Gender and Politics in Kuwait: Women and Political Participation in the Gulf 9780755607914, 9781780763064

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ACRONYMS USED

AWDS AWID BLACD BWHBC CEDAW CSC CSO DRL ECWR EPA FKWA GCC IBC IBRD ICS ILO KDF KES KSA KUNA

Arab Women’s Development Society Association for Women’s Rights in Development Better Life Association for Comprehensive Development Boston Women’s Health Book Collective Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women Civil Service Commission [in Kuwait] Civil Society Organizations Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights Environmental Protection Agency [in Kuwait] Federation of Kuwaiti Women’s Associations Gulf Cooperation Council International Biographical Centre International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Islamic Care Society International Labour Organization Kuwait Democratic Forum Kuwait Economic Society Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Kuwait News Agency vii

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MEPI NDF NDI NGO PLO PWO UAE UN UN-DAW UN-DESA UNDP UNESCO UN-ESCWA UN-ICCPR UNICEF UNIFEM UNIS US GAO VWACS WCSS WEDO

GENDER AND POLITICS IN KUWAIT

Middle East Partnership Initiative National Democratic Forum National Democratic Institute Non-Governmental Organization Palestine Liberation Organization Public Welfare Organization United Arab Emirates United Nations United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women United Nations Department of International Economic and Social Affairs United Nations Development Programme United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child United Nations Development Fund for Women United Nations Information Service United States Government Accountability Office Volunteer Women’s Association for Community Service Women’s Cultural and Social Society Women’s Environment and Development Organization

INTRODUCTION

In the Persian Gulf region, the issue of women’s rights promotes fierce and intense debate, and most Westerners see the unique Islamic culture of the region as oppressive to women.1 The Western media shows pictures of veiled Saudi Arabian women, using them to illustrate how Islamic society is built entirely for the benefit of men, and treats women as lower-class citizens or possessions. Because of these stereotypes, Western observers assume that all the Gulf States are oppressive, totalitarian regimes when, in fact, most of the states in this region do not match this perception.2 Even the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), which does not claim to be fully democratic, has started to address the issue of women’s rights.3 States such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait and Bahrain are not as backwards as commonly perceived in this respect, as they actively promote the equality of women in education and employment, or are, at least, moving towards that ideal. Instead of importing ‘Western’ democracy into the region, a process that is inevitably doomed to fail, these states are developing Islamic democracies, blending Islamic culture with many of the recognized freedoms and rights enjoyed by developed nations. Despite this progress, the emancipation of women has been a major exception to this democratization, meeting resistance from traditionalists and Islamic scholars. Giving women the right to participate in the political process has been slow, because it encompasses wider issues than women’s rights alone. The issue of women’s 1

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political rights in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) highlights the tension between classes, the differing ideologies of Shi‘is and Sunnis and, most importantly, the battle between liberal secularists and traditional Islamists. The State of Kuwait acts as a microcosm of the Gulf region as a whole, and studying this state reveals the mood and goals of the inhabitants, showing how women’s rights lie at the heart of democratization. The history of feminism in Kuwait captures the transformation from the ‘Western feminism’ developed in the 1960s and 1970s, where activists believed that gender was a social construct acting as a barrier to true equality, to an Islamic feminism, where men and women enjoy equal rights but maintain gender-specific roles. The fight for the vote in Kuwait showed that Western feminism is alien to Arab cultures, antagonizing traditionalists and preventing compromise. Conversely, the Islamic feminism adopted by Kuwaiti activists after the 1996 election was not only palatable to most sections of society, but was supported by all but the most extreme Islamists in the state and National Assembly. Despite this, some of the most intense resistance to emancipation has been from women themselves, largely because many women were used to a welfare system that was promoted by a social contract between Kuwait’s rulers and people, which had created a culture of dependency. Lynda Stone, in The Education Feminism Reader, and Diane Bell and Renate Klein in Radically Speaking: Feminism Reclaimed,4 elucidate the idea that feminism can set woman against woman and create divisions where there should be none. The culture of depending upon the state to provide also promoted voter apathy, since Kuwaitis were used to having the state cater to their needs – the fact that they were indirectly guaranteed a decent standard of living suppressed any potential political dynamism and activism. In terms of human rights, democratization, freedom of the press and economic development, Kuwait has always been regarded as a progressive and forward-thinking GCC state, and it acted as a model for development across the Arab world, until the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain gained the upper hand in the early twenty-first century showing the benefits of investing in education and infrastructure. The other factor that made Kuwait unique was the Gulf conflict of 1990, when Iraq occupied the emirate and met a campaign of insurrection

INTRODUCTION

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from the Kuwaiti resistance. The bravery of Kuwaiti women during this conflict, subsequently lauded in literature and art, acted as a catalyst for the process of democratization and the re-energizing of the women’s rights movement. The long debate, which raged backwards and forwards, ultimately showed the power of women’s education. It showed how emancipation is no threat to an emerging Islamic democracy, and how a strong and educated female workforce can drive a country forwards. Looking at the history of Kuwait, as it transformed from a largely nomadic culture into a modern state, reveals why this emirate followed a different course from other members of the GCC and developed a strong constitution, based upon peace and stability.5 After the Second World War, when oil wealth flowed into the state, the government embarked upon a series of social reform programmes to supplement infrastructural improvements.6 Faced with labour shortages for the ambitious projects, the government promoted mass immigration from the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia.7 The constitution guaranteed Kuwaiti women access to all levels of education and opened up the employment market. Change took a couple of generations, but modern Kuwaiti women are more likely to enter higher education than men, resulting in a strong demographic of highly educated and ambitious women. Employment lagged a little, but the government actively promoted feminization of the workplace, a process designed to increase the proportion of nationals in the workforce, which had been diluted by the huge influx of foreign workers. Things looked positive for women, as they reaped the benefits of blending equality with their traditional Islamic position. Despite this, one important factor was lacking – the idea of voting and participation within the democratic process.8 Looking at the development of Kuwait from a tribal culture to an oil-rich emirate, provides an excellent case study of the unique culture and background that created a breeding ground for limited democratization, albeit within the confines of an autocracy – a process mirrored by many GCC states. Michael Casey’s history of Kuwait and Michael Herb’s studies provide an excellent narrative of the forging of this new state, the process of full independence, in 1961, and the discovery of oil.9 They point out that this unique history ultimately

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resulted in the state’s forward-thinking policies towards freedoms, human rights and the education of women. Haya Al-Mughni assesses the history from a woman’s point of view, noting the rise and the fall of the burgeoning feminist movement of the 1960s through to the 1980s.10 The independence and early development of Kuwait occurred at a time of unrest within the Islamic world – culminating in the Iran – Iraq conflict of the 1980s – and shows how the quest for emancipation was ensnared in this political vortex and became part of the ideological battle between secularism, pan-Arab nationalism and traditional Islam. This terminated when Emir Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah dissolved Parliament in 1986; thereafter a political stasis developed, as the rulers and the National Assembly constantly sought ways to obfuscate the process of emancipation, setting one group against another in a process of divide and conquer. This status quo was to be rudely shattered, as the tension between Kuwait and its neighbour erupted and, emboldened by history and an assumption of Western laissez-faire, Iraq invaded.11 The 1990 Gulf War was a turning point in history, not just for the Gulf region, but for the world as a whole. The invasion by Iraq, the first example of one Arab nation invading another, was the culmination of a long, fraught history between the small Emirate of Kuwait and its larger neighbour. The conflict was based partly upon nationalism, but the undoubted wealth and oil revenue generated by the small state was the major factor behind the invasion.12 This tension had roots in the time when the British divided the Middle East and carved out nation-states, regardless of ethnicity, cultural and tribal differences. Kuwait, a fragment of the old Ottoman Empire, became an emirate ruled by the Al-Sabah family but Iraqi nationalists firmly believed that Kuwait was rightfully the Nineteenth province of Iraq.13 This belief was not lost after Iraq seized the country and insisted that all references to Kuwaiti independence, from flags to car registration plates, be removed. In a surprise attack, the Iraqi army had poured over the border and invaded Kuwait. And, on 2 August 1990, Iraqi troops and tanks rapidly closed in upon Kuwait City. The small Kuwaiti army offered little resistance and soon the state was under Iraqi martial law.14 Seeking legitimacy for their actions, the Iraqis tried to set up a puppet regime after the ruling emir and his family sought

INTRODUCTION

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refuge in Saudi Arabia, but they vastly underestimated the nationalistic fervour of Kuwaitis, who mounted a determined campaign of resistance. Saddam Hussein expected to find a nation grown indolent and soft on oil riches, with little stomach for sustained resistance.15 In this, he grossly underestimated the people. The war became a fatal mistake that unleashed a political chain of events that would lead to his eventual removal and execution over two decades later. The resistance used guerrilla tactics and disrupted Iraqi logistics. Bravely, at great risk to their lives, the resistance hid and fed Westerners, saving them from a dire fate as hostages of the Iraqi regime. The exiled Kuwaiti government sought to gain international consensus for a counter-invasion, and used stories of the fierce Kuwaiti resistance as propaganda tools. The key, as regards this book, was that Kuwaiti women underpinned the whole resistance movement, organizing raids despite the very real danger of torture, rape and execution.16 This female strength and indomitability kindled a shift in attitudes when the conflict came to an end. To the Kuwaitis, their womenfolk were the true heroes of the war, and their bravery changed the attitude of Kuwaiti men towards their wives and daughters. Testimonies, novels and newspaper reports supported this view, explaining the renewed calls for the emancipation of women in post-war Kuwait.17 In the aftermath of the war, as Kuwaitis assessed the damage and attempted to recover from their deep mental scars, the issue of women’s rights now shifted to the forefront, fuelled by pressure from the international media, who joined the clamour for emancipation. As the government attempted to balance the idea of women’s rights with the pressure from traditionalist Islamic groups, the old tactics of distraction and obfuscation were employed; governmentbacked women’s groups convinced the majority of Kuwaiti women that they did not need the vote, and that they should accept the roles given to them by Islamic laws and scripture. This tactic, on the face of it, appeared to work and quietened the emancipation movement, but the desire ran deep and women merely shifted their efforts in another direction. The pressure exerted by a strong, intelligent and well-educated segment of the female population ultimately had to find a release. The traditionalist Islamists won the initial debate, in the immediate wake of the conflict, and the emir resisted calls to include

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voting rights for women in the voting reform after the 1992 election, a process that derailed the women’s rights movement. The later half of the 1990s would see traditionalists forced onto the defensive as modern Kuwaiti women, forever changed and emboldened by their wartime experiences, fought back, culminating in the emir’s 1999 decree.18 This decree, although blocked by the Assembly, saw a change in attitude, as emancipation became a matter of when, not if. Following the 1999 decree, women, disappointed by the denial of their rights, used the fruits of their education and, slowly and inexorably, began to move into positions of power. Academia, business and medicine all saw an increase in the number of women coming to power in their fields during the 1990s, including as the principal of Kuwait University and as the vice-president of the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation. Importantly, professional politicians and activists also began to emerge.19 In 1997, Adela Al-Sayer, president of the Women’s Cultural and Social Society (WCSS), and Sheikha Al-Nesef led the National Democratic Forum (NDF), a political pressure group.20 Intelligent, educated and professional women, such as Dr Rasha Al-Sabah, Dr Rola Dashti and Ambassador Nabila Al-Mulla began to speak out, taking full advantage of the freedom of speech constitutionally granted by Kuwait. After the triumph of Islamists, in the 1996 election, the women’s movement gathered unstoppable momentum and publicity as the rulers were forced onto the back foot. Individual women began to carve out careers, motivated by the perceived injustices. Women such as Rasha Al-Sabah, Haya Al-Mughni, Professor Fayza Al-Khurafi, Professor Badriya Al-Awadi and Bibi Al-Marzouk were at the forefront of this ‘soft’ revolution. Interviews with these notable women throughout this book will show that the debate was never lost but was moved onto a ground of their own choosing. These influential women showed that strong and educated females were of great benefit to the nation, through raising its international profile and proving that an increase in the number of women in the workforce was economically and socially advantageous. Despite repeated attempts at stalling, the publicity generated by the national media fuelled a strong case for emancipation. Of course, these more famous women were not the only drivers behind the process, and women at all levels of Kuwaiti society were involved in forcing change. As the

INTRODUCTION

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world looked on, a class of female politician, articulate and politically aware, started to apply political pressure, using the media to criticize the National Assembly. After the emir’s declaration in 1999 – that denying women the vote was unconstitutional – the process of emancipation was almost complete. After a couple of false dawns, women won the right to stand in elections, and 2005 saw the first female representatives elected to the National Assembly. The fight was long and protracted, but the 1990 Gulf War provided the impetus for this process to reach completion, and for Kuwait to make the transition. This study has wider implications for women’s rights in other Gulf States and, arguably, for women’s rights in many Islamic countries, where the ideal balance between Islamic tradition and human rights is often skewed, and cultural patriarchy replaces the gender parity promised in the Qur’an. Kuwait, as a forward-looking Islamic nation, provides an excellent case study for the process of democratization in the region. Studying the development allows other governments and women’s groups to avoid the mistakes of the past, and the divisions and misunderstandings caused by the battle between feminists and traditionalists. The lessons learned also act as a guide for avoiding some of the major points of contention between Sunnis and Shi‘is, an ideological conflict in which feminism plays a large role. Finally, the lessons learned during the Kuwaiti experience give some guidance for the ongoing efforts to democratize Islamic nations, showing that a wholesale and rapid implementation of Western democracy can be divisive and counterproductive, riding roughshod over local cultural sensibilities. The Gulf War was the turning point in the history of emancipation in Kuwait, but other states can learn from the Kuwaiti experience and understand that strong and educated women are not a threat but an effective barrier against the post-September 11 rise of fundamentalist Islam. Kuwaitis can act as standard-bearers and slowly change the often inaccurate image of Islam portrayed in the Western media, based upon images and reports of ‘Taliban-style’ oppression of female populations.

Chapter 1 1991: A TURNING POINT IN KUWAITI POLITICS

Kuwait is commonly regarded as one of the most liberal of the GCC states, and has shown a steady improvement in women’s rights since independence. Across the region, women are increasingly influencing the socio-economic structure, and the GCC states are tapping into the potential of a whole generation of intelligent and well-educated women, a social experiment that initially started with inclusive education built upon oil wealth. By the year 2000, Kuwait had a very high proportion of women entering tertiary education, at 32 per cent, just behind Qatar, at 36 per cent, and closely followed by Bahrain, at 28 per cent, and the KSA, at 25 per cent. When compared with the 1980 figures, of 15 per cent, 17 per cent, 5 per cent and 5 per cent respectively, this is a huge change, in only 20 years.1 Between 1980 and 2003, the proportion of women in the workforce increased, from 13 per cent to 29 per cent in Kuwait, from 7.6 per cent to 20.2 per cent in the KSA, 11.0 per cent to 22.9 per cent in Bahrain and 6.4 per cent to 17.9 per cent in Qatar.2 These figures show that, while the number of women entering the workforce is low when compared with the number entering higher education, it has still risen. Kuwait has performed well in this area, and compares favourably against other GCC states, while the 9

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region, as a whole, has shown one of the largest increases in women’s education in the world. However, by Western standards, the entire region has rarely addressed the emancipation of women and their participation in the democratic process, despite the fact that women are rapidly forming the backbone of a new professional class. Whilst it is very easy to judge this particular policy as backwards or oppressive, it is important to remember that most GCC countries are very young states that only shrugged off colonialism between 1961 and 1971. The sudden influx of oil wealth supported a rapid process of modernization and a population boom, as the societies transformed from a tribal culture into modern and urbanized states. The experiences of the Gulf States, and Kuwait in particular, are proving to be an unintentional but unique social experiment in developing democratic societies possessing a strong Arabic and Islamic influence.3 Kuwait, traditionally, has stood at the forefront of change, and women were encouraged to participate in the educational system and to enter the workforce, even if this process was a gradual one. Despite this, women were barred from voting or participating in the electoral process, though possessing a constitutional right to equality. As a result, many women’s groups, especially the WCSS and the Arab Women’s Development Society (AWDS) during the 1960s and 1970s, spoke out against this ban and agitated for the right to vote.4 These feminist groups were pitched against a conservative bloc, which used a range of tactics to silence their voices, eventually supporting women’s groups dedicated to maintaining the status quo. This tactic stalled the process of emancipation and equality during the 1980s, but Kuwait was soon to face a unique crisis in the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war of liberation, which would have a permanent impact on the Kuwaiti collective psyche. The war became a catalyst for change, and the courage and ingenuity shown by women during the invasion revitalized the women’s movement, renewing calls for emancipation. To understand the sheer magnitude of this paradigm change, it is important to delve deeply into the Arabic and Islamic foundations of the region, because the roots of Kuwaiti feminism lie deep in the past. The oil boom underpinned the rapid development from a nomadic

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tribal culture into a modern society, and access to education and freedom of speech encouraged women’s groups to become vocal. The ruling classes attempted to ignore the calls for change, but the turmoil caused by the Gulf War opened the floodgates as women discovered a newfound confidence. The Gulf War pushed women’s rights to the forefront of the public consciousness; the issue was supported by pressure from the West as the conflict focused the attention of the international media on the region.

The Demographic, Social and Political Status of Women in Kuwait before the Iraqi Invasion: A Historical Reference Culturally, Kuwait shares many traditions with its neighbouring states but, uniquely, it was founded upon peaceful migration rather than conquest by the sword. This subtle difference lies at the root of Kuwait’s liberal attitude towards women, and fuelled a gradual shift towards equality. Studying this unique history and tradition reveals why Kuwait took a slightly different, but nonetheless significant, direction to that of the other Gulf States, and provides an insight into why the movement for gender equality took root and grew stronger. The 1990 Gulf War did not last for long, but it acted as the tipping point for a cultural change that had been developing ever since the foundation of the state. The long history of Kuwait begins in the early eighteenth century, when clans belonging to the Anaiza tribe gradually migrated to the Persian Gulf from Saudi Arabia. These clans, largely originating from the Najd region of Arabia, formed a confederation and called themselves Bani Utub. The first tribe to settle in the area, in the latter part of the seventeenth century, was the Bani Khalid, traditionally desert nomads who rarely used the sea. This tribe controlled the area and maintained peace, an atmosphere that encouraged other Arab tribes to follow and settle in the region. These new tribes integrated peacefully and, notably, included the Bani Utub, the tribe from which the Kuwaiti ruling family, Al-Sabah; the rulers of Bahrain, the Al-Khalifa family; and the merchant Al-Jalahma family descended.5 This gradual development of Kuwait as a peaceful society, in a strategic location, fuelled its development as a significant centre of trade in the Persian

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Gulf region. The potential for generating wealth also enticed significant numbers of Persians and Indians to settle there.6 Kuwait became a valuable market for many commodities, including horses, wood, spices, coffee and dates, but became most famous as a centre for pearl trading, a trade that gave the newly formed state its name – Kuwait, the Pearl of the Gulf. In the mid-eighteenth century, Sabah I bin Jaber was unanimously chosen as the first Emir of Kuwait, and the Al-Sabah family have remained in power ever since. This peaceful development provides a stark contrast to most other Gulf States, where the rulers seized power through conquest rather than by consent, and is an important factor that shaped the development of Kuwaiti nationalism. The ruling family maintained a steady and healthy relationship with the people of Kuwait, actively striving to consolidate a relationship of trust and mutual respect.7 The key, according to Mohamed Al-Jassem is, ‘the very civilized way the Al-Sabah family came to be rulers: The Kuwaitis agreed to give them power and the relation between the Al-Sabahs and the Kuwaitis has remained based on agreement and very civilized’.8 This genesis, from peaceful origins, formed the bedrock of Kuwaiti culture and acted as the precursor for the state developing a twentieth-century democracy many years ahead of its adjacent Arab neighbours. Unlike nearby Basra, in Iraq, Kuwait City was a free port until 1896, when Mubarak Al-Khabir murdered two of his brothers and seized power. The merchant families, unhappy with this, did not sit idly by. They created representative assemblies in the early 1920s, in an attempt to regain their traditional status and influence within the Kuwaiti political structure.9 Encouraged by the British – who had been originally invited to the country to protect against aggression from the Arabian Peninsula, Persia and Iraq – the second Assembly seized much of the emir’s authority, and built an efficient bureaucracy. In 1939, a coalition of sheikhs, drawn from the ruling family, closed the Assembly and seized control of the bureaucratic structures, once again defeating the efforts of the merchants.10 During this period, the Al-Sabahs adroitly created institutions and installed family members in positions of influence, using nepotism to strengthen their hold on

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the state. This state of affairs continued for many decades as Kuwait maintained a strong mercantile economy. Kuwait’s proximity to Saudi Arabia, alongside the historical and family ties, strongly influenced the formation and development of this small nation. Unlike its other Gulf neighbours, Kuwaiti merchant families formed alliances to protect and insure their sources of wealth. War and strife are expensive, consuming wealth and manpower, so peaceful resolution within families was highly valued in Kuwaiti society. Preferably, disputes were resolved by family members and by the tribal elders of the disputing families. This mechanism perpetuated a balanced system of justice and planted the seeds of fundamental democratic and secular values. Unity was the mark of early Kuwaiti history, built upon the unanimous decision to elect Sabah I bin Jaber as emir by a crude vote rather than by force of arms.11 The occasional outbreaks of rivalry and hostility between the powerful merchant families legitimized the monarchy, who could act as a mediator between the various factions. This structure kept power within the hands of the ruling family, and this has remained the case, despite the challenges generated by oil wealth and the drive towards modernization. Within this structure lay the seeds of the Kuwaiti women’s rights movement, a process that the Al-Sabahs cultivated as oil wealth changed the political and economic landscape of the region.12 Society was soon to see a rapid change, as the discovery of oil brought a sudden influx of wealth into the region. This discovery created a new ‘El Dorado’, as an increasingly technology-based world sought energy to fuel rapid industrialization. Before the discovery of the oil fields, the small population of the Persian Gulf area was predominantly agrarian, comprised of nomads and semi-nomads working the land, and fishermen inhabiting the coastal strip. The small urban populations were mainly built upon the maritime trade routes extending to Southeast Asia and East Africa, although there were a few land routes into the Levant and North Africa. Overall, especially outside the urban centres, the Gulf population survived through a traditional subsistence economy; this was in a particularly poor state after the collapse of the pearl industry in the 1920s, and poverty was endemic.13

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The Oil Boom and Population Explosion: An Investment in Infrastructure and People The oil boom, in the latter half of the twentieth century, forever changed the demographics in Kuwait, and indirectly led to the formation of a strong women’s rights movement. The population explosion saw the population climb from about 277,980 in 1967 to 2,125,000 by 1990, with much of this increase caused by a net influx of migrants.14 For example, of the 1997 population of 2,152,775, only 745,189 were Kuwaiti; the rest were made up of Egyptians, Syrians, Iranians and South Asians.15 In the 1930s, Kuwait became a prime location for oil exportation, although this process was suspended for the duration of the Second World War. In the late 1940s and the early 1950s, oil exploration resumed and the nation began to reap the benefits of the oil era, joining its Gulf State neighbours in embarking on a rapid period of modernization. Across the region, alongside the huge oil refineries, entire cities sprang up, with the GCC states taking advantage of cheap immigrant labour to build new airports, road systems, hospitals, clinics, schools, universities and communication networks. The amount of money spent on construction, between 1971 and 1981, increased 42-fold, as the economy of the GCC states expanded.16 Oil revenues steadily grew in the GCC, rising from US$ 11 billion in 1971, to $79 billion by 1976 and $210 billion in 1981, funding this development, and establishing educational programmes that lay at the heart of the economic development plans for the region.17 Once the accumulated wealth became substantial, the authorities in Kuwait started a programme to develop a large-scale infrastructural network and began to implement socio-economic development plans. In 1953, Kuwait created the semi-autonomous Kuwait Investment Authority, setting up an office in London, and this body invested money into foreign-based sovereign wealth funds, maintaining assets inside and outside Kuwait and channelling 10 per cent of the annual revenue into a Future Generations Fund.18 The Kuwait Investment Authority believed in reinvesting wealth in people, and the declaration of oil as a national asset led to the partial redistribution of oil revenues to the indigenous population, through the provision of free and comprehensive social services.19 Importantly, this investment in people included

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the education of women, a policy that became the major factor in the subsequent rise of women’s movements in the region. The influx of oil wealth fuelled a near exponential rise in the population of Kuwait, built upon rapid urban migration and a shift away from a pastoral culture. In 1907, the population of the area then incorporated into Kuwait was estimated to be 35,000.20 In 1930, this figure had increased to 60,000,21 fuelled by the merchant economy, and, by 1949, it had reached approximately 100,000.22 This level of population was the limit for a subsistence economy, but the discovery of oil fuelled one of the quickest rates of population growth in the region, as urban areas hungrily sucked in workers and labourers. Since the start of the 1950s oil boom, the indigenous population of Kuwait has increased rapidly. According to the 1957 census, the national population of Kuwait was 113,622, and this increased to 161,909 in 1961; 347,396 in 1970; 565,613 in 1980; and 681,288 in 1985, according to the official census figures.23 However, in 1986, the Kuwaiti authorities announced that the number of Kuwaiti nationals recorded in the 1985 census was inflated, due to the inclusion of stateless Arab beduns.24 Nearly 211,000 beduns from the desert areas along the Kuwaiti, Iraqi and Saudi borders were included in the national population, on the premise that they would eventually become Kuwaiti citizens.25 By 1986, the Kuwaiti authorities decided against naturalization of the transient bedun population, although they upheld the right for individuals to apply for citizenship. As a result, the authorities reclassified the bedun population as non-Kuwaiti Arabs, and adjusted the census figures to reflect this. The amended 1985 census assessed the revised national population as 470,473, or 27.7 per cent of the total population, showing how much the state relied upon migrant labour and expertise.26 This rapid growth of population was fuelled by the labour shortage in the region, because there were too few Kuwaitis to support the ambitious infrastructural projects that this growth required. As a result, the state chose to import thousands of labourers from other Arab nations, the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia, to form a pool of cheap and hard-working labour. Ultimately, a rise in fertility rates, coupled with immigration, led to a high youth demographic within Kuwait’s population and an extremely low rate of labour force

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participation by nationals.27 In 1965, the national labour participation rate was 19.5 per cent of the total workforce, broken down into 37.2 per cent for males and 17.7 per cent for female workers. This figure declined to 18.8 per cent in 1970, with little change in gender proportions, at 36.1 per cent for males and 1.2 per cent for females.28 By 1980, it had increased slightly to 19.1 per cent, and women were beginning to enter the workforce in greater numbers, with specific rates of 33.3 per cent for males and 5 per cent for females.29 By 1985, the rate had dropped again to only 18 per cent, but men made up 29 per cent and women 7 per cent. The demographics of Kuwait changed dramatically after the 1990 Gulf conflict, when an estimated 400,000 Palestinian immigrants were expelled from the country, due to the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s support of Iraq. Many of these Palestinian immigrants had arrived after the 1947–8 Arab–Israeli conflict, or the 1967 Six-Day War, and had raised families in Kuwait, so many immigrants were sent back to a country that they had never visited. The fact that many of these Palestinians worked in professional positions left a vacuum that could not be easily filled by immigrants from South Asia or Africa.30 As a result, while the total participation of nationals in the workforce declined, the proportion of females rose, mainly due to a number of educated, professional women entering employment.31 This was unusual amongst the patriarchal Gulf societies, and was symptomatic of the growing influence of women in Kuwaiti society, which, in turn, created a slow and inexorable pressure for change. This period also saw the first stirrings of discontent from Iraq, as Kuwait’s larger neighbour looked enviously at the state’s oil wealth. Kuwait was granted sovereign state status on 19 June 1961, and was quickly accepted as a discrete and individual entity. Despite this consensus, Abdul-Karim Qassim, President of Iraq, swiftly claimed that Kuwait was Iraqi territory and challenged the state’s right to exist. The Kuwaitis referred this problem to the League of Arab States, and this body sent a joint British–Saudi security force to defend Kuwait’s borders against Iraqi agitation. Every other Arab government rejected Qassim’s claim and recognized Kuwait’s right to exist; so Kuwait joined the Arab League in July 1961 and the United Nations in May 1963, as a fully independent nation – although many Kuwaitis see this date as the completion of independence, arguing that the nation has

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had independence, albeit under British protection, since 1899, and had existed as a discrete, non-Ottoman territory since 1913.32 However, this dissention soured relationships between Iraq and Kuwait, and the simmering resentment became the basis of a later Iraqi invasion and anti-Kuwaiti rhetoric and actions.33 The internal politics of Kuwait became a little more complex as the state developed, although the Al-Sabah emirs maintained overall control. By the late 1950s, there was a tacit understanding between the Al-Sabah family and five leading merchant families to devolve power, and give others greater political influence. These demands originally started in the 1930s and 1940s, and the discovery of oil increased this process.34 This pressure culminated with the demand for a constitutional framework to legitimize the participation of the five families. The State of Kuwait’s Constitution was ratified on 11 November 1962,35 and its National Assembly was convened under the stipulations of the Constitution on 29 January 1963.36 However, the burgeoning democratic process could not surmount the prevailing patriarchal tradition, which hid beneath Islamic tradition despite its non-conformity with true Islamic interpretation. Very importantly, there was no legislation in the Constitution of Kuwait limiting a woman’s right to vote or to run for political office, but an electoral law passed by the 1963 Assembly prohibited female participation in politics. Many supporters of women’s political participation claimed that this provision of the electoral law violated the Constitution.37 Kuwait’s first constitution provided for an elected legislature, the National Assembly, with members serving four-year terms. Only literate male citizens over the age of 21, whose parents had lived in Kuwait since 1920, were allowed to vote and take part in political life. This included only a small fraction of the total population, although all Kuwaitis benefited from the wide range of social services offered by the government.38 Despite these limitations, women began to agitate for a role within the political process, strengthened by the constitutional right to free speech.39 Peterson believes that, since the discovery of oil in the region, most of the GCC states can be classed as ‘Post-Traditional’, with the states modernizing within the traditional monarchies common in the Gulf.40 Nonneman divides this further, believing that Kuwait is one of the more modern of the GCC states, based upon the stipulation

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for an electable Assembly as a major part of the political structure.41 During the 1950s and 1960s, economic growth fuelled the inception of a strengthening women’s rights movement, sustained by a growing number of intelligent and educated women.42

Women and Education: The Foundation of the Women’s Movement Before the 1990 invasion, the rulers of Kuwait actively sought to bring women into the educational system and this, more than anything, gave voice to their quest for representation. Taking inspiration from the notable scholar Qassim Amin, the rulers believed that a stronger society needed educated women, allowing them to strengthen families, which were regarded as the foundation of Arab culture.43 At the turn of the twentieth century, there were very few educational facilities in the country, other than a small number of Qur’anic schools. These schools, known as Al-Katatib, taught reading, writing and some arithmetic, alongside the study of the Qur’an.44 There was no public funding for education during the first part of the century, and Kuwait’s wealthier private citizens often employed private tutors for their children. In 1939, the government took control of education and, by 1945, the country boasted 17 schools. Oil revenues funded a huge increase in social services, and education was at the forefront as the post-Second World War administration sought to invest in people and redistribute some of the growing wealth.45 According to Stephen Krauss, ‘the development of the Kuwaiti educational system can be largely attributed to the wealth that oil has brought to the country’.46 By 1960, there were about 45,000 students enrolled in the Kuwaiti educational system and, crucially, this included 18,000 girls. This trend towards universal education continued throughout the decade, and the constitution of 1962 specifically stipulated that education should be assured and promoted by the state, reflecting the belief that education was a fundamental right of all citizens. Schooling was first made compulsory in 1965 and, in 1967, a private school system re-emerged, with the help of considerable government subsidies.47 Sheikh Abdullah Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Minister of Education in the first government of Kuwait in January 1962, had a major impact on the

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progress of education in Kuwait, establishing the foundations and development of education. Today he is remembered as the ‘Father of Education’ or Abu Al-Taalim by Kuwaiti historians. He strongly encouraged and endorsed women to enter the educational system and was an opponent of the segregation of schools in modern Kuwait. Beginning in the 1930s, Sheikh Abdullah had a major role in recruiting qualified teachers from the Arab World to provide education to Kuwaiti men and women. He also established schools in Bombay and Karachi, Oman, and Ras Al-Khaimah to educate Arabs and Muslims the Arabic language and the Islamic religion.48 In 2013, the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) added the late Sheikh Abdullah to its list of world education reformers for his contributions to humanity and his role in promoting education in Kuwait, specifically for women.49 This process was a great benefit to the state, but regional politics soon provided a counterweight to progress, offsetting many of the gains. During the Islamic revival of the 1970s and 1980s, a more extreme and less tolerant ideology emerged, rejecting any conduct that did not adhere to strict Islamic principles. The Salafi movement grew in influence in the region and promoted a return to the Sharia, emulating Prophet Muhammad’s behaviour as closely as possible. Proponents of this movement interpreted the Qur’anic scripture literally, without any regard for modern context or advances. In 1981, followers of this movement established the Islamic Heritage Society, and this body grew in popularity during the 1980s, adopting a militant approach towards gaining political legitimacy, and advocating against granting women the vote.50 Initially, the representatives of the Salafis courted the patronage of the government, as a bulwark against the growing strength of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood movement and their links with the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt.51 The sole proclivity of the Brothers was Arab Nationalism or Arabism, with literal Islamic doctrine as the political and cultural basis.52 The government’s tacit approval of the Salafi movement was designed to create a balancing force of fundamental Islamists to counter the danger of the Muslim Brothers. In a rare failure of foresight, the government granted citizenship to many members of the Salafi movement in an attempt to counter the liberal elements in Kuwait. This assent was supposed to create the appearance that

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they were pro-Islamic, riding out the ripples of anti-establishment influence spreading from Iran’s Islamic revolution of 1979 that had toppled the pro-Western Shah. However, the agenda of the Salafi movement was more radical than that of the Brothers and called for far stricter Islamic reforms, both politically and socially. As Feldman states, Now increasingly fearful that it had created a monster, the Kuwait government, in preparation for the 1985 elections, began to foster the liberals as counterweights to the Salafi, just as they had fostered the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi as counterweights to the nationalists and liberals. Though neither the Salafi nor the nationalist candidates did particularly well in the elections, the emir once again suspended the National Assembly and silenced the press. The intervention of the Iraqi invasion and occupation meant that the National Assembly ceased to operate until well after the defeat and expulsion of the Iraqis in 1991.53

This mistake would lead to problems with regard to the attempts of women to break away from their traditional subservient role. Rather than diluting the power of the traditionalists, this actually made them much stronger and they began to influence policy in the 1990s. Women’s rights were shunted to one side as the emir attempted to balance the National Assembly and appease the traditionalist factions.54

The Socio-Political Status of Women in Kuwait prior to the Invasion Despite the growing influence of strong fundamentalist movements, Kuwait pressed forward with its inclusive education policies, becoming one of the leading Arab countries in the field of female education. The first modern schools were opened in Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq during the nineteenth century, largely due to the influence of colonialism, but these establishments were exclusively for male pupils. In most Gulf States, modern education is a product of the twentieth century, and education for women did not occur until the latter half of that century.55 The Gulf oil boom fuelled a substantial increase in the allocation of funds for education in nearly all Arab countries, which

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drew from one-fifth to one-third of the public spending budget. Total expenditures on education grew rapidly, from US$ 976 million in 1965, to US$ 1.6 billion in 1970 and US$ 8 billion in 1975.56 Kuwait stood at the forefront of female education, establishing schools in 1937. Egypt, as a counterexample, did not devise a more inclusive education programme until the 1960s and 1970s.57 Initially, Kuwaiti schools encompassed basic education and, during the late 1970s and 1980s, Kuwaiti women travelled to the US and the UK for higher education. However, a large proportion of women now attend a national university, and this foresight has paid off for Kuwait; the participation of professional women in the workforce has grown, and this has strengthened society. By the early 1980s, for example, over 4,000 Kuwaiti women held university degrees, compared with only 38 in 1965. Currently, over 67 per cent of Kuwait University graduates are women and,58 between 1980 and 2000, Kuwait witnessed one of the highest positive changes in female labour force participation, with the current figure at an estimated 25 per cent.59 This rise of a female professional class generated a number of vociferous women’s organizations, the first of which was established soon after Kuwaiti independence.60 The Cultural and Social Society, eventually renamed the Women’s Cultural and Social Society (WCSS), exists to this day. Initially a social group for elite women, it would play a critical role in the battle for improving women’s rights, including suffrage. While this organization is still engaged in charitable projects, it has fostered a reputation as an advocacy group for women’s political and social rights.61 The WCSS is proud of its diverse activities and notable successes, such as organizing protests, political rallies and seminars, alongside establishing links with political groups and professional associations. A new generation of young professional women recruits is broadening the scope and appeal of this veteran body.62 The WCSS was, in its earlier days, reluctant to adopt confrontational methods and was not convinced that the vote was attainable or even desirable. An alternative, now extinct organization, took up that battle and began to use radical methods to attain that ultimate goal. The Arab Women’s Development Society (AWDS) became far more politically active than the WCSS and began struggling for women’s rights in the early 1970s.63 The AWDS saw the WCSS as reinforcing

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the prevailing kin class privileges, and felt that this approach would never achieve the desired goals. The AWDS, drawing on a mainly middle-class membership, highlighted the contradiction in the calls for modernization and emancipation, and the traditional subordinate role expected of women. By the 1970s, it was agitating for equal employment, equal rights in divorce and custody, nurseries for working mothers and easier entry into higher education.64 In the mid1970s, the WCSS joined the campaign, but acted in collaboration with the Kuwait government, an alliance that the AWDS believed compromised the goals of the group. During the United Nations’ (UN’s) ‘Decade for Women’, spanning the years 1976 to 1985, the president of the WCSS became the head of Kuwait’s official delegation. Kuwait faced the full force of world opinion concerning its women’s rights record, and was named as one of the nine states still withholding voting rights from women.65 However, the WCSS failed to follow up and apply pressure on the government for substantive change.66 After a conference in 1971, which was attended by women from a range of social backgrounds, the AWDS agreed to present their grievances, in writing, to the National Assembly. The AWDS brought an Equal Rights Bill before the National Assembly in 1973, in an attempt to widen the underlying reasoning behind the drive for women’s rights, attacking citizenship rights by arguing that withholding this was an attack on citizenship rights.67 The WCSS followed the belief that promoting a women’s agenda was in the national interest, but the AWDS sought equal rights for women as individuals, rather than making a case for the greater good, which was a more Western-influenced feminist argument. The AWDS sought to broaden its appeal across class divides, pressing for equality in employment, voting rights and child allowance, but encountered resistance and apathy amongst the lowest and highest echelons of society. Increasingly, the constitutional argument grew in strength as the AWDS used the argument of social justice, reversing the strategy that packaged women’s rights as a component of Kuwaiti modernization, built around the idea that educated and professional women would become more productive citizens.68 In 1975, this issue raised the first serious conflict between the women’s movement and traditionalists.69 The National Assembly agreed to discuss two issues in the AWDS’ proposed Bill of Rights:

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allowing emancipation and illegalizing the practice of polygamy.70 Members of the Assembly expressed outrage over this challenge to their culture, traditions and Sharia law, quoting passages from the Qur’an and Hadith that permitted plural marriage, with certain limitations and conditions, and did not make it compulsory. They argued that it was hypocritical to condemn polygamy when the number of people involved in extramarital affairs, many times with multiple partners, was increasing dramatically, and that adultery is a crime against society, with high rates of divorce and fatherless families most affecting children. Emancipation was not the main point of contention, as the proposals suggesting the abolition of polygamy caused bitter debates and eventually led to the dissolution of the AWDS by the government in 1980.71 It was during the late 1970s and early 1980s that the picture became complicated, as Islamist women’s groups filled the vacuum, emphasizing a return to traditional values and rejecting Western feminism as a corrupting and alien import.72 Now, the widening division amongst Kuwaiti women was not only class-based, but driven by religious factors – and this ‘divide and conquer’ approach halted the movement in its tracks. Prominent female Islamists joined their male counterparts and set up their own women’s campaign, basing it upon traditional values and suggesting that women should accept their place in society. However, as Moghissi suggests, the rich and influential classes drove this; they gained a lot of power through their position and marriage, and felt threatened by intelligent and educated women transcending traditional social barriers.73 Under pressure from all sides, the government supported two Islamic women’s organizations, Bayader al-Salam and the Islamic Care Society (ICS).74 During the 1980s, as discussed previously, the Kuwait government was attempting to offset the challenge posed by liberal reformists and nationalists. They did not understand that promoting the re-Islamization of Kuwait would soon generate a different set of challenges. The Islamic Care Society appropriated the AWDS’ building for its own headquarters and adopted this governmental-driven agenda. The founder of this society was a member of the Al-Sabah family and the wife of the former Crown Prince, so she wielded significant power and influence. Joining with the male Islamist movements, she sought to promote

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Islamic values, although the movement, designed to help upper-class women maintain their influence and wealth, had little appeal outside the elite class.75 Its founder, Sheikha Latifa, was rich in her own right and successfully appropriated government funds, starting a religious school, charitable institutions and Islamic centres, all promoting her conservative agenda.76 The mission diverged from that of the Muslim Brotherhood by combining nationalist patriotism and religious devotion, and by arguing that religion and state should be mutually supportive, although that specific policy stemmed from Latifa’s membership of the ruling family rather than any personal ideology.77 This apparent fracture in the women’s movement, between religious and non-religious women, was far more complex than it seemed. Not all religious women opposed women’s rights any more than all nonreligious women could be assumed to support them. Many educated women saw no contradiction between authentic Islam and women’s equal political rights, and there was a great deal of overlap between the two schools of thought. Disillusioned by the approach of the compromised ICS, many Islamist women demanded their rights as stipulated by Islamic tradition, creating another strand in the evolving struggle for women’s rights. Prominent Shi‘i activist Khadijah al-Mahmeed joined the WCSS rather than the Sunni-dominated ICS, seeing that she had more in common with the reformers than the elite.78 Islamist and Western-style feminists alike united in their call for emancipation and democratic recognition, causing the government’s attempt to silence the reformers to have the opposite effect. Emboldened by such unity, the WCSS embraced the push for emancipation.79 This struggle between tradition and modernity transcended many of the conventional class and religious boundaries. Throughout the growth of the women’s rights movement, particularly during its initial stages, it had to embrace centuries of cultural traditions and strict religious convictions. In addition, the movement was fractured and often riven with internal contradictions, partly due to a lack of coherent policy, partly to divisions promoted by the government. This contradiction is apparent in interviews with two women from the Kuwaiti elite, conducted by the magazine Al-Sabah in 2009.80 Replying to

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the question of granting citizenship to children of Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis, Ghanima Al-Fahad,81 a journalist and writer at Al-Rai newspaper, said that she was against it, since man is the root of any nationality, in line with her interpretation of Islamic religion. However, in the same interview, Najla Al-Naqi,82 a lawyer at the Legal Advice and Legislation Council of Kuwait, stated that she was firmly opposed to such arguments. She further added that she was in favour of a naturalization process for the sons of divorced and widowed women, who had married non-Kuwaiti or non-identified nationals, purely on humanitarian grounds.83 Thus, we find that members of the women’s organizations failed to provide a united front and that their convictions, as individuals or as groups, varied greatly. The division between modernists and traditionalists, in particular, stymied the women’s rights movements in Kuwait, partly due to circumstance and partly due to deliberate governmental intervention. This prevented any real shift from the status quo and stopped women achieving equality in many areas of society and politics. However, the educational achievements of women, and the growth of a well-educated population of female professionals, contributed steady pressure. This pressure, often unseen, slowly shifted the goals of women and sowed the potential for change, a shift that would be affected by the Gulf War.

The Iraqi Invasion: Its Influences on Society and its Relevance to the Ensuing Socio-Political Change The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 brought about political and socio-economic changes in the Gulf region in general, and Kuwait in particular. The trauma, the tragedy and the bravery in the face of the crisis would scar the memory of a generation of Kuwaitis, changing the course of the society in a very short time. Aristotle maintained that, ‘tragedy creates a catharsis by purging the soul of its base concepts’.84 This catharsis became manifested in the socio-political changes after the conflict, although the pace was slow and faced resistance from a cross-section of society holding traditionalist views. The entire region, for the first time in generations, realized how fragile the concept of Arab Brotherhood was and how Iraq’s betrayal had caused

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a shift in the balance of regional power, marked by the semi-permanent presence of American military bases, which had been rejected by the GCC countries in earlier years. In the first few days after the invasion, the Government in Exile garnered mixed responses from the outside world. Previously, US President George H. Bush had shown little inclination to become involved in the conflict or the dispute preceding it – changing this opinion became the prime focus of the Government in Exile.85 The monarchy had become infamous for its failure to address women’s rights, although much of the criticism was directed at the region as a whole, including countries engaged in far worse female oppression than Kuwait. Forced into a desperate situation, the Government in Exile formed an organization called Citizens for a Free Kuwait, and sought to improve its image and apply pressure on the international community. This organization hired Hill+Knowlton, the largest public relations firm in the US, to gain support for a campaign against Iraq.86 The slick media campaign included press and video releases, which were picked up by major media outlets.87 The campaign was a major reason for the consolidation of US support in favour of Kuwait, and President Bush became an ally in helping to build up a coalition to free Kuwait.88 Many of the most outlandish stories, such as the famous testimony of Iraqis leaving hundreds of Kuwaiti premature babies to die, were subsequently shown to be false.89 As a side effect, the Kuwaiti government learnt the benefit of creating an image that could consolidate political ambitions, so they made promises that they would implement democratic reforms after the conflict. The entire region now understood that Arabian solidarity could be easily destroyed by one rogue state, and believed that a shift towards democracy was the best way to counter this threat.90 The lasting impact of this war, on Kuwaiti society, was extensive in its breadth and depth, and it would influence the economy, policy, public sentiments, social trends and cultural expression, especially in the field of women’s rights. This book will examine the myriad ways in which the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait affected and changed society. It will cover a wide range of general thematic categories, issues and topics that address not only the geopolitical effects of the war on Kuwait, but the social and cultural ramifications. To illustrate the range of connections between

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the Iraqi invasion, the war and Kuwaiti society, this book will look at three types of effect caused by the invasion and the war: • • •

direct effects; interactive relationships; indirect effects.

This will illuminate the correlations between wartime events and the experiences of Kuwaiti society, not only during the war but also in the longer term with regard to the lasting impact they had on society in the decades long after the conflict ended. To uncover these trends, this work will draw upon a number of sources, including: letters, diaries, autobiographies, official documents, novels, poems, national songs and political cartoons. It will also use surveys and public opinion polls. The invasion had a huge impact on culture; civil–military relations; the economy; labour; education (both military and civilian); the environment and health; journalism and the media; law and justice; urban planning; gender and religion; government leaders, and the ruling family as a whole. These diverse sources, drawn from local and international newspapers, journals, books, websites and blogs, provide an excellent overview of the impact of the conflict on the core focus of this book – women in politics. Alongside the work of academics such as Mary Tétreault, Haya Al-Mughni and Mary Rizzo, blogs, questionnaires and interviews with ordinary Kuwaitis give a holistic view of the dynamic political situation in Kuwait after the 1990 conflict. Direct effects The mentality of the Kuwaiti soldiers and civilians changed dramatically during and after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, with stress disorders and mental trauma afflicting a large proportion of the population. The strategy and policy of the Kuwaiti armed forces shifted, and compulsory military service would permanently affect social structures, especially with regard to how it fuelled a trend towards military careers for many young men. The direct physical impact of the Iraqi War was considerable and devastating, and many Kuwaitis

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lost everything they owned, widening the gap between rich and poor. More than 80 per cent of the livestock animals in Kuwait – mainly cattle, sheep and goats – died during the Iraqi occupation between August 1990 and March 1991. The war caused the death of thousands of birds, and the oil fires and oil spills damaged terrestrial and marine environments.91 However, recovery from the physical effects of this conflict was swift, and Kuwaiti citizens fully supported the government in its rebuilding efforts, putting aside political differences in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. The reconstruction of the devastated country was supported by invaluable international financial aid, obtained by the government when in exile. As for the economic effects, paying for the war and for rebuilding the shattered state would be an expensive process, seriously hampering the productivity of Kuwait. Add to that the delay in resuming oil production, and the financial effects would impact on the pockets of average Kuwaitis for many years, forcing the emirate to find ways of cutting expenditure, by reducing handouts and weaning Kuwaitis from the ‘state-dependence’ mentality.92 However, reform was slow, as parliamentary stasis, caused by friction between liberal and conservative factions, blocked any substantial changes until the twenty-first century.93 Interactive relationships The struggle during the invasion forged a strong and common solidarity amongst all Kuwaitis, regardless of class and background. This unity was new when compared with the many class- and religiondriven divisions apparent during the era of economic prosperity in the 1970s and 1980s. As Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmad Al-Rahmani has pointed out, ‘In Kuwait, everyone from children to old men resisted. There were no Kuwaiti puppets, which Iraq could use to form a Government. Every Kuwaiti was in the Resistance.’94 This gave the Iraqis little legitimacy for their invasion, and made it impossible to set up a puppet government in order to try to influence Kuwaitis to work with the occupiers. The Kuwaiti resistance, whilst initially disorganized, put up stiff resistance and showed the Iraqis that subjugating Kuwait would not be as easy as they hoped.95 Armed groups instigated a guerrilla campaign, sabotaging Iraqi installations, and many

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Kuwaitis passively resisted the Iraqis by hiding foreigners, gathering information for the coalition forces, instigating a campaign of civil disobedience, translating news from the international media and passing out newsletters, setting up medical facilities for wounded resistance fighters and working to minimize the destruction of oil wells.96 To give a representative example, John Levins states, in his collection of Gulf War experiences, On the night of August 11, most Kuwaitis went onto the roofs of their houses and called ‘Allahu Akhbar’ (God is Great) from the Islamic call to prayer for a full half-hour. This exercise was repeated on the night of September 1. It was a spine-chilling experience to hear thousands of voices rising out of the darkness like the keening of damned souls, and unnerved the Iraqis so much that they fired assault rifles and machine guns over the rooftops to stop it. The combination of the green and red tracers arching low over the city and the crackle of the weapons over the chanting was a terrifying inspiration. Voices against bullets … Close cooperation bonded many of the Kuwaitis in a way they had not experienced since before the easy wealth of oil. ‘We were like this in the old days!’ was the comment of one old Kuwaiti lady I spoke to. ‘At least the Iraqis have taught us the value of life, and reminded us what it was like to struggle in the old days,’ she said with optimism. ‘I hope it continues when they are gone.’97

A group of enterprising Kuwaiti technicians smuggled radio equipment out of the country and sent out broadcasts from the Saudi desert, known as the ‘Voice of Kuwait’. Alongside broadcasts and speeches from the Government in Exile, Kuwaiti musicians contributed to the resistance. Celebrated Kuwaiti singer Shadi Al-Khaleej raised morale with this song, ‘Resistance springs from our soil … We are strong like the mountains and the storm will not shake or move us.’98 Other songs, interspersed with news and reports, gave Kuwaitis hope and raised morale amongst the population, letting them know that they were not alone during the occupation.99 Class, gender and tribal affiliations melted away as the nation stood as one. ‘For the first time,’ said Ali Salem, a resistance leader, ‘all barriers were breached. Shi‘i Muslims, who have long been discriminated against by the Sunni

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majority, were major players, perhaps even the most significant. We were, at least for that time, truly one.’100 Women acted as the focus for a form of passive resistance, the catalyst around which the resistance movement began. One of the women involved, Fatima, reminisced, After the invasion, the whole of Kuwait nearly froze. Nothing going on except telephone calls and tears and fears, and of course you hear all of these sounds of the military machines. We felt it was our responsibility to break the ice. If somebody hits you on the head and you faint, you need somebody to splash cold water, to pat your cheeks to wake you up. I think at this particular moment this is the role of women in Kuwait.101

This deep involvement of women in the resistance would be the key to the change in Kuwaiti society after the war. For a fleeting moment, the beliefs of the traditionalists, of unity through culture, and the modernist belief, of unity through democracy, overlapped. This moment, more than any other, encapsulated the shift in society that was about to envelop Kuwait in the post-war period. This newfound unity would become the largest underlying force guiding the post-war development of Kuwaiti society. It would break down many of the old divisions permanently. Indirect effects The invasion destroyed buildings, roads and bridges, but also shattered the collective memory of Kuwaitis for many years. Despite the liberation, people found little solace, especially as Saddam Hussein remained over the border, an ominous threat to peace and security, with huge armed forces at his disposal as well as possibly a stock of chemical and biological weapons. The scars inflicted on the Kuwaiti subconscious ran deep, a wound that the Western media failed to acknowledge adequately, downplaying the mental trauma and effects of the occupation. The memory of violence, the occasional discovery of skeletons in the desert, mines maiming and killing, and the sight of unexploded bombs floating in the sea, created a real sense of fear and

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instilled a siege mentality in the minds of Kuwaitis. Those returning from exile came back to a country devastated and almost unrecognizable, and even those Kuwaitis who had managed to flee suffered from a post-traumatic malaise.102 The psychological disturbance and post-traumatic disorders were often manifested through violent acts by young boys and catatonia amongst children, with a 1993 study showing that 70 per cent of Kuwaiti children suffered from some form of post-traumatic stress disorder after the conflict, a trend intensified by witnessing death and injury or viewing graphic television and newspaper images.103 Incidents of students committing violent acts against teachers, previously unimaginable, showed how deeply this conflict had damaged an entire generation of Kuwaiti children.104 This malaise was further complicated by drug and alcohol abuse and an increase in malpractice and corruption in business. Some women’s organizations, alongside religious bodies and the Sports Council, were active in trying to rehabilitate victims of drug abuse through understanding rather than punishment.105 After the liberation, Mark Sandman, an American expert in traumatic stress, was contacted by a representative of the Emiri Diwan.106 He was invited to Kuwait to treat the psychological after-effects of the Iraqi invasion and train indigenous medical staff. After his long and meaningful involvement in Kuwait, it is worth noting his remarks: We can define Kuwaiti’s growth as a legacy of the Iraqi aggression. In general, we can say that the brutality of the Iraqi forces left behind a legacy of great divide between the Arab world and the Islamic world. It is impossible to return exactly to the way life was before the aggression. However, the Kuwaitis and their recovery exemplify how a traumatic event can lead to growth and fortification. Kuwaitis had to redefine their lives based on the reality of what they had been through and what they had learned from their experience.107

The post-conflict era saw changes in attitudes and a growth in ideological divides, as Kuwait, forever changed, tried to find a clear and different strategy for a post-conflict world. The government granted concessions to liberal factions, such as a freer press and the

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liberalization of trade, but also attempted to court the traditionalists, by setting up a committee to look at strengthening Sharia law. Unfortunately, by trying to pacify the various groups, in an attempt to tap into the post-war Kuwaiti unity, the government merely heightened divisions. Much of the energy and transformation of the war experience was thus wasted on infighting, rather than growth and development; nevertheless, Kuwaitis were now prepared to challenge the existing, paternalistic system favoured by the Al-Sabahs, and push for reform.108 The artist Yvonne Pepin-Wakefield analysed the way in which young Kuwaitis expressed themselves artistically after the conflict, and found that most of the pictures drawn were violent in nature, with a heavy use of aggressive colours such as red and orange. This fascinating study showed how deeply the deprivations of conflict could ingrain themselves into the psyche of an entire generation.109 Interestingly, she also found a marked difference in the reactions of men and women; males drew much more violent pictures, containing guns and other military hardware.110 Pepin-Wakefield suggests that this represents their inbuilt frustration: that they could not defend their nation.111 After the war, a period of bloodletting – as alleged informers were either jailed, deported or executed – deepened the scars.112 Palestinians living in Kuwait bore the brunt of this, as some thousands were deported, splitting up families and leaving many Kuwaiti spouses and children with no rights of citizenship. This would become one of the issues that would lead to a concerted action for emancipation immediately after the war.113

The Role of Women during the Iraqi Occupation and the War During Iraq’s seven-month occupation, Kuwaiti women became the voices of defiance and active resistance. Amongst other things, they were crucial in providing food, health care and other services to the larger Kuwaiti community, especially as many of the men had disappeared or moved underground. These women transcended tradition, culture and religion by reaching out to others and putting up fierce resistance to the Iraqi occupation, including a brave armed struggle,

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sabotaging Iraqi installations and attacking troops. Professor Talaat I. Farag, founder of the Ambassador’s Research Council, wrote, After playing a front-line role in the resistance to the Iraqi occupation, Kuwait women won the support of the country’s ruler at the time, Emir Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, and the respect of all Kuwaitis. Following the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, the petroleum engineer, Sarah Akbar, made a remarkable and unforgettable effort in extinguishing the oilfield fires which were set ablaze by Saddam’s force prior to their withdrawal from Kuwait.114

This was only the start of the resistance, and women became indispensable in every aspect of the opposition to the Iraqi occupation, from hiding Westerners to taking direct action, using bombs and guns alongside the Kuwaiti men. Outside Kuwait, women were the prime organizers of protests in many capital cities, communicating and liaising with women still inside the country. This was another factor that helped to raise awareness and generate publicity.115 A number of Kuwaitis point to the 1990–1 Iraqi invasion and occupation as a pivotal moment for women’s advancement, and relate this to their roles as the backbone of the resistance during those traumatic months. Whilst thousands of women were involved, John Levins points to a select band of Kuwaiti women, such as Wafa Al-Amer, Khalud Al-Khamis, Amy Burhan and Asrar Al-Qabandi, as the true leaders of the resistance, figureheads around whom the resistance rallied.116 Many male Kuwaitis joined the resistance due to the shame and anger unleashed when Asrar was found brutally executed.117 Women smuggled weapons, forged papers and organized many aspects of the campaign, roles that carried the possibility of torture and execution, if caught. Wafa, a 23-year-old radiographer, was part of the group that bombed the Kuwait International Hotel and Iraqi-commandeered restaurants. Eventually the Iraqis captured and killed her, and she passed into Kuwaiti history as a martyr. Khalud, a journalist, was a regular member of resistance counter-attacks. Amy turned her house into a resistance meeting place,118 whilst the famous Asrar Al-Qabandi, a 30-year-old woman, became Kuwait’s heroine. Her first mission, alongside Hind Al-Bahar, Hashim Behbehani and

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others,119 was to find sanctuary for members of the ruling Al-Sabah family. They smuggled 15 Al-Sabah children, prime targets for the Iraqis, out of the country. Asrar’s subsequent activities included forging documents and licences for Kuwaitis, Americans and Britons, identifying them as safe nationalities; setting up safe houses; and helping the Bahraini ambassador to issue Bahraini passports to ‘at risk’ Kuwaitis. On one occasion, she disguised herself as an Indian lady and smuggled computer disks out of a ministry building.120 She kept the plight of the Kuwaitis on the front pages of the Western newspapers and fervently believed that her country would be liberated.121 Asrar was captured and brutally executed, just before Operation Desert Storm; one of many Kuwaiti women hanged in reprisal.122 According to the National Committee for Missing & Prisoners of War, there was clear evidence that Iraq held at least 605 prisoners in 1991, seven of whom were women.123 For more than a decade, the families of those POWs hoped that they were in captivity and might return home, despite the protestations of the Iraqis that there were no prisoners.124 The recent conflict, following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, dashed these hopes, when DNA tests from the mass graves showed that many corpses were Kuwaiti POWs. This news deflated all Kuwaitis, who shared the grief of the families.125 There are many more tales of brave resistance in Kuwait, and this had an almost immediate impact on Kuwaiti culture. Before the invasion, only 7 per cent of the Kuwaiti workforce was made up of national women, but more women chose to work after the conflict, and some set up businesses. The depravations of the occupation, and the subsequent resistance, taught Kuwaiti women that people had to work to prove themselves, irrespective of gender; the perception of any difference between men and women changed and then disappeared. Books and plays told of the pivotal role of women within the resistance movement, and this bravery would become the cornerstone of the long fight for emancipation.126 The women who laid down their lives for their country during the invasion of Kuwait were the catalyst for this change in perception, and the prevalent attitude amongst men also began to change.127 When the coalition forces liberated Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Kuwaiti men and women celebrated the return of freedom. The war was over, and hundreds of Kuwaiti women could

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return to their family duties. The war mobilized many women to join the rebuilding after the war effort, but many more chose to return home and take care of their families, settling back into their traditional roles.128 For some women, this was not enough; the development of wartime resistance gave them a taste of freedom and action, and a sense of their own independence and strength. Though they still faced some discrimination on entering the workforce, it was nothing like the level experienced before the Iraqi invasion and, for the first time, women were able to experience some sort of social mobility. They now had choices and could develop true individuality and independence, building their own identity rather than taking on their husband’s. For seven months, Kuwaiti women had responded to dire circumstances by working hard and risking their lives to support their country. In a reversal of roles during the conflict, men had to become invisible and let women take the lead. This, more than anything, contributed to the reawakening of the women’s rights movement.129 After the liberation, their noble efforts paid off and public opinion swung in favour of women’s rights; the active role taken by the women during the invasion caused most men to see their women as strong fighters and as soldiers, true equals. The war allowed women to make decisions and gave them the strength to fight for their rights and, subsequently, they developed the long missing sense of unity and purpose, as well as links with reformist men’s groups. The consequences of the Iraqi invasion fuelled many of the civil rights movements of the 1990s, now based upon individual rights rather than the greater good and nationalism.130 Women showed that the two ideals were not mutually exclusive and that empowering women did contribute to the greater good.

The Response of Society to Women’s Role during the Crisis and the Emergence of Political Promises The exiled Kuwaiti government made several public promises about changes to society that they would implement after the liberation. These included the promise that women would play a greater role and make more significant contributions to the country that they had valiantly helped to defend. In a meeting with US Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah ‘indicated a willingness

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to look at eventually extending the right to vote to women in his small but oil-rich country’.131 This position was further clarified by the former Crown Prince Sheikh Saad, who stated that women will ‘play a greater role and make more noble contributions in liberated Kuwait’.132 This was a tacit admission that the government aimed to grant women the same rights as men.133 The conspicuous public role of the women during the invasion, and the esteem in which they were now held, evoked a receptive sentiment across the strata of the male-dominated society. However, the prominence of women was seen as a potential threat by Islamists who had resisted and manipulated the issue of women’s suffrage for more than a decade. Though the women’s rights movement, founded on the demands for political, social and humanitarian rights, was initiated in the 1970s, it gathered momentum only in the post-invasion years, due to greater public support.134 The war was the valve that released the pressure that had built up during the previous two decades, and women felt empowered to speak out in their quest for equality. In an interview with Dr Rasha Al-Sabah, Undersecretary for Higher Education in Kuwait, conducted in July 2009, she said, The resistance of Kuwaiti women and their sacrifice for their nation during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait is well documented and became obvious to the political leadership of Kuwait and to the world at large. In these critical conditions, the political maturity of Kuwaiti women was evident to all, and this was a turning point in the consideration of granting Kuwaiti women full political rights.135

However, Dr Taghreed Alqudsi-Ghabra, Associate Professor and founding chair of the Department of Information Science at Kuwait University, made one observation that would prove to be prophetic and encapsulate the problems that would be faced by women as they strove for their rights. Speaking in 1991, soon after the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, she pointed out that, It is essential for women at this stage not to fall into the trap of indiscriminately accepting the political ideologies of the different groups, and end up being used by all of them … Kuwaiti women’s groups need

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to draw their own basic agendas, with their own priorities and demands, and follow through accordingly.

These words would prove to be prescient.136

Conclusion: The War is Over: Now a New Battle Begins During the invasion and the occupation, the Kuwaiti resistance killed a number of Iraqis – estimated to be between five and 20 per day – in turn, suffering hundreds of casualties over the course of the occupation.137 This fierce resistance fomented feelings of nationalism amongst Kuwaitis and a commitment to their homeland that the world had not been aware of previously. John Levins states, While the Western media perpetuated easy clichés about Kuwaitis’ being five-star refugees who paid the Americans and British to liberate them, the real story was quite different … The accounts of life under occupation, the atrocities, and the courage of the ordinary Kuwaitis transmitted by people like ‘Abd al-Jabir Maʾrafi and Asrar al-Qabandi were critical in keeping Western public opinion focused on the issue of human rights. The actions of the Kuwaiti resistance helped to retain the moral high ground for Kuwait in a way that politicians, diplomats, and public relations consultants could not.138

After the occupation ended, women began to join the professional classes and took on new and influential titles, including university rector, vice-president of the Kuwait Oil Company, and even ambassador when, in 1993, Nabila Al-Mulla became the first female ambassador in the Gulf region.139 However, true political equality remained frustratingly out of reach, as the government refused to rescind the Election Law (No. 35 of 1962), and also continued to ban political rights long after the conflict was over. The government mouthed promises of democracy and emancipation, but continually stalled and obfuscated, with many parliamentary representatives who had supported human rights reneging on their side of the bargain, partly out of fear of the Islamist factions, partly because many felt that allowing women to stand for election could jeopardize their own

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positions.140 The women’s rights movement, emboldened by the resistance to occupation, still had a fight on their hands to gain their rights. In many ways, there had been only a minor change since the days of the ICS, and many men in wider society worked to keep women in their traditional roles, despite the growing number of professionals challenging the status quo. The government encouraged women to join the workforce because they wanted to promote a larger number of nationals, yet failed to deliver on their side of the bargain. However, the government underestimated the underlying spirit and strength of Kuwaiti women, and the battle was only just beginning. This spirit was indomitable and went beyond the traditional patriarchal dominance, cultural norms and religious intimidation. One can see the reflection of these nuances in the revealing utterance of Shaikha Al-Nesef in 2009 when she answered the question, ‘Who is the Kuwaiti woman?’ She is a first-degree citizen, same as a man. She has had her role and contribution since ages. Her role didn’t begin when she was given her political rights in 2005. Her role was very clear before the oil era, when she not only would take care of all her household needs but also would equally take care of the administration of her neighbours, while Kuwaiti men were out in the long pearl diving expeditions. Hence, she is a confident woman who has exhibited many examples of sacrifice and care on numerous occasions in the past and is capable of facing changes and adapting to developments.141

This, more than anything, sums up the strength of Kuwaiti women and the spirit that would carry them far in their quest for equality. The debate for full representation had only just begun and would be a long and protracted fight for recognition. Ultimately, the issue became intertwined with the battle between secularism and traditionalism, but the new class of well-educated Kuwaiti women would ultimately find their own unique way to demand their rights.

Chapter 2 GOING BACK TO MOVE FORWARDS: INTERNAL DEBATE OVER THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 1990 CRISIS

Documenting the development of the women’s rights movement in Kuwait requires a study of the Gulf region as a whole, because the countries in this part of the Middle East have a shared history and a common culture. From the foundation of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf Nations, with the exception of Persia, shared a way of life, with the boundaries between the modern countries largely an artificial construct of the colonial era.1 Across the Gulf region, women’s rights have a long and complex history, and a common assumption is that the patriarchal suppression of women is a return to older values, based upon the ‘sexist’ Qur’an. This view is simplistic and incorrect, failing to take into account the complex gender interaction and the extended family structure that shaped society in the region.2 Islam grants women some individual rights, but political machinations in the region sought to use interpretations of Islamic Sharia law as a 39

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tool for oppression, to suit hidden agendas, rather than satisfy deeply buried misogyny. Before the process of modernization started to shape the region, women made huge contributions to the economy and society of the region, enjoying freedoms often surpassing those of Western women. The Qur’an includes some verses or surahs empowering women and defining the different roles of the genders, and the wives and female companions of the prophet, such as Khadijah and Fatima, are still held in great esteem.3 This was not true gender equality, in the modern sense, and the phrase ‘gender parity’ is more accurate, with men and women having different roles but still respected as having individual rights. Islamic women were largely responsible for acting as wives and mothers, but they also contributed to the economy, working in agriculture, as market traders and as shopkeepers.4 The first challenge to this society arose during the colonial era of the early twentieth century. Oil was discovered in the region and, in the resulting scramble for wealth, the colonial nations of Europe carved up the region, drawing national boundaries with little respect for geography or tribal regions. Ultimately, these boundaries – which are still contested and incomplete – became the cause of friction in the region and were one of the root causes of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.5 France and Great Britain, after the First World War, sought justification for carving up the region and used the treatment of women as an excuse for intervention. To the bemusement of the local population, the colonial powers pointed to the oppression of women as a sign that the Arabs could not run their own affairs, a hypocritical stance, given that women in Europe and the United States were still fighting for their rights. This was the first use of women as political pawns, and an indirect assault on their rights in their quest for economic and political domination that would define the wider struggle for women’s rights in the region.6 In the 1960s and 1970s, when the nations in the Gulf received independence, the influence of the earlier colonial era continued to define the fractious relationship between West and East, with many Gulf States looking towards the United States or the Soviet Union for support, as the region became a proxy battlefield for the Cold War. Women became part of a propaganda war, exalted as chaste, puritan

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mothers and wives, yet shunned as overtly sexual temptresses.7 Western interference in the region, as part of the battle against communism, saw oppressive regimes supported, including the Pahlavi regime in Iran. The arming of Saddam Hussein by the Soviet Union and European nations, most notably France, and the bitter war between Iran and Iraq, drove people of all generations into the arms of traditionalist Islamists, as the only strong body of protest against external interference.8 The discovery of oil in the region changed the socio-economic landscape and allowed the Gulf States to modernize and change. Most of the Gulf States, using oil wealth, offered universal employment, so there was no need for women to work and fewer left the home. Before the discovery of oil, women contributed greatly to the economy, working the land, trading and selling handicrafts. Against the wider picture of Islamization and the growth of a consumer society that had less place for markets, crafts, farming and fishing, women no longer entered the workforce in great numbers.9 Because families could now live on a single income and even afford to hire servants, it became easy to cloister women and promote gender segregation. This trend was largely influenced by the wishes of the rulers to deflect their society away from Marxism or nationalism, both of which tended to grant women equal rights in order to strike a counterblow against traditionalists.10 Sharia law is used as the basis of this discrimination against women, with Islamists using extremely narrow definitions to strip rights away from women and treat them as second-class citizens, destroying the previous ‘spirit of the law’ that advocated gender parity. Much of the Sharia depends upon interpretation, and traditionalist clerics and religious scholars can bend the law to suit their agendas.11 Initially, feminists and reformists tried to fight this by advocating secularism, but this was too much for the culture found around the Gulf.12 Recent moves have advocated returning women to the legal status of the Qur’anic era where, although they have distinct roles, they are treated as individuals of somewhat equal status to men. This drive, by female scholars, to use the Sharia against secularists, is the root of the new Islamic feminism, a way to attract broad support without the accusations of betraying Islam or acting as lackeys for imperialism.13

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Despite this increased suppression of the rights of women, most Gulf States promoted equality in education, understanding that a welleducated population is a fundamental building block of any modern society. According to the tenets of Islam, the education of women is not only permitted, but should be encouraged, and this is one aspect of the Sharia that was difficult for the religious scholars to deny.14 Even in Saudi Arabia, where resistance to female education was fiercest, Iffat, wife of King Saud, was instrumental in promoting the education of women.15 Across the region, nations have spent money developing an educational infrastructure for both sexes and, despite the resistance from some traditionalists, who felt that women should be restricted to studying religion, education or nursing, women have the right to education in all of the Gulf States. Illiterate mothers willingly sent their daughters to school, realizing that their daughters could have the opportunities denied to them, and fathers often believed that a daughter who successfully graduated from university brought honour to the family. All of the GCC states now have excellent literacy rates, and most provide adult education in literacy and vocational training.16 There is always room for improvement, but this is the single most important aspect influencing the socio-economic role of women in the Gulf, giving women an outlet and ensuring that they have the intelligence and education to maximize opportunity. World events show the precarious nature of relying upon oil as a sole export and, as Bahrain showed when the wells began to run dry, the Gulf economies must diversify. Education is a large part of this, but encouraging women to enter the workforce is key – a process that is slowly taking place across the region, but is facing resistance in some areas, especially Saudi Arabia.17 In Iraq, women have a great deal of freedom in all spheres of life, providing an example to Kuwait of how women can contribute to the economy and reduce the dependence upon foreign labour. Women own a lot of the wealth across the region, but they are often required to allow a male representative to handle their money and, if they want to own a business, they must seek male support. Islamic laws state that women should be allowed to own property and wealth, but as this is a threat to a patriarchal society, it leads to men developing indirect means to control the wealth of women, using gender segregation or morality to curb

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independence.18 As a result, much private wealth sits unused rather than being invested, although attitudes are softening. The GCC, as a whole, fares poorly in the percentage of women entering the workforce, but the situation is constantly improving.19 The position of women in Islamic society, and specifically the Gulf, has become a political pawn, used for propaganda purposes. On the one hand, the Western media uses images of veiled women as a sign that Islamic society is oppressed, on the other hand, Islamists use the fear of Western imperialism and perceived immorality as a sign that Western powers want to return the region to the old days, where the hypocrisy of the colonial nations using women as an excuse for intervention was apparent.20 This focus upon women’s rights deflects attention away from wider human rights abuses in the region, and the emphasis is now upon addressing women’s rights within the context of human rights; using the skill of women in conflict resolution and diplomacy; and tapping into their ability to work across ethnic, religious, generational and class boundaries.21 Because of this, feminist groups and reformists are now looking at the idea of ‘inclusive security’ as a holistic approach tying women’s rights in with broader human rights.22 Inclusive security needs a strong civil society, filling the space between families, communities and government, ensuring that grass-roots reform and polices are implemented and that feedback is passed up the chain faster than is the case with monolithic bureaucracy. Civil society and non-government organizations (NGOs) are dynamic, helping to avoid over-centralization and ensuring that every sector of society has representation, an important element in societies where political freedom and parties are curtailed.23 Across the Gulf, civil society has varied from state to state, robust in some states and weak in others, although cross-border initiatives are improving the situation. For example, the Organization of Arab Women, under the auspices of the Arab League, works hard to improve the treatment of women across the Arab world.24 Progress is slow, and many Gulf States strictly regulate civil society by using the welfare state to create a ‘culture of dependency’, creating apathy for women’s causes, although internal and external pressure are improving this situation. For example, Saudi Arabia restricts civil society and does not allow groups to pursue political goals, and other states like

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Kuwait use the threat of withdrawing funding to maintain control. Across the region, states utilized the wealth from oil to shape society, using the welfare state and civil service employment to remove the need for civil society and undermine the traditional social groups in the quest to quell dissent.25 In Iraq, Saddam Hussein almost completely destroyed civil society as a source of potential opposition, but even states such as Bahrain and Kuwait used similar tactics of containment and control. The net result of destroying civil society was the silencing of voices of many groups, including women, youth, tribal groups and religious minorities.26 Essential to the functioning of civil society and to balancing the excesses of government is a free press, a crucial ingredient of democracy. Across the region, the media has some freedom and serves the needs of a politically sophisticated populace. While freedom of the press is nominally supported in most GCC states, journalists often operate self-censorship and don’t tackle the real issues, and newspapers become little less than pulpits for extremists to write scathing editorials. The media is not only the channel for the voice of the people, but it is a conduit to the outside world and defines how others see the Islamic world. As part of the shift away from traditional media, television stations are challenging the status quo, with even Saudi television shows employing unveiled anchorwomen and discussing women’s issues. The advantage of this medium is that, if Saudi Arabia tries to pass laws preventing this, the inhabitants can simply tune into Qatar-based Al Jazeera and see the Qatari female business leaders or international ambassadors, destroying the argument of Saudi traditionalists that women are unsuitable to lead.27 Short of banning satellite dishes, there is no way to stop this, and it is becoming difficult for regimes to censor the media. The same applies to the internet: not only does it give a voice to people and confer the protection of anonymity, but it allows citizens to read international news and, despite attempts at censorship, there are ways for men and women to socialize in chat rooms. The excellent communications infrastructure found across the region has created a subculture based around mobile phones, text messages and social networking. As shown in Iran during the protests of 2009, mobile phones are a way to organize demonstrations under the radar of the authorities, making it more difficult

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for those in power to take direct action.28 If they do take measures, they risk pictures taken on the spot being uploaded to sites such as YouTube, which showed the tragic death of Neda Agha-Soltan, killed during a demonstration.29 Permitting an independent media is the key to reform, and encouraging women to work within the media will help to give balance and show that the region is serious about reform. The final aspect of women’s rights is politics built upon the right of women to participate fully in the democratic process. Islam does not forbid women from entering politics, as shown by Pakistan’s Benazir Bhutto, Bangladesh’s Khaleda Zia and Hasina Wajed, and Indonesia’s Megawati Sukarnoputri. The Gulf States have been reluctant to give women the vote or allow them to enter politics, using so-called weak Hadith and conventions stating that it is not permitted.30 Political representation has become the area of most conflict in the Gulf, with an increasingly educated population of women seeking the right to have a voice and decide their own fate. Across the GCC, often with the support of the ruling classes, women have taken up ministerial, diplomatic and ambassadorial roles, although the representation of women in national Parliaments is low; however, even many Scandinavian nations, alongside Iraq and Rwanda where democracy was rebuilt after conflict, are far from parity.31 As part of the drive for inclusive security and to prevent conflict, including more women in Parliament is paramount – particularly in enough numbers to influence policy, rather than act as tokens to appease the international media. Across the region, many traditionalists opposed universal suffrage in the 1960s and 1970s but soon realized that they could draw upon the support of women to suit their own agendas, with very little compromise needed. Looking at individual states around the Gulf illuminates the complexity of women’s issues in the region, showing that states can excel in one area but underperform in another. For example, Kuwait has an excellent educational system, producing many highly qualified women, but women are under-represented in positions of influence. Oman provided universal education later than other states – in 1984 – but the Sultanate has slashed the illiteracy rates and, in common with other GCC nations, women comprise at least half of university graduates. In terms of employment, women make up half

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of the civil service and occupy 13 per cent of the senior positions within it.32 Oman has one of the highest representations of women in the workforce in the GCC, and women were given the vote in 2003. Omani women are free to run for office and, as of 2007, occupied three ministerial positions, with the nation being the first in the Gulf to appoint a female ambassador.33 Overall, the Omani government recognized the importance of empowering women in education, the economy, the law and civil society and, while there is still room for much improvement, the Sultanate is moving in the right direction.34 Iraq under Saddam Hussein was the most complex of the Gulf States with regard to the area of women’s rights: it was an undemocratic regime that had an outstanding record for promoting gender equality, albeit set amongst a horde of other human rights violations. Despite the Ba’ath Party’s systematic denial of human rights and penchant for genocide, it promoted women’s rights, as a way to dilute the power of opposing factions, combat Islamists and attract broader support from all sections of society.35 In education, employment, family rights, military service and ministerial positions women approached parity in Iraq, and they were safe from religious, if not dictatorial, extremism.36 The indirect effect of Saddam’s 1990 invasion was in Saudi Arabia: the Kingdom saw women serving in the United States and Kuwaiti armed forces, giving indirect support to women’s rights and even sparking a protest – 46 women drove through the streets of Riyadh in defiance of the ban on women driving.37 Post-Saddam, the United States coalition is trying to promote equality as part of the conflict resolution, as in the Balkans, Rwanda and Liberia, but the removal of Hussein and anger at the occupying forces has seen hard-line extremists filter into the region, potentially jeopardizing any progress.38 Bahrain is one of the most progressive states in the Gulf concerning women’s rights, with massive demonstrations there organized and held exclusively by women for women. Women have held the right to vote and run for office since 2002, after the constitution was amended, turning the country into a constitutional Kingdom. Bahrain’s move towards a more inclusive democracy was credited with encouraging women’s rights groups in the Gulf to demand equality, and in 2005, Kuwaiti women were finally granted their political rights. Bahraini female candidates in both municipal and parliamentary 2002 elections

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failed to be elected into office and, as a result, declined to participate in the 2006 elections, with only one candidate, Latifa Al-Gaoud, winning by default.39 Scholar Mona Abas blamed Islamists for the poor performance of women candidates during the elections, claiming that Bahraini women had little self-esteem, believing they were meant only to remain in the home.40 Many Bahraini political parties have female members but were against proposing that women should be elected into office, as it went against their ‘Islamic principles’.41 Currently, Bahraini women hold high-profile positions as ambassadors, university deans, judges, ministers and UN representatives and, perhaps because Bahrain was one of the first oil-rich states to begin to suffer from depleted reserves, it was the first to install women as the heart of reform, understanding that this was socially and economically imperative.42 Bahrain is involved in many international initiatives, such as Women in Technology, which trains women in IT.43 Notably, Bahrain has adopted a holistic approach to women’s rights, incorporating it into a process of wider reform and democratization, such as guaranteeing the freedom of the press.44 The UAE, an oil-rich collection of seven sheikhdoms, is a fairly typical GCC state, with a wealthy population and a high proportion of women in education. Seventy-seven per cent of women are enrolled in higher education institutions, 24 per cent higher than the total number of men seeking higher education – albeit a large number of men study abroad – and female literacy was 90 per cent in 2009, slightly higher than for males.45 Women make up a large percentage of the workforce, occupying a number of roles, and they can reach influential positions, although there is wage discrimination and allegations of poor treatment, especially amongst immigrant workers.46 The country is regarded as progressive in terms of women’s rights – despite the fact that there is a strong Islamist movement alongside restrictive interpretations of Sharia law – and domestic violence and rape charges are becoming easier to pursue.47 The first ever election held in the country was in 2006, where half of the 40-member consultative Federal National Council were elected. Only one woman won in the Federal National Council elections, among the 19 Emirati men appointed to the assembly. Eight women members were appointed by each of the seven emirates.48 A small percentage of the population was invited to vote at these

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elections, making reformists press for full democratization rather than concentrate solely upon women’s issues. 49 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is seen as the least progressive in the region, systematically denying women freedom under the auspices of Islamic doctrine, although the basis of this inequality is cultural more than Islamic. Women are not permitted to drive and gender segregation is strict, with religious police ensuring that women do not appear without veils.50 Initially, due to the efforts of King Faisal and his wife, Iffat, the KSA followed other GCC states in slowly easing restrictions on women and encouraging education.51 However, the 1980s saw a shift towards a more oppressive and moralistic structure, partly as a response to the Islamic revolution in Iran and partly because of the fear of Westernization.52 The Al-Saud ruling family were under pressure from Islamists to enforce Sharia law, making women’s rights a secondary issue and, by this stage, oil wealth and the welfare state had rendered civil society impotent, so there was little opposition to the gradual eroding of these rights.53 However, even here, there have been some moves towards reform, largely driven by the media, which has reduced the objectification of women and now portrays them as individuals with rights.54 In addition, the actions of neighbouring states are having positive effect; once afraid to antagonize the KSA, they now proceed with reform regardless, and there are signs that the younger, Western-educated generation within the ruling family support wider women’s rights.55 Qatar, an oil-rich state with vast natural gas reserves, has been conducive to women’s rights, granting women the right to vote in 1999. That same year, the country held the first elections for its 29-member municipal council, a body holding no executive powers and offering only advice to the Cabinet. None of the six women candidates were elected, but the fact that women were voters and candidates was a first amongst the GCC states.56 In 2003, the constitution was ratified by public referendum, granting women equality and allowing for an elected Parliament. A Qatari woman was the first elected in the GCC in 2003, and the ruling emir regularly appoints women to high positions.57 Many Qatari women serve as public school teachers, university professors, senior professionals in government service, health and education, the police and private business.58 Women’s

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groups, human rights groups, political parties and trade groups are not allowed in Qatar instead the Supreme Council for Family Affairs was established in 1998 and the National Committee for Human Rights in 2002.59 With the 2022 Football World Cup due to be held in Qatar, the world’s attention will be focused on the Gulf, so further reform needs to happen quickly. There are plans to hold legislative elections in the next few years, following in the footsteps of Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman, which have staged direct parliamentary elections. Saudi Arabia held its first limited municipal polls in 2005, and the UAE was the last country to hold partial elections in 2006. Across the Gulf, the battle for women’s rights is part of a wider conflict between traditionalists and reformists. This battle has even spread to the family, where parents are faced with children wanting to adopt Western ways and becoming less deferential to their elders, increasing the fear of traditionalists that their entire way of life is under threat.60 Kuwait provides a fine example of this, as the fight for the vote, after the Gulf conflict of 1990, shows how the generational conflict, voter apathy and the struggle between reform and conservatism can be overcome.

Women’s Rights and Traditionalism in Kuwait Traditionally, Kuwait has been one of the most forward-thinking Gulf States, built upon peaceful foundations and an eclectic mix of ethnicities and classes. Since independence in 1961, the country has developed a constitution that includes concessions to democracy, making Kuwait one of the few Arab states to possess a written constitution and guarantee certain rights for its citizens. Free speech, the right to fair elections and human rights are all enshrined in this document, and there have been few major deviations from the letter or the spirit of the constitution.61 The constitution defined the balance of power between the various factions, ensuring that an elected National Assembly counterbalanced the ruling Al-Sabah family. The constitution balanced the ruling family, the National Assembly and the Islamic judiciary reasonably well, with the council providing a check on the government. However, this political structure also contained some weaknesses that allowed political manoeuvring to take place, and policymaking

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became a matter of balancing the various interests of powerful lobbying groups. Maintaining a consensus often involved playing one side off against the other, or creating artificial divisions between different groups. Many of Kuwait’s power struggles were class-based, including battles between richer urbanites and poorer tribal cultures; this particular division was intensified by the doctrinal and cultural differences between the Shi‘i and the Sunni majority. The Shi‘is tended to be urban-based and of Iranian descent; many still spoke Farsi amongst themselves and travelled extensively to Iran. Conversely, the Sunnis tended to have tribal origins, and were tied to family groups across the Arabian Peninsula and Iran.62 The shifting alliances, and the rise and fall of various pressure groups, often left women’s rights groups vulnerable in a political maelstrom, and they became pawns in political games. However, emancipation remained out of reach and women’s pressure groups, often associated with secular groups, were perceived as a threat to the elite class and the Assembly. As a result, emancipation seemed to be an unattainable dream, as successive governments throughout the 1990s found excuses to deny women their constitutional rights, even though Kuwait is theoretically very forward-thinking in its attitude towards women, with the constitution allowing them the right to full education and employment, of which they have taken full advantage. Looking at some of the barriers blocking the participation of women in the democratic process after the 1990 invasion, reveals how their rising and falling fortunes occurred against a backdrop of traditionalist and secularist action. The constantly shifting post-war debate, as documented by Haya Al-Mughni,63 became a war of attrition; the authorities fell back upon their usual tactic of creating and supporting docile women’s groups, in order to distract and mislead feminists. In retaliation, many women’s groups used publicity and the international media to promote their cause. This proved to be their downfall; they allied with liberal reformist groups and became, or could be represented as, a direct threat to the government’s attempts to appease traditionalists. Ultimately, the process of emancipation appeared to end in the mid-1990s, as the traditionalist feminist groups dominated, and promoted a return to traditional Islamic values and morals. Yet this outward perception could not disguise the shifting

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opinion beneath the surface, as women sought other arenas in which to fight their ideological battles. This bitter and protracted debate contrasted with the increasing success of Kuwaiti women outside politics, eventually persuading many to enter politics and attempt to change the system from within. The inner strength and belief developed by Kuwaiti women, in response to the horrors of occupation, started to create an unstoppable momentum that would carry the movement into the twenty-first century. Despite the controversy and the upheaval during the 1990s, the seeds of emancipation were laid during this important debate, through raised awareness and self-belief.

Kuwait’s Political Structure To most Westerners, Kuwait’s political structure is practically unrecognizable as a representative democracy, and the idea of a ruling class is an alien concept. In most Islamic democracies, the relationship between rulers and people is built upon traditional tribal and feudal structures, and the idea of kinship and family ties is still very strong.64 The majority of citizens in Kuwait are happy with this particular situation.65 Of course, there are still factions pressing for complete change, and Kuwaitis, during the 1990s, felt much freer to discuss previously sensitive subjects, such as the Al-Sabahs, with the National Assembly starting to question individual members of the ruling family.66 Al-Mughni describes the relationship between state and citizen as ‘clientelistic’, a situation where the state provides for its citizens in terms of social services, education, unemployment payments and healthcare.67 The net result of this feudal structure is that there is some, but growing, direct political opposition to the state and civil bodies operate as voluntary and semi-autonomous groups. These NGOs are usually politically inert, but many of them are capable of exerting pressure and act as one of the only ways for the population to become involved in the political process.68 Kuwait permits labour unions, social groups and other associations that engage in free political debate and, given the close-knit nature of Kuwaiti society, these groups are usually close to individuals in power and those who are decision-makers.69 These organizations act as a counterbalance to the state, but they are often part of the problem as they end up as facades

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for political factions and the ruling family – a fact that the women’s rights groups of the 1970s and 1980s knew well. The various factions making Kuwaiti policy are adept at manipulating pressure groups, often playing one side off against the other or supporting the group that they feel will further their own aims. Sadly, as is so often the case, this favouritism can backfire, as government-backed groups often create more problems than they solve. The numerous public welfare organizations (PWOs) cover a wide range of activities, and are often seen as little more than social clubs or charities, but this element often acts as a facade for such organizations to address social, political and environmental issues. The groups are restricted and subject to legislation, giving the Kuwaiti state a degree of control and censorship over certain opinions, although this control is usually achieved through indirect means. Women’s rights PWOs certainly acted as fronts for political activism throughout the pre-war period, and hid behind the front of being a social group or having charitable status. The Girls’ Clubs and the Women’s Cultural Social Society are fine examples of this subterfuge; although they performed their charitable work admirably, they also acted as a place for feminists and reformist women to meet and discuss ideas.70 However, the government was very adept at playing political games, and promoted other groups to spread confusion and dissent. The largest of these, the Islamic Care Council, drained a great deal of support away from the WCSS by deflecting the feminist agenda towards traditionally Islamic values.71 The reasons behind the governmental fear of emancipation are complex, although they are largely based upon the reluctance of rulers, politicians and religious leaders to relinquish their power and influence. The rulers of Kuwait were afraid of the potential influence of liberal and secular nationalist groups, so they often supported Islamist groups in order to counter this threat.72 The aims of the various feminist groups often overlapped with the secularists, and the rulers felt that granting emancipation would open the floodgates and lend legitimacy to the claims of the reformists.73 Before the Iraqi invasion of 1990, women’s rights groups were fragmented and promoted different aims and outlooks. Some groups fought for emancipation on the grounds that they felt that it was their right, whilst others believed that promoting equality would improve and strengthen Kuwaiti society.74

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The government attempted to misdirect this process by appealing to the traditionalist elite, and they obliged by gently informing women that their place was in the home, using such groups as the ICC to promote their message. Despite the promises of the ruling classes that they would emancipate women as part of the package of seeking international aid in driving out the Iraqis, the rulers of Kuwait became entangled in a web of their own making. The traditionalist and fundamentalist groups originally set up as a bulwark against secularization, became a thorn in the side of the Kuwaiti government. These vociferous groups agitated for a return to traditional values and consistently blocked the idea of women voting or entering the political process. Ominously, in 1998, Islamist factions in the National Assembly pressed for the creation of morality police and a restriction of women’s rights, including education and a Saudi Arabian-style ban on driving or using mobile phones.75 The other barrier to women’s rights in Kuwait has been caused by the Islamic nature of the political structures, and the fact that there is no separation between religion and state. According to the constitution, women have the legal right to vote and participate in politics, but this is at odds with the Islamic framework pervading legal and political life. The constitution explicitly states that the laws of Kuwait are founded upon Islamic principles, in the form of the Sharia, and this is the overriding arbiter and source of justice.76 Depending upon who interprets the Sharia, this structure creates an intolerable situation for women, because they are constantly denied their constitutional rights under the guise of law. This particular dichotomy causes women to become, as Al-Mughni says, dual citizens of their own country. They are equal and full citizens under the constitution, yet second class under Sharia law; in the eyes of the Sunni majority, this law debars women from the democratic process and also provides strict definitions of a woman’s role.77 Whilst constitutional rights were upheld concerning education and employment, they were circumvented by Islamic law whenever calls for emancipation grew. This particular quirk of the political system allows the ruling parties to select the best option to suit their agenda; in the case of education and employment, the underlying motive for this was the nationalization of the highly migrant workforce rather than an appeal to liberty and justice.78 This

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hypocrisy highlights the processes of obfuscation that systematically misdirected and marginalized feminist groups, and the dichotomy provides an easily exploitable division between women, namely those who are happy to follow the Islamic tradition and those demanding constitutional reform. Many Muslim women genuinely prefer the traditional role, believing that they have some rights not possessed by Western women, based upon the Muslim woman’s unique role in society. For the elite women making up the ICC, this was a convenient cover for their own desire to maintain their position and influence.79 The problems with this attitude arise when these definitions or prohibitions are forced upon all women, preventing them from developing and following their own goals in life. Al-Mughni suggests, with justification, that a secular state would allow a woman to balance equal democratic rights and employment with traditional duties, if she wished. But many women have opposed this view.80 The contradiction between constitutional rights and traditionalism also fuels a situation where a woman fighting for her rights is perceived as deviating from the path of Islam, which is a genuine dilemma if the woman in question is particularly devout.81 Making the picture much more complicated is the fact that Sharia law can be interpreted in many different ways, giving the ruling classes even more scope for creating artificial divisions between groups. For example, many Shi‘is claim that Islamic doctrine does not bar women from politics, a view that is at odds with Sunni religious interpretations.82 Many women’s rights groups before the 1990 conflict ran into this particular barrier and became powerless to change their own destiny, often drifting into apathy and inaction in the face of criticism from vocal Islamists backed by the government.83 This particular division was used after the Gulf War in 1994, when Kuwait finally signed up to and ratified the 1971 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).84 Kuwait prohibits most forms of gender discrimination and does not follow extremist readings of Sharia law, but there is always room for improvement.85 This charter laid down the rights of women and guaranteed them equality and emancipation but there was one major proviso; the Cairo Declaration on human rights stated that the Gulf countries would only observe CEDAW within the context of Islamic law, and that Sharia law always came first. This particular

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addendum to the document promising equal rights for women once again maintained the status quo, and the UN had absolutely no leverage to effect change as it could not interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. It could only exert pressure on the states to observe CEDAW amongst other human rights declarations, but that was the limit of its influence.86

Women’s Rights after the Conflict: Publicity and Passion Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, women’s rights were not at the forefront of political debate, and the authorities managed to quell the call for emancipation by withdrawing support from certain groups, although they stopped short of restricting freedom of speech. As noted in the previous chapter, the government adopted a policy of ‘divide and conquer’, by successfully pitting one women’s group against another. For example, the Islamic Care Council promoted the idea that women should remain entrenched in Islamic tradition and be good wives and mothers. This movement, ultimately, was based upon the desire of women occupying the upper echelons of society to remain at the top and retain the status that they had gained through blood or marriage. The policy worked and, unable to compete with the sheer amount of funds available to this society, many women’s groups dissolved within a couple of years of the end of the conflict. The traditionalists had the upper hand and used a misreading of Islamic texts to justify their anti-feminist stance. Using subtle political machinations, the traditionalists made it appear that the oppression of women was to the overall benefit of women, a celebration of the role of women within Islam and recognition of their unique position.87 This particular course was set against a backdrop of increasing Islamic fundamentalism in the region, supported by many Gulf States as they attempted to combat and negate the rise of secularists and reformists. Kuwait was no exception to this and it is likely that the ruling classes did not want to relinquish their hold on power. If this meant sacrificing the rights of women, in an attempt to pander to the Islamists, then that was a small price to pay for retaining power and the status quo. The unique structure of many Islamic states, especially in the Gulf, meant that the theocracy, the leadership and the

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politicians were unwilling to loosen their hold on power. As a result, Kuwaiti women and, to a certain extent, the Shi‘is, were constantly misled and lied to, as the politicians sought ways to silence them. As Feldman points out, the political trade-off in Kuwait, during the 1990s, was that control of the family would lie within the domain of the religious authorities; in return, they would allow the rulers to embark upon modernization and democratization, including promoting female education and some relaxation of morals. This occurred under the guise of increasing the number of nationals in the Kuwaiti workforce. 88 After the 1990–1 conflict, women’s rights once again dominated political debate, and genuine women’s rights groups returned from relative obscurity. Kuwaiti women believed that they had earned the right to be treated as equals and, for the first time, many men agreed, especially as many owed their lives to female members of the resistance. Raida Al-Foudari, a resistance fighter during the conflict, stated: The attitude of women toward themselves changed. They think of themselves as different persons. They found many things inside themselves they had never seen before. They should be given their rights … The Government will need the people. The war has just started. We have to build the new Kuwait we dreamed of before the invasion. We are in a war now to make it more beautiful, better, freer than it was before.89

Abdullah Saad Al-Hadlaq, a mechanical engineer, pointed to the role that women played in the resistance as the force behind change after the war. He supported the democratization process and believed that the resistance and civil defence roles of women, giving medical assistance and generating media publicity, changed the perception of women in the eyes of Kuwaiti men.90 Many more Kuwaiti men thought like him and were strong supporters of women’s rights, although the distinctions between the Sunnis and the Shi‘is remained, alongside the division between rural and urban areas.91 Women were extremely optimistic about the cause, and began to apply pressure for change, channelling the emotions released by the

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invasion. Computer programmer Sundus Hussein summed up the prevailing mood, stating that, ‘Before the war, Kuwait women didn’t really know what they were capable of.’92 Petroleum engineer Sarah Akbar, the first woman to hold a senior position at the Kuwait Oil Company and Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration Company, further revealed the prevalent mood, ‘I know men who wouldn’t step out of their houses for seven months.’ Women now knew what they were capable of and the new drive for equality and emancipation was under way.93 Shamael Al-Sharikh, columnist for the Kuwait Times and board member of the Women’s Cultural Social Society, was a teenager during the conflict. She summed up the prevailing mood for change brought about as a reaction to the invasion and the high-profile role of women: I think the 1990 Invasion was a sobering experience for all Kuwaitis. The lines between rich and poor, educated and uneducated, male and female were erased. Iraqi soldiers killed Kuwaiti men and women. They stole from Kuwaiti men and women. They raped Kuwaiti men and women. The strength and perseverance of women during the Invasion showed that Kuwaiti women are just as capable as men, if not more, and it was high time they receive their political rights.94

These testimonies reveal the optimism amongst young and educated Kuwaitis but, crucially, this particular sentiment did not always cross the class boundaries or influence the older generation. Many amongst the older generation felt that their unique culture was under threat from Westernization, and saw giving women the vote as an attack on their way of life. Poorer Kuwaitis tended to vote for candidates who would give them financial incentives and benefits, with ideology a long way down the list of priorities.95 Before the war women attempted to use the mechanisms of government to overcome resistance to change, but the authorities sidestepped this by refusing to recognize major lobbying groups, such as the AWDS and the WCSS. This particular policy changed after the war, and women started to protest, vocally and publicly. They began to demand their rights rather than merely ask for them, pointing to the promises that the Emir had made as he sought international

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consensus to remove Iraq.96 In the run-up to the 1992 elections, Kuwaiti women embarked upon a publicity campaign, organizing marches and press conferences, distributing literature and setting up publicity campaigns. They were fully aware that the eyes of the international community were firmly focused upon Kuwait, and they knew that the government had promised to look at women’s rights as part of the campaign to garner support for a counter-invasion against Iraq. The flash point for the new beginning of the women’s rights movement in Kuwait crystallized around one issue: the denial of nationality and equality to non-Kuwaiti husbands and their children. Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis lost all of their rights and access to many government services, such as housing and living allowances, and this was made more difficult by the deportation of many non-Kuwaiti men, leaving the women with no source of income. Conversely, a Kuwaiti man married to a non-Kuwaiti retained all his privileges, and this inequality became a legal battleground.97 In the aftermath of the conflict, women of all classes and backgrounds united to fight against this policy, angered that they received no support despite risking their lives for their country. Whether professional or Bedouin, the women began a concerted campaign to raise awareness and reverse this discriminatory practice. Badria Al-Awadi, a lawyer, and psychologist Buthaina Al-Makhawi were elected as the representatives of a loose confederation of activists appealing to the average Kuwaiti woman rather than to elite groups. These women used the premises of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to hold their meetings and develop an agenda, and their cause was later adopted by the WCSS in 1993. The anger against gender discrimination was vehement, and they organized a march, despite the risk of arrest, using the threat of informing the Western media to deter the authorities from taking this particular course of action. The leaders of the group organized meetings with representatives of the government, but reported that these representatives treated them with disdain because of their gender.98 Their main weapon in this particular battle was the Western media, who were still casting their gaze over Kuwait in the aftermath of the invasion. After the war, Kuwait was under scrutiny by the international media, and women’s rights groups across the world watched the

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direction taken by the country in the wake of the promises made to address women’s rights as a condition of receiving international support for ousting Saddam Hussein. Newspapers from around the world portrayed the mood just after the conflict, and most sources were highly critical at the perceived failure of the Kuwaiti government to follow through on its promises of emancipation. For example, in the US Toledo Blade, the editorial was scathing in its criticism of Kuwaiti rulers and Parliament, stating that, ‘The emir has vowed to study giving women the vote and says that there will be general elections next year. Neither of these pledges is worth the hot air they float on …’99 The article accused the Kuwaiti government of being ‘a regime with scant regard for human or political rights’. Tennessee’s Daily News was less judgemental in tone, carrying an article, ‘Women Fight for the Right to Vote in Male-Dominated Kuwait’, about the attempt of women to register to vote in the elections. This type of headline, whilst displaying a level of sensationalism, did little to promote the image of Kuwait as a nation that respected women’s rights, even though the article praises Kuwait for its relatively enlightened approach in other areas of gender equality.100 The USA was not the only country to criticize Kuwait’s lack of movement on gender reform, with newspapers in the UK joining the condemnation. The centre-left Independent ran headlines such as, ‘Kuwait’s Men-Only Poll’,101 and ‘Kuwaiti Women Demand Political Rights in a March on a Polling Station’.102 An article from the Associated Press, syndicated worldwide, compared Kuwait unfavourably with Iran, pointing out that even that nation granted full voting rights.103 This showed the depth of feeling against Kuwait’s stalling over granting women the right to vote. The general mood portrayed by the international media was disappointment that Kuwait still oppressed women, using the cover of religion, and that the rulers were exceptionally ungrateful for the help received in liberating the country from occupation. The strides made in social reform went unnoticed and Kuwait was in danger of becoming infamous, as a ‘typically oppressive’ Islamic regime. The Western media also began to step up the pressure on Kuwait by lumping it with neighbouring countries that were oppressive. Whilst Kuwait is far further along the road to democracy and equality than the US and the UK, it became associated with them, as the cost

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of living under the microscope of world opinion became apparent. As Los Angeles Times journalist Henry Bienen stated, ‘Witness the criticism of the Bush Administration when, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, it restored the Emir of Kuwait as head of a system that does not grant equal rights to women.’104 Because of attacks like this, the rulers were under a great deal of pressure to reform. Women’s rights advocates in the United States and Europe may not have understood the full story of Kuwait’s relatively progressive approach to women’s education and improvement, but perception is everything. There was a barrage of criticism in 1992 as it became clear that women would not be able to vote in the autumn elections, and the criticism was scathing.105 A group of women, as a protest, attempted to register for voting at the Elections Department and were turned away, fuelling a media frenzy.106 One woman, in a previously unheard public display, stood up during a public meeting and shouted: ‘I’m going to vote anyway on October 5! Is anybody going to stop me?’107 Even in Kuwait, with a good record concerning the freedom of speech, an outburst like this was unprecedented. The notable feminist activist, Najt Sultan, encapsulated the mood, ‘Kuwaitis have proved that they have the right stuff to fight an invading enemy and help liberate the country, but two years after the liberation of Kuwait they have not proved their right to democracy.’108 The Kuwaiti government, as it was only too aware, was indebted to the rest of the world and could not afford to alienate its allies. Most Western countries still saw Kuwait as a repressed society, even if it was more progressive than many other Gulf States. Judith Mann, of the Washington Post, asked, ‘Is This What We Went to War For?’ as she delivered a scathing critique of the Kuwaiti government’s failure to follow through on its promises.109 Jack Kelley of USA Today exposed how Kuwaiti society now shunned Kuwaiti women who were raped by Iraqi soldiers. He pointed out that the victims of rape could not get abortions and that many women were suicidal. More recently, it has come to light that hundreds of female domestic workers from the Third World have taken refuge in their embassies, in Kuwait City, after their Kuwaiti employers beat and raped them and then refused to hand over their passports.110 Arvonne Fraser, a senior fellow at the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, and Director of the International Women’s Rights Action Watch, said,

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Kuwait is enlightened in the sense [that] they buy fancy cars and all the modern goods. But enlightenment in my terms is in your head. I don’t call this enlightenment. I call it degradation of women, and it offends me that my country thinks oil is more important than women.111

This summed up the prevailing mood amongst the media.

The Debate Continues: A Long and Bitter Fight For those seeking equality for women married to non-nationals, the final blow to their campaign came in 1993 when, amidst accusations of sexism, the all-male board of the EPA withdrew support and denied the women a place to meet. It was at this point that the WCSS took up the cause and offered support to this group of women, but the group dispersed and became another victim of the government’s use of subterfuge to destabilize women’s groups.112 However, they lit the spark for the movement and their cause was seized by the WCSS, and turned in to something much more political. Unlike the pre-war period, when the authorities used political games to quell voices of protest, the international media pressure opened up another angle of attack for the WCSS, and they went on the offensive. Before the conflict, the WCSS had attempted to forge links with male or progressive and reformist groups, in an attempt to raise their profile and gain publicity and strength. The only effect of this was that they found themselves caught in the crossfire as the government courted Islamist groups to counter and nullify these progressive groups.113 The feminists found themselves drowned out by a slick countermove, as the ICC and other groups took the limelight after the 1992 election. In a complete reversal of roles, activist women’s rights groups, especially the WCSS, found themselves in the ascendancy. Instead of trying to raise their profile through alliances, they suddenly found that liberals and reformists wanted to forge links with them, seeking to tap into the maelstrom of publicity surrounding the movement for emancipation.114 The outcome of this was that the government faced a strong challenge for reform, from all angles, and had to resolve this issue, whilst courting the Islamist vote in rural areas.115 However, the 1992 election did not deliver the promised reforms, and traditionalists felt

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that they had a mandate, one that they would pursue, looking – during the 1996 election campaigning – to build upon their success. Such strong pressure from reformist women met with an equal and opposite reaction from the traditionalist groups within Kuwaiti society, which dominated the build-up to the 1996 election. The Pandora’s box that had been opened by the ruling elite when it promoted traditionalist sects over liberal secularists in the 1970s and 1980s, now came back to haunt it.116 These groups sought to block women from voting and participating in the electoral and democratic processes, and the ruling family had to navigate a route between the two extremes. Ominously, the Islamists began to exert pressure to strip away the rights of women in education, agitating for a return to Sharia law. For the class of professional women who had grown for the best part of 30 years, this was an extremely serious threat to their rights. As elements within the government began to look at these proposals seriously, many women wondered what they had actually achieved by fighting for their country. Unfortunately, as is so often the case with politics, those sympathetic to Islamist demands in the government were not always driven by ideology or misogyny but by money. Kuwait needed money to pay for the war and for infrastructural repairs; one of the ways to achieve this was by cutting public spending – and restricting female education was an easy way to contribute towards this goal.117 However, whatever the underlying reason, the government established a committee to look at implementing the Sharia, including the domestication of women and the regulation of public morality, much like Saudi Arabia or Iran.118 The Islamic Constitutional Movement, closely linked with the Muslim Brotherhood, sought to implement the Sharia as the only source of law and, more ominously, the Salafi lobbied for the implementation of strict interpretations, such as those found amongst Saudi Arabian Wahabists.119 This was the sparking point for women’s groups, as even the less engaged ones sensed the inherent danger in this proposal. There had to be a counter-reaction – and this came in the form of a political call to arms. Women’s rights groups formed links with liberal male reformist groups, most of whom respected the strides made during the conflict, and they sought change through publicity and activism. The Islamic women’s organizations argued their case through discourse, using the

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existing political structure, whilst the WCSS used publicity. Whatever the difference in the methods, both worked towards countering the immediate threat posed by fundamental Islamists.120 In the aftermath of the conflict, the authorities went back to the tried and tested method of divide and conquer, setting up women’s groups with a traditionalist agenda to deflect publicity. The government’s policy, after the war, was to court traditionalist groups in an attempt to curb left-wing and liberal groups, and use the denial of women’s rights as a tool to promote this agenda. Previously, this tactic worked well and the rulers maintained a large degree of control, but they failed to take into account the newfound strength of Kuwait’s women, who had discovered their voice and inner strength during their resistance to the Iraqi occupation. To counter these actions and challenge the status quo, the WCSS resurfaced in 1993, keen to carry on the fight for women’s rights and provide an alternative to the ICSdominated feminism supported by the rulers.121 The elite classes of Kuwait forgot that most Kuwaiti women were now highly educated and could see through the machinations. Women were aware that the international media, already critical of Kuwait’s failure to deliver emancipation, would prevent forcible repression or free speech, so they organized a highly visible and highly vocal public demonstration. The WCSS activists organized seminars, petitions and press releases to put pressure on Kuwait’s rulers. In an unexpected reversal, feminists turned the tables on the ruling classes.122 It was now up to the government to make the next move, and they had to negotiate the international media circus. The Government in Exile had raised a near frenzy in the press to force the hand of the US government in defence of Kuwait. Now, the same rulers found that there was a cost incurred by such action, and the benevolence of the press could turn into criticism very quickly. Once again, the prime movers behind this silencing of dissenting voices came from the elite classes, and many women from the upper echelons of society again worked against the interests of those struggling for women’s rights. Like the politicians, they had a lot to lose if secular actors gained strength and, due to the increasing tendency for women’s rights and secularism to overlap, sacrificing women’s rights was seen as one way of combating this perceived threat.123 The ICS still

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operated and, while it performed genuinely good work in rebuilding a physically and mentally shattered nation, it soon diverted the course of Kuwaiti feminism. Alongside the ICS, the Volunteer Women’s Association for Community Service (VWACS) was formed in 1991 and, in 1994, the Federation of Kuwaiti Women’s Associations (FKWA) incorporated both of these, aided by the fact that the wife of the Crown Prince was chair of all three bodies. She was the official representative of women’s rights in Kuwait and she would never create any trouble for the authorities.124 Even more ominously, under the guise of women’s rights, she implemented a campaign to return women to Islamic values, by claiming that it was in their best interests. This propaganda campaign was almost completely unopposed by other groups and threatened to destroy the movement permanently.125 Not only had the ruling classes ignored the contribution of women during the war, they took things backwards. In an insidious campaign, the FKWA informed women that they were at fault if the family broke up, or if their husband became unemployed, and that they should be dutiful wives. There was no sympathy for women who married nonKuwaitis, as they should have found a Kuwaiti man to marry. As well as being part of the larger effort to cling onto power, this move was intended to give the government an escape route for reducing costs and saving money, with the added potential bonus of neutralizing the claims of women married to non-nationals.126 Whereas the distracting tactics of the FKWA would have worked in pre-war Kuwait, by dividing classes, liberals and traditionalists, by 1994–5 they only succeeded in galvanizing feminists, who began to embark upon a publicity campaign. Even more importantly, the tactics threw disparate groups together, including the secularists and leftist groups.127 This did not go unchallenged, and the rulers of the emirate stepped up the process of Islamic traditionalism. They were fully aware that they could not meet this challenge head on and, in time-honoured fashion, began to appeal to traditionalists. Faced by such a united front, they looked to the default position of many Islamic states – morality.128 The problem with appealing to morality is that it automatically polarizes debate and leaves little room for compromise, especially when it is mixed with nationalism. Because the women’s rights movement was now at the vanguard of the battle, they were

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the sole subject of the government’s attention. In 1992, a bill was presented that segregated the sexes in universities and private education establishments, a process designed to curb liberalism, which often flourished on campus; morality was used as the cover for this bill.129 In the middle of the 1990s, the government stepped up its idea of divide and conquer, once again promoting the ideals of ‘traditionalist feminism’ and ‘freedom within Islam’.130 This time, the propaganda went much deeper than before, as the rulers strove to drive a deep and fatal blow to the women’s movement and quell dissent. The governmentfriendly women’s groups concentrated upon the ‘controlled freedom’ already enjoyed by Kuwaiti women, such as education and employment, in an attempt to deflect fear of an Islamic state.131 Yet more traditionalist social groups were formed, under the auspices of conservative Islamists. Their first angle of attack was to appeal to the national good, as they tried to tap into post-war sentiment, shift public opinion away from the female resistance and give it a much more nationalistic flavour. Once again, as in the 1980s, they argued that a woman should put her differences aside for the good of the nation and find freedom within Islam, as prescribed by the Sharia. The bravery of the women of Kuwait during the crisis was shifted to represent the position of women as the staunch defenders of the nation, and portray them as the guardians of not only society, but of traditional culture and Islamic customs, sacrificing their ‘selfish’ aspirations for the good of the state.132 This slogan-laden and clumsy campaign managed, nevertheless, to find widespread support, especially in the tribal areas, where traditionalism still held sway. The message of upholding morality is always powerful and was a deliberate attempt to turn women away from ‘Western’ feminism, where the women sought equality as a human right. Using morality gave male powerbrokers the ability to divide groups into two distinct mentalities. Again, polarization wiped out the ability for discourse and often ended up with one group working against its own best interests.133 The crucial factor was linking women’s rights to secularism, and many traditionalist women came to believe in their own superiority over ‘immoral’ and ‘liberal’ women. Many repeated the words of the revered Islamic scholar, Al-Ghazali, that the role of a Muslim woman is to,

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… stay at home and get on with her sewing. She should not go out often, she must not be well-informed, nor must she be communicative with her neighbors and only visit them when absolutely necessary; she should take care of her husband … and seek to satisfy him in everything … Her sole worry should be her virtue … She should be clean and ready to satisfy her husband’s sexual needs at any moment.134

Traditionalist women wore their hijabs proudly and believed that they had a moral superiority. Of course, as Al-Mughni points out, such an idea is exceptionally divisive and caused many women to believe that pushing to fulfil their rights would compromise their standing in Islam; it also thus reflected the dualistic nature of Kuwait’s political structure and the merging of religion with the state.135 So strong is the influence of traditionalist women that many others were genuinely concerned about what would happen if they won the vote, because they feared that traditionalist women would vote with the Islamists to return to Islamic values and control.136 Cleverly, the traditionalists, now finding support amongst the traditionally conservative tribes, accused women’s groups of only looking after their own interests and out for their own personal gain, neglecting the traditional values and culture that defined Kuwait. The groups favoured by the government, such as the ICS, now became Trojan Horses, a point of attack for levelling general criticism against all women’s groups,137 showing the effectiveness of the ‘divide and conquer’ approach. Fatima Al-Abdeli, environmental engineer and women’s rights activist, summed up the disappointment: ‘After the invasion, everything seemed ready to change . . . Our case was strong. Maybe we took it for granted. We thought we would get it automatically. But we were shocked.’138 Kuwaitis certainly wanted to become more democratic after the politicizing effect of the conflict, but this did not necessarily mean that there was the same support for women’s rights. The underlying political situation was far more complex than the feminists initially thought.139 The net outcome of this increased alignment of traditional women behind the Islamist-dominated status quo, and the perceived secularism of the liberal feminists, again scaled up this debate and threw the reformists on the defensive. Once again, ‘modernist’ Islamist groups emerged and appealed to tradition, and again they began to dominate

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the discussion as the international media frenzy died down, and Kuwait largely returned to its pre-war status as a country rarely in the news.140 In a huge shift, the idea of female educational rights, employment and freedoms now became part of the debate dominating the build-up to the 1996 elections. These had never been open to question before, especially with the success of governmental attempts to include women in the workforce. Now, Islamists pointed out how well regarded women were in Kuwait compared with other states, sugarcoating the idea that they should be grateful for what they had. The fight continued against the secularists, as the hard-line conservatives, unleashed by the government’s support of fundamentalist groups, now raised concerns that women were going to be forced back into their traditional roles in the home: an idea that would drive many moderates away from the cause.141 The rhetoric of a former Kuwaiti Member of Parliament, Walid Al-Tabtabae, summed up this hardline resistance, stating that feminists in Parliament would, ‘sabotage his faith, Westernize society and spread homosexuality and depravity’.142 However, some traditionalists did have a valid point; they felt that women who chose to remain at home and raise families should be given respect, believing that women would not achieve equality by emulating men, but by forging their own identity.143 Liberal groups attempted to allay these concerns and made it clear that Kuwait was not going to follow the same path as Saudi Arabia or Taliban-dominated Afghanistan. Despite this rhetoric, there is little doubt that the male Islamists were agitating for a backwards step and looking to force women to conform to traditional roles. After the war, women increasingly found employment as the country strove to rebuild, and this was anathema to the Islamists, especially as they could tap into the dissatisfaction prevalent amongst a large group of unemployed young men.144 They blamed the increase in child crime and divorce upon women entering the workforce, and suggested that increasing social unrest and rising crime was evidence of what would happen if the country moved towards secularization. Of course, they conveniently forgot to mention that this rise was almost entirely due to the mental traumas caused by the invasion.145 The idea of restricting emancipation and democratic rights was carefully couched in soft language, such as controlled freedom and protection, indicating that

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the reason that women could not enjoy full rights was because they had to be protected from immorality. So clever was this campaign that it grew, and the government was now back in control of the debate, although the various competing and conflicting groups threatened to tear the whole political process asunder if they made a wrong choice or bad decision. The Kuwaiti women’s groups, whilst well-intentioned, had shown no unity of purpose. The older generation harked back to the tired, failed pre-war approach and the younger generations lacked the political sophistication to counter the tactics of the opposition.146

Sectarianism and the Religious Divide: Women’s Rights as the Focus The aftermath of the war also saw a reappearance of the split along sectarian lines, as Sunnis and Shi‘is gravitated towards different poles in this particular debate. Sunnis make up the majority of the world’s Muslim population outside Iran, and the Gulf States are no exception, although the Shi‘is make up a healthy 15–20 per cent of the population in Kuwait. For many years, this minority had felt disenfranchised by the Kuwaiti government, and had had to fight long and hard for representation.147 The division between the Shi‘is and the Sunnis has deep roots in history. In 1921 and 1938, the merchant families sought to limit the power of the rulers by setting up two councils, majalis, which acted as a counterbalance.148 The Shi‘i minority had absolutely no representation on these councils, and this led to resentment between the two sects, a familiar process in many Islamic countries. This divide would often be at the root of political problems and would become increasingly important in the struggle for emancipation, as the Shi‘is, unlike the Sunnis, had little opposition to women becoming involved in politics. This would lead to the objectives of Shi‘is and of women becoming inexorably intertwined throughout the course of the century, especially as Shi‘is were far more likely to support secular groups and agitate for democracy. Until independence, there was often friction between the communities, based not so much upon doctrinal differences but upon the cultural differences between the rural, tribal Sunni and the largely urban Shi‘i. Before 1961, the Shi‘is had little representation within the

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ruling classes, and were regarded as outsiders.149 After independence, they finally saw some representation within the political structure, and their numbers within the National Assembly steadily grew. In fact, the Shi‘is became useful to the ruling class, as they were regarded as a possible bulwark against the rise of Arab nationalist movements and the growing number of traditionalists, who had strong support in rural areas. This relationship became strained during the Iranian Islamic revolution and the subsequent prolonged war between Iran and Iraq, where many Kuwaiti Shi‘is supported Ayatollah Khomeini.150 Kuwait, after pressure from Saddam Hussein, supported Iraq with loans of money and oil, but the possibility of Iranian victory was viewed by the emir as a threat, and as a result many Shi‘is were removed from military posts and the numbers of Shi‘i deputies were slashed.151 After a period of trying to suppress the tribal Islamist movements, Kuwaiti rulers eventually attempted to court the tribes, as a bulwark against the danger of Shi‘i aggression. This tension was heightened by the threat of Shi‘i unrest within the borders of the state, adding to the instability within Kuwait and reflecting the volatility of the region as a whole. The government amended the voting system to reduce Shi‘i participation in the National Assembly, which had risen to ten seats, or 20 per cent – approximately the same proportion as in the population. This mistrust continued until the 1990–1 conflict, where the unity of Kuwaitis against the Iraqi army encompassed Sunni and Shi‘i alike, and the brave contribution of the Shi‘is ensured that the Sunni majority were more amenable to their demands. However, like the feminist groups, the promises of equality made to the Shi‘is never actually materialized, and they became increasingly frustrated by the government’s failure to address this. Moreover, offended by the government’s support for Saudi Arabia’s oppression of its Shi‘i minority, they began to find common ground with the feminist movement, and soon adopted the cause as their own.152 The tribal Kuwaitis living outside the cities are the other main group that has opposed the emancipation of women, and they possess a sufficiently strong demographic for the National Assembly to court them.153 Their overall representation in the National Assembly was significantly improved when the emir ordered boundary changes just before the 1981 election, establishing 25 districts, electing two members

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each, rather than ten constituencies returning five members. This political manoeuvring was an attempt to curb the influence of secularists by engaging traditionalists and increasing their numbers within the National Assembly. By contrast, the influence of the urban classes and the Shi‘i Kuwaitis was reduced and, unfortunately, as previously mentioned, the Shi‘is were traditionally more amenable to the emancipation of women. This powerful coalition of Sunni conservatives and tribal traditionalists would act as the major barrier to reform for over a decade.154

The Role of the Emir The other interesting subplot in this particular story of the fight for women’s rights is the attitude of the emir, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence to suggest that he agreed with the cause, and may have been sincere in his promise to give women the vote after the conflict, but he was ultimately stymied by the ruling council.155 The fact that the emir promoted his cousin, Rasha, to the role of Undersecretary of the Ministry of Higher Education in 1994, speaks volumes; it can be assumed that he was fully aware of her views and perhaps saw this as the ideal way to tacitly support women’s rights, without compromising his position and attracting undue criticism. She complained about her relative powerlessness and inability to effect change, although the benefit of hindsight shows that her appointment would, ultimately, reap great benefits further down the line.156 Slowly, she began to suggest women for positions of influence within the government. Kuwaiti women had earned respect as fighters during the conflict, but now the battle had moved. Rasha knew how to play the game of politics, and the fight for women’s rights would be won in the corridors of political power.157

Conclusion The occupation and war brought out a spirit of unity and a strong sense of nationalism amongst Kuwaitis, and women were certainly a major component of that unity. The resourcefulness and bravery shown by women during the conflict gave them a sense of purpose and the drive to push for emancipation. Supported by the scrutiny

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of an international media focused upon Kuwait’s rulers, the WCSS stepped up its campaign and courted publicity in its call for emancipation. This publicity also drew many male secular and liberal groups to unite, keen to tap into the publicity and promote their own cause. This alliance would, ultimately, draw pressure from the Islamist groups and the higher classes, who felt that a secular and democratized society would threaten their status and influence. As a result, such Kuwaitis resorted to their favoured technique of dividing the movements, using ‘traditionalist feminism’ to counter ‘secular feminism’, and using morality as a tool to encourage women to vote against their own best interests, especially in the poorer, more compliant, Sunni-dominated parts of society. The government attempted to exploit this split and used its influence to disband or marginalize secular groups. The problem with this course of action is that it leaves a power vacuum, and the traditionalist groups moved into this, acting as a breeding ground for fundamentalists who would later become a barrier to the women’s rights movement. This backlash had a marked effect and, once the Western media lost interest, women’s rights in Kuwait became about preserving what they had already achieved and attempting to counter the Islamist wish to force women to conform to traditional roles, potentially threatening educational and employment rights. On the surface, the battle was lost and the status quo preserved, with women once again enjoying some freedom but only within the confines of Islamic law, which overrode both the constitution and international conventions. Despite this apparent setback on the wider political front, this certainly was not the end of the women’s rights movement in Kuwait. And despite the efforts of traditionalist Islamists to try to restrict the access of women to education and employment and return them to a subservient role, the fight was not over. Outside politics, highly educated and professional women began forging their own path. Even within politics, whilst the larger movement was suppressed, individual women began to seek careers within the political structure and began to effect change from the inside. This struggle was far from lost and, despite the controversy, despite the upheaval, there was no going back.

Chapter 3 INDIRECT CHANGE: THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE NON-POLITICAL ARENA

After the Gulf conflict, where women showed great courage, initiative and fortitude, some of Kuwait’s numerous social groups, such as the WCSS and the Nadi Al-Fatat (Girls’ Club), formed – and moved emancipation to the forefront of the political agenda.1 During the war, women gained in confidence, self-belief and strength. They also earned the respect of Kuwait’s male population. This resurrected the movement for change, long dormant since the takeover of women’s rights issues by government-backed social groups. Feminist groups grew more vocal and began to organize grass-roots movements to effect change. Regrettably, as in the pre-conflict era, the lack of direction and organization shown by women’s rights activists allowed fatal fractures within the movement. Again, traditionalist Islamic groups, dominated by elite women keen to hold onto their status, caused the movement to drift towards seeking equal rights within Sharia law, which traditionalists interpreted to mean that women should be kept out of politics. This particular interpretation held that a woman should be grateful for her honoured role in Islam, as a homemaker 73

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and mother, although most traditionalists conceded that women had the right to work. In yet another example of obfuscation, set against the powerful bloc of traditionalists and Islamists within the National Assembly, women became their own worst enemy, and opinion polls consistently showed that females were far more opposed to emancipation than men.2 This particular stalemate was a direct result of women’s rights becoming inextricably entwined with the liberal reformist movement, and the highly controversial battle for reform across society. This debate, after swinging backwards and forwards in the immediate aftermath of the war, halted the women’s rights movement and left Kuwait as one of the few countries in the world that extended voting rights to men and not to women.3 However, despite outward appearances, the fight did not stop; it simply moved to another battlefield, where women’s rights activists could make a stand on ground of their own choosing. Instead of shackling their ideology to the idea of liberal reform and working against traditionalists, feminists began to explore the possibility of working within Islam. Outside the failure of the emancipation project and the inclusion of women within the democratic process, Kuwait fared well in upholding women’s rights. Whilst there was always room for improvement, Kuwait certainly earned the reputation as one of the most forwardthinking states in the Gulf. In terms of employment and education for women, Kuwait compared favourably with other Islamic countries and even many Western democracies, with the USA and Europe still striving for equality.4 Since full independence, in 1961, and the influx of oil wealth into the nation, Kuwait’s constitution guaranteed equal educational rights for women and made education for all citizens compulsory between the ages of seven and 14. Equality in employment has been a little slower to come to fruition, but the proportion of women in the workforce gradually increased, reaching 25 per cent by 1997, the highest in the GCC.5 Given the opportunity of education, unavailable to women in neighbouring states, women began to excel, and their educational achievements grew year by year, soon surpassing those of males. By the time of the Gulf conflict, more women than men were entering tertiary education, in all academic fields. Women travelled to study in foreign universities and even those who chose

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to remain in Kuwait received a good state-funded education. Soon, even the most traditional of Kuwaiti families began to understand the benefits of educating women and urged their daughters to excel in their studies. Whilst there was some resistance to women entering the workforce before the 1990–1 conflict, mainly from traditionalist men and women who believed that a woman’s place was in the home, the percentage of women in the Kuwaiti workforce also steadily grew. Despite resistance from some quarters, this class of young, educated and professional women began to dominate certain professional classes. However, despite legislation promising otherwise, there appeared to be a glass ceiling in place, making it difficult for women to rise to the top of many academic and professional occupations. This area became the new battleground in the fight for emancipation and for respecting women’s rights across the board. The growing number of highly educated, professional women began to challenge these discriminatory policies, and the 1990s saw an increase in the number of women achieving high positions in NGOs, academic institutions and the media.6 The fight for women’s rights moved away from grassroots concerns and towards applying indirect pressure on decisionmakers. Women who reached influential positions had a threefold effect upon the battle for emancipation and improving the status of women in Kuwaiti society. •

•

•

Indirectly, through the international media and international conventions, they could apply firm and consistent pressure for change, causing Kuwait to become something of a pariah for its refusal to let women participate in the political process. Despite the enlightened approach of the ruling Al-Sabah family, architects of the eventual change in the legislation concerning voting rights, the criticism they received became a millstone. The growth in the number of strong, intelligent and educated women in ministerial and managerial positions destroyed some of the myths about women lacking the attributes needed for decision-making. This effect was so strong that Kuwaiti men became more amenable to emancipation than Kuwaiti women. Women forging successful careers became the elite class’ worst nightmare. For decades, elite women had fought against women’s

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rights, fearing that a new class of hungry and educated women would threaten their position and status. Despite their continued support of traditionalism and efforts to misdirect the energies of women’s rights-oriented social groups, this indirect approach soon outflanked them and provided solid foundations for the final push towards democratic equality. Looking at how women fared in some of these areas, through studying the fortunes of the average Kuwaiti woman and by looking at the rise of career women, will show how indirect improvements in the status of women laid the foundations for a renewed assault upon the status quo. Influential women often became the leading advocates of emancipation, and provided the leadership and direction that the grass-roots movements lacked, using gradual pressure instead of meeting the system head-on, only to be marginalized by the polarized political system.

Women’s Status in NGOs and Civil Society Groups In a state where opposition political parties are barred from operating and where Kuwaitis have little direct say in government policy, NGOs and unofficial civil society groups act as a safety valve, giving citizens an outlet to release frustration with the government and to indirectly influence policy decisions. Across the GCC region, civil society is usually weak, but Kuwait is recognized as having a vibrant civil society and trade unions, although political interference and governmental allocation of resources can dilute their effectiveness.7 As far as women’s groups are concerned, civil society groups provided a platform to press for change but, ultimately, also provided ammunition for opponents within the National Assembly to hinder progress, as seen before and immediately after the conflict. Whilst civil society groups faded into the background between 1991 and 2009, they still attracted support and acted as a reservoir of discontent. Before studying the ebb and flow of civil society groups, it is important to establish exactly those parts of society covered by the term. Defining civil society is difficult, and depends largely upon history, culture and perspective, but it is an important constituent part of

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any successful nation aspiring towards democracy. The Macmillan Dictionary describes civil society as, ‘The part of society that consists of organizations and institutions that help and look after people, their health and their rights. It does not include the government or the family.’8 The London School of Economics and Political Science provides a more complex definition: Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women’s organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups.9

One of the simplest ways of describing civil society is as a sector of society separate from government and private business, covering intermediary bodies and institutions such as unions, professional associations, religious groups and citizen advocacy groups. Each of these provides a section of society with a platform to air views, benefit from the security of collective action, and gain an indirect means to participate in the government through applying pressure and lobbying.10 However, this broad and sweeping definition also contains many grey areas, and civil society, government and business overlap, especially in Kuwait, where the authorities have many measures that they can use to apply equal and opposite pressure to civil society organizations (CSOs) and NGOs. In addition, any definition generally excludes the media; apart from being influential enough to warrant discussion as a stand-alone concern, the media is partially censored by the Kuwaiti state, which owns many television and radio stations and expects Kuwaiti media sources to operate self-censorship in certain areas. Academia is also excluded from civil society, because the academic sphere does not

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really allow average Kuwaitis to air their views, although academics can, and do, exert their own influence upon the government. In Kuwait, the space between individuals and the state is bridged by two main types of group: sanctioned NGOs and the plethora of unofficial voluntary groups and social groups that often incorporate a political dimension. As official groups, trade unions and the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce are influential in advising policy, while unofficial groups centre around the diwaniyas – informal social gatherings where Kuwaiti men discuss politics. These informal gatherings are often patronized by parliamentary members, so do wield some influence in the decision-making process. Social groups have, traditionally, been at the forefront of pressing for change, and NGOs often attract ambitious and politically minded women who are debarred from the normal political process.11 In most democracies, NGOs are the backbone of society, and organizations including charities, think tanks and lobby groups are all able to generate publicity and exert pressure on the government. In the Western world, women’s rights NGOs, such as the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) are well established, and many semi-official organizations monitor the treatment of women within a nation.12 Inside Kuwait, setting up organizations to monitor and promote women’s rights has always been difficult, due to the role of the government in the setting up and operating of NGOs. Whilst the Kuwaiti government has always respected the right of women to assemble, taking the next logical step and forming a pressure group is heavily regulated and subject to severe licensing restrictions. According to Association Law 24/1962, any request to establish an NGO must be submitted to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, and they have the authority to grant or revoke licences and dissolve NGOs. In addition, any official group must have an elected board, a written and accessible constitution, and a membership paying dues.13 Roger Owen points out that this has affected the strength of NGOs supporting women in Kuwait. He observes that, whilst there appear to be a number of bodies supporting women’s rights, they are often dominated by English-speaking women from the elite classes, and representation for women outside this unrepresentative,

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but privileged, demographic is negligible.14 In addition, as with the old social groups, this tendency towards the elite means that mixed messages are given out from women who are reluctant to give up their position and status. For example, as one Bedouin man claimed, ‘Look at the names of those who advocate for political rights for women – all of them belong to big influential families in Kuwait; their sole concern is achieving their own personal interests. By doing so, these women are leading this movement to achieve personal glories.’15 This common perception shows how the government’s successful approach to move female activism towards a traditionalist agenda, by funding groups such as the ICS, hampered the women’s rights movement throughout the early 1990s. This tendency is further enhanced by governmental control over the funding and financing of NGOs, allowing them to decide which ones best promote their agenda and to dissolve those that they perceive as a threat.16 According to the humanitarian forum held at the Safar Conference in 2006, ‘the role of women in NGOs is almost negligible’ in Kuwait.17 Despite this, there were some minor successes with the setting up of NGOs designed to promote women’s issues. To diversify and strengthen the community of NGOs operating in Kuwait, in 2002 the USA undertook a programme, via the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), to build and finance groups, although even they had to ensure that there was no overly political agenda involved. In 2004, the US-based National Democratic Institute (NDI) worked with the Kuwait Transparency Society to campaign for women’s voting rights, and measured the support for women’s rights movements in Kuwait.18 Promoting entrepreneurship and creativity amongst youth has also been addressed, through the groups Zawaya and Jusoor Arabiya, and training programmes and film-making groups have further added to the spectrum of NGOs operating within Kuwait.19 An inherent part of the civil societal structure in Kuwait is the voluntary civil society organizations. Though looser and less influential than bona fide NGOs, they have the advantage that they are much more difficult for the government to control directly. For decades these CSOs were at the heart of civil society in Kuwait, providing a platform for Kuwaitis to influence government policy and decisions.20 These groups provided the bridge between the government and the

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people, allowing like-minded individuals to meet, share experiences and discuss the latest developments, and in 2008 over 55 groups operated in the country, alongside various international groups, such as Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch.21 As women’s groups discovered in the early 1990s, when the ICS diverted women’s rights towards traditionalist values, the government is adept at manipulating these groups and playing one off against the other to ensure that dissent is directed down the right path.22 To a certain extent, the fact that CSOs are free to join and are completely voluntary ensures that they reflect the current mood of pressing issues across society, such as emancipation. However, this openness works both ways and allows the government to subtly manipulate the mood to influence the agenda, by diverting funds to pro-government groups, withholding licences from certain societies or establishing CSOs with presidents drawn from the ruling family. As Massouma S. Al-Mubarak, a former faculty member in the International Relations and Law Department at Kuwait University, later minister and MP, points out, ‘sometimes it is women who work against women. Regardless of our long years of struggle, we’ll have the same situation: women will work against women. Correcting this needs enlightenment and awareness raising.’23 This quote encapsulates the difficulties of relying upon CSOs for change as they are so easily countered; activists must instead look to a longer timescale based around gradual education and the instilling of different attitudes, rather than demanding immediate change. This idea is supported by Dr Rola Dashti, the former chairperson of the Kuwait Economic Society (KES) who later became MP and Minister, and who has highlighted some of the problems with the civil society culture in Kuwait in particular, and the Arab world in general. She argued that CSOs fail to create the groundwork for permanent change. In her opinion, they have become elitist and have disenfranchised many constituents, failing to fulfil their role of acting as a voice for the people. Her model for reform involves setting up dynamic, politically neutral CSOs, intended to be more proactive in engaging with all sections of Kuwaiti society rather than pursuing liberal or Islamist goals, with regular changes in leadership to bring fresh ideas and representation across the generations. In her words, ‘You can’t build a constituency by giving speeches in “a language people don’t

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know.”’24 She also pointed out that most of these groups have been completely impractical, and even fixated on single issues whilst failing to provide useful information that would change the lives of the average Kuwaiti for the better. For example, one Kuwaiti man expressed a very scathing opinion of the women’s rights organizations, ‘None of these organizations defends women’s rights. They only use women. There are many rights that need to be defended. Women’s organizations and associations mostly care about political rights, but ignore other important rights.’25 Certainly, this view has some merit and supports Dr Dashti’s idea of a holistic approach, encompassing all parts of society rather than focusing upon one narrow group. In her opinion, concentrating upon training and advice for establishing businesses provides a greater impetus for political change than direct activism. The work and contributions of the KES will be expanded upon, in detail below. Dashti’s ideas do have some merit, and the period after the 1990 Gulf War saw the marginalization of ideology-driven CSOs, whilst practical and charitable CSOs were permitted to flourish. Ultimately, as the WCSS and other women’s groups found, facing the state apparatus in a head-on battle is not going to achieve victory, because the state possesses a battery of legislation, and CSOs pursuing political reform are extremely susceptible to political whims. For example, a CSO promoting liberalism may not be seen as a threat when the reformists hold sway in the National Assembly. If the pendulum shifts, then they suddenly find themselves under pressure from Islamists. Ultimately, the government makes the rules and can use wealth and influence to leverage opinion, especially when most Kuwaitis are tied to the government via the civil service, and cannot afford to speak out against their employer, the state.26 Dashti points out that Islamists successfully courted grass-roots support throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and she believes that secular civil society groups should do the same, by appealing to practicality rather than ideology. In her opinion, educating women about their rights is not merely instructing them about feminism. Rather, ‘treating them as citizens’, and teaching women how to use modern business tools, such as the internet, empowers women far more and gives them the tools to break out of the traditionalist mentality.27

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This approach is extremely important in a society that is still largely based upon patriarchal and tribal structures, and male attitudes need to change before any lasting reform is possible. As a result, Dashti believes that CSOs should be concentrating upon changing the landscape, which is a long and slow process but one that will bring about lasting change. Haya Al-Mughni describes this process very well, pointing out the difficulty of changing the Kuwaiti mentality. ‘Our society is based on a patriarchal model stemming from our tribal heritage,’ she said. ‘The individual does not exist in this society. The name of the family comes first.’28 Nabila Al-Anjari, Assistant Undersecretary for Tourism Affairs at the Kuwaiti Ministry of Information, admits that women’s CSOs failed to address this core paradigm and may have exaggerated the problem by putting traditionalists onto the defensive. The blame should be mostly put on women themselves. Their efforts are not coordinated. Every party’s working for itself. Kuwaiti woman has all the privileges and doesn’t feel the need to fight for more rights. Living in a rich country and having everything available, she is not motivated enough to fight for a political say. Men, too, think women don’t need that. I have always said this is in the women’s hands. If they don’t talk and don’t try, how can they expect their rights to be restored?29

This view is common in Kuwait, especially amongst older generations who have benefited from the extensive welfare state in the nation, which ensured that mothers did not have to go out to work. This strengthened the position of the family and created apathy amongst many Kuwaiti women, who saw no major need to press for democratic representation. In terms of civil rights, women suffered everyday discrimination and disadvantage until very recently, and needed a male family member to obtain a passport or open a bank account. ‘Inevitably, dayto-day life is affected,’ said Lulwa Al-Mulla, Secretary General of the WCSS, speaking in 2004. ‘A few days ago, I went to the bank to open an account for my son, but they told me that I didn’t have the right to do that, and the presence of his father was requested,’ she continued.30

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Thus CSOs in Kuwait failed to address the challenges women face on a daily basis due to their little experience of mounting public opinion and awareness campaigns. The CSOs have a disparate and unfocused approach, because women themselves are unsure of the best direction to take. Kuwait possesses some genuinely enlightened attitudes towards women, mixed with archaic and repressive traditions. Without direction and leadership, the status of women in Kuwaiti civil society will always be open to question, certainly in a political sense. However, outside the political sphere, NGOs and CSOs pressed for other reforms and sought to improve attitudes towards women.

Women’s Rights: Victories and Challenges Alongside the drive for the emancipation of women, there are many other aspects of Kuwaiti society that changed in the post-conflict years. Whilst the CSOs and NGOs may have been fairly powerless in effecting large changes, they still had many positive effects on women’s rights. Outside the debate between liberals and reformists, Kuwaiti society was changing from the bottom upwards in the amount of respect paid to women and the promotion of women’s rights. Women won a series of small, but important, victories after the war, capitalizing upon the newfound respect earned by the women of the Kuwaiti resistance. Improving the position of women in society was a matter of balancing the views of reformists with Islamists, a task made slightly easier by the fact that Sharia law does contain some rules and stipulations protecting women, such as the right to own property and wealth, or protection from intermarital violence.31 One such victory was in the area of domestic violence against women, where consistent pressure to outlaw this and ensure that perpetrators were punished resulted in action. As Haya Al-Mughni, in an interview for the New York Times in 1995, stated, ‘It is part of our culture to discipline women and keep them in their place. From childhood to motherhood, women live in a cycle of fear and obedience.’32 Domestic abuse is still an issue in Kuwait, a trend exaggerated by cultural traditions that lead many men to believe that they have the right to intimidate women, mentally and physically. The setting up of a hotline for victims by the government allowed some gathering of

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data about this problem. Any data on domestic violence is rare, mainly because the police are reluctant to intervene in what they perceive to be entirely a family affair, while shame and fear prevent many women from coming forward. The fact that the government showed that it took the issue seriously indicated that it would not tolerate such barbarous behaviour; this was a huge step in the right direction and one with which most Kuwaiti men agreed.33 In addition, as the hotline was installed by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, this suggested that the policy of balancing reformists with traditionalists was important, and that women should be protected according to Islamic teachings and traditions. Despite the apparent abyss between reformers and traditionalists, there were still some areas where consensus was possible. However, the government was slow to follow up the hotline and there are still no shelters for victims of domestic violence, or laws protecting women from abuse within the home.34 However, the granting of women’s rights in Kuwait is an extremely complex affair, and for every positive, there is a negative; a result of the ruling family’s attempts to balance the wishes of reformists and traditionalists. One example of this is in the universities, where laws passed in 1996 and 2000 enforced the segregation of the sexes. Indeed, one leading advocate for reform, a member and the current speaker of the National Assembly Ali al-Rashid, received a death threat over the telephone for opposing this law. The caller informed Al-Rashed that, ‘If he doesn’t withdraw the bill, seven bullets will settle the matter’, showing that there is still a violent undercurrent in Kuwait with regard to upholding the rights of women.35 The former speaker in Parliament, Jassem al-Kharafi, denounced this threat and urged the authorities to find and punish the culprit.36 This type of discrimination is one area where the CSOs should be applying indirect pressure, as stated by Dashti. Interestingly, even the reformists still fall back upon Sharia law to justify change, showing that the debate over women’s rights has become a question of interpretation rather than whether the whole democratic process is flawed. In most discussions about the status of women in Kuwait attention naturally focuses upon Kuwaiti nationals. Kuwaiti women, outside of the domestic arena, have a lot of legal protection, with violence and rape against nationals pursued by the police and reported in

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the press.37 However, one area that is rarely discussed is the rights of non-Kuwaiti women, especially domestic servants, who are often the targets of extreme abuse and violations. One maid, requiring surgery for fractures on both her legs and her spine claimed, ‘I had no option other than to jump from the third floor of the building after I received the worst beating of my life from my madam. She locked me inside the bathroom and threatened to skin me alive when she returned from work.’38 Reports of rape and violence against immigrant women trickle out of Kuwait and, as reported by the US Department of State, this has led to many suicides amongst this group.39 Many of these women are non-Muslims, so Sharia law does not extend to them and they are often forced to work for very little money and under atrocious conditions. CEDAW has addressed this matter, pointing out that Kuwait signed the convention promoting women’s rights and that these rights should extend to all women living and working in the state.40 Non-national women are often subject to arbitrary arrest and deportation, especially after the Islamists began to hold sway in the late 1990s and imposed stricter moral codes and penalties for transgression against Islam and Kuwaiti customs and traditions.41 This particular problem is so bad that the Nepalese government recently enforced a ban upon nationals travelling to Kuwait as domestic workers.42 This is one area where all Kuwaitis are culpable, men and women, and a failure to address these issues will always leave the Kuwaiti movement for women’s rights tainted with hypocrisy. The CEDAW document makes no distinctions about the nationality of the women within the nation and, at the time of writing, all levels of Kuwaiti society, governmental and civil, must do more.43

Women and their Contribution to the Economy Kuwaiti women, since the Gulf conflict, have rapidly become a major part of the economy of Kuwait. Apart from the increased proportion of women entering the workforce, women are becoming entrepreneurs and business leaders, rising to high positions in banking, financial institutions and economic think tanks.44 For example, Fadwa Al-Homaizi is the Chairperson of the Kout Food Group and the Co-Vice Chair of the Al-Homaizi Group, and she is an Advisor to the

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Centre for Human Emergence Middle East, a think tank dedicated to developing strong economies in the GCC.45 Sarah Akbar is the Deputy Chairperson and CEO of Kuwait Energy, one of the fastest growing independent oil and gas exploration and production companies in the Middle East. Kuwaiti businesses and the economy benefit from the high number of educated women, but despite making up over a quarter of the workforce, Kuwaiti women only occupy 3 per cent of the leadership positions, although women are less likely to meet a glass ceiling in the growing private sector than in the civil service.46 It is not just the high-ranking and influential women who contribute to the economy, and Kuwaitis are beginning to understand the economic value of nurturing and helping businesswomen and female entrepreneurs, who strengthen the economy and help Kuwait reduce its bloated civil service and welfare state. Rola Dashti is an example of the sort of woman who pressed for women’s rights by empowering women to change, rather than by petitioning the government. She holds a PhD in Population Economics from Johns Hopkins University and has been one of the main drivers behind Kuwait’s attempt to diversify its economy and encourage investment from the private sector. Dashti headed an international consultancy firm advising the government of the best way to privatize institutions, and is a proponent of utilizing the huge pool of educated women in Kuwait, encouraging them to set up businesses and become entrepreneurs. In a conference held in 2008 to discuss strategies for combating the unfolding economic crisis, Dashti stated, ‘We are experiencing an unprecedented shift in global financial markets right now, and so our focus on helping women entrepreneurs and business community in Kuwait navigate these difficult waters is extremely timely.’ Mary MacPherson, Programme Director with Vital Voices Global Partnership, would add: Through this series of focused, high-level exchanges, our goal is to equip the women that participate with innovative new ideas, approaches, contacts and knowledge that they will use to strengthen their businesses, help provide for their families and create jobs in their communities – even during these particularly challenging times.47

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This type of initiative – focused upon instilling belief in women – is designed to give women the skills and confidence to start and run their own businesses, and is probably the greatest weapon possessed by women to counter the traditional tribal culture and mentality. However, a 2004 survey of small businesses showed that, while female Kuwaiti business owners tend to be better educated than men, they lack entrepreneurial and business skills, something that organizations like the KES and Vital Voices are trying to address.48 Showing that women are capable of contributing to the development of a thriving economy was a huge factor in the eventual concessions in voting rights. Ultimately, money talks, and the work of the KES in showing that restricting women to traditional roles stifles growth offers a large amount of leverage. With the aid of the USA, the Corporate Ambassadors Programme organizes conferences and seminars to advise and teach Middle Eastern businesswomen how to set up and expand profitable businesses.49 Dr Rola Dashti laments the decline of civil society organizations, believing that they failed to fulfil their potential and became sidetracked by ideology, instead of making real changes in the status of women in Kuwait. She claims that CSOs ‘lost their path’ by becoming ‘intellectual elite networks’ and this cut them off from society. In the drive for reform, the fact that there was a professional class of Kuwaitis who needed practical advice in how to set up businesses and forge their own path in life was forgotten. The Islamists and the liberals dominated civil society and sidelined entrepreneurs, the heart of any economy. She contrasts this with the Kuwait Economic Society (KES), established in 1970, which has gone beyond mere rhetoric to provide real solutions to problems. The main thrust of her argument is that there is no point in trying to push for governmental reform if there is no change in society, and the fact that many Kuwaitis feel that Islamists and reformists fail to address their particular difficulties lends support to her views. Dashti highlighted the KES as an example of an organization that influences society through deeds rather than rhetoric. She has, however, also pointed out that KES received a great deal of support from both the ruling family and from the government, because the group did not profess any overt political ambitions, instead offering practical economic advice.50 The KES has helped

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to modernize the Kuwaiti economy and has been instrumental in showing entrepreneurs, including women, how to embrace modern technology and use the internet to start and develop businesses. In partnership with Microsoft, the KES developed project EMPOWER: a programme designed to ensure that Kuwaitis have the skills desired by employers. Promoting IT technology will allow Kuwait to compete internationally and give women and the youth a better chance of being recruited and gaining promotion within the private sector.51 Dashti believes that, This initiative is an essential investment in Kuwait’s future. Putting technology to work for people throughout the country will enable us to strengthen our economy and create greater opportunity for young people to fulfill their dreams. The program also seeks to empower women by imparting technical knowledge with demand-driven skills, giving women a competitive edge in the job market. We value Microsoft’s support as we take positive steps towards promoting economic growth and reform within our economy.52

Dr Dashti is a successful business leader from the upper echelons of society, but there are thousands of Kuwaiti women making a good living as small entrepreneurs, often working from home. Fifty-six-year-old Um Salah is an example of this: a mother and grandmother forced into setting up a business in desperation, after her husband lost his sight. She explained the beginnings of her career: On the advice of a friend, she always praised the way I tattooed with henna on people’s hands, and started referring people to come to me. It first started as me doing this as a favour for a friend’s friend. But then she suggested that I start charging for it. It didn’t feel appropriate, but desperate times call for desperate measures.53

Quite soon, Um Salah began offering other beauty services, dressing and tinting hair as well as waxing and threading. Her children were embarrassed at what she did for a living.

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My eldest daughter found it difficult to accept that I thread her math teacher’s eyebrows, and sell home-made boxy wax in powdered milk cans to her Arabic teacher. She used to come to my room late at night when everyone else was asleep and drag along my other daughter – her younger sister – and she used to cry on my lap and tell me that when she grew up, she would start working and make a lot of money so that I wouldn’t need to wax her teacher’s legs again. But look at her now. She tells me I should get a license and rent a place for the salon.54

Um Salah’s case shows how even a high-school diploma can give women the confidence to set up, organize and run a business. Entrepreneurs are the lifeblood of a thriving economy and women from all classes and sections of society have begun to generate their own income, either through finding a job or by setting up cottage industries. Small businesses pervade every section of society, generating income but also strengthening society by allowing people to meet and socialize. Nabila is another Kuwaiti entrepreneur, who makes a little extra money by cooking exotic dishes for friends: I started eight years ago, when I took a dessert I made at home to a charity exhibition at my daughter’s school. A lot of the mothers and teachers seemed to like it, and I have always had the idea at the back of my head to have such a business. Everyone seems to be doing quite well with it. With word of mouth here in Kuwait, you can never go out of business. All you have to do is have good relations with your potential customers, and I had that.55

Certainly, there is a growing movement amongst women to earn their own money and, more importantly, their husbands have absolutely no problem with it, especially when the option of working from home ensures that traditionalist women can mix work and family life. More than anything, this entrepreneurial spirit represents the new Kuwaiti women, and shows how they put the strength and self-confidence gained during the war into practice. It was from this sector of society that the grass-roots support for women’s rights would grow, increasing the pressure for giving women the right to vote, as Kuwait moved into the twenty-first century.

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Women and Education: The Success Story Education is one area in which Kuwaiti women have always made a strong showing, surpassing the achievements of men at all levels. Fifty years ago education in Kuwait, for all but the elite classes, was very basic and restricted in range. For women, the situation was even worse: only a handful of women received a rudimentary education, built upon Islamic teachings and Qur’anic study. The transition from an agrarian and mercantile economy to an oil economy changed that paradigm, as the ruling classes understood the need for a large pool of educated Kuwaiti nationals; the latter half of the twentieth century saw a steady improvement in education, with women eventually making up the bulk of university students.56 After the Gulf conflict this strong foundation acted as a pillar of reform, and women soon became involved not only at undergraduate level but also in postgraduate education.57 Amongst Islamic states, such as Iran and the GCC, Kuwait has been at the forefront of promoting educational equality and ensuring that all citizens have free and unrestricted access to all levels of education, even facilitating study abroad for promising students. By this, the country has increased the pool of professionals available to the civil service and to the private sector. Chairperson of the Union of Kuwaiti Women Societies and wife of the former Crown Prince, who became emir in 2006, Sheikha Latifa Al-Fahad Al-Salem Al-Sabah points out that the government cannot be faulted in providing education for women, It was the government which opened the doors of education and the labour market to women. Women are working today because they are educated. The government encouraged women to learn so they could work. Those who did not find the chance to go to school were also provided with an opportunity to be trained in certain vocations to be able to work.58

She believes that these educational opportunities opened the door for women to enter the labour force and reach high positions, and that this will slowly bring about pressure for change. There is some truth in this view, as the increasing number of capable and intelligent women holding decision-making positions influenced the drive for equality

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much more than the easily manipulated CSOs, which failed to secure emancipation in the post-war period, despite their best efforts. As one young urban female put it, ‘I don’t know, but I believe that the most important thing is education, and that through education, I can achieve all my rights.’59 Education, above all else, has allowed women to fulfil their potential and understand that they have an integral role in the future of Kuwait. As the former Minister of Education, Nouriya Al-Sabeeh, pointed out, ‘Female students represent a high percentage of graduates’; she rates this as the most important accomplishment of Kuwait over the last two decades.60 Education, more than anything, has led to much higher status for women, even amongst the traditionalist Bedouin. As one young Bedouin man stated, ‘In the past, parents never let their daughters go to school. These days, they are more concerned that their daughters should complete their education.’61 This perfectly sums up the attitude of acceptance amongst even the most traditional segments of the population towards women’s education, supporting the view that changing minds and traditions is a gradual process. There is little doubt that women have surpassed all expectations in education and, in 2006, primary school enrolment stood at 87 per cent, secondary school enrolment at 80 per cent and third level education at 33 per cent. At tertiary level, women make up 70 per cent of undergraduates, an astonishing figure. This rise echoes trends in Europe, where the transition from an agrarian and industrial economy, to a skills-based, highly technological one, has created a rise in the number of graduates.62 Especially in southern and Eastern Europe, the number of women entering tertiary education rose between the 1990s and the early 2000s, with more than half of women entering university, as opposed to 43 per cent of men.63 As is the case with Kuwait, this is based upon the tendency of young men to learn a trade or join the police or armed forces, bringing in a wage rather than spending a number of years in higher education.64 However, the difference between Kuwait and Europe is that gender segregation is actually less apparent, and Kuwaiti women study subjects traditionally seen as a ‘male preserve’ in Europe.65 For example, in Europe, 18.5 per cent of men study engineering, as opposed to only 6.9 per cent of women, who tend to concentrate upon the humanities, education,

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health, welfare or veterinary studies.66 By contrast, nearly two-thirds of the graduates from the College of Engineering at Kuwait University are women, and many Kuwaiti women also enter fields such as mathematics and economics.67 In an attempt to encourage more males to enter tertiary education and create a more favourable ratio, Kuwait University, in the mid-1990s, stiffened the entry requirements for women; however, this appears to have had little impact.68 Some of this discrepancy can be explained by the fact that males are more likely to study abroad but, as Berkowitz states, a major factor is that men tend to coast through education, aware that they can build a career in the military or the police.69 As a result, women are indispensable to the continued success of Kuwait, providing a strong professional class of engineers, doctors, teachers and lawyers. Again, this tendency slowly changed the attitudes of Kuwaiti women and how they saw themselves, chipping away at the myth that women were not ready for emancipation or equal rights.70 In terms of breaking down the traditional tribal culture that still holds sway in Kuwait, education has been one of the major weapons.71

Women in the Civil Service Due to a special contract between rulers and the general population in most Gulf States, the state is seen as having a duty to provide for its citizens. Apart from various handouts and allowances, the state is by far the largest employer, seeing this as the easiest way to care for nationals and reduce unemployment, and thus spreading the wealth gained from oil.72 Before the 1990 Gulf conflict, this mostly meant that men dominated all aspects of the civil service, from traditional jobs in the military and the police to senior government posts and ministries. After the conflict, with the resulting realization amongst both men and women that Kuwait possessed strong and intelligent women, allied to the achievements of women in education and the drive towards nationalizing the workforce, more women started to enter the civil service and the percentage of females employed there increased.73 This is not the only aspect of the story: there was resistance from the traditionalists who strove to make women conform to traditional

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roles, and there may well have been some resistance amongst individual men to women entering the civil service, as is the case with many countries. However, this attempt to change the civil service occurred at a time when the government, faced with large debts after the war, was trying to reduce the dependence upon governmental benevolence and to trim the civil service to reduce costs. As Al Quds, a Palestinian newspaper based in London, reported in 1996, 93 per cent of the national Kuwaiti workforce was employed directly by the state;74 by 2000, this had risen to 95 per cent, and the government was still trying to reduce this percentage by promoting the private sector, a difficult task considering the benefits and good wages enjoyed by state employees.75 After 20 years of service, Kuwaiti public sector workers are entitled to retire on 75 per cent of their salaries and take out loans to start a business on favourable terms.76 Against a shorter working week, good pensions and benefits, the private sector is not an attractive proposition. Speaking in 2007, Sheikha al-Khaled, a young graduate, highlighted the difficulty of embarking upon a civil service career for recent graduates, who are faced with bureaucracy and waiting lists, ‘The process of applying to the civil service commission seems clear and organized, but this is not true. They pretend to be well planned and helpful but once they get our application forms they just ignore us.’77 This highlights the difficulty of finding employment in the traditional way, although it must be stressed that this difficulty now afflicts both genders as the government tries to wean Kuwaitis away from the ‘Cradle to Grave’ culture of government provision. This has acted as a barrier to women entering the civil service, but the proportion of women in the Civil Service Commission (CSC) has still increased since the early 1990s. For the average Kuwaiti woman, finding a civil service position is no harder than for a man, and there is little sexual discrimination for entry-level jobs. However, at the higher levels, despite women making up a large proportion of the workforce, there have been some obstacles to women reaching the top. The official stance on the situation is clear, as stated by the former Kuwaiti Ambassador to the Ukraine, Khaled M. Al-Duwailah, in 2004. When asked whether women were able to take up influential positions within the civil service, he answered, ‘Yes, they can hold any position except as a deputy of Parliament. We have

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many women serving as diplomats. [The] Women’s movement is well developed in Kuwait.’ He was also positive about the potential resolution of the debarring of women from the deputy role, stating, This is a historical casualty. When the Constitution of The State of Kuwait was written women simply were not mentioned, so currently they cannot elect or be elected to the Parliament unless the legislative body passes the amendment bill. Now the amendments to the Constitution are widely discussed and I think that this historical confusion will be solved.78

However, as is often the case with Kuwaiti politics, just because something is not forbidden does not mean that it is likely to happen, as the scarcity of women inhabiting the upper levels of governance suggests. A United Nations Development Programme consultation with women’s rights activists noted that, Despite [the fact that] women take up a large proportion of the civil service workforce, it was highlighted that very few have been able to take up senior decision making positions. It was suggested that the Civil Service Commission should take an active role to ensure women representation in managerial positions in the government. However, it was stressed that providing women with equal opportunities was more important at this point.79

Whilst Kuwait, like Europe and the USA, displays gender equality in terms of women entering the civil service, there is little doubt that mechanisms within the system make it harder for women to rise to the top. This can partly be explained by traditional gender roles and the career break that a woman may take to start a family, but this is not the entire story. As with many countries, an established masculine order, as well as institutionalized discrimination and the ‘Old Boys’ Network’ heighten the problem.80 This is a trend that is being addressed in the USA, Europe and the UK with quota systems. In 2009, 53 per cent of UK civil service employees were women, and 34 per cent of senior civil service positions were filled by women, a percentage that doubled in ten years.81 In Kuwait, 44.1 per cent of civil service employees are

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women, but only 17 out of 269 senior posts were occupied by women, a proportion that must change.82

The Workforce and Kuwaitization Since 1990, Kuwaiti women have made huge strides in entering the workforce and achieving a modicum of equality with men, breaking away from the stereotypical female professions of teaching and nursing. Before the 1950s, when women received only the most basic education and when cultural traditions restricted freedom, the opportunities open to women were limited to midwifery, seamstresses, teachers and market traders, all segregated from men and many forced to wear the abbaya.83 By contrast, in 1990, just before the conflict, women made up 20 per cent of the workforce, a figure that rose to 30 per cent by the year 2000.84 In 1993, nearly half of these jobs were in the professional/technical sector and 44.3 per cent were clerical jobs, pointing to a strong and educated professional class of women, who were contributing to the economy.85 By 2006, women constituted 49 per cent of Kuwait’s national labour force, one of the highest percentages in the Gulf region, and they still make up a large percentage of the workforce in engineering, medicine, architecture and education. The drift towards these professions is partly dictated by the potential remuneration, but partly by the fact that some cultural traditions are still apparent. Despite anti-discrimination laws, a woman may have to obtain consent from her husband or a male guardian before entering certain careers, so women shy away from studying in such fields, knowing that they may not be guaranteed a career after graduation. Legislation cannot influence this domestic control, and giving women complete freedom of choice requires a change in cultural attitudes.86 One factor to consider with regard to Kuwait’s labour force, in common with many of the GCC states, is the heavy reliance upon migrant labour, which skews any figures revealing the percentage of women within the labour force. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has pointed out that the number of Kuwaiti women in the workforce, 38.2 per cent in 2003, only includes nationals. If this figure is expressed as a percentage of the total workforce, this number drops to 7.3 per cent.87 This split between nationals working

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in the civil service and expatriates dominating the private sector is one of the main reasons why the government is constantly pushing for the increased participation of Kuwaitis, and this Kuwaitization programme relies heavily on women to take many of the jobs in the private sector. Between 2000 and 2010, the ratio of women in the private workforce jumped from 27 per cent to over 50 per cent, especially in catering, retail and hospitality.88 So far, this process has not been entirely successful at the lowest levels, but women have started to rise through the ranks and reach higher positions in the business community. One example of this is Maha Al-Ghunaim who, in 2007, was appointed Chairperson and CEO of Global Investment House, a giant amongst Kuwaiti banking and finance companies, possessing assets with a value in excess of US$ 6.5 billion.89

The Media and Indirect Change With a few notable exceptions, the media is one area of Kuwaiti life that is reasonably free from interference. Since the creation of the constitution, the right to free speech has been enshrined in Kuwaiti law, except for the following areas: ‘The Printing and Publications Law 3/1961 deems it a criminal offence to criticize the emir, publish materials offensive to Islam, or publish material that may incite violence, hatred, or dissent.’90 These guidelines are fairly clear, all sides understand the rules, and the line is rarely crossed. Prosecutions of the media are rare, due to self-censorship, and even academics who are supposedly immune from censorship tend to moderate their tone and findings, sometimes due to pressure, to avoid direct criticism of the government or ruling families. Women have always had a pivotal role and influence within the media, although this has been somewhat of a double-edged sword, with both positive and negative effects. As early as the 1930s, the merchant classes in Kuwait realized that educating women and creating a more inclusive society would create a strong and robust state, and this provided the basis of the upward trend in educational achievement. As the grass-roots women’s organizations and civil society organizations struggled and foundered, women began to gravitate towards the media, which, in the latter half of the twentieth century, displayed a distinct bias towards liberalism

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and feminism.91 Since the 1960s, the involvement of Kuwaiti women at all levels within the media has shown an upwards trend, and they have been able to apply some pressure on politicians, despite the restraints of self-censorship. The involvement of women at the highest levels of the press, radio and television has often helped the Kuwaiti women’s movements regardless of government interference in other avenues.92 Kuwaitis have always devoured news and are extremely media savvy, making the media possibly the most influential sector of Kuwaiti society, surpassing even social groups and NGOs. It is quite legitimate to say that the media provided the biggest driving force for gender equality, especially when the influence of the international media, which faces no restrictions upon freedom of speech, is taken into account. The first publication aimed entirely at women was the magazine Usrati, started by Ghanima Al-Marzouk, a scion of one of the influential merchant families. This publication, founded in 1965, acted as a blueprint for many other publications, especially those springing up in the wake of the 1990–1 conflict. These magazines leaned towards liberalism and feminism, but also acted as a microcosm of the prevailing mentality of women in Kuwait, showing how they had moved from traditional Islamic roles to become as sophisticated and worldly wise as any Western woman. One example of such a publication was Fatima Hussein’s Samra magazine, first published in 1991, which included articles about domestic violence, infidelity and protests against forced marriage, all subjects that would have been unthinkable topics for discussion before the conflict.93 This magazine had a circulation of 35,000 by 1994, a very respectable number considering the population of the emirate (around 2 million, of whom 600,000 were Emiratis). Another women’s magazine, Nissa, with a highly feminist agenda, was first published in 1996 and continued to press for electoral reform against the backdrop of the political battle between reformists and traditionalists. In the period when the traditional groups, such as the ICS, dominated the feminist movement, Nissa was often a lone voice in the wilderness.94 The misinformation spread by these government-backed societies convinced many women that they did not have the necessary skills to enter politics. The media acted as the only counterbalance to this view and, allied with the number of Kuwaiti women carving out careers, became the seed that would

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eventually bloom into the renewed movement for women’s rights that arose towards the end of the 1990s.95 The involvement of women in the media was not without problems, and there were isolated cases of women falling foul of censorship laws or risking injury or death for their journalistic work. January 2000 saw the trial of two women writers for breaking laws on indecency and offending Islamic sensibilities. The US Department of State reported: ‘In January 2000, two female authors, Leila Al-Othman and Alia Shuaib, were found guilty in two separate cases of writing “obscene” and “blasphemous” books. An appeals court overturned Shuaib’s conviction in March 2000, but Al-Othman was indicted and fined US$ 3,000 (912 dinars), as was her publisher.’96 Al-Othman had used the word ‘lustful’ to describe the action of waves and Shuaib was accused of mocking Islam – hardly major offences.97 This shows the difficult task faced by all Kuwaitis when working in the media and the arts, and is one of the main reasons why many feminist groups were wary of attempting to push the boundaries too far. In an even more extreme case, Hedaya Al-Salem, chief editor of the magazine Al-Majales, was gunned down by a policeman.98 The reason for the murder was based upon tribal honour, as she was perceived to have insulted the women of the Al-Awazem tribe.99 These examples show some of the inherent difficulties in challenging some of the values ingrained into Kuwaiti society, and that any influencing of opinion through the media must be subtle, where possible. In terms of women working in the media, the numbers are remarkable and show that they have reached parity in this area. Women hold jobs in both print and broadcast outlets as reporters, broadcasters and producers. In 2008, the Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) employed 166 women, 38 per cent of its total workforce.100 Women in Kuwait use the media as a vehicle for bringing gender issues to the forefront of public debate, and most newspapers devote considerable space to the activities of women’s groups. Nevertheless, elements in the media continue to stereotype women, often stressing the divisions between women’s groups, rather than presenting a more positive image of women’s rights activists and female political candidates. During the 1990s, when Islamist women began to dominate women’s societies, they took on opposite views to the liberal groups, projecting an image

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of Islamic women as modest wives and mothers, an image that has proved difficult to shake off.101 Mohamed Al-Ujairi, Director General of KUNA, provided some interesting figures concerning the proportion of women working in the organization. Proudly, he pointed out that women made up almost half of the workforce in the newsroom. This figure can be further divided into 55 per cent in the computer and IT division and 45 per cent in the technical/engineering department.102 This process has been aided by exchange programmes with international media outlets, allowing both male and female journalists to learn how the press works in other countries. The USA has been very proactive in this respect and, in 2006, arranged for two female reporters to attend a programme that revealed the influence that the press could have upon governments and their policymaking decisions – as a counterbalance to politicians.103 This opening up of the Kuwaiti press is a gradual process, but the average Kuwaiti understands the value of a free press. Women’s rights activists have realized that the media is a far more potent weapon than social groups, and they have tapped into the potential of the medium. Certainly, the press has swayed the opinions of many across society, from the average Kuwaiti all the way up to the emir. Even in the role of the frontline journalists, Kuwaiti women have increasingly become the face of the domestic media. The presence of Kuwaiti women in the media as TV presenters and broadcasters became widespread after the liberation and Americanization of Kuwait in 1990, but especially after the establishment of many media outlets in 2006 competing for the most representable female broadcaster and controversial female journalists. Dr Kafiya Ramadan has noted how female Kuwaiti journalists in the 1950s and 1960s used pen names to circumvent convention.104 More recently, many of the major newspapers and media outlets have employed women in influential positions, including Bibi Khaled al-Marzouk, Editor-in-Chief of Al-Anbaa, one of the main daily newspapers. She held the position from 1997 until 2009.105 Fatima Hussein, the founder and original Editor-in-Chief of Samra, became an activist promoting equality for women in the media and diplomatic service, and soon found a platform as a writer and radio and television host.106 These influential women indirectly kept women’s

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rights at the forefront of the media, and slowly convinced women that they did have a role to play within politics. Journalist Fatima Al-Abdeli, a reformist during the 1990s, said that ‘the media made me interactive with people, especially Al-Qabas newspaper, which never deleted one word from my articles’.107 Gradually, the damage wrought by the subtle indoctrination of the traditionalist women’s groups would be repaired, adding to the impetus gained through women forging ahead in education, the workplace, business and academia. This all contributed to the pressure exerted upon the National Assembly and the rulers, and would affect the debate in the political arena, the only place where the status quo could be challenged and overturned.

Conclusion Outside the political arena, the gender inequality was overturned in many areas of Kuwaiti society, as women began to utilize the positive attitude changes imbued by the Gulf conflict. Civil society organizations and NGOs, tainted by the 1990s’ battle between extremists in the National Assembly, were sidelined after the bitter debate that dominated the post-conflict discussions. However, the focus shifted to other areas and women began to make great strides in fighting for their rights, applying indirect pressure to the ruling classes. The CSOs were seen as elitist and self-serving, but women rose to prominence in other parts of society, becoming business leaders, entrepreneurs and journalists. These trailblazers started to convince all sections of society that women could become politicians and had the education and intelligence to contribute positively to society, gradually changing attitudes as the nation entered the twenty-first century. As Nouriya Al-Sabeeh pointed out in a questionnaire, the number of women reaching high positions in the government and private sectors is second only to women’s education as a positive accomplishment over the last two decades.108 Kuwaiti women began to move up the ladder and become career women but, more importantly, many more became entrepreneurs or professionals. Underpinning this success was the benefit of a good education, a field in which women had long surpassed men and had

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provided a sizable proportion of the nation’s teachers, engineers and doctors. Trying to force women’s rights met with resistance, but gradually changing opinions and influencing society had a much more subtle yet longer lasting effect, as a greater number of Kuwaitis began to accept that women should have the right to vote. Whilst Kuwait still received international criticism for its steadfast refusal to give full rights to women, slowly but surely Kuwaitis took matters into their own hands. Women had already carved out a niche in the media, and this became another weapon in combating the traditionalists and pushing the agenda for reform. In addition, whilst there was resistance to allowing women to vote or stand for election, this pressure improved rights in other areas, reducing the amount of discrimination in the workplace and civil service. This pressure built up over the course of the 1990s, causing the ruling emir to take action and also push for reform and the granting of full citizenship rights to women, which would culminate in the emir’s attempt to push through reform in 1999. This reopened the battle as Kuwait entered the new millennium, and the debate between reformists and tribal traditionalists raged for years. This time, women believed that they could succeed, due to the improvements in status gained over the course of the 1990s. In time, the combination of highprofile women, revitalized CSOs and support from all sectors of the population would force the National Assembly and government into a corner, where they would have to make a decision rather than use evasion and obfuscation.

Chapter 4 THE DEBATE WITHIN THE RULING FAMILY

The issue of women’s rights in Kuwait, especially concerning emancipation and participation in the electoral process, has been a paradoxical one. On the one hand, Kuwaiti women have enjoyed a great amount of freedom and equity in civil society, education and the labour market, earning the country a reputation as one of the most enlightened states in the Arab world. On the other hand, the fact that Kuwait was the one country where women have not been allowed to play a part in determining their own destiny created the impression that Kuwait was, in many ways, a ‘typically backward’ Gulf society. One of the most important factors in the debate over suffrage was the ruling family of Kuwait, the Al-Sabahs, who, through a special contract with the people, exercised a great deal of influence over the direction of the state. However, unlike neighbouring states with a more autocratic approach, the ruling family was accountable to Parliament. Whilst the checks and balances built into the Kuwaiti constitution and legal system acted to prevent excesses by the Al-Sabahs, they also acted as a brake on progress, often forcing the ruling family to make compromises or attempt to maintain a balance in Parliament between the opposing factions.1 In addition, whilst the Al-Sabahs tended to be 103

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liberal, certainly in terms of society and rights, they were sceptical of reformists, who they felt were a threat to their rule. Successive rulers believed that making too many concessions could undermine their position as emirs of the state so, as an often silent partner, they played the political game and indirectly influenced policy. The ruling family became adept at deflecting criticism and redirecting agendas, seeking to consolidate their own position and nullify any threats before they spiralled out of control.2 After the Gulf conflict of 1990–1, when the emir-in-exile, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, alluded to emancipation for women, the ruling family came under constant pressure to deliver this, from both inside and outside Kuwait. However, for various reasons, the family never seemed to take that final step and often paid no more than lip service to women’s rights.3 •

•

•

Islamists and conservatives were growing in strength in Kuwait, as was the case in many Arab states, so the ruling family had to attempt to placate these voices or risk alienating Parliament. This would lead to stasis in a country needing forward-thinking economic reforms after the Gulf conflict. The ruling family also wanted to limit the influence of progressive reformists and secularists, who, they felt, undermined their own position. For many years, the cause of emancipation remained allied to secularism, and the Al-Sabahs felt that conceding might lead to difficult questions. It is tempting to think of the ruling family as a bloc, but many men and women of the family were well-educated and influential. Many of the Al-Sabahs, especially the women, felt that their position amongst the elite could be threatened by the large number of well-educated Kuwaiti women influencing society.

In order to study the influence of the Al-Sabah family upon emancipation for women, it is first necessary to research the history of the family and understand its role and place in Kuwait. The Al-Sabahs oversaw the state’s transformation from an agrarian and tribal society to a modern country, a process for which they rightly receive credit. It is also essential to understand the unique structure of the Kuwaiti political system, which places limitations upon the family, through

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the constitution and the legal structure.4 This dualistic structure sometimes influences the family’s decisions and dilutes their capacity for direct rule, ensuring that Kuwait has never fallen into the authoritarian style of rule practised by many of its GCC partners (the family gets what it always wants). Consequently, it is possible to undertake a full analysis of the evolution of opinion within Kuwait, and show how the Al-Sabahs underpinned the whole emancipation movement, for better or for worse.

The History of the Al-Sabah Family The rise of the Al-Sabah family began in 1756, when Sabah I bin Jaber was the first ruler; all members of the current family are descended from this ruler. The position of Kuwait in relation to the Ottomans was always unclear, with the Ottomans claiming some control, although this did not occur in practice. In 1899, the Ottoman Empire threatened to annex Kuwait and take more than nominal control, so the small nation sought the protection of the British. The Al-Sabahs were recognized as leaders by the British, who held Kuwait as a protectorate until full independence in 1961, although Kuwait enjoyed a large amount of autonomy. The state continued to function as a relative backwater until the discovery of oil in the 1930s, when the wealth and relative influence of the ruling family steadily grew. On 19 June 1961, Kuwait was granted full independence by the British, and the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, became its first independent ruler.5 Under his guidance, the new state developed its own constitution and, on 11 November 1962, the method of governance for the new country was enshrined in law and recognized by international organizations.6 This structure laid the foundation for the legislature and also provided some balance, limiting the emir and the ruling family and preventing them from becoming too dictatorial. This structure provided the state with much stability, and guaranteed Kuwaitis freedoms denied to many of their neighbours, but also provided the many conflicting factions with the power to stifle progress and protect their own interests.7 As in most political systems, politics became a game of self-interest and corruption, and the ruling family were not immune from this. Unfortunately, the issue

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of emancipation became intertwined in this greater game, a victim of the eternal stand-off between rulers and politicians. When Abdullah Al-Salem died in 1965, his brother, Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, ascended to the emirate. This was a controversial succession because it deviated from the established tradition of alternating the emirate between the two sides of the family, the Al-Salem and the Al-Jaber. This particular tradition had been in place since the rule of Mubarak, who ruled from 1896 to 1915, in an attempt to lessen the chance of any civil conflict arising from a contested succession. Sheikh Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah was from the Salem line, rather than the Jaber line, although there was little protest in the face of a period of peaceful rule.8 The practice was restored in December 1977, when a Jaber, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, inherited the emirate.9 As Kuwait modernized, the influence of external events came to dominate Jaber Al-Ahmad’s rule, as the state found itself thrust onto the world stage. The first key event was the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–8, which increased the level of political violence in the state, as sectarianism and Islamism began to divide the emirate.10 Major events included the 1983 bombings of the United States and French embassies and the assassination attempt on the emir in 1985.11 The tension associated with the war also exacerbated divisions within Kuwaiti society, notably that between Sunnis and Shi‘is, and prompted the emir to limit his public appearances and involvement in the political scene. In 1980, Sheikh Jaber restored the National Assembly that his predecessor had dissolved in 1976, but the heightened political tensions and threats upon his life prompted him to dissolve it once again in 1986, and to implement decrees curtailing political freedom and speech.12

The Unique Political Structure of Kuwait Despite many newspaper and populist headlines associating the word ‘democracy’ with Kuwait, the state has never been democratic, although it does provide citizens with a political voice. It is, in fact, a hereditary emirate, with an autocratic ruling family dominating politics and directing policy. However, the constitution provides checks and balances, preventing the ruling family from becoming too dictatorial and overriding the basic rights of Kuwaiti citizens. The state’s

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administration and political system is made up of a balance between the executive, legislative and judicial branches, although the system is heavily weighted towards the executive branch.13 The emir, who is the head of state and is solely responsible for appointing the prime minister and two deputy prime ministers, heads the executive branch. These are, by precedent, drawn from the ruling family. In consultation with the Emir, the Prime Minister appoints a decision-making cabinet of ministers, who are not always members of the National Assembly but are often drawn from the ruling family. Amongst a whole raft of powers held by the emir, the main ones that directly influence policy are the ability to suspend the National Assembly for up to one month and to dissolve the Assembly, as long as elections are called within two months. He is allowed to issue decrees, which automatically become law, but they can be challenged and overridden by the National Assembly. In addition, the emir is the source of all submitted laws even if, in reality, he is usually presented with laws for approval. Importantly, the emir is constitutionally protected from criticism and legal action, and is beyond reproach, although he is often criticized ‘by proxy’.14 The Kuwaiti Council of Ministers answer to the emir and the members are all recommended by the prime minister, although the emir has the power to veto any appointment. This council is responsible for devising policies and ensuring that they are all enacted properly.15 The minutes of ministerial meetings are usually never divulged, even in these days of WikiLeaks, and a simple majority voting system is used to arrive at decisions, with the prime minister having the casting vote. Decisions are then submitted to the emir, who will grant or deny approval. By tradition, the ruling family generally controls the most important of the Kuwaiti ministries, including Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Energy, and the administrative branch.16 Set against the executive branch is the legislative branch, made up of a National Assembly containing 50 elected members serving a four-year term, and 11 to 16 unelected ministers making up the cabinet. It is possible for the prime minister to include elected officials in the cabinet, accordingly reducing the number of unelected officials. The National Assembly has the power to initiate legislation, which must be passed to the emir, for approval within 30 days, or

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seven days in an emergency.17 If the law is not sent back within this period, the law is passed. However, these laws require a two-thirds majority, so passing legislation can be extremely difficult. In addition, the National Assembly can overturn decrees made by the emir and veto laws passed by the government, within 15 days. This especially applies to decrees passed by the emir when Parliament is dissolved, as the National Assembly can strip them of the force of law. Finally, the Assembly can pass votes of no confidence in a minister or even the prime minister.18 This results in the removal of the minister or, in the case of the prime minister, results in the appointment of a new cabinet or the dissolution of Parliament.19 The final cornerstone of this balance of power is the judiciary, and the Constitutional Court ensures that legislation follows the tenets of the constitution. According to Freedom House, reporting in 2004, ‘Kuwait has become the only Arab country in which the elected legislature serves as a powerful check on executive power.’20 Despite the fact that Kuwait is not a true democracy, many leading reformists seek dilution of the power of the emir rather than wholesale democratic reform. According to Peter Berkowitz some would like to see more accountability within Parliament, and ministers drawn from the Assembly rather than the ruling family.21 Nathan Brown adds that Kuwaitis support the monarchic system, based upon the belief that the constitution provides plenty of scope for changes. He points to a specific clause: The provisions relating to the emiri system in Kuwait and the principles of liberty and equality provided for in this constitution may not be proposed for revision except in relation to the title of the emirate or to increase the guarantees of liberty and equality.22

This clause appears to allow room for the adaptation and modification of the Kuwaiti electoral system, without wholesale challenges to constitutional law. Mohamed Al-Jassem, former editor of the daily newspaper Al-Watan, and former editor of the Arabic translations of Newsweek International and Foreign Policy, believes that support for the ruling family is grounded in the perception that they have always acted in the

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best interests of the nation, and that this strong symbiotic relationship between the Al-Sabahs and the Kuwaiti people is ‘based on agreement’.23 After being imprisoned for his political views on the Al-Sabahs, today Al-Jassem is one of the most vocal opposition voices in the country. The National Assembly often acts independently of the emir and this frequently leads to the stasis all too prevalent within Kuwaiti politics. Despite the ban on official political parties, and the stipulation that all electoral candidates stand as independents, the National Assembly is made up of political blocs, divided largely between traditionalists and reformists.24 These blocs, more than anything, acted as the major barrier to emancipation for women, as the women’s rights movement became a political pawn caught between rival interests. During the 1970s, the government, fearing secular reformists, actively courted the traditionalist blocs, but this led to a serious imbalance in the political structure of Kuwait.25

The Failure of the Ruling Family: Pressure for Reform As promised to the international community, the emir ordered elections in 1992, showing the world that Kuwait was prepared to undergo a process of democratization. Despite the hopes of women’s rights groups and bodies, the traditionalists dominated the National Assembly, and the issue of the emancipation of women slipped further down the agenda as the new government sought to maintain its hold over Kuwait. During the 1990–1 exile, the emir had promised to address the issue of emancipation, but he failed to deliver after liberation.26 The main reason for this, on the part of the emir, was the ruling family’s fear of the traditionalists and the agitation for a return to Sharia law. The Al-Sabahs also faced criticism for their conduct during the Gulf conflict; some Kuwaitis saw them as returning heroes, who built a coalition to liberate Kuwait, but others saw them as indecisive and weak.27 As one activist stated in 1991, ‘we want ministers from the people who were in Kuwait during the Iraqi time’;28 the Al-Sabahs also attracted anger for the way in which they returned from exile with food and provisions while ordinary Kuwaitis went without. According to Haynes, a large percentage of Kuwaitis felt that the regime showed itself to be too indecisive before and during the invasion, and failed to

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see the warning signs. They also pointed to the seeming reluctance of the government to seize the initiative and instigate lasting reform in Kuwait’s political, social and economic structures after the conflict.29 The contingent factors, provided by the circumstances of the Iraqi invasion, turned out to be more important than the structural position of absolutist rule: as a consequence, Kuwait tentatively democratized. The ruling family feared that women would tend to vote conservative, strengthening the hold of the traditionalist bloc within the Assembly and causing an impasse.30 The emir could not afford to cede any more power to Islamists, because any shift towards more fundamental Islamism could be problematic with the eyes of the Western media and governments focused upon this corner of the Gulf. In addition, the conservatives were responsible for most of the promises made to the electorate, in terms of dispersing money. The near bankrupt country needed to tighten its belt and push through economic reform, but the conservatives constantly railed against this and created a decadelong impasse with Parliament. The ruling family were coming under intense pressure from ordinary Kuwaitis and the international community to implement reform, especially in the field of women’s rights, but this had to be balanced against regional pressures.31 The family experienced a great deal of pressure from the KSA, which had given the Kuwaiti ruling family much support during the conflict, and which did not want the effects of Kuwaiti emancipation to spread and legitimize its own women’s rights movement.32 Granting women the vote could well create similar pressure in the KSA, which was behind other GCC states in the process of developing a more open democracy.33 Certainly, this is one more facet in the complicated picture that prevented the ruling family from delivering full emancipation.

The Relationship between the Ruling Family and the People The majority of Kuwaitis, whilst respecting the emir, felt let down by his passiveness and reluctance to take positive action. From the traditionalist and the liberal camps, there was criticism that he had failed to take the initiative and deliver upon his promises. The constant bickering over the issue of emancipation, and the sidelining of pressure

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groups, led many activists to believe that they would never enjoy democracy. Analysts and reformers felt that the emir had paid far too much attention to the tribal and traditionalist factions within the state, believing that this perceived alliance with Islamists went against the wishes of the majority. Dr Shamlan Al-Essa, Professor of Political Science at Kuwait University, gave his analysis of the situation, offering proof that the ruling family was guilty of duplicity and said one thing whilst doing another. Boldly, he stated, ‘You expected, after the liberation, the government will jump after the Americans. Instead, they are trying to please the Islamic fundamentalists.’34 He also added a list of grievances, stating that the ruling family appointed committees to undertake ‘Islamicization of the law’, sidelining reformist groups and societies in favour of conservative groups, and adding a larger element of religious education in schools.35 Whilst much of Shamlan’s analysis is true, and the ruling family failed to push through the promised reforms, it does not fully take into account the difficult balancing act that the government had to undertake to prevent either faction in Parliament seizing too much influence. After the 1996 election, 21 per cent of the parliamentary representatives broadly supported the government, with 14 per cent regarded as hard-line Islamists. To further complicate the matter, Islamists often mustered over half of the vote for Islamic issues, and this conflict of various interests made consensus difficult, especially as reformists and Islamists increasingly drifted towards the opposite ends of the political spectrum.36 Whilst it can be argued that the emir could have been much more decisive, he also had to try and push through economic reforms for which he would need the Islamist bloc, and he had to offer them something in exchange for their support. Nevertheless, Shamlan’s analysis was a fairly typical assessment, as the 1990s progressed without any sign of respite, and most doubted that the emir could be shaken from this inaction.37

The Women in the Ruling Family Despite the apparent inaction of the emir and the rest of the ruling family, there were some deep disagreements between members. Many within the ruling family had received a high-quality and well-rounded

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education, which included periods abroad, so they were very open to the idea of emancipation and the promotion of women’s rights. Whilst this particular trait transcended gender boundaries, the women in the ruling family encapsulated this mood and were at the forefront of the push for reform. Dr Rasha Al-Sabah has always been in the vanguard of the women’s rights movement in Kuwait and earned a place as a trusted advisor to the emir. She was the Undersecretary of Higher Education, and was given the accolade of International Woman of the Year, for 1996–7, by the International Biographical Centre (IBC).38 She was careful to highlight the positive steps taken by Kuwait to promote women’s rights, and argued that the ruling family was extremely active in developing a culture of equality. Rasha pointed to the opportunities for women in education and in the workplace, keen to draw attention to the fact that the ruling family had performed many good deeds in the emirate.39 However, she has always been adamant that women should have the right to vote and to participate in the democratic process, arguing that it would ‘change the whole spectrum of Kuwaiti politics’. Dr Al-Sabah, in an interview, has made the point that, ‘denied the vote, how could women not internalize the harmful message that they were ill-equipped for democratic politics, and how could men not internalize the harmful message that they were particularly wellequipped?’40 Whilst she maintained a dignified silence in public, there is little doubt that this influential politician had a key role in persuading the emir to support the right of women to vote. Another influential woman within the ruling family is Sheikha Hessah Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, the daughter of the late Emir Sheikh Saad. In an interview for a leading Kuwaiti magazine, she pointed to the success of businesswomen in Kuwait and the progressive way in which Kuwait promoted women in business and the workplace.41 As president of the Council for Arab Business Women, Sheikha Hessah has been an influential force in driving gender equality in the field of economic development, but also in fighting for the right to vote.42 In 2005, the wife of the former Crown Prince and late Emir Sheikh Saad, Sheikha Latifa Al-Fahad Al-Sabah, the Chairperson of the Parliamentary Women’s Affairs Committee, and also the President of the Kuwait Union of Women’s Societies, welcomed the decision

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to grant women the vote, stating her belief that, ‘Kuwaiti women will help in actively developing the homeland’, a reference to the idea that increased participation of women would reduce corruption and break the inactivity that often dogged Kuwaiti politics.43 She added: Relations between Parliament and government, in particular Sheikh Saad as prime minister, remained fractious throughout the 1990s. The increased difficulty of running the government and legislating effectively, together with the sense that Sheikh Saad remained suspicious of opposition and distant from Parliamentarians, eventually led to a decision in 2003 to split, for the first time, the positions of crown prince and prime minister.44

Many of the Al-Sabah women were very influential in the fields of economics and business, but Sheikha Suad Al-Sabah provided another angle. Trained in economics, she was best known as an award-winning poet, and was one of the most forthright of the Al-Sabahs in promoting women’s right to vote. Her affiliation with international human rights organizations and development NGOs gave her gravitas and influence.45 With such powerful women within the ruling family outwardly expressing their support for giving women the vote, the pressure upon the ruling emir built up. Whilst it is a well-known fact that he was personally in favour of emancipation, this further exposed the dichotomy between what the ruling family said and what it actually did concerning democratic rights for women. The willingness of outspoken women within the family to announce publicly their support for granting women the right to vote caused a great deal of embarrassment to the ruler, and undoubtedly had an effect in ensuring that the momentum gained after the 1990–1 conflict remained. The women acted as figureheads for the feminist movement, and their high visibility and publicity prevented the issue becoming sidelined or deflected.

The 1999 Decree: The Emir Finally Picks a Side After the near destruction of the women’s rights movement in 1996, most Kuwaitis – as well as the international community – felt that the position of the government and, by extension the ruling family, was clear. The 1994

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ratification of the CEDAW treaty, with provisions arguing that Sharia law was paramount and that women would not be given the vote, seemed to be straightforward. The promise of the Emir during the Government in Exile seemed to have meant nothing, and it appeared that Kuwait was going to remain a disenfranchised nation when it came to women. The dissolution of Parliament in 1999, on the face of it, appeared to be for a fairly trivial matter, and most political commentators felt that the situation would return to normal after an election. However, this changed when the Emir decided to issue a decree giving women the vote, a move that caught both traditionalists and liberals off guard and gave hope to the various women’s rights movements.46 The timing of the Emir’s announcement took many by surprise. ‘The decision was taken out of a personal conviction and belief in the equality between men and women,’ the Emir told a delegation of a hundred women at his palace. However, some analysts see the decision as part of the struggle for power between the executive and the ruling family, with one Gulf diplomat declaring, The Emir may have chosen to use the women’s-vote issue as a weapon in the stand-off between his cabinet and the Parliament. Obviously, the make-up of the new Parliament will determine the fate of the order. But no matter how assertive the MPs are, an Emiri decree will still carry significant weight.47

The decision of the Emir to submit a decree for emancipation caught most people by surprise, especially when a decree is considered law until specifically dismissed by Parliament. Of course, it would be rewarding to assume that this move was fuelled entirely by the wish of the Al-Sabahs to deliver on their promises but the ruling family are experienced politicians, so any action must also be gauged against the prevailing conditions at the time. There were many reasons for the Emir’s decision to push for reform and issue a decree calling for the emancipation of women. Firstly, he had been under pressure from members of his family, many of whom were high-profile advocates for emancipation. The Sheikh would have been well aware of public opinion, and would have understood fully that the majority of citizens were now in favour of such legislation.

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Of course, there is little doubt that pressure from the USA, which still had thousands of troops stationed in the emirate and which, through unofficial channels, constantly pressed for reform, was substantial.48 The emir’s decision was, however, also based upon his need to distract the attention of Kuwaitis away from a government that was, allegedly, riddled with corruption, and was seen as ineffective and impotent. Constant bickering marred the image of government – added to which it had completely failed to shore up the fragile postwar economy or push through the necessary reforms despite various conflicting interests.49 Much of the blame for this stasis could be placed at the door of individual members who had made expensive promises in return for votes but, by association, this negative perception also reflected badly upon the Al-Sabahs. In a country where most citizens viewed them as a positive, largely due to the generous welfare state and the idea that they were perceived as a counterweight against parliamentary squabbles and extremism, this was damaging. Appealing to the majority of Kuwaiti women was certainly one way of altering this perception.50 This policy, when considered alongside the large number of controversial decrees issued in this period, shows that the emir was trying to force the hand of the National Assembly, pushing it to make decisions and adopt economic and social reform. Many of the liberals and moderate conservatives, often opposed to other bills, were outflanked by this manoeuvre and hurriedly attempted to counteract the proposals.51 The fact that these decrees were issued during the suspension of Parliament ensured that they only needed a simple majority to enter law when the new government was formed within 60 days. The hope was that these elements of the Assembly, in voting in support of this particular decree, would then be unable to claim that the other decrees were, in any way, unconstitutional. This particular tactic did not work, as the liberal reformists saw through it and did not support any of the bills. As an example, the 1996 Speaker of the Assembly, Ahmad Al-Saadun, based his campaign for re-election around defying these decrees.52 The indirect effect that granting women the vote would have upon the emir’s attempt to break the deadlock, and push through reforms, also had a bearing upon the decision. The Assembly, and indeed the entire electorate, had become entrenched in a stalemate that blocked

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any reforms proposed by either side. Islamists and reformists had become so fixated on preventing the opposition from functioning that they ceased supporting any decrees – a significant challenge to a political system that relies upon partisanship.53 Despite the ban on political parties, the Assembly still had distinct factions that cancelled each other out. Including women in the vote, and potentially providing the opportunity for them to become Parliamentarians, was an easy way to negate this confrontational approach. Changing the demographic could certainly break up some of these traditional factions, and even ensure that previously under-represented groups, such as small tribes and the minority Shi‘is, would be able to gain enough support to push through their reform bills from the twice-as-large pool of potential voters. Ultimately, this particular approach also relied upon reforming the electoral districts, a change that the government made a few years later.54 Yet another factor in this decision to submit the decree was an attempt by the ruling family to attack several of the traditional powerbases of some of the more obstinate politicians. During the 1990s, the government had consistently undermined the strength of social groups, including women’s groups and liberal groups. However, this had given politicians free rein in the diwaniyas, the meeting places for men that also served as centres of political debate and opposition.55 These male-only preserves acted as the centre for electioneering, and were also the places where parliamentary candidates made most of their promises to potential voters. In addition, they were often the places where candidates made shady deals and formed alliances, acting as unofficial and illegal political parties. Granting the vote to women would suddenly diminish the power of diwaniyas, and probably prevent wealthier candidates offering bribes in poorer areas of Kuwait.56 As well as ensuring campaigning did not happen solely in these male preserves, Kuwaiti women were seen as more honest than men and less likely to be swayed by envelopes stuffed with money. As in most countries, Kuwaiti politics was a dirty game, and the emir hoped that women would help to put an end to some of the worst aspects of corruption.57 Another motive for allowing women to stand for election was certainly the image of the ruling family as a whole. The right of the ruling family to appoint ministers, and select the prime minister, had

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been tainted by high-profile allegations of corruption, and the family was in danger of running out of good candidates, with many of the younger males more concerned with enjoying the playboy lifestyle and making the most of their monthly and annual financial allowance as well as other privileges that come with being a sheikh(a) or a member of the ruling family.58 In spite of the tremendous amounts of money spent on their education, many sheikhs in Kuwait have adopted lifestyles rather than responsibility. With few accomplishments to their name, many prefer to remain in the background, avoiding responsibility, out of the public eye and away from scrutiny. Most were kept from practicing politics or sharing in ruling the country by the few elders who are in their seventies and eighties controlling every aspect of the ruling family and even Kuwait despite the fact that many sheikhs and sheikhas are well-educated, ambitious, of good standing in society, and had excelled in their line of expertise. They resorted to business ventures, some using their names as royals carving out vast personal fortunes. Partying all night, sleeping all day, and driving exclusive cars is the life of many modern sheikhs, more glamorous than ever and more disconnected from the life they were once expected to lead. Not many people know who these young princes are but their way of life is instantly recognizable. By contrast, many older female members of the Al-Sabah family were relatively untouched by scandal, and their success and competence in civil society and academia ensured that they portrayed the ruling family in a much better light.59 As well as increasing the number of good ministerial candidates, emancipation would guarantee support for female ministers from women, thus rebuilding the reputation of the family and addressing the concerns of many Kuwaitis. The ruling party had previously used the electorate to promote its own vision in order to protect itself from specific factions. In the past, the rulers gave citizenship and the vote to many tribal Bedouin in an attempt to shore up the traditionalist vote – and to act as a counterweight to the reformists, who were threatening to dominate the Assembly – and, by default, support the position of the ruling family itself.60 As discussed in Chapter 3, this particular policy of promoting conservative and tribal groups at the expense of liberals also pushed women’s rights further down the list of priorities, as there was little

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hope of passing such a decree without alienating conservatives. Sadly, this led to the indirect suppression of women’s groups in the immediate post-war period, as the ruling party attempted to appeal to conservatives to try to move forward with reform.61 This backfired, and the Al-Sabahs had to find a way to lessen the strength of Islamists, who were seeking to impose strict Sharia law, which threatened the fabric of Kuwaiti society by threatening to undo the advances made in other areas of gender equality.62 Although the female electorate encompassed a wide range of views, from conservative to liberal, they were perceived as being much more likely to adopt a moderate stance, so an influx of female candidates and voters could be the key to smashing the polarity prevalent in the National Assembly. As with the case of enfranchising the Bedouin, the ruling family hoped to develop a solid base of voters who would be loyal to them, rather than to notions of conservatism or, conversely, reform.63 Certainly, the timing of the bill was interesting and had a notable impact on the women of Kuwait. There was no guarantee that the bill would be passed, but it certainly galvanized the women of Kuwait into action, and gave the various women’s groups impetus to try to influence change through activism and legal challenges. Whatever the reasons for the emir submitting this bill, and whether he expected it to be successful or not, his action breathed life into the women’s rights movement. Ultimately, members of Parliament blocked the decree on 23 November 1999, for reasons that will be elaborated upon in Chapter 8, but the fact that suffrage was now publicly supported by the ruling family became a critical step in the move towards emancipation that would define the opening decade of the twenty-first century.64 The emir, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, who was then Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that the Assembly had ‘a duty under the constitution to grant women political rights … The constitution should not deprive women from assuming their rightful political roles in Kuwaiti life. There has been a grave constitutional mistake and it should be rectified immediately’, also adding that the decree was of ‘importance internally and abroad’.65 This bill certainly set the tone for the debate as Kuwait entered the new millennium, and it heralded a number of subtle changes in the political structure of the state.

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The Defeat of the Bill and the Decline of the Islamists Unsurprisingly, the Islamist factions and many of the liberal moderates united to block this bill, citing the undemocratic manner in which it had been submitted as the reason for their stance. The bill was resubmitted on 30 November, as a parliamentary motion, but was defeated by a narrow margin of 32 to 30 votes.66 One of the traditionalist Assembly members, Ahmed Baqer, shouted that the Kuwaiti people did not want women’s rights, asking, ‘Why do you want to force it on them?’67 This showed the depth of opposition amongst many of the traditionalist members. One of the liberal members, Sami Al-Munayes, accused his reformist bloc of tacitly supporting the ban by hiding behind procedure and the constitution, using an abstention to defeat the bill whilst appearing to support it. The complexity of Kuwaiti politics once again acted to conceal the real reasons behind the voting down of the decree.68 Some liberals, such as Mohamed Al-Jassem, believed that the defeat of the decree demonstrated the strength of the Kuwaiti Parliament and ensured that the emir did not have free rein. Other reformists also felt this way, and believed that by supporting the decree they would undermine their own agenda, built around reducing the power of the emir.69 However, some reformists stood accused of being just as opposed to the emancipation of women as the Islamists, and the resubmission of the bill, via Parliament, acted as a means to test liberal opinion and remove the excuse of hiding behind technicalities. As a kind of consolation prize, the government said that it would extend limited ministerial duties for the first time to a woman, Dr Rasha Al-Sabah, a member of the ruling family, who was appointed Undersecretary for Higher Education in 1993, a post she held until 2009.70 Despite the protestations of the emir to the contrary, he fully understood that this decree stood a strong chance of being overturned. There was always the possibility that Parliament and government would manage to filibuster the opposition until 2000, when women could register to vote. This failed, yet the emir fully achieved some of his goals. The pressure and debate from within his own family, as well as criticism from the international media concerning his promise to grant women the vote made in the aftermath of the 1990–1 conflict, had previously become vituperative. Throughout the 1990s he had received criticism that his promises were empty and that the

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new, democratic Kuwait had failed to materialize. The United States, particularly, had pressed for reform and change, including emancipation, but the National Assembly continued in a near-perpetual stalemate.71 The Emir had received criticism for failing to push hard enough for reform, and the ruling family certainly lost face during the rebuilding period, so this decree clearly enhanced their international reputation. However, the failure of the decree to pass through the National Assembly did have some serious ramifications domestically, with many Kuwaitis fearing that the chance was lost and that the Al-Sabahs were using their perceived duplicity to tacitly support the Islamist faction. Massouma Al-Mubarak, a former Professor of Political Science at Kuwait University, former minister and Member of Parliament, summed the situation up: she believed in the promise of the exiled emir to give women voting rights, listening to his 1990 speech from Saudi Arabia with optimism. His promise became reality and a decree was issued only to be rejected by Parliament.72 Certainly, the decision to submit the decree in 1999 was something of a surprise to the average Kuwaiti, who had seen far too many false dawns. Despite the intervention of the National Assembly, the Kuwaitis had the political sophistication to understand that the emir’s hands were tied in this particular matter and that they should direct their energies against elected representatives, rather than the ruling family, although this still begged the question of why the emir did not submit a decree immediately after the war, before the 1992 elections.73 Many activists for reform felt that the government, rather than the ruling family, was to blame, and criticism was certainly deflected away from the family as the National Assembly went on the defensive. Others believed that the emir had become increasingly frustrated at the impasse and the indecisiveness of the former Crown Prince and Prime Minister, the late Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Salem. In 2003, the emir split the office for the first time, in an attempt to inject dynamism and drive into the government, making it proactive rather than reactive.74 According to many prominent figures close to the Emir, this sidelining of the Crown Prince led to the Emir Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, then Deputy Prime Minister, taking control of the day-to-day running of the government. This dynamic member of the ruling family promised to shake off some of the apathy and inaction that had plagued the Assembly. The

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move also signalled a step towards reform – this had been one of the major demands of the liberal reformist faction in the house – creating momentum for changes in the political structure, including extending voting rights to women.75 Despite the failure of the decree in 1999 women were galvanized into action, and the level of determination amongst activists rose. During the annual voter registration on 1 April 2000, hundreds of women marched into the registration centres and demanded the right to register as voters. They were turned away, but the very action tapped into a groundswell of public support. Legal challenges were enacted in the Constitutional Court and, whilst dismissed on constitutional grounds, added to the prevailing sense of injustice.76 Whatever the reason for the failure of the bill, and whether the blame lay with the ruling family or the National Assembly, the defeat reignited the reformist movement and women again began to press for emancipation.

Success: The Pressure of the Ruling Family Finally Has an Effect The momentum of this activism carried on throughout the lifetime of the Parliament and, in October 2003, the cabinet attempted to introduce a bill granting women full suffrage, a process discussed more fully in Chapter 8. This was again defeated, but the resubmission of the bill, culminating in a vote on 16 May 2005, finally granted full rights, and the pressure exerted by the emir and the prime minister paid off, as the Kuwaiti Parliament eventually saw fit to pass the bill granting women the right to full participation in the democratic process.77 Despite the opposition from traditionalists, women finally had the right to vote, and the decision of the emir to submit the 1999 decree was, seemingly, fully vindicated.78 The government had shown a great deal of brinkmanship and a willingness to face down the National Assembly, understanding that Islamism was becoming extremely dangerous in the Middle East and beyond.79 The government and ruling family closed ranks and presented a united front, claiming a great deal of satisfaction from the passage of the bill. The former prime minister, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmed, stated, ‘We are satisfied with the result. I hope that Kuwaiti women will be a help to the men in developing the

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country … The government now has the right to appoint a woman as a government minister.’80 In addition, the emir signalled his intent to push forward the feminization of Parliament by appointing a female cabinet minister, Massouma Al-Mubarak. Amid cheers from reformists and jeers from Islamists, she took her seat as Planning Minister and made Kuwaiti history – the fact that she was publicly pro-reform further strengthening the feminist movement.81 Prime Minister Sabah Al-Ahmed refuted the allegations that the ruling family had succumbed to pressure from the international community and media, claiming that, ‘Granting political rights to women is the will of the Emir of Kuwait [Jaber Al-Sabah], and not the result of an external will.’82 He continued, ‘We see a Kuwaiti woman’s appointment as a government minister as an important step that we had hoped to realize – and today we witness the realization of this wish.’ The new minister stated that she was honoured to be ‘the first woman minister in the history of Kuwait’, and added: I hope that the experience of appointing a woman to this kind of post will serve as a source of strength and as proof of [women’s] contribution. [The goal] of my being a minister is to prove the capabilities and ambitions of the Kuwaiti woman, and her role in the building and development of this homeland.83

The enormity of this particular appointment was not lost on the suffrage movement and any ideas of unconstitutionality were quickly dismissed. Rola Dashti stated, I think we have started the second phase of our process in becoming a democracy by engaging women in political life as a voter and as a candidate … This process will continue and we will engage more women in public life and we make sure that women are elected into the Parliament and are included in the decision-making process.84

The emir’s willingness to force change upon the static National Assembly continued as he began to extend his appointments to other senior public posts. On 5 June 2005, the government appointed two

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women to the newly formed Kuwait City Municipal Council. Against a backdrop of dissent, and claims that this positive discrimination overrode the will of Parliament and, by extension, the people, former Parliamentary Speaker Jassem Al-Khurafi retorted, Parliament’s agreement [to the amendment] is a victory for Kuwait and for democracy, and a response to the will of the emir … After the vote [granting] political rights to the woman, there is now nothing to prevent the Kuwaiti prime minister from appointing a woman as minister in his government … He also has the right to appoint a female member of the current municipal council.85

The appointment of two female engineers, Fatima Nasser Al-Sabah and Fawziya Al-Bahar, also signified a victory for the educational system, showing that well-educated Kuwaiti women could rise to high office.86 Engineer Al-Sabah said that she was ‘proud and happy about the appointment … a responsibility I aspire to carry out conscientiously, for Kuwait’.87 These posts, within a 16-member council, involved making decisions about the normal functioning of the city – including planning, public health, property law and monitoring construction within city boundaries. Fawziya Al-Bahar promised to continue promoting the cause of Kuwaiti women, stating that, ‘I never dreamed of being a member in the council. I am very proud to be the first Kuwaiti woman to be appointed to this council … The council is technical and deals with planning matters but still, I will try to promote the cause of Kuwaiti women wherever possible.’88 Latifa Al-Sabah, wife of the former Kuwaiti Crown Prince and prime minister, the late Emir Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah, chairperson of the Parliamentary Women’s Affairs Committee and president of the Kuwaiti Union for Women Societies, welcomed the new amendment. She expressed her hope that, ‘the Kuwaiti woman will help in actively developing the homeland’.89 The ruling family had finally seized the initiative and forced the issue, but the next battle would concern whether their actions would allow women to reach Parliament on their own merit. Despite the celebrations, there was still a chance that the actions of the emir could backfire, and that his appointment of women to the cabinet and council would cause great harm to the feminist movement.

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Kuwaiti feminists celebrated the decision to grant the vote and install ministers but, if they were perceived to fail in their duties, then opponents would seize upon this as proof that women did not belong in politics.90 This move also had the potential to undermine the women’s position, associating their presence in the government and legislature with royal appointment and decree, whilst placing women ministers in a potentially adversarial position in relation to reformist legislators. Prior to this landmark legislation, the emir had issued many decrees, and criticisms of his unconstitutional methods grew. This apparent forcing of issues certainly had the potential to damage the reputation of women within politics, if their cause became inextricably linked with such accusations.91 The emir may well have depended upon women to increase the proportion of his supporters in the National Assembly, as a trade-off for his support of women’s rights, but this also had the potential to backfire upon all parties concerned.92 In June 2005, he hinted at opening up government to women by appointing a greater number of female ministers, and many political candidates expressed great interest in applying for these positions. As Dashti stated, after the 2006 elections, ‘we do expect that women will become part of the incoming cabinet. We do hope that we will have two women instead of one woman in the cabinet, but this is in the hands of the prime minister who is asked to [form the government].’93 However, it could be argued that female politicians were elected to Parliament as a result of ‘positive’ discrimination.94 Nevertheless, the deputy prime minister and interior minister who became Crown Prince in 2006, Sheikh Nawaf Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, congratulated Kuwaitis ‘for believing in half of society, that is, the woman, for receiving her political rights’.95 He pointed out that his Interior Ministry registered over 200,000 women voters for the February 2006 elections.96 The ruling family had taken a huge gamble in fully supporting women’s rights and risked their reputation.97 The political analyst Michael Herb pointed out that the National Assembly was beginning to assert its influence, stating that, ‘So far it’s largely been a veto of the ministers chosen by the ruling family … It will become democratic when instead the Parliament chooses who the ministers are. It’s certainly moving in that direction.’98 For women, the goal was now to

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validate the patronage of the ruling family and become members of Parliament on their own merit, achieving political legitimacy in the process.

2006: The Death of the Emir, Parliament Exercises its Rights, and Reform The Emir Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah died in January 2006, bringing to an end almost 30 years of rule. The Sheikh was remembered with fondness by most Kuwaitis, although he also received some blame for sustaining the status quo, by cultivating traditionalist factions to oppose the reformists in the National Assembly,99 and for not tackling with force the endemic corruption within the political system.100 Within the ruling family, Sheikh Jaber was seen as a man of morals who respected and understood the family, treating its members as equal. Sheikh Jaber received some blame by a few elderly members of the family for not taking the necessary precautions that could have prevented the occupation of his country in August 1990. During his reign, the ruling family was more united and more respected by the people. Sheikh Jaber was seen as a good listener, minimizing family feuds.101 Emir Sheikh Jaber was more accessible to members of the family, and the people had greater public accessibility to the family. Sheikh Jaber spent a lot of his time remarrying, leaving politics to his relatives, especially as he got older. He rarely travelled, except for some state visits, and rarely conducted media interviews, especially after being traumatized by the 1990 invasion.102 On the whole, the emir was a positive influence upon Kuwait, and guided the developing nation through some challenging times.103 Some of the obituaries highlighted general attitudes towards the man, although it must be stressed that such plaudits, given after death, are usually positive. Ghanim Al-Najar, a Professor of Political Science at Kuwait University, stated, ‘People are sad, and I didn’t expect to be that sad … I felt sad in some way on the personal side. He commanded very good affection among people, definitely the younger generation.’104 Mohamed Al Rumaihi, Professor of Political Sociology at Kuwait University and former Editor-in-Chief of Awan daily newspaper and the monthly magazine Al-Arabi, added, ‘We have lost today

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the last father, if you like, of Kuwait.’105 These quotes, referring to the emir as a father figure, show the esteem in which he was held, but hint that his long reign left him untouchable. The lengthy periods of rule are usually an impediment to major reform. The death of the long-serving emir opened up a new era in Kuwaiti politics, where the National Assembly felt freer to criticize the ruling family and flex its political muscles. Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmed ruled for so long that he was regarded as a national institution, generally above reproach. The ailing Crown Prince, Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah, became emir in 2006, and the National Assembly used its constitutional rights and privileges to alter the course of the succession and give birth to a full-blown constitutional crisis.106 Sheikh Saad, the cousin of Sheikh Jaber, had been regarded by many as a peripheral figure in Kuwaiti politics during his role as Crown Prince. According to the Ambassador’s Online Magazine, writing after his death in May 2008, he was the Kuwaiti hero of the liberation, and they were strong in their praise, stating, ‘While holding the title of Crown Prince for many years, Sheikh Saad never showed a driving ambition to be head of state, with all the surrounding pomp. He was born in an era when Kuwait was a poor backwater in the Gulf, and Kuwaitis led simple lives.’107 Gerald Butt of the Independent described him as, ‘A tall and dignified man, he was happier with the lifestyle of the pre-oil wealth Kuwait than with that of the brash modern world.’108 Crown Prince Sheikh Saad was seen as an inherently decent, short-tempered man, more of a military type personality, who had tried to avoid the cut and thrust of debate, but this also labelled him, by some, as having old-fashioned values and living in the days of tribal politics and Pre-Oil Kuwait. One obituary, in The Times, stated that, ‘The Kuwaiti merchant class and liberal MPs accused him of hindering economic reform and shielding government corruption.’ It argued that his involvement with the police and security forces, as minister, and his mistrust of Parliament, were the main drivers behind stasis in government.109 However, this was tempered by his open and accepting demeanour towards average Kuwaitis, making him something of an enigma. These 2008 obituaries sum up attitudes to the former Crown Prince and suggest that he was regarded by all factions within the National Assembly as a relic of an outdated age. Whilst there is little doubt that he inherited the

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Al-Sabah ability to deflect crisis, he was largely seen as a man who tried to please everyone but, ultimately, antagonized everybody within Parliament, however well loved he was by the people. One obituary stated, ‘He was one of the kindest and gentlest of senior Kuwaitis, admired and respected by his people.’ Another obituary read, ‘He craved no riches, and he was as embarrassed as many Kuwaitis were by the way in which some of his closest family members exploited his name to amass fortunes.’110 Others see his beautiful and spacious sea-side residential palace located on Kuwait’s main road, the Gulf Road, that took years to build in the 1980s, complete with its fleet of bullet-proof Mercedes and decorated honour guards, as a constant reminder of his affluent lifestyle in a time when most members of the ruling family drove Chevrolet Caprices and resided in modest homes, including Emir Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmed. These platitudes perhaps summed up the paradox of the ruling family and how it was generally revered by Kuwaitis, but the electorate increasingly saw them as politically naive and out of touch with contemporary challenges. Without the freedom to directly criticize the emir, it had always been difficult to express unhappiness with the system, until social networks such as Twitter opened up the flood gates of harsh criticism directed at some members of the ruling family by the opposition especially after the government restricted the media months before the December 2012 elections. Many opposition members were banned from appearing in major local news outlets. In 2012 nearly a dozen Kuwaiti Twitter users and bloggers were arrested for insulting the emir, including the first Kuwaiti woman, Sarah Al-Drais, arrested for tweeting.111 Kuwaiti TV stations, like Scope and Al-Youm, were shut down.112 Four former opposition MPs were convicted of insulting the emir, including opposition leader Mussallam Al-Barrak;113 a popular political figure in Kuwait who received the highest number of votes in the 2012 election and who had served in parliament since 1996.114 Al-Barrak’s firm stance against corruption gained him some admirers and supporters even within the ruling family. Because of such crackdowns, Kuwait’s reputation was harmed abroad, in a time when the world’s media was closely monitoring the unprecedented public demonstrations unfolding in Kuwait.

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The crisis came to a head as the scale of Sheikh Saad’s illness became apparent and, at the time of his ascent, politicians began to move to bar him from office, by looking to a little-used article of the constitution permitting the Assembly to influence the course of succession.111 Sheikh Saad, suffering from a range of medical conditions, did not even have the strength to pledge the lengthy Kuwait oath of office, and this opened up an intense and vituperative debate within both Parliament and the ruling family. The deadline for taking the oath passed and the Assembly used a 1964 constitutional law to remove the heir and install instead the half-brother of the late Emir Sheikh Jaber as the head of state. Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, previously the Prime Minister, became emir. Sheikh Sabah is far more involved, dissolving parliament five times with seven governments since he took office in 2006116 – a reaction to perceived dissatisfaction with his key appointments. The Kuwaiti opposition claim that corruption became more widespread and traditionalist causes more accepted during Sheikh Sabah’s time in power. Recently, the prestige of the office of the emir was somewhat tarnished by insults directed at the emir whose power was seen as receding. As notions of hereditary rule and autocracy become increasingly outdated, even across the Middle East with the unfolding events of the Arab/Islamic Spring, the ruling family was under pressure from many of its own members to open a dialogue with opposition members and refrain from using force. Emir Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah has always been regarded as the ‘father of diplomacy’, having served as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1963 to 2003. Further damage was done to the Office of the emir when Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser Al-Mohamed Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah was forced to resign in 2011, following protests calling for his removal.117 Sheikh Nasser could be compared to Sarah Palin, vice presidential candidate, who hurt presidential candidate John McCain’s campaign during the US election in 2008. Well-admired and respected among family circles, the Western-educated, generous and mild-mannered former prime minister was best known for serving as Minister of Information from 1985 to 1988 and Minister of the Royal Court from 1991 to 2006. A nephew of the emir, Sheikh Nasser was seen by some as

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having big ambitions and at times acting like an emir, believing he was beyond reproach. Sheikh Nasser was the only Kuwaiti prime minister forced out of office since the Office of Prime Minister was created in 1962. His governments were considered Kuwait’s most corrupt. The Kuwaiti population, that enjoys one of the highest per capita incomes in the world, was and remains one of the least happy nations because of its political problems. The rise in oil prices has not reflected well on the status of many average Kuwaitis. Sheikh Sabah, as emir, was now ready to oversee the development of the Kuwaiti political structure, with women set to vote for the first time, later in 2006. Sheikh Sabah was renowned for his support of women’s rights; when serving as Prime Minister he was responsible for pushing through the 2005 electoral law amendments granting women the right to vote, and appointed a woman, Massouma Al-Mubarak, as Minister of Planning.118 He stated, ‘Getting women the right to vote is a natural progression in our democracy and it has had a positive impact on Kuwait and its people. Kuwaiti women deserved to have their rights long ago, and they have proven this by taking leading roles.’119 Going in to the elections, this gave women a great deal of hope as they looked forward to exercising their newfound rights. In the elections of June 2006, 27 women ran but none won seats, although they did gain a reasonable number of votes, and the emir did include a woman in his cabinet.120 However, the new Parliament, with a mandate to end government corruption, forced two cabinet ministers to resign in 2007, raising concerns about the ruling family.121 The Emir continued to be a driving force behind the acceptance of women within the political structure, and his support lent credibility to the movement. For the first time, there was an emir who was unafraid to attempt to trade blows with Parliament publicly, rather than indirectly influence policy. After another period of stasis, he dissolved the traditionalist-dominated Parliament on 17 March 2007 and prepared for new elections. He argued that ‘there is no place in the country for fanaticism or allegiance to a sect, tribe or a social class at the cost of the nation’.122 After decades of being sidelined as a sacrifice to other interests, female candidates became the ground on which the ruling family placed their hopes, as they sought to break the stand-off between the government and Islamist factions. The factions in Parliament

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did not include female candidates, and women failed to produce a coherent manifesto, campaigning for women’s rights and issues rather than electioneering upon other, pressing issues and appealing to a broad section of Kuwaiti society. Seasoned Islamist candidates told constituents what they wanted to hear and tried to buy votes, employing electoral experience that female candidates did not have. Because women had only 20 days to prepare, there was little cohesion, with some districts represented by multiple female candidates, others with none, and no time to build coalitions or develop a wideranging manifesto.123 However, there was some room for optimism after the results were in, and the emir fulfilled his part by appointing another woman to government. The former Education Minister, Nouriyah Al-Sabeeh, was joined by Muthi Al-Humoud, Minister for Housing and Administrative Development, showing that the ruling family was prepared to raise the stakes and break away from an indecisive path. The Sheikh also called for women to play ‘a greater and more comprehensive role, with women working hand-in-hand with their brothers and actively bearing the responsibilities of development in all fields’.124 However, the government was about to face a bitter battle over allegations of corruption, and the danger was that women’s rights would be forgotten as the power struggle between Assembly and government raged. The former Minister of Health, Sheikh Ahmad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah, stood accused of mismanagement and corruption, leading to the resignation of the cabinet and a reshuffle. These political tensions continued as the antagonism grew between the government and the Assembly, and the latter pressed for the power to interrogate cabinet ministers over allegations of corruption and poor performance. Previously, questioning cabinet members, who were generally members of the ruling family, was taboo, but this was no longer the case, and the emir dissolved Parliament in March 2008. After an election on 17 May 2008, Islamist members of Parliament demanded the right to question the Prime Minister, Sheikh Nasser Al-Mohamed Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, over allegations that he sponsored the entry of a prominent Iranian cleric and critic of Sunni traditions into the country. Whilst the charges against the prime minister proved to be largely unfounded, they did give the Assembly leverage to criticize the

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government, and the cabinet resigned in November. However, the emir reappointed the Prime Minister numerous times subsequently until massive demonstrations against the corruption of the Prime Minister forced him to resign, and the tension between the ruling family and the Assembly continued.125

Conclusion The relationship between the ruling family and women’s rights has resulted in an extremely complex dynamic: the emir and most of his family were certainly personally pro-women’s rights, but they tried to balance this against the need to maintain their grip on power. Throughout the 1990s, and despite promises made whilst in exile, they consistently failed to deliver on emancipation. Part of the blame for this lies in the unique structure of the Kuwaiti political system, which does not grant the Al-Sabahs full autonomy, and provides the National Assembly with many checks and balances to curb any excessive misuse of the family’s authority. This, more than anything, led to the status quo being prolonged, as the emir and the Al-Sabah-dominated government attempted to push through the reform and rebuilding programmes that the country desperately needed. Women’s rights were, in turn, sacrificed as the emir attempted to negotiate a path through the stasis in Parliament. Despite Sheikh Jaber’s seeming reluctance to dwell upon the issue of women’s rights, other members of the family did not have to show restraint and could promote a pro-woman agenda, based upon the right to vote, without fear of repercussions. Many of the women within the family did so, as did some of the younger generation, who would become much more vocal after the deaths of Emir Jaber and his heir Sheikh Saad. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Sheikh Jaber threw his support publicly behind women’s rights, perhaps realizing that this issue would allow him to assert authority over the National Assembly and also combat the rising influence of hard-line Islamism within Kuwait. The current emir, Sheikh Sabah, has continued this path as he seeks to reassert the influence of the ruling family. He appointed women to government and risked his reputation by banking upon the Kuwait electorate following suit and democratically electing female representatives, which they did in 2008. However, the family is constantly under attack

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from Assembly members on charges of corruption, and there is still a chance that the women’s rights agenda could be tainted if the emir wavers and begins to use women’s rights to appease Islamist Assembly members. Paradoxically, women’s rights activists have argued that their democratic rights were infringed by the refusal of Kuwait to give them the vote, but now rely upon the undemocratic protection of the ruling family, certainly until they have stronger representation in the National Assembly. Thus, the same ruling family that kept women out of politics after the 1990–1 conflict now sponsors and supports their rights. If Kuwait does become more democratic, there is a chance that Islamists could reassert their dominance and strip away these hard-won gains. For the moment, feminists do have to remain under this protective influence and slowly build strength, through proving themselves to be capable politicians, free of corruption. Until then, they have to be part of a new status quo and adopt a patient approach towards seeking reform, lest they sow the seeds of their own downfall.

Chapter 5 WOMEN IN POLITICS: THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DEBATE

The debate over women’s rights in Kuwait did not take place in a political vacuum: Kuwaiti and international media groups played a significant role in the ideological battle. Whilst the Kuwaiti media was hugely important in informing the politically aware Kuwaiti public of the latest developments, it also became embroiled in the ‘phoney war’, where propaganda and misinformation were used to distract the opposition. The Kuwaiti media was always relatively free to criticize and discuss politics without repercussions, but it was still vulnerable to the whim of proprietors, whether the state or private, and there was a disconnection between the elite, liberal-leaning classes running the media and average Kuwaitis. This often led to alienation of the latter group, so many of them turned to the international media, especially as the internet grew in influence and improved access to information. The history of the media in Kuwait, as in many countries, shows how media opinion adapts, often in response to market forces, and newspapers alter their bias to suit a specific audience and sell more units. Thus, the print media, traditionally liberal, swung towards 133

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the Islamists, certainly in terms of women’s rights, after the 1990–1 conflict, as the feminist groups were outmanoeuvred by experienced professional politicians and the ruling family. As pressure outside Kuwait, including from the international press, mounted, women’s interest groups began to wrest back control and were much quicker to adapt to the electronic age than the traditionalists. This was a huge contributory factor in the recovery of the suffrage movement after the low of the 1996 election. Even as women turned the tide and began to enter the political process and vote, the media war continued as Islamists fought back and looked to use the media to promote their own agenda. Whilst they could not directly attack the emir’s decree, or demand that voting rights were removed, they started a concerted campaign under the guise of ‘moral decency’. By attacking perceived immorality in the modern media and seeking to link it to women and their insistence upon voting, they have attempted to tap into anti-American sentiments and influence voters of both genders. Whilst this has had little success at present, the possibility that their insinuations may gradually sway opinion is potentially dangerous; consequently, advocates for reform must ensure that the Islamists are countered. To this end, they must continue to engage the Kuwaiti media, but must also continue to use the publicity generated by international outlets to ensure that they are not outflanked.

The History of the Kuwaiti Press – Creating a Politically Aware Population Since the inception of the Kuwaiti constitution in 1962, the media in Kuwait has been guaranteed a great deal of autonomy and freedom and has been free to express its opinions – which is unusual amongst the Arab countries of the Gulf region – as long as journalists did not criticize the emir or blaspheme against Islam.1 If the government wanted to take action against a publication, it had to use the courts, and this was usually more trouble than it was worth, because such a move would merely give more publicity to the offending publication.2 As a result, Kuwaiti publications have never been afraid to adopt a strong, opinionated stance, and most newspapers are packed

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with opinion pieces and editorials designed to stimulate debate and provide topics for discussion in the diwaniyas.3 This freedom to express strong opinions is a foundation stone of Kuwaiti society, and it can be argued that the Kuwaiti press is one of the major reasons why the state has not experienced the bitter battles between Islamists and reformists apparent in many other nations, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, where political polarization is more common.4 There is little doubt that oppression and media censorship lead to resistance and political unrest; Kuwait has remained relatively peaceful, as opposing views have been accommodated rather than silenced. The media has created an open political arena for the sharing of views and has allowed strong criticism of the government, granting Kuwaitis a release valve. Kuwaitis have always been avid readers of political news and views, and the robustness of the media allows the average Kuwaiti to feel part of the political structure rather than a disinterested observer.5 With the occasional aberration, the Kuwaiti press has always exercised a degree of self-control in avoiding inflaming situations in the name of sensationalism. However, this self-censorship does carry a price; whilst the Kuwaiti media is ‘often aggressive in their coverage of politics and the government’, it stops short of directly criticizing the ruling family, which can create an imbalance in perception.6 As Jamie Etheridge, managing editor of the Kuwait Times points out, ‘The greatest problem journalists face here in Kuwait is self-censorship. This is particularly true for Arab journalists who are pretty aware of how writings will affect certain communities in Kuwait.’7 However, most Kuwaitis are sufficiently politically sophisticated to understand this particular source of bias.8 Less publicized is the difficulty of persuading sources to blow the whistle and also the influence of advertisers, who will pull adverts from media outlets running overly controversial pieces.9 While women have never been allowed to enter most diwaniyas, the media kept most of them informed about the latest political developments. Specifically, educated Kuwaiti women certainly read newspapers and kept abreast of the latest political news and, whilst denied the vote, there is little doubt that they shared their opinions with male relatives and their husbands; they were certainly not expected to keep their opinions to themselves or leave the room when ‘the men’ were talking.10 Kuwaiti

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women were not isolated from politics and had an indirect avenue for affecting the political process – a facet embraced by many newspapers, which realized that a large proportion of their readers were women and devoted a large part of their content to women’s issues and reform.11 The Kuwaiti media acted as an excellent outlet for the sharing of political views, and the structure of the press adapted to the non-partisan structure of the Kuwaiti Parliament. The lack of political parties ensured that there was less partisanship in the Kuwaiti media, and it tended to remain issue, rather than ideologically, driven, thereby concentrating upon individual politicians rather than factions or blocs.12 Straddling the divide between politics and the media, Kuwaiti parliamentary representatives often wrote columns for the daily and weekly newspapers, allowing them to maintain a more personal relationship with the electorate than is possible with the party-political media in many Western countries.13 In the USA and UK, for example, the media fall upon either side of the Democrat/Republican or Labour/Conservative divide, broadly split into the left and the right and often changing allegiance as a new government takes power. For example, a 2007 study by Stanford University showed that the gulf between the conservative Fox News and the liberal CNN has widened in recent years, as both sources moved away from the centre.14 Of course, it would be disingenuous to suggest that the Kuwaiti media does not suffer from inbuilt bias, depending upon the affiliation and inherent bias of the owner, but the distinction is less marked and creates a politically aware population.15 For example, many newspapers are happy to carry articles and columns from politicians with opposing viewpoints, especially if this sells more copies in a competitive market.16 In return, these politicians are given the chance to connect with voters across a broad political spectrum.17 Established politicians employ the media to connect with their constituents and maintain support, whereas aspiring ones use the media as a vehicle to attract voters and launch themselves. As campaign posters spring up around the state before an election, Kuwaiti politicians must ensure that their faces are recognized. This attracts voters, much more than membership of any particular faction or political bloc, and allows the electorate to opt for individuals perceived to share their political views rather than a clearly defined party.18

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One notable nuance of the Kuwaiti media, certainly before the 1990–1 conflict, was that newspapers tended to lean towards reformist viewpoints, with only one weekly magazine, the Al-Furqan, providing an alternative Islamic viewpoint.19 Part of this bias can be explained by the political affiliations of the owners, who tended to be drawn from the liberal merchant families, keen to maintain steady pressure upon the ruling family and press for a dilution of the power of the Al-Sabahs.20 When the emir dissolved the National Assembly, between 1976 and 1986, this opposition became particularly vituperative, and the media reflected the views of disenfranchised Kuwaitis with no political voice during the decade. The other reason for this particular bias can be explained by the demographic of the target audience at that time. Before the 1990s, newspapers sold more heavily in urban areas than rural districts, and the population of the cities and towns tended to be much more liberal and reformist in nature than in the outlying areas.21 This liberal tendency within the Kuwaiti media also created a strong relationship between Kuwaiti women and the media; the liberal media generally supported and promoted women’s rights, including their participation in the political process.22 This tendency manifested itself indirectly, through criticism of policy, and directly, by publishing articles aimed at this important segment of the population. Again, this was largely due to the reformist slant, but also related to the fact that ignoring such a large proportion of the population would affect sales. Originally, women wrote short pieces for magazines under pseudonyms but, over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, articles written by women began to appear in mainstream publications. Kuwaitis, used to educated women, saw little problem with that and the articles became much more political in nature, criticizing the government for its failure to address emancipation. As early as the 1950s, many newspapers included a ‘Women’s Corner’, a place for women, often writing under pseudonyms, to discuss women’s issues, including education, work and political involvement.23 The media also lay behind the rapid modernization of the state, as it depicted modern Kuwaiti women as educated and career-minded, encouraging more women to participate in the process of modernization.24 Women started to work in the media in the 1950s, and educated

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Kuwaiti women were certainly amongst the most avid readers of newspapers and magazines, the only way that they could connect with politics and opinion. Any newspaper or magazine failing to address this demographic would have been at a huge commercial disadvantage; Kuwaiti women, whilst still denied the vote, certainly wielded power within the walls of their own homes and purchased whichever newspapers they chose. Enticing women to work within the media gave newspapers an edge in catering for women and getting ahead in a competitive market. Of course, pre-conflict Kuwait still maintained the old social taboos restricting many women from working with unrelated men, which acted as a barrier for many women wishing to become broadcasters or journalists. However, the changing mood in Kuwait, and the increasing influence of education meant that most Kuwaiti fathers wanted what was best for their daughters rather than simply sticking to tradition. In this respect, having a career in the media was little different to becoming an engineer or a doctor; consequently, the restrictions lessened in influence and women became a much more familiar sight on television screens.25 For as long as the pre-1990 conflict status quo remained in force, the media continued to criticize the government, the ruling family and the National Assembly. However, the changing political landscape after the Iraqi occupation saw the Islamists look to influence the media. In addition, after the successful international public relations exercise that allowed the ‘Government in Exile’ to gain support for a coalition to liberate the country, the ruling family also began to fully understand the power of the media and to use it to influence the electorate.

The Influence of the Kuwaiti Media and the Islamization of the Press Traditionally, as we have just seen, the media in Kuwait showed a heavy bias towards liberals and reformists, but the 1980s began to see a shift in this attitude as traditionalists, who had already begun to embrace the power of the media, sought to harness it for their own particular agenda. Initially, this use of the media by conservative women’s groups was limited in scale and hardly impacted public

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opinion, but they slowly built up a loyal base of readers. They produced literature designed to appeal to women happy within the traditional Islamic role, as wife and mother, offering a counter point of view to the more liberal feminists, who sought ‘Western-style’ freedom and equality.26 The conservative feminist publications used subtle imagery and targeted articles proclaiming the traditional role of women as an alternative to the perceived liberal bias in the media. This particular movement started on the university campuses as traditionalist women produced their own publications, challenging what they perceived to be the forcing of foreign values upon women. In 1981 the traditionalist women expanded a small newsletter called The Voice of Keifan into a full monthly publication, called Manbar Al-Taleba. This publication was intended to tap into the increasing numbers of politically aware young women on university campuses, but soon expanded into nonacademic areas, encouraging women to embrace traditional roles and Islamic ways.27 One way of gently swaying opinion and attracting converts was through the subtle use of pictures displaying female university students in traditional Islamic dress and hijabs. This aimed to impress upon young women the idea that Islamic dress was worn by most Kuwaiti women – despite the fact that most female students had long since adopted Western clothes and fashions. In addition, Manbar Al-Taleba contained interviews with traditionalist women: the overarching implication was that traditionalists made up the majority of the female student population. Of course, the magazine also included many political opinions and agendas, in common with the liberal publications, satiating the Kuwaiti hunger for political discussion and debate. This type of portrayal was certainly a reaction to the liberal bias of the Kuwaiti press, and highlighted the divide amongst Kuwaiti women and society in general, depicting a very black-and-white issue with very few opinions occupying the middle ground. The growing influence of traditionalism within the press continued throughout the 1980s, and this promoted a divergence of views after the 1990 conflict. Some sections of the press began to turn upon women’s rights groups, portraying them as disorganized interest groups with little idea of what they actually wanted.28 The artificial division between the pro-reform women’s groups and the traditionalist

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groups destroyed any chance for compromise, and the caricature-like portrayal of opponents gave the press fuel for further igniting the divisions. Instead of attempting to find common ground, the two views had become diametrically opposed and incapable of compromise.29 However, the mainstream press still maintained an agenda of reform and continued to mock traditionalists and the government for their refusal to grant emancipation. Sadly, having such a heavily biased viewpoint usually causes an equal and opposite reaction built upon complacency and underestimating opposing factions. This became particularly apparent after the liberation of Kuwait, when the national press created an air of inevitability of emancipation, practically guaranteeing that women would be granted their democratic rights soon after the liberation. As the former Crown Prince Sheikh Saad proclaimed: The Kuwaiti woman, whether she is a mother, a sister or a wife, has confirmed that she is equal to men and has participated fully in the resistance, rejecting the occupation. She has proven that she is equal to her brothers in Kuwait. I am quite confident that she will play a major role and contribute further in our future, freed Kuwait.30

This statement is not particularly specific but, in a country embraced by post-liberation euphoria, it is understandable why women thought that, after such a statement in the media, it was only a matter of time before they were granted democratic rights. After the 1990–1 conflict, reading the heavily pro-liberal press gave the impression that all of the various women’s rights groups were working towards the same goal – of giving women the vote – even though the truth was somewhat different.31 Initially, the views of the opponents of reform were ignored, and they were portrayed as misogynistic fools, lampooned in articles and cartoons as backwards and obstinate. The problem with this particular one-sidedness was that it gave a very distorted view of the situation, lulling feminist groups into believing that all women were supporters of their cause. This ignored the rising popularity of government-sponsored traditionalist women’s groups promoting the view that women should maintain their traditional and honoured roles within Islam.32 The media paid little heed to the rise of publications

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such as Manbar Al-Taleba, and ignored the views of a large section of the Kuwaiti population. Whilst it is unfair to blame the one-sidedness of the media for the sidelining of the women’s rights movement in the early 1990s, there is little doubt that it was a contributing factor. The fact that the liberal press portrayed all women as wanting the vote led to the countermovement not being taken seriously until it was too late. Feminist groups believed the media stories and became complacent, failing to work together to present a united front, and this fragmented approach gave the traditionalists the weakness that they sought.33 This weakness was exploited by the government’s support of conservative women’s groups, and thus media coverage was certainly an indirect cause of the decline of the women’s social groups in the early 1990s.34

The Early 1990s: Ignoring the Islamists As the internal debate about women’s rights intensified in the aftermath of the 1990–1 conflict, the traditionalist groups began to fight back against the liberal bias in the media and started producing their own publications, designed to be much harder hitting than Manbar Al-Taleba. This growth in proponents of the opposing viewpoint in the media rapidly resulted in a propaganda war, with both sides veering wildly away from holding balanced views.35 Previously, Islamists had operated on the fringes of the media, but this changed with the acquisition of a major newspaper by a member of the ruling family, under pressure after allegations of serious financial corruption.36 Sheikh Ali Al-Khalifa Al-Sabah bought Al-Watan as a personal platform to air his views and attempt to deflect criticism. To achieve this, he gave the newspaper a decidedly pro-Islamist slant, allowing the Islamic faction in Parliament a platform with which to connect with voters and push their anti-reform views, of which denying the vote to women was one. Most of Sheikh Ali’s critics were part of the reformist faction of the National Assembly and he sought to fight back, allying with the Islamists to strengthen his own position and targeting the merchant owners of other titles.37 The newspaper offered contributions on Islamist thought, conservatism and tribal news, appealing to a broadly anti-reformist group concentrated around Wahabi and Salafist Islamists and uniting support against granting women

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the right to vote in the Assembly. There is little doubt that this move led to much of the stasis within the Assembly and gave a voice to opponents of women’s rights, a campaign against which the inexperienced women’s movements had little defence, making it easy for the various stakeholders in power to divide women along traditionalist and reformist lines. With no equivalent representation in the media, women did not have the same access to put forward their views and the issue of suffrage became a political pawn, with both sides fearing the implications of women voting. Islamists believed that emancipation would strengthen reformists, whilst liberals feared that women would tend to vote conservatively.38 As discussed in Chapter 2, this is due to the complexity of the women’s rights movement in Kuwait, with class and religious divides promoting a diversity of views. As a crude division, liberal-educated women from urban areas are likely to be pro-reform, whereas rural women often believe that women did not have the experience to lead. Complicating the issue was the elite, wealthy class of women, who opposed reform because of the potential effects upon their status. However, these classifications are broad and do not fully portray the convoluted nature of Kuwaiti political opinion. The divisions within the women’s movement gave men the perfect excuse to deny women the vote, claiming that if they could not organize themselves enough to be certain of their goals and aims, then they were surely too naive to be trusted to make political decisions or to even think about running for seats in Parliament. Suddenly, both the liberal and the traditionalist media began to publicize this particular view, influencing the vast number of Kuwaitis who occupied the middle ground concerning women’s rights. This in turn led to the lack of interest in women’s rights that surrounded the 1996 elections, when the suffrage movement was silenced.39 Elements inside the Kuwaiti media played a huge part in denying women the right to vote, using caricatures and sensationalist yellow journalism to attack women’s groups: the same ammunition that reformists used against traditionalists in the 1980s.40 Despite the political sophistication of Kuwaitis it was difficult to ignore this level of saturation coverage, and many Kuwaitis, men and women alike, were swayed by the media.41

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Some felt that women should be denied all political rights; others that they should be allowed to vote but that they should be barred from entering the political arena. In the 1999 election, after the emir issued the decree granting women the right to vote, some of the traditionalists argued against this decision and derided women’s groups, once again, as a disorganized mob.42 Former Islamist MP, Walid Al-Tabtabae, stated, ‘It is in the sayings of the Prophet that people will not succeed if they allow women to be their commanders … Besides that, the entry of women into politics will cause social and political problems.’43 Some of the rhetoric was personal and unfair, highlighting divisions in the movement and also denigrating activists as elitists, snobs and spinsters, who needed a husband and children.44 Saadun Al-Otaibi, a former member of the Assembly, stated, ‘How would you feel if a candidate called to say “I want to speak with your wife and daughter”’,45 appealing to the traditional position of men as heads of the household. However, in contrast to the 1996 election campaign, the Kuwaiti press now began to turn on the parliamentary representatives, especially the liberals who voted against the 1999 bill under the guise of protecting the constitution.46 Talal Al-Arab, in an editorial in Al-Qabas, pointed out that, ‘the freedom of half of Kuwait’s population has been buried in the name of democracy … To those who fought and succeeded in killing the rights of one half of our society, we say: “Congratulations on this fantastic victory and let us hope for more backwardness in the name of democracy.”’47 This sarcastic quote encapsulates how the media felt about the betrayal by liberal MPs and their use of ‘constitutional protection’ to defeat a bill that they should have supported. The Arab Times, meanwhile, accused MPs of voting with religious groups to secure electoral favour and personal gain.48 For the first time, some of the Kuwaiti press began to turn on the liberals who abstained from voting against the emir’s 1999 decree, effectively defeating it, and this showed a shift in the ideology of many elements of the media. In contrast, some among the press alluded to the fact that if women spent a little more time on their domestic duties and on being good wives and mothers, they would not have the time to play at politics. The activists were described as a ‘minority of

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bourgeois women’, a reference to the governmental support of elitist, traditionalist women’s groups in the early 1990s.49 The conflicting viewpoints in the press were difficult to explain, but probably reflected the complexity of views amongst Kuwaitis concerning voting rights for women. With some women and liberals supporting the status quo, and many men and traditionalists supporting the right to vote, there were no clear ideological divisions between groups. A large number of traditionalists realized that women voters could strengthen their own position, whilst many amongst the liberal bloc believed that an influx of women voting conservative could weaken their own position. As a result, some liberal MPs tried to block the decree, even if they publically supported it, fuelling the conflicting viewpoints of the media. The liberals, while ideologically supportive of women’s rights, were afraid that granting women the right to vote could actually lead to greater support for conservatives, so they felt that sacrificing emancipation was acceptable in the context of wider political reforms, particularly with regard to attacking the political influence of the ruling family. Despite the failure of the decree to enter legislation, the call for electoral reform was gaining momentum, as will be discussed in Chapter 8. At the beginning of the new century, women’s groups were much more organized, bolstered by the rise of influential women within other areas of Kuwaiti society. They began to use the international media to raise publicity and were aware that there was little chance of Kuwaiti politicians interfering in this process. In addition, women’s rights activists began to embrace the electronic age, realizing that the internet and other forms of communication were going to rise in importance and become key factors in the spreading of news and views, a subject expanded upon in the next section.50

The Influence of the International Media on Women’s Rights It is tempting to think of the fight for women’s democratic representation as completely self-contained within Kuwait. However, the international media also exerted a lot of pressure upon the nation to change its policy and allow full voting rights, a factor largely tied to the unique geopolitical situation in the region. The interest of the

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international media fluctuated, usually tied to the evolving state of affairs in Kuwait’s neighbour, Iraq, and so the international pressure brought to bear on the state closely followed US political, economic and military activity. Interest in women’s issues in Kuwait peaked after the 1990–1 conflict and later during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.51 The eyes of the world were focused on Kuwait after the 1990–1 conflict and the country occupied many column inches, as an interested world charted the progress of democratization in the recently liberated state. The entire build-up to the liberation, and the liberation itself, dominated the international news, and critics waited to see if all of the time and effort had been justified. Previously, few people in the Western world knew much about Kuwait, and it was usually associated with its close neighbours, as an autocratic and wealthy regime that denied rights to most of its population and actively oppressed women.52 Public opinion, in other countries, was largely unaware of the great strides taken towards gender equality within the education system and the workplace, and certainly knew nothing about the political structure and policies of the state. Before the 1990–1 conflict, the Government in Exile needed to use the media to garner support for a coalition of nations to drive out Iraq. They employed a large public relations company, Hill+Knowlton, to instigate a media campaign revealing the excesses of the occupying Iraqi forces, using a mixture of truth, half-truths and outright lies.53 This propaganda, producing stories of premature babies left to die and the raping of women, had the desired effect and, like all successful propaganda, contained enough truth to make the stories plausible.54 The exiled rulers were also happy to use the women of Kuwait for their own purposes, and women’s groups inside and outside Kuwait made pleas for help and earned a great deal of international respect for their fierce resistance and for the bravery shown under torture and rape. This, coupled with pressure from the George H. Bush administration, prompted the Emir to promise complete electoral reform and a return to due democratic processes as the price for engaging international support.55 In the United States, the lead player in the coalition effort to drive out Iraqi forces, public pressure mounted against Iraq as the media campaign succeeded. Due to the stigma of being seen

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as a regime that oppressed women, the emir hinted strongly at full representation for women, as part of this promise, and the women of Kuwait firmly believed that they would receive their rights in the election immediately after the conflict – only to see their hopes dashed, despite a large number of women and men supporting the idea.56 In spite of great strides in non-political areas, especially in academia, business and the civil service, emancipation remained elusive and the efforts of feminist groups became bogged down in the stalemate between reformists and Islamists within the National Assembly. As the emir and ruling family attempted to balance the two factions and retain their hold on power, and as the state rebuilt after the war, women’s rights became a forgotten issue. This failure to follow through on the promised reforms was not well-received internationally, and the ruling family was roundly condemned in the press.57. Media outlets pointed out that other countries had sent forces to liberate Kuwait, yet in the words of the Chicago Tribune, ‘women and naturalized citizens still have not been given the vote’. The Associated Press followed this lead, pointing to the disparity between the brave women of the resistance and the lack of voting rights: ‘Iman Al-Bedah was a gun runner for the Kuwaiti resistance during the Iraqi occupation. Now she finds her own liberation lagging.’58 Despite the pro-women opportunities in other areas of society, the nation was again linked to the KSA, and was labelled as a nation of rich, misogynistic and ungrateful Arabs.59 These stories, in major publications, increased the pressure upon the ruling family and caused a great deal of embarrassment to a country that was actively trying to seek international investment for its ambitious rebuilding programmes. Furthermore, the international media seized upon stories coming out of Kuwait itself, often from women within the Kuwaiti media, who were relatively free to speak out and criticize the government. In addition, the rise in the number of Kuwaiti women in positions of international influence generated publicity, especially as they were invariably pro-reform. However, as the aftermath of the conflict died down and sanctions against Iraq began to silence the rhetoric of Saddam Hussein, the gaze of the international media turned elsewhere and the fight for emancipation went largely unnoticed, as the attention of the world drifted

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towards other topics. Throughout the first half of the decade, as the status quo continued, Kuwaiti women went largely unsupported as they hit the low point of the 1996 elections. The Kuwaiti media, traditionally allied to the cause of emancipation and reform, lost cohesion, reflecting the increasing divergence of views within Kuwait and the growth of the traditionalist women’s groups.60 With inexperienced women’s activists unable to use the media to fight fire with fire, the momentum gained after the conflict dissipated. The national and international media would rarely mention the struggle for representation until 1999 and the emir’s decree. Whilst many Kuwaiti women believed that engaging the international media was paramount, many others did not. This fragmented approach ultimately contributed to the issue becoming sidelined within the world as a whole, especially as international feminist groups were reluctant to overtly interfere in another culture, particularly one that gave a great deal of equality to women in other areas of society. As Zainab Al-Harbi, a leader of the WCSS stated, We don’t need others to help. We don’t have a problem campaigning and lobbying for our rights … If every time there was a meeting between a senior official here and a senior official from another country – yes, Britain and the United States, too, if they would keep raising it – then that would help.61

This almost contradictory approach of appealing to politicians, whilst ignoring the popular appeal of the media, showed a certain naivety, one picked up on by opponents. It was not until the dawning of the electronic age that the various feminist groups began to unleash the power of public opinion and international consensus.62

The Electronic Age: Media and Mobiles Despite the fragmentation of the women’s rights movement in Kuwait, and the patchy reporting of women’s issues in the mainstream media, the ideological struggle in Kuwait was far from over and began to move into another domain. Kuwaiti feminists, welleducated and used to using technology, understood the power of

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the internet and electronic communications for disseminating views around the world.63 The international media, which had been very quiet about the political situation in Kuwait since the beginning of the 1990s, again began to concentrate upon this corner of the Persian Gulf, in the aftermath of the emir’s defeated 1999 decree. During the 1990s, Kuwait began to rebuild its shattered infrastructure, incorporating new technologies. The country also saw a huge rise in the use of mobile phones, texting and personal computers, all of which were enlisted in the drive for voting rights.64 Kuwaiti women used blogs to share their views with each other and with the wider world and, in one famous example, women pressing for the vote in 2005 used text messaging to organize demonstrations and summon young women out of school. This allowed for a level of organization that was not possible in the early 1990s, and was one of the reasons why the usual tactics used by the government, of dividing women’s groups, failed to meet with its traditional success.65 As quickly as the Kuwaiti media lampooned women’s groups after the failure of the emir’s 1999 decree, women reacted by making full use of the electronic age, employing computers and mobile phones to raise levels of support not seen since the 1990–1 conflict.66 The start of the twenty-first century saw a new cohesiveness in the women’s rights movement, as activists made full use of every means available to them, giving interviews on television, organizing protests and rallies, and engaging the media inside and, more importantly, outside Kuwait. Whether by accident or design, the attention of the international press was beginning to focus on this part of the world, as a belligerent Saddam Hussein once again began to challenge the West during the war of words that preceded the 2003 invasion of Iraq.67 The international media again began to question why Kuwaiti women still did not have the vote, nearly a decade after the conflict. Certainly, this created a lot of embarrassment for the ruling family and the state as a whole, especially when set against a backdrop of Islamic fundamentalism in the region. Despite the unflattering portrayal of feminism in the Kuwaiti press, the international press, through interviews and blogs, saw the feminist movements as well-organized and united. Publicity stunts, such as marching upon offices to register for voting, kept the movement in the spotlight and provoked a great deal

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of sympathy.68 The international media, although writing few stories about Kuwait, was certainly quick to point out its significance. For example, a study by Wanta, Golan and Lee showed that there were only 30 US news stories about Kuwait during 2004, as against 296 for the United Kingdom, but Kuwait was perceived as extremely important to US interests by 68 per cent of the US population, slightly higher than that of the UK.69 The 2003 invasion of Iraq had inevitably raised the profile of Kuwait and this certainly created a great deal of embarrassment. As pointed out by Brewer and Willnat, the media has a role in shaping the perception of other nations, and failure to grant emancipation was beginning to influence Kuwait’s standing in the world. For a country that needed inward investment from abroad, negative publicity was a major problem.70 With influential media outlets like the BBC and the New York Times running headlines criticizing Kuwait over its women’s rights record, the pressure on the government was increased. New York Times journalist Nicholas D. Kristof, in April 2003, referred back to the 1990 conflict, stating that ‘twelve years after Americans lost their lives to liberate Kuwait, women still don’t have the vote’. He used Kuwait as an example to the coalition forces involved in the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, adding, ‘So let’s remember the missed opportunities of Kuwait as we work on Iraq.’71 Gerry Northram of the BBC wrote in an article entitled ‘Kuwait’s Pampered Economy’, ‘Notoriously, the women who make up a third of the national workforce, among them many at the very top of business and academic life, still cannot vote or stand for election.’72 These criticisms, echoed by other media outlets, gave the impression that Kuwait was a slightly backward, conservative state: hardly ideal for a nation pushing towards modernity. The embarrassment caused by this international exposure forced the hand of the government and helped it to maintain support for the granting of full democratic representation to women. It continued to press for reform and used every political means at its disposal. However, it also had to sway Kuwaiti people and ensure that they bought into the idea: pressing for women in government without gaining support amongst voters could have had dire consequences.73 If the electorate failed to vote women into the Assembly, then the emir’s support could have been construed as undemocratic, as the

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opponents of reform claimed, and this would have caused irreparable damage to the women’s rights movement.74 As a result, in early 2005, the ruling family began to take an active interest in using the media to spread publicity about its particular agenda, and reduce the chance of the reform becoming a weapon that could be turned against them. Previously, unwilling to be seen as tacitly using it as a cover for his own agenda – considering the Kuwaiti tradition of relative press freedom – the emir adopted a hands-off approach to the media. In this case, in a sign of the emir’s wish to rectify this particular issue once and for all, he and the government conducted a robust campaign in support of granting women the right to vote. This unusual and largely unprecedented move was a twist that would change the political landscape, and help in delivering what had long been promised. This also started a long and bitter media battle, as both sides of the debate sought to garner public opinion and, for the first time, the pro-reformists began to question the outdated interpretations of the Qur’an. Due to the danger of straying into the area of criticizing Islam, the press had always shied away from such observations, but the tacit support of the ruling family meant that there would be no repercussions. Journalists, activists and lawyers began to question Sharia law upon which the state’s legal system was based, and this started a protracted and acrimonious battle of quotes and soundbites. As an example, Bashar Al-Sayegh, a regular columnist for the Kuwaiti daily Al-Siyassa, wrote a hard-hitting opinion piece: During the era of the Prophet and the era of the [righteous] caliphs, Muslim woman played a prominent role in setting out the policy of the Muslim state at that time. The Koranic text and the believers, men and women, are guardians of each other; they enjoin the just and forbid evil [9:71], proving that the opinion of the woman is no different [in importance] than that of the man, and that the woman is [man’s] partner in determining what is permitted and what is prohibited in society. All Koranic texts agree that the woman is equal to the man in rights and obligations … Similarly, the Muslim woman participated in the oath of allegiance to the Prophet in the two bay’as – the first and the second – at Al-’Aqaba … The modern sense of the oath of allegiance [to a ruler] is elections. If the woman did not have the right to

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vote and to participate in the political process, then the Prophet would have settled for an oath of allegiance from the man, without [that] of the woman … Women’s political rights are not strictly a women’s issue; rather, they are linked to the liberation of half of society and the liberation of all society. That is, the realization of full democracy, and the political participation [of the woman] as voter and as candidate, will complete her natural role in society.75

This column was designed to engage those Kuwaiti men and women who occupied the middle ground, wishing to hold to Islamic values, but not ideologically against female politicians. Throughout the 1990s, the polarization of the debate had led many Kuwaitis to believe that the two views were mutually exclusive and that allowing women to enjoy full political rights was somehow un-Islamic.76 However, the above interpretation opened up a third way and drew a lot of support away from the hard-line Islamists. Other notable Kuwaitis joined the fray. In an article in the daily newspaper Al-Qabas, lawyer Badriya Al-Awda opined, The Muslim woman’s participation in political activity during the time of the Prophet was clear, and was manifest in the women’s ba’ya to the Prophet, since they saw him as leader of the Muslims. [This participation] attests to the woman’s independent personality and to the fact that not only is she not subjugate to the man, but that she swore allegiance [to the ruler] just like the man.77

These views began to influence the nature of the debate, and the Islamists were forced onto the defensive, rapidly losing legitimacy in the eyes of many Kuwaitis. Rather than dig their heels in and insist upon completely barring women from politics, they began to fight back less defensively, conceding that there was nothing in the law preventing women from voting. However, they were insistent that the law meant that women could not actually participate in politics and so should not stand for election or become ministers.78 This twist in the proceedings again sparked a fierce counter-debate in the media when it was claimed that a 1985 fatwa, issued by the government’s very own Fatwa and Legislation Department, specifically stated that becoming

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an Assembly member was barred to women, as they were not allowed to lead. As an example, former Assembly member Daifallah Buramya informed the news agency Al-Rai Al-Aam that several Hadith and Qur’anic verses prove that ‘women were not appointed to leadership posts not because of their reduced value, but in preservation of their honour’.79 Again, the Islamists turned the debate around and claimed that they were protecting women, a theme that they continue to cling to right up to the present day. The most vociferous opponent of granting women full democratic representation, the former Islamic Assembly member, Walid Al-Tabtabae, supported Buramya’s view, telling the Daily Star that he was against female suffrage on the grounds that, Islamic Sharia only allows men to govern a state. Despite this, we believe that women have the right to vote for candidates, and choose representatives … She has the right to criticize, to oppose and to give her opinion, according to the Sharia. But we are against them running in the Parliament.80

This opening of a new debate, about the participation of women, rather than the vote, certainly signalled that the long battle was entering its final phase. As Sheikha Al-Nesef, head of the Kuwait Cultural and Social Women’s Society put it, ‘Global and Gulf situations have changed in favour of women’s rights. The government is throwing its weight behind the bill … but we need more effort.’81 The renewed media campaign finally paid off and women were granted full representation and political recognition in May 2005. However, the traditionalists showed that they were not going to concede defeat easily and again went on the offensive, seizing upon the perceived Westernization of the media as their new point of attack. The opening up of Kuwait to international influence, and the electronic age of internet and satellite television, gave them another point of attack, based upon projections of immorality. This particular debate, continuing at present, is one that must be monitored closely as it is set against a general resurgence of Islamism in the region. Ironically, as Kuwait moves towards full democracy, it leaves itself open for exploitation by

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populists, and the hard-earned political victory of women might be easily overturned.

Censorship and the Future Despite the granting of voting rights to women and the election of female ministers and members of the National Assembly, the media debate continues, and popular television has become the medium for a new battleground between women’s rights activists and their traditionalist opponents. As the Westernization of Kuwaiti culture continues, and Western-influenced TV shows are broadcast, Islamists feel that the nature of Kuwaiti society is being diluted and that their fears about allowing women into government leading to a moral decline have become reality.82 The most high-profile case involved a reality television show known as Star Academy, a pan-Arab talent show, first broadcast in 2003–4. The show raised serious concerns in many Islamic countries about the behaviour of women and garnered criticism that it was encouraging un-Islamic attitudes. Whilst reality shows such as Star Academy, Super Star and Al-Ra’is would be written off as mere commercial television in the West, these shows have had a disproportionate impact across the Islamic world, including Kuwait. They are the most popular television programmes in Kuwaiti television history, and have taken the question of censorship to a whole new level.83 The show created a great deal of controversy and, noticeably, the critics and supporters of the show were split over exactly the same lines as in the battle for giving women the vote. The opposition was headed by the outspoken former Assembly member, Walid Al-Tabtabae, who had been the most vociferous opponent of Kuwaiti women participating in the democratic process. As with giving women the vote, he and his faction were sidelined, although it is fair to say that he did have some justification in this particular case; in many parts of the Islamic world, liberalization of the media must take into account the sentiments of traditionalists.84 Traditionalists still make up a large part of the electorate, and it is imperative that their voice is heard or the Kuwaiti nation will be in serious danger of overcompensating and granting one group rights whilst stripping away the rights of another.

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Balance is practically impossible to achieve, but opposing views must at least be heard and addressed. However, the issue of whether such programmes should be allowed in an Islamic society does raise the spectre of censorship. Kuwait has always tried to adopt an open approach to the media and broadcasting, so censoring television strikes at the heart of this tradition. On the one hand, programmes pushing the boundaries stimulate political debate and raise important issues that cannot be conveyed through the traditional mediums of radio and the printed word. The popularity of Star Academy and similar shows perhaps grants them a legitimacy and influence that appears to be out of proportion with their content, especially to Western audiences for whom there is no question of impropriety.85 Such popularity has opened a new debate and, in the same way that women’s political rights became a political football between two sides, the conduct of women in reality shows became a new battleground.86 The traditionalists, fearing for their way of life in the face of creeping globalization and democratization, again decided to use the role of Islamic women as the core of their rearguard action. There is a chance that they may be using this to weaken the process of political reform and show that societal problems, such as rising crime and higher rates of divorce, can be blamed upon allowing women to enter politics when they should be raising strong and stable families.87 However, considering the support for reform and emancipation, there is little chance of this view prevailing and the opposition to the media is much more likely to be based upon the battle between Islam and ‘The West’ apparent across the Middle East, in numerous guises. On a wider scale, Star Academy has proved itself to be extremely political and some critics have pointed out that its nature, which involves the public voting for their particular favourites, is a sideswipe at the Arab states that do not practise full democracy, although this particular point must remain largely conjectural.88 This battle against censorship has widened to encompass all of the media, and Kuwait now stands accused of censoring the press as the battle between reformists and the government shifts. As recently as 2009, the government banned a television programme called Soatak Wassal (Your Voice is Heard).89 This satirical show poked fun

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at Kuwaiti officials and the National Assembly – a type of political humour rarely seen in the state due to the reluctance of journalists and editors to antagonize those in power. As the Kuwaiti authorities moved to censor or ban the show, activists called the move a restriction of free speech, with the Arab Network for Human Rights Information decrying the move as a ‘blatant violation of freedom of expression and an unjust abuse of power’.90 Egypt’s former Minister of Information, Anas Al-Fiqi, justified the action by claiming that by lampooning the Prime Minister, it also denigrated the Royal Family. Of course, part of this was undoubtedly due to the show’s producers wishing to take advantage of the split in the duties of Prime Minister and Crown Prince. The other part was the tendency of the media and satirists to push the boundaries of taste, in a move to fight back against the authorities and against official attempts to strengthen censorship laws in Kuwait.91 Since a law regulating the press was passed on 6 March 2006, journalists can be jailed for insulting Islam or for articles deemed to be against the national interest, and the state reserves the right to censor material deemed to be ‘morally offensive’.92 This law particularly antagonized reformists in the state as it was an attack upon the Kuwait constitutional right to free speech, as well as upon political freedom. The 2006 law grants political freedom to the press, but strengthened the punishments for criticism of the regime or the judiciary – and the government has shown great determination in attacking media outlets for broadcasting overtly political and critical material. However, this law has the potential to be misused and this was the case in 2008, when other outlets were attacked.93 Comedians/ satirists are often the first to push boundaries, as with Soatak Wassal, but serious journalists often follow and exploit any gaps. This was the case in March 2008, when the authorities attacked the newspapers Al-Abraj and Al-Shaab, again for being critical of the Prime Minister. This was all performed under the guise of a new law that would, ‘criminalize the promotion of immoral conduct, encouraging antigovernment sentiments, divulging state secrets, or insulting Islam online’.94 The main worry for women in Kuwait is the addition of the term ‘immoral conduct’, could easily be invoked to bring up the question of women’s rights, and thus the question of whether this issue is again going to be used as a weapon between government and reformists,

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with little heed to the actual women involved in such decisions. Censoring immoral behaviour is a statement that can be interpreted in many different ways, and it is entirely possible that any un-Islamic depiction of women on television could lead to a show or news outlet being attacked for its political views, under the smokescreen of protecting Islamic values, traditions and women. Of course, the situation is not entirely black and white, and finding the correct balance is a problem when the issue becomes politicized. As an example, AbdulKarim Al-Shamali, Head of the Sports Department at daily newspaper Al-Jarida, stated that the Kuwaiti right to freedom of speech was under attack from religious groups, many allied with the government.95 The groups were looking for an excuse to censor, premised upon morality, and this particular trail can lead to any number of undesirable destinations. Already, the Kuwaiti authorities were using the 2006 legislation to prevent publication of any parliamentary dealings unless they had been cleared by the Ministry of Information. Saud Al-Anazi, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Al-Jarida, lamented, ‘the new law does not allow us to publish discussions conducted in the Parliament or the Cabinet unless it was permitted previously. We used to publish the events and discussion without any limitations. Now we can only publish about the discussions that are constitutionally licensed.’96 This movement to censor television and the internet is part of a larger anti-European and anti-American agenda, as Islamists begin to use the mass media to influence the wider population. Whilst Kuwaitis are very media savvy, the danger is that extremist views, especially in the face of perceived Western aggression in the Middle East, can take root. As an example, Nabil Al-Awadi, in an editorial for Al-Watan, completely denigrated European culture. The article titled ‘The Qualities of the European’ contained a tirade claiming that Europeans were dirty, dishonest and cowardly. Here are some of his choicest quotes: Yes, that is the truth about the West. It is not restrained by religion, values or virtue, but only by fear of punishment and fines. Furthermore, without surveillance, even the police would take part in the thievery … Usually, they do not aid those who are wronged or help those in distress, except seldom. Many a time have I seen people being beaten and old people lying injured on the ground, with no one lifting

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a finger to help them. They pay no attention to others and think only of themselves … As for stinginess, the Europeans are the very model of it. The European is miserly even towards his own wife and children. He may dine with his wife in a restaurant, and then each of them pays their own bill!! And when his son or daughter turns 18, he asks them to pay rent for living under his roof!97

These words are designed to appeal to the disaffected and often unemployed youth in the region, and are in some ways the antithesis of the equally inaccurate Western depictions of Arabs as treacherous, uncivilized and fundamentalist terrorists.98 The article indirectly claimed that Europeans were inferior because they do not have religious laws underpinning their society. It is very clear that Al-Awadi is putting forward a case for Sharia law, and this would certainly include returning women to a subservient role. Whilst granting the press more freedom of expression is the sign of growing democratization, it also means that the extremists have a pulpit from which to preach. This leads to much of the uncertainty about the government’s implementation of new licensing laws. The laws could be used to deter extremist views, but could also silence reformist voices, under the guise of immorality. In terms of the sexualization of the media and advertising, many Kuwaitis have different sensibilities from most Westerners, tending to be more conservative, which means that the government feels justified in censoring some elements of the media, or risk inadvertently supporting the views of Islamists that ‘Western immorality’ threatens their culture. However, this has the potential to very quickly lead to the suppression of opinions, as the line between immorality and criticizing politicians is often a very fine one. As far as women’s rights are concerned, the media gave them a voice and increased the pressure on the government, but the media owes no allegiance and can easily turn to reflect popular opinion, all of which creates a selffulfilling cycle. The relative freedom of the international press to report in Kuwait does provide a counterbalance to this and ensures that the public is exposed to other views, but this does require licensing, which can be withdrawn at any time. In addition, the internet is the unknown quantity and the government has already blocked some liberal and

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reformist websites for criticizing the government. As long as the government supports women’s rights, this is no problem; if, on the other hand, the National Assembly grows in power and begins to swing towards the traditionalist factions, then the feminist movement may well find itself under siege.

Conclusion In many ways, the failure to use the media as a weapon and as a means of defence was one of the major reasons why the women of Kuwait had to wait so long to be granted their democratic right to vote. Before the 1990–1 conflict, the Kuwaiti press enjoyed a great deal of freedom, as long as journalists refrained from criticizing Islam or the ruling family. Iraq’s invasion of the country coincided with the blossoming of mass media and the Government in Exile began to understand the power of the media, as a result of the campaign to foster support for an international coalition. Kuwaiti women, buoyed by their acts of heroism during the resistance, thought that they were going to be granted the vote without question, and were largely lulled into a false sense of security by the national and international media. They failed to anticipate the rise of media outlets with an Islamist agenda, and did not mount a concerted campaign to educate the average Kuwaiti as to why women should be given democratic equality. The vacuum left by this failure was filled by traditionalist women, who diverted the movement away from emancipation and promoted the idea that women should fulfil traditional roles. This creeping Islamization lay behind the doldrums of the mid1990s, when the women’s movement reached its lowest point during the 1996 elections. The emir’s decree of 1999 revitalized the movement for gender equality within the democratic process, and a new generation of educated and powerful Kuwaiti women seized the initiative and started a media campaign. Using electronic media to coordinate actions and publicize views, a topic expanded upon in Chapter 7, women’s groups created a groundswell of public opinion, both in Kuwait and abroad. This largely neutralized the national media, which for the most part adopted an anti-emancipation bias. This use of the media maintained

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momentum and chipped away at the resistance within the National Assembly and within Kuwaiti society generally. However, even as women gained the right to vote, the Islamists conceded ground, admitting that they supported the right of women to vote, although not to become politicians. From this apparent climb-down, they actually created a new focus of debate. Aware that using the media was crucial to regaining ground, they began to attack the media itself, under the guise of protecting society from immorality. From reality shows to websites, Islamists demanded that the censors intervene to protect Islamic sensibilities. As has happened throughout history, censorship can lead to the oppression of political views and, worryingly, there have been some moves in that particular direction, especially concerning the restriction of information passed from politicians to journalists. Whilst the government is a long way from becoming oppressive, there is the danger that it may return to a policy of appeasement, in an attempt to maintain its own position. The women’s rights movement is not yet strong enough to withstand a concerted attack, especially against a growing background of anti-Western sentiment, so NGOs, journalists and female politicians must anticipate any such threats and use all of the means available to generate publicity and accustom Kuwaitis to the idea of women as leaders. The media is the only defence, especially if an increasingly democratized Kuwait dilutes the power of the emir and allows Islamist parties to gain strength. Algeria provides a fine example of the potential problems associated with rapid democratization. In 1989, the Algerian regime changed the constitution to allow full democracy and freedom of the press, but this simply resulted in a coalition of Islamists, the Islamic Salvation Front, threatening to sweep to power in a landslide victory. The army instigated a coup and this led to a bitter civil war marked by over 100,000 deaths and a long period of brutality by both sides. This ‘Algerian Scenario’ defines the Middle Eastern process of democratization, as a warning of what can happen if the process moves too quickly or without planning.99 The Islamists in Algeria grew in popularity because of perceived corruption within the government, so it is essential that, in Kuwait and other GCC countries, the press is free to expose and criticize the rulers. However, this must be balanced against giving the Islamists

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ammunition, by allowing images and portrayals that offend Islamic sensibilities and giving credence to their claims of ‘immorality’. Changing cultural norms is a process requiring years and must be handled with care.

Chapter 6 SPONSORS AND FACTIONS OF THE KUWAITI WOMEN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT

The major problem with analysing the women’s rights movement in Kuwait is that it is difficult to determine the positions and motives of the various sponsors and factions involved. The fight for representation cannot be defined as a simple black-and-white issue of polar opposites, due to the existence of so many factions with their own agendas. For example, it is easy to view extreme Islamists through the lens of the Western media, and assume that they are committed to denying women all rights.1 Conversely, it is easy to paint Kuwaiti women in terms familiar to Western feminists, and tie them closely to the reformist, liberal cause.2 These strict definitions, whilst having some basis in reality, are ultimately incorrect. Simple ‘for and against’ views do not take into account the differing opinions, numerous complex political views and personal considerations of individual Kuwaitis. Kuwaitis are, on the whole, well-educated, well-read and politically sophisticated, so any discussion of women’s rights must take this into account.3 To graft polarized, Western-influenced views

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onto the situation does Kuwaitis a great disservice and oversimplifies the issue. The other variable, when trying to uncover the factions and sponsors behind the debate on women’s issues, is time, because opinions have constantly shifted since the founding of Kuwait. These changes have arisen because of the tendency of the National Assembly and the ruling family to use women’s rights as a political tool to balance various interests.4 The aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of 1990 was the major event that solidified opinion, but there were other, more gradual changes which obscure a clear analysis. For instance, Islamists, in the early part of the 1990s, obstructed any movement towards the right of women to vote. As Kuwait moved into the new century, many Islamists adjusted their position, realizing that, far from being a threat to their influence, engaging the women’s vote could actually strengthen their position.5 Conversely, women’s rights have always been associated closely with liberals and reformists, but many of those failed to back up their words with action and consistently blocked votes to ratify the emir’s 1999 decree.6 Studying the various factions, and uncovering their agendas, gives some insight into the underlying reasons for their actions, and reveals the underlying tensions between the National Assembly and the ruling family. In an increasingly globalized world, linked by electronic communication and the internet, young Kuwaitis increasingly diverge from the social constructs of older generations.7 This particular conflict of modernization may well replace women’s rights as the debate that defines the future of democracy in Kuwait and, as proposed by the United Nations and other international bodies, engaging women’s groups lies at the heart of ensuring that disaffected, unemployed youth do not fall into crime, substance abuse and extremism.8 Kuwait is attempting to modernize and, in doing so, wean its population off the culture of dependency and the bloated welfare state, but the economic implications, especially considering the unrest in other GCC countries, call for an inclusive approach, engaging a broader cross-section of Kuwaiti society.9 Women in politics and civil society will be at the heart of this approach and the new, focused agenda of women’s rights activists must include a wider range of issues facing society.10

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However, despite women gaining the right to vote and stand for Parliament, there is still plenty of opportunity for this to be reversed if international, or internal, politics serve to damage the democratization process and hard-line Islamists achieve a majority in Parliament, as happened in Algeria in the 1991 elections.11 As Kuwait inexorably moves towards a more open democracy, and the influence of the ruling family wanes, it is vital to ensure that the other political factions support the cause. Women’s rights cannot be used as a weapon to serve other agendas.

Islamists and the Anti-Western Agenda During the 1990s, the strong Islamist bloc within the National Assembly constantly opposed granting women the right to vote; some of the more extreme representatives went as far as pursuing an agenda of returning Kuwait to a strict interpretation of Sharia law.12 Whilst many Islamists did not belong to this extreme faction, the group found widespread support in the traditionally tribal areas of Kuwait, where women were expected to fulfil the traditional roles of wife and mother. The particular point of attack used by this bloc was based around the idea that Kuwaiti law follows Islamic traditions, prohibiting women from participating in politics.13 Of course, like any interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadith, there is no definitive answer and legal scholars can draw any interpretation they wish; the Sharia can be easily twisted to suit any agenda concerning women, either raising or oppressing their status. This approach served to cover the underlying unease amongst traditionalist politicians – that highly educated and ambitious women would challenge their position. As a result, using loose legal definitions to override the Kuwaiti Constitution served their purpose perfectly.14 As is common in most political and ideological debates, the vociferous extremist groups always enjoyed a disproportionate status, largely based around the ruling family’s fear of extremism within Kuwait, always a perceived danger in the Middle East. As a result, most of the compromises made by the ruling family, which used women’s rights as a bargaining tool, were designed to placate the Islamists and dilute the power of influential groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and

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the Salafis. The growing influence of Arab pan-Islamism lay at the root of the emir’s decision to unconstitutionally suspend Parliament between 1986 and 1992.15 The emir promised democratic reform after the 1992 conflict, so the Kuwaiti government had to allow the traditionalists to have a voice, and they formed an implacable barrier to any reform. As a side note, the opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood to emancipation in Kuwait deviated from the views of the movement in other countries, where giving women the vote was never an issue. The split between the Kuwaiti Brotherhood and the international Brotherhood occurred because of the latter’s attempts to mediate with Saddam Hussein, condemning the presence of US troops in Kuwait.16 However, even within the extremist vote, there were many different interpretations of the preferred role for women within Kuwaiti society. Some Islamists wished women to be subordinate to men, and denied the right to education and employment, but most opinions lay some way away from this extreme; the majority of Islamists had no problem with women receiving the same educational opportunities as men, in the long-established Kuwaiti tradition.17 However, unlike the fragmented reformists, the traditionalists usually managed to present a coherent bloc within the National Assembly when faced with simple issues, throwing their differences aside in their quest to block reforms and maintain pressure upon the emir. The traditionalist bloc was aware that the ruling family also feared reformists, as a threat to their grip upon power.18 As a result, maintaining the status quo, and denying women the right to vote, became a sacrifice that many of the Al-Sabahs were prepared to make, as they attempted to navigate the ground between the two groups although, as discussed in Chapter 4, there were dissenting voices within the ruling family.19 This malaise within the Kuwaiti political structure ran deep and many reformists, whilst placing the blame squarely upon the shoulders of the ruling family, pointed to the resistance to change amongst Kuwaitis, a trait based as much on apathetic inertia as on any actions of Islamic extremists. As Massouma Al-Mubarak stated,20 We hoped this war would bring democracy to Iraq, but we all know democratization doesn’t come by a statement from a foreign government … Even if the United States spent millions of dollars on democ-

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racy, it wouldn’t be so unless people are really believing in democracy, and so far in the Middle East, belief in democracy is not well rooted. None of the governments in the Middle East truly believes in democracy.21

The resulting public apathy helped the Islamists to dictate policy and block reform, aided by inexperience amongst women’s groups. They also deflected the agendas of civil society groups, towards upholding a traditionalist feminism, which repackaged the status quo and convinced voters that women were honoured in Islam. The accusations that the ruling family tacitly aided Islamists rested on the fact that the ruling family promoted Islamic charities and education in schools, culminating in the notorious drive to genderseparate educational establishments. Certainly, the picture was always much more complex than simply a polarized debate amongst reformers and traditionalists, but many analysts still believe that the public indifference towards voting reform spread downwards from the ruling family, as it actively attempted to placate Islamic fundamentalists.22 The Al-Sabahs gave the impression that they were pushing through reforms, but failed to follow their words with action, all in an attempt to maintain their own position and influence.23 This commonly held view was echoed by rhetoric from the traditionalists, with Mubarak Al-Duwailah, former leader of the fundamentalists’ parliamentary bloc, proudly proclaiming that, ‘Yes, we have more power now than before the liberation. That’s because we are the most powerful group in society.’24 However, this view does do the ruling family a slight disservice as, whilst it certainly could have been more proactive in promoting women’s rights, it was backed into a corner by the unified front presented by the alliance between Islamist fundamentalists and tribal conservatives. Crudely, the main non-sectarian divide in Kuwait has always been between the modernist urban dwellers and rural Kuwaitis, who maintain a strong, traditional and tribal background, although this divide is not black and white and does not take into account other divisions based around class, gender and age. This split lay at the root of most of the divisions in the National Assembly and also provided the greatest difference in attitudes towards suffrage, with urban dwellers largely supporting emancipation and the tribal

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groups using their bloc vote to stifle reform.25 It can be legitimately argued that the emirs created their own problems by attempting to use the tribes to outflank reformists, but their policy backfired badly. Throughout the first half of the 1990s, there was a coherent Islamist bloc, made up of an alliance of tribal leaders and conservatives, all united by a common purpose. However, this did not mean that the faction was completely homogenous, and the issue of women’s rights began to cause some fractures within the bloc; different factions followed different agendas, based upon class and age. One of the most implacable opponents of reform and granting women the right to vote were the Salafis, but they found themselves isolated as other groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, softened their stance towards emancipation. During the early twenty-first century, as opposition to the Salafi constitutionally and legally based refutation of emancipation grew, they shifted their focus, claiming that granting women the vote and full democratic participation was an attack upon Islamic culture by the West.26 Their agenda was, as before, to deflect any perceived threat against their own position from ambitious women, but they tried to appeal to traditionalism and anti-Western sentiment, rather than Sharia. Even as late as 2005, this group voiced their concerns about women’s rights, arguing that they pandered to Western sensibilities. Using a concerted propaganda campaign, the Salafis claimed that women themselves had little wish to participate, a view that was driven by the perceived split between Western feminists and women wishing to uphold Islamic values. As former MP Daifallah Buramya stated, ‘Ninety per cent of the Kuwaiti women reject political rights because they know it is against their religion.’27 This type of rhetoric was aimed at Kuwaiti women, as an extension of the successful 1990s campaign, to divide women’s rights groups and persuade Kuwaiti women that they had to choose between political reform and their religious convictions. The leader of the Salafi Alliance, Khaled Al-Issa, used the spectre of foreign attempts to dilute Islamic culture as a rallying call, and blamed liberals and ‘agents of some foreign embassies’ for attempting to divide Muslims from their religion, playing upon the fear of US dominance and manipulation.28 At protest rallies, he raised a call to arms, proclaiming that ‘the constitution must represent the will of the Kuwaiti people to change

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the political course we have chosen’.29 To bolster his argument that women themselves had no interest in political participation, he used the example of a 2005 election of the Kuwaiti Journalists Association, in which only 830 out of 460,000 women voted, and argued that this was a clear sign that the status quo should remain intact.30 In a similar vein, the Salafi Islamic Union Spokesman Salem Al-Nashi stated, The union is against giving political rights to the woman, both for voting and for being elected … Five studies published by official and government institutions, including Kuwait University, have shown that the Kuwaiti woman has no interest whatsoever in taking part in political activity.31

However, the problem with adopting extreme views, and hiding behind unbreachable walls that prevent compromise, is that other groups may enter the middle ground and entice moderates. The anti-Western rhetoric of the Salafis soon began to backfire, as most Kuwaitis wanted engagement with the West, fuelled by the increasing availability of the internet and the globalization spreading inexorably across the region.32 The Salafis soon began to alienate even traditionalist women, especially when their representatives began to question the established rights of women in other areas, such as education and employment.33 This reaction catalysed the development of a more moderate form of traditionalism, and saw a growth of other Islamic factions holding more moderate views. All of a sudden, the late 1990s saw fractures begin to appear within the Islamist bloc, as splinter groups formed and promoted different values. One such group, the Scientific Salafis, began to question the direction of traditionalism. Centred around a younger leadership, they fought against the dominance of older generations in key positions, a sign of the generational conflict that is beginning to replace women’s rights as the main area of political and social confrontation in Kuwait.34 The Umah Party, with no objection to emancipation, was yet further evidence that helped many Islamists to realize that they had to shift towards the middle ground, if they were to maintain a broad appeal amongst the electorate.35 Unlike the Salafis, this Sunni group supports full political participation for women and advocates a move away from the tribally

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based conservatism of Islamism. Their stance may be entirely due to the desire for modernization but, equally, it reflects the expansion of Islamism outside of its traditional strongholds, and the increasing encroachment of Western values.36 It was only with the reform of electoral districts in 2006 that Kuwaitis could overcome these boundaries, and begin to see women going into elections with a genuine chance of gaining seats. Interestingly, by this point in time, traditionalists had largely begun to support the rights of women to vote and participate. The conservatives could now implement Sharia law in Kuwait because tribal votes were at the discretion of tribal elders who supported women’s political rights.37 Sixty-five per cent of Kuwaitis are considered tribal, so this wider grouping cannot be written off, and allowing tribal women to vote potentially increases the support for traditionalism.38 However, the core of hardliners still fought against the right of women to vote, couching their views in religious rhetoric. During the debate over the emir’s 1999 decree, Sunni Islamist former MP and Minister Ahmad al-Baqer called the emancipation of Kuwaiti women a ‘sinful act’.39 This obstinacy encapsulates the difficulty of enacting any meaningful legislation. He also self-defeatingly added that, ‘God said in the Holy Koran that men are better than women. Why can’t we settle for that?’40 This view was not shared by the vast majority of Kuwaitis and such extremism made the Salafis no more than a fringe group, walling themselves off from reasoned debate and diluting their influence even amongst their most traditional supporters. The reform of electoral districts prevented them from using bribery to influence votes and they retreated into the background, still a threat, but one that is currently toothless.41 This shift in attitudes was undoubtedly also fuelled by the increasing Westernization of the region, and the Islamists attempted to resist what they perceived to be the creeping dilution of their culture. In the same way that the National Assembly and ruling family used the denial of women’s rights to appease the Islamists, the Islamists used women’s rights as the focus of their battle against Western interference, falling back on the model that had served them in the aftermath of the Iraqi occupation. This opposition centred around the May 2005 bill to grant women full voting rights and, expecting similar support

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as previously, the Islamists appealed to traditionalist women. They argued that granting women the right to vote was a sign of Western pressure on Kuwait with regard to how ordinary Kuwaitis should lead their lives. In March 2005, the former Islamist MP Daifallah Buramya went so far as to claim, ‘by pressuring the Arab and Gulf countries, the Western countries are trying to impose the violation of Islamic law in order to ruin the society’.42 This call to arms focused heavily on the idea that their ‘un-Islamic’ behaviour, such as going against Sharia and giving women the vote, would leave Kuwait in the hands of ‘Derelicts, deviants and homosexuals’.43 Another MP added, We must pay no attention to the external demands that call on us to give women political rights. They must know that the situation of women in Kuwait is better than their situation in the advanced democratic countries. The issue goes beyond engaging in voting or candidacy for Parliament; the [Western] goal is comprehensive social change [in Kuwait] that will influence the structure of the Kuwaiti family and the relations among its members.44

This rhetoric, ultimately, was doomed to fail, and the tactics of ‘divide and conquer’, which Islamists had traditionally used against women’s rights groups, backfired. By alienating the vast majority of their constituents, they backed themselves into a corner. Whilst many Kuwaitis are genuinely concerned about the gradual Westernization of their culture and globalization, fundamentalist Islamists did not understand that Kuwaitis had moved on and that most now supported women’s rights.45 Any validity that the claim of these Islamists may have had was lost amongst the noise of their anti-woman agenda. The sophisticated, educated and politically active Kuwaitis soon saw through the rhetoric and began to drift away from extremism and towards the middle ground, where the rejuvenated women’s rights movement was once again able to gain support across a wide section of the electorate.46

The Liberal Bloc and Betrayal? Throughout the 1990s the liberal, reformist bloc known as the National Democratic Alliance was, at first glance, the direct opposite of the

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traditionalists. This bloc sought governmental reform, democratization and modernization, but also fought against the perceived gradual Islamization of Kuwait. As a result, the loose confederation adopted the cause of emancipation as part of its drive for democratic reform and social justice. However, as with the Islamists, there was a considerable underlying complexity, with not all liberals working towards this goal, and with many following the lead of the ruling family in treating women’s rights as a sacrificial cause, rather than placing it at the heart of their agenda. The liberals followed their own interests, picking up the cause of women’s rights when it suited them, but dropping it just as quickly if it threatened to undermine their own position.47 One example of liberal duplicity was in the run-up to the 1992 elections, where the liberal bloc adopted women’s rights as a cause, but would not allow women into the diwaniyas, claiming that it would undermine cultural traditions and societal norms. The liberals failed to back up their promises with actions, a common theme throughout the decade and a sign that, even amongst reformists, Islamic tradition was a strong influence.48 Ultimately, if reformist groups were not willing to allow women into their discussions, then it could be assumed that they did not want to share a Parliament with them. This happened throughout the 1990s, culminating in the abstention of liberal Assembly members in the vote to ratify the emir’s decree. They claimed that it was because they did not want to set a precedent that would open the door for unconstitutional behaviour. However, this particular argument is diluted by the fact that they refused to press the emir on the issue in 1992, when the clamour for granting women full voting rights was at its peak. They certainly had their own particular agenda, and the evidence suggests that they manufactured and manipulated the vote through the use of these abstentions.49 Liberals wanted to appear to be supporters but blocked the passage of the bill, largely based upon the shift of Islamists towards permitting women to vote and the fear that the latter could campaign for votes amongst the large demographic of conservative women in Kuwait.50 If Islamists gained widespread support amongst conservative and tribal women, then the whole reformist agenda of increased democratization was at risk. As before, the liberals decided that jettisoning women’s rights would best serve their interests, a view that would change during the first decade

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of the twenty-first century and the resurgence of a stronger, broader feminist agenda.51 However, as Kuwait entered the twenty-first century, reformists presented a much more united front when promoting women’s rights, partially because of modernization within their own ranks, and partly because women’s groups had recovered from the misdirection of the 1990s. Kuwaiti feminists were now much more adept at playing the political game. The relationship between women and liberals became a partnership of equals and, increasingly, liberal groups sought to court women’s groups, rather than the other way around. Undoubtedly, liberals saw this as an opportunity to further promote their cause of reforming and democratizing Parliament.52 Rather than debating whether women should be given the right to vote, Islamists and reformists began to prepare for the inevitable, and started to seek support amongst women. Both groups realized that the battlefield had shifted and that it was now important to actively court women, who comprised over half of the electorate. Reformists, previously reluctant to fully adopt women’s issues for fear of driving voters into the arms of the extremists, now understood that they had to make sure that when women were granted the vote, the Islamists did not make huge inroads into the electorate, including the female one.53 This was helped by the rhetoric of the extremist Salafis, which had long since ceased to make an impact amongst voters since they made the same points over and over again. As the twenty-first century progressed, the reformists were in the ascendancy and, for the first time, the issue of women’s rights was now at the heart of the reform movement’s pro-Western stance, rather than a peripheral consideration to be jettisoned at will.

The United States and the Push for Reform As a country in a very volatile area of the world, Kuwait has always been subject to the influence of external forces, and has had to respond to international opinion. Islamic culture shaped the formation of the country, and the refusal to allow women the right to vote was not unusual during the period between the end of the Second World War and the end of the Cold War in 1991. In addition, Kuwait has also had

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to pay heed to a belligerent Iraq and a powerful Saudi Arabia as immediate neighbours, and policies have often been influenced by one or the other, or both simultaneously.54 However, the biggest influence upon modern Kuwaiti politics has been, without a doubt, the United States. The liberation of Kuwait focused the eyes of the world upon the nation, and it was no longer a little-known backwater but the centre of international attention. The international media had a large impact upon changes in the treatment of women, but successive US administrations also played a key role, applying diplomatic pressure for reform – although any statements generally stopped some way short of outright condemnation.55 Instead, the USA supported civil society groups and NGOs, and also implemented educational programmes and exchanges.56 The US administration invested a great deal in the liberation and came under intense pressure from US-based feminist groups, as did many participants in the coalition against Iraq. This battle continued through diplomatic channels for many years, as US politicians sought to exert pressure and influence, without overpublicizing the issue or straining diplomatic relations.57 The USA could not be too aggressive in its diplomatic discussions, because that ran the risk of alienating hard-line Islamists, especially after the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the perception of a US ‘War Against Islam’.58 Kuwait had to be wary of sectarianism spreading from Iraq, a situation that could intensify due to the current diplomatic difficulties with Iran, so the USA has had to be very careful not to be too critical of one of its allies,59 as this would play straight into the hands of the extremist Salafis and their anti-Western rhetoric, reviving a faction that is currently dormant and toothless.60 Despite these limits, the efforts of the USA carried a lot of weight due to the debt that Kuwait owed; the USA committed a lot of resources to the Gulf conflict and also lost soldiers fighting for the freedom of Kuwait, so the pressure from feminist groups within the USA was considerable. Ms. Magazine, an insert in New York Magazine, and owned by the Feminist Majority Foundation, constantly questioned the reluctance of the Kuwaiti government to grant women their democratic rights.61 The Our Bodies, Ourselves organization ensured that the landmark feminist issues book Our Bodies, Ourselves, a collection of papers concerning women’s issues, was translated into

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Arabic and made available to Kuwaiti women, despite the opposition of censors.62 Sharon Smith, in the International Socialist Review, highlighted the hypocrisy in the US stance, whereby the George W. Bush administration condemned the Taliban in Afghanistan for their ‘gender segregation’, but said little to Kuwait or the KSA.63 The successive US administration had to justify this, something particularly difficult to do when the international misperception was of a state ruled by a cabal of sexist sheikhs. As Abdel-Muneim Saeid Aly, Director of the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, said, ‘The billionaire represents those filthy rich Arabs, bloated by a wealth they do not deserve and who inevitably squander their fortunes, ostentatiously, on debauchery and gambling.’64 Simply by association, Kuwait was seen as opulent and undeserving, so the USA had to change this view.65 Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the USA did regard Kuwait as an ally, and also respected the fact that the ruling family was attempting to push through reform. In a carefully worded obituary speech about Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, President George W. Bush stated, I was deeply saddened to learn of the death of His Highness Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad Al Sabah, the Emir of Kuwait. Sheikh Jaber was a friend and steadfast and reliable ally of the United States. He supported the US servicemen and women who fought to liberate Kuwait and later Iraq from the aggression and tyranny of Saddam Hussein. Sheikh Jaber worked tirelessly to provide a better future for Kuwait’s citizens and was the driving force behind many reforms, including the establishment of a vibrant, elected Parliament and a free press. In his last months, he provided critical leadership to ensure that Kuwait’s women achieved political rights. On behalf of the American people, Laura and I send our deepest condolences to Sheikh Jaber’s family and to the government and people of Kuwait on the passing of this historic leader.66

Such close ties with the USA made it one of the most powerful international sponsors of the drive for emancipation, and the USA often commented upon the Kuwait situation, expressing disappointment that the failure of Kuwait to grant women the vote hindered

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its development into a strong democracy.67 In 2005 former First Lady Barbara Bush stated, Women who have not yet won these rights are watching Freedom, especially freedom for women, is more than the absence of oppression. It’s the right to speak and vote and worship freely. Human rights require the rights of women. And human rights are empty promises without human liberty.68

However, some comments by Sheikh Saud Nasser Al-Sabah, a former Kuwaiti Ambassador to the USA, showed the other side of US pressure of reform: We’ve lost the 12 years since the liberation because of the resistance of the political Islamic movement … They do not welcome any further US or Western investment in the country … Once you have democracy in Iraq, many of the political regimes in the area will be forced to reform as well.69

This certainly provided some ammunition to the Islamists and their fears that Kuwait was becoming a puppet of the USA, but they ultimately misread the wishes of ordinary citizens. Most Kuwaitis, especially those affected badly by the Iraqi invasion and youth with access to modern technology and the foreign media, welcomed Westernization.70 As in so many societies, US culture slowly pervaded, through computer and TV screens, despite attempts at limited censorship. This creeping Americanization galvanized young Kuwaitis, who would go on to provide support for the women’s rights activists in the early twenty-first century. The USA was not alone in their push for this issue, and Kuwait also faced political pressure from the United Nations, as it started to actively promote women’s rights internationally. The international organization placed a huge amount of pressure on Kuwait, and a steady stream of directives highlighted the disappointment at the slow pace of progress. A report by the United Nations Human Rights Committee, in July 2000, stated,

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9. The Committee is deeply concerned that, in spite of constitutional provisions on equality, Kuwait’s electoral laws continue to exclude entirely women from voting and being elected to public office. It notes with regret that the emir’s initiatives to remedy this situation were defeated in Parliament.71

Most of the criticism concentrated upon the physical and mental abuse of foreign domestic servants, rather than calling for political reform, but an increasing awareness that including women in politics created a stable society saw the pressure intensify. As a signatory of the CEDAW report of 1979, and the subsequent UN Resolutions 1325 and 1888, Kuwait had a duty to promote the equality of women and grant them full democratic rights – a recurring theme as the United Nations attempted to press for change.72 A report of the UN CEDAW placed pressure on Kuwait and criticized the slow pace of reform, stating: 60. The Committee expresses concern at the reservations entered by the State party to article 7 (a), article 9, paragraph 2, and article 16 (f) of the Convention. While welcoming the State party’s stated intention to introduce legislation during the current legislative period that is expected to create the conditions for the withdrawal of the reservation to article 7 (a), the Committee is concerned at the failure of the State party to ensure that women have, on equal terms with men, the right to vote in all elections and public referendums, and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies. The Committee considers the lack of political rights of women a very serious limitation of their rights, which also has a significant negative impact on women’s enjoyment of other rights protected under the Convention.73

This, and other directives, are closely tied to the idea of involving women in all levels of a socio-political structure, to help promote diplomacy over confrontation.74 Whilst Kuwait is not regarded as a country at particular risk from extremism, domestic terrorism is a concern for all of the GCC States. Kuwaitis remember the bombing of the US and French embassies in 1983, allegedly by the Islamic

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Dawa Party, so they are aware that ensuring that all political voices are heard is crucial in preventing groups from subscribing to harmful, violent ideologies.75 Including more women in the process could ease any situations before they become a major problem, part of a process known as ‘inclusive security’.76 Kofi Annan, in a speech given to the UN Security Council, stated, ‘For generations, women have served as peace educators, both in their families and in their societies. They have proved instrumental in building bridges rather than walls.’77 The success of women in many conflicted regions, including Northern Ireland, Rwanda and Liberia, influenced the UN to continue to put pressure upon Kuwait to reform its Parliament and grant women full democratic rights. The United Nations, and international NGOs, also hoped that female politicians would help engage with an increasingly unhappy section of society: disaffected youth. As has been shown in many societies, the rights of women and the rights of children and young adults are inextricably linked.

The Youth of Kuwait Any study of the factions and sponsors of suffrage cannot fail to take into account the influence of the youth vote in Kuwait. Youth can be defined as individuals between the ages of 15 and 24, passing into adulthood, with many yet to reach the voting age of 21. Most of this generation of Kuwaitis were born after the 1990 invasion, so they make up a distinct, Westernized demographic of the population, comfortable with the internet and electronic communication.78 As in most countries in the region, young Kuwaitis make up the majority of the population and they tend towards reform and activism. The youth vote, and pressure from youth groups, was amongst the biggest influences forcing the hand of government in pushing for suffrage, because a government ignores the youth vote at its peril.79 The Kuwaitis only needed to look across the Gulf to Iran for an example of how a student-led protest can overthrow governments; consequently, the Kuwaiti government has always taken care to pay heed to this particular demographic.80 In 2006, up to one thousand Kuwaiti youths ignored the government restrictions on public demonstrations, and the government virtually failed to respond since the eyes of the world

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were focused on neighbouring Iraq. Effectively, youth demonstrations in 2006 forced a change in the law governing the size of electoral districts, which opened the door for women and other minority groups to have a voice and stand for election, with genuine hopes of success.81 The youth of Kuwait have also been instrumental in agitating for a change in laws protecting migrant workers, especially the thousands of Southeast Asian and Indian women who are continually mistreated by Kuwaiti citizens; many are held in the country by the archaic sponsor system that denies them the right to freely leave.82 This particular campaign once again shows how the issue of women’s rights is becoming linked to other elements of Kuwaiti society, rather than standing alone, and dovetails with the modern approach to feminism: tying women’s rights to other causes.83 Whilst the campaign for achieving emancipation, and the subsequent successes of reformists in the 2006 elections, were planned and carried out by women’s rights activists and academics, their efforts ultimately relied upon the youth of Kuwait, who mobilized in order to spread awareness and gain support.84 As Brian Whitaker pointed out, during the June 2006 election, The other surprise element in this election was the emergence of a youth movement demanding reform and more power for Parliament. Members of the Orange Youth are too young to stand for election (the age threshold is 30) and many cannot vote because they are under 21, but their protests helped trigger the dissolution of Parliament last month and they have used the internet to name and shame candidates not committed to reform and fighting corruption.85

Crucially, this support transcended gender, and both young men and young women were united in their call for change. As Saud Al-Anezi, Deputy Secretary General of the National Democratic Alliance, stated,86 ‘The new generation is getting aboard … With globalization in the media – on the Internet – it just makes it so hard for any country to go back for less democratization.’87 Women’s activist Mary Ann Tétreault, an attendee at rallies in support of female candidates, added, ‘I saw women that brought their daughters, and I saw men

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bringing their sons and daughters to the events that they are going to. They’re out there. They have questions.’88 Young Kuwaitis were at the heart of imbuing the movement with energy, and used the internet to gain widespread support. Blogs circumvented the state-controlled media, and Kuwait bloggers wrote about ‘q80’ politics.89 One such blogger, a young Canadian expatriate living in Kuwait, introduced his blog with the following: Kuwait, a culture of face, is more concerned about its reputation than anything else. As a result, issues such as corruption, terrorism and human rights violations are often denied or simply ignored. In most cases, the victims are punished. Despite the fact most people are too afraid to denounce them, some Kuwaiti and Expat writers are exposing the violations committed against helpless victims … sometimes at the risk of being accused of destroying Kuwait’s reputation or even being arrested.90

Another blogger criticized the Salafis and their sudden change in direction in regard to women’s rights: The topic which was of great importance in the Ahmadi area was the ‘Islamic hejab’. Our beloved Salafis were promoting what they called the correct Hejab which was basically a woman covered from head to toe, including gloves and socks and black cloak resting on the head. On the flyer, the Salafis denounced all forms of hejabs you witness in ordinary life including the cloak which women commonly wore on the shoulder. I really do not understand why those idiots are magnifying the sexual notion of women in our region. In return, women’s liberties and freedom are being violated. I don’t see those Salafis talking about ‘correct men dress’, or I don’t even hear them criticising the men neglecting their familial responsibilities for their Diwaniyas or what have you. Let’s also not forget that the Salafis are the ones who did not want women to get their political rights, but now they are gagging for all women to practice their right because it is an ‘Islamic responsibility’. More like they realised that females constitute a larger proportion of the society, hence greater chance of them winning the elections. The greater problem: people are blind and forgetful.91

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Because of the intricacies of Kuwaiti politics, it is unfair to assume that all young Kuwaitis share these reformist beliefs because, as shown in other Islamic cultures, young men and women are often drawn into extremism.92 However, there is little sign of such indoctrination in Kuwait, largely due to the education system, which promotes practical education over Qur’anic study.93 It is impossible to calculate exactly how much effect and influence the youth of Kuwait exerted upon the process of gaining women’s rights but, returning to the issue of Islamists trying to propose an anti-Western agenda, their rhetoric backfired amongst a modern youth knowledgeable about the internet and well aware of world politics.94 The sheer scale of the internet and blogging phenomenon was something that the traditionalists could not fight, with a 2009 survey showing that almost 100 per cent of Kuwaitis had internet access at home, 75 per cent had access through their mobile phones, 30 per cent read blogs regularly and 4.5 per cent contributed to blogs.95 In the face of this energetic countermovement, traditionalists became sidelined, as moderate Islamists realized that barring women from voting was not an issue worth fighting over: they preferred to shift the battle to other areas. They understood that there was a growing generational conflict, and realized that they would need the support of conservative women in tribal areas to swell the electorate in their favour.96 The energy of Kuwait’s youth bodes well for the future of women’s rights and for the development of inclusive security within Kuwait. These voters and Parliamentarians of the future are of a different generation and will be the architects determining the future of Kuwait. As Al-Anezi stated, The political atmosphere became vibrant with the rally to change the electoral law … Young women and men participated and, first, they started participating in [applying] political pressure on the government and on the members of Parliament. We merged forces with them and they became real engines behind the movement. Their issues became the country’s issues.97

In the process of reform, Kuwaiti youth are going to play a crucial role, although with the proviso that support can go both ways. Whilst

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Kuwait’s youth are politically sophisticated and educated, if Kuwait experiences difficult economic times and youth unemployment rises, this could cause a few young Kuwaitis to drift towards extremist politics.98 Recently, the country has shown signs of increasing disenchantment amongst the youth, with unemployment of Kuwaiti nationals in the 15 to 24 age group hitting 23.3 per cent in 2010.99 This manifests itself in increased levels of violent crime, drug and alcohol dependency, vandalism and extreme religiosity.100 One drug rehabilitation clinic admits 15 new cases every month, while a report in The Economist described young Kuwaitis as ‘a drug dealer’s delight: rich, Westernized and bored’.101 This is hardly surprising when the average productivity of Kuwaiti workers is 20 minutes per day, so even employed youth are prone to boredom.102 These issues amongst the youth demographic could lead to a loss of social cohesion and would give the traditionalists fuel to fight what they present as ‘the Western agenda’. In a worst-case scenario, it could allow them to claim that their predictions were right, and that giving women the vote will destroy society. This is unlikely, given the demographics of the Kuwaiti population, but the geopolitical situation in the Gulf is volatile and unpredictable.

The Culture of Dependency When looking at the sponsorship and factions behind women’s rights in Kuwait, the unique culture of dependency apparent in the oil-rich Gulf States has proved to be one of the greatest barriers to reform.103 Most GCC states developed a ‘social contracts’, based upon the tribal system where ruler and subjects are tied to mutual bonds of obligation, with the subjects offering loyalty if the ruler rewards them and shows competence. Modern variations of this social contract lay down the balance between people, rulers and religion, and, in Kuwait’s case, a constitution that established rights for the rulers, the merchant classes and the citizens. Such social contracts lie behind the extensive welfare systems apparent in most GCC states, because the rulers, according to the social contract, had to distribute wealth to the people.104 Whilst Kuwaitis complain and press for reform, they are ultimately aware that they are dependent upon the state for their livelihoods and their

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relatively high quality of life.105 This patronage ties Kuwaitis to their government with stronger bonds than any military or police state could muster, and the fact that this quality of life could be withdrawn, at any moment, has acted as one of the biggest barriers to electoral reform. The structure of the economy ensures that, whilst dissenters may complain, most of them ultimately seek employment within the civil service. One important distinction that sets Kuwait apart from its neighbours is the fact that oil revenue is taken by the state, rather than by the ruling family, which has always allowed Kuwaitis to be a little more dynamic and divert funds to the population.106 However, this also allowed candidates for the National Assembly to use patronage as a means to buy votes, promising more money to voters as they gerrymandered entire electoral districts.107 This state sponsorship also lies at the root of why emancipation took so long, as many women were reluctant to be too forceful in their protests because they enjoyed a good, state-sponsored life, and had no need to go out and seek employment. It is very telling that the movement for emancipation was strongest amongst women denied their state benefits because they had married non-Kuwaitis, and women who had divorced their husbands only to find themselves placed in poor-quality state housing, isolated from the main cities.108 Although a slow process, moving the economy towards the private sector is crucial for the country, as private employment will allow reformists to be more vocal without feeling that they are biting the hand that feeds them. In terms of women entering the employment market in larger numbers, increased private sector influence will be beneficial. On a cautionary note, the private sector is unlikely to be a panacea, considering the glass ceiling that still acts against women everywhere. That particular battle is an international one and is still being fought in Parliaments and boardrooms around the world. For the present, the culture of dependency remains and 93 per cent of all working Kuwaitis are engaged in the public sector, with benefits offered to many more – most Kuwaitis can retire with an adequate pension at the age of 50, and with a full pension at age 65 or after 30 years of service. This unhealthy ratio has allowed the Islamists to use bribery to gain seats, constantly promising to increase the number of jobs or raise wages, a tough proposition for reformists to overcome,

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especially as most of these are in favour of opening up Kuwait to internationalism and private industry. This will be a hard cycle to break and it will require a redefinition of the social contract, a cultural as much as a political change, because individual Kuwaitis will have to get used to the idea that the rulers cannot possibly fulfil their obligation to take care of citizens from cradle to grave, and must instead ensure that they have the environment to generate their own wealth and develop self-responsibility. The social contract partly lay behind the National Assembly’s reluctance to open up the northern oil fields to private investment, a decision that cost the state a huge amount of money. In 1997, the Kuwaiti government looked at increasing production from the northern fields, a process named ‘Project Kuwait’. This involved inviting foreign companies to invest in the fields and use their technological expertise to double production from 450,000 barrels per day to 900,000 barrels per day. However, many lawmakers felt that the oilfields were a national resource, for Kuwaitis only, adding that these reserves should remain largely untapped, for the benefit of future generations of Kuwaitis; the resulting debate continues to this day.109 This adds to the complicated subplot surrounding the future of the country, as an increasingly uncertain economic future, and fluctuating oil prices, places Kuwait in a very precarious position. As Saud Nasser Al-Sabah stated, ‘It’s dead now … It’s back to square one.’110

Pan-Arab Islamism One major factor in Kuwait’s openness to reform is based upon the government’s reluctance to adopt the idea of pan-Arabism, common across the Middle East and North African region. The Gulf conflict, which saw one Arab nation invade another, alongside the support extended to Saddam Hussein by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), destroyed any feelings of brotherhood amongst Arab nations.111 In addition, the example set by oppressive regimes, such as Iraq and Iran, served as a sobering example of the dangers of governmental oppression.112 However, the issue of emancipation became isolated from this general reform, partly due to the fear of complete secularism, and partly because the government could not completely ignore tribal values. Whilst a large amount of legitimate criticism can

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be levelled at the government and the ruling family, they did have to balance many different and diametrically opposed points of view.113 It could be legitimately argued that the government avoided alienating and radicalizing the Islamists, because such an action would almost certainly have led to an even greater polarization of opinion than was seen during the 1990s. Sadly, the issue of emancipation became a part of that avoidance and, whilst the ruling family certainly appeared to be largely supportive of giving women the vote, gave rise to their constant sidelining of women’s social groups and manipulation of opinion, either as a way of stopping the process completely or, at least, of delaying the inevitable confrontation.114 The government did just enough to ease international media and organizational condemnations whilst also following the lead of other Arab nations. In that respect, it is very likely that the decision of other GCC states on emancipation, such as Qatar in 1999, Bahrain in 2002 and Oman in 2003, also played a large part in Kuwait’s eventual decision, simply because the government ran out of excuses.115

Women and the Complexity of Feminism Looking at sponsors also requires looking at the women themselves, because it is all too easy to fall into the trap of treating Kuwaiti women as a homogenous entity, all holding the same goals and desires. This is disingenuous and does not reflect the individualism of Kuwaiti women, as their views are just as complex and varied as those of Western women. Whilst feminist groups from other countries have always supported Kuwaiti feminists, they had to understand that developing women’s rights in the nation needed to be within an Islamic context, that is, according to traditional cultural and religious values.116 The majority of Kuwaiti feminists see no conflict between their religion and their political ideology, but traditionalist women still hold to the Qur’an and Sharia as safeguards of women’s rights, whereas reformists argue that the laws were written when culture was very different. The latter argue that laws from centuries ago cannot hold true in the modern world, and contest that such laws are ill-equipped to deal with the challenges of technology, globalization and changing societies. This division, between reformists and traditionalists, lay at the root

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of the failure of the women’s rights movement during the 1990s, as it provided a weakness for traditionalists to exploit.117 Fatima Ayad believes that, whilst the reasons behind the slow progress of women’s voting rights in Kuwait are complex, blame lies with the ‘fanatical groups’.118 They twisted Islamic teachings and managed to convince a large number of women that they did not need change: They use Islam as a reason to prove their point of view. This is abusing, not using, Islam. There is nothing in Islam that is opposed to women’s rights … They were able to convince women that they were having a good life. They did not need any more.119

These tactics were successful during the elections of June 2006, where the majority of women voted for male candidates: some under direction from their husbands or tribal leaders, others because they felt that there was a conflict between Western ideas of feminism and Islam. The inexperienced female candidates had not done enough to appeal to a broad cross-section of society and, by focusing solely on women’s issues, potentially alienated many male voters. Male voters were as disillusioned with the National Assembly as women, and would happily have voted for change if they felt that their views also counted.120 Only 35 per cent of the country’s eligible women voted and there is little doubt that, despite an encouraging showing, the 2006 model of feminism, based upon removing all differences between the genders, was flawed, and failed to appeal to conservative women voters.121 As Dr Amani Alessa of the University of Durham wrote about her time teaching in Kuwait: Speaking from experience, I have taught in an all-female college for six years (1997–2003). During that time, Kuwaiti women were deprived of their political rights. In each section of mine – approximately 48 sections – I have discussed this issue and whether to support it or not. Most of the students in each section (about 35–40 students in each section), coming from different backgrounds in society – Bedouins and city dwellers – were against women’s involvement in politics, mainly because they believed that it is a man’s field and not suitable for woman because she is weak, very emotional and most importantly,

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it is forbidden by Sharia. The students were brainwashed, they all have the exact same reasons why a woman should not be in a ‘man’s specialty field’.122

Amongst the Gulf States, Kuwait was the first to have an elected Parliament, dating back to the publication of its constitution in 1952. Certainly, women were quick to protest their right to vote but could not have envisioned that it would be such a long battle, especially as neighbouring states were quicker to act. Dr Ayad added: If you read the history of women in Kuwait, [campaigning for women’s suffrage] started much earlier than in other Gulf and Arab countries. It is illogical that women in Kuwait got political rights just a few months ago. Part of the problem might have been a complacency that grew up because Kuwaiti women had already achieved so much.123

Kuwaiti women made great strides in education, business, academia and the workplace, in most cases outstripping their counterparts in other GCC states. When added to the bravery of women in the Kuwait resistance during the 1990 conflict, this may well have created complacency, encouraging Kuwait’s women to believe that emancipation was only a matter of time. This may also explain the difficulties surrounding the 1996 elections, because women found that excellent academic credentials and business achievements are of little use in the dirty business of Kuwaiti politics. Recently, there has been much more coherence within the women’s rights movement and, like the traditionalist blocs, feminist groups have been attempting to cultivate a broader appeal and present a united front. Women’s groups have begun to form their own political bloc, which aims to act as a rallying point for all women, regardless of whether they are traditionalist, reformist or straddle the divide.124 In addition, this bloc intends to promote women’s rights across society, rather than focusing upon politics, seeking to encourage more women to build upon the work of Dr Rola Dashti and other leading academics and civil society representatives. The bloc, called ‘Growth’, was set up in 2008 by three Kuwaiti women and hopes to make inroads into the large female section of the electorate, 58 per cent of the total.125 Khowla

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Al-Ateeqi, one of the founders, stated that the bloc was formed as a response to ‘the extreme failure of female candidates in the previous parliamentary elections’.126 She went on to blame this on the failure of any of the blocs to fully commit their support behind female candidates, a veiled criticism of the liberal bloc that failed to back up its words with action. The united feminist bloc aimed to appeal to a broad cross-section of society, including traditionalists, reformists, Sunnis and Shi‘is, with the ultimate goal to ‘prepare women to be a partner in the process of decision-making as well as pave the way for the society’s acceptance of that’.127 This would include strengthening the role of women in finance, academia, journalism and civil society, closely following UN Resolution 1325, which calls for the increased influence of women in society. However, one cautionary note with this Resolution is the idea that most feminists are moving away from the idea of women’s rights as a separate field, and towards addressing it within the sphere of human rights, as part of the inclusive security concept that will be discussed in Chapter 7.128 As discussed in Chapter 3, when compared with most other societies in the region, Kuwait has a thriving civil society which, whilst suffering some constraints due to the relationship with the government, funding and indirect attempts to shift the focus of the agenda, combines with the relatively free press to allow the public debate of issues.129 As explained in Chapter 2, the manipulation by elite women, intent on maintaining their status, meant that the use of civil societies to fight for the vote shifted and became fixated upon the definition of women’s rights within traditional Islamic contexts, promoting women as equals in Islam, but under the guidance of men: as homemakers, wives and mothers.130 This particular misdirection portrayed Western feminism as immoral and un-Islamic, and probably served as the main factor inhibiting women during the doldrums of the 1990s, during which time the fervour and momentum gained after the heroics of women in the Kuwaiti resistance, as documented in Chapter 1, faded.

The Rest of the Islamic World Proponents of reform and of granting women democratic rights used the Islamic world as an example, pointing out that Egypt, Iran and

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Indonesia had no problem with giving women the right to participate in the political process as equals, and that Pakistanis had elected a female president.131 On the other hand, nearby countries such as Oman and Saudi Arabia resisted the process, and Qatar granted women the vote only in 1999. Despite the progress made in other areas of society, Kuwait still denied the vote to many – a strange anomaly. The fact that other GCC countries have been slow to reform did not give Kuwait the right to follow suit if it wished to maintain a reputation as an enlightened Arab country.132 One avenue of support of increased female political participation comes from the Arab League, a group with strong secular roots and one which strongly advocates the advancement of women. This is partially due to the increasing perception of women’s rights as a human rights issue, as shown by the Arab League’s willingness to lobby for an improvement of conditions for Palestinian women in Israeli jails.133 Economics plays a part in this and the Arab League, traditionally very vocal in attempting to build strong economic ties between Arab countries, understands that this cannot be achieved if well-educated and talented Arab women are barred from high positions and the right to have a say in their own fate. As Hessah Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah, the daughter of the former emir stated, in an interview with Al Mara Al-Arabiya, There is great support from the Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa and the League is interested in reinforcing women’s economic participation … During the meetings of the 29th Arab Women’s Committee at the Arab League headquarters, we discussed issues related to the report of the Arab organizations specially concerned with the advancement of Arab women, and the situation of Palestinian women imprisoned in Israeli jails.134

Another ally of the feminist cause is the minority Shi‘i community, which has never had a problem with the emancipation of women, and has always traditionally supported women’s rights. This is partly due to a genuine belief and partly due to the fact that the two groups were fighting the same enemy: Sunni traditionalists. After vocal Shi‘i demonstrations following the Iranian Cultural Revolution, the

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Kuwaiti government reacted forcefully and attempted to suppress Shi‘i groups.135 The government constantly tried to lessen the impact of the Shi‘is, by debarring Shi‘i social groups, although the Shi‘is found strength by allying with the various opposition groups throughout the 1990s. Subsequently, they always managed to gain some seats in the Assembly, although never enough to consistently influence votes concerning women’s rights and suffrage.136

Islamic Feminism Support for ‘Western’-style feminism fell out of favour with Kuwaitis, as many harboured genuine concerns about the dilution of Islamic values. Their view was shared by moderates as much as by staunch traditionalists, and so women’s rights groups increasingly began to shift their focus. In the aftermath of the 1990s, and with the focus of the international media on Kuwait, women’s rights groups can be justifiably accused of partially bringing about their own downfall.137 Some of the political games played out between the ruling family and the National Assembly were responsible for this, in large part, as was the hijacking of the movement by the richer elements of society. However, Kuwaiti feminists, mainly through naivety and inexperience, pushed too hard for a Western agenda and inadvertently tried to fight extremism with extremism.138 By adopting ideas for radical reform, they alienated many moderate women and men, who were broadly supportive of a woman’s right to participate in politics, but were torn between this and the fear that their Islamic values were under threat. This allowed the hijacking of the emancipation agenda and women’s groups by the ruling classes, who were set upon maintaining the status quo by portraying it as preserving Islamic rights, and using imagery and portrayals of the ‘perfect Islamic woman’.139 This move could not be countered as long as Kuwaiti feminists maintained this self-imposed barrier to dialogue and compromise, despite the best attempts of influential women working in academia and journalism. It is against this backdrop that many Kuwaiti feminists began to adopt their own ideas about feminism, embracing and developing an Islamic feminism that they claim allows women to retain their Islamic

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identity whilst achieving a greater degree of societal and political equality.140 This is entirely based around bridging the divide between secularism and Islamism, which forced many Kuwaitis to choose one or the other. This Islamic feminism, influenced by countries such as Kuwait, and even Iran, fits well with the idea of a modern Islamic state. In a region beset by many ideological struggles, between extremists and reformists, Sunni and Shi‘i, this removes women’s issues from the frontline of the political debate.141 This compromise solution suits the majority of Kuwaitis, as it ensures that women’s issues cannot become the focus of political agendas. Anthropologist and Islamic feminist, Dr Ziba Mir-Hosseini, describes Islamic feminism in the following way: These gender activists, using Islamic arguments to critique and challenge the Islamists, brought classical fiqh and tafsir texts to public scrutiny and made them a subject of public debate and discussion, articulating alternative, gender-friendly understandings, indeed visions, of Islam. That marked the broadening, in terms of class, of the fledgling Islamic feminist movement.142

Islamic feminists seek to work within the existing religious, cultural and societal structures, challenging what they perceive to be patriarchal interpretations of Islam rather than Islam itself, and believing that there is no conflict between fulfilling the role of an Islamic woman while striving for equality as an individual. They seek to reinterpret Islamic teachings and challenge laws designed to further a patriarchal system rather than remain true to the teachings of the Prophet. As Sula Al-Naqeeb, a New Generation Fellow of the Center for Human Emergence Middle East, points out, this process must include men, many of whom were very supportive of giving women the right to vote, and are a long way removed from the Western feminist idea that Arab men are oppressors incapable of loving or caring for their families.143 As per the various directives from the United Nations, ensuring that women’s rights remain at the heart of the process, rather than using women’s rights as a tool for leverage, is part of a holistic approach to preventing conflict. Most sponsors and factions understand that taking a retrograde step with women’s rights would harm

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their own cause, even the Islamic traditionalists in Kuwait who enjoy a healthy proportion of the vote in tribal areas. Against the backdrop of democratizing Kuwait and diluting the influence of the ruling family – a mission shared by many factions within the National Assembly before the December 2012 pro-government Parliament – courting the women’s vote is essential. In the area of female representation, most traditionalists are starting to realize that there is a greater battle, and that selecting female candidates running on a traditionalist platform may be one way of broadening their appeal and furthering their agenda. Western feminists must also take an active role in fostering this holistic approach and stop stereotyping all Islamic women as oppressed, assuming that they must adopt Western-style equality or remain second-class citizens.144 Understanding and encouraging an Islamic feminism, sensitive to cultural values, and blending culture with modernism, might create a stronger and less divided society than labelling feminism as a secular or reformist issue. Tentatively, it is possible to propose that women in civil society, and the media in Kuwait, can do much to ease tensions between the various factions in Parliament, encouraging compromise and cooperation rather than divisive debate and stasis.145 Whilst Kuwait is in little danger of civil violent unrest, incorporating women into the political process, as an alternative to masculine, confrontational politics, should allow Kuwait to resist division and parliamentary stasis.146 As suggested by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, the inclusion of religion within political debate, as well as society and even private life, has given Islamic feminists the opportunity to participate in theological debates, reinterpreting the Qur’an and Hadith and challenging patriarchal laws.147 The current feeling amongst Kuwaitis seems to be to support a move away from faction-driven politics, as shown by a gradual reduction in the percentage of the electorate voting in the 2009 elections, from the usual 80 per cent to 60 per cent.148 The number of votes for the traditionalists declined, always encouraging for female politicians, as is the move towards voting for independently orientated candidates. Of course, women campaigning for the vote must take on board the idea that they have to represent a broad constituency, based around more than a single issue such as women’s rights.149 The Kuwaiti

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electorate, so far, has shown little reluctance to vote for women, with four female representatives voted into the Assembly in the 2009 elections. Women will continue to thrive as politicians.

Conclusion In the aftermath of the first Gulf conflict, the constant interplay between the various sponsors and factions created many problems for the women’s rights movement in Kuwait. The Islamists and the traditionalists in the tribal areas united, to create a strong and powerful bloc, which could face off the emir and create stasis in the National Assembly. Whilst this does not completely excuse the apathy spreading downwards from the ruling family, it does give very little justification for their actions in blocking women’s rights, as a way of appeasing the traditionalist bloc. This status quo lasted for a decade, mainly due to the inability of the women’s rights activists, international organizations and reformists to present a united front and make demands on the emir. However, as the Islamists used extremist rhetoric and shackled anti-Western sentiments to deny women the vote, claiming that granting women the vote was an attack upon Islam, they began to lose the moderates amongst their electorate, many of whom were not particularly anti-Western. Some groups, such as the Salafis, began to wane, as they misread the signals and underestimated the appeal of an enlarged middle ground drawn towards the growing reformist movement and the Islamic feminist movement, which broadened its appeal to every section of Kuwaiti society, rather than attempting to attract only the liberal elite. With this shift in attitudes, for the first time there appeared to be an inevitability about women gaining the vote in Kuwait, and an increasing awareness that the face-off between traditionalists and reformists was dividing along generational-based, rather than gender lines. The youth vote and activism was crucial in pushing the motion to grant women the vote across the line, and this may well be the defining moment for future Kuwaiti democratization and the shift in power towards the National Assembly. Pressure from outside Kuwait mounted, as the United Nations and the United States maintained a diplomatic dialogue, chastising Kuwait’s rulers for their reluctance

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to act decisively. However, sensitive to local politics and the likelihood of inflaming the situation, such diplomacy was low key, and was only marginally effective. Change had to come from within, especially given the low turnout of female voters in the 2006 elections and the failure to elect even one woman to the Assembly.

Chapter 7 THE FUTURE: CHALLENGES, EXPECTATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES

The battle for women’s rights in Kuwait has been a long one, beginning with the activism of the feminist movement in the 1970s and continuing to the present day, as women still fight for full equality and recognition. This long-running effort included the positivity immediately after the 1990 Gulf conflict, when Kuwait’s women first tasted emancipation, and the doldrums of the late 1990s, when the women’s rights movement was directed towards adopting a traditionalist approach.1 After the emir’s decree, in 1999, there was an air of inevitability about women receiving their democratic rights, and the start of the twenty-first century saw the movement again grow in strength.2 Throughout the entire period, women’s rights have been used as a political chess piece by all of the relevant actors, but women eventually became integral to reform, as all but a few extremists realized that granting women full democratic rights was merely a matter of time. Traditionalists and reformists began a battle of hearts and minds, hoping to gain the support of women and build a popular mandate for wider political aims, such as promoting traditional Islam, or pressing

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for democratic reform.3 Women make up over half of the electorate in Kuwait, and the liberal bloc needs these votes to push forward a broader agenda of reform. Conversely, traditionalists need the votes to uphold Islamic values and prevent what they perceive to be the dilution of their culture, a result of the increasing interference of Western nations in the region.4 Kuwait is changing rapidly – culturally, socially and economically – and the government constantly produces directives to amend the structure of government or guarantee rights. The separation of the roles of Crown Prince and Prime Minister in 2003, and the forced resignation of the Prime Minister in 2011 as direct response to popular demonstrations, is evidence that Kuwait is slowly moving towards true democracy.5 This perception of democratic reform is supported by the recent trend of picking ministers from outside the ruling family, broadening the appeal and underpinning a shift towards an Islamic democracy. A decade after this separation, the influence of the ruling family is waning and the National Assembly is beginning to assert its influence and power. Some analysts believe that the Al-Sabahs are destined to become figureheads, with the emir as the head of state rather than a major policymaker.6 However, political, sociological and cultural developments in Kuwait are influenced by current world events and the fragile ideological balance apparent in the Middle East as a whole, especially after the revolts of the Arab World.7 Kuwait finds itself in an area of conflict, as Saudi Arabia, despite some mild reforms, still follows the traditionalist path, refusing to allow women to participate in politics or enjoy the same rights to education and employment.8 This places a great amount of pressure on Kuwait’s rulers who are, understandably, wary of their powerful neighbour.9 Across the Gulf, Iran is polarizing between traditionalists and reformists: a potential future reality for Kuwait if the ideological divisions are left unaddressed.10 To most observers, Kuwait is a rich, peaceful state but, in reality, it is beset by internal difficulties: youth unemployment, a growing dissatisfaction with traditional values and the difficulties of the time-honoured social contract discussed in Chapter 6, are creating intergenerational antagonism.11 Against this broader situation,

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the struggle for women’s rights is largely over, and contemporary thinking suggests a holistic approach, built around addressing these concerns before they breed tension and resentment.12 Women’s rights is no longer a stand-alone issue, but is integral to the wider issue of human rights, as discussed in Chapter 6.13 Palestinian women, since the Intifada of 2000–1, find themselves treading a very similar path to Kuwaiti women and have seen their position in society gradually improve due to their courage and determination. The tribulations of Kuwaiti women could provide a roadmap, especially in a state where a perceived battle against oppression runs alongside a generational conflict.14 In the Gulf region, the multifaceted debate includes a confrontation between traditionalists and pro-Western reformists, Shi‘is and Sunnis, young and old, and tribes and urbanites. This splintered situation could explode into civil war, especially when set against the antagonism surrounding the Palestinian conflict and the sabre-rattling between Iran and the USA. Kuwait is situated between large neighbours; its location has always been problematic, especially considering the huge oil reserves lying below ground. Tapping the potential of Kuwait’s well-educated and well-motivated women is a way to prevent Kuwait from being drawn into any of these conflicts, and to also ensure that Kuwait acts as a source of inspiration for other Islamic countries around the world. Kuwait once stood alone as at least a regional model for developing women’s rights amongst Islamic nations, built upon its good educational and employment opportunities for women.15 As academic Abdullah Al-Shayeji pointed out: Since its inception over four decades ago, the Kuwaiti parliamentary experience has been the harbinger and beacon for other Gulf states. With the full participation of all its citizens, Kuwait now becomes more important than ever before as an indigenous model. As such, the fate of the Kuwaiti experiment is no longer solely a domestic issue but one of regional significance.16

For the Gulf region, and for the Islamic world as a whole, political and social developments in Kuwait will influence policies at all levels. As a

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result, it is essential that Kuwait overcomes some of its current challenges and acts as a model for other states undergoing the same rapid pace of change.

Tribalism, Islamists and Indirect Attacks on Women’s Rights Over the course of the twenty-first century, electoral reforms have diluted the power of the tribes, discouraging block voting and making it difficult for prospective National Assembly members to use bribes to buy the votes of tribes.17 Despite this, the tribes will continue to have a significant influence in Kuwaiti politics; tribal groups make up two-thirds of the population and are almost entirely Sunni in composition. The most implacable opponents of granting women the vote are found amongst the tribes, as they believe that feminism is a sign of the Westernization sweeping the region, directly threatening their culture and way of life.18 As a Bedouin male residing in the province of Sulaibikhat said, in a National Democratic Institute focus group, ‘women rely on their passions more than their minds’.19 This does not mean that all tribal Kuwaitis are anti-emancipation, especially as the tribal tendency to run primary ballots and bloc vote skews any observations, and as tribes tend to concentrate upon local issues more than ideology.20 As Rola Dashti has summarized: There are many interlinked factors related to the religious and social environment as well as the attitude of political leaders, who have not taken a clear position: should women have a role in public life, private life only, or a mix of the two? In the Gulf, there is a conflict between a modernizing and development-oriented perspective and a religious-tribal perspective. The latter fights to keep women at home and preserve the traditional arrangement of male domination of the public sphere and female limitation to the private sphere. Men have succeeded in the public sphere to the extent that they are giving up their roles at home. The modernizing perspective promotes a partnership between men and women in public life, and citizenship rights and duties for both. The struggle between these two trends remains unresolved, and here the third force appears – the government role – which is unstable and swings

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back and forth, one day siding with the modernizers and the next day with religious and tribal elements. The media also can play an important role in this struggle by showing women in leadership roles.21

Despite this, most tribal Kuwaitis have few problems with women receiving an education, so their views, as with many Kuwaiti political viewpoints, are deeply complex. Developing an approach built upon inclusive security involves looking at the situation from the ‘other’s’ point of view, and understanding the reasons behind resistance to reform. The tribes are stakeholders in the future of Kuwait and have an equal right to express their opinion.22 Instead of writing the tribes off, as antagonistic to the women’s rights movement, it is essential to balance tribal rights, as an integral part of the political process. For the long-term security of Kuwait, as is often the case with issues concerning the rights of one group overlapping the rights of another, it is counterproductive if the voices of one group are forcibly silenced, allowing resentment to breed. The tribes are full participants within the political process and, rather than fuelling the battle between extreme points of view, cultivating common ground and compromise is key.23 Women’s groups can be a huge part of this process, and supporting civil society groups is one way of achieving this ideal. For example, women’s groups across the Arab world are encouraging women to become entrepreneurs, and form cooperatives to sell traditional crafts.24 In Egypt, women’s societies, such as the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights (ECWR) and the Better Life Association for Comprehensive Development (BLACD), have been instrumental in pressing for reform, such as halting the practice of female circumcision, changing divorce laws, and improving the nationality laws so that the children of women married to non-Egyptians can seek citizenship.25 This, more than anything, will add to the strength of Islamic feminism and inclusive security, respecting traditional Islam whilst encouraging women to pursue educational and employment opportunities.26 Currently, many tribal males will not allow women to mix with men, so helping them to earn a wage and enjoy independence is one way to circumvent this.27 To most Westerners, this compromise strikes at the heart of equality, with society seemingly settling for

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second best, but gradual change will develop longer lasting roots than the imposition of quick reform that will breed resentment. Engaging the tribes of Kuwait is a balancing act but, instead of creating a ‘for or against’ situation, where the rights of women become a political tool, a low-level approach will create an environment for permanent, cultural change.28 Globalization holds the danger of changing societies too quickly, unwinding the fabric of their unique culture, so a holistic approach to managing women’s rights, while balancing the rights of the tribes, is paramount. As an example, if Kuwait decides to give statehood to the thousands of stateless Arab bedun living in the country, but only to those who qualify, giving them full voting rights, they could easily sway the voting demographic. It is easier to work with the tribes and help them modernize fully, than to dictate how they should change.29

The Traditionalists and Conservatives in Parliament The main change in the debate over women’s rights in Kuwait is the reversal of attitudes, as traditionalists and reformists in the Kuwaiti National Assembly indirectly use the political status of women to serve their wider aims. Instead of resisting the political participation of women, as a way to fight Westernization, the traditionalists now see the potential of courting female voters as a bulwark against change, and a way to defend their culture.30 Previously, traditionalists saw women’s rights groups as servants of the ‘immoral West’, but a more Islamic approach to feminism has eroded this perception. Whilst a few extremists, such as the Salafis, cling to the hope of stripping women of their voting rights, most traditionalists realize that engaging a large percentage of the electorate is a better option for holding onto their culture and influence.31 Traditionalist women voters make up a significant voting group and potential candidates cannot afford to ignore this particular demographic.32 The debate over women’s rights often portrayed all traditionalists as the ‘Bad Guys’, but this is disingenuous and flouts the idea of democracy, built around the right to have an opinion. Most traditionalists, like their tribal supporters, feel that they are besieged by antagonistic and un-Islamic forces, and see them as a direct threat

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to their way of life.33 Democratization involves listening to a broad cross-section of society, rather than imposing and dictating policies. This holistic approach is extremely important when applied to a wider context and the Middle East as a whole, because there is always a possibility that traditionalists, feeling that their concerns are disregarded, could drift towards the extremists, as a way of uniting against a common foe.34 Currently, the Salafis and their allies are sidelined within Kuwait, and moderates hold sway in the National Assembly. However, they are still a potent force, and ensuring that all voices are heard is the key to ensuring that they remain on the fringes of the decision-making process. The press in Kuwait enjoys a great amount of freedom compared to its Arab counterparts but somewhat limited compared to the US or European media and, if youth unemployment or dissatisfaction amongst the tribes grows, the extremists may find an audience for their inflammatory rhetoric.35 As shown by the amendment to the law maintaining that female politicians should follow Sharia law and wear the hijab, extremists are still trying to impose their agenda, and can be counted on to seize any opportunity to remain in the public eye.36 The bill was ultimately defeated, but the intent to create difficulties was there – as this was a public relations move more than a genuine ideological challenge.37 Their attempts have not been sufficient to prevent Kuwait from pushing through reform, but the Salafis were quick to publicize their opposition upon contentious issues, and writing them off through complacency would be a dangerous course of action. As an example, in 2009 the Constitutional Court ruled that Kuwaiti women could apply for passports without the sponsorship of their husbands or fathers, in what appeared to be a strike against the extremists.38 On the other hand, this particular law does not really challenge Islamic tradition, and the Salafis may be saving their opposition for battles ahead, rather than risking the ire of the population. Appearing as self-caricatures, guaranteed to vote against every piece of legislation, would deter potential voters, most of whom appreciate that Kuwait has to undertake some type of reform. The traditionalists, well versed in generating publicity and using the media, may be waiting for the chance to fight a battle on familiar grounds, especially in the face of economic or political crises like the Arab/Islamic Spring

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that may bring uncertainty about oil prices once it reaches the shores of countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or the UAE. Kuwaitis fully understand that the country needs to become less reliant upon the vagaries of international oil prices, so the electorate will not accept a bloc of elected ministers continually working against reform. Kuwaitis already feel that inertia in Parliament, largely centred upon traditionalists, has cost the country, so, for the time being, there is little sign of a growth in support for extremist views, hence the low-key approach.39 Ultimately, the traditionalists understand that the state is slowly moving towards true democracy and are waiting for this process to unfold, supporting reform when it suits their interests and returning to the tried and tested method of displaying a united front over simple issues. After the 2009 election, where the Islamic Salafi Alliance saw its number of seats reduced from four to two, spokesman Abdul-Rahman Al-Mutawa said that ‘the alliance’s popularity has been hit by leading figures publicly disagreeing on policy, making the public unsure of the group’s official line’.40 Nasser Al-Sine, Secretary General of the Islamic Constitutional Movement, echoed these concerns, adding that he wanted the group to ‘refocus on Islamist issues, such as the gradual implementation of Sharia, that he believes lies at the root of its previous success, before it was politicized’. 41 Again, this highlights the importance of a more inclusive approach to Kuwaiti politics, because the only safe way to ensure that the National Assembly will not drift towards extremism is to ensure that as few elements as possible in society are disaffected. Any disenchantment amongst large sections of the electorate is a breeding ground for firebrand politicians such as Al-Tabtabae to start building support.42 Political systems throughout history have shown a drift towards extremes when populations are under political, economic or social pressure, and women’s rights should be used as a way of finding common ground, rather than as a political weapon.

Female Politicians and the Importance of Remaining Untainted The four women elected to the Kuwaiti National Assembly on 16 May 2009, as well as the women serving as appointed ministers, have taken on a huge burden of responsibility. They have made great strides in

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achieving political equality for women in Kuwait but, in doing so, have subjected themselves to inequality. These women are pioneers, and will have to endure a higher level of scrutiny than their male counterparts. They will have to outperform other representatives if they are to withstand attacks, preserving their own positions and opening the door for future female candidates. It is not safe to assume that the fight is over and that these pioneers are a sign that Kuwait’s women have achieved true equality. Female politicians must look beyond this and use their positions to reach out to other areas of Kuwaiti society, become active in solving many of the problems in Kuwait and act as mediators in the polarized National Assembly. These politicians are not just fighting for women’s rights, but for children’s rights, tribal rights and the rights of migrant workers. They are human rights advocates and, with their mixed background as economists, academics and women’s rights activists, undoubtedly have the talent and the experience – which they must now convert into real political achievements.43 As a poignant example, the election of Benazir Bhutto as the Prime Minister of Pakistan was seen as a victory for women, but she soon became mired in corruption and scandal, ultimately harming the cause.44 Either way, female politicians must strive to outperform their male counterparts and stay away from the corruption and playground politics that constantly plague the Kuwaiti political system. Any suggestion that women have failed to change the status quo may well see the old ways returning, and throw the wisdom of granting women the right to enter politics into question.45 The current small group of female politicians is not robust enough to withstand a concerted attack without the support of reformists and the ruling family; they must strive to avoid alienating the moderates, who could so easily shift towards the extreme end of the spectrum. However, these female representatives have allies in the National Assembly, so they do not stand alone in deflecting unfair criticisms and baseless accusations. As MP Ali Al-Rashed stated: We are now taking the first steps toward social acceptance of female participation in elections. The performances of former minister Massouma al-Mubarak and current Minister of Education Nouria al-Sub-

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eih have demonstrated women’s abilities. We as a movement remain convinced that women are capable of serving in government, but there are other movements that believe the contrary. We always want to prove that women are capable of achievement, sometimes more so than men.46 

Part of the reason Kuwaitis voted women into the National Assembly was because they felt that it was the ‘right’ thing to do. However, the poor showing of women in the elections of 2005, where they restricted their political manifestos to women’s issues, when compared with the success in the 2009 elections, highlighted in Chapter 8, where they adopted a broad manifesto aimed at moderate reform across a wide range of issues, shows that Kuwaitis voted for change and that female politicians will be expected to deliver.47 This amount of pressure is unfair, but it is part of the process; if women are seen to be a success, then Kuwaitis will quickly throw gender politics out of the window and vote for candidates that they feel will do the best job. The former Minister of Education, Nouriyah Al-Sabeeh, believed that she has greater influence than many of her male counterparts because of the need to be seen to be ‘working harder to prove high abilities’ and because she will be ‘enjoying achievements in a short period of time as a result of previous efforts’.48 She is aware that female politicians currently attract goodwill from the majority of Kuwaitis, who understand that women have fought with tenacity and honesty to gain their political rights. As shown in Chapter 6, the female candidates owe a lot of their success to the youth of Kuwait, who were active in challenging the status quo. They must ensure that this faith is repaid, both in the political arena and by supporting female-organized civil groups looking to address problems such as unemployment and drug abuse amongst young Kuwaitis.49 To make the task more difficult, whilst the female politicians must maintain a clean image and stand above the political mire that plagues Kuwaiti politics, they still have to play that game and use the political system for their own benefit.50 An element of Kuwaiti political society still wants to bring women down and will use any means to achieve this goal. For example, Islamist parties have toned down their rhetoric demanding that article 2 of the constitution be amended to state

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that Kuwait’s laws should be entirely Sharia-based.51 They have realized the short-sightedness of alienating allied opposition members, so have restricted themselves to working entirely within the constitution. However, it is safe to assume that behind this public relations exercise has been constructed the usual web of secret deals and alliances. To a certain extent, the four female members will need to become involved in the unavoidable background alliances and saloon-bar politics, to ensure that they are not caught unaware by the hidden patronage that plagues most political systems.52 Accomplishing this, without leaving themselves open to accusations of corruption and bias, will be a difficult task, especially in a system that promotes patronage and nepotism.53

Democratization in Kuwait: The Double-Edged Sword The recent political developments in Kuwait are a result of democratization: a gradual changing of the political system that began in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf conflict. In the two decades since that upheaval, the struggle for women’s rights has, to a certain extent, been part of the creeping democratization of the political structure and the gradual dilution of the ruling family’s influence. Once women finally won the right to vote in 2005, this process has gathered momentum, as Kuwaitis increasingly seek to decide their own destiny, a belief fuelled by persistent reports of corruption in that ruling family and the playboy lifestyles enjoyed by many members of the family.54 Kuwaitis generally respect the emir and members of the ruling family, but the patronage of other members, many of whom seem to enjoy extravagant lifestyles whilst average Kuwaitis struggle to meet their daily needs, is changing this perception.55 Unlike other Gulf States, the Kuwaiti Royal Family is not the owner of the oil wealth and has no direct hold over the culture of dependency.56 By splitting the roles of heir to the throne and Prime Minister, the ruling family is slowly yielding to an inevitable decline in their direct involvement in Kuwaiti politics. The family has been under intense pressure from reformists campaigning for more accountability and political freedom, and even from the USA, to loosen its grip on power.57 For women in politics, this increases the pressure because, to a certain extent and despite

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their own efforts, they rely upon the patronage of the ruling family to press for reform. The landmark decree of 1999, whereby the emir finally stopped trying to use women’s rights as an issue to maintain the status quo, finally adopting a ‘side’, sped up the process and helped female politicians take the first tentative steps on what would be a steep learning curve. Democracy, whilst a sign of progress, can be a double-edged sword and opens up the potential of traditionalists gaining widespread support amongst the electorate, pushing through laws aimed to restrict the rights of women and forcing them into a submissive role. On the other hand, it could increase the number of female politicians and speed up the pace of reform. Kuwaitis are broadly split between rural and urban dwellers, but the fragmented nature of the small society makes any prediction about potential outcomes difficult. One other potential change to the Kuwaiti system that may influence the effectiveness of female politicians would be to allow the formation of political parties. Currently, these are banned, but this has never stopped the building of alliances and informal factions within the National Assembly.58 At the time of writing (2012), many Kuwaiti politicians and the ruling family are against establishing official parties, because this would require a constitutional amendment. Thus, the formation of political parties remains some distance off, but could cause a significant problem for female politicians. The structure of the Kuwaiti political system, and the fact that candidates stand as independents, ensures that they have a very strong relationship with their constituents, rather than blindly following party lines.59 However, if the voting age is reduced from 21 to 18, and if the members of the military are allowed to vote, the electorate will triple and official parties may be the only way to streamline political participation.60 If parties form, it is almost certain that they will be split down traditionalist and reformist lines, and the scattering of female politicians and the drive to defend women’s rights could be buried beneath other legislation. In a system dominated by two parties, the predominant party generally has free rein, and a traditionalist majority could well act against women’s rights with very little counterbalance, especially if Kuwait continues to reduce the direct influence of the emir. Alternatively, creating parties could heighten the splintering and divisions that constantly plague the Kuwaiti Parliament, especially if

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proportional representation is chosen as the preferred system, with coalitions rarely lasting for long amidst the shifting tides of Kuwaiti politics.61 In this situation, as during the 1990s, women’s rights could become another political football, bandied around as a weapon between the reformists and the traditionalists, without ever being fully addressed. This makes it vital for feminists to address wider issues, rather than be seen as ‘one issue warriors’, because engaging the electorate is always the best form of defence; if women politicians are seen as capable, caring and untarnished by the bitter infighting that creates stasis in government, then it is unlikely that any political party adopting the restriction of women’s rights would receive votes or a mandate.62 Again, any work by female members of Parliament must be matched by grass-roots programmes aimed at improving society from the bottom up. If political parties form, the influence of women in civil society could help in moving away from single-issue politics to a broader, holistic approach, engaging with tribes and youth, and working across sectarian, gender and class divides.63 Having said that, there is no democracy without political parties, Kuwait will eventually have competing political parties for women, for Shi‘is, Sunnis, traditionalists, liberalists, Secularists, the youths, the handicapped, among many others not represented in the current political scene. Having a Prime Minister picked from one of those parties will take democracy towards a higher level, and will shield the ruling family from further political accusations and constant attacks. Having a female emir from the ruling family would take Kuwait to new heights. Of course that depends upon updating the 50-year-old Kuwaiti Constitution. Thus, any future elections will set the benchmark for future progress in Kuwait. The reforms of 2006 have empowered Parliament to be more representative of the people, and the sheer scale of reform has given elected representatives more of a voice.64 On the one hand, this could also hamper and dilute the voice of women, if the wave of anti-Westernization that sprung from the wreckage of the recent Iraq conflict spreads. Conversely, the weakened Al-Sabahs may decide to attempt to reassert their authority; therefore, the future of Kuwaiti politics is as unpredictable and dynamic as ever.65 The opposition has fragmented and wavered, so the elections will determine the course of Kuwait and reveal how much influence female politicians will be able to exert upon

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Parliament. The new electoral districts, designed to dilute the power of the main blocs, should provide an opportunity for more women to enter Parliament.66 However, they will have a difficult task, and will need to use all of their political skills and education to ensure that they are not sidelined or betrayed. Politics is a very dirty business, but the female politicians have to remain clean.

Using the Internet to Promote the Cause As touched upon in Chapter 5, the internet is opening up a new realm of possibilities for Kuwaiti women, both within wider society and the more narrow political elite. Apart from the obvious advantage of allowing women’s groups to organize and maintain the unity that eluded them in the early 1990s, the use of the internet is freeing women in other ways, opening up society and employment opportunities. Women are embracing chat rooms, blogging and social sites, meeting people outside of their family and immediate circle of friends, without going against traditional Islamic ideals. A 2010 survey found that 83 per cent of Arab women access the internet from home, with 71 per cent using social networking sites, and 45 per cent reading articles and magazines online. Kuwaiti women are well represented in this sample, with 53 per cent spending more than seven hours per week online, outside the workplace, and 68 per cent having a Facebook account.67 Younger women can meet other young people, including men, outside of the family’s domain, liberating them from the practice of arranged marriages.68 The use of the internet also allows them to make the international community aware of any issues, such as the separation of the genders within universities, or any attempts to strip away hard-won political rights. This may seem to be unlikely at present, but if Kuwait continues upon its process of democratization, there is always a chance that traditionalists could sweep into power against the backdrop of a perceived conflict between Kuwait and the West. In this context, voting rights could just as easily be stripped away, especially if the veto power of the ruling family is diluted.69 For this reason, encouraging women to make use of the electronic age, and employ all of the tools at their disposal, is a good way of ensuring that they are

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not outflanked and caught unawares. This ability to fight back adds an extra counterbalance that will combat any creeping Islamization. The main danger of using the internet as a way to raise awareness, is the gradual censorship that has begun to block certain sites: a phenomenon apparent in most of the GCC states.70 This censorship is based around the loose term ‘immorality’, and it is designed to block the worst excesses of pornography and violence. However, as shown with television, appealing to morality as a way of censoring content is a dangerous move, because there is a very fine line between censoring perceived immorality and quieting legitimate dissent, by using decency as a convenient smokescreen.71 In addition, allowing the government to dictate public choice will, potentially, give them a great deal of leverage. For example, it is perfectly understandable that Islamists wish to censor hardcore pornography, but the idea of censoring television shows depicting the social mixing of men and women could easily spread to the internet. In the case of television and the press, the removal of the law requiring judicial assent before the authorities can close down newspapers is a worrying precedent.72 In the case of internet censorship, the mechanisms are already there, and determining what content is allowed through the filters is a problematic and contentious issue; censorship could easily be adapted to filter out politically undesirable content, for example.73 This scenario does contain a lot of ‘What if?’ questions, but the history of the fight for women’s rights in Kuwait shows how conflicting interests are happy to use any tactics at their disposal. It would be easy for the country to return to its previous stance, and it is wise to guard against such an eventuality and prepare for it long before it might happen. However, the main impact of the internet on Kuwait will be the indirect benefit to the economy, an essential part of changing the social contract, as discussed in Chapter 6. Most analysts predict that Kuwait has to open up to international markets, divesting itself of protectionist policies. The country also needs to reduce the culture of dependence, which will slowly bankrupt the state if allowed to continue at present levels.74 This is likely to have severe repercussions, including unrest, as the financial pinch bites. One way of circumventing this, and softening the blow, is to promote the idea of two-income

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families, where the woman works at least part-time, as is common in Western countries.75 The internet could open up many opportunities in this area, giving women the chance to work online and compete in the global market, in Arabic and in English. This would allow women to juggle work with home duties, avoiding the need for paying childcare costs, and also striking a balance between the modern image of the working woman and traditionalism.76 Taking this further, many of the tribal women sell their goods online.77 This move towards remote working is already supported by the Arab League, the Kuwait Economic Society and civil society groups, but needs to find greater support amongst the government, which must reduce the price of internet access.78 Negotiating the accusations of decadence and immorality online may be difficult, but improving internet coverage is key to the future diversification of Kuwait’s economy.

Expanding the Meaning of Feminism to be More Inclusive The other major issue that must be addressed in order to maintain women’s rights in Kuwait is the definition of feminism, as a concept and also in reality. Most discussions of feminism in Kuwait tend to adopt the Western paradigm, painting the cause as an ‘us against them’ struggle.79 Considering the polarization of the National Assembly, and the constantly shifting agendas, the emancipation of women became central to the ideological confrontation between traditionalists and reformists. It is too easy to fall into the trap of dismissing conservative women wishing to follow Islamic values, but this would be unrepresentative and unfair. It is disingenuous to assume that all Kuwaiti women wish to enjoy the type of freedom seen by Western women and strive to achieve full independence.80 This would create the type of hard-line blackand-white distinction that caused stasis in the National Assembly and government, ultimately benefiting no one, least of all Kuwaiti women.81 Feminism is an extremely difficult concept to define, with many groupings and sub-groupings, some overlapping and some mutually exclusive. Even Islamic feminism is difficult to define, because Islam covers such a broad geographical range, encompassing many cultures and ethnicities; an Islamic feminist in Bosnia

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may have different aims and values from those of an Indonesian; a tribal Kuwaiti feminist may have a different outlook from that of an American Muslim in New York. For this reason, Islamic feminism fits into Valentine Moghadam’s broad definition of global feminism, respecting national and cultural differences: The discourse and movement of women aimed at advancing the status of women through greater access to resources, through legal measures to effect gender equality, and through the self-empowerment of women within national boundaries but through transnational forms of organizing and mobilizing. It is predicated upon the notion that notwithstanding cultural, class and ideological differences among the women of the world, there is a commonality in the forms of women’s disadvantage and the forms of women’s organizations worldwide.82

Whilst it is unfair to expect female representatives to be automatically tied to the issue of women’s rights, to the detriment of other interests, it can be argued that they represent all Kuwaiti women and must take into account all viewpoints, a factor that also applies to the women’s social groups and NGOs. Redefining and broadening the issue of feminism to include conservative women is paramount; a woman can be both a feminist and traditionalist as the two are not mutually exclusive.83 Many women wish to maintain traditionalist Islamic values and raise families, rather than follow careers. A proportion of these have no wish to vote and prefer to allow their husbands to make the political decisions. As a result, they have no ballot box and, whilst it can be argued that they have disenfranchised themselves through a refusal to vote,84 as Kuwait democratizes and modernizes these women must be listened to and their rights respected, and they must not be forced into adopting Western values. The danger of democratization is in creating artificial divisions that can lead to extreme and unusual actions, and it is perfectly conceivable that these women could decide to exercise their right to vote and elect to vote conservatively. Viewing women’s rights as a spectrum, rather than two distinct poles, will ensure that all Kuwaiti women have a voice, and allow them to take on whichever parts of feminist ideology that they choose, rather than being forced into an all or nothing stance. Diversity is strength and

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will avoid the ‘divide and conquer’ methods often used by the 1990s Kuwaiti government, turning woman against woman. Whilst there are always wider issues that can change the political landscape in an instant, as the 1990–1 conflict showed, Kuwaiti women can ensure that their own house is kept in order and that any potential threats are dissipated. In addition, recent trends in the worldwide perception of women’s rights have moved towards recognizing their rights within the context of human rights. This drive towards ‘inclusive security’, as mentioned in previous chapters, proposes that women must be at the heart of any reforms and peace initiatives, or be at least treated equally; in the Gulf States, they can form part of the barrier against the burgeoning Islamic extremist movement and rising political instability in the region.85 Civil society, the media and politics benefit from the added voices of women, especially in attempting to diffuse the confrontational politics prevalent in the National Assembly of Kuwait. As well as ensuring that female representatives engage a broad spectrum of Kuwaiti women, they must also build bridges between broader sections of Kuwaiti society.86 It is short-sighted to consider women’s rights without looking at men’s rights, and a stable society needs to ensure that the unique needs of men are also addressed.87 Men are having to undergo a shift in values, becoming dependent upon wives as earners, or understanding daughters wishing to follow Western ideals and wear Western clothes. Much of the support for traditionalists comes from failing to adjust to this change in society, and helping men to find a new role within Kuwait will cure the root cause, rather than merely treat the symptom.88 This goes beyond the tired clichés about men being emasculated by feminism, and is more about redefining the unique role of men in society, as feminists strive to redefine the role of women. The Middle East is faced by the same upheavals as the rest of the world, with increasing urbanization and a growing generational gap, so women’s rights do not exist in an ideological vacuum.89 Strong equality is built upon recognizing differences and understanding weaknesses, not only between the genders, but between tribal and urban dwellers, or Sunnis and Shi‘is. The new feminism must shift and become tied to other causes, under the broad umbrella of human rights, allowing the various facets of a splintered Kuwaiti society to

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seek compromise and negotiation, rather than highlight differences and adopt divisive policies.90 As Professor Othman Al-Khader stated, the women’s rights movement has ‘improved a lot during the last 5 years. But they need to care more about Kuwait problems not only getting more power [sic]’.91 Women in Kuwait understand fully the damage that can be caused by a divided society, as they were on the receiving end of such a polarized battle for many years.

Democracy and the Danger of Complacency One of the major concerns about women’s rights in Kuwait is assuming that the battle ended with the election of four women to the National Assembly in 2009. This assumption will lead to dangerous complacency. As the triumphant headlines highlighted, women voting and entering the Assembly was a huge victory for democracy in Kuwait, and was the culmination of an extremely long and difficult process. As Shamael Al-Sharikh, columnist for the Kuwait Times and board member for the WCSS, pointed out, the present status of the women’s rights movement in Kuwait is ‘marred by internal conflict between women NGOs and civil society organizations. Also, it lost much momentum, after women gained their political rights in 2005.’ She also bemoaned the ‘lack of [a] grassroots populist movement to pursue more rights for women’.92 These comments show that this process is not at an end, but at the beginning. Gaining political rights was only one battle and, despite the enlightened attitude of the Kuwaiti rulers and government in promoting gender equality, there are still many areas where women suffer inequality.93 The former Minister of Education, Nouriyah Al-Sabeeh, stated that the greatest achievement of the Kuwaiti woman was that ‘she broke the politics glass ceiling’. However, she added that other areas, such as housing law and the issue of Kuwaiti women married to non-nationals, now demand immediate attention, and provide no opportunity for complacency.94 Kuwaiti women do not receive the same rights as men, and it is essential to prevent discrimination in other areas from spreading across the system.95 In addition, the issue of foreign domestic workers must be addressed, because Kuwait is earning a notorious reputation, bordering on claims of slavery, for its poor treatment of immigrants.96 The

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other area of concern is the attack upon women’s rights under the guise of upholding morality and decency, which has manifested itself in many areas of Kuwaiti society. This is a sign that, despite the relative euphoria surrounding the sidelining of the extremists in the National Assembly, much still needs to be done across Kuwaiti society. The biggest potential issue is the proposal tabled by traditionalists to prevent women and men from working together; the attack upon popular TV shows is very much part of this new morality-driven agenda. Originally, this low-level infiltration of society began with legislation, passed in 2000, to segregate male and female students, but some Islamists in the National Assembly are seeking to extend this to the workplace. Such legislation will undo all of the good work undertaken to promote education amongst women, and will block their continued progress in the civil and private sectors.97 This type of indirect discrimination is an attack on democratization and, in the context of an increasing polarization in the Islamic world, is something that should be taken very seriously.98 The attempt to introduce this legislation is also part of the effort by the Islamic factions to promote moral decency, again arguing that the mixing of the sexes leads to immoral behaviour.99 During the debate over whether to segregate students within the education system, Islamist MPs such as Waleed Al-Tabtabae and Mubarak Al-Duwailah implied that the wider goal was to return Kuwait to Sharia law.100 The legislation to grant women the right to participate in the democratic process stalled because the ruling family wished to placate the Islamists and maintain their own hold on power.101 Ironically, the influence of the ruling family may be an important factor in protecting female politicians, at least until the latter have overcome some of the short-term difficulties and proved themselves to be invaluable to Parliament and to Kuwait as a whole. Many Kuwaitis, both female and male, feel that female representatives cannot do a worse job than the men, so it is vital to ensure that the goodwill does not evaporate, as political opinion can be extremely fickle and short-lived.102 To strengthen their case for segregation, conservative MPs often cherry-pick data and studies to support their claims, taking the findings out of context to promote their particular agenda. For example, columnist Abdul-Lateef Al-Ateeqi published an article in Al-Qabas

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in 2009 showing the findings of an Australian study into romantic relationships in the workplace, claiming that 80 per cent of employees had feelings for colleagues, or had actually embarked upon sexual relationships of some sort – anathema to an Islamic culture built upon strong family relationships.103 He suggested that the logical conclusion of this was that Kuwait would fall into depravity and broken families, and that Kuwaitis ‘were committing adultery by merely working together’.104 However, using journalistic licence, he ignored cause and effect and generalized the results to postulate very unlikely outcomes. The study actually showed that the reason that so many relationships started in the workplace was because of the exceptionally long hours worked, and the decline of quality time to spend socializing.105 However, such journalistic sloppiness can create discord and misrepresented issues become topics of conversation in the diwaniyas. The views of many Kuwaitis are firmly against workplace segregation, as shown by a series of interviews, although it must be noted that these interviewees are drawn from the urban middle class, who tend to have liberal viewpoints. For example, Haitham Al-Kandari, a 34-year-old aviation services employee, explained: We have been brought up to believe in our religion. That being said, I stress that such ideas are far away from religion; they push people away from religion by making such claims. It is against the Constitution to segregate people in their workplace; it is against any and every human law.106

Sharing these sentiments, Alia Al-Mansour, a 29-year-old high school teacher, said: Is this it? Is this our dark age? Are we seriously going through this here in Kuwait, the most democratic nation in the Persian Gulf region? Kuwait is a very small country, and literally everyone is related to everyone else somehow. To suggest that colleagues will commit adultery is insulting, and not acceptable.107

This is an area where a battle over women’s rights will be fought, and cannot be allowed to reverse the increase in the number of women

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in the workplace. However, becoming entrenched in a bitter debate, with neither side compromising, is not a solution and is another point of contention that will create stagnation within the Parliament, when there are far more pressing concerns to consider.108 Instead, a compromise may be likely, built around strengthening the level of disciplinary action for sexual harassment in the workplace and government ministries.109 The Kuwaiti economy desperately needs women to enter employment and strengthen the economic outlook.110 Part of the problem with Kuwaiti women in relation to the law was the article inserted in the legislation granting women the vote, stating that any female voter or politician must abide by Islamic law, a concession that was granted to prevent the traditionalists from filibustering the decree.111 Unfortunately, the vague wording of the clause leaves it open to numerous interpretations and makes it a potential weakness in the legislation, returning the debate to the weak Hadith and convention stating that women cannot assume positions of leadership. Whilst there is little danger of this having any adverse effect while the ruling family and government support the rights of women to vote and enter the Assembly, it is an oversight that could be open to misuse. It has been argued that this particular phrase is discriminatory and goes against the Kuwaiti constitution, but this may well need clarification from the Constitutional Court.112 This law has already been used to attack female ministers in Kuwait, as some amongst the traditionalist bloc and their media supporters seek to create mischief. As an example, an attack upon the former Minister of Education, Nouriyah Al-Sabeeh, resulted in a vote of no confidence, which she barely survived. The reasons given by the Islamist deputies were mismanagement and, in a sinister turn, failure to uphold Islamic values. In October 2007, the Islamist members again tried to attack Al-Sabeeh and also targeted Mouthi Al-Humud, the former Housing Minister, for failing to uphold Islamic traditions by refusing to wear the hijab.113 These charges were dismissed, but serve as examples of how indirect assaults serve a wider agenda, reinforcing the idea that female politicians need to be very careful to stay away from the corrupt, seedy side of politics. Accusations of mismanagement and corruption are designed to erode the confidence of the electorate in female candidates. Al-Sabeeh appears to be fully aware of the difficulties, arguing that ‘the society

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will gradually accept women presentation [sic] in different areas and fields’, and that ‘men and women are facing the same challenges’.114 My analysis is that corruption and stasis within the Parliament is a much bigger issue than gender equality, and concentrating upon these is far more important than allowing women’s rights to dominate the agenda, so it is to be hoped that her vision comes to fruition, ‘by persuading voters and improving Parliamentary performance’.115 Expanding on the idea of Kuwaiti women and the law, there are other areas that require attention. Some of these are employment related and are a case of waiting for women to enter the workforce in greater numbers, allied with legislation to prevent discrimination in the workplace and discourage nepotism and institutional sexism.116 Other facets of the law are trickier because they strike at the root of the Sharia law upon which Kuwait is founded. The law does offer some protection, for example domestic violence against women is being taken much more seriously. On the other hand, there is a definite bias; for example, divorce is much easier for males, and women have few grounds – mainly domestic violence or desertion – on which to seek the right to divorce.117 Other areas of concern are that the woman must have a male guardian to seek marriage, and that a woman only inherits half of the amount her brothers do.118 Many of these laws may have made perfect sense when the laws of Islam were first laid down, but they do not fit in with the modern world, and Kuwait must arrive at a solution that grants women the same rights as men. Since it is unfair to judge Kuwait by studies in Australia, it is also unfair to expect the nation to become a Western democracy like Australia, or a secular Muslim majority state like Turkey. Kuwait must find a type of Islamic democracy that balances both ideals: where some religious values are incorporated into public life but where Islam is not the only source of law, such as in Malaysia, Pakistan, Algeria and the Maldives. The other pressing issue with women’s rights in Kuwait is ensuring that these rights apply to all women, not just Kuwaiti nationals. As covered in Chapters 3 and 6, many female migrant workers suffer sexual abuse and the nation is a well-known destination for sex trafficking, something that the government must try harder to correct, by using stiff punishments and by changing the sponsorship system that can reduce foreign nationals to semi-slavery, by preventing them from

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leaving the country.119 Physical abuse of migrant women is certainly an issue and, sadly, is often perpetrated by Kuwaiti women – a situation that does not help the cause. It is difficult for Kuwaiti feminists to fight for equality if the equality only applies to a small segment of the female population. This is an issue that female politicians in Parliament must address and pursue, before it becomes a potential weapon to be used against them.

Conclusion Globalization, now gradually spreading throughout the Middle East, is an unknown quantity. It will have unknown effects on human rights in general, and on women’s rights in particular. On the one hand, the Westernization of Kuwait, and the entire Gulf region, could modernize and bring in Western values. However, this could have the opposite effect and create a barrier between reformists and traditionalists, keen to cling to their traditional values in a world that, following the actions of the USA and its allies in the region, they perceive as being against Islam. Rather than opening up democracy in the Middle East, Parliaments such as Kuwait’s could become even more divided and imbued with stasis. One solution to this problem may well be to remove the question of women’s rights as a stand-alone issue, and associate it much more closely with general human rights. In a country where there are many worrying human rights abuses, especially of migrant workers and Beduns, this is vitally important. For example, the recent victory granting women the right to apply for passports, without the assent of a male family member, should be seen as a victory for human rights, not only for women’s rights. The ruling family and National Assembly certainly cannot afford to brush the whole idea of human rights under the carpet, as they previously did with women’s issues, because this would draw criticism from the international and national media, as well as the United Nations and other bodies, with no possibility of hiding behind Sharia law or the constitution. Currently, women’s rights are still under attack from fundamentalists, and the fear of any retributive and possibly violent action from extremists possibly inhibits government and the ruling family. The euphoria surrounding the election of four

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women into the National Assembly is almost gone, and these women, supported by civil society, will have to fend off attacks from extremists, whilst trying to outperform male deputies and show that they are above the corruption endemic to the Kuwaiti political system. They are not alone in this, as the support of youth and of liberal male deputies is crucial, but the new Assembly members will have to ensure that they appeal to a wide cross-section of Kuwaiti society. Under the banner of ‘Inclusive Security’, the increasing prominence of women at all levels of Kuwaiti society is an asset in a region beset by a culture clash and polarization. What happens in Kuwait could provide a model for other Islamic countries, but this must be achieved from within, or the suspicion of Western interference and ‘immorality’ risks driving moderate traditionalists into the arms of the fundamentalists. The situation is delicately poised but, if the needs and rights of all sections of Kuwaiti society, whether tribal, urban, Sunni or Shi‘i are addressed, and the danger of complacency is avoided, then there is real hope for the future.

Chapter 8 THE LONG ROAD TO SUCCESS: WOMEN IN KUWAITI POLITICS 1991–2009

Since the establishment of the Kuwaiti constitution in 1962, and the creation of an autocratic Islamic political structure, women in Kuwait have enjoyed genuine equality in many areas of society. The constitution gave women the right to receive an education, and the state has gained a deserved reputation as one of the more progressive and liberal in the Islamic world. This entry of women into mainstream education, and fields such as engineering and medicine, ensured that the number of women participating in the workforce steadily increased. Previously locked in a subservient role within the home, women slowly began to create pressure for change that saw them seek out other careers. In this respect, Kuwait not only stood out amongst its neighbours, but also amongst many Western-style democracies, due to the high achievements of Kuwaiti women in many fields, as illustrated in Chapter 3. The Gulf War of 1991 acted as a catalyst in speeding up this process even more, and women began to make up a healthy percentage of the Kuwaiti workforce, at 33.8 per cent of the total.1 In addition, building on the reputation gained during the 219

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resistance to Iraqi occupation, women began to occupy positions of genuine influence and moved up the career ladder. In academia, business and science, a generation of bright female graduates reached the higher echelons and highlighted the fact that Kuwaiti women were intelligent, industrious and well-educated. Although the last vestiges of resistance from traditionalists and a glass ceiling remained, there was no more gender inequity than in most countries, and Kuwaiti families became proud of their daughters, pushing them to continue the education process and strive for success.2 Despite these advances, Kuwait still promoted inequality in one area: the refusal to allow women the right to stand for election or even vote. This issue has been the subject of a long-running battle, ever since the formation of the nation, but there always seemed to be some good reason to deny women their voice in the political arena. Before the 1990–1 conflict, the rulers and the National Assembly had claimed that the constitution included provisions for a basis in Sharia law, and quoted weak Hadith and conventions to debar women from voting. Political parties have always been illegal in Kuwait, but a cluster of women’s CSOs attempted to build a base of support and challenge Kuwait’s political system. Sadly, women’s rights often got caught up in the battle between progressives and traditionalists, tribes and urbanites, and Shi‘is and traditionalists within the ruling classes. Islamists believed that if they allowed women to vote, it would open the doors for wholesale reform and a weakening of their own position within society. As a result, with tacit governmental approval and support, women from the elite classes began to fight against reform and hijacked the CSOs, promoting traditionalism and marginalizing the large group of well-educated women pushing for change. The call for emancipation, vociferous in pre-war Kuwait, died down as a campaign of misdirection and obfuscation sidelined the issue. As women lacked the political skills, experience and sophistication to force the issue, Kuwait resorted to being a typical Gulf State rather than a leading promoter of political equality in the region. As discussed in Chapter 1, the conflict completely changed this attitude, and women, once again, began to agitate and press for equal recognition in the eyes of the law. The conflict awakened them to their own potential and they began

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the process of trying to force the rulers to follow through on their promises. As the 1990s unfolded, and the political situation remained unchanged, women began to exert indirect pressure, through international NGOs and the media. As well as courting international publicity, women began to learn how to play, rather than be pawns, in the wider political game. In the 1996 elections, it seemed that all hope was lost and the door to equality in the voting booth was closed. However, women were not to be denied, and slowly but surely they built up support and political influence. The activists were fighting conservatives not only amongst men, but also amongst women who saw no need to change or even felt threatened by the prospect. By seizing the initiative and educating a generation of Kuwaitis, women ensured that the Gulf War memories were not forgotten and that their efforts in that conflict were not in vain. As Kuwaitis moved into the twenty-first century, women won a long series of battles in the course of a protracted campaign. A combination of grass-roots activism and the gradual increase of strong-willed and capable females within the political structure slowly turned the tide. In a Kuwaiti Parliament plagued by stasis and inter-factional squabbling, Kuwaitis turned to women as a way to break the status quo, first giving them the vote and then, against the odds, voting representatives into Parliament. Charting the progress of women within politics will show that Kuwaiti women, politically naive after the Gulf conflict, used their talent and education to put the traditionalists on the defensive. Women seized the initiative and made politicians react to their actions, rather than maintaining the passive posture that promoted the status quo.

The Argument for Change For many years, women’s rights were sidelined by the dichotomy between the Kuwaiti constitution and the provision that the Kuwaiti legal system should be based upon Islamic law. Depending upon a particular reading, this was interpreted as stating that women were not permitted to vote; it was not their role in an Islamic society. As Massouma Al-Mubarak opined,3 ‘debates started from their own understanding of Islam and they [Islamic scholars] defend their

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position that Islam sees women as less able than men in terms of thinking power or because they’re emotional. They present some Hadith (Traditions) that are weak in reference and have their own interpretation of the Qur’an.’4 This particular issue became the main point of the debate, and provided an almost insurmountable barrier to reform, giving lawmakers the perfect excuse to maintain inequality. This legal wrangle became the principal battleground between traditionalists and progressives, and also took on a religious perspective; minority Shi‘is saw little wrong with allowing women to participate in politics, whilst the Sunnis felt that it threatened the traditional tribal structure. Article 29 of Kuwait’s constitution declares, ‘All people are equal in human dignity, and in public rights and duties before the law, without distinction to race, origin, language or religion.’5 The main thrust of the argument used by women’s rights activists in pre-war Kuwait was that this particular article did not debar women from voting. Sadly, subsequent laws allowed the spirit, if not the letter, of the constitution to be broken.6 As Freedom House points out, the Personal Status Law, Welfare Law 22/1987 and Decree Law 1116 on Housing Care, specifically state that women were not individuals but were dependent upon men, either their male relatives or their husbands.7 As a final blow to the feminists, the Election Law of 1962 had specifically barred women from the vote, and this cycle of circular reasoning prevented any real action.8 Whilst many men had little problem with women gaining the vote, they also felt that women did not have the experience to engage in politics, a view shared by many women. This particular area of debate was much more complicated than a two-sided argument, as conservatives constantly turned the idea around and made it appear that they were actually protecting women. They proposed that the Koran forbade women to occupy positions of political influence. MP Walid Al-Tabtabae stated that,9 ‘it is in the sayings of the Prophet that people will not succeed if they allow women to be their commanders. Besides that, the entry of women into politics will cause social and political problems.’10 This view not only appealed to those who felt that women politicians offended Islam, but also to those who felt that this was not a rights issue, as women could influence their husbands and male relatives. The final crux of this traditional view was the argument that women would be exposed

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to un-Islamic influences as they campaigned for votes.11 Proponents of reform had always argued that this particular element of Sharia law did not apply to Parliament, only military command, pointing to other Islamic nations, such as Pakistan, that had voted in female presidents. However, the traditionalist view certainly held sway; Feldman points out that, in 1995, 84.1 per cent of scholars in the Sharia College of Kuwait University were against emancipation, with 81.7 per cent using religious grounds to justify this view.12 This bloc of traditionalists would prove difficult to overcome and would constantly shift focus and tactics in order to confound the opposition. It must be noted that these figures are from 1995, when the women’s rights movement was at its lowest ebb, before the call for emancipation received support from a broader section of society. By the beginning of the twenty-first century Kuwaitis began to realize that their women were strong, independent, educated and sophisticated members of the nation. Using the symbolism and heroism of Kuwaiti women, proponents for change began to press for their constitutional rights, and this movement started to take root in Kuwaiti society. The various social groups, as in pre-war Kuwait, began to press for genuine change. The WCSS, with a history dating back to 1963, once again arose from relative dormancy and began to agitate and lobby the rulers to follow the spirit of the constitution, arguing specifically that ‘democracy, justice, liberty and equality are the pillars of society’.13 This heroism was allied to the increasing pride in Kuwait as a modern state, and the country also took pride in the fact that its women were at the forefront of gender equity in the fields of academia and business. By the 1990s, Kuwaiti women began to dominate education, engineering, medicine and law, also making up 35 per cent of the workforce of Kuwaiti nationals.14 Kuwaitis were exceptionally proud of this, a figure that not only outstripped most Islamic countries, but put many Westernized democracies to shame. However, this particular image was damaged by denying this class of independent women the right to vote, despite the promises made by the emir whilst attempting to gain support for the Gulf conflict.15 Instead, the rulers used their fallback position of using women to combat women by promoting groups that appealed to nationalism, and stating that an Islamic woman’s patriotic duty was to serve the country by obeying men.

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Haya Al-Mughni summed the process up, postulating that the 1990s denial of women’s rights was not ‘the result of oppression, but rather, as that of a political game between the government and Parliament’.16 Sadly, this political game was set to become much more intense and bitter over the course of the next decade, turning into a battle between conservatism and reform. For the women of Kuwait, things were set to become much worse before they improved, and the fight for representation would sink to a new low.

The 1992 Election and the Breaking of the Promise The women of Kuwait approached the 1992 election with a great deal of optimism and hope, believing that the emir, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, would keep the promises he made while in exile. They finally hoped for the opportunity to contribute to the destiny of their nation, which had been socially and physically damaged by the war. As the former Kuwaiti Education Minister, Nouriyah Al-Sabeeh, pointed out: During the invasion, women had shown courageous actions by participating in the resistance groups and managing to deal with the day to day life under difficult circumstances. Such experiences had redefined the women into much stronger personalities and led to achieving different goals.17

Women felt that their courage during the resistance earned them the right to vote, but it soon became apparent that their hopes were unfounded.18 A vote for suffrage was comprehensively defeated, with Parliamentarians claiming that women did not possess the necessary experience to judge and evaluate political candidates, much less actually participate in the process.19 The reasons for this particular defeat, described in Chapter 1, ultimately rested with the perception that women were not experienced enough to stand for Parliament. The next few years were spent in the doldrums, as the conservativedominated women’s societies surreptitiously worked to further the traditionalist cause.20 There was still some hope left, but nobody was

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sure who was responsible for carrying the fight and the women’s movement lacked inspired leadership. The devastated movement did not quickly regain its strength, and the first years of the decade were a minor disaster for the emancipation movement, which was weakened and fragmented by attacks from the Islamists. The 1996 elections were one of the lowest points in the fight for representation in Kuwait, and were also the moment when women’s groups realized that there was going to be no change to the status quo. Partly due to the inexperience prevailing amongst activists and apathy amongst the population, and partly due to the old pattern of diverting energy away from real issues, the pre-war status quo once again filled the vacuum of Kuwaiti politics. Again, the various groups working against emancipation successfully used the process of divide and conquer to deflect criticism and deny women voting rights.21 Suffragists protested their right to vote but, at every turn, the traditionalists organized counter-demonstrations, supporting the conservative viewpoint.22 The energy and optimism shown during the aftermath of the Gulf conflict evaporated and, once again, the population became exceptionally disillusioned by an Assembly that was perceived as all talk and little positive action. The rulers failed to seize the initiative and became fixated upon the eternal battle between conservatives and reformists.23 In an attempt to head off the perceived threat of secularists, the National Assembly again courted the Islamists, trying to bolster their numbers and protect their own interests. Through association, women’s rights became a political football, and many of the elected representatives believed that giving women voting rights would send out the wrong message.24

The 1996 Elections and the Lowest Point The 1996 election was unique in that it opened up the right to vote to a greater percentage of the population. Previously, voting had been restricted to male Kuwaiti nationals over the age of 21, excluding those serving in the police and military. By 1996, voting rights now included the descendants of naturalized citizens.25 This increased the number of eligible voters by one-third, although the election ultimately resulted

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in an extremely conservative and protectionist Parliament, described by the Arab Times as ‘one of the most conservative Parliaments in the nation’s short, democratic history’.26 The liberal-leaning and independent representatives were routed at the polls and the pro-government, pro-Islamic members came to dominate the Assembly, leaving little chance for the issue of women’s rights to be pushed to the top of the agenda. From the promise of the early years of the decade, hope practically disappeared and women were left in limbo. Whilst women’s rights outside politics were improving, the paradox of Kuwait continued; it was one of the most forward-thinking GCC states, in terms of gender equality, but one of the most restricted for gender equality in terms of voting rights.27 Ominously, for activists, the National Assembly began to make noises about stripping away some of the rights already enjoyed by women, with one notorious decree ordering gender separation in educational establishments.28 In a sinister turn of events, the spectre of unfairness and electoral wrongdoing raised its head during this election. Elections within Kuwait had always been fairly transparent and relatively free of accusations of vote-rigging and fraud, except for accusations of ‘bloc-voting’ in some of the tribal areas.29 This election threw up accusations of vote-rigging, gerrymandering and vote buying. Candidates promised ‘special favours’ for those who voted for them, offering to cut through the bureaucratic red tape that plagued many of Kuwait’s civil service departments. Direct vote buying was also an issue, with large sums of money offered as bribes to voters, in a damning critique of the electoral process.30 For example, MP Hassan Jahwar stated, ‘In 1992, the international atmosphere was not good for the government to openly interfere in the elections, but now there seemed to be no obstacle.’31 This certainly did lead to stasis, because it forced members to deliver upon promises made to individual electors, rather than focus on their parliamentary role, and to spend money on the bribes rather than investing it for the good of the country as a whole. Kuwait was still reeling from the economic costs of the conflict, so giving handouts would not allow the nation to pay off debts, invest in infrastructure, replenish cash reserves or fix the faltering economy. Abdullah Al-Nibari, a member of the

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Kuwait Democratic Forum (KDF), predicted that Kuwait would suffer ‘another period of immobility and muddling’.32 With the majority of MPs leaning towards traditionalism, and some ministers also supporting this, the outlook was bleak for reformists. The conservatives were prepared to use any tactics available to stall the process, from indirectly influencing interest groups to outright bribes, leaving little room for manoeuvre. Despite the fact that many Kuwaitis wanted reform, the splits were far more complex than gender divisions, although a look at the differing viewpoints of men and women gives a snapshot of why progress was halted.

The Complexity of the Male Viewpoint There are many potential reasons why the male-dominated Assembly, and many men outside of office, would have agitated against promoting women’s rights, although it must be stressed that not all men were against women receiving the right to vote. In fact, men were often the strongest supporters in what became a game, as women’s rights and the ability to vote became a cause adopted by whichever party could best use it to their own advantage. As Al-Mughni pointed out, the resistance amongst many men, especially in the traditionalist camp, was due to a number of deep-seated reasons, and circular legal arguments were a convenient way to disguise this.33 During the 1990s, post-war Kuwait was beset by many other problems, from a stagnant economy to a rising youth unemployment problem, as revealed in Chapter 6.34 The logical extension of this was that a section of the male population felt that promoting women’s rights could emasculate them and undermine their position as provider.35 Considering that there was a class of well-educated and ambitious women beginning to achieve positions of influence and climb the career ladder, this fear was understandable, if unfounded. Examples of this increasing representation of women in society include the female appointments of the president of Kuwait University, the Undersecretary in the Ministry of Education and the Deputy Chairperson and CEO of Kuwait Energy Company.36 As is common in any society, the projection of one’s failings elsewhere is the easiest way to deal with one’s problem. As a

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parallel, most countries with unemployment problems project them onto immigrants or another social class rather than addressing their own shortcomings. A sizable minority of Kuwaiti men was no different and sought to blame women for their own failings. Many men had become complacent with their guarantee of a safe civil service job and had not applied themselves properly to their education.37 This came back to haunt them when they struggled to find state support during tough economic circumstances and so jealousy entered the equation. Of course, there was also some old-fashioned chauvinism and misogyny, and many men believed they were superior to women. The net result of all this was that many men in traditional and Bedouin society strove to subjugate women, using every weapon at their disposal, partly for the reasons stated above, partly out of genuine fear for a culture that they felt to be under threat. Considering that, essentially, tribal representatives could call upon a bloc vote, they provided the foundations of the resistance to change. Using rhetoric and hyperbole, Islamists began to blame all of society’s ills upon women and, when a society is struggling, such accusations make an impact. Blaming the increasing power of women and this departure from traditional roles for child delinquency, a higher rate of divorce and the lessening of traditional family values became very easy.38 This rhetoric forced the government to make mothers retire early, opening up more jobs for Kuwaiti men. However, this type of reactive policy can only ever be short-lived and, since it failed to address the deeper issues, merely applied a populist sticking plaster.39 Some of the conservative rhetoric was inflammatory and appealed to the fringes of society, but it hit home in enough areas of Kuwait for traditionalists to maintain a majority in Parliament. Former MP Hussein Al-Mutairi exclaimed: Those women who are calling for political rights have reached menopause and need someone to remind them of God. They know that they will be exposed to public meetings with men during elections … So how can a husband or a brother allow his wife or sister to run in elections and meet with voters which often also involves private oneon-one sessions?40

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This, of course, was only one side of this complicated story. A large proportion of men supported the emancipation of women. As is so often the case, this particular divergence in views occurred along traditional lines, with educated men much more likely to support women’s rights, creating a split between tribal and urban areas, which was further reinforced by the established differences of opinion between Sunnis and Shi‘is. In addition, there was a growing generational divide, as students of both sexes began to press for reform and change. In fact, former Minister of Education Nouriyah Al-Sabeeh was keen to point out that ‘the positive reaction of the society towards women [sic] activities’ was a major accomplishment in the country, indicating that she believed that the majority of Kuwaitis are supportive of women’s rights; the problems are mainly confined to the political arena.41 However, despite the support of many Kuwaiti men, the division within the female population caused the biggest resistance to change.

The Female Struggle for Self-Confidence The overall view of women towards change was very fragmented and, as shown by the pro-Islamist stance of the IWS, many women were happy to leave the decision-making and politics to men.42 There is little doubt that this prolonged the struggle for women’s rights, a fact that the ruling council knew all too well when they promoted anti-emancipatory women’s groups. Using women in this way gave Kuwaiti rulers a weapon to deflect criticism for their refusal to grant rights, because they could show their critics, should they want to, that the majority of women agreed with their stance. As discussed in Chapter 3, one of the main reasons for this was the idea, certainly amongst women who had been born or had married into rich and powerful families, that they had much more impact on politics by indirectly influencing men, as well as the fear that giving all women the vote could undermine their own favoured positions. According to Al-Mughni, ‘women feel they have a lot to gain by preserving this state of affairs; they can have a trade off with political influence’.43 Generally, women holding this view were influential and

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acted as the greatest traditionalists. The extent of their influence also led to the perception that these women were the voice of ‘all’ Kuwaiti women, and this certainly made many reformist feminists feel that they were voices in the wilderness.44 This elitist view found sympathy amongst many women, especially those rooted in the more traditional areas of society, because they felt that women did not have the political sophistication or experience to enter the political sphere or even make political judgements.45 This particular belief was one of the hardest to change, due to its deep historical roots in Arab society. Lulwa Al-Mulla, Secretary General of the WCSS, highlighted this, pointing out how traditional socio-cultural values may influence this, ‘when the man was at sea, pearl-diving or trading, women ran households and developed the ability to manage the affairs of the family’.46 This suggests that there may have been a generational influence at play here and that many of the older Kuwaiti women may have been less inclined to support women’s rights. However, due to the long-standing nature of Kuwait’s education system, such a generational difference is likely to have been swamped by other prevailing divisions, especially between urban and rural areas.47 This trend of women seeing themselves as unfit for politics is certainly not only a Kuwaiti problem, because other Arab countries have shown the same leaning towards reluctance on the part of women to participate in the democratic process. For example, the Qatari election of 1999 showed a distinct reluctance on the part of women to vote for other women, pointing out that many women ran for election but a sizable number of women did not vote for them, despite a 70 per cent turnout. Despite this, the Qatar election was the first amongst the GCC countries to allow women to vote, setting an example to Kuwait and taking away any excuses for blocking emancipation; the timing of the election, in March, may even have influenced the emir’s decree of May 1999.48 Lebanon showed the same trend and, as Amal Khoury, of the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies has pointed out, ‘Even women do not elect women. There is no trust in women that they are capable of doing the job. There is still a mentality that as long as a husband is working, she should stay home and take care of the children.’49 However, this view only underscores the fact that it is dangerous to assume that any female voter is more likely to vote for a

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woman just because she is a woman. If a female alternative is unimpressive in a pre-election campaign, then all voters, not just women, may vote for a male candidate, especially if he has served them well in the past. Unfortunately, trying to tease out the many reasons for women not supporting the democratic process is always difficult and can even be contradictory. Many critics of the women’s rights movements put the blame equally on Kuwaiti women, arguing that they became too used to the status quo and the idea that the state would provide for all, part of the social contract discussed in Chapter 6. For example, the social security culture certainly greatly slowed down much of the impetus of the women’s rights movement, giving women a safety net but also removing the incentive to work or to set up businesses. One example is the social security law of 1995, which guaranteed retirement benefits to any Kuwaiti woman over 40 years of age, and with 15 years of work behind her. Added to the generous pension, maternity leave and child benefit, this removes many women from productive activity when they should be at their most influential, in their late thirties and early forties. Comfort may well have contributed to a lack of experienced women pushing for change. The Assistant Undersecretary for Tourism Affairs at Kuwait’s Ministry for Information, Nabila Al-Anjari, speaking in 2005 with the benefit of hindsight, certainly subscribed to this view, admitting that, The blame should be mostly put on women themselves. Their efforts are not coordinated. Every party’s working for itself. Kuwaiti woman has all the privileges and doesn’t feel the need to fight for more rights. Living in a rich country and having everything available, she is not motivated enough to fight for a political say. Men, too, think women don’t need that. I have always said this is in the women’s hands. If they don’t talk and don’t try, how can they expect their rights to be restored?50

Massouma Al-Mubarak, a Kuwaiti academic educated in the USA, who became Kuwait’s first female minister in June 2005 and a member of the Kuwaiti Parliament in May 2009, further supported this particular view.

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Finally, Kuwait had the problem that women had been out of the political scene for so long that most of the public believed that a female candidate could not possibly have the skill or experience to stand for election or even make a political decision. For example, participants in a focus group stated that ‘men always accuse women of lack of knowledge and understanding and of being emotional, and not logical. Such frequent insults frustrate women who lose their selfconfidence to such an extent that they believe what men say about them. They are convinced that men are always right.’51 The same focus group also highlighted the generational gap, with middle-aged and tribal women more convinced that traditional roles should be maintained. For example, typical responses from an NDI included: ‘We have a Kuwaiti proverb that says “May God never enable a woman to control another”’, ‘It would be a great problem for us if our responsibility was in the hand of a woman’ and ‘No good comes to a country governed by a woman’. This highlighted the depth and complexity of the issue and, as the NDI report found, there was often more support for emancipation amongst men than amongst women.52

1999 and the Dissolution of Parliament The 1999 election, in terms of women’s right to vote and participate, was probably the most crucial election in the history of Kuwait. Whilst women were still barred from voting, they found some hope during this period, and took comfort from the fact that the rulers of Kuwait finally looked to openly support their cause. The problems inherent with the Parliament elected in 1996 caused friction between the ruling emir and the National Assembly, mainly due to a vicious battle concerning the funding of the Kuwaiti welfare system.53 As women’s rights activists continued to fight for their rights, the entire parliamentary session proved to be far too volatile. The ruler, Sheikh Jaber, dissolved Parliament and issued a decree in June 1999 ordering that women should be given the same voting rights as men and that they should also be allowed to run for office in the next election.54 Despite the election of a new Parliament in the July elections, November saw the defeat of this bill, by 32 to 30, with one abstention.55 This particular bill became the focus of extreme debate as the two sides

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shadow-boxed, due to the quirk of Kuwaiti law that ensures that any decree from the emir is law until rejected by Parliament. The progressives attempted to delay the vote as they frantically attempted to seek support, whilst the Islamists tried to force a quick vote, eventually winning the decision by a small margin. Some of the rhetoric during this particular debate became very heated. Influential Parliamentarian Hussein Al-Mutairi stated that only 10 per cent of Kuwaiti women were in favour of the decree,56 a figure that he plucked out of the air but which serves as an example of the scale of the ideological battle. The liberals in Parliament attempted to delay until February 2000, when women would be able to register to vote, but to no avail. Despite the defeat, the fact that the Emir Sheikh Jaber appeared to support women’s rights gave the movement fresh hope as the state moved into the new century. Some liberal members and ministers began to take the initiative, and Kuwait saw women enter political positions for the first time. For example, the liberal-leaning former Minister of Higher Education, Youssef Al-Ibrahim, transferred some of his ministerial portfolio to Dr Rasha Al-Sabah, his undersecretary, as was his right. Dr Al-Sabah, a member of the ruling family and a staunch supporter of women’s rights, did not hesitate to accept this position. She stated that the move ‘stresses the Government’s trust in women’s role in leading positions and granting women additional powers and ministerial duties’.57 Dr Lubna Al-Kazi, Professor of Sociology at Kuwait University and a strong advocate for women’s suffrage, stated, ‘We were always told, “Be patient. Women will have their political rights when the time is right.” Forty years later, here in Kuwait, our time has finally come.’58 Whilst women had not managed to persuade the National Assembly, the women’s rights activists, after the mistakes of the previous decade, were able to analyse what exactly had gone wrong and now began to direct support in the right areas. In Kuwait, as with many Arab countries, forcing change from the top was practically impossible, because this approach also allowed opponents to hijack the system. The emir had performed his duty, and the women’s rights activists now had to play their part in building up a grass-roots movement.59 ‘The way this issue came to the public agenda was not healthy,’ explained Dr Fatima Al-Abdeli, Senior Specialist Health, Safety and Environment Group at the Kuwait Oil Company.

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‘Women were saying they think things are fine as they are, without the vote, and that allowed legislators to say the timing is not right.’60 This certainly appeared to be the major issue; women were not encouraged to take direct action, but they fell into the frustrating tendency, often visible in Kuwait, of expecting somebody else to take care of problems. Overcoming this apathy was now the major focus of the drive for change: Kuwaiti women had to use their intelligence, resourcefulness and education to effect change.

Into the Twenty-First Century and the Reopening of the Debate Following the overturning of Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah’s decree, the continued arguing and stasis in the National Assembly only intensified, as the Islamists attempted to delay the inevitable in the face of insurmountable pressure. From the very fragmented approach of the 1990s, women’s groups now knew how to apply their own pressure. Lobbyists began to pressurize the government, and the addition of women to positions of power and even within the elite families began to exhibit a noticeable effect.61 Women in influential positions within industry and the civil service had shown that there was no reason for the ban to continue.62 Female legal experts began to pick apart the legislation preventing women from calling upon the constitution and, for the first time, the majority of women and men began to support the right to vote.63 Men in influential positions also began to suggest that women would soon receive the right to vote, offering definite hope rather than the constant stalling practised throughout the 1990s. Mohamed Al-Ujairi, Chairperson and General Manager of Kuwait News Agency, put forward the traditional line in an interview: A number of women’s rights activists insist that the law is counter-constitution. Ours is a traditional conservative society, wherein women fall behind men in political participation. There is also a lot of controversy over Islamic Sharia stance and the religious decrees surrounding women’s right to vote. A whole host of complicated legal and jurisprudential deliberations revolve around the issue. Then there are the Bedouin tribes. All these hinder a unanimous consensus on the subject.64

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Interestingly, he also admitted that there was serious discussion in Parliament about the issue for the first time, adding that, ‘The first step seems to be endorsement of the right to vote, and standing in elections will come next. Mention should however be made that it was only in recent years when Western countries started propagating women’s rights.’65 This cautionary but slightly optimistic note from a man in a position close to governmental policy was the first tantalizing hint of the change that was about to come. This period also saw a resurrection of women’s societies, long since silenced by the conservative factions within government, and they now adopted a much more coherent approach in working for reform. The WCSS, which had by now steadily recovered from its sidelining during the mid-1990s, began to exert concerted pressure, lobbying the government but also raising the profile of the women’s rights movement internationally.66 Lulwa Al-Mulla, Secretary General of the society, said, ‘we have lobbied so hard that the Kuwaiti government is systematically called into question over women’s rights during international summits’.67 She also pointed out the new strategy of the group. They had taken a much more hands-on approach in seeking political allies within the National Assembly, rather than waiting for supporters to find them. ‘In the 1980s, during election time, we managed to have the right to listen to the radio station and hear what was going on in the polling stations,’ stated Al-Mulla. ‘Progressively, we managed to enter the polling stations and today we have the right to assist in the contests and to sit with the men. Last year, during the parliamentary elections, two MPs invited a woman from our organization to join them in expressing themselves in public,’ she continued.68 This proactive approach meant that women were not as likely to be at the whim of conflicting interests and ensured that women’s rights was not going to be shackled to the progressive cause, but would now exist as a stand-alone issue in its own right. Certainly, this removed some of the opposition to the drive for emancipation and, finally, some conservatives began to see how they could appeal to the female voter to strengthen their own positions. Instead of seeing women as a tool of the secularists and progressives, conservatives realized that the demographic presented an opportunity for the support of traditional values.69 Women’s groups began promoting their views and thinking

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outside the box, seeking support amongst politicians and religious leaders. Lubna Al-Kazi best summed up this particular view: We realized that the key to change lay with the Parliamentarians – and we thought that the best way to convince them to join our cause was through other Parliamentarians. We knew some MPs believed women should gain political rights. We began setting up meetings with them, inviting them to join us as allies. We also organized public debates to educate the public and gain press attention. We even engaged MPs’ wives and conservative leaders. We needed to prove that denying half the population their basic rights as citizens was legally, socially and politically wrong. We worked to dispel many misconceptions among both men and women. We engaged religious leaders to join our cause and communicate to their followers that suffrage is not a religious issue. We also had to fight the misconception that political rights were something only elite, middle-aged women wanted. We started getting signatures from university students, religious leaders, business people, and Parliamentarians. We published them in the newspapers to demonstrate the diverse support for our cause.70

Kuwaiti activists also saw that they needed to prepare for the inevitable and ensure that they were fully ready to take advantage of the situation when they were given the vote. As an example, Dr Al-Kazi pointed to Bahrain, where women were almost surprised by emancipation when it came.71 They had little time to organize a concerted effort and this disorganization provided fuel for the critics, who could argue that women were not fit for political life. ‘We were determined to be prepared so we would not fall victim to the same fate.72 We reached out to governments and international NGOs like Vital Voices. Kuwaiti women began traveling to the US for political skills training and seeking advice from women Parliamentarians of other Arab nations,’ continued Al-Kazi.73 Other GCC states, including Oman and Saudi Arabia, were making efforts to include women in the political process, so Kuwaiti activists understood the importance of their success or failure to the region as a whole. They could not afford to display the fragmented approach of the 1990s and had to show that

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they could make important decisions and, more importantly, learn from their past mistakes.74 The activists began to change the approach of their campaign, broadening the appeal of the movement from a women-focused plan to a focus on the state as a whole. As Al-Kazi pointed out, ‘we began to shift the language from “women’s rights” to “a strong future for Kuwait” – convincing people that our country’s future should not be hijacked and decided by a few elites. This really helped to engage young people, who started organizing public rallies.’75 For the first time, women felt that they had some support within the government and that there was again some hope.76 Kuwaiti women began to enter the offices responsible for registering votes, demanding their rights and keeping the publicity focused upon their cause. ‘Our democracy will only be complete with women,’ proclaimed the placards of protestors. ‘We are not less, you are not more. We need a balance, open the door,’ chanted women, some wearing traditional black veils.77 In a Kuwait beset by internal strife and stasis within Parliament, many Kuwaitis began to support the cause. However, whilst most men supported voting rights, some did not agree with allowing women to stand for election. ‘I don’t have any problem with giving women the vote, but for a woman to be a Member of Parliament, this is refused,’ said police inspector, Faleh Al-Azab.78 Activists, both male and female, began to demand their constitutional rights, again returning to the spirit of 1990 and the Kuwaiti resistance.79 This mix of genders and generations began to place insurmountable pressure upon the government to pass reforms rather than sideline the issue. Women’s groups threw down the gauntlet and asked questions that the rulers had to answer, rather than showing the indecisiveness that had plagued Parliament for over a decade. This assault upon politicians and the legal system began to bear fruit, and with the eyes of the world once again on the Gulf, with the conflict in neighbouring Iraq, the Kuwaiti government had little room to manoeuvre. Political activism was not the only weapon available to activists and, despite the direct ban upon women voting in elections or standing as candidates, Kuwaiti women slowly moved into positions of political influence. Although this was facilitated by the emir, now

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fully sympathetic to emancipation, this in no way suggests that the women were installed as a result of positive discrimination. They were promoted to these positions through ability rather than gender. One such politician, Nabila Al-Anjari, the Assistant Undersecretary for Tourism Affairs at Kuwait’s Ministry for Information, said ‘I think Kuwaiti women have accomplished a lot. The government has given women power, but we still demand our right to enter the Parliament. There is a long road ahead of us. Nevertheless, women are fulfilling their responsibilities perfectly.’80 She was equally scathing of the reasons behind the constant refusal of the conservatives to allow the issue to be discussed, lamenting the stalling tactics and anti-women’s rights rhetoric couched as ‘protecting women’. She added: This has been a long debate. At the beginning, they justified the denial of rights to women based on their selective interpretation of religious law. When other Muslim countries started to admit women into their Parliaments, the conservatives changed their mind – this time citing cultural excuses. Now that Persian Gulf Cooperation Council countries have assigned women as ministers and MPs, it’s a shame for Kuwait – a former pioneer in pursuing women’s rights – to bar women from occupying the positions. Kuwait opened the first school for girls back in 1938 when they were absent in most other Arab nations. And after such a long time, we are still debating whether or not women should enter the Parliament.81

The Culmination of a Long and Difficult Struggle The pressure, from inside and outside of Kuwait, had built to the point that something had to give, one way or the other. The traditionalists were now on the back foot, and even the most conservative realized that, without the support of the emir, they had little chance of stemming the tide. Their focus shifted onto preventing women from standing for election rather than opposing emancipation. Carefully, the rulers and government coordinated the disparate political groups and resubmitted the bill to emancipate Kuwait’s women.82 In May 2005, Parliament finally passed a motion to remove ‘men’ from the legal definition of those entitled to vote. Women now had the right to vote

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and stand in elections.83 Finally, the long fight for emancipation was over and women had the right to vote for their own destiny. Whilst there was still a lot of work to be done, especially in terms of actual representation in the National Assembly, women now had the right to enter a polling booth and vote for a candidate. The alliance of tribal factions and Islamists had been comprehensively outflanked by the media and the ruling family. With 35 votes in favour and 23 against, this amendment allowed Kuwait to join Oman, Qatar and Bahrain in giving equal democratic rights to women.84 The veteran pro-reform lawmaker, Mohamed Jasser Al-Sager, claimed the decision was ‘one of the greatest achievements of all time in the Kuwaiti political arena’.85 ‘This is a celebration for democracy even though it is 45 years late,’ proclaimed Jassim Al-Gutami, a former MP and head of the Kuwaiti Human Rights Association.86 The GCC women’s groups fighting for reform were equally jubilant, with Hoda Badran, Chairperson of the Alliance for Arab Women, based in Cairo, adding, ‘the amendment is of fundamental importance as it ends gender discrimination in Kuwait and bestows a basic human right. It also symbolises the sweeping changes that the region is experiencing.’87 Dr Laila Al-Marayati, a founding member and past president of the Muslim Women’s League – a non-profit Muslim American organization based in Los Angeles – added to this view by stating that ‘we hope that this is the beginning of a trend that will be followed by the few remaining Muslim countries who continue to deny women the right to full participation in society’.88 For too long, a high-profile country like Kuwait had been used as a model for other nations to deny emancipation, and this vote was another victory in the eternal struggle for equality. A BBC News report attracted comments from inside and outside Kuwait, speaking of the relief brought about with the passing of their long overdue bill. Amanda, a British expatriate living in Kuwait, wrote, ‘The day after women were given the vote I walked out in the streets. I saw Kuwaiti women I’ve known for many years; they were walking upright, heads up, and smiling. Kuwaiti women are tough; if any group of women in this world can get ahead in politics it’s them and they’ve years of oppression to make up for.’89 Fahad, a Kuwaiti, proudly proclaimed, ‘Congratulations to the Kuwaiti people for this historic day. Women have taken up leadership roles such as ambassadors, lawyers and

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doctors in the past and I believe there is no reason as to why they should not get their political rights. With the other half of the population now being able to vote, we can truly say we are taking the right steps to democracy.’90 This decision, whilst overdue for Kuwaiti women, also had international significance and would go a long way to vanquishing some of the perceptions that Kuwait was a backwards country in respect to equality for women. Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations, added his considerable gravitas to the chorus, stating that this was one truly ‘historic step’, which could not be underestimated. The rulers of Kuwait, instrumental in forcing through this particular legislation, felt vindicated by this vote, especially as it allowed them to deliver finally on the promises made by the 1990 government in exile. Former Prime Minister Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah said, ‘I congratulate the women of Kuwait for having achieved their political rights.’91 However, once the euphoria settled down, the fight would continue and the political game dragged on. Whilst emancipation was a big milestone, there was a veritable abyss between women voting and women being accepted as candidates and potential political representatives. Even in the face of defeat, traditionalists managed to raise barriers to progress, in an attempt to further stall the process. These Islamist interests, still operating under the auspices of defending the faith and traditional values, added an amendment to the bill stating that the rights of women to operate in the political arena must be within the confines of Sharia law. This law stated that, ‘a Kuwaiti woman, voting and running for political office, should do so while fully adhering to the dictates of Islamic Sharia’.92 In a repeat of how Islamic law was used to deprive women of their constitutional rights, this seemingly small and insignificant amendment laid the ground for future battles. Not every Kuwaiti felt that this was the right move, and the gap between voting and being elected would be the next obstacle to progress.93 Even now, the conservatives were prepared to hide behind Islamic tradition as a weapon to further their own agendas. As stated by the Senior Advisor to the Muslim Affairs Council, Dr Maher Hathout, ‘we congratulate the Muslim men and women of Kuwait for such an achievement, and we support the minority’s right to express its opinion, but they should not rely on a false sense of Islamic

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legitimacy in their goal to maintain the status quo or advance their personal agendas’.94 The next stage in this ideological conflict was set to happen, as women looked forward to the election cycle in 2007 as the first chance to vote and to stand for election.

The 2007 Election and the Setback The immediate period before the 2007 election saw intense interest and fevered discussion as candidates attempted to court the women’s vote, realizing that the relative success of appealing to this demographic could make or break a candidate. In addition, for the first time, female candidates stood for election, attempting to breach the traditionalist, ideological walls built around the National Assembly. A municipal election, in 2006, provided a good test run for the election, as two female candidates announced their candidacy. In terms of turnout, 57 per cent of the voters were female, as women from all areas of society flooded the polling booths, keen to partake in the new freedom.95 This factor, just a year before the national election, certainly warned potential Assembly members that ignoring the vote of women would be to commit political suicide. Ultimately, the two female candidates failed, but this allowed the activists to analyse the situation and to attempt to discover what went wrong. One of the female candidates, Khaledah Al-Khader, reported that she faced vituperative criticism from some Islamic groups. Al-Khader, a physician trained in the USA, stated, ‘Some individuals believe that simply because I am of the female gender, I am incapable of having a seat in the council – because I would not be strong enough to deal with the pressure.’96 This by-election, in which six male candidates also ran, highlighted some of the potential difficulties that might be faced by female candidates in future elections. The voting process actually went very smoothly, with separate polling booths for women and a team of female monitors to check the identity of women hidden behind abayas.97 The female candidates, however, could not operate on the same level playing field as the men, and faced disadvantages from the start. The other female candidate, Jenan Bousheri, a chemical engineer, carefully avoided antagonizing the conservative elements of Kuwaiti society

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during the election. She wore the hijab, and avoided visiting the male social clubs, known as diwaniyas.98 Bousheri, who came second in the election, was careful to point out that she did this through choice and indicated that she was aware that she had to play a political game and find the right balance. In addition to attire and observing tradition, she also avoided including her photograph on campaign billboards, something that might potentially be seen as indecent by many conservative elements. She justified her action by stating ‘it’s a new situation in Kuwait. I don’t want to put [up] my pictures. Maybe in the next two years or three years, the situation will be different … I can use them [photos of herself] but it’s my decision.’99 Whilst the female candidates were not successful, the election did give some idea of what they could expect. Although it was difficult to extract too many lessons from a traditionally low-turnout municipal election, it did reinforce the growing importance of the youth vote. Mohamed Al-Khatib, secretary general of the umbrella organization encompassing student unions in Kuwait, stated: During the municipal elections that are affiliated to the main elections, one woman had nominated herself as a candidate amongst a large number of male candidates. She came second as a result of the electoral support that she had received from the youth, as well as the fact that female students in Kuwaiti universities have become strong contestants for high profile posts. One of the most recent successes is that of Jawaher Ali Reda who was voted head of student government.100

The youth vote, allied with the political nous of women who had served in influential positions, was seriously threatening the traditionalists, and they began to court women voters rather than attempt to push them away, realizing that there was a strong conservative element amongst women, to whom they could definitely appeal. In June 2006, the emir called for new national elections, a year early. This would technically prove to be the first time that women really entered the frontline of the political battle as equal players. Despite fielding 27 candidates, and with women making up a slight majority of the electorate, they failed to win a single seat. The media

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lamented this failure, and many critics highlighted it as proof that women should stay out of politics. However, the activists, rather than panicking, analysed the situation, determining that they would not be caught out in the next election. One of the more pessimistic journalists actually called for positive discrimination, so adamant was he that this had damaged the rights movement. He opined: Kuwait must finish what it started when it opened the door for participation and granted women the right to stand for election without any parliamentary guarantees. The state should [therefore] directly appoint women MPs. Free elections for women was a mistake in the first place; a model solution would have been to offer a set number of seats to women candidates with the largest number of votes in the election, even if they failed to beat male candidates. This would give them the opportunity to build a record that would qualify them for victory in free elections.101

Abdul-Rahman Alyan, the Editor-in-Chief of the English-language daily Kuwaiti Times declared, ‘it will take them another two or three elections to get into Parliament’.102 These attitudes showed the difficulty female candidates faced, and a thorough analysis of the failure threw up a few reasons why women failed to gain any seats in the National Assembly. According to a focus group study for the National Democratic Institute in Washington DC,103 the reasons for failure were: • • • • • •

The snap election gave little time for preparation. The lack of experience and the lack of a coherent voting bloc. The lack of voter awareness of female candidates, partly caused by media bias. Some lack of confidence in the ability of women. The negative effects caused by tribalism and Islamism. A lack of political backing and focus.

However, the main criticism was that, in developing manifestos to appeal to female voters, the female candidates forgot to address the wider issues, especially in a society already angered and frustrated

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by perceived inaction and corruption amongst politicians. ‘Female candidates focused so much on women’s issues that they forgot the bigger picture and the issues that relate to Kuwait as a whole, like corruption. She’s going to focus on women’s issues anyway because it would be hard for men to vote for her,’ was the view of one female respondent.104 Another claimed, ‘they had ideologies and topics that were not publicly known. I personally still have not seen a woman qualified enough to make it to the assembly, for lack of a winning program.’ However, most Kuwaitis surveyed did not buy into the rhetoric of opponents and felt that this had been a good effort. ‘It was the first time for women. Nevertheless, I think that the voting percentage was good for the first time. Women might succeed in the future because the percentage was very good,’ argued one woman. Another added, ‘these women were brave. It takes courage to run for elections the first time.’105 Clearly, despite the prevailing general pessimism, there was still a great amount of support, and female candidates would not be caught out next time. They learned from their mistakes and focused upon what Kuwaitis actually wanted.

Success: The Breaching of the Walls The year 2008, a momentous one in Kuwaiti history, began with the build up to the 2009 elections, which saw more female candidates than ever before. Despite the pessimism of some critics, the mood amongst voters was buoyant, even if it could have been argued that they were expecting steady improvement rather than a breakthrough. Despite this, some activists in the media led a call to arms, asking Kuwaitis to vote for change. The Korean daily Chosun Ilbo trumpeted: Isn’t it time we draw on the numerous talents of many of our Kuwaiti women who are accomplished doctors, entrepreneurs and public servants? Wouldn’t the presence of women in Parliament, who can bring fresh resolve and determination to new initiatives, be a breath of fresh air to the stagnation and knuckle-dragging that characterizes some of our current MPs?106

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The emir, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, called the election to end a stalemate between lawmakers and ministers, and the results exceeded the wildest expectations of the women’s groups, as voters punished the Islamists for perceived stubbornness and returned four female candidates, amidst scenes of exultation.107 The four successful candidates were: •

•

•

•

Dr Massouma Al-Mubarak: She was a Professor of Political Science at Kuwait University until her appointment as the first female cabinet minister in Kuwait in June 2005 when she was named Minister of Planning and Minister of State for Administrative Development. She also served as the Health Minister, but resigned in August 2007 after two hospital patients died in a huge fire. Despite a smear campaign from Islamists, the result showed the high esteem in which she was held.108 She went on to win the December 2012 elections. Dr Rola Dashti: She holds a PhD in Population Economics from Johns Hopkins University. She has always been a stalwart of the movement for women’s rights. As well as being the first female to head the Kuwaiti Economic Society, she is renowned internationally, due to her work with the World Bank.109 She later won a seat in the December 2012 Parliament and was appointed Minister for Planning and Development and Minister for National Assembly Affairs. Dr Aseel Al-Awadhi: She earned her PhD in Philosophy from the University of Texas, Austin. She has taught Philosophy at Kuwait University. Al-Awadhi said after the election victory, ‘People voted for change because people are fed up with deadlocks. It is time to focus on our priorities inside the Parliament.’110 Dr Salwa Al-Jassar: Another US-educated professor and women’s rights activist. She chairs the Kuwait Transparency Society Women’s Empowerment Center. After her victory, she said, ‘Finally, our democracy is walking on two legs as we now have both male and female Parliamentarians – the first in the region.’111

The scale of this victory was far in excess of expectation, but it was the result of hard work from the candidates and women’s rights

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activists, as well as being due to the inability of the Kuwaiti Parliament to make any progress. Kuwaitis voted against the status quo that had failed and showed enough open-mindedness to vote for female candidates. One anonymous Kuwaiti, a resistance fighter during the 1990–1 conflict, stated, ‘like most Kuwaitis, I am tired of hearing about the National Assembly’s inability to make real changes, and it is the same story over and over. To be honest, I’d like to see women elected to the National Assembly.’112 Many Kuwaitis felt like this and had become thoroughly sick of the corruption and petty bickering of the National Assembly, which left Kuwait’s socio-economic and structural development lagging behind its neighbours in the UAE and Qatar. Kuwaitis punished the traditionalists and Islamists at the polling booth, and their share of the vote plummeted.113 The smear campaigns instigated by traditionalist sympathizers also backfired; in the 2007 election, candidate Ayesha Al-Reshaid allegedly received death threats warning her to pull out, and this type of tactic did not find favour amongst Kuwaitis.114 The other surprising thing about these results was the demographic split, as the female candidates appeared to draw support from a large cross-section of Kuwait society. Massouma Al-Mubarak’s constituency contained Shi‘is, Sunnis, urbanites and tribes, yet support was fairly equal across these groups.115 Al-Awadhi appealed to Sunnis in a traditionalist area, showing the depth of the Kuwaiti need for change.116 An anonymous blogger was lavish in praise of Al-Awadhi, posting, ‘Anyone who has recently observed her on interviews, rallies, and in person visiting diwaniyas, can detect she is a sincere, compassionate, progressive individual who feels strongly about social, civic and humanitarian issues, as well as being an avid proponent of free speech and the values of the Kuwaiti Constitution.’117 These women, although all holding PhD degrees, with three of them having careers as academics, came from different backgrounds and had different talents. As Dashti observed, ‘Yes all of us are educated, but we also have a woman who is married to a non-Kuwaiti, one who is divorced, one who is not yet married, one whose mother is Lebanese … We represent different social strata.’118 Perhaps they provided a slightly more human face than the traditionalists, who were set on returning to Sharia ways, a cause that

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was anathema to many Kuwaitis. Whatever the reasons, the election was a truly monumental success after four decades of denial of voting rights, and this result heralded wider success, a sign that the inhabitants of the Gulf region did not want a return to traditional, oppressive values.

Conclusion The period between 1991, after the Gulf conflict, and the eventual emancipation of women was tumultuous, and women first had to suffer despair before being given the right to vote. From the optimism of the post-war period, especially considering the promises of the emir, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmed, 1996 saw the low point in the struggle, as the experienced traditionalists used a series of measures to deflect and confound the women’s rights movement. By supporting pro-conservative women’s groups to smear campaigns, their tactics succeeded in undermining the activists. However, the proliferation of women in other fields, as well as a strong youth movement promoting change, began to turn this around. Whilst there is little doubt that the directives of the emir helped to facilitate change, this grass-roots support started to break down the traditional boundaries. From the low point of the mid1990s, the women’s movement began to gather unstoppable momentum and a series of votes on the issue, each one driving them a little closer to their goals. Finally, in 2005, not only did women receive the vote, but they were given equal rights to stand in elections. They seized the initiative and capitalized on growing dissatisfaction with the National Assembly, seen as corrupt, bloated and inept. The intelligent and educated female candidates provided a fresh alternative and became a symbol of optimism for Kuwait. The election of four candidates was not the end of the process. As Shamael Al-Sharikh, columnist for the Kuwait Times and board member for the WCSS stated: Success for women in Kuwait happens when we no longer have to go through absurd debates about women wearing Hijab in the National Assembly, or women being fit for the office of Minister. Success hap-

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pens when the Council of Ministers does not have to appoint only one or two women as tokens, but rather, when they can appoint whoever is fit to be Minister, irrespective of gender.119

However, she also found great optimism in the result, stating: I think it is a monumental success when four women make it into office, despite the defamation campaigns and character assassinations that religious extremists ran against them. In the end, almost all Islamist parties lost major seats and women made it to office. Furthermore, the fact that women made it to office without a quota system shows that Kuwaitis are much more accepting and openminded than we ever thought, and our Constitution is much more resilient than we ever thought. We do not need to make any changes to it, except to allow more democratic participation.120

This sums up the entire debate about gender in Kuwait. It was a battle that is not yet over. However, this open-mindedness amongst Kuwaitis is a strength that can be used to bring equality, justice and fairness to all sections of society. Now that women have achieved their goal, they can use this experience at the grass-roots level to create change from the bottom up. Certainly, women are stakeholders in Kuwait, and will have a major role to play in generating and implementing policy decisions.

EPILOGUE

Inclusive Security: Expanding the Concept of Women’s Rights The key to promoting women’s rights in Kuwait is to extend and expand the concept; now that they have won the right to participate in democracy and receive concessions, such as the ability to apply for passports, it is no longer a stand-alone principle. The idea must be expanded to include improved rights for everyone and, instead of women’s rights being a principle that can be isolated and ignored, it should become a cornerstone of the attempt to improve Kuwaiti society as a whole. Women have made huge contributions in many areas of Kuwaiti society, and carrying this drive and ability into the political sphere will benefit the country and all classes and sections of society. This leads on to the idea of inclusive security, which is built upon the concept that all sections of society need to be included in the socio-political process: from the ruling family to civil society, from city dwellers to the tribes, and Sunnis and Shi‘is alike. This is crucial in building a peaceful society and removing any vestiges of extremism and an ‘us vs them’ mentality. Whilst Kuwait is in no imminent danger of civil war, it is situated in the middle of a region beset with friction concerning conflicting ideological views. In Saudi Arabia, the Al-Saud ruling family has some progressive tendencies, but they are hampered by Islamists concerned about the perceived immorality of Western influence. In neighbouring Iraq, the rebuilding process includes women, but the country is now acting as a magnet for extremists. The 249

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idea of inclusive security also includes prevention, and using Kuwait as an example of how an ‘Islamic democracy’ can operate will enable proponents of a ‘middle way’. Kuwait can act as a model for an Islamic democracy, an idea that can be used as an example to other Islamic nations around the world, until they are ready to absorb the values of modernism and true democracy. Kuwait and the other small GCC states are already influencing opinion in the KSA, simply due to the fact that Saudi households can receive satellite television from neighbours and see women in influential roles, or as unveiled anchors of television shows. If Kuwait can democratize and show that the process does not involve imperialism or rampant immorality, it would strike at the heart of strict Sharia interpretations across the Gulf region. Policy Recommendations Kuwaiti and international organizations must do much more to publicize the advances made in the country. Currently, the Western media and public have the unfair perception that Kuwait is practically a Dark Age nation, with oppression and human rights abuses common. This is fuelled by its proximity to its neighbouring countries, and Western journalists often throw all of the GCC nations into this category. The Kuwaitis learned, when seeking American support during the first Gulf War, that public relations is the key. They need to promote Kuwait and show how Islam and democracy can coexist, without needing to import ‘Western democracy’. Other GCC nations are moving in the same direction, showing that the leaps made in education and employment across the region can help to promote a positive image. National and international organizations and civil society must take into account all elements of Kuwaiti society. For example, there is a generational conflict within Kuwait, as mirrored across the whole Arab world, where older men feel that their cultural identity is under threat. Whilst most are happy for their daughters to be educated, many are finding it difficult to adapt to a rapidly changing society. Any legislation in Kuwait must accept tribal rights and adopt an inclusive approach, ideally working across boundaries to tackle extremism in the entire Middle East.

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Compromise is essential in this process. For example, whilst it is easy to demand that women should enjoy exactly the same rights as men, adopting a stance which allows no compromise merely serves to put those holding divergent views on the defensive. Encouraging working from home or working online allows women to combine traditionalism and modernity, by working and also fulfilling traditional duties. This is not ideal, but is something upon which to build a new socio-economic model for the region. The concept of inclusive security requires a redefinition of feminism, as the idea of Western feminism fuels this divide, alienating traditionalist males and many Kuwaiti women. It is possible to be both conservative and desire equality, so the actors and policymakers need to publicize this and reassure traditionalist sections of society that allowing women to work and enjoy rights is not going to lead to decadence, a dilution of Islamic values or an attack upon the status of the elite classes. Currently, the extremist Salafis have been reduced to the occasional attack from the sidelines of the political structure. Amidst the social and political instability in the region, they are still a menace, particularly if fundamentalist thought and ideas begin to seep into Kuwait from Sunni Iraq and Egypt and Shi‘i Iran. The best barrier against extremism is other traditionalists, so adopting policies that engage moderate traditionalists within the process is imperative. Alienating them, on the other hand, may well drive them towards the extreme, returning Kuwait to the confrontational politics that have caused stasis for so long. Again, cross-border cooperation is crucial in tackling the threat.

Increasing the Contribution of Women to the Economy As with many GCC states, the Kuwaiti government realizes that it must increase the number of nationals within the workforce as a way to build a solid economy; in 2000, 55 per cent of the population and 82 per cent of the workforce were non-nationals. Including the large numbers of educated and motivated Kuwaiti women is one way to do this, as shown by the increase in the number of Kuwaiti nationals in the workforce between 1989 and 2000, which rose from 22 per

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cent to 26 per cent, largely due to more women entering the workplace.1 However, most policies addressing this have been half-hearted, as the government repeatedly skirted around the issue to avoid alienating traditionalists. The whole socio-economic structure of Kuwait must alter, as a changing world means that the culture of dependency, built upon oil wealth, is no longer sustainable. In Bahrain, where the government had to move away from an oil-based economy, this process is working and helping the nation to diversify, setting a fine example for others to follow. The government must scale down their involvement and encourage more Kuwaitis to work, partly to save money, but also to reduce dependence upon imported labour. There will always be a need for immigrants, especially in construction, but many other jobs could be filled by Kuwaitis, particularly those working in the private sector. Private enterprise must be allowed to operate in Kuwait, and the government must avoid situations where bickering in the National Assembly blocks private industry, depriving the state coffers of billions of dollars in revenue. Encouraging women to work, as skilled employees in state and private organizations is crucial, as is encouraging women to become entrepreneurs and the owners of small businesses. Policy Recommendations Some areas, such as academia and the media, have taken great strides in encouraging women to seek careers, but this was set against institutionalized inertia and resistance, especially from the civil service. Kuwait’s success in education must be matched by an increased willingness to ensure that women can seek careers or open businesses, and receive the same financial support as men; it is vital that they operate freely and without male interference. Improving the link between education and employment is crucial and, in a country with very few resources other than oil, and a nonexistent tourism industry, investing in people is vital; improving technology and communications is the only way to do this. Improving internet access, and lowering the cost of access, will enable educated Kuwaitis to compete in a global marketplace and take part in the outsourcing phenomenon. It will also help women to work from home, if they wish to combine work with raising a family.

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Developing a new approach to education and employment is essential for the future modernization and democratization of Kuwait. Women’s groups fought long and hard for equality in these areas, and there is still some inequality in employment. However, considering rising youth unemployment, it is important to address this as part of a holistic plan to tackle this problem. Encouraging private investment and ensuring that Kuwait teaches technology to students lies at the core of this development. If the integration of women into the workforce continues to develop slowly, the government may have to look at introducing quotas into the civil service, although this could give ammunition to opponents so it should be implemented with care. The government must strengthen legislation protecting the rights of women at work. This should also include protection for nonKuwaiti women, bringing the maltreatment of domestic workers to an end, and encouraging the police to take allegations seriously. The government and judiciary must take allegations of gender discrimination seriously, including protection from sexual harassment. Any incidents of harassment, or alleged immorality in the workplace, will provide ammunition for opponents.

Equality in the Education System There is little doubt that the promotion of equality within the education system formed the backbone of the nation’s economic success, and the inclusion of women created a large, well-educated workforce, able to meet the challenges of modernization. In this respect, Kuwait sets an example not only to other Arab nations, but to the Western world; many Kuwaiti women take degrees in traditionally maledominated industries, such as engineering, medicine and economics. The problem with the Kuwaiti education system is that it is too easy to look solely at women’s rights and ignore some of the other issues. Kuwait, quite rightly, is very proud that women make up the majority of students in higher education. However, looking from the other side, the question becomes, ‘Why are fewer men entering universities?’ Against a backdrop of youth disenchantment, this is a crucial question. The huge number of intelligent female Kuwaiti professionals

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acted as figureheads for the feminist movement, culminating in women receiving the vote, and they can now play an important role in addressing some of the other imbalances in Kuwaiti society. They also inspire women in other states due to the easy availability of satellite television. Qatari businesswomen and politicians inspired the entire region, and high-profile Kuwait women can break down resistance from traditionalists promoting the idea that women cannot lead. Policy Recommendations There is little doubt that men are discouraged from entering higher education because it is much easier to find a job in the civil service, with the added bonus of a somewhat early retirement and an adequate pension. As Kuwait moves away from this culture of dependency, it is important to encourage a higher rate of participation in education, and ensure that well-educated Kuwait men and women can use their skills to make a good living. Kuwait has a reasonably good education system, but it still has some inequalities. There is a divide, in quality and access, between rural and urban areas, leaving many rural dwellers undereducated and resulting in rural areas becoming breeding grounds for extremism. The educational curriculum should be improved to incorporate modern technology. For Kuwaitis, understanding modern technology increases skills and makes foreign investment in the country more likely. For women, the internet and remote working offer the chance to work from home and compete globally, granting empowerment. The government should remove gender bias in educational materials and ensure that gender segregation is reversed.

Building from the Grass Roots: CSOs and NGOs Achieving the goal of including women within the political process was a great victory for the women’s rights movement, and owed much to the input of civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations. Women’s civil society groups in Kuwait have made many contributions to stability, helping sectors of society and generating tangible solutions to problems. Promoting these groups,

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and helping them to act as a conduit between politicians and the people, is critical to a healthy society, and women’s groups often transcend cultural, social and religious divides. Certainly, in engaging potentially overlooked members of society, women’s civil society groups can be part of a two-way process, pointing out any difficulties and potential problems before they become a destructive force, and ensuring that any top-down directives benefit every Kuwaiti, not just the chosen few. Policy Recommendations The fact that the government has the authority to grant and revoke licences for civil society groups, and can withdraw funding or meeting places, compromises their independence. The Kuwaiti government must stop attempting to divert civil society groups to suit a particular agenda, and instead allow groups to form under the auspices of freedom of expression. Civil society groups and NGOs can act as the eyes and ears of government, raising awareness of issues away from political bias and hidden agendas. Civil society groups allow government to become proactive and reactive, and women’s groups across the world contribute to healthy, dynamic political systems. Liaison between the government and civil society groups must improve, and issues must be taken seriously. Civil society groups and NGOs are invaluable partners in collecting gender- and age-aggregated statistical data and ensuring that top-down initiatives are working. For example, the government could use civil society groups to monitor the effect of encouraging women to start businesses and become entrepreneurs. Data gathered by civil society organizations will allow policymakers to monitor the programme and identify any weaknesses and areas of non-compliance. Civil society groups and NGOs can transcend national boundaries, and, by linking with women’s groups in other Arab nations, they can aid a comprehensive policy aimed at tackling regional issues, such as Islamic extremism or discrimination. Encouraging this will promote building bridges at a non-governmental level, and they can pass on

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their knowledge and experience to fledgling civil society organizations in other states.

The Law and Equality The debate about women’s rights concentrated largely upon the political system, but an increased participation of women in government should bring about change in other areas. For example, women still face discrimination within the justice system and law, and domestic violence is still an issue within the country. The government is only one aspect of the issue of women’s rights and human rights within Kuwait, and addressing some of the legal inequalities is crucial. The Sharia-based approach still promotes inequality, both in everyday life and in how women can work and start businesses. This approach involves adjusting the law to attempt to promote equality in all areas of Kuwaiti society, in women and minority groups being made aware of their rights and in identifying and rectifying any institutionalized discrimination. This crosses all sectors of Kuwaiti society, including non-nationals and stateless Arabs. Policy Recommendations Women and other minorities should have the same specific legal rights under Kuwaiti law, and this must be communicated to all levels of the judiciary, law enforcement and the civil service. Family laws must be amended to give equal rights to both partners, especially in the case of divorce and the division of property. For example, the Nationality Act of 1959 should be amended to ensure that Kuwaiti women have the same rights as Kuwaiti men to transfer nationality to foreign-born spouses and children. All laws that prevent women from participating in employment, or seeking finance for business, must be removed if women are to bolster the Kuwaiti workforce. Mechanisms must be put in place to ensure that gender and religious discrimination are robust, and that people are aware of these processes and will be given a fair hearing. This should be extended

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to discrimination based upon nationality, to halt the abuses against migrant workers.

Women, the Media and Morality A free media is one of the cornerstones of Kuwaiti society and, despite restrictions on criticizing the emir or the Crown Prince and Islam, the media is free to publish its opinions. Alongside the state news agency KUNA, private publications allow balanced, diverse views. In terms of participation within the media, women are well represented and have an important input into publications and programming. However, the Kuwaiti press stands accused of portraying women in a biased manner, and highlighting divisions between women’s groups, rather than portraying the good work that many do. In setting out the idea of creating a representative society, with civil society, government and the judiciary promoting the idea of equality and fair treatment, the media is crucial. However, any recommendations must preserve freedom of speech at their heart, and initiatives to promote inclusive, holistic security cannot impinge upon this right. In addition, the media is at the forefront of the debate about morality and, if it continues to push boundaries and alienate and offend large sections of Kuwaiti society, this will fuel the traditionalists and potentially put female politicians under pressure. Policy Recommendations As shown by the Star Academy debate, television is at the forefront of discussions about morality.2 To Western eyes, and indeed to many Kuwaitis, it is a harmless show, but there are still elements that may offend older generations or traditionalists. This show provided an example of how the Kuwaiti media could be forced to maintain a strict code of self-censorship and avoid using controversy to inflate viewing figures, allowing the media to concentrate upon issues such as domestic violence, rape and inequality in divorce laws. However, due to the increasing use of satellite dishes, any censorship of television will be difficult.

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It is important to monitor any censorship, and ensure that any legislation on morality should be clearly defined, otherwise it risks spreading, and becoming censorship of genuine political views. One example of this concerns comedians and satirists, who often push the boundaries: the heavy-handed persecution of political satire would strike at the heart of free speech. As the work of Kuwaiti bloggers expressing intelligent opinions shows, freedom of speech should extend to the internet. Censoring indecent material is acceptable, as long as it does not stray into censoring speech and opinion. Gradually, Kuwait must move towards full press freedom and the right to publish without fear. However, as is the case in many Western democracies, balancing the right to free speech with the rising problem of ‘hate speech’ is difficult. This is something that is difficult to counter with legislation but, as in the West, allowing a diverse range of independent news sources should enable Kuwaitis to gain a balanced view. Women’s groups are now adept at using the international media to publicize their cause, so this will curb the worst excesses of the traditionalist firebrands. The government must ease its restrictions upon reporting about politicians and the ruling family, as well as respect the journalistic profession. Journalists are an excellent counterbalance to corruption and wrongdoing in a political system.

The Political Arena: Strengthening the Role of Women and Opening up the Process Until now, women in the Kuwaiti Parliament have enjoyed a strong mandate and widespread support amongst a broad cross-section of Kuwaiti society. This must continue, despite attacks from traditionalists, and they must ensure that they remain free from the taint of corruption within the National Assembly. By adopting a broad policy base, and addressing issues faced by many Kuwaitis, their strength will grow and they will be able to act as a valuable link between the government, the media and civil society. If they are successful, they will serve as an example for other under-represented sections of Kuwaiti society, such as the Shi‘i minority, to participate in the political process.

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Kuwait is likely to continue with its process of democratization, and this brings with it many potential problems, depending upon which course it takes, and how much power is devolved from the emir. Moving towards democracy, with the highest office becoming more of a presidential one, should unblock the stasis in the government, caused by the extreme polarization in the National Assembly. Policy Recommendations Most Kuwaitis are satisfied with the current role of the emir, and blame the opposition and factions within the National Assembly for problems within the state. International organizations and governments must understand that any move towards a more open democratic model must take this into account and that a more open model must be allowed room to develop and grow. Democratization must be accompanied by a fight against political corruption and bribery at all levels. This is the issue that antagonizes Kuwaitis more than ever. If the ban upon political parties is to be lifted, this should be accompanied by a drive towards parties accepting broad manifestoes, rather than following single issues, and allowing cross-party support that will help to alleviate the stasis that has seen Kuwait stagnate, both economically and culturally. Whilst democratic reform is the ultimate aim, this should not be hurried; the process should be gently guided, preventing any one faction from dominating. The Kuwaiti people, with the help of civil society groups and the media, must be full stakeholders in democratization. The majority of Kuwaitis believe in the constitution at the moment, so political reform should take place within the confines of that document. The constitution does, however, need updating to reflect today’s world, and to empower women. These changes could lead to women becoming prime minister or even emir one day. The strength of Kuwait, and its resistance to extremism, has been due to the fact that participation and accommodation within the political system has prevented most extremists from using violence and

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intimidation to achieve their aims. Any new model should include all elements of Kuwaiti society; the Shi‘is and tribes should not have to undergo the same lengthy battle for political rights as women have.

Kuwait, a Model State In many areas, Kuwait stands as a fine example of inclusivity and equality, although it has to overcome the barrier of traditionalism and a male-dominated culture. Alongside Qatar, Bahrain and Oman, it shows that tackling women’s rights as part of wider human rights issues can be successful. The Gulf region has already seen women rise to influential positions, with ambitious Bahraini entrepreneurs, talented Qatari diplomats and Omani professors acting as figureheads for the younger generations. Crucially, this transcends the gender divide and the youth in the region are less afflicted by the old, conservative ways, and are full of ambition and a willingness to agitate for change. The modern Gulf citizen is intelligent, well-educated and is the future of the region, politically, economically, culturally and socially. Ensuring that the genders enjoy equality can bring peace and stability to the region, taking it to the next stage of modernization and development. In a region beset by political turmoil, war and the rise of extremism, continuing this process by embracing reform and allowing all sections of society to have equality and input is crucial. The fight of Kuwaiti women for the right to vote also gave birth to a strong civil society, and encouraged educated Kuwaiti women to strive for recognition and personal and professional betterment. With their experience, Kuwait can emerge from the process of globalization with a strong and robust economy, political system and society.

NOTES

Introduction 1

2

3

4

5

The Gulf region is defined as Iran, Iraq, Oman (via the Musandam Peninsula), Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. They are also referred to as the Persian Gulf States. Meryl Streep associated Kuwait with Saudi Arabia, stating: ‘a woman cannot vote in Kuwait and she cannot drive in Saudi Arabia’. This is a slightly unfair statement, but it sums up how the rest of the world views Kuwait’s failure to emancipate women. See Allegra Stratton, ‘Women in Black who Want to Vote’, New Statesman (14 Mar. 2005), n.p., available at . Christopher Dickey, ‘The Monarch Who Declared His Own Revolution’, Newsweek (21 Mar. 2009), n.p., available at . Lynda Stone, The Education Feminism Reader (North Melbourne: Spinifex Press, 1996), 1–10; Diane Bell and Renate Klein, Radically Speaking: Feminism Reclaimed (New York: Routledge, 1994), xv–xxx. The Gulf Cooperation Council states, known as the GCC, include the Arab countries surrounding the Persian Gulf. The countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

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Michael S. Casey, The History of Kuwait (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007), 65–85. Robin Cohen, The Cambridge Survey of World Migration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 418. Michael Herb, ‘Kuwait’, paper prepared for the USIP-Muslim World Initiative Working Group and Study Project: The Transition from Liberalized Autocracy? New Options for Promoting Democracy in the Arab World, Georgia State University, 26 Oct. 2005, available at . Casey, 2007: 65–85; Herb, 2005. Haya Al-Mughni, ‘Women’s Movements and the Autonomy of Civil Society in Kuwait’, in Conscious Acts and the Politics of Social Change, ed. Robin L. Teske and Mary Ann Tétreault (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003). Ken Matthews, The Gulf conflict and International Relations (Oxford: Routledge, 1993), 33–45. There are two sides to every story, although Iraq’s was still very much as the aggressor. Kuwait stood accused of ignoring oil quotas and artificially depressing the price of oil, in violation of OPEC agreements. In addition, Kuwait began to demand the return of $12 billion in loans, seen as being ungrateful by Iraq, which saw itself as defending the Arab world against Iranian aggression. See: Hassan A. El-Najjar, Overreaction and Excessiveness (Dalton, GA: Amazone Press, 2001), ch. 6. This gives an alternative, although highly partisan, view of the conflict. Gadi Wolfsfeld, Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 169–175. Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 1990–91: The Iraq–Kuwait Conflict and its Implications (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 123–127. Shahrzad Mojab, ‘Women and the Gulf War: A Critique of Feminist Responses’, in Spoils of War: Women of Color, Cultures, and Revolutions, ed. T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting (Savage, ND: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 64–72. Khadduri and Ghareeb, 2001: 169–173. Mojab, 1997: 73–82.

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On 23 Nov. 1999, members of Parliament succeeded in blocking a decree submitted by the late Emir Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah that would have granted women full political rights. Mary Ann Tétreault and Haya Al-Mughni, ‘From Subjects to Citizens: Women and the Nation in Kuwait’, in Women, States, and Nationalism: At Home in the Nation? ed. Sita Ranchod-Nilsson and Mary Ann Tétreault (London: Routledge, 2000), 158. Al-Mughni, 2003: 177.

Chapter 1: 1991: A Turning Point in Kuwaiti Politics 1

2

3 4 5 6 7 8

9 10 11 12

John Willoughby, ‘Segmented Feminization and the Decline of Neopatriarchy in GCC Countries of the Persian Gulf’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 28.1 (2008), 184–199, at 187–189. Julia C. Devlin, Challenges of Economic Development in the Middle East and North Africa Region (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2010), 367. Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 18–21. Al-Mughni, 2003: 170. Casey, 2007: 29–32. Shamlan Y. Alessa, The Manpower Problem in Kuwait (London: Kegan Paul International, 1981), 1. Crystal, 1990: 18–21. Casey, 2007: 34. Mohamed Al-Jassem was the editor of Al-Watan, one of Kuwait’s major daily independent newspapers, and was also editor of the Arabic-language translations of Newsweek International and Foreign Policy. Peter Berkowitz, ‘An Oasis, Kuwaiti Women Make Progress’, National Review (3 Mar. 2004), 17, available at . Casey, 2007: 144. Herb, 2005: 4–6. Casey, 2007: 35–36. In fact, the idea of strong women was not new to Kuwaitis, and folklore tells of a strong heroine named Mariam. This semi-legendary

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eighteenth-century woman took up arms and raised a force to fight off the Al-Nassars; her name is still used as a war cry by modern Kuwaiti troops. Casey 34. J. S. Birks and J. A. Rimmer, Developing Education Systems in the Oil States of Arabia: Conflicts of Purpose and Focus (Durham: University of Durham, 1984), 4. World Bank Development Indicators . Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘Kuwait’, available at . Yusif Abdalla Sayigh [Yūsuf Abd Allāh ā igh], The Economies of the Arab World: Economies since 1945 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1978), 81–87. A. A. Kubursi, Oil, Industrialization and Development in the Gulf Arab States (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1984), 7–9. Nader Habibi, ‘Managing the Oil Wealth: Foreign Assets of GCC Countries’, Crown Paper 1, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University (June 2008), 39. UN-DESA, Case Studies in Population Policy: Kuwait, Population Policy Paper 15 (New York: United Nations, 1988), 7–8. Jacqueline S. Ismael, Kuwait, Social Change in Historical Perspective (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1982), 117. Mostafa H. El-Shalakani and Amal Y. A. Al-Sabah, Population Spatial Distribution Policies in Kuwait, ed. ESCWA, Population Spatial Distribution (Amman: United Nations, 1993), 107; see also IBRD, The Economic Development of Kuwait (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), 24. Ismael, 1982: 117. A comprehensive synopsis of historical census data can be found in: Onn Winckler, ‘Demographic Developments and Population Polices in Kuwait’, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies (Aug. 1998), 7–8, available at . This term is derived from an Arabic term meaning ‘without’. Winckler, 1998: 8.

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Sharon Stanton Russell and Muhammad Ali Al-Ramadhan, ‘Kuwait’s Migration Policy since the Gulf Crisis’, IJMES, 26 (1994), 569–588, at 570. Willoughby, 2008: 187–189. Winckler, 1998: 11. Winckler, 1998: 11. Nichlas van Hear, New Diasporas: The Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant Communities (London: UCL Press, 1998), 80–89. Willoughby, 2008: 7. N. K Bourisly and M. N. Al-Hajji, ‘Kuwait’s National Day: Four Decades of Transformed Celebrations’, in National Days/National Ways: Historical, Political, and Religious Celebrations around the World, ed. Linda K. Fuller (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 125. E. Lauterpacht, C. J. Greenwood and Marc Weller, The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 81–83. Casey, 2007: 36–37. The Kuwaiti Constitution is available in Arabic and English at . Casey, 2007: 65–67. Mary Ann Tétreault, ‘Civil Society in Kuwait: Protected Spaces and Women’s Rights’, Middle East Journal, 47.2 (Spring 1993), 278–285. Don Peretz, ‘State of Kuwait’, in Grolier’s The New Book of Knowledge (n.d.), available at . Al-Mughni, 2003: 172. J. E Peterson, ‘The Emergence of Post-Traditional Oman’, Working paper, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham (2005), 5–8, available at . G. Nonneman, ‘Political Reform in the Gulf Monarchies: From Liberalisation to Democratisation? A Comparative Perspective’, Working paper, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham (2006), 4–6, available at .

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50 51

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Haideh Moghissi, Women and Islam: Images and Realities (Oxford: Taylor & Francis, 2005), 86–88. Qāsim Amīın, Tah.ır al-Mar-ah [The Liberation of Woman] (Cairo: Maktabat al-Taraqq’ı, 1899). He was only one in a long line of Islamic scholars who believed that the repression of women was harmful to society. Casey, 2007: 62–64; see also: Federal Research Division, Kuwait: A Country Guide (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2004), 80–83. Kuwait Cultural Office, History of Education in Kuwait (Washington DC: Kuwait Cultural Office, 27 Aug. 2009), n.p., available at . Stephen Krauss, Note on Kuwait (Brussels: European Parliament Policy Department, 2005), 7, available at . Kuwait Cultural Office, 2009. Dr Ahmed Abu Seedi, ‘Memories and meetings: The late Sheikh Abdullah Al-Jaber Al-Sabah’, Al-Nahar Kuwaiti newspaper, August 7, 2012. http://168.187.3.27/annahar/ArticlePrint.aspx?id=343545&mode=print. Al-Mazyad, Ahmad. ‘UNESCO to Mark Anniversary of Kuwait’s Sheikh Abdullah Al-Jaber’, Kuwait News Agency, 26 April 2013, available at accessed 26 April 2013. Helen Mary Rizzo, Islam, Democracy, and the Status of Women: The Case of Kuwait (London: Routledge, 2005), 19. Jacqueline S. Ismael, ‘The Arab Gulf States’, in Politics and Government in the Middle East and North Africa, ed. Tareq Y. Ismael, Jacqueline S. Ismael and Kamel Abu Jaber (Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 1991), 460–464. Barry M. Rubin, Revolutionaries and Reformers: Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Middle East (New York: SUNY Press, 2003), 105–107. Jan Feldman, ‘Kuwaiti Women: Between Citizenship and Shari’a’, WAPPP, JFK School of Government, Harvard University (2007), 16, available at . Feldman, 2007: 16.

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60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

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Ayad al-Qazzaz, ‘Education of Women in the Arab World’, California State University, Sacramento (n.d), n.p., available at . Al-Qazzaz. . Sulaman S. Al-Qudsi and Nasra M. Shah, ‘Female Work Roles in a Traditional, Oil Economy: Kuwait’, Research in Human Capital and Development, 6 (1990), 213–246. David E. Bloom, David Canning, Günther Fink, and Jocelyn E. Finlay, ‘Fertility, Female Labor Force Participation, and the Demographic Dividend’, Harvard Initiative for Global Health, Program on the Global Demography of Aging, Working paper ser. 25 (Sep. 2007), n.p., available at . Feldman, 2007: 17. Feldman, 2007: 17. Al-Mughni, 2003: 177. Al-Mughni, 2003: 173–176. Al-Mughni, 2003: 171–174. Associated Press, ‘Women Still Excluded from Most Centers of Power’, Sarasota Journal [Florida], 15 Jan. 1976, 6B. Feldman, 2007: 18–19. Al-Mughni, 2003: 173–176. Feldman, 2007: 20. Feldman, 2007: 18–21. Kathleen Bishtawi, ‘Kuwaiti Women Emerge from Behind Veil’, Eugene Register, 9 Mar. 1980, n.p. Al-Mughni, 2003: 175. Feldman, 2007: 18–19. Moghissi, 2005: 331–332. Rizzo, 2005: 54–56. Feldman, 2007: 18–19. Feldman, 2007: 18–19. Rizzo, 2005: 57–58. Feldman, 2007: 19. Feldman, 2007: 20.

(translated from Arabic).

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Starting as a scholar, then a journalist writer at Al-Rai newspaper, Ghanima Al-Fahad wrote more than 5,000 articles in addition to her books about Kuwaiti literary heritage. She is considered as one of the best Kuwaiti heritage writers. In 1973, she started her career as a teacher and, after a long career, retired as a school principal. She is married, with children. Born in 1964, Najla Al-Naqi holds a BA in Law from Kuwait University, and enjoyed two summer sessions at Harvard University. She is the founder of the Najla Al-Naqi Forum – a political, social and cultural forum that brings Kuwaiti women together with experts, men and women, to discuss the issues of home and family, and of women. It gives younger Kuwaiti women the opportunity to learn the art of dialogue and etiquette, with eminent personalities invited to attend the forum monthly meetings. The forum is firm in calling for change and an improvement to the Kuwaiti society and women’s rights in particular. Al-Naqi is the mother of a boy and four girls.

(translated from Arabic). F. L. Lucas, Tragedy in Relation to Aristotle’s Poetics, p. 24. El-Najjar, 2001: ch. 6. Douglas Kellner, The Persian Gulf TV War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 2, available at . ‘War on Truth: The Secret Battle for the American Mind – An Interview with John Stauber’, Sun, Mar. 1999, n.p., available at . Philip M. Seib, Headline Diplomacy: How News Coverage Affects Foreign Policy (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997), 50–54. President Bush’s Declaration of War can be seen at: . In a few months, Kuwaitis went from mistrusting Americans to cheering when the speech was made! See also: . Sadly, when the propaganda and public relations campaign took over, many of the true tragic stories lay buried beneath the spin. An example of some of the less reliable rumours, at least partly believed

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by Amnesty International, amongst others, can be found in: Judith Miller, ‘War in the Gulf: The Exiles; Worries Dim Hopes as Kuwaiti Exiles Lose Touch with Resistance’, New York Times, 26 Feb. 1991, n.p., available at . 90 Abdullah Al-Shayeji, ‘Kuwait Invasion Changed Region’, Gulf News [UAE], 3 Aug. 2008, n.p., available at . Dr Abdullah Al-Shayeji is Professor of International Relations and the Head of the American Studies Unit, Kuwait University. 91 See for a chilling five-part video montage of the oil fires, set as part of an Iraqi ‘Scorched Earth’ policy. Also see John Loretz, ‘The Animal Victims of the Gulf War’, PSR Quarterly, 1.4 (1991), 221–225, available at . 92 Rodney Wilson, ‘The Regional Economic Impact of the Gulf War’, in Politics and International Relations in the Middle East, ed. M. Jane Davis (Brookfield, VT: Elgar Publishing Company, 1995), 90–105. 93 Barry M. Rubin, Crises in the Contemporary Persian Gulf (Abingdon: Frank Cass Press, 2001), 123–124. 94 John Levins, ‘The Kuwaiti Resistance’, Middle East Quarterly (Mar. 1995), 25–36, available at . 95 See for some video footage of the Kaifan Resistance preparing to fight. 96 Levins, 1995. 97 Levins, 1995. 98 Chris Hedges, ‘War in the Gulf: Resistance: Radio Voice Gives Heart to Kuwaitis’, New York Times, 23 Sep. 2009, A9. 99 Hedges, 2009: A9. 100 Michael Kramer and Lara Marlowe, ‘Kuwait: Chaos and Revenge’, TIME Magazine (18 Mar. 1991), n.p., available at . 101 Kim Murphy, ‘Kuwait Women Resist Iraq, Seek Recognition of Role – Gulf Crisis: Chants, Posters and Peaceful Marches are their Arms against Invaders. Three have Died so Far’, LA Times, 16 Oct. 1990,

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n.p. Whilst some of the reports of women and the resistance were undoubtedly used as propaganda in the quest for support, there is little doubt that the international community, especially women, genuinely admired the stance of the Kuwaiti women. Kurt Holden, ‘Down but Not Out: A Kuwaiti who Fights Back’, Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs (Jan. 1991), 41, available at . K. O. Nader, R. S. Piroos, L. A. Fairbanks, M. Al-Ajeel and A. AlAsfour. ‘A Preliminary Study of PTSD and Grief among the Children of Kuwait following the Gulf Crisis’, British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 46.5 (1992), 315–319. Lewis A. Leavitt and Nathan A. Fox, The Psychological Effects of War and Violence on Children (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1993), 180–190. Lateef Farook, ‘Kuwait’s Scars Still Bleed’, Gulf News Tabloid, 18 Dec. 1999, n.p. The royal court of His Highness the Emir of Kuwait. Mark Sandman, ‘Kuwaiti Resilience’, American Academy of Experts in Traumatic Stress (n.d.), n.p., available at . Joseph Kostimer, ‘Kuwait’, in Middle East Contemporary Survey, ed. Mekhon Shiloaḥ le-ḥeḳer ha-Mizraḥ ha-tikhon ḥe-Afriḳah and Merkaz Dayan le-ḥeḳer ha-Mizraḥ ha-Tikhon ḥe-Afriḳa (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 568–574. Yvonne Pepin-Wakefield, ‘The Use of Projective Drawings to Determine Visual Themes in Young Kuwaiti Women Impacted by the Iraqi Invasion’, International Journal of Art and Design Education, 27 (2008), 70–82. Yvonne Pepin-Wakefield, ‘Color, Image and Symbol: Memory Recalling the 1990 Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait through Drawings’, Hektoen International, 1.4 (2008), n.p., available at . This must be tempered with the proviso that most children did not want to remember it, claiming that ‘the invasion killed all life’. Sandman, n.d. This article documents the hatred and mistrust, as a Kuwaiti shoots a childhood friend, suspecting that he was an infor-

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mant for the Iraqi secret police. This pattern was repeated all over Kuwait. Van Hear, 1998: 80–89. Talaat I. Farag, ‘Exceptional Gulf Women: From Queen Balqis to Dr. Soaad Al-Sabah’, Ambassadors Online Magazine, 9.2 (July 2006), n.p., available at . See . This video of a newscast shows some of these protests, voices that shamed reluctant Western governments into taking action. John Levins has lived in Kuwait for many years, and was in the state when the Iraqi tanks rolled down the streets of the city. He was decorated for his bravery during the conflict. His article, ‘The Kuwaiti Resistance’ (1995), provides a first-hand account of the fight against the occupiers. Kramer and Marlowe, 1991. This interview relates the story of ‘Mike’, a personal friend of Asrar, who joined the resistance after finding her body. Amy, who is half-Kuwaiti, half-English, was a teenager at the time of the conflict. Behbehani was a notable political science lecturer at Kuwait University. As Levins (1995) relates: ‘When orders came from Ta’if for the Resistance to cease military operations in urban Kuwait because the Iraqi reprisals were killing too many Kuwaitis, she and a friend were busy scouting targets in Basra for car bomb attacks in Iraq itself.’ Asrar Al-Qabandi was a remarkable and formidable woman. Levins, 1995. ‘Kuwaiti Women Hanged’, New Straits Time Malaysia, 15 Feb. 1991. . Nicholas Blanford, ‘Kuwait Hopes for Answers on its Gulf War POWs’, Christian Science Monitor, 23 Dec. 2002, n.p., available at . Ahmed Jarallah, ‘Kuwait’, Arab Times [Kuwait], 9 June 2003, n.p., available at .

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126 See . This is a play depicting the bravery of the Kuwaiti women, as they used a mixture of passive and active resistance to combat the Iraqi occupation. 127 Brian Katulis, ‘Women’s Rights in Focus: Kuwait’, Freedom House (8 Mar. 2005), 9, available at . 128 Moghissi, 2005: 332–335. 129 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. Esposito, Islam, Gender and Social Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 194–195. 130 Al Mughni, 2003: 176–178. 131 Associated Press, ‘Kuwait, Israel May Talk’, The Vindicator [Ohio], 9 Mar. 1991. Web. 132 Youssef Ibrahim, ‘Mideast Tensions: A Kuwaiti Prince Sees Wider Rights’, New York Times, 14 Oct. 1990, n.p., available at . 133 Ibrahim, 1990. 134 ‘Interview with Shaikha Al-Nesef, President of the Women’s Cultural Association’, National Union of Kuwaiti Students (1 Oct. 2009), n.p., available at . 135 From the feedback questionnaire filled in by Dr Rasha Al-Sabah, 2010. 136 Taghreed Alqudsi-Ghabra, ‘Women in Kuwait: Educated, Modern and Middle Eastern’, Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs (July 1991), 29, available at . 137 Shafeeq Ghabra, ‘The Iraqi Occupation of Kuwait: An Eyewitness Account’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 20.2 (Winter 1991), 112–125. 138 Levins, 1995. 139 Haila al-Mekaimi, ‘Kuwait Women’s Tepid Political Awakening’, Arab Insight, 2.1 (Winter 2008), 54. 140 Douglas Jehl, ‘Rest of Kuwait (the Women) May Soon Get Right to Vote’, Muslim Woman’s League, n.d., available at . 141 ‘Interview with Shaikha Al-Nesef’, 2009. Translated from the original interview in Arabic.

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Chapter 2: Going Back to Move Forwards: Internal Debate over the Consequences of the 1990 Crisis 1 2

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7 8 9 10 11 12 13

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

Ewan W. Anderson and William Bayne Fisher, The Middle East Geography and Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 2000), 267–269. Valentine Moghadam, Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 32–37. H. A. Jawad, The Rights of Women in Islam: An Authentic Approach (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 16–21. Peter N. Stearns, Gender in World History (New York: Routledge, 2000), 43–46. Anderson and Bayne Fisher, 2000: 266–268. Nikki R. Keddie, ‘Women in the Middle East since the Rise of Islam’, in Women’s History in Global Perspective, Volume 3, ed. Bonnie G. Smith (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2005), 63–67. Stearns, 2000: 43–46. Keddie, 2005: 101–105. Stearns, 2000: 43–46. Keddie, 2005: 101–105. Keddie, 2005: 101–105. Freda Hussain, Muslim Women (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1984), 3–7. Deniz Kandiyoti, ‘Women, Islam and the State’, in Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report, ed. Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 166–170. Jawad, 1998: 16–21. Peter W. Wilson and Douglas Graham, Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 241. Keddie, 2005: 158–160. Oxford Business Group, The Report: Bahrain 2008 (Oxford: Oxford Business Group, 2008), 29–30. Stearns, 2000: 43–46. Keddie, 2005: 158–160. Keddie, 2005: 63–67. Swanee Hunt, ‘Moving Beyond Silence: Women Waging Peace’, in Listening to the Silences: Women and War, ed. Helen Durham

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and Tracy Gurd (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 251–271, available at . Hunt, 2005: 251–271. Sameena Nazir and Leigh Tomppert, Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Citizenship and Justice (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 131–138. Oxford Business Group, The Report: Oman 2007 (Oxford: Oxford Business Group, 2007), 14–15. Keddie, 2005: 63–67. Jill Crystal, ‘Civil Society in the Persian Gulf’, in Civil Society in the Middle East, ed Augustus Richard Norton (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 259–262. Sean Foley, ‘All I Want is Equality with Girls: Gender and Social Change in the Twenty-First Century Gulf’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 14.1 (Mar. 2010), 18–22. Rob Salkowitz, Young World Rising: How Youth Technology and Entrepreneurship are Changing the World from the Bottom Up (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2010), 37–39. Borzou Daragahi, ‘From the Archives: Family, Friends Mourn “Neda”, Iranian Who Died on Video’, LA Times, 23 June 2009, n.p., available at . Jawad, 1998: 83–84. Walter F. Murphy, Constitutional Democracy: Creating and Maintaining a Just Political Order (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 180. Mary Jane Deeb, ‘Country Report: Oman’, Freedom House (n.d.), n.p., available at . Oxford Business Group, 2007: 14–15. Nikki Keddie, Women in the Middle East: Past and Present (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 155. Keddie, 2006: 127–129. Laura Sjoberg, Gender, Justice, and the Wars in Iraq: A Feminist Reformulation of Just War Theory (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2006), 113. Donna Fenn Heintzen, ‘Male-Dominated Saudi Women in Stunning Protest of Driving Ban’, Seattle Times, 7 Nov. 1990, n.p., available at .

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Camille Pampell Conaway, ‘Charting Progress: The Role of Women in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations: Companion Article to the Special Report’, United States Institute of Peace, Working Group on the Role of Women in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations (15 Sep. 2005), 9–17, available at . Zoi Constantine, ‘Bahrain’s Women Work to Win More Parliamentary Seats’, The National [Egypt], 17 Dec. 2009, 1–2, available at . Suad Hamada, ‘Politics Bahrain: More than a Matter of Putting Women in Office’, Global Geopolitics & Political Economy (18 Oct. 2010), n.p., available at . Hamada, 2010. Oxford Business Group, The Report: Bahrain 2008 (Oxford: Oxford Business Group, 2008), 15–18. ‘Where We Work: Bahrain’, Women in Technology (n.d.), n.p., available at . Oxford Business Group, 2007: 143. ‘Women in the UAE’, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, Washington DC (2010), 1–2, available at . David Keane and Nicholas McGeehan, ‘Enforcing Migrant Workers’ Rights in the United Arab Emirates’, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 15 (2008), 81–115, available at . Serra Kirdar, ‘Country Report: United Arab Emirates’, Freedom House (2010), 2–9, available at . May Al Dabbagh and Lana Nusseibeh, Women in Parliament and Politics in the UAE: A Study of the First Federal National Council Elections, Dubai School of Government (Feb. 2009),

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22–24, available at . Keddie, 2006: 158. Keddie, 2006: 149–150. Willard A. Beling, King Faisal and the Modernisation of Saudi Arabia (London: Croom Helm, 1980), 142–154. Tim Niblock, Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 89–94. Niblock, 2006: 89–94. Naomi Sakr, ‘Women and Media in Saudi Arabia: Changes and Contradictions’, Reset: Dialogues on Civilization (23 Sep. 2009), n.p., available at . Pascal Ménoret, The Saudi Enigma: A History (London: Zed Books, 2005), 174–178. James Roberts, ‘Women Make History in Qatar Election’, The Independent [London], 9 Mar. 1999, n.p., available at . Keddie, 2006: 159. Jill Crystal, ‘Country Report: Qatar’, Freedom House (2010), n.p., available at . Crystal, 2010. Anderson and Bayne Fisher, 2000: 159–160. Mohammad Al Rumaihi, ‘Kuwait: Oasis of Liberalism?’ Middle East Quarterly, 1.3 (Sep. 1994), n.p., available at . Laurence Louër, Transnational Shi‘i Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 45–49. Al-Mughni, 2003. Berkowitz, 2004. Ali Paya, ‘Islamic Democracy: A Valid Concept or an Oxymoron?’ National Research Institute for Science Policy (NRISP), Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster (n.d), 1–3, available at ; Al Rumaihi, 1994.

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Nathan Brown, ‘Kuwaiti Democracy in Crisis’, Islam Online (16 May 2009), n.p., available at .

67

Al-Mughni, 2003: 170. Jill Crystal, ‘Coalitions in Oil Monarchies: Kuwait and Qatar’, Comparative Politics, 21.4 (July 1989), 427–443, at 429. Al-Mughni, 2003: 171. Daniel L. Byman and Jerrold D. Green, ‘The Enigma of Political Stability in the Persian Gulf Monarchies’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 3.3 (1999), n.p. Rizzo, 2005: 54–58. Al-Mughni, 2003: 171. Feldman, 2007: 16. Al-Mughni, 2003: 172. Yazbeck Haddad and Esposito, 1998: 193–200. Al-Mughni, 2003: 183. Feldman, 2007: 16. Al-Mughni, 2003: 172. Feldman, 2007: 6. Moghissi, 2005: 335–336. Al-Mughni, 2003: 172. Susan Jeffords and Lauren Rabinovitz, Seeing through the Media: The Persian Gulf War (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994), 215. Katherine Meyer, Helen Rizzo and Yousef Ali, ‘Islam and the Extension of Citizenship Rights to Women in Kuwait’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 37.1 (Mar. 1998), 138. Yazbeck Haddad and Esposito, 1998: 192–193. UN-DAW, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (New York: United Nations, 1979), available at . UNDP, Conditions of Women, Gender and Citizenship Initiative (United Nations, 2002), available at. UNDP, 2002. Al-Mughni, 2003: 171–175. Feldman, 2007: 7–16.

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Yazbeck Haddad and Esposito, 1998: 199. Personal communication, 2009. Yazbeck Haddad and Esposito, 1998: 200–202. ‘Kuwaiti Women Want to Vote’, Spokane Chronicles [Washington], 4 Feb. 1992, n.p. ‘Kuwaiti Women Want to Vote’, 1992. Personal communication, 2009. Al-Mekaimi, 2008: 58. Ibrahim, 1990. Bob Hepburn, ‘Modern-Day Suffragette Fights On in Kuwait’, Toronto Star, 3 Oct. 1992, 16. Al-Mughni, 2003: 171–175. ‘Democracy Loses in Kuwait’, Toledo Blade, 24 Apr. 1991, n.p. Nassir Shirkhani, ‘Women Fight for the Right to Vote in MaleDominated Kuwait’, Daily News [Tennessee], 18 Mar. 1992, n.p. ‘Kuwait’s Men-Only Poll’, The Independent [London], 5 Oct. 1992, n.p. ‘Kuwaiti Women Demand Political Rights in a March on a Polling Station Yesterday during the Country’s Parliamentary Election’, The Independent [London], 6 Oct. 1992, n.p. ‘Kuwait Women Fight for Vote Rights’, The Ledger [Lakeland, FL, syndicated from Associated Press], 4 Feb. 1992, n.p. Henry Bienen, ‘Perspective on Women’s Rights: Putting Gender in Foreign Policy – American Policy-Makers Can No Longer Ignore the Issue of How Women are Treated in Other Countries’, Los Angeles Times, 23 Dec. 1993, n.p. For some good articles documenting Western perceptions of Kuwait’s failure to address emancipation: Kramer and Marlowe, 1991: n.p.; Elaine Sciolino, ‘The Many Faces of Islamic Law’, New York Times, 13 Oct. 1996, n.p.; Chris Hedges, ‘A Year Later, Kuwait Sinks into Malaise’, New York Times, 2 Aug.1991, n.p.; Tom Hundley, ‘In Kuwait, Democracy is Selective’, Chicago Tribune, 4 Oct. 1992, n.p. ‘Political Rights Sought’, Arab Times, 10 Mar. 1992, n.p. ‘Kuwaiti Women Daringly Demand Right to Vote’, Toledo Blade [Syndicated from Reuters], 30 Sep. 1992, n.p. Yazbeck Haddad and Esposito, 1998: 202.

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109 Judy Mann, ‘Is This What We Went to War For?’ Washington Post, 18 Mar. 1992, n.p. 110 Jack Kelley, ‘Charges of Rights Abuses in Kuwait Mount’, USA Today, 12 June 1991, 9. 111 Mann, 1992: n.p. 112 Al-Mughni, 2003: 174–175. 113 Yazbeck Haddad and Esposito, 1998: 192–193. 114 Al-Mughni, 2003: 174–175. See also: ‘Women Campaign for Vote in Kuwait – War Experience Unites Women’, Boca Raton News [Syndicated from Associated Press], 4 Feb. 1992, n.p. 115 Al-Mekaimi, 2008: 8. 116 Moghissi, 2005: 335–336. 117 Al-Mughni, 2003: 172. 118 Yazbeck Haddad and Esposito, 1998: 203. 119 Kenneth R. Timmerman, ‘The Gulf Monarchies: Kuwait’s Real Elections’, Middle East Quarterly (Dec. 1996), n.p., available at . 120 Al-Mughni, 2003: 174–175. 121 Al-Mughni, 2003: 174–175. 122 Moghissi, 2005: 335. 123 Tétreault and Al-Mughni, 2000: 162. 124 Al-Mughni, 2003: 176–178. 125 Munira A. Fakhno, ‘Civil Society and Democracy in the Gulf Region’, paper prepared for 11th Mediterranean Dialogue Seminar: Security and Development in the Gulf Region, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Doha, Qatar, 26–28 Nov. 2005, 6–7. 126 Al-Mughni, 2003: 179. 127 Haya Al-Mughni, Women in Kuwait: The Politics of Gender (London: Saqi, 2001), 164–166. 128 Al-Mughni, 2003: 179. 129 Abbas Abdelkarim, Change and Development in the Gulf (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 229. 130 Shafeeq Ghabra, ‘10 Years After: Embracing Reform in Kuwait’, Middle East Insight, 16.3 (June–July 2001), 23–26, available at . 131 Al-Mughni, 2003: 180–181.

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132 Feldman, 2007: 19–20. 133 Al-Mughni, 2003: 179. 134 Geoff Dougherty, ‘Women in Kuwait’, California State University Channel Islands (n.d.), available at . 135 Al-Mughni, 2003: 179. 136 Yazbeck Haddad and Esposito, 1998: 203–204. 137 Moghissi, 2005: 332–335. 138 Natasha Walter, ‘Electoral Shock: There is One Country Left in the World Where Women are Specifically Denied the Vote’, The Guardian [London], 29 Sep. 2003, n.p., available at . 139 Meyer, Rizzo and Ali, 1998: 289–324. 140 Al-Mekaimi, 2008: 2–4. 141 Tétreault and Al-Mughni, 2000: 157–159. 142 For these comments he was successfully sued by liberal groups, censured and ordered to pay a fine. See: Ali Al-Baghli, ‘Rejected Logic’, Al-Qabas, 5 Mar. 2005, 17. 143 Augustus Richard Norton, Diane Singerman, Mary E. Morris, Valentine M. Moghadam, Munira A. Fakhro, Ayse Saktanber, Lisa Taraki, Boutheina Cheriet and Sheila Carapico, ‘Gender, Politics and the State: What do Middle Eastern Women Want?’ Middle East Policy, 5 (1997), n.p. 144 Feldman, 2007: 19–20. 145 Moghissi, 2005: 334. 146 Maria Julia and Hadi Ridha, ‘Women and War: The Role Kuwaiti Women Played during the Iraqi Occupation’, Journal of International Development, 13.5 (2001), 583–598, at 592. 147 Eran Segal, ‘Shi‘is in Kuwait: Toward Growing Sectarianism?’ The Meir and Miriam Center for Gulf Studies (21 Dec. 2005), n.p., available at . 148 Segal, 2005. 149 Herb, 2005: 15–19. 150 Segal, 2005. 151 Leonard Binder, Ethnic Conflict and International Politics in the Middle East (University Press of Florida, 1999).

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152 Segal, 2005. 153 Herb, 2005: 14–16. 154 Mary Ann Tétreault, ‘Women’s Rights and the Meaning of Citizenship in Kuwait’, Middle East Report Online (MERIP) (10 Feb. 2005), n.p., available at . 155 Fred Halliday, ‘Letter from Kuwait’, Middle East Report, 215 (2000), n.p., available at . 156 Joseph Albright, ‘Princess Takes Policy Making Role in Kuwait’, Austin American Statesman, 16 Aug. 1992, 9. 157 Sarah Gauch, ‘A Voice for Change is Also a Voice of the Kuwaiti Royal Family’, Chicago Tribune, 2 Aug. 1992, 1.

Chapter 3: Indirect Change: The Status of Women in the NonPolitical Arena 1 2

3 4

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Al-Mughni, 2003: 182. A report commissioned by the Kuwait Economic Society, which randomly surveyed 600 men and 600 women by telephone, found that 41 per cent of men would happily vote for a female candidate as opposed to 35 per cent of women. In addition, 71 per cent of men would encourage female family members to vote as opposed to 62 per cent of women. Kuwait Economic Society, Kuwaiti Public Opinion Survey Report (Kuwait: Kuwaiti Economic Society, 2006), 22. Al-Mughni, 2003: 170–174. Pietro Garibaldi and Paolo Mauro, ‘Job Creation: Why Some Countries do Better’, Economic Issues, International Monetary Fund, 20 (Apr. 2000), n.p., available at ; Nicky Le Feuvre and Muriel Andriocci, ‘Comparative Data Report 3: Employment Opportunities for Women in Europe’, University of Hull (Apr. 2003), 17, available at . UNDP-RBAS, The Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations (Amman: UN Publications, 2002), 158.

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Naomi Sakr, Women and Media in the Middle East: Power through Self-Expression (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004), 128–130. Crystal, 1994: 259–262. Macmillan Dictionary . Centre for Civil Society, ‘Report on Activities: July 2007–August 2008’, London School of Economics (2008), 1, available at . Civil Society International, ‘What is Civil Society?’ (n.d.), n.p., available at . Elizabeth Warnock Fernea, In Search of Islamic Feminism (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books/Doubleday, 1998), 173–176. Anne Sisson Runyan, ‘Global Feminism’, in Feminism and Women’s Rights Worldwide, Volume 3, ed. Michele A. Paludi (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO), 1–3. Nazir and Tomppert, 2005: 135. Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (Oxford: Routledge, 2004), 204–209. Katulis, 2005: 9. Owen, 2004: 209–210. Humanitarian Forum, ‘Kuwait’, paper presented at Safar conference, 26 Mar. 2006, available at . M. Nazrul Islam and Muhammad Azam, ‘Democratization in the Gulf Monarchies and American Civil Society’, Turkish Journal of International Relations, 9.3 (2010), 8–25, at 22. US Embassy Kuwait, Kuwait (2006), 3, available at . Feldman, 2007: 2. Yara Abdul-Hamid, ‘Child’s Rights Situation Analysis for MENA Region’, Save the Children Sweden (2008), 64–66, available at . Al-Mughni, 2003: 171.

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Bita Ghaffari, ‘Kuwaiti Women Need Power to Progress: Dialogue Best Way to Achieve Rights’, Iran Daily [Tehran], 25 Jan. 2005, n.p. Rola Dashti, ‘Building at the Grassroots: Leader in Kuwaiti Civil Society Discusses Reform in the Arab World’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (19 Jan. 2007), n.p., available at . Katulis, 2005: 9. Shahid Jamal Ansari, ‘Contemporary Gulf Civil Society with Special Reference to Women’, Radiance Views Weekly (Sunday, 27 Sep. 2009), n.p., available at . Dashti, 2007. Vincent Vulin, ‘Women in Kuwait Struggle for Right to Vote’, Online Women in Politics (May 2004), n.p. available at . Ghaffari, 2005. Vulin, 2004. Abd Allāh Aḥmad Naḥīm, Islamic Family Law in a Changing World: A Global Resourcebook (London: Zed Books, 2002), 103. ‘Kuwait Plans Hotline for Abused Women’, New York Times, 12 June 1995, A2. ‘Kuwait Plans Hotline’, 1995. Haya Al-Mughni, ‘Kuwait’, Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa (Washington DC: Freedom House Gulf Edition, 2009), 10–12. Diane Elias, ‘Kuwait MP Gets Threat Over Education Bill’, Arab News [Syndicated from Associated Press], 7 Feb. 2008, n.p., available at . ‘Kuwait MP says Life Threatened for Supporting Co-Education’, Associated French Press, 6 Feb. 2008, n.p., available at . Al-Mughni, 2009: 10–12.

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Chidi Emmanuel, ‘Al-Razi Last Stop for Distressed Maids’, Kuwait Times, 17 Sep. 2009, n.p., available at . DRL, Kuwait (Washington: US Department of State, 4 Mar. 2002), n.p., available at . UNIS, Women’s Anti-Discrimination Committee Examines Report of Kuwait (New York: United Nations, 16 Jan. 2004), n.p., available at . UNIS, 2004. Renu Kshetry, ‘Housemaids Often Experience Odds of Life’, New Nation, 1 Oct. 2009, n.p., available at . Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, a UN document designed to enshrine the rights of women into law. Kuwait ratified this document and, whilst it stipulates that Islamic law takes precedence, this loophole should not apply here. Katulis, 2005: 31. ‘Fadwa Al-Homaizi’, CHE Middle East (n.d), n.p., available at . ‘Interview with Sara Akhbar’, Kuwait Energy (26 Mar. 2010), n.p., available at . ‘US and Kuwaiti Women Executives Examine How to Navigate Current Global Financial Crisis in Kuwait’, Turkish Weekly [Ankara], 21 Nov. 2008, n.p. Abdullah Kh. Alowaihan, ‘Gender and Business Performance of Kuwait Small Firms: A Comparative Approach’, International Journal of Commerce and Management, 14.3 (2004), 69–82. PR Newswire, ‘Leading US and Kuwaiti Women Executives to Examine How to Navigate the Current Global Financial Crisis’, conference held in Kuwait City, Kuwait, 19–20 Nov. 2008, available at . Dashti, 2007. ‘Community Technology Skills Program’ .

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Stacy Lobo, ‘Microsoft Supports Kuwait Economic Society “Empower” Project: Paving the Way for Creation of Skilled Workforce in Kuwait’, ArabianBusiness.com (31 Aug. 2008), n.p., available at . There is also a lot of useful information about the latest work of KES on their website: . Hussain Al-Qatari, ‘The Closeted Business of Housewife Entrepreneurs’, Kuwait Times, 12 Sep. 2008, n.p., available at . Al-Qatari, 2008. Al-Qatari, 2008. Kuwait Cultural Office, 2009. Haya Al-Mughni, ‘All Roads Lead to the Franchise: Enfranchising Women in Kuwait’, UNESCO Courier [New York] (Mar. 2001), n.p., available at . Ghaffari, 2005. Katulis, 2005: 29. Personal communication, 2010. Katulis, 2005: 29–30. Cathryn Magno and Iveta Silova, ‘Divergent Trends in Higher Education in the Post-Socialist Transition’, International Studies in Education, 9 (2008), 6–11, available at . Magno and Silova, 2008: 6–11. Lahja Johanna Lasonen, ‘A European Perspective on the Promotion of Women’s Career Aspirations’, paper presented at a conference on Changing Places: Gender Issues in Further Education – Scottish and European Perspectives, 27 Sep. 1995, available at . Magno and Silova, 2008: 6–11. Janina Pasaniuc, ‘Does Interdisciplinary Education Improve the Gender Balance and Attract More Young People in Engineering and Technology Higher Education?’ paper presented at ‘Gender and Interdisciplinary Education for Engineers – GIEE 2011’, Les Corde-

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liers, Conference Centre of the Paris University, Paris, 23–24 June 2011, available at . Rana A. Al-Fares and Lulwa A. Al-Abdulmuhsen, ‘Work in Progress – Gender Parity Success in the Civil Engineering Department at Kuwait University’, paper presented at 38th ASEE/IEEE Frontiers in Education Conference in Saratoga Springs, NY, 22–25 Oct. 2008, 1–2, available at < http://fie-conference.org/fie2008/papers/1101.pdf>. AAAS, ‘Profiles of Women in STE in Kuwait’ (n.d.), available at . Berkowitz, 2004. UNDP, Report on Gender Discussion with Women Activists in the State of Kuwait (New York: United Nations, 2004), available at . Al-Mughni, 2001. Krauss, 2005: 7. John Rossant, ‘A Dangerous Oil Habit’, BusinessWeek (4 Nov. 1996), n.p., available at . Rossant, 1996. UNDP, 2004: 2. Nana Oishi, Women in Motion: Globalization, State Policies, and Labor Migration in Asia (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 44–49. Nancy Oteifa, ‘Plight of Fresh Kuwait Graduates’, Kuwait Times, 9 July 2007, n.p., available at . Olexandr Kolot, ‘Destination Europe: Through Kuwait’, Ukraine Today, n.d., n.p., available at . UNDP, 2004: 4. Commonwealth Secretariat, Gender Mainstreaming in the Public Service: A Reference Manual for Governments and Other Stakeholders (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1999), available at . ‘Civil Service Statistics’, Office for National Statistics (2010), n.p., available at . B. Izzak, ‘Kuwaiti Women Complain of Discrimination’, Kuwait Times, 9 Mar. 2009, n.p., available at . Al-Mughni, 2003: 170. Oishi, 2005: 44–49. Oishi, 2005: 44–49. AAAS, n.d. ILO, ‘Non-Traditional Skills for Arab Women in Kuwait’, World of Work Magazine, 52 (Nov. 2004), available at . Paul Holdsworth, ‘Employment Grows Quicker in Kuwait Reaching 6.8 Percent in First Half of the Year’, Gulf Jobs Market News, 30 Nov. 2010, n.p., available at < http://news.gulfjobsmarket.com/ employment-grows-quicker-in-kuwait-reaching-6-8-percent-infirst-half-of-the-year-7861996-news>. Mushtak Parker, ‘The Politics of Female Empowerment’, Arab News, Sunday, 25 Mar. 2007, n.p. Nazir and Tomppert, 2005: 135. Sakr, 2004: 128–130. Delinda C. Hanley, ‘Arab Women Journalists Seek Ways to Improve their Image at Home and in the West’, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (Apr. 2002), 52–55, available at . Sakr, 2004: 128–130. Sakr, 2004: 128–130. UNDP, 2004. DRL, 2002. Freedom House, ‘Country Report: Kuwait’, Freedom House, Washington DC (n.d.), n.p., available at . .

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‘Journalist Hedaya al-Salem Buried, the Killer Found’, Arabic News, 22 Mar. 2001, n.p., available at . Sakr, 2004: 129–130. Al Mughni, 2009: 38. Sakr, 2004: 131–133. Ghaffari, 2005. US Embassy Kuwait, 2006. Hanley, 2002: 52–55. ‘Al-Anba Appoints New Editor-in-Chief’, Kuwait Times, Feb. 2009, n.p., available at . Vital Voices Global Partnership, ‘Global Council Advisory Members’, Vital Voices (n.d.), available at . Sakr, 2004: 132. Nouriyah Al-Sabeeh, the Kuwaiti Education Minister, private communication, 2010.

Chapter 4: The Debate within the Ruling Family 1

2

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Nathan J. Brown, Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for Accountable Government (New York: SUNY Press, 2002), 130–134. Mary Ann Tétreault, ‘Gender, Citizenship and State in the Middle East’, in Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications, ed. Nils August Butenschøn, Uri Davis and Manuel Sarkis Hassassian (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 81–84. Al-Mughni, 2003: 170–189. This chapter gives an excellent summary of the struggle between the various facets of the Kuwaiti political system and how they relate to gender issues. Brown, 2002: 130–134. . Berkowitz, 2004. Casey, 2007: 64–66.

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Michael Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies (New York: SUNY Press, 1999), 80–82. William Smyth, ‘Kuwait’, in Kuwait: A Country Study, ed. Helen Chapin Metz (Washington DC: Library of Congress, US Federal Research Division, 1993), ch. 1 . Byman and Green, 1999: n.p. . Brown, 2002: 130–134. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms – Kuwait’, Carnegie Endowment (n.d.), 3–5, available at . Carnegie Endowment, n.d.: 3–5. Jill Crystal, ‘Kuwait’, in Kuwait: A Country Study, ed. Helen Chapin Metz (Washington DC: Library of Congress, US Federal Research Division 1993), ch. 2, available at . Kogan Page, Middle East Review (London: Kogan Page Publishers, 2004), 96–99. Carnegie Endowment, n.d.: 3–5. Carnegie Endowment, n.d.: 3–5. . Berkowitz, 2004. Berkowitz, 2004. Nathan J. Brown, ‘Moving out of Kuwait’s Political Impasse’, Carnegie Middle East Center (25 June 2007), n.p., available at . Berkowitz, 2004. A. Abukhalil, ‘Change and Democratisation in the Arab World: The Role of Political Parties’, Third World Quarterly, 18.1(1997), 149–163. Crystal, 1993. Yazbeck Haddad and Esposito, 1998: 199–201. Brown, 2002: 134–137. Greg Myre, ‘Kuwaiti Government Resigns amid Criticism’, Kentucky New Era [Syndicated from Associated Press], 14 Mar. 1991, 8A.

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Jeff Haynes, ‘Why has Democratisation in the Muslim World been so Slow to Occur?’ London Metropolitan University (2003), 24, available at . Tétreault and Al-Mughni, 2000: 161–163; Haynes, 2003: 25. Simon Murden, Islam, the Middle East, and the New Global Hegemony (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 165. Rebecca Hillauer, Encyclopedia of Arab Women Filmmakers (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2005), 417. Yazbeck Haddad and Esposito, 1998: 194–195. Mary Ann Tétreault, ‘Three Emirs and a Tale of Three Transitions’, Middle East Report Online (10 Feb. 2006), n.p., available at . . Susan B. Glasser, ‘Democracy in Kuwait is Promise Unfulfilled’, Washington Post, 27 Feb. 2003, available at . Rubin, 2003: 119–122. Jehl, n.d. ‘Women in Politics’, Datamatrix Women S.M.E Association (n.d.), available at . Berkowitz, 2004. Berkowitz, 2004. ‘Businesswomen Federation Head: Arab Businessmen “Actually Do Show Support”’, Al Mar’a al-Arabiya, 13 Jan. 2006, n.p., available at . ‘Women in Business Conference Begins in Oman’, Kuwait News Agency, 6 Feb. 2007, n.p., available at . Y. Admon, ‘The Public Debate on the New Amendment Granting Kuwaiti Women Political Rights’, Inquiry and Analysis: The Middle East Media Research Institute, 228 (24 June 2005), n.p., available at . Sharif Hikmat Nashashibi, ‘Obituaries of Kuwait’s Sheikh Saad AlAbdullah Al-Sabah in Britain’s National Press’, Arab Media Watch (21

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May 2008), available at . Mamoun Fandy, ‘Kuwaiti Women in Parliament: A Look at History and Identity’, Asharq Alawsat, 27 May 2005, n.p., available at ; . ‘Kuwait Rejects Political Rights for Women’, New York Times, 24 Nov. 1999, n.p., available at . Sanjay Upadhya, ‘Voting Rights for Women Poll Issue in Kuwait’, NY Transfer News Collective, 26 May 1999, n.p., available at . Dominic Moran, ‘Election Deepens Kuwait’s Political Crisis’, International Relations and Security Network (3 July 2006), available at . Adrian Karatnycky, Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 2000–2001(Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 308–309. Paul Dresch and James P. Piscatori, Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf (London: I.B.Tauris, 2005), 216–218. Rubin, 2003: 119–122. Dresch and Piscatori, 2005: 216–218. Routledge, The Middle East and North Africa 2004, Volume 50 (London: Routledge, 2004), 682–685. Dresch and Piscatori, 2005: 216–218. Yazbeck Haddad and Esposito, 1998: 200–203. Routledge, 2004: 684–686. Dresch and Piscatori, 2005: 216–218. J. E. Peterson, ‘The Nature of Succession in the Gulf’, Middle East Journal, 55.4 (Autumn 2001), 586–589. Fandy, 2005. Dresch and Piscatori, 2005: 217–219. Rubin, 2003: 105–107. Al-Mughni, 2003: 174. Dresch and Piscatori, 2005: 217–219.

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Upadhya, 1999. ‘Kuwaiti Women Refused the Vote’, BBC News, 23 Nov. 1999, available at . Kenneth Katzman, Kuwait: Security, Reform, and US Policy (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 20 May 2009), 2, available at . ‘Kuwait Rejects Political Rights for Women’, 1999. ‘Kuwait Rejects Political Rights for Women’, 1999. Berkowitz, 2004. Jehl. Routledge, 2004. Glasser, 2003. Jehl. Al-Mubarak was a member of the National Assembly in 2009. ‘Kuwait Appoints New PM’, BBC News, 13 July 2003, n.p., available at . Jehl. Feldman, 2007: 8–10. ‘Kuwait Nearing Voting Rights for Women’, China Daily, 20 Apr. 2004, n.p.; Kianne Sadeq, ‘Kuwait Grants Women Right to Vote’, CNN, 16 May 2005, available at . Moran, 2006. Barbara Lewis, ‘Kuwaiti Women Eye Parliament’, Boloji (26 Feb. 2006), available at . Al Rai Al-’Aam (17 May 2005), quoted in: Admon, 2005. Moran, 2006. Al Rai Al-’Aam (17 May 2005). Al Rai Al-’Aam (13 June 2005), quoted in Admon, 2005. Moran, 2006. Al Rai Al-’Aam (Kuwait), 18 May 2005. ‘Kuwait Names Woman Minister’, Arab News, 13 June 2005, n.p., available at . Al Rai Al-’Aam (6 June 2005), quoted in Admon, 2005. Naveen Ahmad, ‘Vote of Confidence’, Newsline, July 2005, n.p., available at .

NOTES

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91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

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Al-Watan [Kuwait] (18 May 2005), quoted in Admon, 2005. ‘Kuwaiti Women Launch Campaign for their Rights’, Arab News, 22 Mar. 2005, n.p., available at . Ahmad, 2005. Moran, 2006. Moran, 2006. Moran, 2006. Al Rai Al-’Aam (17 May 2005). Al Rai Al-’Aam (17 May 2005). Katzman, 2000: 2. Katzman, 2000: 2. Naomi Sakr, Civil Society, Media and Accountability in the Arab Region (New York: UNDP Human Development Report Office, 2002), 18–19, available at . ‘Welcome to the Old Kuwait’, The Economist (1 Mar. 2001), n.p., available at . Qattan, Lidia. ‘Sheikh Jaber transformed Kuwait into oasis of beauty: A good soul’, Arab Times, 27 April 2013, available at accessed 27 April 2013). The Telegraph, ‘His Highness Sheikh Jaber III’, 16 January 2006, available at accessed 26 April 2013). ‘Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah’, The Times, 16 Jan. 2006, n.p., available at . Michael Slackman and Neil McFarquhar, ‘Sheik Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah, the Leader of Kuwait for 28 Years, is Dead at 79’, New York Times, 16 Jan. 2006, n.p., available at . Slackman and McFarquhar, 2006. Marshall Cavendish, World and its Peoples: The Middle East, Western Asia, and Northern Africa (London: Marshall Cavendish, 2006).

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107 Talaat I. Farag, ‘Sheikh Saad Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah: The Unforgettable Liberation Hero (1930–2008)’, Ambassadors Online Magazine, 11.24 (June 2008), n.p., available at . 108 Gerald Butt, ‘Sheikh Saad al-Abdullah al-Sabah: Emir of Kuwait for Nine Days’, The Independent [London], 15 May 2008, n.p., available at . 109 ‘Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah: Emir of Kuwait for Nine Days in 2006 Who Was Called “The Hero of the Liberation” for His Steadfastness during the Gulf War’, The Times [London], 15 May 2008, n.p., available at . 110 Butt, 2008. 111 Courtney C. Radsch,’Twitter vs. the Emir: Tweeting in Kuwait Becoming a Dangerous Pastime’, Huffpost World, February 8 2013, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mobileweb/courtneyc-radsch/twitter-vs-the-emir-tweet_b_2620792.html accessed 26 April 2013 112 Kuwait shuts opposition-linked television’, Ahram Online, (20 Dec. 2012), available at accessed 27 April 2013). 113 ‘Kuwait court bails an ex-MP guilty of insulting emir‘, BBC News, 22 April 2013, available at accessed 28 April 2013. 114 Toum, Habib, ‘Musallam Al Barrak: Admired and criticised’, Gulf News, 15 April 2013, n.p., available at accessed 30 April 2013). 115 ‘Ailing Emir Expected to Abdicate Today’, LA Times, 24 Jan. 2006, n.p., available at . Talaat I. Farag. 116 Al Tamimi, Jumana. ‘Kuwait Emir dissolves parliament’, Gulf News, 7 October 2012, n.p., available at accessed 30 April 2013.

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117 Abubakar A. Ibrahim, ‘Rally warns of protests until ‘government goes; Punish Corrupt’, Arab Times, 5 Oct. 2011, n.p., available at accessed 28 April 2013. 118 Hassan M. Fattah, ‘Kuwaiti Women Join the Voting after a Long Battle for Suffrage’, New York Times, 30 June 2006, n.p., available at . 119 ‘Ailing Emir’, 2006. 120 Refworld, Freedom in the World 2009: Kuwait (New York: United Nations Refugee Agency, 2009), n.p., available at . 121 Refworld, 2009. 122 ‘Kuwait Dissolves Parliament, Sets May 17 Election Date’, AFP, 19 Mar. 2008, n.p., available at . 123 Muhamed S. Olimat, ‘Women and Politics in Kuwait’, Journal of International Women’s Studies, 11 (Nov. 2009), 199–212, at 206–209, available at . 124 Feldman, 2007: 16. 125 Refworld, 2009.

Chapter 5: Women in Politics: The National and International Debate 1

2 3 4

William A. Rugh, Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio and Television in Arab Politics (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), 107–109. Sakr, Women and Media, 2004: 134–135. Rugh, 2004: 107–109. Gwenn Okruhlik, ‘Networks of Dissent: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia’, Social Science Research Council (Jan. 2002), n.p., available at . Homa Katouzian and Hossein Shahidi, Iran in the 21st Century: Politics, Economics and Conflict (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 4–5.

296

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Oxford Business Group, Emerging Kuwait 2006 (Oxford: Oxford Business Group, 2006), 147. ‘Kuwait’, Open Net Initiative (6 Aug. 2009), n.p., available at . Kevin Stoda, ‘Editor of Kuwaiti Times on Press Censorship’, OpEd News, 19 June 2008, n.p., available at . ‘Kuwait’, 2009. Oxford Business Group, 2006: 147. Sakr, 2004: 128. Sakr, 2004: 127. Rugh, 2004: 107–109. Sakr, 2004: 130. Shanto Lyengar and Kyu S. Hahn, ‘Red Media, Blue Media: Evidence of Ideological Polarization in Media Use’, Journal of Communication, 59 (2008), 19–39, available at < http://pcl.stanford.edu/ research/2009/iyengar-redmedia-bluemedia.pdf>. Oxford Business Group, 2006: 147. Sakr, 2004: 130. Russell E. Lucas, ‘Monarchial Authoritarianism: Survival and Political Liberalization in a Middle Eastern Regime Type’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 36.1 (2004), 103–119. Sakr, 2004: 130. Rugh, 2004: 100–102. Rugh, 2004: 100–102. Sakr, 2004: 130. Nazir and Tomppert, 2005: 135. Sakr, 2004: 133. Sakr, 2004: 133. Hanley, 2002: 52–55. Sakr, 2004: 133. Sakr, 2004: 135. Rubin, 2003: 105–107. Al-Mughni, 2003: 171–174. Murphy, 1990. Al-Mughni, 2003: 171–174.

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Moghissi, 2005: 86–88. Sakr, 2004: 135–137. Moghissi, 2005: 86–88. Sakr, 2004: 136–138. These became more than just allegations in 2007, when Sheikh Ali Al-Khalifa was accused of corruption whilst Oil Minister. The prosecution foundered due to lack of evidence. Sources include: Caryle Murphy, ‘Kuwait Accuses Ex-Official in Kickback Scheme’, Washington Post, 9 Jan. 1994, n.p., available at ; A. Saleh, ‘Al-Khalifa Won’t Face Graft Charges’, Kuwait Times, 31 Oct. 2007, n.p., available at ; Zaki Taleb, ‘Targeting the Minister Who Hails from the Ruling Family is Dangerous’, Arab Times, 27 May 2007, n.p., available at . Sakr, 2004: 135. Rizzo, 2005: 60–61. Nazir and Tomppert, 2005: 135. Sakr, 2004: 135. Sakr, 2004: 135. ‘Kuwait Rejects Political Rights for Women’, 1999. Ilene R. Prusher, ‘Kuwaiti Women Seek Right to Vote’, Christian Science Monitor, 8 Aug. 2000, n.p., available at . Haya Al-Mughni and Mary Ann Tétreault, ‘Citizenship, Gender and the Politics of Quasi-States’, in Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, ed. Suad Joseph (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 254–256. ‘Kuwait: The Struggle for Women’s Suffrage’, Online Women in Politics (n.d.), available at . Eleanor Abdella Doumato and Marsha Pripstein Posusney, Women and Globalization in the Arab Middle East: Gender, Economy, and Society (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 159. John Howard, ‘Democracy in Kuwait Not for Women’, Converge (2 Dec. 1999), n.p., available at .

298

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53

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Howard, 1999. Rabéa Naciri, ‘The Women’s Movement in the Maghreb: With Emphasis on Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria’, Al-Raida, 20.100 (Winter 2003), 20–28, at 27; Sabika Muhammad al-Najjar, ‘The Feminist Movement in the Gulf’, Al-Raida, 20.100 (Winter 2003), 29–33. Deborah L. Wheeler, The Internet in the Middle East: Global Expectations and Local Imagination in Kuwait (Syracuse: SUNY Press, 2005), 128–130. Marina Ottaway and Julia Choucair-Vizoso, Beyond the Façade: Political Reform in the Arab World (New York: SUNY Press, 2008), 214–216. W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz, Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 138–142. The public relations company had to include better rights for women as part of the campaign in an attempt to point out that Kuwait was not a ‘typical’ Gulf State. Hill+Knowlton built a campaign for support based upon half-truths, in an attempt to garner public and political support: Bennett and Paletz, 2004: 138–142. Miller, 1991: n.p. Hilal Kashan, ‘History’s Burden’, American University of Beirut (n.d.), available at . Translated from the original Arabic source: Huquq al-Insan fi’I-Khalij al-’Arabi, Al-Lajna ad-Duwaliya li-Huquq alInsan fi’l-Khalij wa’I-Jazira al’Arabiya (1994), 5. Feldman, 2007: 16. Ray Moseley, ‘Postwar Kuwait’s Changed for the Better But It’s Still No Paragon of Democracy’, Chicago Tribune, 20 Oct. 1994, n.p. ‘Kuwait Women Isolated: Only Men Allowed to Choose Leaders’, Sun Sentinel [Fort Lauderdale, FL, syndicated from Associated Press], 3 Oct. 1992, n.p. Neil MacFarquhar, ‘Shaky Kuwait tries to Recover: Shadow of Hussein Darkens the Return of Luxury Living’, Chicago Tribune, 1 Aug. 1992, 9. Sakr, 2004: 135. Sakr, 2004. Natasha Walter, ‘The Struggle for Suffrage in Kuwait’, Buzzle (2003), n.p., available at .

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73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81

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Wheeler, 2005: 129–133. Allison H. Fine, Momentum: Igniting Social Change in the Connected Age (New York: Wiley & Sons, 2006), 59–73. Michael Edwards, Civil Society (2nd edn, Cambridge: Polity, 2009), 76. Nazir and Tomppert, 2005: 135. Lawrence Pintak, ‘Arab News Media in the Vortex of Change’, in The Real (Arab) World: Is Reality TV Democratizing the Middle East? (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2006), 300–304. Sakr, 2004: 135–138. Wayne Wanta, Guy Golan and Cheolhan Lee, ‘Agenda Setting and International News: Media Influence on Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations’, J&MC Quarterly, 81.2 (Summer 2004), 364–377. Paul R. Brewer, Joseph Graf and Lars Willnat, ‘Priming or Framing? Media Influence on Attitudes towards Foreign Countries’, Gazette: The International Journal for Communication Studies, 65.6 (2003), 493–508, available at . Nicholas D. Kristof, ‘Running for the Exits’, New York Times, 18 Apr. 2003, n.p. Gerry Northram, ‘Kuwait’s Pampered Economy’, BBC News, 27 Feb. 2001, n.p., available at . Dresch and Piscatori, 2005: 220–223. Sakr, 2004: 135–138. Admon, 2005. Al-Mughni and Tétreault, 2000: 256–264. Admon, 2005. Sakr, Women and Media, 2004: 135–138. Admon, 2005. Souheila Al-Jaada, ‘According to Islamic Shari’a, Women Do Not Have Political Rights’, Daily Star [London], 12 May 2005, n.p. Omar Hassan, ‘Kuwaiti Women One Step Away from their Political Rights’, Middle East Online, 9 Mar. 2005, n.p., available at . Marwan Kraidy, ‘Idioms of Contention: Star Academy in Lebanon and Kuwait’, in Arab Media and Political Renewal: Community, Legitimacy and Public Life, ed. Naomi Sakr (London: I.B.Tauris, 2006), 44–55.

300

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Marwan Kraidy, ‘Reality Television and Politics in the Arab World: Preliminary Observations’, Arab Media and Society (formerly TBS Journal) (Fall 2003), n.p., available at . Kraidy, 2006: 44–55. Hila Raz, ‘Arab Television Landscape Report’, Islam, Media and the West (Dec. 2009), available at . Naomi Sakr, Democratisation in the Arab World Media and Women, Directorate B, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, European Parliament, Strasburg (2004), 6, available at . Kraidy, 44–55. Marwan M. Kraidy, ‘Star Academy as Arab Political Satire’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 40 (2008), 369–371, available at . ‘Kuwait, Egypt: Censors Pull Plug on Shows that Mock Politicians’, Los Angeles Times, 10 Sep. 2009, n.p., available at . ‘Egypt Races Kuwait in Banning TV Shows Criticizing Ministers and Officials now in the Red Zone’, Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, 31 Aug. 2009, available at . ‘Kuwait, Egypt’, 2009. Reporters Without Borders, Reporters Without Borders Annual Report 2007 – Kuwait (UNHCR, 1 Feb. 2007), n.p., available at . Kraidy, 2006: 44–55. Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2009 – Kuwait’ (New York: United Nations, 16 July 2009), n.p., available at .

NOTES

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IREX, ‘Media Sustainability Index 2006/2007: The Development of Sustainable Independent Media in the Middle East and North Africa’, IREX (2007), 157–158, available at . IREX, 2007: 158–159. Al-Watan [Kuwait] (17 Aug. 2008), available at ; ‘Government-Appointed Kuwaiti Preacher: Europeans are Immoral, Unclean, and Cowardly’, MEMRI (16 Sep. 2008), available at . Pepe Esacobar, ‘When Stereotypes Collide’, Asia Times, 13 Feb. 2003, n.p., available at . Francesco Cavatorta, ‘Alternative Lessons from the “Algerian Scenario”’, Perspectives on Terrorism, 2.1 (2008), n.p., available at .

Chapter 6: Sponsors and Factions of the Kuwaiti Women’s Rights Movement 1 2

3 4 5 6

7

Yazbeck Haddad and Esposito, 1998: 203. Howard Schneider, ‘Kuwait at Odds on Women’s Rights Issues’, Washington Post Online, 5 Dec. 1999, n.p., available at . Emile F. Sahliyeh, Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World (New York: SUNY Press, 1990), 212–214. Tétreault and Al-Mughni, 2000: 144. Ghabra, 2001: 23–26. David Hirst, ‘Kuwait Stalls on Votes for Women’, The Guardian [London], Wednesday, 24 Nov. 1999, n.p., available at . UN-ESCWA, Youth Employment in the ESCWA Region United Nations, paper prepared for the Youth Employment Summit, Alexandria, Egypt, 7–11 Sep. 2002, 2–5, available at . Deborah Wheeler offers an excellent synopsis of the way in which the internet is changing Kuwait society: Deborah L. Wheeler, ‘The Internet and Youth Subculture in Kuwait’, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 8.2 (2003), n.p., available at . UN-ESCWA, 2002. Elisabeth Porter, ‘Long-Term Peacebuilding: Where are the Women?’ Centre for Peace, Conflict and Mediation in the Asia-Pacific Project (Aug. 2007), n.p., available at ; Yousef H. Al-Ebraheem, ‘Kuwait’s Economic Travails’, Middle East Quarterly, 3.3 (Sep. 1996), n.p., available at . F. Rokni and A. Poladian, ‘Arab Women Viewpoints with Respect to their Participation in Social Development in the Society’, Journal of Applied Sciences, 9.7 (2009), 1293–1300. Cavatorta, 2008: n.p. Timmerman, 1996.

13 14 15

Feldman, 2007: 16. Al-Mekaimi, 2008: 58. Feldman, 2007: 16.

16

Wendy Kristianasen, ‘Kuwait’s Islamists: Unofficially Official’, Le Monde Diplomatique, 6 Apr. 2002, n.p., available at . UNDP-RBAS, The Arab Human Development Report 2005: Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 82–85. Jehl, n.d. Berkowitz, 2004. Mubarak was a Professor of Political Science at Kuwait University, a government minister and a current MP. Glasser, 2003, n.d. Doumato and Posusney, 2003: 228. Crystal, 1989: 429. Glasser, 2003. Tétreault and Al-Mughni, 2000: 144–146. Al-Mekaimi, 2008: 57–60.

8 9

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18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

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29

30 31 32 33

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38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

47 48 49 50 51 52

303

Ahmad, 2005. Omar Hasan, ‘Kuwait’s Islamists Vow to Thwart Women’s Rights’, Middle East Online, 2 Mar. 2005, n.p., available at . Omar Hasan, ‘Kuwait’s Islamists Threaten Vow to Thwart Women’s Rights’, Middle East Online, (2 Mar. 2005), n.p., available at . Admon, 2005. Admon, 2005. Wheeler, 2005: 166–168. Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad’, Middle East Policy, 8.4 (Dec. 2001), 18–38, available at . Al-Mekaimi, 2008: 58. Al-Mekaimi, 2008: 58. Ahmad, 2005. Paul Salem, ‘Politics in a Participatory Emirate’, in Beyond the Façade: Political Reform in the Arab World, ed. Marina Ottaway and Julia Choucair-Vizoso (New York: SUNY Press, 2008), 228. Salem, 2008: 7. ‘Kuwaiti Women Refused the Vote’, 1999. ‘Kuwaiti Women Refused the Vote’, 1999. Moran, 2006. Admon, 2005. Al-Mekaimi, 2008: 8. Admon, 2005. Katulis, 2005: 9. Mary Ann Tétreault, ‘A State of Two Minds: State Cultures, Women, and Politics in Kuwait’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 33 (2001), 203–220. Tétreault, 2001: 205–210. Yazbeck Haddad and Esposito, 1998: 200. Dresch and Piscatori, 2005: 216–218. Sakr, 2004: 135–136. Brown, 2002: 130–134. Brown, ‘Moving out of Kuwait’s Political Impasse’, 2007.

304

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57 58

59

60 61

62

63

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Yazbeck Haddad and Esposito, 1998: 200–201. Salem, 2008: 228. Katzman, 2009: 6. DRL, Near East and Africa: Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The US Record 2006 (Washington: US Department of State, 2006), n.p., available at . Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 2001 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2001), 361. Andrew F. Tully, ‘US: Comments Raise Specter of Religious Clash within Terror War’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 20 Oct. 2003, n.p., available at . US GAO, Information on US Agencies’ Efforts to Address Islamic Extremism (Washington DC: United States Government Accountability Office, Sep. 2005), 5–12, available at . Mary Ann Tétreault, ‘Advice and Dissent in Kuwait’, Middle East Report, 226 (Spring 2003), 36–39. ‘Still Kuwaiting’, Ms. Magazine (28 Mar. 2000), n.p., available at . This provides an example of a story criticizing the reluctance of the Kuwaiti government to grant women the vote. Kathy Davis, ‘Feminist Body/Politics as World Traveller: Translating Our Bodies, Ourselves’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 9.3 (2002), 223–247, at 233–234. Sharon Smith, ‘Using Women’s Rights to Sell Washington’s War’, International Socialist Review, 21 (2002), n.p., available at < http:// www.isreview.org/issues/21/afghan_women.shtml>. Esacobar, 2003. Salem, 2008: 228. ‘Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad Al-Sabah: Statement by the President’, Republican National Convention Blog (16 Jan. 2006), n.p., available at . Salem, 2008: 227.

NOTES

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69 70

71

72 73

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75 76 77 78

79 80 81

305

Jim VandeHei, ‘First Lady Speaks on Women’s Rights’, Washington Post (21 May 2005), n.p., available at . Admon, 2005. Sarah Alzouman, ‘Youth Producers to Shape Future of Arab Media’, Kuwait Times, 5 Mar. 2009, n.p., available at . UN-ICCPR, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee – Kuwait, CCPR//CO/69/KWT (New York: United Nations, 27 July 2006), available at . Full text versions of all UN CEDAW reports are available at: . UN, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (New York: United Nations, Jan. 2004), Supplement no. 38 A/59/38, 12–30, available at . One example of which can be found at: Moez Doraid, ‘Kuwait – United Nations Resident Coordinator Annual Report 2005’, United Nations, ORG/141/1/1-RC (19 Feb. 2006), available at .This is a progress report from the Resident Coordinator for UN Operational Activities for Development in Kuwait to the Secretary General, Kofi Annan. Associated Press, ‘Kuwait Attacks Injure 54’, Youngstown Vindicator, 12 Dec. 2003, 1, 9. Web. Hunt, 2005: 251–271. Hunt, 2005: 251–271. Ragui Assaad and Farzaneh Roudi-Fahimi, ‘Youth in the Middle East and North Africa: Demographic Opportunity of Challenge?’ Population Reference Bureau (Apr. 2007), 1–5, available at . Salem, 2008: 228. Salem, 2008: 231. Omar Hasan, ‘Young Kuwaitis Turn “Orange”’, Middle East Online, 29 May 2006, available at .

306

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86 87

88 89 90

91 92 93

94 95

96

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Doumato and Posusney, 2003: 227. Brown, 2002. Katzman, 2009: 3–4. Brian Whitaker, ‘Vote Buying Mars Kuwait Poll First’, The Age [Australia], 30 June 2006, n.p., available at . The National Democratic Alliance are the liberal minority bloc in the National Assembly. Adnaan Wasey, ‘Women’s Suffrage, Reformist Victory Mark Kuwaiti Elections’, PBS Newshour, 30 June 2006, n.p., available at . Wasey, 2006. Wasey, 2006. Ben Rivard, Q80 Dictator [weblog entry] (June 2006), n.p., available at . Ben’s blog is typical of the activity surrounding the 2006 electoral reforms, and a sign that young Kuwaitis and ex-pats are showing their dissatisfaction with the stagnation and oppression of the older generation of politicians and police. . Doumato and Posusney, 2003: 227. . After Grade Eight, students can elect to take vocational-, religiousor academic-based lessons. Wheeler, 2003. Deborah L. Wheeler, ‘The Internet and Political Change in Kuwait’, Middle East Channel (15 Apr. 2010), n.p., available at . Global Youth Action Network, ‘Arab Youth and WPAY, Challenges and Success 1995–2005: A Regional Overview’, United Nations Report, coordinated by Mohammed H. Al-Ghanim (New York: United Nations, 28 Apr. 2005), available at . Wasey, 2006.

NOTES

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107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119

307

Mary Ann Tétreault, ‘Terrorist Violence in Kuwait’, Foreign Policy in Focus (30 Sep. 2005), n.p., available at . Rashid Bashir, ‘Wanted: A National Labor Force: Labor Policies and Youth Unemployment in the Gulf Region’, A Middle East Point of View (Nov. 2010), 15, available at . Doumato and Posusney, 2003: 227–229. ‘High in the Gulf’, The Economist (26 Feb. 1998), n.p., available at . Sara Mourad, ‘Studying Youth in the Arab World’, The Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at AUB the Goethe Institute (13–14 Jan. 2009), 4, available at . Tétreault and Al-Mughni, 2000: 160. Mary Ann Tétreault, Stories of Democracy: Politics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 18–38. Samir Dasgupta, The Changing Face of Globalization (London: Sage, 2004), 234–235. Eyüp Zengìn and Ali Askerov, ‘State Formation and Oil: Kuwait and Qatar’ (Qafqaz University, n.d.), available at . Crystal, 1990: 13–17. Tétreault, 2001: 203–207. Oxford Business Group, The Report: Kuwait 2008 (Oxford: Oxford Business Group, 2008), 119–120. Glasser, 2003. Routledge, 2004: 618. Birks and Rimmer, 1984: 4; Al-Qudsi and Shah, 1990: 213, 246. Salem, 2008: 227–229. Al-Mughni, 2003: 170. Berkowitz, 2004. Moghissi, 2005: 322–324. Al-Mughni, 2003: 171–175. Professor of Clinical Psychology at Kuwait University and a board member of the Women’s Cultural Social Society. Lewis, 2006.

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120 Al-Mughni, 2003: 171–175. 121 Lea Terhune, ‘Kuwaiti Women Remain Determined after Landmark Election’ (Washington DC: America.gov, 30 June 2006), available at . 122 Amani Alessa, ‘Specializing in Feminism in the Middle East’, KVInfo (2009), 3, available at . 123 Lewis, 2006. 124 Yvonne Galligan, ‘Bringing Women In: Global Strategies for Gender Parity in Political Representation’, University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class (Fall 2006), 321–326, available at . 125 A good synopsis of the plans for the growth of this bloc can be downloaded at: . 126 Laila Ali, ‘Political Bloc to Endorse Women Candidates’, Gulf News, 10 Mar. 2008, n.p., available at . 127 Ali, 2008. 128 Hunt, 2005: 6–8. 129 Tétreault and Al-Mughni, 2000: 160–164. 130 Fakhno, ‘Gulf Region’, 2005: 6–7. 131 Asghar Ali Engineer and Asgharali Engineer, The Qurʼan, Women, and Modern Society (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd, 2005), 5–10. 132 Jehl. 133 Fact Sheet Series, ‘Behind the Bars: Palestinian Women in Israeli Prisons’, Arab League Online (Aug. 2008), available at . 134 ‘Businesswomen Federation Head’, 2006. 135 Louër, 2008: 59–64. 136 Salem, 2008: 228. 137 Al-Mughni, 2003: 171–175. 138 Feldman, 2007: 8–14.

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139 Al-Mughni, 2003: 171–175. 140 Margot Badran, ‘Exploring Islamic Feminism’, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (n.d.), available at . 141 Lily Zakiyah Munir, ‘Women, Islam and Human Security’, Center for Pesantren and Democracy Studies (CEPDES), Indonesia (n.d.), available at . 142 Yoginder Sikand, ‘Understanding Islamic Feminism: Interview with Ziba Mir-Hosseini’, Arab News Blog (10 Feb. 2010), n.p., available at . 143 Sula Al-Naqueeb, ‘Indigenous Feminism’, Global Feminine (4 Jan. 2010), n.p., available at . 144 Munir, n.d.: 5. 145 Farina, 1998: 144–162. 146 Nayereh Tohidi, ‘Islamic Feminism: Perils and Promises’, Middle Eastern Women on the Move, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2003), available at . 147 Tohidi, 2003: 3–7. 148 Mary Ann Tétreault and Mohammed Al-Ghanim, ‘The Day After “Victory”: Kuwait’s 2009 Election and the Contentious Present’, Middle East Report Online (8 July 2009), n.p., available at . 149 UNICEF, Summary Record of the 489th Meeting: Kuwait, CRC/C/ SR.48.9 (New York: United Nations, 2 Oct. 1998), available at .

Chapter 7: The Future: Challenges, Expectations and Opportunities 1 2

Al-Mughni, 2003: 170. This decree did not receive the support of the National Assembly, but is commonly regarded as the point at which emancipation became inevitable.

310

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6 7

8

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11

12

13

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Brian Whitaker, ‘Suffrage and Slow Motion in Kuwait’, The Guardian [London], 30 June 2006, n.p., available at . Tétreault, 2001: 203–220. Nathan J. Brown. ‘Pushing toward Party Politics? Kuwait’s Islamic Constitutional Movement’, Carnegie Papers: Middle East Series, 79 (Jan. 2007), 5–11. Salem, 2008: 228. ‘Salafism Rising in Mideast’, Kuwait Times, 20 Oct. 2008, available at . Amy Hawthorne, ‘Is Civil Society the Answer?’ in Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East, ed. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2005). Jehl, n.d. Thomas Erdbrink, ‘A Polarized Iran Prepares to Go to Polls’, Washington Post, 12 June 2009, n.p., available at . Nawara Fattahova, ‘Al-Shaya Focuses on Tackling Youth Unemployment’, Kuwait Times, 9 May 2008, n.p., available at . This idea of holistic security is based upon the work of Anderlini and Swanee Hunt, and places women at the heart of conflict resolution. The fight for women’s rights is not over, but is now integral to the fight for human rights, a process called ‘Inclusive Security’. Ernest Harsch, ‘Security Reform Key to Protecting Women’, Africa Renewal, 23.4 (Jan. 2010), n.p., available at . Joost R. Hiltermann. ‘The Women’s Movement during the Uprising’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 20.3 (1991), 48–52. Abdullah Al-Shayeji, ‘A Democratic Model in Trouble’, Arab Reform Bulletin (3 Feb. 2009), n.p., available at . Abdullah Al Shayeji, ‘Beyond Women’s Suffrage’, Arab Reform Bulletin, Carnegie Endowment (20 Aug. 2008), n.p., available at .

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Nathan Brown, ‘Moving out of Kuwait’s Political Impasse’, Carnegie Endowment (June 2009), available at . Michele Dunne, ‘Women’s Political Participation in the Gulf: A Conversation with Activists Fatin Bundagji (Saudi Arabia), Rola Dashti (Kuwait), Munira Fakhro (Bahrain)’, Arab Reform Bulletin, Carnegie Endowment (12 Aug. 2008), n.p., available at . NDI, ‘Kuwait: Citizen’s Perceptions of Women in Politics’, NDI Focus Group (Feb. 2007), 15, available at . Muna Al-Fuzai, ‘Tribalism’s Effect on Kuwait’, Kuwait Times, 22 Apr. 2009, n.p., available at . Dunne, 2008. Dunne, 2008. UNDP-RBAS, 2006: 84–88. provides an example of one such initiative, designed to empower women and grant them economic freedom. Rasha Dewadar, ‘The Untold Story of Women’s Rights in Egypt’, Daily Star [Lebanon], 14 Apr. 2010, n.p., available at . Deborah Wheeler, ‘Blessings and Curses: Women and the Internet Revolution in the Arab World’, in Women and Media in the Middle East: Power through Self-Expression, ed. Naomi Sakr (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004), 138–142. Dunne, 2008. Clement M. Henry and Robert Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 30–62. Herb, 2005: 12–13. Kristianasen, 2002. An interviewee in an Al Jazeera interview reported that many Kuwaiti traditionalists threatened to divorce their wives if they voted for female candidates. ‘In Kuwait Election, Women Press for

312

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35 36

37

38

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Change’ [video], Al Jazeera, 17 May 2009, available at . Kristianasen, 2009. Tétreault, 2001: 205–211. Nathan J. Brown, ‘Kuwait’s 2008 Parliamentary Elections: A Setback for Democratic Islamism?’ Carnegie Endowment (May 2008), 2–8, available at . Global Youth Action Network, 2005. Badrya Darwish, ‘Good Scenario, Bad Scenario’, Kuwait Times, 14 Oct. 2009, n.p., available at . This particular debate is being played out across the Gulf region and is an example of how Islamists are constantly probing and pressing for weaknesses. Kelly Theobold, ‘Women’s Rights Changing in Kuwait’, Upstart, 2 Nov. 2009, n.p., available at ; ‘Kuwaiti MP Seeks to Scrap Shari’a Controls in Election Law’, Associated Press, 11 Oct. 2009, n.p., available at . Theobold, 2009; ‘Kuwait to Allow Women to Travel without Husband’s Consent’, Voice of America, 21 Oct. 2009, n.p., available at . Katzman, 2009: 2. James Calderwood, ‘Kuwait’s Islamists Back on their Feet’, Middle East Online (26 May 2010), n.p., available at . Calderwood, 2010. Augustus Richard Norton et al., 1997. This is built upon the current United Resolutions 1325 and 1888, which promote a broad approach to women’s rights and their place in a holistic approach. A good summary of these documents can be found at: Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, Judy El-Bushra and Sarah Maguire, ‘The Conceptual Framework: Security, Peace, Accountability and Rights’, Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit

NOTES

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46 47

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for Advocacy and Action (2004), 5–14, available at . Whitaker, 2006. Eran Segal, ‘Kuwait Parliamentary Elections: Women Making History’, Tel Aviv Notes, Moshe Dayan Center (10 June 2009), 2–6, available at . Dunne, 2008. Segal, 2009: 2–6. Al Jazeera carried a news item relating the reasons behind the success of women in the 2009 election. In the course of the interview, Rola Dashti and Aseel Al Alwahi highlighted the challenges faced by female representatives in the National Assembly. ‘Kuwait Votes for Women and Change’ [Video], Al Jazeera, 17 May 2009, available at . Personal communication, 2010. Tétreault and Al-Mughni, 2000: 162; Doumato and Posusney, 2003: 228. Al Jazeera reports one such example of the political inertia adversely affecting the markets. ‘Political Infighting Disrupts Kuwait’s Markets’ [Video], Al Jazeera, 15 May 2009, available at . Feldman, 2007: 16. Brown, 2009. NDI, 2007: 15. Brown, 2009. One member of the ruling family, Talal Nasser Al-Sabah, was sentenced to death for dealing drugs, a sign that the name no longer guarantees immunity from judicial process. Raed Rafei, ‘A Royal Death Sentence in Kuwait’, Los Angeles Times, 12 Aug. 2008, n.p., available at . Michael Herb, ‘A Nation of Bureaucrats: Political Participation and Economic Diversification in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 41 (2009), 375–395. ‘Kuwait Appoints New PM’, 2003: n.p. Nathan Brown, ‘The Beginning of Real Politics in Kuwait?’, Arab Reform Bulletin, Carnegie Endowment (13 Aug. 2008),

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n.p., available at .] Salem, 2008: 228. Al Shayeji, 2008. Hesham al-Awadi, ‘Kuwait: New Faces, Same Potential for Trouble’, Arab Reform Bulletin, Carnegie Endowment (2 June 2009), n.p., available at . M. More, ‘Islamist Parties and Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 19.3 (July 2008), 5–6. Al Shayeji, 2008. Brown, 2008. Brown, 2008. Reducing the number of electoral districts, from 25 small districts, each returning two members, to five larger ones returning ten members, should prevent and dissuade powerful candidates from gerrymandering the electorate. Ghanim Al-Najjar, ‘Struggle over Parliament’, Arab Reform Bulletin (18 Aug. 2008), n.p., available at . ‘Arab Women Score High on Internet Use’, Khaleej Times, 14 June 2010, n.p., available at . Wheeler, 2003. Brown, 2009. Wheeler, 2003. Ricky Laxa, ‘Censorship in Kuwait: Weakening Development or Justified Based on Tradition?’ Al Watan Daily, 14 Feb. 2010, n.p. Sakr, 2004: 6. US Department of State, Kuwait: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Washington DC: US Department of State, 23 Feb. 2001), n.p., available at . Crystal, 1990: 13–17. Gassan Al-Kibsi, Claus Benkert and Jörg Schubert, ‘Getting Labor Policy to Work in the Gulf’, McKinsey Quarterly (Feb. 2007),

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available at . Deborah Wheeler, ‘New Technologies, Old Culture: A Look at Women, Gender and the Internet in Kuwait’, in Culture, Technology, Communication: Towards an Intercultural Global Village, ed. Chris Ess and Fay Sudweeks (New York: SUNY Press, 2001), 194–199. Lucy Donkin, ‘Crafts and Conservation Synthesis Report for ICCROM’, ICCROM (Feb. 2004), 24–32, available at . Wheeler, 2001: 194–199. UNDP-RBAS, 2006. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, ‘The Construction of Gender in Islamic Legal Thought: Strategies for Reform’, Dawrah Fiqh Concerning Women (n.d.), available at . Munir, n.d. Valentine M. Moghadam, ‘Transnational Feminist Networks: Collective Action in an Era of Globalization’, International Sociology, 15.1 (Mar. 2000), 57–85, at 62, available at . Haya Abdulrahman Al-Mughni, ‘The Politics of Women’s Suffrage in Kuwait’, Arab Reform Bulletin (20 Aug. 2008), n.p., available at . Fernea, 1998: 144–162. Tara Ahmadinejad, ‘The Future of Women in Kuwaiti Politics’, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 24.7 (Sep./Oct. 2005), 65–66. Al Shayeji, 2008. Munir, n.d. Nazi Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (Oxford: Routledge, 1991), 38. Ayubi, 1991: 38–39. Helen Rizzo, Katherine Meyer and Yousef Ali, ‘Women’s Political Rights: Islam, Status and Networks in Kuwait’, Sociology, 36.3 (Aug. 2002), 639–662, at 643–645, available at .

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92 93 94 95 96

97 98

99 100 101 102 103

104 105

106 107 108

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Personal communication, 2009. Professor Al-Khader is the President of the Committee on Social Sciences at the College of Graduate Studies at Kuwait University. Personal communication, 2009. Nazir and Tomppert, 2005: 126–130. Personal communication, 2010. Tétreault and Al-Mughni, 2000: 158. Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, Women Building Peace: What They Do, Why It Matters (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007). Nazir and Tomppert, 2005: 126–130. Henry M. Bowles, ‘Kuwait’s Women’s Rights Pioneer Talks Religion and the Future’, Kuwait Times, 30 Nov. 2007, n.p., available at . Munir, n.d.: 6–13. Augustus Richard Norton et al., 1997: n.p.; Timmerman, 1996. Al-Mughni, 2003: 179. Katulis, 2005: 9. Hussain Al-Qatari, ‘The Rhetoric of Gender Divide at the Workplace Picks Up’, Kuwait Times, 18 Sep. 2009, n.p., available at . Al-Qatari, 2009. Lee Glendinning, ‘Workplace Disagreements’, SMH, 7 June 2002, n.p., available at . Al-Qatari, 2009. Al-Qatari, 2009. Duraid Al-Baik, ‘Kuwait Talks to Tackle Socio-Economic Issues’, Gulf News, 29 Mar. 2008, n.p., available at . Kuwait, like many GCC states, is beset by high inflation and rising unemployment. This, alongside the economic problems in Dubai, needs immediate attention; there is no time for endless bickering in the National Assembly. Al-Qatari, 2009. Rory Miller and Meshal Al-Sabah, ‘Gulf Women in the Workforce are Key to Nationalisation’, The National, 6 Dec. 2009, available at

NOTES

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. Richard Spencer, ‘Kuwaiti Women MPs Refuse to Wear Hijab in Parliament’, The Telegraph [London], 12 Oct. 2009, n.p., available at . Chidi Emmanuel, ‘To Veil or Not to Veil? Kuwait Women Face Off’, Kuwait Times, 29 Jan. 2010, n.p., available at . Freedom House, 2009. Personal communication, 2010. Personal communication, 2010. Al-Mughni, 2003: 169–171. Haya Al-Mughni, ‘Special Report Section – Kuwait’, Freedom House (2009), 5–9, available at . Al-Mughni, 2009: 5–9. Martin Godfrey, Martin Ruhs, Nasra Shah and Monica Smith, ‘Migrant Domestic Workers in Kuwait: Findings Based on a Field Survey and Additional Research’, in Gender and Migration in Arab States, ed. Simel Esim and Monica Smith (Beirut: ILO, June 2004), 8–10, available at . This report contains a scathing assessment about the poor working conditions of many female domestic workers in Kuwait. Of course, male migrant workers are equally ill-used, an issue that Kuwait must address in the coming years.

Chapter 8: The Long Road to Success: Women in Kuwaiti Politics 1991–2009 1

2

Embassy of Kuwait, ‘Kuwaiti Woman’, Embassy of Kuwait, Australia (n.d.), n.p., available at . Feldman, 2007: 16.

318

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4 5 6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

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Al-Mubarak is a former faculty member who specialized in international relations and law at Kuwait University; she was later a minister and MP. Ghaffari, 2005. . Al-Mughni, 2003: 170, Freedom House, n.d. Al-Mughni, ‘All Roads Lead to the Franchise’, 2001: 1. Walid Al-Tabtabae, a vociferous traditionalist former MP in the Kuwaiti Parliament, became well known for his vehement opposition to women’s rights. He became the voice of the conservative hardliners within Kuwait. Prusher, 2000. Prusher, 2000. Feldman, 2007: 29. Al-Mughni, 2002: 1–3. Al-Mughni, 2001: 3. DRL, 2002. Vulin, 2004. Personal communication, 2010. Al-Mughni, 2001: 3. Lubna Al-Kazi, ‘Strategies for Change’, Vital Voices (n.d.), available at . Mary Ann Tétreault and Haya Al-Mughni, ‘Modernization and its Discontents: State and Gender in Kuwait’, Middle East Journal, 49.3 (Summer 1995), 403–417, at 403. Al-Mekaimi, 2008: 8. Al-Mughni, 2001: 3. Mary Ann Tétreault, ‘Kuwait’s Parliament Considers Women’s Political Rights, Again’, News and Opinion. William Bowles, 2 Sep. 2004, n.p., available at . Tétreault and Al-Mughni, 1995: 403. Carnegie Endowment, n.d. Paul Aarts, ‘Post-War Kuwait and the Process of Democratization: The Persistence of Political Tribalism’, in Change and Development

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in the Gulf, ed. Abbas Abdelkarim (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 229. Al-Mughni, 2003: 183. Al-Mughni and Tétreault, 2000: 268. Al-Mekaimi, 2008: 4. Tétreault, 2004. Aarts, 1999: 230. Aarts, 1999: 230. Al-Mughni, 2001: 3. UN-ESCWA, 2002: 2–5. Al-Mughni, 2001. Al-Mughni, 2001. Tétreault and Al-Mughni, 2000: 159. Doumato and Posusney, 2003: 159. Al-Mughni, 2001. Ashraf Foad, ‘Kuwait Delays Historic Women’s Rights Vote’, Islamic Daily, 9 Nov. 1999, n.p., available at . Personal communication, 2010. Ghabra, 2001: 23–26. Vulin, 2004. Yazbeck Haddad and Esposito, 1998: 194–195. UNDP, 2004: 2; NDI, 2007: 15. Vulin, 2004. Feldman, 2007: 16. Amy Hawthorne, ‘Women Run in Qatar’s First Municipal Elections’, Elections Today (June 1999), 6. Prusher, 2000. Ghaffari, 2005. NDI, 2007: 16. NDI, 2007: 16. Doumato and Posusney, 2003: 230–232. Tétreault and Al-Mughni, 2000: 162–164. AWID, ‘Feminism in Kuwait: A Report on the Struggle for Women’s Political Participation’, AWID (15 May 2005), n.p., available at . Prusher, 2000.

320

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Foad, 1999. Governance World Watch, ‘Kuwaiti Woman Gets Some Ministerial Duties’, Reuters, Dec. 1999, 19, available at . Al-Kazi, n.d. Prusher, 2000. Prusher, 2000. Al-Mughni, 2003: 185–187. Al-Mughni, 2001. Tétreault, 2004. Ghaffari, 2005. Ghaffari, 2005. Rizzo, 2005: 54–58. Vulin, 2004. Vulin, 2004. Feldman, 2007: 15–18. Al-Kazi, n.d. Thomas Friedman, ‘Bahrain Takes Step Towards Democracy’, Gadsden Times, 1 Nov. 2002, A4. Al-Kazi, n.d. Al-Kazi, n.d. Prusher, 2000. Al-Kazi, n.d. Al-Kazi, n.d. ‘Kuwait Women Protest for Voting Rights’, The Telegraph [Calcutta], 8 Mar. 2005, n.p., available at . Sourced from Reuters. Jehl, n.d. Kelly Machinchick, Kuwaiti Women’s Suffrage Movement Comes to Washington: Vital Voices Panel Discusses Voting Rights for Kuwaiti Women (Washington, DC: US Department of State, Office of International Information Programs, 2 Apr. 2003), n.p., available at . Ghaffari, 2005. Ghaffari, 2005. Al-Mekaimi, 2008: 56–58.

NOTES

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Feldman, 2007. Muslim Public Affairs Council, ‘Kuwaiti Women Gain Right to Vote’ [press release], (24 May 2005), available at . 85 Sadeq, 2005: n.p. 86 Muslim Public Affairs Council, 2005. 87 Atul Aneja, ‘Kuwaiti Women Get Political Rights’, The Hindu, 18 May 2005, n.p., available at . 88 Muslim Public Affairs Council, 2005. 89 ‘Kuwaiti Women’s Vote: Your Reaction’, BBC News, 20 May 2005, n.p., available at . 90 ‘Kuwaiti Women’s Vote’, 2005. 91 Aneja, 2005. 92 Muslim Public Affairs Council, 2005. 93 Hassan M. Fattah, ‘First Time Out, Kuwaiti Women Become a Political Force’, New York Times, 26 June 2006, n.p., available at . 94 Muslim Public Affairs Council, 2005. 95 ‘Kuwaiti Women Vote for First Time’, BBC News, 4 Apr. 2006, n.p., available at . 96 Jamie Etheridge, ‘Historic First: Kuwaiti Women Vote, Run’, Christian Science Monitor (5 Apr. 2006), n.p., available at . 97 ‘Kuwaiti Women Vote for First Time’, 2006. 98 ‘Jenan Talks’[blog post], Jewaira’s Boudoir (11 Apr. 2006), n.p., available at . 99 Etheridge, 2006. 100 Mohammed Al-Jazairy, ‘Will Kuwaiti Women Get the Youth Vote’, Asharq Alawsat, 28 June 2006, n.p., available at . 101 Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed, ‘The Impossibility of Women Being Elected in Kuwait’, Al-Arabiya News Channel, Wednesday, 29 Apr. 2009, n.p., available at . 102 Segal, 2009: 2–3.

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NDI, 2005. NDI, 2005. NDI, 2005. ‘Kuwaiti Women Win Parliamentary Seats for 1st Time’, Chosun Ilbo [English edn], 16 May 2009, n.p., available at . ‘Factbox – Key Facts about Kuwait’s Political System’, Reuters, 17 May 2009, n.p., available at . ‘Factbox: Who Are Kuwait’s First Women Lawmakers?’ Reuters, 17 May 2009, n.p., available at ; Francesca Davis Di Piazza, Kuwait in Pictures (2nd edn, Minneapolis: Twenty-First Century Books, 2007), 70. Reuters, ‘Global Advisory Council Members’, Vital Voices (n.d.), n.p., available at . Mark Tran, ‘First Women Elected to Kuwaiti Parliament’, The Guardian [London] (17 May 2009), n.p., available at ; Rania El Gamal and Eman Goma, ‘Kuwait Women Enter Parliament, Deadlock May Not End’, Reuters, 17 May 2009, n.p., available at ; ‘Factbox: Who are Kuwait’s First Women Lawmakers?’, 2009. Abubakar A. Ibrahim and Ben Al-Arfaj, ‘“She” did it … She’s in! 4 Women through in Historic Poll; Kuwait Punishes Islamists … Votes for Change’, Arab Times, 17 May 2009, n.p., available at ; ‘Factbox: Who are Kuwait’s First Women Lawmakers?’, 2009. Shaheen Al-Haddad, ‘Give Kuwaiti Women a Chance’, Kuwait Times, 6 Mar. 2009, n.p. Ibrahim and Al-Arfaj, 2009. Etheridge, 2006. Mashari Al-Zaydi, ‘Four Roses Bloom in Kuwait’, Asharq Alawsat, 23 May 2009, n.p., available at .

NOTES

323

116 Paul Kujawsky, ‘Kuwait Chooses Hope and Change, Too: Four Women Elected to Legislature’, The Examiner, 19 May 2009, n.p., available at . 117 ‘Get the Vote Out for 3rd District Candidate Dr. Aseel Al-Awadhi’, Hilaliya, 13 May 2008, 23, available at . 118 ‘Kuwait Elects First Women MPs’, Al Jazeera, 17 May 2009, n.p., available at . 119 Personal communication, 2009. 120 Personal communication, 2009.

Epilogue 1

2

Andrzej Kapiszewski, ‘Arab versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries’, paper presented at the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, UN/POP/EGM/2006/02 (22 May 2006), 1–8. As discussed in Chapter 5.

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INDEX

Arab–Israeli conflict, 16 Arab League, 16, 43, 185 Arab nationalism, 4, 19 Arab tribes, 11 Arab Women’s Development Society (AWDS), 21–23 Al-Awadhi, Aseel, 245–246 Al-Awadhi, Nabil, 156

education, 2–4, 18–22, 90–92, 100, 111–112 elections 2005, 7, 167 emancipation, 3, 75, 144 employment, 3, 22, 41, 44–45

Al-Barrak, Mussallam, 127 Bedouin, 117, 184, 228 bedun, 15, 198 biological weapons, 30 Britain, 40, 145 Bush, George W., 26, 145, 173

globalization, 177, 198, 216 Gulf region, 1, 7 Bahrain, 46 KSA, 48 Kuwait, 2–5 Oman, 45 Qatar, 48 UAE, 47 Gulf War, 4, 25–32 women’s resistance, 29–34

Faisal, King, 48, fundamentalists, Muslim, 71, 111, 165

colonialism, 10, 20, constitution, 3, 17–18, 49 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 54–55, 85 corruption, 31, 113, 115–117, 125, 132 culture, see society

Herb, Michael, 3, 124

Dashti, Rola, 80–82, 86–88, 185, 245 decree 1999, 6–7, 118 divorce, 22–23, 67, 154, 215, 246

inclusive Security, 43 independence, 3–4, 16–17 Iran–Iraq war, 4, 41, 69, 106 Iraq 4–5, 12, 16, 46 Islam, 181–184 Islamic Feminism, 188–190, 197, 208–209

economy, 13–15, 26, 40–42, 85–91

Al-Jassar, Salwa, 245 361

362

GENDER AND POLITICS IN KUWAIT

Al-Jassem, Mohamed, 108 justice, 53, 221 Kuwait, 2–7, 10–18 labour force, 20, 95 League of Arab States, 16 Legislature, 17, 108 livestock, 27 marriage, 23, 97, 206 minorities, 44, 256 Al-Mubarak, Massouma, 80, 231, 245 Al-Mughni, Haya, 4 Muhammad, Prophet, 19 Al-Mulla, Lulwa, 230, 235 Muslims, see also Islam Sunnis, 50, 68, 106 Shi‘is, 29, 205 nationalism, 4, 223 nomads, 11, 13 Al-Nesef, Sheikha, 6, 38, 152 oil production, 28 opposition, political, 51 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 16 Parliament, 4, 28, 45–46 political parties, 76, 109, 204 politics, see government polygamy, 22–23 reformist, 23–24, 41, 48–50, 61–62

Al-Sabah ruling family, 4, 11–13, 17 Al-Sabah, Abdullah Al-Jaber, 18 Al-Sabah, Abdullah Al-Salem, 105–106 Al-Sabah, Jaber Al-Ahmed, 70, 124–126 Al-Sabah, Latifa Al-Fahad, 23–24, 112 Al-Sabah, Nasser Al-Mohamed, 128–130 Al-Sabah, Rasha, 6, 70, 112, 233 Al-Sabah, Saad Al-Abdullah, 35, 126, 128 Al-Sabah, Sabah Al-Ahmed, 129 schools, 18–21 sheikhs, 117 society, 51, 55, 60 Al-Tabtabae, Walid, 67, 152–153 technology, 47, 88, 174 television, 207, 250 unemployment, 92, 253 United Nations, 22, 94, 160 United States, 40, 46, 119, 145, 172–173 voting, 22, 53, 59 Women’s Cultural and Social Society (WCSS), 10, 21–24 women’s rights, 45, 53–56, 143–144, 157–158, 160, 186–188, 198, 211 youth, 79, 88, 157