. They note the expanded role of the Japan Coast Guard in protecting Japan’s territorial waters, particularly areas under dispute with its neighbors, a role that goes beyond the JCG’s traditional law enforcement responsibilities, and which has caused it to acquire new capabilities, such as high speed cutters, that may soon make it the “de facto” fourth military service. In the fourth chapter, the authors focus on the impact of the United States on the development of Japan’s indigenous defense institutions, capabilities, and missions. They note the incessant pressure the United States exerted for Japan to increase its military roles and missions, and the simultaneous desire to contain Japanese military ambitions while Japan sought to respond to this pressure in a manner that would avoid either entrapment in conflicts the United States was involved in, or abandonment by its key ally. Oros and Tatsumi examine the multiple avenues of influence that the United States has to shape Japanese defense policy, not only the formal defense consultation mechanisms and military exercises but also that many unofficial contacts between defense industries, scholars and commentators, the results of which are reflected in the expanded Guidelines for Defense Cooperation and the many joint declarations on common strategic goals and roadmaps for implementation. The authors end this chapter with a discussion of the challenge of meeting mutual expectations. After reviewing the evolution of the respective alliance expectations of Americans and Japanese over the years, Oros and Tatsumi cite the recent National Bureau of Asian Research report that argues that the alliance is failing to meet the expectations of both the United States and Japan in significant ways. The authors also note other scholars who lament the lack of depth in the nonmilitary dimensions of the Japan-U.S. alliance, concluding that closing this expectation gap between the two countries is complicated by the divisions within each country’s visions of the alliance. The fifth chapter of the volume discusses Japan’s regional security environment along familiar lines. Noting that East Asia is a microcosm of the traditional and non-traditional security threats facing the world as a whole, the authors review the Korean Peninsula and the North Korean nuclear challenge; the rise of China and cross-straits issues; the unresolved issues between Japan and Russia; and new opportunities for security cooperation with more distant Asian states, notably Australia and India. They next turn to regional security cooperation, including cooperative steps within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to deal with terrorism and piracy and the efforts of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to address transnational security issues. Focusing on Japan’s role in regional security, the authors review the historical legacy that still colors perceptions of Japanese military activities in the region

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and resultant focus by Japan on non-military tools to advance its interests. Nevertheless, multilateral security cooperation is in the rise, driven in part by the need for joint efforts to combat terrorism, piracy, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The authors do not see an overarching East Asian security structure as likely to emerge, but rather predict increasing regional cooperation as part of a multilayered approach to regional security. They argue that Japan, under Hatoyama and the DPJ, appears to give less importance to playing a leading regional security role than did Prime Minister Koizumi. The final chapter examines Japan’s security policy in the context of its evolving politics, focusing particularly on the implications of the August 2009 elections that brought the DPJ to power. The authors note that while the election was decided largely on domestic issues, the DPJ staked out in its platform a foreign policy that represents a sharp departure from the long established LDP approach. Notably, the DPJ calls for a “more equal” alliance between Japan and the United States, an end to MSDF participation in re-fueling operations in the Indian Ocean, renegotiation of the recent Japan-U.S. agreement on U.S. military base realignment in Okinawa, and giving priority to a closer relationship between Japan and the rest of Asia. The authors argue that while it is too early to say whether the new direction proposed by the DPJ will represent one of the critical turning points in Japan’s security policy, the DPJ’s pronouncements have already engendered a debate on these issues within Japan. They add that whatever the policy outcome of the debate, there will almost certainly be major changes in the way security issues are addressed and decided in Japan’s political process, particularly more active involvement by politicians and more transparency. After reviewing the evolution of the domestic politics of Japan’s postwar security policy, Oros and Tatsumi examine the remaining political and legal constraints, including Japan’s ingrained pacifism and the ban on collective self-defense. They then look at the key personalities in the DPJ shaping security policy, particularly Prime Minister Hatoyama and DPJ Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa and the difficulty the new government is having in translating election rhetoric into practical programs. The authors conclude that despite disagreements over alliance management issues, Japan is likely to continue to base its security policy on the Japan-U.S. alliance. At the same time, the center of gravity of decision-making on security issues will shift away from bureaucrats and toward politicians. This change is a doubleedged sword, perhaps allowing Japan to be a more proactive player; or, by further politicizing national security policy decision-making, limiting Japan’s ability to respond effectively to security challenges. This volume represents an important contribution to the study of Japan’s national security policy. Its brings together in a clear and coherent fashion the

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external and internal factors that shape this policy, and adds an excellent description and analysis of the evolution of the civilian and military institutions responsible for security policy development and implementation. It will be a valuable tool in the years ahead as scholars, practitioners, and students seek to understand how and why national security policy is made in Japan. Rust Deming

Rust Deming retired in 2004 after 38 years serving in the U.S. Foreign Service, much of it spent dealing with Japan. He now teaches as an Adjunct Professor in the Japan Studies program at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University.

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Preface This volume represents the second collaborative project that we have undertaken together as co-authors, and we hope it reflects our relative strengths and compensates for some of our individual shortcomings. We have long sought to create a single-volume reference source on Japanese security beyond the useful annual Defense of Japan provided by Japan’s Ministry of Defense and the numerous more scholarly treatments that have appeared in recent years, and were delighted when Praeger Press contacted us to contribute to this series. This volume draws on earlier efforts at this task, a co-edited volume, Japan’s New Defense Establishment: Institutions, Capabilities and Implications (The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2007), and Yuki Tatsumi’s single-authored volume, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure: Can Tokyo Meet Washington’s Expectations? (The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2008). It also draws on some of the more theoretical conceptualizations of the politics of Japanese security policy developed in in Andrew L. Oros’s Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford University Press, 2008). In addition, both of us have written numerous short articles about Japan’s evolving security practices in the past several years, and some of these ideas have been incorporated into this volume. While we do not agree 100 percent about all aspects of the transformation of Japan’s security policy and policymaking institutions, or Japan’s overall security future, we believe that our collaboration provides a useful and timely snapshot of Japan’s national security capabilities, policies, and challenges today. It is a time of potentially dramatic change in Japan’s security posture, however, just nine months after the election of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) ended over a half-century of nearly uninterrupted rule by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). An election in Japan’s upper

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house of parliament, the House of Councillors, in July 2010 may set the stage for even deeper changes. We are grateful to our editors at Praeger Press who allowed a delay in submitting this manuscript until after the historic August 2009 lower house election, and believe that the beginning of the year that marks the 50th anniversary of the 1960 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty revision is an appropriate time to take stock of important changes that have taken place in Japan’s security policies in recent years, and to consider possible scenarios for next steps in Japan’s security evolution, under a possibly unified DPJ government by year’s end, or under continued divided government of multi-party coalitions. We both are grateful to many people—dedicated diplomats, politicians, government and military officials, researchers and scholars in both countries— who have helped us develop a deeper understanding of Japan’s evolving security policies and politics, many of whom have been thanked individually in recent single-authored volumes we have completed. In particular, we would like to thank Rust Deming for contributing both his thoughts and the foreword to this volume, and to the following friends and research colleagues who kindly offered their thoughts on various pieces of the manuscript: Yasuaki Chijiwa, Brad Glosserman, Chris Hughes, Paul Midford, Wilhelm Vosse, Piers Williamson, Taro Yamato, and Hiroshi Yamazoe. We thank also Kent Mullen, an intern at the Stimson Center, for his careful proofreading and help with the glossary to this volume. Andrew L. Oros would like to extend special thanks for assistance in completing this volume to members of the Research and Military History divisions of the National Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS) in Tokyo, who offered an invited research fellowship to him in the summer of 2009; to several research institutions in Washington, DC who have generously included him in many valuable programs related to this topic, in particular the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, the Henry L. Stimson Center, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; to Washington College; and to Steve for his unflagging personal support. In addition, he would like to thank his co-author for her intellectual contributions, logistical support, and useful feedback over now many years, and to congratulate her in print for the birth of her first child, Akiyoshi, in the midst of this project. Yuki Tatsumi would like to thank her co-author for giving her the opportunity to collaborate with him again. She is extremely grateful for his patience and understanding throughout the drafting process. Her gratitude also goes to the Henry L. Stimson Center which has been providing a stimulating environment for her professional development. Although too many to thank individually, she also owes a great deal to all of the former and current Japanese and American defense and foreign policy officials as well as uniformed officers

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who mentored her and have shared their valuable insights with her throughout her research. Finally, her deepest gratitude goes to Hideaki for his support for her work. Naturally, any errors of fact or interpretation rest solely with the authors. We hope that this modest but sustained collaboration between nationals of Japan and the United States may symbolize a future sustained collaboration in the area of security between our two countries.

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Acronyms ACSA APEC APT ARF ASDF ASEAN ASW BMD CIRO CLB CSICE DCI DIA DIH DMZ DOD DPJ DPRI DPRK GDP GPR GRDC GSDF GSOMIA ICBM IGS

Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ASEAN Plus Three ASEAN Regional Forum Air Self Defense Force Association of Southeast Asian Nations anti-submarine warfare ballistic missile defense Cabinet Intelligence Research Office Cabinet Legislative Bureau Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center Director of Cabinet Intelligence Defense Intelligence Agency (U.S.) Defense Intelligence Headquarters (Japan) de-militarized zone Department of Defense (U.S.) Democratic Party of Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) gross domestic product Global Posture Review Ground Research and Development Command (of the GSDF) Ground Self Defense Force General Security of Military Information Agreement intercontinental ballistic missile information gathering satellite

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Acronyms

JCG JDA JI JSC JSDF JSO JSP LDP METI MEXT MILF MITI MLIT MOD MOF MOFA MSDF NATO NDPG NDPO NIDS NPA NPR NPSC NPT NSB NSO ODA OEF PKO PPH PPP PRC P-REX PSI QDR ROC ROK SACO SCC SCO SDP

Japan Coast Guard Japan Defense Agency Jemaah Islamiah Joint Staff Council Japan Self Defense Forces Joint Staff Office Japan Socialist Party Liberal Democratic Party Ministry of the Economy, Trade, and Industry (formerly MITI) Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science & Technology Moro Islamic Liberation Front Ministry of International Trade and Industry Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transportation and Tourism Ministry of Defense Ministry of Finance Ministry of Foreign Affairs Maritime Self Defense Force North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Defense Program Guidelines National Defense Program Outline National Institute of Defense Studies (Japan) National Police Agency National Police Reserves National Public Safety Commission Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty National Strategy Bureau National Strategy Office overseas development assistance Operation Enduring Freedom peacekeeping operations (United Nations) Prefectural Police Headquarters purchasing power parity People’s Republic of China Police Team of Rescue Units Proliferation Security Initiative Quadrennial Defense Review Republic of China (Taiwan) Republic of Korea (South Korea) Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa Security Consultative Committee Shanghai Cooperation Organization Social Democratic Party

Acronyms

SIPRI SOFA UN UNPKO UNSC U.S. WMDs

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute status of forces agreement United Nations United Nations peacekeeping operations United Nations Security Council United States weapons of mass destruction

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CHAPTER

1

Historical Overview: The Rise and Fall (and Rise?) of a Global Military Power

Japan has faced many crossroads since its emergence as a modern state in the late nineteenth century. The choices Japan’s leaders have made have affected not only the Japanese people but peoples from many countries near and far. Japan has served as a model of democracy and development—Asia’s first democracy and first global economic power—and has been reviled as a colonizer and brutal occupier. Following its defeat in World War II, Japan transformed itself into an “economic superpower,” eschewing many of the military responsibilities of a state of its population size and economic might, and instead opted to rely on a close security alliance with the United States. This course has received many plaudits from pacifists worldwide, and from others who praise Japan for its principled stands on disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and generally peace-centered foreign policies. That Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, Japan’s longest serving prime minister (1964–1972), won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974 is one indication of such global admiration. Others have criticized Japan for “free-riding” on the goodwill of other states— the United States in particular—that have provided the military might to protect Japan’s interests, particularly as Japan’s national power rose from the ashes of World War II and bitter memories of Imperial Japan faded in many places. Inside Japan as well, many on the political left and on the political right lament the perceived subordinate status of Japan as a state that relies on another state for its protection. Such sentiments were a factor in an historic national election in August 2009 that led the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the then-primary opposition party, to a landslide victory, ending over a half century of nearcontinuous rule by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). As if to

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signal a new direction for Tokyo’s foreign and national security policy, Japan’s new prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, made headline news in his first new year’s address on January 4, 2010, by stressing the point that Japan will seek a more “equal” partnership with the United States, echoing a pledge that often had been heard on the campaign trail in 2009. Japan faces no shortage of substantial security challenges today.1 Its neighborhood is characterized by tense standoffs over the divided states of China/Taiwan and North/South Korea, increasing arms spending and arms build-ups, nuclear proliferation, long-standing and sometimes bitter territorial disputes among many states, Islamic-related terrorist activity in a number of Southeast Asian states that stands to jeopardize important shipping routes, and widespread concerns over the “rise” of China. Japanese security practices have naturally been evolving to respond to these threats, including in some ways that outside observers find surprising, such as increased military capabilities in some areas (surveillance satellites, ballistic missile defense, mid-air aircraft refueling), the creation of a full-fledged Ministry of Defense (MOD), and limited dispatch of Japan’s “self-defense forces” (JSDF) abroad (though only in non-combat roles). Japan’s security policies and military capabilities are largely what one would expect of one of the world’s largest economies and population states. According to Military Balance 2009, Japan is roughly the seventh largest military spender in the world (after the United States, China, and several European powers)2 and possesses armed forces that also rank among the world’s most formidable in terms of advanced technological capability. Comparative statistics on military spending are complex, however, subject to exchange rate fluctuations, variation in what expenses are included, and sometimes intentional obfuscation. By other measures, Japan has ranked consistently in the top five military spenders world-wide for several decades.3 Still, Japan’s security policies continue to be limited by long-standing institutional constraints and widespread public attitudes that question the need and desirability for further military spending and engagement abroad; in fact, Japanese military spending has declined every year for the past eight years, in line with general budget tightening in deficit-plagued Japan.4 Japan’s defense spending in 2008 was lower than its spending in 1996. By contrast, China and the United States both more than doubled their defense spending in that period. A new course that contemporary Japan seeks to chart has been the subject of a great deal of debate since the end of the Cold War. The debate revolves around whether today’s Japan should seek to become a “normal nation,” or perhaps a “middle power,” as two prominent Japanese thinkers have argued.5 The evolution of Japan’s security role thus far has suggested that, while taking place slowly in the two decades since the end of the Cold War, Japan has crossed many proverbial crossroads and seems to be heading toward becoming a “normal nation”–though recent events and continued opposition to such a course both call into question Japan’s future path.

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Today, Japan faces another set of choices, a choice initiated by Japanese voters— over 70 million of whom cast ballots in the historic August 2009 election that led to a changeover in party rule. It is too early to tell whether Japan’s new ruling party, the DPJ, will greatly alter Japan’s security policies during their time in office. Their campaign rhetoric and early policy decisions suggest a mix of continuity and change not dissimilar to their predecessors, the LDP, though somewhat different in emphasis and long-term strategy. The keystone Japan-U.S. alliance almost certainly will continue, though perhaps in some altered form. The year 2010 marks the 50th anniversary of the signing of the current Japan-U.S. security treaty, which itself was a revision of an earlier security treaty signed in 1951 (in anticipation of the end of the postwar occupation of Japan). Such a long-standing alliance is unlikely to be broken as a result of a single election, absent some compelling crisis. The last major crisis to Japan’s security, its defeat in World War II, resulted in a fundamentally altered Japanese security policy. Japan’s armed forces were disbanded, its colonial possessions stripped away, its main territory occupied by a foreign power for almost seven years, and a new “peace constitution” that renounced the use of force to resolve international disputes was adopted. Japan’s contemporary security policies are still shaped by this experience, in particular Article Nine of its constitution that fundamentally limits the military role Japan can play in the world. Questions of possibly revising this part of the constitution are central to discussions of Japan’s security future and have long been part of political debate. This volume seeks to provide a broad overview of Japan’s security policies and military capabilities as it faces a new era. In order to do this, several historical factors must also be considered further, including the security alliance with the United States, the postwar constitution, and Japan’s evolving relations with the neighbors it once occupied under Imperial rule. The interplay between the historical evolution of Japan’s security policies and its current capabilities will be a central theme of this volume. Another theme will be the uncertainty under which Japanese leaders have sought to re-craft Japan’s security policies in the past decade, and the continuing uncertainty of how Japan’s security future will develop. Although it may sound like a cliche´, Japan today truly faces a crossroads in its security future. In the next year or two, many aspects of Japan’s security policies may change as a result of the new domestic political situation, combined with deepening demographic and economic challenges as well as tensions between at least two competing visions of Japan’s security future that have been evident in the past decade. Most likely, however, change in Japan’s security policies will develop within the fairly narrow band of options Japanese have been considering for at least a decade, though some of the choices may be different from those of the recent past. Not too long ago the idea of composing a volume on Japan’s global security role would have raised eyebrows.6 It was not surprising to hear even from those knowledgeable about Japan, “but Japan doesn’t have a military.” Even as recently

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as 10 years ago, many Japanese—including those who are involved in security policymaking in Japan—shied away from openly discussing the subject of Japan’s national defense. Japanese universities, research institutions, and charitable foundations also were reluctant to conduct analytical studies of Japan’s evolving defense needs, defense institutions, and defense strategy. Today, the situation has changed greatly. In the last several years, it has become quite ordinary to see uniformed members of the JSDF featured in the mass media, portrayed on television or in movies, or walking the streets of Japan and abroad as defense attache´s, participants in defense exchanges or conferences, or as members of international relief forces. It has also become commonplace to hear Japanese civilian bureaucrats, businessmen, scholars, and pundits opine about the necessary moves Japan must take in its security policy. It is not just the visibility that has changed in recent years. Institutions that work toward the defense of Japan have evolved substantially over time, particularly in the past decade. A country’s national security policies often extend beyond addressing traditional military security concerns in response to evolving threats. The evolution of the definition of “national security” is often reflected by which agencies are included in the country’s national security community. In the United States, for example, the list goes well beyond a small group of agencies that deal with conventional security threats, such as the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, the intelligence community, and the military services. In the post-9/11 era in which everything from food safety, transportation safety, and border security are considered critical to the country’s national security, the national security community in the United States now includes the agencies that have primary responsibilities to address non-conventional security threats, such as the Department of Energy, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice (including the Federal Bureau of Investigation), the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Transportation. Japan similarly has experienced a shifting definition of the concept of national security. What is unique about Japan is the process of this evolution. In contrast to the United States, where the term “national security” or “security” was first narrowly defined in terms of military security and was broadened later, the constitutional restrictions on Japan’s armed forces have propelled Japan to first explore a broader concept for the term anzen hosho (security). Furthermore, for most of the postWorld War II years, the term “security” (anzen) tended to be used in the context of public safety. In that vein, the National Police Agency (NPA)—an agency that essentially controls all of the local police departments, plays a dominant role in Japan’s intelligence community, and possesses the primary jurisdiction over security issues such as counter-terrorism—played a significant role in Japanese security policy. However, the change in Japan’s security environment examined in this volume made Japanese—elite and public alike—aware of the importance of Japan having a sound military security policy that not only defends Japan from direct

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threats but also indirectly protects Japan from destabilizing forces in the world by actively contributing to the global security environment. This volume will focus on this latter definition of security, security in the traditional military sense. In this volume, therefore, Japan’s national security establishment is defined as the community of government institutions that are directly involved in shaping and executing Japanese military security policy. This establishment has two components: civilian and uniformed. We refrain from using the term “military” opposite “civilian” because institutions in Japan that have enforcement capabilities include formally non-military organizations such as the Japan Coast Guard (JCG). In addition, the term “military” is a sensitive one in Japan; some prefer not to refer even to the Self Defense Forces as a “military.” Civilian institutions consist of the Internal Bureau of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Police Agency, and relevant Cabinet offices, primarily the Office of Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for National Security and Crisis Management and its previous incarnations. The JSDF, the JCG, and local police force comprise the primary uniformed component of Japan’s national security establishment. These two sets of institutions are examined in detail in the following two chapters, after a broader discussion of the historical evolution of Japan’s security policies concludes this chapter. JAPAN’S FIRST RISE (AND FALL) AS A GLOBAL MILITARY POWER

One might think that events of 70, 100, or even 150 years ago would not have much of an effect on a state’s contemporary security policy, but that is not the case with Japan. Japan’s rise as a modern state and its conduct as a great power in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries continue to cast a shadow on its relations with its close neighbors, and to shape domestic political discourse. How the nineteenth-century Japanese state would respond to the security threat posed by the arrival of the Black Ships of U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry to a “closed” Japan in 1853 provoked such deep political divisions that a revolution in governance occurred, leading to an entirely new structure for a centralized Japanese state that included a “restoration” of the emperor as the top political authority, the creation of central government ministries and a national parliament, and an Imperial Army and Navy. For centuries Japan had been ruled more-or-less regionally, with a central military leader, or shogun, exercising only a weak degree of centralized control and the millennia-old imperial line serving largely in a cultural role far away from the center of political power. Japan’s facing of a serious external military threat exacerbated tensions within that long-standing political order, leading in only fifteen years to the end of the old order and the “restoration” of imperial rule, including the creation of an “eastern capital” (as the Chinese characters for Tokyo symbolize) for the emperor to reside in and rule where the great city of Edo had existed.

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In its attempts to keep from being colonized or otherwise exploited, as it had witnessed happen to its Asian neighbors, Japan became an excellent student of Western imperialism, including theories of governance, industrial prowess, and especially military technology. Only roughly 30 years after the creation of a centralized navy and army (in 1869 and 1871, respectively), Imperial Japan had won wars and significant concessions from neighbors China (1894–1995) and Russia (1904–1905). These victories paved the way for the incorporation of what is present-day Taiwan and the two Koreas into the Japanese empire. Japan’s formal annexation of the Korean peninsula in 1910 and subsequent 36 years of colonial rule created a bitter legacy between Japan and its closest neighbors that continues to negatively affect relations between the states today. Japan’s growing military activities in present-day China significantly raised international tensions in the 1930s, including with out-of-area powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom. How Japan should respond to its growing international isolation in the 1930s provoked bitter political divisions that ultimately led to the collapse of the democratic governance that had blossomed in the 1920s. Japan launched a full-scale military invasion of China on July 7, 1937, after the so-called Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the date that many Japanese historians mark as the outbreak of the eight-year “Pacific War” (what Westerners often refer to as the Asian theater of the World War II). Others speak of a “fifteen-year war,” dating back to the so-called Manchurian Incident of 1931, which paved the way for the creation of the Japanese puppet-state of Manchuko the following year. The lead-up to these incidents was unclear to many Japanese at the time. Imperial propaganda had explained in both cases that the Japanese Imperial Army had been attacked by the Chinese, and that Japan was therefore fighting a war of self-defense. The threat posed by Western powers in the region (especially the United States and United Kingdom) was also played up by the Imperial government. Thus, Japan’s surprise attack on the U.S. navy at Pearl Harbor, on the then-U.S. territory of Hawaii, also was portrayed as an act of self-defense against the state that had sought to cut off Japan’s access to oil, a resource critical to Japan’s industrial and military machine. The fall of the Japanese empire happened even more quickly than its dramatic rise. By 1942, five years after its advance deep into China, the Japanese empire had expanded as far as present-day Burma, Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia, and included Taiwan, the Korean peninsula, much of China, and even the Aleutian islands in the northwest corner of North America. Three years later, by August 1945, Japan’s largest cities would be in ruins, its economy decimated, millions dead, and a formal military occupation would be beginning. Many Japanese prefer not to think or write about this period of Japan’s history, but it forms a critical backdrop to understanding how Japan’s conception of its security would unfold in the following six decades. In particular, three legacies from this extended historical period remain with Japan today.

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First, Japan’s military was completely discredited by its loss in the war, its behavior after defeat, and later by the revelations of countless atrocities committed by the military in the emperor’s name. The distrust of the Japanese military would run deep, both within and outside of Japan. Although Japan’s military forces were formally disbanded by the Allied forces that would come to occupy Japan, the Japanese people themselves equally reviled their returning military and sought to hold accountable those responsible for what was popularly portrayed as Japan’s descent into the “Dark Valley” of its path to war.7 Conversely, and somewhat controversially, the occupation authorities did not hold the emperor himself (at the time the Showa Emperor, Hirohito) responsible for Japan’s conduct, though Japan’s military policies had been carried out in his name. It was not until after the death of the Showa emperor in 1989 that a degree of frank discussion of this issue began, and even still there are many taboos (and, of course, the fact that almost 50 years had passed greatly limited corroborating evidence—what hadn’t been immediately burned in the final days before surrender). Second, and more broadly, many Japanese came to view armed military conflict as folly, given mid-twentieth century technological capabilities and Japan’s vulnerable position as a resource-poor island nation. Japan’s physical destruction and great loss of life also created what many scholars and pundits have described as a “victim mentality” in postwar Japan, which often obscured for many Japanese the fact that other places in Asia had been decimated as well and Japan had acted as an aggressor. Third, Japan’s relations with other Asian states would face a huge—almost insurmountable—hurdle to return to friendly terms. The outbreak of the Cold War, cutting off relations with China and with North Korea—two of the countries that were most ravaged by the Imperial Army—would further exacerbate the challenge of reconciliation. Japan would face a heavy burden in repairing relations with states outside of the region as well, but the United States would ultimately champion Japan’s cause with many states outside of the region (in sharp contrast to the isolation from communist North Korea and China it imposed upon Japan). THE CONSTRAINED EVOLUTION OF JAPAN’S MILITARY FORCES DURING THE COLD WAR8

The limited role of the military in Japan’s postwar security policy thus not only is a direct result of the new postwar constitution, implemented in 1947, but of the broader legacies of the past: deep suspicion of the Japanese military (both by Japanese and non-Japanese), Japanese own concerns about the potential perils of “re-militarization” in “postwar” Japan, and attempts to provide a better diplomatic climate through a strategy of reassurance. The postwar “peace constitution” complemented nicely the policies to address each of these legacies, which provides one compelling set of reasons why this constitution has never been revised, despite the formal occupation of Japan having ended over a half-century ago.

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In Article Nine, the constitution seemingly unambiguously prohibits the maintenance of a military force. (See the reprint of this article in Appendix C.) How, then, could the Japanese government justify the creation of the JSDF in 1954, and the steady expansion in roles and capabilities of these forces in the postwar years? In short, it argued that even the constitution does not deny Japan the right of self-defense. In other words, to have the JSDF as an organization for self-defense is not the same as the “war potential” renounced in the constitution, therefore making the existence of the JSDF acceptable. This was a controversial interpretation both within and outside of Japan, one rejected by most legal scholars at the time but steadfastly asserted by the ruling conservatives.9 Two additional points of interpretation are critical to the postwar development of Japan’s quasi-military forces. First, the line between “self-defense” and “war potential” was tenuous in practice, not as easy as the rhetorical conception of “defensive” weapons being acceptable while “offensive” weapons not being so. The former was defined as the “minimum necessary to defend Japan,” while the latter was defined as what would result from surplus capacity.10 Conceptually, this definition offered clarity, but in practice it was often difficult to say for certain what was really necessary for pure defense, particularly later in the postwar period as technology and the capabilities of rival states improved. Second, since Japan also renounced “the use of force to settle international disputes” in Article Nine of the postwar constitution, it was argued that it was only permissible for Japan to defend itself, not other states. This analysis—still upheld today—becomes critical to postwar Japan because this interpretation allows Japan to possess only the right of individual self-defense, not collective self-defense.11 As a result, even the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was explained within this context— leading to a general avoidance of the term “alliance” (doumei) when describing the relationship until the 1980s, when the contours of postwar Japanese security had become codified over two generations. Moreover, the basis of the alliance was agreed to be fundamentally unequal in order to fulfill this proscription: U.S. troops were obliged to come to Japan’s defense if Japan were attacked, but Japanese troops were not obligated to come the United States’defense if U.S. forces were attacked, as this clearly would be an instance of exercising the right of collective self-defense beyond simply defending Japan. When Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama called for a more “equal” alliance with the United States, he seems to implicitly call into question this long-standing constitutional interpretation. However, it does not seem that Hatoyama actually seeks an expansion of the roles of the JSDF, a development that the United States would most likely welcome. As a result of constitutional constraints, as well as broader concerns on the part of the war-weary Japanese public, the JSDF initially was established as a “police reserve” in 1950 and when elevated to a formal “self defense force” in June 1954, still was not considered a “military.” Unlike a regular military, the JSDF did not have military law or a court martial. Its personnel did not have the status of

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soldiers or military officers: they were considered civil servants, like diplomats, police officers, and other government employees. Further, the JSDF was not organized with the prospect of overseas dispatches in mind. In fact, dispatch of the JSDF abroad was formally prohibited under a Diet resolution passed in the House of Councillors one week before the legislation authorizing the creation of the JSDF from the former National Safety Force was passed, though such Diet resolutions do not formally hold the force of law. All in all, the JSDF was regarded as an organization that existed for defending Japan from external aggression and helping the police to maintain public order, not as a professional military organization. Japan’s commitment to the principle of keeping the role of military power limited was institutionalized in the Cabinet-adopted 1957 Basic Policy for National Defense (Kokubo no Kihon Hoshin). (See Appendix C for a reproduction of this document.) This policy sets out that Japan’s defense capability should (1) support the United Nations, (2) stabilize public life and acquire defense capabilities that are necessary for self-defense, and (3) address acts of aggression by using the Japan-U.S. security system until the United Nations possesses the capacity to effectively intervene in such conflicts. Over time, additional limits were imposed by political leaders as Japan’s de facto military power grew. Under Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, Japan’s longest-serving prime minister (1964–1972), the so-called Three Non-Nuclear Principles (no possession, no production, no introduction of nuclear weapons) were declared at a Diet committee session in December 1967, and also partially legislated into several international agreements, such as Japan’s signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (which prohibits two of the three—no possession and no production) in February 1970 (though it was only ratified by the Diet in June 1976). Also in 1967, the Diet passed the Three Principles on Arms Export, institutionalizing long de facto limits on arms exports (and then later completely banned arms exports under Prime Minister Takeo Miki in 1976). Later under Sato’s tenure, in May 1969, the Diet passed a resolution calling for the use of outer space only for “peaceful purposes” (heiwa no mokuteki), which also subsequently was institutionalized into various pieces of legislation pertaining to Japan’s outer space development agencies. Further, in 1976 under Prime Minister Miki, the Cabinet declared that Japan’s defense spending would not exceed 1 percent of its GDP. Although in retrospect scholars have identified cases where these principles were partly abrogated—such as the secret agreement between the United States and Japan on some limited introduction of nuclear weapons via transiting ships in Okinawa that was revealed as the result of both an internal investigation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the one by the wiseman’s committee in March 2010,12 Japan’s export of “dual use” technology used in weapons, or the unusual calculation of defense spending which understates true spending by as much as 40 percent13—the spirit and general enforcement of these principles is

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notable, enough so that Prime Minister Sato won the Nobel Peace Prize for Japan’s commitment to a peaceful and non-nuclear world in 1974. Beyond the negative limits imposed on Japan’s postwar military policy, Japanese political leaders also developed a more positive vision of postwar Japanese security that transcended purely military concerns. In particular, the concept of “comprehensive security” (sogo anzen hosho) emerged as a notion to describe Japan’s security policy strategy during the Cold War. Comprehensive security can be defined as the principle that links national security in terms of defense from aggression with broader non-military goals, and sets policies in such a way that optimizes nonmilitary measures.14 In other words, it was the antithesis to the notion that military power—as the central element in a country’s national security policy—would enhance national security. Rather, according to the notion of comprehensive security, military power should play very little visible role in Japan’s national security policy during the Cold War. One aspect of this approach was for Japan to provide for its security through the pursuit of economic power, while relying largely on the Japan-U.S. alliance, supplemented with limited capabilities of the JSDF, to provide for military security. This three-part conceptualization of Japan’s security (an economic focus, reliance on the United States, and limited Japanese rearmament) is widely described as the “Yoshida Doctrine,” after two-time postwar prime minister, Shigeru Yoshida, and was seen as the essence of Japan’s postwar foreign policy. As argued by one noted Japan scholar, it was a “triumph of economic realism.”15 Through a strategy of export-driven trade policy and an industrial policy focused on nurturing advanced technology, Japan’s exports surged 114-fold (over 5,000%) from 1955 to 1987, a year that many see as the peak of Japanese economic power in the postwar period. 16 By 1991 the cumulative value of Japanese overseas investments reached $2 trillion.17 Moreover, Japan had not only become the world’s largest creditor but also the world’s largest foreign aid donor,18 and the second-largest financial contributor to the United Nations after the United States.19 Changes in the security policies of its key ally, the United States, forced Japan to adjust its security policies as Japan’s economic power rose (and, conversely, U.S. economic power entered a period of relative decline). In an important speech by President Richard Nixon on July 25, 1969, sometimes referred to as the Guam Declaration, Nixon declared that each U.S. ally should hold primary responsibility for its national defense and that a military alliance with the United States should be seen only as supplementary.20 The Basic Defense Capability Concept (kiban-teki boueiryoku kousou) emerged from Japan’s attempt to adjust to this change in U.S. global strategy. In essence, the Basic Concept was based on the idea that Japan’s defense capability should be at the level where it would not create a power vacuum in East Asia, yet restrained enough to be considered exclusively defense-oriented. The National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) (Bouei Keikaku no Taiko) that was adopted in 1976 was a reflection of the Basic Defense Capability Concept.

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While established without revising the aforementioned Basic Policy for National Defense (1957), the NDPO envisioned a further enhancement of the capabilities of the JSDF. The NDPO states, in part: “Japan has steadily improved its defense capability through the drafting and implementation of a series of four defense buildup plans. At this time, the present scale of defense capability seems to closely approach the target goals. . . . Based on the information given below, efforts will be made to qualitatively maintain and improve defense capability, and fulfill the purpose of that capability, in specific upgrading, maintenance and operation of defense functions.”21 Thus, the NDPO laid the groundwork for the JSDF to become one of the most advanced militaries in the world by the mid-1980s, with more than 200,000 personnel and numerous state-of-the-art weapons platforms. Despite such an evolution of its defense posture, however, the core of Japan’s Cold War security policy remained quite consistent: relying to a great extent on the United States for its military security while simultaneously seeking to insure Japan’s security through non-military means, primarily economic power and friendly diplomatic relations. In areas where the Japan Defense Agency ( JDA) or JSDF began to play a larger role over time, many of these roles were sheltered from the public eye by bureaucrats and the long-ruling LDP to the extent possible. Even when the hawkish Yasuhiro Nakasone, prime minister from 1982 through 1987, tried to stress the importance of Japan strengthening its autonomous defense capability, departing in small ways from Japan’s past security practices (such as once exceeding the 1% cap on defense spending as a percentage of GDP), Japan’s approach toward national security policy remained fundamentally unchanged in its emphasis on non-military elements and constraining the few military means that contributed to overall Japanese security.22 A MIXED RESPONSE TO POST-COLD WAR SHOCKS TO THE SECURITY STATUS QUO

The end of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union exerted a greater effect in Europe than in Asia, where communist China and North Korea continued to serve as areas of security concern. Still, the end of U.S.-USSR Cold War rivalry led to two immediate challenges for Japan. The first challenge was how to respond to a fear that the United States might not continue to maintain its significant force posture based in Japan after the Soviet threat diminished, perhaps leading to Japan being asked to play a greater role in its own defense along the lines of Nixon’s 1969 Guam Declaration. Japan’s response to this challenge is addressed in chapter four, which focuses on the evolution of the critical JapanU.S. alliance. The second challenge emerged when Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, shattering the then-growing belief that the “post-Cold War era” would be one of great peace, and leading to immediate demands (particularly by the United States)

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on Japan to play a role in the coordinated response of the global community commensurate with its economic power. Given the constraints on Japan’s SDF, and of its security apparatus more broadly, Japan found itself unable to immediately rise to these new expectations. Members of the then-ruling LDP did attempt to introduce legislation in the Diet to allow for the first-ever dispatch of the JSDF abroad, but it was withdrawn even before a vote was taken—the writing being on the wall that such a significant change to Japan’s long-standing security practices could not be rushed through. That the LDP had lost control of the House of Councillors in 1989 was one factor, but the broader reason was that public opinion was overwhelmingly opposed to a radical change to Japan’s security role globally. Instead, Japan reverted to its tried-and-true view of a broader notion of security, attempting to employ economic diplomacy as a response to the crisis: it ultimately offered over $13 billion to countries working to expel Iraq from Kuwait under UN resolution, while the Diet lumbered on regarding possible broader changes to Japan’s security policies that might allow the JSDF to be deployed abroad under limited circumstances in the future. Many in Japan came to consider Japan’s large economic contribution as underappreciated by the international community, including liberated Kuwait, which failed to include Japan on the list of countries it formally thanked in a resolution passed after its liberation, and by the United States as well. A belated dispatch of a few Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) vessels to help with mine-sweeping in the waters around Kuwait after combat operations ended in 1991—a significant development in the context of Japan’s long-standing security practices—did not quell growing criticism of Japan; nor did the enactment of the United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) Cooperation Law in June 1992 that resulted in the first overseas deployment of the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) for a UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia, where the GSDF focused largely on road repair, water purification, and the provision of medical services. The 1990s continued to wrack Japan with a dizzying array of security shocks. The first stage of what would become the extended North Korea nuclear crisis in 1993, an underground nuclear test by China in 1995 (the first after a long pause), a sarin gas attack on a Tokyo subway in 1995, the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, a Taepodong missile overflight from North Korea in 1998, and the incursion by “unidentified ships” from North Korea in 1999 all underscored the uncertain world Japan faced in the post-Cold War era. These shocks made Japanese—elite and general populace alike—aware of the inadequacy of their government’s capacity to address such security challenges, resulting in renewed efforts to re-conceptualize and re-cast Japan’s security policies for a new era, including its military capabilities and posture.23 More broadly, these factors had a broader effect on the political discourse over security policy that emphasized the goal of raising Japan’s profile in international security affairs by making a “visible” (menimieru) contribution. As usefully framed by one noted Japan expert, the debate became about how Japan

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could depart from its Cold War practice of “passive pacifism” and move toward what may be described as “reluctant realism.”24 Japan’s extreme hesitance to play a greater military role in the world was evident in the debate that eventually led to the enactment of the 1992 UNPKO Cooperation Law. When this law was finally enacted, it included the so-called PKO Five Principles. According to these principles, the JSDF could only participate in an overseas PKO if: (1) a ceasefire agreement was in place, (2) there was unanimous consent to the deployment of the PKO forces (and Japan’s participation therein) by all the parties, (3) there was impartiality for the PKO forces, (4) Japan had the right to withdraw if the conditions on the ground changed, and (5) the JSDF use of weapons was highly limited.25 These principles essentially prevented a timely and effective JSDF deployment for UNPKO, as demonstrated by the difficulties in dispatching the JSDF to East Timor. In particular, the extensive restrictions on the use of weapons placed the JSDF in the awkward position of not being allowed to use their weapons to protect other countries’ PKO forces that were under attack. Furthermore, the government ban on JSDF participation in “core” PKO missions (hontai gyomu)—including cease-fire monitoring and patrolling, transport inspection, disposal of weapons, and assistance for the exchange of prisoners—severely limited the scope of activities to which the JSDF could be deployed. Some restrictions were finally lifted in 2001, allowing a JSDF dispatch to East Timor, but Japanese limitations on the use of weapons still exceeded those of UN forces overall (and continue to do so to this day). The Japanese government’s decision to revise the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in 1995 for the first time since the adoption of the original NDPO in 1976 was one of the first concrete outcomes of the broader political debates about Japan’s post-Cold War security role, beyond the 1992 JSDF overseas dispatch legislation. The 1995 NDPO marked a clear departure from the original NDPO as it included a “contribution to a more stable international environment” among the goals for Japanese security policy, indicating that the JSDF would be used for international peacekeeping operations and other overseas humanitarian relief activities.26 The 1995 NDPO also continued the longstanding linkage of Japan’s efforts to enhance its own security through strengthening its alliance with the United States. This would be followed soon after by a revision to the JapanU.S. Guidelines for defense cooperation in 1997, which also had not been changed since they originally were crafted in the 1970s. (See Appendix C for selections from this key document.) Through this process, the roles Japan would play within the framework of the Japan-U.S. alliance in case of contingencies outside of Japanese territory were clarified (to a degree) and expanded (both functionally and by introducing some uncertainty as to which particular areas outside of Japanese territory the JSDF would operate). Still, while Japan tried to strengthen its position within the Japan-U.S. alliance and looked to expand the role of the JSDF overseas, it continued to define security

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in non-military terms. For instance, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama (1994– 1996), spoke about his vision for a Japan “that is kind to people” and suggested that Japan should devote greater efforts to addressing such issues as poverty, hunger, population, the environment, and HIV/AIDS in order to play “an appropriate” (oubun no) role, to create peace as a “peaceful nation” (heiwa kokka).27 His successor, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto (1996–1998), advocated a strong JapanU.S. alliance, but also spoke of Japan’s need to boost its “Eurasian diplomacy” and to become a supporter of sustainable development.28 Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi (1998–2000) framed Japan’s post-Cold War diplomacy in the context of “five bridges”—bridges to the world, prosperity, sense of peace (anshin), safety, and the future—and also stressed that Japan should make “an appropriate” contribution to the world.29 With Obuchi’s leadership, Japan also established “human security” (ningen no anzen hosho) as one of the pillars of Japan’s foreign policy, leading international efforts to establish the Human Security Fund of the United Nations in 1999.30 These efforts by Japanese leaders throughout the 1990s illustrate Japan’s inclination to view national security more broadly than simply military security. Nevertheless, the tensions in East Asia and the public’s concerns regarding the government’s capacity for crisis management writ large forced the government to focus more on national security in conventional military terms. Japan’s reluctance to expand the role of the JSDF was also apparent in the debate over revision of the Japan-U.S. Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. The issue of Japan’s self-imposed ban on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense in particular came to the forefront of this debate. As early as 1959 the Japanese government had argued that Article Nine of the constitution prohibited Japan from engaging in activities that were so closely related to the use of force by other countries that they could be considered to be an integral part of using military force. Japanese legislators who had reservations about Japan’s more recent deepening defense cooperation with the United States argued that if the JSDF were to provide logistical support for U.S. forces in a situation in the area surrounding Japan, such support could be considered as integrated with the use of force.31 When the Diet deliberated the legislation that would enable the Japanese government to fulfill its responsibilities under the new Guidelines for Defense Cooperation in the case of so-called shuhen jitai (situation in the areas surrounding Japan, or regional contingencies), the legal definition of the geographical area that was covered under this concept became an intense focus of debate.32 By contrast, greater strategic issues such as Japan’s proper role in a post-Cold War security environment or Japan’s appropriate role as an ally of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region were not significantly addressed in the debate. In short, following the end of the Cold War, Japan found itself asked to contribute more to global security affairs both to maintain its solid alliance with the United States and also to earn respect from the international community more broadly. However, Japan’s strong disinclination to participate in military activities

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overseas prohibited it from revising its security policy priorities in a more robust and comprehensive way. CONTINUED TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SECURITY SHOCKS AND JAPAN’S WAVERING RESPONSE

In the twenty-first century, Japan faces both a global and regional security environment that looks more uncertain than ever. Its response to new security challenges continues to be characterized by a great reluctance to pursue dramatic change, and an increasingly evident split in Japanese society about the appropriate path forward. Shortly after North Korea unexpectedly launched the 1998 Taepodong over Japanese territory, a suspected North Korean spy ship was detected off the Noto Peninsula in the Sea of Japan in March 1999, followed by another “suspicious ship” incursion into Japanese waters in southern Japan in 2001. Japan’s threat perception also was aggravated by the September 2002 North Korean revelation of its previous abductions of Japanese citizens from Japanese territory years earlier (the greatly hyped, “abduction incidents,” or rachi jiken), and Pyongyang’s behavior around its suspected nuclear programs (including two nuclear weapons tests, in 2006 and 2009). A Chinese nuclear submarine entering Japanese waters in November 2004, anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in August 2004 (after a Japan–China soccer match) and in April 2005 (in response to numerous emotional issues related to past history and territorial disputes), as well as trade tensions and continuing barbs over each nation’s treatment of past history added to the growing sense of threat. Apart from such discrete events, China’s steady economic and military rise continues to concern Japanese security planners as well as the general public, and is now noted with rising concern in Japanese defense white papers. China’s total defense spending since the end of the Cold War has more than tripled, while Japan’s has risen only modestly. Beyond an increased sense of threat from its neighbors (the topic of chapter five of this volume), Japan has sought to contribute to the global fight against international terrorism, particularly after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, and subsequent terrorist attacks elsewhere around the globe. Security shocks to Japan in this area included the fatal shooting of two Japanese diplomats in Iraq (2003), and the kidnapping of three Japanese aid workers and, later, two Japanese journalists (2004). Fortunately and importantly, the JSDF was sent to the Middle East in its first overseas deployment to an area of active conflict (2004–2006), but suffered no combat-related deaths. These post-1999 developments in the global and regional security environments prompted Japan to further revise its security and defense policy priorities, most notably, regarding new policies regarding the dispatch of the JSDF abroad. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006) instinctively understood the potential impact on the Japan-U.S. alliance in the event of his government’s

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inaction in the wake of such a significant threat to Japan’s close alliance partner as the September 11 attacks on the United States.33 Following the 2001 attacks, Koizumi announced within ten days Japan’s seven-point plan for assistance to the United States.34 The plan included a JSDF dispatch to support the military operations that would be led by the United States (though, as usual, in a non-combat role). Since there was no precedent for the JSDF to participate in a multinational military operation that had no explicit UN mandate, the Japanese government enacted the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law on November 2, 2001, paving the way for the first dispatch of the JSDF to an area of active combat—and outside of the mandate of an international organization such as the United Nations—in its history that same month, by way of MSDF vessels deployed to the Indian Ocean to provide rear area support first to U.S. and then to other coalition vessels. Also that same month the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) began transport operations in support of anti-terrorism efforts between U.S. bases in Japan for the first time. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was a significant legislative development for Japan’s national security policy. First and foremost, it established an important precedent for the legal approach to enable JSDF participation in non–UN-mandated multinational operations in the future. Without the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, it is questionable whether Japan would have been able to enact the subsequent 2003 Iraq Reconstruction Special Measures Law (which led to the dispatch of the GSDF to Iraq from 2004–2006) or the 2008 New Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. Furthermore, it demonstrated that enacting a special measures law can serve as a useful legislative compromise when the government urgently needs to make a certain national security policy decision on issues that are politically too controversial to get consensus among legislators: a time limit attached to the law makes it is easier to draw a compromise out of the opposition. In such a changed domestic policy and international security environment, the government once again initiated important domestic processes to reassess the changes in the international security situation in the post-9/11 era and to revise the guiding direction of Japanese security policy priorities overall. The process began with deliberations conducted by a task force called the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities (more commonly known in the United States as the Araki Commission) in 2004. The Commission included former senior defense officials, retired senior JSDF officers, business leaders, and scholars who were influential in security debates in Japan. After several month-long deliberations, the Council submitted its report, Japan’s Visions for Future Security and Defense Capability (a.k.a., the Araki Report), to Prime Minister Koizumi in October 2004. The Araki Report had several elements that distinguished it from preceding task force reports of this kind, including the 1994 Higuchi Report. For one, it clearly articulated the goal of Japanese national security policy for the first time. The report identified the defense of Japan and prevention of threats in the international

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security environment as the two goals that Japan’s national security policy should pursue. The report further suggested that Japan should create a multi-layered security policy by flexibly combining three approaches: (1) developing Japan’s own defense build-up plans; (2) cooperating with its ally, the United States; and, (3) cooperating with the broader international community in its efforts to achieve these goals. The report also stood out as the clearest statement to date on how Japan seeks to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance while cooperating with the international community (including the United Nations) in a complementary manner. It is worthwhile to note that while the task force’s deliberations did not go beyond the current constitutional framework, the report was more forthcoming in suggesting that Japan might be at a crossroads where the restrictions in Japan’s broader military power should be revisited. In addition to stressing Japan’s need to build up a “multi-faceted and flexible defense capability,” the report, for instance, suggested the potential need for revising Japan’s long-held principles on arms exports.35 The 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), a second revision to the original NDPO adopted in 1978 and first revised in 1996,36 incorporated some of the basic ideas that were put forward in the Araki Report. For example, they called attention to “new threats and various situations” (i.e., terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) as Japan’s greatest security challenge in the post-9/11 security environment.37 What is particularly notable was the degree of importance attached to JSDF participation in international operations. Compared with the 1995 NDPO, in which JSDF engagement in international activities was of secondary importance, the 2004 NDPG addressed it as a mission with equal significance to the defense of the homeland and maintenance of a strong JapanU.S. alliance. The importance of inter-agency coordination and cooperation with nongovernmental organizations was also noted for the first time. As for defense capabilities, the 2004 NDPG called for Japan to have “a responsive, mobile, flexible, and multi-purpose” capability that is supported by “high technological and intelligence capabilities.”38 To achieve these goals, the 2004 NDPG dictated that Japan should have defense capabilities that not only respond to ballistic missile threats but also other security threats, including guerrilla attacks, the takeover of outlying Japanese islands, incursion attempts, and large-scale disasters.It strongly argued that Japan should revise its force structure in a fundamental manner. It proposed that rather than maintaining a force that is meant to counter aggression by foreign states using conventional weapons, Japan should have a “multifunctional, flexible and effective force that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities measuring up to the military-technological level of other major countries” that can be useful in countering conventional (e.g., missile attacks against Japan or large-scale invasion) as well as non-conventional (e.g., terrorist or guerilla attacks) security threats.

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Japan also launched a parallel effort to strengthen its alliance relationship with the United States. When the alliance went through a period of redefinition and reaffirmation in the mid-1990s, bilateral efforts had focused on finding a new meaning. With the alliance’s role redefined as the stabilizer of the Asia-Pacific region, the two governments took another step to both expand the scope of and to deepen the alliance, with an eye to growing it into a global partnership. The three documents issued by the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) between February 2005 and May 2006 laid out the vision and concrete steps for the two countries to move toward that goal.39 Taken together, these policy developments all seemed to point to a Japan reconsidering its key principles based on its national security policy during the Cold War. That is, Japan appeared willing to allow greater space and profile for military power as a major element of its national security policy. This certainly did not mean that Japan would pursue an autonomous assertive military capability. But it seemed to mean, at minimum, that Japan was more willing to put forward the JSDF as one of the major faces of its national security policy, utilizing it more robustly in the context of national defense, its alliance with the United States, and international efforts to respond to global transnational security threats. Developments in the post-Koizumi era have called into question the resolve and the potential to enact such significant change to Japan’s military security policies, however. The three subsequent LDP prime ministers to follow Koizumi each resigned their terms after only a year, in part due to frustration from not being able to realize their political agendas, including in the area of national security. In addition, there were significant differences in the tone, the policy proposals, and the resolve that each of these three prime ministers—Shinzo Abe (2006–2007), Yasuo Fukuda (2007–2008), and Taro Aso (2008–2009)—displayed on national security issues, despite all being from the same conservative political party. The rise to power of the formerly opposition DPJ and its prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, further underscores that a counter-narrative can be drawn to show a possible backlash to the otherwise forward-looking progression of Japan’s military policies under Prime Minister Koizumi. These recent developments will be considered further in the concluding chapter to this volume. INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION AND INNOVATION IN RESPONSE TO A NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT40

Until recently, there was very little change in the strategic and policymaking aspects of Japan’s national security establishment. For most of the postwar years, it had been hoped that the civilian institutions responsible for Japan’s national security—the Internal Bureau of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Cabinet Office in charge of national security and crisis management—would work together to form Japanese national security

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strategy, set priorities for its security and defense policies, manage Japan’s external security relations (including the alliance with the United States) and allocate necessary resources for the JSDF. The JSDF had been expected to shape a defense strategy that supported the goals identified in the national security strategy and come up with a force build-up plan that was consistent with these policy goals. In reality, however, for most of Japan’s post-World War II history, Japan’s national security establishment worked quite differently from these expectations. MOFA—the North American Affairs Bureau, in particular—played the primary role in shaping Japanese security policy, and was the primary counterpart to the United States in managing the Japan-U.S. alliance because the focus of Japanese postwar security policy was anchored in maintaining the alliance relationship with the United States. The Cabinet Office in charge of national security and crisis management, which would have been an ideal and logical office to take charge in shaping Japan’s national security priority, historically played a mere coordinating role in the process of security policymaking in Japan. Since its first establishment in 1986 with the name of Cabinet National Security Affairs (naikaku anzen hosho shitsu) under the Nakasone cabinet, the office was filled with seconded officials from the NPA, MOFA, and JDA, and intense inter-agency rivalry among them forced the Cabinet Office to play a mere coordinating role among these three powerful institutions. Due to MOFA’s predominant role in security policy and NPA’s leading role on the issues related to Japan’s internal security, the role of the JDA was limited to (1) ensuring that the JSDF was prepared to repel limitedscale invasion attempts by foreign countries, (2) addressing the grievances expressed by the local communities that host the JSDF and U.S. forces, and (3) keeping a “lid” on the activities by the JSDF under the name of “maintaining civilian control.” The JSDF, as the military component of Japan’s national security establishment, would have been expected to give “teeth” to Japanese defense policy in support of Japan’s national security policy goals, but its activities were long restricted to within Japanese borders under the principle of maintaining an exclusive self-defense oriented defense posture derived from the prohibition of the use of force “as a means to settle international disputes” enshrined in the constitution. Therefore, it built up its forces based on the notion that Japan would only have a basic defense capability that would demonstrate just enough deterrent capability so as not to make the area around Japan into a power vacuum, the aforementioned Basic Defense Capability Concept (Kiban-teki Bouei-ryoku Kousou). Since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s national security establishment has undergone a great deal of change. The pace of change seems to have accelerated in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, and continues in terms of institutional evolution even under DPJ rule. Drivers of change include shifting domestic political forces, new demands and challenges from important international actors such as the United States and China, and,

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more broadly, a changed international environment posing new threats—issues outlined briefly earlier and in greater detail in the following chapters of this volume. At the policy level, Japan has twice revised National Defense Program Outline/Guidelines in 1995 and 2004, and another revision is expected to be completed by December 2010. In addition, the Japanese government has actively considered revision of some of its long-held principles in Japanese security policy, including Article Nine of the postwar constitution (in particular Japan’s self-imposed ban on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense), the Basic Principles of National Defense (kokubo no kihon honshin), the Basic Defense Capability Concept, the three principles on arms exports, the three non-nuclear principles, and the peaceful use of outer space policy. Not all of these considerations have resulted in actual policy change, however—and indeed in some areas a trend seems to have emerged in the opposite direction, particularly after the DPJ’s rise to power in August 2009, but to some extent apparent as well under postKoizumi LDP rule. In some areas already there has been noticeable change (e.g., relaxation of arms export restrictions to allow for missile defense coproduction and a new outer space law), while in other areas there has been notable pushback from the DPJ government (e.g., the non-nuclear policies and the fact that constitutional revision no longer is on the political agenda). Institutional frameworks and practices within both civilian and military components of Japan’s national security establishment also have been reorganized and reoriented, but as with policy change, the direction and implications of institutional change are unclear. On the civilian side, MOFA has undergone several reorganization efforts in the past decade to allow a more integrated policymaking process within the ministry, in particular as part of broader governmentwide administrative reform implemented in 2001. As noted previously, the North American Bureau historically has been the key player in shaping Japanese security policy by managing Japan’s alliance relationship with the United States. A weak point of this practice, however, has been that the views on security policy issues presented by MOFA often are not part of a unified MOFA position. For instance, while the North American Affairs Bureau tends to take relatively more forwardleaning positions on the issue in Japanese security policy, other bureaus within MOFA, such as the Treaties Bureau and the Asian Affairs Bureau, often take a more cautious position. Disagreements among the major bureaus often delay the policy- and decision-making process within MOFA, which historically has placed the Japanese government in the mode of constantly reacting to external events rather than proactively putting Japan’s own agenda forward.41 The JDA, now Ministry of Defense (MOD), also has begun to play a greater role in shaping Japanese security and defense policies, including the management of the Japan-U.S. alliance. The trend is evident when the JDA’s role in the first round of efforts to redefine the Japan-U.S. alliance in the mid-1990s is compared to that during the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), which took place from

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December 2002 to May 2006. While MOFA played a predominant role in the negotiation with the United States in the former, it was clear in the case of the DPRI that the JDA took the lead in the negotiation. The elevation of the JDA’s profile within Japan’s national security establishment is intimately linked with Japan’s deepening alliance with the United States and the JSDF’s increasing role in ensuring both Japan’s internal and external security. In the context of the Japan-U.S. alliance, the JDA’s voices began to be heard more loudly as the nature of the alliance consultation between Tokyo and Washington evolved into a discussion that focuses on how U.S. forces and the JSDF can operate together more effectively in the defense of Japan, regional contingencies, and multinational activities beyond “the Far East.” In response to increasing pressure from the international community for Japan to dispatch the JSDF to participate in various multinational operations, the JDA, as a supervisory institution of the JSDF, began to have greater input in the deliberation of whether Japan should dispatch the JSDF for certain overseas missions. A series of corruption charges in acquisition and procurement offices also prompted the JDA to implement an extensive reorganization in the summer of 2005. Further reorganization was implemented when the JDA formally became a cabinet ministry and assumed the name of the Ministry of Defense in January 2007, which included the consolidation of acquisition and procurement offices. JDA’s elevation to the MOD, thereby achieving a bureaucratic status on par with MOFA (its arch-rival in the bureaucratic security policymaking process) has begun to affect inter-agency dynamics, fueling further rivalry between the MOD and MOFA in some areas, but also leading to a more holistic security policy in other areas. The JSDF has also begun an earnest effort to transform itself to better adapt to the changes both in the security environment and the mission that they are now expected to fulfill. The JDA’s decision to transition the JSDF into a joint operational system was one of the highlights of these efforts. With this decision, the Joint Staff Council—which had functioned merely as the coordinator among the Air, Ground, and Maritime Staff Offices with no real authority—was replaced with the Joint Staff Office. The Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff now holds authority to make decisions on all issues related to JSDF operations. Developments in the global and regional security environments have also compelled Japan to take measures to further enhance Tokyo’s alliance relationship with the United States even beyond a first round of “deepening” that took place in the 1990s, as Japanese officials came to believe that the only way for Japan to ensure its own security in the post-Cold War security environment was to maintain a solid alliance relationship with the United States, its only treaty ally and the only country committed to defend Japan if it comes under an armed attack. In addition, Japan also sought out new multilateral security arrangements to supplement the Japan-U.S. security alliance. Such developments are considered further in chapters four and five.

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CONCLUSION

In the 20 years since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s national security institutions and its basic defense policies have evolved substantially. While these developments remain intriguing, they are still within the realm of the incremental changes that have been taking place since the 1950s when the JSDF was first established. Still, the efforts in the past two decades have resulted in a substantive change in Japan’s national security establishment. Will it result in changes in the way security matters are conceptualized, debated, and handled in the Japanese political system more broadly? The following chapters will examine four areas of dynamic change in Japan’s national security establishment: (1) the reform of Japan’s civilian national security institutions; (2) the enhanced capabilities of Japan’s uniformed services, including the actual dispatch of the JSDF abroad; (3) Japan’s alliance relationship with the United States, and the broader effect of the United States on Japan’s national security policies; and, (4) Japan’s view of and role in its regional security environment. The conclusion of this volume will focus in particular on the politics of national security in Japan, from the vibrant debates over whether to re-create military forces at all after the military occupation of Japan ended in 1952, to the new situation Japan finds itself in today, soon after the major opposition party has come to power for the first time as the winner of a national election. While electoral politics will continue to influence Japan’s future security choices, one thing is certain: the era of conservative LDP dominance of policymaking related to national security is over, at least for the medium term, opening the possibility of a different political course. Japanese leaders and the public alike— not to mention Japan’s close alliance partner, the United States, and other international actors—must come to terms with this new political reality. The coming years may mark a period of substantial change to Japan’s military security policies, or a period of retrenchment and a return to many tried-and-true practices that typified what many see as Japan’s successful postwar strategy. Either way, understanding the postwar—and especially very recent—development of Japan’s national security policies and institutions laid out in the following chapters offers a critical baseline from which to judge the future direction of Japan’s national security policies. NOTES 1. This paragraph has been adapted from Andrew L. Oros, “Japan’s Security Future” in Routledge Handbook of Asian Security, eds. Ganguly, Scobell, & Liow (New York: Routledge, 2010). 2. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Military Balance 2009, www.sipri.org (accessed January 5, 2010).

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3. Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009), 37–40. 4. The defense budget declined from the previous fiscal year since 2002—from a 10-year high of ¥4,939.5 billion in 2002 to ¥4,702.8 billion in 2009, a nearly 5% decline over that period (data from MOD, Nihon on Bouei Heisei 21 [Defense of Japan 2009], 344). 5. In Japanese, see, for example, Yoshihide Soeya, Japan’s ‘Middle Power’ Diplomacy: Choice and Framework of Postwar Japan (author translation), 2005. Ironically, the book that coined the phrase “normal nation” (futsu no kuni, in Japanese) proposes an international role for Japan much more in line with the civilian power school than the great military power school with which the term presently is associated. See, Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation, trans. Louisa Rubinfien (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994). 6. This and the remaining paragraphs of this section have been adapted and expanded from Andrew Oros and Yuki Tatsumi, “Japan’s Evolving Defense Establishment,” in Japan’s New Defense Establishment, eds. Yuki Tatsumi and Andrew L. Oros (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2007). 7. John Dower’s Pulitzer prize-winning, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), provides an engaging overview of this fascinating period of Japan’s postwar history, including recounting the devastating scale of Japan’s defeat in terms of loss of life, property, and ideology. 8. A more detailed exposition on the evolution of Japan’s postwar security policy, upon which this and the following two sections draws, is provided in Yuki Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2008), chapter one. 9. Government of Japan Statement in response to the question submitted by Kiyoshi Mori, Member, House of Representatives. December 5, 1980. Published in Asagumo Shimbun-sha. Heisei 17-nen Bouei Handbook [Handbook for Defense 2005], p. 593. 10. Material submitted by the Government of Japan in response to the question submitted by Yanosuke Narasaki, Member, House of Representatives, October 14, 1980. Published in Asagumo Shimbun-sha. Heisei 17-nen Bouei Handbook [Handbook for Defense 2005], p. 613. 11. Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2008 (Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2008) provides a short official overview of the current Japanese government position on this important issue (p. 109). Also see Appendix C for a reprint of the paragraph related to collective self-defense. 12. The text of the MOFA international investigative report can be seen at http:// www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyaku/pdfs/hokoku_naibu.pdf. The text of the wisemen’s committee’s investigative report can be seen at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/ mitsuyaku/pdfs/hokoku_yushiki.pdf. 13. Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitariziation (New York: Routledge, 2009), 39. 14. Shinkichi Eto and Yoshinobu Yamamoto, Sogo Ampo to Mirai no Sentaku [Comprehensive security and the choices for the future] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1991), 67. Also see Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2004), 125. 15. Kenneth Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 256. 16. Kenneth Pyle, Japan Rising, 257. 17. Edward J. Lincoln, Japan’s New Global Role (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993), 62 (as cited in Pyle, Japan Rising, 257).

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Global Security Watch—Japan 18. Pyle, Japan Rising, 258. 19. MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook 1990, section 4.1.5c http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/ other/bluebook/1990/1990-2-4.htm (date accessed, May 20, 2010). 20. Eto and Yamamoto, Sogo Ampo to Mirai no Sentaku, 159–60. 21. The complete text is available on “The World and Japan” Database Project. Tokyo: Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/ documents/texts/docs/19761029.O1E.html. 22. For a comprehensive review of Japan’s security policy under Prime Minister Nakasone, see Nathaniel B. Thayer, “Japanese Foreign Policy in the Nakasone Years,” in Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change, ed. Gerald L. Curtis (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), 90–104. 23. For a deeper examination of the different ways that political actors sought to reconceptualize Japan’s post-Cold War security policies, and challenges Japan has faced (both international and domestic) in the immediate post-Cold War period, see Andrew L. Oros, “Reaffirming Core Principles in a ‘Lost Decade,’ 1989–98,” in Normalizing Japan,(Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2008), 71–89. 24. Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 3. 25. Akihiko Tanaka, Anzen Hosho [National security] (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun-sha, 1997), 319. 26. National Defense Program Outline (adopted by the Cabinet on November 28, 1995), reproduced in Defense of Japan 2008 (Tokyo: Inter Group Corporation, 2003), 406–13. 27. Tomiichi Murayama, Nento shokan: Souzou to Tasahisa no Kunidukuri no Vision [New year’s message: A vision for creative and compassionate ation-building], Prime Minister’s Office, January 1, 1995, (www.kantei.go.jp), among other speeches where he developed these themes (also available from www.kantei.go.jp) 28. Ryutaro Hashimoto, Dai Hyaku Yonju-ni Kai Kokkai ni okeru Shisei Honshin Enzetsu [Policy speech to the 142nd diet session], February 16, 1997, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/ hasimotosouri/speech/1998/0216sisei.html (accessed February 1, 2010). 29. Keizo Obuchi, Dai Hyaku Yonju-go Kai Kokkai ni okeru Shisei Honshin Enzetsu [Policy speech to the 145th ciet session], January 19, 2000, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/obutisouri/ speech/1999/0119sisei.html (accessed January 28, 2010). 30. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ningen no Anzen Hosho Kikin [Human security fund], 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/pr/pub/pamph/pdfs/t_fund21.pdf (accessed December 10, 2009). 31. Statement by Shuzo Hayashi (Director, Cabinet Legislative Bureau) in response to a question posed by the Honorable Kazuo Shii at the Special Legislative Committee on the Japan-United States Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, House of Representatives, 145th Session, March 26, 1999. Cited in Kokkai Shingi kara Bouei-ron wo Yomitoku [Understanding national diet defense debate through diet deliberations], eds. Tetsuo Maeda and Shigeaki Ijima (Tokyo: Sanseido, 2003), 203–4. 32. Statement by Masahiko Koumura (Minister of Foreign Affairs) in response to the Honorable Hideyo Fudesaka at the Special Legislative Committee on the Japan-United States Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, House of Councillors, 145th Session, May 10, 1999. Cited in Kokkai Shingi kara Bouse-ron wo Yomitoku [Understanding national diet defense debate through diet deliberations], eds. Testuo Maeda and Shigeaki Ijima (Tokyo: Sanseido, 2003), 199–200.

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33. This and the following paragraph summarize material first presented in Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure, chapter five. 34. Press conference with Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, September 19, 2001, http:// www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2001/0919sourikaiken.html (accessed December 15, 2009). 35. Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, Japan’s Vision for Future Security and Defense Capability (Tokyo: October 2004), 4–11. 36. Note that the terminology for this plan has changed from “Outline” to “Guideline,” though the basic function of the planning remains the same. Moreover, this should not be confused with the Japan-United States Defense Guidelines, first passed in 1978 and later revised in 1997, as noted previously and further discussed in chapter four. 37. Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, Japan’s Vision for Future Security and Defense Capability (Tokyo: October 2004), 4–11. 38. Ministry of Defense, National Defense Program Guideline for FY 2005 and After, December 10, 2004, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/pdf/national_guideline.pdf (accessed January 5, 2010). 39. Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2008 (Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2008) provides the complete text of these agreements (pp. 457–71). Also see Appendix C, Document 10 for a reprint of the joint statement released after the May 2006 meeting. All of these documents also are available on the Web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: www.mofa.go.jp 40. This section has been adapted from Oros and Tatsumi, “Japan’s Evolving Defense Establishment.” 41. Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 35–75.

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CHAPTER

2

Civilian Institutions for the Defense of Japan

Across all advanced industrial democracies, including Japan, civilian institutions define a strategy based on broad national goals and interests, and set the policy priorities for a country’s national security-related institutions. Civilian institutions also oversee the uniformed institutions to ensure that the roles assigned to them are properly implemented. In all democratic systems, the relationship between civilian and military institutions is complex and often contentious. In the case of Japan in particular, the relationship is further complicated by the wariness toward uniformed organizations (particularly the JSDF) that still prevails today. Such wariness has its roots in the years immediately after the end of World War II. Japan had not planned to arm itself in the immediate postwar years, following strictly the edict of its so-called Peace Constitution; it was only upon urging from the United States that Japan began to re-establish its national defense organizations. As Japanese leaders reconstructed Japan’s national defense institutions, they made sure that the uniformed institutions (particularly the military) played very little role in the national security policymaking process. In other words, uniformed institutions were given the role of mere executors or enforcers of the policy determined by the civilian leaders.1 An examination of the institutional component of Japan’s national security infrastructure, therefore, has to start with civilian institutions. This chapter examines how each of the “civilian” institutions in Japan’s national security policy infrastructure is organized, with particular attention to key offices in Japan’s national security policymaking in each institution. The chapter ends with an examination of potential challenges to improving the existing institutional arrangements focusing on two issues: interagency coordination and proposals to create a Japanese-style National Security Council.

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OVERVIEW OF EACH INSTITUTION

Four main civilian institutions form the infrastructure for Japan’s national security policymaking: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Defense, and the Cabinet Secretariat. This section provides a brief overview of each institution, and identifies the specific bureaus/divisions within each institution that play a role in Japan’s national security policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Traditional Steward of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is one of Japan’s oldest ministries, dating to Japan’s original cabinet of nine ministries in 1885. Presently, its mandates, as defined in the MOFA Establishment Law, are to: (1) contribute to the maintenance of a peaceful and secure international community; (2) help create an atmosphere that is conducive to a positive international environment through proactive efforts; and, (3) attempt to promote the Japanese national interest, as well as that of its people.2 The law further grants MOFA the jurisdiction to manage issues of national security policy, which has allowed the ministry to maintain the statutory primary jurisdiction over national security policy to the present.3 Indeed, for much of Japan’s postwar history, MOFA, rather than the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), played the dominant role in shaping Japan’s security policy. Recently MOFA has faced a challenge for primacy in handling Japanese security matters from the newly established Ministry of Defense (MOD), which was renamed from the Japan Defense Agency in 2007. This fairly recent development is considered later in this chapter. MOFA still plays a sizable role in Japan’s security policymaking, however. The ministry is organized into five regional affairs bureaus and four functional bureaus. Among them, three bureaus are most engaged in Japan’s national security policymaking. The first is the Foreign Policy Bureau (Sogo Gaiko Seisaku Kyoku). Within this bureau, the National Security Policy Division is most important, as it engages in interagency discussions that deeply involve Japan’s national security policy interests. While the role played by the Foreign Policy Bureau within MOFA has been steadily expanding, the North American Affairs Bureau (Hokubei Kyoku) continues to play an important role in alliance management with the United States. In particular, two divisions in the North American Affairs Bureau need to be highlighted: the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division has historically led the Japanese government’s negotiation with the United States on alliance issues, and the Status of U.S. Forces Agreement (SOFA) Division has served as a point of contact with the U.S. Departments of State and Defense as well as U.S. forces in Japan when incidents arise concerning U.S. military personnel and their families in Japan. For instance, whenever U.S. service members commit a crime in Japan, the SOFA

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Division is responsible for coordinating the bilateral efforts to respond to the situation, including facilitating communication between Japanese law enforcement and U.S. military police. Finally, while maintaining a low profile, the International Legal Affairs Bureau (Kokusai-ho Kyoku), in particular its Treaties Division, is also a critical institution to Japan’s security because of its responsibility to ensure that international legal agreements that the Japanese government signs do not contradict Japan’s domestic laws and, importantly, its peace-leaning constitution. The important role that the bureau played in the deliberation of national security policy within the Japanese government is demonstrated most vividly when Japanese lawmakers debate Japan’s security policy. For example, when the Japanese Diet deliberated on Japan’s contribution to the 1990–1991 Gulf War, it was the senior officials from the Treaty Bureau who were at the frontline of answering the questions from Japanese legislators. During the Cold War, Japan’s national security policy was by and large about maintaining its alliance with the United States. Because of Japan’s exclusive focus on self-defense in its national security policy, even Japan’s policy toward the Japan-U.S. alliance revolved around questions such as, “What area does ‘Far East’ in Article Six of the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty cover?,” “If Japan supports a U.S. military operation in East Asia, does that constitute the prohibition of the exercise of the right of collective self-defense?,” and so on. Therefore, the context in which Japan’s national security policy was discussed during the Cold War was more legalistic than strategic or policy-driven. Also, the discussion took place almost exclusively in the context of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Therefore, it was reasonable that the North American Affairs Bureau played a leading role in MOFA’s efforts in national security policy. Such dynamics began to change with the establishment of the Foreign Policy Bureau (Sogo Gaiko Seisaku Kyoku) in 1993. Since then, whenever MOFA discussed reorganization to enhance its policymaking capability, the enhancement of the Foreign Policy Bureau was included in the recommendations that followed such a discussion. The reorganization which took effect on August 1, 2004, deserves particular attention, as the reorganization explicitly designated the National Security Policy Division in the Foreign Policy Bureau as the “lead” division in shaping Japan’s national security policy.4 Furthermore, in the attempt to grant the Foreign Policy Bureau the influence that corresponds with its necessary stature within the ministry, MOFA made the institutional decision to elevate the position of the Foreign Policy Bureau within its bureaucracy. Its decision was demonstrated mainly through the appointment of senior personnel in the bureau. That is, by making it customary to appoint its best and brightest senior diplomats to the Foreign Policy Bureau DirectorGeneral position, MOFA sent a signal that the Foreign Policy Bureau has a higher stature within its bureaucracy.5 Even below the level of director-general, MOFA has made conscious personnel decisions to signal the seniority of the Foreign Policy

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Bureau over other regional and functional bureaus. For instance, while sharing titles such as “deputy director-general,” “director,” and “deputy director,” those who held these positions in the offices within the Foreign Policy Bureau are generally a few years senior to those who have the same job title in other bureaus.6 Recent examples suggest that the Foreign Policy Bureau may have finally begun to preside over the other bureaus’ policymaking on specific issues, getting involved in setting mid- and long-term policy priorities, and leading MOFA’s effort in the area of Japan’s national security policy. For instance, the National Security Policy Division played a primary role in the process leading up to Japan’s historic dispatch of JSDF vessels to the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2001 and its dispatch of JSDF ground troops to Iraq in 2004. It took the lead in coordinating with the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), while coordinating with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division on Tokyo’s relations with Washington, the Treaty Division on constructing the legal argument in support of authorizing such a dispatch, the Second Middle East Division on evaluating the situation on the ground, and the UN Policy Division on coordination with the United Nations. Japan’s recent efforts towards deepening the security relationship with Australia and India are also led by the Foreign Policy Bureau. Still, the North American Affairs Bureau continues to play a dominant role in the management of the Japan-U.S. alliance. From cooperation in ballistic missile defense to the negotiations on realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division has been MOFA’s primary representative in the negotiation team. This arrangement illustrates the difficulty of changing the several-decades-old practice in which the North American Affairs Bureau has been the central player within MOFA when it comes to security policy issues. The National Police Agency: A Bastion of Domestic Security

While the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs historically has managed Japan’s national security policy vis-a`-vis abroad, the National Policy Agency (NPA) has dominated the area that can be categorized as “homeland security” in today’s terminology. Having the primary responsibility in law enforcement, the NPA has been responsible for maintaining domestic security throughout Japan’s postwar history. Because the JDA (including the Self Defense Forces) is not statutorily authorized to play a tangible role in the day-to-day efforts to secure stability inside Japan, the NPA serves as a de facto leading national security agency in Japan. The police organization in Japan is headed by the National Public Safety Commission (NPSC, or Kokka Koan Iinkai), which is under the direct control of the prime minister. The chairman of the NPSC is a cabinet-level position, and the Commission has five members under the chairman.7 The NPA supports the NPSC in the day-to-day management of the national police organization (planning, budgeting, and personnel), plays a major role in the government’s response to situations

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that affect the nation’s public safety (i.e., natural disasters or domestic disturbances), cooperates in international criminal investigations, and engages in law enforcement activities both inside and outside Japan. The NPA is also in charge of maintaining its communication system, laboratories, training facilities for its personnel, and activities of the Imperial Police.8 In case of an emergency (i.e., large-scale disasters or domestic disturbances) that requires police mobilization to maintain public order, the prime minister, based on the recommendation from the NPSC, not the MOD, declares a “national emergency.”9 Once a “national emergency” is declared, the prime minister, not the NPSC chairman, directly commands the NPA.10 The Police Law (Keisatsu-ho) provides a basic legal foundation for Japan’s national law enforcement structure. Police in Japan are mandated to “protect people’s rights and freedom, and maintain public safety and order.”11 The NPA, as the institution that commands the national police structure, is mandated to protect Japan from any source of destabilization within the country. The Police Law also authorizes the NPA to engage in international activities in areas beyond simple criminal investigation, albeit in the context of law enforcement. For instance, the NPA may engage in a situation outside Japan that “damages, or has the risk of damaging, Japanese people’s lives, physical safety or assets, and/or Japan’s critical national interests.”12 The Police Law also authorizes the NPA to engage in issues related to international emergency disaster relief.13 In addition, while the law anticipates criminal activities in Japan (from the wording of the text, it appears that terrorist and hijacking activities are anticipated), the law also authorizes the NPA to respond to situations in Japan that, if left unattended, “could gravely impact international relations and infringe on other countries’ critical national interests” for law enforcement purposes.14 Within the NPA, three bureaus should be highlighted for their roles in Japan’s homeland security. The Commissioner General’s Secretariat (Chokan Kanbo) is in charge of providing directions for the protection of classified information within the NPA. It also houses the Office of the Executive Assistant to the NPSC Chairman, and serves as the communication window between the NPSC and the NPA.15 The Secretariat also coordinates policies within the NPA, including its international activities.16 Second is the Criminal Investigation Bureau (Keiji-kyoku). Within the bureau, the Organized Crime Department is particularly important, because it is in charge of Japan’s international criminal investigation, manages the NPA’s relationship with the International Commission of Police Organizations, addresses issues related to organized criminal groups in Japan and other types of organized crimes (unless other bureaus already claim the primary responsibility for them), controls firearms and drugs, and manages issues that arise with the NPA’s cooperation in international criminal investigations.17 Finally, the Security Bureau (Keibi-kyoku) is in charge of public security (koan). Because of its mandate to maintain public order and safety, the Security Bureau

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plays a quiet yet critical role in collecting intelligence on groups and individuals that are potentially threatening to Japan’s internal security, including ideologically extreme groups such as the Japanese Red Army and Aum Shinrikyo. In order to enhance its efforts in internal security, it also collects foreign intelligence on the movements of terrorists and their ties to groups and individuals in Japan. Intelligence gathering has made the Security Bureau the most influential bureau in the NPA throughout its history. In addition to the statutory mandate, the NPA has also carefully built up a network of its personnel within the Japanese government in order to maintain its status and influence in homeland security over the years. For example, out of the Prime Minister’s four official secretaries (officials from MOFA, NPA, Ministry of Treasury, and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry usually assume the positions), the one seconded from NPA has customarily been considered to have the highest seniority.18 Also, NPA personnel have occupied key positions in other national security agencies in Japan. In fact, until a few years ago, the International Planning Division of the Ministry of Defense (today’s International Policy Division, in charge of Japan’s defense exchanges with countries other than the United States) has been headed by a seconded NPA official. The director of the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO) and several key positions in charge of foreign intelligence also are filled by seconded senior NPA officials. Furthermore, the position of the Deputy Assistant Cabinet Secretary in charge of the National Security and Crisis Management (a key position in Japan’s response to national emergencies) is usually filled by a retired NPA senior official who has had a long career in public safety. The NPA also often assigns its officials to Japanese embassies abroad, where they function as the point of contact with the intelligence community in their host countries. For instance, at the Embassy of Japan in the United States, the Police Attache´ is the official point of contact with the Central Intelligence Agency. An unambiguous statutory designation of the NPA as the primary agency for internal security, the international aspects of its mandate, and the ongoing practice of seconding its personnel to key national security positions across the Japanese government have made the NPA a key national security policy agency in Japan. The role of the NPA in Japan’s security policymaking will likely become greater in the future, because what used to be recognized as law enforcement issues (smuggling of illegal materials, terrorism) has come to be seen as national security problems in the post-9/11 world, especially given the increasingly transnational nature of these challenges. Ministry of Defense: An Organization at a Crossroad

In January 2007, based on legislation enacted in December 2006, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) was renamed as the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and was granted full ministerial status. While this raised the statutory status of this

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agency from “agency” to “ministry,” its basic structure of a civilian Internal Bureau (naikyoku) exercising oversight over the uniformed Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) remains unchanged. The Ministry of Defense can be divided between the Internal Bureau that is predominantly civilian, and the Self Defense Forces, Japan’s quasimilitary. This chapter focuses on the Internal Bureau as the “civilian” institution. The Japan Self Defense Forces will be examined in detail in chapter three. For most of its history since its establishment in 1954, the JDA/MOD played very little role in shaping Japan’s national security policy. Having been positioned among the agencies subordinate to the Prime Minister’s Office until January 2007, its role was confined to the management of the JSDF and coordination with the local governments that host U.S. forces in Japan and the JSDF facilities on the issues arising from hosting these forces. With the tight limits on its military activity during the Cold War, the JDA was expected to play the role primarily of a “management agency” (kanri kancho) rather than a “policy agency” (seisaku kancho) and had functioned as such. Changes came with the end of the Cold War as pressure began to mount on Japan to make more tangible contributions to the efforts to improve the international security environment. As such international demands rose, so too did expectations of a growing JDA role in Japan’s national security policymaking. In particular, JSDF participation in international activities including UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) prompted such a trend. Changes in the international security environment and changing expectations of Japan also resulted in a greater emphasis on the military aspect of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Consequently, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) became a lead agency on the U.S. side in alliance consultations.19 This, in turn, raised the role of the JDA as an institutional counterpart in Japan-U.S. alliance discussions. This trend, which was first noticed when the two countries redefined the bilateral alliance in the mid-1990s, was further advanced by developments in the post-9/11 environment—including the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) negotiations between 2002 and 2006. Upgrading the JDA to a ministry (and the change of its official name to the MOD) means several things for the MOD. First and foremost, it means that the MOD now enjoys certain procedural prerogatives—such as the right to directly negotiate its annual budget with the Ministry of Finance (MOF)—that it had not had prior to becoming a ministry. Further, its ministerial status also positions the MOD as being equal to MOFA (which historically had taken a lead in shaping Japan’s national security policy), and allows the MOD to demand, at minimum, equal involvement in shaping Japan’s national security policy.20 In the organizational description of the MOD, the Internal Bureau (with approximately 22,000 personnel) is described as “one of the twelve organizations subordinate to the Minister of Defense.”21 However, this paints a misleading picture of the primacy of the Internal Bureau in MOD organization. In practice,

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the Internal Bureau manages JSDF operations, planning, acquisition, and personnel.22 Furthermore, it is tasked with managing the relations with U.S. forces in Japan, including addressing the grievances raised by the local communities that host U.S. forces.23 The Internal Bureau itself is divided into six bureaus, among which the Defense Policy Bureau and the Operational Policy Bureau are particularly important players in Japan’s national security policy. The Defense Policy Bureau’s primary task is to develop a defense strategy that takes into account Japan’s broader national interest and national security policy goals.24 Specifically, it is in charge of (1) shaping Japan’s defense policy, (2) managing the MOD’s defense exchanges, (3) planning the JSDF’s organization and platforms, and (4) playing a central role in the MOD’s efforts to collect and analyze intelligence. The Operational Policy Bureau has had the responsibility to ensure an effective use of JSDF capabilities to secure and promote Japan’s national interests.25 Under this mandate, the Operational Policy Bureau has managed the issues associated with JSDF domestic and overseas deployments. It also has been tasked to handle administrative work related to the handling of information and communication within the MOD and the JSDF,26 and has been the first responder in cases of JSDF-related accidents in Japan. For instance, when the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) Aegis destroyer Atago collided with a fishing boat in March 2008, the Operational Policy Bureau, in coordination with other divisions within the Internal Bureau as well as Maritime Staff Office, initially responded. This may change, however, as the result of deliberations by the Advisory Council on MOD Reform. Based on the Council’s recommendation, there is an ongoing discussion of eliminating the Operational Policy Bureau and consolidating it with the Operation Directorate ( J-3) of the Joint Staff Office. In principle, the JDA’s upgrade to the MOD was a positive step for Japanese security policymaking. However, the MOD still suffers from a number of challenges. First, despite several in-house reorganization efforts since January 2007, the MOD still lacks a strong policy-planning capacity. The MOD did create the Strategic Planning Office at the time of the September 2007 reorganization with the intention that it be an office that would focus on long-term strategy planning, such as drafting the National Defense Program Guideline, revising the overall policy for the MOD’s defense exchange programs, assessing the future security threat, etc. In reality, however, the Strategic Planning Office has become a place where the policy issues that involve more than one division within the MOD, both short- and long-term, are brought in and consequently it is hardly a place to focus on long-term issues.27 Furthermore, because the mandate of this office remains somewhat unclear, the tasks that the Strategic Planning Office take on are heavily dependent upon the preference of its director.28 Also, the office’s place within the MOD hierarchy—an office within the Defense Policy Division of the Defense

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Policy Bureau—does not grant the institutional clout that the office may need to fulfill its policy-planning responsibility. Its chief, although holding the title of “director,” is junior to the directors of not only the Defense Policy Division, but also other full divisions within the MOD. Considering that the U.S. Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff reports directly to the Secretary of State and that DOD has a large-scale bureaucracy under the Undersecretary of Defense for Strategy, the stature of the MOD Strategic Planning Office is far from sufficient (both in terms of institutional clout within the MOD and its staffing) to be able to offer a long-term strategic view that wins the ears of senior officials within the MOD, let alone across the Japanese government. Furthermore, repeated MOD reorganizations have created a lack of direction, lowering the morale of MOD officials. Even the members of the Advisory Council on MOD Reform—established under the chairmanship of the Chief Cabinet Secretary in February 2008—expressed concerns in this regard as the Council prepared its recommendation to the prime minister. In fact, several Advisory Council members admitted that, while reorganization can be a useful tool in MOD reform, real change will not be brought to the MOD so long as the existing organizational culture and the mentality behind its business practices do not change.29 Since the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) assumed power in September 2009, the implementation of the recommendations for MOD reform has been “frozen until discussed further” at the order of Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa. Although this move certainly prevents the sense of confusion and lack of direction from deepening, there is little doubt that the role of the Internal Bureau needs serious re-examination. The old rationale for maintaining the Internal Bureau— that control of the JSDF by the civilian officials in the Internal Bureau is essential to preventing the JSDF from returning to its militarist past—is clearly out of date today. It is time to rethink the role of the Internal Bureau vis-a`-vis the JSDF, and to consider a fundamental reorganization based on the principle that civilian officials and JSDF officers work in partnership to shape a security policy for Japan, so that the MOD can proactively participate in the security policymaking process. In the new political environment in which the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is in government, there is a renewed imperative in revisiting—and perhaps redefining—the role of the Internal Bureau in the MOD. Cabinet Secretariat: Increasing Role, though Effectiveness Remains in Question

The Cabinet Secretariat (naikaku kanbo) is an organization that has seen its influence on national security policymaking in Japan rise steadily since the 1990s. As an organization that directly supports the prime minister, the Cabinet Secretariat is tasked with shaping the policies that are important for the prime

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Figure 2.1 Organizational Chart of the Cabinet Secretariat Source: Cabinet Secretariat, Soshiki-zu [Organizational Chart] http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/sosiki/ index.html (accessed November 18, 2009).

minister and the cabinet, and playing an intermediary role among the ministries as necessary; it also collects intelligence on important policy issues.30 The Cabinet Secretariat had 716 employees as of the FY2008–2009. Within the current organization of the Cabinet Secretariat (Figure 2.1), there are six positions relevant to Japan’s national security policymaking. One is the Special Advisor to the Prime Minister. Out of five special advisors to the prime minister that are allowed under the Cabinet Law,31 one is designated to be in charge of national security affairs. If former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2006– 2007) had been successful in establishing a United States National Security Council-style staff organization to support the Prime Minister and Chief Cabinet Secretary, as well as making decisions on Japan’s national security policy, this position would have been critical in heading the envisioned organization. This position, however, has been vacant since Yuriko Koike, appointed by then-prime minister Shinzo Abe in September 2006, left the position to become the defense minister in July 2007. The Chief Cabinet Secretary has been arguably the most important individual (next to the prime minister, of course) in the Cabinet. Mandated to provide oversight for all the work that the Cabinet Secretariat is involved in,32 only the Chief Cabinet Secretary has been granted the status of a Minister of State among the senior officers in the Secretariat, and is therefore authorized to participate in cabinet meetings. When describing the role of the Chief Cabinet Secretary using U.S. terminology, some describe the position as “three positions in one”—that is, the Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan assumes the role of (1) vice president, (2) national security advisor, and (3) chief of staff. In concrete terms, the Chief Cabinet Secretary plays a quiet but critical role in working with the government (all the ministries and agencies), and the Diet (both ruling and opposition parties)

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in order to implement the cabinet’s policies. Also, it is often the Chief Cabinet Secretary, not the Special Advisor to the Prime Minister for Public Relations or the Cabinet Press Relations Secretary, who holds press conferences on a regular basis—which effectively makes the Chief Cabinet Secretary a government spokesperson as well.33 As such, throughout the history of Japanese politics, the Chief Cabinet Secretary has been held in the highest confidence by the prime minister of the time. The position is often described as “sori no nyobo-yaku” (the role of prime minister’s wife) or “sori no futokoro gatana” (the prime minister’s right hand man), both referring to the critical nature of the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s support for the prime minister, as well as the position’s influence in the government as someone who has the ear of the prime minister. Furthermore, in April 2000 the Chief Cabinet Secretary was formally designated to be the first in line to assume the position of acting prime minister should the prime minister become incapacitated due to illness or other emergency reasons. This designation has made the position all the more important within the government, making whomever holds it one of the key players in Japan’s national security policymaking as well. It must be noted that the status and authority enjoyed by the Chief Cabinet Secretary may be greatly affected when the National Strategy Bureau (Kokka Senryaku Kyoku, NSB) is officially established after FY 2010. Currently launched as the National Strategy Office (Kokka Senryaku-Shitsu, NSO), NSB is expected to provide guidance on the issues that transcend ministerial jurisdiction and Japan’s critical national interest by directly reporting to the prime minister. Naoto Kan was appointed as the first head of the NSO, and additionally as Vice Prime Minister, signaling the bureaucratic stature that NSB could ultimately enjoy. This change will no doubt greatly affect the precedents that have made the position of the Chief Cabinet Secretary one of the most important leadership positions in the Japanese government. However, the details that define the authority and structural relationships between NSB and other offices in the Cabinet Secretariat, including the relationship between the head of NSB and the Chief Cabinet Secretary, are still being worked out, and a great deal remains to be settled. The Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Administration is also a critical player. Simply put, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Administration sits at the top of the entire Japanese bureaucracy. Although there are no formal “requirements” to be Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for administration, it is customary that a retired senior civil servant is appointed to serve in the position after having completed service as the administrative vice minister (the highest position in Japanese bureaucracy) at one of the ministries in the Japanese government, 34 which makes the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for administration the highest-ranking bureaucrat in the Japanese system: this status alone allows the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for administration to exert influence on inter-agency negotiation during policymaking.

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The longevity of the tenure also makes the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Administration important in Japan’s policy- and decision-making processes. The Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary is not the Minister of State and, therefore, is not obligated to resign as the cabinet changes (however, at the change in the ruling political party in September 2009, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Minister for Administration did change). While the Parliamentary Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary (two are appointed) rotates in and out with the cabinet changes, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Administration tends to stay, providing the only sense of continuity at the senior level of the government. For example, Japan has had seven prime ministers since 2000, whereas only four individuals have served as the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Administration during the same period. The Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management has a mandate to assist the Chief Cabinet Secretary and two other Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries in the area of crisis management.35 Since extensive knowledge about the workings of the domestic security system is required for this position, every individual that has served in this position since its creation has been a former senior NPA official. Also, while most of the senior government positions rotate every 18–24 months, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management serves a longer term—the average period of service of the three former Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries for Crisis Management is three years.36 The Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for National Security and Crisis Management is mandated to “assist the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management.” The position is customarily filled by an official seconded either from the MOD or NPA. While the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for crisis management ultimately takes charge in the Japanese government’s efforts to respond to national emergencies, the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary plays a primary role within the Cabinet in shaping Japan’s national security policy on a day-to-day basis. The role of the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for National Security and Crisis Management and related staff has been increasing in Japan’s national security policymaking in recent years. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, for instance, they played a central role in drafting the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law, which enabled Japan to dispatch the JSDF for a refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. When then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi expressed his support for the U.S. war against Iraq in March 2003, then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda and then-Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for National Security and Crisis Management Keiji Ohmori initiated the decision to form an interagency team (comprised of the officials from MOFA, JDA, and other agencies) to prepare the Iraq Reconstruction Special Measures Law. Further, this team played a central role in drafting several pieces of key national security legislation, including the contingency legislation which was enacted in 2003, as well as the U.S. force realignment implementation legislation. Furthermore, this team

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played a leading role in the revision of the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines. Compared to 1995, the Office of the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for National Security and Crisis Management was much more involved in the revision process, including drafting.37 As such, among the agencies that are traditionally identified as the national security policy agencies (NPA, MOD, and MOFA), there seems to be an acknowledgment that the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary and his office will likely expand their role in Japan’s national security policymaking. Finally, the Director of Cabinet Intelligence (Naikaku Joho Kan, DCI) has an important role collecting and providing intelligence on high-priority policy issues for the cabinet in order to support the prime minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, and the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for National Security and Crisis Management. 38 The DCI also heads the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO). The Cabinet Intelligence Satellite Center, established in 2001 following Japan’s decision to introduce indigenous multi-purpose information-gathering satellites, also reports to the DCI. With the most recent reorganization that took effect in May 2008, the Cabinet Intelligence Officer has five Senior Intelligence Analysts (bunseki-kan) who report directly. The position of the Cabinet Intelligence Officer is customarily assumed by a senior official seconded from the NPA whose career has been concentrated in the fields of public safety and security. For instance, the DCI in 2009 had served as the director of the Foreign Affairs and Intelligence Department. It took several restructurings in the Cabinet Secretariat to arrive at the current organizational structure. Restructuring national security-related offices was part of an overall effort to enhance the support for the prime minister within the Cabinet Secretariat. Through this process, the organizational structure for Japan’s national security policymaking was streamlined and its authority steadily consolidated. When the process began in 1986, the Cabinet Office of National Security was established as one of the six cabinet offices, whose director wore another hat as the director of the Office of National Security in the Prime Minister’s Office. Further rationalization of national security-related positions within the Cabinet Secretariat in the 1990s took place as a part of the effort to better equip the prime minister with the institutional support necessary for crisis management. The position of the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management was created in April 1998 as the central coordinator in the Japanese government’s crisis management system. At that time, the Offices of National Security in the Cabinet Secretariat as well as the Prime Minister’s Office were renamed as the Office of National Security Affairs and Crisis Management.39 The comprehensive administrative reform in January 2001 abolished the Prime Minister’s Office and reorganized it, along with several other agencies, into the Cabinet Affairs Office (Naikaku-fu). In this process, the Office of National Security Affairs and Crisis Management in the Prime Minister’s Office was

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abolished, and its function and authority was integrated into the Cabinet Secretariat, reorganized as the organization under the Cabinet Counselor for Crisis Management (kiki kanri tantou shingi-kan) who reports to the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for National Security and Crisis Management.40 With the streamlining of the organization, the office of Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for national security and crisis management also began to assume a greater role in providing policy and legislative support for the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Prime Minister in the area of national security. The repeated reorganization of the Cabinet Secretariat, including the national security-related offices, suggests that the status of the Cabinet Secretariat is still evolving. One should note that the past reorganization efforts often focused on how to help political leadership better respond to national emergencies, not its policy-planning capacity. The evolving role of the office of Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary also suggests that the Cabinet Secretariat has been more actively engaging in interagency policy coordination process, but the efforts in this area are still at a nascent stage. The attempts by then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to create an American-style National Security Council within the Cabinet Secretariat (discussed later in the chapter) were in fact the first serious effort in this regard. Thus, although the Cabinet Secretariat is better structured to handle national emergencies such as large-scale disasters, its policymaking capacity still has much room for development. CHALLENGES AHEAD

The civilian institutions in Japan’s national security policy infrastructure have evolved over time, a trend that accelerated after the end of the Cold War. Looking ahead, what are the anticipated challenges for these institutions in the years ahead if Japan is to have a sound institutional foundation for its national security policy? Aside from the challenges that each civilian institution faces, interagency coordination perhaps looms as the greatest challenge in making Japan’s security policy infrastructure function effectively. This is not a new problem for Japan. In fact, interagency coordination has always been a serious challenge for national security institutions in Japan. The NPA historically has taken the lead in issues that have to do with maintaining stability in Japan, and MOFA (North American Affairs Bureau, to be exact) has tended Japan’s alliance relations with the United States. The Cabinet Secretariat—the logical place in the Japanese bureaucracy to be in charge of shaping Japan’s strategy and setting priorities for its national security policy—played a role not much greater than a referee among these agencies.41 During the Cold War, the global strategic environment was stable enough under the bipolar world order that Japan was able to function despite such compartmentalization. With little incentive for interagency coordination there was almost no role for the JDA within Japan’s national security policymaking system.

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Circumstances changed drastically when the Cold War ended, because it brought about two major changes in Japan’s security environment. First, as the bipolar global security structure gave way to the uncertain global security situation, Japan realized that it could no longer participate in world affairs only through economic means. Secondly, questions about the validity of maintaining the Japan-U.S. alliance in the post-Cold War era began to surface. In particular, the conceptualization of the Japan-U.S. alliance as a bulwark against communism and the Soviet threat had to be re-imagined and rearticulated in a new strategic context if it were to survive the collapse of the Soviet Union. As described later, such circumstances intensified expectations that the United States held toward Japan. Because of these changes, Japan has entered a period in which it has to be mindful of how to utilize the JSDF as an asset.42 These external changes triggered a shift in interagency dynamics in Japan’s national security policy infrastructure. Namely, the increasing need for Japan to dispatch the JSDF abroad and the redefinition of the Japan-U.S. alliance enhanced the status of the JDA, with its command of a 240,000-people-strong JSDF. While other agencies (i.e., MOFA and the NPA) were—and still are, to some extent—hesitant to accept the JDA’s greater role, they almost had no choice, because only the JDA could command the JSDF. Compared to the early 1990s, interagency coordination has improved a great deal. The MOD continues to accept seconded officials from NPA, MOFA, MOF and METI, but the flow of personnel exchange is more reciprocal today. For instance, the MOD began two-way personnel exchanges with the NPA, under which a director-level MOD official is placed in the NPA’s Security Bureau. MOFA and the MOD have been exchanging their personnel among the offices related to nonproliferation, arms control, intelligence, regional security, and the Japan-U.S. alliance for some time. A deep cooperative relationship has been established between the MOD and METI, as well, through personnel exchanges in the area of export control.43 A significant improvement in the relationship between the MOD and the NPA in recent years is particularly noteworthy. In 2000, the NPA and the MOD (then the JDA) revised the basic cooperative agreement in case of JSDF mobilization to maintain public order in Japan. The original agreement put in place in 1954 only envisioned the scenario in which the JSDF and Japanese police would work together to qualm domestic disturbances such as a riot, and did not have unconventional scenarios in mind (e.g., activities by North Korean agents in Japan). New agreements which spelled out specifics of the cooperation on the ground were signed in May 2002 between the JSDF headquarters across Japan and the local police forces. In addition, the MOD (then the JDA) and the NPA in September 2004 developed common response guidelines in case of incursion by armed foreign agents into Japan. Regional JSDF headquarters and local police forces throughout Japan followed suit by also developing a common response

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manual in March 2005. Since then, the JSDF troops and local police forces have conducted a number of table top exercises as well as real joint exercises.44 Interagency coordination still has much room for improvement, however. For instance, as much as the relationship has improved between the MOD and the NPA, many differences in culture remain—i.e., MOD, being an organization for national defense, focuses on deterring and stopping adversaries at all costs, whereas the NPA, primarily being a law enforcement agency, takes pains to ensure that its actions can be backed up with legal justification. While information sharing has been much encouraged across the relevant national security agencies, a great deal of hesitancy remains, in particular on the part of the MOD to share imagery data.45 While the MOD and METI have increasingly had more discussions on cooperation in the area of export control, the discussion is often not shared with other relevant government agencies, such as MOFA. Furthermore, as more agencies have assumed stakes in national security policy and Japan’s national means to pursue its security, interagency coordination only increases in complexity. The Cabinet Secretariat-run Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSICE) is a good example of how interagency coordination becomes more complicated as more agencies have day-to-day interactions with Japan’s national security policy. The administrative staff and the analysts in the CSICE, which was established in order to introduce indigenous information gathering satellites (IGS), come from 15 Japanese government ministries and agencies. While its imagery analysts are primarily seconded from the MOD, the satellite system is operated by the team that are by and large seconded officials from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation (MLIT) and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT, or Somusho), neither of which has much exposure to national security issues.46 This variety in personnel and their focus makes the interagency coordination within CSICE all the more important, but more complex as well. Second, the development of the policy-planning capacity within the Cabinet Secretariat remains an important challenge. In fact, if Japan is to have an effective security policy infrastructure to support its political leadership, an enhanced Cabinet Secretariat at the top to support Japanese leadership is a key necessity. In this context, the debate over creating a Japanese-style National Security Council while Shinzo Abe served as prime minister was interesting. Although expressing concerns in the beginning, the relevant national security policy agencies, including MOFA, MOD, and NPA, eventually supported the idea.47 On the other hand, the officials in the Cabinet Secretariat, including those who have been seconded from other government agencies, turned out to be less supportive of the idea.48 Typical concerns they raised included: (1) that the current Japanese bureaucracy could use fewer layers of supervision, not more; and (2) that too much overlapping of the proposed functions of a Japan National Security Council and the existing function of Cabinet Secretariat offices would exist. They also

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raised questions about whether qualified individuals could be found and recruited outside the Japanese government.49 They usually argued that further expansion of the existing office’s staff size and authority would serve the prime minister and the chief cabinet secretary adequately for the time-being. Still, consensus seems to exist throughout the Japanese government that the current policy- and decision-making processes in Japan’s national security policy infrastructure inhibits the Japanese government from (1) conducting long-range strategic planning and providing strategic guidance to the government agencies, (2) executing national security policies that require a complex web of interagency coordination to succeed, and (3) assisting the prime minister and Chief Cabinet Secretary’s decision-making based on policy analyses and proposals using information acquired independently from the bureaucracy. They recognize that the Chief Cabinet Secretary carries too big a political and policy portfolio, so appointing the Chief Cabinet Secretary for National Security Affairs, for instance, and having him/her head the proposed Japan National Security Council, is a reasonable proposition.50 Two decades after the Cold War ended, civilian institutions in Japan’s national security policy infrastructure have evolved in the direction of greater interagency coordination and enhancement of functions and roles. Substantial progress has been made in improving the tension that had existed between the MOD and other agencies that used to restrict the JDA/MOD’s scope of activities. However, Japan still has far to go in further overcoming the tension and the rivalry among these agencies. The Cabinet Secretariat, while having made considerable progress in placing itself in a more effective position, still needs to have its authority further enhanced by appropriate political and bureaucratic stature within the Japanese bureaucracy in order to support Japanese leadership in their decision-making and policy execution. And the MOD, where most outsiders look for major decisions related to Japanese security policy, still remains relatively weak in strategic planning and policymaking. Even given the changes brought in by the Hatoyama government after September 2009 under the mantra of seiji shudo (political leadership) and datsu kanryo-izon (overcoming reliance on bureaucrats), very little change has been suggested given Japanese government’s national security policymaking capacity. Given such circumstances, Japan’s civilian institutions, while developed considerably since the end of the Cold War, still have a great deal to develop in order to acquire robust national security policymaking capacity. NOTES This chapter has been adapted and updated from Yuki Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Infrastructure (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2008), 33–63. 1. Kenneth Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 225–29.

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Global Security Watch—Japan 2. Gaimusho Secchi ho [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Establishment Law] Article 3. http:// www.kantei.go.jp/jp/cyuo-syocho/990427honbu/gaimu-h.html (accessed April 14, 2008). 3. Ibid., Article 4-i. (accessed April 14, 2008). 4. Ibid., 19; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Sougou Gaikou Seisaku Kyoku no Kinou Kyoka [The enhancement of the foreign policy bureau], http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ annai/honsho/kai_genjo/pdfs/sogo.pdf (accessed March 1, 2008). Also, on MOFA’s Japanese language website, it is clear that the National Security Policy Division is designated as having the primary jurisdiction on Japan’s national security policy. See http://www.mofa.go.jp/ mofaj/annai/honsho/sosiki/sogo.html (accessed on March 2, 2008). 5. Seniority of the Director-General of the Foreign Policy Bureau is also illustrated by the fact that he/she is selected from those who are currently serving as the director-general of other bureaus. For instance, Shunji Yanai, the first Director-General of the Foreign Policy Bureau, served as the Director-General of the Treaty Bureau (today’s International Law Bureau) prior to his appointment as the Foreign Policy Bureau’s director-general. 6. For example, Nobukatsu Kanehara (deputy director-general of European Affairs Bureau), the former director of the Policy Coordination Division of the Foreign Policy Bureau had already served as the director of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division and worked at the Embassy of Japan in Washington DC as the Political Minister before assuming the latter position. Similarly, Kazuyoshi Umemoto (director-general of North American Affairs Bureau), before being appointed to be the Deputy Director-General of the Foreign Policy Bureau, served as the Deputy Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau. 7. As of November 2009, the commission is headed by the Honorable Hiroshi Nakai, a member of the House of Representatives, who also serves as the Minister of State in charge of abduction issues. The current members are Yukio Sato (former Ambassador to the United Nations), Yoshiyuki Kasai (Chairman of Japan Central Railway Company), Mariko Hasegawa (Professor, Graduate Research Institute of Policy Studies), Nobuyuki Yoshida (Managing Director, Sankei Shimbun), and Kenjiro Tao (Judge, Hiroshima Superior Court). http:// www.npsc.go.jp/detail/index.html (accessed November, 16 2009). 8. Ibid., Articles 5.2–5.17. http://www.npa.go.jp/syokanhourei/soumu1/20070326-1.pdf (accessed March 2, 2008). 9. Ibid., Article 71. http://www.npa.go.jp/syokanhourei/soumu1/20070326-1.pdf (accessed March 2, 2008). 10. Ibid., Article 72. http://www.npa.go.jp/syokanhourei/soumu1/20070326-1.pdf (accessed March 2, 2008). 11. Keisatsu-ho [The police law] Article 1. http://www.npa.go.jp/syokanhourei/soumu1/ 20070326-1.pdf (accessed March 2, 2008). 12. Ibid., Article 5.6-b. http://www.npa.go.jp/syokanhourei/soumu1/20070326-1.pdf (accessed March 2, 2008). 13. Ibid., Article 5.10. http://www.npa.go.jp/syokanhourei/soumu1/20070326-1.pdf (accessed March 2, 2008). 14. Ibid., Article 5.4-c. http://www.npa.go.jp/syokanhourei/soumu1/20070326-1.pdf (accessed March 2, 2008). 15. Ibid., Article 21-1. http://www.npa.go.jp/syokanhourei/soumu1/20070326-1.pdf (accessed March 2, 2008); NPA Organizational Chart, http://www.npa.go.jp/english/kokusai/ 1.pdf Organizational chart appears in page 3 of this document. (accessed March 3, 2008). 16. Ibid., Articles 21-4, 21-20; http://www.npa.go.jp/syokanhourei/soumu1/20070326 -1.pdf (accessed March 2, 2008).

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17. Ibid., Articles 23, 23-2-1, 23-2-2. http://www.npa.go.jp/syokanhourei/soumu1/ 20070326-1.pdf (accessed March 2, 2008). 18. This custom was broken when Taro Aso granted seniority to the secretary seconded from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 19. Yuki Tatsumi and Ken Jimbo, “From the JDA to the MOD—A Step Forward, but Challenges Remain,” PacNet Newsletter no. 3A, January 22, 2007. http://www.csis.org/ media/csis/pubs/pac0703a.pdf (accessed January 23, 2008). 20. Ibid. 21. http://www.mod.go.jp/j/profile/mod_sdf/index.html (accessed February 25, 2008). 22. The MOD Law, Articles 3, 8-1, 8-2, and 8-3. http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S29/ S29HO164.html#1000000000003000000002000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000 (accessed January 15, 2008). 23. Ibid., Article 8-4. http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S29/S29HO164.html#1000000 000003000000002000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 (accessed January 15, 2008). 24. Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2007, 196. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/ w_paper/pdf/2007/30Part2_Chap3_Sec3.pdf (accessed January 25, 2008). 25. Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2007, 196. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/ w_paper/pdf/2007/30Part2_Chap3_Sec3.pdf (accessed January 25, 2008). 26. Ibid. 27. Author’s private conversation (Tatsumi) with an MOD official. March 1, 2008. 28. Author’s interview (Tatsumi) with a visiting MOD official, Washington, DC May 10, 2010. 29. Author’s interviews (Tatsumi) with the members of the Advisory Council on the MOD Reform. Tokyo, Japan. May 12–15, 2008. 30. Cabinet Secretariat, Naikaku Kanbo no Gaiyo [Overview of the Cabinet Secretariat], http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/index.html (accessed March 2, 2008); Naikaku-ho [Cabinet law], Article 12, enacted January 16, 1947, most recently updated July 16, 1999. http:// www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/naikaku_h.html (accessed March 2, 2008). 31. Naikaku-ho [Cabinet law], Article 19. http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/ naikaku_h.html (accessed March 2, 2008). 32. Cabinet Law, Article 13. http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S22/S22HO005.html (accessed March 1, 2008). 33. Customarily, the Chief Cabinet Secretary holds a press conference once a day; Naikaku Kanbo Chokan [Chief Cabinet Secretary]. Wikipedia, http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5 %86%85%E9%96%A3%E5%AE%98%E6%88%BF%E9%95%B7%E5%AE%98 (accessed February 28, 2008). 34. Usually, former vice ministers of the agencies that used to be a part of pre-World War II Interior Ministry (naimu-sho)—the Ministry of Home Affairs (jichi-sho), the NPA, the Ministry of Health and Welfare (kosei-sho), and the Ministry of Labor (rodo-sho), for example—are appointed to serve in this position. 35. Cabinet Law, Article 15. http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S22/S22HO005.html (accessed March 1, 2008). 36. Naikaku Kiki Kanri-kan [Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management], Wikipedia, http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%86%85%E9%96%A3%E5%8D%B1%E6 %A9%9F%E7%AE%A1%E%90%86%E7%9B%A3. 37. Author’s interview (Tatsumi) with the MOD official. May 13, 2008.

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Global Security Watch—Japan 38. Cabinet Law, Article 18. http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S22/S22HO005.html (accessed March 2, 2008). 39. Ibid. (accessed March 1, 2008). 40. Ibid. (accessed March 1, 2008); Crisis Management in Japan and the United States, ed., James L. Schoff (Cambridge, MA: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc./Brassey’s, Inc., 2004), 83–84. 41. Andrew L. Oros and Yuki Tatsumi, “Japan’s Evolving Defense Establishment” in Japan’s New Defense Establishment: Institutions, Capabilities, and Implications, eds.Yuki Tatsumi and Andrew Oros, (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2007), 17. 42. Author’s interview (Tatsumi) with a Cabinet Secretariat official. Tokyo, Japan. May 13, 2008. 43. Author’s interview (Tatsumi) with a former MOD official. Tokyo, Japan. May 8, 2008; Author’s interview (Tatsumi) with a MOD official. Tokyo, Japan. May 8, 2008; Author’s interview (Tatsumi) with METI officials. Tokyo, Japan. May 15, 2008. 44. As of May 2008, JSDF regional headquarters have held the total of 42 table-top exercises with every single prefectural police headquarters. They also have conducted the total of 14 real joint exercises with 30 prefectural police headquarters. Unclassified fact sheet provided to the author from the MOD. May 8, 2008. 45. Author’s interview (Tatsumi) with a MOD official. Tokyo, Japan. May 8, 2008. 46. Unclassified fact sheet on the Cabinet Satellite Information Center, provided to the author by a former Cabinet Secretariat official. Tokyo, Japan. May 8, 2008. 47. Author’s interview (Tatsumi) with a MOD official. Tokyo, Japan. May 8, 2008; Author’s interview (Tatsumi) with a senior MOD official. Tokyo, Japan. May 15, 2008; Author’s interview (Tatsumi) with an MOFA official. Tokyo, Japan. May 13, 2008. 48. Author’s interview (Tatsumi) with Cabinet Secretariat officials. Tokyo Japan. May 13 and 15, 2008; Author’s interview (Tatsumi) with a retired senior Japanese government official. Tokyo, Japan. May 13, 2008. 49. Author’s interview (Tatsumi) with a Japanese government official. Tokyo, Japan. May 13, 2008. 50. Author’s interview (Tatsumi) with a Cabinet Secretariat official. Tokyo, Japan. May 13, 2008.

CHAPTER

3

Uniformed Institutions and Capabilities

The civilian agencies examined in the previous chapter are expected to provide strategic direction and set priorities in Japan’s national security policy. Uniformed institutions shoulder the task of executing the policies that require manpower. In most cases, these tasks are implemented by the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF), Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and, in case of emergency situations inside Japan, local police forces and other responders (i.e., fire departments, medical facilities). In this chapter, these three organizations—JSDF, JCG, and local police forces—will be examined regarding their structure, the evolution of their roles in Japan’s national security policy since the end of the Cold War, and each organization’s future challenges. THE JAPAN SELF DEFENSE FORCES

The Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) originate in the National Police Reserves (NPR, or Keisatsu Yobi-tai) that were established in 1950. After being renamed briefly as a Security Force (Hoantai) in 1952, the JSDF (Jiei-tai) was officially inaugurated with its current name in 1954, together with the Japan Defense Agency (JDA).1 During the first five decades, the core mission of the JSDF was defined as the defense of Japan from external invasion. Since the 1990s, however, expectations from the international community for JSDF’s greater participation in peacekeeping and other international operations by multinational forces have been growing steadily. Consequently, when the Self Defense Forces Law—the law that defines the JSDF organizational structure and responsibilities—was revised

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alongside the JDA’s upgrade to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in 2006, the core mission of the JSDF was redefined as (1) the defense of Japan, and (2) engagement in the international activities that are deemed to contribute to a stable and secure international security environment.2 From the time it was established, the JSDF has suffered from one fundamental problem as an institution: the constitutionality of its existence. As discussed in chapter one, a logical reading of Article Nine of the postwar constitution (see Appendix C) poses the question why, under a constitution that explicitly outlaws Japan to possess “armed forces,” the JSDF has been able to exist in the first place. A short answer to this question is because the JSDF was originally not established as a military force but rather as a constabulary force.3 During the debate that led to the reorganization of the NPR into the JSDF, the Japanese government explained that the creation of the JSDF would not violate the constitution because “war potential refers to a force with the equipment and organization capable of conducting modern warfare . . . it is neither unconstitutional to maintain capabilities that fall short of war potential nor . . . to utilize these capabilities to defend the nation from direct invasion.”4 This original characterization of the JSDF continues to handicap it today. The JSDF consists of three services: Air Self Defense Force (ASDF), Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF), and Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF). As of the end of the fiscal year (FY) 2009, the JSDF’s personnel numbers totaled 228,536, with a budget of approximately $46.3 billion.5 Each service is led by a Chief of Staff (bakuryocho) who, with the support from the officers in the Staff Offices (bakuryo kanbu), oversees the day-to-day operation of each JSDF service. The Chairman of Joint Staff serves as the highest-ranking military advisor to the defense minister.6 The SDF Law designates the prime minister as the supreme commander of the JSDF, but during peacetime, the minister of defense, supported by each service chief as well as the Chairman of Joint Staff, commands the JSDF.7 Air Self Defense Force (ASDF)

The ASDF is one of the most advanced air forces in the world, with approximately 43,652 active duty personnel (as of March 2009).8 Early in the twentyfirst century, the ASDF trailed only the air forces of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, when measured by the number of fighter aircraft and the supporting air control and warning systems, making it the world’s fourth most powerful air force.9 Although today China and Russia also would likely be near the top of that list, the ASDF still clearly maintains one of the world’s most capable forces. In addition, the ASDF has made a great deal of investment in acquiring ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities. So far, the ASDF has purchased Standard Missile (SM)-3s and upgraded the radar systems of the ASDF surveillance aircraft, as well as command and control systems, in order

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to ensure that the ASDF BMD-related assets can function seamlessly with those operated by the Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF). As of FY2008–2009, the ASDF commands six surface-to-air missile (SAM) groups which include eighteen batteries of PAC-3, sixteen of which have been operational since 2006.10 The ASDF has three core missions: defense of Japan’s airspace, response to large-scale disasters and other emergencies, and contribution to international efforts for peace and security. Needless to say, the primary mission of the JASDF is to defend Japan’s airspace. During peacetime, ASDF aircraft and surveillance radars are put on alert to (1) detect unidentified aircraft that enter Japanese airspace, (2) identify whether such aircraft are friends or foes, and (3) in case of suspicious aircraft, counter them and ensure that they exit Japanese airspace as soon as possible. In time of conflict, the ASDF would destroy, if necessary, enemy aircraft that invade Japan’s airspace. Furthermore, starting in 2003, the ASDF was designated as the service in charge of the operation of Japan’s ballistic missile defense system.11 The ASDF also supports local authorities in Japan in case of large-scale disasters (natural or manmade) by providing aerial reconnaissance and transporting aid materials and personnel, including the evacuation of the residents of the affected area. Such dispatches are based on the requests from local authorities, usually by the prefectural governments. In order to respond to such requests in a more effective and timely manner, the ASDF established a set of guidelines that defines (1) the general principles for response, (2) anticipated damages, and (3) anticipated nature of the requests under four geographical environments—urban areas, rural areas (mountains), distant islands, and special circumstances (e.g., emergencies that involve weapons of mass destruction or terrorist incidents).12 Finally, the ASDF has been increasingly asked to utilize its domestic disaster relief capabilities—its transport capability, in particular—for international disaster relief and other multinational activities since the 1990s.13 Starting with its first dispatch to Honduras in 1998, the ASDF has participated in international disaster relief operations in India (2001), Iran (2005), Pakistan (2005), and Indonesia (2005, 2006).14 The ASDF has also participated in UN peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia (1992–1993), Mozambique (1993–1995), Rwanda (1994), East Timor (1999–2000, 2002), and Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003–2009).15 For most of its organizational history, response to incursions into Japanese airspace was the primary mission for the ASDF. Its force structure has emphasized air reconnaissance and defense missions. Rules of engagement for these missions are extremely strict; shooting down suspicious planes is allowed only when Japan is in imminent danger. Since the 1990s, responding to the diversification of its mission, the structure of the ASDF has begun to shift its focus from the defense against airspace incursions by unidentified aircrafts. In particular, as the missile threat posed by North Korea began to rise, BMDs began to be considered as an important part of air defense missions. As a result, the ASDF was designated as

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the lead JSDF service in Japan’s efforts towards developing BMD capabilities. Further, as ASDF’s transportation capability turned out to be a valuable asset that Japan can offer in international humanitarian and disaster relief missions, officials within the Ministry of Defense began to recognize the necessity of enhancing the range and capability of ASDF’s transport squadron. Today, the ASDF force structure is in transition. While air-to-air defense operations remain a major focus, the ASDF is transitioning to a structure that strikes a better balance among the capabilities for air-to-air defensive operations, ballistic missile defense, and transport missions. In particular, in response to the increasing need for the ASDF’s transport capability in international disaster relief and other multinational operations, the ASDF began the process of improving its airlift capacity. Acquisition of mid-air refueling capability is also a part of the effort to this end, with a recognition that the lack of such capacity will continue to restrict ASDF’s capacity to conduct long-distance transport operations. Looking into the near- and medium-term future, the ASDF faces considerable challenges. First is the future of its fighter fleet. The ASDF’s most prominent asset for air defense has been its fighters, but because its existing fighter fleet (consisting of F-2s, F-15s and F-4s) is aging, modernization is a major concern. With the rapid modernization of China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force, the ASDF’s capability advantage vis-a`-vis China has been shrinking for the last several years.16 This shift has convinced the ASDF that as it looks at replacement aircraft for F-4s, acquiring fifth-generation fighters is key to maintaining its capability advantage. Given the ASDF’s preference to acquire equipment of proven capability, the F-22 was the ASDF’s preferred choice to replace the F-4. With the decision made by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that the production of F-22s for the United States Air Force will halt at the end of FY 2010,17 the ASDF’s acquisition of F-22 seems off the table. So far, the ASDF has decided to accelerate the pace of F15 modernization to lengthen its operational life while it deliberates an alternative course of action.18 However, this is only a temporary solution, and the ASDF will have to make its fighter acquisition decision in the next two to three years.19 The future of ASDF’s transport capability is also in question. In order to complement its existing transport capability, the ASDF has been heavily investing in the indigenous research and development of a next-generation medium-range cargo aircraft (C-X). However, the program has been plagued with a series of problems, which has caused considerable delays in its development. While it finally took its first flight in January 2010, its introduction has been postponed until at least later in the year, or even 2011 or after. The desire to enhance the JSDF’s airborne reconnaissance capability has been actively debated, but with very little prospect of a significant increase in the defense budget, the ASDF faces hard choices in prioritizing the capabilities it seeks to enhance. Ultimately, the question that the ASDF faces is the vision for its force structure in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world. Will the ASDF seek to maintain its

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predominant focus on air defense at the expense of other capabilities, or will it aim to have a force that has a better balance among a wider range of capabilities? Lack of clear answers to this fundamental question will continue to complicate ASDF’s modernization effort. Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF)

The Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF) hold the largest number of activeduty as well as reserve personnel of the three JSDF services, with approximately 142,000 active duty personnel as of March 2009.20 When it was first established, the primary mission of the GSDF was to “deter attack, repulse a small invasion, or provide a holding action until reinforced by the United States armed forces.”21 The GSDF missions have evolved with the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan. Today the GSDF’s missions are threefold: homeland defense (both from conventional and unconventional threats), domestic disaster/ humanitarian relief, and international activities (including participation in UN peacekeeping operations, international disaster/humanitarian relief efforts and participation in other types of activities conducted by multinational forces).22 Homeland defense remains the top priority for the GSDF. While hardly recognized during peacetime, the GSDF is indeed the first line of national defense in conventional warfare. From evacuation of citizens to consequence management, the GSDF, working with the local authorities, will also command the on-the-ground operations in times of national emergency. GSDF’s role in domestic disaster relief activities first became known nationwide at the time of Mount Unzen Fugen’s volcanic eruption in 1991. Its operations in conjunction with the eruption continued until December 1995, the longest disaster relief deployment in the GSDF’s history.23 Its large-scale relief and support activities at the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, along with its decontamination work and medical advice of GSDF doctors and nurses at civilian hospitals at the time of the 1995 sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo subway, further contributed to an increase in public awareness of GSDF activities in this area.24 Since the end of the Cold War, the GSDF has been dispatched to various parts of Japan for disaster relief operations, including the 2004 and 2007 earthquakes in Niigata, flooding in Kagoshima in 2006, and most recently in the aftermath of the earthquake in Iwate and Miyagi in June 2008.25 The GSDF also has a long history of participating in international peacekeeping and other non-combatant operations. It first dispatched an engineering battalion in support of the UN Peacekeeping Operations in Cambodia in 1992. Since then, it has dispatched troops (mostly engineering and medical units) to the UN peacekeeping missions in Mozambique (1993), Golan Heights (began in 1996 and ongoing), East Timor (2002), and Nepal (2007). Most recently, JSDF troops have participated in PKO in Haiti since February 2010.26 It also has dispatched

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troops to international disaster and humanitarian relief operations in Rwanda (1994), Honduras (1998), India (2001), Sumatra (2004), Pakistan (2005), Indonesia (2006).27 Furthermore, its participation in the reconstruction operation in Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2004–2006 was a critical part of Japan’s overall support of U.S.-led coalition forces stabilizing Iraq. The GSDF is divided into five regional armies, other specialized forces (including the Central Readiness Force) and six organizations (education and training institutions, Research and Development Headquarters, hospitals, logistics headquarters, logistical depots, and the Regional Cooperation Headquarters). Out of these organizations, Regional Cooperation Headquarters (Chiho Kyoryoku Honbu) is a joint organization to facilitate the coordination between JSDF troops of all three services and local authorities throughout Japan. The GSDF also maintains a number of training, research, and educational institutions for its personnel. One institution that deserves particular attention is the Ground Research and Development Command (GRDC), headquartered in Tokyo. Led by a three-star general, the GRDC is mandated to conduct research on GSDF operational concepts, force structure, equipment, education and training, and to develop new concepts in these areas. It also conducts analyses on its past operations and puts together “lessons learned” from past GSDF deployments. These “lessons learned” are collected, compiled, examined and analyzed, and eventually utilized for future training and education of GSDF officers and soldiers. Most recently, at the time of the GSDF deployment to Iraq, the materials compiled in GRDC’s Kyoukun Center (Center for GSDF Lessons Learned) were used to prepare the troops that were to be deployed. Then, when its mission was completed in September 2006, researchers (all GSDF officers) interviewed those who were deployed to Iraq. The results of these interviews were compiled and stored in the Center for GSDF Lessons Learned. The GSDF is also the only service in the JSDF that has a high school-equivalent youth educational institution.28 The GSDF’s primary mission is to defend Japanese territory from external invasion. Due to the perception that the Soviet Union posed the greatest security threat to Japan during the Cold War, the GSDF was organized to be able to counter and repel Soviet-style large-scale invasion attempts that would use heavy tanks and artillery. The result was a concentration of heavy tanks and artillery in Hokkaido, the most northern island in the Japanese archipelago. Since the GSDF was not expected to operate overseas during the Cold War, the logistics support capability, including transport, was not given a high priority. Therefore, throughout the Cold War, the GSDF invested its resources in acquiring heavy tanks, artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and other heavy platforms. The end of the Cold War and the resulting changes in the international security environment pushed the GSDF to reorganize and reprioritize. In particular, the GSDF faced an urgent need to alter its force structure. The changing nature of the international system and security threats suggested that preparing only for a

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Soviet invasion was simply not sufficient to defend Japanese territory. Internally, the threat from large-scale invasion was replaced by growing concerns over possible domestic disruption caused by state and non-state actors employing unconventional methods. Further, the disappearance of the overarching Soviet threat has increased the risk that smaller-scale disputes (such as accidents in the areas of disputed territorial claims) in East Asia could easily escalate into armed conflicts. Beyond East Asia, a growing need to participate in various non-combat peacekeeping operations and international disaster relief activities meant that the GSDF became increasingly expected to handle long-distance deployment over a longer period of time. In short, the GSDF has found itself in need of transitioning into a more mobile and agile force that can respond to a broader set of threats. Awareness of these changes has been driving the GSDF’s transformation efforts since the 1990s. Most visibly, the GSDF has begun acquiring equipment that allows greater agility and mobility, including helicopters (combat, transport and multipurpose) and light armored vehicles. As insistent as it may be on maintaining a certain level of tanks and heavy artillery capability, the GSDF has been reducing the amount of such equipment. For instance, the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) set the goal of reducing the number of GDSF tanks by 30 percent. While short of achieving that goal, the FY 2005-2009 Mid-Term Defense Program, when the original program was revised in December 2008, revised the number of tanks in its service from the original 104 to 96, a reduction by 7.6%.29 Compared to the build-up level of tanks under the original 1976 National Defense Program Outline, this is a reduction of almost 34 percent.30 The GSDF is also changing the deployment patterns of its forces. During the Cold War, the force structure of all the Regional Armies was more or less the same, with tanks and heavy artillery playing a central role. Today, the GSDF deploys two types of divisions and brigades. One is readiness—modernized divisions/brigades (sokuo kindai-ka shidan/ryodan). Deployed throughout Japan except for Hokkaido, their force build-up is geared toward responding to situations in which agility and flexibility of the force are essential.31 The other, comprehensive modernized divisions/brigades (sougou kindai-ka shidan/ryodan), has a more traditional force structure that is deployed only in Hokkaido, with the assumption that Hokkaido is still the place that Japan faces a conventional threat.32 Furthermore, the creation of the Central Readiness Force in March 2007 demonstrates the GSDF’s interest in having a multi-functional force that can be deployed quickly to a broader range of threats more effectively.33 Today, the transformation of the GSDF continues. Looking ahead, however, the GSDF has several major challenges to overcome. First, the necessity of a deeper reduction in GSDF’s tanks and heavy artillery needs to be debated more seriously. Only one-third of the tanks owned by the GSDF today are capable of fighting in modern warfare, with their survivability long being in question. The physical size of tanks also severely restricts their

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maneuverability, making them only useful in Hokkaido.34 The GSDF may insist that it needs tanks for its homeland defense mission, and it may argue that now that the GSDF is more likely to be asked to participate in overseas missions when security situations on the ground are unstable, retention of heavy equipment is justified. Whether to hold onto the tanks that are obsolete and/or not maneuverable in mainland Japan, or to replace them with smaller and more maneuverable tanks is a key acquisition issue. At minimum, the present decision to maintain the current inventory of tanks should not be accepted at face value. Second, not enough attention has been paid to the GSDF’s logistics. As the GSDF’s participation in overseas mission continues, the GSDF’s logistical capability should be developed accordingly in order to support the deployed GSDF troops. Further, as the security threat against Japanese territory becomes diversified, it may allow the GSDF little time before its troops are expected to conduct necessary operations. This diversity makes an enhanced logistical capability even more critical.35 Finally, as the GSDF gains more experience in overseas operations, it is important that the “lessons learned” from such experiences are discussed openly to the greatest extent possible. Since its first participation in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia in 1992, the GSDF has built 18 years of experience in overseas operations. It has also accumulated valuable experience through disaster relief operations in Japan. The “lessons learned” are crucial as the GSDF—and JSDF at large—continues to evolve into the role that is expected in today’s security environment. In this context, the establishment of the Center for GSDF Lessons Learned in the Ground Research and Development Command in 2003 was epoch-making. Looking ahead, establishing a system in which “lessons learned” are collected, analyzed, and shared (as appropriate) will be a valuable process in GSDF transformation. Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF)

With 42,431 active duty personnel and an additional 1,100 in reserve (as of March 2009), the MSDF is the service with the smallest personnel size.36 Despite such a limited number of personnel, the MSDF is one of the most advanced navies in the world, particularly known for its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) as well as minesweeping capabilities. Its four Aegis-equipped destroyers also offer formidable anti-air operations.37 With 148 vessels (including 52 destroyers, 16 submarines, and 30 mine sweepers) and 195 aircraft (of which 185 are for surveillance),38 the MSDF is tasked with three main missions: to defend Japan’s maritime domain, to engage in a variety of non-combatant operations overseas, and to respond to calls for search and rescue within Japanese territorial water in cases of maritime accidents. The defense of Japan’s maritime domain includes operating sea-based components of the ballistic missile defense system, supporting defensive operations

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through aerial reconnaissance and surveillance, and utilizing its submarines, surface combatants, and transport vessels.39 In particular, surveillance and reconnaissance has long been a key MSDF capability that directly contributes not only to the defense of Japan, but also to the maritime security of East Asia. During the Cold War, although hardly known to the broader public, this MSDF capability functioned as an effective deterrent against Soviet submarines that operated in the Far East.40 After the Cold War, MSDF’s surveillance, reconnaissance, and patrol operations began to attract public attention as media reported increased occurrences of suspicious maritime activities by foreign ships. In particular, maritime patrol operations against a North Korean spy ship in March 1999 and against a Chinese submarine in November 2004 reiterated the significance of the MSDF’s capabilities for the defense of Japan.41 As part of its second mission, the MSDF engages in a variety of non-combatant operations overseas. In fact, the MSDF is a forerunner to JSDF’s participation in overseas operations: six MSDF minesweepers engaged in a mission in the Persian Gulf in 1991 after the 1990–1991 Gulf War, marking the first-ever JSDF overseas deployment. 42 The MSDF have also participated in international emergency disaster relief operations and provided medical and other support to the victims in affected areas. It has engaged in salvaging a Russian submarine after an underwater accident. Most recently, the MSDF has supported the U.S.-led multinational operation in Afghanistan to fight against terrorism by providing refueling support since late 2001—though the recent change in government in Japan led to the end of such activities in January 2010. As part of its third mission, the MSDF responds to calls for search and rescue within Japanese territorial waters when there are maritime accidents. It evacuates those who are affected to hospitals, and provides them with emergency relief materials. During natural disasters, it offers various types of humanitarian support at the request of prefectural governments and local communities.43 The MSDF has four destroyer flotillas, five destroyer divisions, four submarine divisions, one minesweeper flotilla, and nine flight squadrons. They are organized into one fleet, five regional districts, an air training command, and one training squadron. Each regional district is responsible for the defense of maritime areas which are divided into five regions: from Hokkaido to the northern tip of mainland Japan (jurisdiction of Ohminato District), the northeastern to eastern part of Japan on the Pacific Ocean side (jurisdiction of Yokosuka District), the northeastern to central-west part of Japan facing the Sea of Japan (jurisdiction of Maizuru District), the southeastern part of Japan (Kure District) and the southern part of Japan (jurisdiction under Sasebo District). In addition, the MSDF has communication command, material command, and six training schools for its officers and sailors. With the reorganization implemented in March 2008, the MSDF changed its operational structure, reorganizing destroyer units into: (1) units that focus on the operation of helicopters; and (2) units that focus on

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air defense, including the operation of ballistic missile defense, centered around the Aegis destroyers.44 In addition, the Self Defense Fleet now functions as a force provider to each regional district: the commander of the Self Defense Fleet holds authority to decide the composition of vessels that will be used in each deployment. Commanders of each regional district, as force users, then command operations using the vessels assigned by the Self Defense Fleet.45 The force structure of the MSDF cannot be discussed without considering its long history of cooperative relations with the United States Navy. As such, from its earliest years, the history of the development of the MSDF’s force structure is closely connected to the division of roles and their evolution between the MSDF and the United States Navy. The division of roles between the U.S. military and the JSDF are often described as “the spear” (i.e., the U.S. military) and “the shield” (i.e., the JSDF). The relationship between the MSDF and United States Navy is no exception. The MSDF has organized its force structure around its primary mission of maritime defense of the homeland, focusing its force build-up efforts on three areas in particular: minesweeping, anti-submarine capabilities, and surveillance. 46 Because of the strategic environment in East Asia during the Cold War, the MSDF build-up efforts for homeland defense also supplemented the United States Navy’s deterrence capability in East Asia.47 Furthermore, because ensuring the freedom of navigation was deemed to be one of Japan’s critical defense needs, mine warfare capabilities have also become critical. Anticipating that the threats against Japan will be conventional in nature and state-based, the MSDF took a “zone defense” approach in distribution of these assets: while the MSDF has secured mobile operation flotillas under the command of Defense Fleet, its assets were also distributed to five regional districts. Today, the MSDF faces an extremely difficult task in conceptualizing its future force structure. On the one hand, the priorities during the Cold War—homeland defense, mine warfare, and ASW—continue to be the MSDF’s core priorities, particularly with the recent build-up of Chinese naval capability. On the other hand, the demand for MSDF capabilities has been on the rise across the spectrum. Its capabilities in surveillance, anti-submarine operation, and minesweeping remain high, particularly with the emergence of a missile threat and the development of anti-access capabilities by China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy. The demand for logistical support capabilities also has increased. In addition, since the 2003 decision by the Japanese government to introduce a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, development of the BMD capability has been added to MSDF’s list of priorities.48 Simply put, the MSDF now finds itself having to enhance the capability of new areas while sustaining—or even strengthening—the capabilities that were its strength during the Cold War. Recent acquisition decisions by the MSDF illustrate its effort to tackle this task of realigning priorities. In responding to the demand for a greater MSDF

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replenishment capacity, it introduced two AOE Mashu Class oilers in 2004 and 2005. Since they became operational, both vessels have replaced their predecessor AOE Towada Class oilers and have been engaging in refueling missions in the Indian Ocean. Since there are only two vessels of this type, their operational tempo has been stretched to its maximum, with its crews experiencing multiple deployments to the Indian Ocean. The acquisition of a new DDH Hyuga Class also signals the MSDF’s determination to maintain a balance between homeland defense capability and new operational areas. Built to be roughly the same size as the AOE Mashu Class, it is one of the MSDF’s largest vessels. With an advanced command and control system, storage space big enough for either eight SH-60K surveillance helicopters or four MCH-101 transport helicopters, and an upgraded sonar system, it offers an enhancement of MSDF’s capability in the variety of areas. In case of national emergency, the DDH Hyuga Class, as a wartime flagship, would serve as a command-and-control platform, coordinating the activities of other units while its organic helicopters conduct anti-submarine warfare operations. During peacetime, it can join the LST Osumi Class for peacekeeping and relief operations, or participate in other situations short of armed conflict that Japan foresees confronting on the high seas.49 Challenges for the JSDF

In addition to the service-specific challenges, the JSDF as an institution faces three additional major challenges. It is critical that each of these challenges be addressed so that the JSDF will better help Japan to achieve its national security policy goals. Addressing each challenge sufficiently will require long-term solutions that overcome significant political and legal challenges. First, JSDF joint operation capacity continues to present the biggest challenge for the JSDF. The JSDF transitioned to a joint operation structure in March 2006. Under the current structure, each service maintains responsibility for equipping and training its officers and soldiers as “force providers,” with Chairman of Joint Staff Council and his staff in the Joint Staff Office now considered as a “force user.” The Joint Staff Office also engages in planning joint training and other administrative tasks as necessary.50 While there are signs of progress, the JSDF has much room to improve in the assignment and training of its personnel for a joint force. On personnel management, it is questionable whether each JSDF service is motivated to assign its most capable officers to the “joint” assignments. Prior to the March 2006 transition, there was a debate within the JSDF about whether an internal regulation should be created so that promotion beyond a certain rank would require experience in “joint” assignments: it was hoped that such a personnel management system would create an incentive for each JSDF service to assign its most qualified

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officers to the positions in the Joint Staff Office. However, no clear guideline has been established, and it remains unclear whether each service can really be persuaded to assign its capable staff outside its service. Further, education and training of JSDF officers needs to be done with the joint operation environment in mind. Since the JSDF is expected to operate in a joint environment more frequently (especially so in overseas missions), it is particularly crucial that the officers who command joint operations have knowledge, understanding, and appreciation of such operations, and know how to command them. Since March 2006, the curriculum at the Air, Ground, and Maritime Staff Colleges and the Joint Staff College has been putting greater emphasis on joint education. The inter-service personnel exchanges that predate the transition (exchanges between students at the Staff Colleges had existed long before the March 2006 transition) have been enhanced, but it will take several more years before any tangible result will be visible from these changes. A second institution-wide challenge is that although the Joint Staff Office is now in charge of matters related to JSDF operations, planning and programming responsibilities remain with each JSDF service. In other words, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs and his staff, while being a “force user,” currently have no means to have their opinions considered in the force planning, programming, and acquisition processes. Although the current programming and acquisition system may go through a drastic change as the result of the ongoing efforts in the MOD reform, a great deal of uncertainty remains about how such changes will take place. Finally, fiscal pressure will continue to constrain JSDF’s efforts in modernizing its forces and adjust them to the evolving security environment. Although Japan is among the top seven defense spenders in the world,51 it spends less than 1% of its gross domestic product on defense. In fact, since 2002, Japan’s defense spending has been steadily decreasing each year.52 A steady downward trend in the defense budget makes it clear that the resources available for the JSDF continue to be limited. In order to ensure that the JSDF can meet the twenty-first century security challenges, the availability of the resources will be a critical question.53 LAW ENFORCEMENT: JAPAN COAST GUARD AND LOCAL POLICE

In Japan, law enforcement agencies play important roles in national security policy. In particular, in case of emergencies inside Japan, law enforcement agencies are expected to bear primary responsibility for responding to the situation: the JSDF cannot be mobilized without the explicit consent and request from local authorities. Even after the JSDF is mobilized, the cooperation between the JSDF and the law enforcement agencies is critical to successfully address national security concerns while maintaining public order. In the post-9/11 security environment, what had traditionally been considered law enforcement matters (e.g., terrorism, protection of critical infrastructure,

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cyber crimes) are increasingly viewed as national security issues. Further, as the notion of maritime security and its significance to the country’s national security is recognized more widely, piracy and other illegal activities that take place in the maritime domain are also being acknowledged more as potential national security threats. As such, the law enforcement agencies are expected to cooperate with military and other elements of the country’s national security policy community to an unprecedented degree. In this context, the Japan Coast Guard and Japanese police organizations are both important components of Japan’s national security policy infrastructure. The next section examines these two organizations, and discusses the recent efforts that they have been undertaking to respond to the changing environment surrounding their activities. Japan Coast Guard (JCG)

The Japan Coast Guard (JCG), formerly named the Maritime Safety Agency, was established in 1948 as an agency under the Ministry of Transportation (today’s Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism) that protects lives and prevents, investigates, and stops illegal activities in the maritime domain.54 Based on this mandate, the JCG has the mission of ensuring safety and security at sea by engaging in the following activities:55 • Enforcement of maritime laws and regulations; • Maritime search and rescue; • Prevention of maritime pollution; • Prevention and suppression of criminal activities at sea; • Criminal investigation and arrest at sea; • Maritime regulation on ship navigation; and • Business on waterways and navigation signs.

The Japan Coast Guard consists of two major components: central organization and regional coastal headquarters. The JCG had a staff of approximately 12,500 as of the end of FY2008-2009, much smaller than the MSDF.56 Those who are assigned to the central organization only amount to approximately nine percent of the staff. The vast majority—approximately 82.3 percent—are assigned to 11 Regional Coastal Headquarters and engage in activities that ensure maritime safety in Japan’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zones.57 In the context of Japan’s national security policy, it is important to note the JCG’s primary responsibility is patrolling Japan’s coastal areas, responding to violent activities at sea, engaging in criminal investigations and arrests at sea, detaining suspects, participating in international investigative cooperation, and cooperating with other agencies, including police. 58 The JCG Law also

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authorizes the JCG to participate in international peacekeeping operations as long as it does not interfere with JCG’s core mission.59 During the Cold War, the JCG, while being the agency that has primary oversight of issues of maritime security and safety in Japanese territorial waters, maintained a relatively low profile in the area of national security policy. Since the end of the Cold War, however, its role in maritime security, particularly in the area that impacts Japan’s national security interests, has been steadily expanding. Japan’s joining in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1996 was the initial factor that drove the JCG (then called the Maritime Safety Agency) to strengthen and expand its role in maritime security. In its attempt to respond to the expansion of the sea surveillance area management after assuming new obligations under the UN convention, the JCG began to enhance its surveillance capability. A series of major maritime incidents that the JCG faced during the 1990s—the incursion of North Korean spy ships and the rising tensions in areas where Japan has territorial disputes (e.g., Takeshima/Tokdo Island, Senkaku/ Daoyutai Islands)—further drove the JCG’s effort to enhance its capability in surveillance, patrolling, and policing.60 In particular, a sharp difference in the emphasis of the JCG’s annual report can be found before and after 1998. In pre-1998 years, the JCG’s annual reports emphasized its efforts at enhancing its capacity to respond to maritime accidents and contain potential environmental damage created by such incidents.61 After 1998, in contrast, JCG’s annual reports have been discussing JCG’s efforts to respond to threats against the security of territorial waters at a greater length. They have also begun to identify weapon, drug, and human smuggling cases, piracy, and other suspicious activities as the organization’s prime concerns. JCG’s efforts in policing the areas subject to territorial disputes between Japan and its neighbors have also been discussed with greater emphasis since 1998.62 Since its renaming in 2000, the JCG has expanded efforts to raise its profile as the “go-to” agency for Japan’s maritime security policy. In April 2001, the JCG issued the Maritime Safety Task Implementation Plan (Kaijo Hoan Gyomu Suiko Keikaku) for the first time. This plan—described as a “medium- to long-term management plan in the private sector”63—identified its strategic goals and specific program objectives for the next five years.64 After the plan was revised in 2004, the JCG issued The Second Maritime Safety Task Implementation Plan (Dai Ni-ji Kaijo Hoan Gyomu Suiko Keikaku) in April 2006. Between the two plans, the strategic objectives of the JCG have evolved into those in which the JCG is more self-aware of its role in maritime security (See Table 3.1). The language used in the 2006 plan—the term “maritime order,” in particular— suggests that the JCG identifies its role in maintaining the safety and security of Japanese territorial waters in a broader context than strictly law enforcement. As the JCG’s perception of its own mission evolves, so has its equipment. In both the 2001 and 2006 Maritime Safety Task Implementation plans, enhancing

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Table 3.1 Comparison of the Strategic Objectives in JCG’s Maritime Safety Task

Implementation Plans

The 2001 Plan

The 2006 Plan

Maintenance of safety

Maintenance of maritime order

Securing the safety of maritime traffic

Maritime accident rescue

Maritime accident rescue

Maritime disaster prevention/preservation of maritime environment

Maritime disaster prevention/preservation of maritime environment

Securing the safety of maritime traffic

Collaboration and cooperation with foreign organizations

Collaboration and cooperation with foreign organizations

Source: The JCG. Kaijo Hoan Gyomu Suiko Keikaku [Maritime Safety Task Implementation Plan]. April 2001. http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/seisakuhyoka/h16.48/keikaku.pdf. (accessed February 20, 2008); The JCG. Dai Ni-ji Kaijo Hoan Gyomu Suiko Keikaku [Second Maritime Safety Task Implementation Plan]. April 2006. http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/seisakuhyoka/no2keikaku.pdf. (accessed February 20, 2008).

the JCG’s surveillance and policing capabilities by modernizing its patrol ships and surveillance aircrafts is identified as one of the top priorities.65 The introduction of small, high-speed patrol ships, acquisition of the patrol ships that can carry surveillance helicopters, and overall improvement in surveillance capability near and within Japanese territorial waters point to the JCG evolving into an enforcement organization that is faster, more agile, and has greater enforcement capability.66 In addition to the efforts to strengthen its capability, the JCG has been intensifying efforts to raise its international profile. For instance, the JCG launched the Northwestern Pacific Maritime Security Conference, hosting its first meeting in Tokyo in December 2000. Further, to expand on the efforts at the head-ofthe-agency level, the meeting was reorganized into the North Pacific Maritime Security Forum in 2005 at the time of its fifth annual meeting in Kobe, Japan.67 The JCG has also been actively engaged in supporting efforts for Southeast Asian countries to develop their own maritime security institutions by providing assistance in education and technical training.68 With the JCG’s heightened level of activities since 2000, there is an emerging view that considers the JCG as the “de facto fourth branch of the Japanese military.”69 To be sure, the JCG has been enhancing its capability. As of March 2009, the JCG commands 355 patrol and coastal combatants and 73 aircraft (including helicopters).70 Further, the JCG has been accelerating the modernization of its vessels. In addition, with the revision of the JCG Law in 2002 concerning the rules of engagement, JCG inspectors can now use firearms and other weapons in order to force fleeing suspicious ships to stop for ship inspections. Even if the shooting ends up creating casualties, the shooting is deemed legitimate as

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long as the JCG Commandant agrees that the circumstances called for such an action.71 Taking these changes together, it is fair to say that, compared to when it started with a mere 200 ships and 3 helicopters in 1948, the JCG today is a much stronger and dynamic organization. However, it may be premature to treat the JCG as the de facto fourth branch of the Japanese military at present. First and foremost, it is still a law enforcement agency within the MLIT—it is not even a full-fledged law enforcement agency in the sense that it does not subject itself to the supervision of the National Public Safety Commission. Even though the JCG is assuming an increasingly high-profile role in Japan’s efforts to guard its maritime interests, its activities are fundamentally law enforcement-oriented. In other words, no matter how much JCG’s capability grows, its ultimate goal is to investigate incidents, make arrests, and prosecute those who are responsible whenever possible. Furthermore, even with the recent enhancements, the JCG is a far smaller organization—both its personnel size and budget—compared to the MSDF. Local Police Forces in Japan

Japan has a centralized police organization under which the National Police Agency (NPA) receives oversight from the National Public Safety Commission. While focusing mostly on the day-to-day operations in police organization, the NPA also oversees the prefectural police in Japan through regional police bureaus. The relationship between the NPA and prefectural police can be best described by the analogy of the human body—the NPA is “the brain” and the prefectural police are “the body.” When a national emergency occurs, it is prefectural police who will move as arms and legs of the police organization to actually bear the primary responsibility to protect lives, property, and safety of the people and to maintain public order within their prefectural jurisdictions.72 The personnel distribution vividly illustrates such a relationship between the NPA and local police organization. In 2007, the police organizations as a whole (both the NPA and prefectural police included) were approximately 290,000 people strong—a size slightly larger than the JSDF. Among them, however, only 2.6 percent work in the NPA: the remaining 97.4 percent belong to prefectural police organizations throughout Japan.73 Japan places local police organizations in all of its 47 prefectures. The Prefectural Public Safety Commissions in each prefecture oversee the administration of prefectural police with the governors’ supervision. This arrangement makes the prefectural governors commanders of the local police forces. The prefectural police are headed by the chief of prefectural police headquarters, which answers to the Prefectural Public Safety Commissions. Within the local police forces, approximately 10 percent are administrative staff. The remaining 90 percent are the police officers, including those who are assigned

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to kidotai (riot police).74 Kidotai is a police force established specifically for responding to various emergencies. Each prefectural police organization typically has three types of kidotai units: permanent units, region-wide units (kanku kidotai) and the secondary units (dai-ni kidotai). In case of emergencies, based on the judgment of the governor, these forces will be mobilized to maintain public order while responding to the situation through various means, including search-andrescue and maintaining public order, to ensure the safety of its citizens. In recent years, the local forces have been investing in the capacity to mobilize assets beyond their prefectural jurisdictions in order to respond to large-scale disasters and other emergencies more effectively. For example, based on the lessons learned from the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, a Wider-Region Emergency Support Unit (koiki kinkyu enjo-tai) was established in each prefectural police organization in 1999. These units support prefectural police by collecting the information on damage, conducting emergency search-and-rescue, communicating the situation to the citizens, and securing safe passage out of the damage area. In the last few years, the capacity of these units has been further enhanced by acquiring the capability to conduct highly complicated rescue missions (Police Team of Rescue Units, P-REX), and units that can conduct identification and autopsy of victims in a timely manner.75 CHALLENGES AHEAD

In aggregate, the uniformed institutions examined earlier possess formidable capabilities. There are challenges, however, in facilitating the intra-institution cooperation necessary to maximize their capabilities. There have been efforts to establish frameworks for cooperation and specification of procedures among these institutions. For instance, based on the 2001 agreement between the MOD (then the JDA) and NPA on inter-agency coordination, the designated JSDF regional headquarters and the Prefectural Police Headquarters (PPHs) signed an agreement that, among other cooperative measures, defined the division of roles between the JSDF and local police, designated points of contact for communication, and established coordination meetings to plan and conduct joint trainings in 2002. Further, in 2005, the designated JSDF regional headquarters and the PPHs created the guidelines for joint response against activities by armed hostile agents inside Japan. Based on these agreements, numerous joint tabletop exercises and joint trainings have been conducted between the JSDF units and police forces. As a result, cooperation and coordination between the JSDF and local police have greatly improved, particularly in their response to large-scale natural disasters within Japan, and collaboration between the JSDF and local fire departments and hospitals has also been enhanced.76 Similar efforts have been made by the JCG and the MSDF to improve their cooperation and coordination. Following the first North Korean spy ship incident

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in 1999, the Japanese government released the list of “lessons learned” from the event.77 Based on this report, the two institutions established procedures for joint response to such scenarios in the same year and have conducted joint training and exercises since. The JCG-MSDF cooperation in Japan’s participation in antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden also illustrates how the two institutions can cooperate.78 Following a joint JCG-MSDF exercise in anti-piracy operations in February 2009, the Japanese government decided to dispatch the MSDF to engage in patrolling the Gulf of Aden and escort civilian vessels in March 2009. Since the beginning of this mission, JCG inspectors have been aboard MSDF destroyers.79 The lessons learned from this operation can provide useful guidance as to how MSDF and JCG can optimize each other’s assets and capabilities in anti-piracy and other maritime security operations. Still, there is much room for improvement in cooperation between these institutions. While the cooperation among them has much improved in cases of natural disasters, it will take more joint training and joint exercises to ensure that they can cooperate just as well in the case of Japan being exposed to foreign threats. In particular, the relationship between the JCG and the MSDF, while having grown more cooperative in recent years, has much room to improve. For instance, regarding Japan’s participation in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the JCG initially resisted MSDF participation in PSI exercises, arguing that the activities involved are primarily law enforcement in nature.80 In fact, participation by both the JCG and the MSDF in 2004’s Team Samurai (a multinational exercise under the PSI that Japan hosted) marked the first time that both the JCG and the MSDF participated in a PSI exercise together. As the JCG moves toward acquiring greater firepower and greater mobility in countering smuggling, piracy, incursion of spy ships, and other illegal activities, a greater effort should be made to clarify, for instance, when the JCG should decide to ask for MSDF intervention, or what needs to be done when the JCG refuses to acknowledge that the situation is beyond its capacity to address. The bias against the JSDF within Japanese society continues to present challenges. In fact, it needs to be noted that many in the police organization still look at their role as “defending the people from the military (i.e., the JSDF).”81 The Japanese government, having to justify the JSDF as a legitimate entity, created an extremely elaborate and meticulous legal argument about why the existence of the JSDF does not violate Article Nine of Japanese constitution. The legal labyrinth created since, together with JSDF’s original nature as a constabulary force, has prevented the JSDF from gaining an identity as a professional military organization. The JSDF’s non-military status has also been institutionalized in the Japanese legal framework. According to Japanese law, for instance, the legal status of its personnel, while being treated as military personnel abroad, is that of a civil servant. Japan’s experience with a professional military organization before and during World War II makes it understandable that the JSDF was met with a great

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deal of skepticism in its early years. Given the important role that the JSDF has played since then, not only in disaster relief within Japan but also in non-combat international activities, however, time is ripe for such a bias to change. Practically speaking as well, as the distinction between internal and external national security threats becomes less clear, the bias against the JSDF held among the law enforcement agencies must be set aside for the benefit of effective operational cooperation. As long as such a mentality continues to exist among the uniformed institutions, it prohibits them from working together for a single goal—protecting Japan’s national security interests. The ultimate impact a DPJ-led government will have in changing such an attitude remains to be seen. So far, however, Prime Minister Hatoyama has been hesitant to utilize the JSDF, no doubt in part due to the Social Democrat’s initial inclusion in the coalition government and their skepticism toward the JSDF. This attitude seems unlikely to change in short term, even under new DPJ leadership. NOTES This chapter has been adapted and updated from Yuki Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Infrastructure (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2008), 65–96. 1. Bouei-Cho Secchi Ho [Japan Defense Agency establishment law], adopted June 9, 1954. http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S29/S29HO164.html; Jieitai Ho [Self Defense Forces (SDF) law] adopted June 9, 1954, most recently revised May 2, 2008. http://law.e-gov.go.jp/ htmldata/S29/S29HO165.html (accessed March 1, 2008). 2. Ibid., Article 3.http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S29/S29HO165.html (accessed March 1, 2008). 3. Yuko Whitestone, “PKO Sanka to Jiei-kan no Shokugyo-teki Identity no Henka” [Participation in peacekeeping operations and changes in professional identities among the SDF personnel] Kokusai Anzen Hosho [International security] 35, No. 3 (December 2007): 28. 4. Richard J. Samuels, “New Fighting Power! Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security,” International Security 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/08): 86. 5. Ministry of Defense, Heisei 21-nendo Nihon no Bouei [Defense of Japan 2009], Chart 61, 387; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIRPI), SIPRI Yearbook 2009, Appendix 5A, http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/05/05A (accessed May 21, 2010). 6. The SDF Law, Article 9. http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S29/S29HO165.html (accessed March 2, 2008). 7. Ibid., Article 7. http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S29/S29HO165.html (accessed March 2, 2008). 8. Ministry of Defense, Heisei 21-nendo Nihon no Bouei [Defense of Japan 2009], http:// www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2009/2009/pdf/21shiryo3_4.pdf (accessed November 23, 2009). 9. Jennifer Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?” International Security 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004): 97–98. 10. Ministry of Defense, Heisei 21-nendo Bouei Hakusho [Defense of Japan 2009], 157–58, http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2009/2009/pdf/21030102.pdf (accessed November 20, 2009).

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Global Security Watch—Japan 11. Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF), Koku Jieitai no Yakuwari [Role of the Air Self Defense Force], http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/english/mission/index.html (accessed March 5, 2008); JASDF, Koku Jieitai no Yakuwari: Sora karano Bouei [The role of the JASDF: Defense from Air], http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/mission/mission01.html (accessed March 6, 2008). 12. JASDF, Koku Jieitai no Yakuwari: Daikibo Saigai-nado he no Taiou [The role of the JASDF: Responses to large-scale disasters and other situations], http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/ mission/mission04.html (accessed March 5, 2008). 13. Ibid. 14. JASDF, Kokusai Kinkyuu Enjo Katsutou no Jisseki [A history of the participation in international emergency relief operations]. http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/about/role/kouken _jisseki/ (accessed May 14, 2010). 15. JASDF, Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryokju Katsudo no Jisseki [A history of the participation in peace-cooperation activities]. http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/about/role/kouken_jisseki/ (accessed May 14, 2010); JASDF, Iraku Fukko Shien Haken Koukuu Yusou Tai [Iraq reconstruction support airlift wing], http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/irsaw/ (accessed October 2, 2009). 16. U.S. Department of Defense, Military Capability of the People’s Republic of China, page 5, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf (accessed March 5, 2008). 17. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement April 6, 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341 (accessed October 1, 2009). 18. It is worth noting that the upgrading of the F-15 anticipated under the Mid-Term Defense Program FY 2005–2009 was completed a year earlier than schedule by the end of FY 2008. Ministry of Defense, Wagakuni no Bouei to Yosan: Heisei 20-nendo Yosan no Gaiyo [Japan’s defense and budget: Overview of Japan’s defense budget for FY 2008–2009], 23, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/ yosan/2008/yosan_gaiyou.pdf (accessed March 3, 2008); Yasunori Nishida, “Heisei20-nendo Bouei Kankeihi ni Tsuite” [FY 2008 defense budget]. Finance (March 2008): 22. 19. Author interview (Tatsumi) with a JASDF officer. Tokyo, Japan. May 12, 2008. 20. Ministry of Defense, Heisei 21-nendo Nihon no Bouei [Defense of Japan 2009], http:// www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2009/2009/pdf/21shiryo3_4.pdf (accessed November 23, 2009). 21. Japan Ground Self Defense Force, “Yakuwari” [Our role], http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/ about/roles/index.html (accessed March 6, 2008). 22. Ibid. 23. “Unzen Dake” [Mount Unzen], Wikipedia, http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%9B %B2%E4%BB%99#.E9.9B.B2.E4.BB.99.E5.B2.B3.E3.81.AE.E9.98.B2.E7.81.BD (accessed March 6, 2008). 24. “Chikatetsu Sarini Jiken” [Subway sarin incident], Wikipedia, http://ja.wikipedia.org/ wiki/%E5%9C%B0%E4%B8%8B%E9%89%84%E3%82%B5%E3%83%AA%E3%83 %B3%E4%BA%8B%E4%BB%B6#.E9.98.B2.E8.A1.9B.E5.BA.81.E3.83.BB.E8.87.AA .E8.A1.9B.E9.9A.8A (accessed March 7, 2008). 25. Ministry of Defense, “Heisei 20-nen Iwate Miyagi-nairiku Jishin no Taiou ni Tsuite” [Response to the 2008 Iwate-Miyagi earthquake], http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2008/ 06/19b.html (accessed June 20, 2008). 26. Ministry of Defense, Haiti ni okeru Jieitai butai no PKO Katsudou ni tuite [JSDF operations in PKO in Haiti] February 22, 2010. http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/kokusai _heiwa/haiti_pko/20100209.pdf (accessed, May 14, 2010)

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27. Ministry of Defense, Heisei 19-nen ban Nihon no Bouei [Defense of Japan 2007]. July 2007. 131. 28. Author interview (Tatsumi) with a retired JGSDF officer, Tokyo, Japan, May 10, 2008; JGSDF, Rikujo Jieitai no Soshiki [Organization of the JGSDF], http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/ about/station/index.html (accessed March 6, 2008). 29. Ministry of Defense, Heisei 21-nen ban Bouei Hakusho [2009 defense white paper], page 135. http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2009/2009/pdf/21020204.pdf (accessed May 14, 2010) 30. Ministry of Defense, Heisei 19-nen ban Bouei Hakusho [2007 defense white paper], page 108. 31. Ibid., page 107. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid., page 108. 34. Kensuke Ebata, Nihon no Bouei no Arikata [The modality of defense of Japan], (Tokyo: KK Bestsellers, 2004), 245–57. 35. For a detailed explanation of GSDF’s definition of logistics, see, for example, Shun Azuma, “Jieitai no Kouhou to ha Nani ka” [What is JSDF’s logistics] Securitarian (September 2002), 16–19. 36. http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2009/2009/pdf/21shiryo3_4.pdf (accessed March 10, 2010) 37. See, for example, “Uniformed Institutions” in Yuki Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure: Can Tokyo Meet Washington’s Expectations? (The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2008); Peter J. Wooley, Japan’s Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971–2000 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999). 38. Ministry of Defense, Heisei 21 nendo Nihon no Bouei [Defense of Japan 2009], http:// www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2009/2009/datindex.html (accessed November 26, 2009). 39. Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF), “Kaijo Jieitai no Bouei-ryoku” [Defensive capabilities of the MSDF], http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/formal/about/bouei/index.html (accessed April 10, 2008). 40. James. E. Auer, “Aitsugu Bouei-sho Fushoji: Seiji to Kokumi no Sekinin ni Me wo Mukeyo” [Ministry of Defense scandals continue: Responsibility of political leaders and public must be questioned] Wedge, July 2008: 88–90; Naoyuki Agawa, Umi no Yujo: Beikoku Kaigun to Kaijou Jieitai [Friendship of the sea: U.S. Navy and the Maritime Self-Defense Force] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2001). 41. JMSDF, Keikai Kanshi [Surveillance and reconnaissance], http://www.mod.go.jp/ msdf/formal/about/keikai/index.html (accessed April 5, 2008). 42. See Yoshiro Ikari, Perusha-wan no Gunkan-ki—Kaijo Jieitai Soukai Butai no Kiroku [Battleship flag in the Persian Gulf: Record of JMSDF minesweeping flotilla] (Tokyo: Kojin-sha, 2007) for the accounts of those who were involved in the mission. 43. JMSDF, Saigai he no Taiou” [Response to disasters], http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/ formal/about/saigai/index.html (accessed April 2, 2008). 44. Author’s (Tatsumi) interview with a MSDF officer, January 30, 2008. 45. MSDF Ohminato Regional District Force, Ohminato Chiho Sokan Takeda Yoshikazu [Ohminato Regional District Commander ADM Yoshikazu Takeda], http://www.mod.go.jp/ msdf/oominato/soukan/soukan.htm (accessed May 1, 2008); MSDF Maizuru District Force,

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Global Security Watch—Japan Maizuru Chiho Sokan karano Goaisatsu [Greeting from the Commander of Maizuru District Force],” http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/maizuru/ (accessed May 1, 2008). 46. Kensuke Ebata, op. cit., 27–28. 47. Discussion of the MSDF contribution to U.S. naval deterrent strategy during the Cold War can be found in James E. Auer, “Aitsugu Bouei Fushouji: Seiji to Kokumin no Sekinin ni Me wo Mukeyo” [Continuous scandals by the Ministry of Defense: Responsibility of politicians and the public needs to be examined] Wedge (Wedge Inc.) July 2008, 88–90. A more comprehensive discussion can be found in Naoyuki Agawa, Umi no Yuujo [Friendship at sea] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shin-sha, 2001). 48. Ministry of Defense, Heisei 17-nendo ikou ni Kakawaru Bouei Keikaku no Taiko ni Tsuite [National defense program guideline in and after the Japanese FY 2005], December 10, 2004. In Defense of Japan 2007, 462–69. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/ 44Reference_1_63.pdf (accessed March 30, 2008). 49. “16DDH ‘13,500 ton’ Class” Globalsecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ world/japan/ddh-x.htm (accessed May 6, 2008). 50. Joint Staff Office, Togo Bakuryo Kanbu no Shosho Jimu [The responsibility of the Joint Staff Office], http://www.mod.go.jp/jso/jurisdiction.htm (accessed March 5, 2008). 51. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIRPI), SIPRI Yearbook 2009, Appendix 5A, http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/05/05A (accessed May 21, 2010). 52. The defense budget declined from a ten-year high of ¥4,939.5 billion in 2002 to ¥4,702.8 billion in 2009, a nearly 5% decline over that period (data from MOD, Nihon on Bouei Heisei 21 [Defense of Japan 2009], 344). 53. Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right Through 2020 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 22. 54. Kaijo Hoan-cho Ho, [Japan Coast Guard (JCG) law], Article 1. Adopted April 27, 1948, most recently revised May 2, 2008. http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S23/S23HO028.html (accessed May 10, 2008). 55. Ibid., Article 2. http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S23/S23HO028.html (accessed May 10, 2008). 56. The Japan Coast Guard, Kaijo Hoan Report 2009 nen-ban [Maritime security report 2007] HTML Version, http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/books/report2009/Degital/ninmu/ p041.html#h01 (accessed May 14, 2010). 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid., Articles 5-12, 5-13, 5-14, 5-15, 5-16, 5-17. http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S23/ S23HO028.html (accessed May 10, 2008). 59. Ibid., Article 28-2. http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S23/S23HO028.html (accessed May 10, 2008). 60. Maritime Safety Agency (MSA), Annual Report on Maritime Safety 1998 Edition, http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/e/tosho/apoms1.pdf (accessed March 3, 2008). 61. See, for instance, the MSA, Heisei 9 nen-ban Kaijou Hoan Hakusho [White paper on maritime safety 1997 edition], http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/books/h9haku/mokuji.htm (accessed March 10, 2008). 62. MSA, Heisei 10 nen-ban Kaijou Hoan Hakusho [White paper on maritime safety 1998 edition]; Heisei 11 nen-ban Kaijou Hoan Hakusho [White paper on maritime safety 1999 edition]; Heisei 12 nen-ban Kaijou Hoan Hakusho [White paper on maritime safety 2000 edition].

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63. JCG, “Message from the Commandant” in Kaijo Hoan Report 2001 [2001 Japan Coast Guard annual report], http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/books/report2001/message/ index.html (accessed February 18, 2008). 64. JCG, Kaijo Hoan Gyomu Suiko Keikaku [Maritime safety task implementation plan], April 2001, http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/seisakuhyoka/h16.4.8/keikaku.pdf (accessed February 20, 2008). 65. JCG, Kaijo Hoan Gyomu Suiko Keikaku [Maritime safety task implementation plan], April 2001, http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/seisakuhyoka/h16.4.8/keikaku.pdf (accessed February 20, 2008); The JCG, Dai Ni-ji Kaijo Hoan Gyomu Suiko Keikaku [Second maritime safety task implementation plan], April 2006, http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/seisakuhyoka/no2keikaku.pdf (accessed February 20, 2008). 66. JCG, “Junshi-sen/tei Koku-ki no Seibi” [Acquisition of patrol ships/boats and aircraft], http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/shisaku/soubi.htm (accessed February 3, 2008). 67. JCG, “Tatkokukan Renkei” [Multinational collaboration] in Kaijo Hoan Report 2006 nenban [Japan Coast Guard Annual Report 2006], HTML version, http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/ info/books/report2006/tokushu/p019.html (accessed March 5, 2008). 68. Ibid. 69. Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 77. 70. JCG, Shiryohen: JunshiSentei no Joukyoui [Appendices: Ships] in Kaijo Hoan Report 2009 nen-ban [Japan Coast Guard annual report 2009], HTML version, http://www .kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/books/report2009/Degital/shiryo/p130.html (accessed May 14, 2010); JCG, Shiryohen: Koukuuki no Haibi Joukyou [Appendices: Distribution of airplanes] in Kaijo Hoan Report 2009 nen-ban [Japan Coast Guard annual report 2009], HTML version. http:// www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/books/report2009/Degital/shiryo/p131.html (accessed May 14, 2010). 71. JCG, Kaijo Hoan-cho ho no Kaisei [Revision of the JCG law] in Kaijo Hoan Report 2002 nen-ban [Japan Coast Guard annual report 2002], HTML version, http:// www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/books/report2002/topics/01_2.html (accessed March 15, 2008). 72. National Police Agency (NPA), “Police of Japan: Organization,” page 5. http:// www.npa.go.jp/english/kokusai/1.pdf (accessed February 2, 2008). 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid. 75. Ibid. 76. Toshiyuki Shikata, Nihon wa Konomama deha Ikinokorenai [Japan cannot survive as is] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 2007), 101–107. 77. MOD, “Noto Hanto Oki Fushin-sen Jian ni okeru Kyokun Hansei Jikou ni Tsuite: Youshi” [Regarding the “lessons learned” from the Unidentified Ship Incident off of Noto peninsula: Summary], http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1999/zuhyo/frame/ az116009.htm (accessed March 5, 2008). 78. The Japanese government ordered the dispatch of the JSDF to engage in the anti-piracy operations on March 13, 2009. The operation was first ordered as Kaijo Keibi Koudou (Maritime Patrol Operation) that is authorized under Article 93 of the SDF Law. As the government enacted the Anti-Piracy Law in July 2009, this law authorizes the ongoing SDF operation in the Gulf of Aden today. Since the operations went underway in March 2009, MSDF vessels have completed over 100 missions, escorting 834 civilian vessels as of April 2010, of which

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Global Security Watch—Japan 713 vessels have been escorted since the enactment of the Anti-Piracy Law. Ministry of Defense, Kaizoku Taisho no tame ni haken sareta Suijou Butai no Goei Jisseki ni Tsuite [Regarding the accomplishments in escorts missions conducted by MSDF surface ships dispatched to engage in anti-piracy activities],” May 7, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/ news/2010/05/07b.html (accessed May 14, 2010). 79. Ministry of Defense, Asou Naikaku Souri Daijin no Danwa [Statement by Prime Minister Aso] March 13, 2009, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/asospeech/2009/03/13danwa.html (accessed May 14, 2010). 80. Author interview (Tatsumi) with a MSDF officer. Tokyo, Japan. July 20, 2008. 81. Author interview (Tatsumi) with a MOD official. Tokyo, Japan. May 8, 2008.

CHAPTER

4

The Japan-United States Security Relationship

2010 marks the 50th anniversary of the Mutual Security Treaty between Japan and the United States, and 65 years since hostilities between the two countries ended with Japan’s defeat in World War II. A number of commemorations are planned for Tokyo and Washington to mark this historic anniversary of one the world’s most important and long-standing security alliances. At the same time, the commemorations were marked with tension and concern due both to long-simmering undercurrents in each country and around the world that have worked to undermine the depth of the alliance in some ways, and to the recent sea-change in Japanese domestic politics that could lead to a fundamental restructuring of the nature of the alliance in the coming years. Regardless of what the future may bring, the fact that the United States was central to the development of Japan’s postwar military capabilities and overall security posture is undisputed. Although Japan itself, naturally, determines the course of its own security policy, an examination of Japan’s overall security policy would not be complete without careful consideration of the role of the United States in the creation, maintenance, and likely future course of Japan’s security posture. The United States has contributed substantially to the development of Japan’s security from the time of the initial development of new military structures after World War II through the considerable deepening of the military alliance in recent years. In fact, so substantial is the role of the United States that much analysis of Japan’s security policy—its development, its strategy, its future direction—begins by examining the role that the Japan-U.S. alliance played in shaping Japanese security policy, and the contributions of the United States in

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particular. This volume so far has taken a different approach, focusing on Japan’s indigenous defense institutions, capabilities, and development. Nevertheless, it is not possible to understand any of these three areas without reference to the United States. While previous chapters have made passing references to the role of the United States, this chapter focuses on it: the role of the United States both as an independent actor and, distinctly, as a formal alliance partner in the development and recent evolution of Japan’s national security policy. This discussion of the role of the United States in a bilateral security relationship is then further expanded to consider the evolving regional and multilateral context of Japan’s security in chapter five. The Japan-U.S. relationship is not limited to a military alliance. Rather, it is one the deepest, closest, and longest-standing relationships between two states in the contemporary international system. Although many focus on the security aspects of the alliance, the economic health of the relationship between the two states may be even more central to their shared future.1 The United States and Japan have long been the two largest economies in the world (though China will surpass Japan in the near future) and, despite occasional intense bilateral tensions over trade, have worked very closely in global economic management, including during the recent global economic downturn. The two states also provide the most funds to the United Nations and they work closely together in that venue as well as in a wide range of areas including traditional and non-traditional security, economic development, human rights, global climate change, and countless other issues. The two states also have deep cultural and social ties dating back to the late nineteenth century when both were rising challengers to the Europeandominated global order, to the contemporary period where a large number of citizens of both states have lived in the other state for study, business, military service, or to pursue cultural interests. The mainstream view among citizens of both the United States and Japan is that the Japan-U.S. alliance has acted as a positive force for both countries for years, serving vital national interests for both states. Japan’s security alliance with the United States was a strategy widely seen as successful among the Japanese public, elites, and scholars. In particular, the alliance with the United States allowed Japan to spend less on its military than it likely would have had it been solely responsible for its national defense. It also provided a second-order benefit of limiting the political confrontation at home and abroad that likely would have developed had Japan moved to quickly rebuild a full-fledged military in the early postwar years. The fact that no member of Japan’s postwar military forces has been killed in combat in over 65 years is a point of pride and relief to many Japanese, and a point of envy from many states in the world. The role of the Japan-U.S. alliance should not be minimized in allowing this success. At the same time, however, the alliance relationship has been politicized in both states at various times in the postwar period, including at the present time.

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In Japan, many on the political left have viewed the United States as a negative, militarizing influence on a fragile postwar democracy, while some on the political right have characterized the Japan-U.S. security treaty as an unwelcome infringement on Japanese sovereignty by the United States.2 The mass political demonstrations in front of the Diet building in Tokyo opposing the revision of the Japan-U.S. security treaty in 1960 are thought to be the largest demonstrations in Japanese political history; and the signing of the new security treaty was only achieved by means that have widely been viewed as undemocratic, and that led to the resignation of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, the de-purged war criminal who resorted to such tactics under American tutelage. Arguably, Japanese domestic politics have become a more unpredictable variable in alliance management today—after the rise of the DPJ to power in August 2009—than perhaps at any point since the controversial revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960, although the periods around the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control (late 1960s to early 1970s) and immediately after the end of the Cold War (especially when the LDP briefly lost their hold on power in 1993) also were quite uncertain. Three broad security objectives characterize U.S. policy towards Japan and its national security establishment. First, the United States seeks to ensure peace and stability in East Asia, and looks to Japan to support this objective. Second, more broadly, the United States seeks diplomatic and logistical reinforcement of U.S. initiatives and policy preferences both in the region and world-wide. Third, more concretely, the United States seeks in Japan a partner to share the “burden” of supplying such security deliverables—both directly financial (such as the $13 billion payment Japan contributed to the costs of the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War and the “host-nation support” Japan contributes to offset the cost of U.S. forces based in Japan) as well as “in-kind” support of U.S. military roles (for example, the Japanese MSDF patrolling of sea lanes in East Asia and refueling support in Operation Enduring Freedom related to Afghanistan). These three U.S. policy objectives vis-a`-vis Japan have a long lineage that in part shape how Japan’s national security establishment interprets U.S. requests for assistance in the present day, as discussed in the sections that follow. FROM PROTECTOR TO PARTNER: THE POSTWAR EVOLUTION OF JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONS IN BRIEF

It is important to review the basic threads of the long and often contentious history of Japan-U.S. security relations in order to understand contemporary Japan-U.S. interaction over security issues.3 The long-term U.S. military relationship with Japan was fundamentally shaped by past war experiences, in particular the Second World War and the Cold War, and more recently the so-called Global War on Terrorism. As outlined briefly in chapter one, the United States played the

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leading role first in Japan’s disarmament after its surrender to end World War II, and then, conversely, in Japan’s re-armament after the outbreak of the Cold War with the Soviet Union (and, to a lesser extent, China). The United States insisted on an unconditional surrender of Japan to end World War II, and required a complete demilitarization of Japanese forces during the first years of the postwar occupation of Japan. The U.S. occupation force played the leading role in drafting a new postwar constitution for Japan that enshrined the principle of Japan’s renunciation of war in the now-famous Article Nine, which also proclaims that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.”4 As the security situation in East Asia deteriorated in the immediate postwar years, however, it was also the United States that strongly pressured Japan to rebuild military forces under an entirely different institutional framework. Even a politically weak Japan—recently defeated and heavily dependent on U.S. assistance—resisted to some extent strong U.S. pressure to build up military forces to a far greater degree than actually developed, a strategy typically credited to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida (see Appendix A for a brief biography), and elevated in much writing about Japan’s national security policies to comprise part of the so-called “Yoshida Doctrine.”5 These past behaviors illustrate that for quite some time the United States has actively sought to “normalize” Japan’s security practices—that is, to recreate among the Japanese leadership at least, and preferably among the Japanese public as well, a belief that the use of military force is a “normal” means of statecraft and that the pursuit of expanded military capabilities for the state is a “normal” objective of political leadership. As early as the Korean War (1950–1953) and as recently as the Global War on Terrorism (2001–present)—with a number of specific and general Cold War conflicts in between—the United States has sought a concrete Japanese contribution to the maintenance of international security. Table 4.1 chronicles major milestones in this relationship during the Cold War. Current Japanese defense planners are well aware of this history and—as discussed previously in the context of debate over the overseas deployment of the JSDF— often are haunted by past inability to satisfy the United States’ seemingly insatiable demand, despite the multiple instances of Japan responding to U.S. demands, as shown in Table 4.1. At the same time, another important historical antecedent to understanding the current U.S. role in Japan’s security policies was the simultaneous U.S. desire to contain Japan—to prevent Japan from the development of sufficient military capacity to once again challenge the United States militarily, or to thwart U.S. security objectives in the region. The pursuit of a considerable U.S. base presence in Japan served this, among other, purposes; U.S. efforts to ensure that Japan would not become a nuclear weapons state in the 1960s, including efforts to secure Japanese ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is another.

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Table 4.1 Important Developments in the Japan-U.S. Security Relationship,

1945–911

Date

Event

1945

World War II ends with Japan’s surrender; occupation of Japan begins.

1951

U.S.–Japan Mutual Security Treaty signed.

1952

Occupation of Japan ends, apart from administrative control over Okinawa.

1954

Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) established.

1960

Japan-U.S. Security Treaty revised to its current form.

1969

U.S. President Nixon declares a new “doctrine” in Guam calling for greater reliance on Asian allies, in particular Japan, for their own security.

1972

Administrative control of Okinawa returns to Japan.

1978

First Guidelines on Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation signed.

1981

Prime Minister Suzuki pledges to extend MSDF patrol of sea lanes to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan.

1983

Prime Minister Nakasone refers to Japan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in his meeting with U.S. president Reagan.

1991

Japan sends MSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf, after declining to send the JSDF to participate in Operation Desert Storm.

1

See Appendix B for a more detailed chronology of major events in Japanese security, including further developments in the Japan-U.S. security relationship.

More broadly the care taken in selecting which military technology to share with Japan and what type of capabilities to encourage the JSDF to develop equally derive, in part, from a strategy of containment—though another important motivation, especially in recent years, is a U.S. desire to achieve synergies and interoperability with Japanese forces at the least economic cost to both states. In the later years of the Cold War, decisions over which military technologies to share with Japan also were affected by the desire to contain Japan’s economic expansion and commercial technology base, but this is a separate issue—and one that at times came in conflict with U.S. security objectives.6 It is important to keep in mind the economic aspects of the Japan-U.S. relationship in this context—that according to one often-cited poll, in 1988 more Americans viewed Japanese economic competition as a greater threat to the United States than Soviet military might.7 Although the vestiges of this strategy remain in the major documents that govern the Japan-U.S. military alliance, the explicit (or even implicit) idea of U.S. containment of Japan is almost wholly absent in current U.S. strategic thinking regarding Japan. However, the United States continues to follow a clear policy course that

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nevertheless seeks to achieve a similar result—a permanent U.S. base presence in Japan and a seamless meshing of U.S. and Japanese military forces that are fully interoperable and have clearly delineated roles and missions for a range of military contingencies in the region (and perhaps beyond).8 Beyond the two principal strands of historical development of Japan-U.S. security cooperation—the incessant U.S. pressure for Japan to increase its military roles and missions and the simultaneous desire to contain Japanese military ambitions—a third area of important historical development is the expanded military role Japan began to play in the later years of the Cold War. Two distinct aspects of recent Japanese actions in the area of military security—alliancedeepening and increased capabilities for the JSDF—have their genesis in the late 1970s and 1980s, symbolized by such important developments (see Table 4.1) as the signing of the first Japan-U.S. Guidelines for Defense Cooperation in 1978 and the expanded Japanese role in patrolling sea lanes in East Asia promised in the early 1980s and delivered over the course of that decade. Japan proved to be an indispensable partner to the United States in what would become the end game of the Cold War. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) reportedly considered Japan the “chain link fence” to contain Soviet naval and air capabilities in the Pacific during that period.9 In the immediate post-Cold War years, there was a palpable fear among some in Japan and elsewhere in the region that the United States would reduce its security role in the region, leading to possible instability resulting from expanded military roles by other powers in the region to fill the vacuum. Others questioned the continued need for a U.S. presence after the disappearance of the Soviet threat. In reality, however, the significance of the U.S.-Japan alliance to U.S. strategy in Asia has been recognized and supported on a bi-partisan basis. During the Clinton administration, after DOD’s 1993 Bottom-up Review of U.S. strategy in the postCold War strategic environment, the United States proactively advocated the need for a continued U.S. presence in Asia in both official and semi-official documents that have contributed to the shape of U.S. alliance policy in the Asia–Pacific region in the post-Cold War era. For instance, the 1995 U.S. Security Strategy for the Asia– Pacific Region (the so-called East Asia Strategy Report but better known as the Nye Initiative, named after Joseph S. Nye, Jr., then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, who initiated the issuance of the report), sought to address this concern by reiterating that the United States would maintain a troop presence of 100,000 personnel in the Asia-Pacific region in order to ensure peace and stability region-wide.10 With regard to the Japan-U.S. alliance in particular, the report indicated that the United States considered this alliance the lynchpin of peace and stability in the region. The U.S. government also concluded a bilateral consultation process which resulted in the reaffirmation and the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance (by the issuance of Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996) and the revision of defense cooperation between U.S. armed

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forces and the JSDF (the 1997 revision of the Japan-U.S. Guidelines for Defense Cooperation).11 U.S. emphasis on the centrality of the Japan-U.S. alliance was further reiterated in a Special Report issued by the Institute of National Strategic Studies in October 2000, commonly referred to as “the Armitage-Nye Report.”12 The Report encouraged the U.S. government to nurture its relationship with Japan toward the kind of a “special relationship” that Washington enjoyed with Great Britain—a recommendation that was largely incorporated into the George W. Bush administration’s policy toward Asia. For instance, the National Security Strategy of the United States issued in 2002 and in 2006 by the White House stresses the importance of nurturing relationships with U.S. allies worldwide.13 The February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) by the DOD specifically refers to the enhancement of U.S. alliances in the Asia–Pacific region, including Japan.14 Lastly, one of the critical components of the Global Posture Review (GPR), which was formally launched in 2004, was a large-scale U.S. force realignment in Japan, and the transformation of the roles and missions between U.S. forces and the JSDF that will accompany the realignment. Known as the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) in a bilateral context, the two governments revisited the strategic rationale for the Japan-U.S. alliance in the post-9/11 world, revised the roles and missions between U.S. armed forces and the JSDF, and discussed the realignment of U.S. force presence in Japan. It is this realignment that has been called into question when the DPJ government under Yukio Hatoyama decided to delay the implementation of a plan for relocation of U.S. Marine bases in Okinawa concluded in May 2006 by the previous LDP government as one of its first security policy decisions. Current U.S. initiatives to pursue “jointness,” “interoperability,” and the “revolution in military affairs” inevitably continue to force Japan’s national security establishment to consider carefully how it, too, will address such issues—both to respond to the wishes of its alliance partner, and to develop its own Self Defense Forces in the most effective manner to secure the defense of Japan. Both before and after the shift in U.S. security policy following September 11, 2001, the United States has sought to influence Japanese domestic debates on Japan’s future security role, and continues to do so in relation to both country-specific issues like North Korea and China, as well as to capability and process issues such as interoperability of U.S. and Japanese forces and the joint development of missile defense. Today the alliance’s goals and functions evolve in tandem with the security environment in the Asia–Pacific region and globally. MULTIPLE AVENUES OF U.S. INFLUENCE ON JAPAN’S SECURITY POLICIES

It is often perceived in both countries that faced with long-standing constraints on national security policy, the United States has worked with a conservative elite

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in Japan to push the envelope of Japan’s public opinion in responding to new security threats as they emerge. Under this interpretation, the rise of China and continuing instability on the Korean peninsula, combined with a new frame of an international war on terrorism, should allow political elites in both Japan and the United States to advance a long-standing agenda to boost Japanese military capabilities and practices. In reality, however, the ways in which the United States affects the development of Japan’s security policies are much more complicated and, indeed, diverse. Through the provision of advanced weapons technology and institutional expertise, joint participation in strategic planning, formal negotiations, and informal daily interaction through alliance institutions as well as ad hoc cooperative exercises and commercial ventures, the United States influences Japan’s national security policy in a multitude of ways, large and small. Such influence has deeply affected the core functions of Japan’s national security institutions in ways that have evolved over time. At the most basic level, the existence of a formal military alliance between Japan and the United States led to less need for military capabilities than otherwise would have been pursued by Japan in the postwar period. As noted previously, and by many analysts of postwar Japanese defense policy, the United States has pressured Japan to play a greater role in its defense for decades with only limited success (though there have more successes in recent years). Beyond defense planning under a military alliance, the United States also has provided a great range of military technologies and equipment to Japan over the years.15 These transfers resulted in a lessened cost of weapons development for Japan, and a broader influence on Japanese defense planners by the United States in terms of the type of equipment purchased, often presented as an argument for ensuring a high level of interoperability between Japanese and American armed forces. Beginning in the 1980s, and especially in the 1990s and more recently, coordination on weapons procurement moved to the joint development of weapons and related technology for use by the armed forces of both states—the controversial FSX (now F-2) fighter plane being one early attempt, and the equally controversial (at least initially) missile defense joint development being a more recent example. These programs have been controversial in Japan in part because they call into question Japan’s strict policies restricting the export of weapons or weapons-related technology; as a result, a series of exceptions to Japan’s arms export policies have had to be made to allow Japan-U.S. joint weapons development, exceptions that have not been made to allow joint development with any other countries.16 Table 4.2 provides a complete list of joint Japan-U.S. weapons development programs to date, indicating the range of areas where the United States has influenced the defense planning of the Japanese state and the marked increase of such activities in recent years, with six different projects currently on-going. Another discrete area of influence by the United States on Japan’s broader national security policies is through the regular interaction of defense-related

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Table 4.2 Japan–U.S. Joint Research Projects, 1992–2009 Project

Date of Initiation

Date of Completion

Ducted rocket engine

Sept. 1992

Jan. 1999

Advanced steel technology

Oct. 1995

Jan. 2002

Fighting vehicle propulsion technology (ceramic materials)

Oct. 1995

Oct. 2002

Eye-safe laser radar

Sept. 1996

Sept. 2001

Ejection seat

Mar. 1998

Mar. 2003

Advance hybrid propulsion technology

May 1998

May 2005

Shallow water acoustic technology

June 1999

Feb. 2003

Ballistic missile defense technology

Aug. 1999

Mar. 2008

Low vulnerability gun propellant for field artillery

Mar. 2000

Jan. 2004

Avionics aboard the follow-on aircraft to the P-3C

Mar. 2002

Sept 2006

Software radio

Mar. 2002

Mar. 2007

Advanced hull material/structural technology

Apr. 2005

Ongoing

Sea-based radar system

Apr. 2006

Ongoing

Combat system for ship

Apr. 2006

Ongoing

New guided missiles for ballistic missile defense

June 2006

Ongoing

Effect on people by aircraft fuel and/or engine emission

Mar. 2007

Ongoing

Palm-sized automated chemical agent detector

Mar. 2008

Ongoing

Source: Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2009, p. 249.

officials of the two states—beyond the planning of defense doctrine specified under the formal alliance to the day-to-day consultation and influence on standard procedures, institutional structures, and personal attitudes and beliefs. The demonstration effect of the United States is quite strong and arguably deepening as the United States and Japan work closely together in an increasing number of areas. The establishment in Japan of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) in 1995, for example, mirrored the earlier establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in the United States, and for similar purposes—to promote sharing intelligence across the military services and civilian defense organizations. The U.S. decision to move towards greater “jointness” among

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the military services in the planning and execution of their missions similarly has been a recent export of the United States to Japan’s broader national security policies. Person-to-person interaction also is increasing between Japanese and Americans in areas related to defense. The number of joint exercises between U.S. and Japanese forces has increased markedly over the postwar period, with 27 such exercises involving tens of thousands of personnel from each country in 2007—the latest year that has been officially chronicled in Japan’s annual defense white paper.17 As well, there has been a marked growth in the number of formal Japanese “defense attache´s” and JSDF officers serving in Washington, DC, and a large number of American civilian and uniformed defense-related personnel visiting and residing in Japan from the Department of Defense, the military services, and other government agencies involved in the war on terrorism (though the number of U.S. military personnel based in Japan has steadily declined in the postwar period from its peak during the formal military occupation of Japan from 1945–1952). In the non-governmental sector, person-to-person interaction through defense contracting also seems to be increasing in line with the initiation and growth in formal joint weapons development in the past decade, as noted previously. As such interactions increase, individuals on both sides are socialized into perceiving threats and solutions in a common manner.18 In addition to an increasing number of informal and personal-level exchanges between individuals in the Japanese and U.S. national security establishments, formal institutional consultation also has increased in frequency and depth in the past decade, as indicated in Table 4.3—though some believe that such consultation may have peaked in the Koizumi-Bush years (2001–2006). As discussed previously, Japan and United States formally clarified and augmented their respective roles and missions in their military alliance in 1997 by revising the U.S.–Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, modifying an earlier agreement originally signed in 1978. The revision of the bilateral guidelines for defense cooperation began in earnest when U.S. and Japanese government officials lamented after the 1993 North Korean nuclear crisis that there was very little clarity in what Japan could do to support the United States in a military conflict in East Asia. The revised Guidelines clarified the roles expected of Japan under three different circumstances—in peacetime, at a time of direct attacks against Japan, and a new middle ground in the event of a regional security contingency (the so-called shuhen jitai, “situation in the areas surrounding Japan”—see Appendix C, Document 9). Among the three categories where the Guidelines might come into play, what Japan should do in a regional contingency was the most politically controversial, as it was not a clear case of armed attack against Japan, yet Japanese assistance to U.S. military action was called for. After several years of debate, new “guidelines”

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Table 4.3 Major Japan-U.S. Security Agreements, 1996–2010 Year

Event

1996

Hashimoto-Clinton Joint Security Declaration

1996

New Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA) proclaimed

1997

Security Consultative Committee (SCC) releases revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation

2001

Japan offers to send MSDF ships to Indian Ocean to assist the U.S.-led coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan (as well as other support post-9/11)

2003

Japan offers to send JSDF troops to Iraq to assist with reconstruction and relief efforts

2005

Japan agrees to co-development of missile defense with the U.S.

2005

SCC reports released (February and October) on “common strategic objectives” and on realignment of the alliance

2006

SCC report releases an implementation plan for the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan

2007

SCC report on “alliance transformation” issued

2009

Agreement signed on the transfer of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa to Guam, based on the 2006 SCC report

2010

SCC joint declaration commemorates the 50th anniversary of the Security Treaty

as to what the Japanese government is authorized to do in case of contingencies in situations in the areas surrounding Japan were legislated in May 1999 into the Law to Ensure Japan’s Peace and Security in the Situations in the Areas Surrounding Japan (the shuhen jitai-hou). As discussed in greater detail in chapter three, the law authorizes the JSDF to engage in the following activities at sea and in the airspace in the area surrounding Japanese territory: logistical support, rear-area search-andrescue operations, and ship inspections.19 Although this expanded regional security role for Japan was motivated by the new post-Cold War security environment Japan faced, the role of the United States in driving this reconsideration should not be minimized. Around the same time, in 1996, the United States and Japan signed a revised Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA), which enabled the Self Defense Forces to provide and receive goods and services from U.S forces when the JSDF participates in joint training, UN peacekeeping operations, international relief activities, and regional contingencies,20 further placing the United States in a driving role, pushing Japan to modernize and deepen its defense commitments and capabilities.

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Another institutionalized aspect of greater Japan-U.S. defense cooperation that helped to facilitate these broader agreements was the upgrade of the long-standing Security Consultative Committee (SCC) to an equal exchange of Japanese and U.S. officials under a “two plus two” framework of the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of the JDA (now Minister of Defense) and the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense (upgraded from the previous practice of the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command).21 It is this body that declared formally the new Guidelines for Defense Cooperation in 1997, and more recently announced a series of new agreements in reports issued in February 2005, October 2005, and May 2006 which were the result of a bilateral dialogue to adjust the alliance mechanism, a process known as the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). (See Appendix C, Document 10 for the text of the May 2006 joint statement.) These and subsequent SCC reports have announced the intention to increase missions to be completed by the JSDF in conjunction with the U.S. military and the capabilities of the JSDF itself, augmenting the cooperative framework set out in the revised 1997 Guidelines related to security contingencies in areas surrounding Japan and those related to fighting terrorism. Moreover, the reports have emphasized an even greater degree of shared goals and values of the Japanese and U.S. foreign policy.22 THE CHALLENGE OF MEETING MUTUAL EXPECTATIONS

The expanding and deepening of the Japan-U.S. security relationship over the past six decades should not be seen as an inevitable outcome dictated by the international environment or the politics within each state. Throughout the relationship, considerable effort has been expended on both sides to address evolving domestic politics and the personal relationships among political and bureaucratic leaders. The latest tensions apparent from the rise of the DPJ to power—the call for a more “equal partnership,” the politicization of secret side-deals regarding the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan during the Cold War, and delaying previous government agreements on U.S. base realignment in Japan—are only the latest examples of the challenge of meeting the political and security expectations of both sides. During the Cold War, the principal goal of U.S. policy toward Asia broadly and Japan in particular was to prevent a communist takeover of capitalist states in the region, including Japan. U.S. bases in Japan, and to a lesser extent Japanese logistical support, were critical to U.S. war efforts on the Korean Peninsula and in Vietnam, and to containing Chinese ambitions vis-a`-vis Taiwan and Soviet naval activities. Today, this goal has transformed to encouraging Japan to partner with the United States in the global war on terrorism, to help check a rising China and belligerent North Korea, and to promote transparency and stability

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in security planning and practice in Asia overall. Still, the primary U.S. complaint regarding Japanese security policy remains that Japan does not contribute enough—that it “free-rides” on U.S. blood and treasure. Japan has, first and foremost, expected from the United States a firm commitment to its co-defense in exchange for allowing U.S. military bases in Japan to be used for other U.S. military objectives. Japan also has sought a broader U.S. contribution to regional security and stability. Japanese government concerns vis-a`-vis the United States have oscillated between “abandonment” (that the United States would fail to come to Japan’s defense at a time of need) and “entrapment” (that the United States would draw Japan into a military conflict that Japan might have avoided on its own). Among the Japanese public there has been a broader range of criticisms, ranging from fears (especially on the left) that the United States has negatively influenced a greater “militarization” of Japan than it otherwise would have followed, to fears (especially on the political right) that due to U.S. influence Japan has not pursued sufficient military capabilities of its own. The fear of abandonment was high in Japan after the end of the Cold War. Despite broad fears of U.S. disengagement with the Asia–Pacific region in the early 1990s, however, Japan and the United States embarked upon a substantial broadening and deepening of their military alliance by the mid-1990s. By redefining the Japan-U.S. alliance to be “the linchpin of United States security policy in Asia,”23 Tokyo and Washington transformed their bilateral alliance from a Cold War-era anti-Soviet bloc alliance to the core of a web of U.S. bilateral alliances in the Asia–Pacific region and even worldwide. As a result, Japan’s national security institutions, particularly its military institutions, have had to adapt to a substantial degree—as discussed in chapters two and three. Beyond peace and stability in the East Asian region, the United States seeks from Japan diplomatic reinforcement of U.S. initiatives and policy preferences beyond the security realm in East Asia, and in the world as a whole. Moreover, the United States seeks a partner in Japan that not only will support U.S. policy objectives, but also will lend its own substantial political resources and weight to help to achieve these objectives—be they to balance against a rising China, contain a belligerent North Korea, help monitor and manage Islamic extremism in Southeast Asia, or to assist in international problems outside of East Asia, from climate change to piracy. In the East Asian region, the United States often has called on Japan to coordinate its approach to interaction with China with that of the United States—attempting a delicate equilibrium of engagement and military balancing. The U.S. successfully pressured Japan to limit relations with China through much of the Cold War (until the U.S. itself decided to open to China) and again after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, and more recently has coordinated policy over a range of issues. The fact that Japan now conducts more trade with China than does the United States, and long has invested far more in

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China than the United States, makes Japan potentially an even more valuable partner to the United States to expand U.S. influence over China—if the two countries can coordinate their policies regarding China. Such coordination is not without a cost, nor without political risks, to Japan. Japanese leaders must satisfy their own domestic political constituencies vis-a`vis China as well as their own conceptions of Japanese national interest. Some quarters perceive that Japan’s military alliance with the United States gets in the way of better Japanese relations with China, either due to too much of a military role for Japan or too little independent Japanese military capability.24 On the other hand, some in the United States fear that U.S. interests in China may be compromised by too close an American relationship with Japan.25 They fear that tension between Japan and China over historical issues and other questions of military and economic competition could jeopardize more expansive cooperation between the United States and China. The United States also has actively sought Japanese support for U.S. policy initiatives with North Korea—particularly in the areas of counter-proliferation of nuclear and missile technology. Through such institutional structures as the Six-Party Talks (the United States, Japan, South Korea, China, Russia, and North Korea), the United States has sought to coordinate with Japan to lead other members of the talks to follow a harder line with North Korea. In the wake of North Korean missile tests in July 2006 that were followed by nuclear tests in October 2006, the United States and Japan together pursued an even harder line with North Korea, jointly pressuring China to support sanctions against North Korea in the United Nations, and agreeing to accelerate deployment of joint missile defense systems; such coordination has been redoubled in the wake of similar North Korean missile and nuclear tests in 2009. In Southeast Asia as well, the United States has sought an active partner in Japan to leverage substantial Japanese assets (both financial and knowledge-based) in the region. Although not as high profile as Japan’s overseas deployments to the Indian Ocean or to Iraq, under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Japan has trained and equipped the maritime security forces of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Outside the Asia–Pacific region, the United States has sought Japanese diplomatic and material support for U.S. military campaigns and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, for addressing growing concern over Iranian nuclear development, and for a large range of issues the United States seeks to pursue in the United Nations. Japan was the first ally to deploy in support of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in October 2001 and provided a wide range of other support for U.S. efforts in the war on terrorism, including being one of the twenty-seven states forming the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq in 2003—although in both cases in non-combat roles. Moreover, Japan was one of only two states to support the U.S. contention before the outbreak of that war that even if United Nations inspections were strengthened and expanded, they

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were unlikely to lead to the elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.26 In recent years Japan has become the leading financial contributor to the civil reconstruction of Afghanistan—though Japan thus far has continued to eschew a military contribution to efforts there. Finally, beyond rhetorical support for U.S. objectives, the United States seeks a concrete contribution from Japan to provide security deliverables in the region and worldwide, such as the cases of JSDF cooperation with U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean, in Iraq, and in Southeast Asia through PSI noted earlier. In the early Cold War years, such a contribution was conceptualized as a new type of armed forces—the Self Defense Forces—which would protect Japan in the event of an attack, freeing up U.S. forces based in Japan to concentrate on other areas. The multiple defense build-ups of the JSDF in the Cold War years were a testament to this strategy, as illustrated by a growing number of tanks, fighter planes, and ships in the JSDF. As the capabilities of the JSDF increased over time, the United States increasingly sought a regional security role for the JSDF, such as the MSDF patrolling of sea lanes in areas surrounding Japan. In the post-Cold War era, joint weapons development entered the agenda. More recently, the United States has sought even further expanded roles for the JSDF to provide for regional security and to participate in the front lines of the war on terror—both based in Japan as well as abroad, such as the foreign dispatch of the JSDF discussed in chapter three and the greater participation of Japan in international security forums discussed in chapter five. Japan’s political and national security establishments have responded concretely to steady U.S. demands for burden sharing, sometimes in dramatic ways. For example, the “host-nation support” to provide financial offsets for the cost of U.S. forces stationed in Japan is unparalleled among the dozens of countries in which U.S. forces are based,27 amounting to $4.4 billion in direct and indirect support in 2004—estimated at 75 percent of the total cost of maintaining U.S. troops in Japan.28 As well, Japan was the only country to increase taxes explicitly to make a financial contribution to the first Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991, ultimately contributing over $13 billion to that conflict. In May 2006, Japan agreed to cover over half of the estimated cost of redeploying U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam, to the tune of $6 billion—though the implementation of this agreement is currently uncertain under the DPJ government. Beyond a financial contribution, the expanded patrolling of sea lanes in Asia by the MSDF that began in the latter years of the Cold War and the refueling operations by the MSDF in support of OEF in Afghanistan are two additional areas of concrete support provided by Japan at the instigation of the United States. These latter areas of in-kind support provided by the MSDF in support of broader American military objectives exemplify the deep influence of the United States on the development of Japan’s national security institutions, capabilities, and policies.

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Certainly it is the Japanese themselves who make decisions about how their own national security institutions should evolve in response to changing global conditions. However, it is often difficult to separate Japanese concepts of security challenges and their appropriate responses from the overt and indirect influence of Japan’s long-standing (and only) alliance partner. Still, divergence is clear in some areas, and the attempts to reconcile these sometimes different conceptions of Japanese and American interest is instructive when examining the U.S. role in Japan’s national security policies. A recent somewhat pessimistic report by the U.S.-based National Bureau of Asian Research writes: “The alliance is failing to meet the expectations of both the U.S. and Japan in significant ways. For the U.S., the continuing inability of the alliance to achieve an operational state in the core mission of the defense of Japan as well as to be operationally relevant in the region remain the key failings. For Japan, the primary growing concern is the U.S. meeting and sustaining commitments to the defense of Japan, including extended deterrence. At base, both partners have reasonable reasons to feel their core expectations are not being met nor will be met by the current trajectory. Thus, despite public statements about strength, the alliance is actually quite brittle precisely at a time when both allies are perhaps depending on it more than ever.”29 Others also have lamented a lack of depth in the non-military aspects of the Japan-U.S. alliance, but are more optimistic about future ties.30 Calder, for example, sees the alliance as critical to the positive future of both countries, and argues that a vibrant future relationship is possible if both parties seek it.31 It is not uncommon for joint statements and other comments from officials on both sides of the Pacific to seek to paper over real differences in policy objectives, threat perception, and defense goals. At each stage of the alliance partnership— today as well as in the past—domestic politics on both sides, different geopolitical and geo-strategic circumstances, and differing perceptions of threat all contribute to the position of the United States not just as a partner but also as an advocate for a particular agenda. Because U.S. policy objectives globally and in Asia require substantial Japanese cooperation and support, the United States often puts heavy political pressure on Japan. As such, the crafting of joint statements or the issuing of public statements from either side can serve as opportunities to push favored agenda items and policy outcomes as much as to reflect genuine agreement on the stated policy. Differences are not limited to those between the United States and Japan as sovereign states. There often are substantial disagreements over national security objectives within each state, among policymakers, strategists, and the general public. At times, divisive foreign policy issues are elevated to the center of national political debate, and can form a basis for differentiation of political party platforms or individual candidates for office in both countries. The degree of military capability of the JSDF and the conditions under which the JSDF might be deployed overseas illustrate well how different constituencies within Japan

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can hold very different views about security policy. The United States also has experienced instances of foreign policy questions generating substantial public disagreements—the 2003 Iraq War being the most striking recent example—but past policy towards Japan (in particular during the 1970s and 1980s when tense bilateral trade relations plagued Japan–U.S. relations) provides another illustration of this phenomenon, having generated very public attempts by each side to discredit the other with labels such as “Japan basher,” “Chrysanthemum clubber,” and the like.32 Moreover, these two “levels” of disagreement—among groups within states as well as between states—can interact, forming a “two-level game” of diplomacy and political maneuvering among actors holding common objectives across national boundaries.33 As formal alliance cooperation mechanisms deepen between the United States and Japan, such cross-national coalitionbuilding opportunities expand, creating broader and deeper avenues for the United States to influence the development of Japan’s national security policies. Despite a much larger role for Japan’s contribution to alliance decisions, and for acting on its own vision of its security interests, the era of American gaiatsu (foreign pressure) is far from over.34 LOOKING FORWARD: U.S. INFLUENCE ON JAPAN’S FUTURE SECURITY CHOICES

Despite multiple areas to monitor in the future development of Japan’s security relationship with the United States, Japan’s national security policies and institutions most likely will continue to evolve under the close guidance and cooperation of its core American ally—although perhaps under somewhat different specific parameters if very recent discussions of “equality” or new basing agreements move forward. Japan’s alliance relationship with the United States will likely hasten further capacity and capability development in Japan’s national security infrastructure in four areas in particular. First, the U.S. goal of greater interoperability and joint capabilities of the JSDF and U.S. forces will most likely lead to further enhancements of JSDF capabilities and de facto increases in bi-national cooperation. Areas of particular note would include missile defense, greater sharing of intelligence, increased cooperation in antiterrorism and counter-proliferation activities (as discussed in chapter five), and further development of maritime cooperation. 35 The March 2009 MSDF deployment to the waters around the Gulf of Aden to join multinational efforts led by the United States to fight piracy may be a portent of other such activities in the coming decade. Second, the JSDF is quite likely to play a greater role in managing military bases within Japan, including the assumption of full responsibility for some bases currently operated largely by the United States, as well as a growing number of jointly-operated bases. While, again, tension has emerged recently between Japan

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and the United States on the issue of force realignment, DPJ rhetoric would at least seem to support a greater JSDF role in managing bases within Japan—an area of discussion that was underway with the previous LDP government. Third, and despite new political rhetoric heard from the DPJ-led government, Japan will likely deepen its experience working in third world countries together with its American ally, building on the now-concluded experiences in the Indian Ocean and in areas around Iraq. There have been setbacks in this area very recently. The LDP-led government ended GSDF participation in Iraq in 2006 after three years and failed to pass a “general law” (ippan-hou) governing the deployment of the JSDF overseas, resorting instead to a series of “special measures” laws. The DPJ recently ended the MSDF refueling operations of coalition forces in the Indian Ocean and has so far demurred on a JSDF deployment to Afghanistan. Still, as noted in earlier chapters, participation in international activities is now one of the core missions of the JSDF, and also is an area of consensus among both major political parties. What is unclear is the exact nature of these future deployments, in particular whether they must take place only under the mandate of an international organization and the extent to which traditional military activities will be permitted. Fourth, and related, the MOD and JSDF are poised to play enhanced leadership roles within the alliance and on their own, as leaders in regional security forums and participants in multilateral security organizations and exercises—a topic developed further in chapter five. All of these areas will lead to a more militarily confident and capable Japan in the coming decade, and should serve to deepen Japan’s relations with the United States overall (even if areas of tension do—and likely will—arise). Still, in conclusion, it is worth considering other scenarios, and also a few areas of special concern, in Japan’s security evolution with regard to the United States. The Greatest Concern: Alliance Rupture

The conventional wisdom regarding the Japan-U.S. security alliance, particularly until the August 2009 rise of the DPJ to power, has been to assume that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty will remain in effect, that U.S. forces will remain in Japan for the medium-term at least, and that Japan will work actively to support —even to deepen—its security relationship with the United States. By all indications, each of these assumptions reflects the most likely scenario even under DPJ rule. However, there are imaginable circumstances that would lead to these assumptions not proving correct—and that would underscore in a negative way what has been presented previously about how central the United States has become to Japan’s defense planning and evolving national security strategy. As recently as the mid-1990s it was a mainstream position to question the longevity of the Japan-U.S. security alliance; under the warm Bush-Koizumi friendship,

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the relationship was so apparently strong, and so many mechanisms put into place to solidify and deepen the alliance, nearly all bets were on this relationship moving toward further deepening. As with the quadruple shocks of 1989–1991, however—a declining economy, death of the Showa emperor, end of the Cold War, and loss of LDP control of the Upper House of Diet—a similar combination of shocks to Japan’s domestic and international environment could once again call the alliance into question. A rupture in the Japan-U.S. alliance could serve as a catalyst for substantial change in Japan’s national security policies more broadly. In 1995, antiAmerican riots sparked by the rape of a school-age girl by U.S. marines in Okinawa spread throughout Japan and exerted considerable political pressure on the United States for major force realignment. At that time, the factors that contributed most to the lessening of tensions arguably were the worsening international environment (first with North Korea, and with a rising China in the background) rather than the resolution of long-standing grievances of the Japanese public (particularly in Okinawa) regarding U.S. forces in Japan. It also was not that long ago (in 1998) that Japan’s first non-LDP prime minister in nearly 40 years published an article in the influential American journal, Foreign Affairs, calling for “an alliance without bases”—i.e., a continued Japan-U.S. alliance, but one without permanent U.S. forces stationed in Japan.36 Some fear a return to such divisive politics under DPJ rule. While not overtly calling for such a policy, the DPJ also has flirted with such rhetoric. In February 2009, then-DPJ president Ichiro Ozawa was quoted as calling for a withdrawal of all U.S. forces apart from the Seventh Fleet, though he subsequently “clarified” the comment as meaning only if the JSDF could enhance its own capabilities in exchange; a component of the DPJ platform for the August 2009 election opposed the relocation of the U.S. Marine Air Base at Futenma to elsewhere in Okinawa, calling for it instead to be moved outside of Okinawa; and the DPJ has called for “drastic” reduction in the “host-nation support” that the Japanese government provides to offset the cost of basing U.S. forces in Japan, a reduction that could well lead to at least the partial withdrawal of U.S. forces.37 A rising nationalism in Japan—a factor being watched closely by many analysts—also could potentially latch onto the presence of U.S. bases in Japan and a deepening interoperability of U.S. and Japanese forces as unacceptable affronts to Japanese national pride or sovereignty, as has happened in other countries where the U.S. military has worn out its welcome. The concerns about the apparent permanence of U.S. forces in Japan, about U.S. pressure on Japan to further increase military activities and capabilities, and about the increased threat that the presence of U.S. forces on Japanese soil may cause Japan are heard not only from those on the far right (those traditionally associated with nationalism) but also among many on the left and even among government officials themselves also suggests that this scenario be considered seriously.

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The More Likely Future: Deepening . . . to a Degree

More likely than the earlier cautionary scenario is that Japan-U.S. defense cooperation will move forward in the areas spelled out at the beginning of this section. Recent alliance deepening is not the result of limited and temporary situational events, but rather of long-term challenges to the security of Japan and the United States that provide an enduring rationale for continued cooperation. (See the June 2006 joint statement from President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi for an extended exposition on these shared concerns in Appendix C, Document 10.) Still, even cooperation under a logical rationale will require close coordination among political leaders and among operational-level bureaucrats and military personnel on both sides. Moreover, both countries have displayed in recent years more open concern about “entrapment” in a security contingency beyond what each state’s national interest can justify. Japan long has expressed concern over entrapment into the larger geo-strategic conflicts in which its superpower ally often found itself entangled, and continues to fear such entrapment both regionally (particularly related to China) and globally (with Iran and the broader war on terrorism, for example). The United States also has shown evidence of such fears, such as when Japan’s relations with China soured under the Koizumi years.38 Such concerns may set a limit for how interoperable, how deep, and how extensive the alliance between the United States and Japan can grow. Ultimately, a bilateral Japan-U.S. alliance alone is unlikely to prove sufficient for either party in providing adequate security for East Asia. As East Asia and the international system as a whole adjusts to such macro-level, systemic shifts as the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States globally and of Japan economically, greater institutionalization of the security apparatus in the region beyond the “hard bilateralism and soft multilateralism” of the past decades will be required.39 This belief in the need to move beyond reliance only on the JapanU.S. alliance is apparently shared by Japanese security planners, who increasingly have sought to expand security cooperation beyond their bilateral alliance with the United States (a topic of chapter five), and was apparent also in Prime Minister Hatoyama’s vision for a closer relationship between Japan and its Asian neighbors.

CONCLUSION

Today, the Japan-U.S. security relationship faces its largest challenges in a generation. On the one hand, it is a symbol of longevity and robustness—celebrating in 2010 the 50th anniversary of the current Japan-U.S. security treaty upon which the alliance rests. The United States and Japan are partners far beyond military security, together providing critical management of the world economy, working together in the United Nations and other international organizations, and sharing a cautious yet engaged approach to the rise of China. On the other

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hand, even before the historic transfer of power in Japan in August 2009 there was growing concern in Washington of an alliance adrift, what one authority termed “a quiet crisis.”40 After the election of the DPJ to power, such tensions emerged from the back corridors of the political and academic worlds into the mainstream media. In this 50th anniversary year, it is not clear which direction the next decade will take the alliance. It is regrettable that the new DPJ government got off to a poor start with the United States in the security arena. The delay of implementation of the Futenma relocation could have been handled better, for example, and its mishandling may have long-term repercussions in the level of trust between politicians and between bureaucrats on both sides of the Pacific. The primary reason that Japan and the United States will be celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Japan-U.S. security treaty in 2010, however, is because the two countries share so many common interests regionally and globally—not because of past collusion among the political and bureaucratic elite. Similarly, missteps in one policy area are unlikely to undermine the deeper logic of the trans-Pacific partnership. Moreover, the fact the annual poll of December 2009 conducted by Japan’s Cabinet Office found the highest level of “friendly feelings” toward the United States (78.9%) since the polling began in the mid-1970s, and an 81.8 percent favorable view of Japan-U.S. relations, should encourage leaders of both states.41 There is likely to be more short-term pain, though, before the rewards of a more broadly supported security alliance with the United States are reaped. Celebrations of the successes of the long-standing alliance in 2010 should help ease that pain, and facilitate a frank discussion of concerns and reinforcement of the core common interests shared by the two states, as seen in the SCC joint statement issued on the actual anniversary day of January 19, 2010.42 At one level, the U.S. would welcome a truly “equal” alliance—as the DPJ has called for in their campaign slogans—if it meant that Japan would share the burdens equally, but this clearly is not what is meant given Japan’s postwar military evolution. Most Japanese have absolutely no interest in Japan developing military forces comparable to the United States, nor spending substantially more on defense, nor becoming more enmeshed in global security affairs. Given this, the criticism that what the DPJ means by such equality is unclear is understandable. Over the first year of the DPJ administration, the United States (and the rest of the world) will likely find the new political leadership in Tokyo primarily inward-looking and less interested in engaging in substantive consultation on foreign policy issues. The challenge lies in how to maintain positive momentum between Tokyo and Washington at times when it is difficult to point to concrete signs of new cooperation in that key relationship. In retrospect, it is beginning to look like the leadership style (and success) of Prime Minister Koizumi (2001–2006) and the deepening of the Japan-U.S. alliance under the Koizumi-Bush years was an anomaly, not a sign of positive,

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permanent change in Japanese politics and its national security policy. After Koizumi, four prime ministers served one year each (Abe, Fukuda, Aso, and Hatoyama), returning to an unfortunate practice of the previous decade where nine politicians served as prime minister from 1989–1999. The length of Prime Minister Kan’s tenure (2010–) remains a question of deep political interest, one that will be influenced by unfolding political scandals and by the vote of the Japanese people in upcoming elections. Whether the alliance will continue a period of “deepening” or undergo a period of “retrenchment”—and the effect on Japanese domestic politics—is an open question, one that will be addressed further in chapter six. NOTES This chapter draws on material first published in Andrew L. Oros, “The United States and ‘Alliance’ Role in Japan’s New Defense Establishment,” in Japan’s New Defense Establishment: Institutions, Capabilities, and Implications, eds. Yuki Tatsumi and Andrew L. Oros, (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2007). 1. Kent Calder, The Pacific Alliance: Reviving U.S.-Japan Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), provides an excellent overview of the many aspects of the postwar relationship between the two states. 2. One recent study critical of the effect of the United States on Japan is Gavan McCormack, Client State: Japan in the American Embrace (London and New York: Verso, 2007). McCormack’s first chapter, “Forever Twelve Years Old,” sets the stage for what is to come. He writes: “Japan has been turned into a client state, or even, as some would have it, a puppet state” (p. 2). Specialists have much to learn from McCormack’s deep understanding and coverage of issues that are often under-reported in the mainstream media and in think tanks in Washington and Tokyo, which provide insight into the undercurrents in Japanese society against the Japan- U.S. alliance. 3. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999) provides a more detailed overview of this history over 16 chapters. Kent Calder, The Pacific Alliance: Reviving U.S.-Japan Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) offers a shorter and more current history. 4. See Appendix C of this volume, Document 1, for the complete text of Article Nine. 5. Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001), and Richard J. Samuels, Machiavelli’s Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003) both develop this commonly asserted line of argument. In sum, the three pillars of the Yoshida doctrine are argued to be: (1) military alliance with the United States, (2) limited rearmament, and (3) a focus on economic development and commercial relations abroad. 6. Richard Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army”: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994) is a good entry point to an extensive literature on this topic. 7. Norman J. Ornstein and Mark Schmitt, “The 1988 Election,” Foreign Affairs 86:1 (1988/89): 43. 8. Samuels discusses this point in relation to current political and intellectual debates over Japan’s future security path. See Richard J. Samuels, “Japan’s Goldilocks Strategy,” The Washington Quarterly 29:4 (Autumn 2007): 111–27.

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9. Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, “Japan- U.S. Relations,” in The Routledge Handbook of Japanese Politics, ed. Alisha Gaunder, (New York: Routledge, 2010 forthcoming). 10. United States Department of Defense. U.S. Security Strategy for the Asia–Pacific Region (1995). 11. Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century April 17, 1996. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html (accessed May 15, 2010); The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation September 23, 1997. http://www.mofa .go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html (accessed, May 15, 2010). 12. Institute of National Strategic Studies (INSS), “The United States and Japan: Advancing toward a Mature Partnership” (also known as the “Armitage–Nye Report”), INSS Special Report (Washington, DC: National Defense University, October 11, 2000). 13. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002 and 2006) http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf and http:// georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf (accessed May 20, 2010). 14. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/qdr-2006-report.htm (accessed May 20, 2010). 15. Michael J. Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). 16. Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan, chapter four provides an overview of Japan’s postwar arms export restrictions. 17. Defense of Japan 2009, pp. 477–78 provides a complete listing by military service. 18. Isao Miyaoka, “Collective Identity Formation and Broadening ‘Self ’ Defense: Japan’s Alliance with the United States.” Workshop paper. (Washington, DC: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University, December 6, 2006), 18. 19. The Law to Ensure Japan’s Peace and Security in the Situations in the Areas Surrounding Japan, Article 2. http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H11/H11HO060.html (accessed May 20, 2010). 20. An Agreement to Revise the Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement between Japan and the United States, Article 3. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/ agreement.pdf (accessed May 20, 2010). 21. Isao Miyaoka, “Collective Identity Formation.” Although this change was agreed to in December 1990, the SCC did not meet with these new actors until March 1994, and even then only with the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense. 22. See Komei Isozaki and Nicholas Szechenyi, “New Roles and Missions: Transforming the U.S.–Japan Alliance—A Report of the Co-Chairs,” Japan Chair Platform (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 12, 2006) for discussion of the expanded roles and mission aspect, and Michael J. Green, “U.S.–Japanese Relations after Koizumi: Convergence or Cooling?” The American Interest (Sept/Oct 2006), 101–10, for a discussion of the shared values aspect. 23. United States Department of Defense, U.S. Security Strategy for the Asia–Pacific Region (1995), 10. 24. See Benjamin L. Self, The Dragon’s Shadow: The Rise of China and Japan’s New Nationalism (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006) for a compelling argument that Japan’s very national identity is inextricably linked to Japan’s relations with, and notions of, China. 25. Przystup and Saunders, for example, note the long and successful strategic partnership with China during the later years of the Cold War that achieved a strategic balance against Soviet expansion, as well as during the early post-Cold War period of strategic partnership

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Global Security Watch—Japan under President Bill Clinton, and more recently in the global war on terror under President George W. Bush. James Przystup and Phillip Saunders, “Visions of Order: Japan and China in U.S. Strategy,” Strategic Forum No. 220 (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2006). 26. Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mark E. Manyin, and William H. Cooper, “Japan–U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress (RL33436) October 5, 2006, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress), 4. 27. See Kent E. Calder, “The Outlier Alliance: U.S.–Japan Security Ties in Comparative Perspective” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 15:2 (Fall 2003), 31–56 for a useful comparative perspective on the Japan-U.S. alliance. 28. Chanlett-Avery, et al., “Japan-U.S. Relations,” 10. 29. Michael Finnegan, “Managing Unmet Expectations in the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” NBR Special Report No. 17 (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, November 2009), 2. 30. For recent Japanese perspectives on the contemporary challenges facing the alliance, see: Japan Forum on International Relations, Positive Pacifism and the Future of the Japan- U.S. Alliance (Tokyo, 2009), http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/pr/pdf/32.pdf and Tokyo Foundation, New Security Strategy of Japan: Multilayered and Cooperative Security Strategy (Tokyo, 2008), http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/additional_info/New%20Security%20Strategy%20of %20Japan.pdf. 31. His final chapter spells out nine specific propositions, as well as “benchmarks” from which to judge progress. Interestingly, the volume appeared first in Japanese under a somewhat different title, roughly, “The Quiet Crisis of the Alliance,” the title of chapter one of his English-language volume. Kent Calder, The Pacific Alliance. 32. Richard Katz, “The System that Soured: Toward a New Paradigm to Guide Japan Policy” The Washington Quarterly 21:4 (Autumn 1998), 43–78 provides a good overview of this divisive, and increasingly forgotten, period in Japan-U.S. relations. 33. Robert Putnam coined this phrase in the context of economic policy negotiations, spawning a large literature devoted to this topic from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. See Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42:3 (Summer 1988): 427–60. 34. The most notable studies of gaiatsu in Japanese foreign policy all derive from economic cases and have not been applied systematically to the security realm. See, for example, Leonard Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressure Can and Cannot Do (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) and Dennis T. Yasutomo, The New Multilateralism in Japan’s Foreign Policy (London: Macmillan, 1995). 35. See Isozaki and Szechenyi, “New Roles and Missions” for further discussion of likely developments in these areas. 36. Morihiro Hosokawa, “Are U.S. Troops in Japan Needed? Reforming the Alliance” Foreign Affairs 77:4 (July/August 1998): 2–5. 37. Weston Konishi, “The Democratic Party of Japan: Its Foreign Policy Position and Implications for U.S. Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, August 12, 2009 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service), 5. 38. Mochizuki, for example, expresses concern about how negative developments in Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbors may eventually blow back to weaken the Japan-U.S. alliance. Mike M. Mochizuki, “Paradigms Lost: Japan’s Nationalist Drift,” The American Interest (Sept/ Oct 2006): 80–89.

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39. Ikenberry offers an interesting and concise comparative regional development of this argument. Katzenstein offers a similar but more developed and historically grounded crossregional comparison. See G. John Ikenberry, “American Strategy in the New East.” The American Interest (Sept/Oct 2006): 80–94 and Peter Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). 40. Kent E. Calder, Pacific Alliance. 41. The results of the poll (in Japanese) are available from the Cabinet Office Web site: http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h21/h21-gaiko/3.html. The historical comparison is made by Kyodo News, “Good will toward U.S. at record high: poll” (December 13, 2009), http:// search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20091213a3.html (accessed January 5, 2010). 42. Minister for Foreign Affairs Okada, Minister of Defense Kitazawa, Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Gates, “Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee Marking the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security” (January 19, 2010), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/ security/joint1001.html (accessed May 20, 2010).

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CHAPTER

5

Japan’s Regional Security Environment

East Asia, Japan’s immediate region, serves as a microcosm of the security issues the world faces as a whole. Issues range from traditional concerns over arms races, the spread of new military technologies, access to critical resources, and territorial disputes to newer concerns over terrorism, piracy, climate change, and the spread of epidemic disease. Japan has a long and complicated history of interaction with the countries of the region. In modern times, Japan fought wars in each, wrangling territorial concessions as a result, territories that later were forfeited after Japan’s defeat in World War II. The regional security environment in East Asia continued to evolve after World War II, and so did perceived security threats for Japan. During the Cold War, Japan was particularly concerned about a potential invasion by Soviet forces, and oriented its military posture accordingly. More recently, concerns over North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and development of ballistic missile technology, as well as China’s growing military capabilities and resulting military activities in the region, have topped Japan’s list of major security concerns. Expanding further afield to Asia as a whole, the region accounts for nearly half of the world’s population and attracts global attention to active conflicts in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. Global security concerns such as the proliferation of nuclear materials and other weapons, the spread of international terrorism, energy security, and climate change all are “regional” problems to Asia as well, and therefore also high on Japan’s list of security concerns. Japan’s annual defense white paper—which provides both a wealth of data as well as narrative perspective into Japan’s regional security concerns—typically begins with an overview of the major military forces in Northeast Asia (which it

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terms the Asia-Pacific), home to over three million soldiers alone (not including sailors and airmen). This includes approximately 1.6 million in China, 1 million in North Korea, 560,000 in South Korea, 200,000 in Taiwan, 90,000 in the Russian Far East, and 35,000 U.S. soldiers based in South Korea and Japan.1 By contrast, as noted in chapter three, Japan’s ground forces (the GSDF) number approximately 142,000 active duty personnel, fewer than most of the ground forces in the region. In terms of sheer numbers, Japan also lags behind states in the region in the number of naval vessels and combat aircraft.2 However, as discussed in previous chapters, to some extent Japan makes up with quality what it lacks in quantity. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, most of Japan’s close neighbors face more immediate security concerns than Japan does, and thus have to maintain a higher level of armed forces as a result. For example, many of China’s military forces have been developed with the island of Taiwan in mind, a territory it considers a wayward province. Taiwanese forces, in turn, are aimed to deter a Chinese armed attack. Similarly, the bulk of North and South Korean forces are focused on each other. As a result, a comparison of the number of forces alone can be misleading. In addition, it is important to note at the outset that Japan’s military forces (the JSDF) have not directly participated in any military combat in the region in more than three generations; no Japanese soldier, sailor, or airman has died or been injured in combat in the region in over 60 years—despite the region itself having been a hotbed of conflict during the “Cold” War. U.S. forces based in Japan fought two extended wars during the Cold War period in Asia, on the Korean peninsula (1950–1953) and in Vietnam (1960s–1975). In both of these conflicts, U.S. forces relied on access to bases in Japan for their operations. The JSDF did not provide combat support for the United States in these conflicts, however. As discussed in previous chapters, the JSDF was not deployed overseas until MSDF minesweepers were dispatched to the Persian Gulf in 1991, after active combat in the First Iraq War had ended. When Japan deployed the GSDF for the first time, to Cambodia in 1992, its numbers were limited, and the deployed GSDF carried out only non-combat operations. Since then, while all three branches of the JSDF have been deployed to several locations in Asia in limited numbers, including as part of multinational forces in East Timor and as part of a re-fueling operation in the Indian Ocean to support U.S.-led anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan, all of their missions have continued to be in non-combat roles. Thus, despite a number of security fears evident in Japanese defense discourse, the past 60 years of experience in Asia has not included to any active military role for Japan. Still, in today’s regional security environment, the amassing of large numbers of forces and weapons in its neighborhood introduces the element of uncertainty to Japan’s regional security and a need for Japan to be able to respond to a large number of possible regional contingencies, as noted in previous chapters. For example,

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Japan’s security planners are greatly concerned about a possible disruption of maritime and airborne trade should a hot war break out in its region, which could potentially cripple the Japanese economy and even lead to shortages of critical energy and food supplies. In addition, due to Japan’s ties to the United States via its security alliance, Japan fears that it could be drawn into a regional conflict centered around China-Taiwan or North-South Korea if U.S. forces located on Japanese territory were to become involved in these conflicts. PRIMARY REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

Japan’s specific security concerns are expressed both conceptually and regionally. Conceptually, as noted previously, concerns over nuclear and other weapons proliferation, international terrorism, and many so-called new security threats are evident in contemporary Japanese defense planning. Still, many of Japan’s traditional security concerns continue to focus on specific regional actors, in particular those on the Korean peninsula, Russia, and China, and to a lesser extent other regional actors.3 The Korean Peninsula

Japan occupied the Korean peninsula from 1910–1945, departing only after its defeat in World War II. Many Koreans harbor bitter feelings toward Japan as a result, and the legacy of occupation continues to hamper Japan’s relationship with both North Korea (formally the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) and South Korea (formally the Republic of Korea, or ROK). In the vacuum left by Japan’s departure from the peninsula in 1945, a civil war broke out, fueled by the emerging Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, which resulted in the outbreak of a major war on June 25, 1950. A cease-fire was negotiated three years later, on July 27, 1953, and the two states have been separated by a de-militarized zone (DMZ) ever since. The Korean peninsula has existed in a state of tense cease-fire since the 1953 armistice that halted, but did not settle, the Korean War (1950–1953). A half century later, over 1.5 million soldiers are separated by only a roughly 2.5 mile(4 kilometer-) wide DMZ, making the region around the DMZ the most militarized place on the planet today. A renewed outbreak of major fighting between North and South Korea would immediately draw in the United States (due to U.S. forces located in South Korea, and the U.S.-South Korea security pact) and likely China (given China’s traditional support of North Korea and that China borders North Korea). Japan also would likely be asked to participate militarily in supporting the U.S. and South Korean efforts, which could lead to both a political and diplomatic crisis for Japan due to Japan’s constitutional constraints. In addition, the disruption of trade, regional production, and financial markets that would

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result from a new hot war would severely impact the Japanese economy. Large numbers of refugees may flee to Japan by ship or air. The possibility of a nuclear conflict is increasingly present as North Korea continues with its nuclear weapons program despite decades of effort by the United States, South Korea, and Japan (and more recently China and Russia) to negotiate multiple UN Security Council resolutions, and increasingly harsh international sanctions. As a result of all of these factors, Japan has a strong interest in encouraging the peaceful resolution of this longstanding stalemate just 120 miles (200 kilometers) across the Korea Strait from the southern Japanese island of Kyushu. Beyond the divided state issue of the Korean peninsula, Japan’s primary security concern in recent times has been North Korea’s efforts to develop more accurate and longer-range missiles that can reach Japanese territory and North Korea’s development and proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. Japan considers North Korea to be a hostile state and notes the North Korean leadership’s regular scapegoating of Japan in the North Korean state-controlled media with great concern. The 2009 Japanese defense white paper characterizes North Korea as pursuing a “military-first politics” that it describes from North Korean media sources as “a form of leadership that advances the great undertaking of socialism by resolving all problems that arise in the revolution and national construction on the principle of military first and stressing the importance of the armed forces as the pillar of the revolution.”4 In this sense, North Korean ideology could not be more different from the ideology of non-aggression expressed in Japan’s postwar constitution. At the same time, the weak state of the North Korean economy, chronic food shortages, and questions about the longevity of the ruling dictator, Kim Jong Il, are also concerns for Japan that require somewhat different solutions than those posed by a direct military threat. North Korea’s population of roughly 22.6 million and GDP of only $40 billion (using purchasing power parity, PPP) are only a small fraction of Japan’s (about 1/6 and 1/100, respectively).5 Despite the apparent unlikelihood of a military threat posed by such a small and impoverished country, a test of a Taepodong I medium-range missile by North Korea on August 31, 1998, that overflew the main Japanese island of Honshu before splashing down into the Pacific Ocean served as a lightning rod for a new security awareness in Japan, what has been equated to the “Sputnik shock” that gripped the United States after the Soviet Union launched the world’s first artificial satellite in 1957. Although North Korea had conducted missile tests before that had concerned Japanese defense planners, the 1998 test caused a large public outcry and led soon after to new legislation in Japan that paved the way for development of indigenously produced and operated surveillance satellites that would, in part, monitor North Korea more closely, and to co-development with the United States of a ballistic missile defense system to protect against a possible future hostile launch of North Korean missiles against Japan (or U.S. forces in Japan).6 A North Korean test launch of seven ballistic missiles on July 5, 2006,

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further stoked fears and anger in Japan, and seems to have redoubled Japan’s commitment to the development of missile defense systems; the first PAC-3 missile battery was installed in Japan, at the ASDF base in Iruma (just outside of Tokyo), less than a year later on March 30, 2007. A further test launch was conducted by North Korea on April 5, 2009, leading to additional international condemnation, and an additional angry response to the condemnation by North Korea, followed by a promise by North Korea to redouble its efforts at nuclear weapons development—a promise it kept. North Korea views the development of advanced weapons technology as a necessary deterrent to possible U.S. aggression, perhaps from bases in Japan, and refuses to negotiate away its right to such “self-defense,” absent a peace treaty with the United States, a promise of nonaggression, and extensive economic incentives. To date North Korean missiles are fueled by liquid fuel, making their detection by Japanese or U.S. surveillance satellites before launch more likely; the missiles also seem to suffer from limitations in their guidance systems. Improvement in North Korean missile technology is a major concern. Japan’s defense white paper includes the following statement on this issue: “Combined with the nuclear issue, North Korea’s missile issue is thus becoming a destabilizing factor not only for the Asia-Pacific region but also for the entire international community.”7 In addition to the threat North Korea poses itself, the state is also a known proliferator of missile and nuclear technology. Japan, the United States, and other states have long been concerned over North Korean efforts to develop nuclear weapons, as well. The issue was first addressed internationally through the so-called Agreed Framework in 1994, signed by the United States and North Korea with the support of Japan and South Korea. This agreement sought to reduce the North Korea’s ability to develop nuclear weapons technology by providing technical assistance to develop light-water civilian nuclear power reactors under international supervision. It also provided a roadmap for the normalization of relations between the United States and North Korea. The agreement effectively broke down in August 2002 under recriminations from both sides that important terms were not being fulfilled. The following year, a new international approach to resolving the issue, the so-called Six Party Talks hosted by China and including the United States, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and Japan commenced. Six rounds of talks were held until the process stalled in October 2007, one year after North Korea conducted its first underground nuclear test in October 2006. A second nuclear test was conducted on May 25, 2009, leading to a UN Security Council resolution condemning the nuclear test and to the imposition of additional sanctions on North Korea. In response, North Korea further ratcheted up tensions, proclaiming that it would enrich even more plutonium, and also commence with the enrichment of uranium. Experts disagree about the extent of the threat North Korea actually poses to Japan or other countries. Analysis is complicated by the secretive nature of

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the North Korean regime. Combining missile technology with a working and miniaturized nuclear weapon certainly seems beyond current North Korean means. As noted by Japan’s defense white paper, however: “considering the fact that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s, it is difficult to eliminate the possibility that North Korea, in a relatively short time, will achieve miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquire nuclear warheads.”8 Another major concern of Japan vis-a` -vis North Korea is one that seems somewhat obscure to outsiders, but is a very salient domestic political issue in Japan—the so-called abduction incidents (rachi jiken) that were revealed unexpectedly by North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the first-ever visit of a Japanese prime minister to North Korea in September 2002. In brief, North Korea admitted to long-standing Japanese suspicions that North Korea had secretly abducted Japanese citizens from the coast of Japan’s main island and from abroad during the waning years of the Cold War. The number of citizens it abducted and what had happened to them in North Korea were not immediately forthcoming, however, leading to widespread condemnation in the Japanese press and among the Japanese people. In the ensuing years, the Japanese and North Korean governments engaged in substantial dialogue on this topic, but dialogue greatly hampered by the concerns over North Korean missile and nuclear weapons development. The Japanese government established a “headquarters for the abduction issue” which recognizes 17 cases of abduction, while the North Koreans admit to 13.9 Five of the admitted abductees were returned to Japan, with North Korea claiming that the others had perished. Many in the media and among the general public suspect dozens more cases, including additional Japanese citizens being held against their will in North Korea. As a result of both Japan’s concerns about North Korean military actions (its missile and nuclear weapons development in particular) as well as the abduction issue, relations between the two countries may well be at an all-time low point. The shrill discourse between the two states is notable, particularly from the North Korean side, which regularly refers to Japan as an imperialist state, a fascist dictatorship, and a pawn on the United States. In sum, Japanese security concerns from North Korea, one of its closet neighbors, are deep and multi-faceted. South of the border, Japan has experienced a more constructive, if complicated, relationship with South Korea, but here too there are security concerns as well as a politicized discourse about how Japan has atoned for its past actions before and during World War II. Japan and South Korea are linked indirectly as major U.S. allies who both have bilateral security treaties with the United States and host a large number of U.S. military personnel and U.S. bases in

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their territories. Japan and South Korea concluded a treaty to establish “basic relations” in 1965 (see Appendix C). Today they are linked as well by a deep economic relationship: Japan is South Korea’s second largest import market and third largest export market.10 South Korea’s population of approximately 48.5 million and GDP of $1.34 trillion (using purchasing power parity) is about 40 percent and 32 percent of Japan’s, respectively.11 On the positive side, Japan and South Korea have embarked on a series of political and defense exchanges and regular consultations between defense officials in recent years, including Japan-ROK security dialogues in 2003 and 2007, annual military-to-military consultations, and near-annual exchanges of chiefs of staff of the respective service branches. The states also meet regularly in multilateral security forums. The heads of state of the two countries exchanged multiple visits in 2008 and in 2009. In October of 2008, two MSDF vessels participated in an international fleet review in Busan, South Korea to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the South Korean government and military.12 On the less positive side, however, the two states have experienced a series of nationalist-tinged outbursts over disputed islands between the two states, known as Takeshima in Japan and Dokdo in Korea. The islands are uninhabited and have little strategic value between two otherwise friendly states, though the fishing rights associated with ownership of the islands is a factor. On July 30, 2008, South Korea conducted a joint defense drill involving its Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard to practice a defense of the island chain; similar drills were held again in December 2008, and had been conducted previously.13 Given the need to prepare for a possible attack from North Korea, South Korean military forces are quite formidable. The possibility of miscalculation or an unintentional skirmish between Japanese and South Korean forces is a fear expressed privately by both sides. In rhetoric as well, South Korea often plays up this issue—such as in South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s speech commemorating National Liberation Day (the day that Japanese colonial rule ended) and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Korea. In that speech he called on Japan to “refrain from making the foolish mistake of repeating the unfortunate past again today,” interpreted as an indirect reference to the simmering territorial dispute.14 South Korea also has pursued deeper bilateral ties with Russia and with China, two states that only formally recognized the existence of South Korea after the end of the Cold War. By contrast, South Korea experienced a period of worsening relations with the United States in the past decade under the previous president, Roh Moo-hyun, over a series of trade issues as well as a large scale discussion of realignment of U.S. forces located in South Korea. Relations with the United States (and with Japan) have improved under the more conservative President Lee. In sum, apart from a minor territorial dispute, Japan faces no significant security threat from South Korea itself, but the potential for cooperative,

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direct military relations is limited by history and politics. In addition, the Korean peninsula as a whole comprises a significant security concern for Japanese defense planners. Russia

In contrast to escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula, Japan’s perceived threat from Russia/the Soviet Union has decreased greatly since the heady years of the Cold War. As with South Korea, however, a number of thorny security issues remain—not the least of which is that Russia and Japan have not concluded a formal peace treaty to mark the end of World War II, largely due to an outstanding territorial dispute over four small islands north of the large Japanese island of Hokkaido. Russia’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War years has not focused significantly on the East Asian region, but Russia continues to be a respected regional power and traditional supporter of many of the policy positions of China, and to a lesser extent, North Korea. Moreover, Russia continues to maintain the second largest number of nuclear weapons in the world (after the United States), including over 500 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 252 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and 79 long-range strategic bombers.15 In addition, it maintains the world’s second largest naval forces in terms of tonnage (after the United States; first in terms of number of vessels), and the third largest number of combat aircraft (after the United States and China).16 Additionally, its defense spending has more than doubled since 2004, fueled by surging oil revenues.17 As with China, however, Russia is a large territory with a number of security concerns beyond East Asia—thus, as noted previously, its force posture is largely oriented away from Japan’s immediate region. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union constituted Japan’s largest perceived security threat. As discussed in previous chapters, the JSDF posture and deployments were designed largely around countering this threat and have been gradually reoriented in the two decades since the end of the Cold War. By all measures, Russian military deployments in what it terms “the Far East” have declined substantially since their peak around 1985: the number of soldiers, ship tonnage, and combat aircraft deployed all were less than one-third their 1985 levels in 2007.18 Russia’s latest military strategy document, its “Foreign Policy Concept” of 2008 (the first released since 2000), does not alter the priorities of Russian foreign policy which place the Far East as quite a low priority, after its relations with the former states of the Soviet Union, with Europe, and with the United States. Within the Asian region, Russia’s focus historically has been with China, its one-time partner in communism, and more recently with the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and with India. 19 Russia-China security relations deepened in the early twenty-first century, including the historic first of a complete demarcation of the Russia-China border, a source of numerous

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skirmishes in previous decades.20 Russia and South Korea have also elevated their relationship to one of “strategic partnership” in 2008.21 Although the Cold War has long ended, Russia-U.S. strategic rivalry is still very much in evidence on the world stage, and perhaps has been gaining intensity in recent years. And, as during the Cold War period, the key U.S. ally in Asia, Japan, has experienced a measure of spillover from this rivalry. Japanese co-development of ballistic missile defense with the United States—which Russia strongly opposes—is thought to be one reason for this spillover. Japanese defense analysts have noted: “Russia, increasingly suspicious of U.S. intentions, has repeatedly been sending its strategic bombers near the airspace of Europe, Japan and other U.S. allies. In August 2007, Russia resumed regular strategic bomber patrols, and Russian aircraft now reach the airspace of the UK, Japan, Guam, Alaska, and other regions, sometimes necessitating the scrambling of warplanes.”22 On February 9, 2008, a Russian Tu-95 strategic bomber violated Japanese airspace over the Izu off-shore island chain, the first such violation in 33 years, requiring the scramble of t24 ASDF warplanes. In fiscal year 2007, foreign aircraft approached (but did not ultimately enter) Japanese airspace 307 times; in over 250 of these cases the aircraft were Russian.23 As with North and South Korea, and with China, nationalist elements in both Russia and Japan play a role in souring relations between the two countries. So-called history issues, some dating back to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 but many related to Soviet treatment of Japanese POWs marooned on the Asian mainland after the conclusion of World War II, surface with some regularity to fan nationalist flames on both sides. In addition, the Soviet Union’s “betrayal” of Japan through abrogation of its neutrality pact with Japan during the war is an enduring bitter memory among some. In particular, though, the so-called Northern Territory Issue (hoppo ryodo mondai) has repeatedly frustrated deepened Soviet/Russia-Japan relations over the years and, as noted previously, has been the principal obstacle to a formal peace treaty between the two states. The islands exist at the fringe of both Japanese and Russian territory, but were recognized to be part of Japan by Russia in the states’ first exchange of diplomatic relations in 1855. Japan took possession of the islands north of these—including the southern half of the much larger northern island of Sakhalin—at the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Japan renounced its claim to Sakhalin after its defeat in the World War II; most other territories Japan had acquired in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (such as the island of Taiwan and the Korean peninsula) also were stripped from Japan, but Japan insists that Russia has no right to the four small islands quite close in proximity to the large Japanese island of Hokkaido.24 The Soviet Union had only declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945, claiming possession of the islands soon after—and expelled some Japanese residents in the years to follow with the fate of others among the estimated 17,000 who had been living on

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the islands unknown.25 It is thought that approximately 3,500 Russian soldiers are based in the Northern Territories today, with a stated Russian intention to neither increase nor decrease this presence.26 A recent Japanese white paper on defense makes only brief mention of this issue, stating in summary: “As mentioned previously, Russian troops continue to be stationed in the Northern Territories, which are an integral part of Japanese territory, and it is hoped that the issue will be resolved at an early date.”27 The prospects for such an early resolution seem quite slim, however—which continues then to cast a shadow over prospects for deeper Japanese-Russia security cooperation in other areas. China

Japan has a multi-faceted relationship with China that extends far beyond the security realm. Recorded relations between the two states go back over one thousand years; Japanese language and culture is permeated by Chinese influences. China is Japan’s largest trading partner (surpassing trade with the United States recently), and many Japanese multinational firms credit their overall profitability to sales and/or production based in China. Although there are tensions with China on a number of fronts—economic and trade-related, cultural and history-related as well as political and security-related—relations between the two states are deep and increasingly interdependent. China’s population of approximately 1.34 billion is over ten times that of Japan, but its official economic size (in terms of GDP at official exchange rates) is slightly smaller than Japan’s.28 Unlike Japan, however, the Chinese economy has been growing rapidly for decades, and almost surely will grow beyond the total size of the Japanese economy in the coming decade. In terms of purchasing power parity, the Chinese economy already is almost twice as large as Japan’s, though, of course, its per capita economic size is much smaller.29 China’s steady economic growth and the concomitant growth in military spending presents one of the greatest long-term strategic concerns for Japanese security planners, and is noted with rising concern in the latest Japanese defense white papers. Due to China’s steady and substantial economic growth, its economic size is roughly triple that of 1989, when Japan made its first steps into the post-Cold War period. More starkly, China’s military spending has increased at an even greater pace. As Japan’s 2009 defense white paper notes: “China announced a national defense budget for FY 2009 of approximately 472.9 billion yuan, 15.3% up from the previous year. Thus China’s official defense budget recorded a growth rate of over 10% for 21 consecutive years in terms of the initial defense budget. This pace of increase in official defense expenditures means that the defense budget has doubled every five years, and that the official national defense budget of China has nominally increased twenty-two fold over the last 21 years.” 30 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2009 estimates China’s military expenditure for 2008 as approximately

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$84.9 billion, ranking China as the second largest spender after the United States (with Japan ranked as number seven).31 The U.S. Defense Department’s 2009 Annual Report, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, estimates China’s actual defense spending as $105–150 billion, although China’s official defense budget for 2008 is approximately $60 billion.32 Like Japan, China has been seeking to modernize its military forces by investing in better equipment, but China also has pursued cost savings by reducing its vast manpower—from over three million soldiers in 1985 to around 1.6 million today.33 China has a stated intention of developing a blue water navy, which in the future will surely become a more visible presence in East Asia (and perhaps beyond) in addition to Japanese, Russian, and U.S. naval forces. China’s achievement of manned space flight in October 2003—only the third nation to do so, following the United States and the then-Soviet Union—created a stir in the Japanese defense and outer space industry as well as among defense planners overall. China’s successful attack on and destruction of one of its own satellites in a January 2007 test also has fueled serious concerns in Japan and the United States about Chinese militarized space capabilities and has fed fears of a spacebased arms race. Overall, while trying not to be alarmist, Japan’s defense white paper identifies a multi-faceted security threat from China—ranging from missile and weapons proliferation, traditional military incursions (ships, submarines, and planes) into Japanese territorial waters and airspace and disputes over off-shore island territories, to cyber-security and the potential militarization of outer space. The rhetoric and action over territorial disputes over off-shore islands and maritime resources have ratcheted up notably in the past decade, fueled by nationalist activists on both sides. Japan and China dispute the ownership of the Senkaku/ Daioyu islands (directly west of the Japanese islands of Okinawa) and maritime rights in the East China Sea (north of the Senkakus) that currently relate to the exploration of undersea oil and gas resources. To date, the official exchange of views over the disputes—which first were raised by China in the 1970s—has been measured, but as with the territorial dispute with South Korea, the potential for unintentional military miscalculation is ever-present. In the words of one analyst: “given the strategic and economic value attached to the islands and periods of tension in the broader China-Japan relationship, the absence of armed conflict or even tense military confrontations is nothing short of remarkable. At the same time, the two sides have yet to engage in any serious effort to resolve the dispute. Instead, both sides have adopted what could be best described as a delaying strategy that defers settlement to the future.”34 The United States also has been drawn into the dispute over the Senkaku islands because it administered the territory from the time of Japan’s defeat in the Second World War until the return of the Okinawa and Ogasawara islands to Japanese administrative control in 1972. More importantly, since the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty covers explicitly areas “administered by Japan,” the Japanese government view is that the United States

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would be obliged to assist Japan in the event of a foreign effort to take control of the Senkakus. Officially, the U.S. government has taken no position on the competing territorial claims of Japan and China (and Taiwan). The issue remains a potential source of major tension in the alliance, however, since some on the Japanese political right have sought to use the Senkakus as a test case for the credibility of the U.S. commitment to defend Japan under the Security Treaty. China-Taiwan

A much larger territorial dispute that preoccupies China is over the island of Taiwan, which China considers part of its territory but in fact operated as an independent quasi-state since the conclusion of the Chinese civil war in 1949, marked by the establishment of the government of the Republic of China (ROC) led by Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan while the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was declared on the mainland by Mao Zedong. Japan had occupied Taiwan since the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, but was forced to depart from the territory as part of its surrender in World War II in 1945. In contrast to Japan’s relations with the other territory it occupied for decades, the Korean peninsula, Japan’s relations with Taiwan have been cordial for much of the postwar period, perhaps in part because local Taiwanese came to resent Chinese “occupation” under Chiang Kai-shek more than the Japanese occupation that had immediately preceded it. Like the United States, Japan recognized the ROC as the legitimate government of China until the 1970s, and continued a deep economic relationship and friendly ties with Taiwan even after recognizing the PRC in 1972 (seven years before the United States). Today Japan is one of Taiwan’s largest trading partners, and the “states” maintain deep cultural, educational, and tourist ties—though Taiwan also has laid claim to the Senkaku islands separately from China. In contrast to increasingly tense relations between China and Japan over territorial disputes, relations between China and Taiwan (an island that China considers to be a renegade province) have improved markedly in recent years under the conservative Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, though his political future and thus the next steps in the direction of China-Taiwan political relations is unclear. As with the long-standing dispute between North and South Korea, the tense military standoff between China and Taiwan (formally the Republic of China, ROC, or Chinese Taipei) has simmered over half a century though does not seem any closer to resolution. Over time, as China’s military modernization continues, the balance of military advantage between the two “states” will likely shift in China’s favor. At the moment, however, Japan’s defense white paper summarizes the current military balance as follows: (1) Regarding ground forces, China possesses an overwhelming troop force; however, their capacity for landing on and invading the island of Taiwan is limited. Nevertheless,

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China is making efforts to improve its landing and invasion capabilities, such as by building large landing ships in recent years. (2) Regarding naval and air forces, China has outnumbered Taiwan in terms of quantity while Taiwan has had qualitative superiority thus far. However, China has been steadily modernizing its naval and air forces in recent years. (3) Regarding missile attack capabilities, China possesses numerous shortrange ballistic missiles with a range that covers Taiwan, and Taiwan seems to have few effective countermeasures.35

The potential conflict is not limited just to China and Taiwan, however. Taiwan is supported militarily by the United States under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, a document that reiterated the U.S. commitment to the defense of Taiwan despite the U.S. switch of diplomatic recognition of “China” to the PRC on January 1, 1979. Subsequent U.S. government-issued statements and the regular sales of advanced U.S. weapons technology to Taiwan have reiterated this commitment over the years. In 1996, the so-called Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, precipitated by a series of Chinese missile tests in the waters around Taiwan near the time of the Taiwanese presidential election, led U.S. President Bill Clinton to dispatch two U.S. aircraft carrier groups into the waters around Taiwan, demonstrating the United States’ commitment to the defense of Taiwan and to East Asian stability more broadly.36 Japan is connected to U.S. efforts to defend Taiwan due to the long-term U.S. military presence in Japan. U.S. forces located in Okinawa are quite close to Taiwan and stand ready to assist Taiwan in a crisis. One of the primary “regional contingencies” anticipated by U.S. defense planners for the area is outbreak of hostilities around Taiwan. (Another is the aforementioned stalemate between North and South Korea.) It is in this context that the United States and Japan sought to revise their Guidelines for Defense Cooperation in 1997, as discussed in chapter four, including clarifying what role Japan may play in a “regional contingency” in an “area surrounding Japan.” China opposed these new Guidelines, asking for clarification of the “region” envisioned in a “regional contingency”—in particular whether it meant Taiwan. Japan sought to maintain strategic ambiguity on this point. Combined with the subsequent Japanese decision to work with the United States to develop missile defense, the Japan-China relationship deteriorated as a result.

The Japan-China Political Relationship over Security

Deepening relations with the United States and issues related to Taiwan were not the only reason for deteriorating Japan-China political relations. Inside Japan, Japanese rightists and nationalist outrage over Prime Minister Murayama’s “apology” to Asia in 1995 (reprinted in Appendix C), their fervor over the history textbook issue discussed later, and Japanese conservative politicians’ growing practice of visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo led to growing diplomatic tension between Japan and China. The “Yasukuni issue” has been fodder for thousands of news stories in the past decade. The shrine, now privately

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operated, had been the home of the state religion of Shinto during the era of Imperial Japan, and in the Shinto belief continues to house the souls of Japan’s war dead, including among the millions some war criminals convicted of atrocities in China, on the Korean peninsula, and elsewhere in Asia. In the fall of 2005, the time of the lower house election immediately prior to the August 2009 election, Japanese politicians (both LDP and opposition DPJ) sought to capitalize on growing anti-China sentiment among Japanese voters by overtly referring to China as a “threat” in public speeches. Prime Minister Koizumi, widely considered to be anti-China (or at least to have contributed to souring relations with China, including through annual visits to the Yasukuni shrine despite the controversy that resulted), led his party to the largest electoral victory in its history.37 Certainly this victory was not due to China alone, but it seems unlikely that the stance on China was irrelevant to his success. Japan-China relations, including security ties, have improved since the end of the Koizumi period in 2006, including under the LDP prime ministers who succeeded him, and have included exchange of visits of high-level political figures as well as limited military exchanges. The decision by the DPJ to send a 600-member delegation to Beijing soon after the DPJ electoral victory in the House of Representatives in August 2009 was an especially dramatic symbol of improved relations, a delegation that included 146 DPJ Dietmembers, many of whom who had only just been elected. Former DPJ leader, Ichiro Ozawa, had visited China numerous times in the past, including twice before as the leader of the DPJ, and capitalized on these relationships. Chinese President Hu Jintao reportedly started his meeting with DPJ Dietmembers by calling Ozawa “an old friend of the Chinese people who visited China many times and made important contributions to bilateral relations.”38 Chinese Vice President Li Jinping visited Tokyo later that month, a visit which included a meeting with the Japanese emperor (which sparked some controversy due to its last-minute scheduling). On the military side, recent exchanges include a historic visit by a Chinese missile destroyer to the port of Tokyo in November 2007 (becoming the first Chinese warship to make a port call to Japan) and, in return, a port call by a Japanese MSDF destroyer to Zhanjiang in June 2008.39 In addition, Chinese Air Force General Xu Qiliang met with Japanese Defense Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi in Tokyo in September 2008 (the first such visit since 2001), and in March 2009 Japan’s Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada met with his counterpart, Liang Guanglie, in Beijing.40 These certainly are constructive developments, but at the same time defense exchanges between Tokyo and Beijing have not expanded beyond rare port calls, limited cadet exchanges, and high-level visits—all of which typically are highly choreographed. Despite facing multiple territorial disputes that are often aggravated by debates over whether Japan has “properly atoned for the past,” the two countries have yet to identify an opportunity to engage in more in-depth security dialogue. Even efforts to gather non-government historians

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from both states to map out a joint history of the relations between the two states have been mired in political delays and ultimately have produced only parallel histories rather than a joint understanding of the past.41 In sum, China will surely continue to be both a principal concern and a principal opportunity in Japan’s security future. Efforts to keep a lid on an escalating regional rivalry and to work together on shared security concerns will be central to managing Japan’s regional security environment. Further Afield

Beyond Japan’s immediate neighbors, one may consider Japan’s region to include the lesser-developed Southeast Asian states (the ten members of the regional organization, ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian nations), Australia and New Zealand, the small Pacific island states (such as Fiji, Guam, and the Marshall Islands), and even further afield, the South Asian states of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and others, and the Central Asian states of Afghanistan and some former Soviet republics. Of these wider regional areas, it is Southeast Asian states that most enter Japan’s security consciousness. By contrast, as discussed in the following section, Australia and India enter Japan’s security consciousness more as potential security partners, Pakistan and India also as nuclear weapons states (apart from their regional identity), and Central Asia as a global security issue. The ASEAN states (Brunei, Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) play the greatest role in Japan’s broader regional security picture due to the potential disruption to Japan’s trade and access to resources that could occur as a result of military conflict or instability in the region based on their geographic location as the corridor between Japan and the resources of the Middle East and Africa and the markets of Europe and beyond. These states also themselves serve as important markets and production sites for Japan, though their collective GDP is only two-thirds that of Japan (in terms of purchasing power parity, much less in terms of market exchange rates) despite a collective population of 584 million (almost four times that of Japan).42 It is a highly militarized region with a history of inter-state and intra-state conflict, multiple continuing and overlapping territorial disputes (including with neighbor, China), widespread ethnic and religious tensions (including Islamic extremism), and, more recently, a troubling growth of piracy in critical global shipping routes. The ten ASEAN states have among them more than 1.5 million soldiers, and nearly 1,000 naval vessels and combat aircraft.43 In recent years, due to continuing economic development in most of these states, military forces are being modernized, with improvements including significant investment in naval and air capabilities.44 The inter-state and large-scale domestic civil conflicts of past decades have been replaced in recent years largely by concerns over terrorism in several of the larger

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ASEAN states—in particular Indonesia (the world’s largest Islamic population state, at roughly 228.5 million) and the Philippines (population 90.5 million).45 Concern about a terrorist attack in the vulnerable Straits of Malacca is especially strong in Japan, which relies on the narrow passage (as little as 500 meters at one potential choke-point) for much of its international trade. 46 Each year approximately 63,000 ships (20% owned by Japanese firms) pass through the strait (as many as 900 ships in a single day), carrying half of the world’s merchant tonnage and half of the world’s oil shipments (including 80% of Japan’s oil imports).47 Coordinated action based on cooperation with the ASEAN states has led to success in combating terrorism and piracy in region. As noted in the 2009 East Asian Strategic Review: In Indonesia, large-scale bombings attributed to the extremist organization Jemaah Islamiah (JI) occurred continually between 2002 and 2005, but since 2006 the country has experienced no major acts of terrorism. Supported by the United States and Australia, the anti-terrorist special forces unit of the Indonesian National Police has cracked down on JI and arrested or killed its leaders, severely reducing its organizational ability to carry out large-scale attacks.48

Joint training exercises between the United States and the Philippines also seem to have contributed to a decline in the threat posed by Philippine-based Islamic extremist organizations, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaf.49 The ASEAN regional organization itself has worked hard to create a sense of community among its member states, states that in past decades often held bitter animosity towards one another. The organization does not seek to provide collective security among its members (as does the United Nations) nor to form an alliance against outside states (as NATO does in Europe), but rather encourages dialogue and peaceful interaction under the guiding principles of non-intervention and consensus-led decision-making.50 For example, the body regularly discusses the issue of terrorism (a problem domestically in most of the ASEAN states as well as a transnational problem), and in July 2004, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore created trilateral coordinated patrols to deter and combat pirates operating in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, coordinating the actions of the naval forces of the three countries’ patrols of their own territory.51 Since 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has gathered together annually representatives from the ten ASEAN states plus seventeen other states from the region: the 10 ASEAN “dialogue partners” (Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the United States); one ASEAN observer (Papua New Guinea); and Bangladesh, East Timor, Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 52 “ASEAN plus Three” (APT)—the ASEAN ten plus China, Japan, and South Korea—also has provided a useful impetus to region-wide security cooperation since 1997, working together to

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combat such transnational security issues as terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, arms smuggling, sea piracy, and cyber crime.53 The growth of such regional cooperative mechanisms for security as well as the role that other regional actors have played together with Japan to provide security for the region will be considered further in the context of an examination of Japan’s evolving role in regional security since the end of World War II. JAPAN’S EVOLVING ROLE IN REGIONAL SECURITY

All of the states of East Asia have undergone dramatic changes in their security postures and relationships since the end of the Second World War; indeed, many new states have come into existence in the region since 1945. As discussed in earlier chapters, Japan also followed a fundamentally new course. Its military was disbanded at the end of World War II and its colonial possessions stripped from it. Millions of Japanese soldiers and citizens returned to the four main Japanese islands to re-craft a new role for Japan in the “postwar” period. This new role would be a dramatically non-military role, based on broader ideas of “comprehensive security” and economic diplomacy rooted in extensive trade and investment linkages and generous overseas development assistance (ODA) focused on East Asian states. Only in the later years of the Cold War would the JSDF venture beyond the areas immediately surrounding Japan, to play an expanded role in patrolling international waters in East Asia together with its U.S. ally, and only in the postCold War period would Japanese political leaders engage actively in multilateral security discussions with Japan’s Asian neighbors and deploy the JSDF overseas for limited non-combat missions. The Legacy of the Past and Japan’s Limited Cold War Role in Regional Security

Despite over a half-century of peaceful relations with its neighbors, Japan continues to be viewed with suspicion by some in the region, either due to genuinely held concerns based on knowledge or direct experience with Japan’s wartime atrocities, or due to political manipulation by elites through education and propaganda campaigns biased against Japan. Within Japanese domestic politics, and in the international politics between Japan and its neighbors, a “politics of apology” has continued to affect Japan’s regional security role (and regional leadership more broadly). 54 Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, Japan’s first Socialist prime minister since the 1940s whose party had joined into a surprising coalition with the LDP, sought to settle this matter decisively by offering what he viewed as a comprehensive apology for Japan’s wartime actions on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the conclusion of World War II on August 15, 1995 (see complete text in Appendix C). This apology only

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served to generate a series of new demands for more specific apologies and for compensation for acts of the Japanese Imperial Army in the region. Murayama’s statement also angered Japanese conservatives and ultra-nationalists who, in turn, re-energized their activities to promote a reinterpretation of Japan’s wartime history. Their activities—including efforts to publish a new history textbook that reflected their view of Japan’s international behavior in the 1930s and 1940s55— have seriously hampered the Japanese government’s efforts to build a forwardlooking relationship with its neighbors in Asia. In part as a result of the suspicion with which Japan was viewed in the region, in part due to Japan’s own newly held views about the limited utility of military power, and also due to the outbreak of the Cold War in East Asia, Japan’s security role for the first 50 years after the end of World War II was largely limited to refraining from military action itself, to contributing to its own protection, and to hosting U.S. forces in Japan so that they could play an active role in maintaining security in the region. After the so-called Guam Doctrine delivered by U.S. President Richard Nixon in 1969 (discussed in chapter four), Japan began to play a larger role in contributing to its own defense and initiated discussions with the United States about playing a limited support role to U.S. forces in the region, primarily via the MSDF. By the 1980s, the height of what many historians refer to as the “second” Cold War with the Soviet Union (after the de´tente of the 1970s), Japan was contributing in limited ways to the regional containment of Soviet military activities in the region—through the sharing of intelligence gathering, joint patrolling of sea lanes, and the build-up of JSDF military capability. The end of the Cold War led to a fundamental reexamination of Japan’s military security role. New Efforts at Multilateralism in the Post-Cold War Era56

Security ties in East Asia since the conclusion of the Second World War largely had taken the form of bilateral alliances or less formal bilateral cooperation.57 Most prominent among the bilateral alliances was the long-standing Japan-U.S. relationship that has underpinned security in the region for almost six decades and has further deepened in recent years, as discussed in chapter four. The United States has also long maintained a bilateral alliance with South Korea, and close ties with numerous states in Southeast Asia. China, for its part, developed bilateral security ties in the postwar period with the Soviet Union and with North Korea, though these were less formalized and have waned over time, in contrast to the strengthening bilateral ties between the United States and its East Asian allies. Another important characteristic of the Cold War period was that many states in the region (including China) were preoccupied with internal politics and domestic security issues, which distracted them from cooperating to address broader, region-wide security concerns.

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Since the end of the Cold War, the bilateral security cooperation that characterized the Cold War period has been supplemented by new efforts at multilateral security cooperation. Such new forms of security cooperation include the expansion of bilateral mechanisms to new actors (enhanced bilateralism58), the creation of new trilateral or small-n multilateral cooperation59 (whether institutionalized or not), and the deepening of existing (or creation of a new) region-wide institutions for security such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).60Such cooperation—in particular through the ARF, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—involves a large number of actors and a much larger region. After a decade or more of uncertainty in the immediate post-Cold War period, the outlook for a more cooperative security architecture in East Asia has improved—despite continued concerns over the outbreak of an active military conflict, as noted earlier. Across the region a consensus seems to have developed around the benefits of a “multi-layered security architecture” for the region, one that draws on overlapping webs of cooperation rather than aspiring to create a single one-size-fits-all institution.61 As a result, a single overarching security institution—a “NATO for Asia”—is not likely to emerge, even in the long term. This multi-layered approach opens space for cooperation even among states that possess continued rivalries and suspicions about each other, further enabling Japan to play a leading role, in principle. One reason why multilateral security cooperation is on the rise in East Asia is the growth of new security threats that face many states simultaneously and are difficult for any one state to address individually. Such issues include both “traditional” security concerns such as fighting terrorism and piracy, assuring access to critical strategic resources by maintaining open sea lanes, limiting weapons proliferation, and resolving territorial disputes; as well as so-called non-traditional security concerns such as containing the spread of epidemic diseases and addressing the factors leading to global climate change. As the three largest states in the region—in terms of population, size of economy, and military capability—the United States, Japan, and China are often the critical actors to address such new security concerns, though prospects for formal cooperation among these three seem quite limited in the short term.62 Still, opportunities for an enhanced regional security role for Japan certainly is present, even within the self-constrained non-military roles Japan has preferred to play in the postwar period. What remains a question to a large degree is the extent of political will Japan can muster to pursue an enhanced regional security role. An Enhanced Regional Security Role in the Twenty-First Century?

In the early twenty-first century, under the leadership of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Japan seemed poised to assume a higher degree of leadership

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and engagement in regional security matters. As discussed in earlier chapters, in November 2001 Koizumi dispatched the MSDF overseas for the first time to support an active combat operation—by refueling foreign naval vessels involved in anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan—followed later by the dispatch of all three branches of the JSDF to support U.S.-led combat operations in Iraq (though the GSDF deployment to Iraq itself was directly involved only in reconstruction and humanitarian relief efforts). Multiple meetings of the Security Consultative Council (SCC) between Japan and the United States conveyed the message of a deepening Japan-U.S. alliance that involved Japan playing a larger regional security role, building on the new Japan-U.S. Guidelines that had been agreed to in 1997 but were only put into place in stages in the years that followed. At the same time, Japan undertook a deepening of its bilateral security ties with other states in the region as well—in particular with Australia, another key U.S. ally in the region. The armed forces of the two states began to cooperate directly through JSDF missions overseas to Cambodia, East Timor, and Iraq.63 After a series of exchange visits by the political and military leaders of both states in the early twenty-first century (under the political leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi and his successor, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe), the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was announced in March 2007, after talks between Prime Minister Abe and Australian Prime Minister John Howard.64 It is the first bilateral declaration on security cooperation between Japan and a state other than the United States.65 Although both countries have since undergone a change in political leadership (including in both cases a change in government towards the political left), Australia’s subsequent prime minister, Kevin Rudd, also called for strengthening of trilateral Japan-Australia-U.S. security cooperation as well as deepened bilateral security cooperation between Japan and Australia, continuing the practice of exchange visits by the defense ministers of each state.66 Also under Prime Minister Abe, Japan sought to deepen its security ties with India—going as far as to declare an “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” in Asia stretching from Japan across Pacific Asia to India (and notably excluding China). Abe invited India to join this “arc” in what was billed as an historic state visit by Japan to India in August 2007.67 Prime Minister Abe would resign as prime minister the next month, however, serving only one year in total; his successor, Yasuo Fukuda, did not embrace the “values-based diplomacy” agenda of his predecessor, but also served only one year in office before yielding to Abe’s Foreign Minister Taro Aso, who also would serve only one year as prime minister before leading his party into the biggest electoral defeat in its history, resulting in the loss of his party’s majority in the Diet and the DPJ’s rise to power. As noted previously, in its first year in office the DPJ has sought to “re-balance” its relationship with Asia vis-a`-vis the United States. DPJ senior leaders, as well as rank-and-file Dietmembers, visited China and South Korea soon after coming to

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power, and remain in close consultation. Specific initiatives on the regional security front so far have not materialized, however. Meanwhile, the same security issues outlined earlier remain: territorial disputes, criticisms over each other’s presentation of past history, and disagreements over how to address perceived security threats to Japan, such as North Korean missile and nuclear activities, and “non-traditional security threats” such as global climate change. CONCLUSION

The uncertain nature of the future security environment in East Asia is daunting for all states in the region. This uncertainty is rooted both in the domestic politics of the major states of the region and in unknown potential regional security developments. Domestically, Japan’s future role in the region as a security actor is very much at the center of vibrant open debate in the context of far-reaching political changes that are taking place in Japan’s political system. In the United States as well, foreign policy issues have moved to the center of political party disagreement, creating inextricable links between foreign and domestic policy. One possible outcome of future domestic political wrangling in the United States is a lesser role for the United States in Asia, if U.S. economic power continues to decline relative to other states (especially in Asia) and the U.S. military continues to be involved in multiple active conflicts in other regions. Chinese domestic politics also expose a range of challenges and uncertainties that can deeply affect its international engagement and its overall security posture. Thus, even security specialists focused on regional security architecture and contingencies must heed domestic political developments in the region due to their important effect on regional security relations and prospects for cooperation. Unexpected developments in either the international security arena or domestic politics could greatly alter the calculus for Japan’s defense planners. For example, the occurrence of another major terrorist incident along the lines of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States (or the Taepodong missile overflight of Japan on August 31, 1998) might either be a force for deeper Japanese security cooperation with others or a force for more unilateral Japanese security action; much depends on how such an event is processed through the domestic political environment. The topic of the politics of national security in Japan therefore ends this volume, in chapter six. NOTES 1. Ministry of Defense (MOD), Defense of Japan 2008 (Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2008), 4. 2. MOD, Defense of Japan 2008, 4. 3. Japan’s annual defense white paper, Defense of Japan, and East Asian Strategic Review, published by the National Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS), a research institute affiliated

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Global Security Watch—Japan with Japan’s Ministry of Defense, each include large sections on these regional actors, providing far more empirical detail that conveyed in the short overview that follows. 4. MOD, Defense of Japan 2009, 35. 5. CIA Factbook: North Korea (January 19, 2010), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html (accessed February 5, 2010) and CIA Factbook: Japan (January 26, 2010), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html (accessed February 5, 2010). 6. Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan, chapters five and six, examine these two policy developments in relation to the “Taepodong shock.” 7. MOD, Defense of Japan 2008, 33. 8. MOD, Defense of Japan 2009, 38. 9. Headquarters for Abductions, Government of Japan, http://www.rachi.go.jp/en/ ratimondai/jian.html (accessed February 5, 2010). 10. CIA Factbook: South Korea (January 26, 2010), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html (accessed February 5, 2010). 11. CIA Factbook: South Korea (January 26, 2010), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html (accessed February 5, 2010) and CIA Factbook: Japan (January 26, 2010), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html (accessed February 5, 2010). 12. National Institute for Defense Studies Japan (NIDS), East Asian Strategic Review 2009 (Tokyo: Japan Times, 2009), 93. 13. NIDS, East Asian Strategic Review 2009, 93. 14. Quoted in NIDS, East Asian Strategic Review 2009, 94. 15. MOD, Defense of Japan 2008, 391. 16. Ibid., 393. 17. Ibid., 60. 18. Ibid., 394. 19. NIDS, East Asian Strategic Review 2009, 199–200. 20. Ibid., 200. 21. Ibid. 22. NIDS East Asian Strategic Review 2009, 202. 23. Ibid., 202. 24. For an overview of Japan’s diplomatic position, see the pages dedicated to this issue on the Web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/ territory/ (accessed February 5, 2010). 25. Kanako Takahara, “Nemuro raid survivor longs for homeland” Japan Times (September 22, 2007). 26. MOD, Defense of Japan 2008, 69. 27. MOD, Defense of Japan 2008, 69. 28. CIA Factbook: China, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/ch.html (accessed January 26, 2010) and CIA Factbook: Japan, https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html (accessed January 26, 2010). 29. CIA Factbook: China, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/ch.html (accessed January 26, 2010) and CIA Factbook: Japan, https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html (accessed January 26, 2010). 30. MOD, Defense of Japan 2009, 50. 31. SIPRI, The Military Balance 2009. (www.sipri.org)(accessed February 5, 2010).

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32. MOD, Defense of Japan 2009, 103, fn 78. 33. MOD, Defense of Japan 2008, 394. 34. Taylor Fravel, “Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Daioyu) Islands Dispute,” in Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-U.S. Relations, eds. Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun, and Jisi Wang, (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2010),145. 35. MOD, Defense of Japan 2008, 58. 36. Robert S. Ross, “The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force” International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 87–123. 37. Kliman provides insightful analysis of polling data showing increasingly unfavorable attitudes of China, noting in particular a marked increase in such views among Japan’s elderly (pp. 59–61). Daniel M. Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik. Washington Papers No. 183. (Westport, CT: Praeger/CSIS Press, 2006). 38. “Hu meets Secretary-General of Japanese DPJ,” (December 11, 2009), http://www .china.org.cn/world/2009-12/11/content_19046400.htm (accessed February 5, 2010). 39. Emma Chanlett-Avery, Kerry Dumbaugh, and William H. Cooper, “Sino-Japanese Relations: Issues for U.S. Policy,” CRS Report for Congress (No. 7-5700-R40093), December 19, 2008. 40. “Hamada, Liang Mull Defense Issues,” Japan Times, (March 21, 2009), http://search .japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090321a9.html (accessed February 5, 2010). 41. Jun’ichiro Shoji, “Briefing Memo: Outlook for the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee,” The National Institute for Defense Studies News, No. 127 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, December 2008). 42. ASEAN Economic Community, Chartbook 2009, 1, 3, http://www.aseansec.org/ publications/AEC-Chartbook-2009.pdf (accessed February 5, 2010). 43. MOD, Defense of Japan 2008, 71. 44. MOD, Defense of Japan 2008, 71; an overview of specific new capabilities is provided on page 74. 45. ASEAN, “Selected Basic ASEAN Indicators,” http://www.aseansec.org/stat/Table1.pdf (accessed January 4, 2010). 46. Ed Blanche, “Terror Attacks Threaten Gulf ’s Oil Routes,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, (1 December 2002), http://jtic.janes.com (accessed February 5, 2010). 47. Based on data presented in Derek A. West, “Reluctant Samurai: Partnering with Japan to Combat Terrorism,” Master’s Thesis. Alabama: Maxwell Air Base, Air Command and Staff College, Air University (April 2006), 21–22. 48. NIDS, East Asian Strategic Review 2009, 176–77. 49. NIDS, East Asian Strategic Review 2009, 178. 50. The ASEAN Web site sets out these guiding principles and an overview of the organization’s development and major initiatives:www.asean.org (accessed February 5, 2010). 51. MOD, Defense of Japan 2008, 73. 52. Several chapters within Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama, (eds.), East Asian Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008) provide different views of the various forms multilateralism in East Asia might take. 53. See the official Web site overview of APT: http://www.aseansec.org/16580.htm 54. See, for example, Tom Zeller, Jr., “The Politics of Apology for Japan’s ‘Comfort Women,’ ” (March 5, 2007), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/03/05/the-politics-of -apology-for-japans-comfort-women/ (accessed February 5, 2010). For a more scholarly

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Global Security Watch—Japan analysis, see Jennifer Lind, Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008). 55. There is a large body of scholarly literature in English and in Japanese examining the politics of this issue, as well as the content of the new textbook. An English translation of the chapters of Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho [New history textbook] is available from the sponsoring organization’s Web site: http://www.tsukurukai.com/05_rekisi_text/rekishi_English/ English.pdf 56. This section draws on material first presented in Andrew L. Oros, “Prospects for Trilateral Security Cooperation,” in Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-U.S. Relations, eds. Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun, and Jisi Wang, (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2010). 57. See chapters by Kent Calder and Bruce Cumings for expansion on this point in East Asian Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability, eds. Kent Calder and Francis Fukuyama, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 2008). 58. Others have used the phrase “expanded bilateralism” to connote the same idea— adding new actors to existing bilateral mechanisms. For example, see Ken Jimbo, “From ‘Double Track’ to ‘Convergence’: Japanese Defense Policy and an Emerging Security Architecture in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in Japan’s New Defense Establishment: Institutions, Capabilities, and Implications, eds. Yuki Tatsumi and Andrews L. Oros (pp. 99-115); and Brian L. Jobs, “Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in Bilateralism in a Multilateral Era: The Future of the San Francisco Alliance System in the Asia-Pacific eds. William Tow, Russell Trood, and Toshiya Hoshino (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1999). 59. The recent Six-Party Talks among China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and the United States are exemplary of this option of “small-n multilateralism”—i.e., multilateralism that features a limited number of participants. Mulgan appropriately coins the term “modest minilateralism” to refer to the current state of Japan’s efforts in the region; see Aurelia George Mulgan, “Breaking the Mould: Japan’s Subtle Shift from Exclusive Bilateralism to Modest Minilateralism,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 30: 1 (April 2008): 52–72. 60. Several chapters within Calder and Fukuyama, eds., East Asian Multilateralism, provide different views of the various forms multilateralism in East Asia might take. 61. Two recent books that describe these trends are Calder and Fukuyama, eds. (see note 60), and Michael Green and Bates Gill, eds., Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 62. Andrew L. Oros, “Prospects for Trilateral Security Cooperation,” in Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-U.S. Relations, eds. Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun, and Jisi Wang, (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2010). 63. NIDS, East Asian Strategic Review 2009, 266. 64. The full text of the declaration is posted on the Web site of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html (accessed February 5, 2010). 65. NIDS, East Asian Strategic Review 2009, 266. 66. NIDS, East Asian Strategic Review 2009, 266. 67. Surojit Chatterjee, “Japan invites India to ‘the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity,’ ” International Business Times, (25 August 2007), http://www.ibtimes.co.in/articles/20070825/ japan-prime-minister-india-visit-helps-boost-bilateral-trade-renew-defense-ties.htm (accessed February 5, 2010). .

CHAPTER

6

Democratic Politics and Japan’s Evolving Security Role

On August 30, 2009, Japanese voters overwhelmingly elected the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) to a majority in the powerful Lower House of Japan’s parliament. The scale of the DPJ victory, winning 308 out of 480 seats in the House of Representatives, is unprecedented in post-World War II Japan. That the party voted out of power, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), had dominated Japanese politics for the previous half century made the Japanese voters’ decision all the more historic. Yukio Hatoyama, president of the DPJ, became prime minister on September 16, with a DPJ Minister of Defense and Minister of Foreign Affairs (along with other new Cabinet positions) appointed the same day. While exit polling showed that the August 30 election was largely determined by domestic issues (and also the non-issue factor of many voters simply wanting to see a change in government), a visible aspect of the DPJ campaign included a number of policy platforms that clearly distinguished DPJ foreign policy from the ruling LDP: calls for a “more equal” alliance between Japan and the United States, an end to MSDF participation in re-fueling ships of the U.S.-led coalition operating in the Indian Ocean as a part of the war on terrorism, opposition to a recent Japan-U.S. agreement on U.S. base realignment in Okinawa, and for a closer relationship between Japan and the rest of Asia, among them. It is too early to tell whether the new direction proposed by the DPJ will have a lasting impact on Japan’s national security policy. Certainly the resignation of the first DPJ prime minister, Hatoyama, after only eight months in office suggests that the DPJ faces significant obstacles in implementing its preferred new course. Nonetheless, the second decade of the twenty-first century will be one of the critical turning points in Japanese security policy and of Japan’s broader vision of itself

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in the world, as the DPJ’s policy initiatives force debate on these issues within Japan. Only time will tell what kind of a new consensus may emerge from such a debate. Similar to the immediate post-Cold War period when there also was much talk about dramatic change, Japan may very well reach a conclusion that its current national security direction is more-or-less the right path for Japan, and that all that is necessary is continued incremental change. Or the debate may produce another conclusion, that Japan’s interests will be better served by the vision of Japan which is closer to what the DPJ policy platform offers. An understanding of Japan’s past security policy changes, the long-standing domestic political debates over security policy, and recent developments in Japan’s geo-strategic environment each provides some clues to Japan’s likely future evolution, and all suggest a likelihood for a high degree of policy continuity over time despite (or perhaps because of ) long-standing political disagreements over certain aspects of Japan’s national security policy. At the same time, however, the evolution of the Japanese policymaking process in recent years suggests that whatever future policy may be, there will also be key changes in the politics of Japanese security, and further changes to the policymaking process. As the examination of different aspects of Japanese security policy throughout this volume has shown, Japan’s security policies often have been seen from abroad as “abnormal” due to Japan’s reliance on another great power (the United States) for its military security, its eschewal of offensive weapons (even though it has the technological and economic capability to produce them), and its rejection of using its military power to compel states to follow its lead. Japan’s “Self Defense Forces,” its “peace constitution,” and its lack of representation as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (despite being the second largest financial donor to the UN) all strike many as examples of “abnormal” Japan as well. As noted in previous chapters, many Japanese also see their state as abnormal. For half a century prominent Japanese politicians, industrial leaders, intellectuals, and average citizens have decried Japan’s status as a “junior partner,” “little brother,” or “semi-sovereign state” in comparison to its alliance partner, the United States. This rhetoric was apparent in the campaign of the DPJ in their recent landslide victory. But the debate over Japan’s status in its relations to the United States as well as in the international community began much earlier. In fact, the debate was first sparked in the 1990s by the published work of a then-prominent LDP politician, Ichiro Ozawa, calling literally for Japan to become a “normal nation” (futsu no kuni).1 Sixteen years later, Ozawa, as the Secretary General of the DPJ, masterminded the DPJ’s 2009 campaign and is in the position of actualizing his vision—though the way he currently articulates this vision has changed since he first coined the phrase “normal nation.” Aspiration for Japan to become “normal” is not limited to Democrats, however. For example, as noted in previous chapters, the derision that Japan provided only “checkbook diplomacy” in response to the 1990–1991 Gulf War haunts many Japanese, especially conservatives and policy

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elites. In fact, it motivated different actions in Japan’s response to the 2003 Iraq War led by the United States. Other conservatives would like to see Japan work less with the United States. Tokyo governor and nationalist author Shintaro Ishihara represents this vision well in his best-selling book of the 1990s, The Japan That Can Say No.2 Japanese military security policy in recent years has also clearly undergone a degree of “normalization” at home, well beyond what long had been considered the scope of acceptable practice. Japan’s Ministry of Defense and its armed forces (the JSDF) are more or less accepted as legitimate actors, often called on to play support roles at home and abroad; military strategy is the subject of scores of articles every month in Japan’s major opinion journals, news weeklies, and newspaper op-ed pages; and Japan’s broader security practices—from its attitude toward its constitution and defense cooperation with the United States to industrial policy over defense production and outer space use—have moved to a large degree beyond the stale dogma that posed significant restrictions on such activities in the half-century after Japan’s defeat in World War II to an area of open, informed debate, and even change. Today, Japan has one of the largest military budgets in the world, and possesses military capabilities which, by many measures, rank among the top few states in the world. JSDF has participated in multinational operations around the world since their first overseas deployment to the Persian Gulf in 1991, including recent JSDF participation in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia that have been ongoing since March 2009, and multi-service JSDF relief efforts after the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti.3 Beyond the issue of JSDF overseas deployment, the image of the JSDF at home and abroad also has improved in the twenty-first century through greater involvement in multilateral disaster relief and training exercises with foreign counterparts, extensive involvement in disaster relief as well as search and rescue operations domestically. The Transformation and Realignment: The U.S.–Japan Alliance in the 21st Century, issued by the Japanese and U.S. governments at the conclusion of the October 2005 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting, speaks to the increasingly important role that the JSDF has come to occupy as one of the pillars that support the alliance,4 sentiments repeated in the January 2010 joint statement of the SCC despite visible political disagreements over certain specific policy issues (most notably the delayed relocation of the U.S. base at Futenma in Okinawa) 5 and in a statement by Prime Minister Hatoyama commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Japan-U.S. security treaty that same month (reprinted in Appendix C). What has been driving—and determining—changes in Japanese security and defense policy in the post-Cold War era? There is no single answer to this question. Shocks to past Japanese security practices date to even before the end of the Cold War, but seem to have increased in frequency in the post-Cold War

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period. A changing domestic political environment certainly also has played a significant formative role—characterized first by a new kind of political opposition (rather than the long-present Japan Socialist Party [JSP]) and now by a political “opposition” in control of government, the DPJ. Moreover, pressure from the United States and other outside actors also has moved Japan in ways unexpected, and unpredicted, by a focus solely on domestic factors. These multiple sources of change in Japanese security policy also indicate the breadth of actors involved in security policymaking in Japan today and in the past. Unlike in many areas of policy in the postwar period, politicians have played a leading role in many controversial security policy decisions— leaving bureaucrats (especially from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and more recently from the Ministry of Defense) to devise methods of implementation. The news headlines regarding the DPJ’s security policies—or, at least, delays in implementation of previously agreed-on policies—is the most recent example that underscores this point. Industry actors, civil society movements, and voters themselves also have played important roles in crafting Japan’s security policies at times. Apart from headline issues, however, bureaucrats from Japan and the United States have often worked closely together to make incremental but steady changes to Japan’s security policies beyond the close watch of the public or their elected representatives—a fact that the DPJ has recently raised as a political issue. Through the lens of national security, it is possible to gain insight into broader questions of institutional evolution in Japan (the strengthening of the Cabinet Secretariat, the Cabinet itself, and the Ministry of Defense), civil society activism (from the peace movement to ultra-nationalist rightists), the broader effects of long-term economic stagnation, and Japan’s challenging demographic future (e.g., its aging population). One thing is certain: a familiarity with the past and present politics of national security is essential to discerning Japan’s likely security future. LONG-STANDING POLITICAL DIVISIONS OVER SECURITY IN JAPAN6

Clearly, national security continues to be a deeply political and politicized topic in Japan in the second decade of the twenty-first century, as it has been from the nineteenth century. How nineteenth-century Japan would respond to the security threat posed by the arrival of the Black Ships of U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry to a “closed” Japan in 1853 provoked such deep political divisions that a revolution in governance occurred. How Japan should respond to its growing international isolation in the 1930s similarly provoked bitter political divisions that ultimately led to the collapse of democratic governance. In the postwar period, the split between the LDP and the JSP on the topic of national security for the duration of the Cold War is one of the major reasons for the LDP’s one-party dominance of Japanese domestic politics from 1955 to 1989,

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the year the Berlin Wall fell. (Interestingly, the LDP lost control of the House of Councillors, the less-powerful chamber of the Japanese Diet, the same year.) The LDP—the party that ruled Japan almost continuously for 54 years—came together as a party in the tumultuous 1950s when political conservatives were especially divided on national security issues, particularly over the need for (and extent of ) a long-term military alliance with the United States, direct Japanese involvement in the emerging Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, and military rearmament in general. What bound political conservatives together was an opposition to socialism and the party that supported it, the JSP. When rival factions of the JSP formed a unified front against divided conservatives in 1955, political conservatives responded by merging the Liberal and Democratic parties in to the LDP. This “1955 System”—a unified and dominant conservative party versus a fractured and subordinate political left—would provide the basis of Japanese electoral politics for the next four decades. One must be careful not to oversimplify the nature of the “1955 System” when discussing the politics of national security, however. Public opinion polling throughout the postwar period shows large numbers of Japanese sympathetic to the JSP on many issues related to national security. These numbers were too large for the LDP to ignore if it wanted to maintain an electoral majority. Among such public sympathies was the strong political force of “pacifism,” or a related “anti-militarist” belief, that was championed by the JSP.7 As noted earlier in this volume, the popularity of such ideas forced the LDP to compromise on many security policy issues, and more broadly kept the LDP on the defensive with regard to issues related to the JSDF and Japan’s security policy writ large. Fearing a loss of its majority in elections in the late 1960s and 1970s, LDP leaders advocated “lite” versions of JSP policies regarding arms production and export, nuclear weapons, security relations with the United States, and the level of rearmament in an economically booming Japan.8 It is in this period that many of the important and well-known principles of Japanese security policies—restriction on arms exports, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (prohibition of possession, introduction and production of nuclear weapons), limitation in defense spending to less than 1 percent of GDP, prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes, and prohibition of the use of the JSDF overseas—were most clearly articulated. Even during the Cold War under the 1955 System, national security issues continually entered national political debates and campaigns. Today is certainly not the first time that security policy issues have been politicized, conservative politicians have become alarmed that “politics” was fundamentally undermining Japan’s national security, or the United States has become deeply disappointed in Japan for not following through with agreements made by political elites. And it surely will not be the last. The heading “security policy” contains much deeper issues than simply the level of defense spending and the types of weapons in Japan; it also includes a

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number of hot-button political issues that play a key role in party formation and cohesion, and ultimately in Japanese elections—issues such as teaching history and patriotism, how to commemorate the sacrifices of the war dead, how to properly atone for the past, and the constitutionality of Japan’s sizable military forces. Today, contrary to what one might think from recent press reports, there is much more agreement about core national security concerns among the mainstream members of both major parties in Japan, the DPJ and the LDP, than in the Cold War years. Moreover, each party faces deep divisions among their own members on national security questions. For example, both parties contain members (perhaps even a majority of members) who support revision of Article Nine of the postwar constitution, who support deployment of the JSDF abroad under certain circumstances, who strongly support the Japan-U.S. security alliance, who favor a hard line regarding North Korea, and who wish to counter the military rise of China. Such consensus across parties is wholly different from the politics of security for most of the postwar period. The proscriptions of the new postwar constitution—put into force in 1947 under U.S. occupation—have been especially central to the politics of national security in postwar Japan.9 To many Japanese, their constitution is sacrosanct— especially its Article Nine.10 It is seen as a critical guarantor of the peace and prosperity that Japan has enjoyed since the end of the Second World War. Others have argued from its inception that the document is an affront to Japanese sovereignty, and that it was forced upon a defeated, occupied nation. Despite these different views—or perhaps because of them—Japan’s constitution has never been formally revised (although it has been interpreted in substantially different ways). Political conservatives in immediate postwar Japan were opposed to many aspects of the occupation-imposed constitution: to women’s suffrage, the diminished status of the emperor, rights afforded to organized labor, and a host of other provisions. Controversy over Article Nine has proved most resilient, however, with calls for its change being voiced consistently for over 60 years. Those seeking change to Article Nine have never been able to reach the high bar necessary for formal constitutional revision, however: a two-thirds affirmative vote in both houses of the Diet and a majority affirmative vote in a national referendum. The possibility of achieving the first step, the two-thirds Diet vote, has been so remote that a legislated procedure to conduct the second step was not even devised and introduced into the Diet until 2007, where it passed subject to a three-year waiting period that meant it came into effect in 2010. Although constitutional revision has never been introduced into the Diet, this is not because large numbers of Japanese did not advocate for it. Extensive public opinion polling in Japan throughout the postwar period conducted by the media and the Cabinet Office shows large numbers of Japanese in favor of revision, generally understood to mean, in particular, revision of Article Nine. Still, support never reached the two-thirds majority necessary among Diet members,

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and only in the very early postwar years—and again in the early 2000s—did it exceed the 50 percent approval necessary among the public. Instead, conservatives pursued their agenda for change in other ways. The ruling LDP instead used its power over the courts to encourage a relaxed interpretation of Article Nine to allow for a steady building of the capabilities and activities of the JSDF. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to rule on what it deemed a political and policy issue, thereby granting the LDP much leeway on this issue. The Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB), an institution controlled by the LDP until the DPJ victory in August 2009, was therefore free to use its position as the legal advisor to the Cabinet about legislative proposals and drafts to issue a series of interpretations over time that have justified the existence of the JSDF, while setting limits on its mission and capabilities.11 For example, under CLB guidance the government issued the latest statement on its interpretation of constitutional restrictions on the exercise of Japan’s sovereign right of self-defense (see Appendix C, documents 12 and 13). Still, despite vigorously defending the constitutionality of the JSDF, CLB bureaucrats also consistently ruled during the Cold War period—reflecting widespread political sentiment—that Japan may maintain only the minimum military force necessary for the defense of Japan, may not possess offensive weaponry, and may not participate in “collective self-defense” activities (i.e., military activities in alliance with other states). What exactly constituted the “minimum necessary force” or “offensive” weapons clearly was gradually expanded during the postwar LDP dominance, particularly under the prime ministers who did not shy away from exercising firm leadership, such as Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982–1987), Ryutaro Hashimoto (1996–1998), or Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006). These prime ministers enacted important policy changes that included a new MSDF role in patrolling sea lanes up to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan, a partial exception to the arms export ban for the United States, and breaking precedent by allocating more than one percent of Japan’s national budget to defense (Nakasone); deepened security cooperation under Japan-U.S. alliance revised “guidelines” for defense cooperation (Hashimoto); and the first JSDF overseas dispatches to areas of active combat (although still in non-combat roles), the approval to develop mid-air refueling capabilities for combat aircraft, and the approval to develop and deploy a ballistic missile defense (Koizumi). CONTINUING LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON JAPAN’S SECURITY ACTIVITIES

The question of constitutional revision continues to play an important role in contemporary Japanese politics, though, as with many security issues, in a less clear-cut or obvious way than under the 1955 System. Two important shifts in the politics of this issue are: (1) that neither major political party now holds as

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a platform issue the maintenance of the current Article Nine (as the JSP had under the 1955 System), and (2) that no major political party now holds the view that the JSDF itself represents an unconstitutional exercise of political power. Rather, in contemporary Japan the politics of constitutional revision have become much messier: it is no longer (if it ever was) just about Article Nine; and there is divergence in the view about the issue within political parties (though one could argue that the LDP always had been divided on this issue). Today, two substantial constitutional barriers remain on the JSDF, and therefore on Japan’s security policies, broadly speaking: (1) limitations on acquiring offensive capabilities, and (2) a prohibition on the exercise of the right of “collective self-defense” with the militaries of other states. As during the Cold War period, there is no consensus on the desirability of fundamentally changing either of these two policies, and thus, no consensus on the desirability of constitutional revision of Article Nine. Interestingly, in recent years an alternative group of constitutional revision advocates has emerged that, in contrast to the long-standing conservative push for constitutional revision, seeks to clarify the anti-militarist language of the constitution to maintain essentially the status quo: a JSDF, but not a true “military.” Others, especially conservatives, have come to feel even more strongly in this new international environment that Japan must abandon the constitutional constraints of Article Nine and develop a robust military force that can operate—either together with or independently of the United States—to protect Japan’s national interests such as its territorial integrity, its safety from North Korean missiles, and especially the potential threat from a rising China. The politics of constitutional revision, particularly over Article Nine, thus reveal both a shadow of the past and a foretelling of the future of Japanese politics; contentment with the security policies that have kept Japan both safe and prosperous for over six decades, and growing realism about the dangerous nature of Japan’s international environment and the need to respond to it. Thus, although one does see many of the same security-related issues arise in contemporary Japanese politics as from past decades, arguably there is a very new politics of security in Japan today—as exemplified, of course, by the rise of the “opposition” to power after over 54 years of nearly continuous LDP rule. The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era of security awareness and challenges in Japan. Beginning with criticism of its “checkbook diplomacy” response to the 1990–1991 Gulf War (over $13 billion contributed), Japan’s sense of insecurity was exacerbated by instances of domestic and international terrorism in the mid-1990s and the increasingly threatening actions of neighbors North Korea and China. The Japanese political system was also shaken by the end of the Cold War (together with the concomitant collapse of the “bubble economy”), resulting in a series of political upsets, including in particular the implausible rise of Socialist Tomiichi Murayama as Prime Minister in 1994 in coalition with the LDP, clearly signaling the end of the 1955 System. However,

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the historical cleavage over security issues felt by the Japanese public manifestly persisted, as seen in the results of the 1996 Lower House election where the JSP was routed in what analysts widely considered to be voter backlash against the party which had campaigned on security principles that it abandoned when it formed an alliance with the LDP. (At the same time, one also should allow for the fact that some voters changed their minds about the JSP’s former antiSDF and anti-Japan-U.S. alliance security policies as increasingly out of touch with reality, and so abandoned the party for this opposite reason.) In subsequent election campaigns through the August 2009 election, a number of different opposition parties have campaigned on issues that exemplify a continuing historical cleavage on security issues. Although the names and faces have changed in some cases, issues of war responsibility, allegiance to veterans and their memory, textbook accounts of the past, symbols of the state (such as the national flag and national anthem), the roles and missions of the JSDF (including new overseas deployments), and the deepening of the Japan-U.S. alliance all continued to be volatile political issues that helped to differentiate political candidates and parties. Indeed, deeply symbolic of this long-standing continuity of issues is that in the most recent Lower House election (August 2009) the grandson of the prime minister who campaigned in part on opposition to continued U.S. bases in Japan (Yukio Hatoyama, who is a grandson of Ichiro Hatoyama), defeated the grandson of the prime minister who sought to maintain and deepen the security alliance with the United States (Taro Aso, a grandson of Shigeru Yoshida), just as it had unfolded in the 1950s! So-called pacifists and their champion political party re-formed as the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1996, and since then have played a much less important role in national political debates over security, though related attitudes are still widely apparent among the general public in opinion polling, due either to principled beliefs or simply habit. (The SDP has played a larger role than its support rates would suggest, however, due to its recent position as a coalition partner of the DPJ, a factor that surely influenced DPJ security policy.) The DPJ counts among its supporters many who previously voted for the JSP/SDP due to their pacifist foreign policy preferences, though in reality the DPJ acted as only a minor check on the security ambitions of the LDP when the LDP was in power and the DPJ controlled the House of Councillors (the situation of “divided government” that characterized the political system from July 2007 until August 2009). To a large degree, the DPJ did not act as the former JSP had because many DPJ members came from the LDP originally, or are newer participants in electoral politics who do not share foreign policy views colored by the cleavages of the former 1955 System. The fact that the DPJ strategist (and former party leader) responsible for the party’s landslide victory in the August 2009 Lower House election, Ichiro Ozawa, is the former LDP politician who wrote a widely cited book that popularized the idea (back in 1993) that Japan should

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seek to be become a “normal nation” surely indicates that the DPJ is not a party of pacifists. There are numerous other signs that the shadow of the past is not as long as it once was in Japan today. A new politics of constitutional interpretation and revision serves as one such example. Today Japan has deployed or is developing capabilities long thought to be prohibited by the language of Article Nine—such as mid-air aircraft refueling (which, in theory, could allow Japanese forces to attack an enemy abroad and then return to Japanese bases), surveillance satellites (five satellites largely used for military purposes have been launched since 2003, after a 1969 Diet resolution prohibiting the military use of outer space was reinterpreted12), and ballistic missile defense (which for years was delayed due in part to concerns over joint production and operation contravening arms export and collective defense restrictions13). The most noted sign of a shift has been the new role of the JSDF at home and abroad, however. The contrast between a hamstrung Diet unable to dispatch troops for the 1991 Iraq War and SDF participation in the coalition led by the United States in the 2001 operation against Afghanistan and the 2003 Iraq War (albeit still in non-combat and largely humanitarian roles in both instances) is striking. By 2009, over 10,000 members of the SDF had been dispatched abroad to 19 countries or areas since its first overseas deployment of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in 1991, though only in cases related to the Indian Ocean and Iraq did such activities have anything to do with an ongoing conflict.14 Even despite the change in government in Japan in 2009 and the DPJ’s termination of the MSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean in support of U.S.-led anti-terrorism operations in January 2010, JSDF deployments overseas are very likely to continue—albeit perhaps under new rules. This is due to a major change in the JSDF that took place simultaneous to the creation of the MOD, which designated a new mission for the JSDF on par with its original mission of “the defense of Japan.” Since 2007, “engagement in international activities that are deemed to contribute to a stable and secure international environment” is now an equal “core mission” of the JSDF. 15 The JSDF expanded defense cooperation and training with the United States military, reflected in the revised defense “guidelines” issued in 1997, and other areas of increased cooperation in response to the global war on terrorism (broadly framed as new “roles and missions” for each partner in the alliance) also are very likely to continue even under DPJ rule. Indeed, a primary campaign issue of the DPJ—subsequently stressed in its first months in power—was to elevate Japan’s role in the Japan-U.S. alliance to one of more “equal partnership.” At home as well, recent JSDF activity in disaster relief and other domestic assistance marks a striking contrast to the delay experienced in authorizing the JSDF to help respond to a devastating earthquake in the Kobe area in 1995. By all accounts, the JSDF is viewed much less suspiciously by Japanese today, to

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the extent that members of the long-publicity-shy JSDF may now walk the streets of Tokyo in uniform (rather than having to change to civilian clothes off base), are portrayed in television dramas, and even allowed to become the subjects of mass media reporting and academic research.16 Japan’s relationship with the United States also is viewed favorably by a great majority of Japanese (81.8%), with an almost equally high number responding that they harbor “friendly feeling” toward the United States (78.9%)—a higher percentage, according to Cabinet Office polling conducted in the fall of 2009, than ever before.17 Still, the first year of the DPJ in office has shown clearly that the alliance remains a controversial political issue and that the “deepening” of the alliance achieved in the late 1990s and early 2000s cannot be taken for granted even as both governments celebrate the 50th year of their core security treaty. THE “OPPOSITION” IN CONTROL: A NEW SECURITY POLITICS UNDER THE DPJ?

The DPJ’s rise to power has the potential to become a watershed event in Japanese politics in general, and in the politics of national security in particular. The DPJ-led government sought to concentrate on domestic issues in its first year in office with the hope that their government will have accomplishments to show to the voters by the House of Councillors election in July 2010. The DPJ’s campaign slogan for the 2009 Lower House election was “change of government for your better life.” Citizens voted on their frustration about the economy (continued sluggish economic performance, a widening income gap, rising unemployment, a pension system on the verge of breaking down), insufficient child care and education support, and on the LDP-led government’s inability to address these problems (symbolized by the succession of three prime ministers in just three years). The DPJ has tried to focus on showing progress on these issues, seeking to win the confidence of the Japanese public that it has the ability to govern effectively and therefore can offer a real alternative to the LDP as the party in power. DPJ leaders quickly discovered that the party could not escape confronting foreign policy challenges essentially from day one, however. The first months of DPJ rule required Prime Minister Hatoyama to respond to a range of foreign policy challenges: at the opening of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh, at the APEC Leaders’ Summit in Singapore, in Tokyo itself while hosting U.S. President Barack Obama, and especially over policy meetings among bureaucrats and Diet members in Japan. The DPJ received decidedly mixed reviews at these early performances, most often criticized for not having a proactive agenda and for conveying mixed messages among its leadership and among its rank-and-file members. The divisions within the DPJ regarding national security issues are apparent, seem unlikely to be

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resolved in the near future, and were aggravated by its uneasy political coalition with the SDP, a coalition that ultimately broke under the weight of disagreement over one of the most vexing security issues faced by the new DPJ government in its first year, the proposed relocation of the Futenma air base in Okinawa—an issue that also led to the resignation of Prime Minister Hatoyama on June 2, 2010. The DPJ’s decision to propose a National Strategy Bureau (Kokka Senryaku Kyoku) has been promoted as a central component of the party’s national strategy, a symbol of change from the way the Japanese government made decisions under LDP rule. The proposed National Strategy Bureau (NSB) would report directly to the prime minister. The NSB would be led by a cabinet-level minister and its members would be appointed directly by the prime minister. The NSB’s function would be to discuss and identify strategic priorities for Japan. Establishing core principles for the budget and identifying overarching foreign policy goals are expected to be its two key functions, though in practice the office that was set up immediately after the election to realize this goal has focused overwhelmingly on domestic strategies for Japan’s long-term development and economic growth. How quickly a full Bureau can be established will have a big impact on the new government’s ability to prove its effectiveness. A commonality between DPJ domestic and foreign policy is a deep investment in new ways of arriving at important policy decisions that are rooted in two core principles of democracy: transparency and politicians’ control of policymaking. The proposed NSB exemplifies both principles. While popular among the public, these two principles put great stress on the Japan-U.S. relationship in the first 100 days of the Hatoyama administration because historically the alliance has not been rooted in either transparency or politician control. It was deeply inconvenient—and at time quite acrimonious—for alliance managers that the DPJ elevated these principles, which has resulted in public acknowledgement of past secrecy and a delay implementing painstakingly negotiated plans for future realignment of U.S. bases in Japan, and deepening of the alliance. By contrast, early DPJ policy toward China began cordially, including frequent meetings between the senior DPJ leadership and senior Chinese officials and a legislative exchange trip to Beijing by almost half of DPJ Diet members soon after their August 2009 election to office. The goodwill gesture from the DPJ government culminated in December 2009 when Ichiro Ozawa led the delegation of approximately 600 (about 140 of whom were Diet members) to China and, in return, the Chinese Vice President, Xi Jinping, visited Tokyo (including a controversial last-minute meeting with the Emperor of Japan). The hope is that a symbolic improvement in Japan-China relations will lead to greater cooperation between Japan and China on a range of substantive concerns Japan holds regarding double-digit increases in China’s military spending, its acquisition of evergreater military technology, and its claim to numerous outlying islands and sea

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resources also claimed by Japan, among others. Similarly, relations with South Korea started well symbolically, including the visits of senior DPJ leaders to Seoul and meetings on the sidelines of other international forums. Beyond a desire to focus on domestic issues and the new principles of transparency and politician control, the DPJ faces two short-term foreign policy challenges as it begins a new era of governance not dominated by the LDP. First, relationships matter. The United States and other foreign countries must establish good working relationships with DPJ figures who may be unfamiliar to their foreign counterparts. The fact that the pacifist-leaning SDP was part of the first DPJ ruling coalition compounded this challenge for Japan-U.S. alliance managers. In particular, assessing the DPJ’s united position on key foreign policy issues will continue to be a challenge. Understanding two key players—Yukio Hatoyama and Ichiro Ozawa—in the first DPJ-led government alone turned out to be difficult. Hatoyama is a fourth-generation politician (including being a grandson of a former prime minister) and was trained in engineering at Stanford University, but little was known about his personal political philosophy or his stance toward key foreign policy issues.18 While he often talked about “friendship and love” (or “fraternity,” as the term yu-ai is sometimes translated) as his basic idea for politics, how this relates to specific policy positions was not clear. Initially Hatoyama was generally considered moderate, patient, and one who values consensus-building. Ultimately, he was regarded more as indecisive and wavering, his decisions unpredictable. Ichiro Ozawa, considered the mastermind of the DPJ electoral victory of August 2009, has not assumed any official role in the DPJ government. His behind-the-scenes influence on the overall policy direction of the DPJ-led government has been considerable, however. While Ozawa was the LDP’s Secretary-General nearly two decades ago, very few outside Japan have a good understanding of his personality or his policy principles nowadays. Although he was the one who coined the phrase “normal nation,” his more recent thinking on the future course for Japan’s foreign policy remains unknown. Beyond these two central figures, the DPJ is populated by party members who possess a wide range of views on national security issues, including former socialists (Takahiro Yokomichi), ultra-conservatives (Shingo Nishimura) and a wide range in between. One example of this range of views is the contrast between the first DPJ Minister of Defense, Toshimi Kitazawa, and the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, Akihisa Nagashima. While Kitazawa has a record of opposing the expansion of SDF activities overseas, Nagashima is well known for his strong support for a robust defense capability for the SDF as well as Japan’s expanded role in international security affairs. Further, the DPJ intention to have politicians play a greater role in policymaking might lead to less predictable outcomes that affect the established policy coordination mechanisms between Tokyo and Washington. Today, the Japanese

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and U.S. governments have agreed upon procedures for every major policy issue of mutual concern. Whether the DPJ’s plan to have its politicians engage more in the management of the day-to-day process will lead to a fundamental change in the Japanese policymaking process, including the role of technocrats, remains to be seen. Still, such a change already has caused confusion in the established bureaucratic consultative mechanism between Washington and Tokyo. One serious obstacle to the long-term implementation of this idea, however, is the limited number of staff working directly for elected politicians and, more broadly, the surfeit of knowledgeable potential staff outside of the bureaucracy. Already in the first year of DPJ rule, the party has had to relax restrictions it had initially placed on bureaucrats due to an absence of anyone else who could perform their functions. A second near-term challenge for the DPJ is to translate vague campaign rhetoric into actual policy programs. The DPJ’s campaign policy platform requires considerable clarification, particularly with respect to foreign policy. For instance, it has touted a “close but equal U.S.-Japan relationship” but what does the DPJ mean by “equal”? Does it mean when its government challenges Washington, its dissent is based on genuine differences over policy outlook, or will it be seen as posturing? For instance, the DPJ’s campaign platform for the August 2009 election included quite controversial issues such as the revision of Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), termination of the Self Defense Forces’ mission in the Indian Ocean, and the revision of the U.S. force realignment plan agreed upon between the Tokyo and Washington in October 2005. In its first 100 days in power, the Hatoyama government implemented change in one of these three areas (the decision not to renew the Indian Ocean deployment) and a significant delay in a second (U.S. force realignment). In both cases, one can argue that the Hatoyama government failed to proactively offer alternative policies, a key factor in his early resignation. There are other examples of vagueness in the DPJ foreign policy platform. For instance, the campaign platform advocated “denuclearization of North Korea and resolution of abduction issues,” but mentions no specifics on how a DPJ-led government will achieve such goals. It also proposes that Japan play a leadership role in UN reform, but does not explain how its approach would differ from the LDP approach. In their first phone conversation as heads of state on September 2, 2009, Hatoyama reportedly attempted to reassure President Obama that he considers the Japan-U.S. alliance the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy, but how it will play out on specific bilateral or regional issues in the medium term is unknown. CONCLUSION

Beyond the never-ending electoral cycle, a broader issue Japanese political parties and people continue to face is what role they imagine Japan playing in a twenty-first century international system. As noted previously, this has been

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a central and unanswered political question of the late twentieth century as well, dating from the boom years of the Japanese economy of the late 1980s and continuing into the early post-Cold War era. The DPJ came to power with the stated claim of making the Japan-U.S. alliance more “equal” and supplementing this relationship with closer ties to Asia. These goals are reminiscent of the idea of an East Asian Community proposed in the early 1990s. But such slogans belie deeper questions about Japan’s political future—the hollowing out of manufacturing, the shrinking population, continued aversion to development of robust military capabilities and alliance relationships, a growing fear and resentment of China, and continued frustration with North Korea in particular. None of these issues have easy solutions, and all pose serious challenges to a significant re-imagining of Japan’s future international role. This volume has focused in particular on incremental changes to Japan’s national security policy and its institutions since the end of the Cold War. The examination of this evolution suggests that key principles of Japan’s national security policy will remain largely unchanged in the next round of reform. Despite disagreements over alliance management issues (such as the implementation of U.S. force realignment), Japan will likely continue to place the utmost importance on the Japan-U.S. alliance as its key security policy vehicle. The JSDF’s overseas dispatch is also likely to continue in a limited manner regardless of the nature of the government in Tokyo. Even if the government at times may be more hesitant to allow JSDF participation in multinational operations more closely linked with combat, JSDF deployment for humanitarian purposes (such as the recent deployment to Haiti) will continue. What may change from the era of long-time LDP rule is how the policy debate is handled within the government and how the decisions are implemented. Under the Hatoyama administration, the DPJ sought to institutionalize a new policymaking process that shifts the center of gravity away from the bureaucracy. Although different in substance, conceptually this approach reinforces the strengthening of the Prime Minister’s Office (kantei) that was pursued under LDP prime ministers Koizumi and Abe. Realizing this goal of establishing greater politician control and less bureaucratic input would have a lasting impact on Japan’s security policymaking. Such a change is a double-edged sword, however. If used appropriately, it may allow Japan to be a more proactive and creative player in the global security environment. On the other hand, it also has the risk of exposing national security policy to politicization, preventing Japan from responding effectively to security challenges. Only time will tell whether changes to Japan’s security policymaking process will better serve Japan’s long-term national interest. Beyond the process, however, it is the policies themselves that must keep Japan safe and secure in a dangerous world and shifting international climate. Japan’s national security policies—and the institutions that create and implement these policies—have adapted

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substantially to its changing domestic and international environment in modern times. Japan’s future security policies can be expected to continue to evolve largely in line with past precedents in the years to come, but surely also will continue to innovate new approaches to respond to new security threats, evolving technology, and a constrained domestic economic and demographic future. NOTES 1. See, in English, Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation, trans. Louisa Rubinfien (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994). 2. In English, Shintaro Ishihara, The Japan That Can Say No: Why Japan Will Be First Among Equals (New York: Touchstone Books, 1992). The book was first published in Japanese in 1991 with a co-author Akio Morita, the chairman of the Sony Corporation. 3. In addition, there have been two recent “special measures deployments” to the Indian Ocean and to Iraq, eight instances of International Peace Cooperation Activities (Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Golan Heights, twice to East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq), and six instances of International Disaster Relief Activities (Honduras, Turkey, India, Iran, Thailand, and Indonesia). Defense of Japan 2008, 505–7. 4. The full text of this report is reprinted in Defense of Japan 2008, 457–65. 5. Minister for Foreign Affairs Okada, Minister of Defense Kitazawa, Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Gates, “Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee Marking the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security” http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/joint1001 .html (accessed January 19, 2010). 6. This section is adapted from Andrew L. Oros, “The Politics of National Security” in Routledge Handbook of Japanese Politics, ed. Alisa Gunder, (New York: Routledge, 2010, forthcoming). 7. On the important difference between “pacifism” as an ideology and “antimilitarism” as a political practice, see Thomas Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism. 8. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and Evolution of Security Practice, chapter two. 9. For a more extended discussion of the politics of constitutional revision, from which this short discussion has been adapted, see Andrew L. Oros, “The Domestic and International Politics of Constitutional Change in Japan,” Education about Asia 12: 3 (Winter 2007). 39–44. 10. See Appendix C of this volume, Document 1, for the complete text of Article Nine. 11. An excellent overview of this under-studied institution is provided in J. Patrick Boyd and Richard Samuels, “Nine Lives?: The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan,” Policy Studies 19 (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2005). 12. An overview of the plans to develop the surveillance satellites and how they were initially utilized institutionally is provided in Andrew L. Oros, “Explaining Japan’s Tortured Course to Surveillance Satellites,” Review of Policy Research 24:1 (January 2007): 29–48. 13. Constitutional issues raised by the introduction of BMD by Japan are addressed in Oros, Normalizing Japan, chapter six. 14. The MOD itself lists a higher count of SDF deployments due to multiple “missions” within the same region. Further information about these deployments is provided in Defense of Japan 2008, 505–7.

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15. Self Defense Forces (SDF) Law, adopted June 9, 1954, revised May 8, 2008, http:// law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S29/S29HO165.html 16. One important study is Sabine Fruhstuck, Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). A U.S. PBS television show, “Wide Angle,” for example, was granted extensive access to recent recruits for the GSDF for their episode, “Japan’s About-Face,” which first aired on July 8, 2008. 17. The results of the poll (in Japanese) are available from the Cabinet Office Web site: http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h21/h21-gaiko/3.html (accessed January 5, 2010). The historical comparison is made by Kyodo News, “Good will toward U.S. at record high: poll”: http:// search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20091213a3.html (accessed December 13, 2009). 18. See the short biography of Prime Minister Hatoyama in Appendix A.

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APPENDIX A

Biographies

NAOTO KAN, PRIME MINISTER (2010–)

Naoto Kan was elected to be the 94th Prime Minister of Japan on June 8, 2010, after having served as the Vice Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, and Minister of State in charge of the National Strategy Office (NSO) from September 16 2009 in the Hatoyama Cabinet. He was born in Yamaguchi Prefecture on October 10, 1946. After graduating from the Tokyo Institute of Technology, he entered politics when he began to work for civic activist Fusae Ichikawa, who was later elected to the House of Councillors in 1974 after being out of office for the previous three years. He joined the Socialist Democratic Federation and was elected to the House of Representatives in 1980 after several failed attempts in national elections. When the Socialist Democratic Federation was disbanded in 1994, Kan joined the New Party Sakigake. During the Murayama government, Kan served as the Secretary General of the New Party Sakigake, working closely with his LDP counterpart Koichi Kato. When the Hashimoto cabinet was established in January 1996, Kan was appointed to be the Minister of Public Health and Welfare, a position he served in until November 1996. Kan’s tenure as the Minister of Public Health and Welfare brought him nationwide fame. While in the position, Kan discovered and publicly released internal documents of the ministry that recognized the ministry’s responsibility in using improperly processed blood for the treatment of the patients of hemophilia, which resulted in many of these patients contracting HIV/AIDS. By this incident,

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Kan’s reputation as the “politician who is not hesitant to go against the bureaucrats” was solidified. When Yukio Hatoyama launched the Democratic Party of Japan in 1996, Kan joined his efforts as one of the party’s founding members and served as Chief Representative with Hatoyama. Kan again served as Chief Representative from 2002 to 2004. He also served in the party’s other leadership positions, including Chairman of Policy Affairs Research Council (1999–2000) and Secretary General (2000–2002). From April 2006 until his appointment as the Vice Prime Minister in September 2009, Kan served as the DPJ’s Acting Chief Representative. One of the core initiatives put forward by the Hatoyama cabinet in the area of policymaking process is the creation of the National Strategy Bureau (Kokka Senryaku-kyoku, NSB) that directly reports to the prime minister and is expected to tackle “the big picture issues” for the government, including overall guidelines for the national budget. Kan was appointed the head of the interim National Strategy Office, envisioned as the precursor to an NSB. How the NSO/NSB will evolve in its authority and its function within the government potentially has a profound impact on the policymaking process in Japan. In this regard, how Kan will perform in this newly established position will be key to the fate of NSB. TOSHIMI KITAZAWA, DEFENSE MINISTER (2009–)

Toshimi Kitazawa, a member of the House of Councillors, was appointed to serve as the 7th Minister of Defense by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama on September 16, 2009. Born in Nagano Prefecture on March 6, 1938, Kitazawa is a son of Teiichi Kitazawa, who served in Nagano Prefectural Assembly. Kitazawa began his political career in 1975 when he was elected to be a member of Nagano Prefectural Assembly, endorsed by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). After he served in the Assembly for five terms, he was first elected to the House of Councillors in 1992. Throughout his service as a member of the House of Councillors, Kitazawa remained close to Tsutomu Hata. He left the LDP, following Hata to the Japan Renewal Party (Shinseito), the New Frontier Party (Shinshinto), the Sun Party (Taiyoto), and the Good Governance Party (Minseito) before Minseito joined forces with three other political parties to form the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in April, 1998. Other than his chairmanship of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense in the House of Councillors, the position he held from September 2007 until he was appointed to be Minister of Defense, Kitazawa was a largely unknown figure in Japanese politics. Having served in a senior government position only as the Parliamentary Vice Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries during the Hata cabinet, which only lasted about 60 days, Kitazawa is not known for his expertise or strong interest in foreign affairs or defense policy.

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A prevailing view is that the reason for his appointment as the defense minister was his strong beliefs on certain policy issues, such as maintaining Article Nine of the Japanese constitution as well as sustaining “civilian control” over the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) by reining in on “revisionist views on history” that seemed to be held among some JSDF officers. KATSUYA OKADA, FOREIGN MINISTER (2009–)

Katsuya Okada was appointed to become the 142nd Foreign Minister of Japan by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama on September 16, 2009. Born in Mie Prefecture on July 14, 1953, he was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1990 from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). He is currently serving his 7th term as the member of the House of Representatives. Okada is the second son of Takuya Okada, the founder of AEON Group, which owns the nationwide supermarket chain Jusco and Daiei. Following his graduation from the University of Tokyo, he entered the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), today’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), in 1976. He left the LDP in 1993 to follow Ichiro Ozawa and Tsutomu Hata, who formed the Japan Renewal Party, which later merged with the New Frontier Party in 1994. While Okada says that he considers Ichiro Ozawa as “the father figure in his life as a politician,” he chose to part ways from Ozawa when Ozawa dismantled the New Frontier Party in 1997. After joining the Democratic Party of Japan in 1998, Okada has assumed a number of party leadership positions, including Chairman of Policy Affairs Research Council (September 2000–September 2002), Secretary General (December 2002–April 2004, May 2009–September 2009), Chief Representative (May 2004–September 2005), and Deputy Chief Representative (September 2006–April 2009). He has a reputation of not compromising on policy principles. His stubbornness in this regard sometimes invites his critics to call him “fundamentalist.” In the area of foreign and security policy, Okada is cautious about dispatching the Self Defense Forces (SDF) to overseas missions. He has consistently opposed the dispatch of SDF ground troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. Other foreign policy issues he has shown strong interest in include environmental policy and nuclear disarmament. On the latter issue, he ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan to conduct a thorough internal investigation on the classified documents that pertain to the “secret agreement” between Japan and the United States regarding the interpretation of Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles during the negotiations on the reversion of Okinawa during the 1960s, immediately after he was appointed Foreign Minister. He also consistently insisted upon the revision of the plan for U.S. force realignment in Japan agreed between the two

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governments under the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) under successive LDP governments. YUKIO HATOYAMA, PRIME MINISTER (2009–2010)

Yukio Hatoyama was elected to be the 93rd Prime Minister of Japan on September 16, 2009. He was born in Tokyo on February 11, 1947. First elected to the House of Representatives from the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) in 1986, he is currently serving his 8th term as a member of the House of Representatives. Yukio Hatoyama left the LDP in 1993 to form the New Party Sakigake. Following the LDP loss in the 1993 General Election and the establishment of the first non-LDP cabinet since 1955 under Morihiro Hosokawa, Hatoyama served as the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary. In 1996, he launched the Democratic Party of Japan as one of its founding members, together with Naoto Kan, Takahiro Yokomichi, and Kunio Hatoyama. Since then, Hatoyama has maintained his position as one of the leading figures within the DPJ. He served as its president for the first time from 1999–2000, and served as Secretary General from 2005–2009. Following his election to serve as the DPJ Chief Representative in May 2009, he led the DPJ to a landslide victory in the General Election held on August 30, 2009. Hatoyama describes his political philosophy being based on “yu-ai” (fraternity). He has been criticized for not sufficiently articulating what exactly he means by that. For instance, in the article he contributed to the Japanese monthly journal Voice in its September 2009 edition, Hatoyama describes the notion of yu-ai as the moderating principle that corrects excessive capitalism to create a more compassionate society. Hatoyama fails to articulate, however, how these principles are applied in specific policies he upholds. Worse yet, a truncated translation of this article appeared in the New York Times online, causing concerns among policymakers in Washington that he may be anti-American. While he has been trying to shake off such an image, the public image he would like to portray remains unclear. Hatoyama will be remembered as the prime minister that led the first non-LDP majority in postwar Japanese history, but also as another in a series of prime ministers who failed to meet public expectations and resigned before his term expired. Hatoyama resigned on June 2, 2010, to take responsibility for mishandling of negotiations with the United States over the relocation of the Futenma air base in Okinawa, which led to a major fissure in the Japan-U.S. relationship and his reneging on a campaign pledge to move the base off of Okinawa. Hatoyama is a fourth-generation politician from a strong political family with a very secure financial background. Kazuo Hatoyama, his great-grandfather, served as the Vice Foreign Minister and as the 6th Speaker of the House of

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Representatives from 1896 to1897. Ichiro Hatoyama, the first president of the LDP, and the man who served as the 52nd, 53rd and 54th prime minister, is his grandfather. His father, Iichiro Hatoyama, served as the Foreign Minister between 1976–1977. Hatoyama’s younger brother, Kunio, who served as the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications under Prime Minster Taro Aso between 2008 and 2009, was a politician in LDP until March 2010, and is currently serving his 9th term as a member of the House of Representatives. Hatoyama’s mother, Yasuko, is a granddaughter of Seijiro Ishibashi, the founder of Bridgestone tire company. ICHIRO OZAWA, DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE DPJ (2009–2010), CAMPAIGN STRATEGIST, AND AUTHOR

Ichiro Ozawa, former president of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), was born in Tokyo on May 24, 1942. A son of Sakichi Ozawa, member of the House of Representatives, he was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1969 from his father’s district in Iwate Prefecture as a candidate from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) after his father unexpectedly passed away. Ozawa served consecutive terms as a member of the House of Representatives as an LDP politician until he left the LDP in 1993. Since then, he created and disbanded several political parties—the New Frontier Party, the New Progress Party, and the Liberal Party. In 2003, Ozawa disbanded the Liberal Party and joined the Democratic Party of Japan with his followers. He became DPJ president in April 2006, but resigned in May 2009, several months after a scandal that involved bribery by one of his political aides broke out. He is credited with masterminding the successful electoral strategy that resulted in the DPJ landslide in the August 2009 Lower House elections. Having earned a reputation as the most powerful politician in the LDP when he served as the party’s secretary-general in the early 1990s, Ozawa is also known to have first used the phrase “normal nation” (futsu no kuni) as the future vision for Japan in his book Blueprint for a New Japan. In the book, Ozawa proposed that Japan should proactively engage in international efforts to maintain peace and security by measures that go beyond financial assistance. In particular, he advocated Japan’s participation in the multinational peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts that take place under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). Ozawa also advocated the revision of the Article 9 of Japanese constitution, arguing that while Japan should never engage in wars of aggression, it should be able to participate actively in the collective security system of the UN. His tendency to seek international legitimacy in the operation of multinational forces in the UN was enhanced particularly after he joined the DPJ in September, 2003. This tendency was most vividly demonstrated in 2007 when the DPJ, led by Ozawa, opposed the extension of the LDP-sponsored Anti-Terror Special Measures Law

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that allowed the MSDF to participate in refueling of foreign naval vessels involved in anti-terrorism activities around Afghanistan on the grounds that the refueling mission that had been conducted was for the support of a U.S. military operation, not the activities of multinational forces that are sanctioned by the UN. At that time, Ozawa proposed that although he was opposed to the extension of the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, he would support JSDF participation in an International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan which has a UN mandate. Today, the legacy of Ozawa’s ideas is still alive and well in the debate over the future of Japanese security policy. For instance, the debate more or less continues to revolve around whether Japan should become a “normal nation”—the phrase he coined. He also was one of the few influential politicians in Japan during the Cold War who openly acknowledged the constraints of Article Nine on Japan’s security role abroad and advocated its change. While sometimes criticized for his idealistic view of the UN, Ozawa’s argument continues to provide an alternative for the debate on the future of Japanese security policy. JUNICHIRO KOIZUMI, PRIME MINISTER (2001–2006)

Junichiro Koizumi, the 87th, 88th, and 89th Prime Minister of Japan, was born in Yokosuka City in Kanagawa Prefecture on January 8, 1942. He comes from a political family—his grandfather Matajiro Koizumi and his father Junya Koizumi both served in the House of Representatives—and entered politics in December 1972, when he was elected to the House of Representatives. While he established a reputation as a “lone wolf,” he served in cabinet positions several times prior to becoming prime minister in 2001. He served as the Minister for Health and Welfare twice, once in 1988 under Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita and again in 1996 under Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. He also served as the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications in 1992 under then-Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa. Once he rose to the premiership in April 2001, he remained in the position until September 2006, when his term as the president of the Liberal Democratic Party was over. His tenure as the prime minister is the third longest in postwar Japan, surpassed only by Prime Ministers Shigeru Yoshida and Eisaku Sato. With the exception of Yasuhiro Nakasone (who is the fourthlongest serving prime minister), Koizumi is the only other prime minister who served his full term as the president of the Liberal Democratic Party. Koizumi is remembered for a number of achievements during the five plus years of his tenure as the prime minister. First and foremost, he maintained an extremely high popularity among voters throughout his tenure, which was quite unprecedented. Domestically, his biggest achievement was the privatization of the Japanese postal service system, which was his lifetime agenda as a politician. He is also known for his push to deregulate the Japanese economy. However, his more

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memorable achievements as prime minister are in the areas of foreign and security policy. Under his watch, Japan dispatched the JSDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq in support of the coalition efforts against global terrorism. Leveraging an extremely close personal relationship between Koizumi and then-U.S. president George W. Bush, the United States and Japan also successfully concluded the Defense Policy Review Initiative, under which the two countries agreed on a large-scale realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. Finally, while it remains controversial to date, Koizumi’s two visits to North Korea and bringing back some of the victims of abduction with their families was certainly considered to be a major diplomatic feat at that time. While his critics point to the downturn in Japan’s relations with the Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China during his tenure, Koizumi is remembered as the prime minister who contributed a great deal to the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance, and who paved the way for a much broader discussion on Japanese security policy within the country. Even after his departure from the position of prime minister in September, 2006, Koizumi’s legacy continued to influence his successors, though none of his LDP successors—Shinzo Abe, Yasuo Fukuda, and Taro Aso—were able to enjoy the level of support that Koizumi had from the public. Further, the decisions that were made during the Koizumi cabinet on Japanese security policy (e.g., JSDF dispatches to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, and the introduction of a ballistic missile defense) opened debates on the questions in Japanese security policy which continue today. YASUHIRO NAKASONE, PRIME MINISTER (1982–1987)

Yasuhiro Nakasone, the 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Prime Minister of Japan, was born in Takasaki City in Gunma Prefecture on May 27, 1918. Upon graduating from Tokyo Imperial University (today’s University of Tokyo), he started his career as a civil servant at the Ministry of Interior in 1941. During World War II, he served in Japan’s Imperial Navy as a lieutenant commander. After the war, he was elected to the House of Representatives in 1947. During his service as a member of the House of Representatives, Nakasone served in numerous cabinet positions, including Director-General of the Science and Technology Agency (1959), Minister of Transportation (1967), Director-General of the Japan Defense Agency (1970), and Minister of International Trade and Industry (1972) before assuming the premiership in 1982. He served as the Prime Minister of Japan for five years—the fourth-longest tenure in postwar Japan. He served in the House of Representatives for 56 years until his retirement in 2003. Nakasone made numerous notable contributions to postwar Japanese security policy during his career as a politician. When he served as the Director-General of the Japan Defense Agency ( JDA) from 1970–1971, he pursued a large-scale build-up of the Japan Self Defense Forces ( JSDF) that involved its considerable

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modernization. Furthermore, Nakasone became known as the prime minister who allowed the Japanese defense budget to go beyond 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), which was a “glass ceiling” on the size of the Japanese defense budget until then. Finally, he was the first Japanese prime minister who explicitly acknowledged the significance of the Japan-U.S. alliance by describing the importance of Japan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” for the security of the Far East. Nakasone was also known for his close personal relationship with U.S. president Ronald Reagan, ushering the Japan-U.S. relationship into a “Ron-Yasu” era. Even after his retirement from politics in 2003, Nakasone remains an important figure in Japanese security policy. As a conservative politician who has been a long-time proponent of constitutional revision, Nakasone continues to articulate his views on a future vision for Japan, the Japan-U.S. alliance, and Japanese security policy through frequent public speeches and essays in important opinion journals and newspaper columns. SHIGERU YOSHIDA, PRIME MINISTER (1946–1947; 1948–1954)

Shigeru Yoshida, the 45th, and the 48th–51st Prime Minster of Japan, was born in Tokyo on September 22, 1878. After graduating from Tokyo Imperial University (now the University of Tokyo), he entered the Japanese diplomatic corps in 1906. After serving various senior positions in Japanese foreign ministry, he retired from the foreign service in 1939 after serving as Japan’s Ambassador to London. During the 1930s, Yoshida was a strong opponent of Japan’s deepening relationships with Germany and Italy. During the Second World War, he was involved in several attempts to end the war, which sometimes resulted in his arrest by Japan’s internal police. When Japan accepted unconditional surrender under the Higashikuni Cabinet in 1945, he was serving as its foreign minister. He stayed on as the foreign minister when the Higashikuni Cabinet was succeeded by the Shidehara Cabinet in November, 1945. He became the prime minister in 1946, and led Japan through the period immediately after the war by successfully forging a close working relationship with General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the General Headquarters (GHQ)/ Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). Under his premiership, Japan regained its independence under the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. Yoshida’s government also laid a foundation of the Japan-U.S. alliance by signing the first Mutual Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America in 1951. Yoshida was replaced by Ichiro Hatoyama as the prime minister in 1954. After retiring from politics in 1955, the same year he retired from the Japanese Diet, Yoshida published several memoirs and books on Japanese diplomacy. In 1966, he contributed an article, “Japan’s Decisive Century,” to Encyclopedia Britannica. He passed away in 1967 at his residence in Oiso, Kanagawa.

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Almost six decades after his death, Yoshida’s legacy continues to live on in today’s Japan. Yoshida pursued a foreign policy that emphasized Japan’s economic recovery and a reliance on U.S. military protection at the expense of independence in foreign affairs, in what became known as the Yoshida Doctrine. The Yoshida Doctrine continues to shape Japanese foreign policy at a fundamental level today. Domestically, Japan began to rebuild its lost industrial infrastructure and placed a premium on unrestrained economic growth under Yoshida’s leadership. Many of the policies shaped by Yoshida still impact Japan’s political and economic policies. His love for cigars also garnered him a nickname of “Japan’s Churchill.” Taro Aso, the 92nd Prime Minister of Japan, is Yoshida’s grandson.

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APPENDIX B

Chronology

Events of high significance to Japan’s security in the modern era.1 Events in italics occurred outside of Japan. 1853

U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry arrives in Uraga Harbor (near modern Tokyo) to demand that Japan open its border to trade, causing political turmoil among the ruling Tokugawa shogunate.

1868

A new centralized Japanese state is created under the political rule of the Meiji emperor.

1869

The Imperial Japanese Navy is created from previous regional forces.

1871

The Imperial Japanese Army is created, following the abolition of feudal domains the same year.

1885

Cabinet system established to include Ministries of the Army, of the Navy, and of Foreign Affairs, among 10 initial ministries.

1894–1895

Sino-Japanese war, ending in a Japanese victory that includes territorial concession of the island of Taiwan and recognition by China of the Korean peninsula as independent territory.

1904–05

Russo-Japanese war, ending in a Japanese victory that resulted in the creation of a Japanese protectorate on the Korean peninsula.

1910

Japan formally annexes the Korean peninsula.

1937 (Jul 7)

The “Marco Polo Bridge Incident” leads to full-scale war with China.

1 The postwar section of this chronology selects especially from a far more extensive (though less detailed) chronology provided in Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2008 (Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2008), 541–75.

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Appendix B 1941 (Dec 7)

Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (U.S. territory).

1942

At its height, the Japanese empire stretched deep into China and to present-day Singapore, Burma, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

1945 (April)

The Battle of Okinawa (through Jun 22) marks the only major combat during the Second World War on what is current Japanese territory, resulting in the loss of over 100,000 Japanese and 10,000 U.S. troops, plus likely greater civilian casualties.

1945 (Aug 6)

U.S. drops the atomic bomb, Little Boy, on Hiroshima, leading to the immediate deaths of 60,000–80,000 people.

1945 (Aug 8)

Soviet Union declares war on Japan.

1945 (Aug 9)

U.S. drops the atomic bomb, Fat Man, on Nagasaki, leading to the immediate deaths of an estimated 40,000–70,000 people.

1945 (Aug 15)

Japan surrenders unconditionally to end World War II.

1945 (Aug 30)

General MacArthur arrives in Japan to head the military occupation of Japan by the Allied Powers, led by the United States. More than 350,000 U.S. troops would arrive by the end of the year. One of the first orders of business is to disband what was left of the Imperial Army and Navy.

1947 (May 3)

New constitution takes effect.

1948 (Apr 27)

Japan Coast Guard established.

1948 (Nov 12)

International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the Tokyo Tribunal) delivers its verdicts, finding all 28 defendants (the top military and political leaders, apart from the emperor) guilty of crimes against peace (“Class A”), against humanity (“Class C”), or general war crimes (“Class B”).

1949 (Oct 1)

People’s Republic of China established.

1950 (Jun 25)

Outbreak of the Korean War (ends July 27, 1953).

1950 (Aug 10)

National Police Reserve (a precursor to the SDF) established.

1951 (Sept 8)

49 countries, including the United States, sign a peace treaty with Japan. Japan-U.S. Security Treaty signed, to go into effect on Apr 28, 1952.

1952 (Apr 28)

Occupation of Japan ends with Japan-U.S. Security Treaty put into force. Japan-Taiwan peace treaty concluded.

1952 (Aug 1)

National Safety Agency (a precursor to the JDA) established.

1952 (Oct 15)

National Safety Force (a precursor to the SDF) inaugurated.

1954 (Mar 8)

Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) agreement signed with the U.S.

1954 ( Jun 2)

House of Councillors passes resolution prohibiting dispatch of Japanese forces overseas.

1954 ( Jun 9)

Defense Agency Establishment Law and Self Defense Forces Law passed.

1954 ( Jul 1)

Japan Defense Agency (JDA) inaugurated.

1956 (Dec 18)

Japan joins the United Nations.

1957 (May 20)

Basic Guidelines for National Defense adopted by the Cabinet.

1957 ( Jun 14)

First Defense Build-up Plan adopted by the Cabinet.

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1958 (Apr 18)

House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs.

1960 ( Jan 19)

New Japan-U.S. Security Treaty signed (enters into force Jun 23) despite massive public demonstrations.

1961 ( Jul 18)

Second Defense Build-up Plan adopted by the Cabinet.

1962 (Nov 1)

Defense Facilities Administration established.

1963 (Aug 14)

Japan joins Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (enters into force on Jun 15, 1964).

1963 (Oct 16)

China successfully carries out its first nuclear test.

1964 (Nov 12)

U.S. nuclear-powered submarine (Sea Dragon) enters a Japanese port.

1965 ( Jun 22)

Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) Basic Treaty signed.

1966 (Nov 29)

Outline of Third Defense Build-up Plan adopted by the Cabinet.

1967 (April 21)

Three Principles on Arms Export (not to communist bloc, not to countries under UN embargo, not to countries involved in or likely to be involved in conflict) passed in the Diet, in a House of Representatives Audit Committee meeting.

1968 ( Jan 19)

U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (Enterprise) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time.

1968 ( Jun 26)

Ogasawara islands revert to Japan from U.S. administration.

1969 (May 9)

Resolution limiting the use of outer space to “peaceful purposes” adopted by the Diet, House of Representative plenary session.

1969 (Nov 21)

Sato-Nixon Joint Statement on extension of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and return of Okinawa to Japanese control by 1972.

1970 (Feb 3)

Japan signs Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (enters into force on Jun 8, 1976).

1970 (Feb 11)

Japan launches first domestically produced artificial satellite.

1970 (Oct 20)

Publication of the first white paper on defense, The Defense of Japan.

1971 ( Jun 17)

Agreement on the return of Okinawa to Japanese control signed.

1972 (Feb 8)

Fourth Defense Build-up Plan adopted by the Cabinet.

1972 (Apr 10)

Japan signs Biological Weapons Convention (enters into force on Jun 8, 1982).

1972 (May 15)

Okinawa returned to Japanese control.

1972 (Sep 29)

Japan normalizes relations with China. Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visits China.

1973 (Jan 23)

14th Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting agrees on consolidation of U.S. bases in Japan (Kanto Program).

1973 (Jul 1)

Commencement of ASDF defense mission on Okinawa.

1974 (May 18)

India carries out first underground nuclear test.

1976 (Oct 29)

First National Defense Program Outline adopted by the Cabinet.

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Appendix B 1978 (Aug 12)

Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China signed in Beijing.

1978 (Nov 27)

First Japan ASDF-U.S. joint training exercises (through Dec 1).

1978 (Nov 28)

Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation adopted by the Cabinet.

1979 (Jan 1)

United States and China normalize diplomatic relations.

1980 (Feb 26)

MSDF takes part in RIMPAC joint military exercises for first time (through Mar 18).

1981 (Oct 1)

First Japan GSDF-U.S. joint exercises staged (through Oct 3).

1983 (Sept 1)

Korean Airline (KAL) passenger plane shot down by Soviet fighters over Sakhalin Island north of Japan.

1986 (Sept 5)

First transfer of military technology to the U.S. approved by the Cabinet.

1987 ( Jan 30)

First Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost-sharing of U.S. forces stationed in Japan signed (effective Jun 1).

1988 (Nov 29)

Memorandum related to joint development of FS-X fighter plane signed with U.S.

1989 ( Jan 7)

Showa Emperor (Hirohito) dies.

1989 (Jun 4)

Tiananmen Square Incident crackdown on democracy activists in Beijing cools relations between Japan and China.

1990 (Aug 2)

Iraq invades Kuwait.

1990 (Oct 16)

Bill on Cooperation with UN Peacekeeping Operations submitted to the Diet with the aim of allowing JSDF participation in coalition operations against Iraq. (The bill is annulled on Nov 10).

1990 (Nov 12)

Coronation of Heisei Emperor (Akihito).

1991 ( Jan 17)

Coalition forces led by the U.S. launch Operation Desert Storm against Kuwait and Iraq without Japanese SDF participation.

1991 ( Jan 24)

Japan pledges US$9 billion to efforts to restore peace in the Persian Gulf region (in addition to US$3 billion pledged on Sept 14, 1990).

1991 (Apr 26)

Six MSDF vessels, including minesweepers, depart for Persian Gulf.

1991 (Sep 17)

Republic of Korea (ROK) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) [South and North Korea] simultaneously admitted to the UN.

1991 (Oct 9)

SDF personnel join UN teams to inspect for Iraqi chemical weapons.

1992 (Feb 25)

China enacts Territorial Waters Act designating the Senkaku Islands as an integral part of China.

1992 (May 25)

IAEA officials make the first designated inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities (through Jun 5).

1992 (Aug 10)

International Peace Cooperation Law comes into force, paving the way for limited SDF participation in UN peacekeeping operations overseas.

1992 (Sept 17)

GSDF units dispatched to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (through Sept 26, 1993), the first overseas dispatch of the GSDF since their creation. This would be followed by numerous subsequent minor overseas deployments in the 1990s and 2000s.

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1992 (Oct 23)

Emperor and Empress visit China for first time (through Oct 28).

1993 (Aug 9)

Hosokawa Cabinet formed, the first non-LDP cabinet since 1955 (lasting fewer than nine months, until April 27, 1994).

1994 (Mar 1)

First Japan-China security dialogue, held in Beijing.

1994 (Mar 31)

North Korea announces its intention to withdraw from the IAEA.

1994 (Jun 30)

Murayama cabinet formed, the first JSP prime minister since 1948, though in coalition with former arch-rival, the LDP (lasting through Jan 10, 1996).

1994 (Jul 25)

First ASEAN Regional Forum meeting, in Bangkok, brings together the then-6 ASEAN states with 12 others, including Japan, plus the European Union to discuss regional political and security issues.

1994 (Nov 9)

First Japan-ROK working-level defense policy dialogue, held in Seoul.

1995 (Jan 17)

SDF disaster relief teams dispatched (after some delay) in response to the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake near Kobe, Japan (through Apr 27).

1995 (Mar 20)

SDF personnel dispatched to carry out rescue operations in response to a sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway.

1995 (Jun 9)

Security Council of Japan meets for the first time, to discuss the state of future defense capabilities.

1995 (Sept 4)

The assault of a Japanese schoolgirl by three U.S. soldiers based in Okinawa causes a media sensation leading to widespread anti-U.S. protests and calls for U.S. forces to leave Okinawa.

1995 (Nov 19)

Prime Minister Murayama and United States Vice President Gore agree on the establishment of the Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO).

1996 (Apr 15)

Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement signed.

1996 (Apr 17)

Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security issued.

1996 (Jul 26)

First visit of MSDF ships to Russia (to Vladivostok, through Jul 30).

1996 (Sept 2)

First visit of MSDF ships to the ROK (to Busan, through Sept 6).

1996 (Dec 2)

Final SACO report approved by Japan-U.S. Joint Security Council.

1996 (Dec 24)

Security Council and Cabinet approve responses to foreign submarines traveling in Japanese territorial waters.

1997 (Jan 20)

Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) established.

1997 (Sept 23)

New Japan-U.S. defense cooperation Joint Consultative Committee is established and issues new guidelines for defense cooperation.

1998 (Jul 27)

China publishes its first defense white paper, “Defense of China.”

1998 (Jul 29)

First large-scale Japan-Russia combined military exercise conducted, for search and rescue including ASDF, MSDF, and Russian navy.

1998 (Aug 31)

North Korea launches a Taepodong II missile over Japanese territory, causing a public security panic and leading to a significant change in Japanese security policy.

1998 (Nov 15)

First joint exercise among all three branches of the SDF (involving 2,400 personnel), on Iwo Jima.

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Appendix B 1998 (Dec 22)

Cabinet approves development of intelligence-gathering satellites.

1998 (Dec 25)

Security Council approves Japan-U.S. cooperative research on ballistic missile defense technologies. (Signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States takes place on Aug 16, 1999).

1999 (Aug 5)

First joint military exercises between MSDF and ROK navy.

1999 (Aug 25)

The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan comes into force.

2000 (May 8)

JDA moves to new, more modern facilities in Ichigaya, Tokyo.

2001 (Jan 6)

Large-scale reorganization of Japanese ministries and agencies enacted.

2001 (Jun 15)

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is established by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

2001 (Sept 11)

Four U.S. planes are hijacked and crashed in a coordinated terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland, resulting in the collapse of the World Trade Center towers in New York City and over 3,000 deaths.

2001 (Sept 19)

Prime Minister Koizumi announces immediate measures in response to the Sept 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.

2001 (Nov 2)

Anti Terrorism Special Measures Law enacted to allow for dispatch of MSDF to the Indian Ocean to assist a U.S.-led anti-terrorism force.

2001 (Nov)

MSDF vessels deployed to the Indian Ocean and ASDF begins aerial transportation among U.S. bases in Japan in assistance of U.S.-led anti-terrorism operations.

2001 (Dec)

MSDF begins re-fueling operations of U.S. vessels in the Indian Ocean (expanded to British vessels in Jan 2002 and later to other coalition members, operations which continue until December 2009).

2001 (Dec 14)

Cabinet approves development of in-flight refueling aircraft for the SDF, a significant reinterpretation of “minimal defense necessary to defend Japan.”

2002 (Jun 13)

United States withdraws from Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in relation to a dispute with Russia over the United States’ development of missile defense capabilities (including jointly with Japan).

2002 (Oct 12)

Terrorist bombing incident in Bali, Indonesia results in over 200 deaths, largely of foreign tourists.

2002 (Dec 12)

North Korea announces it will resume operation of nuclear-related facilities. (It announces withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on Jan 10, 2003).

2002 (Dec 16)

Revision of Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law allows for deployment of Kirishima, a vessel equipped with Aegis air defense systems.

2003 (Mar 20)

U.S. and UK forces begin military operations in Iraq.

2003 (Mar 28)

Japan’s first two “information-gathering” satellites are launched successfully, one optical and one radar. Another pair is destroyed in a launch later in the year, on Nov 29.

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2003 (Jul 26)

Law concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq passes the House of Councillors plenary session.

2003 (Aug 27)

First Six-Party Talks related to the North Korean nuclear issue are held among Japan, China, Russia, South Korea, the United States, and North Korea (through August 29). Six subsequent rounds will follow (through 2007).

2003 (Oct 7)

First joint communique´ from a Japan-China-ROK summit is signed.

2003 (Oct 15)

China becomes the third country to successfully launch a manned spacecraft into orbit, following the United States and former Soviet Union.

2003 (Dec 19)

Introduction of a ballistic missile defense for Japan approved by the Cabinet.

2004 (Feb 3)

First GSDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction activities departs. (Supplemented by support from Kuwait by the ASDF from Jan 22, and MSDF from Feb 9). The GSDF mission continues until Jul 25, 2006.

2004 (Sept 8)

JDA/SDF 50th anniversary commemoration ceremonies held.

2005 (Feb 19)

Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee common strategic objectives confirmed.

2005 (Apr 9)

Large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations take place in Beijing and elsewhere in China during April.

2005 (May 2)

The SDF takes part in the U.S.-led multilateral military exercise “Cobra Gold 15” for the first time, in Chiang Mai, Thailand (through May 13).

2005 (Aug 18)

The first-ever China-Russia joint military exercises are conducted (through Aug 25).

2005 (Sept 9)

MSDF identifies five Chinese naval destroyers navigating the median line between Japan and China in the East China Sea near the Kashi gas field.

2005 (Oct 29)

Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee announces “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.”

2005 (Dec 14)

The first East Asia Summit is held, in Kuala Lumpur, among 16 states, including Japan, plus the ASEAN-10, Australia, China, India, New Zealand, and South Korea.

2006 (Apr 23)

Japanese and U.S. Defense Ministers agree to share expenses of relocating U.S. marines in Okinawa to Guam as part of U.S. force realignment.

2006 (May 1)

Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee announces “The Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation.”

2006 (Jul 5)

North Korea test launches seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan. (These actions are condemned in UNSC Resolution 1695 on Jul 15).

2006 (Jul 19)

Memorandum concluded with the U.S. for joint development and transfer of weapons and technology for missile defense.

2006 (Jul 25)

GSDF humanitarian and reconstruction mission to Iraq ends.

2006 (Oct 9)

North Korea announces that it conducted a successful underground nuclear test.

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Appendix B 2007 (Jan 9)

Ceremony held to commemorate transition of the JDA to the MOD.

2007 (Jan 12)

China successfully conducts an anti-satellite missile test.

2007 (Mar 30)

First PAC-3 missile defense battery is installed in Japan, at the ASDF Iruma base.

2007 (Apr 16)

First Japan-India-U.S. naval exercise conducted.

2007 (May 14)

Legislation passes the House of Councillors which sets out a process for a popular referendum on constitutional revision should such a proposal first pass by a two-thirds majority in the Diet (goes into effect in 2010).

2007 (Aug 10)

General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) concluded with the U.S.

2007 (Sept 23)

First SDF participation as an observer in a Chinese military exercise.

2007 (Nov 28)

First Chinese naval vessel visit to Japan (through Dec 1).

2008 (Feb 9)

A Russian Tu-95 strategic bomber violates Japanese airspace over the Izu island chain, the first such violation in 33 years, requiring the scrambling of 24 ASDF warplanes.

2008 (May 21)

New Basic Space Law enacted that allows greater military use of space (enters into force on Aug 27).

2008 (Jun 18)

Agreement reached with China over joint development of natural gas in the East China Sea.

2008 (Jun 24)

First visit of an MSDF vessel to China (through Jun 28).

2008 (Dec 12)

First Japan-China-ROK Tripartite Summit. ASDF ceases operations in Kuwait in support of Iraqi mission.

2008 (Dec 20)

China announces dispatch of three naval destroyers to Gulf of Aden to conduct anti-piracy operations.

2009 (Feb 17)

Agreement concerning relocation of U.S. marines from Okinawa to Guam signed (comes into force on May 19).

2009 (Mar 13)

Anti-piracy bill adopted by the Cabinet; Japan announces dispatch of MSDF to Gulf of Aden to assist in U.S.-led anti-piracy operations. (Defense destroyers Sazanami and Samidare set sail on Mar 14.)

2009 (May 25)

North Korea conducts a second nuclear weapons test, leading the UN Security Council to adopt resolution 1874 condemning the test and imposing additional sanctions on North Korea.

2009 (Aug 30)

Opposition DPJ wins landslide Lower House election, leading to first DPJ Cabinet in Japanese political history.

2009 (Sept 16)

Yukio Hatoyama becomes the first DPJ prime minister of Japan, appointing the first DPJ Minister of Defense and Minister of Foreign Affairs (and other Cabinet positions).

2009 (Dec 15)

DPJ announces a delay to study the previous agreement with the United States to relocate the U.S. Futenma airbase on Okinawa.

2010 ( Jan 15)

MSDF refueling operations in the Indian Ocean cease.

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2010 ( Jan 19)

Japan and the United States commemorate the 50th anniversary of Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States.

2010 ( Jan 25)

Japan announces intention to dispatch the GSDF to Haiti to participate in UN relief efforts. (The first 160 GSDF personnel depart on Feb 6.)

2010 (Mar 26)

South Korean naval vessel, Cheonan, is sunk near the border with North Korea, purportedly by a North Korean submarine torpedo, killing 46 sailors and leading to calls for new UN sanctions against North Korea.

2010 (Apr 13)

MSDF destroyers unexpectedly encounter two Chinese submarines and eight destroyer warships in international waters near the coast of Okinawa, leading to protests from the MOD.

2010 ( Jun 2)

Prime Minister Hatoyama resigns after only eight months in office to take responsibility for mishandling of the Futenma air base issue with the United States.

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APPENDIX C

Documents

The following are texts or excerpts of key documents related to the security of Japan. They include: 1. Constitution of Japan (1946)—Preface and Article Nine 2. Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America (1951) 3. Basic Policy for National Defense (1957) 4. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States (Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) (1960) 5. Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (1965) 6. Joint Communique´ of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (1972) 7. Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China (1978) 8. Statement of Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the End of World War II (1995) 9. Japan-United States Guidelines for Defense Cooperation (1997) 10. Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee Document Joint Statement (2006) 11. Efforts by the Government of Japan regarding Realignment of U.S. Force Structure in Japan and Others (2006) 12. Government Interpretation of the Geographic Boundaries within which the Right of Collective Self-Defense May Be Exercised (2008) 13. Government Interpretation of the Right of Collective Self-Defense (2008) 14. Statement by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of Japan and the United States of America (2010)

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DOCUMENT 1 Constitution of Japan (1946)—Preface and Article Nine

Put into effect on May 3, 1947. Reprinted on “The World and Japan” Database Project, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo (http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/ documents/texts/docs/19461103.O1E.html) PREFACE We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded. We reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith. We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want. We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations. We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources. ARTICLE NINE 1. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

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2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. DOCUMENT 2 Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America (1951)

Signed in San Francisco, USA on September 8, 1951; put into effect April 28, 1952. Reprinted on “The World and Japan” Database Project, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo (http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/ texts/docs/19510908.T2E.html) Japan has this day signed a Treaty of Peace with the Allied Powers. On the coming into force of that Treaty, Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defense because it has been disarmed. There is danger to Japan in this situation because irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. Therefore, Japan desires a Security Treaty with the United States of America to come into force simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the United States of America. The Treaty of Peace recognizes that Japan as a sovereign nation has the right to enter into collective security arrangements, and further, the Charter of the United Nations recognizes that all nations possess an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. In exercise of these rights, Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan. The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. Accordingly, the two countries have agreed as follows: ARTICLE I Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States

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land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers. ARTICLE II During the exercise of the right referred to in Article I, Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights, powers or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air or naval forces to any third power. ARTICLE III The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements between the two Governments. ARTICLE IV This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the United States of America there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan Area. ARTICLE V This Treaty shall be ratified by Japan and the United States of America and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty. DONE in duplicate at the city of San Francisco, in the Japanese and English languages, this eighth day of September, 1951. FOR JAPAN: Shigeru Yoshida FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Alexander Wiley, Styles Bridges

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NOTES EXCHANGED BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER YOSHIDA AND SECRETARY OF STATE ACHESON AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING OF THE SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Excellency: Upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace signed today, Japan will assume obligations expressed in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations which requires the giving to the United Nations of “every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter.” As we know, armed aggression has occurred in Korea, against which the United Nations and its members are taking action. There has been established a unified command of the United Nations under the United States pursuant to Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950, and the General Assembly, by Resolution of February 1, 1951, has called upon all states and authorities to lend every assistance to the United Nations action and to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressor. With the approval of SCAP, Japan has been and now is rendering important assistance to the United Nations action in the form of facilities and services made available to the members of the United Nations, the Armed Forces of which are participating in the United Nations action. Since the future is unsettled and it may unhappily be that the occasion for facilities and services in Japan in support of United Nations action will continue or recur, I would appreciate confirmation, on behalf of your Government, that if and when the forces of a member or members of the United Nations are engaged in any United Nations action in the Far East after the Treaty of Peace comes into force, Japan will permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan, by the member or members, of the forces engaged in such United Nations action; the expenses involved in the use of Japanese facilities and services to be borne as at present or as otherwise mutually agreed between Japan and the United Nations member concerned. In so far as the United States is concerned the use of facilities and services, over and above those provided to the United States pursuant to the Administrative Agreement which will implement the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, would be at United States expense, as at present. Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration. DEAN ACHESON September 8, 1951. His Excellency, Shigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister of Japan.

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DOCUMENT 3 Basic Policy for National Defense (1957)

Kokubo no Kihon Houshin, approved by the Japanese Cabinet on May 20, 1957. Reproduced in Defense of Japan 2008 (Tokyo: Urban Connections), 395. The aim of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression and to repel any such aggression with the aim of protecting Japan’s independence and peace, which are founded on democracy. In order to achieve this, the Basic Policy states as follows: (1) To support the UN activities and promote international cooperation to achieve world peace. (2) To stabilize the livelihood of the people, promote their patriotism, and establish the foundations required for national security. (3) Within the limits required for self-defense, to progressively establish efficient defense capabilities in accordance with the nation’s strength and situation. (4) To deal with external act of aggression based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, until the United Nations can provide sufficient foundations to effectively prevent such acts in the future.

DOCUMENT 4 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty between Japan and the United States (Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) (1960)

Signed January 19, 1960; entered into force June 23, 1960, to replace the former 1951 treaty. Reprinted on “The World and Japan” Database Project, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo (http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/ texts/docs/19600119.T1E.html) Japan and the United States of America, Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law, Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries, Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,

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Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security, Therefore agree as follows: ARTICLE I The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively. ARTICLE II The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them. ARTICLE III The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack. ARTICLE IV The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened. ARTICLE V Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its

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constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. ARTICLE VI For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon. ARTICLE VII This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. ARTICLE VIII This Treaty shall be ratified by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo. ARTICLE IX The Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty. ARTICLE X This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the United States of America there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.

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However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty. DONE in duplicate at Washington in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960. FOR JAPAN: Nobusuke Kishi, Aiichiro Fujiyama, Mitsujiro Ishii, Tadashi Adachi, Koichiro Asakai FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: Christian A. Herter, Douglas MacArthur II, J. Graham Parsons DOCUMENT 5 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (1965)

Signed on June 22, 1965. Reprinted on “The World and Japan” Database Project, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo (http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/ texts/docs/19650622.T1E.html) Japan and the Republic of Korea, Considering the historical background of relationship between their peoples and their mutual desire for good neighborliness and for the normalization of their relations on the basis of the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty; Recognizing the importance of their close cooperation in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations to the promotion of their mutual welfare and common interests and to the maintenance of international peace and security; and Recalling the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 and the Resolution 195 (III) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 12, 1948; Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty on Basic Relations and have accordingly appointed as their Plenipotentiaries, Japan: Etsusaburo Shiina, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan; Shinichi Takasugi The Republic of Korea: Tong Won Lee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea; Dong Jo Kim, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Korea

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Who, having communicated to each other their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles: Article I Diplomatic and consular relations shall be established between the High Contracting Parties. The High Contracting Parties shall exchange diplomatic envoys with the Ambassadorial rank without delay. The High Contracting Parties will also establish consulates at locations to be agreed upon by the two Governments. Article II It is confirmed that all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and the Empire of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void. Article III It is confirmed that the Government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful Government in Korea as specified in the Resolution 195 (III) of the United Nations General Assembly. Article IV (a) The High Contracting Parties will be guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations in their mutual relations. (b) The High Contracting Parties will cooperate in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations in promoting their mutual welfare and common interests. Article V The High Contracting Parties will enter into negotiations at the earliest practicable date for the conclusion of treaties or agreements to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis. Article VI The High Contracting Parties will enter into negotiations at the earliest practicable date for the conclusion of an agreement relating to civil air transport. Article VII The present Treaty shall be ratified. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Seoul as soon as possible. The present Treaty shall enter into force as from the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals. DONE in duplicate at Tokyo, this twenty-second day of June of the year one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five in the Japanese, Korean, and English languages, each text being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail. FOR JAPAN: Etsusaburo Shiina, Shinichi Takasugi FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: Tong Won Lee, Dong Jo Kim

DOCUMENT 6 Joint Communique´ of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (1972)

Signed on September 29, 1972. (Unofficial English Translation). Reprinted on “The World and Japan” Database Project, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo (http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/ texts/docs/19720929.D1E.html) Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan visited the People’s Republic of China at the Invitation of Premier of the State Council, Chou En-lai, of the People’s Republic of China from September 25 to September 30, 1972. Accompanying Prime Minister Tanaka were Minister for Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Ohira, Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaido and other government officials. Chairman Mao Tse-tung met Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on September 27. They had an earnest and friendly conversation. Prime Minister Tanaka and Minister for Foreign Affairs Ohira had an earnest and frank exchange of views with Premier Chou En-lai and Minister for Foreign Affairs Chi Peng-fei in a friendly atmosphere throughout on the question of the normalization of relations between Japan and China and other problems between the two countries as well as on other matters of interest to both sides, and agreed to issue the following Joint Communique of the two Governments: Japan and China are neighboring countries, separated only by a strip of water, with a long history of traditional friendship. The peoples of the two countries earnestly desire to put an end to the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The realization of the aspiration of the two peoples for the termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations between Japan and China will add a new page to the annals of relations between the two countries.

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The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself. Further, the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of relations between the two countries from the stand of fully understanding “the three principles for the restoration of relations” put forward by the Government of the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this. In spite of the differences in their social systems existing between the two countries, the two countries should, and can, establish relations of peace and friendship. The normalization of relations and development of good neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries are in the interests of the two peoples and will contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and peace in the world. 1. The abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between Japan and the People’s Republic of China is terminated on the date on which this Joint Communique is issued. 2. The Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. 3. The Government of the People’s Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation. 4. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China have decided to establish diplomatic relations as from September 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to take all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of the functions of each other’s embassy in their respective capitals in accordance with international law and practice, and to exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible. 5. The Government of the People’s Republics of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan. 6. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China agree to establish relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. The two Governments confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Japan and China shall in

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their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force. 7. The normalization of relations between Japan and China is not directed against any third country. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony. 8. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries, the two Governments will enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace and friendship. 9. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to further promoting relations between the two countries and to expanding interchanges of people, the two Governments will, as necessary and taking account of the existing non-governmental arrangements, enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding agreements concerning such matters as trade, shipping, aviation, and fisheries. Done at Peking, September 29, 1972 Prime Minister of Japan (Signed) Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan (Signed) Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (Signed) Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (Signed)

DOCUMENT 7 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China (1978)

Signed on August 12, 1978. (Unofficial English translation). Reprinted on “The World and Japan” Database Project, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo (http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/ texts/docs/19780812.T1E.html) Japan and the People’s Republic of China, Recalling with satisfaction that since the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China issued a Joint Communique in Peking on September 29, 1972, the friendly relations between the two Governments and the peoples of the two countries have developed greatly on a new basis,

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Confirming that the above-mentioned Joint Communique constitutes the basis of the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries and that the principles enunciated in the Joint Communique should be strictly observed, Confirming that the principles of the Charter of the United Nations should be fully respected, Hoping to contribute to peace and stability in Asia and in the world, For the purpose of solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries, Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace and Friendship and for that purpose have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries: Japan: Minister for Foreign Affairs Sunao Sonoda People’s Republic of China: Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows: [Article I] 1. The Contracting Parties shall develop relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. 2. The Contracting Parties confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, they shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force. [Article II] The contracting Parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony. [Article III] The Contracting Parties shall, in the good-neighborly and friendly spirit and in conformity with the principles of equality and mutual benefit and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, endeavor to further develop

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economic and cultural relations between the two countries and to promote exchange between the peoples of the two countries. [Article IV] The present Treaty shall not affect the position of either Contracting Party regarding its relations with third countries. [Article VI] 1. The present Treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification which shall take place at Tokyo. The present Treaty shall remain in force for ten years and thereafter shall continue to be in force until terminated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2. 2. Either Contracting Party may, by giving one year’s written notice to the other Contracting Party, terminate the present Treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any time thereafter. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals. DONE in duplicate, in the Japanese and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic, at Peking, this twelfth day of August, 1978. For Japan For the People’s Republic of China

DOCUMENT 8 Statement of Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the End of World War II (1995)

Delivered on the floor of the House of Representatives, August 15, 1995. Reprinted on “The World and Japan” Database Project, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo (http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/ texts/docs/19950815.S1E.html) The world has seen fifty years elapse since the war came to an end. Now, when I remember the many people both at home and abroad who fell victim to war, my heart is overwhelmed by a flood of emotions. The peace and prosperity of today were built as Japan overcame great difficulty to arise from a devastated land after defeat in the war. That achievement is something of which we are proud, and let me herein express my heartfelt admiration

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for the wisdom and untiring effort of each and every one of our citizens. Let me also express once again my profound gratitude for the indispensable support and assistance extended to Japan by the countries of the world, beginning with the United States of America. I am also delighted that we have been able to build the friendly relations which we enjoy today with the neighboring countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the United States and the countries of Europe. Now that Japan has come to enjoy peace and abundance, we tend to overlook the pricelessness and blessings of peace. Our task is to convey to younger generations the horrors of war, so that we never repreat[sic] the errors in our history. I believe that, as we join hands, especially with the peoples of neighboring countries, to ensure true peace in the Asia-Pacific region—indeed, in the entire world—it is necessary, more than anything else, that we foster relations with all countries based on deep understanding and trust. Guided by this conviction, the Gvernment[sic] has launched the Peace, Friendship and Exchange Initiative, which consists of two parts promoting: support for historical research into relations in the modern era between Japan and the neighboring countries of Asia and elsewhere; and rapid expansion of exchanges with those countries. Furthermore, I will continue in all sincerity to do my utmost in efforts being made on the issues arisen from the war, in order to further strengthen the relations of trust between Japan and those countries. Now, upon this historic occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end, we should bear in mind that we must look into the past to learn from the lessons of history, and ensure that we do not stray from the path to the peace and prosperity of human society in the future. During a certain period in the not-too-distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history. Building from our deep remorse on this occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, Japan must eliminate self-righteous nationalism, promote international coordination as a responsible member of the international community and, thereby, advance the principles of peace and democracy. At the same time, as the only country to have experienced the devastation of atomic bombing, Japan, with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, must actively strive to further global disarmament in areas such as the strengthening of the

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nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is my conviction that in this way alone can Japan atone for its past and lay to rest the spirits of those who perished. It is said that one can rely on good faith. And so, at this time of remembrance, I declare to the people of Japan and abroad my intention to make good faith the foundation of our Government policy, and this is my vow. DOCUMENT 9 Japan-United States Guidelines for Defense Cooperation (1997)

Adopted in New York City on September 23, 1997. Reprinted in full on “The World and Japan” Database Project, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/ documents/texts/docs/19970923.O1E.html I. The Aim of the Guidelines The aim of these Guidelines is to create a solid basis for more effective and credible JapanU.S. cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed attack against Japan, and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. The Guidelines also provide a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both under normal circumstances and during contingencies. [II–IV omitted] V. Cooperation in Areas Surrounding Japan that Will Have Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security (Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)Situations in areas surrounding Japan will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. The concept, situations in areas surrounding Japan, is not geographic but situational. The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent such situations from occurring. When the two Governments reach a common assessment of the state of each situation, they will effectively coordinate their activities. In responding to such situations, measures taken may differ depending on circumstances. 1. When a Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan is Anticipated [omitted] 2. Responses to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan [omitted] [VI–VII omitted]

DOCUMENT 10 Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee Document Joint Statement (2006)

Released on May 1, 2006 by United States Secretary of State Rice, United States Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Aso, and Japanese Minister of State for Defense Nukaga.

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Reprinted at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/ joint0605.html The U.S.-Japan Alliance, with the U.S.-Japan security relationship at its core, is the indispensable foundation of Japan’s security and of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the linchpin of American security policy in the region. This strong partnership is increasingly vital in meeting global challenges, and in promoting fundamental values shared by both nations, including basic human rights, freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. The alliance has successfully adapted itself to changes in the regional and global security environment, and it must continue to evolve in depth and scope in order to address future challenges. To remain strong, this partnership must be reinforced by continued firm public support in both countries. At today’s meeting, the Ministers, sharing the view that new and emerging threats pose a common challenge that affects the security of nations worldwide, noted the increasingly close cooperation between their two countries on a broad array of issues. The Ministers confirmed their desire to expand that cooperation to ensure the U.S.-Japan Alliance continues to play a vital role in enhancing regional and global peace and security. The Ministers noted the importance of U.S. and Japanese efforts to strengthen democracy in and reconstruct Iraq and Afghanistan, and to support reform efforts in the broader Middle East. They committed to work closely on efforts to convince Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities and cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s investigation, and agreed on the need for concerted United Nations Security Council action. As elsewhere in the world, the Asia-Pacific region faces persistent challenges that give rise to unpredictability and uncertainty. The Ministers reconfirmed a shared commitment to the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and urged North Korea to return expeditiously to the talks without preconditions, to dismantle its nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and to cease all illicit and proliferation activities. They reaffirmed the importance of resolving regional disputes through diplomatic efforts, and called for greater transparency on the modernization of military capabilities in the region. In this security environment, the Ministers affirmed their commitment to close cooperation in realizing the common strategic objectives the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) identified in February 2005. The Ministers stressed the imperative of strengthening and improving the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation in such areas as ballistic missile defense, bilateral contingency planning, information sharing and intelligence cooperation, and international peace cooperation activities, as well as the importance of improving interoperability of Japan’s Self Defense Forces and U.S. forces, as outlined in the recommendations on bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities described in the

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October 2005 SCC document. In this context, the Ministers emphasized the importance of examining the scope of security and defense cooperation to ensure a robust alliance relationship, and to enhance the alliance’s capability to respond to diverse challenges in the evolving regional and global security environment. At the SCC meeting held today, the Ministers approved implementation details for the October 2005 realignment initiatives, which are described in today’s SCC document, “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation.” The Ministers recognized that the implementation of these realignment initiatives will lead to a new phase in alliance cooperation and strengthened alliance capabilities in the region. The measures to be implemented demonstrate the resolve of both parties to strengthen their commitments under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and, at the same time, to reduce the burden on local communities, including those on Okinawa, thereby providing the basis for enhanced public support for the security alliance. Recognizing the Government of Japan’s coordination with local communities, the Ministers confirmed the feasibility of the realignment initiatives. Recognizing also that completion of these realignment initiatives is essential to strengthen the foundation of alliance transformation, the Ministers committed themselves to the timely and thorough implementation of the plan, consistent with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements. DOCUMENT 11 Efforts by the Government of Japan regarding Realignment of U.S. Force Structure in Japan and Others (2006)

Cabinet Decision released May 30, 2006. Printed in Defense of Japan 2008 (Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2008), 471–72. 1. The Governments of Japan and the U.S. had a series of consultations regarding examinations of the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan’s Self Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. Armed Forces, and of realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan. And at the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Meeting of October 29, 2005, recommendations on those issues were approved. The governments of the two countries continued consultations and at the SCC Meeting of May 1, 2006 the final report including specific initiatives for realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and other issues (hereinafter “realignment related measures”) was approved. 2. In the new security environment, it is important to maintain and develop the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements to ensure the security of Japan and maintain the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region in a continuous manner. Stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan is at the core of the Japan-U.S. Security

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Arrangements, and stable use of facilities and areas of the U.S. forces needs to be secured. Facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces concentrate on Okinawa, and areas around facilities and areas on the mainland are increasingly urbanized, hence these facilities and areas have great impact on the living environment of residents and regional development. In light of such conditions, it is important to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities, in order to secure stable use of facilities and areas by gaining broader public understanding and cooperation as well as to maintain and develop the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. 3. The final report includes the following specific initiatives: relocation of approximately 8,000 Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa where facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces concentrate; relocation of Futenma Air Station to Camp Schwab; return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base which are densely populated (including total returns of Futenma Air Station, Makiminato Service Area, Naha port facilities and other facilities); collocation of ASDF Air Defense Command and relevant units at Yokota Air Base to enhance coordination between the headquarters; transformation of the U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama; deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system for BMD at ASDF Shariki Base; relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station; return of some portions of Camp Zama and Sagami General Depot; and relocation of trainings. These realignment-related measures shall be steadily implemented based on the timeframe for implementation presented in the final report. 4. Ensuring security arrangements for maintenance of the peace and security of Japan is one of the most significant policies of the Japanese government, therefore, it is necessary for the government to address the issue with responsibility. Based on such recognition, in implementing realignment-related measures that entail new burdens on the part of local authorities, the government will take requests from the local authorities that shoulder such burdens into consideration, and take measures for regional development and others in return for their contributions to the peace and security of Japan. In addition, the Government of Japan will continue to be totally committed to taking measures in promotion of the use of returned land and securing employment stability of workers at USFJ facilities and areas. 5. Relocation of Marine units in Okinawa to Guam is critical in reducing burdens on Okinawa where U.S. facilities and areas concentrate, thus it shall be rapidly implemented with required costs shared by Japan.

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6. Based on such recognition, the Government of Japan shall properly and promptly implement realignment-related measures including legal and budgetary aspects. Meanwhile, under the strained state of public finance, the Government of Japan shall make efforts in more drastic rationalization and streamlining of defense-related expenses to implement an efficient defense program, in line with the efforts of the government as a whole in cost-cutting and rationalization. The “Mid-Term Defense Program (for FY 2005 to FY 2009)” (approved by the Cabinet on December 10, 2004) shall be reviewed once estimates for the entire cost of realignment-related measures become clear based on concrete contents of realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and others. 7. As to relocation of Futenma Air Station, it shall be implemented based on the plan approved at the SCC Meeting on May 1, 2006, with due consideration on the positions of the national government, the local government of Okinawa and relevant local authorities, as well as the course of discussions so far regarding the issues such as facilities related with relocation of Futenma Air Station, the basing agreement and regional development and others, through paying enough attention to removal of danger of Futenma Air Station, safety of lives of residents in the vicinity, preservation of natural environment and feasibility of the program. Also a construction plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) shall be formulated in a prompt manner. The government shall establish a consultative body together with the Government of Okinawa and relevant local governments to have consultations about and address the issues of a concrete construction plan of the FRF, safety and environmental measures and regional development. In accordance with this, the Government Policy Concerning Relocation of Futenma Air Station (approved by the Cabinet on December 28, 1999) shall be abolished. However, in FY 2006, the projects based on the “II Regional Development” stipulated in the above-mentioned government policy shall be implemented. DOCUMENT 12 Government Interpretation of the Geographic Boundaries within which the Right of Collective Self-Defense May Be Exercised (2008)

Printed in Defense of Japan 2008 (Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2008), 109. The use of minimum necessary force to defend Japan under the right of selfdefense is not necessarily confined to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territory, territorial waters and airspace. However, it is difficult to give a general

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definition of the actual extent to which it may be used, as this would vary with the situation. Nevertheless, the Government interprets that the Constitution does not permit armed troops to be dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of other countries with the aim of using force; such overseas deployment of troops would exceed the definition of the minimum necessary level for self-defense. DOCUMENT 13 Government Interpretation of the Right of Collective Self-Defense (2008)

Printed in Defense of Japan 2008 (Tokyo: Urban Connection, 2008), 110. International law permits a state to have the right of collective self defense, which is the right to use force to stop an armed attack on a foreign country with which the state has close relations, even if the state itself is not under direct attack. Since Japan is a sovereign state, it naturally has the right of collective self-defense under international law. Nevertheless, the Japanese government believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds the limit on self-defense authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution and is not permissible. DOCUMENT 14 Statement by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of Japan and the United States of America (2010)

Issued on January 19, 2010. Provided on the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs web-site: (http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hatoyama/statement/201001/19danwa_e.html) The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of Japan and the United States of America was signed in Washington, D.C. on January 19, 1960 by delegates of Japan and the United States. Today marks the fiftieth anniversary of that day. The U.S.-Japan security arrangements have greatly contributed not only to the security of Japan but also the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. It is not an exaggeration to say that it was thanks to the U.S.-Japan security arrangements that Japan has maintained peace, while respecting freedom and democracy, and enjoyed economic development in that environment since the end of the last World War to this day.

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Over the last half-century, the global security environment has changed dramatically, as exemplified by the end of the Cold War and the September 11th attacks. Nonetheless, the security environment surrounding Japan remains difficult, as can be seen by the nuclear and missile testing by North Korea. Under such circumstances, for Japan, which has declared not to acquire nuclear weapons nor to become a military power, the deterrence provided by the U.S. Forces based on the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, together with Japan’s Self Defense Forces, serves, and will continue to serve, an essential role in the foreseeable future to maintain Japan’s peace and security. The U.S.-Japan security arrangements continue to be indispensable not only for the defense of Japan alone, but also for the peace and prosperity of the entire Asia-Pacific region. Under a security environment in which there still exist uncertainty and unpredictability, the presence of the U.S. Forces based on the Treaty will continue to function as a public good by creating a strong sense of security to the countries in the region. Based on the aforementioned recognition, in this memorable year commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the revision of the Treaty, we intend to work jointly with the U.S. Government to further deepen the U.S.-Japan Alliance, with the U.S.-Japan security arrangements at its core, in order to adapt to the evolving environment of the twenty-first century. I would like to present the people of Japan with the results of this work before the end of this year.

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Glossary Article Nine — A clause of the postwar constitution of Japan adopted in 1947 that formally renounces war as a sovereign right of Japan, prohibits the settlement of international disputes with the threat or use of force by the state, and—in order to accomplish those aims—prohibits Japan from maintaining a military with war potential. See reprinted text in Appendix C. Ballistic missile defense (BMD) — A set of military strategies and systems designed to protect a country from attack by ballistic missiles. In 2004, the U.S. and Japan signed an agreement regarding cooperation on BMD, with Japan’s current role including the Aegis sea-based missile defense system, the land-based Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptor missiles and the land-based X-band radar. Basic Principles of National Defense — A set of principles that dictate the defense policy of Japan based on the “Basic Policy for National Defense” adopted by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet in May 1957. See reprinted text in Appendix C. Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB) — A bureau that directly assists the Cabinet on legislative issues, acts as legal counsel to the Cabinet, and offers opinions to the Prime Minister and other Cabinet Ministers on legal issues. The bureau also undertakes interpretation of laws. Checkbook Diplomacy — A term used to describe the use of economic aid and investment by states to earn diplomatic favor. Japan is often accused of checkbook diplomacy, especially during the First Gulf War, when instead of committing troops to assist in the military action, it offered large financial assistance. Diet — The bicameral legislature of Japan that is composed of the lower house (the House of Representatives), and the upper house (the House of Councillors).

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Members of the Diet are elected by four different voting systems, two in each house, and are responsible for passing legislation and choosing a prime minister. First Gulf War — The conflict between Iraq and a coalition force of 34 countries in 1990–1991 in response to Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990. The war lasted seven months and ended with a decisive victory for the coalition forces and the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwaiti territory. Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) — The military forces of Japan established after the end of the Allied occupation following Japan’s defeat in World War II. Consisting of three branches—ground, maritime, and air—the JSDF has around 238,000 active personnel and maintains a defense-oriented posture. Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty — The name of the treaty signed on January 19, 1960, defining the security relationship between Japan and the United States. This treaty was a revision of an earlier Japan-United States Security Alliance treaty signed in San Francisco in 1951. Article Five of the treaty states that each party will act to meet the danger of an armed attack against the other within the territory of Japan in accordance with constitutional provisions and processes, and Article Six gives U.S. forces access to facilities within Japan to use in order to contribute to the security of Japan and East Asia. Mid-Term Defense Program — A plan that defines Japan’s policies and major projects for five-year periods in order to achieve the defense capabilities spelled out in the National Defense Program Guidelines. National Defense Program Guideline — see National Defense Program Outline. National Defense Program Outline — An outline of Japan’s current security policy. First adopted in 1976, it was revised in 1995 and 2004, and is expected to be revised again in 2010. After the 2004 revision, the English translation of the title changed from National Defense Program Outline to National Defense Program Guideline. PKO Five Principles — A series of principles established by a law enacted in 1992 that allows the JSDF to participate in overseas operations only if a cease-fire agreement is in place, there is unanimous consent to the use of peacekeeping forces by all parties, the peacekeeping forces are impartial, Japan has the right to withdraw if conditions on the ground change, and the JSDF has limits on its use of weapons. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) — A U.S.-led international initiative to halt the transfer of banned weapons and weapons technology, especially nuclear materials. Announced by President George W. Bush in May 2003, the initiative has over 90 member nations and includes activities such as the interdiction of third-nation ships on the high seas that contain illicit materials. Right of collective self-defense — The right of nations to use force against an aggressor if another country suffers an armed attack, a right authorized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The Japanese government maintains

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it has the right of collective self-defense under international law, but is prohibited from exercising this right by Article Nine of its constitution. Security Consultative Committee (a.k.a. “2 plus 2”) — A committee established in 1960 to study issues jointly concerning the Japanese and U.S. governments in order to strengthen their cooperative relationship. The meetings were originally with the foreign and defense ministers of Japan and the United States Ambassador to Japan and the commander of U.S. forces in Japan, but in 1990 the U.S. representatives were upgraded to the Secretaries of State and Defense. One notable 2 plus 2 meeting was on February 19, 2005, when the U.S. secretaries of State and Defense met with their Japanese counterparts in Washington, DC. After the meeting a joint statement was issued that applauded the cooperation between the two countries, reaffirmed the importance of the security relationship, articulated goals for the alliance, and noted Japan’s efforts to become more active in international security affairs. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) — An agreement between a host country and a foreign nation regarding the stationing of military forces. The Japan-U.S. SOFA was enacted in 1960 as stipulated in Article VI of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation — Guidelines developed in the late 1970s in order to create a solid basis for more effective Japan-U.S. defense cooperation. The guidelines describe the nature of cooperation both under normal circumstances and when Japan is under attack. The document was revised in 1997, with a section added that broadened the scope of cooperation in emergencies in areas within and around Japan. The Tokyo Declaration — The Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, or the Tokyo Declaration, was adopted in 1996 after a year-long review of the JapanU.S. security relationship as well as the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The declaration reiterated the importance of the Japan-U.S. security alliance remains the “cornerstone” of maintaining a peaceful and stable environment in East Asia. Three Non-Nuclear Principles — Three tenets that have guided Japanese policy regarding nuclear weapons, originally declared by Prime Minister Sato in the House of Representatives in 1967 that declare that Japan shall neither possess, nor manufacture, nor permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. The principles were later declared by parliamentary resolution, which does not have the force of law, but Japan is bound to uphold the principles banning possession and manufacture as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in general these principles have guided Japanese policies regarding nuclear weapons since their declaration. Three Principles of Arms Exports — Principles adopted by the Japanese government in 1967 that prohibit Japan from exporting weapons to communist countries, countries subject to UN sanctions, or countries engaged or

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likely to be engaged in international conflicts. These prohibitions were extended in 1976 to all arms exports, though export of some “dual-use” materials and limited export of arms-related technology to the United States does take place (including the co-development of ballistic missile defense systems). Yoshida Doctrine — A political doctrine named after Japan’s post-World War II Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida (see Appendix A) that places economic development as the top national priority while anchoring the defense of Japan to the Japan-U.S. military alliance under limited Japanese rearmament. Aimed at ensuring a speedy recovery after World War II, this doctrine was the basis for Japanese foreign policy throughout the Cold War.

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Index Page numbers followed by “f ” indicate figure; page numbers followed by “t” indicate table. Abe, Shinzo: invitation of India to join “arc,” 116; Japanese-style National Security Council, 42; on national security, 18 ABM Treaty. See Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA), proclamation of, 81t ACSA. See Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA) Agreed Framework (1994), 101 Air Self Defense Force (ASDF): antiterrorism support efforts and, 16; cease of operations in Kuwait and, 156; installation of PAC-3 missile battery, 101, 156; Japan ASDF-U.S. joint training exercises, 152; Maritime Self Defense Forces vessels transportation and, 154; overview of, 48–51; scrambling of airplanes, 156; structure, evolution, and role of, 48–51 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, U.S. withdrawal from, 154 Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), 56 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, 16 APT. See ASEAN Plus Three (APT)

Araki Commission, 16 Araki Report. See Japan’s Visions for Future Security and Defense Capability ARF. See ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) The Armitage-Nye Report, 77 Article Nine: on appointment of defense minister, 141; conservatives and, 8, 128; controversy over, 126, 130; defined, 183; as early as 1959, 14; on Japan’s renunciation of war, 74; on military force, 8, 20; on military role of Japan, 3; Ozawa’s acknowledging constraints of, 144; revision of, 20, 126, 128. See also Constitution of Japan (1946) ASDF. See Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) ASEAN Plus Three (APT), 112 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 112, 115 ASEAN states. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 115, 131 Aso, Taro: loss in election, 116; national security and, 18 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states, 111–113 ASW. See Anti-submarine warfare (ASW)

192

Index Ballistic missile defense (BMD): Air Self Defense Force and, 30, 48, 50, 178; China and, 109; co-development with U.S., 100, 105, 186; defined, 183; delay of, 130; introduction of, 56, 145, 155; Japan’s maritime domain and, 54; Japan-U.S. research projects on, 79t, 154; Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee on, 176; policies for developing and deploying, 127; Russia’s opposition to Japan’s, 105 Basic Defense Capability Concept, 10–11, 19 Basic Policy for National Defense, 9, 11, 159, 164 Basic Principles of National Defense: defined, 183; revision of, 20 Black Ships of U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry, 5, 124 Blueprint for a New Japan (Ozawa), 143 BMD. See Ballistic missile defense (BMD) Cabinet Intelligence Research Office (CIRO), 32, 39 Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB): defined, 183; Liberal Democratic Party and Democratic Party of Japan and, 127 Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSICE), 42 Cabinet Secretariat: administration and staff of, 36–39; organizational chart of, 36f; overview of, 35–36; restructurings of, 39–40 Challenges: of Air Self Defense Force, 50; of Asia-Pacific region, 176; of civilian institutions, 40–43; of the Democratic Party of Japan, 133–134; at the end of Cold War, 11–12, 128–129; foreign policy, 131–134; of Ground Self Defense Force, 53–54; for the Japan Self Defense Forces, 57–58; of Japan-U.S. security relationship, 90–91; of Ministry of Defense, 34; security, 2, 15; of uniformed institutions, 63–65 Checkbook diplomacy: criticism of, 128; defined, 183; Gulf War and, 122–123 China: as area of security concern, 11; defense spending of, 2, 15; gross

domestic product of, 106; Japan’s military activities in, 6; military capability of, 97–98; military spending of, 15, 106, 107, 132; relationship with Japan, 7, 83, 106–108, 109–111; Russia and, 104; threats to Japan, 15; ties with South Korea, 103–104 CIRO. See Cabinet Intelligence Research Office (CIRO) Civilian institutions for Japan’s defense: Cabinet Secretariat, 35–40; challenges of, 40–43; Ministry of Defense, 32–35; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28–30; National Police Agency, 30–32; role of, 27 CLB. See Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB) Cold War era: challenges at the end of, 11–12, 128–129; global strategic environment during, 40–41; Japan Coast Guard and, 60; Japan’s national security during, 29, 125; Japan’s relation with China and North Korea, 7; Japan’s role in regional security, 113–114; military forces during, 7–11; national security establishment since end of, 19; security awareness at end of, 128–129; Soviet Union threat to Japan during, 52; U.S. policy toward Japan during, 82. See also Post Cold War era Comprehensive security, 10, 113 Conservatives: Article Nine and, 8, 128; Gulf War and, 122–123; in immediate postwar Japan, 126; Murayama and, 114; national security issues and, 125 Constitution of Japan (1946): Article Nine (See Article Nine); Japan’s politics and revision of, 127–128; postwar, 126; preface, 159, 160–161 Council on Security and Defense Capabilities. See Araki Commission Criminal Investigation Bureau, 31 CSICE. See Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSICE) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 79 Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), 79, 153

Index Defense Policy Bureau, 34 Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI): Global Posture Review and, 77; Japan Defense Agency and, 20–21, 33; process of, 82; U.S. force realignment in Japan, 142, 177–179 De-militarized zone (DMZ), 99 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ): challenges of, 133–134; foreign policy platform of, 134; Maritime Self Defense Forces operations and, 88; Ministry of Defense reform under, 35; relationship with China, 110, 132–133; relationship with U.S. in security arena, 91; relocation of U.S. marine base in Okinawa, 77; rise to power of, 18, 20, 35, 73, 82; security policies and, 3, 131–134; victory of, 1, 121, 127 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) (DPRK). See North Korea DIA. See Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Diet: constitutional revisions and, 126–127; defined, 183–184; on dispatch of Japan Self Defense Forces abroad, 12; on Japan’s contribution to Gulf War, 29; Three Principles on Arms Export and, 9; use of outer space and, 9, 130 DIH. See Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) DMZ. See De-militarized zone (DMZ) DPJ. See Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) DPRI. See Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) First Gulf War: defined, 184; Japan’s checkbook diplomacy and, 122–123, 128; Japan’s contribution to, 29, 73, 85 Foreign Policy Bureau, 28, 29–30 Fukuda, Yasuo, 38, 92, 145; national security and, 18; “values based diplomacy” and, 116 GDP. See Gross domestic product (GDP) General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), 156

193 Global military power of Japan: first rise (and fall), 5–7; military forces during the Cold War, 7–11; military spending, 2; national security and, 4–5; new security environment, 18–21; post Cold War, 11–15; security policies, 2–4; twenty-first century security shocks, 15–18 Global Posture Review (GPR), 77 Glossary, 183–186 GPR. See Global Posture Review (GPR) GRDC. See Ground Research and Development Command (of the GSDF) (GRDC) Gross domestic product (GDP): of China, 106; of Japan, 9, 11, 111, 146; of North Korea, 100; of South Korea, 103 Ground Research and Development Command (of the GSDF) (GRDC), 52 Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF): deployment in Cambodia, 12, 98; dispatch to Haiti, 157; Japan-U.S. joint exercises, 152; number of personnel in Japan, 98; participation in Iraq, 16, 88, 116, 118, 155; structure, evolution, and role, 51–54 Ground Staff Office. See Joint Staff Office (JSO) GSDF. See Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF) GSOMIA. See General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, 14 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, 185 Gulf War. See First Gulf War Hashimoto, Ryutaro: on Japan-U.S. alliance, 14; policy changes, 127; Security Declaration, 81t Hatoyama, Yukio: background and ideas of, 133; biography of, 142–143; government of, 134, 135, 140; on Japan military policies, 18; on Japan-U.S. relationship, 2, 8, 132, 134; as prime minister, 121, 123, 131, 156; on relationship with Asian neighbors, 90;

194

Index on relocation of U.S. marine bases in Okinawa, 77; resignation of, 132, 157; statement on anniversary of Japan-U.S. treaty, 159, 180–181; on utilization of Japan Self Defense Forces, 65 Higuchi Report 1994, 16 Hirohito, 7, 152 Human security, in foreign policy, 14 ICBM. See Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) IGS. See Information gathering satellite (IGS) Information gathering satellite (IGS), 42 Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), 104 Internal Bureau of Ministry of Defense, 5, 33–34, 35 International Legal Affairs Bureau, 29 Iraq Reconstruction Special Measures Law, 16, 38 Japan Coast Guard (JCG): Maritime Self Defense Forces and, 63–64; national security and, 5; overview of, 59–62 “Japan Decisive Century” (Yoshida), 146 Japan Defense Agency (JDA). See Ministry of Defense (MOD) Japan new security environment: global and regional security and, 21; Japan Self Defense Forces and, 19, 21; Ministry of Defense and, 20–21; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, 20; North American Affairs Bureau and, 19, 20; since the end of the Cold War, 19–20. See also Japan’s security role Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF): activity in domestic assistance, 130–131; agreement to send troops to Iraq, 81t; challenges for, 57–58; defined, 184; dispatch after 2001 attacks, 16; establishment and services, 47–48, 75t; in the last several years, 4; National Defense Program Outline and, 11; national security and, 5, 18, 19; as an organization, 8–9; overview of, 47–48;

role and deployment of, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19 Japan Socialist Party (JSP): Murayama cabinet and, 153; national security and, 124, 125, 128, 129 Japan’s government: interpretation of geographic boundaries, 179; realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and others, 177–179 Japan’s regional security environment: ASEAN states and, 111–113; China and, 106–108; China security relationship with Japan, 109–111; China-Taiwan and, 108–109; East Asia and, 97–99; Korean Peninsula, 99–104; role in regional security, 113–117; Russia and, 104–106. See also Japan new security environment Japan’s security role: constraints on security activities, 127–131; Democratic Party of Japan and, 121–124, 131–134; divisions over security, 124–127 Japan’s Visions for Future Security and Defense Capability, 16–17 Japan-U.S. alliance, 1, 10; alliance rupture, 88–89; continuation of, 3; document signed in 1951, 161–163; future of, 90; Hashimoto and, 14; Japan’s cooperation with international community and, 17; in the mid-1990s, 18, 20; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, 28–30; September 11 attacks and, 15–16 Japan-U.S. guidelines for defense cooperation (1997), 175 Japan-U.S. joint research projects, 79t Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty, 184 Japan-U.S. security agreements (1996–2010), 81t Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC), 18, 175–177 Japan-U.S. security consultative committee document joint statement (2006), 175–177 Japan-U.S. security relationship: challenges of, 82–87; Japan’s security alliance with U.S., 72–73; postwar evolution of, 73–77; U.S. influence on Japan’s

Index security choices, 87–90; U.S. influence on Japan’s security policies, 77–82; U.S. role in Japan security policy, 71–72 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty: explanation of, 8; fiftieth anniversary of, 3 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division, 28 JCG. See Japan Coast Guard (JCG) Joint Communique´ of the government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (1972), 169–171 Joint Staff Council (JSC). See Joint Staff Office (JSO) Joint Staff Office ( JSO), 21, 34, 57, 58 JSDF. See Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) JSO. See Joint Staff Office (JSO) JSP. See Japan Socialist Party (JSP) Kan, Naoto, 142; biography of, 139–140; as head of National Strategy Office, 37 Kitazawa, Toshimi, 35; biography of, 140– 141; views on national security, 133 Koizumi, Junichiro˜, 154; biography of, 144–145; China and, 110; Japan relationship with China and, 90; policy changes, 127; regional security and, 115–116; seven-point plan for assistance to U.S., 15–16; support for U.S. war against Iraq, 38 Korea, North. See North Korea Korean Peninsula: annexation of, 6; instability of, 78; Japan war on, 98; relationship with Taiwan, 108; security concerns, 99–104 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 140, 141, 142, 143; Article Nine interpretation and, 127, 128; election of August 2009, 1; Japanese politics and, 121; security policies and, 3 Local Police Forces in Japan, 62–63. See also National Police Agency (NPA) Manchurian Incident of 1931, 6 Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 6, 149 Maritime Safety Agency. See Japan Coast Guard (JCG)

195 Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF): dispatch around Kuwait, 12; overview of, 54–57; structure, evolution, and role, 54–57 Maritime Staff Office, 21, 34 METI. See Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (formerly MITI) METI MEXT. See Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) Mid-Term Defense Program, 184 Miki, Takeo, 9 MILF. See Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Military activities in China, 6 Military and defense spending: of China, 15, 106, 107, 132; of Japan in 1976, 9; of Japan in the past eight years, 2, 58; of Russia since 2004, 104 Military Balance 2009, 2 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 107 Military threat: Japan’s political order and, 5; of North Korea to Japan, 100 Ministry of Defense (MOD), 123; establishment of Japan Defense Agency, 75t, 150; Japan Defense Agency and, 20–21, 32–33; Japan Defense Agency upgrade to, 33–34, 48; overview of, 32–35; reform under Democratic Party of Japan, 35 Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (formerly MITI) METI, 141 Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), 42 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 5, 18, 124; Japan’s new security environment and, 20; Okada and, 141; overview of, 28–30 Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). See Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (formerly MITI) METI Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation (MLIT), 42 MITI. See Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (formerly MITI) METI

196

Index MLIT. See Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transportation (MLIT) MOD. See Ministry of Defense (MOD) MOFA. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), 112 MSDF. See Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF) Murayama, Tomiichi, 139, 153; coalition with Liberal Democratic Party, 128; statement at the end of World War II, 113, 114, 173–175; vision of, 14 Nagashima, Akihisa, views on national security, 133 Nakasone, Yasuhiro, 127, 144; biography of, 145–146; Cabinet of, 19; on defense capability, 11; meeting with U.S. President Reagan, 75t; policy changes, 127 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG): defined, 184; revision, 17. See also National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) National Defense Program Outline (NDPO): adoption by the Cabinet, 151; Basic Defense Capability Concept and, 10; defined, 184; revision of, 13, 20 National Police Agency (NPA): overview of, 30–32; prefectural police and, 62–63; role and responsibility of, 4 National Public Safety Commission (NPSC), 30, 62 National security of Japan: civilian institutions and, 18–19; during Cold War era, 29, 125; evolution of, 4; global and regional security environments and, 21; Japan Defense Agency role in, 20–21; Japan Self Defense Forces role in, 19, 21; Ministry of Defense and, 20–21; North American Affairs Bureau and, 19, 20; reorganization of institutions, 20; since end of Cold War, 19–20 National Security Policy Division, role of, 28, 29, 30 National Security Strategy of the United States, 77

National Strategy Bureau (NSB): creation of, 37; function of, 132; Hatoyama and, 140; Kan and, 139 National Strategy Office (NSO): Naoto as the first head of, 37, 139; role of, 37 NDPG. See National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) NDPO. See National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) New Frontier Party, 141 New York Times, 142 Nishimura, Shingo, views on national security, 133 Normal nation: after end of Cold War, 2; Ozawa and, 122, 130, 133, 143, 144; phrase of, 22 North American Affairs Bureau, role within Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28, 30 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 112, 115 Northern Territory Issue, 105 North Korea: on abduction incidents, 102; as area of security concern, 11; development of ballistic missile technology, 97; gross domestic product of, 100; Japan’s relationship during Cold War, 7; nuclear weapons and, 97, 100–101; nuclear weapons tests, 15, 156; threats to Japan, 15 NPA. See National Police Agency (NPA) NPSC. See National Public Safety Commission (NPSC) NSB. See National Strategy Bureau (NSB) NSO. See National Strategy Office (NSO) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 154, 185; developments in, 75t; Japanese ratification of, 74; signing of, 9, 151 Nuclear weapons, 74; introduction into Japan during Cold War, 82; Japan and, 174, 181; Japan-U.S. introduction of, 9; Liberal Democratic Party and, 125; North Korea and, 97, 100, 101, 102; Pakistan and India and, 111; Russia and, 104; tests, 15, 156; in the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, 9 Nye, Joseph S., Jr., 76

197

Index Obuchi, Keizo, 14 ODA. See Overseas development assistance (ODA) OEF. See Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Okada, Katsuya, biography of, 141–142 Operational Policy Bureau, 34 Operation Directorate (J-3), 34 Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), 84, 85 Overseas development assistance (ODA), 113 Ozawa, Ichiro: biography of, 143–144; on normal nation, 122, 129–130, 133, 143; on revision of Article Nine, 143; visits to China, 110, 132; on withdrawal of U.S. forces from Seventh Fleet, 89 Peace Constitution, 122; adoption of, 27; Japan plan to arm, 27; policies and, 7 Peacekeeping operations (United Nations) (UNPKO), 12, 33, 51, 81, 152 People’s Republic of China (PRC). See China Persian Gulf War. See First Gulf War PKO Five Principles: defined, 184; Ground Self Defense Forces and, 13 Police. See Local Police Forces in Japan Police Law, tasks of, 31 Police Team of Rescue Units (P-REX), 63 Post Cold War era: civilian institutions in, 43; diplomacy in, 14; Ground Self Defense Forces in, 51; Japanese security and defense policy in, 123–124; Maritime Self Defense Forces and, 55, 56; multilateralism in, 114–115; security status quo in, 11–15. See also Cold War era PPH. See Prefectural Police Headquarters (PPH) PPP. See Purchasing power parity (PPP) Prefectural Police Headquarters (PPH), 62, 63 P-REX. See Police Team of Rescue Units (P-REX) Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): defined, 184; Japan participation in U.S.-led, 64; security cooperation

and, 115; training of maritime security forces, 84 PSI. See Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Purchasing power parity (PPP), 100, 103, 106, 111 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 77 Republic of China (Taiwan) (ROC). See Taiwan Republic of Korea (South Korea) (ROK). See South Korea Right of collective self-defense, 159, 179; defined, 184–185, 190; government interpretation of, 169, 179–180; Japan’s ban on, 14, 20 Russia: during the Cold War, 104–105; Japan military exercise with, 153; Japan war victory with, 6; relationship with Japan, 105–106; in Six Party Talks, 101, 155; threat to Japan during Cold War, 52; ties with South Korea, 103–104; visit of MSDF ships to, 153 Sato, Eisaku: declaration of No Nuclear Principles, 9, 185; Nobel Peace Prize, 1, 10; use of outer space for peaceful purposes, 9 SCC. See Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC; Security Consultative Council [SCC]) Security Bureau, 31–32 Security Consultative Committee (a.k.a. “2 plus 2”), 185 Security Consultative Council (SCC), 116 Security policies: after defeat in World War II, 3; coverage of, 125–126; during Cold War, 10–11, 29; limitation of, 2; military, 4–5, 123; MOFA as manager of, 28; national, 16–18, 19; National Police Agency and, 4; in the past decade, 4; role of military in Japan’s postwar, 7–8 Security threats, 4, 59, 115, 117; internal and external, 65; Japan and, 5, 97, 124; of Japan from China, 107; of Japan from South Korea, 103; National Defense

198

Index Program Guidelines and, 17, 34; Soviet Union and, 52, 104 Security treaty. See Japan-U.S. alliance Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 104, 115, 154 Six-Party Talks, 84, 101, 155, 176 Social Democratic Party (SDP), role in security debates, 129 South Korea, 84, 98, 157; gross domestic product of, 103; Japan’s relationship with, 102–103; ties with Russia and China, 103–104 Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO), 153 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): defined, 185; revision of, 134 Status of U.S. Forces Agreement (SOFA) Division, 28–29 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 106 Strategic Planning Office, tasks of, 34 Taiwan: disputes of China over, 108; Japan and China’s disputes over, 108–109; U.S. efforts to defend, 109 Three Non-Nuclear Principles, 20; defined, 185; Japan security policy and, 125; Okada and, 141; Sato and, 9 Three Principles of Arms Exports: in 1967, 151; defined, 185–186; the Diet and, 9 The Tokyo Declaration, 185 Treaty(ies): Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 154; of cooperation and security between Japan and United States, 164–167; between Japan and Republic of Korea, 167–169; Japan-U.S. security treaty (See Japan-U.S. Security Treaty); Mutual Security Treaty between Japan and U.S., 71, 164–167; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (See Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty); of peace and friendship between Japan and China, 171–173

Twenty-first century: Japan’s security shocks, 15–18; regional security role in, 115–117 Uniformed institutions and capabilities: Air Self Defense Force, 48–51; challenges of, 63–65; Ground Self Defense Forces, 51–54; Japan Coast Guard, 59–62; Japan Self Defense Forces, 47–48; Japan Self Defense Forces challenges, 57–58; Local Police Forces in Japan, 62–63; Maritime Self Defense Forces, 54–57 United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO), 12, 13, 33 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Japan and, 122 United States: Japan seeking partnership with, 2; national security community in, 4; security alliance with, 1, 3. See also Japan-U.S. alliance; Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty; Japan-U.S. security relationship; UNPKO. See Peacekeeping operations (United Nations) (UNPKO) U.S.-Japan alliance. See Japan-U.S. alliance The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century (Ota), 123 U.S. Security Strategy for the Asia-Pacific Region (the so-called East Asia Strategy Report), 76 World War II: Japan’s defeat after, 1; Japan’s security and, 3, 114; Japan’s surrender at end of, 150; Murayama statement at end of, 159; post, security in, 4, 19; security environment in East Asia after, 97; United States and Japan after, 71, 74; Yoshida and, 146 Yokomichi, Takahiro, 133, 142 Yoshida, Shigeru, biography of, 146–147 Yoshida Doctrine, 10, 74, 186

About the Authors ANDREW L. OROS is an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Studies and Chair of the Social Sciences Division at Washington College in Chestertown, Maryland. He has studied at Nanzan University, Osaka University of Foreign Studies, and at the University of Tokyo, completed a summer research fellowship at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo, and in 2007 was selected as one of six “emerging leaders” in Japan-U.S. relations by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japan Foundation. He is the author of Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford University Press, 2008) and over a dozen scholarly articles and book chapters related to Japanese politics and security. He earned his doctorate in political science at Columbia University, a master’s degree at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a bachelor’s degree at the University of Southern California. YUKI TATSUMI is a Senior Associate of the East Asia Program at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, DC. Prior to her appointment as Senior Associate, she served as a research fellow at the Stimson Center, a research associate in the International Security Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and as Special Assistant for Political Affairs at the Embassy of Japan in Washington, DC. Her analysis frequently appears in major publications in the United States and Japan, as well as in the global media. She has also testified before the House Committee on International Relations of the United States Congress. Tatsumi earned a BA in liberal arts from the International Christian University in Tokyo, Japan, and an MA in international economics and Asian studies from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC.