Functional Categories in Language Acquisition: Self-Organization of a Dynamical System [Reprint 2011 ed.] 9783110923520, 9783484304567

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Linguistische Arbeiten

456

Herausgegeben von Hans Altmann, Peter Blumenthal, Hans Jürgen Heringer, Ingo Plag, Heinz Vater und Richard Wiese

Annette Hohenberger

Functional Categories in Language Acquisition Self-Organization of a Dynamical System

Max Niemeyer Verlag Tübingen 2002

Für Saskia und Tilman

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme Hohenberger, Annette: Functional categories in language acquisition : self-organization of a dynamical system / Annette Hohenberger. - Tübingen : Niemeyer, 2002 (Linguistische Arbeiten ; 456) Zugl.: Frankfurt (Main), Univ., Diss., 1997 ISBN 3-484-30456-1

ISSN 0344-6727

© Max Niemeyer Verlag GmbH, Tübingen 2002 Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen. Printed in Germany. Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem Papier. Druck: Weihert-Druck GmbH, Darmstadt Einband: Industriebuchbinderei Nadele, Nehren

Danksagung

Diese Arbeit wäre nicht ohne die hilfreiche Unterstützung vieler Personen entstanden. Zuerst danke ich meiner Familie. Ohne Saskia und Tilman hätte es keinen empirischen Teil gegeben. Ich hatte das Glück, in einer "Familienphase" auch wissenschaftlich forschen zu können. Die Verbindung dieser beiden Aspekte—Familie und wissenschaftliche Arbeit—ist für eine Frau nicht selbstverständlich. Die finanzielle Grundlage dafür war ein Promotionsabschlussstipendium im Rahmen des Zweiten Hochschulsonderprogramms (HSP II), mit dem meine Arbeit von April 1995 bis September 1996 gefördert wurde. Mein persönlicher Dank gilt der zuvorkommenden Betreuung von Frau Knobloch und Prau Jahnel vom Dezernat II der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt. Heien Leuninger ist meine Doktormutter. Sie hat mir während der gesamten Zeit der Promotion in allen fachlichen Fragen zur Seite gestanden, mich auf Fehler aufmerksam gemacht und mir anregende Kommentare gegeben. Sie hat mich mit auf Vorträge genommen und mich in die scientific community eingeführt. Mittlerweile arbeite ich in ihrem DFGProjekt Sprachliche Fehlleistungen und ihre Korrekturen in Abhängigkeit von der Modalität: Deutsche Lautsprache vs. Deutsche Gebärdensprache (DGS). Eine experimentelle psycholinguistische Studie im Rahmen des DFG-Schwerpunkts Sprachproduktion. Sie hat auch die Verbindung mit Rosemarie Tracy, meiner Zweitgutachterin, hergestellt, mit der ich seitdem alle Fragen des Spracherwerbs diskutieren kann. Wenn ich mich auf dynamische Modellbildung in der generativen Spracherwerbsforschung berufen kann, dann auf sie und ihre Forschergruppe. Annemarie Peltzer-Karpf, meine Drittgutachterin, hat mir durch ihre maßgeblichen Veröffentlichungen zur Selbstorganisation, Chaos-Theorie und zu dynamischen Systemen im Spracherwerb die Anregung und den Mut gegeben, den Erwerb Funktionaler Kategorien unter der Perspektive der Selbstorganisation zu untersuchen. Ausschnitte meiner Arbeit habe ich in Kolloquien und Seminaren vorgetragen und mit Kollegen/innen und Studenten/innen diskutiert. Mein besonderer Dank gilt meinen Kollegen/innen Jörg Keller, Susanne Glück und Roland Pfau aus Frankfurt, sowie Sonja Eisenbeiss und Martina Penke. Meine Dissertation ist in englischer Sprache verfasst. Dies ist heute in der generativen Linguistik längst nicht mehr ungewöhnlich. Ich habe einen Korrektor, Thomas Köhn, gefunden, der gleichermaßen kompetent in englischer Sprache wie in Linguistik ist. Er hat die Arbeit mit großer Sorgfalt hinsichtlich Grammatik, Rechtschreibung, Interpunktion und Stil korrigiert. Für verbliebene Fehler und Zusätze, die ich nach seiner Korrektur vorgenommen habe, bin ich natürlich selbst verantwortlich. Ich danke allen, die diese Arbeit ermöglicht haben.

Frankfurt am Main, im November 2001 Annette Hohenberger

Contents

Part A: Self-Organization and Language Acquisition. 1 Introduction 1.1 Definitions of Self-Organization 1.2 Self-Organization of Language 1.3 Methodology and Method 1.3.1 Methodological Probity 1.3.2 Methodological Adequacy: The Idiographic Method 1.4 A Theory of the Data 1.4.1 Peirce's Theory of Categories

1 3 6 8 8 10 12 13

2 Language Acquisition Research in Generative Grammar: The Classical Models 2.1 The Instantaneous Model of Language Acquisition 2.2 The Continuity Hypothesis 2.3 Maturation

16 18 19 21

3 Language Acquisition Research in Generative Grammar: New Models 3.1 Lexical vs. Functional Categories: The Structure-Building Hypothesis 3.1.1 The Structure of the Pre-functional Stage 3.2 The Building-Block Model

23 23 27 27

4 Liminalia 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Time in Language Acquisition 4.2.1 Time, Historicity, and Dissipative Systems 4.2.2 The Macroscopic Time-Scale 4.2.3 The Microscopic Time-Scale 4.2.3.1 Temporal Coding of Nerve Cell Assemblies 4.2.3.2 The Slaving Principle in Synergetics 4.2.4 The Medium Time-Scale 4.3 Three Factors of Language Acquisition 4.3.1 Variation, Selection, and Self-Organization 4.3.1.1 The Genetic Envelope 4.3.2 The Generator of Variations 4.3.2.1 Spontaneous Electric Activity 4.3.2.2 The Chaotic Generator of Variations 4.3.3 A Chaotic-Selective Framework for Linguistics 4.4 Variations 4.5 Continuity vs. Discontinuity 4.5.1 Continuity and Discontinuity in Language Change and Language Acquisition

32 32 33 37 38 43 47 48 52 52 55 55 59 59 60 64 67 73 76

VIII

4.5. l. l Ecological Aspects of the Logistic Growth Curve 4.6 Adult-centered vs. Child-centered Perspective 4.7 Hysteresis 4.8 Liminal Conclusions

79 81 85 89

Part B: Theme and Variation Self-Organization in Language Acquisition: Models, Data and Analyses 5 Models of Layers and Levels of Syntactic Structures 5.1 Lebeaux1 Model of Levels of Representation: Language Acquisition and the Form of the Grammar 5.1.1 Dynamical Reinterpretation of Lebeaux1 Account 5.2 Grimshaw's Extended Projection 5.2.1 The Core Idea 5.2.2 Grimshaw's EP and Weissenborn's Local Well-formedness 5.2.3 Weissenborn's Data 5.2.3.1 Infinitives 5.2.3.2 Finite Sentences 5.2.4 Dynamical Reinterpretation of EP and LWC: The Three-Story Pyramid 5.3 Outlook: Variation and Selection Revisited

91 91 91 97 101 101 103 104 104 105 107 108

6 Case Morphology 6.1 Systemic Variation in the Acquisition of German Genitive Morphology

Ill 112

7 Finiteness, Non-Finiteness, Verb Placement, and Negation 7.1 Variation in the/-System 7.1.1 Paul 7.1.2 Benny

126 154 155 156

8 The Acquisition of German W/i-Questions: Aspects of Variation in the C-System.... 8.1 Valle 8.2 Tilman 8.2.1 Target-like Formulaic Questions 8.2.2 Wi-Questions and VE. 8.2.3 Yes-No Questions with Pro Drop of the Pronominal Subject 8.2.4 Yes-No Questions and Declaratives with Differing Intonation 8.2.5 Zero Questions 8.2.6 Target-like Questions

165 166 168 170 171 183 185 188 197

9 The Position of Adjuncts

200

κ 10

Syntactic Surface Blends

207

11

Functional Neologisms, Proto-Functional Categories, or, Living Dinosaurs

221

12

Precursors: Composition 12.1 Precursors 12.2 Compounding 12.2.1 Early Compounds and their Precursors, or, a Visit to the Zoo 12.2.2 Late Compounds 12.2.3 The Ecology of Compounds

230 230 233 233 239 249

Part C: Dynamical Principles and Notions in Language Acquisition

251

13

Oscillations

251

14

Bootstrapping

259

15

Symmetry-Breakers and Predators vs. Matter and Prey: The Relation between Functional and Lexical Categories

262

16

The Trigger 16.1 Introduction 16.2 The Trigger in Generative Models of Language Acquisition 16.3 A Dynamical Trigger Conception 16.3.1 The Trigger and the System 16.3.2 Internal and External Triggers, Fluctuations 16.3.3 The Trigger Hierarchy 16.4 After Triggering 16.5 Summary: A Redefinition of the Trigger

271 271 273 276 277 280 285 288 289

Part D: Outlook

291

17

291

Beyond Economy: Ecology

Abbreviations

302

Bibliography

303

Lao-Tzu

(Chapter 63)

Plan for the difficult while it is easy; Act on the large while it's minute. The most difficult things in the world begin as things that are easy: The largest things in the world arise from the minute.

I-.]

(Chapter 64) What is at rest is easy to hold; What has not yet given a sign is easy to plan for; The brittle is easily scattered; The minute is easily scattered; Act on it before it comes into being; Order it before it turns into chaos. A tree so big that it takes both arms to surround starts out as the tiniest shoot; A nine story terrace rises up from a basket of dirt. A high place of hundred, one thousand feet high begins from under your feet.

(Lao-Tzu 1989)

Part A: Self-Organization and Language Acquisition 1

Introduction

What is this?

Fig. 1 A hat, a Gaussian normal distribution, or—if you are familiar with Saint-Exupery's Little Prince—a boa constrictor after devouring an elephant? Yet, neither is right! You think a fourth is not given? One can interpret empirical data, like this drawing, in different ways, of course not arbitrarily, depending on which theory one has in mind. This study is not about elephants, nor about boa constrictors, it is even anti-Gaussian! This study is about language acquisition. It is about interpreting old and new data in a new light, i.e., about reframing. This seems to be desirable and all the more interesting as the sciences are in a situation of paradigmatic change. Some have already fully performed this change, others are right in the midst of it, still others are almost untouched by it. For generative grammar the latter is true. This new paradigm embraces a cluster of theories and models which are tightly related to one another, i.e., have a common attractor. With this notion I have already lifted the hat up a bit, to stay in the picture. Let us lift it up completely now:

Fig. 2

Now you know what it is: an attractor that has been turned around. In this way you can think of an attractor, in a cross-section, as a first figurative approximation. More precisely, an attractor is defined as follows: The general definition of an attractor is a set of points or states in state space to which trajectories within some volume of state space converge asymptotically over time. (Kauffman 1993: 177, cf. Crutchfield et al. 1986: 42, Stadler/Kruse 1992: 146, Kelso, Ding/Schöner 1993: 18, among others)

Imagine now such a point as a little ball, rolling around somewhere in the so-called basin of attraction, which again is defined as follows: "[...] an entire volume of states which lie on trajectories flowing to that attractor is its basin of attraction [...]." (Kauffman 1993: 176, cf. Kauffman 1991: 66)

Fig. 3 Where will the little ball inevitably roll?1 Just as it will roll down to the bottom of the valley, i.e., to its energy minimum, a couple of recent models now converge on a common attractor: (l)(i)

dynamical models of self-organizing dissipative systems (Prigogine 1977, Prigogine/Stengers 1984, 1990) (ii) dynamical systems theory (cf. Thelen 1989, Smith/Thelen 1993, Thelen/Smith 1994)) (iii) physiological models of cortical self-organization (cf. Singer 1987, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1995, v.d.Malsburg/Singer 1988, Skarda/Freeman 1987, Stryker et al. 1988, Gehirn und Kognition 1992) (iv) chaos theory (cf. Shaw 1981, Crutchfield et al. 1986, Gleick 1987, Briggs/Peat 1989, Cramer 1988/1993, Maddox 1990, Chaos und Fraktale 1989, Jürgens, Peitgen/Saupe 1990, Ebeling 1991, Barton 1994, Cohen/Stewart 1994, Abraham/ Gilgen 1995, Robertson/Combs 1995, Liebovitch 1998, Liebovitch/Scheurle 2000) (v) theories of Emergenz (cf. Krohn/Kuppers 1992, Eisenhardt, Kurth/Stiehl 1995) (vi) catastrophy theory (cf. Thorn 1975, in the reception of Wildgen/Mottron 1987, Guastello 1995)

This scenario, of course, is reminiscent of Waddington's (1957) famous diagram depicting a "Part of an Epigenetic Landscape" (ibid.: 29). There, the little ball uses one of several pathways, or "creodes", until it reaches its final state. This epigenetic landscape is formed by the "chemical tendencies which the genes produce" (ibid.: 36), i.e., is "ultimately anchored to the genes" (ibid.) in the sense of Waddington's "strategies of the genes" (1957). Note, too, that Waddington's theory was already discussed by Piaget in 1972, in his article on "Equilibration".

(vii) synergetics (cf. Haken 1977, 1981, 1983, 1988, 1989, 1990a+b, Haken/Stadler 1990) As self-organization is the most common notion and is equally used in any of these models, I prefer it here as a collective catchword in the headline of my study. The theory of dynamical systems is the larger framework including the study of chaos (cf. Crutchfield et al. 1986). Hardly any of these models apply to linguistics, the target here. That a bridging from dynamical systems theory to linguistics, especially to generative grammar, is possible, is the point of departure of this investigation. I explicitly understand it as a bridging theory.

1.1

Definitions of Self-Organization

According to a general definition of self-organization, [...] all those systems are self-organizing in which the causes of system change lie in the system itself, and external influences on the system's dynamics are not decisive. (Kiippers/Krohn 1992: 165)2 This definition is not unproblematic, as it denies almost any external influences. But living systems, with which we are dealing here, are highly interactive with their environment. They take up energy from outside, use it to build up a structure of their own and discharge energy again. Thus, a seeming paradox results: autonomy on the one hand, but dependency from the environment, on the other. This puzzle is resolved if we conceive of a self-organizing system as segregating itself from its environment by building up a systemic border or coat: "Self-organization then is autonomization by building up a systemic border." (ibid.: 166)3 Self-organization not only allows for interaction with the environment, but presupposes it. No autonomous system may exist without a structured environment (cf. ibid.: 167). Self-organizing systems are open as well as closed systems. Paradoxically, they maintain themselves as closed systems in that they are open systems (cf. Eisenhardt, Kurth/Stiehl 1995: 75f.). Mathematically, self-organizing systems are characterized by the following differential equation for continuous processes: (2)

dX/dt = Op (X, P) (ibid.: 166, cf. Kelso, Ding/Schöner 1993: 15, 17)

The original German quotation reads as follows: "Rein formal sind alle Systeme selbstorganisierend, bei denen die Ursachen für Systemveränderungen im System selbst liegen und externe Einflüsse auf die Systemdynamik nicht entscheidend sind." This translation and all the following ones from German into English are my own, Annette Hohenberger. Selbstorganisation ist dann Autonomisierung durch systemische Randbildung. Compare how Cohen/Stewart informally describe the function of a cell's coat: "The coat's job is to keep the outside world where it ought to be—outside—and to keep the inside of the cell where «/ought to be." (Cohen/Stewart 1994: 60) This nice description can be carried over to dynamical systems in general.

Here, X is a vector with the system's variables {xi, \2 ... XR}; dXJdt is the first derivation of the vector in time; Op are the operations of the system: these operations are dependent on X as well as on free parameters P. Ebeling (1991), in his definition, focusses on three further aspects of self-organization: irreversibility, non-linearity, and cooperation: Self-organization: Irreversible processes in non-linear dynamical systems, leading to more complex structures of the overall system by the cooperative activity of subsystems. (Ebeling 1991: 118, cf. 17)4

Stadler/Kruse conceive of self-organizing systems as "order-building or entropy-minimizing, dissipative systems" (1992: 150).5 Informally, entropy is a measure for the system's disorder. "Entropy-minimizing" thus only paraphrases "order-building". Following Prigogine (1977), dissipative systems are systems branching under energy consumption. Dissipare means to disperse, i.e., energy is consumed in order to build up structure; the growing energetic waste is discharged. This waste, or entropy, can be used again by other organisms (cf. Briggs/Peat 1989). Entropy export is a crucial feature of selforganizing systems. Again following Prigogine, now with Ebeling (1991: 15f), self-organizing systems export more entropy than they import. This means that they produce negentropy, or order, which they use for their own purposes. Using the earth as an example, Ebeling (1991: 9ff., cf. also Goerner 1995: 12) shows that the so-called photone mill drives self-organizing processes on our planet. The earth takes up high energy—photones—from the sun, uses part of it like a water-mill uses the energy from the water falling down on it, and discharges low energy to the cosmos again, that is, exports entropy. It is this ability to get rid of entropy, or disorder, that allows all self-organizing systems to build up well-ordered structures.6 Transferred to language acquisition, the scenario looks as follows: the child takes up "high energy", i.e., highly structured syntax full of morphology etc. from the adult. The child is the "earth", the adult is the "sun", so to speak. Initially, the child may not use all of the given energy, but only part of it, as is usually the case with "machines" exchanging energy of any kind. Much entropy is discharged in child language. But the "language-mill" becomes more and more efficient as the child's grammar self-organizes, or "matures", as we used to say. Thus, structure, i.e., grammar, is built up, while entropy, disorder, is exported. But where does entropy go to? One answer is that it is discharged by our speech-acts, i.e., by parole. However, what we speak is not garbage but a highly structured output others are able to pick up and use again, and so on. 4

5 6

Selbstorganisation: irreversible Prozesse in nichtlinearen dynamischen Systemen, die durch das kooperative Wirken von Teilsystemen zu komplexeren Strukturen des Gesamtsystems führen. [...] ordnungsbildende oder entropieminimierende, dissipative Systeme. Cf. also Mende/Peschel (1981: 197). They point out that some local processes contradict global processes. So the sun as the enveloping higher system of the earth looses energy, while the earth as a center of "aggregated ('cosmetic') evolution" (ibid.) wins this energy and builds up well-ordered structures. This is an instance of an overall "space cosmetic dualism" (ibid.): "The ash of the one is the gold of the other." (ibid.) Structure decay and structure-building, however, can be "consistently unified in an ecological approach" (ibid.), which considers a system and its interactions with its surrounding.

That this output is still highly structured need not be taken as counter-evidence, but suggests that the structures built up internally are even more structured, which is true if you look at linguistic representations as they are put forward in generative grammar (GG). The linguistic output is relatively shallow, i.e., on a low energetic level, but can be energetically enriched by our language comprehension system, the parser, or whatever. But linguistic structure as such is never visible, even that in an abstract reconstruction; only the speech-act is somewhat accessible.7 It is the linguist who tries to make it visible—something speakers/hearers can perfectly do without. According to recent proposals by Chomsky (1992, 1994, 1995, 2000), overt syntax, i.e., strings of words in utterances, are in fact morphological waste left by the internal mechanisms of feature checking. Feature checking is essential. When it has been carried out, the overt devices—morphology—fall out like a substrate in a chemical solution. Sentences are uttered. This is what we perceive. But this is only an (epi)phenomenon. We still have to ask how the child eventually manages to build up a grammar with approximately the same efficiency as the adult's, how syntax reproduces itself in the filial generation. Are there only "suns", to stay in the metaphor, after completion of the child's grammar? Or, where does the adult take the energy from? From an even hotter "sun"? Or, do the "suns" feed one another? Is structure inevitably lost, as is true because of the second sentence of thermodynamics, which in fact seems to be the case in language evolution, diachronically viewed? (see chapter 15) While structural decay is expected in this respect, it is counteracted by structure-building. Both processes seem to interact ecologically: order and disorder. After all, ontogeny, diachrony and phylogeny of language are given facts. Self-organization makes use of two crucial principles: selectivity and differentiation Karpf 1990: 17). She explains that

(cf.

the organism selects the data it takes up from the environment according to certain criteria, with the respective system determining the basis for further intake and organization, and that systems differentiate when a critical value of complexity is reached.8 (Karpf 1990: 12) Thus, self-organizing systems counteract the second sentence of thermodynamics, which roughly states that energy is inevitably lost in transformation, and that entropy increases until the system reaches the so-called heat death. Even more, they are able to irreversibly build up increasingly complex structures:

The notion "speech-act" suggests a restriction to spoken language. This, however, is not intended here. In sign language, exactly the same holds. [...], daß der Organismus die Daten, die er aus der Umwelt aufnimmt, nach bestimmten Kriterien auswählt, wobei das jeweilige System die Basis für die weitere Aufnahme und Organisation bestimmt und daß sich Systeme differenzieren, sobald ein kritischer Wert der Komplexität erreicht ist. Tracy (1991: 71ff.) points out that "structure-building by differentiation" is also a topic in Piaget's work. In accordance with Karpf (1990) she holds that the modular organization of mental faculties as the language faculty might also be the result of processes of differentiation and integration.

The apparent swimming against the stream of structure decay, the building-up of structure becomes only seizeable in the thermodynamics far from the equilibrium. (Wildgen/Mottron 1987: 71)

Far from the equilibrium, this is the regime dissipative systems work in. (Random) perturbations are not dampened here, but may be stabilized and serve as origins of structure. Their stabilization generates a set of 'new' coexisting, stable states. We arrive at the simplest case of a higher organization on the basis of variation and random perturbations.10 (ibid.: 74)

One alternative is then selected from this array, while the others are dismissed or maintained for subordinated functions. At each branching point, or bifurcation, dissipative systems build up so-called entropy barriers (cf. Briggs/Peat 1989), by means of which they segregate from the reversible time. Their development has a direction in time. Dynamical models speak of "time's arrow". Last, as a research strategy, self-organization itself naturally emphasizes the study of the process and not so much the architecture as the product of self-organization (cf. v.d. Malsburg/Singer 1988). It is not the "realization of a preexisting plan", but "the genesis of structures which arise through cooperating mechanisms as optimal equilibria of the participating forces" (v.d. Malsburg/Singer 1988: 69). This, v.d. Malsburg and Singer have in mind when they use the notion "self-organization." Self-organization is a universal principle that nowadays is investigated on any scale of space and time, from the macroscopic to the microscopic. Hence, self-organization applies independently of scale, or, it is fractal. Our brain, which provides us with the language faculty, is highly self-organized as well (see section 4.2).

1.2

Self-Organization of Language

Keeping these facts in mind, it appears to be worth looking for self-organization in the realm of the language faculty. In generative grammar these ideas are still quite unfamiliar but not incompatible. Recently, signs of interest have accumulated (cf. Lebeaux 1988, Karpf 1990, 1993, Lightfoot 1991, 1999, Tracy 1991, Verrips 1994, Uriagereka 1998). For the purpose of developing a bridging concept from Generative grammar to dynamical models we may already draw on the "dynamical theory of language" of the Bremer school around Wildgen (cf. Wildgen 1985, Wildgen 1990, Wildgen/Mottron 1987, Ballmer/ Wildgen 1987). I do not want to conceal that Wildgen strictly rejects generative grammar. But aiming at a discussion in which even opposed concepts may optimize one another, I will deliberately ignore his disapproval. My prime interest here is possible convergence. 9

Das scheinbare Schwimmen gegen den Strom des Strukturverlustes, der Aufbau von Struktur wird erst in der Thermodynamik fern des Gleichgewichts erfaßbar. Cohen and Stewart also point out that the second sentence of thermodynamics "sits uneasily with the rich complexities of life on out planet." (1994: 248ff.) We witness structurebuilding rather than structural decay! 10 [...] eine Menge 'neuer' koexistierender, stabiler Zustände. Wir erhalten den einfachsten Fall einer Höherorganisation auf der Basis von Variation und Zufallsschwankungen.

This I do not indend for the whole realm of language theory—phonology, semantics, syntax, pragmatics—but just for a special section: I will inspect only syntax, more exactly Functional Categories (PCs), i.e., grammatical features like inflection (nominal and verbal), agreement, determiners, complementizers, and even further restrict myself to the perspective of acquisition. This narrowing is by no means artificial; rather, it is an exciting condensation, as any of the following three specifications conspire with self-organization and magnify the dynamics: (3) (i)

Language and grammar: The fundamental characterization of a language is its grammar. Chomsky (1986) speaks of an I-(intentional) language, i.e., the mental representation in the mind/ brain of the speaker-listener. GG is an explicit model of this I-language. That grammar is "highly self-organized"' 1 (Wildgen/Mottron 1987: 87) is not surprising, as it is the last emergent brain faculty that separates us from our closer biological relatives. Only our species possesses grammar. I admit without hesitation that it is "a hard challenge for a dynamical theory of language." (ibid.)1^ Nevertheless I shall try to tackle it here. (ii) Syntax and PCs: If Ouhalla (1991) is right and syntax amounts to nothing but PCs and their respective lexical features, then syntax and PCs are almost synonymous.13 Recently in GG, the acquisition of PCs has been equated with the beginning parameterization, as any syntactic cross-linguistic difference is rooted in the choice of different parameter values. The respective lexical features of PCs encode these differences. Before parametrization, the grammars of all languages are equal. This is pure UG, or, the original language of mankind. Only with the acquisition of PCs a cascade of bifurcations, or phase-transitions, sets in and changes the child's grammar into the adult one by means of a dynamic interplay between continuity and discontinuity. PCs are the agents of this dynamics. If we want to learn something about linguistic self-organization, we have to look exactly here, (iii) PCs and language acquisition: Language acquisition is the dynamical component of any linguistic theory, in an absolute sense (cf. Horvath 1990: 469). Whatever our notions of what happens in the child's mind/brain—language growth, learning, or acquisition—these very processes will eventually lead to adult linguistic competence. Both systems, the child's as well as the adult's, are presumed to be organized and work in a dynamic way, but the child has to work out this computational system in the first place. According to the logic of the model here, this is achieved by self-organization processes. The investigation of language acquisition will have to take into consideration the crucial factor of time (see section 4.1). Here, the principles-and-parameters theory (cf. Chomsky 1981, 1986, among others) has to be changed in a fundamental way. The abstracting away from time, as in the instantaneous Model of Language Acquisition (see section 2.1), has to be given up in favor of the acknowledgement of the concrete role of time. Of course, generative models of language acquisition include time, but more as an abstract moment in the sense of the logical problem of language acquisition (cf. Hornstein/

11

hochgradig selbstorganisiert [...] eine harte Herausforderung für eine dynamische Sprachtheorie 13 A note on the use of the three crucial notions is in order here: grammar, syntax, and PCs. While grammar traditionally comprises morphology (formation of words) and syntax, syntax is related to the formation of phrases and sentences (cf. Radford 1997: 1). PCs, the most narrow notion, refer to grammatical features only.

12

Lightfoot 1981, Hyams 1986: 2, Felix 1984: 133, Clahsen 1987, among others), i.e., how the child manages to acquire such rich and detailed linguistic knowledge on the basis of defective and degenerate data in such an amazingly short period of time. Time, however, is more like a window-pane through which we normally look at acquisition. But time becomes a protagonist in a dynamical approach. Summarizing, I focus on Functional Categories and language acquisition because both relate naturally to self-organization. PCs are at the heart of every, also of every dynamical, linguistic theory. Language acquisition is even more intuitively related to dynamics due to its developmental aspect. The research in the acquisition of PCs in the light of self-organization thus is supposed to yield major insights into the dynamics of the language faculty.

1.3

Methodology and Method

1.3.1

Methodological Probity

Self-organization and chaos theory are new models that have been developed especially in mathematics, physics, physiology and chemistry, e.g., Haken's synergetics in physics and Prigogine's dissipative systems in chemistry. There, they are formulated in an exact quantitative calculus. An adaptation to language theory can hardly transpose this calculus in any direct and comprehensive way. But it is of crucial interest here that these dynamical models make interesting new qualitative statements and hypotheses which are challenging and applicable to linguistics as well. Thus, we can hardly expect an exact mathematization at merely the beginning of the establishment of dynamic or chaos linguistics, but a transfer of meaning of the general frame. This is legitimate as long as one keeps this gap in mind and does not mix up the respective levels of argumentation. The methodological claims have to be formulated for each layer separately. What may be a conditio sine qua non in mathematics may not be realistic at all for linguistics. Nevertheless, the extrapolation to complex, living, social or even symbolic systems principally remains beyond an exact mathematization and a sufficient empirical foundation.14 (Wildgen/Mottron 1987: 75) The problems of a "sufficient empirical foundation" are discussed by Lightfoot: Techniques for analyzing chaos are 'data-hungry', and it is hard to determine whether fractal attractors exist for some body of data unless there are enormous quantities of data. (1991: 165; cf. also Smith/Thelen 1993: 166) But he goes on: Though it may be hard to verify chaoticness in biological domains, the ideas of chaos theory have influenced the way in which problems are viewed. (Lightfoot 1991: 165)

14

Trotzdem bleibt die Extrapolation auf komplexe, lebende, soziale oder gar symbolische Systeme prinzipiell jenseits einer exakten Mathematisierung und einer ausreichenden empirischen Fundierung.

By that he means above all the ability to perceice a hidden order behind seeming disorder. In generative grammar, the crystallized order in the genome is emphasized more. It appears to be worth looking for hidden chaos behind order, as well. Back to the different data levels. One should not try to be more exact than the data allow for, if one does not want to fall victim to the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness."15 By restricting the scope of the investigation—to the acquisition of Functional Categories only— a sufficient specificity is attained. R. Thorn's warning: "Chaos can be overplayed" (Thorn 1978: 182) or Perkel's question "Fad or insight?" (Perkel 1987: 180) have to be taken seriously especially at the beginning of the discussion of a new paradigm. Perkel's cautious estimation concerning chaos in biological systems should make us alert: The question that immediately arises is whether the biological phenomena themselves dictate or justify the theory's mathematical structures. The alternative is that the beauty, versatility, and power of the mathematical approach may have led its aficionado to find areas of application in the spirit of the proverbial small boy with a hammer, who discovers an entire world in need of pounding. (Perkel 1987: 181; cf. also Aslin 1993: 386, Smith/Thelen 1993: 151).

Chaos is en vogue and has gained a positive connotation by now. Suddenly, everything has to be chaotic. Therefore, do we have to quickly create a chaos linguistics in order to jump on the band waggon? It is important neither to become blinded by the chaos fashion nor to ignore its possible contribution to linguistics. We have to navigate between both extremes. On the empirical level I have tried to be as restrictive as possible. I only consider the acquisition of Functional Categories. Statements about this phenomenon targets the doubleheart of the focal theme here: self-organization is classically expressed in ontogeny, grammar in Functional Categories. On the conceptual level we have to keep the metaphorization of concepts absolutely transparent, in linguistics as well as in psychology: Terms that refer to specific and limited ideas in mathematics and physics should not be confused with the broader characteristics of self-organizing psychological systems. Using these terms as metaphors may be acceptable as a heuristic device, but the two are not the same. (Barton 1994: 12; cf. also Robertson, Cohen/Mayer-Kress 1993: 119)

Yet, proper metaphors are crucial (cf. Smith/Thelen 1993: 166; Goldstein 1995). The appropriate use of the new descriptive vocabulary is necessary, as well. Notions like attractors, cascades of bifurcation, symmetry-breaking, fractals, limit cycles, torii, dissipation, etc. have a certain appeal simply because they are new. But there is nothing mystic about them, even if chaos theory may have been propagated as a quasi-religion in the spirit of holism, New Age etc. The cautious use of notions is indispensable (cf. Goldstein 1995). Skarda and Freeman are right in warning against a "verbal inflation that comes with overuse" (1987: 192) and feel uncomfortable with a "terminology in transition" (ibid.). This is by no means a peripheral problem, but mirrors the dilemma of a dynamical linguistic theory. Unrestricted

15

With these words of A. N. Whitehead R. Thorn (1987: 182) criticizes Skarda and Freeman's (1987) attempt to apply chaos theory to biological systems. This objection seems to be a proper warning here, too.

10

speculations have to be avoided. On the other hand, never before has the situation been so favorable to pursuing a dynamical theory of language than right now.

1.3.2

Methodological Adequacy: The Idiographic Method

Traditionally, investigators of language acquisition have collected their data in longitudinal studies of one or a few, ideally their own children. An early example are the recordings of the Stern couple (1928) and the corpus of Brown (1973). In generative grammar, the Simone corpus of Max Miller is legendary by now for German. As language acquisition is a historical process extending over a certain time, diaries, and nowadays audio-visual documentations that corpora are assembled from, are the most natural method, and in fact the method of choice, even if one has to call them naive and, in a way, pre-scientific. In psychology, they fall under the notion of idiographic method, as they apply to a single Individuum and do not allow generalization in the sense of general laws, as in fact does its pendant, the nomothetic method, which tests many subjects in controlled experimental settings, cross-sectionally. Thus, Poeppel and Wexler (1993) with Cook (1990) argue against an "example-based approach in language acquisition" (Poeppel/Wexler 1993: 8). In fact, it is a fallacy of diaries to consider single examples, also counter-examples, instead of looking at the statistical distribution of the bulk of material, which may yield a quite different picture. This critique, however, targets more the fallacies of giving "single examples" than single case studies as such. Longitudinal studies are not necessarily n=l case studies. Thus, Rosemarie Tracy and her collaborators in their Tübinger Project on the acquisition of complex syntax investigated 10 children over two to three years of time (cf. Fritzenschaft et al. 1990, Gawlitzek-Maiwald et al. 1992, Tracy 1994/95). For each child, the individual course of linguistic development was assessed. It is not generally advisable to collapse data of different children in order to obtain an average and representative linguistic behaviour, as the interesting differences in the respective paths of development are lost and blurred this way. Yet, the idiographic method of longitudinal case studies gains significance when it is selected by a conscious decision, as a "case-study design" (cf. Thelen 1989: 105), for methodical reasons, but as well for methodological, theoretical reasons. I also subscribe to this method and have used it with my own two children, Saskia and Tilman. Data were recruted from a spontaneous diary as well as from audio-recorded documentation. The methodical advantages are the following:16 (4) (i) (ii)

16

Congruence of the method with its object under investigation. As development is concerned, longitudinal studies are to be favored over cross-sectional studies (even with many subjects). Ecological validity: Especially investigations of one's own children, but also the regular meeting with children in longitudinal studies guarantee that representative linguistic behaviour is assessed, as in every-day interactions in the children's natural environments.

See also Tracy (1994/1995: 194f) on shortcomings and advantages of case studies.

11

(iii) Objectivity, the proper interpretation of the data, which, especially in the beginning, may be quite distorted or even be drawn from a private-speech lexicon, is optimally guaranteed. This also contributes to reliability and internally valid statements.' 7 (iv) Reliability and validity through qualitative accuracy in the data assesssment: in longitudinal studies of this kind, best care is taken to assess short liminal or intermediate phases that may consist of no more than a dozen utterances in two weeks, but that are of prime significance. They typically escape even in weekly audio-recorded documentations because of low frequency. Whereas there may exist truly "silent stages" (Roeper 1992: 340, cf. also Roeper/deVilliers 1992: 196), we must be careful to assess the few overt tokens lest they become "silent" simply by inattention. 18 Idiographicity is intimitately related to self-organization and receives its appropriate significance only in such a paradigm. Thus, it is not used arbitrarily but because of a conscious decision being required by the design of the overall paradigm. In language acquisition, as understood by generative grammar, UG is conceived of as an innate mental device that is projected onto the primary linguistic data (PLD) and generates a given grammar. This UG is a timeless, abstract function and operative in any subject in the same way, in principle. Therefore generative models of language acquisition have always been secondary models, representing the special case with regard to the normal case, i.e., adult competence. In the generative literature, there has not been much interest neither in interindividual nor in intraindividual differences, until recently. Yet, they do exist. In the connectionist literature, variation is a well-discussed topic (cf. Bates/MacWhinney 1987, Bates, Dale/Thai 1995, Mac Whinney 1987, among others). In generative grammar, both kinds of variablity gain relevance only in respective models of language acquisition (cf. Tracy 1991, Tracy/Lattey 1994 and articles therein). Language acquisition is temporarily obviously interpunctuated—we know the initial state of UG, S/; we know that around the second year PCs fall in with vehement impetus; and we know the steady state Ss of adult competence that any learner eventually converges on. We all reach the same steady state, with minor differences.19 But how the concrete trajectories from 5,/0 via many intermediate steps to Ss unfold, is in a way unpredictable. Cutting the acquisition path into phases and creating profiles as in Clahsen (1984,1986, 1988) is meaningful, indeed. They inform us about the macroscopic movement on the acquisitional trajectories that are constrained by UG. Yet, microscopically, this path is distinct for any child and deserves to be traced back as a concrete historical process which is unique for any child. Thus, the individual course of a developmental

17

Only somebody well acquainted with the children knows that dlala are shoes, and that mba means "hot", as to give an example for Saskias private lexicon. 18 A good example of low-frequent data are child speech errors (cf. Hohenberger/Leuninger, in prep.). This is a very refractory data-class. They can be assessed only by spontaneous protocols from nobody else than a close intimate of the child, sharing pretty much time with her and being linguistically trained to perceive them in the first place. To find speech errors in the child's spontaneous speech by the aid of audio-visual documents is like searching for the proverbial needle in the haystack. 19 Although we have to admit here, too, that any brain is singular and that any brain attains a singular Ss.

12

trajectory may never be fully knowable beforehand, even though the global outcome can be predicted quite confidently (cf. Smith/Thelen 1993: xiv, Thelen/Smith 1994: xvi). Individual acquisition paths are fractal, intraindividually as well as interindividually. A fractal, according to Mandelbrot (1982), is a self-similar form in which any part is similar to the whole, only on a smaller scale. With regard to the interindividual aspect, n acquisition paths are neither identical nor equal on the average, neglecting statistical fluctuations, but of course not radically different These ideas enforce methodological and methodical consequences. We have to free ourselves from longstanding prejudices about the standard method lore, especially concerning variability: [...] in contrast to traditional views where variability from a mean standard of performance is considered as noise in a system, dynamic approaches give variability important theoretical status. This has two important consequences: First, the use of group averages and conventional inferential statistics may be appropriate only at the first, most global level of analysis. Understanding process must involve the use of individual developmental data, collected longitudinally. [...] Second, [...] dynamic approaches predict increased variability as an index of patterns in transition from one form to a new form. (Smith/Thelen 1993: xiv, cf. also ibid.: 163, Thelen 1989: 95, 106, Aslin 1993: 387f., Kelso et al. 1993, Tracy 1991: 405,430) A new solution for the critical relation between variability and uniformity is the fractal. In every single subject the overall potential is contained—not as a law, or nomos, but as a Gestalt. Therefore, in principal, the consideration of a single case is sufficient to make relevant statements about language acquisition in general. In a singular case all the others are contained. A case can never be exhausted, much like the Mandelbrot set contains new selfsimilar figures in every new section of its variability (cf. Jürgens, Peitgen/Saupe 1990). Apart from this idealization, it has to be admitted that a single case study is insufficient, as should be clear. The reason is that one can never penetrate into it so deeply—neither quantitatively nor qualitatively—as to identify all the aspects of its fractal. The necessary degree of dissolution cannot be met. Thus, the singular case is only virtually inexhaustible. Therefore, we are dependent on the other methods, e.g., the nomothetical method, now as before. The idiographic method does not compete with these, but cooperates and conspires with them. Yet, it gains its original importance in connection with the dynamical conception and the notion of the fractal in language acquisition.

1.4

A Theory of the Data

As the primary linguistic data (PLD) are crucial in any language acquisition model, I shall elaborate on this notion here. From the point of view of generative grammar, (5) (i) (ii)

the child acquires her language by the interaction between her genetic endowment (UG) and the primary linguistic data she is confronted with. Moreover, it is assumed that only positive evidence is available to her, i.e., acquisition does not require correction, teaching etc. (cf. Marcus 1993)

In what follows, I want to show that these primary linguistic data have to be characterized in yet another way, in order to explain that and how they can be received by the child (and by any language user). This primarily concerns the categorial status of the data. In order to

13 be taken up by the child in the first place, a datum has to be conceived of as something, e.g., child as N or laugh as V, later the child as DP, laughs as INFL, because as COMP, etc. Only then does input become intake (cf. White 1981: 247; Felix 1984: 139). The grammatical categories determine perception, and not vice versa (cf. Felix 1984: 140). When the analytical instruments, e.g., the categories N, V, A and P of the open class , are missing for the elements of the open class, or when the categories INFL (AGR, TNS), COMP, DET, NEC, etc. of the closed class, are missing for the elements of the closed class, then the data are not accessible to the child but filtered out as noise. The child is "blind" to them. The categories as such are not learnable in this sense, but primary for logical reasons. Yet, to say they are inborn would only short-cut the obviously complex and possibly circular constitution of types out of tokens. Let us nevertheless hold on to the idea of logical precedence and innateness at least informally until a better-suited concept is available and now turn to a theory of data, going back to the founder of pragmatism, and later pragmaticism, Ch. S. Peirce.

1.4.1

Peirce's Theory of Categories

The categorial status of data is described in the theory of categories of the pragmatist and later pragmaticist Charles S. Peirce. Following Peirce, there exist three levels of data, three categorial levels, which he simply callsfirstness, secondness, and thirdness. They are assumed to be universal (cf. Hookway 1985: 80). Of data from the level of firstness we only know that they are there, but not which empirical features they possess, to which other elements they belong, etc.: Firstness is the mode of being ofthat which is such as it is, positively and without reference to anything else. (CP 8.328)5°

Firstness is the level of pure possibility and relates to absolute present (cf. Pharies 1985: 11). Of data from the level of secondness we can already grasp empirical features and the qualities which they display. Perhaps we know these qualities from similar elements and can distinguish them: Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to a second, but regardless to any third. (CP 8.328)

Secondness is the level of reality or actuality and relates to the past (cf. Pharies 1985: 11). Opposition and otherness are characteristic for the perception of these brute facts (cf. ibid.). The transition from secondness to thirdness is crucial, marking the difference between input and intake. It is only on the level of thirdness that the full categorial status of a datum is reached. Now it can be represented as something, we can interpret it, connect it with

20

"CP" means "Collected Papers" of Charles S. Peirce. The numbers denote the volume and the paragraph.

14 our overall (cognitive) system of knowledge. Above all, the mediation of data is now possible in a general, ordered, and lawful way: Thirdness is the mode of being ofthat which is such as it is, in bringing a second and a third into relation to each other. (CP 8.328) This third is relative in nature. It has no proper "substance" but only the function to relate elements, thereby constituting something like order or law. Thirdness is virtual and relates to the future (cf. Pharies 1985: 12). It is continuous in the sense of applying inevitably whenever the proper conditions are met (cf. ibid.). Interestingly, not only reasoning is a prime example for thirdness, but also perceptual judgements: The bare percept is a second, a construct of neural data, which in order to be made intelligible to the mind must be clarified by a perceptual judgment, i.e., an inference or hypothesis about the percept's content based on the comparison of the percept with other experience. (Pharies 1985: 12). In this way, perception is like semiosis in general, where a sign or representamen is related to its object for an interprelant. This is Peirce's semiotic triad (cf. Pharies 1985: 153ff.). In his "remarkable theorem" Peirce detects that a triadic relation is enough, even for analyzing higher polyads. The triadic relation, however, cannot be reduced to any dyad. This sketchy excursion into philosophical semiotics should help us reach a better understanding of the nature of the data the child encounters. Initially, the child has not yet appropriate linguistic categories at her command to analyze incoming data of the closed class. These data remain on the level of secondness for the child. They may be perceived as pure empirical facts, but strand on their way towards a proper interpretation. Only with a suitable inventory may the child advance to the level of thirdness. Then, these elements are integrated in her language system. The crucial difference between secondness and thirdness plays a decisive role with respect to the trigger problem, i.e., the question why, at a certain time, data that have been around all the time eventually trigger off the setting of certain parameters and enable the child to build new structures (see chapter 16). The book is organized in four major parts. In part A, after having outlined the basic claims of a theory of self-organization, I will, in chapter 2, briefly outline the state-of-the-art of generative language acquisition research and sketch the standard hypotheses: continuity and maturation. In chapter 3,1 will discuss more recent generative models which have been put forward in order to solve the problems of the standard models: the structure-building hypothesis, including the crucial distinction between LCs and PCs, and the building-block model. In chapter 4,1 will treat the various aspects of a dynamical systems model under the notion of liminality. The threshold character, processuality, and the mediating task of selforganization will be discussed on various levels of space and time. Part B, Self-Organization in Language Acquisition: Data and Analyses, contains the main bulk of empirical data and discussion of these. Before exploring the data, in chapter 5, I will first reinterpret Lebeaux' (1988/2000) model of grammatical layers and Grimshaw's (1991) Extended Projection as dynamical generative precursor concepts. In chapter 6, I will discuss the acquisition of case morphology, in chapter 7 the position of the finite/non-finite verb, the /-system, in chapter 8 the acquisition of the C-system, in chapter 9 the position of adjuncts, in chapter 10 syntactic surface blends, and in chapter 11 Functional Neolo-

15

gisms. In each of these cases it will be shown how first structural variants are produced, and how a selection takes place subsequently. The concept of precursors is elaborated; empirical evidence for precursor constructions in compound formation is given in chapter 12. In part C, dynamical principles and notions will be applied to language acquisition. In chapter 13,1 will provide evidence for oscillations: children sometimes seem to "fall back" into a previous stage while entertaining already stable adult-like structures at the same time. In chapter 14, a further dynamical principle is discussed: bootstrapping. Children may use already available linguistic knowledge structures and transfer them to other linguistic domains. The long-term relation between PCs and LCs as a possible limit-cycle attractor is speculated on in chapter 15. Here, the diachronic time-scale is also taken into consideration. PCs and LCs may entertain predator-prey-like relations, whereby PCs are spontaneously recruited from the pool of LCs as symmetry-breaking devices, saving a growing lexicon and growing phrase-markers from becoming disordered. Chapter 16 elaborates on a crucial notion in any language acquisition model: the trigger. A new dynamical concept is put forward, emphasizing the system condition, i.e., the role of the overall system the presumed trigger is interacting with. A physiologically oriented trigger hierarchy is developed, crediting the trigger with an evolution of its own, in the course of which it becomes increasingly specific, culminating in the triggering event. Part D contains only one chapter, 17, which gives a speculative and sketchy outlook on the applicability of a dynamical linguistics to synchronous syntax, i.e., adult competence. I will try to go beyond the crucial notion of economy and confront it with the dynamical notion of ecology which should regulate the overall syntactic design.

2

Language Acquisition Research in Generative Grammar: The Classical Models

Although the child herself appears to have no serious problems with language acquisition, linguists have conceptual problems with modelling it. They struggle for proper models and put forward competing approaches. The following three hypotheses formulate different ideas about the triggering factors and about the how of language acquisition; yet, they all belong to the common paradigm of generative grammar and the principles-and-parameters theory. I will briefly outline these common assumptions. Chomsky (1986, 1990) usually asks three questions with respect to language: (6) (i) what is its nature? (ii) what is its origin? (iii) what is its use?

Here, we are primarily interested in the second question, i.e., how a natural language is acquired. Chomsky speaks of the paradoxical situation that we possess such a rich and detailed knowledge of language in spite of only insufficient empirical evidence as Plato's problem. With respect to language acquisition, Plato's problem takes a special form, called the logical problem of language acquisition (cf. Baker/McCarthy 1981, Hornstein/Lightfoot 1981, Hyams 1986: 2, Felix 1984: 133, Clahsen 1987), i.e., how we are able to acquire such a rich and detailed knowledge system on the basis of only defective data. This poverty of stimulus-argumenl includes three kinds of deficiencies (cf. Hornstein/ Lightfoot 1981: 9, Hyams 1986: 3, 91, Tracy 1991: 21f.): (7) (i)

The data are degenerate, i.e., there exist performance errors, slips of the tongue.cutoffs during speech planning, etc. (ii) The available data are finite. Yet, the child acquires the ability to generate and understand an infinite number of new sentences. (iii) For some rare or complex constructions the child never or only rarely receives direct evidence. Yet, she acquires correct knowledge of them. Even more so, children generally do not receive information concerning metalinguistic judgements on the data, e.g., on synonymy, ambiguity, etc., not even on ungrammaticality. These all are non-primary data (cf. White 1981: 242).

These three kinds of deficiencies, especially the third one, are insurmountable hurdles for any empiricist theory of language or language acquisition: how can knowledge be acquired partly without a relevant inductive base? Generative grammar straightforwardly solves this logical problem of language acquisition by recourse to innate knowledge of language: the human subject is equipped with a UG as part of her species-specific genetic endowment. On the one side, this UG is rich enough to allow her to acquire any human language, on the other side it is constrained, such that it offers to the subject only one or a few alternatives to choose from on the basis of the primary linguistic data encountered in the input. Hence, the child is equipped with UG, or a Language Acquisition Device (LAD), as the language module in her modularly organized cognitive faculty.

17 Following Chomsky (1981, 1986), UG consists of fixed principles that hold universally, and variable parameters, which can take different values cross-linguistically. In the initial state, UG is still "pure", i.e., the principles already exist, but the parameters have not yet been set. Only in the course of time does the child acquire enough knowledge to find out the proper values and to carry out the respective parametric switches. Yet, there are various explanatory possibilities within the principles-and-parameters models that explain how and when parameters are set, what controls this, etc. Therefore, we are faced with various generative language acquisition models. In any case, a narrow notion of learning, in the sense of inductive learning, is not appropriate. Instead, the neutral notion of language acquisition is to be favored. Under generative assumptions, the child need not "learn" her native language—she is already endowed with the language faculty as she is with other bodily and mental functions, too. Language simply "grows" in her, given an appropriate linguistic environment: "knowledge of language grows in the mind/brain of a child placed in a certain speech community." (Chomsky 1990: 635) Language acquisition is conceived of as effortless and easy. Theoretically, this is expressed by the characterization of the transition from the initial state 5,/0 to the steady state Ss of adult competence as being deterministic, without consciousness, uniform and instantaneous (cf. Chomsky 1981, 1986). This last idealization apart, Chomsky takes the "developmental problem" seriously (cf. Clahsen 1978, Felix 1984: 133, Verrips 1990, Tracy 1991), of course. There exist certain intermediate stages Sj, Sj, between 5,·/0 and Ss, and they are responsible for the course of acquisition: primary linguistic data (PLD)

I I I 111 si/0--> s, --> 82 --> s3 --> Sj --> ss

initial state

intermediate states

final

steady state

Fig. 4: The acquisition path from the initial to the steady state The existence of such intermediate grammars necessitates theories of acquisition. The process of language acquisition is data driven (Chomsky 1990: 634). It cannot take place without interaction with the linguistic environment, just as any other cognitive faculty, e.g., the visual faculty of the neocortex, crucially depends on visual input (cf. Hubel/Wiesel 1962, 1968). Children acquire their mother tongue solely on the basis of positive evidence. Negative evidence as the origin of linguistic knowledge is refuted (cf. Marcus 1993). A child does not test inductive hypotheses. Above all, she cannot handle data of the form non X. Thus, corrections by pedagogically commited parents lack any impact or are obediently repeated once, but forgotten next time (cf. Tracy 1990, Atkinson 1992: 24). Supplying the child with instances of "proper" constructions only has an effect if this construction is already "within

18

reach" for the child. But then, this help is almost superfluous! The same is true of other metalinguistic judgements on language (cf. Gleitman, Gleitman/Shipley 1973). Even if children were to receive such information, it would be void for them. They acquire language tacitly as much as their knowledge is a tacit knowledge (cf. Chomsky 1980). This is also true of the adult language user. Only the linguist reflects upon language and has at her disposal such metalinguistic data as well as negative evidence (cf. Hornstein/Lightfoot 1981: 9f.). Now let us look at the classical generative acquisition models.

2.1

The Instantaneous Model of Language Acquisition

Chomsky's (1975,1986, 1990, among others) idea that language acquisition takes place instantaneously is an idealization, as he points out himself (cf. Chomsky 1975)1. Like other Chomskian idealizations, such as the ideal speaker-listener, it is supposed to lead to important and interesting questions and results. In our case we shall acknowledge the fact that we all acquire essentially the same knowledge of language despite differing individual experiences in the course of language acquisition (cf. White 1981: 253). Such a fiction is admissible because of its explanatory adequacy for the grammatical theory (cf. Clahsen 1978 with Chomsky 1965), i.e., Plato's problem. With the innate UG we hold in our hands such a strong instrument for explaining the language faculty that we can abstract away from the developmental problem for the time being. UG offers a set of options, possible grammars, which the child simply has to select from on the basis of the data. Therefore, it suffices to look at the initial state Sj/0. UG then directly and instantaneously maps the appropriate grammar onto the primary linguistic data, and the steady state Ss is reached (cf. Clahsen 1978, Hyams 1986: 2, 168ff, Tracy 1991: 7). Here, UG is a mapping function , and as such suspended from any consideration of time. UG with its principles and parameters plus the data are sufficient to determine language acquisition in its entirety. All the temporally intermediate stages that have to be passed realiter have to conform to UG anyway. To that extent, they are irrelevant for the function. The temporal problem is not solvable in such a theory of grammar. Instead, we have to criticize this theory as being only a static one: the factor "time" is simply missing (cf. Felix 1984: 134). Note again that Chomsky deliberately makes this reduction. For him, it does not matter in which way the derivation is achieved, which of its lines is written down first, and which lines follow afterwards. If there is any temporal ordering, then only because we are temporal beings. In chapter 4 we will come across dynamical models that emphasize the role of time as indispensable for modelling any acquisition. With regard to Chomsky's

1

The Instantaneous model is the first variant of Chomsky's LAD (Language Acquisition Device), an extensional version as it takes only its own output and new data as input (cf. Tracy 1991: 36). The second version, LAD 2, is intensional, i.e., it does not consider its own output, but only the recent grammar and new data (cf. ibid.: 37). Here, I will not provide a detailed critique of the instantaneous model, but rather restrict myself to the aspect of timelessness.

19 abstracting away from time, the notion instantaneous is not even appropriate because this is a temporal one again (cf. Helen Leuninger, p.c.). Thus, we are faced with a "language acquisition" model that is none at all, or at least does not care for the fact that language acquisitition takes some time, although it really happens very quickly. Yet, this fact necessitates special acquisition models, to which we shall turn now.

2.2

The Continuity Hypothesis

The continuity hypothesis claims that the principles of UG are available right from the beginning and constrain the child's grammar at any given stage. As "[...] the innate endowment for language acquisition does not change over time f...]" (Felix 1992: 27), continuity is guaranteed. Transitions exist, but the changes are supposed to be quite modest so that the overall picture of a smooth development can be maintained. Changes are started by triggers, i.e., crucial data in the input that lead to a reorganization of the child grammar. The reliance on external, perceptual input qualifies the continuity hypothesis as belonging to perceptionism (cf. Felix 1992: 26f.). The continuity hypothesis purports to be a null hypothesis in that it refutes any extrinsic ordering of UG-principles, which it assumes to be operative from the very beginning. The Language Acquisition Device (LAD) is thus maximally simple and does not have to change. With respect to Occam's razor such a theory, invoking only simple and unchanging predicates, is preferable to a theory that invokes more complex predicates, i.e., changing principles and parameters during development (cf. Clahsen 1978). One only has to postulate the initial and the steady state. The interim states will fall out logically as the product of the learning mechanisms applying to the data, especially lexical learning (cf. Pinker 1984, Clahsen 1987, 1988, 1990, Clahsen, Eisenbeiss/Vainikka 1993, Clahsen, Eisenbeiss/Penke 1994, Eisenbeiss 1991). Wild grammars are impossible, as any developmental stage is constrained by UG. With regard to the targeted steady state the child has no teleological knowledge about it. She just tries to build up a grammar which is compatible with the date she encounters. The relation of the interim grammars to the steady state grammar is only an indirect one (cf. Hyams 1986: 6). The continuity hypothesis comes along in two versions: weak continuity and strong continuity. Weak continuity claims that any interim child grammar is UG-constrained and that the child builds up only UG-constrained structures. So, the interim grammars belong to the set of possible human languages. The associated structures need not necessarily be possible structures in the respective target language, but in another human language (cf. Weissenbom, Goodluck, Roeper 1992: 5, Verrips 1990). Most generative linguists adhere to this weak version (cf. Pinker 1984, Hyams 1986, 1992, Clahsen and his colleagues, see above, Roeper/deVilliers 1992, Weissenbom 1992). Strong continuity goes beyond weak continuity by claiming that any child structure is also a possible structure in the target language (cf. Weissenbom, Goodluck/Roeper 1992: 5). Recently, Weissenbom (1990, 1994) as well as Lust (1994) have taken up the challenge

20 of providing a conceptual frame and empirical evidence for strong continuity. With their Full Competence Hypothesis (FCH) Poeppel and Wexler (1993) have put forward an equally restricted version of strongest continuity: "[...] the child has the adult grammar." (ibid.: 3) With regard to Lexical and Functional Categories, continuity theorists claim that apart from Lexical Categories, Functional Categories too are present from early on. Weak continuity includes IP in the child's phrase marker; strong continuity even CP (cf. Poeppel/ Wexler 1993, Lust 1994). The advantage of excluding UG-unconstrained wild grammars is counter-balanced by a severe disadvantage having to do with the triggers responsible for the reorganization of the child grammars: (8) (i)

(ii)

Which exactly is the trigger? The choice of the trigger mostly depends on theory-internal reasons, i.e., on the special theory of grammar underlying the analysis of a parameter. As the continuity hypothesis views the changes as being data-driven, the decisive triggering data should be easily accessible to the child and frequent enough so that the child will perceive them in any case (cf. Guilfoyle/Noonan 1988: 3). Why does the child suddenly attend to these triggering data, and why didn't shedo so before? All the more if the trigger is really easily accessible and frequent as desired in (i) (cf. Guilfyole/Noonan (1988)! Or, why does the child now evaluate these data differently? One could only face this objection made by Borer and Wexler (1987) by assuming a strictly ordered input, such that the child would receive evidence for a certain construction only at a certain time, e.g., for passive only at a relatively late time, as the child masters passive constructions only around three years of age and older. Such a hypothesis would tie in with the intuitive idea that the caregivers present increasingly demanding data to the child in accordance with her growingcognitive and linguistic competence. This is the so-called motherese-hypothesis. Yet, generativists, including continuity theorists, generally reject this hypothesis as it has been proven empirically inadequate (cf. Tracy 1990, 1991: 43 and literature therein). The child is surrounded by a complete data corpus from early on.

Thus, the question remains why certain data become crucial triggers only at a certain time. Clahsen (1987: 5f, 1990: 368, FN5) tries to counter this objection by proposing a variable intake during the course of acquisition. Just as other cognitive faculties like memory span, general processing capacity, and attention increase, the linguistic intake increases, too. Thus, the child's perception of the input changes and data that so far have remained unattended can now be processed. This line of argumentation is quite common in Generative grammar. Even Chomsky himself attributes the introduction of Functional Categories to extra-linguistic sources: [...] it has been observed that the transition from so-called telegraphic speech lacking function words, to normal speech is quite rapid, and includes a number of different systems: questions, negations, tag questions, etc. Furthermore, in the telegraphic speech stage, children understand normal speech better than their own telegraphic speech, and if function words are introduced randomly, the results are unintelligible. This suggests that the children know the facts of normal speech all along, and were using telegraphic speech because of some limitiation of attention and memory. When this limitation is overcome in the course of normal growth and maturation, their already acquired knowledge of language can be manifested. (Chomsky 1990: 643)

21 While Chomsky is more inclined towards maturational accounts, the continuity hypothesis lays more stress on the altered perception as the agent of change. Yet, it must remain open in this framework what exactly causes this change. In the dynamical systems theory to be outlined here, it is well-known that unspecific control parameters such as memory and attention may induce a critical phase transition. With regard to modularity, it would be desirable to point to intrinsically linguistic control parameters as the agents of change, e.g., a growing mental lexicon and growing phrase markers. Of course, these again depend on other extra-linguistic faculties as well. Above all, the role of Functional Categories should be emphasized more. Their emergence has two aspects. On the one hand, they passively fall out like crystals out of a saturated chemical solution, if proper conditions are met; on the other hand they actively promote syntactic parameter setting in the sense of symmetry-breakers. They are considered the patients and agents of syntactic change at the same time. Note that this circular argumentation is not at all offending to a dynamical account (see section 4.2.4 about the emergence of order parameters). Returning to the trigger problem and the continuity hypothesis, it remains to say that the former problem is unsolvable within the framework of the latter. In terms of Peirce's theory of categories, the continuity account ignores that before the critical bifurcation the child only reaches the level of secondness with respect to the triggering data. The child may perceive these particular data, but not ay triggering data, because the system does not yet meet the proper conditions for the triggering event. A dynamical trigger conception is worked out here in chapter 16.

2.3

Maturation

In order to avoid the seemingly insurmountable trigger problem of the continuity hypothesis, theorists of maturation prefer to explain the delayed acquistion of certain constructions and/or structures not by virtue of features of the data, but by virtue of a maturational schedule. This schedule is responsible for certain UG principles not operating from early on, but only maturing at a certain point of time. The child thus proceeds from an immature initial state through increasingly mature states, until she eventually reaches a fully mature steady state. This idea is patterned after other biological processes, which language is readily compared with: like these, language is potentially given in its entirety from early on, but the genetic program determines that it is activated only later. Strictly speaking, nothing is "explained" here, but the developmental problem is just shifted to another field, biology. But can the biologist tell us more about language acquisition than the linguist? Nor is the trigger problem solved. Now we have to rely on biological triggers (encymes, catalysts) to explain the activation of certain UG principles. The maturation hypothesis comes along in two main versions, strong maturation (cf. Felix 1984, 1987, 1992) and weak maturation (cf. Borer/Wexler 1987). Strong maturation is an instance of a discontinuity theory (cf. Felix 1992, Weissenbom, Goodluck/Roeper 1992: 5f.), as it allows for "wild" grammars, i.e., intermediate child grammars not restricted

22

by UG. For this reason Clahsen (1990: 367) criticizes that Felix1 proposal amounts to a theoretically unrestricted view. These wild grammars violate UG principles, since the latter have not yet matured. This leads to two undesirable consequences (cf. Guilfoyle/Noonan 1988: 5). First, learnability of the target grammar is rendered more difficult if the initial and the target grammar entertain only a loose relationship with each other. The initial grammar need not even fall inside the set of possible human grammars. Second, the importance of UG for linguistic theory is crucially weakened. UG, then, would only constrain the later, more mature grammars, but not the early, immature ones, although UG has been conceptualized exactly for determining the format of possible human languages. Neither the exact point when UG does in fact operate, nor when it does not, would be easy to determine. Yet, as Weissenborn, Goodluck/Roeper (1992: 5) point out, maturation is not necessarily an instance of discontinuity. While Felix1 strong version appears to be too unrestricted, Borer and Wexler's (1987, Wexler 1990) weak version of maturation rules out any UG violations. Therefore, it is also called UG-constrained maturation (cf. Borer/Wexler 1987, Wexler 1990). UG principles are valid at any developmental stage, but some constructions or structures are still not accessible to the child. Borer/Wexler (1987) discuss the maturation of argument(A)-chains in the acquisition of the passive. Initially, the child may process only lexical or adjectival passives. The true syntactic, or verbal passive, is still not available to her, as a certain UG principle, the chain algorithm relating a moved argument in a case position with its trace in a theta-position, has not yet matured. This non-local discharge of a theta-role is still barred to the child. In adjectival passives, on the other side, no movement is necessary, as it is an operation in the lexicon, where the argument structure and the syntactic features of the verb are free to change. Therefore, this kind of passive is already available. For a critique, see Guilfoyle and Noonan (1988). While the continuity hypothesis has difficulties in explaining all changes with appropriate empirical triggers, the maturation hypothesis can easily "explain" them by the aid of maturation of the respective principles. Yet, this explanation is too easy, as any change can be thus explained. This way, it looses its specific explanatory power. It is simply not falsifiable, a demand of the philosophy of science for any good theory. The theory of maturation can explain the occurrence of an event and its non-occurence, i.e., its opposite, at the same time. If a construction already is in place, the respective principle is said to already have matured. If the same construction is not yet in place, the respective principle is simply assumend not to have matured yet. Although the continuity approach and the maturational approach make different proposals concerning language acquisition, they are not mutually exclusive, especially in both their weak forms. In fact, weak continuity and weak maturation sometimes seem to be so close as to be interchangeable. Thus, Lebeaux (1988) is taken to represent a discontinuity hypothesis in Weissenborn, Goodluck and Roeper (1992: 6), whereas the very same text is taken to represent the weak continuity hypothesis in Clahsen, Eisenbeiss and Vainikka (1993: 87). Guilfoyle and Noonan (1988/1991) have even merged both concepts and created a "hybrid" hypothesis called structure-building theory. In the following chapter I will examine this proposal and another recent concept, the building-block model (cf. d'Avis/Gretsch 1994, Fritzenschaft et al. 1990, GawlitzekMaiwald et al. 1992) with regard to the dynamical concept to be developed here.

3

Language Acquisition Research in Generative Grammar: New Models

3.1 Lexical vs. Functional Categories: The Structure-Building Hypothesis Guilfoyle/Noonan (1988/1991) claim in their structure-building hypothesis that the principles of UG as well as the Lexical Categories (N, A, V, P) are in place right from the beginning, but that the Functional Categories (their INFL, COMP, DET, KASE1) only mature later on. This is a restricted maturaaonal or discontinuity approach which tries to circumvent the problems of maturation, as only one module, albeit a central one, is assumed to obey the laws of maturation. On the other side, one could speak of an augmented continuity approach, as the central claim of the latter—that UG principles are given from the beginning—is maintained. The structure-building hypothesis aims at a synthesis between these two current approaches. Such a synthesis was made possible by the overall development of Generative grammar since the late 1980's concerning the elaboration of the difference between Functional and Lexical Categories. In the realm of generative language acquisition research, the apparent lack of FCs in very early child grammar led to speculations about their possible role in the acquisition of syntax (Guilfoyle/Noonan 1988/1991, Lebeaux 1988/2000, Radford 1988, 1990a,b, 1992, 1995, Platzack 1992,Tsimpli 1991, 1992). At the same time, the same class,2 i.e., FCs, was identified as the locus of cross-linguistic parametric variation (cf. Borer 1983, Lebeaux 1988/2000, Chomsky 1989, Ouhalla 1991). Parametric variation amounts to exactly the difference in the lexical features of Functional Categories, as they are evidenced in the various human languages. According to Ouhalla (1991, 1993), Functional Categories constitute a genuine linguistic module, as do Lexical Categories, both with their respective lexicons. In this lexicon the features of the elements are listed. Thus, functional elements also have "lexical" features, e.g., case, +/-wh. 1 2

Kase includes Case + F-features (see also Fukui 1986, Fukui/Speas 1986). Of course, the different classes had been known all the time. They had only been given different names. The following table gives an overview: (i) content words vs. Junction words (Brown 1973) (ii) autosemantica vs. synsemantica (iii) lexical categories vs. grammatical categories (iv) open class vs. closed class (v) contentives vs. ßtnctors (Abney 1985) (vi) lexical categories vs. functional categories (Guilfoyle/Noonan 1988/1991) (vii) substantives vs. functional categories (Ouhalla 1991, Tsimpli 1991) The two classes differ in that lexical elements carry semantic, thematic information and thus determine the content of an utterance, whereas functional elements carry grammatical information and thus determine the form, i.e., syntax (cf. Guilfoyle/Noonan 1988/1991, Radford 1990a: 8). A basic capacity of lexical elements thus is reference. Recently, a third category between Functional and Lexical Categories—Semi-lexical Categories—has been identified. Elements of this hybrid class, such as prepositions, display features of both FCs and LCs (Corver/vanRiemsdijk 2001).

24 Besides these grammatical features, Functional Categories are characterized by c (=categorial)-selectional properties, i.e., a certain functional element selects a certain syntactic category, e.g., AGR c-selects TNS or vice versa, NEG c-selects VP (cf. Ouhalla 1991: 14, compare also Grewendorf 1991: 15).3 Apart from c-selectional properties, Functional Categories have m(=morphological)-selectional properties, specifying which categories, mostly substantives, they take as hosts, e.g., TNS and AGR attach to the verb. But also free morphemes like C, AUX, or DET have m-selectional properties (cf. Ouhalla 1991: 15; compare also Grewendorf 1991: 16). They are specified as (-affixal] in the lexicon. Of course, m-selection is not restricted to FCs; also substantives show this property. Finally, FCs are characterized by grammatical features (cf. Ouhalla 1991: 16, compare also Grewendorf 1991: 17), such as ρΛι-features (person, number, gender) associated with AGR, temporal features associated with TNS, ννΛ-features associated with C and case features like nominative associated with AGR-S, accusative associated with AGR-O, or dative associated with AGR-IO. What FCs lack but LCs possess are i(semantic)-selectional properties (cf. Ouhalla 1991: 13; compare also Grewendorf 1991: 15). Thus, LCs s-select the arguments contained in their theta-grid, e.g., a transitive verb takes two arguments, the external argument (subject) and the internal (the object), and discharges two respective theta roles, e.g., agent to the external argument, and patient to the internal argument, as in Peter hit Paul. Because of the redundancy between s-selection and c-selection in the case of substantives—a verb s-selects a patient theta role which is categorially realized as an NP in a predictable way—the necessity of c-selection is obviated here. This redundancy is captured by the notion of Canonical Structural Realization (CSR) (cf. Chomsky 1986). Summarizing, FCs show c-selectional and m-selectional properties and have grammatical features4. Of course, FCs are also categorially specified (+/-V, +/-N), e.g., AUX and modal s are verbs. For parameterization to succeed, the child must simply determine the respective lexical elements realizing a certain FC and determine its lexical properties, e.g., which c-selectional, which m-selectional properties, which grammatical features a FC possesses, but not that it possesses these features: Generally, we can think of functional categories as constituting a small (closed) lexicon whose members are determined by UG. Each member has a set of relevant lexical information associated with it, the values of which are open. The learning process can be thought of consisting of two steps. The first step is to identify the elements which correspond to each of those categories in a given language, and the second is to determine the lexical properties of each of these elements on the basis of positive evidence. (Ouhalla 1991: 18)

Note that parameterization presumably operates on discrete items, i.e., each fuctional item may have a distinct parametric value independent of other members of the same functional For a different view the organisation of phrase-structure, see Grimshaw (1991), who claims that phrase-structure is not organised by selection but by projection. See section 5.3 for a discussion of Grimshaw's Extended Projection. In Guilfoyle/Noonan (1988/1991) yet another distinctive feature of FCs is given. Relying on Fukui (1986), Functional Categories are presumed to offer only one specifier position, as opposed to multiple, iterative specifier positions of Lexical Categories. That is, Functional and Lexical Categories are also distinct in terms of X-bar-theory.

25

class (cf. Wexler/Manzini 1987). This is the Lexical Parameterization hypothesis. The structure-building hypothesis makes the interesting prediction that potentially available principles still have to wait for their application until the respective grammatical structures they operate on have matured. Thus, it may happen that principles apply vacuously in the beginning (cf. Guilfoyle/Noonan 1988: 5). It looks like they did not exist. But appearances are deceptive: principles simply cannot apply until they can be structurally represented. By the integration of both the continuity and the maturational approach, the advantages of both are maintained while the disadvantages of both are avoided. The trigger problem is circumvented by reliance on the maturational approach, "wild" grammars are excluded by reliance on the continuity approach. Note that the problems with maturation are nevertheless mantained in the section of the structure-building hypothesis that still underlies maturation: PCs. As PCs are so tightly associated with syntax, these problems concern the crucial aspect of language acquisition. As before, maturation, now only of PCs, remains mysterious. Formerly, one could excuse the lack of a certain structure or construction with the still immature system. Now, one can excuse it by saying that a certain PC has not yet matured. The continuity hypothesis claims that the child's grammar equals the target adult grammar, the only difference being the absence of PCs. Thus, the child's grammar is automatically a subset of the target adult grammar. The absence of Functional Categories has another interesting implication concerning another module, Move-alpha. It is an often discussed topic whether a child's grammar exhibits syntactic movement or not.5 The position taken in the structure-building hypothesis is that, while move-alpha is not really missing, it may not show up because of the absence of functional projections and their respective heads and specifiers, which alone could serve as landing sites for moved elements. Necessary reorderings of constituents have to be improvised by means of adjunction. Apart from the landing-site argument, consider the motivational argument, which is in fact decisive: movement is not motivated in child grammar! For that reason it does not take place and is in fact barred for even stronger reasons of economy. Since Chomsky's economy conderations (Chomsky 1989) and his Minimalist Framework (1992, 1994, 1995, 2000), any process not serving a necessary and indispensable checking process is strictly ruled out. Only in this sense are syntactic movements licit, any others are illicit. Movement takes place for grammatical reasons. According to the theta-criterion, movement always targets a non-theta-position. The position a lexical element is base-generated in, is always thetamarked. The child does not yet "know" non-theta-positions. Arguments are always basegenerated in their argument position and have a local relation to their theta-marking head. Hence, in their base structure, child utterances are always true representations of the argument structure (e.g., of a verb), or true lexical structures (cf. Radford 1988, 1990a+b, Lebeaux 1988/2000). Therefore, they look semantic and have led to the erroneous The discussion here logically implies that the target grammar in fact comprises such a module, i.e., that move -alpha is a proper ingredient of our modularly organized grammatical faculty. But note that it is a topic still under discussion whether UG has to be characterized in both representational as well as derivational terms, the position taken by Chomsky (cf. 1992, 1994, 1995), or whether a strictly representational account renouncing movement can be given (cf. Brody 1993).

26 conclusion that children are still lacking syntax; instead, they are supposed to operate on the basis of semantic rules with only semantic predicates (Schlesinger 1971, Brown 1973, Bowerman 1973). Here, the structure-building hypothesis achieves the second basic integration. It does not claim that children start out with semantics and change the linguistic representation into true syntax only later on. By claiming instead that only the grammatical structures but not the whole grammar are delayed, it can explain and predict early child language in a way that is empirically adequate. The telegraphic style, the semantic-thematic look of this language results from the missing syntactic or functional module (cf. Radford 1990a: 197). Since theta-theory and argument structure are part of the grammar and are also syntactically structured, as Lebeaux (1988/2000) convincingly shows, one cannot say that the child lacks syntax or that syntax is "too difficult" for her. The child is endowed with syntax and with all of the UG principles. Only one module, PCs, is missing and thus cannot contribute to the modular interaction that finally leads to linguistic utterances. The child only operates with the Lexical Categories, N, V, A, and P. They carry the early linguistic expressions of the child in the so-called pre-functional stage (cf. Radford 1990a, Tsimpli 1991, 1992), until she can take possession of her full grammatical faculty after the emergence of Functional Categories. Guilfoyle/Noonan (1988: 15f.) contrast the pre-functional stage withfive,functional stage as follows: (9)

Stage (i) Lexical Categories only No INFL, COMP or DET or KASE: no movement by substitution, no tense marking, no modals. The appearance of negatives and Wh-words at the beginning of clauses are due to adjunction where Wh-words and negatives adjoin to VP. No determiners or genitive marking on nouns. Stage (ii) Functional categories appear The Adult grammar: Modals, tense and agreement marking, determiners and plurals. For English NP- and Wh-movement are now possible as now SPEC of IP and SPEC of CP are now available. For German, V-movement is now possible and we find evidence of V2effects. (Guilfoyle/Noonan 1988: 15f.)

According to Radford (1990a: 1%), the pre-functional stage begins at around 20 months, the functional stage at around 24 months +/- 20%. The generalized functional stage in (ii) can be specified or sub-divided, as not all PCs emerge instantaneously, but temporally ordered. This is especially true of the C-system, which is the latest achievement in language acquisition as far as syntax is concerned. The order of the emergence of Functional Categories is still unsettled (cf. Radford 1990a; Tsimpli 1991: 133), even if the mechanism is clear: as soon as a new FC "matures", it is built into the already existing structure as a new projection, in accordance with the X-bar scheme: "This implies that language development is essentially a process of structure building." (Tsimpli 1991: 133; cf. Guilfoyle/Noonan 1988/1991) But note that the structure-building hypothesis has only elegantly evaded the crucial question: how do the FC come into being in the first place? The contrast (9 (i)) vs. (9 (ii)) is not at all surprising. This, we knew all the time. But what we still do not know is how the transition from (i) to (ii) is performed! Maturation is the old answer, but we should not content ourselves with it.

27 Before we engange in a tentative new answer in the spirit of dynamical systems, let us look at the syntax of the pre-functional stage, or, at the early patterned speech (cf. Radford 1990a).

3.1.1

The Structure of the Pre-functional Stage

According to Radford (1990a: 1%) the pre-functional phrase marker has the abstract canonical form in (10):

(10)

XP

YP

theta-marked specifier (subject) X lexical thetamarking head

ZP lexical thetamarked complement

In this purely thematic but syntactically structured theta-tree (cf. Lebeaux 1988/2000), the specifier YP, as well as the complement ZP, are theta-marked by the lexical head X. There are still no non-thematic constituents, e.g., expletives: "The predicate phrase is the domain of theta-marking and theta-receiving elements only." (Ouhalla 1991: 31) Radford (1988, 1990a+b) also calls the general scheme of the form [NP XP] small clause (SC), where the constituent XP can be represented by any of the four lexical categories AP, NP, VP, PP. The NP is the subject, the XP is the predicate. The child's VP has traditionally received the most attention in the literature, followed by the child's NP. The resemblance of the child's sentence structure to a similar one that has long been known to exist in the adult grammar as well, i.e., the SC, is compelling. The coincidence between the two is well expressed this way. Yet, a crucial difference between child SCs and adult SCs must not be neglected: SCs in the adult grammar may never function as matrix clauses, whereas the child SCs regularly are matrix clauses (cf. Radford 1988: 28). Could it be that child structures, like SCs, do not disappear in the course of language acquisition but are retained as modules in the adult grammar, much in the spirit of Lebeaux1 (1988/2000) model of grammatical layers?

3.2

The Building-Block Model

While discussing existing generative language acquisition models and looking for proper candidates for a dynamical approach in the field, the building-block model of the Tübingen

28 group around Rosemarie Tracy (Fritzenschaft et al. 1990, Gawlitzek-Maiwald et al. 1992, d'Avis/Gretsch 1994, Fritzenschaft 1994, Tracy 1991, 1994, 1994/95) is promising in several respects. Firstly, it is a modular approach, allowing for the temporally distinct acquisition of the re-spective modules. Secondly, it predicts intra- as well as interindividual variation, which both are at the core of any dynamical model. Variations occur in an interim phase in grammatical development, allowing for non-deterministic acquisition paths (cf. d'Avis/ Gretsch 1994, see chapter 4). Thirdly, the building-block model implements dynamical interactions in the course of acquisition, e.g., bootstrapping (see also chapter 14) and precursor phenomena (see also chapter 12). Let us elaborate on these aspects. What are the crucial building-blocks of the buildingblock model? The target grammar is viewed as consisting of "various levels or modules" (Fritzenschaft 1994: If.), "i.e., pragmatics, semantics, syntax, lexicon, etc." (ibid.: 2). This is the traditional modularity assumption in generative grammar. But, transferred to language acquisition, modularity is crucially exploited as a source of variation. The child acquiring certain structures, or constructions6 does not acquire them in an all or nothing fashion, but rather develops them over time'^', by discovering and collecting relevant information at various levels or modules of the target language grammar, i.e., pragmatics, semantics, syntax, lexicon, etc. (...) As individual learners may temporally focus on different aspects of their overall task, variation is to be expected, (ibid.: If., cf. also 12, 16,28)

The children, selectively gathering information from these various modules, converge on the common target, but each of them in a different way. This appears to be rather natural, given the overall modular design of the language faculty. However, until now no crucial use has been made of modularity for an explanation of developmental variation. But, in fact, modularity invites an elaboration on the different modules in different ways during acquisition. Fritzenschaft (1994), discussing the acquisition of German passive, points out that it would be perfectly possible for the child to start out with the verbal passive instead of the adjectival passive, with the latter generally taken to be the first kind of passive since the influential article of Borer/Wexler (1987, see section 2.2). We have to get used to the idea that language acquisition—apart from general developmental similarities—apparently displays more variation than our hitherto existing models allowed us to perceive. D'Avis/Gretsch (1994) place variation inside an interim phase (B) of grammar acquisition, a phase that is framed by a phase (A) before the onset of a new construction or structure, i.e., the initial grammar, and a phase (C) where the respective structure/construction has been acquired, i.e., the target grammar (ibid.: 64). This idea ties in very nicely with the dynamical model to be proposed here (see section 4.2). Yet, the Tübingen group also uses concepts to be dismissed here, e.g., the concept of learner types. Before critically discussing this topic, let us summarize the building-block design in a nutshell, as it is proposed in d'Avis/Gretsch (1994):

Fritzenschaft (1994) takes the acquisition of passive as a paradigmatic case, Tracy (1994) the acquisition of wh-phrases; d'Avis/Gretsch (1994) focus on the complementizer system.

29 This building-block model accounts for the variation in the data on the basis of a highly modular architecture whereby the acquisition of a new structure depends on the acquisition of individual constituents, the building-blocks. There is, figuratively speaking, a box of blocks for every structure that gets built by the child during the acquisition process. In order to acquire a structure a child must assemble all the blocks. The way the blocks get assembled depends in each case on the learning strategies applied and the learner types involved. (d'Avis/Gretsch 1994: 60)

What are these different learner types, and how are they characterized? First, d'Avis/Gretsch (1994: 69ff.) rely on the traditional distinction between type and token: A type contains all relevant feature-value pairs with individual values replaced by variables. A token is, in contrast, the specific instantiation of some type, (ibid.: 69) The authors, discussing the acquisition of complementizers, characterise the type, i.e., the C-head, with regard to the various building-blocks. Thus, on the phonetic level, the type is simply represented as a variable X. On the syntactic level a whole feature-bundle is characteristic, e.g., category: C, bar-level: 0, selection: S, subordination: +, V2: -, etc. (ibid.: 68). On the semantic level the complementizer belongs to a class of connectors, which again is characterized by a variable, Y. The token, on the other hand, is an individual lexical item, a constant belonging to the set of complementizers, e.g., German weil (because). Again, this token has concrete entries for any of the building-block levels. Phonetically, it is spelled out as [vail]. Syntactically, the features are determined as above. Semantically, the class of connectors that weil belongs to is determined as causal (ibid.: 68). How does the child exploit the type-token-distinctionl On the basis of this differentiation there are principally two possible developmental styles: Lexically-oriented learners (bottom-up learners) initially acquire single tokens and generalize across them in the course of development in order to derive a type. Top-down learners, on the other hand, begin with a type where place holders for individual values have to be replaced by specific values. (d'Avis/Gretsch 1994: 69) This learner-type distinction patterns intuitively with what we all know of the different modes of acquisition and learning: some of us are more "analytically" oriented, others more "synthetically". In fact, the top-down/bottom-up distinction is quite traditional and is also expressed by the dichotomy "goal-driven" vs. "data-driven" (ibid.: 67). But can it tell us anything specific about language acquisition? Firstly, it serves as a more informal and perhaps also stereotypical and idealized characterization. The authors admit that any kind of combination between the two learning strategies may be choosen by a single child, or that the strategies mix at a certain time, follow one another, that different strategies may be choosen with respect to the various building blocks, etc. (ibid.: 69). Secondly, it adds a further dimension to the overall developmental matrix. Besides the level-orientation, i.e., the question of whether a child prefers the syntactic or any other module at the outset, a process orientation (ibid.: 69), i.e., the learning strategy, is introduced. Both factors interact and result in individual developmental styles (ibid.), evidenced by interindividual variation. Again, the building-block framework supplies a consistent explanation of the whole range of phenomena without neglecting developmental determinism:

30 This free variation clashes with the requirement of leamability theory that language acquisition can only be explained in a deterministic fashion. The data appear to be compatible both with a deterministic process and with a non-deterministic process rich in variation. This paradox is resolved by subdividing the developmental process into superordinate grammars and subordinate interim grammars. It is on the level of feature acquisition, or rather feature matching (that is, at the level of the interim grammars), that variation occurs, whereas the level of the superordinate grammar, of complete developmental steps, is subject to rigid determinism, (ibid.: 70) Without elaborating further on this topic, let us grant that the authors give a coherent picture of UG-conform development but also allow for rich variation. Thirdly, the learner-type concept naturally explains dynamical phenomena like bootstrapping, over-generalization, and precursors. Bootstrapping occurs when an already well-developed building-block, say, the syntactic one, speeds up the acquisition of a still under-developed module, say, the phonetic one, or allows for transfer in the acquisition of still other structures and constructions. Over-generalizations happen when the learner initially takes the token for the type, e.g., when a German child takes weil to be a generalized complementizer serving any connecting function. Precursors appear in the interim phase (B) when, for example, the complex features of C have not yet been completely accumulated. The incomplete bundles of features manifest themselves as various precursor structures. After this evaluation, what is wrong, especially with the learner-type concept? Firstly, it has no explanative power, only a descriptive value, and was probably also conceived as such. We observe different children obviously focussing on different aspects, on syntax rather than on semantics, or on types rather than on tokens. But if one whishes to rehabilitate variation—and this is the cornern and the achievement of the building-block model—why does one renounce it again by grouping together individuals in terms of learner-types or learning strategies? These dichotomies have no place in a fully spelled-out dynamical model, where they are seen as epiphenomena at best. There are no general types to abstract away from individuals (see section 4.3). A sample is not charactarized by mean values or stereotypes, but each individual trajectory is taken to be the singular instantiation of individual parametric values. This implies a new methodological outlook. Of course, there is some natural tension between idiomaticity and nomothetical laws, already discussed in 1.3, with advantages and disadvantages on either side. Here, the focus is on individuals. That individuals prefer to choose similar developmental pathways may show that the epigenetic landscape, which serves as the background for acquisition, allows for some grand avenues, but not as learning types but as an epiphenomenon of selforganization. These similarities fall out spontaneously. They are not caused by any group characteristics, much as big rivers are the organic result of many small ones converging on a single river-bed for reasons of self-organization and fractality. Another problem arises with regard to the tension between determinism and non-determinism. In d'Avis/Gretsch (1994) this dichotomous pair is correctly considered problematic for any account incorporating rich variation. For reasons of leamability, language acquisition must be strictly deterministic (ibid.: 70). Yet, rich variation requires loosening this strict constraint. Some aspects of acquisition seem to be non-deterministic. The authors try to resolve this "paradox" (ibid.) by means of a divide et impera strategy. While the overall

31 development, especially in phases (A) and (C), i.e., in the superordinate grammar, proceeds in a deterministic fashion, this is not the case for phase (B), i.e., for the interim or subordinate grammar. Here, non-determinism reigns. The advantage of such a mixed deterministic/non-deterministic model is a more flexible conceptualization of a developmental model (ibid.) (that) tries for the synthesis of so far conflicting positions and is therefore more apt at handling the data than previous models [...]. (ibid.: 70f.) This is stated with a good intention. However, this elegant deterministic/non-deterministic attribution to the various kinds of grammars, superordinate and subordinate, seems implausible. After all, the subordinate grammar is a grammar too, as is the superordinate one, and it is not convincing to treat the former that differently from the latter. Yet, if a more general framework could be supplied in which these seeming paradoxes disappear, one would be more willing to accept this proposal. In fact, such an account will be given below (see section 4). I will try to motivate a dynamical model of language acquisition in which the deterministic/non-deterministic distinction is relieved by a new paradigmatic concept, i.e., deterministic chaos. As is known from chaos theory and the various models of self-organizing dynamical systems, strictly deterministic systems may exhibit phases of apparent "chaos", while they are nevertheless governed by deterministic equations. Under given circumstances, these deterministic equations lead dynamical systems into turbulent phases which they leave again when the computation eventually reaches the attractors, i.e., order parameters, by which these systems are characterized. D'Avis/Gretsch's (1994) proposal is well on the way towards such an account, but it needs to be supplied with a suitable and coherent paradigmatic frame. The crucial step to be made is from static models to dynamical models. In static models—and generative grammar is still a static one—proposals like the above remain odd. Either one stays inside the old framework and dismisses them, or one adopts a new framework in which they can receive new sense. Only then can these ideas receive their full explanatory force, or, to speak with Peirce again, will secondness turn to thirdness.

4

Liminalia

1. All that is, is local. 2. All that is, is interaction. 3. All that is, is discrete. 4. AH that is, becomes. (Eisenhardt, Kurth/Stiehl 1995: 135)'

4.1 Introduction The title of this chapter—liminalia, from lat. Urnen ('threshold')—only apparently leads away from linguistics to structural anthropology, where the notion liminality originated and was fruitfully used by V. W. Turner (1967, 1969, 1974, 1977) in discussing the "rites de passages" (cf. v. Gennep 1960, Bianchi 1986, Pentikäinen 1986). Turner focussed on the unstable, liminal phase between two stable states. This tripartite structure of change of state which a traditional society or an individual may undergo, is universal. In cultural anthropology it was found to be accompanied by special "rites of passage": rites of separation at the end of the first, stable state (A), liminal rites of passage (in the narrow meaning) during the critical phase (B), and rites of aggregation at the beginning of a qualitatively new stable phase (C).2 Due to its universality, it is not surprising to find this algorithm again in other fields of research, for example linguistics. The tripartite conceptualization of initial grammar, interim grammar, and target grammar, as in d'Avis/ Gretsch (1994) and more or less explicitely throughout generative grammar—remember the notions initial state S„ interim states Sj etc. and steady state Ss—all have their roots here. In order to show the interdisciplinary scope and to honor the illuminated and illuminating work of Turner, who first and most thorougly elaborated this algorithm, I will use his tripartite concept and his terminology in discussing dynamical systems. Although his concept stems from the 70's, Turner was as far-sighted as to foresee developmental trends of the next 20 years across many disciplines. Now they can also be applied to linguisticsabstracting away from rites, of course... The tripartite algorithm sensu Turner, applied to language acquisition, can be divided as follows: (11) (i) Preliminal stable state (A). This state corresponds to the initial state characterized by a stable and coherent working regime, i.e., grammar, up to the point where fluctuation sets it and heralds the

(ii) Liminal unstable state (B). This state corresponds to the interim state characterized by an unstable grammar, allowing for (restricted) variation, i.e., for dissipative branching of the system, with only one or a few "successful" stabilizing branches in the future. Here, symmetryAlles, was ist, ist lokal. Alles, was ist, ist Wechselwirkung. Alles, was ist, ist diskret. Alles, was ist, wird. These three phases are also called pre-liminal, liminal, and post-liminal, respectively.

33 breaking or the critical phase-transition takes place. This is the proper field of selforganization eventually resulting in a (iii) Post-liminal stable state (C). This state corresponds to the steady state and is characterized again by a stable, but presumably more complex working regime, i.e., the adult grammar (core and periphery).

This tripartite algorithm is assumed to apply repeatedly, not only once, leading to increasing dissolution and refinement on several scales of magnitude and time (see section 4.2). Yet, on any such scale the system looks self-similar. In this sense, (11) is also true as a bold characterization of the whole course of language acquisition. But note that this is no idealization, due to the acknowledgement of its fractality. Much as Turner did, I will not focus here on the stable states, but on the liminal or unstable threshold states, i.e., on the process by which the critical passage between two stable grammars is mastered. This focussing on liminality as the "figure"—in terms of Gestalt psychology—necessarily implies that the "ground", i.e., the frames of stability around the unstable phase is somewhat disregarded. But who actually knows what the frame or "normal" state is: order or chaos? With this question, chaos theory challenges previous static theories as well as our common sense. In addition, I will always take pains to point out the polarity and interdependence between any of the hitherto dichotomous aspects, e.g., stability vs. instability, determinism vs. indeterminism, continuity vs. discontinuity, process vs. state, order vs. disorder, figure vs. ground. Liminality manifests itself in several aspects to each of which a separate chapter is devoted—with overlappings, as is natural in this field. I will start out with the discussion of time, which recently has become a focal theme of discussion in many areas of research. Richard Feynman's definition: time is what happens when nothing else happens3 may serve as a point of departure here. Stripping off events of any kind, time emerges as a protagonist itself. Nor will it come as a surprise that the brain as the liminal organ becomes another protagonist here.

4.2 Time in Language Acquisition Quid est ergo "tempus"? Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio.4 ('What, then, is "time"? When no-one asks me about it, I know it; when I want to explain it to a questioner, I don't know it.')

No less a person than Augustinus can I take recourse to in not being able to answer the question about the nature of time, myself. Why, then, should one ask about time in linguistics? 3 4

This quotation is taken from Poeppel (1985: 16). Again, this quotation is taken from Poeppel (1985: 17). It stems from Augustinus, from the 11th book of his Confessiones (orig. 397/398).

34 The answer has to be given for different time-scales: on a macro time-scale, on a medium time-scale,5 and on a micro time-scale, for language has become a faculty of the human brain over time (phylogeny) and changes over time (diachrony); it is acquired anew by each generation (ontogeny)', and, it is processed in time by our brains (microgenesis).6 As trivial as these statements are, they have hardly entered research in linguistics. Compared to the recent interest in time in the other sciences (cf. Prigogine 1977, 1997, Prigogine/Stengers 1987, 1990, Briggs/Peat 1989, Hawking 1988), there is some backlog for generative linguistics to work off. Time—more exactly, the direction of time—is indispensable for the explanation of the ontogeny of language, the major topic here: "However, unless the direction of time is introduced, evolutionary processes cannot be described in any nontrivial way" (Prigogine 1977: 2). Prigogine rejects "a static universe: a universe of being without becoming" (ibid.), as in the Newtonian paradigm in physics. Instead, he develops a new scientific paradigm—the physics of becoming—which is characterized by true historicity, dissipation, and self-organization. It is crucial to take into account that in dynamical, dissipative systems development is not simply time-dependent but state-dependent. The system's state Sn depends on the system's state S n _i, i.e., the state in which the system was before. This, van Geert (1993) stresses is his own dynamical model, the state-dependent model of growth: The state-dependent model of growth, which lies at the heart of our dynamic systems approach, however, employs time not as a parameter, but as an operator. Time is proportional to the number of times an equation has been iteratively applied, that is, the number of times an equation has taken its previous result [S n _i, my remark, A. H.], as input to produce a new result [Sn, my remark, A. H.j, that is, a new state variable, (van Geert 1993: 327)

Such iterative equations lead to ordered as well as to chaotic regimes—as chaos theory always stresses—due to the nonlinear character of dynamical systems. This aspect is relevant to language acquisition, where the change between stability and variability is a central topic: State-dependent iterative equations produce regularity as well as irregularity and chaos, progression as well as regression, order as well as chaos. The state-dependent conception places complexity, nonlinearity, non-predictability (by extrapolation) and intra- and interpersonal variability back to where it belongs: at the heart of developmental inquiry, (van Geert 1993: 327f.)

Variation, the theme in section 4.4, is already introduced here in connection with time. Both are interactive, or variations on a common dynamical theme. Yet, in generative grammar, the temporal aspect is "idealized away", as in Chomsky's instantaneous model of language acquisition (see section 2.1). Smith/Thelen (1993) explicitly point out and criticize the tight connection between structural theories as Chomsky's generative grammer and the neglect of time: Here, the medium-time scale is associated with the ontogeny of language, i.e., primarily with the period from childhood to adolescence of an individual. Note that in Waddington (1957) this time scale is associated with the whole life-span of an individual: "On the medium scale, an animal or plant must be thought of as something which has a life history." (ibid.: 6) For the fast psychological time scale v.d. Malsburg (1987: 425) also uses the term logogenesis.

35 Explanations of global structure in terms of timeless constants in the head lead to theories that are inherently incomplete and that do not explain how the global order of behavior is ever actually achieved. (Smith/Thelen 1993: 161)

Although intermediate stages are known in generative grammar, the stress has always been on the initial state S, and on the steady state SSi The transitions are considered strictly deterministic in the sense of UG. But as Wildgen correctly points out, this treatment is incomplete: not only the two classical levels of stability, S, (initial state) and Ss (steady state) of Chomsky, have to be considered, but also a multitude of intermediate levels through which the child passes during language acquisition: The mediation between different levels of stability (CHOMSKY gave only the genetic code as initial state and the stationary state of the mature speaker; cf. CHOMSKY, 1981: 68) must be achieved by processes which produce stability and explain the enormous increase of structure. Today, the theory of dynamical and self-organizing systems seems to fulfill this task in first approximation. (Wildgen/Mottron 1987: llf.) 7

In linguistics, especially generative grammar, the transition to nonlinear, dynamical systems has not been executed. On the other hand, the defenders of dynamical systems have not penetrated into the study of syntax, as the generativists have! As this study investigates the acquisition of syntax under a dynamical perspective, I am in a twofold liminal situation. The task of explaining syntax as self-organized is sufficiently clear; its solution is not automatically given, however. Against previous assumptions, especially grammar manifests itself as highly self-organized. But, due to its complexity and the diversity of cooperating levels, it is a great challenge for a dynamical theory of language. (Wildgen/Mottron 1987: 87)8

Back to generative grammar. Nobody would want to deny its merits with respect to the nativist account as against the behaviorist account at the time of the nascence of generative grammar (cf. Chomsky 1959). But generative grammar is an "enterprise" (cf. Chomsky 1982a), a scientific organism evolving in time, too. Its own historical development—the dispute with behaviorism and its roots in American structuralism—stands in nice contrast to the contents of this discipline with regard to time. It ignores time, but has reached this position as a result of timedependent, historical co-evolution with the contemporary competing approaches of the 60's. Structural linguistics is " 'synchronique1, c'est-a-dire qu'elle ignore le temps et ses effets" (Thorn 1974: 239f, cf. Wildgen 1985, Wildgen/Mottron 1987). This ignorance is by no means necessary for a structural approach to linguistics, as Thorn goes on, but—as a historical matter of fact—it has taken this form:

Die Vermittlung zwischen verschiedenen Stabilitätsebenen (CHOMSKY gab nur den genetischen Code als Anfangszustand und den stationären Zustand des ausgereiften Sprechers an; vgl. CHOMSKY, 1981: 68) muß durch Prozesse, welche Stabilität herstellen und die enorme Strukturvermehrung erklären können, geleistet werden. Heute scheint die Theorie dynamischer und selbstorganisierender Systeme diese Aufgabe in erster Annäherung erfüllen zu können. [...] erweist sich gerade die Grammatik als hochgradig selbstorganisiert. Allerdings ist sie wegen ihrer Komplexität und der Vielfalt kooperierender Ebenen eine harte Herausforderung für eine dynamische Sprachtheorie.

36

[...]: on peut faire une theOrie structurale des changements de formes, considers comme une mo hologie sur l'espace produit de l'espace substrat par Taxe des temps, (ibid.: 240) Thorn himself has formulated a general discipline of morphogenesis and considers linguistics a "discipline morphologique exemplaire" (Thorn 1974, title, and p. 241). The state of affairs with regard to generative grammar has changed by now. The self-chosen isolation which Karpf (1990) calls "splendid isolation" has granted autonomy to generative grammar—externally against behaviorism; later, internally, against generative semantics. The claim has been that language, especially the syntactic faculty, is a separate cognitive module, inborn to our species. The modularity claim was elaborated by Fodor (1983, 1985). After its successful etablishment, generative grammar is now in a position where it can free itself from the objectionable and unseasonable armour of idealizations and abstractions. These are no longer adaptive. Meanwhile there have emerged—one does not exactly know why—new models that have already triggered a scientific revolution or that are just about to do so. The theory of dynamical systems offer generative grammar attractive alternatives for co-evolution. The potential attraction that such models offer is, however, ambivalent. One such attractor is connectionism which has recently challenged generative tenets, among others by inviting everybody to "rethink innateness." (Elman et al. 1996) The model to be proposed here is not a connectionist one, as it does not deny a rich initial structure. Yet, it is no strictly nativist model, either. Is it eclectic, then? It is not, as I hope to show, but a third way. If the biologist/connectionist Kauffman (1993) is right in claiming that the fittest systems for the most complex tasks are such that choose neither the solid regime nor the chaotic regime out of three possible macroscopic states, but find a balance in the third, marginal regime "poised on the edge of chaos" (ibid.), then this is also true of the model to be proposed here and also of the scientific model-building today. Like Kauffman, Wildgen (1985) compares Chomsky's generative grammar to the crystalline, solid state of matter: nativism imposes the strictest constraints on the language module. Pure connectionism, on the other side, assuming a tabula rasa, would represent the gaseous aggregate, respectively. Yet, the most adaptive systems, according to Kauffman (1993), are those in the realm of the liquid interface —or, to use again Turner's (1967) terminology, systems that are betwixt and between. Thus, it is desirable to develop such a liminal interface-model for two reasons: the first reason relates to the content of the language acquistition model, the second reason to the theory of science. The reflection on the position of one's own discipline in the discourse of the scientific community is by no means an epiphenomenon but belongs to the fractal character of the account here. This is due to the self-similarity on different scales of magnitude: one is the single concept, the other one is the whole scientific discourse. The most prominent one from the set of dynamical systems I draw upon is the Brussels school around Ilya Prigogine who has revolutionized chemistry with his research on dynamical dissipative systems. His more philosophical ideas about the significance of time in the sciences—physical and mental sciences—shall be explored here for linguistics, as well.

37 4.2.1

Time, Historicity, and Dissipative Systems

Prigogine (1977, 1997) and Prigogine/Stengers (1987, 1990, see also Wildgen/Mottron 1987: 70ff, Smith/Thelen 1993: 163) explicitely introduce time as a historical factor into the physical sciences—an area that hitherto had been governed by seemingly unchangeable "eternal" laws of nature. Prigogine was able to show that nature is not submitted to reversible processes, but that these are only exceptions. The static Newtonian paradigm is superseded by the developing dynamical paradigm of self-organization. Not reversible, linear, integrable equations are in the foreground anymore, but nonlinear, non-integrable equations characterizing dissipative systems far away from equilibrium. Recall that these are systems developing and branching under consumption of energy which they dissipate. These branchings take place at critical instable points of bifurcation and lead the system through discrete phase transitions into new and increasingly complex states: In contrast to thermodiffusion, the formation of a dissipative structure not only requires the distancing from the equilibrium—the stationary states following the equilibrium state far from equilibrium [...] need to loose their stability, too. Only systems the processes of which are described by nonlinear mathematical equations can have this 'threshold of instability'. Beyond this threshold [...] dissipation serves as a source of order and creation of the new. This happens [...] by a truly collective process of selforganization, in which periodical behavior, spatial symmetry-breaking, etc. occur. This is the realm of 'dissipative structures'. ( Prigogine/Stengers 1990: 12)9 (cf. also section 1.1, cf. also Kelso, Ding/Schöner 1993: 18) These phase-transitions determine the irreversibility of the development. At each of these points entropy-barriers are built up. They constitute the system as a temporal, historical one. This process is irreversible: A dissipative structure, on the other hand, is receptive of a true history, which unites the interplay of fluctuations and the determinism of the laws of mean values. For the values that are determined by the border conditions, several stable attracting states are in fact possible. Which of these is realized, depends on the path the system actually chooses. Once the system is more and more removed from the equilibrium by interaction with the environment, the system passes through zones of instability with respect to certain fluctuations (bifurcations), and its developmental path may assume quite an eventful, 'historic' character. (Prigogine/Stengers 1990: 13f.)10 9

The German text I rely on here for the translation is again a translation of the original French text "Devenir et Irreversibilit6" (see bibliography): Im Gegensatz zur Thermodiffustion hat die Entstehung einer dissipativen Struktur nicht nur die Auslenkung vom Gleichgewicht als Bedingung, sondern es müssen außerdem die stationären Zustände, die sich fern vom Gleichgewicht an den Gleichgewichtszustand anschließen (...], ihre Stabilität verlieren. Nur Systeme, deren Prozesse von nichtlinearen mathematischen Gleichungen beschrieben werden, können diese "Instabilitätsschwelle" haben. Hinter dieser Schwelle [...] dient die Dissipation als Quelle der Ordnung und Neuschaffung. Das passiert [...] durch einen wirklich kollektiven Prozess der Selbstorganisation, in dem periodisches Verhalten, räumliche Symmetriebrechung usw. auftreten. Das ist das Gebiet der "dissipativen Strukturen". 10 Eine dissipative Struktur dagegen ist empfänglich für eine wirkliche Geschichte, welche das Zufallsspiel der Fluktuationen und den Determinismus der Mittelwert-Gesetze verbindet. Für die durch die Randbedingungen bestimmten Werte sind tatsächlich mehrere stabile attrahierende Zustände möglich. Welcher sich davon verwirklicht, hängt von dem Weg ab, den das System

38

Language, and especially language acquisition, happens in time, too. As time is directed— recall the term "arrow of time"—there is symmetry-breaking. Recently, Kayne (1993: 25f.) pointed out the significance of the directionality of time for the morphology of linguistic structures. Syntax is strictly anti-symmetric, i.e., always has a direction by necessity.11 That language is a system that developed or was selected far from the equilibrium, is undoubted. The language faculty has always been treated as the last faculty distinguishing our species from our relatives. It emerged from a recent fiilguration, to use a term of Konrad Lorenz (1973: 48).12 Therefore, it is farthest removed from any energetic equilibrium and thus predestined to a dynamical interpretation.

4.2.2

The Macroscopic Time-Scale

Recently, speculations about the phytogeny of the language faculty have caught increasing attention from generativists (cf. Piattelli-Palmarini 1987/1989, Fanselow 1989, Haider 1990, 1993), from linguistic critics of the latter (cf. Pinker/Bloom 1990), and from authors investigating and evaluating the neurological, especially the cortical bases of language evolution (cf. Greenfield 1991, Corballis 1992, Ebdon 1993, Gajdusek et al. 1994). The literature displays a highly incoherent array of possible hypotheses about the evolution of language, moving somewhere on the bipolar dimensions of (12) (i) innatism (as opposed to environmentalism) (ii) selectivism (as opposed to mstructivism) (iii) task-specificity and modularity (as opposed to 'all-purpose devices' and 'general intelligence') (iv) exaptationism (as opposed to adaptation!sm) (Piattelli-Palmarini 1987: 37)

The radically conservative attitude—that the human language faculty evolved gradually as a result of the classical (neo-)Darwinian principles of genetic variation and selection—is de-

tatsächlich wählt. Wenn das System durch die Wechselwirkung mit der Umgebung immer weiter vom Gleichgewicht entfernt wird, so durchschreitet das System Zonen der Instabilität gegenüber bestimmten Fluktuationen (Bifurkationen) und sein Entwicklungsweg kann einen recht ereignisreichen "historischen11 Charakter bekommen. 1 ' His account is embedded in the generative paradigm. Symmetry-breaking or antisymmetry is expressed in terms of antisymmetric c-command, as jn his Linear Correspondence Axiom (LCA) (p. 3). Basically, a given phrase marker is excluded if its terminals are "in too symmetrical a relation to one another. For that reason, they are not 'seen' by the relation of asymmetric c-command, and so fail to be incorporated into the required linear ordering." (ibid.: 6) Thus, antisymmetry is an inherent and universal condition on syntax. Note that Kayne does not distinguish between "asymmetry" and "antisymmetry". If the linguistic phrase marker is a result of symmetry-breaking too, one should better speak of "asymmetry." 12 For the term "fulguration", see also Tracy (1991: 83, 109). Mende/Peschel (1981: 199) relate "fulguration" to their "Evolon"-model. An "Evolon" is an elementary evolution step which consists of seven phases. The first phase is called "breakthrough": if an order parameter has crossed a critical threshold a macroscopic change happens. "K. Lorenz called this phase fulguration, and in evolutionary biology it is called anagenesis. In the social context it is called innovation." (ibid.)

39 fended by Pinker/Bloom (1990). This faculty was exactly tailored to linguistic needs, i.e., the communication of hierarchical and recursive propositions, and to nothing else. Of course, there was a great deal of coincidence and idiosyncrasy; yet, the inspection of the overall design shows that "the engineering demands are simply too complex" (Pinker/ Bloom 1990: 714), that is, only certain structures are admissible—structures that may fulfill these demands. Much like one needs "a television set to display television programs" (ibid.), and no other apparatus—so their analogy—the language system was the only system having evolved by adaptation that may execute the task of communication: Human language is a device capable of communicating exquisitely complex and subtle messages, from convoluted soap opera plots to theories of the origin of the universe. Even if all we know was that humans possessed such a device, we would expect that it would have to have rather special and unusual properties suited to the task of mapping complex prepositional structures onto a serial channel, and an examination of grammar confirms this expectation, (ibid.) That the language faculty was tailored to its task somewhat recalls Lichtenberg's aphorism, who wondered why cats had holes in their fur just where they had their eyes...13 Yet, for Pinker and Bloom this lucky coincidence has nothing circular about it, but serves as an argument for the language faculty's having gradually been shaped by a multitude of small mutations, each with a small effect, in a "hill-climbing process" (ibid.: 711), until it eventually reached its optimal form: Language shows signs of complex design for the communication of propositional structures, and the only explanation for the origins of organs with complex design is the process of natural selection, (ibid.: 726) This explanation is by no means the only one possible. Note that Kauffman (1993, 1995) acknowledges self-organization as an undoubtedly important factor of evolution besides selection. But Pinker and Bloom stand alone not just in the recently revived general discussion about the evolution of complex systems; in the linguistic discussion proper, as well, nobody else holds such a strict Darwinian view. Not even Chomsky, whose statements Pinker and Bloom are forced to quote as counter-arguments. In fact, Chomsky surprises with unorthodox attitudes in his statements about the evolution of language, which constrast with his well-familiar unbroken adherence to nativism. Eventually, these attitudes might even counteract pure nativism. Concerning "an innate language faculty", Chomsky sees [...] a problem for the biologist, since, if true, it is an example of true 'emergence'—the appearance of a qualitatively different phenomenon at a specific stage of complexity of organization. (1972: 70, quoted in Pinker/Bloom 1990: 708) He doubts the overall force of selection: It does seem very hard to believe that the specific character of organisms can be accounted for purely in terms of random mutation and selectional controls.[...] Evolutionary theory appears to have very little to say about speciation, or about any kind of innovation. It can explain 13

Lichtenberg's aphorism reads as follows: "Er wunderte sich, daß den Katzen gerade an der Stelle zwei Löcher in den Pelz geschnitten wären, wo sie die Augen hätten." (Sudelbücher 11, Heft 6883:71)

40 how you get a different distribution of qualities that are already present, but it does not say much about how new qualities can emerge. (Chomsky 1982a: 23, again quoted in Pinker/ Bloom 1990: 708)

But he will not have to wait another hundred years, as he expects himself in the same quotation for biology to out-line a new picture of the evolution of organisms. The starting points of such an account are already in place, and Chomsky vaguely anticipates the crucial factors when he proposes together with the evolutionary theorist S. J. Gould that language may not be the product of natural selection, but a side effect of other evolutionary forces such as an increase in overall brain size and constraints of as yet unknown laws of structure and growth. (Pinker/Bloom 1990: 708) This quotation, paraphrased by Pinker and Bloom, originally reads as follows: Quite possibly other aspects of its [the brain's, my remark, A. H.] development again reflect the operation of physical laws applying to a brain of a certain degree of complexity. (Chomsky 1988: 170, quoted in Corballis 1992: 219)

That is, these physical laws only have an effect on a brain of a certain degree of complexity. The "explosive" increase of the brain volume14 caused by the increase of the neocortex is in fact held responsible for new system potentials like hierarchically organized sequential behavior as evidenced in complex tool use, object manipulation, mathematical computation, and language (cf. Greenfield 1991, Corballis 1992). Dynamically speaking, this corresponds to the emergence of new qualities due to the continuous increase of a control parameter, here the brain volume, or neural connectivity, respectively. No essential change in the genome is necessary for this process. Here, we face a nonlinear, irreversible phase transition, driving away the brain—understood as a dissipative system—from its energetic equilibrium. The energetic "enrichment" of the brain is an investment the system could obviously afford at that time. As it turns out, this increase of the control parameter and subsequent emergence of new brain potentials catapulted the human species at a great distance from its closest relatives. Not only is this phase transition a nonlinear phenomenon in that a qualitative shift happens after a quantitative variation; the respective part of the brain, i.e., the neocortex, is wired in a totally nonlinear way, as well: This means that from most, and presumably all, cells a great number of synaptic paths lead back to themselves again. This circular wiring is typical of the cortex.15 (Braitenberg/Schuz 1989: 173, cf. also Ebdon 1993, cf. section 4.2.3)

Because of this rich self-connection the brain is an autopoetic system, the functioning of which is essentially determined by its hardware design. Because of the genome it is stable enough, because of self-organization via plastic synapses it is flexible enough to optimally adapt to different environmental demands (cf.

14

A realistic mechanism for the rapid increase of the brain's volume is the symmetrical duplication of cortical areas, which show only minor genetic differences (cf. Stryker et al. 1988: 119). 15 Das heißt, daß von den allermeisten, vermutlich von allen Zellen eine große Zahl von synaptisehen Wegen wieder auf sie selbst zurückführt. Diese kreisförmige Verschaltung ist für die Großhirnrinde typisch.

41

Braitenberg/Schüz 1989, Singer 1992, v.d. Malsburg/Singer 1988, Karpf 1990, Ebdon 1993). With the advances made in recent brain research, we come closer to Chomsky's "yet unknown laws of structure and growth" (Pinker/Bloom 1990: 708, see above), as he might have expected himself! That he anticipates them, marks his thinking as progressive and potentially convergent with innovative concepts like the dynamical one. It is no notational peculiarity when he always speaks of the "mind/brain" (cf. Chomsky 1986, etc.), i.e., when he underlines the brain as the organic substrate of our mental language faculty. The mindbrain dichotomy might turn out as an artifact, once a new perspective is taken. This is one of the promises of dynamical systems theory. These ideas have to be embedded in the broader context of a new theory of evolution. Chomsky's concept and those of others begin to replace the classical notion of adaptation by variation and selection with the notion of exaptation (cf. Gould/Vrba 1982, PiattelliPalmarini 1987/1989, Haider 1990,1993). What does exaptation mean? "Exaptive" means "extra-adaptive", i.e., going beyond mere adaptation: "Exaptation describes the emergence of new forms out of chance constellations without selectional pressure."16 (Haider 1990: 14) Thus, some genes are selected for reasons other than the optimation of fitness, e.g., for reasons of mere neighbourhood to a "truly" selected gene. Later, it may turn out that this still inert potential is highly useful for a new emergent function and may indirectly serve an unintended adaptation post hoc. For Haider (1990: 14) this new evolutionary look is a liberation from the "dictate1 ] of adaptation". I quote Piattelli-Palmarini with Haider: What has to supplant adaptation!sm is, in Gould's terms, exaptationism (Gould/Vrba 1982): a style of evolutionary thinking which assigns a central role to traits that have an emergent, serendipitous adaptive value, traits which have been stabilized by mechanisms that were originally independent from their present adaptive value. (Piattelli-Palmarini 1987: 30)

The language faculty, i.e., UG, is taken to be an example of such exaptation: "We have to assume that UG is an exaptive system potential that emerged from the general increase in the capacity of the central nerveous system."17 (Haider 1990: 15) Consequently, Haider uses a dynamical terminology in order to explain the emergence of this new potential: if a "threshold of complexity" (ibid.) is surpassed, [...] totally new, qualitatively different, system faculties emerge. That this new potential is so excellently suited for the processing of the symbol structures that we use in our communication systems, is, in retrospect, a coincidence. That we have continued using it, since it was first used for the processing of natural language, is no coincidence anymore. Man exploits this capacity because it is at his disposal for certain purposes. Not these determine the capacity, but the capacity is present and is instrumentalized. (Haider 1990: 15)18 16

Exaptation beschreibt das Entstehen neuer Formen aus Zufallskonstellationen ohne Selektionsdruck. 17 Wir müssen davon ausgehen, daß UG ein durch die allgemeine Kapazitätssteigerung des Zentralnernsystems (sic!] entstandenes, exaptives Systempotential ist. 18 [...], so treten völlig neue, qualitativ verschiedene, Systemeigenschaften auf. Daß sich dieses neue Potential so exzellent für die Verarbeitung der Symbolstrukturen eignet, die wir in unserem [sie!] Kommunikationssystemen benutzen, ist rückblickend betrachtet ein Zufall. Daß wir es, seit es zur Verarbeitung natürlicher Sprache benützt wird, weiter benützen, ist kein Zufall mehr. Der Mensch nutzt diese Fähigkeit aus, weil sie zur Verfügung steht für bestimmte

42 According to this view, evolution is not necessarily "telic" or guided, as in Lamarck's view (cf. Piattelli-Palmarini 1987: 15); it appears only more "serendipituous" in that still unused, latent potentials are retained for functional selection, which then can happen "instantaneously". This sudden emergence impresses us as a figuration, almost a creatlo ex nihilo. In this sense, selection and emergence are not incompatible. New, emergent capacities of the brain must make use of neuronal cell assemblies, like any other functions, and these neurons must be available. There is nothing mystic about this. Exaptation perfects adaptation. It is not necessarily a contradicting conception of evolution. Even Pinker/Bloom (1990: 712) point out that exaptation corresponds to what Darwin had earlier called preadaptation. Much like there are pre-representations on the neuronal level (cf. Changeux/Dehaene 1989, cf. section 4.3.1.1) which are still unselected, there are these exaptive or preadaptive potentials on an evolutionary scale. Pinker/Bloom correctly view exaptation as an empirical possibility rather than a universal law (1990: 712), as which it is exaggerated in the very enthusiastic essay of Piattelli-Palmarini (1987/1989). This author, however, remains far behind the first heresy—exaptation instead of adaptation—when he allows the exaptive scenario to take place in the genome alone. He only permits for genetic variation as a basis of exaptation and selection: All the constraints come from within; they are coded in the genes and they are so specific, so elaborate and so uniforn within the species that in a wide variety of cases [...] he [the strong innatist, my remark, A. H.J is sure that nothing can go wrong. (Piattelli-Palmarini 1987: 32) He even relies on Changeux* earlier writings and quotes his notion of the genetic envelope. But note that in Changeux/Dehaene (1989) this variation does not necessarily stem from the genome. "Genetic envelope" means: globally licensed by the genes, but locally autonomously realized by the neuronal cell assemblies in the brain (see section 4.3.1.1). Besides, Haider (1990, 1993) proves that the generative language acquisition concept is not strictly selectionist, as Piattelli-Palmarini (1987/1989) wants to make us believe, but hosts an instructivist residual in the form of the notion of parameter fixation. This means that Chomsky holds an interim position (cf. Haider 1990: 18) with his principles-and-parameters-model. On the one hand there is the nativist assumption of a rich innate structure as the basis of selection; on the other hand there is the fixation of the parameter value which, according to Haider, presupposes something like a learning event.19 As he considers UG "cognitive opaque" (ibid.), it remains unexplained how the primary linguistic data (PLD) get mapped onto UG or how they are transferred into it without a "grammar demon" (ibid.). Haider proposes to give up even this learning residual in order to arrive at a "pure selectionist model" (ibid.). The notion of parameter setting is given up in favor of a model of cognitive resonance (Haider 1990,1993). Again, Haider uses a dynamical vocabulary here. He does not view UG Zwecke. Nicht diese determinieren die Fähigkeit, sondern die Fähigkeit ist vorhanden und wird instrumentalisiert. 19 According to Atkinson (1992, chapter 8), it is in fact problematic to draw a neat line between inductive learning (hypothesis testing) and triggering (as assumed in the principles-and-parameters-model). Parameter setting is not so far away from hypothesis testing, if one presupposes that the hypothesis space is severely constrained from the beginning, as generativists do!

43

as a control system but as a processing routine (Haider 1990: 19) that gets activated as a cognitive co-processor (ibid.: 19, also Haider 1993) whenever information with a matching structure comes in.20 For the acquisition process he develops the following neuronal scenario: The child is confronted with a complex task of pattern analysis on various correlated levels (phonetic, form-content, syntax). It will apply the trial and error strategy of general problem solving and try to project representations onto the input which makes it processable. Whenever the child happens to project a structure that suits the "UG-system", the co-processor is activated and these representations become much easier to handle (store, retrieve, match) than others. This is the situation of cognitive resonance, [...]. Under this perspective, the processing potential amounts to a filtering and reinforcement device. It will channel the processing of the language data into UG-conformable channels, and it will do so inevitably. (Haider 1993: 13, cf. also 199»: 19f.)

If Haider calls Chomsky's principles-and-parameters-model hybrid, what then is Haider's account to be called? His terminology and concept floates somewhere between behaviorism and dynamical models. It is surely no advance to drop back on long abandoned behavioristic terms. To break this symmetry and totally rely on a dynamical terminology will be more coherent. Yet, the recourse to terms like trial and error, reinforcement, etc. is not accidental; nor is the revival of behaviorism in terms of connectivism. If one does not want to lapse back into the use of old notions, be they behavioristic, instructionistic, or nativistic, one has to re-interpret them in the new dynamical paradigm. Making their respective roots transparent rather than keeping them opaque is a demand of the philosophy of science. Chomsky's UG-model appears to be more sophisticated, even ambiguous in that Chomsky himself contradicts nativism with his approval of exaptationism. The crucial, hitherto unanswered and, even worse, unanswerable question had been how new qualities such as the language faculty come into being in the first place. Haider's new formulation (1990, 1993) shows how generative grammar has moved in the direction of the dynamical attractor by a minor shift—from parameter setting to cognitive resonance.

4.2.3

The Microscopic Time-Scale

The time scales on which developments take place also stand in resonance with one another. Thus, looking at the evolutionary time scale immediately led to the more fine-grained scale of neuronal time, on which the microgenetical processes of language computation—parsing and production—take place. Since the brain as the liminal motor of language processing is of major importance, a look at neural, especially cortical self-organization is indispensable. Singer (1987, 1989, 1990, 1992a, 1992b) and his colleagues (cf. v.d. Malsburg/Singer 1988, v.d. Malsburg 1987, Stryker etal. 1988, see also Karpf 1990) investigated processes of self-organization in the cortex, especially in the visual area. Here, self-organization means that the genetic program may accomplish its fine wiring of neuronal cell assemblies (NCA) only by depending on experience, i.e., by the aid of spe20

For the terms resonance and dissonance in a "neuronal model of cognitive functions", see Changeux/Dehaene (1989: 87).

44 cific environmental information. Thus, it can "realize functions which would not be realizable with genetic instructions alone." (Singer 1992a: 59)21 The sensory signals from the environment select and consolidate those of a repertoire of genetically given possibilities, the resonance relations of which are optimal, i.e., the internal patterns of which correlate best with the patterns stemming from the periphery (cf. Singer 1992a: 57). Following the mechanism of the Hebb-synapses, the joint activity of neuronal cells causes an increasingly reliable connection of such neurons to cell assemblies, which jointly represent incoming patterns of information. Ineffective synaptic relations between cells are uncoupled again and atrophy. This process is called pruning: Only the more successful synapses can grow; the less successful ones weaken, and eventually disappear." (v.d. Malsburg/Singer 1988: 73) In early development, this pruning involves cortical cells as well. In the beginning, there is an exuberant growth of neurons in the brain which then undergoes activity-dependent selection. Furthermore, this experience-dependent modification relies on central systems such as attention, motivation, awakeness, and feedback, e.g., in the visual area about the position of the eyeballs. It is these central systems "which allow of a global evaluation of the tunedness of the respective activity states." (Singer 1992a: 61)22 Neuronal plasticity is controlled by central projectional systems, among others, using certain neurotransmitters: noradrenaline and acetylcholine. They control the electric excitibility of cells in the visual cortex, which has to pass a critical threshold for an experience-dependent modification to take place. In principle, this could be achieved "also [by] the relations which themselves are responsible for the information processing." (ibid.)23 We have to acknowledge the existence of autopoiesis insofar as the CNS winds off adaptive plastic processes via feedback: The tempting aspect of this hypothesis is that in that case the neuronal nets directly participating in stimulus processing could 'decide' themselves which activity patterns are allowed to leave traces: the better a stimulus matches the given response features of widely ramified neuronal nets, the greater is the number of activated feedback loops and the greater is the probability that the threshold for adaptive changes will be reached. Such a mechanism would have the undoubted advantage that no superordinate control system, which would have to be as least as complex as the processing stuctures themselves that are to be optimized, would be necessary for the supervision of plastic processes.24 (Singer 1992a: 61)

21

[...], Funktionen realisieren kann, die mit genetischen Anweisungen alleine nicht zu verwirklichen wären. 22 (...) welche es erlauben, die Stimmigkeit der jeweiligen Aktivitätszustände global zu bewerten. 23 (...) auch die für die Informationsverarbeitung selbst zuständigen Verbindungen. 24 Das Verlockende an dieser Hypothese ist, daß dann die an der Reizverarbeitung direkt beteiligten Nervennetze selbst darüber 'entscheiden' könnten, welche Aktivierungsmuster Spuren hinterlassen dürfen: Je besser ein Reiz den vorgegebenen Antworteigenschaften weitverzweigter Nervennetze entspricht, um so größer ist die Zahl der aktivierten Rückkopplungsschleifen und um so größer ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, daß die Schwelle für adaptive Veränderungen erreicht wird. Ein solcher Mechanismus hätte den unbestreitbaren Vorzug, daß zur Überwachung plastischer Prozesse kein übergeordnetes Kontrollsystem erforderlich wäre, das mindestens so komplex sein müßte wie die zu optimierenden Verarbeitungsstrukturen selbst.

45 Thus, the fallacy of an infinite regress would be avoided. The superordinate control system would have to be controlled by a further meta control system, and so on...25 In a self-organizing system these advantages are for free, due to nonlinear features like feedback. They belong to the design itself. The interface between the environment and the genome as a third mediating factor (see section 4.3) is of higher significance than Singer himself assumes in his by now already classical model or neuronal (visual) self-organization: The criteria for the experience-dependent association of certain neuronal assemblies are thus determined by three factors: first, by the genetically determined basic wiring of the neuronal nets and the response features of the individual nerve cells, that are determined this way; next by the structure of the visual environment with which the brain enters into interaction via its sensory and motor organs; and finally by the respective state the brain is in while interacting with the environment. The role of extra-genetic factors is accordingly limited to selection from a genetically determined repertoire. (Singer 1992a: 64, cf. ibid.: 51)26 This corresponds exactly to the classical Chomskian conception, according to which one of the genetically given parameter values is selected, depending on the PLD (cf. also Stryker et

al. 1988: 127). However, Singer should not be over-interpreted with respect to presumed chaotic processes in the brain (see section 4.3). Yet, brain physiologists (cf. v.d. Malsburg/Singer 1988, Stryker et al. 1988) make detailed statements about the neuronal principles of selforganization, in which pattern formation plays an important role in the brain, as in other areas of nature. (13) (i) "Fluctuations self-amplify." (ibid.: 71) The initial state of self-organizing systems is relatively undifferentiated. Then, minor accidental fluctuations set in. These fluctuations of the elements of the network—usually discredited as "noise" —can amplify and spontaneously lead to pattern formation, as Prigogine has shown for dissipative structures far from the equilibrium. These patterns are available for selection, then. Here, self-amplification is understood in the sense of Darwinian reproduction (cf. ibid.). (ii) "Limitation of some resource leads to competition among fluctuations and to the selection of the most vigorously growing (the 'fittest') at the expense of others." (ibid., cf. also van Geert (1993)) In biological systems, there is never only a single candidate, but there are always several. They are suited to accomplish their respective task to different degrees. A selection among them must take place. The decision is enforced by the constraints of the competition: the resources are limited; not every fluctuation can grow. But eventually the system is stabilzed by this limitation. Only the best suited candidate wins over the others. Selection between competing patterns of organization is also called symmetry breaking (ibid.: 72): 25

The problem of infinite regress in Piaget's conceptualization of cognitive structures and the meta-Ievels controlling them is discussed in Tracy (1991: 62f.). 26 Die Kriterien für die erfahrungsabhängige Assoziation bestimmter Neuronengrupen werden somit von drei Faktoren bestimmt: einmal von der genetisch vorgegebenen Grundverschaltung der Nervennetze und den dadurch festgelegten Antworteigenschaften der einzelnen Nervenzellen, zum anderen von der Struktur der visuallen Umwelt, mit welcher das Gehirn über seine sensorischen und motorischen Organe in Wechselwirkung tritt, und schließlich von dem jeweiligen Zustand, in dem sich das Gehirn befindet, während es mit der Umwelt interagiert. Die Rolle außergenetischer Faktoren beschränkt sich folglich darauf, aus einem genetisch vorgegegebenen Repertoire auszuwählen.

46 An organizing system may contain a symmetry such that there are several equivalent organized patterns. These compete with each other during organization. [...] One of these has to be spontaneously selected during pattern formation, a process which is called 'spontaneous symmetry breaking, (ibid.) Normally, spontaneous symmetry breaking operates quite slowly, but it can be accelerated by minor changes in the conditions. Then, one pattern is selectively favored. Self-organizing systems are very sensitive to "symmetry-breaking influences" (ibid.: 72) or triggers (see chapter 16). Symmetry-breaking is also responsible for the fractal character of the cortical organization. (iii) "Fluctuations cooperate. The presence of a fluctuation can enhance the fitness of some of the others, in spite of overall competition in the field." (ibid.: 71) All elements of the neuronal net interact. Competition and cooperation are no oppositions, but both have their respective share in self-organization. It is above all local, microscopic interactions which by self-amplification lead to global, coherent patterns on a macroscopic scale: A fundamental and very important observation on organizing systems is the fact that global order can arise from local interactions, (v.d. Malsburg/Singer 1988: 71, cf. also Smith/Thelen 1993, among many others) Hitherto there has existed a chasm between the microscopical world of physiological processes on the one hand and the macroscopical world of psychological processes in the mind on the other hand. A dynamical conception, however, can bridge this chasm. The authors view the principle that global order can arise from local interactions as significant especially for the brain: This fact will be of extreme importance to the brain in which local interactions between neighboring cellular elements are to create states of global order, ultimately leading to coherent behavior, (ibid.: 71) Initial and boundary conditions as well as the kind of forces between the elements constrain self-organization processes (cf. ibid.). These are always embedded in parameters, to which the genome also belongs modulo "predetermined constraints" (ibd.: 74, cf. also 77). To the extent that self-organizing, dissipative systems are always historical phenomena, the reliance on genetic constraints—representing "the frozen wisdom of evolution" (Stryker etal. 1988: 127)—is uncontroversial. Assuming control by central structures (see above) via gating signals (cf. v.d. Malsburg/Singer 1988: 74) does not contradict an approach that underlines especially local interaction. Self-organizing systems are organized top-down/bottom-up (cf. Stadler/Kruse 1992: 154). Different hierarchical levels are intertwined. Thus, in establishing synaptic connections, different signals—local and global—are operating jointly: "These are the presynaptic signal, the postsynaptic signal, and possibly moduiatory signals which are broadcast by central structures." (v.d. Malsburg/Singer 1988: 73) When the activity of two cells (the presynaptic and the postsynaptic cell) is always positively correlated, their synaptic connection is strengthened. This is the mechanism of the ffe&>-synapsis (cf. Singer 1992b: 19ff.). Due to synaptic plasticity, the system can internally generate patterns which correspond to the incoming peripheral signals. Existing relations in the environment can thus be represented internally. As a result, the system becomes exquisitely adapted to its ecological sur-

47 roundings. In order to establish stable connections by self-amplification the critical threshold of plasticity must be passed, for the following reason: The general rule is that the self-amplification of fluctuations must be so weak that only globally ordered systems of cooperating fluctuations are able to grow. This means that the system must be operated just above its plasticity threshold. The consequence of this is that growth is slow: the price to be paid for global order is the amount of time necessary for it to be established, (v.d. Malsburg/Singer 1988: 77) This provides an answer to the question why language acquisition is time-consuming, although the mapping of the PLD onto UG is instantaneous, in principle. The time lag arises from the implementation of UG or whatever will correspond to it in a dynamical approach in the brain. These very processes consume a relatively fair amount of time. They are complex and operate under the polar demands of plasticity on one hand and stability on the other hand, i.e., on the interface between chaos and order. Both demands interact in a presumedly ecological way that ultimately guarantees optimal adaptation. The typical constellation with alternative, symmetrical representations that was mentioned above needs extra time until the symmetry is broken (cf. v.d. Malsburg/Singer 1988: 77). Therefore the effort to break this symmetry as fast as possible. This effort is time- and resource-consuming. Time in particular was shown to play a dominant role in brain mechanisms. Besides the one just discussed, time is also crucially involved in another task, namely the temporal coding of coherently working neuronal cell assemblies. Now, we are looking at time on the most finely-grained scale possible.

4.2.3.1

Temporal Coding of Nerve Cell Assemblies

Nowadays, it is generally held that feature constellations are not represented by so-called grandmother cells, but by '"assemblies' of coactive neurons" (Singer 1992b: 6), i.e., nerve cell assemblies. This kind of representation is relational, as the activity of a single cell is always viewed in connection with the activity of the others and receives its significance only by this very connection (ibid.). By the means of this relationality, economy is likewise granted, since the single cells may be active in different cell-assemblies at different times. This is a dynamical feature of such a network (cf. Singer 1992b: 7). Interestingly, the identification of neuronal cell assemblies as representing a given feature constellation is not achieved by an increased response amplitude. This means that the respective nerve cells do not increase their joint activity when replying to a peripheral feature pattern—as had been thought—but use quite a different technique: a temporal code (Singer 1992a+b): The suggestion was that individual neurons or groups should engage in rhythmic discharges which occur in synchrony for all members of an assembly. (Singer 1992b: 8) This concept of phase coherence is called binding by synchrony (cf. ibid.). Phase-locking, another term for the process under discussion, takes place for the cells in a single NCA as well as for different NCAs being bound by synchrony. These may belong to the same or to different cortical areas. Even cortico-cortical relations between the two hemispheres are achieved by synchronization (cf. Singer 1992b: 13ff.):

48 We found out that the responses of feature detectors are rhythmic and oscillate with a mean frequency of about 40 Hertz. We further observed that spatially distributed groups of feature detectors can synchronize their rhythmic activities and then oscillate in phase.27 (Singer 1992a: 63, cf. also Freeman's 1991 "carrier wave")

Thereby, Gestalt features of the represented objects, e.g., coherent contours, equal directionality and orientational preferences, are of crucial importance (cf. ibid.). In such cases, synchronization is very strong. By this special kind of temporal coding, a particular problem is elegantly avoided—a problem encountered when trying to implement these ideas in artificial neuronal networks: as long as the nerve cell assemblies were differentiated by means of increased response activity (cf. Singer 1992b: 7) it was not possible to represent two different objects at the same time without mixing them. This problem is called the superposition problem (cf. ibid.) or even superposition catastrophe (v.d. Malsburg 1987: 415ff.). With temporal coing the criticism directed against the assembly framework (ibid.: 414ff.) receives a satisfactory solution. Temporal coding resolves the superposition problem. In this way, several ensembles can be activated simultaneously without their responses blending.28 (Singer 1992a: 63, cf. also v.d. Malsburg 1987: 424)

Neurons encoding a certain feature, e.g., colour, even manage to simultaneously cooperate in different assemblies if the respective feature is constituitive for the one constellation as well as for the other! Each group of detectors is synchronized within itself, but not with other groups. Each group has a slightly different frequency (cf. Singer 1992a: 63, 1992b: 13). Thus, different feature constellations are not mixed, due to desynchronization of their respective neuronal cell assemblies. This temporal coding by means of synchronized oscillations is a general principle of cortical processing (cf. Singer 1992a: 63). For this reason it is not surprising that other researchers hit upon it and have described this phenomenon in their respective area of research.

4.2.3.2

The Slaving Principle in Synergetics

Synchronization is also a major topic in H. Haken's synergetics (Haken 1977, 1981,31983, 1987,1988,1989, 1990a+b, Haken/Stadler 1990). What does synergetics deal with?

2

Synergetics deals [...] with qualitative changes on macroscopic scales and it can be considered as a general theory of the emergence of new qualities [...]. (Haken 1990: 3)

Synergetics itself emerged from physics. Its laws are formulated mathematically. Yet, it is Haken's goal to describe psychic phenomena as well, e.g., the emergence of percepts, thought, meanings, and even social phenomena (cf. ibid.). In the course of the investigation 27

Wir haben entdeckt, daß die Antworten von Merkmalsdetektoren rhythmisch sind und mit einer mittleren Frequenz von etwa 40 Hertz oszillieren. Wir haben ferner beobachtet, daß räumlich verteilt liegende Gruppen von Merkmalsdetektoren ihre rhythmischen Aktivitäten synchronisieren können und dann in Phase schwingen. 28 [...] löst das Superpositionsproblem. Es lassen sich auf diese Weise mehrere Ensembles gleichzeitig aktivieren, ohne daß sich ihre Antworten miteinander vermischen.

49

of these disparate phenomena, a common scenario emerges. Under adequate supply of energy, all these systems change their qualitative states: Synergetics (Haken 1977, 1981) investigates those processes in all domains of nature which, under continuous variation of the state of energy of a system (so-called control parameter), first show strong fluctuations and then phase transitions into new, ordered states (so-called order parameters).29 (Stadler/Kruse 1992: 145) These order parameters are system-internal attractors which the system automatically reaches if the appropriate conditions are met Haken (1988: 26) calls these order parameters Informators, as they compress the enormous amount of information necessary for the description of the behavior of the microscopical units along just a few dimensions. Haken's classic example is the laser which may be in four different states, depending on the strength of excitation of its atoms: (14) (i) In the case of only mild excitation, the single laser atoms emit light waves totally independently of one another, (ii) When the excitation passes a critical value, the single atoms cooperate and emit a coherent light wave without noise, i.e., "laser light", (iii) Is the energy supply increased once again, the coherent wave breaks down into many short regular pulsations. (iv) Another increase of energy results in totally chaotic movement of the atoms, (cf. Haken 1990: 4f, cf. also 1988) The conclusion we can draw with Haken is the following: "Though we change an unspecific control parameter, namely the degree of excitation, the system may undergo qualitative changes." (Haken 1990: 5) Is the laser paradigm too far removed from our topic here? That it is not is proved by the following statement about nerve cells, the excitation of which is not principally different: Central nervous processes in principle obey physical, chemical, and biological laws; they are causal-deterministic, yet due to the high complexity of the central nervous system they ordinarlily are chaotic.30 (Stadler /Kruse 1992: 145) That the CNS is a highly sensitive organ, mapping peripheral data onto internal attractors in a nonlinear way by the aid of its chaotic generator of variance, will be dealt with in section 4.3. A gap remains, however: not so much with regard to how attractors emerge out of chaos—this they do spontaneously: In the chaotic processes of the CNS local stabilities will by necessity emerge in different places and at different times. These can be viewed as highly ordered states within an otherwise chaotic environment. 31 (Stadler/Kruse 1992: 145f.) 29

In der Synergetik (Haken 1977, 1981) werden Vorgänge aus allen Bereichen der Natur untersucht, die bei kontinuierlicher Variation des energetischen Zustandes eines Systems (sogenannte Kontroll parameter) zunächst starke Fluktuationen und dann Phasensprünge in neue geordnete Zustände zeigen (sogenannte Ordnungsparameter). 30 Zentralnervöse Prozesse gehorchen prinzipiell physikalischen, chemischen und biologischen Gesetzmäßigkeiten; sie sind kausal-deterministisch, allerdings bei der hohen Komplexität des zentralen Nervensystems in der Regel chaotisch. 3 ' In den chaotischen Prozessen des ZNS werden zwangsläufig an verschiedenen Orten und zu verschiedenen Zeiten lokale Stabilitäten entstehen. Diese können als hoch geordnete Zustände einer im übrigen chaotischen Umgebung betrachtet werden.

50

What we do not yet know is how a particular local attractor manages to get selected at the expense of all the others and to absorb the local oscillations of the nerve cells rapidly and entirely so that it can gain a global impact much like the "laser light". Therefore, we have to look at the principle of slaving that Haken describes in synergetics. "Slaving" means that the oscillations at the local level—in the brain these are the oscillations of the nerve cells—spontaneously meet the oscillations of the global order parameters, i.e., the attractors, which in turn rapidly force the local oscillations under their own pattern of oscillation: In the critical fluctuation the interactions at the elementary level reach single synchronous states of the higher level of integration of the order parameter, which then react on the elementary level by 'enslaving' the rest of the elementary states, that is by synchronizing them. The emergent properties of the order parameter may well react on the elementary level from which they emerged.32 (Stadler/Kruse 1992: 145) Much like Singer has described the temporal coding of NCAs on the microscopic scale by synchronization, synergetics conceive of the stepwise emergence of increasingly higher organized macroscopic states. The chasm between the physical and the psychical, i.e., the question of how physico-chemical processes in the brain and overt behavior are linked, is thus bridged. Synchronous oscillations within an NCA emerge from neural impulses of single neurons; several NCAs can synchronize with one another; several neurons can participate in different NCAs at different times—all this happens via synchronized oscillations. Here, I favor the notion of synchronization over the notion of slaving; the latter sounds just too imperialistic. In the literature, the notion of entrainment is also used to denote "the ability of one unit to cause other units to oscillate at a harmonically related frequency." (Barton 1994: 8) By means of synchronization it is determined with which other single neural cells (or NCAs) a single neural cell (or NCA) may cooperate. This corresponds to what has already been discussed as symmetry breakings. The journey along the optimal developmental path, i.e., Waddington's (1957) creode, leading to an attractor, here an NCA, which pulls the variable local processes onto itself as a global order parameter, gradually excludes all the other alternative paths and attractors or renders them increasingly improbable. In the course of ontogenesis as well as microgenesis the plastic system adapts to a canonical steady state in which it operates. As a distinctive feature generally illicit in static systems, the principle of slaving of dynamical systems evidences a circular causality, as Haken (1988: 25) deliberately concedes. Dynamical systems are capable of a "self-creation of meaning" (Haken 1988: 23). While there is a general ban on circularity in linear scientific explanations, this circular causality becomes constitutive here, the reason being the nonlinear character of these systems, the microscopic and macroscopic levels of which are connected with one another. Thus, the di-

32

Die Interaktionen auf der elementaren Ebene erreichen dabei in der kritischen Fluktuation einzelne synchrone Zustände auf der höheren Integrationsebene des Ordnungsparameters, welche dann auf die Elementarebene zurückwirken, indem sie den Rest der Elementarzustände "versklaven", das heißt synchronisieren. Die emergenten Eigenschaften des Ordnungsparameters können also durchaus auf die Elementarebene, aus der heraus sie entstanden sind, zurückwirken.

51 rection of causality cannot be established unequivocally in the case of synchronization. Recall the laser paradigm: What causes what? On the one hand the order parameter enslaves the atoms, but on the other hand it is itself generated by the joint action of the atoms. (Haken 1988: 25)

The attractor pulls the elements onto itself; yet, they themselves build up the attractor by virtue of their interactions. As has already been pointed out, the very fact of circular causality would be a catastrophe only in linear contexts. Here, in contrast, it is used to get rid of a further obsolete prejudice. It is not applicable to dynamical systems. This is also Prigogine's opinion in terms of his dissipative systems. As the process of the global system's development is not unequivocally predictable, one cannot unequivocally deduce an effect from a cause: "It is the dissipative process itself which determines what will be called the cause and what will be the effects."33 (Prigogine/Stengers 1990: 14) Synergetics, especially the principle of slaving, has already been argued for as being applicable to linguistics as well. In language acquisition Lexical Categories (LCs) have to be synchronized with Functional Categories (PCs), i.e., PCs enslave LCs in the higher functional projection. Research in brain physiology almost forces such a concept upon us. Therefore I will try to make it fruitful for linguistics, too. Feature checking in a Spec-head constellation, too, may be understood as a process of synchronization. If head and specifier share the same features, synchrony is attained. Grammaticality judgements would be reflexes of established or unestablished phase coherence. In this light one can read the following quotation, exchanging "ungrammatical/grammatical" for "meaningless/meaningful", respectively: The transition from asynchronous to synchronous activity states might be equivalent to the transition from 'meaningless' to 'meaningful' states.34 (Singer 1992a: 63 J35

The discovery of the significance of temporal oscillations in the brain is of special relevance to dynamical systems, in which emergent abilities can arise via nonlinear relations: Systems consisting of coupled oscillators show extraordinarily diverse nonlinear properties. [...] Among them are, for example, the properties of assuming a great many metastable states despite a limited number of operating units, of switching between them very rapidly, and of converging on certain states even if the stimulating activity necessary for this is weak, incomplete, or noisy.36 (Singer 1992a: 63, cf. also Freeman 1991, Braitenberg/Schüz 1992) 33

Es ist der dissipative Vorgang selbst, welcher bestimmt, was als Ursache bezeichnet werden wird und was die Wirkungen sein werden. 34 Der Übergang von asynchronen in synchrone Aktivitätszustände könnte also gleichbedeutend sein mit dem Übergang von 'bedeutungslosen' in 'bedeutsame' Zustände. 35 Similarly, Changeux/Dehaene (1989, see also section 4.3.1.1) refer to neuronal pre-representations resulting from spontaneous electric activity as being "transiently meaningless" (ibid.: 87) as long as they "may not match any defined feature of the environment" (ibid.), but as becoming 'meaning full'" (ibid.), when being "selected in novel situations" (ibid.), i.e., when resonance is established between the external percept and the internal pre-representation. 36 Systeme, die aus gekoppelten Oszillatoren bestehen, weisen außerordentlich vielfältige nichtlineare Eigenschaften auf. [...] Hierzu zählen zum Beispiel die Eigenschaften, trotz einer begrenzten Zahl von Schalte!ementen sehr viele metastabile Zustände annehmen zu können, zwischen diesen sehr schnell wechseln zu können und auf bestimmte Zustände zu konvergieren, auch wenn die hierfür notwendige Anregungsaktivität schwach, unvollständig oder verrauscht ist.

52

Weak, incomplete and noisy information—this reminds us of the typical situation in language acquisition. In generative grammar it is known as poverty of stimulus (see chapter 2). Generative grammar makes this an argument for the innateness of linguistic structures. Yet, the discussion above shows that this conclusion is by no means the only one possible, nor the most probable one. Due to their lonlinear properties, dynamical systems achieve exactly the same without the strong claim of genetic over-determination.

4.2.4

The Medium Time-Scale

As the ontogeny of language is the subject of this study, the whole text is concerned with this special time-scale. So, set a temporal index tm to both the whole text and this tiny fractal and go on reading...

4.3

Three Factors of Language Acquisition

An adequate ontogenetic (and phylogenetic) scenario for the emergence of the language faculty can only be one that takes into account the fact of self-organization of our brain (see section 4.2). Besides the two classical factors—the genome and the environment in form of the primary linguistic data— a third factor has to be assumed as an interface mediating between the former two: this is self-organization:

genome ^

self-organization

^

environment/PLD

Fig. 4: Self-organization as the interface between the genome and the environment

Readers acquainted with the studies of Piaget will recognize that he also assumes a third factor which mediates between an a priori knowledge base and the environment: the principle of self-regulation (cf. Tracy 1991: 69). This is not surprising as Piaget must be considered a cybernetic precursor of a dynamical approach to development. However, self-organization is more than simply self-regulation. Piaget stresses the child's capacity to construct her knowledge while interacting with the environment. By means of assimilation and accomodation she constantly adapts her schemes to new demands and tasks. Cognitive conflict is assumed to trigger the restructuring of concepts and levels of representation (cf. Tracy 1991: 80ff.). The child's cognitive system is assumed to constantly search for equilibration, i.e., the optimal balance between the system and the environment, between the various subsystems, and between the subsysThat these compensatory abilities are also crucial for the language acquisition task is pointed out by Tracy (1991: 59ff.). Not only must the child be able to restore deficient linguistic input, but she must also be able to reconstruct e.g., phonetically empty categories in a respective linguistic structure. In order to do this, she must operate in what is called a "latent event-field" by Klix (1976, quoted in Tracy 1991: 60).

53 terns and the overall system (cf. ibid.). It remains a puzzle, however, how global changes are brought about, i.e., the transition from one of Piaget's cognitive stages to the next remains unexplained. According to Piaget, they are the result of self-regulation induced by a cognitive conflict. The child is assumed to manage such a conflict by (unconscious) problem solving until she "feels comfortable" with a newly attained equilibrium. This view is not wrong, but it leads to Fodor's (1980) fallacy: how can a new, more complex structure be learned or acquired on the basis of an old, simple structure? Here, the new term of selforganization in the new framework of dynamical systems can overcome the older cybernetic notion of self-regulation. Self-organization introduces a novum into the classic nativist as well as into Piaget's scenario: non-linearity. To date, emergent properties of systems were inconceivable. Only linear cooperation between the two factors was known, which is insufficient as an explanatory device for the spontaneous emergence of new qualities (cf. Tucker/Hirsh-Pasek 1993: 361, Elman et al. 19%). Therefore the rejection of behaviorism and the resort to nativism. However, with the research in nonlinear dynamical systems of any kind (biological, chemical, physical, etc.), the whole conceptual horizon has changed. Today, it is well-known and accepted that autopoetic, i.e., self-generating systems are capable of emergent achievements due to their nonlinear properties. However, we are faced with what Eisenhardt, Kurth/Stiehl (1995) call the paradox of emergence, i.e., the problem of relating the ancestor to the descendant state in a sensible way: The new state has to bear some relation to the old one; if it does, it can be reduced to the old one and so nothing new has come into being; but if it bears no relation to the old state, all this is totally incomprehensible and a miracle rather than a scientifically seizable processone cannot talk sensibly about it at all. (Eisenhardt, Kurth/Stiehl 1995: 23)37 The resolution of this paradox can only be given in a dynamical model of emergence. The nativist basis of generative grammar has to be enriched by the element of self-organization now. Self-organization is not to be understood "materially"—one cannot reify it in the strict sense. In Peirce's terms it belongs to the realm of thirdness, i.e., has a mediating function rather than any substance. However, the brain, especially the cortex (see section 4.2) with its functional architecture, can be considered the physiological basis of this peculiar property. The other two factors—the genome38 and the environment—are also conceived of as the product of self-organization. The controversy nature vs. nurture is a historically obsolete one (cf. Smith/Thelen 1993: xiv, Changeux/Dehane 1989: 74, Tracy 1991: 67ff.). Neither Chomsky's extreme Cartesian view nor associationism seem to be theoretically and empirically adequate today (cf.

37

Der neue Zustand muß zumalten in irgendeinem Verhältnis stehen; wenn er das tut, kann man ihn auf den alten reduzieren, somit ist nichts Neues entstanden; wenn er aber in keinem Verhältnis zum alten Zustand steht, ist dies alles völlig unbegreiflich und eher ein Wunder als ein wissenschaftlich erfaßbarer Vorgang—man kann gar nicht sinnvoll darüber reden. 38 Today, the DNS-code is no longer understood as a "plan", but as a subtle center for the mediation of feedbacks (cf. Briggs/Peat 1989).

54

Changeux/Dehaene 1989: 100). Yet, critics of a Dynamic Systems Perspective (DSP)39 warn against too rapid a rejection of this difficult problem: One implication drawn from DSP is that genes do not 'control' development, but rather permit interactions with biological and environmental actors to 'assemble' actions during the process of behaving. Thus, there is some sense in which the nature-nurture issue is no longer a question worthy of debate. (Aslin 1993: 395) Although previous researchers already arrived at the same conclusions—Aslin mentions Piaget (1970)40 as the most prominent example—the debate on the contribution of internal and external resources remains unsettled: One cannot simply dismiss the nature-nurture issue by saying it is not a relevant question. It remains one of the most fundamental and intriguing aspects of biological science. (Aslin 1993: 395) Not to dismiss but to reframe this controversy in the light of the new paradigm—this is the justified and not unrealistic hope here. If the genome is indeed self-organized and its Darwinian mechanisms of variation and selection are just placed on a different time-scale, then there is no sense in opposing it to the epigenetic brain processes in ontogeny or to the information intake from the environmentOdsr is neither necessarily related to the genetic code, nor need it be controlled in every detail: "The emergence of order does not require that all details of structure and 'logic' be controlled precisely." (Kauffman 1993: 174) The genome is not the sole cause of order and morphology, but it has its proper share in it: One often speaks of some structural trait of an organism as being 'genetically programmed.' This seems to imply that the genes contained a blueprint describing the organism in full detail. However, all the stages of brain organization (not just evolution) involve, more or less strongly, an element of self-organization: an element of creativity. It has often been emphasized that the genes cannot, in any naive sense, contain the full information necessary to describe the brain. Cerebral cortex alone contains on the order of 1014 synapses. Forgetting considerations of genome size[FN omitled· Α·Η·1, one can hardly imagine how ontogeny could select the correct wiring diagram out of all alternatives if all were equally likely. [...] The conclusion one must draw is that ontogeny makes use of self-organization: [...] (v.d. Malsburg/ Singer 1988: 69f., cf. Briggs/Peat 1989, Changeux/Dehaene 1989: 75, Ebeling 1991: 81, Haken 1988: 28, Thelen 1989: 84). In short: "Ignoring the hypothesis of a divine control of detail, only self-organization processes are imaginable."41 (Wildgen/Mottron 1987: 86) In fact, the discussion in the literature on the evolution of language (cf. Pinker/Bloom 1990, see section 4.2.2) aims at an alternative answer to the question of how human kind met UG. Yet, neither catchwords like "sudden saltation" (Lieberman 1989: 200, quoted in 39

The term Dynamic Systems Perspective (DSP) is used by Aslin (1993) as a cover term for dynamical approaches in psychology. I use the term (and orthography) here to make the following quotation with its unusual terminology clear to the reader. 40 Butterworth (1993) discusses Piaget's connection with the DSP in the same volume (Smith/ Thelen 1993). For the relevance of Piaget to linguistics, especially to language acquisition, see Tracy (1991). 41 Sieht man von der Hypothese einer g ttlichen Detail Steuerung ab, so sind nur Selbstorganisationsprozesse vorstellbar.

55 Pinker/Bloom 1990: 723), nor the disparaging of UG as directly passed on from the creator to man, nor as "a cognitive equivalent of the Big Bang" by Bates et al. (1989: 2f., again quoted in Pinker/Bloom (1990:723)) are adequate here. Rather, this work aims at a bridging theory, tying language acquisition models in generative grammar to recent neuronal models ofcognitive functions (in the sense of Changeux/ Dehaene 1989). These authors show that a minor shift with regard to theory building may cause a great effect. This has always been claimed by chaos theory. The arguments which are to destabilize the location of generative grammar in the attractor of Cartesianism or nativisms and which are to cause a jump into a new, dynamical attractor are given in Changeux /Dehaene (1989) as well as in Kauffman (1993). The goal is to look at classic Darwinism in the broader context of self-organization, i.e., to look at self-organization and selection at the same time. Kauffman's romantic picture of an "evolutionary marriage of self-organization and selection" (1993: XV) is the content of his monograph: Simple and complex systems can exhibit powerful self-organization. Such spontaneous order is available to natural selection and random drift for the further selective crafting of wellwrought designs or the stumbling fortuity of historical accident. Yet no body of thought incorporates self-organization into the weave of evolutionary theory. (Kauffman 1993: VII).

But the Darwinian theory of mutation/variation and selection "fails to incorporate the possibility that simple and complex systems exhibit order spontaneously." (ibid.:XIII) Let us follow these authors in their application of the evolutionary scheme in a generalized frame of self-organization.

4.3.1

Variation, Selection, and Self-Organization

4.3.1.1

The Genetic Envelope

Following Edelman (1987), Changeux/Dehaene (1989) extend the Darwinian scheme of variation and selection to brain processes. Not only in the geological time-scales of evolution, but also in the psychological time-scales of ontogenetic as well as microgenetic processes in the brain, there exist (15) (i) a generator of variations which makes available a set of cognitive (pre-) representations in the form of neuronal cell assemblies (see section 4.2) (ii) a selection mechanism which chooses the optimally suited representation and dismisses the others, (cf. ibid.: 72)

The scheme under consideration here takes away the rigidity from the familiar selectional scheme of the principles-and-parameters approach sensu Chomsky/Fodor: The extension of selectionist mechanisms to all these levels breaks down the rigidity [...] of the strictly nativist or Cartesian schemes (Fodor 1983) by introducing, at each level, a degree of freedom linked with the production of variation. (Changeux/Dehaene 1989: 100)

This selective process and subsequent pruning in ontogeny have been described in full detail by Singer and his colleagues for the visual system (see section 4.2).

56 Changeux and Dehaene stress that the experience-dependent selection of such neuronal cell assemblies and their synaptic connections is a genuine evolutionary process just on a psychological time scale that is able to take place without any genetic recourse. Here, selforganization as a proper interface and the brain as its agent can best be grasped: Our view [...] is that the interaction between the nervous system and the outside world during the course of postnatal development through adulthood, during which the acquisition of some of its highest abilites, including language and reasoning occur [...], also follows an analogous Darwinian scheme. Yet, such evolution is expected to take place within the brain without any necessary change in the genetic material [...], and inside of short time-scales: days or months in the case of embryonic and early postnatal development and tens of seconds in the case of the processing and reorganization of mental representations. (Changeux/Dehaene 1989: 72f.) Much like the Darwinian scheme is used in a fractal or self-similar way on different time scales, the polar pair of constancy vs. variability also has many facets. The authors thus concede that—even for genetically identical individuals—neurons and synaptic connections, their number and the form of axons, show modest, but significant variability (cf. ibid.: 77), that is, each Individuum is unique. This variation is epigenetic.42 These variations are licensed by a genetic envelope (ibid.: 78), a genetic matrix which creates as much order as necessary while leaving as much freedom as possible: Thus, an important degree of variation of neural phenotype is manifest at several levels of organization of the nervous system, and this variability seems to increase with the complexity of the brain, (ibid.: 78) Kauffman sees the spontaneous ordering of self-organization at work again and again, and this not because of selection, but despite selection (1993: XV). Order by self-organization, especially in the brain—the most complex self-organized organ in evolution—is more basic than order by selection alone. The brain of higher organisms is extremely plastic during so-called critical phases. Now, the variability is especially high and the following selection often irreversible. The final functional and architectonic Gestalt of the neuronal net begins to emerge from the initial amorphous superabundance: At a critical stage (or sensitive period) of development, the axonal and dendritic trees branch and spread exuberantly. There is redundancy but also maximal diversity in the connections of the network. Yet, as mentioned, this transient fluctuation [my emphasis, A.H.] of the growing connections remains bounded within stringent limits of the genetic envelope. [...] Such limited fuzziness of the network makes the final tuning of the connectivity necessary, but also offers the opportunity for an adaptive shaping. (Changeux/Dehaene 1989: 78f.)

This plastic adaptation does not happen by direct interaction with the environment, as in the classic information processing scheme, but already in the embryo by endogenous mechanisms. The testing of neuronal functions, the use of neuronal pathways already begins without any relevant input—νια spontaneous electric activity controlled by molecular oscillators. From the point of view of self-organization such endogenous activities are expected and qualify self-organizing systems again as autopoietic. They generate themselves, in a 42

According to the theorem of variability, not even the mapping of a given function onto the underlying neural organization is constant, i.e., the same input-output relation can result from different neural connections, (cf. ibid.: 81)

57

certain sense. This kind of spontaneous cell activity allows for a "strictly internal prod uction of representations" (ibid.: 86). And this is even achieved in an economical way: The cost of this activity in terms of structural genes is very small and bears no relation to its enormous potential for interaction and combination, which results from the activity's eventual contribution to the epigenesis of neuronal synaptic networks, (ibid.: 79, cf. also 81)

What the neuronal scenario looks like during the sensitive phase of maximal connectivity is shown in figure 6 (Changeux/Dehaene's figure 1): growth

Fig. 6: Selective stabilization of synapses during ontogeny (Changeux/Dehaene 1989: 80) (reproduced with kind permission of Fayard, Paris)

In the phase of transient redundancy proliferating cells and synapses initially compete and cooperate for the use of the neuronal connections (compare the first two diagrams above). The stability of a given synaptic connection is regularized retroactively in the sense of the Hebb synapsis, i.e., the activity of a following cell reinforces a given synapsis. In the opposite case, the synapsis is weakened. After this liminal test phase (compare the second diagram), the eventual Gestalt of the network begins to emerge (compare the third diagram). The stabilized neurons and synapses remain, the weakened ones degenerate and are atrophied, i.e., pruned. Note that by the time of emergence of the syntactic function, i.e., around the age of two, the number of neurons in the child's brain has already been fixed. No neurons are pruned anymore. However, the synaptic connectivity is still plastic. A great many synapses are still generated and contribute to the scenario depicted above (Peltzer-Karpf/Zangl 1998). Of this tripartite algorithm of proliferation, liminal trial and error, and eventual selection only the latter act has been stressed in generative grammar. The parametric options are considered to be strictly genetically controlled. One of these parametric values is selected depending on the PLD.

58 Brain researchers and linguists agree on this point. Learning is not the addition of new structures, but the selection from already existing ones: In contrast to the classical empiricist views, activity does not create novel connections but, rather, contributes to the elimination of pre-existing ones. Long-term learning results from disconnection but in a growing network. To learn is to eliminate' (Changeux 1983b: p. 246, English translation). (Changeux/Dehaene 1989: 82)

This is also argued for by Fodor (1980), Piattelli-Palmarini (1987: 33) and Lebeaux (1988). It is not possible to acquire a truly novel structure, but only to select it from an array of pre-existing ones. Especially Fodor (1980) underlines the impossibility of acquiring a richer system from a poorer one (cf. also Tracy 1991: 23, 31). He properly concludes that a new concept could not be "learned". Therefore he resorts to nativism. While this consequence was the only sensible one at a time when only static paradigms were at hand, new answers can be given now. Dynamical systems theory provides an alternative view because of the acknowledgement of nonlinear phase transitions. But how can it integrate the notions of selection and emergence? Isn't it a contradiction to assume emerging new qualities and selection from pre-existing alternatives at the same time? I will try to answer this question below (cf. also the paradox of'emergence). It is unquestionable, however, that the tripartite algorithm mentioned above will apply several times during the whole course of linguistic ontogeny and that it may be considered the neuronal spell-out of what was formerly called "parameter setting". Here, I will focus more on the first two phases, i.e., on proliferation and especially on the llminal phase. But note that I do this for strategic reasons only—in order to find a new balance between variation and constancy. Variations have always been present in the linguistic data. As a result of the too strong stress on nativism in linguistic theory of the generative kind these variations have not been adequately evaluated but underestimated or even ignored. Once this limitation is overcome, as in Changeux/Dehaene (1989), a new look is possible on data which hitherto have been decried as noise, performance errors, etc. As an early exeption, Tracy (1991) describes the neuronal scenario depicted above in terms of Piaget's model of epistemology. A "cognitive conflict" is induced by "rivalty or contradiction between coexisting structures or operations on the same level of structurebuilding or on different levels." (Tracy 1991: 80)43 This conflict is resolved by the final selection of a proper structural analysis. Equilibration is reached on a higher level until the next cognitive conflict arises.44 Yet, a last critical note concerning the genetic envelope is in order. The conception of the latter is by no means unproblematic. This conception is supposed to achieve a synthesis of the various contributing factors—the genes and the environment—on the basis of selforganization. Note that Oyama (1989) nevertheless rejects such interactive concepts as halfhearted, as the genetic imperialism (ibid.: 10) or genocentrism (ibid.: 24, FN 7) is not 43

[...] Rivalität oder Widerspruch zwischen koexistierenden Strukturen oder Operationen innerhalb derselben Ebene der Strukturbildung oder über Ebenen hinweg [...]. 44 In the framework of dynamical systems, however, any "mentalist" interpretation of competition, rivalty, etc. is renounced. The system arrives at the final selection by computation alone. That this may have "psychic" effects which are experienced as "conflicts", is possible, of course.

59

questioned at all (cf. also Thelen 1989: 78). Instead, she advocates a constructivist interactionism (Oyama 1989: 22) as a true remedy, a "concept of the evolving developmental system" (ibid.: 23). Without further elaborating on this constructivist proposal, let us keep in mind the warning that proposals which allow for variation in the genetic constraints have not yet fully overcome the "central dogma" (Oyama 1989) of genetic programming of behavior or form, etc., and—even worse—run into the apory of infinite regress: who constrains the genetic envelop itself?45 Nevertheless, aiming at a full-blown model of self-organization seems to be more promising than embarking on a constructivist enterprise. For, "[...] extending the developmental system beyond the gene [...]", as desired by Oyama (1989: 18) has already been accomplished by Changeux/Dehaene (1989). The genes play their role on their respective time-scale; other, i.e., epigenetic, brain-internal mechanisms contribute to the very same process on a different time-scale. Interactionism as a trump card might turn out to be less powerful than a fractal concept such as the one favored here.

4.3.2

The Generator of Variations

4.3.2.1

Spontaneous Electric Activity

For the time being, let us stay with the already much quoted authors Changeux/Dehaene and cautiously approach the mechanism generating the multitude of neuronal representations which selection finally draws upon. This is not taken to be genetic variation; instead, "[...] such variations may be viewed as resulting from spontaneous activity of nerve cells." (Changeux/Dehaene 1989: 86) This spontaneous activity of neurons in the cortex builds up pre-representations in a transient, dynamic and fleeting manner. At any give time, these pre-representations would be composed of sets of neurons from much larger populations of cells. As a consequence, the correlated firing of diverse combinations of neurons or groups of neurons (or even already stored assemblies) and a wide variety of active neural graphs would be produced successively and transiently. (Changeux/Dehaene 1989: 86)

Note that the authors assume these pre-represen-tations to be "one neuronal component for the so-called productivity of cognitive processes. (Fodor/Pylyshyn 1988)." (Changeux/ Dehaene 1989: 86) In order for a pre-representation to become selected as a valid representation, it must optimally match the percept, or stand in a resonance relation (cf. ibid.: 86, cf. also Haken 1990: 15, Haider 1993, see section 4.1). In the case of dissonance the pre-representation is dismissed, however. Spontaneously generated pre-representations which do not match any feature constellation of the environment, may be "meaningless" for a time, but become "'meaning full"1 (Changeux/Dehaene 1989: 87). They may become activated in novel situations and serve as attraciors for the representation of these features (cf. ibid.: 86f.). Mental representations in the brain are related to the environment and to the brain itself in a dynamical way, as the authors conclude: 45

This problem was pointed out to me by Jörg Keller (p.c.).

60 Finally, mental representations are not static states of the brain, but are produced and chained within a system in constant dynamic interaction with the outside world and within itself. They are part of a system in constant evolution within psychological time-scales, (ibid.: 87) Changeux/Dehaene speak of spontaneous electric activity of neurons and nerve cell assemblies as the generator of variety. At the same time they embrace a selectionist model assuming an initially rich internal structure. The analogy with Chomsky is perfect, despite different terminology: [...] a selectionist model [...] posits an initially rich energy landscape with pre-existing interactions between neurons and an abundance of hierarchically organized attractors. The interaction with the outside world would not enrich the landscape, but rather would select pre-existing energy minima or pre-representations and enlarge them at the expense of other valleys. As a consequence, the whole energy landscape would evolve, the already stored information influencing the pre-representations available for the next learning event. The system possesses internal rigidity so that not every external stimulus would be equally stored. (Changeux/Dehaene 1989: 89) Here, genetic as well as epigenetic variation and selection go hand in hand. I will not try to answer the question here how this rich energy landscape evolved or, to use Piattelli-Palmarini's (1987) metaphor—how the prete-a-porter dresses came into the store... In principle, there must exist an explanatory continuum in the sense of Wildgen (1985) that comprises all time-scales. Instead, I will turn to alternative proposals concerning the generator of variety.

4.3.2.2

The Chaotic Generator of Variations

Freeman (1991), Skarda/Freeman (1987), and Nicolis/Katsikas (1993) go one step further than Changeux/Dehaene (1989). It is not simple spontaneous electric activity which delivers proto-attractors of representations but rather the chaotic background activity or the multifractal attractor of dissipative chaos in the brain. It is time now to state what is meant by chaos here. As Prigogine himself dispenses with a definition of chaos (cf. Briggs/Peat 1989), I will rely on Skarda/Freeman (1987) for this purpose: 'Chaos1 in the oldest sense means the formless void from which order springs. The term is now commonly applied to disorderly, unpredictable happenings that give an observer no sense of regularity. In the technical sense used here it describes a kind of activity that appears to be random or stochastic by every standard statistical test, but is not. It is deterministic, in the sense that it can be reliably simulated by solving sets of coupled nonlinear ordinary differential equations or generated by building a system to certain specifications and putting energy into it. It is pseudorandom noise that can be produced with high precision if the initial conditions are identical on repeated runs, but which is unpredictable if new initial conditions are used. In contrast to noise, chaos has fewer degrees of freedom and is said to be low-dimensional. Chaos exists in many forms and degrees [...]. (Skarda/Freeman 1987: 173, FN1, cf. also p. 165) The kind of chaos considered here, deterministic chaos, is assumed to be a basic state of the brain, be it the rabbit's olfactory bulb, as in Skarda/Freeman (1987), or the human brain. Brain is brain.

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The electric oscillations derived by an ordinary EEG mirror different regimes of the dissipative chaos depending on the various states of the organism: from random noise, i.e., unordered electric activity in the relaxed wakening state to the rigid phase-order in an epileptic seizure. The spontaneous activity of the central nervous system (CNS) is the basis of Skarda/Freeman's model: The elemental phenomenon that must be dealt with in olfactation, as in all of brain physiology, is the background activity manifested in the 'spontaneous' EEG [...] and unit activity of neurons throughout the CNS. How does it arise, and what role does it play? (Skarda/Freeman 1987: 164)

Well, this spontaneous activity does not "arise" at all, but is always present—free of charge—or maybe called for instantaneously. [...]; it can be turned on and off virtually instantaneously, as with a switch, through bifurcation [...]. Chaos is controlled noise with precisely defined properties. Any system that needs random activity can get it more cheaply and reliably from a chaotic generator than from a noise source, (ibid.: 165)

With regard to the instant switches, another property of the chaotic generator is worth noting: Hopf bifurcations are important mechanisms for living systems to self-generate rhythmic oscillations from resting steady states. Interestingly, such self-generated rhythms can be turned on and off by varying a single parameter. (Kelso, Ding/Schöner 1993: 33)46

The brain, more precisely, the central nervous system, works with a chaos generator. In Briggs/Peat (1989)—quoting Bergström—the brain stem is identified with this chaos generator, the activity of which is pooled with the incoming, afferent signals. Freeman (1991) gives two reasons why it should be chaos that is operative in the brain. Firstly, he observes common carrier waves in the bulb of his rabbits not only during bursts—as a reaction to an olfactory stimulus—but also between bursts, that is without any external trigger. This self-generated activity is true of chaotic systems (cf. ibid.: 39, compare the self-generated activity of neurons in embryos, cf. section 4.2). Secondly, he also attributes the ability of neuronal collectives to rapidly change their states, i.e., to bifurcate, even in response to weak input, to a chaotic system (cf. ibid.). For him, chaos in the brain results from two closely intertwined areas such as the olfactory bulb and the olfactory cortex, which are not able to settle on a common oscillation but mutually excite each other again and again (cf. ibid.: 41). Nicolis/Katsikas (1993) call this chaos generator the thalamo-cortical pacemaker. It places the CNS in the various working regimes: In our model of biological processing the thalamocortical pacemaker whose behavior is extemalizd as the EEG is the processor's noisy agent responsible for stimulating the attractors out of semi-coherent groups or cortical neurons, permutating them on a time-division-multiplexing basis and provoking 'crisis' involved in annihilation, creation and fusion of attractors. (Nicolis/Katsikas 1993: 204) 46

'Hopf-bifurcations' describe mathematically nonlinear, though deterministic phase transitions (cf. ibid.: 31), e.g., the transition from a point attractor to a limit cycle, or from a torus attractor to a strange attractor. The critical points at which these phase transitions set in are called 'Hopf instabilities', (cf. Briggs/Peat 1989)

62

Are you impressed? It will even get better. The thalamocortical pacemaker is anything but "a high amplitude dissipative self-sustained nonlinear (relaxation) oscillator." (ibid.: 207).47 This pacemaker is assumed to be a strange attractor with few dimensions during sleep and epilepsy, for example. During the processing of information, i.e., in full work, however, it becomes truly noisy and high-dimensional. The CNS is considered to be highly complex and at the same time "notoriously 'disordered'" (Nicolis/Katsikas 1993: 206, cf. also Braitenberg/Schiiz 1989,1992). Only in such a strange attractor is the whole range of possible working regimes guaranteed. Through bifurcations, i.e., abrupt phase transitions, the system changes from one state into another: We suggest that such behavioural changeovers are produced via bifurcations which trigger the thalamocortical nonlinear pacemaking oscillator to switch from an unstable limit cycle to a strange attractor regime or, more correctly, from simple intermittency to multifractal chaos and vice versa. (Nicolis/Katsikas 1993: 206).48

But why should the brain make use of turbulent chaos, i.e., non-equilibrium, low-dimensional noise? This is the modus operandi of the cortex, as suggested by the authors. The answer to this question is that this kind of chaos—under modest excitation as in the attentive wakening state and while solving cognitive tasks—offers a wide spectrum of spatiotemporal frequencies with which the incoming spatio-temporal patterns may be correlated. A coherence function (ibid.: 210) is computed by the correlation of both parts, the input pattern and the stored internal pattern of several such pairs. The fittest pair, i.e., the one for which the "'degree of cognition'" (ibid.) is maximal, is then selected. Pattern recognition is assumed to be multifractal, inhomogeneous and discontinuous in that only few features, so-called hot spots (ibid.: 185), e.g., salient features, have the lion's share in the processing of information. The system intermittently jumps around between these hot spots—as in saccades. Thus, in the case of visual scanning of an object, salient features such as '"angles'", "'edges'", are searched for and are revisited several times, by leaps. Our biological information processor thus behaves like a chaotic attractor in that chaotic and ordered phases follow one another, (cf. ibid.: 187) As in Changeux/Dehaene (1989), variation and selection are the key to information processing, too. The terms used are slightly different, however. The organism expands a space of alternative attractors by its exploratory behavior—a space that is contracted again after one attractor has been chosen from this set (cf. ibid.:

47

How pleasant, by contrast, is Skarda/Freeman's warning against "verbal inflation" (1987: 192). We are confronted with a "terminology in transition" (ibid.). Yet, by using exotic notions understanding gets obscured, unfortunately. For a "relaxation oscillator", see also van Geert (1993: 298). 48 Some explanations are in order here. First, a limit cycle is an attractor produced by the joint activity of centrifugal and centripetal forces. Both these forces generate a characteristic ring, called the limit cycle, on which the system moves in phase space. Limit cycles emerge by two coupled oscillators, e.g., in & predator-prey system, where the population of both species oscillates in certain periodic rhythms, each period lasting fora certain time before the next stable cycle is entered again (cf. Wildgen/Mottron 1987: 52f, Briggs/Peat 1989, Kelso, Ding/Schöner 1993: 18, Cohen/Stewart 1994: 205). Second, intermittency denotes the emergence of islands of order in the midst of a chaotic, or strange, or fractal attractor.

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132). Dissipative chaos corresponds to the '"expanding phase1" (or "dyastole"), while the convergence on a stable attractor corresponds to the '"contracting phase'" (ibid.: 132).49 Mathematically, the expansion corresponds to a positive Lyapunov exponent, while the contraction corresponds to a negative Lyapunov exponent50 Nicolis/Katsikas explain the relevance of their model to linguistics by saying that a chaotic strange attractor provides, amongst other things, the deus exmachina which, via his positive Lyapounov exponents, creates variety or entropy by amplifying initial uncertainties along some directions in state space and provides order (information) by constraining initial uncertainties along directions in state space characterized by his negative Lyapounov exponents. More generally now concerning linguistic processes, we can claim that the subtle interplay between unpredictability (variety) and reliability (order) which underlies any linguistic scheme is typical of the behavior of a class of low-dimensional nonlinear dissipative dynamical systems (models) [...]. (Nicolis/Katsikas 1993: 133) This quotation recalls Chomsky's well-known dual characterization of UG: it must be rich enough in order to generate any possible human grammar (--> expansion, positive Lyapunov exponent); at the same time it must be restrictive enough in order to allow only these and no others (--> contraction, negative Lyapunov exponent). But under a dynamical view, these properties fall out naturally, given the characterization of the dynamical equations governing the system. There is no "deeper" sense or logic prescribing or designing them. What we should keep in mind is the polarity obviously causing this pulsation, whatever the terminology it is couched in in the respective paradigms. This polarity is one major aspect of the ecology ruling dynamical systems. A biological processor of the kind described above always tries to navigate between chaos and order. Obviously, only a walk on this limen is adaptive, i.e., favored by evolution. Having inspected a variety of Boolian networks as well as living biological systems, Kauffman concludes that dynamical systems which are able of coping effectively with complex tasks are situated right "at the edge of chaos" (cf. Kauffman 1993, Waldrop 1993: 12). He remarks that his Boolian networks could be in any of three different regimes: (16)(i) ordered (ii) chaotic, or (iii) complex. Alternatively, he describes these states as (17) (i) solid (ii) gaseous, and (iii) liquid, respectively. 49

"Expansion" and "Intensification" are also discussed in Mende/Peschel's "Evolon" model (1981). They distinguish two evolution types, namely "(extensive) hyperbolic growth" and "(intensive) parabolic growth" (ibid.: 200f.), which relate to the first two and past five phases of an evolon, respectively: "Type I spreads out many possibilities of existence. Type II selects and reduces to a minimum of well-adapted forms [...]." (ibid.: 200) 50 The Lyapunov exponent is a measure for "the rate of exponential divergence or convergence of two trajectories with slightly different initial conditions." (Kelso, Ding/Schöner 1993: 38, cf. also Wildgen/Mottron 1987: 54f, Briggs/Peat 1989) In the case of positive exponent the points on the trajectory diverge; in the case of a negative exponent they converge.

64 The former two states are not optimal, as they cannot master complex tasks: the first cannot do so because of too much rigidity, the second because of too much disorder. Only the complex state between order and chaos, i.e., the third kind of system, is eligible for this purpose. These systems have reached a dynamical position between expansion and contraction, to use Nicolis/Katsikas' terms again. Unlike these authors, however, Kauffman thinks that an adaptive walk through a truly chaotic state space of a system cannot be successful, because the position of a point in a chaotic attractor cannot be predicted for the next step in principle, even if it is deterministic. Kauffman calls the change of a chaotic attractor into an ordered one learning (cf. Kauffman 1993: 229). The taming of the refractory chaos removes systems which are too unordered back into the functional area between chaos and order. Systems which are too rigid, on the other hand, are pulled right into it. The following holds good of complex systems, then: They achieve a 'poised' state near the boundary between order and chaos, a state which optimizes the complexity of tasks the system can perform and simultaneously optimizes evolvability. (ibid.: 173) His chapter five on "Self-organization and adaptation in complex system" culminates in the following general hypothesis: A bold hypothesis: Living systems exist in the solid regime near the edge of chaos, and natural selection achieves and sustains such a poised state, (ibid.: 232)

With regard to language acquisition, the tight intertwining of the Darwinian principles of variation and selection with chaos theory makes the prediction that right there, on the edge of chaos, we have to expect dynamical linguistic behavior. Note that the idea of a generator of variance has very recently been revived in Optimality Theory (OT), a branch of generative grammar which is especially influencing in phonological theory (Prince/Smolensky 1993, Archangeli 1997, Archangeli/Langendoen 1997, Kager 1999). The generator in OT generates a multitude of linguistic representations from which the "fittest" one is selected according to constraints which are ranked in a language-particular way. OT allows for the violation of constraints, contrary to classical theories of constraint satisfaction. The optimal candidate in this contest is the one which violates the fewest and, most importantly, only the lower ranked constraints as compared to other competitors which violate a higher-ranked constraint. The generator in OT is not biologically oriented but strictly linguistically. However, the same ideas of variation and selection seem to inspire OT, too (see also chapter 17).

4.3.3

A Chaotic-Selective Framework for Linguistics

As a fusion of the reflections prresented in the above two chapters on time and self-organization, I would like to discuss Karpfs (1990, 1993, Peltzer-Karpf/Zangl 1998) studies. It can be nicely shown there how the transition from a non-chaotic selective framework (Karpf 1993: 7), which she embraced in her former study (Karpf 1990), to a full-blown chaotic selective framework (Karpf 1993) can succeed for linguistics proper.

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Her study on "Processes of Self-Organization in Linguistic Ontogeny: First and Second Language(s)"51 (Karpf 1990) belongs to the very paradigm of physiological self-organization which Singer (cf. section 4.2) had developed before. The results of this research are mostly compatible with the selectionist approach of Chomsky (1981, 1986, among others) and Fodor (1983). Karpf (1990) is able to show that the assumed linguistic modules, i.e., the lexicon, morphology, syntax, inflection, are initially undifferentiated, but become modularized and lose their coupling in the course of first and second language acquisition. She draws her empirical evidence from 500 6-46 year old subjects. In contrast to Fodor, she concludes from her research that modularity is not innate but develops in the course of ontogeny (for a discussion of Piaget in connection, see Tracy 1991: 29ff). This conclusion is independently reached by connectionist researchers (Elman etal. 1996: 101, 387, Karmiloff-Smith 1992). With increasing complexity of the system, differential ramifications, or bifurcations, emerge which trigger off nonlinear effects in dynamical systems: In order to predict the likelihood of bifurcation during the ontogenesis of systems it is necessary to use cybernetic models (catastrophy theory), since the interaction between systems and subsystems is highly non-linear (ie. [sic!] changes at local level can trigger off global reorganization processes). The fact that the ontogenesis of language is a non-linear process is reflected in the varying speed with which systems develop and data are qualitatively and quantitatively modified. Fluctuation in the use of forms and the over-generalization and/or nonapplication of rules point to the close linking between systems. (Karpf 1990: 254f, cf. also 1993)

Karpf applies this dynamical framework to morphology. The morphological system, too, emerges from the interplay of selective and balancing processes (cf. Karpf 1993:8). In particular, shefocusses on two phenomena, "[...] i.e., the turbulent state following the onset of chaos and the switching among coexisting attractors." (Karpf 1993: 10). Here, she relies on Kaneko's (1992) network of chaotic elements leading to hierarchical organization on a chaotic path between random and synchronous behavior. This chaotic itinerary looks like this: (18) initial state > quasi stable state > turbulent state > intermittent state > partially ordered state > coherent state (Karpf 1993: 10).52

The following diagram visualizes this chaotic itinerary:

51 52

Selbstorganisationsprozesse in der sprachlichen Ontogenese: Erst- und Zweitsprache(n). This chaotic itinerary consists of six phases. The liminal algorithm (11) discussed in section 4.1, however, consists of only three phases. The former may be conceived of as being an elaboration of the latter. Note that Mende/Peschel's evo/on-model (1981) consists of even seven phases (cf. also Eisenhardt, Kurth/Stiehl 1995: 230).

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initial state (inhomogeneous clustering) quasi stable state onset of chaos onset of dissipation

turbulent state (desynchronized part) intermittent state (clustering) partially ordered state ordered state coherent state (large coupling strength)

self-organizational processes shaping a homogeneous basis into a highly-specialized system of interacting modules Fig. 7 (Karpf's 1993 Figure 1 on p. 11) The chaotic itinerary and self-organization: non-linear processes lead to synchronized patterns of activity (reproduced with kind permission of Padova Unipress). The intermediate stages are particularly interesting, as self-organization takes place right there—between the initial and the steady state. She calls this liminal period a "protracted phase of dissipation" (Karpf 1993: 13). Here, she gives evidence for bifurcations by the aid of cross-correlations in the data of her large 1990 study on the acquisition of first and second language(s). Initially, a strong coupling between the above mentioned subsystems, or modules, is observed (evidenced by high tvalues). At the same time there is a high fluctuation in the use of forms and rules. Later, she is able to observe decreasing coupling (evidenced by falling /-values). Thus, phase transitions take place by which the global and undifferentiated system is irreversibly modularized. The picture of an energy-consuming, branching structure emerges, due to "[...] the search for coherence and balancing processes leading to clusters and bifurcations." (Karpf 1993: 7) Order emerges from selection of patterns which are generated by a chaotic generator of variance (cf. section 4.3.2.2): Systems with many embedded patterns show global and local interaction, expressed in oscillations between states of higher and lower order (Poincare cycles). They are ideally suited to serve as pattern generators and are capable of very rapid transitions from one state to another, i.e., they react with turbulences whenever information is added. So, halfway towards the final order the system may fall back to a (passing) intermediate order. (Karpf 1993: 18) Nicolis/Katsikas (1993) explicitly show that information processing by an alert, motivated subject makes the EEG jump into a chaotically oscillating state via several bifurcations. In this state, several patterns are spontaneously generated and correlated with the peripheral stimulus. The internal pattern—Changeux and Dehaene's (1989) pre-representation—with the highest resonance is eventually chosen.

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4.4

Variations

Varietas delectat. Vive la difference!

53

Heaven's net is large and vast. Its mesh may be course yet nothing slips through. (Lao-tse 1989: 44, chapter 73)

If our language faculty is innate, i.e., genetically installed in all of us in the same way, then it is unnecessary to look for interesting differences in single individuals. There exists genetic variation, e.g., mutations, but this should be the exeption and not the rule. There also exist, to some extent, different linguistic skills, as is true of any human faculty. Chomsky (1990) even allows for special sophistication of the language faculty in some individuals as a consequence of constant elaboration and use in contrast to atrophy owing to only poor use. But this variation is only a superficial one. In a selective-nativist framework it makes no sense to claim that, say, the acquisition of syntax could be accelerated, or even promoted in any significant way. The motherese-hypothesis is rejected, too (see chapter 2). Language, as conceived of by generative grammar, is already present from early on. It only has to be triggered off by the linguistic environment. Then, it is uniformly available to every individual. In fact, the steady state Ss is essentially invariant: for example, every speaker of German acquires what is called the Verb Second (V2) phenomenon, government of the verb to the left, wA-movement in the syntax, does not acquire the option of generalized pro-drop on the null-subject parameter, does not acquire long-distance anaphors, etc. Hence, language acquisition research looked very seriously neither for interindividual nor for intraindividual variation. Language acquisition looked essentially alike for every child. It was familiar to characterize acquisition by several stages and to show that the child was in the kth phase at a given time (cf. Brown 1973, Clahsen 1984, 1986, 1988; for a discussion, see Tracy 1991:409ff.). Yet, this view strangely contrasts with the equally undoubted fact that every child takes a different path on her way from the initial state 5,· to the steady state Ss. In fact, the concrete course of language acquisition is unpredictable, of course within given constraints. In a dynamical approach, in contrast, the initial state Sj is not necessarily equi-initial, i.e., the same for every subject. The system just needs to dwell somewhere in the basin (see chapter 1) of the attractor to be reached later. Interestingly, genetic algorith-based models (cf. Türkei 1996) also dispense with the need to restrict learners to a particular initial configuration.54 53

This motto was also chosen by Bernardo A. Huberman in his talk on The Dynamics of Social Dilemmas given on Jan. 19, 1995 in Frankfurt/Germany. 54 Türkei investigated the acquisition of the V2-X-bar parameter by a genetic algorithm. He found out that the correct word order was attained indepedently of the initial conditions, be they VOS, OVS, SOV, or SVO. This simulation sheds light on the possible variations in acquisition: "[...] the GA (genetic algorithm, my remark, A.H.)-based learner does not need to start in a particular configuration for successful acquisition in the V2-X-bar parameter space. In every case, the algorithm converged, making stipulations about the initial state unnecessary for a GA-based learner."

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While the initial state is no longer necessarily equi-initial, the steady state is equi-final, as has long been observed. The term equi-finality originally stems from the Gestalt psychologist Köhler, who notices that"[...] biological systems tend to reach the same final state in different ways and starting from different initial conditions." (Stadler/Kruse 1990: 33) Equi-finality does not necessarily mean genetically determined, but hints at "the existence of physical systems in which complex structures originate spontaneously from the system's inner dynamics." (ibid.) In generative grammar, Tracy and her colleagues were the first to seriously appreciate individual variation in language acquisition (cf. Tracy 1987, 1991, 1995, Tracy/Lattey 1994 and articles therein, Fritzenschaft et al. 1990, Gawlitzek-Maiwald et al. 1992). Nowadays, there is a growing interest in acquisitional variation, e.g., Haider "Individual courses of acquisition are not uniform, but the steady state is."55 (Haider 1990: 9) Researchers in this field are at least aware of the poor attention payed to interindividual variance, e.g., when Roeper and deVilliers say: "There are too many alternative paths that the child could follow through the input data." (Roeper/deVilliers 1993: 198)

Or, take Pinker, who witnesses individual differences and demands that the best theory would allow the learner latitude in the aspects of language development where individual differences are observed but would have some kind of 'pull' exerted by the end state that is strong enough so that children taking slightly different paths nonetheless approach a common destination. (Pinker 1987: 414)

Pinker, unknowingly, gives a nice informal description of individual trajectories converging on an attractor. While this kind of variation remains only implicit (cf. Roeper/deVilliers 1993) in the discussion on language acquisition, I want to make it explicit here. This is only possible because there exists an appropriate paradigm in which this variation is constitutive. If such a paradigm is embraced, the prediction of variation follows naturally, as in Dressler/Karpf (1994): The concept of selective self-organization predicts interindividual variation in acquisition routes rather than basic homogeneity of developmental stages (empirically incorrect!) as predicted by many earlier and current models of language acquisition [...]. In our view the given state of a system is the result of a many-layered netting in the course of which activity-dependent processes operate on the basis of genetically determined anatomical connections. The processes involved in this interaction are nightly non-linear (i.e., changes at a local level can trigger off global reorganization processes) as is shown in the different onset of neuronal specialization and in the variation of speed in which the individual stages are percolated. (Dressler/Karpf 1994: 155f.)

Variation evidences dynamical features. The fact of equi-finality has long made generative researchers in language acquisition blind to variation, as if the entire acquisition process was genetically fixed in a strict way. I conjecture that the reason for this is a mechanism one could call anticipatory idealization.56 Only that on which development later converges is acknowledged as the only possibility of the system at all. This is a typical selective brain mechanism, a short-circuit, the neural bases of which I showed in section 4.2. It is extra55 56

Individuelle Erwerbsverläufe sind nicht uniform, der stetige Zustand aber doch. Tracy (1991: 29) notes that Piaget, too, tries to answer the question why the results of cognitive development look as if predetermined.

69 ordinarily effective and not easy to overcome. The brain is opaque, so it does not readily allow anyone to see through its game (cf. Roth 1992). Once the attractor has been reached, the processing costs are small, as attractors are fewdimensional structures. Yet, the way to the attractor is polymorph. In generative grammar the negative Lyapunov exponent was stressed—compression. As a balancing reaction, the positive exponent is voted for here—expansion. The inner dynamics ultimately leading to the steady state, or attractor, is self-organiyition. With each iteration51 of its system's equations the Eigenvalues are approximated (cf. Stadler/Kruse 1992: 149), or the limiting image (cf. Jürgens, Peitgen/Saupe 1990) is reached. Even the pragmatist Peirce (see section 1.4) was suspicious of a definite metaphysical initial state, either externally set by God, or, internally set by the genome. With this dynamical claim—that the beginning of knowledge is always a process of beginning (cf. CP 5.263)—the subject was deprived of a fictitious point of origin. As for language acquisition, the subject is situated somewhere inside the genetic envelope, in a process of beginning that began aeons ago and meanwhile has taken the form of habits. "Natural laws" are conceived of as habits58, fossils of formerly variable behavioral tendencies. Apart from non-equi-initiality and equi-finality, the discussion of non-equi-liminality is of central interest here. Vizualized as a small ball, the single subject searches its proper path in the developing system. On these creodes (cf. Waddington 1957)59 it moves toward its attractor. Note that the significance of variability during epigenesis was already acknowledged by the nestor of dynamical theories in biology just mentioned, C.H. Waddington. Rather than attributing the incomplete precision of the "epigenetic mechanism" (ibid.: 39) to external factors, he conceives of this "kind of looseness or 'play' in the epigenetic machine" (ibid.) as "brought about by intangible internal sources of variation" (ibid.) which he also calls "developmental 'noise'" (ibid.). The system's noisiness must, however, be distinguished from the canalization of a developmental pathway or creode (ibid.: 40): If canalisation is represented as a valley in an epigenetic landscape, the noisiness of the system might perhaps be symbolised by the imperfection of the sphericalness of the ball which runs down the valley, (ibid.)

Imagine now such epigenetic pathways or creodes and their canalization in language acquisition. Some children move almost in streamline fashion in deep creodes; their movements are disturbed by only few turbulences. It is these "varieties" who are only poor in variation that generative researchers obviously had in mind when they spoke of the uniformity of language acquisition. But there are also children whose the creodes are much flatter and easier 57

Note that iterations are only approximative mathematical methods which help to solve complex equations. Discreteness is only simulated by so-called Eigenwert-solutions (cf. Eisenhardt, Kurth/Stiehl 1995: 221). 58 This is by no means a fallback on behaviorism. Habits, in pragmatism, have a much broader range. Even the law of gravitation is a habit—of matter—for Peirce. 59 For "creodes", see also Eisenhardt, Kurth/Stiehl (1995: 165).

70 to be disturbed by even minor turbulences. These differences should not be explained away by attributing them to differences in personality. Psychological learner types, as in the building-block model (see section 3.2), are ephiphenomena. The stress here is on a different morphogenesis as its deeper cause. Summarizing: equi-initiality: no; equi-finality: yes; equi-liminality: no. Expressed in terms of brain physiology: no matter where the wave of a neural oscillation locally begins, it becomes globally propagated (cf. Freeman 1990, Barton 1994: 9). One of the great challenges represented by a Dynamical Systems Approach is in fact the relation of "global structure and local variability" (SmiuVThelen 1993: 152). Temporarily, we move away from interindividual variation towards intraindividual variation, another instantiation of the fractal of variation. Dynamical systems advocates make short work of structural theories: Structural theories explain the global order by postulating an underlying order. [...] This idea is the dominant idea in the study of cognition. It is the idea that underlies the most influential theory of language: Chomsky (1986) claims that there really are constant knowledge structures in the head that enable us to understand a variety of individually unique sentences. According to structural theories, the knowledge structure is core and the performance variability arises from something else. (Smith/Thelen 1993: 152, cf. also Becker 1994) The aim must be to cut off all local variability in order to make visible the global order. This is one of the great but seducing idealizations of generative grammar. But it becomes "inherently incomplete" (ibid.: 161) by that omission and has only little to say about developmental changes. Generative language acquisition models are only weakJy integrated into the general developmental discourse. They are still satisfied with old concepts like nativism, continuity, maturation—concepts which have become obsolete by now and are challenged by new dynamical ones. The only variation generative grammar allows for is cross-linguistic variation, i.e., language-specific differences, simply because it is constantly before our eyes. This cross-linguistic variation is even the motor of generative theory building. The design of a parameter results from the variation of its language-specific values. In fact, no other linguistic theory cultivates cross-linguistic variation as an origin of evidence for the parameters underlying this variation to the same extent. If one understands parameters as attractors, i.e., ordered states in the whole parameter space, then the attraction is directed towards only few dimensions, i.e the many possibilities are compressed to only few solutions (cf. Kauffman 1993), but not to just one. As the attraction is as intricate as a meander, there is ample phenomenological variability. To permit this also in singular acquisitional trajectories and to conceptually explain this is the promise of dynamical theories: Individual differences are possible because the fluctuations of the internal and external milieu provide elements of uncertainty and because the collective variable is exquisitely sensitive to the task. (Thelen 1989: 94) Methodological reasons, linked to the design of dynamical theories, result in methodical consequences already outlined in section 1.3. To these belongs the freeing from longstanding methodic prejudices. Recall, first, that the reliance of group averages was doubted; in-

71 stead, variability was rehabilitated as having prime importance. Secondly, variability was taken to indicate major phase transitions. The first consequence, i.e., the acknowledgment of interindividual variance, directly leads to the idiographic method as the dynamical method of choice. Every child is granted a singular acquisition path that can be modeled in a general phase space in dynamical theories. The empirically observable acquisition paths are instantiations of members of a set of trajectories: In principle, any trajectory in the space starting from the initial subspace describes either a potential or an actual developmental sequence of a single subject. A population is described by a set of such trajectories. There is no particular place in such a model for a 'mean' or prototypical trajectory, since all trajectories are explained by the same set of dynamic rules and differ only in their initial state conditions and accepted random perturbations, (van Geert 1993: 294) Given the dynamical equations, a multitude of differing trajectories is simultaneously available. Every singular path "fits" the equations equally well, so no extra measure, like the arithmetic mean etc., is in fact needed. The second consequence resulting from the acknowledgement of intralndividual variance, leads to the conscious search for critical points of bifurcations or phase transitions where the dissipative system ramifies and qualitatively new emergent properties may be selected: [...] when a continuous change in the control parameter crosses a critical value (or critical point) the system may change qualitatively, or discontinuously. These qualitative changes are frequently associated with the spontaneous formation of ordered spatial or temporal patterns. This process of self-organization always arises via an instability. (Kelso, Ding/Schöner 1993: 15) In synergetics, too, fluctuations are a precondition for the emergence of new qualities: Synergetics deals with systems in phase transition from unstable to stable states or from one stable state to another of higher order passing unstable phases. One centra] characteristic of such systems is their fluctuating behavior. Fluctuations are the prerequisite and the motor of phase transitions. Without fluctuation systems are not able to develop higher order and to pass unstable phases. (Stadler/Kruse 1990: 35) These critical phase transitions in dynamical systems only depend upon the system's internal state and not directly upon an external impetus (see chapter 16 about the trigger): The emergence of pattern and pattern switching or change arise solely as a result of the cooperative dynamics of the system [...] with no specific ordering influence from the outside and no homunculus-like pattern generator [...] inside, (cf. Kelso, Ding/Schöner 1993: 15)60 The significance of the two classical factors—the genome and the environment—is relativized in favor of the autonomous operations of self-organization. At critical points of local instability it causes the system's macroscopic behavior to become determined by only few order parameters serving as attractors (cf. Kelso, Ding/Schöner 1993: 15f.). These interesting phase transitions reveal themselves by variability also in language acquisition. This variability is informative for basic attributes of dynamical systems like the following: "Near critical points the essential processes governing a pattern's stability, flex60

Or, as Stadler/Kruse (1992: 137) put it: "Self-organization is the formation of order without an organizer."("Selbstorganisation ist Ordnungsbildung ohne Ordner.")

72

ibility, and even its selection, can be uncovered." (ibid.: 16, cf. also p 45, cf. also Tucker/ Hirsh-Pasek 1993: 363, 366). Ilya Prigogine sees a certain dialectics in the relation between mean values which are important in phases of stability and singular values which are important in phases of instability: (...) the opposition between the singular events in the bosom of a numerically great emsemble and the mean values becomes manifest in a dialectics between areas of stability in which the singular event is insignificant, and areas of instability in which it can lead the whole system with its mean values into a qualitatively new working regime. (Prigogine/Stengers 1990: 15)61

Both stability and instability are significant in the working regimes of the respective systems. It is also at these critical points of bifurcation that the trigger applies. Here, on the limen, it can almost effortlessly guide the system from one attractor that has become unstable into a new stable one (see chapter 16). Dynamical systems theory prevents us from yet another common misunderstanding with regard to variability, i.e., the relation between competence and performance. When unwanted variations occur, "veiling" the pure structure of competence, a common procedure is to declare this a performance resulting from external factors, which as such have nothing to do with the module in question but distube its working. With regard to children, think of the small span of attention or concentration, storing constraints, etc. (cf. Smith/Thelen 1993, Becker 1994).62 Cleared of the polluting effects of performance, the underlying order of competence becomes evident: Within the framework of structural theories, then, the goal is to strip away the variability of performance [...] to reveal the knowledge structures. (Smith/Thelen J993: 152)

Instead of two separate theories—one for competence, one for performance, as Fodor (1983) advocates (cf. Smith/Thelen 1993: 152)—dynamical systems theory brings both together by virtue of its concept of development: The global order of behavior, the directionality of development, and the variability of realtime behavior are all explained by a single process account. (Smith/Thelen 1993: 165f.)

Uniform competence arises from variable performance in the course of the historical developmental pathways, always searching for an optimal equilibrium between the two polar exigencies of stability and variablity. Yet, not every variation is a "system-dependent variation"; there still exist "random perturbations" (both quotations van Geert 1993: 327). Nevertheless, the expectation is that 61

[...] der Gegensatz zwischen den Einzelereignissen im Schöße eines zahlenmäßig großen Ensembles und den Mittelwerten äußert sich in einer Dialektik zwischen Stabilitätsbereichen, in denen das Einzelereignis unbedeutend ist, und Instabilitätsbereichen, in denen es das gesamte System mit seinen Mittelwerten in ein qualitativ neues Arbeitsregime führen kann. 62 Variability in child language data may also be termed slips of the tongue, or speech errors, as inPoeppel/Wexler(1993). But these authors overlook the fact that a speech error is no explanans for variation in the data, or for performance but an explanandum in itself, as proved by Gawlitzek-Maiwald/Tracy 1994).

73 variation, expecially in the critical liminal phases, is not accidental, even if it may look so. In Part B I will offer data from the acquisition of Functional Categories as evidence for inter- and intraindividual variation, proving the operation of dynamical principles.

4.5

Continuity vs. Discontinuity

In the course of the discussion of dynamical systems so far, we have abandoned a couple of longstanding, familiar notions and oppositions such as (19) (i) causality: what is the cause and what is the effect can not straight-forwardly be established (see section 4.2) (ii) the claim of equivalence, i.e., that cause and effect are alike, both quantitatively and qualitatively. This is not at all true of nonlinear systems (cf. Stadler/Kruse 1992: , 35)63,64 (iii) the nature-nurture dichotomy (see section 4.3, cf. also Tracy 1991: 67ff.) (iv) the myth of average numbers and the cross-sectional method, (see section 1.3 and 4.3) The opposition between continuity and discontinuity will share the same fate. Only a few steps are necessary—as the continuity advocates would say—and generative grammar will be changed into a dynamical theory, escpecially acquisition theory—as I would say. Obviously we are all subject to the same (biological) power which makes everything appear continuous. By this I mean the working method of the CNS, for continuity, like causality, only exists in the realm of the psychic. Continuity is a cerebral artifact. A stimulus is either transmitted or not. This is a dichotomic, or binary decision. Especially the brain, while allowing us to construct continuity- an achievement that cannot be overestimated—is impudent enough to work discontinuously. Its synapses are either on or off, they either respond or do not respond.65 These processes take place on the microscopic, the physiological scale. Macroscopically, this basic discontinuity correlates with continuity,66 i.e., with psychic experience and behavior. Continuity and discontinuity do not necessarily have to be oppositions (cf. Tracy 1991: 74f.), their dichotomy is no dictate. Yet, there seems to be a "[...] perennial puzzle of continuiy-within-discontinuity" (Thelen 1989: 88) and, vice versa, discontinuity-within-continuity, as I would like to add. An anticipatory answer to the crucial question: "How can a system retain continuity and yet produce discontinuous manifestations" (ibid.: 88), is given by Thelen herself in the framework of dynamical systems theory. Rather than attributing continuity to the linear part and discontinuity to the nonlinear part of the overall dynamical

63

Stadler/Kruse (1992: 135f.) also list a whole number of prejudices on which I also rely here. Cohen/Stewart speak of this claim of equivalence as "conservation of complexity", which is the intuition of many people: "They expect complicated effects to have complicated causes (and simple things to have simple causes)." (Cohen/Stewart 1994: 19) 65 I am endebted to Prof. W. Schlote for making this point clear to me. 66 It is not surprising that Peirce (1891) relates continuity to the regime of thirdness (CP 6.202). 64

74 process, both must be conceived of as vital forces interactively producing a mixed continuous/discontinuous outcome. Or, according to Thelen: Continuity is maintained because most of the components of the system have not materially changed; discontinuity is manifest because the components relate to one another in a different fashion, and their low-dimensional, collective behavior has undergone a qualitative shift, (ibid.: 89).

In Piaget's framework of genetic epistemology continuity arises from differentiation and integration; discontinuity is entailed by the fact that something new does not arise by simple addition to the old (cf. Tracy 1991: 72). Theories of emergence renounce absolute discreteness as well as absolute continuity (cf. Esenhardt, Kurth/Stiehl 1995: 158). It is reasonably claimed that "the new emerges from the old." (ibid.)67 But while the new is new temporally, it is related to the old spatially. The old already bears the seed of the new. (cf. ibid.) In the framework of chaos theory, Crutchfield et al. (1986) hint at the differing character of fluid motion, depending on circumstances: Under some circumstances the motion of a fluid is laminar—even, steady and regular—and easily predicted from equations. Under other circumstances fluid motion is turbulent—uneven, unsteady and irregular—and difficult to predict. (Crutchfield et al. 1986: 40)

Continuity and discontinuity are temporal variations on one and the same theme. In the framework of dynamical systems, this polarity has long been acknowledged: chaos and order—or chaos and antichaos,68 as the pair is nowadays called (cf. Kauffman 1991)—statics and dynamics belong together. If one plays one pole off against the other, the common dimension gets lost. The proper question in language acquisition cannot be: "Continuity or discontinuity?", but must be: "When or, under which conditions, is language acquisition continuous, and when is it discontinuous?" With this, I address the proper punctuation of the overall process. This is a superordinate point of view, independent of the working regime an acquisitional trajectory just happens to be in—a turbulent or a static one. A language system as a whole may even be in different regimes simultaneously, when one closer inspects the different time strata it operates on, viz. the phylogenetic or diachronic, the ontogenetic, and the actual genetic time-scale, respectively; or, when one has the different modules in mind, viz. syntax, semantics, phonology, pragmatics, etc.:69 "Language as a self-organized system exhibits all levels of structures from very regular to semi-periodic and chaotic ones." (Wildgen 1990: 416) The discussion so far has shown that the phenomenology—whether continuous or discontinuous—depends on the impact of control parameters. Under continuous (!) energetic feeding, after a long time of continuous linear change, proportionally to the control parameter, dynamical systems spontaneously fall into the regime of a new order parameter via an abrupt phase transition or symmetry breaking. So much for the dynamical point of view. 67

Neues emergiert aus Altem. While chaos is the phenomenon of "vastly complex effects arising from simple causes", Kauffman has also investigated "'antichaos', in which complex causes produce simple effects; this is also widespread. Complexity can get lost as well as being created." (Cohen/Stewart 1994: 20) 69 cf. also Tracy (1991: 11 If.). 68

75 There are, however, other contributions to the focal theme—continuity and discontinuity— from the perpective of the principles-and-parameters-theory, which we have to look at carefully before further outlining the dynamical view. Thus, Hyams (1994) discusses the dichotomy of discreteness vs. nondiscreteness and the implications for the principles-and-parameters-model. She acknowledges that language acquisition looks quite continuous, from the point of view of the Ε-language, i.e., concrete child utterances, while paradigmatic changes mirroring the I-language, i.e., the internalized grammar, are discrete, as expected in this framework. She defends this latter claim by pointing out that the overt continuity is an artifact of Ε-language, stemming from the interaction of the—ideally discrete—parametric algorithm with other linguistic modules, such as the lexicon, morphology, pragmatics, etc. In her own words: "I propose that the gradual ness is an artifact of the interaction and uneven maturation of different modules of language." (Hyams 1994: 34, cf. also Thelen 1989: 91) It is this interference with other modules which are not necessarily operating in a discrete manner that accounts for the overall continuous look. While she is probably right in curing us of [...] a common misunderstanding about parameter models—that the course of acquisition is determined solely by the setting of parameters and hence all of the observable properties of early child language should be accounted for within the parameters of core grammar (Hyams 1994: 24) and in stressing interaction and modularity (cf. ibid.), her explaining away of continuity as an artifact is problematic. Yet, first of all, it is remarkable that Hyams defends nondiscreteness, although she belongs more to the continuity community herself. In this chapter I argue against the (naive) continuity approach as outlined above (see section 2.2) and for a theory that acknowledges discrete phase transitions as well. And now, Hyams apparently argues just in this direction. Now, should I simply approve of this unexpected support? Unfortunately, the situation is not that simple. The problem with Hyams1 approach is that she relegates nondiscreteness to external factors: the interaction of parameters with other linguistic modules, each working in a discrete mode while clinging to discrete parameters at least as a purified and idealized concept. But note that I propose a model in which the convergence of the system onto its attractors—formerly called "parameter setting"—endogeneously comprises phases of continuity and phases of discontinuity. Thus, discreteness is not the ideal character of a parameter, but the concrete behavior of a "parameter". This is not to say that Hyams is wrong. On the contrary, I cannot but approve of her conception of interacting modules that give rise to a complex picture of interaction with each sub-component's contribution altering the overall picture in language acquisition. But I call into question her clinging to idealizations, be it to instantaneous language acquisition or to discreteness. Instead, I claim that the very process of parameter setting is the product of both continuity and discontinuity. In a milder form, the criticism against making external factors responsible for the apparent continuity in acquisition could be reproduced with regard to Hyams1 discussion of crosslinguistic variation, and especially individual variation as the epiphenomenal product of multiple factors:

76 Different languages present different input to the child and individual children (and components) mature at different rates. These factors clearly influence the course of development and provide for a range of cross-linguistic and individual variation. (Hyams 1994: 33) Again, I subscribe to this view, but argue that variation is also an endogeneous feature of a dynamical system itself. Interestingly, Hyams goes on to discuss nondeterministic models as an alternative explanation for gradualness. She refers to Valian (1990, 1992) and Verrips (1994), who propose that initially the child works with open parameters rather than with a parameter already fixed at a universal value that has to be reset or not—depending on the language-specific input. The child maintains the whole range of parametric values as "competing representations" (Hyams 1994: 34) and gradually retreats from unsuccessful! options, eventually converging on the appropriate one. Although the acknowledgement of such nondeterministic models is significant, we are left with only gradualness. According to Pinker (1987), one of the defenders of the continuity approach, in language acquisition it may initially be the case that "rules are assigned graded strength values and can be acquired in an incremental fashion." (Pinker 1987: 435) Therefore, the acquisition is slow and clumsy. As the dynamical model developed here clearly resembles these competition models, I feel pushed to insist once again on both continuity and discontinuity. Although Hyams defends the discreteness of parameter setting, she subsribes to a continuity approach which claims that the overall grammatical development is smooth and continuous, especially that Functional Categories and the principles of UG are present and operative from the very outset. Since the study of nonlinear effects in language acquisition is still young, these effects have been only scarcely observed, documented and interpreted. This is the reason for the ignorance of the one and only significant bifurcation in language acquisition: the emergence of Functional Categories. PCs are the agents of symmetry-breaking and introduce linear order into the phrase marker. Without a dynamical paradigm one has to explain away this emergence, as the continuity approach does by claiming that PCs are present from early on (see section 2.2). The rejection of a prefiinctional stage is understandable in such a framework. But meanwhile, with the present study at the latest, there exists a dynamical model that uses the emergence of Functional Categories as witness of the operation of dynamical principles. Now, emerging PCs win the status of evidence, or thirdness, because they are embedded in an appropriate theory.

4.5.1

Continuity and Discontinuity in Language Change and Language Acquisition

Returning once again to the relation between continuity and discontinuity, I now want to consider Lightfoot's (1991, 1999) view on chaos and catastrophes.10

70

The third topic besides chaos and catastrophes, namely Creoles, is left out here. Note that creolization nevertheless relates to the emergence of Functional Categories on the diachronic time-scale.

77 Looking at historical language change, Lightfoot, like Herodot, states that languages are in a state of constant change: "Everything is in flux." (1991: 158) For him, "chaos and the gradualness of change" (his section 7.1 in Lightfoot 1991) belong together. Transitions are gradual for long periods, indeed, but when grammars assign different structures to a linguistic expression from one generation to the other, then there are at least some abrupt changes: "At that point an abrupt change takes place, but it was preceded by gradual changes affecting triggering experiences but not grammars." (ibid.: 160) Such altered triggering experiences can refer to the frequency of a word order pattern, e.g., dislocations like

(20) George, I like him (cf. ibid.) become more frequent in English. Yet, the grammar is still unaffected, as such constructions had already been licensed before and are not novel, in principle. What is affected, instead, is the triggering experience. Another example is the changing categorization of lexical items. Thus, at the point of transition from Old to Middle English premodal verbs were no longer categorized as full verbs, but recategorized as INFL. For example, do was directly base-generated in INFL. John can sing was no longer analyzed as (21 (ii), Lightfoot's (lb)), but as ((21i), Lightfoot's (la)): (21) (i) John [Npjcan AGR] VP [sing] (ii) John INFL VP|can S'(Comp S[PRO INFL sing]]] (ibid.: 161)

Normally, the acquisitional setting ensures continuity, since the parental grammar represents the Primary Linguistic Data (PLD) for the children. But as few as two slightly differing sets of PLD suffice to set a parameter differently—with phenomenologically far-reaching changes. Such a new parameter setting may change in a discrete manner in some individuals, but then gradually penetrates the whole population by a chain reaction: So gradualness exists: triggering experiences may change gradually, lexical classification may change gradually, and new parameter settings may gradually permeate a speech community. Much of this gradual change may have no immediate effect on the setting of structural parameters, which are reset only when the triggering experience has changed in some critical fashion, (ibid.: 162f.; cf. also 1999: 18)

Thus, Lightfoot takes into account both aspects: continuity has the lion's share in the developmental change until a discontinuous phase transition takes place at a certain point of bifurcation (cf. also Cohen/Stewart 1994: 333). From this observations, Lightfoot constructs a curve of growth comprising three phases, as given in Fig. 8:

78

u

§ α

α

Time Fig. 8: Logistic growth curve with the frequency of triggering experience as the y-axis and time as the x-axis (Lightfoot 1991: 163; reproduced with kind permission of MIT-Press) Mathematically, this is a logistic growth curve showing a characteristic S (sigmoid)-shaped form, as it is common in population biology and genetics (cf. ibid.). This s-curve models parametric change in historical language change as well as in ontogenetic language acquisition (cf. also Horvath 1990: 47If)· Take a look at its form: In the first phase, A, the increase in frequency of use of a given construction is still modest, almost imperceptible. Continuity and stability reign until the second phase, B, sets in abruptly and the frequency dramatically increases. Discontinuity and instability are its attributes. Now, parameter (re-)setting takes place. The system is in transition. In the following third phase, C, the system stabilizes again at another level. The parameter value has changed in language change, in language acquisition it may be set for the very first time. Now the system slowly and asymptotically conforms to a new stable state. Lightfoot himself comments on these three phases as follows: [...] the change may be foreshadowed in various ways, but there is a short period of rapid change, followed by a longer period where occasional residual forms gradually disappear, (ibid.: 168) If we were to plot down the standard deviation on this curve as a measure for the variation, the fictitious diagram would show small standard deviations in the bracketing phases A and C, but great ones in the liminal phase B. In the liminal phase, competing forms temporally coexist (cf. section 4.1). In biology, these would correspond to different species competing for resources and reproducing at different rates (cf. Lightfoot 1991: 163, cf. also van Geert 1993, cf. also section 4.4.3 here), until symmetry-break takes place and the system converges onto the order parameter. Now, variance decreases at the level of uninteresting random perturbation, which is always present in any stable phase, too. In Hohenberger (1992: 148ff.)) I already conceptualized a similar tripartite distinction corresponding to Lightfoot's growth curve. There, I termed the phases as follows: (22) (i) Pre-phase, corresponding to the pre-liminal phase in (11) (ii) Nuclear phase, corresponding to the liminal phase, and (iii) Consolidating phase, corresponding to the post-liminal phase, (cf. section 4.1)

79 In a full-blown dynamical framework the latter notions in the sense of liminality are preferred over the others. The convergence with other recent linguistic texts (cf. d'Avis/Gretsch 1994) reinforces this process. It is interesting to note that Lightfoot, too, establishes proximity with recent evolutionary theory. With Eldredge/Gould (1972, cf. Gould/Eldredge 1977) he speaks of a punctuated equilibrium: the evolutionary process is an equilibrium that is repeatedly punctuated by discontinuities: The picture of language change that emerges is one of 'punctuated equilibrium.' Languages are constantly changing gradually and in piece-meal fashion, but meanwhile grammars remain in equilibrium, unchanged in their structural properties. From time to time, however, they undergo more radical, catastrophic restructuring, corresponding to new parameter settings. (Lightfoot 1991: 173) The tripartite model of parameter setting thus embraces aspects of continuity—the pre-liminal and the post-liminal phase—as well as aspects of discontinuity—the liminal phase. The integration of all three phases, or both continuous and discontinuous aspects, still seems to be in need of getting used to, even though familiar in other areas of research for a long time past.

4.5.1.1

Ecological Aspects of the Logistic Growth Curve

Van Geert (1993, cf. also Ruhland, Wijnen/van Geert 1995) discusses in detail such sigmoid or quadratic logistic growth curves as the one put forward by Lightfoot (1991). His discussion is embedded in an ecological model of cognitive growth, which he offers as an alternative to cognitivism (Chomsky/Piaget) as well as to connect!vism. He calls the particular cognitive faculties or modules cognitive growers, each spreading, growing, competing, shrinking etc. in their cognitive biotope, i.e., the organism or, more specifically, the brain. Parameters such as growth level, growth rate, growth resources, and carrying capacity (van Geert 1993: 274ff.) as well as osculations caused by a wavering attentional function (cf. ibid.: 297) all shape the form of the logistic growth curve. Next, depending on the kind of interaction—e.g., whether two cognitive growers interfere with or sustain one another (the latter is a case of bootstrapping (cf. ibid.: 313ff, see chapter 14 here) or whether they are able to mutually increase their growing potential—different curves result. These are additional parameters concerning the interaction between the respective cognitive growers. Thus, step-like growth curves like the ones in Piaget and Flavell for example, result if two cognitive growers are in a supporting relationship. The global patterns resulting from these relations take their special forms without any underlying factor controlling the particular phenomenology: Thus it is not necessary to introduce hidden or underlying structural factors to explain sudden absolute changes in the increase in a cognitive variable. These absolute changes necessarily follow from the logistic nature of growth, (van Geert 1993: 320, cf. also Cohen/Stewart 1994: 334, Elman et al. 19%)

80 Neither internal nor external factors are responsible for the phenomenology of cognitive growth: The steps, dips, and so forth are not artificially introduced in the matrix or explained by external factors. They simply emerge given the parameter values and the nature of the interactions in the system, (ibid.: 323)

Once again, the emergence of special growth patterns is shown to be the sole result of given parameter values and the particular functions describing their interactions in the overall dynamical system. These interactions are understood in terms of ecology, i.e., the behavior of each grower, or structure, or representation, is constrained by the behavior of all the others sharing the same biotope and by the resources available for each. Van Geert discusses in detail the relation of two such cognitive growers, lexicon and syntax. This is directly relevant to the discussion of Lexical vs. Functional Categories. His ecological interpretation of the emergence of the syntactic capacity will be discussed in chapter 15. Here, I only wanted to hint at the relationship between the logistic growth curve independently provided by Lightfoot (1991) and the dynamical conception, i.e., the three phases comprising a phase-transition. Thus, parameter setting is well accounted for in dynamical systems theory. The sigmoid or quadratic growth curve is one possibility for non-linear change in development. Alternatively, jump-wise curves of sudden growth may also occur. These are described by cubic equations (cf. Ruhland, Wijnen/van Geert 1995). Note that the difference between them only depends on the power of the respective dynamical systems equations: the sigmoid, quadratic equation has a power ofp=l, whereas the cubic equation has a power of p=2 . Both can be described by the same general Verhulst-equation (cf. ibid.: 114f.). This function is iterative. What is missing in Lightfoot's account, of course, is the fate of the whole system. Note that a cognitive species, e.g., a syntactic structure, does not exist in isolation; in addition to the growth of the structure in question, the decay of former ones, presumably bearing a precursor status, or whatever relation, has to be taken into account, too. So, one curve alone tells only little. In the field of language acquisition, all kinds of dynamical behavior can be met. Elman et al. (19%, chapter 4) present a taxonomy of growth patterns with their corresponding nonlinear equations and pair them with examples from language acquisition (vocabulary growth, second language acquisition, etc.). They conclude that abrupt phenomenological changes need not correspond to structural changes in some underlying factor which is thought to govern a particular behavior. Instead, minor differences in some control parameter suffice to produce major effects, due to the nonlinear character of the dynamical equations. I cannot but approve to this proper interpretation. The authors are eager to instrumentalize these findings as evidence for the superiority of connectionism over generative grammar. This, however, is no valid conclusion. It is equally possible for generativists to use dynamical systems theory as a computational framework for the interpretation of their findings. Dynamical systems theory does not necessarily go along with connectionism exclusively. Lightfoot's much earlier approach to chaos theory disproves this exclusivity.

81

4.6

Adult-centered vs. Child-centered Perspective

A last aspect of the debate over continuity vs. discontinuity is the point of view from which language acquisition is considered: from the point of view of the adult or from the point of view of the child. One early representative of the latter view is Slobin, for whom "[...] language is created anew by children each generation." (Slobin 1973: ISO)71 The continuity hypothesis, especially in its strong version, has before its eyes the complex phrase marker of the competent adult speaker/listener as in (23a+b) and needs to explain how the child might ever acquire it: (23) (a)

The nominal projection

DP

/\

D1

Spec

/\ D°

AGRNP

/\ Spec

AGRN'

/\ AGRN 0

QP

Λ Spec

1 Q •t

Λ /\ Q°

NP

/\ Spec

N'

/\ N° (23a) is the nominal projection. It has been attributed an equally sophisticated phrase marker (cf. e.g., Penner 1993: 15) as the verbal phrase maker in (23b):

71

This does not mean that I adopt Slobin's cognitive framework for language acquisition in any way. For a brief discussion on him, see Tracy (1991: 27f).

82

(23) (b)

The verbal projection CP

/\C X\

Spec

C°

AGRSP

/\

Spec

AGRS1

/\

AGRS0 AGROP

/\

Spec AGROP AGRO°

ASPP

/\ Spec

ASP

X\

ASP0

Spec

NEGP

Neg1

/\ Neg°

VP

/\ V°

The strategy (of avoidance) employed by the defenders of continuity consists essentially in denying acquisition, in a way. This is tiicphobos of the continuity hypothesis: as it cannot explain structural growth, the latter is ignored completely. On the contrary: the child is already equipped with the adult phrase-marker—via UG—and always generates it in its entirety or at least in "locally wellformed" parts (cf. Weissenborn 1994). In return, the continuity theory accepts the supposition of many mental predicates, i.e., categories (especially Functional Categories) and their projections. This is a strong claim, which is indeed consistent with the nativist claim of a rich innate structure. The continuity hypothesis always purports to be the null-hypothesis (cf. Clahsen 1987) in that it needs the fewest additional developmental requisites to explain language acquisi-

83 tion, since child and adult representations are strictly equivalent. On the other hand, it presupposes a really baroque phrase-marker already being larded with Functional Categories, the number of which is possibly proliferating, as evidenced by the current debate (cf. e.g., Kayne 1993). The structure-building hypothesis in line with the maturational hypothesis, on the other hand, simplifies the child phrase marker in the sense of Lexical Categories only, but inevitably renders the developmental task more difficult. Occam's razor does not permit an unambiguous evaluation of which hypothesis is the simpler one and therefore should be favored, as simplicity on the one hand always goes along with complexity on the other hand.72 Yet, both aspects are indispensable: innate structure and the acquisitional task. The continuity hypothesis attributes high cost to structure but economizes on acquisition. The opposite is true of the structure-building hypothesis or the maturational hypothesis. It is a matter of time-scales again. The rich innate structure once was expensive on a phylogenetic or evolutionary time-scale. Once, this whole phrase-marker had to be established in the brain. At present, however, it is for free. Do not get confused by the account drawn up in Poeppel/Wexler (1993), who emphasize the acquisitional cost which the structure-building hypothesis has to bear with respect to the learnability problem, but who are silent on the cost the "Full Competence Hypothesis" (FCH) has to bear with respect to the rich structure: In our view, the fact that the data are consistent with the Full Competence model is enough to favor this model, since any theory which assumes that the child has less competence would involve more learnability problems. That is, the Full Competence Hypothesis has no developmental question associated with it (except for the optional infinitive problem), whereas theories that assume less than full competence must explain how the missing or wrong properties are learned or, alternatively, develop through maturation. (Poeppel/Wexler 1993: 18) I totally agree with the authors: FCH does not have any acquisitional problem. The reason for this is that it is no acquisitional theory at all. If the child phrase-marker and the adult phrase-marker are identical, nothing has to be acquired. This amounts to selling out generative language acquisition research. Having stated this, one could just as well stop research and restrict oneself to the adult system. I would like to point out that in Poeppel/Wexler (1993) Wexler contradicts his own maturational account which he advocated since Borer/Wexler (1987) and which he underlines once again most recently in Wexler (1999). There, he calls an approach which claims that the child has perfect knowledge from early on and which denies maturation rigidity (ibid.: 59). He vigorously argues in favor of a continuous developmental (CD) view (ibid.: 72) which claims continuity but allows for maturationally constrained development. Empirically, he draws upon Optional Infinitives, his main field of investigation for the last decade (Wexler 1992, 1994, 1999, and literature quoted therein). Optional Infinitives are 72

Note that for Cohen/Stewart (1994: 225ff.) simplicity in the sense of Occam's razor is no longer an unquestioned qualification of a scientific theory, but rather a "working rule of thumb" (ibid.: 226). Above all, the question "What is simple?" cannot be answered straightforwardly. As a joke they invoke a counter-principle, Octant's trowel: "It says that theories should not be rendered unreasonably simple." (ibid.: 227)

84 child matrix clauses with an infinitival instead of a finite verb—an option which is ruled out in any adult target language because of the obligatoriness of Tense in a finite matrix clause. However, the Optional Infinitive stage is a pervasive stage of many child grammars.73 How can these Optional Infinitives be integrated into an account which aims at proving that children have set parameters already at a very early age and that the child grammar ideally does not differ from the adult target? The only way to integrate the OI-stage into the acquisitional scenario is growth/maturation. UG-constrained maturation (UGCM) (Wexler 1999: 75) is just another term for the above-mentioned CD-view. Certain features (in the case of Optional Infinitives D-features which the child only optionally interpretes at the LF-interface) have to mature until the child interpretes them always and in the same way as the adult does. This is just a tiny underlying difference which, however, leads to a very dramatic difference on the syntactic surface. As Wexler repeatedly points out maturation is the only coherent explanation in a generative account of language acquisition. Universal grammar conceived of as a mental organ undergoes comparable maturational changes as other organs do. From a biological perspective, it is the most likely scenario and, in fact, the only one which can really explain the changes in children's grammar which no linguist can deny. In this way Wexler can maintain at the same time his hypothesis of very early parameter setting (VEPS) (ibid.: 96) which suggests that the child is fully competent from early on and his growth hypothesis which allows for minor differences between the child's "proto-UG" and the fullblown adult UG. These differences soon vanish due to biological maturation. I would agree at any time that the child is fully competent. But one does not have to understand this as referring to the fully elaborated phrase marker, but as referring to the competence of the child, namely that she will build this phrase marker in the future. But back to the account of Poeppel and Wexler mentioned above. The trade-off between structural and learnability cost seems unavoidable (cf. deVilliers 1992: 423f.). Both kinds of cost have to be borne. Obviously, there exist different strategies to cope with them, but from a superior point of view, neither seems to be unambiguously preferable over the other. Rather, they reflect global trends: in a world generally focussing on structures above all, the focus on processes is unusual. But note that dynamical theories do just that. Look at the alternatives again. Thephobos of the continuity claim consists in the adult phrase-marker, the acquisition of which is almost miraculous in the absence of a proper developmental model. Therefore refusal and denial. This is the apory of the adult-centered approach. As a therapy, the child-centered approach might be chosen. The child begins with only few mental linguistic predicates, i.e., the Lexical Categories V, N, A, and P (roughly). The cost is only small. But how are the "costly" Functional Categories acquired? They are supposed to mature, but how remains dubious in the maturational approach as well as in the structure-building hypothesis. A truly cost-intensive acquisitional theory, say, benavioristic learning, is correctly refuted in the first place. Instead, one tries to avoid the cost by passing it over to biology.

73

Italian children, however, do not display a comparable OI-stage. As Rizzi (1994) points out this is because in Italian even the uninflected infinitival verb obligatorily undergoes movement to the same higher functional projection as the inflected finite verb. Children acquiring Italian are already sensitive to this contraint from early on.

85

At second glance, the continuity hypothesis is even more honest in that it bears at least the structural cost, while the maturational hypothesis still owes its acquisitional cost. A solution to this obvious puzzle is offered by a dynamical model of self-organization. Here, the acquisition of PCs is understood as spontaneous emergence. This does not mean that this does not cost anything. But biological organisms are obviously lavish in this respect. The advantage of a model of emergence is that the development of more and more complex structures is spontaneous. It happens involuntarily, simply because dynamical systems like our brain, ultimately matter, have this property. To that extent, Chomsky's statement that the child does not "learn" language, but that language acquisition "happens" to her (cf. chapter 2) is correct. Not necessarily in a nativist way, but in a self-organizing mode. How, we will see in detail in part B.

4.7

Hysteresis

One prominent aspect of the liminal phase has to do with the critical phase transitions: hysteresis. Hysteresis (from Greek hysteron = "later") is a wide-spread phenomenon in dynamical systems and was first and most intensively discussed in Haken's synergetics (cf. Haken 1990: 22f, cf. also Haken 1983, Wildgen 1987, Kelso, Ding/Schöner 1993). Let us first look at an instructive example from visual perception before trying to apply it to language acquisition. If you look at figure 9 (Haken 1990: 23), beginning with the man's face, one might maintain this order parameter up to the penultimate picture, where this interpretation eventually breaks down and the girl, i.e., a second order parameter, is perceived unambiguously:

Fig. 9: Visualization of the hysteresis present in the perception of a man's face or a girl (Haken's Fig. 19 in 1990: 23). (Reproduced with kind permission of Springer)

Yet, if you look at the very same pictures beginning with the girl, i.e., if you mirror the sequence, you might perceive the girl until some item in the first row, where the man's face eventually appears. As can be seen in Fig. 10, the switch, or selection of one of either order parameterman's face or girl—takes place at rather distinct points:

86

girl

face 0.75

,"*

O.SO 0.25 0 00

Λ 050

.100

050

.100

•50

TIME

TIME

face

girl d,.< Ο 75 0.50 0.25 0.00

.050

.050

.100

100

.ISO

TIME

TIME

Fig. lOa and b: Different points of transition in the perception of the man's face or the girl (Haken's 1990: 24 Fig. 20aand b). Note the difference in the switching between figures (a) and (b). (Reproduced with kind permission of Springer)

This effect is called hysteresis. Hysteresis shows impressively that the history of the system, i.e., the state it was in before, plays an important role in determining its future behavior. Hysteresis is due to a bias or, metaphorically speaking, to a systemic conservation, that makes the system cling to an order parameter as long as possible, even when there is a coexisting and competing order parameter that will inevitably take over the attraction in the future. Hence, the transition is delayed and happens later than without this bias. Recall that hysteron means "later". The counter-evidence for the other attractor is successfully suppressed: you do not perceive the girl, even in the second row, if you begin with the man's face, although you would still cling to the girl, even in the first row, if you were to begin with the girl. Hysteresis describes an extra- or over-stability. Although the attractor's stability decreases continuously, it nevertheless does not lose its validity up to a sudden, discontinuous switch. Note that the competing attractor must have already been in place and must have received positive evidence in the hysteresis region continuously, although it does not overtly exert any attraction. The categorial response remains the same, but subliminally becomes less and less valid. Other examples of hysteris come from animal locomotion, namely a horse's gait and concerns the speed at which the horse changes from walking into trotting and from trotting

87 into gallopping (cf. Stadler/Kruse 1990: 37). The changes in the horse's gait happen in order to minimize energy cost, i.e., for reasons of economy. The transitional points from one order parameter to the other— walk, trot, gallop—are different for increasing and decreasing speed, respectively. Hysteresis is a common feature in dynamical systems, especially in synergetics. It manifests itself not only in phase transitions, but also if only one stable order parameter is present and the system gets modestly disturbed. The system's behavior will soon return to the reigning attractor, as if nothing had happened. The examples depicted here are only two of a whole range of manifestations: Hysteresis is frequently observed in non-equilibrium phase transitions and may be interpreted as a cohesive tendency of stable states in the nervous system. It means that certain coordinate spatio-temporal patterns are unaffected by local disturbances. (Stadler/Kruse 1990: 37) Because of the great range of application of hysteresis, let us look at a schematic illustration of it provided by Kelso, Ding/Schöner (1993: 30f.) and their commentary:

Hysteresis Region

Fig. 11 (Kelso, Ding/Schöner's Fig. 1.15 in 1993: 31). (Reproduced with kind permission of MIT-Press) A striking feature revealed by the figure is that there exists an overlapping region, -kc< k < kc, in which, depending on the directions of k, the system can rest in either one of two possible states. At k=kc, and A = -kc, the system switches to a different state signifying the end of the coexistence of two distinct attractors. From an empirical point of view, the coexistence of multiple attractors may be regarded as evidence of nonlinearity, and it is manifested by the hysteresis effect. In the quest for a better understanding of biological dynamics, the role of hysteresis can hardly be exaggerated. (Kelso, Ding/Schöner 1993: 30) In the hysteresis region, the system is betwixt and between, as Turner used to characterize the liminal phase. Hysteresis shows that the input and the categorial response do not match one to one, but that a categorial response is upheld even in the light of contradictory data, much like a prejudice or stereotype. Once an order parameter has been instantiated, the system does not leave

it deliberately, even if evidence for this particular attractor is not continuously supplied by the input any more (cf. Stadler/Kruse 1992: 147). Language acquisition, conceived of as a dynamical system, is expected to exhibit hysteresis, too. In part B we will come across data evidencing this prominent effect The hysteresis effect is of particular interest if one thinks of the critical phase transition from Lexical to Functional Categories. Equipped with the knowledge of dynamical systems, one can avoid the sharp and inappropriate confrontation between the two presumed states. Is a particular phrase-marker still lexical of already functional? This all-or-nothing decision might reduce to a hysteresis effect: the child—still clinging to the old lexical attractor that she tries to carry over from the one-word stage, i.e., the very organization of the lexiconexhibits structures that are no longer adequate to deal with more than two words in one utterance in the future. Thus, the so-called pre-junctional stage is situated right in the hysteresis region between Lexical and Functional Categories. It is an unstable realm, because the "higher" attractor already pulls the lexical phrase maker vigorously towards its region of convergence. So neither is surprising: early phrase-markers without and with PCs. Saving us from false dichotomizations and instead pointing to the underlying processes present wherever critical phase transitions take place might turn out a major contribution of the dynamical conception. Consider a revealing child phrase marker which is solely in the lexical mode. Platzack (1990), a pre-functionalist, interprets the child utterance (22) by the Swedish girl Embla as a Lexical phrase marker, as in (24), i.e., a VP: (24) Embla inte ha tacket Embla not has blanket (25) Lexical phrase-marker VP

/\ NP

VP

'/\ ADV inte

VP

/\ NP

V V

NP

ha

tacket

(Platzack 1990: 19)

Disregarding for a moment whether this representation can really be correct, this example evidences a linguistic hysteresis effect. The child, presumably starting out with a VP, tries

89

to maintain this attractor as long as possible, even when more and, above all, functional information enters the system, which cannot adequately be expressed in terms of Lexical Categories only. For V2, subject-verb-congruence, case-marking, and negation proper Functional Categories are needed. Yet, the necessary Functional projections (TenseP, AGRP, Neg-P, DP, etc.) are not (yet) in place here. Instead, multiple adjunction has applied, with the VP expanding twice. This example is a crucial one in showing how a formerly valid lexical representation has turned into an inappropriate one. Such a structure is basically unstable. It is overloaded with parasitic constituents building up on the VP. While multiple adjunctions are possible in theorey, this phrase-marker "cries" for true Functional Categories (cf. Hohenberger 1992: 148). In fact, I would not support such an analysis, but already attribute Functional Categories to Embla. This short excursus is telling in another respect as well: the linguist, too, is subject to hysteresis. Sometimes this is positive, sometimes it is negative. For note that the hysteresis effect is also manifest when looking at a particular development from two opposed points of view. Recall the example of increasing vs. decreasing velocity in a horse's gait. Looking from bottom up, you will say: the horse is still trotting at velocity x. Looking from top down, you will say: the horse is still gal lopping at the same velocity x. Thus, in the hysteresis region, both attractors compete, even in the linguists' debate. It comes as no surprise that the adult-centered investigator (e.g., strong continuity/full competence) should see child language already "in full gallop", i.e., already having an IP, CP, DP, etc., while the child-centered investigator (e.g., structure-building theory, dynamical models) should see the child still "walking" along with a bare VP. The child's fate during the liminal phase is the linguist's fate as well. Whatever attractor we conspire with, we cannot but show solidarity with the child (cf. Gawlitzek-Maiwald et al. 1992). To unite both the lexical and the functional attractor as an interacting whole migh resolve an otherwise fruitless controversy. Note that it became necessary for us to critically call into question our own position as investigators in child language and therefore to switch to a meta-linguistic level of argumentation. Much like in Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, the results we obtain are not independent of our own position.

4.8

Liminal Conclusions

It is rather surprising that one should find similarities in areas apparently as disparate as rites of transition, population biology, synaptic plascticity, cognitive growth in general, and parameter setting in language acquisition in particular. However, it is not surprising if one has a principled account for all these phenomena. This seems to be possible in the framework of a dynamical model. For now, we shall leave the phenomenological variety, which is by no means exhausted by the present discussion, behind and concentrate solely on linguistic data (see part B). After an initial phase of exploration and expansion, the phase of contraction, in the sense of the Lvapownov-exponent, will be rung in. The features and principles of dynamical systems will be reconsidered in child language. In part, it is "old"

90

data discussed in the existing literature; what is new is the outlook on it. We all know what child language looks like. The consideration of empirical data alone cannot cause a paradigmatic change. There must exist an alternative paradigm in the light of which these empirical data can be reinterpreted. Thus, secondness in the sense of Peirce is converted into thirdness. Peirce always underlined the significance of "reality": "Resistance on existence", i.e., we have to struggle with the facts. It was also Peirce who assigned to the "community of investigators" the task to work out the potentially last signifie, i.e., to converge upon an interpretation of shared consensus. Yet, this imaginary point of consensus will very likely turn out a limit cycle rather than a point attractor. In this sense, I do not expect dynamical systems theory to embody the ultimate truth. But, as I have tried to show, linguistics is ready now to be confronted with this new out-look, and it inevitably has to be. This encounter will yield a new understanding and a new focus on particular child data, especially on variation.

Part B: Theme and Variation: Self-Organization in Language Acquisition: Models, Data, and Analyses

In this part of the book, two major symmetry-breakings will take place. Firstly, in what follows we will consider child language data only. Secondly, the criticism directed at generative grammar will be more pronounced in favor of a linguistic model of selforganization. However, the technical terms of generative grammar will be heavily relied on. As I consider it the best syntactic theory around available at present, I will take it as a point of departure towards the dynamical paradigm. The technical apparatus of generative grammar is brilliant; I cannot add anything significant to it. What I want to do is to explore dynamical principles. Their integration into a syntactic theory seems to be in reach (cf. Lebeaux 1988/2000, Karpf 1990, 1993, Lightfoot 1991, 1999, Randall 1990, 1992, Uriagereka 1998, Verrips 1994). Although the generative enterprise has remained inside a static framework, Chomsky himself now contributes to a new, promising process with his Minimalist Program (1992, 1994, 1995, 2000), where he gets rid of superfluous ballast, i.e., of d- and s-structure. Instead, he invokes a dynamical concept: his checking theory of features and his idea of convergence of phrase-structures at the interface levels PF (Phonetic Form) and LF (Logical Form). In what follows I will first discuss Lebeaux' (1988/2000) and Grimshaw's (1991, 1993, 1994) idea of the layering of grammars. In Lebeaux this concerns the layering of representational levels, in Grimshaw the layering of functional levels. These approaches will be reinterpreted in the sense of a dynamical model. Here, the relation of LCs and PCs is fundamental. Recall: if we want to learn something about the acquisition of grammar we have to look at the emergence of FCs.

5

Models of Layers and Levels of Syntactic Structures

5.1 Lebeaux' Model of Levels of Representation: Language Acquisition and the Form of the Grammar According to Lebeaux (1988/2000)1 the child relies on a truly lexical or argument-structure at the prefunctional stage, i.e., the theta-grid. The original grammar is the lexicon (1988, chapter II: 189). This theta-grid is not flat, however, but takes the form of an articulate small lexical subtree which has full syntactic status (ibid.: 70, 75, 79). This small thetatree belongs to the lexical syntax, i.e., it is filled with X°-tokens, or words. The transition 1

Lebeaux1 (1988) doctoral dissertation was published in (2000). In the following, I will rely on the first version.

92

to phrasal syntax (with XPs) begins exactly with the introduction of the elements of the closed class, i.e., PCs. Lebeaux calls this process Project-alpha. Accordingly, the structures of the prefunctional phase are generated by a process called Pre-Project-alpha. The lexical representation of a transitive verb, e.g., hit, contains only the abstract thematic roles agent and patient as arguments of the verb in a hierarchical form (1988: 86):

(24)

V

/\ N

V

agentt yv V

hit

insert N

patient

lexical representation The distinction of the external and the internal argument is already configurationally present at the level of the theta-grid (cf. ibid.: 70). This knowledge is pre-given. The child moves on to the thematic representation by inserting the conrete lexical items into the abstract argument places (OC-insert; OC stands for open class),(cf. ibid.: 86):2

(25)

V

/\ N

agent man V

hit

N

patient dog

thematic representation Both levels—the lexical and the thematic representation—belong to the Pre-Project-alpha representation and jointly characterize the telegraphic style of the prefuctional stage. In principle, this Pre-Project-alpha representation remains intact (as an early module) even in the adult grammar that has already reached the level of phrasal syntax.3 A related idea is that adult small clauses (SCs) correspond to child SCs, in the sense of Radford (1988, see section 3.1).

The term lexical representation for the abstract argument places and thematic representation for the next representation, which is filled with lexical material, are somewhat misleading. Nevermind! In terms of X-bar theory, however, the Pre-Project-alpha representation is illicit in adult grammar, as pointed out to me by Helen Leuninger (p.c.).

93

The basic correspondence between both grammars is their syntactic characterizability. The small lexical subtree is a syntactic one, too. The child grammar is already the young plant out of which the adult structural tree will once grow: [...] this subtree is available in principle prior to the application of Project-a [...]. In the normal course of language use, no instances of Pre-Project-a representations would be expected to be visible, since one utters elements which are sentences, or at least part of the phrasal syntax, and not bare words. However, this need not be the case with the initial stages of acquisition, if we assume, as in fact seems to be the case, that the child starts out with a 'lexical looking' syntax, and only later moves into the phrasal syntax. (Lebeaux 1988: 79) As soon as the perception and the categorization of the elements of the closed class begins, the child's Pre-Project-alpha representations are enriched by functional projections, e.g., Det, I (Tns, Agr), C, Neg, Asp, Pass. Lebeaux uses a geological metaphor for this process: the new sediment of PCs is layered upon the old sediment of the lexical representation (ibid.: 126). In principle, the old sediment is retained. However, it merges into a new modular structure with many facets: That is, telegraphic speech is actually generated by a subgrammar of the adult grammar, a modular and unified subgrammar, and this enters into the full phrase marker, (ibid.: 232) This geological metaphor is misleading however, in one respect: according to Lebeaux, these two representations interact in a highly dynamical way, which is not readily grasped by the picture of a simple layering. The lexical structure is projected into the functional one. The latter comprises the first and melts into it. Lebeaux uses the notion Project-alpha and merger for this process. The result is a Post-merger representation. The phrasal structure is projected from the lexical argument structure, i.e., from the theta-tree: In effect, it (the lexical representation) has constructed the phrasal representation around it, 'projecting out' the structure of the lexical head. Into this phrasal structure, lexical insertion may take place, (ibid.: 74) [...] there exists a grid or template of closed class elements, and the open class elements are projected into them, (ibid.: 230) The functional projections are understood as a fixed frame into which the lexical projections are integrated: The fixed character of the closed class elements [...] is modelled by having such elements be the frame into which the theta representation is projected, (ibid.: 245) Thus, Lebeaux nicely grasps the movement of lexical elements into the functional projections for grammatical reasons. The following complete sentence structure (26) is generated from the two preceding ones ((24) and (25)) by Project-alpha (cf. ibid.: 94):4

4

Lebeaux (1988) uses the old terms S and NP, here. The correspondence with the new terms CP, DP, etc., is straightforward.

94

(26)

Project-a

NP the man

VP s\

V hit

NP the dog

This structure is the result of merger, i.e., the merging of the theta and the case module. One can see the layering character of both modules in detail in the following example (27), which has only insignificantly been changed (cf. ibid.: 69):

NP, VP the man /^v V

/

NPj

the boy

\^

Ni

V

agent

/S. V

hit

NJ

(patient)

The small theta-tree remains intact and is linked to the complete sentential structure. The massive redundancy leads to an apparent doubling of the elements in their respective positions in the hierarchical structure as the result of the application of Project-alpha. This redundancy is defended by Lebeaux by invoking the Projection Principle and the modular design of the grammar: just because the grammar consists of subordinated modules, the information must not get lost in the course of the interaction of the modules. This is the sense of the Projection Principle (cf. ibid.: 74, 77).5 The later structure contains all the information of the previous one plus its own information. This later structure is derived not in a static, additive way but in a highly dynamical, interactive way. This is captured by the other term used for Project-alpha, namely merger. both modules are merged. Not only the quantity of the structure is enlarged by merger, but 5

Note that in Chomsky (1992, 1994, 1995) the Projection Principle is given up together with d- and s-structure.

95

the quality has also changed. Again, we are confronted with Uiejanus face of emergence: on the one hand, the new emerges from the old; on the other hand, however, we have to acknowledge that the emerging structure is a true novelty (cf. Eisenhardt, Kurth/Stiehl 1995: 158). It is only the operating functional module which allows phrasal syntax to be fully exploited. The merging of the lexico-thematic representation with the functional one by the operation merger underlines just the initial and principled autonomy of the former representation. The lexical grammar is a possible UG-grammar, too, though an unextended one as compared to the functional grammar: Merger merged together an open class representation, the theta representation, and a closed class frame. The stage of telegraphic speech, in this view, is not simply the result of an extraneous computational deficit, nor the result of a reduction transformation but is itself a wellformed subpart of the grammar. However, it is only partial, not having undergone merger with a closed class representation. By the General Congruence Principle, a similar structure of telegraphic speech must underlie adult grammar as well, (ibid.: 261) The General Congruence Principle (GPC) alluded to here postulates a congruence between (child) acquisitional stages and (adult) representational levels: the construction of specific grammars in the characteristic stages of acquisition, i.e., Pre-Project-alpha, merger, Postmerger, are derivational levels of the later, more complex grammar: (28) General Congruence Principle Levels of grammatical representations correspond to (the output of) acquisitional stages, (ibid.: 65) Later, Lebeaux reformulates his GCP in the following way: (29) General Congruence Principle: The structure of operations (and their bracketing) within a language is congruent to the structure of parameters. (Lebeaux 1990: 58) (29) is meant to express the idea that the parametric values are accessed by erasing brackets. Initially, both values—X and a (bracketed) marked value Y—are given. In the course of acquisition the child either stays with the default value or proceeds to the marked value, depending on the input. Both values X and Υ are related to two possible grammars G2 and G1. If Υ is the proper value of the language to be acquired, the default value X is superseded by Y. Nevertheless, it serves as a possible value on which the grammar can fall back, e.g., if processing demands are too high. (30) depicts parametrization according to Lebeaux (1988, 1990, in Clahsen (1990: 365)):

(30)

^ X , Y (Gl)

X (G2)

G1 and G2 are two possible target grammars; Y and X are their respective UG-compatible parametric values. Chomsky uses the iw/fcA-metaphor of parametrization, which is a static

96 one: the child sits in front of a lever and finally turns it in one direction. Lebeaux, by contrast, uses a dynamical one: the child "climbs a hill": [...] the nature of parameter setting is taken to involve not so much the flipping of a switch, but the climbing of a hill. This represents a local maximum (the target grammar) surrounded by local minima (the default options). Both the target grammar, and the fall-back grammars must be represented in UG. (Lebeaux 1988: 192, cf. also 180) In this operation-default-type design of parameter setting the initial setting—X, (Y)—is none of the two final setting as in Hyams (1986, 1987), where the child initially has set the pro-drop parameter to the value + pro-drop. Italian children can stay with this value whereas English children have to reset the parameter to -pro-drop. In Lebeaux1 design a parameter is fixed only once. This is also a demand of Clahsen (1990), namely his parameter setting constraint. As long as the target value has not yet been fixed, all options are still available. In contrast to Chomsky (1992,1994, 1995) who renounces d- and s-structure and lessens the significance of the architectural design of the grammar, Lebeaux revives and motivates it as organically grown in the course of language ontogeny in the sense of his model of layers. The temporal aspect, which is missing in Chomsky, is explicitly considered here. That the lexical representations are in fact retained is evidenced by idioms in the adult grammar (Lebeaux 1988: 246ff.). In English, idioms like the following are generated with Xe-categories (e.g., N, A): (31) break bread make tracks keep tabs make strides

(N) (N) (N) (N) (Lebeaux 1988:247)

(32) lose touch lose face take risks take advantage shake loose play dumb hang tough

(N) (N) (N) (N) of (A) (A) (A) (Keyser/Roeper 1992: 93)

According to Keyser/Roeper (1992) these X°-categories are in a universal clitic-position of the verb, which is availabe for any lexical category (N, A, P, V). In the child's grammar this clitic-position may host an argument of the verb. It is a stepping-stone on the way to the elaborate adult syntax and remains present even in the latter grammar, although it has already been overcome (ibid.: 117). Summarizing the differences between Lebeaux' account and the standard account of parametrization, we arrive at the following three points: (33) (i) Developmental aspect: the initial Grammar Go is no final grammar. (Go is only the argument structure) (ii) Parameter setting: Parameter setting is no switching but the climbing of a hill. It is possible for the child to fall back onto the default-value.

97 (iii) Learning: Learning is erasure of information rather than accumulation of knowledge. This is in line with Chomsky and with Fodor (1980). (cf. Lebeaux 1988: 182)

5.1.1

Dynamical Reinterpretation of Lebeaux' Account

In order to assess the relation between LCs and PCs in Lebeaux' model of grammatical layers, remember the organization of the adult phrase marker with the abstract form (34):

(34)

FC"

Spec

F

/\ F°

LC"

/\ Spec

L'

(cf. Grimshaw 1991: 1) A functional projection takes a lexical one into its frame—categorial identity provided. Only isomorphic categories—nominal with nominal, verbal with verbal—may engage in merger. Penner (1994a) takes up an idea of M ller/Sternefeld (1991) and speaks of AJA'-conflation, i.e., the merging of the thematic Α-domain with the athematic, operator A'-domain. The result is a Complete Functional Complex (CFC) in the sense of Chomsky (1986). For the nominal CFC, NP conflates with DP, for the verbal CFC, IP conflates with CP: CFCs are created by means of 'conflating' the A- and the A'- systems. In more technical terms, it seems that the Α-system is 'beheaded1 in that the Α-head becomes the head of both the A'and Α-systems. (Penner 1994a: 39)

This happens either by head movement (V -->/--> C, N -> D, respectively) or by creating a 'non-distinctness' configuration (ibid., again in the sense of M ller/Sternefeld 1991). Let us combine this idea with what we learned earlier about the cortical principles of self-organization. Firstly, neuronal cell assemblies synchronize if they respond to a common feature and represent it. They are an attractor for this feature. Take the categorial feature +yV7-Vfor nouns, -V/+N for verbs, +N/+V for adjectives, and -N/-V for prepositions. Attractors exist for all these feature constellations. The respective cells of such NCAs oscillate in a certain phase-locking mode. Their common frequency serves as their label. We still move on the lexical level inside the small lexical subtree. What Lebeaux does not answer—and nobody else does—is the question of how and why this small lexical sub-

98

tree performs the jump into phrasal syntax, i.e., how and why it merges with a respective FC. The next question is: where do these PCs come from? According to the continuity hypothesis they have always been present; according to the maturational hypothesis they mature. According to the dynamical account they emerge from the small lexical subtree modulo nonlinear properties of the system—an equally mysterious event. The system is supposed to show new qualitative properties once a critical threshold of complexity is passed. The idea is that what we usually call functional properties are emergent properties of the lexical ones or that functional projections are the appropriate emergent spell-out of lexical projections under respective conditions. After the lexicon has reached a certain volume, i.e., the child has acquired a certain number of lexical items, and after the child's phrase marker has reached a respective size, too, a spontaneous bifurcation takes place: Functional Categories and with them phrasal syntax emerge (van Geert 1993, Goldfield/Reznick 19%, see chapter 15). Diachronically viewed, functional items are recruted from the overflowing mass of lexical items in the open class. This process is known as grammaticalization (cf. Traugott/ Heine 1991, Himmelmann 1992, Heine, Claudi/Hiinnemeyer 1991, Campes, Kutscher/ Rudorf 1993). In fact, many functional elements were lexical elements before, diachronically viewed (compare the re-categorization of English main verbs as modals, cf. Lightfoot 1991, here section 4.5; cf. also Ouhalla 1991). Although grammaticalization is considered a continuous process, there remains the sting of discontinuity which consists in the very act of re-categorization. Whether a verb is a lexical main verb or a functional (modal) auxiliary is a binary distinction, however temporally expanded the change may have been. Here, the same sigmoid logistic curve that holds true of parameter setting is presumably valid, too (see section 4.5.1). Recall again that the new is supposed to emerge from the old. Ontogenetically viewed, the child need not generate or "invent" new PCs, although one may witness certain playful functional creations (see chapter 11) on the part of the child. But what happens in creolizationl Somehow the filial generation, which is brought up by a /Wgin-speaking parental generation, arrives at a Functional Grammar—without proper evidence (cf. Bickerton 1984). This is a spontaneous process, too. Our nonlinear dynamical language faculty just can not help doing this. Thus, the emergence of PCs or of syntax once more reflects the swimming against the stream of entropy or, as Cohen/Stewart put this paradox: "Complexity is downhill to evolution." (Cohen/Stewart 1994: 136) Thus, it seems to be easier for a dynamical system to become more intricate in the course of development than not: "Complexity increases." (ibid.) Structure-building, to use Guilfoyle/Noonan's (1988) term, is a natural, spontaneous and creative aspect of matter. If LCs are considered the "bio mass" or the lingusitic "matter", this matter has the potential property to develop syntax—a property which transcends itself. This is the meaning of morphogensis: matter creates forms—morphology. This is the same expression we also use in linguistics. It is widely held that languages are only distinguished by different morphological properties: "Variation of language is essentially morphological in character [...]." (Chomsky 1994: 3) In the case of normal language acquisition these FCs are already part of the input. They can be perceived immediately as intake in the sense of thirdness when the dynamical system has reached the point of bifurcation.

99

Now we return to the relation of LCs and PCs. How Lexical Categories are neurally represented is clear cum grano salis: by NCAs. We simply have to accept as a given fact that the elements of the closed class emerge from this open class. Nothing more is necessary. But how is this emergence reflected in our brains? Microscopically, by the process of synchronization discussed above. Single oscillations of the NCAs which are responsible for the representation of LCs reach the oscillations of the newly emerging order parameter (the functional attractor) by spontaneous fluctuations. This new order parameter rapidly synchronizes the entire lexical projection with its own oscillation: phase-locking takes place. The old oscillation gets superimposed on and fused with the new one. Here, a neuronal translation of Lebeaux1 terms is directly possible. The "lexical" oscillation need not get lost in this process. Rather it can be discharged again or retain its original autonomy somehow else. Thus, the layering falls out rather naturally. But why is the overall phrase marker not changed into a totally distinct functional phrase marker which has nothing in common with the earlier one, as in metamorphosis? If we look at the elaborate syntactic phrase marker, we see that the old lexical projection is retained and a qualitatively new one—the functional one—is layered upon it. This leads to massive redundancy, especially if one looks at the various inevitable movements taking the lexical elements into the respective landing sites of the related functional projections. Why does evolution not "wipe out" the old, worn-out phrase marker and why does it not create a totally new one which is especially designed for functional purposes? It is again Cohen/Stewart (1994: 144) who remark: "Nature, however, doesn't design things." Nature is known to "tinker", instead (cf. Piattelli-Palmarini 1987). There is a reason6 for why it might in fact be "easier" to add an extra layer rather than to change the whole architecture internally: When you add a new stage you can build on what already exists. The old line of development will continue to work just as before [...]. (Cohen/Stewart 1994: 136)7

The extra stage that you have added will allow for extra functions. It is obvious that both stages will engage in a dynamical interaction. Each affects the other. Thus, the layering design of the linguistic phrase marker is considered another instantiation of this general evolutionary character. It ensures continuity but allows for discontinuity at the same time. In the meantime we have become used to this polarity. This short evolutionary excursus sheds light on yet another paradox in Lebeaux1 account of parameter setting: the fixing of parameters is supposed to be the climbing of a hill. This metaphor depicts the evolutionary cost the brain has to spend on reaching marked values or on reaching a new stage in general which involves new functions, such as the transition from Pre-Projecl-alpha to Projectalpha. While this obviously involves extra cost—in economic terms—it seems to pay

In fact, the authors give two reasons. The first one is discussed here, namely that it is advantageous to keep the old stage and add a new one. The second one is that "Most of the time, complicating development is, paradoxically, easier than simplifying it." (ibid.: 137) Imagine the opposite taking place: removing something. But why? It has been functional up to now. So, this function might get lost. Both reasons are understood as being valid in the majority of cases, but not as universal laws. This idea resembles the idea of the subset principle. Thus, it might be possible to motivate the latter in terms of evolution (p.c. Helen Leuninger).

100 off—again in economic terms. All the more, growing complexity is the inevitable fate of evolving organisms, as Cohen/Stewart (1994) show. In the present study, attractors have been characterized as energy minima, i.e., the cheapest solution for the differential equations governing the dynamical system under consideration. Therefore, the system will inevitably converge on this attractor. How, then, can Lebeaux' picture of climbing a hill be reconciled with the other picture, namely that parameter setting proceeds downhill, i.e., a parameter value represents a local minimum rather than a local maximum! Recall that attractors are separated from one another in state space by what Kauffman (1993: 176) calls a separative, or what elsewhere is called a repeller (cf. Wildgen/Mottron 1987: 54ff, Kelso, Ding/Schöner 1993: 20). A repeller drives the system's movement away from the attractor, i.e., it is a local maximum. In order to overcome the repeller, one has in fact to climb a hill, and this takes a long time. Once the top is reached, convergence on the other attractor—no matter how "high" it may be compared to the first attractor—proceeds downhill and takes only a short time. Summarizing, two aspects of maxima and minima have to be kept distinct: Firstly, the way to a more marked parameter or, generally, to a more complex state of the system may be uphill, in a metaphorical sense. Evolutionarily viewed, however, this obvious increase in complexity might turn out the cheapest solution, in the sense of Cohen/Stewart (1994). This is the paradox that increase of complexity is more likely or easier than simplification. Secondly, although the overall pathway to the "higher" attractor is uphill, i.e., the separatrix/repeller has to be overcome first of all, the very act of convergence is always downhill, i.e., an attractor is always a local minimum, on whatever "height" of the system's phase space. What is the use of climbing up the hill, what is its pay-off—in our case the pay-off of investing in Functional Categories? The emergence of FCs, however spontaneous it may be, is considered to fulfil a basic ecological function that may be called a strategy of chaos avoidance. Once the number of lexical entries or elements in the child phrase marker has overgrown a critical threshold, there is a need to order this accumulated mass; otherwise the system would be pushed into chaos.8 Recall that Kauffman (1993, 1995) assumes dynamical systems to be poised at the edge of chaos. This dynamical balancing obviously has adaptive value and may be driven by a meta-attractor that has been shaped by evolution. Rather than becoming chaotic the system escapes into a complex regime. There is no other way out. Or, to use Cohen and Stewart's words: "Emergent simplicities 'collapse1 chaos [...]." (1994: 232) This means that few-dimensional attractors ("simplicities") emerge from the system's dynamics and keep it from becoming truly chaotic. If you view a lexicon as a dictionary, no FCs emerge anywhere, although the volume of a dictionary is much bigger than the volume of a child's lexicon at the prefunctional stage. 8

According to Locke (1994: 31), early lexical items are entered into the child lexicon by means of prosodic memory. This process, however, is limited: "Prosodic memory is presumed to have a small capacity. If lexical items continue to accumulate in this form, the system will soon overload." A similar argument is found in Levelt (1998) discussing Levelt's (1994) study on the phonological development and the early (proto)-lexicon.

101 This is true, but a dictionary is no dynamical system. It is just a static paper lexicon. The human kind, to the contrary, possesses a brain (or the brain possesses us, as you like it). Our brain is a nonlinear, dynamical organ the principles of which we are just about to understand, here with regard to language and its acquisition. The emergence of Functional Categories is presumed to coincide with significant changes in the child's brain at the time under consideration here. Lexical growth coincides with a growing attention and memory span as well as with a growing computational faculty. While the small child manages to consider just one word at a time, the older child will be able to consider more items at the same time. This calls for a syntactic connection of the elements, which is achieved by generating Functional Categories. Given a lexicon which has reached a critical threshold of richness and complexity—the growing attentional and processing faculties trigger syntax. The early developmental restrictions are by no means disadvantageous for language acquisition. Newport (1988, 1990) as well as Elman (1993, cf. also Elman et al. 1996: 340ff), by contrast, argue convincingly for "less is more" and "the importance of starting small." Complex tasks such as language acquisition are more likely to be mastered if the system initially considers only a subset of the task.9 Rather than attributing an input filter to the care-givers who deliberately constrain the primary linguistic data, the limited processing capacities of the child act as such a filter (cf. ibid.: 85). LCs and PCs can be viewed as taking part in such a staggered development. The articulation of the relation of LCs and PCs has proceeded in generative grammar, even without an explicit dynamical frame. As I hope to have shown in this section, one can take Lebeaux' study as a generative precursor of a dynamical language acquisition model. In the next section, I will elaborate on the relation of PCs and LCs by taking up Grimshaw's (especially 1991, to a lesser extent 1993, 1994) idea of Extended Projection. Her conception is another point of departure for a dynamical linguistic account, especially if one applies her ideas to language acquisition, as has been done by Weissenborn (1994, see section 5.3.2).

5.2

Grimshaw's Extended Projection

Grimshaw's study on Extended Projection (EP) (1991) represents a preliminary climax in the generative discussion of LCs and PCs. At the same time, it represents a good summary of the topic. Here, I must disregard her empirical arguments, as they stem from synchronous syntax. Rather, I am interested in applying her ideas to language acquisition.

5.2.1

The Core Idea

Grimshaw (1991) considers the projectional fate of the two main lexical categories, nouns and verbs. The triple N-D-P represents an Extended Projection with the categorial features

9

This holds true of adult learners learning a miniature artificial language, too (Kersten/Earles 2001).

102 [+N/-V]; the triple V-I-C represents an Extended Projection with the categorial features [-N/ +V]. Besides the categorial features which are responsible for the lexical specification, there is a functional feature, the F-value. It indicates the prqjectional height of the EP. The Lexical Categories V and N have the functional value FO; / and D Fl; C and P F2, etc., depending on how many projections one assumes.10 EPs have only one theta-role at the maximal story of the projectional telescope. The lexical phrases NP, VP and their respective functional phrases DP, PP and IP, CP are projections of their FO-heads. NP under DP under PP as well as VP under IP under CP are transparent (cf. ibid.: 13). N and Z), V and / are both heads of the DP/IP. Agreement features are visible throughout the entire EP. Inside an EP ^'"'"-categories may be skipped without violating subjaceny, but Xmax may not be skipped between two different EPs. Functional Categories do not possess categorial features of their own. They inherit them from their categorial head. Interestingly, Grimshaw considers Functional Categories as F-variants of their respective lexical heads. Notions such as "IP" or "CP" are only "notational conveniencies" (Grimshaw 1993):11 The non-lexical categories have the same categorial features, and differ in F-value; they are just functional variants of the lexical categories. (Grimshaw 1991: 30) Head-movement always takes place inside one and the same EP, e.g., V2 : V~> I --> C. The head may only move into another head-postion with a higher F-value:

(35) V -->! ->C FO ->F1 ->F2 Inside an EP feature migration (Grimshaw 1991: 37ff.) may be observed. Thus, say, the r/w-feature has alternative positions: it may be in /or in C, respectively.12 Not selection but projection organizes the phrase structure. Projection (inside the EP) controls which complements F-heads take; selection controls which complements L-heads take. Thus, the C-head does not select an IP. Their succession is automatically accounted for by virtue of the increasing F-value inside the respective verbal EP. Grimshaw makes it clear that PCs do not have a proper existence in their own but only in relation to their lexical ancestors:

10

Besides the verbal and the nominal EP there also existmwrei/EPs, e.g., gerunds (cf. Grimshaw 1991: 22ff.). They have a neutral categorial feature. 11 In fact, Grimshaw (1993) takes the more radical step: "there is no reason any more to lable the projections which make up extended projections." (ibid.: 46) 12 Feature migration is evidenced when different languages are compared, as well (cf. van Gelderen 1993). That is, in different languages the same feature may occupy different head-positions, e.g.,finitenessmay occupy / or C. But feature migration also exists inside one and the same language, namely if different sentence types are considered. Thus, the tns-feature may be in C in German matrix sentences, but in / in subordinated sentences. In French, on the other hand, tns is always in / (cf. Grimshaw 1991: 37).

103 The categorial theory which is the basis for extended projection makes explicit the hypothesis that a functional category is a relational entity. It is a functional category by virtue of its relationship to a lexical category. Thus DP is not just a functional caegory, it is the functional category for N, as IP is for V. (ibid.: 3)

While the standard definition of headJprojection, which Grimshaw calls perfect head/projection (ibid.), controls the relation of D°and the DP sharing the same F-value, the definition of EP controls the relation of the extended lexical heads and the EP, which have different Fvalues. Recall that V has the value FO, while C has the value F2: (36) Definition of Extended Head/Extended Projection: X is the extended head of Υ and Υ is an extended projection of X iff: (a) Y dominates X (b) Υ and X share all categorial features (c) all nodes intervening between X and Υ share all categorial features (d) If X and Υ are not in the same perfect projection, the F-value of Υ is higher than the F-value of X (Grimshaw 1991: 4)

5.2.2

Grimshaw's EP and Weissenborn's Local Well-formedness

In his study of (1994) Weissenborn articulates his strong continuity hypothesis and relates it to Grimshaw's study on Extended Projection (1991). In order to handle the leamability problem in language acquisition, he adds a further constraint to the principles-and-parameter-model, namely the Local Well-formedness Constraint (LWC), The LWC states that child phrase structures bear a very close relation to the adult ones. The latter are reached by incremental learning in a continuous way. It would be best, however, if both the child's and the adult's structures were identical. If not, the child's projection should at least be a lower-projectional variant of the fully extended syntactic telescope, i.e., the full EP. The LWC now specifies the relation of both these projections. Note that in defining the LWC Weissenborn proceeds in a stepwise manner, which resembles the architecture of the EP: (37) Definition I: LWC If one representation Rx differs from another representation Ry such that Rx is included in Ry, then Rx is locally well formed with respect to Ry. (Weissenborn 1994: 216)

With respect to the child, this means: (38) Definition II: LWC If a child's representation, RC, differs from the target, Rt, then RC must be locally well formed with respect to R^ (ibid.)

More generally, the LWC reads as follows: (39) Definition III: LWC The representation of any utterance of the child is locally well formed with respect to a representation of the adult grammar, (ibid.)

104 The LWC, then, holds inside an EP but not between different EPs, following Grimshaw (1991). It appplies to projections as well as to derivations. This twofold aspect is captured in the fourth and last definition of the LWC: (40) Definition IV: LWC The representation of any utterance of the child is locally well formed with respect to a representation of the adult grammar either at the level of phrase structure or at an intermediate level in the sequence of derivations carried out on it. (Weissenborn 1994: 229)

As a rule, the child's phrase marker has smaller F-projections and fewer derivational steps, respectively. Or one can think of the child as having the same phrase marker but carrying out only fewer derivational steps. The latter, however, does not make too much sense. If the child actually had the same (extended) phrase marker (but missed to carry out derivations on it), this would imply empty projections, i.e., empty heads and specifiers, which are not licensed (cf. Grimshaw 1993, 1994, Fukui 1986, among others). According to Weissenborn, the child continuously preceeds from lower to higher F-values. Thus, she can start with the VP, although continuity defenders want to equip the child with a fully functional phrase marker right from the beginning. If this is not possible, the child is at least in the same EP. Grimshaw (1994) herself relates Extended Projections (1991) as well as optimality considerations (1993) to language acquisition. According to her, the child is primarily guided by a constraint called Minimal Projection, which rules out higher functional projections if they are not motivated: "Minimal Projection requires that extended projections are always as small as possible." (Grimshaw 1994: 76) This constraint holds for adults as well (cf. Grimshaw 1993, 1994; cf. chapter 17). As a consequence, clause structure is not uniform! Clauses may be of different size, depending on the various well-formedness conditions they have to meet. She sanctions Weissenborn's Strong Continuity Hypothesis by the claim that functional projections are available in the child grammar in principle: Thus clauses will not be structurally uniform for learners, any more than for adults. It is important to emphasize that under this view there is no stage at which functional projections are unavailable. VP, IP, and CP clause structures are in principle available at all times for learners, but their deployment is governed by Minimal Projection. (Grimshaw 1994: 80)

5.2.3

Weissenborn's Data

5.2.3.1

Infinitives

Weissenborn (1994) relies mainly on the Simone corpus collected by Max Miller. Early child utterances with non-finite verbs, such as (41) schuh ausziehn shoe take off

13

Age is given in years; months, days, as usual.

Simone

1;11,13 1 3

105

*maxe auch (m)usik mache(n) Max also music make (Weissenborn 1994: 217)

Simone

l ; 11, 14

are no CPs or IPs but infinitival VPs with the structure (42): 1 (42)

The utterances in (41) with the structure in (42) are locally well formed, as the VP is a subset of the Extended Projection IP/CP. Keep in mind that such sentences with exactly the same structure, i.e., a VP, are evidence for the prefiinctional stage, in the structure-building hypothesis. The result is an unexpected coincidence: strong continuity and its antagonist are almost identical— thanks to EP!

5.2.3.2

Finite Sentences

For finite child sentences, Clahsen (1991) assumes an FP, Weissenborn (1990) an IP, and Tracy and her collegues an IP with a mobile head (cf. Gawlitzek-Maiwald et al. 1992). Weissenborn (1994) rejects any IP-analysis. Instead, he adopts Müller and Sternefeld's (1992) Split-C-hypothesis with two projections above IP, namely CP for w/i-elements and T(op)P for topics, subjects, etc. Now, there are three functional projections above the VP instead of only two: head-final IP, head-initial CP and TP. Any word order variation of the child can be easily mastered with such convenient equipment. Take for example wh-phroses+V-second clauses of notorious Benny-the-kid from Tracy's project (cf. Gawlitzek-Maiwald et al. 1992). He went so far as to repeatedly utter sentences of the following type: (43) * was ich kann machen? what I can do? Benny 3; 01, 26 (Weissenborn 1994: 218,225; from Gawlitzek-Maiwald et al. 1992) Weissenborn's analysis of (43) is the following:

106

(44)

CP

/\

Spec C [+wh] /\ wask ' ^ C° TP

« /\

T1

Spec

ichi T°

/\ IP

kann : Spec

Γ

VP

t-1, machen t1 k J (Weissenborn 1994: 228) Although (43) as such is ungrammatical, it is locally well-formed in the sense of the fourth definition of Local Well-formedness. The child uses the complete adult phrase marker except for one step, i.e., raising of the finite verb from T° to C°. In doing so, Benny admittedly violates the principle that heads should be filled (cf. Grimshaw's 1993 Head Obligatory (Hd-Ob) and Gawlitzek-Maiwald et al. 1992).14 In the spirit of the Minimalist Program (cf. Chomsky 1992, 1995) one has to ask how the wA-phrase in Spec-C" is able to check its features without the finite verb having raised to C°. The strong wA-feature would be stranded on the PF-interface and inevitable cause the derivation to crash. Resorting to covert LF-movement of the verb from T° to C° would be ad hoc, as well. Yet, for Benny the derivation converges. In section 7.1 I will discuss how Gawlitzek-Maiwald et al. (1992), from whose work these data are taken, analyze such utterances. The discussion on late errors in the sense of Weissenborn (1994) will be postponed as well (see chapter 13).

14

Weissenborn (1994) even states three violations, namely Uniqueness of Designated Heads, the Licensing Condition for Α-bar Specifiers, and the Visibility Condition on Clausal Functional Heads, all in the sense of M ller and Sternefeld ((1993), cf. Weissenborn 1994: 227).

107

5.2.4

Dynamical Reinterpretation of EP and LWC: The Three-Story Pyramid

In the generative literature, there is a special liking for concepts involving steps or stages15—not by chance. We know of the subset principle (cf. Berwick 1985, Wexler/ Manzini 1987), Lebeaux1 model of grammatical layers, Grimshaw's Extended Projection, and Weissenborn's (1994) LWC. Stage concepts have mythological roots in many cultures, and may even be universal. We even encounter the (three-story) pyramid in our fairy tales. The ascent of the human soul to God is symbolized in this way. It is a journey to the Beyond. And beyond the familiar theories, I want to take you now. Our pyramid is not called sun, moon and stars, but VP-IP-CP and NP-DP-PP, respectively. These apparently different projections are in fact identical, as proposed by Grimshaw (1991). VP-IP-CP are only distinguished by an increasing F-value. In dynamical terms, IP and CP are just emergent variants of the VP under the respective system's energetic charge. This energetic charge can be identified with morphological properties which are realized in the functional projections but not in the lexical projection. Qualitatively, IP and CP are new things; this is the discontinuous aspect. Yet, they are simply the result of a steadily increased energetic (morphological) control parameter; this is the continuous aspect. Evolution endows the child with a VP at first. This VP takes then the form of an IP, and even later the form of a CP. As in Lebeaux1 (1988/2000) account, Grimshaw's (1991) EPs appear equally well-suited for an ontogenetic perspective as for a synchronous-derivational perspective. It is Chomsky's desire as much as the desire of a dynamical approach to preserve the derivational history of a phrase marker as its historical path. Functional projections are sediments as in Lebeaux (1988/2000) and Grimshaw (1991). They are laid onto the lexical projection. This is also in line with Tracy's (1991: 79) concept of the layering of hypotheses,16 which she traces back to Lorenz (1974) and Riedl (1980: 30ff.). Each successive layer builds on the former in a non-reductive way. Again both continuity and discontinuity are acknowledged. This bottom-up perspective of layers is typical of emergence (see section 4.6). Neither the child—in ontogeny—nor evolution—in phylogeny—"knows" anything about the fullblown phrase marker of adult or future competence. This development is not enforced. Nobody has "forced" nature to "invent" a CP. However, it has happened—as a matter of fact. The child is not "forced" to create functional projections, either. However, it happens to every child, sooner or later. Here, no laws of nature rule; nor does the genetic code fully spell out the CP according to a detailed and preformed blueprint. The CP emerges automatically in accordance with linguistic self-organization. Note that Weissenborn's (1994) formulation, namely that the child representation Rc is locally well formed with respect to the target grammar R(, can be turned upside down as well: the descendant grammar Gj— I deliberately do not speak of the "target grammar"—is locally well formed with regard to the ancestor grammar Ga. This is almost trivial, as the emergence of an elaborate phrase marker from a less elaborate one obviously took place in evolution once. 15

Tracy (1991: 77) complains about the lack of critical discussion of the concept of developmental "stages" or "phases" in language acquisition research. 16 "Schichtenbau der Hypothesen"

108 According to a dynamical interpretation the more complex grammar is an attractor for the child grammar. This outlook is supposed to change the perspective without being trapped by the fallacy of adultocentrism. Dynamical approaches are top-down/bottom-up (see section 4.5). They are liminal in this respect. Both poles are acknowledged; the interesting processes take place in between. What does the notion "locally well-formed" mean in a dynamical sense? This notion relates to physical processes in the sense of synchronization. Locally well-formed grammars are synchronizable. Thus, the ancestor grammar enters the basin of attraction of the new order parameter, i.e., the descendent grammar, as soon as the control parameter has led it into the region of bifurcation. This new attractor synchronizes it without destroying it. Weissenborn—after discussing his empirical data—finds himself in the camp of his antagonists if you look at the VP-analysis of non-finite sentences (see section 5.2.3.1). The strong continuity claim sits uneasy with such sentences. Non-finite verbs in finite contexts do not exist in the adult grammar. As the morphology is unambiguously non-finite, one cannot project an empty functional apparatus above the VP. This, however, is Weissenborn's strategy: the complete adult phrase marker is already in place; only some derivations are missing. Weissenborn has to allow for a truncated representation. His L WC licenses this. Representations need not be fully elaborate if only the child is in the same EP. This should not be too difficult as the VP is verbal and IP and CP are verbal too, and the child is not likely to mistake the verbal projection line for the nominal projection line. The argumentation using the EP is trivial and circular: the child—with her VP—is in the verbal EP per definitionem. She cannot fall out of it. Grimshaw's EP assigns to VP the lowest level of the verbal EP, which the child now continuously extends like a telescope. The EPs are universally given qua genetic endowment. The child simply has to climb the pyramid which is already present before her. To that extent the LWC is just a trick to assimilate diverging child structures to the adult structures. It has no further explanatory value. Summarizing, I converge on three points of criticism: (45) (i) Derivalionally, the analysis of sentences like (43) fails because of the checking theory. (ii) Representationally, child phrase markers like the VP better fit the structure-building hypothesis. (iii) Thirdly, the derivation of the LWC from EP is trivial. LWC simply sanctions the divergent child representation. The child has at her command a VP instead of an IP, AGRP, or CP. As it is the same EP, the child structure is locally well-formed. But we knew all the time that VP, IP and CP are verbal. Nothing is gained if we call this triple "verbal EP". We still have to explain how the child proceeds from VP to IP and to eventually CP. Strong continuity simply claims the latter's preformed existence. So, the status quo has not changed.

5.3 Outlook: Variation and Selection Revisited In order to change the situation which I have just criticized, I will present data as evidence for the working of dynamical principles in the following chapters (6-8). They relate to the theoretical explanations in section 4.3.1 the tenor of which was that a dynamical system—

109 after leaving the stable phase A—finds itself in the liminal phase B, where it simultaneously entertains several options, i.e., it shows structural or systemic variation. One of these options is eventually selected in an act of symmetry-breaking. The system, then, converges on this attractor and reaches a more complex, but again a stable, phase C. In the generative discussion, analogous proposals have already been made, although in a very rudimentary form. Look at Verrips' principle Maximize Input (MAX): (46) MAX (MAXIMIZE INPUT) For every input string, create as many UG-allowed representations as possible. (Verrips 1994: 115) This recalls the liminal phase. Verrips also prunes these over-abundant representations afterwards, but by means of standard generative devices and not by dynamical ones. Although a precursor and step in the right direction, principles such as MAX remain unconnected to a broader paradigm. MAX, however, can properly be captured here. The intention of the following chapters is to provide data evidencing the liminal phase of structural over-abundance as well as the dynamical principles which lead to the eventual selection. Such data, variationaldata, exist (cf. especially the recent literature, as in Tracy/ Lattey 1994, among others). However, they have not yet received enough attention in a static frame. They were refuted as noise (cf. Tracy/Lattey 1994: viii) or as slips of the tongue (cf. Becker 1994). For a dynamical approach, however, these data are crucial, as already pointed out above (see section 1.3). This kind of variation is not taken to be error variance, but true systemic or structural variance (cf. van Geert 1993, see also section 4.4). With Karpf (1993), I want to call such a dynamical theory with symmetry-breaks a chaotic-selective theory (see section 4.3.3). Chaotic because of the system-internally produced variation; selective because only one option from this spectrum is chosen and convergence takes place. The data themselves are quite variable and comprise as different aspects as case morphology, compound formation, mobile I-heads, wh-variation, the position of adjuncts and surface blends. Note that the importance of variation is subliminally acknowledged in other linguistic research paradigms as well. Slobin (1973), for instance, whose framework of the primacy of general cognitive competence I do not espouse, admits in a footnote: The problem of individual differences between children in their approaches to language acquisition has not been addressed frequently in developmental psycholinguistics, but is obviously of great importance [...]. (Slobin 1973: 193, see also section 4.4) Rather than attributing these differences solely to "innate individual differences" (ibid.: 193) I claim that they are due to the dynamics of the overall system, innate inclinations included. Pye (1988) also critically comments on the ignorance of structural variation: While investigators collecting data on the acquisition of English have shown there can be significant variation between children acquiring the same language [...|, theorists still seem wedded to the belief that all children follow essentially the same general path in acquiring language [...]. (ibid.: 124)17

17

For references, see Pye (1988).

110 In order to avoid such "'monotonic' theories" (ibid.), he demands a "comparative data base" (ibid.) from many different languages, a demand which, interestingly, can probably best be accounted for by generative grammar with its strong interest in even "exotic" languages. Another demand put forward by Pye is the acknowledgement of cultural differences in parents communicating with the child. From a more biological point of view this variance is only of little interest. Children acquire their mother tongue in societies which care a lot for language acquisition as well as in societies which do not. Although I cannot see how an "anthropology of language acquisition" (so the title of Pye's study) might contribute to an interesting theory of language acquisition, I agree with Pye when he demands [...] the development of a more flexible theoretical framework with multiple starting points and pathways for the acquisition of grammar, (ibid.)

This correspondence with the notions of non-equi-initialty, non-equi-liminality, but equifinality (see section 4.4) used here encourages me in advocating dynamical principles as agents of variation. The kairos for the introduction of dynamical systems theory into linguistics is given now. In this spirit, Tracy/Lattey (1994) try to stear their way between Skylla and Charybdis, namely UG-restricted grammars and additional psycholinguistic theories that are supposed to solve the tension which variational data inevitably contribute to acquisition. They themselves confess to variation: [...] in looking for developmental steps, variation is not just noise to abstract from. But taking variation seriously does not mean giving up the search for invariance of for central tendencies^...] Taking variation seriously means searching for restrictive theories of processing and learning that explain, rather than ignore, uncomfortable data. Indeed, there may be a lot to be gained from apparently messy data, such as a deepened understanding of the dynamics of the overall developmental process or a clearer view of the interaction of the child's competence with factors of performance. We believe that language acquisition research is ready for this empirical and theoretical challenge, (ibid.: viii)

This is my own opinion, too. While Tracy/Lattey (1994) give much empirical evidence for variation, the theoretical framework still remains inside the linear generative attractor. The provision of a full-fledged dynamical framework is what I consider to be my very own task. In fact, instead of providing empirical evidence of my own, I could simply refer the readers to Tracy and Lattey (1994), if I did not miss a truly dynamical account of the data there. In the fruitful synergetics of empirical evidence ("secondness") and their theoretical underpinnings ("thirdness") the data are a little bit "ahead" of the theory. To close this gap, dynamical systems theory is introduced here. One last remark: Variation is understoood as an instantiation of the fractal nature of language. Diversity is at the heart of our linguistic faculty. It is no peripheral phenomenon. The deeper we explore the field, the more we come to acknowledge its self-similar, but not self-identical character.

6

Case Morphology

The acquisition of German case-morphology is one of the classical areas of research on the acquisition of Functional Categories (cf. Clahsen 1984, Eisenbeiss 1994a+b, Clahsen, Eisenbeiss/Vainikka 1994, Tracy 1986, Radford 1990, Penner 1993, among others). Case features encode grammatical functions (GFs) such as subject and object. These grammatical functions are instantiated in functional projections. For each grammatical function there exists one functional projection: TP for the subject (AGR-S and CP, respectively), AGR-DO for the direct object, AGR-IO for the indirect object,1 Neg-P for negation, ASP-P for aspect, etc. (cf. Ouhalla 1991). According to the theory of Lexical Learning (cf. Pinker 1984, Clahsen 1986, 1988, 1990, Clahsen, Eisenbeiss/Vainikka 1993, Eisenbeiss 1994a+b), the child receives evidence for these functional projections via morphology. At a certain moment the recognition of case-morphology triggers the instantiation of the respective structural projections. The child only has to find out what the respective ending looks like—the rest is provided by UG. The projection comes for free; it only has to be triggered by the input. Clahsen's Lexlem-model is designed in a bottom-up manner in that the concrete data are the relevant input. In this scenario, the triggers are as specific as they are circular: the genitive-j triggers the DP, the accusative-morphology triggers AGR-DO, the nominativemorphology triggers AGR-S, etc. The same is true for languages with even more elaborated case-morphology (for Finnish see Clahsen, Eisenbeiss/Vainikka 1993). The acquisition of the (German) case system is assumed to be essentially the same for every child: the German child begins with the genitive-s, followed by accusative morphology2; dative morphology emerges last. Nominative case is considered the default-case. This sequence is also true for English, except that the accusative is the default-value there (cf. Brown 1973). As the acquisition of the case systems begins with the genitive-s, a closer look on this very early phase of the installation of the functional module is promising. In contrast to Lexical Learning I expect structural variation in the acquisition of the morphological genitive, or the DP, respectively. 1 2

Or a functional VP-shell above VPinthe sense of Larson (1988, 1990; cf. also Hohenberger 1992, 1994). Clahsen, Eisenbeiss/Vainikka (1993) predict that accusative case morphology is acquired first—before the genitive -s. The reason is that the direct object is hosted in the complement position of the verb, which is universally given. The genitive -s, by contrast, is hosted in the DP projection above the NP. The possessor in possessor-possessed constructions has to raise from Spec-N' to Spec-D'- a position which is not universally given but needs to be triggered by additional morphological evidence. So, why is not accusative the first case marking in child German? The reasons given by the authors is that in German accusative is visible only on the D°-head, but not on the noun, e.g., Ich sehe den Mann (Ί see the-acc. man'). Obviously, accusative needs a "carrier system", namely the DP. As long as the DP has not yet been triggered, accusative is "freezed." The trigger for the DP is the genitive -s. That is why accusative has to await the establishment of the DP and can manifest only after the genitive -s.

112

6.1 Systemic Variation in the Acquisition of German Genitive Morphology In speaking of systemic variation, I do not mean to imply that the acquisition of the possessive semantics is manifested in diffferent structures, but that there exist co-occuring and competing morphological forms which all correspond to the Genetive. I call this "variation" systemic, because its origin is not accidental but rooted in the very structure of the dynamical system. In the liminal phase several morphological attractors may be offered for selection. The target form, the -s in German, is chosen because here the degree of cognition, i.e., the correspondence with the input is maximal (cf. section 4.3). There is ample evidence in the literature that children in the prefunctional phase assumed here still have no £>-system (cf. Guilfoyle/Noonan 1988/1991, Radford 1990b). The functional 5-morpheme on the possessor-subject of a complex nominal utterance is still missing as in the English examples (47): (47) (a)

(b)

Mommy haircurl(er). Mommy cottage cheese. Mommy milk. Mommy hangnail. (Kathrynl;9) Daddy coffee. Daddy bread. Daddy car. Daddy door. Daddy hat (Jonathan 2; 0) (Braine 1976 in Radford 1990b: 202)

Consider also the German examples (48) :3 (48) (a)

(b)

T(ilman): schüsse papa (= Schlüssel papa) key daddy daddy('s) key

T (1; 09, 15)

T: papa schüsse papa('s) key

T (l; 09, 15)

This first possessive datum is interesting as the word order still seems to be variable: papa schüsse vs. schüsse papa. The following occurrences are already determined in favor of the target word order possessor-possessee as in (50), or only the possessor is present as in (49): (49) (a) T:sasa Saskia (He holds Saskia's umbrella in his hands) (b)

T:mama mommy (He holds my umbrella in his hands)

The child Tilman is my own son. The examples stem from a diary.

T (1;09,30)

T (1;09, 30)

113 (c)

T: papa daidy (He wants to fetch his daddy's umbrella)

T (1;09, 30)

T:sasadab Saskia's sandals

T (1; 09, 30)

(b)

T: mama dab mommy's sandals

T (1; 09, 30)

(c)

T: papa dab daddy's sandals

T (1; 10,06)

(φ

T: papa tee daddy's tea

T (1; 10,06)

(e)

T: papa, papa dalan daddy, daddy's sandals (He fetches daddy's sandals)

T (1; 10, 14)

(0

Trmamadasa mommy's bag (He is pointing at a black bag that looks like mine)

T (1; 10, 15)

(50) (a)

At about that time and shortly later, the zero-form co-occurs with the target s-morpheme: (51) (a)

(b)

T: mamas mommy's (He fetches my sandals.)

T (1; 10, 14)

T: sasas, sasa dalan Saskia's, Saskia's sandals

T (1; 10, 19)

It is not too surprising that the zero-form, as in (49) and (50), and the inflected form, as in (51), co-occur. The presumed pre-functional ancestor-form is eventually superseded by the functional descendant form. Surprising, however, is a further morphological realization of the Genitive in Tilman's data, namely an -n, at the same age: (52) (a)

A(nnette): ich geb dir die W rstchen Ί give you the sausages.' (I give him Saskia's remaining sausages) T: sasan, mama« (He throws them back on Saskia's and my plate)

T (1; 10,09)

(b)

T:sasan Saskia's tooth-brush

T (1; 10,22)

(c)

T: mama/i (He points to my shoes) A:hm? (I pretend not to understand) T: mama/i

T (1; 10,22)

114 A: hm? (Again, I pretend not to understand) T: maman

In (52c) I give him two opportunities to correct his form. However, he insists on maman. Note that he knows the s-morpheme at the same time. Zero-forms also still occur: (53) (a)

4

Trsasas Saskia's (He hurls Saskia's Mickey Mouse around)

T (1;10,23)

(b)

T: mamas Mama's (He points at my pee)

T (1;10,23)

(c)

T:sasay Saskia's Saskia's (cup)

T (1;10,23)

(d)

Trnenats Tilman's Til man's (cup)

T (1;10,23)

(e)

T: des sasay, des nenan this Saskia's, this Tilman This (is) Saskia's (juice). This (is) Tilman's (juice).'

T (1; 10,23)

(f)

T:sasas Saskia's Saskia's (toy car) danato your car (It is his car, in fact)4

T (1;10,23)

(g)

A: wo ist saskias auto? 'Where is Saskia's car?' T: sasas, sasa ato Saskia's, Saskia('s) car

T (1; 10, 23)

(h)

Trsasas Saskia's (He points at the swing Saskia usually swings on)

T (1;10,23)

(i)

Tides sasa this saskia This is Saskia's (funnel)

T (1;10,28)

It is quite common that Tilman uses the 2nd person pronoun to refer to his own property. Thus he takes the perspective of someone addressing him, constantly. He is not yet able to adjust the deixis to his own perspective, which is, in fact, a rather high cognitive demand.

115

(j)

T: mamadasa,papadasa Mommy's bag, daddy's bag.

T(l;10,28)

(54) shows that I am able to elicit the s-morpheme after two requests: (54) T:sasa (Saskia's hat) A:hm? T: sasa A:hm? T: sasas

T (1;10,28)

While the repertoire of contexts with Genitive is expanding, including deictic copula-constructions of the kind this is x's and pronominal DPs, the morphology remains mixed, i.e., the zero-form, the s-morpheme, and the «-morpheme co-occur (55) (a)

T: des sasas this Saskia's This is Saskia's (chocolate).'

T (1; 11, 11)

(b)

T: sasas. sasa Saskia's. Saskia('s shell)

T (1; 11, 14)

(c)

T: dan as your ice(-cream) A: das is tilmans eis This is Tilman's ice-cream.1 Tides sasa This (is) Saskia('s ice-cream.)

T (1; 11,14)

(d)

T:papaua daddy('s) watch

T (1; 11, 17)

(e)

T: mamas des mamas mommy's This is mommy's (towel)

T (1; 11, 17)

(f)

T: des mamas hea This (is) mommy's (purse) here.'

T(l;ll,17)

(g)

T: mama, mamas mommy, mommy's (purse)

T (1; 11, 18)

(h)

T: papas daddy's (tape-measure)

T (1; 11, 18)

T (1; 11, 14)

The Genitive-n appears one more time while we are looking at a picture book. The socks shown there remind him of Saskia's ones:

116

(56) A: was ist denn das? 'What is PRT5 that?1 T:dipfa socks sasan Saskia's A:hm? T: sasa Saskia

T (1; 11,19)

After that the Genitive-η does not occur again. Rather, the full DP with possessor and possessee eventually succeeds: (57) T:dessasas This Saskia's A:hm? T: dessasas ... dalsn This Saskia's... sandals These are Saskia's sandals.'

T (1; 11, 19)

(58) T: mamas mama mamaua aba mamas ua mommy's mommy mommy watch but mommy's watch 'But this is Mama's watch.'

T (1; 11,25)

(58) is a beautiful conduite which shows that the DP is still a fragile construction that can only be reached by taking several intermediate speech planning steps rather than by a single run. However, the construction eventually becomes routine as in (59): (59) (a) T: daka sasas hasg bake Saskia's rabbit '(I) bake Saskia's rabbit.' (He is baking Saskia's toy rabbit with sand) (b) T: mamas hesa mommy's trousers

T(l;ll,26)

T (1; 11, 28)

The transition from the pre-functional zero-ending to the functional phase (s- and η-morpheme) is characterized by morphological variation. Not only the target-s (only this Tilman could have heard in the input) but also an obviously endogenously generated /i-morpheme comes into play as a possible morphological attractor for the possessive genitive. This is astonishing because this -n—as a genitive5

PAT stands for particle. German is quite rich in such particles. I omit them in the translation if there exists no appropriate item in English.

117

marker—is not part of the Primary Linguistic Data (PLD). Rather, Tilman has recruted it from his own internal morphological resources. This is not as unusual as it may seem at first sight. Slobin reports several such "playful modifications" (1973: 192), above all in languages with rich morphology: "Children frequently experiment with the form of words before they discover the meaning of particular formal changes." (ibid.:193)6 I see no point in calling this variation "playful". It is a matter of the brain to generate these variations. That they impress us as "creative" or "playful" is another story. Here, they indeed serve a function, namely as options to be selected from. Although the -n is not the target-option for German possessives, the -n is a widespread German morpheme and as such surely part of Tilman's input. The respective -n appears at the age of roughly 1; 10 years as case-morpheme (60), infinitive-morpheme (61) and pluralmorpheme (62): (60) Case-morpheme: T:asa, asa rabbit, rabbit A: du willst auf den hasen? you want on the rabbit? 'Do you want to get on the rabbit?' (toy animal for rocking) A: wo fährt denn der tilman hin? where drives Pit the tilman to? 'Where does Tilman go to?' T:asan rabbit-case-marking

T (1; 10,09)

T (1; 10,09)

(61) Infinitive: (a)

T:lalan 7 draw (He wants to draw)

(b)

(Tilman wants to eat) A: das ist noch heiß This is still hot.' T:ess;vi

(c)

6 7

T: ana eta detan --> (andere ente füttern) other duck feed (He wants to feed the other duck, too.)

T (1; 10,09)

T (1; 10, 09) T (1; 10, 17)

For examples, the reader is referred to Slobin (1973). Before the infinitive morpheme -n appeared, he used reduced forms such as nache (machen, 'make1, T 1; 10, 06), esse (essen, 'eat', T l; 10, 08), abe (haben, 'have', T l; 10, 05), angucke (angucken, 'look at', T l; 10, 03), etc. This is quite common for early child language.

118 (d)

(Pointing at the tower Saskia has built) T: nis umwäfivz not overturn (Then, he turns it over, however.) T: umwafan dum dum overturn, dum dum

T (1; 10, 19)

(62) Plurals (Tilman is looking at several objects in a picture book which he denotes): T:eiero8 T (1; 10,09) eggs dacha« (storchen)9 storks langan snakes (there is only one snake!) vassrt (fischen)1 ° fishes ataw (enten) ducks The plural -n in (62) is clearly overgeneralized. Clahsen et al. (1990, 1992) and Weyerts/Clahsen (1993) are surely right in pointing out the -5 morpheme as the German default-plural. Although the -s attaches only to 8% of German nomina-types, or 2% of the nomina-tokens—in absolute numbers—there exists diary as well as experimental evidence for the correctness of this observation. Even very young children, i.e., two year old ones, can extract this default morpheme from the input despite low absolute frequency. But obviously not every child does it (cf. also GawlitzekMaiwald 1994). Tilman has chosen the -n instead. Consider again other examples: (63) (a)

(b)

8

T: bäfern ~>(käfern, correct: Käfer) bug-Pl T: ühnern (—> hühner) chicken T: eiern (--> eier) eggs T: krokodilarc (--> krokodile) crocodiles T: straußan (-> Strauße) ostriches T: storchan (--> storche) storks

German plural of ei (egg) is eier (eggs) and not eiern. Again, German plural of storch (stork) is storche (storks) and not storchen. 10 Again, German plural offisch (fish) is fische (fishes) and not fischen.

9

T (l; 11)

119

T: vischsn (-> fische) fishes In (63a) he obviously adds -n "on top of" the -er morpheme. This phenomenon is also observed by Gawlitzek-Maiwald (1994: 260). So, Benny (3; 03) generates bl ttern instead of only blatter ('leaves'). In (63b) Tilman replaces the correct plural ending -e by -en. Note that all deviant forms concern masculine and neuter nouns. This result is also consistent with GawlitzekMaiwald's findings (1994: 249). She explains this by pointing out that the German plural rules are more difficult for masculine and neuter gender as opposed to feminine gender. This -n in (63) is definitely not the dative plural as in (64) Ich gebe den Enten BroL Ί give the ducks bread.' It has been reported repeatedly that children become sensitive to the dative in double-object constructions as well as in prepositional phrases at quite a late time; it is the morpheme that emerges last in the German case paradigm (cf. Eisenbeiss 1991, 1993, 1994a+b, Clahsen 1984, Clahsen, Eisenbeiss/Vainikka 1993, Hohenberger 1992, 1994). Accusative morphology (for masculine singular) as in (65) Ich sehe den Jungen. Ί see the boy-accusative.' also does not comes into question, as accusative morphology is not yet manifested in Tilman's corpus at that time. A further curiosity is -n suffigation on adverbs which normally cannot be inflected at all: (66) (a)

(b)

A: der saft ist schon fast alle. The juice is almost empty T: allen (--> alle) empty (Tilman wants to balance on his own) T: nanen '! (-> alleine) alone

T (1; 10,09)

T (1; 10, 23)

This global cluster of overgeneralizations of the -n morpheme hints at a still undifferentiated analysis of this functional morpheme. It has d!e#zn/f-character for encoding any grammatical morphological function. In the sense of Clahsen, Eisenbeiss/Penke (1994) Tilman's DP is clearly underspecified by that time. What is the origin of this overgeneralized -n? It is probably the infinitive -n that expresses the feature [-finite ]: -en is the canonical infinitival morpheme. It may not be a coincidence but reflect a deeper correspondence that the infinitive shows the same form as the genitive case morpheme. In German, the infinitive is also used as a nominalized form, e.g., trinken ('to drink1) and (das) Trinken ('something to drink1). This means there exists an intersection due to the same nominal feature. Tilman's -n morpheme, then, carries a generalized but underspecified [+N]-feature: it attaches to any nominal, even to those to which suf-

11 Before that time he used to say none without the -n , meaning 'alone, on my own'.

120

figation is precluded in the target grammar. The following interactions show that Tilman perceives adjectives as nominal as well—which is in fact correct, as adjectives are characterized by the features [+N,+VJ: (67) (a)

(b)

A: na, bist du müde? Well, are you tired? T: net müde - nganga not tired - boy am not tired, I am a boy.'

T (1; 11, 05)

A: tilman, bist du schlappi, schlappi12? Tilman, are you tired? T: net dapi, dapi - ngangs not tired, tired - boy am not tired, I am a boy.1

T (1; 11, 13)

At an early point in his life, he insists on being a boy and nothing else! He obviously takes the predicative adjectives müde ('tired') and schlappi ('tired') to be nominals, which is partly justified because of their nominal features. This is also a nice example of Pinker's (1987) claim that initially the major categories are still underspecified. Here, A and W would be involved. Their partly common distribution—following the copula—might have misled Tilman into treating them on a par. What he seems to have inferred correctly is the grammatical role of the adjective as predicate. While we have traced back the origins of Tilman's overgeneral use of the -n morpheme, the dynamics behind it remain to be uncovered. As it does not correspond to strings of the input, his particular use of -n is a kind of "invention" resulting in strings of the output which have no correspondence in the input. Yet, he draws on an existing form which he has actually perceived. The -n is around everywhere. How, then, can we describe Tilman's data? Penner and Müller (1992: 166) discuss Lexical Innovation, which can be instantiated in three different ways (cf. also (238) in chapter 11): (68)

Lexical Innovation in Child Grammar (i)

New lexical creations: the child inserts non-existent lexical items into terminal nodes (ii) Re-functioning of existent lexical items (e.g., the use of subject clitics as inflectional suffixes [...]) (iii) Overgeneralization: syncretism of paradigmatic slots (e.g., using one complementizer as a place holder for the whole paradigm). (Penner/Müller's (10) in (1992: 166))

Tilman's overgeneral use of -n obviously belongs to the third class, (68c). But note that the -n does not always replace the correct genitive-s. It occurs only as a variant. It is important to appreciate the simultaneity of several morphological forms—zero, -n and -s—which compete for selection. Recall also that d'Avis/Gretsch (1994) point out different learner types (cf. section 3.2 on the building-block model): bottom-up learners (lexically or token-oriented) vs. top-down 12

In fact, the nominal character of predicate-like adjectives is already evidenced in my own playful change of schlapp ('tired') to the diminuitive form schlappi, which could in fact be a noun.

121 learners (type-oriented). Tilman is obviously a type-learner. What he does with his -n is "to interpret a specific token as a type, which leads to the phenomenon of overgeneralization." (ibid.: 69) Although I do not espouse the notion of learner type (cf. the criticism in 3.2), d'Avis" and Gretsch's description is in accord with the dynamical process in question. The authors teach us not to mix type and token. This also holds conceptually. The objection that can be made against Clahsen's LEXLERN-approach is—ironically stated—that it overgeneralizes the token-learners as the only type of learners. A reframing is surely in order here. A last note on Tilman's genitive -n is in order. As we will see again and again in the following sections, Tilman is what Bates/MacWhinney (1987: 184) and Horgan (1981) call a noun lover (as opposed to a noun leaver), or what Brown (1973) and Nelson (197.3) call a nominal/referential type (as opposed to a pronominal type, or following Nelson (1973) an expressive, more verbally oriented type). This vertical trait—nominal vs. verbal typeseems to be a qualitatively stable, intraindividual trait already present in very young children. This trait is normally distributed with only a small percentage of clear-cut cases. Timan obviously belongs to one of the two extreme tails of the distribution. Thus, we are prepared to meet nominal emphasis everywhere in Tilman's data. Again, this classification as a nominal type is used here only informally. Interestingly, at about the same time, i.e., co-occurring with the emergence of first functional morphemes, Tilman pays unusual attention to the endings of words in accordance with Slobin's Operating Principle A: (69) Operating Principle A Pay attention to the ends of words. (Slobin 1973: 191) They are perceptually salient. While Slobin's Operating Principle A is taken to be valid for the entire course of acquisition, I argue that salience is a variable which crucially depends on the state the system is actually in. When the system is just about to slide into the functional attractor the ends of words become especially salient—not before nor after that point. In Tilman's data, this attention to the ends of words is witnessed in a changed stress pattern. That is, he does not just passively perceive the ends as salient but he actively stresses them. This is another autopoietical behavior that wins over the PLD in which those forms do not exist.13 This happens only for a short time but very vehemently: T: sasA14 (-> SAskia)

T (1; 11, 14)

(b)

T:dadan/ (->KAUgummi) chewing-gum

T ( l ; l l , 14)

(c)

(Tilman wants to get off the swing) T: atA (--> rUnter) down

(70) (a)

13

T (1; 11, 14)

Slobin reports that"[...] newly acquired conjunctions and other connecting words are stressed, even if unstressed in adult speech." (Slobin 1973: 201) 14 Capital letters are taken to denote major stress here.

122

(d)

(His glass is empty) T:all£ empty

(e)

(-->Alle)

Siegfried (his father): tu mal die steine in die dose Put PRT the stones in the box 'Put the stones into the box.' TrdanE (->stEIne) stones

T (1; 11, 16)

T ( l ; l l , 16)

Immediate changes in stress pattern—either in the same turn or at least on the same day— from the usual stress on the stem vocal to stress on the final vocal show this phenomenon most clearly, as in (71) (a) (Tilman wants to eat pudding by himself) T: nAne, nanE (--> allEIne) alone 'by myself

T (1; 11,14)

(b) T: nEke, nekE (-> schnEcke) snail

T (1; 11; 14)

(c) T:desmAmas this mommy's

T (1;11,17)

This (is) mommy's (purse).' (a little later in the conversation, referring to the same object:) T:desmamA515 this mommy's This (is) mommy's (purse).' This curiosity is even enhanced when the unusual stress is not on the final vocal nucleus, as in the utterances (72) and (73) above, but on the consonantic rhyme of the syllable, as in (72) (a) (b)

T:mittagesseMWWvW16 (~>mIttagEssen) lunch T.düeNNNNN (~>bÄren) bears

T ( l ; l l , 19) T (2; 00,14)

The last occurrence of his genitive- also shows final stress: (73) A: was is denn das? what is PRT that? 'What's that?' T:dipfesasAn 15

T (1; 11, 19)

In German there exists a stylistically marked final stress "a la fransaise" yielding (i) mam/4, or (ii) sasA, (cf. (70)). But it is almost impossible that Tilman imitates this special form, as it is not used in our family at all. For the other items ("dadan/", "nan£", "allE") this possibility is ruled out anyway. 16 Here, the final -n even becomes sonorant.

123

socks sasAn 'Saskia's socks.' This short period of variable word stress, ranging from 1; 11, 14 to 1; 11, 19 (or 2; 00, 14), hints at the fact that at just about that time, for roughly one week, the endings become salient. Tilman discovers the possible locus of suffixation at the end of words, to which functional morphemes can now attach. The Lexical Categories offer themselves to becomes functionally charged. Their right edge becomes a place for inflection to attach to. By now it can no longer been upheld that Tilman, like other children on the limen from the prefunctionalto the functional phase, treats functional forms as unanalyzed mono-morphemes, as in Gleitman and Wanner's famous (74) read-it a book, mommy (Gleitman/Wanner 1982: 18), where the pronominal clitic 'it' forms a unit with the lexical item 'read1. Compare also Hyams' examples (75) (a) (b)

I have an acold There's an across on top of the church

(Hyams 1991: 35; FN 21),

where the Functional Category DET'is still reduplicated on a Lexical Category although it is already treated as a functional morpheme of its own. The expressive final stress with which Tilman challenges the existent stress pattern proves that a qualitative change has taken place. The variable stress, as in (71), unambiguously shows that Tilman is in the realm of bifurcation and executes a symmetry-break. Immediately after this liminal stress phase a full-fledged DP occurs, as in: (76) T:dessasas this sasa's A:hm? (pretends not to understand) T: des sasas ...dalan this sasa's sandals These (are) Saskia's sandals.'

T (1; 11, 19)

After that development all the other functional phenomena set in (cf. the following sections). Note that Tilman is 1; 11 years old at that point. However, his grammar is already well on its way to the functional phase. Here we see that age is a poor advisor for the decision whether a child is still prefunctional or already functional. Poeppel and Wexler (1993) claim that the prefunctional ists would categorize children at the age of < 2; 06 as prefunctional (exception: Radford 1990). Thus, their informant child Andreas should be in the prefunctional stage at the age of 2; 01 years—according to the prefunctionalists. Then, they prove that he has already an /- as well as a C-system, performs V2 etc. This is supposed to be the counter-evidence against the structure-building hypothesis. Not at all! Although I vote for a prefunctional stage, I claim that my own son, at the age of 1; 11, already resides in the basin of the funtional attractor. Age, as has often been criticized, cannot be the relevant variable. It is just a psychological carrier-variable. As soon as there is evidence for PCs one

124

has to attribute them to the child, however early they may appear. And the end of the second year is a pretty fine age to become functional. The inevitable fate of variational morphological forms, such as Tilman's -n, is their disappearance. Having spread about the lexicon and having attached to any nominal category, they are pruned or atrophy. They were always unstable configurations as they were not properly fed by the input. They were able to exert a certain attraction as long as the D -feature was still underspecified, due to hysteresis (cf. section 4.7). As soon as full specification takes place they cannot compete any longer. It amounts to some sort of 'Olympic spirit", however, to take part in the competition. They co-occured and competed with the target suffixes because in the proliferant liminal phase the generator of variability is most active. Only the symmetry-break breaks their neck. After that only the morphological form with the highest congruence and support by the input wins. Tilman's -n also shows that Clahsen's LEXLERN-approach is too short-sighted. The perception of the morphology does not straightforwardly trigger the respective functional projection—in a bottom-up manner; the Genitive-s triggers the DP, Accusative-morphology triggers AGR-O etc. Rather, quite subtle deductive processes seem to exert their power in addition—in a top-down manner. The over-generalization of a functional morpheme witnesses this deductive power. As soon as it was extracted—from whatever area—Tilman began to deduce forms which did not exist in the input as such, but only in his own idiosyncratic system. No one else but he has ever maintained this particular morphological configuration in this particular moment in the course of language acquisition. There is no equiliminality. The creodes in Tilman's epigenetic landscape which lead to the competing morphological attractors are shallow enough at that moment, or the turbulence is high enough, so that not a single pathway is favored, but several ones are used, as shown in the intuitive Figure 12:

125

-n

-s

-0

Fig. 12: Intuitive epigenetic landscape in the liminal phase modelling morphological attractors.

Later, the child seems to consider only the target form which she hears in the input as the only one possible. Researchers in language acquisition are all too likely to forget that there has been a "decision" in a selectional scenario. I criticized this as anticipatory idealization (cf. section 4.4). In fact, many children make it easy for us. Such variational forms do not exist in every corpus; they are low-frequent and can easily be neglected as error variance. In dynamical approaches, however, they are admitted and expected, but not prescribed, of course. If they manifest themselves they overtly characterize the covert design of the dynamical system.

Finiteness, Non-Finiteness, Verb Placement, and Negation

The position of the verb is subject of vehement dispute already in the earliest utterances of children. Is it situated in C or in /, in TNS or in AGR, or does it remain in V? Fortunately, there exist independent, unambiguous indicators for the verb position, namely negation, sentential adverbs, e.g., German ouch ('also', 'too'), mal ('once', 'just'), doch ('but'). These are VP-adjuncts or head a projection of their own, say, a NEG-P, immediately above the VP. For the sake of simplicity let us assume a Vf-adjunct analysis as in Clahsen (1988, or in Weissenborn 1991):

(77)

VP

/\

Neg/Adv VP

Spec NP

V

NP 1

Alternatively, consider Chomsky's (1994) proposal. He suggests a "Larsonian solution" (p. 33) for adverbias like "often", a solution which should also carry over to negation. Both structures should not have been derived by Move, i.e., have a lower base-generated position, but should be directly inserted by Merge, i.e., by "base adjunction" (ibid.: 32), because neither adverbs nor negation have any morphological properties to check after movement. Chomsky resents adjunction to an XP "if XP has a semantic role at LF; say, if XP is a predicate (AP or VP)" (ibid.: 31), as in (i) John [yp often(vp reads books/to his children ]] (Chomsky's (39), ρ 32). He doubts that apparently "raised" alternants, as in (ii) John reads often to his children (iii) *John reads often books (Chomsky's (49) on p. 32) have anything to do with verb raising. Instead, he proposes the familiar "Larsonian shell" for these constructions: (iv) VP, /\ John V,

/\

V

VP2

/\ alpha

VI

/\beta

reads

(Chomsky's (44) on p. 33)

127

In fact, the child produces utterances in which the verb is situated either before or behind the negation/adverb. The position of the verb crucially depends on its +/- finiteness: the nonfinite verb stays in situ behind the negation/adverb (verbum infinitum post negationem, or negatioante verbum infinitum, respectively); the finite verb undergoes movement, crosses the negation/adverb and targets a functional head above the VP, be it Neg, I, Tns, Agr, or C (resulting in the pattern verbum finitum ante negationem, or negatio post verbum finitum, respectively). In languages with uniform left-headedness of the functional projections such as/, (AGR and TNS) and C, e.g., English and French, V-to-/-movement already produces the pattern negatio post verbum finitum. The case of German—with a presumedly rightheaded//'—is somewhat more complicated. Here, V-fo-/-raising is a string-vacuous movement, the resulting word order remains verbum finitum post negationem. Thus, phenomenologically, movement is indistinguishable from non-movement. Only further movement of the V+/-complex to the left-peripheral C-position results in the pattern negatio post verbum finitum. Only now the word order has changed. The salient complementary distribution of the +/- finite verb is evidenced in significant parts of child corpora; Tilman is no exception to this rule either: (78) Verbum infinitum post negationem (a)

(He wants to draw on a piece of paper on which I am just writing) T: ach lalsn T (1; 10, 18) also draw

(b)

(Tilman points at the tower that Saskia has built) T: nis umwerfan not overthrow

(c) T: ach dimmeldan vachs also choo-choo train drive (d)

(e)

(f)

(Tilman wants to look at a picture book once more) T: noch nal andeka once more at-look Once more look at.' (Tilman is standing on the window-sill) T: nlsasfallan not out-fall 'not fall out' T: net lange osa anziehen not long trousers on-put 'not put on long trousers'

T (1; 10, 19)

T (1; 10,23)

T (1; 10, 28)

T (1; 10,28)

T (1; 10,28)

Here, VP2 is the projection of a substantive verb, e.g., read. VPj is the projection of a "light verb". If V is selected, the lower verb has to move to it in order to check features (TNS and AGR). Thus, the orders Vfj n > Adverb/Neg and Adverb/Neg >Vfj n fall out quite naturally, in a minimalist theory.

128

(g)

(h)

(Referring to a dolphin) T: ach maman (-->schwimmen) also swim

T (1; 10, 28)

(He wants to press the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle out of their surrounding form) T: noch nal deksn T (1; 10, 28) once more press

The first occurrences of movement of the finite verb to a head-initial functional projection across the negation/adverb are imitations of an immediate model in the discourse: (79) (a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

A(nnette): die liege wackelt nicht the couch shakes not The couch is not shaking.' Ί-.daketms shakes not (Tilman does not want to take off his shoes) S(askia): tilman will nicht til man wants not Tilman does not want to.1 T: ninan nil nis tilman wants not Tilman does not want to.' S: ich will auch gehen I want also go Ί also want to go.' T: Hl ach didats (-> Spielplatz) dehn want also playground go '(I) want to go to the playground, too.' (Tilman is standing on a couch) T: des aket (~>wackelt) this shakes A: ne, des wackelt nicht no, this shakes not 'No, this is not shaking.1 T: des aket nis this shakes not S: wir fangen noch nicht an (zu essen) we begin still not 'We still don't begin (to eat).'

T (1; 10,21)

T (1; 10, 26)

T (l; 11, 03)

T (1; 11,05)

129

T: ngange nich an2 start not on '(We) still don't begin.'

T (1; 11, 11)

A little later, he is able to produce V2 -structures of his own without any model. His use of modals in the second position is by no means accidental: modals are presumed to be the first elements which are base-generated in a functional verbal projection above VP. (80) (a) T: Wach as want also ice-cream '(I) want to have ice-cream, too.' (b) (He does not want to drink his milk) T:/jagnis want not '(I) don't want to.1 (c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(He wants to have a piece of meat, too) T: HI achn las (--> fleisch) want also a meat '(I) want to have a (piece of) meat, too.' (At the zoo) T: fangan (--> schlangen) dibts ach3 snakes gives-it too There are snakes, too.'

(Tilman wants to sweep with a broom, too) T: ach ach lil ach also also want also '(I) want (to sweep) too.' (He wants to jump with me once more) T: noch nal - /// noch nal once more - want once more '(I) want to do it once more.' (He can't sit on the rocking toy animal by himself) Ύ: an nisi can not '(I) cannot.'

T (1; 11,09)

T (1; 11,17)

T (1; 11, 19)

T (l; 11, 21)

T (1; 11,22)

T (1; 11, 22)

T (1; 11,22)

French data in particular (cf. Pierce 1989, 1992, Doprez/Pierce 1993, Deprez 1994, Weissenborn 1994, Verrips/Weissenborn 1992, Weissenborn 1994, Wexler 1999) are cited in the literature as evidence for this distribution. The relevant minimal pair is 2

3

Here, the particle an- (encoding the beginning of the action) is stranded in the final verb position, while the finite part of the verb is raising to a left-peripheral functional head position above the VP. This is an early instance of topicalitation of an object. More topicalizations are given in (92). They start to become productive at the age of 2; 01.

130

(81)

mange pas v s. pas manger eats not v s. not (to) eat (cf. Pierce 1989, quoted in Weissenborn 1991: 219, FN 21; cf. also Verrips/ Weissenborn 1994, Pierce/Deprez 1993, Weissenborn, Verrips/Berman 1989, Müller 1993: 130ff.)

Weissenborn speaks of an early, practically errorless, distinction between finite forms which raise to the left above negation, and non-finite forms that stay in their base position to the right [...]. (Weissenborn 1991:219, FN 21)

Note that the position above the negation to which the finite verb in French moves, is the /-position, and not the C-position as in German. The general tenor (cf. Weissenborn, Verrips/Berman 1989, Weissenborn 1991, 1992, Verrips/Weissenborn 1992, Weissenborn 1994, Poeppel/Wexler 1993, D6prez 1994, Pierce/ Diprez 1993, Wexler 1994, 1999) is that "there are only few errors of verb placement with respect to negation." (Verrips/Weissenborn 1992: 305) If they appear, however, we are dealing with "genuine performance errors" (ibid.: 307): The relatively small number of exceptions are really EXCEPTIONS, and we feel that as such they do not require us to structure our theory explicitely to account for them. In particular, these few exceptions to the otherwise very stable distinction might be performance errors or might depend on a wide variety of other considerations. (Poeppel/Wexler 1993: 8)

We have already seen in (79) - (81) what the ideal distribution looks like. Before we turn our attention to the malicious exceptions, let us sort the logical possibilities of verb placement with respect to negation. This has been already been done by Poeppel/Wexler (1993), Clahsen, Eisenbeiss/Penke (1994) and Schaner-Wolles (1994: 220) in a 2x2-design of allowed and unallowed combinations. Two factors have to be considered which both have two discrete values: (82) (i) Morphology. (ii) Movement.

finite v s. non-finite - movement vs. + movement, resulting in V-end vs. V-initial 4

This results in the following matrix with four cells:

(83) Morphology/Movement

- movement

+ movement

- morphology

o.k.

*

+ morphology

*

o.k.

Only the combinations: -finite verb/-movement and +finite verb/+movement are licit, whereas the logically possible matings of -finite verbid-movement and +finite verb/ -movement are illicit. 4

Recall again that V-initial means V in I in English and French, but V in C in German; V-end means V in the VP in English and French, but V in the VP or V in final I in German.

131

Actually, everything would be alright if children were not sometimes to depart from this rule. As already stated, these examples are only "speech errors" and Poeppel/Wexler (1993: 6f.) also compute for us the threshold up to which language data are just accidental: 7.8%.5 Counter-evidence can be neglected since it is statistically insignificant.6 I have already tried to show above (see section 1.3) that statistical significance, however, is not the measure of choice in dynamical models. Never mind: let us look at the exceptional data. First, let us consider cases where a non-finite verb is placed before the negation/adverb and apparently has undergone movement. In Verrips/Weissenborn's (1992) data from three French children, Fabienne, Benjamin, and Philippe, there are only two such cases: one for Benjamin, i.e., an erroneously placed past participle (84(i)) and one for Philippe, i.e., an infinitive (84(ii)): (84) (i)

Benjamin il est mouiltt plus it is wet no-more

(ii) Philippe prendre pas les pieds to-take not the feet (Verrips/Weissenborn 1992: 306f.)

B (2; 02, 02)

P (2; 02, 10)

The structure for (84 ii) should be (85) in order to explain the word order negatio post verbum infinitum:

(85)

IP

/\ Spec 1° prendre

VP >*v pas

VP

/\ pro

V

XX

Vj

les pieds

Müller, as well, reports some cases of unsystematic verb placement in the data of one of her French-German bilingual children, Pascal (Müller 1993: 131).

5 6

If Andreas' data are adjusted in accordance with even stricter criteria, the percentage is even lower. Exceptions only show up in footnotes, as in Doprez/Pierce (1993: FN 20).

132 Verrips/Weissenborn judge the counter-evidential force of these admittedly poor data as minor: Given the fact that these are the only cases in both corpora and that no errors of this type have been reported by other authors, we chose to consider these cases as genuine performance errors, which we will not discuss, and not as an indication of a stage, in wich both finite and non-finite verbs may move. (Verrips/Weissenborn 1992: 307) But I will supply further evidence for such structures which in fact occur, even though they are admittedly extremely rare. They are, however, not reducible to performance errors, from my point of view. I take Roeper's "silent stages" (1992: 340) as sustaining the methodological route here: Much of the acquisition of grammar is covert. [...] Therefore it is not unnatural to use apparently minor overt signs of systematicity as possible indications of fundamental underlying principles. (Roeper 1992: 340, cf. also Tracy/Lattey 1994: viii) This, of course, does not guarantee the correctness of the analysis proposed here. Let us take a look at the data provided by Tilman. They follow the pattern negatio post verbum infinitivum, which is normally excluded: (86) (a)

(b)

(He does not want to eat his pudding) T: net net - aba net not not have not

T (1; 09, 15)

(He does not want to eat ice-cream) T: net - eis essa net not - ice-cream eat not

T(l;09,31)

In these two examples, we can see a blend of an anaphoric negation (the first negation) with a non-anaphoric negation in the proposition proper. The infinitives appear in a reduced form ending on schwa rather than on -en. For Simone, who also shows these reduced forms along with full forms, i.e., -e as well as -en, Doprez/Pierce (1993: 53f.) try to prove that these two forms are used in functionally different ways, i.e., -en for the true infinitive and -e for finite forms, especially for the third person singular. Thus, the examples in (86) have to be handled cautiously. In the following data, however, the infinitival morphology is more clear-cut: (87) (a)

(b)

(c)

(He wants to press a button, too) T: runterspülen) down-flush too 'flush too1 A: soll ich auch mal an deiner waffel beißen? Shall I also PRT at your waffle bite? 'May I also bite from your waffle?1 T:ess»zach eat too

T (1; 10,19)

T (l; 11,19)

T (1; 11, 19)

133

(d)

A: so, hier kannst du noch trinken PRT here can you still drink "Here you can drink some more.' Τ: kaputt)? this there broken 'Is this (car) broken? Siegfried: des ist nicht kaputt 'this is not broken' T: doch taput is but broken is 'It is broken, though.1

T (2; 00, 05) T (2; 00, 10)

Without stress on the posverbal subject. Note that wackeln ('to shake') is an unaccusative. De"prez/Pierce (1993: 43) show that in these cases postverbal subjects are allowed in German as well as in French.

143 (h)

(Tilman wants to have a spoon) T: achn waffol will·6 also a spoon want '(I) want to have a spoon, too.'

T (2; 00, 14)

Not included are cases where a seemingly finite verb could also be interpreted as a regularly generated past particple, as in (100)

16

(He watches me writing on a sheet of paper) T: da auch reibt there also writes/has written 'Here, (mommy) has written, too.' T: an da? da nis reibt! warum? and there? there not writes/written? why? 'And there? There (you) have not written? Why?17

T (2;00, 29)

Here, the adverb ouch ('too') does not neccessarily have to be related to the verb wollen ('to want'), but may have scope only over the DP einen löffel ('a spoon'). Then, we are dealing with a topicalization of the kind in (i), where the subject in Spec IP would have been dropped, but would be governed by the V in C:

Alternatively, one can invoke an IP in the sense of the asymmetry-hypothesis. The empty subject would stay in Spec V", then. 17 At that time he discovers perfective tense. He has some difficulties in the selection of the proper auxiliary and of the regular/irregular past participle. So, the modal wollen ('want') still selects a past participle (see (i) and (ii)) instead of an infinitive: (i) T: lil ach elefant demalt T (2; 01, 03) want also elephant drawn '(I) also want to draw an elephant.' (ii) T: lil ach trat (->brot) esst T (2; 01,17) want also bread eaten '(I) also want to eat some bread.' This may be taken as evidence that both the V2 and the VE position are charged with inflectional properties. They are doubly spelled out. I regard this a liminal proliferation. Tilman has to find out that if the V2 position has functional features (finiteness) they have to be canceled in the VE position. Such doubly spelled-out inflection is also reported in Müller (1993) and Tracy (1989).

144

Equally excluded are topicalizations, especially deictic topicalizations in which the finite verb appears in final Γ. In these examples, there is already evidence for a filled Spec, be it Spec CP or Spec IP: (101)

(a)

T: daas (--> storch) nis mehr locht stork not more dives The stork does not dive any more.1

T (1; 11, 26)

(b)

T: da ach tsikus is there also circus is There is a circus, too.'

T (2; 00,02)

(c)

T: di u-bahn j hrt there underground train goes There goes the underground train1.

T (2; 00, 16)

(d)

T: eidata (->eidotter) dinin is yolk inside is There is yolk inside.'

T (2; 00, 16)

(e)

T: da neks tomt there snail comes There comes a snail.1

T (2; 00,21)

(f)

(Looks at a picture book where a girl is riding on a horse) Τ: ώ. ach pferd r tst T (2; 00, 18) there also horse rides There (the girl) is riding (on a) horse.'

(g)

Τ: ώ. ulla w ttai ras there Ulla feeds grass There Ulla is feeding grass(to the pigs).'

T (2; 00, 18)

(h)

T: s-bahn so r der hat rapid train so wheels has The rapid train has such wheels.'

T (2; 01,20)

(i)

T: so eine kette sasa hat such a necklace Saskia has 'Saskia has such a necklace.'

T (2; 01, 15)

The structure of these sentences is presumed to be the following CP/TOP-P analysis in (102a), for daas nist mehr locht (stork not more dives). Alternatively, one can invoke an IPanalysis with Spec IP as a topic position, as in (102b):

145

(102a)

CP/TOP-P

(102b)

/\ Spec j

C y>v IP

Spec

,p

Λ''

Γ

Spec

... /\ VP

nist mehr

daas 1°

VP

ec

P

VP

nist mehr

/\ s

i 1° tacht-

VP

/\

v
runterspiilen) chalengagachatedalen? want down-flush?

T (2; 00, 10)

184 want gaga down-flush? 'Do we want to flush the toilet?1 (h)

T: wolen dik-dik asmalen? want dik-dik out-paint? 'Do we want to color the dik-dik?'

T (2; 00, 13)

(i)

T: diken dann aas? get then off 'Do we get off then?1

T (2; 00, 13)

(j)

T: hast h have-2nd ps sg heard? 'Have you heard?

(k)

T: famer niss-bahn? T (2; 00, 25) drive-we not rapid train? 'Don't we go with the rapid train?' (Here, the subject begins to be spelled-out as a (at least phonetical) clitic on the finite verb.)

rt?

T (2; 00, 18)

According to the standard CP-analysis the finite verb is in C° and could license an empty pro in Spec IP via head-government. Diachronically viewed this option also existed for inversion structures in Old French (cf. Clark/Roberts 1993). The analysis would then be straightforward, e.g., (183) for (182c):

(183)

C

/\

C° llen

IP

pro-

—ι

Γ

VP

head gov. s\

/ \V

t.J

ν

/\ as

V essen t-

Spec IP may also host a subject-clitic, as in (182a+k). The difference between pro and a subject clitic is only small. For pro, too, a clitic analysis would be possible: the V in C has a clitic-position, V+cl, or it cliticizes the pronoun in Spec IP, respectively.

185

8.2.4

Yes-No Questions and Declaratives with Differing Intonation

We could content ourselves with the analysis above if there were not some strange interrogative-indicative minimal pairs which show exactly the same word order and differ only in intonation: first interrogative, then declarative intonation: (184)

(a)

T: lolen dasan (-> fasan) delen? lolen dasan delen. want pheasant put? want pheasant put. 'Shall we put the pheasant (on the table)?1 'We shall put the pheasant (on the table).'

T (2; 00,09)

(b)

T: lolen dekedaf dilen? A: hm? T: lolen dekedaf dilen. T: want locomotive play? A:hm? T: want locomotive play. T: Shall we play with the locomotive? A: pardon? T: We shall play with the locomotive.'

T (2; 00,09)

In the next example the interrogative is missing, but the declarative has exactly the same form as in the examples above: (185)

T: lolen dicha delen want animals put 'We want to put the animals (on the table).'

T (2; 00,09)

In these minimal pairs,10 Tilman systematically varies only one factor, namely intonation. This gives rise to the impression that the underlying phrase structure is held constant. Of course, there possibly exists an appropriate pro-drop-analysis for these declaratives, e.g., the topic-drop-analysis of Weissenborn (1992), according to which in German the pronominal subject in the topicalized Spec CP-position is licensed by a discourse antecedent. The analysis for (184a declarative) would then be (186):

10 Tracy (1991: 338) speaks of "Adjazenzpaare" ('adjacency pairs').

186

(186)

CP

/\ pro.

0

V\ lolen

IP

/\ l y '' /\ VP

/\ · «

V'

dasan

V delen t-

However, this analysis is unsatisfactory as it cannot capture the minimal-pair-like sequence of both obviously identical word orders. Both alternants appear in the same turn and differ only in intonation: interrogative (falling-rising) vs. indicative (falling). Intuitively, one may conjecture that Tilman generates them by means of the identical structure and differentiates between them by the prosodic device alone. This, of course, is just a conjecture, but an interesting one. It would free Tilman from an early syntactic differentiation which is presumed to be more difficult than a prosodic differentiation, i.e., one by another module that does not interfere with syntactic structure-building. Following this line of reasoning, one has to ask which structure is the underlying one? Does Tilman depart from the declarative so that his questions are echo-decision-questions without inversion? If this were the case, their expanded reading should be : (187)

Wir wollen den Fasan aufstellen? We want the pheasant on-put? 'Shall we put the pheasant (on the table)?1

The subject would not surface either because of topic-drop in the sense of Weissenborn (1992) or because of a general ban on Spec CP in this particular phase (see below). Alternatively, does Tilman proceed from the interrogative with inversion and extend this inverted structure to declaratives? The latter possibility seems to be rather unattractive, as generally the delarative is taken to be the default-mood and inversion does not licence pro's in Spec IP in declaratives. Let us renounce a premature decision and try to derive a featuretheoretical explanation along the lines of underspecification.

187 What Tilman processes in this phase is the binary feature pair declarative vs. interrogative.11 As seems to be clear, children utter only declaratives in the beginning. But is this really true? I do not think so. Early declaratives may not be true declaratives yet, as their opposites, i.e., interrogative and imperative forms, are still missing. The child thus does not acquire the interrogative mood in addition to the already existing declarative mood, but she acquires declarative and interrogative at the very same time—by the process of feature specification. Before this process, we can witness feature underspecification, i.e., a structure has the syntactic features + as well as -declarative, or + and -wh, respectively. It is declarative and interrogative at the same time, or neither of the two. I claim this to be true of the structures underlying the examples (184a+b). However, both forms are unambiguously differentiated—not via syntax but via intonation. But which of them is the underspecified liminal form—the yes/no-question or the declarative? Despite the problems mentioned before, I plead for the yes/no-question because it demands fewer derivational steps and precedes the declarative in the respective turn, i.e., it can function as an immediate model for the answer. It should be clear that a question demands an answer. But Tilman provides this answer by himself, although the questions are not rhetorical questions and although elsewhere he vehemently demands answers from his interlocutors. Sometimes he asks the very same question ten times. The motivation for answering the questions himself stems from a systeminternal source—as if he had to figure out for himself what mood is all about. He exploits intonation in the beginning as an extra-syntactic, disambiguating device. This is a case of prosodic bootstrapping. His syntax is not yet apt to do this job and to specify whether +declarative or -declarative is given. As soon as this opposition is clear in principle, it may also be differentiated by syntactic means. But initially, syntax is over-charged with this task. The dynamical interpretation, then, is a +/- wh underspecification, presumably in Spec CP. The phrase structure (188) holds for both interrogative and declarative parts of the minimal pairs in (184):

1

' To be precise, we are dealing here with a triple: declarative, interrogative, imperative. In fact, imperatives occurred even earlier than interrogatives in TV/man's data. However, as the acquisition of the interrogative was much more spectacular, I only confront declarative and interrogative.

188

(188)

CP

/\ [+/-wh]

IP

x\

lolenj

IP

J

Γ

/\

VP

Γ

χ\ ' . · t. v

x\

as

V essen t

The trouble caused by the double feature in Spec CP accounts for two other phenomena. Firstly, the processing of what is +/-wh takes place in the area of yes-no questions, the Spec CP of which is not filled with an overt +wA-operator. Secondly, Tilman avoids or even suppresses overt wA-elements in the following time, although he had already produced them before. Was ('what'), wo ('where'), warum ('why') had already been proper entries in his lexicon.

8.2.5

Zero Questions

We now enter the third phase of Tilman's acquisition of the CP. The option of producing wA-questions without a wA-word (cf. Penner 1993) follows the two co-occuring options discussed before, namely formulaic target-like w>A-questions and questions with a VE pattern, but still overlaps with them in part: wΑ-words which had already been produced before are partly suppressed now. The finite V£-pattern with the verb in final INFL is given up in the course of the development. The temporary giving-up (or freezing) of already incorporated lexical entries once more contradicts the idea of Lexical Learning which assumes that items are taken up from the input and that their lexical features trigger the respective functional projections, e.g., +/-wh for the CP. Obviously, this is an unsatisfactory explanation because structure-building is not that straightforward. If the child has these items at her command only in the sense of secondness, i.e., as an empiricial percept, she has not yet processed the features which are responsible for functional structure-building. This is only possible if the state of thirdness is

189

reached. Incremental lexical learning as an exemplified linear process does not seem to be a sufficient explanation. As long as the CP is still the "battle-field" of the +/-»vA-feature, a lexical item had better not show up there. It is avoided in order to escape checking. In the checking procedure— metaphorically speaking—the question would be asked: "are you + or-wA?", but the answer could not yet be given. Examples of this avoidance of +vWz-elements are: (189)

(a)

(Tilman checks where to fit in a piece of a jigsaw puzzle) T: gat hin? T (2; 00, 18) belongs in? '(Where) does this fit in?1

(b)

T: tat hin? der himmel dat nis hin belongs in? the sky belongs not in '(Where) does this one fit in? The 'sky1 does not fit in.'

T (2; 00, 18)

(c)

T: kommt'n da? coming-PART there? '(Who) is coming there?'

T (2; 00, 19)

(d)

T: des tier is das? this animal is that? '(What kind of) animal is this?1

T (2; 00, 19)

190 (e)

T: tat hin? 12 belongs in? '(Where) does it fit in?1

T (2; 00,22)

(f)

T: heißt der? calls this one? '(What) is this one called?

T (2; 00,25)

(g)

T: hast du nacht? have you made? '(What) have you done?1

T (2; 00,28)

Interestingly, a -wh deictic hier ('here'), or da ('there'), or a topicalized DP, presumably also occupying Spec CP, are not equally avoided: (190)

12

(Tilman is doing a jigsaw puzzle) (a) T: hier sat rad here belongs wheel The wheel fits in here.'

T (2; 00,19)

There are numerous examples of the gat hin?-('(where) does it fit in?')-type. In this case the +tvA-element wo ('where') may not be missing at all but be elliptically represented by the commonly stranded preposition hin ('therein', 'thereto'). Hin ('therein') could then be wohin ('where-in'), a compound w>A-element plus preposition with an echo-reading. Note that you can say in German: (i) Wohin gehört das? Where-to belongs that? 'Where does this fit in?' (Pied-piping of the preposition along with the wA-word) (ii) Wo gehört das hin? Where belongs that to? 'Where does this fit in?' (Stranding of the preposition) (iii) Wohin gehört das hin? Where-to belongs that to? 'Where does this fit in?' (Colloquial, sub-standard preposition doubling) (iv) Das gehört wohin? That belongs where-to? This fits in where?' (Echo-question) (v) Wo das hingehört? Where that to-belongs? 'Where this fits in, (I don't know)?1 (Topicalization with ellipsis) Nevertheless, the question remains why it is exactly the tvA-element that is missing or should be elliptically suspended. In fact, at 2; 00, 22 and later, the compound shows up discontinuously: (vi) T: wo tat hin? T (2; 00, 22) Where belongs to? 'Where does it fit in?'

191 (b)

T: tat hin? der Himmel dat nis hin Belongs to? The sky belongs not to 'Where does it fit in? The 'sky1 does not fit in.'

T (2; 00, 18)

(c)

T: dahin tata has there-to belongs-the house The house fits in there.'

T (2; 00, 26)

One could explain the missing +wA-elements along the lines of (172), where the wA-element is present but \hefinite verb missing. There, I argued that the finite verb cannot show up because the wA-element occupies C°. Likewise, one could consider the examples (189) as mirror-images in that now the finite verb in C° rules out any +w>A-element in C°. Note that in the standard theory a mobile categorization of an identical element—once as an 13 Xmax and tnen 35 ^ x°—[s strictly ruled out. Since Chomsky (1994), however, a category may be Xmax or X°, respectively. As long as the CP is not yet fully projected and—informally speaking—reaches only the C'-level, any element in C° is of the X°-type. The finite verb and a +»vA-element both compete for this position. At this stage of Tilman's development the symmetry between the finite verb in C° and the +wA-element in C° is still unbroken. Once symmetry breaking has taken place, C° is reserved for the verb; for the M>A-element the new structural position Spec CP has to be created. That this position may already have existed before, is witnessed by the occurence of -wA-elements along with the finite verb as in (190). Here, one would call this position overspecißed, as only -wA-elements, i.e., deictic operators like , ('there') and hier ('here') or topicalized DPs, may show up in it. As far as topicalized DPs are concerned, this may be a further facet of Tilman's fondness of nouns. The question that remains is what kind of features there are in Tilman's early C°—presumably the +finite feature of the finite verb, but presumably also the +>vA-feature of wAelements. If the +wA-element is missing and only the +finite feature of the verb is present, the +wh feature may still be instantiated by the intonation or is incorporated into the finite verb, which appears as a compound, as in: (191)

13

T: sat hin? Belongs to? 'Where does it fit in?'

When the CP-layer was introduced in generative grammar, there was an uncertainty with regard to the status of wA-elements: were they positioned in C° or in Spec C/*? Following Roeper (1992) and Radford (1992), the wA-element starts out as a head located in C°. Then it is recategorized as an Xmax occupying Spec CP. Roeper (1988) argues that the specifier always needs to be triggered individually.

192

v° tj hin

But in the other case where the +wA-element shows up and the verb is suppressed, what happens to the finiteness feature? Is it covertly represented and satisfied along with the +vt>A-element in C°, as I indicated with the compound +wh + covert finite verb in (169)? In this case, the finite verb and the +wA-element would share the same position, namely C°. Alternatively, I claimed that the finite verb is recoverable from its respective non-finite preposition or its object. Anyway, what we may conclude is that the exposition is still underspecified and heavily competed for. This is an unstable situation and the system's anwer—the instantiation of only one of the competing elements: either the +wA-element or the +finite verb —is unsatisfactory. This is the very motive for disentangling both feature sets and for providing proper positions for each. Maybe the already instantiated -wA-feature in Spec CP serves as a bootstrapping device. The result is the full-blown CP with Spec CP. However, Tilman's strategy of avoidance has not yet reached its end. It reaches its climax when Tilman renounces the entire CP, not just Spec CP, but also C°. He kind of holophrastically asks for nominals only via the lexical category plus intonation, or at best he uses the /P-projection with a final finite verb, as in: (192)

(a)

(Tilman is looking for a piece of the jigsaw puzzle with a knight on it) T: ritta? sat hin? ach sea (->schwer) des da hin? T (2; 00, 20) Knight? Belongs to? Also difficult. This there to? 'Knight? Where does he fit in? This is very difficult. Does this fit in there?'

(b)

(Tilman is looking for his favorite doll, 'Mister Neuroth') T: narit? (~>Neuroth) narit us? T (2; 00, 22) Neuroth? Neuroth is? 'Neuroth? Where is Mr. Neuroth?'

193

(c)

T: mama nacht? mommy makes/made?

T (2; 00, 29)

'(What has) mommy done?' (d)

(e)

(He wants to sit on a big rocking duck) T:antegehn? duck go? 'May I sit on the duck?1 (He is looking for his sister) T: sasa? die sasa? Sasa? The sasa? '(Where is) Saskia?'

T (2; 01,05)

T (2; 01,07)

In these examples, the retreat from CP and even IP is extreme. It has been claimed by Penner (1993) that the child avoids spelling-out CP, while its features are properly instantiated: [...] it seems that the COMP system is available at the level of feature instantiation, but is inoperative at the level of spell out. In other words, the COMP projection is part of the grammatical representation, but neither COMP nor CP-Spec are allowed to surface. (Penner 1993: 178)

As +wA-elements are obviously taboo at that time, Tilman is looking for -wA-items which are also candidates for Spec CP. There seems to be a ban on Spec CP, and especially on +>vA-elements in Spec CP. Let us now have a look at how he enters this projection. As I already pointed out, he uses the -wA-deictic operator da ('there') as a disguise for insinuation: (193)

(Tilman is looking at a picture book, where a girl, Vila, feeds animals and rides on a horse) (a) T: (h ach pferd ratet T (2; 00, 18) there also horse rides There (she) also rides (on a ) horse.' (b)

ώ. wafelt (->streichelt)... there caresses... There, (she) caresses (the horse).1

(c)

schweinchen) (g)ras there feeds piggies grass There, (she) feeds grass (to the) little pigs.1

The deictic operator appears to occupy Spec CP, but this is not straightforward if you look at the next utterance in this little monologue: (194)

(While looking at the same picuture book) Τ: ώ. ulla w ttat ras There ulla feeds grass There, Ulla is feeding grass.'

T (2; 00, 18)

194 In a V2-language, either ώ. or the subject Ulla can occupy Spec CP, but not both.14 There is a well-known ban on adjunction to CP. But Ulla cannot occupy Spec IP either, because then the finite verb would be final, i.e., following the object grass.15 Note that in an even much earlier utterance, the subject and the deictic ώ follow each other: (195)

T: a-dan ώ debt underground train there stands There stands the underground train.'

Τ (1; 10,23)

One possibility is to declare Λ as an extra-sentential, declarative, spatial scope marker in its LF-position. The proposition it has scope over is the CP or IP: Ulla ttert Gras ('Ulla is feeding grass1). The whole sentence would have the reading: Da: Ullafiittert Gras (There: Ulla is feeding grass.'). Another solution would proceed along the lines of Weissenborn's (1994) Split-COMP analysis, which he carries over from Miiller/Stemefeld (1992). In this approach, there are two functional projections above IP, i.e., CP and T(OP)P. The former exclusively hosts operators, the latter—a Topic Phrase—a topic. Both heads are to the left. Ether T (verbal) or C (nominal) is the designated head of CP. Normally only one can be filled, as here, where T hosts the finite verb. Following this analysis, (194) would receive the phrase structure representation (196):

14

At this particular point in time, TV/man's grammar does not yet display the target-like V2 rule. M ller/Penner (19%: 152f.) make analogous observations during the preconjunctional phase of their subjects. Among others, they observe that in the beginning V2-like patterns are restricted to "'light' adverbs" such as da ('there'), jetzt ('now'), so ('like this1) and hier ('here'), and to "a small class of verbs in German, including sein 'to be', gehen 'to go', kommen 'to come1". Interestingly, even such "light" adverbs do not consistently trigger V2: (i) jetzt geht de(r) drin (Ivar2;7, 17) now goes it inside (ii) jetzt der isst (Ivar 2; 7, 17) now it eats (ibid.) (ii) clearly patterns with (188). M ller /Penner explain the lack of V2 in these cases by the special status of those "light" adverbs: they are "ambiguous between genuine topicalized elements and discourse particles [...]." If they are only particles, they have no triggering capacity. 15 In Tilman's corpus, unlike in those of the children of the T bingen project, left-peripheral l°'s are not present to the same extent. In contrast, there is ample evidence for the final finite verb.

195

(196)16

V CP

da

C TP

/\

T1

ulla :

X\ IP wattatj

VP

v

The problem with this analysis is that two (left-peripheral) Functional Categories are needed to account for a single item in Tilman's corpus that never re-appeared. In fact, he proceeds with sentences such as (197): ( 1 97)

T : da wättet (~>schüttet) papa ranensaft rein there pours daddy lemon juice in There, daddy is pouring lemon juice (into the glass).'

T (2; 00, 24)

Here, an orthodox IP plus CP is enough. The verb in C° correctly checks against Spec CP. Even the subject-D/3 is fully spelled out. How, then, is (1%) best accounted for? Note that there seems to be a second clash, apart from the +wh/+ finite clash of the question word and the finite verb, this time with the deictic "operator" dt and the subject, both in Spec CP. If appears, the subject is missing, as in (187); if the subject in Spec CP appears, is missing. This is not peculiar but expected anyway. To this extent, it is not revealing. But (196) is telling if one reads it as the doubly spelled-out Spec CP-position in a liminal phase:

16

Note that A ('there') might not be interpreted by children as a real operator at all. Therefore, I dispense with an OP-variable chain here, lest I complicate things more than necessary.

1%

(198)

CP

Λ Spec

da

ullaj

Λ C

C°

IP

w ttat.

y\.

"A /\ ',· VP

1°

"A ras

V

This time, the symmetry-breaking is much less spectacular than in the former case because the feature is the same: -wh. The only difference is operaiorhood: cb is an operator, the subject is not. Although cb (and w/t-elements) are operators, I leave out the variable, as a careful look at the structure reveals. This is because children still lack the bound-variable reading, i.e., the operator does not yet bind a variable in the adult sense (cf. Penner 1993), but will do so in the course of acquisition. Therefore, one has to be cautious when speaking of "operatorhood".17 The frequently missing subject could be due either to pro-drop in Spec IP under headgovernment by the verb in C° or by covert cliticization/incorporation of the subject in Spec CP. In accordance with the analysis of (h as an LF-scope marker is Penner's (1994: 47, FN 14) analysis of double negation in children, as in (199): (199)

esse nicht ein brot nicht eat not a bread not 'I'm not eating bread.1 (Penner, Tracy/Weissenbom (1992))

Here, the first negation is assumed to be a "dummy scope assigner in the LF landing site of the negator" (Penner 1994b: 47, FN 14). Such "dummy copies in the landing position either replace overt movement or overtly marked LF movement." (ibid.) According to 17

The question of when children begin to establish operator-variale chains is very intricate. I am ignorant of any conclusive study on this topic.

197

Penner this is a "'last resort" strategy" (ibid.)· This precarious situation does not seem to be very robust and it is soon resolved; the subject shows up in Spec IP, as in (191). Tilman, however, is not only concerned with disentangling the +wh/+finite-feature in C° and the -wh deictic/-wh subject feature in Spec CP, but also with the -wh deictic 'da' and the +»vA-elements, i.e., with the +/- wA operator opposition in Spec CP. So da ('there') also substitutes for a +w>A-element in Spec CP, apparently doubling the copy in situ: (200)

T:darabtmamada? there writes mommy there? 'What is mommy writing there?

T (2; 00,26)

Rather than explaining away the first Λ as an anticipation of the second di—which is the least interesting explanation as a "speech error"—I take this doubling as a sign that the +wA-elemen—which has been unstably located in C° up to this time—is looking for its proper residence in Spec CP, along with V2 of the verb. Because Spec CP has been restricted to -wA-elements so far, it is not surprising that the first effort fails and the familiar ώ shows up instead. Questionhood is independently conveyed by intonation, so the "selectional pressure" to use a +H>A-element properly is only moderate. Intonation is still a mighty competitor to a syntactic expression of questions and conveniently compensates for syntactic failure. This explanation relies on terms familiar from the building-block model and from ecological dynamical models. Competition of cognitive growers (cf. van Geert 1993) of different kinds for limited resources (attention, memory, computational space, etc.) yields a complex array of processes with the typical interferential liminal outlook. After processing the crucial syntactic features of wA-question formation and the various devices (syntax vs. intonation), and after breaking the symmetries of the several options, Tilman happily leaves the liminal phase and enters the postliminal phase, where he increasingly stabilizes on the main phrase structure attractor for wA-phrases, i.e., the CP or IP (as A-bar-projection) under the asymmetry account.

8.2.6

Target-like Questions

Tilman is now in the fourth, postliminal , structurally stable and complex phase C. It is sometimes hard to tell exactly where to draw the line between the end of the liminal and the onset of the postliminal phase. Structures which are almost target-like, the fading of variability, ceasing of stuttering, iteration, false starts, etc. are telling. However, relying on a 90% or 99% criterion (cf. Brown 1973) is a sensible statistic criterion only at first glance. Dynamic systems theory, on the other hand, leads us to expect that the full accomplishment, i.e., reaching the ultimate attractor, is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon. Rather, the oscillatory nature of the processes involved may stretch the very point of reaching the target and produce some fuzzy areas between the idealized separate phases. Thus, while converging on the target cum grano salis, there are still minor stochastic fluctuations which resemble fading echos from the turbulent phase before. Utterances like the following witness the almost accomplished stable state C:

198 (201)

(202)

(203)

wh-questions: (a)

T: kört des da-hin? belongs this there-to? '(Where) does this fit in?'

T (2; 01,03)

(b)

T: wo is anders pad? where is other horse? 'Where is the other horse?'

T (2; 01,03)

(c)

T: wo kat des da-hin? where belongs this there-to? 'Where does this fit in?1

T (2; 01,03)

(d)

T: was da-rinnen is? what there-inside is? 'What is in there?1 (Either a defective V2 or a proper echo-question)

T (2; 01,03)

(e)

T: warum weint der? why cries he? 'Why does he cry?'

T (2; 01,04)

(f)

T: wo is denn die hund? where is PRT thefem dog? 'Where is the dog?'

T (2; 01,09)

Yes/no-questions: (a)

T: kommt die sasa jetzt? comes the sasa now? 'Is Saskia coming now?'

T (2; 01, 11)

(b)

T: haste mama fex? have-you mommy fox? 'Do you have mommy fox?'

T (2; 01, 10)

deictic da-sentences: (a)

T: da setzt sasa hin there sits sasa down 'Saskia is sitting down there.'

T (2; 00, 31)

(b) T:dafehJtnrad there misses-a wheel There is a wheel missing.1

T (2; 01,03)

(c)

T (2; 01,05)

T: da is ein rotes ei there is a red egg There is a red egg.1

199

The stable state for matrix wh-phrases is hardly reached when Tilman—almost without taking breath—embarks on the next topic: the elaboration of embedded clauses, and especially of embedded wA-phrases: (204)

(a)

T: weiß net, wo leopard is know not where leopard is "(I) don't know where the leopard is.'

T (2; 00,08)

(b)

T: weiß nicht, wo mama know not where mommy '(I) don't know where mommy (is).'

T (2; 00, 13)

(c)

T: weiß net, wo baby is know not where baby is '(I) don't know where the baby is.1

T (2; 00, 15)

This development will not be discussed here for reasons of space.

9

The Position of Adjuncts

In this chapter I would like to turn to a phenomenon that again witnesses structural variability and hints at what phrase structures close up children's early propositions. In what follows, I will present data from my daughter Saskia and from my son Tilman as well as data from the literature which show multistability in the positioning of adverbs as adjuncts to a given prase marker. During a certain period (ca. 2; 09 to 3; 01 years), Saskia sometimes adjoined adverbs or particles such as noch ('still'), mal ('just'/'once'), denn ('then') etc.1 twice. In some of the examples, each position is licit in the adult system: one has wide scope while the other has only narrow scope. Therefore, both yield slightly different semantic interpretations. Here, however, these subtle differences probably do not play a major role but I take it for granted that the variants have the same meaning. Using the same adjunct twice is not really ungrammatical, as has to be admitted, if one can firmly assume that it is actually enumerated twice and inserted in the respective scope positions, each time modifying a different element. In colloquial speech, however, such an adjunct is usually enumerated and spelled-out only once. Moreover, the reasons for these double instantiations in child language seem to be quite transparent. Rather than explaing away this double occurrence as a performance phenomenon, I would like to use it as evidence that the child maintains two phrase structure gestalts which are equally likely to be modified by an adjunct. As long as the adjunct appears twice, the symmetry-breaking—which of the two takes precedence over the other—has not yet taken place. Consequently, the token is instantiated twice, concurrently with proper single instantiations, as in the following utterances: (205)

S: du äst noch den mund noch voll you have still the mouth still full 'Your mouth is still full.'

S (2; 09,09)

In the following dialogue, Saskia wants to engage in a fairy tale play and is looking for the proper wooden toy figures: (206)

(a)

S: wolln wer dornröschen spielen? A: aber wir haben keinen prinzen S: mal die maus (=Saskiä) suchen S: want we "Sleeping Beauty" play? A: but we have no prince S: PRT (=once) the mouse (=Saskia herself) search S: 'Shall we play 'Sleeping Beauty'?1 A: 'But we have no prince.' S: am going to look for it.'

S (2; 09, 25)

Sometimes, there is no direct translation of these German adverbs or particles. Their semantics and pragmatics is very intricate. For German particles, the reader is referred to Doherty (1985).

201

(b)

(While looking for the 'prince1, she finds a small tube of her brother's baby lotion) S: des is noch til mans bad tilmans bad is des S: this is still tilman's bath tilman's bath is this S:'This is Tilman's bath (lotion).1 (She goes on searching.) S: die sasja mal gucken S: the sasja PRT (=once) look. S:' I am looking (for it).'

(c)

A: und wo ist der tilman? S: mal die maus mal gucken A: and where is the tilman? S: once the mouse once look A: 'And where is Tilman?' S: Ί will look for him.1

In (206) the adverb mal (Once1) has variable surface positions. It surfaces as a VP-adjunct (206a) with the subject die maus ('the mouse') in situ in Spec VP. In (206b) the adverb is again a VP- adjunct (206b), this time with the subject sasja ('Saskia') raised to Spec IP across the adjunct. In (206c) the adverb is doubly instantiated, as a VP-adjunct and an IPadjunct.2 The following examples also show variation: (207)

(a)

S: und noch einen sotoladenpudding harn se noch dekocht S (2; 10, 19)

and then a chocolate pudding have they then cooked 'And they have cooked another chocolate pudding.' (b)

S: mal die mama mal (sch)nipsen once/just the mommy once/just prick Ί prick mommy.1

S (2; 10, 19)

(c)

S: aber die milch gibts aber nicht but the milk gives-it but not 'But there is no milk.'

S (2; 11, 06)

The following examples are later occurrences which "echo" the more frequent tokens two months before:

The analysis of (206c) is not straightforward, however. It could also be the case that she blends a VP and an IP, each with a ma/-adjunct on the VP, i.e., blending (206a) and (206b): (i) [vp mal [γρ die maus gucken ] ] (ii) [jpdie sasjajlypma/ [γρ tj gucken]]] This is an alternative to having mal as an IP-adjunct as well as a VP-adjunct: (iii) \ip mal dp die mausj \\pmal [γρ tj gucken]]]]

202

(208)

(a)

S: erst noch werd noch debaut. first still is still built 'Something is going to be built.'

S (3; 01, 05)

(b)

S: hat1« des dir dem nich demeckt, bar? S (3; 01 , 26) tee-but ciitic this you but not tasted well, bear (=tilman)? 'Didn't this taste well to you, Tilman?'3

In Tilman's data, too, some doublings— either of adverbs or of the negation— are recorded: (209)

(a) T: muss noch färbe geklebt werden noch! must still paint be glued be still? 'Do we still have to put paint on?1

T (2; 08, 26)

(b) T: warum kommt die nicht in der geschichte nicht vor? T (3; 03, 04) why does she not in the story not appear? 'Why doesn't she (the cat) appear in the story?' (c)

T: warum noch immer noch nich draußen? why still always still not outside? 'Why is (the dandruff) not out of my hair yet?'

T (3; 00, 23)

(d)

T: abernocA ich noch'n bisschen but still I still a bit 'But (I) still (want to have) some (milk).1

T (3; 00, 23)

Verrips/Weissenborn (1992) extract some examples from the Simone-corpus which also evidence such double-tokens. Again, the same adverb is doubled as in: (2 1 0)

(a)

auch kuche backe_ auchx . also cake bake also

Sim ( 1 ; 1 0, 22)

(b)

nochmal baun haus1 nochmal. again build house again

Sim (2; 00, 01)

(c)

das auch nicht schmeckt nicht_. this also not tastes not

Sim (2; 00, 23)

(d)

nich spuck nich aus\ not spit not out (in Verrips/Weissenborn 1992: 302f.)

Sim (2; 02, 21)

I agree with the authors that these examples are extremely rare (only 1% in the corpus) and could be neglected. However, they are interesting liminal examples of a phase where obviously a particular symmetry-breaking has not yet taken place. Verrips/ Weissenborn themselves claim that these utterances in (210) consist of "two utterances, where one partially repeats the other one [...]" (ibid.: 303).

3

In (208b) the first adverb denn is cliticized onto the verb in C°; the second denn is fully spelled out. It is quite possible that the clitic is resorbed to such an extent that it is not computed at all, either syntactically or semantically. This enforces a second insertion.

203

Let us take a look at the respective phrase markers. First let us turn to Saskia, who is already quite old and can uncontroversely be ascribed any functional projection up to the CPlayer. In (205) the adverb noch ('still') takes scope over the AP L\p noch L\p den mund voll]]. This complex represents the thematic core of the utterance. In order to meet the predication requirement (Williams 1980) the object is moved out of the AP to the Spec SC of a Small Clause, thus forming a small predicate like: "the mouth (is) full". This SC is again supplied with the adverb noch, indicating its wide LF-scope:

(211)

SC

noch

SC

/\ den muncL SC'

ASC°

AP

(light verb 'ist') noch

AP

/\ t:

A'

A voll

The interesting feature here is that the second, lower noch is still spelled out. The same holds of mal ('just/once') in (206c), which is obviously composed from the two utterances (206a and 206b): "mal die maus gucken" and "die sasja mal gucken." There, the raising of the subject out of Spec VP has broken up the thematic domain, i.e., the VP, the boundary of which is still overtly marked by the adjunct. The compositional process is shown in (212): (212)

(a)

mal die maus gucken once the mouse look

(b)

die sasja mal gucken the sasja once look

(c)

mal die maus mal gucken once the mouse once look

204

(212)

(a)

(b)

(c)

/\

IP /V

mal -

J

/\ diesasjaj Γ

Α Λ /\

VP

VP

Λ /\

mal

VP

die maus

mal

V I V gucken

1°

VP

t.

IP

V I V gucken

IP

/\

die maus-

Γ

A Λ J x\

jo

vp

ma|

yp

t;

V I V gucken

Saskia's remaining examples can be equally accounted for. To take an example from Simone, consider (210a) "auch kuche backe_ auch" (also cake bake also). Here, the whole VP seems to have been topicalized. The base VP is left empty; its former place is only hinted at by the stranded adjunct ouch ('also'): (213)4 double instantiation of ouch IP

[ ypauch [ ypkuche backe]].

Γ

/\ VP

Γ

auch t j The crucial point is that ouch is raised as well as stranded at the same time, which is quite paradoxical. This paradox resolves, however, if you take it to be a liminal phenomenon evidencing a multistable array of competing representations. The child tries to accomodate either, thereby intermittently converging on an unstable compromise: she spells out the scope marker twice. This compromise cannot survive for a long time. 4

I take Spec IP to be an Α-bar position here, in order to avoid too much structure. Nothing hinges on that, however.

205

Let us recapitulate: the common trait is always that the thematic domain, usually the VP, as well as the athematic domain, roughly any functional projection above VP, are both overtly marked for scope. This phenomenon can be looked at from two perspectives. The first focuses on the VP and states that the thematic domain apparently is a "psychologically real" gestalt for the child, the upper boundary of which becomes visible whenever an adjunct is attached to it. When this gestalt— the thematic or lexical attractor—is broken up by syntactically driven movement, e.g., raising of the subject, the new boundary, e.g., the IP or CP, is equally overtly marked for scope. Yet, the VP retains its scope marker because it is still too powerful an attractor for the child to renounce overt scope marking. It is as if the child would like to say: I acknowledge that the phrase marker has been functionally enlarged, but the VP is still so precious to me that I still mark it. The phenomenon of doubly spelled-out adjuncts can be nicely explained in terms of Lebeaux1 (1988/2000) layers (cf. section 5.1) and Grimshaw's (1991) Extended Projection (cf. section 5.2). The most basic verbal phrase marker, the VP, is still significant in the child's computations, even when functional architecture is erected upon it in the course of development. The adjuncts appear in positions which indicate the respective layers— VP or 7P/CP. The second approach focuses on LF-movement, a process normally taking place in the covert component. The adjunct ouch is covertly raised out of its narrow scope position and is adjoined to the IP or CP at LF in order to get wide scope. Apparently, the child "is aware of" the necessity of LF-raising, but is not yet able to form a covert LF-chain with the raised adjunct as head and an LF-trace as root, as in (214):

(214)

IP

/\ adjunct.

IP

γ?

ρ

/\ adjunct- VP

/\ This inability of forming the relevant chain results in a vicarious spelling out of the head and the root twice. It is a surrogate process, or, as Penner (1993) has put it: a "last resort strategy" because this is the ultimate compromise the system can make in order to compensate for a process that is still out of reach for the child, namely the formation of LF-chains. Both approaches—focusing on phrase structure gestalts and on LF-chains, respectively— are not incompatible at all: the reason for the absence of LF-chains is the clinging to thematic domains and to thematic processes. It is two sides of the same medal. How long this process of integrating the respective domains—thematic and athematic— takes, becomes obvious in Saskia's data. While Simone already tackles this problem around her second year, Saskia is still occupied with this task at three years of age.

206

It seems that the emergence of Functional Categories does not only have precursors, foreshadowing their speedy arrival, but also postcursors. There seems to be a clumsy process of accomodation that slowly and asymptotically approximates a target which—cum grano sails—was already instantiated long before, i.e., the functional attractor. This, again, may be conceived of as a hysteresis effect

10 Syntactic Surface Blends

In Tilman's data, a rather astonishing phenomenon occurs during a certain phase from 2; 09 to 3; 02 years of age. It resembles the doubling of an element discussed above (see chapter 9), this time on a larger, clausal, scale.1 He blends two sentential schemata: one is the regular declarative schema, the other one is a topic schema. Both are fully productive in adult German as well as in Tilman's child German. An example of such a "surface blend" is: (215)

(a)

T: die is (d)reckig is die this is dirty is this This (watch) is dirty.'

T (2; 09, 11)

Note that in adult German you may say: (216)

Die Uhr ist dreckig. The watch is dirty.'

with a "normal" declarative reading. The structure is V2 with the subject in Spec CP (under the symmetry-hypothesis). Alternatively, you may say: (217)

Dreckig ist die Uhr. Dirty is the watch 'Dirty, the watch is.'

with the adjective (the predicate) topicalized in Spec CP (or Spec IP (under the asymmetryaccount)). Topicalization is a focusing device which is richly exploited in adult German and is already in place in German child language pretty early. This is also the case for Tilman. As soon as the CP is fully established at around the age of 2; 01 years, he correctly produces topic structures. His early topicalizations are the following ones (see also (92) in chapter 7):

(218)

DP-object topicalized2 (a) T: lungenfisch zeig ich die papa

T (2; 01,05)

lung-fish show I the-fem (!) daddy show the lung-fish to daddy.'

The phenomenon under consideration here relates to a broader class of child language data, namely the phonomenon of over-instantiation of elements (cf. Tracy 1989: 8Iff). Note that comparable data in adult language production have been reported by de Smedt/ Kempen (1987). Early topicalized objects should be of special interest for Th. Roeper, who doubts whether object-topicalization occurs as early as subject topicalization (Roeper 1992). According to him, the former should be more difficult, in that the object does not agree with the verb in C°. Here, however, is the proof that the data gap is just accidental. Tilman provides numerous examples for object topicalization. The examples also constitute evidence against the claim that true topicalization, i.e., the topic residing in Spec CP as evidenced by object-topicalization, does not appear before lexical complementizers (cf. Müller/Penner 1996).

208

(b)

T: blume schenk pro dir3 blume schenk ich dir flower give you flower give I you Ί give you a flower.1

T (2; 01,05)

(c)

T: so eine kette sasa hat4 such a necklace sasa has 'Saskia has such a necklace.1

T (2; 01,15)

(d)

T: (zit)r nensqft kann pro ach rinken lemon juice can pro also drink '(One) can also drink lemon juice.'

T (2; 01, 31)

Note thai pro-drop in Spec IP is still an option for him, but co-occurs with overt spell-out of the pronominal subject, as in the second part of the turn. In the absence of this self-correction, we would in fact be unable to tell whether pro is in Spec IP as can be concluded from this minimal pair, or whether the structure may not be something like blumej (ich) schenk dir /,·. As can be seen from the following examples, pro-drop in topicalizations is highly productive for him. This is surprising, as this behavior is expected only in true pro-drop languages such as Italian: (i) Questro libro non lo voglio. this book non (sic!) it want (Isg) This block, I don't want it.' (Haegeman 1994: 30) Pro-drop is also instantiated in root yes/no-questions by Tilman, as in (ii): (ii) lolen pro as essen? (Yes/No-question) T (2; 00, 09) (cf. examples in (182)) This patterns with Italian root questions such as (iii): (iii) Dovee? where is (3sg) 'Where is he?' (cf. Haegeman 1994: 30) True pro-drop languages also allow for pros in embedded clauses: (iv) Credo ehe sia gi parti to. I believe that be (subj) already left Ί think that he has already left.' (cf. ibid.) Interestingly, Tilman again patterns with Italian in this respect. He utters examples such as: (v) T: duck mal wie pro ganz nell (pro) fachen kann T (2; 04, 16) (vi) T: guck mal wie pro eine ricke (pro) demacht hab T (2; 04, 18) (vii) T: guck mal wieviel pro hab T (2; 04, 31) The latter examples are problematic for Roeper/Weissenborn's account (1990) of the pro-drop parameter, which crucially hinges on the "subordinate clause" stragegy, i.e., the child looks for the "telltale" trigger for pro-drop in the subordinate clause. They assume that the nonoccurrence of pro-drop in embedded clauses in adult German unambiguously reveals it being non-pro-drop. As soon as the CP-layer is instantiated, i.e., if Spec CP or C°are filled, no prodrop will occur. Here, however, clear counter-evidence is given. Note that the verb has not raised to C° but remains in final Γ. That is, the topic cannot yet be checked, strictly speaking.

209

(219)

(220)

(221)

(e)

T: alpakas ham pro derachelt (--> gestreichelt) alpacas have-lps-pl pro touched '(We) have touched the alpacas.'

T (2; 02,01)

(f)

T: polarfuchs bist du polar fox are you 'You are a polar fox.'

T (2; 02, 02)

(g)

T: des mag pro nist this like not '(I) don't like this.1

T (2; 02, 03)

(h)

T: kapfen derachelt ohren ham se nicht carp touched ears have they not '(I have) touched the carp. They (the carps) don't have ears.'

T (2; 02,03)

(i)

T: lamas dipts nist llamas gives-it not There are no llamas.1

T (2; 02, 07)

AP-Topicalizaiion (a)

T:soa/fbindu so old am (!) you 'You are so old.'

T (2; 01, 22)

(b)

nich nass is ahorn not wet is maple The maple (leaf) is not wet.'

T (2; 02, 31)

PP-Topicalization (a)

T: unta wassa wimmt der under water swims he This one (the mushroom) swims under water.'

(b)

T: bei der laue fehlts nich, bei der gelbe fehlts T (2; 04, 07) At the blue misses-it not, at the yellow misses is 'It is not missing on the blue (locomotive), it is missing on the yellow (locomotive).'

T (2; 01, 27)

Adverb-topicalization (a)

T: (h)ier ab pro dezählt here have counted have counted here.'

T (2; 02, 14)

210

(b)

T: hier lept ein schild auf here glues a label on 'Here, a label is glued (on the seat).1

T (2; 02, 19)

(c)

T: leich fällts um immediately falls-it PART 'It will fall immediately.'

T (2; 02,25)

That topicalization may have precursors already at the age of 1; 10 years has been tentatively argued for in chapter 7. The relevant examples are of the dekan ach ('press also') type, which look like negatio post verbwn infinitivum. Tilman begins to produce topicalizations simultaneously with the unmarked SVO-order in German matrixV2 sentences. In doing so he shows that he understands that a linguistic intention can be expressed in various ways. The predominant order is "unmarked SVOmarked Topic-VS" as in (222), but there also exists the order "marked Topic-VS-unmarked SVO\ as in (223): (222)

SVO-Top-VS (a)

T: rabe at watsen mund—watsen mund at der rabe raven has black mouth—black mouth has the raven The raven has a black mouth.'

T (2; 01, 29)

(b)

T: gelbwurst kommt hier bei mir die tat cb. —dahin tat die bei mir bei mir isse yellow-sausage comes here at me it belongs there—there belongs it at me at me is-it The yellow sausage belongs to me. It belongs here. Here it belongs, to me. I have it.'

T (2; 03, 18)

(c)

T: ah, da is meine kuh—meine kuh is da ah, there is my cow my cow is there 'Ah, here is my cow.'

T (2; 05, 30)

(d)

T: des is zu—zu is des this is closed—closed is this This (the wardrobe) is closed.'

T (2; 05,03)

(e)

T: des muss ma zermatschen—zermatschen muss man des T (2; 05, 16) this must one squash—squash must one this This (his lunch) has to be squashed.'

211 (223)

Topic-VS - SVO

(a)

T: alle is die reila-perle—die is alle empty is the sweet—it is empty The sweets are empty.1

T (2; 05,06)

(b) T: blau sieht man—sieht man des blau blue sees one—sees one the blue One can see the blue (color).1

T (2; 08, 22)

He alternates the structures even in the discourse: (224)

S: guck mal, da steht saskia drauf, look PRT, there stands saskia on. 'Look, there is "Saskia" (written) on (the basket).1 T: saskia steht da drauf saskia stands there on '"Saskia" is (written) there.'

T (2; 08, 31)

These co-occurring patterns are now completely blended, yielding the astonishing phenomenology I gave an example of at the beginning of the chapter. Now, I will provide the reader with more tokens: (225)

Surface blends

(a)

T: des muss weg sein muss des this must away be must this This (offending object) must get out of the way.1

T (2; 09, 20)

(b) T: warum is der aufzug is kaputt? why is the elevator is broken? 'Why is the elevator broken?'

T (2; 09, 08)

(c)

T: ich hab einfach ganz neue bunte sandalen hab ich I have simply very new colored sandals have I just have brandnew colored sandals.'

T (2; 11, 28)

(d)

T: die blautst (—> blaue Lokomotive) fährt ganz schnell fährt sie T (3; 00, 18) the blue drives very fast drives she The blue (locomotive) goes very fast.'

(e)

T: der will aufs andre blatt will der this wants on-the other leaf wants this This (ladybug) wants to get onto the other leaf.'

(f)

T: ah, da kommt noch 'n frischer blödstfisch kommt da noch T (3; 00, 27) ah, there comes still another fresh dull-fish comes there still There comes yet another dull, fresh fish.'

T (3; 00, 24)

212

(g)

T: ich will Schokolade, vanille und erdbeer will ich T (3; 01,00) I want chocolate, vanilla and strawberry want I Ί want to have chocolate, vanilla and strawberry (ice-cream).1

(h)

T: meine glocke is nur f r die mama und den papa und die sastija is die nur T (3; 01,09) my bell is only for the mommy and the daddy and the sastija is this only 'My bell is only for Mommy, Daddy, and Saskia.'

(i)

T: da is n grosser stich da is n grosser stich da is n grosser stich is da there is a big sting there is a big sting there is a big sting is there There is a big sting.'

T (3; 01, 11)

0)

T: ich will nur sauri sehen will ich nur ich want only 'saury' see want I only Ί only want to watch TV.'

T (3; 01, 11)

(k)

T: in der Innenstadt gibts r uber gibts in der Innenstadt T (3; 01, 11) in the inner-city gives-it robbers gives-it in the inner-city There are robbers downtown.'

(1)

T: des hab ich weggezaubert hab ich des, wo der kuchen draufstcht T (3; 01, 17) this have I spirited away have I this, where the cake on-stands Ί have spirited this away, where the cake is on.'

(m) T: die mama hat gesagt, wir k nnen mit der blautst fahren, hat die mama gesagt T (3; 01, 25) the mommy has said we can with the blue drive, has the mommy said 'Mommy has said we can go on the blue (locomotive).' (n)

T: ich will mich mal messen will ich mich mal I want me once measure want I me once Ί want to measure myself.'

T (3; 01, 26)

(o) T: ich will nich mit mit 'm papa will ich nich gehen I want not with with the daddy want I not go Ί don't want to go with daddy.'

T (3; 01, 27)

(p)

(φ

T: ich bin noch mehr m de bin ich T (3; 01, 28) I am even more tired am I Ί am even more tired.' T: ich will rausgehen und den drachen steigen lassen will ich T (3; 02,00) I want out-go and the kite fly let want I Ί want to go outside and fly the kite.'

213 After the age of 3; 02 years, however, these constructions suddenly drop to zero. Only one further token has been recorded: (226)

T: geh hoch und kleb des auf mein bett kleb ich des go up and glue this on my bed glue I this '(I) go upstairs and glue this (button) on my bed.'

T (3; 02, 26)

The systematic use of blends like those in (225 and 226) is not common in the language production of children. Therefore they deserve special attention. They have, however, been reported in the literature on adult aphasia, and on repairs in unimpaired language production. As pointed out to me by Helen Leuninger (p.c.), such blends appear quite often in the speech of Wernicke aphasias where they are called syntactic surface blends (cf. Huber/ Schlenck 1988, Schlenck 1991, Wiegand 19%). In these blends part of the syntactic structure of two sentences are blended in accordance with the word order of both sentences, as in (227): (227)

Mit meinem Chef muss ich sprechen werd ich mit ihm. With my boss must I speak will I with him. Ί must/will speak with my boss.1 (Schlenck 1991, quoted in Wiegand 19%: 158)

During the serialisation of the elements the speaker changes from one surface structure to the other. The monitor, the module which supervises the process of language production, does not object to the erroneous output and so the blend surfaces. Furthermore, such surface blends may serve as non-retracing repairs in spontaneous language production. These are a special case of repairs which do not contain a correction marker and which are uttered without hesitation. DeSmedt/Kempen (1987) report the following examples: (228)

(a) (b)

That's the only thing he does is fight. Willemse heeft gisteren heeft de dokter nog gezegd dat het mag. (Willemse has yesterday has the doctor said it is allowed.) (De Smedt/Kempen 1987: 368)

Besides these two occurrences of syntactic surface blends, they also appear in colloquial German where they presumably fulfill a pragmatic function of emphasis. Their function is comparable to that of a tag. The rheme is focused by reproducing the last element of the former sentential schema. The shared constituent becomes the pivot or hook (deSmedt/ Kempen, ibid.) of the sentence around which the "wings" of the blend are almost mirrored. The blend (226), for example, could be paraphrased as (229): (229)

Ί go upstairs and glue this on my bed, yes indeed.'

Although personally I do not use such blends, it is very probable that they were present in Tilman's input. Thus, the most cautious interpretation would be that Tilman has picked up a sentential schema (although a marginal or even slightly ungrammatical one) from the input and used it like an adult with the same pragmatic function. Syntactically, this holds little interest. Slightly expanding this interpretation, I want to claim that these blends nevertheless show crucial abilities of Tilman's recent structure-building. Therefore, let us

214

take a look at the presumed phrase structure representation of the blends.5 Take (225e) for an example: (230)

(a)

T: der will aufs andere blatt will der this wants on-the other leaf wants this This (ladybug) wants to get onto the other leaf.' (b)

unmarked SVO

marked topicalization

; ;ι t

ι aufs andere: blattf

j

J The PP "auf s andere blatt" (On the other leave1) serves as the pivot that "glues" together both surface structures. A coarser representation would be (231): (231)

[ ip j der will [jp2 aufs andere blatt Ipl ] will derTp2] pivot/blend

Instead of spelling out the common constituent twice, as Tilman did before, it is taken from the lexicon only once, but given two different positions in the resulting blend. Note that the blend is really one phrase marker and receives only one coherent intonational curve (rising -peak- peak- falling) with the major stress on thepivof. Intuitively, it looks as if he ran down the phrase marker, starting at IP/or CP, stopped at its end and then turned on his heels and ran up the VP with wings inverted, thus obtaining the subject-verb-inversion (der will - will der ('this one wants - wants this one'), as in (232):

5

For reasons of phrase structure economy I use the IP as sentential schema and not the CP, in the sense of the asymmetry-hypothesis (see section 7.1). Nothing hinges on this decision.

215

(232)

IP

/\ der. 1° willj

VP V1

z\ J. A PP

Spec derV I willj

aufs andere blatt However, the apparent subject-verb-inversion follows from the serialization with the verb in riC ° and the subject in Spec IP/Spec VP, all in the second IP/CP. Similar data with some constituent spelled out twice are reported in Müller (1993, her section 4.3.1.2.1). Her German-French bilingual subjects Ivor and Pascal uttered sentences with two finite verbs as in (233) and (234): (233)

(a) (b) (c) (d)

(234)

(a) (b) (c)

I: und mach(t) bourn macht (and make(s) bourn makes) I: macht [sjeisse der macht (scheisse) I: (makes shit he makes) I: jetzt sagt der das sagt (now says he that says) I: (...) da sind el da sind [n]öwen sind in meine ca[s] (= löwen, cages) (there are lions in my cages) P: is der da is kalt (is that there is cold) P: faut la il faut (must there it must) P: da is die tür is da (there is the door is there) (Müller 1993: 138f.)

I (2; 06, 06) I (2; 09, 18) I (3; 03, 12) I (3; 04,23)

P (2; 04,07) P (2; 07,00) P (3; 00, 17)

Müller takes these tokens as evidence for a stage in the child's grammar where the C-system is still missing but two PCs above the VP are available for the finite verb: AGR and INFL. AGR is final and INFL initial in German. In French, both AGR and INFL are initial:

216 (235)

(a)

German

IP

Spec IP (Α-position)

Γ >^X

I

Spec IP (Α-position)

/\

AGRP

[WH][+F] y\ N (Modality) ' SpecAGR AGR'

/\ VVVP

x\

ν

...

A

I

AGR

l

°RP

™

l

/\ ' SpecAGR AGR' J

/\

AGR

vvvp

/\

ν

(cf. M ller 1993: 129) Main verbs have the possibility to choose either position or to show up in both positions simultaneously. The first instance of the finite verb would be positioned in INFL, the second in A GR. Unfortunately, this analysis does not carry over to Tilman's data; in addition, it is not even appropriate for Muller's own data. Note that under her analysis, the second instantiation of the finite verb in final AGR should close up the sentence, i.e., be peripheral. This may be the case for intransitive verbs, but what about (233d), with a PP ('in my cages'), (234a) with an AP ('cold'), or (234c) with a deictic pronoun ('there') following the verb? For the same reason, Tilman's data escape this analysis. The second finite verb is followed by the repetition of the whole clausal content. Therefore, topic blends, as assumed here, are a more likely interpretation. Note also Muller's insistence that modals and auxiliaries never occur in these constructions (M ller 1993: 139); this is taken as further evidence that these verbs are base-generated in INFL. But in Tilman's data, modals and auxiliaries do occur (cf. examples in (225)). Let us return to the syntactic significance of the blends. They witness at least three recent novelties in Tilman's still developing syntax: (236) (i) IPICP has been acquired completely, including the crucial Spec-position. (ii) Spec IPICP is the landing site for various constituents and may serve various functions (semantic and pragmatic ones beside syntactic ones), (iii) The unmarked, prototypical IPICP is a matrix declarative displaying the common V2-effect. (iv) Topics can also target Spec IP/Spec CP; this entails the same syntactic consequences (i.e., V2). This option is clearly the marked case. Note that Tilman's blends usually start out as a declarative and then mutate into topicalizations. He never utters a hypothetical construction such as (a) with the declarative following the topicalization:

217 (a)tf6

Schokolade, vanille und erdbeer will ich will Schokolade, vanille und erdbeer chocolate, vanilla and strawberry want I want chocolate, vanilla and strawberry Ί want to have chocolate, vanilla, and strawberry (ice-cream).'

More importantly, this blend would not serve the respective pragmatic function because the declarative does not add more emphasis to the topicalization and the "clou", i.e., the focus on the pivot, would be lost, (v) 1PICP serves to ask questions etc. Again, no case like (b) is attested, but only (c): (b)#

warum hab ich grossen hunger hab ich? why have I great hunger have I? 'Why am I so hungry?',

(c)

T: warum hab ich grossen hunger? why have I great hunger? 'Why am I so hungry?'

T (3; 02, 26)

The reasons are the same as in (iv) above.7 Thus, the blends show that Tilman has fully acquired the most intricate properties of the highest functional projection, i.e., CP (or IP under the asymmetry hypothesis.). It remains to be considered whether he passively took up this peculiar sentential blend from the input or whether he is actively playing with his recently acquired syntactic capacities. In fact, this blend-fashion appeared only once, for about 6 months (from 2; 09 to 3; 02) and showed a sharp drop towards the end. The blends never reappeared in any consistent way. Although the blends witness his syntactic capabilities, they also show that he has just escaped, or still is at the very edge of, a highly turbulent syntactic phase with regard to the elaboration of the IP/CP (see section 7.1). This may look like a paradox at first glance. I claim that these particular blends witness the last fraction of the liminal phase in which the determination of the various functions of IP/CP takes place. The blending is almost artistically exaggerated as if he wanted to tell himself and us: "Look, I have understood that I can leave an element in its base-generated position (i.e., in the VP*) but I can also topicalize it to Spec IP/CP." Even if it is "only" a language game it points to a tacit knowledge, an implicit, metalinguistic awareness which Tilman obviously is very susceptible to. The exaggeration shows that the very process of symmetry-breaking and disentangling both options (unmarked declarative vs. marked topicalization) is still to take place. He is still "uneasy" about the two respective phrase markers. Later, when the hybrid blends fade out, the differentiation is (silently) accomplished. Alternatively, one might argue that because the differentiation has already taken place successfully, he can lump the respective alternants together again without any risk of getting confused about them. Put this way, the curious blends reveal that all constituents receive their proper positions now. The language game with positions apparently lumped together again is then a jubilatory expression of mastery, not of apprenticeship. Anyway, the 6 7 8

"#" denotes a hypothetical and unattested example. The only »νΛ-case is (225b) warum is der aujzug is kaputfl (why is the elevator is broken?) I am conservative in assuming here that the direct object of a transitive verb stays inside the VP. In recent analyses it is argued that the object is raised too, namely to the Spec-position of an object-AGR phrase (AGRO-P) which is situated above VP but below ACRS-P and TNS-P (cf. Grewendorf 1991: 18, Ouhalla 1990). Nothing hinges on this, however.

218

blends are liminal expressions, either immediately before of after the eventual accomplishment of IP/CP. After that the blends suddenly disappear. The significance of surface blends for psycho-linguistic considerations of child language production—apart from syntactic knowledge—remains to be explored. As noted above and as the name "surface" suggests, these blends are a product of the sentence production system and a sloppy monitor and may not primarily call for an explanation in terms of syntactic representations. However, as sentential formats such as declarative word order and topicalizations are involved, it makes sense to explore exactly this interaction as well. It is surely no accident that the crucial device is topicalization. Note that topicalization is a widely employed means in standard German and, among others, may be conceived of as a precursor, surrogate, or syntactic cumcursor9 for, say, passive voice. Thus, it makes some sense to relate exuberant topicalization to passive voice. The former may be taken to be a bootstrapping device for the latter or to herald it. Passive is a construction that is almost silently acquired at about the same time by Tilman. It is not especially frequent and emerges completely target-like. The first passive, a verbal passive, was recorded soon after his second birthday, when the IP/CP also began to be established: (237)

Passive voice

(a)

9

(At the zoo) T: nachthas wid zudemacht night-house gets closed The night house is being closed.1

T (2; 01, 29)

(b)

T:abdeäntet der käschenbaum sin - is abdeantet off-harvested the cherry-tree are - is off-harvested The cherry tree has been harvested.'

T (2; 01, 31)

(c)

T: sasja, des is alles geklepfa (-> geklebt worden) sasja, this is all glued-get 'Saskia, this has all been glued.'

T (2; 02,27)

(d)

(Tilman wants to be massaged like dough is kneaded by a baker): T: jetzt is (->ich) bebacken warn T (2; 02, 30) now I baked get 'Now I want to be baked.'

(e)

T: die is son debaut this is already built This (locomotive) has already been built.1

T (2; 03,05)

By the notion cumcursor I mean an alternative option which shares a common function with another option and therefore competes with it; here I consider topicalization and passive voice. Both do not necessarily exclude each other but may occupy different ecological niches.

219 Topicalization and passive voice are acquired early, with a clear preference for topicalization. This is quite natural because the latter does not incolve case absorption, argument demotion or extra morphology, unlike the former. Yet, both serve a similar function, namely to focus a constituent which is not the subject. Thus, both constructions can be seen as linguistic competitors or cumcursors. Topicalization "grows" vigorously and fast; passive more slowly. The relation of topicalization with other constructions pointed out here hints at a linguistic system with rich options. These options are fully exploited.10 The special cases of surface blends may also be related to another emerging construction, namely embedding. This seems curious only at first glace. Taking a second look one realizes that surface blends are an attempt to tie together two sentences, although in an unorthodox fashion: neither by the aid of real hypotaxis nor of real parataxis.'l Instead, a hybrid results. The sentence has no complementizer and there is no specification of one of its parts as a matrix clause. Nor is there any coordination using the logical junctor aid. But note that these blends—peculiar as they may appear—have a clear pivot around which the two clauses are arranged. This pivot is located at the very end of the first and at 10

Topicalization, in particular, seems to be such a powerful device that it shows up in a different area of the child's language production where one would hardly expect it, namely in the corrections of speech errors. While adults usually retain the syntactic construction and repair only the wrong element(s), we found quite a different strategy in Saskia's speech error repairs (cf. Leuninger 1996: 146ff., Hohenberger/Leuninger, in prep.). She may change the syntactic schema from the unmarked word order of matrix clauses, i.e., SVO, to a topic structure where the object is topicalized, as in (i) or a PP, as in (ii): (i) Perseveration, semantic: S: papa hat wieder teewurst gekocht - teewurst hat er gekauft S (3; 08) 'Daddy again cooked sausage - sausage, he bought.' (ii) Substitution, semantic: S: du hast mir eben auf den fuß getreten - auf die hand getreten hast du mir.

S (4;0) 'You stepped on my foot right now - on my hand, you stepped.' In Tilman's speech error corpus, too, topicalization in corrections can be found: (iii) Substitution, semantic: T: ich kann nicht so rund malen - so rund schneiden kann ich nicht. T (5; 02, 08) cannot draw (it) so round - so round, I cannot cut (it).' Although this special kind of correction is not the most frequent one, it is interesting to note that both children have it at their command. In adults, on the other hand, topicalizations in corrections of speech errors are completely absent. 1 ' This interpretation is highly sensitive to developmental considerations: I suggest that the relation of surface blends to embedding holds only for the child in the course of her language acquisition; it does not hold generally. In particular, it does not hold for Wernidfce-aphasics who also produce surface blends frequently. They still have true embedding at their command. Thus, the frequently assumed parallelism of early child grammar and the grammar of aphasics (cf. Ouhalla 1993 on the parallelism of missing PCs in child grammar and agrammatism of Broca-aphasics) breaks down here. Non-parallelism, on the other hand, is expected in a model which stresses irreversibility. The direction of "development" cannot be changed arbitrarily: uphill vs. downhill. The respective results will not be identical. The special function of surface blends in child language—mimicking embedding—does not hold any longer if one tries to project it onto aphasic speech. If this line of argumentation is correct, the present example is of utmost importance. I am indebted to Helen Leuninger for bringing this point to my attention.

220

the very beginning of the second clause. Either position is salient, the former due to a "recency effect", the latter due to a "primacy effect". Taken together, the salience-effect is even enhanced. This is achieved by a syntactically quite economical means. No linking via selection is necessary; no complementizer or coordination; no feature checking. Economically seen, the blend is the cheapest way of realizing a "complex" sentence, namely via letting overlap constituents that are spelled out only once. However, this "embedding"—if it is one—is fruitless because the very same sentence is embedded in itself. The sentence hosts itself. It is a syntactic parthenogenesis, absolutely sterile. It conveys nothing more than emphasis on the very same proposition. From a slightly different point of view one can consider it to convey a non-propositional, i.e., positional "epistemic" attitude toward the proposition. Tilman tells us what he focusses on. The means are not functional elements, but lexical ones. Thus, the pivot is an unsuccessful device for constructing really complex sentences, and it may in fact not be used as such. Nevertheless, it proves that Tilman is syntactically willing and apt to construct more than only a simple matrix sentence. Semantically and pragmatically he employs theme-rheme alternations where the first rheme is simultaneously taken as the next theme, or he expresses his positional attitude toward his proposition. While pragmatics seems to be an approriate category for the topic blends, they are in no way syntactically peripheral. They may represent an expression—however playful—of Tilman's ability to construct complex sentences, and they clearly, although marginally, belong to parataxis and hypotaxis.12 It is simply a third way that he tries out. It becomes a fashionable attractor for a certain time, but the energy valley soon becomes more shallow again and only few tokens still reach it. There always exist more cognitive, here linguistic, species than the individual can apply (cf. van Geert 1993: 271). Resources are limited. So the growth of one species is intricately intertwined with the growth of its fellows or cumcursors. The blends remain an option, as in adult colloquial speech, but they grow only in a small ecological niche. They are tolerated but cannot really compete with analoguous constructions. If an otherwise marginal species is paid extraordinary attentention, as by Tilman, the reasons plainly lie in the special acquisitional situation (and perhaps in his inclination to engage in language games).

12

Maybe one could see the topic blends as a kind of enjambement, a poetic device of pulling the last word of a verse to the beginning of the next one.

11 Functional Neologisms, Proto-Functional Categories, or, Living Dinosaurs

In contrast to the lexical elements (N, A, V, P), grammatical or functional elements (INFL (AGR, TNS), C, D, etc.) are said to belong to a different module. The former items belong to the open class; the latter to the closed class (see section 3.1). One distinguishing criterion is that items may deliberately be added to the open class, while this is not possible for the closed class (cf. Leuninger 1989: 137). In fact, new names for new objects are invented or changed every day, while affixes, auxiliaries, articles, complementizers, etc. may change only once in a century. If a new Functional Category is really added to the system or is changed, a long and tormenting process of language change is involved (cf. Lightfoot 1991, v. Gelderen 1993, Clark/Roberts 1993, among many others). No one simply stands up and invents a Functional Category. Not even poets do so, in general. However, we sometimes find in child language what Tracy (1991a) and Tracy and Penner (in prep.) call Lexical Innovation (cf. also Penner/Müller 1992: 166). This term covers the three following cases (cf. also (68) in section 6.1): (238)

Lexical Innovation in Child Grammar: (i) New lexical creation: the child inserts non-existent lexical items into terminal nodes (ii) Re-functioning of existent lexical items (e.g., the use of subject clitics as inflectional clitics [...]) (iii) Overgeneralization: syncretism of paradigmatic slots (e.g., using one complementizer as a place holder for the whole paradigm) Penner/Müller 1992: 166; cf. section 6.1)

Lexical Innovation applies to PCs, but only in the sense that already existing PCs are represented by somewhat different lexical tokens, not in the sense that new PCs are invented and lexically represented by new lexical tokens. Yet, something of that kind happened in Tilman's case. He "invented" and used two different, contingent nominal affixes, -bW-dil and-p. First, let us turn to -bW-dil. Around the age of 2; 04 years he was playfully singing a little song about a babylaualina (this lexical item has no discernable semantics besides 'baby')· When his elder sister Saskia wanted to join the song, he refused and said: Ne, du bistbabylaualina-bil ('no, you are "babylaualina-bil1"). From that time on he now and then used the affix on other nominals as well. The items all had the common feature of being "big" (at least bigger than he himself), so I tentatively concluded that -bil was a kind of augmentation or honorification morpheme. Consider the following items that were candidates for -bil/dil:' (239)

1

(a)

T: iguanodon-dil 'iguanodon-dil'

T (2; 03,29)

The following items for the most part denote various kinds of dinosaurs, which are familiar to the children nowadays. The children are surrounded by all kinds of creatures of the Mesozoic era.

222

(b)

dego-dil (--> stegosaurus) 'stego(saurus)-dir

(c)

S (joining): diplo-dil (-> diplodocus) T (responding): tiranno-bil 'tyranno (rex)-bil'

T (2; 03, 29)

T (2; 03, 29)

(d)) T: fata-bil (-> vater) father-bil1

T (2; 03, 29)

(e)

T (2; 04, 01)

T: was sagt der tiranno-dil? what says the tyranno-dil? 'What does the tyranno-dil say?'

This affix was spontaneously attached to nouns denoting big animals or persons he showed "respect" for. It was only done in a playful manner, never obligatorily. Thus, it was a language game he fancifullly engaged in. That he was himself able to call it into question meta-linguistically is proved by the following question he asked me: (240)

T: was dadatet 'tiranno-dil'? what means 'tyranno-dil'? 'What does 'tyranno-dil' mean? A: Das weiss ich nicht - das musst du mir sagen. that know I not - that must you me say don't know. You have to tell me.1

T (2; 03, 29)

Of course, he was not able to tell me either. On the contrary, when I asked him in return, I also received a nonsensical answer, as I should have known before: (241)

A: Was is'n das "bil"? what is-PART the "bil"? 'What is it, this "bil"?' T: bil is mama arm 'bil is mommy arm.'

T (2; 03, 29)

This particular affix has its origin in another language game the children would sometimes play, where the latin affix -bus is attached to every major lexical item, as in: (242)

S: In des tiefsubus waldibws gnmdibus ist ein bösi^ws bänbus zu Fmdlbus. In the deepest-6«5 forest-bus ground-bus is an evil-bus bear-bus to find-bus 'In the deepest forest, there you can find an evil bear.' T (replying): tiranno-bus T (2; 03, 30) T: iguanodon-b«5 iguanodon-^Mi

Later, the affix -bus was equally attached to other nominals; the preference for big and honorable animals/persons was no longer as pronounced as it had formerly been:

223

(243)

(a)

: \uchs\bus lynx-interfix-^Ms 'lynx 1

T (2; 06, 31)

(b)

T.eulibus owl-interfix-bns Owl1

T (2; 06, 31)

(c)

T:kleberfe«5 adhesive-iws 'adhesive'

T (2; 06, 31)

(d)

T: goldpapierkleber&wm gold-paper-adhesive-^M/n 'adhesive for golden paper1

T (2; 06, 31)

(e)

T: haschend

T (2; 06, 31)

'rabbit' (f)

T:wolfenfcwj wolf-interfix-£ws 'wolf

T (2; 06, 31)

So, his seemingly "self-generated" affix is nothing but a slightly altered echo of an input he actually received. Even the choice of big objects can be traced back to the bar ('bear1). But this is not the whole story. The fact that he takes up this "foreign" affix and plays with it, alters it, and asks questions about it shows that his computational device is willing to accept this -bus, -bil or -&l as another functional item to serve a new, as yet not overtly expressed syntactic-semantic function: it may be used to pick out a special set of nominals, i.e., those denoting big, dangerous, or honorable objects. Note that affixation is restricted to nominals, whereas in the input example (242) affixation applies to each major category (at least N, A, and V). The -bW-dti suffix soon disappeared. After all, it was not further supported nor systematically reinforced by the environment. So, it had no chance to survive and grow; it was just a "fad." Nevertheless, a year later, Tilman came up with a new affix, -/?, this time with no linking example by the aid of which its genesis could be traced back. Its very phonology, [pi, vaguely hints at the [b] of the [bil]-suffix which has undergone the phonological process of "Auslautverhärtung" ('word-final devoicing'), which is obligatory in German and renders a "voiced" phoneme "unvoiced". The [b], then, is the residual onset of -bus and -bil. It is nominal in character, too, this time attaching to nouns denoting things he is acting upon, which belong to him, which are near or familiar to him, or, maybe, simply to any nominal: (244)

(a)

T:mami-p mommy-p 'mommy'

T (3; 04, 12)

224 (b)

T: ich will auch mein1 stego-p I want also my stego-p also want to have my stego(saurus).'

T (3; 04, 13)

(c)

T: känguruhps2 kangaroo-p-s

T (3; 04, 13)

'kangaroos'

2

3

(d)

T: nein, unter dem stuhbp3 no, under the chair-ip 'No, under the chair.'

T (3; 04, 13)

(e)

Tmamiap mommya-p 'mommy' A: ja, talmiap? yes, talmiap? 'Yes, Tilman?'

T (3; 04, 13)

(f)

T: geh weg, sastiap go away, sastia-p 'Go away, Saskia.1

T (3; 04, 16)

(g)

T: warum schreibst dup? why write you-p? 'Why are you writing?'

T (3; 04, 16)

(h)

T: eine pflanzp a plant-p 'a plant'

T (3; 04, 23)

(i)

T: warum machst du müslip? why make you muesli-p? 'Why are you making muesli?' A: zum frühstückp to-the breakfast-p 'for breakfast'

T (3; 04,24)

0)

T: muskatnussp nutmeg-p 'nutmeg'

T (3; 04, 27)

(k)

T: noch wass-p again wat(er)-p 'more water'

T (3; 04,27)

Note that the proper position of the nominal affix -pis right after the stem, before the plural affix! This token is one of the rare cases in which the affix is truely incorporated (in an untechnical sense) into the word and not just attached at its right periphery. Here, icAwa-epenthesis applies correctly.

225

(1)

T: und daraus mach ich jetzt ein lochp and there-of make I now a hole-p 'And now I make a hole (into the dough).1

(m) T: des is this is fish-p This is fish.1

(n)

fischp

T: ichp jetzt will ichp l-p now want l-p 'Me1 'Now I want'

T (3; 04,27)

T (3; 04, 27)

T (3; 04, 27)

(o)

T: will 'ne milchp want a milk-p '(I) want to have a (glass of) milk.1

T (3; 04, 27)

(p)

T: warum waren wir im schwimmkursp? T (3; 04, 27) A: wie bitte? T: warum waren wir im schwimmkursp, hab ich gesagt. T: why were we in-the swim-course-p? A: how please? T: why were we in-the swim-course-p, have I said T: 'Why did we go to the swimming lesson?1 A: 'Pardon?1 T: 'Why did we go to the swimming lesson, I said.1

(q)

T: eulaliap eulalia-p 'Eulalia' (name of an owl)

(r)

(While looking at a picture book) T: bei mir der kleine bärp at me the little bear-p The little bear is near me.'

T (3; 04, 29)

T (3; 04, 31)

The only token in which -p is attached to a category other than nominals is: (245)

T: ich will auch mal probierp I want also once try(stem)-p also want to try once.'

T (3; 04, 15)

But note that this is an infinitive which probably shares nominal features. Besides, the infinitive ending -en has been deleted, so that only a bare stem remains. This time I tried to actively support this affix and used it, too, but only for [-»-animate] objects. I wanted to carry out a kind of experiment in order to find out whether this spontaneously offered, quasi-functional element could be recruted to represent a familiar semantic feature such as [+/- animate], which is known to play a role in other languages as well. But

226

the experiment was thwarteded because only Tilman and me were conspirative and our "private speech" was not readily accepted by another little family member... It was Saskia who resentfully "forbade" me to speak this way: (246)

A (to T): was haben wir denn gesehen: den domenschwanz/), den diplo/?? what have we then seen: the spike-tail-/>, the diplo-/?? 'What, then, did we see: the stegosaurus, the diplodocus?' S: nein, du sollst net diplop sagen - diplo. no, you shall not 'diplo-/?' say - 'diplo1. 'No, don't say 'diplo-/?1 - 'diplo'.'

Somehow, neologisms other than lexical ones, which are abundant in child speech, are odd. Another reason why -p did not survive was that Tilman himself did not respond to it when I tried to elicit it from him by deliberately using it myself. It seems to have been a curious functional fashion, restricted to his own language device and not intended to be anything more than a language game. After all, no true intersubjectivity was attained. There is another possible reason why this process was not fully systematic. In the sense of Karpf/Dressler (1994) one could consider these affixes as belonging to the realm of preand protomorphology, that is, to a stage before the establishment of the morphological module. Pre- and protomorphological processes are assumed to be handled by the "general cognitive system." (Dressler/Karpf 1994: 102) Such processes are not systematic, do not serve the function of word formation and violate principles of true morphology. They do not take part in the general development of the morphological module. As soon as the latter develops, they strand or at best survive in some ecological niche of the system. But note that Γι/man's morphological module was already well established at that time. Γι/man's affixation was no precursor phenomenon but a liminal or cumcursor phenomenon. A last interesting observation is that all these variants, -bus, -bum, -biU-dil, and -p, occur not only at the end of a noun, but also at the end of the whole utterance. This is trivial in most of the cases, e.g., in utterances with a single noun and in most of the matrix sentences which end with a DP as well. However, one asks why in sentences such as (244b, i, 1, m, p+r) and in (245), for instance, the -p is attached only once, namely to the last noun which is an object (direct object or prepositional object). A possible answer is the salience of the end of an utterance, which normaly is stressed. So, the affix—although clearly belonging to the noun and not to the whole utterance in the sense of a terminal markerseems to be additionally restricted on prosodic grounds. Only where there is strong intonation, affixation may take place. This prosodic restriction seems to carry over to a related process to which I turn now. There is a complementary phenomenon to Tilman's functional affixation, namely functional affix deletion/truncation. While artistically ornamenting nominals with -p, he feels free to truncate and cut off infinitives and nominals after the stem or, unrelated to any functional morphology, after the first syllable, or even worse, to reduce a complex rhyme. This process does not necessarily imply that he has given up the corresponding morphological function of the deleted affixes or syllables, i.e., checking, agreement, etc., but maybe that he has just "thrown overboard" redundant linguistic material which is better processed in a merely abstract manner:

227 (247)

(a)

(He wants to have his scrambled eggs on the plate.) T: aufn tell_ (-> teile·) On the plate'

(b)

T: mein haus_ (--> hausscnwn)4 my house 'My slipper'

(c)

(He wants to sit on a high chair and eat there) T: nein, ich will hier mach_ (--> machen) no, I want here make 'No, I want to do (the eating) here.1

T (3; 04, 15) T (3; 04,15)

T (3; 04,15)

(d)

T: mami, ich möcht eine mil_ (--> milcA) mommy, I want a mil_ 'Mommy, I want a (glass of) milk.1

T (3; 04,15)

(e)

T: ich kann net mehr kleinschneid_ (->kleinschneiden) I can not more small-cut can't cut up (the cheese) any longer.'

T (3; 04, 22)

(f)

T: Ich muss mal pip_ (-> pip/)5 I must PRT pee have to pee.1

T (3; 04, 22)

(g)

T: möchte ne zucchini hab_ (--> haben) want a zucchini have '(I) want to have a zucchini.'

T (3; 04,22)

In (248) he cuts off -er , but affixes -p : (248)

4

5

6

T: noch wassp (--> wassir) again wat(er)-p 'more water16

T (3; 04, 27)

Here, he utters only the specificator haus ('house') of the compound nominal Hausschuh ('house shoe1). This very process, we will meet again in section 12.2.1 on early compounding. Here, he reduces a two-syllabic word,pipi, to a monosyllabic word. See also mach-, schneid-, hab-, etc. in the other examples. The resulting syllables are all of the type CVC, except schneid-, which is a CCVC syllable. In fact, CVC is the unmarked syllable structure in German (cf. Wiese 1988, Keller/Leuninger 1993)! Dressler/Karpf (1994: 111) show that early diminuitive formation, which they consider a case of pre-morphology in early child speech, sometimes goes along with "premorphological truncation" (ibid.), as in German: (i) Mutt-i, Vat-i, Muttchen vj. Mütter-chen/lein, Väter-chen/lein, [...] Nein, Wass-i, nein! 'No, water (German Wasser)' (ibid.) The last example, wass-i resembles Tilman's wass-p in that in both cases the nominal affix -er is deleted and an extra-affix is added. In Dressler/Karpf s examples it is a diminuitive form; in Tilman's example it is a different nominal ending.

228 Here, both processes, deletion/truncation and addition, take place in one and the same token. Looking at the deletion cases alone, one is tempted to say that this boy is just lazy in omitting phonologically redundant material. He is simply reducing the number of syllables, or the number of morphemes. Phonological deletion does not always apply after the first syllable, however, as in (247c, e, f+g), where a CVC-syllable results. Or, alternatively, pip ('pee') is pi-p ('pee'-/?), like wassp in (248). The crucial question concerning both these processes, affixation and deletion/truncation, is whether it is a genuine, "deep" linguistic computation or simply a "shallow" performance effect. In the case of deletion, one would of course plead for a mere performance effect. Nominal morphemes like -er (e.g., in "tell^·", 'plate') or the infinitival -en (e.g., in "machen", "make") in particular are still computed. From this point of view, Tilman is just being materially parsimonous in that he resents spending more effort than is ultimately necessary. But is he a real miser? What does he do with the costs he saves? He immediately invests them in his private, idiosyncratic affixes, like the odd -p. The pay-off he earns in one process is shifted to another process, resulting in a harmonious linguistic transaction, or substitution, best exemplified in wassp ('wat_-p',). He plays on the liminal interface between performance and competence, but this he does in a truly competent way! For affixation, things look similar. If we assume a null-hypothesis—curious as -bil and -ώΐ or -p may seem—they are nothing but ornamentations. That they only apply to nominale is readily explained by Tilman's idiosyncratic fondness for nouns. That they pop up at once and vanish again underlines this interpretation. But one nevertheless has to explain their "nature", "origin", and "use". Thus, slightly expanding the bare performance hypothesis, I will propose a threefold answer on dynamical grounds: (249)

Proto-Functional Categories

(i) Their "nature" First, bil/dil and -p are nominal in nature. Their semantics is only virtual. They could "mean" magnification, honorification, or familiarity, animation, etc., if they were used consistently and intersubjectively. This is obviously not the case. Concerning intersubjectivity, I hasten to add that this is due only to contingent reasons. Under favorable circumstances they could spread and German could eventually end up having these phi-features, along with person, gender, number. The scenario I am briefly sketching out here centers around the crucial transition from arbitrary use to consistent use. In generative grammar, these two are mutually exclusive and opposites to each other rather than truly related. The view offered here is quite different in showing that what is obviously a performance effect—nominal ornamentation—could launch a syntactic "career" and end up being a true Functional Category. With this interpretation in mind I call them Proto-Functional Categories. They are performative precursors of Functional Categories. In terms of Peirce's category theory (see 1.4.1) they belong to the realm of secondness. They have already gone beyond mere recognition of their existence, but have not yet reached the status of a generalized category that is consistently used by the individual himself as well as shared by the linguistic community, in the sense of thirdness. Secondness implies empiry. They are clear empirical facts, recognizable, reproducable (see especially (244p)), measurable. Secondness also implies possibility. They are categorial limiThe authors' explanation in terms of a premorphological process, however, does not seem to carry over. Pre- and protomorphological processes occur much earlier. Crucially, no morphological module needs to have been established so far. This is not true for Tilman at that time.

229 nals which have the opportunity to grow or to vanish again. In Darwinian terms, they are spontaneous point mutations, rare and not too far away from the other elements in the array of possible phi-features. It is the interaction of this mutants with the linguistic environment that decides on their fate; ultimately, whether their reproduction is of any selective advantage, or whether there is any other exaptational possibility for them to survive. This does not seem to be the case, but that is of no major concern here. The major concern here is to evidence the spontaneous emergence of such Proto-FCs and to embed them in a dynamical model, (ii) Their "origin9 Proto-Functional Categories originate from the same source as full-blown PCs—the functional module. It does not matter if they are externally triggered, as in the case of -bil/dil. This trigger just serves as a first seed for further crystallization. What is crucial is that it finds resonance in the system, endogenously. The more clear-cut case of -p, which has only a very indirect input-source, reveals that Proto-FCs may even emerge for "no reason" at all. Tilman's functional module is rich, diverse and generative. German morphology is simply not rich enough for him. While there exist numerous diminuitive affixes in German (e.g., -chen, -lein, -ι), there exist no augmentative affixes. In other languages, e.g., Italian, the latter do exist: -one is the augmentative affix (-ino is the diminuitive affix) (cf. Dressler/Karpf 1994: 109). With regard to these richer morphological options, German is a kind of pidgin language for him, which he deliberately creolizes. There seems to be an endogenous drive to express this morphologic faculty overtly. If what is offered to him as possible overt instantiations is too poor, he simply invents them himself. How can he dare? The answer is that he cannot help it. It is a spontaneous expression of autopoiesis. These Proto-FCs are not superfluous but "overfluous". Normally, such linguistic "vulcanism" is kept under cover, but sometimes it may spontaneously erupt and evidence the system's endogenous forces.7 The linguistic system is dynamical and self-organized. It is typical for the liminal phase to host such variations. We would not expect them to surface that easily under any other condition of the system, (iii) Their "use" As I already pointed out, the use of Proto-FCs is more of a performance phenomenon, but a pretty competent one! For this reason, it is desirable to join a theory of performance with a theory of competence (cf. Smith/Thelen 1993: 152ff.). Instead of providing such a theory, I restrict myself to presenting an example—spontaneous emergence of Proto-FCs—and to showing how a general theory of self-organization deals with it. Besides, this example is striking counter-evidence to the far too narrow Lexlern-design (cf. Clahsen, Eisenbeiss/Penke 1994, among others). The system does not simply wait for the input and then responds with structure-building as an echo. The linguistic system is much more autonomous in this respect. Thus, Tilman is a tightrope-walker on the interface between performance and competence: a linguistic trixter.

In Mende/Peschel's evo/on-model (1981) the third phase, "expansion", is said to be characterized by the determination of "inner growth rates" (ibid: 199). This means that in the liminal phase system-internal processes dominate, which are not primarily input-oriented. In this phase, diversity is maximal and the resources for feeding these varieties are maximally exhausted. A decrease of the inner growth rates and a match with external criteria are features of the next phase, namely "transition".

12

Precursors: Composition

12.1 Precursors Since dynamical systems theory deals with dissipative structures and their emerging properties, the concept of precursors is a natural and important one in this context. New properties need not appear at once as a full-blown phenomenon; rather, they may evolve in disguise, emerging "in the shadow" or "under cover" of some other ecological concomitant circumstance or parasitically hitch-hiking along with it. This is in part due to the observation that"[...] contributing components may mature at different rates." (Thelen 1989: 90) In the spirit of the building-block model (section 3.2), some of these components precede others while the whole construction, category, etc. has to await the assembly of all the relevant parts. This state of affairs does not contradict the overall emphasis on discrete and abrupt phase-transitions which are characteristic of dynamical systems (see section 4.5 on continuity vs. discontinuity). Rather, precursors foreshadow and herald the setting of the stage for a respective novice. Note that in Pinker (1987: 424) underspecified representations of prototypical grammatical notions such as the major categories N, A, V, P, "subject" and "object" are conceived of as precursors of the fully specified vectors. The former variable is replaced by a constant. For Pinker, this process is a continuous one, ultimately converging on a stable category. Although everybody talks about presursors, the phenomenon is far from being wellunderstood or even well-defined. Van Geert (1993: 320) gives the following definition: [...] a species is a precursor to another species, if there exists a takeover relationship between both. The second species takes over the domain of application and resources of the first, precursor species, and eventually extends this domain. Second, the takeover should not be a contingent one: The emergence of the second species taking over the function of the precursor should depend on the presence and properties of the precursor. This is, the precursor is conditional on the emergence of the successor. Focussing on the onset of growth of the successor, it is the case that"[...] in a precursor relation grower A has to have reached a certain level before B can start to grow." (Ruhland, Wijnen/van Geert 1995: 116) This simple mathematical relation, however, is neutral with regard to the causal relation between the precursor and the successor. For this reason one has to require that in addition the relation between the two must not be a contingent one. It is the task of linguistic theory to motivate such a true causal precursor-successor relationship, not the task of dymanical systems theory. Both theories inform one another, in the ideal case (cf. also Ruhland, Wijnen/ van Geert 1995: 131). There exist at least two concepts of what a precursor is. Firstly, a precursor may be an element, structure, or construction that first appears as a torso, i.e., part of its full-blown form is still missing. For this, there are many examples: early infinitives vicariously substituting for finite forms (cf. Poeppel/Wexler 1993, Wexler 1994, among many others), caseless NPs before case-marked DPs (cf. Radford 1990a+b), and the so-called preconjunctional clauses (cf. Rothweiler 1993). Another case in point is

231 early coordination without a logical junctor (or with an abstract junctor) as in (250a) as opposed to (250b), where the junctor is spelled out: (250)

(a)

Coordination without a junctor: A: das passt zusammen: gelb und rot that fits together yellow and red This fits together: yellow and red.1 T: depot yellow red •Yellow (and) red.'

(b)

T (1;08, 15)

Coordination with a junctor: T: tata (--> panther) et tiga 'panther and tiger'

T (1; 11, 17)

In all these cases the target is transparent and clearly instantiated in the system, while its shape has not yet been fully elaborated. I will refer to such cases as homologous precursors.l It is the very same "object" which is only differently instantiated because certain other features are still missing in the repertoire of the system. Secondly, a precursor may be another element, structure, or construction that occupies and grows in the same ecological biotope (in the sense of van Geert 1993). Later, the resources of the precursor are taken over by the successor. Examples of such a takeover relationship are given in chapter 10, where topicalization is considered a more economical or "cheaper" precursor to passive voice and where topic blends are considered a precursor to embedding. But note that van Geert's second requirement—that the takeover depends on the presence of the precursor—is not met in these cases. Neither is it met in the examples of homologous precursors given above. It is clearly not necessary for passive voice that topicalization is mastered before, nor for embedding that the very idiosyncratic and marginal topic blends occur at all. In the latter case, the topic blends occur even after embedding has been mastered (see chapter 10). Nevertheless, they appear to be "logical" precursors in an intuitive sense in that topicalization and passive voice realize an analogous function, say focus, but topicalization does this in a less sophisticated way, especially without extra morphology. Morphology is considered the most "costly" device in overt syntax. Topic blends realize "complex" sentences without the need for complementizers or junctors. Another example is given in Fritzenschaft (1993), where particle- and copu/b-constructions are taken to be precursors to passive voice—this time also temporal precursors. More general examples are the lexicon as a precursor to the onset of syntax, vocabulary size to the growth of utterance length, utterance length to the proportion of finite verbs, or finite verbs to the proportion of pronouns and determiners (examples are taken from Ruhland, Wijnen/van Geert 1995). These precursors belong to a different class. Topicalization, for instance, is a construction different from passive; they are clearly distinguishable individuals. I will call these in-

1

Tracy (1994/95: 198) calls them formal precursors.

232

stances heterologous precursors? In both cases—homologous as well as heterologous precursors—the presursors are "relatives" of the successors. While heterologous precursors behave more like "brothers and sisters", homologous precursors denote the same individual, once as an "infant" that still has to grow and once as the "adult" individual. As pointed out by van Geert (1993), the precursor may be supportive to the successor in that it "paves the way" for it, deliberately prepares the takeover and vanishes when the successor has passed a critical growth rate. In this case, the precursor effect is positive. Conversely, it may be negative, i.e., competitive, if the precursor suppresses the successor (cf. van Geert 1993: 320f.). In the former case there exists a bootstrapping relation; in the latter case one of interference. The example given by van Geert is growth of the lexicon vs. syntactic growth, where the acquisition of single words negatively affects the emergence of syntax. Put differently, the acquisition of LCs, which grow early, suppresses the growth of PCs which occurs later, until a certain threshold is passed, i.e., a certain number of LCs has been accumulated. Then, PCs become stronger and stronger and eventually take over and extend the domains of LCs, quite in the literal sense of Grimshaw's (1991) Extended Projection (see section 5.2). It is not clear whether van Geert (1993) treats LCs as homologous or heterologous precursors, whether they represent the very same individuals or belong to different species. While the latter solution seems to suggest itself—LCs and PCs belong to different linguistic modules (cf. Ouhalla 1991)—the former is not as unplausible as may appear at first glance. If PCs are taken to be LCs "in another aggregate" they may be "relatives" in the above sense. The role of precursors has always been acknowledged in linguistics. Thus, the second part of Slobin's (1973: 184f.) principle that "New forms first express old functions and new functions are first expressed by old forms" can be interpreted as a precursor—successor relationship. Old forms are the precursors of new forms in that they also partly express the genuine function of the new forms. The entire principle expresses hysteresis and bootstrapping as different terms for the precursor-successor relationship. In fact, these three terms are intricately interwoven. The negative precursor effect, with the precursor suppressing the successor, is identical to the hysteresis effect: the old attractor still reigns, somehow unjustifiedly, although the new attractor is already in place. The positive precursor effect expresses a bootstrapping relation: the precursor supports the successor and strengthens its growth rate. Slobin's principle is tied to his observation that a new element, structure, or construction is first introduced implicitely, as in the case of covert complementizers, covert cliticization or incorporation, before it is expressed explicitely. The implicit form, then, is the precursor to the explicit form, i.e., a homologous precursor. It is also Slobin's observation that before the target form is explicitely and regularly expressed, individuals make use of various idiosyncratic strategies—a kind of "bricolage". This state of affairs fits well to the state of dynamical systems right before the point of bifurcation, where turbulence is maximal and symmetry-breaking is reinforced. Anyway, it is a characteristic of the unstable liminal phase. Note that the takeover of the successor from the precursor can take on different forms, depending on the variables of the dynamical system equations (cf. van Geert 1993). Whether

Tracy (1994/95: 198) calls them functional precursors.

233

the curves display the classical "stage" form, or "saw-tooth" form, "pretransitory dips", whether they are steep of flat, etc., is epiphenomenal (see section 4.5.1.1). Let us now turn to some concrete examples of the precursor-successor relationship. While the examples discussed above (topicalization vs. passive voice, topic blends vs. embedding) are of the heterologous variety, I will concentrate on the homologous variety and follow the identical element through its dissipative history.

12.2 Compounding Compounding is one of the first grammtical capabilities of very young children. In fact, compound formation is characteristic of the transition from the one-word phase to the twoword phase and is mastered on a par with two-word utterances. In Keyser/Roeper (1993) the syntactic small VP with a small object as well as the τε-cases are both compounds. In Lebeaux (1988) this small VP, too, is seen as the first step the child takes on her way to phrasal syntax. The branch of lexical syntax in particular seems apt to capture these similarities. The intricate relationship between the lexicon and syntax which this approach advocates is particularly appealing to dynamical systems theory in that the lexicon—passing a critical threshold of complexity—is expected to exhibit new qualities—qualities we use to call "syntactic." Note, however, that compounding, although it is so "natural", "easy" and early observable in child language, is neither characteristic of every human language nor of human language alone (Helen Leuninger, p.c.). Languages vary with regard to the extent to which they use this device: compare, for instance, French and German: in the former language compounds are less frequent than in the latter. On the other hand, primates are known to be able to form two-word utterances, i.e., to compound (Fanselow 1985). So, compound formation is not yet "true syntax", but a precursor. As we will see, these compounds have precursors of their own, as expected in a fractal design of language acquisition.

12.2.1 Early Compounds and their Precursors, or, a Visit to the Zoo In Tilman's corpus compounds are firstly recorded at the age of 1; 06 years. At that time he has just entered the two-word phase and produces utterances such as: (251)

T: alA ... MAma3 'hello... mommy'

T (1; 06, 14)

It is characteristic of Tilman's first two-word utterances that they still lack sentential intonation. The words are selected from the lexicon one after the other and each receives its own stress. Equally important, there is an interval of about one to five seconds between the ele-

If important, stress is indicated by capitals, as in Tracy's studies.

234

merits which will gradually diminish and eventually disappear in the course of the development. More examples are given in (252): (252)

(a)

T: SAsa 'Ana (-> Straßenbahn andere) street train other Other streetcar1

(b)

(Tilman is on my arm. I speak to him: "mama arm" ("mommy arm1). He replies: T: DAda 'Am T ( 1 ; 07, 1 7) 'daddy arm'

(c)

(He is painting with a black crayon) T: DAts LAla (»>schwarz malen) black paint 'paint black'

(c)

T: dAch LAla (--> bus lila) bus lilac 'lilac bus1

T ( l ; 07, 1 1 )

T ( 1 ; 07, 19)

T ( 1 ; 07, 19)

Although early syntactic combinations and lexical compounding are equally interesting cases of first merger, I will concentrate on the latter in what follows. As for the first nominal two-word syntagmas, let us begin with a non-compound example which also displays the characteristic interval between the morphemes that are to be combined: (253)

T: MAma ... ?Ala mommy ... owl "mommy owl"

T (1; 06, 18)

This nominal syntagma for a complex name is not yet target-like because of the missing overall intonational contour and the interval between the constituents; rather, it is a homologous precursor. It is given the following representation with two equal word stresses: (254)

[N MAma] [N ?

The target representation would be (255) with only one major stress on the head-noun: (255)

[ N [Nmama][ N ? Al3]]

Now let us turn to true compounds. Compounds count as phonological words (Wiese 19%, Penner 2000) and receive an asymmetric stress pattern: the specifier is strongly stressed whereas the head is weakly stressed. It is typical of young children in the same liminal phase as Tilman to only have a reduced rhythmic grid and to perform early compounds with symmetric "level stress" instead (Penner 2000: 128f). While Penner interprets the nontarget-like intonation solely as a prosodic interim representation, I interpret it also as a morphosyntactic one. This is justified by the second clue, the time-lag between the specifier and the head. Note, however, that the head-parameter for compounds has already been correctly determined by Tilman which is head-last in German.

235 It is exciting to observe two isolated nominals of a target compound slowly approaching each other until finally they fuse.4»5 In the beginning, the interval is quite discernible: (256)

(a)

T: 'Apfel ... 'Ach (--> apfel ... korb)

T ( l ; 08, 26)

apple ... basket 'apple- basket1 (b) T: 'Apfel ... ?Am6 'Apfel ... 'Ama (--> abfall ... eimer) waste ... basket 'waste-paper basket1

T ( 1 ; 08, 27)

(c) (He does not throw a box in the waste-paper basket right in front of him, so he runs to another one) T: ?Ana ... 'Apfel T (1; 08, 27) other waste Other waste-paper (basket)1 The latter example is especially telling because he tries to combine an adjective (anderer (Other1)) as a specifying element with a nominal one, which happens to be a compound itself, i.e., abfalleimer ('waste-paper basket'). Obviously, he fails. His syntactic computational device is capable of merging only once. This capacity is used up by combining Other1 with the specifier (i.e., 'waste') of the intended compound 'waste-(paper) basket1.7 He can compute either (256c): ana apfel (Other waste'), as in (256c), corresponding to (257a) or apfel ama ('waste-(paper) basket'), as in (256b), corresponding to (257b), but he cannot yet iterate the procedure and recursively embed the elements, as evidenced by his failure in (256c), corresponding to (257c):

(257)

(a)

(b)

(c)

N

A

N

N

/\ A

N

Ν

Ν

Ν

ana

apfel

apfel

ama

apfel

Ν ama

The reason is that the brackets around the compound [N [N J IN 1 I nave not been closed; the inner brackets have not become erased so that the content may become computationally 4

5 6 7

As anyone can imagine, I was hardly able to measure the interval precisely, e.g., by the aid of a stop watch. On the tapes I recorded those compounds with an interval never occured spontaneously. Where I mark the seconds, they are estimated from a brief glance at my watch—a rather unsatisfactory procedure. In the diachronic development of language, too, one can observe the slow approach of two elements that will eventually be compounded. The phonetic shape of the morphemes is still somewhat distorted. At the same time, Tilman erroneously analyzes abfall ('waste') as apfel ('apple'). Interestingly, it is the specifier abfall ('waste') which is maintained, and not the head-noun eimer ('basket').

236 opaque and may now be treated like a regular N. With open brackets, however, there is simply no place for a third element in isolation—as can easily be seen in (258):

(258)

N

/\ A

N

(N)

ana

apfel

ama

It is expected that Tilman already respects the Binary Branching Constraint (cf. Kayne 1984). But obviously his computational device is overcharged with iteration. Single compounding, however, is possible. He even over-extends compounding when he consistently interprets the borrowed German word papagei ('parrot') as a compound papa gei, on a par with mama ale ('mommy owl'):8 (259)

T: PApa ...'AI PApa ... jAI PApa... nAI PApa 'parrot'

T (1; 08, 28)

It is a nice game for him to fool his mother, who is trying to elicit this single-stressed compound noun from him: (260)

A: sag mal "papagEI"! say PRT 'papagei1 'Say 'parrot'.1 T: hehehe PApa... hehehe nAI (laughs) papa (laughs) nai 'parrot'

T (1; 08,28)

Needless to say that the laughter punctuates the morpheme boundaries set up by his interpretation. Since I was not able to measure the diminishing interval between the two Ns objectively I cannot exactly say whether if faded continuously. This was at least my impression. Thus, the interval is a bad diagnostic for accomplished or so far unaccomplished compounding. A better one is stress/intonation. Before he correctly closes the brackets around both Ns and gives the complex N major stress on the specifier and minor stress on the head, utterances with open and with closed brackets co-occur

(261)

8

(At the zoo) T: |N nAch| ...< ca. 2 sec. > [ N ?As] (~>nachthaus) night... house 'night house'

T (1; 09,02)

This is a "surface analogy" (cf. Dressler/Karpf 1994: 101). These authors consider this phenomenon as belonging to "extragrammatical morphology", a precursor of the genuine morphological module.

237 He also uses the specifier alone, as with apfel ('waste') for abfalleimer ('waste-(paper) basket')) (cf. 256c): (262)

T:nAch night 'night house1

T (1; 09, 02)

Eventually, he masters nachthaus ('night house1) with a coherent stress pattern, i.e., a major (') stress on the specifier and a minor one on the head.9 (263)

Tinäch'äs night-house 'night house'

T (1; 09,02)

Thus, nachthaus ('night house') is the first genuine compound, now with the structure in (264): (264)

IN [N nach] [N 'äs]]

The same thing happened on our way to the ape-house! (265)

T: 'Afa ... 'As1 ° (~>affenhaus) ape... house 'ape-house' T: 'äfg'äs 'ape-house'

T (1; 09,02)

It seems that each time he encounters a compound the mechanics of contraction sets in anew. Thus, the first utterance is still of the old precursor kind, but the second one is already the new successor-compound: (266)

9 1

(a)

T:nAch... ? As night... house 'night house' T: nAch ... AFfa night-monkey 'nocturnal monkey' T: näch'as 'night house'

T (1; 09,03)

In order to differentiate major and minor stress, I use (') and (~), respectively. ° The adult form Affenhaus calls for a linking element, -n, between the specifier and the head of the compound. (In the examples above, no such linking element is required.) Tilman leaves out this interfix. This is natural if we assume that the two elements to be compounded are still isolated from each other. A further diagnostic for true compounding, then, is not only the missing interval and a common intonation, but also the appearance of linking elements. For a discussion of the status of linking elements in early child compounds, see Gawlitzek- Maiwald (1994). She proposes that these elements are not plural forms (although they might stem from plurals, diachronically viewed), but true linking elements which are inserted on phonological grounds (cf. ibid.: 263). The correct use of linking elements in early child compounds, however, is presumed to be a late achievement, i.e., it is the ultimate indicator of target-like compounding.

238 Beyond competence there seems to be a performance effect in that exercise: mere repetition apparently facilitates compounding. Interestingly, he also tries out his new ability in the case of non-compounds, as in the following address: (267)

T: 'ALlo ... ... PApa hello... papa 'hello papa!'

T (1; 09,02)

Here, contraction is not required as in the compound case. Nevertheless, he contracts, and the interval disappears, turning the welcome into: (268)

TVallopapa hello-papa 'hello papa!'

T (1; 09,02)

which he repeats several times. All in all, compounding becomes more and more of a routine, despite of problems with the proper intonation, as the following examples show: (269)

(a) T:lAs'Ato "motor lorry/van'

T (1; 09,04)

(b)

gag^As11 (-> Schneckenhaus) snail-house 'snail-shell'

T (l; 09,07)

(c)

T: A1E?AfE (--> halbaffe) half-monkey 'half-monkey'

T (1; 09, 07)

(d)

T: APpal ... sAs apple... juice 'apple juice'

T(l;09,08)

(e)

T:eidOtta yolk 'yolk'

T (1;09, 15)

(f)

babalAnga baby snake 'baby snake'

T (1;09, 15)

(g) T: nanasAtsa (-> Minitörtchen) 'little cake1

T (1; 09, 20)

Eventually, bracketing is accomplished, and soon new and this time functional elements can join the complex compound, such as plural endings (266a) and the rather premature indefinite determiner ein ('a') (270 b+c):

n Again, the linking element -n is missing. See FN 10.

239 (270)

(a)

A: das ist eine kette aus Schneckenhäusern this is a necklace out of snails-houses This is a necklace made from snail-shells T: kak^Asa1 2> snail-houses 'snail-shells'

13

(-->schneckenhäuser)

T ( 1 ; 09, 14)

(b)

Tiakaka'As a snail-house 'a snail-shell'

T (1; 09, 14)

(c)

T: a papadAm (--> ein purzelbaum) 'a somersault'

T ( 1 ; 09, 22)

At the same time determiners generally appear on any /V, i.e., on simplex nouns, too: (271)

(a)

T: a SAsa (-> ein wasser) a water 'water1

T ( 1 , 09, 17)

(b)

T: a gsgaDAda (-> eine Schokolade) a chocolate 'chocolate'

T ( l ; 09, 19)

To summarize: two lexical elements that are to be combined, each in its respective brackets, are brought closer and closer until they really fuse and receive one common intonational pattern. This process— however gradually the interval may vanish— results in a discrete, qualitative change: eventually, compounding is accomplished. As soon as this happens, the newly-formed complex N, and generally any W, can undergo functional affixation. Plurals and first determiners appear.

12.2.2 Late Compounding The previous section dealt with the homologous precursor of early compounding. We saw that once the internal process of compounding has been acquired, the outer brackets have been closed and the inner brackets erased, the complex N becomes opaque and is treated like any other N. The successor has defeated the precursor. Now Tilman produces many inconspicuous compounds such as: (272) 12

(a)

T: lungenfisch14

T (2; 01,05)

SeeFNIO. Interestingly, the plural marker attaches to the head noun which is the rightmost element. This further indicates that bracketing is accomplished. If it were not, i.e., if the expression were a kind of syntagma, we would expect the plural marker to be able to attach to the specifying element on the left, as well. This, however, is not the case. 14 Note that this time linking elements are present. In lungenfisch the -n is treated as such a linking element on a par with affenhaus and Schneckenhaus (see above). 13

240

(b) (c)

'lung-fish' T: fernsehturm 'television tower' Tkönigsfischern15 'kingfishers'

T (2; 01,07) T (2; 01,07)

(d)

T: eichhanchen 'squirrel'

T (2; 01, 07)

(e)

T: lepato (-> schleppauto) haul-car 'lorry/van'

T (2; 01,08)

(f)

T: ruts(ch)bahn 'slide'

T (2; 01,08)

Among these compounds are artistic neologisms such as: (273)

T: tigaregenwurm tiger-rain-worm 'tiger-earth worm1

T (2; 01, 10)

Here, three Ns are cyclically compounded as in (274): (274)

[N tiga [N regen [N wurm ]]]

In what follows nothing more will be said on this kind of compounding. Rather, a very special use of compounds will be of interest now. Compounding becomes the focus of Tilman's computational system—this time with a very different function. The resulting compounds will serve as a heterologous precursor for Prepositional Phrases, circumventing the necessity of introducing Ps which head a phrasal projection of their own, the PP. Note that also the "innocuous" compounds presented above partly imply PPs, cf. (272a), or even 'incorporate1 infinitives with an arbitrary PRO (272b+c): (275)

15 16

(a)

lungenfisch: fisch /n/flungen 16 'lung-fish': fish with lungs

(b)

schleppauto: auto um zu schleppen haul-car car for hauling things "lorry/van1

(c)

rutschbahn: bahn um zu rutschen slide-course: course for sliding down on 'slide1

Here, the -s is the designated linking element. Here, one might argue that the -n is not a linking element, but the genuine plural of lunge. This is correct. However, the relevance of -n as a linking element is derived on systematic grounds. This does not contradict the fact that both plural ending and interfix may sometimes coincide.

241 Tilman begins to use compounds which he selects from the input and generates more and more items of the same kind. Sometimes really artistic constructions result. All of them imply a local semantics: (276)

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(Tilman has chocolate on/around his mouth) T:oh, dakadadenmund (-> schokoladenmund) Oh, chocolate-mouth'

T (2; 01,05)

(He has pineapple ice-cream in/on his mouth) T: ananasmund 'pineapple-mouth'

T (2; 01, 05)

(He has Grüne Sosse ("green sauce1) on his hand) T: riinesossehand green-sauce-hand '"green sauce"-hand'

T (2; 01,05)

(He has mash on his finger(s)) T:breifinger 'mash-finger1

T (2; 01,05)

(He has sand on his hands) T:sandhände 'sand-hands'

T (2; 01, 05)

(He has Nuxi ('chocolate cream') on his hand) T:nuxihand nuxi-hand 'chocolate-hand' (He has potatoes on his hands) T: kartoffelhande 'potato-hands'

T (2; 01,05)

T (2; 01, 10)

Note that there is nothing wrong with compounds of this kind. German is a language which is particularly rich of compounds of any length. Tilman surely does not do anything special when he responds to the ample evidence in the input by deliberately creating compounds of his own. Some of these are even quite common, like schokoladenmund ('chocolate-mouth'), while the others are true neologisms, but proper ones, of course. Thus, nothing more should have to be said abouth these compounds, if they did not exhibit two peculiar features: Firstly, they appear all of a sudden, are heavily exploited, and vanish again. So, there is again a characteristic temporal pattern: they attract Tilman's computations for a certain time and then fade again.17 We have to wonder what happens to his computational device during that time. Secondly, all these compounds have a local, or more generally a prepositional, semantics. In adult German Tilman's compounds could be paraphrased as 17

Recall the syntactic surface blends of chapter 10 which are also chararcteristic of only a short period of time.

242 (277)

(a) (b)

X is onJinJaroundY or is full of X

He has chocolate, pine-apple, ice-cream, green sauce, mash, sand, potatoes on his hands or fingers. So, why does he not say: (278)

have sand, etc. on my hands' ?

The answer is that in his syntax prepositions are still missing. Although the Ps in question are of a lexical kind, i.e., they have a substantial (local) semantics opposed to mere functional prepositions (as English of or for; or as the German subcategorized P auf ('on') in warten oö/('wait for')), prepositions, cum grano salis, belong to the class of Functional Categories. Grimshaw (1991, see section 5.2) analyzes PP as the highest nominal projection, even above DP. But, why does he not wait until the prepositions fall right into place? Because there is a very elegant way of avoiding their use. This compensating strategy is compounding, a mechanism so widely employed in adult German and so early instantiated in child German (see section 12.2.1) that it is a highly probable way out. And in fact, this is Tilman's choice, too. Up to that point, his utterances have lacked prepositions:18 (279)

Missing Prepositions: (a)

(b)

(He still has apple juice in his mouth) T: mund apfelsaft mouth apple-juice '(I still have) apple juice (in my) mouth.'

T (2; 00,26)

(Conduite with the preposition provided in the repetition) T: mama det nis üni T (2; 00,26) mama det nis ai iini mommy goes not uni-ABBR mommy goes not at uni-ABBR 'Mommy does not go to the university.'

Slowly, Tilman introduces mit ('with'), in ('in'), von ('from'), auf (On1), hinter ('behind'), unter ('under1), nach ('to'): (280)

Early prepositions: (a)

(b)

(The dice has fallen behind the lid.) T: Aito deka falla-fallen behind lid fall- fallen '(It has) fallen behind (the lid).1 T: nis in pfütze rädern not in puddle wheels

T (2; 00, 09)

T (2; 00,22)

'(I) don't go into the puddle (with the) wheels.' 18

A rich collection of examples of missing prepositions in early child English is provided by Radford(1991).

243

(c)

T: anderes tezel A: welches denn? T: van hauen (—> von blumen) T: other jigsaw-puzzle A: which PRT? T: from flowers T: '(I want to have) another jigsaw-puzzle.1 A: Which one?1 T: '(The jigsaw-puzzle) with the flowers.1

T (2; 00, 22)

(d)

T: der leine (seehund) wimmt unia wassa the small swims under water The small (seal) is swimming under water.1

T (2; 01,07)

(e)

T: wir füttern die enten (b)rot19 wir füttern die enten mit rot we feed the ducks bread we feed the ducks with bread 'We feed bread to the ducks.1

T (2 ;01, 10)

I take compounding to be a compensatory mechanism to avoid Functional Categories, here prepositions. Simultaneously, excessive compounding marks their immediate arrival, so that we can reasonably expect prepositions to emerge in the course of time, replacing the critical compound-items. In fact they do, and interestingly they appear as a co-occuring paraphrase of the formerly generated local compounds, as in: (281)

(a)

Tsandmund

T (2; 01, 11)

'sand-mouth' (b)

T: sand i m mund sand in-the mouth 'sand in the mouth1

T (2; 01, 11)

(281a+b) is a kind of a minimal pair: the first token without or with an incorporated (implicit) P; the second one with an overt P. (28 la) obviously is a morphological object, a compound noun, and still belongs to the lexicon, whereas (28Ib), a small clause (SC), already belongs to phrasal syntax. Their respective structures are (282a) and (282b):20 (282)

19

(a)

[N sand [N mund]]

(b)

(sc [NP sand [pp im [NP mund]]]]

The first utterance lacking the preposition might be a double-object-construction with die enten ('the ducks') as the IO, but without Dative-morphology, or with default Accusative-morphology. However, it looks more like an expansion which he provides himself in the second run. 20 The flP-structure is left out here.

244 (a)

N-compound

(b)

SC [NP PP] SC

/\ N

NP I N1 l N

/V

sand

N

N

sand

mund

PP

Λ

Λ

/\ P im

NP I

N' N

mund

The observation that the crucial transition here is one between a lexical head (X°) and a phrasal SC, which is a maximal projection (Xmax), nicely relates to Radford's analysis of the early child phrase marker as a Small Clause (Radford 1990a; see section 3.1.1). The leap from lexical into phrasal syntax is even more interesting if one bears in mind the special properties of SCs. As pointed out by Moro (2000), SCs instantiate a very special case of Merger. Merger (Chomsky 1995) is the operation which merges together two constituents α and β without adding new information to the label of the newly formed phrase marker nor attaining mixed labels. In regular substitution, α (or ) will project and also determine the label of the newly formed category; in adjunction, α (or ) will become a twosegment category. Moro claims that there is—apart from these two canonical cases—a third case in which neither α (nor β) projects nor α (nor β) is supplemented by a second segment but Merge simply merges α and β without projecting any of them. It is still crucial that the requirements of Merger are met, i.e., no new information is added and no mixed labels result. This is supposedly the case with SCs. The new label is simply left underspecified. He formalizes the three cases as in (283): (283)

ν α , β, Merge yields K: a. K = {α, {α, β}} b. K = {< α, α > {α , β}} c. Κ = {< 0 > {α , β}} (Moro 2000: 38)

(283a) corresponds to substitution; (283b) to adjunction; (283c) to SCs. From the point of view of language acquisition, SCs have minimal structural requirements and are as such predestined to serve as bootstrapping structures into syntax. They are the result of the purest and simplest case of Merger. Here, once more, Radford's SC-analysis receives very nice support by early child speech. Note that SCs themselves are precursors to a fully expanded phrasal syntax with substitution, movement, dislocation, chains, etc. Thus, we observe a chain of precursors, beginning with compounds, then introducing PPs and SCs, which finally result in fully expanded syntax. In the beginning, in Tilman's case the very effective operating rule of composition seems to prevent full PPs from emerging, in the sense of hysteresis. Obviously, it is a

245

negative bootstrapping relationship, at least at the end of this development. In the beginning, however, one could equally argue that compounds positively affect the emergence of functional PPs in that they already convey the "content", i.e., the local semantics, while the proper "form", i.e., the functional PP, is free to develop without the need to immediately satisfy formal and substantial tasks. /man's special compounds with local semantics stop almost entirely after the occurrence of the examples given above. They preliminarily served a particular function; when this function is taken over by the better-suited successor, the precursor vanishes. But it proved itself so extraordinarily successful a device that he easily draws upon it and occasionally transfers it to different contexts. In the cases to be considered now, it is not sufficient to "incorporate" simple PPs into nominals, but obviously larger entities which are more abstract and more difficult to paraphrase (in an adult sense). It is as if he were testing what carrying capacity a lexical nominal has. To what extreme can he go? He clearly teases out the boundaries of nominal compounding by constructing items like the following: (284)

(Context: We often collect maple leaves and fruits, called "noses", which we glue onto our own noses)2' T (to me): du ahornmann T (2; 01, 26) you maple-man 'You maple-man.'

The presumed paraphrase of the compound could be something like: 'You man, who is always collecting maple leaves and noses', or, 'You man with the maple leaves ...'. (285)

(Context: In the summer, we often went to the bank of the river Main in Frankfurt to play there.) T (to me): du mainufermann T (2; 01,26) you main-bank-man 'You Main-bank-man.'

Again, the paraphrase is something like: 'You man who always goes to the bank of the Main', or, 'You man from the bank of the Main.' The following two compounds were documented after a considerable interval of about 4-5 months, i.e., compounding is a merely marginal device for avoiding explicit phrase structure. Nevertheless, consider the following items: (286)

21

(a)

T: wo is mein kleines magahäschen? where is my little like-rabbit-DIM? 'Where is my beloved little rabbit?'

T (2; 06, 02)

(b)

mein maga-, mein süsses maga my like-, my sweet like'My beloved, my sweet beloved-'

T (2; 06, 23)

That Tilman does not obey gender properly is of no linguistic interest here. In return to Oliver Sack's "Man who mistook his whife for a hat" (1985) one may call Tilman "The boy who mistook his mother for a maple-man", or, as you will see later, for a "Main-bank-man".

246

In (286) Tilman calls his favorite toy-rabbit his magahäschen ('like-rabbit'), that is 'the rabbit that I like1. The rabbit that he likes is his like-rabbit. Phonetically correctly, he fits in an interfix, [-a], between mag ('like') and haschen ('rabbit-DIM'), so that the original maghaschen is smoothly spelled out as mag-a-haschen.22>23 In (286b) he only spells out the specifier of the compound, mag(-a), as an abbreviation of the full complex noun. The same thing he did with some items during the phase of early compounding (see section 12.2.1). His magahäschen is not the only rabbit he owns. There is a second one: (287)

T: da is des schaltierhaschen there is the dish-animal-rabbit-DIM There is the small dish-animal-rabbit.1

T (2; 06, 02)

The schaltierhaschen is a wooden rabbit that belongs to a whole set of wooden toy animals that are stored together in a dish. Thus, the rabbit in question is one of the animals from the dish, in short, the 'dish-animal-rabbit.' Here, compounding applies twice. First, schattier ('dish-animal') is formed, meaning something like 'the animals belonging into the dish', or, 'the animals in/from the dish1. Then, schaltierhaschen is formed, i.e., 'the rabbit belonging to the other animals in the dish'. The complex noun schaltier ('dish-animal') is attached to the simple noun haschen ('rabbit'), forming the triplet schaltierhaschen ('dishanimal-rabbit1). Internally, however, it is no three-membered compound, but a two-membered one due to cyclic application of the compounding rule. What might be a tentative phrase marker for these compounds? Note that it is quite difficult to formulate a structure that can serve as input for the compounding rule. Maybe it is more reasonable to speak of the structure which is targeted by the compound instead of speaking of the input which actually feeds it. Let us begin with the output. For (286), the output seems to be something like (288a), which, for reasons of phonetic adjustment, is spelled out as (288b):

22

It is not very likely that the [-a] is the reduced indefinite determiner ein ('a'), because the reference is clearly definite. Thus, mag-ein-häschen ('like-a-rabbit') is semantically odd. But note that very young children generally use zero determiners with definite reference. However, Tilman is no longer "very young". That maga could be a phonetic paraphase of the infinitive mögen ('like'), which is difficult to pronounce because of German Umlaut [at], is a bit more probable. This interpretation does not interfere with the interpretation given here. 23 An analogous example is provided in Karpf (1990: 128): (i) Gib mir das Kriegsei - ? - Das ist das, was ich gekriegt habe. (Give me the get-interfix-egg - ? - That is the one that I got) Here, the proposition ich kriege ein ei ( get an egg1)—be it expressed as a VP ('to get an egg1) or as an NP with a specifying relative-clause ('egg that I get')—feeds V-W-compounding, as in (286). Again, an interfix, here the so-called German Fugen-s ('joining' -s) is applied, yielding the ambiguous form kriegsei, which literally could also mean war-egg , i.e., resulting from krieg + ei ('war' + 'egg').

247

(288) (a)

N

( b)

/\ V mag like

N haschen rabbit-DIM

N

/\ V mag like

N haschen rabbit-DIM

But what is the target structure for (286)? Let us first assume a virtual relative-clause, as in (289a). Or is a matrix declarative as in (289b) the target? (289)

(a)

relative clause

(b)

declarative clause CP

/\

y\

Ich.

C

mag.

J

/\ N' I N haschen) rabbitj

CP

das j ich mag thatj I like

IP

/\

'.

r /

/\

VP /\^ ' ^ das t. haschen

t

J'

But what kind of rule, if there there really is one behind this peculiar compound, derives (286) from (289a) or from (289b)? Plainly, we must not try to artificially stretch the child's presumed semantic intention and put forward a phrase marker that an adult might choose.24 Thus, neither a virtually targeted relative clause (289a) nor a virtually targeted matrix declarative (289b) are proper synonyma for (286). What nevertheless makes (289a) a particularly attractive candidate is the fact that the whole embedded relative clause is a semantical I y selected specification of the simple noun haschen ('little rabbit'). Mag ('like') clearly singles out this particular rabbit as the one referred to. Moreover, this special token is temporally contingent on Tilman's overall acquisition of embedded clauses (relative clauses included) and thus could conceptually be understood as a heterologous precursor of embedding. Likewise, the matrix-declarative (289b) captures the verb-complement relation between mag ('like') and haschen ('rabbit') which is crucial. But neither (289a) nor (289b) can serve the function for which the compound is used here: naming. This is only possible with a noun. And naming is the function of any of these: ahornmann ('maple-man'), mainufer24

For the problem of proper extension of child utterances, see Tracy (1990).

248 mann ('Main-bank-man'), magahäschen ('like-rabbit'), schaltierhäschen ('dish-animal-rabbit'). So, any semantic intention, spelled out as either (289a) or (289b), must take the form of a nominal anyway. The results are completely well-formed, and adults would do the same, if they had to. But adults obviously don not feel the need to engange in such compound formation. Why don't they? Let us look at the verb-complement-complex of the magahäschen ('like-rabbit') once again:

(290)

V

/\ N haschen rabbit

V mag like

Quite in the spirit of lexical syntax, the verb mag ('like') takes the direct object haschen ('rabbit') as complement and forms the higher projection 'haschen mag' ('like rabbit'). This small VP, as Lebeaux (1988) and Keyser/Roeper (1993) call it, is in fact an analogen to compounding and could feed the compound formation rule which fronts the verb: thus, magahäschen ('like-rabbit') would fall out quite naturally. Tilman would be doing nothing else but changing the head of the compound from verbal as in (290) to nominal as in (291):

(291)

N

/\ V mag like

N haschen rabbit

After all we have already learned about Tilman's syntax it is hardly necessary to point out that the nominal feature is in fact a great attractor for him. Is the precursor-successor relationship between lexical compounding and functional projections lost in this latter analysis? I think it is not. What should have become clear is that the child draws on the "semantic" or "lexical" core of propositions—disregarding for the moment what such a proposition would have to look like in the adult case. The complement relationship between a verb and its (direct) object in the small VP is such a core. Whether it is spelled out as a compound verb (cf. 290) or as a compound noun (cf. 291) is obviously a source of variation and dependent on the function it is selected for. Tilman's data are telling with regard to two domains. The first domain is compounding in the sense of the "small VP "-analysis. The second domain is that of precursors. The compound (verbal or nominal) is a homologous precursor of adult clausal syntax but must not be mistaken for it or directly compared with it. The corresponding adult phrase markers are at best very clumsy paraphrases because the lexical core is not so easily accessible to adults any more. In child language, on the other hand, this core is still highly operative—which is the reason why it is a well-suited

249

candidate for the naming function. But it will slowly vanish or be suppressed by the growth of other linguistic species, expecially functional species— be it PPs or embedded CPs— which soon emerge. Thus, Tilman's use of compounds is one of many "small good bye's" to the lexical or prefunctional phase. This does not mean that this phase is completely "lost". It is another virtue of Radford (1990a) to have pointed out that the SCs children use do not get lost but remain an option in the adult grammar. It seems necessary to look carefully at the ecology of the overall system formed by the interaction of its elements (lexical and functional). In language acquisition, this interaction become most obvious. 12.2.3 The Ecology of Compounds A rather unexplored but nevertheless crucial aspect of ecology concerning the relation of simple and complex structure, or lexical and functional structure, is the overall size lexical elements may take. Let us turn back and overview the whole array of Tilman's problematic nominal compounds. Prototypically, a nominal expression, i.e., a noun, consists of one morpheme, the noun itself, as for exampleyz$c/z ("fisch), türm ('tower1), auto ('car"), wurm ('worm'). This is the simplest case, but not the only one. Besides morphological derivation, as in Häschen (rabbit-DIM), the noun can also undergo compounding with other Lexical Categories (verbal, adjectival, prepositional, or nominal categories). Such a nominal compound is an object that consists of a head (the N) and a specifier (N, A, V, P). In German, the head is to the right, or final, and the specifier is to the left, or initial. Together, they form the compound. This complex noun can undergo iterated compounding, i.e., the output of each single compounding operation can feed a new process of the same kind. The new specifier specifies the already generated compound, and so on. More abstractly, this process can be encoded as in (292) with inner brackets erased: (292)

(a)

2-tuple compound:

[ X 2 l + Ui !-->! *2,xi 1 (b)

3-tuple compound:

(c)

-tuple compound [ x n 1 + [ x n -l, x n _ 2 , ..-, XI ] --> [ x n , Xn-1, *n-2. ···, *1 1

In principle, this process can be iterated ad infinitum. Normally, reasons of performance are appealed to in order to explain why actual compounds do not pass a critical number, presumably the magical number 7+1-2 (cf. Miller 1956). This is, in fact, a fully satisfying explanation. Thus, nothing else needs to be said about the possible size of compounds. But— slightly changing the point of view— why do speakers not make use of compounding even more rigorously as is already done in German? Plainly, compounding is a cheap means of avoiding cost one inevitably has to bear for clausal syntax. Why, then, don't we say everything in one word? Note that this question is a variant of the crucial question concerning language acquisition: why does the child build up phrase structures at all if quite elaborate semantic intentions can be expressed within a complex, but single lexical ele-

250

ment? Of course, the answer is that a complex semantics can be better expressed by a complex syntax. Especially temporal information cannot be conveyed by a compound. The crucial feature TNS can only be instantiated in clausal syntax (cf. Chomsky 1970).25 As for temporality, we simply cannot do without it! With regard to the overall ecology of compounds, let us take a look at other biological examples to shed some light on the problem. As is empirically known, the kernel of a cell cannot control a soma of arbitrary size. A single cell cannot have an arbitrary volume, although a quite considerable one. There seems to be a critical threshold: if the volume is above it, a spontaneous bifurcation—in the sense of self-organization—takes place and the cell divides. This is the reason why there exist not only mono-cellular beings but multicellular ones as well. The system, then, is in a complex regime because it consists of interacting parts. The exact reason for the bifurcation is probably that the relation of the kernel and the soma has become ineffective, that is biologically no longer adaptive. In order to avoid this, more complex alternatives are developed throughout evolution. Back to language acquisition: if simple Lexical Categories are stretched too far, they bifurcate into compounds. But compounds are still no sentences, only "more of the same". Thus, this solution is not fully satisfying, although an empirically possible one. Some languages such as French hardly draw on it at all, while other languages such as German heavily exploit it. When compounding also fails, clausal syntax is the next step—from an ex post facto point of view. Compounding becomes inferior, less powerful, less suited as compared to clausal syntax, although superior with regard to structural cost, and it keeps its own inalienable functions such as "naming", as we saw from Tilman's nominal compounds. But what is really "cheaper"? A "list" of Lexical Categories enumerated in a paratactic sequence, or phrasal syntax forming a hypotactic string which we call "sentence"? Obviously, clausal syntax is the most ecological and adaptive solution for the linguistic system. Note that in biological sytems, this always implies considerations of economy, but not exclusively (see chapter 17). To sum up: compounding is regarded as a heterologous precursor of functional phrasal syntax which is more or less suppressed by this successor in the course of acquisition. It maintains its priority where inalienable functions (such as naming) are concerned. Note that idiosyncrasies, too—be they collective, such as the abundance of compounds in German; be they individual, such as Tilman's fondness for nouns—can contribute to and shape this particular acquisitional phenomenon.

25

I am indebted to Helen Leuninger for reminding me of TNS in this connection.

Part C: Dynamical Principles and Notions in Language Acquisition 13

Oscillations

In the study of child language linguists are concerned with determining whether and when the child has eventually reached the target grammar. Following Brown (1973), a crude measure for mastery is the 90% boundary, i.e., when the child correctly utters a certain construction to 90% of the cases and more, adult competence is attributed to her. Does this imply that the child never falls back on previous stages but strictly clings to the chosen parameter value? Unfortunately for any such static approach, it has been observed that older children who have already settled on a target value exhibit what Weissenborn (1994) and Verrips/ Weissenborn (1992) call late errors. That is—while already in command of the target grammar—children still use representations stemming from previous stages: [...] in principle it is possible for the child to use structures that are characteristic of earlier development at any later moment (Lebeaux 1988, Weissenborn, Roeper/de Villiers, 1991). (Verrips/Weissenborn 1992: 313) Thus, we have to ask with Weissenborn how examples such as (293) are to be accounted for: (293)

(a)

Zero wh-phrases: * is'n das (what) is this

(b)

(2; 08; 15)

Simone

(2; 10, 11)

Simone

(3; 04; 05)

Simone

(2; 08, 15)

Infinitival clause: * ich auch was haben' I also something have

(e)

Simone

Wh-phrase + V-end: ? wann wir essen when we eat

(d)

(2; 10; 04)

Zero complementizers: * mal gucken (ob) des passt let's see (if) this fits

(c)

Simone

V3: * jetzt der muss doch wieder trocken werden now this must PART again dry get (from Weissenborn 1994: 235)

252

Weissenborn assures us that [...| whereas in the earlier stages the same deviant structures may be the result of the absence of some lexical information (e.g., tense, agreement) such that certain processes ( e.g., verb movement) need not and cannot apply, (FN omitted] this cannot be the reason for these later occurrences. (Weissenborn 1994: 235)

This phenomenon is widespread and can be met with in the whole realm of language acquisition. So, d'Avis/Gretsch (1994: 64) also report on it in connection with the acquisition of subordination: Even later, when a large part of the inventory of complementizers has been acquired, and when the child produces almost exclusively target-like subordinate clauses, we may still find phenomena (interruptions, undifferentiated filler syllables, deviant word order, etc.) which can then, however, no longer be interpreted as reflexes of construction-specific acquisition problems.

Weissenborn (1994) offers three possible explanations for this puzzle. Firstly, the child "entertains multiple grammars." (ibid., following Vainikka 1990). Secondly, "the child falls back on earlier grammars" under stress (ibid., following Lebeaux 1988/2000, 1990). On the assumption that these grammars stand in a subset relation, the Local Wellformedness Constraint (LWC) (see section 5.2.3) can properly explain their respective occurrences. However, Weissenborn favors a third, slightly different explanation, namely that both representations—the deviant one and the correct one—are created by the very same grammar and not by two different grammars among which the child switches back and forth. Again, in the sense of the LWC, only a subset of the computations is carried out. Lacking a late step, the derivation converges prematurely. Note that for the child the derivation really converges. Weissenborn compares these late child errors to adult speech errors and agrammatic speech: they all evidence the LWC. Several questions arise in this context, the first of which was already touched on in the introduction. Firstly: has the child stably settled on a parameter value when a criterion of maybe 90% (or whatever) has been reached? How informative is such a criterion? Secondly: how is the target value reached: linear-incrementally or in an oscillating manner? If the latter is true, then the further question arises whether this oscillation is due to inherent rhythmic ups and downs and/or whether it is due to the interaction with other external factors. With regard to the first question recall the dynamical account: under the assumption of competing liminal pre-representations, more than one ready-made candidate for a representation is expected; various such candidates compete and cooperate with one another in an ecological manner. One may precede the other and eventually be superseded by the latter. This does not mean that it has to vanish completely; it may occupy an ecological niche whenever possible. Thus, two alternatives may enter into a (low) damped oscillatory relation in the sense of a limit cycle. The major representation pulls the dynamics centripetally inside the attractor, the minor representation centrifugally pushes it outside. Both movements create the limit cycle attractor.1 But then we would in fact expect these rhythmic cycles to occur again and again, which is obviously not the case. Weissenborn's late errors indeed co-occur with the respective

With more than two factors, a torus would be established.

253

correct forms for a certain time, but not forever. Eventually, the correct form succeeds and the deviant form vanishes. These late errors resemble more a phenomenon known from behaviorism. After a phase of operant conditioning—when reinforcement stops—extinction normally sets in, i.e., the conditioned behavior vanishes in a more or less steep curve. But in the last third of the curve, a curious phenomenon, known as spontaneous recovery, shows up. Suddenly, there is a minor peak in the curve, corresponding to a sudden but modest revival of the behavior that is to be extinguished. Finally, the behavior totally extinguishes. The resemblance between spontaneous recovery and late errors suggests the idea that parameter-setting is like extinction or forgetting. By presupposition, this indirectly favors the idea that two competing grammatical values—the old value that is about to be given up and the new target value—were previously present. The old one is extinguished while the target value vigorously grows. Yet, the minor or precursor value may spontaneously recover under favorable circumstances, resulting in late errors. These favorable circumstances are probably also created by the oscillatory interaction in the system. Thus, late errors are epiphenomena such as steps, sawtooth-like curves, pretransitory dips, etc., (cf. van Geert 1993). In borrowing these terns from behaviorism, I do not intend to adopt or reinforce this particular paradigm; not even in the sense of a late error or of a spontaneous recovery. I have merely drawn the analogy between the respective phenomena in order to gain a certain insight into acquisition processes. The deeper explanation for both spontaneous recovery and late errors cannot stem from behaviorism, but must stem from dynamical systems theory. In fact, the analogy is not that straightforward. The picture is not fine-grained enough. Weissenborn himself provides evidence that even adults are victims of "very late" errors: (294)

(a)

Complementizer + V2-clause: Die tun so, als ob es sei verboten nachzudenken They do, as if it were fobidden to think

(b)

V-end: Was wir noch holen wollten! What we PART to-get wanted

(c)

Zero wh-operator: Sagt das zu wem? (who) says that to whom

(d)

V3:

Ach, Mönchen, eigentlich so'n grossen Putz hob ich heute keine Lust, ai, (Si)mone, rather such a big cleaning have I today no pleasure (=Simone, I am rather not enthusiastic about doing a big clean-up today) (e)

Infinitivais: (...) dann ich's Gumminbärchen wieder ausspucken then I the gummy bears again spit out (Weissenborn 1994: 236f.)

254

For him, adult speech errors obey the same principle, the LWC, as the late child errors do (ibid.). From a dynamical perspective, this would mean that different attractors still entertain a mutual relationship in the form of very long and damped oscillatory cycles so that the activity of the minor attractor is only weak and, as a consequence, the respective behavior occurs only rarely. This might also be the reason why this process is not perceived as a continuous, ongoing one, i.e., as a rhythmic alternation, but only as a single event which we happen to call "speech error". Thus, this kind of oscillation is a by-product of the interaction between two competing representations (cf. van Geert 1993: 284). There remains the question of intrinsic oscillation. Considering the evolution of the single target representation, reaching it is itself an intrinsically oscillatory process. In nature, many processes, although looking linear, turn out to be rhythmic under a more finegrained analysis. Remember the labeling of neuronal circuits by a common rhythmic frequency (see section 4.2.3.1). Van Geert (1993) points out that either oscillation, extrinsic and intrinsic, is important in dynamical systems (ibid.: 285). He notes that organic systems generally rely on "energetic and attentional resources" (ibid.) which cause intrinsic oscillations: The performance of tasks requires effort, which implies that some form of energy must be retrieved. In general, the recovery of energy is slower than its retrieval. Hence, the energetic system forces the process of cognitive acquisition into cycles of activity and rest or recovery. The same is true for the attentional resource. Continued attention to a specific object or activity leads in general to habituation or saturation of interest. It requires a period of recovery for the subject to become interested again in the same object or activity. These forms of energy and attention cycles can be dealt with in the form of time-lag models of growth, (van Geert 1993: 285)2 Of course, the child is not consciously "interested" in syntax and then "not interested" in it, as suggested by the metaphor here. Syntax is no conscious focus of attention; rather, it is omnipresent and cannot be switched on and off. But, of course, it is always submitted to basic rhythmic processes. The acquisition of syntax cannot escape the oscillatory cycles in the brain. Van Geert draws on lexical growth which is also non-linear: "We know from individual MLU data that the increase is not smooth, but rather irregular, showing oscillating monthly averages [...]." (van Geert 1993: 298) Speech errors—in adults as well as in children—witness the (presumed) oscillatory rhythm of the attentional and energetic resource. When the attentional resource has been consumed, which—after a general estimation of the frequency of speech errors—happens approximately every 1000 words (Fromkin 1971), the probability of the occurrence of a speech error is maximal. Discharge of entropy is another way to conceive of speech errors. Every natural dynamic system has to and does get rid of its inherent entropy. In this sense, speech errors are due to energetic discharges of entropy. In this vein, the idea of linearity and static acquisition vanishes in favor of a more dynamical view based on oscillations. 2

Van Geert (1993: 289f.) provides a whole collection of different oscillatory types. Time-lag oscillators, which arise because of a certain recovery time, are only one of them. Another type are relaxation oscillators, which first inhibit change, but when the change has taken place, then the new value is stuck to. Lotka-Volterra oscillators describe two growers—"one being negatively affected by the other while the other is positively affected by the first" — e.g.,/>r£ der Strauß, der Strauß, der klatschte immer viel applaus) the ostrich, the ostrich, he clapped always much applaus The ostrich always applauded much.'

(b)

S: saun (--> braun) 'brown1

S (3; 09, 15)

dot, ot (-- > rot) 'red1 tau (--> blau) 'blue1 du: n (--> grün)3 'green' dongs (--> orange) Orange' o:n (--> schön) 'beautiful' (c)

3

S: mama dada doch (--> mama, warte doch) mommy, wait PRT 'Mommy, wait.'

To weaken again the conjecture that she could orient herself to Tilman's speech, let me contrast Saskia's du:n ('green') with Tilman's corresponding token for "green", which was simply a sonorant [ ].

256

( (e)

S: lasse (--> klasse) 'wow!1 S: ana aus (--> anderer Strauß) Other ostrich1

S (3; 09, 19)

S (3; 07, 24)

ana uks (-> anderer fuchs) Other fox' ana ebra (--> anderes zebra) Other zebra1 eines ebra (--> kleines zebra) 'little zebra1 (296)

(297)

Morphonological "regression": reduced infinitival morpheme: -en —> 9 (a)

S: nane abschneida_ (-> alleine abschneiden) alone off-cut (She wants to cut off a star herself)

S (3; 09, 15)

(b)

S: gaga macha_ 'gaga make' (She is in the toilet)

S (3;09, 19)

(c)

S: nana zudemacht, anorak mama net zumache S (3; 09,23) alone close-made, anorak mommy not close-make '(I) closed the anorak on my own. Mommy (did) not close it.1

Morpho-syntactic "regression": final negation with nein ('no') (a)

S: dast, dast nein fits, fits no This does not fit.1

S (3; 07, 16)

(b)

S:mama, hilf mir nein mommy, help me no "Mommy, don't help me.'

S (3; 07, 16)

(c)

S: mama, hilft mir neicht mommy, help me no/not 'Mommy, don't help me.'

S (3; 07, 16)

In this last token (297c), both negators—the sentential negator nein ('no') and the constituent negator nicht ('not')—conflict and are eventually blended into neicht ('no/not'), a "speech error". Both systems—the previous one and the present one—meet here. Consider the next examples where a property of early child syntax is retrieved, namely pro-drop (or topic drop):

257

(298)

Syntactic "regression":pro-drop (a)

S: dast, dast nein (= 297a)4 fits, fits no 'It does not fit.'

S (3; 07, 16)

(b)

S: niese sneeze '(I) sneeze1

S (3; 07, 24)

Sometimes, the Saskia-as-Tilman-speech is only intonationally and phonetically marked, as in (299)

S: das deht deer (--> das geht schwer) this goes difficult This is difficult. 1

S (3; 07, 24)

Syntactically, this construction is correct. This semi-conscious language game reflects two linguistic aspects. Firstly, it mirrors Saskia's idea about "baby talk". Secondly, the examples show that she is still able to access her own previous grammar, but only in part. Certain properties, such as intonation and phonetic/phonological reduction, seem to be more salient in her memory, more easily recoverable and reproducable than others, especially morphological and syntactic properties. With regard to syntax, there are only few properties which are appropriately "recalled": (300) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

infinitival forms substituting for finite verb forms reduced or missing infinitival marker -en, pro-drop,5 (holistic) sentential negation with nein ('no') instead of constituent negation with nicht ('not').

That the "regression" is only a shallow one with the actual system always "shining through", is shown by the blend neicht ('no/not') in (297c) and the advanced construction with marked (dative) morphology in (297c). Here, the dative personal pronoun mir is inserted for the experiencer role. In the example (299), after all, only the phonology is reduced It would be an interesting task for linguists to investigate older children's capacity to retrieve previous linguistic stages, e.g., in a game of "talking like babies/small children", to find out core-features which seem to persist "under cover", such as infinitives or holistic negation, and to try to find out whether—at least in memory—the child's own previous syntax remains operative and accessible to a certain extent. Under the assumption of encapsulation of the linguistic module in the sense of Fodor's "modularity of mind" (1983) such retrieval is not at all expected!

4

5

Here, pro-drop!topic drop is fully acceptable in colloquial speech. Thus, any interpretation as "regression" is problematic: is it a true regression or just a stylistic variant? Normally, however, she does not drop pro, as in (299). Again, the qualification has to be made that pro-drop in the shape of topic-drop is a colloquial option in German.

258

In short, I have shown that, apart from spontaneous natural cycles, previous stages can also be accessed deliberately as a consequence of a strong psychological motive. Finally, I want to point out the broad correspondence of these phenomena with the evolution of the linguistic system in the sense of Lebeaux' (1988/2000) layers.

14

Bootstrapping

Bootstrapping has become the focus of recent generative research (cf. Penner 1994a+c, Fritzenschaft et al. 1991: 105, Fritzenschaft 1994, d'Avis/Gretsch 1994:69). Bootstrapping refers to a mechanism that applies in several modular domains. Thus, we distinguish (301) (i) semantic bootstrapping (cf. Pinker 1984, 1987) (ii) prosodic/phonological bootstrapping (cf. Morgan/Newport 1981, Morgan 1986) (iii) syntactic bootstrapping (cf. Penner 1994a+c; Gleitman, Gleitman, Landau/ Wanner 1989, cf. also Randall 1992) (iv) multiple bootstrapping (cf. Pinker 1987, Tucker/Hirsh-Pasek 1993: 367ff.) (For this list, cf. Pinker 1987 and Gawlitzek-Maiwald/Tracy 1994)

Recently, we have even become confronted with bilingual bootstrapping (cf. GawlitzekMaiwald/Tracy 1994). What does bootstrapping mean? It means "[...] lifting yourself up by your own bootstraps" (Hofstadter 1980: 24, quoted from Gawlitzek-Maiwald/Tracy 1994: 3) as Münchhausen did. With regard to language acquisition, this implies that certain knowledge gained in one module/domain can be "transferred" to another module/domain and serve a "booster function" (Gawlitzek-Maiwald/Tracy 1994: 3). This other module, then, quickly becomes enriched with linguistic knowledge. Or—putting it somewhat more weakly—one may say that "at least a temporary pooling of resources" (ibid.) between the two (or more) respective areas takes place, promoting the acquisition in both fields. According to Penner (2000: 114f), restriction and interface are crucial notions for understanding the bootstrapping mechanism. Firstly, the child restricts herself to only a subset of the relevant features for a given domain or component. Take, for example, phonology as the domain under consideration. The child first considers only suprasegmental information while ignoring segmental information. Secondly, the child uses this restricted information in order to detect regularities in another component. In the case of prosodic bootstrapping, the child exploits prosodic regularities in order to determine consitutent or word boundaries. Thus, bootstrapping takes place at the interface between these domains or components. Bootstrapping can proceed either (302) (i)

unidirectionally, e.g., semantic bootstrapping, where semantic notions such as agent, action, said proposition, inform the syntactic module about their canonical encoding such asnounlsubject, verb and sentence

or

(ii) bi-lmultidiretionally, i.e., in either direction, that is, both (or n) modules mutually support one another.

It is bi-directional bootstrapping which van Geert (1993: 313ff.) has in mind when discussing the principle of bootstrapping as a "support relation among cognitive species":

260 A mutual support relation implies that the growth in a cognitive species A positively modifies the growth in a species B, and vice versa, either by increasing the carrying capacity,1 or the growth rate,2 or both. If mutual support operates via the increase in the carrying capacity, we have a bootstrapping process. The carrying capacity can be increased by external sources, e.g., the parents' support shaping the child language in the sense of motherese. Generativists claim, however, that motherese plays no decisive role in the child's linguistic development. The child can do without motherese, or even despite motherese (cf. Tracy 1990).3 Another possibility is to allow for "a growth level to directly affect its own carrying capacity" (van Geert 1993: 314). This is an autocatalytic process. The child's grammar, in tentatively applying a syntactic "rule"4 correctly, is supported by convergence (success). As a result, the growth level increases. The system becomes more sensitive to this correct rule and the number of proper applications is augmented. As a further result, the carrying capacity increases. Eventually, the "rule" is stably acquired. Bootstrapping of any kind operates via redundancy and resonance. Redundancy becomes most obvious in the case of semantic bootstrapping where, e.g., the canonical categorial, syntactic encoding of the semantic notion of agent is the subject, or where an object is syntactically expressed as a noun. That is, semantics and syntax—although different modules—are closely related to each other and share parts of their respective information. To a certain degree, semantic notions are encoded in syntactic terms and vice versa, thus creating redundancy. Both modules are in a relation of resonance to each another via the canonical encodings; that is, whenever a semantic notion is touched on the respective syntactic relative is activated, and vice versa. In recent terminology, one would say that this happens on the semantic-syntactic interface. As should have become clear, bootstrapping is a proper dynamical mechanism and can be built into any model of dynamical systems theory (cf. van Geert 1993: 318). As such, it 1 2

3

4

Carrying capacity, according to van Geert, is the maximal growth level, i.e., all the resources the cognitive ecosystem can spend on the particular cognitive species, (cf. ibid.: 276) The growth rate r is the "increase in a growth level over a time interval t" (ibid.: 275); the growth level is the extension (absolute or relative) of a cognitive species, e.g., the number of words in the lexicon, or the percentage of correct application of the subject-verb inversion rule (cf. ibid.). I cannot join in the controversy about motherese here. But note that even the opposite scenario is possible: it is not the mother who, somehow unconsciously, shapes the child's language, but the child shapes the mother's speech and re-activates her own former language system. This would be a kind of childese. So, who shapes who? While it is certainly true that in mother-child interaction the influences are bi-directional—creating an ecosystem of its own—it is also true that this is no necessary precondition for language acquisition to proceed, but rather an empirical possibility that seems to be confined to a privileged, western educational style in a pedagogically interested, higher socio-economic class. However, I do not think that mother-child interaction is superfluous; not at all! Of course, the dynamical mill gets started and promoted only by linguistic interaction. I only believe that this special kind of interaction, i.e., motherese, is superfluous. I put the notion "rule" in quotation marks here, as it was abandoned by generative grammar with the introduction of the principles-and-parameters-approach (Chomsky 1981, Atkinson 1992). A "rule" such as the "subject-verb inversion rule" is better explained by the interaction of several linguistic modules, which ultimately results in an apparently structural "rule" the child follows. After this paradigmatic change, the notion "rule" can only be used informally.

261

influences individual trajectories of any child on her way through the epigenetic landscape. Interestingly, bootstrapping is frequently referred to in generative grammar, whereas other dynamical features such as oscillations are only implicitely present in the data discussed in generative language acquisition research (see chapter 13). But generativists do not seem to realize the whole impact of introducing dynamical principles such as bootstrapping. In my dynamical account, on the other hand, the principles are welcome and can be used to build a dynamical model. They fit. As for the different kinds of bootstrapping—prosodic/ phonological, semantic, syntactic, etc.—the matrix is open to be refined at any level, macroscopic and microscopic. By way of illustration, I want to point to bootstrapping mechanisms in Tilman's language acquisiton which are intra-individually stable but quite subtle. In almost any domain—case morphology, invention of proto-functional categories, subordination— Tilman's fondness for nouns shines through. Nominals are always first and almost artistically elaborated. Thus, one can reasonably speak of nominal bootstrapping that paves the way for and facilitates language acquisition for him. To use Pinker's words, for Tilman, nominals often are the "'seeds' that get the network started" (1987: 439). Although idiosyncratic and microscopic, this phenomenon is sufficiently robust to be diagnosed as another dynamical principle at work.

15

Symmetry-Breakers and Predators vs. Matter and Prey: The Relation between Functional and Lexical Categories

We already discussed the presumed role of Functional Categories enslaving lexical ones (see section 4.2.3.2). Elements belonging to an order parameter or attractor—here elements of the functional module—capture other elements—here elements of the lexical module. Rather than being lost, LCs convert into their corresponding FC-counterpart in the sense of Extended Projection (see section 5.2). This process is assumed to take place on either the phylogenetic or evolutionary (diachronic) time scale, or on the ontogentic (language acquisition) and micro-genetic time scale—not necessarily in an identical, but in a selfsimilar manner. The functionalization of lexical elements, through which determiners, complementizers, auxiliaries, grammatical affixes, etc. evolved, took place a long time ago in the history of a language. The child acquiring this language does not need to "recapitulate" or reconstruct the arbitrary and contingent history of any such element in a naive sense. This process is called grammaticalization (cf. Heine, Claudi/Hünnemeyer 1991, Himmelmann 1992, Traugott/Heine 1991 and the many references in Campes, Kutscher/Rudorf 1993). I do not want to dwell on grammaticalization here; however, it is important to relate this topic to ontogenetic change. The child takes up the already functional!zed items, the past history of which remains opaque to her, and uses them in an appropriate manner when her own system has reached the respective point of bifurcation and the transition from the prefunctional stage to the functional stage takes place. This means that there is a conspiracy between phylogeny and ontogeny. Functional elements stemming from phylogenetic bifurcation become operative only when the actual child grammar bifurcates, too. The premature use of PCs either remains in the realm of secondness—i.e., they are empirically used, but not yet as PCs—or their occurrence is due to independent constraints, e.g., the stem parameter forcing Italian bare stems such as pari- to join with another morpheme in order to become a proper word in contrast to English free-standing stems such as speak (cf. Hyams 1994). Because of the resonance between ontogeny and phylogeny, it is promising to look at grammaticalization from a dynamical point of view. Wildgen (1990) provides such a perspective. For him, grammar is "a product of historical self-organization" (ibid.: 423) much in the sense of Lightfoot (1991, cf. section 4.5.1). The future of the evolving grammar situated "on the edge of chaos and order" (cf. Kauffman 1993) is not fully predictable but adheres to common principles of self-organization which regulate structure building and structure loss: The grammar of a language is something in permanent growth and decay and therefore in a kind of flux-equilibrium. The process of decay governed by general laws (quasi-thermodynamic laws of language). (...] The development and stabilization of grammatical distinctions, categories and principles is commonly called 'grammaticalization'. It operates on a scale, comparable to a life-scale, which begins with spontaneous and mostly unstable 'solutions' to the problem of an effective coordination of verbal signalling and verbal decoding and ends

263 with highly specific markers, which have almost lost any individual signalling function and are merely parts of an interdependent system of grammatical devices." (Wildgen 1990: 423)1 Along these lines he derives a first definition of "grammaticalization": On the continuum between the lexicon and the grammar the process of grammaticalization turns lexical items into grammatical formatives and devices. This process may be observed diachronically and synchronically. (ibid.) 2 How are these changes initiated? The process is governed by two main forces which may be called: (303) (i) spontaneous use of lexical material to signal grammatical functions/ operations, (ii) stabilization of this use, loss of lexical specificity and conventionalization of the grammatical devices. While the processes in (b) are subject to empirical research and seem to be rather unproblematic, the processes in (a) are quite mysterious. This at least is Chomsky's view who states that biology has little to say on truly emergent properties such as the language faculty in general, or syntax in particular (see section 4.2.2.). A dynamical model of self-organization, however, can capture such spontaneous emergence. Much as the mind is regarded as an inherent and emergent property of the brain or— more generally—of matter, the grammar—comprising a set of Functional Categories and their respective "lexical" properties—is regarded as an emergent property of the lexicon. It is not surprising that special elements "fall out" and crystallize as functional architecture, phrase structure, computational neural circuits, etc. Nor is it surprising that these elements co-exist with the lexicon, or even form a modular lexicon of their own (cf. Ouhalla 1993). After establishing the functional module, these elements are fed back to the organism's already existing faculties, with which the new module can interact. In order to find an analogen to the recruitment of lexical entries for grammatical purposes, Wildgen points to processes known from biology. While he is careful enough not to derive a dynamical model of language change directly from these, he is courageous enough to propose Ά predator-prey relationship which looks like a limit cycle in the sense of chaos theory: The interplay of these forces [the two main forces (a) and (b) in the quotation above. A.H.] is comparable to a system of prey and predator. In an idealized scenario we may start with spontaneous ad-hoc solutions (based on lexical meaning) and end with a situation where language use is mainly controlled by grammatical rules. If we consider only the life-cycles of the preys (the lexical items which get grammaticalized) and a specific phase shift between subsequent

What do "quasi-thermodynamic laws of language" refer to in this context? Here, Wildgen appeals to the second law of thermodynamics, which, roughly, states an inevitable energy loss in any case of energy conversion. Entropy grows until the system suffers the so-called "heat death". "Diachronically" refers to the (vertical) history of a language; "synchronically" refers to several languages considered at the same point in time. While a given lexical item may still be a full content word in Language A, it may already have been fully grammaticalized, e.g., converted into a bound morpheme, in Language B, while in Language C it may still hang somewhere in limbo, liminally. "Synchronically" also means that in a single language, any level of grammaticalization may coexist for related or unrelated items. For an example, see the following text.

264

'generations of preys' we see that this leads to curves comparable to those of a prey predator model. At a point in time three levels of grammaticalization may coexist. (Wildgen 1990: 423) Wildgen briefly discusses the several generations of preys, comparing several expressions that encode locality: (304) (i) (ii)

"- on top of something" "- below something"

(iii) "- on something"

(ibid.: 424)

In (304a) grammaticalization is only weak, as the "relational noun" top still fully retains its semantic content. In (304b) the adposition below still possesses some lexical content, but it has already advanced considerably towards being a pure syntactic device. In (304c) grammaticalization is completed; the preposition on is a purely grammatical element. It is still a free morpheme. Other grammatical devices become bound morphemes and remain morphologically dependent on a lexical host, as the possessive -s in: (305)

"- my father's house" (ibid.: 424)

The various degrees of grammaticalization in a given language along the synchronic dimension suggest a chaos-theoretic description in terms of a limit cycle. Recall that a limit cycle is a rhythmically oscillating attractor with a cyclic trajectory in state space. It is particularly apt to describe predator prey-systems, e.g., the relation between the population of rabbits and foxes, or trout and pikes (cf. Briggs/Peat 1989, Bergerud 1989). When the prey prospers, i.e., when its population curve reaches its peak, the curve of the predator population also rises with a certain time lag. Too many predators cause the curve of the prey to decrease, and, as a consequence, its own curve also decreases, again with a time lag. Few predators give the prey enough time to recover, i.e., the population grows again, and so on. Here, an ecological balance is achieved, but not a static one with always the same number of population, but rather a cyclic, dynamical one. Let us now return to lexical and functional elements. Wildgen describes the onset of such a predator prey limit cycle in which single lexical items become the "prey" of functional elements during the course of diachronic language change. But the comparison is not straightforward. First, we have to explain where the predators come from. While in biological ecosystems foxes, pikes, etc. already exist or enter a biotope, we want to enquire into the evolutionary origin of predators here. We have to ask where the functional mode comes from. Note that PCs are assumed still to be absent initially; at first, there are only LCs in place. PCs do not "fall from the sky" in any mysterious way but evolve from LCs, or at least capture their "matter" and use it, changing their form and function in the course of history. The emergence of grammar is assumed to happen spontaneously, as the lexicon passes a critical threshold of number and complexity and the child's processing capacity becomes able to handle more and more linguistic information. Rather than adding new lexical elements to a linear list as in a dictionary, a dynamical lexicon bifurcates at a given time and sets free a potential for a novel faculty. The syntactic faculty happens to be such a novel faculty, which is functionalized in order to "tame" a lexicon that is well on its way to becoming chaotic. Thus, the predators, PCs, emerge from the prey; the lexicon recruits lexical items to act syntactically and to order the vast set of prey. Again, it appears that a sys-

265

tern in danger of becoming chaotic escapes into a complex regime and organically creates a new, ordered state. This new, ordered state, we call syntax. In the sense of Kauffman (1993), the poised state "at the edge of chaos" is reached by introducing syntax. In the slightly different sense of Cohen/Stewart (1994), we could speak of the "collapse of chaos", by means of which the new knowledge state is attained. Furthermore, we have to distinguish between vertical and horizontal capture. Wildgen emphasizes diachronic grammaticalization which converts a lexical item into a functional one. In the course of time, i.e., on the vertical time axis, a given lexical element is swallowed up by a functional one. But this is not the whole story. In every sentence, in every phrase marker, every LC is captured by its respective FC in its EP. In the competent adult system a noun usually does not appear as a bare lexical category but is inflected, determined, etc.; a verb is tensed, it agrees (with the subject and/or with the object(s)), it bears aspect, it is negated, etc. This functional capture happens on the horizontal time axis, i.e., in syntax. It seems that diachrony and synchrony behave in a fractal manner again. Capture takes place vertically as well as horizontally. In both cases it is always the lexicon which serves as the thesaurus for emerging properties. In general, matter possesses inherently novel properties which emerge through bifurcation or symmetry-breaking. These emergent properties manifest themselves as mind, soul, etc., always together with a particular physical base such as the brain, which is emergent, too, as an objective and substantive reflex of evolution. This process is called self-organization. In addition, we have to consider ontogeny, here, language acquisition. It is clear that the child does not have to reconstruct diachronic grammaticalization but can treat functional elements in an opaque way as FCs from the beginning. But the crucial bifurcation—from lexicon to syntax, from the prefunctional to the functional stage—must be achieved anew by every child. Thus, vertical capture and, of course, horizontal capture, must take place. This is assumed to happen via self-organization in ontogeny. The tripartite, liminal algorithm with all the dynamical principles described above—bifurcation, symmetry-breaking, oscillations, under-specification, bootstrapping, precursors, cumcursors, resonance, slaving, etc.—navigates the child through her epigenetic landscape until she eventually converges on the respective attractors. Finally, we have to consider the fate of Lexical Categories. What happens to them after vertical or horizontal capture? Are they inevitably lost or do they remain under cover or revive again as Lexical Categories? Let us first consider horizontal capture. If we look at a fully projected, abstract phrase-marker, say, a German CP as in:

266 (306)3 German CP CP

/\ Spec

C'

/\ C°

IP

/\

Spec

Γ

/\ Γ

VP

/\

v°

it immediately becomes clear that the Lexical Category V,4 along with its VP-projection, is not lost completely, but undergoes merger with its respective functional frames by Project-alpha in the sense of Lebeaux (1988/2000), or is extended in the sense of Grimshaw (1991, see section 5.2). Normally, the competent speaker may not utter bare Lexical Categories; only the child or a pidgin speaker may do so.5 But, as pointed out by Lebeaux, there remain ecological niches where Lexical Categories may "go native". Lebeaux and Keyser/Roeper (1992) cite idioms such as those in (307) and (308), where X°-categories like Ν οτ A still prevail:6 (307)

(308)

break bread make tracks keep tabs

(N) (N) (N)

make strides

(N) (Lebeaux 1988: 247)

lose touch lose face take risks take advantage shake loose play dumb hang tough

(N) (N) (N) (N) of (A) (A) (A) (Keyser/Roeper 1992: 93)

Keyser/Roeper (1992) give a comprehensive explanation of this phenomenon in terms of their universal c/jfic-position of the verb, which can host 3 4 5 6

Alternatively, take any other, more elaborate phrase marker including CP, TP, AGR-S, AGRDO, AGR-1O, NegP, ASPP, etc. The nominal phrase-marker would look accordingly. I deliberately ignore aphasics with agrammatism here (cf. Ouhalla 1993). The examples in (307) and (308) are identical with those in (31) and (32) in section 5.2. They are reproduced here for convenience.

267 (309) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)

rethe abstract dative marker particles idiomatic nouns idiomatic adjectives

and a number of other, invisible clitics (cf. Keyser/Roeper 1992: 94ff.). In short, bare Lexical Categories as linguistic "autochthonous" elements may survive under favorable circumstances in a linguistic ecosystem. So much for horizontal capture. Let us now consider vertical capture. What happens to a Lexical Category which once was recruited as a functional element? Is it possible for such a grammaticalized element to return to its lexical base again? While this is an empirical possibility, it is not really probable. A return is almost excluded because of the long developmental pathway covered by the respective element, which is full of contingent and unpredictable events. More importantly, it is excluded because there is no "recollection" of its former status as a lexical item. The question thus turns out to be rather fruitless, but it is addressed here in order to investigate whether there is a corresponding phase of decrease of syntactic predators following the phase of grammaticalization, i.e., the capture of lexical prey. This would in fact be expected from a limit cycle perspective. In population dynamics, limit cycles repeat themselves over and over again within a certain time span. The populations of predators and prey thus oscillate in recurring, rhythmic patterns. If Wildgen's proposal were valid, such an oscillation should also be expected for lexical and functional items, viewed diachronically. But we must consider very long temporal phases which are not easily surveyed, not even by historical linguistics concerned with language change. Moreover, both modules—the lexical and the functional one—are not as straightforwardly coupled as real biological predators and prey are. The lexicon containing the open class elements deliberately increases by adding new entries, whereas the grammatical inventory harboring closed class elements cannot react with an increase of its own elements that easily, and in fact it does not need to. Our grammar can work equally well with a small or with a big lexicon. Thus, it cannot be the absolute number of lemmata which is decisive. What else is decisive, then? If we take the Lexical Categories N, A, V, P, the situation is almost reversed. Now, we have more predators than prey, because not only are there Del, Neg, AGR, Tense, Asp, C, I, etc., but every single lexical item is already captured by a functional one. But note that this is only the case for functionally rich languages, i.e., those currently known to linguistic inquiry. There might be natural languages which exhibit only a small number of PCs. Poverty of PCs has in fact been claimed for Japanese (cf. Fukui 1986, Fukui/Speas 1986). Propositions take the form of VPs there; IP is defective, but might be in place; CP is claimed to be absent. If this state of affairs is true, it would have to be determined whether Japanese was functionally rich prior to this state and is just sliding down the slope of the predator-curve in the limit clyle or whether it is still at the foot of the increasing curve. It is also true that the PCs, e.g., verbs, retain their lexical nature after being captured by a functional element and the latter gets affected by it. It is the verb which transfers its categorial feature I+V/-NJ to the entire EP. Thus, the categorial information is retained and governs the syntactic processes within the EP, e.g., through which heads the verb might

268

move in the course of the derivation. A verbal head (normally) cannot move into a nominal head but only into another verbal one within its own EP. What can we learn from these bold speculations? The major insight is that the relation between the lexicon and syntax, between LCs and PCs, is a dynamical rather than a static one. Here, we have studied the ontogenetic aspect on a medium time scale, but we may also try to make some diachronic conjectures, on a macroscopic time scale. Any historical linguist will do better than me in this respect. An example of morphological loss is the German dative marker -/j, which was common some 150 years before, as in (310)

Eckermann schrieb Goethe« einen Brief. 'Eckermann wrote Goethe-iizia letter.'

Similarly, the recent loss of the genetive -5 has been observed, as in (311)

das Kleid des Mädchen(s) The dress of the girl-ge/i.'

Nevertheless, it is clear that in both cases "abstract" case is retained. When considering language acquisition or creolization, i.e., dissipative structure building, we always realize only the "mounting" side of the curve but never the whole sinuscurve, let alone the complete oscillatory pattern. But gain and loss, rise and fall, must be considered together. Their relation should be carefully studied. A dynamical model offers an organic frame for these speculations. Speculations, however, should be handled with caution, especially because the survey of very long temporal periods is necessary. In this vein, Wildgen (1990: 425) draws conclusions about the various dynamical aspects of language: Language genesis, language use and grammars show many features of self-organization. [...] At the level of grammars we observe the effects of large populations over long historical periods leading to highly stable structures which are clearly outside the conscious control of the participants in this process. Some of these processes convert lexical information into grammatical information and may be conceived of as stable limit cycles.

The idea that the lexicon and the emerging grammar are related in an oscillatory manner especially during acquisition is explored in detail by van Geert (1993), who reviews the empirical work of Brown (1973) and Dromi (1986, 1987, 1990), among others. He conceives of the lexicon and the grammar as two different linguistic "growers" (compare section 4.5.1.1) that enter into a partly competitive, partly supportive relation as soon as the second grower, grammar, evolves.7 Van Geert is silent on the intrinsic relation between LCs and PCs in the sense I explored above—that grammar is an emergent product of the lexicon. He simply explores their empirically observable interaction. Yet, for him, too, "the emergence of new dimensions in the state space" is "a major challenge for dynamic systems models of development." (cf. van Geert 1993: 294) He starts by considering the early growing lexicon at the age of 8 to 10 months and then looks at "the onset of a new growth process, namely the growth of syntax" (ibid.: 271) at the age of 18 months. When this second species begins to grow and the child enters the two-word phase and afterOf course, the lexicon as well as syntax also interact with other modules such as phonology, morphology, semantics, and conceptual knowledge. Here, I focus on the relation between the lexicon and syntax alone.

269 wards the multiple-word phase, "a significant decrease in the rate of word acquisition as compared with the just preceding one-word stage" (ibid.: 273) can be observed. This means that initially both growers are inversely correlated: "Lexical growth rate sharply decreases as syntactic growth starts." (ibid.: 274) This fact is a necessary consequence of van Geert's conception of a cognitive ecosystem where cognitive species grow under the restriction of limited resources. When a new grower appears on the stage—for whatever reason—and demands part of the resources—computational time, space, energy, attention, etc.—the already settled or preceding growers can retrieve only fewer resources. The growth rate of the ancestor species may also decline for intrinsic reasons such as habituation, setting free part of the resources for other species (cf. van Geert 1993: 298). When habituation takes place in the succesor grower, resources are again free to be spent on the first species, and so on, in a microscopically oscillating manner. All species have to achieve a new balance, given the changing demands on the new, overall cognitive ecosystem (cf. ibid.: 291). But what appears to be a short-time loss might turn out a gain in the long run. After the introduction of syntax, the lexicon is observed to further expand, that is, syntax creates a new and higher growth level for the lexicon. This is intuitively straighforward, as syntax allows for, and even demands, more and more lexical elements to be combined—more than a bare lexicon in the one-word stage would be able to deliver (cf. ibid.: 291). Here again the interaction between growing computational faculties and a growing lexicon is crucial. As a result, the initial picture is almost turned upside down in the course of time. It appears that the relations between the two growers (...) may be rather complex. For instance, a sufficient number of words is needed in order to make the emergence of the species 'syntax' possible (conditional/supportive relationship), but once syntax starts growing it will competewith the species 'lexicon' for time and attention, although both species depend on each other (knowledge of syntactic categories positively affects the learning rate of later words; Dromi, 1990). The combination of supportive and competitive relationships among such species probably accounts for the fact that their growth is not monotonic but rather oscillatory, (van Geert 1993: 274) Again, it is the limit cycle that fits this scenario rather than an isolated and linear development. This oscillatory relation is instigated by a "threshold effect" (ibid.: 291). A certain amount of elements stored in the lexicon is necessary to allow syntax to emerge. In the empirical study of Dromi (1986), this threshold is reached when the lexicon contains about 350 items (cf. van Geert 1993: 295). Note that the development of the lexicon itself is punctuated by a threshold called "vocabulary spurt" (cf. Goldfield/Reznick 19%). It is frequently observed that at an intake level of ca. 50 lexical items, the lexicon suddenly and dramatically spurts. This nonlinear change is due to a "critical mass" (cf. Marchman/Bates 1994) of lexical entries which accelerates the further intake rate. The precondition for a rapidly growing lexicon is a mature phonological component. The child can add new lexical entries only if her phonological component is rich enough to provide enough distinctions for the growing mass of needed phonological forms. In her study on the acquisition of the phonological place feature, Levelt (1994) shows how the transition from a small protolexicon to the mature lexicon is achieved in terms of the "phonologization of the lexicon" (Levelt 1998: 175 summarizing Levelt (1994)). First, a single place feature is spread over the entire word, e.g., words are

270

labial, e.g., [pom], or coronal, e.g., [tin]. It is clear that with only one feature per word only few lexical contrasts can be expressed. In a second step, the onset of the word can acquire an independent place feature; words like [torn] and [pin] are possible now, too. In a third step, the coda of the word can acquire an independent place feature; words like [tip] and [pok] become available. In the end, also the nucleus can be freely specified for its place feature. Now, a lot more lexical contrasts can be expressed. Taken together, we arrive at an understanding of how the developments in each domainphonology, lexicon, morpho-syntax—are dynamically interrelated. Syntax can only grow when the lexicon has a certain size; the lexicon can only grow when enough phonological contrasts can be made. The "critical mass" is a crucial variable in this process. The critical mass hypothesis has been related to the later emergence of syntax. Syntax is conceived of as an emergent property of the lexicon having a certain size. Both specieslexicon and syntax—compete, but also support each other. Thus, we face a bootstrapping mechanism, as already discussed in chapter 14. Bootstrapping, again, is one ingredient of a dynamical ecosystem, where "each variable depends on other variables for its growth and continuity within the cognitive system." (van Geert 1993: 291) All these variables form a "state space" (ibid.: 292) which changes over time. Dynamical systems theory tries to compute "theoretical trajectories" (ibid.) which model the actual movements of the variables in the state space by dynamical rules. As already pointed out above (see sections 1.3.2 and 4.4), a child may start from any point inside the "initial state space" (ibid.: 294) or basin of attraction, that is, the fragment that covers all initial state values that actually occur [...]. In principle, any trajectory in the space starting from the initial subspace describes either a potential or an acutal developmental sequence of a single subject." (ibid.: 294)8

Van Geert's approach and Dromi's data have been taken up by Elman et al. (19%, chapter 4). They remodel vocabulary growth with a set of different nonlinear equations until they fit the actually observed data best. They also tackle the question whether observable "stages" in lexical development—like the vocabulary spurt or u-shaped development—can be modeled without assuming an underlying change in the cognitive system such as a "naming insight". They show how complex behavior can be modeled by respective nonlinear equations without any external causation. The promise of a dynamical model in the ecological sense of van Geert is to provide the technical devices—sets of logistic difference equations—for modeling empirical trajectories of individuals through the state space. These models all incorporate the prime features of self-organizing dynamical systems. Rather than attributing trajectories to a cryptic structure or plan, they are conceived of as empirical solutions within the range offered by the given parameters. Chaos theory and dynamical systems theory are apt to handle dynamical principles in particular. With such a framework new lines of research can be instigated and, hopefully, new answers can be given to old questions.

Remember that dynamical systems theory naturally conspires with idiomaticity (see section 1.3.2).

16

The Trigger

16.1

Introduction

In generative language acquisition research the trigger traditionally plays an important role —conceptually and empirically—and is inherently tied to the principles-and-parameters model (cf. Roeper/Williams 1987, Borer/Wexler 1987, Gibson/Wexler 1994, Meisel 1995). The notion of the trigger and the problems associated with it are tied to the continuity hypothesis (see section 2.2 ) in particular. This approach claims that the child modestly reorganizes her grammer after the recognition of certain triggers in the input: features or constructions that have not played a major role before now become crucial in the child's perception. In terms of White (1981), what has previously been mere input now becomes intake. Before reviewing the generative trigger debate, let us take one step back and consider the trigger from a paradigmatic point of view. Although the trigger is discussed controversly in generative literature, there is a consensus that it is, to varying degrees, an indispensable ingredient of any acquisition concept. It is Chomsky's bold claim in his principles-andparameters model (1981 and following studies) that external linguistic stimuli, i.e., features of the Primary Linguistic Data (PLD), serve as triggers for the linguistic parameters. The trigger has a crucial impact on the child's grammar in that a small cause has a great effect. When a certain linguistic category is perceived and its grammatical features are analyzed, the corresponding parameter is set with all its consequences. This characteristic of the trigger should astonish us, since generative grammar is a static, linear model with preconceived structures, nativist determinism, etc.; the trigger, on the other hand, is a nonlinear element with dynamical features. In fact, the trigger is the only explicit nonlinear ingredient of the generative conception of language acquisition so far. Operating with this notion in an unreflected way, generative researchers do not seem to fully realize what kind of instrument they hold in their hands. Generativists hardly recognize the nonlinear nature of the trigger and its intrinsic relevance to a dynamical model of language acquisition, or even treat the trigger like a linear phenomenon as in the continuity claim, especially in the LEXLERN-approach of Clahsen and his colleagues. Since generative grammar is not a full-fledged nonlinear, dynamical model, the trigger has not gained— and more importantly, cannot gain—true theoretical impact and explanatory force. This situation will hopefully change now with the introduction of a dynamical model of self-organization. What has so far remained implicit—the nonlinear character of the trigger—will now become explicit. In fact, the trigger discussion offers one of the best opportunities to introduce and motivate dynamical principles in the current generative controversy. The trigger concept therefore has prime relevance to the argumentation put forward here. Along this way, some long-standing misunderstandings and frozen claims have to be overcome. Among these are the "prince-kisses-princess" claim, the claim of equivalence of cause and result, the crucial transition from input to intake, or from secondness to thirdness, and the controversy of continuity vs. discontinuity. Let us briefly discuss these topics.

272 Firstly, a common generative view is that at a certain time the child encounters a trigger in the PLD—a new category, phrase structure or construction. This resembles the fairy tales where the sleeping princess is kissed by the prince and wakes up. However, we need another picture because the child's grammatical system does not passively wait for an external impulse to then react with internal restructuring. As a matter of fact, no generativist actually pronounces such an inappropriate trigger metaphor. A compromise view between the generativist and a dynamical systems design would be the "key-keyhole" metaphor, where the trigger tries several times to "unlock" the door to a new grammar but fails unless the system's internal restructuring provides the adequate keyhole—just like only a particular base fits in the DNA string and puts it to work. Crucially, the system must not be confined to passivity and the trigger to activity; instead, it has to be recognized that the system actively prepares the arrival of the trigger and creates the appropriate environment for the final and inevitable triggering act. This very act is only a singular event in a whole drama and loses much of its mystery if part of the responsibility for proper triggering is returned to the (self-)organizers in the background. In fact, we need a major shift from figure to ground —from the trigger to the system's structure (see section 16.3). Secondly, in linear systems the result of a change resembles its cause, quantitatively and qualitatively. As already pointed out in section 4.5, this is not true of nonlinear systems where small causes may have great effects under circumstances of nonequilibrium (cf. Stadler/Kruse 1990: 36, Stadler/Kruse 1992: 135, Prigogine/Stengers 1990: 14). Perhaps, dynamical systems generally tend to move towards states of "self-organized criticality", as claimed by Bak/Chen (1991). Many small, and sometimes few bigger, avalanches discharge the energy surplus that has been linearly accumulated. That is, the system repeatedly climbs up to points of criticality and supercriticality where minor triggers lead to a major catastrophy and the system is released into a subcritical state, and so on. This non-equivalence of cause and effect is readily accepted in generative grammar, as pointed out initially and nicely illustrated by the following statement: "A trigger need not be 'isomorphic' with, and not even analogous to, the structure it sets in motion." (Piattelli-Palmarini 1994: 327) From a strategic point of view, any dynamical argumentation had best start from here. We will see how far mutual agreement can take us and where the claims diverge. Thirdly, we have to reconsider the critical change from input to intake, a major insight given by Lydia White (1981), a generative researcher. While a verbal distinction—input vs. intake —is provided, the differentiation is still unclear. What turns input into intake, what makes a trigger a trigger? The philosophical refraining I tried to give by the aid of Peirce's category theory (see section 1.4.1) does not take us any further. We could say that secondness turns into thirdness and map secondness onto input and thirdness onto intake. While this would at least be coherent, we would still have to ask for an overall paradigm in which these features could unfold their explanatory potential, i.e., gain thirdness of their own. Such a paradigm is supposed to be a dynamical one. Fourthly, the trigger again points to the relation of continuity and discontinuity (see section 4.5). The system's trajectory may in fact be continuous for a long period, but when triggering takes place, a sudden and abrupt bifurcation may discontinuously place the system into another regime; or, to speak with Lightfoot: abrupt change is preceded by longterm gradual change (1992: 160, see section 4.5.1). It is self-evident that this feature of the trigger is crucial, especially for any continuity approach (cf. Pinker 1987).

273 In order to fully capture the significance of the trigger in the various generative approaches, let us briefly review the generative discussion.

16.2 The Trigger in Generative Models of Language Acquisition A comprehensive and cautious discussion of the various generative concepts is given in Meisel (1995), who handles the trigger discussion as a delicate problem for a theory of language acquisition which holds as one of its fundamental hypotheses that much of the relevant information is not contained in the primary linguistic data. (Meisel 1995: 18) As generativists reject triggering in the sense of "inductive learning" (ibid.), they are much closer to dynamical models as one might think. To that extent, generative grammar and dynamical systems theory even resemble each other: the PLD do not have the prime status they have in a behaviorist or connectionist framework. Of course, generativism and a dynamical systems model disagree in that generative grammar emphasizes a priori knowledge structures, whereas a model of self-organization emphasizes the internal process of interaction between elements such as the joint cooperation of nerve cell assemblies. In generative grammar, parameters are conceived of as being set by an algorithm which crucially relies on triggers. One such algorithm is put forward by Gibson/Wexler (1994). The authors take their Triggering Learning Algorithm (TLA) to be the "most natural such algorithm" (ibid.: 409), which is implicitely assumed in the generative trigger discussion. The TLA proceeds in the following way: (312)

The Triggering Learning Algorithm (TLA)

Given an initial set of values for n binary-valued parameters, [FN omitted. A.H.] the learner attempts to syntactically analyze an incoming sentence S. If S can be successfully analyzed, then the learner's hypothesis regarding the target grammar is left unchanged. If, however, the learner cannot analyze S, then the learner uniformly selects a parameter P (with probability 1 In for each parameter), changes the value associated with P, and tries to reprocess S using the new parameter value. If analysis is now possible, then the parameter value change is adopted. Otherwise, the original parameter value is retained. (Gibson/Wexler 1994: 409f.) In this algorithm, the triggering piece of the PLD is a sentence 5, the unsuccessfull parse of which causes the internal system to reject the old parameter value and to select a new one. If S can be parsed with this new value, it is the triggering information for the parameter value adopted now. Gibson/Wexler characterize their TLA by the following three features. Firstly, the TLA is error-driven in that the learner's hypothesis is only changed if no syntactic analysis can be provided for a certain sentence, given a particular parameter value. Secondly, it requires neither negative evidence nor memory of previous data and parameter settings. Thirdly, the TLA is conservative in that only one parameter value is changed if a current analysis fails, rather than changing the overall array of parameters which would result in a grammar radically different from the previous one (cf. ibid.: 410). Let us now take a closer look at the particular elements that serve as triggering information: how are they to be characterized? Meisel gives four features of the PLD ultimately serving as triggers (cf. 1995: 18ff.). These features are commonly agreed upon in the generative literature.

274 Firstly, the PLD convey only positive evidence (cf. the TLA above). Thus, any trigger must be a positive piece of linguistic information. Secondly, the reliability of the PLD is only weak. Phrase-markers only ambiguously contain information about the proper parameter values—a classical example is pro-drop. Moreover, real-time speech is partly ungrammatical. As Meisel correctly points out, poor reliability becomes disastrous in a trigger theory which stresses that only a few tokens should suffice to set a parameter. If these few tokens are hidden in overall noise, the child will hardly be able to accomplish this task. Yet, from a dynamical point of view, one would invoke hysteresis as a counteracting force against the "pendulum problem" (cf. Randall 1990, 1992). Moreover, self-organizing systems, as pointed out by Singer (see section 4.2.3), are exquisitely apt at reconstrucing the whole pattern from only few and distorted pieces of a token, probably due to their fractal character. But let us return to generative grammar. Thirdly, Meisel discusses how frequent and how long the child should be exposed to the relevant trigger. Questions about a "trigger threshold" (cf. Randall 1992: 100, cited in Meisel 1995: 20) or about salience, frequency, accessibility and robustness are still unanswered. Rather than relying on "quantitative criteria" (Meisel 1995: 20f.), Meisel opts for a solution in terms of grammar-internal notions leading to a "unique trigger" proposal (see below) and to a ban on parameter resetting (cf. Clahsen 1991). Fourthly, Meisel proposes "to define accessibility in structural terms" (Meisel 1995: 21). How complex is the phrase markers the child actually considers? The proposals range from degree-0-leamability (cf. Lightfoot 1989, 1991)1—the consideration of root sentences without any embedding suffices to set all parameters—over degree-1-learnability—at least one level of embedding must occur (cf. Roeper 1973, Roper/Weissenborn 1990, Penner 1994c)—to degree-2-leamability—twofold embedding is required. Researchers commonly favor degree- 1-learnability and claim that embedded clauses play a central role in determining what primary word order a grammar exhibits, or whether a grammar is + or - pro drop, among others. With regard to the question why accessibility should be defined in structural terms, Meisel (1995: 21) argues as follows: Only to the extent that the child is capable of assigning a structure to an element encountered in the input can this feature be integrated into the grammar of the learner. Since the determination of a structural trigger domain—the part of a phrase marker in which the trigger appears or is looked for—is crucial, let us explore the special claim of Roeper (1973), Roeper/Weissenborn (1990) and Penner (1994b+c) that the child pays extraordinary attention to the subordinate clause. This "subordinate clause strategy" (Roeper 1973, quoted in Meisel 1995: 22) or "root/non-root distinction" (Müller/Penner 1994, Penner 1994c), goes along with another assumption, the "Unique Trigger Hypothesis". The latter claims that for any parameter there exists one unambiguous or "telltale" trigger2 (cf. also Weissenborn 1994) which automatically sets the parameter to the correct value—once the child has encountered it: 1 2

In fact, Lightfoot proposes degree-0 "plus a little" (Meisel 1995: 22). The term "telltale trigger" was coined by Valian (1990, see Roeper/Weissenborn 1990: 151) as a biological alternative to her hypothesis testing-comparison model. The notion of a "unique trigger" is also held by Roeper/deVilliers (1992).

275

(313) The Unique Trigger Hypothesis If a given parameter is marked by several features, then there will be one unique trigger specified in UG. (Roeper/Weissenborn's (9) in 1990: 151)

Why should such a telltale trigger exist? It is called for because of the ambiguity with which any parametric choice is encoded in the data. Unfortunately, the quest for the correct trigger for a given parameter, especially worked out for the pro-drop parameter (cf. Hyams 1986), has proven unsuccessful. In fact, Hyams and others never found it. Should the prodrop parameter be primarily related to expletives, to postverbal subjects, to morpholgically uniform verbal inflection or to clitic climbing?3 None of these are unambiguous triggers. Roeper/Weissenborn (1990: 152), nevertheless, claim that such an unambiguous trigger exists for every parameter: What the child must find is the one crucial feature which definitely sets the parameter; all other corollary features can exist for either option of the parameter.

The authors' persistent pursuit of the notion of a telltale trigger may, however, lead to a dead end. This danger is partly amended by the authors themselves, who introduce subparameters to counteract the original primary parameter We argue that there is a general parameter which creates a productive rule with a number of consequences. Once set, however, there exist subparameters which are local and structure-specific, which may reverse the original parameter. In effect a parameter creates a set of unmarked biases for a series of subparameters. The unmarked setting of the subparameter will depend on how the primary parameter is set. There must be a specific unique trigger for the primary parameter so that the child does not generalize 'subparametric variation' to include all grammatical environments where pro-drop is possible. (Roeper/Weissenborn 1990: 154)

In the case of pro-drop, the authors identify German V2 in matrix clauses (with the V in C licensing an empty topic in Spec CP) as such a localized trigger. Note that such a choice becomes available only after the setting of the primary parameter, here for -pro-drop in German (cf. ibid.: 155). The primary parameter itself is set by scrutinizing the subordinate clause. In the pro-drop case, an embedded CP with lexical material in Spec CP or a complementizer in C blocks the formation of a topic-chain—which alone could license an empty pro in German, in contrast to Italian—and therefore acts as a unique trigger domain: The emergence of the CP-system restricts the licensing possibilities for null subjects in specific environments (embedded clauses) in the child's grammar. What happens if an empty subject occurs in this environment when it has been analysed by the child? It then functions as a 'unique trigger' for pro-drop, (ibid.: 156)

The accessibility of the correct trigger domain for pro-drop has to await the elaboration of yet another parameter, namely wA-movement to Spec CP (cf. ibid.: 158). Thus, we also have to consider parametric interaction, viz. parametric ordering. While the unique trigger conception is worked out in full detail and gives a convincing and coherent picture of what kind of trigger causes parameter setting in what domain, it fails to provide an answer to other urging questions, the first of them being the longstanding question of "Why now?" (cf. Aslin 1993: 397) Why does the child consider the subordinate clause at a specific time and encounters the telltale trigger only then? One could even These options are quoted from Roeper/Weissenborn (1990: 151).

276 ask: what "triggers" the trigger's becoming a trigger at this specific time?, and so forth. Moreover, is it in fact only this single, distinguished trigger which sets the parameter? This external linguistic element then has to bear the whole burden of triggering. A partial explanation as to why a certain trigger has to wait for its optimal triggering time is given by the notion of ordered parameters. Before, say, the wA-movement parameter has been set by its telltale trigger, the pro-drop telltale trigger may not operate. This is quite in the sense of Penner/Müller (1992) and Penner (1994c), where a parametric decision is frozen unless the local subparameters are set. As a first approximation to the target value, so-called "finger-print knowledge" (Penner 1994c) is attained. Maybe this reasoning best fits to acknowledgement of the internal state of the overall system as being prepared for, and in fact forcing, a trigger to appear, a scenario that would follow from a dynamical point of view (see section 16.3). D'Avis/Gretsch (1994: 66f.) highlight what is still missing in the present conception of parameters and triggers in generative grammar The conception of parameters and their triggers does not yield any immediately applicable proposals for the description of a developmental process that is continuous and rich in variation. Moreover, it is unclear how the necessary interaction between data-driven (bottom-up) and goal-driven (top-drown) processes can be accounted for by the parameter model. The latter problem in particular will be tackled by the following dynamical conception of the trigger.

16.3 A Dynamical Trigger Conception My attempt to improve the current notions of the trigger and of the process of triggering centers around several interrelated topics: Firstly, it is claimed here that the trigger itself must not be viewed in isolation, but always in connection with the overall state of the system it is acting upon. The trigger is the symmetry-breaker which ultimately fixes the state the linguistic system is in. This claim includes questions of autopoiesis and autocatalysis. In this connection it is important to point out that Chomsky (1980) attributes to the trigger not only a triggering function, but also a shaping function. With the latter characterization Chomsky relates the trigger more closely to the language system than generative models of language acquisition normally do.4 Secondly, a distinction is made between internal and external triggers and the role of fluctuations. Is it an internal control parameter, or a piece of external data, or only "random noise" which is crucial for triggering? Thirdly, a trigger hierarchy is proposed, in which the specific triggering event is seen as only the tip of the iceberg and as dependent on a less spectacular series of undifferentiated trigger instantiations which ultimately leads to the final triggering event. The notion of a trigger hierarchy used here must not be confused with Penner's (1994c, cf. also Penner/ 4

I am indebted to Helen Leuninger for bringing this point to my attention.

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Weissenborn, to appear) triggering hierarchy, which is connected to his Strong Continuity approach and his concept of canonical vs. non-canonical triggers partly discussed above (see section 13.2.2). While canonical triggers are "optimally accessible to syntactic bootstrapping" (Miiller/Penner 1994: 8) and can be directly read off from the asymmetries involved in root vs. non-root contexts, non-canonical triggers are language-specific idiosyncrasies which are hard to determine as no bootstrapping mechanisms are available there. This canonical vs. non-canonical distinction determines an accessibility hierarchy. A pure, canonical parameter and its trigger are accessible very early, whereas a non-canonical parameter and its trigger are only accessed stepwise. I have this protracted and presumably dynamical approximation in mind when I speak of a trigger hierarchy. Here, Penner's and my concepts come close to each other.5 It is rather a convergence from two very opposite views, i.e., Strong Continuity and dynamical systems theory. It will be exciting to see whether they are really compatible. The leading idea of my conception, however, is more informed by the physiological considerations discussed above.

16.3.1 The Trigger and the System The standard view roughly claims that the trigger is an independent, external piece of data that "comes in" and sets the parameters in the child's grammatical system at a given time. Yet, we should cautiously ask whether any stimulus can have such an impact. The straightforward answer is that it can. In fact, this is what really happens in the course of language acquisition. However, we have to formulate a specific condition that may be called the system condition—the condition under which a stimulus may act ay a trigger. Fortunately, such a constraint was formulated a long time ago, so I can rely on it here: "Every stimulus is a system stimulus" (quoted in Stadler/Kruse 1990:33).6 This non-trivial statement comes from Gestalt psychology (cf. Stadler/Kruse 1990: 33, referring to W. Metzger 1954). It is meant to make us sensitive to the fact that a trigger is a relational rather than a substantial entity. It is a relational entity for a system much in the sense of the figure-ground relation: without the system as the ground there exists no trigger as the figure; and the system's background changes as the trigger acts, i.e., the figure also forms the ground. Again, the requirement of causality does not seem to be fulfilled; what is prior—the trigger or the system—cannot be answered, and it may be the wrong question to ask in the first place. Both the trigger and the system must be viewed together if we want to get the whole picture. The trigger as the salient component of any triggering mechanism has been focussed upon until now. Nevertheless, this must not make us blind to the contribution of the overall system.

While I was working on my trigger concept and had already fixed the name "trigger hierarchy", I was plainly astonished when I received Miiller/Penner's (1994) article, where Penner's "triggering hierarchy" is briefly discussed. I do not want to be accused of plagiarism, which I am not guilty of. I developed my concept independently—without knowing Penner's Habilitationsschrift (1994c) at that time. Now I know it. Note that Piaget (1967: 25, 1976: 171) also stresses that the system must already be sensitized for a particular stimulus in order to be able to react to it. He traces this condition of the system back to Waddington's notion of "competence". This cross-reference is pointed out in Tracy (1991: 57, 85).

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Putting this "system condition" another way, Freeman (1991: 41) comments on perception and the properties of stimuli in general: [...] an act of perception is not the copying of an incoming stimulus. It is a step in a trajectory by which brains grow, reorganize themselves and reach into their environment to change it to their own advantage. (1991: 41)

The triggering trajectory is in fact instigated by an act of perception, by a stimulus, but not in a direct way. The stimulus may only unfold its triggering capacity if the system "opens the gates" and allows it to turn the key. There is no key as such, only to the extent that the system provides the proper keyhole. Focussing on either contribution alone—external trigger vs. internal system state—is unsatisfactory. For reasons of balancing out their respective shares, the role of the system is emphasized here, but only in order to equalize both! As already shown by Clark/Roberts in their "Genetic Algorithms" (1993), a linguistic trigger and the grammatical system belong closely together. With regard to language change they ask why a certain input triggers a given parameter at one time, but fails to do so again in the next generation and instead instigates a change? (ibid.: 300). The authors claim that "the logical problem of language change" and "the logical problem of language acquisition" ultimately belong together, the former being a subcase of the latter. Much in the sense of fractal scale-invariability, questions of linguistic phylogeny/diachrony also bear on questions of linguistic ontogeny. In this vein, it is promising to look at the authors' definition of "triggering datum": (314)

Trigger: A sentence σ is a trigger for the parameter pj if σ expresses pj. (ibid.: 318)

"Expresses" means that the grammar must set a certain parameter in order to be able to parse sentence σ successfully (ibid.: 317). Note that here the trigger is taken to be a whole sentence and not just a specific feature (cf. also Gibson/Wexler 1994; cf. also section 16.2). If parameters are only ambiguously expressed, as in the case of beginning language change, the grammar is said to fall back on internal factors of evaluation such as "overall elegance of representations and the number of superset settings in each hypothesis" (Clark/Roberts 319) in addition to only relying on the criterion of correct, i.e., successful parsing. It is crucial to the authors' conception that when the grammar is in a phase of instability, a datum which unambiguously triggered a certain parameter value at a former time can be ignored at a later time (cf. ibid.: 340). As an example they discuss the diachronic change from Old French (OF) over Middle French (MidF) to Modern French (ModF) with regard to the parameter regulating Nominative Case Assignment. This parametric change had a threefold consequence: (315) Resetting the Nominative Case Assignment Parameter entailed (i) the loss of simple inversion in interrogatives (ii) the loss of null subjects (iii) the loss of Verb Second (V2)7

In MidF, the liminal phase between the two stable phases of OF and ModF, the trigger which formerly had triggered V2 , the word order X VS, failed to do so any more:

See Clark/Roberts (1993) for examples.

279 (316)

XVS in OF: (Et) lore demande Galaad ses armes, (and) then asks Galahd (for) his arms. (Clark/Roberts 1993: 327, their (5 la))

This sentence has the following structure: (317)

fcp Lors [c demande [IP Galaad...]]] (ibid.: 328, their (53))

This structure triggered V2 and Nominative Case Assignment under government, i.e., the subject in Spec IP was governed by the finite V in C. Such crucial data—X VS triggering V2—began to be disregarded in the 15th century, although they still were part of the input. But, according to the authors' sophisticated "fitness metric" by means of which the parametric encodings of sentences are evaluated, V2 lost its signficance, and other parametric encodings began to prove "fitter". Interestingly, Clark/Roberts reach the crucial conclusion that exactly the same string S,· can successfully trigger a parameter setting P(v]) in one grammatical system G,·, but fail to trigger P(v]) in system Gj # G,·. French XVS order is a case of exactly this sort, where G/ is the grammar of OF and G/ that of late MidF. [...] As in the biological world, successful propagation depends as much on the external environment as on internal properties, so that little can be predicted purely on the basis of internal structural criteria. It is this aspect of genetic algorithm that makes possible a deeper understanding of language change and demonstrates how successive generations my treat the "same" trigger experience differently, (ibid.: 341) In the course of language change a given datum—a sentence σ—may p-encode or trigger a parameter value P(vJ) at one point in time, but fail to do so again at some later point. In Peirce's terms, a given datum is of secondness, an empirical fact, and may only gain the quality of thirdness, i.e., trigger qualities, if the system around it allows for it—as was the case with X VS in the grammar of OF, but no longer in MidF and ModF: Thus, this case shows how an unambiguous trigger for a given property can be disregarded when the system is maximally unstable, even if the instability is located in another area of the grammar. (Clark/Roberts 1993: 336) Later, we will once again draw on the French data provided by Clark/Roberts and show how triggering is related to what is called the "butterfly effect" in chaos theory. Grammars evolve in the course of time. While time seems to stand still inside the attractor, and many more iterations of the equations targeting the limiting image add only little precision to this steady state, time is of extraordinary importance in the liminal state, when the system has desintegrated, is unstable and maximally sensitive to triggers. Thus, after considering the structural or architechtural state of the system, I want to discuss the temporal state the grammatical system is in when it encounters the trigger. Why now?, is in fact one of the major puzzles for generative acquisition models. It is known that a trigger may only set a parameter at a certain time, not before and not after that time. Roughly speaking, any linguistic parameter setting must take place in the so-called "sensitive period" for language acquisition which extends up to puberty and—for first language acquisition—comprises the first three or four years of age. More specifically, for any given parameter, there is a more internally structured sensitive period in which it has to be

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set. There also exist speculations about ordered parameter setting (cf. Roeper/Williams 1987, Weissenbom 1994, Penner 1994c). This sensitive period equals the point or area of bifurcation in the sense of dynamical systems theory. Self-organization leads the system into the area of the state space where a critical phase transition may take place, i.e., a successor order parameter supersedes the ancestor order parameter. It is only in the spatio-temporal situation of bifurcation that triggering may take place. Indeed, this amounts to nothing more than the reframing of existing notions: sensitive period is now restated as point of bifurcation or critical phase transition; trigger is identified with symmetry-breaker. These phase transitions are assumed to take place spontaneously, when the system has been led far away enough from the energetic equilibrium, or to speak with Kauffman (1991,1993), when it dwells at the edge of chaos. Acording to Prigogine, the system self-organizes collectively toward new states of attraction: Once the system is more and more removed from the equilibrium by interaction with the environment, the system passes through zones of instability with respect to certain fluctuations (bifurcations), and its developmental path may assume quite an eventful, 'historic' character. (Prigogine/Stengers 1990: 14)8

Later, we will come back to the role of minor fluctuations that exert a major influence on the global state of the system. Here, it suffices to point out that"[...] away from the equilibrium, matter gets sensitive to influences to which it was insensitive in the equilibrium." (ibid.: 14)9 Models of self-organization thus conceive of phase transitions and of triggering events as autopoietic processes which naturally happen in the course of the evolution of a dynamical system. The trigger and the system may be seen as being linked by a positive feedback loop, one enhancing the other until events culminate in the global catastrophy of phase transition. Then the system is led into a new basin and converges on a new attractor—parameter setting takes place. Thus, it would not be too unresonable to turn the traditional picture upside-down and say that the system itself generates the trigger autopoietically. This view, however, suffers from one-sidedness as much as former conceptions did. But this counter-intuitive, provocative statement should make us critical of obsolete trigger notions.

16.3.2 Internal and External Triggers, Fluctuations After discussing the joint contribution of the system and of the trigger, we now turn to the trigger itself to explore what entity may in fact act as a trigger, where it originates, of what nature it is and how it operates. 8

9

Wenn das System durch die Wechselwirkung mit der Umgebung immer weiter vom Gleichgewicht entfernt wird, so durchschreitet das System Zonen der Instabilität gegenüber bestimmten Fluktuationen (Bifurkationen) und sein Entwicklungsweg kann einen recht ereignisreichen 'historischen1 Charakter bekommen. This quotation is reproduced here for convenience from section 4.2.1. [...] daß die Materie fern vom Gleichgewicht gegenüber Einflüssen empfindlich wird, gegenüber welchen sie im Gleichgewicht unempfindlich war.

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In dynamical systems theory, not only external triggers are known but at least two other candidates or contributors: internal control parameters, and fluctuations or noise. Let us first consider control parameters and go back to the internal forces of the system. As demonstrated by Haken's laser example (see section 4.2.3.2), in synergetics, control parameters are often conceived of as triggering phase transitions; in this particular case from non-cooperation to the joint cooperation of particles that leads to the phenomenon of laser light. Developmental change in biological system may equally be driven by control parameters which have passed a critical value. According to Thelen (1989: 91), this is the first cause of developmental change and can be considered an internal trigger. A second cause may be provided by the environment and can be considered an external trigger: In particular, we have proposed that control parameters can act to trigger developmental transitions in two ways. First, there may be a scalar change in one or more existing components that reach the critical values that initiate a phase shift. These may be identified at many levels of analysis: incremental growth in anatomical systems, increase (or decrease) of neural elements or concentrations of neurotransmitters, changing perceptual, cognitive or motor abilities or memory capacity, or change of attentional mechanisms. Contextual factors may, however, be equally potent in effecting the appearance of new forms.

Linguistic control parameters such as the number of elements in the growing lexicon (see chapter 15), the increasing charge of Lexical Categories (LCs) with morphology (PCs) and, above all, the growing phrase markers that become available to the child in the course of acquisition are crucial for the onset of syntax. The growth of these linguistic control parameters is embedded in the growth of general neuronal parameters such as number of synapses and density of neural interaction, transmitters, memory, and attention. It is unecological to add more and more unrelated lemmata to the lexicon. In the same sense, the situation becomes instable when a single lexical item is charged with more and more functional morphology. After passing the hysteresis region of the ancestor attractors—i.e., the one word stage, or the prefunctional stage—the syntactic system succeeds in handling the abundant growth processes in the spurting language system. Only then do true Functional Categories emerge. They synchronize Lexical Categories and constitute a novel cognitive species. In synergetics, internal control parameters such as energy supply in general may be enough to trigger phase transitions. There is no need for an external trigger. The laser does not need to be "tapped on" from outside. Thus, are we left with the growing capacities of the young brain as the sole source of the emergence of syntax? This can hardly be the case; especially if the specific parameters and their morphological features are considered. As dynamical systems—biological ones in particular—exchange energy with the environment, we expect there to be external control parameters or singular triggers as well. Recall that Thelen mentions "contextual factors" that also trigger new forms. She has in mind the models supplied by tutors or parents. In the case of language acquisition, this external support can be identified with the PLD, and there, presumably very specific features such as the telltale trigger have to be considered. Note that I am not defending any social learning hypothesis or the claim that the child tries to "copy" what her parents say, in a naive sense. The child does not exactly "reproduce" the grammar of her parents. Otherwise creolization could not be explained. At a given time, the child's language system expects certain linguistic features, in particular Functional Categories. In this process, the child is, of course, guided and reinforced by verbal interaction.

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To summarize what has been said sofar, internal and external control parameters, and among the latter quite specific features of the input, serve as triggers for parameter setting. Note that in the child's dynamical systems the trigger is subject to development. As already pointed out above, the trigger is no static entity, but must be viewed in relation to the internal state of the system. In the course of the child's development, this state changes: "the control parameters themselves change during ontogeny" (Thelen 1989: 92). Critical levels which formerly led to a major phase transition now have to be defined quite differently. The interaction of the various control parameters leads to an altered overall state of the system: Our systems view, however, proposes that the control parameters themselves shift as the contributing components grow and differentiate and as the physical and social contexts of the organism change as a result of its development. This is the second source of transitions. The process of development itself is nonlinear, and as the systems regroup and coalesce, these nonlinearities serve as a continuing wellspring for new forms, (ibid.: 92)

In section 16.3.3 I will return to the importance of changing control parameters, and I will develop a trigger hierarchy with increasingly specific triggers whose activity culminates in the triggering event. Before doing so, I want to discuss a last crucial feature of dynamical systems. In dynamical systems theory the role of fluctuations as a source of variation and the emergence of new forms is frequently emphasized. Therefore, we must not only distinguish internal and external control parameters, but also integrate the presumed contribution of fluctuations, or noise. In dynamical systems with stable attractors (point attractors, limit cycles, tori, etc.), random perturbation is ubiquitous. However, these perturbations disturb the behavior of the system only to a minor extent and are quickly damped. The system quickly returns to its old, stable state (cf. Thelen 1989: 85,95, among many others). If, however, the system is in an unstable state such as the liminal state and approximates a point of bifurcation, the situation looks quite different (cf. Thelen 1989: 95; van Geert 1993: 327), due to two kinds of dynamics: fast and slow dynamics (cf. Wilden/Mottron 1987). Both kinds of dynamics refer to different temporal aspects of the system. Recall the picture of the small moving ball in the epigenetic landscape with hills, valleys, edges, etc. Fast dynamics relates to the movement of the ball which becomes increasingly faster and even erratic in the area of bifurcation. Slow dynamics relates to the changing epigenetic landscape, which also alters its surface—of course much more slowly. In this process, what used to be steep and stable attractors may become shallow, and the small ball, the movement of which has become unpredictable due to fast dynamics, may fail to converge on the old attractor, jumping into a new basin instead. It is random noise which is sufficient to change the behavior of the overall system at these critical points, as depicted in figure 14:

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NOISE Control Parameter Fig. 14: Noise as an agent of change (taken from Thelen 1989: 95; reproduced with kind permission of MIT-Press) Phase shifts result from the amplification of normally occurring fluctuations or noise. The stability of a complex system is depicted in the steepness of a potential well: stable systems have steep wells. It is difficult to dislodge the ball from the steep well. At certain values of a control parameter, the internal fluctuations overwhelm the system stability and the system seeks new stable modes, (ibid.) In the stable state, noise can be neglected as an agent of change. In the situation of instability, however, noise may indeed become crucial and serve as a trigger, and be it only as an unspecific one. In linguistics, we are not used to allowing just "anything" to trigger parameter setting, but we try to identify a piece of data with features that logically bear on the parameter, such as null expletives for the pro-drop parameter (cf. Hyams 1986 ff.). By analogy, a particular morphological feature is said to trigger case assignment and the projection of the corresponding phrase markers, e.g., AGR-S, AGR-O, AGR-IO. The identification of such triggers is one of the major tasks in generative language acquisition research and enhances the explanatory force of this concept. But sometimes this search seems to lead to a dead end or turn out to be an idee fixe. Although I am far from discrediting such a notion as the telltale trigger, I confront it with the fact that random perturbation may also instigate change when the proper conditions of the system are met: In complex systems, change results from the amplification of naturally occurring fluctuations or instabilities as the control parameter is scaled passed [sic! A.H.] a critical value (Kelso, Scholz/Schöner 1986). As a result of their complexity and multiple degrees of freedom, biological systems are dynamically stable. This means that they exist within a range of possible states and fluctuate among those states. As one component is gradually changed, there exists a point where the coalition of elements is no longer stable. Normal fluctuations become amplified until this noise disrupts the dynamic stability and the sytem autonomously reorganizes into a new stable state. Note again that fluctuations may become amplified from such control parameters acting outside as well as within the organism [...]. (Thelen 1989: 94; cf. also Smith/Thelen 1993, Stadler/Kruse 1992, among many others.) From section 1.3 we are already acquainted with the decisive role of perturbations and expect variation, instability, and noise to be maximal immediately before parameter setting. This scenario is also confirmed by Prigogine/Stengers (1990: 14): "In the areas of bifurca-

284 tion, fluctuations decide which working regime the system will be in afterwards."10 Before, but not beyond, the threshold of instability, perturbations can be neglected: Beyond the threshold of instability, however, they [the fluctuations. A.H.] may stop being negligible. One can say that away from the equilibrium matter becomes sensitive to influences to which it was insensitive in the equilibrium. This sensitivity is not expressed by an effect which is similar to its cause. The noisy, fluctuating character of the flows is not expressed by an irregular behavior, but by the fanning of new stuctural possibilities." (ibid.) 11 This scenario is supposed to apply to small as well as to broad time scales, to ontogeny as well as to evolution in general. Although instigated by random perturbations, no irregularity results, but rather the dissipative emergence of new stable states. Again, cause and effect are not related in a direct and linear way, but in a nonlinear one. In short, internal and external control parameters trigger developmental change. Additionally, both kinds of trigger change over time—due to the development of the system. Random perturbations can act as unspecific instigators of phase transitions under circumstances of instability. This, however, does not imply that noise can lead the system into arbitrary, new states, for otherwise the development would be quite unpredictable, contrary to the fact of equifinality. No child invents new parameters or even misses a canonical parameter. This means that the grammatical system—although rich and diverse—must be sufficiently constrained in order to allow fluctuations to make the system jump only into the appropriate attractors. In generative grammar, UG is the guarantor for this restrictiveness and for the proper reproduction of syntax in every child. As far as diachronic change is concerned, however (cf. Lightfoot 1991, Clark/Roberts 1993), it may in fact turn out that development is really unpredictable in the long run, i.e., that the overall grammatical system of a speech community follows the trajectories of a truly chaotic or strange attractor. In such an attractor, minimal causes may have dramatic and unpredictable effects. In the context of dynamical systems theory this is called the "butterfly effect": A butterfly fluttering its wings in Tokyo may cause a weather change in New York. As to language change, minor, unspecific changes—even outside the realm of syntax—may provoke a whole cascade of parametric changes. We already discussed the linguistic changes from OF over MidF to ModF, according to Clark/Roberts (1993). In fact, these authors give a nice example of a linguistic butterfly effect, the discussion of which I already promised above. Recall that the unambiguous trigger for the V2 parse in OF was X VS with V in C, X in Spec CP and the subject in Spec IP. The pattern XVS gradually decreased and finally lost its triggering capacity. What might have caused such a change? What events eroded this trigger? Clark/Roberts provide the following answer. In MidF atonic subject clitic pronouns were introduced, for stylistic or whatever reasons. Thus, XVS changed to XsV..., but the atonic clitic did not 10

In den Bifurkationsbereichen entscheiden die Fluktuationen, in welchem Arbeitsregime sich das System danach befinden wird. 1 ' Hinter der Instabilitätsschwelle jedoch können sie aufhören, vernachlässigbar zu sein. Man kann sagen, daß Materie fern vom Gleichgewicht gegenüber Einflüssen empfindlich wird, gegenüber welchen sie im Gleichgewicht unempfindlich war. Diese Empfindlichkeit drückt sich nicht durch eine Wirkung aus, die der hervorrufenden Ursache ähnlich ist. Der rauschende, fluktuierende Charakter der Flüsse drückt sich nicht in einem irregulären Verhalten aus, sondern im Anfachen neuer Strukturierungsmöglichkeiten.

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yet "count" as a constituent (cf. Clark/Roberts 1993: 338). The word order was not really changed. But these atonic subject clitics were not as harmless as they appeared. Their introduction entailed a catastrophic consequence, which became obvious only when they became tonic. One mutant in particular, XSVO, was successful (cf. ibid.: 321) and undermined the V2 parse until it was given up. The parametric interrelations between Nominative Case Assignment under government or via Spec-head agreement, null subjects, and V2 need not be discussed here; it suffices to say that they were all affected by the butterfly effect that led to the overall diachronic parametric change:"[...] syntactic change can be internally driven: change in one parameter can destabilize another." (ibid.: 338) Initially, small perturbations, which do not even have to originate in syntax, propagate throughout the whole system. Note that the change from atonic subject clitics to tonic ones was not located in the syntactic module but in morphonology: As is frequently the case, syntactic change can be traced back to extrasyntactic factors, although the relationship between the extrasyntactic factors and the syntactic changes they cause can be extremely indirect. This is because instability, once introduced, can propagate through a grammatical system, (ibid.: 338)

Again, we face a situation where cause and effect are not alike, but connected in a nonlinear way. Moreover, the system, having changed in one respect, does not "remember" and take into account the origins of this change. So, MidF and ModF "forgot" about the fact that formerly subject clitics were atonic and did not count as proper constituents. To the contrary, it is hard to imagine how a synchronous system should do so. It is the task of the diachronous linguist to make language change transparent and to provide a recolJection; it is not the task of the speaker, in particular not that of the child. Diachronic as well as phylogenetic change is opaque to the computational device of the system.

16.3.3 The Trigger Hierarchy I would like to point out once more that I developed the notion of a trigger hierarchy independently. Penner's alternative notion of a "triggering hierarchy" will have to be compared with my own in order to determine possible convergence and divergence. So far, I have been arguing against traditional prejudices concerning the trigger scenario. One of them is the following longstanding but scarcely reflected idealization. Traditionally, the trigger is seen as an independent entity with a distinctive form, a form that does not change over time. From a dynamical point of view, however, which emphasizes that language acquisition takes place in real time, this is not necessarily the case. To the contrary, it seems to be much more natural to think of the trigger as changing over time, depending on the respective state of the system. Recall that control parameters (internal and external) also change over time (cf. section 16.3.2). Let us now consider a particular external trigger. How does it evolve in time? Especially at the beginning of language acquisition, a global trigger should be sufficient to roughly channels the system into a global attractor.12 The 12

The term "global trigger" used here must not be confused with Gibson/Wexler's (1994: 409) identical term. They use "global trigger" to refer to a trigger which does not depend on the values of other parameters. A "local trigger" (cf. ibid.), on the other hand, does depend on these.

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trigger will gradually become more specific, as the system differentiates and needs more sophisticated information to operate and to navigate through an increasingly fine structured epigenetic landscape with increasingly restrictive steady states. Where does this idea come from? Like many other parallels, it is drawn from biology, especially from the study of Cortical Network Organization (cf. v.d. Malsburg/Singer (1988), see also section 4.2.3). Recall that neurophysiological models of self-organization account for how the brain manages to select and stabilize optimal connections between the sensory input and the cortical areas to which they project, and how connections between these various cortical areas stabilize. In the course of ontogeny, functions become differentiated and highly selective (cf. Karpf 1990, 1994, among others). The input is represented with increasing accuracy due to the presumed principles of cortical self-organization. This increasingly fine-grained representation corresponds to increasingly specific external data or triggers serving as relevant input for cortical computation. Global clues pave the way for specific clues which are actively searched for by the alert brain: As the self-organizing process proceeds and generates increasingly selective connections and response properties, the criteria necessary for afferent activity to induce further changes are likely to become more specific. Hence, the self-organizing process is bound to converge toward states of high selectivity. The implication that the demands on the specificity of changeinducing activity increase with increasing selectivity of the system would easily account for the evidence that, early in development, rather global self-generated patterns of activity suffice to induce modifications; while later only highly structured activity patterns are able to support use-dependent selection of circuits, (v.d. Malsburg/Singer 1988: 85) Recall that as early as in embryonic development neuronal circuits begin to self-organize due to endogenous activity without any discernible external input. This has already been discussed under the heading of "autopoiesis" in section 4.2.3. With regard to the convergence on highly selective triggers, this conception is compatible with the telltale trigger. At the end of a long process, there emerges a detailed clue specifically tailored to feeding self-organized neuronal circuits, or a highly specific key to unlock a highly specific keyhole. What is lacking in the telltake trigger conception, however, is the past history of this trigger. The ultimate trigger has been carefully elaborated all along the way, i.e., it has undergone an evolution of its own. Thus, we have to ask critically if the last trigger which raises above the sea like the tip of an iceberg deserves so much attention; and, vice versa, if the entire trigger hierarchy on which this singular trigger resides upon deserves so little attention. It probably does not. Although it is fully understandable that the last trigger is the most salient one and ultimately induces parameter setting, the relations must be properly spelled out. As everywhere in biological systems, the process of triggering is a joint cooperation, not only of the system and the trigger, but also of the trigger-hierarchy and the last trigger. Our idealizations concerning the independence and timelessness of the trigger have to be given up in favor of a concept of triggering and the trigger hierarchy which always takes into account the state of the system. It is the very notion of the trigger hierarchy which also answers the following questions: Why do we have to wait so long for the trigger to become operative, although it is omnipresent in the input, and why does it become operative only at a certain time? The answer is that the trigger hierarchy has to be built up to reach the critical, last trigger, i.e., the point of bifurcation still has to be reached.

287 Let us turn the first question upside down: Why does triggering—although it is surely not instantaneous—take place relatively quickly, i.e., what speeds up the time necessary for the triggering event to happen? The first part of the answer has to do with the trigger hierarchy. As the trigger becomes increasingly specific, the basin of attraction and the attractor state on which the system ultimately converges become increasingly easy to access. Imagine the slopes becoming steeper and steeper with each approximation; more and more alternatives are rejected as proper candidates. The dynamics is accelerated until it reaches its climax in the instantaneous triggering event. This first part of the answer touches upon the evolutionary or diachronic aspect of the trigger development. For the second part of the question we have to consider the synchronic relationship between the various competing representations that are presumend to exist at a given time. These behave as proto-attractors— symmetrical or quasi-symmetrical—in that they are almost equally well-suited to do the work, but only one, the fittest one, succeeds. As in overall cortical self-organization, the following happens: One of these has to be spontaneously selected during pattern formation, a process which is called 'spontaneous symmetry breaking.1 This usually is a very slow process. However, the boundary or initial conditions may be slightly deformed to destroy the original symmetry so that one organized pattern is favored. Organization is then much quicker. In general, self-organizing systems react very sensitively to symmetry-breaking influences, (v.d. Malsburg/Singer 1988: 72) These symmetry-breaking influences are, of course, triggers. They are assumed to act effectively when internal and external control parameters have reached a critical value. The sensitivity of self-organizing systems to the instigators of symmetry-breaking underlines the significance of a trigger conception which stresses the system. It is the knowledge of biological self-organizing and dissipative systems that calls for a transfer to the trigger notion in linguistics. This notion fits well for language acquisition. The well-known fact of initial underspecification (cf. Pinker 1987, Clahsen, Eisenbeiss/ Penke 1994) is a case in point. Firstly, recall that an early V-position may be under-specified with respect to +/- finiteness so that either non-finite and finite verbs may reside there. Only later when the features are clearly distinct, +finiteness will serve as a trigger for verb movement to /and to C. Secondly, recall the example of Tilman's early case assignment which can only be described in terms of underspecification (see section 6.2). Initially, he uses the «-affix as an overall functional marker comprising infinitives, plurals, adverbs and, surprisingly, genitive case as well. He overgeneralizes the -« which serves as a bold and robust trigger for various instantiations of Functional Categories. Note that he does so in the light of already competing, correct endings, such as the obligatory genitive -j, and clearly against the evidence in the input. Hence, on the one hand we can take the underspecified -n as a first bold or default trigger used for various interrelated functional tasks; on the other hand, we can take the -s as a specific trigger contingent on the input: -n and -s and the other target affixes are related to one another via a small trigger hierarchy. Thus, in the trigger hierarchy one can always go back one step and identify the ancestor conditions that once paved the way for the ability in question. Not every precursor construction needs to be in place in every child. The same holds of the trigger hierarchy. The evolution of the trigger may be as non-equi-initial and non-equiliminal as the child's overall acquisition path. Variation is what we find here, too.

288 Simplicity is lost, but complexity may in fact be what is called for in the inherently delicate trigger controversy.

16.4 After Triggering While exploring a new dynamical trigger notion we encountered several new questions which we tried to answer. A last question is the following one: What happens after triggering? This question seems superfluous at first glance, because we are primarily concerned with answering how triggering functions in the first place. At second glance, however, it may be fruitful to look at the state of the system and the trigger "the day after". With regard to the system, we can say that the parameter is set, the steady state attained, and an almost everlasting period of stable (but dynamical) functioning lies ahead of the child. But a conception which stresses the importance of variation must also ask itself whether variation abruptly ceases after convergence, after triggering, after bifurcation, or whether former states may nevertheless be retained to serve special functions. After all, variation as one aspect of the overall fractality of dynamical systems may subliminally remain, although variation enters the stage and presents itself in the liminal phase before selection, in particular. Concerning the trigger, we have to ask what happens to it? Does the trigger keep its triggering capacity and goes on triggering, and if so, only for a certain time or forever? Take lexical expletives as an example: if they are the triggers for -pro drop, do they continue to do the job, or are they freed from it after succeeding? Recall that the trigger notion put forward here plays down any attempt to identify a trigger as a static entity. In this sense, a trigger, strictly speaking, does not exist as such nor can a trigger stop existing. What exists is only the triggering event in a special spatio-temporal state of the overall system. This is a singular event which, as such, cannot persist. As the state of the system changes, expecially as convergence takes place, the conditions for triggering are no longer met. In the changed constellation of the system, the formerly competing structural representations also arrange themselves in a new manner. While some may be extinguished completely—or at least seem to do so—others may be retained to serve specialized functions or local solutions whenever an ecological niche grants their survival. Amazingly, this picture is a common one in generative models (cf. Lebeaux 1988, 1991, Roeper/Weissenborn 1990). Roeper/Weissenborn, discussing ambiguous input, conclude that this ambiguity is solved by parametric choice. But the child need not abandon the former alternative completely:13 Each side of a parametric choice is a possible productive rule. But a parameter cannot be set in opposite ways. How could a child possibly receive contradictory data if the adult grammar fits one side or the other of a parameter? We argue that when a parametric choice occurs, the opposite parameter remains as an exeptional, hence localized alternative. The localization may be syntactic or lexical. (Roeper/Weissenborn 1990: 149)

13

Note that they have only binary parameters in mind.

289

If the adult really retains the secondary parametric value, the child will of course come across evidence for this choice in the data, too. In replicating the adult system she will make the same parametric decisions and end up with the same system. What is so appealing here is the idea that variation remains and obviously is an inherent feature of the syntactic apparatus. This has several important implications. Firstly, this idea naturally conspires with what we already discussed under the notion of oscillations (chapter 13). This means that even after selection parametric alternatives keep a certain relation to one another, maybe in the form of a very damped and long-periodic limit cycle. Recall Weissenborn's (1994) late errors, and the possible relationship to (adult) speech errors as evidence. Secondly, this idea leads to the notion of fractality in dynamical systems. Recall that a fractal has a broken dimension, somewhere between two integers. If parametric choice is viewed this way, the system does not work with a clear-cut parametric dimension, say a single and exclusive parameter value, but with a "broken" parameter, say a single value "plus a little bit more". As parametric options are not completely lost under this conception, a sort of "quasi-holism", characteristic of fractals, results. Ideally, the system retains all choices, even unused values, so that the syntax of any single human language subliminally hosts the values of any other language, as the cross-linguistic perspective of generative grammar suggests. In the case of the child, UG is operative and yields the whole parametric array from which the child has to select. Generative grammar and self-organizing dynamical systems are fully compatible in this respect. In fact, a translation is so easy that UG may be called a dynamical model variant. This has been the more or less tacit assumption throughout.

16.5

Summary: A Redefinition of the Trigger

The critical discussion of existing generative concepts of the trigger has led to a new understanding of how triggering can be viewed from a dynamical perspective. In the course of this elaboration, some notions such as the telltake or unique trigger were only partly retained, while others were completely given up—in particular the notion of the trigger as an independent unity. Instead, the trigger is now understood more in the sense of a triggering event: a singular event caused by the joint cooperation of the internal state of the system (internal control parameters), the input (external control parameters), and the minor, but decisive role of fluctuations that become crucial at the point of bifurcation. A trigger does not exist as an independent entity. A trigger is a certain, and as such a non-salient, piece of data, possibly just fluctuation or noise, which acquires triggering capacity under certain spatio-temporal conditions which depend on the joint interaction of the internal state of the language system, its governing dynamical rules, and internal and external control parameters. Going even one step further, one could say that the trigger is a selforganized, emergent product triggering a self-organized event, rather than an actual, substantial entity of the real world which can be pointed to. Triggering inevitably and yet spontaneously happens, given these circumstances.

290

In the dynamical spirit, the trigger is granted an evolution of its own which results in a trigger hierarchy from global to increasingly specific information that is necessary for convergence on increasingly specific attractors, i.e., the parameter values. During this process, various symmetries are broken. Therefore, the trigger is taken to be a symmetry-breaker. The abandonment of longstanding prejudices and idealizations about triggering offers a new insight into a major topic of language acquisition research. What once was implicit, has now been worked out explicitely: the dynamical nature of language acquisition.

Part D: Outlook 17

Beyond Economy: Ecology

Ja, kann man ein unscharfes Bild immer mit Vorteil durch ein scharfes ersetzen? 1st das unscharfe nicht oft gerade das, was wir brauchen? Wittgenstein 1984: 280, § 71

Usually, the last chapter of a study is entitled "Summary and Conclusions". This is not the case here. The reason is that the subject matter explored in this study is unfit to be summarized. Conclusions, however, were readily drawn in the previous chapters. This study tries to offer a new, dynamical perspective on language acquisition. It is one of the first to do so explicitely. It is in a liminal position—to apply a central term frequently used here. It proceeds from the generative paradigm and converges on a dynamical one. If I do not give a summary, perhaps I will then give an outlook? This would fit much better. But I will not give an outlook in the usual sense. I will not provide a list of topics which are supposed to be treated in future research along the lines of a dynamical paradigm. Rather, I will point to one broad topic which deserves further attention. It relates to a restriction laid open in the introduction (cf. section 1.2), where I confine my research to PCs and to language acquisition. The combination of these two topics is considered optimal for a dynamical treatment. I hope I have been able to show how fruitful this account is, viz. the previous chapters. Language acquisition is argued to proceed in a dynamical way. Now, a pressing question is whether dynamical systems theory can adequately account for the state of linguistic knowledge in adults, too. Adults are commonly assumed to be in a steady state with respect to knowledge of language. Thus, does the dynamics stop there? A first, rough answer to this rhetorical question is that it does not stop, of course. If language acquisition proceeds dynamically, then its result—knowledge of language—can be accounted for in dynamical terms as well. There already exist some hints as to how the child's acquisitional task is related to the design of the adult system. Recall first the argumentation in Gawlitzek-Maiwald et al. (1992). There, the decision pro or contra the asymmetry hypothesis crucially depends on acquisitional data. Evidence for a mobile /-head in child language is taken as evidence for the following asymmetry in the adult's system: adults have a left-headed IP for matrix clauses and a right-headed IP (embedded under CP) in subordinate clauses. Also recall the argumentation in Lebeaux (1988/2000) and Keyser/Roeper (1992): There, child structures such as "small VPs" are taken to survive in the adult system, albeit in the restricted form of idioms (cf. section 5.1). Finally recall that previous structures may show up even after the decisive triggering event or after parameter setting in the form of "late errors" (cf. section 16.3.3). If it is true that dynamics is a pervasive feature characteristic of the language module in general, we have to ask further in which way dynamical principles rule the linguistic computational device of adults. I am far from being able to answer this question. But I will try to provide the frame in which a possible answer can be given. This attempt is not implau-

292

sible, not even from a generative point of view. It seems promising to look at recent generative considerations of economy (cf. Chomsky 1989), Minimalism (cf. Chomsky 1992, 1994, 1995, 2000) and Optimality Theory (cf. Grimshaw 1993,1 1997, Archangel!/ Langendoen 1997, Kager 1999, T6sar/Smolensky 2000) in order to determine possible convergence with a dynamical proposal. Such a proposal would claim that the principles of variation and selection are operative on a short time scale, too (cf. section 4.2.3). Thus, we predict that competing representations exist in the linguistic computations of adults, as well. Selection then proceeds as usual. In fact, the existence of competing representations in a given language has been proposed in the recent generative discussion.2 Chomsky's (1995, 2000) Minimalist Program allows for the co-existence of various derivations which may all converge on the two linguistic interfaces of Logical Form (LF) and Phonetic Form (PF). The crucial criterion is economy: "Less economic computations are blocked even if they converge." (Chomsky 1995: 220) The competition between various alternatives is even more pronounced in Optimality Theory (Kager 1999). In Optimality Theory, grammaticality is no longer defined as a static norm but as the optimal respresentation available. This corresponds to a weak notion of grammaticality defined not in terms of strict satisfaction of universal constraints but in terms of markedness. What is unmarked, is regarded as universal, what is marked is regarded as less universal. Unmarked universal constraints are regarded as grammatical. In each language the universal contraints are ranked in a specific ranking hierarchy. The optimal candidate in a candidate set will be the one which violates only a lower ranked constraint in comparison to another candidate which violates a higher ranked one. The candidate set is generated by the "generator", one component in Optimality Theory. The proper candidate is selected by the "evaluator" which determines the most "harmonious candidate" in terms of the given constraint ranking (Archangeli/Langendoen 1997). Optimality Theory allows for constraint violation if lower ranked constraints are violated in order to satisfy higher ranked constraints. Constraints are designed to inherently conflict with each other. Usually, the optimal candidate violates some constraint in order to satisfy a higher ranked one. Thus, variability, competition, conflict resolution, and selection are proper ingredients in Optimality Theory—superfluous to say that these are dynamical notions. I will outline the mechanism underlying Optimality Theory by retracing Grimshaw's (1997) argument that clauses are not structurally uniform but vary in size depending on the interaction and satisfaction of syntactic constraints. This topic is chosen because in our discussion of the early child phrase marker the issue remained chronically unresolved how big child phrase markers have to be, whether they have the same projection height as the adult phrase markers, whether it is more parsimonous to propose only small projections, etc. Here, it will be proposed that even adult phrase markers vary in size, that is, a clause is not bound always to be a CP, and neither is a verb bound always to take a CP complement (cf. Grimshaw's first draft "Minimal Projection, Heads, and Optimality" (1993) was finally published in revised form as "Projection, Heads, and Optimality Theory" (1997) in Linguistic Inquiry in 1997. In the following references, I will mainly quote this latter publication. Of course, Grimshaw (1997) does not claim that the variation-selection schema is operative every time a clause structure is generated. But at least she proposes the existence of competing phrase structures in a given language.

293 ibid: 381).3 Instead, there always exists a set of competitors comprising more or less elaborate projections of the same categorial head in the sense of Grimshaw's Extended Projection (1991; cf. section 5.2). The optimal representation is selected from this set, that is the one which violates no or the fewest of a set of ranked syntactic constraints, among them the following: (318)

OPERATORS-IN-SPECIFIER (OP-SPEC) Syntactic operators must be in specifier positions OBLIGATORY HEADS (OB-HD) A projection has a head ECONOMY OF MOVEMENT (STAY) Trace is not allowed (Grimshaw 1997: 474)4

Note that Grimshaw's (1993) constraint MINIMAL PROJECTION (MLN-PROJ) which directly controlled the structural size of a projection was abandoned in Grimshaw (1997) because she could derive the same effects from the independently motivated constraints OB-HD and STAY without further stipulation (cf. Grimshaw 1997, FN1). The shift of focus in Optimality Theory is also recognizable in Chomsky's Minimalist Program when he claims that "the inescapable conditions on language may be satisfied in something like a 'best possible' way." (Chomsky 1995: 379). "Optimality" is a relational notion: a form is optimal relative to other, sub-optimal forms. It is also an economic notion, as the form which is least costly and at the same time violates the fewest constraints is the optimal one: It is a consequence of competition among candidates that a clause is only as big as it needs to be. A clause always has the minimal structure consistent with maximal satisfaction of constraints, unter the OT theory of ranking. (Grimshaw 1997: 381; cf. also 1994). Recall that notions such as CP, IP, etc. are just "notational conveniences" for Grimshaw (1993: 3; cf. section 5.2). Optimality is clearly a dynamical notion, as the selection of the optimal candidate is forced by the interaction of hierarchically ordered constraints which sometimes conflict. Selection favors a form violating a "lower" constraint over a form violating a "higher" constraint (cf. the hierarchy in (318)). In order to illustrate the logic behind optimality let us consider one of Grimshaw's examples. First, consider English declarative vs. interrogative clauses. It is commonly agreed upon that an English matrix declarative clause is an IP (319a), whereas a matrix interrogative clause is a CP (319b): (319)

(a)

They will read some books [iP They will [ γρ read some books]]

(b)

Which books will they t read t ? [CP Which booksi willj [IP they ej [ypreadei ]]] (Grimshaw 1993: 4, 1997: 377))

3 4

Note the affinity of this denial of structural uniformity with the asymmetry hypothesis (cf. section 7.1.2). There exist more constraints in Grimshaw (1997), which need not be considered here.

294 In (319b) fronting of the verb takes place; in (319a) it does not. Underlying a sentence there always exists a set of competing syntactic representations. This set of competitors for matrix declaratives and their evaluation under the ranking OP-SPEC > OB-HD > STAY is given in (320): (320) Matrix Declaratives Candidates ο®>

OP-SPEC

[IP DP will [yp read books]] [CP tlP DP will Lvp read books]]] e

OB-HD

*!

STAY

( )

*!

[cp will} [jp DP ej [yp read books]]] (Grimshaw's tableau 2, (1997: 379))

The first phrase marker, the IP, is optimal as no constraint is violated. The second one is out as C is empty and thus violates OB-HD. In the third phrase marker STAY is violated by the movement of the auxiliary to CP. With this violation of STAY, Grimshaw can rule out inversion in declaratives, which is empirically correct. Note that in (320) OP-SPEC is always satisfied; the crucial constraint here is OB-HD. (The parentheses, "( )", mean that this constraint is not crucial in the contest.) For matrix interrogatives, the picture looks different, as now OB-HD comes into play. It demands that the w/i-phrase occupy a specifier position. The tableau with the crucial competitors for matrix interrogatives is given in (321): (321) Matrix Interrogatives OP-SPEC

Candidates [IP DP will [yp read what]] e

[CP [iP DP will [yp read what]]]

*! *!

[cp what e [IP DP will [yp readt]]]

OB-HD ( )

( )

(*)

( )

*!

(*)

es- [cp what willj [IP DP ej [yp read t]J] [cp willi [ip DP ej [yp read what]]]

STAY

(**)

*!

( )

(*!)

(Grimshaw's tableau 1, (1997: 378)) OP-SPEC is violated if only an IP is projected; therefore, the first alternative is ruled out. An empty CP, as in the second case, violates OP-SPEC along with OB-HD. If the wAphrase is in Spec CP but the verb does not invert to C, OB-HD and STAY are violated, as in the third case. Only if inversion takes place, as in the fourth phrase marker, optimality is attained. The twofold violation of STAY (by fronting of the wA-phrase and the auxiliary) is tolerated as a higher ranked principle, namely OP-SPEC, is satisfied at the same time. The contrast between matrix declaratives and matrix interrogatives is not as telling as the contrast between matrix interrogatives with wA-subjects and those with a different wA-ele-

295 ment. The crucial question is whether matrix interrogatives are always CPs. Grimshaw denies this uniformity claim. Consider matrix interrogatives with a wA-subjects as in (322):

(322)

(a) (b)

Who saw it? *Who did see it?

Let us first consider (322a). According to the constraint ranking above, (322a) is not even an IP but simply a VP: This is because OP-SPEC does not require the wA-phrase to be in a particular Spec position such as Spec CP, but only in a Spec position from which it has scope over the clause. When the wA-word is a subject, this requirement is met already at the level of the VP (Grimshaw 1997: 388). All other candidates invoking higher projections are ruled out by STAY, as can be seen in the following tableau (323). (323) The position of subji;ct wA-phrase;j OP-SPEC

Candidates

OB-HD

FULL-INT

[VP wh V... ]]

US'

[IP wh e [vp t V... Ill [ipwAdotvptV... ]]]

STAY ( )

*!

( )

(*)

*!

(*!)

(Grimshaw's tableau 11, (1997: 389)) If only the wA-phrase was moved to Spec IP, as in the second candidate in (323), this would already violate OB-HD, a fatal violation apart from the violation of STAY. Now let us consider (322b). If—in order to avoid the violation of OB-HD—the dummy auxiliary "do" was inserted in the head position of the IP, as in the third candidate, another constraint, ranked between OB-HD and STAY, namely FULL INTERPRETATION (FULL-INT), would be violated. FULL-INT requires that lexical-conceptual structure is parsed which is not the case with a dummy like "do". In accordance with the empirical findings, (322b) is ungrammatical. The conclusion that clauses are not structurally uniform also argues against uniform selection: the very same predicate may select a CP at one time, an IP at another time, and a VP at yet another time. If a particular candidate violates no constraint, as opposed to a different candidate violating a constraint, the former wins over the latter, as evidenced in the examples above. What, however, happens if two different candidates both respect all principles? Consider the following contrast between auxiliary inversion in conditionals (324a) and a lexically filled head in the same construction (324b): (324)

(a) Had I been on time I would have caught the train (b) If I had been on time I would have caught train (Grimshaw 1993: 19, example 16a, cf. Grimshaw 1997: 402f))5 Both sentences are grammatical and their representations violate no constraints, hence both are optimal and grammatical (Grimshaw 1993: 19f.). In this case, free variation is allowed. It is important to note that both candidates are NOT in the same candidate set because their 5

I will not discuss here which constraints are relevant for inversion structures, but see Grimshaw (1997: 402-404).

296

enumeration is not the same and therefore do NOT compete with each other. In (324b) an additional item, the complementizer "if", is present. Only those candidates are in competiton with each other which share the same enumeration. There is no additional constraint in Grimshaw's system which compares these two options. One could concede that the insertion of lexical material in C, i.e., the complementizer 'if, is "more costly" than movement of the auxiliary to C, or vice versa. There does not seem to exist an objective evaluation metric for this alternation. Both sentences are possible and permitted. In a different case, however, a ranking of alternative options seems desirable— but optimality theory is silent there, too. Consider the following three options for French interrogatives: (325)

(a)

Hie a rencontre" qui? She has met who?

(b)

Qui eile a rencontri t ?

(c)

Qui a-t-elle rencontre" t ? (Grimshaw 1993: 27f.)

In (325a) the κΆ-element is only a quantifier and not an operator: it remains in situ. An IP analysis is therefore sufficient. In (325b), on the other hand, the wA-phrase— again no operator—is adjoined to IP. In (325c), finally, the vfA-element— this time a true operator— is in Spec CP and inversion takes place. The respective phrase markers are all optimal. (326)

(a)

[ipDPIIvpVqui]]

(b)

[i

(c)

[cp qui Ii [IP DP ej [yp V t ]]] (cf. ibid.: 28)

Although the same verbal EP is involved, the three alternatives do not compete.6 Intuitively and— even more importantly— from an acquisitional point of view, however, the three representations are related to one another (326a+b) can be considered homologous precursors of (326c) in the sense that only an IP is projected and qui is not yet interpreted as an operator. In (428a) no movement whatsoever has taken place; in (326b) only adjunction to IP has taken place. So, there is an intuitive acquisitional ranking of (326a) > (326b) > (326c). The notion "competition" appears to be too restricted in Grimshaw's account. There exists competition, as pointed out above, which is not taken into account by optimality theory. On the other hand, we have to ask whether the cases which are actually considered by Grimshaw are really captured by the notion "competition". Recall that the competitor set only consists of candidates inside the same EP. In the case of the verbal EP, for example, 6

In Grimshaw (1997), as opposed to Grimshaw (1993), these examples are not discussed any more, therefore it is unclear how she would handle them with her new sets of constraints. However, she must make sure that these three sentences do not compete although they obviously have the same enumeration. One possible way to account for that might be to say that they have a different LF, which is suggested by the fact that in (325a+b) the wA-word is no operator but in (c) it is one.

297

VP, IP and CP compete. But is this true competition? All other syntactic constraints held constant, a CP can never win over an IP and an IP can never win over a VP because of OBHDand STAY. This impossibility is due to the HP's topological design. As a CP is always erected above an IP it inevitably violates OB-HD and STAY. The design and the syntactic constraints are not independent of each other. From an acquisitional point of view, both the layering design and the constraints of OBHD and STAY follow straightforwardly: the EP is built up in the course of acquisition when heads and Specs move to their higher functional positions and contribute to functional interpretation. As a consequence of this argumentation it is necessary to enrich Grimshaw's (1993) account with considerations of language acquisition.7 If this is achieved, a more complex picture of competition emerges—including precursor relations of the kind pointed out above. The precursor-successor chain (326a) > (326b) > (326) still can be interpreted in a rough sense of "economy": an IP is "less costly" than a CP; a quantifier is "less costly" than an operator; adjunction is "less costly" than substitution (movement). The computational device—especially the developing one—obviously is a good administrator. But note that this is inevitably so, given the condition of limited resources. The combinatorial effect of growing resources (computational, attentional, etc.) and growing intake allows the elaboration of the EP and the establishment of more refined relations such as operatorvariable chains. On each level, economy constrains the representation/derivation. But is this the whole story? Is economy the unique ruling principle? To my mind, it is not. Our considerations of economy are fixed on the local level. This is an important restriction on economy or optimality theories. Economy is a local principle only. It is no monolithic meta-principle. If one considers language acquisition, one has to ask why the child does not just stay with a VP and an NP, or why she does not just stay in a pre-1 inguistic state.8 This would be the most economical solution of all. However, it is a matter of fact that language evolves—on every genetic time scale: ontogenetic, phylogenetic and microgenetic. Note that Chomsky (1995) delegates the puzzle of the emergence of the linguistic faculty to biology and to the brain sciences. In his opinion, the following question is not directly relevant to linguistics: How can a system such as human language arise in the mind/brain, or for that matter, in the organic world, in which one seems not to find anything like the basic properties of human language? (Chomsky 1995: 2)

I do not share this perspective but try to integrate evolutionary concerns. However, I share the doubts that these considerations make direct predictions about the architecture and the functions of the computational system of human language. If one takes an evolutionary perspective seriously, economy considerations alone are not sufficient. The picture is almost turned upside down: more and more resources are tapped, more and more abilities emerge. This upward process is a positive feedback loop. It results in the emergence of the most luxurious faculty of the human brain: language. This development can no longer be characterized by economy. To the contrary, evolution is lavish in Indeed, Grimshaw (1994) applies the idea of Extended Projection and particularly the later abandoned principle MlN-PROJ to language acquisition. The present question, however, is not addressed there. This question can be projected even further into the past. Ultimately, it is a question about evolution: "Why does evolution take place?"

298

that it builds organs of increasing complexity. Thus, a paradox arises: economy is the leading principle on any particular level of development, but this is not true if you look at the whole. How, then, is "the whole" to be characterized? The confrontation of local economy with global profligacy is probably fruitless. Recall that increasing complexity is "downhill", viewed evolutionary (cf. Cohen/Stewart 1994: 136; cf. section 5.1.1). Thus, growing complexity is "less costly" than any other development. I propose to solve this paradox by invoking the notion of ecology. It has been appealed to in various respects throughout this study. Note that the paradigm introduced here—a dynamical systems model of self-organization—is an ecological one (cf. van Geert 1993).9 Such a paradigm claims that the overall system is ruled in terms of ecology. Various species compete for resources in a given biotope. Each has an evolution of its own and co-evolves with others. Ecology naturally embraces economy. A species not adhering to economy is not able to compete! The very notion "economy" logically presupposes the idea of competition: an economical representation is more successful compared to a less economical one. This presupposition, however, usually remains only implicit. We derive the idea of local economy as opposed to global ecology. Economy is the leading principle on a horizontal axis: it holds things "small" or "simple", informally speaking. On the vertical axis of evolution, however, things become "bigger" or "more complex". Again, escaping into a more complex regime is the most ecological solution—given a critical state of the organism. Both processes are embraced by the notion "ecology" and are operative in self-organization. This excursus on ecology has led us away from the original topic of how dynamics is instantiated in the linguistic system of adults. Optimality Theory and the Minimalist account are important steps towards answering this question. Various representations compete. The optimal one is selected. Although the notion "competition" is a restricted one in Grimshaw (1993/1997), the overall account is promising. It allows for flexible phrase structures, unlike the previous, static claim of structural uniformity. Economy as a guiding principle for linguistic computations does not exist in isolation but is supposed to be regulated by an antagonist to which it is related ecologically. There seems to exist a polar relation, but so far we have only looked at one of the poles—economy. What counteracts economy?

Clark (1994: 486ff.), too, speculates on an "ecology of language", but in a different sense. His approach relates to "Genetic Algorithms". What he has in mind is a population of automata building syntactic trees called "treebots" (ibid.: 486), the activity of which is genetically determined. Each treebot builds a subtree of the syntactic representation to be established: The cooperation of these agents would determine the set of representations built by the community of treebots. The result of the foregoing would be a community of beings whose behavior is genetically fixed. This community would form a genetically related population over which natural selection could apply. In other words, learning could be achieved via a Genetic Algorithm [...]. The various treebots would interbreed and produce offspring which become more and more suited to their task—due to natural selection. In this scenario, "ecology" refers to the processes in the community of tree-building automata: how they "learn" their respective tasks, how they interbreed, how they are selected. Although this is a different approach to understanding language acquisition, it reveals a global trend "toward an ecology of language".

299

If we consider language acquisition in particular, a phrase structure becomes "bigger" as functional items enter the scene. They are expressed by a rich morphology and by rich syntactic processes of the language under consideration. The ultimate answer a dynamical account can give to the question why PCs emerge is the inherent richness of the language device. It starts out "small"—given limited resources—but dissipates when critical thresholds of complexity are passed. This cascade of bifurcation is assumed to happen via spontaneous self-organization. Another possibility to express this richness is in terms of fractality. Phrase markers are fractal—inexhaustibly rich! The richness of the human language faculty also strikes us if we look at the many different human languages, at language change, and eventually at the linguistic competence of adults. In adults the language faculty is most fully expressed—at least from today's point of view. Expressivity10 or expliciteness seem to point in the direction where the proper regulative for economy can be expected to be found. If more and more functional features are explicitely expressed in the grammar, the linguistic representations grow. Morphology and syntax become richer. As to syntax, the phrase marker erects functional projections, within which the respective functional features are checked. Movement becomes necessary in order for an item to pick up these features in the course of the derivation. Alternatively, the features in the functional projections attract the item. Chomsky (1995: 297ff.) himself introduces the term "attraction", which shows an obvious affinity to dynamical notions. In the minimalist program, the reason for movement is the checking of strong features which have to be deleted before Spell-out. If features are only weak and therefore not visible on the interfaces, they do not need to be checked until after Spell-out, i.e., on LF. Invoking a slightly different perspective, a functionally enriched lexical item is attracted as far as possible, i.e., to the highest position possible. As far as operators are concerned, for example, this means that, ideally, they occupy their LF scope position. In this case, the polar requirements of economy and expressivity clash: while economy, in particular the Procrastinate principle (cf. Chomsky 1995), favors the cheapest solution in form of covert LF movement, expressivity requires that the operator is installed in the position where it is actually interpreted on LF and where it can check its operator features.1' This requirement is captured by Brody's Transparency principle:12 (327)

Transparency

The lexical category in the chain must be in in the highest position licensed by morphology. (Brody 1993: 58) Brody notes that his Transparency principle restates Pesetsky's Earliness principle. While the latter is phrased in derivational terms, the former uses non-derivational terms. Note that Brody proposes a "Radically Minimalist Program" which dispenses with derivations. Earliness "essentially requires an operation that is forced by some filter to take place as 10

In semantics, the principle of expressibility has been known for a long time (cf. Searle 1969, Katz 1972). This was pointed out to me by Helen Leuninger (p.c.). 1 ' Fora brief discussion on Earliness vs. Procrastinate the reader is referred to Haegeman (1994: 505f.). 12 If, for instance, raising "of the verb in French main clauses, and of the auxiliaries 'have' and 'be' in English |...] must take place at some stage and it can take place overtly, it will do so." (Brody 1993:57)

300

early in the derivation as possible." (Brody 1993: 57) It is important to note that the Transparency principle and the Earliness principle apply in the overt component, i.e., in "syntax" (informally speaking), and not in the covert component, i.e., on LF. On LF, movement as well as functional projections are for free. In Brady's approach, the Transparency principle fulfills a more specific task than the task I have used it for here, namely of "expressing the richness of the language faculty." Such a restriction, of course, is highly desirable. After all, we want to know what concrete conditions UG adheres to: Transparency is natural: it can be taken to express the hypothesis that UG is built to maximize the recoverability of LF from PF. The lexical element must be as high as possible in the chain in order to make explicit LF scopal information at PF. (Brody 1993: 58)

In Brady's "Radically Minimalist Theory", the Transparency principle supersedes Chomsky's (1992, 1994, 1995) Checking Theory. "Apparently untriggered movement" (Brody 1993: 56) such as raising of English "have/be", topicalization in English and multiple overt wA-movement in Hungarian is problematic for the Checking Theory, but readily explained by invoking the Transparency principle.13 Intuitively, the Transparency principle ensures maximal expressivity. It is related to functional information in particular, which must be recovered and interpreted on the linguistic interfaces. The cost for making this information transparent is readily borne by the linguistic computational device. This is considered a trade-off in terms of ecology. My interpretation in terms of a quasi-metaphorical urge of UG—the urge towards "maximal expressivity"—is not at all implied in the generative literature discussed above. There, the contrast between the EarlinessA'ransparency principle on the one hand and Procrastinate on the other hand is quite a different one. This contrast is manifested by a cross-linguistic difference between languages, i.e., whether wA-movement must apply at S-structure and those in which it may apply at LF, and if the former condition holds, whether multiple overt wA-movement is possible. If single wA-movement may apply at S-structure as in English, or if multiple wA-movement at S-structure is possible as in Hungarian, it must apply at S-structure. This condition is expressed by Earliness. If, however, wA-movement cannot take place at S-structure, as in Chinese or Japanese, it is postponed until LF. This condition is expressed by Procrastinate. The latter is taken to be an economy principle, so UG should favor it. As proposed by Haegeman (1994: 506), one may interpret the different application of wh-movement—at S-structure vs. at LF—in the sense of strong vs. weak morphological features. In languages which allow overt wA-movement—whether simple or multiple movement—the morphological feature of the wA-element(s) obviously is strong and must be checked in overt syntax. Therefore, overt movement must apply. This scenario patterns with Earliness and with Transparency. In languages which do not permit overt wA-movement, on the other hand, the wA-feature is only weak and checking may wait until LF. This scenario patterns with Procrastinate. Clearly, my interpretation in terms of expressivity regulating economy goes beyond the generative interpretation. I consider the relation of Procrastinate vs. Earliness/Transparency, or of weak vs. strong features, a dynamical one. In particular, a precursor-successor rela13

For examples the reader is referred to Brody (1993/1995).

301

tionship may exist between the two types of features: the weak vt>A-feature "precedes" the strong w/t-feature. The respective syntactic consequences follow quite naturally. It is not at all surprising that different languages select one or the other possibility. In doing so they satisfy one or the other principle—economy or expressivity. Together, they form a polarity which is regulated by a meta-principle, namely ecology. In the course of language development—whether it is diachronic or ontogenetic development—the linguistic representations grow in a fractal way. Recall that the functionally charged phrase marker is considered a fractal mental object here. Fractal objects in the organic world are characterized by an extended surface, by virtue of which a great amount of information can be processed (cf. Goldberger, Rigney/West 1990: 46, Liebovitch 1998)). I extend this characteristic of bodily organs to mental objects. CP, for example, has a greater "surface" than VP; therefore, more (functional) information can be represented. In fact, the recent inflation of PCs in generative literature is revealing. The more thoroughly we inspect the phrase marker the more PCs we discover! Kayne (1993: 20) asks: "Why are there so many functional heads?"14 A rough answer is that the functional phrase marker is rich and diverse—as is the language faculty in general, according to Chomsky. Richness and diversity are characteristic of fractals. Generally, the exact "length" of a fractal cannot be determined. So I have to leave the question of how many PCs exist unanswered. The fractal is the only notion which can describe various objects in the organic and anorganic world that so far have resisted common linear descriptions. Recall the fractal objects commonly referred to in chaos theory such as the coast of a country, clouds or trees. Bodily organs such as the lungs, the heart and the brain are fractal, too (Liebovitch 1998). Fractals grow in the course of evolution. Paradoxically, the design of these objects is absolutely economic. Fractal organs realize complex functions, are adaptive and flexible, robust and resistant to injury, and can process even distorted information successfully. Although I argue for the requirement of maximal expressivity, these speculations are only impressionistic. I am confident that they will become explicit by future research in linguistics and related fields.

14

Of course, Kayne's problem is "home-made", at least in parts. His "Linear Correspondence Axiom" LCA, i.e., the requirement of asymmetric c-command, demands that every moved phrase adjoin to a newly created functional category as its specifier.

Abbreviations

In the presentation of the data several abbreviations are used. These are listed here in alphabetical order, together with their full forms. ABBR ace AGRP AP ASPP CP dat DIM DP FC fern fin FP gen INT IP LC LOG LP masc NegP nom

abbreviation accusative Agreement Phrase Adjectival Phrase Aspectual Phrase Complementizer Phrase dative diminuitive Determiner Phrase Functional Category feminine finite Functional Phrase genitive intonation Inflectional Phrase Lexical Category locative Lexical Phrase masculine Negation Phrase nominative

NP

Nominal Phrase

pi PP PRT ps QP SC sg subj T(NS)P TopP V2 VE VP

plural Prepositional Phrase particle person Quantifier Phrase small clause singular subjunctive mood Tense Phrase Topic Phrase Verb Second Verb End Verbal Phrase

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