Full Spectrum Dominance: Irregular Warfare and the War on Terror 9781503610668

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FULL SPEC TRUM DOMINANCE

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FULL SPEC TRUM DOMINANCE Irregular Warfare and the War on Terror Maria Ryan

Stanford University Press Stanford, California

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Ryan, Maria, 1979– author. Title: Full spectrum dominance : irregular warfare and the war on terror / Maria Ryan. Description: Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019004068 (print) | LCCN 2019005341 (ebook) | ISBN 9781503610668 | ISBN 9781503609990 (cloth: alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: United States—Military policy. | Irregular warfare—United States. | Terrorism—Prevention—Government policy—United States. | War on Terrorism, 2001–2009. | United States—Foreign relations—2001–2009. | United States— Foreign relations—2009–2017. Classification: LCC UA23 (ebook) | LCC UA23 . R966 2019 (print) | DDC 355/.033573— dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019004068 Cover design: Rob Ehle Cover images: Map, VectorStock; Flag, from U.S. Air Force photo by Capt. Peter Shinn, Task Force Bastogne Public Affairs, via DoDLive

Contents

Acknowledgments

vii



Introduction

1

1.

9/11 and the Early Seeds of Irregular Warfare

19

2.

The Philippines and the War on Terror in Southeast Asia

47

3.

The War on Terror in Sub-Saharan Africa

77

4.

Terrorism and the “Great Game” in Georgia and the Caspian Basin

114

5.

Irregular Warfare at the Pentagon, 2004–2008

136

6.

State, USAID, and the Interagency Mobilization

163

7.

Irregular Warfare with Restraint: The Obama Years

185



Conclusion

213

Notes

221

Index

299

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Acknowledgments

I

have many people to thank for helping, directly or indirectly, to bring this project to fruition. At Stanford University Press, I am grateful to Alan Harvey for the faith he showed in this project from the outset. I am indebted to Alan and to Leah Pennywark for the work they put into making this book happen. Beverly Miller did a wonderful job copyediting the manuscript and made this a better book. My thanks to Tim Roberts for turning it all into a real book. The Arts and Humanities Research Council of the United Kingdom generously supported this project in its early stages with an Early Career Fellowship. The University of Nottingham provided me with three terms of research leave. Without these, the project would have been impossible. Over the years, friends and colleagues have kindly given their time to read through parts of the work and provide feedback. David Fitzgerald provided a rigorous and engaged critique of the entire manuscript, which has improved the final version immeasurably. I am deeply grateful to him. The other anonymous reviewer for Stanford University Press provided comments that were extraordinarily gracious, perceptive, encouraging, and constructive—for which I am profoundly thankful. Additional thanks go to Adam Quinn, whose sharp analysis I much needed at an early stage; Bevan Sewell, who is one of the most discerning readers I know; Paul McGarr, who always encouraged my preoccupation with twenty-first-century “history”; and Steve Hewitt, who read material on short notice and still offered thoughtful, constructive comments. I am grateful to them all.

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The Yuchengco Center at De La Salle University in Manila kindly mailed me reference material that was not available in the United Kingdom. Renato Cruz de Castro helped explain the legal intricacies of US activity in the southern Philippines and pointed me toward relevant sources. I owe a debt of gratitude to colleagues and friends in the Department of American and Canadian Studies at the University of Nottingham. My thanks go to Susan Billingham for being such an excellent (and tolerant) head of department and friend. Christopher Phelps and Vivien Miller were warm and supportive colleagues when I especially needed it. As my wise friend, “Burnt Paw,” says, “Every ship of dreams sails a ragged ocean.” For keeping me going through some difficult times, I am so grateful to the following amazing people: the Baxters—Claire, Andrew, and Charlie— Celeste-Marie Bernier, Will Boyle, Michael Burns, Andy Green, Ian Haines, Stephanie Lewthwaite, Ruth Maxey, Hui Miao, Helen Oakley, Mara Oliva, Sue Paffett, Gillian Roberts, Catherine Rottenberg, and Rizwaan Sabir. This past year, I have been lucky to have Rabi Aminudin, Oanh Hoang, and Byamba Luguusharav in my life too. Thank you all. Finally, I am indebted to the whole extended Ryan clan (including, of course, the “flying” club): Mum and Dad; Helen, Pasquale, and Olivia; Bernadette, Sandro, Elia, and Luca; Ant, Jules, and Jack. Thank you.

Nottingham, November 2018

FULL SPEC TRUM DOMINANCE

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Introduction

T

his book offers a political history of how and why the US military—and indeed the whole of the US government—reoriented the country’s early twenty-first-century national security strategy to encompass a concept that came to be known as “Irregular Warfare.” (Throughout the book, I use the term Irregular Warfare, with capital letters, to refer to the US government’s official definition of the concept, while irregular warfare, without capitals, refers to the concept contested by scholars and practitioners.) It focuses on the intellectual, organizational, strategic, doctrinal, and operational shifts—with particular emphasis on the importance of the peripheral theaters of the war on terror—that led to and resulted from the elevation of irregular warfare in planning and operations across the US government, led by the Department of Defense (DoD), from George W. Bush to Barack Obama. The ultimate purpose of this was what the Pentagon called “full spectrum dominance”—dominance across the entire spectrum of conflict from conventional war through to irregular forms of conflict, for it was only through ensuring supremacy across the range of possible conflict that the United States could prolong its position of primacy in an era of globalization in which the information revolution had apparently changed the character of some of the security challenges faced by the United States. The concept of irregular warfare, derived from the first internationally accepted definition of “regular” war in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, was— and remains—a contested one.1 Colin S. Gray calls it “exceedingly illusive.”2

1

2

Introduction

According to Hew Strachan, war cannot be subdivided neatly into regular and/or irregular forms because hybrid wars—encompassing both regular and irregular techniques have been the historical norm.3 M. L. R. Smith and David Martin Jones claim that entire attempt to categorize war is futile and counterproductive because—as Carl Von Clausewitz, the canonical theorist of Western warfare, argued—“wars must vary with the nature of their motives and the situation which gave rise to them.” In other words, all wars are the unique product of their specific time and place.4 The term irregular warfare also has ethical connotations that can elicit both opposition and support depending on the context.5 Moreover, there are significant disagreements about how to execute irregular warfare in practice.6 These debates notwithstanding, the US defense community developed its own specific definition of irregular warfare, embodied in the September 2007 Joint Operating Concept on Irregular Warfare, the first of its kind: Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as: a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.7

This explanation of irregular warfare, which emerged from several years of debate, resulted in a final definition that encompassed three elements: the agent, who was doing the fighting—which was just as likely to be a nonstate actor as a state; the method—the tactics and techniques used, which were likely to include indirect and nontraditional methods as much as military force; and the objective—winning the allegiance of the people rather than relying on brute force to assert control. The most distinctive feature of IW, according to the Joint Operating Concept, was its focus on co-opting the population.8 This official definition drew on classic accounts of unconventional or untraditional wars, especially counterinsurgencies fought against independence movements by imperial powers such as Britain in Malaya and France in Algeria.9 Unlike conventional interstate war, fought by traditional military units to assert physical control over vast swathes of territory, irregular warfare was a population-centric form of conflict that aimed to secure decisive influence over an area by winning the allegiance of the population—often referred to as a hearts-and-minds approach. This effort employed a panoply



Introduction

3

of political, psychological, social, economic, and military measures. Famously described by Mao Zedong as “20% military, 80% political,” irregular warfare relied just as much on nonmilitary methods as on kinetic military activity— that is, ground operations in which lethal force is used.10 Undermining the appeal of irregular forces required not just military activity to separate insurgents from the indigenous people they hid among, but also a host of ideological, political, social, and economic activities designed to undermine the insurgents’ ideological appeal to the people, offer a counternarrative, and ultimately secure the territory by building an alternative society that the population would have a stake in defending.11 The purpose of this book is not to refine or challenge the US government’s definition of “irregular warfare,” as a practitioner might, but to offer a political history of the rise of this conception of IW across the US government and in practice on the ground in the war on terror on the periphery—the first testing grounds for IW techniques in the twenty-first century. My concern is how and why the US government came to approve such a countercultural definition of warfare and elevate a concept that had been largely peripheral to military planning and U.S. foreign policy since the 1960s, alongside more conventional notions of conflict, and how this initially manifested in the peripheral regions of the war on terror. Arguably more akin to nation building than conventional conflict, this type of protracted warfare had little in common with what Russell Weigley described in 1977 as “the American way of war.” Weigley argued that US wars had traditionally focused on overwhelming battlefield victories and physical destruction of the enemy with little account for what came afterward.12 The traditional conception of conventional interstate war also informed the principles of military intervention articulated by Casper Weinberger, Ronald Reagan’s secretary of defense, in 1984, and later by General Colin Powell, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1990. The Weinberger and Powell doctrines both emphasized clear and attainable objectives, the use of overwhelming battlefield force, and the importance of an exit strategy.13 In this conception of war, the conflict was enemy-centric, not population-centric, and relied overwhelmingly on raw military power. For most scholars, it was not until the United States faced an insurgency in Iraq in the mid-2000s that the Army and, ultimately, the U.S. government were forced to grapple with the realities of irregular warfare—in this case, counterinsurgency, a variant of IW.14 Until then, the military was devoted

4

Introduction

almost exclusively to conventional war, and it was principally in response to the crisis in Iraq that the U.S. Army rediscovered the practice of counterinsurgency that it had largely ignored since Vietnam. This book argues that the pursuit of an irregular warfare capability was also part of a much broader project, with roots that predated the application of counterinsurgency in Iraq (and later, in a modified form, in Afghanistan) and transcended the war on terror. This was the pursuit of what the Pentagon called “full spectrum dominance,” a phrase that came to refer to dominance across the entire spectrum of warfare from conventional through to irregular conflict, in order to ensure the continuation of US military preeminence in an era of globalization, in which networked nonstate actors now also challenged US hegemony alongside traditional state-based threats. Irregular warfare was not a new phenomenon, as its imperial lineage demonstrated, but for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the contemporary wave of globalization and the communications revolution had given new leverage to nonstate actors such as terrorists that could turn the technologies of the information revolution against the United States. The impact of globalization on conflict has been contested by Patrick Porter, who argues convincingly that physical distance and geography still act as constraints on both states and nonstate actors even in a globalized world, and that networked threats from the latter have been exaggerated.15 This was not the view that prevailed in the US defense establishment, however, where the apparent challenge from networked nonstate actors was taken seriously. I argue here that it was not just the quagmire in Iraq that catalyzed the turn toward irregular warfare, but also 9/11. The shock of 9/11 set in motion a new interpretation of the twenty-first century security environment for senior US policymakers. This developed gradually and unevenly, but nevertheless discernibly. For policymakers, the devastating terrorist attacks inside the United States exposed America’s security vulnerabilities, despite its awesome and overwhelming conventional military power. In Theo Farrell’s schema of norm change in modern conflict, the attacks functioned as an “external shock” to the US defense community, catalyzing, over time, “voluntary, radical cultural change” by “undermin[ing] the legitimacy of existing norms.”16 As Joseph Nye observes, for US policymakers, “September 11, 2001 was like a flash of lightning on a summer evening that displayed an altered landscape.”17 In this altered landscape, states were no longer the only or even the principal security threat. Nonstate actors and substate groups and networks could challenge



Introduction

5

the United States in ways it was not equipped to respond to: by employing asymmetric means and irregular methods that exploited new technologies.18 While the al-Qaeda network—a kind of transnational insurgency—was the immediate adversary in the post-9/11 world, it was but one manifestation of the new landscape of power. Over time, policy makers came to believe that to fight and win these new conflicts, and thereby ensure continued US global primacy, it was essential to develop irregular capabilities to complement existing strengths in conventional warfare. This book is the story of an attempt to maintain unchallenged and unassailable military preeminence in an era when potential challenges to American power seemed to be proliferating in ways that US officials had not anticipated. As Max Boot demonstrates, “small wars” that did not fit the template of conventional interstate war were in fact a regular occurrence in American history.19 However, US military culture and doctrine, and the country’s overall national security strategy, remained firmly rooted in conventional notions of industrial interstate war. Time and again, lessons learned in the ‘small’ nontraditional conflicts were not institutionalized and passed on, but forgotten or ignored at the end of the campaign. When it came to unconventional wars, the US military was not, in John Nagl’s phrase, “a learning institution.”20 As David Fitzgerald notes, this resulted in a peculiarly American dual narrative: a long tradition of small wars and, at the same time, a disavowal of their lessons. As Fitzgerald observes, these wars “have not lingered in the [military’s] historical memory.”21 The archetypal example is Vietnam. Though certainly not a small war, Vietnam required, at least in part, the tactics and skills of counterinsurgency against the guerrilla forces of the National Liberation Front. The loss of the war in Southeast Asia was so traumatic for the US Army that it buried the lessons, expunged the defeat from its collective consciousness, and regrouped around its favored paradigm of industrial interstate war in Central Europe against the Soviets.22 This conventional American way of war informed the principles of US defense strategy through the Cold War and into the very early twenty-first century. Nor was this just down to strategic preferences; to some extent, the U.S. economy relied on what Jerry Sanders calls “Keynesian militarism.”23 As Daniel Wirls demonstrates, the continued reliance on military spending to stimulate the domestic economy goes some way to explaining why the state-centric model of equipment-heavy conventional warfare endured in US defense planning into the twenty-first century.24

6

Introduction

Anticipating Irregular Warfare: Debates on the “New Wars” and Globalization While official US defense planning at the end of the Cold War continued to rely primarily on models of conventional interstate conflict, at a lower level, military practitioners and defense intellectuals in the United States began to debate how the demise of the East-West confrontation and the nascent information revolution might bear on international security. Defense scholars and military officers, rather than senior policymakers, were the first to describe the contours of a new type of irregular conflict—though the word irregular was not used at this stage—quite different from the interstate model that they claimed would dominate the twenty-first century, a kind of war for which the US military, at the end of the Cold War, was thoroughly unprepared for. Indeed it was America’s dominance in conventional military terms that meant potential challengers would likely choose other ways of confronting the United States.25 One of the most enduring contributions to this debate was the concept of fourth-generation warfare (4GW), a term coined in 1989 by William S. Lind and colleagues.26 These authors argued that the history of warfare could be broken down into four distinct generations, each reflecting the technology, social conditions and ideas of the day, from smoothbore muskets (first generation) to machine-gun and mass firepower (second), followed by the third-generation blitzkrieg tactics: the synchronization of tanks, infantry, and airpower. Each of these generational shifts was characterized by change in four key areas: greater dispersion on the battlefield, decreasing dependence on centralized logistics, more emphasis on maneuver, and the goal of collapsing the enemy internally rather than physically destroying him. Fourthgeneration warfare would be marked by an intensification of each of these existing trends and would no longer be recognizable as conventional warfare. The trend toward decentralization meant that “the fourth generation battlefield is likely to include the whole of the enemy’s society,” the authors wrote. The ultimate target would change: rather than focusing solely on destroying the adversary’s armed forces and associated infrastructure, targets would also include the population’s support for war and the enemy’s culture. Grinding down the will of the enemy government and its population would lead to victory. Dependence on centralized logistics would decrease further, and there would be a higher tempo to operations. The 4GW battlefield would be “widely



Introduction

7

dispersed and largely undefined.” Lind and colleagues described a kind of permanent low-intensity war in which “the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point” and the “distinction between ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ may disappear.”27 In many respects, this anticipated what the DoD would much later label “irregular warfare”: the dispersed battlefield, the decentralized form of command, and the targeting of civilian society would become indispensable components of the Pentagon’s IW concept. Advocates of fourth-generation warfare particularly emphasized the importance of culture as a contested battleground and the imperative of psychological operations. Since 4GW took place—in Rupert Smith’s phrase—“amongst the people,” winning or maintaining the allegiance of the population was a strategic imperative.28 This required offering an attractive political narrative and undermining the adversary’s vision—an objective that could not be achieved through force of arms. Instead, according to Lind and colleagues, “Fourth generation adversaries will be adept at manipulating the media to alter domestic and world opinion to the point where skillful use of psychological operations will sometimes preclude the commitment of combat forces. A major target will be the enemy population’s support of its government and the war.”29 In Lawrence Freedman’s words, the challenge for each adversary in an irregular conflict would be “to seek to unbind the enemy force by undermining the[ir] strategic narrative.”30 In an age where information was cheaper than ever before and omnipresent, information warfare would become a central component of conflict. Even more prescient was Lind and colleagues’ suggestion that the genesis of fourth-generation warfare might be visible in terrorism. A fourth-generation terrorist might combine high technology with “highly sophisticated psychological warfare” while operating on a transnational basis, making it difficult for conventional forces “designed to operate within a nation state framework” to confront.31 The 4GW concept was updated for the 1990s by Colonel Thomas X. Hammes in 1994.32 According to Hammes, “The world is organizing itself in a series of interconnected networks,” meaning that nation-states were no longer the only actors on the international stage. Transnational and subnational groups and networks were emerging as powerful forces too. Since they lacked the resources to wage interstate war, these groups preferred to fight low-intensity conflicts, encompassing political, economic, social, cultural, psychological, and military measures. In many respects this sounded like classic insurgency warfare, but what distinguished 4GW from its predecessors, according

8

Introduction

to Hammes, was the “use of all the networks available in the information age.”33 Thus, the dominant form of conflict in the twenty-first century would be networked insurgency-style warfare. Nevertheless, even transnational networks required physical bases somewhere. According to Mary Kaldor, who coined the contested but much-discussed term new wars to describe the conflicts of the 1990s, this type of warfare would flourish in the context of state disintegration. For Kaldor, the Balkan wars were the archetype of the new wars, defined by the disintegration of nation-states, ethnic conflict between nonstate and substate actors, and globalized financial networks that funded the conflict, often through illicit means. 34 Observing the disintegration of West African states in the early 1990s, journalist Robert Kaplan came to similar conclusions about twenty-first century conflict. The chaotic and lawless megacities of West Africa were, he argued, the auguries of “the coming anarchy.”35 In other words, it was no longer powerful, centrally organized states that posed the greatest security threat but weak and failing states that might be exploited by nonstate actors. What all these variants of low-intensity warfare had in common was a consideration of the impact of contemporary globalization on the character of conflict in the late twentieth century. The most recent phase of globalization had been driven by deregulation and a revolution in communications technology. The former led to the removal of barriers limiting the free flow of goods, finance, services, and people; the latter resulted in cheap global communications, the Internet, and an unprecedented sense of global interconnectedness.36 The Internet provided a new global communications platform for nonstate actors to share ideas and tactics and organize in relative freedom and secrecy.37 The removal of barriers facilitated global travel, the easy transfer of large sums of money, and the emergence of what Herfried Münkler calls the “shadow globalization” economy, from which nonstate actors could draw the resources necessary to wage conflict, including financial transfers from émigré communities, and (possibly illegal) business interests—all of which were easier to operate and to hide in a deregulated global economy.38 William Hartman points out that the 9/11 terrorists transferred over $500,000 into the United States to support their work, but with $1.5 trillion transferred around the world daily, the terrorists’ transactions were too small to attract any attention.39 Moreover, technology that had formerly been limited to states was increasingly available commercially.40 In October 1998, the Pentagon requested its



Introduction

9

Defense Science Board conduct a study on the security implications of the globalization of military production.41 The report warned of the “irresistible leveling effect [globalization] is having on the international military-technological environment.” Indeed because of the proliferation of military technology, the commercialization of former military-specific technology, and the increasing reliance of militaries worldwide on commercially-developed technology, and the general diffusion of technology and know-how, the majority of militarily useful technology is or eventually will be available commercially and/or from non-U.S. defense companies.42

The resulting perception was what one commentator called “the democratization of violence.”43 Although states had never had a monopoly on the use of force, the contemporary wave of globalization nonetheless appeared to alter the balance of power between states and nonstate actors significantly. It was now easier than ever before for nonstate groups to communicate, organize, sustain themselves on a global scale, and acquire technological and even military capabilities that were once accessible only to states. Twenty-First Century Irregular Warfare: 9/11, Iraq, and the Periphery This book argues that 9/11 was the initial catalyst for the turn toward irregular warfare because it exposed U.S. security vulnerabilities in spite of its unassailable conventional military power. However, the initial testing ground for irregular tactics in the twenty-first century was not Afghanistan, the first target of the war on terror. Since the Taliban government had sheltered Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda training camps, the objective there was a fairly conventional one: regime change. It was also the only militarily realistic option at that time since the capabilities, resources, and doctrine of the general-purpose forces were dedicated almost entirely to major conventional conflict.44 Policy on IW did not suddenly arrive fully formed immediately after 9/11. Instead, the first testing grounds for irregular tactics in the twentyfirst century were the “peripheral,” or smaller, secondary, theaters of the war on terror—weak states that lacked full control over their borders and territory, that policymakers feared terrorists might exploit as operational bases. On September 19, 2001, Rumsfeld wrote, “The President has stressed that we are not defining our fight narrowly and are not focused only on those directly

10

Introduction

responsible for the September 11 attacks.”45 While Afghanistan was the opening front in the war on terror, peripheral fronts developed from late 2001 onward across sub-Saharan Africa, in the Philippines, and in Georgia and the wider Caspian Sea region. On these fronts, US action would be led by special operations forces, which specialized in non-traditional warfare. The irregular approach used to secure these areas from transnational terrorists would later be subsumed into the official definition of Irregular Warfare contained in the 2007 Joint Operating Concept, and become, for a time, a core part of the mission of the general-purpose forces and a component of U.S. national strategy. Thus, peripheral counterterrorism operations constituted an important track—though by no means the only one—along which the policy, doctrine, and practice of IW gradually developed. Yet the peripheral theaters of the war on terror, and their significance, are often overlooked. Most scholars focus on the war in Iraq as the key theater where IW—in particular, counterinsurgency—was rediscovered and implemented in the mid- to late 2000s, with a particular emphasis on the surge in 2007 and, in an institutional sense, on the US Army specifically.46 I agree with these scholars that important lessons about counterinsurgency (COIN) were learned from Iraq. The development of COIN in this theater was in part spontaneous and pragmatic, led from the bottom up by officers serving on the ground there, who realized they were facing an increasingly organized resistance distinctly recognizable as an insurgency.47 In 2003, Major General David Petraeus, then commander of the 101st Airborne Division, had used counterinsurgency tactics in the city of Mosul based on his experience of nation building in Bosnia and Haiti.48 For the most part, however, the deployment of a comprehensive COIN approach across Iraq from 2007 on was down to the subsequent influence of a cadre of scholar-officers, also led by Petraeus, who had a particular devotion to the reclamation of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice, and who, as Paul Rich notes, “found a momentary period of influence at the center of political decision-making on Iraq” in 2006–07.49 While serving as head of the US Army’s Combined Arms Center in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 2005 to 2007, Petraeus oversaw the rewriting of the Army’s Field Manual on counterinsurgency. In the meantime the insurgency in Iraq gathered pace, policymaking in Washington became dysfunctional, and neither the president nor the secretary of defense could forge consensus on the way forward. This policymaking deadlock provided the political space for enthusiastic COIN advocates to exercise decisive influence on the US



Introduction

11

approach to Iraq.50 The new COIN Field Manual, FM 3–24, provided the doctrinal guidance for the troop surge in early 2007 and attracted so much interest that a trade paperback version was released by the University of Chicago Press.51 The perceived success of the COIN tactics in Iraq led to Petraeus’s deployment to Afghanistan in 2010 to oversee a similar approach. Writing in the Clausewitzian tradition of strategic thinking, many scholars who critique COIN in Iraq argue convincingly that the war on terror in this theater was, in Hew Strachan’s words, “astrategic.”52 In Clausewitz’s view, the strategist’s role was to “define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose.”53 In other words, a strategy required a political goal and viable military tactics to achieve that goal. For scholars of COIN in Iraq, the US failure there was down to the absence of strategy: COIN offered a set of military tactics, but political leaders could not articulate overall goals and objectives.54 The United States therefore needed to return to a Clausewitzian understanding of war in which policymakers provided coherent and realistic political objectives. The peripheral theaters of the war on terror were not astrategic in this sense. They were governed by different premises and objectives, which included a political goal and a set of military tactics—flawed though they all were. The political goal in these areas, clearly stated in national strategy documents and understood by personnel on the ground, was to strengthen the security and governing capacities of weak and failing states and bolster their ideological appeal so as to prevent violent nonstate actors from finding refuge there, and to diminish the likelihood of local people tacitly supporting such groups. This was a capacious and ultimately unrealistic political goal, but a goal nonetheless. It was also accompanied by a set of military tactics that the relevant policymakers and practitioners appeared to agree on. As policymakers began to interpret the new al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism as a transnational, networked phenomenon, they tentatively began to turn toward nontraditional responses. In this context, irregular tactics were increasingly seen as the best method for bolstering weak and failing states that were most likely to attract terrorists, though such tactics ultimately proved to be an ineffective remedy. This was the Bush administration’s strategy in the peripheral regions of the war on terror, and the campaigns there developed in advance of the introduction and maturation of COIN in Iraq. In fact it was in operations on the periphery, rather than in a bureaucratic or policy sense or in terms of national strategy, that IW was most advanced

12

Introduction

in the early years of the war on terror—most likely, because these activities were led mainly by special operations forces that were already trained to conduct unconventional operations.55 Under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom–the Philippines, a series of campaigns across sub-Saharan Africa (including Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara) and, on a smaller scale, in the Georgia Train and Equip program, the United States engaged in sophisticated multifaceted campaigns of foreign internal defense (FID) in which US forces would assist in every aspect of counterinsurgency but would stop short of direct participation in combat operations.56 In comparison, policy, doctrine, and new bureaucratic manifestations of IW were underdeveloped in the early war on terror. The irregular tactics used from an early stage in peripheral theaters anticipated the formalization of policy, doctrine, and supporting bureaucracy back in Washington, and eventually their application to the larger theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan. The turn toward irregular warfare was gradual. Although the irregular operations on the periphery were quite sophisticated, the IW concept did not come fully formed in late 2001. While the seeds of the comprehensive articulation of irregular warfare contained in the 2007 Joint Operating Concept are visible in the early months and years of the war on terror, the development of a national strategy, catalyzed by 9/11, that incorporated IW took several years to come to fruition. This process was uneven, often ad hoc, sometimes chaotic and contested. Nevertheless, to fully understand the evolution of U S Irregular Warfare capacity and its elevation into national strategy, as opposed to merely its use by the Army in Iraq and later Afghanistan, it is important to think more broadly about the lessons policymakers learned from the 9/11 attacks and the ways in which the turn toward irregular operations often transcended the large core theaters of the war on terror, where the initial tactics and objectives were more conventional. Ultimately, then, this book argues that the elevation of IW in national strategy and doctrine developed along multiple complementary tracks. First and foremost, it was a response to the perceived impact of globalization on international security—with the al-Qaeda network and the 9/11 attacks the principal manifestation of this. Second, the peripheral theaters of the war on terror became the initial testing grounds for the utilization of irregular tactics; and, finally, as an insurgency developed in Iraq, that campaign became the focus of a major new counterinsurgency effort for the US Army, subsequently applied in a modified form to Afghanistan. That final track has been the subject of almost all studies of counterinsurgency and the war on terror. This book does



Introduction

13

not dispute the importance of those core theaters, but it seeks to widen the analysis by considering other locations in which IW techniques were applied and draws attention to the broader project to develop and embed an irregular warfare capacity to ensure “full spectrum dominance.” Although the whole of the US government was eventually involved in an interagency attempt to build an Irregular Warfare capability, the individual who did most to drive these changes was Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, a major proponent of IW in the peripheral theaters of the war on terror. Rumsfeld saw IW as an integral part of national defense because he believed that irregular and hybrid wars would be the wars of the twenty-first century, and, as we shall see, even before 9/11, he worried about America’s vulnerability to asymmetric and nonconventional attacks. In this respect, then, the rise of IW was not purely a bottom-up phenomenon led by serving members of the US military in Iraq and scholar-generals like Petraeus, but also a top-down phenomenon led by the secretary of defense. To some, this focus on Rumsfeld may seem like a counterintuitive argument. It is well known that as the violence in Iraq became increasingly deadly, Rumsfeld stubbornly refused to use the word insurgency to describe it.57 As Jeffrey Michaels argues, it is uncertain whether this was because he “either genuinely believed the United States was not involved in fighting a guerrilla war or felt that to make this admission, even in closed political and military circles, somehow reflected a personal failing that in turn could have jeopardized his bureaucratic position and authority.”58 An important premise of my argument is that the invasion of Iraq was not governed by the same (flawed) strategic logic as the peripheral theaters of the war on terror and needs to be separated from them intellectually and politically—because this appears to be what US policymakers did, at least in the buildup to the Iraq invasion and its immediate aftermath. For most in the Bush administration there was a strong preexisting tendency to see Iraq as a conventional state-based challenge. The problem, they thought, was not that Iraq was a weak or failing state (the concern in peripheral theaters); it was Saddam’s hold on power that was the problem. Regime change in Baghdad was conceived long before 9/11. Leading members of the Bush administration, including Rumsfeld, had lobbied for Saddam’s ouster during the Clinton years, and their support for regime change then had nothing at all to do with networked transnational terrorism or the supposed perils of weak states. The 2003 invasion was conceived and executed as a conventional projection of American power designed to make

14

Introduction

the Middle East region more pro-American. As Rumsfeld put it in the first meeting of the National Security Council in February 2001, “Imagine what the region would look like without Saddam and with a regime that is aligned with U.S. interests. It would change everything in the region and beyond it. It would demonstrate what U.S. policy is all about.”59 For instrumental reasons, however, the Bush administration constructed a case for regime change in Iraq that attempted to link Saddam to 9/11 and therefore pursue the invasion under the expedient auspices of the war on terror, though in fact its goal there predated 9/11. In time, however, the conflict in Iraq unexpectedly became an unconventional one because the presence of the US-led coalition provoked a violent backlash that the architects of the invasion had not foreseen. Rumsfeld’s prediction and assumption—and, in the end, his insistence over the advice of some of his generals—that a relatively low number of troops would suffice to topple the regime and stabilize the country was proven wrong. If indeed he did believe a guerrilla war was taking place, admitting this would have been a major political embarrassment. Until further documentation is released, we cannot know for certain why Rumsfeld was hostile to COIN in Iraq. What we do know, however, is that he was a strong supporter of other variants of Irregular Warfare elsewhere in the war on terror (although even his ideas about IW did not come fully formed after 9/11). Rumsfeld fulfills the function of the “norm entrepreneur” identified by Farrell as an essential component of norm change in modern conflict.60 I therefore argue that Rumsfeld’s initial dismissal of COIN in Iraq did not equate to an indiscriminate rejection of the concept of COIN or IW; it was a rejection of counterinsurgency specifically in Iraq, but not necessarily elsewhere because Rumsfeld believed that in an age of globalization, security threats were just as likely to be irregular as conventional, meaning that only full spectrum dominance could secure the United States at home and its interests around the world. The evidence presented here about the war on terror on the periphery suggests that Rumsfeld separated the invasion of Iraq intellectually, politically, and operationally from the phenomenon of transnational networked Islamist militants. More broadly, the Bush administration was eventually able to put forward a strategy for confronting transnational nonstate actors in the twenty-first century, flawed though this was, but was not able to do this for the more conventional challenge of Iraq. A crucial caveat is that Rumsfeld—also known as a champion of the so-called revolution in military affairs—did not drop his support for conventional



Introduction

15

military technology but sought to supplement this with irregular capabilities. The turn toward Irregular Warfare was never intended to come at the expense of existing strengths in conventional war fighting. This top-down examination of doctrine and practice in IW also encompasses efforts to mobilize an interagency response to irregular security threats. The book demonstrates that to support the DoD and the military services, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also attempted to reorient themselves around the nonmilitary aspects of Irregular Warfare. Civilian experts from State and USAID would, it was envisaged, play vital roles in the non-combat aspects of Irregular Warfare, thus facilitating a holistic program of military, political, economic, social, cultural, and psychological measures designed to win the allegiance of the population and prevent extremism from taking route in ungoverned areas. These efforts were observable in the peripheral theaters of the war on terror from 2003 onward. More broadly, the book considers why certain countries and regions—the Philippines, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Caspian Basin—emerged as fronts in Washington’s war on terror. My intention is to shed light on these often overlooked theaters by considering what it was it about these particular locations that attracted the interest and concern of the Bush administration after 9/11. As well as the presence of ungoverned spaces in these areas, in each case, I argue, important preexisting or emerging geopolitical interests were identified that might be threatened by the emergence or reality of terrorism there. In particular, the book posits a connection between energy security and the war on terror, which manifested clearly in Georgia and in West Africa.61 Often policymakers provided only scant evidence of a supposed al-Qaeda presence in these areas; in some cases, particularly the African countries, US activities were consciously preventive; in other words it was the potential rather than the reality of terrorism that apparently threatened US interests and spurred intervention. In examining the peripheral theaters of the war on terror, the book eschews simplistic claims about the supposed unilateralism of the Bush administration and offers a more nuanced picture of how US counterterror initiatives were often accepted and shaped by elites in other states. For the Bush administration, twenty-first-century terrorism was a transnational phenomenon, meaning that multilateral cooperation was imperative. Although this study is primarily a consideration of US methods and objectives, it also demonstrates

16

Introduction

that the US presence in the peripheral theaters of the war on terror was often determined by the extent to which ruling elites in other nations were willing, or not, to cooperate. Whereas President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the Philippines publicly courted US intervention and set the parameters of joint operations, US overtures were less welcome in Malaysia and Indonesia. Notwithstanding its conventional (and, increasingly, irregular) military strengths, Washington could not always impose its agenda on these regions, and where it did achieve its objectives, this was usually the result of mutual perceptions of shared interests rather than a unilateral imposition of American power. This points to another reason that these particular locations became fronts in Washington’s war on terror: to some extent, the United States was invited in.62 Just as the efficacy of COIN in Iraq and later Afghanistan has been questioned, so I argue here that IW has been ineffective in stabilizing the peripheral areas of the war on terror. In Somalia, the US presence contributed to the emergence of a violent new Islamist group, Al-Shabaab. In the Philippines, acts of terror by the Abu Sayyaf Group increased during the twelve-year US presence. Ultimately, I argue, the US strategy toward the peripheral theaters was fundamentally flawed. The political objective of stabilizing weak states was misconceived since state failure is not the main catalyst for the emergence of terrorism. This generic assumption ignored the unique and specific circumstances of each country and each manifestation of political violence. The Irregular Warfare paradigm does not engage with the specific circumstances of each conflict zone; rather, it offers instead a depoliticized, one-size-fits-all set of tactics to be applied everywhere, in all circumstances. As M. L. R. Smith and David Martin Jones note, this approach ignores Clausewitz’s dictum that war is “more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case”—in other words, that all violence is unique to its time and place.63 The Bush, and subsequently Obama, administrations ignored the unique circumstances of each peripheral theater and transposed the same prefabricated irregular solution onto each of them. In doing so, they avoided the more difficult job of engaging with the details of what Laleh Khalili calls “the politics that defines and structures revolt.”64 Moreover, as Gian Gentile argues, the notion that Irregular Warfare tactics are a tool kit that can be applied indiscriminately to conflict-prone societies around the world offers the false promise of ‘better,” more successful wars, and even risks becoming “a recipe for perpetual war.”65 The IW approach that Washington developed after 9/11 went far beyond defensive measures designed to hedge against an



Introduction

17

asymmetric attack. Instead, full spectrum dominance was an imperial vision that combined an offensive approach to both irregular challenges and conventional military affairs, with the ultimate objective of maintaining American primacy on a global scale for as long as practicably possible. Finally, I argue that the turn to Irregular Warfare left an ambiguous, though concerning, legacy. To some extent, irregular capabilities and objectives have become embedded in the thinking and practice of the U.S. military, the Department of State, and USAID. By the end of the Obama years, the perceived impact of globalization on conflict was firmly implanted in the organizational mind-set of the defense establishment. However, the political will to undertake major Irregular Warfare campaigns, such as in the failed state of Libya, diminished in the Obama years as a result of public weariness with war and the president’s preference for a more restrained American hegemony.66 Structure The book offers a chronological and thematic history of the rise of the concept of Irregular Warfare, beginning, in Chapter 1, with the very early months of the Bush administration, in which Rumsfeld signaled his earliest concerns about nontraditional security threats. The 9/11 attacks began to catalyze a new way of thinking about international security, which was evident in the elevation of Special Operations Command as the lead integrating command in global counterterrorism operations, but was also visible to some extent in new national and departmental strategy and planning. The immediate post-9/11 period also established the truly global character of the new war on terror. Chapters 2 through 4 examine the parallel, and in many respects more advanced, development of irregular campaigns in the peripheral theaters of the war on terror. Chapter 2 focuses on Operation Enduring Freedom–the Philippines. Chapter 3 examines the interagency campaign of foreign internal defense across sub-Saharan Africa, while Chapter 4 considers the smaller train-and-equip program in Georgia. These chapters also examine other US geopolitical interests in these areas and argue that these countries and regions emerged as fronts in the war on terror because of a confluence of preexisting or newly emerging geopolitical interests combined with the potential for, or reality of, Islamist terrorism in these areas. Chapter 5 examines the maturation of the concept of Irregular Warfare in doctrine, organization, and practice at the Department of Defense from

18

Introduction

roughly 2005 to 2008 and concludes that a serious effort to embed the concept in DoD thought and practice was underway, as demonstrated in the continuity between Rumsfeld and his successor, Robert Gates, and by the ongoing use of IW techniques in areas outside Iraq and Afghanistan. Chapter 6 looks at the attempt to mobilize an interagency response to irregular security challenges and focuses on the intellectual, financial, organizational, and policy reforms at the Department of State and the USAID. These reforms were enthusiastically supported by the leaders of State and USAID, though not by Congress. Nevertheless, they led to some genuine interagency cooperation on the ground, but this came at the cost of making State and USAID subservient to US security policy. Finally, Chapter 7 examines the Obama years and argues that substantive changes had become embedded in national strategy and global outlook by this stage because no one failed to take seriously the perceived impact of globalization on international security, meaning that some competency in irregular responses was deemed essential. Yet Obama himself was unwilling to commit to large-scale IW operations, and his reliance on drone bombing in multiple countries indicated his preference for US forces to be somewhat distant from events on the ground. This book is a work of contemporary history. Although it cannot draw on the vast archives that historians researching decades-old events can, it nevertheless draws from a rich and hitherto mostly unused base of primary source material, including unclassified materials from the Departments of Defense and State, USAID, the Executive Office of the President, US European Command, US Pacific Command, US Africa Command, US Special Operations Command, congressional hearings, the Government Accountability Office, and professional US military journals. Formerly classified State Department cables obtained via Wikileaks have provided extra insight, as have the papers of Donald Rumsfeld, available online. In addition, the book is based on over two hundred documents released by the Departments of State and Defense under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act. The conclusions here are unlikely to be the final word on this subject, but I hope the analysis will provoke new questions that may be addressed in time as more materials become available.

1

9/11 and the Early Seeds of Irregular Warfare

A

t the dawn of the twenty-first century, the United States was the largest single aggregation of power in the world.1 It had the largest economy, spent over 40 percent of the global defense budget, and had almost seven hundred military bases on every continent. It enjoyed unrivaled political, economic, and cultural influence.2 It was a historically unprecedented position. Before 1945, the United States had been one of several major powers in the world. During the Cold War, US primacy was contested by another (arguably lesser) superpower, the USSR. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the United States as the world’s sole superpower for the first time. Some commentators, admirers and critics alike, labeled it an “empire,” for although it no longer had colonies, the United States enjoyed unparalleled and, arguably, unprecedented influence and reach.3 Its military establishment was so vast that it could fight and win two major regional conflicts simultaneously, conduct smaller constabulary duties, and maintain its vast network of military bases.4 Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer claimed it was America’s “unipolar moment”: an era with a “single pole of power” that could exercise decisive influence in any region of the world.5 When the United States was attacked by a transnational terrorist network on September 11, 2001, its conventional military power was irrelevant. The superpower could do nothing to defend itself against a series of horrific asymmetric attacks that killed over three thousand people in three separate locations in just over an hour. America’s conventional military dominance

19

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9/11 and the Early Seeds of Irregular Warfare

was immaterial against a nonstate opponent that used irregular methods and exploited asymmetries of power to its advantage. The al-Qaeda terrorists had targeted the United States’ Achilles’ heel: it was hyperprepared for one type of adversary—a conventional state-based threat—but unprepared for anything else. In an era when globalization was, to some extent, eroding state power, creating complex webs of interdependence, and empowering transnational nonstate actors in new ways, the US government had focused primarily on its preferred method of warfare, the one at which it excelled: traditional interstate conflict between two conventional adversaries. On 9/11, the global superpower appeared remarkably vulnerable. Although the US military had not ignored nontraditional threats entirely during the 1990s, it had played only a peripheral role in defense planning. While the Quadrennial Defense Review of 1997 invoked the goal of “full spectrum dominance,” the first time the phrase was used, the spectrum was described in purely conventional terms: “from deterring an adversary’s aggression or coercion in crisis and conducting concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations, to fighting and winning major theater wars.” 6 Although the military had developed new doctrine on what it referred to as “Military Operations Other Than War,” which included “low-intensity” tasks such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and noncombatant evacuation, these activities were viewed only as marginal components of traditional military operations, not as a different category of warfare.7 Throughout the decade, the main focus was on fighting and winning two major conventional regional conflicts, notably Iraq and North Korea, with overlapping time frames.8 The most significant strategic innovation in this period concerned the application of high-technology to conventional weapons systems—the concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which exploited new communications technologies to link advanced conventional weapons systems together and to sources that could gather information about the battle space, thus creating joint operations between the different military services.9 Innovation in this period was largely directed toward building on existing strengths in major conventional warfare. However, dominance of the conventional battle space meant it would make little sense for an adversary to challenge the United States in this way.10 Steven Metz and James Kievit called this the “band-width problem”: the US military was overprepared for one type of warfare—conventional—but barely prepared at all for any other.11



9/11 and the Early Seeds of Irregular Warfare

21

Rumsfeld (and Bush) in Off ice: The Early Months Given his political coming of age and governmental service during the Cold War, Donald Rumsfeld was an unlikely champion of what would become known as Irregular Warfare (IW) during his tenure as Secretary of Defense, but it was he who led the process by which the Pentagon eventually elevated IW to a status on a par with conventional war. George W. Bush had not given any indication during the 2000 presidential campaign that America’s lack of IW capability was a particular concern; instead, he focused on exploiting the RMA. In a speech at the Citadel in South Carolina in September 1999, Bush called for the use of advanced technology to make America’s conventional forces more “agile, lethal, readily deployable, and require[ing] a minimum of logistical support.” He also promised to earmark at least 20 percent of the military’s procurement budget for “acquisition programs that propel America generations ahead in military technology.”12 In the presidential debates, he ruled out military involvement in nation building: “I would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders. I believe the role of the military is to fight and win war and therefore prevent war from happening in the first place.”13 In February 2001, according to Rumsfeld, the president gave him “explicit guidance” to make the military “lethal, light, and mobile”14 —classic RMA parlance. In his first meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 2001, Rumsfeld had already “asked for their thoughts on what ‘transforming’ could mean for the Department [of Defense].”15 Although he was interested in the RMA, Rumsfeld had some critical distance from it too: “I had not written on the issue of defense transformation, nor did I consider myself in the circle of national security experts who had promoted the idea throughout the 1990s,” he later wrote.16 His own understanding of transformation was broader than just the exploitation of technology: The key to transforming the Department, as I saw it, was through encouraging its civilian and military leaders to be more forward-looking, and to think freely, not conventionally. In my view, transformation hinged more on leadership and organization than it did on technology. Precision-guided weapons and microchips were important, but so was a culture that promoted human innovation and creativity.17

Rumsfeld also realized that conventional military superiority alone did not immunize America from security threats. In his memoir, he recalled that he

22

9/11 and the Early Seeds of Irregular Warfare

had “often noted that the United States then [in 2001] faced no peers with respect to conventional forces—armies, navies, and air forces—and, as a result, future threats would likely lie elsewhere.”18 Like many other critics of the RMA, Rumsfeld realized that even unassailable conventional dominance was not, in Tim Benbow’s phrase, “a magic bullet” because it could not neutralize every type of potential adversary and, arguably, even provided incentives for an opponent to adopt asymmetric tactics.19 “I saw preparing for the inevitability of surprise as a key element in the development of a defense strategy,” Rumsfeld said.20 Even in the pre-9/11 months, Rumsfeld encouraged the Department of Defense (DoD) to consider the impact of contemporary globalization on the security environment and what this meant for US defense strategies and capabilities. The Guidance and Terms of Reference (which determined the focus of the review and shaped its outcome) for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that Rumsfeld presented to Congress in June 2001 called for the review to consider US vulnerabilities in an age of “open borders and open societ[ies].”21 Rumsfeld questioned whether it was still appropriate to maintain a posture based on fighting two nearly simultaneous major theater wars and said that the QDR team would be looking at possible alternatives.22 One notable change would be the incorporation of “capabilities-based” planning models for long-term challenges. Since the Cold War, when the most likely security threat to the United States, the Soviet Union, was well known, the Pentagon had relied on “threat-based” planning models, meaning that force posture would be dictated by the most likely threat. Now, however, threats were more difficult to identify and might not be recognizable in conventional terms. “Contending with uncertainty must be a centerpiece of US defense planning” said the terms of reference.23 Accordingly, Rumsfeld wanted the military to develop “a portfolio of key military capabilities [emphasis added]” that would enable it to confront a spectrum of threats rather than planning for only one particular type of conventional adversary.24 In July Rumsfeld penned a note-to-self with a line he planned to offer the next time he was called to testify in Congress (though in the end, he never had a chance to use it): “I do not want to be sitting before this panel in a modern day version of a Pearl Harbor post-mortem as to who didn’t do what, when, where, and why. None of us would want to be back here going through that agony.”25 The ensuing QDR report released in late September 2001—but written primarily before 9/11—reflected and expanded on these themes in striking ways.



9/11 and the Early Seeds of Irregular Warfare

23

The report acknowledged that a planning system that focused primarily on conventional threats was out of date because the nature of armed conflict was changing “in ways that render military forces and doctrines of great powers obsolescent.”26 In a globalized world “it is not enough to plan for large conventional wars in distant theaters. Instead, the United States must identify the capabilities required to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives.” This would be facilitated by the switch to capabilities-based planning, which would “den[y] asymmetric advantages to adversaries.”27 The construct of two major regional wars, which had dominated defense planning since 1992, was being modified: the Pentagon was “not abandoning planning for two conflicts to planning for less than two . . . [but] changing the concept altogether by planning for victory across the spectrum of possible conflict.”28 This spectrum was no longer defined purely in conventional terms: in the future, the United States was likely to be challenged “by adversaries who possess a wide range of capabilities, including asymmetric approaches to warfare.”29 It must prepare to defeat “any adversaries, including states or non-state actors” and respond to “a variety of potential scenarios in addition to cross-border invasion.”30 This was far from being an articulation or endorsement of irregular warfare, but it did show that the Pentagon was beginning to think about nontraditional security threats in a slightly different way. It was clear that for Rumsfeld at least, the military did not have the capabilities required to dominate the whole spectrum of conflict, despite its embrace of the RMA over the past decade. The content of the QDR was very much a reflection of Rumsfeld’s priorities. A report on the QDR process written by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and based on discussions with officials from the DoD repeatedly noted the “top-down leadership for the [QDR] process.” The secretary of defense and other key officials “actively participated in planning and implementing the 2001 QDR,” even attending a five-day meeting to discuss threats, capabilities, and force structure.31 Moreover, “The Secretary was directly involved in reviewing and revising drafts of the QDR report. One high-ranking OSD official stated that he had not seen as much interaction among the senior leadership in any of the three prior defense planning studies he had participated in. The broad consensus of officials we spoke with across DOD is that the QDR report represents the Secretary’s thinking and vision.”32 Writing in 2005, Ryan Henry, then Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, claimed that the 2001 QDR process “began with a degree of humility.

24

9/11 and the Early Seeds of Irregular Warfare

As Secretary Rumsfeld insisted from the first, the future is uncertain. We can’t predict it. We have to be ready for asymmetric attacks, and we can’t know how or where they will happen.” As a result, “In the course of the 2001 QDR—even before 9/11—the Department came to the conviction that even with limited resources, it had to have effective capabilities across a very broad spectrum.”33 On September 11, 2001, a fortnight or so before the release of the QDR, Rumsfeld attended a breakfast meeting with nine members of the House Armed Services Committee to encourage them to increase investment in national defense and impress on them the importance of preparing for unexpected surprises. “Sometime within the coming period,” he told them, “an event somewhere in the world will be sufficiently shocking that it will remind the American people . . . how important it is for us to have a strong national defense.”34 That very morning, Rumsfeld’s outlook appeared to be vindicated. 9/11 and a Global War on Terror “I was still in my Pentagon office, absorbing news of the attacks in New York,” Rumsfeld later wrote, “when I felt the building shake. The tremor lasted no longer than a few seconds, but I knew that only something truly massive could have made hundreds of thousands of tons of concrete shudder. . . . Hell had descended on the Pentagon.”35 For Rumsfeld, the 9/11 attacks confirmed his view of the contemporary security environment: it was “a transformational event that cries out for us to rethink our activities, and to put that new thinking into action.”36 It is impossible to know how the strategy encapsulated in the 2001 QDR would have evolved had 9/11 not occurred. However, the shock of the attack, which constituted a major challenge to widely held state-based conceptions of national security that relied on conventional military deterrence, made other administration principals more sympathetic to Rumsfeld’s perspective. For Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Council (NSC) adviser, the extreme asymmetry of the attack challenged long-standing assumptions about the primacy of conventional state-based challenges: “The United States was the most powerful country in the world—militarily and economically. And yet, we had not been able to prevent a devastating attack by a stateless network of extremists, operating from the territory of one of the world’s poorest countries. Our entire concept of what constituted security had been shaken.”37 The president also recognized that the attack had not come from a conventional adversary: “This would be a different kind of war. We



9/11 and the Early Seeds of Irregular Warfare

25

faced an enemy that had no capital to call home and no armies to track on the battlefield. Defeating them would require the full resources of our national power.”38 From the very beginning, the war on terror was conceived as an endeavor that was potentially global in scope rather than limited to Afghanistan and later Iraq. The 9/11 tragedy was the immediate catalyst for the largely conventional invasion of Afghanistan and used to construct a justification for the invasion of Iraq—a preexisting state-based adversary—but it was also the gateway for much more. The new “war on terror” would have core fronts— beginning in Afghanistan and ostensibly moving on to Iraq—as well as peripheral or smaller, secondary theaters, where the use of IW techniques would begin for the first time in the twenty-first century. Although the Bush administration did not explicitly define which regions of the world would be core and which would be peripheral in its new schema, the war was defined in expansive terms. From its inception, policymakers discussed the possibility of multiple fronts, and within months, they were ordering actions that would see the establishment of three secondary theaters. Almost immediately after the 9/11 attacks, members of the administration began to discuss ways in which their response to the attacks could be framed in as broad a way as possible. As Rumsfeld, put it at 2:40 p.m. on September 11, he wanted to “[get] best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit SH [Saddam Hussein] at same time. Not only UBL [Usama bin Laden]. . . . Go massive, sweep it all up. Things related and not.”39 Deputy Defense Secretary Douglas Feith later described how the war on terror would, from the beginning, go beyond Afghanistan: “Identifying the perpetrators was not the same as deciding how to define the enemy.” (Although the United States had to be careful how it did define the enemy; Feith candidly acknowledged that it could not target every state that supported or tolerated terrorism because “it . . . complicated matters that the US considered some of these states important friends.”)40 According to Rice, the terrorists constituted a broad network, and the response to 9/11 would be a broad “war”: “We’re not just going to do something once,” she said.41 Two days after the attacks, Feith noted, “the President, Rice and Rumsfeld were already discussing the war as an effort against not only al Qaida but the terrorists’ network broadly conceived.”42 Rumsfeld mused on the importance of surprising the enemy. Surprise was “a crucial operational value,” so striking Afghanistan first might not be the best option. Instead, it might be better “for the initial strike to be directed someplace else

26

9/11 and the Early Seeds of Irregular Warfare

and preferably someplace like South America or South East Asia.”43 On September 14, Rumsfeld told a Pentagon meeting with General Hugh Shelton, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the United States should “do something that has three, four, five moves behind it.” He wanted a “sustained, broad campaign” and, according to Feith, “reiterate[ed] that the threat we faced was from a global terrorist network, not just one organization,” and told advisers, “Don’t over-elevate the importance of al Qaida.” Feith concurred; he believed that the response to 9/11 should include “Jemaah Islamiya in Southeast Asia, Lebanese Hezbollah, various Africa-based groups—and state sponsors beyond Afghanistan.”44 At the suggestion of Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Feith and Peter Rodman, assistant secretary of defense for international affairs, drafted a paper for the National Security Council meeting at Camp David on September 15 based on their discussions with General John Abizaid, head of Central Command, Bill Luti, Rodman’s deputy, “and on what we had learned since [9/11] about the thinking of our bosses and colleagues.” They argued that the United States should confront “the entire network of states, non-state entities, and organizations that engage in or support terrorism against the United States and our interests.”45 Ultimately the president did not support beginning the war on terror with strikes outside Afghanistan, but the congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed on September 18 gave the Bush administration a mandate that was even more expansive than the infamous 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution that presaged the expansion of the Vietnam War. Whereas the Tonkin resolution applied specifically to Southeast Asia, the 9/11 resolution did not stipulate any geographical or temporal limits to the new war, thus permitting the establishment of multiple fronts for an indefinite period of time. The president was granted permission to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against unspecified “nations, organizations, or persons [he] determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of terrorism against the United States.” This remained the core legal basis for all US military action, except Iraq, through the Bush and Obama years.46 Though this by no means signaled a sophisticated conception of a counterterrorist periphery, it did provide the administration with the opportunity to broaden the scope of the war on terror beyond just Afghanistan and establish multiple theaters to counter existing terrorism and prevent new manifestations of it.



9/11 and the Early Seeds of Irregular Warfare

27

In time, and with the support of the president, it was Rumsfeld who would prove to be the most important architect of the administration’s approach to the peripheral theaters of the war on terror. On September 19, 2001, Rumsfeld wrote a memo of guidance to the heads of the unified military commands to help them draft war plans for the counterterrorist campaign to fulfill the president’s directives. Notably, the defense secretary sent this to all the geographical combatant commanders, not just the head of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), which presided over the Middle East and Afghanistan. He instructed the commanders to plan for: “1. Targets worldwide, such as UBL al-Qaida cells in regions outside Afghanistan and even outside the Middle East . . . it will be important to indicate early on that our field of action is much wider than Afghanistan.”47 He went on to state, “The President has stressed that we are not defining our fight narrowly and are not focused only on those directly responsible for the September 11 attacks.”48 On September 24, Bush reported to Congress that he had already deployed US forces to “a number of foreign nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas of operations,” that he might find it necessary to deploy additional forces into other areas of the world, and that he could not predict the scope and duration of these deployments.49 Although it was not until 2003 that the phrase “Global War on Terror” (GWoT) came into use—with Rumsfeld one of the first to publicly use the phrase—the embryonic outlines of a potentially expansive campaign were visible in the September 2001 AUMF and the post-9/11 cabinet-level discussions of strategy. 50 The Seeds of a New Approach to Conf lict While the Taliban, which had permitted bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan, was firmly established as the first target in the war on terror and Iraq was already being discussed as part of a “second round,”51 the 9/11 attacks also set in motion the gradual and, at first, somewhat tentative development of a new approach to unconventional networked challenges, which transcended the immediate needs of regime change in Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. The new approach did not come fully formed after 9/11; the word irregular did not appear until the May 2004 National Military Strategy, while the phrase Irregular Warfare was not used until the 2006 QDR. The intellectual, political, bureaucratic, and operational dimensions of IW gestated across the

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9/11 and the Early Seeds of Irregular Warfare

administration at least until the Pentagon released its formal definition of Irregular Warfare in 2007. This was not surprising. The post-9/11 effort to understand the challenges posed by transnational nonstate actors was being undertaken by an administration composed of senior policymakers who came of age politically during the Cold War. Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick Cheney, Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Deputy Defense Secretaries Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith, had all established themselves politically in an era when policymakers were preoccupied by what they saw as conventional state-based threats.52 In the 1990s, their analyses of international relations continued to revolve firmly around nation-states and military power, even as globalization began to erode state boundaries and transnational security challenges proliferated.53 A strategy that took heed of irregular challenges was a significant intellectual and policy shift for these individuals, and no doubt this partly accounts for the gradual and uneven development of the new approach. In some ways, however, Rumsfeld anticipated at a relatively early stage that the war on terror would be an unconventional type of conflict. In July 2002, he asked the head of Special Operations Command (SOCOM), General Charles R. Holland, to work on a plan to make SOCOM the lead unified military command for planning and synchronizing the war on terror.54 At the time, there was no lead combatant command for counterterrorism operations. Rather than ask CENTCOM, which presided over US military affairs in the Middle East, or any of the other geographical combatant commands, Rumsfeld suggested SOCOM take the lead. While this no doubt reflected the role of special operations forces supporting the general-purpose forces in Afghanistan, giving SOCOM synchronizing authority, meaning it could issue orders to other commands regarding global counterterrorism operations, indicated that its field of operations would be much wider than just Afghanistan. SOCOM’s core activities already included unconventional warfare, psychological operations, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, and civil affairs—ideal for conducting a nontraditional war. The elevation of SOCOM was countercultural, however, and encountered some resistance from the conventional services. As Thomas Mockaitis observes, “Regular soldiers have historically harbored mistrust, even outright hostility, towards [special operations forces] whom they saw as undisciplined mavericks.” During the Cold War, promotion to full colonel and beyond went only to those who had commanded conventional units.55 Despite Rumsfeld’s support for the plan, the geographical combatant commands opposed



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giving SOCOM synchronizing authority. Nevertheless, Rumsfeld’s initiative led to the 2004 Unified Command Plan, which designated the SOCOM commander as “the lead combatant commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with combatant commanders.”56 To meet its new responsibilities, the command received an increase in funding from $3.8 billion to more than $6.4 billion over 2001 to 2005, in addition to over $5 billion in supplemental funding in this period. During this time, funding for military personnel costs at SOCOM increased by 53 percent.57 From 2001 to 2007, SOCOM committed itself to eighty-six new acquisition programs.58 Additional resources would also result from the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.59 In August 2002, Rumsfeld wrote a short memo to General Richard Myers, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, copying Feith and his adviser, Stephen Cambone, asking “what we need to do to get conventional forces capable of doing more of what Special Operations Forces are now doing.” Myers offered a list of six unconventional tasks, mostly unrelated to the GWoT, that might be taken on right away by conventional forces.60 Whether this happened is unknown, but Rumsfeld’s attention to the role of special forces was an indication of the importance he placed on unconventional tactics in the war on terror at a time when these skills were not a core competency for the general-purpose forces. Although SOCOM did not become lead command until 2004, in the years prior to this, the turn toward IW was still more advanced in an operational than a policy sense because, as we shall see, sophisticated irregular campaigns were prosecuted by special operations forces in the peripheral theaters of the war on terror from 2002 onward. These operations in many respects anticipated the formalization across the US government of national strategy, policy, and doctrine on IW. Nevertheless, the early policy roots of the turn toward IW also lie in the immediate post-9/11 period, with the earliest seeds of change discernible in the 2001 QDR and the months and years immediately following 9/11. With transnational Islamist terrorism viewed as the exemplar of the type of networked irregular challenge the United States could face in an age of globalization, a new and more sophisticated definition of terrorism led to new ideas about how to counter it. A New Kind of Threat When terrorism began to threaten US interests in the 1970s and 1980s, it was viewed exclusively through the lens of state sponsorship. From the car bomb

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that ripped through the US Marine barracks in Beirut, to the airplane hijackings by Palestinian nationalists, state sponsors were viewed by policymakers as the key facilitators.61 In many respects, this was accurate: states did often facilitate terrorism either by actively supporting it or by not opposing it. During the 1990s, the Taliban government in Afghanistan had allowed bin Laden to establish al-Qaeda training camps in the country.62 There were tensions between bin Laden’s group and the Taliban since the latter had no interest in transnational jihad; nonetheless, bin Laden was tolerated by the Taliban, which gave his training camps a physical base.63 Yet al-Qaeda functioned chiefly, in Jason Burke’s words, as a transnational “network of networks” with cells spread across Asia, Europe, the United States, and the Middle East, loosely connected through modern communications, and able to transfer money, organize, and spread its propaganda worldwide through the Internet.64 Thus, the bin Laden network could not have functioned as it did without its Afghan safe haven; at the same time, the network was transnational and beyond the control of the Taliban. After the 9/11 attack, the US government gradually began to incorporate the concept of transnational terrorism into its national defense in a more meaningful way. The Bush administration’s first National Security Strategy (NSS), released in September 2002, was the first major post-9/11 attempt to interpret what policymakers saw as a new security environment. As NSC adviser, Rice led the interagency process that resulted in the final NSS document. In the past, she believed the NSS exercise had had little purpose. “The document had previously been a largely bottom-up bureaucratic exercise that had produced an unwieldy tome of several hundred pages.” However, “this time we decided that the national security strategy would be different and consequential,” Rice said, and took as the model NSC-68, the seminal statement of US strategy in the early Cold War.65 The final NSS document acknowledged the impact of globalization on international security and the diminishing frequency of industrial interstate war, declaring, “Enemies past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering. . . . Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us.”66 Groups like al-Qaeda would “not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail.” This meant that “a military structured to deter massive Cold War era armies must be transformed to focus on how an adversary might fight rather than when and where a war



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might occur.”67 Echoing the 2001 QDR, the NSS called for the United States to develop “a broad portfolio of military capabilities.”68 The character of the new adversary was drawn out more explicitly in the February 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT), again written by Rice’s office. This document also offered a definition of terrorism that reflected lessons learned in the aftermath of 9/11. On the one hand, it acknowledged a relationship between states and terrorists because “terrorists must have a physical base from which to operate. Whether through ignorance, inability, or intent, states around the world still offer havens—both physical . . . and virtual.”69 However, a purely state-centric view of the world was outdated: “The classic net assessment of the enemy based on the number of tanks, airplanes or ships does not apply to these non-state actors.”70 Acknowledging the changing nature of security in an era of globalization, the strategy stated that “the terrorist challenge has changed considerably over the past decade. . . . While problems of state sponsorship of terrorism continue, years of sustained counterterrorism efforts, including diplomatic and economic isolation, have convinced some governments to curtail or even abandon support for terrorism as a tool of statecraft.” 71 This was combined with “dramatic improvements in the ease of transnational communication, commerce, and travel” that now allowed terrorist groups to “twist the benefits and conveniences of our increasingly open, integrated, and modernized world.”72 Al-Qaeda now functioned primarily as “a flexible transnational structure, enabled by modern technology and characterized by loose interconnectivity both within and between groups.”73 Confronting al-Qaeda was the antithesis of fighting a large conventional army: “The attacks of September 11 demonstrate that our adversaries will engage asymmetrically, within and across our borders. They will exploit global systems of commerce, transportation, communications, and other sectors to inflict fear, destruction, and death.”74 Conventional military power was of limited value in the face of asymmetric challenges that would exploit US vulnerabilities rather than confront it on its own preferred terms. To counter such a threat, unconventional activity was required. The approach gradually developing in the Bush administration was an indirect one. Instead of focusing on the enemy, it focused on the environment in which the adversary might flourish, and especially on the population that could provide tacit (or even enthusiastic) support to facilitate terrorism. In particular, it emphasized the danger of “weak states” and their potential

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exploitation by transnational terrorist networks, along with the unconventional capabilities required to prevent this from happening. In five key ways, the administration’s new policy and strategy documents, which reflected its thinking about the post-9/11 world, began to anticipate elements of the formal and comprehensive definition of IW released by the Pentagon in 2007: (1) an emphasis on the perceived “‘root causes” of terrorism; (2) the importance of “train-and-equip” security programs in order to secure weak states from terrorist networks; (3) a heightened focus on ideological warfare and a recognition of the imperative of winning the “hearts and minds” of the population in weak states; (4) stability and reconstruction operations; and (5) using all elements of national power to wage a type of conflict that was not just military but also “inherently political,” requiring “control and influence over a relevant population”75 To be sure, these aspects of an irregular approach to conflict did not themselves constitute a comprehensive IW concept, but they were integral elements of the most influential discussions of irregular conflict by practitioners and in time would develop further and feature prominently in the 2007 Joint Operating Concept, the definitive doctrinal explanation of the conduct of Irregular Warfare.76 They also appeared to follow logically from the character of the new threat as policymakers understood it. Root Causes In seeking to understand the contemporary terrorist threat, the Bush administration attempted to identify its root causes.77 The 2002 National Security Strategy was the first official document to identify weak and failing states as the most important catalyst for terrorism in the twenty-first century. Reflecting on the apparent diminution of conventional state-based threats, the NSS asserted that “America is now less threatened by conquering states than failing ones.”78 “Poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks,” the NSS stated. Weak states around the world could be exploited as safe havens by nonstate actors that could move around with ease. Where weak states were hosting terror networks, “we will help ensure the state has the military, law enforcement, political, and financial tools necessary” to confront them.79 Africa was a particular region of concern in this respect, and the United States pledged to “help strengthen Africa’s fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny safe haven for terrorists.”80 The NSCT expanded this analysis, outlining



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the so-called 4-D approach to terrorism: defeat terrorists by attacking their sanctuaries (in failed states), deny further sponsorship and support (by states), diminish the underlying conditions that bred terrorism (the various symptoms and manifestations of state failure), and defend the US homeland. “At base,” the NSCT claimed, “underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious conflict, and ethnic strife create opportunities for terrorists to exploit. . . . Terrorists use these conditions to justify their actions and expand their support.”81 Ungoverned territory was of particular concern to the United States. Using a phrase that would be repeated often, Feith claimed that “ungoverned spaces [emphasis added] serve as breeding grounds for global terrorism.”82 Areas beyond state control could provide safe havens for terrorists or other nonstate actors, while the symptoms of failing states could generate support for terrorists and be used as justification for acts of violence. The NSCT pledged to work with international and regional partners to “ensure effective governance over ungoverned territory.”83 The principal way in which states were involved in international terrorism had therefore changed. Where once the primary problem had been active state sponsorship and facilitation, now the issue appeared to be lack of state influence due to ineffective governance, internal conflict, and inability to control borders. Ungoverned, rather than governed, spaces were the problem. Ironically, then, the US government’s recognition of transnational terrorism led to an indirect solution that focused principally on states. The method of securing those states from infiltration by mobile nonstate actors would be the deployment of an irregular, rather than conventional, military approach. This focus on weak states was a diagnosis that formed the basis of all subsequent US government policy and doctrine on Irregular Warfare and would be elaborated in greater detail in the months and years to come. (It was also unfolding operationally in the peripheral theaters of the war on terror.) To be sure, the search for an underlying cause signaled an effort to develop a more sophisticated understanding of twenty-first-century terrorism that transcended, though at this stage did not dismiss completely, direct state sponsorship. As Edward Newman observes, while many scholars encourage the search for root causes, more conservative analysts often discouraged this on the grounds that it disturbs the moral clarity required to confront terrorism and because they wish to deny that terrorism could ever be associated with a legitimate political cause.84 Yet the claim that weak and failing states were the root cause of terrorism was too superficial to form the basis

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of a meaningful guide to action. Afghanistan notwithstanding, statistical and biographical analyses of the origins of terrorists and their organizations demonstrate only a weak correlation between the presence of terrorists and ungoverned or undergoverned space.85 The infrastructural and logistical problems associated with many weak states, as well as lack of security, were significant disincentives for any group seeking a reliable base of operations.86 While bin Laden himself had lived in Afghanistan, the biographies of the 9/11 hijackers and the wider al-Qaeda network, of which they were part, demonstrated that terrorists did not necessarily reside in or come from weak states. Marc Sageman’s analysis of the bin Laden network from the late 1990s to 9/11 revealed that three-quarters of those who joined were from upper- or middle-class backgrounds. Over 60 percent had some college education, 42 percent were professionals, and another 32 percent were semiskilled (with just 24 percent in unskilled jobs).87 The 9/11 hijackers joined the network while pursuing advanced studies in Hamburg, Germany. The recruitment of suicide terrorists from developed countries intensified in the post-9/11 years and led to the emergence of homegrown European and North American suicide bombers, as demonstrated by attacks by their own citizens in developed countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. While terrorist attacks also occurred in many developing countries, they did not occur only in those countries or, indeed, in all of them.88 Research into the root causes of terrorism emphasizes a complex interplay of activity occurring at three levels: individual, organizational, and environmental—all of which are necessary for a culture and practice of terrorism to develop.89 The search for root causes is also complicated, Paul J. Smith argues, because terrorism is “a protean phenomenon, reflecting the particular local circumstances or environment in which it is situated.” Motivations are “highly-context dependent.”90 Martha Crenshaw warns against the danger of “over-aggregation”: treating terrorism as though it were “a single unified method of violence” by conflating all types of terrorism and assuming they serve the same purpose.91 In fact, this was exactly what the Bush administration’s approach did from the outset. Its search for root causes led to the conflation of all international terrorist threats into a single type subsumed under the auspices of the GWoT framework, to which the antidote, regardless of local circumstances, was an irregular approach to the stabilization of ungoverned space.92 Over the next seven years, it would rely on a generic diagnosis



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of the causes of transnational terrorism—weak and failing states—and a onesize-fits-all solution that could be applied in every case. There is still much more to know about the internal deliberations within the Bush administration that led it to develop the terrorism–weak state paradigm. For now it seems clear that the policy process was not driven by an analysis of the unique circumstances of each front in the new GWoT, but by a reaction to the 9/11 attacks and the perception that because bin Laden had thrived in Afghanistan, terrorists would thrive in other weak and failing states. If the symptoms of weak and failing states were being exploited by terrorists, the antidote was to stabilize those spaces, build local governance and security capacity, and provide a compelling political narrative to win the allegiance of the indigenous population and prevent their tacit support for terrorism—the results promised by an irregular approach to conflict. Building Partner Capacity: Train-and-Equip Programs Training partner forces in weak states in counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense (FID) and equipping them with weapons appropriate for internal security was at the heart of irregular warfare. Once trained, indigenous forces, which knew the local terrain and spoke the local languages, were best placed to provide physical security, gain the support of the local population, and drive out terrorists.93 As policymakers explored the contours of the emerging new threat, they began to advocate train-and-equip programs under the auspices of counterterrorism. Major train-and-equip programs would begin in the Philippines in February 2002, in Georgia in May 2002, and across sub-Saharan Africa from November 2002. The emerging rationale for these was first suggested in the 2002 NSS: “Once the regional campaign localizes the threat to a particular state, we will help ensure the state has the military, law enforcement, political, and financial tools necessary to finish the task. . . . Where governments find the fight against terrorism beyond their capacities, we will match their willpower and their resources with whatever help we and our allies can provide.”94 This was reiterated in the NSCT. Noting that weak states were often willing to combat terrorism but lacked the capacity to do so, the strategy claimed that after 9/11, “we redoubled our efforts to develop programs that help them to acquire the necessary capabilities to fight terrorism through a variety of means.” “Where states are weak but willing,” the strategy claimed, the United States would help them “exercise authority over all their territory and fight terrorism where it exists.”95 “No support will

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be more important to success than that from the other nations that have the will and resources to combat terrorism with us,” the strategy stated.96 Given the Bush administration’s putative unilateralism, the emphasis on train-and-equip programs with willing partner nations is significant. The transnational character of contemporary terrorism necessitated bilateral and multilateral cooperation. As Rumsfeld and other senior Pentagon policymakers developed ideas about the GWoT in the aftermath of 9/11, they collectively agreed that “the global task that lay ahead was too big, too broad and too multidimensional for us to think we could rely exclusively on American military forces.”97 In a speech in December 2003, Feith explicitly rejected pure unilateralism and asserted the importance of working with allies in the war on terror wherever possible. “It bears re-emphasizing,” he said, that “our military forces . . . are only part of our military capability. Another part is rooted in the network of alliances and security relationships we have created with other nations.”98 Rumsfeld later claimed that the accusation of unilateralism against the Bush administration was “preposterous” and maintained that “no senior administration official ever suggested that the United States would be better off responding to 9/11 alone.”99 This was true, though it ignored the administration’s preference for eschewing established institutions, such as the United Nations, that might place greater constraints on US freedom of action, and instead embracing ad hoc multilateralism, working on instrumental grounds with those who shared its interests and objectives. As the Pentagon’s counterterrorism and IW strategies developed over the next five years, bilateral and multilateral US-led programs to build capacity in partner nations—including to train-and-equip programs—would become central to the effort. This instrumental multilateralism was deemed essential to tackle transnational threats located across multiple countries. Winning Hearts and Minds: The Ideological War Since irregular combatants, like terrorists, typically lacked the resources to topple an enemy government, they traditionally focused on winning the allegiance or at least tacit support of the population around them. As a “struggle . . . for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population,” Irregular Warfare required the use of psychological operations (PSYOP), public diplomacy, and public affairs activities designed to win hearts and minds and isolate adversaries ideologically from the local population.100 Offering the population an appealing narrative that undermined tacit support for the terrorists



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was essential.101 In the words of French colonial officer David Galula, the counterinsurgent must “arm himself with a competing cause.” 102 Understanding the unique root causes of each conflict was therefore essential. Rumsfeld believed that “fighting the extremists ideologically . . . would be a crucial element of our country’s campaign against them.” The use of the phrase “war on terror” “led many to believe that the conflict could be won by bullets alone. I knew this was not the case,” he later wrote.103 The 2002 NSS called for the United States to wage a “war of ideas” because the new conflict against Islamic militancy was “a struggle of ideas and this is where America must excel.”104 During the preparation of the 2003 NSCT, Feith urged the NSC to make winning the war of ideas “a principal goal of the strategy”—and was disappointed that there was not an even greater emphasis on this in the final version.105 Nevertheless, the final document did argue that physical control of ungoverned territory was not a sufficient condition for victory; “win[ning] the war of ideas” was also essential: Together with the international community, we will wage a war of ideas to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation, to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit in areas most at risk, and to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom in those societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism.106

Rumsfeld’s ideas also had wider resonance across the administration. In September 2002, the NSC created the Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee to facilitate interagency public diplomacy efforts. It drafted a national communication strategy, but this was never released because the group ceased to function after the departure of its co-chair, the under secretary of state for public diplomacy, Charlotte Beers.107 In January 2003, President Bush established the Office of Global Communications to facilitate and coordinate all US government communication with foreign audiences, but for reasons still unknown, the new office failed to develop a formal national strategy document to guide interagency efforts.108 A third attempt to coordinate strategic communications came from the NSC in July 2004 with the establishment of the Muslim World Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee. This committee was tasked with collecting ideas from embassies in Muslim countries and developing a strategy and tactics for communicating with Muslims around the world, though its work would not come to fruition until Bush’s second term.109

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Since Islamists were ostensibly most likely to emerge from and find shelter in Muslim countries, Washington would seek to support moderate Muslim governments to assure their publics that “American values are not at odds with Islam.” The American narrative in the war on terror would focus on the universal values of democracy and individual freedom. The NSS stated that a country’s “first imperative” was “to clarify what we stand for,” which was the defense of “liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere.”110 This would be accompanied by an attempt to “reverse the spread of extremist ideology” and challenge “those who seek to impose totalitarian ideologies on our Muslim allies and friends.”111 Yet as with the effort to identify the root causes of terrorism, the US response to the terrorists’ ideology was misguided. To be sure, the tiny numbers of individuals who turned to violence were likely to espouse ideological hostility to the United States and the rest of the West, but these extreme sentiments were not shared by the communities on whose behalf those terrorists claimed to act. In fact, the opposite was true. From 2001 to 2007, Gallup conducted the largest and most extensive opinion poll ever done in the Muslim world, across thirty-five countries; it demonstrated conclusively that most Muslims admired Western political freedoms and elements of Western culture and did not believe that Islam and democracy were at odds.112 Emphasizing the compatibility of Islam and democratic values was of limited value if most of the world’s Muslims were already convinced of this. Terrorism certainly required a social and political environment that was conducive to supporting it, but there was little evidence of widespread opposition to American values in the Muslim world. Nevertheless, ideological warfare was given a major boost in October 2003 with the internal publication of the DoD’s “Information Operations Roadmap.”113 The seventy-four-page document was derived from the 2001 QDR, which identified information operations (IO) as one of six new operational goals for the military. In May 2002, the Defense Planning Guidance for FY 2004–2009 directed the military to make IO a core military competency; the IO roadmap was supposed to make this happen. Notably, it included the phrase “war on terror” only once; the need for enhanced IO was not purely a response to terrorism but essential for countering a spectrum of regular and irregular threats.114 The roadmap called for IO to be transformed “into a core military competency on a par with air, ground, maritime, and special operations” because



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it is increasingly important to national security objectives that the USG put out a coherent and compelling political message in concert with military operations . . . the desire for broad political support of military operations, the prevalence of access to global communications in the modern world and the political and cultural origins of terrorism require more comprehensive and proactive USG communication strategies.115

Nonkinetic operations such as PSYOP and IO were not traditionally the firstchoice specialty of most officers.116 As a result, the DoD realized that it would have to create incentives to follow an IO career path: these specialists “should be afforded promotion and advancement opportunities commensurate with other warfighting areas and provided opportunities for advancement to senior or executive or flag level rank.”117 To operationalize this, the Naval Postgraduate School would be designated a DoD Center of Excellence for IO and provide graduate-level IO programs, as well as assistance to joint doctrine development.118 In addition, SOCOM was to create a joint PSYOP support element “to provide rapidly produced, commercial-quality PSYOP product prototypes consistent with overall US Government themes and messages.”119 Yet hearts and minds could be won only if the target population viewed the American narrative as legitimate. Failure to understand the true root causes of each manifestation of terrorism and the flawed assumption that Muslims around the world believed that Islam was incompatible with American values made it unlikely that Washington would be able to craft a compelling story. Stability Operations The early turn toward irregular tactics was also evident at the beginning of the elevation of stability operations (SO) in US military strategy—another indirect method of countering terrorism by focusing on operations that would stabilize the surrounding environment and thus undermine support for insurgents or terrorists. In many respects, SO resembled aspects of nation building. They were designed to contribute to security and social and political stability in weak states. They could win hearts and minds by creating a society that local communities had a stake in maintaining.120 In weak and failing states, SO might convince the population to support the central government and oppose forces challenging the state. It was not until November 2005 that stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (“stability operations” for short) would be made a core military competency by the DoD.121 However, this built on existing

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trends. The Army had begun to write stability operations into its doctrine as early as 2001 as a result of its involvement in the 1990s in complex peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.122 In June 2001, the Army’s Operations manual added “stability” and “support” to the stages of warfare for the first time.123 The purpose, according to the chief of staff, General Eric Shinseki, was to make the Army “dominant across the full spectrum of operations.”124 That spectrum encompassed activities undertaken “in war and military operations other than war.”125 It identified four stages of military operations: offense, defense, stability, and support—the last two both new.126 The result of this, in February 2003, was the Army’s first field manual devoted specifically to stability operations, FM 3–07.127 These activities were designed to “seek to secure the support of civil populations in unstable areas” so that civil authorities could work toward rebuilding infrastructure and resuming vital services. Notably, this was not a humanitarian project; these operations were to “promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment.”128 This was now tier 1 (principal) Army doctrine, and stability operations were described throughout the new field manual as essential parts of the continuum of warfare rather than adjuncts to it—though still not as a component of a new type of warfare.129 However, when SO were elevated to the level of core military competency in 2005, alongside conventional combat operations, it would not be a radical departure from the existing trajectory. In the meantime, policy and strategic guidance developed as a result of 9/11 hinted at the value that would be placed on such operations by emphasizing the importance of development as an antidote to terrorism in US national strategy. The 2002 NSS stated that United States should “expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.” Eight specific development initiatives were listed.130 The 4-D approach to terrorism, outlined in the NSCT, stressed the importance of diminishing the underlying conditions of terrorism, which were identified as “poverty, deprivation, social disenfranchisement, and unresolved political and regional disputes.” If terrorists exploited “the poor and destitute masses,” then development was the remedy. Despite the ostensible overlap between developmental goals and stability operations, however, the latter were not conceived as purely humanitarian projects. In an irregular approach to conflict, they were a tactic of war, used because of their perceived impact on the security situation. The military



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imperative was to win hearts and minds; providing security and reconstruction was a way to do this. “All Instruments of National Power”: The Whole-of-Government Approach An additional dimension of irregular warfare, also highlighted in the Army’s field manual on stability operations, was the importance of an interagency approach to conflict. According to the manual, stability operations “require the combined efforts of all the instruments of national power.”131 Since irregular conflicts were struggles for the allegiance of the population, they were not just military conflicts; they were also political, economic, ideological, and social struggles—an effort that transcended military operations and the DoD. In his observations on colonial counterinsurgency, Galula endorsed Mao’s famous dictum that insurgency was 20 percent military, 80 percent political.132 If the largest proportion of the campaign was given over to nonkinetic operations, the military would not have sufficient capacity for sole responsibility; a whole-of-government approach was essential. When the Bush administration reorganized the NSC in February 2001, interagency crisis planning was given to the NSC Democracy, Human Rights, and International Organizations directorate.133 An updated interagency contingency plan, to replace the Clinton administration’s 1997 directive, Managing Complex Contingency Operations, was produced, known internally as National Security Presidential Directive XX. However, when this was brought to the NSC Deputies Committee in 2003, Cambone insisted that it be rewritten because, according to the directive’s author, Matthew McLean of the NSC, it “usurped the national command authority of the Secretary of Defense.”134 Other members of the NSC were working on alternatives, however. In January 2003, Clint Williamson joined the NCS as director of transnational threats within the Directorate of Counterterrorism. Williamson had been interviewed by Rice and her deputy, Stephen Hadley, who had questioned him on how the United States could improve its postconflict reconstruction capabilities. (Williamson had served in the Balkans from 2001 until his appointment to the NSC.) This was the focus of his work on joining the NSC, but after the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, he was sent to Baghdad for three months. Upon returning to the NSC in July, Williamson was appointed to a different position in the Defense Policy Directorate: director for stability operations.135 Rice asked him to prepare a policy planning memo on reconstruction and

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stabilization in future conflict scenarios. Williamson’s conversations with both State and Defense resulted in a memo that proposed a new office that would have coordinating power over different agencies and manage a wholeof-government approach to reconstruction and stabilization. Impressed with Williamson’s plan, Rice and Hadley instructed him to brief under- and deputy secretaries in Defense, State, USAID, and the Department of Justice.136 In April 2004, the NSC principals—the cabinet secretaries, including Rumsfeld and Powell—approved a plan for an interagency coordination office based in the State Department: the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (known as S/CRS).137 This office would take the lead in reconstruction and stabilization projects outside Iraq and Afghanistan, and in future years, it would be strongly supported, and even funded, by the DoD, as we shall see. Rumsfeld had been quick to defend the autonomy of his department when presented with NSPD XX, but this did not preclude his belief that the wars of the twenty-first century would be more multifaceted than in the past. In June 2002, he had written in Foreign Affairs that “wars in the twenty-first century will increasingly require all elements of national power: economic, diplomatic, financial, law enforcement, intelligence, and both overt and covert military operations. Clausewitz said, `War is the continuation of politics by other means.’ In this century, more of those means may not be military.”138 By summer 2004, Rumsfeld was taking interagency coordination seriously under the auspices of what the DoD called ‘Transforming the U.S. Government for the 21st Century.” In August, he sent a draft Pentagon presentation on the subject to Andrew Card, the White House chief of staff, Vice President Cheney, and Rice. Rumsfeld believed that the national security issues that all of them were grappling with “don’t fit neatly into the responsibilities of any single department or even into any one of the White House councils. But then, the problems we face in the world don’t fit neatly into any one department or into any one of the various White House councils.” “In any event,” he continued, “we have folks in DoD who have been thinking about some of these things” and could give briefings and share ideas.139 The DoD presentation that Rumsfeld sent claimed that a transformation in the way the US government pursued its national security objectives was essential due to the “public attention generated by the 9/11 Commission report.” The need for change was an opportunity for the government to “go beyond the issue of terrorism” and “prepare for broader challenges of [the] 21st century.” The



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Pentagon’s ideas for whole-of-government cooperation included promoting “interagency ‘jointness,” perhaps through a “Goldwater-Nichols for the whole USG?”; transforming US embassy country teams (an initiative Rumsfeld was already working on, as we will see in Chapter 5); “establishing [a] standing USG planning function for building and maintaining coalitions”; establishing a “‘National Security University’ educational system for interagency” use; “reevaluat[ing] USG national security roles and missions (a ‘QDR’ for USG)”; and building “civilian reserve forces” to conduct stability operations. In addition, Rumsfeld pushed some of his developing ideas about the twenty-first-century security environment: “expand[ing] unconventional warfare, civil affairs, and foreign internal defense capabilities”; “strengthen[ing] weak governments so they can increase their legitimacy and authority over ‘ungoverned’ territory/ populations via civic action projects”; and expanding existing train and equip authorities.140 The National Military Strategy 2004 At the DoD, the new thinking of the previous two years was encapsulated in the May 2004 “National Military Strategy” (NMS), a document written to guide the strategic direction of the military in response to the president’s NSS. The strategy reflected a newly emerging, though by no means fully developed, approach to twenty-first-century national security. It stipulated that the United States should remain preeminent in the face of conventional state-based threats but should also prepare to engage with nonstate actors and unconventional adversaries: “The goal is full spectrum dominance” across a range of operations that now included not just conventional but irregular operations too—with the word irregular appearing for the first time.141 Echoing the 2001 QDR, the 2004 document stated that “an uncertain and complex environment requires a capabilities-based approach.” US adversaries still included “states with traditional military forces . . . which could seek to control key regions of the world”; accordingly, it still had to maintain the capability “to swiftly defeat two conventional adversaries in overlapping campaigns” as well as operate in four “forward regions” and deal with a limited number of lesser contingencies.142 However, in the twenty-first century, nonstate actors also posed a major threat. Notably this transcended the war on terror: challenges could emanate from “international criminal organizations and illegal armed groups that menace stability and security.”143 These groups benefited

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from the global diffusion of a wide range of relatively low-cost dual-use technologies and access to advanced weapons and delivery systems.144 According to the NMS, this constellation of potential adversaries presented four possible types of security challenge: traditional, “posed by states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in well-understood forms of military competition”; irregular, “com[ing] from those employing ‘unconventional’ methods to counter the traditional advantages of stronger opponents”; catastrophic, “involv[ing] the acquisition, possession, and use of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] or methods producing WMD-like effects”; or disruptive, “from adversaries who develop and use breakthrough technologies to negate current US advantages in key operational domains.”145 This meant that two of the four possible challenges US forces were to prepare for involved an adversary negating conventional US strength (irregular and disruptive challenges), while a third (catastrophic) involved technology that might be used by either states or nonstate actors. Preparing for these four scenarios constituted a significant, not to mention ambitious, departure from the force structure that had dominated planning in the 1990s, based on fighting two major overlapping conventional regional conflicts. The new approach engaged not only with the conventional military realm of international relations—a longstanding feature of US national strategy—but also the transnational level, from which irregular threats emanated. The strategy also reiterated the problem of “ungoverned states and undergoverned territories,” stressing the need to “deny terrorists safe haven in failed states and ungoverned regions.”146 It was also the first national strategy document to call for conventional military forces to undertake stability operations in order to help “reduce the underlying conditions that foster terrorism and the extremist ideologies that support terrorism.”147 Again, these operations were viewed as a nonkinetic military technique—a tactic of war rather than a purely humanitarian endeavor because the integration of stability operations into combat operations was “to establish conditions of stability and security favorable to the United States.” 148 Conclusion: A New Global Force Posture The new security landscape led to a new global footprint for the US military. The 2001 QDR had called for reorienting the US military’s global posture and for more bases “beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia.” This was



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reflected in the September 2004 Global Posture Review.149 In this document, officials recognized that the existing force posture still reflected the Cold War balance of power, which was no longer appropriate: The September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States clarified our understanding of the key security challenges that our country will face in the 21st century. Traditional, state-based military challenges—for which our current posture is optimized—will remain, but a broader range of security challenges has emerged, including: —The nexus among terrorism, state-sponsors of terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; —Ungoverned states and under-governed areas within states, which can serve as a breeding ground and a sanctuary for terrorists and other transnational threats; and —Potential adversaries’ adoption of asymmetric approaches—including irregular warfare, weapons of mass destruction, and advanced, disruptive, technological challenges—designed to counter U.S. conventional military superiority.150

The review presaged a significant reorganization of America’s overseas military presence that saw bases move southward and eastward, especially into Africa and Eurasia. There would be new, more discrete types of bases designed to reduce the US footprint, with a focus on access rather than permanent stationing of large troop contingents. This approach would create a military that was, in Rumsfeld’s words, “more agile, lethal and deployable” in the face of an adversary that was “operating in small cells scattered across the globe.”151 In late 2003, however, Rumsfeld still wondered whether the Pentagon was doing enough to confront the new twenty-first-century terrorist threat. In a memo to Wolfowitz, Feith, Myers, and his deputy, General Peter Pace, he asked, “Is DoD changing fast enough to deal with the new twenty-first century environment?... Are the changes we are making too modest and incremental? My impression is that we have not yet made truly bold moves, although we have made many sensible, logical moves in the right direction, but are they enough?”152 Rumsfeld’s comment summed up the Pentagon’s evolution since 2001: an intellectual, political, and organizational turn toward irregular methods and objectives had begun in the DoD and across the administration, but it was nascent and uneven (it did not apply to Afghanistan or Iraq). Even Rumsfeld,

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its leading advocate, did not have fully developed ideas or a comprehensive irregular strategy. There was great scope to develop the still somewhat disparate intellectual, policy, doctrinal, and organizational dimensions of the new approach further and for its diffusion and institutionalization across the departments and agencies of the US government. In the immediate post-9/11 years, it was in operations on the counterterrorist periphery that the turn toward irregular warfare was most pronounced.

2

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W

hen the United States and its allies invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, the mission was dubbed Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The OEF epithet was used to link multiple fronts of the Global War on Terror and, ostensibly, provide ideological continuity from the core theater in Afghanistan to the secondary fronts in Africa and the Philippines. It was Operation Enduring Freedom–The Philippines that quickly became known as the second front in the war on terror, and it was here that one of the most sophisticated irregular warfare campaigns of the war of terror began in early 2002.1 Under the auspices of US Pacific Command, the geographic combatant command with responsibility for the Philippines, US special operations forces were already active in the Philippines before 9/11, offering a limited program of military assistance to the pro-American government of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, which was engaged in a long-standing separatist conflict with a tiny band of Islamist militants known as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) operating in the southern Philippine islands. The legacy of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines was a centuries-old separatist conflict in the southern region, which pitted the Christians of the central government in Manila against the minority Muslim Bangasamoro (or Moro) people of the south. In this context, the ASG, the most extreme of all the separatist organizations in the Moro territory, emerged. Operation Enduring Freedom–The Philippines (OEF-P) was essentially an expansion of the existing cooperation between Washington and

47

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Manila, repackaged after 9/11 and pursued under the auspices of the war on terror. US interest in expanding its military presence in the Philippines, its former colony, predated 9/11. Historically it had viewed the country as a base from which it could project power into the Pacific Rim, and it had been attempting to regain preferential access there since the Philippine Congress closed its two major military bases, Clark Air Field and Subic Bay naval base, in 1992. For her part, Arroyo saw in the war on terror a narrative that could encompass the Philippine state’s conflict with the ASG. Casting that conflict as part of the broader war on terror would lead to more economic and material support for Manila’s fight against the organization. The expansion of the US intervention after 9/11 was therefore the result of a convergence between the American and Philippine perceptions of their respective national interests. This outlasted both the Bush and Arroyo administrations: OEF-P continued until 2014, with a reduced military presence under civilian command thereafter.2 The expanded post-9/11 program, led by special operations forces (SOF), was a sophisticated campaign of foreign internal defense (FID), which began in February 2002. FID, later formally classified as a variant of Irregular Warfare by the DoD, meant assisting the host nation forces with a counterinsurgency campaign without taking part in actual combat.3 US Special Forces would train and equip the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and undertake stability operations and psychological warfare in the southern separatist islands. Underpinning this was a commitment to the indirect population-centric approach of Irregular Warfare: the ultimate objective was to erode whatever tacit support existed for the Abu Sayyaf Group among the Bangsamoro people, thereby separating the insurgents from the population. The sophisticated FID campaign in the Philippines was an example of operations in the war on terror preceding many of the IW-related changes in policy, doctrine, and bureaucracy back in Washington. Why the Philippines? Bangsamoro Separatism As the Philippine scholar Rommel C. Banlaoi observes, the struggle of the Abu Sayyaf Group, like those of other Muslim groups in the southern Philippines, is deeply rooted in indigenous social, cultural, political, and economic factors that date back to the fourteenth century, when Islam was brought to



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the Philippines from Indonesia. In 1521, after Islam had taken root, the islands were colonized by Spain and converted to Catholicism, but Muslim leaders in the south resisted the Spanish and fought to retain their Islamic identity.4 By the time the Spanish arrived, the Muslims of the Sulu archipelago and the islands of Mindanao, Basilan, and Palawan had already established their own states, government, and administrative structures, which had diplomatic and trade relations with other countries, including China.5 The native inhabitants of the islands were given the name Bangsamoro, a combination of the Malay word bangsa, meaning nation, and moro, the older Spanish word for Moor, the name given to North African Arabs or Muslims. Although there are significant ethnic and linguistic differences among the Moro people, Bangsamoro separatist nationalism has defined the southern islands’ relationship with “imperial Manila” ever since.6 When the United States invaded the islands during the Spanish-American War of 1898, the Moros organized guerrilla attacks against American forces. When the US occupiers made clear their intention to grant eventual independence to the Philippines, the Bangsamoro leadership registered strong objections to being part of a Philippine republic, even preferring that the southern islands become US territories in their own right on the grounds that when the United States granted independence to its colonies, the Bangsamoro homeland could gain its own independence separate from the territories governed by Manila.7 Although the US colonial regime sought to maintain the territorial integrity of the Philippine state, it nevertheless inadvertently exacerbated sectarian tensions. To overcome ethnic and linguistic differences among the Moros and promote regional development and fealty to Manila, US administrators actively encouraged the development of a self-conscious Muslim identity.8 At the same time, they also encouraged the mass migration of landless Christian peasants from the northern Philippines to the Moro island of Mindanao in order to undermine calls for land reform in the north and to dilute the Muslim population in the south. After World War II, the independent government in Manila continued to encourage northern peasants to move south by giving away land titles in the southern islands. Migration from the Christian north was a major factor in the disaffection of the Moros.9 In the late 1960s, new Moro self-determination organizations began to emerge that were both nationalist and Islamic—from which the ASG would eventually develop as an offshoot. In 1968, local politicians in Cotabato and

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Lanao provinces established the Moro Islamic Movement, which engaged in small-scale violence against Christian settlers.10 Advances in education—particularly Islamic education, funded by Egypt, Libya, and Saudi Arabia—also boosted regional consciousness.11 The Moro resistance was bolstered by outside support too. The new state of Malaysia had incorporated the region of Sabah, which was simultaneously claimed by the Philippines. When the new Philippine president, Ferdinand Marcos, launched covert operations in Sabah in 1968, its leader, Tun Mustapha, responded by arming small groups of Moro rebels fighting against Manila. This was the catalyst for the emergence of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1968 led by university professor Nur Misuari. With arms provided by Tun Mustapha, Misuari’s group began an insurgency in 1972. With approximately 30,000 fighters, the Philippine Army was forced to devote 70 to 80 percent of its resources to fighting the MNLF.12 In 1976, Marcos ostensibly committed to extensive regional autonomy for Mindanao, but when it became clear that the autonomous institutions had very little real authority and as Christian settlers continued to flood into the south, fighting resumed. However, splits began to emerge in the MNLF between secular and Muslim nationalists. In 1984, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), led by Salamat Hashim, was established. MILF favored the creation of an independent Islamic state in Mindanao, and its message became more popular as the southern islands suffered economically under martial law imposed by Marcos in 1972.13 The divergent paths of MNLF and MILF were catalyzed by the fall of the Marcos regime in 1986 and the inauguration of democracy in Manila. The MNLF came under pressure from Malaysia and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to accept regional autonomy under the new regime rather than independence. In contrast, MILF continued to support full independence. The MNLF’s compromise position led to the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in 1990 led by Misuari.14 However, the MILF insurgency, led by an army of eleven to twelve thousand, continued. The new government of Fidel Ramos prioritized negotiations with MILF and in July 1997 signed a ceasefire agreement. This collapsed in 2000 when the new administration of Joseph Estrada ended development spending in the region and responded harshly to what it claimed were MILF violations of the cease-fire.15 MILF and MNLF were essentially Bangsamoro nationalist organizations, but the religious division between the northern and southern Philippines gave



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the conflict a sectarian dimension. Like almost all Islamic political groups in the pre-9/11 period—with the exception of the al-Qaeda network—MILF was focused on national rather than transnational goals. (Bin Laden’s call for transnational jihad against the United States went against the dominant tradition in political Islam of pursuing national rather than international objectives.)16 However, the sectarian dimension to the insurgency in the Philippines led to the emergence of an Islamist splinter group, a radical terrorist faction, committed to the establishment of a theocratic Islamic state in the Moro islands through the use of violence.17 The Abu Sayyaf Group was established in 1990 by Abdurajak Janjalani, an MILF extremist from the island of Basilan. Originally dedicated to the establishment of a theocratic state for the Moros, the ASG evolved from a terrorist group in the early 1990s to a local criminal enterprise by the end of the decade, engaged in kidnapping for ransom, and remaining all the while an amorphous, highly decentralized network with far fewer adherents than either MILF or MNLF. In 1995, its numbers were estimated at just six hundred fighters.18 ASG–bin Laden Connections? The ASG founder, Janjalani, had studied Islamic jurisprudence in Saudi Arabia for three years before fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan. On returning to Basilan, he became a preacher in Zamboanga City and established the Abu Sayyaf (“father of the swordsman”) Group in 1990. Its members were predominantly former members of MILF and MNLF. Over the next five years, the ASG staged ambushes, bombings, kidnappings, and executions, mainly against Filipino Christians on Basilan and the west coast of Mindanao. By 1995, the ASG had conducted over one hundred attacks and was elevated to the status of a regional threat by the US Pacific Command.19 It has been alleged that Janjalani and his cohort had sustained links to bin Laden and the core al-Qaeda network in the early 1990s, and these historic links were cited by the head of the US Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis Blair, in November 2001 as justification for the expansion of US intervention in the Philippines.20 However, contemporary connections between the ASG and the bin Laden network were downplayed in the US government’s annual capstone report on global terrorism. In the 2003 Patterns of Global Terrorism report, for example, there was no allegation of any transnational influence on the ASG. In fact, the report acknowledged that while some terrorist leaders in Southeast Asia “fought or claim to have fought in Afghanistan . . . and

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brought back critical skills and contacts,” all terrorist groups in the region “are focused primarily on effecting change within their home countries”— in other words they focused on their own government rather on the United States, bin Laden’s unique focus.21 Despite the US government’s ambivalence about links between bin Laden and the ASG, some scholars have been especially insistent about these alleged links, but these claims are often exaggerated.22 This case rests on two broad interlinked claims: the first that al-Qaeda was established as a unified coherent, hierarchically structured organization with global reach, led exclusively by bin Laden, in the late 1980s, and, second, that this organization was active in the Philippines from the early 1990s onward, recruiting local Islamists into the formal al-Qaeda organization, and was centrally involved in Operation Bojinka, a failed plan for the simultaneous bombing of eleven US jet planes over the Pacific and the assassination of Pope John Paul II, who was due to visit the Philippines in early 1995. Yet as Jason Burke and Fawas Gerges demonstrate, the concept of al qaeda (“the base”), first enunciated in 1987, referred only to a mode of activism, not to an organization. Nor was it bin Laden’s idea, but that of Abdallah Azzam, a spiritual father to bin Laden and leader of the non-Afghan militants who fought against the Soviets. Azzam wrote about “the vanguard [which] constitutes the strong foundation (al-qaeda al sulba) for the expected society.”23 This referred to a mode of activism—a tactic—whereby the cumulative weight of individual actions would instigate political change.24 At Azzam’s suggestion, bin Laden did set up a small militant group of a dozen or so men in Peshawar in August 1988 who pledged personal loyalty to him, but the tiny size of the group meant it was unable to distinguish itself from the myriad other extremist groups operating at the time in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the Islamic world. Few Islamists active in the region at the time remembered ever hearing the term “al-Qaeda,” though bin Laden himself was well known. Nor is there any mention of al-Qaeda in the eleven-volume Encyclopedia of Jihad compiled between 1991 and 1993 by veterans of the Afghan war for use in other theaters of conflict.25 After bin Laden’s departure from Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1989, he had virtually no involvement with the training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although tens of thousands of militants continued to pour into these camps in the early 1990s, they were not run by bin Laden, but by an assortment of Afghan warlords, Kashmir-focused mujahideen, the Pakistani



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intelligence service, and Pakistani-based madrassas, and were funded by donations from all over the Islamic world.26 In his subsequent time in Sudan, bin Laden was as interested in his legitimate business interests—such as highway construction and sesame seed farms—as he was in organizing a network of Islamic militants.27 It was not until he moved back to Afghanistan in 1996 that bin Laden embarked on a concerted campaign to build the international network devoted to transnational jihad that is commonly referred to as al-Qaeda, though bin Laden himself did not use that name to describe his group.28 Thus, it makes little sense to speak of al-Qaeda establishing a network in the Philippines from 1988 to 1993, as Rohan Gunaratna does, or of the Abu Sayyaf Group established in 1991 at bin Laden’s behest as al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian cell, as Zachary Abuza claims.29 Militants in the Philippines or elsewhere could not send operatives to “al-Qaeda” training camps in Afghanistan in the period before 1996, as both authors claim, because such camps did not exist then (although other Islamic militants were active there).30 This is not to say that there was no Islamist activity in the Philippines in this period. In 1991, Janjalani, the ASG founder, asked Ramzi Yousef, the perpetrator of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, to come to the southern Philippines and teach bomb-making skills to ASG recruits. In some accounts, bin Laden encouraged Ramzi to go to the Philippines, though bin Laden himself told CNN in 1997 that he “did not know” Ramzi.31 While based in Manila in 1994 and 1995, Ramzi worked with his uncle, the 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, on Operation Bojinka.32 Ramzi is often described as an al-Qaeda agent, but the Bojinka activities predated bin Laden’s concerted efforts to establish an international network of jihadists from 1996 onward. Moreover, as Abuza acknowledges, the 9/11 Commission report describes Ramzi and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in this period as “rootless and experienced operatives who—though not necessarily formal members of someone else’s organization—were traveling around the world and joining in projects that were supported by or linked to bin Laden . . . [or his] associates.”33 Perhaps most important, there is no evidence that the Abu Sayyaf Group was involved in the Bojinka plot. Again, Abuza affirms that the ASG was “primarily focused on its domestic grievance,” the Moro separatist question.34 Whereas most militant Islamists at this time focused on the “near enemy”— secular regimes in the Muslim world—bin Laden’s unique selling point, as his network matured from 1996 onward, was his call for the faithful to target the ‘far enemy”—the United States, which supported many of those regimes,

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as well as the state of Israel.35 The Abu Sayyaf Group, like many other such militants in the Arab world and Southeast Asia, directed its efforts primarily against its near enemy, which in the case of the ASG was the presence of the Philippine state in the Moro region. The ASG continued its terrorist attacks until late 1998 when the Philippine National Police killed Janjalani in a firefight on Basilan. The loss of its charismatic leader plunged the ASG into a leadership vacuum. Janjalani’s younger brother, Khaddaffy, was appointed the new leader, but after the death of its founder, the group quickly splintered into factions (a development inconsistent with the narrative of a tightly organized, coherent network managed from the top by bin Laden). Khaddaffy was initially unable to provide the same kind of theological direction as his elder brother, and the ASG turned to banditry, piracy and kidnapping for ransom.36 By 2001 the ASG had become more of a criminal nuisance than a serious terror threat. In November 2001, the Philippine national security adviser, Roilo Golez, told the Philippine Daily Enquirer, “We have no evidence that Abu Sayyaf has gotten financing from bin Laden recently. Otherwise they would not have to resort to kidnapping.”37 The Philippines’ history of insurgency and terrorism prior to the inauguration of the war on terror was by itself no guarantee of US interest in the post-9/11 world. However, an insurgency with an Islamic face, in a country located in a region of geopolitical importance, was a serious concern to Washington. While the roots of the SOF intervention lie in the year prior to the 9/11 attacks, America’s broader strategic interest in the Philippines dated back a century to the US annexation of Spain’s colonial possessions in the Pacific, including the Philippines. America and the Philippines: The Strategic Calculus At the turn of the twentieth century, territories in the Pacific Ocean were keenly sought by the world’s great powers to serve as refueling posts for ships en route to China. The Philippines, an American colony until 1946, was a base from which the United States could project power throughout the Pacific region until its military bases were closed down by the Philippine Congress in 1992. If the existence of the Abu Sayyaf Group was the immediate pretext for intensifying the US presence in the Philippines after 9/11, the colonial roots of the US interest in the country offer a deeper understanding. Since US overseas expansion began in the late nineteenth century, the Philippines had been a linchpin of the American presence in the Pacific.



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When the United States invaded Cuba in 1898 to expel the Spanish occupiers, it expanded the conflict into a war to eject Spain from all its colonies in the Pacific. Philippine republican leader Emilio Aguinaldo invited the Americans to fight against Spanish rule in Manila, but when the United States won the war, it effectively replaced Spain as the colonial power. Under the Treaty of Paris, Washington took full possession of all the former Spanish colonies in the Pacific, including the Philippines. For the Americans, the islands were attractive because of their proximity to China with its enormous markets. The same rationale governed the US annexations of Guam (1898), Samoa and Wake Island (1899), and Hawaii (1900), as well as the diplomatic attempts to penetrate the China market in 1905 by promoting an open door policy there in contrast to the established spheres of influence enjoyed by the European powers.38 The US colonial presence in the Philippines provoked a violent reaction. From 1899, when the Spanish were defeated, until 1902, Aguinaldo’s forces waged a guerrilla campaign against the US occupiers. On the Filipino side, 20,000 combatants and 250,000 noncombatants perished, while 4,000 American soldiers were killed.39 Although the war formally ended after three years, the US Army continued to fight splinter factions of the resistance for another decade.40 The US occupation effectively lasted until World War II. Washington’s long-term plan was to grant independence to the islands, but, influenced by concerns about the protection of US interests, as well as racialized views about the perceived inability of ethnic Filipinos to rule themselves in a manner deemed fitting by Washington, the Philippines was granted only limited autonomy in the pre–World War II years.41 It was not until the Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed in 1935 that the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines was established as a ten-year transition administration leading to full independence in 1945.42 World War II intervened, however. With US military reservations on the islands, the Philippines was a target for Japanese bombing. In 1941, the Japanese invaded. In January 1942, they established a puppet government in Manila and declared the end of US colonial rule. Filipino resistance groups such as the Hukbalahap and the Philippine Communist Party fought alongside US forces, led in the Pacific by General Douglas MacArthur, against the Japanese. When the Japanese were defeated, the Philippines was finally granted its independence by the Americans on July 4, 1946.43 Yet even the country’s ostensible independence was marked by what Ben Reid calls a hegemonic American presence.44 All of the Philippines’ diplomacy

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and foreign affairs were dominated by its relationship with, and dependence on, the United States. This was encapsulated in the so-called unequal treaties.45 The 1946 Philippine-American Treaty on General Relations and the Philippine-American Trade Act of 1946 granted some limited access to the American market but gave full legal parity to US-owned corporations operating in the Philippines and access to many market sectors. The result was “a substantial embedding of the Philippine economy with that of the United States.”46 The 1947 Military Bases Act served US security interests in the Pacific region by granting the US Navy the use of Subic Bay naval base and Clark Air Field, both used during the Korean and Vietnam wars.47 Finally, in 1951 the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed to provide at least a notional collective defense between the two parties, though it contained no guarantee of US military action. Many Filipinos resented these agreements because they were signed at a time when the Philippines was destroyed by war and had no choice but to accept the terms on offer. From 1947 on, the issues that shaped US-Philippine relations were the bases and the popular perception of an overweening US presence in the new republic.48 These arrangements characterized the relationship between the two countries, to the benefit of the US security establishment and the Philippine ruling class, until the mid-1980s, when a popular uprising swept the Marcos dictatorship from power and ushered in a new era of democracy. Marcos had ruled since 1972 with the support of the United States, which saw him as a bulwark against the potential emergence of communism in a country where land reform was a major unfulfilled demand.49 However, as Marcos grew increasingly unpopular, he became a liability to the United States. By the time the United States withdrew its support for Marcos, his overthrow was almost inevitable. The revolution brought Corazon Aquino to power, along with a new constitution in 1987 that imposed restrictions on the presence of foreign military forces and on ownership in certain sections of the Philippine economy.50 The new constitutional provisions, combined with widespread opposition to the US presence, meant the Philippine Congress voted against the renewal of the bases agreement in 1992. This popular and hugely symbolic rejection of the US presence on the islands was a blow to the United States. It led to a weakening of the US position in the Philippines, and Washington downgraded its relationship with Manila by declaring that it could no longer guarantee the external defense of the republic because it had lost the bases from which it could operate.51 The joint US-Philippine Mutual Defense Board



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agreed that joint military maneuvers including the annual Balikatan (“shoulder-to-shoulder”) exercise would continue, as well as routine American ship visits and aircraft transits.52 In 1994, however, the government of Fidel Ramos rejected a US proposal for a bilateral acquisition and cross servicing agreement due to its sensitivity to popular anti-Washington sentiment, and in 1996, large-scale military exercises, including Balikatan, were suspended until agreement could be reached on the legal status of American forces.53 Manila’s downgrading of the relationship with the United States was very popular with the public, but the Ramos government’s military modernization program suffered as a result. Manila could not replace the $200 million per year in military assistance it received from the United States. This covered 67 percent of the acquisition and maintenance costs for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). In February 1995, the Philippine Congress passed a fifteen-year modernization program for the AFP but rejected the necessary costs, instead splitting the program into two phases, with the second to be implemented only on the condition of economic growth.54 Moreover, the Ramos government’s sensitivity to popular anti-Washington sentiment was eclipsed by its fear of China’s increasingly assertive presence in Southeast Asia. In 1995, China occupied and fortified Mischief Reef, a small outpost in the Spratley Islands, also claimed by the Philippines. (The value of the tiny islands lay in the underwater oil resources around them.)55 China’s resort to force unnerved the Philippine government, which reflexively looked to the United States, and the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, to defend its claim to the reef. Washington was unwilling to classify Beijing’s actions as a direct threat to Manila, but it did agree to small-scale military exercises with the Philippines on the island of Palawan to send a message to the Chinese that it was monitoring developments in the region. However, the US military still wanted a clearer legal status for its troops in the Philippines. Feeling the pressure from Beijing, the Ramos government agreed to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement in 1996. This culminated in the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which the Philippine Congress passed as a hedge against Chinese encroachments.56 The VFA provided the legal basis, in line with the 1986 constitution, for US forces to operate in the Philippines. However, it did not encompass the transfer of materials, supplies, or services, so it was not as comprehensive as the pre-1992 arrangements.57 Nevertheless, the VFA paved the way for the return of the large-scale annual Balikatan exercises in February 2000. According to the Pentagon report,

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Security Strategy for East Asia (1998), the United States would seek to develop the defense relationship with the Philippines further, but “in ways and at a pace comfortable to the Philippines.”58 The post-1992 decline of US influence in the Philippines was therefore short-lived. By the turn of the century, the relationship was returning to the closeness that had characterized it in the Cold War years. This was primarily down to the Philippine government, which, despite some popular antiWashington sentiment, actively encouraged a new security relationship with the United States on the grounds that Chinese expansionism in Southeast Asia was worse than a US presence and that this could only benefit the armed forces of the Philippines, which had atrophied after losing their American sponsor in 1992. For its part, Washington was eager to exploit the Philippine perception of vulnerability in the face of an activist China and regain full access to the country. At this point, US geopolitical interests in the Philippines coincided with concerns about terrorism. The Abu Sayyaf Group had already come to the attention of the US Pacific Command (PACOM) as a result of its kidnappingfor-ransom practice. In April 2000, the ASG seized twenty Westerners at a resort in Sipadan, Malaysia, and threatened to kill Americans in the Philippines. PACOM, led by Admiral Dennis Blair, began to look at training options to improve the capability of the AFP. When a further thirty hostages were taken in July and August, including one American, Jeffrey Schilling, PACOM made a formal offer to the Philippine government to help train counterterrorist forces.59 In September 2000, Blair traveled to Manila to discuss the option of a mobile training team (MTT) with the Philippine government and the AFP. The MTT would train and equip a company-sized unit to respond to a terrorist threat. President Joseph Estrada rejected the offer, but when Estrada was forced out of office in January 2001, his replacement, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, was eager to accept and invited PACOM to send the MTT to train the AFP in more effective counterinsurgency techniques in the southern Philippines.60 In March 2001, Company B, First Battalion, First Special Forces Group, began a five-month training program for the first AFP light reaction company.61 On arrival, the trainers assessed the AFP’s capabilities and equipment as poor. This impression was bolstered on May 27, when the ASG kidnapped twenty more hostages from Palawan—seventeen Filipinos and three Americans: Guillermo Sobero and Martin and Gracia Burnham, Christian missionaries. Sobero was beheaded shortly after capture, and Martin



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Burnham was killed in a botched AFP rescue attempt in June 2002—all of which was viewed as evidence of the need for more training of the AFP.62 When the five-month training program complete, the new Philippine Light Reaction Company (LRC) was sent straight to Basilan island, the ASG’s sanctuary. However, it still lacked clear command-and-control capabilities. To this end, Lieutenant David Maxwell, of the First Special Forces Group, was scheduled to meet with the LRC leadership in Mindanao on September 11, 2001, while Brigadier General Donald Wurster, commander of Special Operations Command–Pacific (SOCPAC), and Colonel David Fridovich, commander of the First Special Forces Group, scheduled a meeting for September 12 to discuss incorporating a terrorist coordination and assistance visit into the next Balikatan exercise. After the terrorist attacks on September 11 in the United States, however, Maxwell’s meeting was delayed three days, and the Wurster/Fridovich assistance visit was pushed back until October. In the meantime, the SOCPAC staff focused instead on identifying possible al-Qaeda connections in the region in order to help PACOM develop its regional campaign plan for the war on terror in Southeast Asia, as Rumsfeld requested .63 The 9/11 Effect: A Second Front in the War on Terror President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was quick to frame the Philippines’ struggle against the Abu Sayyaf Group as part of the new war on terror. “We are prepared to go every step of the way” with the United States, she claimed. “First you have the moral issue: it’s the right thing to do. Second, it’s in our national interest. We have our own home-grown terrorism and to the extent that we can obliterate terrorism all over the world, then our own terrorism will be much easier to neutralize.” Arroyo offered Washington unconditional use of the Clark Air and Subic Bay Naval bases, as well as airspace, intelligence, logistical assistance, and—subject to approval of the Philippine Congress—AFP troops. She also anticipated the type of warfare that Washington would increasingly be fighting: “It’s not conventional. They don’t come out and fight. They run. It’s hide and seek.”64 Yet despite the inherent difficulties, she remained enthusiastic about the prospect of US assistance after 9/11: “Every dark cloud has a silver lining, and that’s the silver lining. . . . We expect to have more international cooperation for our efforts.”65 In effect, the existing low-level cooperation between PACOM and the AFP would be intensified and recast, with Manila’s support, as part of Washington’s war on terror.

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In October 2001, the delayed SOCPAC visit to the southern Philippines took place. Two teams of approximately twenty high-level military personnel, led by Wurster and Fridovich, arrived to conduct a needs assessment. The expertise of the special forces when it came to nontraditional warfare was immediately apparent. The SOCPAC teams conducted area assessments down to the village level to collect information on local demographics, infrastructure, and socioeconomic conditions. After visiting Manila, Basilan island, and Zamboanga (a city on the southern island of Mindanao), they concluded that the AFP lacked an adequate communications structure, that its civil affairs operations were ineffective, and that a lack of intelligence sharing was hampering operations against the ASG. In November and December, plans were drafted for a training package for the AFP. All of this would feed into the next annual Balikatan training exercise, to take place from February to July 2002 (known as Balikatan 02–1), which would now take place under the auspices of the war on terror.66 Rumsfeld was particularly pleased with PACOM’s plans to pursue terrorists in the Pacific region. Two weeks after 9/11, he had ordered the heads of the regional combatant commands to draw up options for counterterrorism campaigns worldwide. He rejected most of the plans as narrow and unimaginative. Only the plan submitted by PACOM, which included military intervention in the Philippines, impressed Rumsfeld. The plan also included nonmilitary cooperation with other states in the region, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, but the Philippines was at the center.67 According to Rumsfeld, the SOF advisers were there to provide “advice and assessment” in the fight against “a cell that’s connected to terrorists across the world.”68 In November 2001, the expanded US intervention was codified when Arroyo traveled to Washington to meet Bush. The two agreed that US forces would advise and assist the AFP but would not have a combat role. In military parlance, they would conduct foreign internal defense (FID), not counterinsurgency. The assistance would also be limited geographically to Basilan and the Zamboanga peninsula.69 The presence of US troops in the Philippines was not just politically controversial but also subject to constitutional restrictions. The 1986 Constitution prohibited foreign troops from engaging in offensive combat operations on Philippine soil, so it was essential that both sides agreed to rules of engagement that restricted the American role, not least so that Arroyo avoided an anti-Washington backlash at home. “It’s very clear that I have told him [President Bush] that I draw the line on soldiers on the



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ground and he respects the line I have drawn” Arroyo stated.70 In fact there would be soldiers on the ground, but they would be limited to noncombat action. The rules of engagement for US troops were drawn up with Philippine nationalist sensitivities in mind. In a February 2002 letter to the commander of PACOM advising on the terms of reference for the operation, Brigadier General Wurster insisted, “Bottom line is: [US] command follows [Philippine] national lines. Philippine commander’s authority on the ground will not be infringed.” There would be “no unilateral US operations . . . as that seems to be the most sensitive issue here.”71 The US program would also be limited to assisting the AFP in pursuit of the ASG, not the MILF or the MNLF. The Philippine government made a distinction between the latter two groups, which were engaged in ongoing, though faltering, peace negotiations with Manila, and the ASG, which was not. The MNLF was committed to the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, and the MILF had agreed to a cease-fire and negotiations in 2001 though the cease-fire was fragile and there were still frequent clashes between these two groups and the AFP. The ASG, in contrast, was considered no more than a terrorist group by Manila. At Arroyo’s request, Washington kept both MILF and MNLF off the State Department’s list of terrorist groups, whereas the ASG was listed.72 This arrangement was agreeable to Bush: “I have asked her [Arroyo] point blank what help does she need,” Bush said. “She’s confident that her military can deal with Abu Sayyaf . . . and we want to help her military deal with them.”73 Arroyo received a generous package from Bush that included $100 million in security assistance (including a C-130 transport plane, eight Huey helicopters, a naval patrol boat, 30,000 M-16 rifles, 350 grenade launchers, 25 mortars, 50 sniper rifles, and night vision goggles); $20 million to modernize the AFP; $10 million in Defense Department goods and services, including more equipment from existing stockpiles; $100 billion in trade benefits as well as up to $340 million in debt relief; a $200 million line of credit through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation; and $29 million in poverty alleviation.74 After the formal agreement between Bush and Arroyo, SOCPAC’s preparations continued with the deployment of an intelligence fusion cell to southern AFP headquarters in Zamboanga in December and the arrival of military equipment.75 In February 2002, Joint Task Force 510 (JTF-510) was deployed to the island of Basilan. This was composed of approximately 1,200 US troops, including 150 special operations forces.76 According to the rules of

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engagement, US forces would take direction from Filipino commanders and could use force only to defend themselves.77 Their focus would be on the nonkinetic elements of FID. As Admiral Dennis Blair, head of Pacific Command, told Congress in March 2002, “The war against the Abu Sayyaf Group will not be won by military means alone.”78 JTF-510 had three principal objectives: building AFP capacity to strengthen security, conducting civil–military operations to separate the general population from the ASG fighters, and information operations to support all of these. These actions were to be conducted “by, with, and through” host nation forces, thus avoiding a direct US combat role while building capacity in counterinsurgency techniques in the AFP.79 To facilitate these activities, Fridovich instructed the SOF teams to conduct a detailed assessment of the needs of the local villagers in order to get the teams into the villages and understand the environment as the locals saw it, and also to teach this process to the AFP host units. There were 263 villages on Basilan; thirty were to be sampled by the end of March 2002. In the end, twenty-eight surveys were completed and served as the basis for the civic action plans.80 The teams assigned at Philippine brigade level worked with the largest nongovernmental organization on the island, the Christian Children’s Fund, and all detachment medics held daily sick calls for AFP members and their dependents. This formed the basis for an AFP medical care program across the island designed to build ties to community and initiate a flow of information.81 In March, a US Naval Construction Task Group arrived to conduct an initial survey of infrastructure and confirmed much of what the advisory teams had reported concerning lack of investment on the island. They developed an action plan, briefed it to Philippine authorities, and returned with a 340-man engineering task group and heavy equipment. The operations of the task group followed on from the initial six-month SOF advisory mission and focused on road building, improvements to the local airstrip and port facilities, and establishing freshwater sources.82 The centrality of these operations to the SOF mission reflected an approach that anticipated the Bush administration’s claim that tackling terrorism required solving problems associated with failing states. According to the command sergeant major of the Joint Special Operations Task Force–The Philippines, established in July 2002, stability operations were also supposed to win hearts and minds and offer an attractive narrative of the future: “The battle in the Philippines is a battle against an idea: the idea of intolerance



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and subjugation to totalitarian rule.”83 Colonel Brian Petit, commander of the Second Battalion of the First Special Forces Group, led medical civic action programs—single-day events providing medical and dental care, as well as medical seminars lasting five days in which local villagers were taught basic children’s and women’s health care. Petit’s battalion also conducted rule-oflaw activities designed to build capacity in the Philippine security forces, criminalize terrorism, and support Manila’s efforts to extend its jurisdiction to the southern islands.84 During the 2002 Balikatan exercise, SOF worked with the Filipino Department of Social Welfare and Development to help fund the construction and repair of infrastructure on Basilan that it had already identified in the course of its own development efforts. This included constructing a circumferential road, water wells, an airstrip, a port, and bridges.85 According to Admiral Thomas Fargo, Navy commander at PACOM, humanitarian and civic action programs served as “force multipliers for U.S. and AFP operations because the programs separated the citizens of Basilan from supporting the terrorist threat.”86 The psychological warfare team assigned to the Joint Special Operations Task Force in Manila and the military information support teams that joined them from 2005 onward, augmented the stability operations with newspaper advertisements, handbills, posters, leaflets, radio broadcasts, and what it called “novelty items” promoting the US-AFP campaign. In Command Sergeant Eckert’s words, “Everything we do in the security, capacity-building, and CMO [civil–military operations] arenas can go awry if we fail to communicate our plans and objectives to the local populace.” One of its unique efforts was a ten-part graphic novel series aimed, according to Eckert, at “giving hope and bringing awareness of the evil that terrorism brings to families and communities.” Each story contained local cultural references and real-world correlations. Titles, names, attire, scenery, and dialect were all designed to appeal to the targeted community. Each novel in the series was tested and reviewed by a local focus group to ensure that any culturally offensive dialogue or gestures were avoided. Eckert claimed that the information operations produced “a positive atmosphere,” though how he ascertained their impact is unclear.87 As Colonel Petit observed, these operations were “textbook FID doctrinal solutions in a complex COIN environment.” Asserting that FID was likely to be one of the most common missions for the US military in future years, Petit argued that “thinking COIN, practicing FID” is the proper state of mind for operational planners, tactical forces, and ground practitioners.”88 It was a

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model that both countries wished to extend. In June 2002, Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld’s deputy, visited the Philippines to discuss an extension of the US training mission. Angelo Reyes, the Philippine defense secretary, announced, “We want phase two to begin as soon as possible.”89 The following month, after the initial phase of training finished, JTF-510 was converted into the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P) based in Zamboanaga, which would be the hub of US operations for more than a decade.90 The JSOTF-P numbered approximately 500, including around 160 to 180 special operations forces, and its long-term duties were to build the capacity of the Philippine security forces and carry out targeted civil–military operations, intelligence operations, and information operations.91 In addition, a new special forces forward operating base was opened on the island of Jolo. About 180 US forces were deployed there at any one time, and their primary role was to provide battlefield intelligence to the AFP.92 In other words, the existing mission was now extended to Jolo. At the same time, the broader US-Philippine bilateral security relationship was bolstered by the establishment of a new Bilateral Defense Policy Board by Rumsfeld and his counterpart, Angelo Reyes, in August 2002. This was composed of civilian officials from both sides tasked with managing the alliance and addressing common security challenges.93 It was followed by the Mutual Logistics and Support Agreement (MLSA) signed on November 21. The agreement complemented and built on the Visiting Forces Agreement of 1998, which had provided the legal basis for US troops operating in the Philippines on routine exercises.94 It was not a logistical agreement; it did not facilitate the transfer of materials, supplies, and services from the United States to the Philippines. The MLSA filled this gap, but it was controversial in the Philippines. The agreement was signed after several months of debate late in the evening on November 21, 2002. The Philippine Congress was given very little information about the details of the agreements; only five senior lawmakers were given the final draft of the agreement just an hour before it was signed. George Baylon Radics observes that Arroyo exhibited “an unparalleled drive to align the policies of the Philippines with those of the United States.”95 Admiral Fargo of PACOM called the MLSA “a positive sign of reciprocity and an improving relationship.”96



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Testing Philippine Limits With the extension of US activity to Jolo, Washington began to test the boundaries of the new relationship. Despite the Philippines’ constitutional ban on offensive combat operations by foreign troops, continued attacks by the ASG led Washington to propose a more muscular program of assistance in Jolo, including an offensive combat role for the United States. In background briefings in February 2003, Pentagon officials told the press corps about a plan in which the United States would commit 350 special operations forces to Jolo to take part in offensive combat operations with the AFP as part of the 2003 Balikatan exercise. (An official history of OEF-P by the RAND Corporation claims that as many as 1,000 SOF were to be deployed.97) There would also be 400 support troops deployed at the forward operating base in Zamboanga, plus another 1,300 Navy personnel equipped with Cobra attack helicopters. The mission would be open-ended and would not be discussed by the US Congress, which was in recess.98 A Pentagon spokesman told the Washington Post, “This is an actual combined operation, and it is US forces accompanying and actively participating in Philippine-led offensive operations” and confirmed that there was no exit strategy either: “At this point, we’re going into it saying that the mission will go on until both sides agree it is finished.”99 It remains unclear why the Pentagon gave this briefing and whether Arroyo had suggested that she might consent to an intensified US role. The Washington Post, which reported the DoD’s announcement, claimed that Manila had requested the Pentagon to design a program that included an offensive role for US troops and that an agreement in principle had been reached, but that the Filipinos had been forced to backtrack because of the negative reception at home. The RAND official history claims the idea originated with Arroyo’s defense minister.100 In any case, once the comments by the unnamed DoD official were reported in the Philippines, the Arroyo government was forced to distance itself quickly and affirm that the rules of engagement were “still the same” as the previous Balikatan: “They [US forces] can only engage in combat if they are attacked or in self-defense,” said Arroyo’s chief of staff. Presidential spokesman Ignacio Bunye claimed that while the noncombat nature of the US role was agreed, it was the other details of the next Balikatan, such as the specific number of US troops and the duration of the exercise, that were still to be determined and the exercise would not take place until full agreement had been reached.101 The incident was revealing because it demonstrated again that the US intervention was shaped by domestic constraints that the Philippine

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government faced. It was also a minor embarrassment for the DoD, which had briefed reporters that the offensive Jolo deployment was near certain. The result was that the combat element of the operation was delayed indefinitely— though civil affairs operations and security assistance training continued— while the full terms of reference for Balikatan in Jolo were determined.102 Yet despite the apparent disagreement, the relationship between the two countries remained warm. In May 2003, Arroyo made a state visit to Washington during which the Philippines was formally designated a major nonNATO military ally, a coveted status enjoyed at the time by only ten other countries. During the visit, Bush reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to Arroyo personally—“She’s tough when it comes to terror. She fully understands that in the face of terror you’ve got to be strong, not weak. You can’t talk with them; you can’t negotiate with them”—and confirmed his commitment to the delayed Balikatan exercise, though did not provide details of how or when US troops might take part in it.103 A month later, it was announced that US advisers would probably not take part in the combat elements of the 2003 Balikatan exercises. Lieutenant General Rodolfo Garcia, vice chief of the AFP, confirmed that the terms of reference for Balikatan 03 were “taking some time to refine and finalize.” The exercise would most likely start in December, he now claimed, after US advisers completed the security assistance training of Filipino troops assigned to participate in Balikatan.104 Even a mutiny in the Philippine Army involving three hundred soldiers in July 2003 did not deter the Pentagon from seeking to forge ahead with the Balikatan exercise. “We are still talking with the Philippine government about a possible training event later this year,” a military official told the New York Times.105 By October 2003, the month of Bush’s state visit to the Philippines, it seemed as though the impasse had been resolved. Arroyo’s chief presidential counsel had completed a new draft of the terms of reference for Balikatan to conform with the Philippine constitution. It solved the problem of combat operations by including the Philippine National Police, a civilian agency, in the exercise, meaning that Balikatan would no longer be a purely military operation and could not be defined as combat.106 In the end, however, given the lateness of the agreement, the combat element of Balikatan did not take place in 2003, and the new terms of reference were rolled over for the 2004 exercise.107 The resolve to pursue ongoing negotiations over the terms of reference and Washington’s willingness to overlook the unrest in the Philippine Army



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demonstrated how committed the two sides were to continuing the program of training and the pursuit of the ASG. It was not until a Filipino driver in Iraq was abducted in July 2004 that strains in the alliance appeared. In June 2003, Manila had sent a contingent of noncombat personnel to Iraq in the hope that Filipinos would benefit from business and employment opportunities created by postwar Iraqi reconstruction work and that the Philippines would get some of the Bush administration’s $5 billion foreign assistance package to countries engaged in fighting terrorism.108 When Angelo de la Cruz was captured, insurgents threatened to execute him unless the Philippines withdrew completely from Iraq before July 20. In the Philippines, the public clamored to save de la Cruz. The United States warned that giving in to insurgents’ demands would only encourage more kidnapping, but Arroyo, more concerned with the domestic impact of her actions, withdrew the Philippine contingent against Washington’s wishes. The US ambassador in Manila, Frank Ricciardone, left for Washington for urgent talks about the implications of Arroyo’s decision for the bilateral relationship. Secretary of State Powell brusquely told the press that the Iraqi kidnappers “were paid off” by the Philippine government “and when you start meeting demands of kidnappers, I think you’re going down a very bad and slippery slope.” 109 Both sides took steps to contain the diplomatic crisis, however. Plans for the next Balikatan exercise, in February 2005, went ahead, as did other annual US-Philippine combined exercises such as Talon Vision and Philbex 06, which stimulated large-scale amphibious operations and urban COIN operations in Luzon. These exercises were designed to improve interoperability, but they also included civil affairs projects such as construction and repair of roads, ports, runways, and hospitals in Luzon and Mindanao. In addition, the Pentagon delivered sixteen UH-1 Huey helicopters to strengthen the Philippine military’s COIN and counterterrorism capabilities and provided a grant for the purchase of engineering spare parts. In 2006, Philippine and US security officials drafted a comprehensive plan for combined security exercises until 2009. This included allowing US troops to assist the AFP in field intelligence gathering operations and small-unit infantry training in Mindanao.110 Ultimately, bilateral cooperation had become too important to both sides to allow the de la Cruz kidnapping to derail it.

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The Resilience of the ASG Despite the more or less continuous training of AFP personnel, the achievements of Operation Enduring Freedom–The Philippines were ambiguous. The number of ASG attacks remained steady. In 2002, the first year of OEF-P, the ASG conducted 17 attacks, up from the previous year’s total of 15. In 2003, this number went down to 8, then up to 10 in 2005, and up to 23 in 2008.111 This period was also the first time the ASG had taken an interest in targeting Manila. It included the worst ever terrorist attack at sea, the bombing of a passenger ship, the Superferry 14, which killed over 100 in February 2004, as well as three simultaneous bombings in three cities, killing 11 and wounding 136 on February 14, 2005. 112 In 2004 and 2005, the majority of the ASG’s attacks were bombings—which tended to indicate a well-resourced organization— rather than kidnappings for ransom—usually a resort to criminality due to lack of funds.113 The group’s resilience was most likely due to leadership changes and assistance from sympathetic elements of the MILF. In late 2003, Khaddaffy Janjalani, brother of the founder of the ASG and its new leader, was finally able to consolidate control over the various factions of the group after two other leaders, Aldam Tilao and Ghalib Andang, were killed and captured, respectively. Janjalani’s approach was to bring the group back to its religious origins and assert it once again as a Moro national liberation force.114 Moreover, as a result of the US-Philippine pursuit of the ASG, its operatives had been forced off Basilan northward into Mindanao into areas of the autonomous region controlled by MILF (see Figure 1). This, along with the ASG’s new nationalist credentials, led to collaboration between the ASG and sympathetic commanders from MILF.115 Long-standing training relationships between MILF, the ASG, and Jemaah Islamiyah, based in Malaysia, also contributed to the resilience of the ASG in this period.116 Colonel David Maxwell, who led the first US battalion to deploy in OEF-P and commanded the US forces in the south in 2007, was critical of US military leaders for not understanding the relationship between ASG and the MILF and for inadvertently creating ASG sanctuaries when the AFP moved troops away from MILF-controlled areas for training with the US.117 In response, the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) was established in 2005 between the MILF leadership and the Philippine government to facilitate intelligence sharing on the ASG. This was used to target the ASG in operations supported by the United States and was followed by air strikes against

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Figure 1. Map of the Philippines. The Abu Sayyaf Group took refuge in Basilan, parts of southern Mindanao, and islands in the Sulu Archipelago to the south, especially Jolo. Source: http://thegrumpysociologist.blogspot.co.uk/2009/05/more-on-idps-colonialism-and-guns.html .

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the ASG in MILF-controlled areas of Maguindanao province, as well as a major AFP ground operation, Oplan Tornado, from July to October 2005. As a result, ASG leaders were forced to flee southward to the Sulu islands.118 Where the ASG moved, the US-AFP teams followed. In 2006, training and operations under the guise of Balikatan 06 took place on the Sulu island of Jolo. In Operation Ultimatum, 200 US special forces advised the AFP in its pursuit of approximately 500 ASG fighters. In this operation, US-AFP forces achieved their biggest success, killing the ASG’s leader, Khaddaffy Janjalani, in September 2006.119 The security offensive was accompanied by more civil affairs programs. US troops had been stationed in the Sulus since November 2005 training the AFP and doing civic action work such as building water systems and assisting with mine clearance. In February 2006, 250 US soldiers arrived in Jolo to conduct more humanitarian missions as part of a 5,000-member task force taking part in Balikatan 2006.120 In early 2007, however, the AHJAG cooperation between MILF and the Philippine government ended after a firefight broke out between MILF and the AFP. By this time, the ASG was estimated by the International Crisis Group at 432 men with 284 firearms—small in comparison to the 5,000 troops taking part in the Balikatan exercise in pursuit of them. The State Department estimate at that time was 200 to 500 members—the same estimate it had made in 2002 when OEF-P began.121 On balance, the US-AFP activity seemed to have had little or no impact; certainly a direct correlation between OEF-P and a decline in attacks is difficult to sustain based on the total number of ASG attacks, the type of attacks, and the numbers in the ASG ranks. The total number of ASG bombings had remained fairly constant throughout OEF-P: eight in 2002, six in 2003, four in 2004, eight in 2005, two in 2006, four in 2007, and eight again in 2008. In 2009, however, there was a spike in the number of bombings—thirteen—from a total of nineteen acts of violence by the ASG.122 In April 2009, a large cache of bomb-making equipment was discovered, and in July, twelve ASG bombs were found hidden on a ferry, indicating the group’s intent and ability to conduct another serious bombing campaign.123 Moreover, in January 2007, Philippine forces had had to redeploy back to Basilan in response to revived ASG activity there.124 Basilan was the first island that US special forces had deployed to in 2002; the “Basilan Model” was the name they gave to the FID model that would be rolled out across the southern Philippines. But by the end of the Bush administration’s second term in office—six years after OEF-P began—there was no hard evidence that



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the Basilan Model was diminishing the ASG’s strength and capabilities in the long-term. Southeast Asia in the Global War on Terror The government of the Philippines was a particularly responsive partner in terms of US strategic objectives in Southeast Asia because the Arroyo government had its own reasons for supporting OEF-P. However, this cooperation was not replicated across the region. While the ASG was the primary target of US efforts in this area, it was not the only group that concerned US policymakers. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an Indonesian group with alleged links to al-Qaeda cells across the region and connections with MILF and the ASG, was also a cause for concern.125 JI came to global prominence in October 2002 when it claimed responsibility for two nightclub bombings in tourist areas of Bali killing 202 people, mainly Westerners. It seems likely that these bombings were carried out by independent operatives with some loose links to JI but not connected to bin Laden’s network.126 The State Department’s analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah was equivocal. On the one hand, it acknowledged that most terrorist groups in Southeast Asia were “focused primarily on effecting change within their home countries” rather than targeting the United States;127 on the other hand, it stated that “Southeast Asia remained a major front in the global war on terror” and claimed that an Indonesian militant named Hambali was the “top Jemaah Islamiya leader and al-Qaida’s representative in Southeast Asia,” implying a greater organizational structure than is actually likely.128 As with the alleged links between al-Qaeda and the ASG, the transnational connections of JI are not without foundation, but they are also often overstated.129 The more tentative cooperation the United States received from other states in this region—specifically Indonesia and Malaysia—demonstrated the extent to which this theater of America’s war on terror was shaped not just by US objectives but by the extent to which its friends and allies in the region were, or were not, willing to accept an American military presence there. Rather than following Manila’s lead, the governments of Indonesia and Malaysia were more influenced by popular suspicion of the United States. By the same token, Washington asked less of Indonesia and Malaysia. Its historic relationship with those two countries was not the same as it was with the Philippines; they were not former US colonies and had not hosted important US bases.130

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For the United States, JI was a target in the war on terror, but there would be no military action in Southeast Asia outside the Philippines. PACOM’s October 2001 theater plan for the war on terror in the Pacific region—the only regional combatant command plan that Rumsfeld approved of—emphasized nonmilitary action in Indonesia and Malaysia and proposed financial, diplomatic, and intelligence assistance instead.131 Washington therefore requested less of Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur than it did of Manila; it also received more mixed cooperation from them. In Indonesia, a wave of post-9/11 sympathy for the United States was followed by a scheduled visit to the White House by President Megawati Sukarnoputri. Washington was eager for the visit to go ahead as planned because of the public relations value of early and visible support by the leader of the world’s largest Muslim population. Appearing with Bush, Megawati described the attacks as “barbaric and indiscriminate acts against innocent civilians” and pledged “solidarity with the United States in this hour of grief.” Though she did not endorse military action in Afghanistan, she did grant overflight access for military support aircraft.132 In August 2002, the State Department announced plans to give Indonesia $60 million worth of counterterrorism assistance for police capacity building and anti–money laundering initiatives, as well as $4 million for regional counterterrorism fellowships.133 In his three-hour visit to Bali on October 22, 2003, one year after the attack there, Bush pledged funding for an even wider-ranging nonmilitary capacitybuilding program that encompassed police, immigration, and banking officials, as well as border security training.134 In Malaysia, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad condemned the 9/11 attacks as “horrendous acts” and visited the US embassy in Kuala Lumpur to sign a book of condolences. He also had a private meeting with Bush at the 2001 Asia-Pacific Economic Conference leaders’ summit and received an invitation to the White House in May 2002.135 During that visit, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on counterterrorism, which formed the basis for the US-ASEAN declaration on counterterrorism signed in August 2002. John Ashcroft, the US attorney general, spoke approvingly of Malaysia’s Internal Security Act, legislation that had previously been strongly criticized in State Department’s human rights reports.136 US military aircraft averaged over a thousand flights through Malaysian airspace annually; senior military and intelligence exchanges continued despite differences over Afghanistan and Iraq, and Washington chose



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Kuala Lumpur as the site of its Southeast Asia Regional Training Center for Counter-Terrorism.137 Yet Mahathir and Megawati also publicly criticized aspects of US foreign policy. When the invasion of Iraq took place, Megawati described it as “an act of aggression, which is against international law.”138 In a February 2003 speech to the Non-Aligned Movement, Mahathir said 9/11 attacks had “removed all the restraint in countries of the north. They now no longer respect borders, international laws or even simple moral values.”139 Their collective rejection of Washington’s Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) is the best example of the mixed reception the United States received in Southeast Asia. The initiative was another example of the Bush administration’s willingness to engage in noninstitutional, US-led multilateralism in the face of transnational security challenges. The RMSI was PACOM’s regional implementation of the principles of the Bush administration’s Proliferation Security Initiative, which itself grew out of the 2003 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.140 Proposed in May 2003, the Proliferation Security Initiative was aimed especially at North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and Libya. Eleven core participants agreed to a set of non–legally binding interdiction principles in order to disrupt global trade in weapons of mass destruction; in reality this meant suspected shipments headed toward countries deemed hostile to the United States. In 2004, the DoD claimed that the initiative had sixty supporters, although only twenty had declared this publicly.141 The operational focus for PACOM was the Malacca Strait, a vital chokepoint for global shipping and oil supplies located mainly within the territorial waters of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. In 2005, the strait carried a quarter of the world’s maritime trade; it also had the highest rate of piracy in the world at the time, and the lack of cross-border maritime patrols fed fears that terrorists could target the strait.142 According to Admiral Thomas Fargo, head of PACOM from 2002 to 2005, “the ungoverned littoral regions of Southeast Asia are fertile ground for exploitation by transnational threats like proliferation, terrorism, trafficking in humans or drugs, and piracy.” Under the RMSI, established in 2004, the US approach, according to Fargo, was “to assess and then provide detailed plans to build and synchronize interagency and international capacity to fight threats that use the maritime space to facilitate their illicit activity.”143 In practical terms, this consisted of three components: a sea situation picture of the traffic in the Malacca Strait, a decision-making structure to decide on action, and a stand-by maritime force to

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take action, with PACOM performing a facilitation role assisting in training, providing intelligence, and technical support.144 Before long, however, PACOM quietly abandoned the RMSI due to opposition from Indonesia and Malaysia. In congressional testimony in 2004, Fargo announced that PACOM was considering placing special operations forces on high-speed vessels used for interdiction operations. When it was reported in Indonesia that PACOM planned to station these forces in the Malacca Strait, the governments in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur condemned the RMSI as a violation of their sovereignty and warned that the presence of US forces in the strait would fuel Islamic radicalism. Singapore, shocked by the discovery of a JI cell in the country in December 2001 and dependent on the unimpeded flow of maritime trade, had given tacit support to the initiative, but this was not enough to ensure RMSI’s survival. Although Rumsfeld clarified that the United States did not seek to permanently station forces in the strait, the damage to the reputation of the RMSI was too great, and the initiative was dropped.145 However, the intent of the program survived in a different form. Shortly afterward, the Indonesian government suggested naval patrols with Singapore and Malaysia, which began in July 2004. Thailand joined in 2008. Since the participants were sensitive to issues of national sovereignty, each country controlled its own waters, and there were no joint naval patrols. Each also conducted two aircraft patrols per week. These exercises formed the basis of the Malacca Strait Patrols Initiative. As a result, the instances of piracy declined from thirty-eight in 2004 to eleven in 2006 and seven in 2007.146 This was not entirely without assistance from the United States. Indonesia and Malaysia were opposed to nonnationals patrolling their waters, but they were prepared to accept other forms of assistance from Washington: in FY 2006 and FY 2007, the United States gave Indonesia $47.1 million in maritime security equipment, while Malaysia received $16.3 million.147 This was given minimal publicity due to the RMSI controversy. As Victor Huang notes, enduring postcolonial nationalism and popular antagonism toward the United States meant that it could assist with local maritime security issues but only within highly circumscribed limits.148 Ultimately, security initiatives similar to those PACOM had suggested were implemented, but the United States could not play the leading role that PACOM had originally envisioned.



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Conclusion: Assessing the Basilan Model The FID campaign led by US Special Forces in the Bangsamoro territory was a textbook example of the techniques and overall approach that would be encapsulated in the Pentagon’s official definition of Irregular Warfare in 2007. The ongoing operation in the southern Philippines portended the DoD’s attempts to develop the capacity within the rest of the general-purpose forces to fight irregular conflicts and, indeed, the mobilization of other US government departments and agencies around the nonkinetic aspects of irregular conflict. Writing in Military Review about his experience in the Philippines in 2005, Colonel Gregory Wilson claimed that “US forces received a hero’s welcome when they returned to Basilan for training exercises. The people repeatedly thanked them for their assistance during Balikatan 2002–01.”149 According to Command Sergeant William Eckert, writing in Special Warfare, PACOM and SOCOM had put together “the right force with the right skill sets in place for success”: “The SOF indirect role is proving itself in the southern Philippines, and with patience and persistence, the unconventional warfare tools used here . . . will continue to succeed and to provide a powerful new tool for our nation in fighting the Global War on Terror.”150 The military’s own accounts of OEF-P were largely self-congratulatory.151 Yet by the end of the Bush administration, there was scant evidence that the approach was actually working. Wilson’s description of the “hero’s welcome” enjoyed by US forces referred to their return to Basilan, where the campaign had begun, supposedly successfully, in 2002. The classic counterinsurgency precept of clear-holdbuild was of limited use when the ASG operatives could simply move from island to island.152 The number of ASG attacks remained steady throughout the Bush years. More fundamentally, the underlying rationale of the US intervention— countering terrorism by fixing weak states through using irregular tactics— did not fully account for the root causes underlying the persistent presence of the ASG. As Andrew Tan observes, the presence of armed Muslim groups in Southeast Asian countries, including the Philippines, reflected long-standing “ethnic, nationalist and territorial sentiments that stem from the deep alienation of minorities from the artificially constructed post-colonial state.”153 In the Moro territories, this derived from Spanish and US colonialism; in other Southeast Asian states, British and Dutch imperialism left similar legacies.154 Abhoud Syed M. Lingga, chairman of the Bangsamoro People’s Consultative

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Assembly, observed, “No doubt that the problems of mass poverty, neglect and underdevelopment and other social inequities should ultimately be addressed but it should be after the issue of the political status of the Bangsamoro people has been settled. It should be noted that all these economic and social problems had taken root when the Bangsamoro homeland was illegally annexed to the Philippine nation-state.”155 A similar view was expressed by the MILF founder, Hashim Salamat, who believed that the emergence of ASG was “caused by the oppression and continuous usurpation of the powers within our homeland . . . [and] as long as the region and the Bangsamoro people are still under the control of the Philippine government, and oppression continues, we should expect more Abu Sayyaf style of groups to come to existence.”156 In August 2008 a peace agreement was signed by MILF and the Manila government, which appeared to end the MILF rebellion. Had this lasted, it might at least have limited sympathy and refuge for the ASG in MILF-controlled areas, if not diminished the appeal of the group entirely. However, the agreement was unpopular with Catholics in the Moro region—the descendants of Spanish colonialists—who submitted a petition to the Philippine Supreme Court, which ruled the proposed settlement unconstitutional.157 For its part, Washington simply viewed the conflict through the lens of the Global War on Terror. Complex local issues were subsumed by this narrative, and the Philippines was cast as one of several fronts in the monolithic global struggle against al-Qaeda and its network of affiliates with irregular warfare tactics the universally applicable solution. Yet despite the fact that this approach did little to address the original source of the conflict, the mere presence of US forces in the Philippines was a victory of sorts for the Pentagon. The ongoing OEF-P program had catalyzed a close working relationship with the AFP and, more important from a strategic perspective, ongoing access to the Philippines as a springboard for the projection of US power into East and Southeast Asia. The result was a longterm US military presence in the country, achieved with the consent of the Philippine elite, which continued into the Obama years.

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I

f the Philippines was the second leg of Operation Enduring Freedom—the first being Afghanistan—then the third leg of the war on terror took place in sub-Saharan Africa. Operation Enduring Freedom– Trans-Sahara was inaugurated in 2002 as the Pentagon’s contribution to what eventually became a comprehensive interagency campaign of security and governance capacity building designed to preclude the emergence of Islamist terrorism across sub-Saharan Africa. In keeping with the Bush administration’s stated preference for preventive and offensive action—outlined most clearly in the 2002 National Security Strategy1—the war on terror in Africa was at first a largely preventive endeavor premised on the notion that weak and failing states there might provide a haven for terrorist groups and the symptoms of state failure could lead people to turn to extremism for solutions. In particular, the Bush administration feared that terrorists fleeing Afghanistan might head southwest toward Somalia and from there pass through any number of porous unsecured borders on the continent. Unlike in the Philippines, US intervention in sub-Saharan Africa would not be targeted at a particular insurgent group—there were few Islamist terrorists based in Africa at this stage—but would aim to build security and governing capacity across multiple states in order to preclude their future exploitation as safe havens by terrorist groups. As in the Philippines, the United States would conduct a campaign of foreign internal defense, which in time became an interagency campaign, prosecuted

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collectively by the Departments of Defense and State and, to a lesser extent, the US Agency for International Development. This was also a campaign that anticipated the formalization of bureaucracy, national strategy, and doctrine in Irregular Warfare by encompassing, at a relatively early stage in the war on terror, methods and objectives that would later be codified in the 2007 Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept. In sub-Saharan Africa, as in the Philippines, the Bush administration was not motivated solely by the fear of terrorism; geopolitical interests also confirmed the importance of Africa to the United States and reinforced the need to protect key areas of the continent from the threat of terrorism. In 2000, the National Intelligence Council had predicted that West Africa would provide 25 percent of North American oil imports by 2015.2 The discovery of new reserves of oil in the Gulf of Guinea in the late 1990s and early twenty-first century seemed to affirm that West Africa, in particular, would be a site of commercial and geopolitical importance for the United States in the twentyfirst century. Of the 8 billion barrels of new oil reserves discovered in 2001, 7 billion were found in Africa.3 By 2004, more new oil fields were being discovered in the Gulf of Guinea than in any other region of the world.4 This, together with concerns about weak states and transnational terrorism, led to a significant departure from the relative neglect of sub-Saharan Africa in US strategy since the end of the Cold War. With the end of the competition with the Soviet Union for influence across Africa, the continent had, for the most part, been associated with humanitarian catastrophes: famine, natural disaster, and civil war—all of which US policymakers were inclined to steer clear of.5 After the failed experiment with “assertive multilateralism” in Somalia in 1993 and the loss of eighteen US soldiers, the Clinton administration was unwilling to take any political risks purely for the sake of humanitarianism.6 This precluded any significant involvement in Africa. The 1995 Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa stated plainly that America’s security interests in Africa are very limited. At present we have no permanent or significant military presence anywhere in Africa: We have no bases; we station no combat forces; and we homeport no ships. We do desire access to facilities and material, which have been and might be especially important in the event of contingencies or evacuations. But ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.7



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Nor was there an attractive investment climate there: endemic corruption, poverty, political instability, and insufficient legal guarantees discouraged outside investors. The Clinton administration’s attention to economics in foreign policy and its efforts to export the neoliberal economic model largely ignored Africa.8 Under Bush, however, concerns about terrorism and energy security were fused together into a new geopolitical framework for sub-Saharan Africa. Although the region remained a peripheral front in the war on terror, it was, for the first time since the Cold War, viewed as a site of important security and commercial interests. The Cheney Report and the Turn to African Oil When he ran for the presidency, there was no sign that George W. Bush would substantially alter the existing US approach to Africa. In the second presidential debate, he expressed strong support for Clinton’s decision not to intervene more effectively in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.9 His two keynote foreign policy speeches did not mention Africa, and the Republican platform offered only faint support for “international organizations and non-governmental organizations that can improve the daily lives of Africans.”10 However, an important indication of Africa’s changing status came four months into Bush’s tenure with the publication of the report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, led by Vice President Dick Cheney, also known as the Cheney Report.11 The report was controversial: it emerged that the administration had sought extensive advice from the oil, gas, coal, and nuclear energy industries and incorporated their recommendations, often word for word, into the energy plan.12 One of the main recommendations of the report was the diversification of foreign oil supplies in order to minimize the impact of a supply disruption, such as the 1973 oil embargo. This included the exploitation of West African oil. The study recommended “that the President make energy security a priority of our trade and foreign policy,” with a particular focus on the Western Hemisphere, Africa, and the Caspian Sea.13 In particular, West Africa and the Caspian were areas that, if fully exploited, could lessen the impact of a supply disruption.14 West Africa was destined to be “one of our fastest-growing sources of oil and gas for the American market. African oil tends to be of high quality and low in sulfur, making it suitable for stringent refined product requirements and giving it a growing market share for

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refining centers on the East Coast of the United States.”15 Whereas the previous National Energy Strategy in 1998 did not even mention Africa, the new report called on the president to direct the secretaries of state, energy, and commerce to reinvigorate the US-Africa Trade and Economic Co-Operation Forum and the US-African Energy Ministerial process; deepen bilateral and multilateral engagement to promote a more receptive environment for US oil and gas investment and operations in Africa; promote geographic diversification of energy supplies, addressing such issues as transparency, sanctity of contracts, and security; and revive the Joint Economic Partnership Committee with Nigeria to improve the climate for US oil and gas trade, investment, and operations.16 The Cheney Report led to a significant shift in the administration’s view of sub-Saharan Africa: it identified vital material interests there that could serve the geopolitical imperative of diversifying America’s foreign energy sources. In April 2002, at his inaugural press briefing, the new deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, Michael Westphal acknowledged that “Africa is not always a topic, which is high on the agenda list here in the Pentagon. But I’m here to tell you that it’s actually something, which does matter.” Westphal continued: To begin with, 15 percent of the U.S.’s imported oil supply comes from subSaharan Africa. This is also a number which has the potential for increasing significantly in the next decade. Poverty, unemployment and lack of capital development exacerbate social and ethnic tensions and create havens for conflict, insecurity and terrorism.17

Visiting Nigeria in July 2002, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Walter Kansteiner, announced that “African oil is of national strategic interest to us, and it will increase and become more important as we go forward.”18 For the Department of Energy (DoE), the key objective of the Cheney Report was to develop “a diverse set of energy resources from a diverse set of energy suppliers.” According to John Brodman, an assistant secretary at the DoE, “We have learned from experience that it is the marginal barrels that are the important factor in determining conditions in the oil market. . . . Africa is important to us because it is an important source of the marginal barrels.”19 It was also home to “a number of frontier oil provinces that may become hot exploration areas during the coming decade,” such as São Tomé and Principe, Gambia, Liberia, Togo, Benin, and Niger.20 By 2003, West Africa was supplying the United



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States with approximately 12 percent of its imported oil, with significant production increases expected over the next decade, Brodman noted. However, an unfavorable business climate marked by corruption, political instability, border disputes, and poverty was hampering foreign investment, which was essential for the development of West African oil, much of it located offshore and in deep waters, making access especially costly. The investment climate, Brodman stated, “may keep needed energy resources locked away from development for a long time.” Addressing the African investment climate “is one of the new challenges to our energy security aspirations,” Brodman declared.21 The new focus on the African investment climate led to a series of diplomatic initiatives designed to improve the region’s investment environment and help “transnationalize” African oil—in other words, to bring it to the global market.22 At the G8 summit at Sea Island, Georgia, in 2004, Bush brought together G8 leaders and the heads of four African countries to announce wide-ranging compacts to support transparency and good governance, with a particular focus on revenue flows in the energy sector. One of these was Nigeria, the “anchor of West Africa,” which alone was supplying 10 percent of U.S. crude oil imports every day.23 The US Agency for International Development (USAID) was also providing technical assistance to the Nigerian Federal Budget Office and funding an exchange program on best practices among oil-affected communities in Angola, Nigeria, and São Tomé. The DoE was supporting World Bank and IMF efforts to help build capacity and provide technical assistance on governance, transparency, and budgeting. In Angola, the US embassy and the DoE were supporting the development of a comprehensive domestic energy strategy.24 When Angolan president José Eduardo dos Santos visited the United States in May 2004, he pledged new levels of transparency in the energy sector, including making public current payments from ChevronTexaco.25 In 2003, the United States reopened its embassy in Equatorial Guinea, one of the “hot” “frontier oil provinces.” Finally, in cooperation with the United Kingdom, Norway, and the Netherlands, the United States convened the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights process, bringing together oil and mining companies from the United States and Europe, with leading human rights nongovernmental organizations and corporate social responsibility organizations. According to Paul Simons of the State Department, “Improving transparency in the oil and gas sectors of the major African producers . . . is a win-win situation”: “countries with these attributes make better hosts to the very large investments needed to

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develop energy resources [and] make more reliable contributions to our own energy security.”26 In many respects, the efforts to improve the investment climate resembled the capacity- and state-building activities the United States was increasingly employing to counter terrorism on the periphery, including in Africa. Thus, state building was to become a core component of US energy strategy as well as counterterrorism in Africa. 9/11 and Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa The 9/11 attacks generated a new security dimension to the emerging US approach to sub-Saharan Africa. Now its weak and failing states, porous borders, and ungoverned spaces were also viewed through the lens of transnational terrorism. Colonel Victor Nelson, who would manage the first counterterrorism program in Africa, the Pan Sahel Initiative, stated, “We have said for a long time that if you squeeze terrorists in Afghanistan, Pakistan Iraq and other places, they will find new places to operate and one of those is the Sahel-Maghreb.”27 In the post-9/11 world, weak states in sub-Saharan Africa were now seen as potential breeding grounds for terrorism. According to General James L. Jones, commander of US European Command (EUCOM), which would oversee most of the counterterrorism programs in Africa, it was the “large uncontrolled, ungoverned areas” of the continent that might offer sanctuary to terrorists that concerned the administration most.28 According to the DoD, the region was part of an “arc of instability” stretching from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East, and extending through Asia: There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to our interests. Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from surveillance and attack. Other adversaries take advantage of ungoverned space and under-governed territories from which they prepare plans, train forces and launch attacks. These ungoverned areas often coincide with locations of illicit activities; such coincidence creates opportunities for hostile coalitions of criminal elements and ideological extremists.29

In sub-Saharan Africa the task was primarily to prevent terrorist groups and other nonstate actors from taking root in the first place by securing borders and building the security and governance capacity of weak and failing states. To this end, foreign internal defense programs began across the sub-Saharan



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region in late 2002. At their genesis, these programs encompassed a combination of train-and-equip, information, and stability operations designed to preclude the emergence of terrorism, as well as basic interagency cooperation between the Departments of State and Defense. As these programs evolved and expanded over the next three years, the noncombat dimensions were enlarged and became increasingly sophisticated and integral components of the counterterrorism campaign across sub-Saharan Africa. The war on terror in Africa began as a campaign that was largely preventive rather than defensive; its roots predated the Mombasa, Kenya, attack of November 2002, the first major terrorist attack in Africa in the twenty-first century, in which Western (in this case Israeli) targets were attacked. Nevertheless, the 1990s had witnessed the emergence of genuine Islamic militancy in a small number of African countries, though its causes and manifestations varied. After a military coup in Sudan in 1989, Hassan al-Turabi’s National Islamic Front (NIF) attempted to establish an Islamic state that could rival Saudi Arabia for leadership of the Islamic world. To this end, al-Turabi supported Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and offered to permanently host veterans from the Afghan war, including Osama bin Laden and Egyptian Islamic Jihad in Khartoum.30 Since he was under virtual house arrest in his native Saudi Arabia because of his opposition to Riyadh’s 1990 alliance with Washington, bin Laden relocated to Sudan in 1991. But Turabi’s support for Saddam led to a major cutback in US assistance to the country, and his invitation to bin Laden and other militants earned Sudan a place on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism in August 1993.31 During his time in Sudan, bin Laden’s role in Islamic militancy was limited to funding the ideas and actions of others, who were generally committed to national rather than international jihad, instead of creating his own network to attack Western targets.32 In 1996 the US embassy in Khartoum was closed. That same year, the Sudanese government resolved to rehabilitate itself and end its reputation as a sponsor of terror in order to improve the prospect of foreign investment. Bin Laden had become a liability and was expelled, after which he took up residence in Afghanistan. Khartoum issued invitations to the FBI to visit the country and have unfettered access to Sudanese intelligence on bin Laden and other Islamist groups that the NIF had collected while they had resided in Khartoum. The Clinton administration refused on three occasions, claiming

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that Sudan was still a sponsor of terror and not to be trusted, despite FBI enthusiasm for the offer.33 It was not until 2000 that US counterterrorism specialists were finally allowed to visit Khartoum. By this stage, Sudan had signed all twelve international conventions against terrorism, and, as Alex de Waal notes, Islamism’s big project in Sudan was over.34 With bin Laden’s relocation to Afghanistan in 1996, he began training and funding the transnational network of operatives that became known as al-Qaeda, which focused on attacking American and Israeli targets rather than national secular governments in the Muslim world, which preoccupied most Islamic militants.35 From Afghanistan, bin Laden’s group planned a major attack against US assets in Africa: the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, killing over 200, were a harbinger of the new anti-American terrorism that bin Laden now promoted.36 The other significant Islamist presence in Africa in the pre-9/11 years was in Somalia, though for the most part, Islamists there were unconnected to bin Laden’s network and also responsive to local rather than international issues. The Islamic Courts Union (ICU), against which the United States would use military force in 2006–2007, emerged in northern Mogadishu in 1994 as an effort to establish control in that part of the city after the collapse of the central government in 1991 and the subsequent struggle for control of the city between rival ethnic clans. The ICU recruited judges and militias and set about implementing shari’a law in its area of control. Under their writ, security in the north of the city reached what Alex de Waal calls “a quasi-normal level,” bringing the ICU a certain degree of popular support by allowing people to focus on their daily lives and business. The ICU also took over the main port in Mogadishu and raised revenue through a system of taxation.37 The organization would reemerge as a key actor in Somalia in 2006, but in the 1990s, its impact was limited: the group was defeated in Mogadishu in February 1998 by a rival clan concerned about the increasing power of the ICU and their use of shari`a law.38 The local experiment in maintaining security had collapsed, and the whole of Mogadishu fell back into clan warfare. Finally, another Somali Islamist group, Al-Itihaad al-Islami (AIAI)—also cited by Washington as justification for its intervention in the mid-2000s— emerged in the early 1990s in response to local political conditions. AIAI had modest success controlling and administering some territories in the south of the country in the early 1990s but did not become a major force in national politics. Its Islamism was opposed by the secular clans that dominated



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Mogadishu, and it was unable to maintain control over its territories or spread its ideology. In the mid-1990s, it abandoned the military approach altogether and focused on providing social services such as Islamic schools and health care centers.39 It was, however, deeply implicated in Somalia’s long-standing border dispute with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region and wanted to absorb the area into an Islamic state covering the whole of Somalia.40 In the mid1990s, AIAI was implicated in two hotel bombings inside Ethiopia and an assassination attempt against an Ethiopian minister.41 This was more a reflection of Somali nationalism than a commitment to international jihad; the ongoing Ogaden dispute was a national political issue that transcended AIAI, and there was no indication that the group was interested in any other regions beyond Somali state borders.42 Nevertheless, both Somali groups, AIAI and the Islamic Courts, would be invoked by the US government as grounds for its intervention in Somalia in the mid-2000s. In the immediate 9/11 period, however, the State Department seemed relatively unconcerned about the recent activities of AIAI. The 2002 Patterns of Global Terrorism report, released in April 2003, acknowledged that AIAI had committed terrorist acts in Ethiopia but stated that “in recent years, AIAI has become factionalized, and its membership is difficult to define.” Bin Laden was mentioned just once in the report’s section on Africa.43 The Mombasa bombings in November 2002 demonstrated that Africa was by no means immune to anti-Western terrorism–suggesting, at least, ideological inspiration from bin Laden—but the perpetrators remain unknown over a decade later.44 Set against the broader pattern of localized and often peaceful political Islam in sub-Saharan Africa, anti-Western attacks inspired by bin Laden were mercifully uncommon. The Bush administration’s interest in Africa was largely about preventing militants from converging on the sub-Saharan region rather than countering existing threats, of which there were few. Post 9/11: Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa The war on terror in Africa began with the October 2002 establishment of a regional task force, led by the United States, based in the tiny East African country of Djibouti. The member countries of the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa were Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, the Seychelles, and the host nation, Djibouti. Later it supplemented its area of operations with an expansive “area of interest,” comprising Yemen, Tanzania,

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Mauritius, Madagascar, Mozambique, Burundi, Rwanda, the Comoros, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda.45 The first post-9/11 contact between the United States and Djibouti took place in November 2001 when the deputy assistant secretary for defense, Mike Westphal, visited the country to hold talks with its president, Ismael Omar Guelleh, on November 19.46 For Guelleh, the prospect of hosting a US military presence was an attractive one. A former French colony, Djibouti had been supported financially by Paris since its independence in 1977 and was the largest per capita recipient of French overseas aid. Despite this, aid levels were still relatively low, and the country was poor. The Djiboutian government wanted a wealthier patron and sought to rent its military base out for a higher premium.47 During the 1990s, there seemed little prospect of superpower patronage. Between 1994 and 2000, the United States provided less than half a million dollars per year to Djibouti in aid.48 The war on terror not only brought Djibouti to the attention of the United States, it allowed it to bargain with Washington, which now believed that a presence in the Horn of Africa was a strategic imperative. In fact, Djibouti was not the only country in the Horn that actively sought a US presence. By mid-2002, the Eritrean government had made it clear that it would welcome a US military base on its soil; later in the year, it hired a Washington lobbying firm, Greenberg Traurig LLC, to make the case for a US presence in the country. The firm distributed a press release, “Why Not Eritrea?” which stated that “based on current sentiment of the Arab community and the geography of the region, it is increasingly clear that failure to form an alliance with Eritrea is unconscionable.”49 General Tommy Franks, then commander of US Central Command, reportedly visited both Eritrea and Djibouti four times in 2002, but it was Djibouti that was chosen to host the American-led task force.50 On October 19, 2002 the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was established at a (very) offshore base: Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. In November, the USS Mount Whitney set sail for the Horn of Africa and arrived in Djibouti on December 8. That same month, Rumsfeld visited Djibouti and Ethiopia. Asked how long the United States might operate in Djibouti for, Rumsfeld replied that the answer was “not knowable” but that he suspected “that if we looked out one or two or three or four years, we would find that this facility would be here.” “We need to be where the action is,” he said; “there’s no question but that this part of the world is an area where there’s action.”51 The commander of the Djibouti task force, Major General



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John Sattler, reiterated that the threat of terrorists migrating west was “the exact reason” that Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks established the task force.52 In February 2003, an access agreement was signed between the United States and Djibouti establishing the terms of the US presence in the country.53 This had been preceded by President Guelleh’s red carpet visit to Washington in January 2003, which included a meeting with President Bush that resulted in an increase in US aid to the tiny country from $3 million per annum to $9 million and the opening of a USAID office there.54 Finally in May 2003, three months after the signing of the access agreement, the new task force team left the USS Mount Whitney behind and moved onshore to Camp Lemonnier, the former French base in Djibouti City.55 In addition to the presence at Lemonnier, for which the United States paid the Djiboutian government $30 million per year, the task force also used three forward operating bases in Manda Bay, Kenya; Isiolo, Kenya; and Kasenyi, Uganda—all temporary locations that offered access to air bases 56 The establishment of the task force at Camp Lemonnier gave the United States its first military base in Africa since 1977 when Kagnew communications station in Ethiopia was closed.57 Djibouti was described by the State Department in 2003 as “a critical frontline state in the global war on terrorism.”58 Its location was ideal: next to Somalia, where terrorists would allegedly flee from Afghanistan and also right next to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait: the only link between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean and one of the world’s most important choke points for oil shipments. President Guelleh was fully aware of the value of his country’s location: “We are privileged to be in a strategic position where we can protect and defend the oil route,” he told a meeting of American business executives two days after his meeting with Bush in January 2003.59 The Djiboutian president continued to impress on the US ambassador to his country, Marguerita Ragsdale, how important their bilateral relationship was for the future of Djibouti. In a meeting with Ragsdale in December 2004, Guelleh told her that he wanted Djibouti to be one of the countries that was “closest to the hearts of the Administration and to the President of the United States.” His objective was to make Djibouti a regional service hub like Singapore, and he told Ragsdale that private investment from US firms was essential to this. Guelleh also requested that Djibouti be added to the list of countries eligible for bilateral development assistance through USAID in order to make the US commitment to Djibouti more permanent.60

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The revitalized relationship between the United States and Djibouti was based on a convergence of different interests—although not necessarily an identical set of geopolitical priorities—and was beneficial to both parties in different ways. The Combined Joint Task Force in Djibouti remains the only US task force located in Africa to have its own assigned forces.61 When it was established, there were 400 personnel on the USS Mount Whitney, plus another 900 in Camp Lemonnier. “Some” of these were special operations forces, “that are directly under our tactical control,” though the DoD would not confirm the precise SOF numbers.62 By 2011, 2,000 to 2,500 short-term rotational US military personnel were stationed at Lemonnier at any one time.63 According to the task force public affairs officer, Major Steve Cox, their purpose was “to oversee operations in support of the global war on terrorism in the Horn of Africa” and, more specifically, to “detect, disrupt and defeat terrorists who pose an imminent threat to coalition partners in the region.” According to Major General Sattler, commander of the Djibouti task force, “the porous borders with Somalia” were a key concern, but the mission as a whole was “very broad, in that we [are] to track transnational terrorism across the Horn of Africa, going from Yemen across the Gulf of Aden, and then, you know, the entire Horn.” Moreover, Sattler claimed the task force mandate included “enhancing the long term stability of the region,” which included civil–military operations such as building schools and roads, “enhancing quality of life,” and other humanitarian assistance operations with partner governments or with nongovernmental groups.64 This broad approach was encapsulated in the mission statement of the task force, which affirmed that its objective was “to build partner nation capacity in order to promote regional security and stability, prevent conflict, and protect US and coalition interests.”65 The mission of the Djibouti-based task force was another early manifestation of the more holistic approach to security that was the hallmark of irregular warfare. Negotiating a U.S. Presence: The Pan-Sahel Initiative The Combined Joint Task Force was one of three US government initiatives in Africa at this time. In 2002–2003, the State Department established two interagency counterterrorism programs, one for East Africa and the other for the Sahel (Sahara) region, both of which the DoD contributed to. The Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) was launched in August 2002. In October, the



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Figure 2. Psychological warfare leaflet developed for use in East Africa by the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa. Source: United States Special Operations Command, History: 1987-2007, 128, http://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/2007history.pdf.

State Department’s deputy coordinator for counterterrorism led a delegation to Chad, Niger, Mauritania, and Mali to brief them on the objectives of the new initiative.66 According to the State Department, the PSI was “a State-led effort to assist Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania in detecting and responding to suspicious movement of people and goods across and within their borders through training, equipment and co-operation. Its goals support two US national security interests in Africa: waging the war on terrorism and enhancing regional peace and security.”67 The PSI was developed in response to “the Sahel being identified as the USG’s number two focus in Africa (the ‘Horn’ remains number one) in the War on Terrorism.”68 US European Command (EUCOM, which was responsible for all US military activity in Africa outside the Horn) would “train and equip company-sized forces to conduct rapid-reaction operations

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to stem the flow of illicit arms, goods and people; and to preclude terrorists and terrorist organizations from seeking or establishing sanctuaries in the Sahel.”69 Subsequent DoD reports confirmed that special operations forces were responsible at least for the training in Mali and Mauritania.70 In November 2002, technical assessments began in each country to determine the course of the training and capacity building required. Initial funding for the PSI allocated $6.25 million for counterterrorism mobile training teams, though an additional $1.5 million was added in the second year, for a total of $7.75 million. The program would be overseen by the Department of State, which retained overall responsibility for overseas military aid under the terms of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, designed to ensure that security assistance was aligned with the overall goals of US foreign policy.71 Training was scheduled for completion in April 2004, but the program was designed to be “long term in duration depending on annual funding.” 72 The ultimate objective was to build the capacity for indigenous forces to control the ungoverned spaces of the Sahel. According to the US ambassador to Mali, Vicki Huddleston, “We’re teaching them how to control this area themselves so they can keep it from being used by terrorists. . . . If we don’t help [these countries] control their territories, then these territories will be used by the bad guys.” 73 The response from the four PSI states—Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania—to the US initiative was positive. In Chad, President Idriss Deby hoped “that the US will continue to involve itself more in Central African affairs,” while the minister of defense “received the program enthusiastically and remarked that he was seeking closer co-operation with the United States.”74 The Nigerien defense minister, Hasane Souley, claimed that smuggling across the Niger-Mali border was being used to finance Islamist terrorism in the region (specifically by a remnant of the Algerian civil war, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, known by its French acronym, GSPC). Souley “lauded the Pan Sahel Initiative as the type of co-ordination that is needed in order to address regional insecurity and international terrorism in general.”75 The president of Mauritania and the ministers of defense and the interior welcomed the PSI as an opportunity “to gain greater control over the country’s vast and remote border.” The Mauritanian foreign minister told Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman, “We view the US as a strategic partner. President Taya is very proud of Mauritania’s relationship with the US and wants to preserve and expand this relationship.”76



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The most enthusiastic welcome came from the Malian government, which seemed to share the US analysis of the dangers of ungoverned space. Since its independence in 1960, the central government in Bamako had faced three internal rebellions in the northern region inhabited by ethnic Tuaregs. The Malian minister of security, Souleymane Sidibe, told the PSI briefing delegation in October 2002 that he was concerned about “the age-old problem of desert banditry in the Sahel, and the growing threat of Islamic fundamentalism” and said that regional cooperation would be the key to the PSI’s success.77 The head of Malian state security told the State Department’s PSI delegation that the country “enthusiastically supports the war on terror” and that his organization was “doing everything possible to wrest control of Mali’s enormous northern desert land from bandits, traffickers and smugglers, but it needs a great deal of help with its capabilities.”78 In January 2003, the Malian defense minister, Mahamane Kalil Maiga, told Huddleston that he hoped Washington would “consider forming an even bolder and stronger strategic relationship [with Mali]” because the country “will continue to serve as a barrier to the spread of radical Islam down the traditional trade routes into Africa” and its military was open to bilateral collaboration. Endorsing this, Huddleston told Washington that since Mali was “the only Muslim country in Africa in which the public supports the global war on terrorism . . . [t]here is considerable opportunity—and especially willingness—for a strategic, economic, and political alliance with the USG.”79 The focus on Mali’s northern territories, in which central government control was tenuous, was a key part of the PSI. Mali would receive over half of the program’s funding; Huddleston described the country as the “centerpiece and linchpin” of the PSI.80 The imperative of including Mali may explain Washington’s eventual acquiescence to Bamako’s unwillingness to sign a so-called Article 98 agreement—an accord that would guarantee that Mali would never transfer US military personnel to the recently established International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. Since the establishment of the court, Washington had made bilateral immunity agreements an essential component of its security cooperation activities worldwide so that no American could ever face charges at the ICC. Without this, certain types of US aid and military training were forbidden.81 The deadline for US partners to sign an Article 98 agreement was July 1, 2003—less than a year after the start of the Pan Sahel Initiative. Mauritania and Chad signed immunity agreements in September 2002 and June 2003, respectively. Other partners in the war on terror on the periphery also obliged:

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Djibouti in January 2003, Georgia in February 2003, and the Philippines in May.82 However, Mali and Niger declined. This was not an attempt to frustrate or delay the implementation of US initiatives, for both governments remained pro-American and expressed strong support for the war on terror and the Pan Sahel Initiative. Both countries faced domestic constraints, however. The Malians told US officials that the country had been an early and vocal supporter of the ICC, that a Malian judge had been selected for inclusion on the jury, that Mali had changed its legal code to incorporate the ICC statutes, and that there was an ICC jail located in the country. In essence it would be “an embarrassment” to sign an immunity agreement. US officials warned the Malian government that it risked losing long-term military training and cooperation with the United States. In 2003, $309,000 in US aid was suspended—a relatively insignificant amount but a warning of what might happen if the Article 98 agreement was not signed. As late as 2007, President Amadou Touré continued to express a willingness to consider “any other possibilities that could satisfy the Article 98 requirement,” but an alternative agreement was never signed.83 Yet this did not lead to the suspension of US aid under the Pan Sahel Initiative. The same was true for Niger, which had also incorporated the ICC statutes into its domestic law. In June 2004, Nigerien president Mamadou Tandja was warned by the deputy assistant secretary of state, Pamela Bridgewater, and US ambassador Dennise Mathieu that failure to sign an Article 98 agreement “could result in a Congressionally-mandated scaling back of the Pan-Sahel Initiative.” (Niger had already lost $500,000 in other assistance, and members of the Nigerien military could no longer travel to the United States for training.) In response, President Tandja “delivered an impassioned plea that for the sake of regional security and the global war on terrorism, we should not let Article 98 get in the way [of] our bilateral cooperative agreements” and reiterated that Niger’s position was not the result of anti-Americanism but “based on the Niger constitution,” which would require amending. Since Tandja’s party did not enjoy a majority in parliament, there was no assurance that such an amendment would pass.84 As a result, no agreement was ever signed. The United States was unable to cajole, persuade, or force two of its African allies, Mali and Niger, to sign Article 98 agreements and was ultimately forced to choose between immunity from ICC prosecution for US service members and cooperation in the Pan Sahel Initiative. It chose the PSI, though the risk that US personnel would be rendered to the ICC was low given that Mali and Niger were both US allies.



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The PSI continued until mid-2004. Unlike the Combined Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa, it did not initially include a civil affairs component, but at the suggestion of the US ambassador in N’Djamena, Christopher Goldthwait, this was added to the PSI in Chad. In December 2003, Goldthwait cabled EUCOM headquarters to request a series of “add-ons” to the PSI in Chad, including a variety of small-scale nonlethal assistance and a humanitarian civic action program. Goldthwait believed that the PSI would be more effective in Chad if it could achieve “the co-operation of local populations in monitoring Chad’s troubled border regions”—areas that were subject to “such transnational threats as international terrorism and smuggling.” An “ideal way” of “connecting the PSI-trained unit to the local populace” would be through a medical civic action program that would take account of “the significant health challenges these populations face on a daily basis.”85 So in July 2004, the Marines undertook a fifteen-day medical exercise in Chad. According to Captain Alvin Scott, a medical planner, it was “a great opportunity as U.S. Air Force Reserve medical personnel come into the country of Chad and interact with the local population in a way that is spiritually rewarding and uplifting.” Moreover, stated Major Tim Mitchell, Defense and Army attaché at the US embassy in Chad, “by doing the medical humanitarian mission simultaneously we show them we aren’t just here for military training, but that we care about them. It gives a humanitarian face to accompany the mission of the military.”86 None of this was untrue, but the uniformly positive perspective provided by the EUCOM Public Affairs team was clear. A second interagency program established by the State Department was the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) announced in June 2003 as a counterpart to the PSI. According to Karl Wycoff of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, this was also a capacity-building program because “one of our principal tenets in the war on terrorism is that, whenever possible, our foreign partners should take the lead in combating terrorism on their own territories or in their own financial systems, with the US Government in a strong support role. The ability of most African states to effectively participate in the campaign against terrorism is getting stronger with U.S. help.”87 With similar objectives to the PSI, the EACTI was a $100 million program dedicated to improving the counterterrorist capabilities of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Eritrea, and Ethiopia in 2004. The program was designed to complement the work of the Combined Joint Task Force in Djibouti; EACTI-funded

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training for regional navies and coastal patrols in border security was coordinated through the task force. In addition, EACTI funded financial intelligence units, police training and equipment, and new computer systems to monitor and interdict terrorist movements. Like other US government initiatives in Africa, EACTI also went beyond military activities to incorporate social policy initiatives and information operations. According to the Department of State, EACTI funded “teacher education in disadvantaged Muslim communities, encouraging greater access to education for girls, and improving community involvement in education” as a way to “counter extremist influence and diminish the conditions terrorists seek to exploit for safe haven and recruitment.” In addition, the program would engage in “media and information outreach and English language teaching . . . both to put forward a more accurate picture of the United States and its values, and to serve as a counterweight to Islamist-controlled media outlets.”88 This complemented programs already in place by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) designed “to reach out to Muslim schools and offer support, materials, and training.”89 The heart of the problem, according to Wycoff, was sub-Saharan Africa’s weak and failing states, “The prevalence of poverty, famine and disorder offers terrorists an opportunity to insert themselves into a region, to develop support systems, and to troll for new members for their groups. . . . It is therefore essential that the US pay attention to development issues and to public outreach. . . .  These long-range programs are essential to ultimate success in the war on terrorism.”90 The message from the State Department was that the antidote to terrorism was a holistic development strategy encompassing military, economic, political, and information programs. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative and the Root Causes of Terrorism At this stage, existing programs were relatively small. While EACTI was a more comprehensive $100 million program, the PSI started with just $7.75 million for building partner capacity across Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania. However, the perception of success and of greater need fueled the expansion of the Pan Sahel Initiative, especially the nonmilitary components, into the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) in early 2005—a more holistic program akin to the EACTI. The State Department



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claimed that the PSI had been “very successful,” but “the need for the TSCTI stemmed from ongoing concern over the potential for expansion of operations by Islamic terrorist organizations in the Sahel.”91 Theresa Whelan, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, said that the DoD recognized that the limited funding for the PSI represented “just a drop in the bucket.” “It was a little bit of a Band Aid approach,” Whelan told the press. “We were under no illusion that a single company could, say, patrol the whole of the Mauritanian border . . . but we felt that if they had a military unit that was capable of responding more effectively to information on threats in the region, that would at least be a step in the right direction.”92 The TSCTI encompassed nine countries: the original PSI four (Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania) and an additional five—Nigeria, Senegal, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. Under discussion since mid-2003, the TSCTI proposal was sent to the NSC Deputies Committee in November 2004 and approved by the full NSC in January 2005, where it was “ardently endorsed by the Departments of State and Defense.”93 Although there were no al-Qaeda-linked militant groups in the area at the time, the trans-Sahara region was nevertheless viewed as “a fertile recruiting ground, susceptible to radical terrorist influence and other destabilizing activity.”94Attempting to focus on the perceived root causes of terrorism, the TSCTI was designed as a multiyear effort “to address socio-economic conditions and weak state control over outlying regions of the Sahel that are facilitating the entry of Islamic extremists from outside and the recruitment of disaffected youth.”95 The initiative would be truly interagency, involving the Department of State as the lead and the DoD, Treasury, and USAID. The Pentagon’s contribution to the TSCTI was known as Operation Enduring Freedom–TransSahara (OEF-TS).96 DoD was responsible for most of the train-and-equip programs with border security and counterterrorism units in the TSCTI countries. However, OEF-TS was itself a multifaceted program that also encompassed a variety of nonmilitary activities designed to “promote democratic governance,” “enhance development and institution building,” provide “humanitarian assistance,” and “countering extremist ideology.”97 From the beginning, SOF took the lead in training counterparts in seven countries. Eventually a Joint Special Operations Task Force–Trans-Sahara was responsible for “orchestrat[ing] all Department of Defense efforts and activities toward accomplishing the TSCTP objectives.”98

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The Treasury Department’s contribution to the TSCTI would be an anti-money-laundering program based in Senegal, which would be open to members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and would include training costs, information technology equipment, and staff organization.99 Finally, the Department of State and USAID would take responsibility for a broad category of programs under the umbrella of “democratic development.” This included activities for “strengthening democratic institutions, promoting conflict resolution, improving communication, advancing rule of law, developing water resources, improving education and health, and creating economic growth and jobs.” All of these were aimed at promoting “legitimate authority and . . . legitimate economic activity in the region’s vast, lightly-populated areas where government presence is minimal.”100 One of the key features of the State–USAID trans-Sahara activities was public diplomacy. The purpose of this was to “enhance understanding of US policy, culture, and society; encourage moderation and tolerance among Muslim and other groups; counter misperceptions of US motives and actions; and engage in dialogue on C[ounter] T[errorism].” In doing so, the United States would ostensibly promote a narrative designed to counter extremist voices—one based on “support[ing] democratic values, religious freedom, and advancement of women.”101 This would be achieved through measures including a network of rural radio programming to provide “independent and nonideological news and messages”; increasing the number of speakers (especially Arab and Muslim Americans) and seminars to explore perceptions of issues related to US foreign policy and Islam; more exchange programs to the United States; increased English language teaching and book distribution—“books that reflect the compatibility of Islam and democracy,” as though Muslims were unaware of this; and the expansion of American Corners (Americanstyle libraries) to make information about the United States publicly available to foreign audiences.102 The ultimate objective was to “engage moderate Islamists, government officials, civil society, youth, and marginalized populations” and preclude the emergence of extremism in the Sahel countries.103 Underlying this effort was an assumption that violent anti-American outbreaks would be prevented if Muslim communities in Africa simply knew more about US culture and society. According to Whelan, this approach meant the TSCTI was “a broader package.  .  .  . You’re not just developing one muscle in the body, you’re



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developing the whole body.” The initiative was also described as a “preventative” program. According to the State Department, “A modest amount of funding sustained over four years would help make sure that Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger are not used as a sanctuary or hunting grounds for terrorists” and “this involvement is small when compared to the cost of peacekeeping and nation building elsewhere in Africa.” Instead of reacting to the emergence of a terrorist safe haven, the TSCTI was, according to Whelan, “an excellent example of getting ahead of the power curve and not being behind it and having to catch up.”104 General Jones concurred: the programs carried out by EUCOM in Africa were based “on the principle that it is much more cost-effective to prevent conflicts than to stop one once it’s started.” “Early engagement, often requiring modest investment, can yield significant longterm dividends,” he argued.105 Thus the new programs were not only perceived as effective; fortuitously, they were also inexpensive in comparison to conventional security operations. The trans-Sahara initiative also reinforced the importance of multilateralism in the war on terror: it would be “just a physical impossibility” for the United States to confront terrorism alone, Whelan stated, “so you have to build the capacity of like-minded states to be able to help you confront the threat. And that’s what the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative represents.”106 The new focus on preventing conflict by attending to its supposed underlying causes was subsequently referred to by the military as “Phase Zero.” The term was popularized by General Charles Wald, the EUCOM deputy commander, in an article in Joint Forces Quarterly in 2006.107 “The traditional four phases of a military campaign,” Wald explained, “are deter/engage, seize initiative, decisive operations, and transition.” Phase Zero anticipated these phases: it “encompasses all activities prior to the beginning of Phase I— that is, everything that can be done to prevent conflicts from developing in the first place.”108 It entailed “shaping operations” that were “typically nonkinetic.”109 This approach was particularly apposite for Africa, Wald claimed, because “the vast ungoverned spaces of North Africa serve as fertile recruiting grounds, training areas, and transit routes for a wide range of loosely associated groups that are trying to replace their nations’ governments with their own peculiar intolerant version of an Islamic state.”110 In 2006, the Pentagon published a draft definition of Phase Zero operations for the first time in preparation for using it in doctrine and operations.111 The increasing importance of civil affairs to the military also led to the rewriting,

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rejuvenation, and expansion of training programs in civil affairs and psychological operations run by the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.112 EUCOM also provided military information support teams to US embassies across Africa to work with the US country team “to promote good governance activities, and . . . to counter terrorist and extremist ideology and recruiting efforts.”113 The objective, according to Wald, was “to establish a long-term capability to shape the information environment and counter the negative underlying conditions that impact vulnerable audiences.”114 One example of a web-based Information Operations (IO) initiative established by EUCOM was the news website Magharebia, designed for audiences in the Maghreb countries of Morocco, Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia.115 The hand of US government was not entirely hidden, but the acknowledgment of EUCOM sponsorship could be found only through clicking on a small “About Us” link at the very bottom of the Magharebia home page. Wald described the purpose of these news sites as the provision of “accurate, balanced coverage about key players, events and issues” in the region: “In contrast to extremist ideology propagated throughout the Internet and other media, these sites present positive themes. The principal topics include the rule of law, open and unbiased media, civilian control of the military, and creation of strong accountable institutions in both government and business.”116 EUCOM was effectively providing a moderate pro-American perspective as a counterweight to what it claimed was extremist ideology in the region. It was obviously aware of the risk of overt US association with these sites: it employed local market research firms to assess the attitudes of host nation populations so as to avoid “the stigma that might come from surveys conducted by uniformed US military personnel.”117 Overall, the perception in the military was that the counterterrorism programs across Africa were not only effective but cheap. “For relatively small but consistent investments,” General Jones claimed, “our theater efforts in Africa will have major impacts on the multitude of strategic, security, economic, and political challenges we face.”118 General John Abizaid, head of Central Command (CENTCOM), which oversaw operations in the Horn of Africa, was also effusive, stating, “Dollar for dollar, person for person, our return out here is better than anywhere [else] in the CENTCOM [area of responsibility].” He continued: “From capacity building and nation building perspectives, this investment is one of the best our country has ever made. . . . Ultimately, globalization either works or it doesn’t work. If you want to make it work, you’ve



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got to engage in the places where it’s most difficult and this is precisely one of those places.”119 Rarely was this success ever empirically proven, however. Hard Power and Proxy Warfare in Somalia, 2006–2009 Yet for all the importance of the importance of Phase Zero operations in the new approach, they did not replace military power. Nonmilitary security operations were designed to complement, not replace, the military component of statecraft. This was especially evident in US support for the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in late 2006. In the mid-2000s, as Mogadishu was taken over by the Islamic Courts Union, it seemed to Washington that the potential for terrorists to find safe haven in Somalia had become a reality. After the defeat of the ICU in 1998, Mogadishu had fallen back into clan warfare. In many respects, Somalia became the archetypal failed state that would ostensibly serve as an incubator for terrorism. International efforts to bring stable governance resulted in the establishment of a new transitional national government in 2000, but this was deeply flawed since it did not include representatives from Somaliland, Puntland, or five of the major militia and faction leaders in the country. Moreover, the new government controlled only half of Mogadishu and a handful of areas in the rest of the country, while the main seaport remained closed.120 The lack of security led to the reemergence of the ICU in Mogadishu in the early 2000s. As Mary Harper explains, at its outset, the ICU was “little more than a loosely defined group of independent, discrete units, each one taking responsibility for establishing a degree of order within its very limited area of influence.” However, “as the years went by and nothing emerged to take their place, the authority of the courts began to grow and was often welcomed by a population weary of banditry and warlords.”121 By the end of 2004, it was operating across north and south Mogadishu. By mid-2006, the ICU had taken full control of the city after violent clashes with local clans over the control of the Mogadishu seaport, in which the ICU militias triumphed.122 The Islamic Courts Union succeeded, and gained in popularity, because it brought law and order. Somali refugees who had been resident in Mogadishu during ICU rule were overwhelmingly positive about the state of the city at the time. One former Mogadishu resident commented, “The only time we had peace and stability is when the Islamic Courts Union was in control, if you saw that period, everything was running the way it was supposed to run, and

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it was six months of heaven and we were really blessed.”123 The ICU also facilitated commercial life by ensuring the enforcement of contracts. It appeared to be their emergence from the grassroots that allowed it to achieve legitimacy and popularity in a stateless society that was resistant to central government control.124 Yet the authority of the Islamic Courts put it on a collision course with the latest transitional government established in 2004, which was secular in orientation and dominated by warlords. Because of the power and influence of the local clans and the Islamic Courts in Mogadishu, the transitional government could not sit in the capital, but was located instead in Baidoa, 125 miles northwest of Mogadishu.125 The inability of the secular transitional government to oust the Islamic Courts from the capital alarmed not just the United States but also Somalia’s neighbor, Ethiopia, which feared the nationalism of the ICU. The two countries had a long-standing border dispute over the Ogaden region, and Somalia had a long history of supporting separatist groups there. It also supported the Oromo people’s sometimes violent campaign for self-determination against the Ethiopian state. For its part, Addis Ababa supported the establishment of Somaliland in 1991 and Puntland in 1998 so as to weaken Mogadishu.126 The pro-American Ethiopian leader, Meles Zenawi, told US officials that the Islamic Courts was allied with two anti-Ethiopian armed groups, the Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden National Liberation Front, and that they, along with the ICU, were being armed by Eritrea, Ethiopia’s other enemy. (Eritrea had won its independence from Ethiopia in 1991, but the final border demarcation was still disputed by both sides.) In a June 2006 meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer, Meles told her that “Ethiopia’s security requirements make it imperative that [we] never allow an armed group in Somalia to have a base of operations near its borders. . . . To avoid this Ethiopia has twice entered and removed armed groups that threatened it from Somalia.”127 For Meles, it was the anti-Ethiopian nationalism of the groups allegedly allied to the Islamic Courts that was the principal concern. However, the State Department was more worried about the alleged presence of al-Qaeda-linked militants in Somalia. In June 2006, the ICU elected Hassan Dahir Aweys to the chair of the Shura Council. Aweys was designated a terrorist by the United States because of his supposed links to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Osama bin Laden. That same month, Frazer told the speaker of the Somali government



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in Baidoa that the US ability to engage with the country “remains hindered by the presence of three al Qaeda members in Mogadishu.”128 In February 2006, in response to the rise of the Islamic Courts in Mogadishu, the CIA supported the establishment of a new organization of secular Somali warlords known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism, which launched a campaign to defeat the ICU.129 In a matter of months, however, the Islamic Courts defeated it. Once it had taken over Mogadishu, the ICU wrote two letters to the Bush administration pledging to work toward stability in the region, but Frazer remained skeptical of the group’s intentions: “You certainly can’t make a judgment based on two letters,” she said. “They’re signaling to us their intent to work in the context of the priorities set by the international community; that is, preventing terrorism, supporting stability, working with the Transitional Federal Institutions. But we will have to make a true judgment by their actual actions.”130 Instead, the US government’s belief that there were al-Qaeda-linked terrorists in Mogadishu and in the ICU precluded any meaningful engagement with them and consolidated the alliance with Ethiopia.131 This cooperation was based on a convergence of interests rather than an identical geopolitical analysis. In a meeting with Frazer and other US officials in late June 2006, Meles made it clear that the USG and Ethiopia have parallel interests in Somalia . . . because of the confluence of regional and global interests. The US is driven by the global threat posed by the Islamists. Ethiopia, while also concerned about the larger global terrorist threat, has specific national security interests because its territorial integrity is threatened by Ethiopian fighters allied to the ICU who are members of local insurgencies.132

The Ethiopian leader knew how to frame his concerns in a way that would appeal to US policymakers and encourage them to use to the war on terror as a framework for at least partially interpreting the events in Somalia. In a November 2005 meeting with Frazer’s deputy, Donald Yamamoto, Meles welcomed the US role in the region, telling Yamamoto that it was “a relief for us” and Frazer that “the silver lining in all this is that the USG is taking a direct interest in Somalia and in the region.” An active US role was indispensable, Meles claimed. “If the U.S. were not on board, efforts to stabilize Somalia would fail,” he told Yamamoto.133

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This convergence of interest between the United States and Ethiopia resulted in Washington giving what effectively amounted to a green light for the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in late 2006 and providing US military and intelligence support. The United States waged a proxy war against the ICU by supporting Ethiopian forces. In a series of meetings in late June 2006, Meles told Frazer that Ethiopia would respond militarily if the Islamic Courts was to attack the Baidoa transitional government because if that government were to fall, “there would be no rallying point around which the moderate elements could coalesce and confront the [ICU] and the Islamists.” Frazer made it clear to Meles that “the USG understands Ethiopia’s position that there cannot be an extremist government in Somalia.”134 In a meeting on June 24 with Azouz Ennifar, the head of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, which policed their boundary dispute, Frazer was apparently even more explicit. If the Islamic Courts was to take control of the country “this would have a major negative impact on the Horn and the US . . . would not allow it.” “If Ethiopia intervened in Somalia” under such circumstances, Frazer apparently said, “it would be a mistake for the international community to condemn it.” When Ennifar reported back to UN headquarters in New York, his impression of his meeting with Frazer was clear: “Any Ethiopian action in Somalia would have Washington’s blessing.”135 In her testimony to the House Committee on International Relations on her return from the region on June 29, however, Frazer’s emphasis differed. “We have urged the Ethiopian Government and Prime Minister Meles not to go into Somalia. . . . I think it is important to keep Ethiopia out,” she said, offering an account of the US position that was subtly different from the one she apparently gave to Meles and Ennifar.136 In December 2006, the Ethiopian government invaded Somalia with the Baidoa government still in nominal control, but nevertheless with full US government support. In a meeting with the Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni, in London on November 22, as skirmishes were beginning between Ethiopian troops and Somali Islamists, Frazer claimed that “the [ICU] deliberately drew the Ethiopians in by threatening Baidoa.” By this stage, the US position had hardened. According to the London embassy, in her meeting with Museveni, Frazer noted the sophistication of the [ICU] and the effectiveness of its approach: infiltrating trainers and fighters into an area, reaching out to Islamic leaders, then triggering “spontaneous” uprisings inviting the [ICU] to come in



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and take over. The [ICU’s] agenda is to establish a radical Islamic state. Many of its people have been trained in Afghanistan. There is an Al-Qaeda cell in Mogadishu, and significant terrorist figures are appearing there with increasing openness, even inviting their families to come join them. The [ICU] is making inroads in Puntland and Somaliland.137

Although there is still only an incomplete picture of the US assistance to Ethiopia, it is clear that the Meles government received both military and intelligence support from Washington. In a meeting with Frazer on January 5, 2007, Meles “hailed bilateral military co-operation with the United States and called for continuing and improved joint intelligence operations to target terrorists.” Throughout January, US drones flew into Somalia from Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, targeting members of the Islamic Courts allegedly linked to al-Qaeda. Air strikes focused particularly on the Somalia-Kenya border, and though supposed militants were the targets, the majority of the deaths appeared to be civilians.138 Meles praised an American AC-130 air strike on January 23 as “terrific,” said he was “extremely delighted” with US assistance, and requested further intelligence co-operation as well as humanitarian aid.139 Pentagon officials also acknowledged that a small team of US special operations forces was in Somalia providing military advice and training to Ethiopian and Somali officials on the ground. In addition, the US Navy moved five ships into waters off the Somali coast to conduct security missions, monitor maritime traffic, and intercept and interrogate crew on suspicious ships.140 At the end of January, Yamamoto reported from the US embassy in Addis Ababa that “the Ethiopian National Defense Force  .  .  . continues military operations against extremist elements, with U.S. guidance and intelligence support. Cooperation remains strong, and our intelligence-sharing relationship is robust.”141 The Islamic Courts was driven out of Mogadishu by the end of January 2007, and the transitional government finally moved from Baidoa to Mogadishu. Yet it depended for its survival on US-funded peacekeeping troops from Ethiopia—Somalia’s longstanding adversary—as well as Uganda and Burundi. Its reliance on foreign forces—especially those of its nemesis, Ethiopia— fatally undermined its credibility. The Ethiopian peacekeepers were viewed as occupiers and the government earned the derogatory epithet daba dhilifi (“government set up for a foreign purpose” or “satellite government”).142 As opposition to the new US- and Ethiopian-backed government mounted, the “peacekeepers” became embroiled in a war for the survival of the government.

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From January 2007 to December 2008, over ten thousand were killed, and more than a million fled Mogadishu.143 The leading resistance movement was an increasingly extremist Islamist-nationalist group, Al -Shabaab, formerly a faction within the Islamic Courts. As part of the ICU, it had supported the commitment to shari`a law in Somalia, but its ideology was tempered by the more moderate beliefs of many of the ICU’s leaders and their popular support, which stemmed not from religious conviction but from the widespread belief that the ICU could bring stability to Somalia. Until the Ethiopian invasion, this had moderated Al-Shabaab’s ideology.144 From December 2006 onward, however, Al-Shabaab’s ranks swelled from four hundred to several thousand as volunteers joined to resist what they saw as US-backed Ethiopian aggression. After the ouster of the ICU, Al-Shabaab was the only group actively resisting the Ethiopian occupation. Its popularity from 2006 to 2008 was rooted in its nationalist opposition to the Ethiopian presence. However, in 2008, it began to evolve from a local Islamist nationalist group into an alQaeda franchise that portrayed its war against the transitional government as one front in the global jihadist struggle.145 When its leader, Adan Hashi Farah Ayro, was killed by a US air strike in April 2008, his successor, Ahmed Abdi Godane, sent a communiqué to express greetings to bin Laden. This was the prelude to Al-Shabaab’s affiliation with the al-Qaeda network, which was announced in February 2010.146 In October 2008, Al-Shabaab had begun to use suicide bombings—a first for Somalia. This coincided with an influx of foreign fighters to the country. An Internet campaign designed specifically to attract dedicated foreigners portrayed the Somali conflict as another front in al-Qaeda’s war against the West rather than as a nationalist resistance against the Ethiopians (the narrative favored by Somali recruits).147 Al-Shabaab was able to entice Somali expatriates living in the United States and United Kingdom to return home and fight. In Minnesota, the hub of the Somali community in the United States, the FBI estimated that more than twenty Somalis left to join Al-Shabaab between September 2007 and October 2009. In Minneapolis, the FBI established a Joint Terrorism Task Force to monitor extremism among Somali expatriates.148 By January 2009, the last of Ethiopia’s troops had withdrawn from Somalia after a peace agreement signed in June 2008 established yet another new Somali government. Almost as soon as Ethiopia withdrew, Al-Shabaab took over its positions in central and southern Somalia.149 The former leader of the Islamic Courts, Hassan Dahir Aweys, also led a new Islamist organization, Hizbul



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Islam. Together with Al-Shabaab, it fought against the new government and the peacekeepers from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), funded by the United States.150 Washington continued to support the new government: in May and June 2009, it “shipped in the neighborhood of 40 tons worth of arms and munitions into Somalia” in response to requests from the government.151 In August 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with Somali president Sharif Sheikh Ahmed to offer US support for his government and continued financial and material assistance and training. According to Clinton, Somalia had now “taken up the fight . . . against al Shabaab, a terrorist group with links to al Qaida and other foreign militant networks . . . [that] see Somalia as a future haven for global terrorism.” There was “no doubt,” Clinton continued “that al Shabaab wants to obtain control over Somalia to use it as a base from which to launch attacks against countries far and near.”152 Clinton’s words were a self-fulfilling prophesy. In the course of the USEthiopian intervention in Somalia, the ICU had mutated from an effective localized response to a security vacuum in Mogadishu into Al-Shabaab: a militant al-Qaeda-affiliated anti-Ethiopian and anti-American terrorist group attracting foreign fighters, now occupying and administering large parts of the country. The US-Ethiopian military action had inadvertently generated the very outcome it was supposed to preclude. Beyond Terrorism: Energy Security in Sub-Saharan Africa By the mid-2000s Africa was firmly established as a region of geopolitical importance for the United States, even if some of the actions taken under the auspices of counterterrorism actually served to generate increased militancy. The new US approach to Africa was based on the twin pillars of counterterrorism and energy security. For US policymakers, these two problems were also increasingly linked: terrorism and other transnational security challenges, such as piracy, could pose threats to energy security, and in different ways both energy security and counterterrorism required bolstering weak states, be it strengthening investment climate or dealing with security threats that could destabilize oil-rich regions. The culmination of this new approach was the establishment of Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007—the first freestanding military combatant command structure exclusively for Africa that would oversee all US interests and military operations on the continent.

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The Militarization of US Energy Security Until the mid-2000s, US military activity in sub-Saharan Africa focused primarily on the war on terror; by 2005, however, military activity in the oil-producing Gulf of Guinea had picked up significantly as energy security activities were expanded beyond the diplomatic and economic initiatives that followed the Cheney Report. By 2004, more new oil fields were being discovered there than in any other region of the world, with at least every second hole drilled a hit.153 This was reflected in the increasing frequency of US-led international military operations in and off the coast of West Africa. In April 2004, the assistant US secretary of state for Africa, Charles Snyder, called for a West African coastal security program on the grounds that “a lot of this new oil is actually off-shore. There is no one to protect it, unless we build up African coastal fleets.”154 Similarly, in Abuja, Nigeria, General Wald—deputy commander of EUCOM, then still in charge of US military operations in Africa—said that he had discussed finding “a way that we can cooperate together in monitoring the waters off the Gulf of Guinea” with Nigerian officials, including Deputy Defense Minister Roland Oritsejafor. 155 In October 2004 in Naples, Italy, EUCOM hosted a three-day conference on maritime security in the gulf, which included naval leaders from Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Congo-Brazzaville, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Togo (as well as France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The discussion focused on transnational challenges such as piracy, terrorism, weapons and people trafficking, and conflicts over fishing rights and offshore oil production. The international character of the discussions was indicative of the Bush administration’s pragmatic multilateralism when it came to transnational security challenges.156 By 2006, the US military presence in the gulf had become “nearly continuous,” in contrast to 2004 when it was limited to just twenty days. The US Navy was deployed to train over 750 security personnel from eight Gulf of Guinea countries in boat maintenance and command-and-control organization.157 In November 2006, the Navy, the Department of State, EUCOM, and the DoD’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies held a ministerial-level conference in Benin on maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea attended by representatives from each of the eleven gulf nations.158 Finally, in 2007, the African coastal security program envisioned by Wald and Snyder was established in the form of the US Navy’s Africa Partnership Station (APS),



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which became the flagship program of US Naval Forces Africa.159 Based in the Gulf of Guinea, the APS was an annual six-month sea-based deployment designed to strengthen the capacity of littoral states to govern the gulf region in the face of transnational crime, such as piracy or terrorism, which might disrupt the flow of commerce.160 The Global Fleet Station would focus “primarily on Phase Zero (shaping) operations, Theater Security Cooperation, Global Maritime Awareness, and tasks associated specifically with the War on Terror.”161 The training exercises that took place included not only the Gulf of Guinea nations but seven European countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Portugal. By 2009, there were over seventy international officers and senior enlisted personnel. Of the twenty-one senior staff, ten hailed from countries in the Gulf of Guinea, seven from Europe, and one from South America.162 Multilateralism at sea was essential because “most of the maritime domain is under no single nation’s sovereignty or jurisdiction.” The 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security emphasized that security at sea “will not come from the United States acting alone, but through a powerful coalition of nations maintaining a strong, united, international front.” This was even more salient in the twenty-first century because of “increased economic interdependency and globalization, largely made possible by maritime shipping,” which “underscores the need for a coordinated international approach.”163 It is often assumed that US activity in Africa in this period was directed at China.164 Since the early 2000s, the Chinese government had also been attempting to secure oil, gas, and other natural resources from across Africa.165 China’s use of oil had increased at an exponential rate since the mid1990s. Between 1995 and 2005, its oil consumption doubled to 6.8 million barrels per day. In 2003, it surpassed Japan to become the world’s second largest oil consumer.166 By 2006, China was Africa’s third most important trading partner behind the United States and France, and nine of its top ten trading partners were oil-producing states.167 Beijing’s approach was the opposite of that of the United States: instead of ensuring that oil reached the global market, China sought exclusive supply agreements, which would take oil off the international market, meaning a reduction in global supply and possibly an increase in price.168 In contrast, as assistant secretary of defense Whelan acknowledged in 2008, the United States sought to transnationalize African energy: it was committed to ensuring “free market access” to oil by bringing it to the global market. Energy from the Gulf of Guinea was not just important

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to the United States, Whelan claimed; it was “strategically important to the world. If African oil were to fall off the oil market, it wouldn’t simply be the United States that would see its oil prices go through the roof.”169 It may well be the case that US activities in Africa were designed with Chinese competition in mind, but the official documents currently available rarely, if ever, state explicitly that US efforts were directed against Beijing. Instead, the expressed objective was to integrate all rising powers into the existing global system, creating a positive-sum dynamic and deterring potential challenges to the system. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review stated, “The United States will work to ensure that all major and emerging powers [emphasis added] are integrated as constructive actors and stakeholders into the international system.”170 To be sure, the American free market approach to energy in Africa and elsewhere—its determination to bring those reserves to the international market where they could be bought by anyone—appeared to clash with the Chinese preference for negotiating exclusive supply agreements with producers. Beijing appeared unwilling to rely on an American guarantee that Africa’s oil would reach the global market, instead insisting on its own exclusive supply arrangements. Yet this did not provoke an overt clash between the two powers in Africa in the first two decades of the twenty-first century; at present, there is no documentary evidence to suggest that US policymakers believed that China’s strategy in Africa was a fundamental challenge to the US free market approach to energy security. This may have been down to the fact that China’s strategy was primarily economic rather than military. The increase in the number of Chinese trade officials posted to embassies in Africa was not matched by an increase in military ties. There were no Chinese military bases in Africa until 2017 when a sole base was opened, and China did not train foreign militaries to counter threats to its interests there.171 The US response, however, was led by the military and based on the assumption that transnational and irregular challenges were a threat to energy security. Africa Command The culmination of the new US interest in Africa was the creation, for the first time, of a unified military command structure for the continent approved in late 2006 and established in October 2007. Since the establishment of the geographical combatant commands, responsibility for Africa had been awkwardly divided between EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM.172 This incongruous arrangement was a reflection of the lower priority given much of



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Africa by the Pentagon even during the proxy wars of the Cold War. Africa remained the only region of the world without a DoD command structure to oversee US security interests. Discussion of the possibility of a military command for Africa had taken place at low levels among policy analysts and the officer class since the early 2000s.173 With Africa now identified again as a site of US security interests, the notion of a unified Africa Command gained credence in policymaking circles. Taking his orders directly from Rumsfeld, General James Jones’s first task on becoming the EUCOM commander in 2003 was to “get out of the Cold Wardefense-of-Europe mentality.” As part of a shift away from Western Europe, Jones envisaged EUCOM forces moving eastward and southward. “In Africa,” he claimed in April 2003, “you have a developing problem of large ungoverned regions. . . . It’s a potential hotbed for terrorism, for poverty, and for all kinds of criminal elements that find a nest there.” The restructuring of EUCOM forces would reflect this: “We don’t pay enough attention to Africa, but I think we’re going to have to in in the 21st century,” Jones said.174 “European Command is not the right word anymore” remarked General Charles Ward, Jones’s deputy; “I don’t know what it is . . . but it is something other than European Command.”175 As part of its Global Force Posture Review, the DoD had begun to sign basing access agreements with countries across Africa, including Algeria, Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia. According to a senior official from the Pentagon, “Much of our thinking in Africa, and in other parts of the world, is as much about having agreements as it is about stationing forces or large numbers.”176 By 2006, EUCOM’s staff was spending more than half its time on African issues. However, devising and executing a coherent security strategy there would remain a challenge as long as the continent was divided among three combatant commands.177 In July 2006, Rumsfeld directed EUCOM to form a planning team to advise on requirements for establishing a new military command arrangement for Africa. He told a town hall meeting in September that he and Peter Pace, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had “been pushing and pushing for six months . . . [to] get the system to come up with the details as to exactly how it would be done.” In October, Rumsfeld approved the creation of an interagency planning team for the new command, including representatives from State, USAID, and other agencies working in Africa. In December, after announcing his resignation, he forwarded the recommendation for an Africa

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Command (AFRICOM) to the president, who approved it on December 15. The public announcement was made by Rumsfeld’s successor, Robert Gates, in early February 2007.178 In keeping with the elevation of an irregular approach, the new Africa Command would emphasize the Phase Zero concept. Unlike any other combatant command, it would incorporate personnel from the State Department and USAID. According to Whelan, AFRICOM would take a “holistic” approach to security that would include good governance, the rule of law, and economic opportunity, as well as more traditional security missions such as train-and-equip programs, with the “emphasis on prevention.”179 To this end, AFRICOM would have a directorate for civil–military activities, which would be staffed by military and civilian personnel, and led by a senior official from the State Department, who would also serve as a deputy commander of AFRICOM. As of 2013, there were over thirty AFRICOM personnel from more than ten US government departments excluding DoD.180 This was a departure from the usual combatant command structure. The inclusion of civilians and the focus on the causes of instability as an integral part of the command’s mission was unprecedented. AFRICOM would also assume responsibility for all other US military activity in Africa, including the Combined Joint Task Force in Djibouti and Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans-Sahara, both of which were described by Generals Craddock of EUCOM and Abizaid of CENTCOM as model programs for AFRICOM to build on.181 Despite the ostensible civilian dimension of AFRICOM, its nonmilitary operations were designed as instruments of security policy. They were, in essence, irregular military tactics. Instability was not viewed through the lens of humanitarianism but as a security problem. According to Whelan, the notion that “weakened and/or unstable states create threats to our interests is a key assumption.”182 Presenting the objectives of AFRICOM in February 2008, Whelan outlined US security interests in Africa: the elimination of terrorist networks and safe havens; prevention of weapons of mass destruction, illegal arms proliferation, and narcotics trafficking; strategic access and open sea-lanes of communication; free market access; and weak and unstable states attracting terrorism and crime.183 In other words, the nonkinetic tactics would be directed in pursuit of geopolitical, not purely humanitarian, objectives. The new command was widely unpopular in Africa. Although countries cooperating with US foreign internal defense programs had already consented to those activities, often enthusiastically, they were not consulted



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about the establishment of AFRICOM. The perception that the command was being foisted on Africans and the lack of clarity about its role in advance of its launch meant that Washington was unable to find a single country that would agree to host its headquarters. It was forced to operate indefinitely out of a Cold War military base in Stuttgart, Germany, making it the only US combatant command headquarters located outside its area of operations.184 In October 2007, the African Union’s Pan-African Parliament passed a motion “prevail[ing] upon all African Governments through the African Union (AU) not to accede to the [US] request to host AFRICOM anywhere in the African continent.”185 Privately, a small number of African leaders, including Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, were not opposed to the idea of hosting AFRICOM. Botswana also expressed a tentative interest in the fate of the command headquarters, as did Burkina Faso, Mali, Rwanda, and Gabon. Ultimately, however, even the plan to establish smaller regional offices was shelved due to the widespread suspicion with which the new US military command structure for Africa was viewed.186 The nonconsultation and the apparent militarization of US Africa policy offended African leaders, stoked memories of imperialism, and appeared to undermine existing pan-African arrangements such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).187 Interviews with DoD officials involved in the establishment of AFRICOM, undertaken by James J. F. Forest of the Joint Special Operations University, and Rebecca Crispin, formerly of EUCOM and the Joint Special Operations Command Africa, seemed to confirm that the establishment of AFRICOM had been characterized by haste, poor communications, and lack of consultation. “Details such as where the headquarters would be located, exactly whom AFRICOM would work with and through what mechanisms, and how this new military command would be perceived within the African and global communities were not carefully vetted prior to AFRICOM’s official announcement,” Forest and Crispin reported; “Rather, when AFRICOM was announced, its planners were apparently confident that it would be enthusiastically received and could progress on its own positive momentum.” One of the “gravest mistakes” the AFRICOM planners made, according to Forest and Crispin, was “present[ing] the plan fait accompli, without consultation” because this led to “the perception that the United States was already armed with solutions worked out in Washington . . . and had not taken into account the needs or strategic concerns of the African people it intended to support.”

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Even members of Congress were not updated on the decision to establish the command. Representative Donald Payne (D-NJ), of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (and chair of its subcommittee on Africa), was “shocked and dismayed” when he learned about the plan to establish AFRICOM from a newspaper.188 In its rush to embed and institutionalize the new US approach to Africa, the Pentagon dispensed with consultation and communication, with the result that by 2019, twelve years after its establishment, the AFRICOM HQ remained in Germany. Conclusion: A New Geopolitical Calculus in Sub-Saharan Africa In October 2005, General Jones of EUCOM asserted that “the American presence [in Africa] is valued as long as we do it the right way.” This meant “a commitment on the part of the United States to help African[s] help themselves in a way that preserves their dignity and is not neo-colonialist.”189 While many African leaders were ready to cooperate with the United States on preventive FID programs justified under the auspices of the war on terror, most of them objected to the establishment of a high-profile Africa Command, which appeared to expand US influence over the entire continent, put the Pentagon in charge of both military and nonmilitary policy, and, if the DoD had its way, would mean a major US military command headquarters located in Africa, more substantial and intrusive than any existing base of operations there. Yet ultimately the refusal to host the AFRICOM headquarters was more symbolic than substantive. All the programs established under the auspices of the war on terror continued. The only change was that they were now overseen from Europe by AFRICOM rather than EUCOM (or CENTCOM in the case of the Horn). However, the rebuffing of the command essentially served as a warning that future cooperation would require more respect for African leaders and their inclusion in discussions about the US vision of the continent’s future. The US approach to sub-Saharan Africa had undergone a major shift in the early twenty-first century as a result of a confluence of new geopolitical imperatives: the possibility of terrorism in weak states across Africa and the recognition that Africa harbored energy resources that could facilitate supply diversification—and the realization that transnational threats such as terrorism could imperil US access to these resources both onshore and offshore. Addressing the problems associated with weak states was at the core of the



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US government’s approach to these challenges since weak governance inhibited the kind of foreign investment required to extract and secure Africa’s oil, and also apparently made states more hospitable to terrorists and other nonstate actors. These perceptions about twenty-first-century security fueled the US-led multilateral and bilateral FID programs across sub-Saharan Africa, which culminated in the establishment of AFRICOM to institutionalize this approach. The interagency dimension of this strategy—a key feature of Irregular Warfare—was noteworthy, though it was still in need of further organization and consolidation. According to the Government Accountability Office, interagency cooperation was far from smooth. At the end of the Bush years, there was no comprehensive, integrated strategy to guide the implementation of programs such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), which meant that State, DoD, and USAID used different planning templates for TSCTI activities. There was a lack of guidance from the agencies’ leadership on how to resolve interagency disputes, and, at least initially, AFRICOM was unable to determine the full extent of the interagency representation it required.190 In practice, then, there were many teething problems. Although interagency cooperation took place in Africa, it was disorganized and in need of overarching guidance. In addition, the positive impact of stability operations in Africa was assumed but never proven. In 2010, the GAO criticized the Horn of Africa Task Force for failing to undertake any assessments of the long-term impact of its civil affairs operations, even though they were 60 percent of its activity.191 The perception of success in regard to these operations was not based on empirical findings but was still frequently asserted nonetheless. The expansion of the Bush administration’s counterterrorism programs in sub-Saharan Africa was based on a perception of success—but this narrative of success was not falsifiable because the FID campaigns in Africa were largely preventive anyway. Prior to 9/11 there were few incidences of Islamist terrorism there and, Mombasa 2002 notwithstanding, it continued to be a relatively rare occurrence in the post-9/11 years too. The exception was Somalia, where US-Ethiopian hard power appeared to catalyze the emergence of Al-Shabaab, the opposite of the intended outcome. Later, in the Obama years, jihadi terrorism would also emerge in the Sahel, calling into question the utility of the capacity-building programs that began there in the Bush years.

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Terrorism and the “Great Game” in Georgia and the Caspian Basin

T

he concerns that drove post-9/11 US policy in sub-Saharan Africa, ungoverned spaces and energy security, were recurring motifs in the war on terror that also propelled Washington’s strategy in the former Soviet republic of Georgia and the wider Caspian Sea Basin. Like the Philippines and numerous countries across Africa, Georgia had a relatively weak central state. Although it gained independence from the USSR in 1991, the central government in Tbilisi was unable to exert control over two of its own separatist regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. A third area, the Pankisi Gorge, increasingly became a home for refugees from neighboring Chechnya fleeing the war against Russia in the late 1990s, as well as a haven for Chechen fighters, some of them Islamist, regrouping in Georgia before returning to fight the Russians across the border in Chechnya. After 9/11, the alleged presence of al-Qaeda-related individuals in the Pankisi Gorge was the catalyst for a US troop deployment to Georgia, under the auspices of the war on terror, to train and equip local security forces and ultimately help them reassert control over the gorge. US security assistance in Georgia was less expansive than the programs in Africa and the Philippines, and the nonmilitary dimension was much smaller. Yet it was driven by the same underlying concerns about the challenges that ungoverned space posed. As a result, Georgian territorial integrity became an objective of the war on terror. At the same time, US interest in a stable Georgia also predated 9/11: when new oil and gas deposits were discovered in the Caspian Sea in the 1990s, 114



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Georgia—though not itself a producer of Caspian energy—was identified by Washington as a key oil transit state. In order to avoid transporting oil through a pipeline traversing the Islamic Republic of Iran and to prevent Russia from monopolizing pipelines out of the Caspian, the Clinton administration backed the construction of a pipeline route from Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, located on the Caspian Sea, through Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, and terminating in the Turkish port of Ceyhan. The Baku-TbilisiCeyhan (BTC) pipeline relied on stability and security in Georgia as the only alternative to Russia and Iran. To this end, the Clinton administration, with the full support of ruling elites in Tbilisi, cultivated commercial and political relations with the former Soviet state and worked toward its integration into the Euro-Atlantic sphere. The strong bipartisan commitment to the BTC pipeline and the political capital expended over several years to make this a reality is integral to understanding the emergence of Georgia as a front in the war on terror. The development of this theater reinforces the connection between energy security and counterterrorism in the Bush years and provides a further example of the role the Bush administration envisaged in its global strategy for special operations forces and irregular tactics as an antidote to the perceived dangers of ungoverned spaces in the twenty-first century. It was not until the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 that the administration was forced to reconsider the extent of its commitment to the government in Tbilisi. The security of Georgia and its integration into the Western sphere was deemed essential for the exploitation of Caspian oil, but the tension in this strategy was demonstrated when it became clear that the United States was not prepared to use military force against Russia to defend the Caucasian ally whose loyalty it had done so much to court. Caspian Pipeline Politics from Clinton to Bush On September 20, 1994, the so-called Contract of the Century was signed between the government of Azerbaijan and thirteen oil companies from eight countries (Azerbaijan, the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, Turkey, Norway, Japan, and Saudi Arabia).1 Amid much fanfare, the Azeri government was awarding contracts for the development of its share of Caspian oil resources. Those present at the signing ceremony included Heydar Aliyev, president of Azerbaijan; Bill White, US deputy energy secretary; John Browne, a chief executive of BP; and Natiq Aliyev, president of state oil company of

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Azerbaijan; as well as the Russian minister of fuel and energy, the US ambassador to Azerbaijan, and representatives of other oil companies party to the production sharing agreement.2 Reflecting back four years later, Dick Cheney, then CEO of the oil field services company Halliburton, commented, “I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian. It’s almost as if the opportunities have arisen overnight.”3 In the early to mid-1990s, the estimates of fossil fuel reserves in the Caspian Sea seemed too good to be true. The littoral states—Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran—cited studies suggesting that the Caspian reserves combined were roughly on a par with the individual reserves of Iraq or Kuwait: in 1993, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan claimed a combined total of 121.8 billion barrels of oil.4 Initial estimates proved to be somewhat exaggerated, however. In 1997, the US government claimed that the Caspian region possessed 15.6 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 163 billion barrels of possible reserves. By 2013, after nearly two decades of exploration, these figures had become more accurate still: Washington estimated that the Caspian Basin harbored 48.2 billion barrels of oil with the largest reserves in Azerbaijan (8.5 billion barrels) and Kazakhstan (31.2 million barrels).5 This was a little over one-fifth of the proven reserves in Saudi Arabia; nevertheless, the US government was eager to bring the Caspian oil to the international market because supply diversification meant greater energy security.6 The Clinton administration’s 1998 Comprehensive National Energy Plan stressed the danger of “reliance on a single geographic area” and emphasized the importance of hedging against disruptions in supply by diversify[ing] sources of oil available to world markets. . . . Working to open more sources of oil in other regions of the world can reduce the adverse economic impacts that might be brought on by a cut in supply in any one region. Of particular importance to the expansion of world oil supply sources is the Administration’s work in the Caspian . . . to develop multiple transportation options for moving the region’s oil production out into world markets.7

After the Contract of the Century was signed in 1994, the US objective was to ensure that the pipelines carrying Caspian oil passed through stable pro-Western countries. In practice, this meant preventing Russian domination of the export pipelines and their routes and isolating Iran as much as possible from the exploitation of Caspian energy. While it was agreed that



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early Caspian oil would be transported through the existing Northern Route Export Pipeline via the Russian port of Novorossiysk, an aging Soviet-era pipeline that would carry new Caspian oil from 1998, Washington accepted this on the basis that it would transport only “early” oil and not the bulk of the Caspian reserves. Indeed the pipeline had a limited capacity, meaning that a new route would be required to get more sizable reserves to market.8 In addition, early oil was carried through Georgia via the Baku-Supsa pipeline, which terminated at the Georgian Black Sea port of Supsa. This route had the advantage of avoiding Russia, but the capacity of this older pipeline was also limited and did not replace the need for a major new one. The Supsa line did, however, allow Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze to demonstrate that his country was open for business and pro-Western. The Tbilisi government lined the pipeline with security forces and refurbished the terminal at Supsa. As the first oil tankers were loaded there, Shevardnadze observed the proceedings accompanied by Azerbaijani president Aliyev and the State Department’s ambassador for Caspian energy, Richard Morningstar.9 Beyond these existing pipelines, the Clinton administration expended considerable energy lobbying for a major new pipeline through Georgia so as to avoid both Russia and Iran. The official US position was that it welcomed Russia’s cooperation as a partner in exploiting Caspian energy; given that Moscow had a Caspian Sea coast and therefore a legitimate claim to some of its resources, Russia could not be excluded from their exploitation. However, it could not be allowed to exercise predominant influence over such a vital resource. At the end of the Cold War, the US priority had been to integrate Russia and the newly independent states as far as possible into the Western economic and political system.10 However, the relationship between the two states had soured for political and geopolitical reasons: Russian nationalist revanchism in Chechnya, its support for Serbian aggression in Bosnia, and the deep-seated corruption that marred the Russian transition to a form of crony capitalism (although in truth, the policies supported by the Clinton administration via the International Monetary Fund were equally damaging to the Russian economy).11 All of this made Moscow a less attractive ally when it came to energy security. Its interventions in the former Soviet space challenged the integration of the newly independent states into the Western economic order and threatened the political independence of any state hosting a Caspian oil pipeline. According to Morningstar, the Caspian energy ambassador, “the U.S. never had an ‘anti-Russian’ policy in the Caspian,” but it did

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“[insist] that the sovereignty of new states in the region be respected and that those states have the ability to freely export their resources.” Therefore, the administration’s view was that “Russia should not have a monopoly [emphasis added] on pipelines, and that no pipelines should go through Iran.”12 Rosemarie Forsythe, the National Security Council expert on the Caucasus and initiator of the policy toward Russia, later wrote that US policy since 1994 had been to support “multiple short- and long-term routes” to ensure diversification of supply, including a route through Turkey, because this was a way of “decreas[ing] Caspian countries’ dependence on a single route through Russia.”13 If a route through Russia was undesirable, US support for a route through Iran was not remotely likely—even though it would have been shorter and cheaper than the BTC line—because of the ongoing cold war between the United States and the Islamic Republic that dated back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution.14 On the grounds that it continued to oppose the state of Israel, sponsor Hezbollah, oppose the Oslo peace process in which Clinton was heavily invested, and was seeking weapons of mass destruction, the Clinton administration instituted a full economic embargo against Tehran in 1995, banning all trade between the two countries, followed the next year by even stricter sanctions targeting any third country that traded with Iran, even US allies in Europe.15 The result was that the Clinton administration threw its weight behind the construction of a longer pipeline from Baku through Tbilisi to Ceyhan in Turkey. The Georgian route was the only politically acceptable option for the United States. As Stuart Eizenstat of the State Department commented, “This is a situation where the strategic interests of the United States are so great that they outweigh the temporary advantages of American companies” that would accrue from a cheaper pipeline route.16 In May 1998 at a conference in Istanbul, US Energy Secretary Federico Peña announced the Caspian Sea Initiative to coordinate the efforts of the American Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (owned by the US government), and the Trade Development Agency, which together were ready to sink $6 billion into Caspian energy projects—more than the Export-Import Bank’s portfolios in both China and Mexico. “The Caspian region is a place where American foreign policy and commercial interests meet,” Peña announced; “it is the belief of the United States government that rapid development of the vast energy resources in this region and trade linkages among the countries are critical to the prosperity, the



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stability, and the democracy of the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus.”17 Denying that Washington was pursuing an anti-Russia policy, Peña claimed that Russian involvement in the exploitation of Caspian resources was inevitable and even welcome, but it was clear the United States would try to prevent Moscow from exercising decisive influence in the region. Echoing Morningstar, Peña stressed the importance of developing “multiple pipelines and diversified infrastructure networks to integrate these countries into the global market.” This network of pipelines would serve as “tools for establishing a political and economic framework that will strengthen regional cooperation and stability and encourage reform for the next several decades.” 18 Peña’s successor, Bill Richardson, was even more explicit about Russia’s place in the Caspian order. Exploiting the new resources was not just about American energy security: It’s also about preventing strategic inroads by those who don’t share our values. . . . We’re trying to move these newly independent countries toward the West. . . . We would like to see them reliant on Western commercial and political interests rather than going another way. . . . It’s very important to us that both the pipeline map and the politics come out right.19

As the Caspian region became more important to US policymakers, the territorial integrity and independence of Georgia, as the key oil transit state, were increasingly critical. This importance was reflected in the increase in US government aid to the two countries in the latter half of the 1990s. Total US aid to Georgia, including security assistance, began to increase dramatically in 1998. From 1992 to 1997, US assistance averaged $29.33 million per year. In 1998 this increased to $97.5 million, followed by $89.45 million in 1999 and $109.13 million in 2000. In fact from 1992 to 2006, Georgia received more US aid than any other country in the South Caucasus: a total of $1.67 billion.20 One of the biggest increases was in the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF)—grants to finance the purchase of American weapons. In 1997, Georgia received only $700,000 in FMF; in 1998, this increased to $5.35 million and in 1999 to $7.95 million.21 FMF programs also began in 1997 for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, also Caspian littoral states, with the US commitment increasing each year thereafter to these countries, though never reaching the levels assigned to Georgia. The anomaly was Azerbaijan: although it would be the biggest producer for the BTC pipeline, the US Congress had banned military aid to Baku under Section 907 of the 1992

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Freedom Support Act because of the Azeri blockade of Armenia in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. It was not until after 9/11 that Washington waived Section 907 on national security grounds, citing Azerbaijan’s cooperation in the war on terror.22 Prior to this, however, the Clinton administration cultivated new strategic cooperation with Azerbaijan through the establishment of the annual USAzerbaijan Security Dialogue in 1997, a vehicle for promoting energy cooperation, and political and economic reform without violating Section 907.23 These initiatives occurred alongside the 1994 establishment of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative with Russia and other former Soviet states, including the Caspian oil producers. Although participating countries did not receive a security guarantee from the alliance, membership in the PfP was “the best preparation for states interested in becoming NATO members” according to the State Department.24 In subsequent years, the United States gave its full support to eventual Georgian membership of NATO.25 As with its intervention in the Philippines, Washington did not have to coerce the Georgian elite in order to project power into the region. President Shevardnadze was openly pro-American and actively courted US involvement in Georgian affairs. A former communist, Shevardnadze was admired in the West as one of the liberal modernizers who had overseen a transformation in Soviet foreign policy at the end of the Cold War and subsequently brought a degree of stability to Georgia after the civil wars of the early 1990s.26 He spoke publicly of his desire to bring about “the restoration of Georgia’s geopolitical role” by cultivating links with the West.27 In 1997, Georgia was a founding member of the GUUAM group: a security organization established by Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, dedicated to preserving the territorial integrity of each member in compliance with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.28 Georgia and Azerbaijan were leading supporters of the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) project, established as a joint initiative with the European Union in 1993, which aimed to reinvigorate commercial exchange along the ancient Silk Road route from Europe through the Caucasus to Asia. The first TRACECA conference was held in Tbilisi in March 2000.29 In 1996, Georgia had applied for membership of the Council of Europe and was admitted in January 1999. When US Secretary of Defense William Cohen visited Tbilisi in August that year, he lauded Shevardnadze’s political and economic reforms: Our militaries are working closely together to help Georgia meet its security needs and to support Georgia’s goal as a force for stability in the region.



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This year our militaries will carry out 30 joint exercises. . . . That’s a threefold increase since 1995. We have established a bilateral working group to help Georgia improve its defense planning, its resource allocation, and military training. Georgia’s military reform program is serious—it’s sensible and successful. . . . And I am pleased that our countries are able to work together to advance those goals.30

In sum Washington had firmly committed itself to Georgia as a key regional ally; the relationship was reciprocal and mutually valued. On the fringes of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe conference in Istanbul in November 1999, President Clinton signed the BTC pipeline agreement with the leaders of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson hailed the contract as “a major foreign policy victory for President Clinton” and “a strategic framework that advances America’s national security interests . . . [and] the future of the Caspian region.”31 At this stage, US policy did not address the question of Georgian territorial integrity or the status of the Pankisi Gorge. This relatively lawless area, beyond the control of the Tbilisi government, was of particular concern to Moscow, however, because of the intermittent presence of Chechen insurgents there, training and regrouping before returning to Chechnya to fight the Russians.32 When Russia invaded Chechnya for a second time in 1999, President Vladimir Putin made the first of several demands that Russian troops be able to pursue Chechen fighters over the border into the Pankisi Gorge. As fighting intensified in late 1999, at least six thousand Chechens fled to the gorge. Though it was part of Georgia, the country’s security forces had stopped entering the area because of fear of attack by Chechen rebels; international aid organizations would eventually suspend work there in August 2000 after four nurses were kidnapped.33 After Russian incursions into Georgian airspace in June 1999, Shevardnadze announced his intention to upgrade Georgia’s air defense system with Western support.34 However, the Georgian military still lacked the ability to reassert control in the gorge. In 2000, the State Department’s annual report on terrorism noted that Georgia “faced the potential for spillover violence from the Chechen conflict” and apparently “contended with international mujahidin seeking to use Georgian territory as a conduit for financial and logistic support to the mujahidin in Chechnya” too.35 At this stage, however, there was no indication that the situation would require direct intervention from the United States.

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The strong US commitment to the Caspian Basin, the BTC pipeline project, and the state of Georgia transcended the Clinton administration. In early March 2001, just over a month after the new Republican administration took office, Elizabeth Jones, the new assistant secretary of state for Eurasian affairs, was dispatched to the region to discuss the possibility of Kazakh oil using the BTC route.36 In May 2001, the Bush administration’s National Energy Policy Development Group report, known as the Cheney Report, which called for diversification of foreign oil supplies, highlighted the Caspian Sea basin as “a rapidly growing new area of supply.” US policy in “high-priority regions” like the Caspian (and West Africa) was to “focus on improving the investment climate and facilitating the flow of needed investment and technology.” At the time, the Caspian exported only around 800,000 barrels per day, but “potential exports could increase by 1.8 million barrels of oil per day by 2005, as the United States works closely with private companies and countries in the region to develop commercially viable export routes, such as the BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Caspian Pipeline Consortium oil pipelines.”37 The Cheney Report recommended that the government “support the BTC pipeline as it demonstrates its commercial viability” and “continue working with relevant companies and countries to establish the commercial conditions that will allow oil companies operating in Kazakhstan the option of exporting their oil via the BTC pipeline.”38 On this basis, the US government gave a grant of $346,000 to the government of Kazakhstan in June 2001 to fund a study into the expansion of the Kazakh port of Aktau in order to service the transfer of oil to Baku. New Caspian envoy Steven Mann announced: “I’m very pleased we’re moving ahead with realizing the Aktau part of Aktau -Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. . . . I have come with one simple but important message from Washington, which is that the Bush administration fully supports the East-West energy corridor. The pipelines have momentum and the pipelines will be built.”39 The Bush administration had confirmed its commitment to Caspian oil, the BTC pipeline, and, by extension, the states hosting it. On August 28, 2001, it was announced that President Shevardnadze would visit the White House in October: “This visit reflects the partnership between the United States and Georgia, as both countries strive to strengthen Georgia’s sovereignty and free market, democratic transformation; to advance Georgia’s integration into the global economy; and to foster stability throughout the Caucasus region.” 40 According to the State Department, Georgia was “an important geopolitical linchpin in the Caucasus region” and “remains at the



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center of efforts to create an East-West corridor for the transport of Caspian energy resources.”41 The Impact of 9/11 Just after noon on September 11, 2001, Rumsfeld received a phone call from George Tenet, the head of the CIA, telling him that the National Security Agency had intercepted a phone call from an al-Qaeda operative in Afghanistan to a phone number in Georgia at 9:53 a.m.—just fifteen minutes after a hijacked plane hit the Pentagon. The operative said that he had “heard good news” and suggested that another plane was about to strike.42 Rumsfeld did not elaborate further on the impact of this news on the unfolding war on terror; nevertheless, it did presage the establishment of a new counterterrorist front in Georgia based on allegations that the Pankisi Gorge region was now home to Islamist extremists with links to Osama bin Laden. Few details were ever given about the purported presence of al-Qaedalinked individuals in Georgia, and the State Department’s annual Patterns of Global Terrorism reports seemed to hedge bets. Its 2000 report, released before 9/11, stated that Georgia “faced the potential for spillover violence from the Chechen conflict and contended with international mujahidin seeking to use Georgian territory as a conduit” and that “some evidence suggests” that the border had not been completely sealed. Yet it also acknowledged that “the OSCE has not recorded any movement of mujahidin across the Georgian border with Chechnya.”43 The 2001 report, released in May 2002, after the US intervention in Georgia had begun, contained phasing almost identical to the previous year: Georgia had “contended with international mujahidin using [it] as a conduit for financial and logistic support for the mujahidin and Chechen fighters.” It also stated that Shevardnadze had promised to apprehend any suspected Chechens and foreign fighters “if Moscow furnishes T’blisi with concrete information on their whereabouts and alleged wrongdoing,” implying that such information had not been forthcoming.44 It seemed, then, that the State Department’s ambiguous assessment of the situation had barely changed from 2001–2002. When the Georgia Train and Equip Program was announced publicly in February 2002, US officials provided only vague information about what they claimed was an international terrorist threat in the Pankisi Gorge. General Peter Pace, vice chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that al-Qaeda

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“linkages” existed “worldwide” and that the war on terror was global in scope and therefore included Georgia. Assistant Secretary of Defense Torie Clarke claimed that there had been “some indications of connections . . . of al-Qaeda in that country [Georgia],” but providing further detail was “not appropriate.” Repeatedly pressed by reporters on why the Pankisi Gorge had been identified as a front in the war on terror, Pace, Clarke, and Assistant Secretary of Defense J. D. Crouch cited Washington’s existing “very close relationship with [Georgia]” “which clearly predates September 11th” and the dangers associated with ungoverned space: “If you have a weak security environment, it is more likely that terrorists will come. . . . The fact of the matter is that as we help our friends increase their own security capability, we are helping them in the global war on terrorism and against other internal threats they may have.”45 The US chargé d’affaires in Tbilisi, Philip Remler, made more explicit claims. In an interview with the Georgian media, Remler said that international terrorists were now scattered across the Caucasus: “As for al Qaeda, according to our information, several tens of mujahedin fled from Afghanistan and are now hiding in the Caucasus. We are also aware that some of them are hiding in the Pankisi Gorge and are in contact with Al-Khattab, an Arab terrorist. The latter, for his part, is connected with Osama bin Laden. The Pankisi Gorge is an extremely dangerous place for Georgia.” Remler’s forthright comments were reported by the Associated Press in Georgia, which contacted the US embassy in Tbilisi to confirm the accuracy of the English translation of Remler’s words, spoken in Georgian, before publication.46 The comments were confirmed. Overall, the official US portrayal of the situation in Georgia was mixed. In fact, connections between bin Laden, other international terrorists, and local Islamist Chechen insurgents were minimal. During his time in Sudan, bin Laden had funded a group of operatives going to Chechnya to fight against Russian rule.47 However, the nationalist insurgency there was predominantly non-Islamic. Of the Islamic component, only three hundred out of six thousand fighters were international mujahideen who had trained in Afghanistan in the 1980s.48 This included Ibn al-Khatab, the “Afghan Arab,” referred to by Philip Remler, who was killed by the Russian Federal Security Service in April 2002.49 Moreover, even for the native Chechen Islamists, the insurgency was a national rather than international struggle. Chechen Islamists avoided alienating and demonizing the United States. The leading Chechen proponent



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of fundamentalist Saudi-style Wahabi Islam, Shamil Basayev, was ambivalent about the concept of global jihad. During the tragic Beslan school siege in September 2004 in which his group eventually killed 330 hostages (including 186 children), Basayev’s demands were nationalist political ones that were framed in religious language rather than inherently religious in substance. (These included Chechnya remaining in the Commonwealth of Independent States and in the ruble zone.)50 Logistical and ideological links between the Islamist Chechens alleged to use the Pankisi Gorge and the bin Laden network were therefore minimal, especially after al-Khatab’s death in April 2002, though these alleged connections remained the chief US rationale for a program designed for “dealing seriously with international terrorists linked to al-Qaida.”51 Preparations for a train-and-equip program in Georgia under the auspices of the war on terror began in early October 2001 when President Shevardnadze visited Washington as planned. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz introduced the Georgian president to the media by lauding “Georgia’s early and unconditional support for the fight against terrorism.” Shevardnadze had sent a letter of condolence to Bush after 9/11, and the Georgian parliament had issued a strong statement of support for the United States. Wolfowitz stated, “We’ll be working with Georgia in efforts to secure its borders and its population from terrorism, and in the coming days and months we’ll be taking some concrete measures to help them strengthen their security.” Shevardnadze stated that his meeting with Bush had resulted in “a very general decision that . . . our two countries, together with our friends, must join efforts to collectively fight a war against terrorists.” Georgia, however, “is a relatively poor country. . . . So the United States has promised us that whatever is necessary and whatever is admissible, they would . . . provide to us to help us effectively contribute to this effort.” According to Wolfowitz, the US government would “obviously [be] viewing those requirements in the light of the new situation in the world after September 11th and treating it with both a greater urgency and, I think, a greater availability of resources.”52 Just as the US intervention in the Philippines had been welcomed and encouraged by the Arroyo government, the train-and-equip program in Georgia represented a convergence of interest between the Bush administration and the Shevardnadze government. Under the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), the United States agreed to send military advisers to Georgia to train and equip two thousand

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light infantry soldiers (four battalions) and a small number of police and border guards as part of an initial $64 million, twenty-one month program. Assessments and planning began in February 2002.53 This would create the capacity for the Georgians to take control of the Pankisi Gorge and, ideally, foreclose the possibility of Russian military intervention there.54 On April 29, twenty special forces operators from EUCOM traveled to Georgia to begin assessing the logistical and contractual requirements for the program.55 On May 27, forty-five special forces soldiers, as well as support elements from the US Army and Air Force in Europe, arrived in Tbilisi to begin the training program.56 Colonel Robert M. Waltemayer, the commander of the GTEP, confirmed that the Georgians were being trained “to conduct light infantry operations as they would in a counterinsurgency environment—specifically the Pankisi.” The ultimate purpose of the mission was to “help the Georgian armed forces improve their ability to maintain stability and sovereignty in this region, which would obviously deny safe haven to any of those types of terrorist organizations that would seek haven or transit through this region.” Once trained, the Georgians could “preclud[e] the types of lawlessness and insurgency that might contribute to the impression that they’d have difficulty in defending their own territory from that.” A week into the program, there were 70 US trainers in Georgia; the total number of trainers and support personnel on the ground would never reach more than 150, Waltemayer reported.57 Unlike the US counterterror campaigns in Africa and the Philippines, the GTEP did not include a non-kinetic component (though a small civil affairs program would be developed as part of a subsequent training program). Instead, the GTEP focused on training and equipping Georgian ground forces with skills and equipment relevant to a counterinsurgency-style environment. In effect, it focused on the military dimension of irregular conflict. In May 2002, special forces began a seventy-day staff training program in combined arms operations for members of the Georgian Ministry of Defense, as well as training for the Land Forces Command. This was followed by tactical training for different types of ground forces, including mechanized and light infantry, mountain troops, armor, and heliborne operations. After nine months, the operation was transferred to the US Marines, who provided further training for a light infantry battalion and a mechanized company team. The emphasis on ground forces reflected the mission’s focus on counterinsurgency skills and the need for the Georgian military to be on the ground among the people.58



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Even before the training had begun, the program was already being hailed as a success by the Georgian and US governments. In a joint press conference with Rumsfeld on May 7, 2002, Georgian defense minister David Tevzadze claimed that the situation in the Pankisi had “dramatically improved since the  .  .  . train and equip program was loudly announced” and claimed as well that there was no “al Qaeda influence” in the country.59 Tevzadze was a staunch proponent of the US-Georgian cooperation. In a speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington that month, he said that Tbilisi viewed the GTEP as the first part of a two-step program that would facilitate cooperation with the United States in the war on terror; the second part, to follow the GTEP, would involve fuller participation in the war on terror outside Georgia. In addition, Georgia would restructure its military to resemble Western armed forces. Colonel Waltemeyer confirmed that as a result of the GTEP training, Georgian forces would “understand US doctrine, which is heavily steeped in standard NATO agreements,” and have military equipment that “in many cases, especially the communications gear, will be interoperable with our own.” For Georgia, the GTEP provided much-needed funding and modernization for its military.60 The ultimate objective of the GTEP training was for Georgian forces to take control of the Pankisi Gorge themselves. In summer 2002, Russia still claimed the right to intervene in the gorge to attack Chechen separatists. In July, sixty Chechen guerrillas launched an attack from Georgia on Russian forces in Chechnya. As a result, Russian forces bombed the Pankisi Gorge in August, citing Tbilisi’s failure to act against “terrorists” there. The White House issued a statement “deploring the violation of Georgia’s sovereignty” and reasserted its strong support for “Georgia’s independence and territorial integrity.”61 As a result of the Russian bombing, Washington encouraged Georgia to intervene itself in the Pankisi, reassert control, and stabilize the area, precluding any further Russian interventions. According to the State Department, Georgia subsequently deployed troops into the Pankisi Gorge “to establish checkpoints and root out Chechen fighters and criminal and international terrorist elements.”62 However, the impact of Tbilisi’s intervention was moot: the operation was announced over a week in advance, giving Chechen fighters (and anyone else) time to abandon the area. Shevardnadze described the purpose of the operation as the restoration of order and the elimination of terrorists “if they are present there,” but no arrests were reported and no shots were fired.63 Nevertheless, the State Department still described the operation

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as a sign of Georgia’s commitment to restoring its authority in the area and combating international terrorists linked to al-Qaeda.64 Despite the questionable success of the US-trained troops in the Pankisi Gorge, as the GTEP continued through 2003, US officials proclaimed themselves “well satisfied with professionalism and the enthusiasm, work ethic, and progress of the troops involved” and praised their ability to “make a contribution to the war on terrorism as they’re involved in activities in Georgia and along the borders.”65 When the “rose revolution” toppled the Shevardnadze government in November 2003, the GTEP continued. The new administration, led by Mikheil Saakashvili, though highly critical of corruption under Shevardnadze, was also enthusiastically pro-Western. Condoleezza Rice recalled Saakashvili as “an American-educated firebrand who could not hide his disdain for Moscow.”66 Under his leadership, the US-Georgian relationship continued to be characterized by perceptions of mutual interest and cooperation; even with a new government in Tbilisi, the Bush administration did not need to force its agenda on the former Soviet state. In a visit to Washington in February 2002, Saakashvili and other Georgian “young reformers” who took over after the revolution stressed that their differences with Shevardnadze were of a domestic nature; “on foreign priorities and the vision for Georgia’s strategic development we are still absolutely united with Shevardnadze.”67 In December 2003, after the revolution, Rumsfeld traveled to Georgia to stress the US commitment to “underscore America’s very strong support for stability and security and the territorial integrity here in Georgia” and express “our appreciation for Georgia’s critical assistance in the Global War on Terror.” The DoD remained concerned about “ungoverned space” in the country: “That’s why the U.S. government is paying a lot of attention to [Georgia] from the White House down to the individual agencies.” With the GTEP slated to expire in mid-2004, Rumsfeld hinted at an extension of US-Georgian cooperation, saying that an arrangement was already in place for US forces to “assist with some additional activities . . . in the period thereafter” and that discussions were taking place about “military-to-military cooperation and various types of activities which we would anticipate would continue into the future.”68 It seemed to policymakers in Washington that US strategy toward Georgia and the wider region was successful. The GTEP was valued highly by successive Georgian administrations, and Georgia’s Foreign Policy Strategy 2006–2009 prioritized Euro-Atlantic energy security:



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For Georgia, it is of the utmost importance to present properly the importance of the region as a transport corridor for energy resources. The Diplomatic Service will work to stimulate Euro-Atlantic interest and involvement in developing . . . new routes for energy transportation. . . . Georgia attaches the utmost importance to the elaboration of a Euro-Atlantic energy strategy . . . with the aim of ending Europe’s dangerous dependence on a single provider [Russia] and, at the same time, promoting stability and prosperity in the transit countries.69

Moreover, construction of the BTC pipeline had begun in September 2002, hailed by Bush as “enhancing global energy security, strengthening the sovereignty and independence of countries in the Caspian Basin, and bolstering these states’ economic cooperation and integration into the global economy.”70 General James Jones, commander of EUCOM, which was responsible for the GTEP, described the program as an “extraordinarily successful” example of the kind of bilateral train-and-equip program the Pentagon now favored. The GTEP had trained tactical units to conduct company-level operations “that were instrumental in enhancing Georgia’s ability to protect its sovereignty and stabilize the region.” This was another example of “small investments . . . that yield enormous dividends.”71 At the end of the GTEP, the State Department asserted that while Georgia was “still used to a limited degree as a terrorist transit state,” this was “much less so since the government crackdown on the Pankisi Gorge in late 2002” and again in late 2004.72 By 2006, the number of Chechen refugees in the Gorge had apparently gone down from seven thousand in 1999 to thirteen hundred.73

Consolidation and Expansion The perception in both Washington and Tbilisi that the GTEP had succeeded reinforced the trajectory of US-Georgian relations and encouraged an expansion of the US presence in the region in two ways: the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program, a follow-on from the GTEP, and the Caspian Guard Initiative, a security program focusing on terrorism and other transnational threats. The Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (GSSOP), established after the end of the GTEP, was designed to facilitate an expansion of the Georgian contribution to the war on terror. The GSSOP was a

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fifteen-month, $159 million train-and-equip program focusing specifically on stability operations. US forces would train three brigades of two thousand soldiers in stability operations, which would then be sent to Iraq. Troops were trained in counterinsurgency, brigade-level engineering, logistics, reconnaissance, and signal skills.74 According to General Jones, the GSSOP focused on “enhancing the capabilities of Georgian military forces to assist in preparing deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom” and, moreover, “serve[d] as a model for other programs designed for the same purpose.”75 Phase I of the GSSOP began with predeployment site survey teams dispatched to Georgia in January 2005, and the four phases of training were scheduled to last fifteen months.76 Positive accounts containing details of the GSSOP training were released regularly by the program’s Public Affairs Office.77 The GSSOP also contained a small civil affairs component, which saw US forces contribute to local construction and medical projects in Georgia. The Public Affairs Office and the DoD’s American Forces Press Service publicized these projects and highlighted their contribution to Georgian society.78 They stressed that cultural awareness was a priority for US troops.79 In April 2005, the Public Affairs Office publicized a sightseeing day during which members of the GSSOP task force visited some of Georgia’s historic tourist sites; in the evening, they ate “real authentic Georgian food, [and] discussed the remarkable things that they saw during their trip.”80 Public Affairs also highlighted a marriage between a Georgian woman and a US Marine sergeant; a US Marine tattoo artist who designed “majestic tattoos” for his Georgian counterparts; and US trainers’ efforts to learn the Georgian language, which was “spoken regularly during training and liberty hours when Marines tour the city with their Georgian friends.”81 The GSSOP was popular with many Georgians too. When President Bush visited Tbilisi in May 2005, up to a quarter of a million people turned out to greet him.82 The program was portrayed by Washington as a great success. Major Doug Peterson, the Georgia desk officer at EUCOM, claimed that “a strong Georgian military lends itself to stability in the [Caucasus] region.  .  .  . Where you have stability in a country with a government that supports democracy and a free market economy, that’s one less place the US has to concern itself.” In the short term, the newly trained Georgian soldiers would be deployed to Iraq—“two battalions . . . that the US doesn’t have to provide”—while “in the long term, Georgia gets a better-trained total force,” said EUCOM’s Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Hensley.83



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The importance of energy security in the region also led to the establishment of a wider multilateral framework to protect the Caspian from transnational threats. The Caspian Guard security program evolved from existing US efforts to promote a secure investment environment in the region. According to Anna Borg, an assistant secretary at the State Department, US diplomats in the region had been working closely with US businesses in the early twentyfirst century “to help them understand the Russian and Caspian Basin environments and energy sector opportunities.” The Department of Energy had an ongoing dialogue with energy officials from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan on “market reform in the energy area,” which included the establishment of a US-Kazakhstan energy partnership in December 2001. This led to three meetings over the next year and committed the United States to cooperation in oil and gas development, development of multiple pipeline options, improving investment climate, market reform and increased investment in electric power, energy facility security, environmental protection, and energy science research.84 The ultimate US objective was to secure the transport of Kazakh oil, not just Azeri, through the BTC pipeline by creating the right investment climate.85 The Caspian Guard Initiative built on these political and economic initiatives and merged the energy security agenda with the regional war on terror. The idea for the program was first articulated in March 2004 when Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Lisa Bronson told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the administration had established a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation prevention initiative designed to address “the vulnerability of the F[ormer] S[oviet] U[nion]’s porous borders to WMD smuggling.” A “key element” of this would be a Caspian Sea maritime interdiction project in which the United States would provide surveillance radars and interdiction equipment to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan “to build their capabilities to police their own borders.” Washington would “do what is necessary to build the capability, and then eventually turn it over to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to execute as their contribution to the global war on terrorism and WMD.”86 On a visit to Kazakhstan in 2004, Rumsfeld reaffirmed the importance of the US-Kazakh relationship—Astana had granted overflight access en route to Afghanistan after 9/11 and sent a contingent of engineers to Iraq—but stressed that “it is Caspian security, the Western portion of Kazakhstan, which is important to this country and it is important to the world that security be assured in that area.”87 In addition, EUCOM had

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begun training exercises with the Azeri military. In 2005, a demining program assisted the Azeris with clearing ordnance impeding the construction of a national oil pipeline; “the intent is for the United States and Azerbaijan forces to train together to reduce the threat posed by landmines and in the process to strengthen our emerging partnerships in the trans-Caucasus region,” stated Vice Admiral J. “Boomer” Stufflebeem.88 In other words, security cooperation in the region was dedicated to meeting a variety of transnational challenges not just terrorism. The Caspian Guard Initiative (CGI), which began in 2006, was a multiagency initiative involving the Defense Threat Reduction Agency; the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy; EUCOM; and Central Command. According to Bronson, the under secretary at the DoD, the CGI “assists Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in improving their ability to prevent and, if needed, respond to terrorism, nuclear proliferation, drug and human trafficking, and other transnational threats in the Caspian region.” Though it did not focus exclusively on terrorism, the program was presented as the Azeri and Kazakh contribution to the war on terror.89 Rather than focusing on an oil transit state (Georgia), the CGI centered on the energy producers. CGI projects included maritime special operations training, WMD detection-and-response training and equipment, naval vessel and communication upgrades, development of rapid reaction capabilities, border security, counter-narcoterrorism, and interministry crisis response training.90 The parameters of the GWoT in the Caspian clearly transcended counterterrorism. Though US military intervention in Georgia had been sparked by fears of Islamism in an ungoverned space, the expansion of the US presence was driven by more generalized concerns about the potential impact of transnational threats in what was now viewed as one of the two key oil-producing regions in terms of diversification of foreign oil supplies. Georgia, Russia, and the United States Beyond the War on Terror The emergence of Georgia and the Caspian Basin as a front in the war on terror reinforced two core elements of that war: the link between energy security and counterterrorism, and the Bush administration’s vision of the role of special operations forces in securing ungoverned space in the twenty-first century. Georgia’s position as a key oil transit state, and the existence of an



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ungoverned space that might ostensibly be susceptible to Islamist infiltration, made US intervention after 9/11 important from Washington’s perspective. The pro-American position of the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili governments made that intervention possible. Mutual satisfaction with the GTEP and shared perceptions of success encouraged both sides to expand counterterrorism cooperation further and involve other Caspian littoral states in the international governance of the sea. The US intervention in the Caspian Basin was also part of a broader US security strategy that had as its goal the political, commercial, and military integration of Georgia, as well as the postcommunist Caspian littoral states, into the Western sphere of influence—ultimately best exemplified by the strong US support for Georgian NATO membership, despite Tbilisi’s ongoing disputes with Moscow over the status of the Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.91 Cultivating a close ally located in the former Soviet Union was a strategy that came with risks, however. The ultimate test of the Bush administration’s commitment to Georgia came with the Russian invasion of South Ossetia in August 2008 and the five-day war that followed— an invasion that was in part the result of Russian opposition to Tbilisi’s turn West and US support for this, though catalyzed in the short term by escalating tit-for-tat exchanges between Georgia and Russian “peacekeepers” in South Ossetia.92 As tensions mounted in South Ossetia in the months before the war, the US embassy in Tbilisi reiterated how geopolitically important Georgia had become to the United States: “Without Georgia’s co-operation, no strategy for bringing additional Azeri, Kazakh, or Turkmen oil and gas to the world market without passing through Russia can succeed.”93 In the face of possible Russian aggression, however, the message from Washington was that the Saakashvili government should be cautious and avoid provoking Moscow. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza gave a blunt warning to senior Georgian officials that “if Georgia were to go to war, it would go alone and it would lose not only militarily but also politically—by losing U.S. and European support, including for MAP [the NATO membership process]—as well as economically.”94 Rice, now secretary of state, engaged with Saakashvili personally to “get [him] to see that all of his gains were at risk because of the worsening situation” in South Ossetia. She urged the Georgian president to sign a no-use-of-force pledge. When he balked on the grounds that the Russians were using force, Rice responded sternly, “You don’t have a choice. . . .

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You can’t use force and so the threat doesn’t do you any good.” If the Georgians engaged with Russian forces, “no-one will come to your aid and you will lose.” She agreed to repeat in public “our pledge to defend Georgia’s territorial integrity—with words” and was careful to avoid “any language that might be misinterpreted as committing us to Georgia’s defense with arms.”95 While Washington did seek a way of “blunting Russia’s strategic objectives of dismembering Georgia and undermining the Southern energy corridor,” it would not contemplate the use of force against Moscow.96 According to the US embassy in Tbilisi, Georgian military officials “privately expressed deep disappointment with the US and the West for not providing more support against the Russian attack.” In 2008, no lethal assistance was provided through foreign military financing, which was requested but rebuffed, or foreign military sales.97 After the war, Washington did agree to a massive package of postwar reconstruction aid, requested by the Georgians, who compiled a comprehensive stabilization and reconstruction package for US consideration. This amounted to $1 billion of budgetary support and reconstruction funds in addition to the $38 million worth of humanitarian aid and emergency relief already provided.98 Vice President Cheney and Senator John Kerry, head of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, made visits to Tbilisi as a demonstration of US support, while Rice met Saakashvili at the United Nations in September 2008.99 Cheney’s trip also took in Ukraine and Azerbaijan and included meetings with the local heads of BP and Chevron. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte was dispatched to Azerbaijan to assure President Aliyev that “despite the crisis in Georgia, the USG reaffirms its commitment to work with the [government of Azerbaijan] and other responsible partners in the region to develop the next generation of Caspian energy resources.”100 Energy security therefore remained at the heart of the US relationship with the Caspian region through the invasion and its aftermath, but the crisis with Russia had demonstrated what Washington was and was not prepared to do to defend these interests. The close relationship between the United States and Georgia, which had facilitated the extension of the war on terror to the Caspian Basin, did not extend to military defense from a Russian invasion— and this reality called into question the US policy of supporting Georgia’s accession to NATO. Yet this policy continued even after the war. In September 2008, the NATO-Georgia Council was established to help Georgia prepare for NATO



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membership. In December, at the NATO ministerial summit in Brussels, it was agreed that Georgia should develop an annual national program under the auspices of the NATO–Georgia Council to continue its preparations for membership.101 This was followed by the US–Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership signed in January 2009.102 At its signing, Rice affirmed that “the U.S. supports and will always support Georgia’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity, as well as its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.” Frequent meetings under the auspices of the charter continued into the Obama years.103 The RussoGeorgian War served as a warning of the potential perils of cultivating close geopolitical ties with countries in the former Soviet space that Moscow considered its sphere of influence, yet US policy toward Georgia would be marked by continuity from Bush to Obama rather than change.

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Irregular Warfare at the Pentagon, 2004–2008

O

n June 18, 2004, Donald Rumsfeld penned a memo to President Bush about the nature of the conflict the United States was engaged in. “Are we fighting a ‘Global War on Terror’?” Rumsfeld asked, “or are we witnessing a ‘global civil war within the Muslim religion’ where a relatively small minority of radicals and extremists are trying to hijack the religion from the large majority of moderates? Or are we engaged in a ‘global insurgency’ against us by a minority of radical Muslims in the name of a fanatical ideology? Or is it a combination of the two?” “The important point,” he continued, “is that what we face is an ideologically-based challenge.” Accordingly, “We should test the proposition as to whether it might be accurate and useful to define our problem a new way—to declare it as a ‘civil war within Islam’ and/or a ‘global ideological insurgency.’”1 The latter phrase also made it into the February 2006 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism: “Some extremists’ goals, objectives and methodologies take on the characteristics of insurgencies. . . . Some extremists espouse a global insurgency [emphasis in original] aimed at subverting the existing political and social order of both the world of Islam and the broader world.”2 Ultimately Rumsfeld failed to convince the president that the name war on terror should be changed. However, his use of the phrase global insurgency is striking because it confirms that despite his refusal to acknowledge the insurgency in Iraq and his failure to view developments in Afghanistan through the prism of insurgency, Rumsfeld believed that, elsewhere, the threat from 136



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al-Qaeda-inspired Islamist militancy was irregular in character and posed an ideological challenge that required an unconventional response. Rumsfeld’s musings to the president came at a time when formal doctrine and policy on Irregular Warfare were still underdeveloped. The US government’s turn toward IW had been most evident in the operations on the peripheral fronts of the war on terror. Although a turn toward some typical irregular tactics and objectives had been visible in national strategy documents and Pentagon planning guides as a result of a new understanding of security challenges in the post-9/11 world, operations in the war on terror had anticipated the formalization of doctrine, policy, and the bureaucratic reorganization required to support a whole-of-government interagency approach to Irregular Warfare in the long term. Sophisticated FID campaigns were being prosecuted in the Philippines and Africa and a train-and-equip program in Georgia. However, the doctrinal, political, and organizational shifts needed in Washington to support the waging of interagency irregular campaigns in the future did not come to full fruition until the post-2004 period. The development of new policy and doctrine in this period gave retrospective codification to many of the operations the Departments of State and Defense had begun since 9/11 on the peripheral fronts of the war on terror. It also led to a certain amount of new operational activity on the periphery and elsewhere outside Iraq and Afghanistan, especially in relation to building partners’ security capacity. Above all, this period witnessed the flourishing of a significant intellectual shift that had started after 9/11. By the end of Bush’s second term, the administration had formalized the concept of Irregular Warfare, and this was taken seriously in the national security community. Whether they liked it or not, the conventional military services were compelled, by top-down pressure, to devote resources to understanding IW and integrating it into their future plans. Though these changes were neither full nor complete by the end of Rumsfeld’s tenure in December 2006 or by the end of the Bush administration in 2008, what stands out is the extent of the intellectual and organizational shift in this period. The Rise of Stability Operations Stability operations, led by special operations forces, were already a key component of the war on terror in the Philippines and across sub-Saharan Africa and were described in the 2004 National Military Strategy as an activity that

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could diminish the underlying causes of terrorism. In January 2004, three civilian policymakers in the Department of Defense began a process that would culminate in the elevation of stability operations to a core military competency for the conventional military forces in late 2005. In other words, stability operations would no longer be the preserve of special forces, but would be a routine skill for the general-purpose forces, a development that complemented the administration’s emphasis on weak and failing states as the chief cause of terrorism. In early 2004, Douglas Feith, the under secretary of defense for policy, Stephen Cambone, the under secretary for intelligence, and Michael Wynne, the under secretary for acquisition, technology, and logistics, requested that the Defense Science Board (DSB) conduct a study on the stabilization of postconflict societies. The DSB was the Pentagon’s civilian advisory committee composed of technical and scientific experts. Every year it conducted a summer study at the request of the Office of the Secretary of Defense on an issue related to the logistical and technical demands of key national security objectives. In early 2004, Feith, Cambone, and Wynne set the terms of reference for the next summer study, “Transition to and From Hostilities.”3 The terms of reference (ToR) indicated two things. First, the description of social breakdown in the aftermath of a “conventional military victory” clearly suggested that the study had been prompted by the ongoing—and, for the DoD, unexpected—chaos in postinvasion Iraq; second, the parameters of the study indicated that these policymakers were already prepared to think in new and different ways about how the conventional military forces could stabilize postconflict and conflict-prone societies, in the process taking on roles that were not traditionally within their remit. “We have and will encounter significant challenges following conventional military success as we seek to ensure democracy, human rights, and a productive economy,” the ToR said. “Achieving these ends would be facilitated by successful shaping activities in the years before the outbreak of hostilities, as well as exploiting the capabilities not traditional to our armed forces in the period following hostilities.” Specifically, the ToR ordered the summer study to focus on seven key areas.4 Topics for analysis included “understanding and shaping the environment” and “preparation of the battlespace—in the absence of an immediate threat.” This in turn required “significant cultural understanding and a long attention span, well in advance of hostilities.” The ToR also called for the study to examine how to “stabiliz[e] the population”: “There will be inevitable need to



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address major problems of refugees and displaced persons, mortuary assistance, food supply, housing and health care. DoD will likely be charged with these challenges: what preparation, training, and technology can be applied to facilitate these elements of infrastructure?” The study was also asked to examine the military’s involvement in “re-establishing the rule of law,” with a particular emphasis on doing this in the context of “an insurgency threat in the post hostilities phase.” If possible, the military would take action in the future “in the pre-hostility phase which will minimize or even eliminate post hostility phase insurgency and terrorism problems.” Finally, the ToR called for the study to consider the “rapid rebuilding of basic infrastructure.” To the drafters of the ToR, this meant military involvement in what would effectively amount to an interagency nation-building effort: After the initial effort, it is critical to put in place the infrastructure, economic enablers, and a political/legal structure to establish a successful post-war economy, a representative democratic government, and a stable social structure. What can and should DoD do to further these goals? What other agencies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations should be involved? How should DoD work with them?

The detailed ToR directed the DSB to look beyond the traditional role of the conventional military forces, and in this way it anticipated the findings and recommendations of the report. Through the ToR, Feith, Cambone, and Wynne firmly shaped the outcome of the study. It was on this basis that the summer study made a recommendation that would eventually result in a landmark DoD policy directive: the study called on the Departments of Defense and State “to make stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) missions one of their core competencies.” The DoD had “not yet embraced S&R operations as an explicit mission with the same seriousness as combat operations. This mind-set must be changed” the report stated.5 For the military to operate successfully in postconflict scenarios, stabilization and reconstruction operations needed to be “a core competency of general purpose forces through training, leader development, doctrine development, and other tools DoD applies to serious missions.”6 However, this would be most effective in practice if it was part of “a common vision and coordinated strategy” with the Department of State. State should therefore lead the planning and deployment of civilian components of reconstruction and incorporate international and nongovernmental capacities, the report stated.7

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The final DSB report was published in December 2004, but at the end of August, Rumsfeld was briefed on its findings by the chair, Craig Fields, a former director of the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Afterward Rumsfeld ordered his staff to draft a DoD directive to put the study’s recommendations into effect.8 The job fell to Jeffrey “Jeb” Nadaner, the deputy assistant secretary for stability operations, but it proved difficult to forge agreement between the department and the military services on the precise content of the directive. Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff raised multiple objections to the new missions. In particular, Nadaner faced opposition from the Army’s intelligence command, which opposed to collecting information about social structure and culture.9 Progress was slow. In summer 2005, after nearly a year of discussion, Rumsfeld tried to resolve the impasse by bringing in his former colleague Martin Hoffman, who had served as secretary of the army under President Ford when Rumsfeld led the Pentagon for the first time, from 1975 to 1977. Hoffman’s radical redrafting of the directive put the Army in charge of stability operations at the expense of civilian control of policy. For Rumsfeld and Nadaner, this was unacceptable. To move forward, Nadaner suggested that another external review could be helpful. Rumsfeld assented, and in August 2005, the Defense Science Board was asked to set up another task force “addressing organizational structures necessary to support or conduct stability operations.”10 According to the ToR, for the new report, the DoD was beginning to take stability operations seriously: “The Department has conducted significant work to improve its understanding of the requirements for success in stability operations. This understanding is largely a result of the 2004 Defense Science Board Summer Study . . . and lessons-learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other stability operations.” This had resulted in a draft directive on DoD capabilities for stability operations by Nadaner, but further guidance was requested from the DSB on the organizational changes needed to manage the implementation of stability operations and to conduct and support them, as well as the timing and sequence of these changes and any additional staffing requirements.11 This second DBS report also emphasized the urgency of the task at hand. Although Rumsfeld had ordered the report to try to resolve the impasse over the stability operations directive, he was criticized by its authors for having let the drafting process drift on over the past year. The report urged him to be more “forceful and frequent in getting the message out that stability operations is a core mission for the Department.” Simply ordering the directive was



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not enough; the shift in mind-set and culture that was required for the elevation of stability operations “is so significant [that] sustained senior executive leadership, management, and focus will be needed to effect the evolution.”12 The report claimed that the DoD had made “modest progress towards implementing the recommendations of the 2004 [DSB] report” but that much more needed to be done. It urged that the draft directive on stability operations be signed “posthaste” and made detailed recommendations about high-level responsibilities for stability operations in the DoD and Joint Staff. This report broke the logjam at the DoD over the draft directive on stability operations, and many of its recommendations were incorporated into the final version: Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (DoDD 3000.05), which was signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England on November 28, 2005.13 This path-breaking directive essentially committed the DoD and the conventional military forces to a form of nation building, ideally in concert with other US government agencies and departments, but alone if necessary. It not only reflected lessons being learned in Iraq but also reflected the administration’s belief that terrorism was at root caused by weak and failing states and that the antidote to this was stabilization and reconstruction. Taking its lead from the DSB’s 2004 summer study, the directive asserted that, effective immediately, stability operations “are a core U.S. military mission that the [DoD] shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities.” According to Nadaner, the phrase “comparable to combat operations” came directly from Rumsfeld.14 The goal of stability operations was “to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values.” In the short term, it would be DoD responsibility, independent of the State Department, to “provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs.” In the long term, however, it meant “develop[ing] indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.” This meant military assistance for tasks including “rebuild[ing] indigenous institutions,” “reviv[ing] or build[ing] the private sector,” “develop[ing] representative governmental institutions,” “ensuring security, developing local governance structures, promoting bottom-up economic activity, rebuilding infrastructure, and building indigenous capacity for such tasks.”15 This was a far cry from Bush’s rejection of using the military for nation building in the 2000 presidential campaign.16 What the new

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directive described was essentially a form of armed nation building. While best performed by civilian professionals or indigenous forces, “U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”17 In other words, conventional armed services would develop the ability to conduct the kind of capacity-building operations that were, until now, largely the province of special operations forces. The second DSB report had claimed that making the deputy assistant secretary for stability operations (Nadaner’s position) the chief advocate for these operations in the DoD would underestimate the bureaucratic force required to push through the necessary cultural and organizational changes. The position was “simply too low rank to effectively operate in the interagency process.”18 Under the new directive, the third highest official in the Pentagon, the under secretary of defense for policy, was given chief responsibility for developing stability operations policy options for the secretary of defense, coordinating with the State Department and international partners, incorporating stability operations into policy guidance, and submitting twice-yearly progress reports to the secretary. Other relevant additional duties were parceled out across the DoD to the under- and assistant secretaries, the comptroller, the chair of the JCS, the commanders of the geographic combatant commands, the commanders of the joint forces and special operations forces, and the secretaries of the military departments.19 In other words, the directive addressed integration of stability operations across the full spectrum of Pentagon operations. Eight days after the signing of DoDD 3000.05, the interagency nature of stability operations was codified across the whole US government when President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) on the Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization.20 This directive designated the State Department as the lead agency for stability operations with responsibility to “coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all US Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.” The State Department’s efforts to develop capabilities for stability operations will be examined in Chapter 6, but essentially, NSPD-44 cohered with a parallel effort that had begun at State to create the civilian capacity required for stability operations. The overall result of this was that while State was tasked with overseeing major interagency stability



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operations, the armed forces, under DoDD 3000.05, would nevertheless be capable of conducting these independently where necessary. The signing of DoDD 3000.05 generated further momentum for the integration of stability operations into DoD doctrine and organization. By December 2006, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had written a Joint Operating Concept for Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, as requested in DoDD 3000.05.21 It was not until an operating concept had been written that a new idea could be incorporated into formal defense planning. The language the Joint Chiefs used in the document was strikingly different from the language and norms associated with conventional campaigns and reflected the intellectual shift that was taking place at the highest levels. Recognizing that stability operations were “not solely a military effort but rather one that requires a carefully coordinated deployment of military and civilian, public and private, U.S. and international assets,” the operating concept focused on ways for the military “to support the establishment of a new domestic order” in states that were “under severe stress or ha[ve] collapsed.”22 The “desired end state” would be reached when the US presence had made “very significant achievements with regard to the creation of internal security, economic development and effective governance,” which could serve as “the foundation for a more ambitious long-term strategy.”23 Stability operations would focus on the population because “the most critical determinant of success will be convincing the local populace to recognize the legitimacy of the existing or new government.” In addition, building capacity in local partners was “critical to enabling host nation leaders at all levels to garner the popular support they will need to be able to carry out comprehensive nation building.” Information operations and public diplomacy were also essential “to understand and engage key local and foreign audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to achievement of overall . . . goals and objectives.”24 The Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa was cited as a prime example of “SSTR [stability, security, transition and reconstruction]–related shaping activities”: “traditional and nontraditional military activities,” which had allegedly “set the stage to minimize tribal, ethnic, and religious conflict, decreasing the possibility of failed states or ungoverned spaces in which terrorists or armed insurgent groups can more easily operate or take shelter.”25 By 2007, however, several key challenges remained, according to the Government Accountability Office. The DoD had not yet identified and

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prioritized the full range of capabilities needed for stability operations. Since combatant commanders had not been given DoD-wide guidance, they were still identifying requirements in an ad hoc manner.26 Second, the Pentagon had made only limited progress in developing measures of effectiveness. This was down to “significant confusion over how this task should be accomplished and minimal guidance provided by the Office of Policy.” 27 In peripheral theaters, the effectiveness of stability operations had generally been assumed but not proven. Finally, according to the GAO, the Pentagon needed to consistently use lessons learned from previous operations to develop future contingency plans. As it stood, planners were not required to use lessons learned, and the databases of material were “cumbersome” to access and search.28 Challenges remained. Nevertheless, the new directive on stability operations was consistent with the turn toward an irregular approach and the emphasis on the problems associated with weak and failing states in an era of globalization. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, which, according to Rumsfeld, “reflect[ed] a process of change that has gathered momentum since the release of its predecessor QDR in 2001,” provided the most sophisticated analysis yet of the Pentagon’s global strategy in the early twenty-first century.29 The 2006 QDR and Its Consequences According to Ryan Henry, the deputy under secretary for policy, the 2006 QDR was based on the premise that “the military conflicts of the future are not likely to consist of traditional state-on-state symmetric warfare,” meaning that “we have to invest in capabilities to deal with the unexpected and the asymmetric.” It was essential, Henry wrote, to “open up our intellectual aperture and to be able to appreciate the spectrum of challenges facing us.”30 According to the GAO, one of the strengths of the process was that “key senior DoD leaders maintained sustained involvement throughout the review.” In other words, senior civilian policymakers helped shape the outcome of the report.31 The terms of reference, which determined the focus of the review and shaped its outcomes, were approved by Rumsfeld in March 2005.32 In addition, the deputy secretary of defense, Paul Wolfowitz (succeeded in May 2005 by Gordon England), and the vice chair of the JCS, General Peter Pace (succeeded by Admiral Edmund Giambastiani in August 2005), cochaired a senior-level group that met several times a week to review the work of the



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QDR study teams, provide guidance, and ensure that the assembled panels were addressing strategic priorities.33 Unlike previous QDR reviews, the 2006 report would also address the need for partnerships with civilian agencies in the US government, as well as the imperative of working with overseas allies, in order to address transnational security challenges. Feith commented that the review would examine the whole question of how do we structure ourselves to be more effective working with other agencies of the US government and internationally. . . . We are expanding the set of problems the Defense Department recognizes we’re going to need to play a role in dealing with. We’re also very conscious of the fact that many of these problems are not narrowly DoD problems; they are broadly US government problems.34

In spring 2005, senior DoD officials held meetings with partners from other US government departments and agencies, as well as international allies, to identify potential threats and the capabilities required to address challenges in the QDR areas of focus.35 The final QDR report was the most explicit articulation yet of the path to full spectrum dominance. Extending the 2001 QDR’s emphasis on capabilities-based planning, the document stated that the United States should “possess sufficient capacity to convince any [emphasis added] potential adversary that it cannot prevail in a conflict.”36 It should prepare for all possible scenarios: “from conducting war against nations—to conducting war in countries we are not at war with. . . . From major conventional combat operations—to multiple, irregular, asymmetric operations” against “decentralized network threats from nonstate actors.”37 In a conventional sense, US objectives echoed every major US government strategy and planning document since the end of the Cold War: the United States would “ensure that no foreign power can dictate the terms of regional or global security” and “dissuade any military competitor from developing disruptive or other capabilities that could enable regional hegemony or hostile action.” In addition, US strategy would now also encompass nontraditional forms of conflict, including “large-scale and potentially long-duration irregular warfare” such as counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, asymmetric operations, and stabilization and reconstruction efforts.38 In an age of globalization, which empowered nonstate actors in new ways, maintaining US primacy entailed maintaining the capacity to wage both conventional and irregular warfare.

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To ensure that the most important recommendations of the QDR were implemented, England, the new deputy secretary, requested the establishment of eight post-QDR study teams, each tasked with producing an “execution roadmap” delineating how the QDR objectives would be implemented and when. As well as the more conventional study groups, there were teams examining irregular warfare, building partnership capacity, and strategic communications.39 Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap The 2006 QDR was the first DoD document to use the phrase irregular warfare. According to Mario Mancuso, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations, the IW roadmap was about “institutionaliz[ing] some of the best practices.  .  .  . It is certainly not tied to Iraq and Afghanistan directly.” The roadmap, Mancuso claimed, “established an aggressive timeline for implementing the approximately 30 tasks over the next year in order to improve our ability to conduct irregular warfare.”40 Perhaps most important, the IW roadmap called for the writing of a joint operating concept for irregular warfare so that the concept could be incorporated into formal planning documents across the military services and the DoD.41 From September 2005, when the first interim definition of Irregular Warfare was agreed, to October 2006, when the final meaning was determined, the Pentagon debated “many definitions” of IW. Each of these “focused on defining IW by who conducts it (actors), how they conduct it (methods), or why they conduct it (strategic purpose).”42 The DoD was trying to forge an agreed doctrinal meaning for a contested term. The final definition of IW, contained in the joint operating concept (JOC) of September 2007, reiterated this tripartite characterization: IW was “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations” and it “favors indirect and asymmetric approaches.”43 IW therefore had three unique features: its agents could be either state or nonstate actors, its methods were indirect and asymmetric, and its objective was to win the allegiance of the population in order to stabilize the territory. Beyond this, the JOC reiterated and expanded in a schematic form the key elements of IW that had been emerging in both theory and practice since the early 2000s. IW was population-centric because “Irregular warfare is about people not platforms [emphasis in original].” The focus of operations was the people, and the purpose was to win their



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support. More important than high-tech solutions was “our understanding of such social dynamics as tribal politics, social networks, religious influences, and cultural mores.”44 IW would likely occur in weak or collapsed states.45 (An appendix was titled “Executing IW Within Ungoverned or Under-Governed Spaces.”46) It would probably involve nonstate actors, who, since they lacked the capacity to fight in conventional ways, would employ unconventional forms of resistance to “subvert, attrite, and exhaust us rather than defeat us militarily.”47 It would incorporate political, economic, and psychological initiatives and a whole-of-government approach in order to win the support of the people. “Direct applications of military power are often counterproductive,” it stated.48 Better to focus on building the capacity of the host nation to govern and maintain security. The operational area might also expand to areas in “non-belligerent states.”49 The “globalization of emerging transnational threats” meant that conflict was not always confined within the borders of a particular state—hence, the QDR’s call for “war in countries we are not at war with.”50 Finally the new operating concept listed all the variants of Irregular Warfare that the United States should prepare for: insurgency, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, terrorism, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, stabilization, security, transition and reconstruction operations, strategic communications, psychological operations, information operations, civil– military operations, intelligence and counterintelligence, countering transnational criminal activities that sustained IW, and law enforcement activities. 51 The ultimate goal was for the United States to be “as compelling in IW as it is in conventional warfare”—in other words, to achieve dominance across the entire spectrum of conflict. 52 As well as the JOC, the IW roadmap had other tangible results. One was the establishment of a Center of Excellence for Irregular Warfare and Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations to serve as “a central repository for IW and SSTR training and education knowledge” that could be used “across the DoD and the interagency.”53 This materialized as the Center for Complex Operations. Initially formed in 2008 in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the center moved to the National Defense University in January 2009, where it functioned as a joint enterprise between the university and the DoD, dedicated to research and training in interagency IW operations.54 This initiative influenced similar developments elsewhere in the DoD. In May 2007, the US Marine Corps established its own

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Center for Irregular Warfare, which would identify, coordinate, and implement IW initiatives, including those identified in the IW roadmap, to enable the Marine Corps to conduct operations against irregular threats.55 The Air Force established the Coalition and Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence to facilitate the development of airpower capabilities in irregular conflict.56 Special Operations Command opened a new directorate for Irregular Warfare in June 2007 “to support DoD’s efforts . . . to wage protracted irregular warfare on a global scale.” 57 In addition, the Joint Special Operations University incorporated IW into its special operations curriculum, including courses on counterinsurgency and information operations; it also relocated to MacDill Air Base in Florida so as to be situated alongside SOCOM.58 The establishment of IW research institutions for the conventional military services indicated that the general-purpose forces were now compelled to allocate resources to integrate Irregular Warfare into existing practice. In February 2008, Michael Vickers, the DoD assistant secretary for stability operations and low-intensity conflict, informed Congress that the Pentagon was “in the early stages of developing a DoD directive” that would “reinforce the QDR vision that IW capabilities be accorded priority comparable to traditional warfare capabilities.”59 This directive, DoDD 3000.07, was released in December 2008 and affirmed that it was DoD policy to recognize that “IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare” and to “maintain capabilities and capacity so that the [DoD] is as effective in IW as it is in traditional warfare.” It called for the military services to continue to “explicitly integrate concepts and capabilities relevant to IW across all DoD activities,” a clear indication of the intellectual and doctrinal shift taking place at the DoD.60 Strategic Communications Execution Roadmap Rumsfeld was especially interested in the world of strategic communications (SC). He had first signaled his interest via the 2001 QDR, which had identified information operations as one of six operational goals for the military and resulted in the 2003 Information Operations Roadmap. This had called for a strategy of defense support to public diplomacy, but there was much debate among DoD officials about what this should entail. By late 2004, the DoD strategy had still not been released, though the department had issued a directive in September instructing the under secretary for policy to develop and oversee DoD’s strategic communications efforts.61 Rumsfeld had also requested an extra report from the Defense Science Board, to be completed



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at the same time as the 2004 Summer Study on the Transition to and From Hostilities. The extra report, sponsored by Rumsfeld, the Department of State, and the director of the CIA, George Tenet, examined US strategic communication capabilities and the imperatives of the war on terror.62 Despite the cross-departmental interest in SC, however, interagency cooperation remained weak in the absence of a national strategy. There were also disagreements at the NSC level. The March 2005 National Military Strategy contained a section, “Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism,” that was included at the suggestion of Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith over the objections of the staffs of the secretary of state and the national security adviser. The section called for an information campaign incorporating all instruments of national power to “delegitimate” the terrorists’ narrative, support “models of moderation” in the Muslim world, and reinforce the message that the war on terrorism “is not a war against Islam, but . . . a civil war within Islam.” Victory would come “only when the ideological motivation for the terrorists’ activities has been discredited.” Both Wolfowitz and Feith advised Rumsfeld to keep the section since it “is an important link to the Global War on Terrorism strategy,” and he concurred.63 Attempting to rally a national interagency effort, Rumsfeld wrote a confidential memo in July 2005 to Rice; Stephen Hadley, the new national security adviser; General Richard Myers, chair of the JCS; Vice President Cheney; and Karen Hughes, the new under secretary of state for public diplomacy, telling them that “we need a plan to mobilize moderate Muslims—both in the US and around the world.” Reaching out to moderate Muslims was essential because they “are the force that will be critical in defeating the violent extremists.” If the war on terror was in fact a “global ideological insurgency,” as Rumsfeld had suggested in his June 2004 memo to the president, information operations would help separate the insurgents from their host population—allegedly the world’s Muslims. Mobilizing moderate Muslims was “a national security issue and a vital part of winning this war,” Rumsfeld stated, and called for the formation of a group to consider: 1. Appropriate message, tone, style 2. Desired outcome—what moderate Muslims will need to do. 3. Means of delivering the message—what are the best channels. 4. Lead Agencies within the USG for U.S. and for the world 5. Funding and Congressional Support 6. Metrics to evaluate effectiveness64

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One sign of the DoD’s commitment to strategic communications was the January 2005 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, which was premised in part on the belief that “adversaries will attempt to manipulate the media and leverage sympathetic elements of the population and ‘opposition’ politicians to divide international coalitions.” It was therefore vital that the United States respond in the appropriate languages. The language roadmap set a series of milestones to enable the creation of foreign language expertise and for language skills and regional expertise to be recognized as war-fighting skills and incentivized through promotion opportunities.65 A new DoD directive, 5160.41E, released in October 2005, stated that it was now formal policy that “foreign language and regional expertise be considered critical competencies essential to the DoD mission and shall be managed to maximize the accession, development, maintenance, enhancement, and employment of these critical skills.”66 Without language skills, the impact of information operations was drastically reduced. For the most part, however, further progress on the organization of strategic communications at the Pentagon, and at the national level, was slow. The 2006 QDR stressed the nature of the war on terror as “both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas” and emphasized the need to “communicate US actions effectively to multiple audiences, while rapidly countering enemy agitation and propaganda.” However, it recognized the gaps in capabilities in public affairs, public diplomacy, psychological operations, and information operations.67 Rumsfeld was cognizant of this too. In a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations in February 2006, the month the QDR was released, he claimed, “For the most part, the U.S. government still functions as a five and dime store in an e-bay world. . . . There’s never been a war fought in this environment before.” It was essential that the US government “make communications planning a central component of every aspect of this struggle.” He asked his audience, “What should a US Information Agency or a Radio Free Europe for the 21st century look like?”68 The Strategic Communications Execution Roadmap sought to remedy deficiencies in this area by establishing a plan of action to institutionalize a DoD process by which principles of strategic communication would be incorporated into policy and strategic planning, roles would be defined, doctrine developed, and resources provided for public affairs, information operations, psychological operations, visual information, military diplomacy, and defense support to public diplomacy.69 One important result of this was the production



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of the Joint Integrating Concept on Strategic Communication by the Joint Chiefs, which meant that SC could finally be integrated into operational military planning. This capability was particularly suited to population-centric conflict, the concept noted, since the purpose of strategic communication was “to affect the behaviors of selected populations . . . in a socially complex and globally interconnected information environment.”70 DoD’s work also had wider resonance. The ongoing, and often overlapping, efforts to develop a national strategy for strategic communication came to fruition in May 2007 with the publication of America’s first-ever National Strategy for Public Diplomacy.71 In April 2006, the Muslim World Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee (established by the NSC in 2004) was transformed into the Policy Coordinating Committee for Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy and tasked with writing the national strategy that would bring together SC activities across US government agencies.72 “The US is engaged in an international struggle of ideas and ideologies,” the new strategy stated. “To effectively wage this struggle, public diplomacy must be treated— along with defense, homeland security, and intelligence—as a national security priority in terms of resources.”73 The strategy provided information on America’s strategic communications objectives and interagency coordination. It provided an action plan for creating “a positive vision of hope and opportunity,” isolating and undermining extremists, and “nurtur[ing] and project[ing] common interests and values.” It offered guidance on core messages, which included the following: “As a diverse and multicultural nation founded by immigrants, America includes and respects people of different nations, cultures and faiths”; “America seeks to be a partner for progress, prosperity, and peace”; and “Many Muslims live, work and worship freely in America and are an important part of American society.”74 With the national strategy, the United States finally had strategic communications guidance to facilitate coordinated interagency action, but the message was still based on the somewhat flawed assumption that Muslims did not believe that the United States shared their values and that Islam and democracy were incompatible. Building Partnership Capacity Execution Roadmap The final section of the 2006 QDR dealt with “achieving unity of effort.”75 This was not just about interagency unity but cooperation with international partners too. “Authorities developed before the age of the Internet and globalization have not kept pace with trans-national threats from geographically

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dispersed non-state terrorist and criminal networks,” the QDR stated.76 With threats spread across borders, international partnerships were essential; unilateralism was not an option. Citing the “shift of emphasis” embodied in DoDD 3000.05, the partnership capacity roadmap stated that “the DoD cannot meet many of today’s complex challenges alone.”77 Therefore, “wherever possible, the United States will work with or through others . . . to reduce the drivers of instability, prevent terrorist attacks or disrupt their networks, to deny sanctuary to terrorists anywhere in the world, to separate [them] from host populations and ultimately to defeat them.”78 The Partnership Capacity Roadmap designated twenty-two tasks to policymakers and officials in the JCS and set deadlines for 2006–2007.79 This included the development of “a joint concept for strategic partnerships to extend governance to under- and ungoverned areas” for DoD and its “USG partners.” This meant supporting the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (known bureaucratically as S/ CRS). As we shall see in Chapter 6, S/CRS was poorly resourced in its early years; the partnership capacity roadmap called for the transfer of funds from the DoD to S/CRS to support stabilization and reconstruction operations.80 The roadmap also called for improving international partners’ capacity for stabilization and reconstruction operations. This would reduce the burden on US forces and exploit regional and language expertise that existed elsewhere. At the November 2006 NATO summit, US officials advocated embedding planning, standards, and doctrine for stability and reconstruction operations in NATO doctrine and identifying specific niche capabilities of member states.81 One result was the proposed Stability Operations Fellowship Program, which was designed to “enhance the capacity of international civilian and military officials to be effective partners in stability operations and perform certain stability operations in lieu of US participation.” The program would begin with a $5 million commitment in 2008 and, it was envisaged, would increase annually up to a cap of $25 million as the pool of participating countries increased.82 However, the program was eliminated from the defense budget by the Senate on the grounds that its goal of educating foreign military personnel in stability operations could be achieved through other security assistance programs. Nevertheless, repeated requests for its inclusion demonstrated the commitment of the DoD.83



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Global Train and Equip As important and unprecedented as these stability operations initiatives were, the centerpiece of the ongoing efforts to build partnership capacity in international allies was the Pentagon’s global train-and-equip program and the attempt to make this permanent. Such a program was historically unprecedented. Under the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, all foreign security aid flowed through the State Department so as to ensure the overall coherency of US foreign policy. The Pentagon sometimes carried out security assistance programs but only when requested by, and with the permission of, the Department of State. The DoD could not identify or independently train and equip security forces.84 The 2006 QDR had called explicitly for “expand[ing] the authorities of the Departments of State and Defense to train and equip foreign security forces best suited to internal counterterrorism and counter-insurgency operations.”85 This referred to a DoD authority that had begun in 2004 when Rumsfeld first requested congressional authority to allow special operations forces to assist “foreign fighters, irregular forces, groups, or individuals” engaged in supporting ongoing counterterrorism operations by US Special Forces. This program was executed by SOCOM, without any State Department input, and initially limited to $25 million annually for two years. Passed under Section 1208 of the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act, the funding was known simply as Section 1208 authority.86 The secretary of defense was required to submit an annual report to the congressional defense committees on the assistance provided, but all of these remain classified. All that is known is that the 1208 funding was extended multiple times, including by the Obama administration. It remained in force and grew to $85 million in FY2018.87 Much more is known about a second train-and-equip program known as Section 1206, which related to the general-purpose forces. This request, authorized one year later in the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1206), permitted the DoD, with the concurrence of the secretary of state, to spend up to $200 million per year to provide equipment, supplies, or training to a foreign country to build its capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations or participate in or support stability operations with the United States. While projects would be funded by the DoD, they would be jointly formulated by the secretaries of defense and state, and DoD would take the lead in coordinating their implementation.88 The Section 1206 funding therefore compelled interagency cooperation, as well as cooperation with “partner nations who know the local geography, language, and culture.”89 In 2007, the funding

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was increased to $300 million per year, though the authority still required annual renewal. (The funding increase was still well short of the $750 million requested by the Pentagon.)90 Though State remained involved in the process (unlike the 1208 funding for special forces), placing the DoD in the lead was a departure from the usual rules of foreign security assistance. To access the funding, State and Defense assessed proposals for 1206 funding on the basis of linkage with objectives in the Pentagon’s Security Cooperation Guidance and the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism. Proposals addressed “time-sensitive, emerging threats or opportunities that cannot wait upon the normal budget process.”91 The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which administered the 1206 funding, noted that “because threats often emanate from countries with which the US is not at war, the Department must work through these particular countries to address them.” Reiterating the centrality of failed states to the US government analysis, the DSCA argued that the need for 1206 funds “becomes more acute in an environment of weak states, rapidly developing threats, and ungoverned areas that can be exploited for terrorist safe haven.” According to Eric Edelman, the under secretary of defense for policy, Section 1206 funds helped “reduce ungoverned areas, thereby depriving terrorist organizations of potential safehavens.”92 From fiscal years 2006 to 2010 (that is, October 2005 to September 2010), $1.3 billion in 1206 funds was spent in thirty-four countries, excluding Afghanistan and Iraq, for which there were separate, supplemental appropriations. This included projects across Africa (Chad, Tunisia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, São Tomé and Príncipe, and other countries in the Gulf of Guinea); “Greater Europe” (including Ukraine, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Estonia, and supplementary funding in Georgia that went beyond the Georgia Train and Equip and Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program appropriations); Asia Pacific (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, and, above all, Indonesia and the Philippines); and the Middle East (Lebanon, Pakistan, and Yemen). The top seven recipients of the 1206 funding in this period were Yemen, Pakistan, Lebanon, the Philippines, Indonesia, Bahrain, and Malaysia—with the three Asia Pacific countries (the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia) accounting for 63 percent of the total.93 The regional combatant commanders embraced the 1206 authority and in practice took the leading role in identifying potential projects. According to



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the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, combatant commanders considered Section 1206 “the single most important tool to shape the environment and counter terrorism outside Iraq and Afghanistan.” In just three years, the DSCA claimed, the 1206 train-and-equip program “has rapidly become the gold standard for interagency operations” and “a key element of the overall security cooperation set of programs conducted by the Department of Defense and the Department of State.” Every year, demand for 1206 funds exceeded their availability.94 In 2007, General Peter Pace, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, endorsed the expansion of the 1206 authority through the Building Partnership Capacity Act, which, Pace claimed, “extends and expands past enacted 1206 [and] 1208 authorities for educating, training, and equipping foreign forces for counterterrorism and stability operations.”95 In a joint initiative with the State Department and with the support of the president, the DoD submitted the Building Global Partnerships Act to Congress in May 2007 and requested that the funding ceiling be increased to $750 million per year and that the authority become permanent.96 Robert L. Wilkie, assistant secretary of defense for legislative affairs, described the act as “the centerpiece of our legislative program in 2007.”97 Rumsfeld was eager to push Section 1206 in congressional testimony and requested talking points on the Pentagon’s train-and-equip programs and its transfer of funds to the State Department.98 However, some members of Congress were skeptical of what Representative Ike Skelton, chair of the House Armed Services Committee, said “appears to be the migration of State Department activities to the Defense Department.” Congress increased the funding to $350 million per year and extended it for three years, but would not make the program permanent.99 For the Pentagon, however, the train-and-equip authority was a key tool for tackling transnational threats on a global scale because, in the words of the National Defense Strategy, “our strategic objectives are not attainable without the support and assistance of capable partners at home and abroad.”100 Eager to further improve the efficiency and impact of the 1206 funding process, the under secretary of defense for policy, Ryan Henry, and the director of the joint staff, Walter L. Sharp, requested a joint investigation into all aspects of the 1206 program by the inspectors general of the Departments of State and Defense in 2008.101 When the report was released at the end of August 2009, it offered a relatively positive appraisal of the program as it stood at the end of the Bush years. By this time, cooperation between the DoD and

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DoS had become “a model of interagency co-operation to achieve common goals.”102 The “synergy” between the combatant commands and the country teams based at the embassy was “a unique strength” of the program,103 and “generally, the Section 1206 projects evaluated were effective in building partner nation capacity for counterterrorist and military or stability operations, and helped those countries increase control over their borders and ungoverned spaces.”104 The program was not entirely without problems, however, and the inspectors made nine recommendations for improvement, including incorporating the 1206 procedures into a DoD directive or instruction; factoring in delivery time for equipment; increased reporting requirements to comprehensively track expenditure; developing full concept of operations documents with partners on 1206 projects; and, finally, developing metrics of effectiveness for project outcomes.105 The implementation of the 1206 program therefore had a hasty and unpolished quality despite the high esteem in which it was held; crucially, more needed to be done to measure the effectiveness of the projects. In other words, it was not clear whether the high esteem in which Section 1206 was held was justified by its outcomes. Some progress was subsequently made on some of the inspectors’ recommendations, indicating the Pentagon’s commitment to improving the execution of the program, but it was not until Obama’s second term in office that efforts to measure the success of Section 1206 programs were made.106 SOF Expansion and the GWoT One of the most striking passages of the 2006 QDR was the assertion that fighting the war on terror meant fighting “war in countries we are not at war with”: “The enemies we face are not nation-states but rather dispersed nonstate networks . . . actions must occur on many continents in countries with which the United States is not at war. . . . [The GWoT] extends far beyond the borders of Iraq and Afghanistan.”107 Another feature of Rumsfeld’s tenure in office was his expansion of special operations forces and their mandate to conduct covert operations, related to terrorism, anywhere in the world, including in countries with which the United States was not at war. (These covert activities were in addition to the overt assistance programs described in Chapters 2 to 4.) Since the United States was purportedly fighting a global terrorist network, Rumsfeld wanted to use special operations forces to fight



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covertly anywhere in the world with little or no notice, including in nonbelligerent countries where necessary. This was controversial; only the CIA had a legal mandate to undertake covert action anywhere in the world at any time (that is, outside war zones, with presidential approval). Under the auspices of the war on terror, Rumsfeld pushed the boundaries of the Pentagon’s covert action mandate, ultimately reinterpreting the law on secret operations in wartime, and drastically reducing the DoD’s reliance on the CIA for covert operations. In the aftermath of 9/11, Rumsfeld asked General Charles Holland, head of SOCOM, to come up with a worldwide plan to target al-Qaeda. On September 25, 2001, Holland presented his briefing to Rumsfeld but also informed the secretary that special operations forces would need clearance from the CIA before its troops could be deployed. Robert Andrews, the top civilian in charge of special operations, reported that Rumsfeld “screw[ed] himself into the ceiling” on hearing the news.108 “Given the nature of our world,” Rumsfeld wrote to JCS chairman Mike Myers, “Isn’t it conceivable that the Department ought not to be in a position of near total dependence on the CIA in situations such as this?”109 What Rumsfeld wanted was to use the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), a SOCOM subcommand, as a covert force answerable only to the secretary of defense, in the way that the CIA was answerable to the president.110 In July 2002, Rumsfeld had already requested a plan to make SOCOM the lead synchronizing command in the war on terror; however, this had been countercultural because SOCOM was established in 1986 as a supporting command, unable to plan or execute operations independent of the geographic combatant commands. It served the geographical commanders and did not give orders.111 Rumsfeld, however, was determined to push for greater authority for SOCOM and to use JSOC to conduct secret operations worldwide. In September 2003, with Bush’s full support, Rumsfeld reportedly signed a “War on Terrorism Execute Order,” which listed fifteen countries in which special operations forces could disrupt, capture, and destroy the al-Qaeda network, including Algeria, Iran, Malaysia, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, and Syria.112 In March 2003, the Pentagon created the position of under secretary of defense for intelligence to act as an intelligence adviser to the secretary. By 2004, there were small teams of special operations forces operatives, known as military liaison elements, in US embassies all over the world, “providing situational awareness out in key areas.” Sometimes this was

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done without the approval or even knowledge of the US ambassador, though ambassadorial approval was technically required.113 The specific legal basis for the Pentagon’s covert activities came about through a reinterpretation of the 1991 Intelligence Oversight Act. The 1991 act was passed as a result of the Iran-contra scandal, in which covert activity was passed from the CIA to the members of the National Security Council. It stated that all covert action now required a written presidential finding and that all US government departments and agencies, not just the CIA, should report a covert action finding to the congressional intelligence committees before the action began or as soon as possible thereafter. There was one exception to this reporting requirement, however: “traditional . . . military activities or routine support to such activities” did not require a presidential finding or congressional notification.114 The act was also vague about what actually constituted traditional military activity or support to it. To provide legal cover for special forces to conduct covert action anywhere in the post-9/11 world, the Pentagon interpreted this clause in an expansive way. Since the 2001 Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force placed no geographic limits on the response to 9/11, the war on terror could legally be conceived of as global in scope. If this was the case, then special operations forces might be required to undertake traditional preparatory or anticipatory activities anywhere around the world as part of the “war.” Thus, SOF covert action could be permitted under the guise of traditional military activity. Once classified as traditional, there was no requirement for congressional notification, meaning the activities could effectively be completely secret. What this ultimately meant was that the Pentagon could undertake covert action anywhere in world, via JSOC, at the behest of the secretary of defense without informing Congress. By the end of Bush’s first term in office, the DoD had carved out a secret global covert action mandate for itself under existing law, without any input from Congress and very little from the president. What was once the preserve of the CIA was now deemed permissible as traditional military activity. No one other than senior Pentagon officials would ever know the true extent of this activity because—in contrast to the CIA—of a lack of congressional oversight and no reporting requirements. In early October 2005, Rumsfeld asked the former head of SOCOM, General Wayne Downing, to lead a short but classified assessment of the current state of special operations forces and their contribution to the war on terror, and make recommendations “on adjustments needed to DoD systems and



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future SOF capabilities and capacities to anticipate, prepare for, and defeat the myriad unconventional, asymmetric threats our global enemy may employ.”115 The performance of special operations forces “has been outstanding,” spokesman Larry Di Rita told reporters, but “there is a lot more they might be able to do if we know what they will need to do it.”116 Downing’s November 2005 report was highly favorable and encouraged Rumsfeld to go further and faster. “There have been impressive gains in SOF capability since September 11, 2001,” the report stated. “Today’s SOF operators are conducting more operations in a week, at a higher rate of complexity, than their pre-9/11 predecessors conducted in a career,” Downing claimed.117 Nevertheless, “much remains to be done.” The work on the 2006 QDR, then ongoing, “appear[ed] to be headed in the right direction,”118 but Downing made five specific recommendations: “Posture SOF for the future indirect and clandestine GWOT fight in countries with which we are not at war”—the first known use of that phrase, which eventually made it into the QDR; increase the number of special mission units; promote Joint Special Operations Command from a two- to three-star command reporting directly to the secretary of defense; fix GWoT organization and processes across the DoD; and provide SOCOM with sufficient authority and a presence in Washington—as opposed to its headquarters in Florida—to allow it to fully lead and synchronize the GWoT, as the Unified Command Plan of 2004 intended.119 Some of Downing’s recommendations materialized. Posturing the military to fight “war in countries we are not at war with” was a key principle of the ensuing QDR. In January 2006, as a direct result of the report, JSOC was promoted from a two- to three-star command, though it would still report to Rumsfeld indirectly through its parent command, SOCOM.120 It would not move from Florida to Washington, DC, however, due to the cost of real estate in the Washington area.121 Yet the QDR did heed Downing’s call for a further increase in special operations forces numbers: starting in October 2006, active-duty SOF battalions would increase by a third; psychological operations and civil affairs units would increase by 33 percent; a Marine Corps Special Operations Command of 2,600 would be established; and SEAL Team forces would be increased.122 This was in addition to the increase in funding from $3.8 billion to more than $6.4 billion from 2001 to 2005, as well as over $5 billion in supplemental funding in this period.123 In April 2006, it was reported that Rumsfeld had approved an even more ambitious plan for special forces to operate in around twenty countries

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outside Afghanistan and Iraq, this time without the need for ambassadorial approval.124 In 2007, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Michael Vickers, who had assisted Downing in the review of SOF in 2005, told the Washington Post that SOCOM’s global counterterrorism plan focused on a list of twenty “high-priority” countries, a further twenty-nine “priority” countries, as well as “other countries” that were not named. “It’s not just the Middle East. It’s not just the developing world. It’s not just non-democratic countries—it’s a global problem,” Vickers said. “Threats can emanate from Denmark, the United Kingdom, you name it.”125 In 2008, Admiral Eric Olson, SOCOM commander, told the Senate that special operations forces were active “in about 60 countries.”126 The SOCOM posture statement described special forces as being at the very center of a synchronized, comprehensive, and continuous global campaign that contributes to both the defeat of violent extremist organizations as well as the establishment and maintenance of a global environment inhospitable to violent extremism. This includes marginalizing extremist thought, providing a vision of hope, and creating conditions favorable to peaceful and just societies.127

SOCOM would maintain “a continuous presence in areas of strategic interest to the GWoT.”128 This was most likely to be in “ungoverned or poorly governed areas,” where populations would “serve as recruitment pools and provide willing audiences for anti-Western or anti-American sentiment.”129 These environments ultimately required “the integration of all instruments of national power and the cooperation of all government agencies and coalition partners”—but with its “permanent forward presence . . . for prosecuting irregular warfare,” SOF would be the vanguard of these efforts.130 The Pentagon had carved out an enviable niche for itself: anything that could conceivably be cast as preparation of the global battlefield could be done, and done secretly. Almost all of this covert activity remains classified at the time of writing. Nevertheless, the expansion of SOCOM appears to have been integral to the prosecution of the war on terror. Yet like the Section 1206 program, this was done in a hurried and ad hoc manner. The expansion of the command was so rapid that resource and personnel requirements often lagged behind. In July 2006, the GAO reported that SOCOM’s plans for expansion were going ahead before the command had fully determined all of the personnel requirements necessary. While the command had determined how many SOF soldiers were needed to meet the increase in its fighting units, it had not



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yet completed analyses to determine the number of headquarters staff needed to train the new recruits or plan and synchronize global actions against terrorism. Despite this, SOCOM had already decided to increase the number of positions at its headquarters by at least 75 percent. (A DoD study to determine the actual numbers required was not due until March 2007.) In addition, SOCOM was struggling to fill its existing posts. Since 2000, over half of the SOF specialties had been underfilled annually, and the decrease in the number of personnel deployed for training was accompanied by an increase in the numbers deployed overseas.131 In other words, by the end of the Bush years, SOF forces were being deployed faster than their ranks could be replenished. The hastiness of SOF expansion also affected its acquisitions programs. From 2001 to 2007, SOCOM committed to eighty-six new acquisition programs. Sixty percent of those progressed as planned, staying within original cost and schedule estimates. However, the remaining 40 percent experienced modest delays, and occasionally significant delays, that led to cost increases and schedule delays.132 According to the GAO, this was because addressing highpriority urgent needs from the field meant the diversion of funds from budgeted programs to urgent deployments. (From 2003 to 2007, $259 million was reallocated from budgeted programs to fund almost half of urgent deployments.)133 Reliance on other military departments for technical capabilities also meant that delays elsewhere affected SOCOM programs.134 In addition, the SOCOM tool for managing its acquisition programs, the Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics Information System, lacked sufficient oversight and maintenance. In some cases, information was not updated for years. Finally, SOCOM’s acquisition workforce remained too small throughout the Bush years. Though a 75 percent increase was scheduled to be in place by the end of 2008, the acquisition workforce had grown by just ten positions from 2001 to 2007—not enough to keep pace with the increased demands.135 SOF operations may have been essential to the war on terror, but the bureaucratic reorganization and recruitment required to support this in the long term was disorganized and struggled to keep pace with policy and operations. Once again, ideas and operations in the war on terror were ahead of organizational changes required in Washington.

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Conclusion: Rethinking “Transformation” The continuing development of doctrine, policy and bureaucracy to support Irregular Warfare in the second term of the Bush administration was the culmination of trends and operations that had their roots in the pre-2004 period. Even as policymakers were reluctant to apply the new unconventional methods they were developing to Iraq, lest they appear to accept that US-led actions had generated an insurgency, they remained committed to developing full spectrum dominance: the ability to prevail not just in conventional warfare but in irregular conflicts too. The twenty-first century security environment demanded this: according to the 2006 National Security Strategy, “In recent years, the world has witnessed the growing importance of a set of opportunities and challenges” derived from “the national security implications of globalization.”136 If the United States was to retain its position as the world’s preeminent military power, it had to be prepared to fight the ostensibly “new” wars of the globalized era as well as traditional interstate wars. Indeed, meeting the IW challenge was now part of the transformation agenda—a new term that replaced revolution in military affairs. Military transformation was now defined as revolutionizing the DoD to meet the security requirements of the twenty-first century—both conventional and irregular. As General Peter Pace, chair of the JCS, told the Senate Armed Services Committee, transformation was “an ongoing process of rethinking our doctrine and operation concepts. ... It is not an end state. It is a mindset and a culture that encourages innovation and fresh thinking.”137 The 2005 National Defense Strategy identified improving proficiency against irregular threats as one of the eight operational challenges that were the focus of defense transformation.138 Despite its long-standing association with conventional military technology, the transformation agenda did not hold back the turn toward Irregular Warfare under Rumsfeld because it was no longer tied exclusively to faith in expensive military hardware. Nor was this kind of transformation exclusive to the DoD. The Departments of State and USAID were transforming in their own ways in an attempt to meet the security challenges of the twenty-first century. “‘Transformational diplomacy” and “transformational development” were the new policy slogans for State and USAID designed to complement the DoD’s own twenty-first century transformation.

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T

he intellectual and organizational shift toward Irregular Warfare occurring at the Department of Defense was also evident at the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department. Not only were civilians at these agencies beginning to devote time and resources to dealing with the supposed root causes of terrorism; they were also attempting to do this with the DoD in an interagency fashion that would mobilize the full panoply of US government political, economic, developmental, informational, and security measures. Once again, the intellectual and strategic basis for this was the Bush administration’s emphasis on weak and failing states as the chief cause of terrorism and the belief that countering irregular challenges was an inherently political project that required a whole-of-government approach. From 2004 onward, the State Department and USAID underwent a process of bureaucratic, intellectual, and financial reorganization designed to meet the challenge of weak and failing states. Since these agencies were responsible for the nonmilitary elements of nation building, their new policies entailed an emphasis on development that had not been seen since the heyday of modernization theory in the 1960s, when US policymakers tried to expedite the evolution of capitalism in the developing world as an antidote to the appeal of communism.1 As the head of USAID, Andrew Natsios, told Congress in April 2005, the focus on weak states meant “the whole spectrum of our foreign policy establishment had to be engaged and many of its programs redesigned. . . . Indeed

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‘development’ today has received a level of commitment not seen since the Kennedy or Truman administration.”2 The rationale for development in the twenty-first century was overtly securitized. Since weak states were viewed as the cause of one of the most salient security problems of the twenty-first century, development was deemed an appropriate response—and one that civilian foreign service agencies were ideally suited to. This was in keeping with the Pentagon’s directive on stability operations, 3000.05, which acknowledged that many tasks related to stability and reconstruction were best undertaken by civilian experts, though the military would develop the capacity to do this where necessary. However, the civilian capacity for reconstruction and development would ultimately be an integral component of an Irregular Warfare approach. The military transformation agenda, encompassing new ways of thinking about twenty-first-century security threats, was now accompanied by transformational development and transformational diplomacy, both of which sought to address the security implications of weak and failing states in the twenty-first century. Though progress was often slow—mainly because Congress did not support initiatives put forward by the administration—the new initiatives at State and USAID nevertheless constituted a meaningful attempt to mobilize an interagency response to irregular challenges and demonstrated that the focus on security in failed states transcended the Pentagon. Off ice of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Historically the State Department played the lead coordinating role in the US government’s counterterrorism efforts. Its Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism was established after the terrorist attacks at the Munich Olympics in 1972 to develop and coordinate counterterrorist policy for the US government.3 In the post-9/11 era, the job of the office was “to develop and lead a worldwide effort to combat terrorism using all the instruments of statecraft: diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, law enforcement, and military.”4 Interagency programs such as the Pan Sahel Initiative and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, as well as the Georgia Train and Equip Program, were delivered by DoD but overseen by the State Department. State’s role as the lead agency for stabilization and reconstruction operations was also reaffirmed in NSPD-44 issued in December 2005. Even before this



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directive, however, new initiatives designed to meet the challenge of failing states had begun in the State Department. Following a National Security Council decision in April 2004 (discussed in Chapter 1), the Bush administration established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (known as S/CRS) at the State Department, which was designed to “lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.”5 S/CRS worked with representatives from eighteen other US government departments and subagencies and was designed to be the central locus for planning, synchronizing, and conducting US action in failing states.6 The chief underlying rationale for the new office was the perceived impact of weak and failing states on international security. The S/CRS mandate asserted, “Failing and post-conflict states pose one of the greatest national and international security challenges of our day, threatening vulnerable populations, their neighbors, our allies, and ourselves.”7 According to Stewart Patrick of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, 9/11 had “upended the longstanding geopolitical paradigm that associated security threats with a concentration of state power as opposed to its absence.” As a result, the State Department also recognized that “zones of weak governance in the developing world were . . . incubators and vectors for multiple transnational threats.”8 Reflecting on the change in the international security environment over the previous decade, the first head of S/CRS, Carlos Pascual, argued that the 20th century’s premise—that the struggle between strong powers principally threatens security and stability, and that international security is driven by rational actors scrutinizing one another—was turned on its head on September 11. On that morning, we saw one of the poorest countries in the world become the base of operations for the deadliest external strikes against the United States in our history. It made us fundamentally re-examine our assumptions about national security. One constant in this world is that voids will be filled—in the absence of legitimate governance . . . —[with] terrorism, organized crime, weapons proliferation, trafficking, and other threats to our national interests.

In the post-9/11 world, development was a security imperative, and the new S/ CRS office was the vehicle for delivery.9

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Instrumental in promoting the idea for the new office were Senators Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Joseph Biden (D-DE), chair and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, respectively, who introduced the Stabilization and Reconstruction Management Act of 2004. Biden and Lugar had been shocked by the DoD’s failure to bring security to post-Saddam Iraq. Their bill sought to authorize the creation of a new postconflict management office at the State Department and a civilian response corps with active and standby components, but the bill was never considered by the full Senate and not considered at all by the House International Relations Committee.10 It was also opposed by the House Appropriations Subcommittee, which eliminated the $100 million request to fund the proposed office from the FY 2006 budget, lest the new entity become the means for further overseas intervention.11 However, Lugar and Biden’s activism coincided with the NSC’s attempts to improve America’s postconflict reconstruction capabilities, which culminated in the establishment of the S/CRS office in April 2004. There were major debates within State and USAID about the scope of the new office’s mandate, including concerns from Natsios that the office would compete with USAID’s own conflict management capacity in its new Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation.12 Ultimately, however, Secretary of State Powell endorsed an expansive mandate for S/CRS that—according to Patrick, who was involved in the discussions—“engage[d] the entire panoply of stabilization and reconstruction challenges—including governance, physical infrastructure, and economic development—and would actually plan and run such interventions, rather than simply prepare for them.”13 At least initially, the new office would not focus on the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan but would prepare for future stabilization missions.14 It planned “a holistic approach” toward failing states that resembled the expansive nation building activities described in DoDD 3000.05.15 This approach would have four phases, according to Pascual, beginning with conflict prevention wherever possible through investment in “the kinds of things that will help a society prosper and can serve as a preventative force against conflict” such as the private sector, an open political system, health care, and education. Second, where conflict did break out, S/CRS would focus on “dealing with some of the root causes,” such as corruption, ethnic differences, or religious tension. Third, to aid the transition to a sustainable peace, Pascual advocated nothing less than “the creation of the supply side of governance.” This meant “the laws and institutions of a market economy,” including tax systems, banking



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systems, regulatory policies, elections and political parties, and courts and independent judiciary, most of which would have to be created “from scratch.” Finally, the fourth stage of the transition to a sustainable peace would be “creating the demand side of politics”: developing civil society, nongovernmental organizations, and the media.16 The centerpiece of this ambitious effort would be a civilian reserve corps made up of active and standby components that could function as “an immediate surge response” and also provide more longterm support.17 This exceptionally ambitious agenda could be achieved, it was argued, by bringing together various different departments and agencies from across the US government. “This cannot be the work of one office alone” Pascual asserted; “it must depend on a whole range of partners within the U.S. Government and outside the U.S. Government.”18 The job of the small S/CRS office was to mobilize departments and agencies across the government and internationally. Pascual compared the challenge of creating an interagency mind-set to the military services’ efforts to become interoperable after the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which mandated joint operations, sought to quell interservice rivalry, and make commanders responsible for all military operations within a given region rather than operations conducted only by their own service. The success of those reforms showed what was possible but also that it would “take time for all of this to take root,” Pascual stated.19 In that vein, one of the first tasks for S/CRS was to draft a planning framework for interagency reconstruction, stabilization, and conflict transformation operations with the Joint Forces Command. A draft version was released in December 2005.20 The military strongly supported the establishment of S/ CRS. With general-purpose forces beginning to take on nonkinetic operations for which they were not yet adequately trained, Pascual found that the military was eager to see S/CRS succeed. By December 2004, the new office had already begun to collaborate on conflict prevention and management measures with the National Defense University, the Army War College, the Navy War College, and the Navy Postgraduate School.21 General Richard Myers, chair of the JCS, told the Senate that the new office was “an important step” in helping “post-conflict nations achieve peace, democracy, and a sustainable market economy.” In the future, S/CRS would “synchronize military and civilian efforts and ensure an integrated national approach is applied to post-combat peacekeeping, reconstruction and stability operations,” Myers

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said, but this could only happen “provided this office is given appropriate resources.”22 With a start-up budget of just $100 million per annum, no permanent mandate from Congress because it was set up by an NSC directive, no secure source of annual funding, and an expansive mandate to fulfill, S/CRS was woefully underresourced and lacking in stature.23 To be sure, the office was not supposed to undertake entire stabilization and reconstruction projects itself; for the most part, its job was to mobilize and integrate others, but this required bureaucratic power. The office started life with a staff of just thirtyseven. By 2007, it had a core staff of seventy-three—almost double but still fewer than the eighty suggested by Pascual and Stephen Krasner of the policy planning staff at State.24 The staff was genuinely interagency, however, including nineteen permanent State Department personnel and others from USAID, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the CIA, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Joint Forces Command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Treasury Department.25 Its projects at this stage were small scale and preparatory. In late 2005, well before Congress authorized the creation of a civilian response corps, S/CRS tentatively began to create the first small groups of civilian crisis response personnel. In a 2006 pilot project, it brought together a group of active and retired government employees who were deployed to locations including Darfur, Lebanon, Chad, and Nepal. This was followed in 2007 with individual or very small team deployments to Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cuba, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, and Sri Lanka.26 The common planning framework for the military and civilians was being tested in Cuba and put into use in Sudan and Haiti. It had also been on the curriculum of a number of military training schools since 2005.27 In Washington, plans were put in place for interagency country reconstruction and stabilization groups at the assistant secretary level, which would be responsible for making policy recommendations to the NSC Deputies Committee. To monitor potential crises, S/CRS asked the National Intelligence Council to provide a biannual list of weak states susceptible to crises; at least one of these would then be selected as a test case for intervention through gaming exercises with the under secretaries and assistant secretaries at the relevant regional bureau. In addition, S/CRS developed a civilian-military training exercise for stabilization and reconstruction operations with the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies at the Naval Postgraduate



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School.28 For the most part, however, S/CRS still lacked the personnel and the money to make anything approaching a transformative contribution to the security environment. Section 1207 Funding and the Civilian Reserve Corps Since the inception of S/CRS in 2004, Pascual had lobbied for the creation of a full civilian response corps that could deploy to postconflict scenarios and take the lead in stabilization and reconstruction operations, as envisioned in the original Lugar-Biden bill.29 This was also supported in the DoD by Feith’s staff, who worked with Krasner and Philip Zelikow, Rice’s counselor, to encourage the creation of a civilian corps that could “deploy thousands of civilian experts quickly to do reconstruction and stabilization work abroad.”30 However, this took almost four years to come to fruition. In 2005, the Bush administration requested $124.1 million to fund a civilian rapid response corps, but the Congress never sanctioned the initiative. Five other similar bills failed over the next two years. There was a mixed response in Congress to the idea of a civilian response corps. Although the bills had the support of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and relatively widespread support on the Senate floor, they were not supported by Tom Lantos (D-CA) and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), respectively, chair and ranking minority on the House International Relations Committee and therefore never put to the House. There was also a lack of consensus in Congress on what might constitute a trigger for the deployment of the civilian reserve corps, as well as concerns over the notion of a surge capacity—a phrase that later came to be tarred by associated with the “surge” in Iraq.31 Stewart Patrick observed, “By late 2006, there was widespread agreement within Washington that S/CRS had overpromised and under-delivered”—though in reality there was little it could do without adequate funding from Congress.32 As chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a champion of the S/CRS legislation in the Senate, Richard Lugar sent six of his colleagues on a fact-finding mission to twenty countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. In December 2006, they produced a report that concluded that although there had been “an effort to create a more robust civilian capability to work in hostile environments . . . the State Department effort is still nascent and civilian agencies, especially USAID, are still cobbling together ad hoc teams that, while talented and dedicated, are limited in number.”33 The

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shortage of resources also translated into a lack of bureaucratic influence for S/CRS. As Patrick observed, the new office had “demonstrated little ability to coordinate—much less direct—other U.S. agencies.”34 In the meantime, the Departments of State and Defense attempted to bolster State’s civilian conflict stabilization capacity through a temporary authority dedicated to the kind of activities that S/CRS was set up to cater to. The so-called Section 1207 funding, derived from Section 1207 of the FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, was a transfer authority that permitted the Pentagon to “provide services to, and transfer defense articles and funds to, the Secretary of State for the purposes of facilitating the provision ... of reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country.” (This was distinct from the Section 1206 funding—the DoD-led train-and-equip program—and the Section 1208 funding, the classified SOF train-and-equip program.) Congressional staff reported that the Senate Armed Services Committee had inserted the 1207 transfer authority into the Defense Authorization Act at the behest of Rumsfeld and Rice, who wanted to use it to fund the activities of S/CRS to the tune of $200 million per annum. The two secretaries sent a joint letter to the Defense Authorization Committee in support of the transfer authority.35 Passed in the 2006 Defense Authorization Act, the Section 1207 funding would not exceed $100 million per annum—only half of what Rumsfeld and Rice had requested—and was slated to expire on September 30, 2007. 36 What this meant was that in the short term, the Pentagon could provide resources to bolster State’s capacity to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations. Section 1207 was “built on a recognition that military solutions are not enough to address pressing security concerns and that fundamental social needs must be met to defuse underlying sources of instability.” The Pentagon gave enthusiastic support because, from the DoD’s perspective, the 1207 funding would “relieve pressure for US military personnel to perform these missions.”37 In its first year, from October 2006 to the end of September 2007, the 1207 funding was used to finance stabilization and reconstruction projects in Haiti, Somalia, Yemen, the trans-Sahara region, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia.38 When the authority expired, it was extended twice until the end of September 2010, by which time 1207 funds had financed $445.2 million in stabilization and reconstruction projects in twenty-three countries on a bilateral basis and five on a multilateral basis.39 The DoD also tried to increase funds for the program: in March 2008, it requested that Congress double



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the funding to $200 million per year, extend the authority for five years, and allow it to make the transfers to any department or agency, not just State. In response, Congress approved an additional $50 million for use in Georgia, but otherwise, the $100 million ceiling and other restrictions remained.40 Section 1207 funding was never intended to be permanent; even its sponsors acknowledged that it was “a temporary authority . . . [given] to the Department of State until S/CRS is fully stood up and adequately resourced.”41 As Section 1207 funds were being spent, the Bush administration continued to request authority from Congress for a permanent corps of civilian experts linked to S/CRS. The idea of a civilian reserve corps had been included in the 2006 National Security Strategy, but it was not until his January 2007 State of the Union address that President Bush appealed directly to Congress to support the establishment of the corps. “Such a corps would function much like our military reserve,” he stated. “It would ease the burden on the Armed Forces by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America needs them. It would give people across America who do not wear the uniform a chance to serve in the defining struggle of our time,” he claimed (referring to the war on terror).42 The Senate endorsed a civil reserve corps as part of the 2007 Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act. However, these measures were blocked again in the House, this time because of the associated costs.43 Writing together in the Washington Post in December 2007, Rice, now secretary of state, and Lugar urged the House to “stand up for our troops by giving them the civilian help they need”: “It would be penny-wise but pound foolish to continue to overburden our military with reconstruction duties” they argued.44 Indeed the military strongly supported the expansion of State’s capacity in this respect. In February 2007, General Peter Pace, chair of the JCS, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that “we need greater expeditionary capabilities in US government civilian agencies for stabilization and reconstruction operations . . . the President has proposed the creation of a Civilian Reserve Corps for the State Department. We strongly support this initiative to boost our nation’s capability to deploy civilian expertise in tandem with our military.”45 In February 2008, one year after Bush had requested the establishment of a civilian reserve corps, the administration requested $248.6 million for a comprehensive civilian stabilization initiative. This initiative included a permanent mandate for S/CRS, meaning it could not be dismantled without congressional approval; funds for a 250-member interagency Active Civilian Response

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Corps, a 2,000-member Standby Response Corps, and a 2,000-member Civilian Reserve Corps. Congressional funding was very limited, however. In June 2008, Congress appropriated just $65 million, and from a supplemental appropriations act rather than legislation devoted specifically to the initiative. This allowed only for the establishment of the active and standby components of the response corps but not the 2,000-member civilian reserve corps.46 Yet S/CRS still had some supporters in both chambers of Congress. In the House, thirty-two representatives, led by Sam Farr (D-CA), cosponsored the Reconstruction and Stabilization Management Act of 2008, while in the Senate, Lugar, Biden, and seven others cosponsored equivalent bills.47 These efforts finally came to fruition in October 2008 through Title XVI of the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act in which Congress finally gave permanent legislative authorization to S/CRS and the creation of the Civilian Reserve Corps that had been requested in February but not funded by the supplemental appropriation in June. The act also amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to authorize the president to use funds available under that act for stabilization and reconstruction—in effect, to provide guaranteed funding to S/CRS under the auspices of the 1961 act.48 As a result of the strengthening of its bureaucratic and financial position, S/CRS began to expand the number of stabilization and reconstruction projects. By 2010, S/CRS and the Civilian Reserve Corps had three primary missions: in Kyrgyzstan, Sudan, and, for the first time, Afghanistan. By the end of 2011, it had sixty-eight personnel in eleven countries. Its activities included strategic communications, support for elections and referenda, support to coalition regional commands in Afghanistan, stabilization and conflict mitigation, and economic and trade assessments.49 Though these operations were led by civilian experts, their rationale was, once again, security based. According to its legal authorization, State’s civilian expertise could be deployed only “if the President determines that it is in the national security interests of the United States.”50 While development aid had never been politically neutral, the particularly overt positioning as an integral element of security policy in the Bush years was nevertheless striking. Pascual’s successor at S/CRS, Marcia Wong, argued that “this focus on state weakness is not new,” but “what is different today is that we understand better the interaction between state failure, humanitarian crises, and our own security.”51 On the same grounds, the US Agency for International Development also reoriented itself toward serving US security policy.



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US Agency for International Development In January 2004, USAID released a white paper that took its cue from the 2002 National Security Strategy, which, the paper claimed, “assign[ed] development a new prominence in U.S. national security, along with diplomacy and defense.”52 The paper began to reorient USAID’s existing development objectives toward the counterterrorism agenda and endorsed the Bush administration’s focus on weak and failing states. It suggested that USAID work to strengthen fragile states by offering to “support stabilization, reform, and recovery in selected failed, failing, and recovering states when and where US assistance can make a significant difference in strengthening institutions, managing conflict, and supporting post-conflict reconstruction.” Ultimately the objective would be “transformational development,” which aimed to bring “far-reaching fundamental changes in governance and institutional capacity, human capacity, and economic structure.”53 Building on the 2002 NSS, USAID and the State Department had already created a Joint Management Council and a Joint Policy Council to harmonize foreign policy and development goals.54 In a speech in April 2004, Natsios, the USAID administrator, stated that the war on terror had led to “a broadening of USAID’s mandate and has thrust the Agency into situations that go beyond its traditional role of humanitarian aid and development assistance.”55 Although US foreign aid had always served political purposes, the public repositioning of USAID around such an overtly securitized agenda was noteworthy. The agency essentially acknowledged that this was not development for its own sake but was linked instead to a set of subjective security interests defined by the US government. USAID’s programs would likely cater to strategically important regions. “Selectivity will be applied,” the white paper stated. “Selection of countries will be based on criteria of need, commitment by the host government and/or nongovernmental actors to reform, feasibility of achieving results, and foreign policy importance [emphasis added].”56 Deploying the narrative of the war on terror would also ensure the continued relevance of USAID. One result of the white paper was USAID’s Fragile States Strategy released in January 2005. This official strategy formally endorsed the notion that weak states were “a source of our nation’s most pressing security threats.” The 9/11 attacks had “profoundly demonstrated the global reach of state failure” and “twenty-first century realities demonstrate that ignoring these states can pose great risks and increase the likelihood of terrorism taking root.”57 The

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objective of the strategy was “to guide USAID’s efforts in reversing decline in fragile states and advancing their recovery to a stage where transformational development progress is possible [emphasis in original].” This challenge went beyond the scope of USAID’s capabilities, however, and required “a coordinated U.S. Government approach” to ensure the efforts of USAID, State, Defense, Treasury, Justice, and others were “mutually reinforcing.” “The creation of [S/CRS] at the Department of State is a strong indicator of the increased understanding of the need for a more coordinated U.S. Government response to post-conflict and stabilization efforts,” the strategy stated.58 The specific USAID role in fragile states would focus on four strategic priorities that closely resembled the stabilization activities of DoDD 3000.05. The agency would focus on enhancing stability (“addressing the sources of stress and conflict in the political, economic, and social spheres”); improving security (by “enhancing personal safety . . . but also establishing the conditions under which serious outbreaks of generalized violence are averted”); encouraging reform (in governance, social and economic structures); and developing the capacity of institutions (especially those providing health care, education, and financial services).59 The overall effort required interagency cooperation. In 2005, Natsios, who had served in the Air Force for twenty-three years, presented his vision to the military policy community with an article in Parameters, the quarterly journal of the US Army War College, that “analyze[d] the Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development [relevant] to the military community.”60 Emphasizing the importance of interagency synergy, Natsios argued that the strategic goals of the 2002 NSS “confirm that a new development paradigm has emerged . . . there is a broadening recognition that [USAID] and development work in general are vital U.S. national security interests.” Moreover, “development cannot effectively take place without the security that armed force provides. And security cannot ultimately occur until local populations view the promise of development as an alternative to violence.”61 The continuing development of military support for stability and reconstruction operations meant that convergence and cooperation between USAID and the military were “here to stay” and that the selection of cases ultimately would be based on “support[ing] geopolitical interests.”62 To facilitate cooperation with the military, USAID established its own Military Policy Board and an Office of Military Affairs in early autumn 2005. The Military Policy Board worked on long-term strategic relations and



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operational and policy coordination with the DoD. This resulted in USAID’s formal Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy released in July 2008. The Office of Military Affairs would be the “focal point for USAID interaction [with the] military.”63 In addition, it would place senior USAID development professionals in staff positions on the Pentagon’s five geographic combatant commands (Central, Southern, Northern, Pacific, and European) “to assist military professionals in assessing development needs and priorities.” USAID would also participate in joint exercises with the military “to add development issues to military planning.”64 In its first year of operation, the Office of Military Affairs facilitated the establishment of a joint USAID-DoD emergency supply house in Bulgaria (a success, though hardly in a failing state); provided predeployment briefings for US military units deploying to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines; and assisted with the transportation of water purification chemicals in Pakistan.65 By 2010, cooperation in the field was more substantive. USAID’s civil–military operations included activities on the ground on Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, Yemen, Northern Uganda, Colombia, Kosovo, the countries of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, Djibouti, and cooperation with the Medical Civil Assistance Program.66 In addition, military representatives from the geographic combatant commands and SOCOM were seconded to USAID headquarters to provide day-to-day coordination and management.67 The tension between USAID’s development mandate and its overt turn toward security affairs continued, however. The official Civil–Military Operations Guide, released by USAID’s Office of Military Affairs, noted that the Army’s civil affairs activities “may be designed as much to serve a public relations purpose as a developmental one”—implying a divergence between the ultimate purpose of their respective operations. At the same time, however, USAID staff were also instructed to view the DoD as a partner and “reevaluate mission portfolios through a lens of national security.” Although it was claimed that this was not supposed to “divert USAID from its core sustainable development mission,” reevaluating those missions on the basis of national security could only mean even greater politicization and securitization of USAID’s efforts.68

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Transformational Diplomacy The State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization office was not the only attempt to transform the State Department to meet the irregular security threats of the twenty-first century. As secretary of state, Rice’s capstone policy concept was known as transformational diplomacy. This entailed a new diplomatic posture oriented toward the Global South and East—areas where weak states were more likely to be located—as well as a new emphasis on proactive, expeditionary state-building and developmental activities in these areas. Just as Pentagon officials believed that America’s overseas military bases reflected a Cold War posture, Rice believed that the diplomatic service was still positioned—geographically, technologically, and logistically—to reflect the needs of the twentieth rather than twenty-first century. “The department’s most treasured function, political reporting through long cables, was simply less important in a world of instant communication” Rice argued. “The Foreign Service needed to embrace new functions and perform them in more remote and sometimes highly volatile places” she claimed. “What we needed was an expeditionary foreign service,” Rice stated. Diplomacy would now include “active democracy promotion, AIDS relief, rebuilding failed states, and the like.”69 In August 2005, an internal State Department report comparing staffing levels in sixteen countries around the world pointed out that “the continued high staffing in selected countries that were central to our Cold War needs suggests additional changes might be in order. . . . Our staffing remains high in Western Europe, relative to key emerging states.” For example, there was one diplomat for every 300,000 citizens in Germany, Australia, and Canada. In Nigeria, there was one for every 1.6 million citizens; in India, one for every 3.1 million; and in India and China together, one US diplomat for every 5 million-plus citizens.70 Moreover, just as USAID was emphasizing the importance of security considerations, so Rice believed that the State Department, which ultimately coordinated all US foreign aid, should give even greater consideration to security priorities: “I saw—and still see— nothing wrong with the proposition that development assistance ought to support broader foreign policy objectives,” she later recalled.71 In a December 2005 cable to all chiefs of mission receiving foreign assistance, Rice explained that foreign aid was “one tool of transformational diplomacy” and stated that “one of my top priorities is to better align foreign assistance to support foreign policy goals and objectives. By aligning our resources and programs with our



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foreign policy priorities, we will be better able to accomplish our goals of promoting stable, market-oriented democracies, addressing vital humanitarian needs, and combating terrorism and increasing our national security.”72 Throughout 2005, preparations were made for the formal launch of transformational diplomacy early the following year. By June, a new course had been prepared for the Foreign Service curriculum; Rice spoke at its opening on November 8 “to convey the essence of transformational diplomacy and its importance to Department goals.”73 She actively courted the interest and support of other departments. In October 2005, Rice wrote to Treasury Secretary John W. Snow, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, CIA director Porter Goss, Natsios at USAID, and Rumsfeld at Defense, stressing their shared responsibility “for ensuring America’s interests and values abroad are advanced with energy and skill” and requesting that a representative from each agency (though as many as four each from USAID and Defense) attend the opening seminar.74 Beyond the Foreign Service, Rice promoted a joint initiative on critical languages with the Department of Education to encourage the study of Farsi, Arabic, Chinese, “and other ‘hard’ languages.” As a university student, Rice had become a fluent Russian speaker. “I reminded everyone that the National Defense Languages Act had . . . increase[d] the numbers of speakers of Russian and East European languages” during the Cold War, she later said.75 The result was the National Security Language Initiative launched by the president on January 5, 2006—a comprehensive national plan developed by the Departments of State, Education, and Defense and the director of national intelligence to expand foreign language education from kindergarten through to university and the workplace.76 Ultimately, the purpose was to boost US security: “An essential component of U.S. national security in the post-9/11 world is the ability to engage foreign governments and peoples, especially in critical regions.” In January 2006, Rice gave a keynote speech announcing the policy of transformational diplomacy, defining it as an attempt to “work with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people—and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. . . . Transformational diplomacy is rooted in partnership, not paternalism—in doing things with other people, not for them [emphasis in original].”77 The “transformation” Rice envisioned involved building the capacity of partner states and encouraging

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stable governance. For the State Department, “the future was in hard places doing hard things.” 78 More specifically, Rice outlined five key elements of transformational diplomacy. First, “global repositioning” was essential: “At present, the allocation of American diplomatic resources still has vestiges of our Cold War posture.” Hundreds of diplomatic positions would be moved to “critical emerging areas” in Africa, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East. (This would start immediately with one hundred positions moving out of Europe and Washington.) Second, there would be a new focus on key regions and transnational challenges in those areas. The department would establish regional public diplomacy centers to “take America’s story directly to the people and the regional television media in real time and in the appropriate language.” It would also mount an “effective forward deployment” of diplomats by encouraging more regular travel to areas of expertise. Third, a new focus on localization would entail posting diplomats overseas to “reach beyond the borders of the traditional diplomatic structures . . . [and] move out from behind their desks into the field, from reporting on outcomes to shaping them.” This would be facilitated by the establishment of American “presence posts” in regional population centers outside capital cities and virtual presence posts—an online presence catering to a specific area, which would allegedly “enable[e] millions of local citizens, particularly young people across Europe, and Asia, and Latin America to interact with personnel in embassies.” Fourth, transformational diplomacy required new training: the curriculum at the Foreign Service Institute would be changed to reflect the move toward southern and eastern locations. Diplomats would now be required to be expert in two regions and fluent in two languages to be promoted to senior ranks. Career advancement would also be linked to service “in one of the more challenging posts. These are dangerous but essential jobs often in states that are poorly governed and that are struggling to become secure, developed, and increasingly democratic.” In a cable dispatch to all diplomatic and consular posts, Rice informed the Foreign Service that one-third of the “reprogrammed” posts would come from Europe, one-third from Washington, and one-third from other regional bureaus. Once in these posts, diplomats would be required to take a hands-on role in “helping foreign citizens to promote democracy building, fight corruption, start businesses, improve healthcare, and reform education,” as well as engage in public diplomacy “to promote US interests abroad.” Finally, transformational diplomacy would mean further encouraging diplomats to work with other US government departments and



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agencies “at the critical intersections of diplomatic affairs, economic reconstruction, and military operations.” This included expanding the capabilities of S/CRS and sending more political advisers to the military commands.79 The day after her speech, Rice also created a new position, director of foreign assistance, who would simultaneously serve as USAID administrator and exercise authority over most of USAID and the State Department’s foreign assistance aid in order to provide improved organizational structure and coordination of more than eighteen federal foreign assistance funding programs and bring this assistance into alignment with US foreign policy objectives.80 The work of this director would be informed by the new foreign assistance framework, which offered five transformational diplomacy objectives to guide the direction and purpose of foreign aid: peace and security, governing justly and democratically, investing in people, economic growth, and humanitarian assistance.81 Objectives governing foreign aid now resembled the new goals of the DoD toward weak and failing states. The repositioning of US diplomats was met with a degree of resistance from Foreign Service officers who had not signed up for the kind of service Rice wanted from them. Encouraging the diplomatic corps to voluntarily take up positions in failing states required a degree of coercion. In October 2006, she wrote to all Foreign Service personnel about the impact of the reforms, which she described as “a vital part of the Department’s transformational diplomacy agenda.” Diplomats were urged to “consider seriously the critical and career-enhancing positions in countries on the forefront of the war against terrorism, important posts in rising powers of the developing world, and fascinating new positions created under the Global Repositioning Program.” However, the carrot of career enhancement was followed by a stick: “We will make assignments first to our greatest hardships and danger posts, and we will not move on to fill most domestic or lesser-differential positions until this is done.” Moreover, promotion to the senior Foreign Service rank would no longer be permitted without prior service in a hardship post. Extensions of posts in lesser-hardship positions would now be restricted, as would advance “handshakes” for those posts. In June 2007, the department introduced “an unprecedented country-specific assignment cycle” to fill positions in Iraq. “Serving our country abroad in this important and difficult time in our history will require some personal sacrifice on everyone’s part,” Rice told the Foreign Service. 82 Ultimately this approach began to bear fruit. From 2006 to 2007, there were, on balance, 107 new posts created and filled across

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Africa, the Near East, South and Central Asia, the Western Hemisphere, and East Asia (including 24 in China). In contrast, 49 posts were lost in Europe (including 10 from Germany and 14 in Russia), 2 were removed from international organizations, and 106 domestic posts were cut. In total 200 posts were repositioned.83 The 2006 National Security Strategy endorsed Rice’s approach, stating that “the way ahead” for the United States included “continuing to reorient the Department of State towards transformational diplomacy” and “promoting the efforts of the new director for foreign assistance/administrator to ensure that foreign assistance is used as effectively as possible to meet our broad foreign policy objectives.”84 Successes and Limitations With Rice as secretary, the State Department was forced to begin adapting in earnest to the Bush administration’s vision of the international security environment in the twenty-first century. Transformational diplomacy and the other civilian-led policies designed to tackle the security problems like terrorism that supposedly emanated from weak and failing states were closely aligned with the Bush administration’s efforts to develop a whole-of-government approach to irregular security challenges. Creating cross-departmental synergy was undoubtedly the biggest test in this respect and the most difficult and countercultural part of waging an irregular campaign. The bureaucratic, personnel, and policy changes at State, USAID, and Defense made some progress in facilitating interagency action; still, practice often lagged behind official policy. In October 2007, the GAO released a detailed study of crossdepartmental stabilization and reconstruction operations from October 2005 to September 2007.85 The problem was not that these operations were not taking place, but that there were still several outstanding requirements for full and effective interagency cooperation. Since December 2005, S/CRS had been testing the interagency planning framework for stabilization and reconstruction operations. As of October 2007, however, the framework had not been fully applied to any stabilization or reconstruction operation. The National Security Council had approved the first and second parts of it, but the third was still being redrafted on the basis of interagency feedback.86 Additional criticisms were made in a review of all projects funded under Section 1206 (the DoD-led train-and-equip program) and Section 1207 (the transfer of money and materials from Defense to State) between 2006 and



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2009.87 Though both programs were executed in a way that had “generally been consistent with US strategic priorities related to combating terrorism and addressing instability,” Section 1207 was deemed insufficiently distinct from other existing foreign assistance programs.88 The 1207 program was supposed to fund activities addressing urgent threats that could not be funded in time under any other program. However, the GAO review of all twenty-eight 1207 projects found that twenty-two expanded on recent or ongoing activities originally funded through other foreign assistance accounts. In addition, the implementation of these projects was not necessarily quicker through using 1207 funds. Moreover, since there was no permanent authorization for 1206 or 1207 funding by the end of the second Bush term, the GAO questioned the long-term viability of the projects it financed.89 Finally, like the stabilization and reconstruction operations, the monitoring and evaluation of both 1206 and 1207 activities were weak. Although DoD and State held the programs in high regard, they had “not consistently defined performance measures for their Section 1206 projects” or “established a plan to monitor and evaluate Section 1206 program results systematically.” Measures of effectiveness existed for individual 1207 programs, but S/CRS officials acknowledged that progress reports were usually submitted late and were not fully analyzed.90 In sum, though the momentum toward interagency stabilization initiatives was quite strong, the speed of change at the policy level was not always matched by adequate implementation and reporting arrangements, and the long-term success of the programs had not been proven conclusively. Back at the Pentagon: Rumsfeld’s Departure and Its Aftermath One month before Rumsfeld left the Department of Defense, he gave the annual Landon Lecture at Kansas State University. In it, he spoke of the new kinds of conflicts he believed the United States faced in the twenty-first century. “This long war represents and presents unprecedented challenges for us wholly unlike any that the United States has ever faced,” he opined. Communist regimes were bad, Rumsfeld said, “but they were nation states. They had capitals. They had laws. They had five-year plans. They had diplomats to sign agreements even if they broke them.” However, the new enemy “has no nation state and no territories to defend. . . . The enemy cannot be deterred through rational self-interest. Today’s threats come less from nation-states, but rather

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from enemies that operate in the shadows, that strike through asymmetric and irregular means.” In the war on terror, “all elements of national power, all agencies of government, as well as a broad coalition of nations will have to be brought to bear more effectively” because the struggle “cannot and will not be won by any single country, even the United States of America.”91 Four weeks later, Rumsfeld spoke at his departure ceremony at the Pentagon. “A number of us came here in 2001 with that mission and mandate to prepare this defense establishment to protect the American people from the unconventional and irregular threats,” he claimed, though he would almost certainly not have used the term irregular in 2001. Nevertheless, with some justification, the president spoke of how “there has been more profound change at the Department of Defense over the past six years than . . . since the Department’s creation in the late 1940s.”92 The changes instituted during Rumsfeld’s six years in the Pentagon also continued after he left the administration. His successor, Robert Gates, a career CIA analyst and former director of central intelligence, was equally as committed to maintaining irregular capabilities as Rumsfeld. In his confirmation hearings, Gates emphasized the importance of “continuing to strengthen our capacity to fight irregular wars. . . . I think that’s where the action is going . . . to be for the foreseeable future.”93 In October 2007, Gates gave a speech to the Association of the United States Army, which signaled continuity with Rumsfeld’s approach. The recent “work and these lessons learned in irregular warfare need to be retained and institutionalized, and should not be allowed to wither on the bureaucratic vine,” Gates stated.94 The subsequent National Defense Strategy, the first of Gates’s tenure, reaffirmed the commitment to full spectrum dominance. “If I could describe the new National Defense Strategy in one word,” said Gates in July 2008, “it would be ‘balance’; balance between the range of capabilities to prevail in persistent asymmetric or irregular conflict and sustaining our conventional and strategic force superiority as a hedge against rising powers. . . . We must be ready for both kinds of conflict and fund the capabilities to do both.”95 Other policies that Gates pursued continued and expanded on initiatives started under Rumsfeld. Though the Building Global Partnerships Act was ultimately rejected by Congress, the DoD had planned a coordinated series of events to promote it. These included Gates delivering the annual Landon Lecture at Kansas State University (as Rumsfeld had in 2006), speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, giving a first-ever joint



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congressional testimony with the secretary of state in April 2008 on interagency cooperation and building partnership capacity, and two further speeches at the Brookings Institute and the US Global Leadership Campaign.96 There was also a continued focus on public affairs under Gates. Four new executive-level courses on strategic communications had been established with the Naval Postgraduate School and the University of Southern California, while State and DoD hosted their first joint education summit and planned to cosponsor the annual Worldwide Strategic Communications Seminar. There were detailed plans for the continued expansion of special operations forces; for the continued strengthening of cultural awareness and language capabilities (over 80 percent of the tasks in the 2005 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap had now been completed); for the full operational capacity of AFRICOM (which became freestanding in October 2008); as well as conventional transformation initiatives, such as the continued development of missile defense and the ongoing basing realignment and closure program.97 In recognition of the new emphasis on stability operations in military doctrine, the Gates Pentagon also established the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce. DoD 3000.05 had called on the military to elevate stability operations alongside combat operations, yet it also recognized that many of these operations were best undertaken by civilians. The Civilian Expeditionary Workforce would offer civilians already employed by the DoD the chance to deploy to war zones and areas of instability for six months and contribute to stability operations. Civilians would provide “support mission requirements such as combat, contingencies, emergency operations, humanitarian and civic assistance activities, disaster relief, restoration of order, drug interdiction, and stability operations.”98 According to Patricia Bradshaw, the deputy under secretary of defense for civilian personnel policy, the program originated in a State Department request to the Pentagon in 2007 for support filling one hundred positions in the provincial reconstruction teams that had been deployed to Afghanistan. The Pentagon was running out of troops for deployment, but it did have more than 900,000 civilians working on these issues. Bradshaw began to work on “a military-civilian substitution initiative,” entailing a comprehensive review of DoD and interagency personnel policies and an interagency working group. By the end of 2008, formal planning was in place for the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, which was codified in DoD Directive 1404.10 signed in January 2009, three days after the Bush administration left office (though the

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under secretary of defense, England, who signed the directive, remained during the transition period).99 The DoD now had its own civilian specialists dedicated to conducting stability operations, which, alongside the State Department’s Civilian Response and Reserve Corps, could reduce the burden on the active military when it came to reconstruction and stabilization activities. Conclusion The post-2004 period saw much change across the departments of State, Defense, and USAID intellectually, organizationally, and in policy terms. Transformational diplomacy and transformational development were authentic attempts to address the security implications of weak and failing states— the root causes of terrorism, according to the Bush administration—and develop what amounted to a nonkinetic irregular response capability. However, the pace and scope of the change meant that the “transformations” in diplomacy and development were often underfunded (at least initially), slow to come to fruition, and managed in an ad hoc manner, particularly when it came to interagency cooperation. There were significant exceptions to this, such as the Section 1206 and 1207 programs (though the latter had funded activities that could have been supported in other ways.) Yet the positive impact of even these programs was generally assumed rather than proven, and measuring outcomes remained a problem. That the GAO was, by 2007, writing lengthy reports evaluating interagency cooperation on stability operations was, in itself, indicative of how important that mission had become in just three years since the establishment of S/CRS. However, fashioning new, shared modus operandi across (at least) three large agencies, each with different missions and distinct cultures, organizations, and working patterns was a long-term challenge. Although the change was not full or complete by the end of the second Bush administration, it went well beyond an intellectual shift. Examples of new practices were visible on the ground: USAID’s civil– military operations activities, the repositioning of the diplomatic corps, the Section 1206 funding, and, ultimately, the Civilian Stabilization Initiative had all gone from theory to practice, though they were still in their infancy. Full and complete interagency mobilization remained a work in progress, but the new initiatives begun in these years left a substantive material legacy in the military and civilian foreign service agencies that endured beyond Rumsfeld’s departure from office and survived into the Obama years.

7

Irregular Warfare with Restraint The Obama Years

I

n May 2013, President Barack Obama gave a speech at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, outlining the nature of the terrorist threat as he saw it. “Today the core of al Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the path to defeat,” he said, but this did not mean the end of the terrorist threat. “Instead what we’ve seen is the emergence of various al Qaida affiliates. From Yemen to Iraq, from Somalia to North Africa, the threat today is more diffuse.” Obama’s diagnosis of the cause of terrorism was remarkably similar to the previous administration’s. Terrorists flourished in areas where “the state has only the most tenuous reach into the territory . . . [or] lacks the capacity or will to take action.” They were “fueled by a common ideology. . . . And in an age when ideas and images can travel the globe in an instant, our response to terrorism can’t depend on military or law enforcement alone. We need all elements of national power to win.”1 Although Obama had stopped using the phrase “war on terror” in favor of the more anodyne “overseas contingency operations,” he accepted the Bush administration’s analysis of weak states and the impact of globalization on international security. Under Obama, counterterrorism activity outside of Afghanistan and Iraq became routine defense activity. Obama even hoped to repeal the 9/11 Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force that had facilitated a global war on terror with multiple fronts.2 His administration’s commitment to a whole-of-government approach to conflict and the retention of IW in national strategy documents signaled that the idea of

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Irregular Warfare had become embedded at an elite policymaking level and enjoyed bipartisan support, even though the practice of IW had not been as smooth or efficient as policymakers had wanted it to be during the Bush years. In the Pentagon’s January 2012 report, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, endorsed with a foreword by Obama, the top “primary mission” of the U.S. armed forces in the twenty-first century was listed as “Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare”—and in keeping with the tradition of full spectrum capabilities, US forces would be “capable of deterring and defeating aggression by any [emphasis added] potential adversary.”3 Yet while the idea of Irregular Warfare had become embedded and many of the new capabilities developed during the Bush years were maintained and in some cases developed further under Obama, the Democratic president was less inclined to use these capabilities on a large scale. The pursuit of a full spectrum of capabilities continued, but the political will to use these capabilities was more limited, especially when it came to major conflict. While smallscale irregular operations, like those in Africa and the Philippines, would continue under Obama, the US armed forces would “no longer be sized to conduct large-scale prolonged stability operations [emphasis in original]”—such as the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq—by themselves, though they would still be ready to conduct “limited counterinsurgency and stability operations” alone if necessary.4 Obama’s global counterterrorism campaign took place in the broader context of what Colin Dueck calls “a modest strategic retrenchment,” which appeared to many observers to be the hallmark of his foreign policy.5 The Obama administration had a different vision of American primacy. Obama’s global strategy was informed by an appreciation of the limits of American power in a world of other rising powers, and therefore a more pronounced commitment to working with allies to secure mutual interests— and not just when it came to transnational security issues. While Obama was still committed to the extension of American primacy, he sought, as Georg Loefflman observes, “a reformulation of American leadership” that prioritized minimizing the risk of American military losses and managing the costs of hegemony whilst still operating as a global power.6 On balance then, while the Obama years witnessed the continued acceptance and development of Irregular Warfare at the policy, doctrinal, and organizational levels, Obama’s willingness to actually engage in major conflict, irregular or conventional, was more limited. As a result, when faced with state collapse in Libya in the aftermath of the NATO intervention in 2011, Obama was disinclined to



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nation-build, despite his acceptance at an intellectual level of the supposed connection between failed states and terrorism and despite the continuation of small-scale IW policy elsewhere in the world. Obama’s tenure was therefore characterized by a markedly different tone from that of the Bush years. Continuity: National Priorities in a Globalized World There were nevertheless important policy continuities between the two presidencies. The embedding of the whole-of-government approach to conflict and the emphasis on preparing for irregular scenarios was visible in every national strategy document produced in the Obama era. The security implications of globalization shaped all US national security planning and objectives from the top down. It was now unthinkable that the country could attempt to maintain its position as the world’s preeminent power without taking account of transnational, asymmetric, and irregular challenges. Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) encapsulated the elite bipartisan intellectual shift that had taken place at the highest levels over the preceding decade. To be sure, the United States was still committed to maintaining its conventional military power in order to prevent the emergence of rival superpowers: it would still prepare to face “enemies on traditional battlefields”7 because “military superiority ... has secured our country, and underpinned global security, for decades.”8 However, “threats to our people, our homeland, and our interests have shifted dramatically in the last 20 years”: “Instead of a hostile expansionist empire, we now face a diverse array of challenges, from a loose network of violent extremists to states that flout international norms or face internal collapse.”9 Security threats in the twenty-first century were “increasingly transnational.”10 This was primarily the result of contemporary globalization. Under Obama, 9/11 remained the essential referent that exemplified the security challenges associated with interdependence: In the two decades since the end of the Cold War, the free flow of information, people, goods, and services has accelerated at an unprecedented rate. This interconnection has empowered individuals for good and ill, and challenged state based international institutions that were largely designed in the wake of World War II by policymakers who had different challenges in mind. Nonstate actors can have a dramatic influence on the world around them. . . . Within this environment, the attacks of September 11, 2001, were a transformative event for the United States.11

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This strategic environment meant it was essential to “continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability operations, and meeting increasingly sophisticated security threats.”12 Echoing the Bush administration, the NSS also put a premium on investing in weak and failing states to prevent them becoming terrorist safe havens by developing the “capacity for responsible governance and security through development and security sector assistance.”13 As during the Bush years, state building would require a blend of development, diplomacy, defense, and the right strategic communications.14 Obama’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism, released in June 2011, was essentially an updated version of Bush’s National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism; it contained all the same prescriptions, from using “every element of American power,” to building the capacity of weak states, to the need for “an alternative to al Qaeda’s vision” in the global battle of ideas.15 This security analysis, set at the top tier of the administration, continued to be visible at other US government departments and agencies. Globalization and its attendant security challenges had become routine considerations for the Departments of State and Defense and the military. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the first of the Obama presidency, reflected continuity with the Rumsfeld-Bush years, stressing the importance of balancing conventional and irregular capabilities, and interagency cooperation. Gates was determined that the military would not repeat the mistakes of the post-Vietnam period and forget the lessons of counterinsurgency. The purpose of this QDR, he claimed, was to “institutionalize successful wartime innovations” derived from “the character of these wars—with enemies hiding amongst populations, manipulating the information environment and employing a challenging mix of tactics and technology.”16 The report offered six initiatives designed to further institutionalize the rebalancing of the military, while in June 2010, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued an instruction establishing “procedures, objectives, and responsibilities to develop capabilities and capacities to conduct Irregular Warfare (IW)-relevant operations and activities” across every service, agency, and organization under the Department of Defense. This included detailed guidance on interagency cooperation.17 In 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton initiated the department’s first quadrennial diplomacy and development review (QDDR) as a joint initiative with USAID.18 Consciously building on Rice’s transformational diplomacy, the QDDR was premised on a world in which US interests were threatened by



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weak states and nonstate actors as much as conventional state-based threats: “Power in the international system, once exercised more or less exclusively by a handful of great powers, is now shared by a wide array of states, institutions, and non-state actors. And the information revolution has accelerated the tempo of international affairs.” In this environment, America needed “forward-deployed civilian power”—a combination of development and preventive diplomacy designed to advance core US interests.19 This meant the expansion of USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, a new State Department Bureau for Crisis and Stabilization Operations, and other new bureaus in five transnational policy areas.20 Development was emphasized as “a core pillar of US foreign policy”: AID mission directors would become the primary development advisers to ambassadors, and an increase in the number of AID Foreign Service officers was sanctioned, as well as new career paths for USAID technical experts.21 Paralleling the DoD’s emphasis on information operations, State would also make public diplomacy “a core diplomatic mission.”22 According to Daniel Benjamin, State’s chief counterterrorism official, “the heart of the conflict with al-Qa’ida is a struggle over narratives.” It was therefore essential for the United States “to discredit its arguments and reduce their persuasiveness.”23 In 2011, State launched a new $15 million public diplomacy initiative, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), which aimed “to prevent at-risk, non-violent people from turning to violence (counter-radicalization), amplif[y] credible voices who reject violence, and persuad[e] disengaged terrorists to renounce violence (de-radicalization).” It would also “enable partner capacity building activities in priority countries, including . . . on counter-radicalization plan development.”24 The CVE initiative resulted in the establishment of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communication under the Bureau of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs “to push back against AQ’s online and media activities.”25 Security Assistance: Section 1206 The DoD also continued its attempts to make its Section 1206 global trainand-equip authority permanent. As Bush departed office, the Building Global Partnerships Act had failed to generate sufficient congressional support, and the 1206 funding was not permanent. Gates was a strong supporter of the 1206 funding, stating that “the most important military component in the

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war on terror is not the fighting we do ourselves but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous armies and police—once the province of Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military.”26 From its inception in October 2005 through to April 2014, the DoD spent $2.2 billion in 1206 funds in over forty countries.27 Due to ongoing concerns about whether the program was effective, Congress continued to decline a permanent authority but did agree to extend 1206 for another three years from FY 2014 to FY 2017, and also extended the program to cover the funding of stability operations.28 Further improvements to the 1206 program continued to be made in response to the joint State–DoD inspector general report of 2009 (discussed in Chapter 5). In February 2013, the Pentagon submitted its new framework for assessing 1206 projects to Congress, along with the first round of assessments, which, for the first time, attempted to judge the effectiveness of the program (the results of this are not currently known).29 The work was considered important, though: a DoD Instruction on Security Force Assistance of October 2010 signaled that this job—defined as “a subset of foreign internal defense”—had become a core activity of the general-purpose forces and could occur “across the range of military operations” and across all domains—air, land, maritime, and cyberspace—“to assist host countries to defend against internal and transnational threats to stability.”30 Security force assistance of this kind was also accorded a high priority by the White House. In April 2013, Obama issued a Presidential Policy Directive, PPD-23, on security force assistance that reflected the changes that had taken place in this area since 2005 and its new importance. PPD-23 distilled into a single document lessons learned since 9/11 about weak states, transnational threats, bi- and multilateralism, and interagency mobilization. Building partners’ security capacity was a cost-effective way to “disrupt and defeat transnational threats; sustain legitimate and effective public safety, security, and justice sector institutions . . . maintain control of . . . territory and jurisdiction waters, including air, land, and sea borders; and help indigenous forces assume greater responsibility for operations where US military forces are present.” This could be successful only if delivered through an “inclusive whole-of-government process that ensures alignment of activities and resources with our national security priorities.”31 Building partner capacity was now an essential element of US global strategy in an age of transnational challenges. To be sure, security assistance was nothing new, but the emphasis



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it was now being given and the new form it took—increased Pentagon involvement and more holistic objectives, including stability operations—was a result of the recent turn toward Irregular Warfare and the need for bi- and multilateral efforts to tackle transnational challenges. It may well be the case that the DoD’s efforts to finally assess the impact of its own programs placated members of Congress concerned about their long-term viability. Starting in FY 2015, Congress agreed to make the 1206 authority permanent, and it was codified as Section 2282 in Title 10 of the US Code.32 Yet the long-term impact of the programs remained moot. A 2017 evaluation by the DoD inspector general found many problems with the planning and management of projects; selection of proposals; and procurement, delivery, assembly, and installation of projects. Many of the 1206/2282 projects were deemed unsustainable because partner nations did not have the skills or funds to keep projects alive.33 Most important, the DoD still had not “develop[ed] the metrics and processes necessary to effectively evaluate performance and assess the individual and collective impacts” of projects. It “had not ensured that each Section 1206 project defined an expected level of operational impact, tracked progress and compared the results to actual impact achieved.” Nor had it “developed a systematic program-assessment methodology to determine the collective impact” of its work.34 Ultimately the DoD agreed with thirteen of the fourteen recommendations for improvement made by the inspector general—an implicit acknowledgment of the failure to prove conclusively the positive impact of the 1206/2282 projects.35 Section 1207 and the Global Security Contingency Funds The Section 1206 funding was not the only authority to receive a permanent mandate. In the early Obama years, the State Department consolidated the socalled Section 1207 funding into a permanent authority, though congressional funding fell short of what was requested. Under Section 1207, the DoD had transferred up to $100 million per year in defense articles, services, training, or other support to the State Department for use in reconstruction and stability operations on account of State’s civilian expertise in this area and congressional underfunding of the S/CRS office. Like the 1206 funding, 1207 had also required annual authorization by Congress. In 2008, the DoD requested a five-year mandate and a doubling of the funding to $200 million, but Congress

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declined. The following year, it requested only the funding increase and not the five-year mandate; again Congress declined, mainly due to concerns about long-term requirements of the State Department being funded by the DoD. As such, the 1207 authority was allowed to expire in September 2010. To replace it, the State Department requested funds to establish the Complex Crises Fund of $100 million to “support activities to prevent or respond to emerging or unforeseen crises that address reconstruction, security, or stabilization needs.” Projects funded would “aim to address and prevent root causes of conflict and instability through a whole-of-government approach and will include host government participation.” Congress agreed to only $50 million, however.36 In subsequent years, State requested funding increases, citing the crisis fund’s “critical support for programs in Tunisia, Somalia, Kyrgyz Republic, Yemen, Sri Lanka, and Côte d’Ivoire,” but as of 2014, Congress had declined to increase funds above $50 million per annum.37 The request had come amid a wider debate in Congress about reform of the entire US foreign aid program to make it more coherent, promote a single set of objectives and practices, and, ideally, fewer funding mechanisms, to unite the patchwork of foreign aid programs and appropriations spread across the departments and agencies of the US government. Concept papers, discussion pieces, and draft legislation were released by the House and Senate foreign affairs committees in 2009–ten, but without consensus on what changes were required, no legislation was passed—and the crisis fund remained underfunded.38 However, the State Department also actively promoted yet another interagency capacity building program. In 2012, State requested money for a new Global Security Contingency Fund, which would be financed collaboratively with the DoD. In 2009, Gates wrote to Clinton to suggest that the two departments use “pooled funds set up for security capacity building, stabilization, and conflict prevention. Both the State and Defense departments would contribute to these funds,” Gates suggested, “and no project could move forward without the approval of both agencies.” This was similar to the existing Section 1206 program, but with some subtle yet significant differences. Under Gates’s new proposal, the State Department would lead, though with DoD concurrence, and the authority would be much broader than just military and maritime security forces. “What I found compelling about this approach,” Gates continued, “is that it would actually incentivize collaboration between different agencies of our government.” 39 The suggestion culminated in a 2011 request from the State Department for a three-year, $50 million pilot program



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that would fund security forces as well as “the justice sector . . . rule of law programs, and stabilization efforts.” The ultimate rationale for the Global Security Contingency Fund was by now familiar: “to address rapidly changing, transnational, asymmetric threats, and emergent opportunities strategically where an environment’s security, political, economic, and social needs warrant such attention.”40 In other words, in weak states, lacking effective governance, development was essential to ward off security threats. Funds were committed through 2019 for use in East Africa, the Philippines, Ukraine, and the Lake Chad Basin (encompassing Chad, Niger, and Nigeria).41 Interagency Bureaucratic Adaption As programs like Section 1207 received expanded mandates or were made permanent, investigations by the GAO continued to examine the extent to which State, USAID, and the DoD were adapting to the requirements of a whole-ofgovernment approach. This revealed some progress but also challenges that remained. Specific examples of the drive to improve interagency collaboration could be seen in the DoD’s humanitarian and development assistance programs. As a result of the military’s turn toward nonkinetic operations, its spending on humanitarian and development programs increased by 60 percent between 2005 and 2010.42 A 2012 GAO investigation into these programs found that they had “incorporated positive practices, such as aligning project planning to US and departmental strategic goals and collaborating with State and USAID on individual projects” by seeking agreement on project proposals at an early stage.43 The DoD was already in the process of developing guidance for a new department-wide instruction on humanitarian assistance, and a new data system to capture the results of these programs was scheduled to become operational in February 2011. The Pentagon was mandating after action reports thirty days and one year after project completion.44 The State Department confirmed that it was “already in discussion with respect to broadening the Foreign Assistance Dashboard [State’s database of foreign aid] to include DoD’s foreign assistance.” It was also rolling out the Integrated Country Strategy process, which compelled country teams to develop strategic plans in coordination with the military and any other US government representatives in the country.45 One of the most difficult problems that GAO identified was developing common terminology for humanitarian operations across the three agencies.

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DoD agreed with the need to “develop guidance that provides a common understanding of the terminology used by DoD, State, and USAID related to their humanitarian and development assistance efforts.”46 State responded that “the confusion with respect to terminology is not based on a lack of trying to understand one another, but rather the inconsistent terminology and objectives of DoD . . . when compared to legislative mandates governing the work of [State] and [USAID].”47 (USAID offered a similar response: though information-sharing initiatives were underway, “the difficulties  .  .  . should not be underestimated” because of different authorities and practices at each agency.48) Thus, the agencies were attempting to overcome issues surrounding different terminology and information sharing, but surmounting linguistic and operational differences was a long-term project for which there was no obvious or quick solution. To this end, the Obama administration supported a comprehensive program of professional development activities intended to improve interagency collaboration. As of late 2010, there were 225 such activities that were specifically designed, according to the GAO, “to improve participants’ ability to collaborate across agency lines.” These included training courses, scenariobased simulation programs, interagency rotation programs, joint professional military education programs, and leadership development programs. Activities ranged from ten-month military education programs and year-long interagency rotations (mostly provided by State and DoD) to thirty-minute online training courses.49 The GAO believed that these activities helped in three specific ways. They “buil[t] common foundational knowledge of the national security arena” and, according to agency officials, could help “reinforce a common vocabulary or framework for understanding complex policy issues.” Second, they helped with “developing skills for interagency collaboration on national security . . . such as how to plan, lead, and execute interagency efforts”—for example, the National Defense University’s Whole-of-Government Planning for Reconstruction and Stabilization course offered in collaboration with the State Department. Third, the training “establishe[d] networks across national security agency lines.” The National Defense University’s capstone course for generals, flag officers, and members of the civilian senior executive service brought together participants from all the military services and a range of federal agencies to increase their understanding of a whole-ofgovernment approach to national security. One of the course objectives was for participants to “establish a peer network for future cooperation.”50 These



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efforts culminated in a National Security Professional Development Initiative, established in 2011, which built on a smaller program of the same name from the Bush years and targeted key individuals working primarily in an interagency context.51 These efforts persisted from Bush to Obama because of the shared perception of a new global security environment and the desire to confront and defeat threats and challenges associated with weak states and globalization. The difference between the two presidents was in the precise circumstances under which they believed that the use of force was required. Old Fronts: The Periphery Under Obama US security activity continued in the peripheral theaters of the war on terror under Obama, though in some cases, it took on a new form. In Georgia and the Philippines, existing operations were wound down but replaced with ongoing security assistance; in sub-Saharan Africa, there was continuity with the Bush era and even an intensification of the militarization of US energy policy in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as significant setbacks in Mali and Somalia. Georgia and the Caspian The Obama administration remained committed to the continued integration of Georgia into the Euro-Atlantic sphere. It embraced the Bush administration’s 2009 US–Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership and publicly supported Georgia’s “territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty.”52 Programs to build Georgian military capacity continued but at a lower level and no longer specifically under the auspices of the war on terror. The two countries cooperated on border and maritime security, transnational crime, and detection of nuclear materials.53 The Bush administration’s Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program, which trained Georgian troops in counterinsurgency techniques before deployment to Iraq, continued under Obama as the Georgia Deployment Program (GDP), though this time, the troops would be sent to Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force. Beginning in September 2009, the GDP was a two-year initiative consisting of four six-month rotations, by the end of which Georgian infantry battalions would be “trained, equipped and integrated with US forces to conduct operations in a counterinsurgency environment.”54 On both sides, the perception was of another highly successful program: according to the US trainers, Georgian troops were

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sufficiently qualified “to conduct the full spectrum of combat operations in a counterinsurgency environment,” and the program was extended through 2014 (and eventually to 2017).55 Amid this, the thorny issue of Georgian NATO membership remained. According to the US embassy in Tbilisi, “Whether they make the connection explicit or not, the Georgians see their contributions to Afghanistan as a down payment on their admission into NATO.”56 More broadly, the Obama administration also continued to fund programs “in order to develop security cooperation across the Caspian to develop regional capabilities and respond to maritime transnational threats.”57 This was driven by the continued commitment to exploiting the Caspian’s energy reserves. Obama reappointed Richard Morningstar, Bill Clinton’s former Caspian energy czar, as special envoy for Eurasian energy in charge of finding “new routes to market” for Caspian oil and gas; helping those countries make “independent choices regarding how they deal with their energy resources”; finding new routes for Kazakh oil; and assisting Europe’s quest for energy security—meaning diminishing its reliance on Russia. In this respect, there was continuity with Bush, indicative of the bipartisan agreement that existed on energy security in the Caspian.58 The Philippines: Winding Down the Second Front The same was true in the Philippines, and the perception of success there continued. Admiral Robert Willard, head of Pacific Command, told Congress that Operation Enduring Freedom–The Philippines (OEF-P) had “some notable [Philippine] successes” in 2009, “and we have seen its momentum carry over to 2010.” Under US tutelage, the AFP had captured or killed more than a dozen ASG and Jemaah Islamiya leaders, and “perhaps more importantly the effort has resulted in enhanced quality of life and denial of safe haven to extremists in the area.” OEF-P had reinforced the importance of “a whole of government approach and a coordinated multi-national effort” in counterterrorism operations according to Willard—for example, through the use of Section 1206 funds for maritime security programs in the Philippines and Bangladesh.59 More broadly, Pacific Command was adapting its posture to ensure that it could counter not just conventional state-based threats but also “transnational violent extremist organizations” (a “pervasive and urgent challenge” in the Pacific region) and “transnational criminal activity.”60 At the request of the Philippine government, however, this period also saw the winding down of OEF-P. However, its replacement in 2015 with ongoing



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routine joint security initiatives would mean a significant degree of continuity even without the official OEF-P designation. From 2010, when the Philippine government announced its intention, to September 2015, when OEF-P was scheduled to finish, US efforts focused on institutionalizing the approach taken over the previous eight years within the Philippine armed forces and providing advisory assistance to the Philippine National Police.61 Yet there was little evidence of the success of this approach given the steady size of the ASG and the number of attacks. From 2002 to 2011, the State Department had estimated the ASG’s strength every year at 200 to 500 members; from 2012 to 2016, the estimate each year was 400—in other words, relatively stable despite the US security assistance.62 The number of attacks increased. The early Obama years saw a moderate sustained increase in comparison to the Bush years: nineteen attacks in 2009 and twenty each year from 2010 to 2012.63 Major increases took place from 2013 onward, however, with thirtyfive attacks in 2013, fifty-five in 2014, ninety-three in 2015, and seventy-four in 2016—hardly proof that US Irregular Warfare techniques could solve the root causes of conflict in the Philippines.64 An otherwise favorable report about the history of OEF-P produced in 2016 by the RAND Corporation, at the request of the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low intensity conflict, also highlighted potential problems with the civil–military operations that were a key part of US activity in the Philippines. After interviewing many military and civilian staff who served in OEF-P, the report’s authors claimed that it was only “in later years” that SOF and USAID personnel “made efforts to ensure that projects were not redundant and were serving legitimate economic development needs” and that “undoubtedly some number of roads, schools, wells, and other structures were built that were not needed, finished, or maintained.”65 This highlighted the tension at the heart of stability operations: though they ostensibly appeared humanitarian, they were conceived as tactics in an irregular war, and appearances were more important than effectiveness in the long term. Yet even as the second front of the war on terror wound down, the Philippines remained an important spoke in the American security hub in the Pacific.66 As part of Obama’s pivot to Asia, the US security relationship with the Philippines was deepened further.67 According to Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, the strengthening of the US-Philippine relationship was “part of a broader strategy by the Obama

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administration to increase American strategic engagement and focus in the Asia-Pacific region.” The United States was “an enduring Pacific power,” and the new strategic pivot meant “deepening and broadening our alliances with Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand, and of course the Philippines.” This meant continuing operations against “al Qaeda–linked terrorist groups in the southern Philippines” and expanding cooperation in other areas.68 In November 2011, Clinton visited the Philippines and suggested that the security relationship between the two countries was being stepped up to ensure that both sides were “operationally and materially capable of deterring provocations from the full spectrum of state and non-state actors.”69 This continued cooperation culminated in the Agreement on Enhanced Defense Cooperation signed in April 2014 to coincide with Obama’s visit to the Philippines. This essentially increased US access to the Philippines by expanding the list of “agreed locations” in which the United States could operate on a rotational basis. The “mutuality of benefits” meant there would be no charge for the use of Philippine territory and facilities. In return, the United States would fill “capabilit[y] gaps” in the AFP and aid its “long-term modernization” with a particular focus on maritime security.70 Thus, the US military presence in the Philippines expanded even as Operation Enduring Freedom there came to a close. Counterterrorism in Africa Obama also retained the Bush administration’s emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa as a site of strategic and commercial significance. The 2012 Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa could hardly have differed more from the previous version released during the Clinton years that virtually disavowed any commercial or strategic interest in Africa.71 The 2012 strategy stated that Africa was “more important than ever to the security and prosperity . . . [of] the United States.”72 The continent was home to a number of transnational security challenges such as al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, which required the continuation of US efforts to “strengthen the capacity of civilian bodies to provide security for their citizens and counter violent extremism through more effective governance, development, and law enforcement efforts,” as well as building the security capacity of African militaries.73 However, Africa was also now a site of economic opportunity.74 One manifestation of this was the Increasing American Jobs Though Greater Exports to Africa Act of 2012. As the coauthor of the House bill, Representative Bobby Rush (D-IL), stated



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in congressional hearings on the legislation, “Seven out of ten of the fastest growing economies are today in Africa. Africa has an expanding middle class hungry for American products and its services. It is also in need of investment in its rapidly expanding infrastructure.”75 In his supporting testimony, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson stated his “firm belief that Africa represents the next global economic frontier” because its growth projections were higher than predictions for Latin America, Central Asia, and Europe. The State Department’s initiatives to support US investment in Africa included a recent trade mission to Mozambique, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Ghana with ten US energy companies, and, in collaboration with other US government agencies, State would host the US–Africa Business Conference in Ohio in June 2012.76 (Although Carson did not mention the sizable Chinese commercial presence in Africa, it did concern members of Congress. Bobby Rush warned that “we are standing flat-footed as China, India, and Brazil and others are being fleet-footed.” Other congressional hearings were also convened to discuss China’s role in Africa.77) For the Obama administration, these commercial initiatives would come to nothing without a viable security strategy for Africa. According to Daniel Benjamin, the State Department remained concerned about “porous borders” and the “limited resources” of African states.78 Under Obama, existing Bush-era capacity-building and FID programs endured. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative continued with the same rationale as in the Bush years.79 AFRICOM continued to oversee the work of the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa in Djibouti.80 Its headquarters remained in Stuttgart, however. In 2010, AFRICOM commander William Ward acknowledged that “at this time, it is my estimation that any great effort to locate an Americansize headquarters of that nature [in Africa] would probably be more counterproductive than productive.”81 Obama also supplemented the Bush-era capacity-building programs with new activities cut from the same cloth. The State Department’s $100 million Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism (PREACT) was another “multifaceted, multiyear strateg[y] to combat violent extremism and defeat terrorist organizations” through “build[ing] the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors” in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda.”82 In 2014, at Obama’s request, Congress created the $5 billion Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund, also dedicated to counterterrorism capacity building.83 In 2017, monies were earmarked

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for use in East Africa, the Sahel-Maghreb, and the Lake Chad Basin to counter Boko Haram in Nigeria.84 A third new, subtly different capacity-building program was announced by Obama in August 2014 at the first US–Africa Leaders Summit in Washington. The Security Governance Initiative (SGI), between the United States and six African partners (Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia) was dedicated to “building the capacity of institutions [emphasis added] that help manage a country’s security sector rather than on providing training or equipment to a country’s security forces.”85 The Obama team accepted the Bush administration’s analysis of Africa as a potential and actual locus of terrorism, as well as its emphasis on capacity building in the security sector as an antidote to this. Energy Security in the Gulf of Guinea Under Obama, the militarization of the US approach to the Gulf of Guinea also intensified, driven by concern for the security of the region’s natural resources. Significantly, this occurred as US oil imports from the Gulf were falling dramatically. In 2010, 17.25 percent of all US imported oil came from the Gulf of Guinea; in 2014, it was just 2.98 percent.86 This dramatic downward trajectory was the opposite of what the State Department, the Department of Energy, and the US intelligence community had been predicting in the early twenty-first century.87 This major geopolitical reversal was the result of a massive unforeseen increase in US domestic oil and gas production from shale rock formations.88 Yet, significantly, the fact that the United States itself was less reliant on West African oil did not lessen its commitment to securing that area and ensuring that its oil reached the global market—an important indication of the Obama administration’s commitment to the provision of global public goods and the transnationalization of oil. More specifically, in response to a spike in oil piracy in 2011, the United States intensified its military commitment to the Gulf of Guinea by initiating an annual multinational training exercise, Operation Obangame Express, designed to train partners in this vital region in maritime security. In 2016, Obangame Express had thirty-two countries from the Gulf littoral states and European nations, including the United States, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands.89 In addition to training exercises, the United States organized real interdictions on the high seas under the auspices of the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership.90 The partnership, led by the



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Navy and AFRICOM, was designed to allow “African partner nations to build maritime security capacity and improve management of their maritime environment through real world combined law enforcement operations.”91 Since the establishment of the Africa Partnership Station in 2006, the US Navy had trained thousands of military personnel in skills such as seamanship, searchand-rescue operations, law enforcement, medical readiness, and boat maintenance.92 Nevertheless, local capacity remained insufficient and underdeveloped. By 2015, the Gulf of Guinea had become the most dangerous region in the world for seafarers, with a rise in violence across the year and an increase in kidnap-for-ransom in the fourth quarter of 2015.93 Somalia US efforts fared little better in Somalia. The Obama administration essentially continued the Bush administration’s pro-Ethiopia policy in support of the Meles government in Addis Ababa and the Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab, the terrorist group that emerged in response to the US-backed Ethiopian occupation of the country, grew in strength. In July 2010, it conducted its first attack outside the country, in Kampala, Uganda. From mid-2010 to mid-2011, however, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces were able to virtually expel al-Shabaab from Mogadishu, allowing the transitional federal government to take full control of the city.94 Though Washington was determined to avoid overt US involvement and certainly the use of US ground troops—“we do not want an American footprint or boot on the ground” in Somalia, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson claimed—US support for AMISOM went beyond training and equipment.95 A 2010 Senate report on al-Qaeda in Somalia and Yemen confirmed that the United States had used remote-controlled drones to bomb suspected members of al-Qaeda in Somalia.96 According to journalist Jeremy Scahill, a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) team was deployed inside Somalia to conduct air strikes in support of AMISOM, and many US-based private security contractors were based at Mogadishu airport training Somali security forces, supporting AMISOM, or providing logistical support for aid groups and journalists. The CIA also had its own aircraft in Mogadishu, as well as a counterterrorism center, known by Somalis as the “Pink House” because of its color, at which it ran counterterrorism training courses for Somali intelligence agents.97 In 2012, Carson praised AMISOM’s “remarkable” success now that it controlled all of Mogadishu.98 The reality, however, was that al-Shabaab still

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controlled approximately half the country; according to some reports, this was more than any other faction in Somalia.99 With the election of a new president in September 2012, the United States recognized a permanent government in Somalia for the first time in two decades in January 2013—but the government’s writ was limited and al-Shabaab seemed to be expanding its capabilities. In September 2013, it carried out another international attack, this time in a shopping mall in Nairobi, killing sixty-seven. The State Department continued to hail “the successful completion of the Djibouti peace process” and the newly elected government, and claimed that pressure from AMISOM had “weakened al-Shabaab’s ability to wage conventional military offensives and hold territory inside Somalia.”100 In reality, al-Shabaab, which had officially merged with al-Qaeda in early 2012, continued to control much of southern Somalia and wage an insurgency against the new government in Mogadishu.101 Both al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab were complex entities with multiple factions and franchises; nevertheless, a report by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations concluded that “al-Qaeda is now a more sophisticated and dangerous organization in Africa. . . . [Its] foothold in Somalia has probably been facilitated by the involvement of Western powers and their allies.” In fact, it was likely that US air strikes in Somalia “have only increased popular support for al-Shabaab.”102 A decade of preventive counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa had culminated in the establishment of a new and brutal Islamist extremist group with transnational reach. By 2015, despite the death of key operatives and the loss of previous strongholds and safe haven in parts of south-central Somalia, al-Shabaab established new safe havens across thousands of miles of territory and continued launching attacks and suicide bombings in Somalia. In April it was responsible for the worst terrorist attacks in Kenya’s history, killing 145 at Garissa University. As the Obama administration left office, it reportedly intensified its use of special operations forces and drones in Somalia and broadened the authority for the use of force to include bombing raids to protect African troops fighting against al-Shabaab (that is, when US lives were not at stake).103 Despite the intensification of US activity over the years, attacks by al-Shabaab increased dramatically from 26 in 2008, to 233 in 2012, and a high of 866 in 2014. (In Obama’s final year in office, this had fallen, but only to 558).104 There was little sign that the capacity-building programs implemented in East Africa since 2002 had served their purpose, and the expansion of the Somali theater was a significant legacy of the Obama administration.



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Mali: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Takes Over The same approach also failed to prevent the emergence of another al-Qaeda franchise in North and West Africa, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and its takeover of northern Mali in 2012. AQIM had its roots in violent Islamist militant groups that fought in the Algerian civil war, especially the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).105 Searching for a way to make itself relevant again and find new recruits, the GSPC declared its loyalty to al-Qaeda in 2003, and on September 11, 2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s deputy leader, announced the merger of the two networks in a video statement. In January 2007, the GSPC changed its name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and began conducting frequent attacks in Algeria, Mali, Libya, Mauritania, and Niger.106 By 2012, there were also signs that AQIM was sharing explosives and funds with Nigeria’s Boko Haram, according to General Carter Ham, the new AFRICOM commander.107 Since its independence in 1960, Mali had been wracked by internal rebellions especially in the northern region inhabited by ethnic Tuaregs. A fourth rebellion against the central government in Bamako began in January 2012 and was the result of long-standing political grievances between the government and the Tuaregs.108 For the first time, the Tuaregs formed an alliance of convenience with AQIM and two other Mali-based militant groups, Ansar al-Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa. The progress of these armed groups in the north provoked a military coup in Bamako in March 2012 and, as a result, the suspension of all US foreign assistance to Mali except humanitarian aid. In the post-coup environment, AQIM and its allies took control of over half of Malian territory.109 Mali was now the second country in Africa in which al-Qaeda-inspired militants controlled vast tracts of territory. Comparing the country to Afghanistan, Clinton described the situation as “a very serious ongoing threat because if you look at the size of northern Mali, if you look at the topography, it’s not only desert, it’s caves—sounds reminiscent. We are in for a struggle. . . . We cannot permit Mali to become a safe haven” for terrorists.110 To the State Department, this was another example of the problem of weak states and porous borders. According to Carson, Mali’s problems reflected “the fragility of governance in the region, the lack of economic development . . . [and] the absence of meaningful opportunities for people to engage with their governments.”111 The United States had been engaged in foreign internal defense programs designed to build governance and security capacity in the Sahel and Maghreb regions for almost a decade,

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yet in 2012, US officials continued to blame “porous borders and limited government presence and capacity” for AQIM’s success.112 In response to a request from the Malian government, France, the former colonial power, launched Operation Serval, a multilateral mission, including African francophone countries, to reverse the AQIM position. (The operation included three members of the TSCTI: Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso).113 US support included contributing $96 million to fund the mission, as well as intelligence sharing, airlift support for personnel and equipment, and aerial refueling.114 The French-led intervention enabled the Malian army to regain control of most of the north of the country by mid-2013. Civilian rule was restored in September, and US security assistance resumed. For the most part, the north had been stabilized, but remnants of AQIM and other associated groups remained active, and terrorist incidents continued through 2014 against Chadian, French, and Malian targets.115 In 2003, Mali had been described as the “centerpiece and linchpin” of the Pan Sahel Initiative.116 Yet after almost ten years of capacity building, the country had been unable to prevent the emergence of AQIM or contain its influence. One US Army major, who spent nearly a year in the field with Malian forces, described the “highly visible disintegration of the Malian military in the face of al Qaeda affiliates and the coup d’etat by Malian junior military officers that led to the overthrow of the democratically elected president.”117 Stephen Harman notes that the French military did not include the Malian army in its operations against Islamist fighters in the northern Kidal region because the “hollowness and incompetence” of Malian forces was clear when they were beaten by AQIM and its allies in 2012.118 Although the French-led intervention stabilized the country somewhat, Islamist terrorism continued, and in Mali, it increased. In 2009, AQIM was responsible for thirty-three acts of violence in the Sahel (though twenty-four of these were in Algeria). In 2016, it conducted twenty-nine violent acts, but now the majority (twenty) were in Mali. The group’s geographic reach also expanded. In 2016 it conducted attacks in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Algeria, Niger, and Mauritania, as well as Mali.119 In March 2015, General David Rodriguez, AFRICOM commander, warned of “an increasingly cohesive network of al-Qa’ida affiliates and adherents” in sub-Saharan Africa that “continues to exploit Africa’s under-governed regions and porous borders to train and conduct attacks.” Casualties from improvised explosive devices used by these groups in Africa had increased by approximately 40 percent in 2014,



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Rodriguez claimed.120 Proving the point in the most horrific fashion, AQIM participated in the siege of the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako in November 2015, murdering twenty.121 In ten years, Africa had gone from being a continent largely free of Islamist violence to one that hosted two significant and active al-Qaeda franchises. New Fronts: The Expansion of Drone Warfare In his May 2013 speech about the “end” of the war on terror, Obama claimed that America’s overseas contingency operations would manifest as “a series of persistent targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America.” While this meant that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would be brought to an end—contributing to Obama’s reputation as a president who was more cautious than his predecessor when it came to major combat operations—it also meant the expansion of US operations in other areas, most notably in western Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Yemen. Obama’s favored methods, drone warfare and special operations forces, allowed him to simultaneously expand the geographical scope of counterterrorism activity while avoiding major combat operations. The latter was undoubtedly a priority for a president who was cognizant of public fatigue with major wars and for whom domestic policy objectives, such as health care reform, were equally as important as foreign policy.122 The expansion of Obama’s overseas contingency operations relied on precedents inherited from the Bush years: first, on the September 2001 Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), which placed no temporal or geographical limits on the response to 9/11 and had never been rescinded, and second, on presidential orders that deliberately defined the terrorist threat as global in scope and thus permitted the DoD to take action anywhere on the global battlefield. In September 2009, General David Petraeus, formerly the chief advocate of counterinsurgency in Iraq, and Admiral Eric Olsen, head of SOCOM, drafted the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Execute Order, code-named Avocado, giving permission for clandestine operations outside Iraq and Afghanistan without prior presidential approval for each mission.123 Under Obama, US special operations forces acted covertly on a global scale and worked “harder, faster, quicker, and with the full support of the White House,” according to one JSOC operator.124 By mid-2010, SOCOM had a presence in seventy-five countries around the world, compared to sixty

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when Obama came to power. Four thousand personnel were located outside Iraq and Afghanistan. The president also requested a 5.7 percent increase in the special operations budget for fiscal year 2011 for a total of $6.3 billion with an extra $3.5 billion in 2010 contingency funding. In a seeming reversal of the doctrine of plausible deniability, which had historically been the sine qua non of presidential approval for covert operations, SOCOM commanders were invited directly to the White House to discuss ideas for JSOC operations. A SOCOM official told the Washington Post that “we have a lot more access [under Obama]” and that the president was “asking for ideas and plans . . . calling us in and saying ‘Tell me what you can do. Tell me how you do these things.’”125 Thus, “war in countries we are not at war with” continued under Obama. Much information about Obama’s use of special operations forces remains classified at the time of writing, but more is known about his drone warfare program. Obama relied on JSOC to conduct an expanded campaign of targeted killing by bombing alleged terrorists from unmanned aerial vehicles known as drones. By the end of his term in office, seven countries had been targeted by drones (Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq) under the auspices of the 9/11 AUMF. The expansion of the use of drones was controversial. The killings could be done from afar; drones were piloted remotely, so it was no longer necessary to send American pilots into harm’s way to deliver the bombs, arguably making the resort to force easier. It was also impossible to judge the innocence or guilt of those targeted by the drones because there would be no trial or interrogation of the suspects. No evidence was ever presented against those killed, who were given no opportunity to defend themselves.126 The process by which a target was added to the “kill list” was completely opaque; not even American citizens, such as Anwar al-Awlaki, bombed to death in Yemen in January 2010, were allowed to hear the charges against them.127 Court rulings in 2010, 2013, and 2017 confirmed that domestic courts could not challenge the placement of suspected targets on the kill list.128 Congressional oversight was inconsistent and incomplete.129 The administration also opted to ignore international human rights law— the operative framework for military action in countries with which the United States was not at war (such as Somalia and Yemen) and which permitted lethal action only in case of an imminent threat to life. Since it wanted more latitude in terms of who or what it targeted, the administration made



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up its own list of targeting standards in 2013. These were more circumscribed than the law of armed conflict, which applied in war zones, but looser than international human rights law.130 Ultimately no one knew how many civilians were accidentally killed by drone bombs since the military systematically underestimated casualties due to lack of human intelligence on the ground.131 Pakistan and Yemen After the fall of the Taliban, many of its fighters fled over the border to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of western Pakistan. Here they found refuge, and some began to launch attacks on Western forces from Pakistani territory. The FATA region became a hub for Islamist militants; the July 7 attacks in London and the plot to use a liquid gel explosive at Heathrow airport in 2006 were traced back to the area.132 Until June 2004, drones in western Pakistan were used solely for reconnaissance purposes. It became clear, however, that the Pakistani government, which had pledged its allegiance to the United States after 9/11, was unwilling to attack all of the militant groups in the FATA, some of which supported Pakistan’s policy in Kashmir and others that were useful for intervening in Afghanistan to promote Islamabad’s interests.133 As a result, and with the quiet support of Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf, JSOC began periodic drone attacks in western Pakistan in mid-2004. By the end of Bush’s term in office, forty-four strikes had been conducted.134 Under Obama, the drone program expanded rapidly in Pakistan. The new president sanctioned 52 strikes in 2009—more than in Bush’s entire two terms in office. This was followed by 128 in 2010, 75 in 2011, 50 in 2012, and 27 in 2013, for a combined total of 280 bombings from 2009 to 2013. The most authoritative estimates of civilian casualties currently available, from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, suggest that a minimum of 249 but as many as 625 civilians were killed from 2009 to 2013. (The total number of deaths in this period was between 1,886 and 3,124.)135 Despite claims that drones could be targeted with surgical accuracy, the dearth of human intelligence on the ground in the FATA meant civilian casualties were inevitable. Precision strikes were only as good as, or not, the intelligence that guided them.136 Since none of the evidence against the targets was ever made public, let alone any charges brought against them, it was impossible to verify the administration’s claims that it was targeting only individuals who posed a serious security threat.

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In Yemen, where the first American targeted killing by drone had taken place in 2002, President Saleh was a more enthusiastic supporter.137 In a meeting with John Brennan, deputy national security adviser, on September 6, 2009, Saleh “insisted that Yemen’s national territory is available for unilateral CT [counterterrorism] operations by the US.”138 Yemen was now home to an active new al-Qaeda franchise known as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which emerged in the country after a mass prison breakout in Sana’a in February 2006.139 In his meeting with Brennan, Saleh “repeatedly requested more funds and equipment to fight al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, while at the same time placing responsibility for any future AQAP attacks on the shoulders of the USG now that it enjoys unfettered access to Yemeni airspace, coastal waters and land.” While such access was welcome, the US ambassador to Yemen, Stephen Seche, suggested that Saleh had ulterior motives: “A concerted USG anti-terrorism campaign in Yemen will free Saleh to continue to devote his limited security assets to the ongoing war against Houthi rebels” in the north. (Saleh had tried in vain to equate the Houthi with Iran and/or AQAP and cast the insurgency as part of the war on terror.)140 In the end, it was reported that Saleh agreed to allow at least three drones to operate regularly in Yemen.141 The November 2002 bombing that killed six al-Qaeda suspects with the full support of the government in Sana’a remains the only known US drone attack in Yemen in the Bush years. However, Washington spent over $115 million in training and equipping Yemeni counterterrorism forces from 2002 to 2009.142 Under Obama, an extended bombing campaign began in December 2009 with the full support of Saleh, who expressed a desire for the operations to continue “non-stop until we eradicate this disease.” Moreover, Sana’a maintained publicly that it was solely responsible for the operations and assured the US ambassador that “any evidence of greater U.S. involvement—such as U.S. munitions found at the sites—could be explained away as equipment purchased from the U.S.”143 Yet there is little to no correlation between US drone strikes in Yemen and a diminution in AQAP activity. From 2012 to 2016, the number of drone strikes fluctuated between a minimum of 13 to 15 and a maximum of 32. However, incidences of AQAP terrorism remained very high: 201 violent acts in 2012, 144 in 2013, a high of 337 in 2014, 143 in 2015, and a low of 92 in 2016.144 Again there was scant evidence that the US approach was working.



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Strategic Restraint in Other Failed States The reliance on targeted killing from the air allowed Obama to expand the geographic scope of America’s counterterrorism operations while avoiding major combat operations. Yet the dominant perception of his foreign policy is that it was more restrained and cautious than that of his predecessor.145 There is no doubt that this was partly due to Obama’s preference for remotecontrolled bombing where American drone operators were far away from the conflict zone. Obama’s recognition of the relative decline in American power also contributed to a greater commitment to multilateral action not just as an instrumental method of countering transnational security threats, as seen in the Bush years, but also in pursuit of other shared interests. The 2010 National Security Strategy emphasized the importance of “effective burden sharing among the United States, our allies, and partners” and building a rules-based international system to advance US interests “as we did after World War II.”146 Obama’s commitment to a more restrained hegemony was exemplified above all in his approach to Libya and to territories controlled by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—all areas where state control was weak or nonexistent, where violence by nonstate actors was flourishing, but where Obama was reluctant to lead or deploy American combat troops. “Leading from behind” was the phrase an Obama adviser used to describe the administration’s approach to Libya.147 After the Libyan Arab Spring uprising against the Gaddafi regime began in February 2011, government security forces opened fire on protesters in the eastern city of Benghazi. Antigovernment protests spread and evolved into an armed revolt to topple Gaddafi. Amid rumors that the regime was preparing to slaughter civilians in Benghazi— rumors that later appeared to be unfounded148—the UN Security Council, with the support of the Arab League, authorized “all necessary measures” to protect civilians.” NATO powers launched air strikes on government targets, ostensibly aimed at imposing a no-fly zone.149 The Obama administration’s approach was to act as an enabler for its NATO allies to take primary responsibility for Libya.150 For twelve days at the beginning of the NATO intervention, US airpower took the lead in bombing Libyan air defenses to impose a no-fly zone; thereafter, US forces played a supporting role to the British and French under NATO command. Obama’s limited response reflected his wariness about being dragged into another ground war, as well as his preference for burden sharing with US allies. “When issues of global concern do not pose

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a direct threat to the United States,” he said in 2014, “we must mobilize allies and partners to take collective action” 151 Although they exceeded the UN mandate for a no-fly zone and targeted sites associated with the Gaddafi regime, none of the NATO powers had planned for a post-Gaddafi Libya.152 The country regressed to a failed state: divided, with two competing governments, widespread militia violence, and, even worse, a haven for radical Islamists, especially those associated with ISIS.153 In September 2012, an al-Qaeda-affiliated group, Ansar al-Sharia, attacked the US diplomatic compound in Benghazi, killing the US ambassador, Christopher Stevens, and three other Americans. In his final year in office, Obama claimed that “failing to plan for the day after” in Libya was the “worst mistake” of his presidency.154 On this occasion, the power vacuum in Libya had indeed made the country a haven for terrorists, and old Gaddafi-era weapons flooded the region (some going to AQIM in Mali), but the Obama administration remained largely a bystander, despite Obama’s acceptance at an intellectual level that weak states were incubators of terrorism.155 Against ISIS, Obama was more active given the magnitude of the threat: “exterminationist Sunni chauvinis[t]” insurgents in control of oil-producing territory in the heart of the Middle East.156 Yet even here, caution was the hallmark of his approach in comparison to the previous administration. Obama attempted to stick to the tried-and-tested (though not always successful) formula of train-and-equip plus drone strikes. In 2012, he authorized the CIA to begin providing covert nonlethal aid to Syrian rebels under Operation Timber Sycamore, but following Assad’s use of chemical weapons against the opposition in June 2013, the program was expanded to include arms transfers.157 This was a limited covert operation, however, designed only to repel ISIS, not to topple Assad. Russian airpower kept Assad in control; the only defensive capabilities to counter this—man-portable air defense systems (shoulderlaunched surface-to-air missiles)—were not made available to the rebels lest they fall into the wrong hands.158 Training and equipping the Syrian rebels could not stop the ISIS rampage, however, and in June 2014, ISIS invaded Iraq from its existing base in Syria and proclaimed its territory—approximately one-third of the territory of Iraq and Syria—a new Islamic caliphate, thus imperiling all of the ostensible security gains made in Iraq with American assistance in recent years.159 This prompted Obama to approve a larger train-and-equip program funded by the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund and begin bombing ISIS positions in



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both Syria and Iraq under the auspices of the Combined Joint Task Force– Operation Inherent Resolve—a coalition led by the United States that grew to include over sixty countries.160 The new train-and-equip program was highly circumscribed. Participants could have no connections to Assad or to any terrorist groups and had to focus solely on ISIS, not on toppling the Syrian leader. Nor could training take place inside Syria because no US troops were permitted on the ground there. At the program’s outset, US officials hoped to field a force of 3,000 anti-ISIS fighters by 2015, but the constraints on participation were so restrictive that in October 2015, the program was abandoned after training just 150 fighters.161 Over the following seven months, 300 US military advisers were sent to Syria and 416 to Iraq, while Kurdish forces were armed with heavy weapons in April 2016. By then, the coalition had conducted more than 11,000 drone strikes, forcing ISIS to retreat from 40 percent of its territory in Iraq and 10 percent in Syria.162 In August, US strikes targeted alleged ISIS safe havens in Libya for the first time.163 By February 2017, it was estimated that the US-led bombing campaign had killed around 60,000 suspected ISIS fighters.164 By the following September, as a result of the combined efforts of the militaries of Iraq, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Russia, ISIS had lost most of the territory it had controlled, including the key cities of Mosul and Raqqa. By then, however, it had already mutated into a deadly decentralized transnational ideological phenomenon that inspired terrorist attacks across Europe and the United States, much as bin Laden’s grievances had in previous years. 165 Conclusion The Obama presidency was, paradoxically, a period of both consolidation and caution when it came to Irregular Warfare and the war on terror. The interagency approach to irregular national security challenges that had been initiated under Bush continued under his Democratic successor. Though Obama spoke of ending the war on terror and continued the planned winding down of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that Bush initiated, Obama’s counterterrorism campaigns were marked by continuity. As Trevor McCrisken notes, “Obama always intended to deepen Bush’s commitment to counterterrorism, while at the same time ending the ‘distraction’ of the Iraq war.”166 The battlefield remained global, and US law continued to sanction “war in countries we are not at war with.”

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In many respects, the bureaucratic, political, and organizational embedding of IW continued under Obama. Yet while Obama understood and accepted the intellectual case for IW in a globalized world and while he continued with a small-scale irregular approach in certain areas, his overall grand strategy was more restrained than Bush’s. Obama was less inclined to use the irregular capabilities he was committed to maintaining and was more cautious about deploying American power in major combat scenarios. Though Obama also accepted the Bush administration’s claim that weak and failing states were linked to terrorism, his desire to avoid another Iraq-style quagmire meant that in the case of Libya—the exemplar of a failed state— Obama led from behind. His administration was therefore more selective in its implementation of IW: the train-and-equip component became a central pillar of Obama’s counterterrorism policy, allied with airpower where it was deemed appropriate. While Obama’s strategy was more risk averse when it came to putting US boots on the ground, it was not without risk. The massive expansion of the targeted killing program and the concomitant civilian deaths risked bolstering America’s enemies. As former State Department COIN adviser David Kilcullen and former US Army officer Andrew Exum put it, “Every one of these dead noncombatants represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have increased.”167 The drone warfare program did not eliminate al-Qaeda in Pakistan or anywhere else. In Pakistan, evidence suggested that many militants who escaped the bombs simply moved around the country to other provinces, taking shelter, engaging in gang violence and other forms of sectarian strife, and raising revenue through organized crime.168 Islamist terrorist groups in Africa, the Philippines, and Yemen not only remained highly active but in some cases were even more active at the end of the Obama years than they had been at the beginning.

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he 9/11 attacks, the US failure in Iraq, and the reality of a rising China seemed to catalyze an appreciation of the limits of American power, among scholars at least. The early twenty-first century was described variously as a “post-American world,” a “nonpolar world,” “no-one’s world,” and a world where a newly “frugal superpower” would behave “more like an ordinary country.”1 The Western economic decline that followed the 2008 credit crunch and the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia seemed to confirm that the source of political and economic dynamism in the twentyfirst century would not be the United States but the rising Asian powers. The project to achieve full spectrum dominance constituted a willful rejection of the narrative of American decline by the Bush administration. It optimistically assumed that the preservation of US hegemony was a matter of political will and intellectual and organizational acuity. It was grounded in the belief that the United States should and could dominate international relations not just in the realm of conventional state-based affairs but also at the transnational level. While the Obama administration was more defensive and restrained in its global posture, it remained committed to preserving US hegemony for as long as possible. As Obama foreign policy adviser Ben Rhodes put it, “We’re not trying to preside over America’s decline. What we’re trying to do is get America another fifty years as leader.”2 In a period of austerity in which the Pentagon leaders expected to have to make “thoughtful choices” about the



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location and frequency of its global operations, it was notable that they did not abandon the Irregular Warfare project.3 In practical terms—doctrinally, organizationally, and politically—the IW project had a significant impact on US foreign policy in the early twentyfirst century. If it was still not complete, in the DoD or elsewhere in the US government, it was far from being a failure, on its own terms at least. By the Obama years, no one involved in the formation and execution of US foreign and defense policy failed to take seriously the impact of globalization on international security, meaning that some capacity in Irregular Warfare was deemed essential. The military strongly supported the civilian agencies’ efforts to develop stabilization and reconstruction capabilities, and cooperation between agencies was developing. By the Obama years, interagency activity was routinely taking place on the ground under the auspices of the counterterrorism campaign, although procedures were still often somewhat disorganized, and, most important, the long-term efficacy of stability operations had not been definitively proven. However, the turn toward Irregular Warfare was anchored in a false and misleading analysis of the root causes of irregular conflict in general and Islamist terrorism in particular. The belief that these problems were chiefly the result of weak and failing states was superficial and ahistorical. It was superficial because, as Clausewitz argued, every instance of armed conflict is unique to its time and place.4 Every insurgency plays out in a particular historical context and is shaped by specific ethnic, geographic, resource, ideological, and strategic factors that, in Douglas Porch’s words, “defy a formulaic approach.”5 The weak states theory created a one-size-fits-all model that elided national and local specificities. It was ahistorical because there is so little evidence that weak states have ever been the principal root cause of terrorism or insurgency. Emphasizing a generic cause such as weak states allowed the Bush administration to avoid asking more difficult questions about the specific political grievances that fueled insurgencies; much easier to blame the problem on lack of security and underdevelopment—and who could object to the solution of development and security? Whether this depoliticization was deliberate—and there is no evidence that it necessarily was—it meant that the Bush administration’s Irregular Warfare campaigns were in keeping with a historical trend in which countries waged irregular campaigns instead of engaging with the political cause(s) of the violence.6 If al-Qaeda and its franchises were viewed as a global insurgency hailing from the world’s community of Muslims, as



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Rumsfeld suggested in 2004, the waging of a global counterinsurgency was indicative of the United States’s own unwillingness to examine ways in which specific US policies might have alienated many Muslims worldwide and contributed to the emergence of an extreme and highly politicized anti-American Islamist fringe. This is not to say that the actions of such groups were justified in response to American policy, that the United States “deserved” it, or that US actions were the sole cause of anti-American terrorism. The threat was real, and pursuing the individuals involved was essential—but tackling the root causes required engaging with the unique circumstances of each manifestation of terrorism, including, where appropriate, a consideration of the role of US foreign policy as a contributor to anti-American violence. Instead, the Bush administration opted for a narrative in which weak and failing states were identified as the root cause of irregular nonstate opponents like al-Qaeda, and this absolved the administration from considering the specific political context in which the violence occurred. The framework of the “Global War on Terror” exacerbated this formulaic approach. The application of the GWoT narrative to a series of disparate conflicts and diverse areas of instability resulted in a simplistic conflation of the local and the global. As David Kilcullen observes, the aggregation of different conflicts into a single “war” causes more problems than it solves. Within the GWoT framework area, there were also, Kilcullen notes, “local actors, issues, and grievances. Many have little to do with pan-Islamic objectives, and often pre-date the global jihad by decades or centuries.”7 Treating the separatist conflict in the southern Philippines as merely one front in the war on terror overlooks centuries of Bangsamoro nationalism that has been the oxygen for violent groups in the Sulu archipelago. The challenges facing people across sub-Saharan Africa include human security issues like food and water scarcity, state violence against indigenous populations, HIV/AIDS, job creation, the debt burden, and environmental degradation.8 An approach prioritizing terrorism caused by weak states fails to address these issues, although in most cases, Washington was nevertheless able to find consenting local elites with reasons of their own to support the United States. Permitting local problems and grievances to be subsumed under the banner of the Global War on Terror facilitated the process of aggregation that, Kilcullen argues, allows Islamic militants to “feed on local grievances, integrate them into broader ideologies, and link disparate conflicts through globalized communications, finances, and technology”—exemplified through the merging of regional Islamist

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groups like the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat with the al-Qaeda phenomenon to become al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.9 Thus, Washington’s own geopolitical narrative, the Global War on Terror, benefited extremists like bin Laden who actively sought a confrontation and wanted the United States to overreact and overreach. Instead, the United States and its allies needed to disaggregate local political questions from the issue of global Islam and address the indigenous root causes of instability in peripheral regions separately. In the light of this superficial analysis and reliance on formulaic remedies to counter terrorism, it is hardly surprising that there is so little evidence of success in the US approach. At best, US interventions in the peripheral theaters of the war on terror were ineffective; at worst, they contributed to the emergence of new terrorist groups. In the Sahel, AQIM emerged in spite of the US presence, and the number of attacks it carried out in Mali increased. In the Philippines, there was a significant rise in the frequency of ASG attacks during the US intervention. In Somalia, a new terrorist group emerged in response to the US-backed Ethiopian occupation. Military interventions on the periphery were an excessive and heavy-handed response to the possibility or reality of terrorism there given the relatively weak (though not nonexistent) links between the militant groups in Africa, the Philippines, the Caucasus, and the al-Qaeda core led by bin Laden, and the fact that these regional extremist hubs were generally focused on local adversaries rather than the United States. The GWoT narrative was based on an exaggerated perception of the strength and organization of al-Qaeda in these regions. Underlying the GWoT narrative was the most expansive and ambitious conception of American power and American national interest ever articulated: full spectrum dominance. Not only did the Bush administration seek to preserve the US position as the world’s preeminent conventional power, it also attempted to dominate nonstate actors operating at the transnational level of international relations using irregular methods. At the end of the Cold War, US officials had been determined to preserve and extend what they saw as America’s “unipolar moment.” Successive national security and defense strategies through the 1990s committed the country to preventing the emergence of any rival powers or peer competitors.10 This was derived from a realist conception of global order in which state-based threats were paramount and conventional military power the main currency of international relations. After 9/11, a common criticism of this strategy was not just that it seemed overly



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ambitious but that it ignored the impact of globalization, the gradual erosion of state power, and the burgeoning transnational realm of international relations. What use was conventional superiority over Russia and China combined if the main adversary was a transnational terrorist group?11 After 9/11, the Bush administration itself appeared to realize this and altered course accordingly. It was still essential for US security at home and primacy abroad to prevent the emergence of conventional peer competitors, but in addition, Washington would now also develop the capability to defeat any transnational or nonstate actor. A new realm of international conflict had emerged, and the Bush administration’s conception of America’s national interest, defined as global hegemony, evolved to encompass this. “Full spectrum dominance” went beyond “unipolarity,” which had always been defined in conventional terms; instead, it called for dominance across the entire spectrum of warfare and for the defeat of every type of adversary, including unconventional ones. Ultimately, power projection of this kind is an imperial attempt to assert (sufficient) control or influence. In irregular terms, this does not necessarily mean control of territory or the global commons, but influence over hearts and minds. Because the language of irregular warfare can sound quite benign, its ultimate objective can easily be forgotten. With the emphasis on population-centric activities like stability and reconstruction, the rule of law, and winning hearts and minds, irregular warfare can appear as a liberal or humanitarian endeavor. It is not. In an irregular warfare scenario, these techniques are war-fighting methods that are employed for instrumental, not ethical, reasons. As USAID noted in its guidance to staff cooperating with the DoD, when developmental activities are employed in a wartime scenario, practitioners may well be concerned only with the public relations impact of these operations rather than their intrinsic quality as humanitarian or development operations.12 What is important in an irregular conflict is how these operations are perceived by the indigenous population, which is not necessarily the same as how effective they are in a humanitarian or developmental sense. In evaluating irregular projections of power, we should not lose sight of the fact that the nonkinetic elements are still methods of war designed to channel, and even coerce, popular sentiment in a particular direction. For the Bush administration, the realization that transnational phenomena were beyond the control of any one single state meant that bi- and multilateral collective action was essential. Since the word unilateral has so often been used as a term of opprobrium and signaled disapproval of the Bush

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administration, highlighting its use of bilateral and multilateral action— albeit often ad hoc and outside established multilateral institutions—may appear to legitimize policies that might otherwise have been frowned on. But multilateralism is no guarantee of strategic wisdom or ethical probity. The ultimate objective of the policy remains the same. The United States has historically been successful at co-opting others, especially Western countries, into a global order led by Washington but from which others can derive benefits, though the legitimacy of this order has often been contested. The Bush and Obama administrations’ successful co-option of local elites did not make their interventions wise; it meant that rulers elsewhere shared some degree of responsibility for them. Despite the Obama administration’s more limited use of Irregular Warfare techniques, the changes in the US national security establishment since 9/11 have given policymakers new options for overseas interventions, and these capabilities are likely to endure as global interdependence persists and as long as the United States faces a perceived threat from nonstate actors such as ISIS. This does not necessarily mean that irregular wars will become the norm or that they will be more frequent than they have been over the past decade. Capacity is no guarantee of actual use; the Obama administration’s desire to play only a supporting role in the intervention in Libya in 2011, for example, was politically driven. In addition, geopolitical change may presage a renewed emphasis on conventional power in the future. The much-discussed emergence of China as a great power may well accentuate existing interstate rivalry. The geopolitical balance that emerges as a result of America’s relative decline will most likely lead in time to the reorganization of US defense posture. Just as the turn toward Irregular Warfare was contingent on changes associated with globalization, future changes in the global balance of power between states will likely also lead to new emphases in US national defense, though since globalization is unlikely to be reversed, it seems improbable that the security challenges ostensibly associated with it will be ignored and therefore unlikely that the United States will return to a national defense strategy premised only on conventional interstate conflict. One likely outcome is the waging of hybrid wars: conflicts characterized by a mix of conventional and irregular agents, methods, and objectives. This was arguably a type of conflict the DoD did not pay sufficient attention to in the early twenty-first century, preferring instead to categorize war more neatly into separate “conventional” and “irregular” forms. Yet hybrid wars



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have already occurred: Israel’s conflict with Hamas in Gaza (since 2009) and with Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 are examples of states engaging in hybrid campaigns, in part due to the nature of the adversary and in part to gain a tactical advantage.13 In more recent years, senior US military officials have testified to Congress that hybrid wars are the most likely form of conflict in the future. Discussion of hybrid war has become increasingly common in professional military journals, and the phrase also appeared in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.14 The capabilities developed under the auspices of full spectrum dominance would certainly allow the United States to wage hybrid wars that combine conventional and irregular approaches if this were called for and if there were sufficient political will for intervention. Although the historical record provides little evidence that such interventions work, it provides plenty of evidence that there will be more of them, even in a “post-American” world. As Odd Arne Westad demonstrates, the United States “has been an interventionist power for most of its existence.”15 Before it became a superpower, and even prior to the twentieth century when it was only a regional power, the United States intervened militarily, economically, and politically in the affairs of other nations, especially those in the Western Hemisphere. The record suggests that America’s relative decline, even if it heralds a less offensive global strategy, will not mean the end of US intervention. One need not be a global superpower to intervene abroad; great power status will be more than enough, and the United States will be a great power, with widespread interests, for many decades to come.

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Notes

Introduction 1. Russell Crandall, America’s Dirty Wars: Irregular Warfare from 1776 to the War on Terror (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 7. 2. Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Phoenix, 2006), 214–215. 3. Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 82. See also Frank G. Hoffman, “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars” (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007), http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf. Government Accountability Office, Hybrid Warfare, September 10, 2010, http://www.gao.gov/ assets/100/97053.pdf. 4. Clausewitz, cited in M. L. R. Smith and David Martin Jones, The Political Impossibility of Counterinsurgency: Strategic Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 4. On the futility of categorization, see 1–28. 5. James D. Kiras, “Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency,” in Strategy in the Contemporary World, ed. John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 187. 6. This debate includes Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response,” Special Warfare (February 2005): 6–21. David M. Witty, “The Great UW Debate,” Special Warfare (March–April 2010): 9–17. Lew Irwin, “Filling Irregular Warfare’s Interagency Gaps,” Parameters (Autumn 2009): 65–80. Peter Charles Choharis and James A. Gavrilis, “Counterinsurgency 3.0,” Parameters (Spring 2010): 34–46. Amitai Etzioni, “Whose COIN?’ Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 60 (1st quarter 2011): 19–25. 221

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Sebastian L. v. Gorka and David Kilcullen, “An Actor-Centric Theory of War,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 60 (1st quarter, 2011): 14–17. Mark Grdovic, “Ramping Up to Face the Challenge of Irregular Warfare,” Special Warfare (September–October 2009): 15–18. 7. Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (henceforth IW JOC 2007), version 1.0, September 11, 2007, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA496061. Jennifer Morrison Taw argues that the key conceptual referent for understanding changes in the US defense community in the early twenty-first century is “stability operations” rather than “irregular warfare,” though she acknowledges that stability operations are a subcategory of IW. Because of the widespread use of multiple components of Irregular Warfare in the peripheral theaters of the war on terror, including stability operations, and the elevation of all of these components at the doctrinal and policy level under the auspices of Irregular Warfare, I argue that IW is the umbrella concept that best explains operations in the peripheral regions of the war on terror and the reorientation of the US defense establishment in the twenty-first century. See Jennifer Morrison Taw, Mission Revolution: The U.S. Military and Stability Operations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 3–6. 8. IW JOC 2007, 4–9. 9. On the imperial roots of Western counterinsurgency doctrine and practice, see Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (New York: New Press, 2013); John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Laleh Khalili, Time in the Shadows: Confinement in Counterinsurgencies (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, eds., Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008); Alex Marshall, “Imperial Nostalgia, the Liberal Lie, and the Perils of Postmodern Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 21, no. 2 (2010): 233–258. Some of the colonial-era texts that inspired twenty-first century IW include David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (reprint, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping (London: Faber & Faber, 1971); Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000); and Robert Thompson Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,, 1978). 10. This observation is cited by Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 63. 11. Overviews of irregular warfare and its most common variant, counterinsurgency, include Kiras, “Irregular Warfare”; Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney, eds., Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges (London: Routledge, 2010); Sarah Sewall, “Introduction: A Radical Field Manual,” in U.S. Army/Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), xxi–xxliii; Russell Crandall, America’s Dirty Wars: Irregular Warfare from 1776 to the War on Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014),



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15–28. For a brief history of guerrilla warfare, see Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 178–192. 12. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1973). 13. Colin L. Powell, “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs (Winter 1992/1993): 32–45. Casper Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power,” remarks prepared for delivery to the National Press Club, Washington, DC, November 28, 1984, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/weinberger.html. 14. See Thomas R. Mockaitis, Iraq and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008); James Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces Iraq, 2005–2007 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). David H. Ucko argues that the transformation year in Washington was 2005 and that this was the result of events in Iraq. See his The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009). Iraq is also the key catalyzing case study for Steven Metz, Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2008); David Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013); Gentile, Wrong Turn; Toby Dodge, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012). Morrison Taw focuses on stability operations, a variant of IW, and, again examines Iraq as the key catalyst for the elevation of them into high-level US Army doctrine and strategy. See her Mission Revolution. 15. Patrick Porter, The Global Village Myth: Distance, War, and the Limits of Power (London: Hurst, 2015) 16. In his study of norm change and modern conflict, Farrell argues that norms are changed by norm entrepreneurs, external shocks, and changes in personnel. See Theo Farrell, The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005). 17. Joseph S. Nye Jr., “U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq,” Foreign Affairs (July/ August 2003): http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58997/joseph-s-nye-jr/uspower-and-strategy-after-iraq. See also Pascal Vennesson, “Globalization and Al Qaeda’s Challenge to American Unipolarity,” in How 9/11 Changed Our Ways of War, ed. James Burk (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 232–260. 18. The concept of asymmetry is also highly contested. Colin S. Gray argues that all warfare is characterized by asymmetry to a certain extent because each state has its own strengths and weaknesses, though in irregular warfare, the asymmetries are extreme. See his Another Bloody Century, 230. For a defense of the concept, see Wyn Q. Bowen, “The Dimensions of Asymmetric Warfare,” in The Changing Face of Military Power: Joint Warfare in an Expeditionary Era, ed. Andrew Dorman, Mike Smith, and Matthew Uttley (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 15–44. For an overview of the debate, see Jan Angstrom, “Evaluating Rivalling Interpretations of Asymmetric

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Warfare,” in Conceptualising Modern War, ed. Karl Erik Haug and Ole Jørgen Maaø (London: Hurst, 2013), 29–48. 19. Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002) 20. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. Frank G. Hoffman, “Small Wars Revisited: The United States and Nontraditional Wars,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 6 (2005): 913–940. 21. Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget, 5. 22. Ibid., 39–59; Richard Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation: From Vietnam to Iraq (London: Routledge, 2006). 23. Jerry W. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment (London: Pluto Press, 1983), 210–228. 24. Daniel Wirls, Irrational Security: The Politics of Defense from Reagan to Obama (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010). 25. The phrase “new wars” was coined by Mary Kaldor in 1999 to describe the new pattern of conflict in the post-Soviet world. See her New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (London: Polity Press, 1999). For analysis, see Herfried Münkler, The New Wars (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005); Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin, 2005); Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991); Gray, Another Bloody Century. For critiques, see Jan Angstrom, “Introduction: Exploring the Utility of Armed Force in Modern Conflict,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19 (2008): 297–302. Isabelle Duyvesteyn, “Exploring the Utility of Force: Some Conclusions,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19 (2008): 423–443. Michael J. Artelli and Richard F. Deckro, “Fourth Generation Operations: Principles for the `Long War,`” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19 (2008): 221–237. 26. William S. Lind, Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton, and Gary Wilson, “The Changing Face of Warfare: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette (October 1989): 22–26. 27. Ibid., 23. The concept of low-intensity conflict was used by Van Creveld in Transformation of Warfare, 18–25. 28. Smith, Utility of Force, 17. 29. Lind et al., “Changing Face of Warfare,” 24. 30. Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs (Oxon: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006), 90. 31. Lind et al., “Changing Face of Warfare,” 26. 32. Thomas X. Hammes, “The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette 78, no. 4 (1994): 35–44. See also Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2006). There has been much criticism of the 4GW concept. See Antuilo J. Echevarria II, “Fourth Generation Warfare and Other Myths,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2005, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=632. Lawrence Freedman, “War Evolves into the Fourth Generation: A Comment on Thomas X. Hammes,” Contemporary Security Policy 26, no. 2 (2005): 254–263. Hew Strachan,



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“The Changing Character of War,” in Conceptualising Modern War, ed. Karl Erik Haug and Ole Jørgen Maaø (London: Hurst, 2011), 1–28. David S. Sorensen, “The Mythology of Fourth-Generation Warfare: A Response to Hammes,” Contemporary Security Policy 26, no. 2 (2005): 264–269. 33. Hammes, “Evolution of War,” 44. 34. Kaldor, New and Old Wars. 35. Robert D. Kaplan, ‘The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease Are Rapidly Destroying the Fabric of Our Planet,” Atlantic (February 1994), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/ the-coming-anarchy/304670/. 36. For an overview of the process of globalization across more than four centuries, see Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Petersson, Globalization: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). On the contemporary wave of globalization, see Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), chaps. 2 and 3. On globalization and conflict, see William J. Hartman, Globalization and Asymmetrical Warfare, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, April 2002, http://www. au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/02–053.pdf; Münkler, New Wars, 5–31, 74–98; Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics (London: Hurst, 2012), 67–89; Norrin M. Ripsman and T. V. Paul, Globalization and the National Security State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Fathali M. Moghaddan, The New Global Insecurity: How Terrorism, Environmental Collapse, Economic Inequalities, and Resource Shortages Are Changing Our World (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood, 2010); Richard J. Aldrich, “`A Profoundly Disruptive Force’: The CIA, Historiography and the Perils of Globalization,” Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 2 (2011): 139–158; Kevin O’Brien, “Information Age, Terrorism, and Warfare,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 14, no. 1 (2003): 183–206. 37. Münkler argues, “The most important feature of the recent wave of international terrorism is [the] combination of violence with media presentation.” See New Wars, 112. On the difficulties the US intelligence services faced tracking the 9/11 hijackers’ online communications, see James Bamford, A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America’s Intelligence Agencies (New York: Random House, 2005), 105–116. 38. Münkler, New Wars, 10, 74–98. Kaldor makes a very similar argument in New and Old Wars, 90–111. 39. Hartman, Globalization and Asymmetrical Warfare, 4. 40. Ibid., 14–15. 41. Defense Science Board Task Force on Globalization and Security, “Final Report,” Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, December 1999, http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA371887. 42. Ibid. 43. Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: Norton, 2007), 16.

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44. I use the phrase “general-purpose forces” to refer to forces trained mainly to conduct conventional combat operations, in contrast to special forces, which specialize in unconventional warfare. Although the term “general-purpose forces” is no longer in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms, it is still widely used in this way. See Shannon S. Hume, Rebalancing General Purpose Forces to Meet Expanding Worldwide Irregular Force Requirements, U.S. Marine Corps, April 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a508031.pdf. 45. Cited in Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 66. 46. See note 14. 47. Russell, Innovation, Transformation and War; Mockaitis, Iraq and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency, 124–144. See also Ucko, New Counterinsurgency Era, 60–61, 65–80. 48. Mark Bowden, “The Professor of War,” Vanity Fair, March 30, 2010, https:// www.vanityfair.com/news/2010/05/petraeus-201005. 49. Paul Rich, “A Historical Overview of U.S. Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 25, no. 1 (2014): 28. Writing on COIN by this group includes: David Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,” Military Review (January–February 2006): 2–12, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/petraeus1.pdf; David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (2005): 597–617; David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (May–June 2006): 103–108; David Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” Survival 48, no. 4 (2006): 111–130; Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (May–June 2005): 8–12; Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, and John Nagl, “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (March–April 2006): 49–53. On the drafting of the new Army Field Manual, see Conrad Crane, “United States,” in Understanding Counterinsurgency, ed. Rid and Keaney, 59–72, and John A. Nagl, Foreword to U.S. Army/Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3–24) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), xiii–xx. The most detailed secondary account of the so-called COINdinistas is Kaplan, Insurgents. 50. Jeffrey H. Michaels, The Discourse Trap and the US Military: From the War on Terror to the Surge (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 107–146. Bob Woodward, The War Within (London: Pocket Books, 2008). 51. U.S. Army/Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual. 52. Strachan, Direction of War, 11. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88, 605. 53. Clausewitz, On War, 177. 54. The exception is Mockaitis, who argues that there was a political goal from November 2005 on as expressed in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. See his Iraq and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency, 136–137.



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55. Journalistic accounts of SOF activities in the war on terror offer valuable insights into some operational details of their work—especially capture-and-kill missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan—but do not offer a systemic account of the expansion of irregular activities, including in the general-purpose forces, as part of a broader effort to promote full spectrum dominance. In Afghanistan, SOF remained an adjunct to a largely conventional military campaign. See Linda Robinson, One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare (New York: Public Affairs, 2013); Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars: The World Is a Battlefield (London: Serpent’s Tail, 2013); Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth (New York: Penguin, 2013). 56. FID was described as a variant of irregular warfare in IW JOC 2007, 9. 57. For example, Metz, Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy, 159. 58. Michaels, Discourse Trap, 134. 59. Cited in Paul O’Neill, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O’Neill (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 85. 60. Farrell, Norms of War, 13. 61. Indeed it may be argued that energy security was a fundamental component of Bush’s grand strategy—visible in Iraq—and, more broadly, that oil security is integral to American hegemony. On oil and hegemony see Doug Stokes and Sam Raphael, Global Energy Security and American Hegemony (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2010). 62. The notion of “inviting” American power is derived from Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe Since 1945: From Empire by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 63. Cited in Smith and Jones, Political Impossibility of Counterinsurgency, xix. 64. Khalili, Time in the Shadows, 5. 65. Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (London: New Press, 2013), 33. Khalili, Time in the Shadows, 5. 66. See Colin Dueck, The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016), 2.

Chapter 1 1. Richard Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance?” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (2008): 46. 2. Sam Perlo-Freeman, Olawale Ismail, Noel Kelly, and Carina Solmirano, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Year Book 2010, Table 5A.4, Military Expenditure by Country in Constant U.S. Dollars for 2000–2009 and Current U.S. Dollars for 2009, Appendix 5A, 225–231, http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010/files/ SIPRIYB201005A.pdf. Dinah Walker, “Trends in U.S. Military Spending,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 15, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/defense-budget/trends-usmilitary-spending/p28855. David Vine, Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2015).

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3. For perspectives on empire, see Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (New York: Penguin, 2009); Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2002); John Agnew, Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005). 4. National Military Strategy of the United States, January 1992, https://history. defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nms/nms1992.pdf?ver=2014–06–25–123420–723; Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a359953.pdf. 5. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1990– 1991): 24. 6. Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (henceforth QDR 97), May 1997, sec. II (pages unnumbered): https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR1997.pdf?ver=2014–06–25–110930–527. 7. Headquarters of the Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 100–5, June 1993, chap. 13. Note that the chapter on Military Operations Other Than War is second to last. 8. QDR 97, sec. III, pages unnumbered, and Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review. 9. Andrew Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,” National Interest, no. 37 (Fall 1994): 30–42. Eliot Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (1996): 37–54; Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future,” Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, January 1998, 28–35. Tim Benbow, The Magic Bullet? Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs (London: Brassey’s, 2004). 10. Eliot A. Cohen, “Change and Transformation in Military Affairs,” Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 3 (2004): 401–403. Benbow, Magic Bullet? 88–97. 11. Steven Metz and James Kievit, “Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy,” U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, June 27, 1995, 29. 12. George W. Bush, “A Period of Consequences,” speech at the Citadel, South Carolina, September 23, 1999, http://www.citadel.edu/root/pres_bush. 13. “The First Gore-Bush Presidential Debate,” transcript, October 3, 2000, http:// www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-3–2000-transcript. 14. Rumsfeld handwritten note, February 6, 2001, cited in Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), 294. 15. Rumsfeld, “Meeting with the Chiefs 1/21/01, My 2nd Day,” May 21, 2001, cited in Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 294. 16. Ibid., 294. 17. Ibid., 295. 18. Ibid., 295–296. 19. Benbow, Magic Bullet? 196. 20. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 297.



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21. Prepared testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Senate Armed Services Committee, June 21, 2001, 3, https://www.comw.org/ qdr/010621rumsfeld.pdf. 22. Ibid., 6. 23. “Guidance and Terms of Reference for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review” (henceforth QDR TOR), Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, June 22, 2001, 5, http://www.comw.org/qdr/qdrguidance.pdf. 24. Ibid., 7, my emphasis. 25. Donald Rumsfeld, “Pearl Harbor Post-Mortem,“ July 23, 2001, cited in Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 334. 26. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (henceforth QDR 2001), September 30, 2001, 3, http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf. 27. Ibid., iv. 28. Ibid., 18. 29. Ibid., 3. 30. Ibid., 12, 17. 31. US Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Quadrennial Defense Review: Future Reviews Can Benefit From Better Analysis and Changes in Timing and Scope, November 2002, 2, 9, 10, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0313.pdf. 32. Ibid., 10–11. 33. Ryan Henry, “Defense Transformation and the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review,” Parameters (Winter 2005–2006): 10. 34. Cited in Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 334. 35. Ibid., 335. 36. Department of Defense (DoD), “Transformation Planning Guidance,” April 2003, foreword by Donald Rumsfeld, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a459607. pdf. 37. Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 79. 38. George W. Bush, Decision Points (London: Virgin Books, 2010), 141. 39. Joel Roberts, “Plans for Iraq Attack Began on 9/11,” CBSNews.com, September 4, 2002, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/04/september11/main520830. shtml. 40. Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 6, 8. 41. Ibid., 13, 17. 42. Ibid., 17. See also Tim Weiner, “A Nation Challenged: Global Links; Other Fronts Seen,” New York Times, October 10, 2001. 43. Feith, War and Decision, 66. 44. Ibid., 49–50. 45. Ibid., 50.

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46. Authorization for Use of Military Force, September 18, 2001, Public Law 107– 40, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ40/pdf/PLAW-107publ40.pdf. The only occasion on which additional approval for military action was sought was in the case of Iraq. On October 16, 2002, Congress passed Public Law 107–243, Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq, https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/ publ243/PLAW-107publ243.pdf. 47. Feith, War and Decision, 55. 48. Ibid., 66. 49. Lauren Ploch, Africa Command: US Strategic Interests and the Role of the US Military in Africa, October 2, 2009, 36, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf. 50. One of the earliest references came in Donald Rumsfeld’s speech of May 27, 2003, in New York; transcript available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/ may/28/iraq.iran. 51. Bob Woodward, Bush at War (London: Pocket Books, 2003), 48–49, 83–85, 99, 107. 52. James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (London: Penguin, 2004). Len Colodny and Tom Shachtman, The Forty Years War: The Rise and Fall of the Neocons from Nixon to Obama (New York: Harper Perennial, 2010). 53. The quintessential document encapsulating this worldview was the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance. See “Excerpts from Pentagon’s Plan: `Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival,’” New York Times, March 8, 1992. See also Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2000): 45–62. 54. US Special Operations Command, History: 1987–2007 (henceforth SOCOM History), 12–14, http://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/2007history.pdf. 55. Thomas R. Mockaitis, Iraq and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008), 48. 56. SOCOM History, 16. 57. Government Accountability Office, “Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives,” Special Operations Forces: Several Human Capital Challenges Must Be Addressed to Meet Expanded Role, July 2006, 9, http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/251003.pdf. 58. Government Accountability Office, “Report to the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,” Defense Acquisitions: An Analysis of the Special Operations Command’s Management of Weapons System Programs, June 2007, 9, http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/262964.pdf. 59. See Chapter 5. 60. Donald Rumsfeld to General Myers, Doug Feith, and Steve Cambone, “Subject: Conventional Forces/Special Forces,” memo, August 15, 2002, http://www.rumsfeld. com/archives. 61. Timothy Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2006). Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987 (London: Headline Book Publishing, 1988), esp. 133–140, 210–215, 506–510.



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62. Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 116–135, 166–197. Fawaz A. Gerges, The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 61–67. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 128–141. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 327–558. 63. Gerges, Rise and Fall of Al Qaeda, 64–67. 64. Burke, Al Qaeda, 13. On terrorism and globalization see Paul J. Smith, The Terrorism Ahead: Confronting Transnational Violence in the Twenty-First Century (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2008), 62–82. 65. Rice, No Higher Honor, 152–153. 66. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS), September 2002, introductory text, n.p., https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf. 67. Ibid., 15, 29. 68. Ibid., 30. 69. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT), February 2003, 6, https:// www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf. See also 17–18. 70. Ibid.,16. 71. Ibid., 7. 72. Ibid. 73. Ibid., 8. See also p. 15. 74. Ibid., 25. 75. Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (henceforth IW JOC 2007), version 1.0, September 11, 2007, 1, 7, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA496061. 76. For classic historical accounts of COIN, see Robert Thompson Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1978); David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (reprint, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping London: Faber & Faber,1971); Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (reprint, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000). 77. The IW JOC 2007 stressed the need to focus on “the underlying economic, political, cultural, or security conditions that fuel the grievances of the population”; see p. 18. Also Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 29, and Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 8, 11–16. 78. NSS, 2002, 1. 79. Ibid., introductory text, n.p., 6. 80. Ibid., 10–11. 81. NSCT, 2003, 11–12, 6, 22. 82. The Feith quote is taken from excerpts of a speech given on December 3, 2003, reproduced as Douglas J. Feith, “Transforming the United States Global Defense

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Posture,” DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management (Winter 2003–2004): 34 (henceforth cited as Feith speech). 83. NSCT, 2003, 22 84. Edward Newman, “Exploring the `Root Causes’ of Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 8 (2006): 751. 85. Dominic Lisanti, “Do Failed States Really Breed Terrorists? An Examination of Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa Comparing Statistical Approaches with a Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” paper for the CAPERS Workshops, New York University, May 14, 2010, 1–26 (copy in the author’s possession); James A. Piazza, “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?” International Studies Quarterly 52 (2008): 469–488. 86. Anna Simons and David Tucker, “The Misleading Problem of Failed States: A `Socio-Geography’ of Terrorism in the Post-9/11 Era,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 389. 87. See Marc Sageman’s illuminating discussion of the socioeconomic profile of Salafi jihadists in Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 73–77. 88. The most comprehensive and authoritative list of terror attacks available is the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Counterterrorism, University of Maryland: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 89. Martha Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences (London: Routledge, 2011), chaps. 1 and 2; Martha Crenshaw, “Explaining Suicide Terrorism: A Review Essay,” Security Studies 16, no. 1 (2007): 133–162; Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005); Assaf Moghadam, “The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal Approach,” in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, ed. Ami Pedahzur (London: Routledge, 2006), 81–107; Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat (London: John Murray, 2006), 57–94. Newman also discusses “structural factors,” which create an enabling environment for terrorism and “underlying grievances,” which are “tangible political issues.” See his “Exploring the `Root Causes’ of Terrorism,“ 751. For debate over the causes of suicide terrorism, see Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism; Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); Mia Bloom, “Dying to Kill: Motivations for Suicide Terrorism,” in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism, ed. Pedahzur; Assaf Moghadan, “Suicide Terrorism, Occupation and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique of Dying to Win,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 8 (2006): 707–729; Fawaz A. Gerges, The Rise and Fall of Al Qaeda (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 155–160. 90. Smith, The Terrorism Ahead, 170; Crenshaw, “Explaining Suicide Terrorism,” 154. Psychiatric and psychological research into the characteristics of individual suicide terrorists shows only that there is no unique terrorist mind-set even within the same context and that “the extent to which one will sacrifice oneself for one’s community . . . is determined by the sociopolitical and historical construction of that community.” See Jerrold M. Post, Farhana Ali, Shuyler W. Henderson, Steven Shanfield,



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Jeff Victeroff, and Stevan Weine, “The Psychology of Suicide Terrorism,” Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes 72, no. 1 (2009): 28. For an overview of the psychiatric research literature, see Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 34–39. Martha Crenshaw, “The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century,” Political Psychology 21, no. 2 (2000): 409. On the turn toward online communities, see Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the 21st Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). 91. Crenshaw, “Explaining Suicide Terrorism,” 162. 92. David Kilcullen argues that bin Laden appropriated and aggregated localized conflicts, such as the Chechen insurgency and Bangsamoro separatism in the southern Philippines, under the banner of global jihad. For the West to discredit this narrative, a process of disaggregation was required and the eventual resolution of local conflicts that Islamist fighters appropriated. See his “Countering Global Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (2005): 597–617. 93. John Nagl, “Local Security Forces,” in Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges, ed. Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (London: Routledge, 2010), 160, 166–167. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 156–165. See also IW JOC 2007, 22. 94. NSS, 2002, 6–7, 10–11. 95. NSCT, 2003, 12. 96. Ibid., 20. 97. Rumsfeld claims that the memo setting out this position was the result of lengthy discussions between military and civilian officials at the DoD that resulted in “what was truly a collaborative product, though it came under my signature.” Others involved were Wolfowitz; Feith; Peter Rodman, assistant secretary for international security affairs; General Richard Myers, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and General Tommy Franks, head of Central Command. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 373. 98. Feith speech, 35. 99. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 355. Rumsfeld infamously claimed that the United States would invade Iraq without the support of Britain, France, and Germany, if necessary. However, forty-nine other nations did support the invasion, though not all provided military support. See Scott Althaus and Kalev Leetaru, “Airbrushing History, American Style,” Cline Center for Democracy, University of Illinois, ChicagoUrbana, November 25, 2008, https://clinecenter.illinois.edu/project/NewsAnalytics/ airbrushing-history-american-style. 100. These terms have slightly different meanings. According to the DoD, public diplomacy refers to: “1. Those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. 2. In peace building, civilian agency efforts to promote an understanding of the reconstruction efforts, rule of law, and civic responsibility

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through public affairs and international public diplomacy operations. Its objective is to promote and sustain consent for peace building both within the host nation and externally in the region and in the larger international community.” Public affairs are defined as “those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense.” Psychological operations are defined as “planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives.” See Department of Defense, “Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (As Amended Through April 2010),” joint publication 1–02, April 12, 2001, 380–381, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02-april2010.pdf. 101. IW JOC, 2007, 1, 18. See also Foreword by John A. Nagl in Galula Counterinsurgency Warfare, ix. See also Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 32, 49, 50, 71, 77, and Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 103–110. On the importance of strategic narratives, see Freedman, Transformation of Strategic Affairs, 22–26. On the importance of IO, see Andrew Exum, “Information Operations” in Understanding Counterinsurgency, ed. Rid and Keaney, 216–229. 102. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 71. 103. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 352–353. 104. NSS, 2002, 6, 31. 105. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy to Steve Hadley, Deputy National Security Advisor, “Subject: National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” memo, n.d.; Memo for Andy Hoehn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, to Secretary of Defense, Through Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Strategy, “Subject: National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” memo, February 21, 2003: http://www.rumsfeld.com. 106. NSCT, 2003, 2, 23. 107. GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy, April 2005, 10, http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d05323.pdf. 108. Ibid., 11–13. 109. Ibid., 13–14. 110. NSS, 2002, 3–4. 111. Ibid., 24 112. John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think (New York: Gallup Press, 2008), esp. 29–98. 113. Department of Defense, “Information Operations Roadmap,” October 30, 2003, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB177/info_ops_roadmap.pdf. 114. Ibid., 63. See also Christopher J. Lamb, “Information Operations as a Core Competency,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 36 (December 2004): 88–96. 115. Department of Defense, “Information Operations Roadmap,” 4, 25.



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116. Anna Simons and David Tucker, “United States Special Operations Forces and the War on Terror,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 14, no. 1 (2003): 86–87. 117. Department of Defense, “Information Operations Roadmap,” 33. 118. Ibid., 12. 119. Ibid., 15. 120. On stability operations in historical counterinsurgency see Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 62, 66; Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 66, 113; Kitson, Low Intensity Warfare, 79; Rupert Smith and John Nagl both argue that stability operations in Malaya (the Briggs Plan) generated local support for the British vision of Malaya’s future. See Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin, 2006), 203–206, and John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 71–76. 121. Department of Defense, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations,” DoDD 3000.05, November 28, 2005, https://fas.org/ irp/doddir/dod/d3000_05.pdf. The 2007 “Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept” also listed these operations as a component of irregular warfare. See IW JOC 2007, 8. 122. This is acknowledged in Department of the Army Headquarters, Stability Operations and Support Operations, Field Manual 3–07 (FM 3–07), February 2003, chap. 9, p. 8, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=17929. 123. , Department of the Army Headquarters, Operations, Field Manual 3–0, June 2001, chap. 1, p. 15, https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/amd-us-archive/fm30%2801%29.pdf. 124. Ibid., foreword, n.p. 125. Ibid., chap. 1, p. 4. 126. Ibid., chap. 1, p. 5. 127. Department of the Army, Stability Operations. 128. Ibid., chap. 1, pp. 3, 2. 129. Ibid., iv; chap. 1, p. 3; chap. 1, p. 5. 130. NSS, 2002, 21–23. 131. Department of the Army, Stability Operations, chap. 1, p. 21. See also IW JOC 2007, 1: “Meeting these challenges and combating this approach will require the concerted efforts of all instruments of national power.” 132. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 63. For similar views, see Thompson Defeating Communist Insurgency, 55, and Kitson, Low Intensity Conflict, 51–52, 166. See also Nadia Schadlow, “Governance,” in Understanding Counterinsurgency, ed. Rid and Keaney, 173–188. 133. National Security Council Presidential Directive 1, Organization of the National Security Council, February 13, 2001, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1. pdf. 134. Interview with Matthew McLean, January 18, 2007, cited in Dane F. Smith Jr., U.S. Peacefare: Organizing American Peacebuilding Operations (Santa Barbara, CA: Center for Strategic and International Studies and Praeger, 2010), 39. “Managing

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Complex Contingency Operations,” Public White Paper, Presidential Decision Directive/National Security Council paper no. 56, May 1997, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ pdd56.htm. 135. Smith, U.S. Peacefare, 40. 136. Ibid., 39–40. 137. Ambassador Carlos Pascual, “Stabilization and Reconstruction: Building Peace in a Hostile Environment,” prepared statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 16, 2005, http://2001–2009.state.gov/s/crs/rls/rm/48644.htm. 138. Donald Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2002): 25–26. See also NSCT 2003, 1, 15. 139. Donald Rumsfeld to the Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr., Vice President Richard B. Cheney, and Dr. Condoleezza Rice, “Subject: Transforming the U.S. Government,” memo August 25, 2004, https://www.rumsfeld.com/archives/. 140. Ibid. “Goldwater-Nichols” referred to the landmark legislation streamlining the decision-making structures of the Department of Defense in 1986. 141. National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2004, 23, 4, https:// archive.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf. 142. Ibid., 3, 4, 21. 143. Ibid., 4–5. 144. Ibid., 6. 145. Ibid., 4. 146. Ibid., 5, 11. 147. The Operations field manual of 2001 that added Stability and Support Operations to the stages of warfare, and the subsequent 2003 field manual on Stability Operations were Army publications and therefore did not apply to any of the other military services. Quote from NMS 2004, 13. 148. Ibid., 13–14. 149. QDR, 2001, 25–27. Department of Defense, “Strengthening US Global Defense Posture,” Report to Congress, September 2004, 5–6, http://www.dmzhawaii. org/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/global_posture.pdf. 150. Ibid. 151. Ibid., 10. Donald Rumsfeld, “Positioning America’s Forces for the 21st Century,” September 23, 2004, http://archive.defense.gov/home/articles/2004–09/ a092304b.html. 152. Donald Rumsfeld to Gen. Dick Myers, Paul Wolfowitz, Gen. Peter Pace, and Doug Feith, “Global War on Terrorism,” memo, October 16, 2003, https://www.rumsfeld.com/archives/.

Chapter 2 1. For example, John Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (2002): 60–74.



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2. Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak, U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014, RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/ content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1236/RAND_RR1236.pdf. 3. Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (henceforth, IW JOC 2007), version 1.0, September 11, 2007, 8, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA496061, 8. Robinson et al., U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, xiii. Of the three peripheral GWoT campaigns examined in this book, the most detail is available on the operations in the Philippines, thanks to research undertaken by the Office of the Historian, US Army Special Operations Command, and published in a special edition of the Special Warfare journal in September 2004. 4. Luis H. Francia, A History of the Philippines: From Indios Bravos to Filipinos (New York: Overlook Press, 2010), 82–84, 90–95. Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Threat,” Naval War College Review 58, no. 4 (2005): 67–68. See also Steven Rogers, “Beyond the Abu Sayyaf,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 1 (2004): 15–20. 5. Abhoud Syed M. Lingga, “Understanding Bangsamoro Independence as a Mode of Self-Determination,” Mindanao Journal 17 (2004): 5, http://www.ombudsman.gov. ph/UNDP4/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Independence-Option.pdf. 6. Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 34. Banlaoi, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” 68. 7. Lingga, “Understanding Bangsamoro Independence,” 6. Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, 34. 8. Thomas M. McKenna argues that the US colonial administration did more to encourage a self-conscious Moro identity than Spanish colonialism. See his Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 86–112. 9. Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, 35. Andrew T. H. Tan, Security Strategies in the Asia Pacific: The United States’ “Second Front” in Southeast Asia (New York: Palgrave, 2011), 61. 10. Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, 36. 11. Egypt offered scholarships for Moro students to study at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, while the Saudis and Libyan funded the construction of mosques and subsidized local imams. See McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels, 138–144. 12. Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, 37–38. Francia, A History of the Philippines, 247–251. 13. Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, 39–40. 14. Francia, History of the Philippines, 293. 15. Ibid., 299–300. Tan, Security Strategies in the Asia Pacific, 62–65. 16. Gerges, Rise and Fall of Al Qaeda, 69–71, 78–79, 83–85. 17. Tan, Security Strategies in the Asia Pacific, 40. 18. Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, January 25, 2002, 2. Francia, History of the Philippines, 291–292.

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19. Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 107; Banlaoi, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” 66–67; Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2006): 248–250. C. H. Briscoe and Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Downey, “Multiple Insurgent Groups Complicate Philippine Security,” Special Warfare 17, no. 1 (2004): 13–14. 20. Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command, Media Briefing with General Vilanueva, Chief of Staff of Armed Forces of the Philippines, and Lieutenant General Cimatu, Commander, Southern Command HQ, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Zamboanga City, The Philippines, November 14, 2001, http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/us/cincpac_20011114zamboanga.html (copy in the author’s possession). Blair also stated that the ASG “has ties to Al Qaeda and poses a threat to Americans.” Statement of Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 5, 2002, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/blair_008.asp. 21. Department of State (DoS), “East Asia Overview,” in Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2003/31611.htm. 22. For an overview of this problem, see Natasha Hamilton-Hart, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Expert Analysis, Myopia and Fantasy,” Pacific Review 18, no. 3 (2005): 303–325. On the problem of relying on too many official intelligence sources when analyzing the ASG, see Eduardo F. Ugarte, “`In a Wilderness of Mirrors’: The Use and Abuse of the `Abu Sayyaf’ Label in the Philippines,” South East Asia Research 18, no. 3 (2010): 373–413. For the most exaggerated account of the connections between the ASG and the al-Qaeda core, see Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), ProQuest Ebook Central. To some extent, this is echoed by Abuza in Militant Islam in South East Asia, in which the author tends to overuse the “al-Qaeda” label—though his account is undoubtedly more nuanced than Gunaratna’s and his book contains many other useful insights, some of which I cite here. Former CIA psychiatrist and al-Qaeda expert Marc Sageman wrote in 2017 that Gunaratna’s account was “popular but misleading,” that it was “obviously rushed to publication” and “became a source of confusion, and may well have delayed good scholarly research because it provided the field with a faulty frame and database.” See Marc Sageman, “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 4 (2014): 577, note 4. 23. Burke, Al Qaeda, 2. 24. Gerges, The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda, 47–48. Gerges also notes that bin Laden did set up a training camp in Peshawar sometime from late 1987 to early 1988 in collaboration with the Egyptian group Tanzim al-Jihad, but this was still focused on training recruits to fight against the Soviets. See p. 54. 25. Burke, Al Qaeda, 3. 26. Ibid., 86, 95–98, 104–105. 27. Ibid., 4, 145–146. In this period, bin Laden was also interested in funding plots against the Saudi leadership. See Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama



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Bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999), 71. 28. Gerges, Rise and Fall of Al Qaeda, 61–64; Burke, Al Qaeda, 6, 166–169. 29. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 187; Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, 100–101. 30. Gunaratna claims that the Indonesian group Jemaah Islamiyah sent at least one hundred recruits to al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan in the early 1990s. See Inside al-Qaeda, 202. Abuza claims that an al-Qaeda trainer visited the Philippines in 1995 and that a Philippine Jemaah Islamiyah cell trained at al-Qaeda’s camps in Afghanistan in 1993 and 1994. See Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, 96, 137. Abuza claims that Omar al-Faruq “recruited into Al Qaeda then trained in one of its camps from 1992–95 then dispatched to the Philippines” (137, 148). 31. Reeve claims that bin Laden suggested that Ramzi go to the Philippines. See his New Jackals, 72. CNN interview cited in Burke, Al Qaeda, 110. 32. Reeve, New Jackals, 71–93. 33. Cited in Zachary Abuza, Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf, September 2005, 46, n. 10, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB625.pdf. 34. Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, 101, 121. 35. Gerges, Rise and Fall of Al Qaeda, 41, 46, 57, 66–67, 73–74, 85. “The World Islamic Front” statement by Osama bin Laden, February 23, 1998, in Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden, ed. Bruce Lawrence (London: Verso, 2005), 58–62. 36. Banlaoi, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” 69. 37. Cited in Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, 112. 38. David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (London: Routledge, 2003), 55–69; E. San Juan Jr., U.S. Imperialism and Revolution in the Philippines (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 39. Francia, History of the Philippines, 160. On the brutal conduct of the war, see 144–146. 40. Anthony James Joes, “Counterinsurgency in the Philippines 1898–1954,” in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed. Danial Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 39–49. 41. On limited autonomy, see Francia, History of the Philippines, 166–176. On racism and US colonial rule, see David Brody, Visualizing American Empire: Orientalism and Imperialism in the Philippines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), and Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). 42. Rommel C. Banlaoi, ‘The Role of Philippine-American Relations in the Global Campaign Against Terrorism’ Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 2 ( 2002), 296. Cherilyn A. Walley, “A Century of Turmoil: America’s Relationship with the Philippines,” Special Warfare (September 2004): 6–7. 43. Banlaoi, “Role of Philippine-American Relations,” 297. Francia, History of the Philippines, 179–186.

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44. Ben Reid, “Bush and the Philippines After September 11: Hegemony, Mutual Opportunism and Democratic Retreat,” in Bush and Asia: America’s Evolving Relations with East Asia, ed. Mark Beeson (London: Routledge, 2006), 145–161. 45. Ibid., 148–150. Banlaoi, “Role of Philippine-American Relations,” 298. 46. Reid, “Bush and the Philippines,” 149. 47. Banlaoi, “Role of Philippine-American Relations,” 298. 48. Francia, History of the Philippines, 193, 196–200. Victor A. Felix, Philippine Army, Philippine-US Security Relations: Challenges and Opportunities After 9/11, US Army War College, March 2005, 4. 49. On US support for Marcos, see Francia, History of the Philippines, 233–236. 50. Reid, “Bush and the Philippines,” 151. 51. Renato Cruz De Castro, “The Revitalized Philippine-US Security Relations: A Ghost from the Cold War or an Alliance for the 21st Century?” Asian Survey 43, no. 6 (2003): 976. 52. For a full list of joint training exercises between US and Filipino troops from 1992 to 2006, see the table in US and the War on Terror in the Philippines, ed. Patricio N. Abinales and Nathan Gilbert Quimpo (Pasig City: Anvil, 2008), 77–81. 53. De Castro, “Revitalized Philippine-US Security Relations,” 976–977. 54. Renato Cruz De Castro, “Philippine Defense Policy in the 21st Century: Autonomous Defense or Back to the Alliance?” Pacific Affairs 78, no. 3 (2005): 409–412. 55. Ross Marlay, “China, the Philippines, and the Spratly Islands,” Asian Affairs 23 (1997): 195–201. Leszek Buszynski, “Realism, Institutionalism, and Philippine Security,” Asian Survey 42, no. 3 (2002): 483–501. Renato Cruz De Castro, “The USPhilippine Alliance: An Evolving Hedge Against an Emerging China,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, no. 3 (2009) 399–423. 56. De Castro, “US-Philippine Alliance,” 405, and Buszynski, “Realism, Institutionalism, and Philippine Security,” 497. 57. George Baylon Radics, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Balikatan Exercises in the Philippines and the US ‘War against Terrorism,’” Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 4, no. 2 (2004): 118–121. 58. Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, 1998, 29, http://ryukyu-okinawa.net/downloads/usdod-easr98.pdf. 59. On pre-9/11 involvement of US SOF, see the special edition of Special Warfare (September 2004), especially C. H. Briscoe, “Balikatan Exercise Spearheaded ARSOF Operations in the Philippines,” 16–25, and H. Briscoe, “Rescuing the Burnhams: The Unspoken SOCPAC Mission,” 46–51. 60. Briscoe, “Balikatan Exercise,” 16–17. See also Richard Swain, “Case Study: Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines,” Booz Allen Hamilton, under contract to U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Center, October 2010, 14–15, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/ tr/fulltext/u2/a532988.pdf. 61. Briscoe, “Balikatan Exercise,” 17. 62. Briscoe, “Rescuing the Burnhams.”



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63. Briscoe, “Balikatan Exercises,” 17. Robinson et al., U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014, 15–16. 64. “Philippines Offers U.S. Its Troops and Bases,” New York Times, October 3, 2001. 65. “Global Network; U.S. Advisors May Aid Philippine Antiterror Effort” New York Times, October 11, 2001. 66. Briscoe, “Balikatan Exercise,” 17. Christopher A. Parrinello, “Operation Enduring Freedom, Phase II: The Philippines, Islamic Insurgency, and Abu Sayyaf,” Military Intelligence (April–June 2002): 43. Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach,” Military Review (November–December 2006), http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/ Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20061231_art004.pdf. Swain, “Case Study: OEF-P,” 6, 15. Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, 204. 67. See “Pacific Plan Seeks Clues to al-Qaeda Contacts,” Washington Post, November 4, 2001, and “Somalia Draws Anti-Terrorist Focus,” Washington Post, November 4, 2001. 68. “Tropical Battleground; Americans Aiding Philippines in Fight Against Terrorist Group,” New York Times, October 29, 2001. See also “The Temperature’s a Lot Warmer But the Mission’s the Same: Hunting Down Terrorists,” New York Times, November 4, 2001. 69. Swain, “Case Study: OEF-P,” 16–17. In the end, Rumsfeld’s order allowing American troops to move beyond training and actually accompany AFP on combat missions (though not take part in them) did not arrive until July 1, 2002, when there was only over a month of Balikatan left. However, the approval permitted PACOM to expand its advisory work to the islands of Jolo and Tawi-Tawi, alleged ASG strongholds. Briscoe, “Balikatan Exercise,” 24 70. Arroyo cited in Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, 204. The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article VXIII, Transitory Provisions, Section 25, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/Philippines/PHILIPPINE%20 CONSTITUTION.pdf. 71. Donald Wurster to ADM Blair, February 2002, cited in Robinson et al., U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014, 24. For the full rules of engagement, see appendix A. 72. Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-US Anti-Terrorism Co-operation, Congressional Research Service, April 8, 2003, 8. Zachary Abuza, “War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” in Strategic Asia 2003–04: Fragility and Crisis, ed. Richard J. Ellings, Aaron L. Friedberg, and Michael Wills (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004), 349. 73. “U.S. to Aid Philippines’ Terrorism War; Bush Promises Military Equipment, Help in Freezing Insurgents’ Assets,” Washington Post, November 21, 2001. See also “Terrorism War’s New Front; U.S. Aiding Philippine Fight Against Rebels,” Washington Post, December 22, 2001. Briscoe, “Balikatan Exercise,” 17–18. On the final terms of reference for US conduct, see Cherilyn A. Walley, “Impact of the Semipermissive

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Environment on Force Protection in Philippine Engagements,” Special Warfare (September 2004): 36–41. 74. Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, 205–206. 75. Colonel David S. Maxwell, Commander’s Summary of OEF-P, May 5, 2002, cited in Swain, “Case Study: OEF-P,” 16. 76. Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation.” Bruce Vaughn et al., ”Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, February 7, 2005, 20. 77. Vaughn et al., “Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” 20. 78. Blair, Senate statement, 2002. 79. Swain, “Case Study: OEF-P,” 17–18. William Eckert, “Defeating the Idea: Unconventional Warfare in the Southern Philippines,” Special Warfare (November– December 2006): 16–22. For the influence of COIN theory on OEF-P, see Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation.” For further details of the logistics of the US training package, see Briscoe, “Balikatan Exercise,” 21, and Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation.” See also Brian Petit, “OEF-P: Thinking COIN, Practicing FID,” Special Warfare (January–February 2010): 12. (Note that although Petit was the lead writer, “This article was written collaboratively by the members of the 2st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group.” Full details on p. 15.) 80. Swain, “Case Study: OEF-P,” 19. 81. Ibid., 21. 82. Ibid. See also “U.S. Sends More Troops to Philippines in Rebel Fight,” New York Times, April 20, 2002. For more on stability operations on Basilan, see Cherilyn A. Walley, “Civil Affairs: A Weapon of Peace on Basilan Island,” Special Warfare (September 2004): 30–35. 83. Eckert, “Defeating the Idea,” 18. 84. For full details, see Petit, “OEF-P: Thinking COIN, Practicing FID,” 12–14. 85. Radics, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia,”124. 86. “Excerpt: Admiral Fargo Says Fighting Terrorism Is Top Priority,” June 27, 2003, http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/2003/06–27–2.htm. 87. Eckert, “ Defeating the Idea,” 21–22. See also Wilson, “ Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation.” For an account of the activities of the Fourth Psychological Operations Group (Pacific Command) in the Philippines under the auspices of JTF510, see Briscoe, “Wanted Dead or Alive: Psychological Operations During Balikatan 02–1,” Special Warfare (September 2004), 26–29. See also Cherilyn A. Walley, “Special Forces Training Exercises Continue Balikatan Mission,” Special Warfare (September 2004): 42–45. 88. Petit, “ OEF-P: Thinking COIN, Practicing FID,” 15. 89. “Wolfowitz, in Philippines, Looks to a Greater U.S. Role,” New York Times, June 4, 2002. 90. Briscoe, “Balikatan Exercise,” 24. The JSOPTF-P even kept its own web log: http://jsotf-p.blogspot.co.uk/, as well as a Twitter page: http://twitter.com/JSOTFP. 91. Swain “Case Study: OEF-P,” 23.



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92. International Crisis Group (ICG), The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao, Asia Report 152, May 2008, 22, https://www.files. ethz.ch/isn/55959/152_counterinsurgency_mindanao.pdf. Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation.” De Castro, “US-Philippine Alliance,” 415. 93. Jim Garamone, “US-Philippine Contacts to Expand,” American Forces Information Service, August 13, 2002, http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle. aspx?id=43561. 94. This did not include the special training program undertaken as part of OEF-P. 95. For full details of the MLSA signing, see Radics, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” 119–121. 96. See “Excerpt: Admiral Fargo Says Fighting Terrorism Top Priority.” 97. “Why Are We in Jolo?” Washington Post, February 22, 2003. Robinson et al., U.S. SOF in the Philippines, 37. 98. “Why Are We in Jolo?” “U.S. Combat Force of 1,700 Is Headed to the Philippines,” New York Times, February 21, 2003. Vaughn et al., Terrorism in Southeast Asia, 22. 99. Bradley Graham, “United States Bolsters Philippine Force,” Washington Post, February 20, 2003. 100. “Talks May Clarify U.S. Role in Philippines; Details of Troop Deployment, Possible Combat Mission Remain to Be Resolved,” Washington Post, February 24, 2003. Robinson et al., U.S. SOF in the Philippines, 37. 101. “Manila Denies US Force to Assume Combat Role,” Japan Economic Newswire, February 20, 2003; “US Troops Forbidden from Actual Fight in War Games in Philippines,” Xinhua News Service, February 17, 2003; “Five Killed in Clash on Philippine Hostage Island,” Agence France Presse, February 18, 2003: all accessed via Nexis. 102. Robinson et al., U.S. SOF in the Philippines, 37–38. Juliana Gittler, “US Troops Help Build Schools, Skills, Better Lives for Philippine Villagers,” Stars and Stripes, May 11, 2003, http://www.stripes.com/news/u-s-troops-help-build-schools-skillsbetter-lives-for-philippine-villagers-1.5308. 103. “Bush Affirms U.S. Is Ready to Send Troops to the Philippines,” New York Times, May 20, 2003. 104. See “US Advisors Confined to Barracks for Balikatan,” Philippine Daily Enquirer, June 11, 2003. 105. “Failed Manila Mutiny Leaves U.S. Ties Secure,” New York Times, July 29, 2003. 106. “Philippine President Conveys Interest in Joint Anti-Terrorism Training with US,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, October 22, 2003. 107. Gittler, “US Troops Help Build Schools.” 108. James A. Tyner, Iraq, Terror, and the Philippines’ Will to War (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 88–96. 109. Ibid., 103–108. “Despite Pullout from Iraq, Philippine Leader Reaffirms Support of US and Allies in ‘Fight’: Arroyo Stands By Her Call,” New York Times, July 24,

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2004. See also Temario C. Rivera, “The Philippines in 2004: New Mandate, Daunting Problems,” Asian Survey 45, no. 1 (January/February 2005): 127–133. 110. De Castro, “US-Philippine Alliance,” 407–408. Rivera, “Philippines in 2004,” 132. Table of Joint Exercises Between US and Filipino Troops in US and the War on Terror in the Philippines, ed. Abinales and Quimpo,79–80. 111. Every attack by the ASG from 1994 to 2016 is listed in the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results. aspx?expanded=yes&search=Abu+Sayyaf+Group&ob=GTDID&od=desc&page=1&c ount=100#results-table. 112. Two ASG operatives were arrested in Manila in March 2004 with larges caches of explosives destined for backpack bombs to be detonated in malls. Three ASG members were arrested for plotting to bomb the US embassy in Manila in October 2004. See Abuza, Balik-Terrorism, 10–13; Global Terrorism Database–ASG. See also Swain, “Case Study: OEF-P,” 25. 113. Global Terrorism Database–ASG. 114. For full details of Khaddaffy Janjalani’s leadership strategy, see Abuza, BalikTerrorism, 12–13. 115. ICG, Philippines, 8; Abuza Balik-Terrorism, 22–24. 116. On JI’s involvement, see ICG, Philippines, 3–4. 117. Ibid., 21. 118. Ibid., 10. According to a Philippine general, MILF were not told that US forces would be accompanying the AFP in these operations. See “U.S. and Philippines Joined Forces to Pursue Terrorist Leader,” New York Times, July 23, 2005. 119. ICG, Philippines, 12–14. 120. Sheila S. Coronel, “The Philippines in 2006: Democracy and Its Discontents,” Asian Survey 47, no. 1 (2007): 180–181; ICG Report, 13; Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-US Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, Congressional Research Service, January 24, 2007, 14, 121. ICG, Philippines, 15. DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, chap. 6, https:// www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2007/103714.htm. DoS, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, appendix B, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2002/html/19991.htm. 122. Bombings were not the only form of armed attack by the ASG, but the numbers of all attacks were fairly steady throughout the Bush years. See the statistics at Global Terrorism Database–ASG. 123. Zachary Abuza, “The Philippines Chips Away at the Abu Sayyaf Group’s Strength,” CTC Sentinel 3, no. 4 (2010): 11–12, https://ctc.usma.edu/app/ uploads/2010/08/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss4-art5.pdf. 124. The ASG attacked the Marines on Basilan, killing fourteen, ten of whom were beheaded. In December 2007, an ASG attack killed five soldiers and injured twentyfour in Basilan. Swain, “Case Study: OEF-P,” 25–26. 125. The diversity of terrorist groups in Southeast Asia and their differing aims are discussed in Amitav Acharya and Arabinda Acharya, “The Myth of the Second Front:



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Localizing the `War on Terror’ in Southeast Asia,” Washington Quarterly 30, no. 4 (2007): 75–90. For an overview of the region, see Paul J. Smith, “Terrorism in Asia: Confronting an Emerging Challenge,” Harvard Asia Pacific Review (Spring 2002): 44–50. 126. Of the seven key plotters, “Amrozi” reportedly studied at an Islamic school in southern Malaysia where two other plotters, Imam Samudra and “Mukhlas,” are said to have taught, alongside Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the JI cofounder. “Mukhlas” traveled to Afghanistan in 1989 to join the mujahideen , while Imam Samudra, the chief organizer of the attacks, allegedly went to Afghanistan in the 1990s to fight for the Taliban. See “The Bali Bombing Plotters,” BBC News, March 10, 2010, http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2385323.stm; “The Bali Bomb `Commander,” BBC News, November 8, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2499943.stm; “Profile: Mukhlas,” BBC News, November 8, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ asia-pacific/2542863.stm; Burke, al-Qaeda, 265–266. 127. DoS, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003. 128. DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, chap. 5, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/ rls/crt/2005/64336.htm; DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2003. Hambali also channeled funds to the Bojinka plot with one of Ramzi Yusuf’s co-conspirators, and may have allowed a Malaysian contact to host two of the 9/11 hijackers at his Kuala Lumpur apartment in January 2000. See Burke, Al-Qaeda, 228–229. 129. For example, Gunaratna claims that “since the early 1990s,” JI had sent recruits to train “in Al Qaeda’s training camps” in Afghanistan and that JI was “incorporated as an associate group of Al Qaeda” in the early 1990s—despite the fact that no “al-Qaeda” camps and no organization known as al-Qaeda existed at this point. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 204. Similarly Abuza claims that the establishment of JI in 1993–1994 proves that “Al Qaeda taught the importance of international links” and that a JI cell in Malaysia established front companies to channel funds to al-Qaeda in 1993, 1994, and 1995. Again this relies on an inaccurate perception of al-Qaeda as a recognized and well-organized group with regional branches in the early 1990s. See Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, 128, 134. 130. Other Southeast Asian countries could also serve as examples here—Thailand or Singapore, for instance—but since JI is an Indonesian group with major cells in Malaysia and both countries have high levels of popular anti-Americanism, which had an impact on US policy, they serve as useful foils to the Philippines. On Singapore, see Vaughn et al., “Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” 30–32, and for Thailand, 23–28, 44. 131. “Pacific Plan Seeks Clues to al-Qaeda Contacts,” Washington Post, November 4, 2001. 132. David Capie, “Between a Hegemon and a Hard Place: The ‘War on Terror’ and Southeast Asian–US Relations,” Pacific Review 17, no. 2 ( 2004): 227–228. 133. Ibid., 229. 134. Vaughn et al., “Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” 16. 135. Capie, “Between a Hegemon and a Hard Place,” 230. 136. Vaughn et al., “Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” 28.

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137. Capie, “Between a Hegemon and a Hard Place,” 232–233. 138. “Jakarta Rejects US Call to Cut Ties with Iraq,” Arab News, March 22, 2003, http://www.arabnews.com/node/229557. 139. Capie, “Between a Hegemon and a Hard Place,” 232. On the domestic party political considerations that contributed to Mahathir’s position, see Abuza, “War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” 346–347. 140. DoS, “Proliferation Security Initiative,” n.d., http://2001–2009.state.gov/t/isn/ c10390.htm. Mark T. Esper and Charles A. Allen, “The PSI: Taking Action Against WMD Proliferation,” Monitor 10, 10, no. 1 (2004): 4–6, http://cits.uga.edu/uploads/ documents/monitor_sp_2004.pdf. Victor Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?” Naval War College Review 61, no. 1 (2008): 87–105. Ian Storey, “Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Two Cheers for Regional Co-operation,” Southeast Asian Affairs (January 2009): 36–58. Mark J. Valencia, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Making Waves in Asia (Oxon: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005). On the flimsy legal basis for the PSI, which was neither a treaty nor an institution, see Mark R. Shulman, “The Proliferation Security Initiative and the Evolution of the Law on the Use of Force,” Houston Journal of International Law 28, no. 3 (2006): 771–828. 141. Esper and Allen, “The PSI,” 4. 142. Tammy M. Sittnick, “State Responsibility and Maritime Terrorism in the Strait of Malacca: Persuading Indonesia and Malaysia to Take Additional Steps to Secure the Strait,” Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 14, no. 3 (2005): 744–745. Banlaoi, “Maritime Terrorism,” 63–64. 143. “Excerpt: Admiral Fargo Says Fighting Terrorism Top Priority.” 144. Joshua Ho, “Operationalising the Regional Maritime Security Initiative,” IDDS Commentaries, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, May 27, 2004, https://dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/handle/10220/4021/RSIS-COMMENT_189. pdf?sequence=1. 145. Storey, “Maritime Security in Southeast Asia,” 40. 146. “Factsheet: Milestones of Malacca Strait Patrols,” Ministry of Defence, Singapore, March 28, 2008, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/home. 147. Storey, “Maritime Security in Southeast Asia,” 44. 148. Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia,” 99. 149. Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation.” 150. Eckert, “Defeating the Idea,” 22. 151. Other include Briscoe, “Rescuing the Burnhams,” 50–51: the US mission “significantly altered ASG power on Basilan.” See also Briscoe, “ Balikatan Exercise”; Briscoe, “ Wanted Dead or Alive”; C. H. Briscoe, “Reflections and Observations on ARSOF Operations During Balikatan 02–1,” Special Warfare (September 2004): 55–57; C. H. Briscoe, “Why the Philippines? ARSOF’s Expanded Mission in the War on Terror,” Special Warfare (September 2004): 2–3; Briscoe and Downey, “Multiple Insurgent Groups”; Eckert, “Defeating the Idea”; Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation”; Parrinello, “OEF Phase II”; Walley, “Special Forces Training Exercises



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Continue”; Walley, “Impact of the Semipermissive Environment”; Walley, “Civil Affairs.” 152. David H. Ucko, “Beyond Clear-Hold-Build: Rethinking Local Level Counterinsurgency After Afghanistan,” Contemporary Security Policy 34, no. 3 (2013): 526–551. 153. Tan, Security Strategies in the Asia-Pacific, 21. 154. On Indonesian nationalism and the origins of JI, see ibid., 28–30. On the British in Malaysia, see Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 251–256. On the insurgency in southern Thailand and its origins in the colonial period, see Tan, Security Strategies in the Asia-Pacific, 69–78. 155. Lingga, “Understanding Bangsamoro Independence,” 8. 156. Cited in Banlaoi, “Abu Sayyaf Group,” 250. 157. Tan, Security Strategies in the Asia Pacific, 67–68.

Chapter 3 1. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, 6, 15–16, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf. 2. Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Experts, December 2000, 73, http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Global%20Trends_2015%20 Report.pdf. 3. John Ghazvinian, Untapped: The Scramble for Africa’s Oil (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2007), 12. In 2006, the African continent was home to approximately 117 billion barrels of proven oil reserves—or around 10 percent of the world’s total supply. See British Petroleum, Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2007, 6, 22, cited in Michael Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: How Scare Energy Is Creating a New World Order (Oxford: Oneworld, 2008), 150. 4. J. Dietrich, “The Gulf of Guinea and Global Oil Market Supply and Demand,” in Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development, ed. R. Traub-Merz and D. Yates (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, 2004), 28, cited in Freedom C. Onuoha, “The Geo-Strategy of Oil in the Gulf of Guinea: Implications for Regional Stability,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 45, no. 3 (2010): 373. 5. On the Cold War in Africa, see Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Jonathan T. Reynolds, Sovereignty and Struggle: Africa and Africans in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–1991 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013); Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–76 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2002); Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

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6. See “Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations,” Presidential Review Directive 13, February 15, 1993, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36558, and “US Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,” Presidential Decision Directive 25, May 3, 1994: https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12749. Leonie G. Murray, Clinton, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Intervention (London: Routledge, 2008). Michael G. MacKinnon, The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton (London: Frank Cass, 2000). 7. “U.S. Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa,” Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, August 1, 1995, http://archive.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech. aspx?SpeechID=943. 8. On the enlargement of the community of market democracies, see White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,” February 1995, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss-95.pdf ; I. M. Destler, “Foreign Economic Policy Making Under Bill Clinton,” in James M. Scott, ed., After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post–Cold War World (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 89–107. Renee G. Scherlen, “NAFTA and Beyond: The Politics of Trade in the Post-Cold War Period,” in After the End, ed. Scott, 358–385. 9. “The Second Bush-Gore Presidential Debate,” debate transcript, October 11, 2000, http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-11–2000-debate-transcript. 10. George W. Bush, “A Period of Consequences,” speech at the Citadel, South Carolina, September 23, 1999, http://www.citadel.edu/root/pres_bush. George W. Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism,” speech, November 19, 1999, https://www. mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm. Republican Party Platform of 2000, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25849. 11. National Energy Policy Development Group, National Energy Policy, report, May 2001, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0428/ML042800056.pdf (hereafter cited as NEP report). 12. In spring 2002 the Department of Energy was ordered by a federal Judge to release approximately 13,500 pages of information related to the proceedings of the task force. For access to those documents, see the website of the Natural Resources Defense Council: http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/taskforce/tfinx.asp. 13. NEP report, 8–3, 8–4. 14. Ibid., 8–7. 15. Ibid., 8–11. 16. Ibid. “Comprehensive National Energy Strategy,” April 1998, http://prop1.org/ thomas/peacefulenergy/cnesM.pdf. 17. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Michael Westphal, Department of Defense news briefing, April 2, 2002, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3387. 18. Cited in “With Mideast Uncertainty, US Turns to Africa for Oil,” Christian Science Monitor, May 23, 2002, http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0523/p07s01-woaf.html. 19. Statement of John R. Brodman, Assistant Secretary for Political and International Affairs, Department of Energy, Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations



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Committee: U.S. Energy Security: West Africa and Latin America, October 21, 2003, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg91959/html/CHRG-108shrg91959. htm. 20. Statement of John R. Brodman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for International Energy Policy, Department of Energy, Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: The Gulf of Guinea and U.S. Strategic Energy Policy, July 15, 2004, https:// www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg97231/html/CHRG-108shrg97231.htm. 21. Brodman, 2003 statement. For similar comments, see his 2004 testimony. See also the comments on investment climate and oil exploitation by Paul Simons, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Energy, Sanctions and Commodities, Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: The Gulf of Guinea and U.S. Strategic Energy Policy, July 15, 2004, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg97231/html/CHRG108shrg97231.htm. 22. On transnationalization of oil, see Doug Stokes and Sam Raphael, Global Energy Security and American Hegemony (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 2–3. 23. Summit Documents, “Fighting Corruption and Improving Transparency,” Sea Island, June 10, 2004, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2004seaisland/corruption.html Simons 2004 testimony. White House, “Sea Island Summit,” 2004, https:// georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/g8/2004/. 24. Simons, “Gulf of Guinea and U.S. Strategic Energy Policy.” 25. “Angola Set to Disclose Payments from Big Oil,” New York Times, May 13, 2004. 26. Simons, “Gulf of Guinea and U.S. Strategic Energy Policy.” 27. Jim Fisher-Thompson, “US-African Partnership Helps Counter Terrorists in Sahel Region,” March 23, 2004, reproduced by the State Department’s Bureau of International Information Programs, November 20, 2012, http://preprod.iipdigital.getusinfo.com/st/english/article/2004/03/20040323170343r1ejrehsif0.1366693. html#axzz2DjFCM2zK. 28. Jones, cited in Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Seeking New Access Pacts for Africa Bases,” New York Times, July 5, 2003. He referred often to the “vast ungoverned spaces” of Africa. See, for example, Statement of General James L. Jones, Commander of the United States European Command, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 28, 2005, 9. 29. National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2004, 5, https:// archive.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf. 30. Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 144–145. 31. Department of State, “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” https://www.state.gov/j/ ct/list/c14151.htm. On the events in Sudan and the ultimate failure to construct an Islamic state, see Alex de Waal and A. H. Abdel Salam, “Islamism, State Power and Jihad in Sudan,” and Alex de Waal, “The Politics of Destabilization in the Horn, 1989–2001,” both in Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, ed. Alex de Waal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 71–113, 182–230. Also see Timothy

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Carney, “The Sudan: Political Islamism and Terrorism,” in Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Cambridge: World Peace Foundation, and Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 119–140; and Peter Woodward, The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 54–64. 32. Burke, Al Qaeda, 145–146. 33. David Rose, “The Osama Files,” Vanity Fair, June 4, 2007, https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2002/01/osama200201. 34. De Waal, “Politics of Destabilisation,” 182, and De Waal, “Introduction,” 1, both in De Waal, Islamism and Its Enemies. 35. “Declaration of Jihad,” August 23, 1996, in Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden, ed. Bruce Lawrence (London: Verso, 2005), 23–30. Burke, Al Qaeda, 164–166. Fawaz A. Gerges, The Rise and Fall of Al Qaeda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 40–41. 36. Connections of the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombers to bin Laden are described in Burke, Al Qaeda, 169–178. See also “Four Embassy Bombers Get Life,” CNN.com, October 21, 2001, http://edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/10/19/embassy.bombings/, and “Jury Convicts Four on All Charges,” CNN.com, May 29, 2001, http://edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/05/29/embassy.bombings.verdict/index.html. 37. Roland Marchal, “Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War: Before and After September 11,” in Islamism and Its Enemies, ed. De Waal, 132– 336 (quote on p. 133). International Crisis Group, Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, Africa Report 45, May 23, 2002, 2–5 (henceforth cited as ICG Somalia 2002). Kenneth J. Menkhaus, “Somalia and Somaliland: Terrorism, Political Islam, and State Collapse,” in Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, ed. Rotberg, 23–47. 38. Marchal, “Islamic Politics in the Somali Civil War,” 134. 39. Congressional Research Service (CRS) , Africa and the War on Terrorism, Report for Congress, January 17, 2002, 12. For a detailed picture of AIAI, see ICG Somalia 2002. 40. CRS, Africa and the War on Terrorism, 14. Roland Marchal, “Somalia: A New Front against Terrorism,” Social Science Research Council, February 5, 2007, http:// hornofafrica.ssrc.org/marchal/. 41. ICG, Somalia 2002, 17. 42. CRS, Africa and the War on Terrorism, 14. 43. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, Africa Overview, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2002/html/19981.htm. 44. Six co-accused Kenyan Muslims were tried for the attack in 2005 and found not guilty. Another suspect, Abdulmalik Mohammed, has been held in Guantanamo Bay Prison since 2007 without charge. See “US Wants Israel to Try Gitmo Prisoner for 2002 Kenya Bombing—Report,” Times of Israel, December 9, 2016; “Kenyan Court Overturns Weapons Possession Conviction Against Terror Suspects,” IHS Global Insight, September 17, 2008; “Kenya: Now Terror Suspect Sent to Guantanamo,” Africa



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News, March 28, 2007; “Trial of Kenyans for Mombasa Attack on Israelis Winds Down,” Jerusalem Post, April 27, 2005: all accessed via Nexis. 45. Department of Defense, “Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, 10/19/2002—Organization Authority Record,” https://catalog.archives.gov/ id/10478655 (hereafter cited as “CJTF–HoA Organization Authority Record”). 46. “DJIBOUTI: President in Talks with Visiting US Official,” November 20, 2001, http://www.irinnews.org/Report/28405/DJIBOUTI-President-in-talks-withvisiting-US-official. 47. See Amedee Bollee, “Djibouti: From French Outpost to US Base,” Review of African Political Economy 30, no. 97 (2003): 481–484. 48. See US Institute of Peace, Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, Special Report 113, January 2004, 9. 49. “Eritrea Eager for US Military Partnership,” Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), July 5, 2002. “Tiny Desert Nation Bids to Host Troops; Hires D.C. PR Firm to Press Its Case,” Washington Times, December 12, 2002. 50. Bollee, “Djibouti,” 483. “Country Report, Eritrea,” Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2003, 21, cited in Adekeye Adebajo, “Africa and America in an Age of Terror,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 38, no. 2–3 (2003): 181. 51. A Boston Globe reporter, Robert Schlesinger, toured the US military facility while it was under development in December 2002. See his report: “In Djibouti, US Special Forces Develop Base Amid Secrecy,” Boston Globe, December 12, 2012. See also an early report of US military activity at Camp Lemonnier in “U.S. Military Grows in Djibouti,” Associated Press, September 30, 2002. 52. See John F. Sattler, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, DoD news briefing, January 10, 2003, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript. aspx?TranscriptID=1246. See also “Rumsfeld Pledges Long-Term Partnership with Africa in Fighting Terrorism,” Associated Press, December 10, 2002, accessed via Nexis. 53. “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Djibouti on Access to and Use of Facilities in the Republic of Djibouti,” February 19, 2003, https://2001–2009.state.gov/documents/ organization/97620.pdf. 54. “Djibouti: Turning Strategic Location into Economic Advantage,” AllAfrica, January 27, 2003, http://allafrica.com/stories/200301270051.html. 55. “CJTF–HoA, Organization Authority Record.” 56. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa Task Force, Report to the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, April 2010, 5, https://www.gao.gov/ assets/310/303408.pdf. 57. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 260–261. 58. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, April 30 2003, Africa Overview http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2002/html/19981.htm.

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59. Quote from “Djibouti: Turning Strategic Location into Economic Advantage.” See also Lange Schermerhorn, “Djibouti: A Special Role in the War on Terrorism,” in Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, ed. Rotberg, 49–50. 60. US Embassy Djibouti, “President Guelleh and U.S-Djibouti Bilateral Relations,” cable, December 3, 2004, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04DJIBOUTI1541_a. html. 61. GAO, Defense Management, 1. 62. Sattler, news briefing. 63. Lauren Ploch, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, Congressional Research Service, July 22, 2011, 21, http://www.fas. org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf1. 64. Sattler, news briefing. 65. “Mission, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa,” fact sheet, accessed April 12, 2012, http://www.hoa.africom.mil/AboutCJTF-HOA.asp (no longer online; copy in the author’s possession). 66. SecState to US Embassies in N’Djamena, Bamako, Nouakchott, Niamey, SecDef, Joint Staff, NSC, COMSOCEUR, HQ USEUCOM, USCINCEUR, “Pan Sahel Initiative Conference” declassified cable (DECLASS/C). November 2002. All declassified cables were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. All FOIA materials in author’s possession. 67. “Pan Sahel Initiative,” press release, Office of Counterterrorism, Washington DC, November 7, 2002, http://2001–2009, state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/14987.htm. 68. Unclassified briefing on the Pan-Sahel Initiative, Colonel C. D. Smith Jr., US defense attaché to South Africa, n.d., http://www.cips.up.ac.za/old/Publications/ Col%20CD%20Smith%20Jr.ppt. (No longer online; copy in the author’s possession.) 69. Smith unclassified PSI briefing, 3. For further details on the PSI training and schedule, see the following: DECLASS/C from SecState to Embassies in Algiers, Abuja, Dakar, Paris, N’Djamena, Bamako, Nouakchott, Niamey, London, “Briefing Host Governments on Pan Sahel Initiative,” January 2003; DECLASS/C from SecState to Embassies in Bamako, N’Djamena, Niamey, Nouakchott, for info to embassies in Conakry, Freetown, Joint Staff, SecDef, COMSOCEUR, USEUCOM, “Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) Training Plan,” July 2003; DECLASS/C, From SecState to Embassies in Bamako, N’Djamena, Niamey, Nouakchott, USCINCEUR, USEUCOM, COMSOCEUR, for info to embassies in Conakry, Dakar, Freetown, Joint Staff, SecDef, “Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) Update,” September 2003. 70. “Special Forces Support Pan-Sahel Initiative,” DoD News, March 8, 2004, http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=27112. 71. “Pan Sahel Initiative,” press release, and Smith unclassified PSI briefing, 4 (for a detailed country-by-country budget breakdown, see 7–8). On additional funding, see interview with Colonel Victor Nelson on the Pan Sahel Initiative, Stars and Stripes, April 4, 2004, http://www.stripes.com/news/ stripes-q-a-on-dod-s-pan-sahel-initiative-1.18537. 72. Smith, unclassified PSI briefing, 9, 17.



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73. Quoted in “Airmen Support Pan Sahel Initiative,” March 17, 2004, http://www. eucom.mil/media-library/articles/tags/Belgium?Page=47. 74. DECLASS/C from Embassy N’Djamena, “Pan Sahel Initiative Approval, Chad,” September 19, 2002. DECLASS/C from Embassy N’Djamena, “President Deby on Regional Stability,” September 30, 2002. DECLASS/C from Embassy N’Djamena, “AF/C Office Director Al Eastham Visit to Chad,” February 17, 2003. DECLASS/C from Embassy N’Djamena, ‘USUN: UNSCR 1373, PSI, and Chad’s CT Capabilities,” January 2003. 75. DECLASS/C, from Embassy Niamey, “Niger: Terrorist Groups and Arms Trafficking Contributing to Insecurity,” March 2004. 76. DECLASS/C, From Embassy Nouakchott, “Demarche on Al-Qaida Threats,” October 17, 2002. DECLASS/C, From Embassy Nouakchott, “Pan-Sahel Initiative—AF DAS Perry Hears Mauritania’s Support, Suggestions,” October 31, 2002. DECLASS/C, From SecState WashDC to Embassy Nouakchott, “U/S Grossman’s Meeting with Mauritanian Foreign Minister Ould Tolba,” October 1, 2003. 77. DECLASS/C from Embassy Bamako, “PSI Delegation’s Meeting with Minister of Security Souleymane Sidibe,” October 2002. 78. DECLASS/C, From Embassy Bamako, “Ambassador Perry and PSI Team Visit Malian State Security.” October 2002. 79. DECLASS/C, From Embassy Bamako, “Mali Offers Full Support in Global War on Terror,” January 2, 2003. See also DECLASS/C, From Embassy Bamako, “Ambassador Meets Minister of Defense on Article 98,” March 2003; and DECLASS/C, From Embassy Bamako, “Mali Still Reluctant to Sign Article 98 Agreement,” June 2, 2003. 80. DECLASS/C, From Embassy Bamako, “CODEL Dreier Scenesetter,” July 16, 2003. 81. See the American Service Members Protection Act of 2002, Title II, 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Public Law 107–206, August 2, 2002, http://www.gpo. gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ206/pdf/PLAW-107publ206.pdf. 82. International Criminal Court, “Article 98: Agreements Research Guide,” Georgetown Law Library, http://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/article_98. 83. DECLASS/C, From Embassy Bamako, “Ambassador Meets with Secretary General Sidibe on Article 98,” June 2003; DECLASS/C, From Embassy Bamako, “CODEL Drier Scenesetter,” July 16, 2003; DECLASS/C, From Embassy Bamako, “Article 98—Request for Negotiating Team,” July 2003; DECLASS/C, From Embassy Bamako, “Messages from Mali,” 27 February 2004; “US Cuts in Africa Aid Said to Hurt War on Terror,” New York Times, July 23, 2006; US Embassy Bamako, “The Deputy Secretary in Mali—Meetings with President Touré and Foreign Minister,” cable, November 28, 2007, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BAMAKO1361_a.html. 84. DECLASS/C, From Embassy Niamey to SecState WashDC, “Read Out of DAS Bridgewater Conversation with Niger President Tandja,” June 2004. 85. DECLASS/C, From Embassy N’Djamena to HQ USEUCOM, “Requested AddOns to Pan-Sahel Initiative,” December 2003.

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86. “Reservists Help Needy in Central Africa,” July 19, 2004, http://www.eucom. mil/media-library/articles/2004/7. 87. Karl Wycoff, Associate Coordinator for Press, Policy, Programs and Plans, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, prepared statement before the House Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa92870.000/hfa92870_0.HTM. 88. All of this information is taken from the inset on “Global Terror, Global Response: Partnership in East Africa,” contained in DoS, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, 29, released April 2004. See also William Pope, Deputy State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Opening Remarks at the East Africa Counterterrorism Conference, Kampala, Uganda, April 21, 2004, https://2001–2009.state.gov/s/ ct/rls/rm/2004/31731.htm. 89. Wycoff, prepared statement. 90. Ibid. 91. DoS, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2005, Africa Overview, 46, http://www.state. gov/documents/organization/65468.pdf. The same judgment is made in DoS, “Executive Summary of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative,” January 7, 2005, secret, obtained under FOIA. 92. Donna Miles, “New Counterterrorism Initiative to Focus on Saharan Africa,” American Forces Press Service, May 16, 2005, http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=31643. 93. Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC, Commander, United States European Command, Before the House Armed Services Committee on 7 April 2006, A Commander’s Perspective on Building the Capacity of Foreign Military Forces, 5–6, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2006_hr/060407-jones.pdf. “Executive Summary of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative.” It is known that there were “delays in the interagency process of bringing TSCTI before the Deputies,” but currently available documentation does not elaborate on the reasons for this. This does, however, explain the gap between the end of the PSI in March 2004 and the approval of the TSCTI in January 2005. See DoS, Memorandum for Gregory L. Schulte, Executive Secretary, National Security Council, January 19, 2005, confidential, obtained under FOIA. 94. “Executive Summary of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative.” 95. DoS, Note to the Deputy Secretary, “Recommended Phone Call to OMB re TSCTI,” January 12, 2005, secret, obtained under FOIA. On objectives, see also DoS, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2005, 46. 96. US Africa Command, “Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara,” n.d., accessed November 12, 2012, http://www.africom.mil/oef-ts.asp (no longer online; copy in the author’s possession). See also “Program Overview,” Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, https://www.africom.mil/Doc/7432. See also “Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership” May 2010, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q =&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&ved=2ahUKEwj9k8XDj8jeAhVBhxoKHRHBBJQQFj AEegQIBxAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.africom.mil%2FDoc%2F7432&usg=AOv



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Vaw0SdSolKVWAkLW8GM24n_X5. DoS, “Military to Military Cooperation Action Plan,” January 12, 2005, sensitive but unclassified, obtained through FOIA. “Counterterrorism Cooperation: Action Plan,” January 12, 2005, sensitive but unclassified, obtained through FOIA. 97. US Africa Command, “Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara.” For similar, see also ‘Program Overview: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership’. 98. “Program Overview: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.” Max R. Blumenfeld, “Training in Trans-Sahara Africa,” JSOTF-TS, Public Affairs, December 13, 2010, https://www.africom.mil/media-room/article/7896/training-in-transsahara-africa. 99. DoS, Congressional Notification, attached to DoS, Action Memo for the Deputy Secretary, “Congressional Notification for FY 2004 and 2005 Foreign Operations Funding for TSCTI,” date obscured, confidential, obtained under FOIA. 100. Specific details can be found in ibid. See also DoS, “Supporting Democratic Governance and Economic Growth in the Sahel: Action Plan,” January 12, 2005, obtained through FOIA. 101. DoS, “FY 2005 Proposed Funding for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), Program Component,” n.d., obtained through FOIA. 102. DoS, “Congressional Notification,” and DoS, “Public Diplomacy Campaign: Action Plan,” October 29, 2004, confidential, obtained through FOIA. 103. A summary of interagency responsibilities is contained in GAO, Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, July 2008, 14–20, http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/279056.pdf. 104. Whelan, quoted in Miles, “New Counterterrorism Initiative to Focus on Saharan Africa”; Executive Summary of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative; DoS, “Supporting Democratic Governance and Economic Growth in the Sahel: Action Plan,” January 12, 2005, obtained through FOIA. 105. Cited in Mary Jo Choate, US Marine Corps, “Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative: Balance of Power?” USAWC Strategy Research Project, March 2007, 4, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB627.pdf. 106. Cited in Miles, “New Counterterrorism Initiative to Focus on Saharan Africa.” 107. Charles F. Wald, “The Phase Zero Campaign,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 43 (4th quarter 2006): 72–75. The approach was also explained by Wald’s senior, the EUCOM commander, General James L. Jones, in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 7, 2006, 12. See https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2006_hr/060307-jones.pdf. 108. Wald, “Phase Zero,” 72–33. 109. Ibid., 73. Emphasis in original. 110. Ibid., 72. 111. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP-5–0: Joint Operational Planning, draft, 2006, cited in Hans Sholley, U.S. African Command: Shaping Africa for the Future, Naval War College, October 23, 2006, 7, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc =GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA463683.

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112. On this transformation, see Elbert “Buck” Ross, “The Changing Face of Civil Affairs: Training Today to Meet Tomorrow’s Requirements,” Special Warfare (July– August 2006): 16–19. Janice Burton, “In Fighting Form,” Special Warfare (May–June 2006): 30–31. Janice Burton, “Building Nation Builders: Revamping the CA Pipeline,” Special Warfare (May–June 2008): 8–10. 113. Wald, “Phase Zero,” 74. Quotation from “Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara.” 114. Wald, “Phase Zero,” 74. 115. Ibid., 75. See the English-language version of Magharebia at http://www. magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/homepage/default. 116. Wald, “Phase Zero,” 75. 117. Ibid., 75. On contracting IO to the private sector, see also “Pentagon Funds Diplomacy Effort,” Washington Post, June 11, 2005. The DoD’s 2003 “Information Operations Roadmap,” which made IO a core military competency, recognized that information that did not come directly from US officials has “greater credibility to foreign audiences” and advocated the creation of such web sites containing material from third parties that supported US positions. Department of Defense, “Information Operations Roadmap,” October 2003, 27–28, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ NSAEBB/NSAEBB177/info_ops_roadmap.pdf. 118. Jones, Senate testimony, March 2006, 14. 119. “Gen. Abizaid: Military Work in Horn of Africa ‘Blueprint’ for Future,” Navy. mil, May 11, 2006, https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=23618. 120. ICG, Somalia 2002, 6. 121. Mary Harper, Getting Somalia Wrong? Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State (London: Zed Books, 2012), 79–80. 122. Cedric Barnes and Harun Hassan, “The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts,” Journal of Eastern African Studies, 1 no. 2 (2007): 3–4. 123. For this and other Somali views on the Islamic Courts, see Anna Lindley, “Leaving Mogadishu: Towards a Sociology of Conflict-Related Mobility,” Journal of Refugee Studies 23, no. 1 (2010): 8–9, 11. See also Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars: The World Is a Battlefield (London: Serpent’s Tail, 2013), 203. 124. Lindley, “Leaving Mogadishu,” 9, and Harper, Getting Somalia Wrong? 81–82. 125. Marchal, “Somalia,” 2. Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, “Choosing Sides in the Horn of Africa: Wikileaks, the Ethiopia Imperative, and American Responses to Post-9/11 Regional Conflicts,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 23, no. 4 (2012): 714. 126. On the border disputes, see Marchal, “Somalia.” 127. American Embassy, Addis Ababa, “Meles/Frazer Review Approach to Somalia,” cable, June 29, 2006, http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06ADDISABABA1783.html. 128. US Embassy Nairobi, “Assistant Secretary Frazer’s Meeting with Somali Parliament Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden,” cable, June 23, 2006, http://www. wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06NAIROBI2758.html. In January 2007, the State Department issued a list of four alleged al-Qaeda operatives it claimed were sheltering in Mogadishu as six members of the ICU that it claimed were affiliated with al-Qaeda.



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See “Somalia: Eliminating the Terrorist Threat,” fact sheet, African Affairs, January 25, 2007, http://2001–2009.state.gov/p/af/rls/fs/2007/79383.htm. 129. On this and other CIA activity in Somalia, see Jeremy Scahill, “Blowback in Somalia,” Nation, September 26, 2011, http://www.thenation.com/article/163210/ blowback-somalia#, and Jeremy Scahill, “The CIA’s Secret Sites in Somalia,” Nation, August 1–8, 2011, http://www.thenation.com/article/161936/cias-secret-sites-somalia. 130. Department of State, daily press briefing, June 16, 2006, http://2001–2009, state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2006/67993.htm. The original reference to this briefing, though not the full quote, came from Lefebvre, “Choosing Sides in the Horn of Africa,” 715. 131. On the longer history of the US-Ethiopian alliance and its demise, see Westad, Global Cold War, 250–287. 132. American Embassy, “Meles/Frazer Review Approach to Somalia.” 133. American Embassy Addis Ababa, “Ethiopia: PM Meles Welcomes USG Engagement on Somalia, Calls It Greatest Long-Term Security Threat,” cable, November 30, 2005, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/11/05ADDISABABA3984.html, and American Embassy, “Meles/Frazer Review Approach to Somalia.” 134. American Embassy, “Meles/Frazer Review Approach to Somalia.” Frazer expressed similar concerns to the TFG president, Abdullah Yusuf, and to the Speaker of the Parliament in Baidoa. See US Embassy Nairobi, “Assistant Secretary Frazer’s Meeting with Somali President Abdullah Yusuf,” cable, June 23, 2006, http://wikileaks. org/cable/2006/06/06NAIROBI2761.html; US Embassy Nairobi, “Assistant Secretary Frazer’s Meeting with Somali Parliament Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden,” cable, June 23, 2006, http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06NAIROBI2758.htm. 135. Ennifar, UNMEE, Addis Ababa, to Guenno, United Nations, New York, memo, from “Meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,” June 26, 2006, http://wlstorage.net/file/frazer-somalia-memo-2006.pdf. 136. Statement of Jendayi E. Frazer, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, US Department of State, Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa: Global Human Rights and International Operations and the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the House Committee on International Relations, June 29, 2006, 43, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa28429.000/hfa28429_0f.htm. 137. US Embassy London, “Somalia: Museveni Tells A/S Frazer Ugandan Troops Can Guard Baidoa,” cable, November 22, 2006, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/ cables/06LONDON8066_a.htm. 138. Scahill, Dirty Wars, 204–205, 219–223. 139. US Embassy Addis Ababa, “Somalia: PM Meles Affirms Need for Ethiopian Troops to Withdraw,” cable, January 5, 2007, http://www.wikileaks.org/ cable/2007/01/07ADDISABABA40.html; US Embassy Addis Ababa, “Somalia: Prime Minister Meles Urges Diplomacy Take Center Stage,” cable, January 25, 2007, http:// www.wikileaks.org/cable/2007/01/07ADDISABABA233.html. 140. Pauline Jelinek, “US Special Forces in Somalia,” Associated Press, January 10, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/10/ AR2007011000438.html.

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141. US Embassy Addis Ababa, “Ethiopia: USG Assistance Needed to Meet Burden of War,” cable, January 24, 2007, http://cables.mrkva.eu/cable.php?id=93802. 142. Harper, Getting Somalia Wrong? 177. 143. Markus Virgil Hoehne, “Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: How External Interference Helped to Produce Militant Islamism,” December 2009, 21, http://webarchive. ssrc.org/Somalia_Hoehne_v10.pdf. 144. For the different factions within the UIC, see ibid., 11–19. On Al-Shabaab’s background, see Harper, Getting Somalia Wrong? 86–96. Rob Wise, “Al Shabaab,” Al Qaeda and Associated Movements Futures Project, case study no. 2, July 2011, 4, Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/files/publication/110715_ Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf,. 145. Wise, “Al Shabaab,” 5–8. 146. “Somalia’s Al Shabaab to Ally with al-Qaeda,” Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2010. 147. Wise, “Al Shabaab,” 8–9. 148. FBI Report cited in Harper, Getting Somalia Wrong? 99. 149. Hoehne, “Counter-Terrorism in Somalia,” 22–23. 150. Ibid., 23. African Union Mission in Somalia, “AMISOM Background,” n.d., http://amisom-au.org/about/amisom-background/. Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Africa: Global Health, and Human Rights, September 13, 2012, https://2009–2017.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2012/197773.htm. 151. Background briefing on U.S. Assistance to the Somalia Transitional Federal Government, June 26, 2009, https://2009–2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/06a/125448.htm. 152. Remarks with Somali Transitional Federal Government President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Nairobi, Kenya, August 6, 2009, https://2009–2017, state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/08/126956.htm. 153. J. Dietrich, “The Gulf of Guinea and Global Oil Market Supply and Demand,” in Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development, ed. R. Traub-Merz and D. Yates (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, 2004), 28, cited in Onuoha, “The Geo-Strategy of Oil in the Gulf of Guinea.” 373. 154. Address by Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Charles Snyder at the American Enterprise Institute, transcript, Africa News, April 18, 2004, accessed via Nexis. 155. “U.S. General Proposes Help in ‘Monitoring’ Unstable West Africa Oil Gulf,” Associated Press, July 12, 2004. 156. “Maritime Security Conference Brings Gulf of Guinea Neighbors Together,” United States European Command, October 5, 2004, http://www.eucom.mil/article/21949/Maritime-Security-Conference-Brings-Gulf-Guinea (copy in the author’s possession). 157. Statement of General Bantz J. Craddock, before the House Armed Services Committee, March 15, 2007, 22, http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/TestCraddock070315.pdf.



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158. Ibid. “European Command General Discusses Maritime Security in Africa,” US European Command, November 16, 2006, http://www.eucom.mil/media-library/ articles/tags/croix-rouge?Page=88. 159. “Africa Partnership Station,” n.d., http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/ security-cooperation/africa-partnership-station. “Global Fleet Station Pilot One Step Closer with Arrival of Swift,” April 9, 2007, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display. asp?story_id=28777. 160. “Global Fleet Station Pilot One Step Closer.” Kathi A. Sohn, “The Global Fleet Station: A Powerful Tool for Preventing Conflict,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 1 (2009): 45–58. Jonathan Stevenson, “The U.S. Navy: Into Africa,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 1 (2009): 59–65. Naval Operations Concept 2006, 30–31, https://www. scribd.com/document/63668943/Naval-Operations-Concept-2006. Institute for International Strategic Studies, “The Africa Partnership Station: A New US Approach to Sub-Saharan Engagement,” Strategic Comments 14, no. 6 (2008). 161. Naval Operations Concept, 30–31. 162. UK involvement is confirmed in “Ghana Welcomes Africa Partnership Station,” November 19, 2007, https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=33383. Spanish involvement is confirmed in “US, Spanish Marines Practice Martial Arts aboard USS Fort McHenry,” November 20 2007, http://www.eucom.mil/article/20751/ us-spanish-marines-practice-martials-arts-aboard. Portuguese involvement is confirmed in “Sao Tome Welcomes Africa Partnership Station,” January 23, 2008, http:// www.eucom.mil/article/20713/sao-tome-welcomes-africa-partnership-station. French involvement is confirmed in “Africa Partnership Station Arrives in Libreville, Gabon,” January 9, 2008, http://www.eucom.mil/article/20722/africa-partnership-station-arrives-libreville. On the 2009 composition, see Africa Partnership Station and Maritime Capacity Building in Africa, Foreign Press Center Briefing, Rear Admiral William Loeffler, Washington DC, March 26, 2009, https://2009–2017-fpc. state.gov/121013.htm. 163. The president directed the development of a maritime security strategy in December 2004. See National Strategy for Maritime Security, September 2005, http:// georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/homeland/maritime-security.html. 164. Ian Taylor, “China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa,” International Affairs 82, no. 5 (2006): 942, 944–945. Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet, 168–169. 165. For an overview of Beijing’s global energy strategy, see David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, “China’s Global Hunt for Energy,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2005): 25–38. 166. Taylor, “China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa,” 943. 167. International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics (Washington DC: IMF, 2005), cited in ibid., 937–938. 168. Dambisa Moyo, Winner Take All: China’s Race for Resources and What It Means for Us (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 75–94. 169. On transnationalization, see Stokes and Raphael, Global Energy Security and American Hegemony. “Pentagon Africa Policy Chief Whelan Describes U.S. Objectives

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for Africa Command,” transcript, February 18, 2008, https://www.africom.mil/ media-room/transcript/6123/transcript-pentagon-africa-policy-chief-whelan-des. 170. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 30, http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf. See also National Security Strategy, May 2010, 11, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf; Quadrennial Defense Review, February 2010, 7, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/QDR_as_ of_29JAN10_1600.pdf ; Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, 2, http://archive.defense.gov/news/ Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. 171. Jonathan Holslag, “China’s New Security Strategy for Africa,” Parameters (Summer 2009): 28–29. “China’s Djibouti Military Base: Logistics Facility or Platform for Geopolitical Ambitions Overseas?” South China Morning Post, October 1, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2113300/ chinas-djibouti-military-base-logistics-facility-or. 172. Sean McFate, “US Africa Command: A New Strategic Paradigm?” Military Review (January–February 2008), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20080228_art005.pdf. 173. See discussion in Otto Sieber, “Africa Command: Forecast for the Future,” Strategic Insights 6, no. 1 (January 2007), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ GetTRDoc?AD=ADA519742. See also John E. Campbell, “Sub-Saharan Africa and the Unified Command Plan,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 2001–2002): 72–75. Richard G. Catoire, “A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan—Commanders in Chief,” Parameters 30, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 102–117. 174. “Transforming EUCOM, Part 1: Plan Could Shift Leaner Units Closer to Hot Spots,” Stars and Stripes, June 15, 2003, http://www.stripes. com/news/transforming-eucom-part-1-plan-could-shift-leaner-units-closerto-hot-spots-1.6688. “Transforming EUCOM, Part 3: Zeroing In on the African Continent,” Stars and Stripes, June 17, 2003, http://www.stripes.com/news/ transforming-eucom-part-3-zeroing-in-on-the-african-continent-1.6662. 175. John T. Correll, “European Command Looks South and East,” Air Force Magazine (December 2003): 61. 176. Ploch, Africa Command, 9. “US Global Force Posture Review,” Senior Administration Officials from the Departments of State and Defense, Foreign Press Center Briefing, August 16, 2004, accessed via Nexis. 177. Ploch, Africa Command, 2. 178. Town Hall Meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Pace from the Pentagon, Department of Defense news transcript, September 22, 2006, http://archive.defense.gov/ Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3733. U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs Office, United States Africa Command: The First Three Years, March 2011, 7–8, https://www. scribd.com/document/50930817/U-S-Africa-Command-The-First-ThreeYears-March-2011. 179. Theresa Whelan, Why AFRICOM? An American Perspective, Institute for Security Studies, August 17, 2007, 3–4, 7, http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/



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SITREPAFRICOM170807.PDF. For perspectives on AFRICOM from DoD, State, and USAID, see statements before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, by Jendayi E. Frazer, Theresa Whelan, and Michael Hess (Assistant Administrator, USAID), August 1, 2007, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ CHRG-110shrg44135/html/CHRG-110shrg44135.htm. 180. Whelan, Why AFRICOM? 7 and US Africa Command, “About the Command,” n.d., http://www.africom.mil/about-the-command. Ploch, Africa Command, 8. 181. General Bantz Craddock, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 17, 2007, 9–10, and General John Abizaid, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 16, 2006, 3–4, 32–33, both cited in Robert G. Berschinski, AFRICOM’s Dilemma: The “Global War on Terrorism,” Capacity Building,” Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2007, 11, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display. cfm?pubID=827. 182. “Pentagon Africa Policy Chief Whelan Describes US Objectives for Africa Command, London,” transcript, February 18, 2008, https://www.africom.mil/mediaroom/Transcript/6123/transcript-pentagon-africa-policy-chief-whelan-des. On the militarization of US aid policy, see William F. S. Miles, “Deploying Development to Counter Terrorism: Post-9/11 Transformation of US Foreign Aid to Africa,” African Studies Review 55, no. 3 (2012): 27–60. 183. “Pentagon Africa Policy Chief Whelan.” 184. “AFRICOM Headquarters to Stay in Germany, Dempsey Says,” Stars and Stripes, December 17, 2012, http://www.stripes.com/news/ africom-headquarters-to-stay-in-germany-dempsey-says-1.201048. 185. “Pan-African Parliament Debates Motions,” press release, October 24, 2007, http://www.pan-africanparliament.org/Documents/PR4-E%20PAP%20Debates%20 motions.pdf. 186. US Embassy Monrovia, “Liberia: Legislators Keen on Liberia Hosting AFRICOM,” cable, December 6, 2007, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/ cables/07MONROVIA1393_a.html. US Embassy Djibouti, “Djibouti on AFRICOM: Welcome,” cable, October 16, 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/ cables/08DJIBOUTI815_a.html. US Embassy Djibouti, “President Guelleh Praises Partnership with USG, AFRICOM,” cable, February 8, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/ plusd/cables/09DJIBOUTI101_a.html. US Embassy Gaborone, “Botswana: AFRICOM Demarche Delivered,” cable, October 16, 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/ cables/08GABORONE911_a.html. US Embassy Ouagadougou, “Burkina Faso: Ministry of Defense Reaction to US Africa Command Update,” cable, October 7, 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08OUAGADOUGOU894_a.html. Stephen F. Burgess, “In the National Interest? Authoritarian Decision-Making and the Problematic Creation of US Africa Command,” Contemporary Security Policy 30, no. 1 (2009): 80, 84, 89. 187. On the responses across Africa, see Burgess, “In the National Interest?” 88–91. GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve

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Notes

Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command, February 2009, 10–16, 27–28, https://www.gao.gov/assets/290/286278.pdf. For further criticism of AFRICOM, see “Symposium: The Troubled Rise of AFRICOM,” special issue of Contemporary Security Policy 30, no. 1 (2009). 188. James J. F. Forest and Rebecca Crispin, “AFRICOM: Troubled Infancy, Promising Future,” Contemporary Security Policy 30, no. 1 (2009): 11, 14, 15, 12. 189. “NATO, U.S. European Command Working in Africa,” October 31, 2005, http://www.eucom.mil/media-library/Articles/tags/ship?Page=67. 190. Thomas P. Galvin, “Extending the Phase Zero Campaign Mindset,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 45 (2nd quarter 2007): 46–51; GAO, Combating Terrorism, 23–25, 28. GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, 16–20. 191. GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future, 11–16.

Chapter 4 1. Oil sector website of the president of Azerbaijan: http://en.president.az/ azerbaijan/contract. 2. Platform, Corner House, Friends of the Earth, Campagna per la Riforma della Banca Mondiale, CEE Bankwatch, and Kurdish Human Rights Project, Some Common Concerns: Imagining BP’s Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey Pipelines System (Spalding: Abbey Print,: 2002), 115. 3. Cited in “Moscow Eager to Retain Azeri Oil Transit,” OilPrice.com, June 2, 2013, http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/International/Moscow-Eager-to-Retain-Azeri-OilTransit.html. 4. R. Hrair Dekmejian and Hovann H. Simonian, Troubled Waters: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Region (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 29. As of 2017, Kuwait had 102 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and Iraq, 143 billion. US Energy Information Administration, “Countries,” https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/?view=reserves. 5. Ibid., 30. US Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Caspian Sea Region,” August 26, 2013, 9, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/ regions_of_interest/Caspian_Sea/caspian_sea.pdf. 6. Rosemarie Forsythe, The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, 1996), 17–18. 7. Department of Energy (DoE), Comprehensive National Energy Strategy, April 1998, 6, 16, http://prop1.org/thomas/peacefulenergy/cnesM.pdf. See also White House, National Security Strategy for a New Century, October 1998, 32, https://history. defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1998.pdf?ver=2014–06–25–121250–857. 8. Ariel Cohen, “The New `Great Game’: Oil and Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia,” Heritage Foundation, January 25, 1996, https://www.heritage. org/europe/report/the-new-great-game-oil-politics-the-caucasus-and-centralasia.“Fortune Hunters Lured US into Volatile Region,” Washington Post, October 4,



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1998. “The Caspian—Nitty Gritty, Nuts and Bolts,” Energy Economist, December 1, 1996, accessed via Nexis. Platform et al., Some Common Concerns, 24–27. Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, address at Kent State University, November 23, 1998, http://1997–2001.state.gov/www/ policy_remarks/1998/981123_mrngstar_caspian.html; Richard Morningstar, “The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: A Retrospective and a Look at the Future,” Central Asia–Caucasus Institute, 2006, https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analyticalarticles/item/11010-analytical-articles-caci-analyst-2006–8-23-art-11010.html. 9. Platform et al., Some Common Concerns, 27. For an overview of Georgian energy politics, including the Baku-Supsa pipeline route, see Tracey C. German, “Pipeline Politics: Georgia and Energy Security,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 20, no. 2 (2009): 344–362. 10. Jeremy D. Rosner, “American Assistance to the Former Soviet States in 1993– 94,” in After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World, ed. James M. Scott (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 225–250. 11. Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinsky, The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 87–156. Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). Dmitri V. Trenin, Aleksei V. Malashenko, and Anatol Lieven, Russia’s Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004). Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: Norton, 2002), 133–165. 12. Morningstar, “The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline.” On the origins of this policy in a 1994 National Security Council task force, see Steve LeVine, The Oil and the Glory: The Pursuit of Empire and Fortune on the Caspian Sea (New York: Random House, 2007), 212–228. See also the views of Clinton’s former ombudsman for energy and commercial cooperation with the newly independent states, Jan H. Kalicki: “Caspian Energy at the Crossroads,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 5 (2001): 120–134. 13. Forsythe, Politics of Oil, 19. 14. Ali M. Ansari, Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Roots of Mistrust (London: Hurst), 93–164. 15. Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Iran, Executive Order 12959, May 6, 1995, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/12959. pdf. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, August 5, 1996, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ pkg/BILLS-104hr3107enr/pdf/BILLS-104hr3107enr.pdf. 16. “On Piping Out Caspian Oil, U.S. Insists the Cheaper, Shorter Way Isn’t Better,” New York Times, November 7, 1998. Forsythe, Politics of Oil, 18, 20, 25–26. Eizenstat quoted in LeVine, The Oil and the Glory, 348. 17. Federico Peña, speech at the Crossroads of the World Conference, May 27, 1998, http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/press/energy/archive/1998/june/ de1602.htm. 18. Ibid. 19. “On Piping Out Caspian Oil.”

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20. Striking the Balance: U.S. Policy and Stability in Georgia, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, December 22, 2009, 2, and appendix II, part I, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111SPRT53985/pdf/CPRT-111SPRT53985.pdf. 21. “Foreign Military Financing Program,” in Historical Facts Book, Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense (DoD), 2000, 40–41, http://www.fas.org/ asmp/profiles/FMS_FACTS/FMS_9_30_00/FMFP.pdf. 22. S.2532 Freedom Support Act, 102st Congress, https://www.congress.gov/ bill/102nd-congress/senate-bill/2532/text. Presidential Determination on Azerbaijan, January 25, 2002, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2002/01/20020128–20.html. 23. Little is known about the security dialogue at present, but details were confirmed by the State Department at the tenth annual meeting in July 2007. See “Joint Statement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan for the 10th Annual Bilateral Security Dialogue,” July 9, 2007, http://2001–2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/87995.htm. See also the transcript of Special State Department Briefing, 10th Annual US-Azerbaijan Security Dialogue, July 9, 2007, Federal News Service, accessed via Nexis. 24. Department of State (DoS), NATO Partnership for Peace, June 19, 1997, https://1997–2001.state.gov/regions/eur/nato_fs-pfp.html. Partnership for Peace Framework Document, January 11, 1994, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24469.htm?selectedLocale=en. For analysis, see US General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees, NATO: US Assistance to the Partnership for Peace, July 2001, http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/232072.pdf. 25. “NATO’s Relations with Georgia,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_38988.htm NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007, July 3, 2007, http://www. gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110s494enr/pdf/BILLS-110s494enr.pdf. 26. In September 1999, Shevardnadze was honored with an award by the National Democratic Institute in Washington. President Clinton spoke at the awards dinner. First Lady’s Office, Press Office, and Lissa Muscatine, “FLOTUS Remarks and Speeches 5/99—10/12/99 [Binder]: [National Democratic Institute Dinner—Washington D.C. 9/23/1999],” Clinton Digital Library, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/ items/show/7672. 27. “President Shevardnadze Says Russia’s Treatment of Georgia Unjust,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 22, 1997, cited in Dekmejian and Simonian, Troubled Waters, 114. 28. Yalta GUUAM Charter 2001, https://guam-organization.org/en/yalta-guuamcharter-2001/. 29. “E.U. Support to the Europe-Caucasus-Asia Transport Corridor,” February 28, 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-141_en.htm?locale=en. “First Annual IGC Meeting,” Tbilisi 2000, n.d., http://www.traceca-org.org/en/traceca/ intergovernmental-commission/igc-meetings/first-igc-meeting-2000/ and “Baku Initiative,” n.d., http://www.traceca-org.org/en/home/baku-initiative/.



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30. Joint Press Conference with Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, August 4, 1999, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=389. 31. Bill Clinton, My Life (London: Arrow Books, 2005), 877. “Agreements on BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline and Trans-Caspian Natural Gas Pipeline,” by Energy Secretary Bill Richardson; Special Advisor on Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, John Wolf; and Barry Toiv, Deputy Press Secretary, the White House, transcript: special White House Briefing from Istanbul, Turkey, November 18, 1999, Federal News Services, accessed via Nexis. 32. “Counter-Strike a Limited Military Contingent Sent to Pankisi Gorge,” Russian Press Digest, December 7, 2000; “No Joint Russian-Georgian Operations Planned Against Militants on Georgian Territory,” RIA Novosti, December 8, 2000; “Russia and Georgia to Maintain Strategic Partnership,” RIA Novosti, December 25, 2000: all accessed via Nexis. 33. Lutz Kleveman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), 34. “MSF Medical Aid Group Maintains Freeze on North Caucasus Work,” Agence France Presse, August 14, 2000, accessed via Nexis. 34. Tamara Pataraia, “Georgia and the CIS Security System,” in G81: War and Peace in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe, Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, n.d., 57–59. https://www.da.mod.uk/DesktopModules/EasyDNNNews/DocumentDownload.ashx?portalid=0&moduleid=4079&articleid=349&documentid=445. 35. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, Eurasia Overview, April 2001, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2000/2433.htm. 36. “Kazakh President Backs Use of US-Proposed Oil Pipeline,” Agence France Presse, March 2, 2001; “USA Interested in Co-Operation with Kazakhstan’ RIA Novosti, March 2, 2001. These talks continued in August 2001 when Ambassador Elizabeth Jones visited Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan again. See “US Envoy to Discuss Shipping More Kazakh Oil to Azerbaijan,” Agence France Presse, August 28, 2001; Economic Press Review, August 30, 2001: all accessed via Nexis. 37. National Energy Policy, Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, May 2001, chap. 8, pp. 7, 12, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0428/ML042800056. pdf. 38. Ibid., 3. 39. “IN BRIEF: For the Record,” Moscow Times, June 14, 2001. For a similar expression of commitment from the Bush administration, see Bush’s message to the president of Azerbaijan quoted in “Caspian Oil and Gas Exhibition Opens,” Associated Press International, June 5, 2001. Both accessed via Nexis. 40. “Georgian President Shevardnadze to Visit Washington,” statement by the press secretary, August 28, 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2001/08/20010828.html. 41. DoS, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2002, New Independent States, section on Georgia, July 2, 2001, http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/3971.pdf.

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42. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 341. “Plans for Iraq Began on 9/11,” CBS News, September 4, 2002, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/plans-for-iraqattack-began-on-9–11/. 43. DoS, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2000/2433.htm. 44. DoS, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, May 2002, Eurasia Overview, https:// www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2001/html/10239.htm. 45. DoD News Briefing with Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Torie Clarke and General Peter Pace with Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, J. D. Crouch, February 27, 2002, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/ Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2810. 46. Quoted in “US Targets al-Qaeda Hideout in Georgia,” Guardian, February 15, 2002. See Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili, “U.S. Diplomat Says Some Afghan Terrorists Linked with al-Qaeda Hide in Georgia,” Associated Press International, February 11, 2002, accessed via Nexis. 47. Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 146. 48. Emil Souleimanov and Ondrej Ditrych, “The Internationalisation of the Russian-Chechen Conflict: Myths and Reality,” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 7 (2008): 1208. 49. “Obituary: Chechen Rebel Khatab,” BBC News, April 26, 2002, http://news.bbc. co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1952053.stm. 50. Souleimanov and Ditrych, “Internationalisation of the Russian-Chechen Conflict,” 1211–125. 51. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, Eurasia Overview, April 30, 2003, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2002/html/19984.htm. 52. “U.S., Georgia Pledge Mutual Assistance in Terrorism Fight,” American Forces Press Service, October 5, 2001, https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle. aspx?id=44681. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, news transcript, October 5, 2001, http://archive.defense.gov/ Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2002. For Shevardnadze’s letter to Bush and the Georgian parliamentary statement, see “Republic of Georgia: Global Partner in Anti-Terror War,” American Forces Press Service, May 15, 2002, http://archive. defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44057. 53. Striking the Balance, 5. DoS, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002. “Georgia `Train and Equip’ Program Begins,” DoD news release, April 29, 2002, http://archive. defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=3326. Although the program was initially announced as lasting eighteen months, once the training schedule had been organized, it was confirmed at twenty-one months by its commander. See Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Waltemeyer, commander of the Georgia Train and Equip Program, phone interview May 30 2002, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3468. 54. Striking the Balance, 5. Russia’s offer to intervene in the Pankisi was rejected by Georgia. See “US Troops in Georgia?’ Civil.ge News, February 27, 2002, https://old. civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=1356&search=.



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55. “Georgia `Train and Equip’ Program Begins.” 56. “Special Forces Soldiers Arrive in Georgia for Train and Equip Program,” GTEP Public Affairs Office, May 19, 2002, http://www.eucom.mil/media-library/ article/21910/Special-Forces-soldiers-arrive-Georgia-Train-Equip. 57. Waltemeyer, phone interview. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher also used the word counterinsurgency when describing the training. See “USA Assists Georgia in Anti-Terror War Without Sending Troops,” February 28, 2002, Civil.ge News, https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=1366&search=. 58. “Special Forces Soldiers Arrive in Georgia”; “Georgia Train and Equip Program Transitions to U.S. Marines,” November 22, 2002, http://www.eucom.mil/ media-library/article/21881/Georgia-Train-Equip-Program-Transitions-US-Marines. 59. “Media Availability with Rumsfeld and Georgian Defense Minister,” news transcript, May 7, 2002, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript. aspx?TranscriptID=3430. 60. David Tevzadze, Georgian Minister of Defense, Center for Strategic and International Studies, summary of discussion, May 7, 2002, http://www.csis.org/ files/media/csis/events/020507_tevzadze.pdf; Waltemeyer, phone interview; “Pay for All You Can Be,” Civil.ge News, May 7, 2002. https://old.civil.ge/eng/article. php?id=1793&search. “Defense Ministry Issues the White Paper,” July 5, 2002, Civil. ge News, https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=2218&search=. “Defense—In Need of More Governmental Attention,” Civil.ge News, August 26, 2002, https://old.civil.ge/ eng/article.php?id=2558&search=. 61. Jim Nichol, “Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge: Russian Concerns and US Interests,” Congressional Research Service, March 6, 2003, 2, http://file.wikileaks.org/file/crs/ RS21319.pdf. “US rebukes Russia for Pankisi Raid,” Guardian, August 26, 2002. “Russian Bombing of Georgia,” White House press release, August 24, 2002, http://2001– 2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/prsrl/2002/13002.htm. “Georgia Hearing Heavy Footsteps from Russia’s War in Chechnya,” New York Times, August 1, 2002. 62. DoS, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002. 63. “Georgia Politics: Trying to Tame the Wild Pankisi Gorge,” Economist Intelligence Unit, August 26, 2002. 64. DoS, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002. 65. “Senior Defense Official: Background Briefing in Munich, Germany,” news transcript, February 8, 2003, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript. aspx?TranscriptID=1923. 66. Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (London: Simon & Schuster: 2011), 356. 67. “The Caucasus: Challenges Ahead—Georgia,” with Zurab Zhvania, Former Speaker of Parliament, and Revaz Adamia, Former Chairman of Committee on Defense and Security, Mikhail Machavriani, Former Minister of Revenue, and Mikhail Saakashvili, Former Minister of Justice, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, February 14, 2002, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/ events/020214_georgia.pdf.

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68. “Senior Defense Official: Background Briefing En Route to Georgia,” news transcript, December 5, 2003, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript. aspx?TranscriptID=2773. “Secretary Rumsfeld Press Conference with Acting Georgian President Burdzhanadze,” news transcript, December 5, 2003, http://archive. defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2774. 69. Cited in German, “Pipeline Politics,” 347–348. 70. “Bush, Abraham Hail Benefits of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline,” September 18, 2002, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2002/09/2002091817062 [email protected]#axzz2xwAacxRS. 71. General James L. Jones, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 23, 2004, 13, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2004_hr/040923-jones.pdf. 72. DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, chap. 5, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45321.pdf. 73. DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, Georgia, 68, http://www.state.gov/ documents/organization/105904.pdf. 74. Striking the Balance, 5. 75. Statement of General James L. Jones before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 7, 2006, 21, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2006_hr/060307-jones.pdf. 76. “Republic of Georgia Puts her best into Iraq fight’, 1 September 2005, accessible at http://www.eucom.mil/media-library/Articles/tags/kindergarten?Page=64 (11.14.18) 77. “U.S. Begins Georgian Training Program with Ceremony,” April 21, 2005, http://www.eucom.mil/article/21667/US-begins-Georgian-training-program-ceremony; “EUCOM Issues Military Gear to Georgian Soldiers,” May 23, 2005, http:// www.eucom.mil/article/21633/EUCOM-issues-military-gear-Georgian-soldiers; “Training for Iraq Boosts Security in Caucasus,” June 30, 2005, http://www.eucom. mil/article/21577/Training-Iraq-Boosts-Security-Caucasus; “EUCOM Marines Give, Receive Key Insights in Georgia,” June 30, 2005, http://www.eucom.mil/article/21576/ EUCOM-Marines-Give-Receive-Key-Insights-Georgia; “Georgians Smoke Move Shoot, Maneuver During Live-Fire,” July 21, 2005, http://www.eucom.mil/article/21547/Georgians-smoke-shoot-maneuver-live; “Marines Issue Equipment to Georgian Soldiers,” September 28, 2005, http://www.eucom.mil/article/21459/Marinesissue-equipment-Georgian-soldiers; “Georgian Soldiers Ready for Iraq Deployment,” December 16, 2005, http://www.eucom.mil/article/21382/Georgian-Soldiers-ReadyIraq-Deployment; “Marine-Led Task Force Trains Republic of Georgia Soldiers,” March 27, 2006, http://www.eucom.mil/Article/21290/Marine-led-task-force-trainsRepublic-Georgia; “Marines Train the Trainers in the Republic of Georgia,” June 22, 2006, http://www.eucom.mil/Article/21176/Marines-train-trainers-Republic-Georgia” (copies in the author’s possession). 78. “Navy Doctors Reach Out to Georgian Community,” September 13, 2005, http://www.eucom.mil/Article/21473/Navy-doctors-reach-Georgian-community;



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“Navy Medical Officer Awarded Honorary Doctorate from Republic of Georgia,” February 9, 2006, http://www.eucom.mil/Article/21358/Navy-medical-officer-awardedhonorary-doctorate; “U.S. Task Force Gives Republic of Georgia School,” November 17, 2005, http://www.eucom.mil/article/21407/US-task-force-gives-Republic-Georgiaschool (copies in the author’s possession). 79. “Ambassador to Georgia Welcomes Task Force, Urges Cultural Awareness,” May 2, 2005, http://www.eucom.mil/Article/21659/Ambassador-Georgia-welcomestask-force-urges (copy in the author’s possession). 80. “Take Force Explore Host Country,” April 30, 2005, http://www.eucom.mil/ article/21636/Task-force-explore-host-country, copy in author’s possession. 81. “Georgian-American Ties Change Lives,” August 2, 2005, http://www. eucom.mil/article/21522/Georgian-American-ties-change-lives (copy in the author’s possession). 82. “President Meets Task Force Members During Tbilisi Visit,” May 16, 2005, http://www.eucom.mil/article/21643/President-meets-task-force-members-Tbilisivisit; “Bush Praises Georgia for Setting Example, Supporting War on Terror,” May 10, 2005, http://www.eucom.mil/article/21651/Bush-praises-Georgia-setting-examplesupporting (copies in the author’s possession). 83. “Training for Iraq Boosts Security in Caucasus”; “Georgian Soldiers Ready for Iraq Deployment.” See also “Marine-Led Task Force Trains Republic of Georgia Soldiers,” March 27, 2006, http://www.eucom.mil/Article/21290/Marine-led-task-forcetrains-Republic-Georgia (copy in the author’s possession). 84. Anna Borg, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy, Sanctions, and Commodities, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State, Statement to the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 30, 2003, 4, 8, 5, 13, 18–19, http://www.gpo. gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg89219/pdf/CHRG-108shrg89219.pdf. 85. A. Elizabeth Jones, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, House International Relations Committee: Central Asia: Developments and Administration Policy, October 29, 2003, https://2001–2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/25798.htm The transfer of Kazakh oil was finally agreed in 2007. See German, “Pipeline Politics,” 351. 86. Prepared Testimony of Lisa Bronson, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation, before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 10, 2004, accessed via Nexis. 87. “Secretary Rumsfeld Joint Availability with the Kazakh Minister of Defense,“ transcript, February 25, 2004, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript. aspx?TranscriptID=2199. 88. “U.S., Azerbaijan Military Begin Joint Training,” August 17, 2005, https:// www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=19635. 89. Bronson, prepared testimony; Jones, Senate testimony, 2006, 18. 90. Jones, Senate testimony, 2006, 18. For State Department funding on maritime and border security programs, counterterrorism, and counter-proliferation in

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Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, see Department of State, FY 2007 “Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations,” February 13, 2006, Europe & Eurasia, Azerbaijan, 396, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60653.pdf, and “South and Central Asia,” Kazakhstan, 502–503 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60655.pdf. 91. NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007, July 3, 2007, http://www.gpo.gov/ fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110s494enr/pdf/BILLS-110s494enr.pdf; “NATO’s Relations with Georgia,” September 14, 2018, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_38988.htm. 92. Svante E. Cornell, “War in Georgia, Jitters All Around,” Current History (October 2008): 309–310; Roy Allison, “Russia Resurgent? Moscow’s Campaign to `Coerce Georgia to Peace,’” International Affairs 84, no. 6 (2008): 1146–1148; Houman A. Sadri and Nathan L. Burns, “The Georgia Crisis: A New Cold War on the Horizon?” Caucasian Review of International Affairs 4, no. 2 (2010): 137–138; Saakashvili’s Ajara Success: Repeatable Elsewhere in Georgia? International Crisis Group, Europe Briefing, August 18, 2004, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/ caucasus/georgia/saakashvilis-ajara-success-repeatable-elsewhere-georgia. 93. “Scenesetter for CODEL Wexler Visit May 28–30, 2008,” May 23, 2008, cable 08TBILISI867_a, unclassified, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/ cables/08TBILISI867_a.html. 94. “DAS Fried’s Visit with Defense Minister Kezerashvili,” June 2, 2008, cable 08TBILISI923, confidential, http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TBILISI923. html. See also “DAS Bryza’s Meetings with Georgia Ministry of Internal Affairs Officials,” May 16, 2008, cable 08TBILISI808, confidential, http://www.wikileaks.org/ cable/2008/05/08TBILISI808.html. See also “DAS Bryza Meets with FM Tkeshelashvili,” May 30, 2008, cable 08TBILISI904, confidential, http://www.wikileaks.org/ cable/2008/05/08TBILISI904.html. 95. Rice, No Higher Honor, 685–686. 96. Matthew J. Bryza, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, “Russia, Georgia, and the Return of Power Politics,” testimony before the Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, September 10, 2008, http://2001–2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/109468.htm. 97. “Georgia SITREP 5: Georgians Nearly Exhausted.” Striking the Balance, 4–6. 98. “Georgia: GOG Request for Assistance,” August 8, 2008, cable 08TBILISI1367, unclassified, http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08TBILISI1367.html; Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, “The Current Situation in Georgia and Implications for US Policy,” testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, September 9, 2008, http://2001–2009.state.gov/p/eur/ rls/rm/109345.htm. 99. “Georgia: SITREP 24: Georgians Welcome Vice President Cheney and U.S. Aid,” September 4, 2008, cable 08TBILISI1513, confidential, http://www.wikileaks. org/cable/2008/09/08TBILISI1513.html; “Georgia: Your Meeting with President Saakashvili at UNG,” cable 08TBILISI1620, confidential, September 22, 2008, http:// www.wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08TBILISI1620.html; “Georgia: Scenesetter for



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the Visit of Senator John Kerry to Tbilisi,” December 9, 2008, cable 08TBILISI2303, unclassified, http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TBILISI2303.html. 100. Tony Karon, “Cheney’s Real Mission in Georgia,” Time, September 4, 2008, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1838710,00.html; “Scenesetter for the Deputy Secretary’s Visit to Azerbaijan,” September 26, 2008, cable 08BAKU920_a, confidential, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BAKU920_a.html. 101. NATO–Georgia Commission, last updated December 4, 2012, http://www. nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52131.htm; NATO’s Relations with Georgia, last updated December 14, 2018, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_38988. htm?selectedLocale=en. 102. United States–Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, January 9, 2009, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/121029.htm. For the US perspective on this, see “Georgia, U.S., Sign Strategic Partnership Charter,” Civil.ge News, January 9, 2009, https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20248. 103. US-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission, n.d., http://www.state.gov/p/ eur/ci/gg/usgeorgiacommission/.

Chapter 5 1. Donald Rumsfeld, “What Are We Fighting?” memo to President Bush, June 18, 2004, http://rumsfeld.com/archives. 2. National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, February 2006, 11, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/gwot_stratplan.pdf. 3. For the terms of reference, see Memorandum for the Chairman, Defense Science Board (DSB), January 23, 2004, appendix, contained in DoD, DSB 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities, December 2004, appendix A, https:// www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2000s/ADA430116.pdf. For Rumsfeld’s sponsorship, see DSB Newsletter, October 2004, 4, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/newsletters/2004– 10-DSB_Newsletter.pdf, and DSB Newsletter, May 2005, 3, http://www.acq.osd.mil/ dsb/newsletters/2005–05-DSB_Newsletter.pdf, 3 (copies in the author’s possession). 4. DSB 2004 Summer Study, appendix A, n.p. 5. Ibid., executive summary, vi. 6. Ibid., vii. 7. Ibid., ix. 8. Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), 119. 9. Ibid., 120. 10. Memorandum for Chairman, Defense Science Board, August 23, 2005, in Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD, September 2005, appendix A, https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/ reports/2000s/ADA441078.pdf. For details of these events, see Kaplan, Insurgents, 120–121. 11. DSB, 2005, appendix A.

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12. Ibid., 12, 20. 13. DoD, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, Directive 3000.05, November 28, 2005, http://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/ d3000_05.pdf. 14. Jeffrey Nadaner, remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 11, 2006, cited in Dane F. Smith Jr., U.S. Peacefare: Organizing American Peacebuilding Operations (Santa Barbara, CA: Center for Strategic and International Studies and Praeger, 2010), 115. 15. DoD, Directive 3000.05, 2–3. 16. The First Bush-Gore Presidential Debate, transcript, October 3, 2000, http:// www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-3–2000-transcript. 17. DoD, Directive 3000.05, 3, 2. 18. DSB, 2005, 24 19. For more detail on institutionalizing support for the directive, see Smith, U.S. Peacefare, 120–127. 20. White House, National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD 44, December 7, 2005, https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.pdf. 21. DoD, Directive 3000.05, 8. Department of Defense (DoD), Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, Joint Operating Concept, version 2.0, December 2006, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/ Doctrine/concepts/joc_sstro.pdf?ver=2017–12–28–162022–680 (hereafter cited as SSTR JOC). 22. SSTR JOC, i, ii, iii, iv, 19. 23. Ibid., 29. 24. Ibid., iv, vi. 25. Ibid., 32. 26. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for Future Operations, Statement of Joseph A. Christoff and Janet A. St Laurent, October 30, 2007, 14, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08228t.pdf. For more detail on the lack of guidance to combatant commanders, see GAO, Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning, May 2007, 17–21, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07549.pdf. 27. GAO, Stabilization and Reconstruction, 15. See also GAO, Military Operations, 24–32. 28. GAO, Stabilization and Reconstruction, 15–16. 29. DoD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), February 6, 2006, iii, http:// archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/qdr20060203.pdf (hereafter cited as QDR 2006). 30. Ryan Henry, “Defense Transformation and the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review,” Parameters (Winter 2005–2006): 11, 13. 31. GAO, Quadrennial Defense Review: Future Reviews Could Benefit from Improved Department of Defense Analyses and Changes to Legislative Requirements,



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September 2007, 13, https://www.gao.gov/assets/270/266860.pdf (hereafter cited as GAO, QDR: Future Reviews). 32. Ibid., 10. 33. Ibid., 13. For details of the panels and their mandates, see p. 12. 34. “On Rumsfeld’s `Terms,’” Air Force Magazine (June 2005): 51. 35. GAO, QDR: Future Reviews, 10. 36. QDR 2006, 31. 37. Ibid., vi–vii. 38. Ibid., 30, 38, 4, vi–vii. 39. The others were Institutional Reform and Governance; Joint Command and Control; Locate, Tag, Track; and Sensor-Based Management of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise. See GAO, QDR: Future Reviews, 15. 40. Hearing before the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives: The Irregular Warfare Roadmap, September 27, 2006, 9, 6, https://www.fas.org/irp/////////congress/2006_hr/irregular.pdf. 41. DoD, QDR Execution Roadmap for Irregular Warfare, April 26, 2006, task 2.5.3 (partially redacted copy obtained by author through Freedom of Information Act). 42. DoD, Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IW JOC), version 1.0, September 2007, 7, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/iw-joc.pdf. On the competing draft IW concepts, see Eric V. Larson, Derek Eaton, Brian Nichiporuk, and Thomas S. Szayna, Assessing Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Intelligence Analysis, prepared for the United States Army by the RAND Corporation, 2008, 9–11, https://www.rand.org/ content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG668.pdf. 43. DoD, IW JOC 2007, 6. 44. Ibid., 1. 45. Ibid., 11, appendix E: E-2. 46. Ibid., appendix I. 47. Ibid., 2, 16, 19, appendix C: C-1. 48. Ibid., 1, 9, 18, 20, 21. 49. Ibid., 14, 17–18. 50. Ibid., 21. 51. Ibid., 9–10. 52. Ibid., 2, 5. 53. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), FY 2008/FY 2009 Budget Estimates, February 2007, 429–430, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/ defbudget/fy2008/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_ VOL_1_PARTS/17_DSCA.pdf. 54. Center for Complex Operations, “Case Studies,” n.d., https://cco.ndu.edu/Publications/Case-Studies/. See also US Marine Corps, “Irregular Warfare 101,” Center for Irregular Warfare, Quantico, Virginia, n.d., http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/IW_101_Oct.pdf (hereafter cited as IW 101).

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55. IW 101, 28. This became the Small Wars Center and Irregular Warfare Integration Division, https://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Units/SWCIWID.aspx. 56. Ibid., 34. “Irregular Warfare Center Opens,” April 16, 2009, https://www.nellis.af.mil/News/Article/285654/irregular-warfare-center-opens/. 57. Statement of General Joseph E. Osborne, Director, Irregular Warfare Directorate, Special Operations Command, House Armed Services Committee, “Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations: Approaches to Interagency Integration,” February 26, 2008, 24, https://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_hr/irregular. pdf. 58. IW 101, 36. 59. Statement of Michael Vickers, Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC & IC, House Armed Services Committee, “Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations: Approaches to Interagency Integration,” February 26, 2008, 50, https://www.fas.org/ irp/congress/2008_hr/irregular.pdf0. 60. DoD, Directive 3000.07, Irregular Warfare, December 1, 2008, https://www. hsdl.org/?view&did=233338. 61. GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy, April 17, 2005, http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d05323.pdf. 62. “Appendix A: Terms of Reference,” in Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, September 2004, https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/ dsb/commun.pdf. 63. See the exchange of memos attached to Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, to Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Subject: National Defense Strategy,” action memo, February 7, 2005, https://www.rumsfeld.com/archives/. 64. Donald Rumsfeld to the Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr., “Mobilizing Moderate Muslims,” memo, July 2005, https://www.rumsfeld.com/archives/. 65. DoD, Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, January 2005, 3, 4–13, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/b313370.pdf. See also Janice L. Burton, “Language Transformation Plan to Build Culturally Savvy Soldiers,” Special Warfare (September 2005): 14–17. 66. DoD, Defense Language Program, Directive 5160.41E, October 21, 2005, https://www.dlnseo.org/sites/default/files/DODI_5160.41E.pdf. 67. QDR 2006, 22, 24, 92. 68. Donald Rumsfeld, speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, February 17, 2006, https://www.cfr.org/event/new-realities-media-age-0. 69. QDR, Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication, September 2006, 4–10, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a495367.pdf. 70. DoD, Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept, October 7, 2009, 3, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/jic_strategiccommunications.pdf?ver=2017–12–28–162005–353. 71. US National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, May 31, 2007, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/state/natstrat_strat_comm.pdf.



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72. Jess T. Ford (director, International Affairs and Trade Team, GAO) and Michael M. Tenkate (senior analyst, International Affairs and Trade Team, GAO), interviews, February 12, 2007, cited in Liora Danan, Mixed Blessings: US Government Engagement with Religion in Conflict-Prone Settings, Report of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, August 2007, 14–15. 73. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, 11. 74. Ibid., 3, 4–5, 6–7, 8, 9–10, 13, 22, 25–26, 27. 75. QDR 2006, 83–92. 76. Ibid., 83–84. 77. QDR Execution Roadmap, Building Partnership Capacity (BPC), May 22, 2005, 3, 4, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=756385, 3, 4. 78. Ibid., 5, 6 79. For the full task matrix including responsibilities and deadlines, see ibid., 21. 80. Ibid., 12. 81. Ibid., 17. 82. DSCA, FY 2008/FY 2009 Budget Estimates, 428–429. 83. Senate Report 111–201, accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-111hrpt491/pdf/ CRPT-111hrpt491.pdf. 84. Foreign Assistance Act, Public Law 87–195, September 4, 1961, https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Foreign%20Assistance%20Act%20Of%201961.pdf. Nina M. Serafino, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, February 11, 2011, 1–2. 85. QDR 2006, 90. 86. Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Public Law 108–375, October 28, 2004, sec. 1208 https://www.congress.gov/108/plaws/ publ375/PLAW-108publ375.pdf. Lieutenant General John F. Sattler, Director for Strategic Plans & Policy, Joint Staff, “The View from the Joint Staff,” n.d., unclassified presentation, 10, https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/ndia/2007/solic/sattler. pdf. Donald Rumsfeld to Larry DiRita, “Briefing on SOF,” memo, December 10, 2004, http://www.rumsfeld.com/archive. 87. National Defense Authorization Act, FY 2009, Public Law 110-417, Section 1208, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ417/html/PLAW-110publ417. htm. DoD Authorities for Foreign and Security Assistance Programs, Stimson Center, July 20, 2009, https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/DOD_ security_assistance_authorities_1.pdf. Department of Defense, Inspector General, Evaluation of Section 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act, April 7, 2016, 1, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Jun/19/2001933148/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2016-076%20 (REDACTED).PDF. 88. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Public Law 109-163, January 6, 2006, Section 1206, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ163/ pdf/PLAW-109publ163.pdf.

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89. Eric Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee on Train and Equip Authority, April 7, 2006, 3, http://ogc.osd.mil/olc/docs/TestEdelman060407.pdf. 90. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Section 1206, April 2006, 6, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109hr5122enr/pdf/BILLS109hr5122enr.pdf.Edelman testimony. 91. GAO, Section 1206 Security Assistance, Briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff, December 14, 2006, 13, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07416r.pdf. See also DSCA, 2008/2009 Budget Estimates, 426. 92. Edelman testimony, April 2006, 3. 93. For a full list of what the 1206 funds were spent on, see Serafino, Security Assistance Reform, 25–31. Further details are contained in GAO, Section 1206, 17–21, 25, and DSCA, Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Budget Estimates, 424–425, http://comptroller.defense.gov/ Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2009/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_ and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PARTS/DSCA%20FY%2009%20PB%20OP-5.pdf. 94. DSCA, Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Budget Estimates, 424. DSCA, FY 2008/FY 2009 Budget Estimates, 425. 95. Posture Statement of General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Senate Armed Services Committee, February 6, 2007, 8–9, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007_hr/070206-pace.pdf. 96. See the enclosure contained in General Council of the Department of Defense to the Honorable Nancy Pelosi, May 2, 2007, http://ogc.osd.mil/olc/docs/BGPA.pdf. “DOD Describes Struggle to Expand, Institutionalize Authorities,” Inside the Pentagon 26, no. 8 (April 17, 2008), accessed via Nexis. 97. “Pentagon Hopes to Expand Aid Program,” Washington Post, May 13, 2007. 98. Donald Rumsfeld to Dan Stanley, “Talking Points for Train and Equip,” memo, September 29, 2005, http://www.rumsfeld.com/archives. 99. “More Leeway Sought on Foreign Aid Spending,” Washington Post, April 16, 2008. NDAA 2009, Section 1206. 100. National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 2005, 19, https:// archive.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf. 101. Inspectors General (IG), U.S. Department of Defense, and U.S. Department of State, Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program, Appendix A, Project Request 4748, August 31, 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a596275.pdf. 102. Ibid., 43. 103. Ibid., ii. 104. Ibid., iii. 105. Ibid., iii–iv. 106. Ibid., 45. 107. QDR 2006, 9–11. 108. Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth (New York: Penguin Press, 2013), 66–67.



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109. Cited in ibid., 68. 110. On the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the war on terror, see Steve Niva, “Disappearing Violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s New Cartography of Networked Warfare,” Security Dialogue 44, no. 3 (2013): 185–202. 111. Jennifer D. Kibbe, “Covert Action and the Pentagon,” Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 1 (2007): 59. 112. Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State (New York: Little, Brown, 2011), 236–237. 113. “Elite Troops Get Expanded Role on Intelligence,” New York Times March 8, 2006. Mazzetti, Way of the Knife, 82. Comment by General Bryan D. Brown, Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee: Special Operations Command: Transforming for the Long War, March 8, 2006, 32, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has067260.000/has067260_0.htm. 114. Kibbe, “Covert Action and the Pentagon,” 62–63. In Title 10 of the U.S. Code, this activity was described as “intelligence preparation of the battlefield.” Cited in Priest and Arkin, Top Secret America, 230. 115. General Wayne Downing to Secretary of Defense and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Subject: Special Operations Forces Assessment,” memo, November 9, 2005, http://www.rumsfeld.com/archives. 116. ‘Rumsfeld Orders Review of Special Operations Forces’ Needs,” Agence France Presse, October 27 2005; “JSOC to Become Three Star Command,” Army Times, February 13 2006, both accessed via Nexis. 117. Downing to Secretary of Defense and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1, 2. 118. Ibid., 4. 119. Ibid., 3. 120. “JSOC to Become Three Star Command.” 121. Testimony of General Wayne Downing, Hearing Before the House Armed Services Committee, June 29, 2006, 5, https://fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/soc.pdf. 122. QDR 2006, 44–45. 123. GAO, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, Special Operations Forces: Several Human Capital Challenges Must Be Addressed to Meet Expanded Role, July 2006, 8, http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/251003. pdf. 124. “New Plans Foresee Fighting Terrorism Beyond War Zones,” Washington Post, April 23, 2006. 125. “Sorry Charlie. This Is Michael Vickers’s War,” Washington Post, December 28, 2007. 126. Statement of Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander United States Special Operations Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 4, 2008, 2, http://ogc.osd.mil/olc/docs/testOlson080304.pdf. 127. United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Posture Statement 2006, 4, https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/posture2006.pdf.

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128. United States Special Operations Command, Capstone Concept for Special Operations, 2006, 8, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=Get TRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA458268. 129. Ibid., 5. 130. Ibid., 4, 6. 131. GAO, Special Operations Forces, 3–5. 132. GAO, Report to the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Defense Acquisitions: An Analysis of the Special Operations Command’s Management of Weapons System Programs, June 2007, 18, http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/262964.pdf. 133. Ibid., 21. 134. Ibid., 22. 135. Ibid., 23–24. 136. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/64884.pdf, 47. 137. General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Senate Armed Services Committee, posture statement, February 6, 2007, 8, https://www.globalsecurity. org/military/library/congress/2007_hr/070206-pace.pdf. 138. Cited in QDR IW Roadmap, 6.

Chapter 6 1. On modernization theory, see Nick Cullather, “Modernization Theory,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 2nd ed., ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 212–220; Michael E. Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010); David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 2. Andrew S. Natsios, Administrator, USAID, prepared statement to the Senate Committee on Appropriations, May 26, 2005, 73, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ CHRG-109shrg99878/pdf/CHRG-109shrg99878.pdf. 3. Its original name was the Office for Combating Terrorism. It became the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in 1985 and the Bureau of Counterterrorism in 2012. “Who We Are,” Bureau of Counterterrorism, Department of State, n.d., http://www.state.gov/j/ct/about/index.htm. 4. “Our Mission,” n.d., http://2001–2009.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16570.htm. 5. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), presentation to the DoD, October 27, 2004, 2, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ state/37564.pdf. See also Ambassador Carlos Pascual, “Stabilization and Reconstruction: Building Peace in a Hostile Environment,” prepared statement for the Senate



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Committee on Foreign Relations, June 16, 2005, http://2001–2009.state.gov/s/crs/rls/ rm/48644.htm. 6. Department of State, The S/CRS Inter-Agency Team, July 13, 2008, http://2001– 2009.state.gov/s/crs/c12937.htm. 7. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, http://2001– 2009.state.gov/s/crs/rls/43327.htm. 8. Stewart Patrick, “The U.S. Response to Precarious States: Tentative Progress and Remaining Obstacles to Coherence,” Center for Global Development, July 2007, 3, http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/14093_file_Precarious_States.pdf. 9. Pascual, “Stabilization and Reconstruction.” 10. The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004, March 18, 2004, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108srpt247/html/CRPT-108srpt247. htm. Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and Other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities, Congressional Research Service, September 18, 2008, 11, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/ a487105.pdf. 11. Dane F. Smith Jr., U.S. Peacefare: Organizing American Peacebuilding Operations (Santa Barbara, CA: Center for Strategic and International Studies and Praeger, 2010), 86. 12. Ibid., 85. 13. Patrick, “U.S. Response to Precarious States,” 6. 14. Smith, U.S. Peacefare, 41. 15. Marcia Wong, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, remarks at NDIA SO/LIC Symposium, Crystal City, VA, March 13, 2006, http://2001–2009.state. gov/s/crs/rls/rm/63540.htm. 16. Carlos Pascual, “Capacity and Security,” remarks at the Eisenhower National Security Conference, Washington DC, September 28, 2005, http://2001–2009.state. gov/s/crs/rls/rm/55865.htm. 17. Pascual, “Stabilization and Reconstruction.” See also Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, “Addressing State Failure,” Foreign Affairs (July/ August 2005): 157–158. Krasner was director of policy planning staff at the State Department. 18. Carlos Pascual, address at Joint Event of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, October 20, 2004, http://2001–2009.state.gov/s/crs/rls/rm/37430.htm. 19. Carlos Pascual, remarks at the Association of the U.S. Army Annual Conference, Washington DC, October 4, 2005, http://2001–2009.state.gov/s/crs/rls/rm/54612. htm. 20. Feedback was requested for a final version. See U.S. Joint Forces Command J7, US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation, pamphlet, version 1.0, December 1, 2005, http://www.jcs. mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pams_hands/jwfcpam_draft.pdf.

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21. Carlos Pascual, remarks at symposium on The Challenge of Civilian Management in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: The Lugar Biden Initiative, Washington DC, December 10, 2004, http://2001–2009.state.gov/s/crs/rls/rm/42329.htm. 22. Cited in Serafino and Weiss, Peacekeeping/Stabilization, 12–13. 23. Patrick, “U.S. Response to Precarious States,” 8. 24. Serafino and Weiss, Peacekeeping/Stabilization, summary (unnumbered page), 12. Krasner and Pascual, “Addressing State Failure,” 161. 25. Kennon H. Nakamura and Susan B. Epstein, Diplomacy for the 21st Century: Transformational Diplomacy, Congressional Research Service, August 23, 2007, 8–9, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34141.pdf. 26. Nina M. Serafino, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and Other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities, Congressional Research Service, October 2, 13, 2012, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32862.pdf. 27. Smith, U.S. Peacefare, 86. Pascual, remarks at the Association of the U.S. Army. 28. Pascual, “Capacity and Security.” Serafino and Weiss, Peacekeeping/Stabilization, 17. 29. Pascual, “Capacity and Security,” and Pascual, address at joint event. 30. Douglas J. Feith, “Progress on Building Partnership Capacity Initiatives,” memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, May 28, 2005, http://www.rumsfeld.com/archives. 31. For a list of similar bills and three other related pieces of legislation that all failed, see Serafino and Weiss, Peacekeeping/Stabilization, n. 29. On the budget request, see Pascual, “Stabilization and Reconstruction.” On congressional views, see the comments made by Mary Locke (Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff) and Stephanie Sanok (House Armed Services Committee Staff) in Roundtable on Proposed Civilian Reserve Corps, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2007, 5–6, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071108_roundtable_crc. pdf. 32. Patrick, “US Response to Precarious States,” 8. 33. Embassies as Command Posts in the War on Terror, Report to the Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 109th Congress, December 15, 2006, 8, https://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_rpt/embassies.pdf. 34. Patrick, “US Response to Precarious States,” 7. 35. Robert M. Perito, “Integrated Security Assistance: The 1207 Program,” US Institute for Peace, July 2008, 2, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr207.pdf. Pascual, “Capacity and Security.” 36. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, P.L. 109–163, January 6, 2006, Section 1207, https://www.congress.gov/109/plaws/publ163/PLAW109publ163.pdf. 37. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), FY 2009 Budget Estimates, February 2008, 427–428, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2009/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_ VOL_1_PARTS/DSCA%20FY%2009%20PB%20OP-5.pdf. 38. Ibid., 428–430.



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39. Nina M. Serafino, Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns, FY 2006–FY 2010, Congressional Research Service, March 3, 2011, summary, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/ RS22871.pdf. 40. Serafino, Department of Defense “Section 1207,” 3. 41. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, December 18, 2005, Section 1207, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109hrpt360/pdf/CRPT109hrpt360.pdf, cited in Serafino, Department of Defense “Section 1207,” 3. 42. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, 45, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/64884.pdf. State of the Union Address, January 23, 2007, transcript, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2007/01/20070123–2.html. See also Condoleezza Rice with Senator Richard G. Lugar, “A Civilian Partner for Our Troops,” Washington Post, December 17, 2007. 43. Megan Scully, “Push for Civilian Reserves Echoes Previous Efforts,” Government Executive, January 25, 2007, https://www.govexec.com/defense/2007/01/ push-for-civilian-reserves-echoes-previous-efforts/23578/. 44. Rice and Lugar, “Civilian Partner for Our Troops.” 45. General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Senate Armed Services Committee, posture statement, February 6, 2007, https://www.globalsecurity. org/military/library/congress/2007_hr/070206-pace.pdf. Lieutenant General John F. Sattler, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, “The View from the Joint Staff,” unclassified presentation, n.d., 13, https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudapi. net/ndia/2007/solic/sattler.pdf. 46. Serafino and Weiss, Peacekeeping/Stabilization, 14. See also Serafino Peacekeeping/Stabilization, 15. 47. Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008, H.R.1084, https://congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-bill/1084. S.613, Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2007, https://www.congress.gov/ bill/110th-congress/senate-bill/613. 48. For the full legislative background, see Serafino, Peacekeeping/Stabilization, 10. See also Title XVI, Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2009, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr5658rh/html/BILLS-110hr5658rh.htm. 49. For full details, see Serafino, Peacekeeping/Stabilization, 13–14. 50. NDAA, FY 2009, Section 1604. 51. Wong, remarks at NDIA SO/LIC Symposium. 52. U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century, white paper, Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination, USAID, January 2004, 3, http:// pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdabz322.pdf. 53. Ibid., 14. 54. Ibid., 6. 55. Testimony of Andrew Natsios, Hearing of the Senate Appropriations Committee, April 21, 2004, accessed via Nexis. 56. U.S. Foreign Aid, 20.

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57. U.S. Agency for International Development, Fragile States Strategy, January 2005, 1, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usaid/2005_fragile_states_strategy.pdf. 58. Ibid., 2. 59. Ibid., 5. 60. Andrew S. Natsios, “The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development,” Parameters (Autumn 2005): 5. 61. Ibid., 6. 62. Ibid., 19. Andrew S. Natsios, Administrator, USAID, Fiscal Year 2006 Budget, testimony before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, April 20, 2005 (copy in author’s possession). 63. “USAID-DOD Relations,” presentation, October 19, 2005, http://www.usaid. gov/sites/default/files/usaid_dod_relations.pdf. See also USAID, “Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy,” July 2008, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacl777.pdf. 64. “USAID Announces New Office of Military Affairs,” October 24, 2005, USinfo. state.gov, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/10/mil-051024usia04.htm. 65. “Inputs, Outputs, Activities,” USAID data sheet, Office of Military Affairs, Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, n.d. (copy in the author’s possession). 66. USAID, Civilian-Military Operations Guide, version 1.0, 27 April 13–17, 2010, http://star-tides.net/sites/default/files/documents/files/Civilian-Military%20Operations%20Guide.pdf. 67. Ibid., 10. 68. Ibid., 30, 13. 69. Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (London: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 317, 425–427. 70. Department of State (DoS), “Staffing Comparison of 16 Countries,” tab 2, August 9, 2005, obtained through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 71. Rice, No Higher Honor, 427. 72. Secretary of State to all diplomatic and consular posts, cable, December 2, 2005, obtained through FOIA. 73. “Proposed FSI Course on Transformational Diplomacy,” note to the secretary, June 9, 2005; “Appointment Request: Open FSI’s New Transformational Diplomacy Course Series with Remarks on Democracy-Building,” action memorandum for the secretary, September 22, 2005 (both FOIA). 74. Secretary of State to John W. Snow, Alberto R. Gonzales, Porter J. Goss, Andrew S. Natsios, and Donald H. Rumsfeld, letters dated October 26, 2005 (FOIA). 75. Rice, No Higher Honor, 425–426. 76. “Bush Kicks Off National Foreign Language Initiative,” January 5, 2005, http:// archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=14684. “National Security Language Initiative,” presentation fact sheet, Office of the Spokesman, January 5, 2006, http:// www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/Vol%2028_2/National%20Security%20Language%20Initiativepdf.pdf.



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77. DoS, “Transformational Diplomacy,” fact sheet, Office of the Spokesman, January 18, 2006, http://2001–2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/59339.htm. 78. Rice, No Higher Honor, 427. 79. “Transformational Diplomacy.” See also Condoleezza Rice, “Transformational Diplomacy,” speech at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, January 18, 2006, http://2001–2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm. On political advisers in military commands, see “The Changing Nature of the Pol-Mil Interface and How DOS Will Address it: 21st Century POLADs, Transformational Diplomacy,” Department of State, December 2005 (FOIA). See also Secretary of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, “Global Diplomatic Repositioning,” cable, March 5, 2006 (FOIA). 80. Nakamura and Epstein, Diplomacy for the 21st Century, 6. 81. Ibid., appendix B. 82. The Secretary to All Foreign Service Personnel, “Foreign Service Reforms and You,” memo, October 13, 2006 (FOIA). Nakamura and Epstein, Diplomacy for the 21st Century, 19. 83. Nakamura and Epstein, Diplomacy for the 21st Century, appendix A. 84. National Security Strategy, March 2006, 44–45, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/64884.pdf. 85. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for Future Operations, Statement of Joseph A. Christoff and Janet A. St. Laurent, October 30, 2007, https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08228t. pdf. 86. Ibid., 6–8. 87. GAO, International Security: State and DOD Need to Improve Sustainment Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance Programs, April 15, 2010, http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/303180.pdf. 88. Ibid., 12, 16. For full details of the types of assistance under Sections 1206 and 1207 and the recipient nations, see appendix IV. 89. Ibid., 25–26, 28. 90. Ibid., 33–37 91. Donald Rumsfeld, remarks at the Landon Lecture at Kansas State University, November 9, 2006, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript. aspx?TranscriptID=3781. 92. “President Attends Armed Forces Full Honor Review for Secretary Rumsfeld,” December 15, 2006, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2006/12/20061215–7.html. 93. Cited in Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), 277 94. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, remarks, Washington, DC, October 10, 2007, http://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1181. 95. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, news transcript, July 31, 2008, http://archive.defense.

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gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4268. Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, June 2008, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/ nds/2008_NDS.pdf?ver=2014–06–25–124535–363. See also Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1 (January/February 2009): 28–40. Robert M. Gates, speech at the National Defense University, Washington, DC, September 29, 2008, http://archive.defense.gov/speeches/ speech.aspx?speechid=1279. 96. ., “DoD Organizational Assessment for Fiscal Year 2008,” memorandum for the secretaries of the military departments et al., September16, 2008, tabs H, J3, J4, J5, M, N13. Obtained through FOIA. 97. Ibid. 98. Department of Defense Decision Directive (DoDD) 1404.10, DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, January 232009, https://www.cpms.osd.mil/expeditionary/ pdf/140410p.pdf. Postings are advertised on the website of the Civilian Deployment Experience: http://www.cpms.osd.mil/expeditionary/home.html. 99. “Bradshaw Briefs Obama Camp on DoD Civilian Plan Ahead of Directive,” Inside the Pentagon, December 18, 2008, accessed via Nexis. See also Marilee Fitzgerald, Acting Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, prepared statement, September 16, 2009, http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/20090916FitzgeraldTestimony.pdf.

Chapter 7 1. “Text of President Obama’s May 23 Speech on National Security,” Washington Post, May 23, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/president-obamas-may23-speech-on-national-security-as-prepared-for-delivery/2013/05/23/02c35e30-c3b8–1 1e2–9fe2–6ee52d0eb7c1_story.html. 2. Ibid. 3. Department of Defense (DoD), Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, 4–5, http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_ Strategic_Guidance.pdf. 4. Ibid., 6. 5. Colin Dueck, The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 36. On Obama and strategic restraint, see Michael Clarke and Anthony Ricketts, “Did Obama Have a Grand Strategy?” Journal of Strategic Studies, 40, nos. 1–2 (2017): 295–324, and Adam Quinn, “The Art of Declining Politely: Obama’s Prudent Presidency and the Waning of American Power,” International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 803–824. 6. Georg Loefflman, “Leading from Behind: American Exceptionalism and President Obama’s Post-American Vision of Hegemony,” Geopolitics 20, no. 2 (2015): 327. 7. White House, National Security Strategy (NSS), May 2010, 17, https://www.hsdl. org/?view&did=24251. 8. Ibid., n.p.



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9. Ibid. 10. Ibid., 15. 11. Ibid., 7–8. 12. Ibid., 14. 13. Ibid., 21. 14. Ibid., especially 14–16. 15. “National Strategy for Counterterrorism,” June 2011, n.p., 17, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf. 16. DoD, Quadrennial Defense Review, February 2010, 1, http://archive.defense. gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2029JAN10%201600.pdf. 17. Ibid., 17–39. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Irregular Warfare, instruction number 3210.06, June 10, 2010, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=705001. 18. Department of State (DoS) and US Agency for International Development (USAID), Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), 2010, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153108.pdf (hereafter cited as QDDR 2010). See also Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Leading Through Civilian Power: Redefining American Diplomacy and Development,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (2010) 13–24. 19. QDDR 2010, iii, i. 20. These were an under secretary for economic growth, energy, and the environment; a new Bureau for Energy Resources; a new under secretary for civilian security; expansion of the capacities of the under secretary for arms control and international security; a new Bureau for Counterterrorism; and a coordinator for cyberissues. See ibid., vi–vii, xiv. 21. Ibid., xi. 22. Ibid., viii. See also Judith A. McHale , Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 10, 2010, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg63020/html/CHRG111shrg63020.htm. 23. Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 10, 2010, https://2009–2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2010/138175.htm. 24. DoS, Congressional Budget Justification, vol. 2: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2011, 145, 148, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/137936.pdf. DoS, Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ), vol. 2: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2012, 193, 197, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/158267.pdf. 25. Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony Before House Foreign Affairs Committee, April 14, 2011, https://2009–2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2011/160853.htm. See also DoS, Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ), vol. 1: Operations, FY 2012, 55–58, http://www.state.gov/ documents/organization/156215.pdf. 26. Cited in Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimates, February 2010, 455, https://securityassistance.org/sites/default/files/ DSCA_FY11.pdf.

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27. Nina M. Serafino, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206”—Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 2014, summary (unnumbered page), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22855.pdf. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid., 19. 30. “Security Force Assistance (SFA),” DoD Instruction 5000.68, October 27, 2010, http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/500068p.pdf. 31. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy,” April 5, 2013, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=747214. 32. DSCA, “Update to the Building Partner Capacity Authorities in Chapter 15 of the Security Assistance Management Manual,” April 11, 2016, https://www.samm. dsca.mil/policy-memoranda/dsca-16-22. 33. Inspector General (IG), DoD, Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Build Counterterrorism and Stability Operations Capacity of Foreign Military Forces with Section 1206/2282 Funding, July 21, 2017, 15–50, https://media.defense.gov/2017/ Dec/19/2001858653/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2017–099.PDF. 34. Ibid., 51. 35. Ibid., 20–22, 27–29, 34–35, 43–44, 49–50, 55. 36. CBJ, vol. 2, 2011, 75. 37. DoS, Congressional Budget Justification, vol. 2: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2013, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/185014.pdf, 94. CBJ, vol. 1, FY 2012, 96. DoS, “Congressional Budget Justification,” vol. 2: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2014, 118, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/208290.pdf. 38. Susan B. Epstein, Foreign Aid Reform, National Strategy, and the Quadrennial Review, Congressional Research Service, February 15, 2011, 10–13, https://www.fas. org/sgp/crs/row/R41173.pdf. 39. Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, remarks at the Nixon Center, Washington, DC, February 24, 2010, http://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech. aspx?speechid=1425. 40. CBJ, vol. 2, FY 2012, 161. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Section 1207, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr1540enr/pdf/BILLS112hr1540enr.pdf. Confusingly, the Global Security Contingency Fund was authorized in Section 1207 of this act—the same section that had previously authorized the funding known specifically as Section 1207 funding. The two appropriations were different, however, and by 2012, the original Section 1207 funding had been replaced by the Complex Crises Fund, also discussed in this chapter. 41. DoS, “Global Security Contingency Fund,” n.d., https://www.state.gov/t/pm/ gpi/gscf/. 42. This refers to the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriations, the Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) program, and SOCOM’s Civil Military Support Elements. See General Accounting Office (GAO), Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better Information Sharing



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Needed to Manage the Military’s Efforts, February 2012, 4, 6, http://www.gao.gov/ assets/590/588334.pdf. 43. Ibid., 11, 13. 44. For the full DoD response to the report see ibid., appendix X, 73–79. 45. For State’s response to the report, see ibid., appendix XI, 80–82. 46. Ibid., appendix X, 79. 47. Ibid., appendix XI, 82. 48. Ibid., appendix XII, 85. 49. GAO, An Overview of Professional Development Activities Intended to Improve Interagency Collaboration, November 2010, “What GAO Found,” n.p., http://www. gao.gov/new.items/d11108.pdf. See also appendix II. 50. Ibid., 27–28. 51. Catherine Dale, National Security Professionals and Interagency Reform: Proposals, Recent Experience, and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, September 26, 2011, 7–21, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34565.pdf.. Nancy H. Kichack, Office of Personnel Management, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, April 30, 2009, http://www.opm.gov/news/ testimony/111th-congress/national-security-professional-development. 52. For a review of the meetings of the US–Georgia Commission under Obama, see DoS, “US–Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission,” http://www.state.gov/p/ eur/ci/gg/usgeorgiacommission/index.htm Citation taken from testimony of Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August 4, 2009, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/ imo/media/doc/VershbowTestimony090804p1.pdf. 53. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, 2011, chap. 2, http:// www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195543.htm. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, chap. 2, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209981.htm. 54. US European Command Headquarters, “Georgia Deployment Program,” fact sheet, n.d., http://www.eucom.mil/media-library/document/22826/georgiadeployment-program. 55. Cited in “Georgia: Scenesetter for Special Representative Holbrooke’s Visit,” cable 10TBILISI203_a, February 18, 2010, secret, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/ cables/10TBILISI203_a.html. “Hagel Visits U.S. Marines, Georgian Troops Near Tbilisi,” CQ Federal Department and Agency Documents, Regulatory Intelligence Data, September 7, 2014, accessed via Nexis. Cpl. Dallas Johnson, “6th ANGLICO Marines and Georgian Soldiers Prepare for Deployment in Support of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel,” August 20, 2017, https://www.marforeur.marines.mil/News/ News-Article-Display/Article/1285115/6th-anglico-marines-and-georgian-soldiersprepare-for-deployment-in-support-of/. 56. “Georgia: Scenesetter.” 57. Testimony of Admiral James G. Stavridis, Commander, US European Command, Before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, 112th Congress,

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March 1, 2012, 51, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Stavridis%2003–01–12.pdf. 58. Richard Morningstar, Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy, Testimony Before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, June 2, 2011, 9–18, https://www.hsdl. org/?view&did=732467. 59. Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander U.S. Pacific Command, Before the House Armed Services Committee, March 25, 2010, 52, 63, https://www. gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg58295/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg58295.pdf. 60. Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander U.S. Pacific Command, Before the House Armed Services Committee, April 6, 2011, 3, 19,http://ogc.osd.mil/ olc/docs/testWillard04122011.pdf. 61. Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnson, and Gillian S. Oak, U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), 79–110, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/ RR1200/RR1236/RAND_RR1236.pdf. 62. All State Department reports on foreign terrorist organizations, from 2000 to 2017, including on the ASG, can be consulted here: https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/ index.htm. The RAND Corporation’s favorable 2014 report into OEF-P falsely claims— twice—that the State Department’s 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism report stated that the ASG had “more than 2,000” adherents. In fact, the report states that the ASG was “believed to have a few hundred core fighters, but at least 1000 individuals motivated by the prospect of receiving ransom payments for foreign hostages allegedly joined the group in 2000–2001.” The latter claim about 1,000 new recruits was dropped in all subsequent State Department reports and never repeated again elsewhere. See Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001, appendix B: Background on Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Abu Sayyaf Group, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2001/html/10252. htm#ASG, and Robinson et al., U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines: xviii, 11. 63. This was in comparison to the number of attacks in the Bush years: twentythree in 2008, seven in 2007, eight in 2006, ten in 2005, seven in 2004, eight in 2003, and seventeen in 2002. See “Abu Sayyaf Group,” Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results. aspx?expanded=yes&search=Abu+Sayyaf+Group&ob=GTDID&od=desc&page=1&c ount=100#results-table. 64. Ibid. 65. Robinson et al., U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 91. 66. On the hub-and-spoke security order in East Asia, see G. John Ikenberry, “American Hegemony and East Asian Order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 58, no. 3 (2004): 353–367. 67. On the pivot to Asia, see Robert S. Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 6 (2012): 70–82. 68. Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee



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on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, February 7, 2012, https://2009–2017. state. gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2012/02/183494.htm. 69. “Clinton Reaffirms Military Ties with the Philippines,” New York Times, November 16, 2011. 70. “Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America on Enhanced Defense Cooperation,” April 28, 2014, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/244799.pdf. 71. U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, June 2012, https://2009–2017.state. gov/documents/organization/209377.pdf. DoD, US Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, Office of International Security Affairs, August 1, 1995, http://archive.defense.gov/ Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=943. 72. U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, foreword. 73. Ibid., 5. 74. Ibid., 3–4. 75. The Increasing American Jobs Through Exports to Africa Act, Hearing Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 17, 2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ pkg/CHRG-112hhrg73814/html/CHRG-112hhrg73814.htm. 76. Statement of the Honorable Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African affairs, DoS, Hearing Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 17, 2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg73814/html/ CHRG-112hhrg73814.htm. 77. Bobby Rush opening statement, Increasing American Jobs Through Exports to Africa hearing. See also “Assessing China’s Role and Influence in Africa,” House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, March 29, 2012, https://chrissmith.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2012.03.29_assessing_chinas_ role_and_influence_in_africa.pdf. 78. Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, April 25, 2012, https://2009– 2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/188816.htm. 79. Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 25 April 2012, https://20092017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/188816.htm. CBJ, vol. 2, FY 2011, 146. 80. See “Written Testimony: In Annual Posture Statement, Ward Updates Congress on U.S. Africa Command,” March 17, 2009, http://www.africom.mil/ Newsroom/Transcript/6544/written-testimony-in-annual-posture-statementward. Statement of General Carter Ham Before House Armed Services Committee, “2012 Posture Statement,” March 1, 2012, http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/ article/8832/2012-posture-statement-statement-of-general-carter#. 81. “TRANSCRIPT: AFRICOM’s Ward Testifies Before Senate Armed Services Committee,” March 9, 2010, https://www.africom.mil/media-room/Article/7255/ transcript-africoms-ward-testifies-before-senate-a. 82. CBJ, vol. 2, FY 2012, 195. Benjamin, House, testimony. See also DOS, “Programs and Initiatives,” n.d., http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#PREACT.

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GAO, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate: Combating Terrorism: State Department Can Improve Management of East Africa Program, June 2014, http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664126.pdf. “What GAO Found,” n.p. 83. “Factsheet: Partnering to Counter Terrorism in Africa,” August 6, 2014, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-partnering-counter-terrorism-africa. “Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund, DoD Budget FY 2017,” Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), February 2016, 12, http://comptroller. defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_CTPF_J-Book.pdf. 84. “Factsheet: Partnering to Counter Terrorism in Africa.” Counterterrorism Partnership Fund,” 2–7. 85. “An Update on the Security Governance Initiative,“ March 2, 2016, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/03/02/update-security-governance-initiative. “Fact Sheet: Security Governance Initiative,” August 6, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-security-governance-initiative. 86. Calculated from US Energy Information Administration, “US Crude Imports by Country of Origin, 2010–2015,” n.d., https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_ impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbbl_a.htm. 87. Statement of John R. Brodman, Assistant Secretary for Political and International Affairs, Department of Energy, Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “U.S. Energy Security: West Africa and Latin America,” October 21, 2003, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg91959/html/CHRG-108shrg91959. htm. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015, December 2000, 43, https:// www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000516933.pdf. 88. See Adam Sieminski, U.S. Energy Information Administration, Outlook for U.S. Shale Oil and Gas, March 8, 2014, 2, 7, https://www.eia.gov/pressroom/presentations/sieminski_03082014.pdf. Nancy E. Brune, “The Impact of the U.S. Shale Boom in Africa,” Columbia Journal of International Affairs 69, no. 1 (2016), https://jia.sipa. columbia.edu/impact-u-s-shale-boom-africa. 89. Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea, Report of the Conference Held at Chatham House, March 2013, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0312confreport_maritimesecurity.pdf. “Robert G. Bradley Begins Operation Obangame Express,” March 21, 2011, http:// w w w.africom.mil/NewsBy Categor y/ar ticle/8104/rober t-g-brad ley-beginsexercise-obangame-express. “Exercise Obangame/Sahara Express 2016 Commences,” March 20, 2016, http://www.africom.mil/NewsByCategory/article/28060/ exercise-obangame-saharan-express-2016-commences. 90. See Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea, September 18, 2014, http://nav ylive.dod live.mi l/2014/09/18/maritime-securit y-in-t he-g u lf-ofguinea/. “African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership Underway,” February 4, 2016, http://w w w.africom.mil/NewsByCategory/article/27940/ african-maritime-law-enforcement-partnership-underway. 91. For details, see “African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership Underway.” 92. Ibid.



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93. The State of Maritime Piracy 2015: Piracy and Robbery Against Ships in the Gulf of Guinea 2015, Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015, 5, http://obp.ngo/sites/default/files/State_ of_Maritime_Piracy_2015.pdf. 94. Paul E. Roitsch, The Next Step in Somalia: Exploiting Victory, Post-Mogadishu, U.S. Marine Corps, Command and Staff College, January 2012, 9–10, http://www.dtic. mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a601449.pdf. 95. Cited in Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars: The World Is a Battlefield (London: Serpent’s Tail, 2013), 486. 96. Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A Ticking Time Bomb, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, January 21, 2010, 16, http://www.foreign.senate. gov/imo/media/doc/Yemen.pdf. 97. Scahill, Dirty Wars, 469–70 98. Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Africa Affairs, Testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, September 13, 2012, https://2009–2017.state. gov/p/af/rls/rm/2012/197773.htm. 99. Scahill, Dirty Wars, 474. Matthew J. Thomas, “Exposing and Exploiting Weakness in the Merger of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 24, no. 3 (2013): 414. 100. Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on African Affairs, October 8, 2013, https://2009–2017.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2013/215220.htm. 101. Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2014, Somalia,” 2014, http://www.hrw. org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/somalia. 102. Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia, 14, 16. 103. DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, 2016, chap. 2, https://www.state. gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257514.htm. “In Somalia, U.S. Escalates a Shadow War,” New York Times, October 16, 2016; “Obama Expands War with Al Qaeda to Include Shabab in Somalia,” New York Times, November 27, 2016. 104. “Al-Shabaab,” Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland, https:// www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=1&casualties_type=&casualties_ max=&perpetrator=20036&expanded=no&charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=G TDID&od=desc#results-table. 105. Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, “Backgrounder: al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 8, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717#p1. Lianne Kennedy Boudali, The GSPC: Newest Franchise in Al Qa’ida’s Global Jihad, Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, West Point, April 2007, http:// www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a466539.pdf. 106. AQIM attacks are recorded in a list of attacks by all al-Qaeda franchises in the Global Terrorism Database. 107. “Africa’s Islamist Militants Co-Ordinate Efforts,” BBC News, June 26, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18592789.

292

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108. Amanda Dory, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, “The Crisis in Mali: US Interests and the International Response,” February 14, 2013, http://docs.house.gov/ meetings/FA/FA00/20130214/100248/HHRG-113-FA00-Wstate-DoryA-20130214.pdf. 109. Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Testimony to House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 14, 2013, 5, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/ FA/FA00/20130214/100248/HHRG-113-FA00-Wstate-CarsonJ-20130214.pdf. DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, chap. 2, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209979.htm. 110. Hillary Clinton, Senate Hearing on Benghazi, January 2, 2013, transcript, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1301/23/se.01.html. 111. Carson, testimony to House, 1. 112. Donald Y. Yamamoto, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Testimony to the House Subcommittees on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights; International Organizations; Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade; Middle East and North Africa, May 21, 2013, https://2009–2017.state.gov/p/af/rls/ rm/2013/209790.htm. 113. Ibid. 114. Carson, testimony to House, 4. 115. See DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, chap. 2, http://www.state.gov/j/ ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm. 116. , From Embassy Bamako to SecState WashDC, “CODEL Dreier Scenesetter,’ declassified cable , July 16, 2003, obtained through FOIA. 117. Simon J. Powelson, Enduring Engagement Yes, Episodic Engagement No: Lessons for SOF from Mali, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 2013, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38996/13Dec_Powelson_Simon. pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 118. Stephen Harman, “Securitization Initiatives in the Sahara-Sahel Region in the Twenty-First Century,” African Security 8, no. 4 (2015): 236. 119. From 2012 to 2016, AQIM also conducted attacks in Tunisia, Nigeria, and Libya. See “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Global Terrorism Database, https:// www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=2&search=AQIM&expanded=no &charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GTDID&od=desc#results-table. 120. Statement of General David M. Rodriguez, Commander, U.S. Africa Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 26, 2015, 3, 6, http:// www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rodriguez_03–26–15.pdf. 121. “Mali Hotel Attackers Are Tied to an Algerian Qaeda Leader,” International New York Times, November 21, 2015. 122. Dueck, Obama Doctrine, 2. 123. Scahill, Dirty Wars, 282. 124. “Hunter,” an anonymous JSOC operator who spoke extensively with journalist Jeremy Scahill, cited in Scahill, Dirty Wars, 355. 125. Karen De Young and Greg Jaffe, “US `Secret War’ Expands Globally as Special Operations Forces Take Larger Role,” Washington Post, June 4, 2010.



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126. On drones and their legal and ethical implications, see Trevor McCrisken, “Obama’s Drone War,” Survival 55, no. 2 (2013): 97–122; Medea Benjamin, Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control (New York: Verso, 2012); Grégoire Chamayou, Drone Theory (London: Penguin, 2015). 127. American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Al-Aulaqi v. Obama: Constitutional Challenge to Proposed Killing of US Citizen , October 19, 2011, https://www.aclu.org/ national-security/al-aulaqi-v-obama. “Court Backs Obama on Secrecy,” Washington Post, January 3, 2013. 128. Washington Legal Foundation, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, October 2011, http:// www.wlf.org/litigating/case_detail.asp?id=638. “Court Backs Obama on Secrecy.” 129. “With Less Oversight, Activists Fear More Civilian Casualties from Drone Strikes,” PBS News Hour, December 26, 2016, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ with-less-oversight-activists-fear-more-civilian-casualties-from-drone-strikes. “Deep Support in Washington for CIA’s Drone Missions,” New York Times, April 25, 2015. “Is Congressional Oversight Tough Enough on Drones?” Bureau of Investigative Journalism, August 1, 2013, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/opinion/2013–08–01/iscongressional-oversight-tough-enough-on-drones. Micah Zenko, “Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to the Pentagon,” Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Preventive Action, April 16, 2013, https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2013/04/PIM_Drones_ Zenko_Final_4_16_13.pdf. “Judge in Drone Oversight Case: Congressional Oversight of the Military Is `a Joke,’” Hill, June 30, 2017, http://thehill.com/policy/defense/340270court-dismisses-drone-killing-case-as-judge-laments-democracy-is-broken. 130. “Election Spurred Move to Codify U.S. Drone Policy,” New York Times, November 24, 2012. “Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities,” May 22, 2013, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/presidential_policy_guidance_0.pdf. Letta Tayler, “How Obama’s Drones Rulebook Enabled Trump,” Human Rights Watch, September 26, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/26/howobamas-drones-rulebook-enabled-trump. Luke Hartig, “Trump’s New Drone Strike Policy: What’s Any Different? Why It Matters’ Just Security, September 2, 2017, https:// www.justsecurity.org/45227/trumps-drone-strike-policy-different-matters/. 131. Azmat Khan and Anand Gopal, “The Uncounted,” New York Times Magazine, November 16, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/16/magazine/ uncounted-civilian-casualties-iraq-airstrikes.html?_r=0. 132. Brian Glyn Williams, “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33, no. 10 (2010): 873–874. 133. M. W. Aslam, “A Critical Evaluation of American Drone Strikes in Pakistan: Legality, Legitimacy, and Prudence” Critical Studies on Terrorism, 4, no. 3 (December 2011): 4. 134. Ibid., 5. On Musharaff’s balancing act, see Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth (New York: Penguin, 2013), 110 , 133, and Williams, “CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan,” 882.

294

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135. Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Covert Drone War Project: Pakistan data sets for each year available at http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/08/10/ obama-2009-strikes/. The caveat is that these statistics are best estimates. 136. Cora Currier and Peter Maass, “Firing Blind: Flawed Intelligence and the Limits of Drone Technology,” Intercept, October 15, 2015, https://theintercept.com/ drone-papers/firing-blind/; “Drone Strikes Reveal Uncomfortable Truth: U.S. Is Often Unsure Who Will Die,” New York Times, April 23, 2015. 137. Williams, “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan,” 873. Mazzetti, Way of the Knife, 100–101. 138. , “Brennan-Saleh Meeting Sep 6, 2009,” cable 09SANNA1669, secret, September 9, 2015, http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09SANAA1669.html. 139. Scahill, Dirty Wars, 210. See also the views of former FBI agent Ali H. Soufan in “Scenes from the War on Terrorism in Yemen,” New York Times, January 2, 2010. 140. “Brennan-Saleh Meeting.” 141. Muhammed al Ahmadi, “Al-Qaeda to Respond to Obama’s Strategy in Yemen,” Al-Ghad, December 6, 2009, cited in Scahill, Dirty Wars, 284. 142. “Brennan-Saleh Meeting.” 143. “ROYG Looks Ahead Following CT Operations, But Perhaps Not Far Enough,” cable 09SANAA2251, secret, 21–12–09, http://wikileaks.org/ cable/2009/12/09SANAA2251.html. 144. Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Covert Drone War Project: Yemen data sets for each year, including civilian casualties, available via the links at http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/03/29/yemen-reported-us-covert-actions-since-2001// 145. Quinn, “The Art of Declining Politely’; Clarke and Ricketts, “Did Obama Have a Grand Strategy?”; Loefflmann, “Leading from Behind”; Jonathan Paquin, Justin Massie, and Philippe Beauregard, “Obama’s Leadership Style: Enabling Transatlantic Allies in Libya and Mali,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 15, no. 2 (2017): 184–206; Michelle Bentley and Jack Holland, eds., The Obama Doctrine: A Legacy of Continuity in U.S. Foreign Policy? (London: Routledge, 2016); Alexandra Homolar, “Multilateralism in Crisis? The Character of US International Engagement Under Obama,” Global Society 26, no.1 (2012): 103–122. 146. NSS, 2010, 3, 12. See also 17–18, 22. 147. Ryan Lizza, “The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Re-Made Obama’s Foreign Policy,” New Yorker, May 2, 2011, https://www.newyorker.com/ magazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist. 148. See Alan J. Kuperman, “Obama’s Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 2 (2015): 66–77. 149. United Nations, “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions,” March 17, 2011, https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm. 150. Paquin et al. argue that Obama consciously adopted an enabling strategy in Libya. See their “Obama’s Leadership Style.”



Notes

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151. Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony, West Point, New York, May 28, 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-statesmilitary-academy-commencement-ceremony. 152. Kuperman, “Obama’s Libya Debacle”; Micah Zenko, “The Big Lie About the Libyan War,” Foreign Policy 22 (2016): 82–84, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/22/ libya-and-the-myth-of-humanitarian-intervention/. 153. Kuperman, “Obama’s Libya Debacle.” Dueck, Obama Doctrine. 154. Dominic Tierny, “The Legacy of Obama’s Worst Mistake,” Atlantic, April 25, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/ obamas-worst-mistake-libya/478461/. 155. “A New Libya with ‘Very Little Time Left,” New York Times February 27, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/us/politics/libya-isis-hillary-clinton.html. 156. Jamie Allinson, “Disaster Islamism,” Salvage, no. 4 (February 2017): 129. 157. “Heavy Pressure Led to Decision by Obama on Syrian Arms,” New York Times, June 14, 2013; “U.S. Relies Heavily on Saudi Money to Support Syrian Rebels,” New York Times, January 23, 2016. 158. Christopher M. Blanchard and Amy Belasco, Train and Equip Program for Syria: Authorities, Funding, and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, June 9, 2015, 10, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43727.pdf. Allinson argues that withholding MANPADS was a sign that the United States did not want to topple Assad lest it end up dragged into another ground war in the Middle East. See “Disaster Islamism,” 132–133. 159. Kathy Gilsinan, “The Many Ways to Map the Islamic `State,’” Atlantic Monthly, August 27, 2014, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/themany-ways-to-map-the-islamic-state/379196/. “The Islamic State: From an Insurgency to Rogue State and Back,” New York Times, October 22, 2017, https://www.nytimes. com/interactive/2017/10/22/world/middleeast/isis-the-islamic-state-from-insurgencyto-rogue-state-and-back.html. 160. Lt. Col. J. Stewart Welch and CDR Kevin Bailey, In Pursuit of Good Ideas: The Syria Train and Equip Program, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2016, 1–2, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/ pubs/ResearchNote36-WelchBailey.pdf. Cameron Glenn, “Timeline: U.S. Policy on ISIS,” Wilson Center, April 27, 2016, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-us-policy-isis. “Operation Inherent Resolve, Strike Releases,” https://www. inherentresolve.mil/Media-Library/News-Releases/. “History,” http://www.inherentresolve.mil/Portals/14/Documents/Mission/HISTORY_17OCT2014-JUL2017. pdf?ver=2017–07–22–095806–793. 161. Welch and Bailey, In Pursuit of Good Ideas, 1–2, 4, 5. 162. Glenn, “Timeline: U.S. Policy on ISIS.” 163. “U.S. Launches Airstrikes Against Isis in Libya,” Guardian, August 1, 2016, https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/01/us-airstrikes-against-isis-libya-pentagon.

296

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164. “US Special Ops Chief: More Than 60,000 ISIS Fighters Killed,” CNN.com, February 15, 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/14/politics/isis-60000-fighterskilled/index.html. 165. See “Who Backs Whom in the Syrian Conflict?” Guardian, December 2, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2015/oct/09/who-backs-whomin-the-syrian-conflict. “With Loss of Its Caliphate, ISIS May Return to Guerrilla Roots,” New York Times, October 18, 2017. 166. Trevor McCrisken, “Ten Years On: Obama’s War on Terrorism in Rhetoric and Practice,” International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 781. 167. David Kilcullen and Andrew McDonald Exum, “Death from Above, Outrage Down Below,” New York Times, May 16, 2009. 168. Wali Aslam, Terrorist Relocation and the Societal Consequences of US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, report for the Remote Control Project, Oxford Research Group, London, June 2014, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ WaliAslamReport.pdf.

Conclusion 1. Richard Haass, “U.S. Foreign Policy in a Nonpolar World,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2008): 44–56; Charles A. Kupchan, No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (London: Allen Lane, 2008); Michael Mandelbaum, The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 8. 2. James Mann, The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 72. 3. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, 6, http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. 4. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88, 89. 5. Douglas Porch, “The Dangerous Myths and Dubious Promise of COIN,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 22, no. 2 (2011): 240. 6. Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Alex Marshall, “Imperial Nostalgia, the Liberal Lie, and the Perils of Postmodern Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 21, no. 2 (2010): 233–258. 7. David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (2005): 601. 8. M. A. Mohamed Salih advocates a human security perspective in “An African Perspective on Security,” in US Strategy in Africa: AFRICOM, Terrorism, and Security Challenges, ed. David J. Francis (London: Routledge, 2010), 78–92. See also Josephine Osikena, “Geo-Politics Beyond Washington: Africa’s Alternative Security and



Notes

297

Development Partnerships,” in US Strategy in Africa, ed. Francis, 158–174; Paul D. Williams, “Thinking About Security in Africa,” International Affairs 83, no. 6 (2007): 1021–1038; Nana K. Poku, Neil Renwick, and Joao Gomes Porto, “Human Security and Development in Africa,” International Affairs 83, no. 6 (2007): 1155–1170. 9. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Counterinsurgency,” 604. 10. For a seminal example, see excerpts from the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance, February 18, 1992, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb245/doc03_ extract_nytedit.pdf. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1990–1991): 22–33. 11. Richard Crockatt described the United States as “a Westphalian state in a post-Westphalian system.” See his “What’s the Big Idea? Models of Global Order in the Post–Cold War Era,” in The United States Contested: American Unilateralism and European Discontent, ed. Sergio Fabbrini (London: Routledge, 2006), 84–87. 12. See Chapter 6, note 66. 13. David E. Johnson, Military Capabilities for Hybrid War: Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon and Gaza (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/ RAND_OP285.pdf. Sam Jones, “Ukraine: Russia’s New Art of War,” Financial Times, August 28, 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ea5e82fa-2e0c-11e4-b760–00144feabdc0. html#axzz3JiY076nJ. Oleg Shynkarenko, “Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, July 11, 2014, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/ russias-hybrid-war-ukraine. 14. Statement of General James N. Mattis, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Hearing on US Southern Command, Northern Command, Africa Command, and Joint Forces Command, House Armed Services Committee, 111th Congress, 2009; Statement of Rear Admiral Nevin P. Carr, US Navy Chief of Naval Research, Hearing on the FY 2011 National Defense Authorization Budget Request for Department of Defense’s Science and Technology Programs Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities of the House Armed Services Committee, 111th Congress, 2010; and testimony of Lieutenant James F. Amos, Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Combat Development and Integration, Hearing on U.S. Marine Corps Readiness, Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee on Appropriations: all cited in Government Accountability Office, Hybrid Warfare, September 10, 2010, 1, http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/97053.pdf. The point about the QDR is on p. 11. For analysis of the term, see Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 52 (1st quarter 2009): 34–48; Nathan Freier, “The Defense Identity Crisis: It’s a Hybrid World,” January 28, 2010, http://www.army. mil/article/33626/The_Defense_Identity_Crisis__It__039_s_a_Hybrid_World/. 15. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge: University Press, 2007), 406.

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Index

Abizaid, General John, 26, 98, 110 Abkhazia, 114, 133 Abu Sayyaf Group, 16, 47, 48, 59, 60, 61, 62, 67, 70, 71, 75, 76; alleged connections to bin Laden, 51–54; attacks in 1990s, 51; Bangsamoro nationalism, 68; criminal activity, 54; kidnappings, 58; number of adherents, 51, 70; number of attacks, 68, 70, 197; origins, 51; strength 2002–16, 197; Superferry 14 attack, 68 Afghanistan, 4, 9, 10, 12, 16, 18, 26, 30, 44, 51, 52, 72, 77, 82, 136, 160, 166, 168, 185, 195, 205, 206, 211 Africa Command (AFRICOM). See United States Africa Command Africa Partnership Station, 106–7, 201 African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership, 200–201 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 105, 201 Algeria, 95, 98, 157, 204 Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI); antiEthiopian violence, 85; Department of State views on, 85

Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism, 101 Al-Qaeda, 5, 9, 20, 50, 185, 208, 214; Georgia, 124, 125, 127; origins in 1980s-1990s, 52–53; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report on Al-Qaeda in Somalia and Yemen, 201–2; sub-Saharan Africa, 198; training camps, 27, 52; transnational threat, 11, 185 Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), 208 Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 210, 216; international attacks, 203, 204; Mali takeover 2012, 203; merger with Al-Qaeda, 203; Radisson Blu hotel siege 2015, 205 Al-Shabaab, 113; affiliation with Al Qaeda, 104, 105; foreign fighters, 104; international attacks, 201–2; merger with al-Qaeda, 202; origins and expansion, 104; suicide bombings, 104 “arc of instability,” 82 Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), 48, 57, 59, 60, 64, 66, 68, 76; capacity 299

300

Index

building, 63; irregular warfare practices, 62; Operation Ultimatum, 70; Oplan Tornado 2005, 70 Arroyo, Gloria Macapagal, 16, 47, 58, 59, 61, 64, 65; meeting with George W. Bush 2001, 60; state visit to Washington 2003, 66 Article 98 immunity agreements, 91–92 Asymmetry, 5, 13, 16, 20, 44, 159, 187, 193; Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, 145 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) September 2001, 26, 27, 158, 185, 205, 206 Aweys, Hassan Dahir, 100, 104 Ayro, Adan Hashi Farah, 104 Azerbaijan, 115, 116, 121, 131; Azerbaijan Security Dialogue 1997; Cheney visit 2008, 134; U.S. aid to, 119 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, 115, 118, 121, 131; Bush administration and, 122, 129; construction of, 129 Balikatan exercise, 57; 2002, 60, 63, 75; 2003, 65–66; 2005, 67; 2006, 70 Bangladesh, 168, 196 Bangsamoro people, 47–51, 76, 215 Bangsamoro People’s Consultative Assembly, 75–76 Basilan, 49, 50, 54, 59, 60, 61, 68, 70, 75 “Basilan model,” 70, 71, 75 Benghazi U.S. compound attack, 210 Benin, 80, 106 Benjamin, Daniel, 189, 199 bin Laden, Osama, 9, 27, 30, 34, 71, 100, 123; in Afghanistan, 53; attacks against US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, 84; Chechnya, 124; Sudan years, 53, 83; transnational jihad and, 51, 84 Blair, Admiral Dennis, 51, 58, 62

Bosnia, 10, 40, 117 Botswana, 109, 111 Bronson, Lisa, 131, 132 Building Global Partnerships Act, 182, 189 “building partner capacity,” 35, 95, 146 Building Partnership Capacity Act 2006, 155 Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap, 151–52 Burkina Faso, 111, 204 Bush administration, 13–14, 16, 17, 35, 67, 78; Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline support, 122, 129; support for civilian reserve corps, 171; unilateralism, 217–18 Bush, George W., 1, 21, 188; Africa, views on, 79; Arroyo meeting 2001, 60; Arroyo state visit 2003; civilian reserve corps support for, 171; Indonesian visit 2003; Mahathir Mohamed meeting 2002, 72; 9/11 and, 24–25; Office of Global Communications, 37; unilateralism, 36 Cambone, Stephen, 29, 41; stability operations, 138–39 Camp Lemonnier, 87, 88, 103 “Capabilities-based approach” to defense planning, 22, 23, 43 Carson, Johnnie, 199, 201 Caspian Sea, 10, 114; Caspian Sea Initiative, 118; investment climate, 131; oil reserves, 79, 116; pipeline routes,115, 116, 117, 118, 129; Russian influence, 119; U.S.–Azeri joint military activity, 132 Caspian Sea Basin. See Caspian Sea Caspian Guard Initiative; interagency action, 132; war on terror and, 131–32 Center for Complex Operations, 147



Center for Irregular Warfare (Marine Corps), 147 Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (Naval Postgraduate School), 168 Center of Excellence for Irregular Warfare and SSTR Operations, 147 Central Command (CENTCOM). See United States Central Command Central Intelligence Agency, 101, 157, 201; aid to Syrian rebels, 210 Chad, 86, 89, 90, 97, 168, 193, 204; Article 98 immunity agreement, 91; civil affairs, 93; Medical civic action program, 93 Chechnya, 114, 117; national characteristics of insurgency, 124– 25; Russian invasion 1999, 121 Cheney, Dick, 28, 42, 116; visit to Georgia and Azerbaijan 2008, 134 “Cheney report.” See National Energy Policy Development Group China, 49, 54, 55, 176, 213, 217; African presence, 199; Oil consumption and exclusive supply agreements, 107–8 Civil affairs, 43, 67, 70, 93, 97, 113 Civil-military operations, 62, 64, 88; Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 147 Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, 183 Civilian Rapid Response Corps; lack of Congressional support for, 169 Civilian Reserve Corps, 167, 184; establishment of, 172; lack of Congressional support for, 169; military support for, 171 Civilian Response Corps, 184 Civilian Stabilization Initiative 2008, 171–72, 184 Clausewitz, Carl von, 1, 11, 16, 42, 214 Clinton (Bill) administration, 115, 116, 122; Azerbaijan, 120; Baku-Tbilisi-

Index

301

Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, 118, 121; Oslo peace process, 118 Clinton, Hillary, 105, 192; Philippines visit 2011, 198; Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, 188 Coalition and Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence (Air Force), 148 Cold War, 6, 19, 21, 28, 44, 216; in Africa, 78 Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), 93, 110, 199; “area of interest,” 85; criticisms by Government Accountability Office, 113; forward operating bases, 87; members, 85; mission, 88; origins, 85–86 Conventional war, 3, 4, 5, 17, 20, 23 Conventional military power, 4, 9, 19, 187, 216 Counterinsurgency, 2, 4, 12, 16, 67, 75, 145, 188, 196, 211; Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), 126; Iraq, 10, 14, 205; Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 147; Petraeus, General David and, 10; Vietnam, 5 Counterterrorism, 17, 145, 185, 188; Irregular Warfare and, 186; Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 147 Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund, 199, 210 De la Cruz, Angelo kidnapping, 67 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, 150, 183 Defense Science Board, 9; Summer Study 2004, 138–39; 2004 report on Strategic Communications, 148–49; 2005 study on stability operations, 140–41 Defense Security Co-operation Agency, 154, 155

302

Index

Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 132 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 86, 168 Department of Defense (DoD), 1, 4, 8, 15, 17, 21, 22, 38, 44, 48, 57, 66, 73, 76, 78, 83, 88, 132, 137–38, 147, 188, 218; Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, 183; covert action mandate, 157–61; Global Security Contingency Funds, 191–93; Global Train and Equip Program, 153–56; humanitarian and development operations evaluation by GAO, 193– 94; Operation Enduring FreedomTrans Sahara (OEF-TS), 95; “Section 1206” funding, 153; “Section 1207” funding, 170–72; Security Force Assistance Instruction 2010, 190; USAID co-operation with, 174–75 Department of Defense Decision Directive 1404.10, 183 Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05, 143, 152, 163, 174; details of, 141; bureaucratic implementation, 142 Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, 148 Department of Energy, 80, 131, 132 Department of Social Welfare and Development (Philippines), 63 Department of State, 15, 17, 18, 61, 70, 78, 83, 100, 118, 120, 121, 122, 127, 132, 137, 139, 153, 162, 163, 188, 211; Bureau for Crisis and Stabilization Operations, 189; Bureau of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, 189; Center for Strategic Counterterrorism, 189; Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, 183; Complex Crises Fund, 192; Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), 189; counterterrorism assistance to

Indonesia, 72; development, 96; Global Security Contingency Funds, 191–3; Jemaah Islamiya, 71; Office of the Co-ordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), 42, 152; public diplomacy and, 189; Reconstruction and Stabilization operations, 142; “Section 1206” funding, 153–56; support for U.S. investment in Africa, 199; “Transformational Diplomacy,” 176–80; transnational bureaux, 189; Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), 95 Department of Treasury, 95, 96, 168 Development, 163, 164, 189; antidote to terrorism, 40, 94, 173, 188, 214; Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), 96 Djibouti, 85, 86, 103, 199; access agreement with United States, 87; importance in war on terror, 87; U.S. aid to, 87; USAID office, 87 drone warfare, 18, 103, 205, 211; Authorization for the Use of Military Force 2001, 206; Bush and, 207; civilian deaths, 207; Congressional oversight, 206; controversy over use, 206; International Human Rights Law and, 206; JSOC and, 206, 207; Obama and, 206–11; Pakistan, 207; Yemen, 208 East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI); aims and funding, 93; capacity building, 94; weak states, 94 Eckert, Command Sergeant William, 63, 75 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 96, 111



Energy security, 79, 82, 105, 114, 119, 129, 132, 134; militarization, 106; Obama years, 200–201 England, Gordon, 141, 146, 183 Ennifar, Azouz, 102 Eritrea, 85, 86 Ethiopia, 84, 85, 101, 199; invasion of Somalia 2006; US support for invasion of Somalia, 103 European Command (EUCOM). See United States European Command Failing states. See weak states Fargo, Admiral Thomas, 63, 64, 73, 74 Feith, Douglas, 28, 29, 36, 44; Civilian Reserve Corps support for, 169; 9/11, 25, 26; stability operations, 138–39; “war of ideas,” 37 Foreign Assistance Act 1961, 90, 153, 172 Foreign Internal Defense (FID), 12, 35, 43, 48, 137, 190, 203; Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 147; Philippines, 60, 62, 63, 75; subSaharan Africa, 77, 110, 113 Foreign Military Financing (FMF), 119 Fourth-generation warfare (4GW), 6; irregular warfare and, 7; networkcentric warfare and, 7; psychological operations, 7 France, 2, 106, 107, 204, 211 Franks, General Tommy, 86, 87 Frazer, Jendayi, E., 100, 101, 102, 103 Freedom Support Act 1992, 119–20 Fridovich, Colonel David, 59, 60, 62 “Full spectrum dominance,” 1, 4, 13, 17, 20, 43, 213, 216, 217, 219 Gabon, 106, 109, 111 Galula, David, 37, 41 Gates, Robert, 18, 110; Building Global Partnerships Act, 182; Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, 183; Global Security Contingency Funds,

Index

303

192; Irregular Warfare and, 182, 188; National Defense Strategy 2008, 182; public affairs, 183; Quadrennial Defense Review 2010, 188; “Section 1206” and, 189; Strategic Communications, 183 General purpose forces, 9, 10, 29, 75, 148, 190 Georgia, 10, 15, 35, 114, 115, 136, 168; Al Qaeda presence, 124, 127; Chechen insurgents in, 121; Cheney visit 2008, 134; defense co-operation with United States, 121; Georgia Deployment Program, 195; membership of Council of Europe, 120; membership of Nato (prospective), 120, 133, 196; mujahidin in Pankisi Gorge, 121; Obama and, 195–96; pro-American perspective, 120, 122, 128–29; rose revolution in, 128; Russian invasion 2008 and U.S. response, 133–34; Special Forces in, 126; terrorism, 129; U.S. aid to, 119, 134; United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, 135 Georgia Deployment Program, 195 Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (GSSOP), 129–30, 195 Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), 12, 17, 123, 132, 154; counterinsurgency and, 126; details of, 125–26; interoperability, 127; success of, 127, 128 Ghana, 106, 109, 199, 200 Global Fleet Station, 107 Global Maritime Awareness, 107 Global Posture Review 2004, 45, 109 Global Repositioning Program, 179 Global Security Contingency Funds, 191–93 Global Train and Equip Program, 153–56 Global War on Terror. See war on terror

304

Index

Globalization, 1, 4, 18, 20, 28, 107, 187, 217; conflict and security, 8, 9, 12, 14, 22, 23, 30, 31, 98–99, 162, 185, 188, 214; Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 147; “new wars” and, 6; networked threats and, 7–8; Quadrennial Defense Review 2006 and, 145 Goldthwait, Christopher, 93 Government Accountability Office (GAO), 18, 113; DoD humanitarian and development operations evaluation, 193–94; interagency professional development evaluation, 194–95; Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, 23; Special Forces in war on terror, 160–61; Stability Operations criticisms, 143– 44; Stability and Reconstruction Operations (cross-departmental) report, 180; “Section 1206” and “Section 1207” review, 180–81 Guelleh, President Ismael Omar, 86, 87 Gulf of Guinea, 107; investment climate, 80; military activity, 106; Obama years, 200–201; oil reserves, 78, 79; piracy, 201; US oil imports from, 80, 200 “GUUAM” group (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova), 120 Hadley, Stephen, 41, 42 Hearts and minds approach, 2, 32, 36–39, 41, 217 Heathrow Airport liquid gel plot 2007 Hegemony, 4, 17, 145, 186, 213, 217 Hezbollah, 26, 118, 219 Hizbul Islam, 104–5 House Committee on International Relations, 102, 166, 169 Huddlestone, Vicki, 90 Hybrid wars, 1, 13, 218

Imperialism, 2, 17, 217 Increasing American Jobs Through Greater Exports to Africa Act 2012, 198 Indonesia, 16, 49, 60, 73, 154; co-operation in war on terror, 71–74 Information Operations (IO), 38, 39, 83, 98, 189; graduate-level training in, 39; Quadrennial Defense Review 2006 and, 150; stability operations and, 143 Information Operations Roadmap, 38, 148 Insurgency, 3, 5, 14 Intelligence Oversight Act 1991, 158 Interagency activity, 13, 15, 18, 43, 77, 95, 113, 163, 164, 184, 188, 211, 214; Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, 183; interagency bureaucratic adaption, 193–95; Office of the Co-ordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), 167; “Section 1206” funding, 153–56; “Section 1207” authority, 170; stability operations, 142; Stability & Reconstruction GAO criticisms, 180; USAID and, 174 International Criminal Court (ICC), 91 Interoperability, 67, 127 Inter-state war, 3, 5 Iran, 73, 115, 116, 117; Caspian pipeline routes and, 118; U.S. relationship post-1979, 118 Iraq, 3, 4, 10, 12, 13, 16, 18, 20, 27, 44, 82, 130, 136, 160, 162, 166, 185, 205, 206, 211, 213; insurgency and counterinsurgency, 14; Office of the Co-ordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), 166; “Surge” in, 11, 169; 9/11 and, 14 Irregular warfare, 1, 9, 12, 13, 17, 18, 21, 27, 28, 32, 33, 36, 40, 48, 113, 137, 146, 162, 163, 164, 185, 191, 211, 217,



218; bipartisan support for, 187; colonialism and, 3; counterterrorism and, 186; debate over meaning of, 1–2; Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, 148; Department of State and, 15; fourth-generation warfare and, 7; “full spectrum dominance” and, 4; Gates, Robert, and 182, 188; generic solution for terrorism, 16, 34–35, 76, 214–15; globalization and, 12; Iraq and, 10, 12; Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap, 246–48; Joint Chiefs of Staff and, 188; Joint Operating Concept, 2, 10, 12, 32, 75, 78, 146–47; Mao Zedong and, 3; 9/11 attacks, 4, 10, 12; national strategy, 12; nonmilitary methods, 3, 15, 41; non-state actors, 4; Obama and, 186, 211; official U.S. government definition, 1; origins of U.S. government policy, 29, 32, 46, 48, 75, 78, 88, 137, 144; origins of term, 1; periphery and, 17, 75, 137, 216; Quadrennial Defense Review 2006 and, 146; Rumsfeld support for, 13, 14; in special operations curriculum, 147; United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 15, 78; war on terror on periphery and, 3, 10, 12; weak and failing states, 11 Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 2, 10, 12, 32, 75, 78, 146–47 Islamic Courts Union (ICU), 102; 1994–98, 84; letters to Bush administration, 101; losses in 2007; Opposition to Somali transitional government, 100; re-emergence in 21st century, 99–100 Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 209, 210–11, 218 Janjalani, Abdurajak, 51, 54

Index

305

Janjalani, Khaddaffy, 54, 68, 70 Jemaah Islamiya, 26, 71, 72, 74, 196; Bali attack 2002, 71; connections to bin Laden network, 71 John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 98 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 26, 123, 140, 168, 188 Joint Integrating Concept on Strategic Communications, 150 Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), 157, 201, 205–6; drone warfare, 207 Joint Special Operations Task ForceTrans Sahara (JSOTF-TS), 95 Joint Special Operations University, 148 Joint Special Operations Task ForcePhilippines (JSOTF-P), 62, 63, 64 Joint Task Force 510 (JTF-510), 61, 62, 64 Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Execute Order 2009, 205 Jolo, 64, 65 66, 70 Jones, General James L., 82, 97, 98, 109, 112, 130 Kazakhstan, 116, 121, 131; U.S. aid to, 119, 122; U.S.–Kazakhstan Energy Partnership, 131 Kenya, 85, 109, 199, 200; Garissa University attack 2015, 202; Nairobi shopping mall attack 2013, 202 Kilcullen, David, 211, 215 Krasner, Stephen, 168, 169 Lake Chad Basin, 193, 200 Lebanon, 154, 168, 219 Liberia, 111, 168 Libya, 17, 73, 98, 218; anti-ISIS strikes, 211; Nato intervention, 186, 209–10 Lugar, Senator Richard, 166, 169, 172; civilian reserve corps support for, 171

306

Index

Malacca Strait, 73, 74 Malacca Strait Patrols Initiative, 74 Malaysia, 16, 50, 60, 73, 154, 157; co-operation in war on terror, 71–74 Mali, 89, 97, 109, 111, 157, 200; Article 98 agreement, 91; importance in Pan Sahel Initiative, 91, 204; Operation Serval, 204; support for Pan Sahel Initiative, 91; suspension of US aid, 92; Touareg rebellion and suspension of US aid 2012, 203 Mauritania, 89, 97, 204 Mindanao, 49, 50, 60, 67, 68 Mohamed, Mahathir, 73; meeting with Bush 2002, 72 Morningstar, Richard, 117, 118 Morocco, 95, 98 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), 50, 51, 61, 68, 70, 71; 2008 peace agreement, 76 Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), 50, 51, 61 Moro people. See Bangsamoro people Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, 203 Mozambique, 86, 199 multilateralism, 36, 106, 131, 191, 209; maritime domain, 107 Muslim World Outreach Policy Co-ordinating Committee, 37 Mutual Logistics Support Agreement 2002, 64 Myers, General Richard, 29, 44, 167 Nation building, 3, 21; stability operations and, 39, 141–42 National Defense Strategy 2005, 162 National Defense Strategy 2008, 182 National Defense University, 147, 167; interagency training, 194 National Energy Policy Development Group (“Cheney report”); Caspian Sea, 122; Gulf of Guinea,

106; recommendations of, 79–80, 122 National Intelligence Council, 78, 168 National Islamic Front (Sudan), 83 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism 2006, 136 National Military Strategy (NMS) 2004, 27, 43, 44, 137; strategic communications and, 149 National Security Council (NSC), 14, 26, 41, 118, 149; Deputies Committee and Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, 95 National Security Language Initiative, 177 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, 142, 164 National Security Professional Development Initiative, 195 National Security Strategy (NSS) 2002, 31, 32, 35, 40, 173, 174 National Security Strategy 2006, 162, 171; “Transformational Diplomacy” and, 180 National Security Strategy 2010, 187, 209 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) 2003, 31, 33, 37; “4–D” approach to terrorism, 32–33 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2011, 188 National Strategy for Maritime Security 2005, 107 National Strategy for Public Diplomacy, 150 Nato–Georgia Council, 134 Natsios, Andrew, 163, 166, 173, 174 Naval Postgraduate School, 39, 167, 168, 183 “New wars”, 6, 8, 162 Networked threats, 4, 7–8, 11 Niger, 80, 89, 97, 193, 200, 204; Article 98 immunity agreement, 92; suspension of US aid, 92



Nigeria, 95, 106, 157, 176, 193, 199, 200 9/11 attacks. See September 11 attacks Non-state actors, 4, 9, 14, 20, 28, 43, 145, 189, 198, 209, 216, 217 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 135; Georgian membership, 196; Libyan intervention 2011, 186; Partnership for Peace, 120 Obama administration, 16, 17, 18, 218; aid to Syrian rebels, 210; drone warfare, 206–11; global strategy, 209, 211, 213; interagency professional development, 194–95; Irregular Warfare, 211; Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 209, 210–11; Libya, 209–11; Pakistan, 207; pivot to Asia, 197–98; Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa 2012, 198; Yemen, 208 Obama, Barack, 1, 18, 185, 187, 200, 205; aid to Syrian rebels, 210; continuity with Bush, 211; drone warfare and, 206–11; Georgia, 135, 195–96; global strategy and, 186, 209, 211, 213; Gulf of Guinea energy security, 200; Increasing American Jobs Through Greater Exports to Africa Act 2012, 198; Irregular Warfare and, 186, 211; Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 209, 210–11; Libyan intervention 2011, 186–87, 209–11; “Overseas Contingency Operations,” 185, 205; Pakistan, 207; periphery and, 195–205; Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23, 190; sub-Saharan Africa security, 199–200; targeted killing, 211; transnationalism and, 186; Yemen, 208 Office of the Co-ordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/

Index

307

CRS), 42, 171, 191; civilian-military training exercise, 168; collaboration with military universities and colleges, 167; deployments in 2007, 168; expansion of projects post-2008, 172; funding and lack of Congressional support, 168, 169; interagency management role, 167; interagency staff, 168; military support for, 167; origins and mandate, 164–67; permanent authority for, 172; pilot projects 2005, 168 Oil: Caspian Sea, 116, 122; diversification of supply, 79, 80, 116, 117, 119, 122, 132; “free market access,” 107–8; in Gulf of Guinea, 78; offshore security, 106 Operation Enduring Freedom, 47, 77 Operation Enduring Freedom-the Philippines (OEF-P), 12, 17, 47, 48, 65, 68, 70, 71, 75; effectiveness of civil-military operations, 197; winding down of, 196–97 Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), 12, 77, 95, 110 Operation Obangame Express, 200 Operation Timber Sycamore, 210 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 121, 123 “Overseas Contingency Operations,” 185, 205 Pace, General Peter, 44, 109, 123, 124, 155, 162; civilian reserve corps support for, 171 Pacific Command (PACOM) see United States Pacific Command Pakistan, 82, 154, 157, 205, 211; Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), 207; number of drone bombings 2009–13, 207

308

Index

Pankisi Gorge, 114, 128; Chechen insurgents, 127; mujahidin in, 121, 123–24, 125; Russian intervention, 126, 127 Pan Sahel Initiative, 82, 164; Article 98 immunity agreements; civil affairs component, 93; funding and length of program, 90, 94; goals, 89; Mali as key state, 91, 204; member states, 90; origins, 88–89; public affairs, 93; train-and-equip component, 89–90 Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism (PREACT), 199 Pascual, Carlos, 165, 168 Patrick, Stewart, 165, 169 Patterns of Global Terrorism: Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI), 85; Georgia and Pankisi Gorge, 123; 2000, 121; 2002, 85; 2003, 51 Peña, Federico, 118, 119 Periphery, 1, 3, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 25; as testing ground for irregular warfare, 12, 137; methods and objectives, 11, 82; Obama and, 195–205; Operations, 11–12; preventive counterterrorism, 15, 77, 82, 83, 97; success of IW, 216; Special Forces/ special operations forces, 10; war on terror, 15, 185 Petraeus, General David, 10, 13, 205 “Phase Zero,” 97–98, 99, 107, 110 Philippines, 10, 15, 16, 35, 77, 78, 114, 120, 137, 154, 157, 193, 196, 211, 215, 216; Ad Hoc Joint Action Group, 68, 70; Agreement on Enhanced Defense Co-operation 2014, 198; Bilateral Defense Policy Board, 64; Chinese security threat to, 58; civil affairs, 67, 70; civil-military operations (CMO), 62, 64; combined joint exercises (US-Philippines), 67; constitutional restrictions on foreign forces, 56,

60, 65; counterinsurgency and, 63, 75; foreign internal defense in, 60, 63, 75; interoperability, 67; Joint Special Operations Task ForcePhilippines, 63; Light Reaction Company; Major non-Nato military ally, 66; medical civic action programs in, 63; Military Bases Act 1947, 56; Military information support teams, 63; Mobile Training Team, 58; Mutual Defense Board, 56; Mutual Defense Treaty 1951, 56; Mutual Logistics Support Agreement 2002, 64; offensive U.S. combat role, 65; pivot to Asia and, 197–8; postcolonialism in, 75; Special Forces in, 58, 59, 62; U.S. colony, 48–49, 54, 55; U.S. military bases, 48, 54, 56; U.S. security assistance package 2001, 61; Visiting Forces Agreement 1998, 64 Piracy, 73, 105, 106, 107 Population-centric approach, 2, 3, 31, 47, 217 Porous borders, 77, 82, 88, 131, 199, 203–4 Powell, Colin, 3, 42, 67; Office of the Co-ordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), 166 Proliferation Security Initiative, 73 Psychological operations, 36, 39; Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 147; Quadrennial Defense Review 2006 and, 150; SOCOM and, 39; training, 98 Psychological warfare. See psychological operations Public affairs, 93, 183 Public diplomacy, 96, 189 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 2010, 188–89



Quadrennial Defense Review 1997, 20 Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, 22, 23, 24, 29, 31, 44; Rumsfeld and, 23; Strategic Communications and, 148; terms of reference, 22 Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, 29, 108, 146, 156, 159; asymmetric operations, 145; Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap, 151–2; globalization, 145; Information Operations, 150; influence of senior policy makers, 144; interagency partnerships, 145; irregular warfare, 145; Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap, 146–48; psychological operations, 150; stability operations, 145; Strategic Communications (SC), 150; Strategic Communications Execution Roadmap, 147–51; transnational challenges, 145 Quadrennial Defense Review 2010, 188, 219 Ragsdale, Marguerita, 87 Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), 73–74 Remler, Philip, 124 Revolution in Military Affairs, 14, 20, 21, 162 Rhodes, Ben, 213 Ricciardone, Frank, 67 Rice, Condoleezza, 30, 41, 42, 135, 169; civilian reserve corps support for, 171; 9/11 and, 24, 25; National Security Strategy 2002, 31; Office of the Co-ordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), 170; Saakashvili and, 128, 133–34; “Transformational Diplomacy,” 176–80 Richardson, Bill, 119, 121 Rodriguez, General David, 204–5

Index

309

“Root causes” of terrorism, 32, 33, 34, 37, 75, 95, 163, 185, 192, 214 Rumsfeld, Donald, 4, 9, 14, 17, 18, 21, 42, 59, 87, 137, 158, 162, 188, 215; asymmetry, 22, 24, 182; Georgia, 123, 127; globalization, 22, 23; “global insurgency,” 136; “Global War on Terror,” 27, 136; ideological warfare, 37; Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), 157, 158; military bases, 44; 9/11, 24, 25; Office of the Co-ordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), 170; PACOM theater plan approval, 60, 72; periphery and, 27; Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 and, 23; regime change in Iraq, 13; Regional Maritime Security Initiative, 74; rejection of counterinsurgency in Iraq, 13; resignation and departure ceremony, 182; “Section 1206” funding, 155; “Section 1208” funding, 153; SOCOM and, 28; Special Forces, 29, 156–61; stability operations and, 140; Strategic Communications and, 149; support for AFRICOM; support for IW, 13, 14; “surprise” in national security, 22, 25; unilateralism and, 36; visit to Djibouti and Ethiopia; visit to Kazakhstan 2004, 131; “war of ideas,” 37; “War on Terrorism Execute Order” 2003, 157 Russia, 115, 116, 117, 120, 211, 217; Caspian Sea, 119; invasion of Chechnya 1999, 121; invasion of Georgia 2008 and U.S. response, 133–34; invasion of Ukraine 2014, 219 Rwanda, 40, 86, 111 Saakashvili, Mikheil, 128, 133–34 Saddam Hussein, 13, 14; 9/11 and, 25

310

Index

Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, 90, 216; name change and merger with Al-Qaeda, 203 São Tomé and Principe, 80, 106, 109 Saudi Arabia, 51, 115, 116 “Section 1206” funding, 153–56, 170, 184, 189, 196; extension through 2017, 190; GAO review of, 180–81; impact, 190–91; Inspectors General Report 2009, 155–56, 190; permanent mandate (“Section 2282”), 191; stability operations and, 190 “Section 1207” funding, 169, 184, 193; expiration and replacement with Global Security Contingency Funds, 191–92; GAO review of, 180–81; origins and purpose, 170; projects in 2006–7, 170 “Section 1208” funding, 153, 170 Security Governance Initiative, 200 Security Strategy for East Asia (1998), 58 Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa (1995), 78 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 166; civilian reserve corps support for, 171; report on civilian response capabilities, 169 September 11, 2001, attacks, 4, 9, 19, 20, 30, 31, 40, 44, 59, 120, 205, 213, 216, 217; Afghanistan and, 25; attack on Pentagon, 123; catalyst for development of irregular warfare, 9, 44, 137; Georgia, 123; hijackers, 34; Iraq and, 14, 25; periphery and, 15; Sub-Saharan Africa, 82; weak states, 165. Shevardnadze, Eduard, 117, 120, 121, 122, 123, 127, 133; visit to Washington, October 2001, 125 Singapore, 73, 74 Somalia, 16, 40, 77, 88, 99, 157, 185, 199, 206, 216; African Union

Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 105; Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) mid-1990s, 84–85; alleged al-Qaeda presence, 100–101, 103; Al-Shabaab, 104, 105; “assertive multilateralism,” 78; border dispute with Ethiopia, 84; CIA in, 201; Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, 85; Ethiopian invasion of, 102; Islamic Courts Union (ICU), 84, 99–100; JSOC in, 201; Obama years, 201–2; Ogaden dispute, 100; Oromo separatism, 100; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report on Al-Qaeda in Somalia and Yemen, 201–2; transitional government mid-2000s, 100, 102; US-backed peacekeeping force in, 103; US support for post-2008 government, 105 South East Asia Regional Training Center for Counterterrorism, 73 South Ossetia, 114, 133 Spain, 49, 55, 106, 107 Special Forces/special operations forces, 10, 12, 47, 48, 54, 70, 115, 132, 138, 142, 190; covert operations in war on terror, 156–61; Downing review 2005, 158–59; funding and expansion, 159–60; Gates’ support for, 183; Georgia, 126; Government Accountability Office (GAO) criticisms off, 160–61; Philippines, 58, 59, 62, 63, 63, 64, 65, 75; Obama and, 205–6; Operation Ultimatum, 70; Sub-Saharan Africa, 88, 90, 95; Joint Special Operations Task ForceTrans Sahara (JSOTF-TS), 95 Special Operations Command (SOCOM) see United States Special Operations Command Special Operations Command-Pacific (SOCPAC), 59, 60–61



Stability operations, 32, 39–41, 43, 83, 188, 191, 214; Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, 183; Combined Joint Task ForceHorn of Africa, 143; Government Accountability Office criticisms of, 143–44; Information Operations and, 143; Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 147; Joint Operating Concept for Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, 143; Quadrennial Defense Review 2006 and, 145; post2004, 137–44; purpose, 141; wholeof-government approach, 143 Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR). See stability operations State-based threats, 4, 28, 43, 44, 145, 189, 196, 216; Iraq as, 13 Strategic Communications (SC), 146, 183, 188; Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 and, 148; Quadrennial Defense Review 2006 and, 150 Strategic Communications Execution Roadmap, 147–51 Strategic Communications Policy Co-ordinating Committee, 37 Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa 2012, 198 sub-Saharan Africa, 10, 15, 17, 35, 77, 114, 137, 195; Africa Partnership Station 106–7; “arc of instability,” 82; capacity building, 77, 82, 93, 95, 200; development, 96; economic growth, 199; energy security, 106; foreign internal defense, 77, 110, 112, 199; geopolitical importance, 78, 79, 80, 105, 112; Global Fleet Station, 107; human security, 215; Information Operations, 83, 98; interagency activity, 95; investment

Index

311

climate, 79, 80, 82; Islamic militancy before 9/11, 83–85; offensive action in, 77; “Phase Zero,” 97–98, 107, 110; porous borders, 77, 82, 88; preventive action, 82, 83, 97; public diplomacy, 96; Special Forces, 88; stability operations, 83; Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa 2012, 198; train-and-equip programs, 83; transnational security challenges, 198; weak states, 77, 82, 110, 112 Sudan, 73, 124; Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, 85; FBI visit to, 84; Osama bin Laden and Afghan War veterans in, 83; Statesponsorship of terror, 83; Support for Saddam Hussein, 83 Syria, 157; aid to rebels, 210; U.S. military advisors, 211 Taliban, 9, 27, 207; bin Laden and, 30; sponsorship of terrorism, 30 Tanzania, 85, 199 Tenet, George, 123, 149 Terrorism: energy security and, 79, 115; 1983 Beirut bombing, 30; statesponsorship of, 29–30, 31, 33; as transnational threat, 10, 11, 15, 29, 30, 32, 78, 82, 88, 107, 185, 186 Thailand, 74, 198 Togo, 80, 106 Train-and-equip programs, 32, 35–36, 43, 83, 89–90, 110, 114, 125, 129, 137, 189–90 “Transformational Development,” 173–74, 184 “Transformational Diplomacy,” 176–80, 184, 188; diplomatic repositioning, 178, 179; foreign languages and, 177; Foreign Service Curriculum, 177, 178; S/CRS and, 179 Transnationalism, 8, 14, 28, 44, 90, 105, 131, 132, 152, 186, 187, 190,

312

Index

193, 196, 209; Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept and, 147; terrorism and, 10, 11, 15, 29, 30, 32, 78, 82, 88, 106, 107, 217 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), 97, 164, 199, 204; criticisms by Government Accountability Office, 113; member states, 95; origins, 94–95; public diplomacy and, 96 Tunisia, 95, 98, 109, 200 Turkmenistan, 116, 121; U.S. aid to, 119 Uganda, 86, 109, 199 “Under-governed space.” See ungoverned space “Ungoverned space,” 33, 34, 43, 44, 73, 82, 91, 97, 109, 114, 115, 124, 128, 132, 147, 152, 153–54, 160, 204 Unified Command Plan 2004, 29, 159 Unilateralism, 15, 36, 217–18 “unipolar moment,” 19, 216 United Kingdom, 106, 107, 115, 211 United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), 18, 105, 112, 113, 183, 199, 204; Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, 110; Department of State involvement in, 110; headquarters in Stuttgart, 111; “holistic” mandate, 110; lack of consultation, 111–12; origins, 108–9; Rumsfeld support for, 109; unpopularity in Africa, 110; USAID involvement in, 110 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 17, 18, 87, 94, 162, 163, 168, 217; CivilianMilitary Co-operation Policy, 175; Fragile States Strategy, 173–74; IW and, 15; Joint Policy Council with Department of State, 173; Military Policy Board, 174; Office of Military Affairs, 174–75; Office

of Transition Initiatives, 189; Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 2010, 188; “Transformational Development,” 173–74, 184; weak states, 173 United States Army, 4, 41, 126; stability operations and, 40; Field Manual on Counterinsurgency (FM 3–24), 10–11 United States Central Command (CENTCOM), 26, 27, 86, 98, 108, 110, 132 United States European Command (EUCOM), 18, 82, 93, 98, 108, 110, 126, 130, 132; maritime security conferences, 106 United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, 135, 195 United States Naval Forces Africa, 107 United States Pacific Command (PACOM), 18, 47, 50, 58, 60, 64, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 108, 196 United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM), 17, 18, 75, 205; psychological operations, 39; role in war on terror, 28–29, 157, 160; Rumsfeld and, 28; Irregular Warfare directorate, 148 USS Mount Whitney, 86, 87, 88 Vickers, Michael, 148, 160 Vietnam, 4, 5 Visiting Forces Agreement 1998, 57, 64 Wald, General Charles, 97, 98, 106 “war of ideas,” 37, 38, 149, 188; in Philippines, 62 Waltemeyer, Colonel Robert, 126, 127 War on terror, 3, 9, 12, 47, 59, 75, 76, 83, 114, 185, 211, 215; Caspian Guard Initiative and, 132; Djibouti, 87; as global in scope, 25, 26, 27, 159–60, 205–6, 211; “global



insurgency,” 136, 214; “Global War on Terror,” 27, 47, 136; Iraq and, 27; Islamic militancy and, 136; Joint Special Operations Command and, 157–59; “Overseas Contingency Operations,” 185; Southeast Asia in, 71; Special Forces role in, 156–61 War on terror on the periphery. See periphery Weak states, 9, 11, 16, 31, 32, 35, 39, 144, 154, 163, 164, 165, 184, 188, 189, 190, 193, 209, 211; cause of terrorism, 33, 180, 185, 215; East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative, 94; Mali, 203–4; 9/11 and, 165; Philippines, 62, 75; Sub-Saharan Africa, 77, 78, 82, 110, 112 “Transformational Diplomacy” and, 176; USAID and, 173 Westphal, Michael, 80, 86 Whelan, Theresa, 95, 96, 97, 107

Index

313

“Whole of government approach,” 32, 41–43, 75, 137, 163, 180, 185, 187, 188, 192, 196; reconstruction and stabilization operations, 42, 142; stability operations, 143; Whole of Government Planning for Reconstruction and Stabilization Course (National Defense University), 194 Wolfowitz, Paul, 26, 28, 44, 64; Shevardnadze visit to Washington 2001, 125 Wurster, Brigadier General Donald, 59, 60, 61 Wynne, Michael, 138–9 Yamamoto, Donald, 101, 103 Yemen, 85, 154, 185, 205, 206, 211; drone warfare in, 208 Zamboanga city, 51, 60, 61, 64, 65 Zedong, Mao, 3, 41 Zenawi, Meles, 100, 101, 102, 201