Fundamentalisms & the State 0226508838

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THE FUNDAMENTALISM PROJECT

Fundamentalisms and the State Remaking

Polities,

Economies, and Militance

EDITED BY

MARTIN

E.

MARTY

AND R.

SCOTT APPLEBY

Digitized by the Internet Archive in

2012

http://archive.org/details/fundamentalismssOOmart

FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE

The Fundamentalism Project VOLUME 3

FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE

Remaking Polities^

Economies,

and Militance

EDITED BY

Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby

Sponsored by

The American Academy ofArts and

The

Sciences

University of Chicago Press

Chicago and London

Martin

E.

Marty and

R. Scott Appleby direct the Fundamentalism Project. Cone Distinguished Service Professor of the History of

Martv, the Fairfax M.

Modern

Christianity at the University of Chicago,

senior editor of The Christian

is

Century and the author of numerous books, including the multi-volume

American Reliawn,

also published

Modem

by the University of Chicago Press. Applebv,

research associate at the University of Chicago,

a

the author of "Church andAtje

is

Unite!" The Modernist Impulse in American Catholicism.

The

collection

of essays

in this

volume

is

based on

a project

conducted under the

Academy of Arts and Sciences and supported bv a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The opinions expressed are those of the individual authors only, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Academv or the supporting foundation. auspices of the American

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The Universitv of Chicago Press, Ltd., London © 1993 by The University of Chicago All rights reserved. Published

1993

Printed in the United States of America

02 01 00 99 98 97 96 5 4 3 2 ISBN (cloth): 0-226-50883-8 Library of Congress Cataloging-in- Publication Data

Fundamentalisms and the economics

/

state

:

polities, militance, and Marty and R. Scott Appleby

remaking

edited bv Martin E.

;

sponsored bv the American Academv of Arts and Sciences. p.

cm.

— (The Fundamentalism project

;

v.

3)

Includes index. 1.

Fundamentalism.

2.

Religion and

1928II. Appleby, R. Academy of Arts and Sciences. BL238.F83 vol. 3 291'.09'04s—dc20 [291. L77] E.,

©The

.

paper used in

this publication

American National Standard

Scott, IV.

politics.

1956-

.

I.

Marty, Martin

III.

American

Series.

92-14582

CIP

meets the

minimum

for Information Sciences

Printed Library Materials,

requirements of the

— Permanence of Paper

ANSI Z39,48— 1984.

for

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

chapter

l

Introduction

Martin E. Marty and R.

Part

chapter

2

Remaking

1

Scott Appleby

Polities

Introduction: Fundamentalism and Politics

13

John H. Garvey

chapter

3

chapter

4

Fundamentalism and American John H. Garvey

Law

28

Fundamentalism, Ethnicity, and Enclave

50

Steve Bruce

chapter

5

Jewish Fundamentalism and the Charles

CHAPTER 6

Shi'ite

S.

in the Islamic

Said Amir

7

68

Jurisprudence and Constitution

Making

chapter

Israeli Polity

Liebman

Republic of Iran

A rjomand

The Fundamentalist Impact on Law, and Constitutions Sudan

in Iran, Pakistan,

Ann Elizabeth Mayer

Politics,

and the

110

Contents vi

chapter

8

Fundamentalist Influence Strategies of the

Takfir

in

Egypt: The

Muslim Brotherhood and

152

the

Groups

Abdel Azim Ramadan

chapter 9

Islamic Tajdid and the Political Process in

184

Nigeria

Umar M. chapter

io

Rirai

The Nakshibendi Order of Turkey

204

§erifMardin

chapter

1 1

Hindu Fundamentalism and

the Structural

233

Sikh Fundamentalism: Translating History

256

Stability

of India

Robert Eric Frykenberg

chapter

12

into

Theory

Harjot Oberoi

Part 2

chapter

13

Restructuring Economies

Fundamentalisms and the Economy

289

Timur Kuran CHAPTER

14

The Economic Impact of Islamic

302

Fundamentalism

Timur Kuran chapter

15

Heirs to the Protestant Ethic?

The Economics

342

of American Fundamentalists Laurence R. Iannaccone

chapter

16

Buddhist Economics and Buddhist Fundamentalism in Burma and Thailand

367

Charles F. Keyes

chapter

17

The Economic Impact of Hindu Revivalism Deepak Lai

410

Contents vii

Remaking

Part 3

the

World through

Militancy chapter

18

Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Movements and Groups

429

David C. Rapoport

chapter

19

Three Models of Religious Violence: The Case of Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel

462

Ehud Sprinzak CHAPTER 20

Afghanistan: Olivier

chapter

21

An

Islamic

War of Resistance

491

Roy

Militancy and Religion in Contemporary Iran

511

Nikki R. Keddie and Farah Monian

chapter

22

chapter 23

Hizbullah:

The Calculus of Jihad Martin Kramer

539

Saving America's Souls: Operation Rescue's Crusade against Abortion

557

Faye Ginsburg

chapter 24

Buddhism, Politics, and Violence Tambiah

in Sri

Lanka

589

Stanley].

chapter 25

Conclusion: Remaking the State: The Limits of the Fundamentalist Imagination

Martin E. Marty and R.

620

Scott Appleby

List of Contributors

645

Index

649

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We

thank

the advisers

first

who began

planning and conceptualizing

this

volume

in

House of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Gabriel Almond, Said A. Arjomand, Harvev Brooks, Gerhard Casper, Bruce Hoffman, Gerald Holton, Mohsin Khan, Daniel Levine, §erif Mardin, Joel Orlen, David Rapoport, Susan Rose, Emmanuel Sivan, and Marvin Zonis participated in those sessions in November 1988. meetings

at

the

Also contributing scholars and clarifying

wavs to the process of identifying and recruiting themes for this volume were Nancv Ammerman, Daniel Brum-

in significant

berg, Stephen Graubard, Jeffrey Kaplan, Bruce Lawrence,

Prvor, and Martin Riescbrodt.

Many

Edward

through written responses and criticisms of particular essays during

a

Levi, Frederic L.

other scholars contributed to this volume

public conference; those not mentioned by

name

after they

were presented

here are acknowledged bv

the authors in the endnotes. Joel Orlen, executive officer

of the American Academv of Arts and Sciences, merits

another word of thanks for his leadership and encouragement

from stage to

in

advancing the project

stage.

Alan Thomas of the University of Chicago Press made valuable recommendations

and supervised the various phases of volume review and production. Randolph M. Petilos, Jennie Lightner,

and Kathy Gohl also contributed to the

editorial process in

significant ways.

We

thank the University of Chicago professors W. Clark Gilpin, dean of the Di-

vinity School,

and Bernard McGinn, director of the

of Religion, for providing

Institute for the

intellectual stimulus, office space,

Advanced Study

and the semi-annual use

of Swift Lecture Hall. The Divinity School also hosted Project directors,

a graduate seminar, led bv the drawn which students from throughout the university disduring

cussed and dissected early drafts of the essays.

We

are

most

grateful for the tireless efforts

of the Project

staff,

who

put

in

manv

hours of "overtime." Patricia A. Mitchell shared editorial responsibilities, compiled the index, and prepared the final manuscript for publication. Barbara A.

organized the conferences, coordinated research trips, and happily in their debt.

managed

Lockwood

the office.

We are

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby

In

the early 1990s, pondering the collapse

of communism across Eastern Europe and the unraveling of Marxist ideology even in the Soviet

Whence

will

the focus of

economic, or

Union, American

come

the

political

new encmv?

commentators speculated

Who

American reaction and enmity? What ideology, political

power,

will

at

some

length:

or what will replace the "evil empire" as fortified

by

military,

be virulent and contagious enough to challenge

the efforts of liberal Western democracies to direct the future course of global

development? "Religious fundamentalism" was the answer that came from

The

delicate svmbiosis

for four decades

quarters.

bv which the two great superpowers sustained

of the Cold War had produced an era of

developed world. National borders were respected tice, as

some

the Third World, border disputes and

civil

NATO

their rivalry

relative stability in the

not alwavs

in prac-

and Warsaw Pact

axes. In

in principle, if

the postwar order was maintained along the

1

wars, debilitating foreign debt, and ongo-

ing economic crises onlv deepened the dependency of regimes

on one of the two superpower patrons competing for global hegemony. With the diminishment of the

game of deterrence and neutralization, warned that the era of world history dawning in Mearsheimer political scientist John the 1990s, contrary to widespread expectations, did not augur a splendid Pax AmeriSoviet plavcr in this dangerous but effective

cana.

The end of

the

Cold War would lead instead, in Europe at least, to a new and violent ethnic particularisms, to skirmishes spilling

factionalism, to sectarian strife

over into border disputes, In 1991,

armed

civil

wars, and battles of secession. 2

conflicts in "Yugoslavia," "Czechoslovakia,"

and the

Baltic re-

publics supported Mearsheimer's thesis, at least for the short term, while the splinter-

ing of what appeared increasingly to have been a poorly constructed national unity in India, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Algeria, the

Sudan, Nigeria, and elsewhere suggested

Martin

E.

Marty and R.

Scott Appleby

2

that in certain respects the

the (satellite) state, the state

became

and to

Mcarsheimer

Union was no longer

the Soviet

full

may be

thesis

Once

extent of the fragility and artifice of the postwar nation-

painfully apparent to indigenous bureaucrats in these troubled regions

their postcolonial patrons. Factionalism

tions of an age

and disorder mocked

earlier anticipa-

of globalism, ecumenism, and onc-worldism. Instead the world

seemed beset by mi inward turning of peoples, by the open aggrandizement of

more powerful

now by

antipluralist particularisms, or

states at the

expense of the newly created

Against this chaotic background, the forging of an American-led alliance to

states.

halt

applied beyond Europe.

able to act as a viable constructor and preserver of

and reverse Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait

1990-91, and the subsequent American

Gulf

in the

of

Crisis

policy of respecting Iraqi borders, even at

the expense of ethnic (Kurdish) and religious (Shi'ite) claims to autonomy, seemed to

have more to do with preserving the old order than with establishing a "new world order."' In this context religious fundamentalisms did failed leftist

seemed spent or

seem poised to

inherit the mantle

some nations. Elsewhere, diminished. Whether or not these movements

and nationalist ideologies at least

measure of power and influence

in

in the vears ahead,

of

their influence attain a greater

an examination of their impact in

the 1970s and 1980s offers important lessons for those

who

seek to understand the

1

fundamentalists sociopolitical goals in various nations, and the strategies they have successfully or unsuccessfully pursued to attain these goals.

two companion volumes. One, Fundamentalisms and

We

chose to do

Society, assesses

this in

the progress of

fundamentalist leaders and movements in their attempts to reorder scientific inquiry, to reclaim the patterns of "traditional" family

life

and interpersonal

relations,

and to

reshape education and communications systems. Meanwhile, Fundamentalisms and the State

examines and evaluates the ways

in

which fundamentalists have sought to

influence the course of developments in politics, law, constitutionalism,

and economic

planning during the past twentv-five years.

One

conclusion that will be immediately apparent to readers of both volumes

that "fundamentalism

form on certain

levels

1

has been

'

much more

of "society" than

in

evidence in

at the level

of the

its

is

extreme or unmodified

"state."

The

three terms set

off in quotation marks are central to this discussion and thus require early working definitions.

As

a comparative construct

as rich anity, vice.

and

diverse,

and

encompassing movements within religious traditions

as different

one from another,

as are Islam,

Hinduism, Sikhism, and Buddhism, "fundamentalism"

Objections to the use of the term are discussed in the

Fundamentalisms Observed.* The

meant to

indicate that even'

title

among

disparate

as

tests the

a useful analytical de-

volume of this

of the project

movement examined within

fundamentalism. Rather, the project semblances"

of that volume,

is

first

Judaism, Christi-

it

scries,

itself, is

hypothesis that there are "familv

movements of religiously

not

equally "qualifies" as a re-

inspired reaction to aspects of

the global processes of modernization and secularization in the twentieth century. In the concluding chapter of Fundamentalisms Observed the editors note and describe a

pattern of traits recurring throughout the book's fourteen separate studies of funda-

INTRODUCTION 3

mcntaJist-likc

movements

and

in seven religious traditions

five

continents.

From

those

we

"family traits" the editors construct a working definition of fundamentalism that repeat here to give readers of the present

volume

a general idea

of how the term

is

understood by contributors. Religious fundamentalism has appeared in the twentieth century as a tendency, a habit of mind, found within religious communities and paradigmaticallv certain representative individuals

and movements, which manifests

embodied

in

itself as a strategy,

or set of strategies, bv which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a

people or group. Feeling this identity to be

rary era, they fortify

it

bv

a selective retrieval

of doctrines,

contempo-

at risk in the

beliefs,

and practices from

a sacred past. These retrieved "fundamentals" are refined, modified, and sanctioned in

of shrewd pragmatism: they are to serve

a spirit

ment of outsiders who threaten

draw the

as a

bulwark against the encroach-

believers into a svneretistic, areligious, or

Moreover, these fundamentals are accompanied

irreligious cultural milieu.

new

to

religious portfolio bv unprecedented claims

strength of these innovations and the

the

in

and doctrinal innovations. Bv the

new supporting

doctrines, the retrieved and

updated fundamentals are meant to regain the same charismatic intensity today bv

which they originally forged communal identity from the formative revelatory

reli-

gious experiences long ago. In this sense contemporary fundamentalism original. In the effort to reclaim the efficacy

more

in

common

a

at

once both derivative and life,

artificial

imposition of archaic practices and

simple return to a golden era, a sacred past, a bygone time of origins

nostalgia for such an era identity thus

vitally

fundamentalists have

than not with other religious revivalists of past centuries. But fun-

damentalism intends neither an nor

is

of religious

is

a

lifestyles

— although

hallmark of fundamentalist rhetoric. Instead, religious

renewed becomes the exclusive and absolute

basis for a re-created politi-

and social order that is oriented to the future rather than the past. Selecting elements of tradition and modernity, fundamentalists seek to remake the world in the

cal

service

of a dual commitment to the unfolding cschatological drama (by returning

all

things in submission to the divine) and to self-preservation (by neutralizing the

threatening "Other"). Such an endeavor often requires charismatic and authoritarian leadership,

depends upon

a disciplined inner core

orous sociomoral code for

all

of adherents, and promotes a

followers. Boundaries are set, the

enemy

rig-

identified,

converts sought, and institutions created and sustained in pursuit of a comprehensive reconstruction of society.

"Society"

is

understood here

as the relationships

terized by "the values [these relationships]

tivations they encourage, the incentives they inspire

which

belief, attitude,

among human

beings as charac-

embody, the individual and

collective

and sanction, and the

mo-

by and behavior are established and secured." 5 Fundamentalists ideals

pay special attention to the "values, motivations, incentives, and ideals" according to

How best How best is

which the intimate zones of life are ordered. relations, order family

life,

raise children?

is

one to marry, conduct sexual one to understand and teach

others about creation and procreation, providence and scientific evidence, morality

and

spirituality?

These perennial questions have generated

religiolegal rulings,

moral

Martin E. Marty and R.

Scott Appleby

4

and behavioral codes, and scores of learned

treatises

by Fundamentalist scholars and

educators intent on sustaining, re-creating, or fortifying a religious enclave within a larger society that

perceived as invasive and threatening.

is

But because fundamentalists often ists

— or to fundamentalists of

proximity to nonfundamental-

in close

live

a different religious tradition

—

a

second question

is

w hen one examines "fundamentalist impact," as each author in this volume does. The observer must ask not only "How effective have fundamentalist inevitably raised

movements been

in influencing their

have they exercised

in the lives

own

adherents?" but also

"How much

of nonfundamentalists?" Inevitably

this

impact

second ques-

tion leads to a consideration of the fundamentalist social reformer's relationship to

power within

the "state," understood here as the "supreme public

a sovereign political

entity."*

Fundamentalists are boundary-setters: they excel in marking themselves others bv distinctive dress, customs, and conduct. But thev are also, in

eager to expand their borders bv attracting outsiders

who

will

off"

most

from

cases,

honor fundamentalist

norms, or bv requiring that nonfundamentalists observe fundamentalist codes. The state

is

the final arbiter of disputes within

"fundamentalist" political

agendas (Pakistan, Egypt, India,

encouraged or even empowered to larger society.

The impact

borders. In cases in which the state

its

is

Sudan) or has been influenced by fundamentalist socio-

(e.g., Iran,

spill

Israel), the

over

its

in these instances

is

fundamentalism of the enclave

natural boundaries

of

a different

is

and permeate the

order than in a society

within which fundamentalists have been routed (Algeria, as of this writing), marginalized (Iraq), or

made

to play by the rules

of

political

compromise,

developed

as in

democracies such as the United States and Great Britain.

Bv dividing

this extensive

one from the other; state regulates

many

rather, they overlap

in the case

modern

to imply that the

and

interact in

aspects of social existence,

cultural conditions within

involved in

study of "fundamentalist impact" into two volumes

we do not mean

beled "state" and "society,"

which

political life,

la-

are distinct

complex ways. Because the

establishes the basic political

social life occurs, fundamentalists inevitablv

and

become

even in the attempt to preserve their separateness

(as

of the haredi Jews profiled bv Ehud Sprinzak and Charles Liebman). In so

doing they participate political structures,

in a

common

reinvent aspects of

discourse about modernization, development,

and economic planning. Fundamentalists may nuance and modify or unsuccessfully — they may to or — but they contained within and anv hope of even

the terms of that discourse it

successfully

are

partial return to a pristine

Hindu modern

A Matter of Perspective

less

find

a

the construction of a purely

society or polity', well out of reach.

and Allegiance

volume surveying and evaluating the impact of fundamentalists, who

evaluating? Contributors to Fundamentalisms

redirect

try

it

premodern world, much

Islamic or Christian or Jewish or

In a

and

two realms

and

is

doing the

the State include political scientists,

legal scholars, sociologists, cultural anthropologists, historians

of religion, and econo-

INTRODUCTION 5

None of

mists.

the contributors claims to be a religious fundamentalist, although

some are in greater sympathy with fundamentalism than others, and all draw heavily upon the writings, public pronouncements, and self-descriptions of fundamentalists. In most cases the author hails from the nation or religious tradition about which he or she

is

writing. Nonetheless the participants in this project are resolutely "of the

Western academy," an institution and fellowship that

where oppose on principle and

in the

West have joined

selectively. 7

only recently and very

fundamentalisms,

If

radical fundamentalists every-

moderate fundamentalists

that

like

other social phenomena, display a range of attitudes and

behavioral responses to outsiders,

it

becomes possible

to speak realistically of incor-

porating the ideas of moderate fundamentalists into studies such as

this, just as

becomes possible to speak of moderate fundamentalists incorporating the

ideas

it

and

procedures of the Western academy into their various worldviews. But can fundamentalism trulv exist in a moderate

the present

form without being compromised

volume fundamentalism

is

viewed

in its essence? In

as the struggle to assert

or reassert the

norms and beliefs of "traditional religion" in the public order. For fundamentalists these norms and beliefs, derived from a divinely revealed or otherwise absolute source of knowledge, establish a framework of limits within which development mav occur and public

officials

mav

govern. Thus, the question for

nonfundamentalists alike

is

many

fundamentalists and

whether the alternative modernization programs of fun-

damentalists can be pursued and implemented within a larger philosophical frame-

work

rights

civil

and that respects the human and

that docs not privilege any particular religion

of nonfundamentalists and nonbelievers. Are fundamentalists destined to

remain forceful, disruptive (and exceedingly shrewd) cultural

of responsible basis

political discourse?

Or

outside the pale

critics,

will fundamentalist religion

become

a viable

for sociopolitical programs that compete democratically with nonfundamentalist

and secular programs?

Answering

this

question

is

a matter not simply

vation and definition. If fundamentalism

and actions of its most ism

is

is

radical proponents,

of semantics but of careful obser-

defined and understood by the utterances

then one

may conclude

essentially antidemocratic, anti-accommodationist,

and

that fundamental-

antipluralist

and that

it

a matter ofprinciple, the standards of human rights defended, if not always perfectly upheld, bv Western democracies. By this reading of fundamentalism, the

violates, as

battle lines are

understanding are inevitably

drawn is

clearly

between fundamentalist and nonfundamentalist, mutual

unlikely or impossible, and public policy studies

devoted to the defense of principles and

lifestyles

like

the present one

under

assault

of resurgent religious radicalism. Some influential opinion-makers and policy analysts have concluded that

by the

forces

ing of fundamentalism

now

is

that the evil empire

accurate and sensible. is

no more,

to

They have turned

this read-

their attentions,

combating the spread and influence of fun-

damentalism. Several of the participants

in the

Fundamentalism Project share

this

view, although to varying degrees. But the directors and other participants in the project are devoted to exploring the possibilities of mutual understanding and dia-

logue, in the

hope

that these possibilities will not be

abandoned prematurely, and

in

Martin E. Marty and R.

Scott Appleby

6

the apprehension that

unnuanced

may

policies

simply serve to radicalize potential

fundamentalists and thus to polarize situations.

A careful

ences between

and subtraditions labeled "fundamen-

talist,"

leads

movements

and of the complex

one to

resist

in several traditions

role that religion plays,

sweeping generalizations

understanding of the

and may

like the

differ-

movements,

play, in these

following:

Islamic fundamentalism of the Sunni or Shi'a variety in Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Jor-

dan, the West Bank and Gaza, the

Maghreb and

also Algeria

resistant to

democracy but wholly contemptuous of and

democratic

political culture. ... [It]

as militant

and violent

is

is

not merely

enure

hostile to the

an aggressive revolutionary movement

as the Bolshevik, Fascist,

and Nazi movements of the

past. 8

There

is

another way to define fundamentalism, namelv,

of mind, that mav inspire

a habit

fundamentalist tendency

a variety'

to rule, to gain

is

of

as a generalized

specific activities. If

power

tendency,

said that the

purpose of mandating divine

for the

or sacred law (and/or to serve the personal ambition of the that the

it is

ruler),

it is

equally true

ways and means of pursuing power, and of enforcing the mandate,

These ways and means may run along a spectrum of "accommodationist." As the chapters

in the present

skill

from

are

as

much by

of the fundamentalists

the sociopolitical

in exploiting these cir-

cumstances. Furthermore, the tide of "influence" runs in both directions.

The

In the attempts to order personal relations

or to create alternative social and educational institutions on the local

of fundamentalist concern

is

often narrowly circumscribed for

minimum compromise. When

larger

program

the stakes, the greater the risk for fundamentalists that their message and

mav become compromised.

many.

"radical" to

volume demonstrate, the nature

and scope of fundamentalist impact are determined circumstances as by the zeal and

possibilities

and family level,

maximum

life,

the arena effect

they plav politics to influence the policies of the

and

state,

however, fundamentalisms are thus necessarily involved in some measure of compromise and accommodation. Political involvement dogmatic, and confrontational

mode of the

word "fundamentalist" no longer words

like

applies.

alter the original exclusivist,

Authors of Fundamentalisms and Society use

"pragmatist" or "accommodationist" to describe their subjects

quently than do authors of Fundamentalisms and

Thus,

may

fundamentalist to such a degree that the

we

less fre-

the State.

asked each contributor to consider the ways in which fundamentalist

activism affected the fundamentalists themselves as well as nonfundamentalists within their sphere

of influence. That

is,

in asking,

"How

or succeed in achieving their goals?" authors were

and where did fundamentalists alert to the

the intended consequences of fundamentalist activism.

The

unintended

various circumstances in

which fundamentalists operated, and the complex repercussions of their activism,

summarized

The

in the editors' conclusion to the

fact that

fail

as well as

are

volume.

nonfundamentalists do the writing guarantees that this volume, and

the entire project, will reflect a particular orientation to foundational questions and will

produce conclusions

truth?

What

in

keeping with that orientation.

What

are the appropriate criteria for evaluating data

are the sources

of

and judging success or

INTRODUCTION 7

failure?

From

dalous.

They appear

human

basic

But

this

is

the perspective

rights,

humanistic

way of

are often scan-

individual self-determination, to violate

and to impede material advancement, progress, and prosperity. of fundamentalisms: they and

precisely the point

judged according to strictly

of a nonfundamentalist, fundamentalisms

to stand in the

human

lines;

standards.

behavior

is

One

good

if it

their

cannot evaluate

God

social

conforms to God's

are not to be

behavior along

will. Gritics

who do

not share the ethical and philosophical assumptions of fundamentalists cannot hope to "get

it

right."

But they have

own

tried nonetheless.

The

editors asked the authors to put in brackets

mean that they successfully them behind, but that they become aware of them, take them into consideration, and do some compensating for them. The goal in every case is to come up with essays in which the people described therein would recognize themselves in the portrait, even if they would almost inevitably disagree with the conclusions and evaluations of these nonfundamentalist authors. This seemed the best choice for a volume that seeks their

presuppositions, an approach which does not

leave

upon

to measure fundamentalist impact

outsiders as well as insiders, that asks,

"What

have religious fundamentalists "accomplished' thus far that nonfundamentalists find significant?"

In mentioning this important matter of various perspectives subject such as fundamentalism,

is

it

important to

on

a controversial

state clearly that the positions

or

interpretations put forth in this collection of essays are those of the individual authors

and do not nccessarilv

reflect

Acadcmv of

the views of the American

Arts and Sci-

of the Academy

ences. In undertaking this project, the principal purpose

is

to bring

together scholars with the best credentials in the several areas and cultures under studv,

Bv cases

and to ask them to present a swift glance at the table

as inclusive

and

presentation as possible.

fair a

of contents, the reader

of fundamentalist influence are not examined. This

erations, not the least

of which

is

some important number of consid-

will see that

due to

is

a

the physical limitations of volumes which are alreadv

encyclopedic in length. Furthermore, the implications of recent developments such as

Union

the rapid dissolution of the Soviet

for the spread

of fundamentalisms were

apparent onlv after these studies were commissioned and will be treated in subsequent volumes. The project does not attempt to chase the

latest headlines;

chapters in this volume were completed in 1991, at a time

worldwide seemed to be entering the

Gulf War of 1990-91 and

of these chapters

lies

not

in

a

new phase of intense

most of the

when fundamentalisms

activism in the aftermath of

the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, the usefulness

up-to-the-minute reportage, but in their exemplification

of patterns of fundamentalist activism that the reader may expect to discern in the headlines and news accounts for some time to come. In summarizing and elaborating these patterns in the concluding chapter, we were able to draw upon

and

analysis

examples taken

at the last possible

moment

and not comprehensive. Given the scope of the volume traits

of "fundamentalism" present

ment under consideration

it

(February 1992), but these are

was necessary to ask each author to

in the activities

illustrative

identify the

of the particular group or move-

in the individual chapters.

A

subsequent volume

in this

Martin E. Marty and R.

Scott Appleby

8

upon comparative

series will focus

definitions

of fundamentalism and deal

explicitly

with methodological problems, such as the decision to include Asian traditions in the project, but the authors

of the important chapters

volume on Sikh,

in the present

Hindu, and Buddhist "fundamentalisms" have succinctly provided

their

own

reasons

movements on the Indian John Garvey, Timur Kuran, and David Rapo-

for using the construct to understand certain religiopolitical

subcontinent.

port

—

The

associate editors

—

and patterns across traditions

also identity' fundamentalist family resemblances

and cultures

in the introductory chapters

opening each part of the volume.

Notes 1.

See David Ignatius, "The West's Next

Crusade: Fighting Fundamentalist Islamic Rule," Washington Post National Weekly Edition,

16-22 March 1992, pp. 23-24; "U. Muslim Militants a Threat

Official Calls

Africa,"

New York Times,

1

January 1992,

across cultures, journalists, public officials,

and publics in the parts of the world where these books have their first auscholars,

on

S.

dience have settled

to

seek an idiosyncratic and finally precious

p. 3;

A Force to Be Reckoned With," Chicago Tribune, 20 January 1992, p. 13; "Mahatma vs. Rama," Time, 24 June 1991, p. 35; Benjamin J. Barber, "Jihad vs. McWorld," The Atlantic 269, no. 3 (March 1992): 53-55, 58-62, 64-65.

"Islamic Fundamentalism:

John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," The Atlantic 266, no. 2 (August 1990): 35-50. 2.

ternative,

it

seemed

this term.

Rather than

better for the

al-

team of

scholars to try to inform inquiry with the

word

that

is

here to stay and to correct mis-

With those two reasons goes a third: all words have to come from somewhere and will be more appropriate in some contexts than in others. Words which have appeared uses.

paragraphs

in these 'liberal,'

gent in

and all

'secular'

— 'modern,' — examples.

'religious,'

are

It is ur-

cases that these terms be used in

such ways that they do justice to the par3.

See the discussion by Adeed Dawisha,

"The United States in the Middle East: The Gulf War and Its Aftermath," Current History 91, no. 561 (January 1992): 1-5. Cf. Hermann Frederick Eilts, "The Persian Gulf Crisis: Perspectives and Prospects," Middle East Journal AS, no. 4.

"Among the

single is

(Winter 1991): 22.

1

reasons for insistence

term are these:

here to stay, since

First, it

which we

on

a

serves to create a dis-

realities,

something

are confident readers will find the

present authors responsibly undertaking to do. Fourth, having spent three of the five years set aside for research

and study com-

paring 'fundamentalism' to alternatives,

we

two conclusions. No other coordinating term was found to be as intellihave

'fundamentalism'

of separate

ticularities

come

to

gible or serviceable.

And

attempts of partic-

ular essayists to provide distinctive but in

end confusing accurate

tinction over against cognate but not fully

the

appropriate words such as 'traditionalism,'

to the conclusion that they were describing

1

'conservatism,' or 'orthodoxy praxis.' If the

and 'ortho-

term were to be rejected, the

would have to find some other word if it is to make sense of a set of global phenomena which urgently bid to be understood. However diverse the expressions are, thev present themselves as movements public

which demand comparison even

as

they de-

serve fair separate treatment so that their special lief.

integrities will

Second,

when

appear in bold

re-

thev must communicate

alternatives led

something similar to what are here called fundamentalisms." See Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, "The Fundamentalism Project: A User's Guide" in Marty and Applebv, eds., Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. vii-xiii. 5.

Walter H. Capps, "Society and Reli-

gion," in Mircea Eliade, ed., Encyclopedia of Religion, vol. 13

(New

Free Press), p. 375.

York: Macmillan and

INTRODUCTION 9

6.

The American Heritage Dictionary, 2d

College ed. 1985), 7.

p.

(Boston:

Mifflin,

The academy

when one

But

is

ostensibly a center of

makes

a

good

deal of

believes that she possesses

the sole and absolute truth not to be

precisely this opinion that

makes

it

fundamentalists to take part in a

leagues

may

privately or publicly adhere to a

completely different set of revealed truths,

or to none at

com-

8.

promised through dialogue or give and take; sully matters with a facile ecumenism?

Post,

why

it is

difficult for

roundtable discussion in which their col-

1190.

tolerance. Intolerance

sense

Houghton

Amos

all.

Perlmutter, "Wishful Thinking

about Islamic Fundamentalism," Washington

22 January 1992,

p.

C7.

Remaking

Polities

CHAPTER 2

Introduction: Fundamentalism and Politics

John H. Garvey

JLherc are

fundamentalism discussed

religious if it

were otherwise.

tions.

The

We

we must

international relations, tory.

One

raneity.

is

But

There

modern

is

many

movements within very

It

social

in

even more complex,

forms of government,

mores, and the imprint of

similarity

we can say more than that. way of thinking about law and

would be remarkable

different religious tradi-

politics are

take account of further differences

economic organization,

is

that social

believe that

I

of and that religious fundamentalist movements invariably habit of thought the public/private distinction. Its central premise

a certain

is

politics that

is

characteristic

life

can be divided into public and private realms. The function of gov-

to regulate behavior in the public sphere according to secular rules. Within

Religious fundamentalists reject this

do as they method of

public/private distinction as

they believe in particular that religion

the private sphere people are free to

from law and

This

is

the

politics.

theme

I

artificial;

fundamentalism

ism

—

its

want to develop below.

— only that there

is

ways produce the same

and other matters.

political organization.

modern

I

must add

in this part deal

relation to politics.

say that certain

like, in religious

They is

see the

insepa-

1

going on, though. The chapters

do not

his-

the accident of contempo-

industrial nations,

ernment

rable

of

differences in the forms

of this volume.

tempted to say that the only true

reject. I will call this is

are treating

1

between fundamentalism and

relations

because here

in part

My

a note

of caution before

with only one facet of religious

remarks are limited in the same way.

political ideas

account for the

rise

bad chemistry between the two. Nor does the chemistry

al-

and Muslims

in

reaction. Evangelical Protestants in Ulster

Nigeria both reject the public/private distinction, but they have different names for

and thev

are dealing

I

of fundamental-

with different problems.

13

it

"

John H. Garvey 14

I

I

will

nomena of in

world. 2

By

it is

a principle that

is

apt to

it arose and what it accompany the phe-

industrialism and nationalism, processes that occurred at different times

Europe and America but

trial

— how

begin bv describing the public/private distinction

means. In the most general terms

industrialism

that have

mean

I

happened simultaneously

the change from an agrarian

one, marked by the division of labor, the use of

of the

in other parts

economy

to an indus-

modern production and

distri-

bution technologies, the aggregation of capital (whether in the hands of the state or

of priyate entrepreneurs), and greater population concentration and mobility. This occurred

in

America during the nineteenth century, when we began building

ries, railroads, stores,

and

economically

cities

became

the integral social unit

The

self-sufficient.

on

As we became more

a large scale.

larger.

states

facto-

industrialized

Neither families nor local communities were

were too small to govern

and so the U.S. government was asked to regulate the

commerce,

interstate

railroads,

monopolies, food

and drugs, and so on. Nationalism exerts a similar pull in the direction of a larger social unit. France treats millions

they choose a

who

of people

common

don't

tion, health policy, transportation,

They

life

Both of these

each other as enfants de la patrie. Together

and numerous other matters of daily importance.

and build monuments to commemorate

celebrate holidays

events in the

know

apparatus for making rules about defense, commerce, educa-

significant people

and

of the national community. forces unite very large

numbers of people who, generally speaking,

arc far from homogeneous. They work clubs and families, and believe in cat, dress, and differently, belong to different different gods. Most of them think, moreover, that these differences arc what matter most. They are what define us as individuals, distinct from other members of the

same culture and language. But the people

share the

political

community. This

is

the origin of the public/private distinction.

It

holds that

the government should exercise authority over those matters that concern everyone in

common

(the public sphere) but should refrain

only to individuals, families, churches,

The

line

from meddling

etc. (the private

between the public and private spheres

in affairs that

matter

sphere).

is

maintained in legal systems

through the concept of freedom. In constitutional democracies

this

notion

is

typically

embodied in a constitution. In granting freedom to citizens, a constitution guarantees that the government will not interfere with choices about certain actions deemed particularly important. The American constitution, for example, provides that "Congress shall

make no law

constitution states that

.

.

"all

.

prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].

3

The Indian

persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and

the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion." 4 These rules

worship

as they please.

They

also let people

do other

let

people

religiously motivated acts, like

sending children to a religious school. In general terms, they ensure that the govern-

ment

will

not coerce activity

In the case of religion,

in the private sphere.

modern

the government out of private

life

societies often

go

further. In addition to

keeping

they ban religion from the public arena. This pro-

INTRODUCTION: FUNDAMENTALISM AND POLITICS 15

duces a clean separation: religion

a private affair; the public sphere

is

secular. In

is

done by the Establishment Clause, which speaks to the government: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." 5 In Turkey America

this

is

.

.

.

the constitution speaks instead to individuals:

"No one

shall

be allowed to exploit or

abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred bv religion, in whatever

manner, for the purpose of personal or

political influence,

or for even partially basing

on

the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the State 1'

tenets.

To summarize,

combined

the

forces

of industrialism and nationalism lead to the

organization of societies that embrace large numbers of people less

extensive and well defined territory.

gether by molar

ties

are protected

But there

is

larly true

of

citizens

of friendship, kinship, and

ties

bv

rules

who

inhabit a

religion,

more or

of such societies are bound

about freedom, which divide private

which can win converts. So public

to-

bound in smaller The more intimate

also

religion.

off from public.

life

also a fear that they will pull the larger society to pieces. This

and made

religion

The

of economy and patriotism, but they are

groups bv molecular

bonds

religious

6

life is

is

particu-

also insulated

from

secular.

II

Religious fundamentalism

given the

traits that

three of these that

seem both

are conservative, popular,

When

I

fits

uncomfortably into

typical

and

sav that such

and

world. This

call

is

not surprising,

fundamentalist. There are

politically salient: fundamentalist

movements

practical.

movements

directly) to a particular political slant.

Baptists in

this

movements we

characterize the

I

are conservative,

do not mean,

I

do not

refer (at least

not

for example, that fundamentalist

America vote for right-wing candidates. Rather, fundamentalists

trv to con-

They look to their religious traditions for guidproblems. They do not propose new ideologies, nor do modern with ance in dealing they want to revise their habits and beliefs to keep them in tune with the times. One symptom of this conservatism is an emphasis on literalism in the interpretation of sacred texts. The insistence upon biblical literalism and inerrancy mav be the most frequently remarked trait of American Protestant fundamentalists. They believe that God created the world and Adam and Eve in just the way the Book of Genesis describes. Ann Mayer observes a similar tendency among Muslim fundamentalists in Iran, Pak-

serve a particular religious heritage.

istan,

and the Sudan regarding

their

approach to the Qur'an. This kind of exegesis

is

moving current of scientific and social change. emphasis on "traditional values," a phrase that is the trait conservative Another deemed virtuous within the speaker's tradition. Sexual designates forms of behavior continence is an example that one finds in most cultures and religions. Correct sexual behavior is not just a matter of good manners, prudent health policy, or wise psya

way of holding meaning

chology.

It is a religious

understood

this.

steady in a

obligation. Fundamentalists look back to a time

when people

— John H. Garvey 16

not

It is

coincidence that the religious traditions that fundamentalists reach back

a

Menachem

to typically antedate the public/private distinction. Samuel Heilman and

Friedman have explained how haredi Jews, maintain

language, dress, and customs,

in their

connection with late-eighteenth-century Eastern European society. The

a

of Eastern Europe

traditional Jewish village

symbolizes their ideal past. 7 Such

still

Orthodox communities governed by the norms of halakha (Jewish law) and resisted the trend toward cultural integration, modernization, and secularization that was moving across Western Europe. Steve Bruce has pointed out villages existed as separate

model

that conservative Protestants in Ulster find a

Scots Covenants.

The Covenanters

believed that the

for their political faith in the old civil state

should enforce religious

conformity by suppressing heresy, popery, and related forms of superstition. 8 The connection

is

which

strikingly similar to that

exists

between American Protestant fun-

New

damentalists and the Puritans in seventeenth-century

Maitatsine sect

— the

blown of

best

drew upon the nineteenth-century Mahdist precolonial experience of theocratic

England. In Nigeria the

the Islamic revivalist groups in recent years tradition in that region

government under the Sokoto

and upon the

caliphate.

9

movements arc popular as well as conservative. By do not mean "widely embraced" but, rather, the qualities that give funda-

Religious fundamentalist

"popular"

I

mentalism the potential for mass appeal

The

idea of simplicity

is

few

listing a

beliefs (the

its

simplicity

and

its

nonhicrarchical style.

word "fundamentalist" that we use to The term comes from the American Protestant practice of

implicit in the very

describe such movements.

Jesus, the acceptance

—

fundamentals),

of which

inerrancy and the resurrection of

like biblical

qua non of Christian orthodoxy. This under-

a sine

is

taking leads to a kind of stripped-down religion that travels light and

fast.

Ann Mayer

points to a related kind of simplicity in Islamic fundamentalist movements. These generally its it

call

for reviving the Shari'a (Islamic law), but they simplify

elaborate jurisprudence. Such simplification

is

appeals to the nonspecialist and because greater detail

dissent.

means greater

is

possibility

of

related to the scriptural literalism discussed above. If sacred

have a plain meaning, then the

common man

can understand them, just as he

can remember the fundamentals of theology. This in turn istic

because

10

Doctrinal simplicity texts

and stereotype

politically wise, she argues,

form of ecclesiastical

polity. Believers in a

ecclesiastical structures

when

connected to a character-

system of this kind have no need of a

hierarchy of religious ministers to mediate between

complex

is

them and Cod. Churches

create

they have to enforce doctrinal orthodox}' and

provide religious services to their members. But these are not concerns for fundamentalist

movements, which tend to assume

a populist, loosely connected, nonhierarchial

aspect.

This point

is

easily

obscured by the prominent role that the Avatollah Khomeini

made him more from personal charisma Muslims in fact hold rather "prot-

played in the Iranian Revolution and under the 1979 constitution, which the country's supreme ruler. But his authority derived

and the

civil

constitution than from religious office.

estant" ecclesiastical views.

'

through scripture and inner

'

Thev light,

believe that individuals can get in touch with

without the need to

rely

on

God

spiritual intermediaries.

INTRODUCTION: FUNDAMENTALISM AND POLITICS 17

This seems to reinforce the public/private distinction bv making religion a very personal

affair.

beliefs

there

on

But

their

then

is,

it

mav have

it is

come

the opposite effect. If manv people can

same

to the

And

if

possible to see religion as a molar rather than a molecular bond.

It

own, there may be something to the idea of a

collective will.

could unite a community as large as a nation.

The

of religious fundamentalism is its practical nathough to compensate for their doctrinal simplicity, fundamentalists

third principal characteristic

ture.

Almost

lay a

heaw emphasis on

mentalism

as

right behavior. T.

N. Madan has argued that "Sikh funda-

orthoprax rather than orthodox."

is

It stresses

codes of conduct governing

such matters as dress, smoking, and sexual intercourse with Muslim tural exegesis

is

Robert Frvkenberg makes

The most

visible

through rigorous

contemporary force among them

Young men who

of physical, mental, and

essav in this chapter discusses

governed bv liquor,

a

read for the light

is

it

the Rashtriva

in India.

Swayamsevak

brotherhood of true believers

join

RSS

cadres are subjected to

spiritual exercise.

much concerned with And

sheds on daily living.

theological daily

life is

range of sexual taboos, family obligations, abstinence from drugs and

and so on.

A still

more extreme example is comes at

accurate to sav that their orthopraxis society, at least for males, is

Scrip-

American Protestant fundamentalists. Ex-

cept for their millennial interests, they are not speculation. Scripture

is

that aims at creating a

self-discipline.

daily schedules

My own

about Hindu fundamentalists

a similar point

Sangh (RSS), an organization

demanding

women.

not a major concern. '-

is

a society

the haredim in Israel.

It is

not quite

the expense of belief, since haredi

of scholars. But behavior

in

such communities

regulated to an almost unparalleled extent in matters of dress, diet, ritual, socializa-

tion,

and contact with modern

culture.

Ill

Religious fundamentalist groups with these characteristics

resist

expansion of the public/private distinction. Standing behind damentalists' conviction that

purposes to the divine It is

God

is

bv fencing religion into

will

characteristic of religions

in

modern

his faithful people in a spiritual way.

next

life.

This

fits

active in the world.

He

at cross-

suppose that

God

deals with

up rewards and punishments

stores

God

the fun-

is

Thus, people act

a private arena.

societies to

naturally with the notion that religion

damentalists reject this point of view.

the maintenance and

this resistance

is

a private matter.

doesn't just speak to the heart

for the

But fun-

— God

acts.

People tend to overlook some of God's actions because they blend so naturally into the

mundane sequence of

cause and

effect.

Homosexuality and drug abuse

are the

primary means for transmitting AIDS. But the fundamentalist would claim that the connection

is

more than

shouldn't be surprised at

biological: this.

On

AIDS

harnessing natural causes for such a just

course of events, as

when bad

is

God's way of punishing sinners.

we should admire purpose. Sometimes we are

the contrary,

things happen to

good

people.

Here

his

We

economy

in

surprised at the

too, though, the

John H. Garvey 18

notion of God's intervention proves useful.

allows us to suppose that there

It

we would appreciate "God wills it."

hidden divine purpose which consoling to be able to

God's action

is

sav,

if

we

not always mundane. Sometimes

could understand

it

The

miraculous.

is

original

statement of the fundamentals by the Presbyterian General Assembly in 1910 telling instance

ture the

of the miracles recounted

intervention just a thing of the past.

God

in the Bible.

Among

13

Nor

is

Pentecostals

this extraordinary

actions.

In the

One

typical pattern

West the idea has

chosen people

its

is

it is

possible to discern larger patterns in these divine

God's choice of

most

form

familiar

in the face

group of people

a certain

own.

as his

The Jews

Jewish thought.

in

are God's

whom he sometimes favors and sometimes chastises, according to their

faithfulness in keeping their covenant with him.

of the enticements of modern

The haredim

own

see their

as a miracle attributable to

life,

survival,

God's grace

providing the Torah sages. 14 Protestant Christian Ian Paisley sees the experience of

Free Presbyterians in Ulster in similar terms.

This

little

"God

has a people in this province.

impossible to extricate Ulster from seeming disaster, that

Another

common

millenarian tradition led

by Sant

among

the Sikhs. In recent times

Singh Bhindranwale.

in terms like these:

"A

Singh's rule will be enlarged.

with Christian fundamentalist the battle of Armageddon,

literature

which

God has

justice

and

The

Among

Shi'ite

shall

written this."

will reign

and

molest another. 16

Those

familiar

Jesus's sec-

coming of the messiah. These arrival by the settlement of Judea

Muslims the expectation

—

is

that the

Imam Mahdi

— the

will return to establish a rule

of

equity.

belief that

would not say

God

is

active in the

that

it is

But the fundamentalist could see

sodomy

AIDS. To put

a

there.

the point in

Humean

lines, natural

God

is

not

normative aspect.

We

politics.

falls

to the earth.

justice in the fact that

terms, a world in which

world that collapses the distinction between

run along these

a

"right," "good," or "just" that an apple

it

transmits

world has implications for

magnetism. His actions have

Gravity just pulls

is

The Khalsa

no one

the banks of

millennium that follows

disappeared a millennium ago

a natural force like gravity or

active

on

faringhi will be left

too, look for the

Jewish activists believe that they can hasten his

Imam who

no

cannot miss the similarity to descriptions of

will initiate the

ond coming. The Gush Emunim, and Samaria.

is

belief in God's plan

great battle will take place

Insurrection will take place in the country in [1865].

Day by day Ram

it

was exemplified bv the move-

it

the rajah and ryot will live in peace and comfort, and

twelfth

.

intervened." 15

A century ago the

the Jamna, and blood will flow like the waters of the Ravi, and alive.

.

of history. Harjot Oberoi has pointed to the persistence of a

Jarnail

found expression

when

God

pattern that fundamentalists have discerned in God's activity

a plan for the direction

ment

.

You only seemed humanly

province has had the peculiar preservation of divine Providence.

have to read the history of Ulster to see that time after time

is

kind of

frequently thought that

it is

steps in to heal the sick.

Fundamentalists believe that

in

a

is

of this fascination with miracles. In addition to the inerrancy of scrip-

included the virgin birth of Christ, his bodilv resurrection, and the au-

list

thenticity

a

is

thus

It is

it.

"is"

and "ought." In

events have a deeper level of meaning.

a

God

world

Ann Mayer

ob-

INTRODUCTION FUNDAMENTALISM AND POLITICS 19

serves that, in the

Middle East,

Israel's

preted as God's punishment [visited] Islamic law."

1

"

1967 "has been

defeat of Arab forces in

on Muslim

Jerrv Falwell interprets America's decline in a similar way:

not be mocked, for whatever an individual or a nation sows, that

America with

it.

is

not big enough to shake her

Sodom and Gomorrah Rome, and

Greece,

fell

under the judgment of God, so did

countless other civilizations as well."

The connection between

"is"

shall

"God

will

he also reap.

God and

of a holv

in the face

fist

inter-

countries for having earlier discarded

Israel,

get

away

Babvlon,

18

and "ought" means that

it is

possible to have objec-

knowledge about how we should behave. That would be

a good foundation for would then agree once thev understood the facts, even in a pluralist democracv. This is not an argument for natural law or natural right. Fundamentalists do not claim that we can reach political agreement through the use of reason alone. That belief is actually a form of idolatrv, because it assumes that men and women can get along on their own. The real basis for hope in politics is that God is active in the world. I mentioned above a variety of ways in which his activitv is manifest. But the most important from a political standpoint is this: he has given us, tive

making

laws. People

in writing, the

foundation of a legal code.

Fundamentalists of nearly

all

persuasions hold this conviction. American Protes-

on

tant fundamentalists argue that our law should be based

the Bible, which they look

upon as the word of God. God intervened in human events bv speaking his word to Moses and the evangelists. I explain in my essav how fundamentalists think that word should be transformed into rules of law governing contemporary society. In a large

As Said Arjomand a legal system on "The entire system

sense this has a parallel in the Avatollah Khomeini's vision for Iran.

and

Ann Mayer

explain, he believed that

nothing more than

was possible to base

it

jurists' interpretations

of Islamic sources:

of government and administration, together with the necessary laws, you.

.

.

There

.

draw up

is

no need

for you, after establishing a

laws, or, like rulers

who worship

is

to

draw up

ministerial programs."

is

ready for

down and

ready and waiting. All that

This system of law drawn from the Qur'an and the Sunna

all

sit

re-

19

Birai contends, in his essay in this part, that

on which

lies

foreigners and are infatuated with the West,

run after others to borrow their laws. Everything

mains

government, to

is

the Shari'a.

adoption of the Sharif

is

Umar

the one point

observant Muslims in Nigeria agree. 20 The Muslim Brotherhood

in

Egypt has had the same ambition, according to Abdel Azim Ramadan. 21 Charles Liebman's essav observes that in Israel the declared goal of all the religious parties is a state ruled bv halakha

demand system.

The

— rabbinic interpretations of

reflects a

biblical law. 22

The

failure to press that

degree of political prudence rather than a belief that there

is

a better

23

idea of drawing law from a sacred text

private distinction.

By

relying

on

a religious

is

an obvious repudiation of the public/

document

in the

lawmaking process,

it

violates the principle

of separation, which directs that the public sphere must be kept

secular. If a society

serious about enacting revealed law,

is

understanding of freedom a

as well.

The

good example. God's law imposes

case of

it

might

yiolate the secular

Salman Rushdie's The Satanic

strict penalties for

Verses

is

the sins of apostasy and bias-

John H. Garvey 20

phemy. In a society that keeps religion out of the public arena, bv contrast, individuals change their religious beliefs and to express insulting opinions about mat-

arc free to ters

of faith without

fear

of government

reprisals.

IV I

have argued that religious fundamentalists reject the public/private distinction be-

God

cause thev believe that

volume

reveal,

however, there

We

"fundamentalism." ferent societies. It

is

problem, because they

abundant variety

I

all

captured our attention

argue that there arc

will

similarities, too,

taxonomv

of

1

that

we

overwhelm the

among

the

as facets

this

label dif-

of the same

about the same time. In manv

at

and the

similarities. In this section

and important distinctions, and some striking

real

movements we

address.

leave for the reader to decide. In the

I

essays in part

phenomenon

movements

treat these various

regards, however, the differences

next

in the

apply the term to movements within different religions in

tempting to

is

As the

active in the world.

is

Whether we

end the

issue

arc justified in

our

of naming follows

rather than precedes understanding. I

will address the subject

topics.

The

What

first is.

of differences (and

similarities)

causes fundamentalists to

by looking

become

at

two

related

politicallv active?

causes are not alwavs the same, although they are fewer than one might suppose.

second

is,

What do

politicallv active fundamentalists

want? Here there

In regard to the causes of fundamentalist political activism,

movements reviewed

in this part into

two groups.

In the

first

are

we

is

more

The The

variety.

can divide the

movements

reacting

to a change (or a threat of change) in national identity. These include the Sunni

Muslims

Punjab, the Free Presbyterians in Ulster, and (for

in Pakistan, the Sikhs in

separate reasons) both

movements

Gush Emunim and

the haredim in Israel. In the second are

government efforts to expand the public sphere in an existing would put American Protestant fundamentalists, the Muslim

reacting to

Here

nation-state.

I

Brotherhood and Islamic groups

in

Egypt, the Nakshibendi

activists in

Turkev, the

Islamic tajdid in Nigeria, and the popular revolution in Iran. Neither the

groups

in India

nor Numayri's Islamization program in the Sudan

either category. It

would be

is

easy to understand

whv the

threat

of a change

fits

Hindu

neatly into

in national identity

unsettling to people concerned with preserving a religious tradition. If the

some other faith, that society might suboutcome most feared bv Free Presbyterians in

reconstituted society were dominated by

merge the

tradition entirelv. This

Northern Ireland land.

On

faiths (or

if

Ulster were to

the other hand, if the

no

faith),

is

it

the

merge with the

new

Republic of

might deal with the new pluralism by becoming more

This has been the case with the haredim in

Jews for their

largely Catholic

anti- Zionism,

Israel.

The haredim

but the basis for their opposition

tion to the formation of a secular state that

people from God's hands.

Ire-

society were to include people of several other

are remarkable is

secular.

among

their religious objec-

would wrest the redemption of the Jewish

INTRODUCTION FUNDAMENTALISM AND POLITICS 21

At times, though, the change rather than a threat. is

more

religiously

from India

in

in national identity presents itself as an

partition

(

homogeneous. This

who

people

opportunity

rather than a merger) could result in a society that is

the situation in Pakistan, which was split off

1947 The Islamization program

among

identity

A

there

and

are ethnically

is

an effort to create a national

The one

linguistically divided.

thing

most members of the society have in common is their religion. The 1947 partition was also seen by some Hindu groups as a step toward making India more religiously homogeneous, though there

The

tion.

politics

are

non-Hindu elements

very large

still

of Hindutva aims

in the

reducing their significance, and

at

extended family of religious groups that

we

call

Hindu.

Like a partition, a territorial acquisition can present an opportunity to extend the acquiring religion to a

Emunim

of the Gush

actiyities

in the

most of these

natural that in

It is

new domain. This occupied cases

popula-

uniting the

at

is

territories

— the chance

one way of describing the

of Judea and Samaria.

of merger, acquisition, and

partition, reli-

gious fundamentalists are able to point to a discrete and well-defined group as the

"enerm "

— the force against which they

react. In Ulster c\angelical

Protestantism de-

by opposition to the Catholic church. In India the Bharatiya Janata Party

fines itself

Gush Emunim is locked in struggle occupied territories. The case of Iran presents an

(BJP) inyites conflict with Muslims. In

with the Arab population of the

Israel the

interesting contrast. Khomeini's fundamentalist yision identified the (the Great Satan) as the territorial

Mayer

enemy of his movement. But

boundaries of

puts

it,

Iran. It

was

this conflict did

in a sense proactive rather

United States

not concern the

than reactive. As

the conflict was "prolonged because the regime thrived

Ann

on having

foreign devils to combat." 24

The second change

—

class

This might occur, state.

of movements comprises those that are reacting against internal

efforts to enlarge the public sphere as

World War

Since

without changing

territorial

boundaries.

has in the United States, through an expansion of the welfare

it

the government, and in particular the federal government,

II

has increasingly taken over the direction of such matters as education and family

The

federal courts have applied constitutional

of religion

in the public schools.

equality to change the

rules

of children, and so on. The liying arrangements.

ditures

and

They have used

of family

states

norms of separation

life

life.

to root out vestiges

constitutional ideas of freedom and

about inheritance, the bearing and rearing

ha\e relaxed rules governing marriage, divorce, and

Congress has affected many of the same matters through expen-

tax policy.

these once private matters

As

religious fundamentalists fear that their traditional

become more

ways of life

public and secular,

are being

pushed

aside.

In Iran the popular fundamentalist movement that led to the overthrow of the

shah was preceded bv several decades of modernization. The shah strove to create a high-technology economy, and to buttress

it with educational and cultural downplayed the Islamic aspects of Iranian religious identity. 25 In a similar way, the resurgence of Islam in Turkey since the 1950s can be seen as a reaction to

capitalist

policies that

Atatiirk's secularization policy. Atatiirk

Turkish constitution.

He

introduced the principle of secularism in the

disestablished Islam as the state religion, abolished the

John H. Garvey 22

and made

Shari'a courts,

heim, Atatiirk believed

modern

the

state];

.

education secular. §erif Mardin has said that, "like Durk-

all .

.

had only

religion

was relegated to the

it

secondary or marginal role to play

a

role

of independence advocated

In India the ideology that prevailed at the time

(and under Nehru, secular) democracv similar to those

ralist

[in

of a personal value." 26 Recent

in the West.

unhappiness with that approach has given a push to fundamentalist

a plu-

political, cultural,

Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), and the RSS. a popular sense that the government has treatment to Muslim, Sikh, and other religious minorities.

and religious groups

like

the BJP, the

These groups have successfully played upon given special

follows that in this class of cases religious fundamentalists focus their attention

It

on

issues

United

of reform and

revival

— and on domestic rather than foreign

policy. In the

example, Protestant fundamentalists are concerned with questions

States, for

of abortion, homosexuality, pornography, and public and private education. In Nigeria,

Muslim

traditionalists

have focused on enforcement of the Shari'a,

appointments, and the role of religion in party It is

common

within.

It is

reform efforts of

in

enemv

identify an

against

whom

all

political

politics.

this kind, as

it is

in the first class

believers should unite.

of

cases, to

But here the enemy

is

not a discrete religious or national group but, rather, a certain way of

thinking that can affect anyone. called "secular

Among

humanism. " In Nigeria

American Protestant fundamentalists

it is

called

u

Euro-Christianitv." In Turkey

it

is

it is

"Western Christian capitalism." In the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt it is

AH

"paganism."

portant of them

these ideas have certain features in

common, and

the

most im-

the distinctively liberal notion that religion should be kept out of

is

the public arena.

V What do

politically active fundamentalists

mands they make, and

this

religious ideology, the nature size

Although

talists all

third is

look

in. I will

withdraw from Exit

would

it

its

simplify things too

is

a great variety in the de-

Political

society,

its

is

society.

prospects for success, and

much

to say that religious

manv

other

fundamen-

coercion

at three

of these. The

The second

— the

rejection

is

union

— the

first I will call

rejection

exit

— the choice to

of the idea of separation.

of religious freedom.

an attractive option for obvious reasons. If fundamentalists object to a social

system that divides

life artificially

into public and private spheres,

group to

it

form

more homogeneous community governed by

a smaller and are,

to create a

requires the

Tara Singh put

state. it,

all

it

not leave?

allows

them

It's

to

religious law.

ways of cutting tics with society. One extreme is what extremist Sikhs envision in the Punjab. As Master "The Hindus got Hindustan, the Muslims got Pakistan, what did

of course,

new

start

why

over again, but

a big step because

There

programs van' with

form of government, the

pursue the same objectives, there are several characteristic directions that

move

they

The

of the surrounding

and prosperity of the religious group,

factors.

want? There

should not be surprising.

less drastic

This

is

INTRODUCTION: FUNDAMENTALISM AND POLITICS 23

the Sikhs get?" 2 "

and cut

A less radical solution and out. This

off" traffic in

haredim

in Israel.

More modest

is to form an enclave within the secular society what the Amish have done in America, and the

is

simple geographic concentration and isolation.

still is

In a country as large as the United States, particularly one governed along federalist

option can allow a

lines, this

isolation in

many

fair

parts

emphasis on federalism

deems

as a

for a variety

people to tinker with the

States.

Umar

Birai suggests a greater

way of accommodating Muslim demands

in religious matters.

fit

flexibility for

of the southern United

of these solutions allow the

All

degree of

middle of this century evangelical Christians found that sort of

social system. In the

rest

And

of reasons. Secession

is

in Nigeria. 28

of society to adopt whatever arrangements

yet secularists tend to resist

out of the question because

most forms of it

conflicts

it

exit

with the

ideology of nationalism. Religious dissenters today can't just leave their country and

new one, as the Pilgrims did. They have to take some territory with them. would need to take the Punjab away from India. Why nationalism requires territorial integrity and why the two are such strong forces are difficult questions. But start a

Sikhs

clear that secession, as a solution to religious conflict,

it is

is

a recipe for civil war.

Enclaves are unpopular for slightly different reasons. Advanced societies provide their citizens with a large

number of public goods:

even the system of government

Anchorites

itself.

national defense, roads, schools,

like the

haredim or the Amish

some of these goods, though thev

cally refuse to contribute to

typi-

share in the benefits.

The haredim

decline to serve in the Israeli army, though thev enjoy the security

affords them.

The Amish do not pay

situations like these the general public religious enclave. religious

sons

it

community

may be

tolerance

Even

Of course

is

if

the public

represents to

its

may resent giving a free ride to members of a may also resent the standing reproach that a

secular

and

materialistic habits.

For these

that such enclaves can only be maintained in liberal democracies

legally enforced

through

it

social security taxes or serve in public office. In

a rule

rea-

where

of freedom.

society did not actively resist geographic isolationism,

it

would be hard

to

maintain in an industrial society in the face of improvements in communications and transportation technology. These forces break resisting

The

group into the

down

the barriers and integrate the

larger society.

alternative to exit

is

union. Both reject the idea of separation, but unionists

want to change the system rather than leave it. It is not clear what stimuli produce this reaction. I would make two apparently contradictory claims. One is that funda-

when they are losing. That is to sav, they have when their way of life is most threatened by that they tend to make more radical demands when

mentalists are

more

become more

politically active at times

the political process.

inclined to fight

The other

is

they have a chance of winning. In other words, the degree of union that fundamentalists

seek varies inversely with the pluralism of the society.

Steve Bruce supports the

(NCR) ism

in

America.

in the last

He

first

claim in his analysis of the

argues that the

Christian Right

decade because secular policies formulated at the national

29 impossible to maintain a stance of geographic isolation.

ists'

New

NCR moved from quietism to political activ-

attack has focused

Much

on what Richard John Neuhaus has

level

made

it

of the fundamental-

called the

"naked public

"

John

H. Garvey 24

30

square.

They have

and so

forth.

forward

more

union of church and

state

is

no

in the public schools, creches

society

But there

call for

clement of religion into public

tried to reintroduce an

prayer and teaching about creation

would

part, they ask for neutrality rather than

union

fall

As

public property,

than America, and a straight-

pluralistic

fundamentalists have moderated their demands.

on

life:

on deaf

I

— equal

For that reason

ears.

my

explain in

essay for this

treatment of religion and

secularism. 31

The behavior of die haredim Liebman points

in the last

few

gain. Their politics has been defensive rather than aggressive.

American fundamentalists, have been concerned with the issue

is

in

life

lives.

years, but as Charles

out, they have been motivated by fear of loss rather than

The

inverted in a Jewish state.

square" but a "Jewish street."

The

They

provides an illuminating comparison.

in Israel

have been increasingly involved in electoral politics

issue

controlling metaphor

public

32

Harcdi

hope of

parties, like

of separation, but the

is

not

"naked public

a

willing to permit the conduct of public

is

accordance with Jewish law so long as people can reject religion in their private

But the inversion of terms

ultimate question to look very

is

much

how wide

like its

is

not

as

important

as

one might

think.

For the

the Jewish street should be, and there the debate begins

American counterpart. Like American fundamentalists the

haredim have made modest demands: Sabbath closing laws, more power for rabbinical courts,

of Return

more (a

public

money

for religious schools,

point they have not insisted on). This

and an amendment to the

list is

unimposing,

in

all

Law

likelihood

because the haredim cannot hope for greater success. They are, in matters of religion,

too out of step with their surrounding society.

The case is otherwise in Iran. Once again it is true that the fundamentalist movement arose because observant Muslims felt that they were losing their traditional way of life, in this case to the reforms of the shah's government. But their agenda was much more radical, and it succeeded to a degree. They have created an Islamic government according to Khomeini's model of velayat-e-faqih (rule by the Islamic jurist). There are a number of plausible explanations for this success, but they must include popular support among the lower classes in urban areas for some of the fundamentalists' I

goals and an even wider enthusiasm for Khomeini's charismatic leadership.

turn

now from

the policy of union to the policy of coercion

religious freedom. This

is

a more extreme approach than the

society to establish an official religion for the conduct of

— the rejection of

last. It is

its

possible for a

public affairs and yet

permit individuals to dissent privately. Under such an arrangement the public religion

would be supported by

tax revenues,

they might appoint the governors),

monies, and still

its

ministers might be appointed (or conversely

its its

liturgy

creed might form the basis for

might be integrated into public

some kinds of legislation. But

it

cere-

would

be possible for people to reject that creed, shun public ceremonies, worship in

other ways, proselytize for other

with the

official religion.

This

is

faiths,

and

in general live private lives at variance

actually the situation in Israel. It

degree in England, whose established church

is

is

also true to

some

headed by the queen and supported

with tax revenues.

The most ambitious fundamentalists would

prefer to

stamp out

all

forms of dis-

INTRODUCTION FUNDAMENTALISM AND POLITICS 25

sent. It first

might be

useful,

though, to distinguish between two kinds of coercion. The

forbids 33 behavior that people might object to for either religious or secular

The campaign against pornography in America is a good example. Fundamentalists argue that we should control smut because it is a sin. Secular feminist reasons.

groups support such laws too, not for religious reasons but because thev think por-

nography offends the dignity of women. freedom might accept such

a

A

society

committed to the protection of

law notwithstanding the

part by religious sentiments. If the secular arguments in

fact that its

was motivated

it

in

favor were strong enough,

people could sensibly prefer good legislation over a good legislative process.

The second kind of coercion a

forbids behavior that people can only object to for

Consider the case of the Baha^s

in Iran: their faith has been deemed form of apostasy from Islam, punishable by death. Or consider Ann Mayer's discus-

religious reasons.

sion of the fundamentalist campaign against the

passed in 1984 forbade them "to

call

Ahmadi minority

use Islamic terminology, to use the Islamic

call

to prayer, to

mosques, or to propagate their version of Islam." 34 Here the goodness of the law without is

making

a religious

life

A

law-

call their it is

places of worship

not possible to judge

judgment. Legislation of this kind

the ultimate rejection of the public/private distinction.

into public

in Pakistan.

themselves Muslims or their religion Islam, to

It

not only brings religion

but also eliminates the private sphere.

VI I

not trv to review the individual pieces

will

here. Instead

draw.

The

I

first is

most of them

that

in part 1 further

attribute relatively

ments thev study. Coercion (of the second kind)

much

desired, but

it is

than

I

have already done

by offering two observations about the conclusions that they

will close

is

modest ambitions to the move-

not often mentioned. Union

The

often a token or symbolic kind of union.

grams advanced bv fundamentalist movements have

is

political pro-

a sketchy quality

about them.

Talk about making the Shari'a (halakha, the Bible) the law of the land

is

usually

phrased in the most general terms. Specific proposals and enactments tend to have a

may just be the nature of dissent. Criticism is easier than may only reflect the novelty of the fundamentalist phenomenon.

very limited focus. This reconstruction.

Or

it

In time the programs might be better articulated.

There seems, though, to be point.

Movements

ments (United

in the

a division

more western,

almost along East/West

lines

on

this first

industrial states with strong national govern-

States, Ulster, Israel, Turkey,

Egypt, Nigeria) seem

less

ambitious than

those elsewhere (Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, India).

The second point

is

that

most of the movements

succeed in any impressive way. This point

United States and

Israel;

one may

infer

it

is

explicitly

in the cases

are

thought to be unlikely to

made about movements

the Free Presbyterians in Ulster and the

Gush Emunim

nationalistic objectives are matters that

largely within the control

Once

again, however, this

is

lie

a point that can be

more

in the

of Egypt and Turkey. Whether in Israel will achieve their

of other

parties.

confidently asserted of Western

.

John H. Garvey 26

than of Eastern societies (Nigeria

is

talism in Iran, Pakistan, the Sudan,

The political more difficult to

a special case).

and India

is

future of

fundamen-

predict.

Notes Those

1.

familiar with the role

nized religion in American public

of orgalife

will

I have simplified both sides of dichotomy for the sake of clarity. A more nuanccd statement would require several qualifications. On the one hand mamreligious liberals would tolerate, or even insist on, some overlap of the public and pri-

ment

in

Northern Nigeria

Current Perspective,"

Movements

in Historical

R. Hackett, cd., Nav

in

Nigeria (Lewiston,

realize that

Religious

this

N.Y.: E. Mellon Press, 1987), pp.

vate spheres

— religion has some implications

on Law,

and Constitutions in and the Sudan," this volume.

Politics,

Iran, Pakistan,

Gellner, Islamic Dilemmas.

1 1 is

95-98.

Maver, "The Fundamentalist Im-

10. A.

pact

and

in

more obviously

true

The point

of Sunnis than of

for public policv. (Christian charitv, as well Shi'ites.

as equal protection, requires us to racial discrimination.)

On

combat

the other hand,

American Protestant fundamentalists stop short of arguing for a full integration of religion, law, and politics. (Thev seldom claim that churches as such should have an influ-

N. Madan, "The Double-Edged

12. T.

Sword: Fundamentalism and the Sikh Religious Tradition," in Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago: University

1991),

p.

of Chicago Press,

618.

interference with religion and promotion of

13. G. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (New York: Oxford Uni-

doctrine.)

versity Press, 1980), p. 117.

ence on the

I

and generally

state,

reject state

omit discussion of these qualifications

in

in part

them more fully in chapbecause what I have said

in the text fairly

conveys the difference in

part because ter 3

and

I

treat

14. Heilman and Friedman, "Religious Fundamentalism and Religious Jews,"

pp. 207,

15. Bruce,

orientation between mainline religions and 16.

fundamentalism ists

America. Fundamental-

in

242-44.

"Two

God Save

Ulster! pp.

269-70.

Poles of Akali Politics," Sikh

Reviewll (1983): 45, 47.

do contend that religious ideas, stated in

religious terms, should play a

part in public

life

than the

more

central

of society

rest

is

Gellner,

E.

3.

Islamic

ed.,

Dilemmas:

and

Industrialization

Mouton Publishers,

1985), pp. 1-9.

Re-formers, Nationalists (Berlin:

Mayer, "The Fundamentalist Impact

Pakistan,

comfortable with. 2.

17.

on Law, 18.

Constitution

art.

Mayer, "The Fundamentalist Impact

I.

25

5.

U.S. Const, amend.

6.

Constitution

7.

S.

art.

(India). I.

Heilman and M. Friedman,

"Reli-

gious Fundamentalism and Religious Jews:

The Case of the Haredim,"

in

Fundamental-

isms Observed (Chicago: University

of Chi-

cago Press, 1991), pp. 212-13. 8.

S.

Bruce,

God Save

9.

See

P.

Clarke,

p.

and Constitutions in Iran, and the Sudan." See S. Arjomand, "Shi'ite Jurisprudence and Constitution Making in the Islamic Republic of Iran," this volume. Politics,

Pakistan,

24 (Turkey).

Clarendon Press, 1986),

America! (Garden

Doubleday and Company, 1980), pp.249-50.

on Law, 4.

Falwell, Listen,

in Iran,

Citv, N.Y.:

19.

U.S. Const, amend.

J.

and Constitutions and the Sudan."

Politics,

Ulster! (Oxford:

146.

"The Maitatsine Move-

20. U. Birai, "Islamic Tajdid and the Political

Process in Nigeria," this volume.

21. A.

Ramadan, "Fundamentalist

Influ-

ence in Egypt," this volume. 22. C. Liebman, "Jewish Fundamental-

ism and the 23.

The

Israeli Polity," this

situation

volume.

among Hindus

in India

—

.

INTRODUCTION FUNDAMENTALISM AND POLITICS 27

is

an interesting contrast to the examples

Muslims, Christians, and Jews are monotheists, each with a single sa-

given in the

text.

cred scripture that

is

Among Hindus

law.

the basis for religious the divine takes

manv

forms and there are no texts accepted bv all as authoritative. Hence, one does not hear

of aspirations for the enactment of "Hindu

But Hindu fundamentalists do oppose the enforcement of Muslim law, even in do-

Modern in

J.

Piscatori, ed., Islam

the Political Process

(Cambridge: Cam-

Turkev," in

bridge University Press, 1983), pp. 142-43.

H. Oberoi, "From Punjab to 'Khaand Metacommentarv," Pacific Affairs 60 (1987): 26, 38. 27.

listan': Territoriality

28. Birai, "Islamic Tajdid and the Political

Process in Nigeria."

law."

mestic disputes

among Muslims. And

espouse some forms of legislation tecting

cows)

for

exclusivelv

(e.g.,

thev pro-

religious

H indu— reasons 24. Maver,

"The Fundamentalist Impact and Constitutions in Iran,

Politics,

Pakistan,

and the Sudan."

25. A.

Sachedina,

and Enclave,"

"Activist

and Lebanon,"

in

Shi'ism

in

Fundamental-

isms Observed (Chicago: University of Chi-

cago Press, 1991), pp. 417-20. 26. S. Mardin, "Religion and Politics in

this

volume.

Naked Public Square (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1984). 30. R. Neuhaus, The

31.

on Law,

Iran, Iraq,

29. S. Bruce, "Fundamentalism, Ethnicity,

Garvev,

J.

American Law,"

"Fundamentalism

this

32. Liebman, "Jewish and the Israeli Politv." 33.

Or

I

about prohibitions.

34. Maver,

Pakistan,

Fundamentalism

compels. For simplicity's sake

will talk just

on Law,

and

volume.

"The Fundamentalist Impact and Constitutions in Iran,

Politics,

and the Sudan."

CHAPTER 3

Fundamentalism and American Law

John H. Garvey

In

may seem an anachronism. Toting

estant fundamentalists

ety

the popular imagination,

and modesty, they look and sound

like

American Prot-

Bibles and preaching sobri-

our Puritan forebears awakened from a

long sleep. In keeping with this image, they seem to reject the modern

liberal society

they find around them.

This picture, though their theology liberal ideals.

and

it

politics

contains elements of truth,

Chief among them

is

a very

is

distorted.

A

close look at

a number of modern form of individualism. They also

shows that fundamentalists

are

committed to

accept the related ideals of freedom and equality (though their religious beliefs give these

words

a

unique interpretation). As the popular image suggests, fundamentalists

do embrace some Puritan a source

ideals as well.

Most

notable

is

their devotion to the Bible as

of political wisdom. But even though fundamentalists accept some blending

of church and

state,

they stop far short of prescribing the kind of biblical society that

prevailed in colonial Massachusetts.

In what follows

begin by looking

I

will try to bring fundamentalist politics into sharper focus.

at the

damentalist view of law in simplification,

I

stress

I

fundamentalist view of religion. In order to explain the fun-

two

modern American features

—

its

society,

and

"individualist"

at

and

considerable risk of overits

"biblical" character.

conclude by evaluating the impact this view has had to date and

is

likely to

I

have in

the near future.

Religion

The sociology and theology of

movement are treated at some number of recent monographs. I

the fundamentalist

length in an earlier volume in this series and in a

28

1

FUNDAMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LAW 29

myself with a brief account of the features that bear most directly on law

will content

and

For reasons that

politics.

become obvious,

will

we might

about "what fundamentalists believe" as

The account

lieve."

closely adhere.

It is

I

offer

a

is

model of tvpical

speak precisely

difficult to

is

it

speak about "what Catholics be-

which most fundamentalists

beliefs to

not a confessional statement. Individualist Piety

Fundamentalists espouse a markedlv individualist form of feature

is

born again

is

come

to

to believe that

sat in the kitchen eating breakfast. 3

he

ence

is

memorable.

and

real

how

sincere,

it

A

person will

it

lives.

has been saved. If the rebirth

fortunate. It!" I

"It

Christian

A few years ago

moved

is

he stopped cursing when,

for people to

remember overhearing one of my students

means," he

said, "I

found

a

new

life

God

saves individuals

not a belief that

and

all

the 'church'

is

one by one

—

it

For the fundamentalist, furthermore, coupled with

pietv.

This

is

a

commitment

are not so

what

"I

Found

button meant.

his

this

experience

.

.

is its

individual char-

Jerry has been saved, Judy has not. This

belongs the promise.

ance, but onlv because he belongs to the

is

ask another

Christians share. Consider the account,

called, to

who

at the

first step.

wear buttons saying

Protestant theology, given by Rudolf Bultmann:

liberal

onlv the

in Jesus Christ."

For our purposes the important point about acter.

is

to share his faith with others

was popular

it

is

William Shcehan, chairman of the

testifies that

age of nineteen, he accepted Jesus as his savior. 4 Internal change

The born-again

happens

Jesus. It often

But whether sudden or gradual, the experi-

change the way he

will

To be

in Jesus Christ. 2

happened to him on 20 January 1952

know whether he

Division of Prayer in Falwell's church,

best-known

religiosity. Its life

one has been saved by

rather suddenly. Jerry Falwell recounts as

new

the experience of being "born again" to a

.

.

.

The

.

is

more typical of Catholic "Not the individual but

individual

.

.

finds deliver-

.

community." 5

faith

is

to personal virtue

not just spiritual body building.

not just a theological conviction.

—

It is

chastity, fidelity,

It

temperance, and

an expression of the individual's

6 submission to God. Consider the case of homosexuality:

churchmen not only betray

Liberal

of

God

their ignorance

of and unbelief in the

Word

bv their excessively lenient position on homosexuality, but they also

reveal that they

do not understand

its

true source.

.

.

.

Atheistic

humanism

.

.

.

come to deifv man. Therefore, man owes no allegiance to anyone above him and ought to be permitted to lay aside all restraints on his behavior. Recall "Do your own thing," "Do what you feel like doing," or his favorite maxims "Amthing you want to do that doesn't hurt someone else is all right." has

—

For fundamentalists there are no self-regarding actions or harmless immoralities. Hois a "sin against the body." It causes harm by "keep[ing] us from being

mosexuality

'joined unto the Lord.'

When

it

comes to

"7 living the virtuous

today think that homosexuality

is

life,

"ought" implies "can."

a natural sexual preference,

Many

not a choice,

left-handed rather than right-handed. Fundamentalists disagree. If sin

is

people

like

being

that natural,

John H. Garvey 30

God

then

habitual

playing a cruel joke

is

born again)

on

us. Sin

we can do

hard to shake, but

it is

it

is

Pornography and prostitution,

God. But they

why

it

becomes

faith (being

homosexuality, are sins against oneself and

like

wider significance. Fundamentalists find

also have a

order of male-female relations. Sex

to marriage.

is

essential to virtue. 8

is

in St. Paul's

When

learned behavior.

with God's help. That

And

resonance

a special

an activity that should be confined

is

within marriage there are separate injunctions for husbands and

wives: husbands should "love [their] wives"; wives should "submit [them]selves unto

husbands." 4

[their]

husband, and

A woman should

decidedly antimodern.

with feminists pose treating that

in their

women

wrong because

is

be an ornament to the home, a helpmate to her

mother to her

a loving

It

of sex-segregated

children. This idea

does, though, lead fundamentalists to

roles

is

make common cause

opposition to pornography and prostitution. Both groups opas objects for it is

masculine wish fulfillment. For fundamentalists,

inconsistent with the Christian ideal of chivalrous love.

Adulterv and abortion spread harm in an even wider

circle

— to the family

unit.

The kitchen table 10 is, in Nancy Ammerman's phrase, a kind of "family altar." The home itself is a sanctuarv that offers refuge from a world in which the believer is an alien. The love of husband and wife is an image of God's love for his church. 11 The result is that adultery Family

has an almost sacramental character for fundamentalists.

life

doesn't just cause pain;

it

a

is

kind of apostasy. Because

strains the sinner's relation to his church. (This

which fundamentalists see as

a

is

form of infanticide,

tears apart the family,

it

even true of divorce.)

is

12

it

Abortion,

the ultimate sin against family

life.

Alcohol and drug abuse are other forms of private excess that fundamentalists try to avoid. There

is

new about

nothing

this;

time of Dwight Moody. 13 Like chastity, to drink

kind of amnesia, that

finally a it is

and drugs out of anxiety and

ultimately unsatisfying,

Still

the Answer":

a virtue closely tied to faith. People turn

despair. Substance abuse provides a thrill,

a descending spiral: people

it is

is

faith in

"Some men pretend

make attempts

that things

the answer for a world that's seeking for peace."

The

flip side

of interest

remedy

of the world have brought thrills

they try to find!

find release

/

For Jesus

14

of this preoccupation with personal virtue has been an apparent

in the larger

concerns of social

justice.

sexual discrimination, peace

among

nations,

and so on. This, too,

a history. Early-twentieth-century fundamentalists reacted in the

Social Gospel preached by liberal Protestants. In certainly be a

good

thing,

from

lack

Fundamentalists remain aloof from

organized efforts to address poverty, hunger, environmental pollution,

would

to

God. In the words of the song

them peace of mind / But with the dawn of each new day new Not until they meet the Prince of Peace can they ever hope to is still

and

an inadequate stand-in for the love of God. Because

is

the deficiency. But the only real solution "Jesus Is

temperance has been a concern since the

it is

one way

a Christian point

is

racial

and

an attitude with

same way toward the

this

seems perverse.

It

of view, to wipe out poverty,

hunger, war, pollution, and so on. Fundamentalists do not oppose this social agenda because of

its

discrimination

of sex

roles.)

intended is

results.

(With

this exception: the

designed to produce results

The explanation

is

more

subtle.

in conflict I

will

campaign against sexual

with the fundamentalist view

mention three

factors.

a

FUNDAMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LAW 31

One

a

is

disagreement about the causes of social disorder. Socially active Christians

tend to view

w hack. The

we should

sin, like salvation, as a

activity

—

a matter

of society getting out of

is

a social pathology that

with social science. Fundamentalists disagree. For them society

treat

aggregation of individuals and lems.

group

and the blame are corporate. Sin

responsibility

its

problems are

identical

with the

an

is

sum of their prob-

individual sin that causes social disorder.

It is

This naturally leads to distinct ideas about the solution of social address personal sin

is

symptoms, not the

disease; thev

sins. Social

programs

like

make only cosmetic changes. Of

to

chief causes of

poverty are drug and alcohol abuse, sloth, the breakdown of the family

sequence of individual actions), and similar

The way

ills.

The

to bring about individual conversions.

(

itself a

con-

welfare treat the

course, sin

not

is

the only cause. There are natural misfortunes too, like real sickness, economic dislo-

and old age. But the way to address these

cation,

The Good Samaritan

charitv.

whether he was

Medicare.

eligible for

He

the welfare office to say, 'Hev, there's a

didn't

Even

on

if all this

and

charity.

were

true,

The answer

economy of effort.

the

If

we

—

like the virtue

of

the fellow had Blue Cross. Or,

go running

to the county hospital or side

He

of the road.'

15

one might ask why is

private virtue if

guy back there by the

carried the victim to the inn and cared for him."

faith

is

"didn't check to see

social action couldn't

supplement

that the Social Gospel has unintended consequences

focus

on

we

social solutions,

will

diminish our indi-

vidual exertions proportionately.

The

contrast

I

have drawn between individual and social action suggests that fun-

damentalists should be politically inert. This

below. Government action

is

addresses the real causes of social

toward

So

is

not

so, as

I

will explain in

more detail when it

quite consistent with fundamentalist aspirations

harm

— when

it

away from

leads people

and

sin

lives of private virtue.

far in the discussion

of individual

piety'

I

have focused on the fundamentalist

preoccupation with personal virtue (and the corresponding neglect of social action).

now want to do people who I

The most

word about the institutional features of fundamentalism. How way get together, in churches and other organizations?

sav a

think this

striking thing about Protestant fundamentalist ecclesiology

volun-

is its

and democratic character. Churches are voluntary associations of individuals. People join because the message appeals to them and leave when it does not. When

tary

Jerrv Falwell decided to join a church, he asked his friends,

"Does anybody know

church in Lvnchburg that preaches what Dr. Fuller preaches on the radio?" minister

is

the leader of the

group by virtue of

subject to democratic control in this sense: he tion with

him or

lose his position.

his preaching authority.

must earn'

"Almost everyone

a majority

who

16

a

The

But he

is

of his congrega-

has been part of a funda-

mentalist church for long has been through a full-scale church split over a pastor." I7 In denominational terms most of these churches are independent Baptist, Bible,

and Assemblies of

God

churches, or small fundamentalist sects. 18

churches. In a sense they are like their

over their

own

affairs.

When

members writ

large.

They

They are local autonomy

exercise

several churches join together, they affiliate, rather than

unite in an episcopal or presbyterian fashion.

The connection

is

often looser

still

—

John H. Garvey 32

common

group of Bible

to a

tic

and colleges

institutes

which

at

their pastors are

educated.

Sometimes

has been

it

communion with

more

Jerry Falwdl's

sensible to say that so-and-so

TV show

a fundamentalist in

member of Dr.

he himself was a

(as

is

Fuller's

radio congregation). Television and radio evangelists have plavcd an important role in the definition

and congruence of the fundamentalist movement. Thev

mate form of private voluntary association. Members can tune and can switch churches bv

just

in in their

are the ulti-

own homes

changing the channel. The phenomenon of televan-

The

gelism in turn has led to the creation of other parachurch organizations.

known of

these (Christian Voice,

best

Moral Majority, Religious Roundtable) grew out

of electronic ministries and used television and computerized mailings to communicate with their

members.

There are also numerous other groups, distinctive roles in the fundamentalist

and

less well

stitute (a legal

like

(a direct-action anti-abortion

and

the telcvangelists

lines.

Typical exam-

group), the Rutherford In-

organization concerned with abortion, school prayer and curricula,

and government regulation of churches), and Theonomv radical

that play important

nondenominational

their adherents, generally operate along

ples are Operation Rescue

known,

movement. These groups,

program of laissez-faire capitalism and

biblical law).

group that promotes

(a

a

19

Biblical Faith It is difficult

in

which

to understand the individual piety of fundamentalists apart

it is

rooted. That faith

Fundamentalists believe that

means,

it

was whispered

have been more subde. But

of error. The Bible

When we just to

God

its

talk

is

line

bv

came

it

faith

speaks directly to individuals in the Bible. This is literally

the

"Word of God." One need not The inspiration might

line in the evangelist's ear.

in

terms sufficiently precise to preclude the pos-

inerrant as

God

himself is.

about the fundamentalist belief

mode of authorship

from the

biblical in a very strong sense.

in the first place, that the Bible

believe that

sibility

is

in biblical inerrancy,

but also to a canon of construction.

It is

we

refer

not

not just true;

true. We should, whenever possible, understand it to mean exactly what When Genesis says that God created the world in six days, it means six twenty-

it is literally it

says.

four-hour periods.

One

result

of literalism

is

that the Bible says

about science, history, geography, and so on. Another

is

that

some

we can

surprising things foretell the future

by looking into the prophetic books. This has led fundamentalists to expect (soon)

book of Revelation. 20 makes the Bible accessible

the 1,000-year reign of Jesus Christ predicted in the

The combination of inerrancy and erage person. This

is

literalism

not so true for people

way. The principles of form criticism

now

who

approach

it

in a

more

to the av-

sophisticated

accepted by scholars require the serious

student to have a knowledge of languages, history, literary forms, and the

work of

other biblical experts. Fundamentalists reject those principles for a variety of reasons,

among them

a rather populist

view of God: surely

God would not speak to us in a God loves us all, his word

language that onlv a few academics could understand. If

must be addressed to us

all.

Reading the

text

can be

difficult (particularly the

King

FUNDAMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LAW 33

James version favored by fundamentalists), but the onlv necessary study aids are prayer and the help of a minister.

The

accessibility

of the Bible has a central importance for fundamentalists because

Thev consult it for advice about difficult decisions, for comfort in time of affliction, for words of praise and thanksgiving. One often hears how believers in search of guidance have opened their Bibles at random and thev use

it

as a

guide to dailv

on passages

lighted, like St. Augustine,

often

memorize

occasion

life.

their favorite passages

that spoke personallv to them. People will

and have them

at their fingertips

This frequent practice of reading and memorizing a

arises.

when

common

the text

naturallv affects speech patterns. Fundamentalists have a distinctive biblical argot that

sounds, not surprisinglv, rather Jacobean to outsiders. 21

So Bible studv has

a

quotidian ethical significance. But

of religious observance. People read the Bible

a

sermon, which

mentalist preacher

uplifted Bible

is

the eucharist.

.

is

The

.

also the principal

Bible

is

form

they are not looking

services are organized

pulpit without an

open

"No Funda-

Bible;

it is

an

For a Fundamentalist congregation, the pastor's

his authoritv.

as rituallv significant as .

it is

when

the preacher's explanation of a biblical text.

would even dare enter the of

essential trapping

even

way of worshiping God. Sunday

for personal advice, as a

around

dailv,

is

someone partaking of

the elevated host for

for Fundamentalists the very presence

of God

in rheir

midst." 22

Evangelization (spreading the gospel)

is

itself

an important religious exercise. The

true believer thinks that the most important thing one person can do for another lead

him

to the faith, and that the best entree

to this process: the unbeliever

which he is

is

told

is

the

literal

the

week

first

after

is

a kind

is

of circularity

asked to accept Christ on the authority of a book

is

word of God. But

to bring him to understand the

From

the Bible. There

is

faith

the only

from the

way

inside, so

to enlighten the convert

he

is

taken there directly.

our conversions, Jack trained us to lead other people

We memorized the five or six Scriptures that We practiced reading and quoting outlined the simple plan of salvation. We turned back and forth between the verses until the them to each other. pages almost fell into place and the passages leapt out at us. We paired into to Christ as

we had

just

been

led.

.

.

teams with one

.

.

.

.

member pretending

acting as the evangelist-teacher.

to

know nothing of the

faith

and the other

23

Fundamentalists do not have an elaborate theological system to supplement their

devotion to the Bible. In

fact they take their

effort to reduce Christian belief to tals

there are

official

is

not

clear,

its

name from an

early-twentieth-century

fundamentals. 24 Exactly

how many fundamen-

because fundamentalists are not a denomination with an

creed approved by an authoritative body. But though there are various

they are

all

short.

The

first

historian of the

movement counted

five points:

lists,

the iner-

rancy of the Bible plus certain views about the birth, death, resurrection, and return

of Jesus. 25 This theological simplicity talist

movement.

I

is

quite natural, given other features of the fundamen-

have mentioned the individualism evident in both the conception

H. Garvey

John

34

A movement

of virtue and the reading of the Bible.

own

her

truth in Scripture

not

is

that allows each person to find

develop a complex tradition binding

likely to

all

The voluntary nature of the ties between memand between one church and another, would make it impossible in

adherents to a particular set of views. ber and church,

any event to bind points (few

five

of this kind. in the

way

all

fundamentalists to an elaborate creedal program.

enough

on one hand)

to be counted

that the Bible

I

less stress

than other Christian churches do on

God and humans.

have been examining. If theology it

on. If

God

has a special place not because

of faith.

It is a

with

by which the church or

its

functionaries,

bring God's grace to individuals. Thev are thus out of keeping with

an egalitarian faith that allows each individual to approach

life

fits

we don't need a priestly we also don't need an

simple,

is

This, too,

speaks to each of us in the Bible,

interpreter for his word. Sacraments are acts as intermediaries,

movement

It is accessible

is.

mediators (ministers and sacraments) between

caste to earn'

just the thing for a

theology that the individual can master on her own.

It is a

Fundamentalist churches also put

the features

is

A simple set of

it is

a sacrament,

God on

but because

recognition that the believer has

become

it is

her own. (Baptism

an initiation into the

liturgicallv self-sufficient.)

Law The

religious beliefs

of fundamentalists

for legal reform. In the liberal tradition in their

first

section

will

I

fit

emphasis on individualism and freedom. But they

personal virtue. In the second section

svmpathv

argue that fundamentalists

I

will

show

within the shift these

left

rules

that fundamentalists have a

for the old Puritan religious establishment.

freedom and equality puts them to the

agenda

their

and use them to argue that the government should enforce

ideals to the right

deal of

view of the law and

affect their

But

of the Puritans on the

of

good

their devotion to

political

spectrum.

The Liberal Ideal working hvpothesis of one strand of liberal theory

It is a

from the universe, humanity is

to transcend

everything

somewhat humanity

is

all

talk

is

sovereign. "If there

of good and

permitted."

26

This

is

evil

is

that,

because

God

is

absent

no master design, the challenge

and master the universe.

If

God

the point of view that fundamentalists

is

dead,

condemn,

humanism." Actually it is a bit misleading to sav that would be more accurate to say that individual human beings

looselv, as "secular is

sovereign;

it

are sovereign.

We

are not collectivelv

separate ways, driven

more than "the

heading

by our

own

in

any particular direction.

desires.

As Hobbes

object of any man's appetite or desire

and absolutelv so." 27

It

.

.

We

explains, .

are

all

"good"

going our is

nothing

there being nothing simply

follows from these presuppositions that a legal system cannot

be built around anv particular idea about what

is

good. To do so would be unfair to

FUNDAMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LAW 35

who do

the multitude of sovereign individuals

not share that idea. 28

It

would be

inconsistent with liberal individualism.

Liberal political theorv incorporates these presuppositions in the idea of rights,

Freedom canes out an area where the individual is sovereign. It allows people to make choices. Consider the woman's freedom of choice on the issue of abortion: she can give birth or not give birth, as she wishes. The other freedoms in our Constitution have the same bilateral character. Freedom of speech protects the right to honor the flag or to burn it. Freedom of religion protects believparticularly the right to freedom.

ers

and

29

atheists.

Fundamentalism vidual pietv. Its

a highlv individualist

is

ecclesiology

is

good

— to do God's

with him in the next. The problem with

human is

through Scripture.

world and to be united

will in this

theorv

is

not

1

devoted to the

(like liberals)

its

individualism but

ideal

of freedom. Jerrv

its

come and go;

godlv individual

Fundamentalists believe,

as

is

Fal-

Fundamentalist economic proposals always

mem-

Fundamentalist churches are voluntary organizations:

individual churches retain their independence and reject

larger ecclesiastical structures.

God. The

liberal

called Liberty University.

stress the free market.'

bers are free to

God

nature and the sovereignty of God.

Fundamentalists are also well's college

religion. Its ethics stress indi-

atomistic. 30 Unlike liberals, however, fundamentalists believe that

each person desires the same

views on

form of

theology emphasizes unmediated access to

Its

Freedom one

Cabin

who

also characterizes the individual's relation to

obeys God's

did, that true

commands of his own

freedom

is

free will.

voluntary submission to

the will of God. 32

This

is

where thev part ways with the

mately' submission, even if

it is

liberal tradition

— because freedom

is ulti-

voluntary submission. Fundamentalists argue that laws

which drive us toward God's will are not inconsistent with freedom; indeed, thev set with actions us free. Converselv, true freedom must not be confused with license

—

"Freedom of speech," Jerry Falwell says, "docs not include perverting and sickening the moral appetites of men and women.

that are inconsistent with God's will.

.

.

.

33 In liberal theory the idea of freeLiberty cannot be represented by sexual license."

dom is

bilateral, in the

sense that

For fundamentalists freedom God's In

will,

but

it

some wavs,

may

is

it

permits choices (to have an abortion/to give birth).

unilateral.

properly close

off"

then, fundamentalism

The government must

leave us free to

do

other paths. is

a peculiarly

modern brand of religion

that

shares the ideals (individualism, freedom) of liberalism. But these are subordinate to a higher ideal: to get people to live as ples helps to explain various aspects

Consider lic,

first

God commands.

This peculiar blend of princi-

of the fundamentalist

the defensive side of the program. Like

political

program.

much of the American pub-

fundamentalists object to excessive government control over their private

lives.

The most common provocation has been the regulation of Christian day schools. From one angle this objection is a quintessentially liberal idea: people ought to be free to raise their children as they wish. That is a private matter to be decided on an individual or a family basis.

But for fundamentalists the decision has

gnancy, because Christian education accords with God's will.

a special poi-

John H. Garvey 36

The popular licans.

stereotype sees fundamentalists as law-abiding, conservative Repub-

In a conflict of this kind, however,

civil

man's law requires what God's law forbids, uals are in a position to directly to

God

make

judgment

that

disobedience

it is

is

natural reaction.

When

an obstacle to true freedom. Individ-

for themselves because they can relate

who

through Scripture. Moreover, to one

holds the key to biblical

and Scripture

interpretation (literalism), questions about the conflict of law

questions about which reasonable people can

They

differ.

are issues

are not

of black and

good and evil. A number of fundamentalist parents and educators have shown commitment to these principles by going to jail rather than complying with state

white, their

laws designed to regulate Christian (and other private) schools. 34

Those who engage of the same

in civil

disobedience to protest abortion are motivated by some

Members of Operation Rescue have been

principles.

for blockading the doors of abortion clinics.

arrested repeatedly

These people arc not defending

their

own

freedom, but what they see as innocent

tors,

thev are unperturbed bv their violation of social norms. As Francis Schaeffer put

it,

"If there

is

no

final place for civil

lives.

Like the Christian school protes-

disobedience, then the government has been

.

.

.

put in the place of the living God." 35

Freedom

not just the absence of governmental constraint. True freedom, fun-

is

damentalists believe,

is

willing submission to the will of God. This

use the law to promote freedom by prodding people to

from the defensive to the offensive

side

do God's

of the fundamentalist

means will.

political

that

we can

Here we turn

program.

ways. First, the

we should use the law to promote true freedom in two law should condemn those who do evil. That is the essence of jus-

— to punish

wrongdoers. The criminal law serves a retributive purpose. Most

Fundamentalists think that

tice

fundamentalists support vigorous efforts at crime control and the imposition of capital

punishment. 36

The law can

also serve as a

brought confusion and

wrong. This

is

why

a

moral teacher.

When Adam and Eve

sinned, they

need for instruction. The law can help us to know right from

the political platform of the Christian right has emphasized per-

sonal moral reform.

One

central plank has

been to undo the

effects

of the sexual

revolution: to suppress pornography, discourage homosexuality, prevent heterosexual

promiscuitv, and (by overturning the

abortion

illegal.

Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade) make the modern-day equivalent

Another has been to control drug abuse

—

of the temperance crusade. 37

The Puritan Ideal In our national mythology the Puritans are

Thev thought who violate it. They

virtue.

known

also distinguished

between true

throp called the "liberty wherewith Christ hath erty for a

men

to destrov themselves").

38

The

made

This led to a second religion

trait that

we

liberty

and punish those

(what Governor Win-

us free") and license (the "lib-

Puritans thought of the social contract as

covenant with God: he would show us his favor

merge

for their devotion to personal

that the law should instruct us in God's law

if

we

did his

will.

associate with Puritan society

and government. Their government was not

39

— the tendency to

literally

theocratic in the

FUNDAMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LAW 37

sense that

it

was run bv church

Church and

officials.

and neither was subordinate to the other. Their Aaron. *° Ministers could not hold public

most

ecclesiastical matters.

sion.

The

franchise

41

God's work. They were

working

just

Public officials did God's in Scripture.

adultery, fornication,

One was

Public

work

in the

Moses and

Magistrates could not intervene in

officials,

no

less

a religious mis-

close cooperation

than ministers, were doing

in a different vinevard.

bv enacting and enforcing laws based on

chiefly

This of course included rules against murder and

and sodomy. But

differed

it

from our

legal

system

Puritan willingness to draw from the Bible

rules for affairs (such as trade

institutions,

fraternal, like

But the government existed to carrv out

state.

table ways.

was

was limited to church members, and there was

between the church and the

God's law found

office.

were separate

state

relation

by the merchant

we might

class) that

The

fairly detailed

first,

as well as

government punished blasphemy,

civil

theft,

two no-

consider matters

of religious indifference. The other was that Puritan law covered the the second, table of the decalogue.

in

heresy,

vain swearing, and sabbath breaking. Baptists were banned from Massachusetts; sev-

Quakers were hung. The General Court

eral

obligatory. The Puritans saw no rality" if

— between the

first

likely to

real

one they could enforce the other

to enforce

some synergy

They argue

that the

in

doing

Our common

as well.

because pious citizens were more

law has a similar provenance.

human

The Commonwealth of Kentucky adopted passed

a

law requiring that the Ten

school classroom in the cation of the

state,

vet

it is

the picture

I

this version

is

clearly seen in

Look

at Blackstone's

of history by statute

Com-

in

1978.

be displayed in each public

Most fundamentalists hold just painted.

47

First,

adoption

its

Common Law of the

too simple to sav that fundamentalism

have

based

along with the following notation: 'The secular appli-

Ten Commandments

Puritan heritage.

is

scriptural law into the

laws should not contradict revelation. 45

Commandments

code of Western Civilization and the

And

so,

Founding Fathers wrote

mentaries: they begin bv saving that

legal

worship

fundamentalists frequently say, as the Puritans did, that our law

Bible. 43

Constitution. 44

It

for public

distinction between "religion" and "mo-

be well behaved. 42

Modern on the

made support

and the second tables of the law. Both were God's law, and

human governments were

Indeed, there would be

also

is

just

as the

fundamental

United States." 46

an effort to recover our

beliefs that differ in significant

they demonstrate

less

ways from

enthusiasm than the

Puritans did for enacting the second table of the law. Except for a few extreme groups,

they have limited their efforts to the issues will

only occur

in units

the church. This

is

legislation like the

ment)

48

why

more intimate than

I

addressed above.

More

radical

change

— the family, the school, and

society itself

fundamentalists defend the traditional family (by proposing

Family Protection Act and by opposing the Equal Rights

Amend-

and Christian schools. 49

Second, fundamentalist efforts to enforce the

first

table

of the law (to merge

state) have been tame by Puritan standards. Fundamentalists have pushed and curricular reform in the public schools. But in doing so they have usually appealed to the ideal of freedom. Proposals for school prayer call for noncoercive observance. During his first term. President Reagan urged passage of a constitu-

church and for praver

John H. Garvey 38

amendment permitting voluntary school prayer. 30 Proposals for more religion usually appeal to the norm of equality as well. Consider the idea of a moment of silence, which students can use for prayer or some other form of thought. 51 A variation on this theme, supported by the National Council of Churches as well as evantional

gelical

groups,

the federal Equal Access Act of 1984.

is

It

guarantees religious groups

on secondary school

the same right other voluntary student groups have to meet

premises during noninstructional time. 52 In the case of curricular reform, opposition

of evolution has taken such forms

to the teaching

as Louisiana's

Balanced Treatment

Act, providing for the teaching of "creation science" alongside "evolution science." 53

These appeals to freedom and equality are meant to be taken talists

brand of religion. This, they

The only way

crimination.

alongside

say,

to remain neutral

competitor so that

its

not neutrality about religion but

is

is

Fundamen-

seriously.

humanism

believe that the public schools have established secular

form of

a

to allow the Christian religion

its

dis-

place

who

are

movement

has

can compete for the attention of those

it

own

as their

willing to listen.

By comparison with

historical Puritanism, then, the fundamentalist

been surprisingly modest to suppose, as settle for

what

many is

in

its

view of what the law should accomplish.

do, that this

merely a

is

possible rather than fight for

—

tactical

concession

what

ultimately desirable.

is

mistake

It is a

a willingness to

Though

they reject the value-neutrality of liberalism, fundamentalists are restrained by their

own

devotion to freedom and equality.

An

Evaluation

The American Constitution provides two important

One

nection between law and religion.

directives concerning the con-

make no law Clause). The other

says that "Congress shall

prohibiting the free exercise" of religion (the Free Exercise that "Congress shall

make no law

lishment Clause). There

is

.

.

.

says

respecting an establishment of religion" (the Estab-

an apparent tension between these two

Exercise Clause assumes that religion

is

and gives

special

rules.

The Free The

extra protection.

it

Establishment Clause seems to make religion taboo.

The

liberal tradition resolves the tension

public spheres, and giving each clause includes the interior

with people

who

life

share

its

by dividing the world into private and

own

sphere of influence.

(my thoughts, emotions,

my

thoughts, emotions, and

and so on. The public sphere

is

The

private sphere

my relations my family, my church,

beliefs). It also includes

beliefs:

the larger society outside

my

private

life

— the world

of government and the market. In the liberal tradition religion

meaning

that

it

can't be verified

dream. This view of the private

Freedom

is

a private matter.

is

by other people.

life

(some would say

it

is)

a

explains the characteristic liberal view of freedom.

a right that protects the private life against

ligious freedom, like other freedoms, a variety

We say that belief is "subjective,"

It is like

of choices for and against

is

bilateral (or

religion.

The

government

interference. Re-

perhaps multilateral)

reason, as

we

can

—

now

it

protects

see,

is

that

FUNDAMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LAW 39

un verifiable, incommensurable. There

religious belief is subjective,

whether your religious belief bv giving us both

On

is

a right to religious

with which people hold their erals say, the

dominant

beliefs.

Unless

on

restrictions

the

Clause supports the Free Exercise Clause; at

mentalist ter

anv

rate,

movement

look

I

part in public

The Establishment

life.

testimony to the fervency

It is a

forbid a religious establishment,

does not conflict with

it.

the prevailing ideology in American politics, and the funda-

is

made

has

headway

little

against

In the remainder of this chap-

it.

As

failures.

I

It

will

show,

it

has succeeded

has failed almost entirely in

attempts to introduce religious observance into the public sphere.

its

regulate private morality

me

Let

vet

life, it is

somewhere

falls

division

commandments and

the dreamer experiences. taste the

We

one.

ence

It is

same

unilateral. Religion

is

all

words of the

the

is

and personal

We

are

all

come with

God. And

relation with

same

one loaf of bread

of instructions

set

not

is

a

— we

dream all

life

taste

it

(his

that only

separatelv,

why the fundamentalist conception of freedom

not "subjective";

it is

real, verifiable,

and the same

for every-

don't need to protect a variety of choices against government interfer-

— onlv one.

As

for the public

Fundamentalists

life,

know

that

it

is

God

a delusion to is

suppose that

sovereign over

all

God

spoke

law.

his

word

is

we

can fence

the world. That

behind the evolution controversy. In the Genesis account, ordering the world according to his plan. There

of

— that funda-

cut from the same pattern (in

the

Bible). Religion

rather like

thing. This

effort to

will take up.

I

think should be obvious

a direct

our several experiences are not unique.

We

I

The

of life into private and public spheres. As to the

of us has

true that each

the image and likeness of God).

and vet we

between, for reasons

in

review bv noting what

do not accept the

mentalists private

mv

begin

lib-

creed

its

best with clearly religious claims in the private sphere.

is

treats us alike

on everyone else. This will freedom of dissenters. The Establishment

it

movement's successes and

at the

we

want to impose

sect will

and to

lead to civil strife

That,

no

not actually a condemnation of religion.

is

no way of telling

freedom.

the other hand religion should have

Clause

is

worse than mine. So the law

better or

God

is

God

out.

the real point

present and active,

is

a parallel to this in

our

legal system.

to us in the Bible and thereby laid the foundation for our svstem

The Establishment Clause cannot

require us to treat law and religion like

unrelated phenomena.

on the fundamentalist political agenda. But is what I have called the the resistance to laws that restrict defensive part of the fundamentalists' program their own religious observance. I will offer two examples. These views have had

let

me

first

First,

—

fundamentalists have objected to a variety of state laws governing private

religious schools.

These laws regulate curriculum, textbook

cation, student testing

selection, teacher certifi-

and reporting, and such mundane concerns

as fire prevention,

Fundamentalists argue that these laws interfere with religious

and safety. and the freedom of parents to

health,

dom

a real influence

note one area where they have not mattered. This

raise their children as

consistent with liberal assumptions. Religion

damentalist education

is

is

a matter

they see

fit.

free-

Both claims

are

of private choice, and fun-

one legitimate way of exercising that choice. So, too,

is

child

John H. Garvev 40

to the discretion of parents. It

rearing a private matter, best

left

the legal system should offer

some protection

in this area. It has

is

thus natural that

done so

in several

different ways.

The

strongest form of protection

is

protects fundamentalist schools against requires preschool

program

a

holding that the federal or state constitution

government regulation. The

state

of Michigan

directors to have certain educational qualifications, in-

cluding at least sixty hours of credit from an accredited college.

Preschool objected that this rule would prevent

The Emmanuel Bap-

from hiring born-again Christians from Bob Jones University and Tennessee Temple University. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the rule violated the Free Exercise Clause of the federal tist

Constitution. 54

The Kentucky Supreme Court

it

of the Kentucky

held, at the request

Association of Christian Schools, that a similar rule violated the right of religious

freedom guaranteed by section 5 of the Kentucky constitution. 55 It is clear

and constitutions — the freedom of and the — cover fundamentalist schools. But there difference between the

that federal

right to privacy

religion

state

is

a

may cover me but not protect The government seldom sets out to restrict the usuallv interferes inadvertently, while pursuing some

coverage and the protection of a right. (A suit of armor

me

against certain kinds of bullets.)

freedom of religion

as such. It

56

important enough, courts

innocent secular interest. If the interest

is

the government's way. Fire laws are a

good example. And

will

not stand

in

there are equally good,

innocent, secular reasons for regulating curriculum, teachers, student attendance, and

so on.

The Supreme Court

recently held that the

the federal Constitution affords

no

freedom of religion guaranteed by

special protection against such "neutral, generally

applicable law[s]." 57

Even if the freedom of religion is too weak to invalidate a law, it may be a strong enough reason for a legislative exemption. North Carolina's experience is illustrative. In 1978 a state court upheld, against constitutional claims, the existing scheme for regulating private schools. The next year the state legislature, in response to religious lobbying, enacted a law providing that "in matters of education 'No human .

.

.

authority shall, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience.' " It eliminated the

requirement of

lum. 58

for protection has been strong

Where

demand proven more the

protection has

state approval for teachers

enough,

and curricu-

this

means of

efficacious than resort to the courts. 59

Where neither judicial nor legislative protection is available, the claim of religious freedom may still receive some protection from the executive branch, which can simply decline to enforce regulations that fundamentalist schools find too burden-

some.

It is,

But there

for obvious reasons, difficult to

is

good reason

to believe that

example, a Department of Education

no

it

document the incidence of such occurs. In a recent case in

official testified that

inactivity.

Vermont, for

"the Department conducts

on-site reviews to ensure that the report [discussing the school's hours, objectives,

teachers, course

of studv]

accurate and has 'no authority to review whether, in fact,

is

doing what they say they are doing.' There is no further beyond the reporting." 60 Let me now turn to a second example of the success of the fundamentalist defen-

the private

.

.

.

school

intrusion by the State

is

.

.

.

FUNDAMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LAW 41

sive agenda.

Given the crowded conditions of modern urban

forum

to provide a public ing.

The

)

liberal tradition holds,

place in public

gued

though, that religion

mean

This might

life.

life, it is

often necessary

for private activitv. (Public parks are available for picnick-

— that we should exclude

— and

religious activity

a private matter

is

and has no

the government has sometimes ar-

from public

schools that allow voluntarv student groups to meet

on

fora.

For example, public

the premises after school

hours have often denied that privilege to religious groups. In this kind of dispute, fundamentalists can appeal to widelv accepted principles

of equalitv and freedom to support

groups are

their claim. If other private

meet, religious groups should be equallv

free.

That

free to

the principle behind the federal

is

Equal Access Act. In Board of Education v. Mergens the Supreme Court upheld that act and rejected the argument that it violated the Establishment Clause by bringing religion into the public sphere. 61

The fundamentalists

1

offensive

program

engage the law

tries to

in the

reform of

other people's behavior. Unlike the defensive program, this agenda rejects liberal

sumptions about law and free process for

religion.

accommodating

Fundamentalists argue that the law

We

private concerns.

is

as-

not a value-

cannot make public policy

about abortion, for example, without making some judgments about the value of fetal life.

And

if

convictions about value are to play a role in the legal system, there

reason to exclude religious convictions.

on

rightlv insisted

The

evils

of modern

life

Recall that in liberal theory freedom

choices: birth

no

is

successors have

have been condemned by God.

offensive agenda also rejects liberal assumptions about

life.

its

their entitlement to proclaim that abortion, homosexuality, por-

nographv, and other

vate

The Moral Majority and

is

freedom and the

pri-

a bilateral right. It protects alternative

and abortion, sexual promiscuity and

restraint,

and so on. But

if

God

condemned some of those choices, then freedom is a one-way street. Laws against sexual misconduct do not restrict true freedom. Indeed, they promote it, by showing us the way to go. In the pursuit of this agenda fundamentalists have had some modest success, but thev remain, politically speaking, a third party rather than a "moral majority." Conhas

sider the three

ernment

most

visible issues in recent years:

funding of controversial

The Supreme Court

homosexuality, abortion, and gov-

art.

held in 1986 that the freedom guaranteed by the

Due

Process

Clause does not protect homosexual sodomy. Speaking generally, this was a victory for fundamentalists. religious.

Moral

But the reasons the Court gave for

rules,

it

its

be matters of long- accepted social practice.

We

no means They might just

decision were by

declared, could have their source elsewhere.

can forbid homosexuality because

62 Moreover, the Court did "proscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots."

not hold that homosexual behavior must be forbidden;

it

branches of government to deal with the issue as they

like.

running against the fundamentalist

side. States are

merely freed the elected

And

there the tide

is

with increasing frequency repeal-

63 ing or refusing to enforce their laws against sodomy.

The issue of abortion Supreme Court has taken

has followed a similar pattern. In the three steps

away from Roe

v.

Wade.

It

last

few years the

has indicated a dis-

"

John H. Garvev 42

satisfaction with the trimester rules laid

allowed the government to

down

restrict public

some

states to require (subject to

bv Roe for regulating abortions.

And

funding of abortions.

it

It

has

has permitted

exceptions) that adolescents notify their parents

before having abortions. 64 But once again the Court has upheld these restrictions for

nonreligious reasons.

A limit on

'traditionalist" values

towards abortion, as

particular religion.

6S

And

abortion,

it

has said,

it is

may be

they wish. In that forum fundamentalists

some

Mormons, and other

successes. Louisiana

the trimester rules laid restricted the use

of

a reflection

here again the Court has not held that abortions must be

forbidden, onlv that the elected branches of government

Catholics,

much

"as

an embodiment of the views of any

—

in

deal with the issue as

with large numbers of

religious (and nonreligious) conservatives

and Utah have enacted

down

may

in conjunction

Roe

New

Wade. 66 Iowa, Minnesota, and

v.

of public funds for abortion

assistance.

67

— have had

which diverge from

restrictive laws

York have

Arizona, Arkansas, Michi-

gan, Mississippi, North Dakota, Nebraska, Pennsvlvania, South Carolina, and Tennessee have enacted laws designed to assure parental notice or consent for minors, or

informed consent for tions have failed in

adults. 68

On

the other hand, legislative efforts to restrict abor-

Alabama, Florida, Idaho,

Illinois,

and South Dakota. Connecticut

and Marvland have passed laws designed to guarantee the right

in the event

Roe

v.

Wade should be overruled. 69 In 1990 the funding for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) was jeopardized when it became known that the NEA had subsidized exhibitions of several controversial pieces. These included homoerotic photographs by Robert Mapple-

thorpe, a collage by David Wojnarowicz portraying Jesus as a drug addict, and a

photograph bv Andres Serrano of groups

like the

a crucifix

submerged

American Family Association, Concerned

the Rutherford Institute figured prominently

among

Fundamentalist

in urine.

Women who

those

for America,

objected to such ex-

penditures. Their arguments here had a broad appeal. This was, after effort to regulate offensive behavior.

The government was using

should

seemed to say

it

that if the

pay for antireligious

government could not pay

art.

The

principle of freedom

not a simple

all,

tax revenues (con-

tributed in part bv religious conservatives) to sponsor such behavior. equality

and

The

principle of

for religious art, neither

seemed to say that people

should not be taxed to support blasphemy and the glorification of sin. 70 In the end, however, Congress reauthorized funding for the

toward fundamentalist objections. The lion

NEA

budget.

Its

bill

NEA with onlv a nod

ultimately enacted approved a

$174

mil-

onlv concessions to the NEA's opponents were a requirement

that the agency consider "general standards of decency" in awarding grants

and

a

provision for recoupment of funds from recipients convicted of obscenity. 71

Fundamentalists arc losing the public debate on issues people think that

God

has expressed no opinion about them.

American constitutional and ist

like these

common

ought to have a scriptural foundation overlooks two

American Christians and Jews,

The argument

facts.

One

is

The

claim that they

that a large minority

word of God. The other is that who accept biblical authority, do not is

that

law are based on the Bible ignores the separat-

aspect of eighteenth- (and twentieth-) century legal culture. 72

of Americans doubt that the Bible

because most

the

a majority

of

subscribe to

)

FUNDAMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LAW 43

literalism as a

Manv of these

canon of interpretation.

people will persist in differing

with fundamentalists about the bearing of Scripture on issues of personal virtue. Fundamentalists have had

least success in their efforts

port for specific acts of religious belief or observance.

proved the government display of Christmas creches,

to secure government sup-

The Supreme Court has apbut more as cultural artifacts

museum) than as objects of devotion. 73 Proposals to amend the Constitution, or to restrict the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, in order to restore prayer to the public schools have failed in Congress." 4 The Supreme Court (like religious

struck

pictures in a

down Alabama's moment of silence

purpose."

5

cated that

law because

it

had an obviously religious

The Court also invalidated Louisiana's Balanced Treatment Act and indiwould have no further use for "creation science" in the public schools."6

it

This poor record might seem surprising, since these efforts have liberal icons

anced treatment. The problem religion into public

life

The onlv

religious beliefs that

respected the

now widely

we

manv

no

is

secular reason, comparable

can offer to justifv government-sponsored religious

people do not share.

first

bal-

that the liberal tradition forbids us to introduce

possible explanation for such practices

Establishment Clause was are

is

even on those terms. There

to "traditional morality," that

observance.

all

of freedom and equalitv: thev have called for voluntarv prayer and

It is

is

that they earn- out

only three decades since the

interpreted to forbid these observances, 77 but the rules

accepted.

Conclusion Discussions of the place of fundamentalism in the American legal system often have

an unfortunate two-dimensional aspect. Enthusiastic portrayals tend to ignore the liberal

and separatist

strains in

mentalist objectives as

Legal writers tvpicallv religious beliefs

our constitutional

more congruent with our fail

history,

than they actually

are.

and nuances of fundamentalist

to appreciate the depth

and the extent to which such

and to characterize funda-

legal culture

believers share standard

American

legal

assumptions and idioms. I

have tried to give an account that has a

little

more

perspective and balance.

have argued that fundamentalists espouse individualism, freedom, and equalitv ligion It is

and

politics.

These

not surprising that

are ideals that

when

occupy

a

prominent place

in

our

I

in re-

legal system.

fundamentalists have claimed to uphold these ideals

(freedom for private schools, equal access to public

fora), they

have

won

popular

support and a measure of success. They have even had some success in drawing the boundaries of these

ideals.

(The right to freedom does not extend to homosexual

sodomv, drug abuse, some abortions, some pornography. I

have also argued that fundamentalists espouse a biblical faith that shares some of

the ideals of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Puritan establishment. In this, too, thev are tvpicallv American,

though more out of step with contemporary

thought. Like the Puritans, fundamentalists find moralitv and private from public

life.

it

They think

hard to distinguish religion from

that

America should acknowledge

John H. Garvey 44

dependence on

its

God and

that our law should be based

on the

(Hence, they

Bible.

Commandments

have supported school prayer, creation science, posting the Ten

public schools, and so on.) These efforts have been uniformly unsuccessful. But

should not exaggerate them. Thcv have often been tempered bv the above. School praver

would be voluntary

I

discussed

(or even silent). Creation science

would be

beliefs

given onlv balanced treatment. America Protestant fundamentalism vival

of old-time

religion. It

a

is

in

we

modern (though, of

not just a

is

course, conservative)

re-

way of

modern problems.

thinking about

Notes 1.

Ammerman, "North American

N.

Protestant Fundamentalism," in Martin E.

Marty and R. Scott Appleby,

Funda-

eds..

mentalisms Observed (Chicago: University of

Chicago

and

1991);

Press,

pp.

1971).

Bruce, The Rise

S.

New Christian Right

Fall of the

Doubleday and Company, 1980), 181-86; F. Schaefter, True Spirituality (Wheaton, 111.: Tyndale House Publishers,

City:

Clarendon Press, 1988); D. Bromley and A. Shupe, New Christian Politics (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1984); R. Liebman and R. Wuthnow, The New Christian Right (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1983); G. Marsden, ed., Evangelical-

and Modern America (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1984); R. Neuhaus and M. Cromartie, Piety and Politics (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and ism

1987),

The expression comes from

gospel

a

man

be

3.

p.

3.

Falwell,

J.

(New

York:

4.

F.

Fitzgerald,

ing Army,"

New

"A

Disciplined, Charg-

18

Yorker,

May

1981,

R.

(New

Bultmann,

York:

1958),

p.

12.

Ammerman,

R. Walton,

Jesus

Charles

and

the

Scribner's

Word Sons,

47.

1975),

8.

4-5;

LaHaye, The Unhappy Gays, chaps. Falwell, Listen, America! (Garden

J.

66-68.

America!

p.

240.

One Nation under God

Strength

for

the

Journey,

105. 17.

Ammerman,

18.

J.

New

Bible Believers, p. 126.

Guth, "The

Christian

in

jority

New

Christian Right,"

J.

Right,

chaps.

2-3;

P.

McBride, "The Moral Ma-

the U.S.A. as a

New

Religious

Movement," in E. Barker, ed., Of Gods and Men (Macon: Mercer University Press,

LaHaye,

Ibid., p. 116.

pp.

and R. Liebman, "Mobilizing the Moral Majority," in Liebman and Wuthnow, The

New

p.

127.

G. Wills, "Evangels of Abortion,"

19.

p. 7.

Believers,

p. 175.

16. Falwell,

1983),

The Unhappy Gays (Wheaton, 111.: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 1978), pp. 145-46. 6. T.

Bible

(Washington, D.C.: Third Century Publishers,

Schwartz and

pp. 53, 70. 5.

139.

Eph. 5:22-25.

14. Falwell, Listen,

1987),

103.

Press,

versity Press, 1980), pp.

Strength for the Journey Schuster,

(New

University

13. G. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (New York: Oxford Uni-

p.

Simon and

p.

Bible Believers

Rutgers

144-45.

born again, he cannot see the kingdom of :

Ammerman,

11.

15.

passage where Jesus says, "Except a

God." John 3

N.

10.

Brunswick:

Public Policy Center, 1987). 2.

ICor. 6: 18-20; Eph. 5:22-25.

9.

(Oxford:

York Revira^ of Books,

15 June 1989,

15; R. Pierard, "Religion

Right

in the

1980s," in

J.

and the

Wood,

New

ed., Reli-

gion and the State (Waco: Baylor University Press, 1985), pp. 393,

407-10.

)

FUNDAMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LAW 45

Most

20.

of history known

as "pre-

M. Oakeshott,

27. T. Hobbes, Leviathan,

Protestant fundamentalists sub-

scribe to a view

ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 32. See also

A

Human Nature

millennialism." Premillennialists believe that

D. Hume,

the millennium will be ushered in bv a pe-

ford: Clarendon, 1968), bk. 2, pt. 3, § 3;

riod of great tribulation

on the will

who

living

— God's

judgment

then return to earth and establish a mil-

kingdom bv

lennial

his might. (Postmillen-

bv contrast, believe that the church

nialists,

bring about the millennium peacefully,

will

through Jesus

preaching of the gospel, and that

its

return

will

end

the

at

of

the

millennium.

As to when

this will

all

happen, manv find

1,§

bk. 3, pt.

have rejected Jesus. Jesus

Treatise on

(Ox-

1.

A

28. Garvev,

Comment on

Religious Cou-

nctwns and Lawmaking, 84 Mich. L. Rev.

1288 eral

1986). In this discussion of what

(

theory believes,

more

than

drastically

lib-

have simplified even

I

did above in

I

cussion

of what fundamentalists

Here

are

some

many

religious liberals

my

dis-

believe.

qualifications. First, there are

who

believe that

God

created and reigns over the universe. Their

the interpretive kev in the founding of the

liberalism consists in the important role thev

of Israel in 1948. That fulfilled God's prophecy to restore the Jews to their home-

assign

own

land. Fundamentalists understand the Bible

solutions

to sav that the rest of the prophetic scenario

there are those

state

will

be plaved out within Matt.

event.

24:32;

a

P.

human

beings in working out dieir

and

salvation

to

the existence of

Shriver,

the good.

Thev contend

that that

is

Pluralism, and Politics," in R. Stone, ed.,

propriate attitude to take in political

Reformed Faith and

cause

(Washington,

Politics

D.C.: University Press of America, 1983),

impossible. like Mill)

Ammerman,

23. Falwell, p.

Strength for

the

Journey,

120. 24. The Fundamentals:

Truth

A

Publishing

(New

York: R. R. Smith, 1931),

See the discussion in

J.

Pelikan,

p.

nomenon," in N. Cohen, ed., talist Phenomenon (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1990), p. 3.

I

should note, for the sake of

that the theological simplicity

I

clarity,

discuss in

compensated for by an elaborate, even intricate, system of biblical hermeneutics. A good example of this, still the text

available is

C.

J.

is

partially

on

the shelves of large bookstores,

Scofield's

King James

annotated version of the

Bible.

26. B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal

State

(New

Haven:

Press, 1980), p. 369.

Yale

Johnson,

v.

(1989); Torcaso

University

some

and role

the state interlives.

U.S. 397 367 U.S. 488

491

Watkins,

v.

(1961). 30.

"Funda-

The Fundamen-

when

venes in certain areas of our

34.

mentalism and/or Orthodoxy? Toward an Understanding of the Fundamentalist Phe-

terms,

state to plav

promoting it. Their liberalism derives from their skepticism about the empirical

29. Texas

25. S. Cole, The History of Fundamental-

possible to speak

in

Company, 1910-15). ism

it is

objective

in

likelihood of success

Testimony of the

Testimony

(Chicago:

maintain that

hence possible for the

22. Ibid., p. 132.

be-

on these questions is Third, some liberals (utilitarians

about the good

Bible Relievers, p. 87.

the aplife,

agreement

pp. 48, 56. 21.

own

Second,

problems.

who remain agnostic about God and the objectivity of

few years of that "Piety,

designing their

in

political

J.

p.

An American Dream Crosswav Books, 1987),

Whitehead,

(Westchester,

111.:

152.

One Nation under God; FalAmerica! pp. 12-13. See also the journal Biblical Economics Today, published by the Institute for Christian 31. Walton,

well, Listen,

Economics.

and Law Row, 1969),

32. D. Little, Religion, Order,

(New

Harper pp. 41, 50-52. York:

and

33. Listen, America! p. 201 ton,

One Nation under God,

.

See also Wal-

chap. 3.

34. Nagle v. Olin, 64 Ohio St. 2d 341, 415 N.E. 2d 279 (Ohio 1980); State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E. 2d

(Ohio 1976); State

v.

Faith Baptist Church,

John H. Ganger

46

207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W. 2d 571 (Neb. 1981), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 803 (1981).

A

35. Schaeffer, p.

Christian

Manifesto,

The most noteworthy thing about

130.

these incidents

is

that thev are so infrequent.

Civil disobedience

by fundamentalists has to

37.

LaHave, The Battle for

Falwell,

pp.

186-212;

Family (Wheaton,

First

of

likely to, for several reasons.

is it

Black

all.

themselves

rights activists

civil

as a collective entity

saw

seeking a so-

Robison, Attack on the

J.

Tvndale House Pub-

111.:

1980); Moral Majority Report, 20

lishers,

July 1981.

Bozeman, To Live Ancient

38. T.

Press, 1988); S. Ahlstrom,

overcome.") Fundamentalist

tory of the American People

ence

civil

disobedi-

primarilv motivated bv the indivi-

is

dual's desire to

complv

with God's law, where impossible.

in his

The harm and

personal. There

is

own

actions

law makes that

civil

the reaction are

not that element of group

solidarity necessary to sustain large-scale

il-

Anti-abortion demonstrations

legal action.

do not fit this pattern, but thev are unique. Thev show a spirit of altruism, but no sense of solidarity. The demonstrators are concerned about harm to the unborn. Their reason for acting, however, is that the unborn are helpless, not that thev have some special

The second reason fundamentalist

for the small scale

disobedience

civil

is

of

that

is

homosexual

required).

The law mav

activity or the sale

of pornog-

raphy, but the godly can avoid both. Public-

schools

mav

children

not conduct pravers, but pious

can

still

prav.

In

these circum-

and C. Allen, Illusions ofInnocence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 41 ("lvke unto Hippocrates twinnes"). 41. Curry, The First Freedoms, pp. 3, 24. 42. Ibid., chap.

1;

Ahlstrom,

A

America!

Listen,

201; Schaeffer,

Law

(Nutley,

N.J.':

How

44. F. Schaeffer,

We Then H. Revell

Should

Live? (Old Tappan, N.J.: Felming

Company, 1976), The

head, (Elgin,

pp.

Second

111.:

own

souls; be-

legal

order just

to improve others' chances of salvation.

36.

H. Brown, The Reconstruction of the

Republic

(New

Rochelle, N.Y.:

Arlington

House, 1977), p. 192; W. Baker, "Capital Punishment," Fundamentalist Journal 7 (March 1988): 18; T LaHaye, The Battle for the Family (Old Tappan, N.J.: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1982), pp. 66-80.

Thoburn

torical

p.

Craig Press, 1973).

108-10;

J.

White-

American

Revolution

Cook

Publishing

David C.

28-30; R. Rush-

Va.:

should not upset the

29;

Christian Manifesto, pp. R. Rushdoonv, The Institutes ofBib-

Boycotts and other forms of legal pressure

lievers

p.

A

doonv, This Independent Republic

mately responsible for their

9-10.

Brown, The Reconstruction of the Republic,

triumphs over the desire for reformation. ulti-

Religious

History of the American People, chaps.

Company, 1982),

But the licentious are

p. 6.

Hughes

1956), chap. 5; R.

versity Press,

stances the fundamentalist passion for order

are desirable.

(New

First Freedoms

Miller,

P.

28-29;

permit

Yale

Errand into the Wilderness (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard Uni40.

lical

ding what

The

39. T. Curry,

(by requiring what

forbidden or forbid-

Religious His-

York: Oxford University Press, 1986),

laws seldom conflict directlv with Scripture is

A

(New Haven:

University Press, 1972), pp. 146-47.

43. Falwell,

kinship with the demonstrators.

Lives

(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina

change that would benefit the group to which they belonged. ("We shall cial structural

Christian

Crossway

111.:

Books, 1981); Walton, One Nation under

lawbreaking of the 1960s

ment. Nor

A

Schaeffer,

F.

(Westchester,

Manifesto'

God, chaps. 5-6;

move-

Falwell,

J.

The Fundamentalist Phenomenon (Garden City: Doubledav and Companv, 1981),

date not approached in scale the religious civil rights

the Family;

America!;

Listen,

pp.

Press, 1964), p. 3.

assumptions underlying

(Fairfax,

The

his-

this version

of events are severelv criticized in M. Noll, G. Marsden, and N. Hatch, The Search for Christian America (Colorado Springs: Hel-

mers and Howard Publishers, 1989); R. Pierard, "Schaeffer on History," in R. Ruegsegger, ed., Reflections on Francis Schaeffer

(Grand Rapids: Zondervan House, 1986), p. 197. 45.

Law

W.

Publishing

Blackstone, Commentaries on the

of England 42. See the discussion of

FUNDAMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LAW 47

H.

Blackstone's influence in

and

Blackstoue, 1

Titus, Moses,

Law

the

Land,

of the

C.L.S.Q. 5 (no.

and

4, 1980); J. Whitehead Conlan, The Establishment of the Reli-

J.

of Secular Humanism and Its First Amendment Implications, 10 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1, 25-26 1978); Whitehead, The Sec-

gion

Wallace

51.

v.

Jaffree,

472

U.S.

38

(1985).

20 U.S.C.

52.

Court upheld the Mergens,

496 U.S. 226 (1990)!

The law was

53.

4071. The Supreme Board ofEducation v.

§

act in

held invalid in Edwards

(

American

ond

A

Schaeffer,

Revolution,

30-32;

pp.

v.

Agmllard, 482 U.S. 578

made bv

pare the arguments

Christian Manifesto, p. 38.

jected to the teaching

Rev.

46. Kv.

in

The Supreme Court requirement

held that the posting

violated

Clause, because

its

158.178 (1980).

§

Stat.

Establishment

the

purpose was plainlv

reli-

Graham, 449 U.S. 39 1980). For more elaborate statements of the connection between law and the Bible, see Whitehead, The Second American Revolution; Rushdoony, The Institutes of Biblical Law.

gious. Stone

v.

47. There

(

on the

is

fringes

movement

talism a small

of fundamen-

(Christian recon-

struction) that self-consciously espouses a

Puritan revival in America. See Rushdoonv,

The

Institutes of Biblical

Law; Rushdoonv,

Independent Republic;

Theonomv City,

Christian

in

The movement

1977).

and

journals

(Oklahoma

and Reformed,

Presbvterian

Okla.:

Bahnsen,

G.

Ethics

publishes

newsletters,

various

including

Board of

54. Michigan Dept. of Social Services v. Emmanuel Baptist Preschool, 434 Mich. 390,

455 N.W. 2d

1

(

The court's holding two lines of decisions bv Supreme Court. One pro-

1990).

consistent with

the United States 1

tects parents

educational choices under the

Amend406 U.S. 205 1972) (excusing Amish children from com-

Free Exercise Clause of the First

ment. (

Covenant Renewal, and Dispensatmnalism

v.

655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala.), revd, 827 F. 2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987); Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Term. 1986), rev'd, 827 F2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). Cf. Grove v. Mead School District No. 354, 753 F. 2d 1528 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 826(1985).

the

Chalcedon Report, Christian Reconstruction,

of "secular humanism"

the public schools in Smith

School Comm'rs,

is

This

Comwho ob-

1987).

(

those

Wisconsin

v.

Toder,

pulsory attendance at public schools beyond

in

the eighth grade).

The other

protects such

Transition.

choices as an exercise of libertv under the

48.

The

proposing the Family Pro-

bill

September 1979). See Falwell, Listen, America! p. 136; Walton, One Nation under God, chap. 5; LaHave, The Battle for the Family, pp. 135-46. Act

tection

is

1808

S.

49. Bob Jones Univ.

v.

(24

United

States,

461

U.S. 574 (1983); Devins, State Regulation of Christian Schools, 10 J. Legis. 363 (1983); State and the J. Carper and N. Devins, "The Christian

Dav

School," in

gion and the State, 50.

p.

Wood,

ed., Reli-

211.

18 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs. 664

(17 May 1982). The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment is currently understood to forbid even voluntary prayers conducted by a public school. Engel v. Vitale, School District of AbSchempp, 374 U.S. 203

370 U.S. 421 (1962); ington Township

(1963).

v.

Due

Process

Clause

of the

Fourteenth

Amendment. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to operate a parochial school); Farrington v. Tokushiage, 273 U.S. 284 1927) (striking down certain pro(

grammatic regulations of foreign language schools in the Territory of Hawaii). For other recent examples involving fundamentalist

Church cational

Bangor Baptist Department ofEduand Cultural Services, 576 F. Supp.

v.

schools,

see

State of Maine,

1299 (D. Me. 1983); Sumner v. First Baptist 1, 639 P. 2d 1358 (1982); Nagle v. Olin, 64 Ohio St. 2d 341, 415 N.E. 2d 279 (1980); State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E. 2d 750 Church, 97 Wash. 2d

(1976). 55. Kentucky State Bd., Etc.

v.

Rudasill,

589 S.W. 2d 877 (Ky. 1979). Section 5 provides: "Nor shall any man be compelled to

John H. Garvey 48 send his child to any school to which he

may

56.

F.

Schauer, "Can Rights Be Abused?"

31 (1982): 225.

Philosophical Quarterly

57. Employment Div., Res.

v.

Smith,

Shenandoah Baptist Church, 53 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,791, 59 Ed.

be conscientiously opposed."

Dept.

of

Circ.

1986);

School,

791

EEOC

494 U.S. 872 (1990). See

also

jimmy Swaggait Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 1990); Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).

707

Cir. 1986); U.S.

Shenandoah Baptist Church,

v.

Supp. 1450 (W.D. Va. 1989); Mc-

F.

Leod

Rep. 669 (4th Fremont Christian

2d 1362 (9th

F.

Dept. of Labor

Human

Law

v.

Providence Christian School, 160 Mich. App. 333, 408 N.W. 2d 146 (1987). Such an issue was before the Supreme Court v.

(

For examples of cases applying this rule to health, and safety regulations of funda-

fire,

mentalist

schools,

Church Academy

885

F.

v.

New

see

Baptist

Life

Town ofEastLongmeadow,

2d 940

(1st

1989);

Cir.

Duro

2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983); Antrim Faith Baptist Church v.Com., Dept. of Labor and Industry, 75 Pa. Cmwlth. 61, 460 A. 2d 1228' (1983); Hough v. North Star Baptist Church, 109 Mich. App. 780, 312 N.W. 2d 158 (1981); Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802^ 301 N.W. 2d 571 (1981); State Fire Marshall v. Lee, 101 Mich. App. 829, 300 N.W. 2d 748 (1980). Many other cases have applied the same rule to programmatic issues books, cur712

District Attorney,

v.

F.

—

ricula, teacher certification,

student report-

and so on. New Life Baptist Church Academy v. Town ofEastLongmeadow, 885 F. 2d 940 (1st Cir. 1989); Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F. 2d 485 (8th Cir. ing,

(1987);

Blackwelder

Safnauer,

v.

Supp. 106 (N.D.N.Y. 1988); State

689 v.

Dela-

1990 WL 75320 (Vt. 1990); Care and Protection of Charles, 399 Mass. 324, 504 N.E. 2d 592 (1987); Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Bd. of Educ, 368 N.W. 2d 74 (1985); State v. Rivinius, 328 N.W. 2d 220 (N.D. 1982); New Jersey State Shelton,

90

N.J. 470,

Attorney General

v.

v.

Board of Directors of

448 A. 2d 988 (1982); Bailey, 386 Mass. 367,

436 N.E. 2d 139 (1982); State 294 N.W. 2d 883 (N.D. 1980).

Women

of

employees

schools have often

made

v.

Shaver,

fundamentalist

sex discrimination

claims about their pay and other terms of

employment. The courts have been quite receptive to such claims even in cases where the schools have religious reasons for treating

men and women

differently.

Dole

Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n

v.

Dayton Chris-

477 U.S. 619 (1986), but

the Court did not reach the merits. 58. N.C.

Gen.

(1987); Delconte

§

Stat. v.

State,

115C,

329

39 2d 636

art.

S.E.

(N.C. 1985); Note, The State and Sectarian Education: Regulation

Duke

L.J.

59. Fla. Stat.

("Nothing state

to

Deregulation,

1980

801.

Ann. § 232.01(b)l (1989)

in this section shall authorize the

or any school district to oversee or ex-

academic programs of nonpublic schools"); Tobak and Zirkel, Home Instruction: An Analysis of

ercise control over the curricula or

and Case Law, 8 U. Dayton

the Statutes

Rev.

L.

6-10

State

(1982) (Tabular Analysis of Statutory Provisions concerning

Home

Instruction); N. Devins, ed., Public

1,

Values, Private Schools (Philadelphia:

Press, 1989), pp.

60. State

75320 61.

v.

Falmer

5-7. Delabruere,

1990

WL

(Vt.).

496 U.S. 226(1990).

F.

bruere,

Bd. of Higher Educ.

in

tian Schools, Inc.,

v.

62. Bowers

v.

Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,

192(1986). 63. Note, Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation

and

the

Law, 102 Han-. L. Rev.

1508, 1520-1521, 1536(1989). 64. Hams v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980) (public funding of abortions); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S.

490 (1989) ter system);

(use of public facilities; trimesHodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S.

502 (1990) (parental notification); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990) (parental notification). Cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (abortion counseling and referral bv federally funded clinics). As this volume was going to press the Supreme Court granted review in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania

v.

Casey,

FUNDAMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LAW 49

112 S.Ct. 931(21 January 1992). The case

Department of the Interior and Re-

71.

presented a variety of technical questions

lated Agencies Appropriations Act,

concerning such matters

Pub. L. No. 101-512, 104

spousal notice,

as

parental consent, and informed consent bv

abortion patients. But

some of

the partici-

pants in the litigation, sensitive to charges in

1991,

1963, 1965

Stat.

(1990). 72. Everson

U.S.

1

Board of Education, 330

p.

(1947).

the Court's membership, urged the Court to

reconsider the right of privacy recognized in

Roe

r.

Wade.

65. Harris

p.

McRae, 448 U.S.

at

319.

1991 Iowa Acts § 104, ch. 1270, sec. Minn. Stat. § 145.925 (West 1989); 1991 N.Y. Laws 407. 67.

2;

Rev.

Ann.

Stat.

§

On

the issue of creches, see Lynch

36-2152

p.

465 U.S. 668 (1984); Couun of

Allegheny

v.

American Chnl

On

492 U.S. 573 (1989).

66. 1991 La. Acts 26; Utah Code Ann.§ 76-7-301.1 (MichieSupp. 1991).

68. Ariz.

73.

Donnelly,

lative chaplains, see

Liberties Union,

the issue of legis-

Marsh

p.

Chambers, 463

U.S. 783(1983). 74. E. Jorstad, The

(Lewiston,

Nav

Edwin

N.Y.:

Christian Right

Mellen

Press,

1987), pp. 42-45. In Lee p. Weisman, cert, granted. 111 S.Ct. 1305 (18 March 1991),

(West Supp. 1991); Ark. Code Ann. § 2016-801 (Michie 1991); Mich. Comp. Laws

the

§ 722.903 (West Supp. 1991); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-33 (West Supp. 1991); N.D.

school graduations. Counsel for Lee urged

Cent.

Code

Neb.

Rev.

§ 14-02.1-03 (Michie 1991); Stat.

§

71-6901

(Supp. 1991); 18 Pa. Cons.

to

6902 §§

Stat. -Ann.

3204, 3205, 3211 (West 1991 Supp.); S.C. § 44-41-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); Tcnn. Code Ann. § 39-15-202 (Mi-

Code Ann.

69. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 19a-601 to -602 (West Supp. 1991); 1991 Md. Laws Ch. 1 Bill

70. For accounts of such objections to see Reauthorization of the

tional Foundation on the Arts

Na-

and Humanities

Act Institute ofMuseum Services: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Education, Arts and Humanities of the S. Comm. on Labor and

Human

Resources,

101st Cong.,

2nd

Sess.

349-50 (1990) (testimony of Jane Chastain); Parachini, "Suit Revives Furor over

NEA

Grants," Los Angeles Times, 30 August

Fl; Bernstein, "Arts Endowment's Opponents Are Fighting Fire with Fire,"

1990,

New

p.

York Times, 30

clerical

May

1990,

p.

C13.

consti-

benedictions at public

lishment Clause rules and allow religious expression by the government so long as

did not coerce

reached

a

it

The Court had not when this volume went

belief.

decision

to press.

Wallace

Jajfree,

p.

472

38

U.S.

(1985). 76. Edwards

p.

(1987). In Bowen

162).

NEA funding,

of

the Court to change the prevailing Estab-

75.

chie 1991).

(Senate

Supreme Court considered the

tutionality

Agmllard, 482 U.S. 578 p.

Kendrick,

487 U.S. 589

(1988), the Court upheld the federal Adolescent Family Life Act,

which was designed

to reduce adolescent sexual relations and

pregnane}' by funding the services of public and nonprofit private organizations. The Court indicated that religious organizations

could receive funds but only

if

from

messages

delivering

religious

they refrained

with

their counseling services.

77. Engelv. Vitale, School

District

370 U.S. 421 (1962);

of Abington

Township

Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Epperson Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).

p.

v.

CHAPTER 4

Fundamentalism, Ethnicity, and Enclave

Steve Bruce

Ulster Protestants and American Fundamentalists: Introductory Contrasts

l\ comparison of the

politics

of conservative

Protestantism in Northern Ireland and America can be expressed as the contrast be-

tween the religion of politics and the

politics

of religion. Put

brieflv, the

Ireland the basic structure of the ethnic conflict with Catholics estants, religion

who

are not

remains a

vital

means

dominated by

Britain

that, for Prot-

believers find themselves turning back to con-

and languages to make sense of their apparently

guered position in the north of Ireland and to give purpose to their is

settings

part of their sense of identitv, and even those people

committed "born-again"

servative Protestant ideologies

which

two

produce patterns of action which seem opposites. In Northern

are so different as to

a desire to

and Northern Ireland. The

remain part of the United

political

belea-

agenda,

Kingdom of Great

nationalist Catholic threat to Ulster Protestants

(using the term here politically rather than theologically) gives a political role to fun-

damentalism erend Ian in places

and hence to

'

Paislev.

its

representatives,

who

are best exemplified

by the Rev-

Although American evangelicals have often spoken for America, and

have come close to representing an American "ethnos" (The

WASP — "white

Anglo-Saxon Protestant"), American fundamentalists do not form an ethnic group under

political threat.

American fundamentalists

are identified

bv their

common

reli-

gious culture and are only periodically mobilized to engage in electoral and pressure

group

politics

reproduce

it.

bv what they perceive to be threats to that culture and

Here

it is

the desire to maintain a subculture (and occasionally the belief

that they can once again

Being a minority

dominate mainstream America) which produces the

in a culturally plural

in "secular" form.

Where

politics.

democracy forces American fundamentalists

to attenuate the specifically religious elements in their

agenda

their ability to

program and to

offer their

the Northern Ireland situation gives even nonreli-

50

FUNDAMENTALISM. ETHNICITY, AND ENCLAVE 51

gious Protestants

makes

good reason

religious fundamentalists

American

setting

as secular conservatives. In the

former,

to support fundamentalists, the

masquerade

secular parties appear religious; in the latter, religious groups appear secular.

For most of

its

political unit

Fundamentalism

in the

historv, Ireland has

been

Northern Ireland Conflict politically

subordinate to Great Britain (the

The

containing England, Scotland, and Wales). 2

Northern

conflict in

Ireland (or Ulster, as Protestants prefer) stems from attempts from the sixteenth cen-

tury

onward

who

settled the northeast

to use settlement to pacifv a potentially troublesome neighbor.

of Ireland

in the seventeenth

Those

and eighteenth centuries were

Scots Protestants; the natives were Catholics. These arc not simply

two

different

reli-

gions; thev arc antithetical and have developed their identities in competition. Settlers

and natives encountered each other

Thev did not much of success and

at a

time

when people took

intermarry, and each side used

The

failure in stereotypes.

settlers

its

religion to

bondage bv

in

because thev were hardworking, diligent,

poor because thev had not

their priests. Protestants

literate,

theodicies

explained their privileges as the

natural result of having the true religion: Catholics were

been saved and were kept

religion seriously.

embody

were better off

and responsible. Religion

also pro-

vided consolation for the subordinate population, whose Catholic church acted as the

main repository of Irish

identity.

Furthermore, the Scottish setders were Calvinist Presbyterians. theology requires that only individuals can be

"•elected''''

Although high

to salvation, there has always

been a strong tendency for Calvinists to see themselves,

in

images drawn from the

history of the Children of Israel, as an elect "collectivity," a tendency exaggerated

when

they are threatened bv a large mass of "heathens." Although the 1859 revival in

Ulster saw the import from America of an clement of Arminian evangelicalism, the

covenant motif remained powerful and

is still

periodically used

by Ulster Protestants

3 in political rhetoric.

As

I

have argued

at length elsewhere, secularization

industrializing societies. 4

tween man and politics.

God

Only when

does

it

religion does

is

a natural

tendency of

something other than mediate be-

retain a high place in people's attentions

and

in their

That, from the point of settlement, the groups in competition were divided

bv religion meant that religion remained important. Nothing that has happened since settlement in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, since the rise of the nineteenth-

centurv Irish nationalist

home

rule

movement, or

into the Free State (later the Republic

part of the United

Kingdom of Great

importance of religion. Far from country, Protestants were

bound

it.

since the

1921 partition of Ireland

of Ireland) and Northern Ireland (remaining

Britain

Once

and Northern Ireland) has reduced the was established as a Catholic

the south

to find the idea of a united Ireland abhorrent. Dis-

passionate observers might argue that the Protestants

would be such

a large

block in

any united Ireland that their religious identity could not be threatened bv severing the link with Great Britain. Protestants do not see it that way. Instead, they point to the virtual disappearance of the Protestants in the Republic.

about 11 percent of the population;

now

At

partition they

they are under 4 percent.

were

Steve Bruce

52

As evidence of the hegemony of the Catholic church

in the Republic, Protestants

have been able to point to the failure of recent attempts to liberalize the Republic.

Although organized with the intention of bringing the

Irish

Republic into

other European countries, recent referenda on divorce (which remains

abortion (which before the referendum was fired

and confirmed the

centrality

illegal

and

now

is

with

line

illegal)

and

unconstitutional) back-

of the Catholic church's teachings for the Republic's

sociomoral climate. 5

From 1921 government

at

to 1972,

was governed by fense,

when

the severity of the

civil

unrest persuaded the British

Westminster to take direct control over the province, Northern Ireland a directiy elected parliament at

Stormont. While foreign policy, de-

and major taxation were controlled bv Westminster, Stormont controlled

ing, social policy, education,

and the management of the

economv

local

—

polic-

precisely

those areas which could be used to reward loyal Protestants and punish disloval Catholics. Protestants undoubtedly enjoved considerable material advantages over

Catholics in Northern Ireland.

of having

privilege

their

More important

for

most of them, they enjoyed the

symbols and culture accorded pride of place

in the affairs

of

the state. But they explained these advantages to themselves as the natural conse-

quences of having the true religion. Material and cultural interests combined in a

complex manner so that material Furthermore, what

from

perceived reality, and, far

selves relatively deprived, a

feeling privileged,

paradox which

church's reasons for maintaining leges

—

is

commitment

interests reinforced

usually important in explaining behavior

is

its

own

is

many

Some

felt

One of the

— schools,

that those of the state are not genuinely secular.

to the religion.

not objective but

Protestants have

readily explained.

institutions

is

hospitals,

them-

Catholic

and

col-

Protestants have seen

the institutions of the Northern Ireland state as Protestant, as they ought to be, given

embrace them. But many Protestants

that Catholics refused to betrayal

when

open to

all.

own

institutions. Third, thev could

strong sense of

institutions

were

Thev had

a

compete with Protestants

in

could migrate to the Republic and teach in southern

state institutions. Catholics

if

its

Catholics had already been given most of the island. Second, they

First,

were allowed their

schools.

felt a

the state proclaimed (however disingenuously) that

monopoly

in Catholic schools.

And

they cried "discrimination"

they weren't given jobs in state schools.

Although the acted as though

was frequently seen bv Catholics were), it was sufficiently open-minded

state

it

as "Protestant"

(and often

to appear so neutral that

inadvertently contributed to the sense of relative deprivation of the

it

more nervous

Mater Infirmatorum happily displayed Cathostaff were not shy in making it clear in the daily round of

Protestants. For example, the Catholic lic

symbols and

religious

hospital

work

that

it

were banned from a

its

was

a Catholic hospital. Yet in the early

state hospital in Belfast after

religious offense. Especially

(1963-69), tants

came

who

1960s, gospel choirs

complaints from Catholics about

under the reforming premiership of Terence O'Neill

put economic improvement before ethnic solidarity,

many

Protes-

to feel themselves threatened by Catholics (in the forms of both the Irish

Republic and the minority in Ulster) and disprivileged by what should have been their

own

state.

FUNDAMENTALISM, ETHNICITY. AND ENCLAVE 53

Such reasoning mav have taken scant regard of the objective between Protestants and Catholics

in Ulster,

but

it

status differences

nonetheless explains

Protestants did not feel themselves to be massively advantaged bv the

gime and why shows what

is

they were so hostile to Catholic campaigns for

wrong with

why most

Stormont

re-

"civil rights." It also

the still-popular reduction of Protestant antinationalism to

socioeconomic advantages.

a desire to maintain their

Religious

and "Secular" Protestants

Theologically conservative Ulster Protestants see their opposition to a united Ireland as religious. it is

the

Rome is the Antichrist,

last

hell-bent

on destroying Northern

Ireland because

bastion of evangelical Protestantism in Europe. Whatever the Catholic

church says to the contrary and however often

murder campaign, the

its

militant republicanism of the

work. But such people form onlv

good surveys of Protestant At most, the conservative

a small

bishops

IRA is

condemn

the republican

simply doing the Church's

proportion of the unionists. There are no

theological distribution, but

we

can sensibly estimate

it.

evangelical denominations are only 10 percent of the non-

The Irish Presbyterian Church (to which a third of nonCatholics belong) is on the conservative wing of Presbyterianism; it recently voted against joining the new British ecumenical church organization because the Catholic church was involved. Perhaps a third of its members (with a bias to rural areas) see themselves as evangelicals and subscribe in some part to the view that a united Ireland has to be opposed on religious grounds. Members of the Episcopal Church of Ireland in Ulster are similarly more theologically conservative than Episcopalians elsewhere. Putting these estimates together and being generous, one can suppose that no more Catholic population.

than a third of non-Catholics are evangelicals with a consciously religious view of the civil conflict.

Yet

I

want to suggest

that religion has a considerable influence even

are not themselves evangelicals,

data

on the

which

and

religious composition

are hard to explain

I

will illustrate the

of Ian

Paisley's

For

all its

Party,

existence, the

Democratic Unionist Party, data

without recognizing the central part played generally

unionist politics bv religious beliefs and attitudes.

ist

on those who

argument by presenting some in

6

Stormont parliament was dominated by the Ulster Union-

which had the unquestioned support of the

vast majority

of the Protestant

people, 7 but there was always a critical "right-wing" fringe of two sometimes overlap-

who were unsure of the UUP's were evangelicals who wanted to turn the

ping elements. There were working-class populists willingness to favor Protestants,

and there

government's occasional use of religious rhetoric into a

reality

of preferential

treat-

ment for Protestant churches, ministers, and religious activity. In the 1950s Ian Paisley was active in both these milieu. Paisley was the son of an independent Baptist minister in the town of Ballymena in North Antrim who, like his son, combined religious and political Protestantism. Kyle Paisley had resigned from the Baptist Union over its "liberal" trend. He had also been a member of the Ulster Volunteer Force, the militia which Sir Edward Carson raised in opposition to proposals for Irish independence. Ian Paisley studied for the

Steve Bruce

54

ministry at the theological hall of the gelistic training college in

and he was invited to preach to

active in Belfast's evangelical milieu

dent congregation on the Ravcnhill

had

from the

split

Reformed Presbyterian Church and

Road

Paislev

was

both milieus

his

He

also

became

message was the same: the

and the Unionist

Part}'

need of a

in

job.

and became well known

to build his congregation

of the gospel.

This group

congregation and was in need of a Bible-

local Presbyterian

worked hard

a small indepen-

in working-class east Belfast.

believing gospel-preaching minister. Paisley

street preacher

an evan-

at

Wales. During his time as a theology student, Paisley was

as a

of the

elites

Irish Presbyterian

could not be trusted to maintain the religious and

"Romeward

orthodoxy. "Sell out" and the

but the premiership of Terence O'Neill with

community

as

Church political

trend" were the order of the day. In the

1950s very few people paid much attention to Ian Paisley and gestures to the minority

loud

active in right-wing unionist circles. In

his alarmist message,

(albeit halfhearted)

its

opening

reforms and such

and inviting the

a Catholic school

prime minister to Belfast made

Paisley's paranoia seem like prescience. Here is not the place to explain the rise of the civil rights movement or to describe the way in which first Terence O'Neill and then his successor, Major Chichester-Clark (1969—71), combined acquiescence and repression to alienate Protestants without

Irish Republic's

satisfying Catholics.

destablization.

wolf

What

important for

is

Regarding the

civil

rights

this story

movement

is

the simple fact of political

as the old Irish

republicanism

democratic sheep's clothing, working-class Protestants attacked

in

marches and Catholic

areas. Catholics hit back.

violence (and indeed added their

own

mitting

it

Although

central

London

and Londonderry to keep the

control, this

sides apart.

meant Stormont was both ad-

could not control the trouble and allowing initially

civil rights

could not control the

local police

tuppence worth). The government had to ask

for British troops to be sent in to Belfast

As the army was under

The

London some

pleased to be protected from loyalists, the Catholics

direct input.

came

to see the

troops as defenders of the unacceptable "Protestant state" and support for the increased.

ground

By 1971

the "troubles" had well and truly begun.

that Paisley's popularity

In 1971, Paisley and a

It

was against

and influence, both religious and

number of unionists unhappy about

ingness of the Unionist government to defend

itself against

political,

IRA

this back-

grew.

the apparent unwill-

the twin threats of re-

surgent Irish nationalism and a compromising British government formed the

Democratic Unionist

DUP

Party. Since then the

Unionist Partv in electoral support and

finally to

has

come

first

to rival the Ulster

be accepted by the

UUP as an equal

partner in various campaigns against British government policy. Since he

won

a seat

become easily the most popular unionist politician. In the 1984 elections to the European Community para sixth of the whole electorate voted liament, nearly a quarter of a million people in the Westminster parliament in lune 1970, Ian Paisley has

—

—

for him. 8

In rian

its

early days, the

DUP drew heavily on the membership of the

Church of Ulster (FPC),

as Paisley's first

picked up other congregations of dissident Irish Presbyterians.

launched his

first

major foray into

Free Presbyte-

congregation had become as

electoral politics in

it

gradually

When

Paisley

1969, of six candidates, three

UNOAMi

ETHNICITY. AND ENCLAVE

N'TAI ISM.

55

TABLE 4.1 Denomination of DL'P Activists

%FPC

Total

1973 Assembly

17

1975 Constitutional Convention

18

78

1976 Local councillors

31

65

1978 Local councillors

75

61

1982 Assembly

35

77

218

57

1985 Local council candidates

were

FPC

ministers and one was an

at various points since

FPC

47

elder.

The denominations of DUP

activists

then are shown in table 4.1. FPs are massively ovcrrepresented.

Onlv 1 percent of non-Roman Catholics members of the six different groups of

are FPs, but

DUP

of the almost four hundred

activists,

an average of 64 percent

are FPs.

When DUP the

activists are

218 candidates

most

all

of those

for the

who

not Free Presbyterians, what are they? Table 4.2 describes

1985

are not

local

FPs

government

are

denominations. The three main denominations-

Church of Ireland, and the Methodists

elections.

members of other

— are

all

— the Irish

The

picture

is

clear. Al-

conservative evangelical

Presbyterian Church, the

underrepresented. As

if

the evangeli-

DUP were not sufficiently attested to by these figures, many of the

calism of the

Presbyterians and Baptists signified their place

on

the evangelical

wing of

Irish

their

churches by adding to their election literature that they were "evangelical," "involved in

mission work," or some such reference.

As the second column

in table 4.2

vative evangelicals or fundamentalists.

nonevangelical supporters of the

may

course, this

shows, most Ulster Protestants are not conser-

The

success of the

DUP like

DUP suggests that the many

being represented by fundamentalists.

Of

have nothing to do with religion. Nonbelievers might support fun-

damentalists because they believe

them

and most

to be dogmatic, doctrinaire,

to maintain an extreme unionist position.

likely

However, nonfundamentalist unionists

have had the opportunity to support secular right-wingers every bit as resolute as the

DUP. Between 1969 and 1975, when there were a

of position

number of able

in the party

and

politicians, in

the Unionist Part)'

many of whom had

was tearing

such fraternal organizations as the Orange Order and

the Apprentice Boys of

Deny, who

strove for the right vote.

who had

been sacked

as minister for

William Craig

for constant attacks

on government

policy.

home

The

affairs

best

known was

by O'Neill

in

1969

Craig led the Ulster Loyalist Association

and the Vanguard movement (which became

a fully fledged party in

strongly supported by the paramilitary Ulster Defence Association. lost favor for

itself apart,

the advantage over Paisley

1974) and was

Even before he

suggesting that unionists form a temporary pact with the Catholic Social

and Democratic Labor Party, Craig and his supporters were losing support to Paisley's DUP 9 When given the choice between secular right-wingers and religious rightwingers, the

DUP

many

working-class secular voters have preferred the fundamentalists of

Steve Bruce

56

TABLE

4.2

Denomination of (a) 1985 DUP Local Government Election Candidates and (b) Non-Roman Catholic Population (in %) (b)

(a)

Irish Presbyterian

10.6

35.7

Church of Ireland

3.7

29.6

Methodist

3.2

6.2

Baptist

4.6

1.8

57.3

1.0

Free Presbyterian

Congregational

1.8

0.9

Elim Pentecostal

1.8

0.4

Reformed Presbyterian

0.9

0.3

Independent Methodist

1.4

0.1

Church of God

0.9

0.1

23.3

23.9

Other cyangelical/not known/none

Why

this

should be the case

for ethnic identity. Ulster Irish nationalism

is

clear if

one considers the ideological foundations

unionism needs evangelical Protestantism

does not need Catholicism. 10 Nationalism

supported by movements

all

is

in a

a popular

way in which modern creed

over the world. Since partition, there has been a state in

the south to serve as an encouragement to northern nationalists. Nationalism

strong and stable ideology. In contrast, unionism

been "just

like" the rest

is

now

of the United Kingdom, but

were able to think of themselves the Britishness of Ulster by

as just "British."

making

clear to

all

The

is

a

precarious. Ulster has never

until the

1960s many unionists

"troubles" called into question

parties the extent to

from Great Britain and bv giving many (even within the

which

it

differed

British establishment) a

chance to challenge Ulster's constitutional connection with Britain. Furthermore, the majority of people in Great Britain have Ulster from the

Roman

shown

little

interest in saving Protestant

Catholic Irish Republic.

The pressure on unionists to assert and defend their claims to be British has forced them to be clear about their identity, and this in turn has exposed the gulf between them and the British. The Britain to which unionists are loyal is the assertive Britain of the imperial monarchy. In part dian periods,

when

and

ship, the

its sister

Belfast's

Olympic, were

sacrificing themselves in the it

this reflects nostalgia for the Victorian

and Edwar-

heavy engineering economy was booming (the Titanic thousands

built in Belfast) in the trenches

and the sons of Ulster were

of World War

I

France. In part

represents the conservative religious, moral, and political climate of Ulster.

Some

70 percent of Ulster people go to church; the comparable figure for present-day Britain where abortion and homosexuality are legal and divorce rampant is approxi-

—

—

mately 12 percent.

With the object of Ulster's romantic desires clearly unenthusiastic about the maron close inspection, somewhat undesirable, what can serve as the ideological basis for unionist identity? The only thing which has sufficient presence in the history of Ulster is evangelical Protestantism, which is also the credo that makes the riage, and,

— FUNDAMENTALISM. ETHNICITY. AND ENCLAVE 57

Catholic Republic objectionable. If one

looking for a good reason to be opposed

is

to a united Ireland, one finds oneself being pushed back to fundamentalism.

Conservative members of the British parliament are big farmers, successful entrepreneurs, and lawyers. Conservative voters arc not.

who

are

like

them but

for those

who

represent and

Manv

embodv

people vote not for those the things

which

they

like.

Representatives arc exemplars, not averages. Secular Protestants want to support evangelical Protestants

— and there

arc plenty in unionist politics outside the

DUP

not because thev themselves are evangelicals but because thev recognize that evangelicals,

nence,

although they

embodv what

it

mav

be spoilsports with their Sabbatarianism and total absti-

means to be

a unionist

and

Protestants have of themselves and of Catholics

a Protestant.

The

stereotvpes that

depend on evangelicalism

for their

premises. Protestants arc diligent, industrious, and independent but loval and sacrificing (the I is

enormous

toll

of Ulster volunteers

in the British

armies of World

self-

War

often mentioned) lovers of democracv. Catholics are none of these things. Protes-

tants

and Catholics

false religion.

arc as thev are because they have, respectively, the true

Because a united Ireland would be a Catholic Ireland,

gious truth and the attendant social and

to

conservative Protestants, in religion and in politics,

—

is

found

reli-

Be Done?

preserve their identitv. Part of the threat to identity

of the mainstream churches

and the

threatens

civil virtues.

What Is The main purpose of Ulster

it

in

is

to

— the liberalism and ecumenism

other settings such as America. In Ulster,

Paisley has behaved as American conservatives did earlier in this century and has led a schism

ment

from the main Presbvterian church. The centralized nature of British governAmerica for the formation of specificallv

gives far less opportunity than does

fundamentalist institutions of education, mass media, and the

like,

but Paisley has

on maintaining its own schools, the state schools are often called "Protestant" but Paisleyites find them insufficientlv so and, encouraged bv the American model, the Free Presbyterian Church bv 1991 had some ten independent "Christian" schools. It has its own Bible College for ministerial,

done his best. Because the Catholic church insists

missionarv, and education students.

organizes a round of

It

produces periodicals and tape recordings, and

social activities that

form

a distinct subculture.

Conservative Protestants have campaigned against legislative changes which are seen as eroding the distinctively "Protestant" atmosphere of Northern Ireland: the liberalizing

laws,

of laws on homosexuality, public house licensing hours, Sunday trading

and the

like.

But for Ulster fundamentalists, such sociomoral crusades take second place to the more pressing concern of maintaining citizenship. In contrast to the constitutional stabilitv

Through

of America, the issue of sovereignty in Northern Ireland remains open. the direct political action of forming a part}', fighting (and winning) elec-

and mobilizing popular support, Paisley and his supporters have sought to keep the iron in the soul of Ulster unionism and to prevent any sellout. Generallv these campaigns have been confined to conventional democratic politics. Manv Protestants convicted of terrorist offenses have blamed their actions on Paisley (and other polititions,

— Steve Bruce

58

cians

who

supposedly encouraged them), but Paisley has never actively promoted

freelance violence.

On

the contrary, he has often insisted that loyalist murderers

not deserve the name of "Protestant." However, he

is

not a

has tried to form civilian militias to be ready to fight to defend Ulster

ever withdraw. But he its

monopolv of

is

who

a constitutionalist

do

pacifist; periodically if

he

the British

believes that the state should maintain

monopoly by acting more vigorously forfeits its monopoly (by, for example,

force but should justify that

against nationalist terrorism. 11 If the state

giving Ulster to the Irish Republic), then Protestants should fight and Paisley will lead them.

Hence, periodically he has encouraged people to prepare for doomsday

but has steered clear of illegality.

How successful closed

down

Paisley has been

difficult to judge.

is

Since the British government

the Stormont parliament and took over the direct running of the prov-

ince in the early 1970s, there has been

little

or no opportunity for local politicians to

govern or even to press detailed policy agendas in

The

legislation. British

government

is

House members to vote for it. The House of Lords has little power to change legislation, and members of both houses have almost no power to initiate legislation. Under the present system of direct rule from Westminster, the British government imposes its will on Ulster and, when the partv in power has a majority of over one hundred, there is nothing the seventeen Ulster members of parliament can do about it. peculiarly authoritarian.

of

Commons

cabinet of the party with a clear majority in the

formulates legislation and "whips"

Furthermore, by an accident of fate, fewer possibilities for politics than regional parliament at

it

local

government

does in the

Stormont to give

reform of local government

in the early

remote

as a

of opportunities for

Only

possibility.

rest

Northern Ireland

UK.

offers

Because there was a

"local" representation, the architect

rule

of the

from London was not, of course,

The consequence

is

that there

is

a

marked

lack

politics.

in the search for a stable future political

constitutional issue

in

of the

1960s removed many powers from borough

and county councils. The introduction of direct imagined even

its

— do

local politicians

system for Northern Ireland

— the

have influence. Unionists want to remain

want to become Irish. These are irreconcilable and nongovernment will not accept anything which is acceptable to unionists (because it would be unacceptable to nationalists), the best unionists can do is to stall political innovation. In this. Paisley and his movement have been extremely successful. From 1963 to 1972, three Unionist Partv prime ministers British;

nationalists

negotiable goals.

As

the British

O'Neill, Chichester-Clark,

and Faulkner

—

tried to mollify Catholics

ing Protestants. Paislev and his associates played a

major part

in

without

making

alienat-

sure that

Protestants did feel alienated and that the reform strategy failed. In that sense. Paisley

can reasonably claim to have "seen off" three prime ministers. Paislcvites were also involved in the general strike which brought

ment, a constitutional experiment unionists,

in

down

the

1974 "power-sharing" govern-

which the constitutional

and the very small cross-confessional Alliance

Part}'

nationalist party, liberal

formed an executive to

which powers were devolved. That the

DUP

exists,

ready to recruit defectors, ensures that the Unionist Partv

FUNDAMENTALISM. ETHNICITY. AND ENCLAVE 59

will never return to the reformist strategies

rian

Church

on any

of die O'Neill period. The Free Presbyte-

plays a similar role in maintaining religious orthodoxv, acting as a brake

liberal

or ecumenical tendencies the Irish Presbxterians or the Church of Ire-

land might develop. Paislev succeeded in Ulster religion and politics not by innovating

but by representing what

of

trust

on

political

manv

Ulster Protestants believed.

of the Protestant population, he

a large part

as

he enjoys the

and religious innovation.

The New

Christian Right in America

In explaining the rise and nature of the

important points. fundamentalists II.

So long

continue to exercise a veto

will

On manv

First, the culture

New

Christian Fight

(NCR), 12

of the core constituencv of the

there are

two

NCR — Sun

Belt

— has been increasinglv encroached upon since the end of World War

matters of social and moral policv, geographical and cultural peripheries

have become increasinglv subject to the core of cosmopolitan America. The reach of

government has massively increased: latorv bodies, fifty

in

1976 there were seventy-seven

of them created since I960. 13 The sheer

size,

federal regu-

the divcrsitv of ethnic

groupings, and the federal svstem of American government have long permitted gions considerable autonomv, but the recent trend

is

for politv

re-

and culture to become

more centralized (the mass media, for example, is becoming more centralized and homogeneous in output) and for the center to become more liberal. So fundamentalists have found themselves harder pressed bv a more permissive culture. Where once two-thirds of the states were willing to vote for the prohibition of alcohol, there has

been open campaigning for the legalization of marijuana. Conservative sexual mores have been openlv questioned and sometimes publiclv flouted. Abortion was made legal.

A

more

aggressivelv secularist interpretation of the constitutional doctrine

separation of church and state has meant that school prayer

is

now

of

forbidden.

A more subtle threat has been posed by the increasing frequency of claims to rights member of some

previouslv disadvantaged group

is

anathema to

fundamentalists with their individualist Arminianism). First blacks, then

women, and

as a

(

a

notion that

then homosexuals have claimed that social arrangements should be changed to im-

prove their position.

but to impose ted to

go

their

new

And

own wav.

political, judicial,

seemed willing not only to accept such claims on subcultures which had previously been permit-

the state has

social patterns

and

Since the 1960s the southern states have been under constant

legislative pressure to

All of these changes have appeared

promote

racial integration

as threats to the lifestyle

and

equalitv.

and sociomoral values of

conservative Protestants and hence also as threats to the religious beliefs which fun-

damentalists hold and which legitimate such sociomoral positions.

The more

prescient

knew

that electing conservative

and fundamentalist council-

men in Greenville, South Carolina, had little influence where the important decisions were increasinglv being made: the federal and Supreme courts, the presidency, and Congress. Thev were willing to

listen to

people

who

argued that fundamentalists had

become involved politically if they were to maintain culture which had made America great. to

(or restore) the Christian

Steve Bruce

60

At the same time as some fundamentalists were becoming more politically connumber of professional conservative political activists were coming to see

cerned, a

fundamentalists as an important bloc in a

would around

new

populist conservative grouping which

from the old eastern establishment conservatism

differ

and moral

social

issues as well as

around the more

in mobilizing people

traditional concerns

foreign policy, the welfare state, the economy, and the regulation of business.

persuaded

lists.

number of leading fundamentalists

a

The key

figures in the mobilization

of the

to

become

"New

of

They

politically active.

Christian Right" were televange-

James Robison of Dallas and Pat Robertson of "The 700 Club" and the Christian

Broadcasting Network plaved a part, but the most influential and consistently

in-

volved figure was Jerry Falwell of Lynchburg, Virginia. Falwell mobilized interest at

two

Nationally, he used the audience for his televised church service, his

levels.

puter mailing create a base

lists

of supporters, and other

from which to

lists

com-

of known sociomoral conservatives to

funds and produce the appearance of a large united

raise

movement. At the same time, Falwell and other fundamentalist

leaders used uheir

ministerial networks to influence other independent fundamentalist Baptist pastors,

who

mobilized their congregations. 14

in turn

Pressure Falwell's

Group

Politics

Moral Majority' and similar organizations such

as

Religious Roundtable,

Christian Voice, and American Coalition for Traditional Values raised

campaign

as pressure

groups on a range of public policy issues (such

money

to

as abortion,

homosexuality, the teaching of evolution in schools, the threat of "secular humanism,"

minority rights legislation, and prayer in public school). The campaigns had two related purposes.

The

first

was to mobilize conservative opinion so that

would temper their

judges, journalists, and educators

liberalism (either out

respect for the opinions of conservatives or out of fear of retribution).

was to turn level

that opinion into electoral clout. Legislators at the state

who had

a record

legislators,

of genuine

The second

and congressional

of voting the "wrong wav" found themselves the targets of

well-funded negative campaigns. Funds were also spent on behalf of acceptable conservative candidates.

Unlike the Protestants of Ulster, whose precarious position has meant a long tory of sustained political "quietist" retreat

A major NCR tactic was voter registration, which 1980 and 1984, although it would only have been signifi-

from the world.

seems to have succeeded

in

cant if liberals had not also registered a similar

conservative voters had sustained.

his-

involvement, American fundamentalists have tended to

all

number of new

voted the same way, and

if their

voters, if the

new

involvement had been

15

For a variety of reasons (not history of failure in America.

least,

Even

ous to seriously attempt forming

doomed. So the it

fundamentalists had been sufficiently numer-

a party, the activists

effort to displace liberal politicians

was accompanied by

To put

the value of incumbency) third parties have a

if the

bluntly,

infiltration

none of

knew that such an attempt was

and mobilize conservative voters

of the Republican Party

this

had any great

at the local level.

lasting effect.

Very few

NCR

sup-

FUNDAMENTALISM, ETHNICITY, AND ENCLAVE 61

porters were elected to national office,

some of the few whose success was claimed bv number of the successes (Senator Jeremiah Denton, for example) failed to get reelected. Not surprisingly, given that onlv four or five senators were ever "movement" conservatives and that the Democrats controlled the House of Representatives, the NCR had no legislative success at the congressional level. Although he made supporting noises, President Reagan conspicuously refused to use his influence to mobilize congressional votes for NCR-promoted bills on school praver and abortion. 16 The NCR had some legislative success at the state level the

NCR

repudiated that support, and a

in those states

which had always had

As

these victories were often hollow.

creation science

bill,

manv

NCR

sizable fundamentalist populations, but even in the case discussed

issues

thus could be challenged through the federal courts.

court system then allowed the

more

liberal

and

The

If electoral

and

legislative politics failed to

subtle effects?

which the

Even the much vaunted

centripetal tendency

universalistic values

tan middle classes to overrule the particularisms of the

more

below of the Arkansas

touched on basic constitutional rights and

of the

of the cosmopoli-

NCR. 17

produce anv major changes, were there

shift to the right in the political

agenda

NCR was supposed to have effected turned out to be candy floss. Measured

studies of attitude surveys during the

Reagan

era

showed

that the turn to the right

on defense and economic policy was not accompanied by any significant shift to the right on sociomoral issues. lx It might also be supposed that there is (or will be) a long-term NCR effect through the training of large numbers of evangelicals and fundamentalists for conventional party politics. There is no doubt that manv voting conservative Protestants acquired an interest and some expertise in politics' through NCR involvement, but this would onlv be significant if the movement had not provoked a and matching

similar relative

revival

Republican Party was an

of fundamentalists. trality

of interest

among

liberals

and

if it

were the case that the

absence of religious or sociomoral concerns from the central interests of the

It

accident, a

condition to be rectified simply by the presence

does not require

much thought

to realize that the relative neu-

of the Republican Party on sociomoral issues and

identified with a particular religious position

to the problems

of maximizing voter support

NCR activists

Those

is

anywhere. Those

who

who

its

unwillingness to

become

not an accident but a sensible response

in a culturally plural society.

remained most aggressively fundamentalist

failed to get

got anywhere did so by compromising and becoming largely

indistinguishable from secular conservatives. Instead of following the eight years of

vacuous rhetoric of Reagan with the

real

support of Pat Robertson, the

president George Bush, an old-fashioned eastern

monied

NCR got as

conservative.

The Courts

A minor

but significant

NCR

tactic

was the

initiation

of lawsuits

(sec chap. 3

of the

current volume). Although "unclected" judges were frequently a focus for conservatives' ire,

the

having been largely responsible for

NCR

made

it

clear that the price to

had to be

many of the changes

was willing to use the same avenues for change. free

of

When

they most resented, a

number of courts

be paid for religious freedom was that the public arena

religion, fundamentalists

responded by trying to have "secular hu-

Steve Bruce

62

manism"

(a catch-all label to

cover anything which did not overtly recognize the su-

premacy of Christianity) judged to be schools.

The

a religion so that

it,

too, could be

banned from

19

humanism

presentation of Christianity and secular

gions had

some

but

initial success,

it

was exposed

as sleight

Alabama, Judge Brevard Hand

detailed discussion of the issues. In a major case in

found for Christian

plaintiffs

who wanted

two "matching" reliit came to

as

of hand when

range of textbooks banned for unconsti-

a

promoting secular humanism, but the judgment was overturned by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which ordered Hand to dismiss the case. The tutionally

finality

of the ruling was accepted by the National Legal Foundation,

when

pressure group,

it

a

right-wing

decided not to appeal the case to the Supreme Court. 20

Fundamentalists in a Modern Democracy

The problem

for the

NCR

that fundamentalists are only a small minority

is

American people. To have any national macy, they have to work tants,

Mormons, and

in alliance

effect

and to be able to claim national

secular conservatives.

They have

of the superiority of fundamentalist religious

number of

secular motifs.

The

also to accept the rhetoric

it

on

limitation

beliefs

promoted not on the

and values but on the

this tactic

is

basis

of

basis

of a

that their claims are then

criteria.

The Arkansas "equal time" talists

legiti-

with conservative Catholics, Jews, black Protes-

the separation of church and state so that their crusades are

judged on secular

of the

shifted the defense

bill is

a

good example.

In the early 1970s, fundamen-

of the Genesis account of Creation from saying "we believe

because the Bible says so" to exploiting differences between evolutionary models to

was

now

argue that creation science (as

it

The Arkansas

passed a

state legislature

called) fitted the facts as well as evolution.

bill

to force schools which taught evolution to

give "equal time" to the biblical creation account.

took the case to the courts, arguing that science,

The

and that the

creationists

bill

meant

that schools

The American

crcationism was

Civil Liberties

would be promoting

had to give good reason why anyone

who

a particular religion.

did not accept the Bible

should believe in "special creation"; their presentation of such a case was judge decided for the It is ironic,

NCR

The

given fundamentalist dislike for the notion of group rights, that the it

appealed to "fairness" and presented

discriminated-against minority. Such very limited progress as was

of appealing to the

secular value

of

itself as a

made was

the result

fairness rather than to theological rectitude. At-

demand for a little more social of hegemony were firmly opposed.

tempts to go beyond a

some sort The problem was not only one of

tions.

dire.

ACLU. 21

was most successful when

claiming

Union

a religious belief, not a

space for their

own

culture to

external opposition to fundamentalist aspira-

There was also an internal problem of motivation. The

fundamentalist conservatives was precarious.

The

NCR

alliance

with non-

asked fundamentalists to get

involved in politics to defend their religiously inspired culture and then asked that, in

order to do politics well, they leave behind their religion.

On

Sunday they believed

FUNDAMENTALISM. ETHNICITY. AND ENCLAVE 63

Catholics were not "saved";

on Mondav they had

to

work with Catholics

of their "shared Judeo-Christian" heritage. But placing religion and

compartments governed bv

rate

ligion

which thev

reject.

My

different criteria

is

defense

in

politics in sepa-

exactly the feature

of modern

re-

extensive interviewing in South Carolina and Virginia

it clear to me that fundamentalists cannot be pragmatic without conceding that which defines them and are themselves extremely uncertain, even troubled, bv

made

the issue.

And

even

if

thev could abandon their anti-Semitism, racism, and anti-

Catholicism. Catholics, blacks, and Jews had long enough memories to be suspicious.

Additionally there has always been an organizational block on Catholic participation in

pressure groups: the Catholic church prefers

campaigning to be directed

its

through church-controlled agencies.

Although organizations such

as

Moral Majority

for Traditional Values could always find a

Inc.

and the American Coalition

few black. Catholic, or Jewish figures to

appear on their letterheads and platforms, such alliances were not succcssfullv built local levels,

where

at

NCR organizations remained primarilv fundamentalist. Pat Robertson for President?

Against those

who saw

Jerrv Falwell's

ber 1987 as the end of the

announced retirement from

NCR, some

activists

politics in

the presidential campaign of Pat Robertson, presenter of "The

700 Club" and head of

the Christian Broadcasting Network, as a major step forward for the tainlv represented an

important

increase in aspirations

mass of opinion poll data from which strength of the

a

Novem-

and some commentators construed

number of

NCR.

It cer-

and inadvcrtentlv provided a

general conclusions about the

NCR can be drawn. These can only be sketched here but are discussed

22 in detail elsewhere.

To

most sweeping characterization of Robertson's attempt at the highest office, a well-organized and well-funded campaign backfired. The more

give the

political

people considered the issues raised by such a candidacy, the more anti- Robertson feeling outstripped

pro-Robertson sentiment. Even those people

who

should have

been most svmpathetic were not mobilized. Contrary to the unwise predictions of

some

social scientists,"

of religion and

many

politics. In

fundamentalists were unhappy with such overt mixing

one

poll,

even

self- identified

that Robertson's status as a former clergyman

conservative Protestants said

made them

less rather

than more

likely

him (bv a margin of 42 to 25 percent). Many preferred a secular politician who had some of the "right" positions to a born-again televangelist who had them all (in a poll which was confirmed by the voting patterns in the southern states' primaries, southern fundamentalists and evangelicals divided 44 percent for George Bush, 30 to support

percent for

Bob

Dole, and only 14 percent for Robertson).

General public svmpathv for some

support for NCR

NCR values did not translate into widespread

policies or politicians.

Much

of the mistake made

in predicting the

likelv impact of the NCR came from misunderstanding survey data and the relation between attitudes and actions. An oft-cited indicator of likely NCR support is a studv

bv John Simpson of 1977

NORC General Social Survey data.

24

Simpson claimed the

Steve Bruce

64

showed 30 percent of the public accepting the Moral Majority platform in its and a furdier 42 percent being ideological fellow travelers. These claims were made on the basis of highly contestable assumptions about which responses to which data

entirety

questions represented

"Moral Majority

a

11

of

position. In an excellent reexamination

the same data, Sigelmann and Presser plausibly argue that the survey material gives

no warrant as

for claiming widespread

have argued

I

at

sympathy

for the

NCR platform.

length elsewhere, 26 even where there

is

25

Furthermore,

a general

sympathy for

conservative sociomoral positions, one cannot assume that such sympathy translates

commitment

into shared

"against abortion

11 ;

it

is

to the particular policies of the

NCR.

It is

one thing to be

quite another to actively support this or that measure to

outlaw or severely limit abortion.

Nor can one assume ful sociopolitical

Not

all

that even shared policy commitments translate into a powermovement; fundamentalists have other interests which divide them.

sociomoral conservatives place those interests

top of their agendas,

at the

and anyway they are unlikely to be mobilized around those concerns unless the political

circumstances allow or encourage choices

for the

NCR

has been

its

inability to

keep

its

on those

issues.

The main problem

concerns to the forefront in political

arguments. Finally,

part of

its

we need

to

remember

that the

NCR has not had the field to itself. A large

very limited success was the result of surprise. Liberals took their political

domination for granted and had forgotten that their values required

and

cultural

tive

organized defense. Once natural scientists such

as

ac-

Stephen Jay Gould realized that

they had to defend their evolutionist thinking, they did so extremely convincingly. will give just

two very

different examples

of successful

liberal counterattack.

I

Funda-

mentalists had exerted considerable influence over textbook content because of the legal structure

approved bv

a

of the Texas school book review procedure. Only books that had been

committee could be bought from

permitted members of the public to ists

had dominated these hearings.

their critics. ers

The review procedure many years fundamental-

state funds.

books, and for

did not permit lay people to defend books against

It

Rather than face the possibility of criticism and rejection, many publish-

had taken to censoring

successfully

criticize

their textbook offerings. People for the

campaigned to have the procedure changed so that

could defend those works attacked

for secular

American Way

liberal lay

groups

humanism, and fundamentalist

influ-

ence was drastically reduced.

People for the American

Way were

also successful in countering Pat Robertson's

different faces to different audiences. a born-again Christian

view of

To

good

politicians,

Robertson presented

his religious following

he continued to offer

attempts to shed his evangelist past. Like

all

political events; to the general public

he presented

himself as a conservative businessman whose business interests just happened to clude running a Christian broadcasting network. People for the American

Way

in-

pre-

pared a video compilation of Robertson's utterances as an evangelist and circulated free to

hundreds of television stations so that Robertson's

own

publicity material

it

was

balanced by presentations of a self which he preferred to downplay. Far

more could be

said. In this brief discussion I

have argued that the

NCR,

FUNDAMENTALISM, ETHNICITY. AND ENCLAVE 65

although interesting, was not a particularly successful movement and that

was predictable from an examination of of modern democratic

teristics

own

its

characteristics

its

failure

and from the charac-

societies.

Conclusion Without wishing to implv support for grand evolutionary models of social development, I want to suggest that the role of religion in the Ulster conflict is in the historisense "older" than

cal

in the early davs

what we

see with the

NCR in America and

is

of a tvpe

common

of the formation of nation-states and the development of

democracies. Fundamentalism ethnic identity, there

is

is

important

in Ulster

because religion

is

liberal

central to

considerable ethnic conflict, and the basic political issues of

national sovereignty and the alignment of ethnic and national boundaries have not

been settled (conditions we see the Second

World

as the

in large parts

of the Third World and increasingly

communist hegemony

in

collapses). In such circumstances the

continuing conflict amplifies the importance of religion. That the other party to the conflicts

is

a Catholic people (and

of a very conservative Catholicism) makes ortho-

doxy or "fundamentalism" appealing to Ulster Protestants. In contrast,

America

a stable

is

democracy whose national boundaries

are secure.

In a religiously pluralistic democracy, religious particularisms have to be confined to

the private world of the family and the is

home

(Ulster

shows what happens when

not done). The only "religious" values which can be allowed

are the

most general and benign

banalities

this

in the public

square

which everyone can endorse. The

federal

and decentralized nature of American public administration allows subcultures a de-

autonomy unusual

gree of

in

Europe. This gave fundamentalists the platform from

which to launch an attempt to turn America back to Christ, but the attempt it

was bound

failed, as

to.

Notes 1.

Although

I

accept the usefulness of the

Scott Appleby, eds..

R.

Fundamentalisms

general characterization of fundamentalism

Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago

given in die essays in volume

Press, 1991).

1

of this

Fundamentalisms Observed, and bility to Paisleyism, there are

its

series.

applica-

considerable

between the Ulster Protestant of Calvinist Presbyterianism and North American fundamentalism. In addition to the point about covenants (see n. 3),

differences tradition

the

movements

tantism

is less

differ in that Ulster Protes-

Arminian, very unlikely to be

committed to Scofield premillennialism than American fundamentalism. See Martin E. Marty and Pentecostal,

and

is

far

less

2. For good general accounts of the background to the Ulster "troubles," see P. Arthur and K. Jeffrey, Northern Ireland since 1968 (Oxford, 1988), D. Harkness, Northern Ireland since 1920 (Dublin, 1983), and A. J. Q. Stewart, The Narrow Ground Bel(

fast,

3.

cially

1988).

On

the influence of Calvinism (espe-

the role of the idea of a "covenant" be-

tween

God

and

his

chosen

people)

on

Protestant politics and parallels with South

.

Steve Bruce

66

and Steve Bruce,

Africa, see R. Wallis

and

logical Theory, Religion

1986), chap. 10.

(Belfast,

Steve Bruce,

4.

Socio-

Collective Action

tantism, Schism

A

and

House Divided: Protes(London, L. Berger, The Social

Secularization

1990). See also

P.

Reality ofReligion

(Harmondworth, Middle-

sex,

1973), and B. R. Wilson, Religion in

(Oxford, 1982).

Sociological Perspective

On

5.

church

the

influence

of the

Catholic J.

H.

Wh\te, Church and State

in Modern Ireland, 1923-1979 (Dublin, 1980), and T. Inglis,

Moral Monopoly Dublin, 1986). (

6.

What

follows

God Save

Steve Bruce,

and Politics

argued

is

Ulster!

at

The Religion

R. Wallis, Steve Bruce, and D. Tavlor,

and

No

the Politics of Ethnic

Identity in Northern Ireland (Belfast, 1986). 7.

Harbison,

F.

J.

eds.,

1984).

M.

13.

Societal

The Last Half-Century: America (Chi-

Janovitz,

Change and

Politics in

1978),V 368.

cago,

R. Liebman, "Mobilizing the Moral

Liebman and Wuthnow, The Nav Christian Right, pp. 50—74.

Majoritv," in

15. C. Smidt,

"Born Again

eds.,

Politics:

The

Behavior of Evangelical Christians

Political

eds.,

South and the Non-South," in T. A. P. Steed, and L. W. Moreland, Religion and Politics in the South: Mass

and

Elite

pp.

27-56.

in the

length in

of Paislevism (Oxford, 1986), and

Surrender! Paisley

Wuthnow,

The New Christian Right (New York, 1983), and G. Peele, Revival and Reaction: The Right in Contemporary America (Oxford,

14.

the Republic of Ireland, see

in

See also R. Liebman and R.

The Ulster Unionist

Baker, R.

16. Bruce,

(New

York,

1983),

The Rise and Fall of 133-39.

the Neiv

Perspectives

Christian Right, pp. 17.

On

the role of the courts in

NCR-

Party (Belfast, 1973).

related matters, see R. A. Allev,

The Supreme

8. Details of elections between 1968 and 1988 can be found in W. D. Flackes and S.

Court on Church and State

(New

Northern Ireland:

Elliott, tory,

1968-88

A

Political Direc-

Unlike Great Britain, which uses a

9.

"winner takes

all,"

Church-State Relations: Tensions and Transitions

(Belfast, 1989).

first-past-the-post svstem,

York,

1988), and T. Robbins and R. Robertson,

(New Brunswick,

1987).

18. See, for example, T.

Rogers, "The Right,"

Ferguson and

Mvth of America's Turn The

May

J.

to

1988,

a single

die

transferable vote svstem of proportional rep-

pp.

resentation in order to allow the Catholic

19. Birmingham Alabama Navs, 30 November 1987.

elections in

Northern Ireland use

minoritv a voice they would otherwise be denied. This has the advantage that one can

studv detailed relationships between constituencies

by examining the flows of second

and third preference votes. Source

details for

such data are given in the appendix to Bruce,

God Save 10.

Ulster!

My

interpretation of Paisley's success

Steve Bruce, "Protestantism and Ter-

rorism in Northern Ireland," in A.

and

Y.

12.

New

O'Dav

Alexander, eds., Ireland's Terrorist

Trauma (London, 1989), parts

What

follows

is

pp.

13-33.

a very brief outline

of Steve Bruce, The Rise and

of

Fall of the

Christian Right: Conservative Protestant

Politics in

20. For a detailed account of the Ar-

kansas creation science

trial,

America, 1978-88 (Oxford, 1988).

see

Langdon and

Gilkev, Creationism on Trial: Evolution

God at Little Rock (Minneapolis, 1985). 21.

The

lessons

of the Robertson cam-

paign and the demise of the

and of unionism generallv is challenged by A. Aughev, "Recent Interpretations of Unionism," Political Quarterly 61, no. 2 (1990): 188-99. 1 1

Atlantic,

43-53.

amined

in detail in

NCR

are ex-

Steve Bruce, Pray

Televangelism in America

TV:

(London, 1990).

22. For an embarrassinglv mistaken as-

sessment of the potential of the

NCR

and

Pat Robertson's campaign, see Jeffrey K.

Hadden and Anson Shupe, Televangelism: Power and Politics on God's Frontier (New

What is argued much greater detail in

York, 1988).

here

sented in

chaps. 8 and

is

pre-

9 of Bruce, Pray TV. Simpson, "Moral Issues and Status pp. 187-205, in Liebman and vVuthnow, eds., The New Christian Right. 23.

J.

Politics,"

FUNDAMENTALISM. ETHNICITY. AND ENCLAVE 67

24. L. Sigelman and S. Presser, "Measur-

ing Public Support for the

Christian

26.

A

lengthv sociological explanation of

the difficulties of fundamentalist politics

is

of Point Estimation," PubOpinion Quarterly 52 1988): 325- 37.

presented in Steve Bruce, "Modernity and

25. Bruce, Pray TV, chap. 9.

in

Right: lic

The

New

Perils

(

Fundamentalism: The

New

Christian Right

America," British Journal of Sociolojj)' 41

(1990): 477-96.

CHAPTER 5

Jewish Fundamentalism and the Israeli Polity

Charles S. Liebman

1 talism

and

its

he effort to understand Jewish fundamen-

Not the least is manner which is both methodologically rigorous and politiFundamentalist beliefs and aspirations are not the same as the beliefs impact on

Israeli society

is

fraught with challenges.

1

defining the subject in a cally relevant.

and aspirations of other able

from them

to disentangle

either.

from national and ethnic

Israeli society

mentalism. tionalistic

the

and aspirations

and

are

sometimes hard

aspirations.

1967, independently of the growth of Jewish religious funda-

In addition, Judaism, in Israel, has been increasingly interpreted in na-

and ethnically chauvinistic terms. This development has been influenced by

growth of

growth. That

is

religious

fundamentalism but

is

not entirely accounted for by that

the subject of another study. 3 This essay

impact of religious fundamentalism on is

beliefs

beliefs

has been profoundly influenced by Jewish religious symbols and

ideas, especially since 2

religiously serious people, but they aren't always distinguish-

Moreover, religious

to describe the

is

concerned with the direct

the Israeli political system. Its

demands which fundamentalist spokesmen have

primary purpose

raised

and the man-

ner in which the nonfundamentalist sector has responded to these demands.

should be noted, however,

is

that social

and

cultural

years within the secular public in general, but ticular,

have generated a climate of sympathy

of fundamentalist ideas which did not

The

changes

among

the secular nationalists in par-

for religion

and

a legitimacy to the airing

exist in the past.

Subjects of This Study

According to most estimates, somewhat fewer than 20 percent of themselves as religious (dati).

What

in the last twenty-five

The

last

few years have seen the

68

rise

Israeli

Jews define

of fundamentalist

JEWISH FUND>MENTALISM AND THE ISRAELI POLITY 69

or fundamentalistlike tendencies

One

rections.

tendency

among them. These

come from two

tendencies

di-

the increased influence of the haredim (sg.: haredi; some-

is

Haredim look

times called ultra-Orthodox).

source of legitimacy and are

at least

to the religious tradition as the exclusive

nominally hostile to Zionism, which they view

as

an ideology that conceives of the Jews as a people defined by a national, rather than a

and that

religious, essence

third

of

Israel's religious

of reliable surveys

aspires to the normalization

of Jewish

population could be described

as haredi,

— haredim generally

resist

— and

being surveyed

life.

but

4

(About one-

in the

absence

precise definitions,

a rough estimate. The other strand of fundamentalism is associated mind with Gush Emunim. 5 Gush Emunim was organized in 1974 to further Jewish settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, areas that Israel occupied following the June 1967 war. Gush Emunim is led bv religious Jews who hold diverse opinions on many religious matters but who share the conviction that the areas Israel occupied as a result of the 1967 war must be settled by Jews and must become an this

must remain

)

in the public

integral part

of the State of

position that not a messianic age,

all

i.e.,

God

accordance with these

is

will

beliefs.

is

more

— the position that we

a religious

mandate,

We

Israel if

term "Gush

will use the

because that

is

stage in the

itself a

not forsake the State of

label for this theological position fact, it

activists share

are living in

of imminent Redemption; that the settlement of the

a period

occupied territories bv Jews

demption; and that

This view has been associated with a theological

Israel.

Gush Emunim

the

way

it

Emunim"

it is

coming Re-

develops policies in

used

as a

in the

accurately ascribed to the theological disciples of the late

shorthand media. In

Rabbi Zvi

Yehuda Kook who were the founders of and continue to dominate the leadership of

Gush Emunim but are a minority among its supporters. Within these two strands of fundamentalism, the haredi and Gush Emunim, we can identify a variety of individuals and groups and a range of opinions. 6 If we focus on the more extreme elements in each strand the most haredi, the most faithful to the tradition, the most vigorous in opposition to any innovation on the one hand and then we will find that the two the most messianic and ultranationalist on the other strands have little in common. The most extreme haredim are hostile to the State of

—

—

Israel.

them

Their antagonism to any suggestion of Jewish nationalism has led a handful of to favor dismantling the Jewish state.

dim, but thev

fall

within the

treme haredim, those tradition

who

camp of

They

constitute a tiny minority' of hare-

haredi fundamentalism. Even

of political passivity with respect to non-Jews, an

anxiety'

the nations of the world, and a desire to find a peaceful

Arabs, even

if it

among

less ex-

define themselves as loyal citizens of Israel, there

is

a

about antagonizing

accommodation with the

requires surrendering territory which Israel has held since 1967. 7

At the other extreme, among many of the most extreme ultranationalist messiaand support for retaining the Greater nists, opposition to any surrender of territory

—

Land of

Israel

under Jewish sovereignty and

land with Jewish

few of them

in

settlers

settling the length

— supersedes even' other

the imminent coming of the Messiah encourages

extreme form. "I

am

and breadth of the

religious obligation.

The

activity'

belief of a

of the most

not afraid of any death penalty, because the messiah will arrive

shortly," proclaims Rafi

Solomon, charged with the attempted random murder of two

— Charles

Liebman

S.

70

them

Arabs. 8 Nationalism to

and groups

extreme end of the ultranationalist continuum,

at the

compromise on

are prepared to

who

alliances

rabbis

individuals

find those

who

demand. To

fur-

we

with secular Jewish nationalists

of a positive religious commandment.

are active in ultranationalist nonreligious parties

number of prominent

opposed to

(as

formed

justified this alliance as the fulfillment

Religious Jews clude a

Among

virtually every other religiopolitical

ther their cause they not only have

but have

highest form of religion." 9

"is the

— tend to be most moderate

— and they

in-

in raising "religious"

demands on the Israeli politv. Indeed, these demands members of these parties have been willing to concede. make a rather convincing argument for distinguishing be-

"nationalist")

never exceed what the secular

One

could, therefore,

tween two

Israeli

nothing

ally

in

Jewish fundamentalistlike strands and arguing that thev have virtu-

common

with one another

at the political level.

The argument I offer here is a different one. The emergence of militant fundamentalistlike groups on the Israeli scene in the last few decades needs to be assessed in terms of not only what the extremists and ideological purists have asserted but also

how

their

emergence has effected that fundamentalism

If Israeli-Jewish

is

Israeli

Jewish public which defines

treated in this way,

itself as dati.

one can point to the emergence

of tendencies which integrate both fundamentalist strands, modifying and moderating

them of

in the process.

Viewed from

this perspective

one can discuss the

political

impact

fundamentalism without necessarily distinguishing one type of fun-

Israeli- Jewish

damentalism from another.

There

justification for this

is

invented as a derogatory term haredi).

To

the best of

my

approach

less

in the

growing usage of

than ten years ago

knowledge, the term was

first

used by a moderate,

haredi leader of the religious- Zionist youth movement, Bnei Akiva.

cerned with the growth of haredi tendencies within his

though perhaps well. is

The term

now borne

less distressed,

was

a label that

haredi-leumi (a nationalist

He

anti-

was very con-

movement and unhappy,

about the emergence of ultranationalist tendencies

haredi-leumi was certainly intended

as a

as

term of opprobrium. The term

with pride by a growing number of religious schools, by a rapidly grow-

ing religious youth movement, Ezra, and by an increasing

who, according to

a poll

number of religious Jews

conducted bv the religious weekly Erev Shabbat, decline to

identify themselves as either haredi or religious- Zionist but prefer to be called haredi-

leumi.

No

less

seats.

120-member Knesset

These 18

Shas 6 Agudat

seats

as follows:

Israel 5

Ha Torah

Agudat

in

were distributed

National Religious Part)'

Degel

among religious parties in Israel. In the elecNovember 1988, the religious parties won 18

persuasive are developments

tions to the

Israel

stituents are

(NRP)

5

2

and Degel

Ha

Torah

are

acknowledged haredi

predominantly Ashkenazic, that

East European) descent. Shas leaders label themselves haredi

is 1()

identified

is,

parties.

Their con-

of European or American (primarily

by the media

as a haredi party

and

its

although, in this case, the label can be misleading.

)

JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE ISRAELI POLITY 71

Shas's constituents arc

overwhelmingly Sephardic, that

marily North African) descent.

Agudat

parties,

Zionist

when

Israel,

Ha

Degel

the term "Zionism"

thirteen scats in 1988. rael

Most Shas

The two

— appeared so much

used

in

—

anti-

won

largest parties

—

at least

of the three

nominally

— Shas and Agudat

more dovish

left

Is-

of the right

closer to the leading secular nationalist party

(Likud) than to the leading partv of the

(pri-

an ideological sense. Together, they

Torah, and Shas are is

of Asian or African

is,

voters are not haredi but leaders of all three

(Labor) that most observers

dismissed the possibility that these religious parties would join a government led by

Labor rather than Likud. (But thev were proven wrong and the Labor Partv succeeded

1992 when Yitzhak Rabin

bringing Shas into a governing coalition.

in

Leaders of Shas and Agudat

in

Israel

have been inconsistent on the issue of

Israeli

withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. Shas's premier religious leader reversed himself and adopted a dovish position in the earlv 1990s, but this came over the

who

objections of his party's supporters,

Furthermore, what Shas lacks phobia.

campaign

Its television

adopting harsher measures are gencrallv

constrained his activitv in the political arena.

in territorial aggressiveness,

in

1988 was

critical

in the suppression

hawkish." Dcgel

pouse a dovish position. But

Ha as

of the

of the

it

balances by ethnic xeno-

Israeli

Intifada.

for not

Israel's leaders

Torah, the smallest of the haredi parties, does

with the religious leadership of Shas,

does not stem from an interest in the Palestinians or any belief their rights to the

government

Agudat

Land of Israel or

for that matter out

es-

this position

in the legitimacy

of

of any concern with the abuse

human rights that has accompanied Jewish rule over a recalcitrant national minoritv. The dovish position stems from the fear of antagonizing the non-Jewish

of

world, the United States in particular, and from the possible outbreak of bloodv warfare, which

would

of Jewish

result in the loss

lives.

Those fundamentalists who

object to surrendering territory, be they haredim or ultranationalists,

on the

basis

of

religious salience.

To

positions, such as the religious leaders territory

is

do so

primarily

who have adopted dovish and Degel Ha Torah, surrendering

the fundamentalists

of Shas

an issue of secondary concern.

In the 1988 election the Likud

Each of these two

forming a governing seats in the Knesset)

won

forty Knesset seats

and Labor

thirty-nine.

large parties then turned to the smaller parties in the alliance

with some of them

(i.e.,

hope of

control of at least sixty-one

and without the participation of the other major

part}'.

Shas

won

compared to four in the previous election. Its leaders were tempted by generous promises from the Labor party with regard to religious legislation, especially promises of public funds and political appointments. However, demonstrations by six seats

Shas's

own

supporters and a reminder that the part)' leadership had explicitly prom-

would not

Labor rather than the Likud from taking this step. The next largest haredi party, Agudat Israel, increased the number of its seats from two to five. Agudat Israel received support from two important groups whose religiously based opposition to any Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories ised,

during the campaign, that

it

join with

restrained the part)' leaders

Emunim. These two groups do not view the State of Israel in the same messianic and apocalyptic terms as does Gush Emunim, nor do they attribute the same metaphysical significance to events which began a century ago when nonre-

equals that of Gush

Charles

Liebman

S.

72

ligious settlers initiated the present Zionist settlement

adamant about the

less

of the land. But thev are no

of maintaining Jewish sovereignty over

religious imperative

the Territories.

The growth of support

for haredi parties

was an indication of

their ability to

from non-harcdi segments of the population. This would have been

attract voters

unlikely had they not adopted a dc facto nationalistic orientation

and muted

their

opposition to Zionism. 12

At the

religious-Zionist

(NRP) and

constituents

its

end of the continuum, the National Religious Party

— who

1970s were characterized bv religious

until the

moderation, by an accommodationist rather than a rejectionist orientation toward

modernity and secular culture

— show

increasing signs of rejecting modernity and

adopting a rather reactionary interpretation of the religious tradition. This in the increased allocation

of school time to the studv of sacred

is

evident

texts in religious-

Zionist schools, 13 in an increasing insistence

with religious Zionism, and in

identified

many

observance to which

ments

upon separating the sexes in institutions the more stringent standards of religious

now

religious- Zionists

adhere.

14

There are moderate

and has

the Likud. Its position

on

other,

though not

all,

matters increasingly resembles that

of the haredim. The counterpart to the nationalization of the haredim sense, haredization

of the religious-Zionists. But

panied bv the toning in circles

We of

ele-

NRP, but its foreign political platform has been increasingly radicalized come to resemble that of the Likud and even of secular parties to the right of

in the

down of messianic

this

is,

in

some

development has been accom-

expectations. Thus, in

1989

a leading figure

which heretofore spoke of the imminent Redemption wrote that

don't

know how much time will pass until we arrive completely security. Perhaps many generations. "But I believe with

and

rest

coming of the messiah, and even though he

in the

delays, "with

all

this," despite all the crises

—

at a state full faith

tarries," despite all the

"I await

him each dav

that he

may come." 15 The author

invokes, within his quotation marks, a traditional article of faith.

reminds the reader that belief

But

tradition.

Nothing

is

this very

in the

coming of the Messiah

reminder tempers expectations for

quite so religiously incendiary, or

cions of heresv

among

haredim,

believed that the Messiah

as the fear

raises as

of

"false

many

It

is

indeed basic to the

his

immediate coming.

historically

based suspi-

messianism." But Jews always

would come, "even though he

tarries."

The admission

that

"he tarries" integrates the writer's theology into that of traditional Judaism. Statements bv attempted murderer Rail Solomon, cited above, and by the religionationalist

"underground" movement uncovered

tion

among

anic,

though not

1984

16

generated a counter reac-

them to moderate their messiGrowing numbers of Jews may continue

religious-Zionist fundamentalists. It led their nationalist, doctrine.

to espouse acts of violence, and will rind

in

if

Jewish-Arab relations continue to deteriorate

an escalation of terror and counterterror. However, these

longer, for the

most

activities are

we no

part, legitimated in theological terms.

These developments

justify a

conclusion that the growth of Jewish fundamental-

JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE ISRAELI POLITY 73

ism can be treated

as a

phenomenon

that cuts across past differences

Zionist and anti-Zionist strands. Elsewhere ingly

dominant

hostility

between

spirit that

is

its

increas-

an orientation toward ethnic particularism

in Israeli religious circles as

which includes suspicion of and

have defined the

I

toward non-Jews, cultural isolationism

in-

cluding a suspicion of universalist moralist values, and, as already indicated, territorial irredentism.

1

"

We would expect these general orientations, which are admittedly more

pronounced among some groups than among others, to

find political expression in

demands of the

fundamentalistically oriented religious population. But before

to that subject,

it is

here.

According to

public policy particular.

is

The

we

turn

important to grasp the significance of the approach being urged this

approach, the impact of Jewish fundamentalism on

Israeli

mediated bv the larger religious public and the religious parties

religious public has certainly

in

been influenced by the fundamentalistlike

Gush Emunim, but it has also moderated these tenand reformulated them in terms that are more acceptable to the general soci-

orientations of the haredim and

dencies ety.

The National Religious

of Gush Emunim, but neutralized

its

(i.e.,

Party has adopted

much of the

nationalist-political vision

continued Jewish sovereignty over the Greater Land of Israel)

radical religious

(i.e.,

messianic) message. Opposition to any sur-

render of territory tends to be phrased in terms

of Israeli security

as

much

as in

terms

—

and the relationship between Jewish settlement in the West Bank or Jewish sovereignty over the Greater Land of Israel and the imminent Redemption (i.e., the messianic vision of Gush Emunim) is generally absent. In the case of the haredim, anti-Zionism is muted and demands for expanding religious legislaof Divine promises

tion are surrendered at the bargaining table without

much

resistance.

how

Let us sec

this has affected Israeli society at large.

Religious

One its

Demands on

the Israeli Polity

could make the case that the religio-nationalist demands of Gush

supporters have successfully influenced

Israeli society

Emunim and

independently of the

reli-

Gush Emunim spearheaded 1990 fewer than 20 percent of the esti-

18 gious parties and even, perhaps, of the religious public.

the settlement of the occupied territories. In

mated eighty thousand Jewish be active supporters of Gush

settlers in Judea,

Emunim

of theological messianists), but

its

councils in the Territories as well as

Samaria, and Gaza were thought to

(the political group, not the even smaller

band

sympathizers dominated the local and regional its

cultural

life.

In 1989,

Gush Emunim enjoyed

the deference of a group of thirty-one Knesset members calling itself the Land of Israel Lobby. That lobby is composed of members of right-wing as well as religious parties. Israeli

At

this writing (late

area, the

it

remains the spearhead of opposition to any it

might be argued

that, in at least

one

Jewish fundamentalists have achieved a great victory and have had a major

impact on the

in

1991)

concessions to the Palestinians. Hence,

Israeli political

system independently of the religious parties.

But one can view the success of the religio-nationalist fundamentalists in this area a different light. It is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish the program of

Charles

Liebman

S.

74

Gush Emunim from

Emunim

the

program of secular

itself resorts less

As noted above, Gush

ultranationalists.

From

frequently to religious rhetoric.

the very outset,

its

depended on the sympathy and cooperation of nonreligious Jews. These secularists were not influenced bv Gush Emunim's religious program or religious visuccess

sion.

Although thev were impressed by the

and

zeal

Emunim

of Gush

self-sacrifice

members, what was most important was the coincidence of their goals and those of the religious nationalists. This

and

rising Jewish-Arab tensions, Israelis, especially

of the

increasingly true in the 1990s.

is

is

intifada has led to

of many

these, in turn, have strengthened the sense

ultranationalists, that

ous, since their ultimate goal

The

any concession to the Arabs

danger-

is

the destruction of the Jews. In addition, the rise in

tensions has triggered ethnic loyalties and xenophobic tendencies

them to support anv program which that Gush Emunim has not succeeded

among manv Jews

that lead

is

anti-Arab. All of this leads to a con-

clusion

in

imposing

on

program

a fundamentalist

the Israeli political system but instead has succeeded through a coincidence be-

tween

objectives

its

and those of nonreligious

nationalists.

Furthermore, the

own

nationalist fundamentalists have significantly modified their

religio-

religious message.

Rather than resolving whether Gush Emunim's success should or should not be treated as the success of religious fundamentalism, the remainder of this paper

devoted to an analysis of demands raised by fundamentalists which

demands

into the category of religious

at the

domestic

level,

fall

is

quite clearly

demands which

them

set

apart from the remainder of the Jewish population. Peculiarly rule

A

enough, one demand that

by Jewish

state ruled in

Mayer,

a

a focus

pay

lip service

fact, as critics

suitable to serve as the law

Jewish law to a modern state would

manv changes

that

— with

not

votes to impose Jewish law

its

what

at all clear

upon

the state,

consequences for the conduct of the

religious leaders often proclaim that the is

it is

have pointed out, in the unlikely event that the

enough

they would have trouble interpreting

therefore,

for

is

to this as an ultimate goal.

of emotional commitment, 19 but

religious parties ever obtained

so

not heard from the religious parties

accordance with Jewish law constitutes, to borrow a notion of Ann

svmbol and

"Jewish law" means. In

Whereas

is

law. All the religious parties

Torah covers

of the land,

all

aspects of

state.

life

and,

in practice, the application

of

require so extensive an interpretive enterprise and

—

minor exceptions among ultranationalists rabbinical groundwork necessary to transform their

leaders have been hesitant to undertake the

vision into a series of specific policies. 20

As we noted, somewhat fewer than 20 percent of Israeli Jews define themselves as dati. The majority of Israeli Jews are not "religious" in belief or behavior. Many, probably most, of them harbor a feeling of sympathy for the religious tradition. Indeed,

when

asked about their religious identification between 35 and 40 percent

prefer to define themselves as "traditional" rather than "secular."

though not to the point alienation

from

of doing much about

religious rite

even this general

mood

is

if

Manv

they might hope for

arc distressed,

by the increased ignorance of and

and custom they find among

their

own

often accompanied by anticlerical feeling.

children.

Under

the

But cir-

demand the imposition of Jewish law, such an eventuality. What they have called for, in more

cumstances, religious leaders are reluctant to

even

it,

— JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE ISRAELI POLITY 75

outspoken terms, duct of public

is

the maintenance of what

accordance with Jewish law. In

in

life

called a "Jewish street,"

is

fact, as

we

i.e.,

the con-

they have

shall see,

been more anxious to maintain victories thev have alrcadv secured than to expand the scope of religious law. It is far easier

manv

for

nonreligious Jews, especiallv political leaders anxious to

form an alliance with religious parties, to acquiesce in demands of that sort

may

because they

mands

are not perceived as an infringement

of freedom or

no

ing to them, in other words, requires

in part

what

respects, a conflict over

public and

is

as religious coercion. Yield-

basic sacrifice of principle

of religion and

secular leaders. Political conflict over issues

what

is

private.

and what does the nonreligious public consider

on

the part of

state in Israel

What do

and the religious public consider basic to maintaining the image of as Jewish,

—

be personallv svmpathetic to them and in part because such de-

is,

manv

in

religious parties Israeli

public

life

basic to the private rights

of an individual? It is

spirit

remarkable

how

which has penetrated the

some of the

tance which

has changed despite the

little all this

religious public. Part

religious parties

agenda which bv their definition

is,

ficientlv sensitive to the distinction

now

place

new

of the reason

on

fundamentalist

rests

on

their "nationalist"

the impor-

agenda

— an

of course, "religious." Nevertheless, thev are

between "national" and "religious"

suf-

the secular public to avoid jeopardizing their "nationalist" agenda bv emphasis their "religious" one.

Even

if

one accepts that

ing to surrender, parts of the Greater

on

this issue rather

now

haredi parties

regard

Land of Israel

on

at least refus-

a "religious" issue, the

emphasis

seek the support of nonreligious Jews and greater integration into if onlv

to benefit

attributable, at least in part, to

is

is

and annexing, or

than others suggests an order of priorities. In addition, even the

the Israeli political svstem, this

settling

of

in the eves

from the its

spoils

of office. Shas's success

in

emphasis on Jewish ethnicity and the

use of ethnic, rather than narrowly religious, symbols. This, as well as the decline of

ideology among, for example, Agudat Israel and the increased weight matic considerations, parties

make

for

reflected in the rather

is

it

gives to prag-

modest demands which even haredi

expanding the scope of Jewish law.

Consequentlv, as alreadv suggested, the key demands of the religious parties

1988 Knesset ties

elections

simplv sought to retain the

had secured

in the

were defensive demands. In manv instances, the religious par-

in the past.

fruits

of

legislative

and administrative

victories they

The most important of these included Sabbath closing laws

passed bv municipal councils which a 1988 court decision held invalid because the

Knesset had never explicitly empowered local councils to pass such laws. Closelv lated ters

was the demand

of personal

eroded

for the expansion of the authority

status (especially marriage

as a result

of decisions by

of rabbinical courts

in

re-

mat-

and divorce), an authoritv which has been (The legal status of the latter is

secular courts.

two of the three in most important defensive demand was the continuing assurance that

superior to that of the former. ) However, for the haredi parties, particular, the

yeshiva (pi., vesbivot) students (students at schools for

which means

virtually

all

haredi youth)

would continue

tions as long as they were enrolled in yeshivot.

advanced religious studv to benefit

from

draft

exemp-

Charles

Liebman

S.

7b

A second type of demand

included increased benefits, or public funding for haredi

educational and philanthropic institutions equal to what the non-haredi sector ceives.

The

haredi parties also called for greater housing benefits for

and Shas was

especially interested in

government recognition of

re-

voung couples, schools as an

its

independent, administratively autonomous system eligible for public funding. These

demands, while marginally burdensome to the jor shift in relations

An

effort to

of demands.

between religion and

expand religious influence

One was of

hardlv presaged a ma-

Israeli taxpayer,

state.

was

in Israeli society

reflected in

two types

symbolic nature. For example, amending the

a generally

"Law of Return"

to preclude recognition by the State of Israel of non-Orthodox u conversions performed abroad (popularly known as the Is a Jew?" law) would

Who

have affected no more than a handful of Israelis but was of great symbolic importance because

whom

would have

it

established the authority of

Orthodox

rabbis in determining

demand was in the and education. Proposals in this regard were rather vague. They included the demand that the government introduce more Jewish (read "religious") education. The NRP also talked about the need for more national (read "ultranationthe State of Israel recognizes as a Jew.

The second

tvpe of

area of culture

alist")

education. There were also hints at the need to preserve Israeli culture against

"negative influences" (an allusion to pornography and probably to antireligious and

University'" (in fact, a branch

Jerusalem also

falls

"Mormon

Opposition to the construction of the

antinationalist expressions as well).

of Brigham Young University) on Mount Scopus

into this category. These demands,

in

should be noted, were

it

phrased very carefully, generally in a positive rather than a negative vein, under cate-

gory headings that talked about the need for the for the proposal to

amend

the

"Who

Is a

unit)'

of the Jewish people. Except

Jew?" law, these demands were quickly

surrendered in the negotiations over the establishment of a coalition government

lowing the election. Furthermore, although Agudat

NRP

did

strongly about the need to

feel

them conditioned

their joining the

amend

the

government on

"Who a

fol-

and some leaders of the

Israel

Is a

change

Jew?" law, neither of

in the law.

Of course,

once Likud and Labor agreed to form a "unity government" together, the bargaining position of

all

the smaller parties including the religious parties

was

severely

weakened.

To conclude

this point, despite the success

the religious parties, the

were

relatively

Two

modest.

demands

of the fundamentalists

that these parties

made upon

in controlling

the political system

How does one account for this?

types of factors ought to be mentioned.

One

set

of factors

is

political.

This

two religious parties, Shas and Agudat Israel, to attract This means that their platform and campaign had to be phrased

includes the effort bv at least

nonreligious voters. in religiously

moderate terms. Both parties succeeded

voters because, to some, these parties

and

social protest

in attracting

had become outlets for

during and immediately

after the election

such nonreligious

a display

of ethnic pride

campaign. In addition,

the religious parties feared a secular backlash should their

demands appear

The religious parties are aware of their minority position

in the society and are anx-

excessive.

ious to avoid confrontations with the nonreligious majority at both the political and

JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE ISRAELI POLITY 77

the social level

— confrontations which thev can onlv

parties in particular share in the benefits derived coalition, the

more

mands which

the majoritv will refuse to meet.

A second viction

which

all

Indeed, the

theological rather than political.

is

unit}'.

This

more moderate among them and it

stems from the con-

not an emptv slogan or even a

is

perceived, especially by the religio-nationalists, as a religious

lation lest

It

but the most extreme fundamentalists share about the supreme im-

portance of Jewish

politically

more the harcdi government

in a

reluctant thev are to jeopardize this participation bv raising de-

of factors

set

lose.

from participating

to insist that, even

religiously appropriate,

lead to conflict

among

The

it

though

tactical device. It

mandate and has

a course

is

led the

of action was both

could not be imposed on a recalcitrant popu-

Jews. 21

"Secular" Response

Despite the rather modest demands of the religious parties, the increase in the number

of Knesset

which thev won

seats

1988 elections (their number grew from The assumption of virtually everyone, from was that the Likud would form a narrow coali-

in the

thirteen to eighteen) evoked near hvsteria. political analyst to

tion

man

in the street,

government with the

The images of the

religious parties

and three small

parties

of the

radical right.

future reflected in various newspaper columns included religious

control of the school system; increased expenditures for yeshivot at the expense of universities; greater censorship

of the

new

the authority of religious courts; the Sabbath; and

tween cial

Israel

amending the

press, movies,

and the

theater; an expansion

of

laws restricting the opening of public places on

"Who

Is a

Jew?" law resulting

in sharp conflict be-

and Diaspora Jewry and the consequent reduction of political and

finan-

support from the Diaspora. 22

For example, on 3 November 1988 the Jerusalem

Post,

the only English-language

daily newspaper, editorialized that the religious parties "will vie for the lead in

wrenching

Israel

away from

its

commitment

to the Declaration of Independence and

into an undertaking to Halakha [Jewish law]." Headlines in Haaretz, Israel's

most

prestigious daily, referred to "extortion of the religious" or "parents [who] have rea-

son to be anxious in the face of the possibility of the narrowing of our children's horizons."

The more popular

Maariv, headlined stories with banners attribut-

daily,

— now

"You didn't want the kosher law "You didn't want yeshivot, soon we

ing such statements to religious Jews as get the supervision of our courts"; buildings

on Mount Scopus,"

a reference to the

transforming democracy and a minority

Hebrew

University; or,

will

you'll

buy the

"Now we

are

will rule over the majority."

A number of mass demonstrations took place in which two types of demands were heard.

The

first

type was for revision of the electoral system. Proposals to revise the

political agenda independently of the 1988 election results. What was stimulate public demands for electoral change (for example, disor the direct election of the prime minister) that would limit the capac-

system were on the the election did trict elections

ity

of small

parties in general

and the

religious parties in particular to

form the balance

Charles

S.

Liebman

78

of power

in a

government. Second, the backlash against the religious parties

and the haredi parties

who under

in particular stimulated calls for the drafting

ened the hands of

a

group within the Likud which favored

why

Labor. There were a number of reasons unlikely

it is

it

would have succeeded

Committee if not for the public ties would have a major voice.

fear

in

a

own

effort to turn

secular right

what the

The

Likud-led

but

a coalition,

—

in

its

in

which

religious par-

agenda, politicians of the

harbor toward the religious parleft,

as

we

shall see, has also

case, to unite secular Israelis in

strategy of appealing to secular nationalists in an

them against religious nationalists will probablv fail. The fact is that the more ultranationalist and antidove than it is anticlerical. Furthermore,

is

secular left has never understood

and clericalism

religion

political

Israelis

growth of clericalism. The moderate

sought to exploit the public's fear of religion opposition to ultranationalism.

a

existence strength-

group favored such

this

of

fear

broader coalition with

a

of a narrow government

In this case, therefore, to further their

and toward

its

winning the support of the Likud's Central

moderate right exploited the suspicions most ties

The

the present law are exempt from military service.

dependent upon the support of religious parties for

coalition

in general

of veshiva students,

is

manv of the

that

are not shared as intensely

tionalist secularists perceive religion as

fears

bv the secular

it

harbors about

The

right.

ultrana-

an important part of the national heritage and

of unity among Jews. They are less concerned than is the left over, for example, limiting freedom of expression. To their mind, a more important issue is proa source

tecting national values or

what they

call

"the spiritual treasures of the nation" from

defamation, thereby strengthening the "national will." But the point here

whether the propaganda of the secular secular left believes that

manv

fundamentalistlike religion.

The

final

other

They

question, therefore,

Rather, the point

left is effective.

Israelis share their

is

is

not

that the

antipathv toward and fear of

are at least partiallv correct in that assessment. is,

moderate as those portraved above,

If religious

demands on the body

how do we

1988 election returns generated or the

effort

politic are as

account for the grave concern the

by manv

intellectuals (see

below) to

exploit fears of religious extremism?

Religious Fundamentalism: Image and Reality Religious fundamentalism in is

Israeli society

has been portrayed in

portrayed as demanding the imposition of Jewish law on

Jewish religion, according to this point of view,

is

all

two wavs.

have of the

political

manv

secular-

ambitions of the religious establishment. Second, the fun-

damentalists have been portrayed as successful.

modemitv, and Jewish univcrsalism

The

forces

of

light,

and Jewish particularism. 23

We

liberalism,

are in constant retreat before the onslaught

fundamentalist Judaism, which means medievalism, close-mindedness, tion,

The

antidemocratic, and the rabbis seek

to rule the entire population. "Khomeini-like" embraces the image that ists

First, it

aspects of society.

noted above that the moderate

of

cultural isola-

left

has invoked

the fears of fundamentalism in an effort to incite the secular ultranationalists against

JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE ISRAELI POLITY 79

religious ultranationalists. Here, for example,

generally considered a moderate threat

from the

A small

sect, a cruel

and obdurate

emerged

sect,

and to bring down upon us

a savage

tional ties dating

from the

cities

that

all

is

ago from

.

.

.

to

which Jews have emo-

But the truth

is

aims: the imposition of an uglv and distorted version of Judaism

of Israel.

The

.

.

that, for this

merely a sophisticated ploy to disguise

is

dark

a

dear and holy to

struggling for our sovereignty in

is

on the West Bank

Biblical period].

Greater Land of Israel

cult, the

Amos Oz,

and insane blood-cult.

People think, mistakenly, that this sect

Hebron and Nablus [Arab

several years

threatening to destroy

it is

author

Gush Emunim:

religio-nationalist fundamentalists such as

corner of Judaism; and us,

how world-famous

is

and by no means an extremist, describes the

leftist

its

on the

real

State

.

aim of

real

this cult

the expulsion of the Arabs so as to oppress the

is

Jews afterwards, to force us

to

all

bow

to the authority of their brutal false

prophets.

Oz

goes on to talk about the shocking success this cult has had in

hundreds of thousands of to recognize

Hizbullah.

.

.

.

Israelis

pull[ing] the

.

wool over the eyes of

with alarm were they

the face of the cruel and freedom-hating fanatic Jewish

if

secular right, reinforce the notion

and

.

24

Obviously such images, even

general,

.

who would quake

Israeli intellectuals,

they

the nationalist fervor of the

of the danger from fundamentalists. The media

rise

of

are identified with the political

religious

number of

factors are,

the activity of Khomeini,

factors

and given

who

credibility

posed

in

left,

fundamentalism feeds these

and provides them with new elements to

reinforced by a first,

dampen

to

most of whom

have always been antireligious, and the antircligious sentiments

fail

caricature.

They

arc

by others. The reinforcing

a living

model of what

religious

fundamentalism can lead to and showed that a fundamentalist group can take power.

The second

factor

is

the statements of the religious fundamentalists themselves which

plav directly into the fears of their opponents. This

the extremists.

Even the moderate fundamentalist

is

not only true of statements by

rhetoric strengthens the suspicions

of the nonreligious. In the case of the haredim, their nominal opposition to Zionism, even though it has no practical consequences today, is an irritant to the vast majority of

Israelis to

whom

"Zionism"

is

a

term which symbolizes their attachment to the

Israeli state and society. The invoking of a messianic rhetoric by the religio-nationalist fundamentalists of Gush Emunim and their sympathizers strikes the nonreligious Jew

as

an indication of

one and

—

in attracting

raises fears

irrationality.

of children turning against

of this world to take up of resentment and their

Third, the fundamentalists' success

young men

—

albeit a

modest

former secularists to their camp has generated enormous publicity their parents or

of sons leaving the pursuits

studies in religious institutions. Finally, there

hostility

toward the haredim because of the

to serve in the army.

is

refusal

a

deep residue

of so many of

Charles

S.

Liebman

80

In Israel, one's religious orientation

is

viewed

lump

Religious and nonreligious tend to

tity.

than a partial iden-

as a total rather

the "others" into one stereotype and

thereby assume that by defining them as religious or nonreligious, certainly as haredi

or secular, they have identified

that

all

important about the other party. At the

is

risk

of oversimplifying, the dominant images each side has of the other are negative.

Among

the nonreligious, these include the haredi image (the image of the religious

Gush Emunim image

fanatic), the

image of the nationalist

(the

and the Shas

fanatic),

image (the image of the poorly educated, superstitious Scphardim). Images and

of the "other"

catures

as a political leftist, a

shaky,

among

religious Jews.

person of relatively loose morals,

whose children

Jewish tradition.

also exist

are potential

drug

and

users,

who

and

distant

is

hostile to the

25

Caricatures of religion and religious Jews can be maintained for a few reasons.

between religious and nonreligious Jews

social distance

cari-

Thev perceive the secular Jew one whose family relations are

in Israel

The

generally great.

is

There are few occasions for intimate associations between most religious and nonreligious Jews.

armv

is

Thev

are separated

by play group and school from the

one of the few places where these two publics

of intimate relationship, and that relationship

do not

girls

serve in the army.

is

Haredim do not

are likely to

armv undergo

serve in the

marily of other religious soldiers. This

is

meet

limited by the fact that

The

in

any kind

most

religious

generally serve in the army. If they do,

they perform specialized functions of a religious nature, and

men who do

earliest age.

many young

their basic training in units less true

among

religious

composed

pri-

the Sephardic segment of

the population, and Sephardim, in the past, were far less affected by the negative

images of religious Jews. But

too

this

is

changing. Social distance means that reports

from the media and other secondary sources, anecdotes, and

superficial impressions

are likely to determine the images that each side has of the other.

Negative stereotyping

among

attitudes

Israeli

is

related to

and reinforced by everything we know of public

Jews. Virtually even' public issue

should construct the Lavi airplane, extradite convicted France, negotiate with the rights

of

Israeli

pornography issue.

—

PLO,

finds the

Those who

same population groups arranged on the two

are better educated,

who

are

likely to

is

two

sets

of related

divided. These are the balance between a

who

define themselves as

when

issues

they do, haredim are

around which the

commitment

this critical

civil,

and

political liberties to every

and highly emotional

set

of

issues, the

education, ethnicity, and religious orientation

Obviously not

all

reli-

less

Israeli polity

to the Jewish historical and

person and the

willing to take in order to achieve a political settlement with the Arabs

On

who

one position, and those with the

and the security needs of the Jewish people on the one hand, and

the extension of cultural, is

of the

adopt the opposite position. (Haredim are generally omitted from

respond.) There are

religious tradition

sides

of Ashkenazic background, and

such surveys. Pollsters don't often reach them, and likely to

Israel

surrender territory in exchange for peace, limit the

formal education, of Sephardic background, and

gious are

or not

William Nakash to

Arabs to vote or be elected, limit the freedom of the media, censor

define themselves as nonreligious are likely to adopt least

— whether

killer

do not

on

risks

one

the other.

sociodemographic factors of overlap; they are cumulative.

religious Jews lack extensive secular education,

nor are

all

of them

JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE ISRAELI POLITY 81

Sephardim. Indeed, the majority of haredim arc of Ashkenazic origin.

among

clear that

the nonreligious not

all

are well-educated

equally

It is

Ashkenazim. But when

each side thinks of the other, thev tend to think in stereotypes, and the image of

and nonreligious

religious

is

likely to

accompany an attendant package with educareligious and non-

and ethnic components. In other words, the images of

tional

religious distinguish not only

two

orientations but between values

beliefs

of

identity,

— and the image of the Other

There

a

is

danger

is

forms of

life,

in overstating this condition. It isn't true

But these images

damentalist extremists but tual elite

of the

religious.

are

political

how

of

and we

all Israelis,

widespread these images

most prevalent not only among the

among

and

threatening.

don't have the in-depth attitude surveys to indicate reallv are.

and religious

between groups with different cultures, styles

and fun-

secular

the cultural elite of the nonreligious and the spiri-

own way, intellectuals among the secular and the much to lose from concessions to the other of secular intellectuals, who feel far more threatened bv

Each

in

its

rabbinical leaders of the religious, has side.

This

is

especially true

fundamentalistlike tendencies, bv anv hint of censorship or religious coercion, than

does the general public. The general public objects to inconveniences which religious parties

Among

might impose upon them.

that their very

way of life, and

intellectuals,

their deepest

a

proper soci-

threatened bv the fundamentalists.

ety, is

The Future of Fundamentalism

as a Political

"Observers cannot predict future developments

actors in the

drama include

are to metapolitical beliefs

insulated

from

religiously motivated people

political pressures.

of the experience of the

that fundamentalism will

today.

To

the contrary,

parties are

it

One

past.

become seems

becoming more

especially true

is

and to the authority of

a

more

likely to

is

nothing

when

the major

whose ultimate commitments

spiritual leaders

can, however,

There

Phenomenon

Middle East," one pundit has

in the

noted; "thev can't even predict the present." This

basis

however, one finds a sense

image of what constitutes

reflect

upon

who

are often

the future

in its recent history to

significant factor in Israeli politics than

become

less significant.

The

and the

direct benefits

the

it is

haredi-oriented

rather than less involved in the political system.

appetite for the spoils of office

on

suggest

As

their

of increased public funding

grows, their demands for religious legislation of a far-reaching nature, the kind of

would do more than inconvenience the nonreligious public, are likely As long as Israel does not undergo a religious revival in which large numbers of Jews embrace a religious way of life, the ability of religious parties to retain power will depend on a modicum of goodwill on the part of nonreligious lews. Nothing destroys that goodwill more than demands for increased religious legislation. There legislation that

to lessen.

is no evidence that the nonreligious segment of the Israeli population has become any more observant of religious norms. On the contrary, there is evidence that the off-

spring of the nonreligious are totally indifferent to the Jewish religious tradition in their private lives

and appallingly ignorant of

its

foundations. 26 As long as the

reli-

gious fundamentalists are politically accountable to this population group in some

a

Charles

S.

Liebman

82

way, thev

may

will satisfy

continue to pay

lip service to

racy not only limits the achievements of the

of

demands. There

their

demand for religious legislation but communal interests. Democfundamentalists; it eyen moderates many the

themselves with a defense of their narrower

from the ruling

always a possibility that the haredi parties might resign

is

coalition. Infighting

and acute

among

dissatisfaction with

haredim, an unstable structure of internal

some symbolic

act of the government could become extremely unlikely that any haredi party or, for that matter, any religious party would actually join in vigorous opposition to the government. Agudat Israel, incensed bv Shamir's broken promises to them following the 1988 elections, did resign from the government, but this was interpreted as little more than a symbolic gesture of annoyance. Agudat Israel was confident that the Likud would not invoke retaliatory measures, and the Likud was confident that Agudat Israel would limit its critique to complaints against the integrity of the prime minister.

authority,

But

lead to this.

it

—

has

—

No

religious party today

The no

nationalist

prepared to remain in the

is

government bestow upon

the benefits that ties to the

demands of the

political wilderness, bereft

of Gush Emunim show more and more from mes-

religious fundamentalists

signs of moderation but are likely to be transformed

sianic to secular nationalist

from the nonreligious possibility that

the victorious

among Jews alists

demands. Less and

ultranationalist.

the Palestinians involving

seemed more

less

Should

seems to distinguish the religious

Israel reach

likely after the

are likely to follow. It

is

bv no means

or the secular nationalists are more

means

are

territories

—

newly elected prime minister and head of

Labor part)', Yitzhak Rabin, took office

ticularly if violent

an accommodation with

withdrawal from the presently occupied

its

of

it.

in July

clear

likely to

1992

—

civil

disturbances

whether the religious nation-

engage

in

such disturbances, par-

employed.

Postscript

developments between March and June of 1990 offered a

Political

conclusions of this chapter. In

March 1990

the government. Its resignation

the

Labor

of the major

was triggered by the opposition of Likud

Prime Minister Shamir, to a Cairo meeting between tatives.

test

party, in effect, resigned

Labor, however, only resigned after

its

Israeli

leader,

from

leader.

and Palestinian represen-

Shimon

Peres,

became con-

vinced that a majority of the Knesset would support a "no confidence" motion in the

Shamir government and that leadership.

On

a majority

would support

a

new government under

his

15 March a majority did, indeed, pass a motion of "no confidence."

Peres had a block of fifty-five

members from Labor and

secular parties to the

left

of

Labor. Shamir had a block of forty-eight members from the Likud and secular parties to the right of the Likud. Peres, therefore, needed to secure six votes

eighteen

members of the

out the Likud). Shamir, a

religious parties to

a

from among the

"narrow" government (one with-

needed thirteen of the religious party votes to form

in turn,

"narrow" government under

form

his leadership. Peres failed to secure the necessary

Knesset votes; Shamir succeeded.

JEWISH

NP\MENTALISM AND THE ISRAELI POLITY

FL

83

For over

a year

preceding the

fall

of the Shamir government, Peres courted the

haredi parties in his effort to overthrow the "unity" government of Shamir and to win

support for a "narrow" government under his leadership. Peres received an unintended

assist

from the

distrust

which other partv leaders harbor toward Shamir. In

negotiations which preceded the formation of the 1988 government Shamir lied to virtually everyone, in

some

cases so blatantlv

those of Agudat Israel in particular, it

was preferable to negotiate

parties control

and welfare Israel to

and

flagrantly that

a deal with the

Labor

manv

a

But bearing

government, the

in

mind

legislative

partv. Peres

legislation. It also

Jewish consciousness, to

a radio

make no changes

their educational

that Peres needed the support of Agudat

would be used by the courts

promised to establish

believable,

promised the haredi

promises which Agudat

from him appear minor. Labor promised not to press for the religious parties feared

party leaders,

Shamir said was

that since nothing

of important ministries and generous funding for

institutions.

form

felt

Israel extracted

a civil liberties law,

which

to overturn existing religious

channel devoted to strengthening

in the electoral

law without

first

consulting

the leaders of Agudat Israel, to support passage of a law prohibiting the marketing or sale

of pork products, to establish a joint committee to recommend laws that would

outlaw "advertisements for abominations"

(a reference

to advertisements which the

haredi public consider lewd), and to establish a joint committee to study wavs of

on on the Sabbath an hour or two before the

lessening Sabbath desecration (intended primarily to prohibit bus transportation

the Sabbath; at the present time buses are prohibited from operating in all cities

except Haifa, but they generally begin traveling

Sabbath ends; the proposal was aimed

at

prohibiting these early departures).

On the basis of these promises, Agudat Israel announced its readiness to join a Labor government, but Peres was unable to secure the support of any other religious partv. The unwillingness of Degel Ha Torah to support a Labor government was most interesting since Degel

Ha

Torah's supreme religious leader, Rabbi Eliczer Schach,

does not oppose surrender of the West Bank and Gaza views are,

if

anything, to the

to permit Degel his partv,

Ha

Torah to

which was aired

from secular

intellectuals

left

of

join a

live

on

strip.

Pcres's. Nevertheless,

government

led

Israeli television

and the president of

Israel,

His ostensibly dovish

Schach adamantly refused

by Peres. In

a

major address to

and provoked vigorous attacks Schach's position

on the

para-

who violate the law, was mountry of made clear. In this matter, the Labor party, by virtue of its behavior in the 1940s and 1950s, was deemed less trustworthy than the Likud. A view attributed to Rav Schach was that the "nations of the world" would force Israel to surrender the West Bank and Gaza regardless of who was in office. Therefore, peace and order within Israel could be maintained if it was the Likud rather than Labor that presided over the observing Jewish law,

and

his disdain for those

surrender of the Territories. This suggests Territories

is

from

a religious perspective

how

trivial in his

opinion the issue of the

— more evidence of the

fact that haredi par-

from those of the non-haredim and another measuring them by their stance on issues which are of problematic the indication of

ties

march to tunes which

critical

are different

to the non-harcdi public.

In the case of the Sephardic haredi party, Shas, developments in

1990

paralleled

Charles

S.

Liebman

84

The

those following the 1988 elections.

of a Labor-led government.

He

religious leader

of Shas favored the formation

himself was a dove, and the extravagant promises of

—

money for Shas institutions and patronage for their political representatives rumored to include the Ministrv of the Treasury were verv tempting. This led Shas to

—

abstain in the

"no confidence"

vote,

which caused the collapse of the Shamir govern-

who

ment. But pressure from Shas constituents,

who

and from Rav Schach,

support a Peres government. Shas leader's authority

was

are

both hawkish and xenophobic,

revered bv Shas's leaders, led to the party's refusal to

is

itself

was

left

badlv scarred, and

it

its

hawkish position precluded

looked

its

observers predicted, and voices within the

government

after

its

NRP.

It

was assumed

joining a Labor government. However,

though Peres was going to succeed

as

religious

severely undermined.

Peres undertook fewer efforts to enlist the support of the that

own

its

NRP

in

when

forming a government,

political

NRP

join the

demanded, that the

confirmation bv the Knesset.

The behavior of the NRP between March and June cast doubts on its radicalism. Once it became clear that Peres was unable to form a "narrow" government and the task

NRP

of forming a government was transferred to Shamir, the

effort in seeking to

convince or even coerce Shamir into reviving a "unitv" govern-

ment with Labor. This seems not be

forthcoming

as

as a

and

it

would

gested.

But

its

it

certainlv not

political negotiations in the

surprising. After

all,

a "unity"

"narrow" right-wing government

settlements in the Territories; part,

invested great

might even agree to

their surrender, in

Jewish

whole or

in

annex them. The NRP, therefore, emerged from the

spring of 1990 as

less radical

behavior did confirm another point

NRP

of messianic nationalism. The

government would

in establishing

made

than this chapter has sug-

in

the chapter

— the decline

understood that a "narrow" right-wing govern-

ment in which radical secular nationalists such as Ariel Sharon held kev positions would isolate Israel in the international arena. Under such conditions Israel would be in no position to effect any kind of nationalist program of any duration. Such thinking indicates that the NRP has effectively eschewed messianic expectations. It was no longer considered sufficient for Israel to do what was religiously proper and to anticipate God's help in the ensuing conflict. In the

last analvsis,

however, although

all

the religious parties preferred a "unity"

government, they were prepared to join Shamir regardless of whether he succeeded in

forming a "narrow" government without Labor or was forced to renew the broad

coalition with Labor.

The onlv

difference

between them was that Agudat

Israel indi-

would onlv join a "narrow" Shamir government some time after its forprice Agudat Israel extracted from Shamir was a bit more than what they had extracted from Peres. The munificent sums of monev which Labor had showered on the haredi parties were retained but not enlarged. At the legislative level, Agudat cated that

mation.

Israel

it

The

secured legislation tightening the present abortion laws but these, in

quite liberal, and

symbolic its

it is

effect. Finally,

the Likud sent an abject letter of apology to

fact, are

more than Agudat Israel for

generally' believed that the tightening will have

little

broken promises. In conclusion, events during the spring of

1990 placed the

religious parties in a

JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE ISRAELI POLITY 85

power which

position of potential parties

responded

like traditional

The

unlikely ever again to be equaled.

is

religious

conservative religious parties rather than radical fun-

They were given the power to choose which of two major foreign policy would be followed. Thcv sought to avoid making a choice. They had the

damentalists. alternatives

power even

to determine

this decision.

which partv was to

and thev preferred to avoid

rule the country,

enormous power into more money for their and welfare institutions, more positions in government for the

Thev

educational, cultural,

translated their

partv faithful, and incremental changes in legislation affecting the narrowest of

gious interests

—

pornographv, abortions,

against public transportation

outcome of

may be

reli-

of pork products, and enforcing of laws

on the Sabbath. In the long

these developments

electoral reform

sale

run, the

most important

demand

the strengthening of popular

as a secular backlash to the perception

for

of religious partv power. For

example, die proposal for the direct election of the prime minister has become extremclv popular.

Its

enactment would severely reduce the bargaining positions of the

religious parties and, in turn,

of the fundamentalists.

Notes Mv colleague

1.

Professor Ilan Greilsam-

mer read this paper with great care and offered a number of very helpful comments.

We

remain

in

disagreement over

a

few-

On

this

Liebman and

development, see Charles Eliezer

Don

ligion in Israel: Traditional litical

not

fit

S.

Yehiya, Civil Re-

Judaism and Po-

Culture in the Jewish State (Berkeley:

its

program, do

racist

neatly into either of these categories

although, as

dicmselves

points. 2.

Kach, ruled ineligible to run in the 1988 elections because of

we

are

shall

the categories

see,

dissolving.

In

any event,

Kahane's program of expelling the Arabs

and conducting a campaign of punishment against all of them sympathetic chord

among many

collective strikes

a

Jews, high

University of California Press, 1983).

school students, the economically poorer

3. Charles S. Liebman and Steven M. Cohen, Two Worlds of Judaism: The Israeli and American Experiences (New Haven: Yale

groups, and Jews from Arab-speaking lands

4. Samuel C. Heilman and Menachem Friedman, "Religious Fundamentalism and Religious Jews: The Case of the Haredim," in Martin E. Mart)' and R. Scott Appleby,

Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1991). 5.

On

the history and present activity of

Gush Emunim, Emergence of the

see

Ehud

Israeli

Sprinzak,

Radical Right

The

(New

York: Oxford University Press, 1990), and

Gideon Aran, "Jewish Zionist Fundamentalism: On the Bloc of the Faithful (Gush

Emunim),"

in

Marty and Appleby,

eds.,

Fundamentalisms Observed. 6.

be treated inde-

pendently of a study of the

political

impact

of religious fundamentalism. While Kahane

University Press, 1990).

eds.,

in particular. It deserves to

Rabbi Meir Kahane and

his

party,

is

certainly a religious fundamentalist,

not

at all clear that his

to

his

popularity

fundamentalism.

It

is

it

is

related

would

both

lengthen and unduly complicate this study

add a consideration of Kahane and his movement. For a comprehensive discussion of Kahane within the framework of Israeli politics and the emergence of ultranationalto

ism, see Sprinzak, Israeli Radical Right. 7.

None of

this

is

true of

one haredi

group, Habad, the followers of the Lubavitch rebbe.

They

are sui generis

and merit

separate treatment.

6 luly 1989,

8.

Tediot Aharonot,

9.

Gideon Aran, "From Religious Zionist

p. 17.

.

—

.

Charles

.

S.

Liebman

86

to

The Origin and Emunim, a Messianic Modern Israel" (Ph.D.

Religion:

Zionist

a

of Gush

Culture

Movement in diss., Hebrew brew),

1987,

University,

in

He-

524.

p.

1985 (London: Associated University

fairs

18. See

especially

tions, 1988).

was interviewed, and one known

mentalist Impact

for his

moderate rather than extremist position,

quoted

is

following in an inter-

as saving the

view. "I never pretended to be something

other than what

of Shas.

I

am

I

am.

I

a haredi.

am I

a representative

tried

and

trv to

I

function in the public interest and not

We

only for the haredi public.

upon diot

work

must take

ourselves the burden of the state." Te-

Abaronot, Sabbath Supplement, 22 De-

cember 1989, 1 1

rael's

p. 4.

who

is

Ann

19.

the charismatic authority for

"The Fundaand Con-

Elizabeth Maver,

on Law,

Politics,

and the Sudan,"

stitutions in Iran, Pakistan,

chap. 7, this volume.

The point

20.

is

made bv

frequently

that

outstanding polemicist and religious iconoIt is made in Moshe Samet, The

Yeshayahu Leibowitz.

clast

more temperate terms

in

Conflict over the Institutionalization ofJudaic

Values in the State of Israel (Jerusalem:

De-

partment of Sociology, Hebrew University, 1979, in Hebrew).

Studies in Sociology,

For example, the head of Agudat IsCouncil of Torah Sages, the Gerer

rebbe,

Ian Lustick, For the

Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel (New York: Council on Foreign Rela-

For example. Ant Dc'eri, a leader of Shas, minister of the Interior at the time he 10.

28-50.

Presses, 1985), pp.

Evidence

to be found in a speech bv

is

Zerach Wharhaftig to the World Conference

of Mizrachi

in

1949.

Wharhaftig,

who

many years,

most important faction within Agudat Israel, announced that no part of the Land

served as minister of religion for

of Israel could be transferred to foreign

integrate Jewish law into the law of Israel.

the

Maariv, 22 December 1989, 12.

Yosef Fund,

rule.

His speech

p. 10.

"Agudat

Israel

Con-

University,

1

diss.,

Bar-Han

Michael

Rosenak,

"Jewish

damentalisms and Society (Chicago: University

this

of Chicago volume.

Press, 1992),

A

companion

is

summarized

in

Zerach Whar-

and World Center of HapoelHamizrachi, 1988, in He351-57. But see especially pp.

Constitution for Israel: Religion

Mizrachi

—

brew), pp.

990, in Hebrew)

Fundamentalism in Israeli Education," in Martin E. Marts' and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fun13.

haftig,

active in the effort to

State (Jerusalem: Mesilot,

fronting Zionism and the State of Israel

Ideology and Policv" (Ph.D.

was one of those most

to

14. Aran finds these same tendencies in Merkaz Harav, the educational institution out of which Gush Emunim's leadership

emerged. Aran, "From Religious Zionist to

356-57, and the

refusal

bv die presidium to

permit discussion of the topic, 21

The point

p.

357.

recurs constantly in articles

written bv moderate and even

some of the Gush

than moderate sympathizers with

less

Emunim on the pages of Nebuda, the monthlv journal of the settlements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. In the case of such moderate fundamentalists as Yoel

Bin-Nun, the

desire for Jewish unity led finally to resigna-

from Gush Emunim. It is what led Rabbi Yehuda Amital, seven vears earlier, to oppose die war in Lebanon. tion

a Zionist Religion." 15.

Rav Shlomo Aviner, "BaMidbar

Jerusalem

Independence

B'shabbato, 2 June 1989, in 16.

and

its

For

a description

impact on Gush

Day,"

Hebrew,

Shabat p. 1.

uel C.

Secular Press: Aftermath of the 1988 Elec-

see Sprin-

Liebman, "Jewish UltraIsrael: Converging Strands,"

William Frankel,

ed..

the Israeli press

of the underground

17. Charles S.

in

how

Emunim,

zak, Israeli Political Right.

Nationalism in

22. For a study of

projected this image of the future, see Sam-

Survey ofJewish Af-

Heilman, "Religious Jewry

tions," in Charles S.

and

Secular: Conflict

in

the

Liebman, ed.. Religious and Accommodation be-

tween Jews in Israel (Jerusalem: Keter, 1990), pp.

45-56.

JEWISH FUNBAMENTALISM AND THE ISRAELI POLITY 87

23.

view

A is

good summary of

found

in

this

point of

Uri Huppert's largely po-

lemical work, Back to the Ghetto: Zionism in

Retreat (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,

1988). For a

more balanced presentation of

point of view, see Amnon Rubinstein, The Zionist Dream Revisited: From Herzl to Gush Emunim and Back (New York: Schocken Books, 1984), and for a scholarly presentation, see Gershon Weiler, Jewish Thethis

ocracy (Leiden: E.

24.

The

J.

excerpt

ered at a Peace

Brill, is

Now

1988).

from a speech delivrallv on 3 June 1989.

The

full text

appeared

in translation in die

Jerusalem Post, 8 June 1989, 25. This

is

even true

p. 4.

among

religious Se-

phardim, who, until recentlv, were

distin-

guished bv their greater understanding of

and sympathy for the nonreligious. See, for example, Shlomo Deshen, "To Understand the Special Attraction of Religion for the

Sephardim" (in Hebrew), 40-43.

Polttika

24 (Janu-

ary 1989):

26. Ephraim Tabory, "Living in a Mixed Neighborhood," in Liebman, ed., Rclinwus and Secular, pp. 113-30.

CHAPTER 6

Shi

c

ite

Jurisprudence and Constitution

Making

in the Islamic Republic

Said

Amir Arjomand

i.

commonly

he Islamic revolution of 1979

in Iran

is

seen as the most resounding triumph of religious fundamentalism in the

contemporary world. Furthermore,

its

primary, and virtually immediate, impact was

the remaking of the political order into a Shi'ite theocracy.

fundamental transformation has been constructed bv

this

of Iran

The

framework

legal

who

clerical jurists

for

entered

upon the distinctively modern enterprise of constitution making with the traditional methods of Shi'ite jurisprudence. Their ongoing efforts in the 1980s and early 1990s to reconcile the principles of Shi'ite jurisprudence and the public law of the Iranian state

on

the basis of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's idea of theocratic

have set in motion a legal revolution that

is

the subject of this chapter.

The Making of the Constitution of the While

in exile in the late

Islamic theocratic

had been

government

Islamic Republic of Iran

1960s Khomeini began to consider the establishment of an

government

in place

of the monarch}'. By that time,

theory, and constitutionalism

was

a staple

of Iranian

a parliament

was

in force in

political culture held

dear by the

in existence in Iran for over a half-century, a constitution

nationalist and Liberal opponents of the shah. Furthermore, the bureaucratic state which the Pahlavis had established on the Western model had made possible the division of governmental functions and the separation of powers. Khomeini and his

followers

among

the ulama (religious scholars) had, however, given

the character and functioning of this institutional apparatus. But

little

when

thought to

thev seized

it

after the revolutionary overthrow of the Pahlavi regime, the question of the consti-

tution of the

new

political

order rose immediately. In this section,

reaction.

88

I

shall analyze their

SHTITE JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSTITUTION MAKING IN IRAN 89

Constitutionalism had traveled from Western Europe to Iran through the Otto-

man Empire, where suspended Iran in

less

had been promulgated

a constitution

than two vears

later.

The

first

in

modern Asian

December 1876 and

revolution occurred in

1906 and was soon labeled the "Constitutional Revolution"

in

view of

its

primary objective of establishing a parliament and subjecting absolute monarchy to the rule of law. That revolution produced the Fundamental

Law of December 1906

and the Supplement of October 1907 which together made up the constitution of monarchical Iran until 1979.

Though based largely on the Belgian constitution of 1831, the Constitution of 1906-7 was not un-Islamic and included a number of articles proposed by the clerical leaders to safeguard Shi'ite Islam and hierocratic interests. The Supplement of 1907 to the Fundamental Law represented a compromise between constitutionalism and Shi'ism in which some of the features of constitutional European law that were ob1

viously inconsistent with the Shi'ite religiolegal tradition were modified. 2 But there

was no attempt to

create an Islamic constitution or a system

of public law rigorouslv

based on Shi'ite law. This was to be done after the Islamic revolution in the Funda-

mental

Law of 1979.

After the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy in 1979, Iran was declared an Islamic

Republic. There had been virtually no discussion of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's idea of the

"Mandate of the

Jurist" (velayat-e-faqih)

during the revolutionary turmoil

of 1978- 79. 3 In those days the vague term "Islamic government" enjoyed currency.

But when the Assembly of Experts began Islamic Republic in the

summer of 1979,

its

on the constitution of the Mandate of the Jurist became the basis

deliberations

the

of the new Fundamental Law. This was a revolutionary change radical transformation

of the traditional

lution consists in the synthesis of the theocratic idea of the

the principles and organization of the

modern

According to the traditional theory, the fell

in Shi'ism itself and a

theory of authority, indeed, the revo-

Shi'ite

Mandate of the

Jurist

with

nation-state.

political authority

of the

infallible

imams The on the

into abevance after the disappearance of the last of them in the ninth century.

authority of the

imams

as teachers in religion

and the Sacred

Law

(Shari'a),

Khomeini took the radical other hand, was step of claiming that the imams' right to rule also devolved upon the religious jurists and, further, that if one of them succeeded in setting up a government it was the duty of the other jurists to follow him. This last step was a sharp departure from the traditional Shi'ite principle that no religious jurist has any authority over other religious jurists. 4 As such, it radically undermined the position of the other preeminent gradually transferred to the Shi'ite jurists.

religious jurists, the sources

of imitation (mamje'-e

independent according to the traditional

Shi'ite

taqlid),

who had been categorically

theory of authority.

Khomeini himself, however, apparently did not grant much significance to constitution making at first. In declaring the formation of the Council of the Islamic Revolution on 12 January 1979, Khomeini specified as one of its tasks "the formation of a constituent assembly to approve the

new

composed of

the elected representatives of the people in order

constitution of the Islamic Republic." 5 There can be

that this item in the declaration

no doubt emanated from Bazargan and the other Liberals and

Said Amir Arjomand 90

Islamic modernists in the revolutionary coalition. Faithful to this declaration, the Ba-

zargan cabinet and the Council of the Islamic Revolution prepared a draft constitu-

of 1979.

tion during the spring

and

respects,

It

was

Council of Guardians, consisting of (Parliament) from a

list

made bv

the

this draft constitution in

jurists in the

leftist

it

many

envisioned a

to be elected by the Majlis

supplied by the sources of imitation, with

hensive about the advances

pared to accept

constitution in

of clerical authorities:

five religious jurists,

of the committee of five religious

in place

1906-7

similar to the

especially with regard to the role

six lay legal experts

Supplement of 1907. 6 Appre-

groups, Khomeini was reportedly pre-

June 1979 with onlv minor changes. In

fact,

he proposed to bypass the promised constituent assemblv and to submit the draft directly to a referendum. 7 It

on the

election

asked the

latter,

of

"Who do you

of ignorant and

highly significant that Bazargan and Bani-Sadr insisted

Hashemi Rafsanjani

A fistful

think will be elected to a constituent assembly?

fanatical fundamentalists

regret ever having

won

is

a constituent assembly while Hojjatulislam 8

convened them."

9

The

who

do such damage

will

lay modernists,

their Pyrrhic victory. Elections for an assembly

that

you

will

Bazargan and Bani-Sadr,

were to be held on 3 August

1979, but, for reasons to be discussed presently, Khomeini was by then on his guard

on an Assembly of Experts instead of the promised constituent assembly. The draft constitution instantly became the subject of debate by various secular parties, journals, and organizations. The most notable debate was generated by the and

insisted

commentaries of the Tehran University law professor Naser Katouziyan. Some of Katouziyan

1

s

strictures

on

a preliminary draft published in

was modified accordingly.

provisional government, and the draft

alarmed Khomeini. At the end of June, he told the tive

was the revision of the

draft

This right belongs to you.

Mav were

from an Islamic

The

the constitution of Islam. Don't

These debates

clerics that their exclusive

who may

express

constitution of the Islamic Republic

sit

preroga-

perspective:

those knowledgeable in Islam

It is

an opinion on the law of Islam.

accepted by the

10

back while foreignized

means

who

intellectuals,

have no faith in Islam, give their views and write the things they write. Pick up

your pens and

in the

of the things that

And

in

mosques, from the

altars, in

the streets and bazaars, speak

your view should be included

they did so, especially as elected

in the constitution.

members of the Assembly of

11

Experts.

At

this

point, a process largely independent of the personal inclinations of the participating ayatollahs

was

set in

motion

ern nation-state, the cratic ideas.

of the

— that of working out, within the framework of the mod-

full logical

clerically

institutional implications

'Ali

in the

of Khomeini's theo-

form of the constitution making

dominated Assembly of Experts.

Foremost among those Hossein

and

This impersonal process unfolded

Montazeri and

who

responded to Khomeini's charge were Ayatollahs

Mohammad

Hosseini Behcshti. Behcshti seems to have

been influenced by the constitutional ideas of the Iraqi

Shi'ite thinker

Baqir al-Sadr in Iraq. In his jurisprudential commentary constitution, 12 al-Sadr held that the function of

on

Mohammad

the proposed Islamic

Imamate had been

fulfilled

through

the leadership of the sources of imitation during the Occultation. Accordingly,

it

SHPITE JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSTITUTION MAKING

IN

IRAN

91

would be proper for one of these sources of imitation to assume the position of the head of state and commander of the armed forces in the new Islamic regime and to nominate, or at anv rate approve, a candidate for presidency to be popularly elected as the

head of the executive branch of government.

also suggested the institutionalization 1

Mohammad

of an "assembly of the people of loosening and

whose members were to be those ulama and

binding'

Baqir al-Sadr had

Islamic thinkers proposed for

popular election by the source of imitation. 13 Beheshti appears to have adopted

this

suggestion by endorsing the form of the Assembly of Experts in preference to the

promised constituent assembly. Ayatollah Montazeri wrote constitution of the provisional government

of the

Jurist

and refuted the separation of the three powers

subordinate to the just tion to the

a

jurist.

He was

14

commentary on the

draft

which advanced the idea of the Mandate

prevailed

—

three were said to be

all

upon by Khomeini

to run for elec-

Assembly of Experts from Tehran, and was elected president, with Ayatol-

lah Beheshti serving as vice-president

and playing

making of the new constitution. The stage was

important role

a particularly

set for the defeat

in the

of the proponents of

national sovereignty and the unveiling of Khomeini's theocratic project.

In an important statement at the fortieth session of the Assembly of Experts

9 October 1979,

on

president, Montazeri, presented as the major objective of the

making the removal of the

constitution political

its

and religious authority,

He

and "hierocratic government."

traditional duality'

or, in his

and contradiction between

words, between "customary government"

distinguished between

Qur'anic and jurisprudential ordinances derived from the

and "governmental ordinances," on the other. The

two kinds of ordinances, Traditions, on one hand, not derived from the

latter are

Qur'an and the Traditions by methods of jurisprudence but are based on generalities

An

and the necessity of maintaining order.

example would be

traffic

regulations en-

acted bv the Majlis.

Such would be

a

governmental ordinance. If the ordinance

cratic authority /judge,

obliged to act upon

But

if it

does not

it.

it.

incumbent on us to obey

its

from the hiero-

authority and

we

are

15

rest

the conscience, which to observe

it is

is

on the Sacred Law, it would not be enforceable upon that it would not be necessary for me personally

means

Many of the

laws passed by the Majlis are of this kind.

governmental laws, and so long appointees of the (Hidden)

as the religious jurists,

Imam

They

are

whom we consider the

albeit in a collective

and general fashion,

commanded us to execute them. Therefore, if we want to follow

have not approved and endorsed them and have not

them,

we

are not obligated to execute

the Sacred Law,

we must say

(Majlis) are not legal jurists

that the enactments of the Consultative

Assembly

and enforceable without the approval of the religious

of the Council of Guardians. 16

The establishment of the supervening

hierocratic authority

and veto of the

clerical

of the Council of Guardians paved the way for the enthronement of the supreme hierocratic jurist as the Leader of the Islamic Republic. With Ayatollah Beheshti in the chair as vice-president, the militant clerics in the Assembly of Experts

jurists

Said Amir

A rjomand

92

moved

Mandate of the Jurist. Hojjatulislam Rabbani AmJashi, for instance, argued that it was time to rescue the institution of the leadership of the sources of imitation from its present unsatisfactory condition bv transforming it into the Mandate of the Jurist. He pointed out that if plans for doing to establish Khomeini's idea of the

so had been devised earlier, the Islamic revolution- might have triumphed fifteen or sixteen years sooner. 17

The

clerical

makers of the constitution of 1979 then proceeded

to institutionalize theocracy as described below. It

is

interesting to note that, in this

compromise with the norms of national sovereignty and, on 7 November 1979, rejected an article proposing that "the Leader and the members of the Leadership Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran must be Iranian citizens and [resident] in Iran." 18 The Assembly of Experts had entertained many other suggestions and altered the Bazargan government's draft bevond recognition. The new draft was no longer a republican constitution consistent with Shi'ite Islam, but a constitution that purported to be fundamentally Islamic and to incorporate specifically Shi'ite principles of government. To demonstrate this, Quranic verses and Traditions in support of many of the articles were cited in an "Appendix to the Fundamental Law." The Assembly concluded its deliberations shortly thereafter, in mid-November, and its draft constitution was ratified by the referendum of 2-3 December 1979. matter, they refused to

The Fundamental Law of 1979

A comprehensive treatment of the contents of the Fundamental Law of 1979 has been offered elsewhere. 19 Here, constitution,

reflected

it

it

point out that, in comparison with the old

suffices to

many of

the changes in the international political culture

during the intervening eight decades. 20 These differences, however, were marginal

comparison to the features that constitution

amply

clear

not only

it

set the

superseded, and indeed from

all

modern

by the Preamble to the Fundamental

as emphatically ideological

in

Fundamental Law of 1979 apart from the constitutions. This

Law of 1979, which

was made

characterized

it

but also as distinctly and thoroughly Islamic.

begins, in the name of God, with a historical sketch of the Islamic movement. revolutionary The Fundamental Law is then presented as an attempt by the nation to cleanse itself of the dust of godless government and foreign ideas, as a

The Preamble

way

to return to

God and

to the "authentic intellectual positions

and worldview of

Islam."

As an

ideological constitution, the

strictions

on

the

civil

Fundamental Law of 1979 imposed severe

re-

rights of the individual. The vague qualification of the freedom

of association in the previous constitution 21 was replaced by the

much more

restrictive

and associations must not "violate the Islamic standards and the bases of the Islamic Republic." This could be and has been interpreted as outlawing secu-

one that

parties

larist political parties

constitutions, strations

was

22

and

associations. Furthermore, in the

the previously unqualified right to

virtuallv nullified

to the fundamental principles

manner of

ideological

unarmed gatherings and demon-

bv the qualification that thev must "not be detrimental

of Islam"

(article 27).

SHITTE JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSTITUTION MAKING IN IRAN 93

More

extraordinary and far-reaching in

implications than even this ideological

its

was the Islamic and theocratic nature of the 1979 constitution. Article 2 of

character

the Fundamental

Law

legislation the exclusive possession

of the

order as an order based on belief in the

One of these

by making sovereignty and

explicitly established a theocracy

principles, the

One God

and bv defining the Islamic

(2.1),

of faith

five principal articles

in Shi'itc Islam.

Imamate, was extended, following Khomeini's theory, to

establish the political authority

of the

clerical jurists (2.5

and

2.6).

This amounted to

a firm rejection of the separation of religion and the political order, the constitution

of which

determined by the Fundamental

is

principles

of the previous constitution such

Law of 1979.

Thereafter, the underlying

as national sovereignty, separation

of the

powers, and the legislative power of the Majlis are systematically reassessed and refor-

mulated from

this particular Islamic theocractic perspective.

Although chapter 5 of the Fundamental Law

entitled

is

"The Right of Sovereignty

is no direct statement on 26 of the Supplement of 1907. delimited obliquely and in a manner devoid of clear

of the Nation and the Powers Deriving Therefrom," there national sovereignty that

would correspond

Instead, national sovereignty

56

legal implications. Article is

He who has made man

separation of powers executive,

is

is

declares: "Absolute sovereignty' belongs to

the governor of his social destiny."

Mandate

to Rule

all

God, and

it

However, the idea of the

retained, at least in principle, even

and judiciary powers are

vested with] the

to article

though the

legislative,

subject to "the supervision of the [person in-

and the Imamate of the community of believers"

(article 57).

The

Majlis as the organ of national sovereignty

is

unquestionably the most impor-

tant institution of the old constitution retained by the legislative

power, however,

is

Fundamental Law of 1979.

subjected to important

new

limitations. Article

Its

72

specifies that "the National Consultative Assembly cannot enact laws contrary to the principles and ordinances of the established religion or the Fundamental Law," leav-

ing the determination of this matter to the clerical jurists of the Council of Guardians.

93 further declares the Majlis devoid of legal validity in the absence of the Council of Guardians. These articles make the Council of Guardians a legislative bodv. 23 The Council of Guardians in effect emerges as an appointed upper house with

Article

veto power over clerical jurists)

Majlis legislation.

all

and

six

members with

The organization of the mental

Law of

judiciary

1979. Article

157

It

consists

restricted

power

is

institutes a

of six plenipotentiary members (the

powers (the

laid

down

Supreme

and three judges, 163

all

of whom must be religious

states that the qualifications

Sacred

Law

settle all

will

of

of the judges

be determined by law, and

disputes according to the laws, or

and prepare laws appro-

president, the prosecutor general,

its

accordance with the criteria of the

article

167 requires

be of no

avail,

Islamic sources or a valid injunction [of a clerical jurist]." There

of justice, but

powers

(article

158 and 162). Article

jurists (articles

in

if they

of the Funda-

Judiciary Council, the highest

judiciary organ, to reorganize the judiciary, recruit judges, priate for the Islamic Republic. It consists

lay lawyers) (article 91).

in chapter 1 1

that the judges

on

is

must

the basis of "valid

also to be a minister

of coordination with the executive and legislative 160). Article 171, curiously, makes the judge personally responsible

his function

is

that

Said

A mir A rjomand 94

for

damages

in cases

of willful miscarriage of justice. Thus, the traditional duality of

the judiciary system of Shi'ite Iran,

which was recognized

replaced by a monistic theocratic one, and the judicial

in the old constitution,

power

is

is

put exclusively under

clerical control.

The Jurist.

centerpiece of the

This idea

is

new Fundamental Law, however,

the

is

Mandate of the

enunciated in the Preamble and translated into law in

articles 5,

107, and 110: In keeping with the principle of the

Mandate

to Rule

and the continuous

Imamate, the Constitution provides for the establishment of leadership by a clerical jurist

possessing the necessary qualifications and recognized as leader

by the people. This is

is

in accordance

to be in the hands of those

has permitted and that which

To extend

with the Tradition: "The conduct of affairs

who are trustworthy guardians of that which He He has forbidden" (Preamble). "Imamate"

the traditional connotation of the term

tionary direction in the above passage, the

unwonted

in the novel revolu-

qualification "continuous" (mos-

added to Imamate

just as it is coupled with the Mandate to Rule. Article "Imamate and continuous leadership and its fundamental role in the continuation of the Islamic revolution" (emphasis added), thus equating Imamate

tamerr)

is

2.5 speaks of

with "continuous leadership." All the above

is

then juxtaposed with "continuous

ju-

risprudential endeavor of the clerical jurists" in the following subsection, 2.6a. This

paves the

way

to the Jurist,

for the transfer

whom

of the Imamate from the twelve

infallible

holy imams

the subsequent articles refer to as the Leader of the Islamic

Republic:

During the Occultation of the Lord of the Age the Mandate to Rule and Imamate devolve upon the just and pious Jurist, who is acquainted with the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administra.

tive ability;

and recognized and accepted

people. In the event that

no

Jurist

people, a Leadership Council,

.

.

as leader

by the majority of the

should be recognized by the majority of the

composed of

jurists

possessing the aforemen-

tioned qualifications, will assume these responsibilities in accordance with Article

107

Article

(article 5).

107

specifies

being a source of imitation as a necessary qualification for the

position of Leadership, or for

membership

in the Leadership Council,

which

is

to

consist of three or five sources of imitation. It also entrusts the selection of the Leader

of the Leadership Council to popularly elected "experts" whose number and cations, according to the ensuing article 108, cil

were

first

to be determined by the

qualifi-

Coun-

of Guardians and approved by the Leader, and thereafter by the Assembly of

Experts

itself.

This bodv

is,

furthermore, entrusted with the important task of dis-

missing the Leader in cases of incapacitation and loss of qualifications in accordance

with regulations to be ates the extensive

armed

forces;

laid

down

in its first session (article 111). Article

110 enumer-

powers of the Leader, which include supreme command of the

appointment and dismissal of the chief of the general

staff

and of the

SHITTE JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSTITUTION MAKING IN IRAN 95

commanders of the army, naw,

of the president of the republic and

Court or

a vote

of

"political

and the revolutionary guards; confirmation

air force,

his dismissal

upon

of the Supreme

either a verdict

incompetence" by the Majlis; and appointment of the

highest judiciary authority and the jurists of the Council of Guardians.

The

Majlis

was given no

jurisdiction over the election

and constitution of the

Assembly of Experts. These matters were regulated by laws passed by the Council of Guardians

in

October 1980 and October 1982, and by amendments

November of 1982. The most important "competence

as either

in

qualification for the candidates

by the

in religious jurisprudence," established

approval of the Leader or bv reputation in the learned

August and

was

specified

explicit

or

or preparation for

circles,

Assembly of Experts was elected

14 July 1983. Four days dance with

article

later,

in

it

at

24

The December 1982 and was inaugurated on

the highest level of religious learning, as certified by three reputable professors. first

tacit

the Assembly passed

its

internal constitution in accor-

108 of the Fundamental Law. During the elections for the second

Assembly of Experts

in

October 1990, the

clerical jurists

assumed the function of qualifying the candidates on the

of the Council of Guardians of their competence in

basis

religious jurisprudence.

Constitutional Crisis and the

In the elections for the

publican Party Liberals

who

1980, the

won

first

Amendment of the Fundamental Law

Majlis after the revolution, the clerically led Islamic Re-

a solid majority against the Islamic modernists, nationalists,

supported Bazargan and Bani-Sadr. By the

new

Majlis changed

its official

to Islamic Consultative Assembly. This

first

act

it

and

passed on 22 July

name from National Consultative Assembly was done, however, without amending the

Fundamental Law accordingly.

From

the very outset, the Majlis and President

been elected in January, were deadlocked in

came manifest

in a

to the

Majlis. In fact,

the Leader.

this

power

no provision was made

Nor could he

he could and did use

ments of the Majlis

He

as required

by

for the dissolution

erwise they

immediately be-

at a disadvantage,

of the Majlis, not even by constitutional

his signature

power

from the enact-

123 of the Fundamental Law. By June 1981,

the Majlis had decided to use and even exceed president. It

had

of the prime minister

was

The one

was to withhold

article

who

did not have the power to dissolve the

dismiss the prime minister.

in this struggle

first

struggle the president

Fundamental Law of 1979.

Bani-Sadr,

a political struggle that

prolonged disagreement over the choice

and then of the cabinet. In

owing

AbuTHasan

its

constitutional

powers againsc the

passed a law giving the president five days to sign the enactments; oth-

would become law without

his signature. 25

More

important, on 17 June

1981, the Majlis passed a law expanding on the provision made in article 110.5 for the dismissal of the president on grounds of "political incompetence." After the dismissal of Bani-Sadr, with the Islamic Republican Party in control of the presidency, the premiership, and the Majlis, constitutional conflict took a

new

form. Adhering to traditional Shi'ite principles of jurisprudence and using their

-

Said

A mir A rjomand 96

power

to determine the consistency of the enactments of the Majlis with Islamic stan-

dards, the jurists of the Council of Guardians vetoed several

bills

for land distribution,

nationalization of foreign trade, labor, distribution, hoarding, and other

economic

measures. These had been found to be at variance with the rules of the Sacred Law,

on grounds of infringement of the rights of private property and freedom of As early as October 1981 and again in January 1983, Majlis speaker Ha-

usually

contract.

shemi Rafsanjani sought Khomeini's

explicit intervention as the Jurist to

The

the veto of the Council of Guardians.

on

rested

a radically

position taken by

broadened interpretation of the

Shi'ite jurisprudential principles

of public "interest" and "overriding necessity." In the the Council of Guardians had vetoed a

land within the limits of

bill

instance, in 1981,

first

when

introducing qualifications to ownership of

Khomeini refused

cities,

overcome

Hashemi Rafsanjani

to intervene but issued an order

delegating his authority as the Jurist to a majority of the deputies of the Majlis to

determine overriding necessity and posit laws, on a temporary

"secondary

basis, as

The Council of Guardians, however, persisted in its veto, and it was not years later that Khomeini reaffirmed the delegation of his authority to de-

ordinances." until four

termine overriding necessity to the Majlis, this time requiring a majority of twothirds. 26

Even

of juristic authority stretched the principle of

this qualified delegation

overriding necessity far beyond

stringent limitations in Shi'ite jurisprudence. 27 In

its

the second instance, in 1983, too, Khomeini's intervention exercise of the legislative authority

In January 1988,

Khomeini

of the supreme

jurist.

fell

short of the explicit

28

did what he had been reluctant to do

finally

earlier.

On

6 January he reprimanded President Ayatollah Saxyid 'Ali Khamane'i for saving that the authority of Islamic government could only be exercised within the frame-

work of

the ordinances of the Sacred Law. This statement

showed

that President

Khamane'i misunderstood and misrepresented Khomeini's views, and that he did not

Mandate of the

accept the

Jurist.

Government

in the

form of the God-given "absolute

mandate" was "the most important of the divine commandments and has over

derivative divine

all

commandments. ...

ments of Islam and has priority oxer fasting

all

of affirmations and

who

priority

one of the primary command-

commandments, even over

later, in

clarifications

referred to the president as a brother Jurist.

derivative

and pilgrimage to Mecca." Fixe days

for a chorus

[It is]

another

by the ruling

letter

which

prayer,

set the

clerical elite,

tone

Khomeini

supported the Absolute Mandate of the

29

There immediately followed

a

campaign to promote the new elaboration of

Khomeini's theory, which culminated leaders

1988. ,0

on

in a

the clarification of the Absolute

On

seminar of the congregational praver

Mandate of the

Jurist

on 19-20 January

12 and 13 January, respectively, the spokesman and the secretary of the

Council of Guardians, duly humbled, had visited Khomeini and declared their submission to his rulings.

nounced

that,

The spokesman,

in the eves

Hojjatulislam

Emami

Kashani, had an-

of the Council of Guardians, the Imam's injunctions

constituted legal proof as required bv the Sacred

Law; and the

could therefore be reconsidered with greater latitude. The

bills

rejected earlier

Imam had

taken the occa-

sion of the visit bv the conservative secretary of the Council, Avatollah Lotfollah Safi, to issue a categorical statement

of

his revolutionary ruling

which marked the

final

JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSTITUTION MAKING

SHI'ITE

IN

IRAN

97

of "progressive" jurisprudence demanded bv Hashemi Rafsanjani: the Man-

victory

date of the Jurist and the "governmental ordinance" were

among

the "primary ordi-

nances" of God. 31 Finallv,

on 22

principles of the

propounded the

January, a chastened President Khamane'i thus

new

theocratic absolutism:

The commandments of the ruling like the commandments of God.

primary commandments and arcThe regulations of the Islamic Republic [Thcv are all] and obedience to them is incumbent. .

are Islamic regulations,

jurist are

.

.

.

governmental ordinances of the ruling legitimacy of the

Mandate [of the

The Mandate of the

Jurist

... In reality,

jurist.

Jurist] that

they

.

because of the

acquire legitimacy.

body of the regime.

like the soul in the

is

all

.

it is

further and sav that the validity of the

Fundamental Law, which

standard, and framework of

due to

by the ruling have?

What

and make the

lish

It is

it

jurist.

right

all

laws,

is

Otherwise, what right do

do

I

will

all

the people?

Fundamental Law for society the ruling jurist

who

acceptance and confirmation

or sixty or a hundred experts

society'

The person who

is

the ruling

creates the order

jurist.

sins,

Law

has the right to estab.

.

.

of the Islamic Republic

and requires obedience to

then becomes forbidden as one of the cardinal

go

the basis,

the majority of people have to ratify a Fundamental

binding on

order for the Islamic

its

fifty

is

it.

Opposing

this

as

an

order

and combating the oppo-

nents of this order becomes an incumbent religious duty. 32

The downgrading of phatic than ever before,

though more em-

the Majlis in the president's statement,

was

in line

with the interpretation of the principle of consul-

tation bv the makers of the constitution

of 1979. The

degradation of the

explicit

constitution of the Islamic Republic, on the other hand, was new and clearly implied that the God-given Absolute Mandate of the Jurist no longer needed such man-made

props

as the

Fundamental Law.

The matter

did not rest with the statement of the principle of the Absolute

Man-

Khomeini proceeded with its institutionalization. His intervention had also come against the background of the tightening of the government's grip on the private sector. In July 1987, Khomeini as the Jurist had delegated his authority to regulate prices and execute "governmental punishments" to the government in date of the Jurist, and

order to strengthen

1988,

in

it

in

its

fight against

"economic terrorism." 33

order to determine "governmental ordinances"

in cases

On

6 February

of disagreement be-

tween the Majlis and the Council of Guardians, 34 he appointed a commission consisting of the six clerical jurists of the Council of Guardians, President Khamanci, Majlis speaker

Hashemi

Rafsanjani, Hojjatulislams Ardabili (president of the

diciary Council), Tavassoli (a

member of Khomeini's

secretariat),

Supreme

Ju-

Kho'iniha (prose-

cutor general), Prime Minister Musavi, and the minister concerned with the particular bill

under discussion. Khomeini's son, Ahmad, would also participate in the meetings may reach me faster." The commission was to decide

"so that the report of the sessions

on the

bills

approved by the Majlis and rejected by the Council of Guardians by simple

majority vote of those present at

its

meetings. 35

The Commission

for the Determina-

A mir A rjomand

Said

98

Order held

tion of the Interest of the Islamic

its first

procedural rules, and elected President Khamane'i as

The

ailing clerics were not the only

meeting a week

of the Absolute Mandate of the

Khomeini's extraordinary

react to

was published

Jurist. It

later, set its

chairman.

Freedom Movement courageously

rulings. In April 1988, Bazargan's

rejection

group to

its

as a

issued a firm

book, together

with the Arabic texts and Persian translations of the refutations of the idea of Mandate

of the

Jurist

by three of the most eminent Shiitc

twentieth centuries.

The book

jurists

of the nineteenth and earlv

Mandate of the Jurist as God) and considered

characterized the Absolute

exemplifying the cardinal sin of shirk (setting up partners for the creation of the to burying the

Commission

for the Determination of Interest to be

Law and

Fundamental

the traditional jurisprudence.

tantamount

The book

also

enumerated the contradictions between the new Absolute Mandate and the Fundamental It is

Law of 1979. 36 interesting to note that the controversy

was revived

after

Khomeini's death bv

the proponents of traditional jurisprudence. In February 1990, both in a Friday ser-

mon and tions

and

in his

newspaper, Resalat, Avatollah Azari

between the Absolute Mandate of the

institutions.

The

Qumi

and

highlighted the contradic-

traditional Shi'itc jurisprudence

Majlis speaker, Hojjatulislam Karrubi, and the Majlis deputies

vehemently denounced Azari in

Jurist

"Imam-obliteration"

less

Qumi

for

sowing division and

dissent,

and for engaging

than a year after the Imam's death. Khomeini's u

were resoundingly affirmed, and such governmental ordinances"

as

to execute the writer Salman Rushdie were hailed "as valid as Islam

last

rulings

Khomeini's order itself."

37

The constitutional implications of the statements on the Absolute Mandate of the Jurist made in January and February 1988 remained unclear. In particular, it was not clear what would happen after Khomeini's death. On 28 March 1989, Khomeini's successor-designate, Avatollah Montazeri, complied with the Imam's wish and re-

signed as his successor-designate. vision

To

was added the urgency of

the already pressing need for constitutional

a constitutional

resolution of the

re-

problem of

succession.

On rately,

18 April 1988, 170 Majlis deputies, and the Supreme Judiciary Council sepa-

urged the

Imam

to order the revision of the

Fundamental Law.

within a week, assigning the task to a committee consisting of 18 to

clerics

He

agreed

and 2 laymen,

which the Majlis was invited to add 5 of its members. They were given two months

to complete a revision of the Fundamental tions: (1) leadership, (2) centralization

of authority

Law

in the judiciary, (4) centralization

vision network, (5) the

number of

with regard to the following ques-

of authority

in the executive, (3) centralization

of management of the radio and

Majlis deputies and the changing of

designation to the National Islamic Assembly, (6) the place of the for the

Determination of

Interest,

and

finally (7)

tele-

its official

new Commission

provisions for subsequent amend-

ments of the Fundamental Law.

The committee met on 26 the Assemblv of Experts, as vice-presidents,

its

April and elected Avatollah Meshkini, the president of president, with

and subsequently designated

Khamane'i and Hashemi Rafsanjani

itself

as

the Council for the Review of the

Fundamental Law. The only recorded subsequent instructions from Khomeini came

SHIITE JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSTITUTION MAKING

IRAN

IN

99

in a letter

on 9 May advising

that the requirement that the Leader be a source

of

imitation be dropped. In Khomeini's opinion, a "just religious jurist" recognized by

Assembly of Experts would

the

suffice.

Khomeini died on 3 June 1989. The clerical elite acted decisively and without the The Assembly of Experts met the following morning and after a long

slightest delav.

session elected President

Khamane

l

as

Khomeini's successor, the Leader of the Islamic

Republic, by sixty out of seventy-four votes. Except for "Imam," political tides

were transferred to Khamane'i,

who was

all

of Khomeini's

hailed as the Leader

of the

Revolution, Leader of the Islamic Republic, and holder of the Mandate to Rule over the Muslims.

Even the revolutionary

clerics

must have concluded

that the use

of the

"Imam" was too much of an innovation in Shi'ism to be viable beyond Khomeini. However, the other titles transferred to the new Leader confirmed the authority given to him bv the Fundamental Law and thereby clearly implied that he exercises the function of "continuous Imamate." Khomeini's son, Ahmad, declared his obedience to him as the new ruling jurist. 38 The Council of Guardians, the Central Bureau of title

the Congregational Prayer Leaders, and the

humbled prime minister did

Within three weeks, the new Leader of the Islamic Republic had asserted authority as the jurist by confirming one of the jurist,

Imam Khomeini. 39 Khamane'i

last

now

officially referred

The Council speed, and held revisions

supreme

either confirmed Khomeini's representatives in

own. These

to as the representatives of the "ruling jurist."

Review of the Fundamental Law continued its work at full thirty-eighth and last session on 8 July 1989. The most important

for the its

were made

figures, the revised in the

his

decrees issued bv the deceased

various governmental and revolutionary organizations or appointed his are

the same.

in the

month

after

Khomeini's death. According to the

Fundamental Law was

official

approved by over 97 percent of the votes

referendum held alongside the presidential elections on 28 July 1989.

council had faithfully carried out Khomeini's instructions. The name of the was now constitutionally changed to the Islamic Consultative Assembly throughout the revised Fundamental Law. A Council for the Review of the Funda-

The

Majlis

mental

Law was

established.

mination of Interest

as

A new article established the Commission

for the Deter-

an organ of the state at die service of the Leader,

being to advise on any matter referred to the Majlis and the Council of Guardians.

it

by the Leader and to

The Supreme

its

arbitrate

Judiciary Council

functions

between

was replaced

by a single head of the Judiciary Power, to be appointed by the Leader for five years. The first and foremost task, and the most difficult one, had of course been the constitutional implementation of the

Leadership

issue. In

Mandate of the

Jurist,

or the settlement of the

accordance with Khomeini's instructions, the requirement that

the Leader be a marja' was eliminated as a qualification for the office of the jurist in

Beyond this, some very important amendments were made after Khomeini's death. The amended article 111 gave the Assembly of Experts the power to dismiss the Leader upon incapacitation "or if it should become apparent that he had lacked one of the qualifications from the beginning." This new formula-

the

amended

article

109.

tion appears to give the

Assembly of Experts

virtually unrestricted latitude, because

the qualifications specified by article 109 include not only competence in religious

Said Amir Arjomand 100

jurisprudence but also a "correct political and social perspective, administrative and

managerial competence, courage, and adequate power for Leadership." Last but not least,

the provisions for a Leadership Council to

eliminated in the

amended

articles

the function of the jurist were

fulfill

5 and 107.

Thus, the powers of Leadership were to be concentrated in a single person,

were the executive and judiciary powers. The further diffused, even

exercised by

though

in principle

and

citizens, lay

all

clerical,

it

legislative

emanated from Leadership.

through

It

could be

their participation in the Majlis,

the six clerical jurists of the Council of Guardians,

all

as

power, by contrast, became

by

of whom were appointed bv the

Leader, and by the clerically dominated Commission for the Determination of Interest.

Theocratic Constitution

Max Weber saw ity.

the

modern

Making and

the Shi'ite Jurists'

state as the tvpical organization

Khomeini's project of Islamicization of the modern

required a drastic transformation of Shi'ite Sacred Law.

Law

of rational-legal author-

state into a Shi'ite theocracy

From

a "jurists'

law"

it

had

to be transformed into the law of the state. Shi'ite law had to be extended to cover

public law fully; and law finding, the typical activity of the Shi'ite jurists, was supple-

mented,

if

not replaced, by legislation and codification. The purpose of this section

is

to analyze this transformation, which represents the impact of the takeover of the constitutional state by the Shi'ite legal tradition.

The Fundamental Law of 1979, Fundamental Law attempts to

ratified

make Khomeini's

around two

why the

for the

of 1988, and the revised

it

of

of constitution making during the 1980s centered of the traditional

religious authority

new theory of

Shi'ite institution

might be helpful to examine the

the public law of the state in ancient

theocratic government,

relation

Rome, which

of

of the "sources of imitation,"

increasing centralization of authority in the postrevolutionary state.

explanation,

as a series

with the legal framework of the modern nation-state.

politics

paramount

make room

crisis

1989 can be viewed

which was innovativelv derived from

issues: (1) the radical depreciation

religious leadership, the in order to

in July

theocratic idea,

Shi'ite jurisprudence, consistent

This would explain

the constitutional

by a referendum

To

between the

and

(2) the

arrive at this

jurists'

law and

supplies the prototypes of both

types of law.

In the ously.

Roman Empire

The

the jurists' law and the law of the state coexisted harmoni-

four sources of ancient

Roman

law were custom (unwritten law),

tion by the popular assemblies, edicts of the magistrates,

embodied

in the responsa

century c.E.) two

new

of the

jurists.

By

of auctoritas prudentium by private

and commentaries on

legisla-

auctoritas prudentium as

the end of the classical period (mid-third

sources had been added to these: the resolutions of the Senate

and the constitutions of the emperor. 40 The exercise

and

ius civile

was an

jurists'

law that developed in

jurists in their

integral

Rome

as the

answers to legal questions

component of Roman

law. In fact, "in

SHITTE JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSTITUTION MAKING

IRAN

IN

101

the creative period of earlv classical times the development of new law bv interpretatio far

new law provided bv

exceeded in bulk and in significance the

important to note that the little

jurists

completelv dominated

or no attention to public and other

Roman

private law consisted

of the

legal

norms and

Until the present century, Shi'ite Sacred

never

made

anitv apart

the transition to law

laws. 43

from other sacred

organization of the

making

of

fields

Law

principles

is

private law but paid

law. Consequentlv, the bulk

of the

remained very much

that sets the

The

Roman

statute." 41 It

jurists' law.

of

42

a jurists' law. It

canon law of Western Christi-

Shi'ite hierocracv lacked the centralized

Roman Catholic church, and the 44

engaged

Shi'ite religious jurists

exclusively in law rinding, experiencing a last spurt of jurisprudential creativitv as late as the

nineteenth centurv.

The

fact that Shi'ite

Sacred

Law was

important implications for the institutionalization of authoritv

a jurists' law also

in Shi'ism:

it

had

produced

the above-mentioned pluralism of religious authority at the highest level by assuring the equalitv of the sources of imitation. 45

This pluralism in authoritv had striking parallels in

Roman

law and in Sunni Islam.

In each case, the effect of this pluralism could be mitigated onlv through state intervention. In

Rome,

the fact that the authoritative private jurists could have different

opinions on the same question required the intervention of the magistrate (praetor)

or the emperor. The emperor often settled the controversial issue bv rescript.

emperors were thus drawn into the jurisprudential process and would give advice in response to a service

libellus

(written petition) from a private citizen, and their legal

soon developed into the

third centuries

show

office

a

libellis.

that this rescript office

issued responsa in the emperor's name,

and whose emphasis was on private agreement among

Roman

free legal

The

whose

perspective

law. 46 In the

authoritative jurisconsults

records from the late second and

was manned by professional

jurists

who

was that of private lawyers,

Ottoman Empire,

was resolved along

the issue of dis-

similar lines

through

the appointment of the jurisconsults by the sultan as subordinates of the chief jurisconsult, the

Shavkh

A centralized office

al-Islam.

function similar to that of the

opment had

Roman

performed a

for issuing injunctions

rescript office. 47 In Shi'ite Iran, a parallel devel-

to await the Islamic revolution of 1979, but then

it

came with

a

vengeance.

The

institutionalization

of the Mandate of the

structure of the nation-state

was

Jurist into a monistic authoritv

directly detrimental to the traditional pluralism

the institution of the religious leadership of the sources of imitation.

The

of

latest stage

of the constitutional implementation of the Mandate of the Jurist has entailed a shift in the foundation of hierocratic authority: a radical step back from the authority of the sources of imitation, and thus religious jurisprudence

and

for the conciliar institutionalization

made

definitive

bv the

from acclamation by following, to competence

qualification

by formal

training. This step

of hierocratic authority

initiated

amended Fundamental Law of 1989. 48

in

was required

by Khomeini and

A number of important

most notably that of electing the Leader of the Islamic Republic, are entrusted to the clerical Assembly of Experts, whose members must be religious jurists by virtue tasks,

of their formal training

in religious jurisprudence.

The importance of

this clerical

Said Amir

A rjomand

102

body

is

tremendously enhanced by amended

111, which

article

empowers

it

not only

to elect but also to dismiss the Jurist.

The retention of the institution of religious leadership by the sources of imitation mav not be due entirely to political expediency and in any event is revealing of the

new

paradoxical articulation of public and private law in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

As there

no

is

state office for issuing injunctions

come

jurisconsults, a duality has is

and

rescripts

and no state-appointed

into existence within the realm of private law. There

the state-enforced private law, the bulk of which consists of secular contents of the

new

modified codes and law,

Majlis enactments, and the totally unregulated Shi'ite jurists'

which occupies the so-far-uncontested domain of religious duties and

servance.

The paradox

consists in the de facto secularization

ritual

of private law that

is

ob-

due

to the theocratic constitutional law.

Theocratic Constitution

Making and

the Nation-State

There can be no doubt that Khomeini sought to restore tradition threatened

by Western cultural and

political

can never be simply set back; every restoration characterized Khomeini's

movement

is

Shi'ite

Islam as a religious

domination. However, the clock

also a revolution.

I

have therefore

as "revolutionary traditionalism." 49

The

initial

impact of this revolutionary traditionalism on the constitution of the Iranian state was

examined

in section 2,

concluding section,

and

I shall

its

impact on

focus

Shi'ite law was traced in section 4. In this on the absorption of revolutionary traditionalism by

the state.

The

revised

major ways.

in the Jurist

distinction

gious

Fundamental

First,

it

on behalf of

between

jurists,

in the

reconciles theocracy

the

all

and the nation-state

Hidden Imam. Second, by

it

establishes a fundamental

their formal qualification as reli-

lav citizens. Eligibility for Leadership, in the

Assembly of Experts, and the

Council of Guardians

is

in four

three branches of government, invested

a hierocratic elite, defined

and the

power, membership

Law

centralizes authority in

headship of the judiciary

six

consequential positions

de jure reserved for the hierocratic

elite.

In addition,

the ulama are certain to dominate the Council for the Determination of Interest and

any future Council for the Revision of the Fundamental Law. The position of minister

of information Law. Other clerics alike. litical,

is

also reserved for the hierocratic elite,

offices,

Unlike the lay citizens, the hierocratic

elite are

administrative, or judiciarv office. Third, the

subordination of parliamentary legislation to

of Guardians and,

though not

in the

Fundamental

including membership in the Majlis, arc open to lay citizens and

if

necessary, the

Finally, legislation, codification,

clerical

Commission

not barred from any po-

Fundamental Law mandates the supervision through the Council

for the Determination of Interest.

and systematic review of public law,

as distinct

from

law finding (the derivation of the Sacred Law), have become institutionalized in the Shi'ite legal tradition.

This process began with the constitution making of the ayatollahs in 1979. As was pointed out, not only were Qur'anic verses and Traditions frequently cited in the body

SHI'ITE

JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSTITUTION MAKING

IRAN

IN

103

of the Fundamental Law, but

a special

Appendix consisting of additional

and

verses

Traditions pertaining to specific Articles was added to the Fundamental Law. This

was meant to demonstrate the consistency of the Fundamental Law with Shiite prudence and, by implication, to present legislation bv assemblies

juris-

an extension of

as

the traditional jurisprudential methodology. Since then, throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s, the jurists of the Council of Guardians have participated in the legislative

The Commission for the composed of ulama, has also been

process regularly, as has the Assembly of Experts.

Determination of Interest, the majority of which

is

established to exercise the legislative authority' of the Jurist as the Leader of the

Is-

lamic Republic of Iran.

The constiaitionalists who framed the Fundamental Law of 1906 and its Supplement of 1907 envisioned a distinct secular sphere to be subject to popular legislation. The Islamic revolutionary elite have vehemently denied this and have instead sought to extend the rule

of the Sacred

Law

to

spheres of

all

bv

life

of institutional

a series

innovations that have extended the competence of the religious jurists from law finding to legislation. Nevertheless, their victory

is

more apparent than

real.

In practice,

popular (parliamentary) legislation covers most areas of life. This legislation has now

been "•Islamicizcd" and can claim Islamic legitimacy

as a result

of the

institutional

innovations of the clerical constitution-makers.

These innovations have had two far-reaching and closely related consequences:

tremendous expansion of

Shi'ite public law,

enormous amount of secular

legal material.

cal supervision, the Majlis has

shown

Although

its

legislation

subject to cleri-

is

great vigor and has enacted an impressive

of laws. These include the revision of the European-based commercial, codes of the Pahlavi

era,

which now appear Islamicizcd

as

the jurists of the Council of Guardians. In this fashion, an lar legal

a

and the accompanying absorption of an

civil,

bodv

and other

thev bear the approval of

enormous amount of secu-

material has been appropriated as the public law of the Islamic Republic.

There

is

a surprising

measure of agreement among Western Orientalists and

Is-

lamic fundamentalists that religion and politics are inseparable in Islam, that "church"

and

state are one.

50

Both claim

that Islam

is

a total

way of life and

Against the authority of the former and the enthusiasm of the

sought to emphasize the paradox of the actual insignificance of Sacred

Shi'ite

due to the state

Law

— the paucity of

fact that Shi'ite

Sacred

its political

Law

provisions 51

has hitherto been a

a total ideology.

however,

latter,

I

have

political ethics in the

— which jurists'

is

undoubtedly

law and not the

law or the "law of the land."

It is

Amid of the

gratifying to have explicit confirmation of my thesis

from unexpected quarters.

the confusion arising from the hasty campaign to clarify the Absolute Jurist, a

number of

Mandate

very candid admissions were made, such as the one bv

Ayatollah Jannati, secretary of the Supreme Council for Islamic Propaganda and

member of the Council of Guardians:

When we

refer to

books of applied jurisprudence, we see the discussion of

purification, prayer, pilgrimage to

bulk of the contents

—

Mecca, transactions and the

for instance, in

our

largest

like

occupy the

book, the Jawaher [al-Kalam]

Said Amir

A rjomand

104

there are six volumes

eight volumes (vilayat)

on

on

rules

of cleanliness and on impure substances, and

prayer, whereas there are only a

— while the topic of Islamic government

is

few pages about authority

among the

rare

and forgot-

ten topics in our centers of learning and books of law. 52

Ayatollah Ali Meshkini, chairman of the Assembly of Experts, declared that, "in

my

opinion, the broad subject of this seminar [the Absolute Mandate of the Jurist] needs

The problem of government has had no place in the books of jurisprudence and has not been properly worked on. The issue of a nation liberating itself from tyranny and finding the power to form a state has not been posed in our books of law even at the hypothetical level." 53 The final attestation to Khomeini's revolutionary departure from the Shi'ite tradition is from Hashemi Rafsanjani's Fridav sermon following Khomeini's death: "The writing of The Mandate of the Jurist itself at that time in Najaf was a great revolution: that he should come from the jurists and write on such an issue." 54 extensive time for research.

.

.

.

.

For nearly nine years the in

theory and

clerical rulers

sought to resolve

it

from expediency

first

in practice

derive

by

a variety

as the prerequisite for the

between "primary ordinances" and

"sec-

implementation of the incumbent primary

on

the believer as a religious duty.

the principle of the public interest, any act could be considered necessary

for the prevalence for the

of devices. The most impor-

from the sources of the Sacred Law, the second

ordinances. Both categories were said to be binding

Through

.

of Iran denied the existence of this paradox

tant of these has been the legal distinction

ondary ordinances." The

.

first

of Islam and the implementation of its primary ordinances. Then,

time in Shi'ite history, incumbencv was claimed for a category of second-

ary ordinances comprising

all

state laws

bency was derived not from the

juristic

and government regulations, and competence of

this

incum-

from

the religious jurists but

the alleged right of the supreme Jurist to rule. This radical departure from the Shi'ite tradition could not help but arouse the sarcasm even

who had

lahs

jurist.

explicitly

of one of the two Grand Avatol-

acknowledged Khomeini's superior authority

as the

supreme

55

In January 1988 the charade of the primary and secondary distinctions was definitively

given up. Khomeini ruled that

all

governmental ordinances belong to the cate-

gory of primary ordinances of the Sacred all.

But

it

problems

became as

it

clear

solved.

Law and

are immediately

even to Khomeini's followers that

Bv March 1990,

a

incumbent upon

this ruling created as

prominent member of

many

the clerical

elite,

Hojjatulislam Taheri Khorramabadi, had concluded that Khomeini's division of the

ordinances into primary and secondary was unworkable.

of the

fact that

under Islamic government law

is

He

posited by

proposed

God and

view

that, "in

society

is

ruled

by divine laws alone," there are three kinds of laws and ordinances for the administration of the country: "primary ordinances and laws," "secondary ordinances,"

"governmental ordinances and regulations." 56 In

of

previous negligible status while a novel category

"secondary ordinances" reverts to

its

of "governmental ordinances"

put forward to cover public law and

is

and

this view, the traditional category'

is

said to be

SHITTE JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSTITUTION MAKING IN IRAN 105

binding on the consciences of the Muslims. This significant statement

on

Islamic

synthesis

government

between

an acknowledgment of the failure to create a consistent

Shi'ite jurisprudence

The attempt

public.

is

in a disquisition

and the constitutional law of the Islamic Re-

to stretch the established categories of Shi'ite jurisprudence

had

not worked, and only by setting up a novel category could contradiction be avoided.

Khomeini's statements on the Absolute Mandate of the

Jurist

would not only have

created far greater latitude for regulation and legislation than was allowed bv the traditional Shiite jurisprudence; they

The

would

also have

made

the Shrite state highly

no statement on the Absolute Mandate of the Jurist. But it does bureaucratize the legislative authority of the jurist and establishes the Commission for the Determination of Interest as the organ representing it. autocratic.

It

revised constitution contains

therefore has the

same consequence of removing the

governmental authority imposed bv

Shi'ite

Sacred

limitations

Law and

on

die exercise of

thus strengthens the au-

thority of the state.

The

story

is

not w ithout ironv.

I

Khomeini,

believe that

who had

outsmarted

all

opponents, was eventually defeated bv the cunning of history. The practical conse-

quence of Khomeini's statements and of the amended constitution has been the strengthening of the actual authority of the bureaucratic state rather than the hypo-

of the

thetical authority

To

jurist.

see the irony

of

this

development, one need only

be reminded of the declaration on executive power in the Preamble to the Fundamental

Law of 1979: "The

of government,

will

system of bureaucracy, the result and product of Godless forms

be firmlv cast away!" Nine years

that obeying pcttv bureaucrats,

who

later

we were

told bv

Khomeini

derive their authority' from the sacred

Mandate

Jurist, is more important than prayer and fasting. Finally, the constitutional amendments of 1989 completed the translation of the Mandate of the Jurist into

of the

constitutional law of the bureaucratic state by compartmentalizing, conciliarizing, and

bureaucratizing

it.

Well over a century ago, de Tocqueville noted that,

consequence of revolution was the strengthening of the

There can be

little

in France, the paradoxical

state

it

sought to destroy. 57

doubt that de Tocqueville has once more been vindicated. The Mandate of the Jurist in 1988 and the constitutional revisions

reinterpretation of the

of 1989 have made the

state

more

autocratic.

The

state,

which Khomeini

intended to see wither, not only has grown enormously in size

58

initially

but has expanded in

the legal sphere too and has emerged as the unintended victor of the Islamic revolution,

making

its clerical

masters also slaves to

its logic.

Nevertheless, the absorptive capacity of the

construed.

The

state that has prevailed

rational- legal legitimacy

is

in different configurations

is

modern

state

should not be mis-

not an essence. The modern

capable of assuming

many forms.

Its

state

with

and be given enormously varying weights. Revolutionary

traditionalism has transformed the Iranian nation-state as fundamentally as Shi'ism.

of the

Though

legal logic

its

components can occur

it

has

theocratic constitution

making

of the modern

has nonetheless transformed the latter into a

veritable theocracy.

state,

it

in Iran

does bear the distinct imprint

Said

A mir A rjomand 106

APPENDIX Glossary of the Persian or Arabic Equivalents of Technical Terms All but

wo or three technical terms have been translated into English

This glossary

is

provided for readers

Absolute Mandate of the Jurist articles

usul-e din

Assemblv of Experts

shura-ve khobragan fuqaha'

clerical jurists

Commission

who want

velayat-e motlaqa-ve faqih

of faith

Interest

manv Persian or Arabic words. to know the original expressions.

order not to encumber the text with too

in

for the

Determination of the

majma'-e tashkish-e maslahat-e nezam-c eslami

of the Islamic Order

competence

in religious jurisprudence

ejtehad

Council for the Review of Constitution

shura-ve baznegari-ve qanun-e asasi

Council of Guardians

shura-ye negahban

customarv government

Fundamental

hokumat-e

Law

qanun-e

'orfi

asasi

governmental ordinances

ahkam-e hokumati

governmental punishments

ta"zirat-e

hokumati

hierocratic authoritv/judge

hakem-e

shar'

hierocratic

government

hokumat-e

injunction

fatva

(public) interest

maslahat

jurisconsult

mufti

(the) jurist

faqih

(the)

Leader

rahbar

Leadership

Mandate of the

shar'i

rahbari velayat-e faqih

Jurist

Mandate to Rule

velayat-e

ordinances

ahkam

amr

overriding necessity

zarurat

people of loosening and binding

ahl al-hall

primary ordinances

ahkam-e awaliyya

waT'aqd

religious jurist

mojtahed

ruling jurist

vali-ye faqih

Sacred

Law

Shari'a

ahkam-e thanaviyya

secondary ordinances sources of imitation

maraje'-e taqlid

sovereignty

hakemivvat

Notes 1.

Cf. Encyclopaedia Iranica, s.v. "Consti-

tutional

Laws of 1906-7" (1992).

There is one exception. The religious leaders had vehemently opposed the principle of equality of all citizens before the law (article 8), which thev correctly perceived as contradictory to the provisions of the Sacred Law, but had eventually given in, reportedly 2.

because of both personal threats of violence

and the

of die Armenian miH. Hairi, Shi'ism and Con-

restlessness

nority. Cf. A. stitutionalism

in

Iran (Leiden: E.

J.

Brill,

1977), pp. 232-33. 3.

Ruhollah Khomeini, Hokumat-e eslami

(Najaf and Tehran, 1971). 4.

S.

H. Modarressi, "Rationalism and

SHIITE JL'RISrRlDENCE AND CONSTITUTION MAKING IN IRAN 107

Traditionalism

Preliminary

Jurisprudence:

Shi'i

in

Survey,"

Stucim

A 59

Islamica

(1984): 143.

Hamid

5.

Constitution of the Is-

lamic Republic of Iran, English trans, with a

preface

1980),

(Berkeley,

Mizan

Calif.:

Press,

p. 8.

N. Katouzivan, Gozari bar engelab-e iran (Tehran: Chapkhaneh-ve Daneshgah-e 6.

Tehran, 1981),

p.

technical

more gen-

Velayat-e

Iran,

(Tehran,

motlaqeh-ye faqih

this

n.d.

of goyernor

Shi'ite

ulama

title

goyernment and transform it into a manThe same is true of the substantive, "goyernment" (hokumat), mentioned earlier.

16. Cited in S.

for

God and

Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890 (Chicago: University of Chicago^ Press, 1984), pp. 238, 246. It' underwent a process of gradual depreciation

18.

Madani, Hoquq-e

is

used to designate a

The

is

latter is

member of

the ulama

authoritatiye in Shi'ite jurisprudence.

of the grand ayatollahs,

who

Law of the

and the

social

women, and

followers.

Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Aya(New York: Basic Books, 1984),

bar

Gozari

10. Katouziyan,

21

the influence of the national

movements.

.

Article 2

"not give

1

Bakhash, The Reign of the

rise

Ayatollahs,

my

attention.

13.

M.

B. al-Sadr,

2d 11-13.

M.

and

worldly

first

ideo-

government the right to "deprive individuals and sections of the community of any rights used by them to the detriment of the interests of logical constitution, gives the

23. Katouziyan, Gozari bar engelab-e iran,

p.

259-61; Madani, Hoquq-e

fi

"Lamha

fiqhiyya tam-

yaqud al1403/1982-83),

iran," in Al-Islam

ed.

asasi, vol. 2,

133.

pp.

Hoquq-e

asasi,

vol.

2,

87-92.

25. Ibid., pp.

192-93.

26. Nahzat-e Azadi, Velayat-e motlaqeh-ye

hidiyya an mashru' dostur al-jomhuriyyat

hayah,

religious

22. For instance, article 23 of the Soviet

24. Madani,

Mr. Ali al-Oraibi for bringing the importance of this document grateful to

I

al-islamiyya

to

constitution of 1918, the world's

engelab-e

78.

am

of the Supplement of 1 907

sedition."

pp.

12.

14.

and economic rights of the and political participation of

die Socialist revolution."

74-75.

iran, p. 132.

pp.

Islamic Republic."

required that associations and gatherings

consists

are considered

the "sources of imitation" by their Shi'ite

11.

177,

asasi, vol. 2, p.

20. Notably the idea of the welfare state

term

currently

The highest echelon of this category

to

23.

20 Sarhriyar

currently used for a religious leader

ranks below ayatollah.

means the "sign of God" and

p.

n.

19. Encyclopaedia Iranica, s.v. "Constitu-

tional

liberation

pp.

asasi

iran, vol. 2 (Tehran:

n. 14.

citizens, social

9.

Madani, Hoquq-e

17. Transcript in Ettela'at,

the

tollah

J.

Sorush, 1985), pp. 177-78,

nineteenth century. See

in the

Said A. Arjomand, The Shadow of

who

yery significant in

1363.

gained currency as an honorific

and

is

date to rule.

The term means "proof of Islam" and

who

—

attempt to extend hierocratic authority

to

[1988]),

p. 12.

8.

older,

dar jomhuri-ve eslami-ye

168.

Azadi-ve

Nahzat-e

7.

more

hakem

eral sense

Algar,

—the

sense of judge, and the newer and

term

(Tehran,

Izadi,

Gozari

bar

zendeqi

va

faqih, pp.

8-9.

27. Ayatollah Azari

Qumi knew

this well

and emphasized that overriding necessity could only be applied when chaos and dire danger threaten the lives and interests of the believers.

Furthermore, "Some think that

andishehha-ve ayatollah montazeri (Tehran:

the Jurist {vali-ye faqih) and the Islamic gov-

Nahzat-e Zanan-e Mosalman), pp. 272-78.

ernment have the right to

15.

The

play

on

the

two

senses of the

legislate

and can

delegate this right, for instance, to the Maj-

Said Amir

A rjomand

108

lis; and if so, the enactments of the Majlis would become divine ordinances. No! Not

only

not accepted by any of the

this

is

jurists,

but even the seminarians

this to

be

wrong

in Shi'ism."

.

.

Shi'ite .

know

Cited in Key-

1972), esp. chap. 21; also, A. A. Schiller, "Jurists'

42. Ibid., pp. 1231, 1235.

Max Weber, Economy and

43.

Martin Kramer,

in Iran," in

and Revolution

sistance

Westview

Press, 1987), pp.

Re-

ed., Shi'ism,

(Boulder,

Arjomand, "The Rule of God Social Compass 36, no. 4 (1989).

30. Said A.

31. Jomhuri-ye Eslami, 13 and 14 January

1988.

27 January 1988. Compare this with the statement he made less than two months earlier: "The Funda32. Kayhan-e Hava'i,

Law

mental

is

the crystallization of the revo-

and foundation of the Fundamental Law are the Koran and the Sunna. One of the aims of the Funda-

lution;

the

mental

Law

.

.

of power

basis

.

is

to prevent the concentration

one place, because the concenof power in one place [evokes] a very

tration

University pp.

Cited in Nahzat-e Azadi,

Velayat-e motlaqa-ye faqih, p. 20.

33. Nahzat-e Azadi, Velayat-e motlaqa-ye faqih, p. 11.

The made

G.

California

Press,

1968),

828-29.

and

the

Hidden Imam.

45. Ibid., p. 9. 46. T Honore, Emperors and Lawyers (London: Duckworth, 1981), p. 102. 47. H. J. Liebesney, The Law of the Near and Middle East: Readings, Cases, and Materials

(Albany: State University of

Press, 1975), pp.

New

York

38-41.

48. Nevertheless,

the

clerical

elite

re-

mained divided on this issue and found it prudent to compromise with the principle of following a source of imitation in view of public sentiment. Thev promoted a rela-

in

bitter experience."

of

Society,

eds. (Berkeley, Calif:

44. Said A. Arjomand, The Shadow of God

29. Jomhuri-ye Eslami, 12 January 1988.

in Iran,"

Roth and C. Wittich,

Colo.:

104-5, 108.

1227-28.

41. Schiller, "Jurists' Law," pp.

han, 28 February 1990. 28. S. Bakhash, "Islam and Social Justice

Law," Columbia Law Review 58

(1958): 1230.

tively

obscure figure, Ayatollah Araki, into

the position of a source of imitation. Their

endorsement was accompanied bv the advice to Khomeini's followers in law and ritual to imitate Araki, and by the promise to bring out the latter's own manual. Meanwhile,

request for such a determina-

Araki advised them to continue following

by the president, the Majlis speaker, the president of the Supreme Judiciary Council, and two other signatories, was printed together with Khomeini's

own manual was mid-August 1989. Kayhan-e Hava'i, 23 August 1989.

decree.

Twentieth Century Iran,"

34. tion,

in a letter

Khomeini's rulings. His

eventually published in

49. Said A. Arjomand, "Traditionalism in in Said

A. Arjom-

35. Jomhuri-ye Eslami, 7 February 1988.

and, ed., From Nationalism

36. Nahzat-e Azadi, Velayat-e motlaqa-ye

Islam (London: Macmillan, 1984).

faqih,

4,

pp.

24,

113-18,' 136-37.

The

Many

50.

The

should

and statements were also documented. See Nahzat-e Azadi, Velayat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih, pp. 106-13.

Gustav von Grunebaum

37.

1990,

Kayhan-e Hava'i, 25 and 28 February p. 2.

38. Ibid., 14 June 1989.

28 June 1989.

40. H.

Jolowicz and B. Nicholas, His-

F.

Study ofRoman

suffice.

distinguished Orientalist insisted that for the

Muslims Allah is not only spiritually supreme but "also the mundane head of his community which he not only rules but governs." The eminent fundamentalist thinker Ayatollah Mortaza Motahhari considered dieocracy the essence of Islam and rejected

39. Ibid.,

torical Introduction to the

Revolutionary

examples can be given, but two

contradictions with Khomeini's earlier promises

to

die "colonialist idea of separation of religion

Law

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

from

politics." Cf.

G. von Grunebaum, Me-

dieval Islam (Chicago: University

of Chicago

Press, 1954), p. 12; Motahhari's statement

SHI'ITE

JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSTITUTION MAKING

IN

IRAN

109

is

I

Arjomand, The Turban for Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran

cited in Said A.

the

New York:

pp.

Oxford University 179-80.

Press, 1988),

the

17 January 1988.

Jomhim-ye Eslami, 19 January 1988. His awareness of the urgent need for 53. See

extensive research

on and

jurisprudential ex-

Mandate of the would not make Avatollah Meshkini

ploration of the topic of the Jurist

hesitant in the least in proceeding to affirm

Mandate of the Imam upon society from the incumbency of the daily prayer upon society. They are both at the same level and are among the primary ordithat "the is

different

nances. But thev very

much

Reza Golpavgani took the occasion of the of President Khamane'i in 1985 to urge the implementation of the "primary orreelection

51. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and Hidden Imam. 52. Jomhuri-ye Eslami,

mental laws and regulations as "secondary Grand Avatollah Mohammad

ordinances,"

differ in

dinances of Islam" and complained of the

implementation of "other than the primary ordinances."

The Mandate [of the Jurist] is the most important of the primary ordinances." Mocking

the

passing

of govern-

would "be

hope

careful

God's ordinances." See Shabrough Akhavi, "Elite Factionalism in the Islamic Republic

of Iran," Middle East Journal 41, no. 2 (1987): 191-92. 56. Kayhan, 5

March 1990.

57. Alexis de Tocqueville, Ancien Regime

and

the Revolution, S. Gilbert, trans. (Berke-

ley, Calif.:

54. Kayhan-c Hara'i, 14 June 1989. 55.

further expressed the

and be governed bv the primary ordinances of Islam, not ordinances which God's servants [i.e., thev themselves] wish to sav are

impor-

tance.

He

that the ruling elements

58. p.

Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955).

Arjomand, The Turban for

173.

the

Crown,

CHAPTER 7

The Fundamentalist Impact on Law, Politics, and Constitutions in Iran, Pakistan, and the Sudan Ann

Mayer

Elizabeth

In

this

fundamentalism that Martin Marty offered

paper

in a

I

1988

will

be using the definition of

article.

1

do

I

this in the belief

that the criteria that he has set forth can be meaningfully applied in the Islamic context

and

in the

hope of

facilitating

definition or the best definition

comparisons, not to imply that Marty's

of fundamentalism for use

is

the only

Mv

in the Islamic context.

1967 Arabperiod, there was a

focus will be limited to manifestations of Islamic fundamentalism after the Israeli

war, the era of the so-called Islamic resurgence. In that

noticeable disenchantment in the nationalist ideologies

values

and a groundswell of support for

and Islamic law, the

Rather than

Near and Middle East with the prevailing policies

it

as a

treat the Shari'a as a

scheme

body of specific and highly it

political ideology, the Shari'a has inevitably

ills.

become

In

of its divine

what

have been slighted in

reinstating the Shari'a

its

simplified

and

politicized;

worked out by the

fundamentalist formulations. In

might involve

in practice

is

origins, can

conversion for use as a

its

elaborate jurisprudence and the complex and extensive rules jurists

technical legal rules,

into an ideology, thereby

for reorganizing society that, because

serve as a panacea for political, economic, and social

modern

of returning to Islamic

Shari'a.

contemporary Muslim fundamentalists tend to transform treating

secular

often

left

many

areas,

vague by the pro-

ponents of Islamization when they are seeking popular support. This vagueness politically useful, since

it

allows Muslims

who

its

pre-

is

favor Islamization in the abstract to

them to enumerated, Muslims who were committed to a different vision of Islamization could be alienated. Where left vague, "Islamization" could be espoused by Muslims hoping to achieve a wide read into programs for reviving the Shari'a the content that they have. Were the goals of an Islamization program

variety

of goals, including goals that had

little

110

would

like

specifically

or nothing

in

common

with those of

THE FUNDAMENTALIST IMPACT

AND THE SUDAN

IN IRAN. PAKISTAN, 111

fundamentalists.

The deemphasis of specific

rations to garner

mass

legal rules

political support, since the

is

also a natural result

of

aspi-

intended audiences could hardly be

expected to be galvanized into action bv discussing intricacies of Shari'a law,

developed by and for Muslims with advanced legal educations and

far

a law-

bevond the

grasp of nonspecialists.

A variety of ideological

formulations of the Shari'a that range from the radical

to the reactionary right have been proposed in recent decades bv

gent philosophies and

mean

could such

as

interests. In

Muslims

that

cases,

Muslims with

are calling for the realization

of political and economic goals

honest and democratic government, accountability of public

In another context,

and

expanding religious instruction religious minorities and

programs, or preventing

Governments

officials, social

egalitarian societv.

Islamization could signifv a pattern of hostile reactions

calls for

to modernization measures

diver-

support for returning to the Sharif

and the redistribution of wealth, or the establishment of an

justice,

on

some

left

a

commitment

to buttressing the patriarchal family,

in public schools,

Muslim

imposing discriminatory measures

women from working and

that adopt

of land reform

dissidents, challenging the legality

serving in public office.

programs of Islamization naturallv propose ideological

formulations that serve to consolidate their power while opposition groups appeal to ideological conceptions of Islamic requirements that

those in power. Islamization

whatever

which

is

its

is

also

their

supported by Muslims

who

campaigns to unseat are convinced that,

rules call for, the Shari'a can serve as a prophvlactic against the West,

viewed

as

bent on exploiting and oppressing Muslims. Muslims have been

inclined to believe that Western-stvie law

cept in Saudi Arabia, were imposed effort to

justify'

undermine

and

adopted everywhere ex-

legal svstems,

on Muslim countries bv Western powers in an This belief is prompted bv the fact that West-

local sovereignty.

ernization of laws in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries coincided with the period in

which Europeans colonized and subjugated most parts of the Near and Middle

East.

The borrowing of Western

legal systems

religious obligations leading to a corrosion

been military vulnerability and

political

is

perceived as a betrayal of Muslims

of morals for which the punishment has

weakness. For example, the 1967 Arab defeat

has been interpreted as God's punishment vested on earlier discarded Islamic

Muslim countries for having is made that the revival of

law and morality. The assumption

Islamic law will automaticallv restore traditional morality in turn

1

and

social order,

which

will

thwart neo-imperialist designs, protecting Muslim countries from ever again

being subjugated and exploited by Western powers. 2 In addition to being viewed as a bulwark against Western political influence, Islamization

is

seen a

way of blocking Western

cultural authenticity,

and demands

define a cultural identity vis-a-vis the

cultural imperialism. Islam

for Islamization have resulted

West

at a

time

when Western

is

associated with

from

threatened to overwhelm the indigenous cultural identity. Islamization

complex phenomenon not necessarily prompted by fundamentalist

is,

therefore, a

attitudes.

oxer, even where Islamization involves a fundamentalist impulse, this

bined with other

a desire to

cultural influences

More-

may be com-

factors.

In this chapter three fundamentalist governmental Islamization campaigns of the

Ami Elizabeth Mayer 112

post- 1967 period

be reviewed.

will

To put them

one should

in perspective,

response has been

official resistance

first

One

consider other responses that governments have had to the Islamic resurgence.

to popular pressures for Islamization. Examples

of this can be seen in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran under the shah. Egypt under Sadat

and Mubarak and Pakistan under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto exemplify another type of sponse, by which governments following basicallv secular policies

concessions

tegic

groups demanding Islamization.

to

A

third

idiosyncratic approach to Islamization can be seen in the policies

There Islamization was

just

make

re-

limited, stra-

and somewhat

of Qaddafi

in Libya.

one of the many symbolic measures originally adopted by

Qaddafi to revive and glorify Arab culture and

instill

pride in indigenous institutions.

Islamization was also exploited to legitimize the military regime that had replaced the

venerable

King

Idris.

Qaddafi proved after

Far from being an a

few years

in

ally

power

of fundamentalists or sharing

to be

more

like Fidel

their goals,

Castro or

Mao

Tse-

in his outlook and became the bitter foe of groups like al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, Muslim Brotherhood, the most powerful fundamentalist organization in the region. The thrust of his major initiatives affecting law and religion was actually de-

tung or

signed to relegate Islam to a marginal role. In Iran, Pakistan, and the Sudan, the philosophies shaping the governmental

lamization programs ucts

all

represented a fundamentalist outlook.

The

legislative

of the programs indicate that the objectives were broadly similar

countries. Pakistan under President Zia

al-Numayri and

Omar Hassan

in

Is-

prod-

all

ul-Haq and the Sudan under Presidents

three Jafar

al-Bashir represent models of military regimes espous-

ing Islamization as the central government policy, enacting Shari'a rules into law,

coopting members of fundamentalist groups, implementing aspects of their programs, and allowing them roles in the government, educational institutions, and the

The overthrow of the shah's government by a was followed by a takeover of the new government by Shi'ite

courts. Iran offers a distinctive model.

popular revolution clerics,

the force within the revolution that was

most committed

to implementing a

fundamentalist Islamization policy.

What does

it

mean

of "fundamentalism?" initial

to say that these governmental programs First,

the legislative program

phases, consistently reactive

and

in

some

cases reactionary.

Where

its

Islamic rules

societies

of Western society, the

Shari'a being identified with the traditional social order traditional Islamic jurisprudence

there could be only stan,

into the category

was, at least in

and to reimpose what was ostensibly an Islamic model of

were enacted into law, they were ones designed to purge the influences

fit

in these cases

was discounted:

one version of Islamic

law.

To

and morality. The diversity of

in official Islamization

programs

the fundamentalists in Iran, Paki-

and the Sudan the Islamic sources had an objective and univocal meaning. Prob-

manner into codes of positive law, with no acknowledgment that these texts might be ambiguous or that they could be legitimately interpreted as stating moral principles incumbent on the individual belematic Islamic texts were converted in

liever's

The

literalist

conscience or as having symbolic or allegorical meanings.

They were acMuslim dissent-

Islamization programs were also exclusivist and oppositional.

companied by repressive policies and censorship directed at silencing

THE FUNDAMENTALIST IMPACT

AND THE SUDAN

IN IRAN, PAKISTAN. 113

ers,

some of whom were condemned

to death as "hypocrites," "infidels," "heretics,"

or "apostates from Islam." The Islamization programs included harsh treatment of

Muslim that,

liberals

and modernists and discrimination against

local religious minorities

according to the fundamentalists' perceptions, presented dangers to Islam. En-

embodv

actments purporting to

Shari'a criminal laws

centerpieces of the Islamization programs.

The

were

effectively

enshrined

as the

priority giyen to criminal law

was

emblematic of the antipermissive outlook informing the programs. The corpus of Shari'a rules

was

mined

selectively

means of punishing and deterring immoral

for

conduct and eradicating decadence, while Western-inspired laws and institutions

fre-

quendy remained intact in areas where the fight against vice was not implicated. The consistent stress on legal prohibitions of immoral conduct and the preoccupation with rules in the criminal justice sphere

Islamic jurists,

who had

were

in contrast

with the orientation of premodcrn

not been preoccupied with reacting against perceived deca-

dence when they elaborated their multivolumc works of jurisprudence was

more concerned with

laws, interpreting them, talists

civil

legal principles.

and meting out punishments the contemporary fundamen-

have tended to construe Islamic prohibitions broadly, creating

of offenses that would than was criminalized stan, the

Premodern

than with criminal matters. In drafting

condemning and prosecuting

justify

premodern

in the

new

categories

wider range of conduct

a

Shari'a. In the Islamization

programs

Sudan, and Iran some Shari'a laws were directed against crimes

apostasv, fornication, and alcohol use in the

Muslim community

in Paki-

like theft,

— which were crimi-

nalized in the traditional Shari'a. But Islam was also presented as the rationale for

prohibiting abortion,

and women's participation

girls'

in

sports,

coeducational

modern and traditional folkloric), "immodest" women's use of cosmetics, women's participation in

schooling, dancing and music (both

and "un-Islamic" women's

dress,

the professions and service in political positions, public school instruction not in ac-

cordance with Islamic values, and immorality' and "obscenity'" fined

—

in

— very

broadlv de-

books, movies, and television programs. In Iran and the Sudan, alcohol use

became criminalized even outside the Muslim community. An example of the reactive and antipermissive character of fundamentalist of Islamization can be seen

in a

visions

statement by Maulana Maududi, the famous Pakistani

fundamentalist whose ideas inspired the Pakistani model of Islamization, regarding the goals and duties of an Islamic state:

Unlike a Secular

state, its

duty

not merely to maintain internal order, to

is

defend the frontiers and to work for the material prosperity of the country. Rather [prayer]

its

first

and foremost obligation

and Zakat [alms

tax], to

is

to establish the system of Salat

propagate and establish those things which

have been declared to be "virtues" by

God and

His Messenger, and to eradicate

those things which have been declared to be "vices" by them. In other words,

no

state

can be called Islamic

if it

does not

fulfil this

fundamental objective of

an Islamic State. Thus a state which does not take interest

and eradicating ture, indecent

vice

and

in

which

adulter)', drinking,

films, \Tilgar songs,

in establishing virtue

gambling, obscene

litera-

immoral display of beauty, promiscuous

Ann Elizabeth Mayer 114

mingling of

men and women,

co-education,

drance, cannot be called an Islamic

State.

An

etc. flourish

without

let

must

Islamic Constitution

or hindeclare

the above mentioned objective as the primarv duty of the State. 3

The may be

three Islamization campaigns that have been classified here as fundamentalist

contrasted with the legal system of Saudi Arabia. Before 1992, although the

Saudi legal system had seen the introduction of some legal innovations in the form of

new

institutions that

were designed to regulate business

putes in areas that the regime had decided

would

activity

and to resolve

modern

require

dis-

expertise, formal

"law" remained the premodern jurisprudence contained in the treatises of Islamic jurists,

or fuqaba

— that

Shari'a law in the

is,

same form that was

world before the onset of Westernizing reforms. For

in use in the

had no constitution before the belated promulgation of one on theory

at least, the

Muslim

Saudi Arabia had

this reason, 1

March 1992.

In

system of jurists' law that the Saudis retained until the campaign

of legislative reform was launched the government, and

it left

in early

no room

for

1992 could not be revised or controlled by

human

legislation. Instead,

it

was law

inter-

preted and applied by fuqaha with traditional religious educations. Leaving aside the areas

where there had been "regulation" (not "law") designed to cope with some

pressing practical problems, what qualified as "law" in Saudi Arabia remained the kind

of premodern Islamic jurisprudence that had governed Muslim ago. Furthermore, the country remains governed by a traditional

March 1992 had

resisted

all

demands

societies centuries

monarchv

kind of dvnastic rule exercised by the house of Ibn Saud has ancient in

that until

The antecedents. So

for changes in governmental institutions.

terms of law and politics in Saudi Arabia one has, rather than fundamentalism,

conservatism, traditionalism, and orthodoxy. In countries like Iran, Pakistan, and the

Sudan, one sees the reactive character of fundamentalism

in

measures taken by the

regimes to implement fundamentalist policies to change the legal and political systems. But the insiders in the Saudi system had favored continuitv and the maintenance

of the hoar)' status quo; they wanted to preserve premodern Islamic jurisprudence their

law and the traditional monarchical form of government. Therefore, the

as

official

Saudi policies in the areas of law and politics can hardly be labeled "fundamentalist" as

long

as

one

sticks rigorously to

the existing Saudi system might

damentalist impact to

do

A

Marty's categories.

want

on law and

to

Many of

the opponents of

implement programs that would have

politics,

but they have so

far

a fun-

had no opportunity

so.

few points where there

Saudi Arabia

is

is

possibility for confusion

should be

so often called "fundamentalist" by people

who

clarified,

because

are not discussing

questions of the impact of fundamentalism on contemporary law and politics or are not using Martv's definition. 4

Manv

who

people talk of Saudi fundamentalism in con-

Wahhabi movement, which was an important impetus behind the rise of the Saudi dvnastv in the eighteenth century. Wahhabism was indeed a fundamentalist phenomenon. 5 However, since it made its impact on law and politics long nection with the

before the time framework of this essav, which only comprises events in the 1970s

and 1980s, the Wahhabi version of fundamentalism, which has

lost its original, reac-

THE FUNDAMENTALIST IMPACT

AND THE SUDAN

IN IRAN. PAKISTAN. 115

rive zeal after

People

becoming entrenched

may be impressed bv

finance fundamentalist

in the

Saudi system,

the fact that the Saudis are

movements abroad. 6 This mav

lead

is

not considered here.

known them

to encourage and

to infer, incorrectly,

that the regime follows fundamentalist policies domesticallv. In realitv the conservative

Saudis have

come under

fire

from some fundamentalists

form of Islam, which the Iranian regime dismissivelv

calls

not

Mecca, the leader of which condemned the Saudis

and corruption and

for religious laxity

is

1979 the Saudis even had to

serviceable for the fundamentalists' political agenda. In face a fundamentalist uprising in

preciselv because their

"American Islam,"

called for a return to the

model of Islamic

society established in the era of the Prophet. In 1991 the Saudi regime

was

ingly concerned about the threat posed bv the domestic fundamentalist

movement. 7

increas-

Iran

The Goals of Islamization

Anv examination of the

in

Iran

goals of fundamentalism in Iran entails an analysis of the goals

of the Iranian Revolution of 1978—79, a complex phenomenon beyond the scope of

At the very

this paper.

leaders

least,

however,

it

should be noted that

and the fundamentalist program were linked

in Iran

in a variety

fundamentalist

of ways to

a strong

popular movement that culminated in a broad-based revolution. This was not the case either in Pakistan or in the

Sudan, where Islamization was imposed from above bv

military dictators.

Iranian fundamentalists insist that the Iranian Revolution

was

bv them and

led

fought on behalf of their cause, so that Islamization can be said to have been the goal

of the revolution. talist

It

seems more accurate, however, to say that there was

nomic

goals.

fundamen-

There was doubtless popular support for some of the broader

fundamentalist goals, particularly areas,

a

takeover of a revolution that was fought primarily for secular political and eco-

but

it

would

among the

lower middle and lower classes

be hard to establish that the Iranian Revolution

stood to have been waged on behalf of the specifics of the

emerged

after

powerful

clerics seized control.

in

urban

was widely under-

legislative

program

that

Indeed, Ayatollah Khomeini, before

consolidating his control, was evasive and vague in pronouncements about his objectives. 8 It is

possible that he realized that a candid revelation of the details of his fun-

damentalist agenda might weaken his position and undermine his popularity. After the revolution the early focus of Iran's establishing an Islamic government,

official

and one of the

Islamization

first

tasks

program was on

of the new regime was

writing an Islamic constitution. This was a natural priority' because of the prominence

of Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership

role in the struggle against the shah

and

his

own

preoccupation with setting up an Islamic government according to his model of wilayat al-faqih, or rule

by the Islamic

tion provoked

much

who remained

convinced that

drafting process that

criticism

was

jurist.

Khomeini's ideas for the Iranian constitu-

by Iranians, including some prominent clerics

Shi'ite

ulama

should not play a role in governance. After a

replete with disputes, in late

1979

Iran did succeed in pro-

Ann Elizabeth Mayer 116

mitigating a

ernment

new

(articles

constitution, in

the land (article 4), which

Arjomand

12). Said

which the faqih was placed

at the

apex of the gov-

5 and 107) and Islamic law was established as the supreme law of

meant the law of the majority Twelver

Shi'ite sect (article

discusses the particular features of this constitution in his chapter

of the current volume.

Once

play a

domain. 9

his allies

had not advertised prior to the revolution or even

aftermath: implementing a theocratic

would

Khomeini and

firmly ensconced in power, Ayatollah

a goal that they

dominant

role in

Shi'ite clerics allied

model of government

worked toward

in its

which

in

important spheres and particularly

all

with Khomeini proved eager to take

immediate

Shi'ite clerics

in the legal

political positions

who had

and to supplant the Western-trained or Western-oriented judges and lawyers

come

to

dominate the

legal establishment

under the Pahlavis, under

the legal profession had been largely reformed along French lines.

and

law and

revolution gave

opportunity to assume the central roles that thev had plaved in the courts

clerics the

in legal

education prior to the secularizing reforms of the 1920s. In addition,

began to play

clerics

The

whom

a

Majlis, or parliament,

new and

unfamiliar role, that of the dominant force in the

which had been

a thoroughly secular institution

during the

reign of Muhammad Reza Shah.

One could see the clerics' dislodging of Westernized professionals and secularminded technocrats from the dominant positions that they had occupied under the shah as just one facet of the populist, anti-elitist dynamic of the revolution. The Westernized elite of the shah's era had grown estranged from Iranian traditions and had little

in

more

in

common

with the values and outlooks of

Pahlavi era. Nonetheless, this does not

tween theocracy and democracy a result

on

that the Iranians

were

of the

would have chosen

the domestic scene.

cally affected

a

be-

in free elections.

of clerical ascendancy, postrevolutionary fundamentalist

have been articulated by Shi'ite noires

mean

elite

form of government had they been given the opportunity to choose

theocratic

As

less affluent Iranians. Clerics

touch with the traditional culture of the average Iranian than the

clerics. Iran's

Not

surprisingly, these

bv the Islamization program. The

rejected their traditional cloistered

first

and subjugated

were the groups most dramatitarget

role

women

was Iranian

and demanded

with men. As Shahla Haeri points out in volume 2 of this aroused bv the 1963 reform which granted

policies in Iran

fundamentalist clerics had two betes

women who full

scries, clerical ire

equality

had been

the right to vote and by the Ira-

nian Family Protection Act of 1967, which significantly improved women's rights in the area of family law.

The growing prominence of women

in public roles

and the

professions in the last decades of the shah's regime was also profoundly disturbing to the clerics.

A

prime goal of the

as traitors to Islam, or

were

in

clerical

"Western

regime was to discredit emancipated

dolls," as they

were often

power, Islamic precepts were interpreted

in

labeled.

Once

women

the clerics

ways that promoted sexual

seg-

regation and the exclusion of women from areas of education, employment, and public activity.

Harsh criminal

penalties

by females that conservative

modest dress was treated

clerics

were imposed to punish and deter any conduct found indecent or immoral. Violating

as a serious offense,

with penalities such

rules

of

as seventy-four

THE FUNDAMENTALIST IMPACT

AND THE SUDAN

IN IRAN, PAKISTAN. 117

women

imposed on

lashes being

The other nemesis of coincidentallv,

appeared

if they

was the

the clergy

in public

sizable Baha'i

was ecumenically oriented, espoused

liberal

without proper

veiling. 10

community, which, not

and humanistic

values,

and

women. Baha'ism had originated in Iran in the nineteenth had won century and many converts among Iran's Muslims. Clerics deemed that conaccorded

Baha'ism and their descendants were apostates from Islam and deserving of

verts to capital

equality to

full

punishment, the apostasy penalty

set in

premodern

Shari'a jurisprudence.

Un-

der the shah, despite intermittent persecutions, Baha'is had been able to achieve

measure of equality with Muslims. By neglecting to mention Baha'is minority- religion, the

a

as a recognized

1979 constitution denied them the measure of religious

tolera-

was accorded Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians in article 13. To destroy Baha'ism and the values it stood for, the regime undertook persecutions, imprison-

tion that

ments, and executions of Baha'is and Baha'i institutions were dismantled. pressure was exerted Islamic fold."

may

The

on

Baha'is to repent of their theological errors and return to the

kinds of reactions fundamentalists have to the

One of the most

distinguished scholars of Shi'ism

opined that Baha'is are seen by Iranians Semites and that anti-Baha'ism

viewed

is

much

as

Jews were seen by European

anti-

comparable to anti-Semitism. Like Jews thev are

being cosmospolitan types. "Baha'is are seen to symbolize threatening

as

pects of modernity. alacrity,

some modern world and modern Iran has

reasons for the persecution of the Baha'is arc complex, but

relate closely to the

in general.

Enormous

.

.

.

producing large

as-

Thev adopt modern education and modern science with numbers of intellectuals, physicians, engineers, and business

people. If modernity menaces Iran's identity, they are surely accomplices."

12

How Islamization Was Pursued In Iran Islamization proceeded as a by-product of the clerical takeover of the govern-

ment and

the courts.

forces that

Shi'ite clerics,

der house arrest

when

Islamization

as if their

process entailed the unseating and eventual defeat of secular

were disposed to

by dissident

official

The

resist clerical rule.

who

The regime was

and even placed un-

they questioned the legitimacy of clerical rule or criticized the

line.

13

Claiming to represent "Islam," the regime treated

its

foes

opposition to the government was tantamount to declaring war on the

Islamic religion. Ruthless persecution, incarceration, torture,

the regime's critics withered the opposition. potential

intolerant of criticism

risked being censored, harassed,

opponents of the regime,

About two

fled to foreign

and mass executions of

million Iranians, actual and

havens and

wound up

as exiles in

the West and in neighboring Turkey.

There was no way to challenge the regime's oppressive scheme of Islamization in meted out an arbitrary form of summary justice from which any

the courts, which

Among other secular institutions,

semblance of due process was banished. Bar Association was destroyed and with bers'

commitment

to legality.

it

the

modern

legal profession

the Iranian

and

its

mem-

14

Khomeini's Islamization polio' was directed against various foreign devils, among which the United States was singled out for particularly strong vilification due to

American support

for the shah. In

Khomeini's program the pursuit of Islamization

Ann Elizabeth Mayer 118

became

with a strident anti-Americanism, with the United States

closely associated

incessantly excoriated as the Great Satan

and presented

as the

enemy of Islam.

(This

stands in remarkable contrast to the situation in Pakistan, where the United States

was the primary backer of the Zia regime, and to the situation the United States

was the

sole foreign

prop

in the final stages

in the

Sudan, where

of Numayri's regime.)

Khomeini's demonizing of the regime of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein served a

program; the war with Iraq was in part a pro-

similar role within his Islamization

infidels on the doorstep. And once Khomeini kept the fires stoked by calling for the execution of Salman Rushdie as an apostate from Islam, while Iran's propagandists sought to tie Rushdie's work to an American and Israeli plot against Islam.

longed demonstration of revolutionary zeal against

war ended

that

It is

in the

1988

ceasefire,

thus ironic that, while these battles were being fought, strikingly

made toward

progress was ture

and

one

finds

institutions

of the

little

lasting

on the fundamental structhe 1979 Iranian constitution

eradicating Western influences legal system.

borrowed Western

For example,

in

institutions that lack Islamic antecedents such as the

republican form of government, the division of the government into three separate branches, a directly elected president ister

and

a cabinet, the ideas

who

functions as chief executive, a prime min-

of the independence of the judiciary and

judicial review,

the concept of legality, the notion of an elected legislative body, the need for the

cabinet to obtain votes of confidence from the legislative branch, and the concept of national sovereignty'.

1979

constitution,

is

Even the distinctive institution of the faqih, as set forth in the embedded in a matrix of relations with other, conventional

Western governmental

institutions.

duties include appointing the chief

For example, according to of staff of

Iran's

armed

article

110 the

faqih's

forces, declaring war, or-

ganizing the Supreme Council for National Defense (the president, prime minister, minister of defense, and others), confirming the appointment of the president after

and dismissing the president

his election,

preme Court ruling

in the interests

of the country

that the president has violated his legal duties.

after a Su-

Such

principles

have counterparts in Western political systems, but they have no relation to the ditional function

In

many

of a

facets

1958 French

tra-

Shi'ite faqih.

and

in

its

constitution.

general format, the Iranian constitution resembles the

The way

with French antecedents can be

Islamic content has been injected into provisions

illustrated

by comparing the treatment of national

sovereignty in article 56 of the Iranian constitution with article 3 of the French constitution.

The French

version establishes that sovereignty rests

on

the will of the

people as expressed through referendums and enjoins interference with the exercise

of popular sovereignty. shall exercise this

No

It

which means of referendums.

begins: "'National sovereign ty belongs to the people,

sovereignty through

its

representatives by

section of the people, nor any individual,

may

attribute to themselves or himself

"The article 56

the exercise thereof." In chapter 5 of the Iranian constitution under the heading

Right of National Sovereignty and the Powers Derived from

It"

one

sees in

the Islamizcd version of the same provision, in which the theological tenet that

God

is

ference

the

—

Supreme Ruler

this

is

inserted

and the French provisions enjoining

time with Divine Sovereignty

— have

inter-

been incongruously retained:

THE FUNDAMENTALIST IMPACT

AND THE SUDAN

IN IRAN, PAKISTAN. 119

"Absolute sovereignty over the world and mankind

mined the

of human beings. None

social destiny

from another person or make use of it to serve

Wanting to

it

is

shall take

away

this

God-given right

his special personal or

group

interests."

of the Iranian

exercised bv the people via referendums and the idea that

the exclusive province of the deitv has been rendered

is

incongruity remains: there in a

alone has deter-

to article 59, bv which placement the clash between the idea

that national sovereigntv

dums

He

God's and

retain the provision for popular referendums, the authors

constitution relegated

sovereignty

is

is

no room

less

obvious.

The

for popular sovereigntv exercised via referen-

system based on the theological premise of divine

rule,

which

at the

very

should mean that God's laws are binding and not subject to modification bv anv

least

human

agency, such as popular referendums involve.

A similar

pattern of borrowing Western constitutional principles and then modithem can be seen in chapter 3 of the Iranian constitution, where there arc

fying

provisions for rights principles that are of Western derivation but with Islamic qualifications

man

added to circumscribe them. Thus, for example,

rights, a

article

20 provides

for hu-

Western concept, but Islamizes them bv indicating that thev are to be

enjoved "according to Islamic standards." Again, there

is

a resultant incongruity, since

the philosophv of human rights precludes curbing rights bv reference to the standards

of a particular

religion.

Even though the making of laws via human agency is barred under traditional Islamic legal theory, according to which all laws are to be found in and derived from the Islamic sources, Iran's Islamic constitution provided for in article 58,

lawmaking bv the Majlis

and laws continued to be enacted by the Majlis

just as they

had been

under the shah.

The law

in

Iranian approach to legislation thus differed markedly

from the approach to

Saudi Arabia, where, in deference to Islamic tradition, there was

man-made law 15 Avatollah Khomeini seems similar system

of

jurists' law, asserting in

officially

no

to have originally aspired to return to a

1970

in a speech:

"The

entire system

of

government and administration, together with the necessary laws, lies readv for vou. There is no need for vou, after establishing a government, to sit down and draw up laws, or, like rulers after

to

draw up

lines

who

others to borrow

worship foreigners and are infatuated with the West, run

their laws. Everything

ministerial programs."

16

is

ready and waiting. All that remains

However, modern

legal institutions

proved firmly rooted and survived the Islamic revolution largely

The

ultimate guarantee that laws

would be in conformity with the Shari'a lay in would be supreme, overriding not only anv

4

laws in conflict with

but even the constitution

clerics

on

on Western

intact.

that Islamic law

the provision in article it

is

the Council of Guardians

itself.

The

article also

would make the decisions

represented the achievement of a goal of Iran's clerics,

who had

provided that

in this regard.

This

been determined to

ensure that there would be effective clerical review of proposed legislation in order to ensure conformity with Shari'a requirements. In practice, the Council of Guardians reviewed and invalidated proposed laws with

such stringency and zeal that acute embarrassment resulted

at

times for the govern-

ment. For example, economic reforms such as land reform laws enacted by the Majlis

Ann Elizabeth Mayer 120

were needed to

support of the poorer

retain the political

classes

but were repeatedly

by the Council of Guardians on the grounds that thev violated Islamic law.

nullified

For nine years Khomeini avoided challenging these "Islamic" vctos of legislation that the regime

deemed

politically essential.

1988 that the Islamic

Muhammad — and

Prophet

However, Khomeini

on 7 January power enjoyed by the adopt such measures as it deemed nec-

had absolute power

state

was permitted to

—

finally ruled

the

like

essary for the interests of the Islamic state even where these might conflict with Islamic

law or a fundamental

religious obligation like the

pilgrimage

to

Mecca} 7 This ruling

seemed to mean that measures passed by the Majlis and acceptable to the faqih would henceforth go into effect even

if

the Guardians believed that thev contravened the

requirements of the Shari'a. This ruling proved that fundamentalists were not actually

concerned with restoring Shari'a law per

commitment was talists' political

stood

in the

the Iranian experience showed, the

way of programs

that served the fundamentalists' d'etat

were

officially

the implementation of Islamic law.

1989 attempted to

deal with this

A constitutional

Council of Guardians.

18

Since the

own

between

what

they

officially

committed to

amendment adopted on 28

new

conflicts occurred

July

council's

between the Majlis and the

members were

to be appointed by the

seemed unlikely that they would be disposed to contradict

early to say

when

political interests.

problem bv endorsing the establishment of a council

would mediate and consult when it

fundamen-

permitted to override Islamic

This was, ultimately, embarrassing for a government

criteria.

faqih,

As

agendas. Conversely, Shari'a rules could be discounted

Thus, considerations of raison

that

se.

actually to reinstate Shari'a rules insofar as they served

his views. It

is

too

role the council will actually be able to play in resolving conflicts

legislation

and Shari'a law, but

its

establishment suggests that the position

of the Council of Guardians has been downgraded.

How Successful Has Islamization Been? In terms of the scope of Islamization measures that have been formally enacted into law,

it is

in Iran that the fundamentalists

ization has

gone

government

far

itself

enough

there that

have enjoyed their greatest successes. Islam-

it is

destined to have a long-term impact.

The

has been reconstituted, and the constitution rewritten to institu-

and the supremacy of Islamic law (however

tionalize clerical authority

it

might be

interpreted). In the 1980s and early 1990s fundamentalist clerics were firmly en-

sconced

in

powerful positions and dominated the country's

legal system.

Laws were

enacted that embodied the fundamentalists' policies of combating the erosion of the traditional social structure

and value system. Even

to enforce Islamic morality

was relaxed somewhat,

if

the application of criminal laws

as

it

appeared to be

in

1991, the

impact of these laws on Iranian society remained considerable. Pre-revolution advances in women's status were rolled back, the 1967 Family Protection Act repealed,

and

women

relegated to subservient roles caring for their husbands and children.

The

Baha'i religion has been virtually persecuted out of existence in Iran. 19

At the same time, there have been detrimental side effects of fundamentalist policies that were not intended bv the policymakers. In the wake of official efforts to confine

women

to domestic roles and encouraged by the regime's initial pronatalist

THE FUNDAMENTALIST IMPACT

IN IRAN, PAKISTAN,

AND THE SUDAN

121

policies, the birthrate

soared to 3.9 percent a vear.

The population growth became so

alarming that in 1990 fears were being publicly expressed

in official circles that

it

could pose an obstacle to Iran's development. In a dramatic reversal, the regime began to support birth control measures.

from the mass exodus of highlv trained professionals and technocrats By 1989 there was

drain resulting

who were

Another obstacle to development was the brain

alienated by the fundamentalist policies of the regime.

growing evidence essential to

woo

that leaders

of the regime

felt

back members of the educated

that a policv of liberalization

elite

from

exile.

was

In hopes of attracting

foreign investment and trade from Europe and Japan, a major project for a free-trade

zone on

Qcshm

ment

February of 1990, despite conservatives' vocal opposition to the plan for

in

Island at the entrance to the Persian

granting foreigners on

of pragmatism,

Qcshm exemptions from

was possible to hear

it

"To

openlv

in Parliament:

reality.

The more freedom we provide

tract." 20

Thus, to

install

attract badly

Gulf was approved bv the

Parlia-

Iranian law. In the prevailing climate

a cleric, Hojjatulislam

Hassan Ruhani, say

on Qeshm is in contradiction with investors, the more of them we can at-

Islamic codes for

needed foreign

capital, the

the application of its version of Islamic law. Ironicallv, this

regime was prepared to

meant

lift

replicating the kind

of scheme of extraterritorial treatment for foreign nationals that had been negotiated bv Americans under the shah, which Avatollah Khomeini had excoriated

in a

famous

speech in 1964 as the work of traitors. 21 Moreover, there were even some indications

of official sentiment favoring Iran's clerics

liberalization

of the veiling requirements for women. 22

remain uneasv with Iranian nationalism, which has been generallv

espoused bv secular-minded politicians and interests.

The

late

shah gave

alism, since his version

intellectuals

unsympathetic to

Iran's clerics special reasons for

clerical

opposing Iranian nation-

of Iranian nationalism sought to revive pride in

Iran's pre-

Islamic heritage as a means of denigrating the Islamic contribution to Iranian culture.

In consequence, clerics have at various points since the revolution advocated measures like

destroving the ancient ruins at Persepolis, banning the distinctive Iranian

(New That

is,

clerical

which survived the revolution, did so despite and fundamentalist antipathy to aspects of Iranian nationalism. 23 The failure Iran's character as a nation-state,

of the fundamentalists to carrv out tional identity

and

the great resistance

and proud of their

The

Iranian

setting

from

up

their plans for eradicating a separate Iranian na-

a supranational polity

Iranians,

who

are for the

on

a religious basis

most part profoundly

was due to nationalistic

distinctive culture.

model has not been emulated by other

fundamentalists, the Islamic Republic of Iran it

Nowruz

Year) celebrations as pagan, and promoting Arabic as a replacement for Persian.

is

countries. In the eyes of

many

a failure as an Islamic polity, because

has a specific, Iranian national character. Islamic fundamentalists, including

some

in

Iran, have tended to favor the concept that in Islam the only legitimate political entity is

the

umma, or community of believers, and

inherently un-Islamic.

One of the

issues that

ing of the constitution was whether or not

that the nation-state

and nationalism

had proved contentious during the it

was permissible

are

draft-

for a self-proclaimed

Islamic state to have a national territory, a national language, and citizenship require-

ments

like

those of other nation-states. Although the

final

version of the Iranian con-

Ann Elizabeth Mayer 122

stitution

affirms

Iran's

persisted in challenging

The but

is

Islamic fundamentalists have

character as a nation-state, its

legitimacy.

Iranian fundamentalist version of Islam

not an inclusive, ecumenical one

is

fraught with distinctive Twelver Shi'ite characteristics, and this bias in favor of

Twelver Shi'ism may eventually have an untoward the Sunni Baluchis, Kurds, and

Turkomans

bias has sharplv limited the appeal

of

on the

effect

political lovalties

inside Iran. Outside Iran this

Iran's Islamic revolution,

same

which was

of

Shi'ite

originally

intended to be a model that would be emulated throughout the Muslim world but

which has inspired scant emulation except

in

Twelver

Shi'ite

communities

in places

Lebanon.

like

Future Prospects

The

fortunes of fundamentalism in Iran will be stronglv affected bv which factions

are ultimatelv successful in the

power

struggles that ensued after Khomeini's death.

1990 and 1991

Politically active clerics in

differed significantly in the degree to

which

they were actually committed to the fundamentalist cause.

Before the Rushdie figures in the

affair

of February 1989 there were indications that powerful

government were readv to adopt more moderate and conciliatorv

toward the opposition and the West and

cies

that they

fundamentalist extremism. 24 After the Rushdie

affair

had become disenchanted with

exploded, the moderate Ayatol-

Hossein Ali Montazeri, long Khomeini's chosen successor, came under

lah

was

finally

obliged to resign on 28

March

after

poli-

siege.

He

being attacked for having criticized

government repression and for urging toleration of dissent. These manifestations of liberal

sympathies led Montazeri to be characterized

as

one

who had moved away

from the Islamic system. 25

The June 1989 death of Avatollah Khomeini

placed the viability of his concept of

No

successor of equivalent prestige and

governance bv the leading

jurist in jeopardv.

charisma was available to serve as faqih. After the disgrace of Avatollah Montazeri his elimination from the succession, no distinguished, high ranking clerics remained who could be trusted to follow Khomeini's political line. Articles 107 and 109 of the constitution were amended in Julv of 1989 to downgrade the requirements

and

for serving the office of faqih in order to

eminent

less

cleric

accommodate Avatollah AJi Khamene'i,

a far

than Avatollah Khomeini had been. In the aftermath of these

changes, the importance of the office of faqih seemed destined to dwindle.

amendments adopted minister and concentrated power in the Constitutional

in July

of 1989 eliminated the

office

presidency, a secular office, even

of prime

though cur-

rently occupied by a cleric. Hojjatulislam Ali

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was

win

1989. Rafsanjani's subsequent consoli-

a

pro forma election

as president in July

dation of his power signaled at least a temporary victory by

a relatively

able to

moderate and

pragmatic faction in the government at the expense of the fundamentalist hard-liners.

The

original Islamic

transformed into a

Under

scheme of government seemed to be

mundane

in the process

of being

presidential one.

the leadership of President Rafsanjani

significantlv liberalized in the political,

it

seems that

Iran's policies are

economic, and social domains.

One

being

suspects

THE FUNDAMENTALIST IMPACT

AND THE SUDAN

IN IRAN, PAKISTAN. 123

that, if

he did not have to fear a backlash from militant fundamentalist forces and

own

could follow his

toward

women

ing

moving even

personal inclinations, Rafsanjani might be

move

liberalization. In a brave

for a cleric, he has supported the idea

greater freedoms and participation in public

life

faster

of allow-

and the professions than

thev enjoved under Khomeini. 26

Like Prime Minister

Nawaz

Sharif of Pakistan, Rafsanjani seems to have

little

personal enthusiasm for the cultural dimensions of Islamization and appears primarily

concerned with bold reforms to end

his country's economic deterioration and to promote rapid development along free-market lines. 2 " This liberalization program entails improving Iran's relations with Europe and Japan and institutions like the IMF, which in turn necessitate hewing to a moderate political line. The trends justified a tentative conclusion that under President Rafsanjani and the pragmatists allied with him, and in the face of overwhelming need to extricate the countrv from an economic morass,

the fundamentalist impulse faded in the earlv 1990s level,

where

it

would shape

politics, laws,

—

the governmental

at least at

and the constitution.

Pakistan

The Goals ofIslamization In Pakistan

one goal of President

an

unifying ideology and to mine

official,

fundamentalism

is

in Pakistan

Zia's Islamization it

program was to

as a source

identity. Since

used, in Marty's words, "for setting boundaries, for attracting one's

kind and alienating other kinds, for demarcating," one sees

would

establish Islam as

of national

why

Zia's

government

adopt an ideology linked to a fundamentalist version of Islam.

Unlike Iran, a nation with roots in antiquity where today Persian culture

is

disseminated and the Persian majority has a strong cultural identity, Pakistan

and

artificial entitv,

dating onlv from 1947. Pakistan's identity as a nation

being defined against the

map of India,

where Muslims outnumbered Hindus

is

out of which two areas were carved

in a last-minute

widely

is

a

new

negative,

in regions

compromise agreement worked

out bv the departing British colonizers. Domestically, Pakistan's leaders have had to

cope with chronic regional

common

rivalries

ethnic or linguistic bonds

1971 civil war ominous demonstration of the

and

that resulted in the loss

and to create elements of

ongoing

identity

crisis.

28

One

different

groups

of East Pakistan,

fragile nature

Islamization in Pakistan can be seen as a polity

fissiparous tendencies caused

among

of the

polity.

by a lack of

in the population.

now

Against this background,

program designed to

reinforce an unstable

a shared culture for a nation that suffers

can see parallels between the

The

Bangladesh, was an

official

from an

espousal of Islamic

fundamentalism and the government's campaign launched in the early 1980s to spread the use of Urdu at the expense of the regional languages spoken by most Pakistanis

and

its

insistence that bureaucrats

wear uniform

attire that

was

officially

designated

"national dress." 29

The

various players in the program also had specific agendas.

From

President Zia's

standpoint, a central aim of Islamization was to provide legitimation for his protracted

Ann Elizabeth Mayer 124

military dictatorship.

Bhutto

in

Having overthrown the

government of Zulfikar

elected

Ali

1977, Zia badly needed a justification for his repeated rebuffs to popular

demands for a return to democracy. Zia, himself a devout Sunni whose personal pietv was respected even by his foes, found in the Islamization campaign an ideal pretext for retaining power. Since the goal of achieving Islamization proved conveniently elusive,

when demands

for a return to

democracy became embarrassingly loud, Zia

was able to counter that he could not relinquish power, because the goal of Islamization

had not been

fully realized. 30

Via Islamization, Zia forged

with Sunni

alliances

clerics

and fundamentalist

groups. Very active and militant Sunni fundamentalist groups operate in Pakistan, including the Jamaat-i-Islami.

Though

originally

stan, since they believed the nation-state

opposed to the formation of

Paki-

incompatible with Islam, Sunni fundamen-

like Maududi later decided to participate in Pakistan's political life. Thev hoped to gain enough power to implement their program of reimposing the Shari'a, which had been displaced by Anglo-Muhammadan law and British law during the period of British imperial rule. However, in Pakistan's occasional democratic electalists

tions, fundamentalist

groups

like

Maududi's Jamaat-i-Islami consistently made poor

showings. 31

From Zia,

who made common

the standpoint of the Sunni fundamentalists

one goal was to exploit

creasing their

own

courts, the schools,

their alliance with

him

to

cause with

expand opportunities for

in-

participation in important institutions like the government, the

and the media. In return

program, Zia gave them

much more

for their

endorsement of his Islamization

significant roles than they

had been able to win

previously. It is

worth remarking

that, in contrast to Iran, the

hotbed of Shi'ite fundamental-

ism, in Pakistan the large Shi'ite minority tended to be liberal, progressive, and bitterly

from

opposed to fundamentalism. Some of the most vigorous criticism of Zia came Shi'ite clerics. Benazir Bhutto's mother was a Shi'ite, and her opposition party

was able to form

alliances

with

Shi'ite forces.

the revered founder of Pakistan,

was himself

Quaid-i-Azam

Mohammad

Ali Jinnah,

a Shi'ite. Like other Pakistani liberals,

Jinnah envisaged Pakistan as a basically secular political entity. In contrast, Sunni fundamentalists have argued that religion

is

the sole raison d'etre for Pakistan and that

whole purpose of establishing Pakistan was to enable Muslims from the subcontinent to live under a government constituted according to Islamic principles and a the

society governed bv Islamic law. 32

Taking a page from the fundamentalist agenda, Zia sought to have the 1973 constitution

of Pakistan replaced bv an Islamic one. Naturally, Zia insisted on

tution that

would

ratify

his hold on power. However,

this goal

a consti-

of producing an

was never achieved. All proposed drafts proved problematic, and became obvious that adopting anv version of an Islamic constitution was likely to cause such dissension and division that it would be politicallv counterproductive. InIslamic constitution

it

stead, Pakistani Islamization in

on

what remained

basically a

meant die reinstatement of various

common

specific Islamic rules

law system. The greatest emphasis was placed

reviving Islamic rules in the area of criminal law, preserving morality, and imple-

THE FUNDAMENTALIST IMPACT

IN IRAN. PAKISTAN.

AND THE SUDAN

125

meriting

some changes

in tax

and banking law designed to eliminate certain features

deemed objectionable by proponents of tional system

cated,

and

Islamic economics. In addition, the educa-

was reformed to ensure that Islam was studied and Islamic values

clerics

were accorded higher professional standing and

incul-

a greater role in the

legal system. 33

had ambitions to

Pakistan's fundamentalists also

halt the progress

of female eman-

more and more Pakistani women abandoned housebound roles, obtained higher educations, and moved into desirable professional and government jobs. While feminist ideas circulated among members of the elite, a backlash emerged among fundamentalists, who insisted that the traditional cipation. Fundamentalists

patriarchal order

women

had been outraged

as

had been divinely ordained and sought to use Islamic law to relegate

to a segregated

and subjugated

status. 34

As

will

be discussed, several factors

limited their successes.

A ate

prime goal of the fundamentalists was to promote measures that would humili-

and discredit members of the

large

Ahmadi

minority. This Islamic sect had long

been excoriated by Pakistan's fundamentalists for what they saw

orthodox

beliefs,

and Maududi and

his followers

had engaged

as the

9

Ahmadis un-

in intense

propaganda

campaigns against the Ahmadis. 35 So intense had pressures grown for anti-Ahmadi measures that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, no

make

a gesture to

declared to be non-Muslims via an

officially

Zia, the

real friend to

fundamentalism, had decided to

appease the anti-Ahmadi sentiment in 1974 by having Ahmadis

government winked

additional stigmas were

at

amendment

Under

to the constitution.

harassment of Ahmadis bv fundamentalist groups, and

imposed on them by

a

1984 law forbidding them to

call

themselves Muslims or their religion Islam, to use Islamic terminology, to use the Islamic call to prayer, to

version of Islam.

Under

call their

this

places

of worship mosques, or to propagate

their

law they became subject to criminal penalties for any

conduct that "outrages" the religious feelings of a Muslim, making the subjective reactions of Muslims the

gauge for what constituted

be condemned to fines and ensued. 36

The

jail.

intrusive nature

a crime for

which Ahmadis could

Criminal prosecutions and convictions of Ahmadis

of the anti-Ahmadi campaign was shown when

a

group

of Ahmadis were arrested and faced criminal charges for the offense of holding prayer meeting in a private home.

3

a

"

How Islamization Was Pursued In Pakistan, President Zia was able to set the parameters of Islamization.

pragmatic and cautious

man whose

ultimate concern was holding

on

He was

a

to power. Al-

seems that he was genuinely committed to Islamization, he did not let his enthusiasm for Islamization lure him into attempting drastic or sudden changes until

though

it

shortly before his death. In

May

of 1988 Zia dissolved Parliament and dismissed

government, alleging that there had been

a failure to

followed by the sudden issuance of a presidential decree embodying a dramatic Islamization initiative

would have nullified.

on 15 lune 1988 according

to guided by Islamic law and

This Islamic

all

his

push for Islamization. This was

to

which

all

government

new

policies

laws contravening Islamic law were to be

Law Enforcement Ordinance was

apparently designed to im-

Ann Elizabeth Mayer 126

plcmcnt Islamic law across the board under

clerical

supervision and to

make

all

laws,

including the constitution, subordinate to the Shari'a, as had been provided in article

4 of the Iranian

institutional creditors,

constitution.

To

avoid problems with foreign aid donors and

one exception was made for international economic and

in-

vestment agreements. This Islamization decree was vigorously denounced by Pakistanis representing

demands

resisting

seems

tution. It

of the

political

spectrum,

who saw

reluctantly scheduled for the

on the grounds

Shari'a. 38 Zia's left it

a

dead

that

as a fresh pretext for

decree was prompted bv Zia's fears of

women

upcoming

elec-

autumn; he may have planned to

most formidable oppo-

exploit "Islamic" criteria to disqualify Benazir Bhutto, Zia's

nent,

it

of democracy and for undermining the consti-

for the restoration

likelv that the

had

tions that he

parts

all

serving in high political office contravened the

death on 17 August 1988, before the decree had been formally

ratified,

letter.

Prior to the June decree, Islamization measures had been officially adopted onlv after consultative processes

and input from groups that Zia

felt

the need to conciliate.

Thus, even though he ruled under martial law from 1977 through 1985 and sus-

pended

all

constitutional rights and freedoms in this period, Zia did not rush the

Islamization process and took

some

were well prepared and

consequences weighed before actually implementing

their

pains to ensure that his Islamization proposals

them. The bureaucratic machinery for carrying them out was considered, as well. Through gradual, piecemeal enactments over several years, laws embodying some fundamentalist policies were extended to

made when

promises were

many areas without great disruption. Commade reforms inadvisable. As it turned

political realities

out, Zia's cautious approach to Islamization provoked disillusionment

some uncompromising fundamentalists, who objected

on

the part of

to Zia's measures as half-

hearted and inadequate.

Although

was not

as

Zia's

regime engaged in repression and censorship of

brutally or comprehensively quelled

within limits, express

critical

it

was

in Iran,

its

foes, dissent

and Pakistanis could,

opinions. Civil society survived in the face of military

dictatorship. Cynical assessments

educated

as

elite, liberals, leftists,

of

and

Zia's Islamic laws

secularists,

who

were made by members of the

never accepted the validity of the

premises of the Islamization program. Occasional public salvos at the Islamization

program were was enough

by courageous

fired

political

room

for

clerics, journalists, lawyers,

maneuver

protests over Islamization measures in for Zia,

inhibited

who had

for the opposition

ways that constituted

to be careful of running afoul

him from attempting

radical

change

—

and

political

of aid donors

at least until

politicians.

on occasion

There

to register

embarrassments

in the West.

This

June of 1988.

Zia tried to circumvent the concerns for legality on the part of the bar and the judiciary in Pakistan a

major role

in

bv exploiting the martial law regime and allowing militarv courts

implementing "Islamic

justice,"

which enabled the

justice

system to

get around the niceties of due process. Harsh penalties like flogging were often im-

posed bv militarv courts. 39 In contrast, the regular courts were disinclined to order floggings,

much

less

amputations and stonings. The regular courts remained

relatively

strong and independent institutions, and there were instances in which Pakistan's

THE FUNDAMENTALIST [MPACT

IN IRAN, PAKISTAN.

AND THE SUDAN

127

courts agreed with lawyers

who

brought cases challenging the

justifications for certain

Islamization measures. Political prudence therefore dictated that the

more extreme

fundamentalist initiatives be abandoned or watered down.

Members of the Islamization,

large Shite minority

which embodied

to Pakistani Shi'ites. In July of

of hundreds of thousands

in

were

especially

vehement

in their attacks

on

Sunni fundamentalist perspective that was anathema

a

1980 the

Shi'itc

minority mustered a demonstration

Islamabad that forced the government to revise an

Is-

lamic tax measure that was particularly offensive to the Shi'itc community, conflicting as

it

did with a central tenet of their jurisprudence.

The

relations

between the Sunni

majority and Shi'itc minority deteriorated sharply under Zia's rule due to frictions

between the two

were traceable to the Sunni

sects that

of the Islamization

bias

campaign. 40 Zia was also confronted bv organized opposition from women's groups

when he

sought to implement the fundamentalist agenda affecting their rights and Feminists had

regime for

a

much

to oppose, since fundamentalist groups kept pressuring the Zia

wide range of curbs on women's

Islamic Ideology (CII),

one of the

rights

and freedoms. 41 The Council of

institutions entrusted

by Zia with the formulation

of Islamization measures, was one of the targets of feminist mentality of CII

members can be seen

in a leading

was ostensibly circulated by the CII to survey role:

"To

women

satisfy their

own

lusts

in

ire.

An

illustration

of the

question on a questionnaire that

Pakistanis' views

on women's proper

westernised individuals in Pakistan want to bring

out of their homes and make them the center of attraction

gation of Islamic instructions. ties in

status.

They wish

addition to family responsibilities.

in society in ne-

on women economic responsibiliIn your opinion, what weakness will result

to thrust

an Islamic society because of this unnatural approach?" 42 phrasing illustrates how the CII served to spread women belonged in a domestic role. A number of directed at women were enacted that were informed by the

The message embodied

in this

the fundamentalists' view that

discriminatory measures

fundamentalist philosophy.

The government

also gave fundamentalists access to the

media, which thev used to broadcast claims that Westernized

women

were the source

of decadence and immorality and that sexual segregation was essential for the preservation of virtue. However, fear of the embarrassment that women's groups kept the regime from adopting Islamization measures that too blatantly conflicted with national Pakistani

human

rights norms.

women

For example, while sharply curtailing the

inter-

ability

of

to participate in international sporting events pursuant to funda-

mentalist claims that female athletes' participation in public sports violated Islamic

norms of modesty, the government prudently decided participation in sports lest Pakistan be classified with ticing discrimination,

which could have

to enact

no law barring female

South Africa

led to Pakistan's

as a

country prac-

male athletes being barred

from international competitions.

The kind of bad protests in

Lahore

in

women

resorted to public

February of 1983 to denounce a proposed law on evidence,

woman's testimony to be devalued in relation to a man's. These and the rough treatment meted out to the women protesters by the police

which allowed protests

publicity the regime feared occurred as

a

Ann Elizabeth Mayer 128

were reported

in the international press.

Although the evidence law was enacted

in

1984, the regime was chastened by the feminists' response. Thus, certain proposals

new

for

laws, such as

killings the value

one that would have reinstated the Sharif

of a woman's

life

was to be

calculated as being

rule that in cases of worth one-half that

of a man's, were never actually enacted, despite strong support from fundamentalists. Attempts by the fundamentalists to prohibit "un-Islamic"

— foundered

in the face

who came from backgrounds

in

women from

wearing

saris

— allegedlv

of adamant resistance from Pakistani matrons

which wearing the

sari

was dc rigueur for married

women. 43 In terms of practical consequences, Islamization

had more impact

in policies

man-

dating an expanded role for clerics in the court system; in laws and regulations mandating religious instruction in schools and revising textbooks in accordance with Islamic standards; in the extensive restructuring of the operations of financial institutions to eliminate interest charges;

ment of the law on

and

in

changes

in the tax

system after the enact-

zakat, or alms tax. 44

How Successful Has Islamization Been? While Zia was goals,

taking. it

alive, Pakistan's

fundamentalists, though not able to achieve

all

their

had reason to be pleased with the general direction developments had been

However,

Zia's Islamization

program may have

better served his interests than

did the cause of fundamentalism. For Zia, Islamization offered a pretext for per-

petuating his militarv rule and refusing to allow freely contested elections on a partv

which Bhutto's Pakistan People's Parry would have been sure to emerge But for fundamentalists the linkage of the fundamentalist program to

basis, in

victorious. 45

Zia's continuation in office

meant

that their victories

cancellation with any change in regime. This

Islamic constitution adopted that

had

won

would have

might be

was due to

illusorv, subject to

their inabilitv to get a

new

institutionalized the political gains they

with Zia's support.

Perhaps the single most grievous failure of the fundamentalists was their inabilitv

would have demoted women to an inferior and subjugated status. They failed to obtain legislation to repeal the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961, which had introduced modest reforms improving the rights of women in the familv and which fundamentalists condemned as a contravention of the Shari'a. Thev were also thwarted in their objectives of preventing women from working outside the home and of removing them from government jobs. The fundato get laws enacted like those in Iran that

mentalist campaign against

women's

rights

had the unintended

effect

of provoking

counterpropaganda that offered feminist interpretations of the Islamic sources and

arguments that the fundamentalist model of women's role was being shaped bv

reac-

tionarv interests and a retrograde clerical mentality, not by the true Islam of the

Qur'an and the Prophet. 46

One

reason for the fundamentalists' failures in this area was that Pakistan's govern-

ment was dominated bv

militarv officers

and high-ranking members of the

bureaucracy. In these strata female participation in society and the

norm, and

women commonlv obtained

work

civil service

force

was the

higher educations. In this regard the members

THE FUNDAMENTALIST IMPACT

IN IRAN. PAKISTAN.

AND THE SUDAN

129

of the Zia regime were very different from the postrevolutionarv

clerical elite in Iran,

whose wives and female relatives seem to have accepted the chador (the black veil Iranian women must wear), seclusion, and loss of freedoms that thev had enjoyed under the shah with

little, if

of women,

anv, protest. Thus, with regard to the status

the goals of the fundamentalist

allies

of the militarv regime seem to have been

with the attitudes of the militarv and bureaucratic

elite,

at

odds

which mav account for manv

of the fundamentalist plans for curbing women's rights being thwarted.

As the

election of Benazir

Bhutto proved

in

1988, the fundamentalists after enjov-

ing twelve vears of official sponsorship had not succeeded in adequatelv shaping public

a

attitudes via their

woman from

propaganda on the proper

Bhutto, a vigorous critic especiallv

abominated

homemaking and

men

role for

acceding to the prime minister's

women

in societv to forestall

To make

office.

matters worse,

of Islamization, embodied evervthing the fundamentalists

— she studied

in the

West, refused to

child care, espoused leftist policies,

and

settle

insisted

down

to a

life

of

on competing with

in the political arena.

Future Prospects

wav for the first relativelv free elections held in Paki1977 coup. Running on a secular platform, a woman who had attacked Zia's Islamization program emerged the winner. Benazir Bhutto, long Zia's most prominent political opponent, was able to win more votes than any other candidate and to become prime minister in December of 1988. This suggested that Zia's unwillingness to allow democratic elections had been based on a well-founded apprehension that his Islamization program had shallow popular support. Candidates who ran President Zia's death paved the

stan since his

on fundamentalist platforms immediately after Zia's death generallv Benazir Bhutto's strongest opponent was the Punjabi industrialist Na-

in the elections

fared poorlv.

waz

Sharif, a friend

of the powerful military forces overseeing the election and the

leading candidate pledged to continue Zia's policies. Sharif did in

less

well than Bhutto

1988, even though the circumstances were advantageous for him, since opposi-

tional political activitv

with

ties

to the military

During her tenure

had been was

in

in office,

restricted for over a

power during the

that she

had

elections.

Bhutto demonstrated

chronic political instability and did not

manage

criticized while in opposition.

decade and a caretaker regime

little

capacity to cure Pakistan's

to roll back the Islamization measures

While trying to

find her political footing,

Bhutto seemed to fear risking an attempt to repeal Islamic laws, which could have provided her conservative opponents with a fresh issue to use against her. Given the exacerbated religious sensitivities stirred up by violent anti-Rushdie agitation encour-

aged by her

political foes at the

time she became prime minister, which continued

47 into 1990, she had reason to proceed with great caution.

As months passed without

constructive initiatives,

many of Bhutto's

porters professed disenchantment over her inability to define and that

would address the fundamental problems

erstwhile sup-

promote programs

facing her troubled country.

to take effective measures to end the turmoil and rising crime rate in her ince of Sind

was

also held against her. Exasperation

Her failure

home

prov-

was commonly expressed over her

Ann Elizabeth Mayer 130

of egregious patterns of corruption that allegedly surrounded her, and her husband was rumored to have profited spectacularly bv exploiting his connection to toleration

his

powerful spouse. The exalted hopes originally entertained by Pakistanis that a

would bring progress on

return to democracy

the economic front, social justice, and

peace seem to have been dashed by Bhutto's lackluster performance at a time

when

wise and forceful leadership was desperately needed.

Bhutto herself was abruptly dismissed from

The move was

dent.

on

officially justified

on 6 August 1990 by

office

the grounds that her

the presi-

government had been

corrupt and nepotistic, but she claimed that her dismissal was a disguised military

coup mounted by the

foes

of democracy. While many charges were leveled against her

and criminal prosecutions of her family were threatened,

government had not substantiated

24 October 1990

claims.

its

state

of two years

later the

national elections under a cloud, not having had anv chance to clear

herself in a court of law of the charges

The low

as

Meanwhile, Bhutto had to contest the

made

against her and her family.

voter turnout seems to have resulted from the disillusioned and apathetic

of the

Amid charges of vote-rigging, Bhutto's partv was able to win won by the loose eight-party coalition known as the Islamic

electorate.

only 45 seats to the 105

Democratic Alliance. 48 ter's office,

the military.

made mean relied ists

Of the

The disappointing

easier for the military

it

three alliance leaders contending for the prime minis-

the one chosen to lead the

government was Nawaz

results

and

Sharif, the favorite

of

of the restoration of democracy seem to have

their civilian allies to reassert control.

But

will this

the revival of a military and fundamentalist coalition along the lines of the one

on by

Zia?

It is

possible that

Nawaz

Sharif made his alliance with fundamental-

only for reasons of political expediency.

To

date

remains unclear whether Prime

it

Minister Sharif will actively pursue a fundamentalist program or accord the face of the

enormous problems he

worsening economic Zia, he cannot count

priority in

faces in dealing with Pakistan's dramatically

plight, the crisis in

on the United

it

Kashmir, and the country's other

ills.

Unlike

him out or prop him up, because dwindling U.S. interest in the Afghan conflict

States to bail

improving U.S. -Soviet relations and a

have led to a decrease in Pakistan's strategic value.

On

11 April 1991,

when he introduced

Act 1991, to make Shari'a law supreme

his

own

reportedly told a joint session of Parliament, "I

avowal could have been prompted by talism should further

damage

bill,

in Pakistan,

fears lest

his ties to the

am

the Enforcement of Shari'a

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif not

a fundamentalist." 49

This

an association with Islamic fundamen-

United

States,

which had already been

hurt bv the American assessment that Pakistan's nuclear program was, contrary to official assurances,

aimed

at

developing nuclear weapons. However, the evidence sug-

gests that he did not have a fundamentalist mentality. In his

campaigns to

attract

Western investment, he has tried to downplay Islamization and present himself to the

American business community

as a pragmatic, technocratic

pro-business, free-market orientation. 50 private law, the his

bill

calling for legislation to

It

seems

implement

likely that,

reformer with a strong given the existence of a

a fundamentalist version

of Shari'a

prime minister simply decided to preempt such proposals by putting forward

own scheme

for Islamization,

one that he could control and that would not unduly

)

THE FUNDAMENTALIST IMPACT

IN IRAN, PAKISTAN,

AND THE SUDAN

131

interfere with the

conduct of

economic reform measures,

his

his efforts to attract

foreign investment, and his relations with international financial and aid institutions.

In this connection, all

it is

noteworthy that section 18 of his

of Pakistan's international

economic system

native

is

financial obligations shall

evolved."

(One

bill specifically

remain binding

provides that

an

"till

suspects that alternative system

alter-

may be

a

very long time in coming.

Many

of the proposals

President Zia

in

Nawaz

Sharif's

— Islamization of education

bill

resemble measures pursued under

and the economy, promotion of Islamic

and the eradication of obscenity, immorality, and

values in the media,

provisions of the law were

how

vice. Crucial

vague and abstract to allow the government

left sufficiently

would be hard

to

determine exactly what kind of action would be required to comply with section

5,

great leeway in deciding

implement them. For example,

to

it

U A11

Muslim citizens of Pakistan shall order their lives according to Members of religious parties in the Parliament denounced the bill as inadequate and "diluted," and they called for a constitutional amendment to make the

which provides the Sharif."

Shari'a the

One

supreme

law. 51

got a sense of Prime Minister Sharif's mindset from the highly discursive and

frequently repetitive speech he gave introducing his Shari'a

bill.

52

The prime

minister

rambled, seeming uncomfortable talking about exactly what he envisaged Islamization

would mean, repeatedly bringing up topics like

rampant corruption,

and the

Pakistan's indebtedness,

returning was the trating

on

meet

on

economic

Islamization.

the

ills

He

arms, arrogant bureaucrats, delay in the courts,

of poverty.

his

own

Shari'a

more extreme

his

private

bill

issues to

which he kept

had been diverted from concen-

and development problems to deal with the

lamented

that, "while the

comments,

was not only

bill

One of the

that

the challenges [of] the twenty-first century,

of progress." 53 In the light of

ward

evils

his Shari'a bill only to switch rapidly to other

amount of time and energy

Pakistan's

rent debates

illegal

a

it

we

are

world

still

is

recurfast

to

to decide our direction

seems probable that

move designed

marching

his putting for-

to forestall the enactment of

but also an attempt to end the divisive conflicts over

Islamization measures that had been absorbing the attention of the government and to refocus attention

need to

on remedies

for Pakistan's dire

economic plight and the urgent

revitalize the private sector.

A more sinister theme

in the

prime minister's speech

lay in his reiterated threats

of

punishment for the vague crime of abusing or insulting Pakistan, which seemed to tie in with the call in section 16 of the Shari'a bill for laws protecting "the ideology, solidarity

and integrity of Pakistan

as

an Islamic State." This arrogation of sweeping

authority to penalize political opponents and critics of Islamization was ominous.

Since under the

new

bill

the Shari'a will override conflicting provisions in the consti-

tution and since neither the Shari'a

concern for respecting future of civil liberties

human

bill

nor the Prime Minister's speech expressed any

rights or protecting individual freedoms, alarm for the

seemed warranted,

particularly in

pression accumulated by other governments

Under talist,

the leadership of a businessman

Pakistan

now

view of the records of

when pursuing

who

re-

Islamization.

publicly denies that he

is

a

fundamen-

seems embarked on a curious experiment of combining a seem-

Ann Elizabeth Mayer 132

perfunctory

ingly

commitment

official

to Islamization with a determination to

program of far-reaching economic reform that would entail close cooperation with the West, Japan, and international institutions. Combining these policies implement

will

be

a

Pakistan

difficult;

is

in a state

of mounting

creasingly serious social turbulence, crime waves,

The image of the

internal crisis, being beset

fundamentalist-military alliance has been tarnished bv

Nawaz

erupted in 1991 in which both

financial scandals that

bv

in-

and general lawlessness. 54

two major

and

Sharif's

Zia's re-

gimes were implicated, scandals that were an acute source of embarrassment since charges of corruption had provided the pretext for removing Benazir Bhutto from the

prime ministership. As the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) lapsed amidst revelations of staggering levels of corruption and fraud, that

manv high-ranking members of the

been involved explain why,

in

BCCI

when

deals that

were

militarv, including

at best questionable.

it

col-

turned out

former president Zia, had

Nawaz

Sharif also had to

the state cooperative societies had been going bankrupt, wiping

out the savings of about 700,000 Pakistanis, thev had been extending billions of rupees in loans to his family business. 55 Intriguing questions were raised bv the facts that President

Ghulam

Ishaq Khan,

be closely tied to the BCCI, and

from

a

office,

BCCI denied

association

BCCI

who had

Nawaz

sacked Benazir Bhutto, turned out to

Sharif's family

was shown to have benefited

— whereas both Benazir Bhutto and her father had, while

in

licenses to operate in Pakistan. 56

In the light of Pakistan's deepening internal

Minister Sharif will be able to accomplish

crisis, it is

doubtful

— or how much time he

stabilize the situation before the military decides that

it

is

how much Prime will

have to try to

necessary to intervene

directly.

The Sudan The Goals ofIslamization

When

Sudanese president

Jafar

in the

Sudan

al-Numayri undertook Islamization

in

1983, he was

faced with a political and religious situation significantly at variance with the ones in Iran and Pakistan. He had ruled the country as its military dictator for fourteen years, managing to cling to power in the face of many hostile plots and attempted coups. Bv 1983 the political threat from secular and leftist political opposition forces like the Communists and Ba'thists had been exhausted, and Numayri's remaining major political rivals

were ones

who had

strong Islamic credentials for leadership.

Sufism, Islamic mysticism, was an important

Sudan. Traditionally, the two major

and Khatmiyva

Sufi orders.

component of

political parties

religious

life

in the

had been organized by the Ansar

As of 1983 Numayri's most prominent political rival was Ummah Party, which corresponded to the Ansar

Sadiq al-Mahdi, the leader of the order.

But Numavri

also

had to deal with the

political

power of the Democratic

Unionist Party, which corresponded to the Khatmiyva order. Sufi leaders

al-Mahdi enjoyed both spiritual and

Compared

political authority

to groups like the Ansar

among

like

Sadiq

their followers.

and the Khatmiyva orders, fundamentalists

THE FUNDAMENTALIST [MPAC1

IN IRAN.

PAKISTAN, AND

SUDAN

111!

133

organized in groups

Sudanese

Muslim Brotherhood were relative newcomers on the in a short time they grew into a potent force. A local

like the

political scene,

but

branch of the Brotherhood was led bv Sadiq al-Mahdfs brother-in-law, Hassan Turabi,

who became

internationally

famous

as

damentalist cause and assumed a prominent role in Sudanese politics

The

role

of Islam

been contentious in

and the place of the Shari'a

in the state

issues in

Sudanese

al-

an articulate spokesperson for the fun-

politics ever since the

the 1970s. 5

in

"

system had

in the legal

Sudan became independent

1956. There were recurring but inconclusive debates on whether the Sudan should

have an Islamic constitution and whether Shari'a law should replace the

common

law

system that had been inherited from the British, leaving the Shari'a applicable only the area of personal status.

As the country was wracked bv

political

in

upheavals and

attempted coups, resolution of the Islamization issue was repeatedly deferred. 58

While be, the

politicians like Sadiq

Muslim Brotherhood

al-Mahdi wavered on what the role of Islam should

consistently

adoption of an Islamic constitution. hostile to

Arab nationalism

campaigned

for Islamization, including the

Although the Muslim Brotherhood has been

as a secular

ideology incompatible with the universalist

mission of Islam, in the Sudanese context fundamentalist

calls for

law

were associated with the imposition of an Arab and Islamic

that

was vigorously rejected bv the southern Sudanese.

manv

Like so that

African nations, the Sudan

is

an

artificial entity

were drawn with flagrant disregard for natural ethnic,

divisions.

erners

The most important

single cleavage

is

imposing Islamic

identity, an identity

with boundaries

religious, or linguistic

the one dividing Arab

Muslim north-

and African non-Muslim southerners. Southerners constitute approximately

From the Khartoum and inclined

one-third of the population and adhere to Christianity or animist religions.

beginning they have been suspicious of the governments to resent

domination by northerners, characterizing

in

their policies as racist

and exploit-

Southerners have been insistent that their African heritage has to be accorded

ative.

equal respect with the Arab one and that the government needs to be structured so that their interests are protected.

The northern was to have

disinclination to respect the sensitivities of the southern Sudanese

fateful

consequences. Civil war broke out even before independence was

formally proclaimed, and to

power

via a

coup

in

it

continued until 1972. President Numavri,

1969,

won

who had

come-

considerable prestige as a statesman and conciliator

by arranging the 1972 peace settlement, the Addis Ababa Agreement. The

role

of

Islam was a major bone of contention, and, as a condition for ending the war, southerners

demanded

that

no attempt be made

to declare Islam the religion of the state. 54

The 1973 Sudanese Constitution recognized Islam, Christianity, and traditional religions and accorded each of these respect. To appease the southerners, the use of religion in constitutional or legal provisions to compromise the political and civil rights

of any

When

citizen

President

was prohibited. 60

Numavri

in

August of 1983 suddenly decided

lamic fundamentalist agenda and pursue a policy of Islamization,

turnabout.

time

when

It

signaled an

abandonment of

the country could

ill

his policy

to co-opt the Isit

was

a startling

of conciliating the South

afford the consequences.

at a

Ann Elizabeth Mayer 134

The timing of the 1983 Sudanese nal assessment

of the

legal

program made

Islamization

little

sense.

A ratio-

of the country's needs would not have led to the conclusion that reform

system should be given prioritv, for the existing legal system happened to

be a good one for a countrv at the Sudan's stage of development. There were other

much more

The Sudan was in dire straits, because the country was economy had so deteriorated that the government was essentially

pressing problems.

so indebted and the

bankrupt. There were serious scarcities of vital commodities

and sorghum;

like petrol

away the

the infrastructure had grievously deteriorated; a brain drain was leeching

most able and best-educated Sudanese; devastating drought and famine afflicted much of the countrv; there was mass starvation afflicting several million Sudanese and Ethiopian refugees; and rapid desertification was causing displacement and misery for the population in the West.

Most

serious of

end

crucial

development projects

Concern

recovery.

civil

itself

should have been

any pursuit of Islamization. Numavri nonetheless proceeded,

decision, southerners have placed the

and laws

any economic

essential for

of the southerners by

therewith ending anv hopes of averting a full-scale

cies

southern Su-

war, a renewal of which would

South that were

in the

for the reactions

sufficient to forestall

politically disaffected

all,

danese were already on the verge of renewing the

as the sine

qua non

civil

war. Ever since that fateful

abandonment of Numavri's Islamization

poli-

ending the war. 61

for

Numavri's decision to adopt fundamentalist policies in the face of these counterindications

was improvident and quite

difficult to explain in the light

of

his

own

character and political history. Earlier in his political career he had been closely allied

with

leftist

groups and friendly with Sudanese communists, archfoes of the funda-

mentalists. Unlike the genuinely

devout Zia, Numavri enjoved no reputation

as a

who

sur-

pious Muslim. Numavri was a rough-hewn military

man of

loose morals

rounded himself with corrupt cronies and had been notorious

To

the extent that personal motives

pose

zeal in

may

have played a role in Numavri's decision to

champion of Islamization, observers speculated

as a

for his alcoholism. 62

that his

newfound

religious

1983 might have been connected to his declining health after major surgery. it may be significant that bv 1983 he had to forgo alcohol for medical

In this regard,

reasons after years of hcaw drinking.

Whatever increase seems that some

in personal religious feeling

political calculations

may

Numavri may have experienced,

it

have prompted his adoption of Islamiza-

possible that, after seeing the Iranian Revolution

and the 1981 murder of

Sadat bv Egyptian fundamentalists, Numavri was anxious to

forestall a political threat

tion. It

is

that he perceived to be

coming from Sudanese fundamentalists. Perhaps the

policy

bv hopes that the fundamentalists, who enjoyed funding from Arabian sources, could serve as a useful political prop and source of funds for his

was

also suggested

faltering

and impecunious regime.

There were Sudanese fundamentalists collaboration

lest

bers of the large minority faction of the

leadership of Sadiq to the majority

who

abhorred Numavri and refused any

they be tainted bv association with his hated regime, such as

Abd

Allah

Abd

Muslim Brotherhood who

split

mem-

off under the

al-Majid. In contrast, fundamentalists belonging

wing of the Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) acclaimed

his decision to

THE FUNDAMENTALIST IMPACT

AND THE SUDAN

IN IRAN. PAKISTAN. 135

Islamize and quickly

became

his ardent supporters.

As

Numayri appointed

a reward,

cooperative fundamentalists to various government posts and particularly to the courts.

For example, Hassan al-Turabi, the most prominent figure

in the

Sudanese

Ikhwan, became attorney general and al-Makashfi Taha al-Kabbashi became

pow-

a

erful judge.

In

1984 Numayri proclaimed himself the Sudan's Imam, meaning

in this context

the supreme religious and political leader. .Although Numayri's fundamentalist

allies

Imam, when Numayri in July of 1984 normally acquiescent Sudanese People's Assembly to amend the 1973

proved willing to acknowledge him pressed the

as their

constitution to recognize his religious authority and establish .m Islamic form

ernment, the assembly balked

at

endorsing

anv plans to rewrite the constitution to

Numayri had

his pretensions.

supreme

ratify his status as

to

of govabandon

religious leader.

How Islamization Was Pursued Numayri's Islamization program proceeded quite differently from

Zia's.

Apparently

desirous of avoiding the need to share the credit for his Islamization program,

Nu-

mayri did not allow the Muslim Brotherhood or qualified ulama to participate in the drafting of his Islamic laws, cronies. In the last half

aiming the

of 1983 the

very short notice "Islamic" codes

were thrown together their task

when

in desperate

Numayri. The laws

topics proposed by

attempts to meet Numayri's deadlines.

drafting the longest and potentially

Code, which happened to be

ill-qualified

were periodically assigned to produce on

on various

much of the

Transactions Act, the drafters cribbed Civil

some of his

task instead over to

latter

French

largely

most important

facilitate

law, the Civil

"Islamic" law from the Jordanian in inspiration, inserting at points

no preparation, Su-

various opaque and ill-drafted "Islamic" provisions. Thus, with

danese lawyers and judges, trained in the British

To

common

law system, were faced with

having to use laws based on a dissimilar French tradition that contained various ments, often garbled ones, of "Islamic" unintelligible, lawyers

new and

the

and

were unable to guess

unsettled rules of the game.

the threat

state-

Since Numayri's Islamic laws were often

how

to structure

civil

transactions under

The confusion about what

the laws

meant

of potential criminal liability for inadvertent violations discouraged

business activity. 63 Because the activity

rules.

was sparse

in

economy was approaching

of collapse, business

a state

any event, so fewer transactions were affected than would oth-

erwise have been the case. In striking contrast to Iran and Pakistan, in the

under Numayri to subjugated

from the

role.

utilizing Islamic

The

initial

law as

Sudan

a device to force

little

women

fact that, as described,

major fundamentalist figures were excluded from the

power

military junta seized

into a traditional,

deemphasis of issues of women's status may have resulted

process of drafting most of Numayri's Islamization measures.

new

attention was paid

in

1989 and adopted

It

was only

after the

a rigorous fundamentalist

policy that measures along the lines of those adopted in Iran were taken to

women from

public

life,

to relegate

them to domestic

roles,

and to

remove

restrict their

freedoms. 64

The Sudanese

judiciary

and bar strongly opposed Numayri's Islamization

policy.

Ami Elizabeth Mayer 136

When

was

cases involving Islamization measures arose, there

dragging bv judges, and,

in

abeyance. Infuriated by this judicial resistance,

an

official state

of emergency

great leeway

in

much

foot-

consequence, for some time the Islamic laws were virtually

in

This entailed suspending

initially

in

Numayri on 29 April 1984 declared

order to effectuate Islamization without further delay.

constitutional rights and freedoms, allowing the police

all

undertaking searches and making

arrests, and setting up courts of manned bv new appointees who were enthusiastic partisans Under the new judges, penalties like executions, jailings, fines, flog-

decisive justice, the latter

of Islamization.

gings, and amputations were

meted out not only to persons

actually

found

of the Islamic laws but to persons merely suspected of offenses or with persons

who had

violated Numayri's laws.

The accused were convicted

in

breach

some ties to summary,

in

arbitrary proceedings. 65

The

revival

and application of Sharif penal law were treated

as the centerpieces

of

Numayri's Islamization program. Residents of Khartoum were well informed of the rising toll

of victims of Islamic

in reports

on Khartoum

justice since the criminal convictions

television

to the state of emergency

were chronicled

during prime time. Even when he put

on 29 September 1984, Numavri kept

a

formal end

the emergency courts

going, renaming them courts of decisive justice.

The operations of

the criminal justice system in this period caused dismay and

outrage. In general, criminal law

was applied

in a

manner

that reflected the nature of

Numayri's government. Members of the regime and powerful and well-connected figures continued their blatantly corrupt practices unhindered. 66 Businesspersons in

the private sector of the economy, toward

were

common

targets

which Numavri bore considerable animus,

of criminal searches and prosecutions. Persons with

enemies or helpless members of the poorer harshest penalties. Although there are

of Islamic

no

classes

accurate statistics

justice in this period, there are indications that

floggings and amputations were

influential

were frequently subjected to the

non-Muslim southerners.

on

the race of the victims

many of the

victims of the

67

Foreign governments that had formerly given aid to Numavri's regime abandoned

him

after seeing the

way

the

economy was being mismanaged and out of disgust over United States, which wound up as the sole finan-

his repressive policies, except for the cial

backer of his regime. 68 In return for generous financial aid, the United States

found its

a

staunch

ally for

pursuing

its

objectives in a strategic region

and support for

As mainstays of the faltering regime, the U.S. Embassy International Development (AID) missions did in practice obtain

anti-Qaddafi campaign.

and Agency for

certain exemptions

from Islamic law, enabling these

69

institutions to

import and serve

Although official U.S. State Department program did contain some accurate information on aspects of the human rights violations Numayri was perpetrating, the importance of the country for U.S. foreign

alcohol.

reports during die Islamization

policy seems to have inhibited the United States

warning of a cutoff of funding

from giving Numayri an ultimatum

if he did not end the abuses caused bv the Islamization

program.""

Although the Islamization program was deeply resented and Numayri's versions still in power the regime's

of Islamic laws were viewed with contempt, while he was

THE FUNDAMENTALIST IMPACT

IN IRAN. PAKISTAN,

AND THE SLOAN

137

punishment of dissent deterred many Sudanese from For the most

part,

it

was

in the

criticizing the laws in public.

demonstrations and after the popular revolution

Numayri that one saw the full depth of scorn and hatred that Sudanese felt for the dictator. With the lifting of censorship, his policies were pilloried in the newly free press and the media. However, even before Numayri was toppled and despite the against

dangers of speaking out, some Sudanese risked their

lives to

denounce the Islamiza-

Among the most outspoken foes of the Islamization program were the Brothers, a group of Muslims who supported liberal, modernist interpre-

tion program.

Republican

of Islam and demanded respect for human rights according to international

tations

standards.

The Rcpublieans advocated the cause of democratic pluralism, defending non-Muslim African Sudanese, who suffered under the new svstem of

the rights of

Islamic criminal justice,

which represented values

alien

to sub-Saharan African

culture.

In retaliation for their criticisms of

Republicans were

jailed. Finally,

Numavrfs

version of Islamization, prominent

Mahmud Muhammad

Taha, the aged leader of the

Republicans, was tried in January of 1985, convicted of apostasy, denied the chanceto repent that the convicted apostate

is

given under the Shari'a, and sentenced to be

hanged. This conviction took place even though there was no law on the books providing that apostasy was a criminal offense,

Taha was publicly hanged fanfare

and acclaim on

hostile to the

in

less

one punishable by execution.

the part of Sudanese fundamentalists,

Republicans and their

to intimidate Tafia's followers,

some of Taha's

much

Khartoum on 18 January 1985, accompanied by liberal ideas.

Numayri resorted

close associates, during

To

who had

great

long been

trv to quiet further dissent

to a publicly televised heresy

and

trial

of

which they were interrogated and berated and

forced, under threat of execution, to repudiate formally their Republican beliefs."'

How Successful Has Islamization Been? Numayri

fell

on 6 April 1985,

than three months after the judicial murder of

less

Taha, which was widely perceived in

Khartoum

at variance with Sudanese values and tradition.

of abject barbarism

Hanging Taha

and

tion but, rather, fueled outrage at the cruelty justice

as an act

totally

did not quell opposi-

arbitrariness with

which criminal

was being administered. Indeed, Numayri himself seems to have belatedly

per-

ceived that his sponsorship of the fundamentalist agenda, far from solving any prob-

lems or enhancing his tarnished image, had only aggravated his political woes. In the last

months before he was overthrown, he sought

of the Islamization program on

to place the blame for the injustices

his erstwhile fundamentalist allies, distancing himself

from the Muslim Brotherhood and dismissing Turabi from the government ruary of 1985 and then jailing

fundamentalism came too

toum convinced

late.

him

in

Massive

the military that

in

Feb-

March. However, Numavri's repudiation of strikes

Numayrfs

and popular demonstrations position was untenable.

The

in

Khar-

military

staged a coup and then set up a caretaker regime that was later followed by a civilian

government

An

in

1986.

interim constitution was drawn up. 72

should prevail over

all

other laws.

It also

It

stipulated that constitutional principles

provided that the state should

strive to

Ann

Elizabeth

Maver

138

"eradicate racial

and religious fanaticism," that the

subject to the rule of law

pendent, and that

state

and each person should be

as applied bv the courts, that the judiciary should be inde-

persons should be equal under the law. In calling for restoring

all

the rule of law, respecting constitutional rights protections, and ending discrimina-

tory treatment, which southerners associated with Numavri's versions of Islamization

and Islamic

justice,

it

obviously was intended as a corrective to the abuses that had

taken place under Numavri's Islamization policy.

Bv anv terms, Numavri's Islamization campaign must be classified as the least sucof the three considered in this essay. It was short-lived and haphazard, and provoked a wave of revision that culminated in a popular revolution against the

cessful

own

regime. Numavri's ill-considered initiatives led directlv to his ers

who had

downfall. Like oth-

collaborated with him, fundamentalists associated with his policies dis-

covered that their discrediting the

own

credibility

A

had been badlv compromised.

Numavri regime was

further factor

the revelation after censorship was lifted that,

while he had been pouring resources into Islamization, he had been concealing from the public in the capital the horrors that had resulted

from the devastating famine

had savaged mam' outlving regions. Indignation welled up

as

that

information and pho-

tographs showing the starvation and misers' that Numavri had ignored and tried to conceal at

last

became

suffering that the

Deeply implicated as

Taha acquired the

his execution

and Sudanese grasped the extent of the death and

available

Numavri regime had been covering

up.

were further embarrassed

in Tafia's death, the fundamentalists

status

was selected

of a martyr for the cause of human rights and the date of

as the

day for the annual celebration of Arab

Human

Dav. The honor that Taha received in death was a symbolic victory for the

Rights

liberal

and

humanistic vision of Islam that the Sudanese fundamentalists had sought to have

condemned

as heretical.

Future Prospects

Long plagued by after

instability, the

agement of the economy, the ine,

Sudanese

political situation

and other accumulated

system."

3

When

disaffection

ills

free elections

of southerners, the ravages of war and fam-

placed great strains

were held

in

1986

on

the newly democratized political

at the

military rule, candidates representing the traditional

mm'a

groups did

well, together garnering almost

But Sadiq al-Mahdi,

who

continued to be troubled

Numavri's overthrow. Dealing with the aftermath of Numavri's gross misman-

let

who became

end of the interim period of

Umma/Ansar and DUP/Khat-

70 percent of the

prime minister, proved

a

total votes cast." 4

weak and

indecisive leader

the existing problems fester, including the contentious issue of

with the legacy of Islamization measures

left

by Numavri. The

civil

how

to deal

war, carried out

increasingly by irregular forces, continued to devastate the South.

In die free political atmosphere after the overthrow

of Numavri, Sudanese lawyers

and scholars outspokenly denounced the defects of his amateurishly drafted Islamic laws and criticized

them

that they could pave the flaws.

as travesties

way

of Islamic jurisprudence. Perhaps they assumed

for discarding Numavri's laws

However, they were to discover

that proponents

bv demonstrating

their

of Islamization were not

as

THE FUNDAMENTALIST IMPACT

IN IRAN. PAKISTAN.

AND THE SLOAN

139

concerned with whether Numavri's laws correctly stated Shari'a principles

they

as

were with upholding the general principle that Islamization should be pursued. Sudanese fundamentalists defended Numavri's laws and fought zealously for their retention, threatening a

bloodbath

if

they were abandoned. At the most, they conceded

of Numayri's laws might be

that certain purifications

Although fundamentalists did not do well

in order.

in the

democratic elections that

fol-

lowed Numavri's oyerthrow, the Muslim Brotherhood's strong, disciplined organiza-

and single-minded

tion its

members remained

stage

disruptive

gave

a force to

it

disproportionate political weight. In particular,

be reckoned with in the capital, where they could

demonstrations.

prompted the shaky tary rule

zeal

of the

Fear

fundamentalists'

political

power

governments that followed the interim period of

coalition

to seek some accommodations with the most

party, Turabi's National Islamic

mili-

influential fundamentalist

Front (NIF). The attempts to placate the

NIF com-

plicated negotiations for settling the civil war.

John Garang, the leader of the Sudanese People's Liberation

adamant that the

civil

war would not end

until a

Armv (SPLA), was

commitment was given

to

abandon

Islamic law. The SPLA and its civilian counterpart, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), insisted that a secular government should be established with a 75

system in which

legal

all

Sudanese, regardless of race or religion, would be equal. 76

war and pressures from the military prompted the government to accept a tentative agreement with the SPLA on 16 November 1988 which called for freezing Islamic law. A constitutional conference was to be held in September 1989, a move that was denounced by the NIF, which had been excluded from a new government formed in March 1989 that seemed to be moving toward a decision to

The

roll

drain of the

civil

back Islamization measures.

A

military faction again intervened, overthrowing the civilian

government on

30 June 1989. Lieutenant General Omar Hassan al-Bashir at first sought to disguise his ties to the NIF, but as the months wore on, it became obvious that the regime was closely allied with the NIF. However, Hassan al-Turabi was not formally a

member of

leviating the tive

the government.

interest in al-

tenta-

peace settlement, adopting an adamant position on retaining Shari'a law, which

led to the collapse

of a peace conference with the

which former U.S. president

On

The new regime showed no

economic miseries of the population. The regime scuttled the

7 December 1989, an

again be enforced and

Jimmy

official

its

SPLA on

announcement was made

penalities

to have forestalled the executions of

5

December 1989

Carter was playing a central mediating that Shari'a law

in

role.

would

imposed, but international pressures seem

some amputation

penalties that should have

followed. zeal

to

and ruthlessness, declaring a

stifle

dissent

state

of emergency and resorting to

and to intimidate and punish

seizing power, Bashir

imposed

strict press

critics

of NIF

policies.

drastic

measures

Immediately

after

censorship, threw political leaders and

members of the professional elite into jail, and abrogated the interim constitution. The regime dissolved the Sudan Bar Association and the Sudan Human Rights Association, which had campaigned vigorously on behalf of human rights and peace in

Ann

Elizabeth

Mayer

140

the South.

""

Bashir's

government and security

gious disregard for legality and systematic

forces have

human

campaigns of repression and persecution directed tions that have in the past

shown

compiled a record of egre-

rights violations in the course at political

opponents and

of

institu-

their capacity to mobilize resistance to military

dictatorships. Civil society, long a prized feature

of the Sudanese

political landscape,

disappeared under this onslaught. 78 Widespread purges have been undertaken to eliminate persons

deemed unsympathetic

to the fundamentalist cause

from jobs

in the

public sector, jobs that have been turned over to fundamentalist loyalists. There have

been

and protracted detentions without

arrests

trial

of hundreds of Sudanese human

rights activists, doctors, lawyers, trade unionists, journalists, professors, diplomats,

bankers, and

and the evidence

civil servants,

is

that

manv

detentions have been accom-

panied by beatings, mistreatment, and torture. Several Sudanese have been executed after politically inspired prosecutions. In April

of

of 1990 there was a documented case

doctor being tortured to death by security forces. Twentv-eight army

a

officers

opposed to NIF

policies

volvement

attempted coup. Meanwhile, the regime tolerated and perhaps even

in an

encouraged

militias

were summarily executed, ostensibly

and irregular forces that engaged

civilians at El Jcbelein

a

punishment for

in-

of wanton destruction

in acts

and violence against southern Sudanese, which included dred

as

massacre of about

six

hun-

on 28 December 1989. 79

Before the universities were closed

down by

NIF members monitored

the regime,

the contents of university lectures to ensure that they accorded with fundamentalist el Nur of the Faculty of Science of Khartoum University November of 1989, when the head of the securitv svstem expressed disapproval of his lectures, after which fundamentalist members of the security forces tortured him in an effort to force him to recant his belief in Darwinian evolution,

tenets. Dr.

Farouk Ibrahim

was arrested

in

which they stated was incompatible with Islam. 80

Concerned and embarrassed about reports of atrocities in the South and repression North, the government imposed curbs on foreign visitors, restricting the

in the

activity

of foreign

relief

Mounting evidence

in

In this connection,

manv

workers and harassing and detaining foreign journalists.

1990 of an approaching famine of disastrous proportions gave the Bashir government a new motive for excluding foreign observers and relief workers, because the regime was determined to pretend that there was no food shortage. ists

observers realized that one

way

for

Sudanese fundamental-

program would be to

to eliminate the major obstacle to their Islamization

let

southerners, the Sudanese most affected by the famine, simply starve to death out of

view of the international community. Reports

and nine million

lives

were

at risk

in

1991 suggested that between

five

from famine. The government was obviously an-

gered bv the complaints of foreign governments and international agencies that the

government was blocking critics, stridently

vital relief efforts

denouncing them. Only

and took the offensive against

in

March 1991 did

it

relent

its

foreign

and allow

in

81 international aid and famine relief workers.

On

31 December 1990, the government announced

law, but onlv in the northern part

its

of the country, where

it

decision to apply Islamic

would apply both

to the

THE FUNDAMENTALIST IMPACT

AND THE SUDAN

IN IRAN. PAKISTAN, 141

Muslim and enacted

a

to the

On

non-Muslim populations.

22 March 1991, the government

new Islamic penal code designed by Hassan al-Turabi that included the

premodern

Shari'a rules discriminating against

women

and non-Muslims and requir-

ing penalties like flogging, amputation, and stoning to death.

included

It

provision

a

Muslim who advocates the rejection of Islamic beliefs or announces his own rejection of Islam by word or act." 82 On the basis of the record, one would expect that this would apply to dissident Muslims who requiring the death penalty lor apostasy for "any

government and

criticized the

its

Islamization policy.

The enactment of the penal code seemed regime

in the

of financial ated

all

in context to be an act of defiance by a most parlous of circumstances, bankrupt and cut off from most sources

By

aid.

allying itself with Iraq

during the Gulf Crisis, the Sudan had

the countries in the U.S. -sponsored coalition, the

members of which were

not deceived by the regime's occasional propaganda efforts to portray

of principled

neutrality.

Estrangement from neighbors

like

its

stance as one

Egypt and Saudi Arabia

number of

ensued. During the buildup before the war, Hassan al-Turabi was one of a

prominent Islamic fundamentalists Islam despite

Saddam Hussein's record

mentalist groups. abi's stance.

who

It

alien-

identified the cause of Iraq with the cause of

of persecution of religious leaders and funda-

was not possible to gauge how many Sudanese agreed with Tur-

By spring 1991 General

places, a rare exception

Bashir's regime

had become

being Libya, with which the Sudan was

a pariah in

most

theoretically in the

process of merging despite Qaddafi's well-known antipathy for Islamic fundamental-

ism and his executions of Muslim Brothers. The Sudan's need for

oil

and

financial

support and Qaddafi's eagerness to expand his influence apparently were behind the

proposed merger. Qaddafi's record of pursuing numerous abortive union projects with other Arab countries, none of which had resulted

in effective

or stable unions,

gave one reason to doubt that the Sudan-Libya merger would be successful.

nouncement bv

the Bashir regime

political prisoners

on 29 April 1991

that there

would be

An

an-

a release

of

suggested that the beleaguered regime might be trying to make a

conciliator}' gesture to the

opposition and also to improve

its

standing

in

the inter-

national community.'" Ironies

abounded

in the shifts in alliances after the

Gulf War. After haying sided with Saddam Hussein began moving toward

Bashir's regime at

traumatic experiences of the

in late

close cooperation with

1990 and

early 1991,

Saddam's nemesis,

the end of 1991. In return for substantial Iranian aid, Bashir allowed the

be used by Iran

as a staging

ground

Iran,

Sudan to

for various forces cooperating with the Iranian

regime, including both Islamic fundamentalist groups and terrorist organizations. 84

The

policy of pursuing a fundamentalist

program seemed to

doom

the

Sudan

to

the perpetuation of a cruel military dictatorship, arbitrary criminal justice, and contin-

ued

civil strife,

accompanied by an increasing

future of Sudanese Islamization

is

toll

of human suffering and death. The

uncertain, but the Bashir regime's adherence to the

fundamentalist line has unquestionably had a disastrous impact on democratic free-

doms and human

rights

and has dimmed the prospects for the Sudan's survival

nation. In the case of the southern Sudanese,

it

may

as a

threaten their physical survival.

Ann Elizabeth Mayer 142

Conclusion and the Sudan arc noteworthy for being

Iran, Pakistan,

where

sites

field

experiments

along fundamentalist lines have been carried out. Bv 1991 they were

in Islamization

the only countries in which Islamic fundamentalist

movements were

enough power to attempt to remake

and constitutions. Despite the

laws, politics,

able to gain

dissimilarities in the specific reforms enacted in the three countries, there are

common

draw general conclusions about the impact of

features that enable the observer to

Islamic fundamentalism. First

and foremost, the ascendancy of fundamentalists did not mean a reversion to

premodern Islamic law but instead Shari'a that

fit

the fundamentalists

a vcrv selective revival 1

immediate program and priorities— priorities

which one could have predicted using Marty's large, the legal

of Iranian

of certain features of the

definition

of fundamentalism. By and

svstems remained heavily influenced by Western models.

political

developments and constitutional amendments

in

On

the basis

1989, one might

sav that

some of the

make

Islamic have alreadv been diluted or abandoned, having apparently been rec-

it

ognized

central features

of the 1979 constitution that were designed to

as impractical.

From the examples of Iran and the Sudan, and to a lesser extent, Pakistan, one sees how, when Islamic fundamentalism is adopted as a government policv, it tends to accentuate the antidemocratic, authoritarian, and repressive tendencies in the local political svstems.

gaged

used to

justify

political

absolutist spirit

which seem to

talists

the divine mandate they enjov can be

any measures needed to keep their hold on power and to destroy their

modern

legal educations

of law have been perceived 1

of fundamentalism pervades governments enfeel that

enemies without anv concern for

judges with rule

The

in Islamization,

who

legality.

are

The

and

local bar associations

committed to

as constituting obstacles to

certain principles

of the

implementing fundamen-

version of Islamic justice. Special military courts or tribunals staffed with fun-

damentalists, which are permitted to mete out crude forms of summary justice, have

had to be established. Egregious disregard for increase in arbitrariness

and cruelty

legality

and human

in the administration

1

correlated with fundamentalists ascendancy.

Among

rights

of criminal

have

other things, fundamentalist

cendancy has meant the criminalization of certain nonconforming religious

and the imposition of criminal

and an

justice

penalties, including executions,

on

as-

beliefs

religious dissidents

and religious minorities.

The evidence

suggests that, while "Islam

11

1

and "the ShariV have highly positive

connotations for Muslims, the specifics of the agendas pursued bv fundamentalist

groups

in

power do not enjoy wide popular support. Except where fundamentalists

are able to associate their cause with popular protests against the existing order or the

seem unlikely to come coming to power and then

pursuit of broader social and political goals, fundamentalists to

power

in free elections. If ever thev

were successful

rigorously carried out fundamentalist policies, they in office

under

fully

in

would be

unlikely to remain long

democratic conditions. The reactive oppositional bent of radical

fundamentalists means that thev concentrate

on purging

societies

of immorality' and

THE FUNDAMENTALIST IMPACT

AND THE SLOAN

IN IRAN. PAKISTAN. 143

showing

fighting enemies, social

ills

capacity to pursue constructive programs to alleviate

little

or to eradicate pervasive economic problems.

The stunning

victory

won bv

known

the Algerian fundamentalist partv

Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the

first

round of parliamentary

elections in

as the

Decem-

ber of 1991 offered the prospect of testing this interpretation. But the FIS electoral success

was not indisputably

tied to the specifics

of the FIS program. Indeed, during

it would take if it won a 430 seats in the first round was the fact that the ailing National Liberation Front (FLX) was able to win onlv 15 seats or about 4 percent of the total. The vote was compelling testimony to

its

campaign the FIS remained vague about the measures

majority.

As

significant as the FIS' gain

of 188 of the

total

—

Algerians' disillusionment with the repressive

FLX

regime, which had dominated the

country since 1962, bringing Algeria to the brink of economic ruin while a small reaped the benefits of the FLX's stranglehold on power. Moreover, the secular cal parties

were fragmented and the FIS,

as the

onlv opposition partv with

FLX, seems

base and a chance of unseating the

to have

become the

elite

politi-

a national

beneficiary of

pervasive anti-FLX sentiment. Voter dissatisfaction with the range of options being offered

may account

for the approximately

fully free election in Algeria's history.

the FIS would ia's

fare

once

40 percent abstention

Those

had the opportunity to

it

rate in this, the first

more about how govern were thwarted when Alger-

interested in learning

bold democratic experiment was aborted bv a thinlv disguised military interven-

tion

on 11 January 1992 before the

round of

final

elections

were held, thereby

robbing the FIS of its projected victory.

The examples

to date

show

that fundamentalist

domination survived

in Iran

by

the systematic use of terror and recourse to harsh repression and censorship. Iran held

periodic elections, but in circumstances in which there was

proval of clerical rule. Since 1981, exile, there

has been

the part of the small ister

no

when

no

of voter ap-

real test

President Bani-Sadr was forced to flee to

toleration of any political opposition to clerical rule except

and beleaguered Freedom Movement

Mchdi Bazargan, which

led

suffered constant harassment

on

bv former prime min-

and

threats. Since the

Revolution voters have only been allowed to choose between candidates pledged to follow the

official

Islamic ideology, not to express disapproval by voting for candidates

To demand

more open system has proved perilous. In June of 1990 Freedom Movement calling for more respect for constitutionally protected rights led to their arrest. Xinc were kept in detention without charges being filed for over a year. They were then tried in secret, being punished with prison sentences from six months to three years and floggings of between ten and thirty lashes. Bazargan, whose proven moral courage and

that

oppose

an open

it.

letter

a

bv prominent

political figures in Bazargan's

reputation for steadfast advocacy of

human

rights

under the shah had long shielded

him from the treatment meted out to other dissidents, was himself placed under housearrest. 85 Even the pleas of this small group for greater freedoms were seen as intolerably subversive.

One important

study of attitudes toward the

Iranian village suggests that disillusionment

clerical

and disaffection among

regime

its

in

an

inhabitants

has been widespread. 86 In Pakistan and the Sudan, the fundamentalists' political ascendancy

owed

a great

Ann Elizabeth Mayer 144

deal to their willingness to forge alliances with the military or with military dictator-

When,

ships.

after the experience

of fundamentalist domination, the people of Paki-

and the Sudan did have the chance to vote

stan

fundamentalists were unable to win

Pakistan

was

When

it

a victory

from which

was something

relative

freedom,

the

The October 1990 victor)' of the eightNawaz Sharif to the prime ministership of

elections.

partv coalition that ultimately brought

However,

in

Pakistan's fundamentalists could initiallv take heart.

than a clear mandate for fundamentalist government.

less

does an entrenched fundamentalist regime cease to be fundamentalist? Funda-

mentalism

is

oppositional and reactive in character, determined to purge society of

corruption and restore a putative ideal Islamic model. But after a certain period in

power,

a

government

that

is

in

its

origins fundamentalist, like the Saudi regime,

mav

become the kind of establishment against which new generations of fundamentalists are bound to react. Indeed, Saudi Arabia now faces serious trouble in the form of a burgeoning fundamentalist opposition. The indications are that in Iran and Pakistan, where fundamentalist

policies

dominated for over

a decade, albeit with

among

tion in Pakistan under Bhutto, fundamentalist militance

regimes has significantlv diminished. 87 In the Sudan, mentalists of the

NIF

their leaders' zeal to

the leaders of these

another story. The funda-

it is

have had the upper hand only since the coup of June 1989, and

remake the world according to

tinues unabated. This has ciples

one interrup-

meant

that in an era

of democracy, constitutionalism, and the

parts of the globe, the

Sudan

in

1992 seems

are abolished, rights are disregarded,

rule

to

agenda con-

their fundamentalist

when renewed concern of law

embodv

is

manifesting

a society in

for the prinitself in

most

which freedoms

and the reigning ideological absolutism

elimi-

nates anv prospect of democratic pluralism.

Notes Martin E. Mart)', "Fundamentalism

3.

Abul Ala Maududi, The Islamic Law

Phenomenon," Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 42 (November 1988): 15-29.

and

Constitution (Lahore: Islamic Publica-

1.

as

a

2.

Social

For background and

analysis, consult

Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, ed., Islamic Resur-

gence in the Arab World

(New

Islam

(New

York: Praeger,

of Resurgent York: Oxford University Press,

1982); John L. Esposito,

Voices

1983); Shireen Hunter, ed.. The Islamic Revivalism: Diversity

Politics

of

and Unity (Bloo-

mington: Indiana University Press, 1988); Bassam Tibi, The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological

Age

(Salt

Utah, 1988).

Lake City: University of

tions, 1980), p. 263.

Depending on the

definition of fundaone might conclude that Saudi Arabia was the archetype of the fundamentalist state. For example, Dilip Hiro presents Saudi Arabia as "the oldest 4.

mentalism one

is

using,

fundamentalist state," but he uses a definition verv dissimilar to Marty's.

fundamentalism

Hiro defines

term used for effort to define die fundamentals of a religious sysas "the

tem and adhere

to them." Dilip Hiro, IsFundamentalism (London: Paladin, 1988), pp. 1-2.

lamic

5.

For background, see Edward Mor-

.

THE FUNDAMENTALIST IMPACT

AND THE SUDAN

IN IRAN. PAKISTAN, 145

Faith and Power: The Politics of (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), 60-64.

creased.

Factionalism

pp.

179; Hiro, Islamic Fundamen-

Ibid., p.

6.

talism, p. 141.

Mortimer, Faith and Power, pp. 180—

7.

85: Hiro, Islamic Fundamentalism, pp. 128 —

New

35;

York Times,

p.

Al; Nnr York

p.

A3.

31 December 1991,

Times,

30 January 1992.

Middle

Iran."

Islamic

Fast

Journal

181-201. With the growth

to consolidate his leadership in exile just

Kho-

prior to the overthrow of the shah,

meini maintained

a

prudent silence on sen-

questions like his attitudes toward

sitive

democracy, agrarian reform, the role

ulama

in politics,

or"

and the status of women.

Hiro, Islamic Fundamentalism,

p.

167.

nificance

of his

jurist in the

tract

sig-

on the leadership of the

period before his ability to con-

trol the political

scene had been established.

Ibid., p. 170.

10.

For background on the status of and their treatment bv Iran's theogovernment, see Azar Tabari and Na-

Shadow of Islam: The Women's Movement in Iran (London: Zed Press, 1982); Eliz Sanasarian, The Women's Rights Movement in Iran: Mutiny, Appeasement, and Repression from 1900 to Khomeini (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 124-50. hid Veganeh,

1 1

/;;

the

Documentation of the persecutions

of the Baha'is has been published bv nu-

merous authors and international organizations.

A

useful introduction to the subject

is

D. Martin, "The Persecution of the Baha'is Iran,

1844-1984," Baha'i

Studies 12/13

(1984). 12. tory

(1987):

repression,

within the government entrusted with the

pronouncing on whether in

conformity with

Is-

lamic law were ordered to cease expressing public disagreement with the government.

Thus, declarations by the clerical members of the Council of Guardians that proposed legislation favored

bv the regime violated

Is-

lamic precepts provoked an admonition bv the then speaker of the Majlis,

the leader are our

final

Hashemi Raf-

Today 48 (March 1990): 28.

I

of

beg

pay serious heed to the imam's guidance, not to allow their

own

views or those of othimplementation of the

imam's guidelines. with

If thev

a certain issue,

have a problem

thev can meet with the

imam privately and ask questions." FBISXES-88-004, 7 January 1988. p. 51.

A

of the and the end of any respect for the principle of legality after the 14.

basic source for the effects

collapse of the rule of law

revolution

is

the reporting bv

Amnestv

In-

ternational contained in the Iranian sections

of its annual reports beginning with the

ume

vol-

covering 1980.

15.

On

the official status of Islamic law in

Saudi Arabia, see Hiro, Islamic Fundamentalism,

pp.

Power,

pp.

120-21; Mortimer, Faith and 172-73; Farouk A. Sankan,

"Islam and Politics

Juan Cole, "The Baha'is of Iran," His-

authority. ...

the esteemed Council of Guardians ... to

ers to obstruct the

women cratic

41 in

sanjani, to the effect that "today the views

Khomeini's aides downplayed the

9.

the

"Elite

Republic of

fewer clerics were willing to speak out in condemnation of the government. By 1988 the intolerance of dissident clerical voices had reached such a level that even clerics responsibility of

In the period in which he was seeking

Akhavi,

the

in

proposed laws were 8.

of

Shahrough

See

timer.

Islam

in

Saudi Arabia,"

in

Dessouki, Islamic Resurgence, pp. 180-83. While theoretically the only law in force, in

At the outset of Khomeini's regime, was \igorous dissent from his policies voiced bv many clerics, as discussed in Shahrough Akhavi, "Ideology and Praxis

practice the Shari'a has been extensively sup-

Com-

to Regulate Development," Columbia Jour-

13.

there

of Shi'ism

in

the Iranian Revolution,"

and History 25 (1983): 195-221. As the years went by, or-

parative Studies in

Society'

ganized harassment of

clerical

Critics

in-

W

plemented by secular rules. See Bryant Seaman, "Islamic Law and Modern Government: Saudi Arabia Supplements the Shari'a nal

of

Transnational

Law

18

(1980):

413-81. 16.

Imam

[Ruhollah] Khomeini, Islam

Ann Elizabeth Mayer 146

and p.

and

Revolution: Writings

Imam Khomeini

Declarations of

(Berkeley: Mizan,

1981),

Khomeini's

letter

can be read in FBIS-

NES-88-004, 7 January 1988, pp. 49-50. 18. Iran Focus 2 (July 1989):

gion

For example,

in the

1987

in Iran in the

no longer even chapter on reliyearbook

published by the Islamic Propagation Or-

communities are covered but Baha'ism

is

completely ignored. Islamic Republic of Iran Today (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Orga-

20.

New

109-27.

ment Printing

Islam

and

p.

A4.

Revolution,

pp. 181-88. 22. See Iran Focus 2 (June 1989): 5; 3

(January 1990): 3; 3 (February 1990):

The Case of Iran,"

Hunter, The

in

Politics

of

24. A component of the dissatisfaction on the part of moderates was the record of human rights violations that the regime had accumulated since the revolution. Both Ayatollah Montazeri and Rafsanjani gave indications in 1987 that they wanted more respect for human rights in Iran. Amnesty International Report, 1988 (London: Am-

nesty International Publications), p. 234.

Montazeri

in the

months before

openly

resignation

his forced

whether

questioned

these rights violations were not

damaging to

Many

30.

tics in this

women

their

ternational

accounts of Zia's tacin Afzal Iqbal, Is-

(Lahore:

of Pakistan

and

1990 speech he

right

writers,

to

said

and he sup-

participate

sporting events.

Vanguard

He

in

in-

indicated

ac-

companying the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,

Albert Blaustein

in

and Gisbert Flanz,

eds., Constitutions of the

Countries

World

the

of

(Dobbs

a laudator)'

Ferry:

account by

an admirer of Zia's Islamization policy it

as

who

an attempted synthesis of Islamic

and democratic values, see Golam W. Choudhury, Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule (Essex: Scorpion Publishing, 1988).

31. For example, in the 1970 elections in West Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's leftist Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was condemned by clerics as anti-Islamic, but got 58.7 percent of the vote, as against 2.9 percent for the Jamaat-i-Islami and a total of

two ulama-based

10.2 percent for

Mortimer, Faith and Power, election held

as a

could be philosophers, scholars,

teachers, jurists,

ported

critical

Examples may be found lamisation

under Zia

banned. Zia, 25. Iran Focus 2 (June 1989): 3-4. 26. For example, in a

226-

pp.

connection have been published.

in

ted bv die major parties,

the revolution.

that

183-256.

and Power,

29. Mortimer, Faith

views

270-72.

A

327.

Oceana, 1986). For

3.

23. See Shireen Hunter, "Islam in Power:

Islamic Revivalism, pp.

Office, 1984), pp.

Books, 1986), and the 1986 Supplement

York Times, 2 July 1991,

21. Khomeini,

pro-

is

Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Govern-

ganization, various minority religions and

nization, 1987), pp.

p. 4.

vided in Richard Nyrop, ed., Pakistan:

5-6.

official

August 1991,

28. Helpful general background

19. Officially, the religion exists.

indicated that 65

statistics

the official poverty line. Financial Times, 2

137. 17.

own

1991. Iran's

percent of the population was living under

who was

p.

parties.

214. The

1985 was boycotwhich had been

not himself running

candidate for office, had arrested hun-

dreds of his opponents and had banned political

campaign

activity like rallies.

None-

theless, after eight vears

of fundamentalist

propaganda, the Jamaat

in these favorable

circumstances

won

only eight of the sixty-

approval of

women being heard on teleand on the radio, expressing disapproval of "fanatics" who thought that women's voices should not be heard. FBIS-

three

vision

the voters rejected almost

NES-90-I67, 28 August 1990,

him. Iqbal, Islamisation, pp. 130-31. In the

p.

67.

27. The urgency of economic improvement was brought home by arson and rioting in Tehran in July and August of

dates

contested

who had

national

been

seats. all

Likewise,

of the candi-

involved

in

the

Zia government or closely associated with

1988

elections, the Jamaat-i-Islami

was able

to win three seats in parliament, while the

party of Benazir Bhutto, the nemesis of the

THE FUNDAMENTALIST IMPACT

IN IRAN. PAKISTAN.

AND THE SUDAN

147

Jamaat, got ninety-three. Malise Ruthven,

ity

A

In

of the punishments that they meted out. 1985 Amnesty published a special re-

and the Katie ofIslam (London: Chatto and Windus,

port,

1990),

Prisoners

Satanic Affair: Salman Rushdie

p. 108.

32. Pervez Amirali Hoodbhov and Abdul Hasmeed Nayyar, "Rewriting the History

of Pakistan," ed., Islam,

Mohammed

in

Politics

Experience

istan

and

Asghar Khan, The Pak-

the State:

(London:

Zed,

1985),

Courts

Trial and Treatment of Political Convicted bv Special Military

The 1986 Amnesty

in Pakistan."

33. Pakistan:

A

201 —

Country Study, pp.

In-

Report detailed the ways that the operations of the courts violated international legal standards, including their lack of independence from the military authorities, ternational

and

their unfair procedures,

164-77.

pp.

"The

their denial

of

the right to appeal. Amnesty International

1986 (London: Amnesty Interna-

Report,

32,225.

tional Publications), p. 248.

An

34.

introduction

excellent

to

this

Khawar Mumtaz and Farida Shaheed's Women of Pakistan: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back (London: Zed Books, 1987). topic

40.

is

exceptionally thorough account

of the disputes and conflicts between fundamentalists and the

Ahmadis and

riots that these led to

the 1953

can be found in docu-

ments widely known as the Munir Report. It w as published as Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954

Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 (Lahore: Government Printing, 1954).

to

36. Note,

XX of Implications on Human Ordinance

"Pakistan

1984: International

Rights," Loyola of Los Anneles International

and Comparative Law Journal 9 (1987) 667. By 1986 at least two Ahmadis had been

Politics

236-37; 223-26.

pp. pp.

An

35.

Mumtaz Ahmad, The

ter,

"Pakistan," in Islamic

of

A

Pakistan:

Hun-

Revivalism,

Country Study,

41. An excellent survey of the conflicts between the proponents of Islamization and feminists can be found in Mumtaz and Shaheed, Women of Pakistan, pp. 71-162. 42. Rashda Patel, Islamisation of Laws in Pakistan? (Karachi: Faiza, 1986), p. 59.

43.

Mumtaz and

kistan, pp.

44. See tion

Shaheed, Women of Pa-

77-78.

Ann

Elizabeth Maver, "Islamiza-

and Taxation

in

Pakistan," in Anita

Weiss, ed.. Islamic Rcassertiou in Pakistan:

The Application of Islamic Laws

in a

Modern

:

sentenced to death under the Ordinance

State (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,

Omar Asghar Khan, and Economic Aspects of Islamisation," in Khan, Islam, Politics and the State, pp. 127-63. 1986), pp. 59-77;

"Political

683).

(p.

The group was

37.

bad

in

arrested in Abbota-

January 1990. Sec Amnesty Interna-

tional Repent,

1991

(New

York:

Amnesty

International, 1991), p. 176.

38. In this Zia

titude toward his regime

would have had the sup-

port of the Jamaat-i-Islami. See Ruthven,

A

Satanic Affair, p. 108. However, in an earlier election, at a time litical

when

it

served their po-

goals to support the candidacy of Jin-

had argued that there were no Islamic grounds for objecting to a female leader. Kalim Bahadur, The Jama'ati-Islami of Pakistan: Political Thought and Political Action (New Delhi: Chetana Publications, 1977), pp. 106-10. naffs sister, the Jamaat

39.

The annual

45. Zia's mistrust of the level of popular

support for Islamization and the public

reports of Amnestv Inter-

national regularly criticized rights violations

caused bv the military courts and the brutal-

is

amendments when he ended martial law constitutional

at-

evinced in the

that he in

imposed

1985. Clearly

anticipating challenges to the legitimacy of his acts

under martial law, Zia had added to

the constitution provisions validating

all

ac-

of the martial law regime, including those of the martial law courts, and immunizing them from any kind of questioning on any grounds, as well as barring any tions

prosecution or legal

proceedings

against

persons acting on behalf of the martial law regime. 46. Materials in the

Shaheed provide good

book by Mumtaz and illustrations

of femi-

Ann Elizabeth Mayer 148

nist reactions.

See also Patel, Islamisation,

78-82, 92-93, 120-27, 213-14.

pp.

Some background on the agitation, which the Jamaat-i-Islami seems likely to have been involved, is given in Ruthven, A Satanic Affair, pp. 107-8. 47.

in

48. The London Times, p. 13.

26 October 1990,

Credible evidence that there had been

vote rigging bv Bhutto's foes belatedly sur-

New

York

Times,

5

New

York

Times,

11

faced. p.

p.

August 1991,

A2. 49.

A5.

Street Journal reporter, "Pakistan's Free

keteer," Wall Street Journal,

Mar-

11 Julv 1991,

A10. 15

April

1991,

71-72. FBIS-NES-91071, 54-59.

12

April

1991,

The

strife

and breakdown

in

law and

in the

Wall Street Jour-

31 July 1991,

p. Al;

FBIS-NES-91,

July 1991, pp.

p.

p.

1

52-55.

Wall Street Journal, 9 August 1991,

A6; New York Times, 19 November 1991, A17.

p.

Wall Street Journal, 23 October 1991,

Al. 57.

A

helpful survey of the complicated

background and the

entations of different groups

Sudanese 58. For

lan-

of the

oil

discovery in the south and signifi-

the Southern Regional

Government

to the

government; the Shari'a law replaced

a secular system

of the

life

p. 14.

of the country."

(The "language

ar-

a retraction

of

the policies in place prior to the 1972 Addis

which Arabic was promoted in languages and English, which had become the lingua franca of the nonMuslim South.) Numayri's 1983 adoption accords, in lieu

of

of

local

his Islamization policy coincided

with

a

of the previous policy of official efto establish Arabic as the language of

revival

As already noted, Islamization in Sudan has been associated with a policv of Arabization. In 1987 Francis Deng, a die Sudan.

leading southern Sudanese intellectual, in

Politics,"

Orient 26 (1985):

background on

this, see

Abdul-

An-Na'im, "The Elusive Islamic Constitution: The Sudanese Experience," Orient

26 (1985): 329-40. 59. Gabriel Warburg, "Islam in Sudanese Politics,"

in

Politics

Michael Curtis, in

the

ed., Relijjion

Middle East (Boulder,

Colo.: Westview, 1981), p. 315.

Deng and

Gifford, eds.. The Search for Peace

Prosser

and Unity

Sudan (Washington, D.C.: Wilson

Center Press, 1987),

p. 14.

Numavri

era, said that the

most

critical areas

of debate were religion and, to a lesser extent, language and insisted that the Sudan be organized along secular lines because "to adopt an official religion or discriminate between religions in any way can only breed discontent, resentment, and hostility with the risk of endangering not only national unity, but indeed the very survival

of the na-

Mading Deng, "Myth and ReSudanese Identity," in Deng and The Search for Peace, pp. 67-68.

tion." Francis ality

Bona Malwal, "The Roots of Current

Contention," in Francis the

which promoted one

guage over others; the economic and financial arrangements were reviewed in the wake

discussing North-South tensions in the post-

in

lahi

in

an attempt to return to the

Khalid

is

572-600.

60.

in

political ori-

Duran, "The Centrifugal Force of Religion

and

.

the

religious

in

.

original policies

forts

56.

to

partly

and regulation of public life in the countrv and partlv to weaken the autonomy in the south security and military arrangements were changed, the language arrangement

rangement" referred to was

order are described

55.

agreement,

the

Malwal, The Roots,

53. Ibid., p. 57.

nal,

before

strengthen fundamentalist religious control

central

52.

54.

quo

cant financial powers were reassigned from

51. FBIS-NES-91072,

pp.

policy as follows: "In

was canceled

veyed in an interview with an Asian Wall

pp.

1983 changes in 1983 The Addis Ababa Agreement was illegally revised by the action of one man supported by groups whose main aim was to return to the status

the significance of the

.

1991,

April

50. See the positive impression he con-

p.

Bona Malwal, one of the most politiprominent Southerners, summarized

61. callv

in

Prosser,

62.

A

scathingly

negative

been painted of Numavri by

former Nimeiry

colleague.

and

the

See

portrait

has

a disillusioned

Mansour.

Revolution

Khalid,

of Dis-May

THE FUNDAMENTALIST IMPACT

AND THE SUDAN

IN IRAN. PAKISTAN. 149

(London: KPI Limited. 1985). See also comments in Peter Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: The Unstable State (BoulLvnne Rienner Publishers, 1990), der: pp. 175-76, 186, 215, 254. In the period of his Islamization policy. Numayri was also closelv associated with Adnan Khashoggi, the infamous Saudi Arabian middleman and

who

arms dealer sonnage

has figured as a central per-

in several

major international cor-

63. These

comments

interviews

on

are based

communities during research

in

Khartoum

December 1984- January 1985. Aspects

of the laws and the predicament that thev created

described

are

fee

in

Ann

Elizabeth

—

made

that millions of dollars had

obtain this extraordinary conces-

officials to

sion. This contract

discussed in Khalid,

is

Xwicin: pp. 380-82.

was immediately

It

when Numayri was overthrown.

hundreds of African were flogged and imprisoned be-

67. For example,

women

cause thev manufactured and sold a nutritious and mildly alcoholic beer, a staple of their traditional diet, the sale

used to obtain lies.

money

Alcohol had become prohibited to non-

8, 25-62. Among other whole principle of limited liability seemed to be undermined bv the new laws. There was risk of criminal liability being imposed bv the courts of decisive justice for "offenses" in violation of Shari'a principles that were not stipulated as such in the penal laws. Thus, for example, in 1984 at a time when interest was not criminalized and was being routinely charged, a hapless Hindu merchant was suddenly singled out and arrested for charging interest in violation of Shari'a rules. He was sentenced to a flogging of ninety lashes, ten years in jail, confiscation of his personal property, and an S8 million fine. Ibid., pp. 25-26. A person

for acts that fundamentalist

i

March 1985):

connected

to

the

Indian

Khartoum told the author ment of the merchant was tives

community inspired by

mo-

Women's

Status

from Fundamentalist Regime," News from Africa Watch, 9 April 1990; "Women under Sudan's Fundamentalist Regime," Middle East International, 3 August 1990, 65.

The

p.

20.

reports of Amnesty International

covering the years

1983-85 provide many

details

of the collapse of legality and the rule

of law

in this

man

period and the consequent hu-

standards.

68.

Woodward, Sudan,

69.

The author attended

66.

A

striking

example of the kind of

deal that could be openly carried out

was

pp.

170-71. the large and

New Year's Eve party thrown bv the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum on 30 December 1984. Alcohol flowed freely, but there was little risk of arrest, because the Sudanese government had placed guards around the premises to ensure that its American paymasters would not be disturbed bv any zealous enforcers of Islamic boisterous outdoor

morality.

Documentation of some of the policy

70.

considerations leading to U.S. support for

Numavri,

as well as

can be found

the

some in the

criticisms

Hearing before

Africa of the

mittee on Foreign Affairs,

of the

testimony in Su-

Prospects,

Subcommmitee on

Com-

House of Rep-

Ninety-eighth Congress, 2d March 1984. Especially interestSudan sections of the Country

resentatives,

Session, 28

ing are the

Reports on in

Human

Rights Practices issued

February of 1984, 1985, and 1986 by the

U.S. Department of State, which report not just

on

the rights situation in the

provide

rights violations.

Muslims con-

cording to African cultural and religious

dan: Problems and 64. "Sudan: Threat to

Muslims under Numayri,

sidered crimes but that were innocuous ac-

latter,

of personal revenge.

as well as

with the result that Africans were punished

in

that the punish-

of which they

to support their fami-

Muslims

8

for a filing

been passed under the table to government

Mayer, "Islamization: Business Is Definitely Not As Usual," Middle East Executive Reports things, the

all

of about S125. The assumption was

widely

exten-

conducted bv the author

with members of the legal and business

in

the Sudan's natural resources

abrogated

ruption scandals.

sive

Numayri made widi Khashoggi in September of 1984 which gave Khashoggi 50 percent ownership of all

the public agreement

statistics

on

Sudan but

the level of assistance

being afforded by the U.S. government. 71.

An

account of this case bv one of Ta-

Ann Elizabeth Mayer 150

ha's

most prominent

lamic

Law

found

disciples can be

Ahmed An-Na'im, "The

Abdullahi

in

of Apostasy and

Modern

Its

Sudan," Religion

Applicability to the

Is-

16

(1986): 197-224. 72.

The

text

of this document along with

and

legal

developments can be found

in the

content.

.

questions

.

equally to

in Albert

Blaustein

the Countries of the

World (Dobbs Ferry:

Oceana, 1989). There was

Constitutions

of

a stipulation that

both the Shari'a and "custom" (which could

mean Arab or

African custom)

should be the main source of legislation,

which had

also

been included

in the

1973

constitution. 73.

Woodward, Sudan,

pp.

commit-

is

.

with

.

democratic and secular

a

so that the Sudan belongs irrespective

all

of

race, religion,

family background, or any other sectarian

Lam

consideration."

War and

Its

The Search for

Deng and

Prosser,

Peace, p. 19.

77. "Sudan: Sudanese

ganizations,"

"The Present

Akol,

Solution," in

Human Rights Or-

News from Africa Watch, 4 No-

vember 1991. 78. John Voll has pointed out how out of keeping with Sudanese democratic and

206-27.

ongoing civil war, no voting in parts of the

74. Because of the there could be

as slogans

have concrete

The SPLM/SPLA

.

...

of the Sudan" 1985,

eds..

.

not

rights,

realities that

teed to solving the nationality and religious

context

potentially

human

respect for

"Transitional Constitution of the Republic

and Gisbert Flanz,

Su-

Democracy which embodies equality', freedom, economic and social justice, and

dan.

but as concrete

an interesting survey of releyant historical

New

the establishment of a democratic

South affected by the conflict, so a large segment of the African Sudanese who would

egalitarian traditions the authoritarian, re-

of the Bashir regime are and

pressive policies

how

antithetical

Sudanese

its

intolerant attitude

political culture.

John

is

to

Voll, "Su-

certainly have voted against the Islamic fun-

dan: State and Society in Crisis," Middle

damentalists did not have their votes

East Journal

tallied.

Antifundamentalist groups worked against the candidacy of Turabi,

who

lost his elec-

44

(1990):'

575-95.

79. In addition to being based

on

infor-

mation shared by Sudanese acquaintances

Ummah

Party

of the author,

got 38.2 percent of the votes, the

DUP

supplied by Africa Watch, which has been

tion. In the actual tally, the

29.5 percent, and the

However,

it

is

NIF

18.4 percent.

important to note that

in

the normal, geographically based voting districts,

the

NIF got

twenty-eight of

its

total

this

regularly reporting

man

account

on

rests

on

details

the deteriorating hu-

under the Bashir government. Samples of die reports include "Sudan: Destruction of the Independent rights situation

The remaining twenty-

Secular

three were obtained only through votes cast

Clamps

through the Sudan's oddly designed "graduate constituencies," which were tailor-made

tember 1989); "Political Detainees in the Sudan" (24 October 1989); "Sudan, Khar-

of fifty-one

for

control

seats.

the

via

discipline

and

funded organization of the NIF. For see

Woodward, Sudan,

p.

well-

details,

207. The result of

the NIF's ability to dominate the graduate

constituencies

meant

that the

NIF was

prob-

ably substantially overrepresented in pro-

portion to

its

numerical support

among

Sudanese voters. 75. His positions are outlined in

Man-

sour Khalid, ed., John Garang Speaks (Lon-

don: KPI, 1987).

Lam Akol, one SPLM/SPLA leaders, at a conference 1987: "The SPLM/SPLA is committed to

76. See the statement bv

of the in

toum:

Judiciary:

Down on

Government Freedom" (25 Sep-

Military

Press

Government to Execute

Striking

Doctors," "The Provinces: Militia Killings

and Starvation Policy Return" (6 December 1989); "Sudan: Recent Developments in Khartoum, an Update" (13 December 1989); "Political Detainees in Sudan: Academics" (22 January 1990); "Sudan: The Massacre at al Jebelein" (23 January 1990). Maiw of the findings presented in these and other reports have been compiled in "Denying the Honor of Living," Sudan: A Human Rights Disaster, an Africa Watch Report, March 1990. 80. "Sudan:

Suppression

of

Informa-

THE FUNDAMENTALIST IMPACT

IN IRAN. PAKISTAN.

AND THE SUDAN

151

rion,"

News from Africa Watch, 30 August

1990, pp. 23-24. In actuality, the torturers were demonstrating how greatlv the values

presented

Held

"Iran:

in

Dissidents,

Political

and attitudes of fundamentalism had shaped own understanding of what Islam per-

Arc Reportedlv Sentenced," News from Middle East Watch, 3 September 1991, and the September 1991 release from the Lawyers Committee for

mitted or forbade. American fundamentalist

Human

their

of evolution

strictures against the teaching

have until recently not had

Muslim world,

many

counter-

for over a Year,

Rights, "Action Update: Islamic Re-

public of Iran, Ali Ardalan." See also

New

York Times, 12 September 1991, p. A9.

few Muslims

86. After presenting the opinions of his

have found any contradictions between the

interviewees, the author summarizes aspects

parts in the

natural sciences

and

as

their religion.

81. See articles in the

New

of their views

York Times,

October 1990, p. A6; 31 October 1990, A3; 8 November 1990, p. A20; 11 December 1990, p. A15.

much

government, thev

5

a

p.

for the well-being

82. "Sudan:

Violates Basic

New Islamic Penal Code Human Rights," News from

nomic

The announcement can be

read in

FBIS-N-5-9 1-083, 30 April 1991, Not all prisoners were released. 84.

New

York Times International,

1

cember 1991, p. A7; New York Times national, 26 Januarv 1992, p. A12. 85. is

The new wave of repression

discussed in Iran: Violations of

Rights,

decline,

in that

in

Amnesty

Reviewing the

of the

In-

International reported that

period thousands of political prison-

had been executed, including a total of about twenty-five hundred in a few months of 1988. Reports of the cases of the nine persons imprisoned and later punished are ers

.

.

.

They condemn against

officials

the

of

the former government, the harsh punish-

reject the clergy's

three

should provide

subjects. Instead,

unemployment, of general lack of care for the

vengefulness

Inter-

Human

last

regime's

ment of moral ment of Islamic

1990

its

inflation,

3 De-

1987-1990 (New York: Amnesty

ternational, 1990). years,

11.

p.

believe,

of

inequality, injustice, repression, decline

people's condition.

83.

rind

there are warfare, bloodshed, refugees, eco-

education, and a

Africa Watch, 9 April 1991.

"Nor can they

as follows:

Islam in the Islamic government. Such

offenders, and the enforcerules

by violent means. They

dominant

because they

state,

government's

blatant

role in the affairs feel it

causes the

failure."

Reinhold

Loefiier, Islam in Practice: Religious Beliefs in

a Persian Village (Albany: p.

SUNY,

1988),

226. 87. In Iran in late 1991 there were even

once vilified by fundamentalists and disgraced for being hints that Avatollah Montazeri,

too moderate, might be being habilitated.

officially re-

See FBIS-NES-9 1-233,

cember 1991, pp. 52-54.

4 De-

CHAPTER 8

Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt:

The

Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups

Strategies of the

Abdel Azim Ramadan

Fundamentalism before 1970 CCT7

V undamentalists"

usuliyyun)

is

a

(rendered in Arabic as

Western term that the Arabic references and sources do not

references describe the

Muslim Brotherhood's members simply

use. 1

Arabic

as "radicals." 2

Hasan

al-Banna, the founder of the Brotherhood, described his mission as a "salafiyya

He

3 ditional, or literally, 'ancestral'] mission."

Muhammadan,

Islamic society,

which follows the way of the Noble Qur'an, takes the

path of the Great Prophet, does not deviate from what has

Book,

his Messenger's

in the

come down

to us in God's

Sunna, and the conduct of the venerable forefathers." 4 The

name "fundamentalist" appeared groups

[tra-

described his society as a "Qur'anic,

time of Sadat;

it

in the

Egyptian press with the

was used to

distinguish

rise

of militant Islamic

them from the Muslim Broth-

erhood. The Egyptian press called these fundamentalists "Islamic groups" or "extremist

religious groups."

When

they resorted to violence, the

name

"terrorist religious

groups" was applied to them. Because they adopted the concepts of jahiliyya (preIslamic idolatrous society), al-hakimiyya (God's sovereignty), and al-takfir (branding

with atheism), these groups were considered trend, while the

Muslim Brotherhood was

a part

of the modern

largely considered a part

Islamic trend. 5 For the purposes of this chapter, however,

two forms of fundamentalism,

we

radical Islamic

of the traditional

will consider these as

the former a radical fundamentalism, the latter a

moderate mainstream fundamentalism. Both large groupings were committed in the 1970s and 1980s to the implementation of Islamic law in Egypt, but thev differed in important ways in their strategies for bringing

The term "fundamentalist" withdraw from secular

life

in Islam, then,

and return to 152

this about.

does not apply to those

earlier

forms of religious

who

life.

wish to

Rather,

it

FUNDAMENTALIST INFLUENCE

EGYPT

IN

153

applies to those beliefs,

who

to return to

wish to renew Islam by working to purify

it

from spurious

principles, to reconcile Islam with the requirements

its first

of the

modern age, to consider Islam as an appropriate instrument for government, and to insist on Islam's capacity to "push the wheels of progress" rather than to rely on Western secular political structures and laws. The Salafiwin opposed the "Westernizers,"

who

Western

adopted secular Western thought and were influenced by the lure of the

lifestyle.

After the modernization of Egypt during the reign of Muhammad Ali and Isma'il in the nineteenth century, the leadership

ternizers.

The changes

of political and

ownership

life

passed to the Wes-

productive relationships during that period

in

tenure from the system of Iltizam (tax-farming) to private land

social

— led to the

rise

of a new

monopoly and

—

shifts in land

to a system of

These changes

social class.

in eco-

nomic and

social life

had

introduction to Western thought with the student missions to Europe and

its first

the translation

were

reflected in the intellectual

life

of Egyptian society, which

movement. Education was transformed from the

Kuttabs (Qur'anic mosque schools) to studied sciences and foreign languages.

thought arose to contest with the

a

traditional system

of

svstcm of modern schools where students

A new educated class

men of religion ulama) (

influenced by European

centered in the great

Is-

lamic university of al- Azhar in Cairo. 6 In the beginning, the Salafiyyin sought to counter the Westernizing trend by tying

work and

religion to

to jihad (used here in the sense

fighting the corruption

hammad Abduh, modern

and otherworldly mysticism of the

Sufi orders.

Shaykh Mu-

leader of the reforming Salafiyyin, called for the introduction of

sciences into the

He

haul.

of internal struggle), and by

al-

Azhar curriculum

as part

of its complete educational over-

urged Muslims to learn European languages and use them to benefit the

Islamic sciences. 7 Meanwhile,

Shaykh Ali

the caliphate as the legitimate Islamic basis in the

Abd al-Raziq was the first Muslim to attack

form of government;

Qur'an or the Prophet's Sunna.

lamic history, saying that

it

He condemned

had, he said, no textual its

role

was "a scourge on Islam and Muslims and

it

throughout a source

and corruption." Not a generation had passed without an attempt on the caliph. In theory, the caliphate

was based on

Raziq maintained,

on

caliphate

it

rested only

and held that

systems. 8 This reform

God had

movement

elective consensus; in reality,

arbitrary power.

He called for the

Qur'an

catching up with the

modern

of a

Abd

al-

given Muslims the freedom to choose their political also maintained that the decline in the conditions

in light

alien to Islam's first principles

life

abolition of the

Muslims derived from the stagnation of Islamic thought, the cessation of interpretation of the

Is-

of evil

of

ijtihad (re-

of current needs), and the adoption of new

beliefs

which had paralyzed Muslims, preventing them from

age. 9

War I, in the political climate created by the nationalist revolution of reform movement entered a new stage. Copts and Muslims participated

After World

1919,

this

together in the revolt against the British occupation, and Atatiirk's Turkey provided a

model tion

for secularization. Indeed, Turkey's turn

of religion from the

state, its abolition

education, law, and literature, and

its

toward the West followed

of the caliphate,

its

its

separa-

Westernization of

adoption of European dress. At the same time

Abdel Azim Ramadan 154

the Westernizing trend intensified in Egypt, under the belief that the only achieve

what Western

of Western

civilization has achieved

Hadn't modern Japan successfully taken on the

civilization.

pects of Western civilization,

footing?

During the 1920s Egyptian

force, acquired an education,

lygamy and

now able to women abandoned

and wasn't

way

was to adopt the substance and

even participated in

the

politics,

veil,

essential as-

on an equal entered the work

stand with

it

it

and began to

criticize

for elimination of the Shari'a (Islamic law) courts. Egyptian

call

turned to European

lifestyles in their dress,

religious education at al-Azhar to

po-

men

customs, and thinking; vouth turned from

modern

sciences

and embraced the principle of

freedom. 10

intellectual

Naturally, this social transformation alarmed the religious fundamentalists in

Azhar and Dar aPUlum, the

working

class,

al-

and the Manor magazine school of students

Sufi orders,

of Shaykh Rashid Rida. These fundamentalists were descended from geoisie,

to

spirit

petite bour-

and peasant roots; they were unable to bear the exorbitant

educational expenses which British occupation had imposed and thus were forced to turn to the only type of education that was free at the time, the training colleges

— Dar

al-iJlum and al-Azhar. 11

The fundamentalist movement which tion followed the path of confrontation

ment of moral

disintegration, a

wave of Westernizawhat was considered a move-

arose in response to this

and

resistance to

wave of "apostasy and obscenity." Hasan al-Banna,

a

teacher at an elementary school in Ismailiyya in 1927, challenged religious leaders to

defend Islam from these encroachments: "If Islam [were]

and the ulama would disappear too, and you [wouldn't] spend." u In

this early

lost in this nation, al-Azhar

find

food to eat or money to

phase the fundamentalist movement commingled religion with

the interests of a class fearing extinction under the advance of secularists.

It

had no

well-defined ideology; the goal was merely to hold fast to the basic principles of Islam in the face

of obscenity and apostasy. The

first

steps included the formation

of Islamic

societies, the publishing of Islamic newspapers, preaching, and providing guidance to

The Muslim Brotherhood, begun by Hasan al-Banna in Ismailiyya in March 1927, was thus a purely religious society, a reformist Islamic movement. Its goal was to bring up vouth in accordance with proper Islamic ethics, and to dissemi-

the people.

nate the merits and purposes of Muhammadan prophecy, including the moral virtues

of truthfulness,

chastity,

and good

13 social relations.

With these simple

principles, over

which there was no disagreement, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to draw the attention of the masses of the people and to extend branches into other cities, like

Abu

Port Said, Suez,

Suwair, and al-Bahr al-Saghir.

Cairo in October 1932, and after one first

newspaper,

a weekly,

year there were

Its

moved

to

May 1933

its

headquarters was

fifty'

branches. In

appeared under the name The Muslim Brotherhoods

With missionary work and the passage of time, it became necessary for the Brothits ideological positions on a number of political issues. There is

erhood to define

some evidence

that al-Banna relied

upon

the

Manar

school in doing so. 15

The

basic

elements of al-Banna's ideology were the oneness of the religious world and the lay world, of religion and state; the belief in pan-Islamism in the face of Egyptian nationalism

16

(this

accounts for the spread of the Muslim Brotherhood outside Egypt, par-

FUNDAMENTALIST INFLUENCE

IN

EGYPT

155

ticuJarlv into the

Sudan, Syria, and the Maghreb);

I7

the adherence to the concept of

the caliphate as a svmbol of Islamic unity; and the establishment of an Islamic govern-

ment as the final goal. 18 The Muslim Brotherhood was thus the first Islamic association to appear in modern Egypt with the goal of seizing power. Hasan al-Banna considered noninvolvement in politics an "Islamic crime." The Brotherhood was also the first Islamic association to shift orders,

from the

its activities

traditional Islamic centers such as al-Azhar, the Sufi

and the uneducated popular

sway to the secular

universities

classes over

and the educated

which

religion

had great

classes influenced

spiritual

bv Western

cul-

19

ture. The Brotherhood shifted the responsibility for establishing Islamic government from the religiously educated class to the Western inculturcd class, from the shavkhs to the lawyers, doctors, engineers, pharmacists, and army and police officers. This was a significant development in the history of contemporary Egypt because it linked pan-Islamic Egypt before World War I to nationalist Egypt after the war, just as it linked religion to modern science, and so prevented Egypt from joining Turkey

in a

headlong rush toward Westernization.

The cal

powers

Egyptian set the

work of the Muslim Brotherhood soon led to clashes with the politiEgypt. The Brotherhood saw the royal palace as the force dominating

political in

political life,

Brotherhood

which was struggling tion

of

British forces

protect the

and so avoided

at

it

at

with

it

and even bargained with allied to the

it.

Wafd

This

Party,

for independence, constitutional

government, and the evacua-

from Egypt. The Brotherhood

also created a secret

movement from

This in turn set

conflict

odds with the major popular forces

army

to

the hostility of the state (and in due time to seize power).

odds with the

political system,

which ruled the country according

to a semiliberal constitution. In 1948 Egyptian Prime Minister Nuqrashi directed a

preemptive blow against the Brotherhood bv dissolving the organization and detainits leaders. Both he and Hasan al-Banna paid with their lives for this clash. AlBanna was succeeded as Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood bv Hasan al-Hudavbi. Under his leadership the Brotherhood was the first to support the military officers of the July Revolution in order to strike a blow at liberalism. But amicable relations did not last long. The officers ordered the Brotherhood dissolved on 14 lanuarv 1954. The conflict reached a climax when the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Abdcl

ing

Nasser in Alexandria.

During

Its

this critical

undergoing profound

leaders

were

jailed for

terms of five to ten years. 20

period for the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian society was

social

changes different from those that had produced the ide-

ology of Hasan al-Banna. The older transformations had not touched the

society's

productive relations, the essence of which remained semifeudal-semicapitalist, despite the rapid

movement toward

of Egypt (Bank Misr)

in

capitalist

production with the founding of the Bank

1920. Between 1952 and 1964, however, semifeudal-

semicapitalist productive relations yielded to capitalist productive relations with the

agrarian reform laws of 1952, then to socialist productive relations with the nationalization laws

of July 1961. Owing to these changes, the semifeudal

class, which had was brought down by the agrarian reform laws. In of the capitalist class, which had revived somewhat under the

ruled before the July Revolution,

1961 there came the

fall

Abdel Azim Ramadan 156

revolution, through the Egyptianization law of 1957.

The

petite bourgeoisie

and the

masses of workers and peasants thus came to the fore, but without exerting anv

influ-

ence on the government, owing to the complete control of the officers of the July

Revolution over the country. Their imposition of dictatorship and their imprisoning

of

all

left,

political opposition,

from the extreme Islamic right to the extreme communist

prevented these emergent classes from taking anv substantive role in the processes

of government.

The

reactionary, submissive social values characteristic

faded with the semifeudal

modern

class.

With

values typical of industrial secular societies.

created a

huge bureaucratic

of semifcudal

societies

agricultural reform

The 1961

which grew even

class,

and

industrialization

came

nationalization laws

larger after the revolutionary

leaders appointed university graduates to jobs in public factories or public administra-

tion whether their services

were required or not. These changes were accompanied by

the spread of secular socialist thought at the hands of the sole political organization

of the revolution, the "Socialist Union." Nationalization was seen ism. Egyptian

communists and

socialist press

(which the revolution tolerated) to publish proper

They

encouraged

as equal to social-

this naive belief,

and used the thought.

socialist

also accepted the Socialist Union's invitations to deliver educational

logical lectures in the filled

socialists

and ideo-

Union's youth camps in Helwan and elsewhere. The media were

with their writings and broadcasts; the weekly al-Ahram was an arena in which

socialist writers vied for public acceptance.

Egypt established warmer

relations with the Soviet

in 1955, assistance in building the

High Dam, and

a

Union, which provided arms

promise of support to counter

the West's arming of Israel. Egypt's pro-Soviet policies negatively affected

with the Islamic Arab

West

in general

states

and on the United States

reached a high point in 1962,

relations

its

(most notably Saudi Arabia), which depended on the

when

in particular.

Egyptian-Saudi tensions

two countries supported opposite

the

sides dur-

ing the revolution in North Yemen.

Muslim Brothers anxiously watched these developments fallen into the hand of the communist athelong presence in the prisons had isolated them from society. 21 One

In the early 1960s, the

and concluded that Egyptian society had ists.

The

Brothers'

such prisoner, Sayyid Qutb, forged a

new

Egyptian society completely, along with liyya. Belief in

God's divinity and belief

defining marks of an Islamic society.

by humans. Muslim

societies

It

ideology for the Brotherhood.

all

He

rejected

other societies which he considered jahi-

in the Five Pillars

must

also reject

all

were no longer

sufficient

laws and traditions

governed by human laws are

in reality

considered praver and belief in God's divinity inadequate as long as a

pagan.

man

made Qutb

conferred

upon other than God. Thus, he branded all Islamic societies with atheism and considered them kafir (atheist). This was unprecedented in the history' of the Islamic movements in modern Egypt and constituted a break from the sovereignty (hakimiyya)

ideology of Hasan al-Banna.

Qutb drew many of his

ideas

and some of his terms from

a

book by

the Pakistani

thinker Abul Ala Maududi. Qutb's writings proved controversial even within the

Brotherhood, which suffered a

split

when Hasan al-Hudaybi

rejected them. 22

A vio-

FUNDAMENTALIST INFLUENCE

IN

EGYPT

157

vouth movement espoused Qutb's cause, but he was executed

lent

influence

waned within

in

1965 and

his

the ranks of the Brotherhood. But other Islamic groups took

up his cause: radicalism leading to armed violence passed from the Muslim Brotherhood itself, only to be taken up bv takfir secret organizations. Thus, two major strands of fundamentalism developed in Egyptian society after 1965 with different strategics and

levels

of impact.

The

Ideologies of the Takfir Organizations

Two

vears after the execution of Sayyid Qutb, in 1967, Egypt's defeat in the Six Day War ended the conflict between the July Revolution and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Israeli occupation of Sinai brought other political issues to the fore, especially after Abdel Nasser stirred nationalist feeling through what was known as the War of Attrition.

There followed vears of preparation for the 1973 October War. In

general context a

number of secret

this

Islamic organizations arose in Egypt.

The Military Technical College Organization 1967 the

became more powerfully attractive to extremist youth groups emerging from the Muslim Brotherhood and to other more radical and violent religious groups. Some of them formed secret organizations aimed After

at

overthrowing the

varied

of hakimivya and

ideas

state

takfir

and establishing an Islamic government. The idea of

ing the ruler alone with atheism to so branding the whole society with him.

and most dangerous of these organizations appeared the leadership of Salih

Abd

1948 defeat of the of his party

allied

at the

in Palestine.

Lebanon, and

Iraq.

first

member of

group founded by Taqi al-Din al-Nabohani

Arab armies

in Jordan, Syria,

The

beginning of 1974 under

Allah Siriyya, a Palestinian. Siriyya began as a

the Islamic Liberation Parrs', a

lish

takfir

from one Islamic organization to another; interpretations ranged from brand-

after the

Al-Nabahani established branches

He

sought to take power and estab-

an Islamic society by force. Salih Siriyya

wed

the Islamic Liberation Party's idea of taking

Qutb's (and Maududi's) ideas of hakimivya and ganization's principles, goals, and plan

of action,

previous Islamic societies (including the their failure.

To

Siriwa, his predecessors'

approach to seizing power

— bv

first

takfir.

as

power by

force with

His notebook detailed

formed by

his or-

his critical study

of

Muslim Brotherhood) and the reasons for most important mistake was their gradualist

preparing the individual, then preparing the so-

then ultimately establishing the Islamic state. This was the strategy adopted by Supreme Guides of the Muslim Brotherhood and endorsed by Sayyid Qutb. Siriyya argued that the right course of action was first to seize control of the state through the overthrow of the Egyptian order. Muslims could then proceed directly

ciety,

the

to the task of creating a society shaped according to their Siriyya

expanded the membership of his organization but

own

goals and beliefs. 23

failed in his

attempt to take

over the Military Technical College in April 1974 (the event from which his group

Abdel Azim Ramadan 158

took

name). The Muslim Brotherhood, on good terms with Sadat

its

condemned

The The

of Salih

failure

at the time,

the attempt.

Muslims

Society of the

Siriyya's organization

had an

upon

effect

Musknown as al-Takfir The Society of the

the Society of the

an organization founded by Shukri Mustafa and popularly

lims,

w'al-Hijra

"charging with atheism and emigration").

(literally,

Muslims dropped

—

at least

temporarily

— the

idea of taking over the state

adopted a new idea which Salih Ashmawi had introduced

in

1954 during

first

and

his struggle

with al-Hudaybi for the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood: the idea of emigraThis doctrine held that there must be an emigration of the good elements of

tion.

for God and His mission, and for Islam and its Shari'a, to a place growth of the Islamic concept and the flourishing of the Muham-

who work

society

suitable for the

madan mission (much

Prophet's

like the

own

hijra to

Medina

in

622

c.E.). 24

Shukri Mustafa broadened the historical connotation of emigration, dividing the

He

concept into stages. ship

mosques

(i.e., all

in

called

on

non-Muslim places of worTrue Muslims would which God alone was worshiped, in

his followers to desert

Egypt not under the

society's control).

then leave their homeland for another land in

which

all

would be exorcised of their polytheism.

This having been done, retribution will descend upon them, and not us;

mercy

will

descend upon us, and

not

will

fall

upon them,

fall

as there

upon is no

intermingling or assimilation or confusion between truth and falsehood, and as

it

cannot be that

while

God would

basic principles are

its

still

assist a society that

pretends to support Islam,

Jahiliyya principles,

and

its

branches are inter-

twined with the branches of Jahiliyya. 25 After the emigration from the land of Egypt

war

— Muslims would prepare to

— the land of atheism and the abode of

fight atheist society'

and attack the existing

political

system so as to take over the reins of authority. Thus, the movement would follow the

same stages

hijra,

jihad)

as the historical

The

.

spread of Islam: Call, Emigration, Holy

would begin

fighting

defensively and

end

War

(da'wa,

offensively. 26

Shukri Mustafa embellished the idea of takfir with the following assertions: 1.

All sin

is

a kind

of polytheism; everything which

God

forbade

is

an atro-

cious crime. 2.

Because is

3.

4.

God imposed

every religious imperative as a condition in Islam,

necessary to perform

Even' Muslim

who

does not join

an

is

is

them

all.

If one

reached by the

infidel.

Infidels deserve death,

missed, the rest are of no

is

call

of the Society of the Muslims and

27

whether singly or

as a

group.

The

infidel's life's

blood, his wealth, and his family honor arc forfeit to the Muslim. 5.

It is

not permissible to name any mosque

those

who

prav there believe in

God and

and

God. 28

prayer, give zakat,

fear only

it

avail.

as a

mosque of God

unless

all

the day of judgment, perform

FUNDAMENTALIST INFLUENCE

IN

EGYPT

159

Mustafa's view of the exterior enemy, represented bv

He

view of the interior enemy, Egyptian society. ciety

from which the

eventual jihad.

faithful

When

and the

local

military conscription.

Muslims was eventually brought to

the Society of the

the

trial,

their position in the event that Jewish forces

its

enemv. 29 For

his

should emigrate to prepare and gather strength for the

members about should enter Egypt. They replied that Egyptian army, but rather would flee court questioned

was analogous to

Israel,

considered each a blasphemous so-

their society

would not fight in the ranks of the from both the incoming enemy encouraged its members to avoid

to a place safe

this reason, the society

-

30

Although the Society of the Muslims' plan was to emigrate government's unceasing pressure on

first

of all, the Egyptian

and the increased detention of

it

individual

its

members led the society to abduct al-Shavkh al-Dhahabi (the former minister of waqfi [Islamic

endowments]) on 4 July 1977, conditioning his release on the government's When the government showed signs of evasion, the

freeing of the society's detainees.

society lulled al-Dhahabi. In a few days, the

government arrested the perpetrators of

members of the society. were condemned to death.

the crime, as well as the rest of the

Shukri Mustafa and four others

On

31 November 1977,

The Jihad Organization At the same time, another extremist Organization. in the

in

Alexandria

in

organization also came to

who had

trial,

1975, the organization centered

province of al-Buhaira and in the town of Port Said.

engineer It

Formed

takfir

Ahmed

the Jihad

its activities

Amcr, an

Salih

received his degree from University of al-Mansoura, led the group.

consisted primarily of students of the universities and higher institutes. This orga-

nization

may be considered an

goals and tactics, that

is,

extension of Salih Siriwa's group

overthrowing the

The

"Islamization" of the infidel society. leaders

of Salih

throwing the

which aimed

An

at

Jihad's leadership

Sirivya's organization. Its tactical

state,

— both had the same

infidel state as the first step

toward the

sprang from the freed

methods aimed primarily

at over-

and thus did not mirror those of the Society of the Muslims,

withdrawing from the society to prepare for future empowerment.

ideological conflict soon broke out

between the two organizations. 31 Members of

the Jihad were arrested and charged in

November 1977 with

participating "in an

agreement of criminal aim to forcefully overthrow and change the constitution of the state, its

republican system, and

its

form, in that they established a secret organization

calling for Jihad against the existing regime,

pretext that the system

is

This organization was the

to bear the

first

applied to successive organizations. in

The

first

one of its members

who

its

annihilation bv force,

on the

escaped

arrest,

name

"Jihad," but the

name was

also

successor to the original Jihad appeared

Alexandria in 1979 and met the same fate as

year

and

with the regulations of the Islamic Sharra." 32

in conflict

its

predecessor in February 1980. That

Muhammad Abd

al-Salam Faraj, an en-

gineer in the administration of the University of Cairo, formed the third Jihad organization, the

one that eventually

religious imperative

of

killed Sadat. In

jihad), Faraj

unlike Shukri Mustafa, Sayyid

The Missing Ordinance

invoked the ideas of hakimiwa and

Qutb, and Salih

Siriyya,

each of

whom

(i.e.,

takfir.

the

But

had declared

Abdel Azim Ramadan 160

both the ruler and the society to be infidel. Faraj cited

was the

atheist, Faraj believed that the ruler alone

zfaftva (legal religious opinion) by the great

Damascene

"literalist"

scholar Shavkh al-Islam ibn Taymiyya

"Since the state

is

(1263-1328), which he interpreted to mean: ruled by the judgments of atheism despite the fact that its people

Muslims; and since the laws which are raised over the Muslims today are the laws

are

of atheism imposed on the Muslims by atheist Muslims, and jihad against the atheist is

and obligations which

state."

The

Islamic state all

is

it is

religious duty for

upon

all

who

rulers

The path

pass through the liberation of our

These blasphemous

Through

Islam.

blasphemv

is

men

this earth

more appropriate than

to liberate Jerusalem, Faraj believed,

own

countries from blasphemous rule.

rulers are responsible for the colonialism in the countries

and

nationalistic ideas

increases.

nationalist battles, their store

So they must be eliminated

as a prelude to the

under an Islamic leadership, for the liberation of the sacred

Muslims should save

and establish the

their energy

eruption of forces,

places. In other

state

of

of power and

of Islam

words,

and then

rather than emigrate to another country in order to establish the state there return,

all

holding the reins of

without revolutionary violence; the tyrants of

their subjects

fighting the distant foreign enemy. first

enjoined on

have forcefully imposed their abso-

not be overthrown except by the sword. Fighting them

must

God

Muslims whose country was

— an enemy represented by the

government. Muslims cannot depose rulers

will

peace for the

the nucleus from which to reestablish the "Islamic caliph-

Muslims anew. was the

occupied by the enemy

is

impossible to perform in the absence of the "Islamic

Faraj believed that jihad

lutism

hence there

rulers,

This jihad to establish the Islamic state

and an Islamic obligation, because

a religious ordinance

duties

ate" to unite

state."

in their

own

countrv and then go forth from

it

conquering. The onlv method validated bv Sharif

for establishing the Islamic state

is

fighting. 33

In the

summer of 1980,

Faraj decided to

form nationwide an armed

nization, thercbv taking advantage

of the

balancing

Egypt against each

rival political forces in

groups the necessary leeway to function

tember of 1980

political climate created

as a

Jihad's secret organization

authorities felt constrained to arrest

its

secret orga-

bv Sadat's game of

other. This gave the Islamic

counterweight to the

socialists.

Bv Sep-

had grown to the point where the securitv

members. Between 3 and 5 September

paign to suppress Sadat's political adversaries took place.

It

a

cam-

included the detention of

1,536 people nationwide. Sheer coincidence, or the will of God, as Jihad adherents

would have

when

First

it,

provided the opportunity for the organization to assassinate Sadat,

Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambuli was selected to participate in the military

parade review on 6 October 1981.

of the organization tance in

some of the

fell

provincial

The downfall of the

The

assassination

was

a success, but the

into the grasp of the state security organs after

last

cities.

members

armed

resis-

34

Jihad group did not, however, end the influence of radical

fundamentalists in Egypt. President Mubarak's cautious democratization and liberal-

made possible a resurgence of the takfir organizations in The most widespread group was the Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic

ization policies nonetheless

the 1980s.

Group). 3S This successor organization embraces the idea of

takfir

developed by

its

FUNDAMENTALIST INFLUENCE

IN

EGYPT

161

blind philosopher, Shavkh

Umar Abd al-Rahman,

in his

statement for the defense in

the Jihad court case, which Al- Jama'a published as a book. This collection of sophistries

and misinterpretations uses a

the ideas of takfir and hakimiyya. 36 in

interpretation of Qur'anic verses to support

literal It is

considered the manifesto of the Islamic groups

Egypt.

Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya Al-Jama'a aJ-Islamiwa (hereafter the Jama'a) was formed bv leaders of Jihad

been released from

and bv members of the former Islamic groups

jail,

in

who

had

Cairo and

Upper Egypt. The name was taken from the organization founded bx the Pakistani thinker Maududi. Led bv Abd al-Rahman, who had been acquitted of issuing a fatwa legitimizing the assassination of Sadat, the Jama'a covered a broad range of Egyptian society

and

a

wide expanse of Egyptian geography, from Upper Egypt

to Alexandria in the North. Its

main

activities

were

in

South

in the

Upper Egypt and Cairo. This Muslim Broth-

organization took up the mantle of Islamic fundamentalism from the

erhood, but

Abd it

in

doing so made

takfir a central

al-Rahman worked out

to religious

and

concept.

social activity and, given the lesson

of Sadat's assassination,

relin-

The new

orga-

quished any thought of political assassination or military coup nization

was centered

in

confined

a practical policy for his organization that

d'etat.

student environments and in working-class neighborhoods

where the standard of living had deteriorated and people were open to the idea of an Islamic order

and government.

According to

Abd

al-Rahman 's interpretation of takfir, both

pagan, but individuals are not necessarily so. 3 " Although

Mustafa differed

proper scope of

in the

principle of the sovereignty of

against

them

until there

is

takfir,

Abd

and society are

ruler

al-Rahman and Shukri

both agreed that

it

was based on the

God. Under the motto of the Qur'anic verse "Eight

no fitna [polytheism], and

the religion

is

entirely

God's"

(8:39), the Jama'a was built on the logic of resistance to and confrontation with

whatever was seen to

as

contrary to Islam in Egyptian society.

implement the principle

"Command what

is

right,

It

thus sought in

and forbid what

is

duty imposed on Muslims by religious law. The organization took for thority of the ruler Islam.

An

on

the pretext that the present ruling order was not

liyya

is

pagan. 38 In this

itself

as a

the au-

committed to ruler

who jahi-

Any

not a historical period prior to the appearance of Islam but a condition that

found whenever

where

rule

People

who

is

is

cases

way of thinking,

Islamic ruling order should apply Shari'a systematically.

governs without respect to divine revelation

all

wrong"

and

its

constituent elements are present in a situation or system

legislation are subject to

are not

class, a

caprice rather than to Islamic law.

rule

for the people, they are entirely free

serve only

is

a state

become the slaves of their legislator, whether it nation, or a group of nations. But when God legislates

under God's

an individual, a social

human

—

and equal because they bow only to

God and

God. 39

This ideology defined the Jama'a's political theory. the ideal form of government for Islam.

Any

This of course entailed the rejection of the

liberal

It

saw the Islamic caliphate

as

other political system was rejected. 40

democratic experiment in Egypt. In

AbdclAzim Ramadan 162

the unwritten "social contract" between the

Mubarak government and

the Islamic

groups, social and religious activity was permissible, as was a limited degree of political

organization and participation (although not under the open banner of Islam).

But the

radical Jama'a

saw the Muslim Brotherhood's participation

in the

liamentary elections as a "great sin and offense. " Parliament, after positive civil laws

Parliament

is

and cannot,

two

is

1984

par-

based on

consequence, promulgate Islamic religious law. The

in

worthy onlv of burning. 41

In keeping with

opposed

all,

opposition to the

its

liberal

democratic experiment, the Jama'a

a multiparty system for the simple reason that an Islamic society

parties, the party

of

God and

knows only

the partv of Satan. Since the Jama'a alone repre-

sented the part}' of God, the remaining parties must represent the partv of Satan.

Some of the

of the Jama'a on public questions were based on

distinctive positions

dualistic worldview.

From

ancient

Muslim

society, for

this

example, the Jama'a retrieved

the requirement that non-Muslims pav tribute as compensation for being excused

from

jihad.

The group

also

opposed

a

peace settlement with Israel and insisted on the

militarv option of liberating Palestine.

Muslim Brotherhood with mitment to the Shari'a by

the

Wafd

The Jama'a opposed

the

1984

alliance

of the

party as an attempt to weaken the Islamic

com-

assimilating Islam to liberalism. It resolutelv rejected the

suggestion that the Islamic

movement might become

of the svstem instead of

part

standing apart and towering above the system, as Sayyid

Qutb had recommended. 42

The Jama'a also virulenr.lv opposed the participation of Muslims in the 1987 elections. Group members imprisoned in connection with the Sadat assassination directed a taped appeal from inside the prison to

and

ticipate in the elections

The Jama'a

all

Muslims, announcing their refusal to par-

calling for a bovcott

believed that any

Muslim who

God's legislation must launch a jihad. 44 But ligations: the call to

tional

and

God and

this

of them. 43 sees that his societv

not ruled by

is

mission must also include other ob-

the recruitment of members; the publication of educa-

instructive tracts; the

conducting of Islamic social

activities,

such as aiding

the poor with the zakat (alms) and sadaqa (donation) taxes and visiting the sick in hospitals. 45

The leadership of the Jama'a defined its activities around three axes: first, the call to God, whether in the mosques or in the coffeehouses, clubs, or train stations; second, "the commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong," beginning with notification and preaching, and ending with warning and rebuke, until factories

producing intoxicants were closed,

until the tribute

upon non-Muslims

all

be-

longing to the "People of the Book" was imposed, and until the zakat was collected to be spent according to the Shari'a; and third, the

God was

waging of jihad

until the rule

of

mosques, and gave lessons and public meetings

in

"

fullv realized. 4

Group members spoke

in the

various quarters and areas, and in villages, clubs, schools, and universities. Although

the prevailing Islamic rule restricted using force to correct

wrongdoing

to the ruler,

the Jama'a arrogated this right to itself in dealing with obvious perpetrators of sin

— drunks on the

street, truck drivers

transporting intoxicants, and purveyors of sex

videotapes. Another matter the group considered a clear sin was the wearing streets

of immodest clothing and shorts by foreign female

tourists.

on

the

These clothes, they

FUNDAMENTALIST INFLUENCE

EGYPT

IN

163

held, reveal parts

of the female anatomy that "excite the feelings of Muslim youth." 47

Similarly, thev considered the staging

shows

in the colleges

"prohibiting the

and

wrong*

of plays

in the cities

universities to be sins.

and dramatic and musical

The Jama'a

applied the principle of

to them. First they alerted the authorities to prevent the

staging of such shows. If the staging of the shows went ahead, group

them down. Naturally

force to shut

way

Jama'a in this Brothers, but

Group

it

this led to clashes

inherited a legacy of violence once associated with the

was violence of a new

activity

members used

with the security forces. The

began

in

Muslim

type.

1984 and 1985 with the publication of

basic principles

and the recruitment of members. At the beginning of 1986 the group entered phase the

when

cities.

sent

it

On

its

members

a new-

to assault beer sellers, singers, and videotape clubs in

24 August 1986 group members

down

sat

across the Cairo- Aswan

highway, blocking access to trucks earning beer, and then arose and threw their car-

gos into the canals and on the road. The security forces intervened, and confrontation took place zation's leaders

prosecutor.

48

The most

violent confrontation

Avn Shams

district

large

number of

a violent

the organi-

state security

between the Jama'a and the security

of Cairo and

large university student population,

its

A

al-Rahman mosque.

were arrested and brought before the courts by the

forces occurred in the

with

at the

became

a

in

al-Faniim. 'Ayn Shams,

staging ground for the Jihad

Members of this group were prosecuted and made the Mosque of Adam in 'Ayn Shams their center of activity. On 12 August 1988 security' forces threw a cordon around the Mosque of Adam. After

Organization, which assassinated Sadat. acquitted, and

the congregation set tires alight to use as barricades and threw blazing blocks and rocks at security forces,

it

was met with

tear gas

and water cannons. The Jama'a

managed

to set a police vehicle

vehicles.

But the police arrested 105 members. 49 Subsequently the Jama'a obtained

explosives

and planned to

on

fire

strike at

with blazing torches and to demolish two other

tourism

in the

country under the pretext that

tourism was a major source of corruption, inasmuch as the short dresses worn by female foreigners provoked the devout youth.

Members of the

Jama'a decided to

timidate the tourists by burning a tourist bus in front of the al-Salam Hotel Year's

Eve

in

1988, but they were arrested before thev could commit

this

on

in-

New

crime and

subsequently prosecuted. s " Finally, in al-Fayyum three members of the group tossed a

bomb

officer.

into a tent being used for the staging of a controversial play,

Rahman. Demonstrators rock,

carried firearms, heavy metal chains,

and clashed with security forces when the

ruling order. Forty-nine demonstrators

brought before the State Security Court

The

wounding an

The group planned a demonstration for the following Friday led by

and in

first

Abd

al-

and pieces of brick and

hostile cries

their blind leader

went up against the were arrested and

1989. 51

policy of the interior minister, Zaki Badr,

was to deal with the Jama'a bv

repaying violence with violence, including lethal force. In January 1990, Badr was dismissed as interior minister.

To

test his successor,

General

Muhammad Abd

al-

Halim Musa, the Jama'a prepared to occupy three mosques in three separate provinces on 25 January 1990, the day of the police celebration. Demonstrations moved through the streets of Asvut, al-Fayyum, and Cairo. The Jama'a commander for Man-

AbdelAzim Ramadan 164

falut

was to announce the organization's demands while President Mubarak was de-

on the occasion of the Police Holiday. Among these of Jama'a members who were imprisoned, and for the

livering a political speech

demands was

a call for release

immediate prosecution of Zaki Badr,

The demonstration

actuallv

in As\oit

number of the prominent jewelry stores in the city's major Mosque of al-Khashabah. Security forces did

onstrators demolished a streets

from the three mosques. on Mondav, 22 Januarv: Jama'a dem-

in return for evacuation

took place

along their way to occupy the

not hesitate in dealing with the demonstrators. There was an exchange of

commander

Jama'a

fell

dead immediately, and

members of

forces arrested thirteen

newspaper

new

The battle had been The Jama'a were resort to violent

no room here

for a discussion or

minister unless or until he and his

men

mutual under-

return to the Truth." 53

joined.

Muslim Brothers in other wavs besides the skirmishes with the securitv forces. They also sought and exercised the successors to the

neighborhoods and clashed frequently with the turned toward the

wider stage

in

neighborhoods takfir

liberal

Egypt

was centered

activity

the

the group. 52 In an interview published in the

authority over devout Egyptian youth in the universities, schools, villages,

a

fire;

wounded. Security

'Abd al-Rahman commented upon the meaning of these

in particular,

violent skirmishes: "There will be

standing with the

others were

an organ of the Islamic movement in general and the Muslim

al-Sha'b,

Brotherhood

six

political

cities,

and

order after the Brothers had

Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed principles than the Jama'a, whose

experiment. Nevertheless, the

for the propagation of

in the cities

in Cairo. 54

group was linked to

The undeniable its

its

of Upper Egypt and

ideology:

its

in certain poor,

limit to the appeal

were

principles

accepted and fully comprehended by the masses, and

never took root on a mass

its

of

in fact

Abd

overcrowded al-Rahman's

too radical to be

demonstrations and

riots

scale.

The New Muslim Brotherhood Even the

as takfir

groups such

as the

Jama'a attained a limited prominence in the 1980s,

Muslim Brotherhood was undergoing

a transformation

of some import. The

Brotherhood had been renewed bv Nasser's death and the appearance

in the

1970s of

new leaders ripened by vears of imprisonment. Foremost among them were Mustafa Mashhur and Ma'mun al-Hudavbi, along with such traditional leaders as Farid Abd al-Khaliq, Abd al-Qadir Hilmi, the members of the Office of Supreme Guidance, and the Supreme Guide Hasan al-Hudaybi. The administrative agencies began to form in and Sadat's

prison,

victors'

over Nasser's supporters became a historic opportunity for

more favorable conditions. The fallen group group which the Soviet Union had supported. When Sadat overpowered them, he lost favor with the Soviets, who withdrew the support they had offered in Nasser's time. After Sadat expelled Soviet military advisers from the Egyptian army the Brothers to resume their activities in

was the

in July

leftist

1972, the Egyptian

left

began to intensify

its

criticism

Sadat offered for his conflict with the Nasserite group was

of him. Since the pretext

its

desire to set

up

a die-

FUNDAMENTALIST INFLUENCE

IN

EGYPT

165

tatorship (in contrast to his risk

own

enlightened support of democracy), Sadat did not

vanquishing them as Nasser had done with his opponents. Instead he bolstered

the political forces

King

He was thus

x\rab world.

King

opposed

to the

One

left.

of Saudi Arabia was

Faisal

time righting the Soviet influence

meeting between Sadat and the leaders

Faisal arranged a

who

that he

was facing problems comparable to

During

lived outside Egypt.

and that he shared

theirs,

He

their objectives

promised to help ease the return of the

Egypt. 55 Shortlv thereafter he released the

activity in

group of imprisoned Brothers.

meeting Sadat told Brotherhood leaders

this

opposing communism and blasphemv.

Brotherhood to public

in the

summer of 1971 of the Muslim Broth-

attuned to Sadat's political situation. In the

erhood

in

such force was the Muslim Brotherhood.

at this

Among them

was Ulnar al-Tclmsani, who

first

later be-

came the Supreme Guide upon the death of Hasan al-Hudavbi. Immediately after his release he went to the Abdin Palace to render his thanks to Sadat in the official visitors'

book. 56

The following

year Sadat sought a meeting with certain

nothing objectionable

Muslim Brotherhood

of the country." Supreme Guide al-Hudavbi saw

leaders to "cooperate in the service

in the idea if Sadat's intentions

al-Telmsani with continuing negotiations. 5 "

The

were good, and charged

release

was graduallv completed, and crowned bv a comprehensive pardon of that

by

had been handed down

a reorganization

in political cases before 15

of Egypt's

Rallv, then as the National

formed

it

Union, then

into three "platforms"

—

It

as the

right, center,

Arab

Under

in Julv

sentences

the Julv Revolution

first as

Socialist

left.

all

1971. This was followed

was known

and

promulgated bv the National General Conference

was

Mav

political partv structure.

onlv one political organization was recognized.

Umar

of the imprisoned Brothers

the Liberation

Union. Sadat

A decision 1975. The

trans-

to this effect

was

name "platforms"

bv "organizations," then "parties."

later replaced

The Muslim Brotherhood began

to replenish

its

ranks under these favorable

cir-

cumstances and discreetly to resume forming grassroots organizations throughout the

would seek permission to headed either bv Kemal al-Din Husavn or bv Husavn al-Shafi (Islamic personalities from among the Free Officers of the Julv Revolution). Thev of course denied the rumors. The Brotherhood then began to insinuate itself within the government bv recruiting allies among public

countrv. Brotherhood leaders circulated rumors that thev reconstitute the

Brotherhood "as

opinion shapers and

Brotherhood

a religious Societv," to be

Yet even as

it

sought to enter the

political

mainstream, the Brotherhood was

political role.

One group wanted immediCall), in order to give the

Brotherhood an organ to express

its

new

opinions and principles and announce the return

of the Muslim Brothers in a practical and direct way. This might lead, to an increase in

membership and

a type

of de facto

political

second group called instead for a delay in publication and to improve in Julv

di-

resume publishing the journal Al-Da'wa (The

vided about the proper approach to a atelv to

capable of facilitating, or at least condoning,

political leaders

activity. 58

its

journalistic quality.

1976 with

The

first

a

and

it

was hoped,

legal existence.

A

revamping of Al-Da'wa

approach prevailed; Al-Da'wa reappeared

Salih al-Ashawi as editor-in-chief,

under the management and

su-

Abdel Azim Ramadan 166

pervision of Umar al-Telmsani. die

first

The Muslim Brotherhood reclaimed

a public voice for

time since 1954.

But the speed with which Al-Da'wa was published took an inevitable a certain professionalism,

and the subjects

it

toll. It

lacked

treated did not necessarily appeal to

The lead articles resurrected the main old principles and policies that had formed the Muslim Brotherhood's original philosophy, that is, pan-Islamism, the demand for the application of the Shari'a, and a presentation of Islam as both religion and state. The single exception was a new treatment of the Islamic caliphate. The journal declared a truce with Sadat's regime in order to gain Muslim youth or the

its

confidence;

The

party.

it

was hoped that the Brotherhood would be allowed to form

journal

The Brotherhood hostile to Islam

Islamic masses.

condemned Nasser and

also

opposed the United

communists

States,

in

as a legal

Egypt and elsewhere.

which had "an inclination which

and disruptive of any kind of return to true Muslim

were skeptical of America's that

the

efforts to establish peace in the

life."

is

The Brothers

Middle East; they believed

wanted to impose an American- Israeli settlement. But there were no objections

it

to the

economic "open-door" policy

capitalists to

initiated

The Brotherhood's approach

to the economic, social, and political problems of

Egyptian society was purely religious. "failure to applv the Islamic Shari'a."

was the only way to

salvation:

ever save you, only this that only

its

nation and

by Sadat or to the return of Western

Egypt. 59

It

traced the causes of these problems to the

Al-Da'wa announced that

and nothing

else."

of this religion

else

vou have

will

Consequently, the Brotherhood argued

legal return to the political field

"fix the pillars

a return to religion

"Return to the rule of God. Nothing

would

in the souls

lead to a revival of the Islamic

of Muslims

in a practical

way." 60

The official attitude toward the Muslim Brotherhood wavered at this time between two tendencies. The first tendency was to see it as the only society capable of opposing the communists, and therefore advocated its legal return as a political party; these politicians sought to have the Brotherhood lend them the authority of the Shari'a. Sayyid Mar'y, speaker of the People's Assembly, announced that "there is no sensibility here for the establishment of any sort of parties so long as they are committed to the national unity, the social peace and the inevitability of the socialist solution."

But

a

second body of opinion argued that confrontation with the communists did not

demand

require paving this price. If the

for Islamic Shari'a

came from an

officially

sanctioned political party, this school argued, the government would be put in an

awkward

situation.

To

applv the Shari'a over the opposition of the Copts would be

to risk the unitv of the nation. There were external considerations as well: such a policy

would

as the events

in the

end bring the government into

collision with the

Brotherhood,

of 1954 had demonstrated. President Sadat announced that the "estab-

lishment of a political party based on religion will never be permitted" and instead

appointed Salih

Abu Ruqavaq,

a

preeminent Brotherhood leader, to a leading posi-

A number of others were co-opted in the same way. 28 October and 4 November 1976, the government held new (multiparty) elections for the People's Assembly. Ruqavaq waived his constituency in favor of the general secretary of the Center Party, which on 1 1 November 1976 was renamed the tion in the ruling Center Partv.

On

FUNDAMENTALIST INFLUENCE

IN

EGYPT

16"

Socialist

Arab Party of Egypt.

attached to the

Six other

members of the Brotherhood who had been

however, entered the People's Assembly, and were chosen for

parrs',

leadership positions in both the party and the Assembly. 61 In a very short time the

Muslim Brotherhood was cities,

able to

become

major

a

power.

political

It

spread in the

the towns, the universities, and other institutions. Its importance was apparent

during the elections. Campaign

rallies to which its leaders were invited in the Sayyida Damanhur, and in the universities attracted large numbers of students and young people who demanded the application of the Shari'a. 62

Zavnab

district in Cairo, in

Yet the Brotherhood was

of electing

Supreme Guide

a

There was some sentiment party.

still,

officially,

to succeed

an

faced the necessity

Hasan al-Hudavbi, who had died

of Salih

in favor

illegal society. It also

Abu

Ruqavac], a

in

1973.

member of the

ruling

their oldest member, Umar al-Telmsani, Supreme Guide in all but name, particularly management of Al-Da'wn had given him effective power. The Egyptian auacknowledged this and held him answerable for the Brotherhood, though

But the leadership decided to choose

He was

without any elections. after his

thorities

already the

not in an organizational sense, "for had they been certain that an organization existed they would have delivered ation, carried

on

several situations.

all

his duties,

He

of us up to the courts

the Brotherhood dissolve. 6

crisis

accepted this situin

in the political arena, despite the

which threatened

it

order of 1954 that

'

The Muslim Brotherhood served Nasserites)

He

considered this an implicit acknowledgment bv the government

of the Brotherhood's existence

forces

instantly."

and offered the authorities the Brotherhood's help

Sadat's regime bv confronting the

— the forces of the

two

political

political left (Marxists, Socialists,

and

which held the open-door policy responsible for the deepening economic

and the widening gap between the

social classes,

and the forces of the extreme

The Brotherhood attacked communism, Nasserism, and socialism in each issue of Al-Da'wa. As for the extreme religious right, the Brotherhood did not hesitate to attack the takfir organizations, condemning their ideology and interpreting their movements as a revolt against true Islam. When Salih Siriyya confessed, in the course of the Military Technical Academy trial, that he had been in contact with certain leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood including Hasan al-Huright (the takfir organizations).

—

daybi, Shavkh Siriyya

and

Muhammad

his militance.

al-Ghazali,

and Zavnab al-Ghazali

— the

latter

repudiated

Shavkh al-Ghazali, an adviser to the Ministry of VVaqf, denied

meeting Salih Siriwa and vowed that he would never conspire against the believerpresident, Sadat. 64

thought prayer,

as

it

As

branded

for the Society its

members with atheism, prohibited following

and declared shedding

Yet the Brotherhood also its

work and

of the Muslims, the Brothers condemned

for refusing to

their

their lead in

blood lawful.

condemned

implement the

to control the extremist societies, the in a position to inhibit the

its

the existing political order for prohibiting Shari'a.

The

argument went,

spread of takfir thought

state

needed the Brotherhood

for the

Brotherhood alone was

among young

activists distraught

over the corruption of society' and searching for an Islamic solution. 65 In July 1977, for example,

Al-Da'wa

called the assassination

of Shavkh al-Dhahabi "an awful crime,

forbidden bv religion and repugnant to custom; those

who

perpetrated this grievous

Abdel Azim Ramadan 168

crime did not have the

of religious knowledge.

least

We condemn

from the bottom

of our hearts the crime, circumstances, and immediate causes of it."

The honeymoon between

66

the Brotherhood and Sadat's regime ended soon after

The Brotherhood did not make its opposition to the for a number of reasons, not the least of which was that the visit was well received by the masses and a significant number of religious personalities. To oppose the trip would also seem to place the Brotherhood in the same camp as the communists and Nasserites. Nevertheless, when the dispute the president's visit to Jerusalem. trip

known

time

at the

it

was announced

over the peace terms arose and Sadat cut off links with

courage to oppose the policy. From Februarv 1978

Israel,

the Brotherhood gained

was outspoken about

it

Israel's

greed for everything from the Euphrates River to the Nile, and warned against a peace that

would sanction

Israel's illegitimate

position in the Arab area. 67

Umar

al-Telmsani

claimed that the Zionists had usurped the land of Palestine and must return

it;

the

live in Palestine as fellow citizens but not as rulers. The Muslim Brotherhood was considering the visit to Jerusalem, he said, in light of the doctrine forbidding a Muslim to accept the attrition of his land. The attitude of the Brotherhood entered a new phase with the Camp David ac-

Jews might

cords.

It

The is

announced

religious

and

seized

this

is

its

Law of Islam

if they are

he has usurped. be!

all

We

states that if

able to recover

what has happened

incompatible with

would

violent opposition to the agreement in

it

October 1978:

any part of the Land of the Muslims

but do not, then they are sinners.

since the establishment

of the State of

divine laws to acknowledge a usurper's right to have

need not, then, be afraid of war whatever

its

And

Israel. It is

what

consequences

68

Yet the same issue of Al-Da'wa called for deliberation to ease the conflict between

Egypt and the other Arab

states.

The opposition to the Camp David accords was clearly a crisis for the Muslim Brotherhood. Would it be content to use the channels Sadat's regime had opened for opposition, or would it resort to force? Some of the Islamic groups began to criticize the Brotherhood's attitude, suspecting

announced

its

it

of weakness or

opposition to the use offeree.

opposition to the existing order

Muslim Brotherhood was

—

until

But the Brotherhood

al-Telmsani wrote that despite

such time as the law of God was applied

its

— the

means of transport, plundering stores, and would destroy the property of the people.

against burning

wrecking government foundations;

The Brotherhood was

Umar

fatigue.

similarly

this

opposed to plotting against the regime;

its

ideologues

explained that the Brotherhood (unlike the takfir groups) did not seek rule or care

about those

who

ruled. It cared onlv

about the sort of rule

and regulations. Violent clashes with the authorities did the

power of the people bv wasting

—

little

its

constitution, form,

more than undermine

their efforts, ultimately benefiting onlv the ene-

mies of the country. Clearly a change in the attitude of the

Muslim Brotherhood had taken

the bitter confrontation with Nasser in 1954.

It

place since

had learned from the ordeals of 1948,

— FUNDAMENTALIST INFLUENCE

EGYPT

IN

169

1954, and 1965; in each case the political order in

new pragmatism

it

had suffered profoundly from physical

collisions

Egvpt and was determined to avoid the same mistake

with

again.

A

characterized the Brotherhood in the 1980s.

Sadat called on the religious scholars at al-Azhar Islamic establishment to vindicate

Camp David

the

accords to counter the accusation that he had violated the principles

of Islam bv acknowledging the existence of an

was made

in

Israeli state in Palestine.

fatwa issued bv the Muslim Brotherhood and a

Al-Azhar represented several establishments

— the

This accusation

number of Arab

states.

Academy,

Islamic Research

al-

Azhar University, the Higher Council of al-Azhar, the Committee for Fatwa, the General Administration for Propaganda and Guidance, and the al-Azhar Institutes

and thus appealed ion. it

as

an authoritative Islamic voice to moderate Egyptian public opin-

Al-Azhar dutifullv published an

called the "Islamic

Israeli

Treaty:

support

of Muslims could do

in

May

Opinion" and the "Religious Legal

and to be vigilant for

lav in reconciliation

so.

the "Peace

statement

Egypt was an Islamic country, and

affairs

its

official

its

it

1979, announcing what

Verdict*'

on the Egyptian-

was necessary

protection. If he

its

ruler to

saw that the best

interests

for

with their enemies and making peace with them, he

The announcement compared

the Egyptian-Israeli peace accords with

ofal-Hudaybiya" and the "Pact ofGhatfan"

and validated the agreement on the

basis

— both drafted bv the Prophet

of Qur'an verse 8 (Al-Anfal): 61 ("If they

make peace with them"). Contracting the Egyptian-Israeli accords stood religiously w ithin the bounds of Islamic rule, for it was concluded out of incline to peace,

strength after the victory of the October War, to Islamic people, and

realized the return

it

did not surrender Jerusalem to the

it

Brotherhood published two strong refutations

in the July

of Islamic territory

Israelis.

1979

issue

The Muslim

of Al-Da wa. 69 l

This struggle between the Brotherhood and al-Azhar did not, however, push the

Brotherhood toward extremist Islam, which had begun to

Embassy and the

assassination of Israeli diplomats

and

collaborating with them). Al-Da'wa continued to

April 1980:

"Now

what must we do? and

kill

them? No,

that disaster has befallen

Do we a

magazine urged instead

a

Despite these efforts

at

attacks

on the

as well as

Israeli

Egyptians

warn against such extremism

in

an embassy in our country,

Do we

seize the Jewish diplomats

blow up the Embassy?

Israeli

of another embassy

boycott of everything

(

Israel has

thousand times no! Blowing up the

lead to anv result but the reconstruction

inevitable.

and

call for

tourists

Israeli.

at

Embassy

will never

Egypt's expense."

The

70

moderation, a collision with the regime began to seem

The January 1979

issue

of Al-Da'wa had published a

CIA

report (an ap-

parent forgery) asking the government of Egypt to destroy Islamic organizations

Muslim Brotherhood foremost among them. The report was attributed to Richard Mitchell, professor of modern Near East and North African history at the University of Michigan and author of the book The Society of Muslim Brothers. This publication enraged Sadat, as it insinuated that his government received instructions from the the

United issue

States.

The Egyptian

of the magazine/

the forged

CIA

1

authorities for the

first

Sadat publicly upbraided

report, reminding

him

that

it

time confiscated an offending

Umar

was within

al-Telmsani for publishing

his authority as president

of

Abdel Azim Ramadan 170

Muslim Brotherhood and

the republic to abolish the

had any

newspaper, neither of which

its

basis in law. Sadat nevertheless said that "as a family elder" (a role in

he loved to imagine himself) he would not do Publication of the false

CIA

this.

report was not the only thing to disturb relations

between the Brotherhood and the regime. The Brotherhood had asked for recognition of it.

The only

existence, claiming that there

its

tion.

But Sadat

Tve opened that

is

vours.

I

jails

official

was

a legal

resolution dissolving

1948 bv al-Nuqrashi prior to

in

The Wafd government had subsequently rescinded

insisted that there

the

was no

was the one issued

relevant resolution

the July Revolution.

which

72

a resolution dissolving the society

and the concentration camps and restored to vou

all

the resolu-

and added: the respect

have given the people complete freedom and restored the respect of

the law; the proof of this

the fact that vou publish a journal without anyone

lies in

obstructing you, although this publication

is

minister of the Interior to sav to you: 'Shame

on an on

extralegal basis. " 73

I

just sent

you the

Other incidents and recrimi-

you!'

nations followed." 4

Muslim Brotherhood attempted to consolidate the Islamic groups in the universities under its leadership a move the Sadat regime viewed as an attempt bv the Brotherhood to recover the power and influence it had enjoyed prior to 1954. By the early 1980s every university in Egypt boasted an Islamic group In the early 1980s the

—

These Islamic groups fluctuated

between the

with an emir over

it.

ideology of

and the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Da'wa dissemi-

takfir

nated their news and encouraged their

activities as a

various groups under Brotherhood leadership. eral

emir over

produced

all

of them. Then

gress for the Propagation

The regime saw policy

a coalition

a general organizational

in their allegiance

prelude to consolidating the

The emirs of the groups

elected a gen-

of Islamic groups outside the universities

framework known

as the

Permanent Islamic Con-

of Islam, which elected al-Telmsani

as its president.

the establishment of this congress as a dangerous shift in the

and attitude of the Brotherhood. The regime naturally preferred dealing with

each group separately so as to play one off against another, and Nasserites and communists. This that the Islamic groups

new

regime's foreign policy and the

as the

Camp

of them against the

consolidated organizational framework meant

had begun to work for

of the regime/ 5 This became evident

all

their

own

specific objectives,

not those

congress began to organize against the

David accords. By various means the congress

attempted to hinder Egypt from implementing the treaty, threatening to subvert Egyptian relations and cancel the

Israeli

congress held a public meeting on 29 at

al-Azhar

mosque

When

plant less than a

week

Abbasiva

of Cairo to discuss

Salamah, and Salah

May

1981 immediately

Israel

evening praver

later,

Abu

launched an unprovoked raid against the Iraqi nuclear the congress held a rally at the al-Nur

Isma'il

a response.

spoke

Umar

at the rally, as

mosque

in the

al-Telmsani, Shavkh Hafiz

did the supreme

{emir) of the Islamic groups, the physician Hilmi al-Jazzar.

The

rally

commander

drafted a decla-

him not only to condemn the Israeli raid but also to take deter Israel." The congress demanded abrogation of the process of

ration to Sadat asking "practical steps to

after the

to discuss ways of recovering Jerusalem. Tens of thousands of

people attended.

district

Israeli-

withdrawal from the Sinai. For example, the

FUNOAMHNTAI.IST INFLUENCE

EGYPT

IN

171

Camp

normalization; a halt to the implementation of the

David accords; the with-

drawal of the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv; and the expulsion of the

Israeli

ambassador. The declaration summoned all young people to jihad for Jerusalem and demanded the lifting of all restrictions on Islamic groups and the opening of the mosques to independent Islamic preachers. Mosques, it stressed, are places not only for pravcr but also for governing, consultation, legislation, and implementation. At another meeting in Alexandria the congress passed resolutions demanding the recovery of Jerusalem and Palestine, nonrecognition of the legitimacy of the Zionist

and

zure,

a

sei-

proclamation of jihad as "an obligation remaining in force until

Judgement Daw""* In

this

atmosphere of rising Islamic militancy, sectarian clashes

occurred in Zawiva al-Hamra, one of the poor neighborhoods of Cairo, on 17 June 1981.

A

riot

between Muslims and Copts ensued. Dozens died and over

a

hundred

people were wounded; a number of shops and dwellings were burned. The incident threatened to turn into a sectarian war. Sadat's policy

of balancing the

his foreign policv

erhood

political left

and even threatening

at integrating the Islamic

had created a counterforce endangering

his regime.

The

success of the

Muslim Broth-

groups under the banner of the congress alerted him

came

to the danger of the Brotherhood's revival. Sadat

to believe that the Islamic

groups represented the Brotherhood's secret organization:

When

they [the

Muslim Brothers] became aware

that there

thousand boys [of the Islamic groups] including those

were seven to eight

who

called themselves

them and gave them weapons so as to frighten other students, and intimidation prevailed in all universities. The Islamic groups are the secret weapon of the Muslim Brothers, but instead of repeating their mistake and using them secretly, they used them openly! The Muslim Brothers did not immediately express themselves clearly; they emirs of the Islamic groups, they fooled

took time." Sadat charged that the Muslim Brotherhood proclaimed the supremacy of God alone, identified the ruling authority as atheist and the societv as pagan, and incited violence

among

the Islamic groups." 8

Despite Sadat's accusations, the Muslim Brotherhood did not control Islamic groups.

A

large proportion

garded the Brothers with

Umar

as enemies.

of these groups,

Nor were

all

as

the

as

New Wafd

Party,

20-30

all

of the

percent, re-

the leaders of the Brotherhood content

al-Telmsani's policv of cooperation with the regime.

have preferred to form alliances with opposition parties Part)',

much

Some of them would

— notably the

leftist

Unionist

and the Labor Party. These dissidents believed that

Umar

was preventing the Brotherhood from gaining the support of a large portion of the Islamic forces and was permitting other emergent religious leaders to influence the public and gain fame. These new leaders included preachers

al-Telmsani's policv

in the larger

mosques, notably Shaykh

at the al-Qa'id

and preacher

Ibrahim mosque

at the

Muhammad

in Alexandria),

Dayr al-Malak mosque

(Imam and preacher

at the

al-Kahlawi

Shaykh

in Cairo),

mosque of Salah al-Din

Abd

(Imam and

preacher

al-Hamid Kishk (Imam

and Shaykh 'Abd al-Rashid Saqr

in Cairo). 79

Abdel Azim Ramadan 172

Sadat's conflation

mistake, for the

of the Muslim Brotherhood with the

two were

antithetical.

takfir

groups was a great

Sadat did not understand that the congress

was an attempt by the Brotherhood to absorb the extremism which embodied the real

danger to the regime; he mistakenly feared that the congress would threaten the

By focusing

concern on the Brotherhood alone, Sadat him his life, for the center and motivating force of Islamic extremism had passed from the Muslim Brotherhood into the hands of the takfir groups, of which the Jihad Organization was at the time the most liberation

made

of the

Sinai.

his

the mistake that ultimately cost

dangerous.

This confusion of the Muslim Brotherhood with the extremists led Sadat to strike preemptively

at the political forces

the Israeli forces.

He

Israeli hard-liners

blocking the path to the liberation of the Sinai from

feared that these Islamic forces in the political arena

an excuse to cancel the

him of preparations by launch a preemptive

would

give

His intelligence apparatus warned

the extremists to destabilize his regime, and he decided to

strike.

On

journalists, writers, politicians,

Umar

political currents.

treaty.

3 September 1981 his security forces arrested 1,536

and Muslim and Christian leaders representing various

al-Telmsani and other leaders of the Brotherhood were

among them. Over one hundred were

from the

arrested

traditional Islamic societies

alone. 80

The

arrest

of the Muslim Brothers represented a turning point

with other opposition forces

in

in their relations

Egypt. During their detention in Nasser's time

it

was

customary to segregate the Brothers from other prisoners even during exercise periods. in

This practice actually led to the further radicalization of the organization. But

1981 the Brothers were mingled with Wafd

oners in the same in plain

cells

view of their

entered a

new phase

and mixed with them

rivals,

Party, Nasserite,

in

and communist

lunchrooms and

at

meetings. 81

whether from inside the regime or outside

in their relations

with these

ended under the presidency of Husni Mubarak.

the Brothers

political forces after the

Umar Siraj

detention

al-Telmsani even described his

ideological rivals as "extremely charming," mentioning especially

Abdallah, the venerable communist, and Fu'ad

it,

pris-

Now

Doctor Ismail Sabri

al-Din Pasha, leader of the

Wafd

Party. 82

Mubarak began

his

term of office

after Sadat's assassination

by releasing thirty-one

detainees associated with various parties and political organizations

on 25 November upon their

1981.

He

release

from prison. The prime minister announced the right of the released detainees

received the detainees at the presidential palace immediately

to return to their professions and to practice their political activity. 83

Telmsani and the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were released

after

Umar

al-

having been

moved from Tura prison to the Qasr al-Ayni hospital. 84 The opposition journals began to reappear. 85 But because Sadat had

died

at the

hand of an Islamic group member, the regime did not permit the return of the religious journals, forcing them to fall back on the courts. 86 Thus, the Muslim Brother-

hood

lost

Al-Da'wa, formerly

a

powerful means of expressing

only the magazine Al-Ptisam, with a small circulation and

its

views.

little

They

impact.

represent their point of view completely but rather the opinions of a

It

retained

did not

more extreme

FUNDAMENTALIST INFLUENCE

IN

EGYPT

173

Islamic organization, the Al-Jama'a al-Shar'iva (the Legal

Mahmud

Group) founded bv Shavkh

Khattab al-Subki.

In the three vears between the release of the Brotherhood leaders and the

27 May

1984 elections, the Brotherhood resumed its attack on the rival ideology of takfir, which was in a sense responsible for Sadat's death. Umar al-Telmsani aided the politiestablishment bv working

cal

among

the prisoners from takfir organizations at Tura

them to abandon that ideology. He told the prisoners bluntlv in August 1982 that what they were calling for "is not Islam, because Islam is an appeal to believe in God by means of wise and benevolent spiritual counsels." He reminded them that the regime was continuing to release them every penitentiary, persuading

meeting held

at a

few davs;

in

Tura

one batch

Brotherhood alist

at

hundred prisoners were

six

relations with the

communists

released.""

in the

organ, had published a series of interviews with

bv

attacks

rightist writers.

ss

The Brotherhood

between personal relations and neighbor, the Jew.

The Qasr

Umar

praved with us."

how he saw

ssl

Umar

al-Telmsani which aroused

leader responded that he distinguished

his Islamic faith.

Even the Prophet had

visited his

many different Communists who

al-Avni prison, he said, brought together

schools of thought and opinion: "There were those

among

the

al-Telmsani maintained this stance. Asked four vears later

the possibilities for an alliance of Islamic and

he answered that "anyone

who

argued that fundamentalism ress:

Unionist Progressive Nation-

Partv improved. In October 1982 the newspaper Al-Abali, the Unionist Partv

freedom

calls for

{salnfiyyci)

is

my

leftist

forces in specific cases,

and

allv

I

am

does not mean "backwardness";

"Can anv arrogant person advance

a single

his ally."

it

He

means prog-

proof that the Islamic fundamentalists

welcome anv discovery or invention for the good of the people? Did they call for segregation, isolation, or detachment from the people? Thev called in fact for diligent effort in all of life's objectives, in economics, society, politics, war and peace, did not

in everything that benefits

people

in this

world and the next."

This significant change in attitude, the result of a course of three decades, enabled the

1

'

political

Muslim Brotherhood

maturation over the

to participate in the re-

newed life of parliamentary politics under the cloak of a secular party, the Wafd Partv. The Brotherhood had tailed in its attempts to recover its organizational headquarters

Umar al-Telmsani also wrote an open letter to the interior minister demanding full legal existence for the Muslim Brotherhood like that allowed bv the Mubarak regime to other parties. He cited the cooperation of the Brotherhood with the government in calming the students of the Islamic groups inside and outside the and Al-Da'wa.

universities.

He

also referred to the Brotherhood's opposition to violence

demnation of terrorism. 91 But once

it

became

clear that the

return the Brotherhood's headquarters or magazine, or acknowledge tence, the Partv.

and con-

government would never its

legal exis-

Brotherhood sought to enter the Parliament under the auspices of the Wafd

The Wafd was

restored to political

February 1984 the government returned

Wafd began publishing

its

life

by

judicial decree in

political rights to the

own weekly newspaper on 22 March

October 1983. In

Wafd

leaders.

The

1984, took leadership

of the opposition press, and prepared to plunge into the campaign for the elections scheduled for 27

Mav

1984. 92

Abdel Azim Ramadan 174

Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood had concluded

and chose to

tion political parties in the elections.

An

alliance

with the

a detailed

studv of opposi-

with the Wafd Party in order to take part

ally itself

Unionist Partv was out of the question in

leftist

view of doctrinal differences. The Liberal Partv had no popular base of support. The

Labor

Party's recognition

of Nasser ruled

it

out. This left only the

Wafd

Parts',

which

had condemned Nasser's dictatorship and vielded to the forces pressing for applicaof the

tion

the

Shari'a.

An

agreement was reached bv which the Wafd remained the Wafd,

Muslim Brotherhood

retained

its

own

and both would stand

character,

as

oppo-

government. The Brotherhood deputies would attend the meetings held

sition to the

by the Wafdist members of Parliament. The Wafd and the Muslim Brothers were able

wav

to enter the elections in each electoral district jointly in such a

that in districts

without Brotherhood nominees the Brothers would throw their support to the Wafd candidates. 93

The

of the Wafd on the ideological

alliance affected the reputation

had previously stood for the separation of religion and personal matter, with the homeland open to existence

rule.

members of the party, as well as one of the older Louis Awad, a major intellectual figure, criticized

94

The Wafd

level.

considered religion a

The Wafd

religions.

all

had no respect for nonconstitutional

state. It

in

its

previous

For these reasons the newer

leaders, resigned over the alliance.

the

party'.

95

The newspapers of the The present

ruling National Partv accused the Brotherhood of political opportunism.

author held the ruling partv responsible for the alliance because the

it

had not permitted

Brotherhood to form a legal party of its own. 96

Muslim Not surprisingly,

this alliance

had

gram. Shavkh Salah abu Isma'il was after a thirty-year

a significant impact

among

absence from political

life.

source of legislation."

Part}'

the

Wafd

electoral profirst

platform

Following a demand for democracy and as "a

main

propaganda held that Islam was both religion and

state

a constitution, the platform called for the application 97

on

the architects of the party's

of the Islamic Shari'a

and demanded the Islamization of the mass media and educational

institutions. 98

Despite the political opposition of the regime, the alliance of the Muslim Broth-

erhood and the Wafd was immediately successful the People's Assembly. In a futile bid to

vened

in favor

of the ruling National

impede

in increasing their share

of seats

in

this success, the administration inter-

Party's candidates.

The proportional

represen-

tation electoral system transferred votes for parties receiving less that 8 percent to the

majority (government)

part}'.

Nonetheless the Wafd Party,

now backed by

the Broth-

erhood, received 15 percent of the vote, forfeited 2 percent by reason of the offset for small parties, but

won 58 of 488

Bv gaining entrv become part of the tive"

among

99

into the Parliament in this fashion, the

Muslim Brotherhood had

ruling political system rather than part of the "Islamic Alterna-

— the path taken bv the

precedented, for

seats.

This situation was not entirely un-

takfir organizations.

some of the Brothers entered

the

the ranks of the ruling partv. But they had

October/November 1976 elections done so on the basis of individual

personal reputations rather than as representatives of their organization. authority accepted the cntrv of the auspices of the

Wafd because

this

Muslim Brotherhood

The

ruling

into Parliament under the

seemed the best solution to the "Islamic problem."

)

FUNDAMENTALIST INFLUENCE

EGYPT

IN

175

The Brotherhood's undeniable popular strength was now recognized within the system notwithstanding the tact that the Brotherhood had no formal legal recognition. (Legal recognition would have led to resentment and riots bv the Copts, the bitterest enemies of the Brotherhood

in

Egypt.

on 24 Mav 1986. Before his death he had formed a temSupreme Guidance and made Mustafa Mashhur, the youngest Mus-

(Jmar al-Telmsani died porary Office for

lim Brother, his deputy, neglecting the established principle of seniority. Yet this did

not make the choice of his successor any

hood was divided

into a

who had

the "Qutabis"

easier.

Upon

number of factions. The

been imprisoned

first

in the fifties

Telmsani's death the Brother-

number of

taction included a

and

sixties after the dissolution

of the secret Brotherhood organization and the execution of Sayyid Qutb. Under the leadership of Salah Shadi, a former police officer, thev had called for the immediate election

on

of a Supreme Guide. The second taction, led bv Salih

the selection of

Justice

someone detached from the former

Ma'mun Hassan

insisted

secret organization, such as

al-Hudavbi, the eldest son of the former Supreme Guide

Hudavbi.

A third taction, calling itself the "Bannaw

Mashhur

as a

new

Abu Ruqavaq,

is

al-

and Qutbis," supported Mustafa

matter of self-interest. This faction was supported bv the Brotherhood's

capitalism,

which established

telex,

telephone, and telegraphic capacities to en-

hance rapid communication with organizations of Brothers

in

Europe and Kuwait.

A

made up of former Brothers, companions of al-Banna, and those intimate with him, demanded a return to Hasan al-Banna's original vision for the organization. Thev nominated Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, Hasan al-Banna's brother, who believed that the Brotherhood needed a mere "chief," not a Supreme Guide (a title fourth faction,

which had

historical

connections and should only be carried bv

course, the political situation prevented the

form. luu In the end, opinion came to settle upon as

temporary Supreme Guide, on the

a

reformer).

group from convening

basis that

in

Muhammad Hamid

anv

Of

legal

Abul Nasr

he was the oldest of the senior

members. 101

The Parliament of 1984 did not last long, because the opposition discredited it on Mubarak decided to poll the Egyptian people on dissolving the People's Assemblv, which meant advanced preparations for the new elections, leading

constitutional bases.

to a

new

parliament to be entrusted with the election of a president of the republic

by 1988. 102 Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood was faced stances similar to those of 1984: they

in April

1987 with circum-

needed to enter the new parliament under the

cover of another party.

The experience of

their alliance with the

Wafd convinced some

Brotherhood that the Wafd was more dedicated to pursuing

was to the terms of the to resign

alliance.

This led Shavkh Salah

from the Wafd and join the Liberal Party

to achieve in the Liberal Party

mad Amir

what he could not

(the Islamic writer for the

Abu

its

Isma'il in

Wafd.

He

it

February 1986

He

was able

transferred

Muham-

as vice-president.

in the

factions of the

secular politics than

103

newspaper Al-Nur) to the Liberal Party paper,

Al-Ahmr, and made him chief editor. 104 The newspaper's policy then turned toward Islam, paving the way for another alliance between the Brotherhood and both the Liberal

and Labor

parties.

Abdel Azim Ramadan 176

The Labor that

Party was a

leftist

party which belonged to the July Revolution

had prevented the Muslim Brotherhood from forming an

1984

Labor had gained 7 percent of the

elections.

8 percent, and had forfeited

Labor Party

leader,

its

had learned

alliance

with

—

it

a fact

for the

vote, less than the required

votes to the ruling National Party. 105 Ibrahim Shukri, his lesson

and began preparation for an

alliance

with

106

Muslim Brotherhood. Given the Islamic transformations of the Liberal and Labor parties, the Muslim Brotherhood had a greater inclination to ally with them

the

than with the Wafd. Salah Shadi and

Ma'mun al-Hudaybi were commissioned

negotiate an alliance with the Labor Party leader

20 percent of the Assembly

on

would

receive

results

were announced, the Muslim Brotherhood had gained the

(thirty-six),

seats.

to

the understanding that Labor

Labor agreed.

When

the election

lion's share

of seats

while the Labor Party received twelve seats and the Liberals three

seats. 107

of the Muslim Brotherhood with the Wafd Party had brought

Just as the alliance

about the resignation of some of its members, so the alliance of the Brotherhood with the

Labor

Part}' led to a certain

number of defections. Those with

a social

democratic

orientation protested against the alliance, and three of them were dismissed from the party. 108

Two

years later a major schism split

with their leader following

a defeat

by

Labor when the Social Democrats

their Islamic rivals in elections for the

left

new

They announced that they represented the real Labor Party. 109 The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, had in 1988 become the potent force in the alliance, with thirty-two seats in the People's Assembly and two newspapers, Al-Sha'b and Al-Ahrar, to publish their opinions. In the alliance with the Wafd they executive committee.

had been the smaller partner and weaker

voice.

The new deputies from the Muslim Brotherhood hurried to announce that the Islamic Shari'a would once again be their primary issue and that they would begin by reintroducing the Islamic legislation they had supported in the previous session of the

Assembly. These

law as

first

demands were Assembly

bills

steps

a call

at the

included the trade law, the maritime law, and the draft of a zakat

toward conformity with the

the

month of Ramadan; and

more provocative

the delaying of recrea-

programming to make the performance of the tarawih

easier for the lims.)

Among

hours of prayer; an amendment of radio and television programming

to suit the times of prayer during the tional

Shari'a.

by Shavkh Yusuf al-Badri to suspend sessions of the People's

prayers of

Ramadan

Muslims. (These prayers are not obligatory or performed by

Another unusual proposal came from Shaykh Yusuf

lamic group and attached to the Liberal Party.

He

al-Badri, leader

all

Mus-

of an

Is-

lobbied for a declaration of a

"renegade war" against Bulgaria and Spain since both had been Islamic states that lapsed from the Islamic religion. 110

erhood would unity.

that the

Muslim Broth-

only means of realizing

111

more temperate voices among the BrotherMa'mun al-Hudaybi announced that the Brotherhood would not

There were, however, some

hood

Mukhtar Nuh announced

strive to restore the Islamic Caliphate as the

politicians.

slightly

seek to establish an Islamic state after the Iranian pattern, but only for the purpose of restoring the Shari'a.

1

'

2

Muhammad Hamid

Abul Nasr, the new Supreme Guide of

the Brotherhood, argued that the Shari'a must be applied gradually, just as the Shari'a

'

FUNDAMENTALIST INFLUENCE

EGYPT

IN

177

itself

had appeared gradually

in the history

of Islam. The prohibition of alcohol, for

came in three stages and the prohibition of slavery took many. Gradualism, he said, was the fundamental characteristic of the Shari'a." 3 In this way the Muslim Brotherhood transformed itself into a parliamentary political party with a unique place, existing and yet not existing on the political map. instance,

The

political

system does not acknowledge

law but acknowledges

in

it

deputies enjoy parliamentary immunity, which enables the government, and to examine

its

them

it

in fact. Its

to legislate, to oversee

accounts. But they cannot voice their opinions as

—

members of the Muslim Brotherhood only in their capacity as deputies of the alliance. They are a part of the political system, not an Islamic alternative to it, yet the system does not acknowledge legally that they are part of it. They attempt to shape public opinion on the pages of the two party newspapers, Al-Sba'b and Al-Abrnr, but they are unable to confront it on the pages of a newspaper bearing their name. Nonetheless the experience of entering Parliament and participating in the parliamentary process has been fruitful from the Brotherhood's point of view.

Muhammad

al-Sheetani,

one of its deputies,

said, "It established the existence

As

of the

Brotherhood on the arena. The Brothers learned much from entering Parliament and

The Islamic partisans inside Egypt and body and soldiers working for it." u The presence of the Brothers in Parliament gave them the opportunity at least to open debate on the issue of the Shari'a and to present drafts of Islamic legislation. 115 Husni acquired a long experience in political

life.

abroad were assured that Islam has both

Abd

a

al-Baqi argued that entering Parliament

for the

Brotherhood

political objectiyes

in the

only within parties. Similarly,

the Brotherhood presented tions

and demands of

political arena

was indispensable

popular arena, inasmuch

as the

in creating legitimacy

law permits them to pursue

Muhammad

al-Maraghi noted that

more than two hundred noteworthy and

interest to the people, but their actiyity did

because they did not

own

significant ques-

not appear

in the

a newspaper. 116

Nevertheless, the Brotherhood's parliamentary experiment has not been

crowned

with success. They have been unable to realize the implementation of the Shari'a and

make good on

their

campaign slogan "Islam

is

attributes this failure to the Brotherhood's lack

that

"we

tried to present drafts

of Islamic

the majority opinion, began cleaning

lamic legislation."

the solution."

117

Husni Abd al-Baqi

of a parliamentary majority, explaining

legislation but the Assembly,

up the

existing law instead

supported bv

of authorizing

Is-

118

The actual accomplishments of the Muslim Brothers on the legislative level have amounted to very little indeed. Yet their very presence in the Parliament has pressed the issue of applying the Shari'a on a national level for the first time in Egyptian history. Opponents of the Brotherhood argue that this is not a substantive issue because the entire civil law in Egypt is in agreement with the Shari'a. The criminal code differs

from Islamic law only

in the

matter of punishments for serious crimes (hu-

dud). U9 These severe punishments could be, according to

Supreme Guide al-Hudavbi,

commuted by

constitute greater danger to

society

the ruler, for there are

and yet

are not included in

of public properties, forgery and

some crimes which

hudud, such

falsification

as briber}',

espionage, embezzlement

of official records, ravishment, narcotic

.

Abdel Azim Ramadan 178

crimes, and traffic crimes. Islamic jurisprudence held that

the ruler

— that

in

is,

modern times

the legislator

was within the

it

— to consider

he sees as being dangerous to the society or disturbing

as a

of

and to impose

security,

its

rights

crime any action

whatever punishments he wants. These punishments are ta'azir (castigations or punishments not based on Qur'anic

texts).

As

allows the victim's family to accept blood cation for this in

to forgive, but there

modern times when immense wealth

tices to people, killing

Hence, the Egyptian

compromise

murder and disfigurement crimes, Islam

for

money or

and

disfiguring,

its

no

is

justifi-

owners to do

injus-

and to oblige them to accept blood money. of crimes or

legislation allows the victims

in civil rights cases,

enables

their families to reach

but not in criminal cases, which are

left

to the public

prosecutor to take up on behalf of the societv and, consequently, could not be given up.

Members of the Egyptian

intelligentsia

have

Ma'mun Shari'a

made such arguments, but

When

have never been convinced by them. 120

ers

the Broth-

a journalist confronted Justice

al-Hudaybi, one of the most prominent Muslim Brothers, with the fact that

was already applied

Hudavbi

replied, "This

is

in

Egypt with the exception of criminal hudud,

sophistry! For

outset to promulgate laws which

command of God." give justifications

121

is

it

incumbent upon the

conform to the

But of course

this, too,

is

logic

al-

from the

and not to obstruct the

Shari'a

in the tradition

which do not correspond to the

ruler

of all

who

politicians,

of things. The debate

in the

Parliament continues at this writing. 122

Notes This essav, an excerpt from a larger

1.

work bv Professor Ramadan to be published as a separate book, was adapted for this vol-

ume bv

R. Scott Applebv.

Cf., for

2.

example,

Dr. Abdel

7.

DarMadbuli,

hammad

al-Arabi, 1973), p. 302. This constitutes the

mosque

academic studv of the Muslim Brother-

hood.

Mu-

Ali 'Imara, Beirut, 1972).

Abd

9.

itself

to

al-Nadim

Allah

orators: kill

the

attacked

"Had Europe

taken

upon

it

the zeal and enthusiasm of the

in devising a wav would not have hit upon what these orators have done." Quoted from Al-'Ustadb, 20 December 1892, in Dr. Mu-

Muslims, and spent ages

Hasan al-Banna, Risalat al-Mu'tamar

3.

29-35.

wa-'Usul al-Hukm (republished bv Dr.

al-Hamka al-Wataniyya fi Misr min sannat 1937 ila sanat 1948, vol. 1 (Dar al-Watan first

1981), pp.

Shaykh All Abd al-Raziq, Al-Tslam

8.

my book Tatawwur

Azim Ramadan, Al-Fikr al-

Thawrifi Misr qabl thawrat 23 Tulio (Cairo

al-Khamis (Dar al-I'tisam,

Haqq, no.

5,

1977),

Sislsilat

sawt

al-

p. 18.

Hasan al-Banna's letter to the newspaper al-Misri, 26 July 1938. 4.

to reach that end,

hammad

it

Hussein, Al'lttijabat al-Wataniyya

fi-al-Adab al-Mu'asir, part

1

(Cairo: Makta-

bat al-'Adab, 1956), p. 320.

Center for Strategic Studies, Egypt,

5.

and prohibited militarv edition: June 1987), pp. 103-4.

Religious Extremism (limited

6.

Dr. Abdel

fi

1936 (Cairo; Daral-Kitab

27-28.

Dar

Rosa'l Yusuf, 1982), p. 25.

Azim Ramadan, Tatawwur

al-Hamka al-watauivva pp.

10. Dr. Abdel Azim Ramadan, Al-Ikbwan al-Muslimun wa'l-Tanzim al-Sirri (Cairo:

Misr min 1918al-'Arabi, 1968),

1 1

Dr. Abdel

Azim Ramadan,

TabaqatfiMisr (Beirut, 1978 12.

Hasan

al-Banna,

),

p.

Sira'a al-

149.

Mudhakkirat

al-

FUNDAMENTALIST INFLUENCE

IN

EGYPT

179

Da'wa wa-l-DaHya

Dar al-Shehab,

Gandat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimm, the

13. fifth

(Cairo:

p. 50.

1966).

of Sha'ban, 1352 a.h. (1933).

14. Dr.

Abdel Azim Ramadan, Tatawwur

al-Hamka al-Wataniyya According to

15.

ft

Misr, pp.

302-4.

memoirs, he used to

his

attend Rashid Rida's seminars and perused

Al-Manar magazine. Hasan al-Banna, Mudhakkimt

al-Da'wa

wa-l-Da'iva,

pp.

29,

social, and political changes in Egypt from 1928 to 1954, cf. Dr. Abdel Azim Ramadan, al-Stra'a al-'Iftima'i wa-l-Siyassi-fi Misr nun thawrat 23 Tulio ila'azmat Mans 1954 (Cairo: Maktabat Madbouli, 1975); Abd al-Xastr wa-Aznmt Maris (Cairo: Dar Roza'l Yusuf, 1976); Al-Ikhwan al- Mitslimun wa-l-Tanzim al-Stm; Misr ft Asr alSadat, vol. 2 (Cairo: Maktabat Madbouli 1986); Misr fi Asr al-Sadat, part 1 (Cairo: Maktabat Madbouli, 1989).

nomic,

49-50.

22. Sa\Tid

Hasan al-Banna asserted that "every piece of earth on which the banner of Islam is raised is a homeland for every Muslim to protect, work, and fight for" and that, "just 16.

it is a belief and a worship, [Islam] is a homeland and a nationality. We consider all Muslims as one nation and the Islamic homeland as an integral whole." Hasan al-

Banna, "Qawmimat al-'Islam [The National(8

DhH-Qe'da, 1352 a.h. [1933]).

Preachers, not judges

(

wal Nashr 23.

and

into the Sudan, eastward into

Sham and

its

Lebanon, Jordan, and Palesand westward into the Maghreb and

parts (Syria, tine), its

parts." 18.

Ibid., pp.

Although

39-40, 49. the

Society

ligious fields

and fighting Christian evange-

and apostasy, as well as to sports activities. It did not organize its followers lism

work or for seizing political Hasan al-Banna, Mudhakkirat al-Da'wa wa-l-Da'iya, pp. 52-54; and Dr. Zakariya Sulayman Bayumi, Al-Ikhwan alMuslimun wa-l-Jama at al-'Islamiyya fi alHavat al-Siyasivva al-Misriyya (Cairo, 1979), pp.'68-7L for political

power.

On these developments, cf.

Dr. Abdel

Azim Ramadan, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa21

.

(

doctrine to which Salih Siriwa

and

which brands the Supreme Court of

a,

Of Salih Abd Allah

Others, part 48.

24. Salih (

Dar al-Tiba'a 63-65.

Cairo:

society with infidelity.

Siriyya

the

Qnda

organization subscribed was the

Ashmawi, Hijra wa

Emigration and segregation

)

Tamyiz

(al-Da'wa, 18

September 1953). 25.

Ragab Madkour, Al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra

wajhan liwajh (Face to Face with

al-takfir

and commentary by 160, quoting from a

wa'l hijra), with a study

Dr. Ali Graisha,

26. Dr.

of Muslim

Youth preceded the appearance of the Muslim Brotherhood in December of 1927, its activities were restricted to the social and re-

l-Tanzim

The

his

)

in

la

p.

manuscript bv Shukri Mustafa.

19.

20.

a

al-Islamiyya, 1977), pp.

doctrine of al-hakimiv\

outside Egypt from early on. In Risalat al-

Mu'tamar al-Khamis [Message of the Fifth Congress] (1938), p. 33. Hasan al-Banna said, "The mission has spread southward

nor

Sunna. Hasan al-Hudavbi, Dit'a

State Security, The Case

of the association spread

17. Branches

"sovereignty"

range

the verses of the Qur'an,

in

as

ism of Islam}," Al-Ikhwan al-Muslinnn

Qutb gave

of meaning. The Supreme Guide said that the word was not mentioned broad

al-Sirri.

For more

concerning the eco-

et al.,

Muwajahat

thought in Islam), p. 46, quoting from records of the court, p. 472. radical

27. Ibid., pp. 19-22. 28. Accordingly,

mosques on earth

there

arc

only

four

which the necessary conditions are met. They are al-Haram mosque in Mecca, the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, and in Medina the Quba'a Mosque and the al-Masjid al-Nabawi. With the exception of these four mosques and some of the privately owned mosques in Egypt, Shukri forbids praver in all other mosques which in

he considered "harmful" (derar). Ragab Madkour, Al-Takfir, pp. 192-95; Dr. Hamid Hassan et al., Muwajahat, p. 90. 29. Dr.

details

Hamid Hassan

al-Fikr al-Mutatarriffi-l-lslam (Confronting

pp.

Hamid Hassan

63-64.

et

al.,

Muwajahat,

Abdel Azim Ramadan 180

The

30.

evading mili-

society's pretext for

was that it is not appropriate for the individual Muslim to defend the pagan tary service

See the court proceedings in the

society.

murder case of Doctor al-Dhahabi, AlAbram, 1 November 1977. Not onlv did the society brand the society' of Egypt as a whole

79-80.

39. Ibid., pp.

40. Fahmi Huwaydi, Abram, 6 March 1986. 41. As was mosque built by

the

"Al-Azma,"

al-Dirar

Al-

(harmful)

the hypocrites in the time

of the Prophet. Interview with Dr.

Umar

7

with atheism but thev considered

members

all

non-

who

joined the society without her husband was

given sanction to leave him and to marrv else

without getting

member of al.,

a divorce,

on

new husband be a Dr. Hamid Hassan

the condition that the

et

Arab (London), 26 June 1987.

to be atheist. Thus, according to

the ideology of the society, every wife

someone

Abd al-Rahman published in the journal Al-

the society.

Muwajahat, pp. 66-67.

42.

44. Dr. baqq, pp.

November 1977; and Al-Akhbar, 2 and 13 November 1977.

November 1977.

Muhammad 'Imara, Al-Farida al-

Sba'b,

bit,

DarTha-

June 1982).

34.

"The court

case of the Jihad organi-

zation, reasons for the sentence in the crimi-

48

nal case no.

State

by

Security,

Advocate

1982," Supreme

for year

prepared

A.bd

and

al-Aziz

presented

al-Sharqawi,

46.

The

security establishment in

does not recognize this name. Rather,

Egypt it

the society the "Jihad Organization." the most

among

in al-Minya,

Al-

AlAbram, 9 October 1987. Ali 'abd Al-Fattah interview.

48. "Truth of the Events in al-Minya,"

AkbirSa'a, 11

November 1986.

49. Al-Wafd, 14

August 1988.

50.

AlAkbbar, 23 April 1989.

51.

Al-Ahram, 5 June 1989.

52. In

Ayn

Shams, Cairo, the second

pivot of their plans, Islamic group tried to recapture the

members

Mosque of Adam by

But the security forces frustrated the and made arrests. And in alFayyum, the third pivot, security forces surrounded the al-Shuhada Mosque, preventing group members from occupying it, and arrested sixty of them. Al-Wafd, 24 January 1990; Al-Abrar, 29 January 1990. force.

attempt

pp. 66ff. 35.

al-Rahman, Kalimat

19 September 1987.

Gha'iba (The missing ordinance: exposition, discussion and evaluation) (Cairo:

Al-

45. Interview with 'Ali 'Abd al-Fattah,

47.

33. Dr.

Umar Abd

in

110-11.

emir of the Islamic Group

31. Al-Abram, 17, 27, and 30

32. AlAkbbar, 2

Fahmi Huwaydi, "Al-Azma."

An

article by Fahmi Huwaydi Watan (Kuwait), 12 May 1987.

43.

calls It is

important Islamic organization

the Islamic societies, which, accord-

ing to security sources,

amount

to forty-four

groups.

53. Al-Sba'b,

30 January 1990.

The southern Egyptian cities where Muslim group was most active were As-

54.

36. Dr.

Umar 'Abd

al-Rahman, Kalimat

the

baqq (A word of truth: the testimony of Dr.

yut, al-Minya, Suhaj, al-Fayyum,

Umar 'Abd al-Rahman

Suef. In Cairo the group's activity centered

(Cairo:

Dar

in the Jihad case)

al-I'tisam).

and Bani

pagan anyone guilty of disobedience or rejection of the society and thus subject to the seizure of his property and

on the neighborhoods of Bulaq al-Dakrur and on 'Ayn Shams. Asyut, capital of Upper Egypt, derives its special character from being the first to open a regional university, in 1957, which led to a heavy concentration of vouth in its university area. These roughly

Umar Abd al-Rahman, Kali-

seven thousand students are receptive to a

37.

He

therebv opposed Shukri Mustafa,

the leader of the Society of Muslims,

had labeled

who

as

even death. Dr.

mat baqq (A word of truth), pp. 103-4. 38. Ibid., pp. 42-47. This sort of

variety

paganism

conservative environment.

a

is

a

"major paganism" that expels

Muslim out of al-millab

(religion).

of

ideas, particularly to extremist re-

ligious thought, always

most acceptable in a The Muslims of

Asvut do not have a strong presence

in the

FUNDAMENTALIST INFLUENCE

EGYPT

IN

181

economy or

professions inasmuch as these dominated bv the Copts. But w hen the university opened, the majority of the poor Muslims were able to provide their sons with higher education free of charge and, accordingly, to change the social composition of the middle class. The new Islamic presence was associated with everintensifving Islamic feelings that was promising for the activities of the Islamic group. The group's teachings found a fertile ground in the hostel, which was crowded with students from the Upper Egyptian countryside. The students of the Al-Jama a al-Islamiva swept the student union elections in nearly fields are

63. pp.

Umar

64. Adil pp.

al-Telmsani,

Dhikrayat,

Hammuda,

Al-Hijra,

176-77.

33-35.

65.

Commentary

in

Al-Da'wa,

January

1978, concerning the sentences to

life

prisonment and the death sentence

im-

in the

Takfir w'al-Hijra case.

66. Al-Da'wa, July 1977. 67. Al-Da'wa, February and April 1978. 68. Al-Dafwa, October 1978. 69. According to

Umar

al-Telmsani, the

w

the colleges, gaining

all

eight) in

all

the seats (forty-

the colleges except the College

all

of Commerce. In the elections for the

all-

university union they gained twenty-eight of thirty-eight

Fahmi Huwavdi,

seats.

"Al-

Azma." 55.

Muhammad

pp.

Hasanavn

Havkal,

(Beirut,

1983),

al-ghadab

Khartf

269-70.

Hammuda,

56. Adil (Cairo: 57.

Dar Sina

The

Al-Hijra

I'unf

ila

Pil-nashr, 1987), p. 59.

negotiations reached a point at

which al-Telmsani was asked to draw up a committee of Brothers to meet Sadat in Alexandria to place a

final seal

ment, but Sadat saw

fit

on the

agree-

to delay; the lines

of communication were cut off suddenly. Umar al-Telmsani, Dhikrayat la Mudhakkirat (Cairo:

Dar

al-Ptisam, 1985), pp.

113-14.

Azim Ramadan,

"Al-Tan-

58. Dr. Abdel

zim

al-jadid li'1-Ikhwan al-Muslimin,"

Ruz

September 1976; "Le nouvel elan des Freres Musulmins," Le monde diplomatique, August 1977, p. 10. al-Tusuf, 13

59. See the issues of the

publication of Al-Da'wa, June

first

year of

1976-Junc

1977. 60. Ibid. 61.

Among the

were Jamal Rabi, genof the ruling party Isma'il, chairman of the six

eral assistant secretary

and Salah

Abu

Committee on Social Affairs, Waqf (Religious Endowments), and chairman of religious

affairs

of the People's Assembly.

62. Dr. Abdel vel elan."

Azim Ramadan, "Le nou-

Israelis

did not really incline to peace: thev

had established their state on Palestinian territory; they had persisted in building up settlements in the occupied territories; they had stated that Jerusalem would forever be

Doctor Abd alAzim al-Mata'ni upon which al-Azhar had built up its fatwa, through making distinctions between the Peace ofal-Hudaybiya and the Pact of Ghatafan, contracted bv the Prophet, on the one hand, and the peace which Sadat made with Israel, on the other. In a small pamphlet, "Documentation for the Statement," al-Azhar defended its opinion bv stressing the permissibility of taking

their capital.

tried to refute the basis

whatever measures for peace the well-being

of the Muslims dictated. See the text of the al-Azhar statement in Kitab Hasanavn

Krum, The Muslim Brotherhood and with Israel

(Cairo:

tiba'a w'al-nashr,

Sharikat

1985), pp.

the Peace

Nadirku

145-54

l'il-

.

70. Al-Da'wa, April 1980.

Hasanavn Krum, The Muslim BrothAmerican Embassy, as well as Professor Mitchell, responded to what was in the alleged document in Al-Da'wa, 71.

erhood, p. 42; the

February 1979. 72. Umar al-Telmsani responded that he had refused to form a coalition with the Communists, "that the Muslim Brotherhood would never agree with them, ever." He "called on God to prolong the regime of Sadat for as long as possible, because under it we enjoy our freedom." Al-Ahram, 22 Au-

gust 1979. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid.

The

next incident was caused bv

the elections for the president of the Syndi-

Abdel Azim Ramadan 182

cate

of Barristers. The Muslim Brothers had

Abd

united behind

al-Aziz al-Shurbaji,

Camp

attacked the

who

David accords and

at-

him of and suppressing freedom of

tacked Sadat personally, accusing dictatorship

opinion.

responded

Sadat

Umar

to

Telmsani:

"Shame on vou! Did

command

the election of one

the state and

al-

religion

who

abuses

insolent to the regime? Is

is

it

Muslim Brotherhood to with the New Wafd party

reasonable for the join a coalition

and the communists to support date?"

Umar

this candi-

al-Telmsani denied having or-

dered the Brotherhood lawyers to nominate al-Shurbaji.

He

said that he

vitations bv the

had refused

communists

for

him

tend a meeting they called, "because that Islam

knew

and

Communism

that thev

Umar

I

know

are enemies;

wanted to announce

al-Telmsani

sits

in-

to at-

with

I

that

Communist

Muslim Brothers and Communists associate with one another. Muslim Brothers and Communists will never colleaders, that

laborate at anv time in the future, will never associate with

one another,

ever."

Hasanayn Krum, The Muslim Broth-

75.

160-62.

77. Speech by Sadat, 14

September 1981

(Al-Jumhurtva, 15 September 1981). 78. Speech by Sadat, 5

September 1981

The magazine Al-Ttisam

86.

cle

49 of

Umar al-Telmsani,

statistics cited

Dhikrayat

la

Mud-

the legal basis for

death of

reappeared, arti-

upon

publication

its

the

owner, Salih Ashmawi, on 12

its

December 1983. The

text

of article 49

that "journals presently established

states

and pub-

by individuals remain the particular

lished

property of their owners, and continue to

pursue their

al-Dimuqratiya wa-ma'ziq al-sahafa

al-qawmiya 1987),

of a publication ends owner. Ramzi Mikha'il,

life

with the death of its

Azmat

decease." In

until

activities,

other words, the

Maktabat

(Cairo:

madbuli,

189.

p.

87. Al-Jumhurtya,

25 August 1982.

88. Al-Jumhuriya,

28 October 1982.

89. Al-Jumhuriya,

4 December 1982.

91.

Akhbar al-Tawm, 25 December 1982.

92.

Ramzi

93.

83. Al-Jumhuriya,

Umar

al-Telmsani, Dhikrayat la

hakkirat, p. 116. Their detention this time

brought them under the

close, kind care

of

al-Dimuqra-

Azim Ramadan, Tatawwur

al-Wataniyya

Ji

95.

96. Dr. Abdel

Azim Ramadan, "Al-Wafd

w'al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, lima kullu Hadhihi al-zawba'a?"

erhood,

What

sha'b,

("The Wafd and the BrothNoise For?"), Al-

All This

March 1984.

Markaz

al-dirasat

al-siyasiyya

1984, dirasa wa-tahlil (Cairo, 1986),

p. 76.

98.

Markaz

al-dirasat, pp.

102-3; Hizb

Party, the

Telmsani states that the governor of Tura

w'al-

b'il-Ahram: Intikhabat majlis al-

Umar

al-

2,

Al-Musawwar, 23 March 1984.

the Interior Ministry, with special regard for tion under Abdel Nasser. In his memoirs,

part

Misr,

al-Wafd al-Jadid, al-Bir namij (The

al-Telmsani, unlike the earlier deten-

Mud-

184-85.

192-93.

istratijiya

Mud-

Azmat

al-Telmsani, Dhikrayat la

94. Dr. Abdel

97.

26 November 1981.

Mikha'il,

225.

Wafd, 22

220-22.

82. Ibid., p. 222.

Umar

1982,

the law governing the press, lost

Two

by Sadat. Speech by Sadat, 14 September 1981 (Al-Jumhuriya, 15 September 1981).

84.

May

in

but the journal Al-Da'wa, according to

pp.

hakkirat, pp.

began publishing

Progressive Nationalist Party.

al-Haraka

groups, according to the

81.

Party,

followed bv Al-Ahali, organ of the Unionist

Hasanavn Krum, The Muslim Broth163-64.

hundred thirty-five were taken from the Islamic groups and 469 from the takfir

my

to

see

The newspaper Al-Sha'b, organ of the

85.

Labor

hakkirat, pp.

erhood, pp.

80.

to

comfort."

tiya, p.

(Al-Jumhuriya, 6 September 1981). 79.

continually of the in-

orders

minister's

90. Al-Siyasa al-Kuwaytiya, 3 April 1986.

erhood, p. 158.

76. Ibid., pp.

me

prison "informed terior

new Wafd

program) (Cairo, 1984),

p. 15.

99. Ibid., pp. 254-56; Ramzi Mikha'il, Azmat al-Dimuqratiya, p. 220.

)

FUNDAMENTALIST INFLUENCE

EGYPT

IN

183

100. "Mushkilat al-Ikhwan ba'd ghiyab aJ-Telmsani." Al-Musamrar,

30

Mav

made

101. This choice was

1986. an ex-

at

tremely restricted meeting attended by no

more lars

than

three

— Muhammad

Salih

of the

society's

pil-

Hamid

Abul Nasr, abu Ruqavaq, and Dr. Husavn Kamal

al-Din.

103. Al-Xur, 19

November 1986.

the religious newspaper

Partv,

March 1989.

111. "Qira'a

fi

rikr

al-Ikhwan al-Barlama-

4 May 1987.

nivin al-judud," October,

edited

president of the

by

Hamza

or"

Mamun

al-Hudavbi,

(This

De'bis,

vice-

part)-.

April 1987.

105.

Ramzi

He

Azmat

Mikha'il,

al-

Al-tmam, April 1987.

replaced the former Nasserite

Adil Husavn, the former Marxist writer

who

turned into an extreme Muslim and joined

December 1986, and the journal Al-Sba'b took on an Islamic political the Labor Partv in

When

the partv held

its

fourth

convention on 20 January 1987, Adil

1 1

7.

Hu-

madha

vajib

"Hadha Bavan

Fil-nas,

li-

sawtak

l'il-sawt

al-

an

tu'ti

Islami."

118. Al-rtisam, April 1987.

119. These punishments, or hudud, are six:

cutting

oft"

the

hand

(

for adultery; cutting off the

cants; death for apostasy.

—

modifying the party president's speech before the convention to include describing the period of rule bv the July Revolution as a period of injustices

and arbitrary

tvrannv. This modification

suddenly because two months partv had put forward a

demand

came

for larceny; flog-

ging for calumny accusations of adulter)' in particular); flogging, or stoning till death

the Labor Partv and an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood that is, Nasser-

political

al-

Muslim

Election pamphlet for die

way robbery; flogging

— bv

Isma'il,

Muhammad

\\\xh

savn dropped the barrier that stood between

ism

Abu

115. Interview with Salah

Al-rnsam, April 1987.

Brotherhood;

editor of the partv newspaper Al-Sba'b with

orientation.

Supreme Guide

19 April 1987.

Maraghi, Al-ltisam, April 1987.

Dimuqratiya, pp. 220, 236-37. 106.

114.

116. Interview

104. Ibid.

23

Al-Jumhuriya,

after the election, October,

the Liberal

Muhammad

112. Interview with Judge

113. Interview with the

102. Al-watan al'arabi, 3 April 1987.

is

109. Al-Sha'b, 14

110. Akhir Sofa, 22 April 1987.

hand

for high-

for drinking intoxi-

120. See Abdel Azim Ramadan, AlIkhwan al-Muslimun w'al-Tanzim al-Sirri, pp.

302-3; "Qissat Tatbiq

Islamiva," October,

ruf al-dini

al-Shari'a

30 June 1985;

al-

'Al-tatar-

wa-muhakamat al-Shaykh

Ali

abd

al-Raziq marratan ukhra," October, 31 Janu-

earlier the

ary

to join the

ukhra," October, 14 February 1988;

"Mahakim

1988;

al-taftish

marratan

Ta

fa-

Second Socialist International of the Labor and Socialist International. Earlier the party had proposed joining forces with African Socialism during Leopold Sanjur's visit to Cairo. "Asrar safqat al-tahaluf," Akhir Sa'a,

Al-Shari'a al-Islamiya w'al-Qanun al-Misri

22 April 1987.

(Cairo: 1988).

107. Ibid.

See

also

Muhammad

121. Interview

108. Ibid. These are

Husam al-Din Abu Zavd.

28 February 1988; "Bavn al-Shari'a al-Islamiya w'al-Qanun al-Misri," October, 25 December 1988. dilat al-Shaykh," October,

Mamduh

Qenawi,

Ma'mun al-Hudavbi

Abd

al-Majid

April 1987.

Kamil, and

122. January 1991.

Sa'id

with in

al-'Ashmawi,

Muhammad

Al-Jumhuriya,

24

CHAPTER 9

Islamic Tajdid and the Political Process in Nigeria

Umar M.

It "fundamentalism" to the religious there

a

is

of thought.

The ment.

2

I

I

movement

in

1

In this chapter

I

will

But

realitv

attempt

adopt instead the viewpoint of one inside the movement. In collecting

Though

may

to a degree which the reader

the

movement

a political cast

is

judge.

has obvious religious and cultural aspects,

and has led to

move-

best understood as a tajdid (renewal)

a "crisis

of factionalism within the Muslim

it

has also

of state and religion." 3 Muslims argue

that the secular state perpetuates Euro-Christian culture a degree

societies.

Nigeria without recourse to the usual categories

Islamic revival within Nigeria

assumed

Muslim

have interviewed a number of the leading shaykhs, and their perspective

my own

informs

revivals occurring in various

mood and moments of actual Muslims."

to examine the Islamic

data,

currently fashionable to apply the term

danger that the term may not "directly correspond to the cognitive

that reflects the

my

is

Birai

umma

and neocolonialism. There

is

(community), but the different

voices are to an important degree united. 4

the "ideologies are different, our religion

of the

state,

Nigeria

As Shaykh Ibrahim Saleh has said, though 5 is one." The Christian minority, on the side

has defended the status quo. In that effort the Christian Association of

(CAN)

has plaved a central role.

opposition bv Muslims. Indeed,

its

Its activities

position as a

have generated considerable

common

foe has

done

a

good

deal

to bridge the gaps separating various Islamic groups. Constitutionally, Nigeria

which

leaves

little

room

for

is

a federal republic. It has a strong central

autonomy within

ruled by a military regime, but

it is

The

the hope of keeping

government

At present the country

preparing for a return to

stage of this transition should occur in 1992. create a two-partv system, in

the states.

civil

democracy. The

is

final

military has been attempting to religious, geographic,

and

tribal

divisions out of the political process.

Nigeria was

first

brought together

as a single political entity in

184

1914 by the

British

ISLAMIC TAJDID AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN NIGERIA 185

colonial authorities,

venience.

who

The north

socially, politically,

Dan Fodio

in

united the northern and southern areas for their

larger in

is

both population and

and economically bv the

1804.

From then

until the

nineteenth century, Islam was the

tajdid

territory.

movement

It

led

con-

by Shaykh Usman

conquest of the Sokoto caliphate

official state religion.

own

was transformed later in the

The north remains predomi-

The south, by contrast, is divided between animists and Christians, though it is bv no means homogeneous. In the southwest the ratio of Muslims to Christians is about fifty-fifty. And in some areas, such as Ovo State, Muslims hold Muslim

nantly

today.

a majority.

None of these figures is very precise, come from the 1963 census, and that was

because the most reliable population data itself controversial.

According to the 1963

Muslim and 35 percent Christian. The present population estimates put the percentage of Muslims at anywhere between 42 percent and 75 percent. The most probable figure lies somewhere around 55-60 percent. 6 The largest ethnic group in Nigeria is the Hausa-Fulani, a Muslim tribe located in the north. Next in size are the Yoruba in the southwest, about half of whom are Muslims." The Ibo, a predominantly Catholic tribe in the east, are the third largest. Since the end of the civil war in 1970 a number of them have configures, the

population of

fifty-five

million was 47.2 percent

verted to Islam.

The country religious factor

is

thus divided religiously, geographically, and ethnically

But the

One

sees, for

had become the predominant one bv the

early 1990s.

example, increasing solidarity between the Muslims in the north and those south. This unity

is

stimulated bv the efforts of various organizations: the

in the

Supreme

Council for Islamic Affairs, the Council of Ulama, the Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI),

and the powerful Muslim Students' Society (MSS), founded wav, the formation of

CAN

in the

in

1954. In the same

mid-1970s has done much to unite the northern

Christian minorities with Christians in the south.

Religious divisions were intensified during the

of

Biafra. In

1967, Ibos

in the East-Central,

tempted to secede from Nigeria and to form to

call

the Republic of Biafra.

civil

war 1967-70) over the (

status

South-Eastern, and Rivers states

their

own

Those leading the

at-

country, which they proposed

rebellion argued that thev were

resisting an Islamic jihad (in this context, a "holy war") against the largely Christian

eastern part of the country. Colonel it

as "a resistance to

Ojukwu,

the leader of the rebellion, characterized

Arab Muslim expansionism." 8 After the war, Islam did indeed

is now common there to hear Onyeama (former chairman of the Anambra Board) and Muhammad Aminu Kelechi (a radio broadcaster). To parr}'

begin to make modest inroads

in the eastern states. It

such Muslim names as Alhaji Suleiman State Pilgrims this effort,

efforts,

and

a

CAN

though,

has begun to oppose any manifestation of Islam in the area.

may

former government minister, has made

What is

Its

be counterproductive. Ibrahim Tahir, a professor of sociology

interesting

is

ment of propaganda constantly hear those

that

CAN today

is

this observation:

paradoxically the

for Islamic conversion

who

among

most

effective instru-

Christians because,

if

you

say they are protecting your interest bewailing the

Umar M.

Birai

186

oppose

success of those they

in

maintaining the so-called Muslim domination

and so-called Islamisation of the

you would be

state,

[a] fool

not to hurry up

with vour conversion. 9

The Nigerian Islamic revival might seem to be just another in a series of such movements throughout Africa and the Middle East. But it is, at least in part, a response to conditions internal to the country. Since 1986, the government has been attempting to earn' out

Fund)

a Structural

10

(at the

behest of World Bank and the International Monetary

Adjustment Program (SAP) that has almost eliminated the middle

emptv for lack on the verge of collapse. Murder and armed robbery are on the increase. There are among the symptoms of a deeper social malady whose cure can only be spiritual. Shaykh Abubakar Jibril has observed that revolution will erupt in Nigeria unless its leaders conform their attitudes to the class.

There

is

a crisis in the health care deliver)' system; hospitals are

of drugs and equipment. The educational system

is

teachings of Islam. 11 Professor Tahir has echoed this sentiment: "It

is

amazing given

the present circumstances [that] a violent revolution has not yet occurred."

"almost a matter of consensus is

in absolute

among

[a]

broad spectrum of Nigerians that

need of an all-embracing transformation."

I3

During the

has been renewed intellectual interest in the historical jihad of

number of seminars and conferences have been devoted relevance to contemporary Nigerian

The are,

From

a Christian point

decade there

Usman Dan

Fodio.

A

to those events and their

Movement

Taj did

of view "the happenings

of modern Muslim fundamentalism

a kind]

It is

this nation

affairs.

of course, different ways of describing these

There

last

12

.

.

.

in

activities

among

the

umma.

Nigeria can be [best explained as

[the belief] that

Muslim government

and people should go back to practice primitive Islam." 14 From a Muslim point of view what is happening is a kind of tajdid a spiritual reawakening at the individual

—

level

and within the larger umma. This process, begun

in the

1970s, has

now

spilled

over into the political arena.

The movement efforts

has not been entirely spontaneous.

It

has been spurred by the

of the ulama and various Islamic groups. As Muslims understand

process of reawakening and reformation.

through teaching, preaching, and ijtihad

It

in print.

can be spread, as

But

it

it

it,

tajdid

is

a

has been in Nigeria,

can also take the form of jihad and

(independent reasoning and interpretation). 15

The

tajdid within Nigeria

fected bv external forces.

obvious

is

essentially

homegrown, 16 but

it

has not been unaf-

The ulama of the younger generation, for example, owe an

debt to Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. The Islamic revolution had an even more noticeable impact. Shaykh Abubakar Gumi, a leader of

intellectual

in Iran has

the Izala

movement, has described the Ayatollah Khomeini

Malam Adamu Ciroma

—

a

former editor of

Bank of Nigeria, and minister and

New

as a respected scholar.

Nigeria, governor of the Central

secretary-general of the National Party of Nigeria

ISLAMIC TAJDID AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN NIGERIA 187

(NPN)

— has praised Khomeini's "boldness"

implementing the

in

Shari'a.

1

"

Ibrahim

Gambari, the Nigerian ambassador to the United Nations, has suggested that the connection with Iran

mav go even

further.

There

students in the north have been educated at

some evidence

is

Qom

(in Iran)

that radical

and have received

Muslim financial

support from Iran. 18 The affected groups deny the connection, 19 though they make

no

secret

of their identification with the

ideals

of the Iranian revolution.

The debate over outside influence has overtones of conspiracy about it, but that is not the impression I want to convev. The idea of tajdid is firmly established in Islamic thought.

Many

connect

of each century such

a

it

with the Prophet's saving that "Allah will

people for this

umma

raise at the

head

as will revive its religion for it." 20

And

movement within Nigeria is amthing but overt. On university campuses many young women have adopted hijab (Islamic dress). (I would estimate that some 30 percent have done so.) The same is true in the secondary schools, particularly in the northern states. Indeed, one even notices it among older. Western-educated working women. Young men have adopted turbans and beards, and overflow the mosques. 21 The proponents of tajdid are not just numerous but often well known. 22 the

Religion and Politics in Nigeria For devout Muslims,

it is

difficult to

keep the

political sphere. In theory, at least, religion

Political parties

have not

—

at least

politics arc

not explicitly

terms, whether Christian or Muslim. 23

The

of this religious

spirit

and

revival

out of the

discontinuous in Nigeria.

— defined

themselves in religious

constitution provides that "the govern-

ment of the federation or of a state shall not adopt any religion as a state religion." The president. General Ibrahim Babangida, has reiterated the secular character of the state.

24

But

as events

occurring within since about 1985 have shown,

increasingly difficult to maintain the separation will

mention

just four

it is

becoming

between religion and government.

examples: Babangida's political appointments; Nigeria's

bership in the Islamic Conference Organization; the Kafanchan

crisis;

I

mem-

and the

at-

tempted coup on 22 April 1990.

The government of General Babangida came 1985.

He

replaced General Buhari, a

man whom

to

power by

a

coup on 27 August

Christians suspected of planning to

"advance the cause of Islam." 2S Under General Buhari the government's highest law-

making body was the Supreme Military Council (SMC). It was composed of nineteen members: ten Muslims (Buhari and his deputy among them) and nine Christians. Buhari's Council of Ministers had twenty-one members: eleven Muslims and ten Christians.

The National Council of States, made up of the

then nineteen

states,

During the

first

two

years of Babangida's regime this balance shifted toward

greater representation of the Christian minority.

Armed

military governors of the

had seven Muslims and twelve Christians.

Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), whose 28

tween Muslims and Christians.

Of the

The SMC was replaced by members were evenly divided

the be-

14 Christian members, 3 were from the Lan-

tang group, a northern Christian ethnic group. Babangida's Council of Ministers had

Umar M.

Birai

188

22 members, only 9 of them Muslims. And of the 19 military governors in the Naof States, only 5 were Muslims. All told, between Babangida's acces-

tional Council

December 1989,

sion and

204 members

Christians had

in the three

major arms of

government, Muslims only 138. 26 Since August 1991, there have been 30 military governors; 13 or so are Muslims. Christians were initially encouraged by these appointments. Muslims, by contrast,

began to

uneasy. Shaykh

feel

Adam Al-Ilorin,

the

most widely known Muslim scholar

expressed this feeling in confidence and kept a distance from the govern-

in the south,

ment. 2 " In December 1989 the balance shifted

slightly,

and the Christian reaction was

Domkat Bali, a member member of the AFRC, and

immediate. General Babangida relieved Lieutenant General

of the Lantang group, of

his posts as defense minister,

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of defense minister.

He

nied bv others in

all

Babangida himself assumed the position of

it soon after the changes. The AFRC was reduced Muslims and nine Christians. 28 This change was accompa-

relinquished

to nineteen members: ten

strations in a

Staff.

three arms of government. In response,

number of northern

that the changes were the

last

states.

wish to assure you, on behalf of

security forces,

We

is

it

would

all

resist that step at all costs:

Christians, that our confidence in our

neither in you nor even in the Christian population of the

but

in

charged

phase in the "ultimate promulgation of Nigeria as an

Islamic state" and declared that Christians

We

CAN organized demon-

In a letter to General Babangida

God. Nobodv goes

are confident that even if

to

all

war with God and comes out

armed

victorious.

Muslims and the

the service chiefs remain

entire armed forces Islamised, no single weapon or design against the people

of God

Babangida middle

will prosper. 29 felt

belt,

no

compelled to respond. "There Christianity or Islam, there

is

is,"

he

said,

"no north or south, no

a Nigerian nation.

.

.

.

The

state

is

the

unit of representation. 30 It is

obvious, despite Babangida's disclaimers, that religion

ingly important role in Nigerian political litical

appointments

a

life.

That

fact has

playing an increas-

is

made

the process of po-

contentious one, and neither Muslims nor Christians have been

happv with the outcome. The same might be

said

of the government's decision to join

the Islamic Conference Organization (OIC). Nigeria had been an observer at

meetings for

a

number of

years, but

in January

1986

member. At that time the military government had been and was seeking a wider basis of legitimacy. Its decision

it

OIC

decided to become a

in office

to join

full

only a few months

OIC

was seen

as

an

win the confidence and support of Muslims. The immediate price of that effort was a loss of some Christian support. Babangida's deputy, a southern Christian, claimed that the matter had not been discussed effort to

by the

CAN threatened unrest and insisted that was part of "a plan to Islamize the nation." 32 This was not entirelv accuhas as members a number of Christian-dominated African countries: Ga-

AFRC or the

Council of Ministers. 31

the decision rate.

OIC

bon, Sierra Leone, Benin Republic, and Uganda are a few examples. But as true in politics,

what mattered was the perception, not the

reality.

is

so often

The Muslim Coun-

ISLAMIC TAIDID AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN NIGERIA 189

cil

of Nigeria responded firmly to CAN"s objections: "From now on we

and take

effective steps to obtain

will rebuff

our

Although we

rights.

any threat or blackmail with the toughness that

of Muslims."-" This incident,

whieh religion

— excluded

in

like the

is

historically characteristic

appointments process, shows the degree to

theory from the strueture of government

permeate the practice of political

life

demand we

will

be peace-loving,

will

in Nigeria. It

makes equally

clear

— has come to

what

a real

and

widening gap separates Muslim and Christian tactions within the country.

The dispute

has not been confined to exchanges of words. Kafanchan,

nantly Christian city in north-central Nigeria, has a minority

most of which local

is

ethnically Hausa-Fulani.

On

5

March 1987

a

predomi-

Muslim population,

a dispute

College of Education between Muslim and Christian students.

began

at the

The immediate

proyocation seems to have been uncomplimentary remarks about the Qur'an and the

Prophet by a minister.' 4

The

dispute spread to the town, where

dimensions. tion,

A

number of Muslim

were attacked and

sacked.

Many of

the

killed.

it

immediatelv took on ethnic and religious

residents, regarded as settlers by the local popula-

Their properties were burned and two mosques were

Muslims

fled

back to their old homes

in Zaria, Katsina,

Funtua and spread the controyersv with them. Several churches,

bars,

and

and movie thea-

ters in those towns were burned down. (Bars and movie theaters are seen bv the Muslim vouth as symbols of the country's moral decay. The aftermath of the crisis fueled Muslim suspicions about the fairness of the state. The original (Christian) provocateur was still at large in 1991. Muslims in Kafanchan, |

Zaria, Katsina, Funtua,

and Kaduna, however, were arrested, tortured, and sentenced

to terms of four to twelve years bv the Karibi Christian.)

garoo

The

Islamic Welfare Foundation in

justice": "the tribunal placed a high[er]

than [on the] enormous loss of Muslim

appeared before the tribunal throughout

Whyte

Whyte is a outcome as "kan-

Tribunal. (Justice

Lagos described the

premium on

its sittings. It

the burning of churches

And no

lives in the crisis.

single Christian

was [Christian]

justice at

its

best." 35

The Council of Ulama has echoed these sentiments.' 6 Each year since 1987 Muslim youths have come to Kaduna to commemorate the Kafanchan crisis. On 2 January 1988 there was a sects

rally

of unprecedented

and groups around the country to

raise

size

which attracted Muslims from

funds for the victims of the

Muslims even came across the border from Niger Republic.

All

crisis.

Muslims

Some

jailed

or

detained were released in October 1990.

One can see

in the events at

against the national

Kafanchan some foreshadowing of the coup attempted

government on 22 April 1990. In each

case there seems to have

been apprehension or resentment, harbored by the Christian middle

Muslim

ethnic groups from the north.

And

in

belt,

toward

each case the primary consequence of

the crisis has been a worsening of relations between the

two

religious groups.

The

22 April coup was led bv a group of junior officers, all of them Christians, and many from the middle belt of the country. Major Gideon Orkah, the leader of the rebels, was both. In a broadcast pending

five

at the

time of the coup Orkah announced that he was sus-

— Katsina, Sokoto, — from the Nigerian Federation. Citizens from those

predominantly Muslim and Hausa-Fulani

Borno, Kano, and Bauchi

states

states

Umar M.

Birai

190

were to be sacked from federal appointments and given seven days to leave other parts of the federation for their

home

states. 3 "

BBC London

correctly perceived that the

attempt was "a coup against the Muslim-dominated north" bv the Christian middle belt. 38

The

forcible aspect

among

feelings

CAN,

CAN

of the coup was speedily put down, but the event

Tanko Yusuf, and

Jolly

left bitter

even those peripherally involved. The northern zone coordinator of his secretary

threatened public unrest

were held

in

connection with the coup.

they were not released, renewed

if

its

demand

that

Nigeria withdraw from the OIC, and asked that the government once again make

changes

in the

composition of the

AFRC

and the Council of Ministers.

—

It

insisted in

on the removal of two Muslim ministers Professor Jibril Aminu (Petroleum Resources) and Alhaji Rilwanu Lukman (External Affairs) arguing that the government was trying to Islamize "all facets of public life including party politics particular

—

[and] appointments to top political positions." 39

The Council of Ulama

We

wish to

government

reacted strongly to the

state categorically that the is

an Islamic one

is

CAN charges:

assumption by

CAN

that the present

untrue. Strictly speaking, the government has

more

to do with Christianity than Islam since secularism as practised by the government is an extension of the church concept of government. In Islam, politics

and

religion are inseparable.

to be the legislator through the

For

a

government to be

Quran and

the

The National Council of Muslim Youth Organizations sentiments.

It

burning

is

The coup and

in the veins

its

lines.

42

of martyrdom that

is

characteristic

of

[in Nigeria]." 41

scheduled to conclude in 1992. The coup demonstrated that,

of the country, the military

The

spirit

of the Muslim youths

echoed these

would not tolerate

it

aftermath cast a dark shadow over the transition from military to

civilian rule, a process like the rest

(NACOMYO)

concluded, though, with the stronger message that

any attempt to intimidate Muslims: "The

Muslims

Islamic, Allah has

Sunna of the Prophet. 40

military

is

divided along religious,

tribal,

and regional

government hopes to cut across these divisions by creating

secular two-partv system.

But the two

parties

a

— the National Republican Convention —

(NRC) and the Social Democratic Party' (SDP) themselves reflect the deeper social cleavage. The NRC is generally assumed to represent Islam and the north. The SDP is

viewed

There

as the representative

are, to

be sure, Muslims and Christians in both parties. But in northern areas

where residents

are mixed, the

Christians tend to join the all officials

the

of the south and of the northern Christian minority. 43

NRC

is

overwhelmingly Muslim

SDP. The Samaru area

and delegates to

state

in

Kaduna

in

State

membership and is

a case in point:

and national conventions are Christian members of

SDP. 44

The coup

also

drew attention to the

settled

assumption that federalism

is

the best

approach to uniting the religiously diverse and ethnically plural Nigerian nation. does appear that Nigerians

in general

still

want

to live together under

government. But what kind of federation? As the tajdid movement nation finds

it

more

difficult to

one

intensifies,

It

federal

and the

keep religion out of the process and structure of

ISLAMIC TAJDID AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

NIGERIA

IN

191

government, a federation with greater an arrangement

dominantly Muslim tenets

state

— not unlike the system

of Islamic

more freedom

states

law. It

is

autonomy becomes more attractive. Such 1960-66 would allow the pre-

—

in effect in

to organize their societies according to the

to a discussion of that ambition that

now

I

turn.

The Sharif Debate The most important and complex Nigeria in the earlv 1990s

political issue dividing

Muslims and Christians

in

whether, and to what extent, the government should

is

recognize and enforce the Shari'a (Muslim religious law).

To Muslims

the issue

is

simply whether thev too shall be able to enjoy the religious freedom guaranteed in theory to

all

citizens

of Nigeria. As one Muslim leader put

it,

'While not

a bit

of the

Constitution deprived the Christian from being Christian, every bit of the same Constitution can easily deprive the

for

Muslim from being Muslim." 45 For

enforcement of the Shari'a awakens

of

fears

a

Christians the

call

further "Islamization" of the

country.

We There

cannot assess the views of cither side without looking closely are, generally

speaking,

form now applicable federation.

whether

I

in the

north

will call this the

Shari'a,

two

which

I

first is

be extended

whether Shari'a in practice to

which today governs only questions of personal

will call this the "legal" extension

in

shall

The

"geographic" extension of Shari'a.

inheritance), should be enforced in I

issues.

all its

particulars as a

of Shari'a. Let

me up

at the debate.

in the limited

all

parts of the

The second

issue

status (marriage

comprehensive

is

and

legal system.

take these issues in the order

have mentioned them.

"Geographic" Extension Nigeria became an independent country on

1

October 1960.

It

was then

a federation

of three regions, Northern, Western, and Eastern. In the Northern Region the courts of original jurisdiction

in civil

and criminal cases were the native courts. Appeals from

High Court of the Region in ordinary cases, but in cases involving Muslim personal law (Shari'a) appeals went to the Shari'a Court of Appeal,

the native courts lav to the

which applied the law of the Maliki school

as

it

was customarily interpreted

area around the native court. Jurisdictional disputes Shari'a

Court of Appeal were resolved by

a

in the

between the High Court and the

Court of Resolution. Decisions of

the Shari'a Court of Appeal involving constitutional issues could be appealed further

Supreme Court. 46 This constitutional system came to an end with a military coup in 1966. From then until 1979 Nigeria was ruled by a military government. It continued, after a fashion, the federal structure of control, though the country was redivided into twelve (later nineteen) states. The military regime determined in 1975 to prepare a new constitution (the Second Republic) and return power to a democratically elected ci-

to the Federal

vilian

government.

1977-78

A

partly elected, partly appointed Constituent

Assembly met

in

to consider and approve a draft constitution. In those debates the issue of

UmarM.

Birai

192

became a bone of contention between Muslims and Christians. The most expansive proposal would have provided for Shari'a courts in the states, and state and federal Shari'a courts of appeal. Jurisdiction within this system was to be Shari'a courts

limited to questions of Muslim customarv law. This proposal

met with strong opposition, however, and the military government intervened to impose a compromise. Within the states there would be Shari'a courts and state Shari'a courts of appeal. Further review of decisions that might conflict with federal law lav to a Federal Court

of Appeal and, ultimately, the Federal Supreme Court. 4

"

A new civilian government was installed cember 1983, when

it

in October 1979 and lasted until 31 Dewas overthrown by another militarv coup. The militarv again

proposed relinquishing control to

a democratically' elected

constitution (the Third Republic).

To

that

end

it

government under

a

new

created another Constituent Assem-

and approving the revised constitution. Here again the issue of Shari'a courts proved more controversial than any other. Debate that began before the Constituent Assembly continued in the two leading newspapers the New Nigerian (owned by the federal government and based in Kably for the purpose of reviewing

—

duna) and the National Concord private lv owned and based (

in

CAN

in Lagos).

argued

Januarv 1986 that "the Shari'a debate was a prelude to ensuring that in anv subse-

quent Constitutional arrangement

in this country, Islam will

be imposed." 48 In Sep-

tember of that year the Council of Ulama responded that Muslims

vowed

to reject

any new

political

in

Nigeria "have

order that does not recognize the uninhibited appli-

cation of Shari'a law in Nigeria." 49

Some members of machinery of

the Constituent Assembly were to be chosen through the

Those

local council elections.

religious terms in the north, particularly in

CAN

help of

most members

tian

members proposed

new

states.

country

and the

With the

When

constitution create

no

religious courts. If the

"decides to rubber-stamp the desires of Muslims," thev argued,

reject the constitution this

that the

1987, were carried out in

Kaduna and Gongola

from the northern Christian minority areas the Asscmblv convened in 1989, Chris-

elected

subscribed to an anti-Shari'a platform.

AFRC

elections, in

AFRC

must be ready to produce

"we

for Christians in

50 a Christian constitution that recognizes ecclesiastical courts."

on the other hand, insisted at effect under the Second Republic: lims,

a

minimum on

Shari'a courts

diction in anv state that desired them.

a continuation

Mus-

of the svstem

of original and appellate

They argued, though,

shall

in

juris-

that that svstem should

be extended in practice as well as in theory to the southern part of the country,

where Muslim requests sition in

the Assembly

for Shari'a courts

had not been

establishing and funding religious courts. Indeed,

support

satisfied.

was that the government had primary

The Muslim poresponsibility for

some members were

willing to

ecclesiastical courts as well as Shari'a courts if Christians actually

wanted

them. 51

The Constituent Assembly was unable to reach a consensus. In the end the militarv government intervened and retained the system used during the Second Republic. This has hardlv been satisfactory for opponents of the system. At the same time, it does not go

far

enough

to

as the geographical, reach

satisfy'

Muslims,

of Shari'a.

who would

like to

extend the

legal, as well

ISLAMIC TAIDID AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN NIGERIA 193

"Legal" Extension In 1862 the British made Lagos a colony and established a court there. Until then, in most of the area now covered bv the Northern states, the principal law was Muslim law of the Maliki school. For purposes of facilitating their own trade, and eventually in

order to run their Nigerian colonv, the British gradually displaced Shari'a with

their

own

What was

legal system.

left

The departing

eve of independence.

of Islamic criminal law was eliminated on the

colonial administration threatened to withhold

independence, impose economic sanctions, and prevent Nigeria's membership

United Nations unless this

demand was

all

were eradicated.

vestiges of Shari'a

Muslim law of personal

the

status,

52

in the

The only exception

to

which deals with various aspects

of marriage and inheritance.

Devout Muslims today view argue that

its

system

as essentially Christian.

has failed "to provide solutions to the country's problems."

it

movement

this secular legal

53

The

has highlighted their dissatisfaction with this system and evoked

Thev tajdid

calls for

abandonment. According to Malam Ibrahim Suleiman, the "irreducible minimum"

demand of the umma

is

that the Shari'a shall enjoy

and that

nate,

application in areas where

full

takes precedence over

it

all

Muslims predomi-

other legal systems in Nigeria as the

law that governs the majoritv of her people; that such other legal systems are accorded recognition in accordance with the extent of the following they com-

mand. Equallv abolish

all

significant, there

aspects of

must be

a definite

imposed laws which

mental values, norms and demands of our enterprise

commitment bv Nigeria

to

are inconsistent with [the] fundafaith.

In fact, the entire colonial

must be abolished and be replaced with our authentic and

legiti-

laws. 54

mate

Suleiman's voice

is

not a solitary one. Muslims of all stripes generallv concur with

program. As the Council of Ulama has put

of Shari'a law

it,

his

they seek "the uninhibited application

in Nigeria." 55

important to note, however, that none of the ulama or Islamic groups whose

It is

views have stimulated the process of tajdid has developed very systematic views on

law and

politics.

In that regard they are unlike revolutionaries such as the Avatollah

Khomeini or the Islamic surprising. In

its

theorist Savyid

Abul Ala Maududi. This should not be too effort aimed at spiritual and

movement was an

origins the tajdid

moral rejuvenation, designed simply to address ignorance about the basic tenets of Islam.

Participants in the steps to address them. at

Ahmadu

movement

are

For example,

aware of these limitations and have taken some

in

May 1990 the

Centre for Islamic Legal Studies

Bello University established a Fatwa (authoritative ruling) Commission.

The commission

is

designed to be a "problem-solving body" which concerns

with such issues as "the need for an economic order appropriate for It

would be

by the

full

difficult to specif)' in exact

implementation of the

direction of change:

Shari'a.

.

.

.

itself

Muslims." 56

terms the changes that would be entailed

A number of examples

should indicate the

.

Umar M.

Birai

194

We

1

can expect the enactment of sumptuary laws, particularly with respect to

prostitution, alcohol,

and gambling. Most of the older

such laws in place against the

We

2.

cities

of the north already have

of alcohol.

sale

can also expect zakat (poor tax) to be revived and given a central place in

Devout Muslims view zakat

the economy.

as the

most

means

effective

for the redistri-

bution of wealth, the elimination of poverty, and the redress of social deprivation.

Land reform

3.

will

which holds

society,

security for the

it

be an important

Under the

issue.

in trust for Allah, to the

weak and poor.

Shari'a, land belongs to

end that we may

In concrete terms this

means

realize justice

and

that land will be retrieved

from multinational corporations and given back to the peasants. 4.

We

The IMF/World Bank

can expect a variety of economic reforms.

Adjustment Programme has been

difficult to

Structural

implement because the economy

it is

designed to restructure from the bondage of debts to make Nigeria economically

independent has been

in ruins for so long. In a related area,

Some

posals for "Islamic" reform of the banking system.

of riba (charging or collecting

interest).

The Kano

State Foundation, a private orga-

On

nization, has floated a proposal for an Islamic bank.

Nigeria Universal Bank Limited in

some of

its

now

branches, where that

one hears various pro-

argue against the institution

a

more modest

provides separate counters for is

in

level,

the

men and women

keeping with the religious attitude of the

people.

Educational reform would proceed along

5.

Students' Society has called

on the National

The Muslim Commission and the Council the curriculum. 57 This would

fairly predictable lines.

Universities

of Legal Education to accord prominence to Shari'a

in

require the creation of courses in Islamic economics, banking, political science, and

so forth.

It

would

also entail particular attention to the various faculties

on the Islamic legal system. It would be some have suggested, that a legal system based on Shari'a only on "common law" made by Islamic jurists. Muslims in Nigeria do not

would be responsible

for developing courses

erroneous to suppose,

must

rely

as

object to statutory and constitutional law. to the provisions of the Qur'an

complexities of the

What

they require

and the Sunna, making

full

it is

the tajdid

movement now under way seems

a gradual process

umma. might

In recent years call

leaders

all

laws conform

allowance for the changing

and

we

it

Umma

to be uniting

Muslims

in Nigeria,

has had to counteract a variety of divisions within the

have seen three such divisions. The

"denominational." The third

is

first

two

are

what we

more philosophical dispute among

a

of the tajdid movement about the proper pace and method of change.

speak of this

last at

some length below. There

is

a fourth

phenomenon which

times, mistakenly, seen as a facet of the Islamic revival. This

ment, which

The

that

is

human environment.

Division and Unity within the

Though

of law, which

first

I

will address at the

"denominational"

end of this

split

is

I

some-

is

the Maitatsine

the will

move-

section.

worthy of mention was the

rift

between the

Tijja-

ISLAMIC TAJDID AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN NIGERIA 195

niyya and Qadiriyya sects that occurred during the 1950s and early 1960s.

It

mir-

some extent, a division within the political establishment. Most of the emirs were members of the Tijjaniwa sect. The emirs were traditional rulers governing defined territories (emirates) in the north. They traced their positions to the jihad of rored, to

Usman Dan Fodio as

in the earlv nineteenth century.

custodians of the traditions of Islam. This

ago. Their loss of prestige

shown

they have

among

the

young

not

At one time the emirs were seen as true

there

was an acute schism between the two particularlv in the north.

The

rift

as

the Tijjaniwa and

Qadiriwa

The denominational one hand, and Jama'atu

movement, begun

are

more or

in

less

division currently Izalatul Bidia

sects. Physical clashes

was healed through the

such as the Jama'atu Nasril Islam, founded

1962 primarily

it

was forty years

efforts

of organizations

for that purpose.

Todav

most

visible

is

between the Tariqa, on the

Waikamatus Sunna

(Izala),

on the

other.

The

1978, has been inspired bv the teachings of Shaykh Abu-

in

regard Izala as a kind of Wahabbism. to Saudi Arabia. Izala

some years were not uncom-

united in a group called Tariqa.

bakar Gumi. 59 Shavkh Ismail Idris, a student of Gumi,

the control of

today

attributable in part to the cooperation

is

secular authorities since independence. 58 In any case for

mon,

Izala

is

Its

leadership

and Tariqa have clashed on

mosques or during preaching

a

is

is its

chief missioner. Some-

certainly politically sympathetic

number of occasions,

usually over

sessions. Their disagreements,

though

minor, are numerous. Thev concern such matters as naming ceremonies, discipline, celebration of the birthday of the Prophet, prayers for the dead and other forms of

tombs of saints, even the mode of greetings between

pravcr, visits to the

son. In

father

and

of these disputes Izala contends that Tariqa has tolerated innovations, and

all

needs to return to the original teaching of the Qur'an and the Sunna.

do not wish to overstate the degree of division within the Muslim umma. Perhaps as much as 65 percent of the total Muslim population belongs to neither Tariqa I

nor

Many see

Izala.

the conflict as trivial and unnecessary. Moreover, both within and

without these groups there

is

general agreement

on matters of more substantive im-

portance: salat (prayer), zakat (charitv), bajj (pilgrimage), fasting, and the primacy

of Shari'a

More tioned

is

as the

law that should govern the Islamic community.

relevant to our purposes than the "denominational" divisions a philosophical difference

I

have men-

over the means of bringing Shari'a into the

politi-

Here the opposing camps might be called gradualists and radicals. The gradualists believe that, since Muslims are a majority within Nigeria, they can accomplish their aims bv constitutional means through active participation in politics.

cal

svstem.

What

this calls for

at the ballot

is

active efforts at education

box. For

all

and the exercise of numerical strength

their differences over

minor doctrinal matters, both the

Tariqa and the Izala groups generally favor this approach. Shaykh Idris has put the

matter most succinctly.

The

conflict

between Tariqa and

Izala,

he asserted,

is

simply

an in-house matter that should not impede the larger effort to uproot secularism and institute the Shari'a.

basis

of unity

exists

Shaykh Dahiru Bauchi, speaking

(though he suggested that

Undoubtedly the most

Gumi, the most

Izala

for the Tariqa, agreed that a

must be "reasonable"). 60

influential figure within the gradualist

politically articulate

camp

is

Shavkh

of the older generation of ulama. During the

Umar M.

Birai

196

Republic he was the Grand Kadi of northern Nigeria

First

the Shari'a

Court of Appeal). Since then

his influence has

kind of chief justice of

(a

extended throughout the

month of Rama-

country. Since the 1970s, his daily exegeses of the Qur'an during the

dan, and his weekly Hasken Musulunci programs in the Sultan Bello mosque, have attracted

huge crowds. The Ramadan exegeses

are broadcast in

Kaduna by

the Federal

Radio Corporation and the Nigerian Television Authoritv. One can gauge

their im-

pact from the fact that the military government tried (without success) to reduce the

power of the Kaduna radio station in 1978. For Gumi, politics is "rooted in the practice of Islam.' 161

On

the eve of the 1983

general elections he issued a controversial fatwa stating that in contemporary Nigeria

more important than prayer" or going on pilgrimage, because politics Gumi repeated the point in June 1990 as the country prepared for the elections for executive positions within the two political parties: "A Muslim who neglected [prayer] would have caused himself injury, but a Muslim who allowed the ship of state to sail anyhow, would have caused the whole "politics

is

ultimately controls the right to pray. 62

society a major injury." 63 In his weekly

Hasken Musulunci Shaykh

urged Muslims, including women, to take part tary to civilian rule, in order to determine

in the politics

who

shall

Gumi

has repeatedly

of transition from

mili-

be the leaders of the Third

Republic.

Shaykh Gumi

except in extraordinary circumstances

He

Muslim population should, regime), have Muslim leaders.

believes that a country with a majority (e.g., a military

certainlv correct as a practical matter in saying that "it will be difficult for a

is

non-Muslim

to be [elected] leader in Nigeria."

But he has caused considerable con-

sternation by his willingness to carry these views to their logical conclusion. "If Christians

do not accept Muslims

as their leaders,"

Gumi

reason

he has

said,

lines.

Though he Gumi believes

has urged

very useful" in

peans

women

that leadership

hopes not to see a

is

some

Muslims cannot accept Christians

then Nigeria will have to be divided. 64 Perhaps for that

favors a one-party system;

along religious

that he

as their leaders [and]

is

two

parties will inevitably divide the country

to play a role in the politics of transition, Shavkh

an

woman

affair exclusively for

men.

leading Nigeria while he

aspects of politics, but "to

is

He

has

alive.

made

it

"Women

make them mix [with men]

like

clear

can be

Euro-

not acceptable to Islam." 65

There are those, particularly among the young,

Gumi and

who

reject the

gradualism typified

means of transforming the country along Islamic lines. The powerful MSS, the numerous Muslim youth organizations (including NACOMYO), and, perhaps most notably, the Islamic Movement argue that Musby Shavkh

favor

more

radical

on which it is Muslims have spent too much time and attention

lims should reject the present secular order, including the constitution

based. These groups contend that

on

trivial

among

disagreements

—

a

tendency they think

is

exacerbated bv petty jealousies

the older generation of ulama.

Tvpical of the groups that favor a radical approach

is

the Islamic

home of its leader, Malam Ibrahim El-Zak Zaky, among university' students and youths elsewhere. It

Movement. Based

in Zaria, the

it

has attracted a wide

following

is

widely believed that

ISLAMIC TAJ DID AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

IN

NIGERIA

197

May among

El-Zak Zakv engineered the "Islam Onlv" demonstrations that took place on 4

1980

in Zaria.

The demonstrations were designed

Muslim population.

the

to raise political awareness

from the event ("Islam Only") can

Inscriptions

on many public buildings in and around Zaria City. same vear in Sokoto for allegedly burning the country's

be seen

still

El-Zak Zakv was arrested that secular constitution. 66 In

he was again arrested in the aftermath of the Kafanchan

crisis,

1987

though he has been

released.

The

rhetoric of the Islamic

frontational.

Movement,

as these activities

El-Zak Zakv has urged that "the

might suggest,

and other

ria is to establish

the rule of Shari'a,

must destroy the constitution Islamic

Movement, argues

governing law

Whether

temper

must

is

On

ummah

little

in

necessary until Shari'a

to

Nige-

appropriate area"

start to hit at the

Malam Ture Muhammad,

67

that a jihad

this rhetoric will

among

in

it

social maladies. "If the

done

—

it

Zakv's deputy in the is

established as the

in Nigeria. 68

mains to be seen. As to units'

first.

con-

does not deserve worship."

state

the contrary, the custodians of the state have exploited the people and eradicate alcoholism, prostitution,

is

I

be matched bv an equally revolutionary program

have said, there are signs that the tajdid movement

the Nigerian

some measure

Muslim population, and

the effect of this

is

re-

leading

may be

to

the approach of the radicals.

Maitatsine

Between 1980 and 1985 the northern

The

Kano

disruptions began in 9

states suffered

massive outbreaks of violence.

1980, where some

in

thousand people were

five

Borno State, and in 1984 and 1985 to Gombe in Bauchi State, Yola in Gongola State, and Kaduna City. The leader of these riots, Muhammadu Marwa (known as "Maitatsine"), is a mysterious figure."" He was born in Marwa, Camcroun. It is not clear what kind of Islamic education he received, killed.*

They spread

1982 to Bulunkutu

in

in

though he seems to have had "an excessive

Marwa After in

declared

him an

infidel."

moving to Nigeria, he

2

belief in fetishism,""

Maitatsine's

settled at

own

Yan Awaki

wife described

in

and the

1

him

Imam of

as a magician.

Kano, where the violence began

1980.

The motive

force behind Maitatsine's

movement

is

a matter

of some uncertainty.

According to one view, the violence was an expression of deepening tion.

This view has

it

that the protesting

religion (in this case Islam) as a tool

emir of Kano, and the police riots

— which they saw

as

all

is

we have

state

government, the

like this at the

time of the

civil servants.

spiritual

power. If

to suppose that Maitatsine

sustained him.

this

number of promiThese people patronized him for

Maitatsine's close connections with a

nent politicians, businessmen, and

who

The Kano

subscribed to something

charms and other manifestations of people

protest. 73

class contradic-

a marginalized class that took

an attempt to capture political power. The riddle that

explanation does not solve

thesis seriously,

of

group was

we

take the "class conflict"

was reacting against the very

Umar M.

Birai

198

A second view about the Maitatsinc movement holds that fundamentalism ...

Islamic practices." 74 This explanation federal government's report

prophet

among

—

on

a heretical position

more

is

difficult to credit

Awaki engaged

they were rams or goats."

a

Aminu.

It is

in "slaughtering

a mistake,

But

who

.

even evidence that Maitatsine's

is

.

human

.

more

to

if

were those of Profes-

affair

was not.

He was

at best a

Muslim

its

Maitatsine

movement

movement

takes deeper roots

will

It is

not occur

and the

umma

Islamic beliefs, that in the future such preten-

speedilv identified and rejected.

The

An

clearlv

like the

to be hoped, as the tajdid

becomes more sophisticated about ders will be

beings by the neck as

took advantage of our societal weakness." 77

be certain that something it is

than the above. As the

he argued, to "vest [Maitatsine] with the stature of

misguided Muslim reformer, which he

again.

form of "Islamic

76

deviant; at worst, a charlatan difficult to

a

at reviving pristine

hardlv designed to inspire support

is

Perhaps the most sensible comments on the Maitatsine sor Jibril

was

the riots notes, Maitatsine proclaimed himself to be a

within Islam that

the generality of Muslims." 5 Indeed, there

enclave at Yan

it

of Islamic resurgence aimed

a manifestation

Politics

of Transition to Civil Rule

important aspect of the transition program of General Babangida's militarv regime

civil rule is

the attempt to undermine the potency of religion in the Third Republic.

November 1991

In the

religious faith

census, an important item

on the program, data regarding

and ethnic origin of Nigerians, was not included

The census has always been

in the questionnaire.

a controversial issue in Nigeria because

of the weight of

economic, geopolitical, and religious considerations.

On 27 August to thirtv states.

1991 the country was fundamentally restructured from twenty-one states are now coterminous with geopolitical interests of

Some of the

the northern Christian minorities. This for stability in the

The

an attempt to provide a structural balance

is

Third Republic.

primaries for the nomination of governorship candidates in the

two

political

Republican Convention and Social Democratic Party) were con-

parties (National

ducted in October 1991. There was some confusion and accusations of rigging

both parties from

many

states.

This

is

the

first

in

time in the political history of Nigeria

that primaries have been

conducted before elections. However, the fascinating aspect of the primaries was demonstrated

where the 1987

local council elections

example. Observers expected that the

in

those states

took on religious dimensions. Kaduna

SDP

(rightly or

wrongly

is

an

identified generally as

Christian-dominated) would nominate a Christian candidate for governor. But both

SDP nominated Muslim candidates. The NRC won the election. The SDP primaries in the states of Kaduna and Adamawa mav be taken as an indication of the numerical strength of the Muslims in the SDP in these states. It may

the

NRC

result

and

of the

also be an indication that the attempt

by the military to reduce the role of religion in

ISLAMIC TAJDin AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN NIGERIA 199

the political process has

begun to

vicld results.

However,

Benue and Taraba, two

in

minority states in the north, ministers were elected as governors on the platform of

SDP.

the

however, the

Ironically,

state to the

NCR,

SDP lost the prestigious governorship of Lagos SDP governorship candidate and his deputy

largely because the

were both Muslims." 8

The tendency of

success

The

for geopolitical

and religious considerations to be

a presidential candidate

from cither of the

parties

of the extent to which the military government has

test

the potency of religious interest in the politics of transition

on

significant in the

therefore

effectively

still

strong.

undermined

would seem to rest largely two parties. Presiden-

the successful nomination of presidential candidates bv the elections are scheduled for the

tial

Two in

is

civil

1991. The Bauchi

diately

assumed

riots

religious

bances were triggered by

on an

riots

of October 1991 imme-

and ethnic dimensions. The Kano October 1991 a visit

distur-

of a German minister, Reinhard Bonnke, to Nigeria

Bonnke reportedly made uncomplimentary remarks about way to Kano. This reminded Muslims of a previous slight indicate a double standard. In 1988 some Muslim organizations

Kaduna on

had seemed to

in Nigeria

tional

of May 1991 and the Kano

evangelical mission.

Islam in that

end of 1992.

disturbances, probably motivated bv political considerations, took place

his

had invited

Muslim

a black

American Muslim, Louis Farrakhan, and an

preacher, Shavkh

Ahmed

Deedat, to preach

in Nigeria.

interna-

But thev were

refused permission to preach. Several people were killed in the October 1991 riots,

and property' worth millions of naira was destroyed or looted bv hoodlums and the army of unemployed youths. The large-scale destruction and looting of public and private properties has sive

made

the religious dimension difficult to understand.

The mas-

involvement of an army of unemployed vouth indicates the extent to which Struc-

Adjustment Programme has been unable to turn the economy around. However, both CAN and some Muslim organizations blamed the government

tural

the riots.

NACOMYO's

stand on the issue

is

are the result of the government's double standard religious organizations." 9

ingly

The

and inequity

riots are, in a real sense,

wide gap between Muslims and Christians

in its

treatment of

an indication of the increas-

in Nigeria.

Divisive religious tendencies within the Nigerian polity are not onlv crease but are also affecting sensitive institutions

establishment

People"

is

A new

itself.

The

on the

in-

of government including the military

organization called "Christian Fellowship of Uniformed

said to have penetrated the military establishment

organizations.

for

suggestive that these kinds of problems

and other paramilitary

minister of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff called

on soldiers to avoid religious bigotry in order to ensure the unity of the country. 80 The president, General Babangida, made similar references to the threat posed bv divisive religious tendencies in the country. 81

As the

political

dimension of the ensuing Tajdid process deepens, the Christian

defense of the status

quo

will likely intensify.

Divisive religious tendencies will for

power

in the

become

The

clearer

crisis

of state and religion

and more decisive

in

will

grow.

the competition

Third Republic, perhaps leading to destabilization.

How

far the

.

.

Umar M.

Birai

200

may

reduce

political

atmo-

restructuring of the Nigerian Federation from twenty-two to thirty states this

problem cannot be predicted. In

sphere

Nigeria

in

is

clouded and

would be hazardous to

It

early

in a state

predict

1992 the economic and

of flux.

what success the Third Republic

resolving Nigeria's religious divisions. If Christians continue to insist ration of religion

on

will

have

in

a strict sepa-

and government, the gulf between Muslims and Christians

is

likely

grow wider. The primary objective of the tajdid movement is, after all, to extend the domain of Shari'a as far as possible both geographically and legally. Given Nigeto

ria's

religious diversity, the federal system

keeping the country

intact. It

seems to be the most viable option for

might be necessary to allow the

order to accommodate religious demands on a local

in

much

to

hope that

states

But

level.

more autonomy, perhaps too

it is

be enough to satisfy both sides.

this alone will

Notes Bruce Lawrence, "Muslim Fundamen-

1

Movements:

talist

Reflections

New Approach," in B. Islamic Impulse

F.

towards a

Stowasser, ed., The

(Croom Helm, 1987),

p. 13.

According to Shaykh Ibrahim Saleh, number of tajdid movements within the Muslim umma. Shaykh Ismail Idris, Shaykh Lawal Abubakar, and Professor 2.

there can be a

Abdullahi

all

agree that there

is

movement under way within Nige-

a tajdid ria

Muhammed

I.

A. Gambari, Nigeria and Islamic Re-

vivalism:

Home Grown

(Baltimore: Johns

or Externally Induced?

Hopkins

Press, 1989).

4.

Narswatch, Lagos, 10 October 1988.

5.

Interview, The Pen, Kano, 29 Septem-

ber 1989.

See details in A. A. Mazrui, "African

6.

requirements that

Islam and Competitive Religion between

Revivalism and Expansion,"

Third World

N

750 and

month. This group

is

1500 per

unable to afford basic

less

than

N

350 would

have bought in 1985, before introduction of the Structural Adjustment

Programme. As

Dr. Oni has observed, "Bv cutting

down

in-

vestments in social overheads and directed

by

IMF and

stroying

quired

the

World Bank, Nigeria

human

today, the to

build

growth." Quoted

today.

3.

N

ranges between

a in

is

de-

potentials re-

sustained

"Managers

economic in Nigeria,"

journal of Nigerian Institute of Management 24, no. 5 (September/October 1988^: 7. 1 1

Interview,

koto, 9 Februarv

Community Concord, So1987. Professor Ogun-

sanwo describes the countrv's situation as Ogunsanwo, "Ni1960-1985," geria's External Relations, "blatant enslavement." A.

Public Service Lecture, Lagos, 1985. 12.

Interview, Megastar,

Lagos, March

1989.

Quarterly 10, no. 2 (April 1988): 504-5.

nos.

1-2(1964): 11-12.

The Pen, Kano, 29 September 1989.

14.

D.

8.

Ahira Declaration, 1967.

9.

Interview,

New

Nigerian,

10.

Byang,

Shari'a

in

Nigeria:

A

Christian Perspective (n.p., 1988), p. 71.

30

Mav

H.

Gwarzo, "The Principles of TajContemporarv Muslim World," Umlonn, 1980, 1989. 15.

I.

did (renewal) in the

1990.

N

13.

Western Nigeria Statistical Bulletin 4,

7.

The

national

minimum wage

is

now

250.00 per month ($31.20 at the current rate of exchange). That amount will just buy a 100 kg bag of maiz.e, a staple of the Nigerian diet. The income of the middle class

16.

I.

A. Gambari, "Nigeria and Islamic

Revivalism." 17. A.

Ciroma, Speech,

dio University, 1989.

Usmanu Dan

Fo-

.

ISLAMIC TAJDID AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN NIGERIA 201

18.

I.

A. Gambari, "Nigeria and Islamic

October 1988. Nigerian law forbids political parties and trade unions from seeking or receiving financial or material assistance from outside 19. Newswatch, Lagos, 10

the country. is

Abu Sutma of Abu

reported bv

Hurrvrah and recorded in the Dawud I. Sulaiman argues that "the concept of prophethood is synonymous with the philosophv of revolution or of

in

human

tajdid. It

im-

society should not be left

darkness and corruption but be guided to

righteousness." Sulaiman, History:

A

ria:

A

Revolution in

The Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio

1991).

(n.p.,

CAN's

35.

leadership analysis in "Nige-

Signpost of Danger," Islamic Welfare

Foundation, Lagos, 1989.

Llama

36. Council of

Kano,

20. This tradition

plies that

34. Details in B. Isyaku, The Kafanchan

Carnage

Revivalism."

May

31

press conference,

1990.

("Innocent

Muslims were unjustlv jailed. Reverend Bako and his cohorts who murdered Muslims in cold blood must be brought to .

.

.

.

.

.

book.") 37. G. Orkah, broadcast, 38. BBC:

news

bulletin,

CAN

39. Statement bv

22 April 1990.

22 April 1990. president. Arch-

bishop Okogie, The Democrat, Kaduna, 28

May

1990.

(Mansell, 1986), p. 2. 2

1

"It

in these

is

vouths that one sees the

Jihad proper: to dissipate that virtually

impossible."

spirit

now

is

Lemu, "Remote

S.

and Immediate Causes of [the] Religious Crisis in Nigeria," memo, 31 August 1987. 22. Apart from the ulama, others include,

Maitama Sule (once Nigeria's Permanent Representative at the United Nations), Alhaji Aminu Dantata, and Chief M. K. O. Abiola (formerly vice-president of ITT and a well- known newspaper

40. Council of Ulama press conference, Kano, 31 May 1990.

NACOMYO

41.

ANNALS,

macy- and Conflict in Nigeria,"

24.

New

1989.

one is Muslim. Two of the Christians are from the north; one is a Yosuba from the

24 February 1986.

26. The Democrat, Kaduna, 28

May

1990.

a northerner. Recruit-

and levels of the of "federal characrepresentation. The danger

ter"

—

i.e.,

state

of a religious conflict is that the government might be unable to employ the

43.

I

it

into factions.

have monitored the membership of

the parties in a

number of local government where the population

is

mixed.

New

Kaduna, 3 January

Nigerian,

44. Informal discussion with an insider

1990. 29.

is

military takes account

areas, particularly

27. Informal discussion, June 1988. 28.

The Muslim

into the various arms

military without splitting

25. Newswatch, Lagos,

made with

in the event

Kaduna, 6 October

Nigerian,

positions are

four division

ment

AAPSS, 483, January 1986.

command

As of November 1991, three of the commanders are Christians;

tions.

south. Legiti-

La-

in eye to religious and regional considera-

publisher).

H. Bienen, "Religion,

conference,

42. Appointments to top military and strategic

Alhaji

23. Cf.

press

gos, June 1990.

CAN

Babangida

from SDP, Kaduna

State.

protest letter sent to General after

December

the

1989

changes.

with

Ustaz deputy Grand Kadi of Kwara 45. Interview

Abdallah, State,

June

1990. 30. Statement a

new

made

at the

swearing-in of

minister of internal affairs in the

wake

46. A. O. Obilade, The Nigerian Legal System, vols.

of the December 1989 changes. 31. This

was widely reported

in the press.

See Guardian, Lagos, 24 Januarv 1986. 32. Newswatch, Lagos, 33.

Afkar Inquiry,

24 February 1986.

May

33-40 (London: Sweet and

Maxwell, 1979).

1986.

47. B.

Dudley,

An

gerian Government and ton:

pp.

Indiana

154-64.

Introduction Politics

University

to

Ni-

(Blooming-

Press,

1982),

UmarM.

Birai

202

48.

CAN

49.

New Nigeria, 29 September

Enlightenment

series 1, p. 36.

1986.

H. Yadudu, 'The Prospects

50. A.

11

ence, Abuja,

for

November 1988.

1987. 62.

like

My

Bello,

Sir

On

this point

Shaykh Abubakar

53.

(Cambridge:

Life

Press, 1962), p. 217.

Clark, "Islamic

P.

temporary

Nigeria:

Jibril,

be ahead of

who

agree. Jibril claims that "Islam tics is like a

Cambridge University

Gumi may

the majority of Muslims. There are some,

51. Ibid.

52. A.

Lagos, October

61. Interview, Quality,

Islam in Africa Confer-

Shari'a in Nigeria,

27 August 1989.

60. Interview,

Reform in ConMethods and

Sokoto,

man without

poli-

a head." Interview,

But others, though they

1987.

agree with

essentially

without

Gumi

in principle, are

fortable with die claim that prayer

uncomis

sub-

Aims," Third World Quarterly 10, no. 2

ordinate

(1988): 519-38.

regime. Shaykh Dahiru Bauchi typifies this

54.

Suleiman, "State and Religion in

I.

Nigeria:

A

Suggested Framework,"

New

55.

63.

29 Septem-

1987.

ber 1986. See also National Concord, Lagos,

Ahmadu

Bello

University,

Zaria,

1987; Gasklya Tafi Kobo, Kaduna, 14 September 1989 (Shaykh Nasiur Kabara). As just

one

further

anonymous

example,

consider

tract distributed in

Kano on

the

reminded all Mustime to rise up and go back

Hausa language,

lims that "it

is

66. Interview with El-Zak Zaky's wife. Crescent International,

Suleiman, address

MSS

London, 16-31 Au-

gust 1989. 67. I. El-Zak Zakv, "Reorientation by Deduction from History," lecture, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1987.

68. Interview,

Amana,

69. Gambari,

Zaria, July 1989.

"Nigeria

and

Islamic

Revivalism." 70. For treatment of the Maitatsine phe-

tion of the Fatwa 57.

Lagos, October

65. Ibid. Gumi is joined in this view by Shaykh Ibrahim Saleh. Interview, The Pen, Kano, September 1989.

nomenon I.

secular

it

to Sharta."

56.

a

29 March 1990.

the

day of Eid-El-Kabir, 13 July 1989. Written in the

Tafsir,

64. Interview, Quality,

Nigerian, Kaduna,

6 April 1988 (Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs); interview, 28 May 1990 (Shaykh Lawal Abubakar); I. El-Zak Zaky, "'Reorientation by Deduction from History," lecture,

within

politics

position.

Political

Bureau, Lagos, 1986.

to

at

the inaugura-

Commission.

press conference,

Kaduna, 27

June 1990. 58. In the late 1940s

Reformed Tijjaniwa

and

early

1950s a from

tradition split oft

the Tijjaniwa sect in Kano.

The

issues that

divided them are not unlike the questions that have split

denominations within Ameri-

can Protestantism. In

1954, for example,

An

see

A.

Na-Ayuba, "Yantatsine:

Analysis of the

Gardawa Uprising

in

Kano, Niqeria, 1980-1985" (M.Sc. thesis, Department of Political Science, Bavero University, Kano, December 1986); B. Takaya, "The Foundation of Religious Intolerance in Nigeria: In Search of Background for Understanding die Maitatsine Phenomenon," conference proceedings, Department of Political Science, Ahmadu Bello University,

Zaria

(May 1987);

S.

Bako, "Maitat-

there was a disagreement over whether the

sine Revolts in Nigeria:

Another Case of

Qur'an could be read on the

Class Struggle,"

NASA

Conference, Port

radio.

J.

Paden,

and Political Culture in Kano (Berkeley and Los Angles: University of

Religion

California Press, 1973).

59. Particularly important

71. is

Gumi's

in-

pamphlet Agigatul Sahibah be Muwafigual Sharia (The right path in accordance with the Shari'a) (n.p., n.d.). structional

Harcourt (November 1985); Gambari, "Nigeria and Islamic Revivalism."

New

Niqerian, Kaduna, 21 February

1982. 72.

Na-Avuba,

73. See Takava,

Yantatsine.

"The Foundation of Re-

ligious Intolerance in Nigeria."

ISLAMIC TAIDID AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN NIGERIA 203

74. Na-Ayuba, Tantatsine.

78. Newswatch,

Lagos,

December

30

1991. 75. "Federal

quirv into

Government Tribunal ofln-

Kano

Disturbances," 1981,

p.

25.

79. Press release. gos, 6

76.

New Nigerian, Kaduna, 25 November

1981. 77.

Weekend Concord, La-

November 1991.

80. Daily

Sketch,

18

October

press

briefing.

Ibadan.

1991. J.

Aminn.

Observations, Delta Publi-

cations, 1988, p. 64.

81. General

Calabar, 10

Babangida,

November 1991.

CHAPTER 10

The Nakshibendi Order of Turkey

§erif Mardin

on

V^yurrent works

Islamic fundamentalism

approach the subject from a somewhat disingenuous perspective. Their time frame that

of the present progressive

emergence

when

is

left

unexplained.

set against studies

studies

of

—

i.e.,

fundamentalism

The odditv of

this

is

is

an ongoing process whose

treatment emerges quite clearly

of Western Christian fundamentalism. In the pioneering

this latter genre, analysts, in

with which they have to work, do,

at

order to clarify the conditions of the setting

one time or another, invoke the Bible and

its

meaning, the Church Fathers, and the ideological characteristics of Protestantism. Islamic fundamentalism

which

bias, Islamic

Western

much is

is

sees Islamic history as a

not accorded the same privilege due to

companion

a specific bias

piece to Western history. According to this

fundamentalism can thus be understood onlv against the background of

history.

The point

I

make here

has

no

originality,

recent writing about Islam (Amin, Djait, Fazlur

important to

being the stock-in-trade of

Rahman,

Said).

However, it remedy

state this point here, since the present chapter attempts to

such an optical illusion by studying a Turkish variant of modern Islamic fundamentalism, namely, the

Nakshibendi Sufi order, which

I

will describe in relation to specific

thresholds of Islamic history.

A major watershed in

Islamic history separates Islamic fundamentalism in the pre-

modern version. The earlier frame is that of a world history with relatively little interaction between its component culture areas; the later historical frame, emerging in the late eighteenth century, is marked by the beginnings of a world modern world from

its

communication network showing constant acceleration of the trend toward the mation of the "global

village"

of our days. The primary

progression undergone by Islam,

is

the

new

saliency

shift

of emphasis,

for-

in this

of modern organizational tech-

niques emphasizing mass adherence to social-religious movements. This contrasts with

an

earlier structure

of Islamic conventicles with limited membership. The new ideo-

204

THE NAKSH] B E N D OR H E R O F TURKE V I

205

logical

component, introduced

basic shift in the nature

in

tandem with new mass recruitment,

of the "sounding board"

In the earlier stages, this resonance

Muslims;

modern

in the

stage, the

and the

policies

The

sounding board

of these stages

first

also involves a

of social

identity.

was acquired by setting oneself against heterodox

Within the sphere of modernization "subthresholds."

in the elaboration

is

is

the Western cultural "other."

have discerned what

I

may

be termed

the project of mobilizing the Islamic world

of recruitment necessitated bv

The second

it.

the attempt to capture

is

instruments of modernization such as banks, newspapers, instructional books, and

pamphlets.

modern

The

third stage

schools,

i.e..

is

the attempt to bring into one's orbit minds formed in

engineers, economists, and journalists.

attempts to emerge on the leading edge of

modern

A

final stage consists

political institutions. All

of

of these

important but subtle driving forces of modernization have, together, forced the Nakshibendi order to operate within the setting of a

modern

public.

In this sense, the discourse of the contemporary Nakshibendi ern. Nevertheless, the fact that

maintenance of an Islamic "canon" shows how

idiom of tradition plays the role of

mode

fundamentalisms

is

The

a substantive core

to the

its

Islam the value as a

"canon" means,

in fact,

contemporary Islamic

constructed through the ability of all Muslims to share this idiom.

from the absence of an organized

in Islam.

The Nakshibendi Image

Modern Turkey

in

Asked what he would consider the darkest force of religious reaction a

mod-

wedded

which maintains

populist, democratic thrust of

In turn, the possibility for such a sharing derives

"church"

essentially is

in established cultures like

tor self-placement in the universe. Sharing an Islamic

sharing an Islamic idiom.

is

even today the Nakshibendi order

Kemalist

—

a Turkish intellectual

the Turkish Republic

who

identifies himself

in

Turkey today,

with the secular reforms of

— would probably replv the "Nakshibendi

perception of the Nakshibendi order as fanatical and rigid

[Sufi] order."

one of the

fits

traits

This

which

has been attributed to fundamentalism. Nakshibendi are also fundamentalistlike insofar as they see "history

Hidden behind the

and experience

explicit

as diluting a basic religious

denunciation of the Kemalist

ing the order's perennial opposition to the

canon."

an implication regard-

movement of modernization

throughout the twentieth century. Working back offer us the following

is

in time,

arguments detailing incidents

in

in

Turkey

our Turkish Jacobin would

which the Nakshibendi have,

shown themselves to be foes of modernization. On 13 April 1909, nine months after the Young Turks had carried out a revolution which reinstated the Ottoman constitution of 1876, a rebellion of Turkish privates in his

led

view,

by noncommissioned

officers

took place

students in religious seminaries as well as parliament,

agement to

in

Muslim

Istanbul.

Soldiers, civilians,

clerics laid siege to the

and

Ottoman

demanding the establishment of a state based on religious law. Encourthe rebels to take up cudgels was linked to the propaganda emanating

§erif Mardm

206

from the newspaper Volkan (the Volcano) in the davs preceding the rebellion. The movement itself was soon quelled; the editor of the Volkan a Nakshibendi and a number of other leaders were hanged. Modern Turkish republican history has consis-

—

tent!}'

used the incident in schoolbooks to

—

dangers presented by religious

illustrate the

fanaticism in Turkey.

A second

incident which helped to link the Nakshibendi with "backwardness"

the Kurdish rebellion of 1925, also led by Nakshibendi shaykhs.

The

was

rebellion, oc-

curring shortly after the founding of the Turkish Republic, led to the passing of

draconian laws that clamped

new

down on

the expression of public criticism against the

regime.

Radical republican Turks also recall a

Nakshibendi were implicated, the

little

movement studied

against the republic in

"Menemen

which the

Incident" of 1930. In a

town next to Izmir, a shadowy Nakshibendi figure called Muslims to rally around the Green Flag of Islam and destroy the impious Republican regime. The person who stopped the rebels, a voung officer by the name of Kubilay is rumored to have had his head cut off with a rusty saw when he fell into the hands of the rebels. The resurgence of Nakshibendi influence in the 1980s among a number of edu-

— the origin of crvpto-Nakshibendis — renewed the suspicions of republican Turks.

cated Turks with a rural or provincial background in

Turgut Ozal's Motherland

Part}'

These images of the Nakshibendi order emphasize

backwardness and unrelent-

its

ing drive against secularization. While the role that the Nakshibendi order has played in Islamic history

does confirm

varied set of characteristics than richer set enables us to paint a

its is

stark orthodoxy,

it

also brings into relief a

more

offered by the order's Turkish Jacobin image. This

more

precise picture of

its

"fundamentalism." In a

preliminary evaluation of our Kemalist's reaction to the Nakshibendi

we may

note

two of the cases presented as evidence of Nakshibendi fanaticism, the events of 1909 and the Menemen Incident, reference is made to Nakshibendi purportedly operating within a framework of folk Islam. In fact, the main drift of Nakshibendi activity in history entails Muslim "high" culture. It is true, as we shall see, that in at least

that the order's attempts at

mass mobilization have been able to touch

sensitive nerve in Islamic societies, that

against the unjust ruler.

a historically

of mass outbreaks led by religious leaders

But the direction has been one of bringing the masses into

a

better understanding of their religion rather than of exploiting mass volatility.

History of the Order

The Nakshibendi

is

a

prominent order that originated

characterized as "Sufi." Given the fact that Sufism itself to activist

tion.

The

configurations,

I

is

in the twelfth century. It

must emphasize an important preliminary

sober, inward-looking, disciplined spiritual practices

order brought

it

is

not usually understood as lending

into the very center of orthodoxy

distinc-

of the Nakshibendi

and orthopraxy. This hardly

fits

with either received ideas about Sufism's ecstatic or cosmic aspects, or discussions

THE NAKSHIBENDI ORDER OF TURKEY 207

about whether Sufism

induced by rules of mortification or by theosophical

is

speculation.

Very early

order acquired

in its history the

its

characteristic tonality,

looking attitude which shunned "show or distracting

homologous with

structurally

the spirit of the rule that

Empire. Indeed, the Ottomans relied on the Nakshibendi

of establishing law and order \

ears

of

their rise to

its

inw aid-

The soberness was prevailed in the Ottoman

rites."

as

1

one part of

their policy

During the

in the empire, especially in Anatolia.

power, the Ottomans were confronted bv the heterodox

and practices of the Turkic

had entered Anatolia

tribes that

in

great

early

beliefs

numbers from the

Ottoman hegemony depended on the pacification of tribes, and one way to achieve this was to integrate them with Sunni orthodoxy. From the fifteenth century onward, the Ottomans found in the Nakshibendi an excellent alh' in achieving this goal. They were given the task of bringing the heterodox to heel. The order achieved considerable prestige in the empire, but the revival of its energies came somewhat later and from outside the empire. thirteenth century onward.

Historical information about the Nakshibendi

Nakshibendi operational code, the wav

makes possible an

which the Nakshibendi, bv

in

analysis

of the

activating

and

using some basic structures of Islamic society, arc able to anchor their influence in the Islamic world and in Turkey.

bendi "fundamentalism"

start

venue some of the characteristics of Nakshi-

this

unraveled.

Dimensions of Muslim Fundamentalism

Historical

Let us

With

mav be

with the proposition that fundamentalism

mav be an

episodic forum that

any religion can assume. Fundamentalists have been characterized nold Toynbee,

One of the

who

demonstrates that zealotry

an unseemly throwback to a its

Our hasty attempt

is

that

to classify

possibility that

even a superficial glance

at its

we

study

fundamentalism could be

a recurrent

as well as

fundamentalisms of the fourteenth,

background of the modern movement they are studying, but item in a

series.

I

little is

phenomenon. Yet

manifestation in Islamic culture enables us to distinguish

fundamentalism of the ninth century

modern

it

primitive age should, but in fact does not, encour-

seventeenth, and twentieth centuries. Students of Muslim fundamentalism take

thing as seeing

by Ar-

what appears

study in a diachronic rather than synchronic frame. Thus, relatively

made of the a

more

issue.

as "zealots"

a recurrent category of history.

obstacles to an understanding of fundamentalism

almost exclusively as a contemporary

age

is

this

is

up the

not quite the same

Islamic fundamentalism as a historical emergent and the latest

believe

we need

this perspective,

which docs not exclude that of

more complete understanding of all forms of funemergent. Islamic fundamentalism makes us fasten

"family resemblances," to achieve a

damentalism. Seen as a historical

our gaze on intersecting

historical trends

product of these forces rather than

as

and evaluate

it

as the constantly

changing

an essence or a concept with ontological

justification.

This view of Muslim fundamentalism as a historical emergent enables us to bring

§erifMardin 208

into play three long-term (longue duree) elements that have affected the process of

change during modernization.

religious

which more

sphere, by

element

One

abstract conceptions

the rationalization of the religious

is

of the sacred have replaced the magical

The second element appears

in religion.

apprehension of the divine mvsterium and

its

to be a

demand

for a

more

direct

projection of the "everyday," where

it

The problem of power account in a study of Muslim

takes the shape of a Utopian attempt to build a seamless socictv. in Islamic societies

is

a third vector to be taken into

fundamentalism.

Max Weber lows:

describes the displacement of the magical element in religion as fol-

"The great

historical process

of the disenchantment of the world which began

with the ancient Jewish prophets, and in conjunction with hellcnic

condemned

all

scientific

thinking

magical means of salvation as superstition and blasphemy, was here

completed." 2 Although Weber speaks of the Lutheran ecclesiastical-sacramental Nation,

we have

all

learned about Islam

tells

us that this religion too, with

its

sal-

condem-

nation of magic and idols, was also set on the road to rationalization and, ultimately,

disenchantment. This characteristic of Islam provides a key to the struggle of Muslim sages against the magicalization of the relation between the world.

man and God and man and

The modern Muslim fundamentalist Sawid Qutb's

jahiliyya, the state

of

swinish ignorance of Muslims, gives us an example of this stance. For Qutb, jahiliyya is

framed bv the present magic of modern Western, "soulless" technological superi-

ority as

much

as

it is

by the

magic practices of pre-Islamic Mecca. 3

earlv

In the earlv historv of Islam and in the ideas of the fundamentalist theologian

Ahmad

Ibn Hanbal

(d.

855) the antimagical stance takes the form of keeping stricdy

to the Qur'an and the Hadith (traditions). This religion (al-din al-atiq).

The same

also

is

lampooning of "popular manifestation of Shi'ism" and doctrine of the

"nothing but

Hidden Iman,

false

known

as the pure, the old

attitude appears in medieval thinker Ibn Taymiyya's in his attack

of the

hopes, sedition, and corrupt practices

among

certain

groups of

Muslims." 4 In the thought of seventeenth century Indian Muslim reformer al-Sirhindi, the rationalizing

Shi'ite

the anticipation of the return of which has produced

component appears

as a

Ahmad

deep suspicion of the theosophy

of Sufism and of the cosmological garden of Hinduism, the influence of which he was combating.

A new

element, which

we may

call

"systematic activism," enters the pic-

ture of rationalization at that juncture.

The Role of Cultural Confrontation The

historv of

in the

Muslim fundamentalism underlines

a

Historv of Islam

major element of ambiguitv

in

the propagation of Islam. Basically a product of Arabic-speaking areas, Islam soon

expanded into new areas with independent, well-established cultural traditions. Islam acquired solid foundations in these regions and attempted their swift Islamization but did not fully assimilate the local cultures. Iran

is

a case in point. Central Asia another.

Islam had a problem with non-Arab cultures. For Ibn Taymiyva, the problem was starker since he

had to deal with

a foreign

and "heathen"

culture.

The same

is

true in

THE NAjCSHIBENDl ORDER OF TURKEY 209

Muslim Mughal's occupation of

the case of the

w

as a resistant culture,

of this ment.

for Islam. In the context

confrontation Xakshibendism was fully activated as a proselytizing move-

latter Still

Here too

the Indian subcontinent.

Hinduism, which created problems

another encounter with the invasive West was to constitute the background

for greater

Xakshibcndi activism

in the

In India, cultural confrontation

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

became

a

major problem for Islam

in the seven-

teenth century. At that time, Indian culture was threatening both because of

its

power to offer a magical garden to Muslims and because a Mughal ruler, Akbar. was w illing to listen to the siren's song of Hinduism. The consequence was the fundamentalism of Ahmad al-Sirhindi (d. 1624). Sirhindi found a secure mooring and organizational apparat for his views in the Xakshibcndi order, whose framework makes up the particular stream of fundamentalism I take up here. As a fundamentalist leader combating the diffuse effects on Islamic mvsticism of Hindu culture in the Mughal empire, Ahmad al-Sirhindi seems to have been the first natural

person

who

attempted to link the struggle against

Toward

his

a

new form of

invasive magic, in

theosophy of Ibn al-Arabi, with an organization suited to

this case the

this

combat.

middle years he joined the Xakshibcndi order, which thereafter was

fused with a renewed activism. (the Arabic letter

"m")

He

held a remarkable theory concerning the

in the Prophet's

Muhammad

name, which Friedman describes

two

in-

minis

as follows:

two individuations (ta'ayyun), two individuations were symbolized by the loops of the two minis of his name. The bodilv individuation guaranteed the uninterrupted relationship between the Prophet and his community and consequentlv ensure its spiritual well-being. The spiritual one, on [The Prophet]

had

in his lifetime

the bodily-human and the spiritual-angelic. These

the other hand, directed itself tow ards the Divine and received the continuous

flow of inspiration emanating from that source.

A

proper balance was thus

maintained between the worldlv and the spiritual aspects of Muhammad's personality,

and the Islamic communitv was continuouslv under guidance both

human

prophetic and divine. Since the Prophet's death, however, his

indi-

viduation has been gradually weakening while the spiritual one has been steadily gaining strength.

disappeared altogether.

Its

Within

a

thousand years the human individuation

symbol, the

it

came

Ahmad. He was transformed

to be

first

mim of Muhammad,

and was replaced bv an alef standing for

along with

divinitv.

.

.

.

disappeared

Muhammad

into a purely spiritual being,

no longer

The disappearance of his human attributes ... adverse impact on his community which lost the lights had an of prophetic guidance emanating from Muhammad's human aspect. 5 interested

in

.

.

the affairs of the world.

.

Sirhindi implied that he

would fill this gap. His teachings gave new direction to which thereafter appears with a new name of "re-

the Xakshibcndi order in India,

newalist" (mujaddidi) Xakshibendism. These renewalists were for centuries to exert

an influence,

first

in Indian Islam

Renewalism was not an stated that a renewcr

in the Ottoman Empire. new phenomenon since a tradition

and then

entirelv

would appear

in even'

existed

which

centurv to revitalize Islam. But after

§erif Mardin

210

Sirhindi, the link established

between

gave the idea novel relevance.

What

bendi organizational structure

at that

movements

in Islam this

bient condition

a putative renewalist

point

is

not entirely

a

Nakshibendi leader

in this case the

many similar disappeared if a new am-

clear.

renewalism might have eventually

had not appeared,

and

enabled this idea to be fused with the NakshiLike so

development of the world system

of communication that institutionalized Nakshibendi activism. Already as Islam entered the post- Renaissance era the sensitivity of Muslims to

power arrangements was increasingly felt in regards to the decline of Muslim hegemThe reactions to this perceived incapacity of Islam in the political order appear

ony.

and then through a new self-consciousness of the Islamic world The conquest of Kazan bv the emerging Russian power in 1552 must some echoes to the Islamic world. When Mughal power disintegrated in

first

in specific areas

as a

whole.

have sent

India after 1707, self-consciousness

working

in the renewalist tradition.

promoted the

social Utopia

Here, once again,

of Shah Waliullah

a return to origins

and middle-

of-the-road Sufism were combined, but Waliullah's extensive social project was some-

thing new.

Toward turn. This

the end of the eighteenth centurv, Nakshibendi renewalism took another

was the consequence of what may be described

conditions" promoted bv the these

new

as the

now

hegemony of

emerging

period of industrialism triumphant, the

in a

policies.

on

states

One

facet

Islamic areas

of the new system was the encroachment of the

— the Crimea, Egypt, the Caucasus. But

tervailing facet

was the strengthening of linkages among Muslims. The

pilgrimages to

Mecca and

for ideas

The was

the

acquired world dimensions. This network was crucial in the evolution

of Nakshibendi

new Western

new "boundary

of the world communications system. Whether

conditions are described as having prevailed with the

nation-state or are depicted as

network

rise

the enhanced role of Mecca and

Medina

a coun-

facilitation

of

as clearinghouses

enhanced the weblike pattern of propagation of Nakshibendi teaching.

traditional

Nakshibendi emphasis on an "internal mobilizational of the soul"

now complemented by

an increasing involvement in world history and by an

external mobilization directed against Western imperialism

and

its

cultural policy.

Once more, this was accompanied by the Nakshibendi emphasis on a return to pristine Islam. The structural changes promoted by the new world system also promoted a more acute sense of the need for the masses to be deeply committed to the retrieval of their Islamic inheritance. The stark confrontation with the West brought about fundamental changes lation to

new

in the basic

Identity

The forging of personal ing" and "refilling"

and the ries

Nakshibendi project. These are best studied

recruitment practices and

initiate.

—

new

Models and

identity

among

Social

Change

the Nakshibendi

figures in the relations established

From what we know of Nakshibendi

the foundation of the

bond between

in re-

identity models.

— the

result

between the

of an "emptyPir,

or Master,

history this has been for centu-

teacher and pupil. In Nakshibendi treatises

THE NAKSHIBENDI ORDER OF Tl'RKE

1

211

one of the is

that

who set out on the

requirements for those

first

of total identification with the Master. The

common

surrender to the vocation as such, a step

of surrender

is

which demands an

rabita,

teaching of the Master.

The

close relation

first

to

path for mystical knowledge

part of this surrender

manv

1

Sufi orders.*

on

integral concentration

between Master and

riences of spiritual unity, faith healing

compared

the very beginning of "mujaddidism," rabita

A third element of bonding

the person and

in

expe-

and manv other phenomena. 7

This type of bonding required special ambient conditions for the preeminent role of the Master as

one's

disciple expresses itself

of the two partners upon each other resulting

in tawajjuh, the concentration

is

A second level

success, such as

its

of written commentaries. From

to that

was given importance bv the mujaddidi.

with the Master,

sobbct,

is

the spiritual exchange through

conversation between master and disciple. Together rabita and sohbet set parameters

form of interpersonal and intergroup communication, the "human

for a special

The

chain." ter

and

three anchors of the mvstical self establish a complex

initiate.

Two dimensions of this

bond between Masbond established

relation are the authoritarian

bv the complete surrender to the higher authority of the master and the "libidinal"

dimension of the bond with the Master. Sharabi has commented on tarian social

which he relation

norm bv subsuming

sees pervading

it

under the

of "patrimonialism," a characteristic

title

Middle

social relations in the

all

a similar authori-

East.

But the authoritarian

cannot be properlv understood unless the symmetrical sentiment ashk

translated as "love" but better described sideration. 8

Ashk can be seen

bv the Lacanian "desire"

as a special

form of

a

—

However,

new world communications network tablishing the

bond

itself

in the

nineteenth century, the

A

underwent changes.

the Nakshibendi in a disadvantageous position

This situation had

first

become

critical

when,

mode of

of the opening of the

as a result

—

taken into con-

wider characteristic of Middle

Eastern social formations, the central role of "persuasion" as the interpersonal discourse.

is

first

general

stages

method

of

a

for es-

long and demanding exercise placed if

they wanted to spread their creed.

in the

seventeenth century, the Nakshi-

bendi began to encounter Catholic and Protestant missionaries whose influence thev

had to combat. In

this situation the

bendi completing their training

need for cadres led to

a larger

number of Nakshi-

faster.

These external forces forced the Nakshibendi to change their stance but the personal, one-to-one, relation retained

its

psvche of the follower. Nonetheless, a the career of the mujaddidi father's first disciple

Mir Dard,

and "spent the

Muhammadanism,' which was

rest

centrality

and

its

potential for shaping the

new form of training emerged, the "lvrical poet of Delhi,"

of his

life

as

evinced in

who became

his

propagating the doctrine of 'sincere

a fundamentalist interpretation

of Islam, deepened bv

the mystical and ascetic techniques of the Naqshbandiyya." 9

The

costs

of the new

style

against another Nakshibendi,

of proselytism become evident

Muhammad Mazhar

in the accusation leveled

Jan Janan. 10

A

custodian of the

"old" tradition was shocked by this bowdlerized version of the Nakshibendi initiation

and commented: "Many came to him [when he [succession]

them]

from him without being prepared

in Istanbul [sic]

who

lived in

for

it:

have taken the khilafa and

Mecca] and took the

because

we have

khilafa

seen several [of

know nothing of the

conditions

§erif Mardin

212

of the order.

[ahval]

his intention

And our

Muhammad

Shaikh

Jan was not unaware of that but

was to spread the order." 11

In the process of rabita formation, identity

heterodoxy, and

is

a reflection

of changes occurred

is

formed around the combating of

of the Master's identity and "lodge"

in this constellation

identity.

the era of modernization and mass mobilization. These changes will in the perspective

social

become

identified

we

clearer

of some modern findings about identity formation. In modern

psychology and anthropology, group identity has been linked to

box," which

A number

of identity processes which correspond to

way

could describe as the "other," and the

by stereotypical markers. 12 Confirming

in

a "resonating

which the other

this finding, the

is

Nakshibendi ap-

peared on the modern scene with a violently antisecular and also anti-imperialistic stance.

Accompanying

this

transformation was the shift of the traditional Nakshibendi

"other," the magical garden of pantheism, onto Western

Bv

European Christian

the very nature of this confrontation a field which in the beginning

became

cultural.

that this

The

fact that the

West was now perceived

as

culture.

was theological

an adversary culture and

became the primary preoccupation of Islam, promoted the "ideological" use

of Islam. Islam

itself

began to be seen

as a culture, a

development confirmed by the

studies of W. C. Smith.

Thus,

West

in the nineteenth century, the

as the

lamic emphasis to see ists

its

order became more clearly focused on the

"other" rather than on backsliders

on

the unicity of

who had

forgotten the orthodox

God. This major transformation brought the order

mission in the world very differently than in the past. Running

was relegated

Is-

to the back stage.

An

down panthe-

abstract project, the re-Islamization

of the

Islamic culture, took the place of a narrower identification with the order. In recent

times the inroads of Western material culture the themes of pantheism

— now

among Turkish Muslims have prompted

identified with the

consumer

terred once more. Indulgence in

modern consumption

has been identified with a sliding

away from the eye of God,

form of pantheism and occupies an important place

societv

— to be

disin-

patterns, to the extent that

in the

is

considered to be a

it

new

Nakshibendi critique of

the West.

Mevlana Halid and the Halidi Nakshibendi This important change in training procedures allowed the Nakshibendi Mevlana

Halid

(d.

1827)

l3

to extend his influence in the

Ottoman Empire.

A mujaddidi

Nak-

from Suleymaniye in the Kurdish region of Iraq and from Syria, was able to establish a network of Nakshibendi seminaries in Syria and eastern Anatolia. His followers, now known as "Halidi," organized protest movements based shibendi, Halid, working

on

religious affiliation. This

new

nineteenth-century political propellant of the Nak-

shibendi established a series of seminaries in the Kurdish region of Turkey (interposed

on the path of the Protestant missions

to eastern Turkey).

From one of its

graduates,

that they gave a type of instruction to the student body which prepared them to regain a preponderant position for Muslims chafing under the impious

we understand

THE NAKSHIBENDI ORDER OF TURKEY 213

—

—

what was not very different under the yoke of impious MusThe author of these recollections about Nakshibendi schooling, Bediiizzaman Said Nursi, had a part to plav in the rebellion of 31 March 1909 and was to become one of the most painful thorns in the side of the Turkish Republic. In the Caucasian and Chechen setting, where the Nakshibendi were most influential (1790s, 1830s), the movement was bolstered bv a number of "overdetermining" influences. One was the pristine state of the Chechen tribes, which had been isolated from the Muslim world and therefore could be reconverted to an Islam that appeared as a civilizing, i.e., antimagical, influence. The second was the reverse factor rule

of colonialists or

lim regimes.

of their long contiguity with Russian swift penetration

area but

of an

had not made

alien culture a

dent into

it

gave

in contiguitv to the

rise to a millennial

areas. In fact, in the

form of

Ottoman

a proposal for the

the guideline of reform.

capital, in the

sudden

Chechen

form of Nakshibendi

This had not been true of Nakshibendi fundamentalism in

activity.

less

peripheral

1820s, Nakshibendi activism took the

reform of the empire, and the reinstatement of Islam as

The Nakshibendi

Shar'ia, however, was defeated by

activists'

promotion of a

reform known

a \\ estern-oriented

of the

stricter use

in

Ottoman

his-

the "Tanzimat" (1839-76).

tory- as

The more in the

civilization. Just as in Indonesia, the

which had stood

clearly political

involvement of the Nakshibendi

at this stage places

them

frame of "nativistic" movements. This transmutation was to a large extent un-

The

conscious.

Halidi Nakshibendi believed that they were doing what their spiritual

ancestors, the mujaddidi Nakshibendi, ize Islam.

Having put down roots

centurv, they

had always done, namely, attempting to

in the

Ottoman

became increasingly involved

in

capital

revital-

during the early nineteenth

Ottoman

politics.

The

first

well-

organized rebellion against the Westernizing reforms of the Tanzimat was led by a

Nakshibendi, a certain Shaykh

Ahmed

of Siileymanive, the verv province from which

Halid had emerged (1859). The conspiracy failed and the Nakshibendi came under suspicion.

The

general climate of the

1

860s

in the

Ottoman

capital

was not conducive to the

continuation of the autonomous activities of the order. In these vears part of the

energy of the emerging conservative Muslim opposition to the Tanzimat was drawn into the wider net of the constitutionalist-liberal

Ottomans. 14 Nakshibendi

activitv did,

movement of

the so-called

Young

however, surface during the Russo-Turkish

War of 1877-78 when Nakshibendi shaykhs volunteered for military service. In these years, Suleyman Efendi of the Uzbek Sultantepe Nakshibendi lodge in Istanbul kept his links

with Central Asia from where he had originated.

intelligence service collecting information

He

established a sort of

from Central Asian Muslims for the

of the Ottomans. 15 The leaders of this remarkable center of Nakshibendi involved in

many

educational and social

activities. It is

head of the lodge, Ibrahim Ethem Efendi, a teacher technical schools, built his

Under

own

were

reported that, for example, the

in

one of the newly established

three-horsepower steam engine. 16

somewhat more routinized circumstances the next Halid Nakshibendi Ahmed Ziyaeddin, known as Gumu§hanevi (1812was born on the Black Sea coast of Anatolia; he completed his religious studies these

leader of importance surfaced.

93),

benefit

activity

§erifMardin 214

in Istanbul

and began to

train followers

between 1848 and 1875.

He

and publish

number of works on

a

siderable caution since, at the time, the higher bureaucracy of the

proceeding briskly with

a

religion

continued to spread the Halidi doctrine but with con-

movement of reform

Ottoman

state

was

inspired by Western Cameralism, the

theory underpinning Western enlightened despotism. Gumii§hanevi trained a large

number of men of religion who had come from him.

A

glance at the careers of these

all

men shows

parts of the empire to study with

that he

was extending the scope of

Mevlana Halid's proselytization by targeting the Caucasus, the Crimea, Kazan

Tatars,

and China. Gumiishancvi's activism took the specific form of an appeal to citizens to harken

sound of the mobilization of Ottoman defense forces during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. But Gumu§hanevi also reacted to Ottoman modernist reformism. At the time when the first banks were established in Turkey he created his own "Loan to the

Fund" burt,

He

for his disciples.

and Of. 17

one each

established four libraries,

A pedagogic

in Istanbul, Rize, Bay-

innovation he used was to "stream" his students accord-

ing to their qualifications. This ability to respond in kind to modernization seems

been

also to have

a quality

found among more moderate Nakshibendi of the

later

nineteenth century. Taken together then, the totality of parameters which defined

Nakshibendi

social action

mushanevfs death

in

had changed considerably by the nineteenth century.

1893 brought an interregnum

The substance of the

on

Gii-

Nakshibendi influence.

of Gumusjianevi provides

religious teachings

Islamic hermeneutic that depends both

in

a frame for an

textual interpretation proper

reading of prescribed Sufi interpersonal relations as paratext.

The way

and on which

in

a

this

combination of text and Master-disciple relations led to a structuring of social action

among Gumu§hanevi's

followers can only be understood if we take the religious inner

datum in our analysis. At this point we have to remember some of the elements involved in the acquisition of knowledge in the Nakshibendi mode. In this method the items of book knowledge, the use of memory in propagating these themes, and one's positioning with regard to a mentor are all considered to be part of the substance of knowledge. Knowledge is defined as the pursuit drive of his disciples as a legitimate

of self-purification, and tral

orthodox

line

but

this

is

also, as

to be achieved not only by keeping closely to the cen-

we

have seen, by establishing an intimate link between

mentor and

pupil. This

as a "chain"

of linkages producing

sic

frame

traditions

we

bond, once established, a

is

only the

first

network of Nakshibendi

link in

what operates

influences.

To

this ba-

have to add a nineteenth-century innovation, the increased use of the

of the Prophet, the examples taken from

guidance. This

new element

his

life,

as a source

of

ethical

thereafter functioned as a template for the interpretive

function of the mentor. This was an attempt to bring back the "original" meaning

of Islam into the nineteenth century but by the use of erable flexibility for interpretation.

The

central focus

a

frame which allows consid-

of one's belief now becomes the

human example of the Prophet Muhammad. This development not with the Nakshibendi but the nineteenth century. It

is

a characteristic

is,

one

sees

only

is

associated

throughout the Islamic world

in

together with the transmutation of the "other" from

THE NAKSHIBENDI ORDER OF TURKEY 215

"pantheism" to "Western imperialism," one of the key parameters of the modernized

Nakshibendi teaching.

The Operational Code of the Nakshibendi: Theoretical Considerations In

manv curWhat remains adaptation. One way of

history the Nakshibendi order has encountered and adapted to the

its

rents

— both

unexplained

and external

internal is

— that have shaped Islamic

seemingly serendipitous propensity for

this

history.

explaining the strength and historical breadth of Nakshibendi influence in the Otto-

man Empire would

be to make an argument for

"persistence of aggregates"

with the

fate

would do

of Turkey since the

its

continuity. Pareto's theory of the

well here: the Nakshibendi

fifteenth century,

and

had been involved

would provide an do was unable to match

this in itself

explanation for the persistence of their influence. But such general explanations

not

tell

us

why

the Kadiri order, with a similarly prestigious past,

the Nakshibendi. Surely the success of the Nakshibendi in adapting to ambient conditions since the fifteenth century has a better explanation than "persistence." First, the

Nakshibendi struggle against the "magical garden" of pantheism locked

onto another structural component of Islamic

The one

form of popular participation

persistent

through a sharing of the

ways

in

which

the possibility

of

God

this

societies

common

which was

in social

basic, primordial.

concerns in Islam had been

idiom of the divine message. There were manv

sharing was, with time, restricted, but in the absence of a "church,"

— always present

for

Muslims of all walks of life

— of invoking the Word The

for or against a view, an action, a stand could not be totally erased.

Nakshibendi tapped

this patent legitimation for

a path for the righteous as godless,

when

popular participation through setting

taking sides against what they saw as

"elitist," as

to

political

power, beginning with mujaddidism, they had

their net a

wider stratum of the population. This base for

manipulate the springs of

means of drawing into

well

how

pantheism so that while they themselves had known for centuries

recruitment increased rather than decreased as modernization brought with alienating, secularizing policy

on the

part of the

Ottoman Tanzimat and

it

an

the further

promotion of secularism by the Turkish Republic. In the nineteenth century the Nakshibendi were helped by the

promoted an already

existing diffuse theory

new

of populist legitimation.

factors that

Among

these

were the popular revulsion against the special commercial privileges and de facto more favorable class position gained by

Ottoman Empire. In nineteenth century

non-Muslim minorities and foreign

a restricted sense, then, the success

may be

linked to a

nationals in the

of the mujaddidi during the

Muslim "democratizing"

process, namely, the

new, purely religious legitimation of politics underlined by the Nakshibendi,

a novel

element which emerged as the Ottoman population was gradually socially mobilized.

On

the other hand, aspects of Nakshibendi internal structure are also involved in this

success.

M. van Bruinessen of the

flexibility

has alerted us to the idea that this success

of the order

propose that what

we

in delegating

observe as the

may

be an outcome

powers to proselytizing shaykhs.

flexibility

of the order

is

a

I

would

consequence of other,

§erifMardin 216

internal ritualistic elements political stance that the

These

are the extent to

which had important consequences

order adopted following

which

it

Turkey

Political

Impact

I

clearly

in Turkey:

plemented a policy of radical secularization

in

its

have described above.

Actual and Potential

unique among countries with a majoritv Muslim population

is

more

in the

mujaddidi stage of development.

has been able to construct a social identity for

followers, a process the foundations of which

Nakshibendi

its

modern

times.

in

having im-

Between 1923 and 1950

the attitude of the Turkish government could be characterized as that of Jacobin secularism and

shows manv

parallels

during Mexico's revolutionary

with the

official

Mexican attitude toward the Church

Following the establishment of the Turkish Re-

era.

number of laws redrew the foundation of Turkish society on a nonthe most important of these was the abolition of the Caliphate adoption of the Swiss Civil Code 1926), the Latinization of the alphabet

public in 1923, a Islamic base.

(1924), the

Among

(

(1928), and the striking out of the phrase in the Turkish constitution to the effect that the religion of Turkish state

was Islam (1928). The same law which abolished

the Caliphate also abolished the salaried position of all the upper-echelon "'doctors of Islamic law," or ulama. In the following years, an official effort a public

image of the ulama

as

was made to promote

ignorant exploiters of the masses. Atheism was not

encouraged; on the contrary, the Durkheimian view of religion for society

had much currency among

intellectuals

and

officials

as a stabilizing force

influenced by Durk-

heim. However, religion was seen in these quarters as a private belief with no claims

on the political sphere and as an ancient and outmoded frame norms or the founding of social institutions.

for the setting

of social

This shift toward secularism in a society where Islam had occupied a central place

had some success. It drew into its net three types of persons who became the "guardians" of the new Republican order: the ideologues who were instituting the new social system, the officials, and the upwardly mobile, including an in social relations

important group of primary- and secondary-school teachers. "Kemalism," ideology was named,

left

untouched

large sections

of the

rural

lower-class inhabitants of the three principal cities, Istanbul, Ankara, size towns did exhibit, in the center stage of official public rituals.

But

in the provinces, in the

life,

as the

masses and

neo-

many

and Izmir. Mid-

the correct Republican

back stage, the old structures were maintained.

Children were given private religious instruction, and religious feasts were celebrated;

among

a

against

what was seen

few provincials, religion was

still

could well be misinterpreted by observers into "civil religion."

a

cement for

as over- Westernization.

The embers seem

a latent

communal

solidarity

This residual, private aspect of religion

as the

transformation of small-town Islam

to have contained

more

fire

than could be

observed.

What transformed this glow into a flame seems best explained by theories of group identity. In the Ottoman Empire, group identity of the citizen in the widest sense had been structured by identification with

a religious

group

— Islam

in the case

speaking Muslims, the Greek Orthodox church in the case of Greeks,

of social identity brought together

all

of Turkish-

etc.

Muslims of the Ottoman Empire

This type

—Turks, Ar-

THE NAKSHIBENDI ORDER OF TURKEY 217

Kurds, and, to some extent, Albanians. The intrusion of a new focus of group

abs,

"Turkism," was a relatively recent innovation dating from the beginning of

identity,

the twentieth centurv.

stand the

manv

recent findings of social psychologists enable us to under-

and nationalism.

secularization

of cues of

The

complications which enveloped Muslim Turks with the advent of

social

found that group identitv

Tajfel

structured in terms

is

comparison underlining differences. 18 The question for the Turk

placed in the new secular social setting was, "If identifying with Turkishness,'

who

am going

I

to assume

the 'other" " "Against 1

is

sure mvself to find the difference that will

tell

me who

I

circumstances the "other" had been a religious "other,"

my

identity by

whom

do I have to meaam?" Whereas in the earlier this "other" had now been

number of signs that even during the republic, Muslim Turks continued to identify as Turks not all the bearers

erased bv secularism. Yet, there are a in informal relations,

who were

of Turkish passports but onlv those

What we would

expect

becomes problematic

is

that in a situation

Muslims.

where the elaboration of social identity

want of "building blocks,"

for

a search for

personal identity as

would become more prevabetween a concentration on the

well as "sporadic, idiosvneratic interpersonal behavior" lent.

19

Ail

of

this

then would result in a vacillation

building of personal identitv and a diffuse search for social identitv with a strong

tendency to In the

of

revitalize the old social

first

moorings.

stages of a multiparty- system in

this psvehic instability

Party to emphasize that

Islam than had

its

among

it

a

Turkev

1950s

in the

pool of potential voters that

it is

the perception

drew the Demokrat

stood for a more tolerant attitude toward the practice of

predecessor, the secularizing party (the Republican People's Part}')

of Atatiirk. Elected bv a popular majority between 1950 and 1957, the

removed from ideals

office in

1960 bv

a

group

of the early republic had been

in the military

cast off.

The

who

Demokrat Partv was

believed that the pure

fear that the

Demokrats were ap-

pealing to religious superstition also figured in the apprehensions of the military junta.

But even the continued periodic interventions bv the military between 1960

and 1980 could not destroy the foundations of democracy which had in

first

been

laid

1950. In this period, Islam became increasingly visible as a force in Turkev. Part of

had

this rise

a

simple explanation: the

scene since 1950 had

all

new

political parties that

had appeared on the

been competing for the vote of an increasingly

politically

mobilized rural and lower-class population which between 1923 and 1950 had kept its

Islamic values

on

the back burner but was far

from having extinguished them. In

was increasingly drawn from the provinces and concomitants of religious conservatism: family

addition, the parliamentary personnel

often subtly appealed to the social

cohesiveness, honest}', and social order.

Although the

legal

system of secularism, pro-

it was bv the figure of Atatiirk, could not be subverted, religious conservaworked through the infiltration of government departments. The Ministry of Education, with its many teaching and administrative-level positions and its suitability

tected as tives

for the spreading

In the

could be

first

of ideologies, was immediately targeted and

vears of religious liberalization after 1950, a

classified as

infiltrated.

number of events which

emanating from "fundamentalists" began to embarrass the Dem-

§erifMardin 218

okrat Party.

One was

Atatiirk: these

the

the Tijani sect's widespread destruction of busts and portraits of

were considered

"idols,"

Demokrat

despite

Part}',

its

tolerant view

this history

Nakshibendi order and

its

fears to the forefront. In fact, the

its

incumbency.

of violence has been the continuing influence of the

branches in the contemporarv Turkish setting.

Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, shibendi leader with his

attempt on

of the practice of Islam, strengthened the

laws for the protection of the secular values of the republic during

More important than

An

which the republic worshiped.

of the journalist A. E. Yalman brought these

life

a product

of the Halidi seminaries, emerged

own autonomous

as a

Nak-

organization during the Republican era.

Said Nursi was implicated in the military rebellion of 1909, and though he protested

innocence he was sent into

his

exile in Anatolia. After

began to collaborate with the Young Turks against imperialism

War

I,

1910 he was pardoned and

in their efforts to use Islam as a

weapon

and colonialism. Taken prisoner by the Russians during World

he reairned to find Istanbul occupied by Allied forces. The nationalistic bro-

good graces of the nationalist government in Ankara. But this prestige dissolved when he reminded the representatives to the assembly of the nationalist government that their success was not due simply to their own work but was the result of divine intervention. In self-exile in his native town of chures he wrote at the time put him in the

Bitlis,

he was again accused of being implicated

movement which indeed was Shaykh Said of

led

in the

Kurdish rebellion of 1925, a

by a Nakshibendi shaykh, a namesake of our man,

Palu. Again, Said Nursi claimed total innocence but

mountainous region

in

western Turkey. There he

set

followers were local artisans and tradesmen, and the

out to build

was

exiled to a

a clientele.

His

movement was spread among

peasants of middling status.

The propagation of Said Nursi's writings, known collectively as the Epistle ofLight, up a network of persons who took spiritual sustenance from them. These were circulated clandestinely at first, but with the more tolerant attitude toward religious built

which followed the introduction of multiparty government in Turkey, they were accorded legitimacy (1956) and printed in the Latin alphabet, the only proselvtization

legal alphabet in

Turkey since 1928. Said Nursi himself was imprisoned

for activities aiming to

the time he died in

several times

undermine the secular foundation of the Turkish Republic. By

1960 he had acquired

a

wide following which

is still

extremely

active in Turkey.

When

the

first "clerical'''

party, the National Salvation partv

(NSP), emerged dur-

ing the 1973 elections, the Nurcu, as the followers of Said Nursi are called, supported it.

Although they

later

changed

this political tack,

had not met their expectation by Teni Nesil

(New

Generation),

Mr. Demirel's "True Path"

The

claiming that the leader of the

his policies in parliament in the

still

showed

clear

support for another

political party,

party.

among

central directing institution

the contemporary

Nurcu

is

board of the order which publishes both innumerable reprints of the

and

also Teni Nesil.

Other

activities

the Universe, Cybernetics,

the editorial

Epistle of Light

of the board have been to publish

brochures which are popularizations of modern science and have

Atom and

NSP

1980s, their daily,

titles

and The Big Bang. Each brochure

is

a series

such

as

of

The

uncompro-

THE NAKSHIBENDI ORDER OF TURKEY 219

misinglv "scientific" in plexity

coverage but ends with

its

a

query

as to

whether the com-

of the system described can be reasonably attributed to chance. The contents

on the other hand, are interesting in the sense that thev present a contrast with the more militant themes one finds in the writings of such contemporary fundamentalists as Zahid Efcndi (discussed below). Although the Epistle of Light has a helter-skelter structure which includes reminiscences, instructions, and copies of Said Nursi's correspondence, its bulk consists of commentaries on the Qur'an. An attempt is thus made to explain to an audience which knows no Arabic of the

Epistle of Light,

the layered context of meanings of the Qur'an. This attempt recalls the attempt bv the

nineteenth-century Egyptian-Syrian Salafi\Ta school to

Qur'an are compatible with modern

show

that the teachings of the

science. Said Nursi appears to have

wanted to

give to a large, relatively unlettered, but increasingly literate population an under-

standing of the bases of their religion.

The Nurcu's support of

the existing democratic order in Turkey seems genuine,

the subtlety of this stand

but

appears in a statement of Safa Mursel, a person

been called the "ideologue" of the

modern

In

societies,

who

has

sect.

government

is

either democratic or despotic.

nothing more natural than choosing democracy, which

is

There

is

the libertarian form

of government. The alternative to accepting the mechanism which brought to

power the Demokrat Party, the Justice Party, and the True Path Party representatives of almost the same conservative constituency since 1950] is potism.

To determinedly support

military

coups of 1960, 1971, and 1980] or anarchy [the Marxist

the libertarian parties against revolution [the

ments of the 1970s] does not mean that one est

shown bv Said Nursi

[the des-

is

engaging

Demokrat Partv was due

to the

move-

social

in politics.

The

inter-

to the libertarian

character of this party. 20

The Nurcu group acquired prominence tion of the birthday of the Prophet

November). The lular,

state

in the fall

of 1990 bv organizing

Muhammad on

a celebra-

the day of Atatiirk's death (10

prosecutor started proceedings against the group.

Mchmet

Kut-

today the leader of a splinter group from Nurcu's original leadership, reacted bv

claiming that his group had no intention of undermining the fundamental principles

of the

state (i.e., secularism).

established in tion but

1924 had promised

had never done

so.

According to him, the

state

What had been going on

simply an implementation of this promise. In

up

now

support

"minimum

fact,

government of Ozal

since the

had come to power, the widening of religious instruction could

monopoly of education up religious instruc-

that the state itself would take

in

secondary schools, was

the time was one in which Turks

shared values" in which multiparty democracy figured

front. 21 Kutlular also stated that representation in parliament

could substitute for

the institution of the Caliphate.

With the Nurcu we begin to discern an aspect of the Turkish by the Marxist had

left,

split into (1)

the daily's

name

religious right shared

the tendency to fragmentation of these wings.

By 1990,

the original publishers of Teni Nesil and their rivals, to Teni Asya

(New

the

Nurcu

who changed

Asia); (2) a dissident branch in Izmir led bv

§erif Mardin

220

Fethullah Gulen which was rumored to have links with the intelligence the political establishment;

Mehmed

(3)

younger group of

a

own

Metiner, who, up to 1989, published his

(4) the "scriptarians," a dissident

group which

of Said Nursi's thought by printing Nursi. This, of course,

is

illegal in

it

in the

"intellectual"

insisted

component of Nurcu led by

periodical, Girisim;

on rescuing the

and

authenticity

Arabic alphabet, the script used by Said

modern Turkey-

Said Nursi's teachings also bear the stamp of the

more

esoteric teachings

of the

and often underline the subtlety of the meanings to be drawn from the Qur'an.

Sufis

The

simplicity of

lary,

has an undeniable

some of his images, combined with an involuted style and vocabupower of attraction which gives a special gloss to his homiletics and also colors his more down-to-earth moralistic preachings. Like all Nakshibendi, he sends a message to all Muslims that shows a latent pan- Islamic flavor. Today, in about a hundred private homes, the followers of Said Nursi meet every Saturday to listen to comments on the Epistle of Light. The attendance often overflows onto the stairs. It consists primarily of young persons in their thirties or forties. One can discern that the audience comes from the more conservative Istanbul and takes in artisans, craftsmen, chauffeurs, laborers, minor officials, and university students. Leaders of the sessions have at least a secondary education. They stand in front of the congregation, open a page of the Epistle at random, and comment upon it. Questions are asked from the audience to which the leader responds. Tea

and the audience

disperses.

The

influence of the

Nurcu

sect

the sect's newspaper disseminates the correct stand to take

and economic

issues, the effectiveness

of the Nurcu

is

is is

served, prayers are said,

thus a diffuse one: while

on current

political, social,

that of a freemasonry, of per-

who establish social linkages and personal ties with each other, who support and promote people who think like themselves. But this diffuseness, among followers who sons

may number

a

few hundred thousand,

is

an element to reckon with in the intellectual

climate of contemporary Turkey.

While the Nurcu have primarily appealed to the provincial middle classes and have only recently gathered support from intellectuals, what may be called "main-line" Nakshibendism has stuck with the educated conservatives.

One

coup, that of the "conver-

modern Turkish poet Necip Fazil Kisakiirek 1904-83), is especially interFollowing esting. a somewhat erratic course of studies in Paris in the late 1920s, Necip Fazil returned to Turkey and within a few years came under the spiritual influence of sion" of the

(

the Nakshibendi shavkh Ziyaeddin Arvasi, a development he has related in his auto-

O ve Ben. 22

It may be assumed that it was the influence of the latter which him to publish the periodical Great East in 1943. Necip Fazil's relation with his mentor and the gap which the latter's teaching filled in the poet's intellectual universe

biography,

led

appear in the following description of his parents' household. True,

came At

after the poet's "conversion,"

the time

when women's

but this docs not diminish

its

hair descended to their ankles,

this description

explanatory power:

my

grandmother,

with her clipped hair reminiscent of women's fashions of today, with her grand

demeanor, her jewels which were the envy of Istanbul, the parties she gave, with her mechanical piano and her baskets

full

of novels mostly translated from

THE NAKSHIBENDI ORDER OF TURKEY 221

the West, with her interior decoration that was a mix of every possible style,

model of the refined ladv of Istanbul, a tvpc passed on to the Young Turks bv the preceding Hamidian era, a paste made of Eastern and exhibited the

Western condiments

of the Tanzimat reforms,

in equal proportions, a residue

racked bv neurotic fears, a person displaced from her

found none to replace Also relevant losophy student Paris,

is

but

who had

a phi-

1920s:

in Paris in the

its

axis

pronouncement on Western culture while he was

the poet's

which with

own

23

it.

civilization

svmbolized the West, exhibited on

front

its

stage designs of miraculous refinement which, however, turned out to be

etched on a background of plastic, the latter in it

to

was disguising, namclv, ruin and darkness, knock

one

Kisakiirek's

him

to

society

its

crisis

head against one

wall, against another

Memoirs show the motive force

also a

(he expresses

French)

in

it

and play hide-and-seek from

\\

ay in

which

a

is

need for a cleansing moral gust drew I

have described above as the seamless

in the poet's conversion.

Rimbaud's La

What

its

closure bv the

secular intellectual

Though

government

of the Republican era to

his periodic carousing

production, his prestige as a

modern

Kisakiirek searches for

vraie vie absente.

In 1943 Kisakiirek published Great East, a periodical culture led to

values.

was condemned

to another. 24

Shavkh Arvasi. But the search for what is

what

the eye to

fact, attracting

a civilization that

whose promotion of Islamic was the first Turkish

in 1944. Kisakiirek

try to reevaluate

and propagandize Islamic

diminished his moral influence, his

literary

author, and his articles attacking Western mores

and promoting an Islamic renaissance have given vounger fundamentalists a peg on

which to hang Shaykh

their conservative thought.

Mehmed

Zahid Kotku (1897-1980), the premier Nakshibendi leader of

our time, operated through somewhat different channels. Just

had to work

in a setting in

more ways than one the familv of migrants from

which

Sufi orders

as

Shaykh Arvasi, he

had been outlawed (1925).

legitimate successor of Giimu§hanevi.

Born

in

He was

Bursa into

the Caucasus, a hotbed of Nakshibendi influence,

age twentv-one joined the circle

first

Kotku

the Sufi orders were closed in 1925, he returned to Bursa and took over the

of Izvat where

had been closed,

as

his father

a at

organized by Gumii|hanevi. At the age of

twenty-seven he received authorization to earn' on as an independent shavkh.

in the village

in

had been

officiating.

Although the

When

mosque

Sufi orders

an Imam, Kotku was part of the lower hierarchy of the govern-

ment's General Directorate of Religious Affairs. In this capacity, he was posted to Istanbul in 1952.

At

that time, he succeeded Abdiilaziz Bekkine, the

nominal leader

of the Nakshibendi. This was a purely informal arrangement which had to be kept secret since the order operated

Civizade

Mosque and then

in

underground. In Istanbul, he was

first

posted to the

1958 to the Iskenderpa§a Mosque where he remained

until his death in 1980.

According to

a recent biographer, the

government was

likely

aware of Kotku's

§erifMardin 222

attempts to gather a circle around him but cal

—

activities

rate, his

it

considered these

—

predecessor had already established Nakshibendi influence

of prominent

as yet nonpoliti-

of the shaykh preferable to those of the violent Tijani order. 25 At any citizens in Istanbul.

persons of provincial or rural origin

We now know

from

The

of these

social profile

who had come

a notorious speech

among

disciples

a

number

was that of

to Istanbul for university studies.

of Kotku's son-in-law and successor, Pro-

Co§an, that Kotku was the architect of a many-sided strategy which

fessor Esat

in-

cluded the organization of discussion groups throughout Turkey, the establishment

of

a

Muslim-owned motor producing

tablished 1968),

and

last,

but not

plant, the publication

least,

of the daily Sabah

(es-

the encouragement of political activities. Ac-

cording to Co§an, in 1970 Kotku encouraged the formation of the

first

religious

modern Turkey, the National Order party. When this party was dissolved by the Turkish Supreme Court, it was replaced by the National Salvation party. The advice of Kotku, Co§an implied, resulted in the selection of Professor Necmettin Erbakan to lead this party. Kotku kept a vigilant eye on the activities of the partv, advising it to dissolve its vouth branches because their members had become political party in

too violent.

Two of Kotku's ties

collected sermons,

of the Believer),

27

Cihad (Jihad) 26 and Mu'minin

Vasifiari (Quali-

enable us to reconstitute the themes he was promoting

among

his disciples:

1.

Muslims do not

practice their religion in private: Islam

means being part

of the Islamic community; where the Islamic community disappears, so does Islam. 2.

To be

religious

is

to be readv to engage in combat. Factories are not

purveyors of consumer goods but places where this combat elaborated. This ences, arts

combat demands

that

to be

is

one get to know the worldly

and commerce. This control

will

sci-

be the means of obtaining the

"freedom" of Muslims. 3.

Our

greatest leaders have been mujtahids,

who

have taken upon them-

selves to reinterpret the Qur'an. 4.

Our

nation [interestingly enough, Turkey, not the Muslims] has been

splintered by political parties. This 5.

To voyage

is

unfortunate.

to foreign countries simply to earn

more money

is

irresponsible. 6.

We

think by imitating the West

lost

our most precious

ceded the core of our

we too

characteristic:

identity.

As

a

can go to the moon, but

we

have

through imitation we have con-

consequence our country

ruled by

is

the miniskirt, prostitution, drunkenness, briber}', adultery, gambling and the cinema. Such things didn't exist even in the davs of darkest ignorance that preceded Islam. 7.

We

should forego consumption and encourage national identity Every

Turkish adult wears a watch. This means

we

are giving

away 4

billion

THE NAKSHIBENDl ORDER OF TURKEY 223

to the Swiss.

liras

Wc

must

deliver ourselves

from economic

slavery to

foreigners.

To convince

8.

followers,

believer establishes

The pure of heart

9.

we should

use a clear and friendly language.

and cooperates with other

arc

more learned than

The

believers.

who

the people

have received the

best education.

Muslims should

10.

trv to capture the higher

institutions in their countrv

and

summits of social and

political

establish control over the societv.

Ersin Giindogan, in 1990 a director of Favsal Finans, an Islamic bank operating in

Turkev with Saudi funding, reccntlv published Kotku,

known

his

own

account of the ways in which

Zahid Efendi, was able to capture the minds of his

also as

disciples. 28

model of the type of networking on which Nakshibendi influence is based. He was educated as a mechanical engineer. In 1968 he also completed a higher degree in management. His search for a job began with a visit to a Giindogan's career

is

a

teaching assistant at the Faculty of Engineering of Istanbul Technical University, pre-

sumably someone

who

shared his views. There he met an employee of the State Plan-

ning Organization (SPO). Through hired bv the

SPO

and began work

a chain in

its

of persons linked to

this

organization had been captured bv a team

known

to

its critics

"We were

1968

is

quite clear about

trving to avoid the social and economic structure

which the West was trying to impose on developing countries under the heading of 'modernization' or 'streamlining.'" 29

What he seems

was an economic policv targeted to

awav from

cating

this

as the "clog wearers,"

denoting the clogs worn bv Muslims during ablutions. Giindogan the goals of this group:

employee he was

Projects Assessment Bureau. In

shifting

fallacious

to have been advo-

possible links with the

European Economic Community (EEC) and toward an eventual Muslim

common

market, a strategy which, in the long term, does not seem to have been able to get off the ground.

Giindogan met Kotku (Zahid Efendi) the

SPO. In

words, "It was in the

first

year that he began work-

summer of 1968

that I had the pleasure who, with his pioneering efforts kneaded and educated an army of intellectuals who were dreaming the great dream of protecting the selfhood, culture and identity of Muslims at a time when Turkey had

ing for the

his

of meeting our teacher for the

first

time; a person

entered an era of reconstruction." 30

The concept of an

much of emerged

era

the renewed in

1968.

of restructu ration

activity

The Muslim

is

indeed interesting,

of Muslim conservatism

in

in the sense that

Turkev seems to have

daily Sabah, for instance, a sheet

which

is

rumored

to

have been started with the encouragement of Kotku, began to appear that year.

Whether still is

it

was

a coincidence that the

to be ascertained.

What we

first

Islamic Conference

met the next year has

perceive in Giindogan's narrative of Kotku's influence

probably more important than conspiracy theories aiming to explain the takeoff of

Islamic ideas in 1968. There exists a pattern in this revival that conspiracy theories habitually miss taking into account. In Giindogan's narrative

Kotku

filled a

we

see the

way

in

which

void that was emotional, personal, and ideological. Giindogan's narra-

§erif Mardin

224

tive

emphasizes closeness, friendship, face-to-face relations, sitting by the knee of the

mentor who provides moral guidance. The lesson contact with Kotku generalizes

on

that

Giindogan draws from

theme: he comes to understand the power of

this

sohbet (conversation) in communicating with a Turkish audience.

On the other hand,

Kotku, the teacher, also broaches general ideas about the duties of Muslims

The mysterious attraction of the religious leader seems to intersecting of these two planes of individual and collective action. The ambient, official nationalism of Republican Turkey that was

lective.

ology from the 1930s through the 1960s

most stringently secular times of the strategy

was

as a col-

originate in the

the primary ide-

the "day-to-dav" in a limbo.

left

republic, Islam filled in the void.

a grievous error for, as a

his

Even

in the

The Republican

number of theoreticians of society from Alfred

Shutz to Michel de Certeau have shown, no sociological theory can dispense with the "everydav."

A

theorv that has no "everyday"

theory of social action.

The presence

a theory

is

of and for

intellectuals,

not a

Kotku's "mix" of existential considerations

in

about the meaning of life and death seems to have increased the potency of his teachings.

Within these frames the

clearer.

The ways

in

role

of sohbet

analyzed from this vantage point, one which

de Certeau.

No

social setting

as

one of the operators now becomes

which the Nakshibendi have expanded is

item of Kemalism addressed

their influence should be

closest to the quotidien as described

itself

but one which cumulates in a setting where the personal

the "everyday"

especially salient as

is

by

to the "everyday," a failure in any as

community "cement." But Kotku

an aspect of

also inherited

the general ideological guidance he had received from Giimus.hanevi: to avoid con-

sumerism, to boycott foreign products, not to buy comestibles imported from foreign countries, to prepare for combat, to infiltrate institutions. These themes are constantlv reiterated. Nevertheless, a

change comes about

the rather simplistic economic ideas of

Kotku

frame that Giindogan used

SPO.

nitive

What, then,

is

meaning

the

ence of Kotku insofar

Let us note,

Kotku. In both

first,

as

he

in the

Giindogan stage of the message:

now

interpreted in the wider cog-

influ-

an exemplar of Nakshibendi influence?

is

the similarity between the message of Mevlana Halid and that of

cases, identity, the self,

earliest

are

— and the import — for sociological theory of the

"other," in this case the non-Muslim.

from the

at the

is

defined in contrast and in opposition to the

What

is

remarkable

is

that this stance survives

Nakshibendi "renewalists" of the seventeenth century to the present,

having taken the form of anti-imperialism turies. In this sense

in the late

eighteenth and nineteenth cen-

of an uninterrupted ideological lineage, the stance

from that which we could impute to modern nationalism. It is that, for the first time, we see a softening of this definition of the emphasis on preparation for

real

war

("train

in

is

also different

Giindogan's ideas

self.

Here, the

earlier

your children to be sharpshooters") has

been transformed into the necessity to be prepared to deflect the wiles of Western capitalism. In short, the

more

main

difference

between Kotku and Giindogan

in the secular

schools of the

that Giindogan's intellectual

is

the latter's

mind was formed Turkish Republic. secular There are many other signs development is part of a much more general change

differentiated cognitive universe. Paradoxically, Giindogan's

THE NAKSHIBENDI ORDER OF TURKEY 225

which has

Muslim

fundamentalism and produced a new tvpe

affected

in

Turkcv: the voung

intellectual.

Professor Esat Co§an, Kotku's successor, mentalist intellectual.

He

an example of the new type of funda-

is

publishes magazines of information and analvsis that copy

highbrow Turkish reviews. Co§an was born

the format of the

in

grandfather was a disciple of Gumus.hanevi, and his father was a

1938. His great-

member of Kotku's

circle.

Graduating from the Faculty of Letters of the University of Istanbul, Co§an

began

his

academic career

a full professor,

to

become an

added to

a children's

in

Faculty of Theology in .Ankara. In 1982 he became

new

in

periodical,

Kadin

1991, and Islam

is

(Woman and

ve Aile

of 100,000.

said to have a circulation

ve

Giil Cocuk,

Sanat (Science and

magazine covering history and current developments, was issued

between 1985 and 1989. Yefa Yavincilik for the magazines.

1986 he

the Family). Both of these

magazine, appeared between 1987 and 1990. Ilim

Art), a sophisticated

such as

1985 he started what was

to be retired. In

extensive publishing career bv founding the monthlv, Islam. In

this a

were current

and

at the

1987 he requested

Seha Ne§riyat

Gumus hane\Ts >

is

the Nakshibendi corporation responsible

is

the Nakshibendi

company

books

that publishes

biography.

Such fundamentalist publishing attempts to appropriate and transform secular course. This "capture of the secular discourse" exists

among

fundamentalists

dis-

who

arc

not necessarily Nakshibendi. For example, the autobiography of a young Muslim fundamentalist, Ismct Ozel, bears the

title

Waldo,

Why Aren't

Tou Here?

in reference

to Ralph Waldo Emerson and his stand concerning freedom. An offshoot of the Nurcn published bv the younger generation, the periodical Gu-ism, addresses questions that are more philosophical in nature than the parent group would have tackled. To show that a qualitative change has occurred in the mindset of the more theoretically inclined

vounger generation of Muslim

the reconstitution of the extremely

fundamentalism. ideology with

its

One must social

mav

be seen

Yet the operational

set.

as

Here we

of the periphery,

mode of

the province

had been banned

in Turkey.

i.e.,

is

only the

first

step in

background of modern Turkish intellectual

are dealing with the

personal contacts often channeled through these

social

meshing of the

and psychological moorings. Islam,

pears as a total sociocultural

stratum which

complex

also study the

intellectuals

dimension of

in this perspective, aplife

strategies

of a

social

the province.

was and

what was

is

that of networks based

left

of tarikat structures

These structures of communication

on

after

retain their

shape. Not only do these channels of communication continue to operate in secular

Turkey, but they established the setting for a reenactment of the type of personal that,

ties

according to Kotku, informed collective relations in a Muslim community. As it is in the community that the Muslim individual is formed; Muslim he must operate in and with the community. The ties that estabcollectivity arc personal ties; the community coalesces around them. It is

he rightly pointed out, to remain a lished the

this process

which underlies the peculiar type of traditional Middle Eastern populism

which one has such latent in

difficult)'

defining.

many modern democratic

Note

theories

that the

Western conception which

— Adam Smith's idea that a

lies

collectivity

is

§erif Mardin

226

made

into

one by the forces of the market

—

is

totally alien to this ideal

Muslim

community. Nonetheless

which

we must

eroding

is

and the world of communication become is

of Turkey

also take into consideration an aspect

foundation of Nakshibcndi influence: as

this

in the

politics, the

differentiated, Kotku's ideal Islamic society

undermined. Kotku was quite wary of democratic

politics

and the formation of

adversary groups pitted against each other

on

scheme. The differentiation of society,

seen in the emerging business

motion of its tion,

own

class interests

and

as

in the

turfs that

have no meaning in a religious class's

unleashed processes that take us away from Kotku's Islamic Utopia and into the

That Kotku's influence

many competing

groups.

prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s can be explained by

still

the fact that the Turkish secular elite never understood that the periphery

own marked

teristically

is

a

world

not onlv by a general "backwardness" but by an interlocking set of

social characteristics. It

cial

pro-

unanticipated influence of secular educa-

present fragmentation of Turkish fundamentalism into

of its

1990s

economy,

is

were trying to

boundaries of this

one the Kemalists charac-

in effect a parallel society to the

establish. Secularization

parallel

meant eliminating the

invisible so-

world, and this was a loss that the periphery refused to

accept.

Nakshibendis Today Turkish secularists have sounded the alarm with regard to the role of the Nakshibendi order in contemporary a

politics.

These accusations appeared

newly formed religious party, the National Salvation

of 1973. But these were vague reports that the

NSP

in scattered statements as

Party,

emerged

in the election

was using underground Nakshi-

bcndi groups as propagandists. With the emergence of the Motherland Party in the

mid-1980s, the accusations found lic,

a target.

The brother of the

Turgut Ozal (leader of the Motherland Party), was

mother demanded to be buried near Kotku (which

is

where she

Friday, the preaching of Professor Esat Co§an, the successor attracts a large constituency to the Iskenderpa§a

many

includes

professionals

president of the repub-

Mosque

of Kotku, and

a disciple

rests today).

and son-in-law of Kotku,

in Istanbul,

and what we might describe

his

Every

as

an audience that

Muslim

intellectuals.

A

few years ago Professor Co§an was accused by a conservative Istanbul daily of having given then prime minister Ozal a

list

of

five

candidates to be placed on the ticket of

the Motherland Party, which held a majority in the Turkish parliament. 31

though he requested

made

his

own

a

correction of what he called

this

Even

"unfounded rumor," Co§an

stand clear in a rebuttal published in Islam: "I would gladly support

numbers sufficient to create a caucus or in larger numwould defend with sincerity our glorious past, our pure belief, and our higher national interests using party rules and an economic theory so drafted 32 as to prevent our entrance into the European Community'." Ozal's Motherland Party was said to include many crvpto-Nakshibcndi, but it nevthe presence in parliament, in bers,

of

a party that

ertheless applied for the acceptance

of Turkey into the EEC. The

EEC

delay in re-

THE XARSHIBENDI ORDER OF TURKEY 22"

sponding to the application weakened OzaTs position

economic cooperation. Indeed,

shibendi monthlv Islam

is

Community. In an theme was clear:

article

Manv Europeans not have

a

is

theme

a constant

in the

Nak-

the implausibilitv of a Turkish adhesion to the European

authored bv Halil Necatioglu,

in positions

European

ropean identity

working

vis-a-vis the activists

for an alternative Islamic

identity.

of

pseudonym of Co§an,

responsibility' are repeating that

That country which

that country

a

which

is

this

Turkey does

stated not to have a Eu-

for an entire century

now has taken

the

most absurd measures for the sake of Westernization, namely Turkey. That state which every Tom, Dick, and Harry in the European parliament accuses of having failed with respect to

human

rights

is

not the Ottoman

state;

it is

that entity

which from the very date of its foundation to our dav has engaged

in

manv

a

somersault to "modernize" and to look appealing to the West and which has carried out practices regardless of the belief and culture of

its

people, namely

the Republic of Turkey. 33

The polemic nature of this

article carries the

marks of

a discourse specific to a field

had not vet developed when the Nakshibendi began to be

that

influential

of public opinion.

When

among

the Nak-

Turkish intellectuals in the 1930s, namely, the

field

shibendi agreed to operate in this

of continuing to work under cover, the

field instead

element of prudence and discretion that characterized

its

earlier stance

was profoundly

The Nakshibendi had now been drawn into a public debate and the eddies By the same token, differences of opinion between the various facof believers Nakshibendi and conservative Muslims who saw Sufism as sus-

affected.

thereby created. tions

pect

—

—

at

one time could have been papered over, but now were projected onto the

sphere of public opinion and In fact, the

first

sign of a

envenomed bv rift

this exposure.

between the leaders of the Turkish

clerical parts', the

Welfare Party, and the Nakshibendi appeared in January 1990 in a cryptic leading article

of Islam which,

in its

English version in the same issue, ran as follows:

Throughout historv Muslims have followed the pious, righteous and devout. They obeyed true Islamic scholars [i.e. the Nakshibendi] and pledged their allegiance to them. They worked under their orders and followed the path they showed to them. Thus thev attained happiness in both worlds. The true caliphs of mankind are the blessed adepts and shavkhs joined in spirit with God; thev are not oppressive and despotic politicians. How manv faithful, just and intelligent government officials, commanders, ministers, even sultans pledged their allegiance to them, kissed their hands, requested their pravers, carried out their

orders, took

them

Journalism, though ence,

it

as their guides,

and performed

was seen by Kotku

had brought with

it

as a

sen-ices to

them? 34

means of extending the

order's influ-

unanticipated consequences, including disunity in the ranks

of the Muslims. In the months to follow, the Nakshibendi were gradually

ment of

a political party

drawn

into the establish-

bv the necessarily adversary position thev took toward the

§erif Mardin

228

Welfare Party even though, paradoxically, the themes of brotherhood and togetherness occurred with increasing frequency in the pages of Islam. 35

The

declared goal of

the Nakshibendi publishing firm, a "jihad [religious war] of love and affection," was

presaged in a propaganda campaign launched in June 1990 in the entitled

"The Importance and Place of Politics

Muslims

mands and

are responsible for

.

They cannot remain

.

.

much

as

disinterested,

they are in matters of worship

uninformed,

ineffective, care-

detached and passive. If they do, they will be held responsible.

less,

gion

others.

whole, one cannot

a

is .

.

falls

most natural

the Muslims'

some

fulfill

Political organization ...

.

of democracy and votes

English)

of which follows:

conforming to the religious ordinances and com-

in social-political matters just as

piety.

article (in

in Islam," a passage

is

.

.

Reli-

.

and turn one's back on

parts

necessary because

by means

if governing

into the hands of the opposition, this can lead [to]

rights being violated. 36

This entire issue of Islam was devoted to the concept of shura, or Islamic consultation.

The

rift

Islam and was chronicled in the English translation of the leading

with Co§an, under the rubric "A article,

political

with the Welfare Party was revealed clearlv in the July issue of

Political Party

an interview

article,

and Us." In the Turkish version of the

now open

Professor Co§an indicated that in Central Asia a whole region was

to Nakshibendi influence.

He

undoubtedly was aware that

in Soviet

Russia

who were the architects of the Muslim revival. now dead for a decade, became, once more, a controversial

it

was the

Nakshibendi Kotku,

November 1990, the dav Turkish secularists mourned Atatiirk, chose to mourn their own shaykh. Possibly as a result of the general 11

within a year of three Turkish personalities

killing

who had

own

when on

revulsion for the

loudly proclaimed the

dangers of fundamentalism, Professor Co§an had not taken the ing his

figure

the Nakshibendi

final step

of establish-

party by the date of this writing.

Mv excursus

on how external conThe core of Nakshibendi belief, its revivremained unchanged. The persistence of this common denominator

on Nakshibendi

history has focused primarily

ditions have shaped Nakshibendi strategy. alistic aspect,

has

influence as a principle of hope, a religious force not un-

could be explained by

its

known

But the deeper resonance of this

to Christianity.

the numinous,

still

principle, the effectiveness

remains a mystery to the nonparticipant observer, even though

recurrence as "'fundamentalism" seems

somewhat

clearer

of its

once we have investigated

the case of the Nakshibendi.

The Nakshibendi and Other Nakshibendi "fundamentalism"

is

Constellations of Turkish Revivalism

difficult

enough

to define: only in

its

adapt to modern conditions while preserving a stable ideological core does begin to emerge. But this influence.

is

ability to its

nature

not the only difficulty one encounters in gauging

The mujaddidi-Halidi-Nakshibcndi "trunk"

offshoots which have gone their

own

has given rise to a

its

number of

way. In Turkey in the early 1990s one finds a

THE NAKSHIBENDI ORDER OF TURKEY 229

is onlv one of what one could

constellation of Xakshibcndi subgroups. This constellation, however,

the religious-revivalistic constellations in that country.

It is

true that

led by Kotku and Co§an, are the most would lose much bv not studying the whole gamut of revivalism. influential, but one Were one to take such a more general perspective, the larger picture to emerge would consist of three types of revivalist groups: some of these would be seen to retain a sect organization which they inherited from the past and also to operate within the networks that were adjuncts of this century-old organization. The Suley-

describe as the

main Xakshibcndi groups, those

manci Xakshibendi are representative of such an extremely conservative tendency.

Some

revivalist

groups, the Xurcu and the Kotku-Co§an community, appear to be

using both such traditional networks and the new mass media. These groups can be

The

more radical-revolutionary fundamentalists, would be seen to take their impetus purely from a set of ideological formulas, "slogans," as one recent author, Ru§en C^akir, has described them. These groups are totally focused on the journals which express their goals. The Sulevmanci group is the follower of Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan, born in Buldescribed as moderate-reyiyalistic.

dodging prosecution during

garia in 1888. Constantly

laboration with the Xazis during

He

oyer his followers.

rouser

World War

II,

his lifetime,

accused of col-

he established an absolute ascendancy

died in 1959. His authority was inherited by his son-in-law,

the former parliamentarian success

third group, the

Kemal Kacar, whose

activities

have scored phenomenal

among Turkish workers in Germany. Cemalettin Kaplan, the premier rabbleamong these Turkish guest workers, is the pole of another movement, which,

paradoxically, suffers

from

a lack

of clientele within the borders of the mother country,

Turkey.

What becomes

quite clear

basic structuring force It is

now

of the

when one goes on to the second group is community of believers as such has been

increasingly journals

constitute the fields

that here the

transformed.

and periodicals published by these subgroups that

where influence and

the role of organizational centers.

ideas originate; these journals have

A number of examples

assumed

of this transformation,

pri-

come to mind. First, should study modern science has resulted

marily from the Xurcu, which also seem particularly fissiparous, Said Xursi's advice to his followers that they in the creation

Sur attempts to

offer

its

readers an "objective" study of some of the burning religious

of modern Turkey by opening

issues

same

of two dissident periodicals, Sur (Citadel Wall) and Zafer (Victory).

its

pages to intellectuals of the

time, devoting each entire issue entirely to

ization in

which

it

its

one problem.

It

left

shows

and, at the its

modern-

proud command of modern theories of psychology and parapsychology, 37 In fact, its statistical studies of Qur'anic lettering have its own ends.

uses to

transformed a traditional obsession with numerology into a pseudoscientific project.

A

Xurcu offshoot with

Mchmet Metiner between 1985 and

1990.

Its fare

theory, radical rebellion against a "soft" Islam,

sociology,

which gave

it

a

was Girqim, published by consisted of a mix of critical

real intellectual distinction

and the percipient use of Western

prominent place among the younger generation of Muslim

intellectuals.

Similarly radical in

its

tendencies but

more

conservative in

its

worldview has been

§erifMardin 230

Dava (The Cause), whose main theme is that the Nurcu of the Yeni Asva-Yeni Nesil group have betrayed their Muslim principles bv supporting political parties. For Dava there exists only

mise

its

one

principles

A third

party, the party

of the Qur'an, a partv which

will

not compro-

by "politicking."

Nurcu offshoot is the so-called Erenkoy group. This group, named after a is more interested in Sufism than in politics, but its ideas, once

suburb of Istanbul,

more, are expressed not

in

one-on-one encounters but

Altinoluk (Golden Spout). Notice that

immune

orders are not

This

is

all

pages of a magazine,

in the

show that Sufi modern society.

three of the cases cited above

to the strongly differentiating tendencies of

further evidence of the change which,

unbeknownst

to the sects themselves,

has brought modernizing elements into the very foundation of traditional sects.

One of the most are

interesting constellations of revivalism

failure to

draw

a clientele

radical in their critique last

is

the set of groups which

both fundamentalist and revolutionarv. These groups are interesting more

Dava

than in their extensive influence. Giri$im and

in their

are also

of the immobilism of Turkish Islam but are not part of

this

tendency since they do not promote revolution. The main revolutionary- radical

is the Turkish Hizbullah, modeled on their Lebanese namesakes. They follow wake of Ayatollah Khomeini, although from the beginning of their activities they have been hampered by the strongly Sunni quality of Turkish Islam. 38 Their

group in the

organs

(Independence), §ehadet (Martyrdom), and Tevlrid (Unitv) have tried

Istiklal

gap bv running a series of interviews with Shi'ite leaders and panel discussions on Shi'ism. Thev have taken over Khomeini's formula of a "uni-

to bridge the Shi'ite-Sunni

versal Islamic

most

movement"

interesting

having had

a

in their

attempt to bring

development concerning

hand

in the assassination

this

Shi'ite

group

is

and Sunni together. The

that

it

of a prominent journalist

has been accused of

in the

spring of 1990.

According to a commentator thev have not had the courage cither to confirm or to

denv

their involvement in the murder.

Fanatically

opposed to the

publishers of the periodical

Shi'ites,

but just as militant as the Hizbullah, are the

Ak-Dogui (White

Birth).

With no connections

traditional Islamic world, thev are voting, disgruntled lower-middle-class social profile

is

strikinglv similar to that

to the

vouth whose

of the bulk of the Turkish Marxist

clientele

of

random sentences taken out ofAkDogui: "A strong construction can only be founded on destruction"; and "It is a spiritual truth that to kill has the value of a confirming act." 39 The Ak-Dogu§ group the 1970s. Their outlook can be summarized from

was accused of planning the three assassinations of prominent Turkey

in the spring

of 1990, but

their culpability could

citizens

Even taken together, these representatives of "fundamentalism"

whose

influence can in

no way

which shook

not be established.

rival that of "centrist" Nakshibendis

are mavericks

who,

as

we

saw,

are themselves divided.

A summary of these influences would underline

the fact that as long as Sufi orders

and the many more recent spontaneous fundamentalist organizations continue to

work

as small conventicles, thev

of considerable politics

on the field of national and international majoritv of them have done by deciding to participate in open

solidarity.

— which the

have a strong ideological impact and gather a clientele

Once

they appear

THE NAKSHIBENDI ORDER OF TURKEY 231

debate about national issues that

weaken them

— they

on an equal footing with

bend to organizational imperatives

are obliged to

as religious organizations

but do not transform them into partners

secular political parties.

Acknowledgments I

am

especially grateful to Karl Barbir for the use

changes

in the

Xakshibendi order,

Ottoman Nakshibendi

the

I

of

as to Professor Irene

of organizational

his study

Melikoff on whose work on

rely.

Notes 1.

Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi OrIslam (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

J.

ders

in

1971),

p.

63. Protestant Ethic

the Spirit of Capitalism, translated

Parsons p.

Tajfel, Social Identity

(London, 1982),

and Internroup Rela-

cited in Social Science

Encyclopedia, s.v. "Social Identity."

Max Weber, The

2.

H.

tions

(New

York:

and

bv Talcott

Scribner,

1958),

105.

13. Butrus Abu Manneh, "The Naqshbandiwa Mujaddidiva in Ottoman Lands in

the Earlv 19th Century," Die Welt des Islams

22, no. 5(1982): 1-56.

Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,

Ottoman

1985), pp. 24-25.

University Press, 1962).

3.

Hamid

4.

Enavat, Modern Islamic Political

Thought (London: Macmillan, 1982),

Johannan

5.

Sirhindi

Friedman,

Shaikh

p. 35.

Ahmad

McGill-Queens Uni1971), pp. 15-16.

(Montreal:

versity Press,

Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimen-

6.

sions

of Islam (Chapel Hill:

North Carolina

University of

Press, 1975), p. 117.

7.

Ibid., p. 366.

8.

Donald

and Death,

198. 9.

Is-

kara Social Science Institute, University of

Ankara, Turkey, 1983), 16.

Smith (1980),

17.

Irfan Gundiiz,

p.

63.

p. 136.

Giimushanevi

Ahmed

cial

H.

Tajfel, Differentiation between So-

Groups (London, 1978), cited in Social

Science Encyclopedia, s.v. "Social Identity."

(Paper presented at the Middle East Studies Association,

20. Yeni Asya,

May

1987, cited

in

Ru§en

Cakir, Ayet ve Slogan (Istanbul: Metis Yay-

10. Karl Barbir, "From the Muradis to Mawlana Khalid: Leadership Transition in the Naqshbandiwa in Svria, 1670-1827"

Toronto,

Canada,

1989),

4-5.

11. Ibid., p. 5. 12.

1

19. Ibid.

Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of

lam, p. 374.

pp.

Princeton

(Princeton:

15. Gokhan Cctinsava, "11 Abdulhamid Doneminin ilk Yillarinda 'Islam Birligi Harcketi, 1876-1878" (MA. thesis, An-

18.

Schleifer, Rhetoric

Mardin, The Genesis of Young

'Thought

Ziyaiiddin (Ankara: Seha Nes,rivat, 1984).

(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990), p.

14. Serif

Frederik Barth, Ethnic Groups

and

Boundaries (Boston: Little Brown, 1969);

inlari,

1990),

21. Nokta,

p.

94.

November 1990.

It is

almost

impossible to follow the constant changes in

names of the newspapers published bv Nurcu splinter groups. The group which has adopted Yeni Asya as a name, for instance, has changed a number of times. In this case, personalities seem to be a more the

various

constant point of reference.

Serif Mardin

232

22. Necip

Fazil

Kisakiirek,

O

ve

Ben

(Memoirs), 3d ed. (Istanbul: Biiviik Dogu, 1978). 23. Ibid., p. 9. 24. Ibid.,

25. Cakir, Ayet ve Slogan, p. 18. 26. Shaykh

W

Mehmed

(Ankara-Istanbul: Seha, 1984).

28. Ersin

Gundogan, Gorunmeyen Univ-

(Invisible

University)

bul: Seha, 1989).

the

last

does

a party

exist in

Turkey, the

Partisi [Welfare Part}']),

national

elections

but in

could onlv

it

liances

al-

with other, smaller, parties on the

right.

Mehmed Zahid Kotku, 27. Shavkh Mu'minin Vasiflari (Qualities of the Be-

ersite

Such

(Refah

Zahid Kotku, Ci-

(Jihad) (Istanbul: Seha, 1984).

liever)

32.

RP

October 1987.

achieve a small representation by forging

64.

p.

31. Terciiman, 6

(Ankara-Istan-

33. Islam,

November 1989,

34. Halil Necatioglu,

p.

32.

"The Undisputable

Value and Superiority of Islamic Scholars," Islam, no. 77, January 1990, p. 6.

35. Warn, April 1990, p. 17. 36. Islam, June 1990, p. 7. 37. Cakir, Ayet ve Slogan, p. 114.

29. Ibid., p. 19.

38. Ibid., p. 157.

30. Ibid.

39. Ibid., p. 176.

CHAPTER 11

Hindu Fundamentalism and Stability

the Structural

of India

Robert Eric Frvkenberg

i\n\ tween Hindu fundamentalism and a clear

discussion about the relationship be-

India's political

system as a modern

Let us begin with the terms "Hindu" and "India." As employed arc twins.

Both

trace their lineage (vamsba)

constructed by the East India

upon foundations

Islamic and

earlier

still

from the "Raj"

Company during

teenth centuries

Two

in

modern

— the

times, they

imperial system

the late eighteenth and early nine-

by the Mughals and

laid

indigenous empires.

integration and political mobilization, were as the

state requires

working definition of the concepts "Hindu," "India," and "fundamentalism."

rulers

of

Indo-

earlier

synchronized processes, structural

invoked

in establishing the Raj,

known

"Indian Empire." Both required the employment or mobilization of indigenous

("Native" or "Hindu") peoples.

I

single

upon any single comenough to construct even a regional permanent majority community and is itself a mosaic

no

structures with statelike properties can be maintained,

India possesses a political system

munity, for no community state.

The country

has

no

is

whose

structures cannot rest

large or resourceful

of minorities. This being

so,

and no government can

rule over

such a construction, which do not depend upon

mutual collaboration bv minorities. Even most endure, are ruled bv coalitions of

elite

villages, as political entities

Without such collaboration and "contractual" arrangements plicit),

which

communities which are usually minorities. (either implicit or ex-

no political system can survive for long.

Accordingly, no feature of the political systems of the subcontinent has been decisive than the conflicting nature

more

of primary loyalty and obligation. The lovaltv of 233

— Robert Eric Fnkenberfj '

234

the ruled, including those erful persons

who

have served, or

who

have simplv submitted

to,

pow-

or institutions has often been severely circumscribed. Relationships of

obligation to institutions and structures of "higher authority" have thus been exceed-

At

ingly fragile.

its

deepest

level, this peculiar feature

of Indian history and

politics

has arisen out of differing cultural, ethical, and religious convictions about the nature

of

realitv

profoundlv differing convictions. In India, the ultimate

found

in

who

and thus about the demands which can be made upon those

bonds of community' and custom, which

tests

hold

of obligation have been

embodiment of

are seen as the

divine as well as domestic law. Obligation has also been formalized in the individual's relationship to basic sociopolitical institutions, especially' in times of the construction

of extensive

state systems.

Tension has arisen continually between different kinds of lovaltv and obligation

between bonds of blood, bonds of

belief,

and bonds of contract

— with conflicting

obligations and lovalties intermingling in intricate and complex wavs. Familv and

communitv

ties

distinctiveness.

own

have maintained their

special kinds

Bonds of custom and contract have

of cultural, ethnic, and

rarclv

been harmoniously

ritual

inte-

grated or linked together in larger structures so as to be taken for granted. Such

no matter what

linkages within political systems, features

power

of Indian

society.

To

their size, have never

become circumscribed and

structures of increasing size or sophistication have

constrained, resting like a house of cards

or "communal" contract.

been stable

the contrary', conditions of loyalty and obligation within

upon

carefully'

balanced bonds of personal

1

In the plural ethnic, ideological, political, and religious environments yvhich

up

India as a state, each birth

group

(caste or

community)

sees itself as

make

unique and

inherently distinct from thousands of other separate communities. Thus each birth group has gone to extraordinary lengths to preserve its oyvn separateness and status in the yvorld. For the sake of all that yvas sacred and treasured in their sense of identity'

members of a given birth group yvere not alloyved to intermarry (even to interdine) yvith members of other groups. No overlord or supreme ruler could afford to disregard this sense of primary- identity' and primary loyalty To violate and

ritual purity',

7

.

customs linked to "birth" or "caste" in times

any

yvas to

put one's entire regime

of great upheaval and realignment. Crucial to the

state, raj,

or regime yvas the

loyalty'

of

its

stability

at risk, especially

and the survival of

oyvn retainers, servants, and tributary'

supporters. Such lovaltv could be ensured only by paving scrupulous attention to

those rituals by yvhich each birth group preserved

This situation

is

as prevalent yvithin the

ander marched into the Punjab

in

326

its

distinct identity

subcontinent today

b.c.e.

The

logic

as

of loyalty

it

is

7 .

was yvhen Alex-

strikingly consis-

one is studying the lessons of the great epics such as die Mahabharata and the Ramavana of North India, yvhich reflect political relationships almost a thou-

tent yvhethcr

sand years before Alexander, or attempting to appreciate features underlying

political

1980s and early 1990s bv such national

political

campaigns conducted parties as the parties in

Congress

in the late (I)

or the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), or by regionally strong

Assam, Bengal, or Punjab. The

nature of obligation remains salient.

issue

of the

limits

of primary

lovaltv

and the

HINDU Fl'XDAMEXTALISM AND THE STRUCTURAL

STABI1

OF INDIA

II Y

235

The

Raj, as

it

evolved,

was

a carefully

arranged hierarchy of ranked

social, political,

and religious contracts. The

tiniest of dynastic domains, ruling over family members, and servants and holding sway over cultivated fields (or other tinv territorial resources), was subject to more powerful rulers whose domains covered larger terri-

retainers,

tories; these larger

domains

in

mrn were

subject to

still

larger

and more powerful

and kingdoms which were themselves subject more powerful and holding sway over wider and more vast territorial domains until, finally, somewhere at the top, there was some great overlord who ruled, or at least claimed to rule, over all. This was the kind of structure over which the Great Mughals held sway. The historical and metaphorical families

whose

rulers held principalities

to rajahs and maharajahs, each in turn

paradigm which neatlv depicted

this

ordered pattern of interconnected contracts

arranged lovalties and obligations

intricately

— dates back

at least to the

— or

time of Em-

peror Ashoka and was caricatured in the administration, the alliances, and the archi-

Emperor Akbar. This paradigm, sculpted in stone at Konarak and Fatepur Sikri, was the Great Wheel (Mnba-Clmkm), with its manv spokes connecting central hub to surrounding rim. Another model was the Great Parasol (Maha-Cbatm), with

tecture of

its

overarching canopv,

like that

of

a vast

banyan

protecting shade

tree, casting its

across the length and breadth of the land. Just has

Akbar

allied

himself with

elite families in

North

making

India, in effect

himself personal overlord of each important caste and communitv, so the Company's

Raj (and,

that of the

later,

arrangements, making elite

communitv

Crown and

itself into

in India.

the Congress) entered a matrix of contractual

the corporate overlord of each important dynastic or

Within these arrangements,

conflicts over questions

cedence or rank, over social distinction, over social distance, and over purity (and sacred space) are a recurring

Reports from various

much

the

same

story.

plex varieties of

localities

bonding

are loaded with details

and the

Such

in administrative, military,

appointments, military

of controversies which put

stresses often resulted

Mohandas K. Gandhi,

— serve

all

the source materials.

last

two

centuries

tell

political service (as reflected

stress

or religious endowments),

upon

the limits of loyalty and in the political culture

and well-being of some small com-

The Great Mutiny of 1857 and

Indira Gandhi, and Rajiv

as stark

and

titles,

from too rapid changes

social order that threatened the security

munitv, or set of communities.

regards

in virtually

of pre-

or social

Local sources, especially those which probe the incredibly com-

in land grants, bureaucratic

obligation.

theme

throughout India during the

ritual

Gandhi

reminders of what happens

the assassinations of

— events so different

when

in other

contractual bonds holding

together the complex social elements composing the bodv politic are broken and

when the logic of political obligation is violated. The tvpes of issues that have stretched political locally perceived grievances,

contract held in deeds, engagements, ible if its

and marvelous

variety.

loyalties

beyond

their limits are

"wrongful actions," that have served to violate bonds of

Any

titles,

violation

or

treaties.

These grievances are of incred-

of social custom or sacred

ritual, especially

implications might have cosmic or divine significance, could invite dire political

consequences. Hence, any change in the use of buildings, conveyances, drinks, foods,

garments, hostels, roads, schools, temples, or other kinds of

facilities

could quickly

Robert Eric Erykcnberg 236

transgress the limits of loyalty to a regime state structure into jeopardy.

Once

limits

and put the

political stability

of an entire

of loyalty have been transgressed and bonds

of obligation broken, events have quicklv escalated into protests and these,

in turn,

have quickly become flash points for explosions of outrage and carnage. Heedless officials

have often found

explain

what happened, they have merely used words

it

convenient to gloss over such events. Never bothering to

"spontaneous

like

1

or "unex-

'

pected" in their reportage about the causes of civic and political unrest.

During the Company's Raj, old bonds of lovalty and obligation were undermined

number of developments, including the consolidation of modern military establishments; the reification of modern religious institutions, including the emergence of by

a

an increasingly self-conscious "Hinduism," partly as a bv-product of official policies; the development of

modern education, together with

munication networks

of com-

a vast infrastructure

news, printing, postal/telegraph, and transportation

(e.g.,

sys-

tems); and the evolution of "representative" interests, voluntary associations, and political parties.

The Indian National Congress

"corporate dynasty" of the Raj (succeeding nificant reactions to the shifts

ultimately

assumed the

is

the rise of a competitive

assuming the existence of an ostensible "majority" community,

Communalism

in the

and the consequent

the sig-

"communalism"

in contradistinction

of fundamentalist movements.

rise

contemporary Indian context

is

a deep, almost visceral

of antagonism and antipathv between communities of differing guistic,

of a third

of loyalty and obligation ensuing upon these develop-

ments, the one that most concerns us here

to "minority" communities,

role

Company and Crown). Among

form

cultural, ethnic, lin-

and/or religious identities. Based in part on fear and ignorance of the Other,

communalism often

gives rise to conflict

and violence between Hindus and Muslim

or between caste communities and outcaste communities

(e.g.,

Untouchables).

Com-

munal troubles between Hindus and Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, Hindus and Christians, Hindus and Buddhists, and even between different Untouchable communities (striving against each other for the smallest

common

have been

many

has cost so

during

this century.

lives as that

crumbs of precedence

But no

single

in claims to purity)

form of communalist

conflict

between Muslims and Hindus. "Fundamentalism"

thrives within this system as a distinctively extreme reaction to threats to

communal

form of religious separatism in radical opposition to forces of "Falsehood" or "Impurity" which are perceived as undermining the very foundations identity. It

is

a militant

or "fundamentals" of received "Truth."

Beneath the surface of many

bonds of political

loyalty

conflicts occurring in India today, then,

system

upon

is its

The

substructures of the state

rest, in

role in balancing

and mediating relationships between thousands of sepa-

neutrality, syncretism,

calls for

and tolerance. In

measured degrees of im-

a land

where there had never

existed a consciousness of anything vaguely resembling a single "majority

nity" and

the final

the confidence inspired by promises. Crucial to the stability of the state

rate communities. Such balancing and mediating partiality,

finds that

and obligation, upon which depend the substructures hold-

ing the state together, are most at issue. analysis,

one

where the

separate and separately

commu-

body politic consisted of an intricately arranged mosaic of competing minority communities, the role of the modern state

entire

HINDU FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE STRUCTURAL STABILITY OF INDIA 237

no

has been to ensure that

powerful stability

special favoritism or coalition

as to tip the delicate balance

of competing

of interests could become so

interests

and thereby threaten the

of the whole.

Parallel to the

development of an all-encompassing

state has

been the

fortification

of the notion of an inclusive Hinduism. Romila Thapar, writing about pre-modern India, points out the fallacy

when

of assuming that some sort of inclusive Hinduism existed

"the reality perhaps lav in looking at

observing

common

civilizational

it

as a cluster

of distinctive

sects

and

cults,

symbols, but with belief and ritual ranging from

atheism to animism and a variety of religious organizations identifying themselves by location, language,

and

caste." 2

No common

sense of

community bound

population together. Small communities, birth groups, and religious sects

the entire

— now

ex-

plained in terms like Brahmanism, Shaktism, Puranic Shaivism and Vaishnavism, and

Bhaktism

— ranged from "high" or

religious cultures:

"Hinduism" was

textual cultures to a

innumerable "low" or popular

"mosaic of distinct

cults, deities, sects

and ideas"

adjusting to and distancing themselves from each other. In other words, what

communities to each other,

bound

and then only inadvertently, were the manufac-

if at all

tured mechanisms and structures of statecraft. These structures, while supportive of local religious

and sectarian

had to remain "impartial," "neutral," or

institutions,

"secular."

II

India's first universal

modern

state required the construction

of

a

common

something capable of cutting across the countless parochial

identity,

hierarchically stratified

political

identities,

and each based upon profound convictions about

its

herent uniqueness in purity of birth (sacred blood) and sanctity of earth (sacred

The

political

them

systems of

modern

India are

precisely because they are so

in-

soil).

more potent than those which preceded

much more

potentially all-embracing

the advent of technologies leading to systems of mass social transportation. In their range

each

own

and speed, accuracy, and

— thanks to

communication and rapid

accessibility, these

systems

have enabled massive mobilizations on a scale hitherto unimagined. Mobilizations

engendered by successive communications revolutions cut across the segmental identities

of

local elites,

enabling appeals (whether based on true or

false

information) to

various sentiments.

—

The "Hinduism" promulgated by mass mobilizations the rising ideal of an allis, accordingly, a recent development. embracing, monolithic "Hindu community" The notion of one Hindu community became necessary, in Thapar's view, "when

—

there

was competition

in a colonial situation"

for political

munity which cut across political,

and

munity" that about

its

caste, sect

religious reform is

and economic resources between various groups

and "a need to change from and

movements

religion." 3

in the nineteenth

increasingly self-conscious about

"sacred destiny."

It

a segmental identity to a

From

its

fears

a tide

com-

of socioeconomic,

century emerged a "com-

and aggressively militant

claims the status of sole representative of India's "ma-

Robert Eric Frykenberjj 238'

community" and demands loyalty or submission from ail other communities in India. This "Hindu community" is the twin of "India" as a state. Both were constructed at about the same time. The new system of loyalty, initially used for the construction of what became an imperial state, has more recendy served to buttress what is now a national state. But this system has turned upon its creators in that it has also come to threaten the structures and contracts of obligation that made possible the construction of modern India. The integratiye institutions and processes represented by the terms "Hindu" and "India" first began to take shape during the early years of the Company's Raj, between 1770 and 1820. During the Raj of the British Crown, serious disjunctions began to joritv

deyelop between these parallel

huge imperial/national

body

Fissures in the

Three

sets

of processes. Processes of

beyond processes of structural

accelerated

state

politic

parallel processes

munity known

as

integration.

was undermined by began to appear

The

political mobilization

structural strength

this clashing disjunction

in the late nineteenth century.

contributed to the shaping of the

"Hinduism." One of these was

modern

institutional;

and vet another was

just

when

indigenous to

endowments, and properties, including

all

all

religious institutions,

maintenance and ceremonial functions,

should be brought under the care, protection, and purview of the

during the nineteenth century

and down

— "pukka""Hindu" temples and temple

maintained

sites,

com-

the term

ever to hold sway over the entire subcontinent, decided that

age

religious

another was ideologi-

sociopolitical. The first came bv goyernment fiat in 1810, "Hindu" was coming into vogue as a way to describe all things India. The Raj, then becoming the first "universal" or "All-India" state

cal;

tions

of the

of processes.

all

(or "native") religious

state.

Thereafter,

state

administered and

endowments and

charitable institu-

to our day, the

events, "monastic" academies (matths), pilgrim-

sacred places, ceremonies, festivals, and

much more. The

Raj became a de

"Hindu" (and heavily Brahmanical) Raj. The second process was scholarly. Inspired by Warren Hastings, the Company's first governor-general (1772—86), "Orientalism" was a joint enterprise of discovery, in which learned Europeans and Indians (Brahman pandits, Muslim hakims, Buddhists, Jains, and others) collaborated. They worked together in recovering and preserving India's cultural heritage, rescuing it from the obscurity' and near extinction into which some of it had fallen. This gigantic enterprise, marked by Max Miiller's 4 editing of the fifty- volume series Sacred Boob of the East, found its ultimate apotheosis facto

in the

life,

scholarship,

and

political career

of Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan (president

of India from 1962 to 1967). Orientalism lent to the newly emerging "Hinduism" an aura of intellectual and philosophical respectability, and, through cultivating the eclectic

and

svneretistic impulses necessary for the imperial (and national) integration

of

the state, also provided doctrinallv attractive elements, such as tolerance and nonviolence.

These elements, unveiled

at the

1893 Parliament of World Religions

in Chi-

cago, enabled "Hinduism" to gain formal recognition as a world religion.

The third potent process was a mobilizing of local resistance to radical conversion movements begun bv Christian missionaries in the eighteenth century. Radical con-

HINDU FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE STRUCTURAL STABILITY OF INDIA 239

version

movements became potent and contagious. Reinforced bv

processes described above, radical conversion had a catalytic effect.

the

It

two

parallel

inspired the

glimmerings of a rundamentalistic reaction and marked the emergence of a more self-conscious

"Hinduism"

Two more institutional

distinct

from other

religions. s

innovations during the

nineteenth century further has-

late

tened the social mobilization of a self-consciously Hindu identity.

Census of 1871 introduced

a

(1) that

all

peoples

Sikhs, Christians, Jains, Jews, or Parsis were, ipso facto,

which could be taken to mean

"Hindu"

The

All-India

vocabularv of communal, social, and religious categori-

and conveyed two messages:

zations,

first

fully

who were

"Hindus"

either a native of India or

—

not Muslims, a

still

vague

someone belonging

label

to the

religion (whether a sublime Vishishtadvaita philosopher, a gypsy Banjara,

an untouchable Mala, or a head-hunting Sana Naga)

communities of "clean" or "pure" birth 15 percent of the entire population.

(i.e.,

— and

"Arvans")

The Census found

that

(2) that "twice-born"

made up little more than Muslim and Untouchable

communities together accounted for nearly half of the population of the Indian Empire (roughly

25 and 20 percent, respectively ). Considering that the

untouchabilitv were so strong

— witnessed

in

economic thralldom verging upon

petual slavery and in the denial of entrv to rituallv pure temples for

Ana

showed

Samaj and other propagandists to

that to be

raise cries

of alarm. The Census

clcarlv

in itself, to give these elite

They began

dominance

top ranks of a permanent Hindu-majoritv community.

The

per-

— there were grounds

safe in the future. in the

of

communiwhich occupied would be of strength they

Arvan might not be enough,

any clear assurance that the positions

ties

disabilities

to feel that thev desperately needed to occupy places of

prospects for democratic and representative local self-government increased

after the

1870s, further deepening the fears of a possible future subjection of the "high

born." Native Indians were beginning to take seats in parliament and on benches of the

High Courts. Generating

seemed, to some traditional

political strength

elites, a

by mobilizing voter constituencies

threatening wave of the future.

Ill

The

Hinduism came with the Hindu Sabha, of the Hindu community" that began in the Punjab in 1907. An All-India Hindu Mahasabha came into being in 1915, perhaps partly in reaction to the Muslim League and as an adjunct of the Indian National Congress (which initially allowed dual memberships). 6 By 1920, dismay at the Lucknow Pact (1916) and at Congress concessions on separate electorates, coupled with alarm at the declaration of a pan-Islamic jihad by Muslim activists, made the Mahasabha increasingly militant. Gandhi's calling off of his satyajjraha, or campaign of nonviolent civil disobedience, after the mob killing of police in early 1922 brought further disenchantment. At Benares, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya called for "means to arrest the deterioration and decline of Hindus and to effect an improvefirst

sign of an openly rundamentalistic

an association "ardent and watchful

in the interest

Robert Eric Erykenberg 240

mcnt of

the

Hindus

community."

as a

encouraged Hindus to adopt the martial

model of valor and to form martial gymnasiums (akharns)

{kshatriya)

and women. Lala Lajpat Rai

Hindu

He

later declared that

men

for both

Gandhi's tactics could only weaken

and engender a "slave mentalitv." As energies were directed increasMuslim communitv, Mahasabha activities did little to discourage the of Hindu-Muslim riots which kept mounting in scale, intensity, and violence solidarity

ingly against the spiral

throughout the 1920s. Perhaps no single work was more influential upon rising fundamentalistic militancy than that of Vinayak

Damodar

penned

his booklet

at the

Ratnagiri

jail,

Savarkar. Entitled

Hindutva and

of 1923/24, with

its

originally

later printings

and

its

English version of 1942, contained the essentials of Hindu fundamentalism. Savarkar

proclaimed that Hindus were the original indigenous people of the land and that this people, formed out of the intermingling of Aryan and non-Aryan blood and culture, constituted one single nation (rashtm). Whatever a person's

Hindu was one who

ture or language, region or sect, a

"birth" and "earth."

communitv or

felt

common

The "fundamentals" of Hindutva were imprinted

the pulse of its timeless "antiquity" and

"inner text" as

it

were, which

bound

"unity" (sarujhatan)

from the encompassing

It

was

of sacred

all

as

codes

knowledge

he could

this heritage, this

The subcontinent was

eternal rivers (Indus,

a "holy land"

Ganges, and Brahmaputra)

which, originating beyond the snow ridges of the Himalayas, watered the sacred

and flowed down to the meeting of seas

feel

India's people to their sacred fatherland (pi-

trubhu) and their divine country (punyabhu). stretching

.

caste, cul-

in genetic

linking sacred blood and sacred soil (and, indeed, sacred cosmic sound,

of this stemming from the Rig Veda). Any person was Hindu so long

ties

at

Kanya Kumar i. Here, indeed, was the

soil

basis

for fundamentalism in classic form. 7 Parallel to the

cult hero)

Hindu Mahasabha

(in

which Savarkar became

a central figure, if not

was the Rashtriva Swavamsevak Sangh (RSS), founded by Kesnav Baliram

A Brahman who had already been involved in national politics for some Hedgewar had become disturbed by the lack of any overarching institutions or

Hedgewar. time,

national solidarity in India and by the deep regional, linguistic,

and

social divisions

which, in his view, had opened the subcontinent to Muslim and British subjugation.

He had

also

become profoundly

disillusioned

and frustrated by Gandhi's

tactics

of

nonviolent noncooperation and bv the principles (abimsa and satyagmha) underlying

Gandhi's campaigns. Savarkar's ideas so captivated

Hedgewar that he decided to devote his life to reThe only way in which this could be done,

storing the "essential unitv" of Hindutva.

he decided, would be to bring about a profound psychological change within individuals.

What was

required was a

movement of total

inner transformation, involving each

person in a radical conversion of outlook and commitment. 8 believers,

ders,

of individuals

had to be

built

who

from

scratch.

mitted persons, he could then truly revolutionary.

A "brotherhood" of true

could transcend petty antagonisms and parochial disor-

With

totally transformed and comnew organization, something cadre would depend, he believed, upon

a cadre

of such

begin to build a totally

The building of such

a

HINDU FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE STRUCTURAL STABILITY OF INDIA 241

the awakening of a self-consciousness and sense of

through rigorous

To

community

in

young people

self-discipline.

that end, special "enlightened" swayanisevaks (literally, "self-servants") were

carefully selected

and

recruited.

These self-dedicated voluntary participants, chosen

before thev reached adolescence, were sworn in and trained to serve the cause. Utter loyalty

and ultimate

obligation required special "character-building" exercises. Ideo-

logical indoctrination

with the Sanskritic

and orientation was to be completed

ideals

of the warrior

(kshatriya), these

at

adolescence.

young men

Imbued

were to subject

themselves to demanding dailv schedules of physical, mental, and spiritual exercise.

Bevond self-regimentation and

self-examination, paramilitary drills

and

quarterstaff training), public indoctrinations,

bv oaths, prayers, and

salutes.

(Only

social services,

a relatively small

for a "life oath.") Rituals of fealty were

made

to the

(

involving lathi or

members were bound

proportion were ever judged

Supreme Sangh

Director, to the

Ramdas

Sangh's saffron-colored banner, to the Maruti Deva (Hanuman), and to

Swami (and other

saints).

fit

Organized into tight sbakbas, or regimented "branches,"

swayamscvaks were continually involved

in activities: forest

camps, weekly discus-

and other exercises designed to generate devotion to

sions, special events, holidavs,

the cause.

The new movement was tival

formally launched in September 1925, at the annual

of Dasara, which celebrated Rama's victory over Ravana. The

from an akhara (fencing academy/gymnasium) in that part

in

of India had long been conspicuous

akharas in the area, institutions

known

uniformed volunteers of the

first

Nagpur, were Brahmins. Brahmins soldiers. The number of jumped during the mid-

and

as rulers

for kshatriya lifestyles,

19205 from 230 to 570. 9 To make sure that the

fes-

drawn

first sevaks,

RSS message captured wide attention,

shakha appeared

at the

Ram-Navami

festival

of

1926, singing verses from Ramdas, providing drinking water, and driving away corrupt pandits and priests.

When communal

rioting broke out in 1927, sixteen

squads moved into various neighborhoods to provide protection. Uniformed

members then journeyed

to

sequent years, networks of

Bombay for a RSS branches

multiplied, and rituals proliferated.

grew from 60

to 500, with

By 1929, an

speakers).

session of the

Between 1931 and 1939, the number of shakhas active members (roughly half were Marathi-

elaborate hierarchy of

and tenure, to group or squad and

city

and regional

In sub-

swayamsevak numbers

60,000

emerge. These ranged upward from humble

ers,

Hindu Mahasabha.

rapidly expanded,

RSS RSS

RSS

levels

leaders

and

officials

began to

of swavamsevaks, ranked by age

leaders, chief teachers, secretaries, celibate staff

directors. All

work-

looked up to the Supreme Guide for ultimate

direction and leadership. Yet, for

all

his earlier political activism

pulously kept the

RSS

activities, a feature

this

politics.

and

his regimental style,

until after

scru-

political

independence, brought con-

and disappointment from many Hindu

partisans. Savarkar de-

"purely cultural" emphasis, predicting that the

accomplish anything significant.

Hedgewar

His policy of refraining from overt

which did not disappear

sternation, criticism,

nounced

out of

Anna Sohani withdrew from

the

RSS would never RSS when its uni-

Robert Eric Frykenberg '

242

formed squads were told not to provoke unnecessary violence by marching of mosques on Fridays. After

in front

paramilitary groups, such as the Khaksars,

were Sikh and other militant communities. The RSS G. M. Huddar, was reprimanded for funding antigovernment ac-

were also being provocative, general secretary, tivities

Muslim

all,

as

by means of armed robber}' (which landed him

from the RSS. While RSS individuals could take part

in prison);

he drifted away

in political actions in their

do so as members of the RSS. The RSS even refused Hindu Mahasabha's 1938-39 agitations against Hyderabad. As a con-

private capacities, they could not

to support the

sequence, relations between the Mahasabha and the

RSS

cooled and they gradually

drifted apart. Refusing to participate in anti-British actions during

World War

II,

even refraining from schemes to militarize Hindus or undermine the loyalty of Hin-

dus within the Indian army, the

RSS

eventually severed

its

links

with the Hindu

Mahasabha.

Hedgewar died in 1940, after a long illness. His place as Supreme Leader was Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar. Golwalkar, an ascetic ex-teacher whom Hedgewar had brought into the movement and made general secretary in 1939, was even less political than his mentor. His apolitical style convinced some that he was taken over bv

othcrworldlv. Yet, blunt and innocent of protocol as he was, the

RSS

a svstematic ideology.

His We, or

it

was he

Our Nationhood Defined^

who

gave

first

published in 1938

(abridging Savarkar's Rashtra Mimansa), exemplified the degree of intolerance in

RSS

fundamentalism that worried other communities:

The non-Hindu peoples

in

Hindustan must adopt the Hindu culture and

guage, must learn to respect and hold in reverence tain

no

idea but glorification of the

Hindu

Hindu

and

race

religion,

culture:

i.e.,

must

lan-

enter-

they must not

onlv give up their attitude of intolerance and ungratefulness towards this land

and

its

age-old traditions, but must also cultivate a positive attitude of love

and devotion

instead. ... in a

word, they must cease to be foreigners, or must

stay in this countrv wholly subordinated to the ing, deserving

no

privileges, far less

Hindu

nation, claiming noth-

any preferential treatment, not even

citi-

zen's rights. 10

Since independence, membership in the

being outlawed twice

—

RSS

has

once for being implicated

twentv thousand members were

jailed)

grown enormouslv, despite its Gandhi assassination (some

in the

and again, during the 1975 Emergency, for

subversive activities. Gandhi's assassination by a former sevak

(Nathuram Vinayak

RSS tainted. But Golwalkar devoted his energies to restoring the RSS image. RSS volunteers rendered succor to thousands of refugees after the Partition and after India's wars with Pakistan (1950, 1965, 1971) and China (1962). RSS Godse)

staff

left

the

11

workers were assigned to help Vinobha Bhave in

gram aimed

at getting landlords to give

a sacrificial land

some of their land

donation pro-

to the landless. Later,

RSS

networks were to organize resistance against Indira Gandhi's government during the

Emergencv. After riding the enormous wave of Hindu revivalism 1980s that they had helped to generate, the

RSS

in the

1970s and

could boast in 1989 that

it

com-

HINDU FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE STRUCTURAL STABILITY OF INDIA 243

manded

bound within

the lovaltv of over 1.8 million dedicated and trained sevaks,

approximatelv 25,000 branches and located in some 18,800 urban and rural centers.

IV RSS members showed

clear signs

of frustration

the organization's apolitical stance.

at

This frustration increased with the ban imposed in the wake of Gandhi's assassination (lifted

a

on 11

Julv 1949).

Many

felt that,

ban would not have been possible.

active politicallv, the Partition

had the RSS possessed

Manv

such

political muscle,

had the

also believed that,

RSS

been more

might never have happened. RSS members blamed the

Congress for destroving India's

political unitv.

Thus,

after their release

from

jail

in

— Eknath Ranade, Vasant Rao Oke, M. D. Deores, Deendaval Upadhvava, and others — talked to Svma Prasad Mookerjee about form1948-49,

new

ing a

a

few

elite

partv. Dr.

RSS

leaders

Mookerjee, then

member of the cabinet, alreadv A former member and president of

a disgruntled

Nehru over relations with Pakistan. Hindu Mahasabha, he had recentlv resigned, partlv over policv differences wake of the Gandhi assassination. Instead of joining Patel and the anti-Nehru differed with

the

in the

forces

within the Congress, he resigned from the Cabinet in April 1950 (in protest to

Mav

the Indo-Pakistan Delhi Agreement) and, in

RSS

1951, joined a large segment of

becoming

leadership to inaugurate the political party Bharatiya Jana Sangh,

its

president. 12

RSS

Thus, while the strove to recruit

and

itself

train converts to the

to engage in political combat.

known, caught the public Mookerjee but

officially,

and

party entered the

lists

stayed discreetly out of politics, at least

From

eve. This

Hindu

the very

cause, the

first,

was due,

new

the Jana Sangh, as

it

soon became

in part, to the personal popularity

also, in part, to disciplined efficiency, experience, vigor,

of

and organi-

drawn from the combined ranks of the Arva Samaj, the Hindu Mahasabha, and RSS leaders who entered the political arena as Jana Sangh workers. At no time, it should be noted, was there any formal arrangement between the RSS and the BJS. But, in its roots, the Jana Sangh was a composite creation. Neither the Arya Samaj, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Ram Rajya Parishad, nor the RSS, by itself, in Mookerjee's view, could generate an appeal broad enough to build an alternative to zational skills

the Congress.

But the

possibilitv that a

merger of Hindu

parties could provide such

an alternative ended with Mookerjee's premature death (May 1953) in Kashmir. For

Sangh was

the next quarter centurv, until the Emergency, the Jana

and more militant path.

Its efforts

focus

on concerns

Amid

ever-shifting alliances

upon

restricted to the northern heartland

and

spired bv an activist version of

Brahmanism

to impose Hindi

Hindu nationalism

its

provoked regional alienation.

Sangh

coalitions, the Jana

led into a narrower

the rest of India and

vision of

Hinduism,

"in-

and, indirectly, by the values of

rather than the quietist values of popular

Hinduism," was too exclusive

and restrictive to appeal to a "national" constituency. 13

During the and turned

its

late

1960s and early 1970s, the Jana Sangh softened

appeal toward populism.

The "grand

alliance"

it

its

Hindu

voice

joined in 1971 was

Robert Eric Erykenberg '

244

not very successful. Indira Gandhi, victorious in the Bangladesh War, seemed invincible.

Moreover, with

tactical wizardry,

she was able to co-opt opposition appeals on

behalf of the poor and to adroitly combine vast patronage powers with the organiza-

of the Congress. Eventually, however, arrogance, corruption, and

tional apparatus

scandal accomplished

what no combined opposition had been

able to do. In 1974,

Sangh and RSS cadres joined Java Prakash Naravan's well-orchestrated "total revolution." The ultimate showdown was precipitated by, among other events, a High the Jana

Court decision invalidating Indira Gandhi's

and Naravan's

seat in parliament

call

(on

behalf of a newly formed directorate) for the military to stop obeying "illegal orders."

The government cracked down on opposition, imposed censorship, placing

all

Hindu fundamentalism gained

RSS underground Emergency ended than

the

declared a state of emergency, and

"subversive elements" under "preventive detention."

strength during the

set the stage for

elections

brought

1975-77 Emergency.

what was to India's first

follow.

No

Indeed,

sooner had the

non-Congress government to

power. This Janata government, formed by Moraji Desai, contained three Jana Sangh

members: Atal Behari Vajpayee (External and Broadcasting), and ever, the fragile

Brij Lai

(Industry).

Krishan Advani (Information

From

its

very beginnings, how-

and factionalized Janata coalition was doomed.

Sangh became an

the Jana

Varma

Affairs), Lai

RSS had made huge

issue. Since

RSS influence within RSS and since the

Jana Sangh leaders were

membership and public respect during the Emergency, other groups within the Janata Party protested the holding of dual memberships and loyalties by party members. The dual membership controversy, along with petty ingains in

fighting, contributed to the Janata's disastrous defeat in the general elections

ary 1980. Moreover, by blaming the Jana

Sangh

for

outlawing dual membership, the Janata Party drove their allies into

forming

a

new

party.

Only

many

rump of

a

thirty-five

Party, or the

Quite bilities

members and

Jana Sangh

the old Jana Sangh, extreme

anti-Muslim supporters of Hindu Rashtra, remained behind. The

by over

of Janu-

defeat and, in consequence,

its

new

party,

formed

hundred delegates on 5 April 1980, became the Bharatiya Janata

BJP

clearly leaders

of the new BJP wanted to draw upon the mobilization capa-

of the disciplined RSS

cadres.

At the same time, however, they did not wish it from

to isolate the party from any potentially broader appeal and thus prevent

becoming a national alternative to the Congress (I). There was, in consequence, a curious and ironic reversal of roles. Gone was the fiery "abolish poverty" slogan of the pre-Emergency Indira Gandhi. While the new Indira Gandhi and her government became ever more deeply embroiled in the communalism and separatist troubles of Assam, Kashmir, and Punjab, the BJP sought to portray closely linked to the

RSS.

It

was Indira

who

played the

itself, at this

time, as less

"Hindu card" by

inviting a

making pilgrimages to sacred rivers, shrines, and temples across the country, and by speaking about "Hindu hegemony" in the Hindi heartland. She fomented anti-Muslim fears in Kashmir and turned a deaf ear to Sikh pleas that the constitutional definition of them as Hindus should be cor-

jet-setting sadhu to be her spiritual guide, by

rected. release

At the same time, she of Sant

Jarnail

tried to gain control over the

Punjab by allowing the

Singh Bhindranwale from prison (October 1981). Unwittingly,

HINDU FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE STRUCTURAL STABILITY OF INDIA 245

in courting

Damdami

Bhindranwalc, the militant leader of the

courting her

own

was also Golden Temple in

Taksal, she

destruction. Bhindranwalc took control of the

Amritsar Julv 1982), and the incidence of killing escalated. While Sikh swavamsevaks (

RSS

were dispatched to Punjab to convince Sikh militants that the

considered them

to be part of the "Hindu community," BhindranwaJe sought to polarize relations bv

having gruesome parts of cow carcasses live in

left in

temples. For him, Sikhs "could neither

or with India." 14

The

intensification

of the

stability

of India's

rcligiopoliticaJ crisis

of some of her

tion, in part the result

political svstem.

port," coupled with

its

during Indira Gandhi's administra-

policies, dealt

hea\T blows to the structural

The government's anxiety' to win "Hindu supSikh demands for autonomy, even in a limited

failure to satisfy

way, resulted in turmoil and an increase in terrorism. This in turn led to the strength-

Hindu fundamentalisms. 15 The OperaGolden Temple at Amritsar on 5 June 1984, for

ening of radical factions within Sikh tion Blue Star storming of the

as well as

example, led to a spiral of retaliatory violence in which the prime minister herself was assassinated bv

two Sikh bodyguards (31 October), and over

three thousand Delhi

"Hindu

Sikhs were in turn massacred at the hands of Congress supporters and nationalists."

The parliamentary

"communalized" the

issue

elections held in the aftermath of these events

of national unity; a blatant form of "competitive commu-

nalism" between major parties and a flagrant exploitation of communal "vote banks" contributed to Rajiv Gandhi's landslide victory a few weeks part\ cies.

r

had

effectively

16

The Congress

co-opted BJP issues and had encroached upon BJP constituen-

won

Congress even

later.

support from

RSS

leaders

who were

worried about ways to

check India's disintegration. Clearly, the BJP defeat of 1984 and the advent of Lai

Krishnan Advani

as

and reach "Hindu"

BJP president pushed the party

into an all-out effort to pursue

voters. This strategy required closer relations

agencies which were part of the

Vishwa Hindu Parishad

(or

VHP,

The Sikhs were by no means

with other "Hindu"

Hindu tide, agencies such World Hindu Party).

rising

the

the only

community

to rethink

its

as the

RSS and

loyalty to "India." In

the 1980s other major communities and segments of the population raised serious

challenges and provocations, and

most pervasive

Hindu

revivalism (Hindntva ]agamri)

single political presence in India.

But

this

became the

presence entailed inherent

contradictions between reality and rhetoric, between inclusive claims and exclusive

demands. 17 limit,

Among

the organizations which took this contradiction to

none was more

establishment for

all

persistent in seeking to create a

its

permanent Hindu

farthest religious

VHP, founded in the RSS family. Led

of India than the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. The

1964 bv Golwalkar, was yet another sister affiliate belonging to by former RSS staffers, it was dedicated to molding a unified Hindu society. It worked mainly through educational, ecclesiastical, and missionary' channels, striving to abolish "foreign" ideologies, influences, and institutions and to thwart separatist

Robert Eric Erykenberg 246

movements

1980,

its

main

— setting up schools, — were among "backward,"

activities

temples, and other vehicles for proselytization

clinics, tribal,

in the country. Prior to

and untouchable communities. The purpose of the

reverse

non-Hindu (Muslim,

VHP

was to block and

Christian, Buddhist, or other) influences. In

1981-82,

however, an incident occurred which focused attention, aroused concern, provoked consternation, and concentrated minds

all

over India. This event took place

at

Mccnakshipuram.

Some

fifteen

hundred Dalits

in

Tamil Nadu, untouchables

who

despaired of ever

escaping from their centuries of servitude to "clean-caste" overlords, turned to Islam.

Their bold and desperate action, widely publicized by the media, was furiously debated. If all of India's tribals

and untouchables, amounting perhaps to three hundred

million people, were ever to turn

VHP

could be incalculable.

Muslim or

Christian, the dangers to

Hindu Dharm

proponents raised the alarm of "Hinduism in Danger!"

bud and reHindus might become a minority in their own country. The Meenakshipuram Affair became a symbol of the need to generate Hindu solidarity. A huge campaign under the slogan of "Ekamata Yajna" ("Sacrifice for Unity [One Mother]") was and warned

that, unless

conversions were immediately nipped in the

versed,

launched. Great processions were organized to raise

and

for reconversion.

fifty

million rupees for the cause,

The month-long campaign, conducted between mid-November

and mid-December 1983, mobilized meters, the

VHP claimed.

from other

rivers (all

of the campaign was

sixty million people and covered 85,000 kiloUrns of water from the sacred Ganges, mixed with waters

being sacred), were sold to temples along the way. The message clear:

Hinduism was in danger, and no danger was more sinister movement of Muslim and untouchable communi-

than the possibility of a concerted ties

working together.

The next campaign against the "common enemy" was in the north. Few popular symbols possessed more potential for arousing fear, generating hostility, and mobilizing Hindu masses than the "birthplace of Rama" at Ayodhya. The focal point of hostility was the Babri Masjid. This mosque had been built in 1528 with funds contributed by Babur, the first Mughal ruler. Ever since 1853, the site had been an object of contention. In 1859, the government had erected a fence to separate Hindu and Muslim places of worship within the compound. Legal actions by the Mahant in 1885 and 1886 aimed at constructing a temple on the platform. Sporadic attacks and incidents, year by year since 1912, had culminated on the night of 22-23 December 1949: an idol of the Hindu god Lord Rama was installed inside the mosque, riots erupted, and the gates to the disputed premises were locked by the government. In

1955, the Allahabad High Court confirmed a 1951 order from the

civil

judge allow-

Nandan Agarwal had declared: "The continued existence of such a mosque-like structure is galling to the Hindu psyche and a matter of national shame." 18 Further suits by Muslim wacjf (religious endowments) officials asking for removal of the idols failed. The gates remained locked. The time had come, as VHP leaders saw it in the early 1980s, to convert the mosque into a temple: Lord Rama was still "behind bars" and his place for receiving worship not vet purified. In April 1984, the VHP Dharma Sansad meeting at Vidyan ing the idols to remain. Justice Deoki

Bhavan

in

New

Delhi issued a clarion

call

to action.

Another gigantic campaign was

HINDU FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE STRUCTURAL STABILITY OF INDIA 247

to be launched: the Sri

chariot-cavalcade

Ramajanmabhumi Mukti

Vajna. Six

— actually a motorcade of trucks earning

months

behind Bars," accompanied by thousands of dedicated kar sevaks

armed with swords and

givers)

The

cavalcade was

tridents

—

left

on the point of reaching

Gandhi interrupted

huge

later, a

Rama

images of "Lord (official

service

Bihar and slowly approached Ayodhya.

its

destination

when

the assassination of

came to a head. mosque was reversed: the Faizabad district judge, on 1 February, ordered the gates to the mosque to be unlocked and, at the same time, forbade Muslims from using the mosque for pravers. As if the Meenakshipuram and Avodhva confrontations were not enough, the highest judicial tribunal of the land reached a decision in the controversial Shah Bano 19 case. This case, seemingly so trivial on its surface, stirred deep and explosive emotions. In 1978, the Muslim Ahmed Shah had divorced Shah Bano, his wife of fortyfour years, returning her 3,000 rupee (then S300) down- as required by Muslim community law (Shari'a). This was common practice. But then, the crusty old ladv, perhaps instigated by her sons, sued for maintenance. Under section 25 of the CrimiIndira

A

court refusal to

on puja

restrictions

lift

Code,

nal Procedure

progress. Again, early in 1986, matters

its

a magistrate

in the

awarded her onlv 25 rupees per month.

When

a

higher court raised this amount to 180 rupees, her former husband appealed the

matter to the Supreme Court of India.

At

issue

was

a conflict

between substantive and procedural

law.

system of modern India was constructed by European and Indian India

Company

in the

own

(civic

and domestic) customs and laws were

to be respected so long as the general "civic peace"

of the

state

the legal

of the East

1780s, indigenous substance and alien procedure had been

grafted together. Each community's

curity

When

officials

not undermined

(at

was not endangered and the

which point,

as

se-

under the Mughals or am'

previous state regime, the substance of an issue became a criminal matter). But the

procedures for determining

facts in

anv court, whether

form to the hallowed principles of English

law.

civil

or criminal, were to con-

There had, however, also been occa-

community s domestic law, with precedents nineteenth century. Various forms of communal or "domcstic'

sions of intrusion into the substance of a

going back to the early violence (infanticide,

,

human

sacrifice,

the burning of widows, and so forth), for ex-

ample, had been deemed criminal offenses.

The Supreme Court of India, on matters of

a

bench of five judges whose task was to pronounce

law, ruled that the ex-husband

was required to provide support

for a

wife without other means, and raised Shah Bano's award to 500 rupees. Yet, in pro-

nouncing the law

in this case.

Chief Justice Chandrachud went beyond

his authority

and offered an opinion on the meaning of the domestic law of the Muslim community. He declared that the Supreme Court of India's ruling was more in keeping with the Qur'an than were traditional interpretations of the Qur'an (religious scholars), as

time had

come

for

all

found

in the Shari'a.

communities, irrespective of their

customs, to be subject to one

beyond

a

mere

common

judicial interpretation

made by Muslim ulama

Moreover, the chief justice suggested, the

own

particular beliefs or

code. Clearly, his gratuitous remarks

went

of public law.

Muslims of India were not slow to show their distress. Even those Muslims who was time for "•progressive" reforms, and who wanted to see modest advances in

felt it

Robert Eric Frykenberg 248

the rights of Muslim

now going

were

women, were

incensed. If agencies and instruments of the state

to start interfering with matters intrinsic to the internal government

of various communities, something neither the Mughals nor the British had dared

own peril, then surely the social contract between each comwould be weakened, if not negated. The very grounds of loyalty and obligation to India might become null and void. Surely the entire contractual structure of the body politic, as epitomized in constitutional emphasis upon India's secular nature, required more than this. It was one thing to impose a single, uniform and then only

at their

munity and the

state

"law of the land" and quite another, in so doing, to question the accumulated wisdom

of a community's highest religious authorities,

done

The old

alliance

home

minister (Arif Khan) had

between the Congress and orthodox Muslims, members of the

orthodox Jamiyvat-ul-Ulama

now

as the

in parliament.

in

(clerics linked to the

famous scholars of Deoband), was

danger. Moreover, Muslims held nearly 150 out of a

total

of 542

seats in

VHP extremists spoke of eradicating mosques and erecting temples in

parliament.

As

their place,

and

as violence in

Avodhya sparked Hindu-Muslim

riots in

Old

Kashmir, and Gujarat, laments about the serious weakening of the Muslim

Delhi,

commu-

March 1986, a huge rally was held at New Delhi's Boat Club. Ncarlv a half million Muslims gathered to hear fiery declamations, air their grievances, and voice demands for action. The Congress-led government was not slow to get the message. As protests grew louder and more massive. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi reversed himself and, faced with political realities, introduced the Muslim Women's (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill. But this piece of legislation raised another storm. The controversy became remarkable for the careful, penetrating, and sophisticated debate which it evoked. With so much at stake the essentials of the social order undergirding the grew

nity

louder. Late in

political stability

Madhu

of India

— — the public discourse was impressive and wide

ranging.

Kishore, editor of Manushi and the most radical and vocal feminist in India,

saw the sudden concern

for

Muslim women by

upper-class

Hindus

as a

form of con-

descension and contempt for Muslim backwardness. Muslim opponents of the

orthodox and icallv,

when

liberal alike,

the

bill

was

joined to resist

finallv

Hindu

bill,

bigotry and "colonialism." Yet, iron-

passed a year later (on 6

corporated the substance of the Shari'a provisions:

a

May

1987),

it

divorced Muslim

essentially in-

woman would

have no right to support from her ex-husband but should receive support either from her

own

family and relatives or, failing that, from the

waqf (local

tax-free

maintained for charitable or pious purposes). In the meanwhile, the

endowments

imam of Indore

had long since persuaded Shah Bano to withdraw her claim: no individual's opinion had a right to prevail over the accumulated consensus of the community. 20

VI The

politics

five years, from 1987 through 1991, were marked by Hindu fundamentalists on the political structures of the

of the ensuing

increasing pressures from

FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE STRUCTURAL STABILITY OF INDIA

HINDI'

249

state.

the

In the forefront of this

VHP, and

and Shiv Sena

movement have been

the

RSS, with other

also

throwing themselves into the

the interlinked forces of the BJP,

militant groups such as the regional Bajrang Dal

Each element

frav.

sometimes

in this

awkward BJP-VHP-RSS axis (political partv, missionarv agency, and training institution) has had its own part to plav in a concerted bid to take control of the countrv in the name of Hindutva. After Advani became BJP president in 1986, there was a grass-roots effort to generate a massive Hindu backlash in response to the escalating violence in Punjab and Kashmir. With attacks upon Hindus and with Hindu refugees fleeing for their lives, the "communal card" was played more blatantlv than ever. In political campaigns for the general elections of 1989 and 1991, mounting conflicts and violence over the Babri Masjid— Ramjanmabhumi site and over the "multidimensional challenge of Mandalism" became decisive. The symbol used bv the BJP in the 1989 elections was the Rama Shila Puja. This massive campaign, organized bv the VHP and manned bv the RSS cadres, aimed to bring "sacred bricks" (ramslnlas) from every carrying the

Hindu message

that the

Ram

Birth Place) was being constructed. This

and 132 lion)

feet high,

— was to have

city,

town, and

huge temple

— 270

with 34,000 feet of floor space, costing its

village in India, each

Janmasthan Mandir (Temple of Ram's feet long,

fifty-five

sanctum sanctorum where the image of Ram

126

feet

wide,

crores ($5.5 mil-

now stood,

within

months of backroom maneuvering and court action, the Shila Puja On 9-10 November, a ceremonial brick consecration was held and foundations for the temple were dug. The very next day, however, a delay in construction was announced bv the VHP. The general election had been called (for 22-26 November), and a populist National Front manifesto had tacit BJP-VHP-RSS approval. The new government headed by V P. (Vishvanath Pranab) Singh was a fragile coalition of the Janata Dal with extreme left- and right-wing parthe mosque. After

took place on 30 September 1989.

could not survive without BJP support. The BJP, with 86 of 545 seats in the

ties. It

Lok Sabha (making

it

the third largest partv), played a pivotal role but remained

outside the government.

The

BJP's final rupture with

which thev

split

V

P.

Singh came ten months

were Singh's attempt to build a

political base

later.

The

issues

on

out of the alienated,

backward, and excluded communities and his unwillingness to consistently support die

BJP-VHP-RSS (Hindutva)

agitations in

Ayodhya. Singh's announcement on

9 August 1990 that he would implement the Mandal Commission recommendations, reserving

27 percent of

all

government positions

for other

backward

untouchables), alarmed struggling elements within the urban upper action seriously challenged the BJP's position.

lemma

— oppose Mandal and

lose the urban,

most

tried

lose the rural,

The

castes

(OBCs:

class.

Singh's

BJP's Advani faced a major di-

backward poor or endorse Mandal and

upwardly mobile support. His response was to resort to the BJP's

and trusty weapon: Hindutva.

The BJP-VHP-RSS syndicate heated up the Ayodhya controversy as never before. The demolition of the Babri Masjid and construction of the Rama Mandir were announced for 30 October 1990. A giant Rath Tatra would bring this about by force. Larger than ever, processions throughout the "Hindi heartland"

rallied support.

Robert Eric Frykenbcrg 250

Thirty-six organizations under

VHP-RSS

flags sent ranks

1

Ayodhya. As the "grand progress' entered

its final

of volunteers to march on

phase, leaving Bihar and approach-

ing eastern Uttar Pradesh, the government attempted to block the caravan. Uttar Pradesh's chief minister,

Myalayam Singh Yadav, ordered

action. Arrests increased each mile,

and party

thousands injured, and manv

figures, taken into custody,

of the takeover, tens of thousands broke through police

compound, and planted

victorv flags

state security forces into

with nearly 200,000, including BJP legislators

On the dav

killed.

swept into the

barriers,

on top of the mosque's dome. The

site's

police, retali-

ating with rubber bullets and tear gas, eventually drove the militants away.

But public

confidence was severely shaken by a "crisis of near unmanageable dimensions, the dreadful fall-out of which [would] affect not just the leadership of the country but the very well-being and stability of the nation." 21 Singh's

uncompromising stand on the

issue precipitated his downfall.

had Advani been arrested (on 23 October) than the BJP withdrew Singh.

The BJP, VHP, and RSS now

refused to have anything to

its

No

sooner

support of

do with him. Some-

one had to be chosen to defuse the increasingly dangerous situation and to explosive forces before matters got completelv out of hand. leaders offered to support a

breakaway group, minus V.

renamed themselves the Janata Dal gress this

Their leader,

(I).

sands brought

down

this

was only

(I)

MPs

MPs of the Con-

a

new government. But

a question

of time before shifting

Chandra Shekar, was asked to form It

quell

Congress

Singh, a group of 60

and crossed over to join 211

(S)

arrangement also was too unstable.

political

P.

When

shaky coalition. Chandra Shekar resigned on

7 March 1991. Soon thereafter the president of India dissolved parliament and called for a

midterm general

election.

The time had come, at last, for Hindu fundamentalism BJP was to have its opportunity to take control,

If ever the

of "Lord

Ram

proclaimed their

it

trail,

Delhi on 4 April 1991, and the

RSS

the

workers

"Ram, Bread, and

"OBC" and

VHP

national move.

A half million

and RSS publicly

name of Hindutva and Ram Mandir. Along set

up thousands of banners and

base bevond the

Justice!"

and

large

numbers of seat

"Harijan" candidates. Concerned about

"cow

belt"

its

posters,

rallies.

tickets

BJP were

need to expand

its

of the Hindi heartland, BJP volunteers went into the

south, contesting parliamentary seats and seeking support. Playing that voters

its

was now. Pictures

giving out water, provided jeeps and cars, and organized

slogans called for

given to

New

full participation, in

Advani's campaign stalls

make

surelv

behind Bars" again symbolized the campaign message.

supporters gathered in

manned

to

up

polls

showing

were fed up with corruption and petty squabbles, BJP billboards

cried:

At the same time, knowing that the violence at Avodhva in October had frightened the whole country, the BJP toned down its rhetoric of Hindutva. Emphasizing the unifving role of "Hindu nationalism" as superior to a 'bogus pscudosecularism," the BJP accused the Congress of currying the favor of "minorities," especially Muslims, as exemplified in the Muslim

"You have

tested everyone. Give us a chance too!!"

Women's Bill. The 1991 elections were conducted, however, sassination of Rajiv

over the

state.

Gandhi (by Tamil

Once more,

as in the

in the

ominous shadow of the asBJP failed to gain power

militants). Again, the

post-Emergencv

poll, voters across the

land

HINDU FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE STRUCTURAL STABILITY OF INDIA 251

showed

remarkable caution, restraint, and practical

a

was able to win

a clear majority:

Dal, 55. While the Congress

Congress

common

won 225

"Old Guard,"

led

sense.

by

P.

V.

No

single party

BJP, 115; and Janata

seats; the

Narasimha Rao, cobbled

together another coalition government, however, the BJP's base in the Hindi heartland and Gujarat expanded (at the expense of the Janata Dal), giving the partv 33

more

and 8.5 percent more votes than

seats

More than that, the BJP gained Madhya Pradesh, Himachel Pradesh,

1989.

in

control of state governments in Uttar Pradesh,

and Rajasthan. Clearly, with cohesive

the

VHP

and disciplined cadre organization and with support from

and RSS organizations, the BJP

at this

is

writing (mid- 1992) in a stronger

must prove itself worthv, however, to moderate or "common" voters if it is to be awarded worthy custodv of the structural stability of the state. The inability to project an image of political moderation was a factor inhibiting BJP popuposition than ever. It

larity in late

VHP,

1991

When,

polls.

November, the extremely

in

wing of the some of its

militant

the Bajrang Dal, stormed the Babri Masjid and began to demolish

rooms,

this

image was damaged. This defiance on the part of BJP leadership, resulting

in the arrest

of more than three hundred

came when the Uttar Pradesh

activists,

government, under BJP chief minister Kalavan Singh, dragged

a court

its feet:

forbade the government to turn over three acres at the disputed

site

order

to anv private

group and forbade any new construction thereon. This quarrel within the BJP "family" served to demonstrate that the fiery tonic of Hindutva is potent but can be diluted by inner talism and

its

Quite

strife.

influence

upon

clearly, the last

chapter in the saga of Hindu fundamen-

India's political structures has vet to

be written.

VII

The presence of Hindu fundamentalism

RSS

"family," entails a contradiction

in India, as

between

these fundamentalists that the concepts

reality

epitomized bv the BJP-VHP-

and

rhetoric. 22

"Hindu" and "Indian"

interchangeable, and that "Hindutva" alone encompasses political, social

to the original

or cultural

—

lies at

all

is

(i.e.,

and "not native to India,"

To

customs

to insist

"lawless";

one sense

and mlecbcha: "barbarian")

in

are

on holding

which do not or Vedic norms) are

upon something which, on

not possible. By such reasoning, hundreds of millions of peoples

{adivasis: aboriginal natives) in

religious or

in India

Brahmanic, Puranic, Sanskritic, is

—

insist

of India" or "Hindustani," 23 and to ad-

as "native

religious associations, beliefs, or

adopt the norms of Hindutva "alien"

matters

all

the heart of this contradiction.

meaning of "Hindu"

vance the view that

are

The insistence of synonymous and

its

who

non-Hindus (adharma:

very face,

are

Hindus

"irreligious" or

another sense. In this regard dogmatic and

exclusivistic inflexibility belies claims to eclectic

or svneretistic tolerance.

The

reli-

gious definition of "Hindu" excludes any culture or group in India whose "religious" ("dharmic") positions are not properly "Hindutva," as defined bv Sanskritic norms.

The

political strategy

of Hindu fundamentalism's "majoritarian appeal"

lation that has paid dividends in a time

of economic and communal

accounts for the considerable influence of the

BJP-VHS-RSS

is

a calcu-

crisis: it largely

contingent in electoral

Robert Eric Frykenberg ' 252

1980s and early 1990s. By

politics in the

touchable communities and citizens

this strategy India's native

Muslims, Chris-

Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, and numberless other communities

tians, Sikhs,

of India.

Of

millions, have lived

on

cannot be counted

tribal peoples)

un-

(e.g.,

as loyal

and true

course these "non-Hindus," numbering in the hundreds of the subcontinent and have

become

a part

of its general culture,

even though, bv dint of birth, they have been seen as impure, inferior, or subject. Majoritarian politics, as exploited by the suffering,

system

is

and tragedv.

No

at stake in the current

If we ask

what

is

new about

BJP-VHS-RSS,

the type of influence exerted by

BJP-RSS-VHP upon

can see what

as

happening cither

and obligations between communities, or

servience of

all

communities to the

will

Hindu fundamental-

India's structural stability,

new

an attempt to forge a

for loyalties

intimidation, and terror.

thus a recipe for division,

debate about India's "destiny."

ism or about the impact of the is

is

than the future structural stability of the political

less

as

we

contractual framework

an attempt to impose sub-

of one powerful minority bv means of force,

The BJP-RSS-VHP

on

position

caste

and untouchability

The promise contained in the provisions of the Mandala Commission recommendations would have given "affirmative action" openings to the backward and lowest communities. The consequence of V. P. Singh's support of these recommendations was, as we have seen, an suggests that the latter interpretation

is

closer to the mark.

outburst of indignation from upwardly mobile, urban, and middle class communities

from the "high born" old

elites.

After violent demonstrations in which

offspring immolated themselves, these elites turned to the

them

sustain the traditional places of their

stratas

was

of the traditional

filled

social structure

of each region. The "fundamentalist message"

conversion into a religion whose worldview

who might

to help

communities within the upper ranks and

with menace for anv untouchables

Islam) and for any people

some of their

BJP-RSS-VHP

who might is

more

strive to

have the temerity to opt for

egalitarian (e.g., Christianity or

implement the recommendations of

Mandala Commission. But the message was often conveyed in a pious rhetoric is a "proper" place within "Hindutva" for all whose birth is rooted

the

implying that there

to the sacred earth of India.

The turmoil

at

Avodhva brought down

the

government of Singh. But

not have happened had the government been strong

in the first place.

this

might

However, be-

cause corruption weakened the inner machinery of the once powerful Congress partv

— the Congress party

itself had violated

the "logic of power" bv which structures

of lovalty and obligation are forged within India dynasty" that

it

once was (when

new, dvnamic, and shrewd

what the Companv will

did,

it

—

it

has ceased to be the "corporate

took control of India from the

British). Until

and what the early Congress did, structural

Constitution

— the Rule of Law. But

if this

may be

structure of laws

is

now

did,

stability in India

be in jeopardy. All that stands between India and chaotic disintegration

violated, not just in letter but in spirit,

some

comes along who can do what Akbar

political leader

is

the

to be increasingly

one can only begin to imagine how frightening

the future of communal (and religious)

strife. It

may simply

hasten the tearing

apart of the body-politic.

To many

in India, the

BJP-RSS-VHP

position and influence has been disruptive

— HINDU FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE STRUCTURAL STABILITY OF INDIA 253

of everything which has provided balance and security to the

political system.

Bv

its

appeal to "Hindutva," to "one nation," to "religion" over "secularity," and to "majority

community" dominance, Hindu fundamentalism

fensive reaction in the

name

of "fundamentals."

It is a

is

more than a militantlv depower which, bv

raw bid for

breaking the delicate balance of contractual support for the political system, risks the destruction of India

While

this

itself.

kind of action

may not be unprecedented,

munalism being unleashed bv the BJP-RSS-VHP

axis

the massive scale of

most

certainly

com-

Moreover,

is.

because of this scale of action and of rhetoric released through technologies of

mass communication (both through the public media and through the private

sale

and distribution of audio- and video-cassettes), defensive reactions have come from all

communities

(religious, ethnic, or regional)

which

government-supported and taxpayer-subsidized propaganda

A

threatened.

feel

blitz

occurred

massive

when

the

"Hindutva" worldview imbedded within the Sundav-morning "soap-opera" produc-

two popular epics, the Ramayana and then the Mahabharata, was broadweek after week. This troubled non-Hindutva communities in India, for it hardly seemed to be the impartial action of a government committed to maintaining a delitions of the cast

cate balance

between many communities.

depend upon which constituencies

Election strategies will continue to

are being

may be expected to play well, which communal feelings can be

courted. In the Hindi Heartland, fundamentalism

es-

pecially in Bihar or Gujarat or other places in

in-

flamed. In Assam, Kashmir, and Punjab, however, this rhetoric

is

a recipe for disaster,

insurgency, and terrorism. Indeed, competitive forms of fundamentalism have been

evoked by and are nourished by Hindu fundamentalism. Sikh fundamentalism

in

Punjab has led to the struggle for an independent Khalistan; Muslim fundamentalism in

Kashmir,

after

long provocation, has led to the driving out of Kashmir of the

Brahman and other Hindu communities from ism

in

South India or

Communal

in

its

valley;

and Christian fundamental-

Nagaland, while not yet strident, has also come into being.

troubles evoked between clashing

Hindu-Muslim fundamentalisms have

brought an escalating chain of increasingly violent and widespread past

dozen

years.

two hundred

Should any single fundamentalism ever succeed

million people

"Hindutva" for so long, the dictable.

The

who

results

riots

during the

in galvanizing the

have been counted as "untouchable" rather than

would be

as

tumultuous

as they

structures of India, like spokes of contractual loyalty

gation between communities, need to be balanced

if

the

would be unpreand mutual

Wheel of State

is

obli-

to remain

strong.

Notes 1.

Thus, bv tradition, to accuse any per-

person's integrity and sense of worth.

— that

son, whether prince or peasant, of "namak-

so "publicly"

baram.T (of being

of others, especially

"false-to-salt," in

breach

of contract, or disloval) was to question that

bles

and notables

is

To do

to say, in the presence

in the presence

who were

of nota-

"strangers"

Robert Eric Frykenberg '

254

was to inflict mortal insult, disgrace, and shame ("loss of face") not only upon an in-

upon his family, his caste, community or religion. Yet, conto acclaim any person or community

Ram

dividual but also

and

his

versely,

and practicing "namak-hallalF was to offer praise and tribute, if not worship, to truth, integrity, and lovaltv. as possessing

Romila Thapar, "Imagine Religious Communities? Ancient History and the Modern Search for Hindu Identity," Modern 2.

Asian Studies 23, no. 2 (1989): 229. 3.

Romila Thapar, "Historical

Ramjilal,

in

India

—A

ed..

Communal

Symposium

Realities,"

Problems

(Gvvalior,

in

1988),

'

82-83.

pp.

4. Max Muller, Sacred Books of the East (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). 5.

The

first

glimmers of

tliis

catalytic re-

action can be seen in the 1820s, with the

appearance of the Vibuthi Sangam (Ashes Society)

Veda

the Chatur

Tirunelveli,

in

Siddhanta Sabha (or Salav Street Society) of rise

of

Raja

Ram Mohan

Ron's

Brahmo Samaj

(a

reform movement strongly influenced by Christian thought) and Ranade's Prarthana

Samaj, came

much more

Davanand

— the

Swami

and the Nagari Pra-

Sarasvvati

Here

7.

is

threats

from an alien, hostile, modernist, world which are seen to be in-

herently contradictory

found

in a literal

or

genomes and cosmic sounds of Brahma (stemming from the Rig Veda, as conveyed from the mouths of sages or prophets). See Walter K. Andersen and Sri-

dhar D. Damle, The Brotherhood

1987),

p.

76.

For the anatomy of conversion, see Robert E. Frvkenberg, "On the Study of Conversion Movements: A Review Article 8.

and

a

Research Note," Indian Economic and

Revinv

History

Social

10.

Mahadev Sadashiv Golwalkar,

Our

or

Bharat pp.

Nationhood

Prakashan,

Defined

ist"

movements and

campaigns

in

militant anti-cow-killing

Bengal,

Maharashtra,

and

Punjab. By then, in the name of swaraj, some adherents of these movements were

6.

For those who,

all

along,

felt

that the

Hindu Mahasabha was not "orthodox" enough or who felt offended by the reformist

appeals of the

Ana

Samaj, there was the

edition),

Godse felt that Gandhi had insulted Hindu Nation, weakened it by advocatalnmsa, and, bv his fasts, catered to Mus-

11.

lim

Andersen

fanatics.

12.

p.

and Damle,

The

51 (from a 1969

Godse by Damle.)

Mvron Weiner,

Party

Politics in

India:

The Development of a Multi-Party System (Princeton: 1957), pp. 13.

ism

190-94 (164-

).

Bruce D. Graham, Hindu NationalPolitics: The Origin and De-

and Indian

of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

velopment

1990), 14.

turning to terrorism.

1947

1939,

We,

(Nagpur:

55-56.

interview with Gopal

radical "revival-

(Janu-

Andersen and Damle, The Brotherhood

9.

of law. These movements, along with the

more

1

in Saffron, p. 35.

Brotherhood in Saffron,

turn set the stage for

no.

18,

ary-March 1980): 121-38.

"public" discourse, but especially in courts

Ramakrishna Society, led bv Swami Viveand the Theosophical Society, founded bv Europeans but energized by Brahmin pandits of Advar and Mvlapore, in

in Saffron:

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sandb and Hindu Revivalism (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press,

ing

kananda,

of

im-

text,

printed in

being a militant

latter

to replace

"the Truth" as

an inerrant body of scriptural

Urdu with Hindi (and Perso- Arabic with Deva Nagari script) in all

Sabha

movement

to

strict interpretation

the

charini

and militant reaction

a radical

secularistic

aggressive move-

ments, such as the Arva Samaj of

or, later on, the

Rajya Parishad (RRP).

to certain elements of change and perceived

Madras, and the Dharma Sabha of Bengal. Later in the century, long after the

Dharm Sabha

Sanathana

sar:

p.

256.

Mark

Mrs.

Tullv and Satish Jacob, AmritGandhis East Battle (London:

Cape, 1985), 15. Atul tent: India's

p. 50.

Kohli, Democracy'

Growing

Crisis

and Discon-

of Government

HINDU FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE STRUCTURAL STABILITY OF INDIA 255

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990),

p. 4.

Ashgar Ali Engineer, "Lok Sabha Elections and Communalism in Politics," Economic and Political Weekly, 6-13 Julv 1991, p. 1649; idem, 'The Causes of Com16.

munal Riots

in the Post- Partition

India," in Engineer, ed.. Post -Independence India

Books, Delhi

in

1984),

Grip of

nomic and pp.

pp.

I

Communal Riots in Hvderbad Sangam :

33-41; idem, "Old

Communal

Political

Period in

Weekly,

Frenzy," Eco-

27 June 1987,

ed. Anatomy of a Confrontation: The Balm Masjid-Ramjanmabhuuu Issue (New Delhi:

Viking Penguin], 1990), |

19.

Engineer,

Communal

p. 59.

"Old Delhi

in

Grip of

Frenzv."

20. Ainslee T. Embrcc, Utopias in Con-

and Nationalism

Modern In-

flict:

Religion

dia

Berkeley: University of California Press,

(

in

1990), pp. 93-110. 21. India Today, 15

22. Brass,

The

November 1990.

Politics

of India,

pp.

16-17.

1649-52. 23. Robert Eric Frvkenberg,

17. Paul since

R. Brass, The

Politics

of India

Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1990). The New Cambridge History of India, vol. 4, no.

1,

pp. 16-17.

18. A. G. Xoorani, in Sarvepalli Gopal,

gence of Modern Hinduism

and

as

an Institution,"

theimer and

Hermann

in

30-33.

Giinther D. Son-

Kulke, eds., Hindu-

ism Reconsidered (Delhi:

pp.

"The EmerConcept

as a

Manohar, 1989),

CHAPTER 12

Sikh Fundamentalism: Translating History

Theory

into

Harjot Oberoi There

exists a scholastic

sees as real

and academic

historico-political

outlook which

and worthwhile onlv such movements of revolt

hundred per cent conscious,

movements

i.e.,

as are

one

governed bv plans

that are

worked out in advance to the last detail or in line with abstract theorv. But reality produces a wealth of most bizarre combinations. It is up to the theoretician to unravel these in order to discover fresh his theorv, to "translate" into theoretical

of historical

proof of

language the elements

life.

Antonio Gramsci, Prison Note Books

Meanings

— whether embodied

products of labor,

in actions, institutions,

words, networks of cooperation, or documents

— can be made

only from the inside. Symbolically prestructured reality

that

is

hermeticallv sealed to the view of observers incapable of commu-

nicating; that

lifeworld

speak and

is

is, it

would have

open to onlv

act.

They gain

to remain incomprehensible to them.

subjects access to

who make it

members Jiirgen

The

use of their competence to

by participating,

the communication of members and thus

at least virtually, in

becoming

at least potential

themselves.

Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action

.F undamentalism primarily a

accessible

forms a universe

movement of resistance. While Sikh

among

the Sikhs today

is

fundamentalists certainly envision a

separate nation-state in the Indian subcontinent, in the last decade

energies have been spent in assailing and battling the Indian

state.

much of

Denied

their

political

authority and engaged in constant struggle for survival and legitimacy, Sikh fundamentalists have not succeeded in articulating their vision of the world in any great detail.

This lack of an elaborate model, say on the

world should look

like

is

lines

of Iranian

closely tied to the social origins

majority of them come from the countryside and would be social anthropologists. Historically, peasants

have not been

clerics,

of Sikh

of what the

activists.

A

great

classified as peasants

known

to

by

come up with

grand paradigms of social transformation. Peasant societies are by definition made up

of

little

communities, and their cosmos

To speak of Sikh fundamentalism and

is

its

256

invariably parochial rather than universal.

impact

is

to enter a universe that until re-

SIKH FUN DA MENTAL. ISM 257

centlv

was

largely characterized

by marginality, incoherence, and disorder. But

comforting epigraph from Antonio Gramsci suggests,

it is

what appears to be bizarre and meaningless into

"translate"

as the

for the social scientist to "historical life"

and

theory.

In the present context any efforts to grapple with the raw

be considerably shaped by

and embryonic universe

how we

define and deploy the

of Sikh fundamentalism

will

term fundamentalism.

use the term not out of any ethnocentrism or

I

standing of the historical specificities that

made

it

The current debate surrounding

turn of the century. 1

of under-

lack,

current in the United States at the the term fundamentalism

is

hardly unique in the conceptual history of social sciences. In the past there have been similar discussions regarding the cross-cultural applicability

of terms

feudalism,

like

millenarianism, religion, class, state, madness, and so on. Interestingly, the arguments

proffered in defense or rejection have not been dissimilar to the recent intellectual

exchanges surrounding the term fundamentalism. Those keen on defending these terms have often argued that there was

we did not

common

possess a

little

scope for cross-cultural comparisons

pool of conceptual yocabulary. Others opposed to the

enterprise retorted that the history of the

world should not be inscribed

the Euro- American experience alone, for in doing so

terms of

yocabulary, and

keenly aware of how loaded and tainted the term fundamentalism can be,

my

in

one would further enhance the

hegemony of Euro-American intellectual discourse. With this background to the contested nature of our conceptual to defend

if

would

I

usage of the term Sikh fundamentalism on three grounds.

like

First, in the

Punjabi word mulvad, Sikhs possess a term that exactly corresponds to fundamental-

ism and stands

in stark

opposition to adharma, a Punjabi word for secularism. Al-

though the term mulvad

is

of recent coinage, resulting from the need to have

a

Punjabi counterpart to fundamentalism, Sikh journalists, essayists, and politicians, in discussing contemporary religious and political movements,

now

constantly use the

term mulvad, connoting a polity and society organized on the basis of religious (particularly scriptural) authority. 2

that non-Christian religious

no such equivalent

in their

Thus,

in the

Sikh case the

commonly voiced

groups to which the term fundamentalism

own

is

objection,

applied have

lexicon, does not fully hold.

Second, there arc strong cultural reasons for adopting the term "Sikh fundamentalism."

Much

like

Protestant church groups in the United States that at the turn of

the centurv insisted

on the inerrancy of the Bible and opposed liberal theology, Sikh no patience for hcrmeneutic or critical readings of Sikh scrip-

fundamentalists have tures.

Their scriptural absolutism precludes any secular or rational interpretation of

what they consider to be of Sikh studies

in

a revealed text.

K.

S.

Chandigarh, notes: "Nobody

Mann,

who

a secretary

the Sikhs, should take liberties to indulge in exercises with the 3 [the Sikh scripture], literary or otherwise." Similarly, a recent

group of Sikh

civil

who

of Sikh history and sacred

texts. 4 It is their

can strengthen the faith and espouse

study Sikhism. Daljeet Singh, a Sikh writer

Institute

Guru Granth Sahib book written by a

servants questions the use of Western historiography

analysis for the study

those scholars

of the

has any regard for feelings of

its

and

textual

firm belief that only

"fundamentals" should

who for many years

has opposed the study

Harjot Oberoi 258

of Sikh religion and historv within the academy, protests: "From the point of view of the

men of religion,

and inadequate

such studies would be limited

as a

study of

and empirical

his spiritual

are

life."

in the totality

On

relent or face elimination.

practice

22 February 1984,

was gunned down outside Amritsar. His main

More

interpretation of Sikh theology and tradition.

was

fault

his

and

nity should be guided divinely in

matters and this divine direction

from the Sikh

scripture,

which

critical textual analysis

and

historicity

plurality

is

all

Sikh

journalists. Theoretically, the

perceived as normative for

independent-

recent targets have been

university professors, poets, artists,

A

of

Singh, the thirty-one-vear-old editor of Punjab's oldest literary journal,

Preet-Larbi,

minded

i.e.,

5

under constant pressure to

Summet

in their scope, partial in their vision

of his being and functioning,

among the Sikhs is under attack, and those who dare to

Critical scholarship it

man

all

is

commucome

seen to

time and in

all

places.

of the Sikh scriptures that may introduce an element of

of interpretations, thus undermining scripturalism, would

certainly be construed as an affront

Singh Bhindranwale (1947-84),

— one that would bring quick retribution. key figure in the

a

Jarnail

of Sikh fundamentalism,

rise

repeatedly reminded his audience that they should not tolerate any form of insult

toward the Sikh scriptures and kill

who

an individual

that,

where required, Sikhs were morally obliged to

dared to show disrespect toward the holy book.

Third, the current Sikh movement, as will manifests

manv

become apparent

in this chapter,

amply

tendencies like millenarianism, a prophetic vision, puritanism, and

antipluralism, trends that have been

these three reasons

—

commonly

linguistic, cultural,

associated with fundamentalism. 6 For

and associative

—

think

I

we

are justified in

speaking and thinking in terms of Sikh fundamentalism.

Having

I

must

Sikh fundamentalism.

It is

said this,

stress that in Foucault's

an episteme that

is

terms there

still

is

no archaeology

making, and

in the

its

canon,

ideology, objectives, and practices are being gradually defined. In this sense, for

those here

who

are interested in fundamentalism, the Sikh case

we can

clearly see

how

a

Given

its

Sikh fundamentalism has been staggering. In

and nationalism but

a

all

of particular value, for

group of fundamentalists invent and reproduce them-

selves in the late twentieth centurv.

not only established

is

to

relatively recent origins, the success less

of

than a decade Sikh fundamentalists

multitude of relationships with ethnicity, political economy,

also eventually

tually varied conditions.

came to encompass

To speak of

these materially and concep-

Sikh fundamentalism

simultaneously issues of Sikh identity, the

crisis

is

therefore to address

of agrarian development,

class an-

tagonisms, and the process of state formation in India, including popular resistance to this process. All this can be phrased in another way:

the Sikh population consider

the universe they

live in,

who

they are,

how

When

to live

the answers flow out of what

Why

and ideology of fundamentalism.

is

and

today large segments of

die,

and

how to

may be termed

this discourse so attractive

construct

the discourse

and powerful?

What does this cultural innovation promise? I grapple with these issues in this chapter. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first examines the background of Sikh fundamentalism. What shapes it? While probing the political, religious, and structural conjunctures of fundamentalism,

I

simultaneously seek a social profile of individuals,

SIKH FUNDAMENTALISM 259

mentalist

As Bruce Lawrence work on comparative fundamentalism, "There is no fundamovement apart from it constituent members."" Having looked at the theo-

reticians

and practitioners of Sikh fundamentalism,

organizations, and support groups that arc called fundamentalist.

observes in his seminal

setting

of the

Damdami

Taksal,

particularlv in the institutional

turn in the second part to the vision of Sikh funda-

I

two themes: the demand for a new personal law for the Sikhs, and the famous Anandpur Sahib resolution a document that mav be considered the magna carta of Sikh activists. Bv addressing these two themes we get a glimpse of the world in which Sikh fundamentalists want to live. 8 mentalists.

Here

I

address

—

The Background Despite the powerful normative notion of a Sikh collectivity, popularlv

known

in the

Punjabi language bv the term panth, Sikhs are not a monolithic religious community.

Much

like

other religious communities, the Sikhs are divided bv geography, ethnicity,

social hierarchy, sects,

when

it

comes to

political partv.

ritual

practices,

and individual preferences. Consequently,

political participation, Sikhs

Thev have always opted

for a

have never been represented bv a single

wide variety of political platforms, rang-

ing from archconservative to ultraradical.

The

first

explicitly Sikh political party

— the Central Sikh League — was formally

December 1919. Before the end of the following year the two new organizations: the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak

established in Amritsar in

Sikhs had founded

Committee (henceforth SGPC) and the Shiromani Akali Dal (henceforth Akali While the former was technically only supposed to administer major Sikh soon turned into an arena within which to wage prestige

and patronage.

Its

political battles

offshoot, the Akali Dal, initially

Dal).

shrines,

and to garner

it

social

body to coparty. By actively

formed

ordinate Sikh religious volunteers, gradually matured as a political

as a

participating in the anticolonial nationalist struggle, the Akali Dal gained pan-Indian

recognition.

Mahatma Gandhi, impressed by

congratulated them for winning the

dom. 9 Although the growing

first

the nonviolent agitation of the Akalis,

decisive battle in India's struggle for free-

political influence

of the Akalis was often challenged by

the Central Sikh League, several breakaway groups, and newly founded Sikh political parties,

by the 1940s the Akalis had succeeded

Sikhs. 10

Master Tara Singh (1885-1967), an Akali Dal

in establishing their

leader,

spokesman of the Sikhs and formulated Sikh positions on

hegemony among

emerged

a variety

of

as the chief

issues like In-

World War II, the demand of the Muslim League for a separate state of Pakistan, and the constitutional parleys when the British decided to pull out of India. When in 1947 the colonial government decided to partition the subcontidia's participation in

nent, the Akalis aligned themselves with the Indian National Congress.

Thus emerged

East Punjab, an entity that was to crystallize into the province of Punjab, one of the twenty-five states of India.

In the euphoria of independence its

historic usefulness

and that

it

many Akalis decided

that their party

had outlived

should merge with the Congress, India's national

Harjot Oberoi 260

part}'.

However, the merger did not secure every Akali Dal member

The Congress had Akalis with

its

own

a place in the sun.

constituency and could not provide the

that they aspired to in terms

all

many

pointed,

to take care of

of

policies

and

political

power. Disap-

Akali Dal leaders, never shv of hyperbole, incessantly inquired: "The

Hindus got Hindustan [out of independence], the Muslims got Pakistan [out of parwhat did the Sikhs get [out of independence or the partition]?" 11

tition],

One dominant

response was the

call

to set

up

a

"Punjabi Suba," a state within the

Indian republic where the Punjabi-speaking Sikh population would be a majority.

The

story of

position

is

how

the Punjabi Suba was finally attained in

known

too well

to be repeated here. 12

1966 despite massive op-

What must be noted

is

that the

establishment of the Punjabi Suba completely transformed the religious demography

of the Punjab. Overnight, due to

a redistribution

of territories, the Sikhs turned from

a minority into a majority in the Punjab. In the older, larger

1966, compared to a 63.7 percent

Hindu majority the

Punjab from 1947 to

Sikhs constituted only 33.3 per-

The new state of Punjab reversed the older equations. Now 44 percent of the population, became a minority and the Sikhs a majority' with 54 percent of the population of the new state. The Akalis never had it so good. With such a large Sikh electoral base, Akali strategists thought political power was going to be theirs for the asking. After all, they had been the "natural" cent of the population. the Hindus, with

political party

of the Sikhs since the 1920s. In their reading they had always tried to

now

secure the interests of the panth;

it

was time

for the panth to reward them.

Master Tara Singh's oft-repeated claim that "Sikhs were either

seemed to have rulers

a ring

of truth to

The

it.

rulers or rebels"

now

Sikhs were going to crown the Akalis as the

of the new Punjab.

Unfortunatelv for the Akali Dal, rcalpolitik proved to be different from the theory

of politics. The Congress

was not about to

let

the national capital,

party,

New

away with the province. Punjab was too

Delhi, and invariably what happened

impact on the neighboring

From 1967

which had governed the Punjab since independence,

the Akalis walk

to 1990, a total

close to

in the province had an

of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, and Rajasthan.

states

of twenty-three

years, an Akali-led

government ruled the

province roughly for one-third of the time (approximately eight years and two

months). For the other gress or put

under president's

nance by the Congress, since policies

rule.

it

This

was the

in practice

tually to First,

empower

all

this to

March 1980,

in the province.

understand the

to unfettered gover-

and

it

decided on

Two other

all

the

brief obser-

political process that

was even-

Sikh fundamentalists in the Punjab.

an Akali-led government

for only a year

amounted

federal ruling party,

and key administrative appointments

vations need to be added to

gress.

Punjab was either ruled directly by the Con-

fifteen years the

and four months.

1

in the '

The

Punjab could stay Akalis' best tenure

in

power on an average

was from June 1977 to

two and a half years. This pales in comparison to the Con1977 the Congress, under its leader Giani Zail Singh, enjoyed

a little over

From 1972

to

uninterrupted control oxer the

state.

This solid performance bv

a

non-Sikh

political

party in a Sikh majority state naturally did not enhance the Akali reputation. Second, the Akalis have never secured

more than 38.5 percent of the

total vote,

whereas the

SIKH FUNDAMENTALISM 261

Congress

tally in

some Sikhs into a

the post-

1967 period has been

as

high as 45.2 percent. Clearly, for

the Akalis had badly failed in translating the Sikh

permanent

political

power

demography of Punjab

for Sikhs. In their eyes the democratic option

had

only further weakened Sikhs, by making them susceptible to factionalism, political manipulation, and extended rule by the Congress.

when an

Akali government ruled the Punjab,

it

A

further complaint

failed to

was that eyen

advance Sikh religious

inter-

because the Akalis almost always had alliances with other political parties, par-

ests,

Jam Sangh, an overtly Hindu political party. A position of compromise and consensus among the Akalis was for some a sure sign of political failure. Disilluticularly the

sioned and angered, some Sikhs were ready to teach the Akalis a few political lessons.

kingdom of their own in the early nineteenth century and acumen could be once again put to use. The first sign of this came in April 1978, when a group of young Sikh men assembled in Chandigarh and founded After

all,

the Sikhs had a

this historical

theDalKhalsa. 14 founding of the new body by claiming duped the Sikhs in the name of secularism, that had happened since India had attained its independence in 1947 was the further extension of "Hindu imperialism" and the enslave-

The founders of the Dal Khalsa that the

when

government of India had

actually

from the

all

British

Sikhs. 15 In support

ment of

of

justified the

cleverly

this thesis

Dal Khalsa

activists

pointed to a series of

abuses: Sikhs were not allowed to freely practice their religion, the sanctity of their

holy places had been often violated, Akali governments in the Punjab were never

allowed to

last for

the period of their constitutional term, and Sikhs were being eco-

nomically discriminated against by the federal government, particularly

employment and budget

allocations. Harjinder

Singh Dilgeer,

a

in areas

the Dal Khalsa, writes:

It is

merely in name that the Akali Dal formed the provincial government

in

1967 and 1978. In reality the conditions of the Sikhs were getting worse day by day. Sikhs were being discriminated against on every front: religious, political, and economic. Schemes were being devised to destroy Sikh heritage and culture. Every opponent and enemy of the Sikh community received patronage from the Hindus. Everything that would have favored the Sikhs was forcefully opposed by the Hindus. Surprisingly, the Hindus were willing to see improvements in Russia or China, but not so for the Sikhs. When it came to the Sikhs, the Hindus keenly awaited their eventual destruction. Much like the Sikhs, the Punjab province, too, was discriminated against because it was a Sikh majority state. Punjab was denied its capital, the Punjab several times between

Chandigarh, and other Punjabi-speaking areas that duly belonged to plants belonging to the province

were seized by the Congress-led

it.

Power

federal gov-

moratorium on industrial development in the mechanism ensured that everything produced in Punjab sold for less and everything produced outside the province sold for more. The recruitment of Punjabis into the army was reduced, and similarly a concerted effort was made to reduce the proportion of Punjabi speakers in Punjab ernment. There state.

The

exists a virtual

price control

of

founding member of

Harjot Oberoi 262

by sending

in large

used Punjab

numbers of Hindu migrants. ... In short, Hindu India was done not for anv profound reasons but

like a colony. All this

simply because Punjab

is

a Sikh-majoritv state. 16

For the Dal Khalsa there was from the beginning only one solution to right wrongs, imagined or

real:

was to be

tan." This state

all

the establishment of a sovereign Sikh state called "Khalis-

a "final solution" for

all

the political, economic, and religious

problems affecting the Sikhs. Except for a few quixotic vouth bodies, there were not

many Sikhs who wanted to buv into the Dal Khalsa's final solution. This mav have dawned on the Dal Khalsa leadership when all twentv of its candidates lost badlv in the 1979 SGPC elections. The SGPC had alwavs been considered the first grand step toward power among the Sikhs. What rankled the Dal Khalsa most was the fact that the Akali Dal

it

so badlv detested

house of the SGPC.

who had

17

The

won 133

Akali Dai's

out of 140 seats

hegemony over

out to teach the Akalis a few

set

contested for the general

it

SGPC

the

was

Those

secure.

demonstrated that they

political lessons

themselves needed some.

While the Dal Khalsa came to contest the Akali Dai's power over the Sikhs from a largelv political-secular context,

humble the Akalis on

another body, the

religious grounds.

miserable a failure as the Dal Khalsa, tants elected. Its

it

Damdami

Taksal, sought to

Although the Damdami Taksal was not

succeeded

in getting

onlv four of

most prominent candidate, Bhai Amrik Singh, who was

future to plav a significant role in the politics

of the Sikhs,

as

contes-

its

in the near

lost to a leader

of the

Akalis.

The spring of 1979 was

a

moment of

attained a resounding success in the

been governing federal

in the

Punjab and

government. But

it

took

at last

less

pride for the Akalis.

SGPC

Not onlv had

elections, but for the past year thev

two of their members were

they

had

ministers in the

than a year for this sweet success to turn

bitter.

power at the federal Akali Dal government in the Punjab.

In earlv 1980 the people of India voted Mrs. Gandhi back to level,

and soon thereafter she dismissed the

When new elections were called in the state,

the Akalis lost to Mrs. Gandhi's Congress

partv. This dramatic reversal in Akali Dai's political fortunes

serious blow. its

The Damdami

Taksal was

old foe, the Akali Dal, and

tested

members of the

its

leaders

on its path to power and by mid- 1983 it had on their knees. Month after month, old and

Akali Dal were deserting their part}' to swell the ranks of Jarnail

Singh Bhindranwale, the charismatic leader of the ers are

still

trving to solve this puzzle. There

is

tutional politics that can convincingly explain a historv

was followed bv another

Damdami

Taksal. Political observ-

nothing within the paradigm of insti-

why

an established political partv with

of sixtv vears would come to the brink of collapse within two

vears.

What

is

more, besides wrecking the Akali Dal, Bhindranwale also made Punjab ungovernable.

The Congress

partv that was at the time ruling Punjab proved to be totally inept at

dealing with the storm troopers inspired by Bhindranwale.

There rise

is

an almost obvious nexus between the success of Bhindranwale and the

of Sikh fundamentalism. To account for

talism.

And

this success

is

to explain Sikh fundamen-

anv explanation of Sikh fundamentalism has to be made up of two ingre-

SIKH FUN DA M E NTA L

I

S

M

263

dients: the crisis in Punjab's political

Taksal. Before

turn to these two,

I

it

economy and its articulation bv the Damdami would be appropriate to say something about

the linkages between fundamentalism and political economy.

damentalism in the metropolis,

no

role in

its

let

Those who study fun-

us sav the United States, find the

contemporary formulations. Anvonc

who

economy

economy and fundamentalism sounds almost naive. But fundamentalism all of them agrarian or onlv partially industrialized,

the

ripheral societies, almost

There

tainly different.

is

its

socioeconomic programs.

to be concretized as an analytical category,

science concepts, apply differently to those divide.

The Sikh

case

is

in peis

cer-

begins to address predicaments that in the metropolis are

it

routinely addressed bv the welfare state and

mentalism

to plav

proposes correlations between

good

a

Political

illustration

it

will,

on the other

much

like

If funda-

other social

of the North-South

side

of this point.

Economy and

Sikh Subjectivity

no denying the fact that the nature of the contemporary Sikh polity is closely and economic transformations undergone bv the province of Punjab over the last three decades. Punjab, one of the smallest states in the Indian union, is primarily an agrarian economy, and almost 80 percent of the Sikh population lives here. In 1988-89 over 48.6 percent of the state domestic product was derived from

There

is

tied to the social

and the same sector generated employment for 59.1 percent

agriculture and livestock,

of the

total labor force.

18

Following the

growth

in the agrarian sector

what

commonly known

is

capitalist

made Punjab

as the

the

path of development, the accelerated

first

region in South Asia to experience

"Green Revolution." The

social costs

innovation have been extremely high, and Punjabi society over the has

become highly polarized. The benefits of agrarian development have primarily accrued

rural society

which already possessed substantial resources

like

last

two decades

to those sectors

of

land and capital. 19

By

successfully harnessing their resources to high-yielding varieties

modern technology,

of such agrarian

(HYV) of seeds and

the rich cultivators were able to produce large surpluses and

economic input in Punjab. 1970—71, rich cultivators having more than twenty-five acres of land constituted 5.01 percent of the total peasantry and operated approximately 27 percent of the land.

further expand their resources, particularly land, the key

In

Within a decade their proportion of land use increased to 29.17 percent. 2 " In contrast to rich cultivators, small and marginal farmers have fared poorly in the Green Revolution.

two

They

are faced with a situation

to five acres, have increasingly

where

become

their small land holdings, ranging less viable.

A

from

recent study of agrarian

conditions in Punjab points out that while small farmers were faced with an annual loss

of 125 rupees per capita, farmers with land holdings between

were earning a acres

profit

of 50 rupees per

of land or more were producing a

tive returns

have made

it

five

capita, while substantial farmers profit

of 1,200 rupees per

and ten

acres

with twenty

capita. 21

The nega-

hard for the small and marginal farmers to sustain their

family farms. Consequently, in recent years a large

number of

small holdings have

Harjot Oberoi 264

1970—71

disappeared. According to agricultural census data, from

Punjab declined bv 25.3 percent.

erational holdings in

to

1980—81 op-

22

Suffering this decline were countless Sikh peasants from the small and marginal sector.

As

vet

it is

not clear what exactly has been their

who

development those

In classical models of

fate.

of the agrarian labor

are dispossessed either join the ranks

force or turn to jobs in the burgeoning industrial sector. In Punjab there

is

no such

The bulk of the small and marginal farmers are from the high-status Jat caste, and even when they find themselves without land to cultivate they are most unwilling to become agricultural laborers. This would implv working in the midst of simple transition.

low-caste Harijans, a clear loss of face for the status-conscious

of egalitarianism of the Sikhs does not

The other

alternative

— working

easily

in the industrial sector

—

is

equallv difficult, for

reasons. First, Punjab does not have the large-scale industries

work

small-scale industries, the

from the poorer

prospect which Sikh peasants stoutlv

that a recent

is

economic survey found

work

resist.

that

for subsistence

wages

Consequentlv,

it is

24 percent of the

1965-66

also left those

who

Thev must

options.

labor

for long hours,

hardlv surprising

small farmers and 31 per-

cent of the marginal farmers in Punjab live below the poverty culture since

exist, particularly in

made up of migratorv

of northern India. Given their already depressed conditions,

areas

these nonunionized worker are willing to a

force

two

which could absorb the

depeasantized Sikh cultivators. Second, even where such jobs

medium- and

(The strong sense

Jats.

extend to others, particularlv non-Sikhs.)

line.

23

Capitalist agri-

has not only enhanced differentiation in the countrvside but

have been impoverished with what they perceive either descend in the rural social hicrarchv or

as

nonviable

become

willing

proletarians.

In entering the final quarter of the twentieth century, the Akali Dal, led almost exclusivelv

bv

rich kulaks,

Parkash Singh Badal,

1978

in

had no solution for the

who

crisis in

for a second time became

Punjab's political economy.

a chief minister

of Punjab

in

an Akali Dal-led government, was one of the wealthiest farmers in the whole

of India.

Manv of his

cabinet colleagues

came from highlv

privileged backgrounds.

For the most part the Akali Dal leadership had prospered from the Green Revolution,

and thev were unconcerned about those Herring

is

quite correct

India he observes:

when

"How

in

who had

lost

out

in the process. 24

Ronald

analyzing the issue of redistributive justice in rural

can fundamental structural change be effected through the

verv institutions that sendee and reproduce the existing socictv and reflect the existing distribution of

must

power and

privilege?" 2S

However,

in

all

fairness to the Akali Dal,

it

be acknowledged that the Akalis are part of the general political malaise in the

country. India, a social democracy enamored of socialism, has never jettisoned capitalism.

This hvbrid model of development has only exacerbated poverty and social

unrest. In this context the Akali failure to deal with the social inequities in

was perhaps no greater than,

say, that

of Congress regimes

northern India. But while provincial governments

more

easily gloss over the pervasive

Punjab

in other provinces across

in the rest

of the country could

socioeconomic problems and their long-term

ure to alter the situation, the Akalis had

no such

luck.

Thev were

fail-

faced with a rural

SIKH FUNDAMENTALISM 265

electorate that

had often been mobilized and had

a

bloodv history of radical, religious

solutions.

The

rising tick

of inequalities

in the

Punjab did not

demands

ethos of Sikh religious tradition, which

From

equitable distribution of wealth and resources.

easily

a just

blend with the dominant

moral economy based on an

its

inception in the earlv

six-

teenth century, Sikh discourse has sought the creation of an egalitarian society where all

men,

not

if

all

women, would be collectively. The

economic resources

equal and share the ritual, sacred, profane, and appeal of such teachings was considerable in a

where the organizing ideology gave open recognition to principles of human

society

inequality, expressed in the caste system.

Sikh

movement launched an

social structure, particularly in the

human

condition.

Oyer

a

period of roughly three centuries the

offensive against the theory and practice its

It set

of the "Hindu"

acceptance of the notion that inequality was inherent

up the

institution

of the sangat (congregation) and

langar (communal consumption) to combat social distinctions and molded a collectivity called the

panth.

and there was no

The

practitioner of faith

had equal access to the holy

scripture,

institutional priesthood that could act as the sole custodian

of the

Sikh holv book. During the eighteenth century, Sikh militants further sought to im-

plement the egalitarian paradigm of Sikhism. The Sikh movement attracted the rural poor, the urban underprivileged, and others society.

No efforts

of authority,

away with

a

all

who

persisted

on

the margins of Punjabi

were spared bv the peasant armies of the Sikhs to destroy

order, and

all

mechanisms of social

whole range of intermediaries, those

control.

who

all

They succeeded

modes

in

doing

extracted the much-hated land

revenues for the state and often acted as instruments of oppression. Large estates were dissolved,

and the lands distributed to the peasantry.

Only bv recognizing

this egalitarian

impulse within the Sikh tradition can

we make

sense out of statements like that of the British historian Prinsep that, in the late eigh-

teenth century, Punjab was "ruled bv seventy thousand sovereigns." 26 is

The statement

man

suggestive of intense notions of equality within the Sikh tradition, where each

considered himself equal to the rest and was unwilling to acknowledge any social

George

superiors.

mentions

in his

earthlv superior tarian tradition

pologist politics

who

Forster,

who

toured the Punjab in the

late

travelogue an incident in which a Sikh told

and acknowledged no other master but is

eighteenth century,

him "he disdained an

his prophet." 27

This egali-

not confined to the past. Joyce Pettigrew, a Scottish social anthro-

has lived a long time in the Punjab, in a widely read

of Jat Sikhs, noted among them

a

monograph on

not regard themselves as subordinate to another person." 2 " Obeisance,

if

owed only to God. Whenever this egalitarian

it

onstrated an

immense power

the

strong cultural tradition whereby "they did

thrust within Sikhism has been ably voiced,

to mobilize the faithful and lead

them toward

any,

has

was

dem-

the inver-

sion of the status quo, in order to establish a society free of religious and social inequalities.

Such an ideology becomes most

attractive in periods

of intense

social

change. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries under British colonial rule, there

were numerous movements within the Sikh community,

like

the Kukas,

Harjot Oberoi 266

Ghadaritcs, and Babbar Akalis, which sought to recover the original message of Sikh-

ism and establish a society

of human distinctions. The Sikh past en-

relatively free

dowed its constituents with a highly developed vocabulary of social justice, and the community had a long experience of social movements that fought for greater social equality.

By

the early 1970s then there was a serious crisis in Punjab's political

that polarized class distinctions.

The scope of this

economy

was further enhanced bv the

crisis

nature of the Indian nation-state in general and the pro-rich policies of the Akali Dal in particular.

While the

mav have been more

crisis

easily

accommodated in the rest of was to make the voice of

India, the egalitarian impulse widiin the Sikh tradition

more compelling

redistributive justice

in Punjab. All those

who

perceived their lived

experience in this sequence began increasingly to search for solutions.

Some were

of the veracity of the Dal Khalsa's

Others kept

readily convinced

"final solution."

looking. Eventually in the late 1970s they were to shape a sal

—

that

was to

body

articulate their aspirations forcefully and,

— the Damdami Tak-

bv challenging the status

quo, to turn the 1980s into a decade of Sikh fundamentalism.

Damdami Much

of modern Sikh

as the history

reformation, and nativism, but

almost

at the

politics

is

tied to the Akali Dal, so the tenor

of

most forcefullv represented bv the Damdami history the Sikhs went the way of orthodoxv, traditionalism,

contemporary Sikh fundamentalism Taksal. Earlier in their

Taksal

same time

it is

is

only with the

Damdami

Taksal in the late 1970s,

as the Islamic revolution in Iran, that a considerable

segment

of the Sikh population, particularly young males, seized on the powerful discourse

of fundamentalism. Given the

centrality

mentalism, this section examines,

worldview, particularly

its

first,

nexus with

of

Damdami

Taksal in forging Sikh funda-

the history of this organization; second,

its

a millenarian ideology; and, finally, its social

makeup. Until the early 1970s few Sikhs had heard of the sal).

No

major work on Sikh

Damdami

Taksal (hereafter Tak-

religion, society, or history alludes to this body.

This

obscuritv seems to have helped Taksal leaders invent an impressive genealogy. The}' trace their origins to

who founded

Guru Gobind Singh,

the tenth and final preceptor of the Sikhs

the Khalsa order, which, doctrinally and numericallv,

nant sector within the Sikh community. In

1

706,

is

todav the domi-

when Gobind Singh was encamped

Damdama Sahib), he is said to have founded a distinguished school of exegesis. Among those who graduated from this school, in the class of 1706, was one Deep Singh. When within two vears the Guru died, Deep Singh kept his instruction alive by establishing the Damdami Taksal. at

Sabo Ki Talwandi (more

There is

no

is

much

all

known

in this putative historv that

firm evidence to back

For

recentlv

practical

as

could be correct, but for the

moment

there

it.

purposes the Taksal comes to the fore early

this

century under

Sant Sunder Singh (1883-1930), a figure of great piety and traditional learning. As

SIKH FUNDAMENTALISM 26"

if

almost to foreclose the rapid sociorcligious transformation undergone bv the Sikhs

during

this

period of British colonial

out to purge diversity

raries set

in

to engender a uniform religious

rule,

Sunder Singh

Sikh doctrine,

community. Given

der Singh's strategy to negate differentiation all

ritual,

was the

many of his contempo-

practice,

Sun-

Sikhs was quite simple: abolish cultivate a univocal reading

of

order to shape a more homogeneous community. Accompanying this strategy insistence

on

a standardized Khalsa

code of conduct, or mint. Since many

— including the leadership of the movement — were engaged similar the

others at this juncture the Akali

influential

in a

his

player in this project to manufac-

(

ture a monolithic Sikh

Singh Sabha and

Damdami Taksal under Singh (1932 — 37) and Sant Gur-

task,

two successors, Sant Kartar bachan Singh 1902-69), continued to be a minor Sunder Singh and

community.

Eclipsed by history, the

Damdami

Taksal and

cadres were rescued from poten-

its

oblivion bv three factors: the political failures of the Akali Dal in post- 1966

tial

Punjab, the

induced bv the Green Revolution

crisis

in

Punjab's political economy, and

the zealous teachings of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, the Taksal.

The

skill

two of

first

The

this chapter.

these factors have been addressed at

teachings of Bhindranwale have been recently handled with great

on

the millenarian element in the oppositional

Bhindranwale, a theme that porary Sikh

nities in India,

practice.

is

hardiv

new

no

movement sponsored by

attention in the analysis of contem-

to Sikhism.

Of all

the indigenous religious

commu-

Sikhism possesses the most advanced paradigm of millennial thought

For much of their

history, at least since the rise

of the Khalsa, Sikhs have

— oppression, economic upheavals, colocollapse of semiotic categories — by invoking the millenarian paradigm. Cen-

opted to deal with major nialism,

as yet has attracted

I

politics.

Millenananism

and

new head of Damdami some length earlier in

bv Jovce Pcttigrew, Mark Juergensmevcr, and T. N. Madan. 29 For that reason

will focus

tral

hoping thereby

his special skills in exegesis.

among

polvsemous interpretations of Sikh scriptures and

texts, in

like

and

to this entire

will to establish

social crises

model has been

state

a prophetic figure

of extraordinary charisma with the

an alternative social system in which oppression would cease and

people would lead a

life

of harmony, purity, and good deeds. Bhindranwale was heir

to this cultural tradition. Perhaps nothing

Revolution and the social processes

it

would have come of

it

unleashed. In hindsight

without the Green

it

is

possible to see

how the Sikh past, an expanding network of communications, mechanized farming, and the Sikh identity

became

inextricably linked in the

people to experience the Green Revolution

unprecedented change

in

economy,

in

lived experience,

had prepared them to handle so much change political parties,

a

Punjab of the 1970s. As the

and

Bhindranwale knew

create,

little

but one they no longer

No one

social relationships.

in so little time. Failed

they turned to a messianic leader and his seminar)' to

world thev had helped

first

South Asia, Sikhs were confronted with

fully

bv established

make

sense of

grasped or controlled.

about economics or parliamentary

politics.

He

turned

the complex problems faced by the Sikhs into simple homilies. In his worldview, what I

shall call the

u

Sikh impasse" resulted from the prevalent religious depravity

the Sikhs and the ever-increasing

Hindu domination over

the Sikhs.

among

As had happened

Haijot Oberoi 268

with

earlier social

tion to this

new

movements within

the community, Bhindranwale sought a resolu-

Sikh impasse by invoking the millenarian charter. In 1982 he agreed

to participate in the dharmayuddh, or righteous battle, earlier launched bv the Akalis.

Unlike the Akalis,

who viewed

Bhindranwale characterized

it

dharma vuddh

the

expedient campaign,

as a politically

an epic war where good was pitted against

as

and

evil

only one side was to be victorious. His participation in the campaign was fired bv the

of Sikh millenarianism.

cultural logic

During the eighteenth century many quatrain:

"The armv of the Guru

carried the umbrella of royaltv,

enemies

will sit

and

a Sikh activist

on

its

head

be done/The Khalsa will

will shall

its

had chanted the following

the throne of Delhi/Over

will

be

rule, their

be vanquished/ Onlv those that seek refuge will be saved." In February

will

1984 Bhindranwale echoed

do not want

to rule.

I

that sentiment

would

like the

when he informed

a visiting journalist: "I

Sikhs to rule; rule Delhi, rule the world: Raj

karega khalsa, baaqi rahe na koe [The Khalsa will rule, their enemies will be vanquished]. ... In the next ten vears Sikhs will get their liberation. This will definitely

happen." 30

Manv

similar quotes

from the speeches of Bhindranwale underscore

his

unflinching confidence in divine intervention and strong identification with apocalyptic

How

thinking.

India's population,

else

could he believe that the Sikhs, with

would

than 2 percent of

less

rule Delhi or attain liberation within a decade?

"This will certainly happen,"

is

of messianic

a hallmark

His

refrain,

As Yonina Talmon

leaders.

notes in a review essav on millenarian movements:

Perhaps the most important thing about millenarism It

views time as a linear process which leads to a

from the present into the approximations to the totally different level

means of

a

final future is

final goal. It is a

of existence.

prodigious and

final

.

.

.

is

attitude towards time.

final future.

.

.

.

The

transition

not a gradual process of progressive

sudden and revolutionary leap onto

The

apocalyptic victor)' will be

won

a

by

struggle which will destroy the agents of cor-

ruption, purge the sinful world and prepare

arism

is its

it

for

its final

redemption. Millen-

thus basically a merger between an historical and non-historical

conception of time. Historical change leads to a cessation of all change. 31

The Damdami According to

its

Taksal

own

is

rooted in the metahistorical time to which Talmon alludes.

version of history, the organization was founded by a cultural

hero during the golden age of the Sikhs, the eighteenth ccnturv. Similarly,

new redemptive foundation of Khalistan. By

its

new-

cultural hero, Bhindranwale, anticipated a "decisive phase," a

age for

the Sikhs to be dramatically ushered in with the

casting

this

new

Utopia in a religious idiom, Bhindranwale recruited to his ranks a wide vari-

ety of people

from

different economic, cultural,

and

political

backgrounds. But the

made up of those who were at the constituency confirms a commonplace in the lit-

bulk of his following from 1978 to 1984 was

bottom of the erature

social ladder.

a

on millenarian movements:

herited, the marginalized,

mode

Such

in class

terms they invariably appeal to the disin-

and the subordinate. Millennial aspirations are a

for securing self-respect, social dignity,

and economic well-being for

cultural all

those

SIKH FU N DA M E NT A

I

1

S

M

269

who

lack

particularly in prcindustrial agrarian societies. This too

it,

is

supported

fully

bv Sikh fundamentalism.

On a Sikh

26 January 1986, when the Panthic Committee homeland

No

called "Khalistan,"

issued a short

particularly the

backward

marketing, adulteration and

any indiyidual.

of

Da

.

.

.

The

yillage

[either

will also

policy of Khalistan will be as per the Guru's wish of

Bhala" [welfare of

all]

and

a policy

The segregation of humanity based upon will

will

not allow mental retardation of

of encouraging

promoting the sense of brotherhood of mankind and

and colour

economically or

community. Profiteering, black-

such other offences and social inequalities

all

not be tolerated by the Khalsa, which

"Sarbat

'- announced the formation of document that stated:

be allowed to exploit others

indiyidual will

socially],

it

a sense

a civilized

life,

of involvement.

caste, jati [subcaste), birth, locality

not be permitted, and such divisions will be abolished by the

use ot political power. Likewise, such other cruel and distasteful practices ascribed to social inequality', especially between Sikh males and females, will be

removed through the use of political power. 33 Clearly, Sikh fundamentalists are

ditions in the Punjab der,

and

class.

and envision

responding to prevailing socioeconomic con-

a society free

of distinctions based on

and advance the rights of the subaltern over the

elite.

1990s Sikh fundamentalist organizations, particularly the large public

birth, gen-

Their social program seeks to invert the existing hierarchies of power In the late 1980s and early

Damdami Taksal, convened

meetings which collectively endorsed resolutions

One such popular meeting was held of the Damdami Taksal and the All-India

in

support of an

alter-

of 1986 under the

native society.

in the spring

auspices

Sikh Students Federation. 34

The

assembled public enthusiastically supported a gurmatta (a collective resolution of the congregation): If the hard-earned

income of the people or the natural resources of any nation

or the region are forcibly plundered; the goods produced by them are paid arbitrarily

prices

and

determined prices while the goods bought by them are sold in

order to carry this process of economic exploitation to

conclusion, the are the indices

human

rights

of slavery of that nation, region or people. Today, the Sikhs are

and 80 percent of

India's population

is

of high and low, casteism and to Sikh society.

should be

Even

if this

The poor,

thrust

upon the

of poor people and minorities. [sic]

.

.

states .

The

orientation towards exploitation

and appropriation of other's labour should be stopped cially in

logical

of people or of a nation are crushed, then these

shackled by the chains of slavery. This type of slavery

practice

its

at

high

at

in general life

and spe-

women and

children

the weak, the old people,

35 fully respected.

was rhetoric

of thousands of Sikhs are

for public a

consumption, such resolutions endorsed by tens

powerful critique of the existing social norms and

distri-

bution of resources. The vision of an alternative universe has often proven to be

in-

Harjot Oberoi 270

centive for a people to

ushered

in will

expend

all

in pursuit

of

it,

when

particularly

the world to be

have none of the drawbacks of the old.

The Vision The Utopia

that fundamentalists envision

is

defined in terms of Sikh religious tradition.

not a secular one.

The 1986

Its identity is

to be

Declaration of Khalistan stipu-

"The Sikh religion will be the official creed of Khalistan. Further, it will be a paramount duty of the Government to see that Sikhism must flourish unhindered in lates:

Khalistan." 36

By proclaiming an

official religion for

the state of Khalistan, Sikh fun-

damentalists stand in direct opposition to the present secular constitution of India that guarantees

freedom of

aspects of that constitution.

One

is its

secular content.

Sikhs with Hindus. Article 25, section 2b, states that

be open to

all

Hindus, irrespective of their

category "Hindu"

all

dismayed by

religious practice. Sikh militants are

caste. 37

Another

is its

public

Hindu

all

The

several

association of shrines

must

clause includes under the

"persons professing the Sikh, Jain or Buddhist religion." For

among

Sikh fundamentalists there can be no greater affront than being included

the

Hindus. In their view Sikhism and Hinduism are two diametrically opposed religions; is no common ground between them. Angered by the insensitivity shown to them by the constitution, Sikh leaders in February 1984 took to the streets of major

there

cities in

Punjab and publicly defaced copies of the Indian constitution

order to

in

protest article 25, section 2b. Behind this act of defiance stretches a long historv of

Sikh search for a personal law. Fortunately or unfortunately, the codified.

The

ment under organized

little

that

clerical hierarchy.

which

mav be

spells

Here

of Sikhism were never

explicitly

a

comparison with Islam, the other "great"

out what

is

part to the Islamic ulama, which always

further, in

had both

Muslim code of conduct and punishing

Sikhism there a personal its

violation.

to something corresponding to the Shari'a within Sikhism

is

is

and

also a

The

no counter-

moral stake

closest

come

to be

known

as

the rahit, a distinctive

the rahit-nama (manuals of conduct)

texts.

and

down

ritual observances,

in

what

These manuals

visualized a considerably purified Sikhism, shorn of polytheism, idolatry,

manical dominance. In addition, they laid

in

we come

code of conduct constructed from oral and scriptural sources and expressed has

tradi-

no equivalent to the Islamic permissible and what is prohibited for a devout

illuminating. Sikhism has

Muslim. If we may carry the comparison enforcing a

principles

the gurus or preceptors could hardly be enforced in the absence of an

tion in the Punjab, Shari'a,

first

was formalized during the formative phases of the Sikh move-

and Brah-

sumptuary codes,

social behavior.

While the Sikh tradition Sikh gurus, with additions

sees the rahit as having evolved

made by Guru Gobind Singh

to

from the writings of the

its

38 historical research points in a radically different direction.

versions of the rahit

all

corpus in 1699, recent

The bulk of

the extant

appear to date from the nineteenth century, not from the

late

SIKH FUNDAMENTALISM 271

seventeenth or early eighteenth century as tradition

would have us

The only

believe.

Cbaupa Singh rahit-nama, which dates back to the middle of the eighteenth century. The complexity of the Sikh rahit is further compounded by the fact that there are, according to one account, eighteen works that qualify as principal exception

texts

is

the

expounding the rahit." Even when

we

torian,

are left with nine different

certain normative premises, they are b\

what may amount

lishing

question of

how

this list has

been purged bv

manuals of the

no means

a

rahit.

40

a rigorous his-

While they

uniform body of

code of behavior. In addition, there

to a standard

representative of the Sikh panth these

what ways Sikhs over the nineteenth century fashioned

works were.

share

all

literature estab-

It is

is

the

not clear in

their everyday lives according

to the precepts laid out in the rahit manuals.

What we have

here arc different subtraditions evolving within Sikhism, each claim-

ing allegiance and constituents for reflect

its

own

version.

The rahit-nama

textual materials

only the aspirations and worldview of the hegemonic Khalsa tradition and not

of the entire Sikh

tradition.

not articulated until the

late

A

single

orthodoxy for the entire Sikh community was

nineteenth century;

cepted this as the orthodoxy for

all

many

observers have mistakenly ac-

times and phases of the Sikh movement. Given

the pluralistic nature of the Sikh tradition in the nineteenth century and the absence cultural, social, and economic transactions were based on Punjabi customary law and, more recendv, on Anglo-Saxon law as it evolved dur-

of a powerful orthodoxy, Sikh

ing the colonial and postcolonial periods.

This ambiguity

is

not to the liking of Sikh fundamentalists. Thev have demanded

a Sharra-like personal law for the Sikhs.

Such

a

demand was put forward

Dai's forty-five-point charter of demands submitted to the federal

tember 1981. What exactly

is

in the Akali

government

Sep-

in

to be covered under the rubric of Sikh personal law

SPL) is still largely undecided. Though there is no agreement, it is possible some idea of what its scope and nature would be from the sermons of Sikh

(hereafter

to gain

leaders like

Bhindranwale and Darshan Singh Ragi,

a

former head of Sri Akal Takhat

Sahib. 41

The major

thrust of the proposed

SPL would

be to define

who

is

a Sikh.

Although

such definitions have been attempted in the past, particularly in the Sikh Gurdwaras

Act of 1925 and the Sikh Rahit Maryada (Sikh personal code) of 1950, these enact-

ments were ambiguous. 42

A liberal reading of them would

permit a person to consider

him- or herself Sikh without undergoing initiation (the Khalsa amrit ceremony and )

maintaining the famous

undergoing

initiation

five K's.

43

To Bhindranwale one could not be a Sikh without

and upholding the

Bhindranwale spent much of

five K's.

As head of

his time touring the villages

the

Damdami

Taksal,

of Punjab and exhorting

Sikh vouth to take amrit (baptismal nectar) and be loyal to the external insignia of the faith.

He

constantly reiterated in his sermons, "Only people without ambiguity in

their heart

have the right to

call

themselves Khalsa."

The ambiguity Bhindranwale identity. Under the growing

was seeking to redress had to do with contemporary Sikh influence of a secular culture

toward their religious

many Sikhs in To counter

identity.

the 1960s and 1970s turned indifferent this trend, preachers like

Bhindranwale

Harjot Oberoi 272

advocated a

stricter definition

lation into

A

more rigorous

definition

would

from nonbelievers, and help prevent Sikh

assimi-

of Sikh

clearly distinguish the true believers

identity.

Hinduism.

In 1971

when

new

the government introduced

Sikh shrines in Delhi, the

new

definition

legislation for the

management of

of a Sikh came closer to the

ideals

of Sikh

fundamentalism. Ironically, despite being out of power, Sikh preachers had cast a long

shadow on the

epistemology of the federal government. The 1971 legislation,

legal

unlike earlier enactments, identified a Sikh as one

who had unshorn

Keshadhari).^ But a Sikh with unshorn hair

not close enough to the ideal of

a Khalsa Sikh,

one

who

committed himself to

is still

hair (called a

has undergone the initiation ceremony (amrit sanskar) and

live

by the

rahit. If

SPL were

it

would do away

inheritance.

At present both

introduced,

with the ambiguities.

SPL would are covered

also include legislation

on marriage and

bv laws that applv equally to Hindus. For instance, although Sikhs have

a distinct marriage ritual, for a civil marriage Sikhs are

the

"Hindu Marriage Act."

among

Inheritance

Sikhs

still

is

governed bv what

is

called

decided by the Hindu Succes-

do not take governance bv Hindu personal laws lightly, They feel their independent religious identity is threatened when thev are lumped together with Hindus. A common refrain in Bhindranwale's speeches was that Sikhs had been enslaved by "Hindu imperialism." To support his thesis of Hindu dominance he would often speak about how Sikhs could onlv be married under statutes meant for the Hindus and how Sikhs had no sion Act. Sikh fundamentalists as the case

of

article 25, section 2b, illustrates.

right to inheritance without

Hindu

legal precedents.

In addition to distancing Sikhs from Hindus,

tobacco and intoxicants

like

SPL would

also prohibit the use

of

alcohol and opium. If the legacy of Bhindranwale were

itself, consumption of meat, too, would be stopped. However, not all would apply equally. The burden of some would be exclusively carried bv women. Sikh women would be barred from the use of jewelry, cosmetics, and clothing that exposes the body. In the absence of a purdah among Sikhs, the logic of these

to fully assert restrictions

injunctions seems to be to subject female images and sexuality to patriarchal social control.

The

search for a highly univocal identity brought Sikh fundamentalists into direct

conflict with

groups

like the Nirankaris,

their Sikh heritage. This conflict in Pakistan

tradition

is

who have a more

ambivalent attitude towards

not very different from the

travails

of the Ahmadis

or the tragedy of the Baha'is in Iran. Nirankari associations with the Sikh

go back to the mid-nineteenth century when

their founder,

Baba Dayal,

45 tried to introduce a series of reforms in Sikh religious practices and doctrines.

did not

make much headway, and, by

emerged

as a sort

the time he died in 1855, the Nirankaris had

of sect within the larger Sikh

guru or preceptor,

as distinct

tradition.

from the orthodox Sikh

resulted in an uneasy relationship

among

Their firm belief in a living belief in a scriptural guru,

Sikhs and Nirankaris. But since their

num-

ber was small and they never sought to occupy center stage, the Nirankaris were erated.

He

Things began to change dramatically

in the late

guru lineage among the Nirankaris (popularly known

tol-

1960s when a breakaway

as the

Sant Nirankaris) sud-

SIKH

F

I'

N DA M NTALIS M F.

273

number of followers and

dcnlv began to attract large started circulating

the head of the Sant Nirankaris

works that many orthodox Sikhs considered blasphemous. The

Sant Nirankaris paid no heed to Sikh injunctions against image worship. Thev took to worshiping the sandals of

fundamentalists, issue

who were

their spiriaial head. 4*

Baba Gurbachan Singh,

just

For Sikh

beginning to assert themselves, the Sant Nirankari

provided a cause that would bring them public recognition. Sikh preachers be-

gan to publicly denounce the Sant Nirankaris

Some demanded

as false Sikhs.

that

Sant Nirankari centers be closed and the Sant Nirankaris themselves not be allowed into the Punjab. 47

Matters came to a head

when

1978 the Sant Nirankaris met

in April

men

holv city of Amritsar for an annual convention. For the supreme insult.

How

like

could the Sant Nirankaris, a reprobate

Sikh

in the

Bhindranwale,

dare to congre-

sect,

gate in Amritsar, the center of Sikh orthodoxy? Inflammatory speeches bv Sikh

many among

gious leaders, particularly Bhindranwale, prompted to take direct action.

They marched down

Many

blood}' clash in Amritsar. in

1978 an

ing

all

encyclical

melee twelve Sikhs and three Sant Nir-

observers of Sikh fundamentalism date

Two

developments

(hukamnama) was

after the clash are

issued

from

to this

worthy of note.

First,

Sikhs from any dealings with Sant Nirankaris. 49 In other words, Sant Niran-

Baba Gurbachan Singh, was shot dead

Nirankaris,

lowed with the mass

The

writings of

fact that

their

its rise

Akal Takhat Sahib prohibit-

Sri

were no longer to be considered Sikhs. Second, the

karis

reli-

their congregations

to the Sant Nirankari convention center to

forcibly stop the proceedings. In the ensuing

ankaris were killed. 48

was

this

killings

identity

in April

1980. His death was

in all societies require

and further

cultural

us sensitive to the

an image of the Other

their sociopolitical interests. 50 It

profound sense of Otherness that

fol-

in Punjab.

Edward Said and Johannes Fabian have made

power groups

own

of Sant Nirankaris

head of the Sant

spiritual

in is

order to bolster

by cultivating

a

groups promote their notions of superi-

ority, insularity,

and incompatibility. Secular and fundamentalist thought does not

seem to be very

different

when

it

comes to distinguishing "us" from the "others."

Fundamentalists, be they Sikh, Shi'ite, or Hindu, always require the Other to sharpen their self-identity

A discourse tain I

and appropriate

a higher moral

ground

relative to their adversaries.

of heightened religious boundaries helps religious groups to gain or

re-

power. have been arguing that the vision of Sikh fundamentalists

problem of Sikh religion.

identity. Secular public culture in their

To counter

this threat,

tradition.

it

is

constitutions, dietary habits, this

is

no lacuna

to leave

and the envi-

in definition.

For

ambiguity that breeds atheism, immorality, and denial of

The following statement

is

representative of such a worldview:

Retreat from religious and absolute moral values

is

and permissiveness, sex-promiscuity, moral

and

no means

closely related to the

Sikh fundamentalists seek to inscribe their religious

on all possible cultural resources: ronment of the body. The objective of all identity

Sikh fundamentalists

is

view erodes morality and

peculiar to India today, the

laxity

a

world-wide phenomenon social disintegration

phenomenon

is

is

by

world-wide and ecu-

Harjot Oberoi 274

menical, the reasons for which are deep-seated and historical.

nomenon

exceptional to

modern

times. It erupts

Nor

whenever there

decay and deterioration in social cohesiveness and moral

is

vitality

phe-

this

an onset of

is

of culture or

civilization. 51

The World

An

hour's drive from

of Punjab, tenth and

to

Come: The Anandpur Sahib Resolution

Le Corbusier's city of Chandigarh, the capital of the Indian state town of Anandpur. Here in 1699, according to tradition, the

the tinv

is

last

Gobind Singh, transformed Sikh religion bv Anandpur has been a major center of pilgrim-

preceptor of the Sikhs,

founding the Khalsa order. Ever age for the Sikhs;

it is

since,

one of the

five centers

communitv. According to the Akali Dal, committee met been

earlier

proved in

at

of temporal/spiritual authority for the

in the

autumn of 1973

the partv's working

Anandpur and approved the draft of a new policv program that had

prepared bv a special subcommittee. This draft proposal was

in the

form of twelve resolutions

at a

Ludhiana on 28-29 October 1978 and came to be popularlv known

pur Sahib Resolution (hereafter

later ap-

massive conference of the Akali Dal held as the

Anand-

ASR). 52

Perhaps no other "text" in independent India has caused so

ASR. 53 There

much

contention and

two reasons for this controversv. One concerns the provenance, the other the message, of the ASR. The two are in fact related. Of the several versions of the ASR in circulation, some are more radical that is to turmoil as the ten-page

say, secessionist

Most

—

—

in their implications

on the

Jeffrev, a political scientist

graph on the Punjab, searched

1973

than others.

writers accept the official Akali line

deeplv suspicious. Robin

to

are

for a reference to

in daily

newspapers

the ASR. He found

odd, since the Akalis are a leading

origins of the

ASR. 54

A

few are

who recently wrote a major monolike

the Chandigarh Tribune back

none. 55 This

political party in the

is,

to put

Punjab.

it

mildlv, rather

One would

expect a

major partv meeting, particularly one which was going to endorse the draft of a new

ASR was drawn up bv the late Kapur Singh (1909-86), long considered the Rahmat Ali of Khalistan. 56 (Rahmat Ali, a Muslim student at Cambridge, is commonlv considered to have been the brain behind the original proposal for Pakistan, a Muslim nation-state.) Kapur Singh, an Oxford alumnus cashiered from the Indian Civil Service, was the most svstematic ideologue behind the idea of a Sikh homeland called Khalistan. The mystery surrounding the ASR, however, does not end with its origins. program, to be reported. These doubts have led some to believe that the actuallv

Bv

late

English. 5 "

1970s there existed

several different versions

The most controverted of these was

Kapur Singh. Central preamble: "Khalsa

ji

to this version

was

of the

Khalsa."

Punjabi and in

a five-word

Punjabi sentence in the political

de bol bale." According to Kahn Singh's authoritative Encyclo-

pedia of Sikh Literature, this famous sentence translates 58

ASR in

the one associated with the enigmatic

Kapur Singh often spoke and wrote

desideratum of the Khalsa. Sovereignty

is

as:

"The sovereignty of the

that "political sovereignty

the divine

Commandment

is

the true

for the Khalsa,

"

SIKH FUNDAMENTALISM 275

which might be disobeved bv the renegades, neglected bv the weaklings and compromised bv the

traitors,

but which cannot be abrogated or annulled bv the mortals. All

such powers or organizations that seek so to do commit an act of Khalsa.

5g

As

Kapur Singh was concerned,

far as

could be fully enunciated and

of Sikh religious

As an

follow.

means

I

use a word,"

what

"The question

is,"

— protection — would simply

was well aware of the following

Humptv Dumptv:

Humptv Dumptv

choose

I

against the

to gain public recognition, the rest

avid reader of Lewis Carroll's fables, he

just

War

doctrine of Khalsa sovereignty

Sikh separatism, personal law, nation-state

interests,

exchange between Alice and

"When

made

if the

to

it

mean

said Alice,

said, in a rather scornful tone, "it

— neither more or

less."

"whether you can make words mean so many

different things."

'The question all."

is,"

Humptv Dumptv, "which

said

is

to be master

—

that's

60

Kapur Singh, a veteran of Sikh politics, would have heartilv agreed with Humptv Dumpty. The agenda for the Sikhs was "to be master that's all." Another ASR version, viewed bv some as the Urtext, demands a "geographic en-

—

tity" for the

had

a

Khalsa Sikhs and a "political constitution." Mvsteriouslv

Kapur Singh

English rendering

inscription

calls for

— the

may have

ji

de bol bale." But here the

"the supremacy of the Khalsa" as distinct from "the sov-

ereignty of the Khalsa." This Urtext

Scholars

phrase "Khalsa

this text also

is

much

shorter than

its

subsequent incarnations.

the patience to reason about Urtexten, but others, particularly

no such patience. The federal government document of secession, and no one was sure what the Akalis meant when they said that the goal of their dharma \aiddh was the full implementation of the ASR. It slowlv began to dawn on the Akali leadership that they had a major credibility problem and they had to do something to settle the controversies that had begun to simmer around the ASR. On 11 November 1982 Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, the president of the Akali Dal, released what has come to be known as the authenticated version of the ASR. Fortunatelv, the new version was in English, but once again its authors had to grapple with the dilemma posed by Kapur Singh: How were they to render "Khalsa ji de bol bale?" This time the political opposition to the Akalis, had

was beginning to

the

see the

words were rendered

was not of much

avail in

ASR

as

as a

"preeminence of the Khalsa." But

dousing the

fires

this diluted translation

lighted by the older versions of the

ASR.

In the public mind, particularly outside the Punjab, the political opposition to the

Akalis had

made

sure that the

ASR would

be seen and read as a secessionist

text.

On

ASR

embodied the hopes and aspirations of the Sikh people, and simply sought devolution of power by demanding a truly their part the Akalis kept insisting that the

federal system in India.

In 1982, his ist

when Bhindranwale became

major objective groups are

still

was the far

they would take the

full

active in the

dharma yuddh, he

insisted that

implementation of the ASR. Since Sikh fundamental-

from capturing

political

power,

it is

hard to say

how

seriously

ASR if they were to become the political rulers of Punjab.

If their

Hmjot

Oberoi

276

pronouncements

past

are

any indication,

would play

it

a kev role.

Thus anv

of the goals of Sikh fundamentalism would be incomplete without

demands of the ASR. 61 I will refer to the Sant Harchand Singh Longowal. In its structure and demands the ASR festo

of

a political party in India or

made up of three

so-called authenticated version released

is

religious,

one

cally separating the religious

from the

political, the

political,

authors of the

ASR

people

It

is little

in

primarilv seeks

of powers between the federal and provincial governments so that

at the provincial level

opment they want and how first

seem to have

fact there

ASR that by any definition could be classified as fundamentalist.

a redistribution

is

and one economic. Bv categori-

been implicitly acknowledging the impact of secular thought. In the

bv

hardly different from the election mani-

any other part of the world. The document

one

parts:

discussion

review of the

a

resolution of the

The Shiromani

can decide for themselves what kind of economic devel-

best to further their cultural

and

religious interests. 62

The

ASR states:

Akali Dal realizes that India

is

a federal

and republican geo-

graphical entity of different languages, religions and cultures.

To

fundamental rights of the religious and linguistic minorities, to

safeguard the the de-

fulfil

mands of the democratic traditions and to pave the way for economic progress, it has become imperative that the Indian constitutional infrastructure should be given a

on

real federal

shape by redefining the central and state relations and

The climax of the process of centralization of powers of states through repeated amendments of the Constitution during the Congress regime came before the countrvmen in the form of the Emergency, when all fundamental rights of all citizens were usurped. It was then that the programme of decentralization of powers ever rights

the lines of aforesaid principles and objectives ....

advocated by Shiromani Akali Dal was openly accepted and adopted bv other political parties.

and that

is

.

.

.

Shiromani Akali Dal has ever stood firm on

why after very careful

lution to this effect

first at all

considerations

it

this principle

unanimouslv adopted

andpur Sahib which has endorsed the principle of state autonomv with the concept of Federalism. In the economic

domain

the

a reso-

India Akali Conference, Batala, then at Sri Anin

keeping

63

ASR

seeks to rectifv the terms

of trade that have

historicallv gone against the agrarian sector. It also promises housing for all, an unemployment allowance, an old-age pension, and a minimum wage for agrarian and industrial workers. In short, it seeks to "create means to fulfil all those necessities of a civilized life without which life appears incomplete." 64 Although not hostile to the

idea of industrialization, the trol. Similarlv, it

With is

demands

ASR

prefers that

all

that the entire trade in

heavy industries be under

state

con-

food grains should be nationalized.

the bulk of the Sikhs engaged in agrarian production, the agrarian bias of

ASR

understandable. In

more

its

religious objectives

ASR

simply seeks the better propagation of Sikhism, a

streamlined administration of Sikh shrines, and the quality training of preachers.

SIKH FUNDAMENTALISM 277

who

In line with a stricter definition of scale

qualifies to

be

a Sikh, the

code of conduct). In India the federal government has

(the Sikh

number nine of the

radio and television broadcasts. Resolution

religious

for large-

battling since 1982, except for

in league

many

with

for

which Sikh

overt religious diacritics,

its

from that of manv other groups. In seeking

a

others around the globe

more

who

permission

for the broadcast

of

ASR

seems to be the tensions between the

ASR

authors of the

and tens of thousands

decentralized polity, the

become too powerful and

repressive,

and there

of the people over the exactions of the

ASR

embodies emancipatory

will plav a

state.

civil

who

militants have

been

not radically different

is

ASR

is

have already articulated a similar

disenchantment with all-powerful nation-states. Indeed,

In a

monopoly over

music and readings from Sikh scriptures. The proposed broadcasting station

would be underwritten bv the Sikh community. The world the ASR seeks to construct and

the

a

ASR seeks

Golden Temple, Amritsar,

to install a broadcasting station at the

the

ASR calls

campaigns to administer amrit (KhaJsa baptism) and greater emphasis on mint

a

major inspiration behind

society

endorsed

and the

it,

For the

state.

the Indian state has

an urgent need to press for the rights

is

In seeking a greater devolution of power,

objectives,

and Sikh fundamentalists expect that

it

kev role in recasting federal-provincial relations.

way

this

impact has already been

felt.

The Memorandum of Settlement signed

by Rajiv Gandhi and Harchand Singh Longowal in July 1985, required that the sections

of the

ASR

that deal with center-state relations be forwarded to the Justice

Sarkaria commission looking into federal-provincial relations in India. Sikh fundamentalists view this as a triumph for their cause, for the federal

repeatedly stated that the

ASR

was

a secessionist text

and

as

government had

such could not even be

the subject of discussion.

Implementing the ASR, however, fundamentalists seek to establish.

To

is

only the

fully

need to turn to other oral and written

grasp

milestone in the world Sikh

first

its

nature and underlying logic,

texts, like the

we

speeches of Bhindranwale and

1986 Declaration of Khalistan. There is a fundamental chasm between the worldview of Sikh fundamentalists and what Habermas has described as the "project of the

modernity." the

A

kev element in the "project of modernity" has been

domain of

from the sphere of

politics

"cultural value spheres" that

from premodern is

polities.

Max Weber

religion. It

last

millenarian

decade

all

separation of

modern

This distinction between the political and religious domains

shades of Sikh politics

religion

and

politics are inseparable.

— accommodative, intransigent, and

— have been formulated within the walls of gurdwaras, or Sikh

shrines. Sikh ideologues have justified this

When

its

this differentiation across

convincingly used to distinguish

anathema to Sikh fundamentalists. For them In the

was

the sixth Sikh preceptor,

Gum

religious

by invoking the long hand of

history.

Hargobind (1595-1644), was faced with state, he proposed two stratagems. First,

oppression from the all-powerful Mughal

he commissioned the construction of an imposing tower, Akal Takhat (the eternal throne). This (the

new

building was just across from the central Sikh shrine, Harimandir

Golden Temple),

in Amritsar.

Guru Hargobind made

the Akal Takhat his politi-

Harjot Oberoi 278

cal

hegemony of the Mughal state. The combined the temporal and the spiritual. Sec-

headquarters, from which he challenged the

architecture of the holiest Sikh shrine

ond, Hargobind also broke with the convention that the guru should concern himself

He

solelv with spiritual pursuits.

tied

around

his waist

two swords, one

to symbolize

miri (politics) and the other piri (spirituality). These precedents are constantly in-

voked by Sikh leaders to

grew

of the religion of

justify their practice

politics.

Joyce Petti-

writes:

It is

the Sikh doctrine of miri-piri, the indivisibility of religious and political

power, and of the cal

spiritual

and the temporal, that gave legitimacy to the

politi-

action organized from within Darbar Sahib (the Golden Temple), and

which was indeed the organizing principle indeed so fundamental that

it

for that action.

.

.

.

Miri-piri

is

receives material concretization in the nishan, or

Sikh emblem, in which the double-edged sword representing the purity of faith is

shielded by

two protecting Kirpans (swords). 65

In the early 1980s Bhindranwale the Akal Takhat.

When

waged

his battle against the

the government of India

finally

Indian state from

decided to launch a counter-

1984 the army operation, named Operation Blue Star, succeeded only after blowing up the Akal Takhat. The tragedy in no way altered Sikh perceptions concerning the relation between religion and politics. Possibly, the army action onlv attack in June

further strengthened the Sikh resolve to articulate their politics in the idiom of

gion. Indeed, the Sikhs have never

known

a truly secular

reli-

movement of dissent. Op-

position to political authority and the various institutions of the state has always been articulated in religious terms. 66 state in the eighteenth

Whether dealing with the oppression of the Mughal

century or the economic exploitation of British colonial

rule,

movements mediated through religion. of religion. The categories of thought, the heroic figures, the symbols, the costumes which have motivated Sikhs to react to the demands of the state or come to grips with ongoing social transformations have been of a purely religious nature. The most important qualification for a political the Sikhs have always responded with social

Thus the Sikhs have no language of

leader

among

pound on

the Sikhs

their

political leader

is

meaning.

his

It is

of the Sikhs

politics free

understanding of Sikh scriptures and his

no coincidence

that Bhindranwale, the

belonged to a seminary which instructed

in the 1980s,

Sikh students in the art of exegesis. Politics

among

the Sikhs

is

internalized bv referring to the religious history of the panth or

writings of the Sikh masters.

The vocabulary of

society are rooted in perceived Sikh experience. is

unimportant.

It is

not from

the Russian revolution

always explained and

by quoting from the

political discourse

is

and the goals of

What happens outside

models of structural change

— that inspiration

sought.

Nor

is

that experience

— the French or

there an echo of the Indian

from colonial rule. Rather, political mobilization and the search on Sikh texts and semantics. In recasting the world, Sikh today look to the emergence and consolidation of the Sikh movement for

struggle for freedom for justice

militants

classical

ability to ex-

most important

is

their theorv

solely based

and

practice.

SIKH FUNDAMENTALISM 279

But

it

would be wrong

to

draw from

all

fundamentalism was inevitable and a logical be oversimplistic to ascribe the

bv

tradition

rise

conclusion that the

this the

result

of the Sikh

of Nazism to German

Much

past.

rise

as

of Sikh

it

would

tradition, similarly Sikh

no explanation for the formation of Sikh fundamentalism. Funmodern ideology, and while it voraciously appropriates the past, the

itself is

damentalism

is

a

success of Sikh fundamentalism

is

to be traced to the massive crisis in contemporary

Indian society.

Conclusion: The Impact of Sikh Fundamentalism

I

am

when the influence of Sikh The last decade in the Punjab

writing the conclusion to this chapter in late 1991,

fundamentalism seems to be stronger than ever before. belonged

in

many ways

Not only did

to Sikh fundamentalists.

agenda within the province, but their impact was

felt all

they define the public

across India.

One of the main

1984 parliamentary elecposed by Sikh fundamentalists to India's security and na-

planks in the Congress party's electoral strategy during the tions addressed the threat

tionhood. After winning the elections the Congress spent

its

term

in office

grappling

with the issue throughout the 1980s.

The appeal of Sikh fundamentalism was demonstrated during

the

December 1989

Of the thirteen candidates elected from the Punjab, six were from the Akali Dal (the Mann faction) and two others, elected from Amritsar and Ferozepur, were closely aligned to this party. These eight candidates won largely beparliamentary elections.

cause of the efforts of the All-India Sikh Students Federation (hereafter AISSF).

AISSF

closely tied to the

is

Damdami

the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The

Taksal and has served as

its

The

political front in

legitimacy conferred bv the fundamentalist Taksal

enabled Akali Dal (Mann) candidates to trounce the contestants from the Congress party and from the other

As the

two Akali

factions

authoritative discourse in the Punjab;

Sikh ethnonationalism. tional political parties

is

on

a variety

tions. In

ASR

as their

of issues ranging from

1991 Sikhs

has

it

become an autonomous and an subsumed other ideologies, particularly

What once was the exclusive preserve of the state and convennow being increasingly usurped bv fundamentalists. With the

broad policy outlines of the tions

— the Badal and Longowal groups.

election demonstrated, fundamentalism has

all

framework, Sikh fundamentalists take posipolitical

economy

to federal-provincial rela-

over Punjab, in increasing numbers, turn to fundamentalist

organizations to settle land claims, labor disputes, marital discord, and numerous

other collective and personal problems.

The

discourse of Sikh fundamentalism

is

no longer simply rooted

in the material

conditions of the Punjab. Although these conditions continue to sustain

mentalism

is

quickly maturing as an ideology and

solutions for the everyday

life

offers

funda-

seemingly attractive

of both the weak and the powerful. In relating to

contemporary struggles fundamentalism sibility,

now

it,

tackles lasting questions

morality, will, faith, righteousness,

and

of freedom, respon-

collective discipline. It envisions a

Harjot Oberoi 280

state

of

own, where

its

sphere and remake

do not

tions

it

polity,

would reign supreme

in

economy, and

Nonfundamentalist Sikh organiza-

society.

both the private and the public

possess a grand paradigm of transformation to challenge the religious

idealism of the Sikh radicals.

Moreover, the extensive coverage given to Sikh fundamentalists by the print and the broadcast media cause.

What

made people

registered the

all

over India familiar with Bhindranwale and his

most about him and

was

his allies, perhaps,

their ability to

bring India under a state of siege. Fundamentalist Sikhs presented a powerful model for those

who wanted

definitive study

is

the attention of the Indian establishment.

When

written on the history of fundamentalisms in India,

one day

ample connections between Sikh fundamentalism and similar ideologies

Hindu and Muslim

populations. There

tween the Sikh case and the upsurge

is

an obvious connection, for example, be-

Muslim fundamentalism

in

a

show among

will

it

in

Jammu and

Kash-

mir, a province neighboring Punjab.

As long

Sikh fundamentalism embodies the resistance of a significant Sikh

as

population to the Indian nation-state,

it

remain a powerful discourse. However,

will

fundamentalists themselves have not fared quite as well politically as the message they

promote, and radical fundamentalists have poisoned the waters by sporadic violence and the threatened disruption of the electoral process.

beginning of this chapter,

acts

As mentioned

much of the dynamism of Sikh fundamentalism

of

at the

to date has

been generated by an oppositional stance rather than by the construction of

specific

programs to remedy the economic plight of dispossessed Sikh workers. The

active

membership of the Damdami Taksal has always been miniscule, and even today, when it is at the height of its popularity, its cadres do not exceed a few thousand. The 1989 parliamentary election results demonstrated the influence of the fundamentalists, but

did not assure their political hegemony. Sikhs voted for Akali Dal (Mann) because

most

effectively articulated their resistance to the ruling

of what the Indian nation-state should look candidates

who won

like.

Congress

part}'

and

its

it

model

But only one among the thirteen

these elections belonged to the

Damdami

Taksal.

Moreover, the

(Mann) secured only 30.47 percent of the total votes polled in the elections. 67 Its archrival, the Congress party, was not far behind, with 26.49 percent of the votes. In Rajasthan, where Akali Dal (Mann) contested the provincial elections, all nine of its

Akali Dal

candidates

lost.

68

Numerically, Sikh fundamentalists remain a minority bv any count.

What empowers all

this

those

minority

who defy its project, Sikhs who are suspect in

those

ism are

their morality.

While ideologues of Sikh fundamentalu

still

in

The continued movement

necessary for a

to be seen if

,,

their firm

advocacy of

who proposes a critical textual now deemed revealed and thus beyond

makes them quickly attack anyone

of Sikh sacred writings. These are

rational discourse.

may be

trenchant opposition to the Indian state and

the process of formulating Sikh fundamentals,

scriptural inerrancy

analysis

is its

including secularists, communists, collaborators, and

fortification

of an absolutist rendering of Sikhism

that remains oppositional in nature, but

it

remains

such a rendering will inspire the formulation of concrete economic and

political reforms.

SIKH FUNDAMENTALISM 281

Acknowledgments In seeking to understand the nature and dynamic of the Sikh universe under fundamentalist rule,

have tried as

I

my

far as possible to base

on tape-recorded

essav

speeches and discourses of Sikh preachers like Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwalc and

Darshan Singh Ragi.

Much

of

this material

is

only available in Punjabi. Since these

speeches were not systematically recorded, thev are cited here without anv detailed references.

But

am grateful

to

have

I

all

on audio- and videotapes.

the primary materials cited here

I

John Garvey, Bruce Lawrence, R. Scott Appleby, Mark Juergensmeyer,

Susana Devalle, Gerald Larson, Gurudharm Singh, Joyce Pettigrcw, W. H. McLeod,

Gene Thursby, and Barbara Jung for demanding criticisms. The usual disclaimers apply. Jerrv Barrier,

and

their thoughtful suggestions

Notes 1.

came what

On how

the term "fundamentalism"

ism

(Irvine,

Calif.:

Community of

Sikh

and it encompasses, see George M. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture: The Shaping of Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism (New York: Oxford University Press,

North America, 1989),

1980).

Bruce B. Lawrence, Defenders of God (New York: Harper and Row, 1989), p. 105.

to be used in the United States

2.

For instance, see Kirpal Singh Azad,

Mulvad Bare (Regarding Sikh Funda-

mentalism) (Chandigarh, 1988).

4.

Mann, "Compilation of Punjabi Sikh Review 37 (1989): 57.

Gurdev Singh,

ed., Perspectives on the

Sikh Tradition (Patiala: Siddharth Publica-

3-11. In

tions, 1986), especially pp.

view supporting the conclusions of book, Trilochan Singh

go on remaining

all

the basis of

.

.

.

are

matters but

of

and scriptures

compulsive skepticism

[read critical historical

and

textual scholar-

"A Critique of W. H. McLeod's Books on Sikh History, Trilochan

Singh,

Religion and Traditions," Sikh Review 36

(May 1988): 5-18. 5.

Daljeet Singh, "Issues of Sikh Studin

"Two

Poles of Akali

June 1983,

1

p. 5.

Jasbir

Singh Saron,

Singh

eds.,

Mann

Advanced

8.

I

have avoided the subject of violence, it is

of Sikh

irrelevant to a study

fundamentalism but simply because I want to focus on the motives and objectives of the

movement

ponents')

rather than

tactics.

Those

its

(and

its

op-

interested in the

problem may wish to consult Mark Juergens-

silent in the face

historical traditions, doctrines

ies,"

article

Times of India,

meyer, "The Logic of Religious Violence:

such nasty and malevolent attacks on Sikh

ship]."

Politics,"

this

thev are not so insensitive and stupid dunces

on

my

talism in

a re-

"The Sikhs

states:

very tolerant and liberal in

as to

explored the millenarian and

first

prophetic aspects of current Sikh fundamen-

not because

K. S.

Poetry',"

I

21.

7.

Sikh

3.

6.

p.

and Harbans Studies in Sikh-

The Case of

the Punjab," Contributions

to

Indian Sociology 22 (1988): 65-88.

Ganda Singh, ed., Some Confidential Movement (Amritsar: Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, 9.

Papers of the Akali

1965), 10.

p. 11.

For background on Sikh

politics dur-

ing this period, see K. L. Tuteja, Sikh

(1920-40)

(Kurukshetra:

Vishal

Politics

Publica-

tions, 1984).

11. This puzzle is generally attributed to Master Tara Singh. See Spokesman 1 1, no. 27 (1961): 10, quoted in B. R. Nayar, Minority Politics in the

Punjab (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1966), p. 102.

:

Harjot Oberoi 282

12.

For

details, see

Paul Brass, Language,

and Politics in North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 277-366; Joyce Pettigrew, "The Growth of Sikh Communitv Consciousness, 1947— 66," South Asia 3 (1980): 42-62; and Robin Jeffrey, What's Happening to India? (London: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 36-45.

Religion

13.

On how the Congress high command

Hijacker (in Punjabi) (Oslo:

p.

301.

For an excellent analysis of the 1979

17.

SGPC

elections, see Surinder Suri

rinder Dogra,

in

eds., Political Dynamics Punjab (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1988), pp. 123-34; and Robin Jeffrey, What's Happening to India? p.

Crisis in

138.

from Link, 10 August 1990; and Sucha Singh Gill, "Contradictions of Punjab Model of Growth and Search for an 18. Figures

14. So far two theories have been put forward to account for the foundation of the

Alternative," Economic

Dal Khalsa. According to Mark Tully,

23 (1988): 2167.

sion Books, 1984), p. 32, the Dal Khalsa

was

set

up by Giani

Zail Singh, a longtime

chief minister of the Punjab and later a federal

home

minister, to harass the Akalis.

other view spired bv

is

that the Dal Khalsa

Kapur Singh,

The

was

in-

of Sikh

a veteran

How

19.

of Khalistan) (Oslo: Guru Nanak Institute of Sikh Studies, 1988), p. 307. Although

Singh

been under the influence of the Congress, support the Congress

thesis.

By

the early

1980s the Dal Khalsa was closely aligned with Bhindranwale, and several of

its

mem-

Green Revolution further

(

20. These figures Gill,

Model of Growth,"

p.

"Contradictions

Growth,"

p.

22. Sucha

15.

I

lem,"

my

on

reading of Satnam Singh's deposition

before a Pakistani judge in the case of a hijacking of a plane to Lahore

on 29 Septem-

Punjab

of

Singh

Gill,

and

in

Chopra,

Paul

transcript

of

produced

in

Khalsa

and

also

his lengthy deposition

a

The is

re-

Harjinder Singh Dilgeer, Sikh

Impli-

and Surendara Dynamics and Crisis in

Wallace

eds., Political

Punjab, pp. 441-42. 23. G. S. Bhalla, and G. K. Chadha, "Green Revolution and the Small Peasants: A Study of Income Distribution in the Pun-

2 parts, Economic and Political Weekly

member of member of

Dal

of

— an Enquiry into the Punjab Prob-

17(1982): 826-33,870-77.

executive committee.

Gill,

"Development

jab," in

the

Model

Its Political

ber 1981. Satnam Singh was a founding

its

Punjab

2167.

cations

ing observations on Dal Khalsa thinking,

of

2168.

21. Punjab da Kisani Masla (in Punjabi),

Airlines plane in order to have Bhindranwale

base this statement, and the follow-

based on Sucha

13 March 1984, cited in Sucha Singh

Crisis in Agriculture

from prison.

are

"Contradictions

bers were involved in hijacking an Indian

released

Weekly

is bv now well esThere is a vast literature on this theme. For instance, see S. S. Johl, "Gains of Green Revolution: How Thev Have Been Shared in the Punjab," Journal of Development Studies 11 (1975): 178-89; and T. J. Byres, "The New Technology, Class Formation and Class Action in the Indian Countryside," Journal of Peasant Studies 8 198 1 )

405-54.

the later history of the organization does not

Political

tablished.

and a leading advocate for a Sikh For this theory, see Harjinder Singh Dilgeer, Khalistan di Tawarikh (The History

some members of the Dal Khalsa mav have

the

and

enriched rich cultivators

state.

politics

Elec-

Paul Wallace and

Surendara Chopra,

and wreck Akali-led governments in the Punjab, see Paul R. Brass, "The Punjab Crisis and Unity of India," in Atul Kohli, ed., India's Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 169-213.

don: Pari Books, 1985), p. 60, and Kuldip Nayar, in Tragedy ofPunjab (New Delhi: Vi-

and Na-

"A Study of the SGPC

March 1979,"

tions,

and

Amritsar, Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle (Lon-

In-

Harjinder Singh Dilgeer, Khalistan di

16.

Tawarikh,

has persistently sought to split the Akali Dal

in

Guru Nanak

of Sikh Studies, 1989), pp. 130-96.

stitute

24.

On how

the Akali Dal favored rich

peasants, see A. S. Narang, Storm over the Sutlej:

The Akali

Politics

(New

Delhi: Gitan-

— SIKH FUNDAMENTALISM 283

jali

Publishing House, 1983), pp. 198-99.

25. Ronald

Land

Herring,

J.

to the Tiller:

Economy of Agrarian Reform in South Asia (New Haven: Yale University The

Political

health services in the Punjab. This group

H.

Power

T.

33. Panthic Committee,

in the

partment,

Origin of the Sikh

Prinsep,

Punjab

1970,

(Patiala:

Languages De-

published Calcutta,

first

27. G. Forster,

A Journey from

Bengal

and translated from Punjabi in Gopal Singh, Punjab Today (New Delhi: Intellectual

ed.,

(London: R. Faulder, 1798),

p.

34.

to

England through North India, Kashmir, Afghanistan and Persia into Russia, 1783-84, 2 Vols.

"Document of

the Declaration of Khalistan," reproduced

Publishing House, 1987), pp. 389-91.

p. 17.

1834),

is

Committee

the Panthic

as

(Sohan) and has the support of the powerful and well-armed Babbar Khalsa.

Press, 1983), p. 2.

26.

known

widely

286.

The

All-India Sikh Student Federa-

was founded

tion

inception

it

in

1944. Almost from

its

functioned as a student wing of

Dormant during

the Akali Dal.

the 1970s,

it

shot into fame in the early 1980s under Bhai

Robber Noblemen

Pettigrew,

28. Joyce

(New

Delhi:

Ambika

Publications, 1978),

p. 57.

29. Joyce Pettigrew, "In Search of a

New

Kingdom of Lahore," Pacific Affairs 60 (1987): 1-25; Mark Juergensmever, "The Logic of Religious Violence: The Case of the Punjab," Contributions

to

Indian Sociology

22 (1988): 65-88; and T N. Madan, "The Double-Edged Sword: Fundamentalism and the Sikh Religious Tradition," in Martin E. Mart)' and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 594-627. 30. Interview with

M.

J.

Akbar, cited

Amrik Singh,

has been very active in

Sikh politics, and

at

the

Penguin

Books,

and Social Change," and Gertrud Lenzer,

(New

Jersey:

in

Norman Birnbaum

eds., Sociology

Prentice Hall,

and Re1969),

240.

The

Mehta-

Quoted in Pritam Singh, "Two Facof Revivalism: A Defence," in Gopal Singh, ed., Punjab Today, pp. 173-74. 35.

36.

"Document of

the

Declaration

of

Khalistan," in Gopal Singh, ed., Punjab Today, p. 390.

37. Article

25 of the Indian constitution

Subject to public order, morality and

health and to other provisions of this Part,

persons are equally entitled to freedom of

conscience and the right freelv to profess,

31. Yonina Talmon, "Pursuit of the Mil-

32.

there are at

(1)

ets

1985),

lennium: The Relation between Religious

p.

moment

factions:

(4) Gurjit Singh.

in

185.

ligion

major

Chawla, (2) Manjit Singh, (3) Daljit-Bittoo,

all

p.

four

least

stipulates the following:

book, India: The Siege Within (Har-

mondsworth:

of Bhindran-

it

1.

his

a close associate

wale. Since then

and propagate religion. Nothing in this article shall affect the op-

practise 2.

eration of any existing law or prevent the state (a)

from making any law

regulating or restricting any economic,

financial, political

Panthic Committee, a leading

organization

within

movement, was

the

Sikh

resistance

up in January 1986. Its was made up of a fivemember collective, among whom the most well known is Gurbachan Singh Manochahal. The armed wing of the older Panthic Committee is known as the Bhindranwale Tiger Force. The Panthic Committee also has the support of the Khalistan Commando Force. Sometime in mid- 1989 the Panthic Committee split and a new faction emerged under Dr. Sohan Singh, a retired director of set

original leadership

or other secular activity

which may be associated with

religious

practice; (b) providing for social welfare

and reform

or the throwing open of Hindu religious stitutions

of

a public character to

all

in-

classes

and sections of Hindus. The wearing and carrying of

Explanation I

Kirpans

shall

—

be deemed to be included

in

the profession of the Sikh religion.

Explanation II

— In sub-clause

2, the reference to

Hindus

(b)

of clause

shall

be con-

structed as including a reference to persons

professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist

reli-

.

Harjot Oberoi 284 gion, and reference to

Hindu

on

38. For a seminal article

46. For an eleven-point

religious insti-

of Sant Nir-

list

ankari religious practices and doctrines that

tutions shall be construed accordingly.

the origin

and evolution of the rahit-nama literature, W. H. McLeod, "The Problem of the

see

orthodox Sikhs find objectionable, see Sikhism

and

Movement

the Nirankari

Guru Nanak Dev Mission,

(Patiala:

n.d.), pp.

45-50.

Panjabi Rahit-namas," in S. N. Mukherjee,

47. Sikh fundamentalists were not alone

and Thought: Essays in Basham (Calcutta: Subarna1982), pp. 103-26.

karis' practicing their religious traditions in

Kahn

Fauja Singh, had this to say of the Sant Nir-

History

ed., India,

Honour ofA. rekha, 39.

Mohan

L.

Kosh, 4th ed.

Department, 1981), 40.

Gursabad Ratanakar

Singh,

p.

(Patiala:

Languages

W. H. McLeod, "The Problem of the At present there

of

reli-

the Sikhs.

at the Golden Temple one of them. The other four are Harimandir in Patna, Kesgarh Sahib in Anandpur, Hazur Sahib in Nander, and

Akal Takhat Sahib

Sri in

Amritsar

Damdama

is

Sahib in Bhatinda.

42. For a concise examination of these ambiguities, see

pp.

W. H. McLeod, Who Clarendon

(Oxford:

Sikh?

ankaris:

Press,

karis

the

are five seats

among

Is

a

1989),

The

K's are: kesa (unshorn hair),

comb), kara

kanga

(a

kachh

(short

sword). Since

(a

breeches),

bracelet),

steel

and

kirpan

(a

the five external symbols

all

begin with the letter K, they are collectively termed the five K's. They are considered mandatory for Khalsa Sikhs. 44. For background to the 1971 legislation and the

new

definition, see Attar Singh,

"The Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee and the Politicization of the Sikhs," in Joseph T. O'Connell et

Sikh History

and

al.,

eds.,

Religion in the Twentieth

Century (Toronto: Center for South Asian Studies, 1988), pp.

Kaur, The

Politics

226-32; and

Gurdwara

(New

Delhi: National

45.

p.

The

best

the Nirankaris in

John C. B. WebThe Nirankari Sikhs (Delhi: Macmillan, 1979). Also see Surjit Kaur Jolly, Sikh Revivalist Movements (New Delh:: Gitanjali Publishing House, 1988). ster,

is

Sant Niran-

all

right thinking Indians. In

name of spiritualism and brotherhood of

ritsar,

a

account of

this

Tully and Satish Jacob,

Am-

journalistic

Mark

Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle, pp. 58-60.

The orthodox Sikh put forward

in

on this clash is and the Nirankari

position

Sikhism

Movement, pp. 32-35. 49.

The

entire text

reproduced

in

of

this encyclical

is

Satinderpaul Singh Kapur,

Bhindranwale (Jalandar: Bharti Publishers, 1984;

first

50. See

published, 1983), pp. 173-74.

Edward

Said, Orientalism

(New

York: Vintage Books, 1979), and Johannes Fabian, Time ogy

Makes

and

Its

the Other:

Object

(New

How Anthropol-

York: Columbia

University Press, 1983). 5 p.

1

Sikhism

and

the Nirankari

Movement,

40. 52. For this official histon\ see "Anand-

Book Organization,

work on

[their] principles

in actual practice the

Dal [Nakli Nirankari] has become a

clash, see

A

242.

the nineteenth century

historian,

Jatinder

Study of Delhi Management Committee

of Sikhs:

Sikh

1986),

"Whatever mav be

48. For five

prominent Sikh

man, all moral values which are the bedrock of human society, particularly Indian society, have been thrown to the winds. Naturally this is causing heavy damage to our society, to our whole value svstem and it is high time that effective steps were taken by the Government as well as bv the people to ban all these objectionable activities of these Nakli Nirankaris. "Sikbism and the Nirankari Movement," p. 31.

93-97.

43.

A

the Punjab.

challenge to

Panjabi Rahit-namas," pp. 110-11. 41.

wanting to put an end to the Sant Niran-

on paper,

1015.

gious/temporal authority

in

pur Sahib Resolution Authenticated by Sant Harchand Singh Longowal," in Government of India's White Paper on the Punjab Agitation, n.d., pp.

53.

70-71.

Ronald Barthes defines

work conceived, perceived and its

integrally

a text as "a

received in

symbolic nature," in "From

:

SIKH FUNDAMENTALISM 285

Work

to Text," Image-Music-Text

Fontana, 1984),

(London:

159.

p.

54. For instance, see M. J. Akbar, India: The Siege Within (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985), pp. 178-79, and Rajiv

And

if the Akali leaders try to compromise on the Anandpur Sahib resolution I'm not going to forgive them. I will be vour watch dog but I tell you as watch dog that vou will

have to force the Akalis! But don't think as can

everything

A. Kapur, Sikh Separatism (London: Allen

in the past, leaders

andUnwin, 1986),

Delhi or by taking a glass of juice on their

p.

219.

Robin Jeffrey, What's Happening India? pp. 126-27. 55.

56. This view, for instance,

bv Kulwant Singh

in S.

57.

The following

ous versions of the

advanced

Kapur Singh

Punjabi University, 1988),

ala:

is

to

own

p. 10.

Kahn

Singh, Gursabad Ratankar

(Patiala:

ment, 1981),

compound word

p.

Languages

892.

A

Depart-

Punjabi-English

dictionary dating back to 1895, however, interprets the ently. It

word

somewhat

bolbale

differ-

and also states that the word was much used by faqirs and Brahmans as a mode of benediction. See Maya Singh, The Panjabi Dictionary, reprint (Patiala: Languages Department, 1972), p.

59. Press

statement

Singh on 27 April 1969 in

Gur Rattan

made

by

Kapur

at Jullundur, cited

Paul Singh, The Illustrated

History of the Sikhs (Chandigarh: published

by the author, 1979), pp. 109-10.

61. In a speech delivered at the

Golden

Temple, Bhindranwale stated, "You people

come and

of the

analysis

offer

me money,

love

and support.

36.

p. 12, n.

political

conditions and back-

prompted "The Punjab

stage center-state relations that

the

ASR,

Crisis

see Paul R. Brass,

and Unity of India,"

India's Democracy,

ed.,

close legal reading in

R.

ed.,

169-213. A ASR is to be found

Patwant Singh and Harji Maiik,

(New

Punjab: The Fatal Miscalculation published

Delhi: pp.

of the

in Atul Kohli,

pp.

Narula, "Anandpur Saheb Resolu-

S.

tion," in

by the author,

1985),

63-77.

63.

"Anandpur

Resolution AuHarchand Singh LonGovernment of India's White the Punjab Agitation, n.d.,

Sahib

thenticated by Sant

gowal," in

Paper pp.

on

72-73. p.

85.

65. Joyce Pettigrew, "In Search of a

Kingdom of Lahore,"

pp.

New

4-5.

66. For the following observations

I

am

indebted to Bernard Lewis, "Islamic Revolution,"

60. The Works of Lewis Carroll (Feltham: Spring Books, 1965), p. 174.

implementation of the

resolution or their heads."

Joyce Pettigrew, "In Search of a

in

64. Ibid.,

165.

This

in 1961].

62. For a detailed survey and refreshing

provides three English equivalents:

"prosperity, success, superiority,"

full

New Kingdom of Lahore,"

ASR is based on personal

(Lahore: Vanguard, 1987), pp. 460-65.

bolbala in

Either the

Anandpur Sahib Cited

on Sukhdev Singh, "Many Faces of a Resolution," Tribune, 13 September 1982; article reproduced in Ghani Jafar, The Sikh Volcano

Master Tara Singh aban-

unto death

his fast

in

time they can't give up bv taking a glass of

interviews with Sikh political leaders and

Mahan Kos

a reference to

juice.

(Pati-

discussion of the vari-

58. See the entrv for the

[

doning

settle

New

York Review ofBoob 34

(

1988)

46-50. 67. Figures based

1989,

to the

tion Bureau,

on General

Elections,

9th Lok Sabha, Press Informa-

Government of India,

p.

68. Times ofIndia, 9 July 1990, p.

72. 1.

Restructuring Economies

CHAPTER 13

Fundamentalisms and the Economy

Timur Kuran

IVlanv fundamentalist movements have an their participants want to enrich them-

economic agenda. This means not that selves

— which thev might and often do — but that thev wish to restructure economic

systems to conform with the stipulations of their respective religions. So

it is

that

we

hear of Christian economics, Buddhist socialism, and Islamic banking.

To

the untrained eve, the economic agendas of the major fundamentalisms will

seem worlds

apart. After

all,

each agenda draws on a distinct philosophical heritage

and features a unique mode of discourse. in

And

almost no interchange of ideas or methods.

the involved fundamentalisms engage

One

can read thousands of pages of

Islamic economics without encountering a single reference to Christian economics,

and vice

versa. Yet

such economic doctrines share the objective of supplanting secular

economic thought. This mutual isolation

nomic doctrine religion.

is

rooted in two factors.

takes for granted the correctness

First,

each fundamentalist eco-

and unrivaled superiority of its

Thus, no Christian economist would trv to resolve

consulting Deendayal Upadhyaya's Integral

Humanism,

own

biblical ambiguities

a cornerstone

bv

of Hindu eco-

nomics. Second, each doctrine employs a distinct form of expression that outsiders can penetrate onlv with training. Integral ism.

A

Christian economist

Humanism would be overwhelmed by

The mutual

insularity

its

who

chooses to leaf through

esoteric terminology

and svmbol-

of these doctrines stands in sharp contrast to the acknowl-

edged awareness and manifest openness of each to secular economic thought. As the following essavs demonstrate, fundamentalist economic doctrines borrow heavily

from the verv

intellectual traditions they ostensibly

aim to supplant: Marxian

social-

ism and diverse secular traditions that promote a market order. In terms of substance, the economic blueprints contained in these doctrines exhibit

some important

differences.

The

elimination of interest

289

is

a

supreme objective of Is-

Timur Kuran 290

lamic economics but

is

Hindu economics. Buddhist economics

hardlv an issue in

encourages the construction of shrines, a matter alien to Christian economics. Against such substantive differences, there are major commonalities in their messages, rhe-

A

and pragmatic adaptations.

torical tendencies,

sketch of these commonalities will

help place in context the essays of part 2 and sensitize the reader to their shared

themes.

Two

of the following four essavs deal with the fundamentalist doctrines of Islam

and Protestant Christianity,

The other two

upon

faiths that rest

authoritative scriptural foundations.

essavs analyze the fundamentalist doctrines

on canonized

ism, faiths less dependent

of Buddhism and Hindu-

scripture but firmly rooted in traditional belief

and behavior. shall refer to these doctrines collectively as

I

use of this term

is

The The term

"fundamentalist economics."

not meant to obscure the particularities of

its

variants.

"neoclassical

economics" groups together various economic traditions that share

common

of concerns, assumptions, and methods. In the same

set

mav

"fundamentalist economics"

name

serve as a generic

spirit,

a

the term

for a rather diverse cluster

of doctrines that are formally unrelated but share a professed, though not necessarily exercised, opposition to secular

moreover, on a

common

religious sources.

economic

aspiration to

Nor does

and practices

ideals

ground economic prescriptions

the term encompass

gion. While fundamentalist economics

is

all

whose work draws

inspiration

use the term "Buddhist economist,"

from I

in normative

economic thinking linked to

reli-

necessarily religious economics, the converse

does not hold. Bv implication, a "fundamentalist economist" mist

— an opposition based,

mean an

is

who economist who

religion or

one

is

not merely an econoreligious.

So when

I

subscribes to Buddhist

fundamentalist economics, not just any economist of the Buddhist faith or one influ-

enced bv Buddhist teachings. Before tion

is

in

we

set

out to characterize fundamentalist economics, one more

order as to what

it is

backward -looking theologians Utopia.

Although

driven, as

we

its

rhetoric

shall see,

not. Fundamentalist

who

see

economics

is

clarifica-

not the creation of

and seek nothing but the glories of some past

mav convey

a desire to restore lost social virtues,

it is

bv concerns related to contemporary phenomena. Funda-

mentalist economics does not oppose mastery over the physical universe, discourage

temporal prosperity, or glorify poverty.

It is

cism, stoicism, or monasticism. Tertullian thers

mav have denounced

Christian economics

is

no

not the economics of renunciation,

(160-223

c.E.)

asceti-

and other Christian Fa-

the acquisitive instinct as the sin of covetousness,

revolt against property

1

but

and no conspiracy against economic

growth. Nor does fundamentalist economics stand for the leveling of economic achievements. While there far as to talist

our

is

an egalitarian streak in each of its variants, none goes so

oppose earthly rewards for

effort or

economics does not preach that

factories,

demonstrated

faith alone will

and build our highways. Islamic economics

both worldly and otherworldly happiness, but

day

as the

it

talent. Finally,

put bread on our

fundamen-

tables, operate

treats faith as essential to

does not view praving

five

times a

key to material prosperity.

Fundamentalist economics

is

largely a reaction to perceived injustices in existing

FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE ECONOMY 291

economic svstems and to transformations engendered bv the

industrial revolution, the

expansion of government, and the information revolution. The perception place in both rich

economicallv ties,

and poor

societies

— and not simplv

— that modernization has corrupted

compartmentalized

the premodern

human knowledge, and

economv with

common-

left

behind

communi-

individuals, torn apart

replaced the fraternal atmosphere of

either the ruthless competition

of the marketplace or

the equallv bitter competition over public resources.

The propensitv

form of competition

espcciallv

prime cause for alarm

as the

is

segments

in their

is

to view the latter

pronounced

in Protes-

whose American exponents identity closclv with the ideals of the American republic. The Christian economists of America tend to be troubled bv manv new forms of economic regulation, which thev sec as endangering cherished market freedoms. The contrarv tendenev to see market competition as a threat, as opposed to a fading virtue, is most apparent in Hindu economics and in the Burmese tant Christian economics,

variant of Buddhist economics.

The books,

articles,

and pamphlets that constitute the corpus of fundamentalist

economic thought do not alwavs capture the its

development.

One

needs to

of fundamentalist writers

Hindu economics

is

in

know

full

spectrum of factors instrumental to

the historical context to understand the motives

their complexity.

all

As Deepak

Lai's essav explains,

economv

driven bv a desire to keep India's traditionallv closed

highlv protected from foreign competition. This policv serves the interests of the

shopkeepers, professionals, and

quo, but

it

civil

servants with a stake in perpetuating the status

hurts the broader mass of consumers. Islamic economics

ponent of a wider

revivalist

movement

is

just

one com-

that aims to break the domination of Western

thought over Muslim minds and thus restore the Islamic community's sense of superiority.

Manv

recent contributions to Islamic economics obscure this elementary

tivation, creating the impression that

Buddhist economics features,

it

aims simplv to promote justice and

as the essav

by Charles Kcves demonstrates,

stipulations that protect the socioeconomic status is

more

of Buddhist monks.

Its

mo-

efficiency.

a host

of

stated goal

noble: to liberate the individual from the shackles of materialism. Finallv,

from libertarian economics, although some two are equivalent. Laurence Iannacconc's essav Christian economists are opposed not to government per se but, more

Protestant Christian economics

is

distinct

writings give the impression that the indicates that specifically, to

tegic

secular state's

However talist

un-Christian government. Their embrace of libertarian ideals

move aimed

partlv at coalition building

economic

and partly

at

a stra-

base.

thev differ in their misgivings about recent economic trends, fundamen-

economists

all

believe that the

ills

of modern

civilization are

degeneration. Irreligious government and secular education have selfishness

is

weakening the incumbent

untamed,

his

rooted in moral

left

the individual's

ambitions unchartered, and his noble instincts uncultivated.

Accordingly, behavioral reform through moral uplift figures prominently on the

agenda of every variant of fundamentalist economics. In one form or another, each encourages people to bring the social interest into their economic calculations, pro-

motes the display of generosity, and

from waste.

insists

on the

individual's obligation to refrain

Timur Kuran 292

Modern economics, which grew out of the works of David Hume, Adam Smith, and other luminaries of the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment, puts emphasis on morally or proposition

is

motivated individual behavior.

socially

who

that people

own economic

are free to pursue their

economic

by

activities fueled

yield substantial social gains,

collective

instincts

good

posits

unintended and often unforeseen by-products.

as

a radically different view. In the belief that

economic thought exaggerates the by the baser

It

and even ostentation

selfishness, greed, avarice,

though

Fundamentalist economics takes

make

objectives

choices beneficial not just to themselves but also to the wider community. that

little

most celebrated

Its

modern

from economic pursuits motivated

social returns

and greatly underestimates the

social losses,

requires the individual to subordinate his

own

asserts that the

it

interests to those

of the

wider community. This position

rests implicidy,

but

on

critically,

the assumption that the individual

can easily identify the collectively optimal course of action. existence of choices

where

this

condition

is

No

met. If you have your finger

nator of a nuclear bomb, you can figure out effortlessly that for

you to

from pressing the button. But

refrain

where the

sions

collectively optimal choice

considering whether to build a

you construct the

factory,

you

new

is

might be forced to

action

is

may

in

will create

new

face

many

deci-

some

large city. If

some

and existing

deaths,

fertilizer

lay-off workers. Here, the collectively optimal course

with those of others

who

altruistic

easily figure

and authoritatively interpreted

embodied

out what

through

The

religion.

in revelation

are,

least

is

unselfish.

downplavs the

socially optimal, It insists,

strict

signifi-

on ordinary

provided thev

moreover, that these

adherence to divinely revealed

wellspring of economic legitimacy

and

of

your judgment

latter type. It asserts that

have noble intentions and the right frame of mind. crucial characteristics are cultivated only

you

meaning and

are equally well

economic choices of the

economic matters people can

the divine will, as

the deto-

jobs and probably enrich yourself; but

Fundamentalist economics denies the existence, or at cance, of complex

we

life

synthetic fertilizer factory in

not obvious: however well intentioned and

conflict

everyday

on

in society's interest

it is

hardly self-evident. Suppose you are

the fumes emitted by the factory might cause plants

one would deny the

in faculties

is

thus

acquired through faith and

devotion. Implicit in this view

is

the notion of a unique legitimate choice, as opposed to

manv, equally legitimate choices. Right, relative

just,

and good are absolute concepts, not

ones over which informed, reasonable, benevolent people might disagree.

Thus, where modern economics attempts to compensate for the individual's informational deficiencies by absolving him of the need to forecast the social consequences

of

his possible actions, fundamentalist

texts

economics does so by pointing to religious

or traditions as the appropriate behavioral blueprint.

Within each variant of fundamentalist economics one can find positions and specific

statements that blur this contrast.

Most

strikingly, Christian

economics holds

high regard various secular writings on the market's role as mediator ing individual claims, notably the works of Friedrich

This

is

in

among compet-

Hayek and Ludwig von Mises.

not to say that Christian economics concedes the deficiency of Christian teach-

FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE ECONOMY 293

ings as a guide to

between its

its

economic behavior.

embrace of the market

tions.

which

Simplification

as

come

to terms with the inconsistency

an institution that obviates the need to find these solu-

interpretations.

efficiency starts

from

of fundamentalist econom-

in cvcrv variant

shall return.

I

common

is

tual current features thinkers

and

has not

There are such unresolved tensions

a point to

ics,

It

claim that the Bible offers solutions to complex economic problems and

A

to

all

neoclassical

a set

thought, religious and secular.

And

every intellec-

convinced of the correctness of their answers, solutions,

economist exploring

how

to improve

of simplifying assumptions supplied bv

government

his discipline.

Com-

bining these with observations and logic, he concludes that one should restrict the

government's

ability'

to offer the very basis

of

does

this neoclassical economist's

who happens

from that of a Christian economist

same prescription? Each proposes

of action on the

a distinct course

open to modification, assuming, of course,

his proposal

adherent to the central

the obligation to ited

differ, if at all,

thought process that begins from vast simplifications. The neoclassical

a

economist keeps faithful

How

to run budget deficits.

approach to the world

scientific principle

abandon hypotheses,

by new findings. For

of

his school

analytical procedures,

his part, a Christian

economist

that he

is

a

of thought, namely,

and conclusions discred-

loyal to the spirit

of his

own

school treats his conclusions as fixed whenever he considers these to be rooted in the Bible, God's inerrant guide to the correct It

would appear,

natives in terms tions.

Where

budget part, if

of

its

from

its

secular alter-

responsiveness to information inconsistent with adopted posi-

a neoclassical

deficits

economic order.

then, that fundamentalist economics differs

economist might come to recognize that the benefits from

sometimes outweigh

their costs, his Christian fundamentalist counter-

he considers the Bible to speak to the issue and thus to provide

boundaries for analysis,

is

less

inflexible

prepared to change his mind, even in the face of highly

inhospitable empirical evidence.

Once

again, the contrast

practice. Christian

between the two schools of economics gets blurred

economics

is

unchangeable only

in theory.

As

in

a practical matter,

developments of the kind that influence the evolution of neoclassical economics also influence that of Christian economics.

thought

dynamic and the other

is

unabashedly economics, ter

all,

if

in neoclassical

lest a clear

the truths

So the kev

acknowledgment contradict the

embodied

Most

economist

that changes

static. It is

is

is

not that one system of

acknowledged openly and

economics can only be made surreptitiously in Christian

subject to erosion or change oxer time. It neoclassical

difference

Bible's

assumed

in Christian

inerrancy. Af-

economics are absolute, they cannot be is

also true,

no doubt,

that the typical

hardly a paragon of responsiveness to empirical evidence.

practicing neoclassical economists, like their peers in other secular disciplines,

abandon onlv with great

difficulty the

assumptions, methods, and ideas on which they

have staked their careers and reputations. converting the old guard than by outliving

To sum up

thus

far,

a just

secular paradigms

triumph

less

by

it.

Islamic, Christian,

Hindu, and Buddhist eco-

commitment to the idea of unchanging fundamentals economy must rest, not simply their insistence on giving religion a

nomics fundamentalist

on which

what renders

New

is

their

Timur Kuran 294

role in

economic matters. One can

work team or

in the

prescriptions and proscriptions

promote cooperation

believe that religious values

economic lessons

that religious traditions harbor valuable

— without

being a fundamentalist.

One

— even

enters the

realm of fundamentalism by insisting that the relevant teachings and injunctions are absolutely fixed

on

believers

draw

talism to

— never subject to disagreement or adaptation — and equally binding

and unbelievers inspiration

alike.

Accordingly,

it is

not a manifestation of fundamen-

from the economic experiences of the

earliest

Muslims

in

seventh-century Arabia. Such an interest in early Islam approximates fundamentalism

only to the extent that the historical practice.

known

record

knowledge and thus to provide

To

is

assumed to escape the limitations of

a timeless

1986

take another example, in their

normative basis for economic

pastoral letter

on the U.S. economy,

the American Catholic bishops keyed their teachings and the binding authority of their

words to the heterogeneity of their audience. They held Christians to

standard than non-Christians. Likewise,

on

spiritual

a higher

and economic matters they held

practicing Catholics to a higher standard than the general public, including nonprac-

These economic teachings are obviously Christian teachings, but

ticing Catholics.

they do not constitute fundamentalist economics. 2 talism considers

Divided

its

it is

contrast, Christian

of the

social

variants that trader, the

fundamen-

economic injunctions to be equally binding on everyone.

on

on

the merits of market competition and

need of disciplining, fundamentalist economics

stincts in tity

as

By

groups particularly

in

the competitive in-

also divided

is

on

the iden-

need of moral and behavioral reform. In

condemn market competition,

the prime villains of society include the

middleman, and the speculator. In those that glorify competition, they are

the bureaucrat, the social engineer, and the regulator.

But we must be cautious talist

economics forms

in

drawing such categories, for no variant of fundamen-

a logically tight

social thought, fundamentalist

all

and

system of thought. Like

fully consistent

economics partitions what

it

perceives as reality,

mind has the capacitv to incorporate all the and relationships that bear on human existence into one comprehenas neoclassical economics segments its domain of analysis using dif-

simply because no writer's or reader's diverse variables sive

model. Just

ferent

models

in

microeconomics than

macroeconomics, and

in

in labor

economics

than in industrial organization, so, too, fundamentalist economics applies to issues disparate clusters ics

of facts and

principles.

promotes both the market and

We have already seen how Christian econom-

biblical

commandments

as

guides to socially useful

economic behavior, but without recognizing the possibility of conflict, scribing

how

conflict

is

to be resolved. In the

same

vein,

some

let

alone pre-

texts in Islamic eco-

nomics feature long passages on the virtues of the market mechanism which suggest that price

movements

are vital to the equilibration of supply

texts contain other passages that instruct traders to refrain

and demand. These same

from taking advantage of

anticipated shortages through unjust price increases. There

tween these two is

classes

of passages, which

is

is

an inconsistency be-

that the equilibration lauded in the

first

obviated by the principle of the "just price" promoted by the second. Such incon-

sistencies point to the futility

of trying to place Islamic economics squarely

in the

FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE ECONOMY 295

two

pro- or antimarket camps. Islamic economics puts

although one or the other may be more prominent the

list

of immoral economic

from

activities varies

in

faces

on

the market process,

anv particular

text to text.

We

Likewise,

text.

will return to

such

divisions.

competition

If

is

one major theme to which fundamentalist economics

of individual morality, another

issue

nomic supply.

human wants

principles treats

physical resources,

The

as

challenge,

it

then informs,

is

demand

to maximize

subject to resource constraints. Large segments

amoral approach to the economic problem

this

morality. a fact

is

in favor

it

latter objective

would

reject

of one centered on individual

as a

human wants

problem rooted at

as

partly in

The obvious

to couple efforts to supply more consumables with efforts aimed

The

satisfaction

of fundamentalist economics

the standard textbook treats the unboundedness of

for them.

eco-

inevitably exceeds the possible

civilization's failure to control individual acquisitiveness.

demand

the

links the

modern textbook on

some index of social

of life, fundamentalist economics tends to view

modern tion

Where

typical

unbounded. Recognizing the boundedness of

argues that potential

it

The

scarcity.

is

solu-

curbing

involve inculcating the individual

with a sense of moderation.

The fundamentalist emphasis on tempering the individual's wants mav be characno known society has managed to dampen its mem-

terized as a Utopian agenda, for bers'

consumptive and acquisitive ambitions

nonsatiation. Every society features

some

sufficiently to eliminate the

individuals

committed to

problem of

a frugal lifestyle.

In South Asia ascetics, and in Christendom monks, offer prominent cases in point.

But nowhere has

been the

self-denial

rule.

This observation has a major implication: the objective of forming a temperate society provides the basis for a futility

of trying to eliminate

permanent critique of the economic order. Indeed, the all

unsatisfied wants gives fundamentalist

economics an

irremovable justification for demanding moral reform. For the sake of comparison, neoclassical

wants.

economics denies

By

itself the

authority to judge,

let

treating individual preferences as immutable,

nomic performance

To blame

entirely

society's

ills

onto resource

on

excessive wants

tween moderation and immoderation. In

menu of goods

nology, and

temperance

is

availability,

that are

all

is

alone to criticize, individual it

shifts the

burden of eco-

production, and distribution.

to claim an ability to distinguish be-

a static

economy with

fixed, a lasting

a population, tech-

consensus on the limits of

not out of the question. But in a dynamic economy where economic

possibilities are in flux, a

its inception. By number of radios per household settled at one, the would render this limit meaningless. A further complica-

consensus would be outdated almost from

the time the morally acceptable

invention of the transistor tion

lies in

the enormity of the variety of goods. People living beyond subsistence

enjoy a vast selection of spending outlets, including diverse learning opportunities, countless forms of leisure, a huge array of medical services, and a panoply of social

So consumption

may

among

and

political causes.

uals

of similar means, and with regard to any particular good one individual may

consume more than

patterns

van' substantially

individ-

the norm. Such heterogeneity of lifestyles constitutes an insur-

Timur Kuran 296

mountablc obstacle to achieving

a true consensus

on

the limits of moderation, even

under the most favorable condition where the goal of promoting moderation

is

very

widely shared. Like the notion of "just price" and the treatment of middlemen as exploiters, the search for limits of moderation rests

As

revolution.

a general objective

less differentiated

and

it is

on

a value

changeable than any in existence

far less

poorest and the most stagnant. In view of

economics to

treat

moderation

be seen as an atavism

—

system that predates the industrial

onlv in the context of an economy far

realistic

as a

this,

— even

less

than the

the tendencv within fundamentalist

major instrument for economic betterment should

of a slower and simpler age.

a longing for the cosy certainties

This theme receives further attention in Lai's essay on

Hindu economics.

Bv no means is fundamentalist economics the only branch of social thought that on individual moderation. Secular economic discourse is replete with

places emphasis

resource conservation and frugal living. Such

calls for

ingless or necessarily harmful.

Drawing

not uniformly mean-

calls are

attention to inefficient consumption patterns,

The point remains

they keep vitally important economic issues on the public agenda.

that consumptive inefficiencies cannot be eliminated only through individual tion. Realistically,

one needs to

rely heavily

on

modera-

the price system.

Fundamentalist economics berates secular economic doctrines for their

indiffer-

ence to the moral content of individual economic choices. The individual must be prevented,

from pursuing an immoral

it insists,

of the communitv. But what

for the welfare

lifestyle,

if

behaviors identified as immoral? Apart from redoubling damentalist economics

Most

obviously,

punishment.

it

both for

indoctrination its

own good and

his

fails

to eliminate the

educational efforts, fun-

may respond in one of several ways. may resort to repression, eliciting moral

behavior on pain of

A movement's coercive capacity depends, of course, on its political influ-

ence.

An

more

effective

indoctrination campaign backed by the state's coercive apparatus

than one undertaken in opposition to the

state.

This

is

is

generally

one reason why

fundamentalists advocating an economically limited state are anything but averse to taking control of the reins of government. Thus, Christian economists the welfare state and

much

industrial regulation see

government,

now

who oppose

an obstacle to

American economy according power would serve, of course, other objectives as well. noneconomic objectives like banning abortion constitute com-

their designs, as a potential vehicle for restructuring the

to their

own

morality. Political

As Iannaccone

argues,

plementary,

not more basic, motives for seeking control over the

if

state's

coercive

apparatus. If repression

is

immoral, another

one possible response to

failure to eliminate practices identified as

to look the other way,

and yet another to redefine the nefarious

is

practices as moral. Social facts

movements finding

their aspirations

thwarted by the cold

of human nature have routinely chosen to accommodate

Christianity, for instance, violations

reality.

In medieval

of the usury doctrine were either legalized

through clever stratagems or simply tolerated. 3

And

in the

surdity of trading at prices determined according to the

twentieth century the ab-

Marxian "labor theory of

FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE ECONOMY 297

value" has led

communist countries

to trade with

one another

at prices established in

capitalist-dominated outside markets. 4 Generally speaking, whenever rules are impossible

in

or impractical to follow, even bv a committed believer, thev will yield to reality

one manner or another. They

will either cease to

My

the law through semantic twists. vival est,

of ancient

legal fictions

aimed

and the production of new Redistribution

variants,

theme

a persistent

is

essay

on

at getting is

be enforced or be brought under

Islamic economics

around

a thriving pursuit in Islamic

materially well-off to assist the less fortunate. Yet

able.

are differences in the forms

There are

Not

in social discourse.

prominent concern of fundamentalist economics. All of

though there

shows how the

Islam's ostensible

none

its

ban on

banking.

surprisingly,

it is

a

variants encourage the

on

insists

full equality, al-

and grades of inequality considered

also differences in the degree

re-

inter-

toler-

of coercion deemed necessary to bring

about the desired redistribution. Islamic economics promotes the use of state power to enforce the collection of a religious tax

whose proceeds

are,

by tradition, reserved

Buddhist economics enjoins individuals to support monks

largely for the poor.

through alms and to help finance the construction and maintenance of shrines; the notion of redistribution within the

laity is a

matter of controversy.

Hindu economics

espouses a populist egalitarianism that features protection against foreign competition

and the promotion of small-scale industry. Protestant Christian economics stands out as the

is on preventing redistribution: it advocates abandonment of many of the forced transfer programs instituted decades, on the grounds that they have failed to alleviate poverty. Neverthe-

one variant whose current focus

the curtailment or in recent

teaches that society has a responsibility toward

less, it

poor.

its

And

it

asserts that

obeying God's commands regarding tithing and charity would go a long way toward alleviating poverty' It is

and

one thing to

inequality.

articulate a preference regarding the distribution

of income or

wealth, quite another to formulate a policy' package capable of generating the ostensibly desired distribution.

Proposed

goals they are supposed to serve.

policies are

not necessarily consistent with the

As Iannaccone demonstrates, Protestant Christian

fundamentalists have taken few concrete steps to reverse the transfer policies they profess to oppose. in the

I

argue in

my own

name of Islam have reduced

essay that the redistribution schemes instituted

neither poverty nor inequality. In the same vein,

Hindu

revivalists

politically well

connected

Lai argues that the fierce nationalism and strident populism of the serve to perpetuate the at the

economic

status

quo, benefiting the

expense of consumers and start-up producers.

I

have already touched on

how

the Buddhist traditions of almsgiving and shrine building serve the purpose of distributing wealth to the religious establishment.

While each variant of fundamentalist economics has dominant positions on specific issues,

these are subject to change over time.

presents a united front for instance,

all

on every

feature the

issue.

On

And

at

any one time, no variant

the proper economic role of government,

same ideological cleavages found

Thus, Buddhist economics espouses

a

form of socialism

in

in secular discourse.

Burma (Myanmar) but

mild liberalism in Thailand. The Hindu support of India's long-standing protection-

Timur Kuran 298

ism has been challenged by some prominent Hindu

revivalists,

although the discor-

dant voices remain in the minority. Within the American wing of Protestant Christian

fundamentalism, a large portion of the leadership currentlv subscribes to the ideals of free enterprise.

But the rank and

Revealingly, Christianity

file is

as divided as the

which promotes the view that capitalism betrays the of the poor. 5

redistribution in favor

Finally, Islamic

are evident even in the careers

as a

is

whole.

of liberation theology,

and encourages massive

Bible,

economics has featured, from die

domain of government control and

very beginning, divisions on the

These divisions

American nation

also the ostensible fountainhead

is

intervention.

of its individual promoters. In Pakistan

some of today's champions of an "Islamic market economy" were

until

recendy lead-

ing advocates of "Islamic socialism." 6

The observed

internal divisions within the variants

stem from a combination of two various objectives.

its

It is

a manifestation

is

tensions,

it is

for their

own

actions.

We

must

fight evil, yet

whatever

hardlv surprising that each variant of fundamentalist economics features,

Which one dominates tions

among

of a humanly unfathomable divine plan. In view of such

most common

to use the

each religion harbors tensions

incumbent on us to help the downtrodden, but people

ought to take responsibility exists

factors. First,

of fundamentalist economics

will

taxonomy of our

social

wing and

time, a right

between the Burmese and Thai versions of Buddhist economics whereas the former served

particularities:

ism, the latter

a left wing.

depend on circumstances. Keyes argues that the

was co-opted bv the

as

basic varia-

reflect historical

an ideological weapon against colonialThis brings us to the

local political establishment.

second source of internal divisions. Each of the great religions has a rich heritage that can be used to justify just about any economic policy. provide a wealth of precedents in favor of measures

and traditions

Its scriptures

now

identified with capitalism,

innumerable others in favor of ones identified with socialism. Under the circumstances,

any fundamentalist with

a

modicum of talent can

priate appeals to scripture or interpretations

economic agenda from

What

I

am

strict isolationism

suggesting

is

fundamentalists

become

its

peals.

socialists

economics

or

some

lie

largely

bevond

is

shaped heavilv bv the

texts literally, others

or free-traders, and

their respective religions.

through

selective religious ap-

onlv metaphorically.

ing others as meaningless, unrepresentative, or irrelevant.

shoring up economic is

is

less a distinctive

agendas that

may

or

From

And

they

this perspective, fun-

economic doctrine than

may not be rooted

a

method

for

in religion.

not to sav that the exponents of fundamentalist economics engage

process of selective retrieval self-consciously or in bad faith.

Nor

in this

are thev prepared to

concede the dependence of their cherished "fundamentals" on transient

On

about anv

events and statements as profoundly and eternally significant, dismiss-

damentalist economics

This

just

liberalism.

capitalists, protectionists

particular positions, diey buttress these

Thus, thev accept some

designate

through appro-

proponents claim immunity. Like nonfundamental-

regulators or deregulators for reasons that

Having taken

unencumbered

that fundamentalist

very secular forces from which ists,

to

rationalize,

of religious tradition,

social factors.

the contrary, individual theoreticians, practitioners, and supporters insist

on the

FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE ECONOMY 299

correctness of their

own

interpretations

and by implication,

who

guidedness of their cofundamentalists

if not in

word, on the mis-

subscribe to radically different interpreta-

The process of selective retrieval is not unique to fundamentalists. The works of Karl Marx and the deeds of the Founding Fathers of the United States, to give just two examples, have each provided ideological ammunition to a wide variety of social tions.

movements. 7 But the

parallel

with nonfundamentalist thought stops there. Whereas

and nonfundamentalist religious scholarship harbors numerous traditions that

secular

emphasize the

fluiditv

and multiplicitv of

denv the ambiguities of their guiding

historical interpretation,

texts

and

fundamentalisms

traditions.

Fundamentalist economists differ from nonfundamentalist economists in another crucial aspect: thev insist

human

activity.

At

on

compartmentalized.

it is

It is

and

It is holistic

be developed in isolation from tant,

from other realms of

the inseparability of economics

least in principle, the

fundamentalist view of the world

integrationist. Accordingly,

social,

economics

is

is

not

not to

moral, and political concerns, and most impor-

to be subordinate to religious principles.

one thing to

set

out to provide

a

comprehensive guide to economic

activity,

quite another to achieve this ambitious goal. In practice, fundamentalist economics

pays attention to a select subset of the economic issues that enter public discourse.

on which fundamentalist economics is quiet, if not beyond, little to sav on public finance preoccupation with reviving Islam's traditional scheme of redistribution.

There are major economic silent.

that

is, its

Many

issues

—

For instance, Islamic economics has

Islamic economists acknowledge the need for a flexible taxation system to

nance expenditures that are generally

mute on

fall

fi-

outside the purview of the traditional scheme, but they

the specifics of the additional taxes. This

able given the ongoing dependence of even'

is all

the

more remark-

Muslim government on various

taxes

collected under schemes lacking religious significance.

A salient difference among

the variants of fundamentalist economics that are dis-

cussed in the following essays

lies in

their concrete achievements to date. Islamic

economics has brought into being some widely publicized economic

institutions, in-

cluding Islamic banks in dozens of countries and state-administered redistribution

schemes

in several.

The other

variants have

no comparable achievements. Hindu and

Buddhist economics have lent their support to existing practices and institutions, such as

protectionism in the former case and almsgiving in the

new

latter;

they have not created

institutions or revived ones in disuse. Likewise, the Protestant Christian variant

has had

no

tangible influence

a free-market

on the economy;

it

has merely lent political support to

agenda spearheaded bv secular thinkers and lobbies. These other

ants may, of course, follow the lead of Islamic economics

reshape the economic order in the

name of their

respective religions.

history of Islamic economics provides any indication,

vari-

and take concrete steps to

it is

But

if

the short

doubtful that such steps

would have a major impact on resource allocation or the distribution of wealth. Their main accomplishment would probably be to bolster the appeal of measures desired for nonreligious reasons.

Conspicuously absent from the

list

of religions covered here

is

the oldest scriptural

Timur Kuran 300

religion, Judaism. It so

happens that economic restructuring has not been a major

objective of Jewish fundamentalism,

which

is

preoccupied with the issue of redefining

Jewish identity and other such issues generated bv the establishment of Judaism's intellectually rich heritage there

is

no

Judaic variant of fundamentalist economics. There

is

Israel.

In

of motifs capable of spawning

lack

a

the ancient tithing system, which

could form the basis of a redistribution scheme similar to

its

now-revived Islamic

counterpart. 8 There are the anti-usury laws of the Torah,

on whose authority Jewish fundamentalists could set out to reform Israel's financial svstem. 9 The Torah and a host of rabbinic decisions offer abundant material on which to build a blueprint for Jewish economic conduct. 10 As yet another example, there are biblical commandments

to observe ever}' seventh year as a "Sabbatical Year,"

remitted and land "Jubilee Year,"

left fallow,

when,

when

contracted debt

in addition,

expropriated land

is

to be returned to

owner. These commandments could form the linchpin of

They were

a source

to be

is

and the close of every seventh seven-year cycle

as a

its

original

a distributional

agenda.

as late as 1910, when Abraham Isaac Kook, the movement to make Jews refrain from acquisitive dealings Year. Kook went so far as to encourage the preemptive sale of

of controversy

chief rabbi of Jaffa, led a

during the Sabbatical

Jewish-owned lands to Muslims. His campaign other prominent rabbis,

many of whom were

faltered in the face

of opposition from

busy laying the groundwork for a mod-

ern Jewish state. 11

For our purposes here, the significance of itself

this

episode

is

twofold.

The campaign

demonstrates the potency of scripture as a source of far-reaching economic

policy.

And

competition

its

failure lends

among

support to one of

my

rival religious interpretations

vailing social, political,

earlier points: the

depends substantially

and economic winds.

Also absent from the religions covered here

powerful fundamentalist movement. Motivated

is

Sikhism, which has given

in part

an independent country run by Sikhs. But while

the Sikh nation's economic fortunes,

it

rise

by the perception that

Sikh-populated regions are economically exploited, this tablish

outcome of on the pre-

movement endeavors its

to a

India's

to es-

goals include improving

has not articulated a coherent economic pro-

Nor has it produced a body of economic thought that draws on Sikh motifs. 12 The Jewish and Sikh cases suggest that, for fundamentalisms, the development of

gram.

a distinct

economic doctrine

is

a goal

of second-order importance. In the presence of

serious concerns about national independence or survival, this goal indefinitely.

Such concerns

are

muted,

if

not absent altogether,

may be

shelved

in the birthplaces

of

the fundamentalist doctrines explored in the following four essays.

Acknowledgments This essay was written during a sabbatical

at the Institute for

Princeton, financed partly by a fellowship of the National manities.

I

am

Advanced Study

Endowment

for the

at

Hu-

indebted to R. Scott Appleby, Ekkehart Schlicht, and Laurence Ian-

naccone for some helpful comments.

.

FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE ECONOMY 301

Notes 1

trines

For an overview of the economic docof earlv Christianity, see Barn' Gor-

don, "Biblical and Earlv Judeo-Christian

Thought," Classical

in

S.

Todd Lowry,

ed.,

Pre-

Economic Thought: From the Greeks

to the Scottish

Enlightenment (Boston: Klu-

wer Academic Publishers, 1987), pp. 4367. A fuller account is provided bv Jacob Viner, in Jacques Melitz and Donald Winch, eds., Religious Thought and Economic Society (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1978), chap. 2.

1.

Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter

on Catholic Social Teaching and the

U.S.

Economy (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1986).

For manv other examples from diverse

times and places, see E. L. Jones, Growth Recurring: Economic

Change

in

World History

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), chap. 5.

See Michael

Novak,

ed..

5.

Liberation

and the Liberal Society (WashingD.C.: American Enterprise Institute for

Theology ton,

Public Policy Research,

William

P.

Glade,

Jr.,

"A

77. 6. Based on discussions with Shahid Zahid and Tanzil-ur-Rahman, Karachi, November 1989.

For more examples and many

7.

1987), especially Dialectic

between

perti-

nent insights, see Bernard Lewis, History

—

Remembered. Recovered. Invented (Princeton,

and David Lowenthal, The Past Is a Foreign Country (New York: Cambridge University N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975);

Press, 1985).

Encyclopaedia J udaica,

8.

10.

"Tithe."

s.v.

9. Jewish Encyclopedia, s.v.

3. Dictionary of the History ofIdeas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas, s.v. "Casuistry."

4.

Liberationism and Liberalism," pp. 4-20; and Arturo Fontaine, "It Is Not Easy to Argue with Liberation Theologians," pp. 164-

"Usurv."

For one such attempt, see Meir Ta-

mari, "With All Tour Possessions": Jewish Ethics

and Economic

Life

1987). Tamari, an

(New

York: Free Press,

Israeli,

is

not

affiliated

with anv organized fundamentalist move-

ment. 11. Encyclopaedia J udaica, s.v. "Sabbatical

Year and Jubilee." 12. See Harjot

Oberoi, "Sikh Fundamen-

talism: Translating Historv into this

volume.

Theory,"

in

CHAPTER 14

The Economic Impact of Islamic Fundamentalism Timur Kuran

The

give est,

its

economy an

Islamic

Islamic character.

Economy

In 1979 Pakistan took some major steps to To satisfy the presumed Qur'anic ban on inter-

banks were ordered to offer an interest-free alternative to the conventional savings

account and to purge interest from

all

their operations within five years.

Although the

is no longer Another highlight of the 1979 program was zakat,

wider objective has not yet been met, the interest-bearing savings account an option for

new

depositors.

on wealth and income. Voluntary until then, zakat was made a legal obliThe Pakistani government now collects zakat from several sources, notablv

Islam's tax

gation.

bank deposits and farm output. Every year thousands of local committees distribute the proceeds to designated groups.

1

Pakistan has not been alone in trying to restructure ostensibly Islamic stipulations. Zakat sia,

is

now compulsory

its

economy according

for certain

groups

in

to

Malay-

Saudi Arabia, and the Sudan. In some other predominantly Muslim countries, the

establishment of a state-run zakat system ization

is

especially

widespread

is

under consideration. The impact of Islam-

in banking.

Banks claiming an Islamic identity are

in

operation in most countries of North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. In

some of these they hold more than 10 percent of the commercial

deposits. 2

The

lead-

ing Islamic banks have also established a presence in countries where Muslims form a small minority.

New

Zealand

now

has an "Islamic Finance Corporation," and Pasa-

dena, California, an "Al Baraka Bankcorp."

These developments are not occurring

growing

literature

known

as "Islamic

ongoing reforms. * The prescriptions

in

an intellectual vacuum. There

economics" that seeks to guide and in this literature rest partly

and partly on the Qur'an and the Sunna, the 302

latter consisting

is

a rapidly

justify the

on economic

logic

of recollections of the

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 303

words and deeds or Prophet

Muhammad and his companions.

have been established to promote Islamic economics. International Center for Research in Islamic in Jeddah, the International Association for

Several research centers

Some of

Economics

these, including the

King Abdulaziz University Islamic Economics in Leicester, and the at

Kullivah of Economics at the International Islamic University in Kuala

Lumpur,

publish journals devoted to the discipline. There are also several specialized periodicals,

such as the Journal of Islamic Banking and Finance,

a

quarterly published in

Karachi.

The exponents of phasize that

it

this discipline,

covers far

more than

who

call

themselves "Islamic economists," em-

zakat and interest-free banking.

aims, thev say, to provide a comprehensive blueprint for cordinglv, a

list

The

economic

all

discipline

activity.

Ac-

of suggested research topics published bv the International Center for

Research in Islamic Economics covers every major category of research recognized bv

Economic Association, including consumer behavior, market structure, international trade, and economic development. 4 Some Islamic economists are quick to admit that in most of these realms the nascent discipline has vet to make a significant contribution. But thev generally agree the American

central planning, industrial relations,

that the fundamental sources of Islam harbor clear

conceivable economic problem.

Qur'an and to the wisdom of the bia,

definitive solutions to every

find these, thev suggest,

earliest Islamic

communitv

we must

in

turn to the

seventh-century Ara-

drawing wherever necessarv on modern tools and concepts.

Islamic

The

To

and

Economics

as

Fundamentalist Doctrine

numerous prescriptions that lend themselves to the construction of economic norms, and the religion's early history offers an arrav of lessons concerning economic behavior and institutions. But the notion of an economics discipline that is distinctlv and self-consciouslv Islamic is very new. The great philosophers of Medieval Islam wandered freely bevond the intellectual confines of the Islamic scriptures. And none of their works, not even the celebrated Prolegomena of Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406 C.E.), gave rise to an independent discipline of econom5 ics. The origins of Islamic economics lie in the works of Sawid Abul-Aia Maududi 1903-79), a Pakistani social thinker who sought to turn Islam into a "complete way of life." In his voluminous writings Maududi exhorted that Islam is much more than a set of rituals. It encompasses, he argued, all domains of human existence, including education, medicine, art, law, politics, and economics. To support this assertion, he laid the foundations of several Islamic disciplines, among them Islamic economics. 6 Other seminal contributions to Islamic economics were made bv Sayyid Qutb 1906— 7 66), an Egyptian, and Muhammad Baqir Sadr (1931-80), an Iraqi. classical

sources of Islam contain

(

(

There are major substantive differences among the teachings of these pioneers.

Maududi

is

quite sympathetic to the market process, though he insists that market

behavior must be constrained by behavioral norms found in the Islam. Generally less trusting of the market,

Qutb and Sadr

classical

sources of

favor supplementing

Timur Kuran 304

norm-guided

by state-enforced controls.

self-regulation

Qutb and Sadr

A

related difference

is

that

of economic inequality. These variations among the

arc less tolerant

pioneers of Islamic economics are reflected in the writings of their followers, which offer a

wide spectrum of views concerning government, markets, and property

But they have not given divisions within Islamic neoclassical

The

to sharply differentiated subschools.

rise

economics are more amorphous than,

say,

rights.

substantive

those between

economics and Marxian economics. Thus, the followers of Maududi tend

and Sadr's works

to hold Qutb's

in

high esteem. Moreover, their key positions often

bear the influence of these other pioneers.

Whatever

its

internal divisions, Islamic

front in justifving

major

virtually even'

and moral

own

its

existence.

time,

text asserts, are responsible for severe injustices, inefficiencies,

failures. In capitalism interest

in socialism the

economics has always presented a united

The dominant economic systems of our

promotes callousness and exploitation, while

suppression of trade breeds tyranny and monstrous disequilibria. 8

The

fundamental sources of Islam prohibit interest but allow trade; hence, a properly lamic

economy would

Typically, this claim

622-61

possess the virtues of these

is

their defects.

supported by references to Islam's Golden Age, the period

which spans the

C.E.,

two systems without

Is-

latter part

of Prophet Muhammad's helmsmanship of

Muslim community and the tenure of the "rightly guided" caliphs. 9 During the Golden Age, it is suggested, the Islamic code of economic behavior enjoved widespread adherence, the prevailing spirit being one of brotherly cooperation. With everyone "subject to the same laws" and "burdened with the same obligations," the

injustices

were minimized. 10

And

resources were allocated very efficiently, ensuring a

rapid rise in living standards. After the

Golden Age, so the

belief goes, the

Muslim

community's attachment to the precepts of Islam weakened, setting the stage for painful and protracted decline in

The case two claims.

for restructuring First,

its

economies according to Islamic principles thus

the prevailing systems have failed us.

And

in perspective the latter claim,

the seventh-centurv

economy of

we must

of the major pollution.

And

it

primitive. It pro-

sponses to problems that arose in this ancient setting.

and

rates

was

essentially free

like air

division of labor.

— mostly

in the

Some of these

and water

The

Sunna

specific

—

are re-

injunctions were

others were seen as changeable. Thus, rules and

regulations were altered openly and unabashedly case in point, the scope

It

modern economies,

most rudimentary

many

alternatives.

was very

in the Islamic scriptures

perceived as eternally valid. But

its

modern standards

the Arabian peninsula

featured only the

economic injunctions found

on

recognize that by

duced few commodities, using uniformly simple technologies. physical externalities that afflict

rests

second, the history of

carlv Islam proves the Islamic system's unrivaled super ioritv over

To put

a

global economic standing.

in

response to

new

conditions.

As

a

of zakat underwent manv modifications during the

Golden Age.

The

some of the virtues attributed to the community was a paragon of brotherly

historical record also calls into question

Golden Age. The

notion that the early Islamic

unity conflicts with the fact that fact that force

it

was plagued by disagreements and

played an important role in

its

also with the

internal governance. Significantly, three

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 305

of the four "rightiv guided" caliphs met

Nor was

the

Golden Age

ends

their

hands of fellow Muslims.

at the

of the corrupt practices attributed to contemporary

free

capitalism and socialism. Officials of the Islamic state, including the caliphs themselves,

were often accused of nepotism and misjudgment." During part of this period

the state did indeed enforce the collection of zakat, and a substantial portion of the

We

proceeds must have gone to various disadvantaged groups. evidence, however,

on whether

brought about

this redistribution

possess a

no

reliable

major reduction

in inequalitv.

the literature

Still,

replete with calls for the

is

immediate implementation of the

holy laws of Islam (Shari'a) in the form thev are believed to have taken almost a

millennium and

one

a half ago, in

locality'.

In issuing such

denies that certain economic problems of the

calls.

Islamic economics

modern age had no counterparts in the might now be dysfunctional, even

past. It also denies that once-beneficial institutions

Some of the

harmful. it

At the same

many

ing

rhetoric of Islamic economics thus conveys the impression that

and restore the economy of a distant

seeks to rediscover

time,

it

that originated outside the Islamic world.

employment

objectives as growth,

past.

draws heavily on modern concepts and methods, includ-

creation,

And

pursues such modern

it

efficiency. 12

and

It

would be wrong, economy of

therefore, to characterize the discipline's intense preoccupation with the

seventh-century Arabia merely as a scholastic search for ancient solutions to ancient

problems

— although

ics applies

this representation

does

fit

certain writings. Islamic

solutions are lacking,

it

seeks scriptural justification for

economics shows

ingly, Islamic

interest in onlv

some

favored reforms. Accord-

its

features

of the seventh-century

Arabian economic order. Having identified the prohibition of interest

non of Islamic reform, rowing.

It

devotes comparatively

default, to refrain

little

is

as

much

a

a

major

if

Notwithstanding much of its rhetoric,

it

thus exhibits

more

it is

a

harmony, and prosperity of an ancient in

its

applications

it

seeks to revive

only bits and pieces of the seventh-century Arabian economy, not to restore In practice

only by

issue.

response to contemporary grievances as

nostalgic escape into the imagined simplicity, social order.

qua

whether the Golden Age

effort to exploring

environmental pollution, having chosen,

from making the environment

Islamic economics

as the sine

engrossed in Qur'anic verses concerning lending and bor-

it is

offers useful prescriptions against

So

econom-

ancient solutions to perceived problems of the present; and where such

it

willingness to accept economic realities than

in toto.

does

it

in theory.

Islamic economics

cause

it

sources of Islam. tive

is

appropriately categorized as a "fundamentalist doctrine," be-

on a set of immutable By no means does its flexibility

claims to be based

principles in practice

drawn from the negate this

power. All doctrines labeled "fundamentalist" claim to

in stone, yet in application these trines assert a

rest

traditional

label's descrip-

on fundamentals

set

prove remarkably malleable. Moreover, such doc-

monopoly over knowledge and good judgment, even

as

they

show

receptivity to outside influences. 13

Having

billed itself as a superior alternative to

lamic economics has

drawn sharp

criticism

all

other economic traditions,

from two quarters.

Is-

A number of scholars,

Timur Kuran 306

including this writer, have drawn attention to the literature's empirical and logical

proposed institutions are either unworkable or inherently

flaws, arguing that the efficient.

14

Other

scholars, notably

economics has invited to be understood

on

all

its

this criticism

own

Vali

Reza Nasr, have observed

bv presenting

itself not as a faith

terms, but as a positive science that lives

In this view, Islamic economics has been

scientific standards.

utilitarian social science

economic

Sewed

traditions

and

it is

trying to prove

of the West on Western

its

turf.

drawn

up

in-

that Islamic

or philosophy to established

game of

into the

worth by beating the

materialistic

The mission of Islamic economics,

maintains Nasr, should be to create a worldview that brings man's material goals into

harmonv with apology it

concentrates

ing to

his spiritual yearnings. It

— without offering excuses, that own

its

on

own

its

agenda,

it

should get on with

is,

will eventuallv

prove

its

Nasr would thus have Islamic economics withdraw into posed isolation

What

mission without

superiority, but accord-

standards as opposed to those of the non-Muslim West. 15

avoid being sidetracked bv Western priorities.

pline.

this

for pursuing nonutilitarian objectives. If

parallels

propelled

The

logic

its

own

behind

order to

shell in

this call to self-im-

Maududi's apparent motivation for establishing the

Maududi

to establish distinctly Islamic disciplines

was

disci-

a desire

to defend Islam "against the inroads of foreign political and intellectual domination."

He wanted to on

establish Islam's authority in

domains where Muslims had come to

rely

the West's guidance, in order to restore the Islamic community's self-confidence

and enable tarv rise

it

to face the world proudly, as in the days before the economic and mili-

of the West. 16 Thus, for Maududi Islamic economics was primarily

for reasserting the

primacv of Islam and secondarily an instrument for

a vehicle

radical eco-

nomic change. Like Maududi, many other supporters of Islamic economics have subordinated it to wider objectives. For example, the Ayatollah Khomeini made a point of denving that the revolution he spearheaded in Iran was motivated bv economics. 17 He meant It was not made, he once quipped, to make watermelons more plentiful. most importhat the revolution was spawned primarily by noneconomic factors

—

tantly, a threat to Islam's role in

guidance

— and so

providing cultural identity, social cohesion, and moral

should not be judged by

it

its

economic impact. Khomeini

repeat-

edly spoke out, of course, against poverty and exploitation, and he supported certain

economic reforms, including the ostensible elimination of interest. But he always subordinated economic objectives to the general goal of restoring the centrality of Islam in private

and public

life

— even to

particular objectives such as eliminating the con-

sumption of alcohol and ensuring feminine modesty. lust as Khomeini's aides included activists for

whom

economic concerns were

paramount, the expositors, practitioners, and sympathizers of Islamic economics clude people

drawn

to the discipline's substantive goals.

an antidote to exploitation and expect

of Islamic economics lems.

To them,

lies in its

it

Many undoubtedly

see

it

in-

as

to bring prosperity. For some, the attraction

promise to solve heretofore intractable economic prob-

the raison d'etre of Islamic economics

is its

ability to

improve eco-

nomic performance, defined in materialistic terms. But the point remains that Islamic economics also serves, and is perceived as serving, as an instrument of legitimation and power. Bv advancing the view that an Islamic economy will promote harmony,

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 307

growth, and

economics enhances the appeal of an

justice simultaneously. Islamic

lamic political order.

And

Muslims can enjov the

bolsters the case for a pan-Islamic

it

benefits or cross-continental trade

mise their religious principles.

Each of the two principal

Is-

union within which

without having to compro-

18

institutions

Islamic banking, provides sources

engendered by Islamic economics, zakat and

of funding

for fundamentalist causes. Islamic banks

channel a portion of their profits into religious education, publishing, networking,

and other

spread of fundamentalism. Likewise, in countries

activities that foster the

with obligator}' zakat, a significant portion of the proceeds are allocated to religious schools dedicated to the dissemination of fundamentalist views. Islamic institutions also constitute a channel

of upward mobility for fundamentalists and potential fun-

damentalists. In Turkey, for example. Islamic banks provide career opportunities to relatively religious

them

youths whose cultural backgrounds might otherwise handicap

in the corporate world.

economic

basis

it

Both the

politicians,

Another

attraction

of Islamic economics, then,

voices support for Islamic economics

discipline

and laymen

and

who

its

are

is

at heart a

fundamen-

applications enjov the public support of intellectuals,

committed neither to Islamization

in general

Islamic economics in particular. Their reason for falsifying their preferences identification

cation,

it

of Islamic economics with core Islamic

become prudent

has

in

some

who

many

politicians

it,

once

in

All this goes to

hardlv

know

this

show

its

from studying

its

do

little

economics owes

past

on

the platform of

of

practical significance to

its

support only

in part to the

and present applications. While one would

primarily in still

its

of reasons

important to keep

of the

others,

it is

an instrument for advancing the

Finally, there are

this diversity

discipline's practical

lie

for

Islamic character but for others mostly in the

support simply to avoid being stigmatized

analysis

as

nonfundamentalists

politi-

who

lend

bad Muslims.

of motivations in mind as

accomplishments.

I

we

turn to an

argue below that there are vast

incongruities between the rhetoric of Islamic economics and I

is

theoretical expositions, there exists a range

agenda of Islamic fundamentalism.

It is

its

to seasoned observers of Pakistani politics

goals are apt to

that Islamic

substance of its economics. For

it

known

sympathetic to

to endorse Islamic banking

people find Islamic economics appealing. The merits of Islamic economics

some fundamentalists cal

it is

as

the

this identifi-

power. 21

and imagined successes of

why

known

fails

nor to

lies in

have a low opinion of Islamic economics. Indeed, politicians

lend public support to

promote real

who

Because of

find his aspirations thwarted. Significantly, Islamic banking

every major political party. 20 Yet that

values.

societies to be

objectives. In Pakistan, for instance, a politician

may

the

is

provides for expanding the influence of fundamentalism.

Not everyone who talist.

19

its

practice. Specifically,

demonstrate that the impact of Islamic banking has been anything but revolutionary,

that obligatory zakat has

and,

lastly,

effect

that the

nowhere become

on economic behavior.

stick Islamic

economics

that the strictly

a significant vehicle for reducing inequality,

renewed emphasis on economic morality has had no appreciable

is

My evaluation

thus indicates that by

its

own

a failure. This assessment needs to be qualified

economic impact of Islamic economics

is

lofty yard-

by the

fact

not the only measure of its

Timur Kuran 308

achievements.

Some of its promoters may

well consider the shortcomings

I

describe

to be outstripped, from the standpoint of the wider fundamentalist cause, by political

and

cultural

consequences that

lie

beyond

this essay's

purview.

Banking and Finance Islamic Banking

Suppose you lend $100 to an

you stand to

year. Since

period of one

industrialist, at 5 percent interest for a

$105

receive exactly

at the

end of the

year,

your return

is

pre-

determined. But the industrialist's return depends on the success of his business. If his revenue exceeds a loss.

An

$105, he

will

make

a profit. If

it falls

short of $105, he will incur

interest-based loan thus places the risk of loss entirelv

Under the prevalent interpretation of Islam, this is prohibited as The literature is replete with additional reasons why interest terest," writes

on

the borrower.

unfair. is

best avoided. "In-

one Islamic economist, "inculcates love for money and the desire to

accumulate wealth for

its

own

sake. It

makes men

selfish, miserly,

stone-hearted." 22 Another evil attributed to interest

is

that

it

narrow-minded and

"transfers wealth

from

the poor to the rich, increasing the inequality in the distribution of wealth." 23 vet another:

it

And

draws people's energies away from productive enterprise. 24

The purpose of

Islamic banking

is

to prevent such inefficiencies, moral failures,

by allowing people to borrow and lend without having to deal

and

injustices

est.

In theory, an Islamic bank accepts only two types of deposits: transaction depos-

which

its,

risk

no

are risk free but yield

of capital

loss for the

return,

in inter-

and investment deposits, which carry the

promise of a variable return. Deliberately ruled out are the

insured savings deposits of conventional banks, which provide a predetermined turn.

An

Islamic bank's lending operations are based

sharing. In lending

money to

a firm,

it

on

re-

the same principle of risk

agrees to share in the losses of the underwritten

business activities in return for a share of any profits.

Since Islamic banks and their depositors are allowed to profit from their monetary assets only

bv carrying some

risk

profit-and-loss sharing as a topic

of

loss, Islamic

economics

of paramount importance.

treats the

Two

mechanics of

profit-and-loss shar-

ing techniques, each utilized in early Islam and discussed in classical Islamic jurispru-

dence, receive the bulk of attention: mudaraba and musharaka.

Under mudaraba, an

group of investors entrusts capital to an entrepreneur, who puts this into production or trade, and then returns to the investor(s) a prespecified share of his revenues. The remaining share is kept by the entrepreneur as a reward for his time investor or

and

effort. If the

business

fails,

the capital loss

is

entrepreneur's loss being his expended labor.

adds some of his a risk

of

own

capital loss.

entrepreneur's

own

capital to that supplied

The key

financial

difference

borne entirely by the investor(s), the

Under musharaka,

the entrepreneur

by the investor(s), exposing himself to

between the two mechanisms

lies in

the

commitment.

Mudaraba and musharaka have been

likened to the financing techniques used by

25 Three factors differthe venture capital industries of today's advanced economies.

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 309

entiate a venture capitalist

from

a

conventional bank.

while the bank bases

First,

its

loan decisions primarilv on the creditworthiness of its applicants, the venture capitalist

focuses

on

the potential profitability

of the proposed

Thus, an applicant

projects.

with no collateral but an economically promising project

may

to secure an ordi-

fail

nary bank loan vet succeed in obtaining venture capital. Second, the conventional

bank earns

interest

on

loans,

its

whereas the venture

of prof-

capitalist receives shares

Third, unlike the bank, the venture capitalist often participates in the execution of

its.

the projects he underwrites, sometimes bv supplving managerial know-how. The second and third differences are obviously linked. The venture capitalist's closer involvement in project execution reflects his greater stake in the project's profitabilitv. In advanced economies the venture capital industry has fostered the rise of many new enterprises, most recentlv the high-technology sector. Islamic banking, sav its proponents, can make an equally significant contribution to the Muslim world's economic development. The logic that sustains this claim is simple. A banking system that bases its loan decisions on project profitabilitv does not turn down projects with

Nor does

excellent long-term prospects but lengthv gestation periods.

deny support

it

to entrepreneurs merely for lack of a track record. It thus allocates credit ciently than

one which

insists

on demonstrated creditworthiness. The

development, with everyone benefiting: entrepreneurs,

write;

who

owners of banks,

their projects;

who

find

it

more

result

is

effi-

faster

easier to finance

share in the profits of the projects they under-

and depositors, whose investment accounts earn greater returns.

The

first

Islamic bank offering a range of commercial services

now

1975, and there

exist Islamic

banks

in

about

fifty

opened

countries. 26

in

Dubai

Many of

in

these

assets. Knowledgeable obmudaraba nor musharaka has ever ab-

banks have been secretive about the composition of their servers generally agree, however, that neither

sorbed a dominant share of the Islamic banks'

by the Central Bank of

Iran, in

percent of the assets of Iranian banks. Pakistan's state-owned

assets.

According to figures supplied

1986 mudaraba and musharaka accounted 2-

Two

vears earlier,

when

for

38

the Islamization of

banking system was ostensibly nearing completion, only 14

percent of that country's bank assets were in mudaraba or musharaka, according to official reports. 28

Moreover, most of the contracts categorized

sharaka were actually based profit- and-loss

on

mudaraba or mu-

as

thinly disguised interest. In violation

sharing the bank

would

set a target return

on

of the

of

spirit

loans, agreeing in

its

advance to reimburse the entrepreneur for any "excess profit." 29 In the Pakistani bank-

community

ing

it is

widely believed that the share of legitimate mudaraba and mu-

sharaka never rose above a few percentage points and that percent. In Turkey, where, in contrast to Pakistan

heavily lar.

and

it

Iran, the

quickly

fell

to under

1

banking sector remains

dominated by conventional banks, profit-and-loss sharing

The

privately

owned

Islamic "finance houses" place at

is similarly unpopumost 8 percent of their

funds in mudaraba and musharaka. 30

By works

far the

most popular financing mode of the Islamic banks

as follows. 31

A

that he wishes to purchase, let us say a ton of steel. its

price as

is

murabaha, which

producer or trader submits to his Islamic bank

compensation for

this service,

and then

The bank buys transfers

a list

of goods

the steel, marks

ownership of the

up

steel to

Timur Kuran 310

Along with

the client.

some

at

jointly

his steel, the client receives a bill at the inflated price, to be paid

determined date

from an Islamic standpoint exposing

itself to risk.

ship, the loss

would

is

Indeed,

fall

in the future.

if

What makes

be negligible, because there

some

time,

the steel were stolen while under the bank's owner-

no minimum

is

make

bank bears no

monev. There remains merely called a "service charge" or

From an economic

and the

risk,

in

stand-

makes murabaha equivalent to an client pavs for the time-value

which

a semantic difference,

"markup"

of the bank's ownership;

to the duration

the transaction legitimate.

point, of course, an infinitesimal ownership period

is

steel for

not on the client but on the bank. But the involved risk could

a millisecond suffices to

interest-based loan: the

this transaction legitimate

bank takes ownership of the

that the

one case and

is

that the client's

of

pavment

"interest" in the other.

In their applications of murabaha, the Islamic banks are keeping their ownership

periods verv short. Banks

whose declared mission

making extensive use of a technique garb. In defense of Islamic banking

penalty for late pavment, as there

that it

is

is

past due.

Thev simplv charge

pavment on

callv

in

under

interest.

This

advance for

from the interest-based financing

murabaha

is

late

Not

practices

is

method

equivalent to interest.

There

is

no

for penalizing accounts

murabaha

differs

client a rebate

onlv cosmeti-

of the merchant banks and trading

surprisinglv, Pakistani bankers routinely 33

is

true in principle, but in

pavment, offering the

time. 32 In implementation, therefore,

firms of the West.

in Islamic

could be said that under murabaha there

practice the Islamic banks have devised an ingenious

for

to stamp out interest are thus

is

nothing but interest concealed

their clients that

tell

actuallv a precedent for treating the

two terms as svnonvmous: an Ottoman ruling of 1887 that pegged interest rates at 9 percent was named the "murabaha ordinance." 34 The second most popular financing mechanism is lease financing, known in some countries as ijara. Under this mechanism, the bank rents some asset, let us say a truck, to an end user for a specified period of time, at a mutually agreed upon rental that reflects the truck's cost as well as the time-value of monev. The end user mav have the option of purchasing the truck. In theory,

of risk sharing, since the bank

ment damage during the

at least, lease financing satisfies the require-

owns the

asset for

leasing period, the resulting loss

some period. If the truck suffers would be borne by the bank. 35

In practice, however, the bank shifts such risk onto others by requiring the user to

put up collateral and to pay for insuring the therefore, the lease-financing practices

of

asset. 36

From an economic

of the Islamic banks do not

the interest-laden, risk-averse leasing firms that have long existed

world, including

many Muslim

Murabaha and but neither to finance

is

its

standpoint,

differ

from those

throughout the

countries.

lease financing are well suited to trade

and commoditv financing,

applicable to the provision of working capital.

A start-up firm that needs

dav-to-dav operations will receive no help from an Islamic bank that has

chosen to specialize in murabaha and

lease financing.

use to a firm with a cash-flow problem: a

not merchandise but money. So,

company

Nor

are these

mechanisms of

facing a pile of unpaid

at least in its current

bills

qualify as a full-fledged substitute for conventional banking, if only because

limited range of financing services.

needs

form. Islamic banking does not it

offers a

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 311

On the whole, differ significantly

the sectoral composition of the Islamic banks' investments does not

from that of conventional commercial banks. Their

favor urbanites, as

opposed to

clients

tend to

opposed to newcomers. They generally who in manv parts of the Muslim world

be established producers and merchants,

as

villagers,

remain dependent for credit on monevlenders charging notoriously high banks have shown no inclination to favor labor-intensive firms.

Manv

rates.

The

have invested

and a few have speculated in the international currency and commodity With few exceptions, thev have preferred trade financing to project financ-

in real estate,

markets.

ing. Insofar as thev

have engaged

in project financing,

thev have favored safe short-

term projects over long-term projects fraught with uncertainty.

Even the Islamic Development Bank, an intergovernmental organization 1975 to promote economic development using Islamic

lished in

has

evoked

into an export-import bank. It uses the funds at

estab-

financial instruments, its

disposal largely to

poor countries of the Muslim

finance international trade, in particular, oil exports to

world. Revealinglv, from 1975 to 1986 the portion of profit-and-loss sharing in the

Development Bank's portfolio

Islamic

murabaha rose from although

this

nil

fell

from 55 percent to

mode of business

not even mentioned

is

it

risk.

Through governmental guarantees and

absolves itself of risk, in violation of

behalf of a Bangladeshi

company

its

own

damaged

is

now

Like

its

goes to great lengths

client-financed private insurance,

principles. If a

machine purchased on

in transit, the loss falls

or some insurance agency, or the government of Bangladesh itself.

percent, while that of

37 in the bank's charter.

commercial counterparts, the Islamic Development Bank to avoid

1

to over 80 percent. Lease financing has also increased sharplv,

on the company, bank

— but never the

38

None

of this implies that the financing operations of the Islamic banks arc harmful

to social welfare.

Thev do no damage bv

promotion of international trade

is

refraining

from earning bona

fide risk.

The

an economically valuable service, especially in

countries featuring severe allocational distortions caused by long-standing protectionism. Lease

and commodity financing stimulates economic production. At

respect to countries

banks,

it is

fair

Mv

do not conform

basic point

it

behooves us to

ask,

simply that the lending practices of the

of Islamic economics.

Resilience ofInterest

does the practice of Islamic banking diverge so

from the underlying theory? Why, lutionize the

is

in the least to the stipulations

The

Why,

with

would not have survived were they not meeting some

to say that thev

previously unfulfilled need. Islamic banks

least

where the Islamic banks compete with conventional commercial

specifically, are

critically

banks that were established to revo-

world of finance sticking so closely to the techniques of conventional

banks?

One

reason has to do with the ongoing presence of conventional banks in

countries with Islamic banks, except Iran and Pakistan.

By allowing entrepreneurs

all

to

choose between interest and profit-and-loss sharing, conventional banks create an "adverse selection"

problem for the Islamic banks: entrepreneurs with below-average minimize their losses in

profit expectations prefer profit-and-loss sharing in order to

Timur Kuran 312

the likelv event of failure, while those with above-average expectations prefer interest

maximize

in order to

their gains in the likely event

of success. The upshot

is

that the

Islamic banks receive a disproportionately large share of the bad risks. 39 Implicit in this

who knows

observation are the following two points. First, an entrepreneur

his project

And

is

very

risk}' is likely

to conceal this

that

from the Islamic banking community.

second, no bank possesses a fail-proof

method

for determining a project's

riskiness.

Through training, of course, bankers can become reasonably adept at identifying deals. Were the attainment of such skills impossible there would be no venture capitalism in the West. But the required skills are in short supply in the Muslim world, bad

which

1

is

banks reluctance to engage

a factor in the Islamic

in

genuine profit-and-loss

sharing. To remedy this recognized deficiency an institute was established in 1982 in northern Cyprus for the training of personnel to screen projects. But it closed in

1984, leaving the Islamic banking system without a training center. 40 If one factor in this closing

on

was the curriculum's shortcomings, another was

a lack

the part of the Islamic banks for genuine profit-and-loss sharing.

of enthusiasm

Even the banks

of Iran and Pakistan, which are shielded by law from having to compete with conventional banks, have

been reluctant,

as

we saw

above, to

commit

substantial funds to

mudaraba or musharaka. So the adverse onlv reason ciples.

whv

problem caused by conventional banking cannot be the

selection

the Islamic banks are extremelv reticent to abide by their

A more fundamental factor

is

own

prin-

the widespread practice of double bookkeeping.

Firms habituallv understate their revenues and overstate their costs to conceal their

from the

profits

government

away with

tax collector, generally getting

audits. 41

Under

it

because of inadequate

the circumstances, bankers are reluctant to lend

on the

sit on the recipient's board. But the no banker monitor its operations, for fear that information about profitability will find its way to the government. In sum, there is a mutual

of profit-and-loss sharing, unless they can

basis

typical firm will let its

true

distrust

tion

mechanism

sharing. is

between the providers and users of funds. This makes

Some

unworkable

however, that

that requires

no monitoring, mutually

interest, a

compensa-

preferable to profit-and-loss

Islamic economists are beginning to realize that profit-and-loss sharing in the presence it is

of rampant dishonesty. 42 They continue to

possible to lower dishonest} to a level 7

where

all

believe,

borrowers and

lenders will happily substitute profit-and-loss sharing for interest.

An

why

the practice of Islamic banking conflicts with the under-

do with

the profitability and relative risklessness of trade and

additional reason

lying theory has to

commoditv

financing. In

many

parts

of the Muslim world certain goods are routinclv

due to production controls, import restrictions, and price ceilings. The firms that acquire these scarce goods for resale or production tend to profit handin short supply,

somely, which makes financing their operations ordinarily quite

many

Islamic banks

into long-term

would

safe.

Understandably,

rather finance such commercial ventures than sink funds

development projects with very uncertain outcomes. In so doing they

seek, like the typical business enterprise, to avoid unnecessary risks.

What

needs

rec-

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 313

ognition here

that the

is

abundance of low-risk, yet

lucrative, opportunities in trade

and commodity financing reduces the appeal of long-term development financing.

A Historical Perspective To put

in perspective

all

these incongruities between theory and practice,

noted that Islamic banking

a very recent creation.

is

tions

among

it

may be

nor medieval

classical

modern

sense, let alone "Islamic" banks.

produced elaborate

rules to regulate financial transac-

Islamic civilization featured banks in the Classical Islamic jurisprudence

Neither

individuals. Yet, as

noted by Murat Cizakqa, these rules did not give

to a system of banking. 43 Medieval Islamic civilization produced

no organizations

rise

that

could pool thousands of people's funds, administer them collectively, and then survive

The

the death of their managers.

of Islam remained frozen up to mod-

financial rules

ern times, precluding the formation, except outside of Islamic law, of durable partnerships involving large starting

numbers of individuals.

from Middle Eastern

centered on banks. 44 Given

this, it is

name of Islam look more

the

It

complex

a

financial

system

not surprising that the banks now operating in

other

like

was the Europeans who, probably

developed

financial practices,

modern

financial institutions than like any-

thing in Islam's heritage. In the 1930s there were banks. But the

1963

lished in

first

some

abortive attempts in India to establish interest-free

successful forerunner

in the

of Islamic banking was

a savings

bank

estab-

Egyptian town of Mit Ghamr. This bank was modeled

after

some of West Germany's local savings banks. It paid no interest on deposits and charged no interest on loans, borrowing and lending on the basis of profit-and-loss sharing.

On

account of these features, the bank claimed an Islamic identity, partly to

distinguish itself

from government banks and

the eyes of pious Egyptian peasants.

partly to

enhance

attractiveness in

its

The Mit Ghamr Savings Bank

rapidly gained

popularity and began making a substantial contribution to the local economy. theless,

it

was closed

in

1968 by

a

government

cious of religion, under the pretext that laws. 45

The

institution ploy,

its

significant point

of the

past.

is

that

Although

essential features

it

it

A

in violation

assumed

None-

and suspi-

of the country's banking

Mit Ghamr was not modeled

were copied from

disguise this appropriation. 46

was

hostile to private initiative

after

some

Islamic

a religious identity as a public relations

a

non-Islamic source, with no attempt to

fundamentally different claim

is

made on behalf of

the commercial banks chartered as Islamic institutions since 1975, under the watchful eyes of clerics.

They have

have seen, there

is

all

been

billed as inherently Islamic creations. Yet, as

nothing distinctly Islamic about their operations. The contrast

could not be more striking. Mit

Ghamr shunned

interest

and

actively

term development; today's Islamic banks pay and receive interest

and

their

Not

primary

that

it

is

activity

is

as a

promoted long-

matter of course,

the promotion of trade.

particularly Islamic to favor profit-and-loss sharing over interest.

Profit-and-loss sharing predates Islam, ticed continually

we

and since the seventh century

by diverse non-Muslim

the world's stock markets operate

on the

societies.

basis

it

has been prac-

Like the venture capital industry,

of profit-and-loss sharing. In any

case,

Timur Kuran 314

it is

not clear that the Qur'anic prohibition of interest was originally understood to

encompass the

institution

unambiguously

is

of

we know

interest as

debt double following a default and redouble

his

it

if

What

todav.

the pre-Islamic Arabian institution of riba,

the Qur'an bans

whereby

a

borrower saw

he defaulted again. Because

it

tended to push defaulters into enslavement, riba had long been a source of communal

The purpose of the ban was undoubtedly to forestall communal disharmony in the spirit of a modern bankruptcy law, the penalty for default. This is

friction.

by curbing,

supported by the

bv

calls for charity.

in distress

may be

and to

Qur'anic verses banning riba tend to be accompanied

fact that the

The Qur'an

refrain

enjoins lenders to

show compassion toward borrowers

from taking advantage of their misfortunes. The ban on

when he

interpreted, then, as an injunction against kicking a person

Many

early

Muslims subscribed to

contemporaries

who

this interpretation,

is

riba

down. 47

and they clashed with

their

read into the ban not an injunction against exploitation but a

general prohibition of interest. 48 While the broader interpretation eventually gained this did not deter Muslims from continuing to borrow and lend at interThev went on doing so through various ruses, such as the following practice which leading jurists endowed with legitimacy: A wants to lend B $100 at 5 percent interest, without violating the ban. So he buys a chair from B in return for $100 and then promptly returns it for $105, payable in one year. The chair's ownership remains unchanged; B receives $100 now; and A stands to receive $105 in a year. While none

dominance, est.

49

of the individual transactions involve

interest,

together they are equivalent to a single

whereby A lends $100 to B at 5 percent per annum. Murabaha, the most popular lending mechanism of the Islamic banks,

transaction

is

a similarly

ancient ruse, which consists of several interest-free transactions that together

Not

to interest.

surprisingly,

murabaha was

of Islamic banking. In 1980 view on

its

a source

Pakistan's Council

legitimacy, stating that although

would not be

advisable to use

it

it

of controversy

amount

in the early days

of Islamic Ideology took

was "permissible under the

widely or indiscriminately." 50 Another

a cautious

Shari'a,

common

it

ruse

form of redefining as Y what everyone knows to be X. In Iran, for instance, government has decreed that when a financial transaction between two public the takes the

agencies takes place at a fixed rate of return, the charge involved est

—

as

it

would be

if

one of the

borrow from each other

parties

were

at interest, liberated

is

not called

inter-

So agencies freely definition from having

a private citizen.

by the twist of a

51 to acknowledge their violation of what passes as a sacred Islamic tenet.

While there

is

economics that

a consensus

interest

"interest-free" loan.

or the

real? In

power?

but a requirement of Islamic.

Two

sinful, there is

inflation,

is it

the theorists and practitioners of Islamic

no consensus

as to

what

is

the nominal rate of return that

meant by an

must be

zero,

other words, must loans be indexed to the rate of inflation to protect

their purchasing

52

is

Under

among both

A

few writers argue that indexation

justice,

although the dominant view

international conferences

1986 and the other

in

Jeddah

in

on

is

is

not only legitimate

that indexation

is

un-

indexation, one held in Islamabad in

1987, reached the conclusion that indexation

is

incompatible with Islam. 53 Nonetheless, the Islamic banks index their markups, commissions, and service charges to inflation. In Turkey,

where

in the

mid-1980s the

rate

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 315

of inflation was about

was

also

about

five

five

times higher than in Pakistan, the

markup under murabaha

times higher.

Denunciations of the Anti-Interest Campaign and the Fundamentalist Defense

The controversv over banking tend to

what goes

to whether

without practical experience

interest rages on. Expositors

on the

insist

in

necessitv of eliminating interest, but they are divided as

banking

as Islamic

is

genuinely Islamic. While

manv

are

com-

fortable with the ruses that provide ways around the prohibition, others see these a manifestation

Each of these positions has drawn that

guiltv

insist

on banning

interest are ignorant, he savs,

of misinterpreting the Qur'an, which bans not

And

interest.

those

and who, for

est

from Suleyman Uludag

fire

who

interest

were unlawful,

in practices

aimed

promotes dishonest)' that the diffusion

it

at

would be

of Islamic history and

interest but usury, or exorbitant

is

savs,

is

a serious

Him. 55 Uludag's suggestion

deceiving

crime against Islam,

also a grave offense against

a lesser sin to deal in interest

God: even

if

openlv than to cloak that Islamic banking

highlv significant in view of the argument, mentioned earlier,

is

of veritable

sharing must await the improvement of

profit- and-loss

business moralitv. If so. Islamic banking duplicity,

treatise classics.

an arrav of ruses are guiltv, in addition, of

this reason, tolerate

a religion that stands for truthfulness. It

and

1988

appreciate the impossibility of doing business without inter-

promoting dishonestv and hvpocrisv. This, he

it

in a

emplovs an Islamic form of expression and draws heavilv on Islamic

Those who

as

of the Muslim community's moral degradation/ 4

own

is its

worst enemy: bv fostering trickerv

hinders the task of imbuing businessmen with norms of truthfulness

it

and trustworthiness.

Another broad attack on the prevalent opinion concerning the legitimacy of interest

came

in

1989 through

a legal

opinion (fatwa) of

Muhammad

Sayyid Tantawi,

mufti of Egypt. Interest-based banking instruments are not necessarily corrupt, says

Tantawi, because they ally beneficial

may

benefit everyone involved, including third parties. Gener-

and, hence, legitimate intruments include, he says, high-yielding gov-

ernment bonds and interest-bearing savings accounts. 56 But Tantawi's position minority position within the Islamic establishment. that

all

interest, regardless

parties, violates

both the

of the benefits

spirit

and the

it

letter

The dominant

is

a

position remains

confers to borrowers, lenders, and third

of Islam.

The proceedings of recent conferences on Islamic banking and statements by leading fundamentalists show that it is now a generallv accepted view in fundamentalist banks

circles that the Islamic

stitutions.

in existence are

Khurshid Ahmad, a

prolific writer

not quite the intended interest-free

who

has held influential positions

in-

on

key governmental commissions charged with steering the Islamization of Pakistan's

economy, has publiclv of their business

is still

criticized his countrv's Islamic banks, saying that

based on

less that for all their identified

interest.

57

Many

"99 percent"

Islamic economists believe nonethe-

shortcomings the Islamic banks are superior to conven-

tional banks.

For one thing, they

say,

even

if

the Islamic banks lend at interest, they generallv

Timur Kuran 316

avoid paying interest to their depositors. Indeed, the dividends paid to depositors are

not predetermined,

in that

they fluctuate. But the same can be said of the

in operation

throughout the Western world.

sets, its yield

on anv given dav being

gerial

A

bond fund holds

bond funds

interest-bearing as-

mana-

the dav's average interest income, minus a

commission. This average mav van' from one day to the next because of changes

in the fund's holdings. Yet the dividends paid to the fund's depositors are financed

pure

interest. Similarlv, the

nate, as

we saw

by

dividends the Islamic banks pay to their depositors origi-

earlier, in thinly

disguised forms of interest.

The

fact that these divi-

dends fluctuate makes an Islamic bank no more "Islamic" than an ordinary bond fund in

Korea or Switzerland.

The second its

line

of defense against the shortcomings of Islamic banking hinges on

allegedlv superior profitabilitv. Independent observers have found, in fact, that in

the late 1970s and earlv 1980s the Islamic banks

made huge

But generally

profits.

speaking their profit rates have subsequently fallen below the domestic norms. In a recent comparative study

Clement Henrv Moore

finds that

between 1984 and 1986

the Islamic banks in Bahrain, Tunisia, and Turkey earned higher returns

on

total assets

than their conventional competitors, while those in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar,

and the Sudan achieved substantially lower returns. Outside of Bahrain, only the

younger Islamic banks seem to be enjoying returns above the norm. The ers in this period

It is

who feel

few months to

existence of a small but significant

attract

a handful

group of savers

about

of branches Turkey's Islamic banks managed in

The

resulting rise in their overhead will

thev could remain

more

most

likely

must open more

reduce their profitabilitv.

profitable than their conventional rivals because, like

of their counterparts elsewhere, the Turkish Islamic banks enjoy

tant legal privileges.

a

percent of the country's total bank deposits. After this

1

surge, however, they found that for further expansion thev

branches.

manv

The

special advantages.

uncomfortable with interest has given the Islamic banks a readv-made source

of deposits. Thus, with

Still,

perform-

not surprising that certain Islamic banks have done very well, because they

some

initial

star

Turkev, the Al Baraka Turkish Finance

in

the Faisal Finance Institution, both established in the mid-1980s. 58

House and enjov

were two Islamic banks

Thev enjoy

tax breaks.

some impor-

They have lower-than-usual

quirements, which means that, relative to their

reserve re-

thev transfer a smaller fraction

rivals,

of their deposits to the Central Bank. And, unlike ordinary banks, thev are allowed to

engage

in real estate transactions

What

is

to suffer a

the oil

surprising, in view

fall

boom

in profitabilitv.

of

loans were

the Islamic banks are

now

mv contention

in foreign trade. 59

all this,

A major

of the 1970s, which are

some of these bad supports

and

is

that the older Islamic banks have tended

reason

now

made under

is

that they

taking a

toll

norm. 61 While

careless loans

their profits.

The

during

fact that

profit-and-loss sharing helps explain It

that these banks face a shortage of the skills required to

of the mid-1980s had by the

this slip

made

lending almost exclusively on the basis of interest.

profit-and-loss sharing viable. 60 Interestingly, in terms tacular performers

on

is

late

of

why also

make

profitabilitv Turkey's spec-

1980s

fallen

attributable in part to the expenses

below the Turkish

of establishing new

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 317

branches,

it

inherently

more

added caution

calls for

in accepting the claim that Islamic

Yet another defense of Islamic banking

that

is

to aggravate the crisis bv defaulting

instability allegedly disappears

decline in bank revenues flaw* in this

when

on

is

enhances economic

stability. In

revenues, causing

of

their interest obligations. This source

returns to depositors are variable, because any

then matched by a

is

it

may lower bank

an interest- based svstem macroeconomic shocks

them

banking

profitable.

fall

bank obligations. 62 There

in

is

a

argument which stems from the implicit assumption that an Islamic bank

whose rexenues

fall

One would expect, on move away from banks performing poorly and into those well. There is, in fact, some evidence that the depositors in not suffer a withdrawal of deposits.

will

the contrary, deposits to

performing

relatively

Islamic institutions are just as fickle as their counterparts in conventional banks. In

Egypt, news in 1986 that the al-Ravan Islamic investment company speculating in gold provoked massive withdrawals. Depositors

hold al-Ravan's shares to

when high

do so once the downside

returns

$100

lost

million

who were happy

to

seemed assured were apparently unwilling

became appreciable. 63

risk

As Volker Xienhaus observes. Islamic banks losing funds must reduce the credit thev supply to their clients. 64 So in any case interest

mav

well be true, and the Iranian

ously. Accordingly, Iran requires

forces rates to stay within a either Iran or Pakistan

of

his

it is

not obvious that the replacement of

bv profit-and-loss sharing enhances macroeconomic

own

banks to share

a single rate

narrow band. 65 Thus, there

between

a depositor's rate

common

bank's operations. Since a

with profit-and-loss sharing, one

stability.

and Pakistani governments take

mav

is

The opposite

this

no necessary

of return

infer that the Iranian

seri-

relationship in

of return and the actual rate

danger

of return, while Pakistan

profitability

effectively

does away

and Pakistani authorities

regard genuinely Islamic banking as destabilizing.

The Responses of Conventional Banks

We

have seen

in several contexts that

banking systems have and-loss sharing. In lutionized banking, secular financial see the

attempts to establish interest-free banks or

failed to replace interest

no country and let

in

bv

its

much

no sense has the

heralded alternative, profit-

anti-interest

movement

alone the entire economic system. Perhaps this

community shows no

campaign against

interest as

sign of alarm.

On

revo-

why

is

the

the contrary, secular banks

having created an exploitable opportunity. In

Egypt and elsewhere many conventional banks, even those under non-Muslim ownership, have established interest-free branches or windows, and some investment companies have begun touting their operations as "Islamic." Even Wall Street has a player: Citicorp

and other

large

acceptable to their customers illegal,

American banks have devised

who

prefer not to deal in interest.

become

financial instruments

And where

interest

European, American, and Far Eastern banks have had no trouble abiding

mally by this ban.

now do only

The

Pakistani branches of

interest-free business,

ing fundamentally

new about

although

for-

Chase Manhattan and Deutsche Bank

it is

their operations.

is

widely recognized that there

is

noth-

Timur Kuran 318

Redistribution

Zakat Like other major religions, Islam stands opposed to great inequalities in the

bution of resources.

aimed

at reducing,

From

the very beginning, therefore,

though not

is

specifies in intricate detail

his relatives. 66

among

distri-

has featured mechanisms

necessarily eliminating altogether, social inequalities.

These include an inheritance law that to be divided

it

A

more

celebrated

how

a person's estate

mechanism

is

zakat, an

annual tax on wealth and income generally understood to incorporate certain levies that have been collected under other names, like the agricultural tax, 'ushr.

The

pro-

ceeds of zakat are earmarked mostly for assistance to specific categories of impover-

Mentioned

ished and disadvantaged individuals.

viewed

as

one of the Five

can afford the

of Islam, along with belief

Pillars

obligatorv pravcrs, fasting during

Quran,

explicitly in the

in the unity

Ramadan, and pilgrimage to Mecca

zakat

is

of God,

for those

who

trip.

The Qur'an provides only the broadest guidelines on zakat's coverage, and it leaves open the issue of rates. By tradition, it is levied on agricultural output, livestock, minerals, and precious metals

century Arabia.

The

— the major sources of income and wealth

rate varies

in seventh-

between 2.5 and 20 percent, depending on die source

and on the conditions of production, although there are various exclusions and emptions. Wealth held in while mining income tion, the rate

on

but 10 percent

is

the form of precious metals

subject to the highest rate,

agricultural output

if it is

is

5 percent

irrigated naturally.

include the poor, the handicapped, travelers in

assist

We do its

the land

is

irrigated

by the owner

tradition, the beneficiaries

difficult)',

of zakat

debtors, dependents of prisare also used to free slaves

people serving the cause of Islam. 67

not

know how

zakat affected inequality in the Arabian

burden

fell

scheme was progressive

economy of early

which is to on the rich. 68 This claim is plausible, but to impact we would need to know not just the intended

Islam. It has been claimed that the

say that

percent. For another illustra-

The proceeds

oners, and the zakat collectors themselves.

and to

if

Again by

20

ex-

subject to a 2.5 percent levy,

is

in collection,

disproportionately

determine the scheme's overall

pattern of collection but also the actual patterns of collection and disbursement. If

evasion was especiallv prevalent with respect to certain sources of income or

if

the

proceeds went primarily to the well-to-do, the overall effect might have been unequalizing. In any case, the purpose of zakat

to raise revenue for the Islamic state.

The

was not only to reduce inequality but

state

was empowered,

channel funds to "people serving the cause of Islam," which allowed revenue on public works and

territorial

also

as already noted, to it

to spend zakat

expansion. Such objectives need not have been

compatible with the goal of inequality reduction.

But whatever the impact of zakat

in seventh-century Arabia, in a

the effect of a traditional zakat scheme

is

modern economy

unlikely to be equalizing. For

one thing, the

involved rates are generally lower than those of the prevailing secular taxation systems;

even the 20 percent levy on mining income

falls

short of the marginal income tax in

most modern economies. For another, the commodities covered by the traditional

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 319

scheme plav

a considerably less

important role todav than they did more than

lennium ago. In anv economy, even

a

very undeveloped

Sudan, a substantial portion of income originates sectors the traditional in

scheme exempts by

forms not covered by the traditional scheme, such Yet

some

a substantial share

as oil wells

of wealth

Islam's spirit.

69

believe,

moreover, that

eyes."

and

70

a restructuring

modern

A

luminary of

surely this kind of attitude

is

of zakat would do violence to

This attachment to ancient specifics has drawn

school of Islamic thought.

is

is

expositors of Islamic economics consider the forms and rates used in the

economy. They

'religion

two

and corporate equity.

se\enth century to be applicable, with similarly beneficial results, to any

wrote: "It

a mil-

of the

like that

industry and the services,

in

And

default.

economy

opium of

the

from the modernist

fire

this school, the late Fazlur

Rahman, once

which gives point to the communist maxim, 1

the poor people,

since

it

effectively

throws dust

in their

The modernists want the sources of collection to include new commodities

activities,

and they favor varying the

rates

according to society's changing needs.

Thcv also wish to redefine the categories of expenditure. The modernist position now has the support of most Islamic economists." But among the reformists there is yet no consensus on what reform should entail. There are disagreements on rates, exemption limits, and disbursements. Another source of 1

controversy

is

the seventh-century principle that property

but not

(zahir)

if it is

exempt bank deposits,

hidden (batin)

equities,

.

On

and other

taxable if

is

it is

financial assets.

apparent

some would

the basis of this principle,

Others hold that because of

advances in accounting and record keeping the distinction between apparent and hid-

den property has become obsolete." 2 Voluntary versus Obligatory Zakat

Two

of the zakat systems

in operation,

those of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, feature

major innovations concerning coverage and

rates.

While

traditionally zakat

was

levied

only on individuals, these countries have extended the obligation to companies, on the grounds that companies are juristic persons. In addition, they have imposed a levy

on

certain types of

varying from

penses on

bank deposits. Saudi Arabia

commodity and

fertilizers

to

of the

mode of irrigation." 3

is

that the levy

is

which

is

classical

5 percent

on

flat

at rates

their ex-

law makes no allowance.

all

farm output, regardless

In contrast to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Malaysia has in

place a collection system that departs minimally

each farmer

on imports,

commodity. Pakistan allows farmers to deduct

insecticides, items for

Another Pakistani innovation

levies zakat

from

traditional stipulations.

granted a fixed exemption, but no deductions are allowed for

production costs. Another striking aspect of the Malaysian system

is

that

exempts industrial workers, bureaucrats, businessmen, and shopkeepers,

it

Thus,

modern

effectively

as well as the

growers of rubber, coconuts, and other tropical cash crops, none of whom are mentioned explicitly in classical

As one might

74

expect, these systems vary greatly in terms of yield

Pakistani figures for

mestic Product.

texts.

A

1987-88 show

and incidence.

that revenue stood at 0.35 percent

mere 8 percent of the

total

came from

agriculture,

of Gross Do-

which

is

ex-

plained partly by the difficulty of compelling rich and powerful landlords to pay their

Timur Kuran 320

dues. 75 Saudi Arabian figures for the 1970s

show

that revenue hovered

between 0.01

and 0.04 percent of Gross Domestic Product."' Given that per capita income 1

Arabia

much

is

higher than in Pakistan, this

coverage and extensive loopholes. In

prima

is

and

also

interestingly,

growers, a large share of Perlis, for instance, rice

1985." 9 If nothing sources

to

whom

lie

also evidence

of widespread

of compliance was

rate

however, the zakat burden

falls

8 per-

just

almost exclusivelv on

below the country's povertv

line.

rice

In the state of

growers accounted for 93 percent of the zakat collection

else, this

the poor;

is

constrained bv extremely restrictive coverage

is

bv substantial evasion. As of 1988, the

More

cent." 8

Saudi

commodities of great economic im-

fact, certain

portance, like housing, are exempt from zakat. There evasion." 7 In Malaysia, too, the yield

in

evidence of restrictive

facie

may

it

in

finding shows that zakat does not necessarilv transfer re-

away from them.

transfer resources

It is also signifi-

cant that in sharp contrast to Pakistan the agricultural sector carries a huge share

of the burden. Within the agricultural

sector, zakat

is

progressive at the lower end of

the income scale because of the traditional exemptions. But

it

regressive at the

is

upper end, apparentlv because the wealthier farmers are more prone to evasion. 80 In

one

of Kedah, for which

village in the state

cal scientist

15 percent

James Scott, the

rate

we

have a detailed studv bv the

politi-

of compliance between 1977 and 1979 was merelv

— which means that the farmers evaded 85

percent of their obligations.

Evasion took, a variety of forms: disguising or underdeclaring one's cultivated acreage, underreporting one's crops, and handing over to the zakat collector spoiled or adulterated grain. 81

Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan are is

administered bv the

over whether and

state.

how

among

handful of countries where zakat

a

Muslim world individuals have discretion The Qur'an itself is mute on the issues of

In most of the

to pay zakat. 82

administration and enforcement, ruling out neither the centralized, obligatory

nor the decentralized, voluntary mode. Yet each dent. In the earliest years assistance to the

poor was unregulated and

mad's

last

when

time

it

strictly voluntary.

after the

was expanding very

lived in

Zakat became

Mecca,

a formal

community's relocation to Medina

rapidly.

Thus, during Prophet

Muham-

few years zakat came to be administered by state-appointed agents and

enforced, as necessary, bv military might. 83 Barely

two decades

ever, the Islamic state's ability to administer zakat

leadership struggles. 84 tion,

mode

has a basis in historical prece-

of Islam, when the Muslim community

and compulsory transfer system shortly (hijra), at a

mode

From

crumbled

after his death, as a result

how-

of violent

then on, zakat was up to the individual Muslim's discre-

although in certain times and places

local bodies played a role in collection

and

disbursement. In sum, while zakat was a centrally administered, obligatory system

during gion's

a brief

life it

but important segment of early Islamic history, for most of the

reli-

has been administered in a decentralized manner, the agents of enforce-

ment being peer

pressure, fear of God,

Distressingly

little

research has

and the

individual's

the available studies suggest that only a fraction

pays regularly.

A

conscience. in operation.

But

of die nonimpoverished population

1978 survey of educated middle-class Muslims

in

Karachi showed

made

regular payments

citizens

must themselves

all

had heard of zakat, fewer than

a quarter

Under

the present system in Pakistan,

Muslim

that while almost

themselves. 85

own

gone into the voluntary system

THE ECONOMIC [MPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 321

dues on their precious metals and deposit these voluntarily into the na-

assess their

According to an internal document of the Permanent Commission on Islamisation of Economy, such deposits have been negligible. 86 Revealingly, the zakat tables in the Pakistan Statistical Yearbook contain no entry tor precious metals. tional zakat hand.

Yet a studv on the zakat potential of another country, Turkey, suggests that the dues on precious metals mav be substantial. On gold and diamonds alone, the study found, s~ this potential is around 5.5 percent of Turkey's annual savings. But it would be very difficult to enforce pavments on precious metals, since they are easily hidden. In anv case, an enforcement campaign would most certainly cause people to shift their wealth from precious metals into assets exempt from zakat, like real estate.

Another important finding untary pavments. Other

is

that charity

common

is

not the onlv impetus for making vol-

motives are the encouragement of worker loyalty

and the promotion of social conformity. In the Kedah

payment was

essentially voluntary until

make, under the rubric of zakat, a small This

1955,

it

village studied

was customary

gift to their

workers, over and above wages.

which the workers came to expect, helped ensure the

gift,

by Scott, where

for landowners to

lovaltv

of the land-

owner's work force during times of peak labor demand. Typically, the size of a work-

depended on his "respectability," as judged bv the landowner. A worker whose comportment, manners, or political views gave him an unfavorable reputation er's gift

received a relatively small

appear to have been the

and the caretaker of the

treat the

such

as the teacher

of religion

mosque. M

local

system that existed

If the

In addition to reputable workers the major beneficiaries

gift.

village's religious functionaries,

in

Kedah

is

any indication, the voluntary

needy equitably. Apart from the religious establishment,

it

mode does

not

benefits primarily

those with connections, tending to pass over the truly destitute, the unemployed, and the handicapped. This observation

world has long featured, even

poor people

who

receive

is

bolstered by the

in relatively

little, if

common

prosperous

fact that the

localities,

many

able, at least understandable. will

desperately

anv, charity. Against this background, the

fundamentalist campaign to recentralize the administration of zakat

The proponents of obligator)'

is,

if

Muslim ongoing

not reason-

zakat argue that this

mode

augment the funds available for distribution and prevent their disbursement

on the

basis

obligator)'

of personal

and

tics.

They remind us that the Prophet himself made zakat dominant voluntary mode took hold after the

also that the currently

Prophet's death.

State-Administered Zakat in Operation

How, they

then, are the recently instituted state-administered systems performing? Arc

more

die poor?

successful than their decentralized counterparts at channeling resources to

Have thev overcome

the role of personal connections? Given the sparseness

of the pertinent documentation and research, these questions can only be answered in a tentative

manner. But we

shall see clearly that the

high hopes of the architects of

obligatory zakat have not materialized. In Pakistan, zakat revenues are channeled by the Zakat Administration to thou-

sands of local committees that decide

funds are allocated

among

whom

in their

communities to support. The

the committees roughly according to the populations they

Timur Kuran 322

which means that

represent,

relatively

poor communities generally receive more than

89 their contributions to the national fund.

1980-88 period 58

According to

during the

official records,

percent of the zakat funds went as subsistence allowances to

people unable to work, including widows, orphans, and the handicapped. 90 But the grants involved were

much too

small to

standards of such groups. In the 1980s, a

month

a significant difference in the living

individual needed an estimated

$22

most zakat payments varied between $4 and $8 per indisome regions the typical payment was as low as $1. 91 The system has

just to survive,

and

vidual,

make

when an

one million

in

beneficiaries,

which represents about 10 percent of the Pakistanis situated

below the country's poverty eight vears of operation

An

line.

official

report notes in this connection that in

Pakistan's state-administered zakat svstem has

impact on inequality. There has been no noticeable decline,

it

had

its

little visible

savs, in the

number of

beggars and no discernible alleviation of poverty. Under the circumstances, "people are losing faith not only in the svstem, but also in the belief that Islam offers a better

economic order." 92

would be

It

a gross error, the report goes

on

to say, to attribute the system's failure

merely to a shortage of resources. The funds set aside for subsistence aid and rehabilitation

should have been enough to provide around $8 per month to even' person

below the poverty

line.

question, the figure

is

While the assumptions that underlie

suggestive, as the report itself indicates, of serious

ment and corruption. 93 In awash

in

this assertion are

fact,

open to

mismanage-

ever since the system's inception Pakistan has been

rumors and newspaper reports of

arbitrariness, favoritism, nepotism,

and

embezzlement. The zakat recipients apparently include "orphans" with two living parents,

"impoverished

women" wearing rows of gold

under the ground. Zakat resources have also been used by fund for programs benefiting primarily the

rich.

and "old people" long

bracelets,

influential people as a slush

94

Ever since the beginning, Pakistan's Zakat Administration has been allocating

about 20 percent of

women women

its

funds to rehabilitation. Under this program,

have received a sewing machine. Unfortunately, the earning is

hampered by

their lack

of training and materials. 95

feeling in official circles that properly

grams would constitute more

managed

rehabilitation

effective antidotes to

ances. Accordingly, the Zakat Administration

Still,

is

manv poor

ability

there

is

a

of these

growing

and public works pro-

poverty than subsistence allow-

now

building seventy-five thousand

houses for the poor and various public works schemes are under discussion. 96 Ironically,

it

was

a modernist, Fazlur

Rahman, who launched

the debate

funds could be used on public health, housing, and education.

pushed for

on whether zakat

When

in the

1960s he

program-oriented expenditure pattern, he was denounced by funda-

a

promoting

mentalists for

a

scheme not anchored

in Islamic tradition. Since

then the

widely recognized failures of the subsistence-oriented expenditure pattern have

manv

made

fundamentalists increasingly receptive to innovative alternatives.

Malaysia's federal structure assigns the administration of zakat to an office at the state level. In

ment. Here

each

is

state, collected

how

funds are forwarded to the zakat office for disburse-

the zakat office in

proceeds in 1970, according to

its

Alor Setar, the capital of Kedah, allocated

own

official report.

Of the

total,

its

53 percent went

toward "commendable measures" (which generally means religious education), 6 per-

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 323

making

cent to people

a

pilgrimage to Mecca, 2 percent to converts, 22 percent as

commissions to the zakat collectors and central administration, leaving percent for the poor. 9 " Figures from the earlv 1980s

show

poor ranged between 11 and 13 percent, with zakat causes claiming

much of the

rest.

98

mere 15

a

that disbursements to the

officials

and various

religious

In Perlis, likewise, about 12 percent of the annual

zakat revenue was going to the poor, the lion's share being set aside for zakat

the faculty and students of Islamic schools, and pilgrims."

indigent were minuscule. Those included in the

and S19 (U.S.)

a vear

office to collect the

As

in Pakistan,

— for manv,

sum

a

less

to the

of recipients received between S3

list

than the cost of traveling to the zakat

monev. 100 funds collected in one locality are often spent in another. Thus, an

impoverished rice-growing village that supplies funds to the system ily

officials,

The amounts given

will

not necessar-

receive anything in return. In the village studied bv Scott, in tact, not a single

poor

peasant had ever received aid through the zakat office, at least as of 1980. Apparently, the only recipient of official aid was the university-student son of the zakat collector,

one of the wealthiest men

in the village.

recognize that the established svstem it

as a

is

101

Manv

Malaysian Islamic economists now

an embarrassment to those

supremely effective measure against poverty.

who

have touted

Some are now advocating a drastic One proposal is to use zakat to start their own businesses. An-

reorientation of expenditures toward rehabilitation.

funds for providing the very poor with resources other

new

is

to divert a portion

jobs.

of the funds into a program to help urban prostitutes find

102

As we saw

earlier, decentralized,

voluntary zakat was criticized for

poor people without proper connections and istani

and Malaysian records suggest that the same flaws mav

The two modes do

zakat administered bv the state.

but the essential difference lies,

lies

its

bias against

The Pak-

failure to alleviate poverty.

its

differ,

also afflict obligatorv

of course,

in their effects,

neither in fairness nor in ability to reduce poverty. It

rather, in the connections to

which thev confer

value. Decentralized zakat confers

on employment; state-adminones touching on religion. Thus, under Malaysia's old decentralized system, the surest way to obtain regular zakat payments was to work loyally for a wealthy landlord; under the current centralized svstem, it is to enroll in a religious school or to work for the zakat office.

value to economic connections, especially ones based

istered zakat confers value to political connections, particularly

A major difference between the current source of compensation for are paid out

officials

of zakat revenues,

in

Pakistani

and Malaysian systems

lies in

of the zakat administration. In Malaysia

the

officials

accordance with scripture. In Pakistan they are paid

out of general government funds, apparently to enhance the system's appeal bv fostering the illusion that the svstem operates cosdessly. 103 Even in Pakistan, of course, the religious establishment benefits

from the svstem. Some

compensation for collection and administration, and revenue

is

channeled into religious education.

1

"4

religious functionaries receive

in addition, a portion

of zakat

But the religious establishment's

where helping the poor appears as a advancing broad Islamic objectives and for lining the pockets

stake in zakat has been far greater in Malaysia,

convenient pretext for

of religious

officials. It is

important to recognize that the

underestimate the actual take of the

officials.

official

There are various

Malaysian figures

irregularities in collec-

Timur Kuran 324

known

tion that benefit the collectors personally. For instance, collectors are

to under-

invoice their collections, presumably embezzling the differences. 105 Malaysia's state-administered zakat system has generated resentment

which tends to view

peasantry,

many

it

as just

another

ordinary Pakistanis harbor similar feelings.

tax.

What may

One

sec,

much

less

determine,

how

his personal contribution

is

the that

is

cause of their resentment

impression of widespread corruption. As in Malaysia, another factor

does not

among

be surprising

is

the

that the payer

is

spent.

106

Not

only does this deny him the satisfaction of observing his contribution's impact, but

opens up the possibility of disagreement over spending

priorities

and

decisions.

it

A

are passed over by a fund known to support may well consider the system inequitable, as apparently many contributors do. Some telling evidence on people's dislike of governmental involvement is that almost no contributions were made to a voluntary zakat fund established by the Pakistani government in the 1950s. 107 More recent evidence comes from a Malay-

zakat payer

whose needy acquaintances

distant students

sian survey

conducted

in

1987 by Aidit bin Ghazali. About 60 percent of this

survey's

participants indicated that they prefer to choose the beneficiaries of their zakat pay-

ments on

their

own,

as

A significant source

opposed of

to leaving the decision to the government.

friction in Pakistan has

been the

Shi'ite minority's unwill-

ingness to pay zakat to a Sunni-dominated government. 109 In zakat law obliged

all

108

its

original form, the

Muslims to contribute to the government-administered fund,

but when the Shi'ites took to the street in protest, the law was amended to give members of minority sects the option of exemption. To exercise this option a Shi'ite would simply have to submit an affidavit to his bank or the rural zakat collector. 110

Many

Shi'ite depositors

have opted to exempt themselves, and

number of Sunni depositors

it is

known

that a small

are passing as Shi'ites simply to avoid the automatic

annual deductions. Yet another cause of frustration

lies

in the

compulsorv nature of the pavments. In

each of these countries, some individual Muslims their religious obligations

people of their

own

choice. 111 In Malaysia there

between the two types of

feel that

obligatory pavments leave

unmet. Accordingly, they make additional pavments to

zakat.

is

even a terminological distinction

Payments to the government are referred to by a

pejorative term, zakat raja, literally the "ruler's zakat," while voluntary

made

pavments

of charity are called zakat peribadi, or "personal zakat." Because some Pakistanis and Malaysians make zakat payments over and above their obligatory payas acts

ments, zakat transfers more wealth to the poor than shown by the while

I

know of no

systematic research

on

official records.

But

do not seem indigent count on signifi-

the additional transfers, thev

to be large. In neither Pakistan nor Malaysia can the typical

cant support from the well-to-do.

Evaluation

—

all the problems of the recently established zakat systems public oppogovernment involvement, widespread evasion, nepotism, and the diversion of extensive resources to the religious establishment are two basic characteristics of human nature. People's perceptions of justice and efficiency are colored by their per-

Underlying

sition to

—

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 325

sonal experiences and circumstances.

resources as a citizens

means of promoting

And people seek to influence the allocation of own priorities. Thus, no society is without

their

opposed to government spending patterns; charges of favoritism, fraud, and as ubiquitous as government itself. In general, moreover, government of-

misuse are ficials

are

more sympathetic than ordinary

relatively less trusting

citizens to centralized redistribution

and

of private decision making. In view of these observations, the

recorded frictions over zakat arc merclv another manifestation of the universal struggle to control resource allocation. This should not be obscured bv the religious character

of

zakat. Neither Islam

human

nor anv other religion has overcome the

impulse to

control economic outcomes. Earlier

I

concluded that Islamic banking has not revolutionized the way Muslims

Now

save and invest.

it

it

has obviously redistributed

has not conferred substantial benefits

in this

made

can add that zakat has not

I

poverty and inequality. While

connection that in

its

on the poor

as a

a

major dent

group.

One must

and physical

capital

nor on consumptive goods

vehicle for limited transfers involving a restricted

like

it

recognize

assets like land

housing and furniture,

menu of goods and

the best of circumstances the distributional impact of such a

Under poor management

wealth,

fundamentalist interpretation zakat constitutes a rather

means of redistribution. Touching neither on productive

conservative

Muslim

in

some income and

assets.

it

is

Even

a in

scheme would be modest.

has been downright disappointing.

In response to this assessment

one might

reiterate that

bv extending

its

coverage

new forms of income and wealth zakat mav be turned into a highly significant instrument of redistribution. The potential yield is indeed considerable. Islamic economists have shown that it can exceed 3 percent of Gross National Product." 2 But to

this estimate

overlooks the huge problem of evasion. In any case, to turn zakat into a

major equalizer

it is

not enough to

raise its yield. It

is

necessary also to increase the

share of the proceeds channeled to the poor. This will require the development of

auditing systems and the establishment of social and legal sanctions that counter the

motivation to divert funds away from the poor.

The existing state-administered systems might be defended on the grounds that many other official transfer programs are afflicted bv the same problems. But remember that Islamic economics aspires to vastly superior standards. zakat will

do

as well as

other systems of redistribution but that

It it

promises not that will

do markedly

better.

Economic Development: The Role of Islamic Morality Islamic economics claims, as mentioned, that Islamic scripture harbors solutions to

every conceivable economic problem. selfishness

Manv

problems arc to be solved by curbing

through injunctions concerning consumption, production, and exchange. pace of economic development will allegedly more balanced, and less disruptive form. This asser-

If these injunctions are followed, the

quicken, while taking tion turns

on

its

on

a fairer,

head the long-standing Western suspicion that Islam

is

an obstacle

Timur Kuran 326

to modernization." 3 Rejecting the notion that Islam

opment, Islamic economics affirms

it

is

inimical to

economic devel-

to be a principal source of growth and harmony.

In their most general form the advocated economic injunctions consist of moral guidelines is

common

many

to

value systems, both religious and secular.

The

individual

encouraged to enjoy the bounties of civilization, but he must be willing to share

possessions with others, particularly with the less fortunate.

abusing the goods or trader, he

is

"fair"

wages to

his

Nor must he

earn

But

in exercising this

more than

He must work

employees and charge "just" prices to hard and

his

from

freedom he must

strive to fulfill his

he must pay

his efforts justify;

his customers.

honest in his economic dealings, he must admit his mistakes and avoid ing.

refrain

and from keeping them unutilized. As a producer

at his disposal

free to seek personal profit.

avoid harming others.

He must

Remaining

false advertis-

commitments. 114

In the early centuries of Islam these general injunctions were applied to a panoply

of situations, generating multitudes of specific injunctions. For example, the require-

ment

to earn

no more than

was taken to imply

one's fair share

the sale or purchase of a fruit tree in blossom.

The

that Islam prohibits

logic: since the traders

cannot

predict the tree's yield with certainty, the selected price could cause an unearned gain for

one party and an undeserved

loss for the other.

1151

Some

sider such ancient interpretations to retain validity in the

some

and

are contradictor)'

interpretations

jurisprudence provides several different

classical Islamic

of many individual

cases.

116

Islamic economists con-

modern world, even though

Feeling

less

constrained by classical appli-

cations, other Islamic economists call for fresh interpretations. 117

But regardless of where they stand on the

applicability

of ancient interpretations,

the Islamic economists generally agree that if the moral guidelines of Islam are ob-

served and enforced the economic performance of dramatically. People will readily sacrifice their

own

Muslim

societies will

improve

material pleasures for society's

They will find their economic activities more fulfilling. Even their jobs will become more satisfying, as they take on the character of worship. Some writers observe such changes already in countries that have committed themselves to Islamization. Here is a striking statement by a Turkish writer in a 1987 volume on economic interests.

development and Islam. In February 1982,

1

was

in a

the time of morning prayers.

bus on the way to Tehran airport,

We

at

dawn, during

passed a middle aged, bearded street sweeper,

who was cleaning the sidewalk on one of the main avenues. That one glimpse gave me the impression that in this hour of prayer he was sweeping with devotion and ecstasy. The glow on his face affected me deeply, and I conveyed my feelings to the young Iranian sitting beside me. He explained: "At various levels

of our society there are Muslims for

worship,

blow

like a service to religion

whom

diligent, effective

and community. This

street

work

is

like

sweeper must

that to devote oneself to cleaning the streets of an Islamic state

is

a

form

of worship. 118

The

central point

of the

article to

which

velopment requires imbuing society with

a

this

quote belongs

is

that successful de-

communitarian morality of

self-sacrifice,

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 327

altruism,

and brotherhood. This

statements such

is

not an isolated view. The literature

"[Islam] deals with

as,

framework of

ways

in the

from

this perspective.""

total

all

human development and

In accordance with this view, a major,

began

when

falling

is

replete with

economic development but

al-

never in a form divorced

119

world's underdevelopment rality

aspects of

is

held to be

its

if

not the primarv, source of the Muslim

moral degeneration. The standard of mo-

the "rightly guided" caliphs of the seventh century were

succeeded bv a string of increasingly corrupt leaders. But this degeneration has taken

form only

a calamitous

in recent centuries,

through the influence of the West. Declin-

ing moralitv, say Islamic economists, has sapped productivity and reduced the effectiveness

of government. Moreover, bv weakening the

ties

of Islamic brotherhood,

it

made Muslims oblivious to one another's needs. As a sad consequence, Muslims divided on key issues and their ri\ alries arc keeping them from cooperating toward

has are

common tical

objectives.

Low

moralitv

is

also held substantially responsible for the prac-

shortcomings of zakat and Islamic banking. The misuse of zakat funds

uted to the moral deficiencies of local

officials.

interest-based lending

we

is

ascribed, as

is

attrib-

Likewise, the continuing prevalence of

saw, to rampant dishonesty in the business

community. All this

is

taken to

mean

that moral education

the process of economic development.

Through

must be accorded

a crucial role in

family and school instruction, people

must be molded to fit the requirements of a just, harmonious, and efficient society. They must be imbued with the notion that they belong to a community of Muslims, the umma, whose interest takes precedence over their interests as individuals. One

may reform

the institutions of society, as

Many students ily

— though not exclusively — by of a

suitability as I

opposed to the people who

of development would argue that underdevelopment

institutional inefficiency, in other words,

society's institutions to its particular

know, no Islamic economist denies that lies in

the primacy

it

bv them.

bv the un-

needs and circumstances. As

social institutions matter; after

attach great importance to the institution of zakat.

tion

is

live

caused primar-

The

all,

far

they

distinctiveness of their posi-

gives to the restructuring of individuals.

Throughout the

made since the beginnings of Islam to instill in individuals an Islamic morality. Have these efforts influenced work effort, generosity, and market behavior? If so, how? Islamic economics has undertaken Muslim world, of

no

course, massive efforts have been

serious investigation of such matters, treating

it

as self-evident that Islamic

edu-

cation furthers growth and justice simultaneously.

Much

of Islamic economics conveys the impression that a communitarian ethic

a prerequisite for is

economic development. But certain writers hold that such an

an objective in

its

own

right.

nomic development, recognizing texts conflict

morality

explicitly

that moral imperatives may

say,

over eco-

in certain con-

with growth. 120 But the two camps are united in the belief that Islamic

a crucial ingredient

is

agree that

This objective takes precedence, they

is

ethic

Muslim

societies

of healthy economic development. Accordingly, they

have been held back by an individualistic ethic that keeps

them from working together toward common objectives. A striking aspect of this emphasis on the inculcation of a communitarian

ethic

is

Timur Kuran 328

that

it

draws no distinction between numerically small and large groups. The Islamic

morality of self-sacrifice, altruism, and brotherhood effectiveness

hammad's

and beneficence

first

in a

is

expected to work with equal

populous modern nation

group of companions. Let us be

clear

as

development of a country committed to an Islamic way of life substantially

by Muslims'

efforts to

mutual cooperation toward

is

this

means. The

expected to be driven

meet one another's observable needs and bv

jointly held

There arc two serious flaws

among Prophet Mu-

about what

and commonly perceived

in this thinking. First,

it

their

goals.

implicitly attributes to the

individual an infinite ability to receive, store, retrieve, and process information. In fact,

even in a small city no individual can handle more than a minuscule fraction of

the information relevant to local interests. Consequently,

nation can be aware of the wants of

He may

understand the needs of

of strangers. But

more than

his acquaintances

not even a pure

in general

altruist

overlooks the difficulty of generating

of

common

a

modern

his fellow citizens.

and have some

feel for the

wants

can be expected to be capable of

The argument's second

identifying the socially optimal course of action. it

no member of

a tiny fraction

flaw

that

is

goals. In a large society, environ-

mental heterogeneities and the division of labor make individuals experience different joys

and

frustrations

and develop different conceptions of

reality'.

tend to form different judgments concerning justice and efficiency.

As

a result, they

A common Islamic

education might mitigate these differences but never eliminate them. This argument

is

supported by recent applications of Islamic economics. Islamic

banks are supposed to commit a portion of their assets to making interest-free loans to the needy (qard hasana)

.

By and

large they

employees, in the form of advances on their

more

sensitive to the needs

can be said about

officials

make such

loans only to their

salaries. Evidently, Islamic

own

bankers are

of their acquaintances than to those of strangers. The same

charged with distributing society's zakat funds. The perva-

sive irregularities in their operations indicate that they are inclined to differentiate

among

the needs of their fellow Muslims.

In an isolated

perform similar

group numbering tasks, the

at

most

in the

range of experiences

low hundreds and whose members

may be

sufficiently

narrow and the

volume of

relevant information sufficiently small to enable a veritable agreement

objectives.

Moreover, the individual members of such

knowledge of one another's needs. But

it is

a

on

group may possess adequate

sheer romanticism to expect such

traits

to

characterize a population running into the millions. In a large society, sustained co-

commonly understood ends is possible only in small work team, and tightly knit partnerships. taught us anything over the past two centuries, it is that the

operation toward jointly held and

subgroups If

like

the family, the

economics has

institution

of the market allows traders pursuing

different, rather

than similar, ends to

achieve mutually satisfying outcomes. As an unrivaled economizer of information, the

market permits traders to serve the needs of others while pursuing nothing but their

own

selfish objectives.

True, the viability of the market mechanism depends

existence of certain constraints

on people's

on

the

actions, such as property rights, sanctions

against dishonesty, regulations to curb harmful externalities, and contracting rules.

And

cooperative production in firms

is

a source

of immense

social gain. Still, a large

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

THfc

329

economic

society's

viability

A

of purpose.

ness

is

ensured not simply, or even mainly, by altruism or joint-

crucial role

is

played by institutions that

make

traders,

whether

lone individuals or firms, serve society as a by-product of personal pursuits based

on

personal knowledge. Put differently, prosperity- does not require the commonality of

knowledge,

all

Nor does

it

in the sense

informational

abilities,

it

Friedrich Hayek, the

common

of each person knowing the needs of every other person.

require general conformity to joint objectives. Given people's very limited

some division of know ledge and labor. modern exponent of these insights, traces

always requires

most

forceful

misperception that the economic viability of

knowledge and purpose to

jointness of both

agement and individual market order

enterprise.

which Aristotle

in

a large society

lived, yet

social order. Generallater thinkers

would

service to another

it

be recognized that the market makes

without bearing him

But habits of thought do not die social doctrine is

a real kindness," or

easily.

it

where

selfish

a

Socialism, arguably the

most

influential

classless society

greed has given way to benevolence. Hayek

the "fatal conceit" of our time, the fundamental error that has led dozens of

calls this

countries to unbearable inefficiency and tyranny.

The supremely

efficient, just,

harmonious society promised by socialism has existed nowhere but ful

do

possible "to

even knowing him. 121

of the twentieth century, promotes the notion that a

possible, even inevitable,

such as

known benefits Not until the eigh-

the notion that only actions aiming at

to others are morally justified and, hence, economically desirable.

teenth century

two

they set the pattern over the following

from the household to the wider economy,

Thomas Aquinas propagated

on household man-

Aristotle's teachings

These teachings showed no comprehension of the

thousand years for religious and philosophical thinking on the izing erroneously

the

depends on

and

murals of bliss-

in

workers resolutely serving socialism. This brings us back to the Iranian street sweeper. The apparent glow on his face

was taken to imply that Islam can generate widespread benevolence and, this

benevolence can propel a large, complex economy

like that

further, that

of modern

Iran.

This

thinking obviously betrays the Aristotelian influences on Islamic philosophy. Like

other derivatives of Aristotelian thought, such as socialism, this philosophy rests to a substantial degree tions

and

on empirically untenable assumptions concerning human

capabilities.

inclina-

122

Given the preeminence of morality

in Islamic thinking

on economic development,

one might expect some consensus of opinion on the proper domain of government and on the need for central planning. In

fact,

there

is

none.

The

literature harbors

various arguments in favor of government ownership and central planning, and

others in favor of private property and the market mechanism,

and

lation

tradition.

123

Significantly, the

"socialism" and with "capitalism." cesses,

point

all

many

supported by reve-

term "Islamic" has been juxtaposed both with

And however

tolerant or intolerant

of market pro-

regimes have had no trouble finding an Islamic basis for their policies. This is

seldom appreciated by the exponents of Islamic economics,

tinely that their

own

who

claim rou-

particular positions are rooted in a well-articulated divine law

unambiguous meaning. on Hashemi Rafsanjani, who

that admits a single, It

was not

lost

as speaker

of the Iranian Parliament

Timur Kuran 330

observed during a heated debate on the economic role of government that some of his colleagues favored

more control over the economy, others

disagreements as "differences that "Islam can rival

among

accommodate

camps reach

a consensus.

all

experts, not over matters

these views."

But

if a

less.

Describing the

of religion," he said he went on, that the

It is desirable,

consensus cannot be reached, then the majority

will have to prevail, and "if in practice the majority view yields no results, then community will obviously revert to the other view." 124 As Shaul Bakhash observes, "To say that the government will try one policv and, if it fails, it will go back very different from asserting that Islam requires that economic and try another is and property relations be ordered on the basis of divine law." 125 Islamic economics features divisions on numerous other concerns of the field we

view the

.

call

.

.

"development economics,"

like trade

protection and industrial promotion.

Many

such issues have no counterparts in early Islam. In seventh-centurv Arabia central

The economy being modern sense. It is even notion of economic development was present. The earlv Muslims

planning was not a possibility, industrialization not an

mostlv nonmonetized, there was no monetary policy doubtful that the

had

a sense

of the

mizes inequality.

ideal

And

economy: one which

they clearly

felt

best to attain

it.

In view of

let

its

participants fairly

that the attainment of this ideal

curbing selfishness and dishonesty. There

of self-sustaining economic growth,

treats

issue.

in the

is

no evidence, however,

and mini-

depends on

that they conceived

alone that thev reflected and agreed

all this, it is

on how

not surprising that Islamic economics

divided on the institutional context of development as

it is

as

is

united on the primacv of

moralitv.

Prognosis

It is

time to pull together the threads of a long argument. In practice, not to mention

doctrine. Islamic economics believe. Its

banking.

is

hardly as comprehensive as

its

proponents apparentlv

concrete applications have been limited cssentiallv to redistribution and

Not even

in Pakistan,

which has undertaken the most

carefullv

planned

tempt to reorder an economy according to Islamic precepts, and which has tion emotionallv

a

at-

popula-

committed to Islam, has the scope of reform gone much beyond

these two areas. Like the underlying theory, the implemented modifications lack co-

herence. Islamic redistribution and banking have invoked

two

separate agendas, and

neither has been reconciled with other institutions and practices serving related or similar goals.

As

a case in point the Pakistani zakat

scheme

exists side

plethora of price controls and indirect taxes which counteract,

tended redistribution. Nor have the sequences.

The advent of

specific

if

not

bv side with

a

offset, the in-

reforms been revolutionarv in their con-

Islamic banking has altered onlv the cosmetics of banking

and finance, and zakat has nowhere led to a perceptible reduction

in

poverty or

in-

economic agenda remains poorlv defined. It is not vet clear, for instance, whether the ban on interest precludes the indexation of monetary commitments. And while there is agreement on the desirability of imbuing Muslims equality. Finally, the Islamic

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 331

with an Islamic morality, no consensus has emerged on what

ment

govern-

this implies for

activitv.

In trying to explain

of causes.

several classes

to give

it

why

Islamic economics has had

First, its

manv

whatever meaning seems

identifies

ambiguities allow the prevailing political forces

least

threatening to the status quo. Second, certain

elements of the Islamic economic agenda conflict with are required to accept financial risk,

no major impact, one

human

nature. Thus,

Muslims

And

they are

whereas thev prefer to avoid

it.

supposed to pav zakat on their precious metals, but thev prefer not to. Third, the

impeded bv

Islamic reforms have been

made

prevalence of tax evasion has loss sharing.

and

And

a shortage

it

We

saw, for instance,

of skills. While there

how

is

some demand

in profit- and-

from poor organization

every society for profit- and-

in

banks do not vet possess the

ex-

the continuing

imprudent for bankers to engage

fourth, the Islamic reforms have suffered

loss sharing, the Islamic

promoters have

social realities that their

pected religious sentiment to overcome.

skills

necessary to

make

this

financing technique viable. Likewise, the established zakat systems suffer from a lack

of effective monitoring.

What does the future hold for Islamic economics, and what of its continuing impact? The myth that the reforms undertaken in the name of Islam represent radical departures from preexisting practices probablv cannot be sustained for much longer. But they can be recognized

without causing the abandonment of basic

as ineffective

do not modify their ideologies at the As Albert Hirschman suggests, mental resis-

objectives like the elimination of interest. People first

sign that they conflict with reality.

tance

is

especially

pronounced where the

begin with. Given the

worsen the

fit

initial disparity,

fit

new

between

ideology'

and

realitv

was poor to

ideology do not

facts that contradict the

appreciably and are therefore disregarded or else easily rationalized. 126

In any event, even

when an

individual

becomes

ideology, real or imagined social pressures might

disillusioned with the prevailing

make him

refrain

from publicizing

his doubts.

Yet, as

long as some individuals have the will to voice their misgivings, there

is

reason to expect the eventual mobilization of an organized opposition, even in countries

where the wisdom of Islamization

long, then, will

it

is

now seldom

the response of committed fundamentalists? Forecasting it

has been said,

but not predict

not

specif)'

how

questioned

take for the emergence of broad-based dissent?

when it is about the future. when these will give way to these will be resolved,

A social

is

in public.

And what

How

will

be

a difficult task, especially,

scientist

can detect

instabilities

order, recognize sources of conflict but

and identify ranges of future

possibilities

but

not provide a definitive account of impending evolution. While historical circumstances delimit the possible evolutionary paths, historical accidents determine the

paths actually followed.

One

possible scenario

is

for the

ongoing quest

for a moral order to

become an

obsession that makes power holders try earnestly to perfect the individual Muslim.

sus that the

vast room for disagreement on the nature of moral perfection, a consenhuman impulses of Muslims need no further organizing would never

emerge. But

if

Since there

is

the historv of socialism

is

any indication,

it

could take decades for a

Timur Kuran 332

broad segment of society to wonder Failures along the

elicit.

way could

why

easily

the desired benevolence

need to be redoubled and non-Islamic influences curbed for the Islamic Utopia the political establishment sive,

making

answers to

would become

economic problems. Meanwhile, the

all

further. In this vain search

increasingly repres-

treacherous to suggest that Islam does not offer clear and definitive

it

could feed on

so difficult to

is

be taken to mean that educational efforts

itself for

discipline

of Islamic economics

decades, mistaking apologetics for serious reflection and cos-

The

metics for genuine reform.

twenty-first centurv could thus

the twentieth was for socialism: a period of infinite

become

for Islam

what

hope and promise, followed bv

disappointment, repression, disillusionment, and despair. Identified with failed policies,

Islam would lose

authority as a wellspring of sound economic policv.

its

sequence could end with a

flight

The

from Islam into other sources of spiritual and moral

inspiration.

An

alternative scenario

force. After

for Islamic

economics which emerged

relationships

of the past to turn into

is

economic

restore idealized

a

as a

movement

the Protestant Reformation started as a backward-looking

all,

to

major innovative

movement,

onlv graduallv assuming a forward-looking character. As the historian R. H. Tawney has documented, Luther and other leaders of the Reformation fought for the reestab-

lishment of virtues they thought had been abandoned; yet, paradoxicallv, their attacks

on

ecclesiastical

corruption weakened Church authority, thereby accelerating the de-

velopments thev tried to

reverse.

The Reformation thus

set the stage for the Industrial

Revolution. 127 Such a scenario could be replayed within the Islamic world. Here possible sequence

the spotlight

on incumbent

they are corrupt.

political establishments,

heightening the perception that the existing regimes are replaced

rid society

nomic problems by restoring properly Islamic values and just yield to the

split into

new

of

its

major

and eco-

social

practices. Alas,

problems do

order. Disillusionment sets in, the fundamentalist regimes

discordant factions, and the ensuing power struggles force the traditionally

interventionist

economic

a

Thus delcgitimized and weakened,

by fundamentalist regimes which promise to not

is

of events. The current preoccupation with economic morality turns

governments of the Muslim world to loosen their controls on private

activity.

Bv

the time central governments regain their lost authority, mar-

ket institutions are firmly entrenched and private enterprise very influential. These

developments leave the promoters of an Aristotelian morality with no significant base

of support. Just as the rise

of European capitalism coincided with the emergence of new

social

philosophies, so, too, political and economic liberalization in the Islamic world could

be accompanied by a far-reaching transformation of Islamic economics. The Islamic

banks become genuine venture capital organizations, and zakat evolves into a bona fide social security svstem.

ism and solidarity carry simple one.

And

Meanwhile,

it

becomes commonplace that

less significance in a large,

feelings

complex economy than

of altru-

in a small,

the notion that the Islamic scriptures offer limited help in the realm

of economic policy gains increasing recognition. There Islam's heritage for accepting the limitations

are, in fact,

precedents within

of the traditional sources. As

point, the religious establishment eventually released

a case in

army commanders from the

re-

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 333

quircmcnt to abide bv Islam's rules of warfare, permitting Muslim armies to

commanders saw

their

act as

fit.

In a less tumultuous and less circuitous variant of the second scenario, the key players are the practitioners

of Islamic economics. Endeavoring to implement Islamic

economics, they recognize the unattainabilitv of

we have

key objectives. As

its

seen,

this

point has already been reached in Islamic banking, where bankers instructed to

lend

on the

basis

of profit-and-loss sharing have discovered that under current circum-

stances this yields

awav with

more

than

loss

Sensing that

profit.

interest, that zakat requires

much new

may

it

never be practical to

instrument of redistribution, and that the envisaged moral transformation

onetime believers

in Islamic

economics begin chipping away

transform only the practice, resorting to theory openly

—

for example,

manv

at its edifice.

Then they begin

ruses.

is

a

At

mirage,

first

they

altering the

bv redefining interest and reformulating the mechanics

of zakat. Their endeavors meet with the approval of individuals with

mon

do

thinking to become an effective

who

practices, including fundamentalists

of Islamic economics serve

business. In this scenario the practitioners

of secularization, arbiters between the

a stake in

com-

have prospered doing "interest-laden"

and the secular

discipline's goals

hidden agents

as

practices

it still

condemns.

Acknowledgments In conducting the research that underlies this essay,

many

people,

important

who

texts,

Muhammad

shared with

and critiqued

me

their

I

benefited from the assistance of

knowledge and

earlier drafts.

I

am

put

insights,

at

indebted especially to

my

disposal

Anjum

Altaf,

Anwar, R. Scott Applebv, Sohrab Behdad, Rusen Cakir, Murat Cizakqa,

S. M. Hasanuzzaman, Abdul Jabbar Khan, Daniel Klein, Jomo Ann Mayer, Anthony Milner, Clement Henry Moore, Jeffrey Nugent, Frederic Pryor, D. M. Qureshi, Tanzil-ur-Rahman, Yusuf Rahme, and Shahid Zahid. My

Nazif Giirdogan, K.

S.,

interpretations in

do not

necessarily

conform to the opinions of these

any case are diverse. The cssav was composed partly during

Institute for

Advanced Study, Princeton, where

Endowment

for the Humanities. Part

of

mv

I

individuals,

which

a sabbatical at the

held a fellowship of the National

was supported bv the Faculty

research

Research and Innovation Fund of the University of Southern California.

Notes 1.

For further

details, see Afzal Iqbal, Is-

lamisation of Pakistan (Delhi: Idarah-i biyat-i Delli, 2.

Ada-

Henrv

Moore,

"Islamic

Banks: Financial and Political Intermediation in

45-57.

For

a

raphy, see

1984), chap. 10.

Clement

3.

Arab Countries," Orient 29 (1988):

sympathetic survey of this

rure and a useful,

though dated,

Muhammad

lirera-

bibliog-

Nejamllah Siddiqi,

A

Muslim Economic Thinking:

Survey

of

Contemporary Literature (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1981).

Among

the influential

contributions in English are

Mohammad

Timur Kuran 334

Abdul Mannan, Islamic Economics: Theory and Practice (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf,

1970); Khurshid

Center for Research

in Islamic

Nawab Haider

1980); Syed

and Economics: ter:

Ahmad,

An

Economics,

Strictly speaking,

9.

U.K.: Islamic

4.

only the Sunnis sub-

Golden Age.

scribe to this conception of the

The

Shi'ites believe that the Islamic social

Naqvi, Ethics

order performed ideallv onlv during the

Islamic Synthesis (Leices-

Prophet's lifetime and the five-vear tenure of

1981); Ziauddin

Islamic Foundation,

Ahmed, Munawar Khan,

Foundation, 1981), chap.

ed., Studies

Economics (Jeddah: International

in Islamic

An Islamic Synthesis (Leicester,

Iqbal,

eds., Fiscal Policy

die fourth caliph,

and M. Fahim

and Resource Alloca-

tion in Islam (Jeddah: International

Center

Economics, 1983); Ziauddin Ahmed, Munawar Iqbal, and M. Fahim Khan, eds., Money and Banking in Is-

10.

"Ali.

Muhammad

Planning

Development

Hussain,

an Islamic State (Karachi: Roval

in

Book Company, 1987),

p. 14.

for Research in Islamic

lam (Jeddah: International Center for Research in Islamic Economics, 1983); and Mohsin S. Khan and Abbas Mirakhor, eds., Theoretical Studies in Islamic Banking and Finance (Houston: Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, 1987). 4.

"Announcement on Research Propos-

als," revised

4th ed. (Jeddah: International

Center for Research

in Islamic

Economics,

1983). 5.

a

sampling of Ibn Khaldun's writ-

An Arab Philosophy ofHistory:

tions from the

Selec-

"Prolegomena" of Ibn Khaldun

of Tunis (1332-1406), translated and arranged by Charles Issawi (Princeton, N.J.:

Darwin

A

Press, 1987; lsted., 1950).

representative

Publications, 1975; 1st

Urdu

1947).

ed.,

Qutb's most relevant work

is

Social

(New J. D. Hardie, trans. York: American Council of Learned Societies, 1970; 1st Arabic ed., 1948). Sadrs

Justice in Islam,

masterwork

4

is

vols. (Tehran:

lamic Services,

Iqtisaduna:

Our

Economics,

World Organization for Is1982-84; 1st Arabic ed.,

1961). 8.

See, for instance,

Yusuf al-Qardawi,

Economic Security in Islam,

Muhammad

Iqbal

Siddiqi, trans. (Lahore: Kazi Publications,

1981;

Islam:

period, see

S.

Civilization, vol.

Chicago

M.

this

Hodgson, The Venture of Conscience and History in a World

Marshall G.

1

(Chicago: Universitv of

1974), pp. 187-217; and

Press,

A. Shaban, Islamic History:

pretation, vol.

1

A New Inter-

(Cambridge, U.K.: Cam-

bridge University Press, 1971), chaps. 2-4. 12. See, for example,

M. Umer Chapra,

Towards a Just Monetary System:

A Discussion

of Money, Banking and Monetary Policy in the Light of Islamic Teachings (Leicester, U.K.:

1st

Arabic ed., 1966), chap. 2;

nan, Islamic Economics, chap. 3;

13. These themes are developed bv Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Applebv, "Conclusion: An Interim Report on a Hy-

podietical Familv," in eds.,

Man-

Muhammad

and Applebv,

of

Chicago

Press,

14.

Detailed critiques of Islamic econom-

include Fazlur

Rahman, "Riba and

est," Islamic Studies

Rahman, "Islam and the Problem of Economic Justice," Pakistan Economist 14 (24 August 1974): 14-39; Timur Kuran, "Behavioral Norms in the Islamic Doctrine of Economics: A Critique," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 4 (1983): 35379; Frederic L. Prvor, "The Islamic Economic Svstem," Journal of Comparative Economics 9 (1985): 197-223; Timur Kuran, "The Economic Svstem in Contemporarv Islamic Thought: Interpretation and Assessment," International Journal of Middle East 135-64; Timur Kuran,

Studies 18 (1986):

"On

Adabiyat-i Delli, 1984), chap. 5; and Syed

Journal of Middle East Studies 21

Naqvi, Ethics and Economics:

Inter-

3 (1964): 1-43; Fazlur

Abdul Mannan, The Frontiers of Islamic Economics: Theory and Practice (Delhi: Idarah-i

Nawab Haider

1991),

814-42.

pp.

ics

Mam'

Fundamentalisms Obsemed (Chicago:

Universitv

economic work by

Maududi is The Economic Problem of Man and Its Islamic Solution (Lahore: Islamic 7.

For the history of

Islamic Foundation, 1985), chap. 8.

For

ings, see

6.

11.

the Notion of Economic Justice in Contemporary Islamic Thought," International

171-91; and Thomas

Philipp,

(1989):

"The Idea of

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 335

Islamic Economics," Die Welt des

Islam 30

(1990): 117-39.

Sewed

Rcza Nasr, "Whither 30 (1988): 211-20. For references to other 15.

Vali

Islamic Economics?" Islamic Quarterly

statements along these

lines, see

Sewed

Vali

Reza Nasr, "Islamic Economics: Novel Perspectives," Middle Eastern Studies 25 1989): (

esp. n. 30.

South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami

and the Tablighi Jamaat," in Marty and Applebv, eds., Fundamentalisms Observed, pp.

24. Ibid., p. 63.

Murat Cjzak^a, "Rise of Islamic Banks and the Potential for Venture Capital in the 25.

Middle East,"

in

Erol Manisali, ed.. The

Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean: Recent Economic

and

Political

Developments

(Is-

Middle East Business and Banking, 1987), pp. 74-90.

Some of these

26.

countries feature only

subsidiaries of Islamic banks headquartered

elsewhere.

457-530.

"What

Khomeini Did," New York Review of Books 36 (20 July Bakhash,

17. Shaul

1989): 16.

A

detailed

(New

Co-operation

York:

St.

Martin's Press,

19. This

is

not to say that these banks

from among the nonWesternized segment of the population. Each has made a point of keeping its ranks open to Westernized bankers, even to non-Muslims from the West. are hiring exclusively

The

20.

was an

Islamization

of economic life economics

issue even before Islamic

achieved recognition as

a discipline.

Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's

Muham-

founding

father,

spoke soon after independence of the need for creating an

economy compatible with Ahmad,

Islamic teachings. See Jamil-ud-din ed., Speeches

(Lahore:

and Writings ofMr. Jinnah,

Sh.

Muhammad

Ashraf,

vol.

2

1952),

565-68.

21

.

ences in the Islamic Republic of Iran and

Change 38

tural

These observations are based on

dis-

cussions with several Pakistanis with excellent connections

to leading politicians.

Khan and Mirakhor,

28.

and Cul-

3.

"Islamic Bank-

Tim

Ingram, "Islamic Banking:

Foreign Bank's View,"

in

A

Butterworths Edi-

Staff, Islamic Banking and Finance (London: Butterworths, 1986), pp. 58-60. Other ruses commonly employed to make interest-based loans appear like musharaka are discussed in a report bv a group of bank executives entitled "Elimination of Elements at Variance with Shari'ah Injunctions from "Mark-Up' and Musharaka Modes of Financing under Non-Interest Banking System in Pakistan." Drafted in Karachi, this photocopied report was submitted in November 1988 to the Permanent Commission on Islamisation of Economy.

torial

30. Tansu Ciller and Murat Qizakqa, Turk Finans Kesiminde Sorunlar ve Reform Onerileri (Istanbul: Istanbul Sanayi Odasi,

1989),

p.

76; and Clement

Henry Moore,

I

22. Afzal-ur- Rahman, Economic Doctrines

tions, 1976), p. 55.

1990), table

"Islamic Banks and Competitive Politics in

ought to point out that the act of preference falsification is by no means a preserve of Pakistanis. For a general analysis of the phenomenon, and evidence from various times and places, see Timur Kuran, "Private and Public Preferences," Economics and Philosophy 6(1990): 1-26. of Islam, vol. 3 (Lahore:

(

ing," table 6.

29.

1989).

mad

27. As cited bv Mohsin S. Khan and Abbas Mirakhor, "Islamic Banking: Experi-

Pakistan," Economic Development

economic argument in favor of a pan- Islamic union is provided bv Masudul Alam Choudhurv, Islamic Economic 18.

pp.

Muslim Economic Thinking,

63.

tanbul:

Mumtaz Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamen-

16.

talism in

23. Siddiqi, p.

Islamic Publica-

World and Turkey," Middle 44 (Spring 1990): 248-49.

the Arab

Journal

East

31. For a detailed illustration, see Ter-

rence L. Carlson, "Trade Finance under

lamic Principles:

A Case

Executive Reports

Is-

Study," Middle East

9 (December 1986):

9,

15-16. 32. Ingram, "Islamic

and

Mohamed

Ariff,

Banking," "Islamic

p. 57; Banking,"

Asian-Pacific Economic literature 2 (Septem-

Titnur Kuran

336

The

practice of 1988 report on banking to Pakistan's Permanent Commission on Islamisation of Economy, "Elimination of Elements at Variance with Shari'ah Injunctions," annex A, pp. 3-4, 10. Interestingly, the report stops short of recommending a ban on rebates, proposing only that income derived from penalties be chan-

ber

1988):

rebates

58.

existing

criticized in the

is

Bank was planning to ing center in

new

establish a

train-

skyscraper under construc-

its

tion in Jeddah.

41. There are

no

reliable statistics

on the

extent of dishonesty and fraud. But anyone

who

has done business

say,

in,

Egypt, or Morocco knows that

go unreported than

transactions

Pakistan,

many more in the de-

veloped economies of Europe and North

neled into welfare activities.

America. Significantly, the

1988 report on banking to the Permanent Commission on Islamisation of the Economy, pp. 2-3. Some bankers,

Islamic Financial Institutions, John R. Presley,

33. See the

ed.

Croom Helm

(London:

Directory of

first

for the Inter-

national Centre for Islamic Studies, 1988),

while admitting that Pakistani institutions

points out that "shortcomings in business

continue to charge interest, point out that

ethics

banks no longer earn 34. Ciller

compound

and CJzakqa, Turk Finans Ke-

pp.

difficult

that "clients either

Luay Allawi, "Leasing: An

operations"

to establish closer

It goes on to say do not keep adequate

Islamic Banking and. Finance,

Staff,

(p.

300).

Islamic

Financial Instrument," in Butterworths Editorial

it

records or keep fraudulent records of their

simi, p. 77.

35.

make

bank-client relationships."

interest.

120-27.

42. See,

instance,

for

Waqar Masood

Khan, "Towards an Interest- Free Islamic Economic System," Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics

36. Barbaras Ceylan, "Finansal Kiralama

Uygulamava

ve

Ili§kin

Kurumlan

Finans

ve

Sorunlar," in Ozel

Uvgulamasi

Turkive

Sempozyumu (Istanbul: Marmara Universitesi Ortadogu ve Islam Ulkeleri Ekonomik Arasurma Merkezi, 1988), pp. 212-28. My interviews with Islamic bankers suggest that this practice

of

risk shifting

is

common

to

1

(1989):

3—

37. Several architects of Pakistan's Islamic-

banking system have suggested to

me

in

private conversations that genuinely Islamic

banking must await

a

major improvement

in

the "moral fiber" of Pakistanis.

43.

Murat Cizakqa, "Origins and Evo-

lution of Islamic Banks," unpublished paper

Islamic banks throughout the world.

presented at the First General Conference of Islamic Banks, Istanbul, October 1986,

37. Islamic Development Bank, Eleventh Annual Report (1985-1986) (Jeddah: IDB,

sect. 6.

1987), pp. xviii-xix. Amazingly, few Islamic economists show an awareness of these

44. Abraham L. Udov itch, "At the Origins of the Western Commenda: Islam, Israel, Byzantium?" Speculum 37 ( 1962) 198-207. :

In

statistics.

terize the

lamic."

fact,

they continue to charac-

IDB's operations

As

as distinctly "Is-

1988 Ariff, "The IDB and are explic-

a case in point, in

"Islamic Banking," p. 48, wrote:

operations are free of interest itly

38. S. A. Meenai, The Islamic Development

A

Case Study of Islamic Co-operation (London: Kegan Paul International, 1989),

esp. chaps.

39.

I

7-10.

owe

Policies in the Sadat Era:

1

observation

to

Volker

Banking: Theory and Practice," Journal of'Islamic Banking and Finance 3 ( 1986): 43.

As of 1990,

the Islamic

Development

The

Social Origins

Egypt," Arab (1985): 36-40'.

of Islamic Banking

in

Law

46. Reversing this interpretation. Islamic-

economists

now

Ghamr was

designed according to

claim that although Mit Islamic-

principles, the Nasser regime's opposition to

Islam forced this

Nienhaus, "Islamic Economics, Finance and

40.

.

Quarterly

based on Shariah principles."

Bank:

For further observations, see Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "Islamic Banking and Credit

45

its

founder,

Ahmed

al-Naggar,

to disguise his source of inspiration. Accordingly, the public relations ploy

package Mit lica

Ghamr

of Germany's

as

was to

an Egyptian rep-

local savings banks.

interpretation enjoys the

This

endorsement of al-

:

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 337

Naggar himself, who went on to become a prominent Islamic banker. See Ahmed Abdel-Fattah El-Ashker, The Islamic Business

(London: Croom Helm, 1987), 155-59.

Omar

Naseef, ed.. Todays Problems, Tomor-

The Future Structure of Muslim Societies (London: Mansell Publishing, row's Solutions:

87.

Enterprise

1988),

pp.

encountered both positions in discussions with fundamentalist leaders in

47. 37.

Rahman, "Riba and Interest," pp. 30-

Manv

other predominantly agricultural

communities operating close to subsistence are

known

to have restricted interest, par-

on

ticularly

loans to people in distress. In-

54.

Pakistan.

Suleyman Uludag, Islamda Faiz MeBtr Bakis (Istanbul: Dergah Yayinlan, 1988), esp. pp. 287-90. 55.

selesine Tent

variably the rationale has been to bolster the

of security, thus reinforcing the community's viability. For evidence and an elaborate argument, see Richard A. U Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society with Special Reference to Law," Journal of Law and Economics 23 (1980): 1-53. individual's sense

48. pp.

Rahman, "Riba and

Interest," esp.

49.

taken

bv

earlier

this century.

See Chibli Mallat, "The Debate on Riba

and Interest

Twentieth Century Jurispru-

in

dence," in Mallat, ed.. Islamic

nance (London: pp.

Law and

Fi-

Graham andTotman, 1988),

69-88.

Islam and Capi-

Pakistan? (Karachi: Faiza Publishers, 1986),

Brian Pearce, trans.

(New

p.

York: Pan-

For evidence on the prevalence of interest

The Cash Waqf Controversy in the Ottoman Empire," International Journal of'Middle East Studies 10 (1979): 289-308. The Arabic term for ruse is hila (plur., hival). 50. Report of the Council ofIslamic Ideology on the Elimination of Interest from the Economy (Islamabad: CII, June 1980), pp. 15-

The

report refers to

murabaha

as "bai

muajjal."

Institutions, p.

300.

52. For the pro- indexation argument, see

Mohammad Abdul Mannan, an Islamic Economic tional Association

The

Dimen-

—An

of Islamic Banks, 1984),

rationale against indexation

developed by

dexation

The Making of

Society: Islamic

Economic Analysis (Cairo: Interna-

chap. 14a.

November 1989

whom

I

cited figures

between 95 and 99.9 percent. 58.

Moore, "Islamic Banks and CompetiArab World and Turkey," 2 and pp. 235-42. Some comple-

tive Politics in the

table

mentary figures pertaining to the earlv to mid-1980s are provided by Volker Nienhaus, "Lectures on Islamic Economics and Banking," Faculty of Economics Discussion Paper no. 6, University of Bochum, December 1988, pp. 24-30. 59. For an English translation of the rele-

51. Presley, Directory of Islamic Financial

sions in

74. Influential fundamentalists

interviewed in

Jon E. Mandaville, "Usu-

rious Piety:

is

were

Maxime Rodinson,

in later times, see

16.

positions

Egyptian religious leaders of

57. Rashida Patel, Islamisation of Laws in

theon, 1973; orig. French ed., 1966), chap. 3.

56. Economist, 16 September 1989, p. 42.

Similar

12-30.

talism,

p. I

S.

M. Hasanuz Zaman,

"In-

Islamic Evaluation," Journal

vant laws and regulations in Turkey, see Ozel

Finans Kurumlan, pp. 73-135. An additional advantage enjoyed by Turkey's Islamic

banks

on

is

that they are permitted to advertise

television,

are not.

The

whereas most of their

rivals

privileges granted to the Is-

Ugur Mumcu,

lamic banks are outlined by

Tarikat, Siyaset, Ticaret (Istanbul: Tekin Yayinevi, 1988). Islamic bankers

complain that

they are denied one major right taken for

of Research in Islamic Economics 2 (1985):

granted bv their non-Islamic

31-53. Additional references and a critical survey of the relevant arguments are offered by Ziauddin Ahmed, "Currency Notes and Loan Indexation," Islamic Studies 28 1989) 39-53.

to the trademark of one's choice. Indeed,

(

53. ics:

Muhammad

Arif, "Islamic

Challenges and Potentials,"

in

rivals:

die right

Turkey's Islamic banks are barred from identifying themselves as such.

60. Meenai, The IslamicDevelopment Bank, p. 74, reports that, like

the commercial

Econom-

lamic banks, the Islamic Development

Abdullah

made an

unusually large

Is-

Bank

number of bad

. .

Timur Kuran 338

loans in

its

earlv years.

Moreover, the

losses

were associated primarily with equity investments. The bank's return on equity was apparently lower even than fee"

on ordinary

modest

its

"service

loans.

et

Egyptien," unpublished paper pre-

sented to the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris,

Mohsin

S.

Free Banking:

A

62.

March 1990,

Khan, "Islamic

table 2.

Fund

Monetary

the al-Ravan

crisis,

see

Robert

Springborg, Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political

Order (Boulder, Colo.:

64. Volker Nienhaus, "Lectures

on

Is-

lamic Economics and Banking," pp. 33-49. 65.

On Iran, Iqbal and Mirakhor, "Islamic 25;

p.

on

Pakistan,

Khan and

Mirakhor, "Islamic Banking," pp. 370-71. 66. For a comprehensive survey of

Is-

means of redistribution, see Anas Zarqa, "Islamic Distribu-

lam's traditional

Muhammad tive

Schemes,"

in

tributive Justice

Munawar

Iqbal, ed., Dis-

and Need Fulfilment

in

an

Economy (Islamabad: International Institute of Islamic Economics, 1986).

Islamic

67. For

Council of Islamic Ideology,

(Islamabad:

1981), pp. 15-21.

Ann

73.

Elizabeth Maver, "Islamization

and Taxation

in

Pakistan,"

Anita

in

M.

Weiss, ed., Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan:

The Application of Islamic Laws

in

a Modern

expositions,

traditional

in Zakah," in Mohammed Monetary and Fiscal Economics of Islam (Jeddah: International Center for Rebia's

Experience

Ariff, ed.,

search in Islamic Economics, pp.

349-54.

reproduced tion of

45-61.

Press, 1989), pp.

Banking,"

controversy, see Tanzil-ur-

this

Introduction of Zakat in Pakistan

Press, 1986), esp. pp. 67-69, 73-75; and Abdin Ahmed Salama, "Fiscal Analysis of Zakah widi Special Reference to Saudi Ara-

Occasional Paper no. 49, 1987.

Westview

On

72.

Theoretical Analysis," in

International

On

of Policy Studies, 1983), chaps. 1-4.

State (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University

Zubair Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, "Islamic

63.

stitute

Interest-

Khan and Mirakhor, eds., Theoretical Studies in Islamic Banking and Finance, chap. 2; and Banking,"

and M. Fahim Khan, eds., Fiscal Policy and

Rahman,

61 Clement Henry Moore, "La Place des Banques Islamiques dans un Systeme Politique d'Ouverture: Comparaison des Cas

Turc

bal,

Resource Allocation in Islam (Islamabad: In-

see

Afzal-ur- Rahman, Economic Doctrines of Is-

lam, vol. 3 (Lahore: Islamic Publications,

Pakistan's Zakat

1982), esp.

Ordinance

is

in Tanzil-ur- Rahman, Introduc-

Zakat

in Pakistan, pp.

27-85. The

ordinance has been amended several times. 74. Ismail Muhd Salleh and Rogayah Ngah, "Distribution of the Zakat Burden on Padi Producers in Malaysia," in M. Raqibuz Zaman, ed., Some Aspects of the Economics of Zakah (Plainfield, Ind.: Association of Muslim Social Scientists, 1980), esp. pp. 81-84. 75. Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1989

(Is-

lamabad: Federal Bureau of Statistics, 1989), pp.

451-52, 507.

76. Salama, "Fiscal Analysis of Zakah with

Special Reference to Saudi Arabia's Experi-

ence in Zakah," table

1.

77. Ibid., p. 351.

78. Aidit bin Ghazali et

al.,

"Zakat:

A Case

Abdur Rahman

Study of Malaysia" (Unpublished paper pre-

Shad, Zakat and 'Ushr (Lahore: Kazi Publi-

sented to the Third International Zakat Con-

cations, 1986).

ference,

1976), chaps. 14-18; and

68. See, for instance,

Ahmad Oran and

Salim Rashid, "Fiscal Policy in Early Islam," Public Finance

44 (1989): 75-101.

69. For explicit statements, see Afzal-ur-

Rahman, Economic Doctrines of Islam, vol. 3, p. 197; and Shad, Zakat and 'Ushr, p. 100. 70. Rahman, "Islam and the Problem of Economic Justice," p. 33.

71

For several more or

sitions, see

less

reformist po-

Ziauddin Ahmed, Munawar

Iq-

79.

"Zakat

Kuala Lumpur,

May

1990),

p.

49.

Nik Mustapha Bin Hj. Nik Hasan, in Malaysia Present and Future Sta-

—

tus" Journal of Islamic Economics 1 (1987): 57. The figure excludes zakat al-fitr, which is paid bv most practicing Muslims at the end of the month of Ramadan. It amounts to about $1 (U.S.) per person.

80. Salleh

and Ngah, "Distribution of

on Padi Producers 86-110.

the Zakat Burden laysia," pp.

in

Ma-

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 339

81. James C. Scott, "Resistance without

Protest and without Organization: Peasant

Opposition to the Islamic Zakat and the

and History 29 1987): 426-27. (

the Nizam-e- Zakat

94. Various irregularities are in a report

82. Thirteen countries have enacted zakat

in

p. 5.

93. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

Christian Tithe," Comparative Studies in Society

"Improvement

92.

and Ushr,"

the

documented

prepared bv Shahid N. Zahid for

World Bank, "The Zakat and Ushr Sysin Pakistan," Karachi, August 1989. Ac-

laws or regulations. But as a practical mat-

tem

ter in

most of these countries the pavment is still voluntary. See Fuad Abdullah al-Omar, "A Comparative Studv of Zakat Systems: The General, Administrative, and Organizational Aspects" Unpublished paper

cording to a small survey included

of zakat

report, die official roster of zakat recipients

Conference, Kuala Lumpur,

May

Mohammad

84. See diqi. Early

Ijtihad

(

s.v.

Welfare System,"

1990).

"Zakat."

Dawn

Law and

Development of Zakat

Karachi: Islamic Research Academy,

p.

90.

(Karachi), 11

November 1989.

without Protest and without Organization," p. 433. 97. Scott,

Akhtar Saeed Sid-

re-

95. Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and 'Ushr as a

96. 83. Encyclopedia of Islam,

having

ceived assistance.

(

presented to the Third International Zakat

who deny

includes poor people

in this

"Resistance

98. Mustapha, "Zakat in Malaysia," pp.

60-62.

1983), chaps. 4-5. 99. Ibid., 85.

M.

A. Sabzwari,yl Study ofZakat and

'Ushr with Special Reference

to

Pakistan

rachi: Industries Printing Press,

(

of Economy

February 1989.

in

87. Besjr

Hamitogullan,

bul: Islami ilimler

"Tiirkive'de

pp.

Zekat Potansiveli (Istan-

Arasurma

and without Organization," pp. 433-34. 102.

Vakfi, 1988),

Times (Kuala Lumpur),

103. Mayer, "Islamization and Taxation

69.

104. Official

figures

show

that

the

in

8.6 percent of the dis-

bursements went to religious education (Pakistan StatisticalTearbook, 1989, pp.

453-59).

105. Scott, "Resistance without Protest and without Organization," pp. 431-32. 106. See Richard Kurin, "Islamization:

Everyday Forms ofPeasant Resistance

(

New Ha-

ven: Yale University Press, 1985), pp.

View from

107. Tanzil-ur- Rahman,

Zakat

89. For further details, see the Zakat and

'Ushr Ordinance,

reprinted

in

Tanzil-ur-

108. Ghazali et

109. a

by Grace Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and 'Ushr Welfare System," in Weiss, ed., Islamic

as a

Reassertion in Pakistan, pp. Statistical

83-91. Yearbook,

1989,

453-59.

91. Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and 'Ushr as a Welfare System," p. 89.

123-24.

Introduction

of

in Pakistan, p. 9.

and table

Rahman, Introduction of Zakat in Pakistan. The disbursement system is also described

A

the Countryside," in Weiss, ed.,

Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan, pp.

121-

22, 169-78.

90. Pakistan

Straits

in Pakistan," p.

27-51.

88. James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak:

pp.

New

6 March 1990.

1980-88 period

Altin-Giimus Gibi Varhklarda Zekat Potansiyeli," in Tiirkiye'de

63-64.

101. Scott, "Resistance without Protest

1979).

"Improvement in the Nizam-e Zakat and Ushr for Achieving Its Declared Objectives of Removing Abject Poverty and Eradication of Beggary from the Country," p. 4. This photocopied report was submitted to the Permanent Commission on Islamisation

62.

100. Ibid., pp.

Ka-

86.

p.

al.,

"Zakat," pp.

47-48

13.

The

Shi'ites base their objection

on

precedent set by rebellious tribes in early

Islam that refused to pay zakat to the

first

by Shi'ites a usurper. See Munir Morad, "Current Thought on Islamic caliph, considered

Taxation:

A

ed., Islamic

Critical Synthesis," in Mallat,

Law and

Finance, pp.

110. Patel, Islamisation of stan? pp.

63-64.

Laws

120—22. in Paki-

Timur Kuran 340

On

111.

Pakistan, see Maver, "Islamiza-

tion and Taxation in Pakistan," p. 64;

on

119. Khurshid Ahmad, "Economic Development in an Islamic Framework," in

Malaysia,

Ahmad,

Protest

p.

see Scott, "Resistance without and without Organization," pp.

many more

431-35. 112. Zarqa,

Distributive

"Islamic

113. For a highly influential argument to

An

ciety:

vols.,

eds.

Max Weber, Economy and So-

Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 3

Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968;

German

1st

ed.,

references, see

1922). Weber's scattered

remarks on Islam are synthesized and

cri-

Muhammad

al-Buraey, Administrative Development: Islamic Perspective

Schemes," pp. 201-2.

this effect, see

Studies in Islamic Economics,

ed.,

178. For additional such statements and

(London: Kegan Paul

A.

An In-

ternational, 1985); Aidit Ghazali, Develop-

An

ment:

Islamic Perspective (Petaling Jaya,

Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 1990); and

Abul Hasan Muhammad Sadeq, EconomicDevelopment in Islam (Petaling Java, Malaysia:

Pelanduk Publications, 1990). 120. See, for instance, Naqvi, Ethics

On

and

the finer points of

tiqued bv Bryan S. Turner, Weber and Islam:

Economics, esp. p. 63.

A

this view, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Toward a Philosophy of Islamic Economics," Muslim World 77 (1987): 175-96.

Critical Study

Kegan

(London: Routledge and

Paul, 1974).

114. These injunctions are discussed in

by M. Umar Chapra, "The Islamic System of Islam: A Discussion of Its Goals and Nature," parts 1-3, Islamic Quarterly 14 (1970): 3-18, 91-96, 143-56; Muhammad Abdul- Rauf, "The Islamic Doctrine of Economics and Contemporary Economic Thought," in Michael Novak, ed., Capidetail

talism

and

Socialism:

A

Theological Inquiry

(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), pp. 4-12; Syed N. H. Naqvi, Ethics

and Economics; and Seyyed Hossein

Nasr, "Islamic

Work Ethics," in Jaroslav Peli-

121. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Fatal Con-

The Errors of Socialism (Chicago: Uniof Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 4547. The quote, recorded by Hayek, belongs to David Hume. On Hayek's views concerning the basis of modern civilization, see the remainder of this book, esp. chaps. 1-5. A more detailed presentation may be found in his Law, Legislation and Liberty, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973-79). ceit:

versity

122. This

is

not to suggest the absence of

kan, Joseph Kitagawa, and Seyyed Hossein

currents within Islamic philosophy which

Nasr, eds., Comparative Work Ethics: Judeo-

conflict

Christian, Islamic,

and Eastern (Washington,

D.C.: Library of Congress, 1985), pp.

49-

62.

115. Afzal-ur- Rahman,

Economic

Doc-

of Islam, vol. 2, 2d. ed. (Lahore: lamic Publications, 1980), p. 47.

trines

Is-

with Aristotelian perceptions. From

the very beginning Islamic philosophy has featured traditions that glorify the market,

commerce, and the trader. See Bernard Lewis, "Sources for the Economic History of the Middle East," in M. A. Cook, ed.. Studies

Nejatullah Siddiqi, The Economic Enterprise in

Economic History of the Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 78-92. But to this day these traditions

Islam (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1972),

have

116. For other examples, see

pp.

Muhammad

117. See, for instance,

S.

Waqar Ahmed

Husaini, Islamic Environmental Systems En-

pp.

(London:

Macmillan,

1980),

79-81.

118. Be§ir Atalay, "Iktisadi Kalkinmada

Geleneksel Degerlerin Yeri (Japon Ornegi)," in

Ahmet Tabakoglu and

Iktisadi

failed to generate a sustained overt re-

action against Islam's communitarian vision.

57-60.

gineering

in the

Kalkinma

ve

Ismail Kurt, eds.,

islam (Istanbul: Islami

Ilimler Ara§tirma Vakfi), p. 97.

123. As an example of the former

class,

H. Naqvi, Individual Freedom, Social Welfare and Islamic Economic Order (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1981), chaps. 4-5; for the latter, see Chapra, "The Economic System of Islam," pt. 2. A detailed comparison is offered bv Sohrab Behdad, "Property Rights in Contemporary Islamic Economic see

Syed

S.

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 341

Thought: A Critical Perspective," Rnnew of Social Economy 47 (1989): 185-211. 124. Shaul Bakhash, "Islam and Social Justice

in

Iran,"

Shi'ism, Resistance,

in

Martin Kramer, (

Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), p. 113.

debate in question took place in 1984. 125. Ibid.

ed.,

and Revolution Boulder,

The

126. Albert O.

velopment,

Hirschman, "Underde-

Obstacles

to

the

Perception

of Change, and Leadership," Daedalus 97 (1968): 925-37. 127. R. H. Tawney, Religion

and

the Rise

of'Capitalism (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith,

1962;

first

published, 1926).

CHAPTER 15

Heirs to the Protestant Ethic? The Economics

of American Fundamentalists Laurence R. Iannaccone

If single

word summarizing

would be

"conservative."

follows: "Theological

the average American were to choose a

the economic views of fundamentalists, the

Asked to defend

this choice,

word probably

he or she might well reply as

and economic conservatism go hand

in

hand. Theologically

conservative Protestants are staunch defenders of market capitalism.

They denounce

every form of socialism, reject paternalistic government spending programs, and advocate free enterprise as the solution to virtually every economic problem."

This image

is

largely a myth.

The

reality

is

both different and more complex.

Theologically conservative Protestant leaders espouse a variety of economic positions.

A free-market

consensus

is

at best a prospect for the future,

and an unlikely prospect

Most rank and file evangelical-fundamentalists are not economic conservatives and would probably reject any free-market consensus that did emerge from their leaders. And, despite well-publicized and extensive lobbving on social and moral isat that.

sues, even such

avowedly conservative groups

as the

Moral Majoritv have never

ously attempted to implement an economic agenda. This essay attempts to

and explain

this surprising state

seri-

document

of affairs.

The Scope of the Study The word "economics"

has

many meanings

what might be termed "formal economics."

in everyday speech. This study concerns It

investigates

vative Protestants have to say about the production

what theologically conser-

of commodities, the nature of

markets, the economic impact of government, and the growth and distribution of a society's

income. The informal aspects of everyday financial

activity,

the specific prob-

lems associated with running a business or managing one's money, are of secondary

342

THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN FUNDAMENTALISTS 343

concern. Hence, this studv does not review sermons and writings that counsel Chris-

admonish them to contribute

tians against personal indebtedness,

them on

spiritual guidelines for

money management. These '

liberally,

or instruct

are omitted, not because

thev are insignificant, but simply because they are, in the words of one Christian

economist, "light years from the mainstream" of formal economic thinking. 2

The word "fundamentalism," to different people. Studies that

cable to the other meanings.

term "fundamentalism"

is

like the

word "economics," means

presume one meaning

To avoid

confusion,

why

used, and

it is

I

different things

arrive at conclusions inappli-

must therefore explain how the

often ayoided, throughout this study.

Theologians and religious historians typically define "fundamentalism" religious

movement

that

as a specific

emerged from the controversies raging within mainstream

American Protestantism around the turn of the century. In the adapt and modernize traditional Christian

beliefs, the

face

members of

of attempts to

movement

this

fought to defend what thev viewed as the "fundamentals" of the Christian so styled diemselves "fundamentalists."

thought and actions of

tions have been chronicled by Sandecn,

not be repeated here. 3 a

common

It suffices

faith

and

origins of historical fundamentalism, the

and the development of

leaders,

its

The

churches and institu-

its

Marsden, Ammerman, and others and need

to note that historical fundamentalists share not only

past but also a particular theology

and

social orientation.

As one

scholar

observes:

Fundamentalist ness

.

.

.

Christians [are those]

— inerrancy — of the Bible

lieve that the present

disaster, as

have

all

in

who

believe in the total errorless-

assertions,

of whatever kind;

who

be-

penultimate dispensation of history will end in utter

of its predecessors;

of Christ

in a

second advent that

who

feel

bound by

and

all its

will

who

expect the imminent, public return

usher in the

final

dispensation of history;

faithfulness in an inerrant scripture to anathematize,

and to separate themselves from, those

who

take a different view, whether they

be Christians or others. 4 Despite

its

value to theologians and religious historians, this definition of funda-

mentalism proves unsuited to manv litical scientists,

and

large-scale data analysis

social scientific investigations. Sociologists, po-

who employ population surveys — — adopt broader definitions which subsume "fundamen-

and economists

particularly those

talism" under the heading of "evangelicalism." ("Evangelicalism" here refers to the

many churches and denominations

that insist that salvation

comes only through

per-

sonal faith in Jesus Christ as Savior, that affirm the need to proselytize, and that accept the Bible as the inerrant

Word of God.) For

example, in a recent book entitled The

Fundamentalist Phenomenon, the noted political scientist James Reichley concludes that "for political analysis, the older

and more inclusive term,

'evangelical' in

many

5

ways works better" than the narrower term, "fundamentalist." In a similar manner, Susan Rose analyzes the educational impact of fundamentalism entirely within the context of evangelicalism. She does so, not because she chooses to ignore the fundamentalist/evangelical distinction, but rather because maintaining that distinction impractical.

She

finds

it

"difficult to assess

how many of

is

the Christian schools arc

Laurence R. Iannaccone 344

'strictly'

the same Christian school associations and the distinction sarily

may belong

fundamentalist, for fundamentalist and charismatic schools

among

types

is

to

not neces-

made." 6

Similar difficulties plague economic studies of fundamentalism. Three of these de-

A

serve special mention: (1)

those belonging to the

have expressed no

would be economic

substantial fraction

more

strict

real interest in

and

of

economic

issues.

brief indeed but also misleading, since issues that

are interested in

is

most noteworthy.

economic

issues have

(2)

all

self-styled "fundamentalists,"

wing of the

separatist

historical

movement,

A study of their economic thought it is

Those

their very lack

of attention to

self-styled fundamentalists

who

developed their ideas and pursued their goals

joindy with other evangelicals. As a practical matter, neither their orientation nor

impact can be separated from that of the other evangelicals with

their

routinely interact. (3) There

behavior of rank and sentative sample

file

is

no

reliable

fundamentalists.

of fundamentalists

way

to isolate the

simply

It

is

economic

whom

they

attitudes or

not possible to survey a repre-

from other theologically conservative

as distinct

Protestants. 7

In light of these problems, this study explores the attitudes and actions of fundamentalists within the larger context of evangelicalism.

It

attitudes of a broad evangelical-fundamentalist population, and

nomic teachings of a

variety

all,

investigates the eco-

some

evangelicals.

leaders. Some of Some, though by no

have been associated with Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority or other organi-

zations of the so-called

New

Christian RJght. Despite these differences, however,

share a distinctive view of economics and religion. the inerrant

Word of God

but also look to

Most have considered

lems.

it

of theologically conservative Protestant

these leaders call themselves fundamentalists,

means

surveys the economic

They not only accept

for specific solutions to

it

all

the Bible as

economic prob-

the economic implications of Scripture at length and have

emerged with something substantive to say about economics, not

just personal

fi-

nances or Christian charity. In other words, they have seriously considered the kind

of

issues that

economists actually address and have arrived

insist are consistent

with

biblical principles

and

justifiable in

at

conclusions that they

terms of specific biblical

Though they are by no means in complete agreement, most are aware of each other's work and take it seriously. Many have interacted face to face, and most actexts.

knowledge the others call

as co-contributors to a

growing body of thought

that they often

"Christian economics."

The Spectrum of Evangelical Economic Thought Evangelical economic attitudes are anything but unanimous. acterize the typical evangelical as supportive

nism

— an

attitude shared

by most Americans

within the movement's religious tians reconstructionists

and the

markets and deer)' virtually

all

and

New

Though

it is

fair

to char-

of capitalism and opposed to commu-

— there

is

wide variation of thought

intellectual leadership.

At one extreme, Chris-

Christian Right enthusiastically embrace free

forms of government intervention. At the opposite

THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN FUNDAMENTALISTS 345

extreme, self-stvled "radical evangelicals" brand capitalism as hopelessly decadent and

espouse a quasi-Marxist theology of liberation. The majority tremes,

some

calling for greater

fall

government intervention and

programs and others advocating more

free enterprise

and

between these

ex-

larger social welfare

a smaller

government

sector. Strict, Self-Styled

Fundamentalists

Historical fundamentalism has always advocated separation

from the corrupting

influ-

ences of secularism and liberal Christianity'. Even so, the degree of separatism has been

of frequent dispute. The original fundamentalist movement

a subject

1940s and 1950s, with

wing ists

that

who

came

Graham and

Billy

others leading the

split in

the

more accommodating

to call itself "evangelical," and Carl Mclntire leading the strict separat-

retained the "fundamentalist" label." Today's self-styled fundamentalists are

more accommodating, or "open," wing epitomized by Jerry Thomas Road Baptist Church and Liberty University, and more strictly separatist wing epitomized bv institutions like Bob Jones University. Strict fundamentalists exist within the American economv and in that sense cannot

similarlv divided, with a

Falwell and his associates at a

help but participate in

it,

but they have never sought to understand or critique

its

workings from a religious perspective. Their major periodical, Sword of the Lord, has little to say about economics, only occasional praise for capitalism (typically within the context of attacks

on communism). 9 Their

largest colleges,

Bob

Jones University,

Tennessee Temple, Baptist Bible College of Missouri, and Baptist Bible College of Pennsylvania, devote

no resources

to

economic

studies.

None

has a department of

economics, none offers an economics major, and with just one exception none even offers courses in

the

economics. 10 Indeed,

it

appears that there

member of fundamentalists." Not

not a single

is

American Economic Association among the ranks of strict

economic

surprisingly, therefore, strict fundamentalists have not participated in the

discussions and debates that have occurred in other theologically conservative circles,

nor have they generated their

economic

attention to

own bodv of economic

issues that best characterizes their

treme separatists appear suspicious of

of any

truly

attitudes

teachings.

all

rejecting the possibility

institution, political or

of the fundamentalist congregation studied by Nancy

ably typical:

very lack of

economic orientation. Ex-

economic systems,

Godly outcomes from any secular

It is this

economic. The

Ammerman

"They accept the division of the world into sacred and

and public. The structures of the economy are not expected to run by God's

When

profit

expected."

12

comes

first,

its

rules.

.

.

.

ahead of God, corruption and dishonesty are only to be

Such fundamentalists

marketplace as

are prob-

secular, private

are as likely to

view themselves

as victims

of the

beneficiaries. 13

The New Christian Right In contrast to their strictly separatist brethren,

accommodating wing have expressed

interest in

members of fundamentalism's more

economic

has often praised the virtues of free enterprise while also

programs and

state control

issues. Falwell, for

condemning

example,

social welfare

of the economy. FalwelPs Liberty University

in

Lynch-

Laurence R. Iannaccone 346

burg, Virginia, has a department of economics, offers an economics major, and teaches a

full

range of undergraduate economics courses.

department ranks

as

one of the

evangelical. 14 Liberty University

four-person economics

any Christian college, fundamentalist or

largest in is

Its

also the site

of a public policy center, the Contem-

porary Economics and Business Association (CEBA), established in 1987. However, as

CEBA's own

Robert Mateer, has emphasized, none of these

president,

should be viewed

as distinctly fundamentalist.

activities

Most of the people featured in CEBA's

conferences and publications label themselves "evangelical" rather than "fundamen-

and some

talisf"

Moreover, many of them contribute to

15

are not even Protestant.

economic discussion and debate occurring versities

through

Wheaton,

such as

activities

in

in organizations

mainstream evangelical

such

such as the Oxford Conference.

as the

17

It is

circles, at uni-

Revival, 16

on

Coalition

and

therefore impossible to isolate

the economic thought and economic activities of fundamentalist leaders, such as Falwell and Mateer, from those of other evangelicals

agenda.

The

natural unit of analysis

is

who

share their political and social

who promote

the entire group of leaders

agenda, both evangelical and fundamentalist, a group

known

as the

New

this

Christian

Right.

The

New

Christian Right, or

NCR,

is

a generic

term applied by

and the media to the collection of theologically and

social scientists

socially conservative Christian

organizations that gained prominence in American politics in the late 1970s and early

1980s. 18 In the popular press and public sentiment, the

NCR has

always been epito-

mized by Jerry Falwell and his now disbanded Moral Majority. 19 The "fundamentalist" label, which Falwell embraced and certainly deserved, therefore is often applied to the entire

NCR,

and many Americans now routinely equate fundamentalism with

The equation is erroneous, howembodiment of fundamentalism but drawn together by their conservative social

religiously motivated conservative political action.

The

ever.

NCR

should not be viewed

as the

rather as a broad coalition of evangelicals

and

political

agenda.

The

evangelicals, charismatics,

over,

many

NCR has

always included nonfundamentalists

and even some mainline Protestants and Catholics. More-

self-styled fundamentalists, those I

reject the goals

and methods of the

NCR. They

diate political activism. Their position

nounced Falwell Christianity

is

Leaders of

have called

man

strict separatists, utterly

remain firmly isolationist and repu-

epitomized by

is

the "most dangerous

as

— moderate

in

Bob

Jones,

America today

Jr.,

who

de-

as far as Biblical

concerned." 20

NCR

organizations share a conservative economic

oudook

that they

have often voiced in sermons, newspaper interviews, popular books, and journal and

newspaper

articles.

Regarding the economy

as a

whole, they applaud the free-market

The following View of Economics," a position paper published the Coalition on Revival, is representative:

system, criticize the welfare state, and oppose any form of socialism.

passage from "The Christian World

by an evangelical association

We

called

economy is the closest approximation man has yet world to the economy set forth in the Bible, and that, of

affirm that a free market

devised in this fallen

THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN FUNDAMENTALISTS 347

all

the economics

We

known

to

man,

and prosperous society lor

just,

the

it is

people

all

most conducive

to producing a free,

(p. 19).

denv that central planning and other coercive interferences with personal

choice can increase the productivity of society; that the

government has

civil

authoritv to set the value of propcrtv; and that the Bible teaches anv "just" price other than that resulting

marketplace of free people

Although statements

from the interaction of supplv and demand

like this

have characterized the

New

inception in the late 1970s, serious attempts to defend

The

intellectual

and

of

biblical defense

Christian Right since

them

economics"

free enterprise "Christian

publishes a journal called Christian Perspectives:

its

are relatively recent. 21

Contemporarv Economics and Business Association.

the primarv goal of the

in a

(p. 15).

A Journal of Free Enterprise,

is

CEBA

sponsors

conferences featuring noted conservative Christian economists and free-market apologists,

and has produced

videotaped series along the lines of Milton Friedman's "Free

a

To Choose"

television series. 22

has financed

its

Through

the energetic efforts of

its

president,

continually expanding activities with private industry donations and

has aimed for professional respectability bv building

its

conferences, publications, and

videotapes around respected authors, economists, and businessmen. 23

of a recent

of CEBA's Christian

issue

The economics

to almost 2.

is

all

CEBA

.

.

.

at

Liberty

believe:

capitalistic economy (free upon which the practical solutions political-economy problems and issues must be based,

that the

enterprise)

The cover page

Perspectives journal states:

of the school [of Business and Government

facultv

University] and the staff of 1.

CEBA

combination of democracy and our

the philosophical foundation

that the

economic development and progress of nations

lated to the extent to

which thev have applied,

is

directly re-

in practice, the principles

of

free-enterprise economics, 3.

that even a free-enterprise-based system

successful in tian

Western

civilization if it has the

of political economy can only be

underpinning of the Judeo-Chris-

moral value system, the value system which has been the basis for most of

our great achievements. 24

The

NCR has been influenced by libertarian ideology associated with the Chicago

and Austria schools of economic thought. Libertarians Friedrich

Hayek provide

Christian economists with a

like

Milton Friedman and

body of

carefully

worked,

highly respectable research that defends free markets, private property, and minimal

government on

theoretical

and empirical grounds. Thus,

in

an extended discussion of

Friedman repeatedly 25 and Robert Mateer

economic

issues, Jerry Falwell cites

ommends

Friedman's Capitalism and Freedom as one of three books "virtually essential

to an understanding of capitalism, freedom,

and the

role

of government." 26

Although the proponents of conservative Christian economics their debt to secular conservatives like

rec-

freely

acknowledge

Friedman, they also emphasize that their views

Laurence R. Iannaccone 348

remain grounded in God's Word. They argue that free enterprise and respect for vate property

is

terprise yields

its

promote the

advocated throughout the Bible. Moreover, they

pri-

insist that free en-

when coupled with ethical structures that maintain and moral principles. The CEBA statement quoted above is in this

benefits only

Bible's

respect completely typical. It

echoed by Pat Robertson's observation that "com-

is

munism and capitalism in their most extreme, secular manifestations are equally doomed to failure. When greed and materialism displace all spiritual and moral values, capitalism breaks down into ugliness." 27 The NCR's economic agenda thus .

.

.

of American capitalism to the restoration of traditional Ameri-

links the rehabilitation

can values. James Kennedy, one of the Moral Majority's founders, argues that Amer-

economic problems

ica's

work

Biblical

will

be solved "only

ethic."

The Christian

No

when we

get back to the Protestant or

28

Reconstructionists

group of theologically conservative Protestants has spelled out

economy

much

detail as the Christian reconstructionists. Its

view of the

two most

prolific

Rousas Rushdoony and Gary North, have written numerous books and

leaders, ticles

in as

its

defending

a free

market

as the

ar-

only economic system compatible with God's

Word. The following statements, from Rushdoony's

of Guilt

Politics

and Pity,

are typi-

cal of their overall economic views:

comes with the accumulation and development of wealth. Wealth comes, in a free economy, as a product of work and thrift in short, of character. Capital is often accumulated by inheritance, a God-given right which Social progress

—

is

strongly stressed in the Bible. ... In a free economy, property

the restrictions of the state because

it is

of a religiously oriented community.

and

in his inheritance,

means

.

.

under the .

The

restrictions

security

a stability in the social

is

freed

from

of the familv and

of a man

in his property,

order which

is

productive

progress. 29

Reconstructionist policy recommendations are in the Austrian school of economic thought.

And

there

many is

cases identical to those

no doubt

has been directly influenced by Austrian writings. 30 Nevertheless, that the reconstructionists use to justify their positions.

demand

a flat tax;

as the world's creator

God's authority

The

of

that North, at least, it is

biblical texts

biblical tithe

is

said to

and ultimate owner prohibits

Old Testament's metallic currencies illustrate that "honest money" is based on tangible commodities, not government fiat; and the eighth commandment ("Thou shalt not steal") condemns income redistribution as nothing more

centralized planning; the

than institutionalized

theft.

As these examples secular

and religious

rest in the doctrine

the reconstructionists reject any distinction between

Rushdoony

claims that the "roots of the free market

of God." 31 "Economics cannot be seen

theology, and much, separate

illustrate,

truth.

much more.

from morality, the

.

family,

.

in isolation

from

.

.

.

ethics,

Economics does not exist in a vacuum, nor is it and vocation." 32 Economic revival and spiritual .

THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN FUNDAMENTALISTS 349

renewal are ultimately inseparable. "The battle for the free market

is

but one facet of

33 a battle against idolatry."

Outsiders sometimes refer to the reconstructionists as fundamentalists, but the

re-

constructionists themselves reject the label

on both

The movement grew out of the

Dutch Reformed wing of Protestant evanfrom that which gave rise to traditional

gelicalism,

which

is

Calvinist

historically distinct

and theological grounds.

historical

fundamentalism.

known as "preGod's Kingdom (the mil-

Reconstructionists also reject the critical fundamentalist doctrine millennialism," the belief that Christ

must return

before

lennium) can be established. True to their Calvinist roots, reconstructionists are "postmillennialists," believing that Christ will return only after Christian efforts help

Kingdom. 34 The

to bring about God's millennial ently esoteric distinction

is

of

practical significance

this appar-

great. Premillennial theology sees the world going from

bad to worse, only to be redeemed through God's sudden intervention

at the

Second

Coming of Christ. Any efforts, including those of Christians, to reform secular society are therefore ultimately futile. The logical Christian response to the evils of the world therefore defensive isolationism, holding the fort until God's cavalry arrives. Pre-

is

millennial theology thus tends to is

undermine arguments

for political activism

and so

something of an albatross about the NCR's neck. In contrast, postmillennial the-

ology is

calls

Christians out of isolation.

incumbent upon Christians to dig

them

tian Right. It has, for

is

and

It

literally

waiting for

increasingly filtering into the mainstream of the

New Chris-

to finish the job that

Dominion theology

A Christian society can and will be achieved.

He

in

fight since Christ

is

began.

example, shaped some of Pat Robertson's economic positions 35

at least one major NCR on Revival. 36 Put off by the reconstructionists' militant rhetoric and occasional ad hominem attacks, most members of the NCR hesitate to be openly associated with them. But as one interviewee said, "Though we hide their books under the bed, we read them just the same."

and underpins many of the economic views and goals of organization, the Coalition

The Evangelical Left The

New

Christian Right has garnered so

positions are sometimes taken as typical of

much all

attention in recent years that

evangelicals.

There are other evangelicals whose economic positions are

NCR and reconstructionists are to the right. be

fully

"Biblical Blueprints," he

When

economics cannot

Ron Sider, When Gary North named his

self-consciously rejecting

comprehensive blueprint for

a

Ronald

new economic

Jim Wallis, and series

of books

Sider's claim that

Christians in

"we

order in Scripture." 37 it

was

an Age ofHunger, and titled Producan Age of Guilt Manipulators. In a recent review of Calvin Beisner's

as a refutation

Prosperity

its

a mistake.

is

another reconstructionist, David Chilton, wrote a book on economics,

framed tive

find a

was

left.

so

as far to the left as the

right's

appreciated apart from the contrasting views of

other leaders of the evangelical

do not

Moreover, the

To do

of Sider's Rich Christians

and Poverty, Liberty

University's

in

Mark Clauson makes

a point

of noting that

"Beisner responds to the Siderite interpretations of Scripture" and espouses "a con-

Laurence R. lannaccone 350

ccpt of justice that

is

opposed to the

directly

of many evangelicals

ideas

of Ronald Sider." 38 This fascination with Sider and evangelical right has

made no analogous attempt

his associates

is

mold The

in the

revealing.

to refute Catholic and mainline

Protestant teachings, which are at least as liberal as those of Sider and which have received far

more

attention in the secular press. Leaders of the evangelical right are

well aware that both they

and

on the

their counterparts

left

contend for the same

evangelical Christian audience.

Ronald Sider ably the

most

inequality,

a

is

philosopher at Eastern Baptist Theological Seminary and prob-

influential leader

and economic

of the evangelical

left.

39

Sider sees issues of poverty,

evangelicals for "ignoring the central Biblical teaching that

poor" 40 and repeatedly draws attention to the standards that exist in the is

basically

consume

modern world. The

one of redistribution. Christians contribute

less,

more

vast disparities in wealth

to

of the

left

concede the

demand

biblical "legitimacy

add that "the right of private property

as the call for a "national

is

living

scriptural solution, according to Sider,

to the poor, and

therefore, that market intervention

and

in the world's developed countries

trade policies that benefit less-developed countries. gelicals

He condemns fellow God is on the side of the

justice as central to biblical morality.

Although Sider and other evan-

of private property," they are quick

not absolute." 41

in

many of their

implicit in

must

that their countries enact

It is

not surprising,

specific proposals,

such

food policy," increased foreign aid (channeled through

organizations like the United Nations), "just" international trade, and guaranteed

wages. 42

A

handful of evangelical leaders

of these are the secular

left,

the 1960s counterculture, and communitarian Christian groups such

as the Hutterites, ty's

capitalism in favor of socialism. Most whose thinking has been influenced by

flatly reject

self-styled "radical evangelicals"

Mennonites, and Amish. Adopting

a

Marxist formulation of socie-

problems, they argue that "the system which creates and sustains

hunger, underdevelopment, and other social talism

is

by

its

in the

ills

world todav

is

much of

the

capitalism. Capi-

very nature a system which promotes individualism, competition, and

profit-making with

little

before social service and

or no regard for social costs.

human

needs.

As such

it is

It

puts profits and private gain

an unjust system which should be

replaced." 43 These sentiments find their strongest expression in the writings of Jim Wallis, the radical

left's

most

influential leader.

His Agenda for Biblical People*4

insists

American "overconsumption is theft from the poor" and that "the people of the nonindustrialized world are poor because we are rich; the poverty of the masses is

that

maintained and perpetuated by our [economic, institutions

and by the way we

live

our

lives."

political,

He

calls for

ism and the "redistribution of wealth and power on

and

military] systems

and

the rejection of consumer-

a global scale." 45

Fundamentalist Attributes and Economic Orientations

Our overview of a talists,

the

NCR,

variety of theologically conservative Protestants

Christian reconstructionists,

—

and the evangelical

strict left

fundamen-

—

illustrates

THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN FUNDAMENTALISTS 351

why

right-to-left variation in religious

sponding variation

economic thought cannot be linked to corre-

in theological beliefs

or social attributes.

It is

simplv not true that

"conservative" economic views are the consequence of "conservative" theologv or

other "fundamentalistlike" attributes. Premillcnnialism, a characteristically fundamentalist doctrine,

not the key to economic conservatism, since the most radicallv

is

right-wing group of evangelicals, the reconstructionists, uttcrlv reject that doctrine.

Separatism also

Bob

ated with

fails

New

repudiate the goals of the fails

— the

to predict economic conservatism

strict separatists associ-

Jones Universitv appear suspicious of all economic systems and utterly Christian Right. Belief in biblical inerrancv likewise

to predict economic outlook. Ronald Sider and other economic liberals of the

evangelical left are defenders of biblical inerrancv,

and

scriptural quotations interpreted literally. Yet Sider

and argues that

"laissez-faire

economics

.

.

Sider's writings are

reflects a

.

packed with

embraces government intervention

modern, secularized outlook

rather than a biblical perspective." 4*

This record of diversity underscores a crucial biblical

fact:

there

is

no

generally accepted

standard for economic conduct. Different evangelical leaders with similar the-

ologies and similar views of Scripture have for radically different

trouble finding biblical justification

little

economic teachings. Some emphasize that the

church "had everything

in

common"

commandments, which prohibit

early Christian

(Acts 4 32); others invoke the eighth and tenth :

stealing or coveting another's property, as

respect for private property; and yet others justify

mandating

income redistribution and poverty

programs with reference to the Jubilee laws (Leviticus 25 8—55), which mandate the :

periodic freeing of slaves and return of land to

its

original owners. 4 " In fact, different

people sometimes defend radically different economic policies with exactly the same scriptures.

The founders of virtually

proof that private property see in this text a

resources. 48

"model"

is

every Christian

in the

Acts 4:32 as

contrary to the Christian ideal. Sider and Wallis likewise

for Christians'

"common

But others use the same passage

unworkable even

commune quote

as

use and consumption" of economic

evidence that

communism proved

golden age of the Apostles. They claim that the experiment

was short-lived and was never repeated "because

it

obviously didn't work." They even

interpret Paul's subsequent efforts to collect funds for the Jerusalem church as

that "the in

poor

communal

saints at Jerusalem

living." 49

Most

.

.

.

proof

bankrupted themselves though their experiment

evangelicals sav that the biblical tithe requires Christians

to contribute a tenth of their income to the church. But the reconstructionists also

government revenue to a flat 10 percent tax. 50 Christians on all sides agree that the Bible commands charity toward the poor. But those on the left invoke these scriptures to justify income redistribution and social welfare programs, whereas those on the right argue that biblical charity and mandated redistriinterpret the tithe as limiting

bution are

in fact antithetical, since true charity

Statistical data

must be

freely given.

provide further proof that economic thinking often varies indepen-

dent of theological

beliefs.

Consider, for example, a 1981 survey of over a thousand

198 seminaries and theological schools drawn from the full range of Christian denominations. The faculty were asked numerous questions about their faculty

members

religious,

at

political,

and economic

beliefs.

The

results

showed

that conservative

Laurence R. Iannaccone 352

theology

—

belief in biblical inerrancy, the divinity

and the threat of Hell

tality,

of Jesus, the promise of immor-

— did not lead to economic conservatism. Theologically

conservative professors displaved tremendous variation in their attitudes toward social

Whereas theologically

welfare programs. liberal

liberal professors

seem to have attained

a

consensus on such issues as welfare spending, income redistribution, reducing

the role of government, and aid to poor countries, theologically conservative professors range

all

over the map. There was no evidence of an economic consensus, con-

servative or otherwise,

among

when

the professors in this latter category. Likewise,

analvzing results by school type, the economic views of professors at evangelical and

fundamentalist schools showed substantially greater variation than those of professors at

mainline Protestant schools. Interestingly, the situation was reversed on issues of

and evangelical schools responded

sexual conduct. Professors at fundamentalist

more

consistently

far

and conservatively to questions about abortion, homosexuality, and

premarital sex than did professors at mainline Protestant schools. Hence, rect to attribute the

economic

gelical-fundamentalist

(as

results to

some

it is

incor-

greater underlying diversity in the evan-

opposed to mainline)

and

Evangelicals

population.

fundamentalists are capable of consensus. But this consensus

is

moral rather than

economic. 51 In short, there

is

litde relation

economic orientation. Unless one

between standard fundamentalist plays with tautologies

fundamentalism with Falwell and the that

all

fundamentalists,

faire capitalism

much

New

— —

Christian Right

less all evangelicals, are

attributes

for example, it is

and

by equating

impossible to argue

ardent supporters of laissez-

or other conservative economic policies. Rather, one must acknowl-

edge that fundamentalist and evangelical leaders with similar theological social traits subscribe to a

beliefs

and

wide range of economic views.

Impact

The economic teachings of evangelical leaders appear to have had little impact on rank and file members or on national debate, economic policies, and economic institutions. Moreover, the evidence below gives no indication that this situation will change am' time soon.

The Rank and File If

one were to compare the economic views of the typical evangelical or fundamento those of the typical American and then summarize the comparison in a single

talist

would be "no difference worth mentioning." This fact so contradicts the conventional wisdom that it demands both evidence and explanation. As already noted, the widespread image of fundamentalists and evangelicals as economic conservatives is partly due to the media's extensive coverage of Falwell and the New Christian Right throughout the 1980s. But it is also due to the fallacious notion that all forms of conservatism— religious, moral, economic, and so forth go hand in hand. Rank and file fundamentalists and evangelicals do indeed stand out as phrase, the phrase

—

THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN FUNDAMENTALISTS 353

religious

able

and moral conservatives, but

their

from those of other Americans. In

school counterparts,

whose

diverse

economic views

this respect

are largely indistinguish-

they are

much

like their

theology

economic views but consistent moral views have

alreadv been noted.

Consider, for example, a recent studv by Ted Jelen comparing the attitudes of

more than one thousand Catholics, mainline Protestants, and evangelical Protestants on issues concerning sexual morality, abortion, feminism, school prayer, communism, arms spending, and government welfare programs. 52 On all issues except the last, evangelicals proved significantly testants.

But

indeed slightlv more

Although

Jelen's

liberal

than) other Christians

1 .

studv addressed onlv one economic issue and employed a very

loose, denominational definition

definitions

more conservative than Catholics and mainline Provirtually the same as (and

toward welfare spending was

their attitude

and manv other

of evangelicalism, the same

issues.

We

marize the moral and economic attitudes of white Protestants

1989 General

result holds for stricter

and 15.2, which sum-

see this in tables 15.1

Social Surveys. In these tables,

I

have

1987, 1988, and

in the

more than four thou-

classified

sand respondents on the basis of their denomination and their personal religious beliefs.

Respondents have been labeled "evangelical-fundamentalist"

to an evangelical or fundamentalist as

God's Word, "to be taken

denomination 53 and,

literally,

word

far

more

likely to

espouse

moral standards than are other white Protestants. Eighty-two percent of

them (but only 57 percent of other for

they belong

for word." 54

Table 15.1 shows that evangelical-fundamentalists are traditional

if (1)

(2) they also accept the Bible

Protestants)

oppose laws that "permit abortion

any reason." Ninety-five percent of them (but onlv 78 percent of others) believe

that "extramarital sex

is

always wrong." Sixtv-threc percent of them (but only 23

percent of others) believe that "premarital sex

is

always wrong." Their condemnation

TABLE 15.1 Moral Issues

Opposes laws

that permit abortion for

Evangelical-

Other

Fundamentalists

Protestants

(%)

(%)

82

57

63

43

95

72

62

23

94

78

any reason Favors laws prohibiting the distribution

of pornography to persons of any age Believes that

homosexual sex

is

always

wrong Believes that premarital sex

is

always

wrong Believes that extramarital sex

is

always

wrong Source: General Social Surveys,

1987 through 1989.

Laurence R. Iannaccone 354

TABLE

15.2

Economic

Issues

Believes that little

we

Evangelical-

Other

Fundamentalists

Protestants

(%)

(%)

currently spend too

24

27

41

43

22

19

64

66

59

64

54

66

4

4

16

16

65

61

on solving the problems of big

cities

Believes that little

Believes that little

we

currently spend too

on welfare

we

currently spend too

on improving the condition of

blacks Believes that little

we

currently spend too

on improving and protecting

the nation's health Believes that little

we

currently spend too

on improving

the nation's

education system Believes that little

we

currently spend too

on improving and protecting

the environment Believes that little

Believes that little

we

currently spend too

on foreign

we

on the

aid

currently spend too

military,

armaments, and

defense Believes that little

we

currently spend too

on halting the

rising

crime rate

Source: General Social Surveys, 1987 through 1989.

of pornography and homosexuality

is

no

less

emphatic.

On each of these moral issues,

the differences between evangelical- fundamentalists and other Protestants striking,

and

ling for

background

statistically significant.

characteristics.

Moreover, these differences remain 55

The

income, education, age, gender, or marital truly are

distinctive attitudes status.

is

strong,

after control-

cannot be traced to

Fundamentalists and evangelicals

moral conservatives.

economic conservatives. Table 15.2 shows this quite clearly. When asked about government spending on health, poverty, education, the environment, and the problems of blacks and large cities, evangelical-fundamentalists are

Even

so, thev are not

nearly as likely as others to advocate increased expenditures. For virtually ever)' eco-

nomic

item, the difference between

them and nonevangelical

Protestants

the order of a few percentage points, and statistically insignificant. 56

The

is

small,

on

NCR not-

withstanding, fundamentalists and evangelicals seem just as comfortable with big gov-

ernment

as

everyone

else.

THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN FUNDAMENTALISTS 355

This

statement can be taken even farther. Recent research bv Burton, Johnson,

last

and Tamnev indicates that when tribution

it

comes

to

"economic restructuring" income (

and job and income guarantees), fundamentalists are actually more

redisliberal

than others. Viewing fundamentalism as a matter of degree. Burton, Johnson, and

Tamnev surveyed people lical

to determine the extent to which thev believed in strict bib-

inerrancy, the second 5"

everv aspect of

life.

attitudes. 58

results

The

coming of Christ, human

show

and God's control over

sinfulness,

Their surveys also investigated

political, sexual,

conservative political attitudes and traditional sexual attitudes, tively

Moral Majority, thev could

orientation. 60 Burton, Johnson,

influence of values

embodied

find

also correlates posi-

it

59

Indeed, even when focusing on supno evidence of a conservative economic

with support for economic restructuring.

porters of the

and economic

although fundamentalism correlates positively with

that,

and Tamnev attribute

in the Populist

their results to the continuing

and Prohibitionist parties of the

late

two movements closely associated with tradiThev conclude that William Jennings Brvan "seems

nineteenth and early twentieth centurv, tional, conservative Protestantism.

a

more apt

personification of Protestant

It is difficult

to

know whether

Fundamentalism than does

the economic views of fundamentalists and evan-

stem from populism. Other explanations certainly are possible. (For

gelicals really

example, one might attribute the rank and

file's

lack

of economic conservatism to

their

Or one might argue that there really is nothing economic attitudes are not much different from anyone else's.)

of economic consensus.

leaders' lack

to explain since their

Nevertheless, the legacy of populism searchers

Jerry Falwell." 61

on the

outside.

is

cited

bv both leaders on the inside and

Gary North has blamed Bryan

re-

for turning fundamentalist

Christians against the gold standard, free trade, and free markets. "Bryan radicalized a substantial

segment of Christian voters

Christian thinking

on economics

is

in the

United

muddled. Christian's

States.

.

.

.

Thus, American

'populist' instincts are anti-

bank, vet pro-paper money. Christians are patriotic, but with this has

come

a suspi-

cion of foreigners and foreign imports." 62 Political scientist James Reichley raises the

same points while discussing

He observes

evangelicals, while for the

given up

evangelicals' historic allegiance to the

Democratic

Party.

that

all

most part

socially conservative

the other attitudes and dispositions that for

loyal to the

Democrats. ... As

confidence,

some have shown

.

.

.

have by no means

many

years kept

them

the evangelicals have begun to acquire political signs of doubting that there

is

a necessary con-

nection between traditional morality and, say, supply-side economics or an aggressively interventionist foreign policy. Older themes of

economic popu-

lism and foreign policy nonintcrventionism, even isolationism, have reappear.

In any case, whether or not populism libertarians

begun

to

63

nor free-market ideologues

home with

is

the key,

most

evangelicals are neither

at heart. In the final analysis, they

seem more

government that fosters and even imposes "Christian" values than a truly nonintrusivc, minimal state. Just as conservative Protestants supported prohibition around the turn of the century, so contemporary evangelicals have at

a "Christian"

Laurence R. Iannaccone 356

sought

ban on abortion,

a constitutional

economic

state for relief from poverty, reductions in

inequality,

urban decay, and environmental pollution. They

conflict,

insofar as

oppose

on drugs, pornography, and

all

it

serves the interests

restrictions

gelicals claim to

on personal

an

texts to teach "creation science" as

The majority of evangelicals

alternative to evolutionary theory.

ment

restrictions

and laws that require school

sexual conduct,

likewise look to the

and solutions to

fear the

racial

growth of govern-

of "secular humanists," but by no means do they

libertv.

One

suspects that

when rank and

file

evan-

support "free" and "open" markets, they mean markets free of com-

munism and open

of Christian

to the influence

values.

Though

might come

it

as

were apdy summarized by Falwell

a surprise, their middle-of-the-road sentiments

himself:

I

believe in the free enterprise system. ...

poverty.

But

I

also believe that

look on socialism as mutually shared

I

we must

continue to struggle to bring

justice,

mercy and generosity through our free entersystem. The exploitation of workers, the misuse and abuse of power and

equality and a fuller measure of prise

wealth, the unequal and discriminator}' distribution of profits should have no place in America's practice of capitalism. 64

Impact on Public

Policy

members with a distinctive economic on governmental policies. Indeed, it appears that purposes they have never even tried to change current economic

If evangelical leaders have failed to impress their ethic, they have had even

for

practical

all

less effect

policy.

Consider, for example, the track record of the

of evangelicals was Yet, for

all its

in the position to

pro-capitalist rhetoric, the

any economic

One

bills.

tas

and

— such

tariffs, scale

Christian Right. If anv group it

NCR.

was the

NCR never lobbied seriously for or against which NCR leaders and

searches in vain for instances in

organizations directed significant time or

market legislation

New

have policy impact in the 1980s

as laws to

back the

money toward

the passage of specific free-

reduce agricultural price supports, eliminate quo-

minimum wage,

or cut social spending and poverty

programs.

The NCR's

lack

of support for economic

proach to moral and educational issues such

of creationism, tuition

tax credits,

and gay

NCR activelv supported constitutional Wade Supreme Court

ruling. It also

legislation contrasts sharplv

with

its

ap-

as abortion, school prayer, the teaching rights. 65

On

abortion, for example, the

amendments designed

to overturn the

supported statutory proposals to

strip the

Roe

v.

Court

of its jurisdiction over the abortion issue. The NCR's approach to school prayer was likewise characterized by support for constitutional amendments, statutory restrictions,

and

special legislation

aimed

at getting

around the Court's

dating the teaching of "creation science" were introduced and in state legislatures. 66

The

rulings. Bills

some

man-

cases passed in

NCR also supported tuition tax credits, but for reasons more

educational than economic.

By reducing

the cost of private Christian schooling, the

NCR simply sought to facilitate the inculcation of fundamentalist values.

THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN FUNDAMENTALISTS 357

The NCR's

political effectiveness

Some

tinues to be debated todav.

extensive lobbying, and eight vears

agenda, virtually none of

of legislative

lack

was debated throughout the 1980s, and

of a president committed publicly to much of its

contend that

victories, others

NCR's

standard, however, the

For

intents,

all

respect, Falwell's

was

it

a

major achievement merely to

separation,

were never even on the

issues

1981 "Agenda for the Eighties" was entirely "vital issues"

ERA,

nography, women's rights,

cither

NCR

agenda. In this

typical. Its ten-item

list

included abortion, homosexuality, drugs, por-

national defense, support for Israel, church-state

and the autonomy of the Moral Majority

was never even mentioned.

By

economic impact must be judged as virtually nonexis-

economic

of the Moral Majority's

con-

policy objectives were realized. 6 " While conceding the

its

get Congress to debate school prayer, abortion, and tuition tax credits. 68

tent.

it

have noted that despite tremendous media coverage,

1980

Falwell's

abortion, homosexuality, pornography,

state organizations.

"Biblical Plan

Of

69

Economics

Action" likewise

humanism, and the fractured family

lists

as the five

major moral-political problems "that moral Americans need to be ready to face." 70

The NCR's

failure to pursue, let alone attain, specific

understand given the

evidence described above.

statistical

economic goals

Rank and

is

easy to

evangelicals

file

no more enamored of free markets than are other Americans, nor are they any more opposed to government intervention. The NCR's legislative activities, which attacked moral issues but avoided economic ones, accurately reflected the interests of are

its

constituency and thus accord with standard political theory.

explained, therefore, rather

why

not

is

why

the

NCR

failed to

What

needs to be

lobby for economic change but

even raised the issue of free markets.

it

Beyond Rhetoric

The economic rhetoric of Falwell and company defies explanation only as long as we focus on the NCR's own constituency. The paradox is resolved when we broaden our perspective and recognize that the

one

side

of

new right-wing

a

the press and the public, has been ologists.

got

its

Christian Right was from

This

fact,

documented by both

Recounting the history of the

start in the

NCR,

Phillips,

its

inception just

though often ignored by

political scientists

and possess

a

comprehensive

leaders of the so-called

of the

activists,

most notably Rich-

New

set

of

political organizations.

Right were careful to emphasize the

assisted in

creating the three groups the media most

political

.

vital

social issues that interested the evangelical conservatives. In

New Christian

soci-

and Paul Weyrich,

out to build a broad coalition that would be autonomous from the

parties

and

Richard Pierard notes that the coalition

mid-1970s, when secular conservative

Howard

ard Viguerie, set

New

political coalition.

.

.

The

nature

1979, thev

closely identified with the

Right: the Moral Majority, (Religious) Roundtable, and Chris-

tian Voice. 71

Pierard's interpretation

In

its

is

echoed by other scholars, such

early stages, the religious

created

7S

by

a cadre

of secular

as Reichley:

72

was tutored and even to some extent conservative organizers and publicists who for

new

right

Laurence R. Iannaccone 358

some

had been seeking to mobilize

years

politics.

.

.

.

Up

growth of the welfare

resistance against the

1976

the Soviet Union. After the social as a

agenda of the religious

new

right-wing coalition in national

a

to 1976, the chief preoccupations of the far right had been

election,

right,

state

and hardline opposition to

Wevrich

in particular spotted the

with which he was in personal sympathy,

source of major electoral strength for a broad right-wing coalition. 74

The New

would probably never have arisen, much less captured public attention, had it not from the start allied itself with secular conservatives. In turn, that alliance would never have formed had not both sides conceded the issues most cherished by the other. The secular conservatives embraced the evangelical-fundamentalist moral agenda, and the NCR in turn embraced the secular conservatives' economic agenda. However, for many leaders, and perhaps most followers, that embrace was less than loving. In the words of one scholar, "Many traditional Republicans Christian Right

agenda of the Christian right."

are uncomfortable with the emotionally charged moral

Hence,

as the fundamentalists

that thev

worked

and evangelicals loudly lamented, the very conservatives

most notably Ronald Reagan,

to elect,

agenda with the vigor that they had anticipated. 75 For

failed to

its

pursue their moral

part, the

NCR gave only NCR leaders'

nominal support to the economic goals of the secular conservatives. The apparently paradoxical failure to lobby for their economic goals the fact that the goals were never really "theirs" in the

The

politics

mentalists have

first

of coalitions helps to explain not only

done so

might have had some

little

is

thus explained bv

place.

why

evangelicals

and funda-

to affect economic policies directlv but also

indirect impact. Insofar as the

NCR

how

they

coalition succeeded,

it

helped elect Republicans whose economic orientation was relatively conservative. The

economic tions:

Was

effect

of the

NCR

in the

1980s thus hinges on the answers to two ques-

the support of fundamentalists and evangelicals critical for the election of

and did the election of these conservatives lead to conservative economic outcomes? The future must be the judge of these questions. To date, scholars

conservatives,

remain deeplv divided over the the rest of the

New

political

Christian Right.

On

impact of Falwell, the Moral Majority, and the one hand,

saw

a substantial increase in the political activity

On

the other hand, the

it

seems clear that the 1980s

of evangelicals and fundamentalists. 76

NCR often

antagonized many more people than it attracted, more opposition than support. 77 and thus may have mobilized The future political effectiveness of evangelicals is also unclear. On the one hand, evangelical support for Republican candidates continues to coalesce. The evangelical vote for Republican presidential candidates has risen from 55 percent in 1976, to 63 percent in 1980, to 76 percent in 1984, and 81 percent in 1988. As Hadden observes, "Evangelical Christians seem to be moving toward a consensus that their best chance for achieving [their] goals

Republican partv

is

now

is

through the Republican partv. Their allegiance to the

approaching" that of blacks to the Democratic Party." 8 The

Republican Partv likewise recognizes that "they need evangelical Christians to build a majority party. tians

and the

.

.

.

Thus from

a

if they are

pragmatic perspective, the moralist Chris-

traditional pro-business Republicans are a likely alliance."

-9

On the other

— THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN FUNDAMENTALISTS 359

hand, this coalition remains "an uncomfortable

cording to Reichley, the religious right can economics and foreign policy than

And

of the early 1980s. S1

.

.

marriage of convenience." 80 Ac-

now showing less enthusiasm for Republiwhen it first joined the Reagan coalition leaders have gained more political clout, they is

it

as evangelical

.

did

have also displavcd a greater tendency to fragment, as they did

in the

1988 Republican

when some supported Robertson, others (including Falwcll) supported Bush, and still others backed Dole or Kemp. All in all, there is little doubt that the New Christian Right will continue to make some contribution to political conserva-

primary*

tism.

But the magnitude of that contribution and

particularly economics,

like

Gary North, Calvin Beisner, and Robert Mateer

beyond the Republican Party and the immediate legislative

relevance to specific policy areas,

most ardent evangelical proponents of economic conservatism

Interestingly, the

people

its

remain open questions.

change on both

practical

future.

—

set their sights well

They disavow lobbying

and theoretical grounds. They know

full

for

well that

do not share their positions. Striving for immediate change is thereThey also recognize the hazards of coalition politics. Gary North, who once worked for the libertarian presidential candidate Ron Paul, is said to have remarked that "anyone who goes to Washington expecting to change things is in for disillusionment." Rather than enter into the process of compromise and concession that ineyitably characterizes political actiyity, they have instead chosen to embark on a long-term program of education. The reconstructionists in particular emphasize that theirs is an educational movement with a "bottom up" rather than "top down" plan most

eyangelicals

fore premature.

of action. For North, Beisner, Mateer, and many others, the immediate goal

mandate for

teach fellow Christians the biblical

free

moral values. They express confidence that their grass-roots methods affect

economic

results.

policies,

Though not

steps: (1)

is

to

markets founded on Christian will eventually

but thev anticipate waiting decades or longer for tangible

always articulated, their plan of action really has four distinct

developing a systematic. Christian view of economics; (2) converting other

evangelical educators dox)' to rank

and

and leaders to Christians;

file

nomic system, bringing

it

this

and

view; (3) teaching this

finally (4)

first

two

ortho-

democratically altering America's eco-

into line with biblical principles.

they have yet to go past the

new economic

By

their

own

admission,

steps. 82 Still, in religion as in politics, progress

and consensus can

arrive unexpectedly.

things are possible"

(Matthew 19:26).

And

as the Bible itself states

"with

God

all

Conclusions This essay has reviewed the economic positions of evangelical leaders and has investigated the impact that these positions have evangelicals

policies.

had upon the

The

attitudes

of rank and

file

positions espoused by evangelical

more diverse than the platforms of specific groups, such Moral Majority, would suggest. A strong free-market consensus remains at best prospect for the future. Moreover, rank and file evangelicals show no signs whatso-

leaders as the a

and national economic

were found to be

far

Laurence R. Iannaccone 360

ever of embracing a distinctive, religiouslv motivated economic ethic.

open

income redistribution

to

as other

Americans and

They

are just as

of govern-

just as supportive

ment programs to promote

health, education,

problems of

and the environment. This contrasts sharply with

attitudes

race, poverty,

toward many moral

servative than those

the

New

are indeed different

why

its

rank and

file

its

that fundamentalists are likely to have

on

The importance of

Moreover, even where

their

support

effect will

the

secular, political allies,

economy

not

in turn helps to

never attempted to

move from

The only immediate impact

"free enterprise" talk to specific free-market legislation.

primary economic

their

from and more con-

members. This

NCR

and other leaders of the

Falwell

vative Republicans.

alleviate the

of other Americans. Thus, the conservative economic rhetoric of

Christian Right appears to be a concession to

an expression of the concerns of explain

which

issues,

and urban renewal, and to

via their support for conser-

is

that support remains a subject of debate.

may have been

or

may

yet

become

decisive,

have been to promote an economic agenda that

is

its

not

with a serious, religiously-oriented commitment to

really theirs. Evangelical leaders

conservative economic principles remain few, their best hopes a distant prospect.

Some

emerge from this study that mav apply to fundamenphenomenon. The first is that the diversity of economic thought talism as a generic within Protestant fundamentalism and the even greater diversity within Protestant tentative conclusions

evangelicalism logic

may

not be exceptional. This study has found no evidence that the

of fundamentalism drives people toward

less particular

trieval" that retrieval,

economic

Rather,

policies.

Martin Marty describes

"picking and choosing

history," aptly describes the

.

way

rived at biblical justifications for

.

.

as

a particular

view of the economy, much

we observed examples of the

common

from some

to

all

earlier

.

"selective re-

fundamentalisms. 83 Selective .

.

stages in one's

own

sacred

which fundamentalists and evangelicals have areverything from a flat tax to communal living, from in

income redistribution to the gold standard. Fundamentalists and evangelicals have no difficulty advocating virtually any reasonable economic orientation, as well as many unreasonable ones, with reference to their traditions and written authorities. Hence, where consensus does ever emerge among fundamentalists and evangelicals on the relative merits of capitalism versus socialism or economic efficiencv versus equity, it more than likely reflects the working of external forces, such as the dictates of political

of communist economics. Such an externally induced consensus may indeed have impact upon both rank and file members and the coalitions or the perceived failure

society in

which they

stances than

it is

by

live,

but

it is

is no less shaped bv secular circumof a particular religious form or tradition.

an impact that

the internal logic

may ultimately relate to economics much the same way that it relates to technology. Observers are always surprised to see how quickly the so-called antiscientific fundamentalists embrace new technology and how readilv thev adapt it to their own purposes. The secular medium of television This leads to a second point. Fundamentalism

in

becomes the

basis for televangelism; the

notebook computer gives

line" Bible. Fundamentalists appear to appropriate

same way: picking and choosing, paying and above

all

little

rise to

economic concepts

in

the "on-

much

the

attention to an item's original source,

using everything they can as an instrument to further their religious

.

THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN FUNDAMENTALISTS 361

(and perhaps ultimately social) agenda. themselves to

bv

recall that

most people

From time

are not terriblv concerned with

logical consistency. In the final analysis, a fundamentalist

as

everyone

w

nor constrained

"worldview" may indeed

toward technology, education, economics, and

limit one's attitudes

often than not a fundamentalist's primary concern

must pinch

to time, aeademics

But more

politics.

each of these

ith

same

the

is

using them as effectively as possible to pursue their larger goals.

else's:

This could well be the most important lesson that emerges from the messy world of evangelical-fundamentalist economics.

Notes So, too, this study docs not concern

1

self

with promises of material gain

reward for personal

bodied

piety,

it-

fundamentalists and evangelicals. This

fail-

God's

ure stems not from inadequate survey design

such as those em-

but rather from the nature of fundamental-

in the teachings that

have

as

come

to be

ism

itself.

The

negative connotations of the

called "prosperity theology."

term "fundamentalist"

Kenneth Elzinga, "What Is Christian Economics?" in Robert N. Mateer, ed..

many people refuse to identify themselves as such when asked "Are you a fundamental-

2.

are

so

great

that

Christian Perspectives on Economics (Lynch-

ist?"

Fundamentalism cannot be inferred

burg, Va.: Christian Economics and Busi-

from

a respondent's

ness Association, 1989), p. 9.

tion, since

R.

Sandeen,

The

Fundamentalism

(Chicago:

University

3.

Ernest

Roots

of

of Chicago Press, 1970); George M. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980);

Nana'

T.

Ammerman,

damentalists

in

the

FunWorld (New

Bible Believers:

Modern

many

independent

denominational

long to denominations

Convention that

Baptist

gious

Wrong (New York: Pilgrim

like-

is

The esoteric

shared by

many

evan-

theological distinctions

that scholars use to differentiate

fundamen-

Press,

sational

premillennialism" versus "historic

on the

premillennialism," are lost

A. James Reichley, "Pietist Politics,"

in

Norman J. Cohen, ed., The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: A View from Within, a Response from Without (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1990), pp. 76-79. Susan Rose, "The Impact of Fundamentalism on North American Education," 6.

in

It

talism and evangelicalism, such as "dispen-

1989), pp. 178-79. 5.

house many

respondents on the basis of their theological beliefs, since these are

Averill, Religious Right, Reli-

also

wise impossible to identify fundamentalist

gelicals.

J.

affiliated

the Southern

like

nonfundamentalist evangelicals.

1987).

Lloyd

not

congregations

with any denomination and most others be-

Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press,

4.

affilia-

fundamentalists belong to

Martin £. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, Fundamentalisms and Society (Chicago:

typical

survey taker. For example, Ted Jelen finds that survey takers

tween

biblical

rancy in "Biblical

Does

do not discriminate

Make

the Difference

Sociological

be-

and biblical inerLiteralism and Inerrancy:

literalism

Analysis

49,

a

Difference?"

no.

421-29. Distinctions based on

4

(1989):

social atti-

tudes such as separatism or militancy are no

eds.,

less

University of Chicago Press, 1993).

shared by evangelicals in the Holiness and

7.

their

National surveys provide researchers best tool

nomic,

political,

for

determining the eco-

and

social attitudes

gious groups in America.

such surveys

fail

to

of

reli-

problematic, since these attitudes are

Pentecostal traditions.

ism," in Cohen, ed.,

Unfortunately,

Phenomenon,

between

searcher has

distinguish

Marsden makes

this

point in "Defining American Fundamental-

p.

The Fundamentalist

26. In short, a survey re-

little

choice but to accept Rei-

Laurence R. lannaccone 362

chley's conclusion

that "there

reliable

tool

statistical

for

is

.

.

.

no

distinguishing

within evangelical ranks between fundamen-

and nonfundamentalists." Reichlev,

talists

"Pietist Politics," p. 79.

For

8.

on

details

Nancy

this split, see

T.

Protestant

Martin E. Marty and

in

The

16.

faith.

Coalition

on Revival

an orga-

is

nization of socially, politically, and theologically conservative evangelicals. E. Calvin

Ammerman, "North American Fundamentalism,"

he emphasized his commitment to "the fun-

damentals" of the

Beisner, die principal author of COR's statement'on "The Christian World View of Eco-

nomics,"

is

a regular contributor to

CEBA's

R. Scott Applebv, eds., Fundamentalisms

conferences, publications, and videos. Like

Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago

Mateer, he rejects the fundamentalist

See, for example,

9.

ruption of a

25

the Lord,

preferring instead to be

1-65.

Press, 1991), pp.

"Communism: Cor-

Dream of Freedom," Sword

May

1990,

p. 11,

which

problems

—

a

of

Letter dated

ist."

29 June 1990.

states

must have the freeown ethnic and economic

chance

and economically

conservative evangelical, not a fundamental-

that "Soviet Republics

dom to solve their

ethically, politically,

ally,

at free enterprise."

The Oxford Conference,

17.

a

group of

more than one hundred evangelical leaders from all over the globe, met Januarv 1990 in Oxford, England, to draft a formal

The exception

10.

which teaches

is

Tennessee Temple,

a standard two-course intro-

duction to economics. For catalog information

on

these schools see College Catalog

all

Index: 1990-1991, Career Guidance Foundation, vol. 17, 1990.

no

tory,

filiated

association

latest

member

is

AEA

direc-

currently

af-

with any of the previously noted

fundamentalist colleges. See American Eco-

nomic Review 79 (December 1989): 12.

Ammerman,

6.

printed and reviewed in Bulletin of the Assoof Christian Economists 15 (Spring

For extended definition and discusNCR, see Steve Bruce, The Rise and Fall of the Nav Christian Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), and" Richard V. Pierard, "Religion and the New Right in the 18.

sion of the

1980's," in James E.

Bible Believers, p. 207.

view appears to be shared by the

Jehovah's Witnesses, a Christian sect which

manifests

manv

"fundamentalistlike" strict separatism,

butes including

biblical inerrancy,

and

belief in the Lord's

return.

— What

14.

You

.

.

One must

ed., Religion

Press, 1985), pp.

392-417. Moral

Majority in August of 1989. For the most part,

however, the organization ceased

activities

upon being absorbed

its

into Falwcll's

Liberty Federation in 1986. See "Falwell

Claims Victory,

Dissolves

Moral Major-

.

note, however, that a four-

person economics department

is

minuscule

by the standards of most secular universities and thus serves to underscore the relative lack

Jr.,

It

and to You" in the Jehovah's Witnesses newsletter Awake! 65, no. 2 (22 January 1984): 3-10. for

Wood,

(Waco, Tex.: Bavlor University

attri-

belief in

immanent

the State

19. Falwell officially dissolved the

emphasis on evangelism,

See, for example, "Big Business

Does

faith

ciation

and 13. This

state-

and economics. The statement, entitled the "Oxford Declaration on Christian Faith and Economics," is re-

ment on Christian

1990): 7-22.

According to the

11.

label,

known as "a doctrin-

of attention that

all

evangelical schools

have given to the subject.

ity,"

pp.

Christianity

Today,

14

July

1989,

58-59.

20. The Baptist pastor James E. Singleton published two booklets of statements

from fundamentalists around the country Falwell and the Moral Majority for their alleged compromises. See The Mo-

condemning ral Majority:

An Assessment of a Movement by

Leading Fundamentalists and The Funda-

15. In private interviews, August 1989 and November 1990, Mateer refused even

mentalist

Phenomenon

Betrayal?

(Tempe,

to label himself "a fundamentalist" although

Baptist Press, n.d.).

or

Ariz.:

Fundamentalist

Fundamentalist

.

THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN FUNDAMENTALISTS 363

2

See, for example, the chapter entitled

1

Our Government Today," in Faiwell's Listen America! (New York:

"A Look Jerry

at

36. North, Rushdoonv, and several other prominent reconstructionists are members of COR's steering committee.

Doubleday, 1980), pp. 69-81.

37. In Honest Money, p. 161,

22. This continuing series, entitled "Perspectives:

nomic

A

Judeo-Chnstian View of Eco-

programs entitled "Collapsing Socialism," "The Creation of Wealth," "The Immorality of Our Issues," currently includes

Welfare State," and "Economics

Nobel

23. These include

— Values."

laureate James

Buchanan, Catholic theologian and

commentator Michael Novak,

political

com-

political

his

"How many

readers,

heard

.

.

.

.

North

Grove,

ers p.

assure

asks

fact

is

provide

that

vou of this

some of

are Chris-

alluding to Ronald Sider,

is

Rich Christians

doesn't

Bible

The odd

.

who

the people tians."

The

.

blueprints'.

North

times have you

an Age of Hunger Down-

in

(

Intervarsitv Press,

111.:

1977),

205.

4 (Spring

38. Christian Perspectives 2, no.

mentator Paul Craig Roberts, and noted

1989): 11.

black economist Walter Williams.

39. Other intellectual leaders include Samuel Escobar of Eastern Baptist Theological Seminary, Robert Goudzwaard of Free University of Amsterdam, Andrew Kirk, C. Rene Padilla, Waldron Scott, and Jim Wallis, editor of Sojourners magazine, and the Sojourners Christian community.

24. Christian

A

Journal of Free Enterprise 2, no. 3 (Winter 1989): 1. 25. Falwell,

Perspectives:

"A Look

at

Our Government

Today," Listen America! pp. 69-81. 26. Mateer, Christian Perspectives on Economics, p. 152.

27. Pat Robertson, The Secret

Thomas

(Nashville:

Kingdom

Nelson, 1982),

p.

151.

James Kennedy, "The Spiritual 1989," Christian Perof the Union

28. D. State

—

spectives 3,

no.

29. Rousas Guilt

and

(Fall

1

J.

1989):

Pitv (Fairfax, Va.:

"An in

and Michael Cromartie, tics:

Evangelical The-

Richard

J.

eds., Piety

Neuhaus and Poli-

and Fundamentalists Con-

Evatigelicals

front the World (Washington, D.C.: Ethics

7.

Rushdoonv, The

40. Ronald Sider,

ology of Liberation,"

and Public Policy Center, 1987), Politics

Thoburn

of

Press,

Hunger,

1978), pp. 236-37. 30. For example, in Honest Money and In-

North cites Hayek's The Road to Serfdom, von Mises's The Theory of Money and Credit, and Dolan's The Foundations ofModern Austrian Economics. herit the Earth,

p.

41. Sider, Rich Christians in an

158.

Age

42. Sider's discussion of trade policies especially

with

of

114.

p.

noteworthy.

tive restrictions

it

is

begins

"sweeping elimination of

a call for the

tariff barriers," it

Though

quickly

on

moves

free trade:

to alterna-

"As developed

nations eliminate trade barriers to products 31. Rousas

J.

Rushdoonv, "The Philoso-

phy of the Free Market," Journal of Christian Reconstruction 10, no. 2 (1984): 35.

Rushdoonv, "How the Christian Will Recover through Economics: The Problem and the Very Great Hope," Journal of Christian Reconstruction 10, no. 2 32. Rousas

J.

(1984): 41. 33. Rousas

grant trade preference to developing nations

and

also permit

them

to protect their infant

industries with tariffs for a time.

nations will also need to have

nism (such

J.

Rushdoonv, "The Philosop. 38.

Ammerman, "North American

Prot-

number of U.S. .

.

.

postmillennial distinction in greater detail.

earnings

repeated references to "dominion."

so that the small

thrown out of work by cheaper foreign imports do not bear this burden alone. Commodity agreements

may be another way

Kingdom contains

all)

citizens

estant Fundamentalism," discusses the pre-

35. Robertson's Secret

Developed

some mecha-

guaranteed job or guaran-

as a

teed annual income for

phy of the Free Market," 34.

from developing countries, two things will be necessary. Developed nations will need to

prices

of poor

to increase the export

nations

by

stabilizing

[above their market levels]." Sider,

Rich Christians in an

Age

of Hunger, p. 212.

Laurence R. Iannaccone 364

Statements

deep

like these

distrust

underscore the

economic

evangelical right accepts classical

arguments, dating back to voluntary trade

no

practice

left's

of unregulated markets. The

is

less

Adam

Smith, that

mutually advantageous in

and

free trade

the take

as

it

on They

free markets. Evangelicals

adopt

left

a

more Marxian

view.

axiomatic that real markets tend to

exploit the disadvantaged. Free trade favors

Economic

the wealthy and the powerful. tivitv

ac-

often a zero-sum game, taking from

is

the poor and giving to the rich. Biblically

mandated solutions

"More

reverse

good

Wigoder, The Encyclopedia of the Jewish (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966), p. 216. frey

Christian

justice." Sider,

12

Side

—

treatment that evangelicals have given to

1976):

"Recent

Gay,

50,

Rich Chris-

(January-

quoted

Evangelical

5.

extremely

divergent

p.

diss.,

Garv North,

Stanford University,

Dominion

of

1989),

62.

The

statements in this paragraph are

and

"Theological

among American

Study of Religion,

of

Hunger, pp. 114-15. describes the Jubilee as follows: "According

land

all

owner.

.

.

.

All slaves

reverted

to

is

to be pro-

were released the

original

[Thus,] only such possession of

Lake City,

from the 1988

52. Jelen's data are taken

General Social Survey.

He

classifies

Protes-

respondents as either "mainline" or

on

the basis of their denomi-

national affiliation.

Ted

Jelen, "Religious Be-

and Attitude Constraint," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 29, no. 1 (March lief

1990): 118-25.

The

evangelical-fundamentalist

nominations Missouri

47. The Encyclopedia of the Jewish Religion

Salt

1989).

53.

Age

Orthodox)'

Political

Theological Faculty" (Pa-

per presented to the Society for the Scien-

45. Ibid., p. 189.

46. Sider, Rich Christians in an

(Fort Worth, Tex.:

Press, 1987), p. 46.

"evangelical"

"The Powerful and the Powerless," in Richard J. Neuhaus and Michael Cromartie, eds., Piety and Politics, pp. 189-202. 44. Jim Wallis,

and

it.

based on Daniel Olson and Jackson Carroll's

tant

claimed a Jubilee

the that

Inherit the Earth, Bibli-

cal Principles for Economics

Craig

in

Appraisals

to the bible every fiftieth year

interpretations

have been drawn from

Capitalism and American Class Culture"

(Ph.D.

Thev do, however, convey

Acts 4 and

tific

February

Rich Christians, pp.

in

49. Kennedy, "The Spiritual State of the Union 1989," p. 6. These brief comments do not do justice to the extensive and serious

51.

Other

communes

180-81, 200-202.

their elected

43. Eugene Toland, Thomas Fenton, and Lawrence McCulloch, "World Justice and Peace: A Radical Analysis for American Christians,"

"The Powerful and the Pow200-202. Sider describes several

48. Wallis, erless," pp.

213-14.

pp.

Zwi Werblowsky and Geof-

Religion

50.

they are willing to pay the cost

of international

and limited period (Lev.

fixed, J.

deal." Chris-

must therefore "inform

officials that

tians,

process:

this

just international trade patterns will

cost affluent consumers a tians

25:28)." R.

than in theorv and that the

"wealth of nations" therefore derives from

known,

for a

Christ,

Southern

include

de-

Baptists,

Synod Lutherans, Churches of

Nazarenes, Pentecostal and Holi-

ness, Assemblies of God, and Churches of God. The nonevangelical-nonfundamentalist

Protestant denominations include Epis-

United

copalians,

Presbyterians,

Church

Methodists,

of Christ, non-Southern

non-Missouri Synod Lutherans,

land as has been obtained through inheri-

Baptists,

permanent in Jewish law. Land obtained in any other way (including land mortgaged for debt) reverts to its original

Disciples of Christ, and Reformed. Several

tance

is

owner with

the advent of the J[ubilee]. This

of an

in-

herited share of the land and converts

all

institution prevents the alienation

sales

or

gifts (Bek.

52b) of land into

leases

empirical

studies,

most notably Rodney

Stark and Charles Clock's American Piety (Berkeley, Calif.: Press,

1968) and

University of California

Wade

Clark

Roof and

Wil-

liam McKinney's American Mainline Reli-

gion

(New

Brunswick,

N.J.:

Rutgers

THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN FUNDAMENTALISTS 365

University Press, 1987), have demonstrated

Johnson, "Explaining Support for the Moral

the validity of this categorization.

Majority," Sociological Forum 3, no. 2

and

54. Researchers

both agree that belief rancy cal,

is

a critical,

fundamentalists

in stria biblical iner-

and perhaps even

the criti-

See

Ronald

fundamentalist doctrine.

Burton, Stephen Johnson, and Joseph Tamnev, "Education

and Fundamentalism," Re-

view of Religions Research 30, no.

4 (June

234-55.

Wilcox's analysis of a 1982 survey of

55. In regressions that take account of

respondents' age, gender, marital status,

in-

come, and education, the evangelical-fundaeffect remains statisticallv mentalist

jority

members

attributed their position

abortion and the liefs,

ERA

56. The differences between evangelicalfundamentalists and other Protestants be-

smaller

after

on

to their religious be-

only half felt that their religious beliefs

on

a bal-

anced budget or social service spending. See

Clyde Wilcox, "Seeing the Connection: Re-

and Politics in the Ohio Moral MaReview ofReligious Research 30, no. 1

ligion

jority,"

(1988): 50.

significant at the .001 level.

come even

Ohio

Moral Majority members. Wilcox found that whereas the vast majority of Moral Ma-

strongly influenced their position

1989).

1988):

(

A similar finding emerged in Clyde

controlling

61. Tamney and Johnson, "Explaining Support for the Moral Majority," p. 92.

133-34.

62. North, Honest Money, pp.

for

respondents' background characteristics.

63. Reichley, "Pietist Politics," pp.

Ronald Burton, Stephen Johnson, and Joseph Tamnev, "Education and 57. See

64. Jerry Falwell, Strength for the Journey

(New

Fundamentalism." See also Joseph B. Tamp.

Ronald Burton, and Stephen D. John"Fundamentalism and Economic Restructuring," in Ted Jelen, ed., Religion and Political Behavior in the United States

75-76.

York:

Simon and

Schuster,

1987),

372.

nev,

son,

(New 58.

The economic questions asked

how

statements

guarantee

government should

to

everyone willing to

work," "we must create

goods and less

a society in

services are distributed

equally

among

all

New

Christian Right,

re-

"the

job

a

83-92, and Bruce,

Press, 1989), pp.

The Rise and Fall of the

stronglv thev agreed with

like

Congress (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of Al-

abama

York: Praeger, 1989).

spondents

65. The NCR's program is discussed by Matthew C. Moen, The Christian Right and

which

more or

people," "emplovers

chap.

66.

5.

The Louisiana and Arkansas

state leg-

islatures passed bills requiring that creation

science be taught as an alternative to evolu-

Both laws were ultimately struck down by federal courts. See Bruce, The Rise and

tion.

New

114-23,

Christian Right, pp.

have an obligation to provide jobs that

Fall of the

people enjoy doing," and "personal income

for a discussion of creationist legislation in

should not be determined solely by one's

the 1980s.

work;

rather,

everybody should get what he

or she needs." Burton, Johnson, and nev, p.

"Education

and

Tam-

Fundamentalism,"

349.

whether defined

Fall of the

68.

New

Right

and

Ed Dobson, Ed Hindson, and

Jerry

Moen,

The

Christian

in

terms of denominational

69.

The Fundamentalist Phenomenon (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House,

Falwell,

1986), pp. 189-90.

or religious belief or both, were

significantly

more

likely

than other Protes-

"government in Washington ought to reduce income differences between rich and poor." tants to agree that

60. See

and

Congress.

59. My analysis of data from the 1987 through 1989 General Social Surveys produced a similar finding. Fundamentalists,

affiliation

67. Bruce, The Rise Christian Right.

Joseph

Tamney and Stephen

252-54.

70. Falwell, Listen America! pp. 71. Pierard,

Right

"Religion

in the 1980's," pp.

72. See also Bruce, the

and

the

New

396-97.

The Rise and

New Christian Right, and

Jeffrey

Fall of K. Had-

Laurence R. Iannaccone 366 den, "Conservative Christians, Televangelism, and Politics: Taking Stock a after the

Decade

76. Reichley, "Religion

American

Founding of the Moral Majority,"

and the Future of

Politics."

The Rise and

77. Bruce,

Christian Right; Clyde Wilcox,

Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1990),

Evangelicals," in Religion

pp.

463-72.

himself traces

Falwell

the

founding of the Moral Majority to a 1979 meeting with "a group of conservative leaders,"

and he

attributes the phrase "moral

majority" to Paul Weyrich. Falwell, Strength for the Journey, pp. 73.

358-59.

For an example of

Christian Rightist

Howard

Phillips

placed in contact with Jerry Falwell at] a

meeting

in

1979

.

.

.

to form a religiopolitical

ior in the

.

.

.

.

.

.

78.

movement

Hadden,

Decade

"Conservative

81. Reichley, "Pietist Politics," p. 75. 82. This

North's

paragraph

essay

74. James A. Reichley, "Religion

Quarterly 101, no. 75. Bruce,

1

(1986): 25-26. Fall of the

Blue-

Economics:

A

System Whose

in Christian Perspectives on

and telephone interviews with Robert Mateer, E. Calvin Beisner, and Bruce Barron in March of 1990. 83. Martin E. Marty, "Fundamentalism as

New

Biblical

Economics;

Politics," Political Science

The Rise and

Christian Right.

and the

based on Garv

prints?" in Honest Money; E. Calvin Beisner's

"Christian

Future of American

is

"What Are

Time Has Come,"

(December 1985): 99.

Founding of the Moral

80. Ibid, p. 468.

and the 1984 Election Campaign," Review of Religious Research 27, no.

2:

Christians,

468-69.

the Moral Majority." Richard V. Pierard,

"Religion

and Political Behav139-55.

States, pp.

after the

79. Ibid, pp.

was

called

United

Majority," p. 467.

[and

persuaded Falwell

New

Televangelism, and Politics: Taking Stock a

"New

of how

"The

Christian Right and the Mobilization of

this creative pro-

cess, see Pierard's description

New

Fall of the

Thomas Robbins and Dick. Anthony, eds., In Gods We Trust, 2d ed., (New in

a

Social

Phenomenon,"

Bulletin:

American Academy of Arts and no. 2:

(November 1988): 20.

The

Sciences 42,

CHAPTER 16

Buddhist Economics and Buddhist

Fundamentalism in Burma and Thailand Charles

F.

Kcves

Buddhism and the Political Economies of Burma and Thailand In Schumacher argued

E. F.

that there

is

a

his

widely read book Small

the "materialist economics" of the post-Christian and

ern economics

is

centered on

is

human

satisfactions

vein,

work and

the worker.

is

rational

.

.

.

tries

to maximize

[

consumption bv the optimal pattern of productive

"While the materialist

is

is

the

means

best pursued within self-sufficient societies:

way of economic

life,

effort." 2 In

mainly interested in goods, the Buddhist

Buddhist economics, therefore, production from

most

1

"Modern economics

mainly interested in liberation" 3 and production

economics

communist West. While mod-

by the optimal pattern of consumption, while Buddhist econom-

to maximize

same

the

to this end.

"From

Burma, 5

justifiable

only

is

Buddhist

the point of view of

local resources for local

need

is

the

while dependence on imports from afar and the

consequent need to produce for export to unknown and distant peoples

uneconomic and

Beautiful

centered on commodities and the product of labor, Buddhist eco-

nomics

ics] tries

Is

"Buddhist economics" which contrasts with

in exceptional cases

and on a small

scale."

highly

is

4

country with which Schumacher had firsthand familiarity and which

a

figures prominently in his discussion, has sought to institute an economic order based on "Buddhist socialism" or "the Burmese wav to socialism." This concept is essentially what Schumacher terms "Buddhist economics." Modern Burmese Buddhist economics

has

that

its

origins in

emerged

The Burmese, in

South Asia,

Pali

what can only be termed

in the first half like the

trace their

Thai, the Lao, the

"fundamentalist" variant of Buddhism

Khmer or Cambodians, and the Sinhalese

Buddhist traditions to the interpretation of texts written

which became authoritative

pretation,

a

of the twentieth century.

which became known

in

in the fourth century c.E. in Sri Lanka. In this interas

Theravada Buddhism, or the "way of the 367

elders,"

Charles F. Keyes

368

the sanjjba, or Buddhist order of monks,

is

seen as the exemplar, teacher, and em-

bodiment of the dbamma, the message of the Buddha. Through following the pline (vinaya),

monks emulate

the liberation which

sermons and

lies at

ritual acts,

gain

"merit'''

From

the path

known

the eleventh through the fifteenth centuries,

movement begun

at the

medieval capital of Sri Lanka). These

it

villages

As

"fields

of merit,"

possible for lay people to

and kingdoms located

some Theravadin monks joined

Mahavihara monastery

monks enjoyed in

what

is

Anuradhapura

in

(the

the patronage of most rulers of

today Burma, Thailand, Laos, and

Cambodia. By the end of the period, temple-monasteries had

most

Through

(punna) which advances them on the path. 6

a purification

principalities

to others.

of alms (dana), monks make

disci-

has achieved

the end of the path established by the Buddha.

monks make

especially for the offering

who

the ideal of the arahant, the saint

also

been established

throughout the region. Theravada Buddhism thus became the

in

basis for

the social orders in these societies. In the nineteenth century, the proselytizing efforts of Protestant missionaries, cou-

some

in

Ceylon

Lanka was known during the colonial period) and Southeast Asia

as

posing serious

pled with the expansion of colonial power, were perceived by

(as Sri

some leading members of the sangha in Ceylon, Siam (as Thailand was known until World War II), and Burma 7 called for a new "purification" of the religion. This move entailed new exegesis of the Tripitaka, the Buddhist scriptures, and a stricter adherence by monks threats to traditional Theravadin orders. In response to these threats,

to the "discipline."

The reforms

instituted in

Theravada Buddhist thought

in the nineteenth

century

what can be termed "Buddhist fundamentalism" because, like fundamentalisms elsewhere, 8 these reforms led to a retrieval from scriptural sources of "essential truths" stripped of traditional trappings. The reforms did not in and of constitute the basis for

themselves produce Buddhist fundamentalism. For this to occur, these reforms

first

had to be popularized so that adherents were not restricted to a small religious elite; in other words, reformed Buddhism had to attract significant followings from among lay

people as well

ment

in the

as

from among monks. The precipitating factor

Theravada Buddhist

societies

was reaction to

in this develop-

radical restructuring

of the

social order.

In

Burma

(as in

Ceylon) 9 the establishment of a colonial order by the British made

the question of the relationship of a "Burmese"

community

to the state intensely

Among Burmans (but not among the Shan, Karen, Karcnni, Chin, and upland peoples, to whom the British colonial government accorded separate

problematic.

other

recognition), the emergence of nationalism interests

—

a vision

of

a

moral community whose

could be served by a state ruled not by a colonial government but by an

indigenous one

— was inextricably linked to reformist Buddhist

ideas.

Buddhist na-

made reformed Buddhism a popular ideology in Burma. Because Burmese nationalist movements in the 1920s and 1930s looked to reform Buddhism for the ideological rationale for radical opposition not only to the colonial state but also to the secularist premises of the state, the nationalist movements assumed a recognizably fundamentalist character. tionalism, in other words,

BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 369

post-World War

In the immediate

pendence from

Britain,

ideology of the dominant the military, and the cal

elite.

Burma

economy has been

Since the 1962 coup which brought General

Socialist

inde-

its

Programme

Party to power, the

Ne Win,

Burmese

politi-

on assumptions derived from a Buddhist fundamennon-communist interpretation of Marxism. 10

structured

talism linked to an explicitly

By

Burma had gained

period, after

II

Buddhist fundamentalist ideas were incorporated into the

the 1980s the socialist experiment in

Burma proved

to have been a failure of

catastrophic proportions, and the deep disillusionment with the guidance provided

by the Burmese military and the Burma Socialist Programme Party precipitated crisis at least

the equal to that of a half centurv earlier.

Many Burmese

a

have again

turned to Buddhism for inspiration and to the sangha for organizational support in their opposition to the

and early 1990s

in

government. The new

Burma

has

some

political

Buddhism of

the late 1980s

clear fundamentalist characteristics:

nontraditional (even an ti traditional);

it is

intensely moralistic;

it is

it is

explicitly

impelled by a quest

communal identity; and it is in opposition to the authority of a would-be secular state. The new political Buddhism of Burma is unlike the fundamentalist Buddhism of an earlier era, however, in that it is not associated with a socialist for an all-inclusive

program.

That

a fundamentalist turn in

Theravada Buddhism does not lead inevitably to the

embracing of Buddhist socialism

is

also

demonstrated by the case of Thailand. Al-

though Siam was never brought under colonial late

rule, the

Siamese governments of the

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries undertook a restructuring of the Siamese

of neighboring colonial orders. Some peoples outside the

polity in direct emulation

core of

Siam experienced

protonationalist

among Lao

form of colonial domination, and

this restructuring as a

movements

— again strongly rooted

in northeastern

Thailand and

in

popular Buddhism

Khonmuang

— emerged

northern Thailand. The

in

Siamese court was ultimately able, however, to assume the role of shaping

a

new

community that would subsume diverse ethnic groups, each of which adhered to Buddhism within the same order. The most significant political change in Siam in the pre- World War II period the imposition in 1932 of a constitution on the king by a group of nonroyalist bureaucrats was not backed by any popular movement, fundamentalist or otherwise. national

—

It

was not

until

much

later in the

twentieth century, after the effects of rapid

economic growth manifested themselves munity was to become

a

burning one

movements have emerged pro-capitalist

—

in

Thai

society, that the question

in Thailand. Since the

to challenge in

of com-

1960s many new popular

one way or another the increasingly secular A number of these movements

governments that have ruled the country.

have also assumed characteristics which are associated with fundamentalisms

else-

where. They have found in the reformist interpretation of Buddhist doctrines the sources for their raison d'etre; thev advocate adoption of strict ethical discipline to

overcome the temptations and

evils

of secularized materialism; they offer

their follow-

of identity with a moral community; and they promote opposition power who do not share their moral vision. Although several of these

ers a strong sense

to those in

movements have entered

into public debates about specific

economic

policies,

and

— Charles F. Keyes

370

although the follower of one has become the governor of Bangkok, none

is

ever likely

be in a position to have exclusive control over the formulation of the basic economic policies

of Thailand. Rather,

these

all

movements

give greater emphasis to the impor-

who

tance of cultivating individual detachment from worldlv desires by those a highly materialistic society. In other

words, none appears

of instituting any form of Buddhist socialism

live in

be in a position

likely to

in Thailand.

The verv different approaches to economic life linked to interpretations of Buddhism in Burma and Thailand do not mean that Buddhist thought is infinitely plastic and that Buddhism is ultimately irrelevant to the actual structure of economies. As I will seek to

show, the development of self-consciousness about what constitutes the

fundamental doctrines of Buddhism in both countries has been inextricably

Mv

twined with the economic transformations of the two countries. be on Burma, and then

I

two Buddhist

11

societies.

will turn to

Salvation and

inter-

focus will

first

Thailand to consider the contrasts between these

Economic Culture

in

Theravada Buddhism

—

The adherents of the historic religions Judaism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism understand everyday life to be disvalued with reference to some ultimate

—

Max

This ultimate or, to use

reality.

place or a state of being

being an absolute power

Weber's term, "other-worldly"

— heaven or nibbana,

for

or will with reference to

example 12

which

— but

it is

reality

is

is

not a

understood

make

possible to

as

sense

of certain experiences. This absolute assumed different forms in different historic religions although, as Weber observed, a fundamental contrast obtains between those religions that

the absolute

emerged is

in the

Middle East and those that arose

in India. In the former,

conceived of as a transcendental volitional being

Allah. In the latter,

it is

understood

as

— Yahweh, God, or

an impersonal immanent force

ing accepted as unquestioned truth a particular notion of the absolute,

one must

also

engage

in certain actions or refrain

positive relationship to this absolute.

ship

is

salvation. It

is

the

way

in

The

from others

if

of achieving such

result

which the quest

for salvation

an economic culture its distinctive religious cast. Wealth viewed from the perspective of salvation goals than when

is

is

one

kamma. Havit

follows that

is

to ensure a

a positive relation-

understood that gives

valued differently

it is

when

viewed with reference

to immediate, this-worldly goals.

The

absolute in Theravada Buddhism, as in Hinduism,

sonal principle of cause and

effect,

the law of

is

understood

as

kamma, which determines

quences of the actions of sentient beings. While the world

is

an imperthe conse-

experienced as constantly

changing and impermanent, the law of kamma is inexorable and eternal. If one's actions, as understood according to Buddhist teachings, are positive, one will acquire u

merit" (Pali punna), which

negative,

one

is

realized as

enhanced well-being.

will acquire "demerit" {papa),

fering" (dukkba). li

death but attaches

The kamma one itself to

which

is

acquires during a lifetime

the "consciousness"

(

If one's actions are

experienced as heightened "sufis

not dissipated after

vinhana) that connects one

life

with

BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 371

the next. Even' person

is

thus born with a

kammic

legacy that situates

him or her

within the world in a particular status and with particular abilities and disabilities.

kammic

This free

not absolutely determinative of one's place

is

in life

have future kammic consequences. Buddhist traditions,

will in turn

which

tions

but leaves one

against the

kamma kamma which

freedom to

Buddhist practice

depending on

on the

like

Hindu

tradi-

as an absolute, accord differential significance to the

also posit

of previous

effects

in

legacy

within certain generalized constraints to assume responsibility for actions which

act to

determine the constraints on present action as

produce new kamma. 14 There are significant differences

Burma, Thailand, and other Theravada Buddhist

in

emphasis given to retrospective and prospective

the relative

interpretation of

how much

societies

kamma and

time must elapse between an action and

its

consequence.

The Theravadin salvation ethic is not restricted to the quest for merit since so long is bound by the law of kamma one can never fully escape from actions which will lead to some suffering. Theravada Buddhism also offers a way to achieve a state, nibbana, in which one has transcended kamma forever. The way to nibbana is also not wholly independent of the quest for merit since one must have a sufficient store as

one

of merit before one

is

able to aspire to nibbana. Nonetheless, the quest for nibbana

does entail a distinctive form of action, one that generates neither positive nor negative merit,

but results instead in "detachment" from the world ordered by the law

of kamma. 15 All

Theravada Buddhists ascribe the origin of teaching of the way to salvation, the

dhamma, mains

to

Gotama Buddha. Although Buddha

a presence in this

world

in the

has achieved nibbana, he

form of "reminders"

(cetiya),

(pagodas), images, and artistic and ritual reenactments of the

of the Boddhisattvas (future Buddhas)

in

life

still

re-

including stupas

of the Buddha and

which the Buddha-to-be achieved the "per-

Buddhahood. By relating to the reminders of the Buddha or recollecting the Buddha through ritual, sermon, and art, one puts oneself in close proximity to the source of the dhamma. Devotion to the Buddha brings, at the very least, merit, and some believe that in exceptional circumstances it may bring one to

fections" necessary for

nibbana

itself.

The dhamma

is both taught and practiced in an exemplary way by the sangha, or The sangha comprises those men who follow a way of life most in keeping with the teachings of the Buddha and who are responsible for the preservation, transmission, and dissemination of the dhamma. To enter the sangha is to launch oneself on the path toward nibbana. To offer alms (ddna) to the members of the sangha is considered throughout the Buddhist world as a primary way for laity to

order of monks.

gain merit. 16

The

basic

dogmas of Theravada Buddhism

— kamma, dukkha, nibbana — do not

determine an invariant economic ethic for those

who

accept

them

as religious truths.

Variant interpretations of these fundamental premises of Theravada

Buddhism by

practicing Buddhists in different societies and, especially since the late nineteenth century, all

within the same society, have led to quite different stances toward economic

of which are

in

some

sense Buddhist.

life,

Charles F. Keyes

372

Burma

Traditional Religious Uses of Wealth in

The

rulers

of Pagan, the great Burmese kingdom that flourished from the eleventh to

the thirteenth centuries, established a distinctive pattern of Buddhist practice perpetuated, albeit in

somewhat

altered form, until the present day.

and the nobles and wealthy commoners act assuring salvation

of the Buddha. The

An

of building

a

formula

work of merit done by husband],

may

all

as

was of such great

by a person

common

to

most such

that wife [the sponsor

monuments,

noblewoman who dedicated

inscriptions:

who

built the 18

either dedicated to the

in anticipation

of

reminder

as a

soteriological signifi-

providing salvation for others as well as him- or

creatures reach nirapan [nibbana]."

erected as funerary built

it

a shrine

of Pagan,

rulers

emulated them, the supreme religious

early-thirteenth-century inscription by a

temple contains

For the

was the building of a pagoda or temple that served act

cance that the builder could see herself

who

17

his or her

own

"By the

benefit

temple for her deceased

Such shrines

were

typically

memory of the

death.

a

of the

deceased or

The building of

a shrine

world to the cosmos, assured the immortality of the sponsor or of the

related this

sponsor's deceased relative, and generated such great merit as to

make

possible die

aspirations for attainment of nibbana not only of the sponsor but also

of

who

all

rejoiced in the merit making.

Aung-Thwin 19

estimates that during the period from the beginning of the elev-

enth to the end of the thirteenth century, three to four thousand shrines were built

at

the capital. Even the remains at Pagan that one can see today astound the visitor. In the post-Pagan period, the building of a shrine

than great well.

The

monuments individual

— became

who was

a goal

as to

1960s found that great prestige was

builder" or "monasterv builder." 21 visitors to

Burma

the ideal of

in the

becoming

woman who

on

a scale

much more modest

render

it

a shortcut to

as

pagoda not

Nibbana but

also

the eyes of his or her fellows. 20 The pattern has persisted to

the present. Research carried out in villages in the earlv

albeit

able to amass sufficient wealth to build a

onlv gained merit of such magnitude acquired great prestige in

—

not only for the rulers but for commoners

still

Mandalay

area in the late 1950s and

attached to one

The numerous

who was

a

"pagoda

recently built shrines observed

by

1970s and 1980s bear witness to the continued salience of

a sponsor

of a pagoda or monastery. The costs for the

aspires to be a p-aya-daga

man

or

by building a shrine of any significance are

immense relative to the local economy. 22 Pagoda building is not the only religious activity that necessitates the expenditure vast wealth. The other act which Burmans believe to generate extraordinary merit of is the sbin-byu, the ordination of a boy into the sangha as a novice. Just when the shin-bvu became an initiation rite through which almost every boy passes is uncertain. Since Buddhism's earlv years in India ordination into the sangha has been believed to

generate merit not onlv for die person ordained but

of the ordination. the

act.

Lanka

The sponsor,

more importantlv

In Burma, as well as elsewhere in Theravadin Southeast Asia

—

it

dained for

became the at least a

ideal in

for the sponsor

typically a parent or parents, reaps great merit

— but not

about the fifteenth century for every

temporarv period. Although

in other

man

from in Sri

to be or-

Southeast Asian Buddhist

BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 373

societies

it

became the custom

twenty as well

men

for

of temporary ordination

monkhood once they turned Burma only the practice

to enter the

vounger bovs to enter the

as lor

novitiate, in

novice was established.

as a

In the late nineteenth century ordination was considered "the most important event in the

of

life

Burman

a

[male], since onlv under the role of the recluse and in

abandonment of the world can he completelv fulfill the law and hope to rind the way to eventual deliverance from the misery of ever-recurring existences." 2 Colonial

the

-'

domination mav have even contributed to the significance of the shin-b\Ti life.

Burmese

in

After the British abolished the monarchy, the shin-bvu ritual provided a means

of some symbolic aspects of court

for the reenactment

significance

it

had not had

in the precolonial period.

therebv investing

life,

24

it

with a

1960 the shin-bvu was

In

still

considered the central Buddhist ceremonv. "Almost without exception, every Burmese

male has

and prototypical Buddhist experience of abandoning the world

this nuclear

and donning the yellow robe." 25 The ceremonv has noted dozens of shin-byus

and again

in earlv

in villages in

lost

upper Burma and

none of in

Mandalav

is

as shin or koyin

from the

shift in the

of lowering the age

effect

ideal

of

in

which

at

which bovs were ordained

age of ordination continued in the twentieth century. In 1960 Spiro

who had

upper Burma was only twelve. 2 " In

upper Burma,

way

in the

an average of about twelve. 26 This down-

fifteen to

found that the eldest among those village in

1985

observed. At the end of the nineteenth century the introduction of

government schools had the

ward

in early

I

1987.

There has been, however, a change over the past hundred vears the pattern

significance;

its

at least

recently a

gone through ordination

shin-bvu

I

saw

in

in a

1985, also in rural

one of the bovs appeared to be no more than three or four vears

of age. The lowering of the age for ordination has been associated with elaboration of the ceremony

at the

ber of the sangha

is

expense of the training and religious disciplining that a

supposed to

receive.

Even

of seeing

for the purpose

a

dained for a very short period of time, parents or other sponsors expend as

mem-

boy

or-

much or

more money on an ordination as thev might in becoming a pagoda builder. 28 While the willingness of a family to expend as much moncv as possible on a shinbyu can be ascribed, in part, to their desire to gain prestige through a sort of Buddhist potlatch in the eves of their fellows, the underlving motivation religious.

kammic

One

is

moved through

the merit generated

must

from the

act

still

be seen

upward on

hierarchy, thus ensuring reduced suffering in a future existence.

Burman can engage

number of other types of clothing, shelter,

in,

one can

also gain lesser merit

ahlu

"offering"), at

rites, called

(lit.,

the

While spon-

soring an ordination or attaining the status of a pagoda builder are the greatest

gious acts a

reli-

by sponsoring

which

as

gifts

a

of food,

and medicine are given to members of the sangha.

Toward a Buddhist Socialism Has

the great expenditure

on pagoda building and ordinations

as well as

on other

alms giving been a hindrance or a stimulus to the production and accumulation of

wealth in Burma? Aung-Thwin maintains that the religious impulse that led so at

Pagan, especially

among

the royalty, to expend vast

mam

amounts of wealth to build

Charles F. Keyes

374

shrines served as a stimulus, not a drain, to the

economy. 29

If the laborers

who

built

and maintained these temples were paid rather than forced to work, production may have been stimulated bv the need for large amounts of surplus wealth. added, however, that the labor expended to build these in the

production of additional

It

must be

monuments was not employed

capital.

Spiro has argued that because Burmese need wealth to attain salvation, they are

motivated

in a

wav

estant Ethic." 30

mav

similar to the Calvinists to

There

is

whom Max Weber ascribed the "Prot-

another side to the picture, however. While salvation goals

stimulate the production of surplus wealth,

if

the wealth thus produced

is

in-

vested primarily in conspicuous displays seen as indicative of attainment of salvation to put into this-worldly enterprises that could generate even more As Sarkisyanz has observed, "Though 'works of Merit' continued to some reduced extent as motivation for economic activity, Buddhist values remained an obstacle to purely economic goals of rational accumulation and profit." 31 Prior to the advent of British rule there was little impetus toward using capital to goals,

little is left

wealth.

expand the economy. The British instituted free-trade the assumption that these in significant

growth

would

stimulate

as peasants

policies predicated in part

economic growth.

saw the

selling

Initially

on

they did result

of produce, especially

rice, as

an

opportunity to garner additional wealth. Through taxation, the colonial government used part of the generated surplus wealth to create an infrastructure port

facilities,

colonial

and so on

government

also be used to

— that would,

it

was

also enabled farmers to

— roads,

railways,

promote further development. The obtain credit that, it was assumed, would held,

expand production. By the

first

decades of the twentieth century,

however, the indebtedness of Burmese farmers was growing more rapidly than

their

income. 32 This situation was explained in two different ways by British

officials

of the time.

Some argued that the farmers were victims of economic forces beyond their control. Some officials stressed, however, what they saw as the "'improvidence" of the Burmese peasants and

their failure to

understand the modern, market-oriented economic

system. In this view agriculturalists borrowed too

much and

spent a high proportion

of their earnings and loans on religious ceremonies, festivals, jewelry, gambling, and other "nonproductive" pursuits. Even more, officials listed the cost of ceremonies such as ahlus

century.

and shin-bvus 33

as a major,

even the main, cause of debt in the carlv twentieth

Although the former explanation was certainly valid to a degree, the fact Burma was incorporated into a world economy most Burmese

remains that even after

were motivated to accumulate wealth by a salvation ethic that entailed expending wealth on nonproductive ceremonies and edifices.

At the same time the

institution

of British

rule caused such a radical disruption in

the social order that the world as experienced could

mony severe

with a cosmic moral hierarchy.

Many Burmese,

no longer be viewed especially

when

as in har-

faced with the

economic hardships of the Great Depression and the resulting

loss

of their

agricultural land to moneylenders, turned to millenarian movements in the hope of

restoring this harmonv. rebellion

of 1930-32,

34

Those involved in such movements, such as the Saya San believed that through manipulation of sacred objects and

BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 375

performance of innovative

rituals,

the British could be ousted and the Buddhist

archy restored. Other Burmese, especially perspectives talist,"

on Buddhism. Their perspectives

although

Buddhism

among

in

the

can,

I

mon-

were attracted to new

elite,

termed "fundamen-

believe, be

term has not previously been applied to the transformation of

this

Burma. Central to

transformation was a self-consciousness about

this

being Buddhist and a recognition that the quest for salvation must entail actions

whose consequences would be

realized not only in a future

life

but also

in sanisara,

or

world. 35

this

One of the most Burma known

significant sources for this transformation

as the

guished himself

as a

Ledi Savadaw

(

1846- 1923). 36

was

a

monk from upper

Early in his career he distin-

student and then as a Pali scholar. After the British conquered

upper Burma and eliminated the monarchy

1885, he abandoned a career

in

as a reli-

gious scholar, leaving the monastic college in Mandalav where he had been residing.

Thenceforth, he pursued a mission of moral renewal, seeking through popular

mons and

tracts to

ser-

persuade people to become conscious of the ethical implications

of Buddhist teachings. Instead of merit making, he promoted the practice of meditation

and the study of metaphysical doctrines contained

philosophical part of the Buddhist scriptures. 3

The Ledi Sayadaw's renown

in the

Abhidhamma,

the

most

"

Government of India to honor him through The recognition made him a powerful advocate for protesting the violation of the sacred space of Buddhist pagodas and monasteries by British officials who refused to remove their shoes and socks on entering such places. During the "foot-wearing" controversy of 1916, the Ledi Savadaw cirthe tide of

Agga-Mahapandita

culated a booklet in Burmese,

led the

191

in

On

l.

38

the Impropriety of Wearing Shoes on

which provided the religious authority for the

protest.

39

Pagoda Platforms,

This incident marked the

beginning of involvement of Burmese monks in the nationalist movement.

The

initial

way

protests gave

to

much more

forceful agitation

provoke police action, and Ledi Savadaw was replaced bv

U

which was meant to

Ottama,

whom many

Gandhi of Burma. 40 U Ottama's militant Buddhist nationalism had a distinctive fundamentalist caste. 41 Born in 1879 near Akyab in Arakan in northwestern Burma, he was first educated in an Anglo-Burmese school and then became a novice at the age of fifteen. A year later, with support from acclaim as a Buddhist saint and others as the

a wealthy

took

Shan woman, he went to Calcutta and, although

a further three years

still

a

Buddhist novice,

of Western education. For the next thirteen years he traveled

between India, Burma, and Japan and

visited

many

other countries in Asia. During

these travels, his encounters with other variants of Buddhism as well as other religions led

of

him

to reflect deeply

on

Pali as well as Sanskrit,

his

own

tradition.

An

accomplished student and teacher

he approached the scriptures with the perspective of one

living in a pluralistic world. In India

he became involved in the Indian nationalist

movement and determined to work for Burmese nationalism. After his return to Burma from Japan in 1919, he formulated in writings, in speeches, and in his actions a Buddhist fundamentalist attack on British rule. He saw no contradiction between being a monk and being a political activist. On the contrary, he argued that for people to attain the ultimate goal of nibbana they must

first

free

Charles F. Keyes

376

themselves from enslavement by an alien government. alive, it is

man had

so

is

a predilection for Nirvana.

because the government

can never obtain

The

"political

cent nationalist

it,

therefore they

is

There

English.

must pray

monks" who followed

movement, and were

U

.

.

When

nothing

is .

u

left

Lord Buddha was

the

now. The reason why

Pongyis pray for Nirvana but slaves

from

for release

Ottama became

slavery in this life." 42

the vanguard of the nas-

particularly effective in

broadening the base of

support for the movement from a small Anglicized educated group to include lagers.

vil-

"The pongyi was the most important instrument by which the independence

movement reached the rural masses and gained the adherence of the bulk of the people." 43 The movement led by U Ottama was fundamentalist not only in its opposition to an "evil" political order

Sayadaw Zeyawadi

but also in

U Thilasara,

its

critique

a leading political

of traditional religious

monk, argued

that

practice.

monks should

devote themselves to efforts to bring about changes in political and economic

life

rather than participate in traditional ceremonies or offer conventional moral guidance. 44

Although the

was of

their vision

monks sought

political

a society

the "restoration" of a Buddhist society,

based on ethical premises rather than a court-centered

who

cosmological order. 45 Unlike the millenarian followers of Saya San, magical means to achieve the restoration, the political litical

agitation

and

turned to

as tools

po-

resistance.

U

Ottama and others disobedience, modeled in part on those In the 1920s

monks employed

of demonstrations of

initiated a series

led

by Gandhi

in India.

The

civil

goals were the

boycott of foreign goods, the denial of tax revenues to the government, the avoidance

of the colonial courts, and the creation of schools run bv Burmese Buddhists rather than foreign Christians. Significant attention was given to promoting abstinence from liquor, an action that

was

ment

46

excise revenues.

in accord with

Buddhist morality and also lowered govern-

U Ottama's leadership of demonstrations led to his arrest in imprisonment for a

year. Arrested again in

1921 and subsequent

1924, he was imprisoned for three years.

Less than a year after his release, he was back in prison and was to remain there until his death in

1939. Although he had an immense influence on the nationalist move-

ment in the 1920s, by the 1930s cal monks to lay people.

Many

lay nationalist leaders

cultivation desires. it

leadership of the

movement had

found appealing

a

Buddhism

shifted

that

from

politi-

emphasized the

through meditation and ethical reflection of detachment from personal

Although the ultimate goal of such detachment

also served a

more mundane purpose

for

many

la}'

the attainment of nibbana,

is

Burmese

practitioners.

Through

the attainment of "dispassionateness, objectivity, and concentration in everything" one

does, 47

it

was believed that one could

The

tying of the spiritual

of a

social order that

act effectively in the

would ensure

a generalized reduction

Buddhism a fundamentalist turn. During the 1930s the lay Buddhist of

a

Buddhist Utopia to

the development of this

world without

discipline of meditation to realization of

a

self-interest.

Buddhist vision

of suffering gave Burmese

began to adapt their vision borrowed from the West. A critical figure in "Buddhist socialism" was U Ba Swe. Born in Tavoy in southsocialist ideas

nationalist leaders

BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 377

Burma

ern

in

Swe

1915, Ba

Rangoon

entered

became acquainted with Marxism and

Communist

to join the

Parrs'

initially

He

of Burma.

of the All-Burma Student Union and

tary

protests in 1938.

Even

University in the mid- 1930s. There he aligned himself with others

of the

as a leader

in this radical phase, his

referred, for example, to Stalin as "builder

effort to organize labor

Buddhist roots were

U

political

Ottama and and

Over the movement,

who had

his followers,

in the

critical vears

between 1938 and 1948,

Ba Swe advocated an ideology

as a

tions

directlv

Buddhism and Marx-

political

economic condi-

of suffering that must precede the Buddhist quest for ultimate liberation from

suffering. In a widely cited speech to military officers in ist

him

linked

major leader of the nationalist

that synthesized

For him, Marxism provided an understanding of the

ism.

It

1920s made the attainment of

of nibbana. 49

social goals prerequisites for the state

U

evident; he

still

of Lokka Nibban," nibbana on earth. 48 The

notion of nibbana on earth was Buddhist, not Marxist, in origin.

with

who were

gained prominence as the general secre-

theory

is

1951, he proclaimed: "Marx-

not antagonistic to Buddhist philosophy. The two are

similar. In fact

they are the same in concept." 50

He saw Marxism

.

.

not merely

.

providing the

as

worldly counterpart to Buddhist metaphysics. By following Marxist tenets to effect the elimination of injustice and poverty in the world, the Path to ultimate liberation, that the

borrowed Marxist methods with

a

Buddhist interpretation.

a strike

of petrol workers he organized

[thabeit

hmauk] and

Strikers [thabeit

humans can be

freed to follow

U

Ba Swe imbued This was apparent in

to nibbana. 51 In the 1930s

is,

1938. "The very terminology for Strike

in

bmauk-tbu] was borrowed

.

.

from

.

a traditional

term for refusal of Buddhist monks to accept alms [by inverting their bowls as protest against the givers]." 52

sanction; if dhist

The

one cannot

refusal to accept

offer alms,

one

is,

alms carries a religious, not a

in effect,

political,

excommunicated from the Bud-

community.

the time of Burmese independence in 1948 until 1958, U Ba Swe held a number of high government posts. 53 The prime minister for most of the period, U Nu, shared the same ideology as U Ba Swe, although they eventually differed

From

regarding practical politics. socialist order,

U Nu

and Ba Swe both worked to

one which was termed Pyidawtha, or "welfare

create a Buddhist

state."

54

Pyidawtha was

because the state was to assume dominance over the economy;

socialist

Buddhist because

it

was to

create the conditions

it

was

by which people could pursue the

path toward ultimate salvation. Their efforts were frustrated, however, by immense

problems. 55

The

authority of governments in the period from 1948 to 1962 was challenged

by powerful insurgents associated with the Communist Party of Burma and with the

Karen National Defense Organization. The economy was

World War

II,

for

more

infrastructure

country in Southeast Asia. Moreover, in the

much

citizenship. 56

in

whom

extreme disarray during

Burma than

were Indians

The problems proved more than most of which were led by U Nu, could cope with.

Indeed, as early as the mid-1950s

in

in

any other

of the productive land of the country was

hands of absentee landlords, many of

Burmese riod,

was destroyed

who

did not hold

the governments of the pe-

U Nu seemed to be turning away from Buddhist

Charles F. Keyes

378

socialism and toward a traditional

dc facto monarch.

He

model of the Buddhist kingship with himself as the

organized a world council of

monks

to purify the Buddhist

1957 of the twenty-five hundredth Pagoda at Kaba Aye on the outskirts of Rangoon in direct emulation of the rulers of Pagan who had sought to harmonize worldly and cosmic orders through the construction of pagodas and temples. Finally, he attempted to establish Buddhism as the state religion, a move that would have accorded preeminence to a neotraditional Burman Buddhism over both socialist and ethnic types of Buddhism as well as over non-Buddhist religions. The protests that emerged in opposition to this move provided the pretext for a coup which launched Burma on the road to autarchic socialism. scriptures in conjunction with the celebration in

anniversary of the Buddha's death.

He

also built the Peace

Failure of the Burmese

On

to

Socialism

2 March 1962 the Burmese military under General

the elected government of Prime Minister

of senior military

entirelv

tary coups in

Way

officers,

were not exceptional

neighboring Thailand

in

nam, and yet another three years launched

Burma on

staged a coup against

assumed power and began ruling by decree. MiliSoutheast Asia

at the time.

1957, another would occur

in

Ne Win

U Nu. A Revolutionary Council, composed

later in Indonesia.

One had been

five years later in

The coup

in

staged

South Viet-

Rangoon, however,

a very different trajectory than other countries in Southeast Asia.

Within a few months of the coup, the new government it

publications, The Burmese

Road

His Environment* 7 the

laid

down

the ideological

sought to create in Burma. These were contained in two

premises of the revolution

latter

to Socialism and The System of Correlation of Man and providing the philosophical underpinnings for the

Marxism and Buddhism, and distinctly from Theravada Buddhist phiBuddhist view of human nature in which the individual is

former. System "was an eclectic mixture of

Burmese." 58 The key terms used losophy, 59 and

it

adopts a

motivated bv egocentric

in System are taken

desires. If left to his

not develop "right livelihood." "Aware

our way of

life

and control

this evil

own

his

a reality,

i.e.,

a socialist

tendency to

creative labor

and

lapse.

initiative."

or her

own

impulses, the individual will

we are of such human frailties we must make way of democratic life that can constantly check as

Only then can everyone have the right of using The discipline of socialism would bring out

60

the altruistic side of human nature.

Although the ideology espoused by the new government had unmistakable roots Buddhist socialism of U Ba Swe and through him in the fundamentalist Bud-

in the

dhism of monks

like

U

Ottama, the government that promoted

fundamental break with Burmese Buddhism

this

in assigning the task

ideology

populace in moral discipline not to the sangha but to the cadre of a

Burma "bv

Socialist

Programme

a 'reorientation

made

a

of instructing the

new

party, the

Party (BSPP). This cadre was expected to lead society

of views' to eradicate 'fraudulent practices, profit motive, easy " and selfishness.' 6I Unlike Pol Pot in Cambodia, Ne Win

living, parasitism, shrinking,

monks by party cadres through the destrucgovernment was not anti-Buddhist even though it tion of the sangha. The Ne Win rescinded the laws and promulgations of the previous regime designed to make Buddid not attempt to replace the Buddhist

BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 379

dhism the

Monks were

state religion.

not, however, to be allowed to plav anv role in

politics, as

manv

distinction

between the legitimate religious

political

Ne Win made

had done prior to 1962. In 1964

in the order

one: 'The Revolutionarv council

.

role

desires the puritv

.

.

of the sangha and an

a

illegitimate

of religion,

espcciallv

of Buddhism, the religion of the majoritv of the people of the countrv, and believes that this task

of keeping the Buddha sasana

[religion]

pure should be borne solely by

Buddha

sasana pure, the Revolutionarv

the sanghas. For this purpose of keeping the

Council

said, the sanghas'' sanctity

of politics."

No U

is

besmirched bv dabbling with the mundane

affair

62

Ottamas were allowed to emerge; monks

were arrested. The

arrests

the sangha bv the state the funeral of

U

of those

who

who engaged

in political action

1965 protested the controls

in

and those involved

in

1974

in

instituted over

demonstrations associated with

Thant, former secretarv general of the United Nations, served as

warnings to others. At the same time monks were allowed to continue to occupv highly respected places in local societv. For the period between 1962 and the 1980s

monks were Denied

in a "legal limbo''' in relation to the state. 63

a political role, the

role in the pursuit

sangha was also excluded from plaving

a constructive

of the Burmese Road to Socialism. Left to themselves, most

in the

sangha over the next twenty-five years perpetuated a traditional cosmological Buddhism.

The consequence

for

Burmese

between two extremes: radicalism change.' the

to

164

was "an uneasy sense of contradiction

economic change and conservatism

in cultural

This reversion to tradition was encouraged bv the xenophobic policies of

Ne Win government, which

make Burma

entirely

sell-sufficiency that

der

in

societv

closed

Schumacher noted

Xe Win, Buddhist

Burma

to external influences.

Ne

Win's intent

independent of the outside world reflected a commitment to

socialism

as a

hallmark of Buddhist economics, but un-

was no longer associated with the sangha.

Alter 1962 foreign as well local firms and banks were nationalized; cultural connections, such as those

promoted bv the

British Council, the

foreign magazines and newspapers, were severed; tourism restricting tourist visas to ies,

Ford Foundation, and

was

effectivelv

ended by

twentv-four hours; foreign nationals, including missionar-

were denied permission to remain

in the countrv. In the

mid-1960s approximately

200,000 Indians and Pakistanis, manv of whom had been born and raised in Burma and who constituted a large percentage of the countrv's traders, managers, and technicians,

— indeed, thev were often stripped of personal wealth such jewelry — thev took with them much of Burma's commercial and managerial

capital

well

were deported. 65 Although thev were not allowed to take away any of their as

as

expertise.

Although the new government's extreme chauvinism appealed to the many Bur-

mans who blamed the former British rulers for most of the problems inherited by an independent Burma, it alienated manv of the indigenous minoritv peoples, some of whom had benefited from British support. The Ne Win government not onlv failed to eliminate the long-running rebellion bv Karen but also faced a proliferation of rebel movements seeking autonomv for groups such as the Shan and Kachin. 66 Although none of the ethnic rebellions have ever posed a serious threat to the Burmese state, 67 they have had a major effect on the economy. The persistence of the minority group

Charles F. Keyes

380

rebellions has required the

Burmese government to maintain and provision one of non-communist Asia. In addition, communist, Karen,

the largest standing armies in

Shan, and some other rebels have controlled

Burma with China,

much of the

trade across the frontiers of

Thailand, and, to a lesser extent, India, and have used the revenues

generated from this trade primarily to support their military lions have resulted, thus, in the expenditure

efforts.

of much of Burma's

The

official

ethnic rebel-

and

unofficial

foreign exchange for arms produced outside the country' rather than in productive

within the country.

activities

The

nationalization of

all

and

industry, banking,

trade,

Burma. In the little

first

decade following the 1962 coup, the

institu-

Ne Win government

in

gave

attention to agriculture, traditionallv the mainstay of the economy. In 1972 the

government admitted its

coupled with the

economic development

tion of centralized planning, failed to stimulate significant

economic

that

policies to

its

policies

had not been successful and moved to reorient

emphasize agriculture,

government procurement

price for rice

forestrv, fisheries,

was increased, although

and mining. 68 The kept low com-

still

pared to world market prices. Although some significant increases in average yields resulted

from technological changes introduced

country's major source of foreign exchange, II levels.

69

The stagnation

rice exports

still

in the export sector

in the 1970s, rice exports,

remained

far

was evident

almost disappeared by the early 1970s, they

long the

below pre- World War although

in the fact that, still

continued to be the

major foreign exchange earner. 70

The government had resulted

new

eventually admitted that even the

in little

1972

policies instituted in

economic growth. In June 1987 Burma applied to the United

Nations for Least- Developed Country

(LDC)

status.

To

qualify for this status,

Burma

met three criteria: (1) that per capita income was less than $200; (2) that the manufacturing component of the economy accounted for less than 10 percent of the GDP; and (3) that the literacy rate was less than 20 percent. 71 In meeting the last criterion, the government of Burma had to pretend that the country's much higher literacy rate was an illusion. The government claimed that most literacy had to demonstrate that

in

Burma

in the

it

1980s had been gained through study

forty years of state-sponsored universal education)

in

monastic schools

and was not

(this, after

effective litcracv. Yet,

while the deception on the question of level of literacy was most troubling, the eco-

nomic

situation did appear to justify the application

status. In its application the

essentially flat since

which Burma had made

government admitted

that per capita

GDP

for

LDC

had been

1970. Since that year, "the annual growth rate was about

2.5 percent, while the population growth rate for the same period was 2 percent.

'Hence,' the government's report concluded, 'there has practicallv been

no

increase in

GDP for the people of Burma.'" 72 In fact, the government's estimate of per capita GDP did not take into account the

the real per-capita

real

economy of Burma. The

black market economy,

much of which

remains in the

hands of insurgents on the country's borders, grew much more rapidly than the cial

that

economy, it

had

especially in the 1980s. In

lost control

November 1985

of the economy, attempted to

the highest denomination banknotes. The

result

was

offi-

the government, realizing

reassert itself

by demonetizing

a slight disruption in

economic

BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 381

activity,

but the black market continued

much

as before.

On

5

September 1987, the

government once again attempted to gain control through demonetization; the very commonlv used 25-, 35-, and 75-kvat banknotes were demonetized."' Estimates of

how much of

van between 60 percent and

the currcnev was rendered valueless

80 percent." 4 These demonetizations, burgeoning entrepreneurial

one

in

like

previous ones, were aimed as

class as

September 1987, however, had

Almost everyone

the population.

much

a

marked

— government

negative impact

— experienced

ment had

instituted a

just before the crisis

a rapid decline in standard

of

living.

number of economic reforms such

nounced, students organized the

The government moved

On

political crisis. first

on much of

Burmans

as well as

Although the govern-

as privatizing the rice trade

second demonetization, these were too few and too

soon gave way to a

The

farmers, workers in

officials as well as

the state trading firms as well as private entrepreneurs, ethnic

minorities

at eliminating a

thev were at controlling the black market.

late.

An economic

the dav the demonetization was an-

significant protest rallies since the

quicklv to suppress these protests but did

little

mid-1970s. to

meet the

underhing economic concerns which had prompted them.

The modest student

September 1987 proved to be the harbinger of

protests of

massive protests in 1988, each of which brought harsh responses from the military.

There was outrage injun' of

at the

government's violent actions, which resulted

hundreds of people. The protesters

1988 students aligned with Buddhist monks

gon Pagoda

in

literally

up

set

Rangoon, the shrine which could

in the

death or

seized the high ground. In June a protest center at the

Shwe Da-

truly be said to be the sacred center

society. 75 The demonstration brought to the fore a new breed of "political monks" who broke with the conservative position adopted bv most monks during the

of Burmese

Nc Win

period.

Between June and September 1988 the crisis deepened despite promises made by the government, under a succession of surrogates for Ne Win, to institute economic and

political reforms.

The demonstrations grew even

from increasingly wider sectors of

society, including

larger

and drew participation

many in the civil service. Stumonks were conspicuous as

dents provided the main leadership for the protests, but

Spokesmen

well.

for the opposition

made connections between

their protests

those of the 1920s and 1930s in which an earlier generation of political

been

active.

The

effective

government

committees of students and monks."

The opposition

Aung

Aung San

has

San,

its

who had

become

towns and

was

in the

hands of

Aung San Suu

Kyi, the

cities

6

eventually turned for

daughter of General British rule.

in several

and

monks had

a hero

led

leadership to

Burma

in

its

struggle to free itself of

of mythological proportions to the Bur-

mese, in part because of his tragic death at the hand of an assassin on the eve of

Burma's independence, and something of this mythological aura surrounds his daughter.

She has

lent her

charisma to a movement seeking to reinstitute a democratic

system and reestablish links with the outside world. In September 1988, the army openly took over the control of the state under a junta called the State

Law and Order

Restoration Council

(SLORC). The new

mili-

Charles F. Keyes 382

tary

government

ban on demonstrations and, when protests continued,

also issued a

deployed forces with orders to use whatever force was necessary to restore order. In the next few weeks, thousands of protestors (mainlv students) were killed. also ordered

all

workers in

state agencies to return to

work or

SLORC

lose their jobs.

The

prospect of losing even minimal pay after a long period of near total collapse of the

economy coupled with

fear

of the use of force brought most government emplovees

back to their jobs.

Even with the not over. Rather, certain

ment

military willing to shoot it

has

moved

anyone judged to be

new phase with

into a

by

that military rule can be sustained only

is

SLORC

lacks lcgitimacv.

bv promising

The

elections.

27 May 1990, were

the

first

1988, and although

make anv

it

since the

postponed

coup of 1962

Socialist

was re-formed

is

a legitimacy crisis

and finally held on number of parties were

several times in

Programme

as the

was

What

force; the militarv-run govern-

acknowledged the existence of

elections,

Burma

allowed to compete. The

a rebel, the crisis

a verv uncertain future.

which

a

Partv was officially abolished in

National Unitv Partv,

it

no longer could

credible claim to providing the moral leadership for the countrv.

SLORC

attempted to ensure that opposition parties would not win the election by imprison-

Aung San Suu Kvi, the general secretary of the National Democracy (the major opposition part)')- Nonetheless, the opposition still won an overwhelming majority in the election. Despite the clear rejection of its mandate to rule the country, the armv refused to transfer power to the opposition; instead, it instituted even more repressive rule. Aung San Suu Kvi, who remained under house arrest and who was allowed no contact with the outside world, became a symbol of the moral bankruptcy of SLORC. The choice in late 1991 of Suu Kvi as the recipient for the Nobel Prize for peace underscored the fact that the crisis of legitimacy in ing the leaders, including

League

for

Burma had not

yet ended.

Buddhism and

the

End of the Burmese Way

to Socialism

The deep-rooted character of the crisis stimulated a reconsideration on many Burmese of Buddhist premises for political and economic order. realization

from the

early

increasing benefits for revolution.

He

all

1980s that government led

Ne Win

to turn

the part of

A

growing

were

failing to bring

away from the

socialist ideals

policies

about

of

his

appeared to look for alternatives not in the Buddhist fundamentalism

of the 1920s and 1930s, but

in a

more

traditional

Buddhism

that emphasizes associ-

means to ensure the humans find themselves. In and, ironically, U Nu, whom

ation with a purified sangha and the building of pagodas as

attainment of liberation from the vale of woes in which

1980, emulating the great Buddhist monarchs of history

he forced from the premiership

in

1962,

Ne Win

called together a

Congregation of

the Sangha of All Orders for Purification, Perpetuation, and Propagation of the Sas-

ana (religion). Representatives of scriptural problems, to

Ne Win,

all

sects

of Buddhist monks gathered "to

weed out bogus monks, and

as the convener,

clarify

to solve doctrinal disputes."

"earned great Buddhist merit and was able to gain approval

BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 383

to register the

monks,

a

long-term goal."" Although

it

gave the state greater control

over the sangha, the convening of this Congregation and a subsequent one in 1985

brought the sangha back to center stage

in

Burma.

One unintended consequence of state support amount of

in the

for sangha reform

was an

increase

surplus wealth used for religious purposes. Despite the faltering

economy, public donations for support of monks and shrines actually increased 1970s and 1980s." 8

Among the most conspicuous of ad

tion of the "great victory"

the

Shwe Dagon pagoda,

in the

hoc projects was the construc-

pagoda (Maha Wizava Zedi) on

a hillock in

Rangoon

the national shrine of Burma. Officially undertaken to

near

com-

memorate the convening of the Congregation of All Orders, the project was Ne Win's own memorial,"9 and was very expensive in wealth and labor. 80 The relative size of investment in this shrine, 50 million kvats, can be grasped by comparing

government budget for public health which

in

it

1977-78 was about 288

to the million

kvats. 81

In emulating the Buddhist

of the

crisis

the

late

1980s into

monarchs of the

a traditional

Burmese monarchy was never

claim; thus, the death

past,

Nc Win

also

one of succession. The

fixed because

of a monarch often ushered

made

line

the political

of succession

in

anv son of anv king could assert a in a

bloodv conflict between poten-

which was resolved onlv when one claimant was able to mount the throne, have himself crowned, and clothe himself, literally, in the raiment of state. tial

successors and their supporters, a conflict

The state

recent effort of the

and sangha

is

government to

indicative

the moral leadership roles

of the

failure

reassert a traditional relationship

of party cadres and army

between

officers to

assume

which they had been expected to do. Even before the events

of 1987-88 the Party had been discredited and

now

the

army has been

as well.

By

vacuum the sangha has reemerged as a major arbiter of legitimonks who became involved in the demonstrations of 1987-88 formed the Yanhapvo, or Young Monks. Even after the crackdown of September 1988, Yanhapvo monks and some of their supporters continued to provide moral leadership to the opposition, especially in Mandalav and northern Burma. 82 These monks became the vanguard for a new, albeit short-lived, fundamentalist Buddhist movement in Burma. Politically this new movement resembled the one that had developed in the 1920s under U Ottama and his associates. Like their predecessors, the Young Monks set themselves apart from the majority of monks in Burma, who continued to reproduce a traditional cosmological Buddhism centered on the important rituals of shin-byu and pagoda building. The new political monks even more clearly set themselves against monks associated with the millennial version of cosmological Buddhism embraced recently by Ne Win. The new political monks also set stepping into the moral

macy.

A

number of

the

themselves against those

monks coopted bv

to create an establishment

While the new

the government in a rather belated effort

form of Buddhism.

political

monks

in

Burma adopted

similar political tactics to their

predecessors of the 1920s and 1930s, they did not share the same vision of new order

by an earlier generation of Buddhist activists. The socialist experiment in Burma, which evolved from vague ideas of social welfare put forth by monks in the

as that held

Charles F. Keyes

384

late

nineteenth and early twentieth century into a synthesis of

Buddhism and Marx-

ism and then into the Buddhist-inspired ideology of the Burma Socialist Programme Part}',

no political faction The Young Monks had

has been so deeply discredited that

advocate

continuation in any form.

its

in

Burma today could

little

time to develop a

coherent stance toward economic action, but thev were aligned with the National

League

for

Democracy, which has advocated

development but with

capitalistic

atten-

tion given to the conservation of natural resources. 83

The primary goal of the Young Monks was military to the parties that election.

to effect a transfer of

had won the mandate of the people

The Young Monks'

political

agenda called for the military to acknowledge

SLORC moved

the moral supremacy of the sangha. In mid- 1990, the

won

potent the National League for Democracy, which had landslide,

by arresting

its

leaders.

At

power from the Mav 1990

in the

that point

monks moved

the

May

to render imelections

by a

to the forefront of the

opposition. In September 1990 thousands of monks, mainly in Mandalav and north-

ern Burma, began a protest which directly echoed those of the 1930s. They refused to accept alms offered by soldiers

one associated with the

and

military." 84

their families, "in effect

Monks would

also

excommunicating any-

"bow down

in front

of passing

soldiers in insulting irony." 85

The highly dramatic and public rejection of the moral authority' of the military by an increasing number of monks was obviously very threatening to SLORC. In late October 1990, the military moved against the monks, storming 133 monasteries and arresting scores of monks. 86 The Young Monk organization was banned. Despite the shocking sight of army men seizing control of monasteries and forcing monks to accept their superior power, the public reaction was very subdued. In a very short time,

SLORC demonstrated that

In the

wake of this

a return to

continue;

it

was firmly

direct assault

in control

on the sangha,

of the country.

SLORC immediately encouraged

cosmological Buddhist practices bv permitting traditional

it

has also sought to restore

its

ritual activity to

patronage of establishment Buddhism. 87

A

"fundamentalist" Buddhism championed by the new political monks had failed not because it lacked popular support but because it was insufficiently militant. This lack is evident in the observation of "a well-educated woman in Rangoon" in wake of the suppression of the boycott by monks of the military. "'Our tradition Reflecting on the revoluand our religion prevent us from getting things done.' tionary zeal of Vietnamese monks who used self-immolation as a weapon against the

of militancy the

.

.

.

Saigon regimes of the 1960s, she stresses the differences. 'Our kind of Buddhism does not allow

,

that.

.

.

.

" 8S

As of late 1991, the future of fundamentalist Buddhism in Burma is uncertain. With a regime so obviously lacking in moral authority in power, the sangha remains an obvious alternative source of legitimacy. At the same time, those in the sangha who reject

cosmological or establishment forms of the religion as the basis for the social

order appear to lack the ability to ethnic insurgents,

who

mount an

effective

opposition to

SLORC. The

have long carried the major burden of the struggle against a

military-dominated Burma, are also very wan- of fundamentalist Buddhism because

many of

their leaders are Christian. Yet, given the role

which fundamentalist Bud-

BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 385

dhism has played

in the

out in a post— Ne

Win

shaping of modern Burma,

unlikely that

it is

it

can be counted

order.

Buddhist Reform and Establishment Buddhism

in

Thailand

Although Buddhist movements exhibiting certain "family resemblances" to fundamentalisms have appeared in Thailand

in recent years, the

conditions that have fos-

movements have been verv different from those in Burma. In Thailand, these movements have developed as part of a wider Buddhist critique of capitalism. The Thai 89 have long shared with Burmans the same basic premises about the fundamental nature of the world which are derived from Theravada Buddhism. Their tered such

of these premises

ethical interpretations

those of the Burmese. tice,

Some of these

however, significantly different from

are,

prcmodern

differences have their roots in

but most derive from fundamentalist reforms instituted

in

prac-

Thai Buddhism begin-

ning in the mid-nineteenth ccnturv which had very different social implications from the comparable ones in Burma.

premodcrn Buddhist

In

Gems

Three

to actions

practice, the Thai, like the

Burmans, took refuge

which would

in a future existence.

result in "merit" in order to ensure their

The

religious acts

enhanced well-being

of the Thai were believed to

situate

the same basic Buddhist cosmological realm as did comparable acts

Many of

mans.

mans

one within

among

the Bur-

the traditional merit-making rites of the Thai are very similar, and

often related, to the ahlus of the Burmans. 90

The Thai

also

"worshiped" the Buddha

form of "reminders," although most tended to accord

in the

in the

— the Buddha, the dhamma, and the sangha — and committed themselves

to stupas and

more

less

attention than Bur-

attention to images as "reminders" of the Buddha. 91

The

Thai, like the Burmans, also sponsored the ordination of males mainlv for temporary

but sometimes for permanent service within the sangha, although the custom of most

Thai again differed from that of the Burmans.

Among

all

but the northern Thai (who

had been under Burmese control for part of their history), temporary ordination into the

monkhood

as

young

adults

was more important than ordination of boys into the

novitiate. Finally, the Thai, like the

or medicine to

Burmans, offered alms of food, clothing,

members of the sangha, although again

there were

Such differences notwithstanding, the Thai shared

practice.

same basic economic ethic

Siam which followed differences in

as that

in the

shelter,

variations in

premodcrn

era the

of the Burmans. In the wake of religious reforms

a very different path to the reforms in

prcmodern

some

religious practice took

on new

in

Burma, some of the

significance

and have contrib-

uted to the formation of the contrastive ethics which can be observed today.

Buddhist reform in Siam began, with the West.

Burma;

it

92

began

as in

Burma,

as a

consequence of a confrontation

This confrontation was, however, quite different in Siam than in earlier in

Siam and was not the result of a political upheaval brought later known to the a young Siamese prince

—

about by colonial domination. In 1824,

world it

as

Mongkut

politically

— who had entered the monkhood

expedient to remain in the order

when

for a

temporary period, found

his father, the king, died

suddenly

Charles F. Keyes

386

and an uncle ascended to the throne. Guided by monks in

Buddhist scriptures or adept

at the practice

become an exemplary monk. He began as currently practiced

through

his

who were

either well versed

of meditation, Mongkut

to acquire a critical perspective of

own

out to

set

Buddhism

study of the tradition and through his ex-

tended conversations and study sessions with the few Westerners in the countrv, most

of

whom

were Protestant missionaries. Mongkut learned of the distinction made

the West between natural and divine law.

From

in

missionaries trained in medicine,

he acquired some knowledge of Western science as well as of Christian theology.

Through correspondence with monks in Sri Lanka, Mongkut became aware of the effects of Western rule on that predominantly Buddhist country. The British conquest of lower Burma in 1824 gave him a more proximate example of the power commanded bv Westerners. His encounters with Western thought and power together

own studies of Buddhist scriptures led Mongkut to develop over the period was in monkhood (1824-51) the basis for a radical reorientation in Buddhist

with his he

The reform of Buddhism he

practice.

throne after he became king in 1851; his

set in it

motion was given the author itv of the

reached

full

florescence during the reign

of

son and successor, King Chulalongkorn.

Mongkut was ideas of Buddhist

merit-making

many popular myths from which people drew their also criticized manv traditional sociallv centered

disdainful of

cosmology and he

rituals,

seeing both as historical accretions which detracted from the

fundamental message of the Buddha. Buddhism, he maintained, was concerned more with the individual cultivation of detachment from the desires which lead to suffering than with the acquisition of merit through unreflective participation in traditional

This shift in emphasis preceded but was parallel to that which occurred in Burmese Buddhism. In Siam, however, the fundamental rethinking of Buddhist docrituals.

trine

and practice became the

basis for state-sponsored

whereas the transformation of Buddhist practice

in

reform of the Buddhist sangha

Burma was

inextricablv iinked to

opposition to a colonial order established by the British.

Buddhism under King Mongkut (1851-68) and especially under King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) contributed indirectly to enhanced individualism through the stress placed on the responsibility of each person for his or her own Official

actions.

Whereas

traditional

Buddhist practice had accentuated merit-making

most of which were carried out sized the individual's pursuit of Initially, this

nobility,

new approach was

as

communal

efforts, this

rituals,

reformed practice empha-

detachment from the desires conducing to

suffering.

number of royalty and was promoted more widely by

restricted to a relatively small

but by the end of the nineteenth century

it

Thammavut order of monks, which established branches throughout the At the turn of the century all members of the Buddhist clergy in the kingdom were placed under the authority of a Thammayut- headed sangha. the strict countrv.

By

the

first

three decades of the twentieth century, the state-sponsored sangha

organization had marshaled

and implemented

a

all

segments of the Buddhist order under

uniform system of clerical education.

its

Some monks,

jurisdiction especially in

northern Thailand, encouraged resistance to the challenge from the state-supported

sangha to distinctive

local traditions. 93

By

the late 1930s, however, most

monks

in the

BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 387

country had been brought under the jurisdiction of a state-supported sangha hierar-

Through

chy.

its

"establishment"

developed

first

control of clerical education, the hierarchy was able to institute an

Buddhism

that

by Mongkut

promoted the perspective on

practice

and doctrine

and later by his son. Prince Wachirayan (Vajiranana),

who

was successively the head of the Thamma\ ut order and then Prince Patriarch with r

jurisdiction over

monks. Prince Wachirayan wrote the basic

all

texts

which

are

still

in

use for clerical education in Thailand. Like his father, he emphasized a rational interpretation of Buddhist doctrine oyer the logical

Buddhist thought.

He

also

myths which had shaped

was responsible

for bringing

traditional

cosmo-

monks throughout

94 the country under the jurisdiction of the state-sponsored sangha.

Capitalist

During the period when was

a state

laid for the reorientation

Development

Thailand

in

Buddhist church was being created, the foundation

of the economy of Siam toward

tem. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the as a

a

world

economy of Siam was

consequence of the adoption of a free trade policy dictated bv the

as in

Burma, the policy encouraged

capitalist sys-

"opened'''

British. In

agricultural production for an export

Siam

market and

discouraged manufacturing and even the production of goods by traditional crafts in order to stimulate

demand

for finished

goods produced

European countries. The major export from Siam,

in

Great Britain and other

from Burma, was

as

rice,

and

in

demand was undertaken primarily bv indigenous peoples. Siam, however, lagged far behind Burma in total exports of rice prior to World War II. 95 In the years just prior to World War II rice exports constituted a lower percentage of the total in Burma than in Siam, but in total tonnage the rice exports of Burma were almost double those of Siam. 96 The fact that rice exports accounted for an average of 44.6 percent of total exports in Burma for the period 1937-41 as compared to an average of 53.5 percent for Siam for 1935-39 suggests that the Burmese economy was also somewhat more diversified than the both cases the expansion of rice production to meet market

Siamese. 97

economic growth was much slower

In general, then,

the

first

in

Siam than

in

Burma during

four decades of the twentieth century. Whereas the Siamese government

lowed conservative

fiscal

fol-

policies, in part to avoid giving the colonial powers a pretext

for extending their rule over their country, the British colonial

government

in

Burma

promoted economic expansion. Because of too rapid reorientation of the Burmese to the world economy, the Burmese suffered much more from the Great

economy

Depression than did the Thai.

While the expansion of commercial

rice

production was carried out by native

peoples in Siam as in Burma, the development of other sectors of the a

demand

for labor

which was met

other Asian countries

— Chinese

in

in

economy created

Siam, again as in Burma, by immigrants from

Siam and Indians

withstanding, the influx of alien labor was

Chinese and Indian immigrants not only

much

filled

in

Burma. Slower growth not-

higher in Siam than in Burma. 98

low-paid laboring jobs but also came

Charles F. Keyes

388

to dominate

greater

many of the middleman

roles in processing and marketing. Despite the compared with Burma, Siam was far less divided by the beginning of World War II. Whereas the Indians in Burma rarely

numbers of aliens

as a society

who

Siam

Burmese Buddhist

assimilated to

Chinese

in

settled in

as

culture, a large percentage

of the descendants of the

Thailand became adherents to Thai Buddhism.

world economy than World War II, after the war the situation was reversed. Thailand experienced economic growth rates among the highest of any Third World country, while Burma's economy stagnated. This reversal was partly a consequence of the far greater problems of postwar economic development faced by the two countries.

While Siam was

Burma

relatively less integrated into a capitalist

prior to

Burma

suffered

war and was

much more damage

restore the infrastructure to inflicted

to

its

had Thailand during the

infrastructure than

not, mainly for political reasons, able to acquire the necessary capital to

on Thailand could

prewar

levels until into the

What damage was

1960s.

also have taken longer to repair if Thailand

had been

demanded mainly by the British because of Thaiwar with Japan. The intervention of the United States, how-

forced to pay the hea\T reparations

during the

land's alliance ever,

not only led to a significant reduction in these reparations but also

for significant foreign investment, especially for building roads in

Thailand during and

A more age of

irrigation projects

after the 1950s.

serious consequence of the

shipyards, airports, and so

The

and

laid the basis

on was

the people, mainly British

who

war

for

Burma than

the destruction of roads,

the loss at the outset of the

war of a

large percent-

and Indians, with managerial and technical

skills."

1942 did not return after the war, as the Burmese government which was to take power in 1948 was committed to policies of economic and Indians

British

left in

nationalism. Very few Chinese

land

left

ment which came Chinese

who

still

by developing

By cies

power

to

alliances

and had begun

its

1947

also

adopted economic nationalist

government had abandoned economic

to encourage private investment,

most of

it

instituted even

more

restrictive

economic

policies, the

their position

nationalist poli-

foreign, in almost installed

nationalist policies than

predecessors. These changes in policy are primarily responsible for the differ-

During

this

1950s the Thai

two countries over the

past three decades.

period Thailand experienced very high economic growth

GNP grew an average of 4.7 percent per year;

a remarkable average

of 8.6 percent per year;

a very strong average

in the

in the

1970s the

rate

are striking.

rates.

1960s

it

In the

grew

at

was slower, but

of 6.9 percent per year; and the strong growth continued

throughout the 1980s, averaging probably above 6.0 percent. 100

Burma

in Thai-

the Thai govern-

economy maintained with high-ranking members of the military.

ent economic histories of the

still

in

economy

And when

of the economy. In contrast, the Burmese government which was

1962 by Nc Win

had

played important roles in the

played a major role in the Thai

the late 1950s the Thai

ever)' sector

in

who

during the war; indeed, some even prospered.

The

contrasts with

By 1980 per capita income in Thailand was about $670 as comin Burma."" Today Thailand has a far more diversified

pared with $150 for 1978

economy than Burma. While

rice

continues to be Burma's major export, other

cant sources of foreign exchange for Thailand include tourism, rubber,

tin,

signifi-

cassava

BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 389

and kenaf, and, increasingly, manufactured goods, especially

Although

of the people

a majority

agriculture, there has

been

in

much more

a

and

textiles

electronics.

both countries continue to be employed significant

movement of people from

in

rural

Burma. In both countries immigrant minorities no

to urban areas in Thailand than in

longer predominate in financial, middleman, and urban labor occupations, although the reasons for this change are radically different for the

Indians were forced to leave

Burma permanently

dence from Great Britain

1948 and

in

on the other hand, have been today to distinguish

among

after the

two

especially after 1962.

Almost

countries.

country gained

The Chinese and

assimilated to a remarkable degree,

its

in it

all

indepen-

Thailand, is

difficult

the middle class those of Sino-Thai and those of ethnic

Thai descent.

Establishment Buddhism and Buddhist Economics in Thailand

Buddhism not only has proven not to be an impediment to rapid capitalistic development in Thailand but also has contributed to this development. 102 Through "strategies

of compromise, ambiguity, and silence" similar to those adopted by Buddhist

sects in Japan,

103

establishment

Buddhism

enabler" of capitalist development.

No

in

Thailand has proven to be a "passive

critique of capitalistic

development has come

from the Buddhist establishment because most recent governments have exerted very tight control over the ally

—

in the

cialist

1(M

and because the religion has

clearly benefited materi-

form of new buildings and shrines and consumer goods such

ators, electric fans,

society.

sangha

and so on permitted for monks

Governments

in

power

since

1957 have

l05

as refriger-

— from the new wealth

explicitly rejected the

and Buddhist-based economic nationalist programs of some

in the

Buddhist so-

earlier political

leaders. 106

The

elaboration of the traditional

Buddhist rains relationship

the ritual

—

retreat or lent

—

of offering robes to monks 10 "

between establishment Buddhism and capitalism. In

was quite simple and served

had spent the three months of lent rite

rite

a rite called thqt kathin in Thai,

was given new

significance

as a

in the

way

a

its

at the

end of

indicative

is

of the

traditional form,

community could honor those who

monastery. Beginning

when King Bhumipol

in the late

1950s, the

Adulyadej, 108 with the support

of the government of Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat, restored an old royal tradition

of offering kathin robes

under roval patronage.

mid-1960s the

rite

109

at

temple-monasteries which had been designated as being

Very quickly others moved to emulate the king, and by the

had been

The robes have become an

significantly transformed.

almost incidental portion of an offering (much of which

is

now

of cash) made bv charitable organizations (many organized for

government agencies,

political parties,

and

typically in the this

especially corporations

and

tutions to temple- monasteries typically located in areas quite distant

the sponsoring institution.

Some

financial insti-

from the

site

of

sponsors hope in return for their offerings to gain

the support of a temple-monasterv's congregation in the

or purchase of products.

form

purpose alone),

form of votes, bank deposits,

Charles F. Keyes

390

While the wealth spent on thQt kathin

rites

today

unquestionably greater in

is

proportion to what was spent in the past, the investment

rarely

is

even primarily for realization of a salvation goal; rather,

it

has

today exclusively or

become

means

a

for

promotion of this-worldlv ends and can be better compared with monies spent on advertisement in the West than with those spent on building stupas in Burma.

The co-opting of establishment Buddhism has not been the only way in which Buddhism has contributed to capitalistic development in Thailand. Some laymen have also acquired through their practice of Buddhism the discipline that enables them to from using their wealth for immediate purposes. Wealth thus accumulated has become available for investment. Two groups in particular in Thailand include mem-

refrain

bers

who

have developed the Buddhist equivalent of the Protestant work ethic as

described bv Weber. 110

The

first

can be found

eastern Thailand,

monkhood

period in the "discipline,"

one does

one

among

where the

ideal

is still

those rural Thai, especiallv the Thai-Lao in north-

of young adult men spending

adhered

cultivates the virtue

two meals

eats only

few

utensils such as a

a

at least

one lenten

In subjecting oneself as an adult to the

of "detachment" to a more intense degree than

from the warmth of one's

as a novice, for in addition to separating oneself

family and forgoing sexual intimacy, the

He

to.

monk

minimize

learns to

his material wants.

day and owns no more than the robes he wears and

begging bowl and

razor. Traditionally, the

who demonstrated

his ability to control his passions for at least a rains-retreat

months was

which indicated prestige

a title

tige increased after

two or

in the local

having spent even longer

a very

reward for a

community. Since one's

in the sangha,

man

of three pres-

manv men would spend

three vears before returning to the world. Today, the reward, although rarelv

conceived of as such, gratification (ot thon),

ern Thailand 111 and

may be economic

mav

The second group

success.

Ex-monks,

who know how

to forgo

have been in the vanguard of rural entrepreneurs in northeast-

is

well have been so elsewhere.

found among the Sino-Thai. Although the Sino-Thai became

adherents of Theravada Buddhism, thev have retained the pragmatism rooted in the Sinitic tradition of their ancestors. This pragmatism, linked to the worldview

of establishment Buddhism, contributed to the development of an ethic of tolerance, well adapted to laissez-faire capitalism. 112

one which

is

erance has

become

the

dominant

those in the middle class

who

ethic

The Sino-Thai

of Thailand's middle

ethic

class todav,

of Sino-Thai descent. As the middle

arc not

of

tol-

including class has

assumed increasing political importance, this ethic has influenced policv formation in the country. This ethic of tolerance

is

manifest in die fact that while

established religion in Thailand, there has been verv

enforce moral tenets specific to

little

Buddhism comparable

Buddhism

is

the

pressure to use the law to

to the use of law in

some

Is-

lamic countries to enforce Islamic moralitv. While avoidance of greed, for example,

one of the

five basic

precepts to which

all

is

Buddhists arc to adhere, the ethic of estab-

Buddhism in Thailand places the ultimate rcsponsibilitv for repressing greed on the individual more than on the state or society at large. Similarly, alms are an individual matter and are not mandated bv law, as is the case in some societies for lishment

Islamic zakat.

BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 391

Buddhist Debates about Capitalistic Development and the Rise of Buddhist ""Fundamentalism in Thailand 1

'

Although the dominant economic ethic of contemporary Thai istic

whether

still

linked explicitly, as

secular form, there have

the

number of

critics

it is

come from

unabashedly

capital-

for most, to Buddhist roots or expressed in

been countcrtendencics

as well. 113

Over the

past

two decades,

of excessive materialism and of the legitimation of

development bv establishment Buddhism has grown cism has

is

secular groups, mainly

on the

significantly.

left,

capitalistic

While some

since the late

criti-

1970s the voices

having the widest appeal have been those drawing their ideas from Buddhist sources.

The highly

respected

monk

Phutthathat Phikkhu (Buddhadasa Bhikkhu)

114

has

provided an articulate defense of an ethic that would foster suppression of personal greed in favor of redistribution of wealth to alleviate suffering more generally. 115 Phutthathat celebrated his eightv-fourth birthday in 1990 (a most auspicious birth date because

it

marked

his

completion of a seventh twelve-year

cycle).

He

"appears to

have been strongly influenced bv the rationalist aspects of the religious reforms of Prince

Mongkut" 116 but

most of

his life

has set himself apart from the Buddhist establishment. For

he has lived in Chaiva in southern Thailand,

both secular and

ecclesiastical

far

from the center of

power. At his "Garden of Liberation" in Chaiva, Phut-

thathat has developed, taught, and put into practice through meditation and his "spiritual theater" a

theology that centers on the premise that "in samsara exists Nib-

XX7

bann" This theology, which he acknowledges seems contradictory, makes detachment from the passions a goal to seek even in the midst of intense acti\ity in the world. In the 1960s and 1970s he began to develop a "dhammic socialist" critique of the

growing materialism

mese, Phutthathafs clivities

in

Thai

dhammic

to greed, anger,

society.

Unlike the Buddhist socialism of the Bur-

socialism looks not to the state to control natural pro-

and delusion but to the enlightened individual working

together with other such individuals.

Some

lay followers

tions dedicated to

of Phutthathat have attempted to create community organiza-

dhammic

A

socialism.

leading figure in this effort has been Sulak

and promoter of groups committed to the Buddhist equivalent of the Social Gospel. In the essay "Buddhism and Development: Is Small Sivaraksa, a prolific social critic

118

Beautiful?"

119

inspired by both Phutthathat

and Schumacher, Sulak argues that the

premises of "development" promoted by economists and politicians entail accentuating the very desires that

Buddhism

considers the major impediments to the attain-

ment of nibbana: For economists see development

in

terms of increasing currency and things,

thus fostering greed (lobba). Politicians see development in terms of increased

power thus fostering ill-will (dosa). Both then work together, hand in glove, and measure the results in terms of quantity, thus fostering ignorance (moha), and completing the Buddhist

triad

of evils. 120

Sulak looks to Sarvodaya, a Buddhist-inspired native perspective

on development. This

movement

village-level

in Sri

Lanka, for an

movement, he observes,

alteris

de-

Charles F. Keyes

392

from the Buddha's teaching of the Four Wheels. "As a cart moves steadily on four wheels, likewise human development should rest on the four dhammas, namely rived

Sharing, Pleasant Speech, Constructive Action, and Equality. 121 "Sharing" (dana) entails

not just the offerings given to monks but

edge, time, labor"

Buddhism

— to

others. "Pleasant

deemed

is

to generate "merit" but

not onlv the all

is

— of "goods, money, knowl-

not limited

Buddha but

to words from the teachings of the

of deceit. "Constructive Action"

giving

all

Speech"

rituals

to

all

as in traditional

talk

which have

"working for each other's

who

"equality" should not be restricted only to those

which

is

devoid

traditionally

been

benefit." Finally,

have become members of the

sangha but should mean that no group will exploit another. 122

Groups committed to the ideals of dhammic socialism have proliferated in the past two decades. They include the Coordinating Group for Religion and Society, the Thai Development Support Group, and the Asian Cultural Forum on Development (ACFOD), in which Sulak has played a key role. 123 They also include a growing number linked to "development monks" (phra phatthdna) whose idea of "development" is very different from the "development monks" of the 1960s and early 1970s who had been recruited bv the government. 124 Neither Phutthathat nor the groups which have sought to promote the equivalent

of a Social Gospel for Thai Buddhism can be considered "fundamentalist," for they remain committed to

a pluralistic

or ecumenical vision of Thai society, one which

includes not only adherents of different types of

and other non-Buddhists

as well.

Buddhism but Muslims,

Christians,

Their critique of capitalism has, however, had a

strong influence on groups which are indeed exclusionary and antipluralist.

A movement that emerged in the

1970s led by

a

monk known

Phra Kittiwuttho

as

(Kittivuddho) manifested the "reactive, reactionary" character of fundamentalist

movements elsewhere. 125 Kittiwuttho became

He

a

monk

shares with Phutthathat the view that Buddhists

in

1957

at the

age of twenty.

must give attention to the con-

ditions of the world because these are prerequisites to the pursuit of religious goals.

He

differs

from Phutthathat

in his

assuming an

active leadership role in the effort to

transform society in accord with his religious vision. This role

view of himself

as a saint

who

is

predicated

on

his

has forgone attainment of nibbana in order to help

others improve conditions in the world. 126

Kittiwuttho's major endeavor has been Cittaphawan College, which he founded in

1965 and continues to

direct.

The

of the sangha establishment, provides

and training

in religious

Development" depends on rate."

128

is

social action for

a healthv

economy; ...

The curriculum of the

all

but independent

monks. 127

"Program

Its

for Spiritual

skills

if

the people are poor,

Buddhism

societv, if the

.

.

will deterio-

such as carpentry and farming.

monks or

.

college includes secular as well as religious subjects,

reasons given for teaching secular subjects and offering practical train-

ing ... are that the

of

which has become

own distinctive form of education for novices

predicated on the assumption that "the prosperity of Buddhism

and students also acquire

The

and

college, its

novices

must have an understanding of all

propagation of Buddhism

is

aspects

to be carried out successfully.

BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 393

Second, the practical work and training dents

The

who may

novices and

of thousands for the

leave the

monkhood

monks who have been

— have formed

is

vocational preparation for those stu-

for the secular world.

trained at the college

129

— numbering

both within the sangha and

a cadre

in the tens

in lav organizations

promotion of Kittiwoittho's message.

In the mid-1970s Kittiwoittho caused a furor bv advocating that the killing of

communists does not

injunction against the taking of

communists

demerit that one would expect from the Buddhist

result in the

life.

He

are not persons but are the

justified this position

by maintaining that

embodiment of Mara,

the Buddhist devil.

This ideological position provided legitimacv for a right-wing political organization

backed bv manv out to

in the militarv

which

thought to have supported death squads sent

is

leaders of left-wing movements. Kittiwoittho's "militant

kill

vided a moral justification of violence in

movements Thai

ment

contemporary

in

His message

politics.

Sri

Buddhism

Lanka. 130 But

it

did not remain a major factor in

appeal after the installation of a

lost

Buddhism" prosome

similar to that espoused by

more

liberal

govern-

in the late 1970s.

In the wake of the political changes and because of a need to improve his reputation after he biles

became embroiled

in a scandal involving the

without the payment of proper

association with establishment

taxes,

import of Volvo automo-

Kittiwuttho

Buddhism and away from

moved toward

a closer

militancy. In the late 1980s,

two ranking monks in the Council of Elders sought to have Kittiwoittho appointed abbot of a famous and wealthy temple, Wat Rakhang, in Bangkok. In such ways monks aligned w ith the political establishment seek to "entrench their clique's position and influence both financially and politically." 131 Despite Kittiwoittho's association with the establishment, Cittaphawan College

remains semi-independent and through

some ways

similar to that advocated

proved efficiency plication

in

work

of dhamma;

self-sacrifice for

the

a

it

he advances an economic ethic that

is

in

bv Phutthathat. Kittiwoittho promotes "im-

and socioeconomic development through the apstrengthening of Buddhist morality to fight corruption; and practices

common

good." 132

He

couples this economic message with a

conservative political one, insisting that "a strong but benevolent central government

composed of representatives of the establishment can mote both development and social welfare." 133

A Buddhist approach

to politics

benefit the people

and economics similar to that of Kittiwoittho has

been adopted bv another movement which became significant 1980s. This movement, centered in

promotes

spiritual

and best pro-

Wat Thammakai on

in

Thailand in the

the outskirts of Bangkok,

renewal through the practice of a simplified form of meditation. 134

The name of the temple and of the movement, Thammakai (Pali dhammakaya), points to the central tenet of the movement, namely, that the dhammic "bod/' (kayo) of the Buddha can be found within the body of every person through meditation. By meditating on the seat of consciousness, located "two finger-breadths above the navel," 135 an effort that

is

to discover the

assisted

Buddha

by visualizing in oneself.

The

this place as a crystal sphere,

creation of this

method

is

one

is

supposed

credited to a

monk,

Charles F. Keves

394

usually

known

where he

Luang PhQ

as

who

resided,

Wat Paknam

("revered father")

died in 1959;

it

has been perpetuated by

two of his

disciples,

who founded

Phra Thammachavo (Dhammajayo) and Phra Thattachiwo (Dhattajlvo),

Wat Thammakai. Having transformed

monastery

after the

oneself spiritually through this method, one

is

prepared to return to the world and act without the desires that lead to suffering. Like the teachings of Phutthathat,

Thammakai emphasizes

that nibbana

is

to be

sought within the world, not through withdrawal from the world.

The

typical

Thammakai follower is a lay person who combines spiritual retreat on work or study in the everyday world during the rest of the week.

the weekends with

Many of the

followers are the "conservative Thai equivalent of Western 'yuppies'"

although some are also "senior members of the Thai establishment." people,

137

136

For these

Thammakai

offers religious legitimation for inequalities in wealth since suc-

world

held to be a reward for spiritual attainment. After practicing the

cess in the

is

monks who lead the movement, it is believed that "students will studv better and people will be more successful in their businesses." 138 The Thammakai movement has adopted an aggressive evangelical program to exmeditation method taught by the

tend

form of Buddhist nationalism throughout Thai

its

society.

For

its

evangelical

— including issuing glossy publications, holding international conferences, and supporting monks traveling both within and outside the country — and for the activities

maintenance of its architecturally striking and elaborate

on

sizable donations

from

its

followers.

facilities,

The temple-monastery

have assets of about $32 million. 139 Insofar as

it

it

from the

differs

the

tendency

movement

typical fundamentalist

in the

cal

and

is,

however,

clearly evident in the student

Thammathavot

universities are closed,

—

spiritual exercises.

monkhood

estimated to

from a

society,

fundamen-

groups which

has spawned.

Each hot season when dents the

sets itself off

movement. There

movement, one most

itself is

emphasizes evangelism over mainte-

nance of a form of spiritual purity by a community which

talist

Thammakai depends

heirs

of the

Male

dhamma

Wat Thammakai sponsors

—

program which

participants in the

program

entails

for stu-

both physi-

are ordained into the

while female participants assume the roles of lay ascetics.

The numbers

involved increased rapidly in the 1980s, with sixty male students ordained in 1979, the

first

year of the program, and over one thousand ordained in 1986. 140 Like those

ordained

at Kittiwuttho's

Cittaphawan College, those

who

have taken the

Thammakai have become a cadre of religious activists of Thammakai, this cadre is restricted almost completely

Thamma-

thavot program at

in the

In the case

to university

students.

A

verv interesting comparison could be drawn between the

students and the Malay students

missionary)

movements

who

have become

affiliated

world.

Thammakai

with dakwah (Islamic

dakwah followers have gained control of Thammakai followers now dominate most of the campuses in Thailand. Here they advocate a more

in Malaysia. Just as

student associations in Malaysia, so

Buddhist associations on university

Buddhism than do the nonstudent leaders of Thammakai. 141 Thammakai has come under criticism for what some consider to be

exclusivist

erodox approach to

spirituality.

a rather het-

Phra Thepwethi (Devavedhi), a theologian

who

is

highly respected both within the sangha establishment and by the followers of Phut-

— BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 395

thathat, 142 has observed that

orthodox Theravada Buddhism (by which

authoritative exegesis of the scriptures bv the fourth-centurv sees the tvpe

of meditation practiced by Thammakai

spiritual liberation

because

can become an end in

it

rather than true understanding

cized for

influential

inadequate for attainment of

producing a

spiritual

high criti-

itself,

meditation system, for the

its

followers of other perspectives

apparent political aspirations.

its

in

shown bv student

commentator on the

meant the

of self and the world. 143 The movement has been

dogmatic insistence on the superiority of

its

intolerance

as

is

monk Buddhaghosa)

144

on Buddhism, and

Kukrit Pramoj, a former prime minister and an

relationship

between

religion, politics,

contemporary Thailand, has questioned whether Thammakai

is

and economics

offering spirituality

or "religious pleasure" comparable to that of recreation clubs and fishing parks. 145 criticisms have not

to both the

for

been only verbal; some

main temple complex and

a

villagers, upset

about the

loss

The

of their lands

branch in northern Thailand, damaged a

Buddha image belonging to the movement, threatened to set fire to the temple, and attacked Thammakai monks. 146 The controversy surrounding Thammakai has not, however, been as intense as that relating to another movement, Santi Asoke. The Santi Asoke sect, its religious center on the outskirts of Bangkok, most closely fits the fundamentalistic mold of any of the movements in contemporary Thailand. The founder of Santi Asoke, known mainly bv his clerical name, Phra Phothirak (Bodhiraksa), typifies the stance which the movements have taken toward capitalism in Thailand. 147 In the 1960s he was a highly visible television personality life

of

Not

a playboy.

who

led the

finding satisfaction in materialism, he turned in his thirties to

more spiritual endeavors. In 1970 he was ordained a monk and soon began to practice a more strict form of Buddhism than was typical of most monks. As a monk, Phothirak became a vegetarian, breaking with the established interpretation in Theravada Buddhism that meat eating is permissible. He also became critical of most ritual practices, which he saw as distractions from the main purpose of Buddhist endeavor achieving detachment from worldly desires.

When

he was denied bv the abbot of the

Thammayut sect into which he had been ordained the right to creown following among members of the sangha, he left the order and was re-

monaster}' of the ate his

ordained

in the

Mahanikai

sect.

hierarchy and established his

In 1975, he separated completely from the sangha

own

religious center. Subsequently, he

monks himself even though he had not been delegated cials.

He

further alienated himself

began to ordain

this authority

by sangha

offi-

from the sangha by claiming to be an incarnation

of Sariputra, one of the Buddha's chief disciples, thereby claiming religious authority higher than that of the most senior

member of the

sangha.

Phothirak's message has been widely characterized in Thailand as "fundamentalist."

He requires all followers — lay as well as clerical — to abandon traditional religious

practices since they involve

Buddha images and

ritualized acts that he considers a

hindrance to achieving detachment. Instead, they must practice meditation on a daily basis and, for lay followers,

must adhere meals a day.

While

strictly to a

The

undertake spiritual retreats periodically. All followers

vegetarian diet, and even lay followers should eat only

true adherent

lay followers

must

eventually give

up

two

sexual activity even if married.

continue to hold positions in the world, they are not to pursue

Charles F. Keyes

396

their activities to satisfy their desires for wealth or

proach their

adherence to the is

with

activities strict

a

power. Rather, they are to ap-

detachment which has been cultivated through

version of the Buddhist precepts.

successful in the world, even in business, while

The

still

ideal follower

is

their

one

who

maintaining a very simple

lifestyle.

Phothirak's message has appealed to the younger generation professionals, middle-class to lower-class

— predominantly

— who have become disenchanted with the

commercialism, ritualism, and animism "which have overtaken our mainstream order

and which have been misinterpreted

as the true essence

of Buddhism." 148 His

fol-

lowers are found not only in Bangkok but also up-country, especially in his native northeastern Thailand.

who

and the man

By

most prominent of the followers of Santi Asoke,

far the

has brought the sect great

Major General Chamlong

visibility, is

Srimuang. 149

Chamlong was converted (and conversion the 1970s while tics, first as

still

him

I

believe, the appropriate term) in

he entered poli-

an adviser to the prime minister and then as a candidate for the governor-

someone who was the

ship of Bangkok. His image as politician,

is,

active in the military. After leaving the military,

whose

pursuit of office

is

antithesis

of the typical

impelled by the quest for power and wealth, gave

He won

a charismatic appeal in the gubernatorial election held in 1985.

landslide.

Chamlong's position probably protected Phothirak from

official

by a

condem-

nation for a period of time. As early as 1982 a commission was set up bv the Sangha

Council to investigate Phothirak, but nothing happened until 1989 when after public attacks bv

one of the most distinguished Buddhist theologians

Ratchawaramunl, that

is,

ThepwethI today), by

a

in the

country (Phra

former prime minister (Kukrit Pra-

moj), and even by sympathetic liberals (Prawase Wasi and Sulak Sivaraksa), the

Sangha Council

finally

pline of the order

determined that Phothirak was in violation of both the

and Thai law

relating to the sangha.

He

disci-

was ordered to be de-

frocked, and legal charges were brought against him.

On ment

19 June 1989, Phothirak was arrested, but almost immediately the govern-

instituted a

ban on media coverage of the aftermath of the

in

September of that year and was given almost no attention

all

on radio and

television.

Despite

long has remained very popular.

arrest.

His

in the press

trial

began

and none

at

— or perhaps because of— the controversy, Cham-

He was

reelected governor of

Bangkok

in early Janu-

1990 in a resounding landslide, and his party, Palang Dhamma (lit., power of the dhamma), took most seats on the city and district councils in related elections. The controversy over Santi Asoke has spurred considerable debate in Thailand ary

about whether establishment Buddhism has

failed to address itself to the

too rapid development and of excessive consumerism. Social Sivaraksa, have

echoed Phothirak

critics,

problems of

such as Sulak

denouncing the tolerance for magical-animistic "The emergence of [the] Santi Asoke fundamen-

in

bv members of the clergy: movement, [Sulak] says, reflects the inefficiency of the clergy in dealing with the pains of alienation among the younger generation, instead confining itself to performing rites and rituals, and concerning itself too gready with materialism and practices

talist

capitalism."

1

"

BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 39"

Throughout 1990 and 1991 very Santi

sangha were about a popular a

little

appeared

woman who

monk who was

stories

concerning the

charged with having had an

claimed to have given birth to his son.

ings bv sangha authorities

about Phothirak or

in the press

Asoke and the case remained unresolved. The major

A

affair

with

succession of legal proceed-

had found the woman's charges to be

monk

and the

valid,

was ordered to defrock. The case provided additional reason for the voungcr generation to feel alienated

from the sangha.

coup

In Februarv 1991, the militarv staged a

in

Thailand and abolished the con-

The National Peacekeeping Committee, whose members include the heads branches of the armed forces and the police, justified the coup on moral grounds,

stitution.

of all

claiming that the previous parliamcntarv-based government had been excessively corrupt.

They

also said the "dictatorship"

were most successful tutions.

in

of a parliament controlled bv the parties which

buying votes had led to the undermining of "national"

These institutions include not onlv the monarchv and the

were referred to extensively

in the

pronouncements of the coup

(established) sangha. Shortly after the coup, the leaders

support for establishment Buddhism bv appearing on a

militarv,

insti-

which

leaders, but also the

demonstrated

live television

visible public-

broadcast in an

audience with the Supreme Patriarch. Critics of establishment Buddhism, whether

or fundamentalists, are unlikelv to be allowed

liberals

military retains ultimate

marked

power

in Thailand.

similarity in the stance

of the militarv governments

Burma toward Buddhism, 151 some fundamental still

much freedom

so long as the

While on the surface there seems to be differences

a

both Thailand and

in

between the two countries

remain.

Conclusions While the debate talistic

in

Thailand about the appropriate stance for Buddhists toward capi-

development may be subdued for

the society have benefited to

unease about

its

ill

a period,

it

will continue.

some degree from economic growth,

Although most

there

is

in

widespread

consequences: unequal distribution of benefits; deterioration of

Bangkok, because of pollution and congested streets; from car accidents; destruction of forests, which will have long-term environmental consequences; high rates of prostitution; and so on.

the quality of

life,

especiallv in

significant increase in injuries

This unease has spurred

many

about economic

and about

activity

Although some

in

to look to their Buddhist culture for alternative ideas policies

which shape such

activity.

Thailand have intensified traditional patterns of "merit-

making," seeking to translate increased wealth through alms into the

kammic ladder of relative

appeal for the Thai than

establishment state

Buddhism

it

in

suffering, cosmological

as

higher position on

Buddhism today holds

does for the Burmese. The major reason for

Thailand

and serves to legitimate the

this

far less is

that

— the Buddhism which both controlled by the order — has been so shaped by the reformist is

political

thought undertaken by Mongkut and his successors in the to undermine the premodern view of the world as ordered hierarchically

rationalizing of Buddhist

sangha

a

Charles F. Keyes

398

according to the distribution of inherited "merit." Cosmological Buddhism has not

—

life, as some state-sponsored rituals especially members of the royal family are designed to evoke

disappeared from contemporary Thai

—

those involving the king or other

from those,

positive responses

remain

salient.

Even

living mainly in villages, for

The is

appeal

rituals

less as

evocations

dramatic theater. 152

Buddhism in Burma than in Thailand reforms of Buddhism were never as fully an establishment form of Buddhism in Burma as they were in Thai-

greater salience today of cosmological

due to

two

factors. First, the rationalizing

incorporated into land.

as

traditional ideas

for villagers, however, given their education in a state school

svstem which emphasizes rational control of life, such

of the sacred than

whom

Under

the British the state did not sponsor the creation of a statewide sangha

comparable to that

and without such

in Thailand,

a

sangha there was no authority to

enforce the institution of reformed Buddhist thought. Second, leaders of postcolonial

governments

in

Burma

have,

when confronted by

serious political crises, turned

themselves to traditional ideas about the relationships between ruler and the as manifest in a stupa

and between

ideas have been backed

ruler

and the sangha. In these

by the authority of the

Buddha

cases, traditional

state in a millenarianlike effort to

harmony between social and cosmic orders. in Burma cosmological Buddhism has not been the primary source of reflection about the relevance of Buddhist values for the modern political economy. In Burma as in Thailand, it was the reforms instituted in Buddhist thought and practice beginning in the nineteenth century that has spawned debates about Buddhist economics and Buddhist politics. Although the reform movements in the two countries restore

Even

have different histories, they share a

common

damentalist thought in other countries.

feature,

The reforms

one they

initiated

also share with fun-

by Prince Mongkut in

Thailand and Ledi Sayadaw in Burma entailed identifying the "basic" or "essential" doctrines of

Buddhism through

Whereas Buddhist reforms ments

in the

a

in

new critical examination of Buddhist teachings. 153 Burma became the basis of fundamentalist move-

1920s because they were linked to opposition to the

state

and to the

goal of national independence, those in Thailand were adopted by a state-sponsored

sangha and were linked, thus, to establishment Buddhism. that the fundamentalist potential in reformed Thai

1970s, an increasing

It

was not

until the

Buddhism reemerged. By

number of Thai, mainly from

1970s

the earlv

become promoted developconsequences and with an establishthe middle classes, had

disillusioned both with a patently corrupt political order that

ment with little regard for the social or cultural ment sangha which could not be counted on for support against government policies and actions. They turned instead to a variety of movements, some radically secular, such as the Communist Partv of Thailand, but others associated with members of the sangha who set themselves apart in one way or another from establishment Buddhism.

Although most of the Buddhist movements which rose to prominence in Thailand 1970s resemble fundamentalist movements elsewhere in their separation from

in the

established religion and in their selective emphasis

doctrine and practice, they

do not

all

on the

"essentials"

of Buddhist

share other characteristics typical of fundamen-

BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 399

talist

movements. Those groups associated with the dhammic

Thammakai movement

Phutthathat Phikkhu and the

because thev are ecumenical and the latter because

it is

socialist teachings

Other movements,

evangelical.

most notablv the militant Buddhist movement under Kittiwuttho the ethically strict Santi sivist

stances

sect

under Phothirak

in the

another,

these

all

nomic concerns which have

1970s and

movements have addressed themselves

intensified in the

1970s and 1980s

and Santi Asoke both advocate the pursuit of a "small

is

common good

rather than through

con-

groups

socialist

beautiful" philosophy, but

implemented through individual commitment to

see this as being

to eco-

as the disrupting

The dhammic

sequences of rapid growth have become more apparent.

about the

in the

1980s, have adopted exclu-

which resemble those of fundamentalisms elsewhere.

way or

In one

Asoke

of

former

are nonexclusivist, the

ethical premises

government imposition of socialist

poli-

Thammakai movement good for the society; but

Kittiwuttho, through his Cittaphawan College, and the

cies.

have taken a different stance, seeing economic growth as

both

insist that spiritual training

is

uncorrupted bv

essential if people are to be

materialism.

Although Buddhist fundamentalism was an important factor 1920s and 1930s,

it all

but disappeared

envisioned by the early fundamentalists ists

when

—

a welfare state

— was adopted by those who came to power

leaders for a

known

who

run bv Burmese national-

independent Burma. The growing socialist

Burma had

resulted

vision. Those monks who have assumed roles in the opposition to government of Burma oppose not onlv the state but also those in the

have associated themselves with the military. Although the ideas of the

monks which

in

in the

new

the military-run

political

Burma

and economic stagnation prompted the Burmans to look to some Buddhist

in political

sangha

in

1980s that the pursuit of the vision of a

realization in the

in

the political and economic program

any

detail

led a

new

fundamentalist

movement

Burma

in

1990

in

and mav not be known because of their suppression,

it

are not

appears

they advocated a stance toward economic behavior which contrasted to that of the

Burmese

Socialist

Programme

to control the base passions

Partv. Instead

of the

BSPP view

that the state

of humans, the new fundamentalists seemed,

is

needed

like their

Thai counterparts, to advocate placing responsibilitv for cultivating detachment from one's passions

on

the individual. Such a position, however,

is

not conducive to the

militancy which seems to be needed in the struggle against military rule.

Buddhist fundamentalism

concomitant of severe

in

political

both Burma and Thailand,

and economic

crises.

the character of fundamentalism. Rather, that character tive

way

priate

crises

been a

do not determine

must be sought

in the distinc-

which anv religious tradition formulates salvation goals and defines approaction within the world to attain such goals. In both Burma and Thailand, in

fundamentalism has been shaped bv reflection nineteenth centurv action

as elsewhere, has

But these

(kamma)

— on the

—

intensified since the reforms

basic Buddhist doctrines

for both self

of the

of the moral consequences of

and others and on the capacity of humans to

cultivate

detachment from desire (tanha) in order to achieve transcendence (nibbana) from suffering (dukkha).

Buddhist fundamentalists

in

both Burma and Thailand have sought to shape de-

Charles F. Keyes

400

bates about the relationship of the economies of these countries to a global system

dominated by

They have not, however, been notably successful in acquirwould make it possible to translate their positions into effective

capitalism.

ing the power which

how

public policy. This lack of success demonstrates sufficiently militant a religion

lence.

Herein may

a

lie

which

difficult

it

has been to

stresses individual responsibility

make

and nonvio-

major difference between Buddhist "fundamentalism" and

fundamentalisms associated with other religions.

Notes Although

1.

I

have not always adopted

their suggestions,

much

have very

I

bene-

from comments made on previous verof this paper by Robert Hefner, Michael Adas, Robert Taylor, Timur Kuran, Chao Tsang Yawnghwe, Jane Keyes, and R. Scott Appleby. The paper is part of a larger project on Buddhist ethics and economic action in which I have been intermittently infited

sions

volved

over

Charles

F.

the

past

several

years.

"La philosophic bouddhiste et les hommes economiques," Information sur les sciences sociales 18 (1979): 489-598; Chaiwat SathaAnand and Suwanna Wongwaisavawan, "Buddhist Economics Revisited," Asian Culture Quarterly (Taipei) 7 (1979): 3745; and Andreas Buss, "Buddhism and Rational

See

Keves, "Buddhist Economics in

Action," in Visakha Puja B.E. 2522 (Bang-

Economic

Activity," Internationales

Asienforum 13 (1982): 211-31. 5.

In

1989 the government of Burma de-

clared that the official

name of

the country

kok: Buddhist Association of Thailand, Annual Publication, 1979), pp. 19-25; In-

was Myanmar. The older name has, however, remained the preferred one in most writings on the country, and I use "Burma"

troduction to "Peasant Strategies in Asian

throughout

Moral and Rational Economic Approaches a Symposium," Journal of Asian Studies 42, no. 4 (1983): 753-68; "Economic Action and Buddhist Morality in

6. For a general overview of Theravada Buddhism, see Frank E. Reynolds and Regina T. Clifford, The Encyclopedia of Religion,

Societies:

—

s.v.

Thai Village," Journal ofAsian Studies 42, no. 4 (1983): 851-68; and "Buddhist Praca

Moralitv

tical

World:

A

land," in

in

a

Changing Agrarian

Case from Northeastern Thai-

Donald K. Swearer and Russell

Sizemore, eds., Attitudes toward Wealth and Poverty in Theravada

Buddhism (Columbia:

University of South Carolina Press, 1990), pp.

170-89.

2.

E. F. Schumacher, "Buddhist

(New

Econom-

York: Har-

ics," in

Small

per and

Row, 1973; originally published in Handbook, Guy Wint, ed. [London:

Asia:

A

Is Beautiful

Anthony Blond, 1966]), 3.

Ibid., p. 57.

4.

Ibid., p. 59.

the

economic

in this paper.

"Theravada."

The reform movements diat developed Cambodia and Laos were both derivative

7.

in

of the one begun 8.

in

Siam.

In characterizing Buddhist fundamen-

talism, I have drawn on Martin E. Marty's "Fundamentalism as a Social Phenomenon," Bulletin of the American Academy ofArts and Sciences 42 (1988): 15-29; and Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Applebv, "Conclusion: An Interim Report on a Hvpothetical Family," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby eds.. Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 814-42. '

p. 58.

9.

For other

implications

reflections

on

of Buddhist

teachings as contained in the Pali scriptures, see the following: Serge-Christophe

Kolm,

The development of Buddhist funda-

mentalism

ment 10.

in

in Ceylon Burma.

Buddhist

parallels

socialist

ideas

its

develop-

have

also

been promoted bv many of the leaders of Sri

BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 401

Lanka, and while the leaders of the Lao Peo-

Democratic

ple's

Republic

are

explicitly

committed to orthodox Marxist-Leninist dogmas, a case might also be made that the socialism of that small country has been adapted to the Buddhism of the majority of the population. The Burmese revolution begun in 1962 has certain similarities to that attempted by Pol Pot in Cambodia from 1975 to 1978; I believe it can be shown that the ideology of the Khmer Rouge also has significant Buddhist roots. See, in this regard, my "Buddhism and Revolution in Cambodia," Cultural Survival Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1990): 60-63. In Burma, however, socialism has been most distinctively Buddhist in character. 11. I

also

er's

yolume

first

in the

Funda-

mentalism Project. Swearer gave primary

emphasis

drawn

Thailand

to

to

Moyements

Sri in

Lanka.

with

comparisons

"Fundamentalistic

Theravada Buddhism,"

As Therayada Buddhist

rive their religious

traditions de-

language from

Pali texts,

employ Pali rather than Sanskrit forms of Buddhist terms. Thus, I use kamma instead of karma, nibbdna instead of nirvana, and I

soon. doctrine

of dukkha

subsumes the experiences of both well-being and suffering since states of well-being are never permanent and

when

perience

In

is

painful.

they end, the ex-

practice,

however,

Burmese and Thai Buddhists contrast

well-

being with suffering.

The Study of Popular

"Introduction:

of Karma,"

in

entine Daniel, eds.,

F.

(Berkeley:

California Press, 1983), pp. 15.

University

of

1-26.

percentage of produce or

as a

Detachment from the world cannot one seeks

a

not, however, de-

is

in-

rather, the

— — offered to members of the sangha.

17.

am

I

concerned here primarily with

the dominant people of Burma, the ethnic

Burmans. The discussion

applies, to a great

Mons and

Arakanese as and the term "Burmese" as I use it subsumes Burmans, Mons, and Arakanese. The extent, to ethnic well,

analysis does not, however, apply to Shans,

whose members

groups

also

adhere

to

Buddhism. 18. Quoted in Michael Aung-Thwin, Pagan: The Origins of Modern Burma (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985),

173.

p.

19. Ibid., p. 169.

20. Sir James

George Scott characterizes

well the pattern as

it

teenth century: "It

how many pagodas

existed in the late ninecertainly marvelous

is

there are in the country,

exceeding the number raised in the sacred

far

island

of Cevlon, or by the Thibetans

Chinese.

.

.

.

No work

of merit

taga [donor of a pagoda] saint

on

earth,

is

is

[or]

so richly

The

Paya-

regarded as a

and when he dies he obtains

him there are no more Shway Yoe [pseud, for James George Scott], The Burman: His Life and Notions (New York: W. W. Norton, Norton the

last release; for

deaths."

in cultivating

revised edition in 1909), p. 153.

21. Cf. Melford E. Spiro, Buddhism Society:

1970),

and

A Great Tradition and Its Burmese v

i-

cissitudes

den

be equated with "renunciation" of the world since

ter

Ideas

Keyes and E. ValKarma: An Anthropo-

Charles

Inquiry

Christian

Library, 1963; originally published in 1882;

14. See, in this regard, Charles F. Keyes,

logical

Dana

paid as the building of a pagoda.

The Buddhist

13.

the

donation impelled bv

donor gives according to her or his own wishes. The most common types of dana are die "four requisites" food, clothing, medicine, and shel-

in

Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms Observed, pp. 628-90. 12.

termined

a

it is

religious motive.

come;

to

similar

is

Buddhist Karen, and some other smaller

By emphasizing Burma in this paper, seek to complement Donald K. Swear-

paper for the

Dana

16.

"tithe" in that

(New 455;

p.

Road

to

temporary

Harper and Row, Manning Nash, The Gol-

York: cf.

Modernity: Village Life in Con-

Burma (New

York: John Wiley

and Sons, 1965), pp. 116-17. 22. In the Mandalay-area village of Yeigyi

detachment to

1960 one

was

wealthy

transcend the passions that lead to attach-

in

ments to the world rather than to world as such.

to have sponsored the construction of a

reject the

monastery

villager

sufficiently

at a total cost

of 10,000

kvats,

.

Charles F. Keyes

402

which

of exchange was more than twenty times

at the official rate

equal to $2,100, or

the annual per capita cash income. Nash,

The Golden Road

to

Modernity, p. 118.

The

of exchange from 1948 to 1971 was

rate

4.76 kvats to the berg,

dollar.

See David

Stein-

I.

Burma's Road toward Development:

Growth and Ideology under Military Rule (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p. xix. 23.

Shwav Yoe, The Burman,

24.

I

am

p. 22.

indebted for this insight to an

unpublished paper by Nancy Pollock.

and

25. Spiro, Buddhism also see p.

to

234;

Modernity,

1987 which

I

which was spent observed.

29. "Pagan stands as an example of

gious endowments

reli-

and temple buildings

that acted as stimulants to agricultural pro-

duction and a variety of related 'industries'; people were attracted into the kingdom where the religion flourished, the culture was exquisite, and festivities and work were plentiful." Aung-Thwin, Pagan, p. 170.

Buddhism and Society, p. 454; Melford E. Spiro, "Buddhism and Economic Saving in Burma," American An30. Spiro,

thropologist

68

(

1

966

)

:

1 1

63 - 73

31. E. Sarkisyanz, Buddhist Backgrounds

131. 26.

to the 14,000 kvats

in the rite in

also see

Society, p.

Nash, The Golden Road

power

Shway Yoe, The Burman,

pp.

22-23.

of the Burmese Revolution (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), p. 142.

and Society,

27. Spiro, Buddhism

p.

235. 32. For an analvsis of the transformation

Burma

1960 in which the average annual income per family was approximately K 1,000, the costs of a shin-byu ranged from K200 to K5,000. Cf. Spiro, Buddhism and Society, p. 237. Nash, The Golden Road to Modernity, p. 126, gives similar figures. In 1987, a tour group under mv leadership came across a shin-byu in a village between Meiktila and Mandalay.

of the Burmese

We

Asian Rice

28. In a village in upper

stopped for a time

in

at the village to join

the roughly one thousand people

who had

joined the festivities prior to the actual or-

economy during the John Sydenham Furniand Practice: A Compara-

political

colonial period, see vall,

Colonial Policy

Study of Burma and Netherlands India (New York: New York University Press,

tive

1956;

first

published in 1948).

33. Michael Adas, The

Burma Delta:

Eco-

nomic Development and Social Challenge on an Frontier,

of

University

1852-1941 (Madison:

Wisconsin

Press,

1974),

pp. 140-41.

dination. There were five boys being or-

34. See Sarkisvanz, Buddhist Backgrounds

appearing to be between seven to

160-65; RobSolomon, Saya San and the Burmese Rebellion (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Cor-

dained,

all

The ceremony was being sponsored by one boy's parents. Through our Tourist Burma guide, we learned that the sponsors nine.

of the Burmese Revolution, pp.

ert L.

poration,

Rand Corporation

Papers P-4004,

of the ceremonv had spent 14,000 kyats. This is equivalent to $2,090 at the then of-

1969); Michael Adas, Prophets of Rebellion: Millenarian Protest Movements against the

should be noted

European Colonial Order (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979),

ficial

rate

of exchange.

It

that official rates of exchange have not, ever

Burma gained

independence, corbuving power of the kyat in Burma. In the 1980s, the black market rate for the kvat was between 30 and 34 kvats to the doilar as compared to an official since

responded to the

its

real

pp.

James

185ff.;

Economy of sistence

and

149-57; to Laity:

Maung, From Sangha

Movements of Burma, 1 920 - 1 940 (Columbia, Mo.: South Asia Books, Austra-

5,000 kvats which Nash and Spiro report as having been expended for shin-byus when

South Asia, no.

equal in buying

and Sub-

(New Haven:

U Maung Nationalist

may have been roughly

The Moral

Yale University Press, 1976), pp.

of 6.69. The difference between official and black market rates in the late 1950s and earlv 1960s was not so great. Thus, the

1959-60

Scott,

South-east Asia

rate

they carried out their fieldwork in

C.

the Peasant: Rebellion

lian

National University

Monographs on 83-107; and

4, 1980), pp.

The Hsaya San Rebellion (Melbourne: Monash University, Centre of Southeast Patricia Herbert,

(1930-1932)

Reappraised

BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 403

Asian

Working Papers, no. 27,

Studies,

1992). 35. Winston L. King, "Contemporary Burmese Buddhism," in Heinrich Dumoulin and John C. Maraldo, eds.. Buddhism in the Modern World New York: Collier Books, 1976), p. 90; also see Winston L. King, In Hope of Nibbana: An Essay on Theravada (

Buddhist Ethics (LaSalle,

Open

111.:

Court,

U Ba Yin (Rangoon: Thamamitta, Djambatam, n.d.). The most extended account in English is to be dependence) bv Bama Khit

found

Michael Mendelson, Sangha and Burma: A Study of Monastic Sectarianism and Leadership (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press), pp. 200-206.

1

Robert

(Lincoln:

University

Sakai, ed.. Studies on Asia

of Nebraska

Press,

1965), pp. 201-9. 36. Savadaw,

come

from soya (teacher)

a senior elder

ten vears in the

achieved

is

monk who

a

a

bv virtue of spending has

knowledge or

for

The term typically is used in association with the name of the monasters' or communitv where the monk resides. The Ledi Savadaw was a highlv respected

religion.

monk who

resided at the Ledi-tawva

upper Burma. See "A Life Sketch of the Venerable Ledi Savadaw," in Ledi Savadaw, The Manual of Insight: Vipasmonastery

in

U

sana Dipani, translated bv

Nyana Maha-

Thera (Kandy, Ceylon: Buddhist Publica-

Wheel Publication no. 31/32, Although some of the Ledi Sayadaw's writings on Buddhist meditation

tion Society,

1961),

86.

p.

have been translated into English, his only sketchily

recorded

in

a

life is

number of

to

Ottama, Rangoon Gazette Weekly Julv and 19 September 1921.

11

Quoted

term

has be-

monkhood and who

reputation

a

of

practice

U

42.

Budget,

43.

Smith, Religion and

in

Burma,

of respect accorded to

Maung Maung, From Sangha

41. See

Laity, p. 14.

1964), and Winston L. King, "Samsara Revalued,' in

in E.

State in

p.

Burma

Police Department,

the Police Administration

quoted

in

Politics

in

Repon

on

96.

in

Burma, 1922,

Albert D. Moscotti, British Pol-

and the Nationalist Movement in Burma, 1917-1937 (Honolulu: University Press of icy

Hawaii, 1974),

36.

p.

44. Sarkisvanz, Buddhist Backgrounds of the

Burmese Revolution,

p.

126.

45. Mendelsohn, Sangha and State Burma, pp. 223-24.

46. Smith, Religion

and Politics

in

in

Burma,

101.

p.

47. King, "Samsara Revalued," p.

207

(emphasis in original). 48. Sarkisvanz, Buddhist Backgrounds of the

Burmese Revolution, pp. 168-69.

49. Ibid., p. 170. 50. Josef

Silverstein,

Burma: Military

scattered sources in English. See Ledi Sava-

Rule and the

daw, The Manual of Insight, and Ledi Savadaw, The Requisites of Enlightenment:

Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 86Ba Swe, The Burmese 87; quotations from

Bodhipakkhiya Dipani,

Revolution

Nyo Tun (Kandy, cation Society,

translated

bv Sein

Ceylon: Buddhist Publi-

Wheel Publication no. 171/

74, 1971).

History

of University

278; "A Life Sketch,"

Press, 1967), p.

p. 86.

38.

"A

39.

Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and

Life Sketch," p. 86.

Burma

(Princeton: Princeton Uni-

as

U

their

source Savadaw

Seikdat

Ottama: he

Office,

1952), pp. 10, 14, 17; see also Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, pp. 128—29.

who

U Ottama U Ottama:

(Sayadaw sowed the seeds of in-

Myozicha

the

Burmese Revolution,

p.

197.

52. Ibid., p. 169.

53.

He was

minister

prime minister for gion and Trager,

40. All English accounts of cite

U

(Rangoon: Information

of defense

and

mines, deputv prime minister, and even

versity Press, 1965), p. 88.

Lutlatye

of Stagnation (Ithaca:

51. Sarkisvanz, Buddhist Backgrounds of

Maung Htin Aung, A Bunna (New York: Columbia 37.

Politics in

Politics

thu

Politics in

a year.

Burma,

See Smith, Relip.

Burma from Kingdom

Historical

and

128; Frank N. to

Political Analysis

Republic:

(New

A

York:

1966), pp. 131-32, 173. Both Robert Taylor (personal communication, 7 January 1990) and Chao Tzang Yawnghwe Praeger,

Charles F. Keyes

404

(personal communication, 2

March 1990)

have suggested, although for quite different

ing material developments, cerns

are

as

much

central con-

its

related

to

traditional

may have overemphasized

notions of Burmese authority and the laws

U Ba Swe's role in the development of politi-

of Buddhist causation." See Jon Wiant, "Tradition in the Service of Revolution: The

reasons, that

I

Burma. I agree with Tavlor that U Nu and Thakin Soe were of at least equal importance to Ba Swe. I have focused on Ba Swe because his thought appears to be an important link between the Buddhist socialism of the U Nu period and the Burmese Road to Socialism of the Ne Win era. cal culture in

Political F.

since

but 'co-operation between

as 'welfare state'

1962

1981),

p.

(Singapore:

in

Burma

in

Maruzen

Asia,

62.

59. Taylor, The State in

60. 54. "Pyidawtha has been freely translated

Symbolism of Taw-hlan-ve-khit,"

K. Lehman, ed.. Military Rule

Burma,

p.

361.

Quoted in Silverstein, Burma: Miliand the Politics of Stagnation, p. 82;

tary Rule

emphasis

in original.

people and government for the happiness of the countrv'

Burma

Cadv,

F.

A History ofModem

Cornell University Press,

(Ithaca:

616. The Pvidawtha program was

1958),

p.

first set

forward

55. After

in

Ne Win

took power

in

1962,

munication, 7 January 1990.

owned bv nonresident landlords), lower Burma was the rice basket of the country and the source of most of the rice exported. See Robert H. Taylor, The State in Burma (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, p.

276. Socialist

Programme

Party,

The System of Correlation ofMan and His Environment (Rangoon: Burma Socialist Pro-

gramme

Partv, 1963).

58. Steinberg,

Burma: A Socialist Nation Wiant savs that al-

of Southeast Asia, p. 76.

though

U

this

work, apparently written by

Chit Hlaing, a Marxist active

in the prc-

revolution National United Front, "draws extensively

on Marxist teaching

1964; quoted p.

in

King, "Samsara Revalued,"

206. 63. Tavlor, The State of Burma, p. 358.

64. Mya Maung, "Cultural Values and Economic Changes in Burma," Asian Survey 4(1964): 763.

Road toward DeThe State in Burma, p. 341, places the number of Indian and Pakistani refugees from Burma between 65. Steinberg, Burma's

velopment, p. 35; Taylor,

125,000 and 300,000.

42 percent of the cultivated land in lower Burma was in the hands of nonresident landlords. Although absentee landlordism was not significant in upper Burma (onlv 7.5 percent of the land was 56. In 1948,

Burma

cialist

62. The Guardian (Rangoon), 19 April

"Ba Swe used to lead a large parade of laymen around the streets of east Rangoon where I lived soliciting alms." Personal com-

57.

is here quoting from the Burma SoProgramme Party's The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment.

Taylor

1952.

Ba Swe was imprisoned along with U Nu and other politicians of the 1950s. When he was released after a short time, he went into retirement. Steinberg, Burma's Road toward Development, pp. 127-28. Robert Taylor reports that when he was in Burma in 1982

1987),

61. Tavlor, The State in Burma, p. 363;

probablv nearer the true

is

meaning." John

in explain-

66. Beginning

in

the

earlv

nineteenth

centurv. Christian (American Baptist Mis-

sion and Catholic) missionaries

considerable success vert tribal Karen.

Bv

met with

in their efforts

to con-

the end of die colonial

period, the large Karen Christian popula-

was found mainly in lowland village and towns. Christian Karen have provided die main leadership of die Karen National Defense Organization, an organization committed to obtaining for Karen either independence or considerable autonomy within the Burmese state. Shan who are related to the Thai and who live in northeastern and northern Burma were relatively both the autonomous under precolonial Burma state and under the cotion

— —

lonial state. After

1962, however, the Bur-

mese government jailed many of the Shan leaders and eliminated most aspects of Shan autonomy. Kachin tribal people, living in

.

BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BL'DDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 405

northern Burma, also have been converted

ments the involvement of monks

to Christianity in large numbers, although

onstrations.

much more recently than were the Karen. Many Kachin also have felt threatened bv

151, 178,217.

Burmese the history of eth-

the assimilationist policies of the

On

state since the 1960s.

nic rebellions in Burma, see Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics ofEthnicity

(London: Zed, 1991).

Burma,

67. Taylor, The State in

p.

334.

Ethnic insurgencies may, however, have an

Road toward De-

velopment, p. 4.

69. In 1940/41 rice exports had totaled

3,123,000 tons. In 1974-75 they had de-

166,000

clined to

an

reached

1979-80. 70.

tons. In the

increased some,

years they

subsequent

but

still

700,000

estimated

Hal

Hill

and

Economy

1960s (Singapore:

Jayasuriya,

in

An

Transition:

in

Burma

since

the

of Southeast

Institute

Asian Studies, Occasional Paper no.

80,

p. 31.

the Expected

UN

Approval for LDC Status," Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 October 1987, p. 101.

78. Tin Maung Sangha and Sasana,"

79. See

Sricharatchanya,

"Riots over

Kyats," Far Eastern Economic Review,

September 1987,

tem,"

"Burma Violence Re-

Disillusionment with Socialist Sys-

The

Burmese

Review, 5

Nation

(Bangkok),

Docility,"

26 June the Key

Is

Far Eastern Economic

November 1987,

p. 50.

Bangkok Post, 25 June 1988; The Na(Bangkok), 26 June 1988. Also see Ber-

75. tion til

Republic,

Also

19.

50.

2

November 1987, Outrage,

Lintner,

see

"Burmese

Sullivan,

pp.

93-94. 80. "Paid for by public donations (estimated at more than 50 million kyats), supervised by a central committee chaired bv the chairman of the Rangoon Division People's Council, and supported by nine working

committees,

brella

took more than five-and-a-

it

28

could be hoisted to

February

Daze,"

p.

Golden

1986,"

its

Um-

pinnacle on

"Burmese

Sullivan,

49.

81. Steinberg, Burma's

Road toward

So-

cialism, p. 86.

By 1988

there

was

also at least

Lintner, Outrage: Burma's Struggle for

one sangha

opposition grouping, the Union of Young

Monks, operating

in territory controlled

by

ethnic insurgents. See "Reflections from a

Monks under of Ne Win," Seeds dhist

(1990):

1988, and Margaret Scott, "Fear to

17

p. 13.

74. Denis Gray, flects

Andrew

Nnr

Daze,"

Maung Than, "The p.

Buddhist Perspective:

72. Ibid.

73. Paisal

163-64.

82. See Lintner, Outrage, pp. 113, 166.

Ted Morello, "Forlorn Conclusion:

Burma Nears

141,

77 Ibid., p. 89; also see Taylor, The State Burma, p. 358, Lintner, Outrage, p. 91; and, for a detailed description. Tin Maung Maung Than, "The Sangha and Sasana in Socialist Burma," Sojourn 3 (1988): 26-61.

half years before the Hti or

Sisira

Economic Development

71.

in

Ibid., p. 113.

Inward-Looking

1986),

only

tons

dem-

132,

in

p.

68. Steinberg, Burma's

in the

pp.

76. See Lintner, Outrage, pp.

important influence on the shape of Bur-

mese nationalism in the post-Ne Win period. See Smith, Burma.

See Outrage,

83.

Problems of Bud-

the Single-Party System

of Peace (Bangkok) 6.1

7.

SLORC

has

attempted to finance

purchases of arms and salaries for a large

army by

selling concessions to

firms for exploitation

and

of

non-Burmese

forests,

fisheries,

oil reserves.

84. Bertil Lintner, "Saffron Sanctions,"

Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 November 1990. 85. The Nation

(Bangkok), 2 October

Democracy (Hong Kong: Review Publishing

1990.

Company, 1989), pp. 122-23. Lintner, whose book and articles in the Far Eastern Economic Review provide the most detailed account of the events of 1987-89, docu-

86. See The Nation and the Bangkok Post, 23 and 24 October 1990. In December Major General Khin Nyunt, the first secretary of SLORC, said that the government had ar-

Charles F. Keyes

406

rested seventy-seven

monks. The Nation, 8

of Power in Thailand, Laos, and Burma, Bardwell L. Smith, ed., (Chambersburg, Pa.:

tion

December 1990. Time magazine, in a feature article on Burma, 19 November 1990, estimated the total arrested was about two

Anima Books, 1978),

hundred.

ages of recent construction than one does in

87. See Time,

Bangkok

Post,

19 November 1990, and

ironicallv, these

development of Thailand than Burma since

November 1990.

more

their construction requires

89.

use the term "Thai" here to include

I

the major Tai-speaking peoples

— the

central

cated technology and architectural are currently available in

Thai or Siamese, northern Thai or Yuan, northeastern Thai or Lao, southern Thai or

Khon Pak who

Thai, and those of Chinese de-

have assimilated to Thai culture

scent

(sometimes called Sino-Thai)

85-90

constitute

— who

todav

percent of the population

of Thailand. Although these peoples today

some distinctive characteristics premodern traditions, all have adapted over the past centurv to the same retain

still

from

dieir

political

economic conditions. Other Tai-

speaking groups outside of Thailand

—

92.

forms

—

the

stem from adapting to

have not taken into account in the discus-

sion that follows the approximately 5 per-

who do

not belong to Tai-speaking groups but are still

Buddhist.

dhists are

Most of these non-Thai Budor members

Khmer (Cambodians)

of groups related to the Khmer. 90. All of the traditions of Theravadin

Southeast Asia, for example, give great to

significance

the

presentation

Vessantara-jataka, the story of the

ritual

of the life

of

which he that of achieved the last of the virtues necessarv to attain Buddha"generositv" the

Buddha

in his incarnation in

—

—

91. There

is

nodiing quite equivalent

in

to the "Emerald Buddha," an image

that has successively served as the palladium

of the kingdoms of Lanna Thai (northern Xang (Laos), and Siam/Thai-

Thailand), Lan

See Frank E. Reynolds, "The Holy Emerald Jewel: Some Aspects of Buddhist Symbolism and Political Legitimation in Thailand and Laos," in Religion and Legitima-

land.

"The Buddhist Monkhood

Cornell University, 1973).

cussed these reforms at

I

have also

some length

in

diss.,

dis-

my

in

and Their Revolutionary Origin in Thailand," in S. N. Eisenstadt, ed.. Structure and History, a special issue of the International Political Science Review 10 (1989): 121-42. "Buddhist

Politics

93. See, in this regard,

mv "Buddhism

and National Integration in Thailand," Journal of Asian Studies 30, no. 3 (1971):

551-68. 94.

On

the role of Prince Wachirayan,

Revnolds, "The Buddhist

especiallv,

see,

Monkhood

in

Nineteenth Century Thai-

land," and Autobiography: The Life of PrincePatriarch Vajiranana of Siam, 1860-1921,

and introduced bv Craig

translated, edited,

Revnolds (Athens: Ohio Universitv Press, 1979). Names and titles for Buddhist

J.

monks, ranks

in the

manv monasteries

Sangha, and names of are

derived

from

Pali

forms; they are, however, pronounced ferentlv in Thai.

form

first

dif-

give the Thai phonetic

I

with the

Pali

form

95. Total exports from

in parentheses.

Burma were, on

the average, about double diose from Siam for the period.

hood.

Burma

The major study of the Buddhist reinitiated bv Mongkut is by Craig

Revnolds,

verv different political economic conditions.

cent of the population of Thailand

than

Burma.

Nineteenth Centurv Thailand" (Ph.D.

the

other hand, evolved contrasting patterns of

I

sophistiskills

e.g.,

Lao of Laos, the Shan of Burma, and Lue of southwestern China have, on

the

cultural practice that

images

stand as indicators of the greater economic

4 and 5 Februarv 1991.

88. Time, 19

Burma. Somewhat

175-93. In Thaimore gargantuan im-

pp.

land todav one sees far

For

figures, see Charles

Fisher, Southeast Asia:

A.

A Social, Economic and

Geography (London: Methuen and 1964),^- 436, 507. 96. For 1937-39 exports of rice from Burma averaged 6,585 million pounds com-

Political

Co.,

pared to an average of 3,349 million pounds for

1935-39

for Siam.

97. Statistics for sell

Burma

are

from

J.

Rus-

Andrus, Burmese Economic Life (Stan-

BUDDHIST ECONOMICS AND BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISM 407

Stanford

ford:

University

issued

Press,

required to adhere to a precept against view-

More wealthv

under the auspices of the American Council,

ing entertainments.

of Pacific Relations, 1948), p. 164, table 23, while those for Siam are from James C. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand, 1950-1970 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), p. 38, table III and

monasteries also have automobiles, vans,

Institute

p.

9 York Times, 8

52. Tern', Operation Rescue, p. 17.

permanent

a

injunction earlv in 1989, Operation Rescue

equivalent to an undergraduate degree or a

on proof-texting the

Bv

contrast, Susan Faludi suggests that Tern'

72.

Quoted

in

Abortion Protests 73.

p.

92.

Brozan, "Effectiveness of Is

Gam' Wills,

Debated."

the historian and scholar

.

SAVING AMERICAS SOULS 585

of American culture observed in an essay written in the summer of 1989 that Terry's "contribution to the effort was not only his

organizing on a larger scale but his

common

disci-

movement bv adoption of

plining of the

tactics for all the

demonstrations.

which had been improvised and unpredictable (in the Scheidler manner) up to this point." Wills, "Evangels of Abortion," p. 19.

Quoted bv Ronald Smothers, "Or-

ganizer of Abortion Protests lanta,"

York

AYti'

letin,

1989,

Julv

decision will be appealed bv the plaintiffs.

See

Church, "Tactics Change

Biuahamtou

Passes,"

20 November 1989,

Ann

Press p.

as

& Sun Bul-

Tern Operation -

,

1990,

Rescue, p. 175.

Objecting to Fine,"

Jailed

after

Times,

6 October 1989.

civil

on

ing abortions

New

was found guiltv

rights

of

women

seek-

the basis of an 1871 law

Ku

drafted to prevent

Klux Klan

activity.

Operation Rescue has challenged the ruling, case,

Health Center,

Bray will

p.

Ale.xandna Women's

be heard before the U.S.

Supreme Court during 1991-92. 80. Constance

Hays,

Foes

Lose Appeal on Protests," New York Tunes, 21 September 1989, p. Al.

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Law, written in 1970, was aimed at organized crime. The 81.

v.

Scheidler et

al.,

NOW et

al.

using diis law was brought

5

NOW, Planned Parenthood, NARAL, claimed that and a number of clinics. Operation Rescue members were acting like racketeers, trying to frighten awav pregnant women and health care workers from clinics. In that sense, they argued. Operation Rescue was engaged in extortion and the use of force to denv rights to others. Operation

NOW

in

New

York; other anti-abortion groups have been fined 5350,000. Alan Dershowitz of Har-

vard

Law

School

feels

this

Cam-

Kim Lawton, "Operation

in

Closed,"

Christianity

Today,

March 1990.

The

84.

fines

were for breaking injuncpeople from blocking

preventing

women's

access to abortion clinics.

85. Craig Wolff, "Judge Fines 10 for Pro-

New

over Abortions"

tests

York Times, 28

February 1990. 86. Staff

Quoted

in

Tamar Lewin, "With Thin

and Thick Debt,"

A 16.

p.

noted that the protesters

It

should be

a: St. Patrick's paid

and respected court orders, unlike Rescue activists. Violating the court order was the reason for the fine. the Operation

87. Ibid. 88. Ibid. 89. Personal

Church, journalist

CrSun

application

is

too broad. "Whatever vou can sav about

communication, Susan at the Binahamton Press

Bulletin.

90. Randall A. Tern', letter to support-

by

Rescue has been fined $150,000

Scheidler,"

their fines

"Abortion

case against Operation Rescue,

HQ

Rescue York

v.

7.

29.

Quoted

tions

79. Operation Rescue

of violating the

p.

5A.

78. Jerrv Schwartz, "Abortion Protester

and the

"NOW

Baker,

82. "Rescue Bails Out." Time, 12 February

83. 77.

for a financial motive.

paign Report 4, no. 13:

76. Susan

Time

it

vou can terrorize protestors the threat of bankruptcy is an attack on democracy.'' See David Shribman, "NOWs Use of RICO against Attacks bv Groups on Abortion Clinics Stirs Debate on Law's Intent," Wall Street Journal, 22 May 1990, p. A22. On 28 May 1991, district Judge James Holderman dismissed r. Scheidler on the grounds diat the defendants are not financially competitive with the plaintiffs. His idea that

At-

Is Jailed in

12

Times,

A 10.

p.

The w ith

NOW

74. See n. 35 for details. 75.

these demonstrators, they're not racketeers.

They're not doing

ers,

15 October 1990, Binghamton, N.Y.

D.C. Project

91 belt,

II

brochure, n.d., Green-

Md.

92. Associated Press, "Judge Orders U.S.

Marshals to Prevent Closing of Abortion

30

Clinics," Neir York Times,

93.

Gwen

Ifill,

July 1991.

"1871 Law

Abortion Dispute,"

New

at

Issue in

York Times,

1 1

Au-

gust 1991. 94. Isabel

Wilkerson,

Abortion Finds

a

"Drive

against

Svmbol: Wichita,"

York Times, 4 August 1991.

New

Faye Ginsburg 586

95. In early 1989, Father

Norman Wes-

former lieutenant colonel

lin, a

Armv

joined

paratroopers,

in the U.S.

with

activists

97. Ibid.

Ann

98.

Baker, personal communication,

August 1991.

Joan Andrews and Randall Tern' to form

what he describes as a "rapid deployment force, a special group of 50-200 dedicated persons who will flv to any part of the nation on short notice to assist any rescue operations with needed reinforcements." Stanlev Interrante,

Wanderer, 16 Februarv 1989.

Originallv he called this group the "Victim

Souls of the the

Unborn

Christ Child" and later

99.

Wilkerson,

I.

"Drive

against

Abortion."

Don Terry,

100.

"Faces of Protest."

101. Keith Tucci,

letter

to

supporters

from Operation Rescue, 6 September 1991, Somendlle, S.C.

Quoted

102.

Lewin, "With Thin Staff

in

and Thick Debt."

"Lambs of Christ."

According to

Baker,

who

runs a pro-

watchdog organization

choice

"80%

Ann

the

called

Majoritv," the group chose

its

own

and hopes there will be local support. "Lambs" are supposed to identify with the targets

name either Babv John Doe. Thev refuse to give their

fetus, giving as their

or Babv Jane

103. Barbara Brotman, "Abortion

Oppo-

nents Regroup," p. 9. 104. Rescue Report,

June 1990, Opera-

tion Rescue.

105. "National Rescue Recap," Operation

Rescue National Rescuer, August- September

1991,

p. 5.

names or walk anwvhere from the time thev are arrested until thev are sentenced.

The

106. Tucci

riod of incarceration accomplishes several goals:

ties

it

up

local systems,

focus for fundraising, and

it

provides a

allows the core

it

—

letter.

pe-

—

group members who have no jobs free room and board. It appears that there are between fifty and one hundred dedicated

When

107.

the writer, Francis Wilkerson,

1989 interview published

in his

Stone, queried

Tern about

in Rolling

the comparisons

made between him and Martin Luther King, Terry replied that he discourages

"Moments

later,

however, Tern' has the

it.

te-

follow Weslin's lead-

merity to explain that his proper place will

ership directly, although there are others

be a matter determined bv historv. 'The ap-

itinerant militants

who

who

behave similarly

who

are not as ex-

treme. Three other organizations

—

clinics in

Toledo,

12 August 1988,

Ohio;

Appleton,

Wis.;

Youngs-

Dobbs

Fern', N.Y.; Asheville, N.C.;

and Fargo, N.D. See Ann Baker, "A Report on the Direct Action Militants," Campaign Report 4, no. 9: 5-8.

What

particularlv interesting

is

perspective of this

volume

that this group,

is

made up of radically consenative is

from the Catholics,

cooperating so completely with the

bv

represented

of fundamentalists

breed

Tern

new

r

96.

.

Don

Wichita

Is

Tern',

"Face

of Protests

Religious and Undoubting,"

York Times, 12 August 1991.

in

New

of

contemporaries

he adds with a flourish"

(p. 92).

Burlington, Vt.; Pittsburgh, Pa.;

town, Ohio; Lufkin, Texas; South Bend, Ind.;

contempt little,'

Movement

offer support

In

ing.

or

plause

means very

and Rescue Outand probablv fundrais1990-91, "Lambs" blockaded

Pro-Life Police,

Souls,

reach

— Victim

Quoted

108.

Lyn Cn'derman, "A

in

Divided," p.

Christianity

Today,

48.

109. Such activities were also denounced

by right-wing Christian reconstructionists because they are in violation of civil law, and because thev "violate the Christian presupposition that change

God's power." p. 80.

comes only through

Ammerman,

Bible Believers,

See also Randy Frame, "Atlanta Gets

Tough," Christianity Today, 4 November 1988,

p.

35.

110. David Coffin, director of the Berea

Studv Center, quoted in inteniew with Randy Frame, "Rescue Theology," Christianity Today, 17 November 1989, p. 48. 111. These quotes are from a two-page

statement released by the staff of Stanley's

SAVING AMERICA'S SOULS 587

church, the First Baptist Church, the largest

tional

congregation in Atlanta after Tern" sought

Polls

endorsement

Stanlev's

tise

"A

entitled

is

Operation

during

Rescue demonstrations

The

in Atlanta.

trea-

on

Biblical Perspective

See Randv Frame, "AtTough," Christianity Today, p. 35.

Opinion Research Center and Gallup benveen 1973 and 1985, it appears

that the level of approval for legalized abor-

proximatelv 23 percent believe that abortion

Civil Disobedience."

should be

lanta Gets

percent believe

"Bv misinterpreting 2 Corinthians 6: 17 ["Therefore come out from their midst and be separate"] manv have ne112.

.

commands

glected their God-given societv

fluence

man.

.

When

.

.

and

serve

salt [the

fellow

Christian influence] is

to deteriorate. There's

no way around p. 51.

cue

it."

Julie

in the Operation ResBinghamton, N.Y., 27 October

Gustafson

offices,

illegal.

should be legal

it

woman's

The resome

in

For further analvses of "The Abor-

life.

these data, see Daniel Granberg, tion Issue in the

Planning

1984

Elections," Family

Perspectives 19, no. 2:

122. VVillke, quoted in

59-62.

Lvn Cn'derman,

"A Movement Divided." 123. Susan Church, "Poll

Quote from videotaped interview

113.

to a

while 19 to 22

should be

it

such as rape, incest, or endangerment

cases,

going

Tern, Operation Rescue,

legal in all cases,

mainder believe

.

to in-

their

stops preserving a nation, that society

with

.

1973. Ap-

tion has remained stable since

Tactics Disliked," Bulletin,

Shows Tern's Press C~ Sun

Binghamton

20 November 1989,

p. 1.

124. Ibid.

1988. 125. Ibid.

Thomas Rose, "How Violence Oc-

114. curs:

A

ture,"

Theon- and Review of the

Thomas Rose,

in

127. Jane Gross, "At

an

interesting

positions

right-to-life

on

this

NRLC

quoted

in

1

Quoted

July 1989, p.

in Wills,

in Office"

A12.

"Save the Babies,"

One obsener noted

that a single

Lyn Cn'derman, "A Movement August

congregation, with the endorsement of the

Christianity

Today,

12

pastor, can reap a busload

and

bombers

Times,

28.

129.

VVillke,

Jack

117. These points are raised by Blan-

chard

128. p.

49.

p.

New York

NOW Convention,

More Women

Putting

Is

speaking engagement before an evangelical

Divided,"

1988,

November 1989. president

Goal

Christi-

r

116.

see

issue,

Rand\ Frame. "Rescue Theology," anity Today, 17

of

discussion

in

1990.

30.

115. For

Lacks

York Times, 30 April

in

America (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), p.

New

Raising Funds,"

Violence

ed..

Group

126. "Anti-Abortion

Litera-

in

Prewitt

The Gideon

regarding

abortion

Project, pp.

266 and

394. 118. Dave Andrusko, "Zealots, Zanies, and Assorted Kooks: How the Main Media Interprets the Pro- Life

Andrusko,

ed.,

Movement,"

in

Dave

The Pro-Life Movement:

Handbook for the 1980s (Harrison, N.Y.:

A

Life

of volunteers.

Wilkinson, "The Gospel according to Randall

Terry," p. 86.

130. Kim Lawton, "Can the Movement Succeed?" Christianity

15 January 1988,

Prolife

Today,

p. 36.

131. Wills, "Evangels of Abortion,"

p.

21.

132. Ibid.

"Where Did Randall Tern'

133. Faludi,

Go Wrong?" p.

25.

Cvcle Press). 134. Tern', Operation Rescue, p. 172.

119. See Robert S. Lichter and Stanley Rothman, "The Media Elite," Public Opinion 96 (1981): 117-25. 120. Tern', from taped intenievv with Julie

Gustafson. 121.

On

the bases of analyses by the Na-

135. Ibid.,

p.

175.

136. Wilkinson, "The Gospel according to Randall Tern," p. 92.

137. Ibid. 138.

Manv

scholars

use

broad under-

Fave Ginsburg 588

standings of fundamentalism as opposed to

ism," Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago:

narrower ones that are based on definitive

Universitv

and the

pp. 1-65.

characteristics such as separatism

theology of dispensational premillennialism.

Among

who use the broader reading are Nana' Ammerman, Bible Believers: Fundamentalists in the Modern World (New those

Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1987); Steve Bruce, The Rise and Fall of the

New

Christian Right

Out

The Scopes sis," talk

the

Trial

York:

Oxford

1988); Susan Harding,

Universitv Press,

"Casting

(New

Fundamentalist Other:

and the Modern Apotheo-

delivered at the Society for Cultural

Anthropology annual meetings. May 1990; George M. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (New York: Oxford Universitv Press, 1980); Martin Martv, "Fundamentalism as A Social Phenomenon," Bulletin of the American Academy ofArts and Sciences 42, no.

2 (November 1988): 15-

29. Ernest Sandeen, in his book The Roots of Fundamentalism (Chicago: Universitv of

Chicago

Press,

1970), espouses the more

specific definition

on

140. Ibid.,

p.

141. According to

1991),

Press,

Ammerman

in

her es-

"North American Protestant Fundamentalism," bv the 1950s the "choice facing the movement was between cultural relevance and cultural separation." In 1948, the evan-

sav

Henrv argued in his influbook Remaking the Modern Mind that

gelical leader Carl

ential

Christians should be sociallv and politically active in an effort to reestablish claims in a civilization

dominated bv secular humanism,

while the quintessential separatist was the

anticommunist Mclntire

right-wing

fundamentalists

crusader

Ammerman

(p. 58).

notes:

Carl

"A few

had joined the anticomfifties, but most had

munist crusades of the

remained ferring

relatively inactive in politics, pre-

instead

to

put

energy

churches and institutions that

into

made

the their

view of the world possible. Evangelism and missions far outweighed social reform on their

agendas"

(p.

61).

of fundamentalism based 142.

doctrinal differences.

139. Marsden, American Culture,

Chicago

of

Fundamentalism

and

p. 5.

186; Nancy Ammerman,

"North American Protestant Fundamental-

Ammerman,

"North

American

Protestant Fundamentalism."

143. Tern', Operation Rescue, p. 48. 144.

I

am

this phrasing.

indebted to Scott Appleby for

CHAPTER 24

Buddhism,

Politics,

and Violence

Stanley

Tambiah

J.

In is

the extent to which, and the

by

Sri

Lankans of the

late

manner

in

this essay the

main question

we

have been changes, how are

probe

it

has participated,

to describe the changing or the

And

if

there

changed shape of

itself as a lived reality?

major aspect of

this difficult task

fined as "Buddhist" issues,

and the

is

the

manner and

extent to

both monks and

actors,

laity,

which

who

issues de-

have espoused

"Buddhist" causes, have contributed to the outbreaks of collective violence

of ethnic

shall

which. Buddhism as a "religion," espoused

have there been changes in the nature of that participation over time?

A

I

nineteeth and the twentieth centuries, has participated in

the current ethnic conflict and collective violence in Sri Lanka. If

Buddhism

Lanka

in Sri

in the

form

riots.

My investigation

must,

it

seems to me, begin with what has come to be called the

"Buddhist revival" that began pose to do

is

in the latter part

of the nineteeth century. What

to cover the century of Sri Lanka's history

I

pro-

from the 1880s to the 1980s,

focusing on the main landmarks and watersheds that figure in the story of how Bud-

dhism

and public religion was interwoven with the changing

as a collective

the island, and

how

that

meshing contributed to ethnic

politics

of

conflicts, especially the occur-

rence of various episodes of violence in the form of civilian riots and insurrections.

The Period of Buddhist The most

vivid

Revivalism,

1860-1915

and consequential formulation of Sinhala Buddhist revivalism with was the anti-Christian movement begun by monks like Gunan-

nationalist overtones

anda and Sumangala

in

mid-ninctccth century, then given an institutional and pro-

pagandist basis bv the Thcosophists, notably Colonel

589

Henry

Steele Olcott as their

Stanley J. '

Tambiah

590

and taken to its ideological limits by the charismatic Anagarika Dharmapala (1864-1933). Fortunately, this phase of Buddhist revivalism during the

leader in the 1880s,

latter

phase of the British Raj has been thickly documented, and in

only sketch

There

we can

is

in the

main points.

no doubt

that Sinhala Buddhist revivalism

recognize today, had

turies. In this earlier

period

I

need

in the

form

this essay

1

its

we

and nationalism,

origin in the late nineteeth and early twentieth cen-

see

most

clearly the very

contours of a movement that

acted as a major shaper of a Sinhala consciousness and of a sense of national identity

and purpose. The most

of the Buddhist revivalism stimulated and

significant activity

sponsored bv Colonel Olcott and the Buddhist Theosophical Society, founded in 1880, was the establishment of Buddhist schools to counter the near monopoly that the Protestant missions (and to a lesser extent the Catholic church) had over the

educational svstem. This issue

Dharmapala

first

found

would

surface again in the 1940s

his vocation

and acquired

his

and 1950s.

propagandist

asso-

skills in

away to propagate Buddhist causes as has been dubbed "Protestant Buddhism" a use-

ciation with the Theosophists but later broke

he envisaged them. His revivalism ful label

to a point, that

is,

if

—

not overly associated with a world-transforming,

this-

worldly asceticism.

The major

features

of his Buddhist revivalism are

as follows: a selective retrieval

of

norms from canonical Buddhism; a denigration of alleged non-Buddhist ritual practices and magical manipulations (an attitude probablv influenced bv Christian missionary denunciation of "heathen" beliefs and practices); the enunciation of a code for lay conduct, suited for the ests,

which emphasized

emergent Sinhalese urban middle

a puritanical sexual morality

class

and etiquette

and business

inter-

in family life; and,

most important of all, an appeal to the past glories of Buddhism and Sinhalese civiliMahavamsa and other chronicles as a way of infusing the

zation celebrated in the Sinhalese with a

and

new

nationalist identity

disabilities suffered

For our purposes

under British

it is

most

rule

and

self-respect in the face

and Christian missionarv

of humiliations

influence.

relevant to note that Dharmapala's brand of Sinhala

Buddhist revivalism and nationalism was supported by and served the rising Sinhala

Buddhist middle

class

and a

circle

these were implicated in the anti-Muslim riots of petitors in the shape

exploiters

Politics

The time of

1915 directed against

of Muslim shopkeepers and businessmen,

of the Sinhalese consumer public

interests

of a

of businessmen, and that some of

who were

their

com-

branded

as

at large. 2

and Constitutional Progress, 1915-46

the twilight of the British Raj was also the seedbed of a

number of

developments, both contradictory and complementary. They foreshadowed things to come.

A remarkable feature of the Buddhist fundamentalist and Sinhala nationalist movement spearheaded by Anagarika Dharmapala is that after the British Raj's show of armed strength and suppression of the 1915 riots, and its incarceration of the tern-

BUDDHISM. TOLITICS, AND VIOLENCE

LANKA

IN SRI

591

perance leaders (which included

F.

R. and D.

S.

Senanavake), and Dharmapala's pro-

where he concentrated on the recovery of Buddha Gava for Buddhism, the movement itself seemed to lose prominence and surrendered the lime-

longed absences

in India

light to a different cast

of Sinhalese and Tamil

of collaboration rather than confrontation It

seems

as if the

trauma of the

riots

politicians,

— during which

volunteers took punitive and disgracing actions against

sons of education and high social standing

and then,

mood

in a

of dialogue, to form

who were

in their dealings

to initiate a phase

with the British.

British officials, the police,

manv

Sri

Lankan

— energized these leaders

political associations in

and

leaders, per-

first

to protest 3

order to negotiate

with authorities.

These leaders were educated

and

of life,

style

rights for the Cevlonese

a policv

in distinct

ways Westernized

of gradualism

in

seeking

more

in dress political

through constitutional means. The Cevlon Reform League

was formed

in

Congress

1919, which through a

in

were

in English,

and were dedicated to

1916 and was subsequently transformed into the Cevlon National series of respectful "memorials" to the Governor

and the Colonial Office sought an increased representation for

supporters in

its elite

the administration of the colonv.

In fact the older nationalist thrust, focused as revivalism, identitv,

and "uplift" through

a rejection

ern lifestyle, seemed to be upstaged bv the

was on

newer movement

movement was committed

tional Congress. This

it

religious

and

cultural

of Christian privilege and a Westled

to a gradualist

by the Cevlon Na-

program of winning

independence through concessions relating to representative government. 4

political

In their deliberations with the Raj, the politicians of the Cevlon National Congress

The two most important

did gain political concessions.

political gains,

stemming

from the Donoughmore Constitution, were the granting of universal franchise 1931

(a

bonus granted bv the

of the congress

who

liberal

in

commission against the wishes of most members

advocated a more restricted franchise entailing property and

literacv qualifications for the voters)

State Council consisting

and of a large measure of internal autonomy to a

of sixty-one members, the majority of whom

(fifty)

were to

be elected through universal suffrage from territorial constituencies.

Radical

Monks and

the Legitimation of Monks' Participation in Politics

Before and during the very

leftist parties,

which were

of religion

human

in

first

general election of

monks exploded on

Marxist-oriented Buddhist

1947

a

group of extremist,

explicitly dedicated to secular politics

affairs.

How was this

and to the devaluation

possible?

Before this election of 1947, individual bhikkhus (monks) certain political candidates

who

as

able,

the political scene in support of the

dayakas (lay patrons)

may have supported

may have sought

their bless-

Such participation by monks was limited and informal; and Christian candidate had to be overcome, the slogan of Buddhism had been

ings and legitimation.

where

a

effective.

But now appeared a group of highly educated,

vocal,

and

activist

monks who

Stanley J.

Tambiah

592

were to

set several

future monks.

precedents which would influence the public posture of

One was

the unclouded and self-conscious

and responsibility of monks to participate

manv

pronouncement of the

right

do with the public weal, and in the nationalist movement and decolonization process. The second was their banding together as a pressure group engaging in political activism. Thus, in a sense this new band of monks, who were labeled the" "Vidvalankara Group" 5 by virtue of

in politics, in matters to

their association with Vidvalankara Pirivena,

island,

remind us of

whose own

monk

activists like

one of the monastic colleges on the

Gunananda, who stimulated Dharmapala,

movement espoused by the laity superseded the role Now, 1946-47, of the monks. in the political monk reemerged in a full-fledged form. The vears 1946 and 1947 are a landmark because they witnessed the trenchant articulation of the debate, Should monks participate in politics? Out of this polemic emerged the self-conscious "political monk" in Sri Lanka. Though tested, rebuked, and even reviled by certain conservative establishment monks within the sangha (brotherhood of monks) and by many members of the laity, both pious Buddhists and iconoclastic "leftists," the political monks established their niche and their right to participate in politics within certain limits. They became part of the regular political scene. They numbered in manv hundreds, they were accepted members of the sangha, and as we shall see they mobilized for action. (We shall investigate as we proceed to what extent such political monks and their ideologies and activities actually fanned the

fires

revivalist- nationalist

of ethnic and

religious violence in subsequent times, especially in

1956 and

1958.) It is relevant to take account of the writings of two scholar monks who propounded radical ideas at this time. Walpola Rahula (who would later author scholarlv books on Buddhism 6 and also increasingly become conservative and chauvinistic) wrote in 1946 a book called Bhikkhupfe Urumaya (The heritage of bhikkhus) in which he sought to establish that monks had from earliest times played a significant political

and

social role in

Ceylon. K. Pannasara, principal of Vidvalankara Pirivena, in a

poste entitled Bhikkhus

(UNP)

and

Politics

politicians (including the Senanayakes) that

elections, declared that politics included

all

aspects

vocation of monks to direct efforts to that end.

The

radical

monks stepped up

— such

in

and increased

as the chief priests

of the Sivam Nikava and of Ramanna Nikava

Society (founded

monks should

stay

of public welfare and

awav from it

was the

7

their criticism

various sections of the clergy and laity ter

ri-

(1946) to the charge by United National Partv

(a nikaya

1891 bv Dharmapala), and the press

is

their following

when

of the Malwatte chap-

a sect), the

Maha Bodhi

— sought to censure them.

Even the All-Cevlon Buddhist Congress, composed of lay Buddhists committed to the restoration of Buddhism, felt obliged to declare that no monk should seek or exercise the rights of a voter and that

The

radical

monks

at a

Eksath Bhikkhu Mandalaya

with a larger reach attracting tect the civil in politics,

and

no monk should seek

(LEBM) manv

political rights

and aired

its

election to a political office.

meeting held on June 1946 determined to form the Lanka (Ceylon Union of Bhikkhus). This body,

oppositional monks, declared

its

now

intention to pro-

of the sangha, affirmed that monks should take part

aim to overthrow the present

UNP

capitalist

government.

"

BUDDHISM. POLITICS. AND VIOLENCE

IN SRI

LANKA

593

The

radical political

adopted

in a

mood

meeting held

Soulbury Constitution

LEBM

of the

in the

can be gauged from these resolutions

following vear (March 1947): the rejection of the

as tailing short

of Ceylon's

desire to be a free

and independent

sovereign state; the support for a socialist program for the nationalization of transport,

mines and

for a

scheme of free education.

The

estates; the necessity to control foreign investments;

and the support

LEBM and the radical monks both proved to be ahead of their time but paved Once the election of 1947 was over and the UNP was

the path for things to come. elected, they

soon became defunct. Being

LEBM

entiate the

political

was

politically radical, there

plarfbrm from that of the

left parties,

little

to differ-

who found

8

it diffi-

cult to withstand the charge that Buddhism should be saved "from the flame of

Marxism." The

The

LEBM

was tarred with the same brush.

real significance

effective participation

and that

it

"political

of the

LEBM

of monks

was that

it

was the forerunner of forceful and

in the elections to

come, most importantlv

in

1956,

voiced the powerful claims of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. In time the

LEBM would progressivelv shed their more congenial political coalition under D. Bandaranaike. As we shall sec, Sri Lankan politics would

bhikkhus" of the sort

who

joined the

left-wing affiliations and rhetoric and join a

W.

the leadership of S.

R.

take an increasingly narrow path limited to a range of issues framed within the confines

of a Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, and the major Sinhala

by and large converge

The What

political parties

would

in a consensus.

Betraval and Restoration of Buddhism: Accusations and

Remedies

did the Buddhist (Sinhala) leaders, the activists and protesters, both lay and

mean by such slogans as "the restoration of Buddhism to its rightful place" and "the betraval of Buddhism" during colonial rule, especially under the British Raj? The enumeration of wrongs committed, and the description and interpretation in

clerical,

detail

by Buddhist

of the restoration of due

activists

rights,

our best entry into

is

understanding what the revival and restoration of Buddhism meant to the Sinhalese activists in substantive terms.

This

is

one way to

entered, informed, and intervened in Sri

ship between If

we

Buddhism and

Lankan

see

how

the cause of

politics, that

is,

Buddhism

to see the relation-

politics.

take this investigative

and interpretive

strategy, there

is

one

text that

was

Lanka that could be said to act as the ideological charter of the Buddhist activists. It is The Betrayal of Buddhism 1956), a report published by the Buddhist Committee of Inquiry, which was set up in 1954 by virtue of produced

in the

mid-1950s

in Sri

(

a resolution passed

bv the All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress

at its thirty-third

annual

The committee's brief was "to inquire into the Ceylon and to report on the conditions necessary to

conference held in December 1953. present state of

Buddhism

in

improve and strengthen the position of Budcihism, and the means whereby those conditions

mav

be

fulfilled.

Stanley J.

Tambiah

594

The

Betrayal of Buddhism

members of the Committee of Inquirv who wrote The Betrayal ofBuddhism are instructive. The committee had seven Buddhist monks, six of whom could be identified as "scholar monks," most of them active as vice-principals or senior teachers at pirivenas (monastic colleges). The coun-

The

professional and vocational backgrounds of the

try's

most famous

Vidyodava, Vidvalankara, and Balagalla pirivenas,

pirivenas, such as

and representatives from the major were represented. The

lav

sects,

members of

Siyam, Amarapura, and

the committee

numbered

Ramanna seven,

Nikayas,

and four of

them were well-known educationalists. 9 The Betrayal of Buddhism composed by this Committee of Inquirv thus reflected the views of some of the island's foremost Buddhist scholars and educators, both clerical and lay. It should come as no surprise that their cause

concerned the system of education

in the country, especially in the nine-

teenth and twentieth centuries, and the consequences of that svstem for Sinhala Buddhists as the majoritv categorv in the population.

The Betrayal of Buddhism in essence made two major comparisons between the status of the Christian missions and of the Buddhist sangha in Sri Lanka, especially during the British period (1796—1948) and the

comparison portrayed the missions

and enjoving activities,

special

as

first

years of independence.

immunities and privileges from the Raj

in

order to pursue their

whereas the Buddhist sangha was fragmented. The component units of the

sangha suffered from certain

disabilities

concerning the use of their economic

sources and therebv were restricted in their activities. related to the

first,

The second comparison,

focused on the successful educational (and proselytizing)

of the Protestant missions, which always had highly favorable lonial

government,

as

did the

Roman

Catholic church in

more

the British, and there were few Buddhist- Sinhalese schools tian schools

The

on the one hand and

report's conclusion

activities

recent times. little

By com-

support from

compared with the Chris-

the Buddhist Sinhala majority population

and exhortation was

re-

closely

relations with the co-

parison, the educational activities of the Buddhist sangha enjoyed

other.

One

having a "corporate" organizational structure

as follows:

on

the

"Education in Ceylon

todav should be oriented towards the bringing forth of a generation with an intimate awareness of

its

national language, historv and culture and capable of enriching that

national heritage." 10

The report suggested two basic remedies for the two major disabilities suffered bv Buddhism in comparison with Christianity. One remedy was that the government should pass a Buddha Sasana Act bv which it "would create an incorporated Buddha Sasana Council to which mav be entrusted all the prerogatives of the Buddhist kings as regards the

Buddhist religion." (The Buddhist kings of the past

with certain "orthodox" segments of the sangha would regulate purifv

it

[sasanavisodhana].)

The proposed

it

in collaboration

and periodically

composed of elected and would act as a "centralized

council, to be

appointed representatives of the sangha and the

lain',

authoritv" to prevent die disintegration of Buddhism in the face of competition from hostile Christian missions. Because

temple lands, and income, a yearly

of past colonial confiscations of sangha properties,

sum of money would be

given to the council by

BUDDHISM. POLITICS. AND VIOLENCE

IN SRI

LANKA

595

way of compensation for the conduct of educational activities on behalf of the sangha. Furthermore, the government would appoint a minister for religious affairs who would act to "rehabilitate the religions which had suffered under Colonial rule." The second remedy proposed had as its purpose the withdrawal of grants-in-aid to Christian mission schools (and other "assisted schools")

over of

all

assisted schools

by the

of schools would be transferred to central and

would be applied

policy of state takeover

the state take over

take-

to

The same teacher training colleges. By having training colleges, the monopolv of

local

all

the schools and teacher

all

and the subsequent

In due course the control and administration

state.

government

agencies.

English education enjoyed by Christian mission schools, and the advantage over the schools of other religions enjoyed by Christian teachers' colleges,

The Buddhist

activists

did not

at all

mind

would be removed.

the government takeover of Buddhist

schools, because they advocated religious education in state schools

and were

confi-

dent that government policv would favor the transmission of Buddhist values, Sinhalese

language and

literature,

and "traditional culture."

The

Social Revolution of

Sinhala Buddhist nationalism remained latent for

mentum of many

in the early fifties. In

1956

it

1956

some time and began

to gain

mo-

A confluence

achieved historic political success.

concerns and aspirations had a cumulative effect upon the elections held at

this time.

The concerns were

former precolonial status; the ministration

(official

cially Sinhalese);

Buddhism

the rehabilitation and restoration of shift

from the English language

as the

to

its

medium of ad-

language) and education to indigenous mother tongues (espe-

and the fostering by the Sinhalese of

their "national identity"

and

their "national culture."

Moreover, the year 1956 was one of great expectations because

it

would be the

time for staging the celebration of Buddha Javanthi marking twenty-five hundred years since the death of the

Buddha and

the landing of the

first

band of followers

the

Lanka Bauddha Mandalava to plan the celebration and to

in Sri

Lanka. The

Sinhalese, Vijaya,

and

UNP government had appointed a bodv called

his

compilation and translation of religious

texts.

initiate projects for the

There was much

politics

surrounding

the nomination of members to this body.

In the preceding vears the All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress had

mands.

One was

Buddhist institutions.

Department and state its

made

certain de-

government should protect and maintain Buddhism and Proposals were also made for the creation of a Buddha Sasana

that the

for the

appointment of

a

Buddhist commission to inquire into the

of Buddhism. Shunning government sponsorship, the Congress had appointed

own

Buddhist Committee of Inquiry, which produced on the eve of the 1956

elections the explosive report discussed above,

The Betrayal of Buddhism, an attack on

Christian, especially Catholic, proselytization in schools.

The

UNP government as lukewarm toward Buddhist restoration.

report also assailed the Finally,

on

the question

Stanley J.

Tambiah

596

of official language(s), there was adverse commentary on the government's regarding the declaration of Sinhalese as the only

These

of the

issues led to the defeat

that party's

monopoly of power

UNP

language.

official

in the fateful elections

since independence

vacillation

came to

of 1956 when

a traumatic end.

Orga-

nization and mobilization at the popular grass-roots level, involving both Buddhist

monks and

contributed to the overthrow of the

laitv,

Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP), headed by of the

also the leader

were the

efforts

of a

Sri

civil

S.

W.

UNP

R

and the success of the

.D. Bandaranaike,

Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Noteworthv servant,

N. Q. Dias,

who

first

who was

in this regard

launched a Buddhist move-

ment among the government administrative servants. In Sabaragamuwa Province, Dias and a monk, Gnanaseeha Thero, founded what came to be called Buddha Sasana Samiti, societies formed to look after the bhikkhus' needs, to manage dhamma schools, etc. These societies caught on and spread all over the country, numbering thirtv-five hundred in the mid-1950s. Thereafter Dias, operating from Colombo in collaboration with L. H. Mettananda, the principal of Ananda College and a member of the Commission of Inquiry, established associations of monks called Sangha Sabhas in many electorates, numbering seventy-two by 1954. The importance of these efforts is that central government officials and local government servants used their positions and their networks to organize associations of monks at the local level. The seventytwo sabhas formed the Sri Lanka Maha Sangha Sabha (SLMSS), a national Colombobased aggregation.

An 1956

even more dramatic development that raised the intensity

election

was the formation of the United Front of Monks." This front was

potent combination of two gress of Buddhists

"progressive

level just before the

monk organizations

the

SLMSS, and

(whose members mosdy belonged to the

monks" of

the 1940s). 12

of the United Front of Monks

is

the All-Ccvlon

LEBM,

The geographical and

the

a

Con-

movement of

sectarian representation

significant. Its leading lights

were Colombo- based,

and the leaders and the majority of the membership came from the Amarapura and Ramanna Nikava the so-called reform sects which were founded in the nineteenth

—

centurv in the southwest urban coastal areas. By contrast, the establishment Siyam Nikava, whose main chapters were located up-country in Kandy, was largely unrepresented.

However,

its

and the monks of the

who

also

low-countrv chapter, located historic

and wealthy temple

in

Kotte

just outside

at Kelaniva, also

outside

Colombo, Colombo,

belonged to the Siyam Nikava, joined ranks with the United Front. Indeed,

the forceful politician-monk

Mapitgama Buddharakkhita, head

the Kelaniva temple, would be

in the forefront

(viharadhipati)

of

of the election campaign. (He would

gain notoriety a few years later for being implicated in the assassination of Premier

Bandaranaike.)

The United Front of Monks was

fiercely

opposed to the

UNP and listed ten points

Buddhists should take into account in their voting, including the candidates'

will-

The Betrayal of Buddhism, to make Sinhala the ingness to implement onlv official language, and to support the implementation of democratic socialism. The United Front was also anti-West, anti-Catholic. One of its slogans was "A vote the proposals in

— BUDDHISM. POLITICS. AND VIOLENCE

IN SRI

LANKA

597

for the United National Part)'

a vote for the Catholics; a vote for the

is

MEP

is

a

vote for the Buddhists."

The United Front monks, working through

the network of local sangha sabhas,

proved to be formidable and untiring election campaigners visits

and distributing pamphlets.

about one-fourth of the national did enlist

total

monk

large effective. Thus,

activists it

swept Bandaranaike and the

is

— making house-to-house

about three to four thousand monks

said that

— worked

some establishment monks, including

tried to prevent the

and

It is

as

UNP

campaigners. Although the

the leaders of leading pirivenas,

from electioneering,

its

clerical

who

support was not bv

no exaggeration to say that the 1956 election which to power was the climactic and singular moment

MEP

in the twentieth-century political

life

of

Sri

Lanka, the

moment when

a significant

number of monks temporarily organized to win an election. Never again in the ensuing decades would the sangha show this much purpose and action. The United Front's decisive contribution lay in "its role in the support mobilization in

providing

a

of the Buddhists and

MEP] common

country-wide Bhikkhu cadre to a party [the

organization and projecting

its

image

as the party

same time, the United Front did not build

would provide the

basis for systematic

of the

with very

little

man." 13 At the

a strong organizational structure that

and long-term action.

The Riots of 1956 and 1958 In the years immcdiatelv following the

1956

elections, the ushering in

"social revolution" dedicated to the restoration

the Sinhalese of their due rights as a nation, there occurred

can

we

say that revivalist

of an alleged

of Buddhism, and the achievement by

two

riots.

To what

extent

Buddhism, the Buddhist component of Sinhalese national-

ism, and the political activism of Buddhist

monks contributed

to these violent

outbursts?

The

first

legislation

lese as the sole official

submitted bv the Bandaranaike government mandated Sinhalanguage. There were

two indigenous languages used on

mother tongue of the Sinhalese majority, and Tamil, the guage of the minoritv, who are mostlv Hindu. The issue of contention was the island: Sinhalese, the

to be assigned the Tamil language (and thus

Tamil-Hindu

the lan-

role

culture) in the public affairs

of the countrv. Certain concessions to the Tamils were considered. These included the provision of opportunities for persons trained in English or Tamil to take examinations in those languages for entry into the public service, the right

of local bodies to

decide for themselves the language of their business, and the right of persons to com-

municate with the government sions culminated in the

first

in their

own

language.

postindependence ethnic

The turmoil over riots,

these conces-

which were

initiated

elements of the Sinhalese civilian population against the Tamils. "Such explicit lative

guarantees would have gone a long

way

to reassure the bulk

by

legis-

of Tamils, but the

reactions of extremists among the Tamils and the Sinhalese were decided!}' unfavor-

Stanley J.

Tambiah

598

W. H. Wriggins

able,"

has written.

A

group of Buddhist bhikkhus connected with

the United Front of Monks protested the inclusion of a clause permitting individuals

who had guage

been educated

until

guage changes. Their a fast

English or Tamil to take public examinations in that lan-

in

1967 and urged the government rallv

on the

by a prominent university

legislation also incited

steps

more

to press ahead

rapidlv with lan-

of the house of representatives culminated

lecturer.

Other concessional

clauses

in

appended to the

organized protests. "Antagonism became so great that a Tamil

sit-down demonstration, near the house of representatives, called by the Federalist leader the day the controversial legislation

was submitted to parliament,

which over one hundred people were

riots in

led to bitter

few days they spread to

injured. In a

Eastern Province, where Tamils and Sinhalese lived intermingled; in Batticaloa and

Ova

the Gal

was such violence that between twenty and two hundred

Valley there

persons were

killed,

depending on which side was doing the

ethnic riots of the postindependence period the

was

compared

relativelv small

damage

tallying.''

to

life,

to the scale of destruction that

14

In these

first

limb, and property

would occur

in future

riots.

If one

wonders what could be the relationship between the

official

language con-

troversy and the ethnic violence taking place at this time in the Eastern Province, the

answer

is

that

around

time the language issue was also becoming interwoven with

this

the government's policy of peasant resettlement in the less populous parts of the land. Just as the

pects of the Tamils, so

changes

in Sinhalese

and therefore

The 1956 Sinhala Onlv

as

had implications

issue

first

would the second be construed

and Tamil (and Muslim) ethnic

tation

is-

and emplovment pros-

as causing

demographic

ratios in the Eastern Province

bearing on the politics of territorial control and of "homelands." did not delay the passing of the

riots Bill):

among

the

MEP and the UNP voted for The 1958

for the educational

riots

it,

members

official

present, the

and the Tamil and Left

were much more serious. The

between the Tamils and the Sinhalese was quick.

parties, the

parties voted against

slide to

ceeded to translate the Sinhala-only policy into action

language legislation (the

two main Sinhala

it.

more acrimonious confronWhile the government pro-

— by reserving

a leading teacher

training college for training Sinhalese only, by creating scholarships and distributing

them on

a

quota basis

six to

one

in favor

tion Federal Partv in turn in June

of the Sinhalese, for example

1956 proclaimed

its

— the opposi-

objective of establishing an

"autonomous Tamil linguistic state within a Federal Union of Ceylon" to protect the cultural freedom and identity of the Tamil-speaking people. The Federal Partv committed

itself to

nonviolent direct action (satyagraha) to achieve

its

goal of a federal

union.

For

a

while

it

seemed

understanding on two

as if

Bandaranaike and the Tamil leaders would reach an

fronts: the reasonable use

noritv, especiallv in the administration

of Tamil

as the

language of a mi-

of the Nordiern and Eastern Provinces; and

the creation of regional councils to correct the overccntralization of the administration

and to enable Tamils to exercise some of control over local affairs through the devolution of powers. This was the substance of the famous Bandaranaike-Chclvanayagam

BUDDHISM. POLITICS, AND VIOLENCE

IN SRI

LANKA

599

which might have

pact,

the Buddhist

Maha Sangha

monk

settled the ethnic conflict.

it

was

precisely at this time that

Sabha, in conjunction with their lav sponsors and

their protest against a "surrender" to Tamil

own

But

pressure groups, such as the United Front and the Sri Lanka

stepped up

allies,

demands and threatened

to conduct their

A

satyagraha campaign unless the prime minister repudiated the agreement.

Kandvan organization,

dene

— who would some decades as

marking the

and poisonous feature of the strives to foster lates Sinhalese

politics

UNP

about-face performed by the

worthy of note

Peramuna, and the

UNP, now

in

oppo-

anv concession to the Tamils.

sition, also protested

The

called the Tri Sinhala

under the influence of

later lead the

"first evele in a

R. Javawar-

—

is

pattern which has recurred as a central

political process at critical junctures.

communal accommodation. The major

parochialism to wreck that attempt."

of the Sinhalese majority would

J.

countrv and rue this manoeuvre

15

The

power

partv in

partv in opposition manipu-

This bipolar oscillation

also hereafter find

its

support

in the

among group-

ings within a divided sangha.

Other sporadic incidents occurred near the time Bandaranaikc and Chelvanayagam

met on 4 April

to discuss the implementation

of

their pact.

to the bhikkhus as the final destrovers of the pact. Several

sit-down near the prime minister's

home and

But the storv belongs

dozen bhikkhus staged

a

move until the pact was persuade the monks to disband, Banrefused to

rescinded. After several unsuccessful attempts to

daranaikc capitulated to their siege and drove to the radio station to announce that

comments, 'And

the pact was dissolved. Bandaranaike's biographer

so, in the

most

grievous blunder of his career, he caved in."" "The Tamil leaders retorted by prepar1

ing for a massive late

May

at

civil

disobedience in protest, and planned to hold a conference in

Vavuniva, a town on the borderline between Tamil and Sinhalese

settle-

"

ments

in the north."

The

1

political crisis

was then

between the Federalist Tamils and

fatefullv escalated

by

strikes

munist and Trotskyitc trade unions. In enforcement agencies, the

riots

this

The

riots

in three

Vavuniya

in

Eravur

in the

in a

in

north preparatory

The second phase was marked by

1958.

The

first

serious

predominately Sinhalese

mainly Tamil section of the

attacks,

Tamils, throughout most of the Sinhalese majority areas.

mainly

in the

May

late

around Polonnaruwa

of the North Central Province and

Eastern Province.

in

protest.

overlapping phases in

incidents occurred mainlv in and area

Com-

of 1958 exploded around the time that the Federalists

campaign of nonviolent

occurred

opponents

directed by

atmosphere of the weakening of the law

were preparing to hold their annual convention to launching a

their Sinhalese

among government workers

overwhelmingly against

The

third phase took place

the Tamil-dominated Northern and Eastern Provinces. "The violence

was directed against Sinhalese and against government personnel and installations." 18 It is not necessary for us to know the actual details of these riots, except to there

remark that the worst violence occurred especially in the

schemes.

in the

North Central and Eastern Provinces,

Polonnaruwa region, the center of the

largest peasant resettlement

Tambiah

Stanley].

600

The Restoration of Buddhism and

die Transformation of Education 1960s and 1970s

in the

When one ture

1958

riots

— the participants,

and

their na-

— such

as the

staged by the United Front

monks and

Buddhist nationalists to protest concessions to the Tamils, the labor

strikes that

derdog had

demonstrations and

status, the

their origins in the rivalries

and,

of

fasts

leftist parties

and which weakened public order,

Colombo and

the fact that the worst riots occurred not in

finally,

the far provinces of peasant colonization resettlement in

their locations,

preceding events and issues

in relation to the

language controversy, the Tamils' pressure for a federal solution to their un-

official

lay

scrutinizes the

— and considers them

— one

is

any meaningful way the "Buddhist" components of the

components, be they economic,

political.

approach the religious,

difficult to disaggregate, I

Lankan Buddhism

or

territorial,

differently. I will

puzzled

Jaffna but in

how to

identify

riots in contrast to

other

Since these components are

and

social,

political aspects

of

Sri

argue that as the energies of Sinhala Buddhist

nationalism were translated into concrete policies and programs of language, educa-

employment, peasant resettlement,

tion,

trinal

this

Buddhism qua

island,

and so on,

of Buddhism as set out in the Mabavamsa) assumed an unprecedented primacy. This religioreligiopolitical associations

political association linked

of the entire

island,

components of canonical doc-

were weakened, displaced, even distorted. As part of

religion

same process, the

chronicles (e.g., the

of the

territorial control

the substantively soteriological, ethical, and normative

Buddhism with

and with

the Sinhala people, with the territory

a political authority dedicated to the protection

Buddhism. Thus, Buddhist fundamentalism and revivalism were progress ivclv formed into

a

Buddhist nationalism that in turn evolved into a

the late 1970s and 1980s.

Buddhism

is

sees itself as

for

many of

religious core or inspiration

either privatized or leached

homogeneous and

owned

possession

The

its

as a legacy,

out

in favor

of

political

trans-

Buddhism

of contemporary

of

in

political

a political collectivity that

Buddhism is a "Buddhism" that,

majoritarian and for which doctrinal

an object that

is

appropriated

members, no longer serves primarily

as

— but

a

an ego- ideal and a mental

discipline for personal salvation.

To put

the matter another way, Sinhalese revivalist

Buddhism with

nationalist

overtones that had an upsurge toward the end of the nineteenth century and the early

decades of the twentieth contained an appeal to a selective scripturalism that placed

an accent on certain doctrinal tenets and on the devaluation of "superstitious" accretions and practices. But inevitably this purification of the religious involved a

process of popularization whereby the Buddhist doctrine and message were carried to the people in simplified catechistic terms leavened with mvthohistorical claims culled

from chronicles such

as the

ization entailed the acquisition

printing press, the

bovs and

girls)

Mabavamsa. This propagandization and popular-

and use of modern communications media such

founding of new

as the

educational institutions (Buddhist schools for

and organizational forms (the Buddhist Theosophical Society, the

All-Cevlon Buddhist Congress, the Young Men's Buddhist Association), the deploy-

ment of

effective techniques

of dissemination

like

sermons and pamphlets in the

BUDDHISM. POLITICS, AND VIOLENCE

IN SRI

LANKA

601

vernacular, and the celebration I

on

of Buddhist

a national scale

such as the

festivals

teak.

But these

activities

of revivalism and reform, including scripturalism, of religion

sively to the ideologization shift

as a charter

led progres-

which represented an increasing

from "religiousness" to "religious-mindcdness," from religion

as

moral practice

to religion as a cultural possession. Finally, in developments since the 1950s, nation-

which grew out of revivalism, advanced further bv encompassing and then

alism,

superseding

of a

it

political

Buddhism or

lective manifestation has

cause of

hegemonic,

its

This, however,

is

links

and exclusive claims

ist

of violence

another development which

is

and ideological potency to

Buddhism

other collectivities

vis-a-vis

in its alleged defense.

only one side of the story. There

truths of doctrinal

Buddhism. While

political

fade in urgency, a collectivist fundamental-

conception of "Buddhist nationalism" and "Buddhist democracy"

dhist socialism"

— sketched and preached bv some prominent back to certain canonical

It refers

form of cakkavatti and

in the

limitations

its

rule. It also refers

sees in

them

rice fields

its

monks,

many ways

is

a

"creative" misreadings of

dealing with ideal righteous rulers

siittas

the attainment of glorious welfare-oriented

back to the regimes of great Sinhalese kings of Mahnvamsa fame

such as Dutthagamani and Parakrama Bahu, rural society

and

— even of "Bud-

clerical scholar

ideologues, and activists suffuses the public consciousness. This in "positive" ideological project despite

the past.

in its col-

with the major tenets of Buddhist ethics and, be-

preferential,

gives a substantive content

climactic phase

Buddhist nationalism and chauvinism, which

a

few

in its midst, erupts as periodic overflows

many of the

comes arguably the

substantive terms. Subsequently

in

who

allegedly constructed an egalitarian

focused on the triad of temple (dagaba)^ the irrigation tank (rara), and

(yaw).

It

sounds a clarion

call for

porary Sinhalese for their divisiveness.

Sinhalese unity and berates the contem-

It criticizes

present-day divisive party politics,

present-day hankering after West-inspired materialist, consumerist, and capitalist

self-

way of does invoke some

seeking goals, and proposes in their place a simpler harmonious "Buddhist life" in a

"Buddhist democracy." This

call

to a Buddhist

way of life

of the precepts and admonitions suitable for householders envisages a central role for

monks

at all levels

set

out

in doctrinal texts.

of the Buddhist polity

Finally,

it

advisers

and counselors. Both trends elucidated above are interwoven

dhism.

now

Its

trajectory informs

in political

and colors the episodes and developments that

I

as

Budshall

sketch.

Let us focus

first

on some

mid-fifties constituted a

when

relevant developments in the sixties

watershed in the

politics

and

seventies.

of postindependence

Sri

The

Lanka,

the arguments for a Buddhist restoration, for the dethronement of the English

language and the elevation of the Sinhalese language, and for the recovery of Sinhalese majoritarian influence were accepted as legitimate through the electoral process, and

entrusted to Bandaranaike and the ties

MEP

for implementation.

The

represent a different trend by virtue of both major parties

UNP — attempting to

implement those

objectives,

and

sixties

and seven-

— the SLFP and the

largely succeeding in the task

(though there were many other issues of reform and reconstruction that had been stalled

or evaded).

Stanley J.

Tambiah

602

By

the 1960s the

platform; therefore,

grew

UNP had accepted these objectives as essential planks in its party the two major Sinhala political parties, the UNP and the SLFP, and became

closer ideologically

Lankan

politics

enacted

is

"bipolar" division within situation,

and

it

alternative choices at subsequent elections. Sri

an arena where the majority group, the Sinhalese, has a

in

ranged against

is

regarded as an enemy or an

is

toward

Paralleling this process

monks

the support of the Buddhist

a

minority which, according to the

ally.

a dual balance

was the progressiye bifurcation of

two major parties. If in 1956 the enormous progressiye monks of the United Front overshadfor the

swell of monks led by the owed the rest of the sangha and decided an election, in the 1960s and 1970s the monks of all sects, temples, and status tended toward a spectrum of parallel support

ground

two main Sinhala parties. The Buddha Sasana Commission (which had been recommended in 1956 in The Betrayal of Buddhism) had made certain regulatory proposals regarding the reorganization and unification of various chapters of monks a move designed to stem the for the

—

alleged increased fragmentation of the sangha

and to give

to compete with the challenge of Christian missions

should receive

government this

it

organizational strength

— and regarding whether monks The SLFP

salaries for filling certain positions, especially in schools.

felt

obliged to

move toward

the implementation of these proposals, and

generated a wave of resistance against government "interference.'" Thus, for

stance, the All-Cevlon

in-

Buddhist Congress protested that "antireligious" and "anti-

democratic" Marxists were influencing the government.

SLFP of 1965 among some

circles

had tarnished

its

It

was

clear that

by

now

the

reputation as the knight in shin-

ing armor defending Buddhism.

This

one of the

is

central obstacles in Sri

Lanka (and Burma)

to any return to

governmental regulation and "purification" of the sangha's internal organization, regimes and was

which was achieved with varying

efficacy in the precolonial political

abandoned by the

of their "disestablishment of Buddhism." Disestab-

British as part

lishment entailed the withdrawal of state support and protection of official religion

"restoring"

of the

Buddhism

state.

to

its

The monks and

laity

this issue

would

tween

Buddhist leaders and establishment monks.

lav

So when there

was

political

parallel

sangha

support for the

19

as the

point

full circle. Political

as

temporalities.

UNP and

in the

March 1965

And

elections,

SLFP, which signaled the emergence of a

The modes of mobilization of support, through

and pamphlet distribution were

mark

its

well as create differences and tensions be-

dualism within the sangha matching the polarization between the two major

political parties.

termed

itself, as

numbers of monks began to canvass

large

as the

in general in

previous preeminence, but would diverge sharply on the

concrete need for administrative regulation of the sangha and split the

Buddhism

might collaborate

when

replicated.

meetings,

the Bhikkhus' participation in electoral politics had turned

polarization of the

Bhikkhu community had reached

both the major parties were supported by

groups who, whatever their nomenclature, could be alignments." 20

rallies,

According to Phadnis, 1965 "could be

a

its

high water

conglomeration of Bhikkhu

easily identified in their political

— BUDDHISM. POLITICS. AND VIOLENCE

IN SRI

LANKA

603

In 1965 the

but in

it

won

power

UNP won

the election. In 1970 it lost it again to Mrs. Bandaranaike, 1977 under the leadership of Mr. J. R. Javawardene, who was 1987, having changed the government to a presidential form, main-

vet again in

until

taining control through referendums rather than elections. In 1987, elections were

again held, and Mr. Premadasa and the

The seesaw

victories

of the

UNP

SLFP and

the

were elected to power.

UNP

between 1960 and 1977 did not

change the now-established pattern of the monks" customarv participation politics

and their divided support for the two main

were no anti-Tamil

riots

parties.

From 1960

to

in electoral

1977 there

or any form of collective violence against ethnic minorities.

The period was, however, punctuated bv the 1971 insurrection of the Sinhalese vouth (the lanatha Yimukthi Peramuna JYP] against an SLFP government which at that time was inspired more bv grievances against the government than bv grievances |

(

against the Tamils. (But as

we

shall see later, in

1977, and again in 1981 and 1983,

there was a recurrence of anti-Tamil riots, those in

Why

was there

a

period of quiescence in

Buddhist militancy was concerned level

?

Why

1983 being the worst.)

1960-77

and

as far as ethnic violence

1977 did ethnic

in

resume and reach a

riots

of violence never before witnessed, and thereafter plunge the country into

prolonged

civil

a

war?

Between 1960 and the

early

1970s the aspirations and objectives of militant

lay

Buddhists and politically ardent Buddhist monks with regard to the restoration of

Buddhism

to a preeminent place had been largelv addressed

bolic high point

of

this era,

when both

SLFP and

the

the

and

UNP

acceptance, was the inclusion in the countrv"s constitution in declaration that

Buddhism would have

fulfilled.

The sym-

collaborated in

its

1972 of the formal

the "foremost place" as the religion of the

MEP

1956 a Department of Cultural Affairs had been set up to sponsor Buddhism. The Buddha Jayanthi celebrations had been successfully staged with pomp, fervor, and piety in that same year majority. After the victory of Bandaranaike

and the

characteristic projects

of

all

and the

politicallv

in

sponsored Buddhist

revivals in the

traditional Buddhist polities of Southeast Asia were undertaken. They were projects

to collate and edit the texts of Pali canon, the Tripitaka, and to translate Sinhalese, to publish a in Sinhalese

number of Buddhist relic,

the palladium of the precolonial Sinhala

and other famous Buddhist monuments

in

in

Burma by Premier

U

into

in Kandy Kingdom,

Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa, and

elsewhere. In the mid-fifties similar projects celebrating the restoration of

were undertaken

them

compile an encyclopedia

and English, and to restore the Dalada Maligawa (the temple

where the Buddha's tooth resided)

literary texts, to

Buddhism

Nu.

Indeed, the architectural restorations of the ancient capitals and other famous

monuments, accompanied by extensive Sinhalese peasant colonization and resettlement of the ancient lands that lay in their hinterland, and the popularization of pilgrimages to these restored sites must be judged to be important contributions to the stimulation as well as appeasement of Sinhalese desires to regain their past glories.

But

it is

education that has been

at the

heart of postindependence politics. Edu-

cation is the umbrella term under which were grouped a set of interlocking issues and interests: the animus against the Christian schools, which taught in English and pro-

Stanley].

Tambiah

604

duced

of Sinhalese

a largely Christian elite; the restoration

istration

and education, thereby enhancing the

which could

as the

social mobility

learn in the vernacular language; the restoration

language of admin-

of the lower

of Buddhist and other

Orientalist studies to a position of preeminence in the universities;

A

and so on.

conspicuous step taken was the creation of two Buddhist universities

daya and Vidyalankara

—

in

1959 by an

land's

two most distinguished

(The

staff of the parent pirivenas

pirivenas

were

act

pirivenas

of Parliament

at the

very

sites

— Vidyoof the

is-

which had dispensed education to monks.

were absorbed into the

universities,

and manv other

with the universities.) These two universities,

affiliated

classes,

already seen, were the seat of and the breeding

ground

as

we

have

for the scholarly activist "pro-

pation

monks who led the United Front. Indeed, the intensified political particiof the monks in the sixties was itself a barometer of their faith in achieving

results

through

gressive"

political participation;

championing "Buddhist"

and

their political relevance

social welfare issues

UNP and the SLFP during the

were harnessed to the

1965 and 1970

and strength full

as

bv both the

elections.

In both ideological and practical terms, probably the most important measures

taken related to the school system and the teacher training colleges of the island. The Betrayal ofBuddhism had is

warned

that

"what Buddhism has to protect

itself from

today

not the Catholic Church, but Catholic Schools" and had urged the nationalization

of

all

schools.

would give

The SLFP promise

a national

to bring the schools under a central system that

stamp to the education imparted was kept by Mrs. Bandaran-

aike in the sixties. All private schools

had previously been

assisted

by the

state.

Now

would be taken over bv the government; all grade I and grade II assisted schools would also be taken over, unless they chose to remain private and to forgo financial assistance. The net result was that the majority of schools so nationalized were those previously run bv Christian organizations, though the latter did decide to retain some of their best secondary schools as private fee-paying schools. The Catholics were the major losers, especially the poorer amongst them. The beneficiaries in the private fee-paving Christian schools came mostly from the elite and wealthy families. Hence, Christian privilege, though diminished, was not eradicated. The majority of private teacher training it

was declared that

all

grade

III assisted

schools (primary and postprimary)

colleges run bv Christian bodies were also similarly surrendered to the government.

By comparison with

the Christian schools, the private schools run by Buddhist orga-

nizations readily participated in the takeover, because

now under governmental

spon-

would be further enhanced. 21 The takeover of the majority of schools, combined with the switch to the mother tongue as the medium of instruction, which was achieved in all primary and secondary schools by 1967, was perhaps the most substantial accomplishment of the program sorship their Sinhala-Buddhist identity

to restore the rights of the religion and language of the majority.

The 1970s and 1980s: The Deepening If

Crisis

bv the early 1970s the program of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism on which most

segments of the

laity

and

all

the clergy could agree had been largely achieved, then

BUDDHISM. POLITICS, AND VIOLENCE

IN SRI

LANKA

605

why did the

Sinha la-Tamil conflict

and 1983, the

up again and produce the

flare

being the most violent and destructive so

last

riots

of 1977, 1981,

experienced?

far

The

answers are complex.

At the core of the Sinhala-Tamil ethnic

conflict since the 1970s,

and generated the passions of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism and the

wo

of Tamils, are

clusters

of interest-based

issues.

One

which invoked

separatist claims

cluster concerns the official

language(s) of administration and the linguistic media of education, and their linkage

with the issues of educational opportunities, including admissions to universities and places

of higher learning and of recruitment to administrative services and the profeslong run the Tamils have

sions. In the

lost

out on these

issues,

decided

in their favor

by the Sinhalese majority, by the imposition of quotas and discriminatory

The

Sri

Lankan Tamils

living in the

north and the

east,

regions which by distant

location and poor resources were less economically developed than

of the

and

island,

had pursued education

in the professions.

in the public life

The

in

policies.

manv

other parts

order to secure employment in administration

"Jaffna Tamils" in particular occupied a conspicuous place

of the country, and their

visibilitv

middle-class occupations had generated the charge

and concentration

among

in certain

Sinhalese competitors that

the Tamils were overrepresented in the envied positions.

The skewing of higher education

in favor

step of discrimination against the Tamils.

and

later

of the Tamil United Liberation

had not succeeded. Their

failure to

of the Sinhalese majority was

a climactic

The Tamil politicians of the Federal Party, Front (TULF), had stoutly complained but

change anything bv constitutional means

finally

drove the Tamil youth movement for Eelam (the Tamil homeland) to take up arms

and engage

in militant confrontation.

In Sri Lanka the arc limited.

There

facilities for is

training in the sciences, both theoretical

heavy competition to enter the universities, especially

in the

and medicine. In the mid-1970s fewer than 9 percent

natural sciences, engineering,

of those taking the entrance examinations were admitted to the called standardization policy that adjusted the

were written

and applied,

in the Sinhalese

examination scores

and Tamil languages and

a

concessions for "backward" districts ultimately worked

universities.

when

test

A

so-

answers

quota system with special first

against the educated

Tamil youth of the north and second against the educated youth of Colombo.

The second

cluster concerns "colonization

sparsely populated tral,

schemes" of peasant resettlement

in the

"Dry Zone" of Sri Lanka, which covers regions in the North Cen-

Northern, and Eastern Provinces. This ongoing conflict involves the vexed and

contested issues of devolution of powers from the central government to provincial/ regional councils, the ethnic quotas to be allocated to colonization schemes under central

and

local control, the

matters of local government,

degree to which regional autonomy education, land alienation,

is

to be granted in

and policing, and so on. 22

While the colonization of the Dry Zone was begun before Independence, since it has been continuously implemented on a large scale as the major form of

the 1950s

agricultural development. Large capital-intensive multipurpose enterprises such as the

Mahaweli Programme are part of this developmental trust. Manv centuries ago, the Dry Zone was the site of a much glorified Sinhala Buddhist civilization centered in Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa, and a return of Sinhalese Gal

Ova Scheme and

the

Stanley J.

Tambiah

606

peasantry to the area

is

seen as a re-creation of that past. But the Northern and Eastern

Provinces currently have as their majority population Sri Lankan (and Indian) Tamils,

with the Muslims the next largest category. Peasant resettlement has involved the migration and transplantation of poor peasants from the denselv populated and land

hungry parts of the country, which are located parts of the island,

where Sinhalese

and southwestern

in the central, south,

And

vastly predominate.

successive Sinhalese

ma-

governments have been preoccupied with catering to the needs of the Sin-

joritarian

halese peasantry, while either discriminating against or ignoring the interests

needs of the minorities,

who

are the

and

major native populations of the Northern and

Eastern Provinces. Given the ethnically preferential policy and the manner in which the Sinhala-Tamil conflict

would their is

was developing,

see the massive migrations

"homelands" and

as

the stance taken bv the

From

an attempt to

most

was

it

inevitable that the Sri

of Sinhalese into the Dry Zone

radical

swamp them. The

Lankan Tamils

an intrusion into

separatist claim to

and militant of the Tamil

the Riots of the 1980s to the Indo-Sri

as

Eelam

dissidents. 23

Lanka Accord

Since 1956, mass violence in the form of riots has been launched seven times by

segments of the Sinhalese population against the Tamils. The most destructive of these riots took place in 1958, 1977, 1981,

and 1983.

1956 and 1958. Our concern here

that occurred in

I

is

have already discussed those with those that flared up in

1981 and 1983.

The were a

riots perpetrated

result

of the

hala nationalism,

and more

by the Sinhalese

collision

civilians

upon

between an emphatic but

which had nevertheless,

as

benefits for the Sinhalese majority,

we have and

the Tamils in 1981 and 1983 still

unsatiated Buddhist Sin-

seen, secured since

Tamil nationalism, which threatened secession and a separate tives

which were bound to

While

at

infuriate

no time did the Tamil

1956 more

a rising, desperate, confrontational state

of Eelam, objec-

and inflame Sinhala chauvinists. civilian public as

such

initiate riots against the

among Tamil youth. many developments. Their feeling of

Sinhalese public, armed insurgency began in the late seventies

The

Tamil Tigers formed as the end result of

hopelessness was caused bv the discrimination practiced against

TULF's

cation, the

intensified objections to the pace

of Sinhalese peasants tion of its

The

militants

who were

in the

commitment 1

first

is

homelands of the Tamils, and

finally the

1977, after

higher edu-

TULF's

declara-

homicide victims were some Tamil politicians and policemen

The government

virtually a Sinhalese

reacted by sending an

seven years of SLFP

rule, the

army of oc-

monopoly) to the north and the

stamp out the insurgency. The following chronology of events escalated to produce the

J.

in

to Eelam.

labeled collaborators.

cupation (the army

them

and magnitude of resettlement

UNP was

reelected

riots

cast to

of 1983. In

under the leadership of

R. Javawardenc. In 1979 this government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act

with

its

draconian provisions, such as defining certain acts as unlawful including the

speaking or writing of words intended to cause religious, social, or

communal

dishar-

BUDDHISM. POLITICS. AND VIOLENCE

LANKA

IN SRI

607

monv; allowing confessions made to the police, possiblv under duress, as admissible army and police to arrest persons and hold them incommunicado for up to eighteen months without trial. This act allowed the security forces to take punitive actions in the north that would progressively alienate the Tamils there

evidence; and permitting the

(e.g.,

arresting persons without a warrant, seizing possessions concerned with "un-

lawful activity," and indefinitely detaining persons).

the District

Development Councils were

Then

1981 the elections to

in

seriously disturbed with violence bv the

Tamil insurgents and the burning of the Public Library in Jaffna bv Sinhalese security

of violent encounters between the armv and the insurgents occurred: the Tamil insurgents detonated land mines and the armv engaged in arrests and shooting reprisals. The atmosphere was further poiforces (in this case the police). Thereafter a string

soned bv random punitive actions of Sinhalese

civilians against

Tamil

civilians in

many

towns throughout the country, including actual or threatened physical attacks on persons or their shops. These mounting tensions escalated into the riots of 1983. riots

were

set off

when Tamil

insurgents

ambushed

The

thirteen Sinhalese soldiers in the

north on 23 July Their mangled bodies were subsequently displayed in Colombo's

main cemetery.

The 1983

riots

in Colombo, the capital city, on 24 July and lasted until on Tamils spread in widening circles to towns in the south-

began

5 August; the attacks

west, to the central tea plantation districts, and to Trincomalec in the Eastern Province.

The death

estimate),

toll

was between 350

and the refugees

in

(the

government

figure)

and 2,000 (the Tamil

Colombo camps numbered from 80,000

the

to

100,000. Arson and property destruction were extensive. Properties methodically destroyed, burned, and looted in

Colombo

included Tamil

middle- and lower-class residential wards; groceries;

textile

homes

in

the city's

shops; tea shops

owned

by Tamils and located in the dense business districts, main thoroughfares, and dential wards; factories,

and over one hundred

Colombo were ness

industrial establishments (textile mills,

rubber goods factories, and coconut thus Tamil

oil distilleries).

homeowners of the middle

class,

The main

resi-

garment

victims in

shopkeepers, large busi-

owners and entrepreneurs, and merchants.

Although some monks were involved the Buddhist

monks and

in inciting the crowds, the vast majority

the sangha were not directly involved in the riots.

they prominent in the immediately preceding events,

when

of

Nor were

the issues that engaged

—

seemed to be more political and territorial focused on than directly resecession and homelands, peasant colonization and discrimination ligious, in the sense of the "restoration of Buddhism," as they had been in the late the Sinhalese and the Tamils

—

1950s and the 1960s. Those previous Buddhist demands

— recognizing Sinhalese

as

the official language, denying state aid to Christian schools, promoting the status of

—

monastic colleges, and making Buddhism the foremost religion on the island had been largely satisfied But as we soon shall see, the explosive issues of the 1980s

surrounding the claim bv Tamils to their homelands, and the increasing toll Tamil insurgent violence would take on both Sinhalese security' forces and civilians, would regalvanize the cause of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, a cause in which Buddhist activist

The

become increasingly involved in the 1980s. 1987 saw the engagement of the government's army and

monks would once years

1984

to

again

secu-

Tambiah

Stanley J.

608

ritv forces

with the Tamil militants of the north and the

however, the

incidents took place

sentiments of the public at large, including

1985 Tamil

manv

militants took the fateful step

civilians in the vicinity city that

cast.

Surelv and unavoidably,

on both sides became exercised. During these vears certain which would periodically inflame the Buddhist and nationalist

civilians

sections of the Buddhist sangha. In

of for the

of the sacred Bo Tree

first

time attacking Sinhalese

in the historic city

of Anuradhapura,

a

not merely a reminder and repository of ancient glorv, but also the focus

is

of pious and celebrated pilgrimages.

It also

stands at the heart of the region of

expanding peasant resettlement, and of the ancient kingdom immortalized bv the

Mabavamsa.

of Tamil militant

targets at

Increasingly, Sinhalese civilians,

Arantalawa

in

A

attacks.

monks, and Buddhist temples became

particularly notorious case

1986 of a busload of monks returning from

was the brutal

a pilgrimage.

killing

The

Sin-

army previously not only killed many Tamil civilians but had also demolished Hindu temples and killed their priests. The armv conducted these operations under

halese

the banner of a

commitment

to stamping out terrorism.

tionalism must have influenced

many of

While Sinhala Buddhist na-

the soldiers, the attack

on temples

as

on

schools was also motivated bv the belief that thev are places of refuge and hiding for the rebels. In the course of such actions civilians institutions have

been victimized.

Sinhalese at their sacred

sites,

Now the Tamil

who

seek refuge in these public

rebels turned the tables, hitting the

thereby making a statement that thev were prepared to

use the same kind of violence against civilians, bystanders, and nonmilitarv targets as the

armed

the

civil

forces did.

war

in the

The

Sinhalese civilians themselves

arms to the Sinhalese Civilian

directly implicated in

Home

the Tamil dissidents, because the defeat, the

became

Northern and Eastern Provinces when the government distributed

Guards and encouraged them to engage with government army was unable to contain, let alone

Tamil militants.

Thus, by the mid-1980s,

as

we

shall see in the

following sections, various protest

organizations and movements, made up of varying numbers of members of political parties,

Buddhist monks, and concerned laymen, were being formed not only to sup-

port the war against Tamil separation but also to protest any tendency on the part of the a

UNP government to

negotiate a peace with the Tamil insurgents

on the

basis

of

devolution of powers to provincial councils. At the same time, the government of

India supported the Tamil rebels and applied pressure to cease

its

economic blockade of Jaffna. The

Sri

on

the Sri

Lankan government

Lankan army's determined

last

push

to eradicate the rebels, the Vadamarachchi Operation, proved fruitless. These events finally

pushed Javawardenc to sign the Indo— Sri Lanka Agreement (the Peace Ac-

cord) in July 1987.

The Peace Accord allowed (estimated at

its

maximum

for the entry into Sri

Lanka of a

accord, to pacify the north and the east, and to achieve forces

had hitherto

large Indian

army

to be around fifty-five thousand troops) to enforce the

failed to accomplish.

The

Sri

what the Sinhalese armed

Lankan government had on

its

side,

apart from the threat of an armed Indian invasion, good reasons for signing the accord. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), an opposition partv which had been

banned

in Sri

Lanka

in

1983, had mounted

its

own

illicit

destabilizing and opposi-

BUDDHISM. POLITICS, AND VIOLENCE

LANKA

IN SRI

609

tional militancy in the core Sinhalese majority provinces (in central, southwestern,

southern parts of the island). As a its

result, the

government

felt

the need to withdraw

troops so as to deploy them against the insurrectionary threat in

But the accord

stirred the fears

its

own

midst.

of Sinhalese nationalists on many grounds. While

affirming the need to preserve the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka, the accord ac-

knowledged that

Lanka was

Sri

each ethnic group had

and multilingual

a "multiethnic

"distinct cultural

its

and

plural society," that

linguistic identity,"

which had to be

nurtured, and that "the Northern and Eastern Provinces haye been areas of historical

Lankan Tamil speaking peoples" while sharing their territory with other ethnic groups. This was tantamount to recognizing the north and east as habitation of the Sri

the homelands of the Tamil, subject to the residential rights of other groups.

The accord

also stated that

once peace was restored

a single provincial council

consisting of both the Northern and Eastern Provinces

understood on the basis of previous negotiations that have

all

powers held bv

to be held before the

hold a referendum

a state in the

this provincial council

it

was

would

Indian Union. Elections to the council were

end of 1987. The president of

in the

would be formed;

Sri

Lanka was authorized to

Eastern Province in the course of the following year to

determine whether die people

in that area (the

Muslims were nearlv

of the

a third

population) wished to remain united with the north or have a separate provincial council of their own.

The annexure

to the accord provided for an Indian peacekeeping contingent,

when

requested bv the Sri Lankan government, to help in terminating the hostilities and to

implement the terms of the agreement. This agreement to an and intervention

in Sri

Lankan

affairs

(which

in fact

active Indian presence

did happen subsequently) was

further complicated bv an agreement between the Indian and Sri in

an exchange of

the island

letters that neither the

would be made

Lankan governments

port of Trimcomalee nor any other part of

"available for military use

by any country

manner

in a

prejudicial to India's interests."

While some ministers even within the

madasa and Athulathmudali, minister

UNP government (like Prime Minister Pre-

for national security)

thought that their

leader.

President Javawardene, had conceded too much, opposition forces quickly coalesced,

however tenuously and

intermittently, to create an uproar.

SLFP, the main opposition

partv,

and supported by the

They were

MEP

and the

led

by the

JVP The

ob-

which exploited the most unfavorable readings of the terms of the accord, were that the government had acceded to the Tamil extremists' demand for their separate homelands, that the island had thereby been dismembered and partitioned, and

jections,

that Sri

Lanka had become

a

pawn and

a client state

of India, which had geopolitical

ambitions of exercising hegemony over the Indian Ocean. The actual presence of a large Indian

armv was an

effective stick to beat the

UNP with,

and

it

played

upon

all

the historic fears of marauding Hindu Tamils invading the island, and threatening the unity'

and sovereignty of

One of the itself is a

a beleaguered but 2,500-year-old Sinhala

complicating factors in Sri Lanka's current conflict

is

Buddhist

polity.

that "devolution"

highly emotive and explosive term, carrying different meanings to different

persons and groups.

A separate state of Eelam;

a federal

union between Tamil and the

Stanley J.

Tambiah

610

Sinhalese states; a unitary state with devolution of

of

councils; the recognition inces,

a

power to regional or

provincial

merger between existing northern and eastern prov-

or portions of them, so as to constitute Tamil homelands; the exact powers and

functions with regard to security, defense, taxation, peasant colonization, education, etc.,

that are to be reserved to the center

councils

— these

are merely

some of

the

and allocated to the regional or provincial

many

which have been

issues

periodically

Lankan and Indian governments, with or without Tamil representatives of the TULF and the militants present. Between June 1985, when under Indian auspices the Sri Lankan government directly discussed issues with the Tamil discussed by the Sri

Thimpu, the

insurgents in

capital

of Bhutan, and Julv 1987, when the Indo-Sri

Lankan Agreement was signed, there were between Indian and the

talks at

New

Delhi (September 1985)

Lankan officials, at Colombo (July 1986) between an Lankan government, and at Bangalore (December 1986)

Sri

Indian delegation and Sri

between Rajiv Gandhi and Jayawardene. All these

talks

were concerned with

specify-

no doubt much progress had been embodied in the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord. But this accord was an agreement between two governments. And the interpretation and implementation of its terms would provide plenty of contentious space for ing the terms of a devolutionarv solution, and

made toward

a solution that

was

finally

the Sinhalese parties and interest groups in opposition to the the one

hand and, on the

other, to the Tamil dissidents

and

UNP

government on

militants,

whose

partici-

pation in the negotiations was irregular, discontinuous, and not binding. In this situation of ambiguity, disagreement, misperception, mischievous exaggeration, and bad faith

among

the Tamil dissidents, the Sinhala political parties, and various pressure

groups, "devolution"

is

a rallying cry

of hope and reconciliation for some, a warn-

ing slogan of national division and dismemberment for others, and an occasion for stretching out the conflict and regrouping for

still

others.

The Mavbima Surakime Vvaparava (MSV) The Movement for Schalk 24 and

Amunugama 25

action and exercises

laity

discuss

power through

through monks' participation

composed of

the Protection of the

how

Motherland

the Buddhist sangha engages in political

linkages with political parties and, indirecdy,

in intersecting, joint, intermediary militant

movements

and monks. These movements and organizations, militantly Bud-

dhist, increasingly proliferated in the

1980s and focused on the Sinhala-Tamil ethnic

conflict allegedly in order to protect the rights

Sinhalese, heirs to the island

ments harkened back

to,

of the "sons of the

and protectors of the Buddhist

soil,"

religion.

the native

These move-

and reactivated, on the one hand, the enduring slogans of Mabavamsa, such as Dhammadipa (the island of the

the remote past enshrined in the

Dhamma),

the island's unification under

King Dutthagamani, and the more

Sinhala Buddhist nationalism and revivalism of Dharmapala.

On

recent

the other hand, the

movements addressed proximate and immediate events of the present-day ethnic con-

BUDDHISM, POLITICS. AND VIOLENCE

LANKA

IN SRI

611

"murderous" Tamil separatism. They warned against the dangers of a devolutionary solution to the ethnic conflict, which thev interpreted as the partition of a unitary island. Finally, they opposed the terms of the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987, which they interpreted as an ignominious capitulation to the designs of imperialist India and its sponsorship of the Tamil cause. Seven leading new orgaflict

and

its

formed since 1979, with members drawn from political parties, laxand the ranks of Buddhist monks. These organizations have as their principal purpose the promotion of the interests of Sinhala Buddhists as the true "sons of the nizations have

circles,

26

soil."

We

are here primarily

founded

in July

many of

the

1986.

new

lay

Mandalava and the

concerned with one of these organizations, the Movement

of the Motherland, or Mavbima Surakime Vvaparava (MSV),

for the Protection

It

was

cum

Jatika

a

wide-ranging umbrella organization which included

clerical

Buddhist organizations such

as the Sinhala Bala

Peramuna.

The MSV's Membership and Organization It is

worth

which

listing the organizational

components and leading

an amalgam both of laitv and monks

is

in their professed identity

Buddhists and as non-Marxists and of anti-UNP lition against the

members of

UNP

is

figures in the

political

constituted of three entities:

MSV,

and unity

as

opponents. This broad coa-

members of

political parties,

the sangha, and individual lav Buddhist enthusiasts and special cause

activists.

From

the political parties,

we

(the son

JVP

of Philip Gunawardena, the founder), and

called the Sri

MSV the SLFP led bv MEP led bv Dincsh Gunavvardena

have in the forefront of the

former prime minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the

a front organization

of the banned

Lanka Deshaprcmi Peramuna. 2 " In understanding the participation

of Buddhist monks,

it is

relevant to note that they have

many

organizational identities

and, according to context and cause, thev mobilize in terms of one or the other.

At

same time it is noteworthy that these multiple memberships, identities, and interests sometimes work at cross purposes and thus sometimes lead to fragmentation, the

weak organizational Their

first

membership

structure,

and lack of sustained

organizational identity in the Sivam,

is

"sectarian"

activity.

stemming from

Amarapura, and Ramanna Nikayas,

distributed in various strengths throughout the island. torial

groupings on

a "district" basis

are smaller local groupings.

and

a

behalf.

next

is

the separate terri-

of the monks belonging to each nikaya

Each of the three

sects has

working committee (karaka sabha) to speak

The

The

their nikaya (sect)

respectively, that are

sect leadership appoints a

monk

its

head monk

officially

on the

— these

{mahanayake) entire nikaya 's

to be head of each of

its

district

groupings.

Leaving aside their sectarian membership, Buddhist monks belonging to nikayas may band together to form special interest associations with a agenda. Their membership in these associations

is

these associations transcending sect division have

all

three

political

therefore trinikaya (three-sect), and

known

links to political parties

and

Stanley J.

Tambiah

612

mav

UNP, SLFP, MEP,

JVP,

of monks on a trinikava

basis

may be mobilized

at all

thus be acknowledged as branches or components of the

and so on. These

special interest political associations

mav be organized these levels to

at local, regional,

rallv,

to meet,

or national levels and

and to launch movements. 28

Three monks who in recent times have figured conspicuously as leaders of activist movements which are coalitions of both monk and lay organizations are Palipane Chandananda, the head monk of the Asgiriva chapter of the Siyam Nikaya; Sobhita Thero, the head monk of Naga Viharaya in Kotte, leader of a temperance movement, and a popular preacher; and Muruttctuve Ananda Thero, incumbent of Abhavarama, a temple located in Narempitiya on the immediate outskirts of Colombo, and the chaplain and president of the Nurses Union. All three have been vociferous opponents

of the Indo— Sri Lanka Peace Accord and of the ruling

The members of the MSV,

like

many

UNP. deny the claim of the

"patriotic" Sinhalese,

Tamil insurrectionists and politicians to their

own homelands and

are totallv

opposed

to any devolutionary solution of the conflict (equating and exaggerating anv notion

of provincial councils

as a division

Buddhist dimension comes from

and partition of the country)- The MSV's

its

plea that a division of the country

special

and the weak-

ening of its "sovereigntv" would also diminish, even doom, Buddhism and the Sinhala culture that

it

supports. These are not specifically "monkish" preoccupations or slo-

monks

gans, but today's

are proclaiming these views

and waving these banners

as

participants of clearly political organizations, even as adherents of different political

keeping their membership in purely sangha-linked organizations.

parties, while also

To underscore

the significance of the

MSV,

taken place through time with regard to the

and the patterns of their were the

first

Front of Monks, Bandaranaikc

political participation.

to assert the rights of the

in

as a canvassing

1956. In the

let

Today we

sixties

of political

and seventies we saw

two

monks

the elections for

political parties

as

within

— the UNP and

of the sangha. The monks are more

members of branch

in coalition

units

and wings

parties.

the effectiveness and visibility of the

short-term spasmodic capacity to organize "colorful

famous and

heart-stirring speakers

Lanka the techniques

tions,

won

a bipolar division

and participate not only

and monks but also

As Schalk has demonstrated,

Sri

activist

to engage in politics, and the United

see a further transformation

laitv,

have exercised

phalanx of monks, largely

differentiated, having pluralistic affiliations,

groups of politicians,

recapitulate the shifts that have

The Vidyalankara monks of the 1950s

monks

the sangha paralleling the contest between the the SLFP.

me

issues that

who

for organizing

rallies all

the

MSV,

formations, has consisted in

its

thus, in

lav in its

can stimulate and mobilize the masses." 29 In

and staging

rallies,

processions, demonstra-

and public meetings are well established and widely used

The campaign of

MSV

over the country led by

in

our era of participatory

devotion to and expertise

in

mass

politics.

politics

and crowd

mobilizing masses for the

holding of rallies and demonstrations. Emotive slogans, stirring rhetoric from impassioned speakers, the massing of people amidst flags and loudspeakers, the converging

of

linear processions in a central arena to fuse into a milling

mass

— these episodic

BUDDHISM. POLITICS, AND VIOLENCE

LANKA

IN SRI

613

short-lived spectacles have been effective in putting pressure

and

their parties.

They have

transmission. In this context,

the impact of opinion polls it is

on

the leading politicians

and instantaneous media

noteworthy that the generalized

battle cry

on behalf

of the motherland has been suitably (and humorously) adjusted to their needs bv university students, secondary school students, and scholar monks in seminaries as

"Motherland land

first,

degree second"; "Motherland

first,

school second"; and "Mother-

pirivena second."

first,

Schalk reports that "between the end of August and the middle of September 1986 as

many

as sixteen rallies

the same year thirty leaves off

were planned

rallies

— the story of how

Peace Accord

on 29

— almost one daily" and that by November of

had been held.

on

We

can take the story beyond where Schalk

the eve of the actual signing of the Indo-Sri

Lanka

MSY

which was seen by members of the

July 1987, an accord

coalition as conceding to the Tamils 5

"sovereignty' of the country, a rated into a horrible riot in

On

28

July 1987, the

and the Indian government the very "unity" and mass rally of protest organized by the MSY deterio-

Colombo.

major components of the

daranaikc and other leaders of that party, the

MSV — the SLFP with

MEP

led

banned JYP represented by university student supporters, and finally hundred monks from virtually all their member organizations staged

—

and assembled under the sacred Bo Tree center.

The

Station,

in Pettah,

A huge crowd

at least

two

a procession

Colombo's "native" commercial

location, adjacent to the central bus station

was chosen so

Mrs. Ban-

by Dinesh Gunawardena, the

and near the Fort Railway

commuting participants to congregate easily. monks as well as the lay leaders waxing black flags

as to enable the

had formed, and the

urged the people to protect the motherland from division and to oppose the accord,

which would pave the way for India to take control of the ernment

in

police fired tear gas into the crowd, to

island. Jayawardene's

turn was prepared to disperse the demonstration bv the use of force.

one report, nineteen

civilians

which went on

were

hundred were wounded when the police eighty buses, scores of cars, and a

a destructive this

one-day

fired into the

crowds.

killed

during

number of

gov-

The

rampage. According

and more than a The mobs set fire to

riot

buildings, including shops, hospitals,

and other government property. The government sealed off the major entry points into the city when it heard that crowds were amassing in the immediate suburbs with the intent of marching to the city's center.

This political demonstration deteriorating into a riot was the climactic point in the political rallies

mounted by

the

MSV

as well as the

beginning of

its

disarray.

Many

participants were put off bv the violence. The monks had been publicly, rudely, and summarily put in vans and taken away. The JVP and its youthful enthusiasts would

now

turn to and intensify their

own

brand of insurgency, which was marked by

ter-

The JVP, which had in recent years sporadically practiced violence, would now systematize it and become a mirror image of the Tamil youth insurgents, fighting the government for its alleged concessionary attitude to the Tamrorism and violence.

ils

and

its

signing of the Peace Accord, and for

address the grievances of the poor.

its

alleged injustices

and

inability to

Tambiah

Stanley J.

614

Monks and

Violence Face to Face

The politically active monks of the 1980s, consisting of many established leaders known for their orthodox adherence to rules pertaining to the monastic life and, even more, the young monks, a great manv of whom were at universities and pirivenas or had recently

left

them, were, by virtue of their

political

commitments, confronted

with the question of having to come to terms with the violence generated by the Tamil-Sinhala ethnic conflict and later by the

civil

war unleashed within the Sinhala

society itself by the JVP.

As

stated before, Tamil guerrillas

Sacred pilgrimage

sites

was found possible to

were being made

inaccessible. In this

fling the ancient epithet

ting heinous crimes against

Bv and

had attacked Buddhist temples and

killed

monks.

charged atmosphere,

it

at

those commit-

and the

east, especially

of mlecca ("savage")

Buddhism.

large the Sinhalese army's operations in the north

after

1983 when the Tamil insurgents themselves became committed to counterviol-

ence,

had been supported by the Sinhala public, and

notable exceptions, the majority of

monks

explicitly

it

can be said that, with some

or privately supported and con-

doned the Sinhalese army's killing of Tamil guerrillas. The cause of preserving Sri Lanka as a sovereign undivided Sinhala Buddhist state is so paramount that the main

body of the sangha has not imposed on Tamil civilians.

In the late 1980s, as popular

and

activist

mism" and

monks

the moral imperative to object to the tribulations

felt

increasingly

movements composed of politicians, formed

lay enthusiasts,

"murderous Tamil Eela-

the government's attempts to seek a devolutionarv solution to the ethnic

Buddhist ceremonial and

conflict,

for protesting the

ritual,

and the preachings of monks invoking

alleg-

edly Buddhist concepts and justifications, informed, colored, and legitimated the public

posture.

How

have the "sons of Buddha"

—

ideally dedicated to

nonviolence and

required bv disciplinary rules not only to refrain from acts of killing but also to be nowhere near marching armies and the traffic in arms taken on the more compelling identity of "sons of the soil," which entails militant and violent politics? The most dramatic illustration of this transformation was in a 1982 Mav Dav parade when

—

about

a

thousand young monks

affiliated

with the

JVP "clad

in their distinctive saffron

red robes walked under the banner of the socialist Bhikkhu Front." 30 In the charters and propaganda sheets of these movements, "Buddhist" aims and objectives are inserted

sons of the

soil.

and interpreted

Monks

recite

as

consonant with the preoccupations of the

pint at the public ceremonies and

rallies;

thev stage

name of dbarmadesanaya; the "commemoration" and recall of the Buddha's enlightenment itself may precede the campaign rhetoric of fighting Tamil terrorism; and, finally, the newly prominent bodbipuja ritual mav again sermons which are given the inflated

be a part of a

rally to protect

the motherland. 31 Moreover, bodhipujas were held in

leading temples to seek the blessings of gods in ensuring the safety and success of military personnel.

tonment

at

Monks

officiated at military functions,

Panagoda saw the erection of an impressive

vious times prime ministers and ministers of state did

and the central army can-

cbaityn (pagoda). 32 If in pre-

this,

now

military

commanders

BUDDHISM. POLITICS, AND VIOLENCE

IN SRI

LANKA

615

too worship

at

the

Temple of the Tooth Relic

obtain blessings from the head

monks of the

The JVP Monks:

Kandv upon appointment, and

in

Asgiriva and Malwatte chapters.

xAJienation

and Violence

For the remaining years of the decade, or more accurately

until the

1989, the story of the monks' involvement with militant politics ence to the JVP.

Among

all

the Sinhala political parties

systematically set out to mobilize

JVP membership

monks

as

it

end of the vear

best told bv refer-

is

was the JVP that most

an essential militant support group. The

was primarily drawn from Sinhala Buddhist male youth of And the movement sought to infiltrate the universities, where

itself

rural social origins.

young monks have increasingly come to constitute as important segment of the student population. The egalitarian, populist, nationalist, anti-Tamil (and notably antiIndian estate labor) Sinhala-Buddhist charter of the In

fact, in

it

was

it

of participating

to voting

in the interior

monks.

had been used

hiding places and outposts for the insurgents. 33

as

in the late eighties that

JVP. Accusing

JVP appealed

some Buddhist temples

arms and ammunition and

to store

But

the 1971 insurgency

monks became an

integral

component of the

of 1983, the Javawardcne

in the anti-Tamil riots

government had banned the JVP, which thereafter had to operate through "front" organizations. Aside from lav university and upper school students, young Buddhist

monks provided this shield and outlet. The JVP attempted to operate through nizations at zonal, district,

made

to

form

a

JVP monk branch

invited to join the JVP.

nized cohorts of

most

effective

and subdistrict at

While other

monks

national committees and territorial orgalevels,

and

each territorial

political parties

across nikaya differences,

appears that an attempt was

it

had

it

also, as

and widest trinikava formation of politically

These monks were particularly useful

in the

34

Monks of all sects were we have seen, orgawas the JVP that achieved the level.

activist

monks.

canvassing of young people to ascer-

on issues. They joined all opposition groups in calling for early general Thev also gave voice to the increasingly visible "consumerism'" a negative judgment on the increased flow of Western goods into Sri Lanka and the intensified adoption of Western lifestyles and recreational patterns ensuing from the "liberaliztain their views

—

elections.

ing" of the economy, the establishment of the free-trade zone, and the expansion of

tourism under the

and the nostalgic

UNP

fiction

The Buddhist emphasis on muting worldly desires of a simple homogeneous precolonial Sinhala-Buddhist peasregime.

ant society were the themes articulated against consumerism and against deepening the division between the rich and the poor.

The most

crucial

dilemma facing the JVP monks concerned

their party's decision

to engage in "revolutionary violence" to right these wrongs. Officially this violent activity

was

said to be the

work not of

the

JVP but of

another organization, the

Deshapremi Janatha Vijayaparaya (DJV), which, despite its disavowal, the public knew to be an armed division of the JVP, implementing the latter's decisions. The engagement in militant violence by the JVP which in the event was directed

—

Stanley J.

Tambiah

616

much

not so

among

the security forces of the government,

of the

local as well as national political agents in Sinhalese majority areas as

opposed to the

— divided

monk

UNP,

Sinhalese in identity and living

MSV,

the umbrella organization

as

Chandananda, the

MSV first, and even more emphati-

with the voting monks committed to the JVP's brand of militant nationalism,

that

its

politic.

The argument of the

violence was a response to the government's prior use of force and re-

pression against civilians provided

no balm to those who were

dissociating themselves

it.

Manv of the JVP monks, betraval,

bv

faced with

monks and

their senior

commitments, became condoncrs

Sinhala parties, the

what thev construed

sectarian leaders,

own

against their elders

as

abandonment, even

and compelled bv

and even collaborators

of,

against senior monks. Within their

mounted criticism that the monks in live

loose

— SLEP,

which was now creating havoc within the Sinhala body

from

made up of a

MEP, JVP, and several lay and SLFP and MEP, and leading Mahanavake of Asgiriva, now saw the need to dis-

of the major opposition parties

tance themselves from active involvement with the

JVP

saw themselves

Buddhist organizations. The representatives of the

monks such callv

all

the groups and parties which

all

as against

administrators, and

its

UNP government in power.

Cracks began to appear in the coalition

army

against the distant Tamil insurgents and the alien Indian

chosen targets

in,

temples and within their

and

their political

of violence

acts

own

sects,

thev

their clerical authorities; they advocated

authority should sever their political connections with the major

UNP and the SLFP,

both of which were believed to be willing to

with the accord; they passively condoned, perhaps even collaborated

sination of recalcitrant senior

monks by JVP/DJV

in,

the assas-

executioners.

The government forces and paramilitary agents counterattacked bv killing susJVP insurgents. Their victims included many alleged JVP monks, who were treated unceremoniously, chased, degraded, arrested, and tortured, and in some cases killed. The JVP monks in reply organized many fasts and satyagrahas at Buddhist pected

temples, the most massive of which was staged at the Temple of the Tooth to put pressure

on the senior monks of the Asgiriva and Malwattc

chapters, the highest

establishments of the Siyam Nikaya. "Soon after this demonstration the highest deci-

making bodies (Karaka Sabha) of these two establishments passed resolutions condemning the Accord and seeking protection for the monks who had been taken sion

into custodv by

armed

services.

When

Buddhist monks were characterized left

the

JVP

as traitors

escalated their terror tactics, leading

and sent death

threats.

As

a result

some

the island and others drastically curtailed their religious and social activities." 35

The JVP

radical

monks'

basic stand

was that the religion of the Buddha and the

language and culture of the Sinhalese cannot flourish without a sovereign territory

which

is

the motherland of Sri Lanka, and the

nounced on

their elders

was that the

elders

uncompromising judgment they pro-

had been

slothful in their patriotic obli-

gations, and had become trapped in such worldly interests as property, rank, and

temple building.

Bv

late

against the

1989 and 1990, the time of my writing, the wheel of fortune had turned JVP as a whole, and also therefore against the JVP monks. The UNP

buddhism, politic

s.

and violence

in sri

lanka

61~

government of Premadasa has by the compliant use of the security forces and

their

JVP The JVP

paramilitary organs succeeded in killing the leadership (the "Politburo") of the

and,

finally, in

monks have

decimating and capturing the dispersed

JVP

awesome show of force bv

paid the price of this

rank and

file.

the state: being readily

many have been killed; many have surrendered, or been many have confessed and turned informers. Manx have retreated with lav members to jungle camps and hideouts. The monk who has finally taken to the gun can no longer be considered a vehicle of the Buddha's religion; recognizable in their robes,

disrobed and become laymen;

moreover, he

is

unlikely to survive physically as a rebel in the jungle, the

that fostered the wandering, meditating renouncer in

same jungle

of the world, the highest achiever

Buddhism.

APPENDIX List of Parties

and Associations with Abbreviations

All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress (All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress)

Colon

National Congress

Communist Party (CP) Lanka Sama Namaja Party

N(

C

(I.SSP)

Lanka Eksath Bhikkhu Mandalaya Ek-sath

Sinhala

(

LEPM)

Bhikkhu Pcramuna (United Front)

Maha Sabha SMS I

Mahajana Eksath Pcramuna (MEP) United National Party (UNP)

Lanka Freedom Partv (SLFP)

Sri

Mavbima Surakimc Vyaparaya (MSV) Dcshapremi Janatha Vijayaparaya iDJ\') Janatha Vimukthi Pcramuna

i

JVP)

Tamil United liberation Front (TULF) Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Edam (LTTE)

Notes 1.

The following

are

examples:

Kitsiri

Malagoda, Buddhism in Sinhalese Society, 1750-1900: A Study ofReligious Revival and

Change (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); Sarath

Amunugama, "Anaga-

1864—1933) and the Dharmapala Transformation of Sinhala Buddhist Orgarika

f

nization in a Colonial Setting," Social Science

4 (1985): 697-730;

Information 24, no.

Ananda Guruge,

ed..

Return

to

Righteous-

ness:

A

Collection of Speeches, Essays,

ters

of

Anaganka Dharmapala (Colombo:

Government

Press,

and

Let-

1965); George Bond,

The Buddhist Revival

in Sri

Lanka: The Reli-

gious Tradition, Reintcrpretation and Response

(Columbia: University of South Carolina 1988); and Richard Gombrich and

Press,

Gananath Obeyesekere, Buddhism TransReligious Change in Sri Lanka

formed:

(Princeton,

N.J.:

Princeton

University

Press, 1988). 2. The anti-Muslim riots of 1915 are well documented. For example, see Journal of Asian Studies 24, no. 2 (1970), in which diere are diree essays under the rubric, "The 1915 Riots in Ceylon: A Symposium," with

.

Stanley J.

Tambiab

618

Ameer

Kan-

World Buddhist Congress; P. de S. Kularatne, at one time principal of Ananda College, the most famous of die Buddhist schools on the island, and later manager of

nangara, "The Riots of 1915 in Sri Lanka:

the Buddhist Theosophical Society schools;

an introduction bv Robert Kearney;

"The 1915 Racial Riots

Ali,

Lanka), a Reappraisal of

Its

in

Ceylon

Causes," South

Asia 4, no. 2 (1981): 1-20; and A.

A

Study

P.

Roots of Communal Vio-

in the

and

Past

lence,"

(Sri

2

no.

Present,

(1984),

130-65.

pp.

Law

in

P.

As R. Kearney (1967: 47-48) puts

4.

it:

"Although originating in the same social and ideological discontents and sharing hostility toward colonial rule, die two streams of sentiment developed markedly different characteristics.

men who,

The Congress was

led

by

attachment to the Sinhalese

past and idealized village

used the En-

life,

home and

glish language for the

the public

platform and adopted Western dress, manner of living, and

mode of thought. Whereas

the Sinhalese traditionalists defined dieir so-

and

cultural goals

by reference to the

Sinhalese past, the congressmen tended to

seek their goals in a closer emulation of

modern

the prominent

monks

Dhammaratana, Rev. Udankandawela

Saranankara, Rev. Walpola Rahula

(all

three

Bambarenda SiriVaranasi), and Rev.

studied in Calcutta), Rev.

(who studied

Kalalalle

in

10. Rahula, History of lon, p.

standard works in English: History of Bud-

dhism

Ceylon

in

1956); and

don tics

What

(Colombo: Gunasena, Buddha Taught (Gor-

the

See Urmila Phadnis, Religion and

Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna.

1 1

Samastha Lanka Bhikkhu Sammalanaya(SLBS). 12.

13.

Lanka,

Communist

Part)'

(CP)

and Lanka

Sama Samaja Part)'. 9. The most prominent of them were G.

P.

p.

Malalasekera, professor of Pali and

Buddhist

civilization,

Politics in Sri

187.

14. W. Howard Wriggins, Dilemmas of a New Nation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 15.

260-61.

James Manor, The Expedient Utopian:

Bandaranaike and Ceylon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989),

p.

269.

16. Ibid. Ibid., p.

287.

286-87.

18.

Ibid., pp.

19.

Thus, Phadnis writes that while the

Lanka Eksath Bhikkhu Mandalava (LEBM) and many teachers of the Vidyalankara and Vidyodaya universities supported the coalithe

UNP

SLFP and

the

LSSP

(Marxists),

drew support from newly formed

Colombo- based monk organizations such as Maha Sangha and Maha Sangha Peramuna as well as

from the chief monk of the Mal-

and Politics

Lanka (London: C. Hurst, 1976), 163-65.

8.

Phadnis, Religion and

in Sri

Poli-

in Sri

pp.

in Cey-

watte chapter of the Sivam Nikava. Religion

Bedford: Fraser, 1967).

7.

Buddhism

92.

tion of the

Anandasagra.

Walpola Rahula authored these two

6.

BTS

in the

Group were Rev. Na-

so-called Vidyalankara

seevali

of the

also an im-

Mettananda served as principal of Dharmaraja College in Kandy before becoming die head of the first Ananda College.

17.

ravila

critic

schools.

Britain."

Some of

5.

strong

although occasionally displaying

a sentimental

cial

a

its activities,

portant educationalist associated with

Ramanadian, Riots and Martial Ceylon, 1915 (London, 1915).

See

3.

and L. H. Mettananda, Catholic church and

dean of the Faculty of

Lanka, pp. 19-92.

20. Ibid., p. 195. 21. The number of private Hindu schools was small bv comparison with Christian and Buddhist schools, and most of the former were taken over by the government. 22.

gam

On

the

Pact of

Bandaranaike -Chelvanaya-

1956-57 and subsequent

on devolution,

cussions

who

biah, "Ethnic Fratricide in Sri Lanka:

served at the height of his career as the

president of the All Ceylon Buddhist gress,

and

later,

as

the

Con-

President of the

Update," lizzi,

in

Remo

and Stanley

J.

see Stanley

J.

dis-

Tam-

Oriental Studies at Peradeniya University,

An

Guidieri, Francesso Pel-

Tambiah,

eds.. Ethnicities

BUDDHISM. TOLITICS. AND VIOLENCE

LANKA

IN SRI

619

and Nations (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988). Also see James Manor. The Expedient Utopian: Randamnaike a>id Ceylon,

oriented and the third

chap. 8.

davana (both JYP oriented

23.

Two

on these

informative recent discussions

issues are Patrick Peebles. "Coloni-

zation and Ethnic Conflict in the

of

Sri

"The Material Basis tor Separatism: The Tamil Eelam Movement in Sri Lanka." pp. 56-77, both in Journal ofAsian Studies tri.

1

(February 1990i.

24. Peter eignty':

Schalk,

'"Unity'

Rev Concepts of

a

and 'Sover-

Militant Bud-

dhist Organization in the Present Conflict in Sri

Lanka," Temenos 1988, pp. 55-82.

two of which were JYP MEP oriented, Thev

Deshapremi Taruna and Bhikshu Sanviand Samasdia Lanka Pragatisili Bhikshu Peramuna (MEP oriented). "Buddhaputra and Bhumiputrar" are

Dry Zone

Lanka," pp. 30-55, and Amita Shas-

49, no.

tional organizations,

i.

29. Schalk, '"Unity' and 'Sovereignty,"' pp.

57-58. One document published bv the

MSY

claimed that "these

the

to

country

rallies

correct

a

have given

understanding

about the provincial council ordinance which has been proposed bv the President, Mr. J. R. Javaw ardena, and which aims to divide the Countrv."

Amunugama,

30.

"Buddhaputra

and

Bhumiputrar"

25. Sarath Amunugama, "Buddhaputra and Bhumiputrar Dilemmas of Modern Sinhala Buddhist Monks in Relation to Ethnic and Political Conflict." Religion 1991 ). (

26. Other organizations concerned with politicoreligious causes are the All-Ceylon

Buddhist Congress and the national branch

On

31.

the bodhipuja ritual, see

Seneviratne

and

Swarna

H. L.

Wickrcmaratne,

"Bodhipuja: Collective Representations of Sri

Lanka Youth," American Ethnologist 1980): 734-43.

no. 4

32.

7,

(

Amunugama,

"Buddhaputra

and

Bhumiputrar"

of the World Fellowship of Buddhists.

two other smaller parties 1990 u namely, Sinlisted bv .Amunugama hala Bala Mandalava led bv Xath Amera27. There were

33. See A. C. Alles, Insttrgency-1971 (Co-

lombo: Colombo Apothecaries' Co., 1976).

(

28.

Amunugama names

three such

34.

Amunugama,

Bhumiputrar"

kone, and Sinhala Janata Peramuna. na-

35. Ibid.

"Buddhaputra

and

—

CHAPTER 25

Conclusion: Remaking the State:

The Limits of the Fundamentalist Imagination Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby

±* undamentalisms Observed, the in this series,

century

demonstrated that religious fundamentalisms thrive

when and where masses of people

volume

first

in the twentieth

fixing in formerlv traditional societies ex-

perience profound personal and social dislocations as a result of rapid modernization

and

in the

absence of mediating institutions capable of meeting the

human

needs

created bv these dislocations. Occasioned by mass migration from rural to urban areas,

by unsvnehronized

social,

schemes of development, by

economic, and cultural transformations and uneven

failures in educational

and

social welfare systems,

ultimately bv the collapse of long- held assumptions about the

of human existence, the experience of dislocation

and

meaning and purpose

fosters a climate

of

crisis.

In this

situation people are needy in a special way. Their hunger for material goods

matched bv

a thirst for spiritual

reassurance and fulfillment. If these needs are inte-

grated and integral, so must be the

power

an encompassing way of life suggests

offering fulfillment. Religion presented as

the bearer of that power.

itself as

Taken together, volumes 2 and 3 of The Fundamentalism Project mentalisms and Society and Fundamentalisms religious fundamentalisms are basis

and

and

crises.

that transcends time

The

the State

—confirm the notion that

is

shaken or destroyed by modern

individual finds her true self in

and space, be

this a personal

God

communion widi

(relijjare)

govern the

lives

to like-minded individuals.

it

an obligation to bind

dictating the codes of behavior that

of these individuals, fundamentalist leaders bind so that they may

unleash. People are united in their

bound together

By

dis-

a real in-

or an impersonal Principle. In

cither case, the gift of a religious conversion carries with

oneself

Funda-

concerned with defining, restoring, and reinforcing the

of personal and communal identity that

locations

is

in

community by

common

experience of oppression or dislocation,

their obligation to

620

uphold the

will

of the

One who

a

'

ONCLUSION

(

621

has treed them, and sent forth into the laboratories and schools and political parties

and

militias in

Unlike

order to secure and expand the borders of the sacred community.

many of

their

nonfundamentalist coreligionists, fundamentalists demand

that the codes of behavior be applied comprehensively

— not only to family

and

life

interpersonal relations but to political organizations and international economies as well.

Fundamentalists struggle for completeness because,

learned that traditional to

ward

based

life

oft the invasive, colonizing

modern people, they have or tribe

is

not sufficient

Other. The religious community must therefore

who

bv conservative or orthodox believers

Fundamentalists know that

life itself

— distinctions too

prefer to "live

depends on victory over the enemy

the control not only of resources but of ideas

placement

as

village,

between "private" and "public" realms

reject artificial distinctions

easilv accepted

home, school,

in the

in institutions at every level

— so

and

let live."

in a

war

for

they prepare true believers for

of society, including the

state.

The observances

of a religious community should permeate the whole of life, an organic unity that the agents of secular modernity have wrongly segmented and compartmentalized.

The

boundaries that matter are not between the "private" and the "public," but between the believer and the infidel.

Fundamentalisms As world-builders motivated bv

as

a fierce

Imagined Communities

opposition to the status quo, fundamentalists

ongoing global process of national

are eager participants in an

self-definition

—

process that has occurred with a special intensity' in periods following a major international war, with the ensuing prospects for realignment and the shifting of ries.

bounda-

Because thev are essentially modern constructs, fundamentalist religious com-

munities, like secular regimes, tend to appropriate the language of nationalism. Yet the fundamentalist nation

grounded

is

from the premodcrn religious

firmly in a territorial and social space inherited

past.

Benedict Anderson has observed that the end of the era of nationalism

remotely in sight; indeed, "nation-ness

is

the

most universally legitimate value

political life

of our time." Once established

nation-ness,

became modular, Anderson argues, and

is

not

in the

in the sixteenth century, nationality, is

or

"capable of being transplanted

with varying degrees of self-consciousness to a great variety of social terrains, to

merge and be merged with

a

correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological

constellations."

Religious fundamentalism appears increasingly to be one such constellation. social philosophers

and

political theorists describe the

student of comparative fundamentalisms

is

example, while the bureaucratic and a product tiquity.

said

it

religiopolitical ide-

2 in a sacred text or tradition.

technocratic nation-state

of modernity', nationalists perceive

The same may be

paradoxes of nationalism, the

reminded of modern

ologies that borrow the language of ultimacy found

When

is,

For

objectively speaking,

subjectively as being rooted in an-

of Christian fundamentalists

in the

United

States,

Martin E. Marty and R.

Scott Appleby

622

who

modern politicalHindu fundamentalists, who define the modern Indian nation as "Hindustan," a vision drawn from the prehistorical past; or of the radical Jewish settlers on the West Bank, who imaginatively extend the nation of Israel's borders to the dimensions of the "Whole Land insist that their

Enlightenment-era democratic republic

is

the

philosophical expression of the ancient Judeo-Christian tradition; of

of Israel"

Torah.

as set forth in the

Other paradoxes are shared by assume that nationality and

will

as a sociocultural

have a nationality

By

manifestations.

nationalists

and fundamentalists. While

concept

— the concept

is

universal

is

— everyone

irredeemably particular in

definition Spanish nationality

sui generis. In the

is

fundamentalism recognizes and even expects that other peoples

nationalists

can, should, its

concrete

same way, each

will react as they

do

by establishing precise boundaries for the sacred community and by developing and deepening the tribe.

But

of

particularities

behavior, dress, diet, and ritual that define a

belief,

acknowledgment of the universal need

this

for rootedness in a traditional

and culture does not modify or soften the fundamentalist's insistence on excep-

soil

tionalism: his claims to the land and cultural definition take priority over others, be-

cause his vision

is

do not pretend

and the

interpretation of history cultural

and

The West Bank Jewish

authentic while others are imitations.

Arab neighbors

that their Palestinian

political

and Sikhs actually

land.

But the Palestinians

hegemonv because

live in

will

it is

radicals

one day accept the Jewish will

have to accept Jewish

promised by God. North Indian Muslims

Hindustan, according to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh

(RSS) (the National Union of Volunteers), and must become "Hindu" bv subordinating their particular rites and behaviors, when necessary, to the ethos of the dominant Indian culture. In the

day when

not dream of a in the

way that

it

late

all

twentieth century, "the most messianic nationalists do

of the members of the human race

was possible

in certain epics for, say, Christians to

Christian planet." 3 Rather, they anticipate a time the rules of the

Thus, one

will join their nation

when

dream of a wholly

the true believer will establish

game for believer and nonbeliever alike. may also juxtapose the political power of

nationalisms (and funda-

mentalisms) and their "philosophical poverty and even incoherence." 4

What

Ernest

Gellner attributes to nationalisms ma}' be said, mutatis mutandis, of many fundamentalisms:

"Nationalism

nations where thev

is

not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness;

do not

exist."

5

The establishment of national borders

been an arbitrary process, taken to absurd extremes East after the Allied defeat of the

of hills serve hills

are

in the

it

invents

has indeed

segmentation of the Middle

Ottoman Empire. Why does this river or that line when the people across the river or over the

as the national dividing line,

of the same bloodline or religious

ten, nationalism

is

the pathology of

are equally "pathological"

ing to govern a

when

faith?

If,

as historian

modern developmental

Tom

Nairn has writ-

history, fundamentalists

they redraw the dividing lines bv imagining and seek-

"Land of Purity"

(e.g.,

the Sikh Khalistan) set off and secured from

nonbclievers. 6

The fundamentalist

land of purity

existing national boundaries.

That

is,

may

coincide with, exist within, or transcend

fundamentalisms may,

strictly

speaking, be sub-

national, national, or transnational in orientation. In any case, the fundamentalist

CONCLUSION 623

homeland groupings.

know

all

an imagined political community that extends bevond local or regional

is

A member of the Jamaat-i-Islami, which numbers in the millions, will never

of

his fellows;

discrete unit.

whole that supercedes

larger

all

of unity with

function as a

with a sense of his or her belonging to a

acts

other national or regional configurations. Even in the

smaller groups such as the Jewish tion Rescue, in

RSS

nor do the one million members of the

Each individual or group

Gush Emunim, or

the American Christian Operawhich members may well know one another intimately, there is a sense

a silent

and

faceless

mass of passive believers

vanguard to plant the seed of the new

who

are waiting for the

or the restored Christian America.

Israel

In Islamic fundamentalisms, for example, there has been a rejection of Arab na-

umma, the universal community of Muslims. movements have experienced factionalism and

tionalism and a rhetorical embrace of the In practice, however, fundamentalist

Rov points out in his chapter on movements in Afghanistan. Alluding to the patterns of Saudi funding of movements before and after the 1990-91 Gulf War, Rov notes that the Saudis were shifting alliances across national borders, as Olivier

Islamic

angered and disappointed

when

including the Afghan resistance matvar, backed

Saddam

certain of the

movement

groups they had supported

financially,

Hizb-i-Islami headed bv Gulbuddin Hik-

Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. After the war, the Saudis

tered their pattern of funding, deepening a split

between

al-

radical fundamentalist

movements and the more conservative or moderate movements favored by

the Saudi

monarch}'. Indeed, the range of responses by fundamentalist groups to the Gulf Crisis

demonstrated the before

fluidity

of fundamentalist

Muslim fundamentalists can claim

alliances

and the distance to be traveled

the realization of a pan-Islamic vision."

Nonetheless, a period of intense collaboration

among movements on

either side

the moderate- radical divide seemed possible in 1992. Reports that the inherited Lebanon's role as

home

of

Sudan had

for international terrorists, including Shi'ite cadres

financed bv Iran, were one sign that previous barriers to pan-Islamic fundamentalist collaboration

among

radical

movements may have

fallen in the

the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the loose talk of a

by Islamic

radicals as a

However

code for

fundamentalists

a return to

come

wake of the Gulf War,

new world

order, interpreted

Western control of Arab resources.

to define the "nation," the similarities between

and fundamentalist imaginings are not merely coincidental. The concept sovereign of the nation was born in an age in which enlightenment and revolution nationalist

were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely ordained, hierarchical dynasty. The nation was invested with ultimacv, even as traditional religion

reemerge, transformed and modernized, in the as a

competitor with secular ideologies of

boundaries, which isms.

all

late

kinds.

are contested by outsiders; the

fell

The nation

same may be

But both the nation and the fundamentalist community

from

finite, if clastic,

of fundamental-

may

hegemonic

people. Like nationalisms, fundamentalisms possess sacrifices

has

said

are conceived

horizontal comradeships, "sacred" fraternities for which people

and demand colossal

into eclipse, only to

nineteenth and twentieth centuries

die or

political

of as deep kill

other

ambitions

their devotees.

National communities are to be distinguished, then, not by the credentials or status

of their founders but bv the

"style in

which they

are imagined." 8

Fundamental-

Martin E. Marty and R.

Scott Appleby

624

isms

and

1

of fundamentalists' imaginings,

the State offers insights regarding the "style"

and the ways

in

which these imagined communities have been

governments,

realized in local

domestic and international economies, and

and

in

wars of attrition

As the preceding chapters demonstrate, fundamentalists have been

successful in at-

state

in

and conquest.

A Religious Imagination tracting attention to themselves

that they have

become

and to

their causes, with the result, in

some

cases,

of polities and the ordering of

viable players in the structuring

economies. Fundamentalists have earned the fear and grudging respect of their secular

and

religious opponents.

reasons for

The

limits

of this success require careful

analysis, as

Part of the explanation for their success in mobilizing followers

ostensibly religious character of fundamentalisms.

volved in fundamentalist movements, or

fundamentalisms

who

do

the

it.

who

Not

benefit

all

is

found

in the

who

are in-

of the people

from them,

are devout. Indeed,

of charlatans and manipulators

in every tradition attract their share

cloak themselves in religious orthodoxy for the sake of political or financial gain.

we

And,

as

more

skillfully

shall see,

and

religious idealism

fundamentalisms often exploit economic and social discontent

readily than they tap religious idealism.

is

To put

it

another way,

often a convenient form bv which to express and channel the

outrage of the economically or politically marginalized. Analysts as

commit

a serious error,

one former State Department

a sociopolitical protest

however,

if

they assume that fundamentalism

is,

during

a public conference, "essentially

movement sugarcoated with

religious pieties." Standing be-

official

put

it

hind some of the most spectacular blunders of the foreign policy establishment have

been

a

number of

rationality

is

errors in judgment, including the

the system underlying

all

smug assumption

that secular

forms of discourse; the tendency to underesti-

mate the capacity of well-educated people for

religious sensibilities;

and the unwill-

ingness or failure to appreciate the genuine alteritv of the religious consciousness.

put the matter directly:

many

influential leaders in the

world genuinely believe

in

To and

in its most literal meaning. When the late Iranian Khomeini issued zfaWa sentencing the Pakistani expatriShi'ite Avatollah Ruhollah ate/British citizen/former Muslim Salman Rushdie to death for apostasy, and promlive

bv religious doctrine taken

many Western

ised paradise to his executioner, political,

analysts focused

on

the possible

economic, and diplomatic rationales for Khomeini's move. Bv dramatically

condemning

a

memory of the

prominent author whose novel, The Satanic

Verses,

had disgraced the

Prophet, the Avatollah was sending a signal of support to the hardlin-

ers in the Iranian regime.

Or, other commentators suggested, Khomeini was reassert-

ing his position as the leader of revolutionary Islam in the Middle East and South Asia.

These were cogent and

political

valid explanations,

imputing

a certain

calculation to Khomeini. But they also tended to overlook

explanation, one

more scandalous

understanding of the

likely

to Western sensibilities but also

amount of shrewd a simple

more

and basic

useful to an

course of events in the years that followed the sentencing. 9

Khomeini was the genuine

article:

he saw the world through the eyes of a Muslim

ONCLUSION

c

625

of imitation,"

Himyn'al-taqlid, a "source

Supreme Hidden Imam.

believed himself to be the

obligated to govern the Islamic Republic in the absence of the

Jurist,

By

who

reckoning such refined Western notions as the independent sovereignty of

this

Great Britain and the rights of

citizens, including

its

ognized. Khomeini acted on faith

—

former Muslims, were not

rec-

who

per-

a faith shared by millions

of Muslims

petuated the calumny on Rushdie long after the Avatollah passed from the scene. This shared faith remains for the

a legitimating principle for putatively Islamic

The

religious character

outweighs the value of the

of fundamentalisms provides a cause whose importance believer's

his chapter

on fundamentalist

flagellation

of

Shi'ites

members King

liberty.

As David Rapoport points out of self-sacrifice,

from the

fundamentalists

who

less

in the service

welcomed in the cause of righteousness no less "heroic" daily self-sacrifices of world. The suicide missions of Hizbullah

sensational but

battles

of the Intifada between Jewish

of the temptation to seek material gain and physical comfort,

ment, that takes precedence over the others

The from of an

ability

— the wearying

command-

responsibility to cling

Land of Israel.

of fundamentalisms to inspire heroism and

a belief in the possibility afterlife,

Pal-

lives character-

and, in the Jew ish case, bv the observation of one mitzvah, or religious

tenaciously to the

and

settlers

bv the "greater jihad," the daily struggle to win control over

ized, in the Islamic case, in the face

of

suffering

Arabs make the headlines, but they are eruptions of private

life

self-

before the doors of abortion clinics, locate the be-

seek to remake the

bombers and the armed

the

like

in

the pravers of Operation Rescue

cosmos that rewards martyrdom or imprisonment

divert attention

one's

or

militancy, religious rituals

God. The dramatic examples of

estinian

life

commemorating Ashura, or

in a fetal position

liever in a sacred

truck

regimes, as well as

post- Khomeini Islamic Republic of Iran.

of personal or

although understood

self-sacrifice

collective immortality.

in its particulars in

stems in part

The expectation

very different ways by the

religious groups studied in this volume, gives fundamentalist leaders an important

psychological advantage in mobilizing people for dangerous assignments and in retaining

members in the long-term operations of a movement. Andersen is no Tomb of the Unknown Marxist or cenotaph for fallen "The reason is that neither Marxism nor liberalism are much concerned with

them

as active

points out that there liberals.

death and immortality," he observes. "If the nationalist imagining this suggests a

The

is

so concerned,

strong affinity with religious imaginings."

great merit of traditional religious worldviews has been their concern with

man-in-the-cosmos,

man

as species being,

and the contingency of life. The

ex-

traordinary survival, over thousands of years, of Buddhism, Christianity, or Islam, in dozens of different social formations attests their imaginative response to the

overwhelming burden of human

and death.

Why

was

I

born blind?

daughter retarded? The religion

of all evolutionary progressive

suffering, disease, mutilation, grief, age,

Why

is

is

my

best friend paralyzed?

Why is my

an attempt to explain. The great weakness

styles

of thought not excluding Marxism

10 such questions are answered with impatient silence.

is

that

Martin E.

Many and R.

Scott Appleby

626

In the attempt to explain, or at least account for, the mysteries of human suffering

and the sacred meaning of

draw on

history, fundamentalists often

eschatalogical, or

end-time, thought. Muslims, Christians, Jews, and Sikhs have in recent decades em-

phasized messianic and millenarian themes within their respective religious traditions. Expectations of an imminent, sweeping, divinely led victory over their enemies have

informed the self-understandings and operational strategies of the Sikh

Damdami

Taksal, the

Gush Emunim

militant groups studied in this volume.

prompted and

is

In

in part

The

radicals

of the

Hizbullah of Lebanon, and other

in Israel, the

resort to violence bv these groups,

means of persuasion, occurs within

bv the failure of purclv political

conditioned bv the moral framework of apocalvpticism.

many

cases in

which militance

is

seen as a necessary means of achieving divine

ends, the religious imagination envisions a "nation" that transcends existing borders.

Martin Kramer quotes one of Hizbullah 's leading state

of justice realized on part of this earth

will

clerics'

prediction that "the divine

not remain confined within

its

geo-

graphic borders." Similarly, Harjot Oberoi notes, Sikhism possesses the most ad-

vanced paradigm of millennial thought and practice of

communities

in India.

"For much of their

Sikhs have opted to deal with major social crises heavals, colonialism, collapse

—

state oppression,

of semiotic categories

paradigm," he writes. "Central to

the indigenous religious

all

history, at least since the rise

this entire

— by

of the Khalsa,

economic up-

invoking the millenarian

model has been

a prophetic figure

of

extraordinarv charisma with the will to establish an alternative social svstem in which

oppression would cease and people would lead a

life

of harmonv, puritv, and good

deeds." In 1982 the Sikh fundamentalist leader, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, led the

dharma yuddb, or righteous battle, which he characterized as an epic war in which good was pitted against evil and only one side was to be victorious. Bhindranwale expected the Sikhs "to rule Delhi, rule the world."

The

religious imagination

of fundamentalists

is

not, however, captured solely by

grislv scenes

of holv war and self-immolation for the cause;

Compassion

for the suffering of others finds concrete expression in the thousands of

it is

also a vision

of mercy.

health care clinics, orphanages, hospitals, schools, and service agencies sponsored by

fundamentalist movements or individuals around the world. institutions

and

riots.

is

at least as

important

in

winning

The good done bv

these

recruits for the cause as are the rallies

In both cases the success of fundamentalisms stands as an indictment of the

weaknesses of secular svstems in providing for

human

psvchological and social needs.

A Political Imagination Fundamentalists inform their religious critique of societv with shrewd observations

of the

The

political culture that resonate

with economically or sociallv aggrieved peoples.

vears of observing their secular opponents at close range enable fundamentalists

to imitate their in parliaments

ways and adopt

their

means

— fundamentalists are increasingly

and press conferences, and adept

at

mass-mail lobbving and computer-

driven technologies. Politics informed by fundamentalist religion politics-as-usual: in

tiation are

its

all

at ease

is

in

many ways

like

but the most oppressive dictatorships, compromise and nego-

lifeblood,

and adaptation to changing

political realities its

mode of

ONCLUSION

t

62"

response. But fundamentalist politics also proceeds bv

may

ment. Fundamentalists

its

own

internal rhvthms,

and ideological requirements of the move-

dictated by the particular organizational

attempt, as the Islamists did for a time in Algeria, to

overcome or minimize the reluctance of voters by projecting an image of moderation. But they may also follow

a strategy

of polarization designed to provoke their oppo-

nents and scandalize the world outside the national communitv, thereby hoping to tap xenophobic energies of the masses and to

awaken previously

politically

somnolent

sympathizers.

The

of

politics

strikingly

on

born of the religious imagination of fundamentalism was

crisis

on

display

the Indian subcontinent in late 1991 and early 1992.

On

December 1991, an extraordinary caravan of trucks, jeeps, and a few customized Tovotas embarked on a "sacred journey" from the southernmost tip of India with the goal of reaching the city of Srinagar, some fifteen hundred miles away, on the north11

western border with Pakistan. Riding

caravan were prominent

in the

members of the

the Bharativa Janata Partv (BJP), the opposition partv in India which

aligned with the

Hindu

activist

movement RSS

Riding atop the lead Toyota, protected bv the BJP, Murli

Manohar

a bullet-proof shield,

closely

was the president of

former professor of phvsics. Organized

Joshi, a

is

— the National Union of Volunteers. as a display

of Indian "unity," the caravan was an expression of the singular nationalist vision of the

BJP-RSS-YHP

front that Robert Frykenberg describes in this volume.

The BJP and RSS of unitv

believe that

call

"Hindu-ness"

is

the authentic source

in the sprawling, multiethnic, multilingual, multireligious Indian nation,

governed presently bv

tution by defining citizenship

of India, which thev

no one

a secular constitution that favors

the right of each to worship as

all

what thev

it

on the

refer to as

The BJP and RSS

pleases.

basis

religion but ensures

seek to alter that consti-

of "Hindu-ness." They seek to "Hindiuze"

"Hindustan," the sacred Hindu nation. All citizens Buddhists, and Marxists,

of Hindustan, including Sikhs, Muslims, Christians,

Jains,

must put

and practices that

the is

aside ethnic, religious or ideological beliefs

dominant Hindu ethos

— an ethos that

is

conflict

with

not spelled out with great precision but

nonetheless spread through the newly revitalized Hindi language and through text-

books

filled

with Hindu mythology and politics that are being urged upon Indian

schoolchildren."

The three-month full

trek across India involved thousands of

repertoire of fundamentalist agitants.

The BJP

Hindus and featured the

eagerly anticipated that a symbolic

journey of Hindu militants through contested regions of northern India would scandalize not only the Sikh

and Muslim

mony, but the

of the governing Congress party

vow

secularists

separatists living there

to raise the Indian flag in Srinigar, the capital of the

of Kashmir, was calculated to provoke quent assertion of Indian

a crisis

leading to

who

as well.

reject Hindu hegeThe BJP president's

Muslim-dominated region

Muslim

riots

and the conse-

state control over the contested region.

settlers on the West Bank profiled by Charles Liebman and Ehud Sprinzak, or the Sinhalese Buddhist militants in Sri Lanka described by Stanley Tambiah, the RSS and BJP cadres forming the Hindu caravan saw them-

Like the radical Jewish

selves as a sacred

vanguard bent on inducing

a reluctant state to declare

its

true affini-

Martin E. Marty and R.

Scott Appleby

628

and endorse

ties

a religious

religious fundamentalist

imagining of the nation. In cases

group

is

like these, in

which

a

the provocateur setting the terms of the engage-

ment, any responsive action of a secular government to defend national integritv against a rebellious minority

liable to

is

be interpreted

ethnoreligious identity for the entire nation.

as

an affirmation of a particular

The imagined community narrows

to a

monolith when fundamentalists lead or shape the imagining. Fundamentalists pro-

voke a

ment

crisis,

to

do

and challenge the govern-

identify their cause with the nation's cause,

When

the enforcing.

state action against Palestinian

Jewish religious nationalists succeed in provoking

Arabs on the West Bank, when Sinhalese Buddhists

when Hindu

inflame the campaign against Tamil Hindus in northern Sri Lanka, itants incite state retaliation against Sikhs in the

Punjab or Muslims

fundamentalist identification with the sovereign nation

is

in

Kashmir, the

deepened. Fundamentalists

shrewdly perceive, exploit, and draw strength from the absolutism implied concept of a sovereign nation; thev drink

name

same wells and

at the

to the principle of sovereignty, whether that

mil-

in

the very

are eager to give a

name be Rama,

Allah,

Yahweh,

or God.

The Hindu provocateurs sought Congress party

dia.

were

at a loss as to

ungovernable.

officials

how

One of the

to reinterpret

viewed the procession

to stop

it

and rename the boundaries of

In-

as "unnecessarily provocative"

but

without seeming to acknowledge that India

clear conclusions

of this volume

is

that fundamentalist ac-

is

tivism yields intended and unintended consequences, both for the fundamentalists

and little

for the people thev seek to influence.

As

in

nonfundamentalist

politics, there is

or no linear progression from intention to result; other plavers have a

reacting in unpredictable

ways that ensure that fundamentalist designs

trated or complicated in the unfolding.

The complex impact of

the

way of

are either frus-

BJP caravan on

Muslim, and Hindu enclaves provides a case in point. The first violent reaction came from Sikh militants, who ambushed a bus carrying BJP workers as it entered the Punjab. The gunmen, disguised as police officers, killed the first act in a cycle of violence that continued for five people and wounded fort)' davs. Sikh radicals came to the fore in Punjab in 1983, when members of the moderate India's Sikh,

—

Sikh political party Akali Dal abandoned the party to swell the ranks of Jarnail Singh

Bhindranwale, the afore-mentioned charismatic leader of the radical party.

Oberoi explains that the moderates had

Punjab into a permanent

political

that the democratic option

power

failed to translate the

for the Sikh majority.

Even when

a

and extended

rule

moderate Sikh government ruled the Punjab,

Sikh religious interests, because parties, including

The

Hindu

Taksal

demography of radicals

charged

had only further weakened the Sikhs bv making them

susceptible to factionalism, political manipulation, party.

Damdami

parties.

it

it

bv the Congress failed to

advance

almost always had alliances with other political

Bhindranwale took the road of violence. To the

— the

short pants,

and

In peripheral agrarian or partially industrialized societies such as the Punjab,

Ob-

traditional

sword

symbols on the Sikh insignia

— he added the motorcycle and the

eroi writes, fundamentalist

unshorn

hair,

revolver.

movements address predicaments

dressed in the West bv the welfare state and

its

that arc routinely ad-

socioeconomic programs. Yet

CON( LUSION 629

fundamentalists arc seldom politically or economically capable of permanently ad-

The movements remain simply

dressing the systemic problems of the region.

Denied

and engaged

political authority

reactive.

constant struggle for survival and

in a

legiti-

macy, Sikh peasants from the countryside swelled the ranks of the radicals but without

much

offering any concrete programs for reform,

formation.

The cosmos of peasant

societies

or universal. Sikh fundamentalism

less

grand paradigms of social trans-

invariably parochial rather than national

is

thus characterized bv marginalitv, incoherence,

is

and disorder. In 1991 the police recorded 4,766 violent deaths to militant Sikh separatist activism intended to

show

in the

the Punjab

is

Punjab related

ungoverned and

ungovernable. 12

Thus, the caravan that rolled through the Punjab

in

Januarv 1992 was assured of

provoking unrest. The sight of Hindu nationalists protected bv Indian security forces

mind

doubtless brought to

the

1984 storming of the Sikh Golden Temple at Amritsar lives, made a martyr of Bhindranwale, and led to

which had claimed one thousand

more Sikh deaths

in

Hindu

riots after Indira

guards. Enraged bv the return of

BJP caravan and

the

Hindu

shortlv thereafter

Gandhi's assassination bv her Sikh body-

militants to the Punjab, Sikh radicals raided

warned

that they

would

kill

anyone voting

in

the elections for parliament and the local legislatures scheduled for 19 Februarv 1992.

Despite the presence of a quarter of

a million

Indian state soldiers, the death threats

kept awav the vast majority (70 percent) of Punjab voters. In single person

came

to vote.

some

villages,

not a

Those who did tended to be members of the Hindu

minority."

The BJP

caravan rolled on to Kashmir, where the

Front has led Muslim separatists

of the

arrival

On

motorcade through the

town square

25 January 1992, the BJP

from

India. In anticipation

called off plans to drive a large

vale of Kashmir. But Joshi did hoist the Indian

Across the border

a total

curfew

in Pakistan the

in the

Hindu

Kashmir

caravan had

Valley. its

14

own

unsettling impact.

13 Februarv, with thousands of supporters trailing behind him,

members

of the Islamic fundamentalist party Jamaat-i-Islami,

Pakistani counterpart to Joshi, led a

was ready to die for Allah. the

first

tists

flag in Srina-

— although to do so he required the presence of tens of thousands

of heavily armed troops and

On

in their efforts to secede

Liberation

of the caravan, Muslim militants bombed the regional police chiefs

office in Srinagar.

gar's

Jammu Kashmir

"It's

many of them

Amanullah Khan, the

march toward Indian-controlled Kashmir. He who leads, but I hope that I will get

not important

Indian bullet," he was quoted as saying. Pakistani police fired on the separa-

trving to cross the border into India, and the Pakistani prime minister,

concerned about the possibility of

Sharif,

action

was

Sharif's

"like

a

throwing innocent people into the

dilemma was

His Democratic Alliance

instructive to observers

won

Nawaz

war with India, said that Amanullah's fire."

1S

of fundamentalist

political influence.

the October 1990 election by defeating the Pakistan

People's Partv of Benazir Bhutto.

The

first

head of government drawn from the

and not from the landowning aristocracy, Sharif implemented policies designed to revive the national economy. His government removed most restrictions on currency and trade, and began turning over many state-run companies and several middle

class

Martin E. Matty and R.

Scott Appleby

630

banks to private owners. The Pakistan rupee quickly surpassed the Indian rupee

new prime minister was caught in and influential Muslim fundamentalists and the

secular

he referred to the Muslim marchers on India

"freedom fighters" even

value. Yet the

as

government of

India. as

Thus,

he came

under criticism from Islamic fundamentalists for halting the march. Sharif was

compromised,

Muslim

in

fundamentalists'' eves, by his

prochement with the United

States.

in

the middle between Pakistan's vocal

ongoing attempts

also

at rap-

Indeed, his policies seemed to reflect a mild case

of schizophrenia. In 1991 he courted the fundamentalists bv introducing a so-called Shari'a Bill in the satisfied the it

wake of the Gulf War. The Democratic Alliance claimed

demand

for the legislation

to be superficial and rejected

embargo, Sharif attempted to

it.

that the

bill

of Islamic law, but the Jamaat-i-Islami found

In 1992, with Pakistan under an American aid

rehabilitate Pakistan's

image by abandoning the long-

standing support of the Muslim fundamentalist fighters in neighboring Afghanistan.

The move enraged

the Islamic parties,

which hold only 10 of the 217

seats in the

National Assembly but form an important part of the governing coalition and wield

enormous influence over the conservative and largely illiterate population. What seemed schizophrenic was actually a carefully calibrated policy designed to appease Muslims on domestic issues while applying the principles of realpolitik on a policy also followed by Arab leaders in Egypt and Jordan the international front besieged bv fundamentalist demands. 16 But this policy carries a high risk of backfiring.

—

As Timur Kuran documents

in the present

volume, "Islamic economics" has been a

slogan rather than a serious policy in Pakistan. But in 1992 Sharif's policies, a mixture

of Western-style modernization and Islamic moderation, incited the highest religious courts in Pakistan to order the government to suspend Western-style banking and abolish interest societies

on bank

deposits, loans, land acquisition, insurance,

— moves that would

dealings,

and thwart attempts to

initially said

the

attract foreign investments. Sharif's finance minister

government would appeal but backed

the Jamaat threatened to

and cooperative

risk financial collapse, jeopardize international financial

bring down

when by withdrawing from it. The

off",

the ruling coalition

temporarily at

least,

story exemplifies the continuing pressure brought to bear bv fundamentalists

upon

governments that claim to uphold Islam without actually implementing Islamic law. 17

The Limits of the Fundamentalist Imagination What

lessons about "fundamentalist impact" are contained in the episode of the

BJP

caravan?

Fundamentalist leaders are effective

and policy

failures

in exploiting the ideological inconsistencies

of nonfundamentalist governments and

in

mobilizing large

num-

bers of people for intense and highly visible short-term rallies or projects, and smaller

numbers of very loyal workers to sustain the long-term life of the organization or movement. While zeal and increasing political sophistication have carried fundamentalist groups to power or to the brink of power in several nations, these groups have not yet proven themselves capable of actually governing effectively. The BJP's Hindu

CONCLUSION

leadership had not formulated a viable economic program bv the time of the election campaign of 1991. Thus, they seemed unprepared to lead India out of its worst eco-

nomic

independence. In this volume Deepak Lai describes BJP economic

crisis since

and incoherent." The Hindu nationalist movement

policies as "changing, vague, jects the

remedies to India's deep-rooted social and economic problems

failed

no

re-

"foreign" influences of Islam, Christianity capitalism, and socialism alike as

viable alternative.

To

— but has posed

varying degrees the same can be said of the Islamic, Jewish,

Christian, Sikh, and Buddhist fundamentalists profiled in this volume: they have

proven themselves

skilled at discerning the

problems of societv and naming the per-

petrators, but thev have been far less impressive in posing

Along with the impressive comes

then,

of the fundamentalist

qualities

a severe limitation.

workable solutions. 18

Fundamentalists find

it

political imagination,

difficult to

govern without

resorting to the services of professional politicians and nonfundamentalist thentic" fundamentalists

—

realize the

to failure.

men and women motivated

is,

—

—

On

are

drawn from the ranks of engineers in

women

and foremost men and

as in the case

not exclu-

—

this

governance, especially

of religion

of Sunni Muslim groups, they

rather than clergy. This

fundamentalists are ipso facto politically naive

tend to be inexperienced

if

the one hand, self-reliance can lead quickly

first

even when,

primarily

"Au-

dilemma when thev attempt to

are caught in a

world thev have imagined.

Genuine fundamentalists

rather than of government are

that

bv religious considerations

sively

allies.

is

is

not to sav that

hardlv the case

in the delicate

all

— but thev do

and all-important

area of international relations. For a head of state or cabinet minister to be a novice

ways of a world run according to secular-material rather than

in the

On

religious-spiritual

on sympathizers and advisers from outside the inner circle can lead just as quickly to the politics of compromise and the distillation of the fundamentalist sociomoral message. (This was precisely the values

is

to court disaster.

the other hand, reliance

possibility that Islamic fundamentalist hardliners feared in the

temporizing regime of

Iranian president Rafsanjani.) Or, conversely, rule bv political or military professionals

can lead to a despotic hardening of fundamentalist injunctions as a justification for

the imposition of a police state (as in the case of the

Sudan under General Omar

Hussain al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi).

Many of the fundamentalist or fundamentalist-like groups examined in this ume seemed to be engaged in a third way of negotiating political influence. In

volthis

pattern fundamentalist leaders and secular politicians found that they shared temporal goals and so entered tacitly or openly into a mutually beneficial alliance. talist

leaders are willing to be carried along

political

on

a

Fundamen-

wave of socioeconomic or purely

resentment, while secular politicians provide financial and political support

for the religious "pioneers"

studiouslv avoids.

may make

rather

When modest

who

will say

and do things that

a

"mainstream" politician

they arc drawn into these types of alliances, fundamentalists political

demands

the retention or modest extension of

for themselves, in

privileges

most

cases asking for

and exemptions that they already

enjoy.

Three authors of the "Remaking in describing fundamentalist

Polities" part

groups which are

of the volume emphasize

in tacit alliance

with

this point

(politically

con-

Martin E. Marty andR.

Scott Appleby

632

servative) secular agents.

"New

ers that the

United

came

to

prominence

in the

1980s

in the

provided an example of a fundamentalist protest movement co-opted

States,

and used bv

John Garvev and Steve Bruce agree with many other observ-

Christian Right," which

powerful and sophisticated secular

a

ultraconservativc

more expansive

wing of the Republican political

and

legal

Part)'.

group

political

The New

—

in this case, the

Christian Right had a

much

agenda, Garvey" points out, than did the Moral

Majority or the Religious Roundtable. Charles Liebman makes a similar point about the influence of religious Jews haredi-leumi, or "nationalist haredi," a recent convergence of

Judaism

raciical

and unique influence,

in Israel

political

one

— on the

Israeli political

two

of

agenda. If one looks at their specific

agenda, Liebman argues, rather than at their long-term cultural

finds that their political

demands have been

relatively

mostly designed to protect privileges they currently enjoy under

more, the "success" of the radical Jews

in

modest, and

Israeli law.

Further-

pioneering settlements on the West Bank

has been possible only with the approval of nonfundamentalist, nonreligious

The fundamentalists have proven secular

— the

distinct strands

Israelis.

to be useful agents of an expansionist polio' of a

government and an increasingly militant

Israeli

public which does not share

the religious doctrine or ideology of the radicals. political impact of Jewish radicals on the Israeli Liebman conflates the two major groups, the religious Zionist setGush Emunim and the anti-Zionist "ultra-Orthodox" haredi Jews. But

For the purpose of analyzing the political system, tlers

of the

when one

looks at these groups separately, as

Ehud Sprinzak does

in his chapter,

one

two distinct types of political-cultural impact on the Israeli population. The Gush Emunim activists, who believe that the time of redemption is nigh and that they

notices

are the agents

hoping to

are

incite to political action

in opposition to Palestinian

1967

Six

as models for an Israeli public which they on God's behalf (that is, in their view, action

of the Messiah, wish to serve Arabs fixing

Day War). Hoping

in the territories

to lend a religious zeal

Gush

perceive as an ethnic Arab-Israeli conflict, the heritage of the secularized Jews,

In this

way

who make up 80

occupied bv

Israel since the

and ultimacv to what many

activists

appeal to the religious

percent of the

Israeli

population.

the religious Zionists aspire to the type of role played bv the Ulster

Protestants profiled by Bruce. "In Northern Ireland," Bruce writes, "the basic structure of the ethnic conflict with Catholics a vital part

of

their sense

of

identity,

means

that, for Protestants, religion

and even those people

who

are not

remains

committed

1

'born-again believers find themselves turning back to conservative Protestant ideolo-

and languages to make sense of their apparently beleaguered position in the north of Ireland and to give purpose to their political agenda, which is dominated by a desire to remain part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland." gies

Thus, fundamentalism takes on

do not

necessarily accept

a political role

many of the

and

attracts a variety

of adherents

who

theological doctrines espoused by the Reverend

Ian Paisley, a prominent leader of the Ulster Protestants. In the same way, the haredi Jews of Israel,

who

enter politics reluctantly and then

only in order to maintain the privileges of their subculture, are comparable to Ameri-

can Christian fundamentalists,

who may employ

a rhetoric

of dominance but whose

CONCLUSION 633

game

suggest that they, too, arc actually in the

political actions

primarily to protect

the values of a distinctive religious subculture from further erosion.

Liebman argues

that as long as the religious fundamentalists are politically ac-

whom

countable to the secularists upon thev

mav continue

they depend for protection and financing,

demand for religious legislation but satisfy communal interests. "Democracy not only fundamentalists; it even moderates many of their de-

to pay lip sen ice to the

themselves with a defense of their narrower limits the

achievements of the

mands." Sprinzak notes, however, that the escalating use of violence by both groups fosters a constant sense

of

crisis that

has a destabilizing effect

on

and

Israeli society

thus poses a serious challenge for the long-term prospects of democracy. "For a de-

mocracy to survive decently,

it is

mally respect

A

its

legal

its

institutions.

not enough that

respect for

its

the partners to the regime for-

all

value and a positive orientation toward

order are also necessary," he writes. "This

is

today the Achilles' heel of Israel's

democracy and the problem with the new religious radicalism. E\ en those ultrana-

and fundamentalists

tionalists

way

are a serious

giance

is

who

in their

own

instrumental and their

alle-

committed to democracy is

conditional."

When one

turns from secular democracies to sectarian states, however, the influ-

ence of fundamentalist extremism political

say they are

danger because their commitment

compromise. Stanley

J.

is

less liable

to be neutralized by the exigencies

of

Tambiaffs account of ethnic and religious conflict

between Tamil Hindus and Sinhalese Buddhists on the island nation of

Lanka

Sri

proyides an example of the dynamic of violence between religious-ethnic communities in

an unstable

state. In

struggling for political hegemony, the fundamentalist perpe-

of violence move beyond the parameters of the

trators

historic religious tradition they

intend to defend. That the Buddhist tradition, committed historically to nonviolence,

could produce a "fundamentalism" defined

in recent years

by "Buddhist nationalism"

and anti-Tamil militancc is no less troubling than the abandonment of ahimsa by the radical Tamils, Tambiah comments. Similarly, there is no mistaking the scandalous aspect of the recent manifestations of Islamic fundamentalism in the Sudan and in Iran, two quite different regimes but comparable in their disregard for Western standards of human rights. Although the revolutionary fervor and radical fundamentalism embodied in Iran by Ayatollah Khomeini

may have waned with

his passing, the Islamic

haps strengthened by what Said Arjomand President

Hashemi

moves toward the States,

and

its

calls a

Republic was sustained and per"pragmatic" ruling

commitment reestablishment of open diplomatic Rafsanjani. Despite

its

to realpolitik,

elite led its

relations with the

consequent relaxation of support for Islamic

by

tentative

United

revolutionary movements

elsewhere, the Iranian government remained committed to the "revolutionary tradi-

tionalism [which] has transformed the Iranian nation-state as fundamentally as

Though constitution-making in Iran does logic of the modern state, Arjomand writes, "it

it

has

Shi'ism."

bear the distinct imprint of the

legal

has nonetheless transformed the

latter into a veritable theocracy."

The National

Islamic Front, led by the Western-educated legal scholar Hassan

Turabi, has controlled the military government of General

Omar Hussan

al-

al-Bashir

Martin E. Marty and R.

Scott Appleby

634

1989 coup

since the

that

brought the military to power. The NIF wants to spread

fundamentalism to the moderate Arab countries and the

rest

of Africa. In a 1992

interview al-Turabi described the march of fundamentalism as "inevitable" as to

fill

the

vacuum

left

bv the

failures

moves

it

of Western-inspired African socialism and Arab

nationalism. Al-Turabi's vision of an Islamic world held together bv religion and eco-

nomic interdependence provided

oil

led him, a Sunni, to seek, assistance

and militarv training

in the earlv 1990s.

Iy

from Iranian

ShiStes,

who

As Ann Maver documents

in

her chapter, al-Turabi's brand of Islamic fundamentalism has emerged since the 1989

coup

as antidemocratic, a violator

human

rights,

and

a protector

of international

government has banned the Sudan's well-entrenched

nizations, the military parties,

of

According to Amnesty International and other human rights orga-

terrorist groups.

political

imprisoned suspected opponents, and tortured detainees.

With or without support from Iran or Saudi Arabia, Islamic fundamentalist

movements vied

for

power

their other

major patron,

in Algeria, Pakistan, Egypt, Af-

among other places. As the movements have had "impact" on different levels of political socictv and through diverse strategies. Some, as in Algeria, Egvpt, Nigeria, and Pakistan, formed as political parties which attempted to work within the confines of the social contract and "rules of the game" established bv the regime in

ghanistan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Jordan, and the Sudan,

present volume amplv demonstrates, these

power. "Islamization" was attempted both through alliances with the ruler istan

under Zia) and through

Jordan). in

openings toward democratic reform

Both developments provided Islamic groups with an expanded

which to

fited

initial

solidify

and enlarge

from these developments

in the short term, the

law and Qur'anic precept into

Pak-

Egypt,

political

arena

While the Islamic groups benedevelopments also exposed flaws

program to render Islam an ideological svstem

in the fundamentalist

translate religious

their constituencies.

(e.g.,

(e.g.,

—

that

is,

to

coherent modern political vision

a

capable of inspiring the formulation of effective solutions for difficult or even intrac-

seemed diminished bv its direct politicalization. As describing Islamization programs in Pakistan, Iran, and the Sudan,

table problems. Islam itself often

Maver puts

it

in

frequently "considerations of political expediency were officially permitted to override Islamic criteria."

A

similar statement

mav be made

regarding Hizbullah's revolutionary program.

Although Hizbullah has employed violence for political and not ritualistic purposes, Martin Kramer notes, the goal of Hizbullah activism is the creation of an Islamic state.

That goal had to be pursued within the law of Islam, and Hizbullah clerics on violence that prevented the group from pursuing narrow sec-

placed restrictions

and employing wholly indiscriminate violence. "To be worthy of Islam," Kramer writes, "the struggle had to be global in conception but discriminating in execution." Nonetheless, "some of Hizbullah's acts of violence met these demandtarian interests

ing criteria,

some did

not."

The

suicide missions

foreigners divided Hizbullah clerics, tice,

others of

principles.

whom

The

railed against

salient point for

and the abduction of innocent

some of whom adapted the teaching to the pracwhat they saw as a clear departure from Islamic

our discussion

is

that the clerics in these instances

reacted to, rather than shaped, the actions of the militants.

The

limitations of the fundamentalist imagination are perhaps

most apparent

in

CONCLUSION 635

on economics. In a pluralistic polity such as the one that exists in the United States, a nation in which Protestant Christian fundamentalists are increasingly

the chapters

assimilated into the mainstream political and

economic

sive

of their

distinctive theological views. 20

Laurence Iannaccone

culture,

economic vision or program expres-

rinds that fundamentalists have not developed an

Furthermore, one cannot even generalize

about Christian fundamentalists and conservative evangelicals

who

write about eco-

nomics. Iannaccone rehearses the "myth" that such Protestants are always staunch defenders of market capitalism and advocates of free enterprise as the solution to virtually every

economic problem. "The

realitv

is

both different and more complex,"

he writes. Theologically conservative Protestant leaders espouse

nomic

positions.

and moral

issues,

a variety of ecoAnd, despite well-publicized and extensive lobbying of social even such avowedly conservative groups as the Moral Majority have .

.

.

never seriouslv attempted to implement an economic agenda."

Timur Kuran comes

to a similar conclusion in surveying and evaluating "Islamic

economics," which aims "to provide

Some

tivity."

a

comprehensive blueprint for

Islamic economists arc quick to admit that in

nascent discipline has yet to

make

a significant

To

Qur'an and to the wisdom of the .Arabia,

economic

ac-

contribution. But they generally agree

that the fundamental sources of Islam harbor clear

conceivable economic problem.

all

most economic realms the

and

definitive solutions to every

find these, thev suggest, earliest Islamic

we must

community

in

turn to the

seventh-century

draw ing wherever nccessarv on modern tools and concepts. In so doing, how-

ever, these

economists must operate within market systems and international rules of

banking, and compete with interest-driven systems. "In this scenario," Kuran points out, "the practitioners of Islamic economics serve as hidden agents of secularization, arbiters

between the

In a chapter

discipline's goals

and the secular

practices

it

now condemns."

on Buddhist economics, Charles Keyes documents

"fundamentalists" in both

Burma

the ways in which

and Thailand have sought to shape debates about

the relationship of the economies of these countries to a global system dominated by capitalism.

"Thev have

w hich would make

it

not, however, been notably successful in acquiring the

power

possible to translate their positions into effective public policy,"

he concludes. "This lack of success demonstrates how

difficult

it

has been to

make

sufficiently militant a religion which stresses individual responsibility and nonvio-

Deepak Lai's account of the failures of BJP leaders to develop a sophisticated Hindu economics confirms the conclusion that the construction of a viable economic program has not been the first item on the fundamentalist agenda. lence."

system of

The Question of Moderation: The Case of Algeria Keves and Lai, writing about the lack of

a

developed economic program

in either

Buddhist or Hindu "fundamentalism," note that Eastern religious traditions which

do not hold

a linear or progressive view

of history, and which do not embrace

a

must first identify, or even construct, the religious "fundamentals" would justify- political action. One might expect, then, that the "People of the Book" Jews, Christians, and Muslims are better poised for political action because revealed set of laws,

that

—

—

Martin E. Marty and R.

Scott Appleby

636

each of the three monotheistic faiths has a code of law and/or behavior revealed

through

a sacred text. Yet

programs and an

even

religion, to agree

upon

theless "protean"

and

one

in these cases

among

even

inabilitv,

finds a lack

a normative politics. Islam, with

"imprecise'''

on

a

of consensus on

political

various fundamentalist groups in the same its

code of

is

none-

politics.

James

Shari'a,

number of questions, including

Piscatori writes:

The it

believer says,

is

"Look

to the Qur'an," but, like

what the reader makes of

nogamy, socialism or

it.

Ask, "Does

of

capitalism, equality

it

fundamental documents,

all

support polvgamy or mo-

women

or inequality, birth con-

trol,

parliamentary democracy?" and the answers hinge on what one hopes to

find.

Although

scriptural interpretation

is

problematic in even' religion,

especially so in the case

of Islam and for several reasons. 21

The problem with

way of arguing

Islam]

is

that

it

this

treats religion

account of them

as social

and

and

[that religion

politics are

phenomena.

thus

It

fails

one

and takes no

politics as ideal categories

it is

to see that their conduct

often in conflict because their motivations are in conflict. If

we

in

real is

set aside the

of faith, there is no reason why truth should triumph over power. But, more to the point, it is very rarely possible when speaking of motivations to make such simple equations of religions and truth, and of politics and power. The history of every civilization shows that both religious and political instilogic

tutions operating in society are contenders, and verv often competitors, for

and hence

people's loyalties

for power. In this sense

both are

political,

but in

the process the religious most often ends explicitly political

— quite

contrary' to

up being subject to, or used bv, the what a great deal of contemporary Mus-

lim opinion holds. 22

grow out of the shahada and also seem unexceptionable; mankind constitutes one spiritual community but that there is also a temporal community of believers which may or may not coincide with the universal community; that God does not directly govern the community of believers but that its government is based on His revealed law (it is not a theocracy but a nomocracy), that governmental edicts and legislation must not Several political ideas

that

all

contradict the revealed law; that obedience

law

—

in the first

poral power,

instance, the

is

owed

Prophet himself and,

to the guardians of the

later, his

successors to tem-

though not to prophetic power; and that the actions of the gov-

ernors themselves must be judged by the standards of the revealed law. These ideas

mark

off the Islamic political

field,

but

we can

also sec that

it is

a

broad

—

which many questions such as who decides on the succession of the Prophet, what form of regime (monarchy or democracy, for example) is sanc-

field in

tioned, and exactly

when

In truth, this broad field as the permissibility

contend. 23

political revolt

is

really a

is

permissible

battleground where

—

are left

many

unanswered.

other ideas, such

of birth control or the prohibition on interest-taking, must

CONCLUSION 637

The

situation in Algeria in

damentalist

1992 demonstrated the challenges faced bv Islamic fun-

movements which attempt

to

become

viable as political parties in secular

In January of that year the fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was

states.

commanding majority in parliament when President Chadli Benof the ruling National Liberation Front resigned, thereby delivering the gov-

poised to assume a jedid

ernment into the hands of the militarv and experiment

By winning 180 of 231

seats contested in the

free national election since Algeria

Islamists

would

effectively

ending Algeria's three-year

democracy.

in

had surprised

gained

their secular

of voter

falter as a result

of the municipalities they had

its

December 1991

opponents,

who

first

1962, the

in

believed that the fundamentalists

dissatisfaction with their

won

election, the

independence from France

incompetent administration

in local elections held in

June 1990. Yet the voters

seemed not to notice; the FIS was better organized and much more popular than the fortv other alternatives to the ruling partv, including the Front for Socialist Forces,

which took

mere 25

a

seats.

Exploiting widespread disgust with the National Libera-

tion Front, the Marxist partv that controlled Algeria for thirtv years despite a record

of inefficiency and corruption, the alike,

Islamists mobilized the disgruntled

including thousands of veiled Algerian

women

and the zealous

clad in traditional Islamic garb.

With more than 200 additional seats in parliament to be decided in the 16 January 1992 election, the Islamists were onlv 28 seats short of a simple majority, and well within reach of the two-thirds majority that would allow them to rewrite Algeria's

on the model of an Islamic republic. The government crackdown on the fundamentalists, engineered bv the "High State Council" formed to rule the countrv into 1993, amounted to the cancellation of

constitution

Arab world's

the

rested hundreds

had

first

full-fledged experiment in democracy.

criticized the militarv or printed fundamentalists'

banned

rallies

cell

military regime ar-

and other

political activities at

who

communiques. The ruling body

mosques, a move widely interpreted

intending to taunt and provoke the poor and jobless young inner

The

of Islamic fundamentalists, along with Arab-language journalists

men who

as

constitute the

of FIS supporters.

In covering these developments in Algeria, the (secular) Western media perceived the crisis through interpretive lenses similar to those used by the (secular) Algerian

government. The

political flexibilitv

quoted above, was forgotten

of Islam, suggested by Piscatori

in several

to enforce the "chilling penal law

in the passages

accounts which portrayed the Islamists as eager

known

as Shari'a," as

one

journalist reported. 24

Evidently lost on the reporter was the fact that the penal code, including the Intddud

punishments for adulterv.

theft,

and other crimes, comprises only

a small

portion of

bodv of sacred law drawn from the Qur'an, the Traditions of commentary on both. By the logic that prevailed in much of the media analvsis, however, either the Algerian voters were unaware of the dozens of alternatives to the Islamic partv, or they were duped by the Islamists, or they were the Shari'a, the complex

the Prophet, and revered

The notion of Islamic fundamentalism found support in the chant of 100,000 Algerians at a stadium rally on "We recognize no constitution and no laws but the laws of God and

simplv irrational and hopelesslv "backwards." as rebarbative

election eve

Islam"

—

— and

in the call for the veiling

of women and their retreat from the workplace.

Martin E. Marty and R.

Scott Appleby

638

more bv

Algerian supporters of the FIS, motivated

working out

for democracy, were not preoccupied with

a passion for Islam

a long-term alliance

than

between

the two. But neither was such an alliance out of the question. Because the Qur'an and the Shari'a provide a sociomoral framework rather than a detailed blueprint for the political order,

was not which

and allow

measure of adaptation and

a

flexibility in state-building,

it

would take a radical fundamentalist position by would be the first order of business.

inevitable that the Islamists

retaliation against secularists

Islamic fundamentalists have yet developing coherent

made

great

demands on

their

governments without

and sophisticated alternative economic and

the emphasis to date has been

on

But the quest for sovereignty and

cultural

and

political authenticity

social policies;

and

self-reliance.

does not rule out a gradual process of

self-reliance

incorporation and "Islamization" of Western structures and mechanisms, including

mass participation

lowed

democratic procedures. (Indeed,

in

in the Islamists" appropriation

which they describe

as, instead,

this has

been the pattern

of Western science and technology,

in the

golden age of Islamic

civilization.) 25

many

inter-

selective.

Even

Like any complex legal code developed over time, the Shari'a admits of pretations and diverse applications, each of

which

is

fol-

borrowing

mode of discourse and

an act of "repossession" of a

production that originated, they claim,

a

unavoidably

—

—

"progressives" by any Western standard have styled themselves as fundamentalists dedicated to the proper interpretation and application of the Shari'a.

University of Khartoum professor

movement

in the

talist" retrieval

Sudan

Akmed An

Na'im, a leader of an Islamic reform

Republican Brothers, has argued that

a

"fundamen-

of Islamic law may be reconcilable with Western notions of human Imprisoned without charge

rights in civil society.

Numayri,

called the

a self-proclaimed fundamentalist,

1984 bv then Sudanese president

in

An Nairn

of Islamic fundamentalism, shared by other Islamic

protested that Numayri's brand

radicals in the

Middle

East,

was

a

mistaken attempt to impose the Shari'a as an antidote to Western neocolonialism and cultural domination.

Khomeini)

He

— those prescriptions revealed to Muhammad

nal law, civil liberties, torically

argued that the elements of Shari'a invoked bv Numayri (and

and the treatment of minorities and

in

Medina dealing with pepromoted a "his-

women

—

dated Islamic self-identity that needs to be reformed." Islamic economic and

social justice

and the

exercise

of legitimate

of the teaching of the Prophet

in

political

power depend upon the

Mecca, which provided,

the "moral and ethical foundation" of the tradition.

in

An

retrieval

Na'im's judgment,

"The Medina message

is

fundamental, universal, eternal message of Islam. That founding message

Mecca," he writes. "This counter-abrogation [of the Medina code] total conciliation

and

civil liberties."

Rare

is

the disputant in such a conflict battle

is

who

does not claim to be

often over what thev are, where

how and by whom they are to be interpreted. In demanding Mecca prophecy, An Na'im concludes, "We [Republican Brothers]

thev are to be found,

of the

the super-fundamentalists."

The

from

will result in the

between Islamic law and the modern development of human rights

upholding the "fundamentals." Rather, the

retrieval

not the is

possibility

of

the are

lb

a "progressive"

fundamentalism-in-power does not ensure, of

course, the existence of one. If the fundamentalists had

won

in Algeria,

they

may

or

CONCLUSION 639

may not have behaved

in

accord with die best interests of the West or of the Algerian

people. Should the Islamists eventually necessitate, the kind

come

that has characterized the "conservative fundamentalist"

Or

may

the situation in Algeria

service, public

may

to power, the situation

allow, or

of shrewd compromise with secular governments and economies

monarchy

in

Saudi Arabia.

eventually approximate that of Egypt, in which lip

ceremony, co-opted senior ulama (men of religion), and occasional

deferential rulings

of government

(that

is,

secular) courts serve as a panacea in lieu

of

the actual implementation of the Islamic law.

The comparison with Egypt

is

instructive because

Egypt has developed

calibrated response to fundamentalist political activism.

of many

levels

and

varieties

Egypt

lives

of Islamic fundamentalism within

its

a carefully

with the presence borders, and over

the course of forty years, since the Free Officers Revolution that brought Nasser to

power

in

1952, the secularized military state has gradually perfected the

constraining and containing Islamic militancy. This

by

combining

a sophisticated policy

sion, constant surveillance

and

partial

infiltration

it

fine art

Mubarak

has done, in the

of

vears,

appeasement, co-optation, ruthless repres-

of

radical cells,

and

a

crushing monopoly

over the media. Nonetheless, the Islamic current endures, with monthly reports of

firebombs hurled through the windows of liquor stores and bars, unveiled harassed by

young

ruffians,

and gun

battles

women

with one or more of the dozens of clan-

destine radical splinter groups that long ago rejected the moderation

of the original

fundamentalist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1992 the Brotherhood published a weekly

new spapcr, supported the Labor

Partv,

and had representatives

in the

Egyptian Parliament. But young Islamic radicals have meanwhile taken over student organizations at most universities, and constantly denounce what they perceive as the

rampant corruption and

inefficiency

of the ruling party

— which

is

to be expected,

they maintain, of a ruling elite which long ago abandoned Islam.

Many of the "mainstream"

Islamic parties have radical counterparts in the under-

ground. Abdel Azim Ramadan's chapter

in this

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood with the radical

volume compares the takfir

strategics

of the

groups of the 1970s and 1980s.

Whereas the former presently eschews violence and subversive activities and finds its greatest contemporary expression in political alliances with the Labor Partv, the latter remain dedicated to an ideology which brands the government as atheistic and leads to physical confrontation with security forces. Islamists

mandate to

throughout the Middle East and South Asia rule

now

recognize that a divine

does not make the social and economic problems of the

umma

less

is the solution," it must become prepared to tackle a 30 percent unemployment rate, and severe shortages of health services and housing and do so while avoiding charging riba (interest) and dealing with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, Western institutions that do not honor the economic prescriptions and proscriptions of the Islamic law. Kuran's comparative study of "Islamic economics" in the four nations in which

intractable. In Algeria, if "Islam

S25

billion foreign debt, a

—

Islamists have striven to

Arabia

— demonstrates

of the religiously

implement the Shari'a

—

Iran, Pakistan, the

Sudan, and Saudi

wide and often inconsistent variety of practices in fulfillment mandated zakat (voluntary tax system) and the religiously proa

Martin E.

Many and R.

Scon Appleby

640

scribed charging of interest.

It

seemed

1992 that

certain in

Islamists in Algeria or

elsewhere would be required bv the exigencies of governing to accept compromises

between the

—

and the possible

ideal

unknown

not

a practice

in the brief history

of

Islamic fundamentalisms comc-to-power.

Conclusion

The

limited but real impact of fundamentalisms

is

due

in part to the fact that nations

open to

continually define themselves and are thus continually

understanding.

The

talisms in reimagining the nation

not exclusively in

revisions in self-

present volume indicates, however, that the success of fundamen-

states in

and remaking the

which the public-private

state

have occurred primarily

distinction, to use

if

John Garvey's

term, has not been written into the constitution and protected by laws and judicial rulings.

To put

the matter another way: in polities in

state separation has

course of national self-definition process of moderation. This in the

United

The

which some form of church-

been adopted, fundamentalism seems

is

— unless

and

most apparent

in the case

the

less likelv to dictate

undergo

until the fundamentalists

a

of Christian fundamentalism

States.

privatization

of

religion,

encouraged by the constitutional protection or the

de facto practice of church-state separation, became a defining characteristic of Western democracies in large part because Christianity in the West experienced debilitating

wars over religion

in the sixteenth

and seventeenth

centuries.

The modern

doctrine of

secularism developed as an antidote to the practice of using the coercive powers of the state to enforce religious orthodoxy. 27

In Islam,

on

the other hand,

where

traditionally there

no such thing

is

as heresy in

the Christian sense of the term, the "privatization of religion" and the enforcement of a distinction

between

religious

and

political affairs

became

a central concern only in

Muslim nation which has formally legalized the separation of religion and state. Because the demand of Islam is not textual accuracy in belief, but loyalty to the communitv and its constituted

the twentieth century and then only in Turkey, the one

Bernard Lewis points out, the broad tolerance of deviation in Islam "ceased

leader,

only

at the

point where

became seditious and

When

became

it

disloyaltv, easily

equated with treason, or where

subversive, a danger to the existing social

that happens, apostasy occurs and

it

becomes an

issue

and

of law, a matter for

prosecution and punishment. Lewis comments:

army God's army, and, of course, the enemy was God's enemy. Of more practical importance, the law was God's law, and in principle there could be no other. The question of separating Church and state did not arise, since there was no Church, as an autonomous For Muslims, the

state

was God's

institution, to be separated.

state, the

Church and

state

were one and the same.

For the same reason, though Islamic society verv soon developed

and

active class

of professional

in the Christian sense, It is

onlv in

Ottoman

men of religion,

a large

these were never a priesthood

and could only loosely be described even times, almost certainly

it

political order."

as a clergy.

.

.

.

under the influence of Christian

CONCLUSION 641

example, that an organization of Muslim religious dignitaries was developed,

with a hierarchy of ranks and with Iran are an even as

more

The

territorial jurisdictions.

avatollahs of

recent innovation, and might not unjustly be described

another step in the Christianization of Islamic institutions, though bv no

means of Islamic It

teachings.

was not only the

lacking in Islam; tolerate

and

live

.

.

theoretical

was

it

.

and

historical basis for separation that

also the practical need.

peaceably with those

who

The

believe otherwise

erwise was, at most times and in most places, high istence to be possible,

enough

and Muslims did not therefore

feel

was

of willingness to

level

and worship oth-

for tolerable coex-

the imperative need

by Christians to seek an escape from the horrors of state-sponsored and

felt

state-enforced doctrine. 28

Fundamentalists Muslims have openlv rejected the attempts of earlier Islamic ernists tice

mod-

and reformers to incorporate the Western principle of separation, and the prac-

of privatization, into Islamic

political

number of governments have begun

and

religious discourse. Subsequentlv "a

to reintroduce Shari'a law, either

from conviction

or as a preemptive strike against the fundamentalist challenge. Even nationalism and patriotism, which, after

some

be generally accepted, are anti-Islamic." 29 In this

initial

opposition from pious Muslims, had begun to

now once

again being questioned and even denounced as

volume Serif Mardin describes the

efforts

order to challenge Kemalist secularism in this century, and tajdid

movement

as

of the Nakshibendi

Umar

Birai discusses the

an attempt to renew the religiously divided Nigerian state on

Islamic principles.

When one

Muslim worlds, with their different approaches to the relationship between religion and the state, it becomes clear that the political imagination of fundamentalists is focused on the questions of constitutionalism and law in nations that seem not to have settled such foundational questions for the current generation. As we have seen, India is a case in point, with Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims, and Buddhists each forming viable fundamentalist-like movements looks beyond the Christian and

which seek to define the national terms.

come

The in

of India (and

Sri

Lanka)

in religio-legal

times of national soul-searching regarding the foundational questions of eth-

and religious

nic

identity-

limited but real successes of Jewish fundamentalists in Israel have likewise

identity, in relation to the

way

Israel

should define and protect

its

national borders.

The

1

success or failure of fundamentalists various attempts to realize the "imag-

ined community,'' then, have depended largely on the sociopolitical environment

and eral

of the land they sought to inherit or repossess. As a genrule fundamentalists in democratic or quasi-democratic societies could hope

historical character

only for a piece of the pie; their imaginings were confined to the home, school, and ghetto. When they ventured into the larger, vibrantly plural world of political competition, fundamentalists found

it

necessary to compromise. In sectarian states

susceptible to or manipulated by ethnic and religious extrcmisms, radical

talism found

its

natural metier. There

of its imaginings.

it

fundamen-

stands the better chance of making a world

Martin E. Marty andR.

Scott Appleby

642

Notes Imagined Com-

Benedict Anderson,

1.

munities: Reflections on the Origin

of Nationalism,

rev.

1983; reprint 1991),

On

2.

(London: Verso,

ed. p. 4.

J.

Nations and Nationalism since

1780:

Programme,

bridge:

Cambridge University

Myth,

Reality

(Cam-

Communities,

p. 7.

4.

Ibid, p. 5.

5.

Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change

(London: 1964),

Tom

6.

and

Weidenfeld

Nicholson,

(London:

and the Tablighi Jamaat" Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp.

15. p.

16. See Beverley Milton-Edwards, "A Temporary Alliance with the Crown: The Islamic Response in Jordan," and Gehad Auda, "An Uncertain Response: The Islamic

Nairn, The Break-up of Britain

New

Left Books, 1977),

p.

359.

Fundamentalisms and the Gulf (Chicago: American Academy of Arts

pp.

Imagined

Anderson,

expectation of the Western press

was that the bounty on Rushdie's head would be lifted when Khomeini died and the "pragmatic" Rafsanjani came to power. Rafsanjani increased die bounty.

Malise

A

Ruthven,

Satanic Affair:

Salman Rushdie and the Rage of Islam (LonWindus, don: Chatto and 1990), pp. 104-25. 10.

Imagined

Anderson,

Communities,

p. 10.

11. Krishna Kumar, "Hindu Revivalism and Education in North Central India," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family,

and Education (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1992). 12. "Violence like Punjabs' Fertile Soil,"

1992,

p.

New

New

York Times, 22 February 1992.

The

case

power

14.

New

of Iran is a notable excepgovernment has been

for over a decade,

failures

ject

of chapters

and

its

successes

bv various standards are the subin this

Ann Mayer,

volume bv Said ArNikki Keddie, and

Timur Kuran. Fulcrum in 29 January 1992,

19. "Fundamentalist Finds a

Sudan,"

New

A3. Turabi

York Times,

who

is

fifty-nine years old, has

degrees in law from

London

Khartoum

University,

and the Sorbonne, and is fluent in Arabic, English, and French, presents the Islamization of die Sudan in a milder way. He says the Shari'a, which calls for the amputation of limbs as the punishment for armed robbery, is being enforced in a responsible manner. He was the architect of Shari'a-based laws in Numavri's regime that resulted in a number of amputations that were carried out in public. 20.

University,

The

profiled bv

Christian

Reconstructionists,

Nancy Ammerman

in

volume

1

Wheat Finds

of this series and dicussed bv Iannaccone in

February

the present volume, are a possible exception

1

to diis generalization.

A2. Election

13. "Punjab's

Threat,"

York Times,

Is-

Crisis,

18.

and

p.

Instead,

Gulf

the

88-108.

jomand,

The

and

17.

Communities,

p. 6.

9.

Egypt," in Piscatori, ed.,

tion in that an Islamic in

and Sciences, 1991). 8.

in

lamic Fundamentalisms

ed., Islamic

Crisis

Chicago Tribune, 14 February 1991,

22.

See the discussion in James Piscatori,

7.

See

457-530.

Movement

161.

p.

"Is-

The

Jamaat-i-Islami

Press, 1990).

Imagined

Anderson,

Mumtaz Ahmad,

Liberation Front, see

lamic Fundamentalism in South Asia:

in

theories of nationalism, see E.

Hobsbawm,

3.

and Spread

York Times,

Chilled

by

20 February 1992.

Edward A. Gargan, "Kashmir Cara-

van bv Hindus

Is

Halted," Chicago Tribune,

26 February 1992.

On

the

Jammu Kashmir

21. James Piscatori, Islam in a World of

Nation-States (Cambridge: Canbridge University Press, 1986), p. 3.

22. Ibid., p. 13 23. Ibid., pp.

14-15.

CONCLUSION 643

24.

Smolowe.

Jill

"An

Alarming

Vote," Time, 13 January 1992,

No

25. See the discussion bv Bassam Tibi, "The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamen-

Attitudes

talists:

Toward Modern Science

and Technology," in eds.. Fundamentalisms

Mam

Muslim

history to the massacres, the forced

conversions, the expulsions, and the burn-

28.

p.

and Appleby,

ings that are so

cratic

a)id Society.

Ahmed An Na'im, "The New Perspectives

in the history

guaranteeing

constimtions,

rights for

26. Abdullahi

common

of

Christendom before the rise of secularism. Bv a sad paradox, the adoption in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of demoall

citizens, in the

equal

Ottoman Em-

27. Bernard Lewis. "Muslims, Christians, and Jews: The Dream or Coexistence." New York Review of Books 39, no. 6 26 March

pire, in Iran, Egypt, and elsewhere, on the whole weakened rather than strengthened the position of minorities. On the one hand it deprived them of the limited but substantial and well-grounded rights and privileges which they enjoyed under the old Islamic

1992

dispensation.

Reformation

of Islam,"

Quarterly (FaQ 1987), p. 51.

i

1

:

49.

"The character and extent of traditional Muslim tolerance should not be misunderstood. If bv tolerance we mean the traditional Muslim state was not tolerant, and indeed a tolerance thus designed would have been seen not as a merit but as a dereliction of duty. No equality was 28. Ibid., p. 50.

conceded,

in practice

or even

less in

theory,

between those who accepted and obeyed God's word, and those who willfully and of their tion

own

was

choice rejected

it.

structural, universal,

Discrimina-

imposed by

doctrine and law and enforced by popular Persecution, on the other hand, though not unknown, was rare and atypical, and there are few if anv equivalents in

consent.

On the other, it failed to make good the new rights and freedoms offered to them bv the newly enacted constimtions which,

in

this as

proved a dead

many

in

other respects,

letter. It is easier

to be toler-

ant from a position of strength than from a

position of weakness, and in the age of over-

whelming European

superiority of wealth

and power, the Christian and to an extent the Jewish minorities, suspected with

some

of sympathizing and even

colla-

justification

borating with European imperialists, were subject

to

increasing

hostility.

After the

w ithdrawal of those imperialists in the postwar period, the surviving minorities were in an exposed and dangerous position." 29. Ibid., p. 52.

CONTRIBUTORS

R. Scott Appleby, the associate director of the Fundamentalism Project,

is

a his-

torian of religion and currently a visiting research associate at the University of Chi-

cago.

He

Said Amir of Chicago at

and Age, Unite! The Modernist Impulse

the author of Church

is

Catholicism and

Arjomand

in

1980, and

Stony Brook.

in

American

the coeditor, with Martin E. Martv, of Fundamentalisms Observed.

is

He

is

was born is

Tehran, received his Ph.D. from the University

in

professor of sociology at the State University of New York

the author of The Shadow of God

and

the

Hidden

Imam and The

Turban for the Crown. He has held visiting appointments at St. Antonv's College, Oxford (1981-82), the University of California at Berkeley (1989), and the University at

of Freiburg

(

1990-91

),

and was

member of the

a

Institute for

Advanced Study

Princeton (1984-85).

Umar M.

Birai

of student

affairs at the

frequently

on the

Steve Bruce Scotland. Rise

and

He

is

is

Department of

senior lecturer in the

is

Political Science

He

University of Abuja, Nigeria.

and dean

has written and lectured

Islamic revival in Africa.

head of the Department of Sociology

the author of Pray

Fall of the

New

A

TV:

at the University

of Aberdeen,

Sociology of Television Evangelism

and The

Christian Right: Protestant Politics in America, 1978-88.

Robert Eric Frykenberg

is

professor of history and South Asian studies at the

University of Wisconsin at Madison.

He

the author of

is

Guntur District, 1788-1848:

A

History of Local Influence and Central Authority in South India, has published numerous articles, and is the editor of several volumes on India, including Land Tenure and Peasant in South Asia, Delhi through the Ages, and Studies of South India.

John H. Garvey is the Ashland Professor of Law at the University of Kentucky College of Law. He has served as assistant to the solicitor general of the United States and

is

the author of

of Readings

in

Modem

Faye Ginsburg where she

is

numerous

is

articles

on

constitutional religious issues and coeditor

Constitutional Theory associate professor

also the director

and The

of anthropology

of the Program

the author of the award-winning

First Amendment:

in

New

York University

Ethnographic Film and Video. She

book Contested 645

at

A Reader.

Lives:

The Abortion Debate

in

is

an

Contributors

646

American Community and coeditor, with Anna Tsing, of Uncertain Terms: Negotiating Gender

in

American Culture. In 1991-92, she received

a

Guggenheim Fellowship

for

her research and writing on the use of film and video bv indigenous peoples. She

beginning

a

is

long-term ethnographic studv of the Salvation Armv.

Laurence R. Iannaccone is associate professor of economics at Santa Clara University. He has written many articles and presented numerous papers on his research, which centers on economic models of religious behavior.

NlKKl R. KEDDIE geles

is

professor of historv at the Universitv of California at Los

and editor of the journal Contention. She has published numerous

books on Iran and the Middle East, including Roots of Revolution: History ofModern Iran and, with Juan Cole, Shi'ism

Charles

F.

Keyes

is

Southeast Asian studies

Thailand: Buddhist

Kingdom

is

Protest.

Chiang Mai University, Thailand.

as

at Tel

He

is

vis-

the author of

Modern Nation-State and editor of Reshaping Local

associate director

ern and African Studies

and

Interpretive

Universitv of Washington and has recentlv been a

Rural Education and Cultural Change

Martin Kramer

An-

professor and chairman of anthropology and director of at the

iting senior research scholar at

Worlds:

and Social

An

articles

in Southeast Asia.

of die Moshe Davan Center for Middle East-

Aviv University.

He

is

the author of Islam Assembled:

The Advent of Muslim Congresses and editor of Middle Eastern

Lives:

The

Practice of

Biography and SelfNarrative and Shi'ism, Resistance, and Revolution.

Timur Kuran

is

associate professor

his essavs evaluate the

book on

of economics

at the Universitv'

His research focuses on the evolution of values and

California.

of Southern

institutions. Several

economic doctrines associated with Islam.

He

is

of

completing a

the ideological, social, political, and economic consequences of preference

falsification

— the

Deepak Lal

act

of concealing one's wants under

social pressure.

Coleman Professor of International Development Studeconomv at Universitv College, London. He is the author of numerous articles and books on development, including The Poverty of Development Economics and The Hindu Equilibrium. He has advised a number of countries and has worked for various international organizations, most recently as research administrator at the World Bank. ies at

the James S.

is

the Universitv of California at Los Angeles and professor of political

Liebman is professor of political science at Bar-Ilan Universitv in Ramat-Gan, Israel. He is the author of many articles and books on religion, politics, and

Charles societv Israel

S.

among Jews

in the

United States and

Israel,

including Religion and

Politics in

and Two Worlds ofJudaism.

§erif

Mardin

is

a sociologist in the School

University and the author of Genesis of Young

numerous

Ottoman Thought.

from 1973 to 1990.

of International Service

studies

at

American

on the Middle East including The

He taught at Bogazici University,

Istanbul, Turkey,

CONTRIBUTORS 647

Martin

Marty

E.

the Fairfax

is

History of Modern Christianity

damentalism Project, and can

Academy of Arts and

the four-yolume history.

M. Cone Distinguished

at the

a senior editor

Sciences,

of Christian Century.

Marty

fellow of the Ameri-

Religion.

associate professor

is

A

the author of over forty books, including

is

Modern American

Ann Elizabeth Mayer

Service professor of the

University of Chicago, the director of the Fun-

of

legal studies at the

Human Rights.

School of the University of Pennsylvania and the author of Islam and

She has also written on the role of Islamic law

in

Wharton

contemporary Middle Eastern

societies.

Harjot Oberoi

holds the chair in Sikh and Punjabi studies

Department of

in the

He

Asian Studies, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. editor of Pacific Affairs sity Press

and

is

the author of a forthcoming

on the emergence of modern Sikh

Abdel Azim Ramadan

is

is

associate

book from Oxford Univer-

identity.

professor of contemporary history. Faculty of Arts,

Monofiva University, Egypt. Recipient of the Egyptian Order of Sciences and Arts, Dr.

Ramadan

is

an editor and writer for the

of twenty-five books

in

political

weekly October.

He

is

the author

Arabic on the social and political history of Egypt and the

Arab world.

David

Rapoport

C.

is

professor of political science at the University of California

Los Angeles and the editor of the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence. He is the author of Assassination and Terrorism and editor of Inside Terrorist Organizations. at

Olivier search).

Roy

He

a researcher at

is

CNRS

(French National Center for Scientific Re-

has traveled with participants in

author of numerous

articles

on

Afghan

resistance

Iran and Afghanistan and the

movements and book Islam and

is

the

Resis-

tance in Afghanistan.

Ehtjd Sprinzak Jerusalem.

He

Israeli Society,

Stanley

J.

is

is

associate professor

of

political science at

Hebrew

University of

the author of The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right, Illegalism in

and many essays on

Tambiah

is

political

and religious extremism.

professor of anthropology at Harvard University.

president of the Association for Asian Studies

(1989-90) and

is

He was

a fellow

of the

American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He which are Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling ofDemocracy and Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics and Violence in Sri Lanka. is

the author of

many

books,

among

INDEX

Muhammad. 153 Abdurrahman, Emir, 493 Abhidharma (Buddhist scripture), 375

Ali

abortion: in Britain, 56; in Ireland, 52; Protestant

All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress, 592, 593, 595,

'Abduh.

143, 491, 492, 627, 634,

41-42,

59, 61, 440. See also Operation Rescue; Roe

Wade Abu Nidal, 503 Addis Ababa Agreement (Sudan), 133. 148n.61 Adolescent Family Life Act, 49n.74 Advani. Lai Knshan, 244, 245, 249, 250. 421 Afghanistan, 456, 623; war of, with Soviet Union, 434, 491, 492, 49", 499, 503, 504. See also Mujahidin; Sunni fundamentalism:

Afghanistan

AFRC,

188, 190, 192 Watch organization, 150n.79 Afzal, Mollah, 505 Agency for International Development (AID): the Sudan, 36

Hindu Mahasabha

in

and

Hindu economics, 413, 420; in India, 263-64, 417. See also Green Rcyolution Agudat Israel party, 70, 71, 75, 76, 82, 83,

Hindu

See

All-India Sikh Students Federation, 269,

279

Buddhism, 297, 299, 368,

alms, giving of: in

371, 373, 377, 385, 390, 397. See also zakat

Amal (Hope), 431, 435, 527; and Hizbullah, 541, 543-44, 548 Amalekites, 449, 467 Amanullah Khan, King (Afghanistan), 493, 509n.6, 629 Salih,

159

Civil Liberties

Union: on creationism,

62 American Coalition for Traditional Values, 60, 63 American Economic Association, 303, 345 American Family Association, 42 Amin, Hafizullah, 503 Aminu, Jibnl, 190 Amital, Rabbi Yehuda, 86n.21

Amlashi, Rabani, 92

Ammerman, Nancy, 345

272 al-Ahram (Egyptian weekly), 156 AIDS, 17, 18, 19

Amnesty

Akali Dal, 259, 260, 262, 264, 266, 267, 268,

Amrik Singh,

in Pakistan, 25, 125,

274, 275, 276, 280, 628 (Turkey;,

International,

230

515 alcohol, use of: and Islamic law, 113, 149n.67, 149n.69; in U.S., 30, 59 Algeria, 639; fundamentalist movements in, 4,

145n.l4,

147n.39,

149n.65, 151n.85, 634 Bhai,

262

Amritsar, 245, 258, 259, 273, 277, 284n.41,

Amndpur

Akbar, Emperor, 235 Ala, Hussain,

58

Amish, 23

86n.ll

Ahmad, Jalal Al-i, 517 Ahmad, Khurshid, 315

Ak-Dogus group

Mahasabha.

All-India

American

1

Ahmadis:

Muhammad, 516

Amer, Ahmed

Africa

agricultural reform, 14; in Afghanistan, 496;

Shah,

Alliance Party (Northern Ireland),

p.

in

See also

596, 600, 602

hjiidamcntalists on, 22, 30, 32, 36. 46n.35.

64, 296, 352, 353, 356; in U.S., 35,

635-38.

elections: in Algeria

Sahib Resolution, 259,

274-79

Anderson, Benedict, 621, 625 animism:

in Nigeria,

185; in the Sudan, 133

Ansar Sufi order, 132, 138 apocalypticism: and fundamentalism, 626 Apprentice Boys of Derry, 55

649

629

1

1

Index 650

Aquinas, Thomas, 329

Bangledesh, 123, 244

Arab- Jewish conflict, 69, 72, 74, 85n.6, 437, 462,

Bani-Sadr, Abu'l-Hasan, 90, 95, 143,

526

banking.

302,

463, 471-72, 473, 474, 476, 482, 483, 486. See

also Six

Dav War; Yom Kippur War

507

Arafat, Yasser,

Araki, Avatollah, 108n.48

archaeology: and violence in

Israel,

453, 462,

463, 467, 468 Aristotle,

philosophy

and Islam, 329, 332,

340n.l22 government Rinding

Arvasi, Zivaeddin, 220,

41, 42

of,

175,

156,

277

Salih,

Northern Ireland,

Omar

Hassan, 112, 139, 140,

141,631,634

221

158

Ashura, 447, 448, 449, 451, 452, 625

Asoka, 446

Basmachis movement, 491

Ba Swe, U, 376-77, 378, 404n.55 Bauchi, Dahiru, 195, 202n.62 Bazargan, Mehdi, 98, 143; and Iranian government, 89-90, 92, 95, 524 BBC, 190 BCCI. See Bank of Credit and Commerce International

539 Assembly of Experts (Iran), 89, 90, 91-92, 95, 102; authority of, 99-100, 101, 103 Assassins, 453, 512, 533, 534n.4,

Assembly of God Church, 3

180-81n.54

of,

Atatiirk, 22, 153, 217, St.,

219, 228

33

Aung San, General, 381 Aung San Suu Kyi, 381, 382 Aung-Thwin, Michael, 372, 373-74 Austria school of economic thought, 347, 348

Aw ad,

154-55,

152,

55; persecution of, 37

469, 484

Augustine,

Hasan,

179n.l6, 186

al-Bashir, General

Arvan Nation, 457n.3 Arva Samaj, 239, 243, 254n.5, 414, 416 ashk, 211 Ashkenazic Jews: and Israeli politics, 70, 80, 81,

Asyut, city

307,

(BCCI): and Pakistan, 132

Baptists: independent, 31; in

Arthashastra (Hindu text), 411

Ashmawi,

299,

baptism: American Protestant, 34; Sikh, 272,

Arminianism, 51, 59, 65n.l art:

297,

308-11, 312, 313-15, 325, 328, 330-31 banking, Western: and Islamic movements, 630 Bank of Credit and Commerce International al-Banna,

of:

223,

Islamic,

Louis,

1

74

'Ayn Shams, 163, 180n.52

Menachem, 474, 475

Beheshti,

Mohammad

Hosseini: and Iranian

Is-

524 Beisner, E. Calvin, 349, 359, 362n.l6 Bekaa Valley 527, 540, 541, 543, 548 Bekkine, Abdiilaziz, 22 Bcnjedid, Chadli, 637 Ben-Shoashan, Yeshua, 475, 476 Ben-Yishai, Shmuel, 483 Betrayal of Buddhism, 593, 594-95, 596, 602 Bhakti movement, 424n.l3 Bharatiya Jana Sangh, 243 lamic government, 90, 91,

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 21, 22, 234, 244,

Ayodhya, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 252, 423,

453 Azerbaijan,

Begin,

245, 249, 250-53, 410, 411, 412, 416,

627, 628, 629; economic program

of,

417-

23.630-31,635

524

al-Azhar University, 154, 155, 169

bbikkhus (monks), 591. See also monks, Buddhist

Bhindranwale, Jarnail Singh, 18, 244-45, 258,

Baath Party, 436, 458n.l5;

in

the Sudan, 132

Babangida^ General Ibrahim, 187-88, 198, 199

262, 267-68, 271, 273, 275, 278, 285n.61,

626, 628, 629

450 Babn Masiid, 246, 249, 251 Badal, Parkash Singh, 264

Bhumipol Adulyadej, King, 389 124,^126, 129-30, Bhutto, Benazir,

Badr, Zaki, 163, 164

Bhutto, Zultikar AH, 112, 124. 125, 146n.31

Babis,

Baha'i faith: in Iran, 25, 117, 120, 146n.l9, 441,

450,515 Bahrain, 316, 451; Shi'ites Bakhtiar, Shapur,

in,

436, 444,

527-28

434-35, 522, 525

Balfour Declaration, 470

346-47, 348, 351, 359, 363-64n.42; and law, 19, 34-38, 42-43, 44; and Protestant fundamentalism, 18, 28, 32-34, 39, also inerrancy, biblical

Bihbihani, Sa\-vid

524 S.

185

and Christian economics, 292-93, 298,

45n.20. See

Bah, General Domkat, 188

Bandaranaikc,

Biafra,

Bible:

civil

Balanced Treatment Act (Louisiana), 38, 43

Baluchistan,

bin Ghazali, Aidit,

W. R.

144,

146n.31, 508, 629

D.,

593,

598-99, 601, 603, 604, 61

1,

596,

612, 613

597,

Muhammad, 516 324

Bin-Nun, Yocl, 86n.21 birth control: in Iran, 121

Index 651

BJP. See Bharatiya Janata Party

talism, 32, 344, 345. 348. 350.

"Black Friday" Tran:. 522

jab.

380-81. 402n.2;

black market: in Burma,

in In-

417

dia.

59

;

Carter, Jimmy, 139; and Iran, 520, 525.

Amram. 46"

537n.53

414, 416,

13,

424n.20

Bnei Brak serdement. 462. 464

Catholic bishops. U.S.:

Board of Education

Catholic church:

v.

412-

caste system. 236. 252, 264,

Bnei Akiva movement. 70

Bob

Pun-

in

Carson, Sir Edward, 53

blacks: as minority in U.S..

Blau, Rabbi

635;

263, 264; in Thailand, 387-89, 390, _ 391 -9 in Turkey, 22

Mernois. 41

Jones University, 40. 345. 351

in

on

294

the economy,

185; in Northern

Nigeria,

Ireland, 21. 51. 52, 53, 57, 66n.9; in Sri

Boddhisatrvas (nature Buddhasi, 371

Lanka, 594, 595, 604;

in U.S.,

63

Bodhiraksa. See Phothirak. Phra

Catholic Social and Democratic Labor Party, 55

Bonnke. Reinhard. 199

Cave of the

"born again," 29. 30

Central Intelligence Agency. See

Bo

Central Sikh League,

Tree. 452. 608.

Brahmins

613 241. 412. 413. 425n.39

(priest caste),

Brahmo Samaj sect. 414 Bngham Young University.

Sec

Mormons:

in

Jerusalem Britain, Great, 4; in Afghanistan,

493;

Burma.

in

368, 373. 374. 375, 376, 379, 386; Egypt. 153, 154;

in India,

414; and

515. 532; and Muslims, 625;

in

in

Iran.

Northern

Ireland, 52, 54, 56, 57, 58; in Pakistan, 123,

124; in Sri Lanka, 602; in the Sudan, 133

488n.29

Patriarchs, 482,

CIA

259

Ceylon. See Sri Lanka Ceylon National Congress. 591

Chamlong Snmuang, Major

General,

396

Chandananda, Palipane, 612, 616 Charan Singh, 420, 426n.48 charity: and Christian economics, 351 Chase Manhattan Bank: and Islamic banking, 317 Chechen tribe, 213 Chelvanayagam. 598, 599 Chicago school of economic thought, 347

Bryan. William Jennings, 355

Chichester-Clark, Major, 54, 58

Buddha, Gotama, 371, 392. 395

Chilton, David,

Buddha Jayanthi celebration, 595. 603 Buddha Sasana Act. 594

China: and Thailand, 388, 389, 407n.98

Buddhadasa Bhikkhu. See Phutthathat Phikkhu Buddhaghosa. 395

Christian Association of Nigeria

Chit Hlaing, U. 404n.58

Buddharakkhita, Mapitgama, 596

Buddhism:

Burma, 378, 379, 386; cosmologi-

in

349

cal,

379, 383, 385, 386, 397, 398;

dia,

236, 431. See

in

In-

also violence, religious:

Buddhist

190, 191, 192, 198,

dan, 133. See

also

199-200;

516

Bush, George, 63, 460n.49; and

New

Christian

Right, 61. 359

Muslim, 305, 327, 448;

in

Egypt. 153.

155, 161-62, 176; in Turkey, 216^

CIA. 169, 503 Citicorp: and Islamic banking, 317 Cittaphawan College, 392, 393, 394, 399 civil rights movement, 46n.35; in Northern

219

Civil Transactions

Act (Sudan), 135

Murat, 313

Cizak(,a,

Calvinism, 35, 51, 65n.l, 349

Clauson, Mark, 349 clerics,

David accords (1978), 168, 169, 170-71, 181-82n.74, 475

capitalism. 14, 298, 304, 308-9, 312, 313, 332,

635; and Buddhist fundamentalism, 385, in

Egypt, 155-56, 166; and Hindu

economics, 420, 422; in Iran, 21; liberation theology on, 298; and Protestant fundamen-

in

Ire-

54

Camp

400;

60

Chulalongkom, King, 386 Church of Ireland, 55, 59

land, 53, caliphate,

Israel,

Ciroma, Malam Adamu, 186

384, 399 Burujirdi, Husain, 434,

Su-

466, 478

Christian Voice organization, 32,

Party, 369, 378, 382,

in the

Copts; Maronites

Christian Mission: in

Programme

466-

67; in Nigeria, 184, 185, 186, 188, 189,

Buhan, General, 187 Bultmann, Rudolf, 29 Burma: economy of, 297, 379, 380. 402n.28 Socialist

184,

I.

Christianity: in India, 236, 413; in Israel,

Buddhist Theosophical Society, 590, 600

Burma

(CAN

188-89, 190, 192, 199 Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN), 60, 63 185.

Muslim, 112, 448;

in

Afghanistan, 493;

Iran, 90, 91, 94, 95, 98, 99,

115,

116,

117,

119,

145n.l3. 449, 512. 526; 543, 551; key,

120, in

in Pakistan, 126,

108n.48,

121.

143,

Lebanon, 541,

146n.31;

218, 227

Coalition on Revival, 346. 349, 362n.l6

in

Tur-

1

Index 652

I, 443, 444, 456 Colombo, Joseph: and Kahane, 481 communism: collapse of, 1, 65; in Burma, 377,

Cold War,

380;

in

Egypt, 166, 173;

in Iran,

516;

in

the

Sudan, 132; in Thailand, 398 Concerned Women for America, 42 Congregation of All Orders for Purification, Perpetuation, and Propagation of the Sasana

382-83

(Burma),

Congress

part)' (India),

constitution, Indian, 252,

283-84n.37

86n.l0

Torah

party, 70, 71,

83

democracy, 6, 205, 633, 640;

637;

in India,

22; in

fundamentalism, 486; Sri

Lanka, 601;

in the

118-19, 120, 142;

126; in the Sudan, 133, constitution, Nigerian. 187,

102-5, 115,

in Pakistan, 124,

137-38 191-92

in Pakistan,

Democratic Alliance partv (Pakistan), 629, 630 Democratic Partv (U.S.): and evangelicals, 355 53, 54, 55,

58-59

Demokrat Party (Turkey), 217, 218, 219 Deng, Francis, 148n.61 Denton, Jeremiah, 61

Deoband

school,

248

97-

Deshapremi Janatha Vijavaparava (DJV), 615,

616 Deutsche Bank, 317 Devavedhi. See Thepwethi, Phra

Mamma

(message of Buddha). See dharma

dhammic socialism, 391, 392, 399 dharma (message of Buddha), 368, 371, 425n.39 Dharmapala, Anaganka (1864-1933), 590-91,

Council of Islamic Ideology (Pakistan), 127

592 dharma vuddh, 268, 275, 626 Dias, N.Q., 596 Diaspora, Jews in, 470, 479, 481 Dilgeer, Harjinder Singh, 261

covenant, notion

divorce, 30, 52

Council for the Determination of Interest, 98, 102, 105

Council of Guardians (Iran), 90, 102, 120, 443; authority of, 91, 93, 96, 103,

1

19-20

of, 5

Dole, Robert, 63

Craig, William, 55 creation science:

legislation,

of, 38,

61, 62, 365n.66;

43, 44, 356

dakwah movements, 394 Dalada Maligawa temple. Tooth

See

Temple of the

See

also

Temple Mount

in

Islamic law,

Due

117. See also

Process Clause-

Dutch Reformed church, 349

Taksal, 245, 259, 262, 263,

401n.l6.

See also

Donoughmore Constitution, 591 Drv Zone (in Sri Lanka), 605-6 due process of law: and Gush Emunim, 474; and U.S. Constitution:

266-70, economics, 292, 294, 296, 299, 300, 328-29;

279, 280, 626, 628 dana,

Dome of the Rock, 475. dominion theology, 349

haredi, 465;

257-58

Dal Khalsa, 261, 262, 266

Damdami

123; in

Sudan, 150n.76

Desai, Morarji, 426n.48

Ottoman, 205 constitution, Saudi, 114 constitution, Sri Lankan, 590-91, 593 Contemporary Economics and Business Association (CEBA), 346, 347 conversion: American Protestant, 29, 33 Copts, 153, 166, 171, 175, 180-81n.54 Cosan, Esat, 222, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229

Daljeet Singh,

82; and Jewish

Derozio, 414

constitution,

teaching

143,

in Algeria,

Israel,

150n.74

516,520 constitution. Islamic: in Iran, 88,

117,

Ha

Democratic Unionist Partv (Sudan), 132, 138,

(1906-7), 89, 90, 515,

Iranian

Degel

Democratic Unionist Partv (Northern Ireland), 234, 248, 251, 252, 260,

262, 264, 279, 411,416, 420, 627, 628 constitution,

De'eri, Arye,

alms,

giving

of:

in

Buddhism

Buddhist, 290, 291, 297, 298, 299, 70,

389-90;

367-

Christian, 35, 289, 290, 291,

Daral-'Ulum, 154

292, 296, 297, 299, 347-48, 350, 351,

Darbar Sahib. See Golden Temple

357; Hindu, 291, 297-98, 299, 410,

Dard, Mir, 211

13,

Daud, President (Afghanistan), 435, 495 Da'wa partv: in Iraq, 436 Al-Da'wa (Muslim Brotherhood journal), 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172 Dayan, Moshc, 472 Davan, Yossi, 482 Davananda, Swami, 414 Dcedat, Ahmed, 199

95, 297, 298, 299, 302,

417-23;

Islamic, 125, 290, 291,

412294-

303-8, 325, 326, 327-28, 330-33, 635; Marxist, 296-97, 303-4; neoclassical, 293, 294, 295, 304.

See also free market system; redistribution,

economic Eda Haredit, 463, 464, 468 education: Buddhist, 600-604; Christian, 22, 35, 36, 40, 346, 351-52, 353, 356; Hindu,

1

Index 653

62". Islamic, 125. 186. 194, 32". 328;

Edam

i

Is-

"6.81

"2.

raeli.

Fanon, Franz, 480, 48 1.51" fnqib, 114. 116, 118, 122

Tamil homeland,. 605. 606. 609. 614

Egypt: fundamentalist movements in. 4. 25-26, 630; and Israel. 15". 162. 169. 1"0. 471;

Faraj,

Muhammad Ahd

Fatimi, Husain,

515

and the Soviet Union. 156; and the Sudan.

Fatimids,

141; and U.S., 169. See also Islamization: in

fatira (legal ruling), 160,

Egypt

FBI: and Kahane,

Eitan, General Raphael. 4 5

elections: 382;

in

Egypt. 162. 1"4;

in Iran.

Tamil). 598, 599,

kistan, 125.

514-16, 518, 523, 524,

533

76-78, 85. 431. 462. 463. 478, 483. in Ni192, 198-99; in Northern Ireland. 54-56. 66n.9; in Pakastan. 129. 130,

FIS. See Islamic Salvation Front

146n.31; in Sri Lanka. 433. 591, 593, 596, 59". 602. 603. 60". 609. 612; in the Sudan.

Fodio,

geria,

138,

150n.~4;

144.

139.

218;

in U.S.. 59.

Turkey, 217,

in

605

12"

Fida'iyan-i Islam, 434,

24, 70, 71, 75,

Israel.

i

315

477-78

feminism: and fundamentalism. 25. 30; in Pa-

245. 249,

in India.

250-51. 262. 279, 418. 420, 629; 90, 94. 122. 143; in

512

Federal Party

143. 50". 63"; in Burma,

in Algeria.

159-60

al-Salam,

Farrakhan, Louis, 199

Five Pillars of Islam,

FLN.

318

See National Liberation Front

Usman Dan,

185, 186, 195

Forqan group, 524

550-51;

France, 14; and Hizbullah,

525

on

Islamic law,

1

18-

19, 135;

influence of,

and

Iraq.

528

el-Nur, Farouk Ibrahim, 140

freedom, religious, 14. 15. 21, 24, 25, 35, 36, 38,

Emerald Buddha. 406n.91 Emerson. Ralph Waldo. 225 Enforcement ofShan'a Act 1991. 130

39, 40, 42, 43 Freedom Movement

Enlightenment. Jewish, 469

Epistle of Uabt,

free

(in Ulster

.

and Hindu economics, 410, 420, 422;

I

dia,

(Israeli religious

626

Free Presbyterian Parts.

52

226-27

evangelicalism, 343,

America,

352-56, 361n.7, 364n.53;

23.

50.

51.

61,

63,

363-

Buddhism, 394; in Northern 53. 54. 55. 56-57. See also New in

evolution. 38. 39; and Islam, 140,

150-51n.80

Ezra movement. 70

Ezzam. Abdallah, 505

Muhammad

Husavn. 544, 546, 547,

549,550,551-52 Faisal,

King (Saudi Arabia), 165

Falwell, Jerry, 19, 29. 31. 32. 35, 60, 345, 346;

on economic matters, 347, 356, 357, 360 Law Ordinance 1967 (Pakistan), 128 Family Protection Act (U.S.), 37 Family Protection Act of 1967 (Iran). 1 16. 120 Family

of:

637

Buddhist, 368,

35.

36,

37-38,

39,

50-51, 294, 343,

345. 361n.7, 365n.59, 623-33; general/

Christian Right

Eadlallah.

part}' (Algeria),

369, 376, 399; Christian. 15, 28, 29-34,

476

European Economic Community (EEC): Turkey

Ireland,

5°

fundamentalism, characteristics

and, 223,

639

Friedman. Milton, 347 Front for Socialist Forces

tablismcnt Clause

Etzion, Yehuda. 474, 475,

in In-

121, 123; in Pakistan, 130

54-55, 56, 57

weekly), 70

Establishment Clause. See U.S. Constitution: Es-

64n.42;

in Iran,

Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster, 18, 20, 26.

eschatology: and fundamentalisms,

in

417;

Free Officers Revolution (Egypt),

37

,

Erbakan. Nccmettin. 222

Ettela'at.

market system: Christian fundamentalists on, 344, 346-47, 348, 356, 359, 363-64n.42;

53

218. 219. 220

Equal Access Act (1984), 38,41 Equal Rights Amendment U.S. Erev Shabbat

143

Exercise Clause

Enlightenment. Scottish, 292 Episcopal Church of Ireland

(Iran), 98,

Free Exercise Clause. See U.S. Constitution: Free

comparative. 2-4, 5-7, 8n.4, 9n.7, 13, 15,

16-17,

19, 22, 23,

24-25, 204, 207-8,

236, 257, 429-30, 431, 442, 447, 450,

454-56, 463, 620-24, 631; Hindu, 41011; Islamic, 6, 103, 113, 114, 121-22, 142-43, 430, 638; Jewish. 17, 72-73, 438; Sikh, 17, 257, 258, 629 fundamentalism, impact of: Buddhist, 384, 399400; Christian, 30-31, 43-44, 50, 63- 64, 65, 31, 298, 360-61, 457n.3, 621-22, 623, 635. 640; general/comparative, 624,

626-27, 628, 631, 634, 640, 641; Hindu, 240, 244, 248-49, 250, 251-53, 253, 622; Islamic, 112-15, 121-22, 132-33, 134, 139, 142, 143-44, 152-53, 154, 204-5, 217-18, 226, 228, 280, 553, 633, 638; Jewish, 68, 70, 73, 78-82, 300, 445,

Index 654

fundamentalism, impact of continued (

Arabs, 483, 488n.29, 489n.40;

)

of, 18, 71, 73,

damentalism; Sunni fundamentalism

79; in occupied territories, 21, 445, 452;

Fundamental Law of 1979 (Iran), 89, 92-95, 97, 100, 102-3, 108n.32; revision of (1989), 98,99, 101, 102

tians,

Ha'aretz

Gnlnt

(exile)

of Jews, 464, 465

baditb

Gandhi, Mahatma, 235, 239, 240, 242, 243, 259, 411, 420; economics

of,

415, 417, 418,

419, 421-22, 423; and Hind Swaraj, 15;

and Hindu

revivalism, 414,

414-

424n.5

Gandhi, Mrs. Indira, 235, 242, 244, 245, 247,

262,420,421,629

421,443,610 499 469. Sec

also

occu-

of

Muhammad),

91,

92,

102-3 bajj (pilgrimage),

195

hakimiyya (God's sovereignty), 152, 157, 161

Imlakim (Jewish law), 16, \9, 25, 77, 465; Ka-

hane on, 480, 484; on violence, 467. See

also

224

Halid, Mevlana, 212, 214,

622

draft

of, 32, 39,

498

haredi, 16, 17, 20, 23, 24, 69, 75, 431, 445, 469,

487n.l4; on Christians, 441-42, 466-67;

pied territories, Israeli

Book

358

Harakat-i inqilab-i Islami,

Strip, settlers in, 69, 83,

Genesis,

Jeffrey,

(Traditions

Hamas, 453 Hand, Judge Brevard, 62

Garang, John, 139

Geilner, Ernest,

466

(Israeli dailv), 77,

law: Jewish

Gandhi, Rajiv, 235, 245, 248, 250, 277, 418,

Gavlani, Sayyad,

449; and nonreligious Jews,

(Lubavitch), 85n.7

Hadden,

Gambari, Ibrahim, 187

442; on democracy, 486; messianism

and violence, 462, 469-77, 484, 485

Habad

Gaza

on Chris-

484-87; Sikh, 260, 262-63, 266, 269, 273, 275-76, 279-80. See also Shi'hc fun-

exemption

of, 75, 78,

80; and

Israeli

government, 75-76, 77, 80, 82, 83, 84; and

62

Germany, West: and Islamic banking, 313, 317

messianism, 448-49; and nationalism, 70,

Gharani, General, 524

632; and violence, 438, 453, 463-69, 484;

Ghulat (Exaggerators), 448

Gobind Singh, 266, 270, 274, 277, 278, 284n.41 Golan Heights, Israeli occupation of, 471 Golden Age of Islam, 304-5 Golden Temple, 245, 278, 629. See also Amritsar Golpavgani, Grand Avatollah Mohammad Reza, 109n.55 Golwalkar, Madhav Sadashiv, 242, 245 good, notion of the: Hobbes's, 34-35; liberal, 45n.28; Protestant fundamentalist, 35

Gould, Stephen

Jav,

64

Graham, Billy, 345 Grand Mosque in Mecca, 449 Granth Sahib, 257 Great Depression: in Burma, 374, 387 Green Revolution, 263, 264, 267, 423 Guevara, Che, 517 Gulf Cooperation Council, 444 Gulf CrisisAVar

(

1990-91

),

2, 7, 141,

and Zionism, 21, 69, 72, 73, 79 Hargobind, 277-78

Hashemi, Mcdhi, 526, 530 Hassidic court system, Hastings, Warren,

Hausa-Fulani

466

238

tribe, 185,

189-90

Hayek, Friedrich, 292, 329, 347 Hazara ethnic group:

in

Afghanistan, 497, 498

Hazhir, Abdul Husain, 515

Hebron, 79, 452, 471-72, 482, 488n.29 Hedgewar, Kesnav Baliram, 240, 241, 242, 416 Hezb-i Wahdat, 498 Hidden Imam, 91, 102, 208, 449, 625 hijab (Islamic dress): in Nigeria, 187 bijra (relocation to Medina), 320 Hikmatyar, Gulbuddin, 495, 505, 507, 623. See also

Hizb-i-Islami

Hillul Hasbem, 468, 479,

434, 436,

480

Hindi language, 412, 627

455, 458n.l5, 460n.49, 505, 507, 530-31,

Hind Swaraj (Gandhi's book), 414-

550-51,623,630

Hinduism, 237, 238, 239, 410, 416; and Indian public policy, 422; and Islam, 209; reform

Gumi, Abubakar, 186, 195-96, 202n.62 Gumiisjiancvi, 213, 214, 224, 225

Gunananda, 589, 592 Gunawardcna, Dinesh, 611, 613 Gunawardena, Philip, 611 Giindogan, Ersin,

223-24

Gurbachan Singh, 267, 273 Gur Hassidics, 466

Gush Emunim, 20, 26, 69, 73-74, 80, 86n.l4, 430, 437-38, 453, 623, 626, 632; and

15,

422

of, 414 Hindu Mahasabha, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243 Hindu Mahasabha (HM) party, 411,416 Hindu Sabha, 239 Hindustan: as Hindu nation, 242, 622, 627 Hindutva, 21, 240, 249, 250, 251-52, 253

Hirschman, Albert, 331 Hizb-i-Islami,

453-54, 498, 499, 500, 503, 504,

507, 623; international supporters

of,

503

7

Index 655

God 450. 435-36. 528. 539-56. 626; and Amal. 436. 541. 54344. and Islamic law. 446-4"; martyrdom

Hizbullah (Party of

i.

and, 625; messianism

230; violence

449;

of,

Integral Humanism, 289, 418. 419, integration, racial: in U.S..

paying of: in Islam, 149n.63, 289-90, 29". 302, 304. 305. 314. 315-17; and Is-

interest,

Turkey,

in

444. 52~, 634

by,

303 International Center for Research in Islamic Eco-

353

nomics. 303 International

hostage taking; by Hizbullah. 548. 550. 552; bv

525

16". 177 1

"8

242

in

54

123. 431. 639; and Afghanistan, 506;

and Amal, 543-44; fundamentalist move-

Algeria, 637; in Egypt.

punishment:

activities of.

Iran. 4.

Imditd (Islamic penal code), 113. 183n.ll9; in

human

Al-

also Palestinians

IRA.

al-Hudavbi. Ma'mun. 164. 175, 1~6.

Monetary Fund. 186. 194; and

639; and Iran. 123 Intifada. "4. 43". 438. 4~6. 482. 483. 625. See geria.

al-Hudaybi. Hasan. 155. 156-5". 158. 164. 165.

M.

313.

International Association for Islamic Economics,

homosexuality. 1". 22. 29. 30. 36. 41. 46n,35.

Huddar.G

310. 311-13.

308.

328. 330

Holocaust: Kahanc on. 4~9. 480-81 home rule movement: in Ireland. 51 Homo Htaarchiis. 410. 421. 423n.l

Iran.

banking.

lamic

Hobbcs. Thomas. 34-35

56. 59. 352.

420

59

177—78.

ments

Islam

25-26, 633;

21. 24.

Islamic revo-

101, 115, 186.

16. 20, 88, 92,

in,

187, 451. 454. 462. 497, 511, 516, 520,

146n.24. 45~n.l2; and

rights: in Iran.

in,

lution

See also

522-23. 526. 533. 541. 542. 552; and

Is

lamie law. 638; Jewish fundamentalists on.

Khomeini.

71; in the Sudan, 138. 139-40. 141. 634;

552; and Palestinians, 435; and Saudi Ara-

Western standard

of.

520. 633. See

also

Am-

Hume,

David, 19. 292 Sol,

625; and Lebanon, 444,

436-3". 444; and

bia,

the Sudan, 141; and

U.S.,21, 121.443.516.518.529.530-31,

nesty International

Hurok,

19,

633; war with

481

Husainiyih Irshad foundation, 5

Iraq,

118, 443, 444, 453,

506. 525. 526. 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 542. 54". See also Islamization: in Iran;

1

Husayn (grandson of Muhammad,, 446. 447, 448.449,451,452.512

Iranian Constitution of 1979,

Husayn, Adil, 183n.l06

Iranian

Revolutionary

in Iran

443 and

Guard:

Hizbullah,

546, 547

Hussein. Saddam, 2. 141. 430. 436. 443, 455,

458n.l5. 507. 526. 528. 623

fundamentalism:

Shi'ite

Iraq, 4,

451; and Afghanistan, 507; and the Su-

dan, 141; and U.S., 2, 531; war of, with

Ibn Hanbal, Ahmad. 208 Ibn Khaldun

(

1332- 1406

Iran, 1.

Ibn TavmnTa. AJ-Islam (1263-1328i. 160. 208 Ibo tribe. 185 ijtibod

(independent reasoning). 153

Imamate, function

of,

89. 90. 93,

94

Burma, 402n.28; in Nigeria, 200n.l0 indexation: and Islamic banking. 314-15, 330 India, 22. 237; Buddhism in. 372; economic income:

policy of, 410. 413, 421;

fundamentalist

25-26; Islam in. 209; and Tamils, 442-43; war of. with Pakistan, 2 1 242, 629 Indian National Congress. 236, 239, 259 Indonesia, 213 Indo-Pakistan Delhi Agreement, 243 Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Agreement, 608-9, 610, 611.612,613 industrialism, 14, 15; in India, 417 Industrial Revolution, 14. 291, 332 in, 4,

17, 20,

,

inerrancy,

biblical,

15,

16,

18,

32, 343, 344,

365n.54; and economics, 293, 351 Inqusition: haredim on,

467

Hussein. Saddam; Shi'ite fundamental-

also

ism: in Iraq Ireland,

51,53

Irish Presbyterian

in

moyements

118, 443, 444, 453, 506, 525, 526,

528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 542. 547. See

303

Paisley. Irish

Church, 53, 54, 55, 59; and

57

Republican

Army

(IRA):

and

Catholic-

church, 53

Ishaw Khan, Ghulam, 132 158, 208-10, 313, 318, 472, 634, 640; and Soviet-Afghan war, 491, 492; in Sri Lanka, 440; in Turkey, 22, 216, 217,

Islam. 93,

230; and violence, 446. See

also

Islamization

Islam (Nakshibendi monthly), 226, 227, 228 Islamic

Conference Organization (OIC),

188,

190 Islamic Consultative Assembly (formerly Majlis),

99 Islamic Democratic Alliance (Pakistan), 130 Islamic Front party (Afghanistan), Islamic Jihad.

See Jihad,

Palestinians

Islamic:

499 in

Lebanon;

Index 656

157

Islamic Liberation Party (Egypt), Islamic Republican Partv,

Islamic Salvation Front (Algeria), 143, 507,

637

Islamization, 302, 307, 634, 638; in Egypt, 112,

112,

113,

112,

113,

in the

Sudan, 20,

132-41, 142, 148n.61,

115,

in

21,

123-32, 142, 147n.45,

115,

309, 315, 335n.20, 634;

642n.l9;

in Pakistan,

Turkey, 112

talism,

45n.20; and Egypt, 157, 162, 169,

170; rundamcntalist movements

in, 4,

25-

26; and Soviet Jews, 477, 478; and U.S., 71,

445; war also

of,

with Lebanon, 435, 478. See

Arab-Jewish conflict; occupied

ries, Israeli; Six

territo-

Dav War; Yom Kippur War

Defence Forces (IDF), 481

Israel

124,

346

630

452

Murli Manohar, 627, 629

Jubilee Year, 300, 351,

21, 25, 80, 437; and Christian fundamen-

Israel:

Josephus,

Falwell,

Ali,

Journal of Islamic Banking and Finance, 303

512

Isma'ili Shi'ites,

Jordan, -135, 316,

159-61, 163, 172

Mohammad

Quaid-i-Azam

335n.20 Jones, Bob, Jr.: on

Joshi,

175

Isma'il, Salah abu, 174,

Jihad Organization (Egypt),

Jinnah,

Pales-

441, 553

tinian,

159, 634; in Iran, 115-23;

Lebanon, 527, 548, 549;

Jihad, Islamic: in

95

364n.47

Judaism, 18, 68, 78, 80, 300 Judea. See occupied territories, Israeli July Revolution (Egypt),

155, 156, 157, 165,

170, 176, 183n.'l06

Jund al-Haqq (Soldiers of Truth), 453 jurisprudence, Islamic, 88, 91,

93-96, 98, 103,

105; and economics, 308, 313, 326 Jurist (in Islam). See

Mandate of the

Jurist

IttihadofSayyaf, 498

movement.

Izala

See Jama'atu Izalatul Bidia Wai-

kamatus Sunna

Kabir (1440-1518), 424n.l3

Kachin

tribe: in

Kach (Thus)

Burma, 379, 380, 404-5n.66

party, 85n.6, 442, 445, 449,

violence and,' 438, 462, 463, Jabotinsky, Vladimir,

481

Kahane, Rabbi Meir, 85n.6, 438, 462, 476,

208 al-Jama'a al-Islamiwa (Egypt), 160-64, 18081n.54

jahilivva (ignorance), 152, 158,

124,

Jamaat-i-Islami,

147n.38,

146n.31,

623,

Jama'atu Izalatul Bidia Waikamatus Sunna (Izala),

195 Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI), 185, 195

499

Jamiwat-ul-Ulama, 248

Jammu Kashmir

Liberation Front,

629

Muhammad Mazhar Jan,

211 Jana Sangh party (Hindu), 243-44, 261, 410, 411-12, 416, 417-23, 426n.48. See also Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Janata Dal party, 249, 250, 251,

Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna

(

420-21

JVP), 603, 608-9,

611,612,613,614,615-17 103-4

Jannati, Ayatollah, Jatika

Peramuna, 611

Jayawardene,

J.

R., 599, 603, 609, 610, 613,

615

Jehovah's Witnesses, 362n.l3 Jelen,

Ted, 353

77 Second Coming, 18, 32 Jewish Defense League (JDL), 477, 480, 481 Jibril, Abubakar, 186, 202n.62

Jerusalem Post, Jesus:

jihad,

448, 453, 460n.47, 513;

in

Afghanistan,

492-94, 497, 501, 503, 505;

in

Egypt,

153, 159, 162; and Hizbullah, 544, 551,

553;

on

in Nigeria,

185

Christians,

458n.l9. See

441-42; on Kach party

secular Jews,

also

Kalayan Singh, 251 See

karma

Kaplan, Cemalettin, 229

Kapur Singh, 274-75 528 Karen National Defense Organization, 377 Karen tribe: in Burma, 379, 404-5n.66 karma, 370-71, 425n,39 Karp Report (1981), 438 Kartar Singh, 267 Kashani, Abul Qasim, 515 Kashani, Emami, 96 Kashmir: Hindu-Muslim conflict in, 244, 248, 249, 627, 628, 629 Kasravi, Ahmad, 514, 515 Katouzivan, Naser, 90 Kaysaniwa, 453 Kelechi, Muhammad Aminu, 185 Kemalism, 216,224,641 Kennedy, James, 348 Khalef, Mavor Karim, 473 Karbala, 451, 452,

Jamilurrahman, Mawlawi, 505

Janan,

486, 489n.51; on Arabs, 485, 489-90n.60;

kamma.

629, 630

Jamiyvat-i Islami, 498,

453;

477-84, 485

Khalistan (Sikh homeland): 268, 269, 270, 274,

277, 622 Khalsa, 18,

267

Khamane'i, Sawid Ali: and Islamic government, 96, 97,

98',

Kharijites, 511,

99, 109n.55, 122

534n.2

Khashoggi, Adnan, 148-49n.62. 149n.66

Khatmiwa

Sufi order, 132,

138

Index 657

klmtrt\a (warrior),

Law Enforcement Ordinance (Pakistan), 125-26 Law of Return (Israel). 24, 76, 437

241

Khmer Rouge, 400-401n.l0 Khomeini. Ahmad Avarollah's i

Khomeini. Avatollah

son), 97, 98,

Ruhollah,

"9.

93.

525 102,

145n.8, 186, 193, 230, 306, 434, 441, 449,

451. 454. 513. 531. 532. 541, 633, 641;

and Hizbullah. 544. 545. 546; and Islamie government. 19. 24. 88. 89, 90. 91. 96.

98-99. 100. 102. 115. 116. 119. 120, 122, 520, 530, 533; and Islamic revolution, 16, 516, 522, 523. 524. 526; and Saddam Hus-

624-25, Supreme Jurist, 97, 98, 104, 105; and U.S., 21, 117-18, 121,51". 525.529. 537n.53; on violence. 520, 521, 522, 533. 536n.38; on women, 146n.26; writings of, sein,

118; and Salman Rushdie,

625;

as

514-15,519 Khorramabadi, Tahcn, 104 Khu'imiha.

Muhammad, 525

310, 311 Lebanon, 451. 455; civil war in, 52". 541, 542; and Iran, 444. 552; Md Palestinians, 543, lease financing: in Islamic banking,

548; and Syria, 542, 552; war of, with Is435, 4~8. See also Hizbullah; Maron-

rael,

fundamentalism: in Lebanon 1846-1923), 375, 398, 403n.36 Leibowirz, Veshavahu, 86n.20 Levinger. Rabbi Moshe, 472, 476 Lewis, Bernard, 448, 640 Liberal Partv (Egypt), 174, 176 liberation theology, 298. 345, 430 libertarian ideology, 291, 34" Shi'ite

ites;

Ledi Savadaw

|

Liberty University. See FalwelL, Jerrv See also Qaddati,

Libva,

1

Likud

party, 71, 77, 82,

12

Muammar

473, 474; and Labor

Partv. "6. "8,

83 Burma, 380 Longowal. Harchand Singh, 275, 276, 277 Luang Phy, 394

Khunnag, 453

literacy: in

Khuzistan, 524, 525

kibbutz movement, 474

Kidusb Hashem, 479, 480

Lubavitch, 85n.~

King James

Lucknow Lukman,

Bible. 33,

45n.25

Kippenberg, Hans G.. 451 Kiryat Arba settlement, 472,

483

239

Pact (1916),

Alhaji Rilwanu,

190

Luther. Martin, 332

Kin at Shmone, 479 Kisakiirek.

Kishore,

Neap

Maariv

FaziL 220, 221

(Israeli daily),

77

McFariane, Robert, 530

Madhu, 248

459n.36

Kittivuddho. See Kittiwuttho. Phra

Machiavelli,

Kittiwuttho, Phra, 392, 393, 399, 408n.l25

Machpela. See Cave of the Patriarchs, 472

Knesset

(Israel's

parliament), "0. 82. 84. 463.

466, 483; elections

for,

71, 75,

77

Mclntirc. Carl, 345

madrasa (religious school):

in

Afghanistan, 501

Kook, Rabbi Abraham Itzhak Hacohen, 300, 470 Kook, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda, 69, 470 Kotku, Mehmed Zahid (1897-1980), 221,

Mahabharata, 234, 253

222-23, 224, 225, 226, 227, 229 Kshatriyas (warrior caste), 412 Kuknt Pramoj, 395, 396 Kurdish rebellion (1925), 206, 218 Kurdistan, 524 Kurds, 2, 212

Mahavamsa, 447, 452, 590, 600, 601, 608, 610 Mahdi (Islamic messiah), 16, 18, 443, 447, 449,

Kuwait, 316, 437, 531; invasion

Maha Bodhi Society, 592 Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP), 596, 597, 598,601,609,612,613,616

451,491,513,545

197-98 Abd, 132, 133,

Maitatsine movement, 16, 194,

444, 623

of,

Mafia: and Kahane, 481

al-Majid, Sadiq

Abd

Allah

134,

138

Labor Party (Egypt), 176, 639 Labor Party (Israel), 71, 82; and Likud, 76, 78, 83; and religious parties, 83, 84 Lagos, 193 laissez-faire,

390. See

also

100, 102,

116, 120, 515; authority of, 93, 94,

and law-making. 91, 103, Malalasekera, G. P., 618n.9 Malaviya,

capitalism

Lanka Bauddha Mandalaya, 595 Lanka Eksath Bhikkhu Mandalava (LEBM), 592-

1

95-97;

19-20

Madan Mohan, 239-40 322-24

Malaysia, 319, 320,

Malwai, Bona, 148n.61

Hindu, 272; Indian, 247; Jewish, 24, 7475, 78, 464; Pakistani, 25; Roman, 100-

Mandala Commission (India), 252 Mandate of the Jurist, 24, 89, 91, 92, 94, 98, 99, 102, 107-8n.27, 115; authority of, 96, 97, 101, 103, 104, 105, 524

101; Sikh, 270, 271-72. See

Mann, K.

93,596,618n.l9 Laos: Marxism in, 400-401n.l0 law:

Majlis (Iranian parliament), 90, 99,

ment:

in Islam; Shari'a;

"Who

also

Is a

punish-

Jew?" law

S.,

257

Mansur, Hasan

Ali,

515, 518

Index 658

Maoism: and Afghan

resistance,

Mongkut, Prince, 385-86, 387, 391, 397, 398 monks, Buddhist, 403n.36, 408n.ll4, 433; and

500

Mapplethorpe, Robert, 42

372-

mavjiT al-taqlid ("source of imitation"), authority

economics, 291, 389; ordination

of,

90-92, 94, 100, 449, 516; and Khomeini, 99, 625 Maronitcs, 431, 442, 540, 541, 544, 545 martyrdom, 625; and Hizbullah, 546-47, 54849, 550; Shi'ite, 453, 512, 519 Marx, Karl, 299 Marxism, 1, 289, 296-97, 304, 415, 430; in Af-

73, 385, 390; and politics, 375,

376-79,

of,

89,

ghanistan, 494, 496, 497, 500; in Algeria,

637; and Buddhism, 377, 378, 384; and Christian economics, 350; and evangelicalism, 345,

363-64n.42;

in Iran,

434, 518,

519; and Islamic fundamentalism, 448, 491; in

Laos, 400-401n.l0; in Turkey,

219

381, 382-83, 384, 386, 392, 399, 450,

591-93, 596, 599, 602, 603; and yiolence, 611-12, 614-17. See also United Front of

Monks Montazeri, Hosscin Ali, 90, 91, 98, 122, 146n.24, I51n.87, 526, 527, 531

Moody, Dwight, 30 Mookerjee, Svma Prasad, 243 Moore, Clement Henry, 316 Moral Majority, 32, 41, 60, 63, 64, 344, 346, 359, 362n.l9, 365n.60, 632; and economics, 342, 355, 357, 635 462, 467

Mashur, Mustafa, 175

Mormons:

Masud, Ahmed Shah, 495, 500, 502-3, 504 Mateer, Robert, 346, 347, 359, 362n.l5 Maududi, Sayyid Abul-A'la, 113-14, 124, 125,

Motahari, Mortaza, 108-9n.50, 524

157, 193; influence

of, in

Afghanistan, 494;

influence of, in Egypt, 156, 161; and Islamic

Mavbima Surakime Vyaparaya (MSV), 610-13,

639 mudaraba. Islamic economic doctrine

2

Medina, 320, 638 meditation, Buddhist: and political moyements,

zakat, 320,

304, 638; on

321

Muhammadu Marwa

376, 393, 395 Mecnakshipuram Affair, 246 Mcnemen Incident (1930), 206 MerkazHarav, 86n.l4, 470 'Ali,

308,

Mudarris, Sayyid Hasan, 515

Muhammad, Malam Ture, 197 Muhammad, the Prophet, 209, 214,

Mecca, 115,638

Mcshkini, Ayatullah

of,

Mughal empire, 209 Mughnivya, 'Imad, 543

616 1,

Motherland Party (Turkey), 206, 226

Mubarak, Husni, 112, 160, 162, 164, 172, 175,

309-10,312,314

economics, 303-4, 306

Mearsheimcr, John,

in Jerusalem, 76,

(Maitatsine). See Maitatsine

movement Mujaddidi, Sebghatullah, 499

mujaddidism, 211, 213 Mujahidin (Afghanistan), 491-92, 493, 500,

98, 104, 109n.53

messianism, 18, 447, 622, 626; in Islam, 448,

501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507

449, 450, 451, 460n.52, 513, 514, 545;

Mujahidin-i Khalq (Iran), 516-20, 523, 524,

and Jewish fundamentalism, 69, 71, 72, 73, 79, 84, 448-49, 453, 460n.51, 464, 470,

mujtahid, 512

475-76, 632. Methodist church:

See also

in

Mahdi

Mukhcrjec,

Northern Ireland, 55

Miahmarot Hatzniut (Chastity Guards), 465 religious,

429, 431, 436, 446, 447,

453, 455-56, 464, 465, 639. See

also vio-

lence, religious

157-58, 167 millenarianism: Buddhist, 374, 376, 398, 450; Christian, 457n.3, 461n.61; and fundamen17, 447, 450, 456, 626; in Islam,

448, 449-50;

411

238

Murphy, Richard, 530 Mursel, Safa, 219 Musa, Muhammad Abd al-Halim, 163 Musaddiq, Muhammad, 515, 529 al-Musawi, Sayyid Abbas, 527, 530, 543, 545, 546, 547 musbaraka, Islamic economic doctrine of, 308, 309,312 Muslim Brotherhood, 112, 507; in Egypt, 19, 20, 22, 152, 154-55, 156-58, 161, 162, 164-78, 495, 505-6, 514, 518, 639; in Kuwait, 505; in the Sudan, 133, 134-35, '

Military Technical College organization (Egypt),

talism,

S. P.,

Muller, Max,

Mettananda, L. H., 596, 618n.9 militancy,

526,530,531,533,534

in

Sikhism, 18, 258, 267,

268-69, 450, 626, 628, 629 missionaries. Christian: and Buddhists, 379,

5n.66, 431; in India, 238-39, 414;

404in Is-

441-42, 467; in Sri Lanka, 368, 590, 594-95; in Turkey, 211 rael,

Mitchell, Richard, 169

Mit Ghamr Sayings Bank, 313, 336n.46

137, 139, 141

Muslim League, 259 Muslim Youth movement (Afghanistan), 495, 498 Muslim Youth organization (Egypt), 179n.l9 Muslims: in India, 236, 244, 247-48, 622, 627,

Index 659

629;

21;

in Israel.

Nigeria. 22.

in

191, 192, 200; in Pakistan, 20; in

188-89.

Sn Lanka.

440. 609

Burma

See

464

24 New Christian Right. 24. 59-65. 344. 345-48, N'euhaus, Richard John.

Mustafa. Shukn. 158-59, 161, I80n.37

Mvanmar.

Nehru, 22, 414, 416. 417, 420-21 Neturei Karta (Guardians of the City),

632; and economics, 344. 360; and public

mvth: and messianism, 451-52; and militancy, 44". 448

policv,

Ne Win.

356-57, 358-59

378- "9, 380, 381, 382,

General. 369,

383, 388

New Nabhis, 79

NACOMVC).

See

National Council of Muslim

1

Nigeria,

Nagpur Resolution. 420 Akmed An. 638 Nairn, Tom, 622

Nigeria

Na]ibullah, President (Afghanistan),

504

Niger Republic, 189 Nirankari group, 2 "2 -73, 284n.4~

Nakash. William. 80

Nakshibendi Nasir,

Sufi order, 20,

nirvana, 370, 371, 372, 394; and Buddhist nationalism, 376, 377, 391

Muhammad Hamid Sewed

204-31, 641

420

P.,

Abul, 176

Yali Reza,

National Council of Churches, 38 National Council of Muslim Youth Organization

iNACOMYOi: National

Endowment

in

NEA), 42

i

National Islamic Front (Sudan), 139, 140, 144,

633-34

Year) celebration: in Iran, 121

L',

Prime Minister (Egypt), 155, 170

Nurcu sect, 218- 19, 220, 229, 230 Nun. Fazlullah, 515 Nursi, Bediiizzaman, Said, 213, 218, 219,

nationalism, 14, 15, 20, 21, 23,

Afghanistan.

i

377-78, 382,603 Numayri, 20, 112, 132, 133-39, 148n.61, 638; and Khashoggi, 148-49n 62, 149n.66; and Nu.

al-Nuc|rashi,

National Front partv (Iran), 520 150n. 74,

Nowniz New

U.S., 118, 136, 149n.70

Nigeria, 190, 196, 199

for the Arts

Gholam Mohammad, 495 Nobel Peace Prize, 382 North, Gary. 348, 349, 355, 359 Niva/i.

305 Nasser, Abdel, 155. 15" 164-65. 166, 174, 336n.46, 639; and Muslim Brotherruxxl 168-69, 172 Nasr,

302

Nienhaus, Yolkcr, 3 7

Na'im,

J.

in,

184-85. 191; fundamentalist movements in. 16. 22, 23, 25-26; Islam in, 13, 19, 20, 641. .Sir also tajdid movement: in

Youth Organization

Naravan,

Zealand: Islamic banking

nibbana. See nirvana

495.

Arab.

621-24. 641; 133. 433.

623;

Buddhist. 368, 375, 376-78, 388, 394,

Occupation, 90, 94 occupied

territories, Israeli, 21, 69, 71, 72, 73,

590. 591, 593. 595, 600, 601, 604-6, 607,

84. 86n.ll, 483, 632. See also

610-11, 633; Catholic, 50; in Egypt, 153, 154-55; Hindu, 21, 242, 243, 250, 297,

settlers

410, 411, 416, 417, 418, 419, 629, 631; Iran,

121;

69-70, in

Irish,

in

51, 54, 56, 58; Jewish.

75, 82, 84. 478. 479; Tamil, 605;

Turkey, 224. See

also

nationalization of industry:

Burma, 380;

oil: in Iran,

m;

Palestinians;

in

515, 532; and Islamic banking, 311;

Hcnrv

Olcott, Colonel

589, 590

Steele,

Onyeama,

Alhaji Suleiman, Star,

245, 278

Operation Rescue, 32, 430, 439-40, 442, 450,

National Legal Foundation, 62

452, 455, 623, 625. See U.S.

(FLN)

(Algeria), 143.

637 National Order Party (Turkey), 222 National Party (Egypt), 174 National Party of Nigeria (NPN), National

186-87

Peacekeeping Committee

(Thailand),

397 National Religious Party

(Israel), 72, 73, 76,

84

National Republican Convention (Nigeria), 190 National Salvation

Part}'

(Turkey), 218, 222,

National Unity Party (Burma), 382 Nazis: haredim on,

467

226

59

185

National Liberation Front (Afghanistan), 499 National Liberation Front

Strip,

and the Sudan, 141 Ojukwu, Colonel, 185

Operation Blue

Egypt, 156 National League for Democracy (Burma), 384

Gaza

West Bank

O'Neill, Terence, 52, 54, 55, 58,

Eelam; Khalistan in

229

in

also

abortion: in

Orange Order, 55 Orientalism, 238 Orkah, Major Gideon, 1 89 Ottama, U, 375, 376, 378, 383

Ottoman Empire, 89, 101, 207, 209, 212, 215, 216,310,452,622,641 O ve Ben, 220 525 Oxford Conference, 346, 362n.l7 Oveisi, Ghulam-Ali,

Oz, Amos, 79 Ozal, Turgut, 206, 219, 226, Ozel, Ismet, 225

227

Index 660

Poujadism, 418

paganism: in Egvpt, 22

Muhammad

Pahlavi,

Reza (shah of

21,

Iran),

pragmatism:

117, 121, 444, 516, 517, 520, 521, 525 Pahlavi regime,

88-89, 103, 116 53-55, 57-59, 632

Pakistan:

356

and Afghanistan, 499, 502, 503, 504, fundamentalist move1 1 in,

;

25-26;

4,

Islamic

banking

in,

307, 309, 310, 312, 314, 317; Islamic eco-

nomics

298, 302, 330; Islam

in,

in,

124,

127; and U.S., 118, 130, 508, 630; war

with India, 21, 242, 629; zakat 320, 321-24, 639. See

in,

of,

319,

also Islamization: in

Pakistan; Shan'a: in Pakistan; Sunni funda-

629 396 Liberation Organization (PLO), 435,

Pakistan People's Party, 128, 130, 146n.31,

Shamma

Palestine

Party (Thailand),

443, 486, 518, 526. See

also Palestinians

and Gush Emunim, 438, 452; and Hizbullah, 552-53; and Lebanon, 541,

Palestinians:

543, 548;

occupied

in

628, 632; relations

of,

Lanka), 603,

65n.l,

349,

609 351,

361n.7 Pribun Songkhram, 407n.l06

Pndi Phanomyong, 407n,106 and Islamic banking, 308,

profit- and-loss sharing:

309, 311, 312, 313-14, 315, 316 prophecy, 32, 45n.20

Hindu economics,

protectionism, economic: and

"Protestant Buddhism," Protestantism:

590

America,

in

16,

279;

73, 82; in

263, 265, 266, 267, 270,

also

26n.l;

in

Punjab, 234, 244, 249, 259, 263-64, 274, 275,

with

Israel,

22,

Northern Ireland, 21, 50-59, 632 punishment: in Islam, 126, 136, 141, 149n.67, 178, 454, 513, 637. See also hudud

483, 622,

as Sikh state, 20, 23,

Puritans, 16, 28,

260, 261, 262,

628-29 36-38, 43-44

Pvidawtha (Buddhist welfare

Intifada

state),

377

367

Muammar,

pantheism: in Turkev, 212, 215

Qaddafi,

Panthic Committee, 269, 283n.32

Qadiriyya

Parliament of World Religions, 238

Qarmatians, 512

487n.l4 Pashtuns: and Afghan resistance, 495, 498, 499, 506, 509n.ll Paul, Ron, 359 Paul, St., 30 People for the American Way: and textbooks, 64

Qatar,

Pashkevib, 468,

People's

(Sri

45n.20,

prcmillennialism,

territories,

West Bank, 471, 473, 475, 477, 484. See Pali language,

Premadasa, Prime Minister

297-98, 299

mentalism: in Pakistan

Palang

121,

37-38, 43, 46n.35, 59, 61,

prayer, school, 32,

53

506, 507-8, 509n.

ments

in Islam,

Prawase Wasi, 396

Paislev, Ian, 18, 50, Paisley, Kyle,

Buddhism, 390;

in

123,434,527,528-29,532

Democratic

of

Party

Afghanistan

(PDPA),496

Qeshm

Island,

in Afghanistan,

501,

121

Quakers, 37

448 107-8n.27 91, 92, 102-3, 472; and Afghan

quietism: in Shi'ism,

Qumi,

Azari, 98,

sistance,

494, 503;

bullah,

542;

in

in

re-

Egypt, 161; and Hiz-

India,

247; and Islamic

302, 303, 305; and Nakshibendi, 230;

396

Phutthathat Phikkhu, 391, 392, 393, 399 Pierard, Richard,

316,437 (communal group): 503, 509n.l4

banking, 314, 315; and Islamic economics,

265

Phothirak, Phra, 395,

112, 141, 503

195

aaxvni

Qur'an, 19,

Shimon, 82, 83, 84 perestroika, 444, 506 Peres,

Pettigrew, Joyce,

sect,

in

Nigeria, 195, 196; and politics, 634, 638; in

Turkev, 219, 220

357

Qutb, Sawid

American Protestant, 29-32, 35 Pilgrims: in U.S., 23 piety:

(1906-66), 156-57, 303-4, 494

159-60,

162,' 175, 186, 208,

Pinchas, 449, 460n.51

pinvenas (monastic colleges), 594

Rabbani, Burhanuddin, 495, 498, 505

PLO.

Rabin, Irzhak, 471, 489n.58

See Palestine Liberation Organization

Pol Pot, 378,

400-401n.l0

population growth:

in India,

valuta,

415, 423;

in Iran,

121 populism, 53, 60, 297, 355, 410, 420, 421 pornography, 25, 30, 36, 41, 46n.35 Porush,

Radhakrishnan, Sarvapalli, 238

Akbar Hashemi, 90, 96, 98, 104, 122-23, 145n.I3, 524, 532, 631; on hu-

Rafsanjani, Ali

man

Menachem, 466

postmillennialism, 45n.20,

211

racism, 85n.6

349

rights,

146n.24, 633; on Islamic eco-

nomics, 329-30; and Rushdie, 434, 642n.9

Index 661

rabit.

Roman

26". 270, 271

Catholic church. Set Catholic church

343-44

Rose. Susan.

Rahman. Fazlur: on zakat, 319. 322 al- Rahman. Uniar Abd. 161. 163. 164

Ro\. Ra|a

Rahula. Ualpola. 592. 618n.5

Ruhani. Hassan. 121.444

Ra|. British: in India. 234. 235. 256. 23S. 414.

Ruqavaq.

415. 493;

590-91

Lanka.

in Sri

Ra|, Permit. 410. 41".

Abu. 166-6". 175

and Khomeini. 98. 118, 531, 624. 642n.9 Rushdoonv. Rousas, 348-49 Russia: and Turkey, 213. 214. 228

421

526

Rajavi, Mas'ud,

Salih

Rushdie, Salman. 20. 122. 129. 434. 45"n .12;

240

Raj. Lala Lajpat.

Ram Mohun. 414

Rama. 246. 453

Rutherford

Institute.

42

Ramakrishna mission. 414

Ramavana, 234. 253 Rao.

P.

V.

Sabbatarianism. 5"

Narasimha. 251

1". 22. Rashtriva Swavamsevak Sangh RSS 240. 241. 242-43. 244. 245. 249. 250. 251-53. 41 1.416. 418. 622. 623. 627 Ratchawaramuni. Set Thcpw ethi, Phra Razmara. General Ali. 515 Reagan. Ronald. 3~-38. 61. 358; and Iran. 529. .

^

530, 531

Anwar. 112, 159, 160. 161. 162, 163. 164-65. 166. 454. 462; and Muslim Broth _ :. erhood, 158. 16" 168, 169-70, 1"1

Sadat.

Muhammad

299, 348. 351;

in Islam.

299, 305. 318-25,

330; and Judaism. 300; and liberation the-

Nawab, 514. 515 512

Safavids,

Saidov, Abdullah. 504.

salafiwa

357—58, 359 Religious Roundtable. 32. 60, 632 Republican Brothers Sudan 137, 638 Republican Party (Irani. 95. 526

Salafiyyin,

Reichley, James, 343. 355.

Parry

(U.S.):

and

New

195

184 Buddhism. 370-71, 375, 399, and

wealth, 372, 374,

390 Israeli

Hindu, 245. 41

1.

Burma. 378-79, 383. 384. 398;

589-90, 600

397. See

492

in

Sri

614;

in In-

USSR,

in

Lanka. 592. 594. 602. 607, 608. 610, 612. 8", 392, 396. in Thailand. 385. 386

414, 416; and eco-

242-43 Santi

Asoke

monks, Buddhist

also

sect.

395. 396, 399

Sanputra, 395

Revolutionary' Guards (Irani,

Sant Thanarat, 389

526

639 of Muslim warfare):

Sarvodaya movement,

riba (interest!, 194, 314, ribat (pattern stan,

13,

Samaria. See occupied territories,

revivalism. Islamic: in Nigeria. 16. 186; in

rice,

1

sanqha (order of Buddhist monks), 368. 371;

32

nomics, 297, 298. 417. 418, 422-23; dia,

152, 173

Samaj, Brahmo, 254n.5

revivalism, Buddhist: in Sri Lanka.

revivalism,

i,

153

salvation: in

Christian

Republic of Ireland, 20 of,

traditional

Saleh, Ibrahim,

358-59,632

Book

I

salat (prayer),

|,

i

Re\elation,

506

Salariwa school, 219

298

Right, 61,

96-97

Sari, Lotfollah.

Reformation, Protestant, 332

Republican

Baqir (1931-80), 90, 91,

303-4 Safavi,

and Christianity.

181-82n "4

173, 18 In 5".

348-

49, 351.642n.20 redistribution, economic. 29";

300

Sacred Law (Islamic). Set Shari'a

al-Sadr,

reconstruetionism. Christian, 4~n.4~, 344,

ology-,

Sabbatical Year.

in

Afghani-

501

Verses,

624. See

production

405n.69;

Satanic

in

of:

in

Burma, 388, 404n.56,

Thailand,

387

446 Yehuda. 482. 483

Richardson, Lewis

391-92

The. 20, 434. 455. 457n.l2, 531, also

Rushdie, Salman

Satmar, Rabbi of, 464

Saudi Arabia, 451, 639; and Afghanistan, 445,

Rida, Rashid, 154

505, 506, 507; and Egypt, 156; funding by, of Islamic movements, 445, 623; and Iran, 444; Islamic law in, 1 1 1. 1 14, 19, 639; and

Rig Veda. 240

the Sudan, 141. Sec also Shi'itc fundamental-

Richter,

F.,

Robertson, Pat, 60, 61, 349; presidential campaign of, 63-65, 359

Robison, James, 60

Roe

v.

Wade, 36, 41-42, 48-49n.64, 356, 440,

452

1

ism: in Saudi Arabia

SAVAK,

522, 524

Savarkar, Vinayak

Damodar, 240, 241 in Burma, 374,

Sava San rebellion (1930-32):

376

1

Index 662

Sayyaf: and GulfWar,

Shas parw, 70-71, 75, 76, 80,

505

SchaefFer, Francis,

36

Scofield, C.

E.

Shi'ism,

scripture,

290;

17,

Buddhist, 378, 601, 603;

349-50, 351, 450;

Christian, 344,

Islamic,

304, 325, 326; Sikh, 258, 267, 278, 280

Second Coming, 349 Second Temple, destruction

of,

464 432-37, 442

sectarianism: and nation building, secular

humanism, 22, 34, 60, 64, 356;

as a reli-

455-56 216, 226

shrines, building of: Buddhist, 297,

F.

S.,

591

R.,

591

Sephardic Jews, 484; and

24

Israeli politics,

71, 80,

87n.25

Sikhs, 236, 242, 244, 413, 622, 627. See also

Damdami

Serrano, Andres, 42 settlements, Jewish. See

Gaza

territories, Israeli;

West Bank

See

sin,

Gurdwara

newspaper),

fundamentalist

Muhammad

Reza

also

Mavor Bassam, 473 government

82-83, 84,

of,

Burma, 379, 380, 404-5n.66

Shari'a (Islamic law),

16,

513, 514, 638, 639;

19, 25, 89, 91, in

111,

Afghanistan, 493, in

Egypt, 160, 161, 166, 167; and Hizbullah, in India,

government, 96,

247, 248; and

102,

103,

104,

105, 110-12, 119, 120, 636, 639, 641; and

Muslim Brotherhood, 176-77, 178; in Nigeria, 22, 191-94, 195, 200; in Pakistan, 124, 130-31, 630; in the Sudan, 133, 13941;

in

Turkev, 213; and the West, 111,1 13,

118-19. See in

punishment:

494, 517, 519

Nawaz, 123, 129, 130, 132, 144, 508,

629, 630 Sharif-Imami,

Six

Day War

Abd

Allah,

Ja'far,

Sharon, Ariel, 84

130-31, 521, 522

157-58, 159-60, 167

(1967), 19, 110, 157, 470, 471,

472, 632;

effect of,

on

Islam,

111,

112;

and Gush Emunim, 469-70; and messianism,

69

Sivam Nikava, 592, 596, 611,616 SLORC. See State Law and Order Restoration Council Beautiful (Schumacher), 367 Adam, 225-26, 292, 363-64n.42 Smith, W. C, 212

Small

Is

Smith,

Social

Democratic Partv (Egypt), 176

Social Democratic Partv (Nigeria), 190

Social Gospel, 30, 31;

Islam

Shari'ati, 'Ali,

Sharif,

also Islamization;

Ahmad, 208, 209, 210

Siriwa, Salih

498, 499, 508; and economics, 305, 314;

446-47, 549, 550;

politics

604, 605 al-Sirhindi,

tribe: in

Islamic

monks, Buddhist: and

Sinhalese language, 435, 596, 597, 598, 601,

489n.58 Shan

Singh, Vishvanath Pranab, 249, 250, 252, 418 Sinhalese Buddhists: in Sri Lanka, 627, 628. See

shah of Iran. See Pahlavi,

Yitzak:

471,

Sinhala Bala Mandalava, 61

Shah Bano, 247, 248

Shamir,

of, 157, 170, 171,

Singh, Tara, 23

(Egyptian

164, 176, 177, 183n.l06

Shak'a,

occupation

476

Parandhak

Committee al-Sba'b

notions of, 20, 25, 29-31, 42

Sinai: Israeli

Shiromani

Taksal; Punjab: as Sikh state; vio-

lence, religious: Sikh

Strip, settlers in; oc-

"700 Club," 63

SGPC.

372-73

503 Siam. See Thailand, Buddhism in; Thai people Sider, Ron, 349, 350, 351, 363n.42 Sikhism, 265-66, 267, 300

slntra (consultation),

separation of church and state, 15, 20,

cupied

Committee

Gurdwara Parandhak (SGPC), 259, 262

Shiromani

Scnanavake, D.

monk),

Shiromani Akali Dal. See Akali Dal

secularization, 51, 430; in Egypt, 153; in Turkey,

Senanavakc,

430, 431, 437, 455, Afghanistan,

in

372, 373

and fundamentalism, 57, 430-31,

secularism:

523;

shin-byu (ordination of novice Buddhist

61-62

gion, 38,

See also

440-41, 497-98; in Bahrain, 444, 527-28; in Iran, 433, 511-34; in Iraq, 443, 444; in Lebanon, 431, 434, 435, 437, 444, 447-48, 462, 527, 539, 540-42, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547-48, 551-54; in Saudi Arabia, 436, 528; in Svria, 435; in Turkev, 230 Shilo, Yigal, 468 460n.44,

323

448, 511-12, 513.

fundamentalism; Twelver Shi'ism

fundamentalism,

Shi'itc

Scots Protestants, 16, 51 Scott, James, 320, 321,

101,

2,

Shi'ite

45n.25

J.,

250

Shekar, Chandra,

620 E, 367, 379

Schalk, Peter, 612, 613,

Schumacher,

83-84

Shcchan, William, 29

Schach, Rabbi Eliezcr, 83, 84

and Buddhism, 391, 392

socialism: Buddhist, 297, 367, 369, 370,

373-

383-84, 391, 400-401n.l0; and economics, 298, 304, 329, 331-32, 350; in 82,

Egypt, 165, 167; Fabian, 416; Gandhian,

426n.48

5

Index 663

54°

Social Nationalist Party (Syria), 548.

Sunthorn Kongsompong, 409n.l51

Supreme Court, I' S. See LJ.S Supreme Court Supreme Judiciary Council (Irani. 99 Supreme Military Council (Nigeria), 187-88 Suu Kyi, Aung San See Aung San Suu Kyi swadeshi (indigenous): Gandhi on. 415. 419, 420

Society of Muslims (Egypt), 158-59. 167

sohbet.lW Sojourners (evangelical magazine

Sokoto

363n.39

i.

185 69—70, "2

caliphate. 16,

Solomon,

Rati.

George. 480

Sorel.

Svvamv. Dr. Suhramanian. 411. 418. 419. 420.

Soulburv Constitution. 593

economic agenda

source of imitation. See niaiya' al-taqlid

Swatantra

Soviet L'nion: collapse ot.

in,

1. 2. 7,

491

svvav

508. 623; and

Egypt. 156. 164; and Iran, 443; war of, in Afghanistan. 491. 492. 49". 499. 503. 504 space, sacred, 252.

Spiro. Melford Sri

F...

amscvaks

Sword of 345 Syria,

450-51. 452. 453. 4~2 373. 374

Muslims

440. 609. See

in,

and

also

421. 422

410.

i.

41".

420.

servants"

""sell

241

,

Lord (fundamentalist publication).

455; and Hi/bullah. 548-49; and 212. See

in.

monks. Bud-

politics; Tamils: conflict of.

the

Israel,

471; and Lebanon. 542. 552; Nakshibcndi

Lanka. 432. 433. 446. 62"; and India. 442.

dhist;

of,

Hindu

(

425n.32

Southern Baptist Convention. 361n.7

South Yemen: Islamic movements

party

fundamentalism:

also Shi'ite

in

Syria

System of Correlation of Man and His Environment.

with

378

The.

Sinhalese Buddhists

Sri

Lanka Deshapremi I'eramuna. 611 Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), 596, 601-3,

Sri

Lanka Maha Sangha Sahha iSLMSSi. 596.

Sri

604. 606, 609. 61

L

612. 613. 616

599 Sri Ramajanmabhumi Mukti Srivivas, M. N., 412 Stark, C..S..S

,

Law

State

Mahmud Muhammad.

Taha.

13". 138

Tahir, Ibrahim. 185. 186

Tahmasbi, Rhalil. 5 tajdid

movement:

1

in

186—87, 194.

Nigeria. 20.

199-200.641 Vajna,

24"

Tajikistan. 50";

and Afghan resistance. 499. 506.

509n.6

531

Takbalizadeh, Husain, 522

Order

and

Restoration

Council

449; in Afghanistan. 50"; Egypt, 15"-64. 1"2.639'

takfir organizations,

(Burma), 381-82, 384, 405n.83 Stormont, Northern Ireland parliament

in,

52,

Tamik

53, 54, 58

434. 435. 440. 442 -43, 628; conflict

with

Sinhalese

Buddhists.

450.

in

of,

597-99,

civil war in, movements in, 25-26, 491. 513. 633; and U.S. 118.

600, 603, 605-11, 612, 613. 614. 615. 616,628.633 Tamil Tigers, 606

136, 149n.70. See also Islamization: in the

Tamil United Liberation front (TULF), 603,

Sudan, the, 132, 141, 451, 623, 631; 133, 134, 150n.74; Islamic 4,

Sudanese People's Sufism. 211;

in

605. 606

Sudan Liberation Army, 139

Sudan; Shan'a:

in

the

Afghanistan, 501;

in

the Sudan,

206-7, 227, 230 391, 392, 396

132; in Turkey,

Sulak Sivaraksa,

Malam

Suleiman,

504

Tana'v. Shahnawaz,

Tantawi,

Muhammad Saw id,

315

Tanzimat reform (Turkey). 213, 215 taqiwa (concealment), 447

Ibrahim, 193

Tara Singh, 259, 260

Sulcvmanci, 229

Tariqa group, 195

Ahmed

213 Sullivan, William, 523, 524 Sumangala, 589 Summet Singh, 258

Tavvhid

Sunder Singh, 266-67

tclcvangclism: in U.S., 32, 60,

Sulevmanivc,

of,

movement Lebanon i

|,

441, 542

Tawney, R. H., 332 taxes:

in

Islamic economics. 299, 315, 639. See

also zakat

360

500. 507. 508. 630;

in Iraq.

169-70, 171, 181-82n.74 Temple Mount, 438, 452-53, 475, 476 Temple of the Tooth, 603, 615, 616 Ten Commandments: and public display, 37, 44 Tennessee Temple University. 40, 345

443;

in Paki-

Territories, the. See occupied territories, Israeli

304

Sunna,

19. 195. 302,

Sunni

fundamentalism,

al-Tclmsani, 165, 166. 167. 168,

430,

460n.47, 512, 513, 553;

431, in

441,

448,

Afghanistan,

433, 435, 440-41, 444, 445, 448, 449-50,

453-54. 492, 494, 495-97, 498, 499in

in Iran, 441; Lebanon, 540, 541, 542;

stan, 20, 124, 125, 127, 128; in bia,

436;

in

Turkey, 230

Saudi Ara-

172, 173, 175, 181n.69,

terrorism,

Arab.

terrorism

See

violence,

religious:

Arab

Index 664

Ncqcd Terror (TNT): and Kahane, 482 290 Thailand, Buddhism in, 297, 385-87

Ulster Defence Association, 55

Thai people, 398, 406n.89

Uludag, Siilevman, 315

Thammakai movement, 393-95, 399 Thammayut order of monks, 386, 387 Thant, U, 379 Thapar, Romila, 237

Umayyad Umayyad

Terror

Ulster Loyalist Association, 55

Tcrtullian,

Ulster Volunteer Force, 53

umma 102-

community of Muslims), 121,

(universal in

Afghanistan, 499, 503;

geria, 184, 187,

Ummah

108n.50

513

partv (Iran), 534n.2

327, 623;

theocracy, Islamic: in Iran, 88, 92, 93, 97, 5,

caliphate,

unionism:

Thepwethi, Phra, 394-95, 396

Unionist Party (Egypt), 173, 174

Theravada Buddhism, principles of, 367-68, 370,

Unionist Party (Ulster), 53, 54, 55,

Northern Ireland, 53-56, 58

617 untouchables. See caste system

and Christian economics, 297, 348, 351; and Judaism, 300 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 105

Upadhyaya, Dcendayal, 243, 289, 418, 419 Urdu language, significance of. 123 U.S. Constitution, 14, 21, 35, 37, 43;

Toldot Aharon, 464

cess

Clause,

599

ghanistan, 502, 503, 504, 507; and Egypt,

True Path Party (Turkey), 219

156,

Tudeh

Iran, 2, 121,

516

Tunahan, Siilevman Hilmi, 229

movements 133,

in,

135,

137,

139,

movements

22,

in,

Russia, 214, 228; and the West,

(Mahdi), 18. See

528, 531; and

149n.70; and

136,

U.S.

Supreme Court, 62, 440; on abortion,

MaM\;

Twel-

ality,

41; on religious freedom, 40, 41, 43,

47n.46, 49n.74, 49n.76; on school prayer, v.

Wade 315

utopianism, 295, 376 Uzbekistan, 507; and Afghan resistance, 498

ver Shi'ism

Twelver Shi'ism, 116, 122, 446, 511, 512, 516,

Vadamarachchi Operation, 608

534n,3

Vajiranana, Prince. See Wachiravan, Prince

'Ubavd, Shaykh 'Abd al-Karim, 549 ulama, 430;

in

Vajpayee, Atal Behari, 244, 418,

Afghanistan, 434, 435, 492, 493,

494-95, 496, 498, 499, 500, 503; Egypt, 153, 639; in India, 247, 248;

in

in Iran,

88, 102, 103, 107n.8, 115, 434, 516; in Nigeria, 186, 189, 190, 193,

key,

195-96;

in

Tur-

216

in, 13, 16,

Vanguard movement (Northern

18,21,25-26

419 Ireland),

van Leer Foundation, 489-90n.60 varna. See caste system

637 Mandate of the

veiling: in Algeria, 154, relayat-c-faqib. See

601 VHP. See Vishwa Hindu Parishad Vidvalankara Pirivena, 592 Vesak

Ulster (Northern Ireland), 20, 50, 56; Protestants

36,

42; on education, 47n.54; on homosexu-

usury, doctrines against, 296, 300, also

Israel,

Thailand, 388

43. See also Roe

shibendi Sufi order

Turkmenistan, 507

Imam

Iraq,

630; and the Sudan,

153. See also Islamization: in Turkey; Nak-

Twelfth

443, 516, 518, 525, 526, 529,

Khalq, 518-19; and Pakistan, 130, 508,

141,

307, 309, 314-15, 316-17, 337n.59;

25-26; and

169; and Hizbullah, 527; and

445; and Kahane, 477-78; and Mujahidin-i

316, 441, 553

Turkey, 15, 117, 216-17, 640; Islamic banking

Islamic fundamentalist

166,

530-31; and

150n.74, 631, 633, 634, 642n.l9

in,

Pro-

cise Clause,

368

Hassan,

Due

Establishment

Clause, 15,

Thailand, 388

Traditions of Muhammad. See hadith

al-Turabi,

47n.54;

41,

38-39, 41, 47n.46; Free Exer38-39, 40, 47n.54; on religious expression, 38, 40, 43, 49n.74 U.S. government, 14, 21, 59, 440, 633; and Af-

Torah, 74, 300, 465, 478, 622

Tunisia: Islamic

Lanka,

Sri

604, 606, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 616,

tithing:

in

in

592-93, 595-96, 597, 598, 599, 601-3,

Sayadaw Zcvawadi U, 376 Third World, 1, 65, 635 Thomas Road Baptist Church, 345 Tijjaniyya sect, 194-95, 202n.58 Thilasara,

Tri Sinhala Peramuna,

58-59

437

602,604,612 United National Partv (UNP):

Thero, Sobhita, 612

partv (Iran),

Shi'ites in,

United Front of Monks, 596-97, 598, 599, 600,

Thero, Murutteruve Ananda, 612

Tripitaka, 603,

in

United Arab Emirates:

Thero, Gnanaseeha, 596

tourism: in Burma, 379;

Ni-

Party (Sudan), 132, 138, 150n.74

Theonomy group, 32

378, 385, 395, 452

in

194-97

festival,

Jurist

55

Index 665

\*ija\ a.

595

Vmcennes. U.S.S.. 531 violence, religious. 433, 434. 435. 43".

445-56.

West Bank: Jewish settlers on. 69. "9. 83. 432. 438. 445. 462. 469. 473, 4~4 "5. 622. 62". 628. 632; Palestinians in. 471, 4~2. 4~3. 4~5. 4~~. 484

Afghanistan, 49293; Arab terrorism. 462. 473, 4~4. 484.

Westouficanon. 51"

530; Buddhist. 393. 440. 446. 452. 591,

Wharhaftig. Zcrach, 86n.20

459n.35, 626. 633.

633;

in

in

Egypt. 163. 168. 1"5. and

Gush

Emunim. 469harcdi, 449. 453. 454. 465-69; Hizbullah. 539 40. 54~- 52. 634 ;

in Iran.

523. 524. 533;

in

"2.

Israel.

438

445. 462-63. 484-8"; and kadi. 4"" ^4 and millenarianism. 450. 451-52; in Ni gena. 19"; and Operation Rescue. 439 Shiitc. 454.

512-13.

Sikh, 239. 245.

Arab

College, 546

Jew?" law. "6.

Is a

Mandate of the

uilayat al-faqtb. See

Jurist

Wilkinson, David, 446

Wbjnarowicz, David, 42

women:

in Africa.

dia.

248

2~i. 278, 450; in the Sudan. 623. 634 against U.S., 52". 528. 530. Sec also Tamils conflict of. with Sinhalese; terrorism.

Wheaton

"Who

149n 6~.

in

Egypt, 154.

in In-

248. and Islamic law.' 113. 116. 120.

12"-29

125. in the

;

in Nigeria.

195, Sikh, 272;

Sudan, 135. 141

World Bank. 186. 194.639 Wriggins. H 598

W

.

Visbwa Hindu Panshad (VHP), 22. 245-4".

248.249.250.251-53.418 Vi\ ckananda.

von Grunebaum. Gusta\ won Mises. Ludwig, 292

.

Pam

108n.50

Egypt), 155. 162. 170,

U'allis.

.

i,

(

1"2.

173,

in

210

Yusuf. JollvTanko, 190

Zahid Efendi, See Kotku,

Jim. 349. 350. 351

Zaidis.

Wall Street; and Islamic banking, 31"

Wat Rakhang temple. 393 Wat Thammakai temple. See Thammakai movement We, or

.

i

174,175,176 Wahhabi movement. 114- 15. 436. 452. 513; Afghanistan. 504-6. in Nigeria. 195 Waliullah. Shah.

.

Yalman.

Wachiravan. Prince, 387

Ward

Mvalavam Singh. 250 A E 218 "5, 78, 462. \eslnra Jewish Orthodox scminan. 466. 468. 470 Yom Kippur War. 471, 473 Young Monks movement Burma 383. 384 Young Ottomans. 213 Young Turks. 205. 218 Vada\

Swami. 414

531.333.639 Malam Ibrahim

Zia. General,

Weber. Max, 208. 2"". 370, 374

Zahid

udutt ialms tax,. 113, 128. 162, 194, 195, 260. 29" 302. 304. 305. 30". 318 25. 330.

Zakv.

Our Sattonhood Defined. 242

Mehmed

512

El Zak.

146n.31. See

196

also

97

Islamizadon:

in

Pakistan

Welfare Parrv (Turkey), 22". 228

415. 423; on Islamic law. 111. 113. 116.

Zionism, 79, 168, 470, 481; harcdi on, 21, 69, 72, 73. 464, 46". 468; and Kah.ine. 4"8. 4 "9

118-19

Zivaeddm. Ahmed. See Gumusfianevi

West, influence of:

in

Egypt, 153. 154.

in India,

Religion/politics

Associate Editors:

Fundamentalisms and the State John H. Garvey, Timur Kuran, and David C. Rapoport

the world, fundamentalist movements are profoundly affecting the way we Around Designed promote understanding of such movements, comprehensive to

project assesses in detail the history, scope, nature, and impact of fundamentalist

ments within the major religious

live.

multivolume

this

move-

traditions.

Fundamentalisms and the State, the third volume of the Fundamentalism Project, covers fundamentalist movements on five continents and within six religions, and the effect that antisecular religious movements have had over the past twenty-five years on national economies, political parties, constitutional issues, and international relations. The contributors to this volume examine an exhaustive set of issues including the anti-abortion

Rescue,

women

in Iran

movement

in the

and Pakistan, the Islamic war of resistance

cosmos of Protestant fundamentalism, and Shi 'ite jurisprudence "Monumental.

...

in

United States, Operation Afghanistan, the creationist

in Iran.

A rich and variegated collection of monographic essays dealing with different

aspects of contemporary religious

movements

in various parts of the world.

.

.

.

Bound

to

become

indispensable reference texts for the informed public, the specialist, and college students alike."

—Jose Casanova, Journal of Religion

"Fundamentalisms and the State is a monumental undertaking by a group of leading scholars. The diverse essays in this volume will become a standard reference for years to come. It should be on the shelf of all serious educators and policy analysts." Robert E. Looney, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

—

Praise for the

"An

Fundamentalism Project

essential tool for all students of religion, this should be immediately required reading for every

thoughtful, enfranchised citizen as well."

—Publishers Weekly "An

authoritative

—Chris

and cogent encyclopedia of fundamentalism."

Arthur, Times Higher Education Supplement

Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby direct the Fundamentalism Project. Marty is the Fairfax M. Cone Distinguished Service Professor of the History of Modern Christianity at the University of Chicago. Appleby is associate professor of history and director of the Cushwa Center for the Study of American Catholicism at the University of Notre Dame.

The Fundamentalism

Project

A series edited by Martin E.

Marty and R. Scott Appleby

The University of Chicago Press

Cover design by Michael Brehm

ISBN 0-EEb-50aa4-b 90000 9 '780226"508849