Genoese Trade and Migration in the Spanish Atlantic, 1700–1830 [1 ed.] 9781107132924

Citation preview

Genoese Trade and Migration in the Spanish Atlantic, 1700–1830 The Republic of Genoa was once a major commercial power. Following the Republic’s decline in the seventeenth century, Genoese merchants adapted and thrived in the changing Atlantic market. Scholars have examined how other foreign merchant groups operated within the Spanish empire, but until now no one has examined how the Genoese adapted to the challenges of increasing competition in Atlantic trade. Here, Catia Brilli explores how Genoese intermediaries maintained a strong presence in Spanish colonial trade by establishing themselves at the port of Cadiz with its monopoly over American trade, and through gradually consolidating strong commercial ties with the Río de la Plata. Situated at the intersection of European, Atlantic, and Latin American history and making extensive use of Spanish, Italian, and Argentinian sources, Genoese Trade and Migration in the Spanish Atlantic, 1700–1830 provides a unique perspective on eighteenthand early nineteenth-century transatlantic trade. Catia Brilli is a research fellow in Economic History at the University of Seville and collaborates with the University “L. Bocconi” in Milan.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Genoese Trade and Migration in the Spanish Atlantic, 1700–1830

CATIA BRILLI

Published online by Cambridge University Press

32 Avenue of the Americas, New York NY 10013 Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge. It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence. www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107132924 © Catia Brilli 2016 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2016 Printed in the United Kingdom by Clays, St Ives plc A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Names: Brilli, Catia, 1975- author. Title: Genoese trade and migration in the Spanish Atlantic, 1700-1830 / Catia Brilli. Description: New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2015038207 | ISBN 9781107132924 (Hardback) Subjects: LCSH: Genoa (Italy)–Commerce–Spain–Colonies–America–History–18th century. | Genoa (Italy)–Commerce–Spain–Colonies–America–History–19th century. | Genoa (Italy)–Emigration and immigration–Economic aspects–History–18th century. | Genoa (Italy)–Emigration and immigration–Economic aspects–History–19th century. | Genoa (Italy)–History–18th century. | Genoa (Italy)–History–19th century. | Spain–Colonies–America–History–18th century. | Spain–Colonies–America–History–19th century. Classification: LCC HF3590.G4 B75 2016 | DDC 382.0945/182107–dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015038207 ISBN 978-1-107-13292-4 Hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Contents

Acknowledgments

page vii

Abbreviations Weights and measures

ix xi

Monetary units

xiii

Introduction

1

part i in the shadow of empire 1 2

Genoese migration to Cadiz: a persisting alliance Carving out a place in Spanish colonial trade

21 56

3

Migration and investments toward colonial Buenos Aires

89

4

part ii transcending empire The breakdown and reorientation of Genoese Atlantic trade

137

5

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

164

Conclusion Appendix Notes Archival sources Bibliography Index

203 217 237 293 299 335

v

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Acknowledgments

For this book, I am grateful to many institutions. The Istituto di Studi Storici “Benedetto Croce” of Naples, the Fondazione “Luigi Einaudi” of Turin, and the “Marie Curie” Program for Early Stage Research Training of the European Commission provided necessary funds for collecting archival sources in Italy, Spain, and Argentina. Subsequent research was conducted with the support of the European University Institute of Florence, the Center for Historical Research at the Ohio State University, and the Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos (CSIC) in Seville. Portions of Chapter 2 appeared previously in Spanish in the book Economía Política de Estambul a Potosí. Ciudades-estado, Imperios y Mercados en el Mediterráneo y en el Atlántico Ibérico, c.1200–1800, edited by Batolomé Yun Casalilla and Fernando Ramos Palencia (Valencia, 2012), and I am grateful to the Universitat de València Press for permission to use the material here. Many people have been generous with their time, help, and encouragement. My mentor, Antonio Annino, contributed to the design of this project from its very early stages. I also thank Marcello Carmagnani for believing in the project and providing useful criticism. Bartolomé Yun Casalilla and Manuel Herrero Sánchez, who were, respectively, my tutor and my main referent in Spain when I was a fellow of the “European Doctorate in the Social History of Europe and the Mediterranean,” have been a true inspiration and offered me essential support. In many respects, the ideas advanced in this book came out of the conversations we had at the academic seminars and conferences they organized. During my stay in Spain, I also benefited from the insights of Jean-Pierre Dedieu, who helped me to maximize the information vii

Published online by Cambridge University Press

viii

Acknowledgments

I collected about river trade in Argentina with an appropriate database, and Juan Marchena Fernández, who provided valuable feedback on the foreign presence in the Spanish and Spanish American armies. In Buenos Aires, I received helpful suggestions from the researchers of the Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana “Emilio Ravignani,” particularly from its director, José Carlos Chiaramonte, and from Roberto Schmit, who kindly answered all my questions about primary sources and their interpretation. Other scholars, such as Antonio García-Baquero González, Marina Alfonso Mola, José María Oliva Melgar, Ana Crespo Solana, Luca Lo Basso, Fernando Jumar, Hernán Asdrúbal Silva, and Kenneth Andrien helped me at different stages of the project, providing useful criticism and advice or sharing their findings with me. I am particularly grateful for the help of Alan Gallay. During his tenure as director of the Center for Historical Research at the OSU and in the years following, he did everything he could to bring this book to completion, revising the entire manuscript, finding words of encouragement in bad times, and offering me his expertise in every aspect of the publishing process. To this incredibly generous scholar and very good friend, I say thank you. As with all works of history, I cannot fail to express my gratitude to the archivists and librarians I met during my research. Among them, Gabriel Taruselli, his many colleagues at the National Archive of Buenos Aires, the librarians of the Ravignani Institute, and Maria Elisa Paiella were particularly patient and ready to assist me in any circumstances. The work of Manuel Ravina Martín, the present-day director of the Archivo de Indias in Seville, to whom we owe the extraordinarily well-organized Provincial Archive of Cadiz, is also gratefully acknowledged. This book is not only a professional achievement, but the outcome of a great journey during which I lost some important people and found new ones. Federico Del Tredici, Adriana Luna-Fabritius, Elena Etcheverry, Néstor A. Yoguel, Marta Susana Avram, Nerea Monte, and a muchwider Argentinian “clan” are now part of my family along with my parents, and this book is for all of them.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Abbreviations

ACCS, ADGG, AGI, AGN, AHN, AHPC, AMC, AMN, ANL, AS, ASG, ASM, ASNA, AST, ASV, BTG, CNBA, GM, HBNBA, b. c. exp. fasc. L.

Archivo General de la Cámara Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Sevilla Archivio Durazzo Giustiniani, Genoa Archivo General de Indias, Seville Archivo General de la Nación, Buenos Aires Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid Archivo Histórico Provincial de Cádiz Archivo Municipal de Cádiz Archivo del Museo Naval, Madrid Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei Archivio Segreto Archivio di Stato di Genova Archivio di Stato di Milano Archivio di Stato di Napoli Archivio di Stato di Torino Archivio di Stato di Venezia Biblioteca de Temas Gaditanos “Juvencio Maeztu,” Cadiz Biblioteca del Colegio Nacional de Buenos Aires Giunta di Marina, Consoli Hemeroteca de la Biblioteca Nacional de Buenos Aires busta caja expediente fascicolo libro

ix

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Abbreviations

x

leg. ms. not. reg. v.

legajo manuscrito notary registro vuelta

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Weights and measures

vara: 0.866 meter cuadra: 150 varas square cuadra: 16.874 m2 ounce: 28.7g fanega: 137.27 liters

xi

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Monetary units

escudo de vellón: worth 1,000 reales de vellón peso escudo or peso fuerte: worth 10 reales de plata peso: silver unit worth 8 reales de plata or 20 reales de vellón The silver peso was the chief coin used in Atlantic trade and in the American colonies. Around 1775, 1 £ sterling (equivalent to 20 shillings or 240 pennies) was worth from 2.5 to 3.5 silver pesos (depending on where it was exchanged). In post-independence Río de la Plata, the monetary system experienced a radical change. In the period before 1820, pesos were most commonly silver pesos minted in Alto Peru before independence. After 1820, nearly all the pesos in everyday circulation were paper pesos issued by the government of Buenos Aires Province. In the following years, due to the need of financing local wars and the budget deficits, paper pesos were subject to steep devaluations. In 1833, the exchange rate was 6.625 pennies per paper peso. For more details, see the conversion tables in Denzel, Markus A., Handbook of World Exchange Rates, 1590–1914, Farnham, Ashgate, 2010.

xiii

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Introduction

“Happy are the people who did not receive almost anything from nature because indigence generated hard work and wits.” Raynal

The memorandum of a meeting of the Genoese Chamber of Commerce in July 1834 opens with these words, which Guillaume-Thomas Raynal had used to celebrate the history of the Phoenician mercantile civilization in his 1770 work L’Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes.1 In the same volume, the French abbey had made explicit references to the centuries-old splendor of the Republic of Genoa, which, during the Middle Ages, handled more trade “than the whole of Europe.”2 The Ligurian traders’ choice of quoting the dedication to the Phoenician people instead of that referring to their own country may appear odd, but it was perfectly comprehensible at the time. At the onset of the nineteenth century, the Genoese had no concrete reason to recall the period in which they were the first commercial power in Europe, but they could still be proud of their qualities – hard work and wits – that, like the Phoenicians, had allowed them to prosper at sea for centuries. Despite the strictures of inhabiting a small coastal region with limited natural resources, the Genoese had not only thrived in the Mediterranean, but also well beyond the Pillars of Hercules. The end of the Genoese golden age in the seventeenth century was followed by a period of progressive decline, but increasing international competition of greater European naval powers, and even the disappearance of the republic of Genoa after the Napoleonic invasion and subsequent annexation to the Sardinian kingdom, had not interrupted that mercantile and maritime 1

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

2

Introduction

tradition. My aim is to shed light on this continuity by showing that the optimism the Genoese expressed in 1834 was largely related to the Atlantic economy and especially to growing relations with Argentina, where they had established regular contacts through trade and migration since the previous century. This chapter of Atlantic history, in which there is a gap of silence in the historiography, is intimately related to the manifold bonds that linked the Genoese to the Spanish empire until its very collapse. If Genoese appear today almost irrelevant in eighteenthcentury global trade, it results from the way they attached themselves to the Spanish monarchy, fulfilling mercantile needs in the Atlantic world as Spain was forced to contend with powerful enemies and competitors that sought to siphon off its riches. By undertaking a host of economic activities, Genoese traders and migrants established themselves in the main ports of the empire, most notably in Cadiz and then in Buenos Aires. This book tells the story of the strategies that enabled this politically marginal group to keep prospering amidst the growth of powerful empires and resulted in the building of a substantial Genoese settlement in the Río de la Plata’s coasts. Works about modern Italian migrations to Argentina often start by underlining an interesting but underestimated fact: most Italians who immigrated to Buenos Aires at the beginning of the nineteenth century came from modern Liguria, that is, the former Republic of Genoa. Scholars have paid little attention to the reasons behind the precocity and the regionspecific provenance of the first Italian settlers. This paucity of attention can be ascribed both to the greater importance given to the subsequent mass Italian migratory flows and to the ideological approaches that have influenced the historiography over the years. The first important works on the history of Italian immigration to America date to the Fascist era and provide short and perfunctory accounts of the early decades of Argentinian independence. Even in detailed and informative works,3 the overall descriptive approach, which sought to celebrate the greatness of Italian immigrants, fails to explain the reasons for the prevalence of Ligurians among Italian settlers in the Río de la Plata region. Since the end of World War II, the valorization of liberal ideas inherited from the Italian Risorgimento has stimulated a new strand of research into Italian political emigration to South America following the Carbonari’s failed 1821 and 1834 uprisings in the Kingdom of Sardinia. Mazzinian republicanism in Southern America and Garibaldi – its most well-known protagonist – have sparked the interest of many historians.4

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Introduction

3

Overlooked is that Garibaldi chose to head for the Río de la Plata precisely because of the strength of the Italian migration that preceded him. In 1836, there were about 5,000 Genoese migrants in Buenos Aires. The community possessed a widespread distrust of the consuls of the Kingdom of Sardinia and little interest in the agenda of Mazzinian republicanism. Garibaldi’s ambitions to proselytize the Río de la Plata immigrants, including his hope to unify Italy, had little meaning for the expatriates; their main preoccupation was to prosper in their businesses, mostly related to trade and navigation, under the protection of local authorities and far from any interferences by their country of origin’s political representatives.5 Literature searches for antecedents and specific traits of the Ligurian settlement in colonial Río de la Plata reveal a persisting tendency to treat this matter within the framework of the history of Italian emigration to South America, which began in the sixteenth century with the pioneering expeditions of explorers and clerics; this tendency derives from a longheld “national” historiographical focus that has been slow to highlight local and regional traits, which, in turn, have been studied only with reference to post-unification migratory chains.6 The smallness of the Italian settlement in the censuses of late colonial Buenos Aires further complicates matters. Although some sources – especially the 1804 census – point to a Genoese prevalence over other Italian groups, for a long time the geographical provenance of these first immigrants has been overshadowed by the notion of the “Italian presence”7 and by highlighting the episodic nature of the phenomenon,8 which slowly developed owing to the creation of the viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata and to the development of international trade but, still, was too limited a matter to warrant specific research or connection to the subsequent migratory flows. In recent years, historians have paid more attention to the history of Ligurian emigration to Argentina,9 but scarce demographic evidence of the Genoese settlement in the Río de la Plata until the 1830s has continued to discourage research into possible precedents in the colonial past. Fernardo Devoto, to whom we owe the most significant studies on this topic, considers the first, small Ligurian settlements in the “remote Southern American lands” to be the result of the “great mobility” inherited from their ancestors, but does not attribute any particular meaning to the phenomenon. In fact, he interprets it as a variant of the wider centuriesold European migrations. Devoto’s remarks helpfully highlight the greater visibility of Genoese immigrants over other Italians, which becomes clearly apparent during the eighteenth century in cities along

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

4

Introduction

the Western Mediterranean and Spanish Atlantic coasts and thus implicitly calls for further and more careful research into these contexts. On the contrary, the Ligurian presence along the Río de la Plata between the creation of the viceroyalty (1776) and the first post-independence decades appears to be almost unimportant due to the smallness of numbers and to the lack of any clear expression of Genoese cultural identity.10 How could a population, which apparently lacked a strong cultural identity and was ostensibly unfamiliar with the Río de la Plata context, privilege such a destination and within a short time create a demographically large and economically successful settlement? In other words, what were the assumptions and the modalities behind the Ligurian “migratory plebiscite” toward the Río de la Plata coasts during the first postindependence decades? To answer these questions, we must consult the institutional documentary sources and notarial deeds to identify the Genoese presence in the late colonial Buenos Aires and then reconstruct their settlement strategies with potential ties to the subsequent migratory flows. We should also more clearly emphasize the intermediary role played by European ports trading with the Americas. Thus, this study begins by analyzing the Genoese presence in the port of Cadiz throughout the eighteenth century. As the main emporium of the Spanish trade with the Indias, the port housed a large Genoese community, many of which, in the wake of the colonial empire’s decline, left to sail to South America.11 Not only did Cadiz represent a bridge between the two sides of the Atlantic but it is also a vantage point to understand how Ligurians settled in the Spanish monarchy’s territories, providing a foundation for assessing the subsequent migratory experience to Buenos Aires. The presence of many Ligurian immigrants in eighteenth-century Cadiz suggests that, although the Republic of Genoa had long been marginalized from mainstream maritime international trade by other European powers, the Genoese maintained active interests in the Spanish Atlantic through commerce. This issue has been largely neglected by scholars who, conversely, have focused on the businessmen who dominated international finance between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, and believed that the Genoese permanently faded from importance in the Atlantic economy. I will show that this was not the case: the Genoese attached themselves to the Spanish Bourbon monarchy, as they had earlier done with the Spanish Habsburgs. When the colonial system collapsed they made themselves indispensable to independent Argentina, and highly profited from it. The coming story follows the connections that linked the Ligurian settlements in Cadiz and their counterparts in the Río de la Plata region,

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Introduction

5

identifying elements of continuity and rupture between the late colonial age and the transitional stage that followed Argentinian independence. The timeframe roughly starts with the War of the Spanish Succession, after which Cadiz officially succeeded Seville as the privileged port for Atlantic trade with the Americas, and ends with the rise to power of caudillo Rosas in independent Buenos Aires, after which the Genoese consolidated their permanent and prosperous place in the new host society.

a maritime nation in diaspora Surrounded by the Maritime Alps and by the Apennine Mountains from east to west, the territory of the republic of Genoa comprised a narrow strip of coast along the Mediterranean Sea. Given the scarcity of fertile soil, Ligurians always turned to the sea to survive. This inescapable choice gave rise to a mercantile civilization that constantly looked beyond borders, modified its course on several occasions, and always embraced change. The Genoese capitalistic drive, aptly labeled as “dramatic” by Fernand Braudel,”12 explains the fortune of the maritime republic in the Middle Ages, when Genoa experienced its golden age by creating extensive trade links to the Aegean, the Levante, the Black Sea, the Western Mediterranean, the European Atlantic coasts, and the North Sea.13 The 1453 Fall of Constantinople represented a turning point for Genoese commerce, which progressively withdrew from the marketplaces that fell under the sphere of influence of the Ottomans and became gateways for the Western commercial routes. Commercial penetration into the Iberian Peninsula opened the road to Genoa’s growing role as a key financial protagonist: ties with the Spanish Crown and other European countries enabled Genoese bankers to create a veritable “International Republic of money.”14 In the mid-seventeenth century, the Monarchy’s repeated bankruptcies caused Genoa to abandon the Spanish orbit and downsize its financial power but did not wipe out its commercial relations with Iberian ports. Little is known about how the Genoese adapted to the new crisis but it is a worthy subject for research: first, because it indicates the survival strategies of a mercantile community lacking any significant political and military weight and, therefore, seemingly unable to react to the challenges posed by the modern maritime competition; second, because it sheds light on the economic relations between the Mediterranean and the Ocean sea beyond the power struggles between the leading maritime nations

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

6

Introduction

through a “bottom-up” analysis of the mechanisms by which men and goods traveled across the Spanish Atlantic in the eighteenth century. Genoa’s centuries-old mercantile expansion did not generate a single and unambiguous “colonization” model, but several settlements and normative strategies that changed in time and space according to the trade interests of those involved, their ties with local authorities, and their homeland’s political influence.15 The extreme juridical and institutional variability of what has been called “a sea empire”16 is visible in the fourteenth-century emporiums located in Byzantium and in the Black Sea, where there were several different types of “colonial enterprises”: (1) territories, such as Chios, more or less directly placed under the homeland’s dominion and governed by private citizens (the Maone) who were licensed by the Republic of Genoa; (2) the Genoese colonies along the coasts of Crimea, Bulgaria, and Romania: these extended to the surrounding countryside, which – in order to guarantee the supply of wheat to the homeland – the Genoese controlled by building fortresses; (3) settlements almost completely independent from local law such as Pera, which was one of Constantinople’s most significant business districts, had its own town mayor, and hosted such a large and stable Genoese settlement that it became largely autonomous from its homeland; (4) a number of ports where the Genoese failed to acquire any political power and limited themselves to establishing their quarters and warehouses.17 Although the Genoese mercantile civilization cannot fit into a single mold, in essence it had a mainly maritime character relying on the private initiative of merchants pursuing an economy without frontiers. As Gabriella Araldi argues, the core privatistic orientation and the early idea of the city as a marketplace and not as a production center placed at the heart of the Genoese life – and, therefore, of its outward projection – the concept of “investment,” which differentiated the colonial system by blending its contents and led the Genoese to create a reticular model which included many centers that were equally important in their own right and acted as parts of a system of which Genoa – the hub where goods and capitals were distributed – was the heart, not the mind.18

These characteristics led historians to shift from the descriptive term of “colony”19 to that of “emporium” to describe a trade gateway geared toward economic exploitation regardless of territorial control and statutory differentiations.20 Genoese penetration into the Iberian peninsula, which relied on the establishment of fondaci (residential and work compounds which included houses, warehouses, and shops), the management of monopolies, and the

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Introduction

7

offer of capital and technical skills to local sovereigns,21 markedly mirrored the privatistic nature of mercantile enterprise, the vocation to settle in cities typically linked to maritime economy, the absence of a politically expansionist agenda, and the tendency to complement the hosting society’s requirements. The opportunities that arose in Spain and Portugal generated an early and consistent migratory flow of merchants, bankers, small retailers, artisans, seafarers, soldiers, servants, and farm laborers. Vicens Vives has estimated that at the start of the sixteenth century more than 10,000 Genoese resided in the Kingdom of Castile and a similar number in the Kingdom of Aragon.22 Many individuals, who differed in social standing and occupation, contributed to the durability and success of the Genoese “empire on the sea.” By following the routes opened by merchants, they created heterogeneous and spatially dispersed communities in myriad ports and marketplaces. In other words, the Genoese were a “nation” in diaspora, rooted in sundry territories where they did not politically rule.23 Since the Middle Ages, the term “nation” has referred to the different communities of foreign merchants settled in the ports and in the main European and Mediterranean marketplaces. Each community, whose members shared the same birthplace (natio), benefited from special privileges and a certain degree of self-regulating freedom granted by law.24 Between the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries, the Genoese settled in the Spanish Monarchy’s territories were among the most prominent mercantile nations trading between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.25 The term “nation,” however, fails to fully portray the complexity of the Genoese mercantile system, especially in the timespan considered here. During the eighteenth century, following the progressive growth of nation-states, Genoese merchants seeking success in the Atlantic trade could uphold very few “national” privileges. Moreover, having been occupied by the French and then annexed to the Kingdom of Sardinia, the Republic of Genoa de facto ceased to exist between 1797 and 1815. To assess how these trade circuits survived and adapted to the radical changes of this crucial period before reaching the Río de la Plata in the wake of the implosion of the Spanish empire, one needs to look beyond the borders of the Genoese mercantile “nation.” In 1971, anthropologist Abner Cohen coined the term “trade diaspora” as “a nation of socially interdependent but spatially dispersed communities.”26 In the mid-1980s, Philip Curtin expanded this expression to include the networks of trading groups operating outside their homeland to promote long-distance trade.27 Curtin used the term as a synonym for trade network and highlighted the role played by these

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

8

Introduction

groups as cross-cultural brokers between their host societies and their own. These networks were not necessarily built on the basis of formal relationships and often resulted from initiatives undertaken by the merchants who had settled in a foreign city. By learning the language, customs, and mercantile strategies of the host society, these merchants fostered trade exchange with their fellow countrymen moving along the trade routes, ultimately leading to the creation of new settlements that loosely relied on a common cultural provenance. Sometimes this phenomenon led to social marginalization (as experienced by the Jewish communities of Medieval Europe), to politically neutral forms of selfgovernment (like the Jahaanke tribe in seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury Western Africa), or to the creation of European trade enclaves backed by coercive military power (forerunners of the Dutch and British empires in Asia). Curtin’s observations on the evolution of long-distance trade challenged the notion of the “expansion” of the European maritime nations in early modern world trade. By observing the articulation of the Asiatic trade networks, he highlighted that, to a large extent, the Portuguese commercial posts in the Indian Ocean were independent from Crown control and held stronger ties with Asiatic merchants than with the metropolis. Furthermore, Curtin emphasized the limits of the initiatives carried out by select British and Dutch East India Companies to monopolize Asian trade circuits: for example, through the trade diasporas of the Gujaratis, the Jainas, and the Armenians, Indian commerce experienced a veritable golden age in the seventeenth century. A reconsideration of the European enterprises’ ability to control the Asian market does not diminish the role played by Western powers, which, in Curtin’s view, were able to thrive from the trade diasporas, whose facilitating function resulted in their very extinction. The growing integration of trade circuits made these cross-cultural brokers redundant, to the advantage of local intermediates. During the eighteenth century, these processes, along with the technological advancement made by European maritime and industrial powers, signaled the end of trade diasporas and the birth from their ashes of colonial or informal empires, transforming Western trade culture into a shared global trading culture. By building on Curtin’s conclusions, not only have scholars widened the discussion of trade diasporas,28 but they have partly argued against his hypotheses on their “decline,” highlighting in some cases their survival and adaptive strategies against the progressive advancement of European maritime powers in the world trade scene. As for the Asian commercial

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Introduction

9

routes, recent studies have shown that, under British rule, the Parsee, Indian, Muslim, and Sephardic trade diasporas enjoyed a new period of prosperity.29 From the end of the seventeenth century, merchants from Syria and Southern Arabia massively entered the South-East Asia trade: at first they devoted themselves to pedlary and retail businesses, but, whenever possible, they extended their interests to wholesale. A similar strategy allowed the Syrians to reach a prominent position in the Manila trade at the end of the nineteenth century.30 British rule in Asia enabled the Jewish diaspora to react to the progressive decline of the Ottoman empire where, since the sixteenth century, the Sephardi Jews had been successful trade brokers between Europe and Asia.31 From 1840, their interests turned to the opium trade and, by the beginning of the twentieth century, they also were involved in smuggling narcotics to California. Despite the manifold contacts established with the British enterprises, the Sephardi economic strategies remained unchanged: up to the third, firmly anglicized, generation, those who had settled in Shanghai maintained brokerage-based family businesses and never ventured into sophisticated commercial operations.32 Trade diasporas also survived in Europe. For instance, the Greek diaspora was not weakened by the progressive consolidation of the European maritime powers in the Mediterranean. From the end of the sixteenth century, when Ottoman expansion inflicted a severe blow to Venice’s maritime supremacy, Greek trade and shipping magnates settled in Venice and played a crucial role in maintaining trade exchanges between the East and Northern Europe (especially London). In the long run, cooperation between the Greeks and the Venetians facilitated British penetration into the Western Mediterranean and transformed the Greek diaspora by forcing it to specialize in the ship-owning sector.33 The British later encouraged Aegean people to settle in Minorca and Gibraltar – the dominions that they had acquired in the wake of the War of the Spanish Succession – so that they could rely on a non-Catholic and non-Spanish maritime business community. Austria promoted Greek settlement in the free port of Trieste to ensure safe maritime communications with the Levante, and so did Russia in 1792, when it founded the port of Odessa as an anti-Turkish measure. The French Revolution also represented an extraordinary opportunity for Greek ship-owners: by taking advantage of the Ottoman flag – which remained neutral until Napoleon’s campaign in Egypt – they gained a central role in bringing Black Sea wheat to European markets and maintained their position throughout the nineteenth century.34

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

10

Introduction

As far as the Jewish diaspora, Francesca Trivellato’s recent work highlighted how the Sephardi Jews of Livorno in the eighteenth century profitably operated in the Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Asian trade by establishing strong cooperation-based networks with non-Jewish intermediaries, the Genoese being among their main partners.35 Finally, the Maltese’s case deserves a special mention; as a “border” between Islam and Christianity and owing to the respect held by the Brothers Hospitallers of Saint John of God in European marketplaces, they played an unprecedented role in Mediterranean commerce from the sixteenth century, notably in shipping and in the cotton trade. Alongside their mainly illicit exchanges with Levante corsairs, the Maltese also established strong commercial ties with the southern ports of France and Spain (especially the port of Cadiz). This state of affairs was further consolidated during the eighteenth century and gave life to a stable migratory pattern between the island and the destination markets, whereby merchants returned to the homeland at least every two years to stock up on goods and visit their families.36 Over time, the Maltese community maintained a strong communitarian cohesion, which was guaranteed by a strict endogamy, a strong respect for consular authorities, and by the creation of confraternities in the busiest marketplaces to maintain a highly specialized mercantile circuit. If, on the one hand, British occupation deprived the Maltese of their traditional markets, on the other hand, it injected a new lease of life into the diaspora with the offering of a flag that guaranteed safe shipping and fostered trade with Barbary corsairs.37 Thus, not all trade diasporas ceased with the advent of modern maritime and industrial powers. Many succeeded in keeping abreast of the times and benefited from the new profitmaking opportunities generated by trade expansion. Generally, scholars tend to dismiss the possibility of likening the European mercantile networks to the category of diasporas. This tendency lies upon the fact that, unlike diasporas, European business enterprises primarily sought to serve the interests of their respective political and territorial groups, by operating on the grounds of impersonal contract negotiations promoted by state policies and institutions.38 In his studies of late medieval Genoa, historian Avner Greif argues that the Republic’s traders in the thirteenth century developed an innovative “individual legal responsibility system” based on limited liability partnerships that enabled them to legally enforce property rights and establish cooperative ties even with non-Genoese agents. This system allowed them to operate more efficiently in long-distance trade and overcome the limits deriving from the communitarian organization of trade in traditional

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Introduction

11

diasporas.39 It seems that the Genoese were the first to appreciate the importance of contracts and the creation of institutions to uphold them; in Greif’s opinion, these conditions were instrumental to broadening and intensifying exchanges between different political and territorial contexts. The ability to innovate business organization may help to explain the expansionist potential of the Genoese mercantile system during the first centuries of its history, but fails to explain how it survived the progressive domination of the great European shipping and trade powers in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. While during the Middle Ages Genoa embodied the paradigm of commercial success, by the eighteenth century, the small aristocratic Republic – with no military power and politically neutral – played an almost marginal role in the competition to control international trade. Still, the Genoese continued to exploit the opportunities generated by trade expansion along the Western Mediterranean and the Atlantic routes. The secret of the Genoese’s persisting success is vividly depicted in an 1780 report of the Venetian consul in Lisbon: “Displaced over the earth like the Jews and lacking protection and credit, the Genoese have always used their ingenuity to flatter the nations where they went to trade, to maintain the peace and harmony among them, and to protect each other for making good profits.”40 The concept of trading diaspora may appropriately describe these polycentric networks and business-oriented forms of solidarity among fellow countrymen. However, the Genoese embodied a special kind of diaspora, given that it was not limited to trade intermediation and lacked stable community boundaries. A number of merchants who prospered in the eighteenth-century Spanish Atlantic allied with non-Genoese intermediaries, married local women, and – whenever possible and convenient – they fully integrated into the hosting society and contributed to their social, political, and economic developments. Ship captains continued to thrive in maritime trade by sailing under flags of convenience and did the most to avoid the customs duties imposed by their consuls. Emigrant artisans and laborers placed their services and skills at disposal of their homeland’s competitors. After a while, many returned to home; others chose to stay where they had managed to achieve a degree of stability and, in many cases, a prominent economic, social, and political standing. Lured by the opportunities generated by even more distant countries, others embarked on a new migration. The behaviors and choices of Genoese expatriates met their own personal and family needs rather than their homeland’s interests. By

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

12

Introduction

pursuing private success or survival-oriented strategies, as we shall see, they also benefited the homeland. Thus, this is not the history of a stateless diaspora, but of a politically marginal, socially diversified, and spatially dispersed community that put its weakness to good use. The Genoese continued to travel and invest in all the main Spanish American hubs and, still in the eighteenth century, their presence is attested in the Río de la Plata as well as in Lima, Mexico, and New Granada.41 The choice of focusing on Buenos Aires depends on the chief importance of this route for the future developments of the Genoese transatlantic trade and migration after the fall of the empire, when Buenos Aires replaced Cadiz as the main Genoese hub in the ocean sea. Similarly to the Jews, the Genoese used their shared cultural origins and the language skills they had acquired through centuries-old migrations to prosper in trade intermediation; their persistence on the Atlantic routes, however, cannot be fully explained without considering their religious affinity with the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies, a cultural feature that allowed them to more easily insert themselves in the main hubs of the Iberian empires and which, perhaps, constituted instead a limit to their expanding capacities in the non-Catholic Atlantic world.

a chapter in atlantic history Over the last few decades, Atlantic history studies42 have radically reconsidered the political, economic, and social processes at the basis of the modern configuration of Europe and America and have also reassessed the role played by West Africa.43 One of the major implications of this approach is to challenge the hierarchic nature of the ties that presided over the constitution of colonial empires, while highlighting a range of exchanges and mutual influences between these large areas. For many scholars, the Atlantic went from being a mere geographical container to “Western civilization’s inner sea,”44 a sea that was certainly more incoherent and disarticulated than the Mediterranean but increasingly able to generate interactions between the global transformation and its different regional manifestations.45 The Atlantic perspective suggests that a full knowledge of imperial dynamics needs to transcend power structures and investigate how these were used by those who operated both within and along their borders. An emphasis on the human, individual, and entrepreneurial aspects has helped to explain that imperial dynamics were not limited to just bilateral relationships between different metropolises and their dominions but

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Introduction

13

were actually influenced by a multitude of interactions that created a much more integrated and polycentric system. The social and economic ties that developed across the Atlantic beyond the limits imposed by the imperial configurations were far from being an exception and contributed to the creation of a truly parallel economy. The inability and, in many cases, the inopportunity of curbing the penetration of foreign people, goods, and capital into immensely large and often hardly controllable dominions offered ample margins for economic freedom to both rivalling maritime powers and to small but economically dynamic trading groups.46 Works on smuggling both in the Spanish and British empires have revealed the “structural” nature of these informal ties, which relied on the participation (or at least, the tolerance) of local officials and populations.47 Historians agree that, from the late seventeenth century, the North European, the Spanish, and the Luso-Atlantic systems began to seriously merge in a more integrated system particularly under the impulse of African slave trade, which intensified the exchanges beyond imperial limits at cultural, social, and economic levels.48 The multilateral and polycentric character of the interactions that developed across and around the ocean basin has led Bernard Bailyn to define the Atlantic as a “single functional unit,”49 but other scholars tend to put some restrictions to this concept: David Hancock, for instance, emphasizes the British empire’s core role in promoting inter-imperial trade through its political and informal initiatives; still, he is cautious about the (often stated but difficult to prove) existence of a shared historical area stretching across the Atlantic coasts of Europe, Western Africa, and North America.50 In this ongoing debate, there is some consensus over the existence of a series of communicating subsystems that were able to transcend imperial frontiers and progressively modify them from within.51 Those who have recently referred to the Spanish or Hispanic Atlantic as an unavoidable reality have noted that by failing to consider Spain’s influence, drive, and mediation, one cannot understand Spanish and Spanish American history.52 Clearly, this does not entail that one should cease to conceive of the Iberian monarchies as a privileged observatory to analyze the genesis and the developments of the multiple interactions that have marked the history of the Atlantic world.53 The density and variety of such interactions become immediately apparent by looking at the organization of the Spanish colonial trade. The Spanish monopoly in the Indias has been aptly defined as being “pseudo-mercantilistic,”54 given that, since the sixteenth century, it was

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

14

Introduction

significantly supported by foreign men, goods, and capital. This support, promoted by the Crown, granted special commercial privileges to foreign businessmen in exchange for loans needed to finance the empire. In turn, the Monarchy’s inability to autonomously supply its colonial markets encouraged widespread smuggling and fraud: these activities grew to the extent that the Crown came to view them as instrumental to its very survival.55 Having accessed the American trade via both licit and illicit channels, the Genoese were among the first and biggest beneficiaries of this system; their supremacy remained unchallenged until the first half of the seventeenth century,56 when the Monarchy’s troubled finances and the progressive marginalization of the Mediterranean to the advantage of new long-distance trade routes allowed the Northern European markets to acquire an unprecedented central role.57 As Genoa never established any territorial control along the Atlantic shores and was itself located far from the ocean basin, scholars tend to overlook its deep connections to the Atlantic world in the long run. Most of the attention has been granted to the Dutch and British, who were able to erode the Spanish monopoly in America and extend their influence to the Asian routes by virtue of their shipping superiority, the support of powerful select companies, and widespread contraband.58 Another key actor was France, who built its own empire by means of a strong mercantile agenda and, from the eighteenth century, benefited from the advent to the Spanish throne of the House of Bourbon to expand its presence in the Atlantic trade.59 The history of the Genoese in eighteenth-century Cadiz and Buenos Aires is clearly inscribed in the Spanish imperial history, but it also transcends its boundaries in many respects. The social, economic, and political history of the small republic was deeply woven to the Atlantic world from the explorations of Columbus to the end of the colonial period and beyond it. Apart from contributing to the establishment of early transoceanic connections, Genoa owed to the Atlantic economy its financial golden age, a persisting commercial prosperity despite progressive marginalization, a renewed protagonism in international trade after the wars for emancipation in America, and a resource for thousands of men and women who left the republic throughout the centuries to make a living. The Genoese case is therefore important to understand not only the history of the Spanish empire, but also the evolving links between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean basin in the transition from the early modern to the modern period. Furthermore, the port cities studied here constituted two “frontiers” of the empire with very different features but with a similarly strong

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Introduction

15

connection to the greater Atlantic circulations. The bay of Cadiz had always been the hub of widespread contraband and once it became the capital of the Spanish colonial trade, in the eighteenth century, it remained a cosmopolitan city where non-Spanish merchant communities could keep managing their commercial interests with the Indias in legal or informal ways and migrants could be employed in different sectors. Buenos Aires, in turn, was situated in a borderline region whose economy rose by virtue of the intermediary role of foreign competitors of the Spanish Crown (especially British, Luso-Brazilians and Dutch), an “interference” that limited the establishment of direct links with the Peninsula until a very late stage of the colonial era. Exploring the ways in which the Genoese penetrated the capital of the Spanish colonial trade and its most southern Atlantic outpost will help us to assess to what extent the imperial boundaries were permeable and how the Spanish empire’s legal framework influenced the choices and strategies of outsiders on both sides of the ocean.60 Finally, this case study may constitute the ground for future comparative and relational analyses involving the Luso-Atlantic context. According to the estimations of the Venetian consul in Lisbon, in 1780 there were around 6,000 Genoese migrants who were employed in trade at different levels and in a variety of more or less qualified activities in the Portuguese capital; another 10,000 were scattered across the kingdom working as gardeners and farmers, without counting those who regularly sailed overseas.61 The existence of such a consistent community highlights that the Genoese operational range area persistently encompassed not only the Spanish, but also the Portuguese empire. The absence of comparable Genoese settlements along the North European Atlantic shores in the same period points to the importance of the oceanic subsystems in determining minority groups’ margins of expansion: while the British had the necessary means to cross the boundaries of these different areas and to stimulate a progressive integration among them, the powerless Genoese traders and migrants mainly oriented toward the Iberian Atlantic world, to which they were linked by cultural affinities, historical heritages, and geo-strategic conveniences. As J. H. Elliot has argued, “the new Atlantic history might be defined as the history, in the broadest sense, of the creation, deconstruction, and re-creation of communities, as the result of the movement, across and around the Atlantic basin, of people, commodities, cultural practices, and ideas.”62 The Genoese took active part in these processes since their very beginning; the history of those who settled in eighteenth century

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

16

Introduction

Cadiz and then passed to Buenos Aires is only the last – and less known – chapter of a much longer and wider movement along and across the Atlantic coasts. Historian David Armitage distinguishes three approaches to the study of the Atlantic world: (1) a circum-Atlantic history, which incorporates everything around the Atlantic basin and is interested in studying all the exchanges that made the ocean a single system of interactions; (2) a transAtlantic history, which studies states, nations, or regions within an oceanic system, allowing comparisons between otherwise distinct areas; (3) and a cis-Atlantic history, which focuses on the study of any particular place – a city, a state, a region, or even an institution – in relation to the wider Atlantic context.63 What follows is the study of a minority group operating in two key hubs of the Spanish Atlantic trade that ended up belonging to two different states; this case does not allow making a rigorous comparative analysis between the two port cities, but it does enable better understanding of their evolving relations within the imperial framework, their connections to the wider oceanic context in a period of deep political transformations, and how these processes influenced the Mediterranean world. A search for the Genoese flag among the vessels that sailed across the Ocean would add little to the understanding of how this group managed to stay afloat in the Atlantic. On the contrary, one needs to search their names – often Hispanicized and difficult to identify – in censuses, notarial deeds, port registers, trade suits, consular correspondence, concessions, licenses, and noble titles but also in the public notices, repeatedly issued both in Cadiz and in Buenos Aires, banning pedlars and shop-owners in order to curtail contraband and foreigner competition. The cross-analysis of these sources neither precisely quantifies nor qualifies the interests and commercial businesses held by the Genoese, but it enables us to reconstruct – at least in part – their stories, relational networks, and strategies. Thus, this is not a study of economic history, but rather a history of traders and emigrants who heavily penetrated the core of the eighteenthcentury Spanish mercantilism, invested, traveled, and in some cases settled in one of its most dynamic dominions, became part of the hosting societies, adapted to the radical changes that marked the transition between the early modern and modern eras, and finally re-created a greater community overseas, which contributed to the development of both the host and the mother country in the age of emerging nation-states. If the political and institutional resources offered, first, by the Republic of Genoa and, later, by the Kingdom of Sardinia, had little role in

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Introduction

17

supporting the Genoese diaspora within and beyond the Spanish empire this history can be read only by trying to follow the footsteps of its protagonists. As suggested by Atlanticist David Hancock, this history is aimed at showing, in a bottom-up perspective, “how real people constructed their commercial, social and cultural lives out of plural demands and influences,” and “how, without significant central direction, a community slowly emerged to satisfy their needs and order their lives.”64

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

part i IN THE SHADOW OF EMPIRE

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Published online by Cambridge University Press

1 Genoese migration to Cadiz A persisting alliance

an age-old symbiosis The history of the Genoese in Cadiz is inscribed in the pluri-secular connections that symbiotically linked the small republic to the Iberian monarchies. Since the Middle Ages, the continual movements of men, goods, and capital toward the Iberian Peninsula allowed Genoa to flourish in trade intermediation and then to become a leading power in international finance. In the eighteenth century, the republic had lost its predominance but it had maintained a strong presence in commercial navigation connecting the Iberian Atlantic to the western Mediterranean coasts. This persisting dynamism was the result of the constant work of large parts of the Genoese population, which continued to seek profit-making opportunities at sea and outside their homeland. The port of Cadiz, which formally outplaced Seville as the hub of the Spanish trade monopoly with the Indias in 1717, was one of the main destinations for Genoese migration and trade at the end of the early modern period. Here, as shown in the following pages, migrants of different social conditions penetrated all the key sectors of local economy with the favor of the Spanish laws as well as of the hosting society, in which they established strong business and family ties. The path toward integration of this minority group was not free from tensions and conflicts; the episodes of rejection, however, did not impede the Genoese from becoming one of the greatest, articulated, and bestintegrated foreign nations in the capital of Spanish mercantilism by virtue of their substantial usefulness to local needs. The Genoese presence in Spain dates back to the twelfth century. The first groups of merchants and migrants initially settled in North Galicia, 21

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

22

In the shadow of empire

Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, and Valencia, and – as the Reconquista process unfolded – they later converged on Andalusia. By 1249, shortly after the conquest of Seville by King Ferdinand III, Genoa was canvassing the King to regulate the presence of its own merchants within the region, by applying for the assignment of a fondaco and for the installation of consuls to settle internal disputes; following long negotiations, a corpus of privileges was finally granted by King Ferdinand III in 1251 and later confirmed by both King Alphonse X in 1261 and King Henry III in 1392.1 The Genoese merchants also showed an early and widespread interest in the bay of Cadiz. The good position of the Andalusian port on the Spanish Atlantic coast prompted easy commercial relations with Flanders and England; following the Portuguese penetration in North Africa, the bay became the hub for exchanges with Berberia.2 In a short time – along with Maiorca, Malaga, Cartagena, and Valencia – Cadiz became an important center within Genoese maritime trade routes. The Genoese merchants managed to play a relevant role along the slipways of southern Iberian coasts by exporting the primary local commodities (olive oil, wheat, and wine). Control over trading allowed them to establish a close financial connection with the landed Andalusian nobility, obtain important political positions in local society, and play a crucial role in settling the first Spanish expansionist enterprises in the Atlantic Ocean.3 The fall of Constantinople and the discovery of America all but increased the value of the Western trade routes centered in Andalusia. In 1503 the crown chose Seville as the hub of the Spanish monopolistic trade with the Indias. The river port, at almost one hundred kilometers from the sea, was preferred to Cadiz due to its demographic, political, and economic centrality in the region; besides, its inland position was considered to offer more protection from foreign smugglers’ assaults.4 The importance of the Genoese capital and know-how for the organization and development of the transatlantic trade transformed Seville into the seat of one of the most prosperous and influential Genoese merchant communities outside the borders of the republic.5 The strategic relevance of the port of Genoa in the communication system within the European territories of Charles V’s empire consolidated these ties of reciprocity in a strong alliance with the Condotta agreement of 1528 – a new constitution established by Admiral Andrea Doria that made Genoa a satellite of the Spanish empire. This reform led to substantial imperial protection over the Republic while also providing the basis for the opening of the so-called Genoese century.6 By virtue of their contribution to the maintenance of the imperial system, the Genoese

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Genoese migration to Cadiz: a persisting alliance

23

figure 1.1 Cadiz and the ports of the Guadalquivir river

became the biggest lenders to the Spanish monarchy and obtained important trade privileges, offices, and titles in exchange for their loans.7 During the seventeenth century, the increasing military weakness and the repeated bankruptcies of the Spanish monarchy loosened these ties of reciprocity.8 The Hispanic-Genoese alliance formally ended with the Treaty of Münster (1648), which – in exchange for countless privileges and royal concessions – formalized the succession of the United Provinces over Genoa for the transport of silver to Flanders.9 From the second half of the seventeenth century, the Genoese found themselves caught between the loss of their preeminent financial role and an irrecoverable political and naval weakness.10 The Republic, which had based its prosperity on political neutrality and the military protection of the Crown of Castile, tried to respond by elaborating a program of naval armament in order to gain access to the trades with East India and – with Portuguese assistance – with America. Inspired by the Dutch model, the Genoese East India Company was set up in 1647 with the aim of expanding maritime trade, especially toward Japan.11 The United Provinces sold two ships to the Genoese Company and allowed it to employ Dutch sailors, but they did not show the same magnanimity when their new competitor’s ships started sailing their routes; on the occasion of the first voyage, Genoese ships and crews were commandeered.12 The Genoese “navalist” party decided not to surrender and created the Company of Saint George – to which the government granted monopoly of armaments in Far East seas: this time the initiative was blocked by the intervention of the English. An arrangement between Genoa and Portugal, based on two Genoese ships being embedded to a fleet headed for Brazil, ended up making a loss and, from the 1680s, not a single initiative was taken by the Republic to sustain oceanic navigation.13

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

24

In the shadow of empire

In spite of progressive marginalization, the Genoese presence in the Atlantic economy did not vanish. The chronic need to supply its colonies with foreign manufactures and capital led Spain to the constant fostering of foreign participation in the Carrera de Indias (the system established by the Spanish crown to regulate trade with its overseas territories) and this resulted in the growth of colonial trades handled by the other European powers. This phenomenon was so substantial that at the end of the seventeenth century Spanish goods – mainly agricultural products – constituted only 4.5% of the authorized loads for the Indias.14 Foreign capital was so crucial to financing the Carrera de Indias that what was formally the Spanish monopolistic business in the Americas became a veritable “international economic empire.”15 The foreign merchants who lived in Seville were nothing more than brokers who bought on credit goods produced in their own country to ship to the Americas. The silver gained in exchange was sent to Seville, where a significant portion was then redistributed abroad via well-tried smuggling procedures carried out by those who were excluded from the monopolistic system or by fraudulent interactions within the same licit system. The limitations imposed by the Crown to prevent foreign interlopers into colonial trade were eluded by the same institutions responsible for enforcement. The Consulado de Cargadores a Indias, the corporation of Seville merchants who were licensed to trade with America, became increasingly autonomous in its relationship with the Crown. In exchange for substantial loans and donations, the members of the Consulado obtained the privilege of self-certifying the amount of goods bound for the Indias without having to submit the crates for inspection. This privilege led to systematic violations of the monopolistic restrictions on American imports and exports. The frauds guaranteed very high returns to both the Spanish and foreign merchants, with the former often providing bogus legal cover to the latter. The widespread fraudulent activities fostered a veritable vicious cycle that deprived Spain of most of the capital generated by the trade with the Indias and which further hindered its capacity to invest in productive activities aimed at redeeming the country’s manufacturing dependence. This seemingly paradoxical system belied a stringent and plain logic of which the Crown was perfectly aware: if Spain wanted to keep receiving galleons full of silver, it had no other choice but to fill them up with forbidden goods.16 Spain’s difficulty in autonomously meeting the needs of colonial trading explain the repeated measures taken over the centuries by the Crown to regularize foreign participation in the Carrera de Indias. Trade

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Genoese migration to Cadiz: a persisting alliance

25

regulations were highly restrictive but, as complicity between the authorities and illicit traders was often rampant, enforcement could be quite lenient.17 During the seventeenth century, the formal channels through which foreigners could gain access to colonial trading were restricted to royal license and naturalization. Licenses allowed foreigners to engage in a single shipment or, alternatively, to trade with the Indias for a given amount of time and were granted as a reward for certain services – often of a pecuniary nature – rendered to the Crown. Conversely, naturalization could be obtained both by Royal grant and on request. On the basis of the Real Cédula (royal decree) of February 1505, King Ferdinand the Catholic decreed that a man who resided and owned properties in Seville, Jerez, or Cadiz and had been married to a Spanishborn woman for at least fifteen years was entitled to the right to apply for naturalization. In 1562 King Philip II extended the residency condition to all the Iberian Kingdoms and to the Canary Islands and shortened its length to ten years. Over the years, however, the entry requirements for naturalization became more complicated and restricted. In 1592, in an attempt to prevent immigrant merchants from acting in Spanish harbors on behalf of foreign buyers, foreigners who were not investing their own capital were forbidden from taking part in colonial trading. Following the Real Cédula issued on October 12, 1608, the residency requirement was extended to twenty consecutive years and – for at least ten of these – the applicant had to show evidence that he had been a house owner and had been married either to a Spanish native-born woman or to a foreigner’s native-born daughter. In addition, the law required an inventory of the candidate’s properties, the accuracy of which was to be verified by the Consejo de Indias through the declarations of several witnesses. The habit of resorting to false witnesses became so widespread that in the 1620 Real Cédula the Crown was compelled to clarify that the applicant’s capital – an asset of at least 4,000 ducats – should be documented by deeds, perpetual sales, or permutations.18 A further significant “loophole” left open by the Spanish jurisdiction was the option for those who were born in Spain to foreign parents (the so-called jenízaros) to obtain the license to trade with the Indias as “verdaderamente originarios y naturales” (truly native-born people), a status granted to them by the Real Cédula that came into force on October 14, 1620.19 Licenses and naturalizations affected only a very small portion of the foreigners who sought to take part in the Carrera de Indias. However, a widespread and subterranean network of interests – engaged in a variety

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

26

In the shadow of empire

of forms of collaboration and links of reciprocity among fellow countrymen – focused around this minority: this made colonial trading accessible to a much-broader range of subjects and, rather than hindering illicit trade, the legalization of the position of foreigners actually helped fuel it. The Spanish empire remained one of the most potentially lucrative markets for Ligurian merchants, but the breakdown of the HispanicGenoese alliance entailed a much-needed review of their participation strategies around colonial trade. By the second half of the seventeenth century, Genoese investment in financial activities was substantially reduced in favor of more genuinely commercial operations.20 Although the Genoese aristocracy living in Seville – unlike the big families attached to the Madrid court – never lost its mercantile vocation,21 the Genoese settlement in this monopolistic port suffered an irreparable decline. At the same time, there was a progressive switch of the bulk of Genoese interests from the fluvial port of Seville to the near bay of Cadiz, which in this period gained the name of “world’s emporium.”22 Given that it was sheltered from the winds and more immediately accessible to Atlantic navigation, Cadiz became the nerve-center of international commerce connected with the Carrera de Indias, where foreign merchants could easily introduce forbidden goods, trade American products and silver, and avoid any form of fiscal control.23 At the time, Cadiz already had become one of the most important naval hubs for the convoys of various European powers, including those organized by the Republic of Genoa between 1655 and 1680.24 Seville’s decline was accelerated by the considerable flight of capital that occurred in the wake of the terrible 1648 plague epidemic, during which 40% of its population died. Through the initiative of some prudent governors, Cadiz was able to capitalize on such a conjunctural advantage by providing significant discounts against the import duties levied by Seville and moreover – upon the payment of 80,000 escudos – the crown was successfully persuaded to relocate the Spanish fleet and the galleons to the bay of Cadiz with the acts ratified on September 23, 1679 and July 4, 1680. The demographic transition is indicative of the growth that Cadiz experienced between 1650 and 1700, when it has been estimated that the population increased from 23,000 to 41,000 residents.25 According to the memoirs of the Savoy merchant Edmundo de Lantery, the Genoese merchants gained a dominant position in Cadiz; between 1670 and 1680, they were the most influential foreign community in the port, where they owned twenty-seven trade houses.26 To highlight how persistently important were the Spanish and Atlantic routes

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Genoese migration to Cadiz: a persisting alliance

27

to the Genoese merchants, one need only to quote the official reports written around 1670 by two French consuls, Catalan and Patoulet, who noted that the Genoese shipped to America a legal volume of merchandise equal to that shipped by the United Provinces, and half the size handled by France. The Genoese stood out as the major exporters of silk textiles (produced both in the Republic and in the North of Italy) and distributed most of the Italian satin, damask, and taffeta.27 The Genoese factories’ primary marketplace was in Spain and in the Americas.28 Following the Bourbon accession to the throne of Spain, the role played by Cadiz in international trade was fully recognized and also strongly supported by the monarchy. The military concerns arising from the English presence in Gibraltar and Minorca prompted the Spanish authorities to choose Cadiz as the main operational center for developing a new shipping plan geared to stimulate the building of boats, the training of marine cadres, and the reform of the monopolistic system.29 To this end, Giulio Alberoni, Andrés de Pez, and José Patiño – heads of the Secretaría del Despacho Universal, of the Consejo de Indias, and of the Intendencia General de Marina, respectively – created the arsenal known as la Carraca, instituted the Escuela de Guardia Marinas (the School of Midshipmen), and relocated from Seville to Cadiz both the Casa de la Contratación (the House of Trade) and the Consulado de Cargadores a Indias.30 With these reforms, Cadiz officially became the monopolistic emporium of Spanish colonial trade and the major center of American silver and retail commodities. If we consider the Genoese traditional presence in Andalusia and the region’s strategic position in international economy, the almost total lack of references to Genoese activities within studies of eighteenth-century Atlantic trade is rather surprising. The paradigm of decadence that has been applied by historians to early modern Genoese history subsequent to their decline as the financiers and bankers of Europe neglects the signs of the persisting commercial vitality of the Republic during the eighteenth century. This odd absence may be also ascribed to the strategies implemented by the Genoese in order to stay afloat in the Atlantic trade, despite the changes in the international scenario.

genoa in the eighteenth century: political weakness and commercial dynamism Genoa started to impose itself on the historiographical panorama around the 1960s, when scholarly focus gradually turned from studying the great

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

28

In the shadow of empire

Ancien Régime territorial powers to researching the evolution of the traditional mercantile civilizations embodied by small Republican states. In this framework Genoa became “the capitalist city par excellence,” which made a living out of commercial circulation and forwent territorial expansion aims, by using political neutrality as a more effective way of moving freely amid the hegemonic ambitions held by territorial States.31 Over time this forward-thinking interpretation has been challenged and reorganized in the light of considerations made about the parasitic nature of Genoese capitalism, the symbiotic character of the republic with respect to the great dynastic systems, and its rigidly oligarchic structure of power.32 At any rate, when measured against the attention given to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century events, Genoa’s eighteenth-century history has prompted little interest among historians, thus justifying Genoa’s inclusion into the paradigm of decadence about “small” European States reduced to an interstitial status in a context dominated by great territorial powers.33 It is only in recent times – by highlighting its strategic geopolitical position as well as its high demographic density and its persisting financial power – that historians have started to challenge the “small state” image used to describe the Republic of Genoa in the eighteenth century.34 This reappraisal does not deny the “non-actuality” of Genoa’s case compared to the new political realities emerging in Europe, but aims at rescuing Genoa from a conjectured precariousness of existence by emphasizing its ability to successfully adapt to the changes in the international context. What is striking about the Republic of Genoa in the eighteenth century is the contrast between the gradual withdrawal from expansionist aims – a heritage of the former century – and the persisting commercial dynamism. Genoa had not lost its own ambitions but managed to fulfill them only on rare occasions. In 1713 it bought the Spanish marquisate of Finale (in the western coast of present-day Liguria), and the alliance treaty ratified with France and Spain during the War of Austrian Succession (Genoa’s only overtly military initiative) was motivated by the will to preserve it. In 1712 the Republic succeeded in reaching with the Ottoman Porte new Capitulation agreements that confirmed those ratified in 1665, but the agreements could not be enforced because of the diplomatic opposition of France, Holland, and England. In 1715, the renewed hostility displayed by the other European maritime powers forced Genoa to abruptly abandon the grandiose plan for commercial expansion in the eastern Mediterranean littoral attributed to the privileged Compagnia Genovese del Levante (Genoese Company of the Levant).35 New reasons for frustration arose

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Genoese migration to Cadiz: a persisting alliance

29

during the 1720s from the failed attempt to control the Principality of Massa and Carrara in order to isolate the port of Livorno from trade. Simultaneously, the Corsican insurrection obligated Genoa to engage in a long battle to maintain control of the island. Lacking the necessary means, the republic asked for the military support of France, which ended up annexing Corsica in 1769. Nine years before, in the framework of the War of Austrian Succession, Genoa also suffered the occupation by the Austrian troops. Having forsaken its former grandiose plans and being almost totally disarmed, from the 1730s the Genoese policy became limited to renovating the free-port status, the effects of which were gradually nullified by the fact that the same privilege spread to the Mediterranean ports of Trieste and Fiume in 1719, Messina in 1728, Ancona in 1732, and Civitavecchia in 1786.36 During the eighteenth century, Genoa also had to cope with some serious governance issues. The most burning question was the shortage of high-ranking officials, due to the impoverishment and biological exhaustion of the leading aristocratic families; to this must be added the endemic political instability resulting from the patricians’ innumerable resignations and requests for exemption from government offices.37 Despite the internal and international problems, the Genoese economy continued to flourish. The aristocracy’s foreign investments, distributed throughout all European courts and especially to France, remained the greatest source of wealth in the Republic.38 Along with the persisting fortunes in finance, a renewed growth of maritime trade generated profits and job opportunities for large parts of the population. Since 1700 the free port’s custom revenue had steadily increased, stabilized in the 1760s, and then experienced a substantial growth from 1773 to 1797.39 To understand this general upward trend it is important to consider the composition of the Ligurian merchant fleet, the people involved in maritime trades, and the very nature of their own mercantile operations. “The history of the Genoese merchant navy during the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries is all about the Ligurian Riviera boats and patrons” who supported trade by means of small, autonomously built coasters.40 Since the Middle Ages, the Ligurian shipbuilding division had been characterized by a high grade of territorial dispersion, a significant lack of logistics, and a marked managerial autonomy.41 As Luisa Piccinno points out, in most cases “shipyards are merely available spaces by the sea, in the vicinity of which wooden sheds have been erected to temporarily house the tools and materials used to build the hulls.”42

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

30

In the shadow of empire

The lack of an integrated organizational system and the essentially private management of the sector resulted from the traditional weakness of the public fleet. Although the Ligurian shipyard industry located in Sampierdarena, Arenzano, and Varazze was a vibrant sector thanks to many foreign contracts, from the seventeenth century the building of high tonnage ships began to slump both because of a decrease of investments in the maritime sector and because of technological advances made by the northern European maritime powers. These new conditions, however, created an unexpected window of opportunity for the Ligurian coasts’ shipbuilding industry, which was oriented toward the construction of smaller naval units. During the eighteenth century, the Ligurian Riviera – whose development had traditionally been hampered by Genoa’s centralizing policy43 – started playing a crucial role in maintaining the Republic’s prosperity and coastal trade centered on small and medium-sized vessels, which became the workhorses of Genoese maritime commerce.44 As Luciana Gatti remarks, ‘it is not really a question of decay – a change to the conditions of a subject that remains the same – as much as a matter of replacement or even of multiplication of the subjects.”45 This phenomenon was not limited to the shipbuilding sector and, due to the very nature of the shipping trade, influenced maritime business as a whole. The study of contractual relationships connected to naval construction has actually proved that the mercantile and the shipbuilding sectors closely complemented each other, both because it was private investors, often merchants, who commissioned the ships and supplied the shipyards with the materials and because of the major role played by the patron or the captain in seeking out profit-making opportunities.46 The property of each shipload was usually divided in shares (carati) owned by and divided between all the subjects involved in the business, according to the costs that each one had borne. A classic Genoese “way of sailing,” which had been developed over the centuries to regulate maritime bargaining in the Mediterranean and which was still implemented in the eighteenth century, was the colonna, an enterprise that included the patron, the sailors, and many small shareholders (caratisti). The patron provided the ship, while the sailors and the shareholders brought to the venture, respectively, the manpower and the money needed to purchase the goods and meet the costs. Business risk, potential damages, and profits were all shared and distributed proportionally according to the share held by each. The division of the shipload’s property met the need to bear the high costs of the shipping trade and also allowed growth in business volume, thanks to the involvement of small investors and to the development of new

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Genoese migration to Cadiz: a persisting alliance

31

commercial networks. The patron (or, alternatively, the captain) acted as a veritable business intermediary who pursued charter contracts, purchased commodities with the company’s capital, and sought out business partners interested in purchasing the goods that the shareholders had entrusted with him.47 The commenda, another form of contractual relationship based on occasional work, was also rather popular: it did not presuppose the establishment of a company but, on the contrary, merely led to the allocation of funds (or goods) that enabled one or more commercial transactions.48 The higher operational deftness of inshore navigation – which, incidentally, was not taxed – explains the unmistakable preponderance in eighteenth-century Genoese merchant fleet of small and medium-sized vessels. If one considers that the spreading of lighter and faster ships had been recorded all over Europe since the seventeenth century,49 the reduced tonnage of Genoa’s fleet cannot be interpreted as a sign of decadence. Inshore navigation allowed Ligurian captains to move nimbly, as well as cheaply, along the traditional routes and, in so doing, to sustain the transit trade of Genoa’s port. Trade with Western Mediterranean ports (including Catalonia, Languedoc, Corsica, Sicily, and Sardinia) was generally assigned to small tonnage ships, while the shipments (especially salt and wheat) to Genoa, the Adriatic, and to the Spanish ports were carried out by higher tonnage ships. Reconstructing the exact size of Genoa’s fleet is no mean feat because of the widespread Genoese custom of flying French, Spanish, English, Austrian, Papal, and Tuscan flags according to convenience and itinerary. This traditional expedient allowed the Genoese to trade with regions that were off-limits because of other maritime powers or the Barbary corsairs and to avoid paying taxes collected by the consuls in the landing ports. The recourse to illicit practices became such a popular and interiorized custom that Ligurian captains caught with fake passports felt entitled to blame the Genoese consuls for persecuting them against the Republic’s interest.50 Because of fiscal concerns and in order to not arouse suspicions of connivance, the Genoese government sought to officially forbid the display of foreign ensigns but with such scant conviction that – in one captain’s words – the prohibitions “did not last more than three days.”51 The high degree of formal unaccountability of Genoese maritime traffic has prevented a full consideration of the issues raised by well-informed researchers about the persistent relevance of Ligurian engagement in eighteenth-century trade.52 For the same reasons, historians have underestimated the persisting commercial relations between the Iberian

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

32

In the shadow of empire

Peninsula and Genoa. During the eighteenth century, Spain and Portugal still constituted the main export markets for Sicilian wheat and the Genoese merchants managed these marketplaces under almost monopolistic conditions.53 The port of Genoa was the main hub for the shipment of goods produced in Northern Italy and in Southern Germany to Spain as well as for the imports from Spain and America to the Habsburg Lombardy.54 In the Mediterranean, the Genoese – alongside the French – also played a relevant role in marketing American sugar.55 The available data on Genoa’s port maritime movements confirm the central role of Iberian routes. Among the 2,349 vessels that entered Genoa’s port between 1781 and 1789, more than 1,200 came from ports located in the Atlantic, the North, and the Baltic Seas, with a recorded average of 140 per year. Lisbon alone absorbed more than a quarter of the Atlantic trades with Genoa (42 vessels per year on average), followed by Great Britain (29 vessels per year on average) and Spain (Cadiz, in particular, recorded 24 naval units per year on average). As far as Mediterranean navigation is concerned, about a quarter of the ships entering Genoa originated from Spanish ports.56 Since it does not include a consideration of the vessel’s ensign, such data does not allow us to determine the exact proportion of Genoese ships against those coming from other nations. At any rate, contemporary documentary sources on the measures taken by the Genoese to trade on the Iberian routes discourage any classification attempt. In 1785, Pedro López de Lerena, the Secretario de Estado and of the Despacho Universal de Hacienda of Spain and the Indias, described the Genoese merchants as being the “most engaged in smuggling” and, for this reason, the less “deserving of leniency.”57 Forms of leniency – when not of overt compliance – were nonetheless so widespread that, in many cases, they made Genoese trade shipping indistinguishable from its Spanish counterpart. The “stingy and rough-andready” Genoese commission agents – whom the Spanish consul based at Genoa described in 1750 as “the biggest defrauders of His Majesty’s Customs”– loaded their goods onto Spanish ships bound for Cadiz without asking the Spanish consul either to endorse the ship’s manifest or its bill of health. In this way, they could offload or take on board smuggled goods both at the intermediate landing ports where the ships stocked up on water and by letting other small crafts load their ships during navigation. Once they reached Cadiz or Lisbon, offloading a quantity of goods larger than that taken on board in Genoa was a fairly common occurrence and one presumes that the same phenomenon took place on the homeward journey.58 By the mid-eighteenth century, most frauds were

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Genoese migration to Cadiz: a persisting alliance

33

connected to the trade with Catalonia and were carried out with the assistance of sea captains and Barcelona traders who – in the wake of the Catalan insurrection against the Bourbon monarchy during the Spanish War of Succession – found shelter and protection in Genoa. Thanks to this complicity, the Genoese merchants59 shipped to Barcelona hemp, books, linen garments, paintings, soap, silk cocoons and commodities on Catalan ships.60 The smuggling carried out by merchants and captains of the Republic became so endemic as to compel King Ferdinand VI to issue in 1757 a decree suspending Genoese commerce with Spain and the Americas.61 The provision – which, in the opinion of a contemporary observer, was equivalent to annihilating two-thirds of the Genoese business volume – would not last. In 1759, the coronation of the more accommodating King Charles III allowed the return to the status quo ante, when illicit trade “was seen as an irrelevant matter.”62 For some time the Genoese had been developing various ways of bringing their own vessels to sail under the shadow of the Spanish ensign. One of the most commonly used expedients was to register at Spanish ports’ departments, where the Genoese pilots and captains applied to purchase or captain a ship; having qualified “to sail as Spanish,” they returned to Genoa to seek new charter contracts. Those who did not possess the license could camouflage the ownership of their ships; all they had to do was to wait for a qualified Spanish captain to enter Genoa’s port and take him on board as the flag captain; the flag captain was no different from other salaried crew on board ship, but it was easy to make him appear as the owner by deftly counterfeiting the ship’s bill of sale. Genoese traders generally preferred to upload their own goods onto the ships of fellow citizens who bore “stolen” Spanish ensigns: this practice was so widespread that it was very difficult for authentic Spanish ships to load freight in Genoa on their homeward journeys.63 According to the Intendente del Departamento of Cadiz, the Genoese predominance in the Spanish coasting navigation was also due to the Andalusian people’s indolence and greed for riches. In a 1790 report, he explained that most of the local captains and sailors preferred to get a better paid job in the shipping companies bound for the Indias; those who shipped along the shores were satisfied to earn enough to make ends meet.64 The “disloyalty of the Genoese,” who piloted and licensed in Spain ships from all Italian ports, was particularly endemic within the department of the port of Cartagena, which, in 1803, could be described as

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

34

In the shadow of empire

being “transplanted in Genoa.” In order to put a stop to these “inconceivable abuses,” the Spanish consul in Genoa recommended the Crown ban the purchase of foreign ships and confiscate Genoese ships caught flying foreign flags.65 In these same years, the Spanish consul in Livorno remarked that the Genoese captains benefited from the same “special treatment” by illicitly obtaining the protection offered by the Spanish flag; however, rather than propose remedies, more realistically the consul tried to justify the state of affairs by claiming that public officers often had to compromise themselves with frauds “in order not to instigate resentment in the traders and in those who profited from such practices.”66 In sum, despite the Republic’s international marginalization, Genoese maritime trade maintained a pivotal role in managing the trade between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean through the intermediation of the Iberian ports; as in previous centuries, such a close association led to an increase in the number of Genoese merchants, craftsmen, and immigrants of all professions who settled along those shores. Having a job far away from one’s own homeland was a rather common condition among the Genoese. The Republic’s impervious territorial geography – a narrow strip of coast surrounded by a “screen of barren mountains”67 – left no other alternative. Since the Middle Ages the Genoese had managed to turn what might appear a curse into a benefit by resorting to migration, which was not only a survival strategy but also the very secret of their mercantile expansion. The traditional inclination toward territorial mobility, which was closely bound to the nature of mercantile business and involved Genoa’s very own nobility, was quite simply the most complete expression of a phenomenon that affected a much wider and socially diversified array of subjects. Since the Middle Ages the workers employed by the shipbuilding companies had been in very high demand in foreign shipyards and arsenals, and had lived by the tenets of geographical mobility both within and outside of the Republic’s borders.68 The emigration of other professionals, such as seamen, spinners, dyers, weavers, and workers in paper and soap factories, was equally substantial. During the eighteenth century, Ligurian emigration had become stronger because of unprecedented “push” factors, the most important of which was undoubtedly a slump in manufacturing. Since the last decades of the seventeenth century, the main Genoese manufacturing industries (silk, paper, and soap) had undergone a slow but steady decline but had kept afloat due to increasingly low labor costs. The cut in wages in the silk industry was obtained by transferring the production processes

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Genoese migration to Cadiz: a persisting alliance

35

to the countryside; as a result, the low quality but cheap Genoese silk would be unrivalled in international markets through the eighteenth century. This persisting competitiveness discouraged any technological and organizational advances in the productive cycle,69 while generating wide pockets of unemployment among urban workers who were left with no other option than to emigrate or enter the maritime industry. Not even the countryside was spared the negative consequences brought by the slump in manufacturing. Although the ruralization of Genoese industry offered new occupational opportunities for the inland population, in most cases, this led to neglect of the fields rather than complementing farm work. As a result, there arose a spiral of famines and plagues, which, along with the short-term crisis caused by the 1746 occupation by the Austrians, ended up swelling the ranks of unskilled emigrants. Emigration may explain why, at the beginning as well as at the end of the eighteenth century, the recorded population of the Republic of Genoa amounted roughly to 400,000–500,000; the mass exodus toward Lombardy, the Neapolitan area, France, Spain, Portugal, and the Americas succeeded in neutralizing the significant demographic surplus in the Ligurian population.70 The persistence of Genoese emigration toward the Iberian Peninsula during the eighteenth century has been noted in several studies,71 but the topic remains largely unexplored. The most accurate assessments have focused on the entrepreneurial strategies embraced by important families settled in Spanish ports along the Mediterranean; for instance, we know that some of these families successfully entered commercial and financial circuits gravitating toward the port of Barcelona,72 while others settled in Valencia played a leading role in the silk trade.73 Local history studies have also hinted at an important Ligurian presence in Alicante, Malaga, and Gibraltar.74 As for the Atlantic ports, the available data is equally scarce; the history of Lisbon’s Genoese community during the eighteenth century still needs to be explored in depth.75 As far as the Canary Islands are concerned, there is only a single study on the Genoese consulate.76 As for the bay of Cadiz, in no way can the attention given to the Genoese presence be compared to the interest raised by the other foreign communities that had settled in the port.77 This scarce interest in the topic seems even more surprising when we consider the important role played by Cadiz in world trade during the eighteenth century and the fact that all the demographic studies agree that the Genoese had been one of the largest foreign communities operating in the port.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

In the shadow of empire

36

cadiz as capital of the genoese diaspora During the eighteenth century the port of Cadiz underwent an almost uninterrupted growth in population. Researchers agree that about 71,000 lived in the city in 1791, a figure that is five times higher than the estimated number for 1714.78 As highlighted in Table 1.1,79 eighteenthcentury foreign emigration to Cadiz paralleled the global population growth and went through a sharp demographic downturn at the beginning of the nineteenth century; this downturn can be ascribed to the numerous yellow fever epidemics and to the irremediable crisis suffered by the port following the 1808 crisis, the war against France, and the downfall of the colonial system. Calculating the exact numbers of the Ligurian community in Cadiz over the eighteenth century is difficult due to the primarily fiscal nature of most of the available censuses, which recorded only the resident household heads and excluded the other members of the family as well as the many itinerant foreign guests. In order to obtain a clearer idea of the constitution of the foreign communities settled in Cadiz, we have to wait until the last decade of the eighteenth century – a period that coincides with the peak in the city’s demographic expansion. A population estimate determined by the local authorities and dated 1791 (Table 1.2) provides us with considerable detail about the presence of women and children:80 Among the Italians, who constituted the port’s largest foreign community, the Ligurians were the most numerous, followed by Piedmontese,

table 1.1 Foreign heads of households in Cadiz in the eighteenth century

Italians French Portuguese Irish Flemish Germans English Swiss Greeks Swedes Dutch TOTAL

1713

1773

1791

1819

329 231 3 21 113 3 17 2 6 1 1 757

1,925 1,363 97 119 38 66 21 18 21 10 10 3,688

2,507 1,598 177 144 35 110 44 28 2 12 2 4,659

907 158 68 18 11 59 35 13 12 4 4 1,289

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Genoese migration to Cadiz: a persisting alliance

37

table 1.2 Foreign population estimate of Cadiz, 1791 FOREIGNERS

MEN

WOMEN

CHILDREN

TOTAL

French Italians Portuguese Germans and Flemish English and Irish Hamburgers, Swedes, Russians, and Poles

1,571 2,661 172 164 139 91

137 405 53 27 58 4

993 1,952 126 86 75 20

2,071 5,108 351 277 272 115

Lombards, and subjects of the Kingdom of Naples. The same trend is noticeable in the neighboring Puerto de Santa María, where the Italian community – mainly from Genoa – constituted the most numerous group of foreigners.81 Although approximate, this data indicates beyond doubt that over the eighteenth century the bay of Cadiz was one of the main centers of attraction for Genoese emigration. By analyzing a sample drawn from a 1794 census of 805 Ligurian males inhabiting nine of Cadiz’s seventeen districts, Carlo Molina gathered some important information about the Genoese settlement’s occupational profile.82 The census sample reported that 42% were employed in commercial enterprise with 6.4% registered as great merchants, 10.2% as retailers, 25.4% as clerks or employees of houses of trade and shops, and 3% as secretaries and accountants. Innkeepers or owners of eating houses made up 2.5%, and 17.8% were cooks. A very large group of variously specialized craftsmen (such as tailors, silversmiths, chocolate makers as well as chair, comb, pasta, hat, mattress and textile makers) followed, with shoemakers prevailing in number (8.2%). The professional variety within the Genoese settlement mirrored the classic profile of the Genoese diaspora, which was characterized by units of small dealers and producers who gravitated around large marketplaces and contributed to integrating the main commercial circuits and to turning ports into consumer markets.83 In regards to the marital status of the Ligurian emigrants, the analysis of data concerning the districts of Santa Cruz and San Lorenzo points to a high prevalence of married couples (63% and 66% respectively). The bachelorhood rates fluctuated between 30% and 28%, while men married to local women constituted the majority in both districts (64% and 63.6% in Santa Cruz and in San Lorenzo, respectively). The average age of the household heads (42 years old) and the average time of

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

38

In the shadow of empire

residence in the port (21 years) confirm the settled nature of the population that had emigrated from Liguria.84 According to the 1794 census, Italian women were the most numerous among the foreigners (435 out of 702): 29.7% were never married, 46.6% were married, and 23.7% were widows. The widows – most of whom had been married to craftsmen or were retailers who had taken over their late husbands’ businesses– were 50 years old on average, had been living in Cadiz for thirty years, and a third of them had settled there as a child with their parents.85 These figures may appear surprising if we consider that, at the beginning of the century, participation in the Atlantic trade had become even harder for the Genoese. The Spanish War of Succession (1701–14) had confirmed, once and for all, Genoese marginalization to the advantage of the large European powers, which were able to sustain the trade and naval policies that Genoa had long since abandoned. Having acquired Gibraltar and having been granted both the privileges of the asiento de negros – which continued to be enjoyed until 1750 – and of the permission ship (navío de permiso), Great Britain took on a decisive role in managing trade between Europe and the Atlantic and attained a substantial freedom to do business with the Indias. With the Bourbon accession to the Spanish throne, France benefited from a preferential treatment and consolidated its position within the Carrera de Indias. Because of the problems generated by war, the merchants of Saint Malo were entrusted with the task of purveying the Peruvian markets in 1716;86 at the same time, by virtue of the Treaty of Utrecht, the privileges that had been granted to France during the second half of the seventeenth century were confirmed; these included a discount on customs duties on textile manufactures and the exemption from the inspection of stocks and French merchants’ warehouses in Spanish ports.87 The signing of the 1733 Family Compact, as well as its subsequent renewals in 1743 and 1761, strengthened the privileged bond between France and Spain, which allowed the former to take control of a large amount of the silver that originated from the Indias. All this helps to explain why the French community remained the richest and most influential foreign mercantile community in eighteenth-century Cadiz.88 Despite the growing international competition, the Genoese continued to find manifold opportunities in the “world’s emporium.” During the eighteenth century, an increase in the import of precious metals was recorded in Spain,89 and the port of Cadiz – the main hub for American silver – kept directing the three main worldwide commercial routes (the

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Genoese migration to Cadiz: a persisting alliance

39

European, the Asiatic, and the American). The “Americanization” of international trade90 – that is, the increase in the global trade traffic volume, due to the development of the American plantation economy and to the rise in the consumption of colonial products in Europe – also favored the Spanish emporium. Traffic growth in the port of Cadiz has been demonstrated by Antonio García-Baquero’s estimations of the tonnage of the ships using the port: these document a shipping expansion cycle that stretched from 1715 until 1778.91 The persisting frauds and contraband allowed the foreign merchants to keep gaining large revenues from trade with the Indias.92 In 1778, in an attempt to curb the widespread draining of resources, which had been made worse by the presence of the nearby free port of Gibraltar,93 the Bourbon reformers authorized direct trade between thirteen Spanish and twenty-four American ports with the so-called decree of comercio libre.94 The liberalization policy formally took away from Cadiz the privileged status of monopolistic emporium, but it did not jeopardize its ancient supremacy in trade intermediation; between 1778 and 1796, Cadiz handled more than 70% of Spain’s exports to the Indias, most of which were foreign goods.95 The overlapping of these favorable conditions clarifies the strategic importance of the port of Cadiz to the Genoese merchants; from there it was possible for them to not only take their own goods into the American markets but also to access the growing retailing of colonial commodities and Spanish products.96 Because it demanded smaller investments compared to those needed to extract American precious metals, the brokering activity between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean commercial circuits created persistently high profit margins to a wide array of economic subjects. As we shall see, the profits gained from these businesses helped to consolidate the position of a new mercantile Genoese elite, which, in most cases, also skillfully succeeded in establishing direct trading with the Indias.

a welcome migration To explain the settling patterns of Genoese emigration and how its mercantile class reached success and self-establishment, we must take into account the whole set of social, economic, and institutional conditions that either fostered or hampered integration in the society that welcomed them. The Spanish monarchy offered many channels of integration both to foreign merchants and to migrants coming from different professional

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

40

In the shadow of empire

areas. The prolonged residence, the possession of property, or a marriage contracted in Spain were considered evidence of a foreigner’s wish to permanently reside in Spain and constituted the first step that an outsider had to take in order to be recognized as a member of the local community (vecino). The vecino status was a fairly flexible notion that was closely connected to one’s reputation and defined by a set of class and community relations that were ultimately sanctioned by the authorities (although not always in a formal way); the status was subject to changes both in time and space, it was adapted to specificities and shifts in everyday social practices whereby rights were enjoyed in a given territorial context.97 Recognizing a foreigner as a member of the local community depended upon the individual’s personal qualities, but also met the short-term needs and interests of subjects competing for control of resources. Foreign immigration to Spain was not only accepted but promoted and encouraged through specific provisions. In an attempt to cure the scarcity of local production, in 1623 King Philip IV promulgated a law whereby foreigners – provided they were Catholic and “friends of the Crown” – were granted the right to reside and work in the Spanish kingdoms.98 As an incentive, both guild masters and their employees were offered exemption from direct and indirect taxes as well as from other duties that were compulsory for vecinos; the judicial authorities were even ordered to find them a house and land, if necessary. The only condition dictated by the law – apparently in order to stem contraband – was that the immigrant craftsmen had to settle at least 20 leagues away from ports, but, given that it was so difficult to enforce, the restriction was revoked a few years later.99 All foreigners who had been living within the Spanish kingdoms on a permanent basis for at least ten years and who had been married to Spanish native-born women for at least six years were given the right to hold minor municipal appointments.100 The exclusion from positions in the municipal government denied a complete equality between foreigners and vecinos; however, the frequent exceptions made by the Crown itself – whereby, over the seventeenth century, noble Genoese asentistas101 were appointed to important political posts – show how a foreigner, especially if deemed particularly “competent” or deserving, could follow integration rationales based both on horizontal (i.e., endorsed by the community) and on vertical (i.e., by Crown privilege) recognition. The Habsburg’s concern for meeting the Monarchy’s demographic and productive needs was acknowledged by the Bourbons in the eighteenth century; since they conceived skilled labor and an agricultural workforce as a key resource for the global increase of wealth and as a means through

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Genoese migration to Cadiz: a persisting alliance

41

which Spain could regain its hegemonic position in Europe, the Bourbon reformers continued to recognize and favor foreign settlements in the Monarchy’s territories.102 On the basis of the law that King Philip V issued in 1716, a foreigner was entitled to call himself a vecino if he met the following requirements: (a) to have obtained the privilege of naturalization or, alternatively, the vecino formal status in a municipality; (b) for those who belonged to other religions, to have converted to Catholicism on their arrival in Spain; (c) to be married to a Spanish native-born woman or man; (d) to be a householder or the owner of other properties; (e) to have been a resident in Spain for at least ten years; (f) to practice a craftsman, retailing, or mechanic profession; (g) to hold public, honorific, or other positions reserved to naturales. More generally, anyone was accepted whose condition conformed to common law, to royal ordinances, and to other relevant regulations.103 The observance of the Catholic faith, the intense relations with the Spanish Monarchy that Genoa had built over the centuries, and the Republic’s political weakness made the Genoese the ideal candidates for settling in the Spanish kingdoms; not only could the Genoese trade in Spain but they could also access the productive fields in which they had achieved a high degree of expertise. The emigration of manpower and shipyard workers to the bay of Cadiz – a less known phenomenon compared to the mercantile emigration but, nonetheless, an equally important one – only lends itself to a fragmentary understanding, given the scarcity of available source materials. However, the few existing documentary sources highlight how Spain’s economic upper crusts put up a struggle against the competition of foreign manufacturers, especially those from Genoa, by employing Genoese manpower and expertise to foster the production of the same goods in the Monarchy’s territories. In silk production, for instance, one of the greatest manufacturing plants for the production of stockings opened in the bay of Cadiz and employed fifty-four skilled workers of both sexes who had been purposefully sent there from Genoa.104 The same pattern occurred in paper production. Traditionally, the Spanish Monarchy had been weakened by a marked dependency on paper imports from Genoa, which supplied both the American and peninsular markets. This dependence remained strong in the eighteenth century; around 1750 Spain and its colonies consumed between half and two-thirds of the paper produced in Genoa.105 In 1751, to contend with the Genoese competition, some Spanish traders created a business venture aimed at

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

42

In the shadow of empire

setting up a paper plant in the bay: the Real Fabrica de Nuestra Señora de los Milagros. Initially, the original plan was to build six mills next to Puerto de Santa María. Luis Martínez Beltrán, the Secretary and General Commissioner to His Majesty’s Armies, was entrusted with the recruitment of a paper mill master who would be willing to relocate to Spain and bring with him the necessary manpower.106 In 1752 two paper mill masters and fourteen women arrived from Genoa to work in the mills that had been already built. The Genoese consul in Cadiz remarked that the creation of this paper plant was part of a wider plan to erect approximately thirty new buildings in the area: the magnitude of such a project – coupled with the increasingly low quality of the paper imported from Genoa – led to fears about new possible influxes of manpower and a form of competition that would be detrimental to paper production in the Republic.107 The 1778 comercio libre decree gave the Genoese the opportunity to set up their own factories within the Monarchy’s territories. In an attempt to stem contraband and to develop the local productive system, the decree abolished a number of taxes levied on transoceanic shipping and on the exports of Spanish textiles, but duty thresholds on foreign manufactures were kept high. However, several significant exceptions were made: the law prescribed that textiles produced by foreign merchants and craftsmen who had immigrated to Spain should be treated as local products; nonnaturalized foreign-born merchants were solely forbidden from exporting goods to America on their own account (art. 23). Article 31 in the decree also prescribed that even textiles that had been spun abroad – but which had been painted and modified to alter their look, use, and destination – could be considered as Spanish goods once they had been introduced into the Monarchy’s territories.108 These regulations supplemented others that aimed to boost foreign productive ventures in Spain, such as the obligation imposed on the gremios (the artisan corporations) to admit foreign Catholic masters (1777), a more pronounced tolerance in the regulation of silk (1778), flax, hemp, and wool (1784–6) textile productive processes and, above all, the liberalization of the number of looms that each entrepreneur was allowed to possess (1787). In October 1789, the freedom of production was extended to the whole textile sector, on the sole condition that all items had to bear the trademark of its maker so that they could be distinguished from those produced by gremios.109 Finally, in 1793, the gremio of throwsters (the workers who specialized in twisting the fibers into yarn) was also abolished.110 On the strength of their vast experience in the sector, Genoese traders and producers secured a dominant place for themselves in the textile

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Genoese migration to Cadiz: a persisting alliance

43

industry of Cadiz; as a result, they found it easy to find customers interested in sending their wares to the Indias or, alternatively, in actually shipping their commodities with the complicity of Spanish or Genoese naturalized merchants. The main textile production center in the bay was Puerto de Santa María. As is made clear in the memoir of the Economic Society of Cadiz redacted by Gaspar Procurante in 1784, the Genoese owned most of the textile plants in the port. Procurante himself was a leading figure in the Genoese community of Cadiz:111 he had been registered with the consulate of the Republic of Genoa at least since the 1760s,112 and owned a silk stocking factory with Juan Bautista Procurante, Mattia Vico, Josef Conti, and Santiago Guido, who were all of Ligurian descent. In 1784, the factory had 203 workers, fifty-four looms for silk, which grew to seventy-six by 1797, and four other looms for the production of woven belts; with the capacity to produce 54,699 units per year, this was the largest silk stocking factory in the area, one with which only Granada’s and Barcelona’s factories could compete.113 Another Genoese businessman, Vico’s nephew, Juan Bautista Cheirasco y Vico, featured as a company associate with a corporate capital of 10,000 pesos (corresponding to a third of the enterprise’s total value) since at least 1795;114 in the application for naturalization, which he filed in that year, he also mentioned considerable loans he had made to his uncle’s company and the ownership of a stock-house for the wholesale of imported colonial goods (such as cocoa, sugar, and tobacco) run by a Spanish agent.115 Wholesaler Josef Alberti supplied the Vico-Conti company with the silk needed for production and in 1788 he appeared as the owner of a small proportion of looms in operation at the factory;116 three years later he declared the ownership of 101 looms for the production of silk stockings in Puerto Real, but it is unclear whether this was an autonomous business or a greater share in the company.117 In the 1784 census, the factory of José Pedemonte,118 a member of an important family of Genoese traders allowed on the Carrera de Indias, stood in second place after Vico-Conti, with its looms producing, in 1798, 8,000 units of stockings, trousers, and gloves. The stocking factories of Antonio Montesisto (a relative of Giuseppe, who had been the Genoese consul between 1755 and 1771), José Fascie, Domingo Cerruti, and Roccatagliata were less important: according to a census conducted in 1790, these did not exceed eighteen looms but had nonetheless established cooperation agreements with other Ligurian and Spanish textile producers.119 Rafael Vicario de Iñigo from Palencia features among these; having been matriculated in the Consulado de Indias since 1760, he owned a large textile

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

44

In the shadow of empire

plant in the bay (the same one where the fifty-four Ligurian masters were employed) and also owned a number of ships and warehouses for the shipping of goods to the Americas.120 The enduring competition of goods imported from abroad and the fall in sales that occurred between 1786 and 1787 (due to the saturation of the colonial markets and to the crisis provoked in the textile sector by the war against England) prevented any form of consolidation in the bay of Cadiz’s textile industry. Paper production suffered a similar fate and the grandiose project of Puerto de Santa María was never completed due to the lack of funds. Conversely, the paper produced in Genoa continued to be shipped to Spain and to the Americas by widely resorting to contraband, despite protectionist barriers and growing competition from local industries. In 1785, the Genoese consul in Cadiz justified the widespread illicit paper trade by ascribing it to “the abuses” of Spanish customs agents who – in his opinion – levied “truly exorbitant” duties.121 Four years later, the consul complained again about the damage deriving to Voltri’s paper producers from “the duty increases . . . on all goods from every foreign nation.”122 The consul actually referred to the tariff discriminations imposed by King Charles III in order to promote Spanish paper.123 However, the paper plants that sprang up in Andalusia, Valencia, and Catalonia were unable to meet the demand of local and colonial merchants; therefore, the contraband Genoese paper was favored by the complicity of the Spanish producers themselves. In 1784, the Genoese consul maintained that “in order to cater for the large consumption of paper, the Catalonian people working at paper plants have stocked up on a quite large amount of paper from Genoa and have made it appear as if it was the product of their own plants.”124 By virtue of this and other strategies, the Indias continued to be one of the main markets for Genoese paper and silk manufactures.125 In summary, the Genoese manufacturers found both an ally and accomplice in the Spanish Monarchy. The upcoming local industry offered new occupational prospects to the workers and craftsmen who were forced to emigrate by the steady decline of Genoa’s industry, while the Crown’s protectionist policy actively encouraged Ligurian businessmen to relocate their production plants to Spain. The low-quality – but still cheap – goods produced in the Republic also maintained their competitiveness in the Monarchy’s territories with the support of local merchants and producers. On the strength of their experience, the Genoese also managed to breach into two other key sectors of the Spanish economy: the maritime

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Genoese migration to Cadiz: a persisting alliance

45

and the shipping industries. In order to solve Spain’s chronic lack of vessels, the Bourbons adopted two different strategies: on the one hand, they invested in the local shipbuilding industry by setting up the Carraca arsenal in Cadiz and, on the other hand, they authorized the acquisition of foreign ships by only charging them a duty fee (the extrangería tax). In 1752, the Genoese consul in Cadiz reported on the arrival of “120 Genoese shipwrights and caulkers in the arsenal to build vessels for this Crown,” many of whom had been hired in Genoa, while others had volunteered.126 The local shipbuilding industry, which specialized mainly in warships, was never able to meet the needs of the trade with the Indias; as a result, the practice of purchasing foreign ships for transatlantic trade became increasingly common, also because the Spanish authorities found it more convenient to levy the extrangería tax rather than to invest capital in shipbuilding. The fact that, in 1749, this duty was charged on every ship docking in the port shows how the distinction between national vessels and foreign ones had completely fallen into disuse. The levy was abolished in 1765 – alongside all the other taxes pertaining to the ships’ qualifying status – and no mention was made about the admission or exclusion of foreign vessels.127 Of the 492 vessels used in the Carrera de Indias between 1717 and 1778, and whose country of origin has been ascertained,128 only 130 (26.4%) came from Spanish or American shipyards; 24% of them were built in England, while 23% were French. Amongst the fifty-one Italian ships (10.4%), thirty-seven were made in Genoa, with the remainder from Venice and Naples.129 Sales of the ships usually took place upon the initiative of the ship-owner, who commissioned the captain to find purchasers. This market must have been rather large as in 1720 the Genoese consul in Cadiz reported that while the “mediocre” Genoese ships sailed under French banner, the “good” ones were sold in Cadiz.130 In some occasions, the vessels were sold to the Spanish authorities.131 Following a ship’s purchase, the seller could also be authorized to sail to the Americas.132 In other cases, the Genoese vessels were hired and employed in Spanish military expeditions.133 The Genoese also contributed to the development of a private shipbuilding industry in Cadiz. The merchant Domingo Colombo, who had been a member of the Consulado de Indias since 1792, owned a large shipyard in Puntales, close to Cadiz, where many workers were employed;134 Jacome Patrón owned several warehouses for the sale of naval supplies in that same location.135 Therefore, the shortcomings of the Spanish shipbuilding industry offered good profit opportunities both

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

46

In the shadow of empire

to the Genoese ship-owners who lived in the Republic and to those who had migrated to Spain. As far as the seamen were concerned, the Genoese presence in the crews of Spanish vessels goes back to the Middle Ages. As well as being connected to their ability and shipping expertise, their recruitment also owed to the lack of local captains and sailors. This was an endemic issue, which had been made worse by the many wars waged by the Crown to defend the empire’s borders. For a long time, the Spanish merchant navy lacked rigid regulations and, as a consequence, its coordination had depended more on immediate and solid requirements rather than on a well-defined legal system.136 With the Bourbon accession to the Spanish throne, however, sailors came under a growing legislative scrutiny by the authorities, who tried to control and increase the military maritime forces by creating a sailors’ register, the socalled matrícula de mar. The first step taken by the authorities was the 1726 Real Orden (Royal Decree), which aimed at making registration attractive to sailors by offering them exemption from Army recruitment. In effect, this was a false privilege, since sailors had traditionally benefited from such an exemption, given that their skills and expertise were needed at sea. The new provision also granted registered sailors priority over nonregistered ones in taking part in transatlantic shipping, which was the most lucrative engagement a sailor could obtain.137 These persuasion strategies were pursued along with navy enlistments organized in foreign ports and in which the Genoese featured on a constant basis.138 In 1737, the Bourbon authorities offered some additional privileges to registered sailors, such as the exemption from quartering troops in their houses and the right to practice maritime activities in an exclusive way. These concessions were clearly a gimmick aimed at securing sailors. The same privileges were offered to foreign sailors who had married or were living in Spain; other Catholic foreigners had complete “freedom” to serve in the Armada Naval (the Spanish Navy), with their rank corresponding to their effective skills.139 By subordinating the benefit of these privileges to the service in the Armada Naval in case of war, the ordenanzas (regulations) issued in 1748 and 1751 unavoidably bound maritime activities to military life.140 The reiteration of the ordenanzas, however, reveals the small appeal held by the matrícula, as it represented a real threat to a sector that had traditionally followed a self-governing and flexible organizational logic; the frequent desertions and the many attempts to corrupt the military authorities in order to avoid army duty were the natural outcomes of this state of affairs.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Genoese migration to Cadiz: a persisting alliance

47

In parallel, the need to support colonial trade led the Crown to allow foreigners to participate in transatlantic shipping. The comercio libre decree issued in 1778 (art. 3) stated that all captains and two-thirds of the sailors who were engaged in the Carrera de Indias had to be Spanish or naturalized subjects; the remainder could be foreigners but nonetheless had to be Catholic, previously registered in the matrícula, and had to return to Spain under the captain’s responsibility.141 However, the chronic shortage of registered sailors convinced the Crown to revoke the decree a few years later. By 1785, companies were allowed to engage also the foreign sailors, shipwrights, and caulkers who were not registered in the matrícula alongside those who had not yet served in the navy, the only prerequisite being the production of a particular application to the maritime authorities by either the ship-owner or the captain.142 The liberal framework regulating foreign participation in transatlantic shipping all but recognized what was a much wider de facto reality that allowed the Genoese to make extensive contact with the colonial world and – in many cases – to trade with it and to settle there. At the turn of the century, the Ligurian mariners remained actively sought-after as a workforce both by the navy and by medium and shortrange maritime trading companies; in order to deal with the chronic shortage of Spanish mariners, the Armada’s high-ranking officers continued to view Genoa as an important recruitment basin,143 and for the same reasons the Genoese captains and sailors were often engaged in Spain for inshore shipping expeditions. The attitude of the port authorities toward local seafarers was so inflexible that paradoxically they preferred licensing the engagement of a foreign sailor rather than a Spaniard who was not registered in the matrícula. In this respect, the case – raised in 1789 – of the Genoese merchant Benito Patrón,144 who had settled in Cadiz some years before, is particularly meaningful. The trader had complained about the impossibility of manning seven of his ships bound for North Africa to obtain wheat for Spain; one of his business associates, the Spanish consul in Morocco, suggested Patrón apply for a license to engage Genoese seafarers. The superintendent of Cadiz’s Department allowed him to use foreign captains and sailors on the condition that their number did not exceed one-third of the entire crew; the engagement of any unregistered Spanish sailor was forbidden for the remaining two-thirds of the crew. Patrón failed to find Spanishregistered sailors and asked for permission to employ unregistered ones. To avoid a potential crisis in the supplying of grain, the superintendent was forced to yield but nonetheless remarked that no further exceptions

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

48

In the shadow of empire

would be granted; furthermore, he took the opportunity to lobby the Marine Ministry on the urgent need to regulate more strictly the Spanish sailors who eluded registration.145 Genoa’s ability to meet the Crown’s production and trade requirements allowed its migrants to massively enter key economic sectors of Cadiz, by making use of informal channels and, at the same time, by benefiting from an increasingly wide legitimization. Although there were some instances of rejection, the trend of inclusiveness of Catholic foreigners was not reversed, as it was the only available way for the Monarchy to take the advantage away from its competitors.

foreign competitors or useful vecinos? a thin borderline The extent and the embedded nature of Ligurian emigration within Cadiz did not constitute per se unquestionable sources of legitimization, both because the lawfulness of the foreign presence could be challenged in times when the fight for resources might grow bitter and because immigrants tended to place themselves in a rather ambiguous position, by attempting to simultaneously benefit from the privileges accorded to the status of vecino and from the military and fiscal exemptions granted to nonresident foreigners. This attitude generated protests and disputes particularly against small retailers. In this sector, the Genoese were one of the most active groups in Cadiz. In the eighteenth century, their points of sale in the port had increased to such an extent that, in 1770, the Spanish retailers convinced the City Council to reprimand the Genoese stallholders and to get them to abide by the rules on license granting.146 The admonition did not solve the problem and, a few years later, the Crown also began to express concerns about the situation. The issue at stake was the control of the wealth generated by the foreign retailers, who were suspected both of tax evasion and of returning periodically to their mother countries with the money they had made in Spain. In response, a 1783 Real Cédula prohibited pedlary in the streets, countryside markets, and at the fairs held in small towns (pueblos); retailers also were obligated to choose a fixed domicile and to set up a shop within the strict deadline of one month. The provision was especially directed at the Maltese, the Piedmontese, and the Genoese, whom the decree mentioned, but it concerned all foreign groups or naturales of the kingdom who had no fixed abode. Stallholders did not deal with low-valuable items but – as stated in the Royal decree – they sold textiles,

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Genoese migration to Cadiz: a persisting alliance

49

underwear, wool, the fine woolen yard called stamen (the most fine and resistant part of carded wool, generally used for precious fabrics), as well as cotton and silk clothes.147 The Genoese merchants ascribed the move – which reinforced a previous law directed at French merchants148 – to a strategy developed by the tenderos montañeses (dealers who originally came from the Cantabrian region) to monopolize the market.149 This particular rivalry is extremely useful for understanding the dynamics regulating retail, and its roots date back to the first decades of the century. The montañeses were first granted a license to set up their own small grocery shops in Cadiz in 1720.150 By 1774, they owned approximately 250 shops.151 Their economic rise was accompanied by a marked corporate solidarity whose symbolic reference points were the brotherhood instituted in their homeland and the sanctuary dedicated to their protector Saint Francisco de Paula.152 By exploiting the high numbers in their community, in 1771 the montañeses successfully lobbied the Crown to question the City Council of Cadiz whether the institution of the gremio of montañeses was appropriate.153 In a memorial sent to the Consejo de Castilla, they justified their request to institute and rule a guild of the city’s retailers by appealing to their leading position in the sector and to the prestige that derived from their presumed status as hidalgos (noblemen). They claimed to be naturales from the “Mountain” (Montaña) of Santander, to be living in Cadiz, and to be the owners, administrators, and agents of most of the grocery shops in the city. Many of these shops had their own taverns, which sold wine, liquors, and other goods, and which were run by shop boys “for the sake of a smoother and faster retail operation.”154 The institution of the gremio was meant to discipline employees, against whose possible frauds the owners wished to protect themselves by determining a set of obligations and fines which– in case of an infraction– their employees had to pay directly into the gremio’s coffers (art. 1–9). According to the montañeses project, competition between owners should be limited by making it compulsory to pay the shop’s license even when the business was actually closed. The payment should be made on an annual basis in May, when most shop-owners left Cadiz to temporarily return to their homeland, while others arrived in town. In this way, licensed shopkeepers would maintain the right to trade, while also preventing other competitors from taking their place (art. 13). The other vital aim behind the institution of the gremio was to severely restrict access to the guild, which aimed to regulate the whole retailing business of Cadiz, to those who were not from the Mountain of Santander (art. 10 and 14).

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

50

In the shadow of empire

Aware of the severe economic damages that the loss of control over one of the town’s most profitable sectors might provide, the municipal authorities did all they could to curb the initiative. The Diputados de Abasto, who regulated the town’s supplies, blamed the montañeses for wanting to exercise a monopoly on retailing and noted that the proposal’s signatories were not all small retailers but actually ran between six and ten grocery shops, either on their own or on behalf of large wholesalers. The Ayuntamiento (the City Council) claimed the right to judge possible frauds and to collect fines, insinuating that the control over employees that the signatories called for was nothing more than an unlawful way of making money. Besides, the institution of the gremio was not considered to be conducive to the common good, since it would have lead to a fixed number of shops and shop-owners and thus reduced local business. To support their claims, the Diputados pointed out that retailing had been “originally [carried out] . . . by this town’s permanent vecinos,” and that every Spanish citizen had to be allowed access to that particular business; as for foreigners, the “continuous” “flow of funds they seize[d] [was] . . . an issue that need[ed] to be solved,” but this also applied to the montañeses, who “secure[d] their interests through retail without having to trouble themselves with the risks and the hard farming work.”155 Thus, the montañeses were implicitly equated with foreigners, not only because they were not vecinos in Cadiz, but also because of the speculative nature of their profession: far from fostering local production, they generated a form of wealth that they wanted to remove from the control of local authorities. Despite the adverse opinion expressed by the local authorities, the provisions – although made to appear not overtly in favor of the montañeses – were brought forward again in 1775.156 The Ayuntamiento resorted to a final act of opposition by denouncing the persisting monopolistic nature of the initiative and by pointing out that “freedom was always the most convenient solution to ensure that everyone could trade.”157 The stubborn opposition of the City Council was partially endorsed by the Consejo de Castilla, which allowed the local authorities to modify as they saw fit the provisions’ text. As a result, guilds were neither allowed to impose new fines nor to prosecute shop boys. Annual contributions were reduced and the regulations on the minimum distance between each shop were made less strict. Foreign retail dealers were supported by granting automatic access to the gremio to those owners whose shops were already open when the Ordenanzas came into effect. Furthermore, the local judiciary was given the right to verify the meeting of the

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Genoese migration to Cadiz: a persisting alliance

51

requirements by those who wanted to open new shops.158 The shopkeepers’ monopoly was also curtailed and stallholders were given permission to sell edibles within well-defined areas of the town where they would not block wagon traffic.159 Not only does the stance taken by the Ayuntamiento corroborate the economic relevance of foreign retailers, but it also mirrored the existence of a wider struggle between the local authorities and the Bourbon administration.160 If the Crown was worried about the heavy burden represented by its dependency on foreigners and, for this reason, sought to monitor, as far as possible, the movements of transient dealers, the city council was quite protective about the city’s prosperity and was inclined to pay the price of a partial capital outflow abroad for keeping up the volume of local trade businesses. Consular papers reveal that the Genoese retailers did not passively accept the decision taken by the Consejo de Castilla. In 1776, they opposed the obligation to join the guild by filing a lawsuit in Madrid through the intermediation of the merchant Emanuele Perasso, who obtained the proxy document from the Genoese consul in Cadiz given that the disposition affected his brother-in-law and a friend of his.161 The promulgation of the aforementioned 1783 Real Cédula against pedlars shows how the montañeses were not satisfied with the privileges that they had obtained and attests to the Crown’s favor toward them. Disputes over the provision were partially settled with a 1784 decree granting pedlary rights to all those who were married and held residence in a shop, but the new measure was not meant to last. In 1788, unexpectedly, the governor of Cadiz ordered the closing of all grocery shops owned by foreign dealers. Once more, the Genoese put the blame on the montañeses, claiming that they had presented to the Consejo de Castilla a captious report in which all the foreign retail dealers working in Cadiz – even those who ran a grocery shop – were likened to pedlars. The Genoese consul in Cadiz predicted that the measure would significantly harm “the entire Nation,” since “most” of his fellow countrymen living in the port were employed in these businesses.162 If they wanted to obtain the reopening of their shops, Genoese retail dealers would have to present themselves as vecinos, the only ones granted the right to retailing. Thus, the formal opportunity of seeking the help of the consul – who was entitled to represent only the interests of nonresidents – remained unavailable.163 Subsequent events, however, highlight how the borderlines between different categories were of little significance, especially at critical junctures. The Genoese retailers made their claims heard by appealing both to Genoese and Spanish institutions, a move that illustrated their

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

52

In the shadow of empire

strategically relevant position in wider trade circuits. An unspecified interlocutor – probably an important Genoese merchant – advised them to file a petition to the Secretario del Despacho de Estado, the Count of Floridablanca, through the Genoese consul in Cadiz. The consul immediately contacted Floridablanca and reassured him that the petitioners were more than willing to bear the costs of his service. The Genoese retail dealers also brought on their side the city council of Cadiz, “aware of how conducive to the public good of such a large population the existence of the said shops.”164 A month later, Floridablanca explained the situation to the Consejo de Hacienda: by virtue of “the long-established (immemorial) settlement of the shops of seeds and other foods held by the Genoese in this city,” he ordered the reinstatement of the rights that the Genoese had possessed before and – in case of any delay – he called for the payment of damages.165 Thus, it should be emphasized that, while the consul informed the Republic’s government about the situation of “our” dealers, the Count’s report stressed the fact that his protégés were vecinos and had married in Spain. The Genoese, according to their consul, obtained the temporary reopening of their shops following “unfair payments”166 to the governor, while waiting for a new provision protecting their rights. In the port archives there is no trace of such a provision, but the census conducted in Cadiz in 1794 shows that the category of Genoese retail dealers continued to flourish. In one of his reports, the consul explained that the Genoese were not pedlars but shopkeepers whose businesses entailed a strong geographic mobility: Everyone has his own shop and if, sometimes, they need to go elsewhere, they do so for a short time and only for the purpose of stocking up with commodities they need; trusted agents take their place when they need to leave but they then go back to their work, which they do with honor and for the common good. They duly contribute to the Royal coffers and to local taxation and, for this reason, they deserve the same treatment as the Spanish are given, if not more: there are more or less five hundred shops belonging to the Spanish here in Cadiz, all of which pay 80,000 reales de vellón per year into Royal coffers; our shops – and there are about sixty of them – are paying 40,000 reales de vellón.167

The available documentation does not allow assessment of the more or less fixed nature of the Genoese retail activities in terms of location. However, all evidence seems to suggest that temporary travels to their mother country or to other destinations were a professional necessity – and, thus, a habit – for different categories of Genoese migrants regardless of their conditions as transient foreigners or vecinos.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Genoese migration to Cadiz: a persisting alliance

53

In some cases, especially in the commerce sector, distinguishing a transient from a long-established immigrant could be a difficult task for the Spanish authorities due to the interest of the same traders in maintaining their unclear status. Throughout the century, the Bourbon authorities repeatedly attempted to limit the movements of foreigners to better control their economic revenues. The need to set apart nonresident foreigners (especially great merchants), who were protected by diplomatic treaties and therefore exempt from the payment of taxes and from military service, prompted the Crown in 1714 to create a special authority, the Junta de Dependencia de Extrangeros,168 and in 1716 to dispose of the annual registration of foreigners. The disposition was ignored, as were the similar ones that followed – just as ineffectively – over the subsequent decades; this allowed foreigners to exploit the dual condition of vecino and transeunte (transient, or nonresident emigrant) to profit from the relative advantages that each status entailed. A Real Cédula issued on May 28, 1764 succeeded in compelling foreign consuls to compile lists of protected subjects in their jurisdictions on an annual basis, but the matrícula remained incomplete. This widespread ambiguity –which was extremely harmful to the Crown’s coffers – became an intolerable risk of political destabilization with the outbreak of the French Revolution. Worried by the presence of numerous French immigrants in Spain, in 1791 King Charles IV not only ordered the compilation of a new matrícula, but he also obliged every foreigner to choose between the condition of transeunte and that of vecino. If one opted for the latter, he was asked to sign an oath of allegiance to the Crown. The Real Orden promulgated on July 12 overtly lamented the fact that “many, if not most, want to enjoy the privileges of both transeuntes and avecindados (residents) and actually do so.” The authorities of all towns were ordered to draw up a list of all foreigners present in their territories and ask them whether they intended to stay in Spain for a short time or settle permanently as subjects of the Spanish Crown. Essentially, the requirements needed to become avencidado were: (a) to be Catholic; (b) to make an oath of allegiance to the King; (c) to renounce the fuero de extrangería (the privileged legal status accorded to transient foreigners); (d) to sever any link with one’s consul, minister, or ambassador. Those who hesitated were reminded that if they did not become vecinos they would not be allowed to practice the liberal and mechanical arts. As a direct consequence, all retailers, tailors, hairdressers, shoemakers, doctors, surgeons, and architects –alongside the servants and the employees of Spanish vassals –were given fifteen days to produce

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

54

In the shadow of empire

both the oath and to renounce to their respective country’s jurisdiction, under penalty of going to jail or to a garrison, or being deported from the Monarchy’s territories and having all their belongings confiscated “according to the quality of the person and of the offence.”169 The civic archives of Cadiz hold the first oaths of allegiance to the King made by foreigners in 1791.170 Most of the 121 oaths taken by Italians relate to individuals from the republic of Genoa. It is impossible to provide exact numerical data, since many of the applicants did not declare where they came from. However, not only does the study of these documents depict a vivid picture of the extreme mobility and heterogeneous professional occupations that characterizes ancient Genoese emigration, but it also attests to the indiscriminate application of a provision that aimed at automatically turning anyone who had set foot on Spanish soil into an avencidado subject. In many instances, crew members of Spanish mercantile and naval vessels (captains, sailors, cook, butlers, and surgeons) stated that they had traveled more than once to the Americas.171 The oath of allegiance was also made by Genoese seamen who claimed they had been spending their lives on board ship; among these, was a captain, Domingo Oneto, who did not speak a word of Castilian and took his oath four days after his arrival with the help of a fellow countryman who acted as interpreter. Other migrants declared to be seasonal farm workers: some resided in Cadiz; those who had just arrived from Genoa to work in the “gardens” near the bay took the oath despite claiming that they did not have an abode. For French migrants the 1791 Real Orden represented a first danger warning, which was followed in 1793 by the decree of expulsion from Spain and the relative confiscation of their belongings.172 In contrast, the perspective of swearing allegiance to the Spanish King did not raise particular concerns among most of the Genoese immigrants. This is attested to by the fatalistic attitude of a Genoese worker employed by Domingo Carli, who in his oath stated that he had arrived in Cadiz “to earn a living but, as it was impossible to do so without the formality of the allegiance, he accept[ed] to be Spanish (tiene acordado ser español).” After all, the obligation of accepting the status of avecindado and subject of the Spanish king did not prevent the Genoese migrants from returning to their country of origin or traveling elsewhere according their needs. Examination of these oaths shows how the emigrants’ mobility took place over a prolonged period of time. There were many who, despite being vecinos in Cadiz, had returned to their countries on one or more occasions or had lived in other ports on the peninsula. These included

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Genoese migration to Cadiz: a persisting alliance

55

great wholesalers, for whom mobility was fairly common – as was the case with silk dealer Josef Alberti, who claimed in his oath to have just returned from Genoa with his butler. Some Genoese shopkeepers asserted that they had traveled to Portugal. One of these, Cayetano Busatto, informed authorities that he had been living in Spain for ten years but that, nonetheless, his wife lived in Lisbon. Among those who took the oath, there were also fideeros (pasta makers) and vaguely defined traficantes (traffickers), who stated that, apart from having traveled back to their countries, in some cases they had been living in other Spanish port cities, such as Ceuta, Barcelona, and Malaga, before opening shops in Cadiz. Although some statements in the oaths might be false or incomplete, they overall document the high mobility of Genoese retail commerce and point to the fine dividing line between stallholder and retailer. In summary, the competition over the control of resources generated, especially in the commercial field, various episodes of hostility toward Genoese emigration. However, the interests gravitating around the mercantile world were so vast and complex that it precluded sustained prejudice against individuals based on their “national” identity. The treatment of Genoese shopkeepers and vendors reveals how little, if any, agreement there was among central and local authorities on control and regulation of their activities in small retailing. These divergences and the more general necessity of using the resources generated by foreign emigration ultimately led to the removal of most of the obstacles that might have hindered Genoese penetration into Spanish society and into its most crucial economic sectors.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

2 Carving out a place in the Spanish colonial trade

a web of relatives and countrymen The Genoese who settled in Cadiz were employed in a variety of activities, but operating in trade intermediation was the main reason for their massive interest toward the port. The barriers imposed by the Crown, however, impeded foreign merchants to easily insert themselves in colonial trade by operating in the heart of the Spanish mercantilism. In order to understand how a politically weak merchant nation was able to overcome these constraints, it is necessary to explore the strategies and the resources the Genoese used, both as individuals and as a community, to succeed in their activities. The networks established among fellow countrymen were vital for them to start and manage a merchant enterprise in the port, but consolidating business interests in transoceanic trade was not possible without the legitimization from the institutions of the Spanish monopoly. This necessary condition, along with the almost irrelevant role of the republic in sustaining the interests of its expatriates, led the Genoese to disregard the maintenance of solid community ties and their own nation’s institutional resources in favor of private strategies of integration into the host society to access the privileges reserved to the locals. The result was a highly conflictive and scarcely cohesive nation made of individuals and groups whose economic success depended on their capacity to transform their political marginality into a source of profit. Reconstructing the careers and economic activities of the Genoese merchants in eighteenth-century Cadiz is a rather challenging feat. Unfortunately, neither familial archives nor the order books of the great trade 56

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Carving out a place in Spanish colonial trade

57

houses have survived. The notarial archive of the port contains thousands of private deeds relating to Ligurian migrants; however, most of these documents are protests on bills of exchange and general proxies that contain little information on the nature and the dimension of Genoese businesses. The available sources mirror the merchants’ propensity to not formalize on public paper their contractual relations, especially referring to maritime trade. This may be ascribed not only to the wide recourse to contraband, but also to the tendency, which started to spread in the midseventeenth century, of not detailing shipments, commissions, and other transactions in front of a notary.1 Even when dictating their last will and testament, traders often restricted themselves to appointing the executors without listing their assets. There might have been different reasons for this discretion: the youngest merchants – who often made their will before embarking on a shipment bound to the Americas or to other destinations – only needed to appoint their heirs and an executor to take care of their interests in case of death; conversely, those who dictated their last will and testament at death’s door were worried about dodging the payment of the capital levy and about eluding the restrictions placed on inheritance by Spanish jurisdiction, which prescribed a fair assets’ distribution to the heirs. Still, given that they allow us to partially reconstruct their social networks, notarial deeds are useful to understanding the economic strategies undertaken by the Ligurian merchants of Cadiz. Those who established a retail business in Cadiz were rarely selfestablished merchants and almost none of them arrived in the port without having previously made use of their network of acquaintances and contacts. The support of relatives and fellow countrymen was essential in launching a business in Spain and in trying to surreptitiously enter the trade with America. The notarial deeds highlight the presence of a strong tie between emigrants and Genoa, which, as noted earlier, remained one of the principal collection points in the Mediterranean basin both for those goods exported from Spain and for those bound for the Iberian Peninsula. However, it appears that the Genoese who settled in Cadiz were not merely emissaries of the Genoese mercantile upper class. On the contrary, with the help of their relatives and other fellow countrymen who had previously emigrated, they found in Spain the opportunity to create new commercial connections with several Mediterranean and Atlantic ports. An examination of the bills of exchange attests to the bonds between the Genoese merchants in Cadiz and the port of Genoa. If one considers

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

58

In the shadow of empire

as an example all the notarial deeds drawn up between 1769 and 1770, one notices that almost all the bills of exchange endorsed and protested by Genoese merchants had been drawn in Genoa.2 The relevance of the funds that the merchants residing in the Republic provided to finance the Cadiz’s Genoese and transatlantic commerce is confirmed by calculating the amount of money given to the corredores de lonja (sales agents) of Cadiz in 1796: in terms of the number of bills of exchange that were issued, Genoa was the fourth city after Madrid, London, and Hamburg.3 The relationships between the Ligurian merchants and their hometown were manifold. Some brokers received generous loans from their fellow countrymen who lived in Genoa at the beginning of their career in Spain,4 while others – despite having long been settled in Cadiz – maintained some of their commercial interests in the Republic, where they entrusted proxies to manage their affairs.5 In addition, some had important creditors in Genoa and did businesses in Cadiz on behalf of relatives.6 For many of these, their mercantile career in Cadiz had started under the protection and guidance of relatives and countrymen who had already established businesses within the port. Some had been sent to Spain as children to be trained at their uncles’ businesses and on becoming independent tended to marry and remain in Cadiz, where they pursued mercantile activities.7 In other cases, a group of brothers would set up a mercantile company under the aegis of a more experienced Genoese merchant;8 corporate ties were frequently established between brothers living in Cadiz and their siblings based in Genoa or in other ports.9 Still, blood ties were not indispensable: certain types of trust-based relationships between fellow countrymen were all that was needed both to find new job opportunities in Cadiz and to access credit.10 The fragmentary information about the first shipments to America undertaken by the Genoese merchants – often without the required certification – also points to several forms of cooperation between relatives or fellow countrymen. Gio Paolo Degola – who died in 1747 in New Spain – arranged that, in the event of his mother’s death, his 655 pesos capital should go to his cousin Antonio Degola, who lived in New Spain with him.11 When he was about to leave Cadiz for an unspecified destination, Antonio Maria Benvenuto appointed Lorenzo Oliveros as his business proxy and entrusted him with the task of forwarding to him any raised funds either to the Indias or to whichever European country he might happen to reside.12 In 1765, the merchant and ship-owner Domingo Colombo (see Chapter 1) undertook what was presumably his first Havana-bound shipment to the Americas. In the first instance, he

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Carving out a place in Spanish colonial trade

59

conferred on his wife Clara Sturla the proxy to make his last will and testament; in the second instance, he appointed as his proxy Antonio María Bechi, a wealthy Genoese trader based in Cadiz, who was about to obtain naturalization and who probably had invested in the shipment.13 In 1770, Colombo was yet again bound for the Indias, at the command of a Spanish landing ship transporting infantry on His Majesty’s service. Before leaving Cadiz, he drew up his last will, which attests to an even wider Genoese network. Should he have died in the Americas, he nominated as his executors Juan Baptista Garibaldi and Nicolás Patrón – who were traveling on his same vessel; should he have died in Spain, he appointed Antonio María Bechi, along with Francesco Buso and his brother Ángel Colombo, all of whom were vecinos in Cadiz.14 Some particularly well-documented cases attest how – despite being important during the settlement and the consolidation phases of mercantile businesses in Cadiz – the bonds between countrymen were neither exclusive nor constrictive. Such a principle applied both to the prosperous merchants and to the many anonymous intermediaries. As far as the former category is concerned, we may take as an example the case of Ángel Gazzino. In 1798 – when he was still unmarried and in good health – he signed a proxy document to make his last will and testament to Nicolás Montobbio, a Genoese trader whose family had probably been settled in Cadiz for a long time.15 “As the clearest evidence of . . . affection and gratitude” for the support that Nicolás had lent to him when he first arrived in town and for having taught him the secrets of trade, Gazzino intended to leave to Montobbio a portion of his household servants and a third of his possessions. Another third of his belongings was to go to his unmarried sister, vecina in Malaga, with the last third going to his brothers Thomás, Ambrosio, and Josef Gazzino, who all lived in Genoa.16 It is likely that Gazzino and Montobbio had both been members of merchant families who already played an active role in Genoese commerce.17 Following the initial training period and the acquisition of financial independence, Gazzino consolidated his business through marriage to the daughter of a well-established town merchant and through the relocation of his relatives in other ports. In 1800, Gazzino signed a new proxy document to will his properties to his betrothed wife Francisca Casilda Pecarrere18 – the daughter of Pedro Pecarrere, a Cadiz corredor and trader of French descent. In order to seal the engagement, Gazzino appointed his betrothed as the sole heiress of five-eighths of his property, while leaving the remainder to his brothers.19 In a proxy document drawn

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

60

In the shadow of empire

a few years later, Gazzino claimed that by marrying Francisca Casilda he had brought into the marriage a capital of 4,500 pesos;20 on this occasion, his properties were willed to his daughter, with his wife, his brotherin-law Francisco Pecarrere, and another unspecified relative named Joaquín Pecarrere acting as trustees until the girl’s coming of age. This Genoese merchant’s pathway is pretty much exemplary, given that it supports the central role played by the figure of the son-in-law in Cadiz merchant families. This phenomenon gained so much relevance that it has been effectively defined by the term yernocracia (literally, the son-in-law’s power).21 The ownership of start-up capital and the pre-acquisition of the technical knowledge needed to manage a business constituted important requirements to secure a good marriage as well as to consolidate one’s own business. Not only did the parallel valorization of the blood ties with his family of origin turn the son-in-law into a useful and skilled business partner, it also became a way to extend the mercantile network of his acquired family. It was no coincidence that Ángel Gazzino, after his marriage, began to work as the consignee of shipments from France.22 At the same time, he extended his business interests to the port of Malaga, where he sent his brother Thomás, with whom he created another commercial firm.23 In the following years Gazzino also licitly invested in overseas commerce.24 The Ravinas – like Gazzino – made their fortune in Cadiz by steering their business interests toward Euro-Mediterranean marketplaces and by belatedly entering the legal circuits of colonial trade. The first traces of their presence in Cadiz date back to a proxy document released in 1727, when the trader Nicolás Ravina featured as a resident in Chiclana de la Frontera.25 His son Tomás, who was born in Genoa, followed Nicolás’ steps and moved to Spain, where he married fellow countrywoman Antonia Bozo. Tomás maintained strong relationships with his hometown. His trade house was, in fact, a Cadiz branch of the firm that he had started in Genoa with his brothers Pietro and Antonio and to which he remained associated until his death.26 Tomás Ravina also cultivated strong relations with Ligurian trade representatives in Cadiz such as Juan Bautista Sciaccaluga (who was a partner in a trade house in Genoa27), Antonio Giolfi, and Ángel Crosa. However, his network of commercial relations and businesses was not circumscribed to the Genoese traders who worked both within and outside of their homeland; notarial deeds attest to solid ties with Mauricio Lubé – the Dutch consul in Cadiz whom Ravina also appointed as executor of his last will and testament28 – as well as investments in the trade between Spain and Morocco.29 It is

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Carving out a place in Spanish colonial trade

61

reasonable to suppose that the bankruptcy petition Tomás Ravina’s wife filed upon his death30 in 1793 did not entail that the departed had left his family in a state of complete indigence. In fact, among his six sons, the one who bore the same name as his father soon became one of the bay’s major wholesalers; like his father, Tomás maintained strong bonds with the port’s expatriate Genoese mercantile community, and when he was arrested in 1801 for smuggling activities with Gibraltar the Genoese consul in Cadiz strenuously pleaded his case.31 As soon as he could, he registered with the Consulado de Indias, to which he was admitted in 1803.32 His son Juan Felipe would follow – with brilliant results – in his father’s steps as a wholesaler.33 The case of the Jordán family (Giordano) illustrates how the naturalization process needed to participate in the Carrera de Indias did not erase the ties with one’s homeland or with fellow countrymen who had migrated to Spain’s ports; on the contrary, such ties could become even stronger. The Jordáns had owned a trade house in Genoa at least since 1786,34 but the actual degree of kinship that united the two branches of the family remains unclear. However, they appear to have settled in Cadiz at a much earlier date. One of the first members of the family to move to the bay was Joseph María, who obtained naturalization and was matriculated into the Consulado de Indias in 1750.35 In 1765, the same privilege was granted to his cousins Antonio, Domingo, and Gerónimo.36 From the 1760s, the notarial deeds attest how the Jordáns’ firm activities were firmly grounded in the colonial trade: between 1769 and 1770, the firm stipulated two sea loans on two different Callao-bound shipments and whose respective premiums stood at 3,000 and 7,000 pesos; a relative of theirs, Feliz Antonio Jordán,37 was put in charge of the first shipment, while the second was entrusted to a Spanish captain.38 The Jordáns also loaned 13,525 pesos to a fellow countryman, Antonio María Vaccarezza, for another commercial shipment bound to Peru.39 The family’s interests and businesses extended to New Spain, where they established contacts with a Veracruz merchant.40 The Jordáns also maintained relations and interests with fellow countrymen who had settled in other Spanish cities; they entrusted the Genoese Juan Bautista Causa – one of the most influential foreign merchants among those who operated in Valencia – to oversee their businesses in that port.41 They also signed a general proxy document for one Joseph Mourere – alongside other fellow countrymen who had settled in Cadiz such as Joseph Sigori, Nicolás Pescia, and the alreadymentioned Tomás Ravina – whom they entrusted to manage both their interests and the related legal proceedings in Madrid.42 Domingo Antonio

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

62

In the shadow of empire

Jordán – another descendant of Joseph María – also had been born in Genoa. Thus, naturalization did not weaken the family’s ties with their hometown; on the contrary, the privileged position of the Jordáns in Spain provided them with a more pronounced cohesion, which was further strengthened by endogamic practices. Domingo Antonio married the daughter of one of his relatives, Juan Bautista Jordán,43 who in Cadiz had worked for the noble Genoese merchant Bernardo Recaño.44 Alongside Domingo Antonio, his brother Pablo Luis and his cousins Gerónimo and Domingo also worked in the family’s commercial company.45 The Jordáns’ lasting fortunes are certified by their inclusion in the 1794 list of the most prosperous vecinos of Cadiz.46 The economic strategies of Genoese merchants in Cadiz are further revealed by examining the story of the Marzán family, who achieved considerable and long-lasting profits through the Carrera de Indias by starting with a small-volume commercial venture. After experiencing difficulties in his mercantile business, Juan Bautista Marzán, who had been born in Nervi and married Gertrudis Facie in Genoa around 1750, decided to move to Spain, for which some countrymen lent him 1,200 pesos. In Cadiz, the loan enabled him to open a small store and confiteria (a candy shop, located in the Plazuela de las Nieves), whose profits allowed him “to change his fortune” in just a few years time and to repay some of the money he had borrowed.47 The first traces of his participation in the Carrera de Indias date to the late 1760s: Juan Bautista features among the payees of three sea loans covering the stock of shipments to the Americas in 1768 and 1774, in which he had invested respectively 976 and 1,120 pesos.48 Five children were born from his marriage. The first son – Andrés – remained at his father’s home even after marrying in order to assist him in the business. The second son – Joseph María – left home after marrying and was entrusted by his family with the confitería; however, the shop’s meager profits led him to ask his father for a 66,322 reales de vellón loan, which he invested in a pasta factory and in a grocery shop in Sanlúcar de Barrameda. The third son – Antonio – was also a merchant in Cadiz, while his daughter Antonia María married the Ligurian merchant Bernardo Morando. The last born, Ángel, was a Carmelite friar belonging to the college of Valladolid in New Spain. Once he settled his children, Juan Bautista’s fortune further improved. He grew his business by opening in partnership with the Genoese Esteban Peñasco a new retail outlet (tienda de mercadería) in Cadiz. Since he could not personally run it, he entrusted his sons Andrés and Antonio and his

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Carving out a place in Spanish colonial trade

63

nephew Carlos with the management. After some time, this partnership was dissolved, Juan Bautista retired from the business and Andrés took over the trade house of his father. The year 1790 represented a turning point for the Marzáns, who decided to invest their entire capital in transatlantic trade. Andrés and Antonio created a partnership between them and financed it through the proceeds, which amounted to approximately 17,000 pesos, derived from liquidation of their father’s trade house. Andrés was in charge of running the partnership’s businesses and remained in Cadiz, while Antonio settled in Havana. Foreign traders were not allowed to travel from Spain to America, but Antonio, who had been born in the bay of Cadiz, could easily obtain the necessary royal license to embark on the Spanish vessel of captain Josef Añeses, who was of Genoese descent: he took with him a load of local and foreign goods at the risk of his brother Andrés and of the Spanish merchant Antonio Pacheco.49 The arrangement turned out successfully, given that Andrés, who in 1794 was ranked amongst the richest vecinos in Cadiz,50 continued to trade with Cuba at least until 1806 and extended his business to the Río de la Plata route. His trade house remained active in Cadiz at least until 1817.51 The examples provided highlight the importance played by the ties of solidarity among relatives and fellow countrymen in creating economic opportunities both for leading and more modest figures in the Genoese trade community of Cadiz. Being in Spain and benefiting from a wide and wellestablished network of countrymen allowed even low-rank Genoese dealers to find the resources they needed to expand their business and, in some cases, to make a fortune. Besides, it would be reductive and misleading to delineate Genoese trading in eighteenth-century Cadiz only through the history of great merchants. In fact, the mercantile elite was accompanied, fostered, and supported by a veritable multitude of smaller brokers. As in the previous centuries, they were the anonymous protagonists of Genoese mercantile expansion and from their ranks emerged many preeminent families of the Genoese economic and political panorama within and outside the Republic. The variegated world of Genoese trading in Cadiz appears to have been not only socially open-ended but also largely autonomous from the hometown. The Republic’s scarce political resources for sustaining public and private economic ventures, the traditional family-based organization of the Genoese enterprise, and, above all, the many profit-making opportunities provided by the Spanish market favored the emergence of an expatriated community whose relation with the country of origin was all but exclusive.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

64

In the shadow of empire

The web of relations and collusion that could be established within the monarchy’s ports was so wide that it could also favor those who wanted to strike it rich by cheating their own fellow countrymen. The story of the Genoese captain Pietro Giuseppe Chiappe is a case in point. In 1784, with the economic support of a number of financial backers with whom he stipulated a colonna contract, Chiappe had the vessel Mater Misericordiae built on the beaches of Sestri Ponente, near Genoa. He retained for himself three out of the twenty-four available shares and pledged that at the end of each shipment he would be accountable to the other shareholders for the shipments’ profits. He took a cargo of wood from Livorno to Cadiz and then undertook a second voyage from Cadiz to Santander, where he remained for a year without making contact with his associates in Genoa. Since they feared that he might have robbed them, the shareholders sent two prominent Genoese merchants in Cadiz – Pedemonte and Ardizzone52 – a proxy document aimed at obtaining from the captain the payment of the profits made from the shipments over the last year. As soon as he learned of the existence of the proxy, Chiappe passed himself off as the sole owner of the ship and sold it to the ministers of the Spanish Banco de San Carlos. Pedemonte and Ardizzone managed to get Chiappe arrested in Santander; the captain, however, won the favor of the port’s Consulado (the merchant tribunal), which successfully “obtained a collusive forfeit of the vessel with no harm to him at all.” This illicit maneuver sparked a conflict between the Consulado of Santander and its counterpart in Cadiz, which, however, was unable to obtain jurisdiction over the lawsuit. The Genoese caratisti of the Mater Misericordiae were summoned to appear in Santander within a strict sixty-day deadline to defend and claim their rights; there was nothing left for them to do but to sign – with little hope – a blank proxy document and ask the Genoese consul in Cadiz to duly deliver it to a “distinguished” person who could adequately represent them.53 The problem revolving around the scant reliability of those who left their country to seek their fortune extended to the emigrant elites and also caused concerns of a political nature in the hometown. In fact, during the eighteenth century there was a raging debate in Genoa against a general mass “flight” of patricians from diplomatic and consular offices; these strategic posts were increasingly more often held by non-noble merchants, and it was feared that their long residence abroad made them subjects to foreign sovereigns rather than upholders of the Republic’s interests.54 Despite proposals aimed at reforming the offices to attract a more “qualified” personnel, the issues linked to the degree of carelessness in the

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Carving out a place in Spanish colonial trade

65

management of the Republic’s diplomatic relationships remained unresolved and any solution was nullified by the foreign (especially Spanish) origin of wealth of most of the new aspiring patricians and consuls.

in search of legal access to the carrera de indias Within a context in which the enjoyment of benefits deriving from the transatlantic trade was inextricably connected to military force and to governments’ ability to formulate policies in support of private commercial interests, the neutrality and the political frailty of the Republic prevented Genoese from competing in international trade with the same tools. In 1703, the Genoese consul in Cadiz Lorenzo Grassi clearly depicted the situation in one of his reports: The Hanseatic, English, Dutch, French, Portuguese and Flemish nations benefit from very broad privileges and from freedom to trade and these make them immune from any attack; this is not our case, given that – since we do not benefit from these same privileges – we have suffered . . . many rapacious violations . . . When trade was based in Seville, our nation enjoyed these privileges but, when it was moved to Cadiz, . . . I suppose that Genoa failed to ask that the Most Serene Crown renovate the license and therefore it was either been . . . deprived of the privileges it benefited from in Seville or it has failed to get new ones in Cadiz . . . I think that such negligence depended upon the fact that our fellow countrymen had lost hope of getting anything; . . . other nations gained such privileges by the force of arms, which allowed them to enforce these rights through peace capitulations . . . , unlike the Serenissima Republic of Genoa which – God willing – has never engaged in such enterprise.55

The consul referred to the privileges obtained by the United Provinces and the cities of the Hanseatic league as a consequence of the treaties of Münster (1647) and Westfalia (1648), the immunities that the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) had brought to France, those granted to Portugal by virtue of the Treaty of Lisbon (1668), and those that the Real Cédula of 1683 gave to the Flemish people. These agreements translated into civil and criminal autonomous jurisdictions in Spain not only for foreigners and the transeuntes but also for the avencidados. Such a privileged condition made it possible to elude Spanish inheritance and bankruptcy laws and included the inviolability of foreigners’ homes and vessels, a stance that can be understood as an effective legitimation of contraband.56 Grassi remarked bitterly that the Republic’s political neutrality had annihilated Genoese trade and led to the bankruptcy of many Genoese trade houses that had long been settled in Cadiz, while the few that had

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

66

In the shadow of empire

managed to survive were compelled to seek foreign houses under the protection of diplomatic treaties. The monopolistic restrictions and the lack of a privileged juridical status did not prevent Genoese merchants from trading with the Americas at the margins of legality, but such ventures were unable to guarantee consistent and durable profits. For those who aimed at carving out a place for themselves in Atlantic trade it was essential to be connected to the institutions that governed the Carrera de Indias’ monopolistic system. Not only did the institutional acknowledgement to access the major transatlantic trade circuits give merchants better assurance that they could trade safely and with continuity, but it also provided them the opportunity to informally grow their business. At the beginning of the century, it appeared that the Genoese in Spain might not attain their goals. Still, the Genoese trade revived by nurturing new generations of merchants. The major ally of the Genoese legal penetration in the Atlantic trade was the paradox at the basis of the Spanish imperial system: the need of foreign competitors’ cooperation to prop up the American market. One of the most significant signs of this ostensible contradiction was the serious conflict that arose around the issue of children born in Spain to foreign parents – the already-mentioned jenízaros – whose right to trade with the Indias was contested by Spanish merchants through the first decades of the eighteenth century. In 1720 the Casa de la Contratación proposed that the privileges accorded to the jenízaros should be revoked and blamed this group for maintaining strong ties with their fathers’ land.57 The legal expedient put forward to delegitimize the jenízaros resulted in a restrictive interpretation of the entry requirements for the jenízaros category, whereby it was claimed that – albeit implicitly – under Spanish law only the children born to naturalized foreign parents could be granted such status. The ambiguous definition of the rights of foreigners triggered a conflict among the merchants who ruled the Carrera de Indias, which – according to their respective interests – were mainly concerned with widening or restricting access rights to colonial trade.58 The struggle dragged on for years – allowing the jenízaros to ship and travel to America with the compliance of local authorities59 – until 1729, when a Real Cédula ratified the reform of the mercantile guild. The new decree stated that the Consulado de Cargadores a Indias was responsible for licensing only those subjects “who were to their liking” among naturals of Seville, Cadiz, and Sanlúcar de Barrameda.60 As a result, the children of the foreigners were formally excluded from colonial trade.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Carving out a place in Spanish colonial trade

67

The goal of this provision was not to prevent foreigners from investing in the Carrera de Indias, but to compel them to make use of Spanish intermediaries whose involvement, however, entailed higher transaction costs and could prove unreliable to non-Spanish investors. In these years, the great businessmen of Genoa were able to maintain their trade within America by collaborating with fellow countrymen who enjoyed a particularly privileged position in Spain,61 but those who resorted to Spanish frontmen faced much more difficulty.62 As well as causing violent complaints among the excluded, the interdiction from trading of the jenízaros exacerbated the controversies between the Consulado of Cadiz and the Crown. The triggering event was the outbreak of the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739–48). The need to finance the expensive conflict persuaded the king that it was more convenient to immediately capitalize on foreign merchants than to persist in enforcing the restrictions of a monopolistic policy that was increasingly flawed and pointless.63 This new attitude became apparent in 1740, when the Crown requested a one million pesos loan from the Casa de la Contratación and the Consulado in Cadiz with the promise of repaying it within ten years at an 8% interest rate. If the Consulado refused to cooperate with the Crown, the king threatened to turn to foreigners for the loan and to repay his creditors by granting them “many licenses to allow their overloaded ships to trade with the Americas.”64 The Consulado’s reaction clearly revealed Spain’s “pseudomercantilism”: on the one hand, it warded off the possibility of granting licenses to foreign merchants by financially backing the Crown but demanding in return a higher commission on goods imported from and exported to the Indias; on the other hand, it secretly suggested to foreign merchants that they might participate in the loan. The Genoese consul in Cadiz was also involved in the deal with the promise that his and his fellow countrymen’s contribution would be much appreciated.65 The most prosperous Genoese merchants of the port immediately offered their contribution to satisfy the loan. Some made funds directly available;66 others offered the capital they had invested through Spanish figureheads in the 1739 New Spain-bound fleet that had been unable to take to the seas due to the outbreak of war;67 there were even Genoese merchants who shared the expenses of arming the Spanish warships.68 This renewed cooperation could not coexist with the restrictions the 1729 Real Cédula had imposed; in 1742, the decree was revoked and the jenízaros once again obtained the right to legitimately establish direct trade with the Americas by accessing the Consulado de Indias.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

68

In the shadow of empire

This episode clearly shows that the Genoese wholesalers, similar to the small retailers, continued to be favored by the Spanish monarchy’s dependence on foreign capital and goods, as well as by the institutional conflicts that dependency generated in the host society. The clashes between the different institutions that theoretically shared the aim of preserving the Spanish monopoly were nothing new. On the contrary, they appeared to be the unwritten rule, the direct consequence of the existing fiscal agreement between the Crown – which held the legal monopoly – and the Consulado de Cargadores a Indias – the corporation of private merchants who managed the monopoly. Over the seventeenth century the Consulado had gained so much financial power that it had become the nerve-center of the monarchy’s public credit. The availability of liquid assets had gradually enhanced its capacity to hold the court of Madrid at ransom and, consequently, to rivalry with the Crown over the benefits deriving from colonial trade.69 The merchant corporation maintained a key financial role until the establishment of the modern bank of San Carlos in 1782, when the Crown released itself by the influence of a group whose interests had the power of retarding the implementation of the comercio libre reform.70 Once the barriers erected to prevent the jenízaros from entering the Consulado had vanished, foreigners again were able to control the proceeds of the American trade even from inside the institutions of the Spanish monopoly. A fiscal source of Cadiz dated 1762 – the Comprobacíon del Catastro de Ensenada – shows that foreigners handled 81.7% of the Carrera de Indias profits.71 According to a 1771 register of the trade houses in Cadiz, firstgeneration Genoese merchants were the third most numerous group of wholesalers after the Spanish and the French (Tables A.1A and A.1B).72 If one takes into account the political disadvantages experienced by the Republic’s merchants, their position was respectable, though clearly not comparable to the one they had occupied in previous centuries. However, the Genoese had no rivals in one particular aspect: they were the foreign community that obtained the highest number of naturalizations to legally participate in the Carrera de Indias (Table A.2), with twenty-eight merchants benefiting from the privilege between 1700 and 1811 (Table A.3). Only the most well-established merchants were granted access to legal trading circuits, but this small minority paved the way to colonial trade for a much wider host of foreign brokers. Besides, the carta de naturaleza was not a personal privilege, but it affected all the subjects who either depended on a given trade house or who were hired to ship goods to the

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Carving out a place in Spanish colonial trade

69

colonies. Throughout the eighteenth century, the requirements needed to obtain the carta were: (a) the holding of properties within the Spanish kingdoms; (b) residence in Spain for at least ten years; (c) contribution to local taxation. Applicants were also required not to be registered in the list of foreign guests passing through the city and not to have paid contributions to the consul of their own “nation.”73 The tendency displayed by Genoese migrants to settle and integrate themselves in Cadiz was particularly marked among the merchants. By analyzing the documentary sources relating to forty-eight individuals who belonged to the Genoese mercantile upper crust of Cadiz in the second half of the eighteenth century, it has emerged that more than 70% had married Spanish women, Genoese women born in Spain, or nonGenoese foreign women living in the port.74 The same documentation reveals that, unlike the other foreign communities of Cadiz, the Genoese displayed a high tendency to invest money in local estate property; when donating money in their wills, they did not show a special interest for helping their own countrymen but privileged the main assistive institutions of the port; by joining many different fraternities in the port, they also demonstrated a scarce interest in creating a cohesive group through religious affiliation.75 The aim and the consequence of this pronounced tendency to establish strong roots in the hosting society was the participation in the Carrera de Indias either by naturalization or by means of the cooperation of Spanishborn sons. Between 1743 and 1813, there were seventy-eight Genoese first- or second-generation merchants who accessed the Consulado de Cargadores (Table A.4). Their massive presence within legal circuits of the Spanish colonial trade also emerges from the examination of the vessels licensed to sail to the Americas; as many as thirty-three ships among all those enlisted in 1793 belonged to twenty-two different merchants of Ligurian descent (Table A.5). In the years following the promulgation of the comercio libre decree, the Genoese could also boast to have outnumbered the foreign naturalized merchants engaged in buying and selling ships.76 The reconstruction of these individuals’ careers show that the strategies aimed at integrating in local society and legally participating in the Carrera de Indias did not necessarily entail the severance of ties with one’s own community or with the country of origin. Hispanization was useful for expanding and strengthening business that did not necessarily depend on the hometown, but it could also serve the purpose of achieving a position of prestige in one’s homeland.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

70

In the shadow of empire

In this respect the Prasca family constitutes a clear example. Their settlement in Cadiz dates to the end of the seventeenth century, when the first members of the family left Finale – a marquisate on the western Ligurian coast that was under Spanish dominion – to establish a trade house within the bay.77 In 1720 the young Cristoforo Maria Prasca migrated to Cadiz to run the family business.78 Despite the fact that Finale had been acquired by the Republic of Genoa in 1713, Cristoforo Maria’s parents and uncles, who earlier had migrated to Spain, continued to be recognized as subjects of the Spanish Crown. This advantage allowed Cristoforo Maria to be granted the privileges enjoyed by naturals of Spain in 1723, but he was not allowed to trade with the Indias.79 Rather than barring him from establishing strong networks with Genoa and the Genoese community of Cadiz, his singular status might actually have favored him. In 1725, a few years after his arrival, he was elected Genoese consul in Cadiz, a position he held until 1750.80 Prasca’s business activity mirrors the close ties he had developed with the Genoese mercantile world gravitating around Cadiz; in partnership with Eustaquio Pedemonte – another great wholesaler who resided in Cadiz81 – he owned a trade house that, among others, operated on behalf of the Magnifico Alessandro Pallavicini, whose family consistently invested funds in the Carrera de Indias.82 Prasca’s ties with his native homeland were constant and deeprooted: as well as marrying a Ligurian woman, J. Maza, and having his children born in Finale, his testimony allowed the Saporitis – another rich mercantile family from Cadiz – to obtain the privilege of being admitted to the Genoese patriciate in 1733.83 The exploitation of institutional channels provided by the Spanish monarchy was essential for the consolidation of the Prascas’ fortune along the generations: this strategy allowed them to strengthen their position in the city of origin as well as to expand their business networks. At the death of Cristoforo Maria in 1751, his son Juan Andrés, who had arrived in Cadiz in 1738,84 inherited the trade house, while the other son, Juan,85 was excluded from his father’s will and became a priest. In 1754 Juan Andrés was granted the status of hidalgo and the possibility of being appointed to correspondent honorific positions.86 Not only did the privilege assure Juan Andrés Prasca immunity from arrest for debtrelated charges,87 but it also helped him to gain more prestige in Spain (where he acquired an aristocratic title) and in the Republic (where his family was admitted to the Genoese patriciate in 1767).88 Juan Andrés could then count on credentials both in his homeland and in Spain to legitimize his interests in transatlantic trade. Flaunting the title “Count

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Carving out a place in Spanish colonial trade

71

Prasca” and wearing the knighthood of the Order of Santiago, in 1774 he obtained access to the Carrera de Indias,89 despite not having married and not owning for a required amount of time the house he had purchased in the isle of Leon near Cadiz.90 Subsequently, he prospered as wholesale merchant and ship-owner of vessels licensed to trade with America.91 Between 1776 and 1785, he subscribed to no fewer than forty-six sea loans for the shipment of goods bound to the Indias.92 He was particularly active in importing “trigo ultramarino,” that is, stocks of American cereals that were redistributed in several European ports in times of shortage. For example, in the 1780s Prasca requested authorization to ship 25,000 fanegas of grain to Marseilles in partnership with the French merchant Juan Haurie.93 For a certain period of time, the interests of Prasca in Marseilles were managed by one of his nephews, who subsequently moved to Genoa to establish a firm in partnership with his countryman Zenoglio.94 Prasca maintained close ties with France and French merchants. Toward the end of the 1770s, in Cadiz he established a firm in partnership with Count d’Arboré, a native of Oloron-Sainte Marie. Like his partner, Count d’Arboré had acquired his title owing to the wealth accrued by trading in the Spanish port;95 toward the end of his life he left Prasca in charge of the firm and returned to his homeland, but remained associated with him until his death (1792).96 By virtue of his privileged position within the Spanish port, the Genoese Count also continued in his father’s steps by managing the Pallavicini family’s investments in shipments to the Americas.97 Throughout the eighteenth century, the ambition to acquire a noble title and its accompanying privileges spread among Cadiz’s economic elites.98 Because of the presence of nobles on the mercantile scene, Cadiz represented an almost unique case within the Spanish monarchy’s territories, where aristocracy traditionally refrained from mercantile activities.99 Conversely, the link between patriciate and trade was a fairly common characteristic of the Genoese context, where the compatibility between the noble condition and the ship-building, banking, trading, industrial, and notarial activities had been formalized by the Leges Novae issued in 1567.100 It should not come as a surprise then that the major representatives of the Genoese mercantile elite in Cadiz – as well as pursuing the naturalization route – also tried to consolidate their wealth and reputation by purchasing a title of nobility. Among many such instances, there is the case of Tomás Miconi Cambiaso, born in Genoa but belonging to a family who had settled in the isle of Leon from at least the 1720s.101 Having married the daughter of a Spanish merchant in

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

72

In the shadow of empire

1734 and then naturalized in 1737 with the right to trade only within Spain,102 in 1766 he acquired the title of Marqués de Méritos103 and was appointed as a member of the Consejo de S.M. de la Contaduría de Cuentas.104 Another particularly interesting pathway is that followed by the rich merchant José María Enrile, born in Arenzano. In 1728 he married Gertrudis Guerci y Mármol, who had been born in Cadiz but was the daughter of a Genoese migrant who, in turn, had married a natural woman from Seville.105 In 1750 he applied for naturalization but this was not granted to him until 1771, when the authorities deemed that the ten-years residency requirement needed for naturalization had been reached and – above all – that ten years had passed since his becoming detached from the Genoese consulate of which he had been a member.106 However, this had not prevented him from winning a leading role in the Carrera de Indias in the preceding years; Enrile was among the first charter members of the Compañía Gaditana de Negros, to which the Crown granted the exclusive privilege to trade slaves to the Americas from 1765 to 1779. The company, whose main operational center was based in Puerto Rico and, later, in Cuba, also invested in the buying and selling of wheat, sugar, coffee, wood, and other goods.107 Joseph María’s son Gerónimo, who had been born in Cadiz in 1730 but had trained in Genoa at his uncle’s and grandfathers’ trade house, was granted the formal status of vecino by the City Council of Cadiz in 1763.108 Six years later, he undertook his first voyage to Havana and Puerto Rico in order to manage the company’s interests; having returned to Cadiz, in 1773 he left for Cuba once again – this time as the director of the company.109 He took with him his wife and his daughters, one of whom – María de la Paz – would marry José de Ezpeleta, Nueva Grenada’s viceroy.110 In 1776, he was back in Havana to supervise his father’s investment in a London company that dealt with the importation of slaves.111 In 1778, while still based in Cuba, he successfully applied for the title of Marqués de Casa Enrile112 and, once the company had been liquidated, he returned to Cadiz for good.113 Gerónimo’s son Pascual, a career soldier born in Cadiz in 1772, played a prominent role in the realist struggle against the insurgentes in New Granada and then in 1830 became governor of the Philippines.114 The Genoese merchants’ desire to integrate and acquire privileges within the host society did not clash with the good relations maintained with fellow countrymen settled in the port. Acquaintance with leading representatives of the Ligurian trade in Cadiz was seen as a factor of

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Carving out a place in Spanish colonial trade

73

legitimization by Cadiz’s government authorities called to decide whether a foreign applicant could be granted communitarian privileges or not. Brothers Benito and Bartolomé Patrón, members of a low-ranking noble family from Voltri in the Ligurian Riviera, provide a case in point. The first traces of their presence in Cadiz date to 1783, when Bartolomé – before embarking on a voyage to Veracruz – conferred on his brother the proxy to make his last will and testament. Bartolomé claimed in this proxy that he was taking with him both goods of his own and goods that belonged to others; he also stated that – in the event of his death – all goods should be shipped to Spain by the Veracruz vecinos Gaspar Marín Vicario and D. Pedro del Puerto Vicario.115 Over these years, the Patróns were able to gain credit both with the Spanish authorities and the Ligurian trade community in Cadiz. As noted earlier, in 1789 Benito Patrón owned seven vessels, which – with the consent of the Spanish consul in Morocco and with the favor of the central government – were engaged in the wheat trade between Spain and North Africa.116 In that same year, the Patróns appeared before the City Council of Cadiz and filed for the hidalguía privileges: as “vecinos . . . of Cadiz and most honorable and fair subjects,” the Count Prasca, brothers Domingo and Luis Jordán, the silk dealer Josef Alberti, the naturalized merchant Alessandro Risso,117 and Agostino Merello – uncle of Gaetano Merello, who had been the Genoese consul in Cadiz between 1777 and 1779 – all appeared to support the brothers’ claims.118 The privileges and the credit Benito Patrón received in the hosting society allowed him both to marry María Teresa Manjón, the daughter of the president of Cadiz’s Real Audiencia de Contratación,119 and to legally access the Carrera de Indias with his brother Bartolomé in the 1790s.120 Benito’s sons Sebastián, Francisco, and Manuel all worked for their father’s trade house and registered with the Carrera de Indias between 1812 and 1813.121 All this evidence suggests that the support of fellow countrymen was crucial for the Genoese merchants’ economic success. However, it was Spanish society and its institutions that offered them the space and the resources needed to emerge and – in some instances – to assert at home the prestige acquired abroad. The extremely fragmented nature of the sources, in many cases, does not permit exact determination of the Genoese merchants’ fortunes and economic relations, but the notarial deeds attest that the most affirmed intermediaries could count on a wide and variegated network of interests. According to the few inventories left by those who access the Consulado de Cargadores a Indias, their business ties with the mother-city were neither exclusive nor prevalent.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

74

In the shadow of empire

In 1803, the ship magnate Domingo Colombo bequeathed an estate worth 1,839,294 reales de vellón. His main creditors were traders who resided in Cadiz (such as his sons, Domingo and Francisco, who helped him to run the family’s businesses) and in several American ports (such as Cartagena de Indias, Montevideo, and Buenos Aires); only one creditor, Juan Binono, came from Genoa, while another Italian creditor, Guillermo Dotto, was active in Palermo.122 In Juan Bautista Codevilla’s inventory, Genoa is merely mentioned; his major debtor was the Consulado de Cargadores a Indias, while his own son, who had served as captain for five years on America-bound shipments on board of one of his father’s ships,123 featured among his creditors. The range of investments made by the shipping magnate Benito Picardo was even wider. Among his active credits, there were loans granted to two Londoners’ business firms: the James Campbell Company owed him 2,026,571 reales de vellón, and the Hearth Furze Company owed him 1,231,674 reales de vellón. Some of his creditors were Genoese, but most of them were settled in various Spanish cities (La Coruña, Malaga, Jerez, Cadiz, Cordoba, Madrid, and the Canary Isles), in Cartagena de Indias, Gibraltar, Lisbon, Marseilles, and Paris. Most of Picardo’s creditors resided in Spanish and American ports, while a minority was located in Genoa and Paris.124 In summary, settling in eighteenth-century Cadiz was for many Genoese merchants the first step to make a name in trade intermediation between the Republic and the Atlantic market. Finding legitimation within the institutions of the Spanish monopoly was for the most skillful of them a suitable strategy to consolidate their interests and even to widen the geographical range of their business affairs well beyond the Genoa-Cadiz axis.

a “weak” nation Since the Middle Ages, the term “nation” had been used to describe the mercantile communities living in foreign lands. As Giovanna Petti Balbi has aptly summarized, it was about spontaneous and free associations set up by private citizens – mainly merchants, businessmen and ship-owners – who happen[ed] to be working temporarily abroad and who gather[ed] together on the basis of a common place of origin in order to achieve shared goals and – above all – to obtain juridical protection and financial privileges without loosening the ties with their homeland or applying for naturalization.125

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Carving out a place in Spanish colonial trade

75

For the merchants who resided in a given territory it was a form of selfprotection, which “having started as a private matter originating from the economic context also became a tool of intermediation and connection between political subjects and established contacts and forms of political and diplomatic negotiations.”126 The leadership of the nation was given to a consul who was usually elected from the representatives of the mercantile community that he was called to represent. For this reason the term “nation” ended up overlapping the term “consulate,” which referred to the power linked to the consular office of a foreign community living in a port or in an important marketplace and which had been instituted to protect the interests of the foreign merchants who lived there.127 The first consulates in Cadiz were established on the basis of pressures made by the first pioneer merchants who had settled in the port. In other instances, the initiative had been promoted by the governments themselves in order to foster the emigration of their own merchants.128 The fact that, by 1625, alongside the Genoese, the French, the English, the Venetians, the Germans, the Scotts, and Catalan had their consuls in Cadiz attests to how the town was an important commercial hub well before becoming a monopolistic port.129 At the beginning of the eighteenth century, as noted earlier, the Genoese nation had lost most of its traditional privileges in Spain. While other foreign mercantile communities were able to strengthen their position in the Iberian Atlantic trade, the Genoese of Cadiz experienced innumerable difficulties and internal disputes throughout the whole century. Such difficulties represent further evidence of the political and military weakness of the Republic of Genoa; however, as we shall see, they also evince both the vitality of the Genoese merchants and their ability to adapt to the new international scene. Unable to uphold their formally recognized privileges, the Genoese merchants steered toward traditional forms of private negotiations with the local authorities. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, Genoese consul Lorenzo Maria Grassi firmly believed that renouncing to apply for certain immunities “was more harmful than the difficulty to obtain them”; to this end, he made every effort to win the favor of the judge of contraband, the Marquis of Monte-Corto, in order to persuade him to interpret the legislation on illicit trade less restrictively, that is, by limiting the controls on the bills of lading of docked ships and by excluding on-board inspections.130 We don’t know the means used by Grassi and whether they were successful; still, his optimism

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

76

In the shadow of empire

may not have been unfounded, as the Marquis of Monte-Corto, Juan Presenti, was also Genoese.131 Conversely, a general sense of frustration merges from Grassi’s dispatches in regards to the consulate’s operative ability to perform all its other duties. First and foremost he worried about the ominous effects of the War of Spanish Succession, which, as well as bankrupting several trade houses, compelled the Genoese to pay a forced contribution to grain supplying.132 The impoverishment of the Genoese mercantile class had dramatically reduced the consulate’s funds and its ability to assist and support the expatriated community; thus, the consulate was forced to neglect its traditional charitable agenda and its support of the nation’s religious institutes. Throughout the seventeenth century, the Genoese community in Cadiz still benefited from a prestigious reputation. Its spiritual center was the chapel of Santa Cruz, which Francesco Usodimare had established in 1487 in the town’s cathedral and which over the seventeenth century had been repeatedly restored on the initiative of great merchants such as Giacomo Muzio and Giovanni Andrea Panes.133 Alongside Flemish and French merchants, the Genoese also had spearheaded the rebuilding of the impressive convent of San Francisco,134 but with the outbreak of the War of Spanish Succession, these kinds of initiatives had to be rapidly abandoned. In 1714, Consul Grassi cut to the bone the contributions toward the Genoese chapel and to the feast of Our Lady of the Assumption (the nation’s festivity), while also completely abolishing donations for the infirm. As a result, he noted that “they all die along the streets or are abandoned in my porch, because there is only one hospital and it caters only for Spanish people; strangers must each pay 24 soldi a day but – among our naturals – there are many boatmen, farmers and dockworkers who have lately arrived from Finale – [and cannot afford such expenses]. We have suspended alms for the poor families and poverty has increased beyond all measure.”135 The situation did not appear to get better in the following years: Grassi’s successor, Giovanni Domenico Pavia, resigned over the “unfortunate events” that had led to the loss of all his assets.136 In 1726, the new consul, Cristoforo Maria Prasca, reported in one of his dispatches that “festivities had long since been cancelled.”137 The loss of revenue deriving from the impossibility of collecting the national fees on the Genoese ships being docked or sold in Cadiz constituted another important problem for the consuls. The limited inclination to pay these fees was so rooted and widespread that the Genoese captains – when faced with Grassi’s complaints – shamelessly stated that they

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Carving out a place in Spanish colonial trade

77

“did not usually pay them.”138 In many instances, the frequent resort to fly flags of convenience did not allow the consul to identify malfeasances. Even when struggling to manage the selling of ships, Grassi received no pay: unlike his French colleague, he was not authorized to require a payment for his services and captains took good care not to offer him one.139 The consulate’s financial straits significantly compromised Cadiz’s mercantile community, which was deprived of the resources needed to negotiate the nation’s exemptions and privileges with the local authorities. The events relating to the Genoese consulate during Cristoforo Maria Prasca’s tenure (1725–50) may help to explain these dynamics. Around 1720, a few months after his arrival, the high esteem in which he was held by his fellow countrymen allowed Prasca to be elected as a diputado and treasurer of the Genoese nation, a position that had not been assigned for more than five years.140 The need for a representative to help the consul, who was frequently out of town on business, had become more urgent because of the two years’ delay in the payment of the aguinaldo. This was a Christmas cash homage usually presented by foreign merchants to Cadiz’s political and military governor, who was also judge in the preliminary hearings of the trade suits filed by strangers residing in the port. The aguinaldo represented an important guarantee and protection instrument, “because there were plenty of occasions in which – thanks to the favor [of the Governor] – individuals could avert sticky situations and dangerous consequences.”141 It should not come as a surprise that the Genoese merchants, who were traditionally averse to any form of fiscal control and who were massively involved in contraband, sought to pay this formally voluntary contribution. In fact, the first request that Prasca made to the Governor was to dispense the Genoese trade houses from local authorities’ controls, without the consent of the consul or, in his absence, of the nation’s diputado. The magistrate did not refute his proposal but demanded the payment of the previous two-years aguinaldo in exchange for his attentiveness. As he was unable to gather the amount of money needed, Prasca tried to justify non-payment by ascribing it to the “complete cessation of trade carried out in the bay under the national flag.” This had nullified the income deriving from the collection of consular fees; in the last few years – according to Prasca – even the costs of supporting the “chapel of the poor” had been covered by the consul, with whom the nation, as a result, was in his debt. Despite all the financial problems, however, the urgent need to regain the Governor’s benevolence

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

78

In the shadow of empire

called for a deal: a fairer redistribution among the merchants of the consular fees on freight charges allowed Prasca to both gather the funds to pay the aguinaldo and to refund to the consul Pavia the money spent to sustain the chapel of the poor.142 By making use of the good offices of the order’s Father General in Madrid, Prasca also obtained exemption from payment for Genoese immigrants admitted to the hospital of San Juan de Dios in Cadiz; Madrid’s intercession allowed the diputado to overcome the resistances of the hospital’s Prior, who demanded that everyone should pay for hospital stays, despite the fact that the Genoese previously had arranged three pious legacies for the maintenance of three bed places.143 To compensate for the lack of celebrations in the previous years, Prasca also attempted to revive religious events within Cadiz’s Genoese community by organizing a five-day celebration in the national chapel on the occasion of the feast of the Virgin Mary’s Assumption.144 Contrary to Prasca’s expectations, the initiative was not viewed by the merchants as a top priority: so strong was the resistance to contribute that the national committee suggested – almost unanimously – that it should be financed through the sale of the chapel’s silver vases. The celebration was made possible only through the “offerings” of some few nationals.145 The same resistance arose again when Prasca proposed the institution of a 2,500 pesos fund for the annual festivity of the Assumption. In the wake of the example set by other nations in Cadiz, his idea was to collect from every merchant a voluntary contribution when fleets from America entered the port. The proposal was harshly contested and a group of merchants – led by Angelo Maria Gnecco – sent to Genoa a memorandum in which they demanded removal of the consul.146 Prasca defended his position by claiming his high-rank acquaintances in Cadiz and by ascribing the illicit conduct of his countrymen to their “great distance from the homeland and this country’s excessive freedom.”147 In short, the consular dispatches of the first half of the century evoke the image of a weak nation that was ill-inclined to cultivate its community identity. However, internal divisions should not be dismissed as evidence of the decline of Ligurian commerce in the port: in fact, conflicts among merchants marked Genoese history within the Spanish monarchy’s territories in both good times and bad.148 The weakness of the Genoese institutions in Cadiz does not necessarily imply that these had no relevance in that community. Moreover, under certain aspects, weakness represented an economic resource. In times of war, the Republic’s political neutrality ensured to the Genoese flag a

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Carving out a place in Spanish colonial trade

79

greater freedom of movement in maritime trade and protected the expatriated merchants from the consequences of military confrontations. These advantages often induced other foreigners to look for the shelter of the Republic’s jurisdiction: during the 1724 famine, the governor of Cadiz ordered the “stranger nations” to provide 15,000 fanegas of wheat, 2,000 of which were to be supplied by the Genoese nation; consul Prasca shared the burden of the contribution among all the Italians, given that “in war time, they all passed themselves off as Genoese, and if they want[ed] to benefit from this privilege, they also [ought] to carry the burdens that c[a] me with it.”149 As noted earlier, the Genoese consuls in Cadiz held an important position in negotiating with local authorities for informal acquisition of privileges that the nation could no longer rightfully claim. It was not always easy to reach an agreement about the collective contributions necessary to the maintenance of these immunities; still, the fact that consular dispatches of the first half of eighteenth century do not further refer to the aguinaldo issue leads one to conclude that the Genoese nation had managed to pay its fees on a more or less regular basis. In emergency circumstances, consuls did not hesitate to “secretly” pay the local authorities out of their own pockets. Consul Giuseppe Montesisto, for instance, successfully secured the governor’s leniency toward the “nation” between 1757 and 1758, when Ferdinand VI suspended the Genoese trade with Spain in an attempt to limit smuggling activities (see Chapter 1).150 The difficulties faced by the Republic’s consuls in imposing the payment of consular fees on ship-captains lowered the transaction costs of the Genoese maritime commerce and, ultimately, boosted its competitiveness. The scarce interest displayed by the Genoese of Cadiz in maintaining their own religious symbols and charity practices may be interpreted in the same way. As being a Genoese in eighteenth-century Cadiz did not grant any particular power or prestige, the cost of supporting the nation was deemed disproportionately high in comparison to their usefulness in promoting both individual and collective interests. The institutional frailty of the Genoese nation of Cadiz cannot be interpreted as a sign of its economic decline but as a complex set of strategies adopted by individuals and groups of subjects experiencing a growing political marginalization. The Genoese repositioning appears to have followed two main guidelines: to maximize the advantages stemming from their diplomatic and military weakness and, wherever possible, to enhance prospects for obtaining privileges in the host society that could not

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

80

In the shadow of empire

be obtained by remaining under the Genoese flag. Both goals could not be pursued by investing in the consolidation of the Genoese “nation” of Cadiz; they actually challenged the nation’s very existence. When, in 1742, jenízaros and naturalized foreigners were once again granted access to the Consulado de Indias, a strong opposition started to loom between those who had had or aimed to gain access to the colonial monopoly’s institutions and those who did not want to or could not do so. The struggle became apparent by 1755, following yet another two-year delay in the payment of the aguinaldo. The need to reach an agreement led to an animated confrontation between consul Giuseppe Montesisto and the naturalized Genoese merchants who, by virtue of their real or presumed status, refused to pay.151 Even the non-naturalized merchants, who, in theory, were supposed to contribute by making a fixed payment for each item on commission from Genoa, entered their orders in the name of Spanish merchants in order to avoid the levy.152 Eventually, the consul found the money to pay for the arrears owed to the governor but only after “unspeakable efforts.”153 All his attempts to sort out the problem proved useless: his proposal to work out a census-based contributory system that included naturalized subjects (who, in his view, did not cease to be Genoese or, at least, ought to show that they felt the nation’s interests at heart) was blocked by a memorandum sent to Genoa by the merchant Pasquale Rapallino, which accused the consul of arbitrarily managing the nation’s affairs.154 Not only was the failed punctuality in the payment of the aguinaldo prejudicial in itself, but it also conveyed an undignified image of the Genoese nation, especially if compared to the zeal demonstrated by other nations in meeting their obligations.155 The Genoese community in Cadiz reached such a marked degree of institutional disarray that they went without a consul for a long time. After Montesisto’s death in 1771, the nation’s interests were represented by two diputados – Emanuele Perasso and Gian Andrea Picardo.156 An anonymous letter sent to Genoa denounced the two diputados for almost entirely ignoring formal consular business, which resulted in a significant loss of income against a pronounced increase in costs. The letter explained that every year it was necessary to offer donations to the port’s governor to conduct trade. However, the Genoese had stopped paying him because “the best” among them had been granted naturalization by virtue of either having resided in Spain for a long time or because their children had been born there.157 No one was willing to stand as consul until Gaetano Merello, who eventually put himself forward as the only candidate, was accepted by the Genoese government without further delay or reserve.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Carving out a place in Spanish colonial trade

81

In the aftermath of his installation, in 1777, Merello found hardly any trace of the records kept by his predecessors; Picardo and Perasso handed him only a notebook containing a few, vague notations about passports, and consulate’s council meetings and notices, contending they had not saved anything they thought to be unimportant.158 The two diputados did not, allegedly, even take the trouble to collect consular fees on maritime trade.159 Although the Genoese consul’s jurisdiction officially extended to the whole of Andalusia,160 Merello admitted that he held no information about the Ligurian settlement in Seville; having gathered some information, he reported that in that town “the Genoese people had lost the innumerable privileges they benefited from because they had not sought to have them confirmed by King Philip V of Spain.” Furthermore, the community in Seville had not had a consulate for at least forty years; in 1770 a Royal Ruling had obliged foreigners who were deprived of consular protection to register with the local Escribanía de Guerra, for which they depended upon the jurisdiction of the Captain General of Andalusia.161 The Genoese diputados in Seville, whom the nation had continued to elect on their own initiative, had done nothing else but abuse their office to pursue their personal interests.162 Merello was too inexperienced to deal with this critical situation. Unlike all his predecessors, the new consul was not a trader. He had studied at a Jesuit college and, since the age of 16, had been educated in law and administration.163 Thanks to the support of his uncle Agostino – a Cadiz merchant who successfully lobbied on his behalf some of the nation’s members in the port – he was made consul when he was just 22. Merello’s initiatives mirror his singular formative background: with a notary-like scrupulousness but lacking mercantile pragmatism, he was the consul who worked the hardest to strengthen “the body of the nation” on juridical, political, and financial grounds. Although potentially commendable, his intentions were bound to fail as they fatally crashed against the particular interests of many of the consulate’s members. His first plan was to gather the documentation related to the nation into a consulate’s archive in order to have at hand the legal instruments needed to safeguard the properties, the juros, the rights, and the privileges that had been forgotten due to the “negligence” of his predecessors. In particular, Merello wanted to redeem “three chaplaincies and the legacies linked to the Nation’s chapel in this cathedral, . . . as well as the Nation’s registers and the Decrees.”164 Another unprecedented initiative was his attempt to trace, through the maritime tribunal of Genoa, all Genoese

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

82

In the shadow of empire

ships that had landed in Cadiz in the previous twenty-five years in order to force the owners or their heirs to pay for the fees they had avoided.165 Unsurprisingly, Merello’s ambitions went nowhere. Even more modest and unassuming initiatives failed, such as finding the foundation deed of the Genoese chapel – a privilege that had fallen into oblivion and which the Cathedral’s canon was keen not to drag out of the archives. To redeem this and other lost privileges would have required so much time and money that the exponents of the Genoese nation thought it was more convenient to persuade the consul to abandon the project.166 Apparently, Merello’s only successful initiative seems to have been the celebration of the feast of Virgin Mary’s Assumption in 1778. After being paid a large amount of money provided almost entirely by the consul, the bishop of Cadiz assisted at the ceremony. The “splendid news” was welcomed by an unexpected popular participation, which Merello interpreted as evidence of a shared spirit of cohesion that boded well for the future.167 The consul’s optimism was tempered by his awareness of having a lot of enemies among his fellow countrymen, particularly Picardo and Perasso. Backed by the merchant Andrea Gherardi, the two diputados tried to delegitimize him by any means. As soon as Merello was elected in 1776 the diputados brought a suit against him in Madrid to prove his incapacity and to prevent the Crown from granting his license.168 Shortly after, they sent the government of Genoa a memorandum applying for cancellation of his appointment on the grounds that he was too young, inexperienced, and lacking the financial resources needed to perform his duties.169 The assumption that the consul had to run the nation out of his own pocket implied that the contributions of the consulate’s members were insufficient and that the Genoese merchants were not inclined to collaborate with their representative. For the same reason, those who had held the position of mayordomo (treasurer) over the years had had to take on themselves most of the financial burdens: Bernardo Masnata, who had been the mayordomo for twenty years, had accrued a 19,000 reales de plata credit against the Genoese nation. Given that no one repayed him, he had taken possession of all the silver in the nation’s chapel that was in his charge.170 His successor, Giovanni Sciaccaluga, faced similar difficulties and resigned only two years after his election.171 The reason for Picardo and Perasso’s hostility toward Merello was selfevident: they wanted to preserve the status quo to maintain their positions as independent diputados and – above all – they wanted to ensure that the

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Carving out a place in Spanish colonial trade

83

new consul would not burden the nation’s exhausted coffers. The two threatened that – if the government did not remove him from office – “the few trade houses still under the flag of Genoa” would follow the example of the others and apply for naturalization.172 Picardo and Perasso argued that in Cadiz there were merchants who were a lot richer and more suitable than Merello to serve as consuls; however, none of them would put forward their candidacy if the Republic did not impose in their favor a new levy on maritime commerce. The problem was always the same: the Genoese merchants who had been naturalized or were seeking to become so refused to pay tax to the nation’s levies and, by doing so, placed the tax burden on all those who had remained under Genoese jurisdiction. According to the two diputados, the only way of putting an end to this vicious cycle was to impose a levy on all the Cadiz-bound shipments from Genoa, regardless of who the consignee was.173 We do not know to what extent the proposal was deemed to be feasible by petitioners. However, the message conveyed in the memorandum was clear: if the Republic did not wish to help the Genoese settled in Cadiz, then these were not prepared to sacrifice their wealth for the good of the nation. For the same reasons they rejected as their representative a man like Merello, whose qualities and intentions were deemed unsuitable for the consular office. The constant complaints against the young consul’s imprudent behavior, which they claimed was “adverse to good governance and harmful to individuals,”174 prevented him from pursuing any kind of initiative. When Merello dared to ask his fellow countrymen to refund the money that he had advanced for the “gifts” to the Governor of Cadiz, Picardo and Perasso made harsh remonstrations and claimed that the custom had been outlawed by the decree issued in 1760.175 The consul tried to abolish the office of diputado, but when he put the proposal to the consular assembly, the opposition was so violent that some members threatened to desert the consulate “to join the Turks.”176 To safeguard himself and uphold his reasons, Merello asked the escribano de guerra of Cadiz to sit in on the consular meetings and he even suggested that the Governor should get Picardo and Perasso arrested for defamation.177 In reply, merchant Pietro Avanzini sent to Genoa a letter in which he denounced the Spanish authorities’ intrusion in the nation’s affairs; if no one put a stop to the consul’s abuses, Avanzini foresaw and justified the outbreak of a “civil war” that would generate riots, arrests, and the closure of many trade houses.178 The lack of zeal with which he upheld the propriety rights of his fellow countrymen contributed to fuel hostility toward Merello; in fact, in the

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

84

In the shadow of empire

event of bankruptcy or ab intestato succession, the consul allowed the Governor to attend to the inventory of merchants’ belongings. Merello also stood accused of requesting money from heirs or creditors in order to pay the deposit before sending the list of inventoried assets.179 In reply, Merello stated that he acted in compliance with Bourbon laws, which granted no autonomy to consuls on such matters.180 Still, Merello’s vindications did not succeed in appeasing the animosity toward him; the respect of those laws was deemed by the nation’s members to be an inconceivable abuse, both because it disclosed the merchant’s financial situation to Spanish authorities and because it gave the consul the power to impose further duties. The imposition of an “extraordinary levy” on all fellow countrymen embarking in Cadiz or wishing to join the Genoese Consulate roll was the final straw.181 This measure, which was taken by Merello to force every member of the community to contribute to the nation’s expenses and to supporting the poor, generated immense indignation and provoked a general mobilization against him.182 Picardo and Perasso, thirty-two Genoese great wholesalers, and twelve other naturalized merchants immediately sent a letter of complaint to Genoa. The missive did not bear the signature of those who had been naturalized, as these were legally prevented from exposing themselves directly; however, the mere mention of their names was evidence of the fact that their opinion could still be decisive in the hometown. The missive sent by Genoa’s Giunta di Marina to two naturalized merchants – Giuseppe Antonio Mosti183 and Gregorio Enrile – to ask for further information about the consul’s behavior confirms the strong ties between the government of the Republic and those who had formally left the Genoese nation to become Spanish subjects.184 Merello responded to the accusations by procuring an array of witnesses to sign a letter in his favor; these included a few merchants185 and the nation’s mayordomo, Juan Bautista Sciaccaluga,186 but most of them were captains, patrons, and sailors.187 Perasso and Picardo doubted the testimonials to be genuine and mischievously insinuated that seamen might have offered their signatures in exchange for the consul’s favor.188 Still, Merello’s last-ditch effort of self-defense came to nothing and in December 1779 he felt obliged to resign his position. Benedetto and Andrea Picardo, Andrea Gherardi, Alejandro Risso, and Emanuele Perasso took his place as interim diputados.189 Ultimately, the leadership of the nation went back to representatives of the mercantile class who cared little about both the prestige of the Genoese nation in the port and its mutual agenda. Some of them had already started pursuing the naturalization route.190

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Carving out a place in Spanish colonial trade

85

The events described here clearly show how the Genoese nation’s borders were wider and more ambiguous than the lists of people registered with the consulate would suggest. In terms of networking and protection, belonging to the Genoese nation offered benefits geared toward economic success and entry – via naturalization or Spanish-born sons – to the legal circuits of the Carrera de Indias. Conversely, the naturalized merchants – by virtue of the capital they gained and the contacts they made from Atlantic commerce – exerted such a powerful influence on Genoese trade that they could determine the fate of the nation that they had formally relinquished. The disputes over the election of a new consul lasted for months.191 Finding a candidate among the wealthy merchants who had continued to operate under the Genoese flag was no mean feat: the majority – by the Genoese Giunta di Marina’s own admission – were naturalized while the others refused to take the office.192 Despite fierce internal debates, in 1781 three of the diputados – Emanuele Perasso, Benedetto Picardo and Andrea Gherardi – enacted an ordinance that established new rules for running the consulate. The ordinance formalized the creation of offices of two permanent diputados as mayordomos, who were to take turns in the financial administration of the institution. The ordinance seriously curtailed the powers held by the consul, who was obliged to resort to the diputados in order to fulfill most of his duties. The new provisions were sent to Genoa along with a petition that requested a new 4-soldi taxation on each peso spent on the hiring of Cadiz-bound ships from Genoa, regardless of the flag or tonnage. Moreover, the way the money had to be collected was specified in detail, stating that it should be paid in Genoa and subsequently forwarded to Cadiz by means of a trusted person. In this way, it was estimated that every year the nation would receive approximately 300–400 pesos, which would allow them “to bury” any dispute between “the very few members of the nation” who were still under Genoese jurisdiction. In the petition it was argued that these few individuals were unfairly forced to provide for all the consulate’s expenses; most of the owners of great trade houses – such as the Giordanos, the Mostis, the Sigoris, the Oderos, the Oliveros, the Balbis, the Codevillas, the Procurantes, and the Corallos – had long been naturalized and, despite being the most prosperous, they neither cared for contributing to the nation’s needs nor helping the poor: It is disgraceful that these naturalized Gentlemen exploit most of the advantages of our commerce by calling themselves Genoese and then – when it comes to pay a miserable 20 or 30 pesos tax per year – they do not recognize their own homeland.193

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

86

In the shadow of empire

Thus, after helping their fellow countrymen to dismiss an exceedingly “controlling” consul, naturalized merchants again became the targets of the Genoese nation’s criticisms and claims for a more “distributive justice.”194 In August 1781 it was agreed that the new consul would be the diputado Andrea Gherardi, who held the office until 1828.195 The longevity of his tenure confirms a certain degree of stability within the Genoese nation. As noted earlier – following the promulgation of the comercio libre decree, Cadiz held a solid position in international trade without compromising the role played by Genoese merchants in the port. Furthermore, rather than imposing new restrictions on foreigners’ integration prospects, the Bourbon authorities continued to promote their settlement in the Spanish Monarchy’s territories, while still attempting to control more closely their businesses. A Real Orden – which transferred jurisdiction over first-grade trade suits involving foreign merchants from the town’s Governor to the Casa de la Contratación – was issued to this end in 1785.196 Gherardi clearly sensed the dangers of the provision; until then, the assignment of juridical authority to the Governor had allowed consuls to easily obtain the unofficial handling of their fellow countrymen’s trade suits and to resolve disputes in a rapid, equitable, and inexpensive way. Conversely, on the basis of their “natural aversion to strangers,” Spanish magistrates would have leapt at the chance to force Genoese merchants to present their account books and to punish them in an exemplary way had they found evidence of transactions with the Americas or other ports.197 Gherardi feared that the provision would unduly affect the Genoese nation, which lacked the political and diplomatic strength needed to negotiate the enforcement of the law.198 The Casa de la Contratación was suppressed in 1790 and the authority over trade suits involving foreigners was transferred to the Consulado de Cargadores a Indias.199 The Republic’s consular dispatches do not make reference to the actual outcomes of this new reform. At any rate, the Genoese diputados had long since learned how to better protect themselves when dealing with trade suits. To cut the costs associated with frequent litigations, in their 1781 reorganization plan they had decided that in case of controversy arbitration should be sought from the nation’s diputados; should the parties fail to reach agreement, then they could resort to the Spanish judiciary.200 When confronted with the increasing reduction of consuls’ juridical prerogatives, the Genoese nation desperately tried to circumscribe and

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Carving out a place in Spanish colonial trade

87

resolve its internal disputes autonomously. Meanwhile, the consuls continued to support their fellow countrymen’s disputes in an unofficial capacity: as noted earlier, in 1788 Gherardi played a significant mediating role in seeking a solution to the closure of Genoese shops; even when, in 1793, taylor Giovanni Poggi got arrested for smuggling, the consul was unable to formally intervene but promised to take action “as a private subject, in order to help him as much as [he] could.”201 With regards to fiscal control over maritime commerce, the consul continued to struggle against the usual difficulties.202 In 1782, the Senate of the Republic of Genoa reacted to the “distributive justice” proposal made by the diputados of Cadiz by imposing a new levy on vessels that left Genoa bound to the Spanish port but the measure did not satisfy their expectations. In fact, the levy consisted of only 2 reales de plata contribution per ton of transported goods and it only applied to ships sailing under the Genoese flag, which the consul had to collect directly from captains in Cadiz. Gherardi complained that there was no point in relying on the captains’ bonafides, because “they taxed themselves with so much moderation as to never pay more than half of the duly owed amount.”203 Furthermore, the new levy was supposed to replace the national and consular fees, thus eliminating all other sources of income. The consul argued that without that money he would not have been able to fulfill his duties and that it would have been particularly hard to “gain the favor of this Governor, or that of the Marine Commander and of men and employees of the political and military Government,” that is, to pay those “Christmas gifts” that were thought to have been abolished since 1760.204 Due to the fact that the fiscal enforcement of Genoese maritime commerce generated more problems than benefits, the tax reform – which had also triggered harsh protests from seafarers – was abolished in 1786.205 The events that marked the history of the Genoese consulate in Cadiz throughout the eighteenth century were the result of a complex set of divergent interests reflecting the varied conditions and strategies of the merchants whom it was called to represent. In essence, the discussions and conflicts within the Genoese nation revolved around two opposite conceptions of how to govern the nation. On the one hand, there was Merello’s thoroughly formulated concept, which, by centralizing the decision-making processes and the management of resources, aimed at promoting the interests of the Genoese community as whole. On the other hand, there were the private strategies of individuals and groups aimed at keeping interference and tax pressures to a minimum, in order to favor – or, at least, to harm as little as possible – their personal interests. The

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

88

In the shadow of empire

latter conception prevailed. The struggle for the prestige and the social cohesion of a nation without rights could not satisfy the selfestablishment of its mercantile elite. Although the cooperation of fellow countrymen was indeed crucial, such ambitions could only be fulfilled through individual strategies aimed at integration into the legal circuits of the Spanish monopoly. Both naturalization and the access obtained through Spanish-born sons to the Consulado de Indias became possible for many and remained the object of aspiration for many others. The government of the Republic never showed any intention of actively supporting the merchants who operated in Cadiz under the Genoese flag; on the contrary, even in the most critical circumstances, the Genoese government appeared to listen more to the opinion of those who had been naturalized. In this context, the hostility displayed by the Genoese merchants toward the payment of national contributions or of any other kind of fiscal impositions should not come as a surprise; in their opinion – and in that of the patrons and captains – tax evasion or the smallest possible tax burden was in itself a resource that had to be preserved. Despite chronic financial difficulties and harsh internal conflicts, the Genoese consulate in Cadiz did not limit itself to act as a mere guarantor of “negative” freedoms. Although in an informal capacity, it continued to play an intermediary role with the local authorities and even ensured a certain degree of juridical protection to its merchants. There is no doubt that its tutelage favored the economic rise of the Genoese merchant class and eventually enabled some of its representatives to legally enter the Carrera de Indias. The functions of the Genoese institutions in Cadiz over the eighteenth century may appear paradoxical, given that they virtually served the interests of economic agents whose goals were to avoid any national taxation and, wherever possible, to separate themselves from the nation and become Spanish. For this politically marginal mercantile class aiming to survive in a hostile international context, however, the “betrayal” of their nation’s interests ultimately contributed to ensuring the persistent competitiveness of Genoese commerce as a whole.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

3 Migration and investments toward colonial Buenos Aires

the rı´ o de la plata as a new pole of the spanish atlantic “As the Spanish were conquering the Americas, the Genoese found their America in Spain.”1 The story described thus far demonstrates that, in many respects, these words used by Thomas Kirk to summarize the Genoese golden age in the Spanish monarchy also apply to the eighteenth century. Even when Madrid ceased to be a great source of income for Genoese bankers, the profits derived from trade intermediation and other related activities continued to foster a consistent migration flow from the Republic to the chief Spanish ports; the same continuity can be observed by looking at Spanish America, which remained a decisive market for the Genoese shipping from the Peninsula and attracted a minority of migrants throughout the entire colonial period. The Genoese participated in most of the early explorations and expeditions of Spanish conquest; from the first century of settlement, they could be found everywhere in the Indias, especially in New Spain.2 Similarly to other foreigners in the Indias, however, they never created large and stable communities. Consistent arrivals to Spanish America were discouraged by the strict laws forbidding migration to foreigners: in the eighteenth century, the only ones who could apply for the necessary license were those who had obtained naturalization or, in the case of sailors or artisans, who had been specifically required to sail to the Indias.3 Another factor that further deterred foreigners, and the Genoese in particular, from settling in Spanish America was the impediment to establish their own consular representative or to claim any other “national” privilege 89

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

90

In the shadow of empire

that could allow them to prosper as a group. Lacking a competitive merchant fleet, the businessmen of the Republic could not even establish an autonomous economic influence in America and continued to depend on the Spanish merchant navy both to travel and to trade overseas. During the colonial period, the Genoese who crossed the ocean were mainly naturalized merchants or agents who aimed at directly managing their businesses and then returning to Spain,4 which remained the center of their activities and, ultimately, the most suitable place for them to thrive. From the second half of the eighteenth century, there was also an increasing migration of Genoese veterans who had joined the Spanish army during the Italian campaigns of the War of the Austrian Succession (1741–7) and whom, especially after the British occupation of Havana (1762), were considered a useful resource to defend the empire’s integrity overseas.5 Legal restrictions, however, did not impede non-authorized individuals – such as small traders and more or less skilled workers – from seeking their fortune and permanently settling in the chief Spanish American commercial cities. As we shall see, the Río de la Plata remained at the margins of the Genoese migration and trade interests until the late eighteenth century, when the consolidation of direct commercial relations with Spain and the increasing importance of the region in the Atlantic economy slightly transformed that empire’s frontier into an appealing destination both for the investments of the traders who lived in the Peninsula and for individuals willing to set roots on the other side of the Atlantic. In colonial Buenos Aires, similarly to other Spanish American centers, the limits deriving from the political and economic configuration of the empire made inconvenient the creation of a large Genoese settlement, but the pioneers of the diaspora found particularly favorable conditions for prospering and integrating themselves into the host society. The Genoese presence in the Río de la Plata began with the very first stages of Spanish colonization. In 1536, Pedro Sangarme, Juan Ambrosio, and Bernardo Centurione – the latter being a member of the General Staff of Andrea Doria’s galleys – participated in the expedition organized by Pedro de Mendoza that led to the founding of Buenos Aires. In that same year, some Genoese shipping magnates set up a second expedition entrusted to León Pancaldo, a native of Savona, which shipped the first load of European goods to Buenos Aires.6 Due to the lack of valuable resources and sedentary population, however, this first colonization attempt failed after a few years. Unable to establish pacific relations with the natives, the Spanish abandoned Buenos Aires in 1541.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

91

After discovering in 1545 the rich silver mines in Potosí, in present-day Bolivia, the Spanish organized their colonial trade along the Potosí-Lima axis, the Pacific maritime route connecting the Peruvian capital to the Isthmus of Panama, and the Atlantic route from Portobelo to Spain.7 From Peru, the Spanish gradually extended their control southward into the continent by establishing the cities of Asunción, Tucumán, Santiago del Estero, Mendoza, and Cordoba. The last step of the colonization venture was to secure the Atlantic access to the viceroyalty. In 1573, Juan de Garay founded the city of Santa Fe along the banks of the Paraná River and a year later was appointed by the Governor in Asunción “Lieutenant Governor and Captain General of all Provinces of the Río de la Plata.” In January 1580, he sailed off from Asunción with three ships, Spanish and American-born settlers, cattle, building tools, seeds, and plants to re-establish a city in the Estuary of the Río de la Plata. The expedition led to the second and definitive founding of Buenos Aires on June 11, 1580. The settlement was fortified and subsequent assaults from the Querandí Indians were violently repelled by the armed residents, but the city’s economic progress was hindered by the Spanish authorities. The second founding of Buenos Aires was promoted to protect the fluvial and terrestrial routes connecting Potosí to the Atlantic from possible foreign military aggressions. As a result, the de la Plata was excluded from the legal trade with Spain and politically subordinated to the viceroyalty of Peru. The Genoese who invested in the American trade under the aegis of the Spanish flag could not consolidate their presence in the Río de la Plata for another two centuries, but the permanent lack of resources and workforce to sustain the local economy attracted the interest of more powerful foreign competitors. With the complicity and collaboration of the inhabitants, this wide estuary soon became a key entrepot for the illegal drainage of Andean mineral resources and for trading of slaves and manufactures, the Portuguese being the first beneficiaries. Excluded from direct communications with Spain, the Río de la Plata inland centers represented a good market for illicitly imported goods from Europe and benefited from their geographical propinquity to Brazil, with which they established an intensive trade in manufactures, agricultural products, and livestock derivatives. The Portuguese were also indispensable for the supply of African slaves, whom were sold in Buenos Aires or redistributed to Santa Fe, Corrientes, Misiones, Tucumán, Cordoba, Salta, Catamarca, Potosí, Asunción, and Chile to be employed in agricultural or mining industry. Unable to autonomously provide workforce to the American kingdoms, the Casa

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

92

In the shadow of empire

de la Contratación of Seville allowed Portuguese and, to a lesser extent, Spanish and Dutch ships to conduct a slave trade through formal licensing as well as the asiento, a royal permission for trade granted for a set period of time to a private individual or company on payment of an annual sum to the Crown. With the Portuguese asientos (the first of which was granted as early as 1595), intercolonial trade between Upper Peru, Brazil, and the Portuguese colonies in Western Africa grew to such an extent that it became the core of the economic activities of the Río de la Plata.8 The Spanish monarchy tolerated the Portuguese predominance in the Río de la Plata trade until 1640, when the bond between the two Royal households was severed. Afterward, particularly from 1648 to 1667, the Dutch acquired a leading role of intermediation in the Río de la Plata by massively resorting to unlicensed landings that were “legally” granted due to bad weather or to carry out repairs on the ships. The landings of foreign ships for unforeseen circumstances, the so-called arribadas forzosas, were often fictions to trade illicitly with local authorities’ tacit approval, and derived from the high demand for imported goods to supply the region.9 By virtue of the connections established with the Dutch and the Portuguese, direct trade with foreign powers became the most important maritime activity of Buenos Aires. The Spanish did not strongly oppose the Dutch smugglers, in the wake of the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48), as they hoped they might forge together a new form of political cooperation that could quench the appetites of the United Provinces for American silver while countering the English occupation of Jamaica and the French advance in Guadalupe, Martinique, Tortuga, and Western Hispaniola. However, the Spanish Crown’s consequent permissiveness toward the arribadas forzosas had exactly the opposite effect and allowed competing foreign powers to increasingly gain access to the Indias trade routes. In 1680, a LusoBrazilian expedition founded a fortress in Colonia do Sacramento, a landing place that had been used by smugglers for decades and was located 50 km from Buenos Aires on the opposite shore of the estuary. The port of Colonia soon became a British trading enclave, closely linked to the Brazilian economy through a series of commercial agreements initiated by Oliver Cromwell in 1654 and extended by the Stuarts in 1703.10 The latter arrangements, made at the end of the Spanish War of Succession, further legitimized the British presence in both the Caribbean and the Southern Atlantic through the concession of the slave trade asiento. Conversely, on the strength of privileges deriving from the

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

93

accession of the house of Bourbon to the Spanish Crown, and the opening of the Cape Horn route from the end of the seventeenth century, French merchants dominated the Atlantic routes to Peru for at least thirty years (1695–1726).11 Intense foreign trading led to the consolidation of the Potosí-Buenos Aires land route, which had been sketched out in the wake of the late Spanish colonization of the area between 1580 and 1590. Between 1650 and 1730, the business volume handled by foreign powers in the viceroyalty of Peru outweighed that directly controlled by Spain.12 This pattern did not significantly change in subsequent years. Following the withdrawal of the asiento in 1739, the growth of the arribadas system guaranteed an ongoing British presence in the Río de la Plata; conversely, the French exploited the war transport needs of their Spanish ally in order to send their mercantile vessels toward the Río de la Plata as navíos de registros, ships licensed to sail outside the regular fleet system. In 1739, the fall of Portobelo at the hands of the British increased the region’s geopolitical relevance and induced the Spanish Crown to unlock the route to Cape Horn to the navíos de registro, which managed the monopolistic trade.13 This reorganization of the legal commerce of Southern America turned Buenos Aires – Lima’s traditional rival – into an obligatory landing place for Spanish ships sailing both from and to Cadiz. Along with Montevideo and Colonia do Sacramento, Buenos Aires also became a main export center for goods from the Pacific Ocean bound for Europe or the nearby Brazilian marketplace. Lacking the necessary financial and organizational resources to compete with the British, the Dutch, and the Portuguese in the Río de la Plata, the Genoese merchants paid little attention to the southern Atlantic fringe of the empire until the 1750s.14 Examinations of the legal trade between Spain and Buenos Aires have shown that, in the first half of the eighteenth century, the involvement of foreign merchants of Cadiz in trade with the Río de la Plata was limited to sporadic shipments organized by modest investors.15 A similar variety of small and occasional transactions can be seen by examining the shipments of the cargadores of Buenos Aires trading with Spain between 1720 and 1778.16 The fragmentation of mercantile interests involving Spain and the Río de la Plata mirrored the weak control of the Spanish Crown over trade in the region. This helps to explain why the Genoese merchants of Cadiz, whose participation in Atlantic commerce was linked symbiotically to Spanish mercantilism, continued to privilege more secure colonial markets such as New Spain, Cuba, and Peru up until the 1750s.17

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

94

In the shadow of empire

By the second half of the century, the interest shown by Genoese intermediaries in the Río de la Plata marketplace became slightly more tangible, paralleling with the Spanish Crown’s efforts to strengthen imperial control over the region. One of the Crown’s first initiatives was to create a privileged company for the slave trade, the Compañía de Buenos Aires, a mercantilist measure that, nonetheless, was bound to fail.18 Furthermore, a new direct postal service connecting Spain to the Río de la Plata was created in 1764;19 the plan – elaborated by Marquis Grimaldi – was to send four (seven from 1776) ships per year from La Coruña to Montevideo for mail, goods, and passenger transport. Regular communication links enhanced both commerce and regional production and modified the territorial hierarchy of the area; Buenos Aires – which was connected by the Río de la Plata river’s estuary to Montevideo (founded in 1726) – rose to the role of epicenter of the communication system with the interior.20 By the 1760s, the Río de la Plata prompted the interest of the biggest Genoese traders of Cadiz, who legally financed shipments to the region or entrusted other brokers with testing the opportunities offered by the new marketplace. In 1762, the Pedemonte Ardizzone firm financed a voyage undertaken by Ambrosio O’Higgins – the future governor of Chile and viceroy of Peru – who moved to South America at a young age to seek his fortune through trade. The loan consisted of a sum of cash money and various batches of silk belts produced in Naples and Genoa that O’Higgins was to market locally. A legal suit filed by Pedemonte to demand the settlement of his credit attests that O’Higgins acted as the informant for the Genoese merchant, by sending him from Montevideo letters in which he depicted the general state of the Río de la Plata marketplace and the prices charged in Lima.21 Around 1768, in parallel with his business in slave trade, José María Enrile invested no less than 15,000 pesos on sea loans for several Buenos Aires–bound shipments in the charge of captain Manuel Estayola, who also was entrusted with the task of selling goods belonging to his creditor.22 In 1774, the Río de la Plata also attracted the interest of future Genoese consul in Cadiz, Andrea Gherardi, who signed a contract for the import of 2,000 hides from Montevideo to Spain. Not being naturalized and not having solid contacts in the Río de la Plata, he resorted to a Spanish frontman, but the shipment was not fulfilled.23 In the same period, other merchants saw the opportunity for embarking on ambitious and risky ventures in the region. In 1775 the judge of first instance of Buenos Aires, Manuel Antonio Warnes, complained that the town had gone through a severe shortage of sugar

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

95

due to the fact that some candy and jam producers had agreed to purchase all the available sugar stocks from Spain, Chile, and Paraguay and speculate on its price. The main culprits were Genoese Francisco Moresco, Antonio Bonelo, and Esteban Ferrari, who had bought an entire stock of sugar that had arrived from La Coruña on the Spanish courier ship. Given that Moresco (the load’s consignee) was a foreigner living in Montevideo, the sugar was confiscated but, after a short amount of time, the judiciary accepted the merchant’s appeal and returned the impounded stock. The Crown, which was called to put a stop to the speculation, banned Moresco from trade and, in the case that Bonelo and Ferrari were found and captured, ordered to ship them to Spain for having entered the Río de la Plata without the necessary royal license.24 In ensuing years, the Crown’s efforts to gain control over the region intensified and the Genoese merchants were offered an increasing number of investment opportunities. The Spanish authorities’ growing concerns about Luso-Brazilian expansionist pressures determined the need to conquer Colonia do Sacramento, integrate the Upper Peru regions within the territory controlled by Buenos Aires, and elevate the city to the status of capital of an autonomous viceroyalty. The occupation of Colonia was performed by Governor Don Pedro de Cevallos, who was made both the military commander and first viceroy of the Río de la Plata in 1776. The institution of the new viceroyalty turned Buenos Aires from a border town into the main tax-collecting hub of an immense territory that included the rich mining center of Potosí, which alone accounted for 60% of all revenues collected in the capital.25 At the same time, a host of blockhouses – such as Rojas, Pergamino, Salto, Areco, Luján, Navarro, Lobos, Monte, Pilar de los Ranchos, and Chascomús (Figure 3.1) – were erected to secure the communication network with the inland from hostile indigenous populations and fulfill the food needs of the new capital. In an attempt to control the trade gravitating around the coastline of the Río de la Plata, Montevideo and Buenos Aires were included among the ports regulated by the comercio libre decree,26 but its effects were temporarily limited by war contingencies. Spain’s support (1779–83) of the United States in its War of Independence against Great Britain strongly hampered Spanish trade with the American ports. This crisis made it necessary to activate the friendship and trade ties between Spain and Portugal that had been ratified in the wake of Cevallos’s expedition in the 1777 Treaty of San Ildefonso. By virtue of its ancient alliance with Great Britain, Lisbon, which had obtained many Spanish vessels captured by the British Royal Navy during the war, became a major business hub

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

96

In the shadow of empire

figure 3.1 The Buenos Aires frontier (1744–1822) Source: Socolow, Susan M.“Buenos Aires: Atlantic port and hinterland.”In Atlantic Port Cities. Economy, Culture, and Society in the Atlantic world, 1650–1850, eds. Franklin Knight and Peggy Liss, 240–61. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1991, p. 242.

for commerce with the Río de la Plata. In 1781, as an emergency measure, the Spanish Crown opened the colonial trade routes to ships sailing under Portugal’s neutral banner by multiplying the licenses to trade Río de la Plata silver and hides along the Lisbon–Rio de Janeiro–Buenos Aires route.27 The Crown’s policy allowed the Genoese settled in Cadiz to maintain an open channel with the Río de la Plata ports.28 Due to war contingencies, however, the Genoese merchant who benefited the most from trading with the Río de la Plata was José María Cambiaso, the scion of a wealthy family of brokers whose trade house was based in Lisbon. Through his factors José González Bolaños and Agustín Wright, Cambiaso became the main silver and hides importer during wartime after Agustín Casimiro Aguirre – who acted for Cadiz’s powerful merchant Ustáriz, was related to viceroy Vértiz, and represented in Buenos Aires the Consulado of Cadiz.29 Cambiaso also had strong business interests in Cadiz, where part of his family lived, owned a trade house and a 760-ton ship licensed to the Carrera de Indias, and was intensely involved in trade with America.30 In Spain, the Cambiasos were held in

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

97

such high regard that in 1782 the Consulado de Indias directly charged them with managing in Cadiz the transport and sale of Buenos Aires rawhide from a Spanish vessel that had become stranded in Rio de Janeiro.31 The wealth accrued in Lisbon, the strong relationships with Cadiz, and the prestige of the family of origin in Genoa (which over the eighteenth century obtained the privilege of being admitted to the Genoese patriciate and provided the Republic with two Dogi32), leads one to presume that, during his time, José María Cambiaso was one of the main Genoese business referents in the Iberian Atlantic. By the end of the war, the comercio libre decree finally went into effect and strengthened trade relations between the new viceroyalty and Spain. A contemporary witness attested that up until 1778 only one mercantile ship was licensed in Cadiz to sail the Montevideo route; over the following two decades, the number of ships arriving from the South American port increased dramatically, reaching fifty-two landings in 1796.33 Under the comercio libre regime, the Río de la Plata began to appeal to many other Ligurian merchants in Cadiz who had either been licensed to the Carrera de Indias in those years or who previously had preferred to invest their capital in Cuba, New Spain, or elsewhere. In 1784, the Pedemonte Ardizzone firm signed a contract with the aforementioned Cadiz trading house of Ustáriz, to which it chartered one of its ships for a Buenos Aires–bound shipment on condition that the firm could embark eleven trunks of shirts on it; given that Pedemonte did not have a representative to sell his wares in the Río de la Plata, Ustáriz put him in touch with one of his own agents in Buenos Aires, wholesaler Isidro Josef Balbastro.34 Granted naturalization in 1778, Alessandro Risso set up several Montevideo-bound shipments by employing vessels hired in partnership with José Belastegui; from 1788, he continued to make investments in that same route by using his own 250-ton ship.35 In 1791 Nicolás Recaño36 went to Buenos Aires to collect credits on behalf of other Cadiz merchants and took with him a batch of goods,37 which he sold on his own account by opening a shop in town;38 three years later, he once again sailed from Cadiz to Montevideo as captain of another Spanish vessel.39 Another case is that of the merchant and ship owner Domingo Colombo. Immediately after registering in 1792 with the Consulado de Indias, he captained a shipment from Cadiz to Montevideo and then Havana.40 The previous year, his Cadiz-born son Pablo had captained another Montevideo-bound Spanish vessel.41 Domingo Colombo

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

98

In the shadow of empire

maintained strong commercial ties with the Río de la Plata market at least until 1804 by importing rawhide stocks both on his own and in partnership with his sons Pablo and Francisco.42 The Genoese merchant who profited the most from trading on this route was the aforementioned ship-owner Bartolomé Patrón, who had made his fortune in the import of wheat from Morocco to Spain. Along with his brother Benito, in the early 1790s he began to regularly organize Montevideo-bound shipments.43 In the Eastern port, the Patróns could count on the collaboration of Miguel De Luca, a Corsican who had migrated from Spain to act as their agent; De Luca married the daughter of the Juan Bautista Patrón – his correspondents’ uncle, who had settled in Buenos Aires around 1750 – and, from 1789 to 1794, he consolidated his career in Montevideo as administrator of the local customs. In 1796, a royal decree allowed Benito Patrón to export 8,000 slaves from Africa to Peru, Buenos Aires, and Chile in exchange for rawhide and silver. This license, which was one of the most important privileges conceded by the Spanish Crown after the abolition of the slave trade asiento in the Río de la Plata (1791), lasted until 1809.44 For managing this business in Montevideo, the Patróns appointed Carlos Camusso, a Cadiz-born trader of Genoese origin who had been licensed for transatlantic trade by the Consulado de Indias in 1791.45 By the early 1790s, the Genoese presence in the Río de la Plata had become strong enough to play a leading role in the trade of bull horns, which, when rolled into thin plates, were useful in the production of knives, handles, combs, buckles, and other small items. In 1794, after returning from the Río de la Plata, a Spanish captain reported to the Madrid authorities that this new branch of trade offered profit-making opportunities that would create jobs for the region’s inhabitants. He suggested lowering the export fees on animal horns and that the horns should be rolled in the Río de la Plata by Montevideo and Buenos Aires craftsmen under an eight-year monopoly. This would take away this abundant raw material from “exclusive” Genoese commerce for the benefit of the “Nation.”46 In his report, the captain did not explain how the Genoese controlled the horn trade. However, the available primary sources suggest that they were interested in this item at different levels. The registers of the Spanish vessels that sailed from Montevideo to Cadiz in 1794 lists many loads of horn rolls produced in the Río de la Plata, and some Genoese traders of Cadiz, such as José Recaño47 and Benito Semin,48 who were among the major importers.49 The horn rolls of Semin were shipped from Buenos Aires by his expatriate countrymen Santiago

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

99

Perfumo, who had migrated a few years earlier and was probably his agent. In the following years, it seems that the Genoese were also able to control the manufacture in loco: according to a matrícula of 1803, Montevideo hosted five horn-rolling factories and their managers all had surnames of seemingly Ligurian or Italian descent.50 The private archive of the Durazzos – one of the most prominent families of the republic’s patriciate – enables us to appreciate the financial significance of the Río de la Plata market for the Genoese merchants settled in Cadiz and those residing in Genoa. Since the late 1760s, Marcello Durazzo and his son, Giacomo Filippo, had been regularly investing in sea loans against Spanish ships destined for the Río de la Plata.51 In order to allocate their investments they used as middlemen some leading figures of Genoese trade in Cadiz such as José Enrile, the Count Prasca, Esteban Mosti and his son José Antonio. Clearly, it is no coincidence that the agents of the Durazzos were all either naturalized merchants or jenízaros. Given that they were granted legitimate access to the trade routes with the Americas, these intermediaries were able to closely monitor the market’s fluctuations, to readily seize the most profitable investment opportunities, and also to establish profitable relations with other guild merchants licensed to trade with America. Apart from handling their fellow countrymen’s interests, the naturalized Genoese merchants of Cadiz invested in maritime exchange contracts on their own account; therefore, they did not act as mere intermediaries between the Republic’s financial capital and the American market but, on the contrary, they acted as veritable businessmen who were able to invest in their own right. In fact, the Durazzos’ agents merely briefed them on the investment proposals that might arise from time to time and left to them the decision on whether and how much to invest.52 Not only did the Durazzos habitually accept the proposals made by their agents, but they also participated in the operation in partnership with them.53 The profits deriving from such ventures were consistent: in 1775, a sea loan on a ship headed for the South Sea could yield a 29% return on the invested capital.54 A year later, in an analogous operation, the Prasca-Arboré firm was able to negotiate a 10% premium increase in the event of a war against Great Britain and a 20% increase in the event of a war against Portugal.55 The maritime exchange (which allowed speculating on the different monetary values in America and in Spain) attracted many foreign investors to the Carrera de Indias.56 The Genoese merchants in Cadiz were able to carve an important role in this key financial sector by offering both

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

100

In the shadow of empire

their expertise and a solid contact network to their countrymen in Genoa. By 1773, Antonio Joseph Mosti’s trade house specialized in maritime exchange contracts drawn on shipments bound to Havana, Cartagena, Honduras, and Buenos Aires.57 The aforementioned Agustín Casimiro and Juan Pedro Aguirre,58 who represented the Ustáriz family in Buenos Aires, acted as agents and guarantors of the payment of Mosti’s remittances in the ports of the Río de la Plata. By virtue of its prominent position in the Río de la Plata, this powerful Spanish company59 was one of the main points of reference for those Genoese merchants interested in participating in South Sea–bound shipments. Both the Count of Prasca’s firm and that of the Mostis frequently invested in maritime exchange contracts drawn on Buenos Aires–bound ships belonging to the Ustáriz family, either in their own right or on behalf of the Durazzos.60 The consolidation of direct trade relations between Spain and the Río de la Plata allowed the Genoese of Cadiz to catch the increasing opportunities offered by the region in different sectors, but their businesses did not entail the establishment of a stable and exclusively Genoese trade network between the two shores of the Atlantic. To invest in sea loans and maritime exchanges in the Río de la Plata, as shown earlier, the naturalized or Spanish-born Genoese economic elite of Cadiz could easily resort to the collaboration of the best-placed Spanish trade houses in the Peninsula. Conversely, the merchants and ship-owners who were mostly interested in trading goods tended to manage their shipments by sending their relatives or other fellow countrymen overseas, but there were also cases in which they found it more convenient to use Spanish or creole correspondents. The Spanish mercantilism hindered the establishment of a dense network of Genoese partnerships between the two shores of the Atlantic, but it left the door open to merchants, artisans, and seamen seeking their fortune in the Spanish dominions. From the late colonial period, the growth of commercial navigation between Spain and the Río de la Plata made the latter an easy destination to reach for those who aimed at testing the profit-making opportunities in the local market and, possibly, establishing there an activity on their own. To this aim, all they had to do was board a Spanish mercantile ship either as passenger (if they lacked the necessary departure license, the voyage could be undertaken by bribing the captain) or as a crew member. This second option allowed individuals to avoid the costs of the trip and to bring a personal batch of goods (the so-called pacotilla)61 for sale. Once ashore, desertion was quite common

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

101

among those who wished to open a small retail shop in the port of arrival. Many mercantile careers started in the Americas in this way, including those of many early Genoese migrants who settled and prospered in colonial Buenos Aires.

pedlars, shop-owners and traders on a commercial frontier The widespread foreign trade and the long-lasting political marginality of the region in the imperial framework conferred to the Río de la Plata harbors some distinctive features: this markedly mercantile society lacking strict colonial hierarchies offered numerous opportunities to individuals of different classes and geographical backgrounds. From the earliest stages of European settlement, the demographics of the port of Buenos Aires – which had 3,359 inhabitants in 165862 – reflected the strong mercantile vocation and foreign influence of the area, with the Portuguese being the most prosperous and consistent merchant group in the city.63 Following the reorganization of legal trade via the Cape Horn route, the illicit Portuguese activities remained the Spanish authorities’ main concern. In accordance with Crown attempts to more tightly control the town’s foreigners, governor Miguel de Salcedo issued a first ban of expulsion against the Portuguese in 1740. The Cabildo (City Council) of Buenos Aires, however, was not of like mind. Supporting a petition signed by the town’s Attorney General, the City Council contested the measure and achieved revocation by making a successful case for the great usefulness of the foreign residents, many of whom were qualified workers and married vecinos of the town. Hence, the ban was only applied to Portuguese bachelors, who, however, were merely ordered to settle at a certain distance from the coast.64 It is unclear whether the governor really deemed the expulsion to be an effective measure to eradicate contraband or if his initiative was just an attempt to pressure neighboring Brazil and to impose more decisively the mediation of Spanish authorities over intercolonial trade. The latter seems to be the most plausible interpretation, given that since the seventeenth century the authorities who were supposed to stem contraband also played a crucial role in it by making use of their power to collect the money needed to sustain local administrative structures and, in turn, widen their own legal and illegal businesses.65 In the following years, while the governor expressed an increasingly formal rigidity toward the foreigners settled in Buenos Aires, conversely the council continued to champion this group by emphasizing its

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

102

In the shadow of empire

importance for the economic and commercial development of the area. The Cabildo of Buenos Aires defended foreigners in 1743, when governor Domingo Ortiz de Rosas proscribed trade with Colonia do Sacramento and ordered the closure of all retail outlets supplying beverages and edibles (pulperías) or other commodities (tiendas and tendejones) run by the Portuguese and other foreign owners. Those who denounced them were promised a third of the goods confiscated from the unlicensed sellers.66 To invalidate the expulsion decree (and yet again on the advice of the Attorney General), the City Council sent the governor a detailed report aimed at showing how conducive foreigners were to the public good. The claim was supported on legal grounds by the Ley 10, Título XXVI, Libro 9 of the Recopilacíon de las Leyes de Indias, whereby foreigners practicing mechanical arts that “were useful to the Republic” could not be banned. In fact, the Cabildo argued that the city had remarkably developed thanks to the contribution of the foreigners who had started settling in Buenos Aires in 1716, in conjunction with the Portuguese occupation of Colonia and the institution of the English Real asiento. According to the City Council, the foreigners’ work in Buenos Aires prompted advances in building construction and in the production of “everyday kitchenware, . . . musical instruments, . . . hardware, . . . dressmaking and shoemaking, silverware and other assorted mechanical arts.”67 The skills of the foreign craftsmen had brought so many advantages to local life, it was argued, that their qualities alone should have entailed some degree of naturalization without the sovereign’s formal approval. The final outcome of this controversy remains unknown; however, the fact that similar bans were repeatedly issued over the following years68 points to the difficulties in applying the proposal and attests to the social credit held by foreigners in a city that, in the Cabildo’s view, owed to them its rise and prosperity as an urban center. Expulsion notices were once again solicited by a group of Buenos Aires–resident Spanish merchants who filed a petition in 1749 aimed at banning forty-two foreigner owners of pulperías, tiendas and tendejones in the town: twenty-three of these were Portuguese, sixteen were Genoese, two French, and one English.69 The fact that most of these small retailers were bachelors or had not married in Buenos Aires attests to a low degree of integration in the local community. To avoid forced repatriation, however, the Genoese retailers invoked their strong ties with Spain and portrayed themselves as subjects of the Crown. For instance, Juan Baptista Cachón declared himself to be a vecino of Malaga married to María Rita Fragela, a Malaga-born woman, and the owner in Buenos Aires of a

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

103

small pulpería worth 150 pesos, a sum which he had borrowed in order to seek his fortune and which he needed to pay back in his homeland. In his appeal, by swearing not to harm the town that had welcomed him and upholding the rights that derived from his being “a legitimate [subject] of the Spanish Realms,” he demanded the freedom to pursue his business interests. Despite not featuring in the initial list of those who were to be banned, Nicolás Gandolfo stated that he was a crew member of Santa María, a ship licensed by the Casa de la Contratación in Cadiz, where he had left his wife and his children who depended on him; given that he intended to return home within six to eight months, he sought “justice” and asked the permission to keep his pulpería open for as long as he deemed necessary. Antonio Carnilia pleaded his case on the grounds of his usefulness to the defense of Buenos Aires. He operated an armoury shop with his brother, a vecino of the city, and stressed the fact that he had always produced and repaired weapons for the colonial authorities; he also emphasized that he had not illegally entered Buenos Aires but as a passenger of regidor (the city’s councilor) Francisco de Alzaybar’s ship, that he had not been able to return to Spain on health grounds, and that he had previously served on two military expeditions in Europe. In light of Carnilia’s services to the Crown, which seemed to be keen to maintain an important Buenos Aires–based garrison to protect the port from Brazil’s expansionist designs, the Real Audiencia of Charcas70 finally granted him a dispensation that saved him from banishment. The usefulness of his profession also allowed him to obtain, in 1755, naturalization and the deriving license to trade freely with the Indias; in his application to the Consejo de Indias, he underlined his efforts in supplying weaponry to the fort and the town’s artillery corps, which, having been founded in 1734, had helped to force back Portuguese raids against regidor Francisco de Alzaybar’s ships.71 The fate of the other Genoese merchants hit by the ban remains unknown; at any rate, by 1761 it was alleged yet again that most warehouses, pulperías, and tiendas of Buenos Aires were run by foreigners.72 The issue re-emerged in 1779, when it became clear that almost a quarter of all the 145 pulperías in town were in foreign hands:73 with ten names on the list of unauthorized retailers, the Genoese came first, followed by eight Portuguese, three Savoyard, an Englishman, a Piedmontese, a Corsican, a Roman, and a Venetian. As usual, they were ordered to shut down their businesses.74 On this occasion, the measure was hindered by the negligence of local officials keen to turn a blind eye. Shortly after the decree had been issued, its supporters claimed that foreigners had not

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

104

In the shadow of empire

been informed of the ban. Felix Zemborain, who was in charge of enforcing the decree, naively stated that he had not even read it having mistaken it for one of the many notices meant to ensure that the retailers’ scales complied with the law.75 The 1779 expulsion notice also featured some Genoese retailers who, despite having married in Buenos Aires, were considered illegal residents. Thus, marrying a local woman did not necessarily protect from trade bans, although there is no doubt that it could be useful. The Genoese merchant Vicente de la Rosa tried to avoid proscription by offering assurances that his shop was wholly in the hands of his wife, Juana Josefa González;76 his argument was accepted and he was left free to trade until his death in 1794.77 The names of other merchants of genuine or presumed Ligurian descent recorded on the general roll of the pulperías operating in the city78 are absent from the proscription lists, but such discrepancies should not come as a surprise. Personal or group rivalries linked to issues of competition rather than to generic battles of principle were often at the root of the expulsion notices: the notice could even hit someone who had lived undisturbed in a given community for decades, while others were wrongly accused of being foreigners as a way to eliminate business rivals. However, in most cases, descent was difficult to prove given emigrants’ ability in adopting camouflage strategies or in finding accomplices who sheltered them from threats. Even though we cannot rely on the bans to ascertain the number of foreign businesses operating in colonial Buenos Aires, these documents offer some indication as to how the different “national” segments were distributed in town and the significant role played by the Genoese. The almost obsessive attention paid by the authorities to retail trade clearly displays the pulperías’ economic importance. These makeshift and often-modest shops were the main interconnective channel for international, interregional, regional, and local trade.79 In colonial Río de la Plata, where unregulated commerce was so rampant as to make irrelevant use of the word “contraband,”80 the sector’s ubiquity was conclusive and explains why foreigners involved in this were the main target of the decrees. In the countryside, the pulperías represented the linchpin of a productive system based on indebted farm workers: by providing loans, selling on credit, and offering gambling facilities in their shops – in the colonial era, the term pulpero was often used as a synonym for pawnbroker81 – pulperos forced farmers to sell their harvests under very unfavorable conditions. The great rural pulperos often depended on a great

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

105

wholesaler, who supplied their shops with goods and to whom they resold all commodities (wheat, rawhide, and other derivatives of livestock farming) purchased from the indebted farmers at ridiculously low prices. The rural pulpero also conducted parallel deals on his account, in the hope of obtaining the capital necessary to become either independent or to enter livestock farming.82 The pulperos category included individuals from different socioeconomic backgrounds: great merchants who owned shops both in towns and in the inland provinces (a feature analogous to that of other colonial areas, such as New Spain83), small retailers selling commodities at a local level, but also small and average landowners seeking to widen their business affairs (mainly producing and selling hides) by reselling imported goods.84 In the city, the pulperos sold goods imported either from Europe or from adjacent marketplaces and, like their rural counterparts, they did not disdain lending money and pawnbroking.85 They often owned small coasters86 as well as small gardens and allotments (chacras or quintas) in the vicinity of the city, where they produced edibles and wood, which were marketed in town. The large number of pulperías, which traditionally characterized the Río de la Plata, was unknown in other colonial scenarios87 and even in North American harbor cities.88 Jorge Gelman has estimated that, in 1798, the Colonia region, which had approximately 5,000 inhabitants, hosted an average of more than one pulpería for every 100 inhabitants. A similar pattern occurred in Buenos Aires: by 1813, there was one pulpería every 94 inhabitants;89 this figure is even more meaningful when compared with the available data on Mexico City, where at the same time there was one pulpería for every 548 inhabitants.90 The proliferation of retail outlets was both legitimated and encouraged by the tax system, as evinced by the reaction of the Junta Superior of the Real Hacienda (the council of the Royal Treasury) of Buenos Aires to a report sent by the Ministers of the royal treasury of the river port of Santa Fe in 1779. The report sought advice on the lawfulness of the local treasury’s custom of making the pulperos pay a 30 pesos license fee, which enabled them to retail even if their shops did not remain open all year long. The Junta of Buenos Aires curtly replied that such a levy was “an abuse of authority,” which “unjustly” caused “harm” and that the pulpero was obliged to pay the license only for the actual trading period. The 30 pesos payment was deemed an excessive measure even if an employee or other individuals took over from the pulpero. Therefore, the Junta condemned the “intrusive zeal” of the Ministers of Santa Fe,

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

106

In the shadow of empire

who should have complied with “the Royal Treasury’s current practice” of charging the levy only for the time during which the shops were open to the public.91 The intense “mercantilization” of the territory and the high degree of dispersion of retail businesses between a minority of wholesalers and a veritable crowd of more or less stable retailers triggered frequent conflicts around the mercantile exploitation of a meager but increasingly growing population. However, the repeated failures to enforce the expulsion notices and the very fact that these only affected a scant minority of the retailers appear to show that, even with a small initial investment, it was not hard for a foreigner to start and develop a business in colonial Río de la Plata. The outcome of the petition filed in 1800 by Pablo Villarino and Antonio Miguel Romero on behalf of some “great pulperos” shows that the Buenos Aires authorities tended to preserve a free market of small retailers (regardless of their origin) as the City Council did in Cadiz. By holding the many small, makeshift retailers responsible for local traderelated “disorders” – which essentially consisted in slave contraband and pawnbroking activities linked to gambling – Romero and Villarino proposed to create a pulperos guild or, at least, a ban from trade of those who did not possess 500 pesos of initial capital. In light of the conviction that a dramatic reduction in the number of small retailers would cause a severe harm to the local economy, the city’s police intendant firmly rejected both proposals and accused the petitioners of concealing monopolistic agendas to damage the poorest retailers rather than the most dishonest ones.92 The historiography has long highlighted that many late eighteenthcentury representatives of the Buenos Aires mercantile elite started their career in retailing, kept the ownership of small shops, and maintained their close ties with inland pedlars, even after expanding their business operations.93 The minimal regulation of retail trade and the opportunities for economic advancement that it offered help to explain the interest of the Genoese for seeking their fortune and, in many cases, permanently settling in colonial Buenos Aires.

paths of integration and economic success The expulsion bans issued against foreign retailers only affected individuals lacking the social and economic resources needed to legitimize – beyond doubt – their having become permanently settled in the territory;

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

107

conversely, many Genoese merchants in the Río de la Plata were never affected by the restrictive measures. While the former managed to avoid proscription by upholding their status as Crown subjects or by claiming blood ties in Spain or in Buenos Aires, the latter succeeded in developing such close ties with the host society that their belonging to the local community was never questioned. Being Catholic, having familiarity with both language and ways of doing businesses in the Hispanic world, and conceiving the migratory experience as a private (and not necessarily temporary) entrepreneurial venture allowed the Genoese not only to establish strong ties with the merchant families of Buenos Aires but also to achieve leading positions within the local political and economic context. Integration in the host society rarely implied formal recognition from local authorities. In her recent work, Tamar Herzog highlighted that in Hispanic America, implicit forms of vecindad acquisition prevailed over explicit recognition status. In most cases, the vecindad was granted on grounds of “reputation,” that is, when a resident adopted the behavior of being assimilated into the community, he was treated as a full member. The rationales for integration in the local community, which invariably favored the Hispanic component, led to discrimination against mestizos, Africans, Native Americans, and, to a certain extent, non-Spanish Europeans.94 Still, by sharing expertise and by providing some sort of capital, it was not hard for a foreign small merchant to establish close blood and business ties in Buenos Aires. Susan Socolow’s classic work on Buenos Aires merchants shows that it was not uncommon for the son-in-law rather than the son to inherit the economic standing of the bride’s father. Examination of marriage contracts reveals that only 8% of traders’ wives were given a substantial dowry by their fathers and that a quarter of the women had no dowry. As in Cadiz, the dowry was not conceived as a vehicle to move wealth from one familial nucleus to another, but as a way of including the bridegroom into his new family’s business.95 The essentially mercantile nature of the first Genoese emigration to the Río de la Plata – which, unlike the Portuguese one, did not pose a real threat to the political stability of the area – helps to explain how easily the Genoese settled along those coasts. The career of Domingo Belgrano Peri, one of the most prosperous Ligurian merchants in the Río de la Plata, provides food for thought to understand the paths of integration and social mobility undertaken by the Genoese merchants who moved to Buenos Aires. Peri originally came from Oneglia, a small town on the western Ligurian coast.96 In 1750 he

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

108

In the shadow of empire

emigrated to Cadiz, where he Hispanicized his name to Pérez. A few years later, he moved to Buenos Aires, where in 1757 he married María Josefa González Casero, who came from Santiago del Estero and was the daughter of a small trader. Although marriage constituted an important gateway to local mercantile networks, it did not necessarily guarantee rapid economic success. Until 1766, Belgrano’s account book only reported small but increasing retail sales of efectos de Castilla (goods imported from Europe), purchased from wholesalers in Buenos Aires and redistributed in the interior.97 The services provided by Belgrano to the Crown seemed to have played a prominent role in his integration strategy: in 1762 he was made Sub-Lieutenant of the Spanish vecinos’ regiment, in 1765 he became lieutenant of the provincial cavalry, and in 1772 received appointment as captain of Buenos Aires’s cavalry militia.98 Service in the town’s militia constituted a vehicle of social affirmation and distinction for members of the local mercantile class until the end of the century, when it began to be perceived as an obligation.99 Belgrano’s crucial jump from a small retailer to a great intermediary occurred in 1776, when his daughter María Florencia married prominent trader and landowner Julian Gregorio Espinosa, who gave his father-inlaw a zero interest loan of more than 18,000 reales to grow his business.100 The three-year period from 1776 to 1778 constitutes a turning point in Belgrano’s commercial career not only because of his daughter’s marriage but from the new opportunities deriving from the institution of the viceroyalty and from the promulgation of the comercio libre decree, which allowed him to trade directly with Spain. A further opportunity arose from the war between Spain and England, during which he became one of the leading Río de la Plata exporters of silver and rawhide, which were sent primarily to Miguel y Folch, his consignatario in Cadiz.101 He also traded slaves imported from Brazil and embarked on commercial operations with the Banda Oriental, France, and Great Britain.102 The economic opportunities offered by international trade further fostered both his credit and retail operations in the interior – mainly Lima and Potosí. Thus, the big merchant moved along the double track of wholesale and retail, by establishing commercial firms and by entrusting his employees with the running of his shops.103 The investments were not restricted to the mercantile sector: between real estate and land, Belgrano purchased no less than twenty properties in Buenos Aires, while also maintaining interests in livestock farming (he possessed two large chacras and two estancias) and lucrative urban ventures such as brick production and tithe collection. Along with a complex system of family alliances, these

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

109

strategies allowed Belgrano and his successors to enter the highest ranks of colonial government.104 Belgrano’s extraordinary rise from “pedlar to great merchant” – as Jorge Gelman puts it – makes his case an exceptional one even from a documentary point of view. However, the most fragmented testimonies to emerge from cross-referencing the various notarial deeds with other sources show how the Oneglia merchant was nothing but the most prominent exponent of a much-wider movement of anonymous Genoese merchants and craftsmen, who by following similar integration pathways had been able to carve out an important place for themselves in the Río de la Plata social and economic scene. Genoa-born Domingo Pelliza was one of these merchants. He moved to Spain in 1738105 and some time in the 1740s arrived in Buenos Aires, where he married twice, first to Rosa Rubio and then to Tomasa Morales, with whom he had nine children. The beginnings of his career are quite obscure, but in his last will and testament he admits some illicit operations: to elude a smuggling charge, he had altered his first wife’s dowry document, where she featured as the lawful owner of the assets (money and jewelry) that he had accrued through trade.106 Not only was Pelliza never hit by an expulsion ban, but he had succeeded in establishing such a good reputation that he soon became the tax auditor to the city’s pulperías. From 1751 to 1756, he also served as Mayordomo (treasurer) to the Cabildo of Buenos Aires and in 1766 he received appointment as the Alcalde de Hermandad (a municipal magistrate with policing powers).107 Meanwhile, he maintained his retail business, which features in a 1779 list of the Buenos Aires pulperías.108 Pelliza managed to widen his business affairs through his family’s support. He obtained a loan from his son-inlaw, José Pereyra, who was married to his daughter María Inés; his sons Domingo and Vicente both pursued mercantile careers in partnership with their father.109 Vicente secured from Manuel Duarte, who married his sister Micaela, a loan and some assistance to set up one of his first shipments, destined to San Juan. As with Belgrano, another key factor to Pelliza’s success was shrewd diversification of investments. The two marriages and the commercial profits allowed him to release from seizure his father-in-law’s properties (two family homes and an estancia near Magdalena), and to purchase others; at the time of his death in 1790, his Buenos Aires property portfolio comprised three houses (two of which included land) and one room divided into two rental dwellings. Pelliza also held interests in direct production. His two pieces of land housed mills with three millstones to grind cereals, and a brick factory with two

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

110

In the shadow of empire

kilns.110 The exact amount of his wealth remains unknown but he must have been very well-off if Pedro Palavecino, who in those same years possessed a similar property portfolio, was – in Lyman Johnson’s opinion – one of the city’s wealthiest men.111 Having moved at a young age to Buenos Aires, Palavecino, who was of Ligurian descent but born in Cadiz, had accrued a considerable fortune through the production and sale of bread. He married a Buenos Aires–born woman, Agustina de Llanes, who gave him nine children, only three of whom reached adulthood. In his 1799 will, Palavecino bequeathed a substantial inheritance valued at 44,109.7 pesos, which included four city center houses, a bakery with three millstones to grind cereal, six slaves, and 17,000 pesos in cash.112 The path taken by Lorenzo Patrón, who was born in Chiavari and moved to Buenos Aires with his brother Juan Bautista, was not dissimilar. Although his brother was mentioned in the 1749 expulsion decree, by 1754, in a register compiled by Mayordomo Domingo Pelliza, both brothers featured as the owners of two regularly trading pulperías.113 Lorenzo married María Magdalena Pimienta and brought to the marriage 800 pesos of capital. The union produced two children who both died relatively young; however, one of them – Juan Antonio – gave his father eight grandsons. At his death, which closely followed that of his son, Lorenzo Patrón possessed 19,820 pesos in assets, including a house with land and two rented city quintas. This was not merely a property portfolio, but a real business producing and selling fruits, vegetables, wine, olive oil, olives, and timber. His properties, where twelve slaves were employed, featured some typically Mediterranean crops: 799 olive trees, 2,060 peach trees, 1,229 grapevines, 77 pear trees, 74 fig trees, a vegetable garden, and a variety of orange, lemon, and pomegranate trees, as well as walnuts and willows. Furthermore, each of the three properties came with a bread oven and two kilns, located in the main dwelling and used to produce bricks and roof tiles. The production of bread and bricks was not meant for in-house use but for resale, as attested by transactions recorded in Patrón’s will.114 As was the custom, the retail business was flanked by borrowing and lending activities: among the deceased’s papers were many bonds issued in his favor and a list including all the debtors to which he had lent money for the payment of the tithe.115 His son Juan Antonio followed in his father’s steps and at his death left a house with a large lot of cropped land that comprised grapevines, fruit orchards, a bread oven, and a pulpería.116 Some Genoese merchants moved to the Río de la Plata with the aim of trading on behalf of Cadiz intermediaries, but most of those who

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

111

remained in Buenos Aires did not maintain this activity as their main or only business. In lack of stable Genoese merchant networks between the two shores of the Atlantic, the decision to not return to Europe depended on the possibility of expanding one’s business in the host society. This is what happened to Francisco Ratto, who went to Buenos Aires as agent of Genoese merchant Bartholomé Dañino of Cadiz in 1762; on behalf of his fellow countryman, he collected the balance of the sea loan on a batch of goods sent from Spain to Juan de Lezica y Torrézuri, regidor of the Buenos Aires city council,117 but then decided to remain in the Río de la Plata, where he married and consolidated his career in local trade.118 The case of Nicolás Braco shows that farming and retail trade of agricultural products could represent a good reason for definitively settling in town. Braco had been born in Voltri but was a vecino of Cadiz, where he had married a Jerez de la Frontera woman whom he left in Spain around 1782 to seek his fortune in the Carrera de Indias.119 Having moved to Buenos Aires, he maintained business ties with his Cadiz factor Antonio Molinely, a fellow Genoese to whom he sent rawhide batches.120 During these years, however, he also bought a quinta that allowed him to produce and retail edibles in the city.121 In 1790, between goods and credits, he declared assets worth 21,282 pesos. Despite his long stay in Buenos Aires, where he had also brought his only surviving son, Braco continued to call himself a residente, that is, a transient immigrant122 until the mid 1790s, when he finally asked his wife to leave Spain and join him.123 It is no coincidence that Ligurian merchants shared interest in investing the economic activities described earlier. Brick production and wheat processing were secure and profitable occupations in a city like Buenos Aires, which experienced rapid population growth and was endowed with a prosperous agricultural hinterland.124 It is well-known that in Buenos Aires the European immigrants, especially those from Spain, occupied a leading position in the bakery and flour production sectors by taking advantage of the lack of guild restraints and regulations. By purchasing wheat directly from indebted producers, by speculating on the price and – in an attempt to limit the distribution costs – by entrusting the pulperos to sell the bread, in a short time the foreign panaderos broke all rules governing the production and consumption of a staple food that traditionally had been sold at a low price.125 These practices were also implemented by Francisco Carnilia, a Genoese pulpero who had been hit by the 1749 expulsion decree but who nonetheless carried on his businesses, possibly owing to the “good offices” offered to the Crown

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

112

In the shadow of empire

by his brother and partner Antonio. In 1762, Francisco was accused of speculating on the price of wheat, but the Regidor acknowledged his status of vecino of the city and simply sentenced him to a fine equal to the value of the overpriced wheat;126 he maintained the right to keep his shop, which became a tienda over the years, and in 1779 he eluded yet another expulsion decree thanks to the naturalization that he and his brother obtained in 1755.127 In 1774, the Cabildo attempted to curtail these monopolistic aims by ordering the closure of all unlicensed bakeries, but the measure was cunningly bypassed by the building of domestic ovens. On several occasions, the local authorities attempted to ban the panaderos who were foreigners or who had married in Spain,128 but due to the favor of some of “the city’s powerful families,” the banned bakers did not suffer any negative consequence.129 The local authorities were left with no option but to increase the tax pressure on the sale of bread, but the many stratagems elaborated by panaderos to pass the levy onto consumers nullified these initiatives.130 Therefore, from the 1770s, the large-scale production and sale of bread in the viceroyalty’s capital remained in the hands of a minority of producers, with many of them having emigrated from Europe. It should not come as a surprise then that in 1796 Juan Bautista Faustino Patrón – the nephew of Genoese merchant Lorenzo Patrón – was assigned the 27,000 pesos contract for the collection of the wheat tithe for all six partidos of Buenos Aires (the administrative areas under the jurisdiction of the city).131 The production of fruit, vegetables, and timber for urban supply was also very profitable. In fact, it was rather cheap to purchase or rent a quinta in the vicinity of Buenos Aires to produce goods in high demand because there was plenty of farming land and a lack of strict urban planning regulations or other legal restrictions on ejido (public lands).132 As we shall see, the production and retail of bread, fruit, and vegetables in the quintas would become the businesses areas preferred by Ligurian immigrants, even after independence. The case of trader Andrés Caneva, who was born in Voltri around 1762 and moved to Buenos Aires around 1776,133 illustrates another typical feature of the Río de la Plata mercantile business world, that is, the river coasting trade. In Buenos Aires, Caneva had married Juana Balerga,134 the daughter of Ligurian merchant Antonio Balerga, who had arrived in Spain in 1762 and moved to Buenos Aires thirty years later.135 Five children were born from the marriage, to which the married couple had brought “solely their personal [moral] decency.” In 1793,

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

113

alongside Luis Balerga, Caneva is listed among the pedlars who purchased a trading license from the Buenos Aires City Council.136 In his 1811 will, Caneva declared himself the owner of four houses valued at 17,936 pesos, nine house servants, and two shops retailing imported goods.137 Alongside these two shops, which he had owned since 1804,138 he possessed a coaster ship, co-owned by an unknown partner. In 1802, Caneva was ranked among the ship-owners operating in Buenos Aires, alongside Juan Caneva139 who, possibly a relative of his, had been born in Voltri and arrived in Buenos Aires around 1790.140 The latter would then widen his business affairs141 by transporting rawhide and tallow from Santa Fe and Paraná, and aguardiente, wine, and iron from Montevideo.142 Andrés Caneva’s son Romualdo, who was left in charge of his father’s shops, also maintained direct interests in the coastal trade.143 One of the first pieces of evidence for the Ligurian presence in the river commerce of the Río de la Plata dates to 1772, when Ignacio Belando signed a charter contract to transport a batch of curupay bark – which was used to tan cowhides – from Corrientes to Buenos Aires in his own boat.144 As we shall see, the Genoese participation in the river trade would become massive only after independence, but the cases mentioned here attest to their interest in this sector when emancipation – and the great migratory flow from Liguria – was still to come. Genoese commercial penetration was not restricted to the harbor region but extended to the intermediary routes leading to the Andean area. Among the documents produced by the authorities who were entrusted to handle the assets of dead merchants, for instance, there is a file concerning Genoese Antonio Risso, who had married Ana Ferreyra in Buenos Aires, where he owned a house, and died in Santiago de Chile in 1792, leaving assets worth 187,988 reales de vellón. The fact that Risso’s trading activities were neither occasional nor restricted to the Chilean region is attested by Jugzado de bienes de difuntos de la Real Audiencia de Chile, which contacted the governors of La Paz, Potosí, and Salta in order to secure the merchant’s outstanding credits.145 Another interesting case is that of Mateo Maza, who was born and likely started his mercantile career in Sant’Ilario di Nervi, nowadays a district of Genoa.146 His presence in the Río de la Plata dates to at least since 1767, when he was listed among the owners of authorized Buenos Aires pulperías.147 In 1783, he sued Felipe Zeballos over the ownership of a female slave.148 Warrants signed by him in 1784 attest to his trade interests with Chile, to which he sent several batches of yerba mate and other unspecified goods.149 During these same years, the merchant established his

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

114

In the shadow of empire

credentials in the host society by defending the Luján border against the natives’ forays and by serving as sublieutenant (alferez) in Buenos Aires’s cavalry militia.150 The notarial deeds provide some other – albeit fragmented – information about the presence of merchants of Genoese descent operating on behalf of local wholesalers in the mining production industry151 and in commercial brokerage between Potosí and Buenos Aires.152 The progressive decadence of the Potosí mining economy, which was worsened by the political fragmentation of the viceroyalty after independence,153 drastically reduced profit-making opportunities for the merchants working as intermediaries between the Andean economic scene and the Río de la Plata ports. Conversely, as we shall see, the harbor region multiplied job opportunities in various sectors. The Genoese diaspora also spread along the eastern bank of Paraná’s estuary.154 The available literature about Montevideo does not allow meticulous comparisons with the Buenos Aires context; still, several factors suggest that the paths toward integration and success undertaken by the merchants who resided in the eastern port may not have been that different. During the colonial period, Montevideo represented the region’s main port for Atlantic traffic, because access to Buenos Aires’s port was much more difficult. The widespread smuggling – especially during wartime – and the lower degree of institutionalization compared with the viceroyalty’s capital, might have provided foreigners with similar or even more opportunities for settlement. In fact, the censuses conducted in Montevideo attest to the presence of Genoese craftsmen, pulperos, shop-owners or, more generically, tratantes at least since the early 1770s.155 The chances for economic improvement held by some of these immigrants are evinced by a list of traders and hacendados (landowners) drawn in 1812 in an attempt to institute a mercantile tribunal that would be independent of the Buenos Aires one.156 The petition was underwritten by Carlos Camusso, the former sales agent of ship-owner Benito Patrón for the importation of slaves in Montevideo, who had been appointed as judge of the local merchant council (Diputación de Comercio). The 1812 list attests a strong presence of Ligurian emigrants (either of first generation or previously Hispanicized) in all the key sectors of Montevideo’s economy: the great brokers included Carlos and José Camuso, Gerónimo Agnese, Jacinto Frabega, Gerónimo Bianqui, and widow Parodi (perhaps the wife of Pascual José Parodi, a secondgeneration Genoese immigrant who was also a member of Montevideo’s City Council);157 among the listed hacendados, there were José Antonio Galiano, José Minolo, Bonifacio Canal, and Nicolás Rovello. Fiorentino

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

115

Bruno and José Lázaro owned wholesale depots and Carlos Vignales158 featured among the tallow producers; both Carlos Camuso and Gerónimo Bianqui were listed as ship-owners. Gerónimo Bianqui was the son of Juan Domingo Bianqui, who was born in Novi (a present-day Piedmontese city under Genoese dominion until 1797); Juan Domingo arrived in the Río de la Plata as an officer of the Spanish Army to be employed in the garrison forces of Buenos Aires, and in 1757 he married Josefa Berthelar, herself the daughter of a Genoese immigrant.159 The cases mentioned so far represent only a part – the most documented – of the Ligurian settlement in the Río de la Plata. Reporting more scattered information about other individuals that can be found in the notarial deeds would not either contradict or add much to what has been said about the economic strategies and integration pathways of the Genoese emigrants. Instead, we will learn more by exploring in greater depth their relationships with local institutions.

prospects for social advancement within local institutions The way in which the first waves of Genoese emigrants related to Buenos Aires institutions differed according to their professional and social status. Once they arrived in the region, they substantially benefited from the weak existing corporate structures, which allowed them to establish an array of businesses without having to contend with the limitations usually imposed by craft guilds in Europe. When the Crown attempted to hinder foreign emigrants’ chances of operating in the local market, they discovered a host of ways to evade restrictions and legitimate their positions. However, the Genoese did not necessarily oppose corporate organizations regulating their activities in the viceroyalty. Those who succeeded in accruing the required economic resources and social networks could attain prominent positions in local governmental institutions. And when they deemed it convenient, they also promoted the establishment of privileged guilds to better protect their interests and those of their respective professional categories. The fast demographic growth of Buenos Aires, the belated institution of the viceroyalty, the modesty of local manufactures against imports, the ethnic tensions between “white” and “non-white” artisans, and, in some cases, the diverging interests between the rich and the poor producers or vendors prevented the consolidation of corporate systems regulating access to productive and mercantile professions. Tailors were the first

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

116

In the shadow of empire

craftsmen who, in 1733, sought to regulate the production and sale of their wares, but they never succeeded in establishing a guild.160 Following a string of government initiatives, the silversmiths organized a guild, which, however, had little influence and was marred by continual internal rifts.161 Baking was one of Buenos Aires’s most lucrative artisan sectors, but bakers also were one of the least organized groups in the Río de la Plata. These “artisans entrepreneurs” viewed the founding of guilds as a hindrance to their freedom and vehemently opposed efforts by the local government to regulate the sales and prices of their products. In regard to trade, as noted earlier, all attempts by the great pulperos to curb competition of small retailers through a corporate lockdown of the sector were foiled by the local authorities. The possibility of acquiring small lots of land near the port, engaging in river trade, opening shops, and producing bread, bricks, or other items for the supply of the city without having to access to a guild offered the expatriated traders and artisans manifold profit-making opportunities and a degree of autonomy that were increasingly difficult to obtain in their home country. Recent studies have reappraised the role and longevity of guilds in early modern Europe by stressing their importance in fostering technological and marketing innovations. This view, which challenges the French revolutionary theories depicting the guilds as the main obstacle to economic progress in the pre-industrial era, does not seems to be applicable to eighteenth-century Genoa.162 The guilds in the Republic were formally maintained until the Napoleonic period, but they experienced an evolution that reduced the artisans’ traditional possibilities for social advancement, increased unemployment in the urban areas, and discouraged innovations. From the second half of the seventeenth century, the Genoese craft guilds fell in the hands of the urban merchantsentrepreneurs who controlled production as well as the repression of frauds with the aim of diminishing the costs of manufactures and coping with growing foreign competition. The productive system’s submission to commercial capital transformed the old independent artisans into mere workers and led to a decrease in wages.163 As noted in Chapter 1, the most strategic Genoese manufactures (especially textiles and paper) remained competitive due to their cheap price and low quality. The guilds regulating the production and sale of bread, pasta, vegetables, meat, and spices were instead exposed to constant governmental interference for control of the city’s food supplies.164 In Buenos Aires, on the contrary, the lack of corporate rigidity allowed the Genoese to combine different lucrative activities. In many cases, the

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

117

economic and relational capital accumulated along the years ensured not only a rise in the social scale, but also access to local institutions or the establishment of privileged relations with them. The important offices held by the pulpero Domingo Pelliza and by the son of pulpero Juan Bautista Faustino Patrón (who were, respectively, municipal treasurer and tithe collector in the Buenos Aires district) attest to the wealth of opportunities for economic and social advancement offered by the city to the more dynamic fringes of foreign immigration and particularly to those involved in trade. Another illuminating case, once again, is that of merchant Domingo Belgrano Pérez, who became a high officer of Buenos Aires’s customs (founded in 1778) and, in 1781–2, was appointed councilor of the Cabildo and procurador (legal representative). In 1790, along with his aforementioned countryman Mateo Maza and other distinguished merchants of the city, Belgrano promoted the institution of the Consulado, Buenos Aires’s merchant guild and tribunal.165 Established in Middle-Age Mediterranean cities as a maritime court166 and later transformed into a permanent mercantile tribunal, the Consulado represented a privilege that the Crown had granted very cautiously in respect to its overseas dominions. Those of México and Lima (founded in 1592 and in 1593 respectively) were the only Consulados present in the Indias until the late eighteenth century; by then, establishing analogous institutions in the other kingdoms stood out as the unavoidable consequence of the contradictions of the Bourbon mercantilist policy that aimed at strengthening the imperial system.167 As noted earlier, one of the main initiatives undertaken by the Bourbon administration to achieve such an ambitious goal was the promulgation of the 1778 comercio libre decree, which extended trade privileges to the empire’s major colonial hubs. To promote productive and shipping activities with the Indias and undermine the power of the monopoly corporation of Cadiz, the Crown ordered the institution of a Consulado de Comercio in every Spanish port licensed to overseas trade.168 Conversely, the institutions of Consulados in the American ports licensed to trade with the metropolis was postponed, due to the opposition of the corporations of México and Lima169 and because of the Bourbons’ ambition to ensure that Spain supplied their overseas dominions through the apt support of its farming and manufacturing sectors.170 The Crown’s aims at restricting the autonomy of Spanish American elite clashed with the limits of the Spanish productive system171 and with the wars triggered by the French Revolution, when a major collaboration with the increasingly restless colonial elites through the extension of mercantile privileges became inevitable:172 in order to

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

118

In the shadow of empire

strengthen imperial ties and to avoid a more serious crisis, between 1793 and 1795 Consulados were instituted in Caracas, Guatemala, Buenos Aires, Havana, Veracruz, Santiago de Chile, Guadalajara, and Cartagena.173 Through the Consulado, the great merchants of Buenos Aires were allowed to control their own commercial lawsuits and remove jurisdiction from the ordinary judiciary. The tribunal was flanked by Junta de Gobierno, a board of merchants and landowners that held the task of fostering the economic development of the viceroyalty by implementing the Bourbon initiatives in support of trade and farming, enforcing protectionist measures against slave smuggling, facilitating river and ground traffic, modernizing ports, collecting some levies, and creating a local shipbuilding industry.174 As prominent exponents of the Buenos Aires merchant elite, the Genoese migrants and their families were allowed to further strengthen their social status by occupying relevant positions in local administration. The paths followed by three sons of Domingo Belgrano clearly show this tendency. Manuel studied law at Salamanca and Valladolid Universities and became the first secretary of the Consulado in 1794.175 In 1790, his brother Joaquín was one of the city’s customs administrators and in the following years was made honorary minister of Buenos Aires’s royal treasures. The third brother, Francisco, was appointed councilor of the Cabildo in 1806.176 Bartolomé Domingo Bianqui, who was the Buenos Aires–born son of the aforementioned Juan Domingo and the brother of the ship-owner Gerónimo, followed a similar career in Montevideo’s administration. Having studied grammar, philosophy, and theology, he served as Royal Treasury officer in the oriental port, where he permanently settled and consolidated his position. In Montevideo he became notary and officer to the Royal Treasury and was responsible for collecting the alcabala (a sales tax charged on all transactions); in 1792, he was granted the title of public notary to the Indias and, in 1793, having presented a report on his own and his father’s merits and a letter of recommendation signed by several Montevideo political and military authorities, he applied for the position of notary to the diputación of the Consulado of Montevideo.177 Ten years later, he became the first notary to the government of Montevideo.178 Trade was not the only economic sector in which the Genoese migrants in Buenos Aires showed the ambition to establish a privileged corporation. A similar initiative was undertaken by the shoemakers, who sought to expand their influence in Buenos Aires by profiting from the privileges they had been granted by the Spanish crown overseas.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

119

In Cadiz, most of the craft guilds were maintained until the beginning of the nineteenth century, but the corporate system did not represent an impediment to foreign artisans. Due to their expertise and their traditionally strong presence in the port, the Genoese entered some of the main craft guilds of Cadiz and the related fraternities at a very early stage. They were particularly influential in the production of shoes, which were sold both in the local and in the American markets. In this sector, they played such a prominent role that in 1723 they obtained the control of some of the guild’s executive offices after threatening the creation of a separate corporation along with the French masters.179 Aware of the advantages deriving from corporate privileges in Spain, some Spanish and foreign masters attempted to control the production and sale of shoes in the Río de la Plata’s capital, where the constant population growth and the presence of the military contingent for the defense of the port guaranteed a high demand for footwear. In 1788, this group proposed the city’s Cabildo to establish a shoemaker guild similar to the one existing in Cadiz.180 Among the petitioners, who called themselves “maestros de obra primera de zapatería” (first class shoemaker masters) and vecinos of Buenos Aires, there were many individuals of Portuguese and Italian (particularly Genoese) descent.181 The Genoese masters were guided by José Canepa, a Voltri-born shoemaker who had moved to Buenos Aires around 1780.182 The petition was based on the need to save the profession from the decline it was experiencing due to the competition of unskilled local artisans (in many cases, slaves of African descent), whom the petitioners called “darners” and who, in their opinion, were careless in their choice of fabrics and traditional shoemaking techniques. They paid their workers paltry wages to produce cheap shoes of an abysmal quality, which impeded the “real shoemakers” to “be conducive to the public good” and led them to look for fall-back jobs. The petitioners called for emulating the Spanish system by instituting a guild that recognized the different degrees of expertise represented by the titles of apprentice, oficial (skilled worker), and maestro (master). They desired regulations for opening a shop, which included a formal examination of applicants’ skills and, above all, that no “national” discrimination other than that between “Spanish” shoemakers (elsewhere referred to as “white”) and “baja esfera” (low rank) in being granted access to the gremio’s executive offices; as with the Spanish system, being vecinos should be the only condition. The following year, a group of delegates appointed by the masters presented to the Cabildo a proposal in which they asked to legally manage

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

120

In the shadow of empire

the guild and suggested that a slave could not become a maestro. The proposal gave maestros a number of privileges, from the sole right to sell shoes – a business that, until then, had been handled by the pulperos – to priority in purchasing shoemaking material from Europe. The petition was immediately opposed by Juan José Romero, who refused to sign the document by contesting the open access to the guild’s executive positions by foreigners.183 Although Romero claimed to represent most of the city’s shoemakers, the Cabildo endorsed the proposal by highlighting how useful the foreigners’ know-how was to the profession and, consequently, to the public good.184 The City Council expressed the hope that the position of the foreign maestros could also be properly regulated in other artisan sectors in order to foster the settlement of foreign skilled labor. In approving temporary regulations, the Cabildo insisted on the need for foreign craftsmen to “grow fond” of the region through marriage to local women, which would spur population growth and local economic development.185 This interest in demography and local production was accompanied by concerns about the problems deriving from the massive presence among shoemakers of enslaved negros and castas (black and mixed race people). Given that many families made a living from slave labor, the Cabildo rejected the idea of banning them from the mechanical arts but it stressed that their inclusion within the guild did not entail their emancipation.186 Not only did the viceroy support the stance taken by the Cabildo, but he also increased the possibilities for foreigners to access executive positions within the nascent guild. In fact, both foreigner vecinos married to local women and bachelors who had resided in the Río de la Plata for at least ten years were granted access to the guild. Slaves were allowed to obtain maestro status but they were forbidden access to the primeros empleos (the guild’s executive positions). Ratification from local authorities did not put an end to the conflict. The protests blew up again in 1791, when Romero contested the appointment of Canepa as vocal (counselor) of the guild despite his election having been endorsed by the majority of voters.187 In 1793, after the expulsion of Romero from the council for irregular conduct during the elections, the foreigners managed to monopolize most of the gremio’s executive,188 but the internal quarrels continued in the matter of which monastery should house the brotherhood attached to the corporation.189 The permanent lack of agreement eventually led to a 1794 royal decree denying the license to permanently constitute the guild, which until then had simply been ratified by the viceroy.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

121

The suspension of the gremio’s statutes was exploited by the mestizo D. Francisco Baquero who, in 1795 and on behalf of black and mixed race maestros, suggested the creation of a separate guild.190 Baquero’s proposal was strenuously opposed by the foreign masters, who feared that the pardos and negros would unavoidably commit frauds in the absence of strict controls;191 moreover, as “non-white” maestros were the majority, their separation would deprive the “white” guild of most of the contributions for its maintenance. To win support in the city, Baquero sought and obtained the valuable backing of the city’s pulperos by offering them to retail shoes, a trade that the “white” shoemakers’ gremio wished to monopolize.192 Taking stock of the irreconcilable nature of the dispute, the Cabildo resolved to dismiss the guild’s project. In 1799, Cornelio Saavedra, attorney to the Cabildo, railed against the corporate system by accusing it of worsening the miserable conditions of the country and, consequently, preventing population growth.193 The arguments that had once led the Cabildo to back the institution of a shoemaker guild were now used to justify its abolition and to assert the sacred right of all humans to earn a living without having to pay fees to a corporation whose unique purpose was to reduce the number of practitioners producing an item needed by the mass of people, for whom prices were made artificially high. Saavedra’s view was recalled in 1809 by Mariano Moreno, who quoted the shoemaker debacle as an example of the damages brought by privileges and thus calling for opening the Río de la Plata commerce to foreign ships.194 The attempt of creating the shoemakers’ guild is the only case in which, in colonial Buenos Aires, some Genoese immigrants acted as a group for being granted a privilege from local authorities. The way and the reasons why they did it depended on the opportunities this sector offered them to prosper in the region. A craft guild was not necessary to start an activity in town; it allowed achieving something as important as the control of the market of a highly demanded item at the detriment of local producers and vendors. The Genoese shoemakers could not claim any prerogative as a nation but, similar to what they had done in Spain, they could ally with other foreigners and try to profit from the local authorities’ good disposition toward skilled immigrants who aimed at contributing to local economic and demographic development. The low regard for “nonwhite” artisans in Buenos Aires and the privileged position the foreigners already possessed in the guild of Cadiz enhanced their possibilities of succeeding; despite all these favoring circumstances, however, their project failed because it clashed with the interests of the majority of the

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

122

In the shadow of empire

existing artisans and, above all, it aimed at depriving local traders of a valuable market segment. In light of the new Enlightenment stance that was gaining ground among the Buenos Aires elite, immigrant artisans lost any further possibility of controlling local production but did not cease to be considered as a useful resource for the economic development of the region. On the eve of independence, Manuel Belgrano, in his capacity as secretary of the Tribunal del Consulado, sought to increase local manufacturing by proposing measures to deregulate labor and to foster immigration of skilled workers. In 1803, on behalf of two Montevideo merchant magnates, Belgrano filed a complaint against the local maritime authorities, who had reserved for themselves the sole rights to nominate the caulkers of mercantile ships.195 The secretary argued that the effectiveness of maritime trading and, indirectly, the Crown’s prosperity would be guaranteed by leaving the merchants free to hire on their own accord as they commonly did in other important harbors such as Cadiz and Havana.196 Belgrano did not explicitly refer to the possibility of hiring foreign caulkers but this was a natural consequence: in Cadiz as well in other great Spanish and American ports, which were in constant need of skilled seamen and workers, the lack of regulation and minimal controls facilitated foreign access to the ships’ crews and local shipbuilding sector. In a memorandum of 1802 Belgrano denounced European (mostly British) designs to control the Río de la Plata rivers and proposed the necessity to acquire the means by which – until then – foreign powers hindered the local trade, industry, and shipping from flourishing. He proposed the institution of tanneries in the bark-rich regions of Paraguay, Corrientes, and Tucumán through the funding derived from trade revenues and the organizational support of the Consulado. The technological gap could be easily filled by fostering immigration of European skilled manpower.197 A year before this petition, the Consulado had tried to hire skilled master tanners from the United States.198 In 1802, Belgrano suggested bringing to Buenos Aires a number of tanners from Ireland, from where the government already had agreed to import wheatharvesting machinery.199 These proposals clearly highlight the value consistently attributed to foreign labor by prominent sections of the ruling classes in colonial Buenos Aires, a recognition shared by both younger and older officials. In summary, the Genoese who settled in colonial Buenos Aires profited from the lack of corporative regulations to establish and expand their activities in many different sectors, but they were not necessarily averse to

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

123

the establishment of guilds. Both those who prospered in trade and in manufacturing, particularly in the production of shoes, looked at the creation of a craft guild as an instrument for consolidating their social and economic position. In supporting the establishment of the merchant guild and tribunal, the Genoese succeeded because they acted as fully integrated members of the host community and in accordance with the interests of local economic elite. Conversely, the initiative of the Genoese shoemakers, who tried to capitalize on the advantages deriving from their foreign status at the expense of local artisans and vendors, ended in failure. In any case, the Genoese strategies of economic and social ascension in Buenos Aires always transcended their “national” identity. Ultimately, their purpose was not – and could not be – to establish hometown credentials or special privileges as a group on the other side of the Atlantic, but to establish themselves as individuals in the host society. The religious affiliations of the Genoese in Buenos Aires confirm their tendency to transcend national allegiance. To the mercantile class of Buenos Aires, ecclesiastical institutions represented an important gateway to social distinction and to the promotion of personal interests. Not infrequently, the big traders were treasurers of the city’s religious orders; the office put them in charge of sums to be reinvested in the mercantile circuits through loans, of supplying the monastic properties and of marketing the commodities produced therein. The same can be said about the city’s charitable institutions. Having been founded in 1743 by a group of distinguished citizens of Buenos Aires, the Hermandad de la Caridad was particularly active in the charitable sector. With its large property portfolio, the brotherhood founded the Casa de Niños Expósitos and the Hospital de Mujeres, which, along with the Hospital de Hombres managed by the Bethlemite order, were the city’s only hospitals.200 The great traders held the brotherhoods’ most prominent offices and gained huge profits from supplying and selling the products of its estancias (mainly hides retailed in Buenos Aires), lending short-term loans, and collecting rent. Through the capellanía201 – a financial instrument rather popular among Buenos Aires traders – the Church provided even the smallest of investors with protection and guarantees. This institution allowed merchants to retain a part of the capital donated to the Church by paying an annual interest; the capital and the interest payments could either be transferred to a third party as a loan or recovered in order to be reinvested in commercial ventures.202 The interest held by the mercantile class in religious institutions was not fuelled exclusively by economic return or by devoutness: the

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

124

In the shadow of empire

attainment of social prestige was an important product of membership and office-holding. The processions organized to celebrate the patron saint represented moments of high visibility and social recognition within the city and it is no accident that in Buenos Aires, between 1760 and 1810, the Royal Banner’s parade was entrusted to a prominent representative of the trading industry for at least forty-eight years.203 Religious affiliation also provided the merchants with important opportunities of sociability and solidarity by joining brotherhoods and secular groups associated with local parishes and cults of saints, which fostered ties of allegiance to a spiritual family that was often supported by family, business, and camaraderie networks.204 Their popularity was so great that there were already two fraternal associations by 1609 in Buenos Aires and, by 1623, the city featured as many as thirteen.205 As socializing spaces, the confraternities were not the reserve of the city’s elite, but included a wide array of social actors, from military officers to artisans. In Buenos Aires, there were no corporate confraternities and only on rare occasions were distinctions made on the basis of “national” or ethnic identity.206 Per se, the tacit agreement not to admit foreigners did not constitute an obstacle to those born outside Spanish dominions; for a foreigner, admittance to local institutions depended on the same implicit acceptance that allowed the informal acquisition of the vecindad status. The increasing appeal exerted by these associations on the city’s large population of African descent resulted in a sharp drop in prestige for mixed fraternities in the course of the eighteenth century. Middle-class merchants, army officials, and civil servants progressively steered toward tertiary orders; these lay groups were bound to the mendicant orders rather than to local parishes and favored social status over natal origins. The most prominent terceras órdenes of Buenos Aires were those of Santo Domingo (the most exclusive) and of San Francisco (the most popular among traders). These were followed by the Mercedarios, who were affiliated with the convent of Nuestra Señora de las Mercedes, and the Betlemitas, who were attached to the chapel of the Hospital de Hombres.207 The notarial deeds confirm that the Genoese settled in Buenos Aires did not tie themselves exclusively to any given religious institution, but decided on the basis of their personal networking and social standing. Following the example of the local elite, the great Ligurian merchants affiliated with the most exclusive terceras órdenes, while also maintaining ties with other religious institutions. Among the hermanos of the tertiary

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

125

order of Santo Domingo, there were Pedro Palavecino (who, in his last will, left money to the Hermandad de Nuestra Señora de Dolores y Ánimas208) and Domingo Pelliza, who also had frequent but not exclusive financial dealings with the monastery of Santo Domingo.209 Domingo Belgrano Pérez was the hermano mayor of the Cofradía, de Ánimas and the treasurer of the Hermandad de la Caridad between 1769 and 1788, when he was removed from the office, following serious irregularities that led to his financial ruin in the management of the confraternity’s assets.210 Still, his family maintained a strong bond with the tertiary order of Santo Domingo; moreover, in 1804, Belgrano’s sons Francisco and Manuel refounded – within the walls of the convent of San Francisco – the ancient Cofradía, de María Santísima en el Misterio de la Imaculada Concepción, an order whose aim was to gather the city’s many confraternities into a single institution.211 As secretary of the Consulado of Buenos Aires over the first years of the nineteenth century, Manuel Belgrano promoted new associative enterprises such as the Sociedad Patriótica, Literaria y Económica del Río de la Plata, founded in 1811 in the wake of similar societies fostered by the Bourbon’s metropolitan reform climate.212 Conversely, the less prominent or socially less mobile Genoese traders preferred to join cheaper – and therefore more easily accessible – confraternities or associations more closely tied to their local interests. Lorenzo Patrón was hermano of the tertiary order of San Francisco and took out a 1,400 pesos chaplaincy on one of his houses located next to the convent of Nuestra Señora de Luján.213 On his deathbed, Joseph Gazano, who was born in Porto Maurizio and owned in Buenos Aires a quinta where he cultivated fruit trees, wore San Francisco’s habit and bequeathed one of his slaves to the convent.214 Andrés Caneva and Lorenzo Patrón’s son Juan Antonio both belonged to the Cofradía, del Cordón de Nuestro Padre San Francisco – better known as San Benito de Palermo – which made sure they both had very solemn funeral and burial rites.215 Merchant Vicente de la Rosa from Finale joined the confraternity of the convent of Nuestra Madre y Señora de Mercedes, where he wished to be buried; at his death, he also held a capellanía valued at 3,000 pesos and a 5% annual income in favor of the Hospital de Mujeres.216 Farmer Bartolo Rizo was connected to the Hermandad de Ánimas attached to the Nuestra Señora de Monserrat parish – where his body lies – but he also left money to the parish of San José de Flores, in whose jurisdiction his quinta was located, to have masses said in his suffrage.217 In terms of religious affiliation, the variety of choices made by the Genoese of Buenos Aires was very similar to that of their counterparts

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

126

In the shadow of empire

in Cadiz. Such a fragmentation makes evident how the interests and social networks each migrant had set in the hosting societies prevailed over any form of community association among fellow countrymen. This high level of integration also helps to explain why the wills left by the Genoese both in Cadiz and in Buenos Aires in the eighteenth century lack of references to fraternities in Genoa or other “national” institutions established in Spain.218 The only case in which a migrant worried to leave an endowment to a religious institution of a city different from where he died was Nicolás Braco. As noted earlier, Braco was born in Voltri, moved to Cadiz where he married, and ultimately settled in Buenos Aires with his son, who was destined for the altar. Before his death, Braco expressed the wish to be buried in the Buenos Aires church of Santa Recolección, where his son had taken his vows, wearing San Francisco’s habit. In his will, the merchant never mentioned the mother city, but he cared about leaving money to all four of Cadiz’s confraternities – the Nuestra Señora del Carmen, the Misericordia, Nuestra Señora del Rosario de Santo Domingo, and the Santos Lugares de Jerusalén – of which he declared himself a hermano.219 Despite the political weakness and the internal contrasts, the numerous Genoese settlement of Cadiz was able to maintain dense ties among expatriates and with the homeland. In Buenos Aires, conversely, the small number of migrants, the chiefly local dimension of their economic interests, and the more sporadic contacts with Europe impeded the consolidation of a robust community, but these limitations did not produce a migratory flux made of isolated individuals forgetful of their origins. Alongside the ties stemming from affiliation to confraternities and tertiary orders, the notarial records make evident that, despite the fact that the Genoese had built strong business and family ties within the local society, in one way or another, these migrants were all mutually related.220 Common place of origin enhanced cooperative and trust relations ranging from economic collaboration to mere friendship or family closeness, which, however, were neither alternative nor predominant with respect to personal ties established for integration to the host society. The case of Pablo Manuel Beruti, father of the more famous leader of Argentinian independence Antonio Luis, attests that collaboration among countrymen could also represent a useful support for accessing local administration. Beruti was born in Cadiz in 1727 into a family of migrants from Finale who cultivated strong ties with the Genoese community in the bay. He started his career in a notary’s office of Cadiz and then he moved to Buenos Aires, where he was appointed as royal notary

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

127

in 1752.221 As witnesses of his capacities for obtaining the office, Beruti presented four merchants, three of whom – Gaetano Bertorelo, Carlos Sartores, and the aforementioned Domingo Pelliza – were of Genoese origin.222 In the following years, Beruti married in Buenos Aires and was employed in the local Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas y Real Hacienda (the accounts division of the council of finance), but he did not abandon his contacts with the Genoese expatriates: in 1769, he acted as a freightbroker for a shipment from Cadiz on behalf of Manuel Raggio – a merchant of Ligurian descent who resided in the Spanish port.223 Far from configuring a cohesive group with tight economic relations with the Genoese community in Spain or the mother city, connections and forms of cooperation among expatriates facilitated the migrants’ insertion in the Río de la Plata and also encouraged new arrivals from Europe. For example, archival sources attest that Belgrano acted as intermediary for his expatriated countrymen to mail their relatives in Genoa and ask them to migrate overseas.224 On other occasions, family reunions were made possible by the contacts the Genoese had established between the two sides of the Atlantic through commercial navigation. In this respect, the most exemplary case is that of Francisco Granara, who settled a pasta factory in Buenos Aires after many years of residence in Cadiz and, as the business had prospered, in 1800 he invited his wife to join him: for arranging her trip from Cadiz to Montevideo, he turned to the captain of “Benito Patrón’s ship.”225 All the cases thus examined confirm the penchant for integration of Genoese immigrants in the Río de la Platas’ coasts as well as the openness of the host society toward them. Individual strategies for economic and social improvement entailed the establishment of family and professional roots in the viceroyalty, which tended to prevail over community ties among fellow countrymen; these ties, however, were not severed, as they proved useful, and sometimes decisive, for a better integration in the new context.

the genoese in buenos aires on the eve of independence The increasingly pivotal role played by the Río de la Plata harbor system in transatlantic commerce lay at the root of Buenos Aires’s constant demographic growth. Between 1779 and 1801 the city’s population grew from 24,000 to about 40,000. In order to understand the extent to which Genoese emigration was rooted in the urban fabric and to evaluate how

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

128

In the shadow of empire

ties between fellow countrymen helped new arrivals to settle in the city, one just needs to look carefully at the censuses conducted in the city at the beginning of the new century. By cross-checking the slave owners’ register dating back to the early years of the nineteenth century226 with the data deriving from both the 1804 and 1807 censuses of foreigners residing in Buenos Aires227 we can draw relevant information on the contours of the Ligurian settlement in the city. Despite these sources’ poor statistical reliability, we should note that, in 1804, after the Portuguese, the sixty-one Genoese heads of household constituted the largest foreign group and outnumbered all other Italian emigrants (Table A.7). Among the Italians, the Ligurians were followed by the Piedmontese, exhibiting the same pattern discernible in Cadiz and, since the Middle Ages, also within Mediterranean and Black Sea Genoese communities, due to the force of attraction exerted by the Genoa on neighboring populations who, when emigrating, tended to follow the routes and the strategies undertaken by the Genoese.228 The Buenos Aires slave owners’ register comprised various Hispanicized and long-established Genoese families, such as the Belgranos, the Ferraris, the Parodis, the Baldovinos, and the Marzanos, whose high degree of integration within the host society is attested by their settlement in the city’s most central neighborhoods. The 1804 census of the city shows that the first-generation Genoese immigrants, most of whom arrived to Buenos Aires from Cadiz as stowaways or as crew members on Spanish vessels, were homogeneously distributed between the city center and the suburbs according to social standing and occupation. More specifically, the neighborhoods closer to the Plaza del Cabildo (identified in the census with the numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9) housed merchants who had been long settled in the city.229 A few pulperos also resided in the area, alongside many artisan and craftsmen such as shoemakers, carpenters, hatters, and chocolatiers. Some of them lived together despite working in different fields and having long been settled in Buenos Aires. For example, in 1807, Ángel Noseto – who had arrived in Buenos Aires in 1776 to follow business interests on behalf of merchants settled in Portugal230 – declared that he lived with chocolatier Bartolomé Fulco, who had also emigrated from Genoa three decades earlier, and had married a local woman.231 There are many instances in which fellow countrymen worked together without being relatives,232 but professional collaboration was often related to family ties.233 A similar pattern emerges from analysis of residential data relating to more suburban neighborhoods (numbered 12–20), which hosted a large

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

129

Ligurian group chiefly devoted to the production and retail of comestibles. Particularly important was the number of millers (harineros) and pasta producers (fideeros), most of whom had migrated at the end of the previous century and had married in Buenos Aires.234 Among those who did not start a family, there were cohabitants who were also business associates, such as Andrés Canevaro and José Bribo; both had been married – the former in Genoa and the latter in Cadiz – and had been widowed before moving illegally to Buenos Aires. Another case is that of José, Matheo, and Antonio Olivari, who, in the early nineteenth century, had arrived from Cadiz to the Río de la Plata on board of different ships where they featured, respectively, as cook, cabin boy, and passenger.235 Although no precise information is available about their degree of kinship, the shared surname and profession as well as the fact that the 1807 census shows them as living and working together all point to an actual blood tie. José remained in this business at least until 1827, when he was living with his Montevideo-born wife, four children, four slaves, and the young Genoese harinero Pedro Pelegro.236 The 1804 census also records the presence of Francisco Granara (or Granea), the same pasta producer who asked his wife to join him in the Río de la Plata.237 His son Juan lived and worked with him. It is unclear whether his wife decided to join him or not or whether she had died, but in the 1827 census the fideero claimed to have married another woman, who was born in Montevideo and with whom he had other children.238 Alongside millers and pasta producers, Buenos Aires’s suburban neighborhoods housed a large group of farmers, who supplied the city with grain, fruit, and vegetables by employing slaves.239 These included Antonio Negres, who had married in Buenos Aires and was the owner of a quinta and a house attached to it. Santiago Suparo also featured amongst the landholders: he had emigrated thirty-four years earlier, married in Buenos Aires, and had nine children. His business must have made good profits as he employed nine slaves in his quinta.240 Another prosperous farmer was Luis Naón, who declared the property of four slaves, a 700 silver pesos capital, and two quintas in San José de Flores.241 Naón was the first to see the potential for these lands, which, being only two leagues from Buenos Aires, would become one of the city’s most important trading districts over the nineteenth century.242 Alongside direct production, Naón also had retail interests, as documented by an early nineteenth-century census where he featured as a pulpero.243 Over time, Naón maintained and widened both businesses. At his death in 1843, he left an estate worth 698,216.5 pesos, which included a pulpería,

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

130

In the shadow of empire

several warehouses, five quintas, and other properties in the districts known today as Caballito and San José de Flores.244 Land ownership was not a determining factor in farmers’ ability to earn profits. On the contrary, many market gardeners – such as Francisco Montar (who held three slaves), Benito Angenelo (who owned the house built within the quinta), and Agustín Capanegra (who owned the house within the quinta and no less than fourteen slaves) – farmed rented land. Nor was being a tenant a sign of one’s unwillingness to settle in the area: Montar, Angenelo, and Capanegra all married in Buenos Aires and remained quinteros even after independence, as attested by both the 1816 and 1827 censuses.245 To these cases one should also add that of Roque Repeto, who, according to the early nineteenth-century slaveholders census, resided in neighborhood 17 and had arrived in Buenos around 1803: in 1816, he was listed as an employed farmer, while in 1827 he declared that he owned a house and that he and his family grew vegetables in a quinta (it remains unknown whether he hired or owned it) with the help of a freed-slave and two Spanish laborers.246 Both the cases of Juan Vigna – listed as a worker in a butcher shop in 1804 and as a quintero in the 1816 census247 – and of the aforementioned merchant Nicolás Braco – who also was listed as a quintero in the 1827 census – show how the profits made growing vegetables also appealed to those who were engaged in retail. The close interdependence between farming and commercial activities can be seen in several cases in which quinteros retailed their own products as in the aforementioned example of Luis Naón. The activities of another small farmer, Bartolo Rizo, offer new insights to understand the role played by the quintas as a vehicle of economic growth and as stimuli for the consolidation of the Genoese settlement in the region. Rizo’s presence in Buenos Aires is first attested in the 1804 census, where he is recorded as a bachelor living and working with Genoese Francisco Sega Nerva (also known as Segalerba) in a rented quinta.248 His work allowed him to accrue enough money (300 pesos) to get married to a San José de Flores small farmer’s daughter, who provided no dowry but inherited three square cuadras of land at the death of her mother. Over the following years, Rizo purchased another three square cuadras of neighboring land, where he cultivated peach trees, fig trees, and sugar canes. In 1819, his capital consisted in two ranchos worth 8,097 pesos, four slaves, two pairs of oxen, five draught-horses, a cart, and 1,000 pesos in cash.249 Rizo did not leave any debts behind but the list of his creditors shows that his businesses had been a point of reference

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

131

for several Ligurian expatriates. Alongside a number of micro-credit operations in favor of some local businessmen, his last will also featured two loans of 690 and 600 pesos to Nicolás Villa and Santiago Pittaluga250 for the purchase of farmland. Apart from supporting other fellow countrymen who aimed at settling in the region as farmers, in 1818 Rizo financed trader Manuel Fontana, who had migrated to Buenos Aires three years before, with a loan of 1,300 pesos.251 In both Cadiz and in Buenos Aires, the Genoese emigrants consistently veered toward the production of food for the local community. Certainly, this was not a new trait of Ligurian immigration but a traditional characteristic of Western Mediterranean Genoese colonies since the twelfth century.252 As far as Cadiz is concerned, no precise data is available about Ligurian emigrants settled in the countryside near the bay, but, on the basis of the little available information, it stands to reason to suppose that gaining access to the market for land was no mean feat. Alongside the few great Ligurian merchants who had invested money in land,253 the migrants’ involvement in Cadiz’s farming production appears to have been mostly characterized by hired hands and seasonal farm workers. By 1815, consul Andrea Gherardi suggested Turin should create a vice-consulate in San Fernando, which was 2 leagues away from the port and where, in his view, “there were plenty of fellow countrymen who are mostly farmers cultivating lands, allotments and gardens.”254 Two years later, the consul clarified that both in the port of Santa María and in San Fernando there were “many of our fellow countrymen who have settled there and have opened their grocery shops [as well as] many non-resident farmers coming and going from the homeland as they see fit.”255 In Cadiz, rural emigrants converged on the district of Extramuros, where a wide array of Ligurian market gardeners and hired hands lived; most of them, unsurprisingly, were bachelors.256 So far, only one case of Genoese farmers settled in the bay and consistently growing fruit and vegetables is attested in the archives of Cadiz: they were the Patrón family from Voltri, who cultivated the allotments located in the Isla de León for several generations, albeit always as tenant farmers.257 In the late colonial period, Buenos Aires’s province presented features that appeared to make it unique within Spanish America. Given its proximity to the indigenous frontier, the territory between Buenos Aires and the Salado River remained untouched by the concentration of property as was common in Peru, New Spain, Chile, and Venezuela. While other colonial contexts were characterized by a wealthy and politically influential rural oligarchy, the bonaerense countryside was fragmented into a

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

132

In the shadow of empire

multitude of small and medium-sized quintas or estancias where various agricultural258 and even artisan activities such as bread-making259 were pursued alongside a prevailing focus on livestock ranching. As well as shining a light on the fact that the nineteenth century’s great Argentinian estanciero is not an heir of the colonial period, the modest scale of land ownership helps us to appreciate the strategic role played by Ligurian-run quintas. The concentration of the Genoese farmers nearby the port,260 in turn, attests to the eminently urban and mercantile profile of the Genoese diaspora. In summary, both in Cadiz and Buenos Aires farming was closely linked to commerce for Ligurian emigrants but with one key difference: while farming in Cadiz constituted a form of investment for few rich merchants and a source of basic income for many seasonal workers, in the territory of Buenos Aires – where there was a freer land market – farming was either a useful way of accessing local commerce or an opportunity for small rising traders to consolidate their businesses by eliminating brokerage costs through direct production and slave labor. This pattern has long been detected in the Argentinian historiography, which – with regards to the countryside of Buenos Aires – has prompted a reconsideration of the vocation to self-sufficiency traditionally attributed to small farmers by highlighting the deeply mercantilized and diversified nature of their enterprises.261 The 1804 census was conducted by Buenos Aires alcaldes de barrio (deputy mayor), in compliance with the ban issued by the Supremo Consejo de Indias262 to expel all foreign residents, especially the Portuguese, over reasons connected to the conflict with Great Britain.263 On this occasion, only thirteen Genoese were hit by the measure.264 At any rate, they were yet again successful in avoiding deportation by benefiting from the protection of the alcaldes de barrio, who managed to impose many derogations to the decree.265 The rich information provided by the city censuses bear witness to the fact that the Genoese had built a circumscribed but well-rooted niche within Buenos Aires well before Argentina’s independence. Toward the end of the colonial period, the inclusion of the Río de la Plata among the routes of the Spanish colonial trade had made the region one of the most appealing destinations both for Genoese trade investments and migration from the Peninsula. In turn, the expansion of the viceroyalty under the impulse of the Atlantic economy had allowed the Genoese expatriates to prosper and deeply integrate themselves in the hosting society. The Catholic faith, the previous familiarity with the Hispanic

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Migration and investments in Buenos Aires

133

world, the private dimension of their business ventures, their flair for integration, and the political weakness of the republic were all factors in favor of those who aimed at settling in a society that, despite Spain’s legal restrictions toward foreign migration to America, was substantially open to their contribution. The size and characteristics of the Genoese migration in Cadiz and in Buenos Aires suggest that the imperial structure and the different positions of the two port cities within it heavily influenced the choices of these powerless outsiders. Cadiz remained the main destination throughout the whole century for the Genoese merchants who aimed at playing an intermediary role in long-distance trade and also for a great variety of more modest migrants looking for an employment in the local maritime sector, in retail trade, or in the industrial production for the American markets; to fulfill their objectives, the former had to adapt their strategies to meet the legal requirements of the Spanish mercantilism, while the latter simply profited from that mercantilist policy’s substantial weaknesses. These conditions allowed the establishment of a great and highly articulated settlement led by a dynamic merchant elite, which maintained community ties and multiple connections with the country of origin despite internal clashes and a widespread tendency to integration in the host society. During the colonial period, Buenos Aires did not offer the same possibilities. On one hand, the distance of the city from Europe, the Crown’s restricting laws against foreigners, the scarcity of export-oriented manufacturing industries, and the local abundance of cheap manpower discouraged the arrival of skilled and non-skilled workers from the republic. On the other hand, the presence of an emerging Spanish merchant elite after the establishment of the viceroyalty, the parallel competition from the British and their Luso-Brazilian allies, the impossibility of establishing direct commercial relations with Italy, and the high level of integration of the Genoese merchants in the monopolistic institutions of Cadiz impeded the consolidation of a Genoese group of great intermediaries in Buenos Aires with close relationships with their counterparts in Spain, in the mother city, or in other Atlantic ports. This explain why, in many cases, the interests of Genoese who sailed to the Río de la Plata to seek their fortune in trade intermediation with Spain rapidly shifted toward the local economy, which offered them the possibility of establishing lucrative productive and commercial activities at the local level and also to rise up the social scale by accessing the viceroyalty’s administration. Along the eighteenth-century, in synthesis, only small fringes of the diaspora left Cadiz to permanently settle in Buenos Aires. Those who

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

134

In the shadow of empire

embarked on this adventure could neither thrive as a community nor establish dense business networks with their countrymen overseas, but they could succeed individually by operating in accordance with their hosting society’s needs. In this context, ties among fellow countrymen became less necessary than in Spain but they were not relinquished: within the city, they were cultivated at an informal level as means to facilitate integration into the host community; the contacts established through commercial navigation with other expatriates on the other side of the Atlantic remained a helpful resource and turned crucial after the fall of the empire, when the position of Cadiz and Buenos Aires in relation to Genoese interests was diametrically reversed.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

part ii TRANSCENDING EMPIRE

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Published online by Cambridge University Press

4 The breakdown and reorientation of Genoese Atlantic trade

the end of the genoese republic The history of the Genoese in Cadiz and in colonial Buenos Aires shows how a small and powerless but still dynamic merchant nation was able to keep an open door to the Atlantic by operating in the shadow of the Spanish empire. By following the steps of their predecessors, as we shall see, new generations of migrants and traders were able to fruitfully adapt to the dramatic effects of the Napoleonic Wars, which disrupted the Genoese commercial system to the point of challenging its very survival. In 1797, the ancient aristocratic republic of Genoa ceased to exist and was transformed into a democratic republic in France’s sphere of influence. Liguria then faced maritime and terrestrial attacks, suffered the British naval blockade, became part of the French empire and, after Napoleon’s defeat, was annexed to the Sardinian kingdom. In 1808, after occupying Lisbon and compelling John VI to seek refuge in Brazil, Napoleon invaded Spain and triggered the collapse of the Spanish empire by obtaining the abdication of Charles IV and future Ferdinand VII in favor of Joseph Bonaparte, Napoleon’s brother. Within two decades, the Genoese mercantile marine was almost annihilated and the port of Cadiz lost once and for all its key role of intermediation in the Atlantic trade, while the Spanish dominions in America went through a difficult and bloody path to obtain independence. Still, the deep transformations resulting from these crises enabled the Genoese to carve a new space in the Atlantic by shifting their migratory and commercial axis from Cadiz to independent Buenos Aires, which in a few years became one of their chief destinations. 137

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

138

Transcending empire

In the framework of the wars that involved the major European powers against revolutionary France and then against Napoleon’s expansionist ambitions, Genoa could not maintain its traditional neutrality. In 1796, as young commander Bonaparte was ordered to cross the Alps and occupy Lombardy, Genoa was directly menaced by both the French Army and the First anti-French Coalition forces: surrounded by Piedmont and the Austrians by ground, and besieged by the British navy at sea, the republic chose to ally with Napoleon. The abandonment of political neutrality was accompanied by a drastic change in the government system: in June 1797, the Genoese oligarchic regime was suppressed and replaced with the establishment of the Ligurian democratic republic. The “1797 revolution” was opposed by both the clergy and the great aristocratic families, but met the expectations of the lower and poorer ranks of the Genoese nobility, some of whom had led an anti-oligarchic revolt one month earlier. The other sectors of the population reacted in different ways. In the countryside, there was an open revolt, fomented by the Church and by the landowners, which expressed the poor rural people’s fear of losing the scarce resources that they were traditionally allowed to earn under the old regime.1 In some areas of the interior, the response was an increase in banditry. Some provincial and mercantile sectors approved the French initiative; their consensus did not result from a sincere embracing of the new political system, but from their opposition to the old ruling class and their ambition to halt the excessive power of Genoa over the republic’s dominions. Many others remained indifferent or preferred to “wait and see” how events unfolded. During the Napoleonic Wars, Genoese saw and experienced fierce repression of dissidents, infrastructural damages, property confiscation, and commercial isolation. In 1798, Liguria was induced by the French to engage in a fast but disastrous war against Piedmont and to participate in the Napoleonic campaign in Egypt; in 1799, the republic was besieged by the Austrian and Russian troops and, one year later, a naval blockade was imposed by the British to impede food supply by sea. The devastating effects of the war became even worse after 1805, when Genoa was formally annexed to the French empire. The imperial authorities extended French customs practice to Ligurian territories, rerouted neutral shipments toward Toulon and Marseilles, privileged Lyon’s silk exportations and then deprived Genoa of the sanitary facilities necessary for the docking of ships coming from the East.2 Until annexation, Genoese trade survived through coastal navigation, which traditionally had been free from formalities and controls even during the English naval

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The reorientation of Genoese Atlantic trade

139

blockade; however, French customs agents readily put duties on coastal navigation to control smuggling and, by also preventing foreign ships from docking in Genoa’s port, robbed Genoa of its traditional role in transit trade. Due to the anti-French insurrection in Spain and the precautionary trade-embargo imposed on Napoleon’s allies, direct trading between Genoa and the Iberian peninsula had come to a complete halt by 1808. To such heavy limitations one should add the piracy activities controlled by the sovereigns of Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis and pursued along Sicilian and – later – Sardinian shores. Over time, the French administration gained the cooperation of intellectual reformers and Genoese businessmen by offering them local government seats. Even the aristocratic conservatives supported the new regime when rewarded with favors and honors. Some large manufacturers received support from the new government and withstood the crisis by introducing technological innovations, but this was not enough to propel an “industrial revolution.” Conversely, trade stagnation ruined many small producers and retailers who, along with the mass of laborers dismissed by the collapsing manufacturer industry, joined the ranks of emigrants.3 French military policy represented a decisive “push” leading Genoese to go abroad. Genoa’s traditional neutrality and the widespread aversion of the population to military service made Genoa a very poor supplier of new recruits. Since 1797, French levies to enlist local ground troops went unheeded and compelled the local administration to recruit French soldiers.4 To set up a fleet capable of tackling the British navy, Napoleon’s attention turned to seafarers. However, efforts to accurately register all men employed in naval dockyards failed to strengthen the French presence at sea and gave rise to a massive drop in maritime employment. Moreover, the Genoese involvement in the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt in 1799 caused many losses to the already weak Ligurian fleet.5 Following the Republic of Genoa’s annexation to France, the imperial authorities imposed twenty-six call-ups for ground troops involving approximately 31,500 men. Compulsory conscription significantly increased desertion and acts of rebellion. The popular oppositions were so violent that a priest of Nervi, after reading the archbishop’s pastoral letter in favor of recruitment, was almost lynched by the women of his parish.6 Following Napoleon’s defeat and the territorial settlement ratified by the Congress of Vienna (1815), Genoa was annexed to the Kingdom of Sardinia, which included the homonym island, Piedmont, Savoy, and the county of Nice. In an attempt to keep the old privileges, the Genoese

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

140

Transcending empire

oligarchies presented, in Vienna, the draft of a constitution proposing the creation of an independent government headed by the city’s aristocracy, exclusive rights to free port status, the reinstatement of Genoa’s Mint and of the Banco di San Giorgio, exemption from conscription and from housing barracks, measures to encourage Genoese exports routed via Sardinian dominions, the abolition of customs between Piedmont and Liguria, and barring the Piedmontese from Ligurian offices while granting Ligurians access to the Piedmontese.7 They also advocated fiscal autonomy by proposing that tax be regulated through laws that could only be passed by the Ligurian Senate.8 The proposal, which sought to maximize the advantages deriving from annexation without shouldering any of the burdens, was not accepted. The territory of the ancient republic could only be granted its public debt, the concession of the free port to Genoa, a commercial court, a supreme tribunal similar to that of Turin, equal rights for Ligurians and other subjects of the kingdom to access public offices, and a few other privileges.9 Alongside the loss of its independence, Genoa had to cope with economic marginalization, which Napoleonic rule and war had made appear as a merely transitional phenomenon. The Turin government accepted the re-establishment of the free port, but Genoa had to share this privilege with Nice. By 1815, most of the Genoese ships weighed less than 100 gross tons10 and the shortage of capital impeded the new government from investing in shipbuilding to support long distance trade. Besides, the Piedmontese authorities failed to abolish the trade barrier between Liguria and Piedmont. Maintaining the Piedmontese customs system, which derived from the need to keep an active trade balance, stimulate local exports, and fight back the fierce French, British, and Austrian competition, seriously damaged Genoa’s transit trade and generated a widespread discontent that was exacerbated by the 1816 famine in the Levante countryside. The rigorous Piedmontese policy toward Ligurians became manifest in 1817, when the President of the Trade Council, Count Serra, sought to limit the number of Genoese commercial agents (sensali) by taxing their activity and curtailing the monopoly on the profession, which had passed from father to son and damaged their counterparts in other cities.11 The Genoese Chamber did its utmost to resist and curtail this legislation but there was little room for maneuver. For a long time Turin remained unresponsive to the demands made by the ancient Republic and in 1818 a “spokesperson” was barred from representing Genoese interests to the Piedmontese government. The Genoese manifested their opposition

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The reorientation of Genoese Atlantic trade

141

to Piedmont’s short-sighted and hostile attitude by consistently boycotting council meetings, which tied in with their traditional aversion to public offices, which were seldom paid and took precious time away from business. This behavior remained unchanged at least until the 1850s and by then only half of the councillors attended meetings.12 The separation of the Ligurian and the Piedmontese customs authorities was repealed in 1818, but the persisting meager salaries and the high prices of staple goods made economic recovery difficult. Besides, the need to strengthen its military resources forced Turin to an onerous taxation review and to an increase of troops through the construction of new forts to defend the port. The hopes held by Genoese traders were reignited by the 1821 Piedmontese liberal insurgencies, which sought to free Italy from foreign domination and felt closer to crowning the old dream of annexing Lombardy. However, the dream remained unfulfilled and there was a surge both in the emigration of laborers and of Piedmontese constitutional rebels, who had supported the failed uprising. The fact that very few Genoese had been involved in the insurgency attests the city’s moderate credentials, which has led researchers to challenge the traditional idealizing view of Genoa as the cradle of Mazzinian and Garibaldinian republicanism.13 Under Carlo Felice’s reign (1821–31), the government started to tackle maritime trade issues and adopted a protective policy, which had contradictory effects on Genoa’s economy. In 1823, Turin signed a trade pact with the Ottoman Porte and two years later with Morocco. These provisions ensured a near monopoly of the Sardinian merchant marine over grain transport and allowed Genoa to become the greatest deposit for cereals in the Mediterranean in the early 1820s. Simultaneously, however, Turin adopted a flag discrimination policy that reduced the treaties’ positive effects. In 1825, the government established differential rights on cereals, wine, and olive oil to favor Sardinian shipping, but the measure discouraged foreign vessels from docking at Genoa and further depressed the profit-making opportunities in the port.14 The authorities did not abolish these rights until 1830, and the extant limitations on foreign ships (such as mooring and docking rights) remained in place until the 1850s. Transit trade, which constantly decreased from 1815 to 1835, was not the only Genoese business sector that went through a long and hard transitional period. According to an 1827 Chamber of Commerce memorandum, the local manufacturers grounded on the traditional putting-out system were “close to ruin.”15

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

142

Transcending empire

During the first two decades following Liguria’s annexation to Piedmont, the protectionist politics implemented by the government of Turin hindered trade in Genoa, but favored the consolidation of the more technologically advanced industries and of the Sardinian mercantile navy. In fact, the recovery of the navy started around this time, when ships began to sail under their own flag. Conversely, for many Ligurians crossing the ocean remained the best option to flee a taxing fiscal regime, conscription, and the undoing of Genoa’s ancient productive system. While the newly independent Río de la Plata soon became the destination of choice for captains and for immigrants from the ancient republic, the port of Cadiz lost its allure following the demise of the Empire.

the decline of cadiz The international conflicts triggered by the French Revolution prompted the definitive crisis of the Spanish colonial system and in a few decades transformed the ancient world emporium of Cadiz into nothing more than a regional harbor. The port’s decline started shortly after the execution of Luis XVI. The first reaction of Spain was to side with Great Britain’s anti-French opposition, but the alliance soon started wavering due to the unpreparedness of Spain for the war and the suspicion that Britain’s true aim was to annihilate both the Spanish and French forces at sea. These considerations, along with Spain’s difficulty of conceiving a war against France after sixty years of the Family Compact, led Charles IV to ally with France after signing the peace of Basel (1795).16 Great Britain responded to Spain’s change of allegiance with war (1796–1801) and initiated a prolonged naval blockade during which Cadiz was shelled and forced to interrupt all communications with the Indias. To remedy the subsequent severe financial crisis, the Crown was obliged to allow its ultramarine dominions to trade directly with foreign colonies. Furthermore, a 1797 decree liberalized access to the Carrera de Indias for ships waving neutral banners. The measure was revoked in 1799, but the return to the traditional restraints was foiled by a large number of derogations due to the opposition of the mercantile class in Spanish America, whose reluctance to forgo the acquired privileges made it difficult to maintain a constant fiscal and commercial flow at both ends of the empire.17 Although the neutral trade decree had unlocked the routes to the Indias to new competitors, especially the United States,18 the unfavorable economic trends did not prevent the Genoese merchants of Cadiz from setting up expeditions to the Americas: they simply had to sail under their

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The reorientation of Genoese Atlantic trade

143

own banner instead of Spain’s. During these very years, ships flying the Republic’s flag began entering the port of Montevideo, either arriving from or bound to Cadiz; on their way back, some docked at Havana, where they were allowed to retail dried beef and wheat produced by the Río de la Plata hacendados. Among the different nations’ ships arriving in Montevideo in 1798, those raising the Genoese flag were the most numerous group,19 and contemporary observers reported that some of them also reached the port of Buenos Aires.20 When the decree was revoked and the use of the neutral flag became redundant, Genoese ship arrivals were rapidly outnumbered by Spanish vessels.21 In Cadiz, the war emergency had multiplied the profit-making opportunities in the ship buying and selling sector. The naturalized shipping magnates were joined by a number of new foreign entrepreneurs, including French privateers, who used the port to sell captured British ships, and a group of Genoese individuals who, given that they did not invest directly in the Carrera de Indias, were able to enter the vessel-selling trade without the need to become naturalized.22 Certainly, the wealth derived from neutral trade did not shelter the Genoese merchants of Cadiz from the crisis experienced by the port: the maritime blockade and compulsory war contributions weighed heavily on the mercantile class and many fell into bankruptcy.23 Further damages derived from the violent 1801 epidemic of yellow fever, which intermittently raged in ensuing years and claimed a heavy toll of victims.24 A comparison of the 1805 list of traders active in the bay with the 1771 tax list attests that the merchants registered with the Consulado more than halved (from 423 to 184).25 The Genoese intermediaries were no exception: by the early nineteenth century, only seven of them were actually listed.26 Three (José Ramón Recaño, Esteban Peñasco, and Cayetano Saturnino Castelli) were jenízaros who had registered between 1802 and the 1804 owing to the support of their families and of other countrymen such as Benito Patrón, Geronimo and Domingo Jordán, and Antonio Galiano, all of whom had been settled in the bay for a long time.27 The dramatic decrease in the number of merchants registered with the Consulado de Cargadores a Indias should not lead us to overestimate the actual number of bankruptcies. Widespread smuggling within Cadiz’s marketplace made it increasingly superfluous to register with the Consulado and led to a dramatic fall in the number of enrollments.28 Furthermore, some houses of trade in Cadiz suspended their businesses only temporarily, by moving to other trading spots (particularly to Gibraltar) where they diverted the purchased goods before smuggling them into Spain.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

144

Transcending empire

It was at this time that some Genoese merchants began to invest in the trade with the Indias and, in particular, with the Río de la Plata. Domingo Colombo’s sons Francisco and Pablo, both admitted to the Carrera de Indias in 1792,29 were among the most active: between 1803 and 1806, in partnership with the aforementioned Andrés Marzán,30 they organized several expeditions to Havana, Veracruz, Cumaná, La Guaira, and Cartagena de Indias, as well as importing rawhide from Montevideo on behalf of their father.31 In 1804, Marzán organized on his own account two Havana-bound and two Montevideo-bound shipments.32 Carlos Malagamba, who had registered with the Carrera in 1785,33 was still organizing expeditions to Veracruz34 at the start of the nineteenth century, when Geronimo Agnese was also investing in the trade with Montevideo.35 Benito Patrón, who had established close and strong commercial ties with the Río de la Plata since the 1790s, continued to run this business in partnership with his sons Sebastián, Francisco, and Juan Manuel, all of whom registered with the Consulado.36 The Genoese intermediaries of Cadiz successfully resisted the emergency resulting from the outbreak of the Anglo-Spanish war, but this was only the first episode of a much larger and irreversible crisis. The Peace of Amiens (1802), which ended the hostilities with Great Britain, offered a truce that was not destined to last. As an ally of France, Spain was involved in a new conflict against Great Britain in 1804 and suffered a disastrous defeat at Trafalgar. The war virtually ended in 1808, when Napoleonic forces occupied Spain and compelled king Charles IV and his son Ferdinand to abdicate in favor of Joseph Bonaparte. To safeguard their independence, Spain engaged in a war against the French, which endured until 1814, when King Ferdinand VII was restored. The conflict caused an extremely serious crisis, to which the Spaniards responded by forming a provisional government (the Junta Central Suprema) and an anti-French alliance with Great Britain. Menaced by the French advancement and protected by the British at sea, the Junta Central took refuge in Cadiz in 1810. Due to its political impotence and discredit, the Junta was replaced by a Regency Council, which called for representatives from local provinces and overseas to meet in an “Extraordinary and General Cortes of the Spanish Nation” for establishing the governmental system to be adopted in the territories of the empire during the absence of the king. From 1810 to 1812, while Cadiz was besieged by French ground troops, the Cortes created the first Spanish Constitution, which was revoked in 1814 with the return of absolutism. The 1808 abdications created a vacuum of power and legitimacy that triggered the emancipation movements in Spanish America.37 By the time

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The reorientation of Genoese Atlantic trade

145

the delegates of the Cortes were to be chosen, some of Spain’s American provinces had successfully established their own juntas, which did not recognize the authority of either the Junta Central or the Regency and therefore did not send representatives to the assembly. Among the “dissidents” were the Río de la Plata provinces. In Buenos Aires, crisis broke out in 1809 with a coup d’état attempt led by a group of Spaniards who aimed at destituting the French-born viceroy Liniers and establishing a junta as on the peninsula. Liniers repressed the insurrection, epurated the Spanish militias, and finally left his office, but the creoles’ ambitions for obtaining a form of autonomous government increased. When Buenos Aires was informed that Spain was almost totally occupied by the Napoleonic troops and that the Junta Central had been dissolved, the new viceroy Cisneros was deposed and the creoles established the Primera Junta in May 25, 1810. The new government refused to acknowledge the Regency Council for it having been established without the American populations’ agreement and also disapproved of the scarce representation reserved to the Americans in the Cortes with respect to that of the peninsular population. As a Spanish military response was considered unrealistic, the Primera Junta began a campaign to extend its control over the viceroyalty and to encourage the revolution in other colonies. The Junta continued to formally claim its loyalty to the deposed monarch, but this was a mere political maneuver: in 1816, two years after the return of Ferdinand VII, the declaration of independence became official.38 The Genoese expatriates in Spain were not long in understanding the implications of the crisis, and reacted differently according to their possibilities. Some of those who had prospered in Cadiz vainly sought the authorities’ support to uphold their privileges: in March 1810, Esteban Peñasco along with other representatives of the Spanish mercantile class, signed a petition addressed to the Consejo de Indias complaining that the British fleet had invaded the Río de la Plata with foreign goods and with the complicity of local authorities also controlled exports. Peñasco was referring to the fact that, in 1809, Viceroy Cisneros had opened Buenos Aires to foreign trade, especially to the British, to solve the financial problems of the city determined by the contemporary insurgences in Upper Peru. The petitioners argued that the fact that foreign goods were cheaper than “national” goods might have led the kingdom to sever its ties with the metropolis. In their view, they pleaded with the Consejo to exercise greater control over trade not only to safeguard the interests of Spanish merchants but to secure the well-being of the “homeland.”39 The signers appeared to be well aware of the imminent danger, but it was too

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

146

Transcending empire

late to find a remedy: the Buenos Aires “May Revolution” of 1810 ended all hopes of Spanish merchants for enjoying special privileges in the region. Other Cadiz merchants with well-established interests in the Río de la Plata, being suddenly unable to maintain them, left the peninsula to join their families or business partners on the other side of the Atlantic. That is what Ligurian shipping magnate Jacome Patrón did after making his fortune by selling naval equipment; in 1810, having fallen into ruin because of the war, he applied for a Royal license to move with his wife and seven children to Montevideo, where, he asserted, two rich uncles of his living there would be able to help him.40 Patrón traveled as a crew member of the frigate Nuestra Señora de Los Ángeles, which belonged to Antonio María Picardo, a member of a well-settled Ligurian mercantile family who had been granted naturalization in 1809.41 The ominous effects of the Napoleonic Wars were evident in the case of Genoese Juan Bautista Cheirasco y Vico, who – as noted earlier – had invested in a silk stocking factory. The French occupancy of Puerto de Santa María, where his factory was located, and severance of the colonial ties with the Río de la Plata, where he sent his products, made it impossible to estimate the value of his assets and losses when he died in 1812.42 The prolonged conflicts in which the Empire was engaged did not entirely wipe out communication with America. Cadiz was able to maintain its supremacy in Spanish exports even in the wake of the Peace of Amiens, especially in 1808 and 1810 and from 1815 to 1818.43 However, traffic volume to the Indias began to drop until it reached its lowest level in 1819 and 1820, following the steady success of the American emancipation movements. As well as inducing a deep trade imbalance detrimental to Cadiz’s import and export economy, the war emergency had shattering consequences for the bay’s entire population, which was stifled by unemployment, epidemics, and an unprecedented military policy. With the 1802 Ordenanzas, the Bourbon administration launched a veritable program of sea-people militarization, as they sought to increase the number of troops to prosecute the war.44 The Ordenanzas succeeded in increasing the navy contingent but also caused a severe hemorrhage of maritime workers who, in most cases, chose to emigrate abroad. The phenomenon was particularly noticeable in the bay of Cadiz, where, in 1804, the Consulado denounced emigration as not only widespread among seafarers but also among carpenters and caulkers. To elude the navy military service, which was hazardous and poorly paid, many young men chose to

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The reorientation of Genoese Atlantic trade

147

get involved in smuggling or to move to ports in the Indias, where an increasing number of ships docked and offered seafarers and workers well-paid job opportunities.45 The new military policy did not spare the Genoese sailors who had been pressed into service while working either in the peninsula’s ports or on board Spanish vessels,46 but even this recruitment base soon dried up. In response to emergency naval needs, authorities planned to enlist a thousand sailors in Genoa, but the measure was immediately dropped due to the operation’s high costs and because Genoa, by that time, could only offer low-class recruits.47 In 1807, a specific law was issued aimed at enlisting foreign conscripts in Spain.48 The measure indiscriminately hit the entire Genoese population of Cadiz, who also had to contribute to housing the troops and was repeatedly forced to provide credit to the authorities.49 The only chance to avoid conscription was to leave Spain. In 1820, the authorities tried to remedy the situation by cancelling the compulsory registration of sailors in the matrículas de mar and by exempting captains, patrons, shipowners, maritime entrepreneurs, and fishing boat magnates from serving in the navy.50 Still, the new provisions did not dispel seafarers’ wellrooted distrust: they were well aware that Cadiz no longer offered the advantageous conditions of yore.

war and conscription in buenos aires The wars triggered by the French revolution had shaken the political and economic stability of the Río de la Plata since 1797, when the British blockade of Cadiz forced the Spanish authorities to issue the neutral trade decree. Opened up to international commerce, in a short period of time Buenos Aires and Montevideo established direct relations with about one hundred ports across the world.51 Revocation of the decree favored the return to the traditional practices of fraud and contraband with Brazil and its British ally. However, the formal reinstatement of the ancient trade restrictions was soon made void by the course of events. Following the battle of Trafalgar, which sealed Britain’s naval supremacy, Napoleon established the continental blockade, whereby his European allies and dominions in Europe were forbidden from trading with Britain. Trade growth was vital to the British who were equipped with a powerful navy and whose industrial output was expanding by leaps and bounds. French economic warfare forced the British to consolidate their presence on the oceanic routes. In 1806, the British conquered the Dutch

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

148

Transcending empire

colony of Cape of Good Hope in order to control the traffic between the Atlantic and Indian oceans. In the same year, despite lacking an official mandate from London, the fleet that had taken part in the Cape of Good Hope expedition sailed toward the Río de la Plata to open a new marketplace by exploiting their contacts in the region and by taking advantage of the viceroyalty’s weak defenses. In 1806 and 1807, Buenos Aires and Montevideo faced two invasions by the British, who imposed duty reductions, opened the ports to free trade, and took possession of the capital’s financial reserves.52 At first the British were viewed with favor by those seeking independence, but with the help of urban militias the invaders were fiercely opposed when they made clear their hegemonic plans. The local population removed from office Viceroy Sobremonte, who was accused of handing over the city’s Treasury to the British. This unprecedented act revealed an aim for political self-rule that soon bore much more radical consequences. As for trade, the persistent British interest in the Río de la Plata market, the sudden change of allegiances caused by the 1808 succession crisis, and the vicinity of Brazil, which following the resettlement of the Portuguese court on the other side of the Atlantic was brimming with British goods, all pointed in the direction of opening up to foreign trade. In 1808 the British set out to attack Buenos Aires yet again, but their fleet was redirected toward Portugal to support the Spanish insurrection against Napoleon. Following their sudden alliance with Spain, the British canceled their plans to conquer South America and, as shown earlier, in 1809 the new Viceroy allowed them to trade with the Río de la Plata. In 1810, following the unveiling of the Primera Junta, the opening to foreign trade became irreversible. The free trade politics and the “May Revolution” ensured Buenos Aires’ prominence as the political and economic heart of the Río de la Plata and made international trade and duty revenues its primary source of wealth. However, the demise of colonial rule did not allow Buenos Aires to preserve the viceroyalty’s territorial unity: the reaction by royalist forces, internal divergent economic interests, and nearby Brazil’s expansionist ambitions over the region caused a series of conflicts that entailed the loss of Paraguay, Upper Peru, and the Banda Oriental and the creation of provincial states which entered long-standing disputes with Buenos Aires over the definition of the new bases for political legitimacy and for control over the revenue generated by river navigation.53 The war period inaugurated by the British invasions disrupted the life of the Genoese settled in the city. The chronic scarcity of regular troops and the complete unreliability of the militia made the Río de la Plata

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The reorientation of Genoese Atlantic trade

149

defensive system completely inadequate to contest the British attack.54 The small contingent led by General William Beresford found it quite easy to occupy Buenos Aires, which capitulated on June 27, 1806. Following the escape of Viceroy Sobremonte, the city’s civilian and ecclesiastic authorities were rapidly subjugated,55 but the occupation lasted only two months. The Spanish and creole vecinos started to organize a military response with the help of the rich Spanish merchant Martín de Álzaga, whose interests had been severely damaged by the British opening of Buenos Aires to free trade. Meanwhile, with the help of the governor of Montevideo, commander Santiago de Liniers organized an army on the other side of the estuary and prepared an expedition of twenty-three ships for defense of the capital. With the support of the armed vecinos, Liniers’ troops quickly reconquered Buenos Aires and forced Beresford to surrender on the 20th of August, but British ships blocked the Río de la Plata ports and waited for reinforcements from London. To repel a possible further attack, in September 1807 Liniers set up a military force that comprised three squads of veterans who had taken part in the first reconquista and organized the vecinos of Buenos Aires in different voluntary corps. The Creoles formed the Carabineros de Carlos IV, the Patricios units, the Patriotas de la Unión squad, the Granaderos de Infantería company, the Navy Battalion, and the Miguetes de Caballería squadron. The various “castes” were regimented into separate corps. The fruit and vegetables growers living in the environs of Buenos Aires were united into the Cuerpo de Quinteros o Labradores. Finally, five military corps, or tercios, constituted by Spanish vecinos and organized on the basis of provenance (Galicia, Catalonia, Cantabria, Biscay, and Andalusia) were created: the Andalusian tercio was led by José Merelo, an official of Ligurian descent.56 The voluntary nature of these militant forces was insufficient to overcome the population’s widespread resistance to conscription; thus, on November 7, 1806, the authorities officially ordered all draft dodgers to report for military service within four days. To identify them more easily, the Cabildo organized a census of the city’s vecinos between 16 and 50 years of age; those who had not joined their Province’s force would be charged with acting against the State’s interests.57 Although incomplete, the 1807 census58 is a valuable resource to sense the degree and the ways in which the Ligurian emigrants were involved in the defense of Buenos Aires. The registers included a total of thirty-six Ligurians, most of whom had not joined any of the forces. Nine of them were listed as elderly, retired or invalid vecinos, but there were also fifteen

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

150

Transcending empire

young retailers and artisans who probably had tried to avoid direct involvement in the conflict. Only twelve first-generation Genoese claimed to belong to a militia and, surprisingly, each was enlisted in a different corp:59 many were embedded in the Spanish vecinos’ tercios, but some joined Creole regiments. The census also registers four Piedmontese individuals, all of whom had voluntarily responded to the recruitment. When the British besieged Buenos Aires on July 4, 1807, the city’s defense was much different than a year before, and after only four days of combat they had to capitulate. Despite traditional lore, local resistance was not characterized by a massive popular participation and the troops were not primarily comprised of volunteers. In fact, Liniers’ troops were joined by 550 Paraguay militiamen led by Colonel José Espínola and obliged to fight alongside soldiers who had been sent from Tucumán, Corrientes, San Luis, and Montevideo. Unfortunately, the lack of sources does not allow us to assess the actual Genoese participation in the city’s defense. Equally difficult to understand is whether they had been intentionally separated in different corps to prevent potential insubordination, or whether such dismemberment resulted from the lack of residential and social cohesion in the Genoese settlement. We do know that Piedmontese clockmaker Santiago Antonini had proposed to the Cabildo creating a militia of French, Italian, and Maltese volunteers, but the authorities preferred them to join the already existing corps. The artisan was a well-known figure in Buenos Aires since 1795, when he was accused of participating in a conspiracy in favor of the French Revolution.60 In September 1806 – alongside Italian Bartolomé Cattaneo, with whom he seemingly was in business – Antonini presented a report in which the two claimed to have put forth their lives and assets to fighting off the British during the reconquista of Buenos Aires, having equipped many inhabitants with weapons and maintenance for their families. In order to tackle the ammunition shortage, they also had provided their 140-ton brigantine Liebre, which, being copper-coated, was deemed safer than other ships and was sent to Spain to procure weapons; however, the expedition failed because of a storm that forced the ship to seek shelter in the Bahia de Todos los Santos. When the Liebre arrived at the peninsula, the Spanish authorities allowed it to return to Buenos Aires with legal goods and without having to pay customs duties.61 Antonini’s good relations with Liniers and his activism in repelling the first British invasion earned him appointment as commissary general to control the budget for provisioning and housing the troops. When the second British invasion was repelled, Liniers sent him to New

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The reorientation of Genoese Atlantic trade

151

York and to Spain to procure more weapons. Different sources attest that between 1808 and 1814 Antonini traveled to Europe and to the United States to promote South American emancipation from Spain and that, to this aim, he also was appointed as Napoleon’s secret agent in New York.62 Another Piedmontese who distinguished himself in the city’s defense was Juan José Canaveri, but it seems that the fight for emancipation was not at the top of his priorities. The 1807 census provides no information about his enlistment, but other sources reveal that his activism led him to be promoted captain and allowed him to consolidate his career. Canaveri started working for the Tribunal de Cuentas, the city’s supreme fiscal body in 1801 as a temporary official; nine years later, he managed to regularize his position as the Tribunal’s notary owing to an application in which he described his efforts to repel invaders as his chief merit.63 The figures of the “French-minded” artisan Antonini and the bureaucrat Canaveri do not resemble any of the first-generation Genoese migrants who lived in Buenos Aires in these years. The 1807 census suggest that many of them attempted to avoid enlistment, while there is no evidence that those who joined a corp engaged in further military campaigns or were somehow rewarded for their contribution. It is possible that most of them, like their countrymen in Genoa, adapted themselves to circumstances or preferred to “wait and see” the turmoils’ outcome, being mainly concerned with safeguarding their lives and interests. This was not the position of all second-generation Genoese immigrants, especially the sons of those who had achieved success in colonial Buenos Aires. With the disruption of the war for independence, some of them not only did not oppose the idea of taking up weapons to fight for emancipation, but ended up playing a crucial role and holding prominent military offices. The most striking example is that of Manuel Belgrano. In his capacity as secretary of the Consulado, he had never overtly spoken out against the Spanish regime: he had developed projects aimed at enhancing the viceroyalty’s productive and commercial potential, which in his view were consistent with the Monarchy’s interests. Belgrano’s ideas were clearly inspired by physiocratic theory but were also mitigated by the neomercantilistic theories elaborated by Spanish authors Campomanes and Jovellanos (both of whom credited the Bourbon state with a crucial role in economic intervention) and by Neapolitan Enlightenment philosophers Galiani and Genovesi (who emphasized the need for a careful analysis of

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

152

Transcending empire

the specific features of any given territory).64 He upheld the principles of free trade, but he was strongly adverse to the foreign powers’ hegemonic ambitions toward the viceroyalty. In 1806, he tried with no success to organize military resistance against the British and was the only member of the Consulado to confirm his allegiance to the Spanish monarchy by not taking the oath to the British crown. He sought refuge in the Banda Oriental and, after the reconquista of Buenos Aires he actively participated in repelling the second British attack. When the abdications of 1808 called into question the empire’s reformability and its very existence, he embraced the cause of independence.65 Belgrano’s Genoese origin had no role in his political choices and did not even entail any special predilection for the republican model of government. To face the uncertain political scenario opened by the Napoleonic invasion of Spain, Belgrano initially proposed to replace the authority of the deposed king with the sister of Ferdinand VII, Carlota Joaquina, who was living in Rio de Janiero and was married to the Portuguese prince John VI. The project was rapidly abandoned due to the fear that it would strengthen Portuguese ambitions for expanding their political control over the Río de la Plata. Two years later, Belgrano was among the main supporters of the Primera Junta, which entrusted him to “extend the revolution” to the rest of the viceroyalty in order to keep it under the control of Buenos Aires authorities; Belgrano was placed at the head of the unsuccessful Paraguay-bound military expedition that led to that country’s secession and, in 1813, he fought against the royalists in Upper Peru. In 1815, after the defeat of Napoleon and the return of Ferdinand VII to the Spanish throne, Belgrano adhered to a monarchist restoration project, which, in an attempt to legitimize the revolutionary process in the Río de la Plata by adapting it to Europe’s new, post–Congress of Vienna political climate, aimed at crowning a descendant of the Incas.66 The project was ultimately rejected, but four years before Belgrano’s death his efforts were crowned by the United Provinces of Río de la Plata’s declaration of independence. The fight for emancipation also involved other second-generation Genoese immigrants. One of them, Antonio Luis Beruti, appears to have followed a pathway similar to Belgrano’s. Beruti’s father, Pablo Manuel Beruti, had left Cadiz and headed to Buenos Aires with Domingo Belgrano Peri. He worked there as the notary to the Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas y Real Hacienda. Antonio Luis had also been sent to study in Spain, where he came into contact with Enlightenment ideas; in 1810, he

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The reorientation of Genoese Atlantic trade

153

was appointed Lieutenant Colonel of the Ejército de América and took part in the 1817 campaign against the royalists in Chile as Chief of Staff of the Andean Army under General José de San Martín.67 Conversely, Tomás Espora – the son of Genoese Luis Espora, who had settled in the Río de la Plata in the second half of the eighteenth century as a textile dealer – chose to engage in the fight for independence as a seaman. Tomás, who was born in 1800 and soon became an orphan, joined the navy at a very young age and was posted to the naval force that transferred San Martín’s army from Chile to Peru; he was then involved in the privateering expeditions organized by the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata to fight the Spanish interests in America and in the Philippines; he also took part in the blockade of the port of Callao, in the taking of Lima, and in the 1826 maritime war against Brazil for the control of the Banda Oriental, which would ultimately evolve into the independence of Uruguay.68 The few cases illustrated so far are not exceptions. The 1810–12 conscription lists of the individuals who had joined either the army or the militias contain many Genoese surnames (Belgrano, Pelliza, Palavecino, Maza, Galliano, Espíndola, Costa, Bianqui, Imperial, and Centurión) belonging to members of prominent families who had been long settled in the main cities of the viceroyalty or had been previously Hispanicized in the Monarchy’s other kingdoms.69 The same documents contain names of additional individuals of likely Genoese or Italian origin (about twentyone men), but their names correspond neither to previously identified Ligurians who had migrated to Buenos Aires in the late colonial period nor to individuals listed in the city’s subsequent censuses. Although the surviving sources do not allow a complete mapping of those who participated in the wars for independence, the aforementioned conscription lists seem to suggest that the emancipation process mainly involved the great exponents of the long-established Genoese families of the viceroyalty, while it was of little concern to the more recent Ligurian migration. This divergence might be related to the interests developed by the old and the new fringes of the diaspora in the region. The former, as fully assimilated and prominent members of local society, had received a good education, made their fortune, and in some cases held prestigious offices within the Spanish monarchy, but they also had become aware of the limits of imperial rule; when the world they knew was thrown into crisis, they embraced the cause of emancipation in the belief that it would defend their country’s prosperity and progress. The more recent migrants, especially first-generation

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

154

Transcending empire

emigrants, had more concern for protecting lives and limited assets than fight for a country to which they scarcely belonged; although they were integrated in local society and interested in its well-being, they were still part of a dispersed trading nation that had long survived and prospered under the shadow of empire. The 1816 census conducted in Buenos Aires contains many of the names identified in the 1804 and 1807 censuses and also records new arrivals.70 This evidence confirms that the fight for colonial emancipation did not substantially hinder the Genoese settlement and migratory flow to Buenos Aires. The occupational and geographic distribution of Genoese emigrants within the city – as recorded by the census – attests to a strong continuity with a recent colonial past. The census records a number of already well-known merchants and dealers,71 living in the city’s most central neighborhoods, along with new merchants, pulperos, and pasta producers72 who had settled there at a later date. The presence of recently arrived retailers, millers, and butchers is also confirmed in the suburban areas.73 Even more striking is the continuity attested in the suburban neighborhoods devoted to the production of fruits and vegetables. Here, there was a qualitative and quantitative rise in the population of Ligurian quinteros: in the 1816 census, many former tenant farmers had become owners of the quintas74 and were joined by other tenant farmers and landowners who had recently arrived in Buenos Aires.75 To understand why the Ligurian immigrants were unscathed by the conflict wreaking havoc in the Río de la Plata without possessing any diplomatic protection, it is necessary to take into consideration the military policies regulating participation in the war. During the first stages of the conflict most recruits were members of the urban plebeian class in Buenos Aires (which had approximately 45,000 inhabitants at the time) and the prospect of a guaranteed wage prompted volunteer enlistments.76 However, their recruitment proved insufficient because of the frequent desertions that occurred soon after payday. The authorities then opted for forced conscription and focused their attention on vagrants, stable boys, slaves, and freedmen. While attempting to satisfy military needs and safeguard public order through the forced enlistment of potentially dangerous poor or unemployed individuals, this recruitment policy also sought to not completely annihilate the city’s commercial and manufacturing productivity. In this respect, the 1814 founding acts of two veterans companies of Pardos y Morenos libres (half-breed and black freedmen) offer an illuminating testimony: the law dispensed from duty “the shop-owners and public workshop owners directly involved in the

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The reorientation of Genoese Atlantic trade

155

running of their businesses.”77 It stands to reason to assume that exemption from military service was not limited to half-breed and black freedmen; on the contrary, it seems that authorities had extended to these individuals an exemption that applied more generally to all the shopkeepers and artisan shop-owners. The authorities did their utmost to protect the farmers as well. In a decree issued in 1815, the gobernador intendente of Buenos Aires ordered the enlistment of all individuals who lived in the countryside and did not possess property. This measure affected hired hands, who in order to avoid conscription needed a paper (papeleta) signed by their employer and countersigned by the local judge. The inability to produce the papeleta, which should be renewed every three months, entailed being classified as “vagrant” and consequential enlistment in the regular army for a five-year term.78 These exemptions offered important assurances of continuity to both the old and more recent Ligurian emigrants who, as noted earlier, were chiefly involved in commercial and productive activities. First-generation emigrants could also count on a further form of immunity deriving from the fact that conscription was not compulsory for foreigners.79 Throughout the “happy experience” years (1822–27) of Rivadavia’s liberal regime, the military policy of the newly founded Province of Buenos Aires continued to pursue the compulsory conscription of vagrants. In 1822, the new government established a draw system in the urban and countryside jurisdictions but the reform attempt had no concrete application: after a year and a half, new laws limited the permanent recruitment basin to “the idle without a job in farming or in other sectors,” alongside those who would be often caught gambling and drinking on weekdays, minors who had escaped from home, and those who had committed a crime by using cold steel.80 Military organization in urban and rural contexts remains a partially unexplored topic and is certainly more complex than may appear from these pages. Still, given that it chiefly affected rural hired hands and urban workers, the recruitment policies of the first independent governments essentially exempted from military service both the first-generation Ligurian emigrants and their offspring, who were mainly self-employed retailers and manufacturers. Despite the damages produced by the war, the immunity from conscription and, as we shall see, the economic recovery experienced by Buenos Aires after independence kept alive the fabric of Genoese trade in the ancient capital of the viceroyalty and created an environment that would draw thousands of their countrymen.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

156

Transcending empire

the opening of the genoa-buenos aires route Very little was left of the Genoese fleet following Genoa’s annexation to the kingdom of Sardinia, but such a prostrating situation soon changed. Within fifteen years, the shipbuilding industry went through a spectacular upturn owing to private initiatives in the Ligurian Riviera. In lack of adequate financial support from the government and bank institutions, families returned to their traditional activities by dedicating themselves to coastal navigation and by setting up, as in the past, improvised shipyards along the coasts.81 The slender but constant work-related income of seafarers financed the rebuilding of the fleet and it has been estimated that thirty million lire were invested over fifteen years: the money derived from freight charges levied by small shipping magnates on behalf of a third party, captains’ wages, and the usual pacotilla sales made by seafarers. These small capital accumulations, which easily eluded both fiscal controls and statistical surveys, doubled the number of recorded shipments and quadrupled the ships’ tonnage from 1816 to 1831.82 The great increase in fleet tonnage reveals the Genoese’s ambition to aim beyond their ordinary coasting routes and engage in long-haul shipping. Given that Piedmontese protectionism cost the port of Genoa its traditional role in transit trade and that the Spanish empire’s crisis had reshaped Cadiz’s function as the emporium for colonial goods, the direct purchase of raw materials from their place of production became a necessary and potentially lucrative business. However, at the start of the 1820s, this challenge could not be met and the newly born Sardinian fleet resolved on intercepting American and Asian goods in nearer ports. At this time, Gibraltar – which, by virtue of its free port status, had replaced Cadiz in its role as international shipping gateway – was the main receptacle for the Sardinian shipments. A Genoese enclave soon developed in Gibraltar and by 1825 it successfully smuggled into Spain more goods than those arriving from the United States and the Netherlands.83 The Sardinian ships transported mainly Russian and Italian grain to Gibraltar and shipped goods coming from Asia and America to Genoa. The documentary sources indicate that the Genoese merchants who had remained in Cadiz (Tomás Ravina and the Jordán y Oneto Company, for instance) maintained trade by importing smuggled goods from the British port.84 Direct trade with Spanish ports was not completely abandoned, but the lack of reliable sources impedes assessment of the Sardinian ships’ traffic: as the consul in Cadiz resignedly acknowledged, the Genoese preferred

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The reorientation of Genoese Atlantic trade

157

sailing under the Spanish flag, which allowed them to save more than 3% on Spanish customs’ duties.85 The Spanish consul in Genoa provides more detailed information on the illicit wheat trade in Spain and reports that Sardinian vessels left Genoa with two different bills of lading: one recording actual transported goods, while the other, presented at their arrival in Gibraltar, attested to an empty hold. The Sardinian vessels were chartered in Genoa by Spanish and other foreign smugglers, who would agree with the captain on the best location to unload the grain to avoid customs checks.86 In fact, not all the grain arrived in Cadiz: a part of it was sold during the journey through the well-oiled mechanism of unloading onto small boats that sold their cargoes along the Catalonian coasts.87 Thanks to Gibraltar’s brokering function and other forms of illicit trade, the captains of the Sardinian ships not only could reopen the ancient Genoese trade with Spain, but they could also sail across the Atlantic to probe Latin American markets. By 1820, they were present in the Brazilian port of Maranhão and in Montevideo; possibly in order to avoid risks, they sailed under the British flag, which they reportedly obtained in Gibraltar.88 The cautious camouflage of flag exchange proved to be an unnecessary scruple and, by the following year, ships sailing under the Sardinian flag began docking in Buenos Aires. Brazil, which received two million lire worth of exports in 1826, was an important destination for Sardinian ships loaded with paper, oil, wines, textiles, and other items;89 however, in the following years, Buenos Aires and Montevideo became the main hubs for the Americas-bound Sardinian shipments.90 Brazil, from which Genoa imported sugar, tobacco, wood, tea, and cocoa, was not abandoned, but remained an intermediate stop for many Sardinian vessels in their voyages to and from the Río de la Plata. The relative data on ships docking in the port of Buenos Aires, reported by the commercial newspaper British Packet, attests a steady – and bound to consolidate – growth in Sardinian trade from the early 1830s (Table 4.1):

table 4.1 Sardinian ship arrivals in the Port of Buenos Aires91 Year 1821 1822 1823 1824 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 Ships 3

7

7

6

14

23

20

26

30

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

43

23

21

20

158

Transcending empire

Since Buenos Aires opened the port to foreign trade in 1810, it became an increasingly attractive hub for the purchase of rawhide, wool, horns, and dried meat in exchange for manufactures and other goods. The Sardinian vessels had many competitors in the Plata estuary, but they were equally able to grasp the opportunities offered by the early disappearance of the Spanish merchant marine from that route. The United Provinces of the Río de la Plata were the first Spanish Atlantic region to achieve independence, obligating Spain to concentrate its efforts in repressing the other kingdoms’ emancipation movements. In 1824, in an extreme attempt to avoid the empire’s collapse, Ferdinand VII approved new laws in favor of direct free trade between his American dominions and the allied or “friendly” foreign powers,92 but the measure could not be implemented at any continental port in America: one year later, the empire only included Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, the Marianas, and the Caroline islands. Hence, the few remaining Spanish ships, which had been depleted by war,93 were used to maintain a nonexclusive trade with what was left of the monarchy’s dominions. As a result of the Spanish American wars for independence, the “neutral” Sardinian vessels not only were allowed to establish and rapidly consolidate direct relations with the Río de la Plata, but they also profited from fulfilling the Spanish monarchy’s need to maintain commercial ties with the former colony for the import of livestock derivatives. Among the first Sardinian ships to be employed in the transport of goods from the Río de la Plata to the peninsula were the Agua Santa and the Triunfo, which were hired by the prosperous Spanish merchants Riquena and Vea Murguía in 1821 and 1822 respectively.94 In the following years, the intermediary role of the Sardinian merchant marine grew to the point that the Genoese traders who had remained in Cadiz experienced a new – though ephemeral – stage of prosperity. Cadiz’s Genoese mercantile community did not officially oppose the prospect of unification with Piedmont. The new regime, in turn, did not propose significant changes in the government of the Genoese nation within the port of Cadiz. Consul Andrea Gherardi, who had been in office since 1781, was reconfirmed by the Napoleonic administration, and enthusiastically bowed to the Piedmontese king in 1815.95 In regards to the consul’s formal duties in Spain, Gherardi admitted that no “act of jurisdiction could be exercised.”96 As for artisans and shop-owners, the Spanish market no longer appealed but remained virtually open to the Genoese migrants.97 Conversely, foreign maritime trade was marred by strong protectionist ties put in place by the Crown in 1826 in an attempt

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The reorientation of Genoese Atlantic trade

159

to recoup the extensive losses caused by the American emancipation wars.98 Due to Gibraltar’s competition, even these barriers fell and forced the Spanish authorities to grant Cadiz free port status in 1829. The privilege generated widespread optimism in Cadiz and attracted many retailers as well as ships that had previously docked at Gibraltar.99 By establishing a close relationship with the captains of the Sardinian ships, the Genoese consignees who were still working in the bay soon became the main point of reference for importing into Spain goods from Buenos Aires and Montevideo.100 Between 1830 and 1834, the Sardinian ships assumed a dominant position on the Cadiz–Río de la Plata route; in fact, in terms of inward journeys, it was second only to Great Britain and it outnumbered all competitors on outward journeys.101 The port of Cadiz had lost its ancient role of intermediation for the export of European goods to America, but it remained a hub for the distribution of American products to the Spanish market. In regards to imports from the Río de la Plata in particular, the Sardinian mercantile navy and its Genoese representatives in the bay assumed the brokering function so far in the hands of the Spanish; for the Genoese shipments to America, conversely, passing through Spain became more and more unnecessary. The case of the brigantine Eolo, which belonged to captain Vincenzo Gianello, perfectly illustrates how Spain had lost its strategic role in the exportation of Genoese goods, and highlights the consolidation of the Sardinian interests in the Río de laPlata trade. In June 1835 – having docked in Genoa, Malaga, and Gibraltar – the Eolo was anchored at Cadiz and held an open account with the Genoese Jordán y Oneto house of trade, to which it had delivered a shipment of hides. The Montevideo-bound vessel had arrived almost fully loaded and promoted Atlantic-crossing tickets.102 Gianello, who had sailed the Río de la Plata route at least since 1830, was listed in the port’s journal as captain of Sardinian ships103 until 1836; still, in 1837, the Neapolitan consul in Cadiz reported that Eolo had entered the port under the Uruguayan banner and remarked that it was the first ship from that country to enter the Spanish port.104 Clearly, the collapse of the colonial order utterly overturned the longstanding relationships between Genoa and Spain; until then, the merchants of the Republic had had to hide behind the Spanish flag to invest in the Indias trade; following the independence wars in Latin America, not only were Genoese able to trade autonomously in the Atlantic for the first time, but they also became essential to Spain for maintaining commercial relations with the Río de la Plata. The new vigor of the Genoese maritime trade along the Mediterranean and the Atlantic routes generated a widespread enthusiasm both in Genoa

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

160

Transcending empire

and within the Genoese mercantile community in Spain. The atmosphere of elation is attested by the portraits of Cristoforo Colombo and the books in his tribute, which Joaquín Francisco Luchy, a Ligurian merchant living in Cadiz, imported from Genoa and which arrived at their destination in January 1830 on board the brigantine Cristobal Colon.105 The writings may be a copy of Giovanni Battista Spotorno’s book Codice Diplomatico. Colombo Americano, ossia Raccolta di Documenti originali e inediti spettanti a Cristoforo Colombo, which was published in 1823. The Spanish consul in Genoa sent a copy of the book to Madrid and remarked that the Decurions of Genoa had ordered its publication to prove the hero’s Genoese origin and to honor “his homeland”; the commission of a marble bust of the navigator completed the Decurions’ initiative.106 A few years later, however, the Genoese intermediaries in Spain realized that their optimism was misplaced. Cadiz had been granted free port status to stimulate Spanish manufacturing, balance the Monarchy’s trade deficit, and renew the Spanish harbor’s prominence.107 Conversely, against all expectations, the privilege had solely enriched foreign merchants living in Cadiz, increased contraband trade, and damaged the other ports of the peninsula; all of these reasons prompted the authorities to revoke Cadiz’s free port privilege in 1832. Sardinian trade between Spain and Río de la Plata did not take a sudden dive,108 but nonetheless was unable to maintain the advantages that it had acquired in the previous years. Sardinian ships’ arrivals at Cadiz progressively decreased throughout the 1840s,109 when the consolidation of the British supremacy and the reopening of direct commercial relations between Spain and the Latin American republics made the Sardinian intermediation redundant. The ancient international emporium, which was set to become a minor port, left no space for the Genoese houses of trade, whose profit making opportunities fell beyond repair. Some of the merchants, artisans, and employers who survived the decline chose to remain, but for the new generations of emigrants Cadiz merely represented – and not for long – a stopover on their journey to the Americas. The end of the Genoese experience in Cadiz became clear a few years later: in 1854, the Sardinian consulate in the bay was closed and transferred to Malaga, where it looked after the interests of Genoa’s Transatlantic Company of steamers that had chosen that port as its main hub.110 Conversely, Genoa further consolidated direct relations with the Río de la Plata (Table 4.2) and became one of the region’s most active commercial partners.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The reorientation of Genoese Atlantic trade

161

table 4.2 Sardinian ship arrivals in the port of Buenos Aires111 Year 1841 1842 1843 1844 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1857 1858 1859 1860 1863 1866 Ships 49

44

69

47

45

31

18

22

40

38

52

58

57

62

81

139

The Neapolitan consul in Genoa vividly depicted the progressive growth of Sardinian trade in the Atlantic, which primarily included Buenos Aires and Montevideo but also enlarged to other South American ports and to the Caribbean. In 1833, he reported that fifty or sixty ships, whose tonnage ranged from 120 to 300 tons, left Genoa each year with many kinds of goods: red wines from the French and Catalonian coasts, manufactures produced in Genoa and in its environs (i.e., pasta, paper, olive oil, cards, corals, velvets, silk, stockings, muslin embroideries, laces, and artificial flowers), Carrara marble, bric-a-brac, smaller minutia coming from the Germanic states, steel and hardware from Trieste, edibles such as Sicilian almonds, processed meats, and olives. The main stops were St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands, which served mainly as a warehouse and transit port, Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco, Havana, Trinidad de Cuba, Buenos Aires, and Montevideo. Furthermore, each year, four or five heavy shipments crossed Cape Horn on their way to Lima and California. The main imports from the Americas were dried and salted rawhide, sugar, coffee, Brazilian cotton, and fine wood. The Sardinian commercial expeditions were set up by experienced merchants and entrusted to knowledgeable captains, who delivered the goods either to the Genoese houses of trade based in American ports or to other European traders. The round trip from Genoa – including the time needed to sell the stocks – lasted between nine and fourteen months and each expedition could provide 20–30% return on the invested capital. The consul ascribed this trade to the “indefatigable activity and shrewdness of the Genoese,” who did not benefit from any fiscal privileges in the port of Genoa, on neither imports nor exports. According to the consul, the only support from the Sardinian government was an 1825 decree whereby ships sailing under a foreign banner paid 50% duty on liquids and grain transported to or from Genoa; owing to this incentive, the Sardinian merchant marine became so prosperous as to compete with France and Great Britain. While Sardinian maritime trade was protected in Genoa, it remained “free” in the Americas. Although the Turin government did not sign any commercial treaties with Latin American countries, the Sardinian flag was well

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

162

Transcending empire

respected. Marketplaces, such as Havana and Rio de Janeiro, had Sardinian agents, while elsewhere Genoese captains could easily rely on the protection offered by French and British consuls.112 In a memorandum written in 1839, the Secretary of the Ministry of Finance for the Kingdom of Naples confirmed the consul’s remarks and concluded that it was impossible for the Neapolitans to compete with the Genoese at sea: Our seafaring traditions are far too recent, while the Genoese one is both protected and venerable. The Genoese have been always drawn to daring actions by their ungrateful rocks and by the sterile mountains which surrounds them. Hence, we shall not be able to challenge Genoese wealth in the sailing industry, given that they sail for need. That consular agent’s argument that Sardinian commerce will soon rival Europe’s first maritime nations should not surprise us. Here [in Genoa] capital is no longer used to build marble mansions, sustain the lifestyle of luxuryprone classes or keep alive sectarian and external rivalries. As they increase, this capital becomes the seed of more promising endeavors and, provided that there are no accidents, our Consul’s prediction shall prove true.113

Both contemporary observers stressed the Sardinian government’s thinning efforts to favor its merchant marine, but they also praised the capacity of the Genoese captains to successfully operate where no state support was available. Neither testimony mentions the severe damage caused by Piedmontese protectionism to Genoese trade and manufacturing, which were both set to embark on a complex transitory phase. Meanwhile, Turin started to mitigate its traditional protectionist stance and embraced a more liberal agenda. This change of direction was not determined solely by the need to stimulate commerce but also by the need to fight contraband, which had been fostered by protectionism. To this end, differential duties were abolished and even import levies were slightly lowered in 1835. In 1838, navigation treaties were signed with Belgium and the United States and similar arrangements were made with Great Britain and France in 1841. Due to these measures, transit commerce – which for centuries had been one of Genoa’s main revenue sources – gave way to import and export trade. The new economic approach had particularly virtuous effects on the manufacturing industries of white lead, cotton, silk and organzine as well as on Genoese paper, whose commercialization in the Americas steadily increased following the end of the Spanish monopoly.114 As historian Giovanni Assereto noted, “it was largely because Genoa found itself supported and almost forced by Piedmont that it successfully completed its mutation from traditional entrepôt to modern port of a

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The reorientation of Genoese Atlantic trade

163

territorial state, and that it managed to obtain what the old Republic had never been able to build, that is, a national merchant marine sailing under a respectable flag.”115 Annexation to the Sardinian kingdom allowed Genoa to successfully adapt to changed international conditions that made the return to the past impossible, but this process would be fully accomplished only in the age of Cavour. As a deputy (1848–9), as minister of agriculture, trade, navy, and finance (1850–1), and then as prime minister (1852–61), Camillo Benso di Cavour implemented a free trade policy, promoted industrial innovations and agricultural production, and supported infrastructural projects for the improvement of terrestrial communications.116 During these years, the Genoese economic elites experienced the positive effects of governmental commitment in fostering trade expansion and embraced the growth perspectives resulting from the consolidation of a national economy.117 To tackle this prolonged restructuring process, which was not free from contradictions and difficulties, the Ligurian population resorted to their traditional commercial strategies and, above all, to emigration, which an observer of the period defined as “a veritable second nature”118 of the region’s inhabitants. The damages caused by the war, the deconstruction of the old economic system, the military conscriptions, and the renewed demographic pressures119 were all factors that pushed generations of emigrants toward destinations, especially the Río de la Plata, where there were clear signs that maritime trade had recovered. In some of these marketplaces, they were not given any substantial protection by the Sardinian government but found a well-established network of countrymen, who made it easier to exploit the growing opportunities offered by the new hosting societies.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

5 Settling in independent Buenos Aires

spontaneous migration toward a growing economy A few years after independence, Buenos Aires became the most appealing destination of Genoese migratory flow in the Atlantic thanks to a favorable combination of novel pull factors and substantial continuities with the past. The most significant change was the opening of the port to foreign maritime trade, which led to the establishment of regular contact between Genoa and the Río de la Plata and opened a new route to migrants. Besides, the end of the restrictions imposed by the Spanish Crown allowed foreigners to freely travel and settle in the region, where local authorities continued to look with favor upon new arrivals. At the same time, the increasing commercial projection in the Atlantic of the Río de la Plata coasts entailed a steady economic and demographic growth that multiplied job opportunities in all the activities in which the Genoese were traditionally interested. One of most appealing for them was commercial navigation among the estuary and the ports of the Paraná River, a sector that grew in parallel with the connections linking the coastal provinces of the interior to the Atlantic market. The continuities with the colonial past also included the Genoese business strategies and their flair for integration in the host society, which allowed them to thrive despite their persisting political weakness as a nation. Another important incentive for insertion in local economy was the survival and broadening of the traditional merchant jurisdiction, which granted a fast and equitable resolution of commercial lawsuits also to non-native residents. The orientation of many entrepreneurs toward the local economy did not weaken their attachment to the land of origin but actually favored, at an 164

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

165

informal level and indirectly, its economic interests. Collaboration among fellow countrymen fostered the integration of new waves of migrants and also helped in consolidating trade exchanges with Genoa, which was able to impose itself as one of the main commercial partners of the region and to compete on the Atlantic scene by using the sizable migration to America as a precious “load” for transatlantic shipping, as a broker for expanding business occasions overseas, and as an end market for Italian products. The combination of these novel and traditional elements created a favorable context for the Genoese to reaffirm their capacity to pursue economic profits in symbiosis with the host society – a symbiosis that, in Buenos Aires as in eighteenth-century Cadiz, enhanced the Atlantic projection of the mother country without the need for any power politics behavior. The opportunities generated by the Río de la Plata’s independence process are crucial to understanding how the Genoese diaspora fostered by the Napoleonic Wars settled on the other side of the Atlantic. Over the last decades of the colonial era, 80% of the volume of the Río de la Plata’s exports still constituted precious metals from Upper Peru, while the remaining 20% was made up of livestock farming derivatives, especially cowhides. Following the territorial fragmentation of the viceroyalty with the independence war, this traditional export model was rapidly dismantled. The secession of Upper Peru deprived Río de la Plata’s foreign trade of its main source of income. The collapse of the mining industry’s circuits caused a complete reorganization of the region’s territorial hierarchy. This resulted in the progressive marginalization of the internal provinces that were traditionally connected to the overland circuits of the precious metals’ trade (Jujuy, Salta, Tucumán, Santiago del Estero, Cordoba, La Rioja, Catamarca, San Luis, San Juan, and Mendoza) and in the increasing valorization of the Cuenca (Figure 5.1), which included Littoral areas (Santa Fe, Corrientes, and Entre Ríos), the province of Buenos Aires, and the Banda Oriental (present-day Uruguay), where, by the mid-nineteenth century, almost all exports comprised livestock farming derivatives.1 As a result of the region’s involvement in the Atlantic trade and of the transport links offered by the Paraná and the Uruguay rivers, these fertile territories became increasingly destined to livestock farming during the course of the eighteenth century.2 The 1778 comercio libre decree, which allowed Buenos Aires to licitly trade with Spain and other Spanish colonies, led to a growing demand for rawhide and dried meat on the international market. This triggered an expansion of the estancias

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

166

Transcending empire

figure 5.1 The Cuenca rioplatense Source: Socolow, Susan M., “Buenos Aires: Atlantic port and hinterland.” In Atlantic Port Cities. Economy, Culture, and Society in the Atlantic World, 1650–1850, eds. Franklin Knight and Peggy Liss, 240–61. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1991, p. 244.

devoted to livestock farming and also an increase in river trade, which, in turn, promoted internal migratory flows toward coastal harbors and led the government to create new settlements.3 Independence did not substantially alter this trend. Opening up Buenos Aires to foreign ships, which had always been in place in a more or less licit way and was further

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

167

stimulated by the 1797 decree of neutral trade and the British invasions,4 contributed to turning the area into one of South America’s most prominent hubs for Atlantic trade.5 Since the colonial era, the valorization of river-based trade circuits had entailed a twofold conflict. On the one hand, the supremacy of the capital city’s Consulado clashed with the coastal areas’ ambition to freely navigate the rivers; on the other hand, Buenos Aires and Montevideo fought over the hegemony of the river and sea trade: the latter conflict loomed with the institution in 1779 of a custom station in the port of the Banda Oriental and was kept alive by repeated attempts to establish an autonomous mercantile tribunal in Montevideo. The crisis of the colonial system exacerbated these tensions and, given its strategic importance, river trade became a major issue in the newly born Republic. The trade dispute between Buenos Aires and Montevideo was not resolved until 1828 when – with the support of the French and the British, who aimed at neutralizing Brazil’s and Argentina’s hegemonic designs and safeguarding free access to the river – the República Oriental del Uruguay became independent.6 However, Buenos Aires jeopardized any aspiration about free river navigation by maintaining customs control on most imports and exports. Hence, as the main river and sea trade junction, Buenos Aires was able to exploit the economic recovery of the Littoral regions, which – despite the difficulties caused by war and interprovincial clashes – had reconnected to the Atlantic trade by the 1820s.7 Following independence and the loss of its role as a privileged port for the export of precious metals, the province of Buenos Aires experienced an unprecedented expansion in local production. In the late colonial era, Buenos Aires’s countryside produced merely 30% of the rawhide exported overseas while the remaining 70% came chiefly from the two opposite banks of the Uruguay River, Misiones, Santa Fe, and Cordoba.8 After 1805, Buenos Aires rapidly recovered by profiting from the rise in the price of livestock farming derivatives demanded by local and international markets; this rise prompted the purchase of new lands and also boosted their value.9 Following a protracted price stagnation caused by the availability of many fertile lots, the land market picked up again, allowing the Buenos Aires province’s economy to become almost unrivaled in exports by the second half of the century.10 The progressive settlement in the region of an unprecedented number of foreign immigrants helps to explain the successful economic transition of the Río de la Plata to independence. Immigration was yet another important consequence of emancipation, but, as noted earlier, the phenomenon

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

168

Transcending empire

appears to be in line with the local authorities’ traditional interest for population growth, particularly by the favor habitually bestowed upon skilled foreign immigrant workers. In 1810, amid growing anti-Spanish hostility, the authorities launched policies based on the expulsion of peninsular Spaniards from political and military offices; this prompted many foreigners (including some Italians) to apply for naturalization, which led to a peaceful resolution of the crisis.11 Simultaneously, the newly born republic sought to equalize the business and trade rights of immigrants and natives. The 1810 provisions were confirmed by the government of the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata with a decree issued on September 4, 1812 whereby foreigners were granted the rights to property, freedom, and safety; in addition, those who intended to devote themselves to farming were guaranteed land and tax relief on the importation of seeds and plants.12 An 1812 decree allowed foreign companies to trade with the region without the need to use local brokers and this represented an important step toward the consolidation of foreign commercial relations. The 1815 Estatuto Provisional implicitly confirmed that foreigners and natives shared the same fundamental rights essential to economic prosperity: life, freedom, equality, property, and safety.13 With Bernardino Rivadavia, the Minister of government and foreign affairs of the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata (1821–23) and the first President of the republic under the new constitution of 1826, supporting European immigration and attracting foreign capital were recognized as essential strategies for local economic and demographic growth. In the early 1820s, the government devised a program of rural colonization based on emphyteusis, that is, leasing public land for twenty years for a fixed sum. At the same time, Rivadavia permitted a private English merchant company in the province of Buenos Aires to open a discount bank with a one million dollar capitalization, and sought British investment in the mining sector. In 1824, he negotiated a one million pound loan with the House of Baring. However, all these efforts were doomed to fail and the flow of foreign capital into Argentina remained rather modest. The project of attracting North European pioneers, whom the authorities looked on with particular favor, delivered only three contingents of English, Scottish, and German settlers.14 Besides, the investments made in the mining industry produced meager returns and the House of Baring loan was spent almost entirely on the war against Brazil over the control of the Banda Oriental.15 In spite of the failure of Rivadavia’s initiatives, foreigners were instrumental in reshaping the newly born Republic’s economic system and

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

169

favored the expansion of international trade, the proliferation of estancias, and industrial stagnation. Right from the first revolutionary decade, Great Britain imposed itself as the first trade partner of the Republic and rerouted its transatlantic operations from Cadiz to Liverpool.16 The competition of British goods was so pronounced as to irrevocably damage the traditional productive sectors of the internal Provinces already enfeebled by the mining crisis and by the loss of Chilean and Upper Peruvian markets. The resulting decline of local industry led the mercantile elite of Buenos Aires to invest, with the government’s support, its own resources in the livestock rather than the farming sector to the extent that, by the 1820s, the Province of Buenos Aires began to depend on grain imported from abroad. The expansion of the economy connected to the export of rawhide and dried meat triggered a concentration of land ownership that favored the political consolidation of a small group of estancieros representing a productive world that was less many-sided and complex than that envisaged by the 1810 group, but could guarantee a steady and lasting economic growth. Great Britain’s strong and early interests in the Río de la Plata is attested by the fact that by 1818 there were no fewer than fifty-five British import– export companies; by 1829, due to competition from other nations (especially France and the United States), there were only thirty-eight, but these still represented 33% of all active trade houses.17 Since 1810, British trade penetration had been flanked by a particularly active diplomatic effort,18 which enabled Great Britain to become the first nation to stipulate a fruitful treaty of friendship, trade, and navigation with the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata in 1825.19 The British merchants also stood out for their strong organizational and community20 cohesion; in Buenos Aires they opened a Chamber of Commerce where businessmen could exchange information, consult their journals, receive mail, and remain abreast of European news, including commodity prices and the demand for goods.21 In 1841, the US consul promoted the institution of a foreign businessmen’s club as an alternative to its British counterpart. The club was opened to French, German, and other foreign merchants, but not to the “Italians.” This exclusion, which was traditionally interpreted as a result of the Sardinian merchants’ small business volume,22 should also be ascribed to the singular commercial penetration strategy embraced by the Genoese immigrants who had settled in the region. The consolidation of the Genoa-Río de la Plata mercantile route started in the early 1820s and over the following decade it enabled the Sardinian mercantile navy to compete against the biggest maritime

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

170

Transcending empire

powers present in the Río de la Plata region.23 However, for a long time this commercial activism lacked power and political visibility given that it developed in the absence of diplomatic cover by the Kingdom of Sardinia or by other institutional organizations. In fact, the Kingdom of Sardinia did not sign a commercial deal with the Argentinian Confederation until 1855.24 The first Sardinian consulate in Buenos Aires was instituted in 1834, but for several years its real representative powers were curtailed by the distrust of the Rosas’s government as well as that of the Sardinian immigrants.25 Just as Buenos Aires was replacing Cadiz as the preferred destination for Ligurian emigration, Savoyard Picolet D’Hermillon, the first consul of the Kingdom of Sardinia in the Argentinian port, complained disconsolately and contemptuously lamented his detachment from those whom he was theoretically called to protect: In Buenos Aires, there is a group of Genoese individuals who are determined to oppose the King’s government. In order to give Your Excellency a picture of the Genoese population settled in Buenos Aires, I am afraid to inform you that it will be very hard to find Consular Chancellor amid the more than five thousand individuals living here. With the exception of very few individuals, they are all sailors, exiles or men who have been banned from His Majesty’s territories in light of their political views. Above all, they stand out for the passion for intrigue; they make use of all necessary means to achieve their scams and, unfortunately, are supported by the authorities of this country.26

Clearly, the ideological apparatus of the anti-Savoy hostility and the exile of Italian liberal opponents that followed the failure of the 1821 and 1831 uprisings in the Italian states cannot explain the massive Ligurian emigration to the Río de la Plata coasts and the widespread indifference or hostility toward their own institutional representatives. Although Picolet appeared to dismiss the economic prospects that the hosting society offered to the immigrants, he did hit the mark when emphasizing the complicity and the informal protection that the Buenos Aires authorities offered to the new arrivals. The Sardinian settlement grew and flourished under the protection offered by the regime of Rosas, who ruled the province of Buenos Aires between 1829 and 1852. According to the report of vice-consul Belloc, in 1850 between 25,000 and 26,000 Sardinians lived in the Argentinian Confederation: three-quarters of them were of Genoese descent and all were engaged in profitable occupations; in particular, the vice-consul reported that there were 300 retailers, shipping magnates, and shipbuilders, all of whom “were held in high esteem and benefited from an honorable commercial position.”27

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

171

The key to understanding Genoese “success” in the Río de la Plata – a success which preceded and differed so much from modern Italian mass migratory flows – resides neither in the colonization agendas promoted by the authorities of Buenos Aires nor in the political or commercial initiatives undertaken by the Kingdom of Sardinia. On the contrary, it will be useful to compare it with Cadiz’s case and with the Río de la Plata’s recent colonial past; both show how the flux of men and goods from the Republic was fostered by networks of informal and flexible cooperation, which were able to overcome the lack of support and tax controls in the homeland. These networks featured subjects inclined to symbiosis and integration within the hosting society in order to better seize its opportunities. Ligurian penetration in the Río de la Plata in the wake of independence was not dissimilar. By following in the footsteps of those who had settled there before or by traveling the routes opened by the Sardinian merchant navy, an increasing number of Genoese immigrants spontaneously headed to Buenos Aires, where they found the support of other already-established countrymen and the possibility of easily integrating themselves into the host society; in these favorable conditions, they were able to play a significant role in sustaining the local economy and to create a prosperous settlement, which, in turn, further consolidated commercial ties with Genoa. This also might explain why they did not join the Buenos Aires foreign businessmen club: for the well-integrated Sardinian immigrants there was no need.

prospering along the river The Ligurian emigrants found in the Río de la Plata river trade a readily available source of profit that fitted their expertise. As noted earlier, the presence of Genoese patrons within the river trade circuits can be traced back to the late colonial period, but the expansion of harbor traffic in the wake of independence transformed river navigation into a primary source of employment for Genoese emigrants. Tentatively at first and then more and more vigorously, waves of Ligurian migrants flocked to the Río de la Plata’s shores to pursue their favored business. The routes sailed by the river expeditions were often shorter than the Mediterranean ones, but much more problematic in terms of navigation. The shoals in the port of Buenos Aires prevented deep-draught vessels from docking and made it necessary to employ pontoons to load and unload goods. Ligurian seafarers were certainly very familiar with this kind of problem. In Genoa the unloading process was made equally troublesome by the port’s flat seabed

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

172

Transcending empire

and compared to what was being employed in other European ports, the machinery was four centuries behind.28 These difficulties are clearly attested by the no-berthing provision for vessels exceeding 30 tons; as a result, captains had to make use of barges driven by skilled on-call pilots.29 The Genoese emigrants’ expertise in navigation made them ideal candidates for the increasingly in-demand brokering positions on the Río de la Plata market. The register of the coasters entering the port of Buenos Aires between 1802 and 1823 contains the first testimonies of the growing Genoese presence in the Río de la Plata rivers traffic (Table A.8). During the years of the British invasions and the war for emancipation,

figure 5.2 The Río de la Plata’s ports before 1860 Source: Kroeber, Clifton B., La navegación de los ríos en la historia argentina. Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1967, p. 65.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

173

the registers record very few arrivals of ships headed by patrons of clear Ligurian descent, with a partial exception for the 1809–10 period: there was a modest and irregular rise in numbers with twists and turns until 1823, when the expansion become more visible. Between 1802 and 1810, the documents record the activity of very few individuals leading coastal expeditions on a permanent basis. In the following decade, this original group of patrons gradually disappeared from the records because of war contingencies, business turnover, or old age.30 By the time of independence, a host of new participants appear. Although most were unable to organize more than three expeditions and operated over a rather limited span of time, in this period also emerged a small group of patrons devoted to regular coastal shipping. The primary role held by the Ligurians in the Río de la Plata river navigation through the 1820s was centered around these individuals, while also relying on new waves of emigrants. One of the most important was Noli-born Pedro Fontana, who operated in the river trade from 1809 until at least 1821 by mainly delivering rawhide, tallow, wood, and lime. Throughout the years, he also expanded into the building industry. In 1839, Fontana became ill and died in the river port of Mercedes, where he was nursed by Antonio Marotto, a vecino of Italian descent and possibly one of his partners in river trade. He bequeathed an estate with vineyards and olive groves and a house in his home town, all of which he had inherited from his mother, but most of his properties were located in Buenos Aires: there, he owned building land in calle Temple and a house in calle México, where he also held a warehouse filled with joinery tools, hardware, building materials, and 9,000 pesos in cash.31 Another example is Juan Chichisola, who was active between 1817 and 1823 as a deliverer of wood and rawhide from the ports of Gualeguay and Montevideo. The notarial deeds attest that he invested in coastal shipping until his death in 1829; at death’s door, he left his vessel to his nephew Esteban Chichisola, who was engaged in the same activity.32 The Genoese patrons who emigrated to Buenos Aires at the beginning of the nineteenth century also massively engaged in shipbuilding. Although in the colonial era the Río de la Plata oceanic trade had chiefly used foreign-built ships,33 its shipbuilding sector had already started to develop. Paraguay had been the most active region until then but following the crisis of the colonial order, the secession from the old viceroyalty, and the advent of the Francia government (1816–40), the sector became a rigidly regulated instrument of national policy; as a result, the port of Asunción could no longer meet the needs of the Río

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

174

Transcending empire

de la Plata river trade and lost its primacy. Asunción was replaced by the port of Corrientes, which became the main shipbuilding hub in the Argentinian provinces. The ports of Montevideo and Ensenada, located within the Río de la Plata estuary, specialized in repairing deep-draught ships, while in the proximity of Buenos Aires, along the Riachuelo River, a busy industry based on the construction and repair of small ships began to develop.34 Ligurian emigrants played such a pivotal role in this sector that they transformed the surrounding neighborhoods of Riachuelo, Barracas and La Boca, into their own residential districts.35 The increasing demand for vessels generated by the development of river trade also allowed foreign shipping magnates to settle and prosper along the river ports of the Littoral. Although, in some cases, this phenomenon triggered the protectionist response of local ship magnates, the local authorities tended to favor Ligurian shipbuilding because of the strategic nature of that industry.36 Documenting the Genoese shipbuilding activities during these years is no mean feat, given that, similar to what occurred along the Ligurian coasts, most of the fleet was constructed in small and improvised shipyards.37 One of the first Ligurian businessmen to have invested in this sector is Domingo Costa. After arriving in Buenos Aires around 1806,38 Costa had been involved in river shipping since at least 1816.39 He featured in the 1827 Buenos Aires census as a wood dealer based in calle Alameda. His workshop was located in a neighborhood inhabited by a large number of fellow countrymen, two of whom were also recorded as wood dealers: Carlos Galliano, who had moved from Savona to Buenos Aires with his family around 1817, and Francisco Sanguinetti.40 In his warehouse in calle Alameda, Costa stored the iron and wood materials obtained by the dismantlement of unserviceable ships and which might come in handy to repair damaged vessels and build new ones.41 At his death, in 1840, Costa declared that he owned a schooner, but it remains unclear whether he had built it or whether he had bought it in order to enter commercial navigation. Some of his relatives also had business interests in the shipbuilding industry: his son-in-law and heir, the Genoese Luis Palma, owned a 43-ton schooner.42 Between 1843 and 1847, his executor, Juan Bautista Boasi, had purchased four ships whose tonnage ranged between 50 and 124 tons.43 Carlos Galliano entered the shipbuilding and ship-repairing industry around 1820, when he declared that he was an “inhabitant” of Buenos Aires. As he was about to travel back to Europe, he entrusted his minority partners Antonio Tagliafico and Geronimo Zinotto to manage his

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

175

property along the river (“en el bajo de río”), which housed iron and wood, and to manage his income until his return.44 In Buenos Aires, Galliano committed himself to shipbuilding activities for three decades;45 he also invested in river trade by sending Sardinian vessels on commercial expeditions along the Buenos Aires–Montevideo route.46 His high social standing within the port, along with his ties to Genoa and the Sardinian mercantile navy, also made him a point of reference for fellow countrymen willing to settle in Buenos Aires. Alassio-native José Murature – who has become rather famous in the history of the Italian emigration to Argentina for having distinguished himself in several military campaigns against Brazil – arrived in Buenos Aires with a letter of recommendation to Galliano,47 who welcomed him in his home and helped him and his father, Francisco Murature, to enter the coastal trade.48 The lawsuit filed against the captain of the Sardinian vessel Amor Constante, Bartolomeo Pagliano, clarifies that Galliano was not the only immigrant to act as a facilitator to the growing number of Ligurians flocking to the region at the time. Bartolomeo traded between Genoa and the Río de la Plata and also held strong businesses interests in Buenos Aires, where he owned a house.49 His brother Marcos, who had been a commercial shipowner since at least 1819, lived and worked in Buenos Aires.50 In 1822, Piedmontese barber Victor Furno and a few Ligurian dealers (the aforementioned Manuel Fontana, Manuel Viale, whom we shall cite again, and Francisco Levriero) asked Marcos Pagliano to negotiate on their behalf a passage from Genoa to Buenos Aires for relatives and friends on Bartolomeo Pagliano’s Sardinian brigantine.51 This lawsuit represents a rare testimony to the early migratory chain activated by the Ligurian emigrants in the Río de la Plata. In fact, this period and this topic lacks similar documentary evidence, which, in this particular case, has survived solely because the voyage ended with a shipwreck. The Amor Constante sank off the coasts of Montevideo, where Pagliano had wanted to stop to enquire about the price of the wine he had loaded at Marseilles and of other goods he carried. In spite of the bad weather, he refused to enter the port to avoid paying berthing dues and to bind the stern of his ship to the Sardinian frigate Thetis, which was anchored at the road-stead. These details reveal the particular strategies that informed the Genoese commercial penetration in the region. Apart from showing their persisting interest in avoiding custom duties whenever possible, they stress the captains’ essential role in trade intermediation as well as in transmitting information for future shipments. During the 1820s, Ligurian emigration in Buenos Aires grew significantly and swelled the ranks of the patrons engaged in river trade. This

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Transcending empire

176

table 5.1 Coasters equipped by patrons of Genoese origin docking Buenos Aires between 1802 and 182852 1802 1803 1809 1810 1811 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1828 2

2

27

24

7

2

8

10

21

3

12

7

6

13

89

215

trend is illustrated by the fact that, starting from 1823, the number of coasters equipped by Ligurian patrons docking at the port rose significantly (see Table 5.1). The details about the 1828 expeditions (Table A.9) show that patrons rarely transported goods on a permanent basis from just one port. Such a “specialization” is only documented in the case of Nicolás Nocheto, who in that year set up and successfully implemented seven Santa Fe–bound expeditions with his barge Fortuna, and of Juan Bautista Sanguineto, who organized five shipments to Montevideo and one to Salto. Most of the patrons – even the more active ones – gave priority to at least two different destinations in the course of the year.53 A comprehensive examination of the Ligurian presence in the Río de la Plata coastal shipping over the course of 1828 offers an articulated picture of an enterprise dominated by a majority of patrons carrying out just one or two expeditions per year. Therefore, it seems that generally river transport was not a permanent business but part of a broader and more complex economic strategy that aimed at supplying certain goods or represented a meaningful temporary occupation while waiting either for other employment or return to one’s homeland. The multipurpose nature of coastal shipping and its irregularity was not exclusive to the Río de la Plata marketplace. A comparison with the small-haul traffic generated by the ports gravitating around Marseilles – which like Buenos Aires, had become a prominent international docking port in the course of the eighteenth century54 and was also very popular among Ligurian patrons55 – attests to a similar situation along the French coasts of the Mediterranean. According to Gilbert Buti’s estimates on the number of coasters entering the port of Marseilles in 1787, it emerges that, with the exception of a few captains specialized in a single route,56 on average each patron had organized about two shipments per year. To return to the Río de la Plata’s case, the 215 arrivals recorded in Buenos Aires in 1828 referred to 101 different patrons. The comparison with data available for the previous years (from 1802 to 1823, only 173 ships belonging to 75 patrons had docked in the port) shows that

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

177

the Ligurian presence in coastal shipping had rapidly increased and, curiously, this growth coincided with a war emergency. From 1825 to 1828, the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata engaged in a war against Brazil over the Banda Oriental and this seriously endangered river navigation. Perhaps, the reasons for this phenomenon may lie in the efforts put forth by the Ligurian patrons and the shipping magnates to face the emergency by acting as guarantors of the safety of the river routes. Shipping magnate Carlos Galliano was one of the first to take the initiative; to defend the river ports and “the nation’s interests” against the Brazilian “enemies” – who, in his opinion, had organized nine small privateer shipments – he equipped his schooner Ana Bella with two cannons and obtained a government license to navigate and trade.57 Many other Ligurians offered their services as owners of corsair coasters, as captains, or simply as sailors.58 In 1826, the government issued a decree prohibiting the arming of ships of less than 25 tons, but the measure was bound to be dropped. In fact, by arguing that the decree had drastically reduced the once-florid river coastal shipping industry to the advantage of Brazilian privateers, not only did captain José Claveli obtain a privateering license for himself and for Antonio Carbón – his second in command – but he also gained permission to arm all the residents’ boats.59 The Oriental Province was eventually lost and became independent; nonetheless, by demonstrating their usefulness to the local economy, the Genoese patrons were able to consolidate their presence in the navigation sector with the support of the merchants of Buenos Aires and of those who had settled in the internal river ports. The vicissitudes of the few Genoese patrons, such as Benito Lanza, who have left a small trail in archives are particularly indicative. According to the arrival registers of the port of Buenos Aires, in 1828, he captained two different vessels employed on five commercial expeditions to Vacas, Soriano, Santa Fe, and Bajada. Over the years, he managed to consolidate his business interests in the Province of Corrientes, where he died in 1848. There, in partnership with local dealer Ramón de Galarraga, he bought the ship Victoria. Following Lanza’s death, his widow sought the intercession of Felipe Llavallol, a wealthy merchant whose father had left Catalonia to live and trade in the Río de la Plata in the late colonial era.60 Llavallol was a leading figure on the city’s social scene and would become governor of Buenos Aires in 1859–60. “Despite being very busy,” Llavallol acted as executor and “kindly arranged” the sale of Lanza’s ship “out of personal feelings of respect.”61 This seemingly exceptional favor

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

178

Transcending empire

was the result of the strong network of cooperation-based ties that the great merchant had established with Genoese brokers. Llavallol features in the Buenos Aires customs’ registers as the consignee of goods transported on Sardinian ships that traded along the coasts and with Genoa,62 and also as an agent of coastal expeditions entrusted to Ligurian patrons to trade stocks of imported goods in the internal river ports. In 1835, for example, Llavallol entrusted patron Juan Accinelli, who owned the schooner Luis María, with a Corrientes-bound shipment loaded with textiles, flour, biscuits, pasta, and olive oil.63 Accinelli was himself a skilled patron with a high degree of expertise in the Corrientes marketplace: his business interests in that port grew to the point that, in 1832, he applied for naturalization to obtain residency and operate on a permanent basis.64 The case of Pedro Roverano offers particularly meaningful details to understand the river trade’s practices. At first, Roverano devoted himself to commercial navigation between Buenos Aires and the ports of the southern branch of the Paraná River (Santa Fe, Rosario, Paraná); between 1821 and 1823 he used the schooner N. S. del Carmen and, from 1828, he employed a boat named S. José y Ánimas, of which he had purchased a third for 4,000 pesos. Coastal ships were frequently purchased and managed in partnerships. Thus, commercial navigation was accessible even by those who had a small start-up capital. These traditional forms of association allowed individuals to quickly save the funds required to start independent ventures or purchase more shares of the company. Coastal shipping companies were set up and dissolved on the basis of individual needs and from the manifold opportunities offered by the Río de la Plata river trade. Over the course of the 1830s, Pedro Roverano extended his business to the province of Corrientes by purchasing the boat Paz Argentina in partnership with his associate José García, a dealer based in the river port of Goya.65 Genoese penetration into the circuits of river trade was actively supported by the Buenos Aires government. In debating the section of the 1831 Tratado de la Liga del Litoral, which dealt with navigation and trade rights across the provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and Entre Ríos, the caudillo Rosas imposed a foreign-friendly stance66 by implementing the term “inhabitant” instead of “citizen,” the less inclusive status put forward by other provinces. Article 8 of the treaty stated: Inhabitants of the three Littoral Provinces shall benefit from the same freedom and safety to dock, load and sail through all the ports, rivers and territories, and they shall share with naturals of the Province the same right to pursue their business, both on a permanent or non-permanent basis with the same freedom, equity and protection.67

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

179

These particularly privileged conditions, along with the development of a sector to which Ligurian emigrants were traditionally drawn, help to explain the high prevalence of Sardinian captains at the helm of the vessels that arrived at the river port of Paraná between 1843 and 1853;68 they constituted a third of all captains, followed by Spaniards, Creoles, and – to a lesser extent – Brazilians, Dalmatians, and Greeks. Coastal shipping also encouraged Ligurian emigrants to settle in the ports of the Littoral, where they pursued permanent trade or different productive businesses, and, in many cases, their families joined the high ranks of the political and economic elite.69 An 1850 Sardinian consular dispatch clearly illustrates the leading role played by the river trade in promoting and fostering the settlement of Genoese emigrants along the shores of the Río de la Plata. The consul estimated that around 70% of coastal shipping was run by patrons of vessels that had been built by Ligurian shipbuilders either in Liguria or in the Río de la Plata. The ships sailed under the local flag, but their crews were Genoese sailors. Such a great interest in the sector was attributed to the salaries paid to the sailors: lured by the prospect of good earnings, once they reached Buenos Aires, sailors systematically deserted the Sardinian ships and found in the local government the protection they needed in order to not be obliged to return to Genoa.70 In summary, the development of river trading in the Río de la Plata harbor system over the first decades after independence allowed Genoese emigration to thrive by meeting the needs of the host society’s economy: by contributing to the creation of a local fleet and by sustaining the ongoing integration of the region into the international market, the Ligurian diaspora laid the groundwork for a new symbiosis that nurtured the local economy and further stimulated migratory and commercial connections with the homeland.

traditional economic strategies in new spaces for social advancement The process of independence allowed the establishment of direct maritime relations between Genoa and the Río de la Plata and a massive penetration of Ligurian migrants in local river trade, but it did not change the very nature of the diaspora’s old business strategies. Coastal or transoceanic shipping continued to represent an essential activity of trading brokerage. For the Genoese patrons, who were traditionally skilled in seeking out profit-making opportunities for themselves, on commission or

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

180

Transcending empire

in partnership with other traders, engagement in navigation was an easy way to earn money quickly after their arrival in Buenos Aires and, possibly, to start a more stable activity or to return to their home. The Genoese migrants who aimed at establishing themselves in the host society, as in the previous century, tended to settle family-based ventures by opening a wholesale or retail shop: many of them also invested or directly participated in river shipping, as it was the most suitable strategy to expand their business network. Following independence, the pulperías multiplied in number parallel to the region’s demographic and economic growth. Genoese migrants investment in this sector was comparable to their participation in the local river trade: in an 1837 register of Buenos Aires shops, around 250 trade licenses, the majority of which were for pulperías, were granted to emigrants of Ligurian descent.71 This data points to the growing opportunities offered by the local market in the wake of emancipation and shows that Genoese business activity in the region became stronger due to a substantial continuity with the recent colonial past. An almost general interest in also taking part in river trading, which allowed Ligurians to carve a primary role of intermediation between the river ports and the international market, appears to be the most novel feature of Genoese investment in post-independent Río de la Plata. The case of the aforementioned trader Manuel Fontana, whose activities are well documented in the archives, is particularly useful to understanding the rationale of Ligurian merchants’ ventures. In 1819, four years after his arrival in Buenos Aires, Fontana was already a vecino and owned a house in calle de las Torres (today calle de Rivadavia).72 The beginnings of his career remain unknown, but the loan he had received from farmer Bartolo Rizo and further evidence attest to the importance of collaborating with other fellow countrymen for economic success. In the same year and in partnership with Antonio Gentile, Fontana purchased from Ligurian shipping magnate Marcos Pagliano a wood depot worth 4,000 pesos: a not insignificant amount, which, at the time, roughly corresponded to 95 gold ounces.73 With the money made from selling the wood, he set up a pulpería.74 Between 1821 and 1822, Fontana enabled fellow countrymen Estevan Cerreti and Lucas Belás to undertake trading by lending them the start-up capital for two pulperías located in the pueblo of San Salvador (in the Banda Oriental) and in the partido of Navarro (in the environs of Buenos Aires), respectively. He entrusted his associates with running the pulperías and in exchange, after a few months, asked them to refund the start-up capital topped up by a

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

181

share of the profits.75 In 1824, the healthy state of Fontana’s business allowed him to buy a home with land attached in the Piedad district:76 the property was intended to house his family, whose passage from Genoa he had paid in 1822. According to the 1827 census Manuel, who featured as a comerciante (a trader, not a mere pulpero), lived with and employed his nephews Agustín and Luis Fontana, aged 27 and 12 respectively.77 In his house Fontana also hosted other fellow countrymen with whom he had business ties: young Andrés Salvarezza, who had emigrated around 1820 and who had been one of his employees since at least 1823;78 and the older Nicolás Villa, who arrived in Buenos Aires in 1824, worked for Fontana between 1827 and 1839, and then set himself up as a wheattrader.79 As well as trading on a permanent basis through retail and wholesale outlets,80 Fontana also invested in river trading by setting up coastal expeditions and purchasing a 32-ton ship.81 Domingo Gallino’s case shows how the persistence of traditional mercantile logics, along with the resources offered by the river navigation, fostered success in local trade and allowed access to land ownership. Gallino settled in Buenos Aires at the start of the nineteenth century, when a fiscal census ranks him as the owner of three slaves.82 The city census records allow us to trace the evolution of his career; in 1816 he was recorded as a pulpero and eleven years later as a comerciante. In the 1820s, he opened a wholesale outlet in partnership with his brother Silvestre who, after Domingo’s death in 1830, inherited the business.83 Despite the political upheaval brought about by independence, Domingo successfully consolidated his social standing by obtaining naturalization and by establishing good relations with the new authorities: in 1823, the government appointed him and Joaquín Belgrano (brother of the more famous Manuel) as administrators for the construction of the church of San José de Flores.84 A year later, Rivadavia called him and other foreigners to join the board committee on emigration, which aimed to attract European laborers with the technical skills needed to develop the local farming industry.85 At Gallino’s death, his widow received a loan from Narciso Martínez, president of the Sociedad Rural, a joint-stock company founded in 1826 and joined by many prominent Creole and British merchants; with government support, the company made huge investments aimed at purchasing and managing land under the law of emphyteusis.86 Gallino was involved both in trade and in land ownership. As well as the wholesale outlet, he also bequeathed two neighboring houses in calle Belgrano and two large properties: an estancia called Santa María y Lerna, located in the partido of Salto, near the environs of Buenos Aires

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

182

Transcending empire

where he bred cows, sheep, and horses, and a large allotment enclosed in the estancia named Cañada de Cepeda, which was inhabited and included logging woods. Perhaps his activity as an estanciero was at the root of his good relationship with local authorities; in fact, possibly because of war contingencies, he lent the government 408 cows, 123 horses, and 8 slaves valued at 11,000 pesos.87 The Gallinos also engaged in river and maritime shipping. In 1829, Domingo’s brother Silvestre appeared in a conjoined testimony88 for an unspecified relative, Juan Bautista Gallino, whom other sources record as a wholesaler89 and owner of two ships (the 48tons schooner named La Duquesa, a.k.a. Los Amigos and the 7-ton barge Argentina).90 The long list of the credits (which amounted to 126,595.2 pesos) recorded at Gallino’s death in 1831 is quite notable and attests to the range and complexity of the business network of a merchant who, fifteen years earlier, was listed as a mere pulpero. Juan Bautista Alberdi (it is unclear whether he was the future father of Argentinian constitutionalism), Martín Santa Coloma (member of one of the most important merchant families in Buenos Aires),91 and many local traders and fellow countrymen all featured as his debtors, alongside the government and some merchants resident abroad.92 The creditors’ list is equally heterogeneous and multifaceted. The mortgages that Gallino took out on his houses and lands in favor of the Cofradía del Rosario and the aforementioned Narciso Martínez confirm how well-settled the merchant was in the region as well as his good relationship with prominent representatives of the host society. His ties with the international market are equally interesting: the document features a solid group of creditors from Bordeaux for whom Gallino acted as consignee in Buenos Aires. Gallino also had several Ligurian creditors who lived both in Genoa and in Buenos Aires.93 Among the latter, there were the heirs of Pablo Agnese, whose legacy further highlights how river shipping and permanent commerce investments complemented each other and how such a strategy was not a privilege of a small minority of large brokers but affected even the lower ranks of the trade sector. Genoa-born Pablo Agnese died prematurely in 1829 and bequeathed a river shipping launch and a pulpería in calle Universidad to young Ligurian Manuel Repetto,94 his minority business partner. At Agnese’s death the pulpería was liquidated to pay the firm’s debts and the capital and the profits were split between shareholders. Interestingly, all Agnese’s debtors were linked to Domingo Gallino, who was recorded as the supplier and customer manager of the pulpería. By virtue of the expenses

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

183

the merchant had met in favor of Agnese between 1824 and 1827, Gallino was due more than two thirds of the firm’s estimated value (3,678 out of 5,092 pesos). These costs included cash loans and goods to supply Agnese’s shop, the maintenance of his boat and the financial support to organize several expeditions in the Río Salado and other river ports, where Agnese went to purchase tobacco, yerba, wood, and rawhides on Gallino’s behalf.95 Not only do all the aforementioned cost entries give a clearer picture of the complex nature of Gallino’s business interests and of the strong ties with his fellow countrymen, but they also highlight how river and maritime shipping activities were closely connected to wholesale and retail, and how the former was fostered by multiple economic relations that ranged from the assignments of punctual commissions to wider and more durable forms of financial backing. The various activities often complemented each other on the basis of cooperation within families. This was the case with the aforementioned patron Pedro Fontana, who operated in the Río de la Plata river shipping business between 1809 and 1821. Around 1819, Pedro was joined by his cousin Nicolás,96 who, in partnership with José Fontana (probably, his brother), opened a pulpería in Buenos Aires.97 Nicolás and José operated their business until the 1840s and invested both in retail and in river shipping; at his death in 1843, Nicolás left assets worth 16,000 pesos, including another retail outlet located in calle Suipacha 248;98 according to an 1841 register of the port, José owned a 32-ton flatboat, Virgen del Carmen.99 Among the activities that the Genoese emigrants practiced both in colonial Río de la Plata and after independence, wheat trade and bakery, in particular, continued to represent attractive and highly profitable occupations. In 1832, Manuel Viale asked the Consulado tribunal of Buenos Aires to grant him his share of the profits from the liquidation of the company that he had established in partnership with the Italian Santiago Marchi and Juan González and which was dissolved upon the death of the latter.100 The company had been formed in the 1820s to establish a bakery in the city center.101 According to the 1827 census, alongside Marchi and Viale, the bakery employed eleven young emigrants, all of whom were bachelors from Liguria.102 Contemporary fiscal sources, in which the establishment was registered as “panadería n.1,” attests that it was one of the most productive bakeries of Buenos Aires.103 The company’s interests were not confined to the bakery and included farming production, local and Atlantic trade. As well as investing in several maritime expeditions for the supplying of grain,104 the company also

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

184

Transcending empire

owned an estancia in the partido of Lobos (to the south of Buenos Aires), a storehouse, a café, other unspecified commercial units, and a schooner, Artica: the profits from these ventures flowed into the company’s capital stock, which amounted to 335,053 pesos.105 Manuel Viale not only was in charge of the bakery but also took an active part in the company’s trade activities. Among his tasks, there was a journey to Europe to personally oversee the shipment of goods (probably wheat or flour) belonging to the three partners.106 Following the company’s dissolution, Viale continued to profitably run his business; an 1836 city register of business activities lists him as the owner of a bakery in calle Buen Orden 45 (today known as Irigoyen).107 His son Ángel, who followed in his father’s footsteps, opened a flour factory,108 which became so successful that in 1865 he was elected senator in Buenos Aires.109 In order to offer a vivid portrait of the bustling Genoese economy along the Río de la Plata coasts, we shall borrow the words of the Neapolitan consul of Rio de Janeiro, Gennaro Merolla, in 1838: Both the coastal and long haul shipping trade in the Río de la Plata are almost entirely in the hands of the Genoese. Between Buenos Aires and Montevideo there are approximately 5,000 Sardinians; some may be considered wealthy and others are close to becoming so. It is not uncommon for a Sardinian ship to sail with two licenses; an Argentinean or Oriental and a Sardinian one. Such persisting abuse surely derived from the negligence of the Sardinian consuls in those countries. Ahead of the law forbidding the importation of pasta – a mass consumption good – trade in the republic of Argentina was thriving; having built there several pasta factories, the Sardinian canvassed the authorities to introduce the ban. [Now, Genoa can only export] paper and Genoese wares such as velvets, French-style tinged pelts and silver trinkets. The Oriental State still allows flour and pastas; as a result, [Genoese] trade with Montevideo is now much more important than that with Buenos Aires. Each year, between 140 and 150 long-haul Sardinian ships enter the Río de la Plata’s ports, importing and exporting goods worth 12 million francs.110

To thrive in the river and maritime shipping industries, the Genoese who settled in the Río de la Plata made use of the same practices adopted by those who had made their fortune along the Spanish coasts in the previous century. Most of the plentiful commercial movements they managed continued to elude the consular agents’ control. The usage of both local flags and that of their nation remained a widely spread strategy to pay less custom duties. The neutral Sardinian ensign, like the Genoese one in the past, granted a substantial immunity in case of war; this privilege became apparent in 1838, when the Sardinian vessels were allowed to maintain their trade in Buenos Aires despite the blockade of the port imposed by the French navy as a result of a diplomatic conflict with Rosas.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

185

The analogies with the past also concerned the ambivalent role of migrants and seafarers with respect to the interests of their land of origin. As can be inferred from Merolla’s dispatch, their activities were essential for Genoa to keep profiting from the Atlantic trade; at the same time, their tendency to set strong roots in the hosting society’s economy could severely harm their mother country’s commercial expansion. Similarly to what happened in Cadiz, the Genoese emigration in Buenos Aires set up in loco production plants that directly competed with the imports from Genoa. To prosper in their businesses, they sought and obtained support from the local government with the 1836 Ley de Aduana, a law that raised duties on goods imported to Buenos Aires from abroad and banned the importation of several locally manufactured items. The protectionist measure soon proved insufficient in significantly sustaining local production and it was dropped in 1841. The repeal of the law caused many protests among the Genoese local producers who had profited from the ban,111 but it allowed Genoa to return to being an important commercial partner of Buenos Aires in the wheat and flour trade, while other Ligurian entrepreneurs could prosper in the local redistribution of these products.112 In summary, the process of independence did not radically alter Ligurian emigration and commerce in the Río de la Plata, but it multiplied the opportunities to successfully access the local market: the collapse of the Empire allowed the Genoese mercantile navy to autonomously consolidate its presence on the route by sailing under its own flag; the intensification of commercial exchange between the Río de la Plata and the Atlantic increased the possibilities for a wider range of subjects to become settled and thrive in the area. The disruption of the imperial mercantile system obliterated the role of Cadiz in the Genoese trade networks and the business strategies imposed by the monopolistic nature of the Spanish trade; to a large extent, however, the new waves of Ligurians who migrated to independent Buenos Aires prospered by following the entrepreneurial strategies embraced by their predecessors in the recent colonial past.

under the cover of the privileged merchant court At an institutional level, the continuity of the traditional mercantile values and practices at the core of the “success” of Ligurian emigration to the newly independent Buenos Aires was ensured by the permanence of the Tribunal del Consulado, which allowed the local mercantile class to

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

186

Transcending empire

efficiently solve their lawsuits. The Ordenanzas de Bilbao, a trade law that had been in force in Spain since 1737 – entrusted the tribunal with “all the suits and controversies between traders, merchants, their associates and farmers over commercial transactions, sales, purchases exchanges, insurances, accounting books, freight-charges [and] merchants’ associations”113 Alongside the Ordenanzas de Bilbao, the Cédula, which established the Consulado of Buenos Aires in 1794, became the normative point of reference for trade suits and replaced the Leyes de Indias (tomo III, libro IX, titulo XXXXVI, which only recognized the privileged merchant guilds of Mexico City and Lima). The Cédula sanctioned the formal validity of the ius mercatorum (merchant law) principles that traditionally regulated trade and aimed at satisfying the specific need for “technical” knowledge and rapidity in solving the conflicts among merchants.114 In order to ensure “a quicker and easier management of justice in trade suits of all types,” the Consulado was to deliver its judgments with estilo llano, verdad sabida y buena fe guardada; that is, it had to use clear formulations based on an extensive knowledge of the suits and adhere to a principle of equity, which was a necessary mitigation of law, in accordance with Cicero’s aphorism summum ius summa iniuria (extreme right is extreme wrong).115 The mercantile class’s need for corporative selfregulation was satisfied by dispensing with gowned judges, on the basis that only those familiar with commerce possessed the expertise required to adjudicate trade suits. The legitimation of verbal trials116 was inspired by the same belief, as was the elimination “of any trace of formal quibbles and legal cavils to ensure quick deliberations made in ‘good faith.’”117 The equity principle confirmed the traditional casuist concept of the Hispanic legal order, which identified the observance of rigidly preestablished rules as a harmful artifice and a hindrance to a rapid settlement of conflicts.118 In case of “patent inequity,” one could file an appeal to the Jugzado de Alzada, which included members of the Consulado and a judge of the Audiencia, and, as a last resort, one could appeal to the Consejo de Indias.119 Conversely, the formalization of contracts upheld by Bourbon regulations, which were aimed at increasing the institution’s ability to monitor local trade, was ignored. In fact, although the Ordenanzas de Bilbao had established the necessity of recording all acts relating to the establishment of trade companies in a public register, the lack of a precise code on the matter meant that the regulation of economic relationships remained characterized by widespread informality.120 Most transactions were performed “according to trading customs,” that is, by means of a consensual

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

187

agreement between the parties obtained without the mediation of the Consulado. In most cases, even delayed payment issues were resolved informally, by virtue of a coercive power that was not legitimised by a law but by the merchant’s verbal commitment to pay; failure to keep one’s word could lead to the rapid loss of credibility on the trade scene.121 There were three options if one failed to repay debts within the agreed time-limit: (i) in agreement with the creditor, the debtor pledged to pay as soon as possible; (ii) the parties could negotiate a flat-rate sum, having admitted the impossibility to honor the debt in full; (iii) the parties could seek the intervention of the Consulado, which, in that case, impounded the debtor’s properties and initiated the so-called concurso de quitas y esperas (a process aimed at finding an arrangement among the creditors to delay repayment or to renounce part of their credits). When the majority of creditors agreed to postpone payment, the Consulado tended to favor the debtor by suspending the impoundment. The consideration shown by the Consulado toward insolvent subjects derived from its willingness to safeguard as far as possible local trading businesses, especially those of high repute. The Consulado’s authoritativeness and efficiency in mediating insolvency issues between local merchants is attested by the case of the Antonini-De Lorenzo Company,122 which in 1823 was sued by Antonio Trincavelli over two unpaid bills of exchange worth 118 pesos. The tribunal ordered the bailiff to visit De Lorenzo’s home and collect the money; he immediately obtained 90 pesos and De Lorenzo’s promise to pay off the rest of his debt by the following Wednesday. In light of this pledge, the equity principle, and the debtor’s status as a “respectable vecino,” the Consulado dismissed impoundment and assumed responsibility for the agreed deferment of payment.123 The lack of a clear jurisdictional hierarchy – a crucial feature of Ancien Régime societies – and the wide array of juridical statuses that defined individuals according to social milieu ended up generating a number of demarcation disputes between the Consulado, the ordinary judiciary and the other privileged fueros (jurisdicitions), especially the military court, which was unique in its transcendence of class and occupational divides. The mercantile justice system began to experience some changes with the broad plan of reforms drafted and launched by Minister Bernardino Rivadavia during Martín Rodríguez’s government (1820–4). One of his first acts was to entrust the Junta de Comercio y Agricultura and the Departamento de Ingenieros with the economic and infrastructural competencies of the Junta de Gobierno.124 However, Rivadavia did not

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

188

Transcending empire

debase the very nature of the Consulado’s main functions, as it maintained exclusive jurisdiction on trade suits and prevailed on “ordinary judiciary.” Following the dissolution of the colonial order, the seconddegree appeals, which had been formerly managed by the Consejo de Indias, were transferred to a member of the Tribunal de Justicia. As for the need to reform mercantile legislation through the establishment of an ad hoc commercial code, in 1822 Rivadavia admitted that “the reflection demanded by such an important matter, the lack of time and equally important issues have prevented drafting a specific code and have entailed a forced delay.”125 At a time when the country was experiencing deep economic and political transformations, the liberal minister’s prudence reveals the difficulty and probably the inopportunity of challenging the jurisdictional privileges of the local mercantile class. The widespread informality of economic relationships, the lack of precise normative codes, the attention paid to the equity principle, and the fact that a merchant’s individual qualities prevailed on the law’s coercive power constituted a legacy of principles shared by the Genoese expatriates and which, ultimately, favored their ability to penetrate and integrate themselves into the local economy. The administration of mercantile justice was traditionally reserved to a closed elite made of great intermediaries, but the more dynamic Ligurian traders of Buenos Aires exploited the reform climate generated by the Rivadavian policies and lobbied to formally extend the privileges to the whole range of the city’s merchants. These pressures are clearly reflected in the trade suit filed in 1821 by the aforementioned Manuel Fontana. In 1819, in partnership with Antonio Gentile, he purchased a wood depot by underwriting a twelve-month obligation payment. Within the depot, as seen earlier, the two associates opened a pulpería managed by Gentile. Having failed to repay the debt within the agreed twelve months, Fontana repeatedly and “amicably” asked his partner for exemption from paying his share of the obligation; he could either leave him the pulpería and its profits or they could sell it in order to settle their debts. Faced with Gentile’s refusal, in 1822, Fontana filed an appeal to the Consulado to have his claims heard. He was concerned that his insolvency might prejudice his other “declared assets.” Conversely, according to his associate, Gentile did not possess any other properties and thus had nothing to lose.126 Fontana appealed at a time of strong institutional debate on the opportunity of allowing pulperos to file suits in the mercantile court, an institution traditionally conceived as the privileged bar of the great intermediaries. The Consulado itself raised the matter and informed the government that “many suits

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

189

referring to pulperos were passed on to ordinary judiciary because pulperos were not seen as traders or because it was unclear whether they belonged to this class, a state of affairs which led to many demarcation disputes between tribunals to the detriment of the interested parties.”127 At first, the Consulado refused to deal with Fontana’s suit and informed him that suits involving pulperías were a matter of abasto (supply) and therefore were adjudicated by first-degree ordinary judges. Fontana’s letter of complaint to the Consulado highlights that the better-established Ligurian emigrants were able to access the institutional and normative circles of the hosting society by swaying its indeterminacies in their favor: There is no doubt that the authority bestowed on this Court by its specific institutions and the Cédula which authorize it, embodies in its exclusive [right] to adjudicate all the controversies involving comerciantes and mercaderes, their associates and their farmers, commercial transactions, sales, purchases, exchanges, insurances and accounting books; furthermore, there is no doubt that, under Royal law, all those who sell and buy items to retail them to a third party for profit are defined as mercaderes, who, according to the Spanish nomenclature, are those who trade saleable goods. The category includes the pulperos, because they have always been traders despite their small jointly-managed sales . . . . Commerce includes several ramified segments which allow for further differentiation. There are stock-houses and outlets which exclusively cater for wholesale and others which deal with retail, but the differentiation neither alters nor damages the nature of the business. If one holds these principles as incontestable, then trade, the companies, the treaties and the contracts related to the pulperías fall under the jurisdiction of this Court. The Cédula instituting the Tribunal as well as that of Bilbao and other similar ones clearly state its competence over all controversies between comerciantes and mercaderes without exception and it falls on Your Excellency to settle them . . . . Besides, all governments have assigned to the Tribunal the funds deriving from the taxes imposed on the pulperías as well as on other shops and warehouses. As the Tribunal is also responsible for verifying the collection of the taxes levied on them, the negotiations regarding the pulperías concretely fall under its jurisdiction. Before making my conclusions, may I remind Your Excellency that the [Consulado’s] archives includes many contracts relating to pulperías and that this would not be the case if such suits and transactions did not fall under Your Excellency’s remit. Furthermore, [there is the case of] ceramic tile depots, which fall under Your Excellency’s monitoring prerogatives even though they are undoubtedly supply outlets. I believe to have offered enough arguments to persuade you to accept the application which I am resubmitting and to extend your jurisdiction to this trade sector: it is a vital and sacred matter which has been very much debated by all corporations over time. Furthermore, there are other reasons for my application . . . . The business which produced the financial obligations between myself, Gentile and Marco Pagliano was not the pulpería but a previously established wood depot, which is still active and which was financed by the profits generated by the pulpería. The Tribunal’s legitimate knowledge of my lawsuit derives from such beginnings.128

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

190

Transcending empire

Fontana’s argument ensured him the right to take his suit before the Consulado and on April 22, 1822, he signed a proxy to D. Ignacio Barajas (who probably wrote the appeal) and entrusted him to represent his interests.129 Just a few days later Fontana’s arguments were formally sanctioned by a decree issued by minister Rivadavia. By condemning the traditional corporative conception of justice as the “privilege of the few,” the new law established that everyone could take to the Consulado controversies stemming from “acts of trading,” defined as “any deal involving the purchasing, selling and lending of items, no matter whether in their original form or in a condition which added or detracted their value.”130 The safeguard of the public deed regardless of the juridical status of the parties was inspired by the French commercial code (art. 632)131 and sought to update local codes according to the principles of modern mercantile law, which aimed at identifying unbiased criteria (i.e., the economic transaction) in place of the subjective parameters traditionally used (i.e., the merchants).132 However, the failure to codify a commercial law characterized by universal and abstract norms extended the jurisdictional privileges of the mercantile tradition to a wide array of subjects and the affairs of many Genoese retailers who were substantially protected from the interference of ordinary judiciary. Fontana’s appeal did not challenge the privileged nature of mercantile justice, but recalled traditional Spanish law to demonstrate the lawfulness of pulperos’ request to be included within the Consulado’s jurisdiction. By moving from the principles of the Spanish mercantile legislation, Fontana sought to turn in his favor its difficulties in circumscribing conceptual categories: the definition of mercader he quoted corresponded verbatim to that of law VVII-I of the Siete Partidas code (formulated between 1256 and 1265 under the supervision of Alfonso the Learned),133 where no distinctions were drawn between wholesalers and retailers. As Fontana pointed out, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century jurisprudence had contested at length about the different meanings embedded in the conception of mercader (which, in jurist Solórzano Pereira’s view, only included wholesalers trading by sea and by ground) and of negociante (which, according to Martínez Gijón and Juan de Hevia Bolaños, also included small retailers and sale agents).134 These concerns about defining the privilege had been a long-debated topic also during the Bourbon age due to an increase in the competence attributed to the Consulados instituted by Charles III’s trade reform, whereby their scope was extended beyond the traditional juridical function to include the support of farming and national industry; the

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

191

reform was accompanied by a substantial increase of the economic subjects privileged by consular jurisdiction, which was originally limited to wholesale retailers and shipping magnates and now also included hacendados, manufacturers, and shopkeepers. In 1787, the number of demarcation disputes between the Consulado and ordinary judiciary led the Consejo de Castilla to submit to Charles III a reform proposal once again restricting consular jurisdiction to the two original categories; however, the impossibility of reinstating the former corporative rigidity of the mercantile system prevented the reform from being enforced and the inclusion of retailers was not formally denied.135 Fontana’s commercial operations, which, as noted earlier, included helping many commercial partners to set up pulperías and investments in river trade expeditions to enlarge their businesses, clearly attests to the longevity of the traditional concept of mercantile enterprise, whereby retail was not necessarily viewed as a permanent or exclusive activity but as a market-oriented temporary venture136 within a wider commercial strategy. Hence, the persisting lack of effective barriers between wholesale and retail gave sense and theoretical legitimacy to Fontana’s twofold attempt to demand the inclusion of suits linked to the pulperías within the jurisdiction of the Consulado. Fontana’s initiative coincided with a political climate particularly sensitive to universalistic instances but also incapable – and possibly uninterested in challenging the social consensus at the very basis of the existing mercantile system; paradoxically, Fontana’s proposal was implemented not by abolishing the privilege but by “liberally” extending it. The Consulado of Buenos Aires offered merchants a degree of protection that they would have found difficult to obtain from the ordinary judiciary. Jurisdictional guarantees were further strengthened by the dense relational networks generated by the manifold forms of association or cooperation, which by binding several economic operators into a “chain of obligation,” enabled them to tackle the uncertainties of the market.137 The ability to refer to the Tribunal del Consulado placed assets under the shelter of a privileged jurisdiction that could settle possible controversies in ways that better suited the interests of the involved parties and took into consideration the social standing and the personal relational network of the merchant in the host society. Fontana’s formal complaint also shows that being a foreign immigrant neither invalidated nor challenged the legitimacy of his appeal to be placed under the jurisdiction of the Consulado. The fact that naturales and foreigners held equal rights in terms of trade jurisdiction highlights

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

192

Transcending empire

that the absence of a “national society,” which was overshadowed by “regional societies” throughout the first half of the nineteenth century,138 had kept alive the traditional value attributed to the “relational” attributes of a subject, who, regardless of descent, was considered a member of the local community by virtue of his deep-rooted interests in the host society. The 1831 suit over Domingo Gallino’s last will and testament evinces the effectiveness of the protection offered by the Tribunal del Consulado to the Genoese merchants who could count on strong personal links to local trade and to members of the institution.139 At Gallino’s death, the Consulado called a concurso de acreedores to sell all of the assets listed in the will and allowed his wife to negotiate with the buyers. On behalf of the widow, Domingo’s brother Silvestre obtained the mercantile court’s permission to mortgage a house belonging to the deceased to pay a debt to the president of the Sociedad Rural, Narciso Martínez.140 Apart from this concession, the treatment reserved to Gallino’s creditors, especially those who resided in other countries, shows the tribunal’s willingness to protect the Genoese merchant’s assets in the settlement of outstanding debts. French trader Marcelino Degassan traveled from Bordeaux to Buenos Aires expressly to collect the money that Gallino owed him, Enrique Degassan, and a Casamayor, as consignee of their shipments. Degassan insinuated that the authorities, in compliance with the heirs, were doing their utmost to delay the payment of creditors. He applied for a special mortgage on Gallino’s estancia, but the Consulado rejected his proposal. Then, he sued the Consulado for having illegally executed Gallino’s will without prior authorization from the guardian of the departed’s underaged children. Degassan’s favor to the trader’s inheritors betrayed the fear that the concurso would undermine any certainty of payment. The creditor accused the Gallino family of having resorted to the mercantile court to “take their chances under the aegis of well-known godfathers” and lamented that he had never seen a concurso being opened for a testamentary bequest. He argued that although Gallino had benefited from the mercantile tribunal because of his occupation, the fact that his inheritors were minors automatically invalidated their actions; according to laws, the transaction carried out under the aegis of the Consulado to fulfill the will should have been placed in the care of a Segundo Voto ordinary judge. Degassan’s argument clearly points to the persistently privileged nature of the mercantile justice system inherited from the colonial age, whereby legal rights were not determined by abstract legal criteria but, rather, by “relational” considerations that valued the merchant’s

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

193

reputation in local society and respected his individual circumstances. In this context, any outsider such as the French merchant had little hope to safeguard his interests in contested cases. The casuistic nature of the merchant law ended up generating growing complaints among local merchants and, above all, foreign investors, whose pressures persuaded Governor Rosas to abolish the concurso de acreedores de quitas y esperas in 1836.141 Nevertheless, the reforms launched in these years did not affect the freedom/privilege to autonomously resolve commercial controversies in conformity with shared values based on reputation. Protected by the primary judiciary’s interferences, in most cases merchants continued to conduct informal agreements among themselves and only sought the Consulado’s direct intervention for ratification142 or compliance purposes.143 For the Genoese emigrants in Buenos Aires, who had set small-sized family enterprises with rooted interests in the hosting community, the existence of the Tribunal del Consulado and access to the merchant law privileges represented a useful resource in the management of their businesses. The same cannot be said about the largest representatives of the production, trade, and finance industries, who were well aware of the limitations of this system in comparison with the demands of an increasingly complex and internationalized economy.144 As a result, there was an increased demand to reorganize mercantile legislation according to fixed and shared rules and the creation of a mercantile court entrusted to professional judges.145 This demand, however, remained unfulfilled until 1859, when the new commercial code of the State of Buenos Aires went into effect, while the Tribunal del Consulado (replaced by two first-degree judges) was not suppressed until 1862. In summary, the mercantile justice system inherited from the colonial past adjusted with some difficulty to the demands deriving from trade liberalization and the Río de la Plata’s growing relationship with the international market. During this prolonged transitional stage, the traditional way of settling mercantile controversies guaranteed by the survival of the Tribunal del Consulado and the extension of its jurisdiction to any commercial act allowed the city’s merchants to slowly adapt to political and economic changes resulting from independence by creating an environment that substantially favored the interests of those who followed traditional business strategies and those who were deeply rooted in the local economy. Among them were well-integrated emigrants who had made a good name for themselves by establishing close relationships with the local mercantile class, but also many others who had migrated to earn

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

194

Transcending empire

a living by establishing small trade ventures that could be managed, as in the past, with a high degree of informality.

toward a new symbiosis The 1827 census of the city of Buenos Aires,146 which is a sufficiently reliable source in reconstructing the backgrounds of individuals, is also useful for analyzing the evolution of the Genoese settlement as a whole. The census includes 252 Italian immigrants, of whom 121 declared to be born in Liguria. Most of the 123 emigrants generically registered as “Italians,” bore unmistakably Ligurian surnames, with the Piedmontese and the Lombard following suit, as usual. The census shows that bachelors (130) slightly outnumbered married emigrants (112) and that the Genoese emigrants tended to marry local women. In fact, at least fortyone of the sixty identified familial groups147 structured around marriages between immigrants and women with a Spanish surname. In many cases, we cannot tell if the spouses were creoles or first-generation Spanish immigrants. However, most of the women who declared their origin were born in the Río de la Plata. Chiara Vangelista has spotted the same pattern amongst the Ligurians resident in Rio de Janeiro in 1837 and interpreted it as a sign of a community marred by poverty and broken families, but this does not seem the case in Buenos Aires.148 In the latter, marriage with local women appears to corroborate the Ligurians’ traditional, self-interested ability to integrate into the hosting society. The census provides evidence that marrying a local woman did not necessarily exclude the possibility of maintaining ties – and even living together149 – with other relatives or fellow countrymen. The solidarity between countrymen constituted an important support network, attested by the twenty-three residential or professional groups that included eighty-two emigrants seemingly lacking close family ties. There are instances of Genoese immigrants associating with other foreigners, but these cases are rare.150 Interestingly, by 1827 there were married couples who had emigrated together from Europe (ten): some of them, such as the aforementioned shipping magnate Carlos Galliano and his wife Anna Esquesa,151 had arrived from Genoa, while the presence of four Ligurian couples from Cadiz further attests to the decline experienced by the Spanish port.152 Analysis of the professional distribution of the Italian community documented by the census yields a remarkable continuity with the recent colonial past and, above all, confirms the traditionally mercantileoriented profile of the Genoese diaspora (Table 5.2).

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

195

table 5.2 Professional distribution of Italian community in Buenos Aires PROFESSION

N.

Traders Pulperos/shopkeepers Artisans Millers/bakers Maritime workers (patrons, caulkers, seafarers) Quinteros (farmers) Other professions

56 46 38 32 16 10 19 217

TOTAL

No less than 102 (47%) of the 217 Italians who declared their profession were employed in wholesale or retail sectors, which also included employees and minority partners (all these categories were rarely specified). Along with the merchants, the presence of millers, bakers and farmers (19. 3%) shows substantial linkage with the recent colonial past. As in eighteenth-century Cadiz, there existed a highly differentiated group of artisans (pewter workers, jewellers, barbers, shoemakers, coopers, tailors, masons, carpenters, carvers and confiteros) and immigrants with other occupations (house servants, innkeepers, busboys, cooks, and musicians). The fact that Boca del Riachuelo (where Genoese started to settle in those very years) did not undergo a census prevents an assessment of the effective size of the immigrant community employed in harbor-linked roles. At any rate, cross-examination of the data from the census and other coeval sources confirm that river shipping was not a specialized profession but an activity that often was combined with the management of small shops.153 In other cases, engagement in trade was strongly connected with farming production. As noted earlier, the Genoese settlement in the quintas near the port was favored by the lack of precise legal restrictions on private land appropriation.154 After independence, the Province of Buenos Aires started to extend its frontiers to the south of the Salado River, where the acquisition of new lands was marked by a high concentration of property. Conversely, the possibility to freely transfer the allotments acquired through donations or under emphyteusis, along with the impartial division of estates between heirs set out by Spanish inheritance law, all but fostered the fragmentation of the lands of the oldest settlements near the city. As a result, in the 1820s the Buenos Aires

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

196

Transcending empire

Province countryside experienced two divergent trends: large livestock farming-oriented estancias were created in the newly occupied lands, while the more ancient colonized lands near the port became increasingly fragmented.155 Ligurian emigration stood relatively at the fringes of new land acquisitions, but maintained a prominent position within the smallsized and more accessible quintas in the city’s environs, which were also more suitable for the supply of the urban market. The 1827 census confirms the slow consolidation of the original nucleus of Genoese farmers who had settled in Buenos Aires before independence. The sketchiness of the documentary sources prevents us from keeping track of all previously identified subjects. However, the census features many names recorded in the previous years156 as well as newly arrived married and unmarried farmers.157 This group of small farmers grew to the point of occupying – according to an 1851 report by the Sardinian vice-consul – nine-tenths of the quintas located in the environs of the city. By reporting that “in the Buenos Aires vegetable market, whoever spoke either Italian or one of the dialects spoken in the territories of His Sardinian Majesty could refrain from speaking Spanish,” the dispatch supported the strong connection between farming and fruit and vegetable retail.158 The 1827 census attests to a wide and articulated Genoese presence in the production and trade of flour, bread, and pasta. In these sectors, businesses usually centered around more or less large groups of fellow countrymen serving different areas of the city. The aforementioned group of eleven Genoese bakers employed by the wheat importers Santiago Marchi and Manuel Viale was active in the city center (quarter 4, calle Potosí 23). Wheat dealer Francisco Negrotto features nearby, in calle de la Reconquista, where he worked along with his employee Francisco Calamaro and various foreign and Italian bakers. Genoese pasta producers Ángel María Pensay and Ángel Moro worked and resided in calle Buen Orden 44 (quarter 5) with a slave and an employee from the Banda Oriental; Pensay and Moro probably worked in partnership with the aforementioned older pasta producer Francisco Granea, who lived next door with his family and three slaves.159 The city center also housed the businesses of two flour wholesalers, Cayetano Palma and Miguel Guñón, who operated in quarter 12. José Olivares, listed in the 1816 census as a pulpero, resided in the intermediate urban belt; by 1827, he worked as a miller alongside young Ligurian Pedro Peleagro.160 Bakers Francisco Maglioni,161 Rafael Gallino, and Bartolo Maglioni worked in partnership with millers Antonio Novela and Juan Facio in two adjacent buildings located in quarter 18, while Italian Ruben Fortunato and his family ran a

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

197

bakery in quarter 17. Finally, on the outer fringes of the city the census records well-known Carlos Sibello, a flour dealer and pasta producer active since the start of the century; despite not featuring directly in the census, he is mentioned by Genoese Juan Testa and Santiago Caprile, who worked for him as a maestro de tahona (miller) and as a journalero (daily laborer) respectively. Other sources attest that Sibello’s business remained active at least until 1837.162 The city’s periphery also hosted some immigrants who had previously devoted themselves to farming and who had managed to accumulate enough funds to integrate or replace this activity with flour production and trade.163 The social and professional heterogeneity of the migrants recorded by the census, their distribution over all the districts of Buenos Aires, and the presence of many familial groups illustrate how the Genoese immigrants of Buenos Aires were able to successfully integrate into the local fabric. At the same time, the strong ties between fellow countrymen both in terms of cohabitation and professional cooperation evince the pivotal role played by common provenance in fostering social and economic advancement. In view of what occurred both in late colonial Buenos Aires and in eighteenth-century Cadiz, the tendency to valorize the community of origin’s relational resources and to establish strong familial and economic ties within the host society attest to a strong continuity with the past. The Genoese diaspora was and continued to be a spontaneous movement of people following the opportunities offered by the international market; in independent Buenos Aires, where the mother country could not offer any concrete political support, they again were able to prosper by meeting the local society’s needs and by collaborating with local authorities to uphold their social standing. These dynamics became particularly evident during wartime. Firstgeneration Genoese immigrants avoided taking sides in local conflicts, but when the internal political clashes posed a threat to their business interests they did not hesitate to take up arms as the guardians of public safety. As we have seen, the Genoese took this stance during the naval war against Brazil. The end of this conflict prompted new tensions between the Unitarian faction supporting a centralized national government and the Federal forces representing the interests of the interior provinces against the dominance of Buenos Aires. Following the peace treaty with Brazil, which sanctioned the independence of the República Oriental del Uruguay, a military contingent led by Juan Lavalle took Buenos Aires and ousted the Federal governor of the city, Manuel Dorrego. The disorder – which ended with the rise to power of caudillo Juan Manuel de Rosas,

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

198

Transcending empire

allied to Dorrego – spread across all provinces before reaching Buenos Aires, which was left without defenses. In an attempt to curb the looting, sacking, and violence caused by the Federales raids and by the ongoing flow of evacuees from the countryside, the Unitarian leader Guillermo Brown and General Paz decided to defend the city by creating an ad hoc militia of resident foreigners, who had been severely affected by the turmoil. In March 1829, they created the Amigos del Orden battalion, which was formed solely by European immigrants – with the exception of the British – and comprised 112 Italians. Although an 1828 decree had extended conscription to immigrants, Brown was cautious and respectful toward this group: he assured them that the militia did not aim at “compromising foreigners in a civil war” but, on the contrary, “at ensuring public safety . . . against those who, by profiting from the political unrest experienced by the country, posed a threat to locals’ and foreigners’ properties.”164 These same purposes featured in a plea published in the “El Pampero” journal by the Italian militiamen, who asked their fellow countrymen to join the corps: We did not take up arms to support a faction, but to support public order and defend our lives and properties. In all countries where civilization is unknown foreigners are obliged to take up arms under impelling circumstances.165

The social and economic visibility of some of the enlisted individuals aptly highlights the relevance of the issues at stake. The battalion included prominent members of the contemporary Genoese community of Buenos Aires, such as Carlos Galliano, Pedro Fontana, Juan Bautista Gallino, Ángel and Domingo Viale, Francisco Maglioni, the Badaracco family,166 and many other Ligurian traders and patrons, followed – as usual – by the Piedmontese.167 By depicting their service as sacrifice made unavoidable by local government’s inability to safeguard property and people, the Genoese reaffirmed their penchant for neutrality, which was instrumental to free trade in the absence of any effective political and diplomatic protection. During emergencies, thus, the Sardinian immigrants displayed a united front by contributing to the restoration of order and by defending their own vested rights. Still, the plea’s resentful tone reclaimed the privileged status usually granted to foreigners and pointed to the exceptional nature of the derogation to their right to be excluded from conscription. The Battallón de los Amigos del Orden was short-lived; having gone against its original remit by fighting a Federal assault on Buenos Aires and having suffered, as a consequence, the defection of its French soldiers,168

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

199

the militia was disbanded at the end of the civil war in May 1829. The situation returned to normal with the rise to power of Rosas in December 1829. As soon as he was installed, he limited the conscription of foreigners to international conflicts.169 Under the caudillo, which remained in power until 1852, Buenos Aires’s Sardinian settlement continued to grow by seeking, as far as possible, to avoid local conflicts and by benefiting from the tacit support of the government. In times of emergency, some Sardinian immigrants – especially sailors – were compelled to leave their work to join the local war efforts.170 However, the fulfillment of local demands during wartime also generated profits. Between 1845 and 1848, when France and Great Britain imposed a second naval blockade on Buenos Aires to safeguard their interests in the region, defend the independence of Uruguay against Rosas’s pressures, and open the rivers to free navigation,171 the employment of ships sailing under the neutral Sardinian flag allowed Ligurian merchants and captains to elude restrictions and play a leading role in maintaining commercial relations between Buenos Aires, Brazil, and Europe.172 By combining with the internal needs of the Rosas’s regime, the Genoese inclination to neutrality sealed a mutually profitable informal alliance, which was readily acknowledged many years later by an Italian newspaper published in Buenos Aires, commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the caudillo’s downfall: Rosas was one of the most cunning and astute tyrants in history . . . . Without Rosas, the country would have succumbed to the anarchy which preceded it; under Rosas’s regime, provided that it did not engage in politics, immigration was protected and this was what mattered because the country needed workers who felt assured about their own safety and proprieties and did keep a distance from political parties.173

These words seem to corroborate the idea that many Genoese immigrants did not experience the limitations to their political freedoms imposed by the caudillo as an unbearable oppression; ultimately, within the Río de la Plata context, the inability to enter politics guaranteed a higher degree of freedom in terms of civil rights. Content with enjoying liberties that suited their flair for commerce, the Genoese immigrants had little interest in being involved in local political matters. For similar reasons, the land of origin’s destinies did not raise more enthusiasm among them. The political indifference of the Genoese expatriates in Buenos Aires as well as in Montevideo is testified by the unsuccessful calls to national unity of Italy made by Mazzinian-inspired

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

200

Transcending empire

Republican exiles such as Giuseppe Garibaldi and Giovan Battista Cuneo, who had moved to South America along the routes opened by the first waves of traders and migrants after independence. In 1841, in an attempt to convince his fellow countrymen to join the struggle for the Italian cause, Cuneo published the Mazzinian journal L’Italiano in Montevideo, where a number of Argentinian liberal exiles had found shelter from Rosas’s regime and which provided more political freedom. Exile Francesco Anzani – one of the major representatives of the Italian republican movement in South America – sent Cuneo a letter expressing strong reservations on the success of the initiative: I would like to know two things. Firstly, was it opposed by the Italians living there? Secondly, will your proposal be as beneficial to our cause as you suggest? You know better than me the spirit of the Italians who are living there. Show them some speculation projects, disclose to them the possibility of quickly doubling their returns and you will be sure to be welcomed and heard . . . . Ignore those narrow-minded . . . the day when success will crown your precious work might be not that distant. Unite your efforts to those of Garibaldi. Stay united.174

Cuneo admitted the problem in the journal’s seventh issue: The thought that some Italians . . . might . . . disapprove . . . never crossed our mind. Nor had we envisioned anyone calling us ‘pests’ and telling us to “be quiet” . . . . We considered some of these individuals to be honest, genuine and staunch patriots but we abhor others, whom we shall not name . . . . May the vile and the pompous wallow in the mire . . . . Those who disapprove of our enterprise neither for political reasons nor because of mere envy but in good faith and with a pure heart argue that – at such a distance from our homeland – it is pointless to consider its freedom, its needs and what we ought to do to sort out this state of affairs; in fact, most of our fellow countrymen who have emigrated to these countries only care to improve their condition through their shops and their work. They do not care about politics and even less about newspaper banter.175

To capture this audience, Cuneo appealed to the ideal of freedom embodied by the medieval Italian republics and sought to establish a continuity between that spirit and the struggle for a united and republican Italy: The republican spirit which spread throughout Italy in the Middle Ages was accompanied by that drive which enriched our republics through commercial speculation, because as he enlarges his sphere of action, man increasingly longs for freedom and hates state oppression.176

As Anzani had feared, the efforts did not bear fruits and the newspaper, despite having been distributed for free, had to close down after only eight issues due to the lack of money. The instances of Mazzinian

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Settling in independent Buenos Aires

201

republicanism, which aimed at creating patriots outside of Italy and to convince them to return and liberate the “enslaved homeland,” held little sway over Ligurian emigrants. References to the traditional freedom of the mercantile republics mattered less than the widespread pre-statal mind-set of those from the dissolved Republic of Genoa, whose pillars had been rather the principle of political neutrality, the tendency to reduce the state’s coercive sphere, and the valorization of social networking against forms of political rationalization.177 L’Italiano was republished in 1842 with a different editorial project. In order to raise funds and subscriptions, it was agreed that the journal would fulfil the tangible interests of potentially new readers by publishing items about the port’s commercial and shipping activities.178 However, the publishers’ scarce competence on the topic jeopardized the new initiative. The Sardinian consul of Montevideo deemed the commercial items “utterly irrelevant”179 and his assessment was on the mark. There was no mention of the price of goods and of trade exchange. Moreover, by the second issue, the maritime traffic bulletins comprised but a short list of ships entering and leaving the port.180 With such scattered data, the newspaper could not impose itself as a more efficient source of information than the informal contacts among countrymen, so the editors were obliged to suspend the publication after the fifteenth issue. By and large, the Genoese people – who long fought against the hegemonic designs of territorial states and who, either actively or through lack of other alternatives, had continued to bet on private economic initiative, emigration, and a multifaceted rapport with the hosting societies, were bound to ignore the calls to fight for Italy’s national unity conveyed by Mazzinism. Conversely, by meeting both the demands of the Ligurian emigration and of the hosting society, the principles inherited by the Genoese tradition continued to hold momentum on the Río de la Plata’s shores. From the second half of the nineteenth century, the Atlantic world, having brought to fruition the “modernizing” seeds planted over the previous century – experienced deep economic and social changes.181 Europe’s population explosion, the impact of the Industrial Revolution, technological advancements in systems of transport, and the advent of price deregulation generated large and unprecedented transoceanic migratory flows, created a demand for new products, favored the international distribution of labor, and made the two sides of the Ocean more integrated than they had been during the previous three centuries. These processes were bound to affect those who had developed strong ties between the Río de la Plata and the Italian coasts of the

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

202

Transcending empire

Mediterranean, opening to them an array of opportunities in both the home country and abroad. A large number of Ligurians kept on moving to the Río de la Plata,182 but the spontaneous, trade-oriented diaspora expressed by the Genoese tradition merged into an ever-growing migratory flow. Argentina’s economic and internal border expansion called for the immigration of a large number of European laborers willing to colonize new lands through farming and other productive activities. At the same time, the difficulties and the contradictions of the Italian unification process (ratified in 1861) encouraged millions of Italian people from every corner of the Peninsula to emigrate to other countries in Europe, South America, and to the United States.183 The port of Genoa managed to meet these changes by maintaining its traditional commercial role and by becoming an important industrial hub within the Kingdom of Italy.184 The ties between Genoa and the ports of the Río de la Plata remained economically strategic; by the middle of the 1860s, Italy was one of the world’s greatest commercial partners of the region and Genoa was the main Mediterranean hub for rawhide imports.185 The growing emigration to America helped consolidate these ties and generated huge profits in the passenger transport business, large remittances, and an increase in demand – and therefore in exportation – of Italian agricultural and manufacturing products to the other side of the Atlantic.186 After the downfall of Rosas’s regime, growing emigration toward Argentina and the parallel unification process in Italy would prompt the establishment of manifold national and mutual associations, which, along with local government, offered support and a variety of services to the new arrivals in the host society.187 In this transition period, which was not free from conflicts and difficulties, many migrants learned to feel themselves Italians outside their country, but they were also helped to better insert and integrate themselves into their new homeland. The great Italian exodus was a phenomenon of unprecedented proportions and was closely linked to the deep transformations that affected the nineteenth-century European and Atlantic world. However, in its essential features, the history of the first Italian emigration to the Río de la Plata may be seen as the history of Genoa’s “long eighteenth century”: an eccentric eighteenth century, during which the Genoese were able to respond and successfully adapt to the challenges of the modern age by remaining attached to their deep-rooted traditions.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Conclusion

The Genoese contributed to the development of the Spanish empire and benefited greatly from it. This work has aimed to show how, in spite of progressive international marginalization, they continued to thrive under the empire until its very last days, and succeeded in profiting from its collapse. From the second half of the seventeenth century, the Hapsburg Monarchy’s repeated bankruptcies and the increasing international competition to control the sea-trade routes drastically reduced both the financial power of Genoese bankers and the ability of the republic’s fleet to expand its oceanic routes. The breakdown of the alliance between the Spanish crown and Genoa, however, did not halt the centuries-old human flow, which, through the pursuit of either trade-related benefits or better employment opportunities, linked the narrow Ligurian region – via the Iberian peninsula – to the Indias. Following the rise to power of the Bourbons, the Genoese who left the Republic to resettle in Cadiz – the emporium of Hispanic colonial trade – continued to play a crucial role in organizing the exchanges between the Mediterranean and the Americas. Their interest toward the Río de la Plata mirrored the region’s economic development and its inclusion within the Spanish trading system, which intensified exchange between the Indias and the Spanish peninsula and encouraged the emigration of many merchants, craftsmen, and adventurers. When the rescission of the colonial bond brought Cadiz into decline and allowed the Genoese to settle and trade in the Americas beyond Spanish control, their interest in the region grew exponentially. Understandably, the last chapter of the centuries-long history of the Hispanic-Genoese symbiosis has so far been largely neglected by scholars. 203

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

204

Conclusion

The neglect arose because, in the eighteenth century, Genoa had lost its strategic and financial centrality in the Spanish imperial system and ostensibly possessed no resource to challenge the British, Dutch, and the French in long-distance trade. A neutral aristocratic republic lacking both a fertile hinterland and a competitive fleet appeared doomed to play an almost irrelevant role on a field dominated by greater European powers possessing Atlantic and Pacific colonies. Many works have shown that the Genoese continued to prosper in the Mediterranean trade system; within the Atlantic context, scholars long have highlighted how Bourbon policies were unsuccessful in guarding the empire’s weak borders from foreign penetration. The reason whereby – despite such evidence – the role played by the Genoese within the Spanish monarchy during the eighteenth century has so far been underestimated lies in the fact that their political weakness, their often modest social background, and their consequent strategic choices rendered the Genoese all but “invisible.” The Genoese patrons and captains involved in coastal shipping between the Mediterranean and the Spanish Atlantic ports used every possible means to elude customs controls and consular fees in the ports where they docked. As a result, the unscrupulous employment of flags of convenience, false patents, and altered bills of lading secured Genoese seatraders an enduring competitiveness throughout the century, as well as a fast upswing after the disastrous Napoleonic Wars. The operators of this informal, widespread, and mimicry-prone commerce neither needed nor were interested in leaving clear signs of their passage. Genoese maritime trade did not flourish owing to national protection but through the independent initiatives of those living along the Ligurian shores. Conversely, seafarers, traders, shipping magnates, retailers, craftsmen, and minor aristocrats from the Republic’s smallest ports were heavily damaged by the port of Genoa’s centralizing policy but, despite lacking the institutional support of the mother-city, they still turned to sea-trade to make their profits. By helping to fund and set up small maritime expeditions, they overcame their original survival strategy and gained access to the brokerage circuits linking both small and large Mediterranean marketplaces. These initiatives led to many family-run private ventures whose businesses grew through the settlement of relatives and commercial partners in the most lucrative ports. By and large, the mercantile class that thrived in Cadiz and sailed toward the Río de la Plata to seek its fortune emerged from the ranks of the many smaller agents who animated eighteenth-century Genoese maritime trade. These

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Conclusion

205

individuals had little or nothing to do with the great merchants and banking families that had brought prestige to the Republic of Genoa between the late Middle Ages and the early modern period; nonetheless they shared their dynamism and their ability to thrive both in the capital of Spanish Atlantic trade and in its south Atlantic frontier. The agents who pursued such informal, mimicry-prone trade did not need nor were interested in leaving behind them too many traces, and the fact that most of the Genoese who moved to Cadiz and Buenos Aires belonged to the lower classes and ran small businesses further explains the difficulty of detecting the group’s activities. The goals and strategies of those who branched beyond the Strait of Gibraltar are equally important for understanding the scarce visibility of the Genoese. The Genoese settlements in Cadiz and Buenos Aires cannot be viewed as trading hubs closely linked to the mother-town but as a diaspora of men and families driven to economic success abroad and without the support of their hometown. Illegal behaviour – such as smuggling and fraud – were instrumental to the profitable running of small brokerage businesses and, by avoiding the restriction imposed by the Spanish monopoly, to access of the Atlantic market. However, the Genoese ability to continue to participate in Atlantic trade cannot be fully understood if we fail to take into account their tendency to settle, operate legally, and fulfill local needs within the Iberian Monarchy’s territories. The Genoese did not find it difficult to establish ties of reciprocity and fully integrate into the hosting society. The Catholic faith, the neutrality of the Republic of Genoa, and the strong economic relationships developed over the centuries along the Iberian coasts allowed the Genoese to move within a close and culturally familiar milieu that rarely perceived them as a hostile presence. Given their long tenure in the bay of Cadiz, where they successfully built strong economic and family ties with the local merchants, the most dynamic representatives of the diaspora were able to access the legal colonial trade circuits as fully fledged members of Cadiz’s elite. Not only was the Genoese presence in other sectors of the local economy – such as retail, ship-building, shipping, and manufacturing – tolerated by the authorities but it was also fostered by a body of laws that legitimated foreign contribution to the local economic development. The few conflicts and resistance expressed by a minority of the local mercantile class to such inclusion were overridden by appealing to the contradictions of Spanish mercantilism, which simultaneously sought to limit foreign competition and capitalize on its expertise and financial resources.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

206

Conclusion

The Genoese adopted a similar integration strategy in the Río de la Plata, where they exploited an even-less-restricting legal framework to gain community membership and trading rights. During the colonial era, the first Genoese immigrants occupied a prominent place in the economy and, in some cases, in the institutions of the viceroyalty, thanks to their avowed Crown-subject status, to the networking they established within the hosting community, and to the local authorities’ substantive leniency toward foreigners willing to settle and contribute to the growth of the region. The emigrants who settled in the Río de la Plata following the collapse of the empire showed a similar will to integrate into the host society. Integration was fostered and made necessary by the inadequate institutional support given by the homeland. Although in Cadiz the Genoese settlement was one of the largest and most successful of the city’s foreign communities throughout the century, it bore little influence and cohesion and was reluctant to financially sustain its own nation’s institutions in the port. Such seemingly contradictory characteristics mirrored both the Republic of Genoa’s political marginality within the Atlantic context and the social and economic opportunities open to those willing to “become” Spanish. Any sense of belonging to one’s original community might be invoked when seeking judicial protection or exemption from military duties or taxes, but was neglected or even repudiated when it became costly and curtailed personal achievement. The consuls who served the Genoese nation in Cadiz were instrumental in negotiating benefits with the local authorities but were hindered by chronic difficulties in funding community initiatives. On the one hand, the consuls’ inability to collect taxes and shipping fees undermined the prestige and financial solidity of the nation as a whole, but, on the other hand, it fostered Ligurian competitiveness and the economic and social rise of the community’s members. Ultimately, the Genoese institutions of Cadiz were meant to support a mercantile class whose primary goal was not to strengthen their nation’s position but rather to forsake their country and gain legal access to colonial trade either through naturalization or with the help of its Spain-born children. In colonial Buenos Aires, where Genoa was not allowed to establish a consulate nor economic relationships without the intermediation of Spain, the Genoese sought recognition as Crown subjects in order to elude the bans against foreign immigration and, after some years of residence, they were easily accepted as vecinos. Following independence, being a foreigner was no longer an obstacle to settling in the region, but

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Conclusion

207

the economic success of merchants and immigrants from the collapsed Republic of Genoa continued to heavily rely on their ability to integrate and act in the interest of the hosting society. Therefore, the diffidence – if not outright mistrust – shown by the Buenos Aires Genoese toward the first Sardinian consul should not come as a surprise, given that he was not chosen from the immigrant community but sent by a state that many considered as a far-flung, alien entity unsuitable to represent the group’s interests in the region. The tendency to integrate in the host society and the lack of allegiance toward their “national” institutions did not entail the abandonment or the devaluation of their original cultural identity. The diaspora owed much of its continued success to expatriates maintaining strong relationships with their homeland, despite the political turmoil of the Atlantic world and Genoa in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In Cadiz, the support of relatives, friends, and business partners from the homeland was often crucial to establish and maintain a career in trade. As for colonial Buenos Aires, support from fellow countrymen helped many Genoese immigrants to easily fit into the local economy and, in the wake of independence, facilitated the settlement in the region of new arrivals. In both contexts, however, the forms of solidarity and cooperation established on the basis of a common origin were neither exclusive nor necessarily oriented to the creation of networks closely linked to Genoa. Many who moved to Cadiz as agents of a Genoese firm became so integrated in the host society that the port became the core of their businesses. The naturalized subjects and the Spain-born children of Genoese used their status to impose themselves as the most effective and influential contacts for allocating capital or goods in the American trade from Genoa, but their privileged position allowed them to extend their business interests well beyond an intermediary role with the homeland. By establishing partnerships with local and foreign houses of trade, they managed to consolidate their position within the Spanish Monarchy, widen the scope of their businesses and reach other European marketplaces. Some were able to have their family included among the ranks of the Genoese nobility, while others decided to free themselves from their homeland and elected the place where they thrived as their new home. As for the more modest immigrants who comprised the majority of the Genoese community in Cadiz, they limited themselves to making their expertise and labor available to anyone willing to pay good wages and opted to emigrate for good or return home according to their personal convenience.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

208

Conclusion

The relationship binding those who had moved to the Río de la Plata to those who lived on the Spanish Atlantic coasts were equally important but, due to the enormous distance, even far less decisive. During the eighteenth century, the Genoese community in Cadiz started to consistently invest and travel to Buenos Aires in parallel with the establishment of regular contacts between the region and Spain. A minority of traders found the convenience to permanently settle in the Río de la Plata, but only few of them maintained significant commercial ties with their Spainbased counterparts. The establishment of an exclusively Genoese trade network between the two shores of the Atlantic was made unnecessary by the structure of the imperial trade, which enabled the Genoese wholesalers of Cadiz to legally operate within the Spanish monopoly and to manage their investments in overseas trade in collaboration with the main Spanish firms; this helps to explain why the majority of the Genoese who chose Buenos Aires as their permanent home, from the settlement’s early stages, tended to pursue individual strategies of integration into the host society and local economy. The routes followed by the Sardinian fleet and by the Genoese immigrants who left the Ligurian coasts in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars attest a thriving network linking Genoa, Cadiz, and the Río de la Plata. However, even when Genoa was able to strengthen direct commercial relations with the Río de la Plata, most of the immigrants who crossed the ocean to settle in the region did not seek to serve the interests of their homeland but to benefit from the opportunities offered by the new land. Even in this remote region, help of fellow countrymen was vital both to immigrants aiming to make money with a view of returning home and those who, having invested in the region, planned to remain there on a permanent basis. In different ways and more or less willingly, Genoese expatriates fostered trade between the Kingdom of Sardinia and South America, but their contribution to the development of the host society’s commerce and industry was equally critical. Genoese immigration to Cadiz and Buenos Aires, thus, cannot be viewed as a merchant network at the service of the home country; rather, it was a diaspora bound by cooperation-based ties between fellow countrymen, prone to integrate into the host community, and able to turn its political weakness to its own advantage. Success rested in the dedicated pursuit of profits abroad, something that large sectors of the population had shared for centuries. A view of business that privileged family and private initiative against geographical and political factors, and its primarily commercial and maritime nature, lay at the core of the diaspora’s

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Conclusion

209

identity and explains its persistence. In Andalusia as well as in the Río de la Plata, Genoese identity was expressed by settling along the coast and in ports, by favoring brokerage activities, and by developing close and mutually beneficial relationships with the host society in order to obviate the lack of protection and political support from the homeland. The versatility deriving from such a horizon of values accounts for the diaspora’s ability to survive the competition of larger maritime powers, the collapse of the Spanish empire, and the dissolution of the Republic of Genoa. Over the centuries, the Genoese often had to change both trading routes and strategies in order to survive. By valorizing the Spanish Atlantic routes, in the fifteenth century the Genoese were able both to react to their progressive exclusion – caused by the expansion of the Ottoman empire – from the East-Mediterranean settlements and to achieve a central role in international finance. Since Philip IV of Spain announced the suspension of payments in 1627, the Spanish Monarchy offered increasingly lower profits to the Genoese but, as shown earlier, still offered good margins in brokerage and other professions. The Napoleonic Wars revolutionized Genoese participation in the Atlantic trade and called for new adjustments. The first and most devastating effect of the conflict was the annexation of the Republic of Genoa to the French empire and later to the Kingdom of Sardinia. The Genoese reacted to the damages caused by the war and by the dissolution of the ancient Republic by resorting to maritime trade and emigration, which had always been, and continued to be, their principal resources. Unlike the French administration, the Kingdom of Sardinia implemented customs policies and signed commercial treaties to support the Ligurian mercantile fleet in the Mediterranean area, but the reconstruction of the latter was mostly funded without state help. Genoese coastal shipping, which was geared chiefly smuggling, continued to move along the Iberian peninsula routes to intercept goods from Asia and the Americas. The complicated reconstruction of the trading circuits with Spain became pointless within a few years, when the Spanish-American independence movements allowed the Sardinian ships to cross the ocean under their own flag. Following the collapse of the Spanish empire, the port of Cadiz irretrievably lost its role as an Atlantic commerce hub. In the 1830s, the former emporio del orbe acquired a different strategic role for Genoese merchants and captains by transforming itself into an attractive end market for the Sardinian vessels that had replaced the Spanish navy on

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

210

Conclusion

the routes to South America. As a result, the ties that had linked the Genoese to the city of Cadiz were radically overturned. In the eighteenth century, settling in the port of Cadiz was a necessary step for Genoese merchants wishing to gain access to the benefits linked to colonial trade. In the following century, albeit only for a short time, Spanish brokers became dependent on the Genoese to trade with the former colonies and in particular with the Río de la Plata, which became formally open to foreign sea trade as early as 1810. Hispanic-American independence steered migrants from the former Republic of Genoa in the same direction. The Genoese consolidated their interest in trading and settling in the Río de la Plata in the late colonial era, but the structure of the imperial economy to which they had adapted made inconvenient for them to establish a settlement comparable in size to that of Cadiz or other ports in the peninsula. The region became attractive for a much greater migratory flow as a result of independence, which irreparably altered the viceroyalty’s economic and territorial equilibrium and multiplied profit-making opportunities to foreigners. The secession of Upper Peru led to the collapse of the mercantile networks linking the capital to the silver-mining center of Potosí and deprived Buenos Aires of its main source of wealth. The Río de la Plata’s commercial and productive axis was interrupted and – as a result – most of the inland provinces, whose economy was focused on mining, experienced an increasing marginalization. Conversely, the upper Atlantic regions successfully tackled the crisis by bolstering their already strong ties with international markets. The provinces of Buenos Aires and – to a lesser extent – of Littoral experienced a strong recovery through the acquisition of new land destined for livestock farming, which soon became the region’s primary resource. The growing import-export activities, which transformed the Río de la Plata coast into one of the most dynamic regions of post-revolutionary Latin America, explain why these ports became the Genoese diaspora’s favorite destinations in the Atlantic after the fall of the Spanish empire. In Buenos Aires, Sardinian vessels encountered a market open to foreign imports and able to fulfill Europe’s increasing demand for low cost raw material. Ligurian merchants and migrants were able to thrive by offering their traditional expertise to the local economy. As with their predecessors, they chiefly worked in retail and in productive activities aimed at supplying the port and the city market. In comparison to the late colonial era, the most visible change was that many more jobs became available in the maritime sector, where the Genoese played a pivotal role

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Conclusion

211

in the loading and unloading of overseas shipments, in trading with internal ports, and in the local ship-building industry. Early nineteenth-century Buenos Aires was very different from eighteenth-century Cadiz. The complex mechanisms governing the circulation of goods imposed by the Spanish monopoly and the benefits granted to its brokers in Spain disappeared. The new migrants in the Río de la Plata could no longer aspire to the wealth, privileges, and status achieved by the most successful Genoese intermediaries who had prospered in the capital of the Spanish colonial trade, but shared their predecessors’ same ambitions: integration in an opportunity-rich environment to improve their condition through work and speculation. Colonial emancipation allowed the British to preserve a dominant position in the Atlantic trade routes by relying, as in the past, on a large mercantile fleet, a strong financial and industrial capability, and effective political and diplomatic support. Genoese expansion in the Río de la Plata, which lacked comparable resources, continued to rely upon private initiatives and diaspora networks. These features account for the different organization and networking models used by the two communities in Buenos Aires. To ensure effective communication and commercial exchange with the homeland, the British brought their own institutions to the new land and endorsed elitist forms of sociability; conversely, the Ligurian immigrants preferred to fit into the host society’s economy. Retail outlets, coastal shipping trade, micro-credit operations, and urban market manufacturing did not require particularly sophisticated management tools. In a market characterized by a low degree of monetization and widespread informality, the success of any business venture continued to depend on trust relations and chains of obligation binding different economic actors. The strong ties held by expatriates with the homeland via the Sardinian vessels that regularly crossed the ocean promoted the exchange of information, goods, and people between Genoa and the Río de la Plata’s ports. By resorting to their traditional business strategies adjusted to meet the needs of the host society, a large number of migrants made good profits and the Sardinian merchant fleet acquired a competitive – albeit not dominant – role on the South American trading routes. Intermediary activities between local, interprovincial, and international circuits opened new opportunities to social mobility. Many who moved from the estuary of the Río de la Plata to the Littoral achieved a pivotal position in the local society, while others followed in the path of many Creole families who had made their fortune through trade during the colonial era and became owners of estancias in the province of Buenos Aires.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

212

Conclusion

The wars that raged in the Río de la Plata during the first decades of the nineteenth century did not affect the relationships between the Genoese and the locals and confirmed their significance. Most of the immigrants who had settled in Buenos Aires on the eve of independence played an active role in the resistance against British invasions. During the emancipation war, some leading figures of the second-generation Genoese immigrants actively participated in the fight for independence. Events dragged others into war but they often were repaid for their efforts with money, employment, and other benefits. In the aftermath of independence, recent immigrants kept as far away as possible from local conflicts and – as foreigners – benefited from exemption from military service. Given that they were rather satisfied to have their safety, their goods, and their businesses respected, rarely were the Genoese perceived as dangerous competitors or as a potential threat to internal political divisions. When clashes between factions and international wars threatened their personal interests, the Genoese did not hesitate to take up arms but their involvement was viewed merely as necessary to protect the social order and the local economy. This “active neutrality” allowed vessels flying the Sardinian flag to play a crucial role in supplying provisions to Buenos Aires during the commercial blockades imposed by the Anglo-French forces. The services rendered by the Genoese diaspora to the local community account for its ability to thrive in the region despite the wars, the political crises, and the lack of a bilateral agreement between the Kingdom of Sardinia and the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata. The country of origin’s lack of support was counterbalanced by the benevolence of the Buenos Aires authorities, the cooperation of leading local merchants, and a legal regime that privileged the businessmen settled in the region. Although the need to reform the colonial mercantile justice system emerged soon after independence, the actual reform underwent a long transitional period. The impossibility of gathering the social consent needed to develop a commercial code based on universal and abstract norms led the authorities to extend the privileged merchant law to all trade suits. The Genoese immigrants championed and exploited the “liberalization” of the privileges originally granted only to the brokering elite. The reform maintained the main principles of the ius mercatorum, whereby trade suits were swiftly judged by expert merchants who were mindful of the parties’ reputation. If the complainant was well-known and well-integrated into the local community, he could count on the preferential treatment of complaisant judges, with whom he was likely to share friends and business interests. Those who lacked high-ranking

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Conclusion

213

friends still benefited from informal arbitration and shielded their business interests from the ordinary justice system. By unveiling how dense and persisting were the human and economic exchanges that vinculated the Italian peninsula, and particularly the Republic of Genoa, to the ocean basin, the Genoese case allows us to make some reflections about the porosity of the imperial boundaries to small foreign nations operating in the Atlantic trade. As attested by their massive presence both in eighteenth-century Cadiz and Lisbon, the Genoese found particularly permeable frontiers in the Iberian empires until the very end of the early modern period. If we confront this evidence with what happened in the English ports, where the Genoese communities started to decline as early as the fifteenth century,1 it comes apparent how much the chances of this minority group to persist in the Atlantic scene depended on the deep and wide connections that historically linked the Republic to the Iberian world. In both the centers of the Spanish and the Portuguese mercantilism, the Genoese found not only two strategic hubs through which to maintain a role in the management of trade and investments between the American markets and the Mediterranean, but they also found a context where their know-how, capital, and workforce were welcomed as beneficial to different sectors of local economy and, no less importantly, where their Catholic faith could be used as a source of legitimation in lack of national privileges or other forms of political support.2 The way in which the Genoese kept an open door to the Iberian Atlantic, however, suggests that imperial configurations highly influenced the strategies and perspectives of the diaspora both in the peninsula and overseas. As shown by the paths followed by those who thrived in Cadiz, gaining direct and permanent access to colonial trade required many years of continual residence and a profound integration in the host country. Legal participation in the Carrera de Indias, in turn, allowed the Genoese merchant elite in Spain to manage their interests overseas without establishing a close network of fellow countrymen in the American ports. The lack of a stable web of Genoese agents in America, the laws preventing foreign migration overseas, and the structure of the imperial economy – which generated scarce opportunities both to qualified and unskilled workforce on the other side of the ocean – discouraged the creation of large settlements of expatriates in America during the colonial period and led those who permanently migrated overseas to orient their interests toward local trade or production. The political and economic structure of the empire, therefore, did not impede the Genoese from trading with

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

214

Conclusion

America or from settling in its main hubs, but it vinculated their business strategies as well as their perspectives of expansion to the societies in which they operated. These conditions radically changed after the fall of the empire, when the growth of local economy in some of the former viceroyalties and their opening to international trade stimulated the massive arrival of both traders and workers. The Genoese diaspora extended beyond the chronological limits set by the present work and grew to the point of becoming one of the homeland’s principal growth agents. The advantages generated by this ongoing emigration were lucidly considered by Jacopo Virgilio, a Ligurian lawyer and economist very close to Genoa’s mercantile and ship-building ranks. In an 1858 pamphlet he wrote: Ligurian seafarers consider Buenos Aires and Montevideo as veritable colonies, given that 80,000 countrymen of theirs are spread around these vast territories, where they do lucrative business and maintain strong trade ties with Genoa. Many emigrate each year from our coasts and emigrations remains a source of wealth and prosperity for us; in fact, those who emigrate to America help our overpopulated and under resourced country, support business with the homeland, make shipping prosper, send more than a million a year to their relatives and return rich to the land which they had left as paupers. Our fathers welcomed emigration, which is now at the basis of our wealth and which, through hard toil and savings, is continuously spreading its peaceful reach!3

A few years after the fall of caudillo Rosas, Ligurian emigration to the Río de la Plata had become large enough to create an overseas market for Italian products, generate large capital investments, encourage further migratory tides to America, and increase the profits made by the Sardinian vessels that transported the new arrivals. Virgilio’s pamphlet attests how Genoese merchant class was keen to encourage emigration through press campaigns. At the same time and to a similar end, the port of Genoa began to host several transport agencies, agents and sub-agents advising migrants on overseas opportunities offered by destinations and offering both work and false documents. Following Italian unification, the constant emigration to the Americas prompted the first protests against “human trade,” whereby some politicians and intellectuals proposed to stop labor emigration.4 The voices against unregulated emigration confirmed landowners’ fears over rural depopulation, which caused the rise of labor costs and upturned the social order in the countryside. In response, in 1868 the Ministry issued a circular advising prefects and mayors to deny emigration permits in the absence of financial backing and a job offer in the country of destination. The circular did not apply to

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Conclusion

215

those wishing to emigrate to the Río de la Plata but – as a result of the officers’ zeal – ended up being extended to the whole of South America. The long extract that follows was published by Jacopo Virgilio in Genoa to denounce the circular’s dire economic consequences and – more generally – state intervention in emigration matters. In contrast to the delusional and naive stance held by the “brethren” of the ancient Republic of Venice – whereby maritime trade could depend on steamer routes to the Orient, on shipbuilding and on shipping routes across the Brennero pass – the Ligurian lawyer argued that it was owing to emigrants that Genoa had succeeded in tackling international maritime competition: Solid maritime trade depends on emigration and numerous settlements abroad . . . As their numbers grow, so do the shipments and the merchant fleet, as do specialist national industries and agriculture, which benefits from fulfilling increased requests from expatriates. In other words, healthy trading, a strong merchant marine, active manufacturing and national prosperity would be impossible without colonies. But which colonies are possible and useful nowadays? Is it those populated by convicts who offer temporary financial and correctional relief or those which offer the metropolis supremacy, jurisdiction and command over a territory inhabited by the settlers? No, such colonies – be they Roman, Spanish, Portuguese or French – have run their course. Science and experience have dismissed State-sponsored law ruled colonies managed by government officials. Truly useful colonies are gradually founded by individuals who – through their own will – settle in a self-ruling foreign country which treats foreigners as its own subjects and is based on enterprise, savings, investment and the economic strength of immigrants. We are convinced that, should Montevideo and Buenos Aires become Italian dominions, the prosperity and the benefits which our nation derives from these colonies would disappear. It is high time that those who envisage expensive and dangerous colonies and push governments to pursue plans deemed to become financially draining and deluded understood this. In essence, the kinds of colonies which we envisage and which Italy has a great need are large foreign settlements, founded through the freewill of emigrants and under the aegis of the laws of the country that offers them fraternal hospitality. Not only do we disagree with those who believe that the government should direct immigration towards potentially more beneficial destinations – given that we feel that the choice should rest entirely with the individual – but we also disapprove of sending the navy to defend national interests in foreign seas. We . . . believe that strong naval outposts often cause reprisals, violence, prevarication, and war which – in turn – generate divisions, hatred and revenge against the nation that expect to rule outside of its confines. Foreign-resident subjects need to be defended against despotic, barbarous and unjust governments; however, wherever justice and freedom prevail, it’s our settlers’ character which offers the best guarantee . . . Nobody can beat or equal the [Italians] when it comes to their sacred hunger for work and their entrepreneurial zeal, prudence and accomplishment. With the odd exception, Italians stand out for the honesty and commercial acumen which are

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

216

Conclusion

admired by their business counterparts and duly respected by the indigenous populations . . . . The large amounts of money which they send to their families every year are very welcome to our population . . . . The fact that many return to Italy attests their love for the homeland, which they left temporarily not on whim or in pursuit of adventure but as the result of the careful self-interested planning which is at the root of all effective progress.5

In line with modern liberal economic theory – many decades after the fall of the Spanish empire and the dissolution of the Republic of Genoa – the principles that underpinned Genoese trade in the Spanish Atlantic during the eighteenth-century could be vindicated as forming the basis for the prosperity of the new Italian state. The pursuit of personal interest, the abandonment of territorial expansion policies, free emigration, and the tendency to settle in countries open to foreign contribution were generating such benefits that costly pursuit of machtpolitik projects appeared to be unnecessary and even dangerous. This view contrasted with the new phase of formal and informal imperialism that the main European powers, principally Great Britain and France, were consolidating in that period in Latin America, Africa and Asia.6 In an attempt to follow in the same path, at the end of the nineteenth century, the Italian government inaugurated its own imperial policy in Africa with the colonization of Eritrea.7 As predicted by Virgilio, the Italian imperial adventure had poor results, whereas the effort of many emigrants who crossed the Atlantic in search of better opportunities remained hugely beneficial to the nation and helped to maintain its internal stability during the difficult and contradictory statehood consolidation. By exploiting their “second nature” as migrants and traders, therefore, the Genoese not only succeeded to stay afloat in the Atlantic during the age of early modern empires; at the dawn of the modern period, they could keep competing across the Ocean sea by opening the routes to the Americas to new generations of countrymen and by transforming the Italian exodus into an asset.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Appendix

table a.1a Merchants of Cadiz and their investments in trade according to the 1771 register of the Unica Contribución (*) NATION Spanish French Italian Irish/English Flemish Danish/Swedish/ Prussian German

N. MERCHANTS

MERCHANT CAPITAL PER NATION (PESOS)

285 180 49 44 20 17

261,444 710,450 149,800 238,100 74,700 75,500

6

31,000

table a.1b Italian vecinos of Cadiz according to the 1771 register of the Unica Contribución (*)

NAME Balbi, José María Bañasco, Pedro Bechi, Antón Beliche, Francisco Biondina, Alberto Bucheli, Carlos Burón, Francisco Burón, Pedro

CAPITAL (PESOS) 2,000 1,800 1,750 8,00 1,500 1,250 1,750 1,750

GENOESE ORIGIN (**) x x x

x

(continued) 217

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Appendix

218 table a.1b (continued)

NAME Cambiazo, Francisco Canavero, Juan Bautista Capela, Pedro Corsi, Antonio Dagnino, Antonio Enrile, José María Ferrari, Angel Garzán Octavio María Gazo, Tomás Gazzo Bartolomé Guilloso, Juan Bautista Jordán, Joseph Liverti, Felipe Masnata, Benito y Bolta y C. Miconi, Tomás Migone, Juan María Montesisto, Joseph y C. Mosti, Claudio Mosti, Esteban Oliveros, Lorenzo y C. Pedemonte, Eustaquio Pedemonte, Juan Bautista Pescia, Juan Bautista Pichardo, Andrés y Juan María Polloni, Francisco Prasca, Juan Andrés y C. Procurante, Jacome y Gaspar Ravelo, Diego Recaño, Costantino Reymundo, Juan Agustín Sciacaluga, Esteban Sigory, Joseph y C. Solari, Antonio Solari, Tomás Testa, Cayetano Testa, Juan Bautista Torre, Joseph Traverso, Gerónimo Vico, Juan

CAPITAL (PESOS) 5,000 2,000 500 750 1,250 6,000 4,800 2,000 1,750 3,500 1,250 4,500 1,000 1,800 10,000 1,500 12,000 9,000 6,250 6,800 5,000 2,000 1,500 2,500 3,000 12,000 3,500 750 1,800 3,000 2,500 5,500 2,500 3,000 2,000 1,000 1,250 2,250 1,000

GENOESE ORIGIN (**) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

*Source: Ruiz Rivera, Julián B., El Consulado de Cádiz: Matrícula de Comerciantes (1730–1823), Cadiz: Diputación Provincial de Cádiz, 1988, pp. 66–73. ** The traders’ origin has been proved by consulting the wills conserved in the Archivo Histórico Provincial de Cádiz.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Appendix

219

table a.2 Foreign merchants who obtained naturalization to participate in the Spanish trade between 1700 and 1787 ORIGIN

NUMBER

Genoa Ireland France Flanders Milan Portugal Venice England Savoy Unknown Athens Florence Jerusalem Lucca Scotland

19 14 11 6 5 5 4 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 77

TOTAL

Source: AGI, Consulados, L. 445.

table a.3 Genoese merchants of Cadiz who obtained Spanish naturalization between 1700 and 1811 NAME

YEAR

Bigo, Juan Antonio Blanco, Pedro Antonio Bucheli, Carlos Felipe Burlando, Joseph María Carnilia, Antonio Cheirasco y Vico, Juan Bautista Crosa, Jacome Felipe Enrile, Joseph María Grondona y Oneto, Juan Francisco Jordán, Joseph María Lavaggi, Domingo Ignocencio Llanos, Bernardo de Maestre, Juan Bautista Malagamba Villarino, Lorenzo Malagamba, Carlos Miconi, Tomás

1700 1751 1753 1729 1755 1795 1719 1771 1723 1750 1811 1723 1753 1795 1785 1737 (continued)

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Appendix

220 table a.3 (continued) NAME

YEAR

Oddo, Juan Teodoro de Picardo, Antonio María Picardo, Benito Picardo, Benito (nephew) Prasca, Juan Andrés Quartín, Ambrogio José Rapalo, Juan Bautista Recaño, Bernardo de Rivera, Vicente Sanguineto, Juan Bautista Traverso, Nicolás Yudice, Cayetano

1729 1809 1802 1810 1774 1795 1787 1719 1802 1719 1793 1753

Source: AGI, Consulados, L. 445, and leg. 891.

table a.4 First- and second-generation Genoese merchants registered in the Consulado de Cargadores a Indias of Cadiz (1743–1823)

NAME Acereto, Juan de Anoceto, Lázaro Juan B. Bayeto, Carlos Bernachi, Juan Bocanegra, Miguel de Bozo, Miguel Burlando, José Francisco Camuso, Carlos Antonio Canepa, Antonio Canepa, Juan Bautista Capitanache, Pablo Carnilia, Antonio Casanova, Juan Pedro Castañeto, Santiago Cristóbal Castelli, Cayetano Saturnino Ceruti, Florencio José Codevila, José María Colombo, Domingo Colombo, Francisco Colombo, Pablo Costa, Juan

BIRTHPLACE Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz foreigner [Genoa] Cadiz Huelva Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

YEAR OF ENLISTMENT 1764 1755 1744 1763 1776 1808 1743 1791 1790 1779 1750 1755 1765 1756 1804 1785 1791 1792 1792 1791 1748

Appendix

NAME Costa, Juan Antón Costa, Juan Felipe Costa, Santiago Costas, Luis Cruzate, Cayetano Cruzati, Andrés José Dañino, José Dapelo y Saviñon, Francisco Dapelo y Saviñón, Juan Bautista Delfín y Torres, Manuel Lorenzo Enrile y Guerci, Jerónimo Antonio Enrile y Guerci, José María Antonio Enrile y Tomati, Nicolás Forte, Fernando Forte, Nicolás Fosati, Sebastian José Galeano, Diego Antonio Gasín, Juan Francisco Gassín y Aguayo, Luis Geraldino, Nicolás Geraldino, Nicolás Antonio Geraldino, Nicolás Miguel Geraldino, Pedro Tomás Gnecco, Agustín Grosso, Juan Jordán y Mandilo, Antonio Jordán y Mandilo, Domingo Jordán y Mandilo, Gerónimo Jordán y Mosti, José Jordán y Sierra, José María Jordán, Felix Antonio Lamberto, Juan Nicolás Masnata, José Rafael Patrón, Diego

BIRTHPLACE Barcelona Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz

221

YEAR OF ENLISTMENT 1777 1751 1751 1748 1750 1749 1756 1760 1760 1743

Cadiz

1771

Cadiz

1761

Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Sanlúcar de Barrameda (Cadiz) Sanlúcar de Barrameda (Cadiz) Cadiz Puerto de Santa María (Cadiz)

1785 1756 1756 1760 1776 1789

Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz

1787 1745 1743 1759 1745 1770 1749 1765 1765 1765 1772 1750 1758 1757 1765 1760 (continued)

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Appendix

222 table a.4 (continued)

NAME Patrón, Francisco Patrón, Juan Patrón, Juan Bautista Patrón, Juan Manuel Patrón, Sebastián Pavia, Juan Fernando Pedemonte, Juan Bautista Peñasco, José Peñasco, Sebastián Prasca, Juan Andrés Ravina, Tomás Recaño, José Recaño, José Ramón Sigori, Antonio Sigori, Domingo Sigori, Pedro Solari, Juan María Suffo, Luis Tomati, Antonio Traverso, Francisco José Traverso, Gerónimo Vial, Claudio José Vial, Juan Crisóstomo

BIRTHPLACE

YEAR OF ENLISTMENT

Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz San Ildefonso (Cadiz) Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz foreigner Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Cadiz Isla de León (Cadiz) foreigner foreigner

1812 1766 1751 1812 1813 1746 1769 1804 1802 1774 1808 1791 1802 1771 1771 1771 1761 1796 1745 1771 1771 1769 1769

Source: AGI, Consulados, L. 447.

table a.5 Ships enlisted in the Carrera de Indias in 1793 belonging to merchants of Genoese origin NAME Álvarez Poggio, Miguel Añeses de, Josef Aveño, Pedro Balbi, Josef María Colombo, Domingo

Colombo, Pablo Copelo, Esteban

SHIP Frigate N.ra S.ra del Carmen Frigate San Josef, alias La Aurora Brigantine N.ra S.ra de la Concepción Frigate S. Josef Frigate Santa Anna Frigate Virgo Potens, alias La América Polacre La Sacra Famiglia, alias El Correo de Cádiz Frigate N.ra S.ra de la Concepción, alias El Jupiter Paquebot Sofía Magdalena

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TONS 118 212 125 – – 200 170 230 200

Appendix NAME Enrile, Marqués de Facio, Josef Francisco Firpo, Felipe Galeano, Diego Malagamba, Carlos

Parodi, Agustín Patrón, Bartolomé Patrón, Benito

Picardo, Benito Prasca, Josef and Benito Patrón Rizo (Risso), Alexandro Romaione, Santiago Sabezari, Hugo Sigori, Antonio Vallarino, Andrés

223

SHIP

TONS

Frigate La Industria, alias La Pizana Brigantine N.ra S.ra del Carmen Brigantine La Fortuna y Santa Ana Frigate N.S. de los Dolores, alias S. Fermín Frigate S. Josef Frigate SS.ma Trinidad Schooner S. Felipe y Santiago Frigate S. Carlos, alias La España Paquebot Carmen y Santa Teresa Frigate N.S. de Gracia y S. Telmo Polacre N.ra S.ra del Carmen y S.ta Teresa Brigantine Rosario, alias La América Sloop Bella Anastasia, alias Paquete de África Frigate N.ra S.ra de Gracia y S.ta Francisca Frigate N.ra S.ra del Rosario y S.ta Barbara Frigate S. Vicente Ferrer, alias El África Brigantine S.ta Barbara, alias La Europa Polacre N.ra S.ra de la Misericordia Frigate N.S. del Pilar Brigantine La María Polacre N.ra S.ra del Carmen Packet Espítiru Santo Polacre Princesa de Asturia Brigantine N.ra S.ra del Rosario y S.ta Teresa

220 120 225 234 200 200 80 190 – 207 125 10 10 250 266 220 – 120 760 250 90 150 160 86

Source: AGI, Consulados, leg. 929.

table a.6 Merchants under the jurisdiction of the Genoese consul of Cadiz in 1764 Don Don Don Don Don Don Don

Eustachio Pedemonte Thomás Solari Antonio María Becchi Thomás Eustaquio Ardizone Jacome Procuranti Gaspar Procuranti Joseph Patrón (continued)

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

224

Appendix

table a.6 (continued) Don Francisco María y D. Andrés Picardo Don Augustín Merello Don Manuel Perasso Don Jacinto Valentino Don Miguel Grena Don Felix Ghignino Don Juan Bautista Codevilla Don Bartholomé Fontichely Don Juan Avegno Don Vicente Saetone Don Ignacio Ravello Don Pablo Brareti [Braseti?] Don Juan Bautista Midolli Don Lorenzo Ronco Don Ángel Braseti Don Pasqual Bruggia Castelli Don Bernardo Riva Don Joseph Ghignino Don Juan Bautista Giorno Don Lorenzo Corallo Don Pasqual y Nicolás Rapallino Don Antonio María Benvenuto Don Benito Areco Don Nicolás Lanata Don Joseph Tognini Don Jacome Solary Don Antonio María Dagnino y Costo Don Nicolás Recagno Don Phelipe Liverti Don Francisco Testa San Martín Don Nicolás Testa Don Nicolás Testa de D. Juan Baptista Don Tomás Ravina Nicolás Jubini Nicolás Canale Juan Jiri Gregorio Picasso Juan Baptista Seyaccaluga [Sciaccaluga] Don Esteban Lamberry Don Domingo Laura Don Antonio María Dagnino y Muerto Don Ignocencio Moro Source: AMC, 5871. The list follows the same sequence as the original document.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Appendix

225

table a.7 Foreign residents in the 1804 census of Buenos Aires: ITALIANS

N.

OTHER FOREIGNERS

N.

Genoa Italy Piedmont Lombardy Naples Venice Rome Sicily Bologna Livorno Modena Parma

61 14 11 4 4 4 3 2 1 1 1 1 107

Portugal France Brazil The United States Great Britain Ireland Germany Iceland Malta Corsica Denmark Hungary Slovenia Angola

246 52 26 24 13 8 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 381

TOTAL

TOTAL

table a.8 Ships of Genoese captains arrived in Buenos Aires between 1802 and 1823: CAPTAIN Ravina, José Caneva, Juan

Caneva, Andrés Pavia, Pedro Colombo, Miguel Calandre, Bernardo Braco, Francisco Espíndola, Sebastián

YEAR 1802 1802 1809 1809 1810 1810 1810 1810 1816 1817 1803 1803 1809 1809 1809 1809 1809 1809

PORT OF ORIGIN

LOAD

Montevideo Santa Fe Montevideo Montevideo Montevideo Montevideo Paraná Santa Fe

aguardiente leathers beverages, money beverages wine wine, iron leathers, tallow leathers

Isla de Lobos Isla de Lobos Isla de Lobos

wood wood wood (continued)

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Appendix

226 table a.8 (continued) CAPTAIN

Villarino, Andrés Chavelo, Cristóbal

Fontán, Pedro

Fontán, Silvestro

Fontán, Feliberto Anselmo, Juan Perfumo, Francisco

Palma, Gregorio

Mayol, José Mayol, Juan Roca, Manuel José Anselmo, Juan Ravasa, Jaime Rivera, Marcos

YEAR

PORT OF ORIGIN

1810 1811 1810 1810 1810 1810 1811 1809 1809 1809 1809 1809 1809 1809

Isla de Lobos British vessel Balizas British vessel British vessel British vessel British vessel Vacas Montevideo Agraciada San Salvador Montevideo Montevideo Santa Fe

1809 1821 1818 1820 1823 1819 1809 1809 1809 1810 1816 1817 1817 1818 1819 1819 1823 1810

Santa Fe Santa Fe Gualeguaychú Bajada Uruguay S. Salvador Paraguay S.to Dom. Soriano S.to Dom. Soriano Corrientes Corrientes Santa Fe Cruz Colorada Mercedes Montevideo Soriano Gualeguaychú San Salvador (in Soriano) Montevideo Gualeguaychú Montevideo Mercedes Montevideo Paraguay Buenos Aires San Nicolás British vessel

1810 1823 1810 1816 1810 1810 1810 1819 1810

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

LOAD leathers

leathers wood wood wood wood wood leathers, tallow, lime wood wood leathers melons coal wood oranges wood wood oranges oranges leathers leathers leathers wood wood posts wood wood leathers wine leathers, tallow wood oranges

money

Appendix CAPTAIN

YEAR

Montagna, Francisco Campodonico, Juan

1811 1811 1815 1811 1811 1814 1823 1814 1815 1815 1815

Ensenada Paraná Gualeguaychú Balizas Colonia Colonia Gualeguaychú

iron wood, peaches leathers, tallow money leathers, tallow leathers, tallow leathers

Vacas Vacas Conchillas

leathers leathers leathers, wood

1815 1816 1815 1815 1816 1816 1816 1816 1816 1818 1815 1819 1820 1816 1817 1817 1817 1817 1817 1819 1819 1823 1817 1817 1817 1817 1823 1819 1819 1819 1820

Conchillas Montevideo Paraguay Montevideo Colonia Ensenada Ensenada Santa Fe Uruguay Montevideo Montevideo San Salvador

wood wood tobacco, yerba wood leathers, tallow leathers leathers melons

Galliano, Juan José Galarzo, Andrés Bianchi, Agustín Bianchi, Andrés Belgrano, Francisco Gallo, Juan Della Rosa, José Claudio

Dentella, Antonio Bachichi, Juan

Costa, Domingo

Poggi, Jaime

Basualdo, Francisco Basualdo, José Adolfo, Bernardo Pascual, Carlos Cavagna, Andrés

Carvagna, José Bachicha,Narciso Rabelo, José Gallo, Juan Chichisola, Juan Casanova, Jaime De Peri, Federico José

PORT OF ORIGIN

227

Colonia Colonia Uruguay Uruguay San Salvador San Salvador Ensenada Montevideo San Nicolás Santa Fe Uruguay Soriano Gualeguay Montevideo Vacas Vacas Gualeguay Gualeguaychú

LOAD

wood cocoa beans, wood leathers, wood leathers, wood tallow leathers leathers wood leathers leathers cheeses, olive oil wood leathers, wool oranges leathers, tallow wood leathers wood wood leathers, tallow leathers leathers, tallow (continued)

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Appendix

228 table a.8 (continued) CAPTAIN

YEAR

PORT OF ORIGIN

Ballesteri, José

1820

San Nicolás

Roverano, Pedro

1821 1821 1823 1823 1823 1822 1822 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1821 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1823 1823 1823 1822 1823 1822 1822 1823 1823

Santa Fe Rosario Santa Fe Paraná Bajada de Santa Fe Gualeguaychú Gualeguaychú Montevideo Gualeguaychú Gualeguaychú Gualeguay Gualeguay Mercedes Arroyo de la China Arroyo de la China Arroyo de la China Gualeguay Arroyo de la China Arroyo de la China Uruguay Gualeguaychú Montevideo Montevideo Montevideo Montevideo Montevideo Montevideo

1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823

Colonia Colonia Colonia Colonia Colonia Vacas Uruguay Paysandú Montevideo Ensenada Ensenada Arroyo de la China Sandú

Palma, Gregorio

Vila, José

Migone, Antonio

Patrón, Antonio Patrón, Estevan Perruta, Tomas Pendola, José Rambalde, Juan Bautista Lorenzi, Francisco

Pedemonte, Lucas

Aycardo, Santiago Canestro, Camilo Villa, Juan

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

LOAD leathers, tallow, wool wood ash wood, horns leathers leathers wood wood wood wood leathers, wood wood wood wood, ash wood wood wood wood horns wood horns horns wood wood wood wood wood wood wood stones leathers leathers wood horns wood wood wheat leathers leathers wood

Appendix CAPTAIN Schiaffino, Santiago

Gandulfo, Domingo

Maggin, Juan Chapela, Lorenzo

Corradino, Domingo

Patrón, Esteban Fontán, Silvestro De Negri, Simón Bontà, Pablo

Manchina, Juan Castelo, Andrés Soleri, José

YEAR 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823 1822

229

PORT OF ORIGIN Uruguay Arroyo de la China Uruguay Colonia Bajada Paraná Paraná Gualeguaychú Vacas Montevideo Montevideo Montevideo Montevideo Montevideo Montevideo Montevideo Vacas Gualeguay Gualeguay Arroyo de la China Paysandú Ensenada Montevideo Montevideo Montevideo Vacas Montevideo Vacas Santa Fe Conchas Gualeguay

LOAD lime leathers leathers leathers lime, wool lime lime wood wood wood wood wood wood wood wood wood wood lime wood coal coal flour wood wood wood wood wood wood leathers canes wood

Source: AGNBA, X, 36-8-9; AGNBA, X, 36-8-10; AGNBA, 36-7-22 bis.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Appendix

230

table a.9 Ships of Sardinian captains arrived in Buenos Aires in 1828 CAPTAIN Accinelli, Benito Aicardi, Jacinto Aicardi, Santiago Alberti, Francisco Alciature, Francisco

PORT OF ORIGIN

LOAD

BOAT

Vacas Ensenada Ensenada Montevideo Vacas

coal empty passengers money wood

sloop Jorge Mateo sloop Dos Hermanos lighter Lancho boat Fortuna lighter Hércules

Montevideo Gualeguay Santa Fe

wood wood wood

Santa Fe

leathers

Corrientes Gualeguaychú Gualeguay Corrientes Santa Fe Santa Fe Vacas

wood wood wood wood boards, wheat leathers empty

Vacas

empty

Vacas

passengers

Vacas

passengers

Bonno, Pedro

Montevideo

“general”

Bonorino, Nicolás

Vacas

passengers

Vacas

passengers

Vacas Soriano

coal coal, wood

Bosanichi, Mateo

Santa Fe Montevideo Montevideo Sandú

fruits wood wood wood

Brunello

Salado

empty

lighter Cledy lighter Cledy sloop Encarnación del Sur sloop Encarnación del Sur sloop S. Basilio sloop Casualidad sloop Casualidad sloop Mercedes sloop Mercedes sloop Mercedes whaler Buena Esperanza whaler Buena Esperanza whaler Buena Esperanza whaler Buena Esperanza schooner “nacional” Francina whaler Buena Esperanza whaler Buena Esperanza boat Domingo schooner N.S. del Carmen sloop Carolina sloop Carolina sloop Carolina schooner N.S. del Carmen boat “nacional” [?]

Aliberti, Felipe

Angelino, Antonio Anselmo, Luis Basallo, José

Bianchi, José

Bonsanti, Mateo Bontà, Pablo

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Appendix

CAPTAIN Campodonico, Francisco

Canestro, Camilo Canevaro, Santiago

Carboni, Nicolás Carcagno, Agustín

Castello, José Cerruti, Pedro

Chapela, Lorenzo Chechi, Luis Corsanego, Antonio Corsanego, José Chichisola, Agustín Chichisola, Esteban

PORT OF ORIGIN

LOAD

231

BOAT

Montevideo

wood

lighter Elisabet

Vacas Vacas Montevideo Montevideo Montevideo Gualeguaychú Montevideo Vacas

wood wood wood wood wood coal “general” wood

Corrientes

wood

Gualeguaychú

wood

Salto

tallow

S. Lucar Mercedes Uruguay Santa Fe Montevideo Soriano Soriano Mercedes Montevideo Corrientes Esquina

“general” coal wood wood wood wood wood leathers wood oranges leathers

lighter Elisabet lighter Elisabet lighter Elisabet whaler Clyde whaler Clyde whaler Clyde schooner Annabella flatboat S. José y Ánimas flatboat S. José y Ánimas flatboat S. José y Ánimas flatboat S. José y Ánimas whaler Laura sloop Santa Elena boat Jorge Mateo sloop Santa Elena sloop Nueva Cartago boat Josefina boat Josefina boat Josefina sloop Atrevida lighter Ciriaco sloop S. Telmo

Santa Fe Gualeguaychú Soriano

fruits wood wood

sloop [?] sloop Napoleón sloop Mercedes

Montevideo

wood

sloop Intrépida

Montevideo Montevideo Montevideo

citrus fruits peaches wood wood wood

sloop Intrépida sloop Intrépida sloop Intrépida flatboat Dolores flatboat María de los Dolores

Vacas

(continued)

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Appendix

232 table a.9 (continued)

CAPTAIN

Claveli, José Cleri, Geronimo

PORT OF ORIGIN

LOAD

Vacas

wood

Vacas

wood

Vacas Martín Chico Vacas Vacas Mercedes

tallow

Vacas Vacas Mercedes Vacas Vacas Vacas Vacas Corrientes

passengers passengers coal coal, wood passengers passengers coal passengers yerba money wood coal, horns

Santa Fe Bajada Bajada

wheat lime, wheat wood

Della Casa, Felipe Della Casa, José De Negri, Simón

Santa Fe Santa Fe Santa Fe San Salvador Montevideo Vacas

Descalzo, Bartolomé Dodero, Juan Donati, Leonardo Falconi, José

Santa Fe

oranges cueros watermelons lime passengers shoepolish, pottery wheat

Ferro, Pablo Fontán, Silvestro

Soriano Vacas S. Salvador Sandú Vacas Gualeguaychú

wood passengers coal, wood wood coal wood

Fossati, Domingo

Uruguay

wood

Forqueto, Vicente

Vacas

wood

Copello, Luis Costa, Alessandro Costa, José

Costanego, Antonio Cuneo, Miguel Dagnino, Juan

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

BOAT flatboat María de los Dolores flatboat María de los Dolores boat Carmen boat Carmen whaler Liguria whaler Liguria boat [?] sloop Concepción whaler Liguria whaler Liguria boat Dolores lighter Elisabet flatboat Leandra flatboat Leandra flatboat Leandra sloop S.Telmo sloop Napoleón lighter [?] lighter S. José y Ánimas lighter S. Pelayo lighter Pelayo boat Feliciana boat Feliciana boat Feliciana sloop Flor del Río sloop N.S. del Carmen sloop Jorge Mateo whaler Oriental boat S. Antonio boat S. Antonio [ ?] flatboat N.S. del Carmen sloop S. José y Ánimas boat Candelaria

Appendix

CAPTAIN Frandini, Vicente

Galeano, Luis Galeano, José Luis Gandulfo, Domingo Garrucino, Andrés Gavazzo, Francisco Gotuso, Francisco Gracini, Andrés

Grondona, Ángel Guastavino, Nicolás

Lanata, Francisco

Lanata, Santiago Landin, Manuel

Lanza, Benito

Lorenzo, Francisco Nocheto, Nicolás

PORT OF ORIGIN

LOAD

233

BOAT

Mercedes Montevideo Montevideo Montevideo Corrientes Corrientes Santa Fe Santa Fe

coal wood wood wood

Vacas Bajada de Santa Fe Bajada Paraná Santa Fe Montevideo Montevideo Montevideo Vacas Vacas Montevideo Sandú

passengers lime

boat Victoria boat Victoria boat Victoria boat Victoria lighter Carmen lighter Carmen schooner Concepción flatboat S. Antonio y Ánimas felucca Pepa sloop Rosario

lime, wheat wheat peanuts wood wood wood passengers wood wood wood

sloop Rosario ketch S. Jorge ketch S. Jorge lighter Ligero lighter Ligero lighter Ligero felucca Pepa felucca Pepa Servina sloop Mercedes sloop Carmelita

Corrientes Uruguay Mercedes Mercedes S. Salvador S. Salvador Gualeguychú Mercedes Vacas

wood coal coal leathers wood wood coal wood

Vacas Vacas Soriano Vacas Santa Fe Bajada Bajada Santa Fe

wood wheat, coal

leathers wood coal coal wheat beds leathers, wood nutria leathers, peanuts

sloop S.ta Rosa sloop S.ta Rosa sloop Nuevo Destino sloop Nuevo Destino sloop Nuevo Destino sloop Nuevo Destino sloop Nuevo Destino boat Esparta schooner Buena Ventura sloop Carmen boat Santa Rosa sloop Jorge Mateo boat S.ta Rosa boat S.ta Rosa boat S.ta Rosa sloop Trinidad lighter Fortuna

(continued)

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Appendix

234 table a.9 (continued)

CAPTAIN Marchani, Próspero

PORT OF ORIGIN

LOAD

BOAT

Gualeguyachú

wood

boat María Josefa

Gualeguyachú Gualeguaychú

wood coal

flatboat Victoria barge Carmen

Montevideo

wood

schooner Montealegre boat Carmen

Montevideo

wood

Montevideo

wood

Mercedes Sandú Sandú Montevideo

wine wood coal wood wood

Nocheti, José

Sauce Montevideo Santa Fe Santa Fe Santa Fe Santa Fe Santa Fe Santa Fe Santa Fe Vacas

nutria leathers wood wood coal leathers, peanuts wood wood, leathers passengers

Pascual, Mateo Olivari, Bernardo

Rosario Gualeguaychú

wood wood, coal

Gualeguaychú

wood

Gualeguaychú

coal

Gualeguaychú Santa Fe Santa Fe Santa Fe S. Pedro S. Pedro

coal, wood coal oranges coal leathers, wheat tallow, wheat

Marconi, Bartolomé Martola, Bartolo Masoni, Juan Bautista Mayoli, Lorenzo

Modino, Mariano Molinari, Esteban Moreti, Ambrogio Murature, Francisco Murature, José Nocheto, Nicolás

Olivari, Domingo

Montevideo

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

sloop N.S. del Carmen sloop N.S. del Carmen ketch Oriental sloop Carmen schooner Fortunata boat Carmen boat Carmen cutter Luis lighter Fortuna lighter Fortuna lighter Fortuna lighter Fortuna lighter Fortuna lighter Fortuna lighter Fortuna whaler Buena Esperanza schooner Rosario flatboat S. Antonio y Ánimas flatboat S. Antonio y Ánimas flatboat S. Antonio y Ánimas barge Fortunata sloop Carmen sloop Carmen sloop Carmen sloop Carmen sloop Carmen

Appendix

CAPTAIN Orta, Ignacio Orta, Nicolás

PORT OF ORIGIN

BOAT

lime lime lime wood

boat Paz sloop Pura y Limpia sloop Pura y Limpia sloop S. Juan boat Fortuna boat Fortuna boat Fortuna lighter Arrogante schooner Clementina

Santa Fe Santa Fe

fruits leathers wood passengers horns, tallow, soap wood wood

Santa Fe

passengers

Santa Fe Santa Fe

coal wheat

Corrientes

oranges

Raballo, Jaime

Goya Corrientes Santa Fe

oranges tobacco peanuts

Raffo, Francisco

Corrientes

Recagno, Lázaro

Vacas Vacas Montevideo Montevideo Montevideo Vacas Bajada de Santa Fe Bajada de Santa Fe Santa Fe

leathers, horsehair passengers wood wood wood wood wood lime

Orsini, Francisco

Paoli, Mateo Pendola, José

Perdono, Manuel

Pinelli, Juan Bautista

Roberto, Juan Roverano, Pedro

Sanguinete, Joaquín

Bajada Bajada Bajada Arroyo de la China Montevideo Sandú Salto Vacas Conchas

LOAD

235

Montevideo Santa Fe Santa Fe

lime, wheat coal oranges coal empty

sloop Napoleón sloop Encarnación del Sur lighter N.S. del Carmen lighter Carmen lighter N.S. del Carmen sloop Dos Amigos sloop Dos Amigos sloop Dos Amigos lighter Santa Catalina sloop Carmen whaler Liguria lighter Elisabet lighter Elisabet lighter Elisabet lighter Elisabet lighter Carlos Juan sloop S. José y Ánimas sloop S. José y Ánimas boat Mercedes felucca Mercedes felucca Mercedes felucca of Marcela López (continued)

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Appendix

236 table a.9 (continued)

CAPTAIN Sanguineto, Juan Bautista

PORT OF ORIGIN

LOAD

BOAT

Montevideo

wood

lighter Ligero

Montevideo Montevideo Montevideo Salto Montevideo Montevideo Montevideo Gualeguaychú Gualeguaychú Gualeguaychú

wood wood wood leathers leathers iron wood coal, wood wood wood

Solari, Bernardo Solari, Evangelista Tortarola, Felipe

Salado Gualeguaychú Corrientes

empty leathers soles

Truco, Sebastián

Santa Fe Vacas

wheat passengers

Vacas

passengers

Vacas

passengers

Montevideo

wood

lighter Ligero lighter Ligero lighter Ligero lighter Ligero lighter Ligero lighter Mariposa boat Leandra boat Fransito boat Fransito boat Fransito de Goya boat Europa flatboat Patriota lighter S. José y Ánimas sloop Carmen whaler Buena Esperanza whaler Buena Esperanza whaler Buena Esperanza sloop Nuevo Destino

coal

lighter Dos Hermanos sloop Napolitana

Schiaffino, Andrés

Vico, Juan Bautista Vico, Pascual

Montevideo

Villa, Pedro

Mercedes

Source: AGNBA, X, 36-8-10.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes

Introduction 1 2 3 4

5

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

ASG, Camera di Commercio, 560; Raynal, L’Histoire philosophique, 4. Ibid., 23. Cuneo, Storia dell’emigrazione; Sergi, Historia de los Italianos. Candido, Los italianos en America del Sur; Candido, “Giuseppe Garibaldi sulla via del ritorno”; Candido, Giuseppe Garibaldi en el Río de la Plata; Candido, “L’azione mazziniana”; Candido, “La Giovine Italia”; Candido, “Le emigrazioni politiche.” See also Weiss, “Voci d’esuli”; Galante Garrone, “L’emigrazione politica”; Dore, La democrazia italiana; Marani, El ideario mazziniano; Chiaramonte, “Risorgimento en el Río de la Plata”; Myers, “Giuseppe Mazzini.” AST, Consolati nazionali, Montevideo, Mazzo 1, 1836–50, Picolet d’Hermillon a S.E. Le Comte Solar de la Marguerite Ministre des Relations Etrangéres, Buenos Aires, July 3, 1836; AST, Consolati Nazionali, Montevideo, Mazzo 1, 1836–50, Gaetano Gavazzo a S.E. Conte Solaro della Margarita Ministro degli Affari Esteri, no. 14, Montevideo, December 4, 1841. See for example Baily, “La cadena migratoria”; Devoto, Le migrazioni italiane, 46–77; Baily, “Cadenas migratorias.” Romano, “Il lungo cammino.” Cuneo, Storia dell’emigrazione, 10–1. See also De Rosa, “L’emigrazione italiana,” 74–5. Chiaramonte, Mercaderes del Litoral; Vangelista, “Traders and workers”; Tarragó, De la orilla. Devoto, “Liguri nell’America australe,” 653–7. See also Devoto, “¿Inventando a los italianos?” A mention of the Ligurian emigration from Cadiz to South America can be found in Giuliani Balestrino, L’Argentina degli italiani, chap. 3. Braudel, I tempi del mondo, 145. Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese. For an overview, see also Scammel, The World Encompassed, chap. 4. 237

Published online by Cambridge University Press

238 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

42 43 44 45 46

47

Notes to pp. 5–13

De Maddalena and Kellenbenz, eds., La repubblica internazionale. Pistarino, I Signori del Mare. Basso, Genova: un impero. Abulafia, “Gli italiani fuori d’Italia,” 186–7. See also Balletto, Genova, Mediterraneo; and Balard, Le mer Noire. Airaldi, Modelli coloniali, 200–1. Lopez, Storia delle colonie. Balard, “Le système portuarie.” Verlinden, “Italian influence”; Pistarino, I Signori del Mare, 398. Vicens Vives, An Economic History, 336. Abulafia, Gli italiani fuori d’Italia, 176; Grendi, La Repubblica aristocratica, 19; Doria, “Conoscenza del mercato,” 106–15. Diccionario de la lengua castellana, en que se explica; Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, 16. Mauro, “Merchant communities.” Cohen, “Cultural strategies,” 267. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade. See e.g., Balard and Ducellier, eds., Migrations et Diasporas; Levi, The Indian Diaspora; Wray, “The seventeenth century Japanese Diaspora.” Reid, “Diaspora networks,”353–8; Plüss, “Globalizing ethnicity.” Clarence Smith, “Middle Eastern entrepreneurs.” Ibid. Betta, “The trade diaspora.” Fusaro, “Coping with transition.” Pepelasis Minoglou, “Toward a typology.” Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers. Vassallo, Corsairing to Commerce. Vassallo, “Maltese entrepreneurial networks.” See e.g. Chaudhury, Trade and Civilization, and North, Institutions, Institutional Change. Grief, Institutions and the Path. ASV, Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia, Prima Serie, b. 795, Anselmo Perelli, Lisbon, September 6, 1780. Nunn, Foreign Immigrants, 121–47, 195 (note 84); García Estrada, “La condición del extranjero,” 95, 119, 122–5; Schurz, This New World, 348. For the case of colonial Peru, see Campbell, “The foreigners,” 153–63; Patrucco Nuñez-Carvallo, “Inserción italiana”; Lévano Medina, “La inserción comercial”; Bonfiglio, Gli italiani, 16. Bailyn, Atlantic History. Thornton, Africa and Africans. Meinig, The Shaping of America, 64–5. Games, “Atlantic history.” Pietschmann, “Historia del sistema atlántico.” See also Postma and Enthoven, eds., Riches from Atlantic Commerce; Klooster, Illicit Riches; Israel, Diaspora within a Diaspora; Studnicki-Gizbert, A Nation Upon the Ocean Sea; Kagan and Morgan, eds., Atlantic Diasporas; Power, “Beyond kinship.” See e.g., Moutoukias, Contrabando y control; and Ramos, El contrabando inglés. As for the penetration of foreign traders into the British empire

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 13–23

48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55

56 57 58

59

60

61 62 63 64

239

emporiums, see the bibliography included in Bailyn, Atlantic History, 89–90. See also García Fernández, Comerciando con el enemigo. Elliott, “Atlantic history,”254; Pietschmann, Atlantic History. Bailyn, “The idea of Atlantic,” 33. Hancock, “The British Atlantic,” 107–25. Pietschmann, Atlantic History, 39 ff. Martínez Shaw and Oliva Melgar, El sistema atlántico, 12. Rahn Phillips, “The Iberian Atlantic”; Rahn Phillips, “The growth and composition”; Andrien, “The Spanish Atlantic.” Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, 86. Chaunu, Séville et l’Amerique; Oliva Melgar, El monopolio. For further discussion on the structural limits of the Spanish mercantilism, see Grafe, “Polycentric States.” Ruiz Martín, Las finanzas de la monarquía. Van Der Wee, “Structural changes.” On the British case, see Bowen, Elites, Enterprise, and the bibliography suggested in Armitage and Braddick, The British Atlantic, 355–6. On the Dutch case, see Israel, Conflicts of Empires; Emmer and Klooster, “The Dutch Atlantic.” See e.g. Malamud Rikles, Cádiz y Saint Malo; Butel, “France, the Antilles”; Priotti and Saupin, dirs., Le commerce atlantique; Dubois, “The French Atlantic”; Pritchard, In Search of Empire; Rossignol, French Atlantic; Marzagalli, “The French Atlantic.” For a recent analysis on the importance of legal framework in influencing the strategies of foreign merchants in the eighteenth-century British Atlantic, Schulte Beerbühl, Forgotten Majority. ASV, Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia, Prima Serie, b. 795, Anselmo Perelli, Lisbon, September 6, 1780. Elliott, “Atlantic history,” 259. Armitage, “Three concepts.” Hancock, “The British Atlantic,” 120. Chapter 1

1 Pistarino, “Presenze ed influenze”; González Jiménez, “Genoveses en Sevilla.” 2 Sancho de Sopranis, Los Genoveses en Cádiz; Sancho de Sopranis, “Los genoveses en la región.” See also Verlinden, “Italian Influence”; and Boscolo, “Gli insediamenti genovesi.” 3 Otte, “Il ruolo dei genovesi.” 4 Pérez-Mallaína, Spain’s Men, 1–4. 5 Pike, Enterprise and Adventure, 377, and Collado Villalta, “La nación genovesa.” 6 Ruiz Martín, “Los hombres de negocios”; Pacini, “I presupposti politici,” 372–6. 7 Carande, Carlos V; Ruiz Martín, “Las finanzas españolas”; Ruiz Martín, “La banca genovesa”; Herrero Sánchez, “Génova y el sistema imperial,”538–9. For an overview, see Ruiz Martín, El Banco de España.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

240

Notes to pp. 23–27

8 Braudel, “Endet das Jahrhundert der Genuensen.”Sanz Ayán, “Presencia y fortuna.” 9 On the Dutch maritime trade, see Israel, Dutch Supremacy; and Israel, Conflict of Empires. On the financial relations between the Spanish monarchy and the Dutch, see Sanz Ayán, “Asenistas holandeses”; and Sanz Ayán, “Negociadores y capitales.” 10 Sanz Ayán, Los banqueros de Carlos II; Sanz Ayán, “El crédito de la Corona.” 11 On Genoa’s commercial policy in the seventeenth century, see Giacchero, Il Seicento e le Compere; Pressotto, “Da Genova alle Indie.” 12 Costantini, La Repubblica di Genova nell’età moderna, 316–18. 13 Ibid., 301 ff. See also Kirk, Genoa and the Sea, 130–3. For a consideration of Genoa’s naval policy within the Genoese patriciate, see Bitossi, Il governo dei Magnifici. 14 Everaert, De internationale en Koloniale Handel, 277–82. 15 Bernal, Financiación de la Carrera; Oliva Melgar, “El imperio económico.” 16 For a summary of swindling in the Carrera de Indias, see Oliva Melgar, El monopolio de las Indias, 59 ff. 17 García-Baquero González, “Extranjeros en el tráfico.” 18 However, especially during Philip IV’s reign, legal restrictions did not prevent unorthodox use of naturalization, which was often granted even to those who did not meet the criteria, Domínguez Ortiz, “La concesión de naturaleza.” 19 In 1565, Philip II stated that all those born in the Spanish kingdoms either to Spanish native parents (at least the father) or to foreigners who had lived in Spain for at least ten years should be considered naturales. 20 Herrero Sánchez, El acercamiento Hispano-Neerlandés. See also Felloni, “Il ceto dirigente,” 1338. 21 Álvarez Nogal, Los banqueros de Felipe IV, 52. 22 De La Concepción, Emporio de el Orbe. 23 Girard, Le commerce français, 594; Carrasco González, Comerciantes y casas. 24 Calcagno, “La navigazione convogliata.” 25 Ponce Cordones, “Dos siglos clave,” 427–8. 26 The Genoese were followed by Dutch and Flemish (twenty trade houses), Spanish (twelve), French (eleven), English (ten), and Hanseatic (seven), Bustos Rodríguez, “Población, sociedad,” 83 ff. See also Ravina Martín, “Un padrón de contribuyentes.” 27 Herrero Sánchez, El acercamiento Hispano-Neerlandés, 310–11. Such data is substantially supported by H. Kamen’s works, which shows that Genoese goods (18.6%) were second only to French exports (30%) in the 1670 shipments bound for the Indias, Kamen, La España de Carlos II, 182. Morineau’s data on exportations to the Indias reveals that in 1686 Genoa was still attempting to bridge the growing gap with France’s exports (17,043,000 vs. 7,831,000 pounds), Morineau, Incroyables gazettes, 267. 28 In 1683, France’s envoy in Genoa, Pidou de Saint Olon remarked that “the populace . . . is employed in the silk, wool, and paper industries and makes a living by trading its wares to Spain, the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily . . . As a consequence, these people are fully Spanish, given that they would starve to death if they could not sell their goods to the Spanish Kingdoms and to the

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 27–32

29 30 31 32

33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

55 56

241

Indias in particular,” Giacchero, Storia economica, 55–6. On the relevance of the Spanish route for the Genoese maritime trade, see Grendi, “La Repubblica aristocratica,”326–7. Bustos Rodríguez, Cádiz en el sistema atlántico, 50–4. Crespo Solana, “Las reformas del comercio.” Braudel, I tempi del mondo, 140. Crespo Solana and Herrero Sánchez, coords., España y las 17 Provincias; Herrero Sánchez, “La quiebra del sistema”; Herrero Sánchez, El acercamiento Hispano-Neerlandés. Garibbo, La neutralità della Repubblica. Bitossi, “La Repubblica è vecchia,”421 ff. Giacchero, Storia economica, 76–87. Bulferetti and Costantini, Industria e Commercio, 222–30. Vitale, Breviario della storia di Genova, 423; Bitossi, “La Repubblica è vecchia,”295. Felloni, Investimenti finanziari; Bitossi, “L’antico regime,” 496. Giacchero, Storia economica, 107 ff.; Piccinno, L., “Economia marittima,” 61. Gatti, Navi e cantieri, 17. For more details see the bibliography suggested by Giuseppe Felloni in “La storiografia marittima.” Piccinno, “Economia marittima,” 195. On the limitations imposed by Genoa on minor ports, see Assereto, “Porti e scali minori.” Gatti, Navi e cantieri, 137; Giacchero, Storia economica, 117; Bulferetti and Costantini, Industria e Commercio, 273. Gatti, Navi e cantieri, 18. Ibid., 86. Bulferetti and Costantini, Industria e Commercio, 166. Gatti, Navi e cantieri, 95–114. Costantini, C., La repubblica di Genova, 164 ff. Giacchero, Storia economica, 115–6. Ibid., 115. Vitale, Breviario della storia di Genova, 440; Giacchero, Storia economica, 109; Lo Basso, “Il Sud dei Genovesi.” Bulferetti and Costantini, Industria e Commercio, 173; Blando, “Grano e mercanti”; Blando, Istituzioni e mercato. AHN, Estado, 4571 (2), Joseph de Uriondo al Conde de Floridablanca, Genoa, October 29, 1781; ASM, Atti di Governo, Commercio Parte Antica, 24, no. 453, Consulta del Magistrato Camerale di Milano, Milan, November 14, 1777. AHN, Estado, exp. 413, Comercio del azúcar de América y navegación a los mares de Levante. Bulferetti and Costantini, Industria e Commercio, 164 ff. Data on the destination port of ships sailing from Genoa during the same period attest similar ratios, Niephaus, Genua Seehandel, 387 ff. On the relevance of Iberian routes for Genoese shipping during the eighteenth century, see Baudi di Vesme, “Genova e il Mediterraneo.”

Published online by Cambridge University Press

242

Notes to pp. 32–36

57 AHN, Estado, 4570 (2), San Ildefonso, September 10, 1785. 58 AHN, Estado, 4571 (1), D. Cayetano de Arpe al Ex. mo Sr. Joseph de Carvajal, Genoa, August 9, 1750. 59 Among them, the most active was Geronimo Bagnasco. 60 AHN, Estado, 4571 (1), Notas de las embarcaciones Cathalanas . . . Genoa, February 27, 1750. 61 Bulferetti and Costantini, Industria e Commercio, 107. 62 ASG, AS, 2673, Montesisto, Cadiz, May 24, 1758. 63 AHN, Estado, 6186, no. 22, Sobre el uso fraudulento que hacen los genoveses de la bandera española en sus embarcaciones con prejuicio de nuestro comercio, Leonardo Javier de Terán y Negrete, Madrid, June 26, 1803. 64 AMN, 0739, ms. 2382/005, Informe de Joaquín Gutiérrez de Rubalcava a D. Antonio Valdés sobre la conveniencia e inconvenientes de conceder la nacionalización a siete patrones genoveses, la poca inclinación de la marinería andaluza a la navegación de la Costa de África . . . , Isla de León, May 4, 1790. 65 Ibid. 66 AHN, Estado, 6186, no. 22, Sobre el uso fraudulento que hacen los genoveses de la bandera española en sus embarcaciones con prejuicio de nuestro comercio, Juan Bautista Virio, Livorno, June 1, 1803. 67 Braudel, I tempi del mondo, 141. 68 Gatti, Navi e cantieri, 45–7. 69 Bulferetti and Costantini, Industria e Commercio, 250. 70 In some places, emigration – whether seasonal or not – affected the entire male working population, ibid., 215 ff. 71 See for example Franch Benavent, “La inmigración italiana.” 72 Maixé Altés, “La colonia genovesa”; and Maixé Altés, Comercio y Banca. 73 Franch Benavent, “Dinastías comerciales.” See also Millares Martínez, “Familias genovesas.” 74 Giménez López, Alicante en el siglo XVIII, 63–6; Villar García, “Extranjeros en Málaga,” 919; Gámez Amián, Comercio colonial; Hills, Rock of Contention; Jackson, The Rock of Gibraltarians; Pellegrini, Frammenti di storia. 75 For a first approach to the study of the Genoese presence in eighteenth-century Lisbon, see Brilli, Coping with Iberian monopolies. Regarding the first decades of the eighteenth century, some useful information can be found in Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers, 215–8. 76 Pellegrini, Il consolato genovese. 77 Only to mention the most recent and important, Weber, Deutsche Kaufleute; Crespo Solana, Entre Cádiz y los Países Bajos; García Fernández, Comunidad extranjera; Lario de Oñate, La colonia mercantil; Bartolomei, “La bourse et la vie.” Conversely, only an essay and a summary of the documents produced by the Republic’s consuls in the port deal with the Genoese case, Molina, “L’emigrazione Ligure”; Pellegrini, Serenissimi Signori. 78 Ponce Cordones, “Dos siglos clave,” 427–8. 79 Collado Villalta, “El impacto americano,”63. For a more accurate analysis of the fluctuations of local and, especially, foreign population, see Bustos Rodríguez, Cádiz en el sistema atlántico, 70–80, 106–19.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 36–41

243

80 AGI, Consulados, leg. 91, Estado de los Extranjeros que hay en Cádiz, Cadiz, August 29, 1791. 81 Iglesias Rodríguez, Una ciudad mercantil, 505. See also González Beltrán, “Extranjeros en el siglo XVIII.” 82 Molina, “L’emigrazione Ligure,” 326–7. 83 Consider the case of the Genoese colony of Pera, which in the fourteenth century had around 10,000 inhabitants; many were either of Ligurian or Italian descent and were integrated in all sectors of the local economy. The same principle also applied to politically less established settlements such as the Genoese community in Tunis, which in the thirteenth century included many permanent residents who fulfilled the needs of great transient merchants, Abulafia, “Gli italiani fuori d’Italia,” 185–6,193. 84 Molina, “L’emigrazione Ligure,” 320. 85 Ibid., 342. 86 Bernal, Financiación de la Carrera, 298. 87 Stein, “Un raudal de oro,” 221–2. 88 Bartolomei, “Identidad e integración”; Bartolomei, “Les relations entre les négociants.” 89 Attman, American Bullion, 25. 90 Bernal, Financiación de la Carrera, 314. See also Rahn Phillips, “The growth and composition.” 91 García-Baquero González, Andalucía y la Carrera. 92 It has been estimated that 44.6% of the silver produced in New Spain between 1767 and 1778 was illegally shipped to Europe by foreign merchants or via direct trade, Bernal, Financiación de la Carrera, 302. 93 García-Baquero González, Comercio colonial, 45–6. 94 Reglamento y Aranceles. 95 Fisher, “Imperial ‘free trade,’” 42. 96 For a comprehensive analysis of the effects of America’s economic growth on Spanish trade and economy, see Yun Casalilla, “The American empire.” 97 Herzog, Defining Nations, 7. 98 Permiso a los extrangeros católicos y amigos de la Corona para venir á exercitar sus oficios en estos Reynos, in Novísima Recopilación de las Leyes de España . . . Mandada a formar por el Señor Don Carlos IV, Libro VI, Título XI, Ley I, Impresa en Madrid, 1805, 165. 99 Se deroga la obligación de vivir veinte leguas tierra adentro, in Novísima Recopilación de las Leyes de España . . . Mandada a formar por el Señor Don Carlos IV, Libro VIII, Título XXIII, parte de la Ley VI, Impresa en Madrid, 1805. 100 As well as being barred from government offices and ecclesiastic benefits, foreigners could not be Corregidor, Gobernador, Alcalde Mayor, Regidor, Alcalde Depositario, Receptor, Escribano de Ayuntamiento and Corredor, ibid. 101 Herrero Sánchez, “Génova y el sistema imperial,” 538–9; Domínguez Ortiz, Los Extranjeros en la vida española, 305. 102 Fernández Díaz, ed., España en el siglo XVIII, 34.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

244

Notes to pp. 41–45

103 Circumstancias que deben concurrir en los extrangeros para considerarse por vecinos de estos Reynos, in Novísima Recopilación de las Leyes de España . . . Mandada a formar por el Señor Don Carlos IV, Libro VI, Título XI, Ley III, Impresa en Madrid, 1805, 166. 104 The plant was opened by Rafael Vicario Iñigo in 1789 and was located in Puerto de Santa María, Iglesias Rodríguez, Una ciudad mercantil, 222. 105 Calegari, La manifattura genovese, 61. 106 AHN, Estado, leg. 3215–1, no. 217, Fabrica de papel en el Puerto de Santa María, 1752. 107 ASG, AS, 2673, Montesisto, Cadiz, November 27, 1752. 108 Reglamento y Aranceles. 109 Llombart, Campomanes, economista, 274. 110 Libertad del arte de torcedores de seda en las personas de ambos sexos; y extincion del Gremio de ellos, in Novísima Recopilación de las Leyes de España . . . Mandada a formar por el Señor Don Carlos IV, Libro VIII, Título XXIII, ley XII, Cédula del Consejo de 29 de enero de 1793, Impresa en Madrid, 1805, 184. “In order to stamp out frauds, silk adulterations and all other possible abuses,” silk-twisting became accessible to everyone, that is, producers, laborers, and their families, both inside and outside their homes and silk fabrics. 111 AHPC, Not. Cádiz 1008, Poder para testar D. Jacome Procurante a D. Gaspar Procurante, Cadiz, April 18, 1736; AHPC, Not. Cádiz 3854, Testamento de D. Gaspar Procurante, Cadiz, August 2, 1786. 112 AMC, 5871. 113 Bustos Rodríguez, Cádiz en el sistema atlántico, 258. 114 Tinoco Rubiales, “Capital y crédito,”260–1, 313. 115 AGI, Consulados, Leg. 891, Juan Bautista Cheirasco y Vico, March 28, 1795. 116 Bustos Rodríguez, Cádiz en el sistema atlántico, 258. 117 AMC, Padrones, c. 4032, 1791. 118 AHPC, Not. El Puerto de Santa María 828, Testamento recíproco de José Pedemonte Lipiani, 1800, 252–7. 119 Ruiz Rivera, El Consulado de Cádiz, 133 ff. 120 Bustos Rodríguez, Cádiz en el sistema atlántico, 258; Iglesias Rodríguez, Una ciudad mercantil, 219–29. 121 ASG, AS, 2673, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, September 26, 1785. 122 ASG, AS, 2673, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, May 26, 1789. 123 Balmaceda, La contribución genovesa, 101. 124 Ibid. See also Martínez Shaw, Cataluña en la Carrera de Indias. 125 De la Lande, Voyage en Italie, 362, 367. 126 ASG, AS, 2673, Montesisto, Cadiz, November 27, 1752. 127 Alfonso Mola, “La Marina Mercante.” 128 During the same period, 598 ships were employed on Indias-bound expeditions. 129 García-Baquero González, Cádiz y el Atlántico, 105. 130 ASG, AS, 2673, Lorenzo Maria Grassi, Cadiz, July 30, 1720. The Genoese consular dispatches highlight that, at the end of the century, ships sales and purchases were still common practice in Spain, ASG, AS, 2673, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, October 23, 1791.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 45–48

245

131 In 1720, captains Lanfranco and Oneto sold two ships to the Intendente de General de Marina Patiño, ASG, AS, 2673, Lorenzo Maria Grassi, Cadiz, October 1, 1720. Four years later the Crown acquired from Oneto another vessel, ASG, AS, 2673, Gio. Dom. Pavia, Cadiz, May 2, 1724. 132 This was the case of Captain Juan Esteban Sanguineto, who in 1720 sold his ship to the Spanish Crown for 74,000 pesos and was asked to command it as an escort ship to the Spanish fleet of landing ships transporting infantry to New Spain, AMN, 0449, ms. 1456/006, Documentos relativos a la compra del navío genovés “N.ra Señora de la Asunción y S. Nicolás de Tolentino, 1720, 16–59. 133 There were twenty-nine ships flying the Republic’s flag and embedded into the military fleet set up in 1720 to free Ceuta from the siege by the troops of the Moroccan sultan Muley Ismael, AHN, Estado, 4571 (1), Estado de los navíos y embarcaciones que han servido en la expedición de África, Cadiz, July 28, 1721. 134 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 0048, Testamento de Domingo [Vallarino] Colombo, 1803. 135 AGI, Jueces de Arribadas, leg. 209A, Ordenes e informes sobre licencia de embarco, Cadiz, August 18, 1810. 136 Alfonso Mola, “La Marina Mercante.” 137 Fernández Díaz and Martínez Shaw, “Las revistas de inspección.” 138 In 1730, for example, the Crown entrusted commander Spinola to go to Genoa with 150 soldiers to receive on His Majesty’s behalf a ship purchased by captain Campanella and recruit as many seafarers as possible, ASG, AS, 2673, Prasca, Cadiz, January 17, 1730. 139 Ordenanza del Infante Almirante, Art. 5, 18 de octubre de 1737, in De Salas, Historia de la matrícula, 169. 140 López Miguel and Mirabet Cucala, “Institucionalización de la Matrícula.” 141 Reglamento y Aranceles. 142 Real Orden para que, a falta de marinería matriculada, se pueda admitir la que no lo esté, 30 de Septiembre de 1785, AGI, Consulados, leg. 97, Consulado de Cargadores a Indias. Secretaría (1720–1817). Impresos e documentos curiosos y varios, exp. 15. 143 In 1793, Antonio Valdés, General Captain of the Real Armada, explored with Marquis Spinola the possibility of recruiting Genoese sailors, AMN, 0071, ms. 0070/302, Carta de Antonio Valdés al comandante de los navíos San Felipe, San Leandro y fragata Santa Rosalía para que vaya a Génova, Aranjuez, May 30, 1793, 324; AMN, 0071, ms. 0074/001, Real orden comunicada por Antonio Valdés al comandante de los navíos San Felipe, San Leandro y fragata Santa Rosalía para que de Argel pase a Génova, May 30, 1793, 442. 144 AMC, 10656, Pruebas de Hidalguía de los S.res D. Benito y Bartolomé Patrón, Cadiz, 1789. 145 AMN, 0738, ms. 2381/051, Nueva exposición de Joaquín Gutiérrez de Rubalcava a D. Antonio Valdés sobre el estado deplorable de la matrícula con motivo de la dificultad que encuentra Benito Patrón, del comercio de Cádiz, para tripular las naves que se les autorizó a emplear para el tráfico de trigo con la costa de Marruecos, Isla de León, July 10, 1789, 314–7.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

246

Notes to pp. 48–54

146 Puestos de recoba que tienen los Genoveses, October 12, 1770, no. 1091, in Guillén Tato, Índice Sistemático, 52. 147 Observancia de la ley precedente prohibitiva de la vagancia de buhoneros en el Reyno, in Novísima Recopilación de las Leyes de España . . . Mandada a formar por el Señor Don Carlos IV, Libro IX, Título V, Ley XIII, Impresa en Madrid, 1805, 258. 148 Domicilio fixo de los buhoneros, y otros vagantes por los pueblos y ferias del Reyno, in Novísima Recopilación de las Leyes de España . . . Mandada a formar por el Señor Don Carlos IV, Libro IX, Título V, Ley VII, Impresa en Madrid, 1805, 257. 149 ASG, AS, 2673, Real Orden que el Sr. Conde de Floridablanca remite al Gov. or del Consejo, Cadiz, February 9, 1788. 150 Acuerdo sobre tiendas de comestibles de Montañeses, September 3, 1720, no. 11755, in Guillén Tato, Índice Sistemático, 633. 151 AMC, L. 10.130, 1774. 152 Ibid. 153 Real provisión pidiendo informe a las Ordenanzas para el mejor gobierno de los dueños de tiendas de comestibles, vinos y licores, bajo el nombre de Comunidad o Gremio, June 12, 1771, in Guillén Tato, Índice Sistemático, no. 11761, 634. 154 AMC, L. 10.130, 1774. 155 AMC, L. 10.130, Pedro Miguel de Agreda, Josef Antonio de Quevedo, Miguel Rodríguez de Cavassa, Agustín Villota, Josef Álvarez Campana, Cadiz, July 13, 1771. 156 AMC, L. 10.131, Ordenanzas dl Gremio de montañeses, 349 v. ff. 157 AMC, L. 10.131, Pedro de Bassoa, Francisco Fernández de Rávago, Phelipe Montes, Sebastián Herrero, Francisco Guerra de la Vega, Ordenanzas del Gremio de montañeses, Cadiz, June 9, 1775, 349 v. ff. 158 AMC, L. 10.131, D. Balthazar de los Reyes Henriques, D. Juan de Mora Morales, Cadiz, June 22, 1775, 349 v. ff. 159 AMC, L. 10.131, Francisco Guerra de la Vega, Cadiz, July 5, 1775, 349 v. ff. 160 Merchán Fernández, Gobierno municipal, 201–60. See also Artola, La Hacienda del Antiguo Régimen. 161 ASG, AS, 2673, Gaetano Merello, Cadiz, July 8, 1777. See also ASG, AS, 2673, Gaetano Merello, Cadiz, May 8, 1778. 162 ASG, AS, 2673, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, January 25, 1788. 163 Collado Villalta, “Los Consulados en el Cádiz,”247 ff. 164 ASG, AS, 2673, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, January 22, 1788. 165 ASG, AS, 2673, Real Orden que el Sr. Conde de Floridablanca remite al Gov.or del Consejo, Cadiz, February 9, 1788. 166 ASG, AS, 2673, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, February 12, 1788. 167 ASG, AS, 2673, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, July 4, 1788. 168 Crespo Solana and Montojo Montojo, “La Junta de Dependencias.” 169 Formación de matrículas de extrangeros residentes en estos Reynos con distinción de transuentes y domiciliados, in Novísima Recopilación, 170–1. 170 AMC, Padrones, c. 4032, 1791.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 54–58

247

171 Genoese mayordomo J.B. Copela, who was married to a fellow countrywoman, declared that he had just arrived from Buenos Aires, that he had been living in Spain for sixteen years, and that he resided in Cadiz. Genoese Domingo Vale (Viale?), who was also married to a fellow countrywoman, declared that he had been living in Spain for four years, that he had just returned from Havana on a Biscayan ship and that he had traveled several times to Cuba. Bachelor Josef Ausilia was a ship cook returning from Veracruz. Genoese Antonio Reveldino, a mercantile vessels’ boatswain, had been twenty-eight years in Spain, was married to a Genoese woman, and had just returned from Montevideo on a French ship; he declared that he lived in Puntales Extramuros (Cadiz) with his cousin José Reveldino, a bachelor who worked on ships and who had arrived in Cadiz from Hamburg thirty-eight days earlier: both had made several trips to America. 172 González Beltrán, “Legislación sobre extranjeros”; Pointreau, Les Espagnols de l’Auvergne, 238–40.

Chapter 2 1 In his 1692 “Ponderazioni sopra la contrattazione marittima,” Genoese jurist Carlo Targa was already reporting the increasing lack of written contracts. In particular, the commission contract (which did not entail the creation of a company but the payment to a courier of a fixed rate commission for each shipping) was replaced by other documents such as the account book, the expense account, the freight charge documentation, and the ship’s bill of lading, which the broker (often the ship’s captain) handed to the consignee and which attested transport, Maixé Altés, “Los instrumentos jurídicos,” 357 ff. 2 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 385: Protexto Juan Bautista Codevilla contra Pedro Balzá y otro, 1769, 213; Protexto Nicolás Rapallino contra Juan Bautista Rapallo, 1769, 339; Carta de pago de Juan Bautista Codevilla contra Francisco Scorich, 1769, 369; Carta de pago y cesión de acciones Benito Masnata contra Juan Bautista Codevilla, 1769, 419; Protexto Agustín Merello contra Antonio Maria Benvenuto, 1770, 14; Protexto Juan Bautista Jordán y Comp. contra Carlos María Dodero, 1770, 35; Protexto Nicolás Rapallino contra Gregorio Picasso, 1770, 55; Protexto Juan Bautista Jordán y Comp. contra Manuel de Tamariz, 1770, 81; Protexto Antonio Maria Benvenuto contra Agustín Tagliaferro, 1770, 330; Protexto Nicolás Rapallino contra Juan Jordán y Cia, 1770, 431; Protexto Thomás Ravina y Comp. contra Nicolás Gadett y Comp., 1770, 13; Protexto Thomás Ravina contra Carlos María Dodero, 1770, 321; Protexto Thomás Ravina y Comp. contra Carlos Maria Dodero, 1770, 285; Protexto Thomás Ravina contra Domingo Joseph Grassi, 1770, 338; Carta de Pago Thomás Ravina contra Nicolás Rapallino, 1770, 441. 3 Carrasco González, Corredores y Comercio, 135. The corredores were intermediaries who sought new purchasers for goods to be sent to the Indias, nominated agents, sourced available ships (sometimes they even traveled with the goods), and subscribed sea loans.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

248

Notes to pp. 58–58

4 This is the case of already-mentioned merchant-shipping magnate Domingo Colombo who, in 1769, received an interest-free loan of 8,700 pesos de plata antigua de 128 cuartos repayable in eighteen months, with the option of deferring payment for a further six months at a 0.5% interest rate, AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 385, Obligación Matheo Servelea contra Domingo Colombo, 1769, 256. 5 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 385, Poder Joseph Sigori a Joseph Fabiani, 1770, 379. 6 This is the case of Gerónimo Colombo; his wife (who refused to follow him to Spain) and his father-in-law, who owned a coral factory, lived in Genoa. In Colombo’s last will there is mention of another Genoese who had acted as a guarantor and of other many Genoese living in Genoa, Cadiz, and Cagliari, AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 5399, Testamento de Gerónimo Colombo Vallarino, 1815, 848–54. 7 Amongst many, one could cite the case of Benito Masnata, who arrived in Cadiz when he was 11 to work in the wholesale and retail businesses owned by his maternal uncles, Bartolomé and Josef Bolta. He remained with his uncles for sixteen years until their death in 1746 and received board lodging and a 50 pesos wage. In 1739 he married a woman from Cadiz, where he lived with his family and made his fortune as a wholesaler, AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 5561, Poder para testar de Benito Masnata Bolta, 1777, 327–32. Another case is that of the merchant of Cogorno Esteban Mosti, who settled in Spain at the beginning of the century with the help of his uncle Bernardo. After becoming independent, Esteban married a Cadiz-born woman and settled a company in the bay with his brother Antonio, who resided in Genoa, AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 1002, Poder para testar D. Antonio Mosti a D. Bernardo Mosti y otro, July 11, 1729, 319–20; AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 1002, Poder para testa reciproco entre d. Esteban Mosti y D.a María Azemar y a otro, October 27, 1730, 1013. 8 Still unmarried, in 1753 Andrés and Francisco María Picardo signed mutual proxies to each other to make their last wills and manage their trade company in Cadiz. In case they both died, they nominated their father Lorenzo as their sole heir and entrusted trader Antonio María Bucheli, a vecino of Cadiz whom they fully trusted, to liquidate the business, AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 5748, Poder recíproco para testar entre Francisco María y Andrés Picardo, 1753, 144–6. 9 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 2460, Poder recíproco para testar Pasqual y Nicolás Rapalin hermanos, 1765, 444–7; AHPC, Not. Cádiz 474, Inventario y tasación de los bienes que han quedado por fallecimiento de D. Benito Picardo (mayor) y su esposa D.a María Antonia Picardo y Arado, 1832. 10 Wealthy dealer Nicolás Recaño owned a wholesale outlet near Plazuela de Las Nieves, which he entrusted to Josef Facia and Diego Muraglia, whom he had expressly sent for from Genoa and with whom he formed a venture in which he was the majority shareholder, AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 385, Carta de pago Joseph Recaño contra Joseph Facia, 1769, 320. In 1764, already-mentioned dealer Domingo Colombo lent 1,000 pesos escudos to shopkeeper Miguel Ángel Bocardo, who mortgaged his grocery shop in Plazuela de Las Nieves as a collateral. The nine-month repayable loan was repaid six years later, AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 385, Carta de pago Miguel Ángel Bocardo contra Domingo Colombo, 1770, 256.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 58–61

249

11 ASG, AS, 2673, Montesisto, Cadiz, December 13, 1758. 12 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 385, Poder de Antonio Benvenuto a Lorenzo Oliveros, 1769, 155 ff. 13 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 383, Poder para testar de Domingo Colombo Vallarino y Clara Sturla, 1765, 165–7. 14 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 385, Testamento de Domingo Colombo Vallarino, 1770, 382–3. 15 In 1769 one A. Montobio, almost certainly a relative of Nicolás’, features as creditor of a riesgo maritimo for an Indias-bound expedition, Bernal, Financiación de la Carrera, 687. 16 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 5792, Testamento de Ángel Gazzino, 1798. 17 The register of the Banco di San Giorgio attests the existence in 1762 Genoa of the venture established by Ambrogio Gazzino and his son and of other trade companies, including those of Michelangelo and Giovanni Montobbio, who had been active at least since 1786, Niephaus, Genua Seehandel, 419, 425. 18 Carrasco González, Corredores y Comercio, 121–2. 19 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, c. 5794, 1800. 20 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, c. 5799, 1805. 21 Fernández Pérez, El rostro familiar. 22 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 467, 1829. 23 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 5794, 1800; AHPC, Not. Cádiz, leg. 443, 1816. 24 Gazzino features amongst the Cadiz traders registered with the Carrera de Indias from 1829 until at least 1831, AGI, Consulados, leg. 895 Bis, 1829; Guía General de los forasteros de Cádiz para el año de 1817; Guía General de los forasteros de Cádiz para el año de 1830; Guía General de los forasteros de Cádiz para el año de 1831. 25 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 66, Poder para testar de Nicolás Ravina, 1727, 338. 26 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 404, Poder para testar de Thomás Ravina, July 22, 1793, 733–6. Their activity on the Genoa marketplace is attested by the registers of the Banco di San Giorgio, where the houses of trade run by Niccolò Pietro Ravina and Pietro and Angelo Ravina are listed in 1762 and 1786 respectively, Niephaus, Genua Seehandel, 421, 426. The company was founded in Genoa by Nicolás, Tommaso’s father, and by his uncle Pietro, AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 385, Poder Thomás Ravina y otros a Hipolito Ravina y otro, 1770, 209–10, Cadiz, July 6, 1770. 27 Juan Bautista Sciaccaluga’s house of trade in Genoa is also listed in 1762 and 1786, Niephaus, Genua Seehandel, 421, 426. 28 Giolfi and Crosa feature as witnesses in the proxy written by Ravina on his deathbed, whilst Sciaccaluga and Lubé are listed as executors alongside Ravina’s wife, Juana Antonia Bozo, ibid. 29 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 385, Dos riesgos Thomás Ravina y Comp. contra el capitán Juan Segui, 1770, 29–30. 30 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 405, Testamento en virtud de Poder de D. Thomás Ravina, Cádiz, 1793-II, 829–36. 31 ASG, AS, 2673, Cadiz, October 31, 1801. 32 AGI, Consulados, L. 447, 442 ff.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

250

Notes to pp. 61–64

33 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, c. 469, Poder Thomás Ravina a Juan Antonio Ravina, 1830-I. 34 Niephaus, Genua Seehandel, 424. 35 AGI, Consulados, L. 445. 36 AGI, Consulados, L. 447, 442 ff. 37 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 385, Riesgo Antonio Jordán contra Joseph Jordán y Comp., Cadiz, 1769, 85 ff. 38 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 385, Riesgo Joseph Jordán y Comp. contra Antonio Berazar, Cadiz, November 16, 1770, 357–8. 39 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 385, Poder Antonio Maria Vaccarezza a la Comp. Jordán y otro, Cadiz, February 10, 1769, 65–8; AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 385, Obligación Juan Bautista Jordán y Cia contra Antonio Maria Vaccarezza, Cadiz, February 10, 1769, 69. 40 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 385, Substitución Feliz Jordán y Comp. a Juan de Mata Martínez y otros, Cadiz, August 24, 1770, 261. 41 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 385, Poder Juan Bautista Jordán y Comp. a Juan Bautista Causa, Cadiz, May 1, 1770, 175–6; AHPC, Not. Cádiz 385, Protexto Juan Bautista Jordán y Comp. contra Juan Lopez de Pozo, Cadiz, June 12, 1770, 192. 42 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 385, Poder de Juan Bautista Jordán y otros a Joseph Mourere, Cadiz, January 9, 1770, 4. 43 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 383, Poder para testar de Juan Bautista Jordán, Cadiz, 1765, 162–4. 44 In 1735, Juan Bautista Jordán features as an employee in the last will and testament of marquis Bernardo Recaño, AHPC, Not. San Fernando, 13, Testamento de Bernardo Recaño Murcia, Marqués de Casa Recaño, 1735, 8–26. In 1758 the Marquis’s homonymous cousin signed a proxy that entrusted Jordán to collect capitals invested in the Banco di Venezia, AHPC, Not. San Fernando, 20, Testamento de D. Bernardo Recaño Carmañola, Marqués de Casa Recaño, 1758, 3–6. 45 AHPC, Not. Cádiz 412, Poder para testar de Domingo Antonio Jordán a D. Pablo Luis Jordán y otros, Cádiz, 1800. 46 AMC, L. 10.151, Don Francisco Montes, Tesoreria Mayor de S.M., Madrid, June 10, 1794. 47 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 1792 (I), leg. 1688, Testamento de D. Juan Bautista Marzán. The family’s whole story is included in this exceptionally detailed document, which was borne from Marzán’s need to delineate the loans he made to his sons, in order to bypass the limitations imposed by Spain’s equitable inheritance law and keep intact the family’s commercial assets. 48 Bernal, Financiación de la Carrera, 685. 49 AGI, Contratación, 5534, no. 2, R. 12. 50 AMC, L. 10.151, Don Francisco Montes, Tesorería Mayor de S.M., Madrid, June 10, 1794. 51 Guía General de los forasteros de Cádiz para el año de 1817. 52 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 5767, Poder para testar de D. Tomás Eustaquio Ardizone a D. Joseph Ardizone y otros, Cadiz, May 8, 1773, 668–71. 53 ASG, AS, 2673, Pro Memoria, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, n.d. [1787].

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 64–67

251

54 See, for example, the debate started by Gian Francesco Doria with his 1750 manual for the upbringing of young patricians Del modo di rimediare . . . , in Bitossi, “La Repubblica è vecchia,” 63, 436. 55 ASG, AS, 2673, Lorenzo Grassi, Cadiz, February 7, 1703. 56 Ibid. 57 For an analysis of the events that led to the interdiction of the jenízaros, see Bustos Rodríguez, “Comerciantes españoles.” 58 For a careful analysis of the conflict, see García-Mauriño Mundi, La pugna entre el Consulado, 58–70. 59 “The Consejo de Indias of Madrid has ordered this Consulate to prevent all those born in Spain to foreign fathers from boarding the aforementioned ships in light of the controversy promoted by native Spaniards, who are seeking sole access to similar voyages and commanderies. However, none of the jenízaros who were due to travel was left ashore and rumor has it that the First Consul was arrested for not stopping them,” ASG, AS, 2673, Pietro Francesco Rivarola Vice Console, Cadiz, November 29, 1722. See also García-Mauriño Mundi, La pugna entre el Consulado, 143–96. 60 García-Baquero González, “Extranjeros en el tráfico.” 61 The Pallavicinos, one of the most powerful aristocratic families in Genoa, invested in trade with America through the intermediation of Cristoforo Maria Prasca and Bernardo Recaño. The merchant letters they interchanged in these years are conserved in ADGG, Pallavicini, Ramo Cadetto, 99, 105, and 106, Cadice. Although he had no legal access to the Carrera de Indias, in 1729 Prasca obtained a “secret license” to ship foreign goods to America by virtue of his “good friendship” with José Patiño, ADGG, Pallavicini, Ramo Cadetto, 99, Cadice, Cristoforo Maria Prasca a Paolo Gerolamo Pallavicino, March 2 and November 23, 1729. Bernardo Recaño bought the title of marquis in Spain and was appointed regidor perpetuo (councilor for life) of Cadiz. With these credentials, he acted as the main agent of the Pallavicinos until 1734, when he went bankrupt due to a wrong financial investment. Before abandoning his business, Recaño ensured Gerolamo Paolo Pallavicino that he had made disappear any trace of his transactions in America and suggested him to collaborate with Juan Bautista Eustaquio Pedemonte, another prosperous Genoese merchant of Cadiz, ADGG, Pallavicini, Ramo Cadetto, 105, Cadice, Bernardo Recaño a Paolo Gerolamo Pallavicino, November 31, 1734 and May 17, 1735. More details on Prasca are provided in this chapter. As for Recaño, see Carrasco González, Comerciantes y casas, 16, 30, 38, 104–7. 62 This is the case of Juan Andrés Cambiazo and sons’ company, which, in 1735, shipped five crates of silk stockings worth more than 5,000 pesos from Genoa to a Spanish figurehead named Juan de Lao Martínez, who was to embark the cargo on a Veracruz-bound fleet and trade it at the Jalapa fair. Fourteen years later, the sons of departed Juan Andrés still sought to collect the proceeds of that operation, ACCS, Fondo Consulado Nuevo de Sevilla, leg. 52, Autos formados por Pedro Andrés Cambiazo, vecino de Génova, contra Juan de Lao Martínez, vecino de Sevilla, comerciante, para el cobro de 5.645 pesos procedentes de la compraventa de géneros, 1749.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

252 63 64 65 66

67

68 69 70 71 72

73

74

75 76

77 78 79

80

Notes to pp. 67–70

Bustos Rodríguez, Cádiz en el sistema, 166–72. ASG, AS, 2673, Prasca, Cadiz, May 2, 1740. Ibid. Such as Joseph Ferrari, Juan Bautista Pedemonte, Juan Patrón, Joseph Guersi, Joseph de Guisasola, Joseph Burlando (naturalized merchant), Beloni y Mori, and José María Enrile, AGI, Consulados, leg. 700; and AGI, Consulados, leg. 701. Polizas depositadas en el tesorero Juan de Garay, sobre un empréstito de 1740, que se remiten para entregar en el Consejo, 1762. Geronimo Delfino, Joseph Grimaldo, Joseph Casoni, Juan Patrón, Tomás Miconi, Theresa Durazo, Eustaquio Pedemonte, Esteban and Antonio Mosti, and Antonio Jordán, AGI, Consulados, leg. 700, and AGI, Consulados, leg. 701, Polizas depositadas en el tesorero Juan de Garay, sobre un empréstito de 1740, que se remiten para entregar en el Consejo, 1762. This was the case of Tomás Miconi and Juan Bautista Pedemonte, AGI, Consulados, leg. 700. Oliva Melgar, “Pacto fiscal”; Oliva Melgar, “La participaciónextranjera”; Bernal, Financiación de la Carrera, 307–10. Kuethe, “El fin del monopolio.” García-Baquero González, “Extranjeros en el tráfico.” Ruiz Rivera, El Consulado de Cádiz, 66–73. Out of a total of forty-seven merchants roughly labeled as being “Italian,” thirty-nine were Genoese. Their Genoese origin has been established by consulting the last will and testament database stored in the Archivo Histórico Provincial de Cádiz. These rights were clearly specified in the cartas de naturaleza, AGI, Consulados, L. 445, Lista de las tomas derazón, o copias de las Reales Cédulas de naturaleza de estos Reynos para comerciar en las Indias, a varios extranjeros con las ampliaciones y limitaciones que en ellas se expresan, desde el año 1700 a 1787. The Spanish women were fifteen, the Genoese women born in Spain were fifteen, and non-Genoese foreign women living in the port were four. The remainders were women who were born in the republic of Genoa (seven) or women whose birthplace is unknown (seven), Brilli, “Importancia de hacerse español.” Ibid. Most of the sixteen identified merchants were Genoese (nine), followed by traders from Great Britain (two), Ireland (one), Gibraltar (one), Switzerland, and other unspecified countries (two). Genoese merchants included José María Enrile, Juan Andrés Prasca, Carlos Malagamba, Alejandro Risso, Juan Bautista Codevilla, Luis de Rivera, Juan Bautista Corletto, Benito Patrón, Francisco Bordas, Benito Picardo and his nephew Benito Picardo, Alfonso Mola, “Los navieros naturalizados.” Ibid. ASG, AS, 2673, Prasca, Cadiz, May 20, 1726. AMC, L. 10.110, Real Despacho de naturaleza de estos Reynos a favor de Juan Andrés Prasca, 17 agosto 1754; AGI, Consulados, L. 445, Lista de las tomas de razón, o copias de Reales Cédulas de naturaleza de estos Reynos para comerciar en los de Indias, a varios extranjeros con las ampliaciones y limitaciones que en ellas se expresan, desde el año 1700 a 1787. ASG, AS, 2673, Prasca, Cadiz, May 20, 1726.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 70–72

253

81 AMC, 5871. Pedemonte’s economic power and social standing within the Genoese community of Cadiz is attested by the fact that his name opens the 1764 list of those registered with the Republic’s consulate (Table A.6). Eustachio’s relative Juan Bautista Pedemonte was granted access to the Consulado of Cadiz in 1769 to legally participate in the Carrera de Indias, AGI, Consulados, L. 447, 442 ff. From 1765 to at least 1778, the escrituras de riesgo signed by him attest large investment to finance the fleet employed on routes to the Indias, Bernal, Financiación de la Carrera, 692. 82 ASG, AS, 2673, Prasca, Cadiz, May 20, 1726. See also ADGG, Pallavicini, Ramo Cadetto, 106, Cadice, 1736 and ADGG, Pallavicini, Ramo Cadetto, 109, Cadice, 1740–2. 83 Bitossi, “La Repubblica è vecchia,” 307–8. 84 AGI, Consulados, L. 445, Juan Andrés Prasca, 1774, 338–45. 85 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 5747, Poder General de D. Juan Andrés Prasca a D. Juan Prasca, Cadiz, July 1, 1752, 330–1. 86 AMC, L. 10.110, Real Despacho de naturaleza de estos Reynos a favor de D. Juan Andrés Prasca, August 17, 1754. 87 Puncuh, Storia di Genova, 370. 88 Bitossi, “La Repubblica è vecchia,” 307–8. 89 Ruiz Rivera, El Consulado de Cádiz, 133 ff. 90 AGI, Consulados, L. 445, Juan Andrés Prasca, 1774, 338–45. 91 Alfonso Mola, “Los navieros naturalizados,” 215. 92 In the flotas set up in 1776, 1778, 1782, and 1785 Prasca invested 346, 245, 79, 932, 27, 737, and 21,557 pesos respectively, Bernal, Financiación de la Carrera, 664. 93 Bustos Rodríguez, Cádiz en el sistema, 353. 94 Another of Prasca’s nephews – Giuseppe – stayed in Cadiz to collaborate with him, ASG, AS, 2673, Gherardi, Cadiz, October 23, 1791. 95 Dumonteil, Oloron-Sainte-Marie, 37. 96 Following the death of Count d’Arboré, the firm was dissolved in 1792 and Prasca resumed its mercantile business by trading with the firm’s old clients, ADGG, Pallavicini, Ramo Primogenito, 272, Cadice (1790–4), Prasca Arboré, July 1, 1792. 97 ADGG, Pallavicini, Ramo Primogenito, 267–272 (1784–92), Cadice; ADGG, Pallavicini, Ramo Cadetto, 274 (1783–85), Cadice. 98 Bustos Rodríguez, Cádiz en el sistema, 280. 99 García-Baquero González, Comercio colonial, 91–2. 100 Felloni, “Ceto dirigente,” 1326–7. 101 Bustos Rodríguez, Cádiz en el sistema, 251. 102 AGI, Consulados, L. 445. 103 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 4497, Testamento de D. Tomas Miconi Cambiazo, Marqués de Méritos, 1759, 1059–64. 104 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 1869, Testamento en virtud de Poder de D. Joseph Montesisto otorgado por Mathias de Landaburu, July 7, 1779. 105 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 2189, Testamento de José María Enrile, Cadiz, March 12, 1776, 267–78. 106 AGI, Consulados, L. 445, Joseph María Enrile, 1771, 311–9.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

254

Notes to pp. 72–75

107 Torres Ramírez, La Compañía Gaditana. 108 AMC, L. 10.119, Vecindad a favor de D. Gerónimo María Enrile, August 1, 1763. 109 AGI, Contratación, 5518, no. 2, 11, Jerónimo Enrile Guerra [Guersi], Cadiz, May 17, 1773. 110 AGI, Estado, 52, no.7, María de la Paz Enrile, San Lorenzo, Santa Fe, July 19, 1794. 111 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 2189, Testamento de Joseph María Enrile, Cadiz, March 12, 1776, 267–78. 112 AGI, Títulos de Castilla, 2, 23, Marqués de Casa Enrile, Isla de Cuba, July 11, 1778. 113 AGI, Estado, 16. no. 4, Carta del Marqués de Casa Peñalver, Havana, November 27, 1794. 114 AGI, Estado, 64, no. 34, Pascual Enrile [Comandante General del Ejército Expedicionario de Costa Firme]sobre asuntos de Venezuela y Nueva Granada, Pamplona, September 24, 1818; Guía de forasteros en Filipinas, 60. 115 AHPC, Not. Cádiz 3848, Poder para testar de D. Benito Patrón Pichardo, 1783, 344–7. 116 AMN, 0739, ms. 2382/005, Informe de Joaquín Gutiérrez de Rubalcava a D. Antonio Valdés sobre la conveniencia . . . , Isla de León, May 4, 1790. 117 Alfonso Mola, “Los navieros naturalizados.” 118 AMC, 10656, Pruebas de Hidalguía de los S.res D. Benito y Bartolomé Patrón, Cadiz, 1789. 119 Alfonso Mola, “Los navieros naturalizados.” 120 AGI, Consulados, leg. 929; AGI, Gobierno, Buenos Aires, leg. 589, Al Exmo. D. Francisco de Saavedra, Cadiz, March 5, 1809. 121 AGI, Consulados, leg. 893; AHPC, Not. Cádiz, c. 454, Poder para testar D. Benito Patrón a Félix Parodi, 1822. 122 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 48, Testamento de Domingo [Vallarino] Colombo, 1803, 262–336. 123 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 439, Liquidación y partición del caudal y bienes quedados por fallecimiento de D. Juan Bap.ta Codevilla, 1813, 78–9. 124 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 474, Inventario y tasación de los bienes que han quedado por fallecimiento de D. Benito Picardo (mayor) y su esposa D.a María Antonia Bonosa de Mondragón: de Antonio María Picardo y Arado: y de D. Benito Picardo y Arado y su consorte D.a Manuela María Picardo, 1832. 125 Petti Balbi, Negoziare fuori patria, 4. 126 Ibid., 5. 127 Diccionario de la lengua castellana compuesto. For an overview on the history of foreign nations in the early modern Spanish monarchy, see Recio Morales and Glesener, coords. “Los extranjeros y la Nación en España y la América española.” On the origins and evolution of the consular institution, see Ulbert and Le Bouëdec, eds., La fonction consulaire; Aglietti, L’istituto consolare; Aglietti, Herrero Sánchez, and Zamora Rodríguez, coords., Cónsules de extranjeros; Marzagalli, Ghazali, and Windler, dirs., Les consuls en Méditerranée. 128 Collado Villalta, “Los Consulados,” 245 ff.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 75–78

255

129 Ibid. 130 ASG, AS, 2673, Lorenzo Grassi, Cadiz, n. d. [1705]. 131 Juan Presenti y López Toñarejos was born in Genoa and descended from a noble family who had moved in Cadiz in the mid-seventeenth century. In 1681, he was made Marquis of Monte-Corto. He was Regidor de Preeminencia and held the office of Juez Veedor of the Real Contrabando in Cadiz. It is unclear when he died but his last testament is dated 1726, De Santa Cruz y Mallén, Historia de familias cubanas, 317–19. AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 5077, Testamento recíproco de Juan Presenti, 1724, 284–9; AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 5078, Codicilo del testamento de Juan Presenti, 1726, 127. 132 ASG, AS, 2673, Lorenzo Maria Grassi, Cadiz, June 7, 1711. 133 Molina, “L’emigrazione Ligure,” 300. Some chronicles report that the chapel also served as a warehouse for smuggled goods, Ravina Martín, “Mármoles Genoveses.” 134 Crespo Solana, “Nación extranjera”; Anton Solé, Situación económica. 135 ASG, AS, 2673, Lorenzo Maria Grassi, Cadiz, June 6, 1714. 136 ASG, AS, 2673, Gio. Dom.o Pavia, Cadiz, May 29, 1724. 137 ASG, AS, 2673, Prasca, Cadice, May 20, 1726. 138 ASG, AS, 2673, Lorenzo Grassi, Cadiz, March 1, 1705. For other instances of contraband and flag changes, see also ASG, AS, 2673, Lorenzo Grassi, Cadiz, March 9, 1703 and September 24, 1713. 139 ASG, AS, 2673, Lorenzo Maria Grassi, Cadiz, July 30, 1720. 140 ASG, AS, 2673, Prasca, Cadiz, May 20, 1726. 141 In one of his reports, Genoese consul Montesisto specified that it was not merely a form of corruption but a veritable public ceremony, which went under the name of “recognition of the nations” and which had long been established by foreign merchants themselves. On the day of the Epiphany – in the presence of Alcalde Mayor and his staff – consuls of all the nations gathered before the Governor of Cadiz and offered him money to become their warranty judge. Montesisto also noted that the Crown appointed as Governors individuals who deserved to be rewarded and repaid for all the heavy expenses they had incurred in their former roles. Thus, although not compulsory, the payment of the aguinaldo was part and parcel of the reward connected to the office and – as a result – Governors claimed it to as a right. As Montesisto concluded, the political value of the practice was such that “not even the Flemish nation has ever been denied payment, despite not being considered to be foreign.” Around 1755, the annual payment was 700 current pieces of ligurde, ASG, AS, 2673, Montesisto, Cadiz, n.d. [1755?]. 142 ASG, AS, 2673, Prasca, Cadiz, May 20, 1726. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid. 146 ASG, AS, 2673, Prasca, Cadiz, May 7, 1725. 147 ASG, AS, 2673, Prasca, Cadiz, May 20, 1726. 148 Collado Villalta, “La nación genovesa”; as for the Kingdom of Naples, see Galasso, Economia e società, 228.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

256

Notes to pp. 79–82

149 ASG, AS, 2673, Prasca, Cadiz, May 20, 1726. 150 Despite the suspension of trade with Genoa, illicit commerce did not cease altogether. In order to at least contain the scandal, Montesisto had the Genoese ships moving to Puntales and secretly made available his own money to tackle “the unfavorable economic juncture.” The Governor of Cadiz agreed to the consul’s initiatives, which he welcomed enthusiastically, ASG, AS, 2673, Joseph Montesisto, Cadiz, August 24, 1757. Almost a year later, in another dispatch Montesisto reported other instances of silk, play cards, and dyed leather contraband. The consul ordered one of the suspect ships to leave its cargo with the customs but allowed the captain to transfer most of the goods on another obliging ship from Genoa sailing under Swedish flag. The consul maintained that, despite the blockade and the non-payment of the previous year’s aguinaldo, the Genoese nation was still highly regarded by the Governor. However, he added that, if good relations were to be maintained, the Christmas gift could be no longer postponed, ASG, AS, 2673, Joseph Montesisto, Cadiz, May 24, 1758. 151 The consul stated that many of those refusing to pay were not naturalized but wanted to be treated as such, ASG, AS, 2673, Montesisto, Cadiz, May 24, 1758. 152 ASG, AS, 2673, Montesisto, Cadiz, November 10, 1756. 153 Ibid. 154 ASG, AS, 2673, Montesisto, Cadiz, February 16, 1756 and November 10, 1756. 155 ASG, AS, 2673, Montesisto, Cadiz, n.d. [1755]. 156 ASG, AS, 2673, Gaetano Merello, Cadiz, October 21, 1777. 157 ASG, AS, 2673, Genova, August 18, 1776. 158 ASG, AS, 2673, Gaetano Merello, Cadiz, June 17, 1777 and July 8, 1777. 159 ASG, AS, 2673, Gaetano Merello, Cadiz, June 30, 1778. 160 Collado Villalta, “Los Consulados,” 249. 161 ASG, AS, 2673, Gaetano Merello, Cadiz, August 18, 1778. 162 One of them, D. Rivarola, instituted a censo (redeemable annuity) on a house making 100 pesos a year to be given to the Genoese poor in Seville and subsequently reversed the capital’s interest in his favor, ASG, AS, 2673, Gaetano Merello, Cadiz, June 30, 1778. 163 ASG, GM, filza 11, Gaetano Merello, Cadiz, September 17, 1776. 164 ASG, AS, 2673, Gaetano Merello, Cadiz, July 1777. 165 ASG, AS, 2673, Gaetano Merello, Cadiz, August 18, 1778. 166 ASG, AS, 2673, Gaetano Merello, Cadiz, June 30, 1778. 167 Merello underlined the warm welcome given to the “splendid news about the ceremony, which was celebrated with great pomp and without straining the coffers. In fact, led my example, everyone spontaneously made a contribution,” ASG, AS, 2673, Gaetano Merello, Cadiz, August 18, 1778. 168 ASG, GM, filza 11, Gaetano Merello, Cadiz, September 17, 1776. 169 ASG, GM, filza 11, Andrés Gherardi, Alessandro Risso q. Gaetano, etc., Cadiz, October 17, 1776. 170 ASG, AS, 2673, Gaetano Merello, Cadiz, May 8, 1778; ASG, GM, filza 11, Da diversi Negozianti, Cadiz, September 14, 1779.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 82–86

257

171 ASG, GM, filza 11, Giobatta Sciaccaluga, Cadiz, October 13, 1779 and November 17, 1780. 172 ASG, GM, filza 11, Piccardo, Perasso, Gherardi, Cadiz, October 15, 1776. 173 ASG, GM, filza 11, Andrés Gherardi, Alessandro Risso q. Gaetano, etc., Cadiz, October 17, 1776. 174 ASG, GM, filza 11, Perasso, Picardo, Avanzini, Risso, Cadiz, September 14, 1779; ASG, GM, filza 11, Copia, n.d. 175 ASG, GM, filza 11, Perasso y Picardo, Cadiz, May 10, 1779 and May 25, 1779. 176 ASG, AS, 2673, Gaetano Merello, Cadiz, August 18, 1778. 177 ASG, GM, filza 11, Perasso y Picardo, Cadiz, May 10, 1779 and May 25, 1779; ASG, AS, 2673, Gaetano Merello, Cadiz, May 23, 1779; ASG, GM, filza 11, Joseph Carzorla, Escribano de Guerra de Cádiz, Cadiz, February 15, 1777. 178 ASG, GM, filza 11, Pietro Avanzini, Cadiz, April 27, 1779. 179 ASG, GM, filza 11, Perasso y Picardo, Cadiz, February 16, 1779; ASG, GM, filza 11, Cadiz, March 24, 1779; ASG, GM, filza 11, Giuseppe Poggi, Cadiz, July 20, 1779; ASG, GM, filza 11, Merello, Cadiz, April 20, 1779 and March 24, 1779. 180 ASG, GM, filza 11, Merello, Cadiz, 31[?] 1779. 181 ASG, AS, 2673, Gaetano Merello, Cadiz, October 21, 1777. 182 ASG, GM, filza 11, Perasso y Picardo, Cadiz, May 25, 1779, and Copia della Rappresentazione che la più parte de’ Nazionali . . . , Cadiz, April 23, 1779. 183 Giuseppe Antonio was the jenízaro son of Esteban Mosti. 184 ASG, GM, filza 11, Copia di tutte le lettere ..., Genoa, May 27, 1779. 185 ASG, GM, filza 11, Cadiz, August 17, 1779 and June 7, 1780. 186 ASG, GM, filza 11, Blas Fernández Pintado, Cadiz, May 21, 1779. 187 Ibid.; ASG, GM, filza 11, Notaio Assereto, Genoa, June 30, 1779; ASG, GM, filza 11, Cadiz, October 31, 1779; ASG, GM, filza 11, Cadiz, August 17, 1779 and April 18, 1780. 188 ASG, GM, filza 11, Picardo y Perasso, Cadiz, May 25, 1779. 189 ASG, GM, filza 11, Genoa, December 27, 1779, January 18, 1780, and February 19, 1780. 190 Alejandro Risso and Benedetto Picardo were naturalized in 1778 and in 1802, Alfonso Mola, “Los navieros naturalizados de Cádiz”; and AGI, Consulados, leg. 891. 191 ASG, GM, filza 11, Genoa, July 17, 1780; ASG, GM, filza 11, Perasso y Picardo, Cadiz, January 30, 1781. 192 ASG, GM, filza 11, Genoa, August 6, 1781. 193 ASG, GM, filza 11, Picardo, Perasso, Gherardi, Cadiz, January 30, 1781. 194 Ibid. 195 ASG, GM, filza 11, Genoa, August 25, 1781. Gherardi was confirmed both by the Napoleonic administration and by King Vittorio Emanuele of Savoy I following the annexation of the Republic of Genoa to the Kingdom of Sardinia in 1815, AST, Mazzo Consolati Nazionali Cadice, 1790–1835, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, April 23, 1815. 196 ASG, AS, 2673, Gherardi, Cadiz, November 8, 1785.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

258

Notes to pp. 86–92

197 ASG, AS, 2673, Gherardi, Cadiz, October 16, 1785. 198 Ibid. 199 In a 1815 memorandum, Gherardi reported that all foreigners, including himself, were subject to the “Spanish Consulate’s Tribunal” of Cadiz with regards to trade suits, AST, Mazzo Consolati Nazionali Cadice, 1790–1835, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, September 19, 1815. 200 ASG, GM, filza 11, Picardo, Perasso, Gherardi, Cadiz, January 30, 1781. 201 ASG, AS, 2673, Andrea Gherardi al Sig. Marchese Pietro Paolo Celesia (Madrid), Cadiz, October 8, 1793. 202 Gherardi often lamented the Ligurian smugglers’ swindling and claimed that he was “constantly criticized by them,” ASG, AS, 2672 A, Il Console Generale della Repubblica Ligure in Cadice [Andrea Gherardi] all’Incaricato d’Affari della Rep.ca Ligure presso S.M.C. [Ottavio Sappia], Cadiz, April 17, 1798. Amongst many, we may mention the case of Captain Angelo Chiappe, who asked the consul to help him lease his ships to the Real Hacienda. After Gherardi had made the “large contributions which are needed in these countries,” the Navy’s General Intendant allowed the captain’s ships to participate in a shipment heading to Algesiras; however, Chiappe refused to repay the deposit and avoided the arrest warrant issued by the consul by eloping on board a ship bound to Genoa, ASG, AS, 2673, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, February 20, 1783; see also ASG, AS, 2673, Pro Memoria, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, n.d. [1787]. 203 ASG, GM, filza 11, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, August 9, 1782. 204 Ibid. 205 Pellegrini, Il consolato genovese, 158–64. Chapter 3 1 Kirk, “A little country,” 409. 2 D’Esposito, “Presenza italiana”; Andrews, The Spanish Caribbean, 39. 3 Illegal migrants who had been living in America for a long period of time could be exceptionally allowed to regularize their position through the payment of a high sum of money (composición), but this practice was abandoned at the end of the seventeenth century, De Cristóforis Morroni, Proa al Plata, 79–80; Poggio, “Las composiciones de extranjeros.” For an overview of the legal framework concerning foreign migration to Spanish America, see Konetzke, “Legislación sobre inmigración.” 4 Kamen, Empire: How Spain, 85. 5 Marchena Fernández, “Italianos al servicio del rey.” 6 Sergi, Historia de los Italianos, 35 ff. For further details, see De Gandía and Fernández Reyna, Pancaldo y la primera expedición; and Mazzitelli, La spedizione di Magellano. 7 For a thorough analysis of the economic evolution of the viceroyalty of Peru between the sixteenth and the seventeenth century, see Fisher, Silver Mines; Assadourian, Sistema de la economía colonial; Bakewell, Miners of the Red Mountain; Andrien, Crisis and Decline. 8 Canabrava, O comercio portugués.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 92–94

259

9 Moutoukias, Contrabando y control, 119 ff. 10 Silva, “La Colonia del Sacramento,” 14. The first trade agreement between Great Britain and the Portuguese Crown dates back to 1642. In 1654 it was extended to Brazil in exchange for British support to the house of Braganza. New agreements were signed in 1661 and 1703, Christelow, “Great Britain.” 11 Malamud Rikles, “España, Francia.” 12 Moutoukias, “Contrabando y sector externo,”186. 13 Silva, “La Colonia del Sacramento,” 21. 14 There were only three Genoese merchants amongst the seventy-five foreign cargadores who shipped consignments from Cadiz to Buenos Aires between 1737 and 1757: Francisco Ayraldo, Juan Ayraldo, and Antonio Tomati, Arazola Corvera, Hombres, barcos. 15 Ibid. 16 Jumar, “Los comerciantes rioplatenses,”194. 17 By observing trade correspondence between some great Genoese aristocratic families and their intermediaries in Cadiz, these markets appear as the prevailing destination of investments in this period, ADGG, Pallavicini-Ramo Cadetto, 99, 105, and 106, Cadice. In 1729, Paolo Gerolamo Pallavecino of Genoa expressed interest in participating in the shipping of the asentistas who were licensed to send their vessels to Buenos Aires, but his agent in Cadiz, Bernardo Recaño, told him that the business was inconvenient, ADGG, Pallavicini-Ramo Cadetto, 105, Cadice, Bernardo Recaño a Paolo Gerolamo Pallavicino, April 5, 1729. The rare occasions in which they showed a patent interest in such a difficult market to penetrate depended, as usual, on their readiness to capitalize from the Spanish monarchy’s needs. In 1747, having arrived in Buenos Aires to export 200,000 pesos via Colonia, Pedro Canisbro and Francisco Gutiérrez asked the sovereign for permission to allow a 30–40-ton Spanish or neutral ship full of clothes and other goods from Cadiz to Buenos Aires. The request was justified by the need for a quick shipment, something that the Portuguese fleet in Lisbon could not guarantee. Permission was granted on the condition that – alongside the requested goods – they also shipped some tobacco batches to the Río de la Plata Governor on behalf of the royal treasury and the official mail from the court of Madrid. To this end, the Genoese vessel Santissimo Christo y las Ánimas was hired. The owner and flag captain of the ship was Juan Bautista Rapallo, who was born in Arenzano, AGN, IX, 43-1-10, leg. 3, exp. 1, Registro de la Goleta genovesa nombrada El Santísimo Christo y las Ánimas de que es Maestre Alonso Díaz, 1747; AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 4465, 1734, 371–3. 18 Between 1755 and 1765, this subsided company only managed to import 609 of the 3,000 slaves it was authorized to introduce, Silva, “La Colonia del Sacramento,” 24. 19 Ibid. 20 The Carrera General de Potosí (which linked Buenos Aires to the Andean silver mining center via Santa Fe, Cordoba, Santiago del Estero, San Miguel de Tucumán, Salta, and Jujuy), and the Carrera General de Chile (which linked Buenos Aires to Santiago via Mendoza) were founded in 1771. 21 AHN, Consejos, 21318, exp. 1, Demanda particular presentada por la Casa de Comercio Pedemonte y Ardizone, de Cádiz, en la Residencia formada a

Published online by Cambridge University Press

260

22

23 24

25 26 27 28

29 30

31 32

33 34 35 36 37

Notes to pp. 94–97

Ambrosio O´Higgins, Marqués de Osorno, Virrey del Perú, seguida a su muerte contra sus albaceas y testamentarios, sobre pago de cantidad de pesos procedentes de intereses de ciertos créditos y de las costas de la cobranza de los mismos (1804–6). AHN, Consejos, 2011, exp. 4, José María Enrile contra Manuel Estayola: pago de escrituras (1772–5); AHN, Consejos, 20206, exp. 5, Felix Carpizo contra José María Enrile: expedición de fragata (1768). AHN, Consejos 20222, exp. 10, Francisco de la Guerra contra el Fiscal: suspensión de multa. Real Cédula al Governador de Buenos Aires, sobre la ida de Francisco Moresco, Antonio Bonelo y Esteban Ferrari, Genoveses, a aquella Provincia, no. 86, November 13, 1776, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Documentos para la historia. Halperín Donghi, Guerra y finanzas, 51. Halperín Donghi, Reforma y disolución, 56. See also Soares Da Veiga García, “Buenos Aires e Cádiz,” and Villalobos, Comercio y contrabando. Silva, El comercio entre España y el Río de la Plata, 18–22. See also Burgos Madroñero, “El comercio marítimo,”432. Francisco Manuel Micón, for instance, was able to keep importing stocks of hides and silver through his agent, Luis de Sabatini, AGN, IX, 43-6-4, leg. 59, exp. 2; see also Garavaglia, Economía, Sociedad, 76, 89 (note 18), 103. A direct descendant of naturalized merchant Tomás Miconi Cambiaso, Francisco Manuel developed direct ties with the Río de la Plata around 1771, when he was ranked as owner and captain of the ship named San Lorenzo anchored in Montevideo and about to sail for Lima, AGN, IX, 8-10-3, April 2, 1771, 200. Garavaglia, Economía, Sociedad. See also Silva, “La Colonia del Sacramento,” 54–9. AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 5752, Testamento de Cayetano Cambiaso, 1757, 399–400; AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 21, Testamento de Francisco Cambiaso, 1759, 121–2. The family’s regular activity in the Carrera de Indias can be inferred by the sea loans its members subscribed between 1760 and 1785, Bernal, Financiación de la Carrera, 600, 662, 687. AHN, Consejos, 20219, exp. 4, Francisco Cambiaso con los interesados en la carga de un navío (1782–1783), Cadiz, 1782. Giovanni Battista (1771–2) and Michelangelo Cambiaso (1791–3) were the Dogi, Bitossi, “La Repubblica è vecchia,” 294, 307; Piastra, Dizionario biografico, 419–20. Ravina Martín, ed., De Cádiz y su comercio, 293. AHN, Consejos, 20233, exp. 5, Blas Jiménez con Juan Bautista Pedemonte: cuentas de expedición, 1790–2. Alfonso Mola, “Los navieros naturalizados.” AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 1468, Poder para testar Nicolás Recaño a Joseph Recaño su hijo, 1761, 26–8. AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 2, 1791, Obligación D. Saturnino Sarasa a favor de D. Nicolás Recaño; ibid., Transición D. Eugenio Lerdo de Tejada y D. Nicolás Recaño; ibid., Chancelación d. Nicolás Recaño a favor de la testamentaria de Gabriel de Castro.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 97–99

261

38 Porro, Astiz, and Rospide, Aspectos de la vida cotidiana, 537. 39 AGI, Gobierno, Buenos Aires, leg. 580, D. Miguel de Luca, Aduana Montevideo 1794. Fragata “Nuestra Señora del Pilar.” 40 ANM 0135, ms. 0160/001, Diario de la navegación de Juan Barrals en la fragata “Pura y Limpia Concepción” (alias “el Jupiter”) del capitán y maestre D. Domingo Colombo para el Puerto de Montevideo y Río de la Plata, 1792. 41 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 4291, Poder para testar de Pablo Colombo Esturla a Domingo Colombo, 1791, 343–5. 42 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 0048, Testamento de Domingo [Vallarino] Colombo, 1803; AGI, Consulados, leg. 915, Calificación de embarcaciones, Cadiz, 1804. 43 On October 31, 1793, Bartolomé Patrón, owner of the 207-ton frigate named N.S. De Gracia y S. Telmo stated that the ship was about to leave for Montevideo, AGI, Consulados, Leg. 929. One year later, his brother Benito received from Montevideo various stocks of goods (especially flour and sheepskins), AGI, Gobierno, Buenos Aires, leg. 580, D. Miguel de Luca, Aduana Montevideo 1794. Fragata española “Santa Francisca,” capitán y maestre Antonio Groso; AGI, Gobierno, Buenos Aires, leg. 580, D. Miguel de Luca, Aduana Montevideo 1794. 44 AGI, Lima, 716, no. 72, Carta n. 105 de Ambrosio O’Higgins, virrey del Perú, Marqués de Osorno, a Pedro Varela, Ministro de Hacienda, October 23, 1797; AGI, Gobierno, Buenos Aires, leg. 589, Al Exmo. D. Francisco de Saavedra, Cadiz, March 5, 1809. See also De Studer, La trata de negros, 288–9. 45 In 1791, Benito Patrón chose him as captain of one of his ships to deliver a batch of goods to Callao, Lima’s port. Camuso then moved to Montevideo with his brother José to act as sales agent for the importation of slaves on behalf of Patrón, AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 402, Poder para testar de Carlos Antonio Camusso a Benito Patrón, 1791, 739–41; Betancur, El puerto colonial, 22. For more details about Camusso and the Patróns, see Brilli, “Genoveses en el comercio.” 46 AGI, Gobierno Buenos Aires, 585, D. Mathias del Cerro, Capitán y Piloto de la Carrera de Cádiz a Indias, Madrid, March 9, 1794. 47 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 2616, Testamento de José Recaño, 1808, 247–52. 48 AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 809, Testamento de D. Juan Benito Semin, 1801, 17–22. 49 AGI, Gobierno, Buenos Aires, leg. 580, D. Miguel de Luca, Aduana Montevideo 1794. See in particular Fragata española “Santa Francisca,” capitan y maestre Antonio Groso, and Paquete “Nuestra Señora de la Concepción,” alias “Neptuno,” su maestre José María Codevilla. 50 Marcos Maculín, Joseph Nicola, Rafael Rivalta, and Andrés Buceta; Betancur, El puerto colonial, 45. 51 ADGG, Durazzo, 143–304, Cadice, 1767–96. 52 ADGG, Durazzo, 143, Cadice, Giuseppe Enrile e figlio, June 29, 1770; ADGG, Durazzo, 144, Cadice, Antonio Joseph Mosti, July 7 and November 5, 1773; ADGG, Durazzo, 294, Cadice, Antonio Joseph Mosti, September 6, 1776; ADGG, Durazzo, 303, Cadice, Antonio Joseph Mosti, June 3 and July 22, 1791. 53 In 1791, Joseph Antonio Mosti and Giacomo Filippo Durazzo had three accounts open relating to three investments in South Seas maritime exchange

Published online by Cambridge University Press

262

54 55 56 57 58

59 60 61

62 63 64 65 66 67 68

69

70 71 72 73 74

Notes to pp. 99–103

contracts, ADGG, Durazzo, 303, Cadice, Antonio Joseph Mosti, February 8, 1791. ADGG, Durazzo, 294, Cadice, Antonio Joseph Mosti, December 22, 1775. ADGG, Durazzo, 294, Cadice, Antonio Joseph Mosti, December 17, 1776. Bernal, España: Proyecto Inacabado, 475. ADGG, Durazzo, 144, Cadice, Antonio Joseph Mosti, November 5, 1773. ADGG, Durazzo, 296, Cadice, Antonio Joseph Mosti, May 7 and June 4, 1779; ADGG, Durazzo, 299, Cadice, Antonio Joseph Mosti, January 16 and February 27, 1784. Ruiz Rivera, “La casa de Ustáriz”; Ruiz Rivera, “La Compañía de Uztáriz.” See, e.g., ADGG, Durazzo, 143, Cadice, Stefano Mosti e figlio, July 13, 1767; and ADGG, Durazzo, 294, Cadice, Prasca Arboré, December 17, 1776. The pacotilla in Spanish (paccottiglia in Italian) was a centuries-old and consolidated seafaring custom. It consisted in tacitly allowing sailors to take on board a small freight and duty-free stock of goods, which they could later sell on their own account, Bono Ferrari, L’epoca eroica, 376. Besio Moreno, Buenos Aires, 385 ff. Tejerina, Luso-Brasileños, 52–3. Tau Anzoategui, “Una defensa,” 276. Moutoukias, “Power, Corruption, and Commerce”; see also Moutoukias, Contrabando y control. Tau Anzoategui, “Una defensa,” 277. Ibid., 279. In 1745, within five months, the authorities issued two expulsion notices against foreigners, followed by others in 1748 and in 1749–50, Tau Anzoategui, “Una defensa,” 280, and AGN, IX, Bandos, 8-10-1, D. Josef de Andoanegui, Brigadier de los Exercitos de S.M. y Su Governador y Capitan General del Río de la Plata, Buenos Aires, December 6, 1745. Amongst the Genoese were Francisco Carnilia, widower, and his brother Antonio; Juan Zufera; Santiago Mathias Ande, bachelor; Manuel Cuitiño, bachelor; Silberio Ardeta, bachelor; Blas Duarte, bachelor; Agustín del Dieque, married in Europe; Juan Bautista Cachón, bachelor; Nicolás Bandofa, bachelor; Jaime Filastiga, bachelor; Francisco Castel, bachelor; Juan Bautista Patrón, married; Francisco Romero, bachelor; Bentura Biruti, bachelor; Nicolás Acosta, married, AGN, IX, Comerciales, 39-7-3, leg. 270, Exp. 7, Comerciantes extrangeros. Autos solicitando la expulsión de varios comerciantes extrangeros por Francisco Antonio Riva, apoderado de los comerciantes españoles de Buenos Aires, 1742–50. AGI, Consulados, Libro 445. Ibid. AGN, IX, Bandos, 42-9-5, Francisco Cabrera, Buenos Aires, April 6, 1761. AGN, IX, Hacienda, 33-1-3, Lista de las pulperías que han pagado el derecho de visita, exp. 389. The Genoese were Antonio Cherisola, Julian Guillén, Josef Rizo, Pedro Quenon, Andrés Manito (or Maneto),Thomás Candido, Esteban Insensi, Lorenzo Cavallero, Don Vicente de la Rosa, and Francisco Carnilia, AGN, IX, Hacienda, 33-1-3, Lista de Extranjeros a quienes se les ha intimado según superior

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 104–107

75 76 77 78

79 80

81 82 83 84

85

86 87 88 89 90 91 92

93 94 95 96

263

decreto cierren las tiendas y pulperías que estaban manejando, Buenos Aires, December 20, 1779. Ibid. Ibid. AGN, Protocolos, Reg.1, 1794–5, Testamento de D. Vicente de la Rosa. For example, there were Manuel Quirisola, Josef Ferrero, Agustín el Ginobés, Antonio Mazo, Pedro Guillén, Andrés Viñali, Gavino, Antonio Canesa, Josef Burdelo, Ventura Crespo, Pablo Villarino, Gabriel Balla, Calisto Vico, Juan Costa, Faustino Bozo, Juan Guillén, one Pinazo, and one Pelliza. Romano, “Algunas consideraciones,” 49. Historiography now considers the term “contraband” to be inappropriate not only because, at least until 1750, legal trade in Buenos Aires amounted to 20–30% of all transactions but also because local authorities were aware of and, as noted earlier, were often at the forefront of illicit transactions, Moutoukias, “Comercio y producción.” Romano, Mecanismo y elementos, 330. Gelman, “Los caminos del mercado,” 109. Brading, Mineros y comerciantes, 139. Gelman, “Los caminos del mercado,” 102. See also Mayo, ed., Pulperos y pulperías; Bossio, Historia de las pulperías; Rodríguez Molas, “La pulpería rioplatense.” Genoese Juan Antonio Cicardo’s suit attests that pawnbroking also hit the vecinos’ underage children. In 1806, Cicardo accused pulpero Pedro Valle of forcing him – for three years and when he was still under paternal authority – to pawn some of his father’s goods to pay for the drinks and gambling debts made in Valle’s retail outlet. Cicardo also claimed that Valle had sold him items on credit at usurer’s rates. When Cicardo married and inherited a small house from his parents, Valle demanded that Cicardo pay the obligations he had signed and collected rent on the property until owning it outright, AGN, Tribunal Comercial, Letra C, leg. 3 (1806–7), Instancia de D. Antonio Cicardo contra D. Pedro Valle sobre cobro de cantidad de pesos que esta le hace, 1806. Moutoukias, “Comercio y producción,” 89. Kinsbruner, Petty Capitalism, 10–3. Price, “Economic function”; Socolow, “Buenos Aires,”252. Gelman, “Los caminos del mercado,” 111. Kinsbruner, Petty Capitalism, 10–3. AGN, IX, Hacienda, 34-2-1, exp. 2387, 1779. AGN, IX, 31-1-6, D. Pablo Villarino y D. Antonio Romero por sí y a nombre de los Dueños de Pulperías en la Instancia sobre Formación de Mostradores, 1800. Socolow, Mercaderes del Buenos Aires virreinal, 25; Gelman, “Los caminos del mercado.” Herzog, Defining Nations, 43–61. Socolow, Mercaderes del Buenos Aires virreinal, 54–5. See also Caula, Mercaderes de Mar. A former dominion of the Doria family, after the sixteenth-century Oneglia (which is currently part of Liguria) became a possession of the House of

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 108–111

264

97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112

113

114 115 116 117

118 119

120 121

122 123 124 125

Savoy. By virtue of its position, Oneglia held social and economic features that closely resemble those of other Western Ligurian ports. For this reason, although Belgrano was not formally born in the Republic of Genoa, he can be considered as a Genoese. Gelman, “Sobre el carácter,” 58. Gelman, De mercachifle a gran comerciante, 143–4. Socolow, Mercaderes del Buenos Aires virreinal, 135 ff. Ibid., 28. Garavaglia, Economía, Sociedad, 103–9. Gelman, “Sobre el carácter,” 54. On Belgrano’s mercantile networks, see also Moutoukias, “Lazos débiles / lazos fuertes.” Ibid., 34–57, 142–3. Gammalsson, Pobladores de Buenos Aires, 353. AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 1, 1790–1791, Testamento de Domingo Pelliza. AGN, Sala Catálogos, Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Escrutinios totales e índices de nombres, 1589–1821, 73–7, 85. AGN, IX, 33-1-3, exp. 389, Lista de las pulperías que han pagado el derecho de visita, 1780. AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 1, 1790–1791, Testamento de Domingo Pelliza. Ibid. Johnson, “The entrepreneurial reorganization,” 151. In particular he owned two houses in calle Real del Cabildo, one near to the hospital and another one in the district of San Juan, AGN, Sucesiones, 7709, Testamento de Pedro Palavecino, 1799. AGN, IX, 8-10-2, Razón de la visita y pulperías que se han registrado y sus baras y pesas y an pagado, 86–90. Lorenzo Patrón was ranked as a licensed pulpero also in a 1767 register, AGN, IX, 8-10-3, 136–8. AGN, Sucesiones, n. 7706, Testamento de D. Lorenzo Patrón, 1790. Ibid. AGN, Sucesiones, n. 7706, Testamento de D. Juan Antonio Patrón, 1789. AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 2, 1762, Chancelación D. Francisco Ratto a favor de los bienes del difunto D. Adrián Falzes de Ibarra, Buenos Aires, December 17, 1762, 289. AGN, Sucesiones, 7706, Testamento de Lorenzo Patrón, 1790. His participation in the Carrera de Indias is attested by a sea loan issued in 1782 to finance an Indias-bound expedition against which Braco had taken out a loan, Bernal, Financiación de la Carrera, 600. AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 3, 1790, Testamento de D. Nicolás Braco. Ibid. According to the 1804 census of Buenos Aires, his quinta was located in the periphery of the city (quarter 19), Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Documentos para la historia, 165. AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 3, 1790, Testamento de D. Nicolás Braco. AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 3, 1794–5, Poder para testar D.a Mariana Guzmán a su marido D. Nicolás Braquio. Garavaglia, Economía, Sociedad, 38–9. Johnson, “The entrepreneurial reorganization.”

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 112–113

265

126 AGN, IX, 8-10-2, ff. 328–9. 127 AGN, IX, Hacienda, 33-1-3, Lista de Extranjeros a quienes se les ha intimado según superior decreto cierren las tiendas y pulperías que estaban manejando, Buenos Aires, December 20, 1779; AGI, Consulados, L. 445. He was granted naturalization because he had been a long-time resident in Buenos Aires (where he had moved nineteen years earlier), had married a local woman (Petronilla Ramírez, who gave him a son, Ildefonso Raymundo), and had paid taxes on a regular basis (he owned a property portfolio worth more than 12,000 pesos). For being allowed to live and trade with the Americas, he also paid 1,000 reales de vellón, AGI, Contratación, leg. 596B. 128 To this end, one of the first measures taken dates back to 1761, AGN, IX, 429-5, Francisco Cabrera, Buenos Aires, April 6, 1761. 129 AGN, IX, 8-10-3, 301–6. The source refers to the final outcome of another expulsion notice issued in 1774. 130 For a thorough analysis of these events, see Johnson, “The entrepreneurial reorganization.” 131 AGN, Sucesiones, 7719, D. Francisco Antonio de Escalada con la testamentaria del finado D. Juan Bautista Faustino Patrón sobre rendición de cuentas, 1825, 140–9. 132 Aliata, La ciudad regular, 102–21. 133 Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Documentos para la historia, 170. 134 AGN, Protocolos, reg. 3, 1815, Testamento de D.a Juana Rosa Balerga, Buenos Aires, March 9, 1815. 135 Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Documentos para la historia, 175. 136 Einsinck, Propios y arbitrios, 277. 137 In his shops, Caneva sold buttons, hats, stockings, dyed leather, silk, cotton and wool trousers, Catalonian linen handkerchiefs, jackets, fabrics from Britain, locks, crockery, decorated tiles, rosaries, blades and knives, scissors, paper, and candelabra, AGN, Sucesiones, 4839, Testamendo de Andrés Caneva, 1812. 138 Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Documentos para la historia, 170. 139 AGN, X, 36-7-22 bis. 140 Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Documentos para la historia, 167. 141 The 1827 Buenos Aires census lists Juan Caneva as a comerciante living in the central Plaza de la Victoria, AGN, X, 23-5-5. 142 AGN, X, 36-8-9, 36-8-10. 143 In 1843 Romualdo was listed as the owner of a 6-ton vessel, AGN, X, 36–8-6. 144 AGN, IX, 30-9-6, Expediente sobre cobrar D. Ignacio Velando a D. Antonio Luis Poyson un mil quinientos pesos en que ajustaron el flete de un barco, 1783. 145 AGI, Gobierno, Buenos Aires, leg. 316, Gaetano García, Buenos Aires, January 12, 1792. 146 In 1790, as he happened to be in Buenos Aires, Mateo Maza signed a proxy to the Vicar of Bisagno so that he could repay debts and collect credits on his behalf to the Bank of Saint George of Genoa; Maza also entrusted the Vicar

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 113–116

266

147 148 149 150 151

152

153

154 155 156 157

158 159

160 161

to manage the assets and properties inherited by his dead father, José Maza, AGN, Protocolos, reg. 1, 1790–1, Mateo Maza, Poder de D. Mateo Maza a favor del Vicario pro Tempore de la curia del Gobierno de Bisagno dominio de la Serenísima República de Génova. AGN, IX, 8-10-3, 139–40. AGN, IX, Tribunales, leg. 85, exp. 4. AGN, X, 41-3-6, no. 170, 345, 379. Unexpectedly, the warrants have been found in the post-colonial section of the archive. Beverina, Virreinato de las provincias, 464. It is the case of Diego Galeano, a vecino of Cuzco living in the partido of Caravaja and licensed to mine silver and quicksilver. He must have been highly regarded for the Potosí top administrators to entrust him with representing their interests in Buenos Aires, where he traveled to in 1790 together with Manuel Galiano, probably a relative, AGN, Protocolos, reg. 3, 1790. In 1800, before leaving Potosí Julian Capriles, a vecino of Cochabamba, signed a 12,000 pesos obligation in favor of dealer Diego Aguero to repay him of goods and money that he had borrowed to set up his expedition. Capriles promised to repay the loan within eight months at a 0.5% interest rate, AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 3, 1800, Obligación de D. Julian Capriles a D. Diego Aguero. In 1791, Tomás Balenzategui, a vecino of Buenos Aires, entrusted by proxy Domingo Antonio Patrón to file legal suits and collect payments on his behalf in the city of Salta, AGN, Protocolos, reg. 1, 1790–1. Saguier, “La penuria de agua”; Tandeter, Coacción y mercado. For a recent discussion about independence and the crisis of the mining industry, see Mira and Gil Lázaro, “Minería, comercio.” Apolant, Genesis de la familia; Dotta, “Italianos en el proceso de formación”; Fabbri Cressatti, “Italianos en el Plata.” See, e.g., the 1772–3 census of Montevideo, Apolant, “Padrones olvidados.” AGI, Gobierno, Buenos Aires, leg. 589, Audiencia de Buenos Aires, Expedientes del Consulado de Comercio (1807–1836), 1812. AGI, Gobierno, Buenos Aires, leg. 317, Ayuntamiento de Montevideo, December 14, 1808. Pascual José Parodi was born in Puerto de Santa María, near Cadiz, Apolant, Genesis de la familia, 469. AGI, Gobierno, Buenos Aires, leg. 589, Audiencia de Buenos Aires, Expedientes del Consulado de Comercio (1807–1836), 1812. AGI, Gobierno Buenos Aires, 585, Bartolomé Domingo Bianqui, 1793; Apolant, Genesis de la familia, 802–3, 621. Josefa’s father, Antonio María Berthelar, was born in La Spezia but married in Buenos Aires, where he was listed as shoemaker in a 1744 census. Torre Revello, El gremio de los Plateros, 25. Ibid., 26. The poor state and the weakness of the sector in the Río de la Plata have been ascribed to the fact that silver smuggling outweighed its processing. Thus, blacksmiths were unable to maintain their own guilds, Márquez Miranda, Ensayo sobre los artífices, 11–13. The contrast with other colonial contexts traditionally devoted to metal processing becomes even more striking if compared to the role played in Peru by the Nobilísimo arte de la

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 116–119

162 163 164 165

166 167 168

169 170 171

172 173

174

175 176

177 178 179

267

Platería and the highly corporative nature of Mexico City’s artisan industry, González Ángulo Aguirre, Artesanado y ciudad. Epstein and Prak, eds., Guilds, Innovation; Mozzarelli, ed., Economia e corporazioni. Bulferetti and Costantini, Industria e Commercio, 72–80. Massa, “Annona e corporazioni,” 392. Junta del Comercio de Buenos Aires. Segundo poder otorgado a favor de Don Manuel Rodríguez de la Vega y Don Martín de Sarratea para que gestionen la instalación del Tribunal del Consulado en la Capital del Virreinato, Buenos Aires, 21 de agosto de 1790, in Archivo General de la Nación, Consulado de Buenos Aires, 88–92. Smith, The Spanish Guild Merchant. Pietschmann, Las reformas borbónicas, 24 ff. Article 53 of the decree reads as follows: “In order to foster my subjects’ enterprise and happiness and by enforcing the Leyes de Castilla y de Indias, I order the institution of Consulados de Comercio in all the Spanish ports enabled by the decree: these institutes will operate under the Crown’s aegis, will be supported by the provincial Sociedades Economicas and will seek to promote farming and manufacturing, while also expanding the shipping routes to my American dominions”; see Reglamento y Aranceles. In conformity with the decree, Charles III created new peninsular consulados in La Coruña, Santander and Malaga in 1785. Smith, “A research report,” 45. Fisher, “Imperial ‘free trade,’” 23. Halperín Donghi, Reforma y disolución, 56. For an analysis of the Bourbon reforms’ impact on Spanish farming and manufacturing, see Llopís Agelán, “Expansión, reformismo”; Fernández Díaz, ed., España en el siglo XVIII; Martín, España en los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII; García Sanz, “La reforma agraria”; Helguera, “Empresas y empresarios.” For a more thorough analysis, see Paquette, “State-civil society.” Other urban centers, such as Montevideo and Puebla, obtained the institution amidst their war for independence (in 1812 and 1821 respectively), Smith, “A research report,” 41–52. Crespi and Salles, “Bases y fuentes,” 58–9. On the organization and the functions of the Tribunal de Consulado of Buenos Aires, see Tjarks, Consulado de Buenos Aires. Gelman, De mercachifle a gran comerciante, 142–3. AGI, Gobierno Buenos Aires, 585, Relación de los méritos y servicios de D. Domingo Belgrano Pérez, Capitán del Regimiento de Caballería de milicias de la Ciudad de Buenos Ayres, Madrid, November 20, 1792. AGI, Gobierno Buenos Aires, 585, Bartolomé Domingo Bianqui, 1793. Arajuo (de), Guía de forasteros en la Ciudad y Virreinato, 57. The Genoese shoemakers’ leading position in Cadiz endured through the years: in 1755, the treasurer of the guild’s fraternity (dedicated to Saints Crispín and Crispiniano) was Ligurian Jacome Bianchi, Rodríguez Díaz, “El final del Gremio,” 351.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

268

Notes to pp. 119–121

180 AGN, IX, 30-4-2, D. Nicolás Rigui y otros, solicitando establecer un gremio de zapatería, 1788. The history of shoemakers’ corporation is thoroughly analyzed in Johnson, Workshop of Revolution, chaps. 3–4. 181 Among the maestros of Ligurian descent, there were José Canepa, Manuel José Ravelo, Rafael de la Rosa, Juan Lorenzo de la Rosa, Pedro Mazzini, Victoriano Vilarino, Antonio Benso, Alessio Rebecco, and Sebastián Esterla. Among the remaining Italians, there were Roverto Bordon, Como-native Pedro Avansini, Pedro Leonetti, Novara-native Giulio Furnara, and Milannative Salvador Pianetti (otherwise referred to either as Vaneti or Baneti), AGN, IX, Tribunales Z, n. 42-9-5, leg. Z4, exp. 6, Zapateros 1792: ordenanzas sobre este gremio, Buenos Aires, 3 agosto 1792; AGN, IX, Tribunales Z, 42-9-5, leg. Z4, exp. 11, Autos sobre la Matrícula de Maestros Zapateros Pardos y Morenos y su jurisdicción, Buenos Aires, 1797; AGN, IX, 30-4-2. 182 In the 1804 Buenos Aires census, Canepa declared his origin and stated that he had been living in Buenos Aires for twenty-five years, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Documentos para la historia, 131–2. 183 Juan José Romero, owner of a shoe shop in town, declared to be a natural of Seville and a vecino of Buenos Aires for some twenty-four years (thus having arrived around 1765), AGN, IX, 30-4-2. 184 AGN, IX, 30-4-2, Buenos Aires, May 13, 1789. 185 AGN, IX, 30-4-2, Buenos Aires, September 16, 1790. 186 Ibid. 187 AGN, IX, 30-4-2. 188 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of chapter 5 of the Ordenanzas stipulated that only firstclass maestros had the right to vote, Leg. Z4, exp. 6, Zapateros 1792: ordenanzas sobre este gremio, Buenos Aires, August 3, 1792; AGN, IX, 30-4-9, Gremio de Zapateros, José Joaquín Álvarez en representación de varios maestros zapateros, sobre elecciones del gremio, leg. 33, exp. 7, Buenos Aires, August 3, 1792; AGN, IX, 30-4-9, Márquez de la Plata, Buenos Aires, November 8, 1792; AGN, IX, 30-5-1, leg. 34, exp. 18, September 3, 1793. 189 AGN, IX, 30-5-1, leg. 34, exp. 18, Obrado sobre diferencias entre vocales de la Junta del Gremio de Zapateros en quanto a la determinación de la Iglesia en donde se ha de establecer su Cofradía, Buenos Aires, September 3, 1793. 190 AGN, IX, 31-2-1, leg. 25, exp. 17, Testimonio del Cuaderno n.4 de los Autos obrados, sobre establecimiento de Gremio de zapateros en esta Capital, Buenos Aires, 1803. 191 AGN, IX, 31-2-1, leg. 54, exp. 2. 192 AGN, IX, leg. 53, exp. 2. 193 Johnson, “Artisans of Buenos Aires,” 135. 194 “Is not it outrageous that in Buenos Aires a pair of good boots costs 20 pesos? The importation of all kind of goods should be allowed. Imported goods that proved to be worse than those made in this country would cause no harm; but, if they proved to be better, they would be copied and would compel our artisans to improve the quality of their products,” Levene, Ensayo Histórico, 294.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 122–125

269

195 AGN, IX, 4-7-7, exp. 5, no. 7, Calafates para barcos dedicados al comercio. Berro y Errasquín representan con motivo de haber dispuesto la comandancia general de marina en Montevideo ser ella la que elija los calafates, Consulado de Buenos Aires, 1803. 196 “These limitations appear even more unbearable if one considers that they stem from a practice which contrasts what may be witnessed everyday in more significant departments such as Cadiz and Havana, where all formalities likely to hinder businesses traffic . . . are reduced to a fast and precise evaluation of the repairs needed by the ships, without the need to screen workers and produce so much paperwork,” ibid. 197 AGN, IX, 4-7-7, exp. 3, Memoria sobre el establecimiento de fabricas de curtiembres en el Virreinato de Buenos Aires, 1802. 198 Caillet Bois, “El Real Consulado,” 265–8. 199 “If we specialized in this activity, what would prevent us from developing an exclusive competition-free trade and . . . attracting here foreigners in search of our rawhide? If we tanned hides by ourselves, the Crown would benefit as we would withhold the raw material from foreigners who deprive us of great profits through tanning . . . Let’s follow wise Nature and exploit her gifts, given that Nature gives each country the means to thrive. That is how any Spanish patriot should be thinking, because by doing so we shall be asking foreigners no more than what they ask from us,” AGN, IX, 4-7-7, exp. 3, Memoria sobre el establecimiento de fábricas de curtiembres, en el Virreinato de Buenos Aires, 1802. 200 Socolow, Mercaderes del Buenos Aires virreinal, 115–6. 201 Socolow, “Religious participation,” 389. 202 In this respect, see for example Levaggi, “Papel de los patronos.” 203 Socolow, Mercaderes del Buenos Aires virreinal, 112. 204 The different religious affiliations also functioned as political launching pads and for many traders represented the step preceding Cabildo membership, Peire, Taller de los Espejos, 152. 205 Socolow, Mercaderes del Buenos Aires virreinal, 113. 206 González Fasani, “Espíritu cofradiero,”272. 207 Socolow, Mercaderes del Buenos Aires virreinal, 112–4. 208 AGN, Sucesiones, no. 7709, Testamento de Pedro Palavecino, 1799. 209 Pelliza borrowed money from the monastery at least twice – once to back the mercantile career of his son-in-law, José Pereyra – and instituted two 1,000 pesos capellanías: one to maintain his son José, a monk (to be passed onto close relatives willing to embark on a religious life after him), and the other to keep his nephew José Justo, also a monk (to be returned to his heirs after his death). However, his last will and testament reveal that his religious ties extended beyond the Dominican order, as attested by a loan received from nuns of the monastery of Santa Catalina against an annual 5% interest mortgage on his home, AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 1, 1790–1, Testamento de D. Domingo Pelliza. 210 Socolow, Mercaderes del Buenos Aires virreinal, 113–20. 211 AGN, IX, Justicia, n. 31-8-5, leg. 47, exp. 1386, Buenos Aires, 1804.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

270

Notes to pp. 125–127

212 Di Stefano et al., De las cofradías a las organizaciones, 45; see also Molina, “El concepto de ciudadanía.” 213 AGN, Sucesiones, 7706, Testamento de Lorenzo Patrón, 1790. 214 AGN, Protocolos, reg. 6, 1769, Testamento de Joseph Gazano. 215 AGN, Sucesiones, 4839, Testamento de Andrés Caneva, 1812. 216 AGN, Protocolos, reg. 1, 1794–5, Testamento de D. Vicente de la Rosa. 217 AGN, Sucesiones, 7783, Testamentaria de Don Bartolo Rizo, 1819. 218 Fort he case of Cadiz, see Brilli, “Importancia de hacerse español.” 219 AGN, Protocolos, reg. 3, 1790, Testamento de D. Nicolás Braco. 220 To carry on his businesses with Spain, as shown earlier, Domingo Belgrano resorted to a Spanish correspondent of Cadiz, but for his trades with the inner provinces he did not disdain the collaboration of brokers of Ligurian descent. Four of the ten business firms Belgrano set up between 1767 and 1786 to trade with the interior featured associates A. Surlin, who was sent to Jujuy and Potosí to sell iron bars; the aforementioned patron Ignacio Belando, who was entrusted to sell efectos de Castilla (imported goods) and then was in charge of the transport of wood from Corrientes; and pulpero C. Vico, who was sent to sell imported wares in Paraguay, Gelman, De mercachifle a gran comerciante, 35. Further examples of these relational networks are offered by the wills. Ligurian merchant Francisco Ratto married Lorenzo Patrón’s wife’s sister in Buenos Aires, AGN, Sucesiones, 7706, Testamento de Lorenzo Patrón, 1790; both Lorenzo and his son Juan Antonio held close business ties with Andrés Manito, a Genoese pulpero who had been ineffectively threatened with expulsion in 1779, AGN, Sucesiones, 7706, Testamento de D. Juan Antonio Patrón, 1789; following Lorenzo Patrón’s death, the Patróns entrusted Genoese farmer Santiago Suparo with the sensitive task of valuing the quintas cultivations of the departed, AGN, Sucesiones, 7706, Testamento de Lorenzo Patrón, 1790; Joseph Gazano appointed as his executor Lorenzo Patrón’s brother Juan Bautista, AGN, Protocolos, reg. 6, 1769, Testamento de Joseph Gazano; Palavecino appointed Ligurian trader Antonio Canessa as his niece Lorenza’s legal guardian. AGN, Sucesiones, 7709, Testamento de Pedro Palavecino, 1799 (regarding Antonio Canessa, who had been living in Buenos Aires, where he had married, at least since 1779, see AGN, IX, 9-7-4, Matrícula de los vecinos y abitantes del barrio n. 8 . . . en el presente año de 1794 and AGN, IX, Hacienda, 33-1-3; AGI, Gobierno, Buenos Aires, 569, Exp. 52); the tendero Vicente de la Rosa was called to witness Nicolás Braco’s last will and testament, AGN, Protocolos, reg. 3, 1790, Testamento de D. Nicolás Braco; prior to his death, Domingo Pelliza instructed De la Rosa and Francisco Ratto to share 300 pesos among “his closest relatives both at home and abroad,” AGN, Protocolos, reg. 1, 1794–5, Testamento de Domingo Pelliza. 221 Soaje Pinto, “Antonio Luis Beruti.” 222 Quesada, Paseo genealógico, 98. 223 AGN, Protocolos, reg. 2, 1769, Obligación D. Juan Ángel Lazcano a favor de D. Pablo Beruti, Buenos Aires, January 19, 1769, 13 v; AGN, Protocolos, reg. 2, 1769, Chancelación D. Joseph Luis Feduche a favor de D. Manuel Raggio, Buenos Aires, October 29, 1769, 166 v.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 127–129

271

224 Tejerina, “Inmigración extranjera.” 225 AGI, Gobierno, Buenos Aires, 569, exp. 114. 226 AGN, IX, Bandos, 8-10-3, Patrón de esclavos y propietarios, Ciudad de Buenos Aires. 227 Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Documentos para la historia, 121 ff. 228 Consider, for example, the large number of South Piedmont emigrants to Genoese colonies on Chios, Caffa and Pera, Balletto, “Astigiani, Alessandrini e Monferrini”; Balletto, “Piemontesi a Pera”; Balletto, “Piemontesi del Quattrocento.” 229 They were Juan Bautista Canepa, Carlos Bozano, Antonio Balerga, Ángel Noseto, and the aforementioned Juan and Antonio Caneva, most of whom had married in Buenos Aires and declared they had arrived in the Río de la Plata in the 1780s and 1790s. 230 Noseto stated this himself in the 1804 census; a general proxy signed by him entrusting a Montevideo dealer to look after his interests in that city attests that he also traded in the Eastern port, AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 3, 1805, Poder D. Ángel Noseto a d. José Maldonado, Buenos Aires, August 12, 1805. 231 The first document attesting the presence of Fulco in Buenos Aires is a bond issued in 1792, AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 1, 1792–93, Obligación de D. Vicente Barba a D Bartolomé Forco, Buenos Aires, April 12, 1792. 232 For example, confitero Santiago Perfumo, who had settled in Buenos Aires thirteen years earlier, employed as a bus boy Genoese Felipe Corbero, who had arrived in Buenos Aires two years earlier. 233 This was the case of Carlos and Juan de Dios Furco, who both worked as waged employees in a Buenos Aires tavern, or that of Diego Marengo, who moved to Buenos Aires around the 1760s and having consolidated his commercial business was joined by his nephews Carlos and Julio, AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 1, 1798–1799, Obligación de Antonio de Andrade y Paderne en favor de Diego Marengo. It is unknown whether he was a relative of Juan Pedro Marengo, an emigrant who, during the early nineteenth century, featured as the owner of twenty-six slaves, AGN, IX, Bandos, 810-3, Padrón de esclavos y propietarios, Ciudad de Buenos Aires. 234 One of them was harinero Juan Antonio Carrega, who arrived in Buenos Aires around 1796 and married a local woman; by 1804, he possessed a furnished home and three servants. The 1807 census featured Carlos Sibello, a pasta producer who had left Cadiz in 1801 and married in Buenos Aires. Fideero Alexandro Imbalde, who arrived in the 1780s and married Buenos Aires-born Fernanda Fulco (probably the daughter of Genoese Bartolomé Fulco), lived in the 7th neighborhood. He was once again listed as a fideero in the 1816 census, while the 1827 one did not specify his occupation: by then he was 79 years old and had probably retired, AGN, X, 9-5-5 and 23-5-5. 235 AGN, X, 23-5-5. 236 AGN, X, 9-5-5. 237 On April 1, 1805 Granea (Granara) claimed again to have ordered his wife to dispose of all their belongings in Cadiz and join him in Buenos Aires; he also

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 129–131

272

238 239 240 241 242 243 244

245

246

247 248 249

250

251

252

believed that she was already on her way, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Documentos para la historia, 205–6. AGN, X, 23-5-5. See also Garavaglia and Marchena, América Latina, 268. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Documentos para la historia, 163. Ibid., 145. For the district’s history, see Cunietti Ferrando, San José de Flores; Casella de Calderón, “Barrios porteños”; Cutolo, Historia de los barrios. AGN, IX, 18–8-11, Comercio y Padrones de esclavos, n.d. AGN, Sucesiones, 5592, Testamentaria de Don Luis Naón, 1844. In the following years, the family would consolidate its fortunes in farming and trade through kinship alliances. Two of Luis Naón’s five children, Carlos and Ángela, married – respectively – María and José Capanegra, the children of wealthy Genoese quintero Agustín, ibid. Francisco Montar and Agustín Capanegra are listed in the 1816 Buenos Aires census as quintero and farm worker respectively, AGN, X, 9-5-5. In 1827, 70-year-old Benito Angenelo claimed to have moved in Buenos Aires in 1775 and to have married Rosario Neira there. At the time, they lived in their quinta with two children: 26-year-old Tiburcio, married to 19-yearold Ana Barbosa, who had given birth to Bartolo two years earlier, and 23year-old Juana who was unmarried. A Chilean laborer also lived with them, AGN, X, 23-5-5. In the 1827 census, 48-year-old Repetto declared to have moved in Buenos Aires in 1803. At the time, he was married with 32-year-old Carmen Burgueño and had six children between 5 months and 12 years of age, ibid. AGN, X, 9-5-5. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Documentos para la historia, 187. AGN, Sucesiones, 7783, Testamentaria de Don Bartolo Rizo, 1819. See also AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 7, 1819-1820-I, Testamento de D. Bartolo Rizo, 77 b, Buenos Aires, October 13, 1819. The 1827 Buenos Aires census ranked him as a 53-year-old Genoa-native unmarried harinero. He declared to have arrived in Buenos Aires in 1817, AGN, X, 23-5-5. The 1827 census attests that Fontana had arrived twelve years earlier and ranks him as a 40-year-old widower living in calle Plata 289, AGN, X, 23-55. After the death of Bartolo Rizo, Fontana cleared his debt to Rizo’s son, Juan José, AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 7, 1819–20, no.1, Escritura de reconocimiento de D. Manuel Fontana a favor de D. Juan José Rizo, Buenos Aires, August 7, 1820, 153b. Roberto Lopez, for instance, reports that in Syria and in Palestine the Genoese had cultivated small suburban orchards (which the Arabs called “gardens”) since the twelfth century. To fulfill food demand from the colonies and by exploiting local slaves, they also cultivated cotton and sugar cane in their country houses and this activity complemented their mercantile interests, Lopez, Storia delle colonie, 81. The presence of owners of vineyards is also attested in Pera and in Mitilene, Pistarino, Chio dei genovesi, 305; Roccatagliata, Notai genovesi in Oltremare, no. 26–9. A much larger

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 131–132

253

254 255 256

257

258

259 260

261

273

number of Genoese “market gardeners” could be found in the hamlets and quarters of the isle of Chios in the fifteenth-century; they cultivated many viridaria, which they either owned (often by marrying Greek women) or managed under emphyteusis or on behalf of the Maona, Argenti, The Occupation of Chios, 739–42, 765–6, 791, 803, 813, 895; Pistarino, Chio dei genovesi, 169–70; Rovere, “Documenti della Maona,” 487. Cayetano Cheirasco y Vico, Manuel Derqui y Tasara, Antonio Olivares and Damian Tomati still featured amongst Cadiz hacendados of Ligurian descent in 1830, Guía General de Forasteros de Cádiz para el año de 1830. AST, Mazzo Consolati Nazionali Cadice 1790–1835, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, April 23, 1815. AST, Mazzo Consolati Nazionali Cadice 1790–1835, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, January 24, 1817. AMC, Padrones, c. 6630, 1819. According to the 1819 census, the Genoese settlement in the district of Extramuros comprised 92 individuals, being the most consistent after that of Santa María (111). AHPC, Not. San Fernando 8, Testamento de Juana Patrona mujer de Eugenio Patrón, 1734, 22–3; AHPC, Not. San Fernando 8, Testamento de Eugenio Patrón vecino de esta Isla, 1734, 24–6; AHPC, Not. San Fernando 49, Testamento de Telmo Patrón de nación genovés vecino de la Real Isla de León y natural de Utre de la República de Génova de estado casado, 1775, 168–70; AHPC, Not. San Fernando 128, Testamento de Eugenio Patrón Maza, 1798, 25–30; AHPC, Not. San Fernando 128, Testamento de Telmo Patrón, 1799, 635–8; AHPC, Not. San Fernando 137, Testamento de Juan Bautista Patrón Caneba, 1800, 550–3; AHPC, Not. San Fernando 163, Testamento de Domingo Patrón, 1806, 25–30. Recent Argentinian historiography has re-evaluated the role played by livestock farming within the bonaerense rural economy during the colonial age by highlighting the importance of wheat, production of which did not decline until the 1820s. Amongst the many works on this subject, see for instance: Fradkin, “Producción y arrendamiento”; Amaral and Ghio, “Diezmos y producción”; García Belsunce, “Diezmos y producción agrícola”; Garavaglia and Gelman, El mundo rural rioplatense; Amaral, The Rise of Capitalism; Mayo, Estancia y sociedad; Garavaglia, “Un siglo de estancias.” Mayo, “Landed but not powerful.” Although incomplete, the lists – originating from notarial deeds written between the second half of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century – of landowners living in Buenos Aires’s rural partidos attest a sporadic Genoese presence, Garavaglia, “La economía rural.” On the issue of access to the land ownership, see also Garavaglia and Gelman, “Rural history.” For the Río de la Plata’s case, see Raul Fradkin’s work, which underlines the persistent pliability of traditional farming strategies to new economic developments demands in the wake of independence, Fradkin, “Contratos rurales.” For other geographical contexts and an overview of the matter, see Aymard, “Autoconsommation et marches”; Bouchard, “Trois chemins”; Domínguez Martín, “Caracterizando al campesinado”; Hubscher, Integración del capesinado.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

274

Notes to pp. 132–143

262 Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Documentos para la historia, 121. 263 In 1801 Spain, in agreement with France, invaded Portugal to force it to break its alliance with Great Britain. 264 Santiago Perfumo, Felipe Corbero, Juan de Dios Furco, Manuel Corbeta, Juan Vigna, Juan Busquias, Antonio Peneo, Pedro Bocon, Santiago Balerga, Simon e Juan Granea, Andrés Canebaro, and Josef Bribo, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Documentos para la historia, 191 ff. 265 Ibid., 198–213. At least seven out of the thirteen Genoese hit by the measure (Juan de Dios Furco, Juan Vigna, Pedro Bocon, Simon and Juan Granea, and Andrés Canebaro) featured in later Buenos Aires censuses.

Chapter 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19

20

Assereto, “I Viva Maria.” Bulferetti and Costantini, Industria e Commercio, 261. Ibid., 300–42. Assereto, “Coscrizione e politica militare,” 308–10. Gabriele, “L’armamento italiano,” 669; Bulferetti and Costantini, Industria e Commercio, 272–3. Assereto, “Coscrizione e politica militare,” 314–5. Assereto, “Problemi amministrativi,” 327. Giacchero, Genova e la Liguria, 23. Assereto, “Dalla fine della repubblica,” 517. Marchese, “L’industria armatoriale,”11. Guglielmino, Genova dal 1814, 51 ff. Giacchero, Genova e la Liguria, 40–1, 49. Assereto, “Dall’antico regime”; Montale, Mito e realtà, 10–1. Bulferetti and Costantini, Industria e Commercio, 378–81. Guglielmino, Genova dal 1814, 89. Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 390–4. Halperín Donghi, Reforma y disolución, 81 ff. Only a few great merchants of Montevideo formally protested against the persisting lack of restrictions to foreign trade. In 1802, they presented a plea to the Consulado of Buenos Aires in which they accused the foreigners for the ruin of the honest merchants who had prospered in the Río de la Plata by investing their capital in legal trade with Europe: among the document’s signers were José Pascual Parodi and Carlos Camuso, AGN, IX, Gobierno, Comerciales, 31-1-9, leg. 3, exp. 3. Halperín Donghi, Revolución y guerra, 47. Out of seventeen ships, five were Genoese, three Ottoman, three AngloAmerican, three Danish, two Spanish, and one from Hamburg, AGI, Gobierno Buenos Aires, 125, no. 201, Razón de los buques que han entrado en este puerto con bandera neutral en virtud del permiso que concede la R.O. del 18 de noviembre de 1797 hasta esta fecha (24 de diciembre de 1798). De Gandía, Buenos Aires colonial, 45, 75. ASG, AS, 2672A, Il Console Generale della Repubblica Ligure in Cadice Andrea Gherardi all’Incaricato d’Affari presso S.M.C. [Ottavio Sappia], November 16, 1798.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 143–145

275

21 Amongst the ships that entered the port of Montevideo during the first months of 1799, seventeen were from Spain, followed by those sailing under the flag of the United States (four), Portugal (three), Genoa (two) and Great Britain (one), AGI, Gobierno Buenos Aires, 366, Relación de las embarcaciones que han entrado y salido de este puerto desde el 9 de enero último hasta hoy día de la fecha, Joseph de Bustamante y Guerra, Montevideo, June 22, 1799. 22 They were Antonio Gansen, José María Gavaso, Antonio Vasallo, and Nicolás Garsiolo, Alfonso Mola, “Los navieros naturalizados,” 212–4. 23 For a list of bankrupt houses of trade, see García-Baquero González, Comercio colonial, 219–42. 24 In 1819, the Bishop of Cadiz was still asking wealthy vecinos to continue giving money to charities aiding the poor and the sick converging on the city due to the spreading of the disease, AGI, Consulados, leg. 98, Impresos y documentos varios y curiosos (1771–1849), Francisco Xavier Obispo de Cádiz a los piadosos habitantes de Cádiz, September 18, 1819. Consul Gherardi estimated that 1,940 people had died in the district of Cadiz between the 1st and 29th of October 1819 and that there were 10,989 sick, AST, Mazzo Consolati Nazionali, Cadice 1790–1835, Andrea Gherardi, Cadice, October 22, 1819. 25 Ruiz Rivera, El Consulado de Cádiz, 101. 26 Ibid., 99–100. They were Juan Bautista Canepa, Santiago Cristóbal Castañeto, Cayetano Saturnino Castelli, Gerónimo Enrile Guerci (whose business – however – had folded), Joaquín María Maza, José Ramón Recaño, and Sebastián Peñasco. 27 The witnesses signed by local dealers in support of candidates’ applications to access the Carrera de Indias attest these ties. Around 1804 Joaquín María Maza had also registered with the Carrera, AGI, Consulados, L. 447, Matrícula de comerciantes (1800–1825). 28 Ruiz Rivera, El Consulado de Cádiz, 97–8. 29 AGI, Consulados, leg. 893. 30 Ibid. 31 AGI, Consulados, L. 450, year 1805–6; AGI, Consulados, leg. 893; AGI, Consulados, leg. 915, Calificación de embarcaciones, Cádiz, 1804; AHPC, Not. Cádiz, 0048, Testamento de Domingo [Vallarino] Colombo, 1803. 32 AGI, Consulados, leg. 893. Marzán’s house of trade remained operational in Cadiz at least until 1817, Guía General de los forasteros de Cádiz para el año de 1817. 33 AGI, Consulados, L. 445. 34 AGI, Consulados, leg. 893; AGI, Consulados, libro 450, 1805–6. 35 AGI, Consulados, L. 450, years 1805–6. 36 AGI, Consulados, leg. 893; AHPC, Not. Cádiz, c. 454, Poder para testar D. Benito Patrón a Félix Parodi, 1822. 37 See e.g., Annino, Castro Leiva, and Guerra, dirs., De los Imperios; Mc Farlane and Posada Carbó, Independence and Revolution. For an overview, see Bethell, ed., The Cambridge History. 38 For a detailed account of the revolutionary wars in the Río de la Plata, see e.g. Adelman, Republic of Capital, chap. 4.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

276

Notes to pp. 145–149

39 AGI, Indiferente, leg. 2642, Comercio libre de extrangeros y America (1810–1811), Cádiz, March 1810. 40 AGI, Jueces de Arribadas, leg. 209A, Órdenes e informes sobre licencia de embarco, Cádiz, 18 August 1810. 41 AGI, Consulados, leg. 891. 42 AHPC, Not. Cádiz 4587, Partición del dinero, vales reales, alajas de plata y oro y muebles hallados al fallecimiento de D. Juan Bautista Cheyrasco y Vico, y de una casa, situada en la calle del Ángel, Barrio de la Viña de esta ciudad, quedando pendientes las demás fincas y un solar en el Puerto de Santa María, la fábrica de medias con sus utensilios, los efectos existentes en el almazen y en la casa y tienda, y en la Américas, y los créditos en el Consulado y en la Junta Provincial de esta Plaza,1812, 912–91. 43 Fisher, “Commerce and the imperial decline.” 44 López Miguel and Mirabet Cucala, “Institucionalización de la Matrícula,” 217–39. 45 AGI, Cosulados, leg. 62, exp. 11, Representación del Consulado de Cádiz sobre el problema de la emigración de la marinería al extrangero, June 17, 1804. In 1812, Minister Vázquez Figueroa complained that salaries had decreased so much that it was impossible not to detect in every seaman’s appearance the signs of an “utter starvation.” Over that same period, Captain General of the Department of Cadiz José de Quevedo bitterly noted “the miserable condition of all the branches of the Royal Navy, which lay abandoned beyond imagination,” De Salas, Historia de la matrícula, 234–43. 46 AHN, Estado, 6186, no. 14, Expediente sobre arresto de algunos individuos genoveses en Cádiz y destinados al servicio de las armas, 1803; AHN, Estado, 6186, n. 30, Sobre reclamación de 8 marineros Ligures detenidos forzosamente en Málaga, 1805. 47 AHN, Estado, 6186, n. 27, Sobre enganche de marinería genovesa, 1805. 48 AGI, Consulados, leg. 98, Impresos y documentos varios y curiosos (1771–1849), Bartolomé Muñoz, Madrid, July 6, 1807. 49 AST, Mazzo Consolati Nazionali Cadice, 1790–1835, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, June 10, 1817. 50 Decreto XLVII. Se extinguen las matrículas de mar y se establecen reglas para la navegación y el servicio militar de Marina, in Colección de Decretos y Órdenes Generales de la primera legislatura de las Cortes Ordinarias de 1820 y 1821 desde 6 de julio hasta 9 de noviembre de 1820, Tomo IV, Madrid, Imprenta Nacional, 1821. 51 Silva, “Comercio exterior.” 52 For an in-depth analysis of the British invasions in the Río de la Plata, Gallo, Invasiones inglesas. See also Blow Williams, “Establishment of British Commerce,” and Burne Goebel, “British trade.” 53 In this respect, see, for example Chiaramonte, Ciudades, provincias, estados; Chiaramonte, “Formas de identidad”; and Chiaramonte, Federalismo argentino. See also the classic overview by Burgin, Aspectos económicos. For an updated overview of Argentina’s fraught independence process, see Gelman, coord., Argentina. Crisis imperial.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 149–154 54 55 56 57 58 59

60 61

62 63

64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71

72

73

74

277

Beverina, Virreinato de las provincias, 318 ff. Halperín Donghi, Revolución y guerra, 137. Beverina, Virreinato de las provincias, 329 ff. Ibid., 341. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Documentos para la historia, 213 ff. Even José and Matheo Oliveros, who worked and lived together, separated, and enlisted – respectively – in the Miñones (Catalan) and in Vizcaínos battalions. Johnson, Workshop of Revolution, 149, 172–3, 267. AGI, Gobierno Buenos Aires, leg. 589, Audiencia de Buenos Aires, Expedientes del Consulado de Comercio (1807–1836), Al Ser.mo Príncipe Ser.mo Almirante, Bartolomé Cattaneo y Compañía, Aranjuez, February 17, 1807; Ibid. Sala Capitular de Buenos Aires, September 9, 1806; ibid. exp. 481, Buenos Aires, March 17, 1808. Petriella and Sosa Miatello, Diccionario biográfico, 45–6. AGI, Gobierno, Buenos Aires, leg. 29, Provisiones de empleos políticos y militares (1810–1825), Aprobando el nombramiento de D. Juan José Canaveri para la plaza de Oficial escribiente de aquel Tribunal de Cuentas, Buenos Aires, February 17, 1810. Chiaramonte, Crítica ilustrada, 119 ff., and 155 ff. For a thorough analysis of the porteño elite’s positions toward independence, see Jumar, “Comercio, comerciantes y revolución.” Halperín Donghi, Reforma y disolución, 159. For further details about Manuel Belgrano, see Pigna, Manuel Belgrano. Sergi, Historia de los Italianos, 58; see also Piccirilli, Romay, and Gianello, Diccionario Histórico Argentino, t. 2, 468–470. Sergi, Historia de los Italianos, 63. On the Río de la Plata’s privateering expeditions, see De Marco, Corsarios Argentinos. AGN, III, División Contaduría Nacional 33, Listas de Revista 1810–1811– 1812. The census registers 113 Italian individuals, forty-six of them specifically declared to be Genoese, AGN, X, 9-5-5. José Caneva, Victor Furno, Antonio Carrega, Bartolomé Fulco, Domingo Gallino, Francisco Turpia, Miguel Viancarlo, as well as Piedmontese Diego and Carlos Marengo. Salvador Lorano, Francisco Siervo, Francisco Pérez, Joaquín Pintos, José María Acosta, Crefour, Nicolás Picaluga, Juan Acosta, Luis Coperón, and Manuel Carpintero. The names of José Olivares, Antonio Buti, Francisco Basso, J. B. Bucardo, Juan Maza, Simón Granea, and Carlos Maneto are already known, whilst Ambrogio Oneto, Santiago Maza, and Juan Guilloto are amongst the new arrivals. For example, Francisco Segoyerva (a.k.a. as Segalerba) and Bartolo Risso, who once were tenant farmers partners, were now listed as independent quinteros. Furthermore, the 1804 census listed Francisco Montarrel (a.k.a. as Montar) Andrés Caneva and Benito Anjenero (a.k.a. as Angenelo) as tenant

Published online by Cambridge University Press

278

75 76 77 78 79 80 81

82 83 84

85 86 87 88 89

90

91 92

93 94 95 96

97

Notes to pp. 154–158

farmers, but they were now listed as quinteros. Juan Vigna, formerly a meat warehouse employer, and Luis Naón, who had been self-employed for many years, were also listed as quinteros. Agustín Capanegra and Sebastián Casanova (listed as pig breeders in 1804) were featured as farm workers. Pedro Basalo and Miguel Seudán. Di Meglio, “Soldados de la revolución,” 44–5. See also Di Meglio, “Os habéis hecho temibles,” and Halperín Donghi, “Militarización revolucionaria.” Di Meglio, “Soldados de la revolución,” 46. Garavaglia, “Ejército y milicia,” 165. Ibid., 159. Ibid., 166–70. During the restoration, only a few Ligurian shipyards in Varazze, Sestri Ponente, and Foce transcended the small dimensions of the traditional family-based system, Marchese, “L’industria ligure,” 1. Giacchero, Genova e la Liguria, 58–63. Sánchez Mantero, Estudios Sobre Gibraltar, 84. AHPC, Not. Cádiz 459, Protesto Dom. Ant. Jordán Oneto y Cia contra Tomás Ravina, May 30, 1825, 488–9; AHPC, Not. Cádiz 459, Protesto Dom. Ant. Jordán y Cia contra Tomás Ravina, June 6, 1825, 518–9. AST, Mazzo Consolati Nazionali Cadice, 1790–1835, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, March 7, 1817. AHN, Estado, leg. 6183–1, Juan Bautista Gavazzo al Conde de Alafia Primer Secretario de Estado y del Despacho Universal, Genoa, August 3, 1824. AHN, Estado, leg. 6183–1, Isidoro de Montenegro, Genoa, March 21, 1825. Mariano and Sacchi, “Formazione della rete consolare.” In 1831, the register of the port of Genoa attest the presence of fourteen Sardinian ships bound to Brazil and of seventeen bound to Argentina, Bulferetti and Costantini, Industria e Commercio, 401 ff. In 1833, thirty-three out of forty-four Sardinian ships sailing between Genoa and the Americas were employed on commercial voyage to Buenos Aires and Montevideo, ASG, Sanità, 1594. Kroeber, Navegación de los ríos, 131. AGI, Indiferente, leg. 2465, Real orden sobre comercio por los extrangeros, El Rey, Madrid, March 10, 1824. For further details, see Fisher, El comercio entre España e Hispanoamérica, 55–9. For a careful analysis of the colonial trade crisis during this period, see also Alfonso Mola, “El tráfico marítimo.” Alfonso Mola, “La guerre et les transformations.” AGI, Buenos Aires, 589, José de Riquena y José de Vea Murguía al Señor Intendente de esta Provincia, Cadiz, June 7, 1822. AST, Mazzo Consolati Nazionali Cadice, 1790–1835, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, April 23, 1815. AST, Mazzo Consolati Nazionali Cadice, 1790–1835, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, June 10, 1817. See also AST, Mazzo Consolati Nazionali Cadice, 1790–1835, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, March 7, 1817. “All foreign subjects are allowed to join Arts and Crafts Guilds and corporations regulated by ordenanzas; by taking the required exam and by paying the agreed fee, they are allowed to call themselves maestros, keep shop, hire

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 159–161

279

laborers and are to be treated as Spanish citizen, except for the fact that they are not allowed to move to and trade with the Americas without special license. License to trade with the Her Majesty’s Americas is accorded to all foreigners’ Spanish-born children,” AST, Mazzo Consolati Nazionali Cadice, 1790–1835, Andrea Gherardi, Cadiz, June 10, 1817. 98 With regards to the protectionist stance of Spanish maritime trade, see García-Baquero González, Comercio colonial, 246. 99 Whilst witnessing incredulously such events, the Neapolitan consul in Cadiz enthusiastically reported that trade with Gibraltar was completely paralyzed, ASNA, Affari Esteri, Regio Console Napoli a Cadice, 1820–1829, fascio 2483, Marco Macchiavelli al Cav. De’ Medici, no. 17, Cadiz, June 30, 1829; see also ASNA, Affari Esteri, Regio Console Napoli a Cadice, 1815–1829, fascio 2480, Marco Macchiavelli al Cav. De’ Medici, no. 4, Cadice, February 24, 1829. 100 For a thorough analysis – based on the Cadiz mercantile journal El Diario de la Vigía – of shipments carried out by Sardinian vessels and for a prosopographic profile of the Genoese consignees in the Spanish port, see Brilli, “Da Cadice a Buenos Aires.” 101 Ibid. 102 Diario marítimo del Vigía, Cadiz, June 1, 1835. 103 Diario marítimo del Vigía, Cadiz, October 9, 1830; ibid., January 15, 1836. 104 ASNA, Affari Esteri, Regio Console Napoli a Cadice, 1830–1839, fascio 2485, Marco Macchiavelli a S.E. il Principe di Cassaro Ministro Segretario di Stato degli Affari Esteri Napoli, no. 46, Cadiz, August 8, 1837. 105 Diario marítimo del Vigía, Cadiz, January 21, 1830. 106 AHN, Estado, leg. 6183–1, Joseph Martínez, Genoa, January 3, 1824. 107 For a close examination of the arguments in support of the free port, see the proposal sent to the King by the Consulado de Comercio of Cadiz on December 23, 1828 proposing its foundation, in ASNA, Affari Esteri, Regio Console Napoli a Cadice, Diversi, 1815–1829, fascio 2480, Il Duca di Floridia Principe di Partanna a S.E. il Sig. Cav. Luigi de’ Medici, no. 340, Madrid, April 4, 1829. 108 Alongside the arrivals of Sardinian ships recorded by the Diario de la Vigía, the 1834 dispatches sent by the French and the Sardinian consuls in the Río de la Plata attest this, Chiaramonte, “Notas sobre la presencia,” 55–6. More specifically, the French consul reported that the Sardinian acted primarily as intermediaries between Spain and the Río de la Plata, but Chiaromonte has argued that such evaluations underestimated the weight of exports from Genoa, Chiaramonte, Mercaderes del Litoral, 95. Spain’s persisting dependency on Sardinian ships for the Río de la Plata importations is also attested by a plea written by Cadiz’s merchants in 1837 and addressed to the Navy Minister, Brilli, “The Genoese response,” 267. 109 In 1843, only five ships entered the port, Molina, “L’emigrazione Ligure,” 371. 110 Ibid., 377. 111 Blinn Reber, “British mercantile houses,”297.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

280

Notes to pp. 162–169

112 ASNA, Affari Esteri, Consolati in Brasile, fascio 2472, Luciano Somma a Cassaro Ministro degli Affari Esteri di Napoli, no. 88, Genoa, August 24, 1833. 113 ASNA, Affari Esteri, Consolati in Brasile, fascio 2472, Segretario di Stato delle Finanze al Segretario di Stato degli Affari Esteri, Naples, August 28, 1839. 114 Bulferetti and Costantini, Industria e Commercio, 397 ff. 115 Assereto, “Problemi della transizione,” 335. 116 Felloni, Popolazione e sviluppo, 177 ff.; Bulferetti and Costantini, Industria e Commercio, part 3, chaps. 1–2; Giacchero, Genova e la Liguria, vol. 1, chaps. 1–2. 117 Garibbo, Politica, amministrazione, 41. 118 Bertolotti, Viaggio nella Liguria marittima, 233. 119 By the end of the Napoleonic wars, the Ligurian population started to increase again and continued to grow along the first half of the nineteenth century, Giacchero, Genova e la Liguria, 91 ff.

Chapter 5 1 Rosal and Schmit, “Exportaciones pecuarias”; and Lynch, “Repúblicas del Río de la Plata.” 2 Schmit and Rosal, “Exportaciones del Litoral,” 581–607. 3 In 1783, the colonial authorities founded the ports of Gualeguay, Concepción del Uruguay and Gualeguaychú to promote the colonization of the Banda Oriental and Entre Ríos coasts, Kroeber, Navegación de los ríos, 56. 4 Silva, “Comercio exterior,”183–221. 5 Halperín Donghi, Reforma y disolución, 275–90; Lynch, “Repúblicas del Río de la Plata”; Schmit and Rosal, “Política comercial.” 6 Blow Williams, “Establishment of British commerce.” See also Herrera, La misión Ponsonby; Winn, “British informal empire.” 7 Rosal and Schmit, Comercio, mercados e integración; Schmit, “Comercio y mercado”; Rosal and Schmit, “Exportaciones pecuarias”; Schmit and Djenderedjan, “Sociedad y economía”; Schmit, “Enlaces conflictivos”; Tedeschi, “Santa Fe en el litoral.”Paraguay’s case partially differs in that – due to the war and to its political consequences – the region experienced greater trade isolation at least until the 1840s, Whigham, Politics of River Trade. 8 Wentzel, “El comercio del ‘Litoral de los Ríos’.” 9 Garavaglia, “La economía rural.” 10 Halperín Donghi, “La expansión ganadera,” 59 ff. 11 Vogel, “New citizens,” 127. 12 Estatuto Provisional para Dirección y Administración del Estado, Junta de Observación, Buenos Aires in Ravignani, Asembleas Constituyentes, 638. 13 Vogel, “New citizens,” 128. 14 Zorraquín Becú, Historia del derecho, 228. 15 Lynch, “Foreign Trade.” 16 Halperín Donghi, Revolución y guerra, 95. See also Ferns, “Investment and trade.”

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 169–173

281

17 Between 1825 and 1850, France quadrupled the volume of its trade with the Río de la Plata; wool, silk, cotton, and wine exports fostered a mass migration, which was mainly made of individuals of Basque descent and which – in turn – stimulated the demand of French products, Lynch, “Foreign trade,”147. 18 Street, “Lord Strangford.” The influence of British diplomacy in a context lacking bilateral and formally recognized relationships lay in the early evolution of the functions attributed to British consuls who, having initially focused mainly on trade matters, had rapidly extended their political and diplomatic reach over strategically relevant or politically unstable areas such as Turkey, Russia, the Berber States, the Far East and, above all, Central and Southern America, Platt, “Role of the British.” 19 Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Instrumentos internacionales, 1957. 20 One of the first tangible signs of such cohesion was the purchase, in 1820, of a piece of land in Buenos Aires to be used as a cemetery. Following the 1825 trade treaty, which sanctioned the free exercise of the Protestant religion both in public and in private, the British started building their own church, which was consecrated in 1838, Humphreys, British Consular Reports, 39–42. 21 Anonymous, Un inglés. 22 Navarro Viola, El club de residentes, 10–5. 23 In 1836, out of the 358 ships which entered the port of Montevideo, 57 were from Sardinia, 62 from Brazil, 58 from Great Britain, 50 from the United States, 40 from France, 17 from Spain and 13 from Portugal, Chiaramonte, Mercaderes del Litoral, 95. A similar pattern was noticeable in Brazil, where French diplomat Alexis de Guest noted that the Sardinian ships employed on transatlantic routes were second in number only to those from Britain and the United States, Vangelista, “Traders and workers,” 37. 24 Ruiz Moreno, Orígenes de la diplomacia, 22. 25 Weiss, Carlo Alberto. 26 AST, Consolati nazionali, Montevideo, Mazzo 1, 1836–1850, Picolet d’Hermillon a S.E. Le Comte Solar de la Marguerite Ministre des Relations Etrangéres, Buenos Aires, July 3, 1836. 27 Chiaramonte, Mercaderes del Litoral, 93 and 251 (note 10). According to Domenico Ruocco’s calculations, around 30,000 Ligurians lived along the two shores of the Río de la Plata, especially in Montevideo and in Buenos Aires, Ruocco, “Emigrazione dalla Liguria,” 7. 28 By the eighteenth century, London and Liverpool had already launched plans to modernize the ports, Palmer, “The eighteenth century ports.” 29 Piccinno, “Economia marittima,” 123. For a detailed consideration of the technical skills and expertise of the pilots in the port of Genoa and, more broadly, on the development of boaters, see Dondero, L’Arte dei barcaioli. 30 This is the case of Juan Caneva who as noted earlier, continued to trade successfully despite retiring from coastal shipping in 1817. 31 The warehouse keys had been handed to Manuel Repetto, who owned a pulpería opposite the building. AGN, Sucesiones, 5702, Testamento de Pedro Fontana, 1839.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

282

Notes to pp. 173–175

32 AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 1 1829–30, Testamento de Juan Quiquisola, Buenos Aires, April 1829. A list of ships berthing at the port of Buenos Aires attests that, in 1828, Esteban Chichisola undertook four expeditions to Montevideo on board the sloop Intrépida and four expeditions to Vacas on board the flatboat María de los Dolores to deliver fruit and wood (see Table A.9). 33 De Arcos, Los intereses marítimos, 663 ff.; Socolow, “Buenos Aires,” 252. 34 Kroeber, Navegación de los ríos, 82 ff. 35 In 1851, vice-consul Belloc reported that “a visitor to the Buenos Aires suburb of Boca would see a small-size town of 2,000–2,500 souls inhabited exclusively by – mostly adult – Ligurians working as carpenters, caulkers, smiths, joiners, sail and rope producers, seafarers, rusk and biscuits producers, innkeepers, grocers, butchers, haberdashers, tailors and shoemakers; as if by magic, on hearing the Genoese dialect, the traveler would think that he had been transported to the coasts of industrious Liguria,” quoted in Chiaramonte, Mercaderes del Litoral, 93. See also Devoto, “Orígenes de un barrio italiano.” 36 Chiaramonte, Mercaderes del Litoral, note 7, 251. 37 Ibid., 134–5. 38 Domingo Colombo declared in the 1827 census that he had arrived in Buenos Aires nineteen years earlier, AGN, X, 23-5-5. 39 In 1816, he made two expeditions on board the balandra N.S del Rosario, whilst, in 1818, he was captain of the longboat S. Antonio, AGN, X, 36-8-10. 40 Carlos Galliano lived with his 50-years-old wife Ana Esquesa and his 20-yearold daughter Luisa Galliano (both born in Savona). A large group of Genoese lived near the Galliano family (it is unclear whether in the same house or in nearby dwellings) and probably worked for them. The group included: Francisco Sanguineti, who had arrived in Buenos Aires six years earlier; day laborer Domingo Quarlin, who had been in Buenos Aires eight years; corsair captain Cristóbal Carnilia, who had emigrated the previous year; patrons José and Francisco Murature, who had settled in Buenos Aires in 1813 and 1816 respectively (one of them must have married Galliano’s daughter, given that the census registered her and her two-months-old daughter Rosa Murature); and, finally, young pulpero José Pellegrino. Domingo Colombo resided at a separate address, in calle Alameda 73, AGN, X, 23-5-5. 41 AGN, Sucesiones, 4864, Testamento de Domingo Costa, 1840. Costa also owned a house in calle 25 de Mayo. 42 AGN, X, 36-8-6. 43 Boasi purchased the 50-tons schooner Aurora, 122-tons schooner Bella Dominga, 124-tons polacra sail vessel Goleta Adelaida and 80-tons schooner Adelaida, AGN, X, 36-8-2, 36-8-3, 36-8-6. 44 AGNBA Not. 3, 1820, Poder de D. Carlos Gallardo [Galleano] a Geronimo Signo [Zinotto] y otro, Buenos Aires, May 22, 1820. 45 Between 1841 and 1848 he was registered as the owner of at least seven ships, including three schooners (121-tons “Luisa,” 50-tons Ana Constancia and 28tons Amalia), two barges (7-tons Pepito and 10-tons Sancho Panza), 22-tons balandra Carmen and 6-tons balandra Providencia, AGN, X, 36-8-2, 36-8-3, 368-6.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 175–177

283

46 In 1842, Galliano acted as cargador on three different Sardinian vessels: the Luisa, Maria, and Rosa schooners, piloted by captains Cavagnaro, Chaparro, and Costa respectively, AGN, X, 17–4-1. 47 Petriella and Sosa Miatello, Diccionario biográfico, 891. 48 AGN, X, 23-5-5. In the 1827 census, Francisco Murature claimed to be 44 (whilst José was 24). They were both born in Alassio and, like Galliano, resided in calle de la Alameda, quarter 1 and declared to be shipping patrons. 49 AGN, Procololos, Reg. 7, 1822–23, Declaratoria D. Bartolo Luqui sobre una casa comprada a D. Marcos Pagliano como apoderado de D. Bartolomé Pagliano su hermano, Buenos Aires, 290 b ff. 50 AGN, Tribunal Comercial, Letra P, leg. 248 (1808–1819), D. Marcos Pagliano con Manuel Francisco Alfonso Dorrego, Buenos Aires, June 26, 1819. It was a suit that Pagliano filed against Dorrego to claim payment for equipping a shipment commissioned to him by Dorrego. 51 The relatives were Manuel Fontana’s grandchildren Luis, Agustín and Teresa Fontana, Ángel Viale (Manuel Viale’s son), José Furno, Luis Bertolotto, Francisco Poggio, José Celasco, and Domingo Vivada. On board there were also passengers, Luis Consigliero and Francisco Botaro (who boarded in Gibraltar), a stock of furniture and clothes, eight crates of paccottiglia and a batch of silk handkerchiefs ordered by Levrero to profit from the sale of imported goods. The suit also reveals passage costs: Francisco Levrero negotiated four 500 pesos passages, while Furno managed to purchase four 800 pesos passages. Fontana only paid his nephew’s 500 pesos passage. Finally, there is mention of an anonymous child whose 120 pesos voyage to Buenos Aires was organized by his father, whose name is not specified, AGN, Tribunal Comercial, Letra P, leg. 249 (1820–1824), Demanda por D. Bartolomé Pagliano Capitán del Bergantín sardo “Amor Constante” contra D. Manuel Fontana sobre cobro de pasaje de varios individuos que condujo desde Genoba a bordo de dicho buque, Buenos Aires, 1823. 52 AGN, X 36-7-22 bis, 36-8-2, 36-8-9, 36-8-10. The 1824–27 data has not been collected and no data is available for the previous years. 53 Esteban Chichisola divided his expeditions between Montevideo and Vacas, while Francisco Lanata set up shipments to Mercedes, Gualeguaychú, and S. Salvador. Benito Lanza was active in Vacas, Santa Fe, Soriano, and Bajada, Domingo Olivari operated between Santa Fe, San Pedro and Gualeguaychú, while Francisco Campodonico was active in Gualeguaychú, Vacas, and Montevideo. 54 Carrière, Négociants marseillais; Carrière, Richesse du passé. 55 Lo Basso, “Il Sud dei Genovesi.” 56 Buti, “Cabotage et caboteurs.” For a comprehensive review on coastal shipping in France, see Buti, “Le cabotage dans tous ses états.” 57 AGN, X, 14-9-7, Informe al Comandante General de Marina, Buenos Aires, June 28, 1828. 58 Domingo Grimaldi and Nicolás Siniglia armed their ballenera Provincia Oriental, AGN, X, 14–9-7, Informe al Comandante General de Marina, Buenos Aires, June 27, 1828. See also the cases of the schooner Estrella del

Published online by Cambridge University Press

284

59 60 61 62

63 64 65 66 67 68 69

70 71

72 73

74

75

Notes to pp. 177–181

Sud, the ballenera Convención Argentina, the Trionfo Argentino, the schooner General Brown, the lugger General Lavalle, the ballenera corsario Recompensa, the ballenera corsario Provinciano Oriental, the barge Republicano Argentino, the barge La Venganza de la Carlota, the ballenera corsario Carlota, AGN, X, 4-5-5, 1826–1827, and the ballenera La Liguria, AGN, X, 14-5-1. AGN, X, 14-9-7, Informe al Comandante General de Marina, Buenos Aires, June 22, 1828. For further information on Jaime Llavallol, see Piccirilli, Romay, and Gianello, Diccionario Histórico Argentino, t. 5, 4. AGN, Sucesiones, 6514, Testamento de Benito Lanza, 1850. AGN, X, 17–4-1. During 1842, for example, Llavallol received the cargoes shipped by two Sardinian schooners: the Cuatro Amigos, which came from Montevideo and was captained by Burao, and the San Giorgio, which came from Genoa-Montevideo and was captained by Gianello. In the same year Llavallol featured as cargador on two Sardinian ships: the Romulo, which was captained by Badaracco and bound for Marseilles and the Carolina, which was captained by Piaggio and bound for Genoa. AGN, X, 25-1-2, no. 834. Whigham, Politics of River Trade, 49–50. AGN, Sucesiones, 7795, Testamento de Pedro Roverano, 1838. Chiaramonte, Mercaderes del Litoral, 15–6. Destefani, dir., Autoridades Historia Marítima, 93. Bosch, “Notas sobre la navegación,” 335. Giuliani Balestrino, “La prima immigrazione”; Tarragó, De la orilla. See also Anadón and Murature de Badaracco, Historia de la Matanza-Victoria; Anadón and Murature de Badaracco, La colectividad italiana; Bosch, “Notas sobre la navegación,” 336. Chiaramonte, Mercaderes del Litoral, 92–3. In particular, there were 199 pulperías and shops, 20 tiendas and 25 wholesale outlets and many other businesses, including mills and bakeries, AGN, III, 337-17, Libro de anotación de patentes año 1837. Such figures should be treated as approximate precise because the trader’s nationality can only inferred from the surname. Only manifestly Ligurian surnames have been considered. AGN, Sucesiones, 7783, Testamentaria de Don Bartolo Rizo, 1819. In 1820, a gold ounce corresponded to 42 paper pesos. The value of the currency notably decreased in the following decades: in 1860, the gold ounce was worth 401 paper pesos, Salvatore and Newland, “Between Independence,” 28. AGN, Tribunal Comercial, Letra F, leg. 82 (1821–4), Manuel Fontana sobre que se obligue a D. Antonio Gentile o a quedarse con una pulpería que tienen en sociedad, pagando una deuda a que ella está afecta en favor de D. Marcos Pagliano, o a que venda dicha pulpería para pagar la deuda, Buenos Aires, 1822. AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 7 1822–3, Poder Especial D. Manuel Fontana a D. Juan Bautista Curadin, 35 ff.; AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 7 1822–3, Poder Especial D. Manuel Fontana a D. Blas Antonio Aguero, p. 43 ff.; AGN,

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 181–182

76

77 78

79

80

81

82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92

285

Tribunal Civil, Letra F., leg. 4, D. Manuel Fontana contra D. Lucas Belás por cobro de pesos, 1821. The allotment was purchased for 1,000 pesos and measured 16  17.5 varas, AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 1, 1824–5, Venta de Terreno Cabral D. Jacinto a D. Manuel Fontana, 292 ff. AGN, X, 23-5-5. His testimony features in the aforementioned suit filed by Fontana, Viale and other fellow countrymen against the captain of brigantine Amor Costante, which, by coming close to sinking, had put their relatives’ lives at risk, AGN, Tribunal Comercial, Letra R, leg. 249 (1820–24). In the 1844 shop register of Buenos Aires, he is recorded as a wheat dealer, AGN, X, 41-3-6. AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 1, 1839, Obligación simple n. 311, D. Manuel Fontana a D. Nicolás Vila, May 3, 1839. This was an obligation whereby Fontana paid Vila 10,000 pesos for twelve-years’ service in his house of trade. In the January of that same year, Vila had lent 5,000 pesos to Andrés Granea, the son of aforementioned Ligurian harinero Simón; in exchange for it, Vila obtained as a collateral a mortgage stipulated on a house located in calle del Parque 137 and situated on a 12.5 by 70 varas lot, which Andrés had inherited from his father. The transaction shows that working for Fontana did not entail a completely dependent relationship but was part of a network of independently managed business, AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 1, 1839, Obligación n. 53, D. Andrés Granea a D. Nicolás Vila, January 22, 1839. In 1835, Fontana also liquidated another business, which he had created with Ligurian Felipe Maggiolo, AGN, Tribunal Comercial, Letra M, 1835–36, leg. 187, Incidente del arbitramiento de D. Felipe Maggiolo y D. Manuel Fontana, Buenos Aires, 1835. In 1836 he was listed as the owner of a warehouse, while in 1844 as the owner of a shop selling lime, AGN, III, 337-17, Libro de Anotación de patentes año de 1837; AGN, X, 41-3-6. In 1829, he shipped goods on board a coaster with unknown destination. The 1841 registers of the port ranked him as the owner of the balandra Florentina, AGN, X, 24-1-3; AGN, X, 36–8-6. AGN, IX, Bandos, 8-10-3, Patrón de esclavos y propietarios, Ciudad de Buenos Aires. AGN, Sucesiones, 3481, Testamentaria de Pablo Agnese, 1829. AGN, X, 12-9-3, B. Rivadavia al Síndico de la Parroquia de San José de Flores, Buenos Aires, December 12, 1823. Vogel, “New citizens,” 127–9. AGN, Sucesiones, 6267, Testamentaria de D. Domingo Gallino, 1831. The credit’s repayment was processed by a Governmental Commission in 1831, ibid. AGN, Sucesiones, 3481, Testamentaria de Pablo Agnese, 1829. AGN, III, 33-7-17, Libro de anotación de patentes año, 1837. AGN, X, 36-8-2; AGN, X, 36-8-6. Socolow, Mercaderes del Buenos Aires virreinal, chap. 7. Among his fellow countrymen, there was a Mrs. Canessa (probably married to the already mentioned dealer Antonio Canessa) who owed him money for a pulpería, shipping-magnate Carlos Galliano, Nicolás Villa, the Antonini and

Published online by Cambridge University Press

286

Notes to pp. 182–183

Lorenzini trade company, Santiago Achineli, Antonio Rocca, Francisco Grasso, Juan Bautista Montebianco, Juan Cannellino, and Pancho Villarino. The debtors who resided abroad were Jaime and Carlos María Galeano of Gibraltar, Cayo Marquesi of Rio Grande and Guillermo Platt of Rio de Janeiro, AGN, Sucesiones, 6267, Testamentaria de D. Domingo Gallino, 1831. 93 One of them was his waged business sales agent, Pedro Carrega, who worked for Gallino since 1822 and, after the merchant’s death, opened a bakery in San José de Flores, AGN, Sucesiones, 6267, D. Pedro Carrega contra la testamentaria de D. Domingo Gallino; AGN, X, 41-3-6. Other creditors residing in Buenos Aires were the aforementioned quintero Luis Naón, the baker Francisco Maglioni, and a few captains engaged in costal shipping: Francisco Grasso, Bernardo Solari, and Nicolás Sacaluga. 94 Agnese invested 3,302 pesos in the pulpería, while Repetto invested 1,916 pesos, AGN, Sucesiones, 3481, Testamentaria de Pablo Agnese, 1829. The 1827 Buenos Aires census listed 24-year-old bachelor Repetto as a pulpero, AGN, X, 23-5-5. 95 AGN, Sucesiones, 3481, Testamentaria de Pablo Agnese, 1829. 96 In his testament, Pedro Fontana named his father as his heir and, in case his father died, his cousin Nicolás, AGN, Sucesiones, 5702, Testamento de Pedro Fontana, 1839. 97 AGN, X, 23-5-5. In 1827, 32-year- old and 36-year-old bachelors Nicolás and Josef resided in calle Suipacha 181; they declared that they had arrived in town 8 years earlier and that they were pulperos. 98 AGN, Sucesiones, 5703, Testamento de Nicolás Fontana, 1843. 99 AGN, X, 36-8-6. See also the case of Juan Quiquisola, who migrated to Buenos Aires with his nephew in the early 1820s and invested both in a barge for river shipping and in a pulpería in partnership with Tomás Quin, AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 1, 1829–30, Testamento de Juan Quiquisola, Buenos Aires, April 9, 1829. 100 AGN, Tribunal Comercial, Letra A, leg. 2, (1831–4), D. Ventura arzac y D. Francisco Anzó solicitando se regule el honorario de las cuentas levantadas de la sociedad De Marchi, Viale y Comp. Con el representante de estos D. Miguel Rodríguez, Buenos Aires, 1832. 101 AGN, Tribunal Comercial, Letra V, leg. 408, (1831–4), D. Manuel Viale con la casa de Santiago Marchi sobre liquidación de cuentas de una sociedad, Buenos Aires, 1832. 102 Twenty-eight-year-old Francisco, 26-year-old Francisco Galluzo, 34-yearold Francisco Estarache, 23-year-old N. Agustini, 30-year-old Telmo Cadelago, 28-year-old Cayetano Costa, 24-year-old Antonio Mascardi, 22-yearold José Carasa, 28-year-old Francisco Bolero, and 20-year-old Vicente Lira. Only 62-year-old Andrés Copián was married and labeled as being “Italian,” AGN, X, 23-5-5. 103 In October 1829, he declared to have produced bread for 30,854 pesos; none of city’s fifteen bakeries surveyed a few months earlier (including those run by Genoese Rafael Gallino, Francisco Butaro, Bartolo Luqui, and Francisco Lebrero) reached the 21,900 pesos mark. AGN, 23–7-5, 1829, mes de

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 183–186

104

105

106 107 108 109 110

111

112

113

114 115

116

117

287

octubre, panadería n. 1 Santiago Marchi y Cia; ibid, Relación del pan que se ha elaborado en las panaderías de esta ciudad en el mes de diciembre último, Buenos Aires, January 7, 1829. One of these investment consisted in chartering an English brigantine to import 3,000 fanegas wheat from the Cape of Good Hope, AGN, Tribunal Commercial, Letra M, leg. 185, (1833–4), Santiago Marchi y Cia contra D. Tomás Guillermo Robinson sobre contrata de un trigo venido del Cabo de Buena Esperanza, Buenos Aires, January 24, 1833. AGN, Tribunal Comercial, Letra V, leg. 408, (1831–4), D. Manuel Viale con la casa de Santiago Marchi sobre liquidación de cuentas de una sociedad, Buenos Aires, 1832. Ibid. AGN, X, 41-3-6. A 1844 register lists him as the owner of an harinería featuring a millstone located in calle Federación (present-day Rivadavia), ibid. Viale was elected in the San Miguel of Buenos Aires parish district, AGN, X, 32-2-5, Marzo 1865, Elecciones de Senadores. ASNA, Affari Esteri, Consolati in Brasile, fascio 2472, Il Console Generale Gennaro Merolla al Principe di Cassaro, Segr. di Stato degli Affari Esteri, Rio de Janeiro, December 29, 1838. In particular, see the debate started by Juan Pablo Granea and Vicente Risoto, who owned a starch factory in Buenos Aires, Mariluz Urquijo, Estado e industria, 135–8. On the nature and the consequences of the Ley de Aduana, see Nicolau, Proteccionismo y Libre Comercio, 33–7. Amongst the Buenos Aires Genoese businessmen involved in the wheat trade, José Ferrando, Bartolomé Viale, José Badino and the Nochetti y Morán Company deserve a special mention, Schmit, “Empresarios” en tiempo de guerra, 54–5. Guillamondegui, Justicia consular patria, 21. See also Guillamondegui,“Justicia consular en Buenos Aires.” For a review on the evolution of mercantile law in Europe and the Indias, see Noejovich, “La institución consular.” For recent discussion and updated bibliography on conflict resolution among merchants, see Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce, 102–40. This definition was published in 1821 by the Gaceta de Buenos Aires in response to the doubts cast by an anonymous reader, who had intervened in the debate over the reform of the Consulado and had raised questions on the concept of “buena fe guardada,” Guillamondegui, Justicia consular patria, 21. Financial suits up to 1,000 reales were dealt with verbally and only entailed a summary of the litigants, the evidence that was produced and the sentence; conversely, suits involving bigger sums – the only ones eligible for appeal (a second-degree board commission composed of members of the Consulado and an oidor of the Audiencia or, as a last resort, the Consejo de Indias) entailed a formal report, which included the evidence, the witness statements and the sentence, Crespi and Salles, “Bases y fuentes,” 58. See the article 16 of the 1794 Cédula instituting the Tribunal del Consulado of Buenos Aires, Guillamondegui, Justicia consular patria, 19.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

288

Notes to pp. 186–191

118 For a close examination of casuistic justice in law of the Indias, see Tau Anzoategui, Casuismo y sistema. 119 Crespi and Salles, “Bases y fuentes,” 56. 120 Guillamondegui, Justicia consular patria. 121 Santiago Marchi exemplifies the impact of personal reputation on the mercantile scene. Having sued a Buenos Aires-based British house of trade for increasing the agreed price of a wheat consignment, Marchi claimed that the news of that speculation had already spread in the marketplace and that, as a result, it would have been difficult for the British to regain the local traders’ trust, AGN, Tribunal Comercial, Letra M, leg. 185 (1833–4), D. Santiago Marchi y Cia contra D. Tomás Guillermo Robinson sobre contrata de un trigo venido del Cabo de Buena Esperanza, Buenos Aires, May 9, 1833. 122 Antonino Antonini and Luis De Lorenzo co-owned a shop. An 1844 Buenos Aires traders’ register listed De Lorenzo as the owner of a pulpería in calle Federación n. 404, AGN, X, 41-3-6. 123 AGN, Tribunal Comercial, Letra T, leg. 384 (1820–1828), Antonio Trincavelli y Cia contra Antonini y Luis Lorenzo cobrando ejecutivamente el valor de una letra, Buenos Aires, 1823. 124 Levene, Historia del derecho, 323. 125 Méndez Calzada, La función judicial, 132–3. 126 AGN, Tribunal Comercial, Letra F, leg. 82 (1821–4), Manuel Fontana sobre que se obligue a D. Antonio Gentile o a quedarse con una pulpería que tienen en sociedad, pagando una deuda a que ella está afecta en favor de D. Marcos Pagliano, o a que venda dicha pulpería para pagar la deuda, Buenos Aires, 1822. 127 Guillamondegui, Justicia consular patria, 22. 128 AGN, Tribunal Comercial, Letra F, leg. 82 (1821–4), Manuel Fontana sobre que se obligue a D. Antonio Gentile o a quedarse con una pulpería, cit. 129 AGN, Tribunal Comercial, Letra F, leg. 82 (1821–4), José Manuel Godoy, Escribano Público Nacional, Buenos Aires, April 22, 1822. 130 Méndez Calzada, La función judicial, 133–4. 131 Corva, “Del Consulado.” 132 Pesaresi, “El APE.” 133 In particular, the law considered mercaderes the following subjects: “todos aquellos que venden o compran a otri, con enteción de las vender a otri, por ganar en ellas,” Sánchez Bella, De la Hera, and Díaz Rementeria, Historia del derecho, 373. 134 Ibid. 135 Coronas González, “Jurisdicción mercantil,”267–71. 136 Occasionally, the lifespan of a company was determined at the time of its constitution. For example, see the contract stipulated between José María Gallardo and José Guido for the establishment of a tienda pública (shop), which, according to the agreement, was to remain “active for two years,” AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 7, 1819–21, Compañía entre D. José María Gallardo y D. José Guido, 352 b ff. The volatility of the companies created to set up retail shops was a trademark of the early modern mercantile strategies, and a similar trend has been observed in colonial trade ventures. According to Guadalupe Carrasco’s estimates, the lifespan of the companies created in

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 191–194

137 138 139 140

141 142

143

144 145 146 147 148 149

150

151 152

289

mid-seventeenth century Cadiz, for example, ranged from fifteen months to six years, Carrasco González, Instrumentos del comercio, 63. Adelman, Republic of Capital, 142–4. Chiaramonte, Nación y Estado, 178. AGN, Sucesiones, 6267, Testamentaria de D. Domingo Gallino, 1831. The house was located in calle Belgrano and widow María Sauco wanted to sell it in order to compensate Narciso Martínez, president of the Sociedad Rural, of the support lent to the departed’s family, ibid. Levaggi, “Supremo decreto.” See for example AGN, Tribunal Comercial, Letra V, leg. 408 (1831–4), Arbitramiento en diferencias de cuentas tenidas entre D. Julian Vivar y D. Francisco Rossi, 1831. This is the case of Ventura Arraz, who had filed a suit with the Consulado to force Nicolás Paduan to pay back an obligation. Persuaded by Manuel José Baez, asesor and “close friend” of the debtor, Arraz granted an extension of the loan. When the agreed deadline expired, Arraz bitterly remarked that for Paduan “friendship compromises [were] as good as his opinions” and asked the Trade Tribunal to stop Baez’s interventions in this and any other suit involving the debtor, AGNBA; Tribunal Comercial, Letra A, leg. 1 (1806–31), D. Ventura Arzac contra D. Nicolás Paduan sobre cobro de una letra, Buenos Aires, February 3, 1831, 3. Mariluz Urquijo, “Sociedades anónimas.” Acevedo, Ensayo histórico, 85. AGN, X, 23-5-5. Immigrants who declared to be married but had failed to specify with whom and where their spouses resided have been excluded from the category. Vangelista, “Relações de gênero.” The sixty identified familial groups comprised seventy Genoese immigrants. Among them, for example, see the case of the seafarer Juan Marín. He lived in calle del Parque in the house of Genoese seafarer José Luis Paydalino, who had arrived in Buenos Aires ten years earlier, married an Argentinian woman and had five children. Another case is that of bachelors Santo Santurio and Domingo Gallino’s brother Silvestre, who both worked for Domingo and lived with his family in quarter 10, calle Perú 151. See, for example, the case of 22-year-old Ligurian José Castagneto, who had arrived in Buenos Aires four years earlier and who worked as a shoemaker together with an Englishman and a Portuguese (calle de la Piedad 48, quarter 3). Quarter 1, calle de la Alameda. The couples were: Francisco Chiclana (whose surname – oddly enough – is that of a borough in the bay of Cadiz hosting a large community of Ligurian immigrants) and his Spanish wife Tomasa Azcuénaga (calle ? 61, quarter 7); Genoese cooper Antonio Marcena, who had traveled with his Cadiz-native wife of Ligurian descent, Rosa Granea (who lived in calle Victoria 232, quarter 19); patron Manuel Molinari and his Cadiz-native wife Teresa Granea (who lived in calle Victoria 364, quarter 26); and merchant Pedro Cadelago, who had emigrated with his Andalusian wife Dolores Sánchez and resided in calle Plata 456, quarter 26.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

290

Notes to pp. 195–196

153 For instance, Manuel Molinari is recorded as a boat owner in the 1827 census and a few years later registered his pulpería in the district of Flores, AGN, X, 41-3-6, 1836. In 1828 Benito Accinelli, who had emigrated in 1820 and owned a pulpería in partnership with Juan Canessa, features in the customs’ register as captain of the balandra named Jorge Mateo transporting coal from Veracruz, AGN, X, 36-8-10. Pulperos Evangelista and Juan Bautista Solar were also patrons of coasters; in 1828, the former entered the port of Buenos Aires at the helm of the 29-tons garandumba Patriota, with a stock of rawhide from Gualeguaychú, while the latter captained two expeditions from Sandú transporting wood, coal, tallow, and other commissioned goods on his balandra Clementina, AGN, X, 25-1-2. no. 401 and 445. Juan Bautista Sanguineti, registered in the census as comerciante alongside Genoese José Ruiz, also held strong business interests in river shipping; in 1828, he undertook no less than nine expeditions to Montevideo, Santa Fe, and Salto where he embarked rawhide, iron, coal, and wood, AGN, X, 36–8-10. Another case is that of the already aforementioned Francisco Murature who, following the death of his second wife in 1826, joined his son José in the Río de la Plata, where they were both active as patrons of coasters. In Buenos Aires he married Feliciana Robbio, a woman of Italian descent: she brought to the union a dowry worth 11,000 pesos in efectos de tienda (store supplies, furniture, or credits), while Francisco contributed 44,000 pesos. The couple set up house and shop in calle Federación; the business was run by Feliciana while Francisco purchased and delivered goods alongside his son José, AGN, Protocolos, Reg. 2, 1851, Testamento que otorga D. Francisco Moratori. José Murature remained involved in river shipping for many years: as well as captaining several expeditions in 1828 and 1842, he also features as the owner of 11-tons barge Vigilante in partnership with Antonio Anselmo, AGN, X, 36-8-2. 154 Aliata, La ciudad regular, 102–1. 155 Amaral, “Producción agropecuaria”; see also Bonaudo and Pucciarelli, eds., Problemática agraria. 156 The quinteros Agustín Capanegra, Benito Angenelo, Roque Repeto and, in quarter de campaña n. 2, Francisco Montarsel, who – meanwhile – had married a local woman with whom he had seven children. 157 The families of farmers Antonio Paoli and Andrés Caneva had settled into two quintas adjoined to Montarsel’s, while young peones José Pelica and Juan González resided in quarter 10. 158 Chiaramonte, Mercaderes del Litoral, 93. In 1849, consul Dunoyer claimed that over 3,000 Sardinian owned small lots of land in the surroundings of Buenos Aires, Vangelista, “Traders and workers,” 43. 159 Granea lived with Vicenta Rissotto – a 32-year-old Montevideo woman of Italian descent who arrived in Buenos Aires four years earlier – seven children aged between 14 and 18 (Juan Pablo, Simón, Juan José, Francisco, Margarita, Magdalena, and María). 160 Pelegro lived in calle Buen Orden 302 (quarter 20) with his 50-year-old wife Josefa Silva, who had emigrated in Buenos Aires 20 years earlier, and his four children – Adolfo, Alvina, Juana, and Rufina – aged between 2 and 15. Olivares lived at number 304.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes to pp. 196–201

291

161 Maglioni is recorded as a panadero in both in the 1827 and 1836 censuses of Buenos Aires, AGN, X, 23-5-5; AGN, X, 41-3-6. In 1827, he declared he had arrived in the Río de la Plata five years earlier, was married, and lived in calle Cangallo 243. 162 In a 1836 shops’ register he was listed as the owner of several wheat millstones located in calle Santiago del Estero 125, AGN, X, 41-3-6; a similar 1837 register specifies that Sibello also owned a pasta factory, AGN, III, Libro de anotación de patentes año 1837. 163 This occurred with Santiago Pittaluga, who had moved to Buenos Aires in 1817; as noted earlier, he received a loan from Genoese farmer Bartolo Risso to purchase ranchos, wood, and unspecified farmed allotments. Ten years later, the census ranked him as an unmarried flour producer living in calle Talcahuano 29 (quarter 18) near Manuel Fontana’s house of trade. Bartolo Luqui, who had migrated at the end of the colonial period, features as a farmer in the 1816 census and as a comerciante in the 1827 one; Luqui lived with his wife, Luisa Ponce, five children, and three slaves in quarter 14, where, according to an 1836 shop register, he owned and managed a mill, AGN, IX, 18-8-11, Comercio y Padrones de esclavos, n.d.; AGN, X, 9-5-5, 1816; AGN, X, 41-3-6, 1836. 164 Sergi, Historia de los Italianos, 132–3. 165 Nascimbene, Historia de los italianos, 38. 166 During the following years, the Badaraccos distinguished themselves as a great family of traders and shipbuilders in la Boca, Piccirilli, Romay, and Gianello, Diccionario Histórico, t. 2, 270. 167 A full list of the Italians enlisted in the Battallón del Orden is included in Sergi, Historia de los Italianos, 133–4. 168 Ibid., 132. 169 Ibid., 133. 170 In an 1841 dispatch, the Sardinian consul argued that many Sardinian sailors had been forced to join the local Navy AST, Consolati Nazionali – Buenos Aires, Mazzo 1 (1835–51), Picolet d’Hermillon a S.E. Monsieur Le Comte Solar de la Marguerite, Buenos Aires, August 4, 1841, no. 75. 171 For a detailed analysis of the conflicts that led to the blockade, see, Mc Lean, War, Diplomacy. 172 Kroeber, Navegación de los ríos, 236–8. 173 HBNBA, “Caseros,” in L’operaio Italiano, February 4, 1877. 174 ANL, Fondo Carte di G.B. Cuneo, cartella 2, doc. 55, Francesco Anzani a G.B. Cuneo, 1841. 175 CNBA, Cuneo, G.B., “Dell’opportunità di pubblicare l’Italiano,” in L’Italiano, fasc. 7, July 3, 1841, 49–50, Montevideo, Stamperia Nacional. 176 Ibid. 177 Garibbo, Politica, amministrazione, 33. 178 CNBA, “Continuazione dell’Italiano,” in L’Italiano, fasc. 9, June 4, 1842, Montevideo, Stamperia del Nacional, 1–2. 179 AST, Consolati Nazionali, Montevideo, Mazzo 1, 1836–1850, Gaetano Gavazzo a S.E. Conte Solaro della Margarita Ministro degli Affari Esteri, no. 14, Montevideo, July 26, 1842. 180 CNBA, L’Italiano, fasc. 10–23, Montevideo, Stampería del Nacional.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

292

Notes to pp. 201–216

181 Moya, “Modernization, modernity.” 182 Ferro, dir., Emigrazione nelle Americhe. 183 According to the existing statistics, almost 26 million people left Italy between 1876 and 1976. Nearly half of them (54%) emigrated before the First World War. The monographs and essays dedicated to the Italian modern migrations are uncountable. For a general view, see Gabaccia, Italy’s Many Diasporas; Sori, L’emigrazione italiana; Pozzetta and Ramírez, eds., Italian Diaspora: Migration. For the case of Argentina, see the recent book of Devoto, Historia de los italianos. 184 Doria, Investimenti e sviluppo. 185 Mantegazza, Río de la Plata, 11. 186 Virgilio, Delle Migrazioni. 187 See e.g., Sacchi, “I consoli e l’ospedale”; Gandolfo, “Las sociedades italianas”; Devoto, “Participación y conflicto”; Baily, “Las sociedades de ayuda.” Conclusion 1 Lopez, “Primi passi”; Heers, “Génois en Angleterre”; Basso, “Note sulla comunità”; Nicolini, “Mercanti e fattori.” 2 For a first appraisal of the importance of religion and related institutions for the Genoese in Lisbon, see Brilli, “Coping with Iberian monopolies.” 3 Virgilio, Del comercio marittimo. 4 Devoto, Historia de los italianos, 63. 5 Virgilio, Delle Migrazioni, 107–12. 6 Porter, ed., Oxford History; Meyer et al. Histoire de la France. 7 Labanca, Oltremare. Storia.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Archival sources

ACCS ADGG

Fondo Consulado Nuevo de Sevilla Durazzo

AGI

Pallavicini, Ramo Cadetto Pallavicini, Ramo Primogenito Arribadas Consulados

Contratación

Estado

leg. 52 Cadice, Casse 143, 144, 294, 296, 299, 303, 304 Cadice, Casse 99, 105, 106, 109, 274 Cadice, Casse 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272 leg. 196, n. 48 leg. 209 A leg. 62, exp. 11 leg. 91 leg. 98 leg. 700 leg. 701 leg. 891 leg. 893 leg. 895 A leg. 895 Bis leg. 911 leg. 915 leg. 929 libro 445 libro 447 libro 450 leg. 596 B leg. 5518, no. 2, r. 11 leg. 5534, no. 2, r. 12 leg. 16. no. 4 leg. 52, no. 7 leg. 64, no. 34 293

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Archival sources

294

Gobierno Buenos Aires

AGN

leg. 29

leg. 125, no. 201 leg. 316 leg. 317 leg. 366 leg. 569, exp. 52 leg. 569, exp. 114 leg. 580 leg. 585 leg. 589 Indiferente leg. 2299, no. 1829 leg. 2465 leg. 2642 Lima leg. 716, no. 72 Títulos de Castilla 2, R. 23 Sala III Contaduría Nacional, Registro de Patentes, 33-7-17 Sala IX, División Colonia, Sección Gobierno Bandos, 8-10-2 Bandos, 8-10-3 Bandos, 42-9-5 Comerciales, 30-9-6 Comerciales, 31-1-9, leg. 23, exp. 3 Comerciales, 31-2-1, leg. 25, exp. 17 Comerciales, 31-2-1, leg. 54, exp. 2 Comerciales, 39-7-3, leg. 270, exp. 7 Comercio y Padrones de Esclavos, 18-8-11 Consulado de Buenos Aires, 4-7-7, exp. 3 Consulado de Buenos Aires, 4-7-7, exp. 5, no. 7 Hacienda, 33-1-3 Hacienda, 34-2-1, exp. 2387 Interior, 30-4-2 Interior, 30-4-9 Interior, 30-5-1, leg. 34, exp. 18 Justicia, 31-8-5, 47, exp. 1386 Padrón de habitantes de Buenos Aires, 1794, 9-7-4 Registros de Navíos, 43-1-10, leg. 3, exp. 1 Registros de Navíos, 43-6-4, leg. 59, exp. 2 Tribunales, 85, exp. 4. Tribunales Z, 42-9-5, leg. Z4, exp. 6 Sala X, Periodo Nacional, Sección Gobierno Censos de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 9-5-5 Censos de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 23-5-5 Guerra del Brasil, 4-5-5 Hospital General de Hombres y de la Residencia, 23-7-5 Marina, 24-1-3

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Archival sources Marina, 36-7-22 bis Marina, 36-8-2 Marina, 36-8-3 Marina, 36-8-6 Marina, 36-8-9 Marina, 36-8-10 Marina, Corsarios, 14-5-1 Marina, Corsarios, 14-9-7 Patentes, 41-3-6 Policía, 32-2-5 Resoluciones, 17-4-1 Secretaría de Rosas, 25-1-2 Tribunal de Justicia, Cámara de Apelaciones, 12-9-3 Sala Catálogos Cabildo de Buenos Aires Escrutinios totales e índices de nombres, 1589–1821 Sucesiones 3481 4839 4864 5592 5702 5703 6267 6514 7388 7706 7709 7719 7783 7795 Protocolos reg. 1 (1790–1) reg. 1 (1792–3) reg.1 (1794–5) reg. 1 (1798–9) reg. 1 (1824–5) reg. 1 (1829–30) reg. 1 (1839) reg. 2 (1762) reg. 2 (1769) reg. 2 (1791) reg. 2 (1851) reg. 3 (1790) reg. 3 (1794–5) reg. 3 (1800) reg. 3 (1805) reg. 3 (1815) reg. 3 (1820)

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

295

Archival sources

296

Tribunal Civil Tribunal Comercial

AHN

Consejos

Estado

AHPC

Not. Cádiz

Not. El Puerto de Santa María Not. San Fernando AMC

reg. 3 (1830) reg. 6 (1769) reg. 7 (1819-20-I) reg. 7 (1819–21) reg. 7 (1822–3) reg. 7 (1824–5) letra F, leg. 4, letra A, leg. 1 (1806–31) letra A, leg. 2, (1831–4) letra C, leg. 3 (1806–7) letra F, leg. 82 (1821–4) letra M, leg. 185, (1833–4) letra M, leg. 187 (1835–6) letra P, leg. 248 (1808–19) letra P, leg. 249 (1820–4) letra T, leg. 384 (1820–8) letra V, leg. 408 (1831–4) 2011, exp. 4 20206, exp. 5 20219, exp. 4 20233, exp. 5 21318, exp. 1 413 4570 (2) 4571 (1) 4571 (2) 6183-1 6186, n. 14 6186, n. 22 6186, n. 27 6186, n. 30 Registros 21, 48, 66, 383, 385, 402, 404, 405, 412, 426,439, 443, 450, 454, 459, 467, 469, 472, 474, 475, 809,1002, 1008, 1468, 1688, 1869, 2189, 2208, 2460, 2616, 3096,3848, 3854, 4291, 4465, 4497, 4587, 5399,5561, 5747, 5748, 5752, 5767,5792, 5794, 5799, 5809,5822 Registro 828 Registros 8, 13, 20, 49, 128, 137, 163 5871 10656 L. 10.110 L. 10.113

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Archival sources

AMN

ANL ASG

ASM

ASNA

AST

ASV BTG CNBA HBNBA

297

L. 10.119 L. 10.128 L. 10.130 L. 10.131 L. 10.151 Padrones, C. 4032, C. 5817, C. 6630 0071, Ms. 0070/302, f. 324 0071, Ms. 0074/001, f. 442 0135, Ms. 0160/001 0449, Ms. 1456/006, ff. 16–59 0738, Ms. 2381/051, fol. 314–17 0739, Ms. 2382/005 Carte di G.B. Cuneo, cartella 2, doc. 55 Archivio Segreto Cadice, 2672 A, 2673 Camera di Commercio 560 Giunta di Marina Consoli, filza n. 11 Sanità 1594 24, no. 453 Atti di Governo, Commercio Parte Antica Affari Esteri Consolati in Brasile, fascio 2472 Regio Console Napoli a Cadice (1815–29), fascio 2480 Regio Console Napoli a Cadice (1820–9), fascio 2483 Regio Console Napoli a Cadice (1830–9), fascio 2485 Consolati Nazionali Buenos Aires, mazzo 1 (1835–51) Cadice (1790–1835) Montevideo, mazzo 1 (1836–50) Cinque Savi alla Prima Serie, b. 795 Mercanzia Diario Marítimo del Vigía, Cádiz, 1830–6 L’Italiano, Montevideo, Stamperia Nacional 1841–2 L’operaio Italiano, 4 febbraio 1877

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Bibliography

Abulafia, David. “Gli italiani fuori d’Italia.” In Orizzonti aperti: Profili del mercante medievale, ed. Gabriella Airaldi, 175–98. Turin: Scriptorium, 1997. Academia Nacional de la Historia. Nueva historia de la nación argentina, tomo VI. Buenos Aires: Planeta, 2000. Acevedo, Carlos Alberto. Ensayo histórico sobre la legislación comercial argentina: Tesis para optar al grado de doctor en Jurisprudencia a la Facultad de Derecho. Buenos Aires: Imp. Alsina, 1914. Acosta Rodríguez, Antonio, Adolfo González Rodríguez, and Enriqueta Vila Vilar, eds. La Casa de la Contratación y la navegación entre España y las Indias. Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 2003. Adelman, Jeremy. Republic of Capital: Buenos Aires and the Legal Transformation of the Atlantic World. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. Aglietti, Marcella. L’istituto consolare tra Sette e Ottocento: Funzioni istituzionali, profilo giurdico e percorsi professionali nella Toscana granducale. Pisa: ETS, 2012. Aglietti, Marcella, Manuel Herrero Sánchez, and Francisco Zamora Rodríguez, coords. Los cónsules extranjeros en la Edad Moderna y a principios de la Edad Contemporánea. Madrid: Doce Calles, 2013. Airaldi, Gabriella. “Modelli coloniali e modelli culturali dal Mediterraneo all’Atlantico.” In Orizzonti aperti: Profili del mercante medievale, ed. Gabriella Airaldi, 199–206. Turin: Scriptorium, 1997. Alfonso Mola, Marina. “La guerre et les transformations de la flotte coloniale espagnole (1797–1828).” In Guerre et économie dans l’espace atlantique du XVIe au XXe siècle, eds. Silvia Marzagalli and Bruno Marnot, 63–81. Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires Bordeaux, 2006. “La Marina Mercante Colonial en la Legislación Borbónica (1700–1828).” In El derecho y el mar en la España moderna, ed. Carlos Martínez Shaw, 173–215. Granada: Editorial Universidad de Granada, 1995.

299

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

300

Bibliography

“Los navieros naturalizados de Cádiz (1778–1820).” In La burguesía de negocios en la Andalucía de la Ilustración, ed. Antonio García-Baquero González, tomo I, 209–26. Cadiz: Diputación Provincial de Cádiz, 1991. “El tráfico marítimo de la Carrera de Indias en las agitadas aguas de las independencia.” In Historia Económica del Cono Sur (Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Paraguay y Uruguay). La era de las revoluciones y la independencia, ed. Hernán A. Silva, 93–178. México: Instituto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia, 2010. Aliata, Fernando. La ciudad regular: Arquitectura, programas e instituciones en el Buenos Aires posrevolucionario, 1821–35. Buenos Aires: Prometeo, 2006. Álvarez Nogal, Carlos. Los banqueros de Felipe IV y los metales preciosos americanos (1621–1655). Madrid: Banco de España, Servicio de Estudios de Historia Económica, 1997. Amaral, Samuel. “Producción agropecuaria (1810–1850).” In Nueva historia de la nación argentina, ed. Academia Nacional de la Historia, tomo VI, 41–64. Buenos Aires: Planeta, 2000. The Rise of Capitalism on the Pampas: The Estancias in Buenos Aires, 1785–1870. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Amaral, Samuel, and José María Ghio. “Diezmos y producción agraria: Buenos Aires, 1750–1800.” Revista de Historia Económica 8, no. 3 (1990): 619–47. Anadón, Carlos A., and María del Carmen Murature de Badaracco. Historia de la Matanza-Victoria. Córdoba, Argentina: Ed. TA.P.AS., 1985. La colectividad italiana en Victoria, E. Rios. Victoria, E. Ríos, [s.n.], 1976. Andrews, Kenneth R. The Spanish Caribbean: Trade and Plunder, 1530–1630. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978. Andrien, Kenneth J. Crisis and Decline: The Viceroyalty of Peru in the Seventeenth Century. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985. “The Spanish Atlantic system.” In Atlantic History: Critical Appraisals, eds. Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan, 55–80. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Annino, Antonio, Luis Castro Leiva, and François-Xavier Guerra, dirs. De los Imperios a las Naciones: Iberoamérica. Zaragoza: Iber Caja-Forum Internacional des Sciences Humaines, 1994. Anonymous. Un inglés. Cinco años en Buenos Aires, 1820–1825. Buenos Aires: Solar-Hachette, 1946. Antón Solé, Pablo. Situación económica y asistencia social en la Diócesis de Cádiz en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII (El espolio y vacante del obispo Tomás del Valle). Cadiz: Caja de Ahorros de Cádiz, 1985. Apolant, Juan Alejandro. Genesis de la familia uruguaya. Montevideo: Instituto histórico y Geográfico del Uruguay, 1966. “Padrones olvidados de Montevideo del siglo XVIII.” I y II, Separata del Boletín Histórico del Estado Mayor General del Ejército, 104–5, 106–7, (1968): 50–128. Arajuo (de), José Joaquín. Guía de forasteros en la Ciudad y Virreinato de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, Ediciones facsimilalres de 1792 y 1803. Buenos Aires: Honorable Senado de la Nación, 1992.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Bibliography

301

Aranda Pérez, and Francisco José, eds. Burgueses o ciudadanos en la España moderna. Cuenca: Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 2003. Arazola Corvera, M. Jesús. Hombres, barcos y comercio de la ruta Cádiz-Buenos Aires (1737–1757). Seville: Diputación, 1998. Archivo General de la Nación. Consulado de Buenos Aires: Antecedentes, Actas, Documentos, tomo I, años 1785 a 1795. Buenos Aires: Kraft, 1936. Argenti, Philip P. The Occupation of Chios by the Genovese and Their Administration of the Island, 1346–1556, vol. III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958. Armitage, David. “Three concepts of Atlantic History.” In The British Atlantic World, 1500–1800, eds. David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, 13–29. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Armitage, David, and Michael J. Braddick, eds. The British Atlantic World, 1500–1800. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Artola, Miguel. La Hacienda del Antiguo Régimen. Madrid: Alianza EditorialBanco de España, 1982. Assadourian, Carlos Sempat. El sistema de la economía colonial: Mercado interno, regiones y espacio económico. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1982. Assereto, Giovanni. “Coscrizione e politica militare negli anni francesi.” In Le metamorfosi della Repubblica: Saggi di storia genovese tra il XVI e il XIX secolo, ed. Giovanni Assereto, 307–22. Savona: Elio Ferraris Editore, 1999. “Dalla fine della repubblica aristocratica all’Unità d’Italia.” In Storia di Genova: Mediterraneo, Europa, Atlantico, ed. Dino Puncuh, 509–50. Genova: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2003. “Dall’antico regime all’Unità.” In Storia d’Italia, Le regioni dall’Unità ad oggi. La Liguria, eds. Antonio Gibelli and Paride Rugafiori, 159–215. Torino: Einaudi, 1994. “I Viva Maria nella Repubblica ligure.” Studi Storici 2 (1998): 449–71. Le metamorfosi della Repubblica: Saggi di storia genovese tra il XVI e il XIX secolo. Savona: Elio Ferraris Editore, 1999. “Porti e scali minori della Repubblica di Genova in età moderna.” In I porti come impresa economica, ed. Simonetta Cavaciocchi, 271–306. Firenze: Le Monnier, 1988. “Problemi amministrativi all’indomani della Restaurazione.” In Le metamorfosi della Repubblica: Saggi di storia genovese tra il XVI e il XIX secolo, ed. Giovanni Assereto, 323–32. Savona: Elio Ferraris Editore, 1999. “Problemi della transizione politico-amministrativa nella Liguria postnapoleonica.” In Ombre e luci della Restaurazione: Trasformazioni e continuità istituzionali nel territori del Regno di Sardegna, Atti del convegno, Torino 21–24 ottobre 1991, 327–35. Roma: Ufficio Centrale per i Beni Archivistici, 1997. Attman, Artur. American Bullion in the European World Trade, 1600–1800. Göteborg: Kungl. Vetenskaps-och Vitterhets-Samhallet, 1986. Aymard, Maurice. “Autoconsommation et marchées: Chayanov, Labrousse ou Le Roy Ladourie?” Annales ESC 6 (1983): 1392–410. Baghdiantz McCabe, Ina, Gelina Harlaftis, and Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou. Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks. New York: Berg, 2005.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

302

Bibliography

Baily, Samuel I. “Cadenas migratorias de italianos a la Argentina: algunos comentarios.” Studi Emigrazione 25, no. 90 (June 1988): 125–35. “La cadena migratoria de los italianos en Argentina.” In La inmigración italiana en la Argentina, coords. Fernando J. Devoto and Gianfausto Rosoli, 45–61. Buenos Aires: Biblos, 1985. “Las sociedades de ayuda mutua y el desarrollo de una comunidad italiana en Buenos Aires, 1858–1918.” Desarrollo Económico 21, no. 84 (1982): 485–512. Bailyn, Bernard. Atlantic History: Concept and Contours. Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2005. “The idea of Atlantic history.” Itinerario 20, no. 1 (March 1996): 19–44. Bakewell, Peter. Miners of the Red Mountain: Indian Labor in Potosi, 1545–1650. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984. Balard, Michel. Le mer Noire et la Romanie génoise (XIIIe–XVe siècles). London: Ashgate, 1989. “Le système portuarie d’outre-mer (XIIe–XVe siècles).” In I porti come impresa economica, ed. Simonetta Cavaciocchi, 21–39. Firenze: Le Monnier, 1988. Balard, Michel, and Alain Ducellier, eds. Migrations et diasporas Méditerranéennes (Xe–XVIe siécles), Actes du Colloques (octobre 1999). Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2002. Balletto, Laura. “Astigiani, Alessandrini e Monferrini a Caffa sulla fine del secolo XIII.” Rivista di Storia Arte e Archeologia per le Province di Alessandria e Asti 85 (1976): 171–84. Genova, Mediterraneo, Mar Nero (secc. XIII–XV). Genoa: Civico Istituto Colombiano, 1976. “Piemontesi a Pera e Costantinopoli nel secolo XV.” Novinostra 23, no. 1 (1991): 8–25. “Piemontesi del Quattrocento nel Vicino Oriente.” Rivista di Storia Arte e Archeologia per le Province di Alessandria e Asti 99 (1990): 21–108. Balmaceda, José Carlos. La contribución genovesa al desarrollo de la manufactura papelera española. Malaga: Colección Apapiris, 2005. Barreneche, Osvaldo, and Andrés Bisso, eds. Ayer, hoy y mañana son contemporáneos. Tradiciones, leyes y proyectos en América Latina. La Plata: Editorial de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata, 2010. Bartolomei, Arnaud. “La bourse et la vie: Destin collectif et trajectoires individuelles des marchands français de Cadix, de l’instauration du comercio libre à la disparition de l’empire espagnol, 1778–1824.” PhD diss., Université de Provence, 2007. “Identidad e integración de los comerciantes extranjeros en la Europa moderna: La colonia francesa de Cádiz a finales del siglo XVIII.” In Comunidades transnacionales: Colonias de extranjeros en el mundo atlántico (1500–1830), ed. Ana Crespo Solana, 359–76. Madrid: Doce Calles, 2010. “Les relations entre les négociants français de Cadix et le pouvoir: comportements collectifs et stratégies individuelles (fin XVIIIe siècle).” In Circulations maritimes: l’Espagne et son empire (XVIe–XVIIIe siècle), eds. Michel Bertrand and Jean-Philippe Priotti, 117–33. Rennes: PUR, 2011. Basso, Enrico. Genova: un impero sul mare. Cagliari: Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Istituto sui Rapporti Italo-Iberici, 1994.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Bibliography

303

“Note sulla comunità genovese a Londra nei secc. XIII–XVI.” In Comunità forestiere e nationes nell’Europa dei secoli XIII–XVI, ed. Giovanna Petti Balbi, 249–68. Naples: Liguori Ed., 2001. Baudi di Vesme, Carlo. “Genova e il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del XVIII secolo.” In Atti del II Congresso Internazionale di studi storici: ‘Rapporti Genova-Mediterraneo-Atlantico nell’età moderna,’ ed. Raffaele Belvederi, 387–435. Genova: Pubblicazioni dell’Istituto di Scienze Storiche Universitá di Genoa, 1985. Belvederi, Raffaele, ed. Atti del II Congresso Internazionale di studi storici “Rapporti Genova-Mediterraneo-Atlantico nell’età moderna.” Genova: Pubblicazioni dell’Istituto di Scienze Storiche Universitá di Genoa, 1985. Bernal, Antonio Miguel. España, Proyecto Inacabado: Los Costes/Beneficios del Imperio. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2005. La financiación de la Carrera de Indias (1492–1824). Dinero y crédito en el comercio colonial español con América. Seville, Madrid: Fundación El Monte, Consorcio Urbanístico del Pasillo Verde Ferroviario, 1992. Bertolotti, Davide. Viaggio nella Liguria marittima, vol. III. Turin: Dai Tipografi Eredi Botta, 1834. Besio Moreno, Nicolás. Buenos Aires: Puerto del Río de la Plata, capital de la Argentina: Estudio crítico de su población (1535–1936). Buenos Aires: Tuduri, 1939. Betancur, Arturo Ariel. El puerto colonial de Montevideo: Guerras y apertura comercial: tres lustros de crecimiento económico, 1791–1806, tomo I. Montevideo: Universidad de la República Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, 1997. Bethell, Leslie, ed. The Cambridge History of Latin America, vol. III, From Independence to c. 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. ed. Historia de América Latina, vol. 6. Barcelona: Crítica, 1991. Betta, Chiara. “The trade diaspora of Baghdadi Jews: From India to China’s treaty ports, 1842–1937.” In Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks, eds. Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, Gelina Harlaftis, and Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou, 269–85. New York: Berg, 2005. Beverina, Juan. El virreinato de las provincias del Río de la Plata: Su organización militar. Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar, 1992. Bianchi, Paola, Davide Maffi, and Enrico Stumpo, eds. Italiani al servizio straniero in età moderna, Annali di Storia Militare Europea, Milan, Franco Angeli, 2008. Bitossi, Carlo. “L’antico regime genovese, 1576–1797.” In Storia di Genova. Mediterraneo, Europa, Atlantico, ed. Dino Puncuh, 391–509. Genoa: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2003. Il governo dei Magnifici: Patriziato e politica a Genova fra Cinque e Seicento. Genoa: Edizioni Culturali Internazionali Genova, 1990. “La Repubblica è vecchia.” Patriziato e governo a Genova nel secondo Settecento. Rome: Istituto Storico per l’Età Moderna e Contemporanea, 1995. Blando, Antonino. “Grano e mercanti nella Sicilia del Settecento.” PhD diss., Università di Catania, 2000. Istituzioni e mercato nella Sicila del grano. Palermo: Puntografia, 2003.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

304

Bibliography

Blinn Reber, Vera. “British mercantile houses in Buenos Aires, 1810–1880.” PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 1972. Blow Williams, Judith. “The establishment of British commerce with Argentina.” The Hispanic American Historical Review 15, no. 1 (February 1935): 43–64. Bonaudo, Marta, and Alfredo R. Pucciarelli, eds. La problemática agraria: Nuevas aproximaciones, vol. I. Buenos Aires: CEAL, 1993. Bonfiglio, Giovanni. Gli italiani nella società peruviana: Unia visione storica. Turin: Edizioni Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1999. Bono Ferrari, Gio. L’epoca eroica della vela: Capitani e bastimenti di Genova e della Riviera di Ponente nel secolo XIX. Rapallo: Arti Grafiche Tigullio, 1941. Bosch, Beatriz. “Notas sobre la navegación fluvial, 1843–1853.” Ensayos e Investigaciones 19, (July–December 1975): 325–45. Boscolo, Alberto. “Gli insediamenti genovesi nel sud della Spagna all’epoca d Cristoforo Colombo.” In Saggi sull’età colombiana, eds. Alberto Boscolo and Francesco Giunta, 11–32. Milan: Cisalpino, 1982. Bossio, Jorge Alberto. Historia de las pulperías. Buenos Aires: Plus Ultra, 1972. Bouchard, Gérard. “Trois chemins vers le marché: capitalisme, protoindustralization, co-intégracion: Réflexion à partir de l’exemple de Saguenay (Quebec).” Histoire et Sociéteés Rurales 2 (1994): 69–90. Bowen, H. V. Elites, Enterprise and the Making of the British Overseas Empire, 1688–1775. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996. Brading, David A. Mineros y comerciantes en el México borbónico (1763–1810). Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1993 (I ed. 1975). Braudel, Fernand. “Endet das Jahrhundert der Genuesen im jahre 1627?” In Wirtshaftliche und soziale structuren in saekularen Wandel: Festschrift für Wilhelm Abel, ed. Ingomar Bog, 455–68. Hannover: Shaper, 1974. I tempi del mondo, vol. 3 of Civiltà materiale, economia e capitalismo (secoli XV–XVIII). Turin: Einaudi, 1982. Brilli, Catia. “Da Cadice a Buenos Aires: crisi e rinascita del commercio ligure nella nuova configurazione dell’Atlantico iberico (1797–1837).” In “L’Italia e le Americhe,” eds. Marcello Carmagnani, Marco Mariani, and Duccio Sacchi, special issue, Annali della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi 42 (2008): 99–125. “Los genoveses en el comercio americano de esclavos (segunda mitad del siglo XVIII).” Rivista Storica Italiana, 2015/1: 159–82. “The Genoese response to the collapse of the Spanish Empire in America.” Jahrbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas/Anuario de Historia de América Latina 47 (2010): 247–72. “La importancia de hacerse español: La élite mercantil genovesa de Cádiz en el siglo XVIII.” In El sistema comercial español en la economía mundial (siglos XVII–XVIII). Homenaje a Jesús Aguado de los Reyes, coords. Isabel Lobato and José María Oliva Melgar, 225–55. Huelva: Universidad de Huelva, 2013. Coping with Iberian monopolies. Genoese trade networks and formal institutions in Spain and in Portugal during the second half of the eighteenth century, European Review of History/Revue Européene d’Histoire, 23:3 (2016), forthcoming. Doi: 10.1080/13507486.2015.1117425

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Bibliography

305

Bulferetti, Luigi, and Claudio Costantini. Industria e Commercio in Liguria nell’età del Risorgimento (1700–1861). Milan: Banca Commerciale Italiana, 1966. Burgin, Miron. Aspectos económicos del federalismo argentino. Buenos Aires: Hachette, 1960. Burgos Madroñero, Manuel. “El comercio marítimo de la España de Carlos III con el puerto de Lisboa (1763–1783).” In Actas del Congreso Internacional sobre “Carlos III y la Ilustración,” vol. II, Economía y sociedad, 425–64. Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura, 1989. Burkholder, Mark A., and Dewitt S. Chandler. From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687–1808. Columbia, MO and London: University of Missouri Press, 1977. Burne Goebel, Dorothy. “British trade to the Spanish Colonies.” The American Historical Review 43, no. 2 (January 1938): 288–320. Bustos Rodríguez, Manuel. Cádiz en el sistema atlántico: La ciudad, sus comerciantes y la actividad mercantil (1650–1830). Cadiz: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Cádiz, Madrid, Silex, 2005. “Comerciantes españoles y extranjeros en la Carrera de Indias: la crisis del siglo XVIII y el papel de las instituciones.” In Burgueses o ciudadanos en la España moderna, ed. Francisco José Aranda Pérez, 327–56. Cuenca: Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 2003. “Población, sociedad y desarrollo urbano (una aproximación al Cádiz de Carlos II).” In Cádiz en su historia: IV Jornadas de Historia de Cádiz, ed. Manuel Bustos Rodríguez, 73–113. Cadiz: Caja de Ahorros de Cádiz, 1985. Butel, Paul. “France, the Antilles, and Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: Renewals of foreign trade.” In The Rise of Merchant Empires. Long Distance Trade in the Early Modern World 1350–1750, ed. James D. Tracy, 153–73. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Buti, Gilbert. “Cabotage et caboteurs de la France méditerranéenne (XVIIe–XVIIIe siècles).” Rives nord Mediterranéennes, Cabotage et réseaux portuaires en Méditerrranée (October 20, 2005), http://rives.revues.org/document164.html “Le cabotage dans tous ses états dans la France d’Ancien Régime.” Rives nord Mediterranéennes, Cabotage et réseaux portuaires en Méditerrranée, (October 20, 2005), http://rives.revues.org/document159.html Caillet Bois, Ricardo R. “El Real Consulado y una tentativa para contratar maestros curtidores en los E.E.U.U. en 1801.” Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina, 2nd ser., 1 (1956): 265–8. Calcagno, Gian Carlo. “La navigazione convogliata a Genova nella seconda metà del Seicento.” Miscellanea Storica Ligure 3, no. 1, (1971): 267–91. Calegari, Manlio. La manifattura genovese della carta (sec. XVI–XVIII). Genoa: ECIG, 1986. Campbell, León G. “The foreigners in Peruvian society during the eighteenth century.” Revista de Historia de América 73–74 (January–December 1972): 153–63. Canabrava, Alice Piffer. O comercio portugués no Rio da Prata (1580–1640). Saõ Paulo: Universidad de São Paulo, 1944.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

306

Bibliography

Candido, Salvatore. “L’azione mazziniana nel Nuovo Mondo.” Il Veltro 4–6 (1973): 597–620. “Le emigrazioni politiche nell’America Iberica nell’Ottocento.” Il Veltro 3–4, (1990): 261–76. “La Giovine Italia a Montevideo (1836–1842): Contributo alla storia dell’azione mazziniana nelle Americhe.” Bollettino della Domus Mazziniana 1 (1975): 53–76. Giuseppe Garibaldi en el Río de la Plata, 1841–1848. Florence: Valmartina, 1972. “Giuseppe Garibaldi sulla via del ritorno in Italia (aprile 1848),” Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento 4 (October–December 1968): 548–72. “Los italianos en América del Sur y el Resurgimiento.” Dialogo 4 (May–August 1962): 7–34. Cañizares-Esguerra, Jorge, and Erik R. Seeman, eds. The Atlantic in Global History, 1500–2000. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007. Carande, Ramón. Carlos V y sus banqueros. Barcelona: Crítica, 1977. Carmagnani, Marcello. Federalismos latinoamericanos: México/ Brasil/Argentina. México: El Colegio de México and Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1993. Carmagnani, Marcello, Alicia Hernández Chávez, and Ruggiero Romano, eds. Para una historia de América II: Los Nudos (1). Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1999. Carrasco González, and María Guadalupe. Comerciantes y casas de negocios en Cádiz (1650–1700). Cadiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 1997. Corredores y Comercio: La Correduría de Lonja gaditana entre 1573 y 1805. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Corredores de Comercio de España, 1999. Los instrumentos del comercio colonial en el Cádiz del siglo XVII (1650–1700). Madrid: Banco de España, Servicio de Estudios de Historia Económica, 1998. Carrière, Charles. Négociants marseillais au XVIIIe siècle: Contribution à l’étude des économies maritimes, 2 vols. Marseille: Institut Historique de Provence, 1973. Richesse du passé marseillais: Le port mondial au XVIIIe siècle. Marseille: Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie de Marseille, 1979. Casella de Calderón, E. “Barrios porteños que se formaron en los antiguos partidos de San José de Flores y de Belgrano.” Buenos Aires nos cuenta 14 (February 1988): 54–95. Caula, Elsa. Mercaderes de Mar y Tierra. Rosario: Humanidades y Artes Ediciones, 2014. Cavaciocchi, Simonetta, ed. L’impresa. Industria, commercio, banca: Secc. XIII– XVIII: Atti della “Ventiduesima Settimana di Studi,”30 aprile-4 maggio 1990, n. 22. Prato: Datini, 1990. ed. I porti come impresa economica. Florence: Le Monnier, 1988. Chaudury, Kirti N. Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean and Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Chaunu, Pierre. Séville et l’Amerique aux XVIe et XVIIIe siècles. Paris: Flammarion, 1977.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Bibliography

307

Chiaramonte, José Carlos. Ciudades, provincias, estados: los orígenes de la nación argentina (1800–1846). Buenos Aires: Ariel, 1997. La crítica ilustrada de la realidad: Economía y sociedad en el pensamiento argentino e iberoamericano del siglo XVIII. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1982. “El federalismo argentino en la primera mitad del siglo XIX.” In Federalismos latinoamericanos: México/ Brasil/Argentina, ed. Marcello Carmagnani, 81–132. Mexico: El Colegio de México and Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1993. “Formas de identidad en le Río de la Plata luego de 1810.” Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana “Dr. E. Ravignani, 3rd ser., 1 (Primer semestre 1989): 71–92. Mercaderes del Litoral: Economía y sociedad en la Provincia de Corrientes, primera mitad el siglo XIX. Mexico-Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1991. Nación y Estado en Iberoamérica: El lenguaje político en tiempos de la independencia. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 2004. “Notas sobre la presencia italiana en el litoral argentino en la primera mitad del siglo XIX.” In L’Italia nella società argentina, coords. Fernando J. Devoto and Gianfausto Rosoli, 44–58. Rome: CSER, 1988. “El Risorgimento en el Río de la Plata y el problema de la unidad nacional.” In Il Risorgimento italiano in America Latina: Atti del Convegno internazionale 24-25-26 novembre 2005, 173–83. Ancona: Affinità Elettive, 2006. Christelow, Allan. “Great Britain and the trades from Cadiz and Lisbon to Spanish America and Brazil, 1759–1783.” The Hispanic American Historical Review 27, no. 1(February 1947): 2–29. Clarence Smith, William G. “Middle Eastern entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia, c.1750–c.1940.” In Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks, eds. Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, Gelina Harlaftis, and Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou, 217–44. New York: Berg, 2005. Cohen, Abner. “Cultural strategies in the organization of trading diaspora.” In The Development of Indigenous Trade and Market in West Africa, ed. Claude Meillassoux, 266–81. London: Oxford University Press, 1971. Colección de Decretos y Órdenes Generales de la primera legislatura de las Cortes Ordinarias de 1820 y 1821 desde 6 de julio hasta 9 de noviembre de 1820, tomo IV. Madrid: Imprenta Nacional, 1821. Collado Villalta, Pedro. “Los Consulados en el Cádiz de Carlos III.” In La burguesía de negocios en la Andalucía de la ilustración, ed. Antonio García-Baquero González, tomo I, 245–57. Cadiz: Diputación Provincial de Cádiz, 1991. “El impacto americano en la Bahía: la inmigración extranjera en Cádiz (1709–1819).” In Primeras Jornadas de Andalucía y América, 51–71. Huelva: Instituto de Estudios Onubenses, 1981. “La nación genovesa en la Sevilla de la Carrera de Indias: declive mercantil y pérdida de la autonomía consular.” In Presencia Italiana en Andalucía, siglos XIV–XVI: Actas del Primer Coloquio Hispano-Italiano, eds. Bibiano Torres Ramírez and José Hernández Palomo, 53–113. Seville: E.E.H.A., 1985.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

308

Bibliography

Comín, Francisco, Mauro Hernández, and Enrique Llopís, eds. Historia económica de España, siglos X–XX. Barcelona: Crítica, 2002. Comín, Francisco, and Pablo Martín Aceña, eds. La empresa en la historia de España. Madrid: Civitas, 1996. Coronas González, Santos M. “La jurisdicción mercantil de los Consulados del Mar en el antiguo régimen (1494–1808).” In Actas del V Centenario del Consulado de Burgos (1494–1994), 251–79. Burgos: Diputación Provincial de Burgos, 1994. Corva, María A. “Del Consulado a la justicia comercial letrada en la provincia de Buenos Aires.” In Ayer, hoy y mañana son contemporáneos: Tradiciones, leyes y proyectos en América Latina, eds. Osvaldo Barreneche and Andrés Bisso, 199–228. La Plata: Editorial de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata, 2010. Costantini, Claudio. La Repubblica di Genova nell’età moderna. In Storia d’Italia, ed. Giuseppe Galasso, vol. IX. Turin: UTET, 1986. Crespi, Liliana, and Estela Salles. “Bases y fuentes documentales para el estudio del Tribunal del Consulado en el Río de la Plata.” América Latina en la Historia Económica 17 (2002): 53–62. Crespo Solana, Ana, ed. Comunidades transnacionales: Colonias de extranjeros en el mundo atlántico (1500–1830). Madrid: Doce Calles, 2010. Entre Cádiz y los Países Bajos: Una comunidad mercantil en la ciudad de la Ilustración. Cadiz: Fundación Municipal de Cultura del Ayuntamiento de Cádiz, 2001. “Nación extranjera y cofradía de mercaderes: el rostro piadoso del integración social.”In Los Extranjeros en la España moderna: Actas del primer coloquio internacional celebrado en Málaga del 28 al 30 de noviembre de 2002, eds. María B. Villar García and Pilar Pezzi Cristóbal, tomo II, 175–87. Malaga, Universidad de Málaga, 2003. “Las reformas del comercio gaditano a comienzos del siglo XVIII en el contexto europeo de las políticas navales y comerciales.” In La Casa de la Contratación y la navegación entre España y las Indias, eds. Antonio Acosta Rodríguez, Adolfo González Rodríguez, and Enriqueta Vila Vilar, 183–203. Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 2003. Crespo Solana, Ana, and Manuel Herrero Sánchez, coords. España y las 17 Provincias de los Países Bajos: Una revisión historiográfica. Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba, 2002. Crespo Solana, Ana, and Vicente Montojo Montojo. “La Junta de Dependencias de Extranjeros (1714–1800): Trasfondo socio-político de una historia institucional.” Hispania 69, no. 232 (2009): 363–94. Cuneo, Niccolò. Storia dell’emigrazione italiana in Argentina (1810–1870). Milan: Garzanti, 1940. Cunietti Ferrando, Arnaldo J. San José de Flores: un pueblo a dos leguas de la ciudad. Buenos Aires: Fundación Banco de Boston, 1991. Curtin, Philip D. Cross-Cultural Trade in World History. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Cutolo, Vicente O. Historia de los barrios de Buenos Aires. Buenos Aires: Ed. Elche, 1998, 2 vols.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Bibliography

309

D’Esposito, Francesco. “Presenza italiana tra i ‘conquistadores’ ed i primi colonizzatori del Nuovo Mondo (1492–1560).” In Presencia italiana en Andalucía. Siglos XIV–XVII: Actas del Tercer Coloquio Hispano-Italiano, ed. José Hernández Palomo, 493–533. Seville: E.E.H.A., 1989. De Arcos, Rafael A., Los intereses marítimos en la guerra de la independencia, in Historia Maritima Argentina, vol. 5. Buenos Aires: Departamento de Estudios Históricos Navales, 1987. De Cristóforis Morroni, Nadia Andrea. Proa al Plata: La migración de gallegos y asturianos a Buenos Aires (fines del siglo XVIII y comienzos del XIX). Madrid: CSIC, 2008. De Gandía, Enrique. Buenos Aires colonial. Buenos Aires: Claridad, 1957. De Gandía, Enrique, and Manuela Fernández Reyna. Pancaldo y la primera expedición genovesa al Río de la Plata: estudios históricos. Buenos Aires: Ateneo Popular de la Boca, 1937. De la Concepción, Gerónimo. Emporio de el Orbe, Cádiz ilustrada: investigación de sus antiguas grandezas, discurrida en concurso de el general Imperio de España. Amsterdam: Imprenta de Joan Bus, 1690. De la Lande, Josef Jérôme. Voyage en Italie, IX. Paris: Veuve Desaint, 1786. De Maddalena, Aldo, and Hermann Kellenbenz, eds. La repubblica internazionale del denaro tra XV e XVII secolo. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1984. De Marco, Miguel Ángel. Corsarios Argentinos. Buenos Aires: Planeta, 2002. De Rosa, Luigi. “L’emigrazione italiana in Argentina: un bilancio.” In L’Italia nella società argentina , eds. Fernando J. Devoto and Gianfausto Rosoli, 73– 89. Rome: CSER, 1988. De Salas, Francisco Javier. Historia de la matrícula de mar y examen de varios sistemas de reclutamiento marítimo. Madrid: Fortanet, 1879. De Santa Cruz y Mallén, Francisco Xavier. Historia de familias cubanas, tomo IV. Havana: Editorial Hércules, 1943. De Studer, Elena F.S. La trata de negros en el Río de la Plata durante el siglo XVIII. Montevideo: Libros de Hispanoamérica, 1984 (I ed. Buenos Aires, 1958). Della Paolera, Gerardo, and Alan M. Taylor, eds. A New Economic History of Argentina. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Denzel, Markus A. Handbook of World Exchange Rates, 1590–1914. Farnham: Ashgate, 2010. Destefani, Laurio H., dir. Autoridades Historia Marítima Argentina, t. V, La Guerra de Independencia (1810–1824). Buenos Aires: Departamento de Estudios Históricos Navales, 1987. Devoto, Fernando J. Historia de los italianos en la Argentina. Buenos Aires: Biblos, 2006. “¿Inventando a los italianos? Imágenes de los primeros inmigrantes en Buenos Aires (1810–1880).” Anuario del IEHS 17 (1992): 121–36. “Liguri nell’America australe.” In Storia d’Italia. Le regioni: La Liguria, eds. Antonio Gibelli and Paride Rugafiori, 653–88. Turin: Einaudi, 1994. Le migrazioni italiane in Argentina: Un saggio interpretativo. Naples: Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, 1994.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

310

Bibliography

“Los orígenes de un barrio italiano en Buenos Aires a mediados del siglo XIX.” Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana “Dr. Emilio Ravignani,” 3rd ser., 1 (Primer semestre 1989): 93–114. Devoto, Fernando J. “Participación y conflicto en las sociedades italianas de socorros mutuos en Buenos Aires y Santa Fe.” In La inmigración italiana en la Argentina, eds. Fernando J. Devoto and Gianfausto Rosoli, 141–64. Buenos Aires: Biblos, 1985. Devoto, Fernando J., and Gianfausto Rosoli, eds. La inmigración italiana en la Argentina. Buenos Aires: Biblos, 1985. Devoto, Fernando J., and Gianfausto Rosoli, coords. In L’Italia nella società argentina. Rome: CSER, 1988. Di Meglio, Gabriel. “Os habéis hecho temibles: La milicia de la ciudad de Buenos Aires y la política entre las invasiones inglesas y el fin del proceso revolucionario, 1806–1820.” Tiempos de América 13 (2006): 151–66. “Soldados de la revolución: Las tropas porteñas en la guerra de independencia (1810–1820).” Anuario IEHS 18 (2003): 39–65. Di Stefano, Roberto, Hilda Sabato, Luis Alberto Romero, and José Luis Moreno. De las cofradías a las organizaciones de la sociedad civil: Historia de la iniciativa asociativa en Argentina, 1776–1990. Buenos Aires: Gadis, 2002. Diccionario de la lengua castellana compuesto por la Real Academia Española. Madrid: Joaquín Ibarra, 1780. Diccionario de la lengua castellana, en que se explica el verdadero sentido de las voces [. . .]. Compuesto por la Real Academia Española. Tomo cuarto. Madrid: Imprenta de la Real Academia Española, por los herederos de Francisco del Hierro, 1734. Domínguez Martín, Rafael. “Caracterizando al campesinado y la economía campesina: pluriactividad y dependencia del mercado como nuevos atributos de la campesinidad.” Agricultura y Sociedad 66 (1993): 97–136. Domínguez Ortiz, Antonio. “La concesión de naturaleza para comerciar en Indias en el siglo XVII.” Revista de Indias 76 (1959): 228–39. Los Extranjeros en la vida española durante el siglo XVII y otros artículos. Seville: Diputación de Sevilla, 1996 (I ed. 1960). Dondero, Dario. L’Arte dei barcaioli a Genova (dal sec. XV al sec. XIX). Genoa: Graphos, 1996. Dore, Maria Grazia. La democrazia italiana e l’emigrazione in America. Brescia: Morcelliana, 1964. Doria, Giorgio. “Conoscenza del mercato e sistema informativo: il know-how dei mercanti-finanziri genovesi nei secoli XVI e XVII.” In La repubblica internazionale del denaro tra XV e XVII secolo, eds. Aldo De Maddalena and Hermann Kellenbenz, 57–121. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1984. Investimenti e sviluppo económico a Genova alla vigilia della Prima Guerra Mondiale. Genoa: Università di Genova-Giuffré Ed., 1969. Dotta, Mario. “Los italianos en el proceso de formación colonial del Uruguay.” Garibaldi 17 (2002): 83–97. Dubois, Laurent. “The French Atlantic.” In Atlantic History: Critical Appraisal, eds. Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan, 137–61. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Bibliography

311

Dumonteil, Jacques. Oloron-Sainte-Marie: Pirénées Atlantiques. Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2003. Elliott, John H. “Atlantic history: A circum-navigation.” In The British Atlantic World, 1500–1800, eds. David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, 253–70. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Einsinck, Oscar Luis. Propios y arbitrios del Cabildo de Buenos Aires. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1990. Emmer, Pieter, and Wim Klooster. “The Dutch Atlantic.” Itinerario 2 (1999): 48–69. Epstein, Stephan R. and Maarten Prak, eds. Guilds, Innovation, and the European Economy, 1400–1800. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Epstein, Steven A. Genoa and the Genoese, 958–1528. Chapel Hill, NC, and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996. Everaert, John. De internationale en Koloniale Handel der Vlaamse firma’s te Cadiz (1670–1700). Brugge (België): Rijksuniversiteit te Gent:werken uitgegeven door de faculteit van de Letteren en Wijsbegeerte, 1973. Fabbri Cressatti, Luce. “Los italianos en el Plata antes de Garibaldi.” Garibaldi 2 (1987): 64–89. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Documentos para la Historia Argentina, Tomo XII. Buenos Aires: Compañía Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1919. Feliciano Ramos, Héctor R. El contrabando inglés en el Caribe y el Golfo de México (1748–1778). Seville: Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1990. Felloni, Giuseppe. “Il ceto dirigente a Genova nel sec. XVII: governanti o uomini d’affari?” In Scritti di storia economica, ed. Giuseppe Felloni, vol. II, 1323–40. Genoa: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 1999. Investimenti finanziari genovesi tra il Seicento e la Restaurazione. Milan: Giuffrè, 1971. Popolazione e sviluppo economico della Liguria nel secolo XIX. Torino: Industria Libraria Tipografica Editrice, 1961. Scritti di storia economica, vol. II. Genoa: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 1999. “La storiografia marittima su Genova in Età Moderna.” In Scritti di storia economica, ed. Giuseppe Felloni, vol. II, 861–78. Genoa: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 1999. Fernández Díaz, Roberto, ed. España en el siglo XVIII: Homenaje a Pierre Vilar. Barcelona: Crítica, 1985. Fernández Díaz, Roberto, and Carlos Martínez Shaw. “Las revistas de inspección de la Matrícula de Mar en el siglo XVIII.” In El derecho y el mar en la España moderna, ed. Carlos Martínez Shaw, 241–71. Granada: Editorial Universidad de Granada, 1995. Fernández Pérez, Paloma. El rostro familiar de la metrópoli: Redes de parentesco y lazos mercantiles en Cádiz, 1700–1812. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1997. Ferns, Henry S. “Investment and trade between Britain and Argentina in the nineteenth century.” The Economic History Review, n. s., 3, no. 2 (1950): 203–18. Ferro, Gaetano, dir. L’emigrazione nelle Americhe dalla Provincia di Genova, 4 vols. Bologna: Patron Editore, 1990. Fisher, John R. El comercio entre España e Hispanoamérica (1797–1820). Madrid: Banco de España, Servicio de Estudios de Historia Económica, n. 27, 1993.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

312

Bibliography

“Commerce and the imperial decline: Spanish trade with Spanish America, 1787–1820.” Journal of Latin American Studies 30 (1981): 459–79. “Imperial ‘free trade’ and the Hispanic economy, 1778–1796.” Journal of Latin American Studies 13, no. 1 (May 1981): 21–56. Silver Mines and Silver Miners in Colonial Peru. Liverpool: Centre for Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool, 1977. Flynn, Dennis O. “Fiscal crisis and the decline of Spain (Castile).” Journal of Economic History 43 (1982): 139–47. Fontana Lázaro, Josep, ed. La economía española al final del Antiguo Régimen. III, Comercio y Colonias. Madrid: Alianza Editorial/Banco de España, 1982. Fradkin, Raúl O. “Los contratos rurales y la transformación de la campaña de Buenos Aires durante la expansión ganadera (1820–1840).” In En busca del tiempo perdido: La economía de Buenos Aires en el país de la abundancia (1750–1865), eds. Raúl O. Fradkin and Juan Carlos Garavaglia, 195–233. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2004. “Producción y arrendamiento en Buenos Aires del siglo XVIII: la hacienda de la Chacarita (1779–1784).” Cuadernos de Historia Regional, Luján, Universidad de Luján, 5, no. 15, (1992): 67–96. Fradkin, Raúl O., and Juan Carlos Garavaglia, eds. En busca del tiempo perdido. La economía de Buenos Aires en el país de la abundancia (1750–1865). Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2004. Franceschini, Antonio. L’emigrazione italiana nell’America del Sud: Studi sulla espansione coloniale transatlantica. Roma: Tip. Forzani e C., 1908. Franch Benavent, Ricardo. “Dinastías comerciales genovesas en la Valencia del siglo XVIII: los Causa, Batifora y Ferrando.” In La documentación notarial en la historia: Actas del II Coloquio de Metodología Histórica Aplicada, vol. II, 295–315. Santiago de Compostela: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 1984. “La inmigración italiana en la España moderna.” In La inmigración en España: actas del coloquio, Santiago de Compostela, 6–7 de noviembre de 2003, coords. Domingo L. González Lopo, and Antonio Eiras Roel, 103–45. Santiago de Compostela: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 2004. Franch Benavent, Ricardo, and Rafael Benítez Sánchez-Blanco. Estudios de historia moderna en homenaje a la Profesora Emilia Salvador Esteban. Valencia: Universitat de València, 2008. Fusaro, Maria. “Coping with transition: Greek merchants and ship-owners between Venice and England in late Sixteenth Century.” In Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks, eds. Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, Gelina Harlaftis, and Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou, 95–123. New York: Berg, 2005. Gabaccia, Donna R. Italy’s Many Diasporas. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000. Gabriele, Mariano. “L’armamento italiano sulle rotte atlantiche dal 1800 al 1860.” Storia e Politica year 6, no. 4 (October–December 1967): 668–88. Galante Garrone, Alessandro. “L’emigrazione politica italiana del Risorgimento.” Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento 41 (1954): 223–42. Galasso, Giuseppe. Economia e società nella Calabria del Cinquecento. Naples: Università di Napoli, 1992 (I ed. 1967).

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Bibliography

313

Gallo, Klaus. Las invasiones inglesas. Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 2004. Galmarini, Hugo R. Los negocios del poder: Reforma y crisis del Estado (1776–1826). Buenos Aires: Corregidor, 2000. Games, Alison. “Atlantic history: Definitions, challenges, and opportunities.” The American Historical Review 111, 3 (June 2006): 741–57. Gámez Amián, Aurora. Comercio colonial y burguesía mercantil “malagueña” (1765–1830). Malaga: Universidad de Málaga, 1992. Gammalsson, Hialmar E. Los pobladores de Buenos Aires y su descendencia. Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Secretaría de Cultura, 1980. Gandolfo, Romolo. “Las sociedades italianas de socorros mutuos de Buenos Aires: cuestiones de clase y etnia dentro de una comunidad de inmigrantes (1880–1920).” In Asociacionismo, trabajo e identidad étnica, eds. Fernando J. Devoto and Eduardo J. Míguez, 311–32. Buenos Aires: CEMLA-CSERIEHS, 1992. Garavaglia, Juan Carlos. “La economía rural en la campaña de Buenos Aires vista a través de sus precios.” In En busca del tiempo perdido: La economía de Buenos Aires en el país de la abundancia (1750–1865), eds. Raúl O. Fradkin and Juan Carlos Garavaglia, 107–58. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2004. Economía, Sociedad y Regiones. Buenos Aires: Ediciones de la Flor, 1987. “Ejército y milicia: los campesinos bonaerenses y el peso de las exigencias militares, 1810–1860.” Anuario IEHS 18 (2003):153–87. “Un siglo de estancias en la campaña de Buenos Aires: 1751 a 1853.” The Hispanic American Historical Review 79, no. 4 (November 1999): 703–34. Garavaglia, Juan Carlos, and Jorge Gelman. El mundo rural rioplatense a fines de la época colonial: estudios sobre producción y mano de obra. Buenos Aires: Biblos, 1988. “Rural history of the Rio de la Plata, 1600–1850.” Latin American Research Review 30, no. 3 (1995): 75–105. Garavaglia, Juan Carlos, and Juan Marchena. América Latina: De los orígenes a la independencia, Vol. II, La sociedad colonial ibérica en el siglo XVIII. Barcelona: Crítica, 2005. García-Baquero González, Antonio. Andalucía y la Carrera de Indias, 1492–1824. Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2002. Cádiz y el Atlántico (1717–1778). El comercio colonial español bajo el monopolio gaditano. Seville: E.E.H.A., 1976. La Carrera de Indias: suma de la contratación y océano de negocios. Seville: Sociedad Estatal Expo 92-Algaida, 1992. Comercio colonial y guerras revolucionarias: La decadencia económica de Cádiz a raíz de la emancipación americana. Seville: E.E.H.A., 1972. “Los extranjeros en el tráfico con Indias: entre el rechazo legal y la tolerancia funcional.” In Los Extranjeros en la España moderna. Actas del primer coloquio internacional celebrado en Málaga del 28 al 30 de noviembre de 2002, eds. María B. Villar García and Pilar Pezzi Cristóbal, tomo I, 73–99. Malaga: Universidad de Málaga, 2003. García Belsunce, César A. “Diezmos y producción agrícola en Buenos Aires virreinal.” Investigación y Ensayos 38 (1988): 317–55.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

314

Bibliography

García Estrada, Rodrigo de J. “La condición del extranjero en el tránsito de la Colonia a la República en la Nueva Granada, 1750–1830.” PhD diss., Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Ecuador, 2012. García, Fernández, María Nélida. Comerciando con el enemigo: el tráfico mercantil anglo-español en el siglo XVIII (1700–1765). Madrid: CSIC, 2006. Comunidad extranjera y puerto privilegiado: Los británicos en Cádiz en el siglo XVIII. Cadiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 2005. García-Mauriño Mundi, Margarita. La pugna entre el Consulado de Cádiz y los jenízaros por las exportaciones a Indias (1720–1765). Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1999. García Sanz, Ángel. “La reforma agraria de la Ilustración: proyectos y resultados. El precedente del arbitrismo agrarista castellano.” In Reformas y políticas agrarias en la historia de España, eds. Ángel García Sanz and Jesús Sanz Fernández, 161–200. Madrid: Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación, 1996. García Sanz, Ángel, and Jesús Sanz Fernández, eds. Reformas y políticas agrarias en la historia de España. Madrid: Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación, 1996. García Tejera, Maríadel Carmen, Isabel Morales Sánchez, Fátima Coca Ramírez, and José A. Hernández Guerrero, eds. Lecturas del pensamiento filosófico, estético y político, XIII Encuentro de la Ilustración al Romanticismo 1750–1850. Cádiz, América y Europa ante la Modernidad, Cadiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 2007. Garibbo, Luciana. La neutralità della Repubblica di Genova: Saggio sulla condizione dei piccoli stati nell’Europa del Settecento. Milan: A. Giuffrè, 1972. Politica, amministrazione e interessi a Genova (1815–1940). Milan: Franco Angeli, 2000. Gatti, Luciana. Navi e cantieri della Repubblica di Genova (secoli XVI–XVIII). Genoa: Brigati, 1999. Gelderblom, Oscar. Cities of Commerce: The Institutional Foundation of International Trade in the Low Countries, 1250–1650. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. Gelman, Jorge, coord. Argentina: Crisis imperial e independencia, 2 vols. Madrid: Fundaciòn MAPFRE-Taurus, 2010. “Los caminos del mercado: campesinos, estancieros y pulperos en una región del Río de La Plata colonial.” Latin American Research Review 28, no. 2 (1993): 89–118. De mercachifle a gran comerciante: Los caminos del ascenso en el Rio de la Plata colonial. Huelva: Universidad Internacional de Andalucía, 1996. “Sobre el carácter del comercio colonial y los patrones de inversión de un gran comerciante en el Río de la Plata del siglo XVIII.” Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana “Dr. E. Ravignani,” 3rd ser., 1 (Primer semestre 1989): 51–69. Giacchero, Giulio. Genova e la Liguria nell’età contemporanea, vol. I. Genoa: Sagep, 1980. Il Seicento e le Compere di San Giorgio. Genoa: Sagep, 1979. Storia economica del Settecento genovese. Genoa: Apuania, 1951.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Bibliography

315

Giménez López, Enrique. Alicante en el siglo XVIII: Economía de una ciudad portuaria en el antiguo régimen. Valencia: Institución Alfonso el Magnánimo, 1981. Girard, Albert. Le commerce français a Seville et Cadix au temps des Habsbourgs: Contribution à l’étude du commerce étranger en Espagne aux XVIe et XVIIIe siècles. Paris: E. de Boccard, 1932. Giuliani Balestrino, Maria Clotilde. L’Argentina degli italiani. Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1989. “La prima immigrazione italiana in alcuni centri minori del Plata Argentino.” Studi e Ricerche di Geografia 10, 1 (1987): 59–77. González Ángulo Aguirre, Jorge. Artesanado y ciudad a fines del siglo XVIII. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1983. González Beltrán, Jesús M. “Extranjeros en el siglo XVIII: procesos de integración y solidaridad interna.” In Los Extranjeros en la España moderna: Actas del primer coloquio internacional celebrado en Málaga del 28 al 30 de noviembre de 2002, eds. María B. Villar García and Pilar Pezzi Cristóbal, tomo I, 379–89. Malaga, Universidad de Málaga, 2003. “Legislación sobre extranjeros a finales del siglo XVIII.” Trocadero 8–9 (1996– 1997): 103–17. González Fasani, Ana M. “El espíritu cofradiero en el Buenos Aires colonial (siglos XVII–XVIII).” In De Prácticas, Comportamientos y formas de Representación Social en Buenos Aires (S. XVII–XIX), coords. Hilda R. Zapico, 261–98. Bahía Blanca: Editorial de la Universidad Nacional del Sur, 2006. “¿Qué entendemos por cofradía colonial?: Un aproximación a un marco teórico para el estudio.” In De Prácticas, Comportamientos y formas de Representación Social en Buenos Aires (S. XVII–XIX), coord. Hilda R. Zapico, 225–60. Bahía Blanca: Editorial de la Universidad Nacional del Sur, 2006. González Jiménez, Manuel. “Genoveses en Sevilla (siglos XII–XV).” In Presencia Italiana en Andalucía, siglos XIV–XVI: Actas del Primer Coloquio HispanoItaliano, eds. Bibiano Torres Ramírez and José Hernández Palomo, 115–30. Seville: E.E.H.A., 1985. González Lopo, Domingo L., and Antonio Eiras Roel, coords. La inmigración en España: actas del coloquio, Santiago de Compostela, 6–7 de noviembre de 2003. Santiago de Compostela: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 2004. Grendi, Edoardo. La Repubblica aristocratica dei Genovesi, Politica, carità e commercio fra Cinque e Seicento. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1987. Grafe, Regina. “Polycentric states: The Spanish reigns and the ‘failures’ of mercantilism.” In Mercantilism Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and its Empire, eds. Philip J. Stern and Carl Wennerlind, 241–258. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Grief, Avner. Institutions and the Path of the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Guenzi, Alberto, Paola Massa, and Angelo Moioli, eds. Corporazioni e gruppi professionali nell’Italia moderna. Milan: Franco Angeli, 1999. Guerra Martinière, Margarita, Cristina Mazzeo de Vivó, and Almeida Denisse Rouillon, eds. Historias compartidas: economía, sociedad y poder, siglos

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

316

Bibliography

XVI–XX. Actas del primer encuentro de Historia Perú-Argentina. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica, 2007. Guglielmino, Enrico. Genova dal 1814 al 1849: Gli sviluppi economici e l’opinione pubblica. Genoa: R. Deputazione di Storia Patria per la Liguria, 1939. Guía de forasteros en Filipinas para el año de 1865. Manila: Establecimiento de los Amigos del País a cargo de Estevan Plana, 1865. Guía General de los forasteros de Cádiz para el año de 1817. Cádiz: Imprenta de D. Ramon Hoove, plazuela del Cañon. Guía General de los forasteros de Cádiz para el año de 1830. Cádiz: Imprenta de D. Nicolás Gómez de Requena, Calle de la Amargura número 5. Guía General de los forasteros de Cádiz para el año de 1831. Cádiz: Imprenta de D. Nicolás Gómez de Requena, Calle de la Amargura número 5. Guillamondegui, Julio César. “La justicia consular en Buenos Aires (1794–1810).” Boletín de la Academia Nacional de la Historia 23, no. 2 (1963): 795–838. La justicia consular patria (1810–1862). Buenos Aires: E.G.L.H., 1965. Guillén Tato, Julio F. Índice Sistemático de acuerdos de las actas capitulares de. . .. Cádiz (1717–1807). Cadiz: Cerón, 1941. Halperín Donghi, Tulio. “La expansión ganadera en la campaña de Buenos Aires (1810–1852).” Desarrollo Económico 3 (April–September 1963): 57–110. Guerra y finanzas en los orígenes del estado argentino (1791–1850). Buenos Aires: Belgrano, 1982. “Militarización revolucionaria en Buenos Aires, 1806–1815.” In El ocaso del orden colonial en Hispanoamérica (1750–1850), ed. Tulio Halperín Donghi, 121–58. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1978. El ocaso del orden colonial en Hispanoamérica (1750–1850). Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1978. Reforma y disolución de los imperios ibéricos, 1750–1850. Madrid: Alianza, 1985. Revolución y guerra: Formación de una elite dirigente en la Argentina criolla. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2005 (I ed. 1972). Hancock, David. “The British Atlantic world: Co-ordination, complexity, and the emergence of an Atlantic market economy, 1651–1815.” Itinerario 2 (1999): 107–25. Hausberger, Bernd, and Antonio Ibarra, eds. Comercio y Poder en América colonial: los consulados de comerciantes, siglos XVII–XIX. Mexico: Instituto de Investigaciones Dr. José María Luis Mora, 2003. Heers, Jacques. “Les Génois en Angleterre: la crise de 1458–1466.” In Studi in onore di Armando Sapori, vol II, 807–32. Milan: Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 1957. Helguera, Juan. “Empresas y empresarios manufactureros en la España del siglo XVIII.” In La empresa en la historia de España, eds. Francisco Comín and Pablo Martín Aceña, 115–40. Madrid: Civitas, 1996. Hernández Palomo, José, ed. Presencia italiana en Andalucía. Siglos XIV–XVII: Actas del Tercer Coloquio Hispano-Italiano. Seville: E.E.H.A., 1989. Herrera, Luis A. La misión Ponsonby. Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1974. Herrero Sánchez, Manuel. El acercamiento Hispano-Neerlandés (1648–1678). Madrid: CSIC, 2000.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Bibliography

317

“Génova y el sistema imperial Hispánico.” In La Monarquía de las Naciones: Patria, Nación y Naturaleza en la Monarquía de España, coords. Bernardo J. García García and Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, 529–62. Madrid: Fundación Carlos de Amberes, 2004. “La quiebra del sistema hispano-genovés (1627–1700).” Hispania 65/1, no. 219 (2005): 115–51. Herzog, Tamar. Defining Nations: Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America. New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press, 2003. Hills, George. Rock of Contention: A History of Gibraltar. London: Ed. Robert Hale & C., 1974. Hobsbawm, Eric J. Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Homenage al Prof. Dr. Hernández Díaz. Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1982. Hubscher, Roland. De la integración del campesinado en la sociedad global: la pluriactividad, ¿un equilibrio o una destabilización de la sociedad rural? Mar del Plata: GIHRR, 1996. Humphreys, Robert A. British Consular Reports on the Trade and Politics of Latin America (1824–1826). London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 1940. Iglesias Rodríguez, Juan José. Una ciudad mercantil en el siglo XVIII: el Puerto de Santa María. Brenes: Seville, Muñoz Moya y Montraveta, 1991. Il Risorgimento italiano in America Latina: Atti del Convegno internazionale 24-25-26 novembre 2005. Ancona: Affinità Elettive, 2006. Irigoin, María Alejandra, and Roberto Schmit, eds. La desintegración de la economía colonial: Comercio y moneda en el interior del espacio colonial (1800–1860). Buenos Aires: Biblos, 2003. Israel, Jonathan. Conflicts of Empires: Spain, the Low Countries and the Struggle for World Supremacy, 1585–1713. London and Rio Grande, OH: Hambledon Press, 1997. Diaspora within a Diaspora: Jews, Crypto-Jews, and the World of Maritime Empires (1540–1740). Boston, MA: Brill, 2002. Dutch Supremacy in World Trade. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Jackson, William G.F. The Rock of Gibraltarians: A History of Gibraltar. Gibraltar: Gibraltar Books Ltd., 2001. Johnson, Lyman. “The artisans of Buenos Aires during the Viceroyalty, 1776–1810.” PhD diss., The University of Connecticut, 1974. “The entrepreneurial reorganization of an artisan trade: The bakers of Buenos Aires, 1770–1820.” The Americas 37, 2 (October 1980): 139–60. Workshop of Revolution: Plebeian Buenos Aires and the Atlantic World, 1776–1810. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 2011. Jumar, Fernando. “Los comerciantes rioplatenses: su participación en el comercio legal español, 1720–1778.” In Mercantilismo y comercio en el mundo ibérico, ed. Fernando Jumar, 5–27. Buenos Aires: Universidad Argentina de la Empresa, 2002. “Comercio, comerciantes y revolución en el Río de la Plata: Siglo XVIIIprincipios del siglo XIX.” In Historias compartidas: economía, sociedad y

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

318

Bibliography

poder, siglos XVI–XX. Actas del primer encuentro de Historia Perú Argentina, coords. Margarita Guerra Martinière, Cristina Mazzeo de Vivó, and Denisse Rouillon Almeida, 307–43. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica, 2007. ed. Mercantilismo y comercio en el mundo ibérico. Buenos Aires: Universidad Argentina de la Empresa, 2002. Kagan, Richard L., and Philip D. Morgan, eds. Atlantic Diasporas: Jews, Conversos, and Crypto-Jews in the Age of Mercantilism, 1500–1800. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009. Kamen, Henry. Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492–1763. New York: Perennial, 2004. La España de Carlos II. Barcelona: Crítica, 1981. Kinsbruner, Jay. Petty Capitalism in Spanish America: The Pulperos of Puebla, Mexico City, Caracas, and Buenos Aires. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987. Kirk, Thomas Allison. Genoa and the Sea: Policy and Power in an Early Modern Maritime Republic, 1559–1684. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. “A little country in a world of empires: Genoese attempts to penetrate the maritime trading empires of seventeenth century.” Journal of European Economic History (JEEH) 25, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 407–21. Klooster, Wim. Illicit Riches: Dutch Trade in the Caribbean. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998. Konetzke, Richard. “Legislación sobre inmigración de extranjeros en América durante la época Colonial.” Revista Internacional de Sociología 3, no. 11– 12 (1945): 269–99. Kroeber, Clifton B. La navegación de los ríos en la historia argentina. Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1967. Kuethe, Allan J. “El fin del monopolio: Los Borbones y el Consulado Andaluz.” In Relaciones de poder y comercio colonial: Nuevas perspectivas, eds. Enriqueta Vila Vilar and Allan J. Kuethe, 35–66. Seville: EEHA-CSIC, 1999. La burguesía mercantil gaditana, 1650–1868. Ponencias presentadas en el XXXI Congreso Luso-Español para el Progreso de las Ciencias, celebrado en Cádiz, 183–99. Cadiz: Instituto de Estudios Gaditanos, 1976. La documentación notarial en la historia: Actas del II Coloquio de Metodología Histórica Aplicada, vol. II. Santiago de Compostela: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 1984. Labanca, Nicola. Oltremare: Storia dell’espansione coloniale italiana. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007. Lario de Oñate, Maríadel Carmen. La colonia mercantil británica e irlandesa en Cádiz a finales del siglo XVIII. Cadiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 2000. Lespagnol, André. “L’entreprise d’Etat.” In L’impresa. Industria, commercio, banca. Secc. XIII–XVIII, Atti della “Ventiduesima Settimana di Studi,” 30 aprile-4 maggio 1990, ed. Simonetta Cavaciocchi, 691–717. Prato: Datini, 1990. Levaggi, Abelardo. “Papel de los patronos en las capellanías: Cuestiones suscitadas a su respecto en el Río de la Plata.” In Cofradías, capellanías y obras pías

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Bibliography

319

en la América Colonial, eds. María del Pilar Martínez López-Cano, Gisela Von Wobeser, and Juan Guillermo Muñoz Correa, 143–54. Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1988. “El Supremo decreto de Rosas sobre quitas y esperas.” Revista del Instituto de Historia del Derecho Ricardo Levene 26 (1980): 57–78. Lévano Medina, Diego. “La inserción comercial de genoveses en las postrimerías del periodo colonial: Lima, 1750–1825.” In Historia de Lima: XVII Coloquio de Historia de Lima, 2010, eds. Miguel Maticorena, Carlos del Águila, Richard Chuhue, and Antonio Coello, 167–85. Lima: UNMSM, 2010. Levene, Ricardo. Ensayo Histórico sobre la revolución de Mayo y Mariano Moreno, vol. I. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Peuser, 1960. Historia del derecho argentino, tomo V. Buenos Aires: Editorial Guillermo Kraft Ltda, 1949. Levi, Scott C. The Indian Diaspora in Central Asia and its Trade, 1550–1900. Leiden: Brill, 2002. Liehr, Reinhard, ed. América Latina en la época de Simon Bolivar. Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1989. Llombart, Vicent. Campomanes, economista y político de Carlos III. Madrid: Alianza, 1992. Llopís Agelán, Enrique. “Expansión, reformismo y obstáculos al crecimiento (1715–1789).” In Historia económica de España, siglos X–XX, eds. Francisco Comín, Mauro Hernández, and Enrique Llopís, 121–64. Barcelona: Crítica, 2002. Lo Basso, Luca. “Il Sud dei Genovesi: Traffici marittimi e pratiche mercantili tra l’Italia Meridionale, Genova e Marsiglia nel Settecento.” In Lo spazio tirrenico nella “Grande Trasformazione.” Merci, uomini e istituzioni nel Settecento e nel Primo Ottocento, ed. Biagio Salvemini, 239–61. Bari: Edipuglia, 2009. Lobato, Isabel, and José María Oliva Melgar, coords. El sistema comercial español en la economía Mundial (siglos XVII–XVIII). Homenaje a Jesús Aguado de los Reyes. Huelva: Universidad de Huelva, 2013. Lopez, Robert S. “I primi passi della colonia genovese in Inghilterra.” Bollettino Ligustico 2, no. 2 (1950): 66–70. Storia delle colonie genovesi nel Mediterraneo. 2nd ed. Genoa: Marietti, 1996. López Miguel, Olga, and Magda Mirabet Cucala. “La institucionalización de la Matrícula de Mar: textos normativos y consecuencias para la gente de mar y maestranza.” In El derecho y el mar en la España moderna, ed. Carlos Martínez Shaw, 217–39. Granada: Editorial Universidad de Granada, 1995. Lynch, John. Bourbon Spain, 1700–1808. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. “Foreign trade and economic interests in Argentina, 1810–1850.” In América Latina en la época de Simon Bolivar, ed. Reinhard Liehr, 139–55. Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1989. “Las Repúblicas del Río de la Plata.” In Historia de América Latina, ed. Leslie Bethell, vol. 6, 264–315. Barcelona: Crítica, 1991. Maixé Altés, J. Carles. “La colonia genovesa en Cataluña en los siglos XVII y XVIII: los Bensi.” In Primer Congrés d’Història Moderna de Catalunya, vol. I, 523–32. Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona, 1984.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

320

Bibliography

Comercio y Banca en la Cataluña del siglo XVIII: La compañía Bensi & Merizano de Barcelona (1724–1750). A Coruña: Universidade da Coruña, 1994. “Los instrumentos jurídicos de la circulación mercantil y la actividad económica catalana en el siglo XVIII.” In El derecho y el mar en la España moderna, ed. Carlos Martínez Shaw, 357–82. Granada: Editorial Universidad de Granada, 1995. Malamud Rikles, Carlos D. Cádiz y Saint Malo en el comercio colonial peruano (1698–1725). Cadiz: Diputación Provincial de Cádiz, 1986. “España, Francia y el ‘comercio directo’ con el espacio peruano (1695–1730): Cádiz y Saint Malo.” In La economía española al final del Antiguo Régimen, III: Comercio y Colonias, ed. Josep Fontana, 1–95. Madrid: Alianza/Banco de España, 1982. Mantegazza, Paolo. Rio de la Plata e Tenerife: Viaggi e Studi. Milan: Brigola, 1867. Marani, Alma Novella. El ideario mazziniano en el Río de la Plata. La Plata: Universidad Nacional de la Plata, 1985. Marchena Fernández, Juan. “Italianos al servicio del rey de España en el ejército de América, 1740–1815.” In Italiani al servizio straniero in età moderna, Annali di Storia Militare Europea, eds. Paola Bianchi, Davide Maffi, and Enrico Stumpo, 135–76. Milan: Franco Angeli, 2008. Marchese, Ugo. “L’industria armatoriale ligure dal 1816 al 1859.” Archivio Economico dell’Unificazione Italiana 6, no. 1 (1957): 1–32. “L’industria ligure delle costruzioni navali dal 1816 al 1859.” Archivio Economico dell’Unificazione Italiana 7, no. 1 (1952): 1–18. Mariano, Marco, and Duccio Sacchi. “La costruzione della rete consolare sarda nelle Americhe, 1815–1860.” Annali della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi 40 (2006): 327–68. Mariluz Urquijo, José María. Estado e industria: 1810–1862. Buenos Aires: Macchi, 1969. “Las sociedades anónimas en Buenos Aires antes del Código de Comercio.” Revista del Instituto de Historia del Derecho Ricardo Levene 16 (1965): 31–65. Márquez Miranda, Fernando. Ensayo sobre los artífices de platería en el Buenos Aires colonial. Buenos Aires: Publicaciones del Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas “E. Ravignani,” n. LXII, 1933. Martín, Alberto M. España en los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII. Economía y sociedad. Barcelona: Crítica, 2001. Martínez López-Cano, María del Pilar, Gisela Von Wobeser, and Juan Guillermo Muñoz Correa, eds. Cofradías, capellanías y obras pías en la América Colonial. Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1988. Martínez Shaw, Carlos. Cataluña en la Carrera de Indias, 1680–1756. Barcelona: Crítica, 1981. ed. El derecho y el mar en la España moderna. Granada: Editorial Universidad de Granada, 1995. Martínez Shaw, Carlos and José María Oliva Melgar. El sistema atlántico español (siglos XVII–XIX). Marcial Pons: Madrid, 2005.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Bibliography

321

Marzagalli, Silvia. “The French Atlantic World in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Atlantic World: 1450–1850, eds. Nicholas Canny and Philip Morgan, 235–51. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Marzagalli, Silvia, Maria Ghazali, and Christian Windler, dirs. Les consuls en Méditerranée, agents d’information, XVIe–XXe siècle. Paris: Classiques Garnier, coll. Les Méditerranées, 2014. Marzagalli, Silvia, and Bruno Marnot, eds. Guerre et économie dans l’espace atlantique du XVIe au XXe siècle. Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires Bordeaux, 2006. Massa, Paola. “Annona e corporazioni del settore alimentare a Genova: organizzazione e conflittualità (XVI–XVIII secolo).” In Corporazioni e gruppi professionali nell’Italia moderna, eds. Alberto Guenzi, Paola Massa, and Angelo Moioli, 390–403. Milan: Franco Angeli, 1999. Mauro, Frédéric. “Merchant communities, 1350–1750.” In The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long Distance Trade in the Early Modern World 1350–1750, ed. James D. Tracy, 255–86. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Mayo, Carlos A. Estancia y sociedad en la Pampa, 1740–1820. Buenos Aires: Biblos, 1995. “Landed but not powerful: The colonial estancieros of Buenos Aires (1750–1810).” Hispanic American Historical Review 71, no. 4 (November 1991): 761–79. ed. Pulperos y pulperías de Buenos Aires (1740–1830). Mar del Plata: Grupo Sociedad y Estado, Buenos Aires, Biblos, 2000. Mazzitelli, Guido. La spedizione di Magellano e Leon Pancaldo savonese. Savona: Marco Sabatelli Editore, 2001. Mc Farlane, Anthony, and Eduardo Posada Carbó. Independence and Revolution in Spanish America: Perspectives and Problems. London: University of London, Institute of Latin American Studies, 1999. Mc Lean, David. War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire: Britain and the Republics of the Rio de la Plata (1836–1853). London: British Academic Press, 1995. Meinig, Donald W. The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History, vol. I, Atlantic America: 1492–1800. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. Méndez Calzada, Luis. La función judicial en las primeras épocas de la independencia. Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1944. Merchán Fernández, A. Carlos. Gobierno municipal y administración local en la España del antiguo régimen. Madrid: Tecnos, 1988. Meyer, Jean, Jean Tarrade, Annie Rey-Golzeiguer, and Jacques Thobie. Histoire de la France coloniale, vol. 1, «Des origines à 1914». Paris: Armand Colin, 1991. Millares Martínez, Pedro. “Familias genovesas afincadas en Murcia vinculadas al comercio sedero.” In Los Extranjeros en la España moderna: Actas del primer coloquio internacional celebrado en Málaga del 28 al 30 de noviembre de 2002, eds. María B. Villar García and Pilar Pezzi Cristóbal, tomo I, 493–503. Malaga: Universidad de Málaga, 2003.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

322

Bibliography

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto. Instrumentos internacionales de carácter bilateral suscriptos por la República Argentina (hasta el 30 de junio de 1948), t. III. Buenos Aires: Alea, 1950. Mira, Guillermo, and Alicia Gil Lázaro. “Minería, comercio y moneda en un periodo de transición: Potosí, la crisis colonial y las bases del crecimiento económico en el Río de la Plata después de la independencia.” In La desintegración de la economía colonial: Comercio y moneda en el interior del espacio colonial (1800–1860), eds. María Alejandra Irigoin and Roberto Schmit, 37–55. Buenos Aires: Biblos, 2003. Molina, Carlo. “L’emigrazione Ligure a Cadice (1709–1854).” Atti della società Ligure di Storia Patria CVIII, 2 (1994): 285–377. Molina, Eugenia. “El concepto de ciudadanía en el discurso y en las prácticas de las ‘modernas’ formas de sociabilidad asociativa (1810–1813).” Sociohistórica 11–12 (Primer y Segundo semestre 2002): 135–57. Montale, Bianca. Mito e realtà di Genova nel Risorgimento. Milan: Franco Angeli, 1999. Morineau, Michel. Incroyables gazettes et fabuleux métaux, Le retours des trésors américains d’aprés les gazettes hollandaises, (XVIe–XVIIIe siècles). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Moutoukias, Zacarías. “Comercio y producción.” In Nueva Historia de la Nación Argentina, ed. Academia Nacional de la Historia, t. III, 51–103. Buenos Aires: Planeta, 2005. Contrabando y control colonial en el siglo XVII. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1988. “Contrabando y sector externo en Hispanoamérica colonial.” In Para una historia de América II: Los Nudos (1), eds. Marcello Carmagnani, Alicia Hernández Chávez, and Ruggiero Romano, 172–97. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1999. “Lazos débiles / lazos fuertes y la organización espacial de los negocios en Hispanoamérica colonial (segunda mitad del siglo XVIII).” In Configuraciones y redes de poder: Un análisis de las relaciones sociales en América Latina, ed. Michel Bertrand, 15–26. Caracas: Tropykos, 2002. “Power, corruption and commerce: The making of the local administrative structure in seventeenth-century Buenos Aires.” Hispanic American Historical Review 68, no. 4 (1988): 771–801. Moya, José C. “Modernization, modernity, and the trans/formation of the Atlantic world in the nineteenth century.” In The Atlantic in Global History, 1500–2000, eds. Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra and Erik R. Seeman, 179–97. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007. Mozzarelli, Cesare, ed. Economia e corporazioni: ll governo degli interessi nella storia d’Italia dal medioevo all’età contemporanea. Milan: Giuffrè, 1988. Myers, Jorge E. “Giuseppe Mazzini and the Emergence of Liberal Nationalism in the River Plate and Chile, 1835–1860.” In Giuseppe Mazzini and the Globalization of Democratic Nationalism, 1830–1920, eds. Christopher A. Bayly and Eugenio F. Biagini, 323–46. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Nascimbene, Mario C. Historia de los italianos en Argentina (1835–1920). Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos, 1987.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Bibliography

323

Navarro Viola, Jorge. El club de residentes extranjeros: Breve reseña histórica en homenaje a sus Fundadores. Buenos Aires: Coni, 1941. Nicolau, Juan Carlos. Proteccionismo y Libre Comercio en Buenos Aires (1810–1850). Cordoba: Centro de Estudios Históricos, 1995. Nicolini, Angelo. “Mercanti e fattori genovesi in Inghilterra nel Quattrocento.” Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria 45, no. 3 (2005): 495–535. Niephaus, Heinz-Theo. Genua Seehandel von 1746–1848: Die Entwicklung der Handelsbeziehungen zur Iberischen Halbinsel, zu West und Nordeuropa sowie den Überseegebieten. Köln Wien: Böhlau, 1975. Noejovich, Héctor C. “La institución consular: conceptos, evolución y pervivencias.” In Comercio y Poder en América colonial: los consulados de comerciantes, siglos XVII–XIX, eds. Bernd Hausberger and Antonio Ibarra, 15–41. México: Instituto de Investigaciones Dr. José María Luis Mora, 2003. North, Douglass C. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Novísima Recopilación de las Leyes de España . . . Mandada a formar por el Señor Don Carlos IV, Impresa en Madrid, 1805. Nunn, Charles F. Foreign Immigrants in Early Bourbon Mexico, 1700–1760. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Oliva Melgar, José María. “El imperio económico internacional sobre América: a propósito de la ‘Financiación de la Carrera de Indias’ de A.M. Bernal: Materiales y reflexiones para una renovación necesaria.” Anuario de Estudios Americanos 52, no. 1 (1995): 261–83. El monopolio de las Indias en el siglo XVII y la economía andaluza: La oportunidad que nunca existió: Lección inaugural curso académico 2004–2005. Huelva: Universidad de Huelva, 2004. “La participación extranjera en el monopolio y el Consulado de Indias en el siglo XVII.” Rábida 22 (2003): 53–66. “Pacto fiscal y eclipse de la contratación en el siglo XVII: Consulado, Corona e indultos en el monopolio de Indias.” In La Casa de la Contratación y la navegación entre España y las Indias, eds. Antonio Acosta Rodríguez, Adolfo González Rodríguez, and Enriqueta Vila Vilar, 449–95. Seville: CSIC, Universidad de Sevilla, 2003. Ombre e luci della Restaurazione: Trasformazioni e continuità istituzionali nel territori del Regno di Sardegna, Atti del convegno, Torino 21–24 ottobre 1991. Rome: Ufficio Centrale per i Beni Archivistici, 1997. Otte, Enrique. “Il ruolo dei genovesi nella Spagna del XV e XVI secolo.” In La repubblica internazionale del denaro tra XV e XVII secolo, eds. Aldo De Maddalena and Hermann Kellenbenz, 17–56. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1984. Pacini, Arturo. “I presupposti politici del secolo dei genovesi: la riforma del 1528.” Special issue, Atti della Società Ligure Storia Patria, n. s., 30, no. 1 (1990). Palmer, Sarah. “The eighteenth century ports of London and Liverpool: Private v. corporate promotion.” In I porti come impresa economica, ed. Simonetta Cavaciocchi, 381–97. Florence: Le Monnier, 1988. Paquette, Gabriel B. “State-civil society cooperation and conflict in the Spanish empire: The intellectual and political activities of the ultramarine consulados

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

324

Bibliography

and economic societies, c. 1780–1810.” Journal of Latin American Studies 39 (2007): 263–98. Patrucco Nuñez-Carvallo, Sandro. “Inserción italiana en el Perú virreinal del siglo XVIII.” In Génova y la monarquía hispánica (1528–1713), dirs. Manuel Herrero Sánchez, Yasmina Rocío Ben Yessef Garfia, Carlo Bitossi, and Dino Puncuh, 965–79. Genoa: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2011. Peire, Jaime. El Taller de los Espejos: Iglesia e Imaginario, 1767–1815. Buenos Aires: Claridad, 2000. Pellegrini, Sandro. Il consolato genovese alla Canarie (1710–1805). Genoa: a Compagna, 1997. Frammenti di storia: Genova, Recco, Spagna (sec. XVII–XX). Genoa: De Ferrari, 2005. Serenissimi Signori: La corrispondenza dei consoli genovesi a Cadice (ante 1523–1805). Genoa: Genova, 2004. Pepelasis Minoglou, Ioanna. “Toward a typology of Greek-Diaspora entrepreneurship.” In Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks, eds. Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, Gelina Harlaftis, and Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou, 173–89. New York: Berg, 2005. Pérez-Mallaína, Pablo E. Spain’s Men of the Sea: Daily Life on the Indies Fleets in the Sixteenth Century. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. Pesaresi, Guillermo. “El APE en la época de Rosas: Legislación y jurisprudencia del derecho comercial patrio.” In Dinámica judicial y acciones en las sociedades y concursos, eds. Edgardo D. Truffaut and Carlos A. Molina Sandoval, 551–64. Cordoba: Advocatus, 2002. Petriella, Dionisio, and Sara Sosa Miatello. Diccionario biográfico italo-argentino. Buenos Aires: Asociación Dante Alighieri, 1976. Petti Balbi, Giovanna, ed. Comunità forestiere e nationes nell’Europa dei secoli XIII–XVI. Naples: Liguori, 2001. Negoziare fuori patria: Nazioni e genovesi in età medievale. Bologna: CLUEB, 2005. Piastra, William. Dizionario biografico dei liguri: Dalle origini al 1990, vol. II. Genoa: Consulta Ligure, 1994. Piccinno, Luisa. “Economia marittima e operatività portuale. Genova, secc. XVII– XIX.” Special issue, Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, n. s., 40, no. 1 (2000). Piccirilli, Ricardo, Francisco Romay, and Leoncio Gianello, eds. Diccionario Histórico Argentino. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Históricas Argentinas, 1953. Pietschmann, Horst. Atlantic History: History of the Atlantic System, 1580–1830. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2002. “Historia del sistema atlántico: Un marco de investigación en Hamburgo.” Memoria y Civilización 1 (1998): 139–64. Las reformas borbónicas y el sistema de intendencias en Nueva España: Un estudio político administrativo. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1996. Pigna, Felipe. Manuel Belgrano: Autobiografía y escritos económicos. Buenos Aires: Grupo Editorial Planeta, 2009. Pike, Ruth. Enterprise and Adventure: The Genoese in Seville and the Opening of the New World. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Bibliography

325

Pistarino, Geo. Chio dei genovesi nel tempo di Cristoforo Colombo. Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1995. “Presenze ed influenze italiane nel sud della Spagna (Secc. XII–XV).” In Presencia italiana en Andalucía. Siglos XIV–XVII: Actas del Primer Coloquio Hispano-Italiano, eds. Bibiano Torres Ramírez and José Hernández Palomo, 21–51. Seville, E.E.H.A., 1985. I Signori del Mare. Genoa: Civico Istituto Colombiano, 1992. Platt, Desmond C.M. “The role of the British consular service in overseas trade, 1825–1914.” The Economic History Review, n. s., 15, no. 3 (1963): 494– 512. Plüss, Caroline. “Globalizing ethnicity with multi-local identifications: The Parsee, Indian Muslim and Sephardi trade diasporas in Hong Kong.” In Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks, eds. Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, Gelina Harlaftis, and Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou, 245–68. New York: Berg, 2005. Poggio, Eleonora. “Las composiciones de extranjeros en la Nueva España, 1595–1700.” In Los extranjeros y la Nación en España y la América española, coords. by Óscar Recio Morales and Thomas Glesener, special issue Cuadernos de Historia Moderna Anejo X (2011): 177–93. Pointreau, Abel. Les Espagnols de l’Auvergne et du Limousin du XVIIIe au XIXe siècle. Aurillac: Mazel-Malroux, 1985. Ponce Cordones, Francisco. “Dos siglos clave en la demografía gaditana (Breve estudio sobre la evolución de la población de Cádiz en las centurias XVII y XVIII).” Gades 11 (1983): 417–46. Porro, Nelly, Juana Astiz, and María Rospide. Aspectos de la vida cotidiana en el Buenos Aires virreinal, vol. 2. Buenos Aires: Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1982. Porter, Andrew, ed. The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. III, The Nineteenth Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Postma, Johannes, and Victor Enthoven, eds. Riches from Atlantic Commerce: Dutch Transatlantic Trade and Shipping, 1585–1817. Leiden: Brill, 2003. Power, Orla. “Beyond kinship: A study of the eighteenth-century Irish community at Saint Croix, Danish West Indies.” Irish Migration Studies in Latin America 5, n. 3 (Nov. 2007): 207–14, www.irlandeses.org/0711power1.htm Pozzetta, George, and Bruno Ramírez, eds. The Italian Diaspora: Migration Across the Globe. Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1992. Pressotto, Danilo. “Da Genova alle Indie alla metà del Seicento: Un singolare contratto di arruolamento marittimo.” Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria 9 (1969): 69–91. Price, Jacob M. “Economic function and the growth of American port towns in the eighteenth century.” Perspectives in American History 8 (1974): 123–86. Priotti, Jean Philippe, and Guy Saupin, dirs. Le commerce atlantique francoespagnol. Acteurs, négoces et ports (XVe–XVIIIe siècle). Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2008. Pritchard, James. In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670–1730. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pulido Bueno, Ildefonso. Almojarifazgos y comercio exterior en Andalucía durante la época mercantilista, 1526–1740. Huelva: Artes Gráf. Andaluzas, 1993.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

326

Bibliography

Puncuh, Dino, ed. Storia di Genova: Mediterraneo, Europa, Atlantico. Genoa: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2003. Quesada, Juan Isidro. Paseo genealógico por la Argentina y Bolivia. Buenos Aires: Centro de Genealogía de Entre Ríos, 2006. Quintana, Francisco Javier. “El comercio malagueño en el siglo XVII.” Revista Pedralbes 7 (1987): 79–102. Rahn Phillips, Carla. “The growth and composition of trade in the Iberian Empires, 1450–1750.” In The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long Distance Trade in the Early Modern World 1350–1750, ed. James D. Tracy, 34– 101. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. “The Iberian Atlantic.” Itinerario 2 (1999): 84–106. Ravignani, Emilio. Asembleas Constituyentes Argentinas seguidas en los textos constitucionales, legislativos y pactos interprovinciales que organizaron políticamente la Nación, tomo VI, segunda parte, 1810–1898. Buenos Aires: Peuser, 1939. Ravina Martín, Manuel, ed. De Cádiz y su comercio: Vol. 13 of Del Viaje de España, Francia e Italia por D. Nicolás de la Cruz y Bahamonde Conde de Maule. Cadiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 1997. “Mármoles Genoveses en Cádiz.” In Homenaje al Prof. Dr. Hernández Díaz, t. I, 595–615. Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1982. “Un padrón de contribuyentes de Cádiz a mediados del siglo XVII.” Archivo Hispalense 59, no. 181 (1976): 133–52. Raynal, Guillume-Thomas. L’Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes, t. I. Geneve, Chez Jean-Leonard Pellet, 1781 (1 ed. Amsterdam 1770). Recio Morales, Óscar and Thomas Glesener, coords. “Los extranjeros y la Nación en España y la América española.” Special issue Cuadernos de Historia Moderna Anejo X (2011). Reglamento y Aranceles Reales para el comercio libre de España a Indias, de 12 de octubre de 1778. Madrid: en la Imprenta de Pedro Marín. Seville: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, E.E.H.A.-C.S.I.C., 1978. Reid, Antony. “Diaspora networks in the Asian maritime context.” In Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks, eds. Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, Gelina Harlaftis, and Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou, 353–58. New York: Berg, 2005. Roccatagliata, Ausilia. Notai genovesi in Oltremare: Atti rogati a Pera e Mitilene, II, Mitilene, 1454–1460. Genoa: Università di Genova, Istituto di Paleografia e Storia Medievale, 1982. Rodríguez Díaz, José María. “El final del Gremio: Cofradía y la secularización del mundo laboral gremial en Cádiz.” In Lecturas del pensamiento filosófico, estético y político, XIII Encuentro de la Ilustración al Romanticismo 1750–1850. Cádiz, América y Europa ante la Modernidad, eds. María del Carmen García Tejera, Isabel Morales Sánchez, FátimaCoca Ramírez, and José A. Hernández Guerrero, 349–56. Cadiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 2007. Rodríguez Molas, Ricardo. “La pulpería rioplatense en el siglo XVIII.” Revista de la Universidad del Litoral 49 (July–September 1961): 1–134. Romano, Ruggiero. “Algunas consideraciones sobre los problemas del comercio en Hispanomérica durante la época colonial.” Boletín del Instituto de

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Bibliography

327

Historia Argentina y Americana “Dr. E. Ravignani,” 3rd ser., no. 1 (Primersemestre 1989): 23–49. “Il lungo cammino dell’emigrazione italiana.” Altreitalie 7 (January–June 1992): 6–18. Mecanismo y elementos del sistema económico colonial americano. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2004. Rosal, Miguel A., and Roberto Schmit. Comercio, mercados e integración económica en la Argentina del siglo XIX (Cuadernos del Instituto Ravignani, 9). Buenos Aires: Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana Dr. Emilio Ravignani, Facultad de Filosofia y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1995. “Las exportaciones pecuarias bonaerenses y el espacio mercantil rioplatense (1768–1854).” In En busca del tiempo perdido: La economía de Buenos Aires en el país de la abundancia (1750–1865), eds. Raúl O. Fradkin and Juan Carlos Garavaglia, 159–93. Buenos Aires: Prometeo, 2004. Rosoli, Gianfausto, ed. Un secolo di emigrazione italiana. 1876–1976. Rome: Centro Studi Emigrazione, 1978. Rossignol, Marie-Jeanne. French Atlantic World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Rovere, Antonella. “Documenti della Maona di Chio (secc. XIV–XVI).” Special issue, Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, n.s., 19, no. 2 (1979). Ruiz Martín, Felipe. El Banco de España: Una historia económica. Madrid: Banco de España, 1970. “La banca genovesa en España durante el siglo XVII.” In Banchi pubblici, banchi privati e monti di pietà nell’Europa pre-industriale: Amministrazione, tecniche operative e ruoli economici, 2 vols., eds. Dino Puncuh and Giuseppe Felloni, 265–74. Genoa: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 1991. Las finanzas de la monarquía hispánica en los tiempos de Felipe IV (1621–1665): discurso leído el día 21 de octubre de 1990. Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1990. “Las finanzas españolas en tiempos de Felipe II.” Cuadernos de Historia. Anexos de la Revista Hispania 2 (1968): 109–73. “Los hombres de negocios genoveses de España durante el siglo XVI.” In Fremde kaufleute auf der Iberischen Halbinsel, ed. Hermann Kellenbenz, 84–99. Köln, Wien: Böhlau, 1970. Ruiz Moreno, Isidoro J. Orígenes de la diplomacia ítalo-argentina. Buenos Aires: Instituto Histórico de la organización Nacional, 1983. Ruiz Rivera, Julián B. “La casa de Ustáriz, San Ginés y Compañía.” In La burguesía mercantil gaditana, 1650–1868: Ponencias presentadas en el XXXI Congreso Luso-Español para el Progreso de las Ciencias, celebrado en Cádiz, 183–99. Cadiz: Instituto de Estudios Gaditanos, 1976. “La Compañía de Uztáriz, las Reales Fábricas de Talavera y el comercio con las Indias.” Anuario de Estudios Americanos 36 (1979): 209–50. El Consulado de Cádiz: Matrícula de Comerciantes (1730–1823). Cadiz: Diputación Provincial de Cádiz, 1988. Ruocco, Domenico. “L’emigrazione dalla Liguria.” Studi e ricerche di Geografia 10, no. 1 (1987): 1–28.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

328

Bibliography

Sacchi, Duccio. “I consoli e l’ospedale: le prime collette per la fondazione dell’ospedale italiano di Buenos Aires (1853–1858),” Quaderni Storici 123, no. 3 (December 2006): 639–69. Saguier, Eduardo. “La penuria de agua, azogue y mano de obra en el origen de la crisis minera colonial: El caso de Potosí a fines del siglo XVIII.” HISLA. Revista Latinoamericana de Historia Económica y Social (Lima) 12 (1988): 69–81. Salas López, Fernando. Ordenanzas militares en España e Iberoamérica. Madrid: MAPFRE, 1992. Salvatore, Ricardo D., and Carlos Newland. “Between Independence and the Golden Age: The early Argentine economy.” In A New Economic History of Argentina, eds. Gerardo Della Paolera and Alan M. Taylor, 19–45. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Sánchez Bella, Ismael, Aberto De la Hera, and Carlos Díaz Rementeria. Historia del derecho indiano. Madrid: MAPFRE, 1992. Sánchez Mantero, Rafael. Estudios Sobre Gibraltar: Política, diplomacia y contrabando en el siglo XIX. Cadiz: Diputación Provincial de Cádiz, 1999. Sancho de Sopranis, Hipólito. Los Genoveses en Cádiz antes del año 1600. Jerez: Sociedad de Estudios Históricos Jerezanos, 1939. “Los genoveses en la región gaditano-xericiense de 1460 a 1800.” Hispania. Revista Española de Historia 8, no. 32 (1948): 355–402. “Las naciones extranjeras en el Cádiz del siglo XVII.” Estudios de Historia Social de España 4, no. 2 (1960): 643–877. Sanz Ayán, Carmen. “Asentistas holandeses en las finanzas de la Monarquía hispánica (1680–1715).” Diálogos Hispánicos de Amsterdam 16 (1995): 139–56. Los banqueros de Carlos II. Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1989. “El crédito de la Corona y los hombres de negocios en los últimos años del reinado de Felipe IV.” Cuadernos de Historia Moderna 9 (1988): 63–94. “Negociadores y capitales holandeses en los sistemas de abastecimientos de pertrechos navales de la monarquía hispánica durante el siglo XVII.” Hispania 182 (1992): 915–945. “Presencia y fortuna de los hombres de negocios genoveses durante la crisis hispana de 1640.” Hispania 56/1, no. 219 (2005): 91–114. Scammel, Geoffrey V. The World Encompassed: The First European Maritime Empires, c. 800–1650. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981. Schmit, Roberto. “Comercio y mercado en el Litoral argentino durante la primera mitad del siglo XIX.” In Circuitos mercantiles y mercados en Latinoamérica, siglos XVIII y XIX, eds. Jorge Silva Riquer, Juan Carlos Grosso, Carmen Yuste, 291–35. Mexico: Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, UNAM, 1995. “Empresarios” en tiempo de guerra: Comercio y producción rural en el Río de la Plata, 1830–1850, Working paper n. 3. Buenos Aires: Univesidad de Buenos Aires, 2002. “Enlaces conflictivos: comercio, fiscalidad y medios de pago en Entre Ríos durante la primera mitad del siglo XIX.” In La desintegración de la economía colonial: Comercio y moneda en el interior del espacio colonial (1800–1860),

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Bibliography

329

eds. María Alejandra Irigoin and Roberto Schmit, 251–76. Buenos Aires: Biblos, 2003. Schmit, Roberto, and Julio Djenderedjian. “Sociedad y economía de Entre Ríos entre el orden colonial, la Revolución y la República.” In Historia económica del Cono Sur de América (Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Paraguay y Uruguay). La era de las revoluciones y la independencia, ed. Hernán Asdrúbal Silva, 653–95. Mexico: Instituto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia, 2010. Schmit, Roberto, and Miguel A. Rosal. “Las exportaciones del Litoral argentino en el puerto de Buenos Aires entre 1783 y 1850.” Revista de Historia Económica 3 (Fall 1995): 581–607. “Politica comercial, flujos mercantiles y negocios: Buenos Aires y Montevideo frente al comercio exterior rioplatense en el siglo XIX.” Revista de Indias vol. 59, no. 215 (1999): 91–112. Schulte Beerbühl, Margrit. The Forgotten Majority: German Merchants in London, Naturalization, and Global Trade, 1660–1815. New York-Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015. Schurz, William Litle. This New World: The Civilization of Latin America. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1956. Sergi, Jorge F. Historia de los Italianos en la Argentina. Buenos Aires: Editora Italo Argentina s.a., 1940. Silva, Hernán Asdrúbal. “La Colonia del Sacramento, El Virreinato del Río de la Plata y el Libre Comercio: Mito y realidad en el rompimiento de relaciones económicas con el Brasil.” In Navegación y comercio rioplatense, ed. Hernán Asdrúbal Silva, vol. I, 7–72. Bahía Blanca: Gabinete de Investigación de Historia Americana y Argentina, Departamento de Humanidades, Universidad Nacional del Sur, 1996. El comercio entre España y el Rio de la Plata (1778–1810). Madrid: Banco de España-Servicio de Estudios de Historia Económica, n. 26, 1993. “El comercio exterior y la navegación rioplatense en épocas de conflicto: Política y economía.” In Historia económica del Cono Sur de América (Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Paraguay y Uruguay). La era de las revoluciones y la independencia, ed. Hernán Asdrúbal Silva, 179–221. Mexico: Instituto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia, 2010. ed. Historia Económica del Cono Sur (Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Paraguay y Uruguay): La era de las revoluciones y la independencia. Mexico: Instituto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia, 2010. ed. Navegación y comercio rioplatense, vol. I. Bahía Blanca: Gabinete de Investigación de Historia Americana y Argentina, Departamento de Humanidades, Universidad Nacional del Sur, 1996. “Pulperías, tendejones, sastres y zapateros, Buenos Aires en la primera mitad del siglo XVIII.” Anuario de Estudios Americanos 26 (1965): 471–506. Silva Riquer, Jorge, Juan Carlos Grosso, and Carmen Yuste, eds. Circuitos mercantiles y mercados en Latinoamérica, siglos XVIII y XIX. México: Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, UNAM, 1995. Smith, Robert S. “A research report on consulado history.” Journal of InterAmerican Studies 3, no. 1 (January 1961): 41–52.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

330

Bibliography

The Spanish Guild Merchant: A History of the Consulado, 1250–1700. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1940. Soaje Pinto, Mario. “Antonio Luis Beruti.” In Genealogia: Hombres de Mayo, 74–5. Buenos Aires: Instituto Argentino de Ciencias Sociales, 1961. Soares da Veiga García, Emanuel. “Buenos Aires e Cádiz: Contribuçao ao estudo do comercio livre (1789–1791).” Special issue, Revista de Historia 48, São Paulo, 1974. Socolow, Susan M. “Buenos Aires: Atlantic port and hinterland.” In Atlantic Port Cities. Economy, Culture, and Society in the Atlantic World, 1650–1850, eds. Franklin Knight and Peggy Liss, 240–61. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1991. Los mercaderes del Buenos Aires virreinal: familia y comercio. 2nd ed. Buenos Aires: Ediciones de la Flor, 1984. “Religious participation of the Porteño merchants: 1778–1810.” The Americas 32, 3 (January 1976): 372–401. Sori, Ercole. L’emigrazione italiana dall’Unità alla seconda guerra mondiale. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1979. Stein, Stanley J. “Un raudal de oro y plata que corría sin cesar de España a Francia”: política mercantil española y el comercio con Francia en la época de Carlos III.” In Actas del Congreso Internacional sobre “Carlos III y la Ilustración,” Tomo II, Economía y sociedad, 219–80. Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura, 1989. Stein, Stanley J., and Barbara H. Stein. Silver, Trade and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. Street, John. “Lord Strangford and Río de la Plata, 1808–1815.” The Hispanic American Historical Review 33, no. 4 (November 1953): 477–510. Studnicki-Gizbert, Daviken. A Nation Upon the Ocean Sea: Portugal’s Atlantic Diaspora and the Crisis of the Spanish Empire, 1492–1640. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Tandeter, Enrique. Coacción y mercado: La minería de la plata en el Potosí colonial, 1692–1826. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1992. Tarragó, Griselda. De la orilla del mar a la vera del río: navegantes y comerciantes genoveses en el Plata y el Paraná (1820–1860). Rosario: Prohistoria, 2011. Tau Anzoategui, Victor. Casuismo y sistema: indagación histórica sobre el espíritu del derecho indiano. Buenos Aires: Edición del Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia del Derecho, 1992. “Una defensa de los extranjeros en el Buenos Aires de 1743.” In VI Congreso Internacional de Historia de América, Tomo IV, 275–283. Buenos Aires: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1982. Tedeschi, Sonia. “Santa Fe en el litoral fluvial rioplatense: Los enlaces entre la economía y la política en época de revolución y guerras.” In Historia económica del Cono Sur de América (Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Paraguay y Uruguay). La era de las revoluciones y la independencia, ed. Hernán Asdrúbal Silva, 699–733. Mexico: Instituto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia, 2010. Tejerina, Marcela. “Inmigración extranjera, sentido de pertenencia y control estatal en el Buenos Aires tardo colonial: el testamento del genovés Guillén,”

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Bibliography

331

Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos, Debates (June 18, 2012). doi: 10.4000/ nuevomundo.63263 Luso-Brasileños en el Buenos Aires virreinal: Trabajos, negocios e intereses en la plaza naviera y comercial. Bahía Blanca: Universidad Nacional del Sur, 2004. Thornton, John. Africa and Africans in the Making of Atlantic World, 1400–1680. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Tinoco Rubiales, Santiago. “Capital y crédito en la Baja Andalucía durante la crisis del Antiguo Régimen.” In La economía española al final del Antiguo Régimen. III, Comercio y Colonias, ed. Josep Fontana Lázaro, 249–388. Madrid: Alianza Editorial/Banco de España, 1982. Tjarks, Germán O. El Consulado de Buenos Aires y sus proyecciones en la Historia del Río de la Plata. Buenos Aires: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Instituto de Historia Argentina Dr. Emilio Ravignani, 1962. Torre Revello, José. El gremio de los Plateros en las Indias Occidentales. Buenos Aires: Publicaciones del Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, n. LX–LXVI, 1932. Torres Ramírez, Bibiano. La Compañía Gaditana de Negros. Seville: E.E.H.A, 1973. Torres Ramírez, Bibiano, and José Hernández Palomo, eds. Presencia Italiana en Andalucía, siglos XIV–XVI: Actas del Primer Coloquio Hispano-Italiano. Seville: E.E.H.A., 1985. Trivellato, Francesca. The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and Cross-Cultural Trade in Early Modern Period. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2009. Truffaut, Edgardo D., and Carlos A. Molina Sandoval, eds. Dinámica judicial y acciones en las sociedades y concursos. Cordoba: Advocatus, 2002. Ulbert, Jörg and Gérard Le Bouëdec, eds. La fonction consulaire à l’époque moderne: L’affirmation d’une institution économique et politique (1500–1700). Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2006. Universidad de Buenos Aires, Instituto de Historia Argentina “Dr. Emilio Ravignani.” Documentos para la historia argentina, tomo V. Buenos Aires: Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1915. Van der Wee, Herman. “Structural changes in European long-distance trade, and particularly in the re-export trade from South to North, 1350–1750.” In The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350–1750, ed. James D. Tracy, 14–33. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Vangelista, Chiara. “Relações de gênero na primeira imigração do século XIX: lígures e piemonteses no Brasil.” In Etnias & Carisma, ed. Antônio Suliani, 338–45. Porto Alegre: EDUPUCRS, 2001. “Traders and workers: Sardinian subjects in Argentina and Brazil.” In The Italian Diaspora: Migration Across the Globe, eds. George Pozzetta and Bruno Ramírez, 37–50. Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1992. Vassallo, Carmen. Corsairing to Commerce: Maltese Merchants in XVIII century Spain. Valletta: Malta University Publishers, 1997.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

332

Bibliography

“Maltese entrepreneurial networks.” In Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks, eds. Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, Gelina Harlaftis, and Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou, 125–44. New York: Berg, 2005. Verlinden, Charles. “Italian influence in Iberian colonization.” The Hispanic American Historical Review 33, no. 2 (May 1953): 199–211. Vicens Vives, Jaime. An Economic History of Spain. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969. Vila Vilar, Enriqueta, and Allan J. Kuethe, eds. Relaciones de poder y comercio colonial: Nuevas perspectivas. Seville: EEHA-CSIC, 1999. Villalobos, Sergio R. Comercio y contrabando en el Río de la Plata y Chile. Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1965. Villar García, María B. “Extranjeros en Málaga: Una presencia multisecular.” In Estudios de historia moderna en homenaje a la Profesora Emilia Salvador Esteban, eds. RicardoFranch Benavent and Rafael Benítez Sánchez-Blanco, Vol. II, 905–22. Valencia: Universitat de València, 2008. Villar García, María B., and Pilar Pezzi Cristóbal, eds. Los Extranjeros en la España moderna: Actas del primer coloquio internacional celebrado en Málaga del 28 al 30 de noviembre de 2002, Tomo II. Malaga: Universidad de Málaga, 2003. Virgilio, Jacopo. Del comercio marittimo e della costruzione delle navi. Genoa: Coi tipi della Gazzetta dei Tribunali, 1858. Delle Migrazioni transatlantiche degli italiani ed in ispecie di quelle dei liguri alle regioni del Plata: Cenni economico-statistici. Genoa: Tipografia del Commercio, Piazza S. Sepolcro, 1868. Vitale, Vito. Breviario della storia di Genova: Lineamenti storici ed orientamenti bibliografici. Genoa: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 1955. Vogel, Hans. “New citizens for a new nation: Naturalization in early independent Argentina.” The Hispanic American Historical Review 71, no. 1 (Feb. 1991): 107–31. Weber, Klaus. Deutsche Kaufleute im Atlantikhandel, 1680–1830, Unternehmen und familien in Hamburg, Caidz und Bordeaux. München: C. H. Beck Verlag, 2004. Weiss, Ignazio. Carlo Alberto e Juan Manuel de Rosas: contributo alla storia delle relazioni diplomatiche fra il regno di Sardegna e la Confederazione Argentina. Modena: Società Tipografica Modenese, 1951. “Voci d’esuli dal Río de la Plata.” Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento year 41, no. 2–3 (April–September 1954): 633–42. Wentzel, Claudia. “El comercio del ‘Litoral de los Ríos’ con Buenos Aires: el área del Paraná, 1783–1821.” Anuario del IEHS 3 (1988): 161–201. Whigham, Thomas. The Politics of River Trade: Tradition and Development in the Upper Plata, 1780–1870. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1991. Winn, Peter. “British informal empire in Uruguay in the nineteenth century.” Past and Present, 73, no. 1 (1976): 100–26. Wray, William D. “The seventeenth century Japanese Diaspora: Questions of boundary and policy.” In Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks, eds. Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, Gelina Harlaftis, and Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou, 73–93. New York: Berg, 2005.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Bibliography

333

Yun Casalilla, Bartolomé. “The American empire and the Spanish economy: An institutional and regional perspective.” Revista de Historia Económica 1 (1998): 123–56. Zapico, Hilda R., coord. De Prácticas, Comportamientos y formas de Representación Social en Buenos Aires (S. XVII–XIX). Bahía Blanca: Editorial de la Universidad Nacional del Sur, 2006. Zorraquín Becú, Ricardo. Historia del derecho argentino, tomo II (1810–1869), II ed. Buenos Aires: Perrot, 1988.

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316459362.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Index

Accinelli, Juan, 178 Adriatic Sea, 31 Aegean Sea, 5 Africa, 98 Agnese, Gerónimo, 114, 144 Agnese, Pablo, 182–3 aguinaldo, 77, 79–80, 87, 256 Aguirre, Agustín Casimiro, 96, 99 Aguirre, Juan Pedro, 100 Alberdi, Juan Bautista, 182 Alberoni, Giulio, 27 Alberti, Josef, 43, 55, 73 Alfonso the Learned, 190 Algiers, 139 Alicante, 35 Alphonse X, 22 America discovery of, 22 Amigos del Orden battalion, 198 Ancona, 29 Andalusia, 22, 27, 81, 149, 209 paper production, 44 Añeses, Josef, 63 Angenelo, Benito, 130 Antonini, Santiago, 150–1 Antonini-De Lorenzo, firm, 187 Anzani, Francesco, 200 Apennine Mountains, 5 Aragon, 7 Araldi, Gabriella, 6 Arboré, Count of, 71, See also PrascaArboré, firm

Ardizzone, Tomás Eustaquio, 64, See also Pedemonte Ardizzone, firm Areco, 95 Argentinian Confederation, the commercial treaty with the Sardinian kingdom, 170 Ley de Aduana, 185 Sardinian emigrants, 170 Armenians, 8 Armitage, David, 16 Asia, 8–9 trade, 8 under British rule, 9 Assereto, Giovanni, 162 Asunción, 91, 173 Atlantic history, 17 Avanzini, Pietro, 83 Badaracco, family, 198 Bailyn, Bernard, 13 Balbastro, Isidro Josef, 97 Balbi, family, 85 Baldovino, family, 128 Balerga, Antonio, 112 Balerga, Juana, 112 Balerga, Luis, 113 Baltic Sea, 32 Banco de San Carlos, 64, 68 Banda Oriental, 148, 153, 165, 168 Baquero, Francisco, 121 Barajas, Ignacio, 190 Barbary corsairs, 10, 31

335

Published online by Cambridge University Press

336

Index

Barcelona, 35, 55 Baring, House of, 168 Bechi, Antonio María, 59 Belando, Ignacio, 113, 270 Belás, Lucas, 180 Belastegui, José, 97 Belgium navigation treaty with the Sardinian kingdom, 162 Belgrano Peri (Pérez), Domingo, 107–9, 117–18, 124, 127, 152, 270 Belgrano, family, 128, 153 Belgrano, Francisco, 118, 125 Belgrano, Joaquín, 118, 181 Belgrano, Manuel, 118, 122, 125, 151–2, 181 Belgrano, María Florencia, 108 Belloc, Carlo, 170 Benvenuto, Antonio Maria, 58 Beresford, William, 149 Berthelar, Josefa, 115 Bertorelo, Gaetano, 127 Beruti, Antonio Luis, 126, 152 Beruti, Pablo Manuel, 126–7, 152 Bianqui, Bartolomé Domingo, 118 Bianqui, family, 153 Bianqui, Gerónimo, 114–15, 118 Bianqui, Juan Domingo, 115, 118 Binono, Juan, 74 Biscay, 149 Black Sea, 5–6, 9 Boasi, Juan Bautista, 174 Bonaparte, Joseph, 137, 144 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 137–9, 148, 151–2 Bonelo, Antonio, 95 Bordeaux, 182, 192 Bourbon, house of, 53 Bozo, Antonia, 60 Braco, Nicolás, 111, 126, 130, 270 Braudel, Fernand, 5 Brazil, 91, 101, 103, 153, 157, 168 Genoese emigration, 194 intercolonial trade, 92 Bribo, José, 129 Brown, Guillermo, 198 Bruno, Fiorentino, 115 Buenos Aires, 74, See also Province of Buenos Aires Alcalde de Hermandad, 109 and the comercio libre, 95 and the slave trade, 91, 94

Published online by Cambridge University Press

bans against foreigners, 101–4, 132 Barracas, 174 blockade, 184, 199 British invasion, 148, 150, 167 City Council, 101–2, 109, 112, 117–21, 149–50 commercial code, 193 Compañía de Buenos Aires, 94 confraternities, 124 economic expansion, 167 exports, 167 foreign merchants, 15 foundation of, 90 guilds, 106, 111, 116, 118–23, See also Consulado Junta de Gobierno, 118 Junta Superior de la Real Hacienda, 105 La Boca, 174, 195 Primera Junta, 145, 152 recruitment policies, 154–5 religious institutions, 123–4 retailers. See retailers Sardinian consulate, 170 second foundation, 91 shoemakers, 118–22 silversmiths, 116 Tribunal de Cuentas, 151 wheat processing industry, 111–12, 116, 183–5 Bulgaria, 6 Busatto, Cayetano, 55 Buso, Francesco, 59 Buti Gilbert, 176 Byzantium. See Constantinople Cachón, Juan Baptista, 102 Cadiz 1794 census, 37–8 aristocracy, 71 as hub of the Carrera de Indias, 21 as hub of the Spanish fleet, 26 as market of Genoese ships, 45 British merchants, 65 Carraca arsenal, 27, 45 City Council, 48–52, 72–3, 106 commercial jurisdiction, 77, 86 Comprobacíon del Catastro de Ensenada, 68 consulates. See foreign merchants convent of San Francisco, 76 demographic growth, 26, 36

Index Dutch merchants, 65 Escuela de Guardia Marinas, 27 Flemish merchants, 65, 76 foreign population, 36 free port, 159–60 French merchants, 65, 68, 76 Genoese chapel, 76, 78, 81–2 Genoese institutions, 74–88 guilds, 42, 119, 278 Hanseatic merchants, 65 hospital. See Saint John of God Italian emigrants, 36 Italian women, 38 paper production, 41–2, 44 Portuguese merchants, 65 retailers. See retailers Spanish merchants. See Spain/Spanish textile production, 41, 43–4 Calamaro, Francisco, 196 California, 9, 161 Callao, 153 Cambiaso, family, 96 Cambiaso, José María, 96–7 Campbell, James (Company), 74 Campomanes, Pedro Rodríguez de, 151 Camuso, Carlos, 98, 114–15, 274 Camuso, José, 114 Canal, Bonifacio, 114 Canary Islands, 25, 35, 74 Canaveri, Juan José, 151 Canepa, José, 119–20, 268 Caneva, Andrés, 112–13, 125 Caneva, Juan, 113, 281 Caneva, Romualdo, 113 Canevaro, Andrés, 129 Cantabria, 149 Capanegra, Agustín, 130 Cape Horn, 93, 101, 161 Cape of Good Hope, 148 capellanía, 123 Caprile, Santiago, 197 carato, 30 Carbon, Antonio, 177 Carbonari’s uprisings, 2 Caribbean, 92 Carli, Domingo, 54 Carlo Felice, king, 141 Carlota Joaquina of Spain, 152 Carnilia, Antonio, 103, 112, 262 Carnilia, Francisco, 111, 262 Caroline islands, 158

Published online by Cambridge University Press

337

Carrara, 29, 161 Cartagena, 22 Genoese trade interests, 100 Cartagena de Indias, 74, 144 Casa de la Contratación, 27, 66–7, 86, 92 Castelli, Cayetano Saturnino, 143 Castile, 7 Catalan, Pierre, 27 Catalonia, 31, 149 insurrection, 33 paper production, 44 Catamarca, 91, 165 Cattaneo, Bartolomé, 150 Causa, Juan Bautista, 61 Cavour (Count of), Camillo Benso, 163 Centurión, family, 153 Centurione, Bernardo, 90 Centurione, Juan Ambrosio, 90 Cerreti, Estevan, 180 Cerruti, Domingo, 43 Ceuta, 55, 245 Cevallos, Pedro de, 95 Charles III, 33, 44, 190–1 Charles IV, 53, 137, 142, 144 Charles V, 22 Chascomús, 95 Cheirasco y Vico, Juan Bautista, 43, 146 Chiappe, Pietro Giuseppe, 64 Chichisola, Esteban, 173 Chichisola, Juan, 173 Chile, 91, 98, 113, 131, 153 Chios, 6, 272 Cisneros, Baltasar Hidalgo de, 145 Cisplatine War, 167–8, 177, 197 Civitavecchia, 29 Claveli, José, 177 Codevilla, family, 85 Codevilla, Juan Bautista, 74 Cohen, Abner, 7 Colombo, Cristoforo, 14, 160 Colombo, Domingo, 45, 58, 74, 97, 144, 248 Colombo, Domingo Jr, 74 Colombo, Francisco, 74, 98, 144 Colombo, Pablo, 97–8, 144 Colonia do Sacramento, 92–3, 95, 102, 105, 259 colonna, 30 comercio libre, 39, 42, 47, 68–9, 86, 95, 97, 108, 117, 165 commenda, 31

338

Index de Vértiz y Salcedo, Juan José, 96 Degassan, Enrique, 192 Degassan, Marcelino, 192 Degola, Antonio, 58 Degola, Gio Paolo, 58 Departamento de Ingenieros, 187 Devoto, Fernando, 3 Doria, Andrea, 90 Doria, Andrea (Admiral), 22 Dorrego, Manuel, 197 Dotto, Guillermo, 74 Duarte, Manuel, 109 Durazzo, family, 99–100 Durazzo, Giacomo Filippo, 99 Durazzo, Marcello, 99 Dutch East India Company, 8 Dutch, the, 14 in Asia, 8 in Cadiz, 65 in the Río de la Plata, 15, 92 model of commercial expansion, 23

Compañía Gaditana de Negros, 72 Congress of Vienna, 139, 152 Consejo de Castilla, 46, 49–50, 191 Consejo de Hacienda, 52 Consejo de Indias, 25, 27, 103, 132, 145, 186, 188 Consejo de S.M. de la Contaduría de Cuentas, 72 Constantinople, 6 fall of, 5, 22 Consulado clashes between Buenos Aires and Montevideo, 167 in Buenos Aires, 117–18, 122, 151, 183, 185–94 in Lima, 117 in México, 117 in Santander, 64 in the Spanish monarchy, 117–18, 190 Consulado de Cargadores a Indias, 24, 27, 66–8, 73, 80, 86, 88, 96, 143 Genoese members, 69 Conti, Josef, 43 Corallo, family, 85 Cordoba, 74, 91, 165, 167 Corrientes, 91, 122, 165 shipbuilding sector, 174 Corsica, 29, 31 Corsican merchants in the Río de la Plata, 103 Costa, Domingo, 174 Costa, family, 153 Crimea, 6 Cromwell, Oliver, 92 Crosa, Ángel, 60 Cuba, 63, 72, 161, See also Havana Genoese trade interests, 93, 100 Cumaná, 144 Cuneo, Giovan Battista, 200 Curtin, Philip, 7–8

Egypt, 138 Elliot, John H., 15 Enrile, Gerónimo (Marqués de), 72 Enrile, Gregorio, 84 Enrile, José María, 72, 94, 252 Enrile, María de la Paz, 72 Enrile, Pascual, 72 Ensenada shipbuilding sector, 174 Entre Ríos, 165 Eritrea, 216 Espíndola, family, 153 Espínola, José, 150 Espinosa, Julian Gregorio, 108 Espora, Tomás, 153 Esquesa, Anna, 194 Estayola, Manuel, 94 Ezpeleta, José de, 72

Dañino, Bartholomé, 111 de Álzaga, Martín, 149 de Alzaybar, Francisco, 103 de Cevallos, Pedro, 95 de Garay, Juan, 91 de Hevia Bolaños, Juan, 190 de la Rosa, Vicente, 104, 125, 270 de Lezica y Torrézuri, Juan, 111 de Llanes, Agustina, 110 de Mendoza, Pedro, 90

Facie, Gertrudis, 62 Facio, Juan, 196 Fascie, José, 43 Ferdinand II, 25 Ferdinand III, 22 Ferdinand VI, 33, 79 Ferdinand VII, 137, 144–5, 152, 158 Ferrari, Esteban, 95 Ferrari, family, 128 Ferreyra, Ana, 113

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Index Finale, 28 Fiume, 29 Flanders, 23 Flemish merchants in Cadiz, 65, 76 privileges in Spain, 65 Floridablanca, Count of, 52 fondaco, 6, 22 Fontana, Agustín, 181 Fontana, José, 183 Fontana, Luis, 181 Fontana, Manuel, 131, 175, 180–1, 188, 190–1 Fontana, Nicolás, 183 Fontana, Pedro, 173, 183, 198 foreign merchants consulates in Cadiz, 75 in Cadiz, 15, 68 in colonial Buenos Aires, 15, 101–4 in Seville, 24 in the Carrera de Indias, 24 in the viceroyalty of Peru, 93 jurisdiction, 86 Spain-born sons (jenízaros), 25, 66–7, 69, 80, 99 Fortunato, Ruben, 196 Frabega, Jacinto, 114 Fragela, María Rita, 102 France/French blockade of Buenos Aires, 184, 199 commercial privileges in Spain, 65 commercial relations with the Río de la Plata, 169, 281 empire, 14, 138 exports to America, 27 Family Compact, 38 Genoese migration, 35 imperialism, 216 merchant community in Spain, 38, 53–4 merchants in Cadiz, 65, 68, 76 merchants in the Atlantic routes to Peru, 93 merchants in the Río de la Plata, 102 merchants of Saint Malo, 38 trade in the Río de la Plata, 93 trade in the Spanish monarchy, 38 treaty with the Sardinian kingdom, 162 Francia, José Gaspar Rodríguez de, 173 French Revolution, 9 Fulco, Bartolomé, 128 Furno, Victor, 175

Published online by Cambridge University Press

339

Galarraga, Ramón de, 177 Galiani, Ferdinando, 151 Galiano, Antonio, 143 Galiano, José Antonio, 114 Galicia, 149 Galliano, Carlos, 174–5, 177, 194, 198 Galliano, family, 153, 282 Gallino, Domingo, 181–3, 192 Gallino, family, 182 Gallino, Juan Bautista, 182, 198 Gallino, Rafael, 196 Gallino, Silvestre, 181–2, 192 Gandolfo, Nicolás, 103 García, José, 178 García-Baquero, Antonio, 39 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 3, 200 Garibaldi, Juan Baptista, 59 Garibaldinian republicanism, 141 Gatti, Luciana, 30 Gazano, Joseph, 125 Gazzino, Ambrosio, 59 Gazzino, Ángel, 59–60 Gazzino, Josef, 59 Gazzino, Thomás, 59–60 Gelman, Jorge, 105, 109 Genoa acquisition of Finale, 28 agreement with the Ottoman Empire, 28 annexation to the Sardinian kingdom. See Sardinian kingdom aristocracy, 70–1, 97, 99, 207 as hub of Northern Italy, 32 as hub of Southern Germany, 32 Banco di San Giorgio, 140 Chamber of Commerce, 1, 141 commercial expansion, 5–6 commercial relations with Berberia, 22 commercial relations with England, 22 commercial relations with Flanders, 22 commercial relations with the Iberian peninsula, 6, 21–2, 31–2, 79 commercial relations with the Río de la Plata, 169, 202 Company of Saint George, 23 Company of the Levant, 28 Condotta agreement, 22 consuls, 31 convoys, 26 Corsican insurrection, 29 East India Company, 23

340

Index

Genoa (cont.) effects of annexation to the Sardinian kingdom, 163 exports to America, 27 financial expansion, 5 flag of convenience in maritime trade, 31, 33–4, 45, 77 foreign investments, 29 free port, 29, 140 Giunta di Marina, 84–5 governance issues, 29, 64 guilds, 116 in the historiography, 27 in the War of the Austrian Succession, 28–9, 90 individual legal responsibility system, 10 Leges Novae, 71 manufacturing industries, 34–5, 116 merchant navy, 29–31, 140 migration to France, 35 migration to Lombardy, 35 migration to Naples, 35 migration to the Iberian monarchies, 7, 35 migratory tradition, 34 Mint, 140 paper production, 41, 44 participation in the Portuguese fleet, 23 political neutrality, 23, 65, 78, 138 strategic role in the Spanish empire, 22 Genoese businessmen and emigrants acquisition of noble titles in Spain, 71 ascension and decline in the Spanish monarchy, 14 commercial jurisdiction in Cadiz, 77, 86 consuls in Cadiz and their functions, 67, 75–88 contribution to the Spanish financial needs, 23, 67 early presence in America, 89 early presence in Cadiz, 22 farmers, 129–32, 196 formal institutions in Cadiz, 74–88 in Alicante, 35 in Andalusia, 22 in Barcelona, 35 in Catalonia, 22 in eighteenth-century Portugal, 15, 35 in Galicia, 22 in Gibraltar, 35 in Lima, 12

Published online by Cambridge University Press

in Malaga, 35 in Montevideo, 95, 114, 118 in New Granada, 12 in New Spain, 12, 89 in Puerto de Santa María, 37 in Rio de Janeiro, 194 in Seville, 22, 26, 81 in the 1804 census of Buenos Aires, 131 in the 1816 census of Buenos Aires, 154 in the 1827 census of Buenos Aires, 194–7 in the Andean area, 113 in the Balearic Islands, 22 in the Canary Islands, 35 in the Consulado de Cargadores a Indias, 69 in the defense of Buenos Aires, 149 in the Río de la Plata, 90, 96–101, 104, 107–16 in the Río de la Plata’s river trade, 171–83 in the silk trade, 35 in Valencia, 21, 35 in wheat processing and trade, 110–12, 185, 196 negotiations with local authorities in Cadiz, 75, See also aguinaldo participation in the Cisplatine War, 177 privileges in Cadiz, 65 privileges in Seville, 65 religious affiliation, 69, 124–6 ship-owners in Cadiz, 69 wholesalers in Cadiz and their strategies, 68–9 Genovesi, Antonio, 151 Gentile, Antonio, 180, 188 Germanic states, 161 Gherardi, Andrea, 82, 84–7, 94, 131, 158 Gianello, Vincenzo, 159 Gibraltar, 9, 27, 35, 38–9, 61, 74, 143, 156–7, 159 Giolfi, Antonio, 60 Giordano, family. see Jordán, family Gnecco, Angelo Maria, 78 González Bolaños, José, 96 González Casero, María Josefa, 108 González, Juan, 183 González, Juana Josefa, 104 Granara, Francisco, 127, 129, 196 Granara, Juan, 129 Grassi, Lorenzo Maria, 65, 75–6 Great Britain, 32

Index Great Britain/British and the Greek diaspora, 9 as commercial power, 15 asiento de negros, 38, 92, 102 blockade of Buenos Aires, 199 Chamber of Commerce in Buenos Aires, 169 commercial agreement with the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, 169 commercial agreements with the Portuguese crown, 92 commercial relations with the Río de la Plata, 169, 281 conquest of Cape of Good Hope, 147 East India Company, 8 imperialism, 216 in Asia, 8–9 in the Western Mediterranean, 9 inter-imperial trade and, 13 intermediary role between Spain and the Río de la Plata, 159 invasion of Buenos Aires, 148, 150, 167 invasion of Buenos Aires, 148 invasion of Montevideo, 148 investments in the Province of Buenos Aires, 168 merchants, 14 merchants in Cadiz, 65 merchants in the Río de la Plata, 102–3 occupation of Havana, 90 occupation of Jamaica, 92 occupation of Malta, 10 trade in Colonia do Sacramento, 92 trade in the Caribbean, 92 trade in the Río de la Plata, 15, 93, 148 treaty with the Sardinian kingdom, 162 Greek diaspora, 9 Greek merchants, 9, 12 cooperation with the Venetians, 9 Greif, Avner, 10 Grimaldi, Girolamo (Marquis), 94 Guadalupe, 92 Guerci y Mármol, Gertrudis, 72 Guido, Santiago, 43 Gujaratis, 8 Guñón, Miguel, 196 Habsburg, House of, 4 Hancock, David, 17 Hanseatic merchants commercial privileges in Spain, 65

Published online by Cambridge University Press

341

in Cadiz, 65 Haurie, Juan, 71 Havana, 63, 72, 90, 143–4, 161 Hearth Furze, Company, 74 Henry III, 22 Herzog, Tamar, 107 hidalguía, 49, 73 Hispaniola, 92 Honduras Genoese trade interests, 100 House of Bourbon, 14, 27, 38, 45–6, 93, 117 Imperial, family, 153 Incas, 152 Indian merchants, 9 Indian Ocean, 8 Ireland, 122 Italian emigration, 202, 216, 292 as a resource for Genoa, 216 in Buenos Aires, 128 in Cadiz, 36 in Europe, 202 to South America, 3, 202 to the United States, 202 Italy imperialism in Africa, 216 ius mercatorum, 186 Jahaanke, 8 Jainas, 8 Jamaica, 92 Jerez de la Frontera, 25, 74 John VI, 137 John VI of Portugal, 152 Jordán y Oneto, firm, 156, 159 Jordán, Domingo, 73, 143 Jordán, Domingo Antonio, 62 Jordán, family, 61–2 Jordán, Feliz Antonio, 61 Jordán, Geronimo, 62, 143 Jordán, Joseph María, 61 Jordán, Juan Bautista, 62 Jordán, Luis, 73 Jordán, Pablo Luis, 62 Jovellanos, Gaspar Melchor de, 151 Jujuy, 165 Junta de Comercio y Agricultura, 187 Junta de Dependencias de Extranjeros, 53 Junta de Gobierno, 187

342

Index

Kirk, Thomas, 89 La Coruña, 74, 94 La Guaira, 144 La Paz, 113 La Rioja, 165 Languedoc, 31 Lantery, Edmundo de, 26 Lanza, Benito, 177 Lavalle, Juan, 197 Lázaro, José, 115 Levante, 5, 9 corsairs, 10 Levriero, Francisco, 175 Leyes de Indias, 186 Lima, 91, 93, 153, 161, 186 Genoese emigration, 12 Liniers, Santiago de, 145, 149–50 Lisbon, 32, 35, 74 Liverpool, 169, 281 Livorno, 29 Llavallol, Felipe, 177 Lobos, 95 Lombard emigration in Cadiz, 36 Lombardy, 141 Genoese migration, 35 López de Lerena, Pedro, 32 Lorenzo, Luis de, 187 Lubé, Mauricio, 60 Luca, Miguel de, 98 Luchy, Joaquín Francisco, 160 Luis XVI, 142 Luján, 95 Luso-Atlantic context, 15 Luso-Brazilian merchants, 133 in the Río de la Plata, 15 Lyon, 138 Madrid, 74 Maglioni, Bartolo, 196 Maglioni, Francisco, 196, 198 Maiorca, 22 Malaga, 22, 35, 55, 59–60, 74, 102, 159–60 Malagamba, Carlos, 144 Malta, 10 Maltese merchants, 10 in Cadiz, 48 Mandeville, John Henry, 198 Manjón, María Teresa, 73 Maone, 6

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Maranhão, 157 Marchi, Santiago, 183, 196, 288 Marianas, 158 Marín Vicario, Gaspar, 73 Maritime Alps, 5 Marotto, Antonio, 173 Marseilles, 71, 74, 138 coasting trade, 176 Martínez Beltrán, Luis, 42 Martínez Gijón, José, 190 Martínez, Narciso, 181–2, 192 Martinique, 92 Marzán, Andrés, 62–3, 144 Marzán, Ángel, 62 Marzán, Antonia María, 62 Marzán, Antonio, 62 Marzán, Carlos, 63 Marzán, family, 62–3 Marzán, Joseph María, 62 Marzán, Juan Bautista, 62 Marzano, family, 128 Masnata, Bernardo, 82 Massa, 29 Maza, family, 153 Maza, J., 70 Maza, Mateo, 113, 117 Mazzinian republicanism, 2, 141 impact on the Genoese immigrants, 201 Mendoza, 91, 165 merchant nation, 7, 74–5 privileges in Spain, 75 Merello, Agostino, 73, 81 Merello, Gaetano, 73, 81–4, 87 Merelo, José, 149 Merolla, Gennaro, 184–5 Messina, 29 Mexico City, 105, 186 Miconi Cambiaso, Tomás (Marqués de Méritos), 71 Miguel y Folch, Antonio, 108 Minolo, José, 114 Minorca, 9, 27 Misiones, 91, 167 Molinely, Antonio, 111 Montar, Francisco, 130 Monte, 95 Monte-Corto, Marquis of, 75, See also Presenti, Juan Montesisto, Antonio, 43 Montesisto, Giuseppe, 79–80

Index Montevideo, 74, 93–4 and the comercio libre, 95 British invasion, 148 City Council, 114 Diputación de Comercio, 114 foundation of, 94 Genoese residents, 95, 114, 118 horn industry, 99 Royal Treasury, 118 shipbuilding sector, 174 Montobbio, Nicolás, 59 Morales, Tomasa, 109 Morando, Bernardo, 62 Moreno, Mariano, 121 Moresco, Francisco, 95 Moro, Ángel, 196 Morocco, 60 commercial treaty with the Sardinian kingdom, 141 wheat trade, 47, 73, 98 Mosti, Antonio Joseph, 100 Mosti, Esteban, 99, 248, 252 Mosti, family, 85, 100 Mosti, Giuseppe Antonio, 84 Mosti, José Antonio, 99 Mourere, Joseph, 61 Murature, Francisco, 175, 290 Murature, José, 175, 290 Muslim merchants, 9 Muzio, Giacomo, 76 Naón, Luis, 129, 278 Naples, 162, 240 Genoese migration, 35 Napoleonic Wars campaign in Egypt, 9 continental blockade, 147 effects in Genoa, 137–40 effects in Spain, 142–4 effects in the Río de la Plata, 144–5, 152 effects on the Genoese merchants of Cadiz, 145–7 naturalization, 25, 41–3, 59, 61–2, 66, 68–9, 80, 168 of Genoese merchants, 68, 80, 83–4, 86, 88, 99 Navarro, 95 Neapolitan emigration in Cadiz, 37 Negres, Antonio, 129 Negrotto, Francisco, 196

Published online by Cambridge University Press

343

Netherlands, 156 neutral trade decree, 142–3, 147 effects in Buenos Aires, 167 New Granada, 72 Genoese emigration, 12 New Spain, 58, 61, 89, 131 Genoese emigration, 12 Genoese trade interests, 93 New York, 151 Nice, 139 Nocheto, Nicolás, 176 North Africa, 47, 73 North Sea, 5, 32 Noseto, Ángel, 128 Novela, Antonio, 196 Odero, family, 85 Odessa, 9 O’Higgins, Ambrosio, 94 Olivares, José, 196 Olivari, Antonio, 129 Olivari, José, 129 Olivari, Matheo, 129 Olivero, family, 85 Oliveros, Lorenzo, 58 Oneglia, 107 Oneto, Domingo, 54 Ordenanzas de Bilbao, 186 Ortiz de Rosas, Domingo, 102 Ottoman empire, 5, 9 agreement with Genoa, 28 commercial treaty with the Sardinian kingdom, 141 expansion, 9, 209 Pacheco, Antonio, 63 pacotilla, 100, 156 Pagliano, Bartolomeo, 175 Pagliano, Marcos, 175, 180 Palavecino, family, 153 Palavecino, Pedro, 110, 125 Palermo, 74 Pallavicini, Alessandro, 70 Pallavicini, family, 71, 251 Palma, Cayetano, 196 Palma, Luis, 174 Panama, 91 Pancaldo, León, 90 Panes, Giovanni Andrea, 76 Paraguay, 122, 148, 152 shipbuilding sector, 173

344

Index

Paraná River, 91, 164–5, 178–9 Paris, 74 Parodi, family, 128 Parodi, Pascual José, 114, 274 Parsee merchants, 9 Patiño, José, 27 Patoulet, Jean Baptiste, 27 Patrón, Bartolomé, 73, 98 Patrón, Benito, 47, 73, 98, 114, 127, 143–4, 252 as slave trader, 98 Patrón, family (farmers in Cadiz), 131 Patrón, Francisco, 73, 144 Patrón, Jacome, 45, 146 Patrón, Juan Antonio, 110, 125, 252 Patrón, Juan Bautista, 98, 110 Patrón, Juan Bautista Faustino, 112, 117 Patrón, Juan Manuel, 144 Patrón, Lorenzo, 110, 112, 125, 270 Patrón, Manuel, 73 Patrón, Nicolás, 59 Patrón, Sebastián, 73, 144 Pavia, Giovanni Domenico, 76, 78 Paz y Haedo, José María, 198 Peace of Amiens, 144 Peace of Basel, 142 Pecarrere, Francisca Casilda, 59–60 Pecarrere, Francisco, 60 Pecarrere, Joaquín, 60 Pecarrere, Pedro, 59 Pedemonte Ardizzone, firm, 94, 97, See also Juan Bautista Pedemonte; Ardizzone, Tomás Eustaquio Pedemonte, Eustaquio, 70, 252 Pedemonte, José, 43 Pedemonte, Juan Bautista, 64, 94, 252, See also Pedemonte Ardizzone, firm Peleagro, Pedro, 196 Pelegro, Pedro, 129 Pelliza, Domingo, 109, 117, 125, 127, 270 Pelliza, family, 153 Pelliza, María Inés, 109 Pelliza, Micaela, 109 Pelliza, Vicente, 109 Peñasco, Esteban, 62, 143, 145 Pensay, Ángel María, 196 Pera, 6, 243, 272 Perasso, Emanuele, 51, 80, 82–5 Pereyra, José, 109 Perfumo, Santiago, 99, 271 Pergamino, 95

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Pernambuco, 161 Peru, 61, 91, 93, 98, 131, 153, See also Lima French merchants. See France/French Genoese emigration, 12 Genoese trade interests, 93 Pescia, Nicolás, 61 Petti Balbi, Giovanna, 74 Pez y Malzarraga, Andrés de, 27 Philip II, 25, 240 Philip IV, 40, 209 Philip V, 41, 81 Philippines, 72, 153, 158 Phoenicians, 1 Picardo, Antonio María, 146 Picardo, Benedetto, 84–5 Picardo, Benito, 74, 252 Picardo, Gian Andrea, 80, 82–4 Piccinno, Luisa, 29 Picolet D’Hermillon (Baron), Henri, 170 Piedmont, 139–40 Piedmontese emigration, 128, 150–1, 271 in Cadiz, 36, 48 in the Río de la Plata, 103 Pilar de los Ranchos, 95 Pimienta, María Magdalena, 110 Pittaluga, Santiago, 131 Poggi, Giovanni, 87 Portobelo, 91 fall of, 93 Portugal/Portuguese asiento de negros, 92 commercial agreements with Great Britain, 92 commercial expansion in Asia, 8 commercial privileges in Spain, 65 Genoese emigration, 15, 35 in the Río de la Plata, 92 merchants in Cadiz, 65 neutral trade, 96 slave trade, 92 trade and migration in the Río de la Plata, 91–2, 101–3, 119, 128 Potosí, 91, 93, 95, 113, 266 Prasca, Cristoforo Maria, 70, 76–9, 251 Prasca, family, 70 Prasca, Juan, 70 Prasca, Juan Andrés (Count of), 70–1, 73, 99–100, 252, See also Prasca-Arboré, firm

Index Prasca-Arboré, firm, 99, See also Prasca, Juan Andrés (Count of); Arboré, Count of Presenti, Juan, 76, See also Monte-Corto, Marquis of Procurante, family, 85 Procurante, Gaspar, 43 Procurante, Juan Bautista, 43 Province of Buenos Aires, 165 British investments, 168 exports, 169 territorial expansion, 195 Puerto de Santa María, 131, 146 Italian emigrants, 37 Puerto Rico, 72, 158 Puerto Vicario, Pedro del, 73 pulpería, 102–5, 180 under merchant jurisdiction, 189 Puntales, 45 Querandí, 91 Raggio, Manuel, 127 Rapallino, Pasquale, 80 Ratto, Francisco, 111, 270 Ravina, Antonio, 60 Ravina, family, 60 Ravina, Juan Felipe, 61 Ravina, Nicolás, 60 Ravina, Pietro, 60 Ravina, Tomás, 60–1, 156 Raynal, Guillaume-Thomas, 1 Real Audiencia de Contratación, 73 Recaño, Bernardo, 62, 251, 259 Recaño, José, 98 Recaño, José Ramón, 143 Recaño, Nicolás, 97, 248 Reconquista, 22 Repeto, Roque, 130 Repetto, Manuel, 182 retailers, 48–53 gremio de montañeses, 49–50 in Buenos Aires, 102–6, 108–12, 116, 129–30, 133, 150, 154–5, 179–83, 189–90, 195, 210–11 in Cadiz, 37–8, 48, 50–1, 57, 159, 205 in Colonia do Sacramento, 105 in Liguria, 139 in Mexico City, 105 in New Spain, 105 in North American ports, 105

Published online by Cambridge University Press

345

in Spain, 53 in the Argentinian Confederation, 170 in the republic of Genoa, 204 in the Río de la Plata, 105 jurisdiction, 191 Riachuelo river, 174, 195 shipbuilding sector, 174 Rio de Janeiro, 161, 194 Río de la Plata British trade, 15, 93, 148 Cuenca, 165 Dutch trade, 15 early Genoese migration and investments, 90, 96–101, 104, 107–16 exports, 165 French trade, 93 horn trade, 98 Littoral, 165, 167, 179 Luso-Brazilian trade, 15 opening to foreign trade, 148 river coasting trade, 112–13, 164, 166–7, 171–9 shipbuilding sector, 173 war for independence, 147–54 Risso, Alessandro, 73, 84, 97 Risso, Antonio, 113 Rivadavia y Rivadavia, Bernardino de la Trinidad Gónzalez, 155, 168, 181, 187, 190 Rizo, Bartolo, 125, 130, 180 Roccatagliata, family, 43 Rodríguez, Martín, 187 Rojas, 95 Roman merchants in the Río de la Plata, 103 Romania, 6 Romero, Antonio Miguel, 106 Romero, Juan José, 120 Rosas, Juan Manuel de, 5, 170, 178, 184, 193, 198–200, 202, 214 Rovello, Nicolás, 114 Roverano, Pedro, 178 Rubio, Rosa, 109 Russia, 9 Saavedra, Cornelio, 121 Saint John of God Brothers Hospitallers, 10 hospital in Cadiz, 76, 78 Salado River, 131, 183, 195 Salcedo, Miguel Fernando de, 101

346

Index

Salta, 91, 113, 165, 266 Salto, 95 Salvarezza, Andrés, 181 San Fernando, 131 San José de Flores, 181 San Juan, 165 San Luis, 165 San Martín, José de, 153 Sangarme, Pedro, 90 Sanguineto, Juan Bautista, 176 Sanguinetti, Francisco, 174 Sanlúcar de Barrameda, 62, 66 Sant’Ilario di Nervi, 113 Santa Coloma, Martín, 182 Santa Fe, 91, 105, 165, 167 Santiago del Estero, 91, 165 Santiago, Order of, 71 Saporiti, family, 70 Sardinia, 31 Sardinian kingdom, 7 annexation of Genoa, 137, 139 commercial relations with South America, 157–8 commercial relations with the Iberian peninsula, 156–7 commercial treaty with Morocco, 141 commercial treaty with the Argentinian Confederation, 170 commercial treaty with the Ottoman empire, 141 consulate in Buenos Aires, 170 emigrants in the Argentinian Confederation, 170 merchant navy in Buenos Aires, 184 navigation treaty with Belgium, 162 navigation treaty with France, 162 navigation treaty with Great Britain, 162 navigation treaty with the United States, 162 policies toward Genoa, 140–2, 162 Sardinian merchant navy, 141–2, 156 flag of convenience, 157 intermediary role between Spain and the Río de la Plata, 158–9 Sartores, Carlos, 127 Savoy, 139 Savoyard merchants in the Río de la Plata, 103 Sciaccaluga, Giovanni, 82 Sciaccaluga, Juan Bautista, 60, 84 Sega Nerva, Francisco, 130 Semin, Benito, 98 Sephardi Jews, 8–10

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Serra di Albugnano, Luigi (Count of), 140 Seville, 5, 22, 24–7, 65–6, 81, 92 as hub of the Carrera de Indias, 22 decline, 26 Shanghai, 9 Sibello, Carlos, 197 Sicily, 31, 240 Siete Partidas, 190 Sigori, family, 85 Sigori, Joseph, 61 slave trade, 13, 92 in the Río de la Plata, 91–2, 98 smuggling, 9 in Cadiz, 26 in the British empire, 13 in the Río de la Plata, 114 in the Spanish empire, 13–15, 24, 26, 39, 65 of Genoese merchants, 32, 57, 61, 75, 79, 109, 156 of Genoese paper, 44 Sobremonte y Núñez, Rafael de, 148–9 Sociedad Rural, 181 Socolow, Susan, 107 Solórzano Pereira, Juan de, 190 Spain mercantilism, 13 textile production, 42 Spain/Spanish colonial trade regulations, 24 Cortes, 144 extrangería tax, 45 Intendencia General de Marina, 27 Junta Central, 145 Junta Central Suprema, 144–5 laws on foreigners, 40–1, 53–5, 66–8 matrícula de mar, 46–7, 146–7 merchant navy, 45–6, 90 merchants in Cadiz, 68 Regency Council, 144–5 Secretaría del Despacho Universal, 27 shipbuilding industry, 45 slave trade, 92 suspension of trade with Genoa, 33 Spotorno, Giovanni Battista, 160 St Thomas, 161 Stuart, House of, 92 Sturla, Clara, 59 Suparo, Santiago, 129 Syrian merchants, 9 Tagliafico, Antonio, 174 Testa, Juan, 197

Index Thirty Years’ War, 92 Tortuga, 92 Toulon, 138 trade diasporas, 7–12 Trafalgar, 144, 147 Tratado de la Liga del Litoral, 178 Treaty of Lisbon, 65 Treaty of Münster, 23, 65 Treaty of San Ildefonso, 95 Treaty of the Pyrenees, 65 Treaty of Utrecht, 38 Treaty of Westfalia, 65 Trieste, 9, 29, 161 Trincavelli, Antonio, 187 Trinidad de Cuba, 161 Tripoli, 139 Trivellato, Francesca, 10 Tucumán, 91, 122, 165 Tunis, 139 United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, the, 153, 158, 177 commercial agreement with Great Britain, 169 policies toward foreigners, 168 United Provinces, the, 23 commercial privileges in Spain, 65 exports to America, 27 United States, the, 122, 142, 156 commercial relations with the Río de la Plata, 169, 281 navigation treaty with the Sardinian kingdom, 162 War of Independence, 95 Upper Peru, 95, 148, 152, 165 intercolonial trade, 92 Uruguay, 153, 165 independence, 167, 197 Uruguay river, 165, 167 Usodimare, Francesco, 76 Ustáriz, family, 100 Ustáriz, firm, 96–7

Published online by Cambridge University Press

347

Vaccarezza, Antonio María, 61 Valencia, 21, 35, 61 paper production, 44 Vangelista, Chiara, 194 vecindad, 53–4, 107, 124, See also vecino vecino, 40–1, 48, 50, 52–5, 62, 98, 101, 120, 187, 206, See also vecindad Venetian merchants in the Río de la Plata, 103 Venezuela, 131 Venice, 215 cooperation with the Greek merchants, 9 Veracruz, 73, 144 Viale, Ángel, 184, 198, 283 Viale, Domingo, 198 Viale, Manuel, 175, 183–4, 196 Vicario de Iñigo, Rafael, 43, 244 Vico, Mattia, 43 Vico-Conti, company, 43 Vignales, Carlos, 115 Villa, Nicolás, 131, 181 Villarino, Pablo, 106 Virgilio, Jacopo, 214–16 Virgin Islands, 161 Vives, Vicens, 7 Voltri, 44, 73, 119 War of Jenkins’ Ear, 67 War of the Spanish Succession, 9, 33, 38, 92 effects on the Genoese of Cadiz, 76 Warnes, Manuel Antonio, 94 Western Africa, 8, 12, 92 Wright, Agustín, 96 yernocracia, 60 Zeballos, Felipe, 113 Zemborain, Felix, 104 Zenoglio, 71 Zinotto, Geronimo, 174