Fulfilling the Sacred Trust: The UN Campaign for International Accountability for Dependent Territories in the Era of Decolonization 1501752707, 9781501752704

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FULFILLING THE SACRED TRUST

FULFILLING THE SACRED TRUST

THE UN CA M P A I GN FO R IN T E R N A T I O N A L ACCO U NT A BI LI T Y F O R D E P E N D E N T TER R I TO R I E S I N T H E E R A O F DE C O L O N I Z A T I O N

Mary Ann Heiss

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS Ithaca and London

 Copyright © 2020 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 2020 by Cornell University Press Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­Publication Data Names: Heiss, Mary Ann, 1961–­author. Title: Fulfilling the sacred trust : the UN campaign for international accountability for dependent territories in the era of decolonization / Mary Ann Heiss. Description: Ithaca [New York] : Cornell University Press, 2020. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020007239 (print) | LCCN 2020007240 (ebook) | ISBN 9781501752704 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781501752711 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: United Nations—­History—20th ­century. | Decolonization. | Non-­self-­governing territories. | Self-­determination, National. Classification: LCC JV151 .H45 2020 (print) | LCC JV151 (ebook) | DDC 341.2/8—­dc23 LC rec­ord available at https://­lccn​.­loc​.­gov​/­2020007239 LC ebook rec­ord available at https://­lccn​.­loc​.­gov​ /­2020007240

 For CEW

Contents

Introduction: ­Toward International Accountability for All Dependent Territories 1 1. Laying the Groundwork: International Interest in Non-­Self-­Governing Territories

18

2. Fits and Starts: The Contours of International Accountability Emerge

36

3. Orga­nizational Foundations: The Committee on Information Becomes Operational

60

4. Rhe­toric and Routine: The Last Vestiges of Western Dominance

82

5. Taking Off the Gloves: New UN Activism in the Chapter XI Territories

104

6. Power Shifts: The Full-­On Drive for Accountability

132

7. Crossing the Rubicon: Proponents of Accountability Take Control

160

8. Activism Triumphant: Achieving International Accountability for All Dependent Territories

178

Conclusion: International Accountability Assessed

202

vi ii C onte nts

Acknowl­edgments  207 Notes  209 Bibliography  271 Index  281

FULFILLING THE SACRED TRUST

Introduction ­ oward International Accountability T for All Dependent Territories

When the United Nations was founded in 1945, dozens of states lacked in­de­pen­dent nationhood and ­were thus ineligible to join. Together, they w ­ ere home to 750 million p­ eople, almost a third of the world’s total population. The UN Charter prescribed two dif­fer­ent approaches to such dependent territories. A far-­reaching Trusteeship System governed the colonies of the nations that had lost the First and Second World Wars. Anchored by the power­f ul Trusteeship Council, that system held administering trustees accountable for conditions in the territories u ­ nder their supervision and explic­itly sought to bring t­ hose territories to in­de­pen­dence.1 Only a vague system of reporting, however, covered the colonies of the victorious Allies. Terming t­hese two groups “non-­self-­governing territories” and “administering states,” respectively, Chapter XI of the Charter protected the interests of the latter and did not set in­de­pen­dence as a goal.2 Given the administering states’ dominant role in drafting the Charter, this should not have been surprising. By 1963, only a handful of dependent territories remained. Most of the trust territories had peacefully achieved some form of in­de­pen­dence.3 The course for the non-­self-­governing territories was rockier. While some gained in­de­pen­ dence relatively peacefully, o ­ thers did so only through war. The lit­er­a­ture on decolonization—­the pro­cess by which formerly dependent territories secured their in­de­pen­dence—­generally focuses on e­ ither ­those strug­gles or the colonial 1

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powers’ reactions to them.4 As valuable as t­ hese studies are, they tell us only half the decolonization story. The other half occurred at the United Nations, where an ever-­growing group of anticolonial activists pushed the organ­ization ­toward a role in the non-­self-­governing territories, which extended well beyond the limits of the Charter and amounted, in the words of David A. Kay, to “institutionalized international accountability.”5 The UN accountability system developed gradually. The First General Assembly took the initial step when it established a committee to examine the information the administering states w ­ ere to transmit u ­ nder the terms of Chapter XI of the Charter. ­Those states ­were able to limit the reach of what ultimately came to be known as the Committee on Information from Non-­ Self-­Governing Territories by insisting that its membership be equally balanced between administering and nonadministering states even though such a configuration did not reflect the organ­ization’s overall makeup. They also ensured that the committee never acquired the sort of powers that ­were vested in the Trusteeship Council. So while its discussions over the years often included harsh anticolonial rhe­toric and proposals for greater international accountability for dependent territories, its tangible accomplishments w ­ ere 6 meager. And the ability of the Western states to control the General Assembly through the mid-1950s prevented more robust action t­ oward international accountability in other UN forums.7 ­After 1955, though, the g­ reat powers’ hold over the United Nations began to erode as formerly dependent territories used the membership that inhered in their in­de­pen­dent nationhood to push the organ­ization ­toward activism on issues that ­were impor­tant to them.8 International accountability for non-­self-­ governing territories was one of t­ hose issues. India was a leading force in this effort from the start. Other states joined it as they achieved in­de­pen­dence.9 By 1960, they attained the ability not only to shape the General Assembly’s agenda but also to determine its leadership. In February 1960, Ghana’s Alex Quaison-­Sackey was elected chair of the Committee on Information, just three years ­after his nation had ceased to be a subject of its consideration. (In 1964, he became the Assembly’s first black African president.) Sixteen months ­later, Burma’s U Thant became the third UN secretary-­general and the first non-­European to hold the position, a testament to the growing power of the Asian, African, and Latin American member-­states within the organ­ization. The same changes in the United Nations’ makeup that allowed for the ascension of Quaison-­Sackey and Thant also made the establishment of meaningful accountability for dependent territories pos­si­ble. Admission of seventeen former dependent territories in 1960 permanently shifted the balance in the General Assembly and guaranteed the developing states’ ability to set the

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organ­ization’s f­ uture course. Not surprisingly, international accountability was one of their highest priorities. In December 1961, forty-­three Asian and African nations pushed for approval of Resolution 1514 (XV), the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples, which condemned “colonialism in all its forms and manifestations” and declared that “all ­peoples have the right to self-­determination.” A year l­ater, thirty-­eight of t­ hose states co-­sponsored Resolution 1654 (XVI), which created a power­ful entity, the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples, to put the declaration into practice. The final step in the drive for international accountability came in 1963, when the Assembly dissolved the Committee on Information and vested all UN authority for dealing with nontrust dependent territories in what was known informally as the Decolonization Committee. This move established essentially parallel institutions to deal with the remaining dependent territories and initiated a new chapter in the UN role in facilitating decolonization.10 Fulfilling the Sacred Trust considers the drive to attain international accountability for dependent territories against a variety of con­temporary contexts and should be seen as a complement to more geo­g raph­i­cally focused accounts of decolonization. One of its strands traces the intricacies of the accountability campaign itself, dissecting its key ele­ments, justification, pro­gress, and ultimate triumph. At heart, that campaign sought to extend to the United Nations the same sorts of powers regarding the non-­self-­governing territories as applied to the trust territories: the authority to determine both when a par­tic­u­lar territory was non-­self-­governing and when it ceased to be so; requiring the administering states to transmit full information about po­liti­cal as well as economic, social, and educational pro­gress; and the right of the United Nations to receive petitions and hear petitioners from the non-­self-­governing territories and to send official del­e­ga­tions to them. To ensure that t­ hese conduits for administering state accountability w ­ ere in fact being used, activists also sought repeatedly—­and ultimately successfully—to redress the weaknesses of the Committee on Information. The pitched b­ attles that the campaign for international accountability for dependent territories engendered between the administering states and their allies, on one side, and the increasingly vocal and numerically expanding anticolonial UN majority, on the other, constitute a second strand interwoven throughout the following chapters. The victors in the Second World War that drafted the UN Charter saw the organ­ization as a vehicle for protecting their own national interests, interests that included far-­flung empires. To them,

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drafting the Charter in ways that ­limited the UN role in the nontrust dependent territories and falling back on that narrow conception when faced with challenges from the anticolonial faction in the General Assembly therefore made perfect sense. Anticolonialists at the United Nations, of course, saw ­things differently. For them, denying the p­ eoples of the nontrust dependent territories international supervision simply ­because the states that administered them had won the war was wrong. Achieving international accountability thus became a moral imperative to rectify the injustice perpetrated at San Francisco and demonstrate to the non-­self-­governing territories that the world cared no less about them and their pro­g ress ­toward in­de­pen­dence than it did about the territories placed ­under the Trusteeship System. Although the drive for international accountability for dependent territories was centered at the United Nations, a variety of outside trends and developments came together to shape its outcome; together, they comprise a third strand woven throughout the chapters to come. One of t­hose international developments was the Cold War, which pitted the Soviet Union and its Eastern Eu­ro­pean satellites against the US-­led ­Free World and played out eco­nom­ ically, po­liti­cally, and militarily throughout Eu­rope, Latin Amer­i­ca, Asia, the ­Middle East, and Africa. It also made its way into the United Nations, where each side sought to use the organ­ization as a platform for criticizing the other. Colonial questions at the United Nations, and specifically efforts to achieve international accountability, thus became a Cold War ­battle ground, with the Soviet bloc using the existence of colonialism and the lack of real UN power to end it as a way of discrediting the West and currying f­ avor with the developing world, where support for accountability was deepest. US efforts to use Moscow’s domination of Central Asia, the Baltic states, and even Eastern Eu­ rope as evidence that the Soviet Union was itself an imperialist power largely fell flat. Instead, more often than not—­and most notably ­after the Soviets led the charge in 1960 for a larger UN role in the nontrust dependent territories—­ the Soviet bloc found common cause with the states of Asia and Africa, although that alliance did not mean that the Asian and African member-­states accepted Soviet leadership. On the contrary, as the chapters to come make clear, it was the Soviets who often fell in line ­after the Asians and Africans.11 Additional international context for the campaign to develop a system of international accountability for nontrust dependent territories, as has already been suggested, came from the pro­cess of decolonization. In 1946, eight administering states admitted responsibility for seventy-­two nontrust dependent territories and pledged to transmit information on them in conformity with Article 73(e) of the UN Charter.12 By 1959, eight of t­ hose states had attained in­de­pen­dent nationhood and joined the United Nations: Indonesia (1950);

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Cambodia and Laos (1955); Morocco and Tunisia (1956); Ghana and the Federation of Malaya (1957); and Guinea (1958). Between 1960 and 1963, the trickle of in­de­pen­dence became a torrent, with two dozen former non-­self-­governing territories and another seven trust territories becoming UN member-­states. By the conclusion of the Eigh­teenth General Assembly, former trust and nontrust dependent territories constituted 38 of the organ­ization’s 113 members or just over one-­third of its membership—­enough to block so-­called impor­ tant questions and thus exert considerable sway over the General Assembly.13 More than merely the ability to block mea­sures they opposed, however, what the new nations also gained was the ability to move the UN agenda away from Cold War geopo­liti­cal concerns and the East-­West divide and ­toward the social, economic, and ­human rights issues that the nascent Non-­Aligned Movement came to champion ­after its founding in 1961. ­These issues included the call for international accountability for dependent territories. Administering-­state opposition to international accountability was axiomatic. France and Belgium consistently challenged growing UN activism vis-­à-­ vis their territories and at dif­fer­ent times refused to participate in the work of the Committee on Information.14 Portugal resisted even more strenuously ­after joining the United Nations in 1955; its refusal to admit that it administered any non-­self-­governing territories, in fact, threw the organ­ization into turmoil.15 Rather than considering t­hese militant states, however, this book focuses on how the two most prominent Western nations, the United States and G ­ reat Britain, dealt with the push for accountability. As an administering power ­under Chapter XI of the Charter, the United States initially reported on Alaska, Hawaii, the Panama Canal Zone, and Puerto Rico. While neither the biggest nor the most notorious colonial administrator, it was by far the most power­ful. From the start, Washington a­ dopted a flexible approach to UN interest in the territories it administered and encouraged its allies to do likewise. It resisted w ­ holesale accountability, however, at least ­until that stance was no longer tenable. In a bid to play honest broker at the United Nations, the administrations of Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy all proclaimed their desire to pursue a middle-­ of-­the-­road approach that favored neither side in the evolving b­ attle over mandated accountability for dependent territories. In practice, however, the United States routinely sided with the Western Eu­ro­pean colonial powers. The US position as leader of the ­Free World explains why. As the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union and its satellites made territory and resources increasingly vital, US officials w ­ ere loath to lose access to e­ ither. As a result, the United States undertook a variety of economic, po­liti­cal, and military measures—­some overt, some covert—­designed to prevent the expansion

6 I ntroduct ion

of Communist influence and maximize the number of states aligned with the Western camp. The lit­er­a­ture has covered ­those vari­ous initiatives well, and they are not outlined in detail in the chapters that follow. They do, however, make their way into the discussion at times as context for the US stance at the United Nations on colonial questions in general and accountability specifically, where they explain both the lengths to which the United States was prepared to go to meet perceived challenges and the deleterious—if unintended—­ consequences of the nation’s Cold War–­motivated foreign policy on its relations with the developing world. If geopo­liti­cal concerns ­shaped the US stance on international accountability for dependent territories, the British position was rooted in the nation’s status as the world’s leading colonial administrator. Support for decolonization of the more than three dozen territories on which Britain transmitted information in conformity with Article 73(e) of the Charter was slow to gain traction, particularly following the return of Conservative Party rule in October 1951.16 Two of ­these territories, Ghana and Malaya, joined the United Nations as in­de­pen­dent states in 1957 and immediately lent their voices to the anticolonial cause, including the accountability campaign; nine other former British colonies secured admission between 1960 and 1963. That meant that Britain still administered more than two dozen non-­self-­governing territories when the accountability campaign outlined in this book concluded; the bulk of t­ hose territories had attained in­de­pen­dence by 1968.17 Britain’s approach to UN activism in the nontrust dependent territories sought to protect its national prerogatives while also recognizing l­imited international interest. To that end, British officials moved from l­egal arguments rooted in the Charter through a fervent defense of the nation’s colonial rec­ ord (and concomitant criticism of Soviet colonialism), to eventual ac­cep­tance of a modest UN interest, and fi­nally to active re­sis­tance when that interest challenged what they saw as their colonial authority. Differences between the Foreign Office, responsible for the ­whole of the nation’s foreign relations, and the more narrowly focused Colonial and Dominions Offices complicated British policy t­ oward international accountability. Although the latter dominated for a time, once the activist ele­ment gained control of the General Assembly, all segments of the British government had to admit that re­sis­tance to accountability was futile.18 As the chapters that follow make clear, proponents of international accountability had the upper hand in virtually all re­spects. They certainly had numerical superiority, particularly a­ fter 1960. They also had the better argument, framing their cause as a moral strug­gle based on equal treatment in a way that proved much more appealing than the administering states’ self-­interested

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foot-­dragging. And they had the march of history on their side, as the late 1950s and early 1960s saw a rising consciousness of the need to redress inequities in the global environment. Differences in the way the Charter treated the trust and nontrust territories—­and by extension, the ­people who populated them—­ thus became one part of a larger movement that the administering states and their dwindling number of allies could not hope to forestall. Fulfilling the Sacred Trust builds on and moves beyond the available scholarship on a variety of topics, among them the United Nations and internationalism in general. Existing studies that touch on questions of UN accountability are l­imited in scope and context.19 Deeper treatment of that concept can be found in the lit­er­a­ture on the League of Nations, with Susan Pedersen’s The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire making the best case for the importance of the League’s Permanent Mandates Commission as an early reflection of that ave­nue of thinking. In fact, that volume, while not providing direct parallel coverage to this book, serves as something of a prelude for it, as in many ways the campaign for international accountability chronicled ­here owed its origins to the narrower sense of internationalism that prevailed during the interwar period.20 Yet whereas the League’s Mandate System was never intended to do more than give flight to the idea of international interest in the dependent territories that fell u ­ nder its auspices, proponents of postwar international accountability sought openly to achieve universal in­de­pen­dence.21 Although that outcome was the explic­itly stated goal of the Trusteeship System and the milestone Resolution 1514 (XV), Chapter XI of the Charter mentions only self-­ government. Achieving international accountability, therefore, was a way to extend the goal of in­de­pen­dence to all dependent territories. Exploring the course and ultimate success of the effort to implement accountability for dependent territories demonstrates the extent to which the idea of internationalism had spread by the postwar period and the degree to which the new nations at the United Nations ­were able to achieve their aims.22 It also complements other studies of decolonization at the United Nations that have started filling the historiographical gap in that area, which Wm. Roger Louis noted in 2006.23 This study also adds layers to the historiography of broader postwar international activism by considering the campaign for accountability against other contemporaneous movements to bring the voices and concerns of the underdeveloped world to the fore. One was the drive for Pan-­Africanism. Following the in­de­pen­dence of Ghana in 1957 and the march of decolonization across Africa, the in­de­pen­dent states of the continent increasingly united to champion

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in­de­pen­dence for the remaining dependent territories, expanded economic development assistance, and an end to state-­sanctioned racial discrimination. The April 1958 Conference of In­de­pen­dent African States in Accra, Ghana, brought eight states together; a second gathering in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in June 1960 drew thirteen. In the wake of the major wave of decolonization in the early 1960s, thirty-­two nations came together in 1963, again in Addis Ababa, to found the Organ­ization of African Unity (OAU). The discussions, final memoranda, and resolutions of ­these early gatherings and the founding documents of the OAU, which demonstrated an emerging “African personality in international affairs,” w ­ ere strongly anticolonial; they also roundly denounced South Africa’s racially discriminatory apartheid policy.24 At the United Nations, as Jeffrey James Byrne has argued in another context, the new African nations used the membership in the organ­ization that their own nation-­state status conferred to pre­sent the case for decolonization on behalf of non-­self-­governing ­peoples who other­wise had no voice, exhorting the United Nations to expand its involvement in the nontrust dependent territories and bring new nations to life—­and into the organ­ization.25 Another international activist effort that related to the campaign for accountability for dependent territories was the Non-­Aligned Movement (NAM). Founded in Belgrade, Yugo­slavia, in 1961, the NAM built on the 1955 Bandung Conference in pursuing decolonization, development, and nuclear disarmament. The twenty-­five Asian, African, and Latin American nations in attendance at the Belgrade Conference eschewed the Cold War and promoted their collective identity as inhabitants of the Global South. Believing fervently in the United Nations’ ability to address their concerns, they worked concertedly to push the organ­ization to ease Cold War tensions and achieve nuclear disarmament as well as to eliminate disparities between the developed North and underdeveloped South.26 The same was true of activists who linked the pro­cess of decolonization with the broad concept of h ­ uman rights, and specifically with the universality of the right to self-­determination and national in­de­pen­dence. Failure of ­either the UN Charter or the 1948 Universal Declaration of H ­ uman Rights (UDHR) to elevate self-­determination to a right was a b­ itter pill for anticolonial activists, who sought throughout the period addressed in this book to push the United Nations to rectify that omission by moving beyond the individual rights enumerated in the UDHR ­toward a more collectivist conception that emphasized the rights of groups or states, including the right to self-­determination. Jumpstarting work on the ­human rights covenants, which ­were intended to give teeth to the ­simple enumeration of individual rights contained in the declaration, was one ele­ment of this reformist effort. Another was moving the

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General Assembly beyond the Charter’s recognition of self-­determination as a princi­ple to declaring it an unassailable, universal right, which was ultimately achieved in Resolution 1514 (XV).27 Although all of ­these activist campaigns condemned South Africa’s racist apartheid policy, the discrete drive to eliminate it is also considered in­de­pen­ dently ­here.28 Evolving ­after 1948 to mandate the total segregation of ­every aspect of national life, apartheid generated immediate domestic opposition but only gradual international attention.29 World opposition to apartheid accelerated in the so-­called Year of Africa, 1960, when the combined effects of the decolonization-­induced growth in the United Nations and the brutal Sharpeville Massacre against unarmed protestors brought the situation in South Africa not only into the words of the members of the United Nations but also onto the organ­ization’s agenda. Citing the Charter’s domestic jurisdiction clause, South Africa vigorously rejected vari­ous resolutions over the years condemning apartheid. Calls for ­actual sanctions had more success, but ran headlong into Western state reluctance to go against an impor­tant Cold War ally. Nevertheless, South Africa became increasingly isolated, withdrawing from the work of some of the organ­ization’s specialized agencies and often failing to attend Assembly sessions entirely. Although the details of the long, and ultimately successful, drive to end apartheid do not figure directly in this book, the anti-­apartheid campaign must be noted h ­ ere as one piece of the larger international drive for equality and evidence of the power of global outrage.30 Taken together, ­these movements expressed a deep sense of moral indignation at the inequalities of the postwar world and constituted an effort to work across national bound­aries—­and especially through the United Nations—to eliminate them.31 As the chapters that follow reveal, the campaign for international accountability for dependent territories was part of that larger effort, too, and it painted the p­ eoples of the territories that the nation-­centric system of administration embodied in Chapter XI covered as worse off than ­those who fell u ­ nder UN supervision via the Trusteeship System. They could not directly pre­sent their grievances to the organ­ization. Nor could they submit written petitions or look to UN site visits to expose the conditions ­under which they lived to the General Assembly and larger world. Ensuring such practices was the purpose of the push for accountability, which proponents came to portray in terms of ­human rights, social justice, and moral decency, avenging the subordination at San Francisco of the rights of individuals to the rights of states and designating self-­determination an incontrovertible, universal h ­ uman right.32 By 1960, in fact, they came to see international supervision by the United Nations in ser­vice of in­de­pen­dence as preferable to national supervision by a colonial metropole and gradual pro­g ress t­ oward that end. The

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idea that self-determination should be effected at all costs made accountability a radical, even revolutionary, proposition, as its proponents sought to replace centuries of metropole control of dependent territories with a system of global involvement and responsibility dedicated to universal self-government andin dependentstatehood. By contrast, the US and British responses to the campaign for international accountability for dependent territories were decidedly conservative. Both were rooted in those nations’ postwar self-conceptions. The United States was arguably the driving force behind creation of the United Nations, and a rich body of scholarship has explored how US officials sought to use the organization to serve the nation’s foreign policy goals. Patrick J. Hearden’s comprehensive examination of all aspects of wartime planning emphasizes US hopes that the organization would prevent another global conflict.33 For Stephen Wertheim, the organ ization, and particularly its universalism, was a way to make US global ambitions p to both the US public and the wider world. His detailed and insightful analy sis of US war time planning breaks new histo-riographical ground, particularly when it comes to the importance of selling the nation’s postwar world leadership to domestic audiences.34 Mark Mazower offers a similar appraisal, but in a broader context that places US international designs in conversation with those of the other great powers. Covering more chronological ground than Wertheim, he emphasizes the realism that characterized US thinking about the United Nations, much to the consternation of reformers and idealists.35 Those reformers figure prominently in other accounts of the US role in the United Nations’ founding. G. John Ikenberry, for example, underscores the progressive values that lay at the heart of the US vision for the United Nations, while Elizabeth Borgwardt focuses specifically on how the new organ ization could support broad human rights goals. As both make clear, however, a variety of developments compromised early idealism about the United Nations’ potential.36 As Cold War divisions rent the United Nations apart and dashed hope that it would speak with one voice regarding international issues, US officials came to see the organ ization’s potential as a propaganda platform for putting their global vision to the rest of the world.37 Their message sought to contrast life in the nations of the US- led Western alliance with conditions in the Soviet- led Communist bloc, always to the latter’s detriment.38 Foundational US Cold War documents, from the very public Truman Doctrine to the top- secret NSC-68, made this sort of case.39 So did the public propaganda of the Voice of Amer i ca, the United States Information Agency (USIA), and other entities that sought to sell the United States to the world.40 US officials also made Cold War– oriented propaganda arguments as part of the UN debate over interna-

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tional accountability for dependent territories, particularly a­ fter 1953, when they began a campaign designed to expose the evils of communism and highlight the virtues of Western liberal capitalism. The overriding importance of the Cold War for the US approach to the drive for accountability for dependent territories, however, should not obscure the pockets of opposition to that approach that periodically appeared within US policymaking circles, most prominently among personnel in the State Department’s Bureau of International Organ­izations and other specialized units, as well as within the US del­e­ga­tion to the United Nations. For ­these officials, the nation’s containment-­framed position on international accountability for dependent territories was hidebound and retrograde, tying Washington to out-­of-­touch allies and poisoning its relationship with the states of the developing world. Events would ultimately prove them right.41 British re­sis­tance to international accountability, which was consistent from the L ­ abour government of Clement Attlee through the Conservative governments of Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan, and Alec Douglas-­Home, rested on a traditional, often defensive, foundation. At times, British officials legalistically fell back on the Charter to explain why they could not accept greater UN activism in the nontrust dependent territories. And like US officials, they at times spoke out aggressively against Soviet imperialism in Eastern Eu­rope, the Baltic states, and Central Asia. But by far the biggest ele­ment of their effort to resist accountability sought to dispel misconceptions and downright falsehoods about Britain’s imperial rec­ord and marshal concrete evidence to demonstrate the salutary effects of their colonial administration.42 In other words, what Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher called the British “official mind” sought to sell the inherent goodness of the empire, including its transitory nature, to the United Nations as a way of defusing criticism of British policy and preventing international involvement in colonial affairs.43 This book considers the British pushback against international accountability for dependent territories as a form of imperial propaganda, designed to defend the nation’s rec­ord as a colonial administrator and, while not preserving its traditional role in the colonies, at least guarantee that former colonies would remain solid trading partners, potential allies, and loyal members of the Commonwealth. Admitting a UN right of supervision could drive Britain’s former colonies in another direction and therefore had to be resisted. In thus seeking to preserve the nation’s economic if not po­liti­cal relationships with former colonies, British officials ­were pursuing a conservative policy that put the interests of the metropole ahead of t­ hose of the developing periphery. They ­were also increasingly placing themselves at odds with prevailing international

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sentiment—­and, ultimately, a significant segment of the British population as well.44 The book also explores how the dozens of new nations that joined the United Nations a­ fter the mid-1950s and particularly in and a­ fter the pivotal year of 1960—­a move that John Karefa-­Smart has deemed as impor­tant in signifying national in­de­pen­dence as “a new flag and a national anthem”—­used the platform the organ­ization afforded them to further their national and collective agendas.45 This was especially the case a­ fter East-­West tensions para­lyzed the Security Council and gave the General Assembly, where all UN member-­ states had the same status, an importance far beyond its original intent. In the Assembly, the new nations could go toe to toe with the g­ reat powers, including their former colonial rulers, on an equal footing.46 It was ­there that they and their allies made the case for international accountability. Beginning in 1955, the Asian and African del­e­ga­tions coordinated their work at the United Nations in order to maximize their impact; from 1958 on, African states did the same. The ever-­larger margins that approved the many resolutions that chipped away at the two-­pronged system for managing the dependent territories reflected over time the growth of anticolonial sentiment and support for the idea of true international responsibility for dependent territories far beyond merely the Asian and African del­e­ga­tions. And the ultimate success of the campaign for accountability, as well as growing UN interest in such issues as economic development, racial equality, and h ­ uman rights, revealed how much the pro­cess of decolonization s­ haped the organ­ization’s agenda ­after 1960. In this way, the major role that the Asian and African group played in securing international accountability for dependent territories confirms David A. Kay’s assertion that the United Nations was “more an arena than an actor on the international scene.” It was what its majority powers made it, and by 1963 the majority of states had turned the organ­ization into an agent of decolonization.47 The official rec­ords of the United Nations, available in microfiche form at UN repository libraries throughout the world, provide complete coverage of the drive for accountability in committee and General Assembly debates, as well as written communications from delegates and papers and reports prepared by the Secretariat. ­Those documents make clear how weighty the issue was for all sides—­and how much import it assumed in par­tic­u­lar for the former dependent territories that gained UN membership in and ­after 1960. Votes, at both the committee and General Assembly level, also provide impor­tant win­dows into the growing appeal of international accountability, as the entry of new, anticolonial states tipped the voting balance from the organ­ization’s

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Western found­ers to the states of the developing world. Fi­nally, a multitude of draft and approved resolutions reveals the depth of feeling and commitment to cause that impelled the growing cadre of activists forward. B ­ ecause UN resolutions carry no enforcement provisions, they are often dismissed as unimportant, particularly by t­hose who prize action and tangible, mea­sur­able results. That perspective misses the impor­tant role t­hose resolutions play in conveying the collective sense of the world on a given issue at a given time. As Amy L. Sayward has argued, they constitute a form of “soft power” that should not be ignored.48 The many resolutions related to international accountability for dependent territories prove that point, revealing growing global outrage at the injustice of the two-­track approach to dependent territories that the administering states simply could not resist. Ultimately, the campaign for international accountability can be seen, most broadly, as the clash of two dif­fer­ent conceptions of what the United Nations should be. Opponents of accountability, which included the very Western powers that had drafted the UN Charter, hewed unalterably to a vision of the organ­ization as designed primarily to protect a world they already dominated. For them, preserving peace was the organ­ization’s number one purpose, and it was in no way to infringe on their rights as colonial powers. They pushed for—­and secured—­a Charter that privileged the rights of states over the rights of individuals and a General Assembly that lacked real power. Proponents of accountability took antithetical positions on ­every score. Seeing the United Nations as a vehicle for global reform on behalf of the weak and powerless, they subordinated the elitist, great-­power-­dominated Security Council to the egalitarian General Assembly and advocated relentlessly for the rights of individuals over the rights of states. Proponents of international accountability ­were revolutionaries on a number of levels. They sought not only to overthrow the existing nation-­centered system for colonial administration but also to facilitate the transfer of power in the non-­self-­governing territories from administering metropoles to the indigenous residents. ­These changes would reshape the United Nations in the pro­cess. The very fact that dozens of new nations secured in­de­pen­dence and membership in the United Nations meant that the world that prevailed when the Charter was drafted was not immutable. If the United States, ­Great Britain, and the other administering states could not deny the real­ity of decolonization, they nevertheless waged a concerted—­but ultimately futile—­campaign to limit its effects by preserving their national prerogatives in the dependent territories ­under their control and their domination of the organ­ization they had created. In this way, t­ hose states resembled what classical realism dubs “status quo” powers, stubbornly clinging

14 I ntroduct ion

to what the proponents of international accountability for dependent territories considered discredited and reactionary positions even as the world changed around them.49 The eight chapters of Fulfilling the Sacred Trust provide a chronological account of the campaign for international responsibility for non-­self-­governing territories. Chapter 1 takes the concept of internationalism back to World War I and the League of Nations Mandate System, which undertook the first, albeit ­limited, effort to legitimize global orga­nizational involvement in dependent territories, and carries it through World War II and the San Francisco Conference. The Anglo-­American discord that marked war­time discussion of international involvement in colonial ­matters, which was fueled by British refusal to be held accountable for the empire, hints at the periodic transatlantic disagreement that surfaced in the years to come. US capitulation to the British position also reveals a tendency to lean t­oward the Western Eu­ro­pean allies when it came to the idea of international involvement in colonial questions. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the First General Assembly’s ­handling of the nontrust dependent territories, including its initial steps beyond the narrow confines of the Charter. The small victories that the proponents of a real UN role in the nontrust dependent territories achieved in 1946 ­were a long way from true international accountability, but they ­were an impor­tant start down that road and an indication of ­things to come. Taken together, chapters 2, 3, and 4 analyze the first phase of the drive for accountability and correspond roughly to the period of Western domination of the United Nations. The international reformist efforts that complemented that drive had not yet gained much steam, so much of the story covered in ­these chapters is UN-­focused. Chapter 2 deals with the three one-­year terms (1947–1949) of the Committee of Information (although it actually operated ­under a series of other names for this period). A variety of proposals for accountability was introduced during t­ hese years, but solid Western state domination of the General Assembly, as well as t­ hose states’ manipulation of UN procedure, prevented much of substance from being accomplished. The importance of the Cold War in shaping discussion of the UN role in the nontrust dependent territories is clear even in this early period, as the Soviet bloc worked to use colonialism as a propaganda weapon against the West across UN forums, but with ­little direct US response. The third chapter details the first three-­ year term (1950–1952) of what fi­nally came to be called the Committee on Information in 1951. As this chapter makes clear, activists w ­ ere already bypassing that ineffectual body and making their case in the Fourth Committee,

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where their numerical superiority afforded them power that they could not achieve on the balanced Committee on Information. Although the General Assembly had approved a number of mea­sures for accountability by the end of 1952, their recommendatory nature allowed the administering states to ignore them without penalty. The Committee on Information’s second three-­ year term (1953–1955) marks the temporal par­ameters of chapter 4. A new presidential administration in Washington coincided with the start of this period, signaling stronger—­yet largely ineffective—­US anti-­Soviet rhe­toric at the United Nations and a more overt effort to use the organ­ization for propaganda purposes. The Cold War’s expansion beyond Eu­rope and the first expression of developing world consciousness in the Bandung Conference brought colonial questions at the United Nations generally, and the accountability campaign specifically, to the forefront. So did the initial stirrings of other reformist campaigns and the admission at the very end of this period of sixteen new UN member-­states, a development that laid the groundwork for a dramatic expansion in the UN role in the nontrust dependent territories. Chapters 5 and 6 address the second phase of the campaign for international accountability for dependent territories. They cover, respectively, the third term (1956–1958) and the first two years (1959–60) of the fourth term of the Committee on Information, years during which power at the United Nations shifted significantly. As chapter 5 demonstrates, the issue of UN authority to determine a par­tic­u­lar territory’s status dominated the committee’s third term, occasioned by the claim of new member-­states Portugal and Spain that they ­were not administering powers ­under the terms of the Charter. Repeated efforts through 1958 to empower the United Nations to pronounce such claims false and declare specific territories non-­self-­governing fell victim to the Western states’ ability to manipulate procedure. The outrage sparked especially by Portugal’s stance, however, boded ill for the long-­term success of such efforts, particularly given the growth in the United Nations’ anticolonial membership, which began in earnest during the years this chapter covers and continued on well past them. By the end of the period covered in chapter 6, that growth had resulted in anticolonial control of the General Assembly, and with it approval of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­ eoples, which put the United Nations in the decolonization business. At the same time, the anticolonial ele­ment sought to neutralize the role of the East-­West conflict in ­matters related to decolonization, thus thwarting Soviet efforts to claim control of the accountability campaign and generally rejecting the US campaign against Soviet colonialism. In this way, as the chapter makes clear, the developing world was beginning to wrest

16 I ntroduct ion

control of the United Nations from the Western states that had founded it and to set the organ­ization on a more universalist course than t­hose states had ever intended. The remainder of the book carries the story of international accountability for dependent territories through to its culmination. Chapter 7 covers the momentous events of 1961, when implementation of the colonialism declaration dominated UN discussion of colonial questions. With the anticolonial faction hewing tightly to the neutralism the newly founded Non-­Aligned Movement symbolized, neither US efforts to paint the Soviets as imperialist, undertaken now by a Demo­cratic administration in Washington, nor Soviet appeals for support for their attacks on US neo­co­lo­nial­ism gained much traction. Consequently, the anticolonial faction worked doggedly to ensure that the Decolonization Committee embodied an internationalist vision that sided with neither East nor West but sought instead to assign primacy to the interests of the ­peoples of the nontrust dependent territories. The first two years of the Special Committee’s life, which ­were also the last two of the Committee on Information, constitute the chronological scope of chapter 8. ­These years marked the full achievement of international accountability for dependent territories, as the Decolonization Committee undertook its work with powers that w ­ ere virtually identical to t­hose that the Charter had assigned to the Trusteeship Council. Its focus on the developing world also mirrored other concurrent UN developments and signaled the continued evolution of the organ­ization from protecting the status quo and ­toward international reform. Collectively, t­ hese chapters seek to recast our understanding of the pro­cess of decolonization on a variety of levels. While not denying the importance of the local in­de­pen­dence movements that dominate the historiography, they reveal that the institutional context of the United Nations was impor­tant, too, as newly in­de­pen­dent nations transformed the organ­ization from a vehicle for preserving the status quo to an instrument of global change. The chapters that follow also serve as a power­ful reminder that the decolonization-­fueled campaign for international accountability for dependent territories was part of the larger multipronged postwar drive for universal equality. It developed contemporaneously with the campaigns for international ­human rights and racial equality and was one plank of the nonaligned platform. Together ­these movements shifted the international gaze from the East-­West Cold War to North-­ South issues. Imbued with a moral fervor, they appealed to ever-­increasing majorities in the General Assembly and helped to reshape the postwar world. If the bulk of the story told in this book occurs a­ fter World War II, it is impor­tant to note that many of the hallmarks of the campaign for international

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accountability for dependent territories actually had their origins much ­earlier. Institutionally, the League of Nations paid lip ser­vice to the idea that the affairs of dependent territories ­were not the exclusive province of the administering states and paved the way ­toward the full-­blown application of that idea in the de­cades ­after World War II. At the same time, nationalists from Asia to Africa and the ­Middle East agitated for self-­determination and in­de­pen­dence. Their lack of immediate success should not obscure their importance. In connecting the postwar drive for international accountability for dependent territories to t­ hese ­earlier efforts, this book demonstrates continuity across the twentieth ­century even as it illustrates the revolutionary nature of the post1945 period.

C h a p t er  1

Laying the Groundwork International Interest in Non-­Self-­Governing Territories

The League of Nations Mandate System, which undertook supervision of the colonies of the vanquished Central Powers ­after World War I, marked the first application of the idea of international accountability for dependent territories. Applied to only a small number of territories and never designed to facilitate po­liti­cal in­de­pen­dence, the Mandate System nevertheless legitimized the idea that the international community had a responsibility to dependent territories and the p­ eople who inhabited them. World War II provided an opportunity to reaffirm that conviction, but like the League Mandates, the subsequent Trusteeship System, at the insistence of the World War II Allies, applied only to the colonies of the war’s losers. Anticolonial sentiment was sufficiently strong ­after World War II, however, for the UN Charter to make a modest provision for international interest—­ but not a­ ctual involvement—in the dependent territories the Western colonial powers administered. If the sort of interest enshrined in the Charter posed no real threat to the colonial states’ authority, placing Allied-­administered territories u ­ nder even a small degree of international scrutiny laid waste to the proposition that a colony’s affairs ­were the exclusive province of the metropole. By the time the First General Assembly concluded in the fall of 1946, the nonadministering majority had succeeded in moving beyond the confines of the Charter—­and gave ­every indication of continuing to push for broad UN

18



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authority over all dependent territories, not just t­ hose that fell u ­ nder the aegis of the Trusteeship System, as the surest route to in­de­pen­dence. Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which w ­ ere intended to serve as a blueprint for the post–­World War I order, opened the door to international intervention in dependent territories by including a call for “a f­ree, open-­minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims,” with equal consideration for the interests of dependent populations and ­those of the colonial states.1 While nationalists in territories as far-­flung as Egypt, ­Korea, and India believed that what Erez Manela has termed “the Wilsonian moment” meant international support for their dreams of self-­government and in­de­pen­dence, universal decolonization in the wake of World War I was not to be.2 Instead, the League of Nations Covenant, drafted by the victors at the Paris Peace Conference, referred only “to ­those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war [had] ceased to be ­under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them”—­another way of saying the lands stripped from the defeated Central Powers of Germany and the Ottoman Empire. The dozens of territories that the victorious World War I Allies controlled w ­ ere 3 not included. The nine carefully worded paragraphs of Article 22 that sketched out the Mandate System articulated the idea of international responsibility for what ­were described as “­peoples not yet able to stand by themselves u ­ nder the strenuous conditions of the modern world.” Declaring “the well-­being and development of such p­ eoples . . . ​a sacred trust of civilization,” Article 22 called upon the “advanced nations” to administer the vari­ous dependent territories on behalf of the League. Rather than a one-­size-­fits-­all plan, the Covenant called for three dif­fer­ent approaches, which depended on such f­ actors as “the stage of the development of the p­ eople, the geo­g raph­i­cal situation of the territory, [and] its economic conditions.” In the schema developed in the Covenant, in­ de­pen­dent nationhood was a real prospect only for t­ hose territories that had once been part of the Ottoman Empire; it was much less certain for African territories and the South Pacific Islands, which ­were considered far too underdeveloped—­backward, even—to successfully navigate “the strenuous conditions of the modern world.” If “the degree of authority, control, or administration” the mandatory powers ­were to exert depended on the status of a par­tic­u­lar territory, in all cases t­ hose powers ­were to act “on behalf of the League” and to submit annual reports on the territories placed in their charge.4 A Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) was enjoined to evaluate the mandatory powers’ annual reports and advise the League on the mandates in

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general. The PMC, on which the nonmandatory states held a majority, was comprised of recognized colonial experts who acted in an individual capacity rather than as representatives of their own nations. It developed a voluntary questionnaire for gathering information about developments in the mandated territories, which Benjamin Gerig, who went on to become an impor­tant figure in UN-­sponsored decolonization, called “formidable and comprehensive.” Eventually the PMC arrogated to itself the right to consider written (but not oral) petitions from inhabitants of the mandated territories.5 During its twenty-­seven-­year existence, the PMC oversaw the administration of a dozen territories, only one of which (Iraq) attained in­de­pen­dence before the outbreak of World War II. That hardly means that it failed, however, as the Covenant did not envision the Mandate System as a vehicle for actually moving territories t­ oward self-­government, let alone in­de­pen­dence. It was, instead, designed to subject an admittedly small number of dependent territories to unpre­ce­dented international scrutiny. In this way, as Susan Pedersen has argued, the PMC constituted an impor­tant step forward in “open[ing] up imperial rule to an uncontainable wave of scrutiny and ‘talk.’ ” By forcing the international discussion of colonial conditions, even if the territories u ­ nder consideration constituted only a very small part of the dependent world and even if in­de­pen­dence was not the ultimate goal, the League’s Mandate System legitimized the idea that such m ­ atters w ­ ere the concern of the w ­ hole world, rather than merely the Eu­ro­pean colonial powers. Its moves in that direction ­were indeed “uncontainable” and paved the way not only for the much more expansive conception of international accountability that came ­after World War II but also for the pro­cess of decolonization itself.6 Allied war­time rhe­toric hinted at that more expansive conception but masked considerable Anglo-­American discord that continued through the postwar period.7 The August 1941 Atlantic Charter listed among its eight “common princi­ples . . . ​for a better ­f uture” a pledge to “re­spect the right of all ­peoples to choose the form of government ­under which they w ­ ill live.”8 Each signatory to the pledge, however, interpreted it differently. Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill denied that it applied to the British Empire. But lest the world see menace in that stance, he took pains to state before Parliament that the British government had made numerous commitments to self-­government in the colonies that “­were ‘complete in themselves’ and ‘­free from ambiguity.’ ” Although Wm. Roger Louis has revealed that t­ hose commitments w ­ ere instead incomplete and quite ambiguous, British officials tirelessly touted their work on behalf of colonial self-­government, both during and a­ fter the war.9 If Britain’s commitment to self-­government throughout the empire was questionable—­and the p­ eople ­under British administration certainly thought



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it was—­President Franklin D. Roo­se­velt’s certainty of the Atlantic Charter’s universal applicability was not. For him, it constituted an anticolonial declaration of the highest order, and he was prepared, at least early on in the war, to consider international trusteeship in ser­vice to in­de­pen­dence for all dependent territories, including the colonies of his Western Eu­ro­pean allies.10 African Americans at home and colonial nationalists abroad shared Roo­se­ velt’s commitment to universal in­de­pen­dence and now hoped to see achievement of the failed promise of Wilson’s soaring rhe­toric on behalf of ending colonialism.11 The 1 January 1942 Declaration by the United Nations, issued by the twenty-­ six nations then fighting “for victory over Hitlerism,” endorsed all of the princi­ples embodied in the Atlantic Charter and thus enshrined anticolonialism as an Allied war aim. Yet colonial questions never assumed prominence on the agendas of the vari­ous war­time conferences, partly due to the pressure of other issues and partly ­because Anglo-­American differences might disrupt the ­Grand Alliance.12 Instead, the US and British governments worked in­de­ pen­dently to translate their core beliefs on the subject into draft plans for dealing with dependent areas. The complicated issues involved guaranteed that ­those discussions would be drawn out on both sides. And the fundamental differences between each side’s position on key issues boded ill for eventual agreement.13 On the US side, a March 1943 State Department draft “Declaration by the United Nations on National In­de­pen­dence,” which was unequivocal in asserting that all “­peoples who aspire to in­de­pen­dence ­shall be given an opportunity to acquire in­ de­ pen­ dent status,” reflected Roo­ se­ velt’s universalist interpretation of the Atlantic Charter. The president’s one-­time predilection for universal trusteeship for all dependent territories, however, now gave way to two separate approaches. For the remaining League Mandates and the Axis colonies, the draft proposed that the United Nations “assume . . . ​a special responsibility analogous to that of a trustee or fiduciary” to guide the territories ­toward in­de­pen­dence, an idea l­ater codified in the Trusteeship System. In the dependent territories that w ­ ere colonies of the Allied powers, it directed administering states to foster “po­liti­cal, economic, social, and educational advancement,” to implement progressive mea­sures of “self-­government,” and to fix target dates for “full in­de­pen­dence.” The revolutionary idea of a general statement of princi­ples to guide administration of the dependent territories ­under Allied control—­but not all of the specifics contained in the US draft statement—­ultimately made its way into the UN Charter as Chapter XI.14 Internal British discussion of the US proposals raised a host of issues. Supporting universal in­de­pen­dence would only “encourage half-­baked ideas” and

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“separatist tendencies” in the colonial territories, many of which officials described, in culturally revealing language, as “so l­ittle removed from their primitive state that it must be a m ­ atter of many generations before they are ready for anything like full self-­government.” Target dates ­were out of the question as an intrusion on Britain’s national prerogatives. And po­liti­cal pro­ gress should be subordinated to economic and social development.15 Some British officials even went so far as to condemn the “ignorance” that must have prompted US calls for blanket in­de­pen­dence and to advocate “patient” education of their US counter­parts regarding the true nature of the colonial prob­lem. This became an ongoing proj­ect throughout the campaign for international accountability for dependent territories that, as we ­will see, paid generally poor dividends.16 The first opportunity for formal discussion of colonial issues came at Yalta, where even their brief consideration caused Churchill to “ ‘explode.’ ” In a position that reflected long-­standing British sentiment and continued throughout the postwar period, he insisted that “­under no circumstances would he ever consent to forty or fifty nations thrusting interfering fin­gers into the life’s existence of the British Empire.” Ultimately, Churchill assented to including in the Yalta Conference Protocol a brief call for “territorial trusteeship” to be extended to “existing mandates of the League of Nations,” “territories detached from the e­ nemy as a result of the pre­sent war,” and “any other territory which might voluntarily be placed ­under trusteeship,” thereby ensuring that it would not be applied to the colonies of the victorious Allies against their w ­ ill—­and marking what John J. Sebrega has correctly termed “the virtual demise of any hope for a progressive postwar readjustment in the treatment of dependent ­peoples.” Once again, it seemed that a world war would not lead to universal supervision of colonial territories. The sponsors of the planned United Nations Conference—­Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States—­ were to gather before that meeting to flesh out the details of the less-­than-­ universal trusteeship plan.17 As it turned out, t­ hose discussions occurred during the San Francisco Conference rather than before it.18 With no agreed-­upon proposals on which to base consideration of colonial questions, conferees fell back on the US plan for two dif­fer­ent approaches to dependent territories. The remaining League Mandates and the former Italian and Japa­nese territories would be governed by a new Trusteeship System, outlined in Chapter XII of the Charter. In a foreshadowing of the drive for international accountability for dependent territories, Australia and the Philippines proposed that that system apply to all such territories regardless of who administered them. Although fierce—­and predictable—­opposition from Britain and the other Eu­ro­pean colonial pow-



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ers doomed that proposal, Chapter XII (like the Yalta Protocol) provided for the voluntary placement of dependent territories u ­ nder the Trusteeship System “by states responsible for their administration.” As expected, not one of the Western colonial powers took advantage of this opportunity.19 The broad goals of the Trusteeship System, enumerated in Article 76 of the Charter, far exceeded t­ hose of the League’s Mandate System. States administering trust territories ­were to “encourage re­spect for ­human rights and for fundamental freedoms” and “ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial m ­ atters,” thereby signaling that the United Nations would be much more direct in managing the trust territories than the League had been with the mandates. Of even greater import was the call “to promote the po­liti­ cal, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development t­ owards self-­government or in­de­pen­dence as may be appropriate,” in language lifted directly from the 1943 State Department draft. In holding out the prospect of in­de­pen­dent nationhood for the trust territories, Article 76 put the United Nations in the decolonization business, setting it on a course to bring new nations to life.20 Chapter XIII of the Charter, which laid out the powers of the Trusteeship Council (TC), also broke new ground. Unlike the PMC’s voluntary questionnaire, the TC’s was mandatory. Its focus on “advancement” indicated that the administering states’ per­for­mance in the trust territories would be monitored and assessed. And in addition to “consider[ing] reports submitted by the administering authority” based on the trusteeship questionnaire, the TC was empowered to “accept petitions” and undertake “periodic visits to the . . . ​ trust territories,” activities that meant ­actual UN supervision. The reasoning ­behind ­these provisions was that ­there was no substitute for direct knowledge about conditions on the ground in individual territories if the United Nations was to accurately gauge their pro­gress t­ oward the Charter-­stated goal of in­de­pen­dence.21 The general statement on colonial territories that had been a prominent feature of US war­time planning received life as Chapter XI of the Charter, which Sergio Armando Frazão has called “the first normative instrument aiming at a comprehensive regulation of the social phenomenon of colonization.”22 Titled “Declaration Regarding Non-­Self-­Governing Territories” and written in the voice of the administering states, signaling their intention to control the UN role in t­ hose territories, Chapter XI applied the princi­ple of international supervision to the territories of nondefeated nations for the very first time. ­Because it made no attempt to identify or enumerate what w ­ ere described simply as “territories whose ­people have not yet attained a full mea­sure of self-­government,” the administering states ­were left to proclaim

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their responsibilities on their own.23 Article 73 affirmed that the interests of the non-­self-­governing territories ­were “paramount” and instructed the administering powers to foster their “po­liti­cal, economic, social, and educational development.” British opposition doomed Chinese and Soviet efforts to include a call for in­de­pen­dence, and Article 73(b)’s reference only to “­free po­liti­cal institutions” was a blow for believers in the universality of the Atlantic Charter. In a move that Evan Luard has described as “unspectacular but potentially impor­ tant,” section (e) of Article 73 called upon the administering states “to transmit regularly to the Secretary-­General for informational purposes . . . ​statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible.” As developments over the coming years made abundantly clear, far from being potentially impor­tant, this directive was profoundly so.24 If the Charter’s two-­track approach to dependent territories mollified Britain and the other Eu­ro­pean administering powers, it sorely disappointed supporters of universal application of the activist Trusteeship System, who would certainly have shared the assessment of Bernard  J. Firestone that it “left most of the world’s colonized p­ eoples protected by word, but still ignored in real­ity.”25 A host of organ­izations had descended on San Francisco in a desperate—­but ultimately futile—­effort to secure inclusion of a strong anticolonial plank in the UN Charter. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored ­People (NAACP), one of forty-­two organ­izations to serve as official con­sul­tants to the US del­e­ga­tion, led the anticolonial charge, linking the ending of colonialism with the Double V campaign that sought to use African American participation in the war against fascism in Eu­rope to justify efforts to achieve equality at home. As Carol Anderson and ­others have made clear, the NAACP’s efforts to push for an all-­inclusive anticolonialism in the Charter ran afoul of US domestic politics, specifically the racially motivated Jim Crow system, as well as the US tendency to defer to the Eu­ro­pean colonial powers’ insistence that real UN involvement be l­ imited to the territories covered by the Trusteeship System.26 Marika Sherwood’s careful explication of the efforts of activists from the then-­British colony of India, who operated outside the conservative hand-­picked official del­e­ga­tion, and of vari­ous groups from throughout Africa reveals the uphill road they too faced. Many of ­these activists, from India as well as Africa, emerged during the postwar period as both national leaders and impor­tant members of their nations’ UN del­e­ga­tions, using the status that forum gave them to continue to argue for an end to colonialism and more active UN intervention to bring about that eventuality.27 In dismissing Chapter XI as a poor substitute for the sort of real UN involvement they believed the residents of the nontrust dependent territories de-



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served, ­these critics expressed the sort of moral outrage that came to infuse the drive for international accountability. Several glaring shortcomings of the UN role in the nontrust dependent territories, in fact, provided an outline of what became the key ele­ments of that effort. Directing the administering states to transmit information on “conditions” in the non-­self-­governing territories, not “advancement” as was the case for the trust territories, suggested a low threshold of expectations that was unlikely to inspire material pro­g ress. Making no provision for the transmission of information on po­liti­cal conditions or advancement ­toward self-­government, even though administering states had been exhorted to promote “the progressive development of f­ ree po­liti­cal institutions,” effectively absolved the Eu­ro­pean administering powers of their responsibilities for encouraging such development. So did omission of an explicit pledge for in­de­pen­dence or any reference to the protection of h ­ uman rights. And characterizing the transmissions as being for “information purposes” implied that they w ­ ere not subject to the sort of study or discussion that applied to responses to the TC’s questionnaire, which effectively made them worthless. Although champions of a robust UN role in the nontrust dependent territories failed to shape the Charter in any meaningful way, the criticisms they launched at San Francisco and ­later signaled nascent but potent support for UN activism to bring about the in­de­pen­dence of the Chapter XI territories. Britain and the other administering states should not, therefore, have been surprised when the first session of the General Assembly, which got u ­ nder way in London in January 1946, charted a modest but meaningful course for activism outside the bonds of the Charter.28 ­ ecause the Charter provided for no separate body to deal with the territoB ries covered ­under Chapter XI, they w ­ ere to be considered within the confines of the Assembly’s Fourth Committee, which was charged with addressing po­liti­cal and decolonization issues. (Like all UN standing committees, the Fourth Committee included one representative from each member-­state.) Among its first significant o ­ rders of business was a US proposal designed to codify the nebulous Charter-­mandated UN role in the Chapter XI territories. In a speech that harkened back to the State Department’s 1943 proposals, US representative and ­f uture secretary of state John Foster Dulles highlighted the common plight of the dependent territories and insisted that the United Nations directly declare its interest in all of them, not merely t­ hose designated as trust territories.29 Debate about the US proposal crystalized along divisions between the majority of UN member-­states that did not administer territories that fell u ­ nder the auspices of Chapter XI and t­ hose few that did in a manner that only widened in the years to come. Delegates from the nonadministering

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states saw UN discussion of conditions in the non-­self-­governing territories as a demonstration of international support for the aspirations of their ­peoples.30 While not necessarily dismissing such aspirations, representatives of the administering states affirmed the sanctity of the Charter’s distinction between the trust and the nontrust dependent territories in arguing vehemently against such a course.31 The US proposal eventually became a formal resolution drafted by a fifteen-­ member subcommittee that sought to bridge the gap between the administering and nonadministering states.32 To placate the former, it reaffirmed the distinction between the territories the Trusteeship System covered and t­ hose that fell u ­ nder the aegis of Chapter XI. It also noted the administering states’ “obligation to develop self-­government” rather than the more expansive goal of in­de­pen­dence. To assuage the latter, however, the resolution asserted the General Assembly’s “keen” interest in the “prob­lems and po­liti­cal aspirations of the p­ eoples who have not yet attained a full mea­sure of self-­government and who are not directly represented ­here,” thereby reaffirming the princi­ple of international interest as well as the importance of nation-­state status in presenting the case for decolonization, since the nontrust dependent territories had no way to make their own case to the United Nations. Perhaps the most far-­reaching ele­ment of the draft resolution, although not likely considered so at the time, was the request that the secretary-­general “include in his annual report on the work of the Organ­ization . . . ​a statement summarizing such information as may have been transmitted to him” in conformity with Article 73(e).33 This short sentence made explicit the idea that the Article 73(e) information was to be shared with all members of the United Nations—­and through its published documentation with the w ­ hole world—­and not simply buried in the files of the Secretariat, and thereby it opened the door to the much greater General Assembly role in the nontrust dependent territories that was to come. In an indication that the administering states saw no danger in the proposal, it generated no opposition, and the revised draft resolution secured unan­i­mous Fourth Committee support.34 In presenting the draft resolution to the General Assembly, Fourth Committee rapporteur Ivan Kerno of Czecho­slo­va­k ia noted that its approval would “show that this first Assembly of the United Nations . . . ​took impor­tant decisions of substance in a sphere in which, to a g­ reat extent, the f­ uture well-­being of a large part of the world depends.” In this way, Kerno emphasized the universality of the colonial question for all nations, not just the non-­self-­ governing territories and their administering powers. US delegate John Foster Dulles singled out for special commendation the resolution’s prescriptions regarding the information transmitted ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter,



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praising “­those States which subordinated their special interests to permit a united and constructive h ­ andling of the entire m ­ atter” in the Fourth Committee and lauding the resolution as a positive step t­ oward “promoting h ­ uman rights and fundamental freedoms.”35 Notably, the only cautionary voice during the almost two-­and-­a-­half hour debate was ­Great Britain’s Arthur Creech Jones. While “­wholeheartedly rejoic[ing] that at last ­there [was] an international colonial convention,” he also asserted that while “the world [was] entitled to be critical of the manner in which colonial Powers discharge their responsibilities,” criticism of the colonial powers “should be informed, . . . ​­free from prejudice . . . ​and offered in a constructive and helpful spirit.” The responsibility the administering states bore, he declared, was substantial, and “a l­ittle less strident criticism from t­ hose who have not that responsibility to carry” was in order.36 ­After issuing his call to balance the international community’s acknowledged interest in the non-­ self-­governing territories with the rights and responsibilities of the administering states, Creech Jones joined the other forty representatives pre­sent in unanimously approving what became Resolution 9 (I), commonly dubbed the “London Resolution on Non-­Self-­Governing ­Peoples.”37 With the General Assembly voting to adjourn the first half of its first session in late February and reconvene in early September, Britain and the other administering powers had a chance to strategize for transmitting the information required ­under Article 73(e), information that it was now clear would be shared with the entire world.38 Policymakers in London ­were of two minds. Some, found most prominently in the Foreign Office, considered an expansive information policy that conveyed “a full display of the virtues and achievements of the Colonial Empire” to be Britain’s “safest” course, particularly when the United States and possibly other administering states w ­ ere expected to undertake that sort of policy.39 (Officials in the Truman administration, in fact, w ­ ere already trumpeting the US colonial rec­ord as “a credit to this Government” and recommending that the nation “fulfill expeditiously and in an exemplary manner” its Article 73[e] responsibilities as a means of enhancing the nation’s “international prestige.”40) To prevent Britain from being unfavorably compared to nations that a­ dopted a generous information transmission policy, policymakers in the Foreign Office hoped sincerely that it would “not prove altogether impossible to follow the American example.” Foot-­ dragging and obstruction, in their minds, would only fuel “dangerous” accusations that Britain was part of an “uncooperative . . . ​colonial bloc” at the United Nations.41 Sentiment at the Colonial Office was more narrowly conceived. “While sending nothing less than we are obliged,” officials ­there maintained, it was equally impor­tant to “avoid sending anything more.”42 ­Those

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same officials, in fact, ­were “willing to supply the United Nations Library with at least as much as we supplied to the League Library,” demonstrating that they objected not so much to the release of information as to the compulsion to provide that information to the Secretariat.43 In the end, the hardline position prevailed. The British government would confine the information it transmitted in fulfillment of the nation’s Article 73(e) responsibilities to the Charter-­mandated areas of economic, social, and educational conditions. It would also continue to oppose any UN discussion of that information, as well as “any right of supervision or intervention” on the part of the United Nations when it came to the nontrust dependent territories.44 The ­limited British view of the London Resolution on Non-­Self-­Governing ­Peoples stood in stark contrast to Secretary-­General Trygve Lie’s expansive one, particularly when it came to the interest of UN member-­states in the ­f uture of the nontrust dependent territories. On 29 June, to remedy the Charter’s lack of specificity when it came to the territories Chapter XI covered and the exact procedures for dealing with them, Lie asked all UN member-­states to weigh in on three interrelated m ­ atters: “the ­factors to be taken into account in determining” ­whether a territory fell ­under the auspices of Chapter XI; ­whether it administered any territories that fell u ­ nder that chapter’s auspices, and if so, what ­those territories ­were; and the best form for transmitting the information requested ­under Article 73(e). ­These three ­matters, Lie believed, would form the basis for the General Assembly’s discussion of the non-­self-­ governing territories when its first session resumed in the fall. His request that all UN members address them, signaled in the subsequent practice of putting ­those issues before all newly admitted members, reflected his conviction that the fate of ­those territories was of universal interest to all the organ­ization’s member-­states. It also suggested that UN discussions of them would have to take account of much more than the administering states’ positions.45 Notwithstanding his solicitation of members’ thoughts, Lie had clear ideas of his own about how the General Assembly should deal with the non-­self-­ governing territories. A ­ fter summarizing the wide-­r anging responses to his three queries in a long report to the Assembly on 21 October, he went on to offer several recommendations. Perhaps most noteworthy, particularly considering the controversy it subsequently generated, was his suggestion that given the amount of time the administering states put into compiling the information they would be transmitting ­under Article 73(e), some provision for its careful study by the General Assembly or an assigned committee was in order. Lie went on to note that he might “need assistance in the preparation of [the] summary” that the London Resolution called for and that the Assembly might “wish to examine this summary in the light of the commentary of



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an expert body,” presumably a committee specifically charged with that task. Lie returned to and amplified this point in a working paper on the subject released on 1 November, wherein he suggested that the “Fourth Committee might . . . ​wish to consider w ­ hether it would be appropriate to appoint a committee which would meet before the opening of the Second Session” to discuss the information transmitted u ­ nder Article 73(e), thereby laying the seeds for what became the Ad Hoc Committee on Information. And lest the members of the General Assembly doubt the secretary-­general’s commitment to decolonization, he noted the overriding importance of “the development of self-­government and of f­ ree po­liti­cal institutions” in the territories that fell ­under Chapter XI of the Charter. His supplementary report on the work of the United Nations on 26 October had made that same point, asserting that UN interest in the non-­self-­governing territories gave their residents “reassurance of the concern of the [organ­ization] for their progressively improved standards of living, their general well-­being, and their full realization of the promise held forth by Chapter XI,” a promise that he believed included in­de­pen­dence.46 With Lie’s reports and working paper as a backdrop for discussion of the non-­ self-­governing territories, the Fourth Committee began the second part of its first session in early November. Included in its charge from the General Assembly was the broad ­matter of the information to be transmitted ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, on which, not surprisingly, the delegates voiced a variety of opinions. The Indian del­e­ga­tion hammered away at the need for the administering states to include po­liti­cal information.47 The Chinese and Australian del­e­ga­tions endorsed the secretary-­general’s proposal regarding the creation of a special committee to examine and study the information transmitted u ­ nder Article 73(e).48 The Guatemalan del­e­ga­tion even proposed placing most of the non-­self-­governing territories ­under the Trusteeship System as the best way “to guarantee their f­ uture freedom and in­de­pen­dence.” The implication that t­ hose goals would not other­wise be attainable reflected back on criticism of the Charter’s two-­track approach to dependent territories and became the central point of the drive for international accountability.49 When it became obvious that the committee as a w ­ hole could not sufficiently address its ambitious agenda, members agreed on 14 November to create two subcommittees, one of which would deal in part with the information to be transmitted ­under Article 73(e).50 In its instructions to the subcommittee, the Secretariat repeated the secretary-­general’s ­earlier call for the pos­si­ble establishment of an ad hoc committee to consider the summaries to be prepared of the information transmitted ­under Article 73(e).51

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The subcommittee’s first three meetings resulted in early accord on several relatively noncontroversial ­matters. Members essentially agreed to disagree when it came to trying to define what a non-­self-­governing territory was and simply de­cided to allow the administering states themselves to determine which territories fell ­under the aegis of Article 73(e).52 They set 30 June 1947 as the deadline for transmission of the first round of Article 73(e) information to the secretary-­general.53 And ­after what was perhaps the liveliest discussion of the initial trio of meetings, they reached an accommodation on the transmission of po­liti­cal information. Although several del­e­ga­tions, most notably India, China, and the Soviet Union, made the case for including information on po­liti­cal developments, it was ultimately agreed that while such information was “much to be desired,” its inclusion was “a ­matter of choice” and could not be required. Not surprisingly, Britain, France, Belgium, and Australia all protested the mandatory inclusion of po­liti­cal information as contrary to the Charter; the subcommittee’s agreement with their position was one of the few significant early victories they achieved in the United Nations’ discussion of the nontrust dependent territories. It is worth noting, however, that a number of administering states, Britain included, admitted a  willingness to provide po­liti­cal information ­under vehicles other than ­Article 73(e). In Britain’s case, its delegate expressed his government’s readiness to provide the United Nations informally with “the same information as submitted to Parliament.” It just would not be compelled to provide po­liti­cal information in connection with its obligations ­under Article 73(e).54 The subcommittee also engaged in animated discussion of a draft resolution from the Secretariat calling for the creation of what it called a “Committee of Experts” to examine the information transmitted ­under Article 73(e) in advance of the opening of the Second General Assembly.55 At its most basic level, the proposal forced the subcommittee to determine “­whether the information [to be transmitted u ­ nder Article 73(e)] was to be material for historians or material for discussion.”56 Sentiment tilted decidedly in the latter direction, with a number of del­e­ga­tions speaking in ­favor of having some body, be it the Trusteeship Council, which at this point had yet to be established, or an ad hoc committee drawn from the General Assembly, study the information transmitted u ­ nder Article 73(e).57 Assistant Secretary-­General in charge of the Department of Trusteeship and Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories Victor Hoo, who attended the subcommittee’s meetings on behalf of the Secretariat, defended the proposed committee as a temporary mea­sure, taking pains to make clear that such a body conformed to the Charter and that in any event, “­there was to be no question of a permanent organ.”58



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It was clear by late November that discussion of how to deal with the information transmitted ­under Article 73(e) was coming to center on what scholars of the US Constitution refer to as the distinction between “loose” and “strict” construction. Supporters of the idea of creating a special body to study that information took the view, originally expressed by the Philippine delegate, General Carlos P. Romulo, “that a course of action which was not expressly prohibited was deemed to be permitted if it was consistent with the objective in view,” which a proposed committee to discuss Article 73(e) information, he maintained, certainly was.59 Not surprisingly, the administering states disagreed.60 Although they accepted their responsibility ­under Article 73(e) to provide economic, social, and educational information and agreed that the secretary-­general could summarize that information in his annual report on the organ­ization’s work as provided for in the London Resolution, they categorically opposed the consideration or discussion of that information. In the words of Britain’s Ivor Thomas, “The Charter was quite explicit and referred to information for information purposes only,” a fact, he claimed, that clearly prohibited having the Trusteeship Council discuss the information or establishing a committee drawn from the General Assembly to do so. Belgium’s Pierre Ryckmans was even more emphatic. “Reports w ­ ere examined,” he avowed, “but information furnished for information was merely accepted and put at the disposal of whoever needed it, just as a book was accepted and put in a library.” Paul-­Émile Naggiar of France posed the strongest strict constructionist objection to the creation of an ad hoc committee, denying that such an organ conformed to the letter of the Charter and maintaining that “if no executive or supervisory body had been provided for in Chapter XI, the reason was that it had not been intended to create one.”61 ­After a dozen and one meetings, the subcommittee issued a generally moderate report. Regarding Article 73(e), it noted that eight administering states had submitted or given notice that they intended to transmit information on seventy-­five territories.62 It also announced that given the difficulty of agreeing on a definition of what constituted a non-­self-­governing territory, the subcommittee de­cided “not to attempt [one] for the time being.” Reflecting the way the subcommittee’s meeting time had been allocated, the report dealt at some length with how the information transmitted ­under Article 73(e) should be handled. It ultimately proposed a resolution that neither mentioned the prospect of creating an ad hoc committee to consider such information nor charged the Trusteeship Council with that task. Instead, it simply stated that the information “should be summarized, analyzed and classified by the Secretary-­General and included in his report to the Second Session of the

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General Assembly,” which could then consider the best approach to the Chapter XI territories moving forward.63 From the administering states’ vantage point, the draft resolution’s failure to propose the creation of an ad hoc committee to consider Article 73(e) information, even though a number of subcommittee members believed ardently that such a course could and should be taken, constituted a real victory. As discussion of the proposed resolution in the Fourth Committee revealed, however, the issue was far from dead, and their victory proved to be short lived. Consideration of the subcommittee’s report in the Fourth Committee focused from the start on the creation of an ad hoc committee to study the information transmitted u ­ nder Article 73(e). A number of del­e­ga­tions lamented that the draft resolution contained in the report had omitted that proposal, defending such a course of action as an aid to efficiency and a way to prevent the Secretariat from becoming entangled in po­liti­cal ­matters—­a tacit admission that decolonization was, in fact, po­liti­cally charged.64 The administering states, of course, would have none of it. Since “the Secretariat was composed of experts whose competence and objectivity w ­ ere indisputable,” the British del­e­ga­tion asserted, it made no sense to create another entity to do a job the Secretariat could easily h ­ andle. The French del­e­ga­tion insisted that the Charter “nowhere mentioned an ad hoc committee,” a concern the US del­e­ga­tion shared. Indeed, Benjamin Gerig went so far as to assert that establishing one was tantamount to “a modification of the Charter.”65 Disregarding t­ hese sentiments, the Fourth Committee, by a margin of 23 to 12, with 3 abstentions, recommended creation of an ad hoc committee to consider the information transmitted on the Chapter XI territories. Mirroring the Trusteeship Committee, the committee was to be composed of a representative from each of the administering states and an equal number of nonadministering states, “elected, by the General Assembly at this Session, on the basis of an equitable geo­g raph­ic­ al distribution.” The French, British, Australian, and Belgian del­e­ga­tions indicated that their governments reserved the right to consider this m ­ atter in the f­ uture, intimating that they might decline to participate in a body that they considered to be in contravention of the Charter should the full General Assembly vote to create one.66 The Assembly’s brief discussion of the Fourth Committee’s recommended resolution suggested that the administering states w ­ ere swimming against the tide of popu­lar support for an ad hoc committee. The Cuban del­e­ga­tion spoke for many in making the case for such a body. Although delegate Guy Pérez Cisneros asserted that the Secretariat’s staff—­“particularly competent, very objective, and inspired by a frankly progressive spirit”—­was eminently qualified to deal with the information transmitted on the non-­self-­governing territories,



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b­ ecause consideration of that information could ultimately necessitate the “difficult” task of criticizing an administering state’s conduct, it was better to follow the Secretariat’s own recommendation that a separate body take on the task. The Fourth Committee had recommended the creation of such a body for one session only, so ­unless the General Assembly de­cided during its second session to “confer immortality” upon it, it was “destined from its very inception to be very short-­lived” and to perform a very specific task.67 Opposition to the creation of an ad hoc committee again came from several quarters. N. S. Blom of the Netherlands railed that it “would not only be contrary to the Charter, but it would also hamper the peaceful development of the [non-­self-­governing] populations, and might well impair good relations” between ­those populations and their respective administering states. Britain’s Ivor Thomas scoffed at the prospect that any ad hoc committee drawn from the General Assembly’s membership could do a better job of assessing the information transmitted u ­ nder Article 73(e) than the Secretariat, “composed” as it was “of experts in their par­tic­u­lar fields.” He also denied that such a task could ever become po­liti­cal, since Article 73(e) made no mention of po­liti­cal information and called merely for economic, social, and educational information to be transmitted purely for informational purposes. And US delegate John Foster Dulles mockingly maintained that “if the Secretary-­General and his staff are not competent to [­handle the information transmitted u ­ nder Article 73(e)] and require the ser­vices of a committee . . . ​to help them, . . . ​­there is something wrong with the Secretariat.”68 Ultimately, the Fourth Committee’s recommended resolution was voted on in two parts. The noncontroversial first portion, which amounted to l­ittle more than a summary of the prevailing situation regarding the nontrust dependent territories and the agreed-­upon guidelines for when information was to be transmitted to the secretary-­general, was approved on a vote of 41 to 0, with 4 abstentions. At the request of the Dutch del­e­ga­tion, the portion of the resolution dealing with creation of the ad hoc committee was put to a roll-­ call vote, which resulted in approval on a vote of 28 to 15, with 7 abstentions. New Zealand alone among the eight administering states abstained; the other seven (Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States) voted no.69 ­Later that day, in accordance with what became Resolution 66 (I), the General Assembly took up the task of electing the eight nonadministering members of the ad hoc committee.70 Procedural questions stretched the pro­cess into the following day, but ­after the last member was elected on 15 December the committee was complete. Brazil, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, the Philippines, the Soviet Union, and Uruguay would balance out the eight administering states.71

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Colonial Secretary Creech Jones’s post-­mortem on the First General Assembly’s ­handling of issues related to the nontrust dependent territories, printed as a Cabinet paper in early January 1947, summed up the administering states’ objections to the nascent campaign for international accountability. Many nations with “no colonial responsibilities,” he asserted, sought merely “for po­ liti­cal considerations” to “pervert Chapter XI into something akin to an alternative form of international trusteeship,” assisted by the secretary-­general, who had introduced the idea of an ad hoc committee to consider the information transmitted ­under Article 73(e) without even bother­ing to consult the administering states in advance. Developments during the First General Assembly, in fact, seemed to confirm the warnings Creech Jones had issued during debate in the London Resolution, particularly when it came to criticism of the administering states by t­ hose who lacked “colonial responsibilities.” Perhaps the only bright spot in the General Assembly’s ­handling of colonial questions during its first session, the secretary claimed, was the purported realization by US officials “that their interests in such m ­ atters lay with the other Colonial Powers rather than with the critics.” But even then he lamented the US tendency to work ­toward mediation rather than “using ­every effort to secure the defeat of unsatisfactory proposals,” a reference to what ultimately emerged as Washington’s deliberately middle-­ground approach when it came to the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories. One year into the life of the United Nations, British officials ­were clearly—­and justifiably—­concerned about the way the organ­ization was discharging its responsibilities ­under Chapter XI of the Charter.72 Creech Jones’s report to the Cabinet portended many of the arguments Britain and the other administering states used against ­those who called for a more activist UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories in the years to come. Condescension and cultural relativism permeated his ascription of the early campaign for accountability to “po­liti­cal prejudice and racial emotion” and description of its proponents as “irresponsible.” Pique at the very idea of an activist UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories of the sort Churchill had expressed at Yalta motivated his assertion that only states with “colonial responsibilities” had a right to weigh in when it came to the nontrust dependent territories. And the need to preserve great-­power control of the United Nations underpinned his unwavering devotion to the sanctity of the Charter. ­These ideas solidified over the coming years, ultimately forming the backbone of administering state efforts to push back against the drive for international accountability. Their failure to hold back that effort testified to how dramatically dif­fer­ent the United Nations of the early 1960s was from the one created in San Francisco in 1945.



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Creation of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter revealed the presence as early as the First General Assembly of considerable anticolonial sentiment as well as the inability of the Eu­ro­pean g­ reat powers that had designed the United Nations to effectively combat that sentiment. Convinced that promoting development of all stripes in the nontrust dependent territories was an international m ­ atter, the majority of UN member-­states took an early and impor­tant step in moving beyond the strict letter of the Charter to provide at least a temporary entity to study information transmitted in conformity with Article 73(e). To be sure, this hardly amounted to international accountability of the sort embodied in the Trusteeship System. It did, however, signal a determination to legitimize some sort of international responsibility for the millions of dependent ­people who ­were excluded from that system. And in this way, it started down the road ­toward fulfilling the hope of ­those who had seen Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the League Mandates, and the Atlantic Charter as stepping stones t­ oward precisely that sort of international responsibility for bringing all dependent territories to in­de­pen­dence.

C h a p t er  2

Fits and Starts The Contours of International Accountability Emerge

Proponents of an activist UN role in the Chapter XI territories built on the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information u ­ nder Article 73(e) of the Charter to advance a variety of proposals during the years 1947–1949 to minimize—if not erase—­the Charter-­imposed differences between the trust and nontrust dependent territories. They secured General Assembly approval for annual renewal of the ad hoc committee u ­ nder a variety of names through 1949, and then in that year won approval of a special committee on the nontrust dependent territories for a three-­year period. Although the Western democracies’ dominance of the organ­ization during ­these years doomed other proposals for effecting a real UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories, the very introduction of such proposals, not to mention the considerable support they received, revealed an embryonic commitment to international accountability for the Chapter XI territories, which boded ill for continued administering state autonomy. Efforts to expand the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories ­were set against the backdrop of the early Cold War, and the East-­West confrontation helped to influence the course of discussion on that subject across UN forums in both the short and the long terms. As the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, Berlin Blockade, creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ­ization, and other international developments marked the superpower confrontation in Eu­rope,

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harsh language and verbal confrontations became the norm at the United Nations. Soviet-­bloc diplomats used the General Assembly as a platform for anti-­Western propaganda, issuing Marxist-­derived critiques of the exploitative nature of traditional colonialism and assuming the mantle of anticolonial champion. If the Soviets earned a reputation for disruptive conduct at all levels of the United Nations and found ­little support for their early bombast on the organ­ization’s role in the non-­self-­governing territories, their calls for greater UN involvement in decolonization eventually saw success, albeit not in the form Moscow proposed.1 Developments at the United Nations itself also helped to shape its evolving role in the non-­self-­governing territories. Four new member-­states (Pakistan, Yemen, Burma, and Israel) joined the organ­ization between 1947 and 1949, further adding to its nonadministering ranks, although Israel generally aligned itself with the Western administering states. At the same time, India assumed a commanding position as the most vocal and respected exponent of a more activist UN position vis-­à-­vis the Chapter XI territories. It is no exaggeration, in fact, to follow historian Amy L. Sayward in describing this period as the “Nehruvian moment” in recognition of India’s major role as a leader of the anticolonial faction at the United Nations.2 Meanwhile, the Western administering states often sought to compensate for their numerical inferiority by relying on procedural maneuvering to increase the threshold for approval of resolutions dealing with the UN role in the Chapter XI territories. Although this strategy paid short-­term gains, it was no permanent solution to rising support for international accountability for dependent territories. Resolution 66 (I) gave the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information u ­ nder Article 73(e) of the Charter a s­ imple charge: to “examine the Secretary-­General’s summary and analy­sis of the information transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter with a view to aiding the General Assembly in its consideration of this information, and . . . ​to making recommendations to the General Assembly regarding the procedures to be followed in the ­future.”3 Its seventeen meetings between 28 August and 12 September 1947, however, made clear the difficulty of translating t­hose relatively straightforward guidelines into action.4 Despite a general air of cooperation, by the time the committee concluded its work on the eve of the opening of the Second General Assembly, a vocal bloc of nonadministering states was leading the charge for a more expansive UN role vis-­à-­vis the nontrust dependent territories. East-­West hostility, manifested by the start of the ad hoc committee’s 1947 session in US launching of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, also came

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into play, with the Soviet bloc using e­ very available opportunity to assault the Western colonial nations and push for a more active UN role in their territories. A US proposal to create a standardized form for the administering states’ transmission of information provided an early opening for t­ hose who wished to ramp up the UN role in the nontrust dependent territories. Likely drawing on his previous experience with the League of Nations mandates questionnaire, US representative Benjamin Gerig described what became known as the Standard Form as a way to ensure that comparable kinds of economic, social, and educational information would be transmitted on all the Chapter XI territories. In keeping with US practice, the Standard Form would also include an optional section for information on a territory’s history, physical features, and government institutions. Most members of the committee applauded Gerig’s proposal, which made sense as a practical way of comparing conditions across the dozens of non-­self-­governing territories.5 Although the other administering states’ del­e­ga­tions did not dismiss the US proposal out of hand, they insisted that the form be seen merely as a guide and not an obligatory questionnaire such as the one the Trusteeship Council employed. The Standard Form that the committee ultimately unanimously endorsed followed the strictures of Article 73(e) by providing for the voluntary transmission of po­liti­cal information rather than mandating it, as was the case with the trust territories. If the Standard Form modestly altered the shape of the administering states’ responsibilities to the General Assembly by providing a framework for the collection and organ­ization of economic, social, and educational information, it left intact the princi­ple that po­liti­cal information could not be required.6 The fact that France, the Netherlands, and the United States had initially transmitted information that could be construed as po­liti­cal in nature kept the issue alive. Representatives of all three emphasized that such information was not obligatory, that their nations had transmitted it voluntarily, and that other nations could not and should not be compelled to follow suit.7 Administering states that had not transmitted such information fell back on the language of the Charter for justification.8 Britain’s Sir Hilton Poynton went so far as to mock t­ hose committee members who, in calling for the transmission of po­ liti­cal information during the very first year of the committee’s work, “wish[ed] for a second helping of information before they had properly digested the first.”9 And even if administering states chose voluntarily to transmit po­liti­cal information, the exclusion of that category from Article 73(e) prohibited the ad hoc committee, which was created specifically to consider the Secretariat’s summaries and analyses of the information transmitted in compliance with that article, from considering or discussing it.10



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Supporters of the transmission of po­liti­cal information advanced a variety of counterarguments and ultimately carried the day when it came to shaping a draft resolution on the subject for the Fourth Committee. Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines, who had worked tirelessly on behalf of dependent territories at San Francisco, deemed it “futile . . . ​to examine technical information without taking into account the po­liti­cal life of the p­ eople,” a sentiment Egypt’s Taha el-­Sayed Nasr shared.11 And the Soviet Union’s Jacob Lomakin wondered how pro­g ress ­toward self-­government in the non-­self-­governing territories, explic­itly stated as a goal in Article 73(b) of the Charter, could be mea­sured if information on that pro­g ress was not provided.12 ­These sentiments represented the majority view on the ad hoc committee, which approved by 8 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions, a mea­sure applauding and encouraging the voluntary transmission of po­liti­cal information that was then sent forward to the Fourth Committee. Unable to make the transmission of such information mandatory, activists settled for a partial victory in their drive for international accountability for dependent territories.13 Institutionalizing that accountability was also the goal of an Indian proposal to make the Ad Hoc Committee on Information permanent.14 Not surprisingly, the administering states w ­ ere strongly opposed, seeing such a move as “blurring the difference between Trust and Non-­Self-­Governing Territories” and thus a clear threat to the sanctity of the Charter. The US del­e­ga­tion even implied that it would invoke Article 2(7) regarding domestic jurisdiction if the mea­sure ­were approved.15 For their part, supporters of the idea insisted that a permanent committee on information was well within the scope of the Charter, that it would be relieving an already overworked General Assembly of having to examine the information transmitted u ­ nder Article 73(e), and that some sort of permanent entity was necessary in order to give the information transmitted on the non-­self-­governing territories the attention it deserved.16 This view prevailed, and the ad hoc committee recommended the creation of a special committee on information, although the administering states did succeed in limiting its purview to consideration of “economic, social, and educational” information only. They also hoped that they would ultimately be able to secure a more moderate recommendation when the Fourth Committee and eventually the General Assembly itself considered the ­matter.17 The seven Fourth Committee meetings at which the UN role in the non-­ self-­governing territories was discussed ­were contentious and difficult, and acrimony ran high on all issues save the creation and adoption of the Standard Form. Rather than giving blanket approval to the evenly balanced Ad  Hoc Committee on Information’s report, which Dutch representative W. J. A. Kernkamp described as “a compromise testifying to a true spirit of

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collaboration,” the Fourth Committee recommended revisions that “completely changed the atmosphere.” This should not have been surprising, given its makeup of eight administering states and forty-­nine nonadministering ones. Nor should the fact that such reversals became almost routine in the years to come.18 The Fourth Committee’s discussion of the ad hoc committee’s proposed resolution regarding the transmission of po­liti­cal information revealed its activist agenda. Once again, the major administering states maintained a strict constructionist position. Britain’s Sir Hilton Poynton and France’s René Mayer both issued strong denunciations of what the former described as “an attempt to rewrite the Charter by means of a resolution of the General Assembly.” And the United States’ Francis B. Sayre argued that the “precise” language of Article 73(e) made it “incontestably clear” that transmitting po­liti­cal information was not included among that article’s responsibilities. “In l­egal language,” he told the committee, “expressio unius est exclusio alterius—­the express listing of certain ­things excluded every­thing ­else.” By listing economic, social, and educational information, he declared, the draf­ters of the Charter had expressly meant to exclude all other kinds of information. Although the United States had voluntarily transmitted po­liti­cal information, it could not countenance an effort to force—or shame through moral suasion—­other states to do the same.19 Supporters of a more expansive UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories embraced a broader, more holistic interpretation of the Charter. Egypt’s Taha el-­Sayed Bey Nasr summed up that position by asserting that po­liti­cal information “was not unrelated to the economic, social, and educational conditions of the Non-­Self-­Governing Territories”; the Soviet Union’s Boris E. Stein and Ukraine’s Alexei D. Voina agreed.20 When the Fourth Committee ultimately voted on what turned out to be a variety of proposals dealing with po­liti­cal information, a Soviet call to remind the administering states that Article 73(b) charged them with promoting self-­government in the non-­ self-­governing territories and to recommend that they transmit information detailing their pro­g ress ­toward that goal squeaked by on a vote of 20 to 19. Despite warnings from several administering states that General Assembly approval of such a mea­sure would negatively affect their countries’ position regarding UN involvement with the non-­self-­governing territories, their real hope was that the close Fourth Committee vote could be reversed at the General Assembly level.21 In the boldest move yet to implement international accountability for dependent territories, the Indian del­e­ga­tion reprised the proposal to formally place the Chapter XI territories u ­ nder UN trusteeship that the Australian and Filipino del­e­ga­tions had first advanced at the San Francisco Conference.22 The



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Pakistani, Cuban, and Soviet del­e­ga­tions joined the Indian del­e­ga­tion in championing the mea­sure, painting it as the best way to facilitate the rapid transformation of the non-­self-­governing territories into in­de­pen­dent nations—­and members of the United Nations.23 Administering-­state hostility was overwhelming, with the British, American, Dutch, French, and Belgian del­e­ga­tions all expressing concerns about the proposal’s sweeping nature, its implied moral threat or compulsion, and the danger it posed to their national prerogatives. The Charter drew a clear distinction between the territories that fell within the Trusteeship System and ­those that did not. Obliterating that distinction through General Assembly action was, to them, unthinkable.24 But once again ­those states found themselves outnumbered. On a roll-­call vote requested by Britain’s Sir Hilton Poynton, the Indian proposal, revised to merely encourage the administering states to place their nontrust dependent territories u ­ nder the UN Trusteeship System, passed by a razor thin vote of 25 to 23, with 3 abstentions; e­ very administering state voted no.25 Beyond revealing jelling support for treating the Chapter XI territories more like the UN trusteeships, discussion at the 1947 session of the Fourth Committee also touched on the nature of Western colonialism itself. H ­ ere the Soviet bloc states took the lead. Ukraine’s Alexei Voina, for example, accused the administering states of exploiting the non-­self-­governing territories for their own benefit, while Frol P. Shmigov of the Byelorus­sian Soviet Socialist Republic called the British Empire “a threat to peace and international security.”26 ­These sorts of charges became core ele­ments of the Communist bloc’s strategy at the United Nations when it came to the non-­self-­governing territories. As the anticolonial contingent ­there grew, some of its more strident non-­bloc members began to employ them as well. The British del­e­ga­tion waged a concerted—­but largely ineffectual—­campaign to “clear away certain fallacious beliefs regarding the colonial system”: “the colonial system was [not] a threat to world peace”; “colonial administration was [not] synonymous with exploitation”; “sovereignty was [not] the supreme remedy for all ills.” In addition to t­ hese by-­now familiar arguments, Sir Hilton Poynton introduced a new one, seeking to debunk what he referred to as “the ‘salt ­water fallacy.’ ” Eventually a staple of Soviet bloc rhe­toric regarding the non-­self-­governing territories at the United Nations, this was the assertion that expansion across contiguous territory—of the sort Rus­sia and then the Soviet Union had undertaken—­was acceptable while expansion across an ocean—as was the case with the Western Eu­ro­pean colonial empires—­was not. For Poynton and representatives of the other administering states, the salt ­water fallacy was nothing more than semantic hair splitting that demonstrated the hollowness of Soviet anticolonial claims.27

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Once debate moved to the General Assembly, the administering states undertook a two-­track effort to preserve the Charter-­mandated division between the trust and nontrust dependent territories. One, led by the US del­e­ga­tion, sought to replace the narrowly approved Fourth Committee resolutions with the Ad Hoc Committee on Information’s more mea­sured ones, which US representative John Foster Dulles reminded the Assembly had been approved by “large majorities.”28 The other turned to Articles 18(2) and (3) of the Charter, which dealt with what w ­ ere termed “impor­tant questions” that required a two-­ thirds majority for approval. Article 18(2) listed specific categories of questions that always required a two-­thirds majority, but Article 18(3), on which the administering states hung their hopes, allowed a s­ imple majority vote of the General Assembly to designate “other questions” or “additional categories of questions” as “impor­tant” and thus requiring the higher standard for approval. If the administering states could secure s­ imple majority support for designating the individual Fourth Committee resolutions impor­tant questions, they might be able to muster the so-­called blocking third to defeat them. As Gary Ostrower has noted, the g­ reat powers had agreed on the two-­thirds requirement for impor­tant questions at Dumbarton Oaks as a way of curbing the power of the smaller states and thus ensuring their continued control of the General Assembly. In 1947 and periodically thereafter, the administering states and their small co­ali­tion of allies used the Charter’s rules regarding impor­tant questions to prevent decisions that would move the UN role in the nontrust dependent territories closer to the one that prevailed in the trust territories, even if that meant thwarting the ­will of the majority.29 The Fourth Committee’s resolution recommending the transmission of po­ liti­cal information ultimately went down to defeat at the General Assembly. Del­e­ga­tions from a number of administering states issued strong statements against the proposal, which US representative Francis Sayre denounced as “intended . . . ​to create an obligation which the Charter clearly and significantly avoids.” In other words, he and other representatives from the administering states insisted on preserving the Charter-­mandated distinction between the trust and nontrust dependent territories.30 The best efforts of supporters such as Colombia, India, and of course the Soviet Union, which accused opponents of the mea­sure of having “something to conceal from the United Nations,”31 could not carry the day, and the final vote on the Fourth Committee’s recommended resolution of 25 to 17, with 9 abstentions was not even close. By a vote of 44 to 2, with 5 abstentions, the General Assembly then approved the more moderate resolution applauding and encouraging—­but not recommending—­ the transmission of po­liti­cal information that had originated in the Ad Hoc Committee on Information.32



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Much the same story played out when it came to the creation of a permanent committee to consider the information transmitted in compliance with Article 73(e). René Mayer of France, Francis Sayre of the United States, and Hector McNeil of the United Kingdom all criticized the Fourth Committee’s proposal, which McNeil claimed sought to create “a backdoor compulsory trusteeship organ­ization” that “the Charter and its authors never contemplated.”33 India’s Raja Sir Maharaj Singh sought to allay some of the administering states’ objections, but even he seemed resigned to defeat. “We had good fortune in the Fourth Committee,” he remarked at the conclusion of debate on the mea­sure, referring to the slate of activist resolutions sent on to the General Assembly. Although he lamented that “the same good fortune [was not repeated] in the General Assembly,” he also noted that “victories of this kind [­were] ephemeral,” a prescient observation that summed up both the short-­ and long-­term results of the drive for international accountability for dependent territories.34 Following roll-­call approval (29 to 22, with 5 abstentions) of a US proposal to apply Article 18 to the final vote on the mea­sure, the General Assembly defeated the Fourth Committee’s version by a vote of 24 to 17, with 9 abstentions (virtually the same results as the vote on the transmission of po­liti­cal information and a margin of approval of 58 ­percent, well below the now required two-­thirds majority). It then approved the more moderate version the ad hoc committee had forwarded, which merely renewed that entity on the same terms for another year, by a vote of 49 to 0, with 4 abstentions.35 The administering states w ­ ere also able to beat back the Indian-­sponsored resolution encouraging them to make use of the Trusteeship System for all their non-­self-­governing territories. In a long and detailed address, the United States’ John Foster Dulles called the mea­sure “a vote of non-­confidence in the operation of Chapter XI” and scoffed at the proposition that the Trusteeship System, “which ha[d] never given in­de­pen­dence to a single person,” was the best system for assisting the nontrust dependent territories to the Charter’s stated goal of self-­government, let alone in­de­pen­dence. Britain’s Hector McNeil considered the proposal “the first step down a very slippery slope of seeking . . . ​to amend the Charter by resolution.”36 Supporters, which included China and India, disagreed. For them, placing non-­self-­governing territories ­under UN trusteeship would give their ­people proof that the international community was concerned about their welfare. If the draf­ters of the Charter had not intended Article 77(1)(c) authorizing such a move to be utilized, moreover, they would not have included it. Activists also averred that the proposal for blanket application of trusteeship was entirely benign, contained no hint of compulsion, and sought simply to advance the cause of in­de­pen­dent

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nationhood among the non-­self-­governing territories by using a mechanism contained in the Charter.37 It would, in other words, do nothing more than encourage the administering states to take advantage of Article 77(1)(c). ­After voting 22 to 18, with 5 abstentions, to approve a British motion that the mea­sure was of sufficient importance to invoke Article 18 of the Charter requiring approval by a two-­thirds majority, the General Assembly, by a British-­requested roll-­call vote of 24 to 24, with 1 abstention (Venezuela), rejected the proposal encouraging the placement of the non-­self-­governing territories within the Trusteeship System, an impor­tant victory for efforts to maintain the Charter-­mandated distinction between the two types of dependent territories.38 The three resolutions that thus resulted from the Second General Assembly’s consideration of the overall UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories posed no threat to administering state authority. Resolution 142 (II), which generated ­little discussion and no acrimony, contained the Standard Form and guidelines regarding its usage. Although the form included sections for information on “government” and “­human rights,” ­those categories w ­ ere labeled “optional material,” thereby allowing administering states to omit them if they wished.39 Resolution 144 (II) did l­ittle more than state the obvious by affirming that the voluntary transmission of po­liti­cal information was “entirely in conformity with the spirit of Article 73 of the Charter, and should be therefore duly noted and encouraged.” It imposed no new obligation on the administering states and did nothing to erode the separate treatment of the two types of dependent territories.40 Fi­nally, Resolution 146 (II) called for the creation of “a special committee to examine the information transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter on the economic, social and educational conditions in the Non-­Self-­Governing Territories.” The committee’s purview extended only to making “such procedural recommendations as it may deem fit” and “such substantive recommendations as it may deem desirable relating to functional fields generally but not with re­spect to individual territories.” The committee was to be constituted in the same way as the ad hoc committee, consisting of a representative from each of the eight administering states and an equal number of nonadministering states. Subsequently, the Fourth Committee elected China, Cuba, Egypt, India, and the Soviet Union, all of which had served on the ad hoc committee in 1947, and newcomers Colombia, Nicaragua, and Sweden.41 In reporting on the just-­concluded Second General Assembly to the British Cabinet, Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones returned to the disparaging language he had used the previous year in dismissing anticolonial sentiment at the United Nations as motivated by “prejudice” and “ignorance.” Rooted in



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Britain’s centuries of experience as a colonial power, such language was out of step with the increasingly popu­lar idea that all territories deserved the sort of international supervision found in the Trusteeship System, supervision that the Charter declared would lead to in­de­pen­dence.42 So long as the administering states and their allies could appeal to Article 18 to designate thorny mea­sures dealing with the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories impor­tant questions requiring two-­thirds majority support for approval and then muster a blocking third to prevent that approval, they could counteract anticolonial sentiment—­even if it reflected majority sentiment in the General Assembly—­ and preserve the Charter’s call for minimal UN involvement. The administering states, as we have seen, used this tactic with good effect during the Second General Assembly. As the pro­cess of decolonization eroded their control of the Assembly, however, this strategy became decreasingly successful. Much of the work of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter in 1948, which met 2–17 September in Geneva and 23 and 29 September in Paris, dealt directly with w ­ hether the distinction between the trust and nontrust dependent states should continue. Using its status as “­until recently . . . ​the most impor­tant Non-­Self-­Governing Territory in the world,” India renewed its call to “remove the distinctions” between the two types of dependent territories. Taking a dif­fer­ent tack than his proposal in 1947 to place all such territories ­under the Trusteeship System, Indian delegate Shiva Rao now advanced a working paper full of ambitious reforms. Among its less contentious ele­ments ­were development of a timetable for transmission of the information required ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter and expansion of the kinds of information to be transmitted via the Standard Form. More controversially, it called for a permanent special committee to be comprised of twenty-­four members “elected by the General Assembly on the princi­ple of equitable geo­g raph­i­cal distribution.” Electing committee members at the General Assembly level rather than the Fourth Committee would place the new entity on par with the Trusteeship Council; not providing for a balanced membership or reserving even one seat for the administering states created the potential for an overwhelmingly anticolonial orientation. (The Trusteeship Council, by contrast, included all of the relevant administering states.) In closing with a call to define the term “non-­self-­ governing ­people” and thus definitively identify ­those territories to which Chapter XI applied, the working paper again mirrored the Charter’s clear delineation of the territories that fell ­under the auspices of the Trusteeship System.43 A competing US working paper took a more moderate approach to many of the same issues. Notably, it expanded the timetables for the

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preparation of information for transmission to the Secretariat and advocated no immediate changes to the Standard Form. And it contained no specific recommendations regarding the renewal of the Special Committee or the creation of a permanent entity, noting simply “the assumption that the General Assembly ­will wish to provide in f­ uture years for a special committee to consider the information transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter.”44 The administering states ­were generally favorably disposed ­toward the US proposals but spoke out loudly and forcefully against several features of the Indian working paper.45 Belgium’s Pierre Ryckmans contended that a special committee configured along the lines India suggested would be nothing but a po­liti­cal body “not qualified to deal with technical questions,” the only sorts of questions such a committee should ­handle. ­Great Britain’s John Fletcher-­Cooke “firmly opposed” the creation of a permanent committee and joined Denmark’s Hermod Lannung in rejecting anything less than a committee that included all of the administering states, which Lannung insisted had a “right to be heard and to answer criticisms.” Nor ­were the other Indian proposals more palatable to Britain, which particularly recoiled at the thought of the General Assembly defining the term “non-­self-­governing territory,” a m ­ atter that “lay exclusively with each Metropolitan Power.” France’s Roger Garreau added an oblique criticism of Soviet colonialism in noting that unlike the eight administering states, which had forthrightly met their obligations ­under Article 73(e), “other sovereign states . . . ​had Non-­Self-­Governing ­peoples within their frontiers, but . . . ​ did not transmit information.” The administering states’ insistence that the task of defining “non-­self-­governing ­people” fell to each metropole, though, weakened their claim that the Soviet Union was a colonial power, since assuming such a mantle would presumably be up to Moscow alone.46 In almost complete opposition to the administering states’ stance, the nonadministering states preferred the Indian proposals to the ones the United States had advanced. The Chinese representative, committee chair Cheng Paonan, saw no reason why the Special Committee could not be permanent, although he did believe that the membership of such an entity must follow that of the balanced Special Committee. In keeping with what was becoming his bent, Soviet representative A. G. Kulagenkov accused the administering states of “attempt[ing] to transform [the Special Committee] into a harmless toy” and proposed that the drafting committee accept the activist agenda contained in the Indian working paper. When he forced a vote on this proposition, it fell to defeat by 11 votes to 1, with 2 abstentions.47 Defeat of the Soviet proposal placed a drafting subcommittee, composed of the representatives of Cuba, France, India, New Zealand, the Soviet Union, and the United States, in charge of crafting proposed resolutions for transmis-



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sion to the Fourth Committee. The resolutions it produced, in the words of Hermod Lannung of Denmark, who served as rapporteur for both entities, ­were the result of a “spirit of compromise,” with each mea­sure ultimately winning the support of e­ very member save the Soviet Union, which e­ ither voted against or abstained on all of them.48 Two of the proposed resolutions dealt with the broad issue of the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories. One addressed information transmission in general and combined ele­ments of the US and Indian working papers. Its most impor­tant point was empowering the Secretariat to prepare summaries of the information transmitted ­under the voluntary sections of the Standard Form, which included po­liti­cal information. Discussion of the draft resolution was neither deep nor long, most representatives having already expressed their views on this subject, although a few minor suggestions for revision w ­ ere offered. The lone exception was the Soviet Union’s Kulagenkov, who had opposed the mea­sure in the drafting subcommittee as not ­going far enough to assist the pro­cess of “transforming colonies into in­de­pen­dent countries” and who formally introduced four amendments that would bring the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories closer to that prevailing in the trust territories: mandatory transmission of po­liti­cal information; consideration of petitions from p­ eople in the nontrust dependent territories; expansion of the sources of information made available to the Secretary-­General; and annual visits to the nontrust dependent territories to consider conditions first hand. ­After finding all four Soviet amendments inadmissible, the Special Committee went on to approve the draft resolution on information transmission by 14 votes to 1, defeating, at least temporarily, efforts to appreciably expand UN responsibility for the non-­self-­governing territories.49 The other resolution that touched on the general UN role in t­ hose territories dealt with the ­f uture of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73(e) and generated considerable discussion. It called for the committee’s extension for one more year (although the option of further extensions was left open) with the same balanced membership. The committee would continue to operate on more or less the same terms of reference, making procedural recommendations as well as substantive ones concerning the three functional fields listed in Article 73(e): economic, social, and educational. No sooner had discussion of the resolution begun than the Soviet representative moved to have it declared inadmissible, claiming that its call for a one-­ year term for the committee conflicted with Resolution 146 (II), which had set no expiration date for the pre­sent Special Committee. Once this motion had been defeated by a vote of 11 to 1, with 2 abstentions, the Special Committee approved the second draft resolution by a vote of 11 to 1, with 3 abstentions. ­Here, as elsewhere, the administering states could take heart

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at having defeated the most expansive proposals for UN intervention in the non-­self-­governing territories.50 Representatives of the administering states used their opening statements to the Fourth Committee to reiterate their firm opposition to international accountability for all dependent territories and to condemn the hy­poc­risy that they saw in Soviet bloc calls for such a course.51 New Zealand’s J. S. Reid asserted that Chapter XI was a “unilateral declaration” of princi­ples the administering states had simply inserted into the Charter for the world to see. It did not imply UN supervision of the nontrust dependent territories and could in no way be construed as a transfer of ­those states’ authority to the United Nations. Australian representative J. D. L. Hood made a similar point, reminding the nonadministering states that by signing the UN Charter, they had agreed “to re­spect the terms and the limitations inherent in that Charter” and should not now be “press[ing] for what was not required by the terms of Chapter XI.” In addition to echoing the call for a strict interpretation of the Charter, Britain’s Grantley Adams also pointed out that although not classified by the United Nations as an administering power, the Soviet Union was in fact “dealing with communities within [its] borders of differing stages of po­liti­cal, economic, social and cultural development. The only difference [between the Soviet situation and that of the colonial powers] was that t­ hose ­peoples [who had been absorbed into the Soviet Union] w ­ ere geo­graph­i­cally within the metropolitan area” while the ­peoples of the non-­self-­governing territories ­were not.52 ­Bitter wrangling over the proper UN role in the nontrust dependent territories continued ­after the Soviet representative reintroduced Kulagenkov’s ­earlier unsuccessful effort to equalize UN ­handling of dependent territories. This effort met a similar end. Uruguay’s Hector A. Gerona spoke for many del­e­ga­tions when he pointed out that by “giv[ing] to Chapter XI the same implications as ­those of Chapters XII and XIII,” the Soviet resolution constituted an unacceptable alteration “of the Charter through a General Assembly resolution.” Poland alone defended the draft resolution, asserting that “only ­those who had something to hide or did not intend to implement their obligations ­under Article 73 would be afraid to vote” for it. ­After a series of roll-­call votes on each portion of the proposal demonstrated the Fourth Committee’s lack of support, it went down to defeat on a non-­roll-­call vote of 30 to 6, presumably securing the votes of only the Soviet bloc states—­Byelorussia, Czecho­ slo­va­k ia, Poland, the Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Yugo­slavia.53 Efforts to treat the Chapter XI territories more like the trust territories did not end t­ here, however. A ­ fter the Soviet del­e­ga­tion again sought unsuccessfully to make the transmission of po­liti­cal information mandatory, the committee approved without alteration, by a vote of 38 to 6, the resolution dealing



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with the issue of information transmission that the Special Committee had sent on. Although t­ here was no recorded roll call, the tenor of committee debate suggests that the Soviet bloc again provided the six dissenting votes. Discussion of the resolution regarding the ­f uture of the Special Committee generated a call for making it permanent. Many del­e­ga­tions defended the resolution that the Special Committee had approved and expressed their intention to back it in the spirit of compromise that had characterized that body’s work, even if they preferred a permanent or longer-­term committee. That position ultimately carried the day, and the original resolution won approval without change by a nonrecorded vote of 38 to 7.54 In another attempt at international accountability, the Indian del­e­ga­tion introduced a resolution calling on administering states to offer an explanation when they de­cided to stop transmitting information on territories formerly listed as non-­self-­governing, a move that was required for the territories that fell ­under the Trusteeship System. India’s motivation in introducing this mea­ sure was its concern that although information on some territories initially listed in 1946 as non-­self-­governing had not been transmitted in 1947 and 1948, the administering states involved had not explained why. The proposal would ensure that cessation of information occurred only when a territory had achieved an appropriate level of self-­government, as judged by the United Nations, thus placing authority for determining an individual territory’s status in the hands of the organ­ization, not the administering state.55 Unlike other proposals, the one on cessation of information generated a rift between the major Eu­ro­pean administering states and the United States. ­Great Britain’s Grantley Adams was the primary spokesperson for the former camp, explaining that his government could not comply with the draft resolution’s call to transmit information regarding “full details of the changes” that had led to a territory’s new status, which w ­ ere exclusively internal United Kingdom ­matters. The del­e­ga­tions of Australia and France agreed. For its part, the United States noted that it would provide the United Nations with the kinds of information called for “even in the absence of a resolution such as the one in question.” The only caveat US representative Francis B. Sayre expressed was that the United Nations could not determine the status of an individual territory.56 Support for the Indian proposal within the Fourth Committee was other­wise high, and it passed on a roll-­call vote of 29 to 0, with 17 abstentions. Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United States among the administering states voted yes; Australia, Belgium, France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom abstained.57 The one plenary meeting that the General Assembly, which now numbered fifty-­eight ­after the admission of Burma in May, devoted to the Fourth

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Committee’s report stood in stark contrast to the time that body, and the Special Committee on Information before it, had spent on ­matters related to the UN role in the nontrust dependent territories. A ­ fter no real discussion, voting in the General Assembly followed the same patterns exhibited in the Fourth Committee. The resolutions that that body had forwarded from the Special Committee w ­ ere, at the request of the Soviet Union, voted by roll call. And the Soviet bloc (Byelorus­sia, Czecho­slo­va­k ia, Poland, the Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Yugo­slavia) voted against both the general mea­sure on information transmission and the renewal of the Special Committee for another year; they ­were virtually the only members not to support ­those resolutions (Argentina and Haiti abstained on the first; Brazil voted no on the second). No roll call was requested on the resolution on the cessation of information transmission that the Indian del­e­ga­tion had introduced in the Fourth Committee, and it passed on a nonrecorded vote “without opposition,” although presumably with the same administering states that had abstained in the Fourth Committee—­Australia, Belgium, France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom—­doing so again.58 None of the three resolutions that dealt with the UN role in the non-­self-­ governing territories approved during the Third General Assembly truly challenged the administering states’ prerogatives. Resolution 218 (III) spelled out specifics regarding the pro­cess of information transmission and affirmed that transmission of po­liti­cal information was voluntary, while Resolution 219 (III) renewed the Special Committee on Information for another year ­under the same terms of reference. China, Egypt, India, the Soviet Union, and Sweden ­were all reelected; Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela ­were all elected as new members.59 Even Resolution 222 (III), which had split the administering states in both the Fourth Committee and the General Assembly, pertained only to ­those territories for which they de­cided to cease transmitting information and thus upheld previous decisions not to seek or make mandatory information on governmental institutions or po­liti­cal ­matters in territories that remained non-­self-­governing.60 In assessing the overall course of the Third General Assembly, British Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones noted with some plea­sure the “definite tendency on the part of most of the non-­colonial Powers to dissociate themselves from the Slav bloc” and the “irresponsible attacks of the Soviet representative,” as evidenced by the numerous recorded votes in which the Soviet bloc stood alone.61 The Soviet bloc’s isolation was in fact becoming noticeable across UN forums, as its members, which always voted in unison at the Soviet Union’s direction, found themselves increasingly at odds with the majority. This was good news for the administering states, which w ­ ere loath to



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see the Soviets gain real allies in the quest to use colonialism as a Cold War tool, and certainly something they hoped to see continue in the f­ uture.62 All ­things considered, the Third General Assembly failed to appreciably expand the UN mandate regarding the Chapter XI territories. It remained to be seen, however, w ­ hether this course could continue. Although not directly related to the evolving drive for international accountability, approval during the Third General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of ­Human Rights (UDHR), which advanced the revolutionary idea that all h ­ uman beings w ­ ere entitled to the same basic rights regardless of where they dwelled, proved to be an impor­tant development for that overall issue. The declaration was not a treaty, carried no force of law, and included no enforcement mechanisms or provisions (a story all to itself that lies beyond the confines of this book), but it nevertheless assumed a prized place in international circles.63 Lebanon’s Charles Malik, who in 1948 chaired the Assembly’s Third Committee, responsible for social, cultural, and humanitarian m ­ atters and who served as a member of the UN ­Human Rights Commission, called the declaration “a document of the first order of importance.” Eleanor Roo­ se­velt, who headed up the commission, postulated that “it might well become the Magna Carta of all mankind.” And Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines, one of the most vocal proponents of international accountability, deemed it nothing less than “justif[ying the United Nations’] existence before an anxious world” at a time when the organ­ization was “on trial for its life.”64 Romulo’s remarks during General Assembly debate over the UDHR placed consideration of that document within broader international developments, specifically rising East-­West tensions, even if he did not say so directly. Debate on the UDHR, in fact, occurred as US cargo planes w ­ ere making daily flights over blockaded West Berlin in a desperate effort to provide the city’s beleaguered residents with vital food, fuel, and medicine. A symbol of Western—­particularly US—­determination not to abandon the Allied zones of Germany, the airlift, as well as the larger issue of a divided Germany, made clear the bipolarization that had come to characterize international relations just three years ­after ­Grand Alliance cooperation had defeated the Axis. That bipolarization had already manifested itself in the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the Soviet crackdown in Czecho­slo­va­k ia, and it would be further solidified in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ­ization and the war in K ­ orea. It was also evident in UN consideration of the UDHR and the general m ­ atter of h ­ uman rights in the years to come, as each side in the East-­West confrontation sought to score points by scouring the other for ­human rights failings. That the six members of the Soviet bloc at the United Nations w ­ ere among eight nations to abstain when the UDHR went up for a

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vote highlighted the East-­West split on ­human rights at the United Nations and set the stage for the harsh rhe­toric on that subject that followed.65 A second impor­tant context for the UDHR was the declaration’s applicability to the more than 700 million ­people who called the dozens of dependent territories home. As Johannes Morsink’s detailed study of the drafting of the UDHR makes clear, the question of ­whether to single out the non-­self-­ governing ­peoples for special mention in the declaration occasioned a fierce and somewhat protracted b­ attle that the major colonial powers ultimately won.66 The declaration therefore contained no separate article dealing with the rights of non-­self-­governing ­peoples, noting merely that “no distinction ­shall be made on the basis of the po­liti­cal, jurisdictional or international status of the territory to which a person belongs, w ­ hether it be in­de­pen­dent, trust, non-­self-­governing or u ­ nder any other limitation of sovereignty.”67 The universal rights enumerated in the declaration also conspicuously omitted the right to self-­determination, a victory for the Western administering states against ­those committed to the complete eradication of colonial rule. If anticolonial activists ­were not strong or numerous enough in 1948 to secure inclusion in the UDHR of explicit endorsement of the right to self-­determination and extension of basic rights protections to non-­self-­governing ­peoples, however, they kept their sights set on ­those goals in the years ahead.68 The period between the conclusion of the Third General Assembly in December 1948 and the opening of the 1949 session of the Special Committee on Information the following August provided American and British officials an opportunity to assess their approaches to the broad question of UN involvement in the non-­self-­governing territories. A sweeping State Department study titled “United States Policy ­toward Colonial Areas” made the Cold War’s paramountcy clear. In formulating a stance ­toward the pro­cess of decolonization in general, the overriding US goal was to ensure that newly emergent states “achieve[d] and maintain[ed] friendly relationships with the western demo­ cratic nations,” a course that squared with the administering states’ own posture. Less appealing to t­hose states was the concomitant US belief that preventing emerging nations from aligning with the Soviet bloc required “a progressive colonial policy” that included administering state concessions to both indigenous nationalism on the ground and calls for greater UN involvement in the nontrust dependent territories. Absent this sort of approach, the Soviet Union would emerge as the champion of decolonization, with disastrous results for Western security. To minimize the Cold War–­related consequences of decolonization, the State Department saw no alternative to continuing a ­middle ground position of mediating between the non-­self-­



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governing territories and the administering states by encouraging self-­ government and in­ de­ pen­ dence where appropriate, pushing for more progressive colonial policies when pos­si­ble, and accepting constructive UN involvement in the nontrust dependent territories.69 When it came to specific issues, internal US discussions and position papers called for a liberal approach to questions related to the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories. For example, US officials endorsed the Special Committee on Information’s continuation for a three-­year period as an alternative to its permanent establishment, which the nonadministering states w ­ ere likely to propose. Although the committee was not an ideal entity, officials in the State Department believed—­with justification—­that its balanced membership had resulted in more moderate recommended resolutions than would have originated in the Fourth Committee, where the eight administering states ­were up against fifty-­one nonadministering ones (Israel having been admitted in May) and where the anticolonial majority held sway. US strategy for the upcoming Special Committee session also included efforts to neutralize Soviet bloc criticisms of Western colonialism with objective, factual information about ­actual achievements and planned development proj­ects in the Chapter XI territories and to encourage moderate nonadministering states such as India, China, and Egypt to play a more active role in countering the Soviet bloc’s anticolonial pretensions.70 British officials ­were also planning for a more activist approach to colonial questions at the United Nations, albeit not precisely the sort that their US counter­parts had in mind. Although US officials could get b­ ehind British plans for a more aggressive campaign to publicize the achievements of British colonial administration, they w ­ ere dismayed at the absence of any consideration of the more moderate colonial policy that Washington advocated. Nor was ­there even the slightest British support for the US proposal to extend the Special Committee for another three years. As far as British policymakers w ­ ere concerned, the committee constituted l­ ittle more than a stage for anticolonial criticism and should not be continued beyond its 1949 session.71 Several ele­ments of the Special Committee’s 1949 session confirmed British fears. One came during consideration of what constituted a non-­ self-­ governing territory—­ a seemingly ­ simple question that defied easy answers—­and spotlighted the split between proponents of a l­imited conception of the UN role in the Chapter XI territories and backers of an expansive, if not limitless, one. For their part, the administering states contended that the ­matter fell outside the committee’s purview. In a continued appeal to the princi­ple of national sovereignty, they insisted that each administering authority should identify the territories it deemed non-­self-­governing and on which

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it would transmit information in conformity with Article 73(e), again apparently without regard for how this position weakened their claim that despite its protestations to the contrary, the Soviet Union was an imperial power.72 Egypt’s Ahmed M. Farrag spoke for t­ hose who held the opposite view—­and who subscribed to a dif­fer­ent sort of princi­ple. The arrival of “a new conception of international law . . . ​which might properly be described as the theory of international accountability,” he proclaimed, made the administering states’ position obsolete. Accordingly, he proposed that the UN formally determinate the territories that fell within Chapter XI’s purview in the same manner that it had identified the territories that fell ­under the auspices of the Trusteeship System. Securing approval of such a move, though, proved difficult. Even India, which normally supported efforts to expand UN power, admitted that Egypt’s proposal fell outside the Special Committee’s terms of reference, although its representative suggested that the Fourth Committee might take up the ­matter of its own volition and draft an appropriate resolution for the w ­ hole General Assembly. ­There the ­matter rested, at least as far as the Special Committee itself was concerned.73 The Indian del­e­ga­tion took the lead on another initiative to demonstrate UN authority in proposing that all administering states be invited to transmit information on t­hose portions of the Standard Form labeled optional—­ addressing geography, history, p­ eople, government, and h ­ uman rights. The real target h ­ ere was the category called “government,” which was another way of saying “po­liti­cal conditions.” Resolution 144 (II) had deemed the “voluntary transmission” of po­liti­cal information “entirely in conformity with the spirit of Article 73 of the Charter” and “encouraged” all administering states to supply it. ­Those that did not wish to do so had found the resolution easy to ignore, since the word “encourage” carried l­ittle weight and t­ here was no penalty for failing to provide information that was “voluntary.” The use of the stronger word “invites” in the Indian resolution thus raised the administering states’ hackles. France’s Garreau, for example, condemned the “moral pressure” implicit in the new proposal and warned that its approval would push his nation to halt its voluntary transmission of po­liti­cal information—an outcome that the representatives from New Zealand and the Netherlands also predicted as they joined him in opposition. For his part, Britain’s Fletcher-­ Cooke castigated the resolution for exceeding the obligations contained in Article 73(e). Indian representative Shiva Rao failed to allay the administering states’ concerns. Nor was he able to defuse criticism from Soviet representative Aleksander Soldatov, who submitted his own draft resolution making the transmission of po­liti­cal information “obligatory.” If the defeat of the Soviet proposal on a vote of 12 to 2 was a victory for a strict interpretation of the



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Charter, subsequent approval of the Indian resolution on a non-­roll-­call vote of 5 to 3, with 8 abstentions (presumably all of the administering states), suggested support for at least encouraging the administering states to be more forthcoming about po­liti­cal developments in their non-­self-­governing territories. It also raised the prospect of a more forceful mea­sure at the Fourth Committee.74 The issue of international accountability also lay at the heart of the Special Committee’s consideration of its own ­future. Resolution 219 (III) creating the committee “without prejudice to the f­ uture” had left open a variety of options. Some states advocated establishing the committee on a permanent basis, a course, they maintained, that was perfectly in keeping with the spirit of the Charter and one that would allow the Special Committee more time to address the substantive ­matters affecting the ­peoples of the non-­self-­ governing territories by eliminating the need to continually debate its own ­f uture. It would also signal UN commitment to shepherding t­ hose territories along the road to self-­government and ultimate in­de­pen­dence by creating an institutional mechanism for dealing with them that resembled the Trusteeship Council. Predictably, the administering states strenuously disagreed. Britain’s John Fletcher-­Cooke warned against efforts to turn the committee into a shadow Trusteeship Council by blurring the distinction between Chapter XI pertaining to the nontrust dependent territories and Chapters XII and XIII dealing with the trust territories. The Special Committee, he contended, should not be continued for more than one year, if that, sentiments Sweden’s Sven Grafström and France’s Roger Garreau shared.75 Ultimately, the committee considered three resolutions regarding its ­future. China, Egypt, India, and Venezuela proposed that it continue with the same terms of reference on a permanent basis. The United States called for continuing it for a period of three years. And Belgium recommended its renewal for 1950 only. Both the establishment of a permanent committee and extension for one year went down on the same nonrecorded 8 to 6 margin. That left the US proposal for a three-­year committee the only remaining option, and it was approved by a roll-­call vote of 8 to 4, with 4 abstentions. Denmark and the United States ­were the only administering states to back the mea­sure. Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom voted in opposition; Australia and New Zealand joined the Dominican Republic and Sweden in abstaining.76 As was the case with the draft resolution dealing with po­liti­cal information, administering state resignation to a three-­year term for the Special Committee on Information was accompanied by the prospect that the Fourth Committee would approve an even more sweeping mea­sure.77 British officials expected “a very rough passage” ahead as the question of the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories moved to the Fourth

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Committee. Although they considered not participating, they de­cided to cooperate with the committee whenever pos­si­ble to ensure that they ­were not left unrepresented. Internal discussions also revealed continued disagreements between the Foreign and Colonial Offices over the best approach to t­ hose UN members who saw Chapter XI as “enshrin[ing] the doctrine of international colonial accountability.” Some within the Foreign Office seemed willing to concede this point, while t­ hose in the Colonial Office took a determined stand against what they considered “any spirit of appeasement” in that direction.78 As we ­will see, divisions between the Foreign and Colonial Offices deepened as the years went on, illustrating the multifaceted international considerations that ­shaped British foreign policy and revealing ultimately that imperial concerns could not dominate policymaking.79 Efforts at the 1949 session of the Fourth Committee to ramp up UN responsibility for the nontrust dependent territories fulfilled British officials’ worst fears. During discussion of the Special Committee on Information’s draft resolution encouraging the transmission of po­liti­cal information, the Cuban del­ e­ga­tion introduced an amendment that explic­itly called for revising the Standard Form to move information on “geography, history, ­people and ­human rights” to the mandatory category and express “the hope” that more states would include po­liti­cal information. French delegate Pierre-­Olivier Lapie led the charge against this most recent attempt to weaken the Charter-­ mandated distinction between the trust and nontrust dependent territories.80 But the Cuban amendment won approval by a vote of 29 to 11, with 5 abstentions, and the resolution sent forward by the Special Committee, as thereby amended, was approved 25 to 8, with 7 abstentions. Although neither vote was taken u ­ nder a roll call, during discussion of the issue Britain and Belgium had announced their opposition to both the original mea­sure and the Cuban amendment, the Netherlands its intention to abstain, and the United States its intention to support the original mea­sure and abstain on the Cuban amendment. As the votes revealed, support for the transmission of po­liti­cal information was significant, well surpassing the two-­thirds margin needed ­under Article 18 pertaining to impor­tant questions and therefore rendering appeal to such a route when it came to voting in the General Assembly moot.81 Supporters of a dramatically expanded UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories had less success when it came to the Special Committee on Information’s f­ uture, a weighty ­matter that was debated over several meetings of the Fourth Committee. The Special Committee itself, as we have seen, had recommended its own renewal for a three-­year period, a compromise between ­those who wished to see it extended in­def­initely and t­ hose who could countenance its extension for merely one more year. Ultimately, the Fourth Com-



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mittee recommended that the Special Committee be granted a three-­year term by the overwhelming vote of 41 to 4, with 2 abstentions, one of the strongest demonstrations of support in the committee’s 1949 session. Britain, France, and Belgium dissented, while New Zealand abstained; the other four administering states joined most states in voting in the affirmative.82 In a move that the administering states saw as another effort to interject the United Nations into their national prerogatives, the Egyptian del­e­ga­tion introduced its proposal for an examination of “the ­factors which should be taken into account in deciding w ­ hether any territory is or is not a territory whose ­people have not yet attained a full mea­sure of self-­government,” which had ­earlier fallen victim to the Special Committee’s ­limited terms of reference. Administering-­state opposition was fierce. In addition to expressing doubt that any “useful purpose” could come from such a study, Fletcher-­Cooke warned that Britain would oppose on princi­ple any Special Committee attempt to decide a par­tic­ul­ar territory’s status. In seeking to defuse criticism of the exercise, Cuba’s Guy Pérez Cisneros asserted that the proposal posed no threat to administering states’ authority and optimistically predicted that most would support it. He could not have been more wrong. The mea­sure did win Fourth Committee approval by a vote of 30 to 10, with 7 abstentions, but it failed to secure the support of a single administering state. Denmark and the United States abstained; the other six colonial administrators voted no.83 Ultimately, proponents of a larger UN role in the nontrust dependent territories carried the day when the General Assembly voted on the proposed resolutions. What became Resolution 332 (IV), approved on a vote of 44 to 5, with 4 abstentions (Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom among the opposition), extended the Special Committee for a three-­year period and empowered it to consider the information transmitted in conformity with Article 73(e) in the context of the Charter’s general princi­ples. In ostensibly charging the committee with judging how well the administering states ­were meeting their Charter-­mandated responsibilities, it thus moved beyond previous UN involvement in the non-­self-­governing territories. (Brazil, Egypt, India, and the Soviet Union w ­ ere elected for three-­year terms, Mexico and the Philippines for two-­year terms, and Sweden and Venezuela for one-­year terms. Mexico and the Philippines ­were joining the committee for the first time; the other states had served previously. In keeping with their opposition to the committee’s formal constitution, Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom refused to participate in the election of nonadministering members of the Special Committee.)84 Further confirmation that the Special Committee would consider substantive m ­ atters came in Resolution 333 (IV), which directed it to give special consideration to education in 1950, thus establishing a rotating

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three-­year cycle regarding the functional areas enumerated in Article 73(e). It passed on a nonrecorded vote of 35 to 5, with 9 abstentions.85 The draft resolution dealing with the f­actors that made a territory non-­self-­governing, alone in generating specific and extended discussion during floor debate, passed with the slimmest margin of victory (30 to 12, with 10 abstentions) on a roll-­call vote that saw Denmark and the United States abstaining, while the other six administering states—­Australia, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom—­dissented. What became Resolution 334 (IV) initiated a study of the f­ actors that made a territory non-­self-­governing, a development the administering states opposed as establishing the princi­ple that the United Nations could determine an individual territory’s status.86 Fi­nally, Resolution 327 (IV) pertaining to the voluntary transmission of information ­under the Standard Form, which passed on a vote of 33 to 9, with 11 abstentions, altered the terms through which the administering states w ­ ere to meet their Article 73(e) responsibilities and constituted for ­those states yet another example of mounting disregard of what they saw as the clear limits of the Charter.87 Taken together, the resolutions the Fourth General Assembly approved went some distance t­oward easing the distinction between the trust and nontrust dependent territories and served as an unwelcome reminder of the growth of anticolonialism at the United Nations. British soul searching ­after the conclusion of the Fourth General Assembly was profound. The successful campaign to expand the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories suggested the need for more proactive propaganda to ­counter per­sis­tent ideas regarding the rapacious nature of Britain’s colonial role. As Roger Allen of the Foreign Office’s United Nations Department made clear, Britain “had not succeeded in ‘putting across’ its line” at the United Nations. Corrective action was needed, he proclaimed, to prevent the British from “fast driving” themselves “into the position hitherto held by the Rus­sians where [they] w ­ ere in opposition to world opinion.” Anglo-­American differences over colonial questions w ­ ere another serious concern for British officials, who well recognized “that the attitude of the United States [was] of vital importance in t­ hose ­matters” but also realized that bending to US sentiment was not an option. The United States seemed “to think that high minded resolutions passed by overwhelming majorities without any attention ­either to the limitations of the Charter or to the realities of the situation in the Non-­Self-­Governing Territories themselves, ­will in some mystical way bolster up the prestige of the United Nations.” British officials could not have rejected this position more firmly and intended to work to dispel it in the months before the 1950 session of the Special Committee. They also appreci-



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ated the need to pre­sent a more aggressive information campaign to the moderate noncolonial powers.88 The years 1947–1949 witnessed a variety of proposals for breaking the administering states’ exclusive responsibility for colonial administration, including making the transmission of po­liti­cal information mandatory and placing all dependent territories u ­ nder the Trusteeship System. If the most extreme proposals for expanding the UN role in the nontrust dependent territories did not secure approval by the close of the Fourth General Assembly, the United Nations had nevertheless assumed impor­tant new functions in that area. It had codified the information administering states ­were to transmit in the Standard Form. It had requested that administering states inform the secretary-­general when they intended to halt the transmission of information ­under Article 73(e). It initiated a study of the ­factors that made a territory non-­self-­governing. And it established the Special Committee on Information for a three-­year period with the power to make recommendations regarding economic, social, and educational conditions in the Chapter XI territories. At the same time, however, in a development that was in keeping with Evan Luard’s description of the United Nations’ first de­cade as “the years of Western domination,” the administering states w ­ ere able to block the most expansive proposals for international accountability for dependent territories, at times through use of Article 18 of the Charter to raise the bar for approval of mea­sures that might challenge their national prerogatives.89 They w ­ ere less successful, however, at dampening anticolonial rhe­toric, particularly from the Soviet bloc, which worked at e­ very turn to use colonial questions at the United Nations for its own purposes. This was particularly the case in the Fourth Committee, where discussion revealed the depth of international interest in the non-­self-­governing territories. Nor w ­ ere British officials able to effect common cause with their American counter­parts, who worried that London’s preoccupation with national interests endangered the larger Western position that was coming to dominate thinking in Washington. As the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter prepared for its first three-­year session, the stage for continuing conflict over colonial questions was set on numerous levels: the administering and nonadministering states would continue to wrangle; British and American policymakers would continue to disagree; and the Soviet bloc would continue to use anticolonialism as a weapon against the West.

C h a p t er  3

Orga­nizational Foundations The Committee on Information Becomes Operational

The period 1950–1952, which constituted the first three-­year session of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter (renamed in 1951 as simply the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories), saw increasing international interest in the non-­self-­governing territories. Strident anticolonial rhe­toric at times punctuated the committee’s meetings, but its balanced composition and l­imited terms of reference meant that it posed no significant challenge to the Charter-­mandated distinction between the trust and nontrust dependent territories. In a pattern that had developed e­ arlier and that intensified l­ater, the Fourth Committee served as the locus of activist sentiment, with proponents of a more robust UN role in the Chapter XI territories advancing a variety of proposals to effect more uniform treatment of the dependent territories that, if approved, would have significantly eroded administering state authority. Although discussion of the non-­self-­governing territories at the General Assembly level was minimal during this period, by late 1952, the UN role in the nontrust dependent territories had expanded beyond the confines set in the Charter. And all signs pointed to further expansion in the foreseeable f­ uture. Cold War tensions continued to cast a pall over UN operations in general, and the ­handling of the Chapter XI territories in par­tic­u­lar, during ­these years. The Korean War, which began in June 1950 just as member-­states ­were beginning to plan for the Fifth General Assembly, rent the organ­ization in two and 60

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had a variety of short-­and long-­term consequences. An ill-­timed Soviet boycott of UN forums in protest of the US-­led refusal to transfer China’s seat in the organ­ization to the recently victorious Communists allowed the United States to push for swift UN intervention in K ­ orea on the side of the West, thereby demonstrating continuing US dominance of the organ­ization. Although the Soviet boycott was actually brief, it provided Western nations with a ready-­made propaganda weapon, once the Soviets returned, in the form of accusations that Moscow was more interested in grinding po­liti­cal axes than working with other nations to address the world’s pressing prob­lems, including decolonization. The Soviets saw more success in their campaign against Secretary-­General Trygve Lie, whose purported favoritism for the West resulted in Soviet refusal to work with him and ultimately forced him to resign in November 1952.1 Broad international developments also worked to shape the evolving UN role in the nontrust dependent territories. Early decolonization, beginning with the in­de­pen­dence of Indonesia in late 1949, inaugurated campaigns to involve the General Assembly more fully in administering states’ decisions to cease transmission of the information called for by Article 73(e) and to define precisely what a non-­self-­governing territory was. Moves on both fronts, which reflected UN practice in the trust territories, threatened the administering states’ l­ imited conception of UN authority vis-­à-­vis the Chapter XI territories. And while ­those states held the line against real challenges to their authority in the territories they oversaw through 1952, they likely realized the short-­term nature of their successes. In the lead-up to the Fifth General Assembly, US officials traced much of the anticolonial sentiment at the United Nations to the hardline stance that Britain in par­tic­u­lar had taken at the previous session, when it had failed to support even one resolution dealing with the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories. Such a position, they maintained, was counterproductive, securing l­ ittle if any gain and ultimately antagonizing members of all po­liti­cal stripes, even t­ hose that w ­ ere not inveterately anticolonial. To improve the situation, US officials sought to convince their British counter­parts that the growing and legitimate international interest in the plight of the non-­self-­governing ­peoples in no way “affect[ed] their control of their Empire.” Far the wisest course for Britain (and by extension the other administering states), therefore, was to accept UN interest in the nontrust dependent territories, cooperate in efforts to bring ­those territories along ­toward self-­government and, where appropriate, in­de­pen­dence, and thereby demonstrate the sort of enlightened and positive attitude that would foster the goodwill of the United Nations’ nonadministering majority.2

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Internal British discussions revealed the continued presence of competing visions of the nation’s international position. Given its focus on preserving Britain’s role as an imperial power, the Colonial Office remained opposed to any move that suggested a UN right of “supervision” over the territories that fell ­under the aegis of Chapter XI of the Charter. Policymakers ­there resented the “powers of roving inquiry” that the Fourth General Assembly had imparted upon the Special Committee on Information, denounced, in culturally loaded language, the “irresponsibility,” “prejudice,” “emotion,” and “ignorance” that motivated many—if not most—of the anticolonial states, and insisted that the “ignorant and incompetent” General Assembly had no right to advise Britain on how to meet its responsibilities t­ oward the non-­self-­governing territories. Not surprisingly, they advocated a tough posture that resisted all efforts to expand the United Nations’ role in the non-­self-­governing territories or to equalize ­those territories and the UN trusteeships.3 Policymakers in the Foreign Office continued to adopt a wider gaze that took account of more than Britain’s interests as an imperial power. The “rigid and reactionary” policy that Britain had employed in 1949, they lamented, had left it “dangerously isolated and separated from the United States,” a most unwelcome situation that could redound negatively on other issues. As a remedy, the Foreign Office advocated abandoning firm opposition to all resolutions dealing with colonial questions, as had been Britain’s wont during the 1949 General Assembly, in f­avor of a policy of “briefly explain[ing] our doubts and abstain[ing].” It also advised British participation in the Committee on Information, despite its questionable effectiveness. Ultimately, the Colonial Office was forced to accede to the Foreign Office’s more moderate position and to accept, at least for the moment, that the nation’s stance on the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories had to be grounded in more than merely imperial considerations.4 ­These national positions informed bilateral discussions in Washington in early July, just a few weeks ­after the outbreak of war in ­Korea.5 British officials took heart at US affirmations that the Charter did indeed draw a clear distinction between the Chapter XI territories and t­ hose that fell u ­ nder the aus6 pices of the Trusteeship System. Less una­nim­i­ty, though, surrounded the “contentious and difficult” issue of the transmission of po­liti­cal information. The United States, of course, had from the start transmitted some po­liti­cal information about its non-­self-­governing territories, although it always maintained that ­doing so was optional. Assistant Secretary John  D. Hickerson succinctly summed up the US position on this question when he noted “that the United States transmitted po­liti­cal information with no embarrassment while the British did not submit po­liti­cal information and ­were embarrassed.” In the minds of US policymakers, the best way to end Britain’s embarrassment was

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for it to demonstrate the pro­g ress its territories ­were making ­toward self-­ government by transmitting po­liti­cal information, a move that would disarm all but the most intractable among the anticolonial bloc. This was easier said than done, or so the British maintained in a way that relied more heavi­ly on the Colonial Office’s views than ­those of the Foreign Office. Po­liti­cal information officially transmitted to the secretary-­general, they argued, would appear on the agenda of vari­ous “prejudiced and hostile” UN forums and thus be open for debate and discussion “by ­people who had no practical experience in colonial administration,” who “­were thus not equipped to discuss colonial prob­lems in a constructive manner,” and whose only purpose was “to criticize and attack”—­arguments that revealed more than a ­little pique ­toward as well as deep cultural prejudices about the anticolonial ele­ment at the United Nations. Try as they might, US officials ­were unable to convince the British that the positives of transmitting po­liti­cal information outweighed the negatives. The only concession the British would make on this subject was a pledge to take a more proactive approach at the United Nations to highlight their “achievements in the field of po­liti­cal and constitutional development” even if they did not officially transmit written information about ­those achievements to the Secretariat. The British “­were willing to make certain changes in their United Nations policies,” the Colonial Office’s John Martin reported. “They w ­ ere not,” however, “in a position to alter their pre­sent attitude of opposition to the submission of po­liti­cal information,” opposition that was rooted in a fundamental princi­ple.7 Despite the absence of complete agreement on how to deal with the mounting support for greater UN activism in the nontrust dependent territories, both sides considered the bilateral talks a success. US officials ­were “ ‘more than delighted’ ” at the overall British attitude and w ­ ere also pleased at plans to bring “the British propaganda rec­ord . . . ​nearer to [their] per­for­mance rec­ord,” even in the face of “intemperate and often unjust criticism of their colonial policy.” British officials w ­ ere similarly gratified by US promises “to do a good deal more to help [them] in the United Nations.” The talks ­were so successful, in fact, that they laid the basis for nearly annual conversations in advance of the opening of the General Assembly, a clear sign of the importance both sides placed on the issue of UN involvement in the non-­self-­governing territories. ­Whether ­either side would make good on the policy plans articulated during the Washington talks, though, remained to be seen.8 When the Special Committee’s first meeting got u ­ nder way on 18 August, it “was, in a sense,” as Britain’s John Fletcher-­Cooke noted, “starting off again” from scratch, given its new three-­year term.9 Indeed, several departures from past sessions of the committee set the 1950 session apart from its pre­de­ces­sors.

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First off, the Soviet Union, which had been elected to the committee for a three-­year term, de­cided not to participate as part of its boycott of UN forums.10 Its absence led to “an atmosphere of harmony and cordiality” and gave the administering states an edge on the normally balanced committee. The new, more flexible British approach to the committee also contributed to the improved atmosphere. Rather than the hostile and defensive posture of years past, the British del­e­ga­tion ­adopted a mea­sured, positive approach, with the end result being what the Secretariat’s Victor Hoo termed “the absence of any sharp division between the Administering and non-­Administering Powers.” Fi­nally, the committee’s ambitious agenda also helped to keep acrimony to a minimum, as it l­imited discussion of the two issues that w ­ ere likely to generate the most controversy—­revision of the Standard Form and consideration of the ­factors that made a territory non-­self-­governing—­because they might lead to international accountability. In the end, neither of ­these issues was even seriously discussed during the 1950 session of the Special Committee; this provided a short-­term victory for the administering states, which was balanced against the realization that the committee would have to deal with them in 1951.11 Discussion of pos­si­ble revision of the Standard Form revealed l­ ittle support for ­wholesale changes that would make it equivalent to the questionnaire that applied to the trust territories. Members admitted that while the form had proved to be a helpful instrument for organ­izing the information transmitted ­under Article 73(e), ­because it was “not an obligatory questionnaire,” any revisions to it should be framed with the specific requirements of Article 73(e) of the Charter in mind. Accordingly, the committee’s resolution on the subject recommended avoiding “undue elaboration” of the Standard Form, advised a focus on economic, social, and educational changes on the ground instead, and called for postponing ­actual revision u ­ ntil 1951. To undertake the task of revising the form, a subcommittee comprised of Brazil, France, India, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United States was to meet in advance of the Special Committee’s 1951 session so that a draft could be ready when the committee began its work. This mild—­even innocuous—­recommendation regarding revision of the Standard Form posed no threat whatsoever to the Charter’s distinction between the two types of dependent territories.12 The same held true when it came to the committee’s decision to postpone consideration of what was ultimately dubbed the “­factors” question. As Egypt’s Ahmed M. Farrag noted in a position the ­whole committee shared, time was too short in 1950 to give adequate consideration to this “very complex question.” In arguing for postponement, members also relied on the specific language of Resolution 334 (IV), which had not required the Fourth Committee to report on the subject at the pre­sent General Assembly. In the end, a­ fter very

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l­ittle discussion, the committee de­cided not to take up the question of what ­factors made a territory non-­self-­governing at its 1950 session, another decision that the administering states could consider at least a short-­term victory for their l­ imited conception of UN authority vis-­à-­vis the nontrust dependent territories.13 Postponing a­ ctual consideration of revision of the Standard Form and the ­factors question, however, did not mean that Fourth Committee discussion of the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories was mild or mea­sured. On the contrary, nonadministering states’ dis­plea­sure with what Cuba’s H. ­Rodriguez termed the administering states’ continued opposition to “international accountability” regarding the non-­self-­governing territories provided a significant source of vitriol. The specific catalyst for their concern lay in the opening statements that the major colonial powers—­Britain, France, and Belgium—­had made in the Special Committee, during which they had reaffirmed their dissatisfaction with attempts at the Fourth General Assembly to blur the distinction between the trust and nontrust dependent territories, reserved their rights as administering states ­under the Charter, and promised nevertheless to participate fully and constructively in discussion of colonial ­matters during the pre­sent Assembly. Many del­e­ga­tions found t­ hese statements regrettable, even if the three administering states in question had thus far participated positively in discussions. Pakistan’s Qazi Mohammed Isa spoke for many when he reminded the Fourth Committee that the administering states’ “rights [in the non-­self-­governing territories] had been acquired by might” and that “the possession of such territories by certain Powers had always disturbed the peace of the world.” Preparing t­hose territories for self-­ government would therefore go some distance ­toward alleviating global conflicts, which was, a­ fter all, the United Nations’ stated purpose. Although this discussion, which was carried through several meetings, did not lead to any concrete proposals, it did paint in bold relief the strength of anticolonial sentiment on the Fourth Committee—­and serve as a harbinger for t­ hings to come.14 Another subject that generated significant, heated discussion was a proposal by Haiti, Mexico, the Philippines, and Syria that administering states include information about implementation of the Universal Declaration of ­Human Rights (UDHR) in their Article 73(e) transmissions to the secretary-­general. That proposal also authorized the Special Committee on Information to make recommendations about the application of the UDHR’s general princi­ples in the non-­self-­governing territories. In introducing their proposal, ­these states ­were part of a wider, global effort to spread the UDHR’s influence, as outlined in the work of Paul Gordon Lauren and ­others.15 They ran up against a wall of administering state opposition. Although t­ hose states had all voted for the

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UDHR when it was debated and approved by the General Assembly in ­December 1948, they vehemently opposed the four-­power proposal. On one level, they pointed to lack of enforcement or assessment provisions in the UDHR itself as an impediment to the sort of reporting the proposal envisioned. On another, they painted it as a violation of the princi­ple of equivalent treatment: in their minds, if information was not to be requested on how the declaration was being implemented in ­every UN member-­state, it could not be requested regarding the Chapter XI territories. In addition to stymieing efforts to evaluate their compliance with the UDHR in the territories they administered, as Lauren has noted, they also waged a concerted campaign to “delay any publicity about . . . ​[it] overseas,” apparently convinced that dependent ­peoples could not agitate for rights about which they w ­ ere unaware. Motivated by a belief in the universality of the basic rights outlined in the UDHR, the majority of Fourth Committee members disagreed, and the draft resolution was approved by a vote of 26 to 10, with 7 abstentions; among the administering states France and the United States abstained, the ­others voted against the mea­sure, a move that Britain took despite its new approach to colonial questions due to the seriousness of the issue.16 The broad ­matter of the cessation of information transmission on territories once covered by Chapter XI, occasioned by the in­de­pen­dence of Indonesia in December 1949, also generated discord. In August 1950, the Netherlands had informed the secretary-­general that it would no longer transmit information on Indonesia, which was admitted to the United Nations the following month and participated in all discussions related to the non-­self-­governing territories. This was a purely informational step taken in conformity with Resolution 222 (III) and one that was not intended to seek UN approval or other­wise suggest international accountability. At the very end of the Fourth Committee’s 1950 session, India introduced a draft resolution commending the Dutch decision to halt information transmission and empowering the Special Committee on Information to examine f­ uture administering state communications regarding the cessation of information and report on them to the General Assembly. While the first part of the draft resolution, which effectively recognized Indonesia’s in­de­pen­dence, was noncontroversial, the portion dealing with the Special Committee suggested a right of supervision for decisions on cessation—­and by extension a UN right to determine an individual territory’s status—­not provided for in the Charter. Discussion of the Indian proposal was exceptionally brief, the only statement of substance coming from Britain’s T. F. Cook, who lamented that the call for the Special Committee to discuss administering states’ communications regarding information cessation rendered the draft resolution unacceptable to his del­e­ga­tion. For voting purposes, the

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resolution was divided into two portions; the first portion was approved by a vote of 35 to 0, with 5 abstentions, the second by a vote of 29 to 0, with 13 abstentions. The draft resolution as a ­whole won approval on a non-­roll-­call vote of 30 to 0, with 12 abstentions.17 ­Matters relating to the non-­self-­governing territories w ­ ere included in many del­e­ga­tions’ opening statements to the Fifth General Assembly, but when the specific agenda item dealing with information transmitted u ­ nder Article 73(e) was taken up, Assembly President Nasrollah Entezam used Rule 67 to dispense with ­actual debate and merely called for a vote on the Fourth Committee’s recommended resolutions, two of which dealt with the question of UN authority for the nontrust dependent territories. What became Resolution 446 (V) “invite[d]” the administering states to transmit information on the implementation of the UDHR and was approved on a roll-­call vote of 37 to 10, with 9 abstentions. The United States was the only administering state to vote yes. France abstained; the other six administering states voted no.18 In Resolution 448 (V), the General Assembly affirmed by a non-­roll-­call vote of 41 to 0, with 8 abstentions, the right of the Special Committee on Information to consider cases of information cessation. By pushing UN authority in the nontrust dependent territories into two areas—­human rights reporting and when territories ceased to be non-­self-­governing—­that the Charter had included only with regard to the trust territories, both resolutions challenged the administering states’ insistence on strict adherence to the two-­track system set forth in San Francisco. And the solid support they received at the General Assembly level constituted a harbinger for continued pressure to implement international accountability.19 In the months following the conclusion of the Fifth General Assembly, British officials reiterated their refusal to move beyond the language of the Charter or to allow the United Nations to apply standards or requirements to the nontrust dependent territories that did not extend to self-­governing states. Thus, Britain could not accept calls for the transmission of po­liti­cal information, UN resolutions that targeted specific non-­self-­governing territories, or UN discussion of po­liti­cal or constitutional conditions in the colonies—­all mea­ sures that applied to the trust territories but that the Charter did not explic­itly provide for when it came to the nontrust dependent territories. Nor could it comply with Resolution 446 (V), which called on administering states to provide information on the implementation of the Universal Declaration of ­Human Rights in the territories u ­ nder their jurisdiction when no such obligation existed regarding in­de­pen­dent states.20 Officials in London accompanied their stance against efforts to conflate all dependent territories with plans for several tactical approaches. For one, they

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intended to c­ ounter Soviet bloc criticisms of the British Empire by highlighting shortcomings and inadequacies b­ ehind the Iron Curtain, particularly when it came to “the abolition of ­human rights and fundamental freedoms in the territories ­under Soviet control.” British representatives ­were also instructed to paint the Soviets as concerned “not with the interests and well being of the ­peoples of the non-­self-­governing and Trust Territories, but with the establishment of the Soviet Union as the so-­called saviour of the backward p­ eoples of the world.” This would expose what London saw as the cynical and disingenuous nature of Moscow’s interest in the non-­self-­governing territories as well as, perhaps unintentionally, the prevailing cultural relativism within the Colonial Office.21 When it came to debates in vari­ous UN forums, the British del­e­ga­tion would vote against resolutions only if they v­ iolated a fundamental tenet of national policy, as had been the case with Resolution 446 (V) on ­human rights reporting. Other­wise, an abstention with an explanatory reservation would be in order. Fi­nally, British strategy advocated solidarity among the administering powers, including the United States. In a reflection of continued great-­power thinking and a desire to perpetuate Western control over the General Assembly, British officials believed that if ­those eight nations stuck together and “ma[d]e it clear that they [­were] determined to discountenance and refute irresponsible criticisms and speeches th[o]se activities [would] be stillborn.”22 For their part, US policymakers concentrated much of their internal discussion on the unresolved issues left over from the 1950 session of the Special Committee on Information, specifically revision of the Standard Form, Resolution 446 (V) calling for information on the implementation of the UDHR in the non-­self-­governing territories, and the ­factors that determined ­whether a territory was or was not non-­self-­governing. All of t­ hese issues related to the broad princi­ple of accountability. In discussions about the Standard Form, US officials reiterated their long-­held belief that the Charter did not require the transmission of po­liti­cal information and indicated an intention to hew to that position, w ­ hether in connection with revision of the Standard Form or in other contexts. When it came to the question of information on h ­ uman rights, the US position called for transparency and openness, not to mention full compliance with General Assembly recommendations. Therefore, the United States intended to transmit detailed information on the application of the UDHR in the non-­self-­governing territories it administered. As for the f­ actors question, US officials conceded that the m ­ atter fell within the competence of the General Assembly, and through it the Special Committee. They objected, however, to the construction of “an all-­inclusive definition” that would apply across the board to all territories and favored instead a “list of f­ actors which should

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obviously be taken into account” in determining a territory’s status. The impor­ tant consideration, which US policymakers considered nonnegotiable, was that “each administering Member ha[d the] right to determine [the] constitutional status of any territory ­under its sovereignty.”23 Like their British counter­parts, US policymakers also considered ways to ­counter Soviet propaganda regarding colonial questions at the United Nations. As a continually elected member of the Special Committee on Information from its inception, the Soviet Union had used the committee for propaganda purposes and sought to turn it into “a replica of the Trusteeship Council.” To defuse Soviet propaganda, the State Department offered two interrelated approaches. One, also part of Britain’s strategy, would “focus attention where it ­really belong[ed]—on Soviet actions which flagrantly violate ­human rights,” or what US officials w ­ ere increasingly dubbing the “conspiracy of Soviet imperialism.” This strand of US policy, which highlighted Soviet absorption of previously in­de­pen­dent countries, became increasingly impor­tant as time went on. The other ele­ment of US policy at the United Nations would play up the success of Western-­administered territories in progressing t­oward self-­ government as a way of debunking Soviet claims to the contrary.24 Bilateral discussions that began in London on 10 October 1951 gave each side a chance to pre­sent its views, and while the talks ­were cordial, it was clear that dif­fer­ent national interests would prevent a uniform strategy for dealing with efforts to expand the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories. The British remained resistant to reporting on po­liti­cal or constitutional affairs. Nor could they agree to report on efforts to implement the UDHR, as that “would amount to accepting trusteeship status for the colonies” and thus violate one of their fundamental princi­ples. A desire to maintain goodwill at the United Nations, where the administering states w ­ ere woefully outnumbered, inspired a more liberal US policy that included the transmission of information on both ­human rights and po­liti­cal conditions. US policy was also ­shaped by what the State Department’s Benjamin Gerig described as the nation’s “domestic prob­ lem of 15,000,000 negro voters,” who presumably expected the United States to eschew close alignment with the colonial powers and work for rapid pro­ gress ­toward self-­government for ­those ­peoples who still lacked it.25 As a result, the United States could accept that the United Nations had “an interest” in the non-­self-­governing territories but no “right to supervision,” a position that “the United Kingdom, with its broader responsibilities for dependent territories,” could not countenance. For their part, the British recognized that the force of anticolonial sentiment in both the United States and the United Nations required them to more actively publicize their role in bringing ­peoples along to self-­government as well as the fact that ­because UN interest

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in the non-­self-­governing territories was unlikely to diminish, the British needed to “do [their] best to make the system work.”26 The first stage of the 1951 round of UN discussion of ­matters related to the non-­self-­governing territories came in the work of the six-­member subcommittee charged with considering revision of the Standard Form. As was the case with all such subcommittees, it was equally balanced between representatives of administering (France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and nonadministering (Brazil, India, and the Philippines) states; the Philippines’ José D. Ingles served as chair. The subcommittee’s five meetings consisted largely of a line-­by-­line consideration of proposals from the Secretariat for a new Standard Form, and although ­those meetings ­were not without conflict, in the end unan­i­mous agreement was reached on a revised version of the form that was sent forward to the Special Committee on Information. The revised form made information on “geography, history, and p­ eople” mandatory. Information on ­human rights would also become obligatory (specifically to be placed ­under “Social Conditions”), and with explicit reference to the UDHR. But in a nod to Britain and like-­minded administering states, it did not require ­human rights information to be based on the declaration itself. The revised Standard Form (which left only information on “government” in the optional category) thus ultimately represented a compromise between the administering and nonadministering states.27 The overall reaction of the Special Committee on Information, on which continuing nonadministering members Brazil, Egypt, India, Mexico, the Philippines, and the Soviet Union ­were joined by newcomers Cuba and Pakistan (replacing Sweden and Venezuela), to the revised Standard Form was generally favorable. Soviet representative A. A. Soldatov, not surprisingly, was highly critical, condemning the proposed form for permitting the administering states to “arbitrarily decide what and how much information to transmit.” As was normally the case, other members of the Special Committee failed to endorse or support this extreme Soviet criticism. Instead, ­those representatives who did raise concerns ­were more mea­sured. Egypt’s Fouad El Pharaony made another push for the transmission of po­liti­cal information, while Pakistan’s Mian Ziaud-­Din and Mexico’s Emilio Calderón Puig appealed for the transmission of information on ­human rights. If neither of ­these calls for enhanced administering state accountability secured immediate approval, time clearly was not on the side of the resisters. Indeed, while the Special Committee, on a vote of 11 to 2, with 2 abstentions, approved a revised Standard Form that failed to make the transmission of po­liti­cal information mandatory or require the administering states to demonstrate the degree to which the UDHR was being implemented in the non-­self-­governing territories they supervised, that

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did not mean that such a ­limited conception of administering state responsibility to the United Nations would continue.28 By cutting to the heart of what the administering states saw as their authority, the other carry-­over issue from 1950, consideration of the ­factors to be taken into account when determining w ­ hether a territory was or was not non-­self-­ governing generated considerable debate. To ­those states’ way of thinking, any potential list of f­ actors that might be drawn up was less impor­tant than how that list might be used, and by whom. For them, authority to determine a par­tic­u­lar territory’s status had to rest with the administering state. Not surprisingly, other members of the Special Committee disagreed. In an effort to prevent the committee’s initial discussion of the ­factors question from becoming counterproductive or downright destructive, Indian representative Apa B. Pant proposed the creation of a subcommittee to study the ­matter in detail and report back to the full Special Committee, the membership of which was fi­nally agreed to be Belgium, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union, which “objected in princi­ple to the inclusion in any auxiliary bodies of members representing Administering Authorities,” tendered one of four abstentions on the other­wise unanimously supported proposal.29 The f­ actors subcommittee held four meetings and reached consensus but not total agreement. Determining the ­actual list of ­factors proved to be relatively ­simple. The rub came in agreeing on specific language describing what that list truly meant. The nonadministering members of the subcommittee—­ Cuba, Egypt, and the Philippines—­favored a short statement downplaying objective mea­sures and designating “the w ­ ill of the ­people” as the most impor­tant ­factor in determining ­whether a territory had achieved full self-­ government. Belgium, Denmark, and the United Kingdom, the subcommittee’s administering members, proposed a more involved explication of the list’s meaning and intended use. Most significantly, they insisted that the vari­ous ­factors should guide conclusions about a territory’s status rather than determine them, which meant that the list of ­factors might or might not be used in determining the status of a par­tic­u­lar territory depending on the circumstances. This caveat was no doubt their way of minimizing the impact of the ­factors exercise and reserving for themselves the right to decide when a territory had or had not achieved that all-­important “full mea­sure of self-­government.” ­Because it proved impossible to reconcile ­these two divergent views in the subcommittee, both w ­ ere included in the draft report sent forward to the full Special Committee, which would then be responsible for selecting one or the other.30 Not surprisingly, the evenly balanced Special Committee also found it difficult to reach agreement on how the list of ­factors would be utilized. The

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nonadministering states favored the formulation that Cuba, Egypt, and the Philippines had proposed in the subcommittee while the administering states endorsed the Anglo-­Belgian-­Danish proposal. With the committee equally balanced between the two groups, a real possibility existed of tie votes on both proposals—­and the approval of neither, a situation that would likely push both sides to reject the subcommittee report in its entirety. Exercising his right as the Special Committee’s chairman, the Netherlands’s W. J. A. Kernkamp called for a vote on the administering states’ proposal first; if it was approved, ­there would be no need to vote on the other version, and the administering states would thereby secure a victory. Only through what the British representative to the Special Committee, W. A. C. Mathieson, described as “a hard-­won abstention by the Indian representative” did the administering states’ preferred version win approval on a vote of 8 to 7, with 1 abstention. The subcommittee report, with recommended list of f­ actors, then won approval by a vote of 10 to 1, with 5 abstentions; the nonadministering states, however, did secure inclusion of their preferred language regarding use of the list of f­actors as a sort of minority opinion in the Special Committee’s report so that the Fourth Committee would have both versions when it considered the ­matter.31 Opening statements in that body revealed continuing discord about the efficacy of maintaining the Charter-­mandated distinction between the trust and nontrust dependent territories, specifically concerning w ­ hether the committee had the right to consider po­liti­cal developments in the Chapter XI territories. This was not a new issue, of course, and had reared its head annually since the General Assembly’s opening session in 1946. Its reemergence in the 1951 Fourth Committee signaled lingering disagreement over how closely the administering states’ obligations to the United Nations regarding the non-­self-­ governing territories should mirror ­those that applied to the trust territories. Greece’s Georges Mavros spoke for t­ hose who supported the transmission of po­liti­cal information when he proclaimed that an “inflexible” adherence to the strict language of the Charter “would put the ­peoples of the Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories at a disadvantage as compared with t­ hose in the Trust Territories,” something “that was [certainly] not the real intention of the Charter.” The administering states disagreed strenuously. Their strict adherence to the letter of the Charter held that the specific exclusion of an obligation to transmit po­liti­cal information made such action entirely voluntary—­and therefore absolved them of ­doing so ­unless they wished to. Gladwyn Jebb made clear that the British government continued to consider any discussion of po­ liti­cal ­matters “ultra vires [beyond the powers] in the Fourth Committee,” a position that may have been legally defensible but that was becoming increasingly untenable.32

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The committee’s discussion of the revision of the Standard Form, in contrast, was brief and relatively unremarkable. Members praised the work of the six-­member subcommittee, appreciated that the new form “represented some degree of compromise between t­ hose who would have wished it to be more detailed and t­ hose who felt that it erred on the side of complexity,” and expressed the belief that the information provided for in the revised form “would be indispensable to the Territories themselves when they became self-­governing.” Several representatives singled out for par­tic­u­lar praise the movement of information on ­human rights from the optional to the obligatory category while at the same time expressing regret that po­liti­cal information remained optional, illustrating thereby the lingering shadow that that issue cast over large swaths of the committee’s work. The revised Standard Form won Fourth Committee approval on a non-­roll-­call vote of 38 to 0, with 7 abstentions. During discussion of the issue, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia among the administering states had indicated their intention to vote for it; France and Belgium subsequently reported that they had abstained.33 The Fourth Committee’s approval of the Special Committee’s work on the Standard Form stood in contrast to its negative reaction to the report on the ­factors that determined ­whether a territory was or was not non-­self-­governing. During discussion that stretched over four meetings, a virtual parade of representatives, particularly from the nonadministering states, noted serious shortcomings in the Special Committee’s work. The list of f­actors was considered too long, inappropriate in spots, and not truly determinative when it came to identifying what made a territory self-­governing. Criticism was also leveled at the Special Committee’s skirting of the competence question. It was ­here, in fact, that the sharpest disagreement seemed to develop, with the nonadministering states insisting that authority to determine when a state ceased to be non-­self-­governing rested only with the General Assembly and the administering states insisting, as the United States’s Channing H. Tobias put it, that absent “world government” in which the responsibilities of statecraft ­were handled multilaterally, that authority rested solely and exclusively with each administering state. In the end, a majority of the Fourth Committee’s members deemed the Special Committee’s work on the ­factors question to be deeply flawed and approved the creation of a subcommittee comprised of Australia, Denmark, France, and the United States from the administering states and Cuba, Guatemala, Iraq, and Venezuela from the nonadministering states to revisit the issue and report back during the committee’s current term. Only Cuba and Denmark had been members of the Special Committee’s subcommittee on f­ actors.34

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The eleven meetings the subcommittee held over as many days between 4 and 20 December constituted the most detailed and far-­reaching consideration of the question of how to define a non-­self-­governing territory theretofore undertaken by a UN body. Early on in its discussion, the subcommittee rejected the idea of compiling a blanket list of ­factors that could cover all territories and de­cided instead to draw up two lists, one for territories that w ­ ere incorporated in some way into the metropole and another for ­those that achieved “in­de­pen­dence or sovereignty outright.” The subcommittee’s rapporteur, Cuba’s Guy Perez Cisneros, described the end result as “a marked improvement on all the former documents on the question,” although he noted that the subcommittee in no way considered its work the last word on the subject. That conclusion related directly to the second ele­ment of the subcommittee’s report, recommendations for further UN study of the f­actors question, which included a request for members’ views on the subject by the spring of 1952 and the constitution of another subcommittee to consider ­those views with an eye t­ oward reporting in time for discussion at the Seventh General Assembly. Despite—or perhaps ­because of—­its failure to make definitive recommendations regarding the ­matter of competence, the subcommittee’s report proved generally acceptable to the Fourth Committee and won approval on a roll-­call vote of 39 to 0, with 6 abstentions. The Netherlands joined Byelorus­sia, Czecho­slo­va­k ia, Poland, Ukraine, and the Soviet Union in not casting an affirmative vote. The eight members of the subcommittee agreed to continue in the new effort, in which they ­were to be joined by administering state Belgium and nonadministering state Burma.35 General Assembly consideration of the Fourth Committee’s report was confined to votes on the recommended draft resolutions.36 What became Resolution 551 (IV) on the Standard Form was approved on a vote of 46 to 0, with 5 abstentions. Plans for continuing discussion of the f­ actors question w ­ ere contained in Resolution 567 (VI), approved by a vote of 46 to 0, with 7 abstentions. Neither vote was recorded. Given the acrimony that had characterized much of the discussion at the Fourth Committee level, the absence of General Assembly debate over the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories was surely a welcome development for the administering states.37 The Assembly’s ­handling of m ­ atters related to the broad UN role in the non-­self-­ governing territories in 1951 was thereby unremarkable. Heated discussion of that role—­and particularly repeated calls for international accountability for all dependent territories—in both what Resolution 569 (VI) decreed would now be called the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories and the Fourth Committee suggested a far dif­fer­ent course in t­hose forums.38 So did General Assembly approval, by a non-­recorded vote of 42 to 7,

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with 5 abstentions, of Resolution 545 (VI), which served notice on the administering states that resisting the press of decolonization was fast falling out of international fashion.39 Resisting all efforts to turn the Committee on Information into a replica of the Trusteeship Council remained a firmly entrenched goal in internal British discussions between the Sixth and Seventh General Assemblies, where a Conservative Government headed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill was now directing policy. Although the change in party control was obvious in other areas, it meant ­little to Britain’s overall stance on efforts to implement international accountability for dependent territories.40 If anticolonial ele­ments on the committee attempted to extend the sort of supervision that the United Nations exerted over the trust territories to ­those that fell ­under Chapter XI by calling for the discussion of po­liti­cal information, the issuance of recommendations concerning individual non-­self-­governing territories, the ac­cep­ tance of petitions or del­e­ga­tions from ­those territories, or the dispatch of UN missions to assess conditions on the ground, British officials agreed that they would threaten withdrawal from the committee. Such a course, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden admitted, “might well fail to arrest” UN actions, leaving Britain in the unenviable position of seeing the Committee on Information undertake discussions of objectionable subjects ­free from the prospect of British response or rebuttal. Yet, in a development that saw the Foreign Office join the more militant Colonial Office for once, all levels of the British government agreed that threatening withdrawal should the committee act in what London considered an inappropriate fashion was a risk worth taking that would presumably give the committee’s anticolonial members pause.41 On specific issues likely to arise in the Committee on Information and Fourth Committee themselves, internal British discussions in the lead up to the Seventh General Assembly revealed l­ittle that was new. Officials w ­ ere willing to cooperate when it came to compiling a list of f­ actors that could be used to determine w ­ hether a territory was or was not non-­self-­governing, but they remained steadfastly opposed to UN discussion of the question of competence to determine a par­tic­u­lar territory’s status. Nor ­were they enthusiastic about extension of the Committee on Information, which the Colonial Office expected “to be the most controversial item on the Committee’s Agenda”: they could live with its renewal for another three years on the same terms, but expanding its scope or making it permanent ­were unthinkable. Lest their willingness to see the committee extended for another term embolden the nonadministering states to push for more, however, British officials emphasized the need to keep it ­under wraps for as long as pos­si­ble. As a result, the

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British del­e­ga­tion was to initially oppose any extension of the committee so that a willingness to renew it for another three years would seem like a concession to t­ hose who wished to give it permanency.42 US discussion of specific issues slated for consideration at the 1952 Committee on Information, on which the eight administering states would be balanced by continuing members Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union and newcomers Ec­ua­dor and Indonesia (replacing Mexico and the Philippines), aligned more closely with the administering states than the nonadministering ones. As in the past, the US del­e­ga­tion was to support extension of the Committee on Information on the same terms of reference for another three-­year cycle. Making it permanent or expanding its terms of reference presented such unacceptable dangers, especially when it came to US relations with the Western Eu­ro­pean allies, as to preclude serious consideration. On the ­factors question, US officials continued to accept the General Assembly’s right to compile a list of ­factors but insisted that no one ­factor or combination of f­ actors could be considered determinative of w ­ hether a territory was or was not non-­self-­governing and maintained that only the relevant administering state could determine when a territory had become self-­ governing. They also repeated their long-­standing position that the transmission of po­liti­cal information was optional, although they hoped that other administering states would follow the US lead in providing it. In all of ­these areas, US officials laid bare their belief that ­there ­were limits on the UN role in the nontrust dependent territories. Interest was acceptable; intervention was not.43 When British and American officials came together in September for bilateral talks in Washington, they “establish[ed] a considerable mea­sure of agreement,” as the Colonial Office’s John M. Martin put it. Both sides agreed that a permanent extension of the Committee on Information was not desirable, that competence to determine the constitutional status of individual territories rested solely with the administering states, and that the ­factors exercise, while perfectly l­egal ­under the Charter, was likely to lead to nothing but confusion. They ­were also in sync when it came to the General Assembly’s lack of authority to accept petitions from, grant oral hearings to representatives of, or dispatch visiting missions to the Chapter XI territories. ­Those rights applied only to the territories that fell u ­ nder the auspices of the Trusteeship System.44 As had been anticipated, the most contentious issue on the 1952 agenda of the Committee on Information was its own f­ uture, discussion of which over the course of five meetings largely pitted the nonadministering states, which wished to establish the committee on a permanent basis, against the major

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administering states, which w ­ ere not keen on extending it for another three years, let alone making it permanent. The remarks of the committee ­chairman, Pakistan’s Muhammad Asad, encapsulated the activist position in appealing to the administering states to accept “the princi­ple of moral accountability . . . ​implied in Article 73” and “render account” of the way they dispatched their responsibilities in the territories u ­ nder their charge so that the world could be sure that they w ­ ere bringing the territories they administered along to self-­government. The Belgian, French, and British representatives made clear that such a course was unlikely. Belgium’s Pierre Ryckmans condemned the nonadministering states for adopting a hostile posture t­ oward the administering states; France’s Léon Pignon described the committee’s previous accomplishments as “meagre” and implied that the time representatives had devoted to its work could have been better spent on other tasks; and Britain’s W. A. C. Mathieson proclaimed that British approval of the UN Charter had been predicated on the understanding that it contained no administering state “accountability . . . ​to the United Nations.” Had it been other­wise, he maintained, British approval of the Charter would have been impossible.45 Two competing resolutions regarding the f­ uture of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories eventually r­ ose to the fore. The first, put forth by the Soviet Union, called for making the committee permanent. “The obligations assumed by the Administering Powers ­under Article 73 ­were permanent,” A. A. Roschin avowed, so “it would be illogical to have a temporary body to deal with [them].” General discussion of the committee’s ­f uture revealed substantial support for such a move, at least among the nonadministering states. But the administering powers, especially Belgium, France, and Britain, remained unalterably opposed to a permanent committee and might refuse to participate if that route w ­ ere taken. To avoid such an eventuality, which would of course render the committee completely ineffectual, the US del­e­ga­tion advanced its own resolution extending the Committee on Information for another three-­year term. Although the United States “was satisfied that the Committee had fulfilled a useful purpose,” it “could not agree that the Committee should be established on a permanent basis.” By allowing the committee to continue its work, another three-­year term would assuage the nonadministering states; by preventing the committee’s permanency, at least for three years, the mea­sure concomitantly placated the administering states that wished to see it terminated. In the end, the committee rejected the Soviet proposal for a permanent committee by a vote of 8 to 7, with 1 abstention, and approved the US-­sponsored resolution extending its life for another three years by a vote of 13 to 3. It remained to be seen ­whether the Fourth Committee, which in the past had undone or altered

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decisions taken in the Committee on Information, would sustain such a recommendation.46 The m ­ atter of the Committee on Information’s f­uture was heavy on the minds of members of the Fourth Committee, as evidenced by both their opening statements and the speeches they made during open debate on that subject. As had been the case during that committee’s own discussions, most del­e­ga­tions came out squarely on the side of establishing the committee on a permanent basis and marshaled the same arguments that had been used to defend the committee in the past. It was perfectly ­legal ­under the Charter and of vital importance in the continuing effort to improve the lot of the p­ eoples of the non-­self-­governing territories, they maintained. Moreover, its establishment on a permanent basis would allow the valuable time that was spent periodically debating its ­f uture to be more profitably spent working on ways to advance the cause of development in the non-­self-­governing territories. That the administering states would disagree on e­ very score was axiomatic. For them, the committee had been minimally helpful at best. More importantly, ­those states also reiterated their challenge to the committee’s legality, insisting that while the Charter, which they had played a major role in drafting, provided a formal mechanism—­the Trusteeship Council—to deal with the territories covered by Chapters XII and XIII, it had deliberately failed to create a similar body to deal with the territories that fell ­under the auspices of Chapter XI. Altering the situation, they insisted, could occur only through formal amendment of the Charter. What they did not say was that this conscious and purposeful choice con­ve­niently shielded the dependent territories they administered from the sort of UN scrutiny that prevailed in the territories formerly held by their enemies, the Axis Powers. As a compromise to the committee’s establishment on a permanent basis, the administering states w ­ ere willing to countenance its renewal for another three-­year period. Should this course be rejected, they raised the specter of nonparticipation. In the end, a­ fter considering a variety of options, the Fourth Committee voted 40 to 12, with 2 abstentions, to extend the committee “for a further three-­year period, and at the end of that period, u ­ nless other­wise de­cided by the General Assembly, to continue the Committee automatically thereafter for as long as ­there exist territories whose p­ eoples have not yet attained a full mea­sure of self-­government,” a move that would effectively make the committee permanent. Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and South Africa joined the eight administering states in voting against the mea­sure; the representatives of Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom reserved their governments’ positions, which was tantamount to saying that they might find it impossible to participate in the work

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of the committee moving forward if the draft resolution secured General Assembly approval.47 More contentious than the debate over the Committee on Information’s renewal, however, was the Fourth Committee’s discussion of the ­factors question. In following the lead of e­ arlier such exercises, the ad hoc committee empaneled in Resolution 567 (VI) had produced a relatively generic list of ­factors that did l­ittle to advance the work of previous bodies. It also failed to address the thorny question of competence to determine when a territory had ceased to be non-­self-­governing, which it declared as falling outside its terms of reference.48 If the ad hoc committee, which was evenly balanced between administering and nonadministering states, was willing to sidestep the issue of competence, supporters of an enlarged UN role in the nontrust dependent territories on the Fourth Committee ­were not. Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Iraq, and Venezuela introduced a draft resolution that confronted that issue head on by describing the list of f­ actors compiled by the ad hoc committee as a guide to both the administering states and the General Assembly “in deciding ­whether a Territory has or has not attained a full mea­sure of self-­ government.” For the administering states, this wording raised the prospect of Assembly intrusion in a pro­cess that they considered their exclusive purview and therefore made the draft resolution unacceptable. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of del­e­ga­tions disagreed, seeing competence to determine a territory’s status as properly falling to the United Nations rather than to the administering states and embracing any draft resolution that empowered the General Assembly to play a role in determining the status of individual territories. Ultimately, by a vote of 34 to 12, with 8 abstentions, the Fourth Committee approved a draft resolution that proclaimed the General Assembly’s “competence to decide on the status attained by a [par­tic­ul­ar] territory,” a power that the United Nations held vis-­à-­vis the trust territories. All eight administering states w ­ ere among the dozen dissenting votes, a clear indication of the division on the committee between the small number of states that had responsibility for administering nontrust dependent territories and the vast majority that did not. Should the General Assembly go on to approve the resolution in plenary session, the administering states would be confronted with a serious challenge to their view that the United Nations did not hold the same level of authority over the non-­self-­governing territories that it did over ­those that fell u ­ nder the auspices of the Trusteeship System.49 The General Assembly’s one-­meeting consideration of issues related to the non-­self-­governing territories resulted in a mixed bag for the administering states. On the question of the renewal of the Committee on Information, the

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representatives of Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom made clear that none of ­those states would participate in a permanent committee, a development that would so compromise such an entity as to make it nonfunctional. The prospect, then, of approving the draft resolution the Fourth Committee had approved, which for all intents and purposes would make the committee permanent, and seeing the key administering states refuse to participate as a result forced a change of strategy at the General Assembly level. In yet another instance of its leadership on broad m ­ atters relating to UN authority in the nontrust dependent territories, the Indian del­e­ga­tion proposed the Committee on Information’s renewal for another three-­year period and consideration in 1955 of “­whether [it] should be renewed for a further period,” language that was sufficiently circumspect to prevent mass administering state opposition. Resolution 646 (VII), approved on a nonrecorded vote of 53 to 2, with 3 abstentions, renewed the Committee on Information for another three-­year period and provided for reconsideration of its ­future in 1955. (Continuing nonadministering members Cuba, Ec­ua­dor, Indonesia, and Pakistan would be joined by newcomers China and Iraq and reelected members Brazil, and India. Conspicuously missing w ­ ere the Soviet Union and any of its satellites.) The administering states prevailed on the renewal question and succeeded in turning back the more extreme position that had prevailed in the Fourth Committee. They ­were not so lucky when it came to the ­factors question. H ­ ere their opposition to the idea of allowing the General Assembly to work in tandem with the administering states in determining the status of individual territories fell on deaf ears, and the draft resolution the Fourth Committee had advanced was approved without alteration as Resolution 648 (VII) by a roll-­call vote of 36 to 15, with 7 abstentions; as was the case at the Fourth Committee level, all of the administering states voted no. The final resolution, which indicated that members w ­ ere not entirely pleased with the 1952 ­factors effort, provided for the creation of yet another ad hoc committee to deal with the ­factors question, to be composed of Australia, Belgium, Burma, Cuba, Guatemala, Iraq, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela, which was to meet in advance of the 1953 General Assembly. It also solicited feedback from member-­states about the broad f­ actors question, thus opening the door to wide-­ranging discussion about both the f­ actors themselves and where competence to apply them lay.50 When the Seventh General Assembly concluded its discussion of the Chapter XI territories in December 1952, the idea of international accountability for dependent territories was gaining traction. Resolutions affirming the UN right to be informed when an administering state wished to cease transmitting in-

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formation on a par­tic­u­lar territory, directing the administering states to provide information on h ­ uman rights pro­g ress in ­those territories, and asserting a UN role in determining ­whether specific territories ­were or ­were not non-­ self-­governing had all made their way through the General Assembly by the end of 1952. T ­ hese resolutions w ­ ere primarily recommendatory in nature, which made them easy to ignore without penalty or sanction. But they indicated the mounting sense at the United Nations that the non-­self-­governing territories and the ­people who inhabited them ­were an international responsibility. The Seventh General Assembly also renewed the Committee on Information for a second three-­year term. Despite administering state opposition to such a move, the committee’s balanced membership between administering and nonadministering states made it a much better venue for the consideration of ­matters related to the nontrust dependent territories than the increasingly anticolonial Fourth Committee, which had emerged as a strong proponent of a much larger international role in fostering decolonization than the General Assembly at that point was willing to advocate. Fourth Committee activism vis-­à-­vis the non-­self-­governing territories posed real challenges for the administering states, which clung to legalistic interpretations of the Charter in an increasingly futile re­sis­tance effort. Nor ­were their threats to withdraw cooperation with UN initiatives in the non-­ self-­governing territories any more successful, since such action was not only unlikely to halt UN activism but would also rob them of their ability to defend themselves or block even greater activism. The administering states thus found themselves in an increasingly difficult position, outnumbered in UN forums and fighting a rearguard action that they could not hope to win in the long run. Solidification of anticolonial sentiment at the Fourth Committee coincided with a change in power in Washington, where the Republicans u ­ nder Dwight D. Eisenhower w ­ ere poised to take control of the White House for the first time since the inauguration of Franklin D. Roo­se­velt in 1933. Given Eisenhower’s harsh criticism of the purported weaknesses of the Truman administration’s foreign policy rec­ord during the election campaign, more aggressive prosecution of the Cold War was likely.51 The same was true of the new administration’s anticipated approach to Cold War questions at the United Nations. As we ­will see, it undertook a much more vigorous campaign to discredit Soviet pretensions as champions of the newly in­de­pen­dent world and crusaders for greater UN involvement in the nontrust dependent territories than its pre­de­ces­sor. Greater activism, however, did not necessarily mean tangible results, and a variety of US initiatives ­after 1953 failed to arrest the drive ­toward international accountability.

C h a p t er  4

Rhe­toric and Routine The Last Vestiges of Western Dominance

Continued Western domination of the UN General Assembly during the period that constituted the Committee on Information’s second three-­year term (1953–1955) generally held the line against international accountability for dependent territories. As that balanced body, which during this period did not include the Soviet Union or any of its satellites, settled into a relatively moderate routine characterized by generally innocuous recommendations, the Fourth Committee increasingly became the center of anticolonial sentiment. Although rhe­toric at the Fourth Committee remained fiercely critical of the existence of colonialism and staunchly in f­ avor of a larger UN role in the territories that fell u ­ nder the auspices of Chapter XI, Western control of the organ­ization ensured that anticolonialism was still more talk than action. That situation could not persist in­def­initely, of course, given the eventual addition to the United Nations of new, anticolonial states. The logjam that had prevented new members from joining the organ­ization, in fact, was broken in 1955, and the sixteen members that w ­ ere admitted at the conclusion of the Tenth General Assembly dramatically altered the climate when it came to discussion of the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories moving forward.1 If the static membership of the United Nations meant ­little tangible pro­ gress ­toward international accountability during this period, Cold War tensions became more evident, particularly when it came to Western efforts to 82

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paint the Soviet Union as a colonial power. Partly an outgrowth of the new Eisenhower administration’s commitment to psychological warfare2 and partly a response to increasingly bombastic Soviet bloc criticism,3 ­these efforts made clear US officials’ appreciation for the prominence the United Nations had attained as a forum for global propaganda.4 They also highlighted the US desire to curry f­ avor with the developing world at a time when the focus of the East-­ West rivalry was shifting from Eu­rope to Africa and the ­Middle East, although ­actual US foreign policy actions in defense of ­those Cold War interests, including support for continued Eu­ro­pean control of much of Africa, often alienated the very ­people the nation was trying to woo.5 So did the Eisenhower administration’s lackluster rec­ord on domestic civil rights.6 The generally disappointing results of US efforts to appeal to the developing world, both during this period and beyond, demonstrated the difficulty of successfully resisting the campaign for international accountability. As the East-­West confrontation ­shaped much of the US approach to ­matters related to the non-­self-­governing territories at the United Nations during this period, however, nations in Africa and Asia w ­ ere already making clear their desire to break f­ree from that paradigm. The April 1955 gathering of representatives from twenty-­nine governments at Bandung, Indonesia, signaled that the nations of the developing world ­were much more concerned with ­matters of economic justice, po­liti­cal in­de­pen­dence, and mutual cooperation than with choosing sides in the superpower confrontation. Although the formal Non-­ Aligned Movement that emerged early in the next de­cade did not directly affect the United Nations in general, or specifically ­handling of the nontrust dependent territories, the mindset it reflected about how best to meet the needs of the developing world was clearly manifest in the increasingly vocal call for a larger UN role in the Chapter XI territories in ser­vice to universal in­de­pen­dence. The new US ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, drew on his own journalistic background to formulate the Eisenhower administration’s UN policy, using the organ­ization as a soapbox from which to highlight differences between the ­Free and Communist Worlds and condemn alleged Soviet hy­poc­risy in an effort to woo the undecided in the Cold War—­including the newly emerging nations—to the Western side.7 What ultimately became known within the administration as the “Lodge Proj­ect” constituted a no-­ holds-­barred effort to embarrass the Soviet Union on the world stage of the United Nations.8 One strand of the wide-­ranging campaign, which dealt with much more than the subject of colonialism, explic­itly contrasted the emergence of new states from Western colonial control with the disappearance of

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­ thers ­behind the Iron Curtain. “While the Soviet Union preaches its concern o for the liberation of dependent ­peoples,” the emerging US propaganda line maintained, “it has ruthlessly converted ­every territory over which it has acquired domination into a vassal of the Soviet state.”9 Lodge’s plan did not win universal support within the administration, however. Among the most prescient assessments of its weakness came from Arthur M. Cox of the Psychological Strategy Board. “I think we have made a ­g reat m ­ istake as a nation of assuming that ­because Soviet power and subversion is the greatest prob­lem facing us ­today, it is therefore the greatest prob­lem facing every­body e­ lse,” he asserted in June  1953. “No amount of horror stories demonstrating the crimes of the Kremlin w ­ ill convince millions of ­people in the ­free world that Soviet-­inspired Communism is their main prob­lem,” he went on, “­because they know that it is not.”10 Cox was a voice in the wilderness, though, as the administration worked diligently to align its UN strategy with wider Cold War propaganda programs.11 When it came to specific issues related to the non-­self-­governing territories likely to come up at the Eighth General Assembly, the new administration hewed closely to its pre­de­ces­sor’s positions. It reiterated the long-­standing US belief that transmission of po­liti­cal information was not obligatory, although it intended to continue the past practice of transmitting such information voluntarily. And it stood firm on the f­actors question, insisting that no list could be considered absolute and that the power to determine a par­tic­u­lar territory’s status rested solely with the relevant administering authority. In spelling out its stance on the ­factors to be taken into account in determining ­whether a territory was or was not non-­self-­governing for the secretary-­ general, as Resolution 648 (VII) had requested, the Eisenhower administration indicated in no uncertain terms its intention to wage a propaganda war against what it called “Soviet imperialism.” “The United States wishes to call special attention,” it asserted, “to the tragic case of ­those ­peoples who enjoyed in­de­pen­dence prior to World War II but who have since had a dependent status imposed upon them.” The ­battle lines ­were thus drawn early on for a more aggressive US war of words at the United Nations. The potential effectiveness of this campaign, however, remained to be seen.12 Despite the British desire to take advantage of the change in administrations in Washington to conduct an extended series of bilateral discussions on the model of ­those that had been taking place for the past several years, events made that impossible. In the end, officials in London simply had to count on the fact that their “views on the h ­ andling of colonial affairs in the United States [­were sufficiently] . . . ​well-­known” that the new administration knew where they stood. They would also have to rely on normal diplomatic and personal

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contact “to convince the Americans that [their] position [was] reasonable and to persuade them to adopt an attitude of sympathetic understanding in the United Nations,” eventualities that would have been the desired outcomes of bilateral talks had they in fact occurred.13 Several ­things set the 1953 session of the Committee on Information apart from t­ hose that preceded it. First off, the government of Belgium refused to participate, though it did transmit information, which meant that the committee lost the even balance between administering and nonadministering states that had been its hallmark since 1946. Although the other administering states ­were at first apprehensive about the advantage Belgium’s absence gave to the nonadministering states on the committee, their fears ultimately proved unfounded. The second departure from previous years was the absence of the Soviet Union, which for the first time since the committee’s establishment in 1946 was not a member. Elections for the committee held late in the Seventh General Assembly had placed China in the seat previously occupied by the Soviet Union, thereby resulting in a significant improvement over past years as far as the administering states w ­ ere concerned, since the Nationalist government on Taiwan rather than the Communist government on the mainland held the Chinese seat in the United Nations. Taken together, ­these two deviations from past committee membership, along with a generally straightforward and noncontroversial agenda, made the 1953 session of the Committee on Information, in British representative W. A. C. Mathieson’s words, “the most harmonious in history.”14 As had been the case since 1950, when the Committee on Information began focusing on one functional area each year, the vast majority of the 1953 session (12 of 17 meetings) was taken up with the primary topic for that year—­ education—­a course that boded well for the overall outcome of the session ­because it left l­ittle time for potentially controversial issues, the two most pressing of which ­were the transmission of po­liti­cal information and the cessation of information. When it came to the former, only Pakistan’s R. Piracha both­ ered to speak, and although he delivered an ardent endorsement of the practice, the committee ultimately sent no recommendation on this subject on to the Fourth Committee.15 The latter issue, addressed in discussion of a draft resolution on the US intention to cease transmission of information on Puerto Rico, generated more sustained discussion. Brazil’s Sergio Armando Frazão led the activist charge, asserting that the committee “would not be carry­ing out its functions” if it failed to assess “the wisdom of the cessation of the transmission of information on Puerto Rico” by conducting an in-­depth examination of the situation. Debate stretching over several sessions revealed significant differences of opinion on the ­matter, with the administering states especially

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concerned that the committee was acting beyond its terms of reference in considering the substance of the US decision to cease the transmission of information. The draft resolution that the committee ultimately sent to the Fourth Committee made no mention of competence per se and merely referred to previous General Assembly resolutions on cessation, most notably Resolution 448 (V), which had directed the Committee on Information to “examine” the information administering states presented when they wished to be released from the responsibility of transmitting information on a par­tic­u­lar territory and to “report thereon to the General Assembly.” Although a number of administering states expressed reservations even then, they ultimately assented, since the resolution did not affirm ­actual committee competence to pass on the legitimacy of claims that a territory was no longer non-­self-­governing and thus no longer subject to the information transmission requirements of Article 73(e); Indonesia, Iraq, and Pakistan cited vari­ous reasons for abstaining.16 The issue of UN competence to determine a par­tic­u­lar territory’s status also came up during the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on ­Factors (Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories) that met in advance of the opening of the regular 1953 UN session with instructions to report directly to the Fourth Committee. While completing its charge, the balanced ad hoc committee (Australia, Belgium, Burma, Cuba, Guatemala, Iraq, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela) built on the list of f­ actors that had been compiled in 1952, making a few modifications but other­wise retaining most of that e­ arlier exercise. In a reflection of its balanced membership, it also assiduously avoided the question of who had competency to determine when a territory had ceased to be non-­self-­governing that had so clouded ­earlier f­ actors exercises, or to even send forth a recommended resolution to the Fourth Committee, noting in its report simply that “in view of the wide divergencies [sic] which prevailed in the Ad Hoc Committee, it was de­cided that this ­matter should be referred to the General Assembly without recommendation.”17 The Fourth Committee, where the administering states ­were outnumbered fifty-­two to eight, decried the ad hoc committee’s failure to weigh in on the ­matter of competency and insisted that authority to remove a territory from the purview of Chapter XI rested, in ­whole or in part, with the United Nations. Pakistan’s Ahmed S. Bokhari colorfully summed up the nonadministering states’ ire by noting: “In a sense, the Administering Members w ­ ere on a black list: they had to account to the United Nations for certain of their actions in the Non-­Self-­Governing Territories. They would surely be happy to see their names struck from that list” and therefore could not be trusted with determining how such an eventuality might come about. Conversely, the administering states could not accept the proposition that authority to deter-

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mine a territory’s constitutional status rested anywhere but in their own national legislatures. They had no real hope, however, of preventing the Fourth Committee from recommending UN competency. Ultimately, a Brazilian draft resolution that recognized UN involvement in determining the constitutional status of individual territories won approval on a roll-­call vote of 27 to 23, with 2 abstentions; e­ very administering state voted against the mea­sure. On this most impor­tant of issues, the administering states thus suffered a serious defeat at the hands of the Fourth Committee, one they certainly hoped could be reversed—as had been the case with previous activist Fourth Committee proposals—at the General Assembly level.18 Fourth Committee discussion of UN authority in the nontrust dependent territories beyond the ­factors question revealed nothing new. The nonadministering states reaffirmed the crucial role that Chapter XI played in advancing conditions in the territories ­under its purview, declared their support for ­those territories’ efforts to gain full in­de­pen­dence and eventual membership in the United Nations, and argued for the legitimacy of UN interest in t­ hose territories’ ­f utures. In general, they also supported the transmission of po­liti­cal information. Not surprisingly, the administering states defended their rec­ords in the nontrust dependent territories, reiterated a commitment to their self-­ government as soon as realistically pos­si­ble, and repeated previous pledges to comply with legitimate UN actions. They made clear, however, their opposition to what they considered unwarranted, unjustified, or unwise UN action. In keeping with the Eisenhower administration’s new propaganda stance at the United Nations, US representative Frances Payne Bolton obliquely brought Soviet colonialism into the debate in proclaiming that “true liberty for dependent or other newly-­liberated p­ eoples could never be attained or made secure ­unless the f­ree world was able and ready to protect itself against the growth and spread of a new form of imperialism, immeasurably more destructive of ­human liberties than any form of alien control in modern history.”19 Before commencing discussion of the Fourth Committee’s work and recommended resolutions, including t­ hose dealing with the ­factors and information cessation questions, a long speech by Mexico’s Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto sparked debate in the General Assembly about the terms ­under which votes on t­ hose resolutions should take place. In a detailed and at times passionate oration that provided a comprehensive outline of the case for international accountability, Espinosa y Prieto denounced the decision at the San Francisco Conference to create two distinct UN categories of dependent territories, a move that thwarted the “courageous attempt to open up a new era in colonial affairs” by leaving Chapter XI’s dealing with the victorious World War II Allies’ colonies “bereft of most of its force” and providing for real UN authority

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only in the territories the Trusteeship System covered. As we have seen, among the Charter-­mandated differences between the two categories of dependent territories was the requirement for a two-­thirds majority for approval of m ­ atters pertaining to the Trusteeship System but not ­those dealing with the territories that fell ­under the auspices of Chapter XI.20 The administering states’ past efforts to use Article 18 to apply that standard on a case-­by-­case basis to mea­ sures dealing with the non-­self-­governing territories while si­mul­ta­neously resisting “any of the benefits contained in Chapters XII and XIII” where UN authority was concerned had, he claimed, been unacceptable subversions of the w ­ ill of the majority. To guard against such a development in the f­ uture, he proposed “that any questions relating to Non-­Self-­Governing Territories may always be de­cided by a ­simple majority.” Discussion of Espinosa y Prieto’s proposal occupied the greater portion of the Assembly’s 459th plenary meeting, with impassioned interventions on both sides of the issue and a fair amount of confusion sprinkled in. Ultimately, ­after a series of votes, the Assembly agreed that all the draft resolutions dealing with the non-­self-­governing territories sent on from the Fourth Committee fell outside the reach of Article 18 and thus required only a s­imple majority to win passage. The administering states complained bitterly, but to no avail.21 Although ­there was no ­actual debate of the Fourth Committee’s recommended resolutions before they came up for a vote, a number of del­e­ga­tions offered explanations of their votes that included substantive statements. Not surprisingly, the administering states again denounced what they saw as the implicit expansion of the UN role in the Chapter XI territories contained in the draft resolutions on f­ actors and the cessation of information, both of which advanced the notion of General Assembly competence to determine the status of individual territories. And again, their arguments fell on deaf ears. What became Resolution 742 (VIII) dealt with the former and was approved on a non-­roll-­call vote of 32 to 19, with 6 abstentions, while the latter was addressed in what became Resolution 748 (VIII), approved on a roll-­call vote of 26 to 16, with 18 abstentions. (The United States voted yes; Australia voted no; the other administering states abstained.) Their approval demonstrated the activist sense that was coming to the forefront in the General Assembly and the difficulty— if not the futility—of trying to resist the drive for international accountability for dependent territories.22 The Eighth General Assembly’s assault on administering state authority colored British planning for the Ninth, which began in earnest in early 1954 and revealed a renewed determination not to surrender when it came to m ­ atters

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of princi­ple. Although policymakers reaffirmed the existence of “a genuine international interest in the affairs of non-­self-­governing territories,” they remained insistent “that that interest [had to be] reflected in constructive and responsible public debate designed to contribute to the pro­g ress and welfare of the inhabitants of ­those territories,” not the sort of public plays to the balcony that they believed had motivated much of the anticolonial critique in the past. For that reason, they had “to set a limit to the extent to which, in the pre­sent state of development of the United Nations, [they w ­ ere] prepared to allow the Organisation to concern itself with the domestic affairs of non-­self-­ governing territories”—­a backhanded slap at the increasing role non-­Western nations w ­ ere beginning to play in the General Assembly and other UN entities. Any UN effort to discuss po­liti­cal conditions in the non-­self-­governing territories, for example, would “involve grave consequences” for Britain’s continued cooperation with the United Nations when it came to colonial questions; the threat had been leveled before, of course, with no action, but now London would presumably follow through if necessary.23 Concurrent discussions within the US government also trod familiar ground. US officials remained committed to Ambassador Lodge’s efforts “to use [the UN General Assembly] for offensive actions to exploit the vulnerabilities of the international Communist conspiracy” and specifically what had come to be called the “Communism—­The New Colonialism” campaign. Accordingly, the State Department advised the US del­e­ga­tion to the United Nations to take ­every opportunity to highlight how “the world communist movement has been waging a new kind of war to establish a new kind of world colonial empire, ­under the domination of the USSR—in the very era when old-­ style colonialism is coming to an end.” The explicit contrast between the impending end of Western colonialism and the consolidation of Soviet imperialism was deliberate and evidenced Washington’s determination to brand Moscow an imperialist on the world stage of the United Nations, thereby turning Soviet criticism of the Western colonial powers on its head.24 In addition to formulating propaganda for the Ninth General Assembly, US officials also prepared for pre-­Assembly consultations with the British. The US position on ­whether po­liti­cal conditions in the non-­self-­governing territories could be discussed in the United Nations’ vari­ous forums was unchanged, emphasizing that transmission of such information was not mandatory ­under the terms of the Charter and reaffirming opposition to UN efforts to “ ‘recommend’ that all Administering Authorities transmit [it].” When it came to the cessation of information transmission, the United States conceded the right of the United Nations “to discuss the constitutional developments in a

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territory which lead the responsible Administering Authority to decide to terminate the transmission of information” but denied that it had “the competence to decide when a territory need no longer be reported on.”25 The first set of bilateral talks on colonial policy since the change in administrations in the United States occurred on 26 and 27 July 1954. ­Little in the way of concrete policy agreement was reached, and the discussions in fact merely revealed differences rooted in each country’s global position. As the world’s leading administering state, Britain simply could not consider allowing the international community, represented by the United Nations, to examine its conduct as a colonial administrator. This was a fundamental component of the British understanding of the Charter. And British officials took pains to explain that should their conception of the limits of UN authority regarding the non-­self-­governing territories be challenged, they would have no choice but to withdraw from discussion of subjects they considered outside the scope of UN competence. For their part, US officials saw their nation’s position as leader of the F ­ ree World as necessitating more active use of the United Nations as a propaganda forum for scouring the Soviets. They w ­ ere also more concerned about the possibility of communist infiltration of local nationalist movements or communist subversion of recently or soon-­to-be in­ de­pen­dent nations than their British counter­parts. Given the singular world roles that London and Washington played, it was not at all surprising that their approaches to UN h ­ andling of colonial questions w ­ ere not always in sync. It could be considered remarkable, in fact, that they found as much unity of purpose and approach as they did.26 The 1954 session of the Committee on Information dealt with one issue related to UN authority in the Chapter XI territories, occasioned by Denmark’s announcement that it would no longer transmit information on Greenland. Although no committee member opposed the removal of Greenland from the ranks of ­those territories covered by Article 73(e), several del­e­ga­tions did use the occasion to affirm their belief in a clear UN role in sanctioning such transitions of the sort that applied to the trust territories. India’s Avtar Singh, for instance, made the case for “new and more comprehensive procedures . . . ​to deal with decisions by Governments . . . ​that Chapter XI no longer applied to formerly dependent p­ eoples,” an idea Brazil’s Sergio Armando Frazão seconded. A variety of other del­e­ga­tions considered the Danish assertion that Greenland was no longer a non-­self-­governing territory against the ­factors enumerated in Resolution 742 (VIII), implicitly endorsing both the legitimacy of using ­those f­actors as determinants of a par­tic­u­lar territory’s status and the UN right to interject itself into the pro­cess of making such determinations. Representatives of the administering states, for their part, argued for l­imited

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applicability of the ­factors listed in Resolution 742 (VIII) and significant restrictions on the UN right to pass judgment on the status of an individual territory. The ­factors, maintained Australia’s Allan  H. Loomes in a typical intervention that rehearsed previously expressed sentiments, ­were merely “a guide” to determining a territory’s status rather than “evidence for a final evaluation.” And in any event, as the United States’ Benjamin Gerig and o ­ thers asserted, “Competen[ce] to decide to terminate transmission of information in re­spect of a dependent territory” rested solely with the responsible administering state. The oft-­times wide-­ranging nature of the Committee on Information’s discussion of cessation of information regarding Greenland notwithstanding, the resolution it ultimately unanimously approved for the Fourth Committee’s consideration dealt only with the specific case at hand and was ­silent when it came to UN competence to determine an individual territory’s status. Australia, Denmark, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States subsequently reaffirmed their conviction that responsibility for determining a territory’s status rested solely with the administering state.27 If the 1954 session of the Committee on Information took no action to challenge the Charter-­mandated distinction between the trust and nontrust dependent territories, the same was not true of the Fourth Committee, where opening statements hinted at the fireworks to come. Many nonadministering del­e­ga­tions lamented the continued existence of the colonial system and defended the United Nations’ interest in the p­ eoples of the non-­self-­governing territories. The Soviet bloc states lobbed their usual criticisms regarding the “inadequacy of the information submitted by the Administering Members” and accused t­ hose states of pursuing policies that ­were “not in the interests of the indigenous population.” And US delegate C. D. Jackson countered with a reminder that while the Western administering states w ­ ere making “tangible pro­g ress in ending the old system of colonialism,” it was impor­tant to devote “some attention . . . ​to the new colonialism of the new Soviet orbit,” thereby introducing into the committee’s work the kind of anti-­Soviet propaganda the Eisenhower administration intended to bring to the United Nations as a ­whole.28 As had increasingly been its wont, the Fourth Committee in 1954 moved beyond the Committee on Information’s report and charted its own course by approving a resolution Burma, Egypt, Lebanon, and the Philippines introduced that repeated ­earlier calls for the voluntary transmission of information on the constitutional development of the non-­self-­governing territories. The mea­sure posed no real challenge to administering state authority ­because it did not actually compel or require the transmission of po­liti­cal information,

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but t­ hose states nevertheless firmly opposed it. The roll-­call vote of 36 to 9, with 4 abstentions, saw Denmark abstain and the other administering states vote no.29 At the same time, two dif­fer­ent discussions of the broad issue of cessation of information revealed the Fourth Committee’s strong support for a large and active UN role in determining the status of individual non-­self-­governing territories. One was focused on Denmark’s intention to cease information transmissions regarding Greenland, an issue that was first discussed in the Committee on Information. Moving well beyond the straightforward and widely acceptable draft resolution on Greenland introduced by Brazil, Guatemala, India, and Peru, the del­e­ga­tion of Uruguay proposed an amendment that affirmed the claim for General Assembly competence to determine w ­ hether a territory had or had not attained a full mea­sure of self-­government. The administering states w ­ ere no more successful in defeating this mea­sure than they had been in keeping this sort of claim out of Resolution 748 (VIII) on Puerto Rico, as the Fourth Committee easily approved the Uruguayan amendment on a roll-­call vote of 33 to 12, with 5 abstentions, and incorporated into the draft resolution on Greenland the idea of overt UN competence to determine a par­tic­ul­ ar territory’s status. ­There ­were no surprises among the dozen states voting no on the Uruguayan amendment: Australia; Belgium; Canada; Denmark; France; the Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; South Africa; Sweden; the United Kingdom; and the United States. The draft resolution as a ­whole won approval by a non-­roll-­call vote of 34 to 4, with 12 abstentions, presumably the same dozen states that had previously opposed the Uruguayan amendment. Danish representative Hermod Lannung denounced the Uruguayan amendment’s introduction of a general claim for Assembly competence to determine an individual territory’s status as “neither reasonable nor necessary” and feared that it would prevent a number of del­e­ga­tions from approving the draft resolution on the cessation of information transmission on Greenland at the General Assembly level.30 The Fourth Committee’s other consideration of the cessation issue, which built on the Uruguayan amendment, centered on a joint proposal by Greece, Indonesia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Syria to establish a procedure for effecting UN competence to determine when a territory ceased to be non-­self-­governing in a manner that resembled the one employed for territories that fell u ­ nder the auspices of the Trusteeship System. Specifically, it charged the Committee on Information with developing steps for examining administering states’ claims for individual territories’ attainment of self-­ government and raised the prospect of UN missions visiting territories whose status had recently changed, presumably to verify that self-­government did

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indeed exist. Yugo­slavia’s Aleksandar Bozovic and ­others saw the draft resolution as a benign mea­sure and claimed that “all it r­ eally called for was a study by the Committee on Information.” The administering states begged to differ. The Netherlands’ C. W. A. Schurmann, the United States’s A. M. Ade Johnson, and Belgium’s Daniel Massonet all denounced the proposal as a backdoor effort to transform the non-­self-­governing territories into trust territories and insisted it was thus contrary to the Charter; Johnson also lamented its implication that the administering states could not be trusted when it came to determining a territory’s status. Given the committee’s approval of the Uruguayan amendment to the draft resolution on Greenland, its endorsement of the broad mea­sure concerning cessation was never in doubt, and it handily approved the proposal on a roll-­call vote of 37 to 11, with 4 abstentions. The dissenters w ­ ere Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Among the administering states, Denmark abstained. In explaining his del­e­ga­tion’s vote against the mea­sure, and doubtless speaking for other states that had voted similarly, New Zealand’s J. V. Scott reproached the majority for failing to display the “spirit of co-­operation without which it would not be pos­si­ble to reach solutions in the interests” of the p­ eoples of the non-­self-­ governing territories, raising in the pro­cess the prospect that the administering states might respond with a lack of cooperation of their own.31 The Fourth Committee’s approval of the draft resolution on cessation of information served as a harbinger for similar action by the General Assembly, which, as it had often done in previous years, voted ­under Rule 68 to dispense with debate of the committee’s report and move instead to an immediate vote on the resolutions it recommended. Broad-­based support for the administering states’ transmission of po­liti­cal information remained the norm, as a strong majority vote—42 to 10, with 3 abstentions—­approved what became Resolution 848 (IX) “reiterat[ing]” the appropriateness of the transmission of po­liti­ cal information and “invit[ing]” ­those administering states that had not previously done so “to give the United Nations their utmost co-­operation in this regard.”32 A greater threat to the Charter-­mandated distinction between the trust and nontrust dependent territories came in the General Assembly’s ­handling of the two draft resolutions on the cessation of information, both of which had easily won Fourth Committee approval. ­After approving the paragraph of the Greenland resolution that claimed General Assembly competence to decide ­whether an individual non-­self-­governing territory had attained a full mea­sure of self-­government on a vote of 38 to 15 (including all of the administering states), with 4 abstentions, the Assembly went on to approve by roll-­ call what became Resolution 849 (IX) by a margin of 45 to 1, with 11 abstentions

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(Denmark and the United States among the administering states voted yes; Belgium voted no; and the o ­ thers abstained). Before the Assembly voted on the more general resolution dealing with cessation, Denmark’s Hermod Lannung repeated the remarks he had made to the Fourth Committee denouncing the Uruguayan amendment for preventing unan­i­mous, or nearly unan­i­mous, approval of the resolution on Greenland. The general proposal on cessation then went on to win approval on a non-­recorded vote of 40 to 12, with 3 abstentions; it became Resolution 850 (IX), the first UN resolution to address the cessation of information outside the context of a par­tic­u­lar territory.33 General Assembly approval—by wide margins—of Resolutions 848 (IX), 849 (IX), and 850 (IX) clearly signaled that the administering states ­were losing their ability to resist greater UN involvement in the non-­self-­governing territories. Calling once again for the transmission of po­liti­cal information and twice affirming the General Assembly’s competence to determine the status of individual territories constituted challenges to the administering states’ strict conception of the ­limited UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories as spelled out in the Charter. Resolution 850 (IX) was perhaps the most problematic of the lot, advancing as it did a UN right to determine a par­tic­u­lar territory’s status and claiming for the organ­ization a power not spelled out in the Charter. All three mea­sures, not to mention the substantial support they received in the Assembly, challenged the administering states’ self-­proclaimed autonomy vis-­à-­vis the Chapter XI territories and suggested that the drive to achieve international accountability for dependent territories would continue unabated, with ever-­more likelihood of success. Internal British discussions in the lead up to the Tenth General Assembly revealed considerable concern about the Fourth Committee’s growing militancy on colonial questions. As we have seen, the committee had on several occasions e­ ither beefed up resolutions drafted in the Committee on Information or approved mea­sures on subjects not addressed (or deliberately avoided) at that level, most recently by endorsing again the “voluntary” transmission of po­liti­cal information and asserting UN competence to determine the constitutional status of individual territories. As far as British policymakers ­were concerned, ­these efforts resulted from the growing “futility” of the Committee on Information, which had “largely ceased to function ­either as a lightning conductor or as a sounding board for [their] achievements.” Its ­limited terms of reference—­shaped as they ­were by Britain and the other administering states, which refused to participate in a committee with an expansive purview—­had pushed what London took to calling the “anti-­colonials” in the Fourth Com-

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mittee t­ oward greater activism, with results that increasingly encroached on the Charter-­mandated distinction between the trust and nontrust dependent territories. A determined stand against that trend was deemed absolutely essential.34 British officials hewed to the same line on the Committee on Information’s f­ uture as the one pursued when the committee was up for renewal in 1952. Their private acquiescence to the committee’s continuation for another three years with the same terms of reference was to be masked by a stern public opposition to renewal ­under any circumstances. In this way, ac­cep­tance of another three-­year term would seem like a compromise. Establishment of the committee on a permanent basis or expansion of its mandate would halt British participation in its work.35 ­Because the 1955 session of the Committee on Information, which now numbered only fourteen given the departure of Denmark (and the nonadministering state that had balanced it), began in mid-­April, ­there was no time for Anglo-­American consultations in advance.36 Instead, both sides approached the committee’s work based on internal discussions and pursued no new policy directions. For Britain, that meant safeguarding what officials saw as their national prerogatives when it came to the non-­self-­governing territories Britain administered. For the United States, it meant waging an activist campaign against Soviet colonialism and preventing colonial questions from becoming divisive enough to split the non-­Communist world apart. As events played out in the committee, both sides essentially succeeded. In a manner that belied its importance, the Committee on Information’s discussion of its own f­ uture was brief and relatively nonconfrontational. That said, it was clear from the start that members had vastly dif­fer­ent ideas about what sort of f­ uture the committee o ­ ught to have. For their part, the administering states, and particularly Britain and France, whose cooperation with any committee was essential, would not budge on certain core questions, including their opposition to a permanent committee and any attempt to expand the committee’s terms of reference beyond t­ hose already in place. Meanwhile, many nonadministering members praised the committee as an essential ele­ ment in the progression of territories to self-­governing status and wished to expand its purview into new areas. When it became clear that Britain and France would refuse to participate in any committee with expanded terms of reference, the United States and China introduced a draft resolution renewing the committee for another three-­year period on the same terms of reference. Ultimately, the committee voted to renew itself on ­these terms by a non-­roll-­call vote of 9 to 0, with 4 abstentions; France and the United Kingdom ­later admitted to having abstained. Regardless of their feelings about the resolution thus approved, committee members almost certainly realized the

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unlikelihood that the Fourth Committee would simply rubber stamp t­ hese renewal terms.37 Consistent with internal US planning before the opening of the Committee on Information’s session, Mason Sears made use of the Soviet colonialism theme during debate over the committee’s ­f uture. “­There ­were tremendous forces at work” in the world, he maintained, “some seeking to create self-­ government, o ­ thers seeking to destroy it. The Committee should be concerned with both trends.” In a succinct expression of emerging US thinking on this ­matter, he asserted that “it was only by contrasting the two trends that one could clearly understand the nature of the colonial question as it was evolving ­today.”38 During the months between the close of the Committee on Information’s session in mid-­May and the opening of the Tenth General Assembly in the fall, US officials persisted with their planning for propaganda efforts at the United Nations, especially in the context of the emerging Soviet colonialism campaign. Sears’s denunciation of Soviet suppression of self-­government during discussions over the renewal of the Committee on Information was seen as just the opening salvo of a concerted campaign against Soviet colonialism to be conducted across vari­ous UN forums once the Assembly opened, a stance the United States was apparently prepared to take despite the failure of the other administering del­e­ga­tions to support Sears’s statement. Ambassador Lodge continued to lead the charge in this direction, convinced that the United Nations constituted “the greatest loudspeaker in the world for influencing world public opinion.” He therefore intended to exploit the organ­ization’s potential to the fullest when it came to pushing the Western case in the Cold War, with exposing what US officials considered the hy­poc­risy of Soviet attacks on Western colonialism high on his list of exploitable themes.39 The propaganda effort to brand the Soviets as imperialists faced an uphill ­battle, however, given prevailing perceptions of US foreign policy. By the mid1950s, the nation was suffering from a lack of credibility on the ­matter of demonstrating a true commitment to national self-­determination. Although US officials saw membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organ­ization (NATO) as a Cold War necessity, the leaders of national liberation movements saw it as an unholy alliance between the United States and the Western Eu­ro­ pean colonial powers in the same way that, as Justin Hart has noted, the Marshall Plan was.40 Nor was the ­matter helped by Washington’s effort to assist the French in returning to Indochina a­ fter 1945 and its assumption of the mantle of counterrevolution t­ here in 1954. Support for the coups d’état in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954 also called into question the US government’s commitment to self-­determination. Taken together, ­these ele­ments of US for-

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eign policy suggested a preoccupation with the East-­West strug­gle at the cost of true support for national self-­determination—­a position that was ­little dif­fer­ent than the one US officials advanced in the Soviet colonialism campaign.41 If Washington’s policy seemed dominated by the East-­West rivalry, the April 1955 Bandung Conference outlined a dif­fer­ent approach to international affairs that had both broad implications and specific relevance to the campaign for international accountability for dependent territories.42 The twenty-­nine Asian and African states that gathered in the capital of the Indonesian province of West Java represented a variety of po­liti­cal orientations. Communist states such as the P ­ eople’s Republic of China and the Demo­cratic Republic of Vietnam w ­ ere in attendance. But staunchly pro-­Western attendees ­were much more numerous. US client-­state South Vietnam was pre­sent. So was Japan, which had concluded a bilateral security pact with the United States in 1951. And many of the states in attendance ­were members of one or more US-­ sponsored defense pacts: Turkey belonged to NATO; Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey ­were members of the Baghdad Pact; and Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines ­were members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organ­ization (SEATO).43 Despite the presence at Bandung of states from both sides of the East-­ West conflict, the prominence of its most vehemently neutralist attendees, particularly Indonesia’s Ahmed Sukarno, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, and India’s Jawaharlal Nehru, ­shaped both con­temporary and subsequent depictions of the gathering as concerned primarily with carving out the philosophy of nonalignment. Sukarno spoke for all attendees when he lamented that “­g reat chasms yawn[ed] between nations and groups of nations,” forcing “the ­peoples of all countries to walk in fear, lest, through no fault of their own, the dogs of war [­were] unchained once again.” Nasser urged re­sis­tance to what he termed “the game of power politics in which the small nations can be used as tools” of the “selfish interests” of the larger states. And in a clear articulation of the emerging nonaligned position, Nehru argued for true equality among all the world’s nations, large and small, rejecting the thought that the nations of Asia and Africa should be mere “yes-­men” to one or the other of the ­g reat powers or “camp-­followers of Rus­sia or Amer­i­ca or any other country.”44 Although the contours of what would become the Non-­Aligned Movement ­were certainly evident at Bandung, Roland Burke has convincingly demonstrated that attendees actually spent more time considering “­human rights and attendant issues” that directly related to their individual and collective positions as Asian and African nations, setting forth in the end “a distinctive Third

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World identity, which was constructed around the common experience of Western subjection and economic underdevelopment.”45 Much of the discussion, as well as a considerable portion of the conference’s final communiqué, included numerous specific recommendations for achieving economic, cultural, and po­liti­cal cooperation among the Bandung nations. But the final communiqué also revealed the conferees’ concerns about the plight of the dozens of dependent states that still remained throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin Amer­i­ca. Viewing the right of ­peoples and nations to self-­determination as universal, the conferees condemned “the subjection of p­ eoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation” as “a denial of fundamental h ­ uman rights” 46 and “contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.” Much to the chagrin of Nehru and the other unabashedly neutralist attendees, the presence of so many Western-­leaning nations at the conference made concomitant criticism of Soviet colonialism almost inevitable, particularly given the Eisenhower administration’s determination to make use of the pro-­ Western attendees to bring that subject into discussions. As Jason Parker’s fascinating discussion of ­these efforts demonstrates, US officials, working indirectly through SEATO, w ­ ere largely responsible for the fact that Iran, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Turkey included condemnations of Soviet colonialism in their opening speeches that ranged, in Roland Burke’s words, “from moderate expressions of concern to full-­blown denunciations.”47 Some of what was said repeated what representatives of t­ hose nations had said in vari­ous UN forums or echoed the remarks t­here of the United States and ­Great Britain. So did the speech of Ceylonese Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala during debate of the conference’s Po­liti­cal Committee, in which he specifically equated Soviet domination of the Eastern Eu­ro­pean states with Eu­ro­pean colonialism in Asia and Africa and proclaimed it the duty of the conference to denounce both.48 Kotelawala’s remarks generated a firestorm. Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey ­were quick to support him, while the ­People’s Republic of China and India offered dif­fer­ent kinds of denunciations.49 In the United States, officials from the State Department to the Operations Coordinating Board to the Central Intelligence Agency ­were delighted at the pro-­Western states’ per­for­mance, and even more with their success in securing inclusion in the final communiqué of a “declar[ation] that colonialism in all its manifestations [was] an evil which should speedily be brought to an end,” although each del­e­ga­tion ultimately agreed to interpret that phrase as it chose.50 Several aspects of the Bandung Conference placed it within the campaign for international accountability for dependent territories. One, of course, was the conferees’ faith in the “fundamental princi­ples of ­Human Rights” as codified in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of H ­ uman Rights “as a

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standard of achievement for all ­peoples and nations.”51 That included the undisputed right to self-­determination and the accompanying belief that the United Nations had the power to achieve decolonization and other­wise work on behalf of the developing world. ­These ­were all impor­tant ele­ments of the campaign for international accountability for dependent territories, whose proponents saw the United Nations as the only available route for replacing the traditional metropole-­centric system of colonial administration with the sort of international supervision that was inherent in the Trusteeship System and designed to lead to in­de­pen­dence. This faith in the power of the organ­ization, in fact, drove the Bandung conferees to call for a break in the long-­standing logjam on the admission of new members and the prompt admission of Cambodia, Ceylon, Libya, and Nepal (all of which w ­ ere pre­sent in Bandung), Jordan (which, as a ­Middle Eastern nation, was not), and a unified Vietnam (both North and South Vietnam ­were pre­sent in Bandung). It also inspired their decision to form a discrete Asian-­African group at the United Nations to facilitate consultation on m ­ atters of common concern and maximize their collective power in the Assembly.52 Fi­nally, the Bandung conferees set themselves firmly against “racial segregation and discrimination,” which they deemed “not only a gross violation of h ­ uman rights, but also a denial of the fundamental values of civilisation and the dignity of man.” Dispelling Western notions of the backwardness and racial inferiority of dependent ­peoples was central to the international accountability campaign, so endorsement of an end to race-­ based discrimination such as South African apartheid in the Bandung final communiqué was further proof of the complementarity of the Asian-­African conference and the campaign for UN activism in dependent territories.53 British officials pushed back hard against the Bandung communiqué’s suggestion that Western colonialism and Soviet imperialism could be viewed equivalently. “The pro­cess of nation-­building which is in pro­g ress in British Colonial territories” could in no way be equated “with Communist oppression of mature and established p­ eoples” ran the agreed-­upon—­and culturally framed—­British line on this ­matter, which asserted the positive uplifting effects of British colonial involvement in bringing ­peoples along to in­de­pen­dence and self-­government. In fact, a defense of British colonialism was to be a major feature of the bilateral discussions slated for August, stemming apparently from a conviction that if the United States did not understand and appreciate “the broad aims of [British] colonial policies and of the scale of achievements in po­liti­cal development in British colonies in recent years,” ­there was ­little to no prospect of getting ­those realities across to other nations.54 If emphasizing the overall beneficence of British colonial policies was a major ele­ment of London’s planning for Anglo-­American bilateral talks, US

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thinking was clearly colored by the Bandung Conference, which Ambassador Lodge lauded for having “condemn[ed] all kinds of colonialism—­including, of course, the communist variety.”55 To be sure, the State Department well appreciated that Western colonialism differed from Soviet imperialism in “motive, method and objectives.” At the same time, however, policymakers ­there realized that given current international and national tendencies to link the two phenomena, they should take the opportunity “to re-­examine and re-­ assess [their] general attitude ­toward the colonial question.” US officials also continued to take a broader view of the potential benefits of trying to meet anticolonial sentiment in the United Nations part way, convinced that “concessions to majority opinion in the UN w ­ ill help to bring about a bloc of moderate and reasonable opinion which ­will be useful in avoiding or defeating extreme proposals,” particularly of the sort members of the Soviet bloc often introduced.56 In a pattern that was becoming familiar, the bilateral discussions ­were less about ­either side securing backing for a par­tic­u­lar action or policy direction than about airing and explaining broad princi­ples so as to minimize surprise and misunderstanding once the General Assembly opened. This meant that British representatives explained their distaste for the equation of Western colonialism and Soviet imperialism, defended their national colonial rec­ord, and expounded on why they could only go so far when it came to UN involvement with the non-­self-­governing territories. For their part, US officials spelled out their belief that while they ­were likely to be compelled ­toward a stronger anticolonial stance at the forthcoming Tenth General Assembly, they understood that immediate in­de­pen­dence had to be foregone in ­favor of an orderly progression ­toward in­de­pen­dence so as to prevent territories from falling to communism.57 As events played out, British representative B. O. B. Gidden spoke for all of the administering states when he reported that the 1955 session of the Fourth Committee exhibited “a general air of tolerance, greater than [had] been noticeable in the past three or four years,” with no notable anticolonial invective and no significant challenges to the Charter-­mandated distinction between the trust and nontrust dependent territories. The substantive work of the Committee on Information was endorsed with l­ittle comment, with most members agreeing with Mexico’s Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto that as “a typical example of collective work,” the committee’s report sought to “be acceptable to all” and “was therefore wholly acceptable to none.” It was unquestionably the best pos­si­ble compromise given the divergent voices it represented and easily won committee approval.58 Members also approved by a non-­roll-­call vote of 39 to 0, with 12 abstentions, a resolution sponsored by Cuba, Ec­ua­

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dor, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Syria, and Yugo­slavia authorizing the secretary-­general to “gather . . . ​in one document the data concerning conditions in the Non-­Self-­Governing Territories transmitted since 1946 . . . ​ so as to show what pro­gress had been achieved in the past ten years.” Although the administering members questioned the need for and utility of such a mea­ sure, they conceded that it posed no challenge to their position regarding the United Nations’ l­imited authority over the nontrust dependent territories.59 In a surprising development for Britain and the other administering states, the renewal of the Committee on Information, which was expected to be the most contentious issue on the Fourth Committee’s agenda, was disposed of relatively easily. Despite unan­i­mous support among the nonadministering members for a permanent committee with a broader mandate, most understood that administering state opposition precluded such a development. The committee ultimately approved on a non-­roll-­call vote of 48 to 1, with 2 abstentions the resolution on renewal that the Committee on Information had sent up. The outcome of the committee’s renewal thus aligned completely with the wishes of Britain and the other administering states, since continuing the committee for another three-­year cycle on the same terms of reference was the best that they could have hoped to achieve.60 Both Britain and the United States followed through on their plans for dealing with the Fourth Committee’s consideration of colonial questions. The British missed no opportunity to extol the positive ele­ments of their colonial rec­ord, lauding the material pro­gress that was occurring in the territories they administered as a way of saying they had no need of international intervention to bring the territories they administered along to self-­government. They also used the threat of nonparticipation to prevent expansion of the Committee on Information’s terms of reference. As it had done in that venue, the US del­e­ga­tion again made use of the “Communist Colonialism” line during the Fourth Committee’s debate, although in a way that avoided a direct attack. ­After noting with plea­sure “the trend t­ owards the disappearance of what was usually called Western colonialism,” US delegate Laird Bell lamented the emergence “of another trend—­a movement which had deprived millions of once ­free ­peoples in Eu­rope and Asia of their in­de­pen­dence.” In what might be seen as a hint at f­ uture US strategy, he went on to say that the United States “was struck by the fact that that trend received so much less attention in the United Nations than the rate of pro­gress of the colonial ­peoples t­ owards freedom.”61 US officials would have agreed with the Colonial Office’s E. G. Hanrott that the Tenth General Assembly’s consideration of m ­ atters related to the non-­self-­ governing territories went “off much more quietly than in previous years . . . ​ without any very damaging criticisms or any very disastrous results.” Not one

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del­e­ga­tion asked to address the Assembly on the subject, and the complete lack of discussion made clear that the Assembly would approve the Fourth Committee’s report and recommendations. Regarding the overall question of UN authority over the non-­self-­governing territories, what became Resolution 933 (X) renewing the Committee on Information was approved on a non-­ roll-­call vote of 54 to 1, with 2 abstentions, while the mea­sure asking the secretary-­general to compile a composite picture of pro­g ress in the non-­self-­ governing territories since 1946 won passage as Resolution 932 (X) with a vote of 45 to 0, with 12 abstentions, again without request for a roll call. Securing renewal of the committee on the same terms of reference was a singular achievement for the British del­e­ga­tion, as was the ease with which this goal was secured compared with the 1952 session. British officials w ­ ere less sanguine about the mea­sure related to pro­g ress in the non-­self-­governing territories, since it could constitute an unwelcome invitation ­toward what B. O. B. Gidden termed UN “inquests into pro­g ress of par­tic­ul­ar Territories ­towards self-­government, time-­tables and the like.” Still, the effects of the resolution seemed at least a year away, and as 1955 closed, Britain and the other administering states had reason indeed to celebrate their success in fending off pos­ si­ble UN challenges to what they considered their national prerogatives when it came to the non-­self-­governing territories they administered. They could also take comfort in the election of India, Iraq, Venezuela, and China to three-­ year terms on the newly renewed Committee on Information (joining returning nonadministering members Burma, Guatemala, and Peru).62 The years that coincided with the second three-­year term of the Committee on Information saw no slackening of international interest in the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories. Calls for orga­nizational activism continued, especially when it came to UN competence to determine what precisely made a territory non-­self-­governing, discuss po­liti­cal conditions in t­ hose territories, and weigh in when it came to declaring that a territory was no longer non-­ self-­governing, all of which w ­ ere codified in General Assembly resolutions. This last issue was becoming increasingly impor­tant as the pro­cess of decolonization moved territories ­toward in­de­pen­dence, on the one hand fulfilling international hopes but on the other raising contentious questions about administering state autonomy. In a manner that reflected the heightening of Cold War tensions during ­these years, East-­West disagreement over the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories also intensified. Soviet bloc criticism of the Western administering states took an increasingly bombastic tone, particularly in the Fourth Committee, which was the only real venue open for such propagandizing, given

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the absence of the Soviet Union and its satellites from the Committee on Information for its 1953–1955 term. The new Eisenhower administration in Washington proved more ready than its pre­de­ces­sor to ­counter Soviet bloc anticolonialism with an aggressive campaign to paint the Soviets themselves as colonialists. And if this campaign paid few dividends, at least through 1955, it made clear that u ­ nder Republican leadership the United States intended to pursue a much more activist role in using the United Nations as a propaganda forum than the Demo­crats had. Changes in the makeup of the General Assembly also ensured that issues related to the Chapter XI territories would remain impor­tant. In December 1955 sixteen new nations w ­ ere admitted, the largest bloc of new member-­ states in the organ­ization’s history to date and the first change in membership since the admission of former non-­self-­governing territory Indonesia in 1950. As we ­will see, ­these new members began tipping the balance in the Assembly away from the Western states that had dominated it since 1945, with consequences for UN h ­ andling of numerous issues, not the least of which was the organ­ization’s role in the nontrust dependent territories. Their admission signaled the transition from the first phase of the campaign for international accountability for dependent territories, which saw Western dominance of the United Nations hold the line against real reform, to a second phase marked by shifting power relations and growing support for UN involvement in the nontrust dependent territories.63

C h a p t er  5

Taking Off the Gloves New UN Activism in the Chapter XI Territories

The third three-­year term of the Committee on Information confirmed its growing in­effec­tive­ness as a vehicle for carving an activist UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories. Its ­limited terms of reference, balanced composition between administering and nonadministering states, and, for the second consecutive term, lack of Soviet-­bloc repre­sen­ta­ tion moderated its tone and prevented it from pushing for the sort of international accountability the anticolonial majority desired. Discussion of expanding the UN role in the nontrust dependent territories still occurred in the committee during this period, and it certainly contained members who supported such a move, but the committee rarely followed through with activist proposals. Consequently, efforts for international accountability continued to center on the Fourth Committee, where anticolonial rhe­toric and calls for an expanded UN role in the Chapter XI territories abounded. This was especially the case when it came to UN involvement in determining the status of individual territories, and even the administering states’ resorting to Article 18 could not prevent pro­g ress in this area by 1958. Wholesale changes in UN membership that began during the Tenth General Assembly in 1955 made clear the impossibility of forever forestalling the drive for international accountability. Only nine states had joined the United Nations during its first de­cade, with total membership locked at sixty states from 1950 to 1955. The waning days of the Tenth Assembly, however, had 10 4

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seen the admission of sixteen new states, and their participation in the organ­ ization for the first time in 1956 materially altered its orientation. Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania ­were part of the Soviet bloc and could be counted on to join the other five members (Byelorus­sia, Czecho­slo­va­k ia, Poland, Ukraine, and the Soviet Union itself ) in taking a stridently anticolonial stance. So could developing states Ceylon, Jordan, Libya, and Nepal and former French-­administered territories Cambodia and Laos. Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Italy could nominally be expected to side with the administering states on issues related to the non-­self-­governing territories. Portugal and Spain could be, too, although their refusal to admit that they administered territories that could be considered non-­self-­governing generated considerable ire and sparked new bids for international accountability for dependent territories. Japan, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia became members in 1956; former British-­ administered territories Ghana and the Federation of Malaya in 1957 and Guinea in 1958. ­These additions brought the total UN membership to eighty-­ two at the end of the Thirteenth General Assembly, with all of t­hese states save Japan assuming active roles in the drive for international accountability.1 At the same time, representatives of eight states at the December 1958 Conference of In­de­pen­dent African States expressed solidarity on a host of issues relevant to the campaign for accountability—­and the broader goal of decolonization—­and pledged to work closely from that point on at the United Nations.2 Intensification of the Cold War rivalry and other international crises also ­shaped consideration of the UN role in the Chapter XI territories. What Ilya Gaiduk has called the “dual crisis” of Suez and Hungary in the fall of 1956 highlighted colonial questions as well as Soviet oppression in Eastern Eu­rope, giving each side in the bipolar conflict a power­f ul piece of propaganda.3 Other manifestations of the superpower clash during ­these years, such as the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Soviets’ failed Berlin gambit, and even the famous Kitchen Debate between Vice President Richard M. Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev made clear how deep the East-­West divide was becoming.4 The Sino-­Soviet split also emerged as an impor­tant ­factor in international affairs, particularly when it came to the Communist strug­gle for the allegiance of the Third World.5 As international lines sharpened, so did the rhe­toric that each side used to denounce the other at the United Nations, especially when it came to the issue of decolonization. As had been the case in 1955, the 1956 session of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories was held in the spring rather than immediately before the fall General Assembly, which meant that it preceded

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rather than followed Anglo-­American talks on colonial questions. Although the committee produced no recommended resolutions on the overall UN role in the nontrust dependent territories for Fourth Committee consideration, its discussions revealed continued interest from some del­e­ga­tions in effecting accountability. The catalyst was an Iraqi proposal to route cessation cases directly to the General Assembly (which meant in real­ity the Fourth Committee) rather than through the Committee on Information as provided for in Resolution 448 (V). ­Because the Committee on Information was, at administering state insistence, “a technical committee” denied the power to consider “anything that was even remotely po­liti­cal in nature,” representative Adnan Pachachi deemed it “illogical that it should have the first, and often the decisive, word on ­matters involving ­legal princi­ples and the appreciation of po­liti­cal situations.” The Iraqi proposal, and the arguments used to support it, highlighted growing disaffection among the nonadministering states at the milquetoast manner with which the balanced Committee on Information had dealt with the question of UN activism in the non-­self-­governing territories.6 US representative Mason Sears, who offered the administering states’ only contribution to the Committee on Information’s discussion of the ­matter, ruled out charging the Fourth Committee with first consideration of cessation cases. “Many del­e­ga­tions” at that level, he asserted, “for reasons of internal policy, ­were obliged to think first of their position at home and only secondly of the interests of the p­ eoples of the Non-­Self-­Governing Territories”—an argument that suggested that anticolonial sentiment at the United Nations was nothing more than a play to the domestic balcony and thus not to be taken seriously. To avoid the politicization of questions related to the decision to cease transmission of information, he issued a plaintive defense of retaining the existing practice of vesting authority to consider such ­matters in the Committee on Information. The Iraqis had introduced a general proposal concerning the cessation procedure rather than a formal draft resolution, so no vote followed open discussion. This was small comfort to the administering states, however, as universal support for the Iraqi proposal among the committee’s nonadministering members constituted a harbinger for the much more anticolonial Fourth Committee’s subsequent consideration of the issue and a warning of even greater activism to come.7 The 1956 round of Anglo-­American talks on colonial questions at the United Nations, held in Washington on 11 and 12 October, reflected the very dif­fer­ ent orientations and priorities at work in London and Washington. Not surprisingly, British officials sought to enlist US support against “United Nations intervention in ­matters of detailed [colonial] administration,” which they believed would lead to precipitous in­de­pen­dence for colonial territories and sure

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gains for the Soviet Union. Cold War considerations ­were also at the forefront of US thinking, but where the British saw Communist gains coming from too rapid a push ­toward self-­government and in­de­pen­dence, the Americans saw danger in too l­ ittle pro­g ress. “Colonial issues had become the principal battleground between East and West,” the State Department’s Christopher Phillips asserted, and it was therefore “especially impor­tant to the United States to adopt policies which would retain the sympathies of the colonial ­peoples.”8 Given the nation’s previous Cold War–­motivated choices, however, the chance of actually adopting ­these sorts of policies was slim. Before the 1956 session of the General Assembly could get ­under way, two international crises, separated by more than thirteen hundred miles, reverberated on both international relations in general and consideration of broad questions of colonialism at the United Nations in par­tic­u­lar. One occurred in Egypt, where a joint British-­French-­Israeli military operation to retake the Suez Canal and perhaps depose the troublesome regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser began on 29 October. The other took place in Hungary as months of pro-­democracy demonstrations led to Soviet military intervention on 4 November. Soviet moves in Hungary seemed to confirm US charges of Soviet colonialism, but the operation in Suez smacked of traditional Western imperialism and made it difficult for US officials to condemn the Soviets in Hungary without also speaking out against the tripartite assault against Egypt. President Eisenhower, whose pique over Suez was exacerbated by its coincidence with the US election, was flabbergasted, calling the operation “ ‘the damnedest business [he] ever saw supposedly intelligent governments get themselves into.’ ”9 Reaction to the Suez crisis at the United Nations, which had sought before the invasion to mediate the diplomatic impasse between Egypt and Britain and France, was fierce and immediate. A Security Council resolution condemning the tripartite attack and calling for the immediate withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli troops from Egyptian soil won the support of both the United States and the Soviet Union. And to defuse regional tensions, the United Nations initiated its first real peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which remained on the ground ­until 1967.10 UN reaction to the Soviet invasion of Hungary was more muted. Although Britain and France sought to push the organ­ization to act on Hungary, their efforts ­were seen as ­little more than an attempt to deflect the organ­ization’s attention from their own ill-­fated operation. Eventual US sponsorship of a Security Council resolution condemning Moscow’s use of force fell victim to the Soviet veto; while the General Assembly did pass such a mea­sure, its unenforceability allowed the Soviets to ignore it without penalty. In assessing

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the Eisenhower administration’s ­handling of the Hungarian crisis, Ilya Gaiduk emphasizes its prioritization of propaganda over a­ ctual aid, which was made manifest in its introduction of a condemnatory resolution only ­after the Soviet invasion, and thus too late to actually help the Hungarian p­ eople. Of perhaps greater significance for the US ability to moderate the campaign for accountability for dependent territories at the United Nations, few del­e­ga­tions from the developing world condemned the Soviet military intervention in Hungary.11 Of the two fall 1956 crises, Suez cast the longer shadow over the ongoing accountability campaign. On the one hand, it painted in bold relief the weakness of Britain and France, and particularly the former, and forced a reappraisal of the nation’s imperial position that had far-­reaching consequences. On the other, it tarnished the nation’s reputation at the United Nations, calling into question its carefully constructed image as a progressive colonial administrator. Wm. Roger Louis has perhaps best summed up the organ­ization’s collective outrage at the operation in dubbing Britain ­after Suez “Public ­Enemy Number One” and reviling it “as a marauding, reactionary force.”12 General debate in the Fourth Committee, the start of which the Suez crisis delayed ­until January 1957, outlined a new UN offensive in the nontrust dependent territories. Some representatives called for transmission of po­liti­cal information. O ­ thers advocated for the ac­cep­tance of petitions and the sending of visiting missions. V. D. Carpio of the Philippines went so far as to proclaim the Committee on Information a “counterpart” of the Trusteeship Council, despite the fact that the Charter provided explic­itly for only the latter.13 Although none of ­these proposals had any chance of passing, their very introduction served notice that activism on behalf of the remaining non-­self-­ governing territories would continue ­until universal in­de­pen­dence had been achieved. Cold War considerations also made their way into the opening debate, with the Ukraine’s N. G. Maksimovitch railing against the non-­self-­governing territories’ “exploitation by the administering Powers” and the Soviet Union’s T. T. Tazhibaev advancing a time-­worn communist claim that as “the old colonial system was breaking up u ­ nder the pressure of national liberation movements, American monopolists ­were endeavoring to establish their own po­liti­cal and economic hegemony over the inhabitants of the colonial areas in the hope of reaping im­mense profits.” Britain’s B. O. B. Gidden was one of the few representatives to offer the administering states’ perspective and the only one to attack the Soviet-­bloc critique of Western colonialism, asserting that Tazhibaev “had doubtless felt that ­after the recent Soviet action in Eastern Eu­rope it was necessary to re-­emphasize to some extent [Moscow’s] op-

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position to what it termed colonialism.” That other del­e­ga­tions did not offer the same sort of remarks was ample evidence of the strength of the anticolonial tide within the ranks of the Fourth Committee, an indication that the shadow of Suez had compromised Britain’s standing at the United Nations, and an unwelcome harbinger of the outcome of the committee’s work for the administering states.14 The fire that had characterized the Committee on Information’s discussion of the cessation issue was even hotter in the Fourth Committee, where the Iraqi del­e­ga­tion formally introduced a draft resolution to transfer responsibility for receiving an administering state’s intention to cease information transmission from the Committee on Information to the General Assembly. Again, sentiment on the mea­sure was divided. Many nonadministering states spoke out in support of the proposal, including Yugo­slavia, the Philippines, Haiti, India, and Egypt. The administering states, however, remained unalterably opposed, with the US and British del­e­ga­tions making general criticisms rooted in the Charter. France’s Robert Bargues provided the most robust critique by linking the cessation of information transmission to the issue of commencing such transmission and claiming that the General Assembly lacked competence in ­either area. Bargues went on to defend the “so-­called colonial countries” for at least living up to the obligation ­under Article 73(e) to transmit information on their non-­self-­governing territories while obliquely criticizing the Soviet Union for failing to do so with regard to the non-­self-­governing territories it administered. Despite the three leading administering states’ spirited criticism of the draft resolution, its approval was never in doubt, and it was sent on to the General Assembly on a non-­roll-­call vote of 38 to 11, with 6 abstentions.15 As France’s Bargues suggested during debate over the Iraqi cessation proposal, the general question of when a state was responsible for transmitting information on a par­tic­u­lar territory also came ­under discussion during the 1956 Fourth Committee. The catalyst for this debate was the way Portugal, one of sixteen new members admitted in 1955, had answered the secretary-­ general’s standard query, put to all new members of the United Nations, ­whether it administered territories that might be considered to fall ­under the auspices of Chapter XI. In keeping with its 1951 constitution, Portugal reported that it administered no non-­self-­governing territories, terming Angola, Mozambique, and other overseas provinces parts of what Lisbon had long portrayed as a pluricontinental Portugal.16 Member-­states’ responses had been shared publicly, both in 1946, when the original list of territories on which information u ­ nder Article 73(e) was to be transmitted was announced, and subsequently, but they had not been discussed, debated, or questioned in any way.

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Now, however, Iraq’s Pachachi took exception to Portugal’s claim that it administered no territories subject to Chapter XI and expressed his del­e­ga­tion’s desire for “an explanation of the status of overseas parts of Portugal, including the extent to which, if any, a Ministry of Overseas Affairs exercised responsibilities in re­spect of ­those territories dif­fer­ent from the responsibilities exercised by the Home Ministry.” In other words, Pachachi maintained, if Portugal truly administered no non-­self-­governing territories, it should be willing to provide supporting evidence to prove it; absent such proof, Pachachi worried not only that the carefully constructed UN system for dealing with the Chapter XI territories would be jeopardized but also that the ­peoples of Asia and Africa would come to doubt the UN commitment “to develop, peacefully and constructively, their own po­liti­cal, social, and cultural life.” Grave consequences would result, he warned, if “Territories regarded by the ­whole world as Non-­Self-­Governing . . . ​escaped the application of Chapter XI of the Charter.”17 Pachachi’s peroration opened the floodgates to what became a long and impassioned debate within the Fourth Committee. A draft resolution that Ceylon, Greece, Liberia, Nepal, and Syria had submitted calling for the creation of an ad hoc committee to consider the replies of the newly admitted states regarding their Chapter XI responsibilities framed the discussion. In introducing the mea­sure, Ceylon’s A. B. Perera painted it as completely within the General Assembly’s power to examine the new members’ responses and denied that it was “impugning the [administering states’] good faith.” Lest ­there be any question regarding which specific “replies” to the Secretary-­General’s letter had occasioned the proposal, however, Perera announced that “the replies of Portugal had not completely convinced all del­e­ga­tions,” thus singling out one par­tic­u­lar new member for special condemnation.18 For the administering states, the five-­power draft resolution stuck at the heart of national autonomy. As we have seen, the administering minority and the nonadministering majority had clashed repeatedly over the proper procedure for removing a territory from the ranks of ­those governed by Article 73(e). Although the administering states had agreed to inform the General Assembly of changes in the constitutional status of individual territories on which they had de­cided to halt information transmission, they stood firm against claims that the United Nations had a right to approve the decision to cease transmitting information, which they insisted rested only with the responsible administering state. This same logic guided their opposition to the five-­ power draft resolution dealing with the new members’ responses to the secretary-­general’s letter. Australia’s Allan Henry Loomes offered perhaps the most complete statement on the issue in noting, “The clear implication [of

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the draft resolution] was that the General Assembly should seek to interpret the constitutions of certain Member States for the purpose of determining the applicability of Article 73 e.” The importance of “uphold[ing] a basic princi­ple of the United Nations: that of absolute re­spect for the domestic legislation of Member States, and particularly for their constitutional structure,” stated Spain’s Juan Pablo de Lojendio in a related argument, required that the mea­ sure be opposed. Although the opponents of the draft resolution could not halt its approval—it passed on a roll-­call vote of 35 to 33 (including all of the administering states, plus Spain and Portugal), with 4 abstentions—­the narrow margin of approval gave them hope of eventual victory at the General Assembly if they could get the mea­sure declared an impor­tant question ­under the terms of Article 18 and thus requiring two-­thirds approval. But even that would likely be only a stopgap mea­sure given the anticipated growth in anticolonial sentiment as additional states joined the Assembly.19 The final substantive issue the Fourth Committee considered was the carry-­ over proposal from the Tenth General Assembly for the secretary-­general to prepare a report summarizing the pro­g ress of the non-­self-­governing territories since 1946. Although the administering states had offered l­ittle comment when the stocktaking exercise was first proposed, once it became more likely, they raised a number of objections. It would entail extra work for their governments to provide the additional information on trends in the non-­self-­ governing territories that the secretary-­general would require. It was not clear what purpose the proposed report would serve, who would use it, and how it would do a better job of summarizing the pro­g ress of the non-­self-­ governing territories than the information the administering states transmitted annually in meeting their obligations u ­ nder Article 73(e) of the Charter. Nor did it seem to be a wise use of the Secretariat’s l­imited financial and personnel resources. Their opposition to the mea­sure led them merely to abstain on the final voting on the eight-­power draft resolution rather than offering up negative votes, and the mea­sure was ­adopted 58 to 1, with 4 abstentions.20 Several ­things ­were notable about the eleventh session of the Fourth Committee insofar as the non-­self-­governing territories ­were concerned. Perhaps most obviously, the committee’s debates revealed the continuing—­widening, even—­split over the proper UN role in the Chapter XI territories, suggesting in the pro­cess that the committee’s work was likely to get more difficult as the years went on. In an ominous development for the administering states, the 1957 session also made clear the new members’ almost solidly anticolonial position. And fi­nally, as was evident in the speeches of several administering states during the committee’s debate on substantive issues, the Cold War continued to creep into the committee’s work. While reminding the

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Fourth Committee of their willingness to acknowledge responsibility for their non-­self-­governing territories, several administering states used veiled references to Soviet control over the Baltic and Central Asian states to condemn Moscow’s unwillingness to acknowledge that it held supervisory authority over ­peoples who w ­ ere not self-­governing. France’s Robert Bargues, for example, noted dismissively that “if the General Assembly had [in 1946] assumed the right to determine for itself which Territories w ­ ere in fact non-­self-­ governing, it might have found that the [Western] colonial Powers w ­ ere not the only ones which administered such Territories.” Claeys Bouuaert of Belgium made a similar point when he reminded the committee that “his del­e­ ga­tion had, at e­ arlier sessions, already expressed the view that the provisions of Chapter XI ­were interpreted in a capricious and irrational manner, and that many Member States beside t­hose which had replied affirmatively to the Secretary-­General’s letter in 1946, should have admitted that they ­were administering Non-­Self-­Governing Territories.” He reiterated this argument during discussion of the proposed report on pro­g ress in the non-­self-­governing territories when he lamented that the exercise “would not give a complete picture of the pro­g ress achieved in the Non-­Self-­Governing Territories” ­because it would address only ­those non-­self-­governing territories claimed by the Western powers.21 The draft resolutions that the Fourth Committee sent on to the Eleventh General Assembly ­were a mixed bag for the administering states. If the secretary-­general’s proposed study of pro­g ress in the non-­self-­governing territories was innocuous enough and not likely to challenge their authority in any meaningful way, the same did not hold true for the other recommended mea­sures. The proposals to extend features of the Trusteeship System to the Chapter XI territories by altering the mechanism for ­handling the cessation of information on a non-­self-­governing territory and creating an ad hoc committee to study the responses of the new members regarding w ­ hether they administered territories that fell u ­ nder the auspices of Chapter XI both challenged the administering states’ prerogatives when it came to identifying and dealing with their dependent territories. They also revealed the ominously increasing anticolonial bent of the Fourth Committee, a trend that boded ill for the administering states’ continued ability to stave off calls for international accountability.22 General Assembly consideration of the Fourth Committee’s recommended resolutions was more protracted and partisan than in previous years. In a departure from recent practice, but in complete conformity with UN rules, the full General Assembly actually discussed the report of the Fourth Committee, and the draft resolutions it contained, for almost two full meetings. Not

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surprisingly, the debate focused on the draft resolution calling for the creation of an ad hoc committee to study the new members’ responses to the secretary-­ general’s query regarding their obligations u ­ nder Chapter XI. Portuguese delegate Vasco Vieira Garin passionately defended his nation’s position and denounced t­ hose who singled it out for special scrutiny. It would not do for the General Assembly to go along with the Fourth Committee’s recommendation on this ­matter, he insisted, as it imposed what amounted to a double standard for Portugal and the other new members and was clearly contrary to the idea that all UN member-­states ­were equal.23 In a move that the United States and the other administering states considered essential, the Swedish del­e­ga­tion proposed that the draft resolution be considered an impor­tant question ­under Article 18, which meant that it would need a two-­thirds majority vote in order to pass. Given the narrow margin by which the draft resolution had passed the Fourth Committee (35 to 33, with 4 abstentions), such a voting requirement might succeed in sending the proposal down to defeat in the General Assembly. Vocal opinions w ­ ere expressed on both sides of the proposal, but in the end its supporters carried the day on a vote of 38 to 34, with 6 abstentions, thereby requiring that the draft resolution secure a two-­thirds majority vote for approval, and making its defeat a real possibility—­although not a certainty. Discussion of the a­ ctual draft resolution was also extended and vociferous, with member-­states lined up in predictable positions: the administering states and other Western Eu­ro­pean nations axiomatically opposed the draft resolution while support came from a variety of sources, including some Asian and ­Middle Eastern nations and the Soviet bloc. The final vote on the resolution, taken as a roll call, was as close as a vote could be—35 to 35, with 5 abstentions. Even if the Swedish proposal had not carried, the draft resolution would have failed, so in a sense its opponents had votes to spare. In real­ity, though, they had no time to savor their success, as the tenor of the debate on both the Swedish proposal and the draft resolution itself guaranteed that the last had not been heard on the ­matter, and that its supporters ­were sure to reintroduce it at some point in the ­f uture, with greater likelihood of success as the pro­cess of decolonization swelled the ranks of the United Nations’ anticolonial faction.24 In addition to rejecting the draft resolution regarding an ad hoc committee to determine when reporting obligations ­under Article 73(e) existed, the Eleventh General Assembly approved two resolutions dealing with the UN role in the nontrust dependent territories. With the bulk of the two plenary sessions devoted to the Fourth Committee’s work taken up with the Swedish proposal to apply Article 18 and the overall reporting issue itself, dedicated discussion of ­either resolution was non­ex­is­tent. What became Resolution 1051 (XI)

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called on the administering states to inform the General Assembly when they intended to cease transmitting information in conformity with Article 73(e), thus bypassing the Committee on Information, which had been tasked with receiving ­those communications in Resolution 448 (V). It passed on a non-­ roll-­call vote of 48 to 15, with 7 abstentions. Resolution 1053 (XI) authorized the secretary-­general’s study of pro­g ress in the non-­self-­governing territories. If the administering states could not get b­ ehind the planned initiative with any enthusiasm, they could at least find comfort that it was confined to ­those functional fields on which information was transmitted u ­ nder Article 73(e), a stricture that omitted consideration of po­liti­cal conditions. In an indication of the mea­sure’s nonthreatening nature, it was approved on a non-­roll-­call vote of 65 to 3, with 3 abstentions.25 US officials came away from the Eleventh General Assembly in a relatively gloomy mood insofar as issues pertaining to the non-­self-­governing territories ­were concerned. “Almost all resolutions [dealing with such territories ­were] initiated by the so-­called anti-­colonial group,” lamented the State Department’s Benjamin Gerig, “and [­were] inspired by criticism of the policies and practices of the Administering Authorities.” Gerig went on to describe ­those resolutions as “somewhat more extreme than in recent years,” owing, he theorized, to the presence of the newly admitted members. Without question, the most problematic resolution of the session was the five-­power proposal regarding the transmission of information ­under Article 73(e) (two of the five sponsors of which, Ceylon and Nepal, w ­ ere participating in their first General Assembly), which the General Assembly narrowly defeated only a­ fter US intervention to have it declared an impor­tant question requiring two-­thirds majority support for passage. State Department officials noted with concern the “­bitter feelings” that h ­ andling of the resolution had aroused in the General Assembly and w ­ ere certain that the m ­ atter would be reintroduced in the next session, with potentially problematic consequences for the administering states.26 Acutely aware of the deleterious effects of the Suez debacle for the United Kingdom’s position in UN forums, British officials had an even less positive assessment of the Eleventh Assembly.27 Not surprisingly, pre-­Assembly plans to emphasize Britain’s colonial achievements ­were of necessity put on hold “so long as the General Assembly maintain[ed] its . . . ​hostile mood ­towards the United Kingdom,” although the Colonial Office’s Henry Bourdillon “hoped that the dust [would] s­ ettle and that the operation in the ­Middle East [would] increasingly come to be recognized, in retrospect, as a necessary step for the maintenance of world peace rather than an act of ‘Colonialist’ aggression.” In an ultimately overoptimistic forecast, Bourdillon went on to predict, “If and

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when the tide begins to turn in this way, it may be expected that ­there ­will be a greater readiness, both in the United Nations and elsewhere, not only to dissociate the M ­ iddle East operation from ‘Colonialism’ but to take an objective view of United Kingdom Colonial policy as such.”28 Bourdillon was clearly mistaken in assuming that over time world opinion would come to an increasing appreciation for British colonialism. On the contrary, as events at the United Nations would make painfully clear, precisely the opposite was true, and the tide of international sentiment came to turn in the other direction, with even bolder calls for an expanded UN role in the nontrust dependent territories, Britain’s included. In an indication that colonial questions at the United Nations w ­ ere becoming increasingly impor­tant for Anglo-­American relations, that subject made its way into discussions at the March 1957 Bermuda Conference, which was ostensibly concerned with broad policy m ­ atters, particularly British plans to scale back their international military commitments. British officials expressed frustration at the nature of debate on colonial m ­ atters at the General Assembly, which Prime Minister Harold Macmillan denounced as “­really quite an untrustworthy body to which to submit a decision on any vital interest.” Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd agreed. It “had not been too bad,” he proclaimed, “with a membership of 60. The unfortunate t­hing had been to increase its numbers.” While returning to the days when the victorious World War II Allies controlled the Assembly was impossible, British and American policymakers agreed at Bermuda to work ­toward “better advance consultation on how to play the hand in the General Assembly” that the organ­ization’s expanded membership—­ now at eighty-­two members—­had dealt them.29 The Bermuda discussions also revealed the growing importance of Africa, particularly for US foreign policymakers. As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reported in this connection, Congress had recently authorized the creation of a separate African Affairs Division within the State Department, thereby confirming the continent’s central place in the constellation of US foreign policy concerns. He also took pains to reassure British officials that despite its refusal to offer “a blanket endorsement of British Colonial Policy,” the United States was not pushing for “premature in­de­pen­dence” in Africa and on the contrary “accepted completely the idea that ­there must be an evolutionary trend ­towards self-­government in ­these new countries.” Ensuring that new states ­were strong enough to stand on their own was particularly impor­ tant, Dulles contended, “since they ­were now faced with the Stalinist tactics of encouraging nationalist movements with the object of afterwards swallowing up the new nationalist states in the Soviet embrace.”30

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British officials sought to build on the Bermuda discussions as they planned for pre-­Assembly talks with their American counter­parts. They considered growing State Department interest in Africa a positive development. And although they lamented the US reluctance to go so far as to declare British colonial policy “one of the principal instruments at the ser­vice of the West in opposing Soviet aims in Africa,” they held out hope that such a recognition might be forthcoming in the f­uture. As a result, emphasizing the positive geopo­liti­cal effects of their colonial administration—­not just the purported benefits for the dependent territories themselves—­thus became a key British goal for the Anglo-­American talks. So did highlighting the dangers of excessive UN interference in colonial m ­ atters, which British officials argued could lead only to Communist bloc gains. It is pos­si­ble that US thinking pushed the British government to emphasize Cold War considerations in its planning for the 1957 bilateral discussions to a much greater degree than had previously been the case. It is also pos­si­ble that British officials had simply realized that framing issues within an East-­West ideological framework was likely to gain Washington’s ear.31 Officials in London also pursued a renewed call for better publicizing Britain’s colonial accomplishments, most prominently through “a continuous distribution of pamphlets on colonial affairs to United Nations del­e­ga­tions.” As the Colonial Office’s S. H. Evans, who was tasked with the proj­ect, noted, other nations w ­ ere making g­ reat use of printed publicity materials, most often distributed to UN del­e­ga­tions by the New York offices of their national information ser­vices, to highlight domestic developments, national life and customs, and other relevant subjects. To Evans’s way of thinking, Britain should undertake the same sort of publicity effort about the empire, producing and distributing materials that might include “an up-­to-­date ‘basic’ pamphlet about the aims, methods, prob­lems and achievements of our colonial policy,” “a challenging statement about our colonial policy in action,” “a pamphlet giving facts and figures about the financial and economic aspects of our colonial policy, designed to deal with ‘exploitation’ allegations,” and “a pamphlet published each September [near the start of the new UN session] summing up developments in the previous year and looking forward as far as pos­si­ble to probable events during the year ahead.” Officials in the Foreign and Colonial Offices generally agreed about the value of such a campaign, and by mid-­February the Colonial Office was making plans to produce the first drafts.32 The most significant effort to come out of this round of empire propaganda was a brief overview by Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-­Boyd titled British Colonial Policy ­Today. In accessible, upbeat, almost celebratory language, this

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nine-­page pamphlet, produced by Britain’s Central Office of Information and distributed to UN del­e­ga­tions by the New York office of British Information Ser­vices, outlined the economic, po­liti­cal, and educational pro­g ress of the territories that had, at one time or another, come ­under British control. Its centerpiece was a two-­page map highlighting the in­de­pen­dence dates of former colonial territories and categorizing the remaining British territories according to their po­liti­cal development (from “local ­people nominated to legislature” to “ministerial system, fully or partly developed”). Although this was not the first effort to sell Britain’s imperial rec­ord to the world, its wide distribution to UN del­e­ga­tions marked a new stage of London’s propaganda campaign and reflected policymakers’ growing realization that they had to take activist mea­sures to counteract the anticolonial sentiment that was increasingly coming to dominate all levels of the United Nations.33 Distribution of material outside the floor of the General Assembly or other UN bodies also revealed British officials’ appreciation for the impor­tant work that occurred in the corridors and offices of vari­ous del­e­ga­tions, away from the press and other media publicity. The overall lack of success in converting other del­e­ga­tions to their positions, however, suggested the difficulty of preventing the sort of activism inherent in the drive for international accountability. At the same time, British officials reiterated their continued opposition to an expanded purview for the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories. Attempts to discuss the ­matter of Portugal’s position as an administering state “should be objected to as being out of order.” Efforts to rework the Standard Form should be resisted as not worth the effort involved. And while it was not pos­si­ble to prevent work on the secretary-­ general’s report on pro­gress in the non-­self-­governing territories, the British del­e­ga­tion was to do what it could to ensure that it was “confined strictly to a report on pro­gress ‘in ­those fields in which information has been transmitted.’ ” In other words, ­there was to be no consideration of po­liti­cal conditions.34 Internal US discussions in preparation for the Anglo-­American talks revealed trepidation about the coming General Assembly. Although policymakers in Washington had seemed nonplused by the effect of the new members on ­matters pertaining to the non-­self-­governing territories during the Eleventh General Assembly, they did not feel the same about the Twelfth, at which the former British-­administered territories of the Federation of Malaya and Ghana would be gaining membership and likely using their positions to lobby for a more active UN role in the nontrust dependent territories. Ghana’s in­de­pen­ dence and admission into the United Nations in March 1957 posed special challenges for the United States. As the first sub-­Saharan African nation to emerge from dependent status to in­de­pen­dence and then UN membership,

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its in­de­pen­dence and subsequent role at the United Nations attracted considerable media attention. It had sent a del­e­ga­tion to the Bandung Conference while still known as the British colony of the Gold Coast, and its leaders, including Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah, gave ­every indication of pursuing a strong anticolonial position at the United Nations.35 Given the growing anticolonial faction at the United Nations, as the admission of Ghana and the Federation of Malaya confirmed, US officials considered it “all but inevitable” that the coming session would see a renewed effort to create an ad hoc committee to examine the administering states’ adherence to their Article 73(e) responsibilities. Such a move could cause serious prob­ lems for ­those states, including the United States, which was torn between its conviction that only administering states could admit responsibility ­under Article 73(e) and its belief that the administering members had a clear obligation to comply with that article’s terms. The vituperative debate in 1956 over the ten-­power draft resolution suggested how impor­tant the question was to the nonadministering states, and US officials placed consideration of how to ­handle a renewed effort at vesting the United Nations with greater responsibility to police the actions of the administering states high on their list of items for discussion with their British counter­parts. A Belgian proposal for a comprehensive study of all of the world’s non-­self-­governing territories, including t­ hose held by the Soviet Union, which regrettably refused to admit that it had Chapter XI responsibilities, made formulating an Anglo-­American plan for ­handling another onslaught on the question of administering state responsibility even more urgent. Convinced that implementing Belgium’s proposal would open a can of worms at the United Nations, US officials sought to defeat or at least to forestall it.36 The only new issue related to the non-­self-­governing territories to come up in the early September 1957 Anglo-­American talks was one that had dominated US discussions beforehand: to wit, how to deal with the likelihood of a repeated assault on the administering states’ ac­cep­tance of responsibility ­under Article 73(e), as well as the specific challenges Belgium’s study proposal posed. If the United Nations de­cided to follow through with the sort of ad hoc committee the Belgians had proposed, the State Department’s Benjamin Gerig argued that that committee’s membership should be drawn equally from the administering and nonadministering states. To remove some of the uncertainty surrounding Belgium’s intentions, the British agreed to initiate conversations with the government in Brussels and to advise caution, lest the United Nations’ anticolonial majority take hasty or precipitous action that could redound unfavorably on all the administering states.37

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The 1957 session of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories met during July rather than in the fall and was thus already completed by the time the Anglo-­American bilateral discussions ­were held in September. As meetings of that body went, it was rather uneventful, with few inflammatory issues related to the larger question of UN authority over the non-­self-­governing territories up for discussion and even fewer intemperate outbursts of the sort that had characterized that body in previous years. This development had also been apparent in 1956 and prob­ably resulted from several ­factors. One was the evolving nature of the committee’s membership. Although the administering states ­were, of course, permanent members, the other half of the committee was comprised of elected nonadministering states. In 1956 and 1957, the nonadministering members of the committee (China, Guatemala, India, Iraq, Peru, and Venezuela served for both years; Burma served in 1956 and was replaced in 1957 by Ceylon) w ­ ere relatively moderate in their views on colonial questions, which meant that their work on the committee was not vocally or irreconcilably anticolonial. The only state to which this generalization did not apply was India, unique in having been elected to the committee continually since its inception without a break. But even then, India’s view of and role on the committee ebbed over time. Although its anticolonial position was unassailable, its representatives often saved their most aggressively anticolonial remarks for the Fourth Committee, where they ­were likely both to receive greater play and to stimulate like-­ minded responses from other states. India’s apparent strategy when it came to ­matters related to the non-­self-­governing territories highlighted the second ­factor likely contributing to the noncontroversial nature of the 1956 and 1957 sessions of the Committee on Information: the growing tendency for the Fourth Committee to emerge as the United Nations’ anticolonial voice. With the Committee on Information’s mounting moderation over the years, as demonstrated in draft resolutions that w ­ ere increasingly mea­sured and quite ­limited when it came to imposing restrictions on the administering states or charging them with additional reporting responsibilities, the Fourth Committee became the real battleground when it came to m ­ atters pertaining to international accountability for dependent territories. The 1957 session of the Committee on Information, in fact, did not recommend a single resolution dealing with the general issue of the UN role in the nontrust dependent territories for the Fourth Committee’s consideration, an indication of its waning role in such m ­ atters.38 In contrast, the 1957 session of the Fourth Committee constituted a new high when it came to support for international accountability. As a result of

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the decision at the Eleventh General Assembly to apply Article 18 of the Charter to the proposal to create a special committee to study member-­states’ ­handling of the Chapter XI responsibilities, the committee dealt with the specific question of w ­ hether the General Assembly could be asked on a case-­by-­case basis to consider questions dealing with the non-­self-­governing territories to be impor­tant ones ­under the terms of that article, and thus subject to a two-­thirds majority vote to pass. Securing the General Assembly’s assent to such a voting procedure, which itself required only a ­simple majority, had over the years been an effective tactic for the administering states when potentially damaging or problematic motions ­were concerned, a fact that was not lost on the United Nations’ anticolonial majority. Eliminating this vehicle for stymieing greater UN involvement in the non-­self-­governing territories therefore assumed a prominent place in the Fourth Committee’s discussions in 1957. So did a resurrected call to empanel a special committee to study the responses of member-­states regarding ­whether they administered territories that fell u ­ nder the purview of Chapter XI. In the end, t­ hese two issues combined to make the 1957 session of the Fourth Committee one of the stormiest and most spirited on rec­ord. Fourth Committee debate on the voting question stretched over three meetings and set the tone for the volatile session to come. Guiding the discussion was a draft resolution ultimately sponsored by six states—­Costa Rica, Greece, Iraq, Mexico, Morocco, and Yugoslavia—­which called upon the International Court of Justice to render judgment on w ­ hether resolutions related to the non-­self-­governing territories could ever be construed as impor­tant questions that fell ­under the two-­thirds rule for approval, despite their omission from the categories explic­itly enumerated in Article 18(2) of the Charter or listed as potential additions in Article 18(3). Opponents of the proposal lined up on several fronts. Some bristled at the resort to outside judgment. For ­others, the proposal simply seemed unnecessary. Strong objections to the draft resolution notwithstanding, it passed on a roll-­call vote of 32 to 29, with 12 abstentions, with the United States abstaining and the remainder of the administering states voting in opposition.39 Without question, the committee’s most acrimonious debate occurred over the ­matter of member-­states’ responsibilities ­under Chapter XI of the Charter. Undeterred by the failure to effect movement on this question at the Eleventh General Assembly, seventeen del­e­ga­tions eventually signed on as sponsors of a draft resolution that called on the secretary-­general to prepare a multifaceted report on the subject, including member responses, statements made during committee debate, and l­egal opinions on the Charter, that would then be studied by a six-­member special committee that would report back to the General Assembly. In an attempt to win broad support for the mea­sure

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and avoid charges that it was discriminatory or targeted one individual state, its sponsors insisted that its provisions applied to all member-­states rather than just the new ones. They and their supporters also took pains, as Yemen’s Tawfik Chamandi put it, to characterize it as a “­simple” proposal that no “del­e­ga­ tion should vote against.”40 Critics of the mea­sure, particularly the administering states, however, enumerated a variety of reasons why they would do just that. Portugal’s A. Franco Nogueira branded the proposal a “dangerous” attempt to “reopen” a ­matter on which the General Assembly had already passed judgment; Belgium’s Pierre Ryckmans went one step further and accused the draft resolution’s sponsors of being “prepared to acknowledge only t­ hose decisions of the General Assembly which met with their approval.” The United States’ Irene Dunne also assailed the draft resolution as “unnecessary,” unlikely to “produce any positive results,” and quite likely instead to “lead to altercations and countercharges.” On a substantive level, opponents of the draft resolution raised numerous criticisms. Ryckmans worried that asking the secretary-­general to prepare a summary of opinions “would lay [him] open to the criticism that he had neglected one or another point of view,” a concern Benjamin Cohen, undersecretary for trusteeship and information from non-­self-­governing territories, shared in noting that “it would be extremely difficult for the Secretary-­General to play the impartial role required of him if he w ­ ere asked to draw up summaries and analyses of a po­liti­cal nature.” Ryckmans also reiterated the by-­now well-­worn Belgian complaint that ­there w ­ ere members of the United Nations that administered non-­self-­governing territories but refused to admit that fact. “If the General Assembly de­cided that it was competent to complete the list of Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” which would be the effect of approving the draft resolution, Ryckmans proclaimed, “the Belgian Government would have a list of such territories to submit.” Fi­nally, notwithstanding the assertions of the draft resolution’s sponsors of its universality, its opponents claimed that statements made during debate singled out one state—­Portugal—­for individual criticism and proved its true purpose. Yugo­slavia’s Aleksandar Bozovic, for example, called Portugal’s assertion that it administered no territories that fell u ­ nder the provisions of Chapter XI “completely at variance with the facts.” In this way, opponents railed, the seventeen-­power draft resolution was no dif­fer­ent than the one that the Eleventh General Assembly had previously defeated. “It was admittedly couched in more moderate language than the previous year’s draft resolution,” the United Kingdom’s Sir Andrew Cohen maintained. “But it was aimed at precisely the same target.” When the draft resolution was put to a roll-­call vote, it was ­adopted on a vote of 42 to 27, with 8 abstentions, a margin of 61 ­percent.

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All of the administering states ­were among the dissenters—­and all seemed willing to fight to prevent the mea­sure from winning passage in the General Assembly, even if that meant again turning to Article 18.41 The 1957 Fourth Committee charted a clear course for greater UN involvement in the nontrust dependent territories. The proposal to seek a ­legal ruling on voting procedures in the General Assembly regarding questions pertaining to the non-­self-­governing territories and the draft resolution dealing with member-­states’ admission of responsibility for territories covered by Chapter XI of the Charter each posed a dif­fer­ent challenge to the administering states’ positions. A ­legal ruling by the Sixth Committee that removed the recourse to the two-­thirds majority would make it more difficult to guard against expansive resolutions in the ­future. And permitting the General Assembly to evaluate the statements of governments regarding their Chapter XI responsibilities, and by implication the national constitutions that undergirded ­those statements, would set a dangerous pre­ce­dent that challenged the very concept of national sovereignty. Having failed to hold sway with the majority in the Fourth Committee, the administering states and their allies approached the General Assembly with no small amount of concern.42 As was its prerogative, the General Assembly again declined to discuss the report of the Fourth Committee and moved immediately to consideration of the draft resolutions the report contained, only one of which touched on the general question of UN involvement in the non-­self-­governing territories. The Fourth Committee’s draft resolution calling for the examination of states’ responsibilities ­under Chapter XI generated considerable acrimony. But before the resolution itself was discussed, Colombian representative Gabriel Carreǹo Mallarino moved that it be subject to the two-­thirds majority rule for approval. Such a course was justified, he maintained, ­because that rule had been applied to a similar draft resolution discussed during the Eleventh General Assembly. It was also appropriate given the resolution’s sheer import. In a move that greatly disturbed the nonadministering faction within the Assembly, President Sir Leslie Munro of New Zealand put the proposal to an immediate vote—on a ­simple majority—­without permitting discussion or comment. The proposal to apply Article 18 approved at the Eleventh General Assembly had passed on a vote of 38 to 34, with 6 abstentions. At the Twelfth Assembly, the vote was 38 to 36, with 7 abstentions; that the two additional dissenters ­were likely newly admitted member-­states Ghana and the Federation of Malaya demonstrated the growing power of the Assembly’s anticolonial faction. ­After the mea­sure’s passage, President Munro guided the Assembly right into a vote on the resolution concerning states’ Chapter XI responsibilities, which of course now needed a two-­thirds majority to win passage. In a roll-­call vote, 41

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member-­states voted for the draft resolution, 30 voted against (including all of the administering states), and 10 abstained. While the mea­sure won a ­simple majority (58 ­percent), it did not secure the two-­thirds required as a result of approval of the Colombian proposal and therefore went down to defeat. Many states offered explanations for their votes on both the Colombian proposal and the draft resolution; some even criticized President Munro for refusing to allow comment or debate on the former. The vehemence of t­ hese comments, and the fact that the proposal to scrutinize states’ ac­cep­tance of their Chapter XI responsibilities won a majority when considered by the Twelfth General Assembly whereas a similar proposal considered at the Eleventh had resulted in a tie vote, boded ill for the administering states’ attempts to limit UN involvement in the non-­self-­governing territories and suggested that it was only am ­ atter of time before the anticolonial majority was able to secure the votes to empower the United Nations to determine when a state’s responsibility ­under Chapter XI existed.43 In the short term, the administering states and their allies could at least take comfort in the Sixth Committee’s decision in early December on the ­matter of voting majority requirements that the Fourth Committee had forwarded to it. ­After studying a working paper prepared by the Secretariat and a series of draft resolutions, the committee concluded “that it [was] not opportune at the pre­sent session to reply to the request of the Fourth Committee.” Motivated in large part by the fact that the General Assembly had already considered and voted on the Fourth Committee’s report, the Sixth Committee simply noted the obvious incongruity of offering guidance on how to vote when voting had already taken place. In other words, the point it had been asked to decide was moot, at least for the pre­sent Assembly. Predictably, news of this decision sparked some recrimination in the Fourth Committee, with blame being cast upon Assembly President Munro for allowing the Colombian proposal on voting majorities to go through to an unchallenged vote. In the eyes of the nonadministering states, however, the real fault lay with t­ hose who had insisted that the Fourth Committee’s report go forward to the General Assembly before the Sixth Committee had reached a decision. Fin­ger pointing aside, the Sixth Committee’s decision to effectively ­table the request for a ruling regarding voting majorities on questions pertaining to the non-­self-­governing territories merely added fuel to the already smoldering fire over UN involvement in t­ hose territories and served as one more reminder of how sharply divided opinion on that subject had become.44 Hints of greater activism when it came to the campaign for international accountability for dependent territories, as well as larger issues of decolonization

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and the concerns of the Global South, came in the form of the Conference of In­de­pen­dent African States, held in Accra, Ghana, from 15 to 22 April 1958. Convened at Prime Minister Nkrumah’s behest, the conference brought together representatives from eight African nations: Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, the Sudan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic; all but Morocco and Tunisia had in some form also attended the 1955 Bandung Conference. Like that gathering, the Accra Conference endorsed a decidedly nonaligned approach to the East-­West conflict and reaffirmed support for the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of H ­ uman Rights. Its policy positions on issues related to the ongoing campaign for accountability included support for the in­de­pen­dence of all remaining dependent territories (and even a call for timetables), all pos­si­ble forms of assistance to territories struggling for in­ de­pen­dence, and condemnation of racial discrimination and segregation. Although the Accra Conference’s stances on t­ hese questions conformed to the broad outlines of the Bandung final communiqué, it went well beyond that gathering’s articulation of a Global South identity in laying out what came to be described as an “African personality” in international relations, which addressed an array of issues of special interest to the continent and called for close regional cooperation on t­ hose issues moving forward. In this way, in the words of Jeffrey James Byrne, the conference “symbolically relaunch[ed] the pan-­ African proj­ect on African soil, with Ghana as its champion.” Ghanaian diplomat and ­future president of the General Assembly Alex Quaison-­Sackey expressed a similar sentiment in noting, “The Eu­ro­pean powers had met in 1885 to dismember Africa; the African states in 1958 to unify [it].”45 Beyond mere rhe­toric, the call at Accra for cooperation among the in­de­ pen­dent African states generated concrete results in the form of closer contact and coordination among African del­e­ga­tions at the United Nations, membership in which the African nations saw as confirming their arrival on the world stage and giving them a platform for shaping international developments in ways that addressed issues that ­were impor­tant to them, including colonialism and race. Although the African del­e­ga­tions at the United Nations already belonged to the Asian-­African group, which had gained increased prominence ­after Bandung, from 1958 on they also formed their own group, revealing the increased importance of the continent for UN developments and affirming the distinct African personality that had been articulated at Accra. The African UN del­e­ga­tions met regularly thereafter, and while consensus was the goal of their discussions, no del­e­ga­tion was compelled to vote with the group. Studies of UN voting nevertheless reveal consistent una­nim­ i­ty when it came to colonial questions, thereby demonstrating the African

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states’ growing clout within the General Assembly and giving their positions the sort of authority that comes from group solidarity.46 If the potential implications of the Accra Conference w ­ ere not quite clear in the spring of 1958, the likelihood of an immediate acceleration in the push for international accountability for dependent territories certainly was, and it ­shaped internal British discussions during the interlude between the Twelfth and Thirteenth General Assemblies. But rather than fuel concessions, it steeled officials’ determination to hew to basic princi­ples regarding UN involvement in the non-­self-­governing territories. First and foremost, they rejected all notions that po­liti­cal information could be expected or provided, since Article 73(e) of the Charter did not mandate its transmission—­regardless of what other del­e­ga­tions “sometimes alleged.” Colonial Office policymakers also emphasized the importance of continuing to oppose UN efforts to “determine the Territories in re­spect of which information should be transmitted,” which was at the heart of the ongoing dispute over Portugal’s refusal to admit that it administered territories that fell u ­ nder Chapter XI of the Charter. H ­ ere the British considered themselves on less solid ­legal ground than on the question of transmitting po­liti­cal information, and thus more likely to have to succumb to e­ ither the ­will of the majority or a l­egal opinion by the International Court of Justice. B ­ ecause they did not feel it pos­si­ble to abandon Portugal, they hoped instead that the Portuguese could be convinced to adopt a more flexible position at the 1958 UN session, admit their Charter responsibilities, and transmit information in conformity with them.47 ­These princi­ples then formed the backbone of British preparations for their annual pre-­ Assembly talks on colonial questions with US officials.48 In the end, the Anglo-­American talks, held 9–10 September, turned out precisely as British officials had hoped. The only substantive point to come up in the two days of discussion that dealt with the general question of the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories was the Portuguese situation, and US officials accepted British explanations about why they would continue to support Portugal’s refusal to admit that it had Chapter XI responsibilities, even if the United States itself could not promise outright and unwavering support for that position. A far more impor­tant outcome, from the British point of view at least, related not to a par­tic­u­lar policy stance or issue but to informal discussion of the possibility of expanding f­ uture talks to include the French, even if such a move, in the words of the State Department’s C. Vaughan Ferguson Jr., “would mean a serious loss of frankness.” British reaction to the proposition, almost certainly floated as a trial balloon, “was not very favorable.” Beyond destroying the “pre­sent informal character” of the bilateral discussions,

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which both sides considered impor­tant, moving to a tripartite arrangement would also make it more difficult for the British to be candid about French colonial policies. The speed with which US officials jettisoned the idea undoubtedly reassured their British colleagues that the special relationship, or at least Britain’s special place as an American ally and confidant, was still at work in Washington, even if that did not always mean automatic US support for British policy.49 As had often been the case, the Committee on Information held its 1958 session in the spring, which meant that it had already concluded by the time Anglo-­American officials gathered for their early September discussions. As was also becoming the norm, debate revealed ­little that was new. Guatemala’s Carlos Urrutia Aparicio insisted that economic, social, and educational information could not be completely understood without corresponding po­liti­cal information, and India’s Rikhi Jaipal lamented that no information had yet been transmitted on “a number of territories which clearly came u ­ nder Chapter XI in accordance with any reasonable test of self-­government,” by which he meant the territories Portugal and to a lesser extent Spain administered. Such statements notwithstanding, the tenor of the committee’s debate and the single draft resolution dealing with UN authority over the non-­self-­ governing territories it approved ­were mild. Ceylon, India, and the United States sponsored a resolution renewing the committee on the same terms for another three years, and it was approved on a vote of 10 to 0, with 3 abstentions (Australia, France, and the United Kingdom), with no debate whatsoever, a sharp departure from previous discussions of the committee’s renewal.50 Securing a draft resolution that merely renewed the committee for another three years with exactly the same terms of reference was no mean feat and certainly a development that British officials considered a victory for themselves and all the administering states, even if they refused to vote for the proposal itself. It is also likely, however, that given the Fourth Committee’s increasingly activist posture, the nonadministering members of the Committee on Information saw no reason to push for an expanded purview, confident that the Fourth Committee would do so itself. General debate in that body encapsulated the manifold differences that rent the United Nations apart. Mexico’s Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto, for example, noted the “injustice” created in the Charter by separating the non-­self-­ governing territories from the trust territories, which he maintained in a succinct explanation of the central justification for the accountability campaign, meant “that the p­ eoples placed u ­ nder trusteeship enjoyed more favorable treatment, solely ­because the countries which had administered them had been defeated.”51 Cold War considerations also made their way into general com-

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mittee debate. The Soviet Union’s V. N. Bendryshev accused the United States of setting itself up as “world policeman,” using “the pretext of combating an imaginary ‘Communist threat’ [to expand] its own colonial domain, crowding out the other colonial Powers as it did so.” For his part, Irving Salomon of the United States included in his opening statement a lament that while “many dependent ­peoples [had] attain[ed] self-­government and in­de­pen­dence during the last twenty years . . . ​other ­peoples, once ­free, had lost their national sovereignty during the same period,” thereby resurrecting the US campaign to depict the march of communism across Eastern Eu­rope and elsewhere as a form of colonialism.52 Once the Fourth Committee moved beyond general debate to the consideration of par­tic­ul­ar issues, ­things became more heated, as was evident in discussion of a draft resolution reintroducing the question of studying states’ ac­cep­tance of responsibilities ­under Chapter XI of the Charter. Despite the assertion of Iraq’s Adnan Pachachi, who introduced the draft resolution on behalf of its sponsors, “that the proposal should arouse ­little objection,” precisely the opposite was true. As had been the case in previous years, some delegates focused on Spain and Portugal, demonstrating again that although the draft resolution covered all member-­states, it in fact targeted t­ hose two, especially the latter. Contrary to the Portuguese government’s insistence that it administered no non-­self-­governing territories, Yugo­slavia’s Bozovic sneered in a statement that was typical of this sort of intervention, evidence suggested other­wise. By Lisbon’s own admission, the residents of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea did not enjoy “all the attributes of [Portuguese] citizenship,” which he claimed by extension meant that t­ hose territories w ­ ere non-­self-­governing. Soviet delegate V. N. Bendryshev went even further, purporting that “­there was no doubt” that Portugal and Spain administered non-­ self-­governing territories and calling on the General Assembly to “condemn [them] and demand that they re­spect the provisions of the Charter.” Assertions like ­those of Australia’s K. T. Kelly that the joint draft resolution “assail[ed] the sovereign rights of all States” and that “its ultimate objective . . . ​was to pass judgement on the constitutions of all Member States” gained l­ittle traction. Neither did US delegate Irving Salomon’s Cold War–­inspired barb that “­there ­were territories which had lost the in­de­pen­dence they had once enjoyed but on which no information was transmitted.” Salomon also warned that the draft resolution advanced UN competence where the non-­self-­governing territories ­were concerned and “would lead to altercations rather than to constructive results,” but again with no effect on the overall discussion. In the end, the Fourth Committee approved the draft resolution on a 41 to 29 roll-­call vote, with 4 abstentions (58 ­percent approval margin); all of the administering

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states voted no. For the third year in a row, then, the General Assembly would be forced to grapple with the question of where responsibility for determining when a state had a duty to submit information ­under the auspices of Chapter XI lay.53 Given the vehemence with which members of the Fourth Committee had argued about other issues, their treatment of the renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories was anticlimactic. In fact, ­there was no real debate or discussion of the issue whatsoever. Instead, the Fourth Committee merely acted on the Belgian del­e­ga­tion’s request for a vote on the draft renewal resolution the Committee on Information had sent forward, approving it on a vote of 61 to 1, with 4 abstentions and Belgium casting the only negative vote. If the committee’s votes on other issues ­were less than satisfactory for the administering states and their allies, the easy approval of the renewal of the Committee on Information for another three years on the same terms of reference was nothing less than a spectacular victory. The question at hand, however, was ­whether it could be sustained.54 General Assembly consideration of the Fourth Committee’s report u ­ nder Rule 68, which meant dispensing with general debate and merely voting on the committee’s recommended resolutions, did not mean that t­ hings moved along smoothly. On the contrary, it took two acrimonious meetings to move through the Fourth Committee’s recommended resolutions regarding the overall UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories. Renewal of the Committee on Information for another three-­year period with the same terms of reference was approved as Resolution 1332 (XIII) on a non-­roll-­call vote of 72 to 1, with 4 abstentions. (The Dominican Republic, Ghana, India, and Iraq ­were subsequently elected to three-­year terms as nonadministering members of the committee, joining returning members Brazil, Ceylon, and Guatemala.) In the absence of debate, the British and Australian del­e­ga­tions subsequently explained their abstentions, the former b­ ecause London “continue[d] to question the constitutional basis of the Committee on Information” and the latter in objection “to the express wish of certain del­e­ga­tions to telescope the consideration of m ­ atters relating to Non-­Self-­Governing Territories and Trust Territories.” Both critiques reflected the administering states’ continued opposition to international accountability for dependent territories.55 The administering states also remained opposed to the Fourth Committee’s call for UN study of states’ ac­cep­tance of responsibilities ­under Chapter XI of the Charter, a proposal that stemmed directly from Portugal’s refusal to admit that it administered territories subject to the reporting requirements of Article 73(e) and one that had been defeated in plenary session twice previously. Given the narrow approval of the proposal in the Fourth Committee

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(41 to 29, with 4 abstentions), Portuguese representative Vasco Garin moved that it be deemed an impor­tant question u ­ nder Article 18 and thus subject to a two-­thirds majority vote for approval. To prevent the administering minority from again using this tactic to defeat a majority-­supported mea­sure dealing with the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories, Iraq’s Adnan Pachachi moved that the General Assembly not act upon the Fourth Committee’s recommended resolution at the current session, a proposal eventually approved on a non-­roll-­call vote of 70 to 2, with 8 abstentions. ­Future consideration of the issue, however, was inevitable.56 Pachachi’s zeal to postpone voting on the draft resolution calling for study of states’ responsibilities ­under Chapter XI stemmed from his co-­sponsorship of a proposal designed to clarify use of Article 18 to designate specific mea­ sures dealing with the non-­self-­governing territories as impor­tant questions requiring two-­thirds approval. Specifically, he joined the representatives from Liberia, Mexico, and Morocco (Ghana ­later signed on) in introducing a draft resolution asking the International Court of Justice to rule on w ­ hether individual resolutions dealing with the Chapter XI territories could be subject to the two-­thirds requirement for approval barring the establishment of “an additional category to that effect” to join t­hose already enumerated in Article 18(3) of the Charter. Speaking in f­ avor of the mea­sure, Mexico’s Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto described it as the “only . . . ​method whereby our disagreement on the question of voting majorities in the case of questions involving non-­self-­governing territories can be solved in a manner which is fair, dignified and worthy of this organ­ization.” The question of importance, he and other sponsors maintained, had not been the real reason for asking that some resolutions be deemed to require two-­thirds majority support for approval, which meant that something ­else had been at work. Asking the International Court of Justice to rule definitively on ­whether individual resolutions could be subjected to the two-­thirds rule would allow for a nonpo­liti­cal judgment on an issue on which the Assembly was badly divided. Opponents of the mea­ sure, all administering states, attacked it from several a­ngles. They questioned the wisdom of seeking outside guidance, even from a distinguished body such as the ICJ, if, as the United Kingdom’s W. V. J. Evans noted, “the General Assembly [was to remain] the master of its own procedure.” They challenged the appropriateness of introducing the mea­sure as part of the debate over the general topic of information from the non-­self-­governing territories. And they condemned its introduction at the very end of the session, which prevented del­e­ga­tions from properly consulting with their governments or devoting sufficient time and consideration to what all agreed was a weighty mea­sure. On New Zealand delegate Ross Shanahan’s motion, the Assembly,

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on a non-­roll-­call vote of 55 to 2, with 21 abstentions, de­cided not to consider the mea­sure further at the current session. Like the issue of UN study of states’ responsibilities ­under Chapter XI of the Charter, however, the ­matter of subjecting individual resolutions to the two-­thirds rule was certain to reappear.57 The drive for international accountability for dependent territories during the period 1956–1958 focused most actively on the idea that the United Nations had a right to determine an individual territory’s status, w ­ hether that meant declaring a territory to be non-­self-­governing or deciding when it ceased to be so. Although a variety of parliamentary and procedural mea­sures ultimately thwarted efforts to expand the UN purview in ­these areas during the Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Assemblies, the steady growth of the organ­ization’s membership made sustaining that stance impossible. That growth was particularly notable when it came to states that had themselves once been non-­ self-­governing, which naturally had a special interest in ­doing what they could to increase the UN role in encouraging decolonization. One of the major flashpoints during this period, Portugal’s refusal to admit that it administered territories that fell ­under the purview of Chapter XI of the Charter, generated anticolonial sentiment across all UN forums and forced the other administering states to confront difficult questions about the limits of Western solidarity. Although the administering states supported the broad princi­ple of national sovereignty that lay at the heart of Portugal’s position on the status of its overseas territories, they questioned the efficacy of Lisbon’s stand and worried that they could end up as collateral damage in a major UN anticolonial offensive. The Portuguese prob­lem was particularly acute for the United States, which found itself between a rock and a hard place when it came to criticizing an impor­tant NATO ally for stubbornly hewing to the position that its overseas territories w ­ ere not non-­self-­governing. In this way, and ­others, the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories continued to intertwine with US Cold War concerns, complicating policymaking in Washington and forcing US policymakers t­ oward unpleasant choices among competing national interests. Additional complications for US policy came from the continuing pro­cess of decolonization and the attendant development of a general Global South—­ and more specifically, African—­worldview. The 1957 in­de­pen­dence of Ghana was a milestone in the development of this worldview, opening the gates to the flood of African states that would join the United Nations over the next five years. So was the Conference of In­de­pen­dent African States held in Accra, Ghana, the following year, which set t­hose nations firmly against colonialism and occasioned a pledge for coordination at the United Nations, where

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they could use their growing numbers to effect real pro­g ress t­ oward accountability. It was this power to shape not only the UN agenda but also the outcome of debate in the General Assembly that Evan Luard was recognizing when he dubbed the second de­cade of the United Nations’ existence “The Age of Decolonization.”58 Beginning with Bandung, continuing through Accra, and, as we ­will see, beyond, questions related to decolonization dominated the organ­ization, turning it from the peace-­keeping mechanism its found­ers had envisioned to the vehicle for reform that Asian and especially African member-­states hoped it could be.

C h a p t er  6

Power Shifts The Full-­On Drive for Accountability

The anticolonial faction at the United Nations gained the unchallenged ability to dominate debate and shape votes during the period that coincided with the first two years of the Committee on Information’s fourth three-­year term. Building on the sea change in the organ­ ization’s membership that had begun in 1955, anticolonial sentiment became more prominent as the years went on and was capped off by the admission in 1960 of seventeen new states, all of them former dependent territories of some sort and all of them admitted in time to participate in the work of the Fifteenth General Assembly. The admission of so many newly in­de­pen­dent states testified to the pro­g ress of decolonization, although the role of the United Nations in moving that pro­cess along was unclear. It also escalated both the tenor and the pace of rhe­toric regarding the need to accelerate the attainment of in­de­ pen­dent nationhood for ­those territories that still lacked it. At the same time, the pitched vio­lence that followed Belgium’s precipitous withdrawal from the Congo (­today the Demo­cratic Republic of the Congo) painted in bold relief the dangers of premature in­de­pen­dence. The details of the ­battle for control on the ground lie beyond the scope of this study, but the eventual UN intervention to prevent the secession of mineral-­rich Katanga province had direct repercussions for the ongoing accountability campaign and the larger debate about the role of the United Nations in the pro­cess of decolonization. ­Because the UN intervention in the Congo ran c­ ounter to Soviet 13 2

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interests, Premier Nikita Khrushchev denounced both it and what he saw as the pro-­Western leanings of Secretary-­General Dag Hammarskjöld. Unwilling to stop at mere criticism, however, Khrushchev even proposed replacing the single secretary-­general with three such officers, one each for the Western states, the Soviet bloc, and the non-­aligned nations, a move that he argued would “ensure the proper functioning of the United Nations so that the interests of the p­ eoples of all countries are taken into account, and not the interests of one or other group of countries, or even, sectors.” Unlike Trygve Lie in 1956, who had resigned in the face of implacable Soviet opposition, Hammarskjöld refused to back down and remained in office ­until his tragic death in a September 1961 plane crash while trying to arrange a cease-­fire in the Congo conflict. The troika proposal, meanwhile, went nowhere.1 As Soviet pique over the Congo operation illustrated, Cold War tensions continued to cast a long shadow over UN ­handling of colonial questions. The Soviet Union stepped up its general anticolonial campaign, for both ideological and propaganda reasons, and the United States, Britain, and other Western nations rehearsed ­earlier accusations that the Soviet Union was the world’s greatest colonial power. Soviet introduction of an anticolonialism declaration at the Fifteenth General Assembly painted in bold relief Moscow’s desire to take control of the decolonization issue at the United Nations and posed serious prob­lems for the administering states, which ­were loath to see the Soviets gain propaganda points at their expense. But while they ultimately succeeded in replacing the stridently anti-­Western Soviet proposal with one that was more balanced, the die was cast by late 1960 for a w ­ holesale UN assault against colonialism and the attendant need for a greater international role in bringing self-­government and in­de­pen­dence to all remaining dependent territories. Approval of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples, made pos­si­ble by the power shift effected by the admission of seventeen formerly dependent territories, signaled international support for a wide-­ranging campaign for accountability and brought the second phase of the drive for a­ ctual UN involvement in the nontrust dependent territories to an end. From the standpoint of questions of UN authority over the nontrust dependent territories, the 1959 session of the Committee on Information, held in April and May, was remarkably brief, yet like previous sessions it revealed deep divisions between the administering and nonadministering states. The most contentious debate came when the committee addressed the ultimate disposition of the report the secretary-­general was preparing on the pro­g ress of the non-­self-­governing territories since 1946. ­Those states at the forefront of the

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anticolonial cry on the committee—­India, Iraq, and Ceylon—­called for full consideration of not only the report, which according to Resolutions 932 (X) and 1053 (XI) was to address the three functional fields enumerated in Article 73(e), but also the non-­self-­governing territories’ po­liti­cal evolution. “­Unless the United Nations could, in examining the pro­g ress report, review the development and advancement of the Territories in all their aspects,” Ceylon’s N. T. D. Kanakaratne argued, “it would lose for ever [sic] the confidence of the ­peoples of the Non-­Self-­Governing Territories.” Clearly, he and other supporters of an expanded conception of examining the secretary-­general’s report ­were applying what had by this time come to be an impor­tant ele­ment of the anticolonial position at the United Nations—­the idea that po­liti­cal developments could not be separated from economic, social, and educational ones—to the ­matter of the pro­g ress report, and in the pro­cess suggesting an enlargement of the UN role in examining conditions in the non-­self-­governing territories. For their part, the administering states found such a prospect unacceptable. As the Netherlands’ L. J. Goedhart noted in speaking for t­ hose states as a w ­ hole, Resolution 1053 (XI), which had spelled out the par­ameters of the secretary-­general’s report, had clearly indicated that it would “deal with ‘the pro­g ress that has taken place in the Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, in ­those fields on which information has been transmitted.’ ” B ­ ecause transmission of po­liti­cal information was not compulsory, the administering states maintained, it could not be considered as falling within ­either the material to be included in the secretary-­general’s report or the subsequent discussion of that report by a body of the United Nations. Reconciling t­ hese conflicting positions proved impossible, and it was simply agreed that the Committee on Information’s report would make note of the vari­ous views without stating a recommended course of action regarding the pro­g ress report. As such sorts of compromises normally go, this was of course no real solution and only papered over serious differences that would come to a head at the Fourth Committee.2 US preparations for the ­Fourteenth UN General Assembly, which occurred largely a­ fter conclusion of the 1959 session of the Committee on Information, included concerted discussions of the changing face of the organ­ization, which had grown from fifty-­one members at its founding to eighty-­two by the start of the 1959 session. Much of this growth came as a result of decolonization, as former non-­self-­governing territories in Asia and North Africa gained in­de­ pen­dence and became UN members, thereby changing both the nature of the General Assembly and the issues with which it was concerned. In terms of sheer numbers, the nations of Asia and Africa (in which the State Department placed the M ­ iddle East as well) held thirty seats in the Assembly at the start of

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the 1959 session, making them the largest geo­g raph­i­cal bloc and giving them the power to defeat impor­tant questions that required a two-­thirds majority vote for approval (the so-­called blocking third). The presence of so many former non-­self-­governing territories had also changed the General Assembly’s direction, making it more concerned with a host of North-­South issues, including “pressure for pro­g ress ­toward self-­government or in­de­pen­dence.” This helped to account for the Assembly’s increasing focus on the non-­self-­governing territories and signaled to policymakers in Washington the need to tread carefully at the United Nations between support for the Western Eu­ro­pean colonial powers, which ­were, of course, the United States’ NATO allies, and the au­then­tic concerns of the newly in­de­pen­dent states, lest they embark on a ­wholesale defection from the West and association with the Soviet bloc, which painted itself as an erstwhile e­ nemy of colonialism and champion of national aspirations for in­de­pen­dence. Although ­these considerations had colored the US approach to questions pertaining to the non-­self-­governing territories from the United Nations’ start, by 1959 they had become vitally impor­tant as decolonization and the emergence of new nations moved from prospect to real­ity.3 Cold War considerations also colored US planning regarding likely Soviet tactics at the F ­ ourteenth General Assembly and attendant committee meetings. In July 1959, the Eisenhower administration had won congressional approval of a joint resolution condemning Soviet imperialism in Eastern Eu­rope and Central Asia and designating the third week of July as “Captive Nations Week” to draw attention to Soviet misdeeds. Although the resolution meant ­little in practice, administration officials believed that taking a public stand against Soviet suppression of freedom was a solid propaganda move.4 They felt the same way about the vari­ous campaigns being undertaken by the United States Information Agency (USIA) to highlight what Washington considered the imperialist nature of Soviet policies in Eastern Eu­rope and the Baltic states.5 For their part, Soviet officials denied emphatically that “­there [was] any such ­thing as a ‘captive nation’ in [the] Soviet bloc,” a position that US officials expected would be repeated during the 1959 UN session. They therefore intended to continue their efforts to publicize Soviet repression b­ ehind the Iron Curtain and to contrast the pro­cess of decolonization, which created new nations out of territories that ­were previously non-­self-­governing, with the disappearance of self-­government in Eastern Eu­rope, the Baltic states, and Central Asia.6 As in previous years, internal British discussions in advance of the 1959 UN session reiterated opposition to any move to expand UN involvement in the nontrust dependent territories, such as consideration of po­liti­cal information

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or conditions, recommendations about specific territories, or extension of UN supervision (that is, receiving petitions, granting hearings, or sending visiting missions). Should the United Nations attempt to encroach on what the British considered t­ hese sacrosanct princi­ples, officials in London agreed that they would refuse to participate in the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories and submit “the bare minimum” information to meet Britain’s obligations ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter. Such a move, they believed, “would destroy the work of the Committee on Information . . . ​and [was] therefore something which [was] feared by the vested interests in the Fourth Committee.” Although British officials ­were not ultimately faced with the question of ­whether to make good on their threat to withdraw, internal discussions had made clear their willingness to derail the committee’s operations if the United Nations impinged too closely on what they considered their national prerogatives in the territories they administered.7 At the same time, British policymakers also softened their stance on what had come to be called the “Portuguese item,” or more specifically the question of where authority for determining which territories fell ­under the scope of Chapter XI lay. In the past, Britain had joined the other administering states and their supporters in stymieing efforts to constitute a special committee to draw up “a list of criteria for determining when a territory is one ‘whose ­people have not yet attained a full mea­sure of self-­government.’ ” Convinced by 1959 that if properly crafted, such an exercise might yield a harmless list akin to the one produced during the e­ arlier “­factors” exercises, British officials now expressed a willingness to at least abstain on—if they could not support—­a resolution on this question, provided individual territories ­were not considered, any recommendations issued w ­ ere nonbinding, and the princi­ple that “the Assembly [was] not competent to determine w ­ hether an obligation exists to transmit information ­under Article 73e in any par­tic­u­lar case, would remain unchanged.” Reaching the point of being willing to make such a concession was an impor­tant indication of London’s appreciation for the changing fortunes of the administering states at the United Nations. Given the ever increasing size of the anticolonial bloc, a hardline, noncompromising position was no longer tenable; accommodation on self-­crafted terms was coming to be seen as the far wiser course. What remained to be seen was ­whether a moderate approach on this question would be sufficient to placate the anticolonial majority.8 The annual round of Anglo-­American talks on colonial questions at the United Nations, held in mid-­September, ­after the conclusion of the Committee on Information’s session, was brief and unremarkable. On the Portuguese item, British officials won tentative American approval of their new strategy

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as well as a promise to work with the British in lobbying other UN del­e­ga­ tions once the F ­ ourteenth General Assembly got ­under way. The other main issue dealing with the non-­self-­governing territories, the secretary-­general’s expected report on their pro­g ress, generated less agreement, as British officials refused to consider the possibility that UN discussions of the report could move beyond the educational, social, and economic information provided for in Article 73(e) of the Charter. In other words, as the administering states’ hardline position had previously proclaimed at the Committee on Information, the report had to be studied within the same confines that bound that entity. With US officials not surprisingly taking a more flexible approach to the subject, final agreement on the question was deferred in ­favor of a general wait-­ and-­ see attitude. Past experience on the Fourth Committee, however, suggested that Britain’s tough stance would meet with re­sis­tance.9 The nonadministering states used their opening statements during the 1959 session of the Fourth Committee to argue forcefully for eradication of the Charter-­mandated distinction between the trust and non-­trust dependent territories. Venezuela’s Pedro Zuloaga attacked the administering states for refusing to transmit po­liti­cal information, accusing them of “endeavouring to rely on shortcomings in the text [of the Charter] to prevent 200 million ­human beings from achieving the self-­government or in­de­pen­dence which they desired.”10 The del­e­ga­tions of Liberia, Guinea, and Iraq called on the Secretariat to provide the Fourth Committee with “all the information communicated to it by inhabitants or groups of inhabitants of Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” which amounted to ac­cep­tance of petitions from the Chapter XI territories. Sudan’s Abdulla El-­Hassan picked up on this same theme and recommended receiving petitioners from the non-­self-­governing territories. Taken together, t­ hese proposals highlighted mounting international dissatisfaction with what Mexico’s Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto dubbed “one of the greatest inconsistencies in history”—­the establishment of two dif­fer­ent categories of dependent territories—­perpetrated ­because “the ­Great Powers did not want the international community to do to them what they themselves imposed on Germany, Turkey, Japan or Italy.” “The stubborn opposition of several administering Powers,” he proclaimed, had prevented the inclusion of their non-­self-­governing territories in the Trusteeship System, which “meant that one group of colonial p­ eoples enjoyed a far less favourable position than did the other, simply b­ ecause their rulers had not been defeated in the war.” In the interest of fulfilling the Charter’s goal of fostering self-­government in all dependent territories, he spoke for many in expressing his hope that the administering states would “voluntarily place the Non-­Self-­Governing Territories ­under the Trusteeship System.”11

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Given the emotion that characterized opening statements, the Fourth Committee’s consideration of the issue of the secretary-­general’s report on pro­ gress in the non-­self-­governing territories was surprisingly tempered. Ceylon, Ghana, India, Iraq, the United Arab Republic, and Yemen (­later joined by Panama) co-­sponsored a draft resolution that simply called on the Committee on Information to study the report and “submit its observations and conclusions” to the Fifteenth General Assembly. No mention was made of having the committee consider any information beyond that already transmitted ­under ­Article 73(e), which implied at least that consideration of the report would fall within the committee’s accepted terms of reference and exclude discussion of po­liti­cal and constitutional ­matters. With this stricture firmly in mind, the administering states found it pos­si­ble to at least abstain on the draft resolution, which was approved on a non-­roll-­call vote of 55 to 1, with 7 abstentions.12 Moderation was also apparent in the Fourth Committee’s h ­ andling of the Portuguese item, officially included ­under “General Questions Relating to the Transmission and Examination of Information.” The committee, of course, was considering this issue for the fourth time. In an effort to achieve the broadest pos­si­ble support this time around for a UN study of when reporting responsibility ­under Chapter XI began, the UK del­e­ga­tion worked ­behind the scenes to craft a relatively innocuous draft resolution, introduced by a broad co­ali­tion of countries, that called for the creation of a special committee equally balanced between administering and nonadministering states “to enumerate the princi­ples which should guide Members in determining ­whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for in Article 73 e” and report to the Fifteenth General Assembly. By proposing a s­ imple enumeration of princi­ples that should guide states in determining w ­ hether they administered territories that fell ­under the auspices of Chapter XI rather than a list of f­ actors to be applied to specific territories, the proposal went some distance ­toward accommodating the positions of the administering states. Discussion of the draft resolution was decidedly dispassionate, and the mea­sure garnered 53 votes, including administering states New Zealand and the United States. The 9 states voting against the mea­sure included France and Portugal. Administering states Australia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom ­were among the 12 states abstaining. At just over 71 ­percent, the margin of approval for the draft resolution was sufficient to secure a two-­thirds majority in the General Assembly if it was declared an impor­tant question ­under Article 18 of the Charter.13 Support for equalizing the UN role in all dependent territories remained very much alive, however, despite ­these compromise agreements. Ghana, India, and Yugo­slavia introduced a draft resolution urging the transmission of

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po­liti­cal information, a move that India’s M. K. Rasgotra noted would make it pos­si­ble “for the General Assembly to judge ­whether it could accept an Administering Member’s assurance that a given Territory had become self-­ governing.” The Iraqi del­e­ga­tion followed up with an amendment calling for “the establishment of intermediate timetables leading to the attainment of self-­ government,” a move designed to accelerate the pace of decolonization. Not surprisingly, opposition to t­ hese proposals came only from administering states or their allies. US representative Clement J. Zablocki, for example, warned that the draft resolution “risk[ed] destroying much of the valuable machinery built up over the years through co-­operation, understanding and mutual trust” by seeking to impose an obligation on the administering states that was absent from the Charter. Australia’s Kevin T. Kelly was even more out­spoken, claiming that the draft resolution and the Iraqi amendment “constituted an attempt to create a l­egal obligation for which no warrant existed in the Charter.” Although supporters w ­ ere quick to point out that the draft resolution simply urged the administering states to transmit po­liti­cal information rather than requiring them to do so, their words fell on deaf ears. In the end, neither proposal received the support of even one of the administering states. The Iraqi amendment regarding timetables was approved with a roll-­call vote of 44 yeas, 7 nays, and 20 abstentions; among the administering states, Australia, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands voted against, while ­Great Britain, New Zealand, and the United States abstained. The 47 affirmative votes for the draft resolution as a w ­ hole did not include any administering states, as all w ­ ere among the 15 nay votes (9 states abstained). If voting on ­these two mea­sures made clear how deeply riven the committee was between competing points of view regarding the proper UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories as well as the growing international support for greater administering-­state accountability, the failure of e­ ither proposal to pass by a margin of two-­thirds demonstrated that the proponents of accountability ­were not yet quite in control.14 The General Assembly’s consideration of the report of the Fourth Committee and the draft resolutions it contained again took place ­under Rule 68 of the UN articles of procedure, which meant that b­ ecause no member requested open debate, none occurred, and the draft resolutions w ­ ere simply voted on, with del­e­ga­tions having the opportunity to explain their votes ­after the fact. Three mea­sures dealt with broad questions of UN competence in the non-­self-­governing territories—­study of the secretary-­general’s pro­g ress report, the transmission of po­liti­cal information and setting of timetables, and the creation of a special committee to study the princi­ples that should help to determine ­whether territories ­were non-­self-­governing. The first, approved on a margin of 62 to 0, with 3 abstentions, became Resolution 1461 (XIV), the

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second, which garnered a vote of 50 to 13, with 9 abstentions, became Resolution 1468 (XIV). The third, which became Resolution 1467 (XIV), won approval on a roll-­call vote of 54 to 5, with 15 abstentions. Among the administering states, Belgium, France, Portugal, and South Africa voted no; Australia, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom abstained.15 A number of states offered extended commentary when explaining their votes, with the bulk of attention being directed at Resolution 1467 (XIV), “General Questions Relating to the Transmission and Examination of Information.” As we have seen, the Fourth Committee had approved vari­ous versions of this resolution in 1956, 1957, and 1958, none of which had secured General Assembly approval. Advance consultation among del­e­ga­tions during the 1959 session had generated what might best be described as an informal quid pro quo: ­there would be no mention of voting rules when the proposal came before the General Assembly provided the e­ arlier proposals to ask the International Court of Justice or the Sixth Committee to rule on the ­matter of voting requirements ­were not reintroduced. Mexico’s Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto hailed this “friendly agreement” as a sign that “the atmosphere which [had previously] so disturbed the General Assembly” had dis­appeared. Given the serious divisions that remained among UN member-­states over the proper role for the organ­ization in the non-­self-­governing territories, however, his optimism was premature.16 When the Committee on Information met for its eleventh regular session in the late winter-­early spring of 1960, beyond its normally scheduled consideration of economic conditions, its attentions ­were primarily focused on the secretary-­general’s report on pro­g ress in the non-­self-­governing territories. Consisting of a general survey, studies of the three functional fields on which information was transmitted in conformity with Article 73(e), and summaries of the information on fifty-­four separate territories, the report was staggering in its detail. The committee’s chairman, Ghana’s Alex Quaison-­Sackey, set the tone for the report’s consideration by hailing his election as proof of the committee’s importance. Only “a few years e­ arlier,” he proclaimed, Ghana “had been one of the objects of the Committee’s deliberations.” “Now [it] was represented by its Chairman.” In assessing the pro­g ress report, he reminded committee members that they should not endeavor “to look at the report for the sole purpose of criticism” and should instead seek “to conclude how far pro­g ress in the Territories had been achieved in the main fields of development.” ­After general discussion over the course of five meetings of the full committee, a subcommittee comprised of Brazil, Ghana, India, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States conducted a more in-­depth

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study stretching over twenty-­six meetings and ultimately produced a compromise report that—­not surprisingly, given the subcommittee’s balanced membership—­reflected the positions of both the administering and nonadministering states.17 The subcommittee’s report, based on a working paper prepared by the Secretariat, generally lauded the pro­g ress achieved in the non-­self-­governing territories since the United Nations’ founding but also noted that much remained to be done. “The most significant feature of the [postwar] period,” the report noted, was that “the number of Non-­Self-­Governing Territories recognized as such, and above all the total number of non-­self-­governing ­peoples, had been considerably diminished,” g­ oing from approximately 215 million in 1946 to approximately 113 million a de­cade l­ ater, most of them in Africa. Although the subcommittee noted that “po­liti­cal dependence [was] by definition the common characteristic of all the Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” suggesting thereby the desirability of a consideration of po­liti­cal information from the territories, it lamented the refusal of Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, which together administered the vast majority of non-­self-­governing territories, to move beyond the strict letter of Article 73(e) of the Charter and transmit it.18 Discussion of the subcommittee’s report by the full Committee on Information was brief and relatively unremarkable. Only India’s C. S. Jha delivered a speech of any substance, lauding the pro­g ress achieved so far in the nontrust dependent territories but warning that “if  . . . ​the pre­sent rate of development ­were to continue, it would be twelve or thirteen years more before all of the Territories had attained e­ ither in­de­pen­dence or complete self-­government. That was [simply] too long,” he asserted. In the end, the subcommittee’s report was approved by a vote of 12 to 0, with 1 abstention. ­Because the report contained “observations . . . ​of a po­liti­cal nature [that] considerably exceeded the Committee’s terms of reference,” the French del­e­ga­tion felt obligated to abstain.19 As US officials planned for the 1960 UN session, largely following the conclusion of the Committee on Information’s session, they fully anticipated “that the 15th General Assembly [would] be conducted in an atmosphere charged with tension.” For one t­ hing, “East-­West relations [­were expected to] be decidedly less amicable than t­hose which existed, at least superficially, during the 14th General Assembly.” Recent breakdowns in Soviet-­American relations, such as the U-2 affair, Soviet refusal to participate in quadripartite talks with Britain, France, and the United States in Paris, and the Soviet withdrawal from disarmament talks in Geneva all boded ill for the upcoming General Assembly, at which US officials expected “an abusive Soviet propaganda campaign.”

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The profound growth in UN membership also generated concern. The organ­ ization had grown from fifty-­one members in 1945 to eighty-­two at the start of the Fifteenth General Assembly. Another seventeen members—­all of them “newly-­independent nations in Africa and Asia”—­were admitted over the course of 1960, in time to participate in discussion of and voting on m ­ atters related to the non-­self-­governing territories. Revealing the deep cultural assumptions that colored the US approach to non-­Western ­peoples, US officials feared that “many . . . ​[of ­those new members ­were] too inexperienced in international affairs to act responsibly on all vital issues.” As a result, they might be swayed by emotional considerations or fall prey to Soviet-­bloc propaganda. Taken together, ­these two developments convinced policymakers in the State Department that their road at the upcoming UN session would be difficult. Yet given the high stakes that ­were involved, they also pushed ­those officials to redouble their efforts to gain advantage at the United Nations.20 One thread of the administration’s evolving strategy for making the US presence more vis­i­ble—­and audible—in the United Nations grew from the Cold War conflict with the Soviet Union. Moscow had from the start been aware of the United Nations’ “propaganda possibilities” and had never hesitated to use it for Cold War purposes. As we have seen, the United States had been slower to use the stage provided by the United Nations as a bully pulpit for selling US policies and positions to other nations. Indeed, such efforts had previously been undertaken only sporadically, most prominently during the early years of the Eisenhower administration, when Ambassador Lodge had initiated his campaign to more forcefully ­counter Soviet propagandizing at the United Nations. Although that campaign had somewhat fallen by the wayside by Eisenhower’s second term, indications that the Soviets intended to step up their efforts to use the United Nations as a platform for propaganda brought about its resurrection in 1960, and policymakers therefore planned to use the Fifteenth General Assembly to “put forth [US] views” and “offer [US] programs for the f­ uture.” They especially sought to reach the new members of the United Nations, which received a steady Soviet “anti-­western, anti-­imperialist and anti-­capitalist line” as well as promises that Moscow was a true supporter of in­de­pen­dence for the remaining non-­self-­governing territories. The United Nations, US officials now understood, “[would] become in [the] ­f uture a more, not less impor­tant front sector in the ­battle for the minds of men, not necessarily all men, but certainly ­those in the non-­committed areas.”21 Not surprisingly, then, the second strand of US thinking when it came to beefing up the nation’s propaganda efforts at the United Nations reflected the consequences of the decolonization-­induced growth in UN membership. Seeing their admission to the United Nations as confirmation of their nation-

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hood and determined to use their membership to work for c­ auses that w ­ ere impor­tant to them, the new members downplayed Cold War issues such as “the question of Berlin and of the unification of Germany, the prob­lem of the Eastern Eu­ro­pean oppressed p­ eople, and the entire issue of East-­West relations” and focused much more attention on what might be described as issues that pitted the haves against the have-­nots, among them “colonialism, racial and national discrimination, raising of living and education standards, . . . ​and overall economic and social development.” The US approach to the United Nations had to respond accordingly, particularly when it came to “the colonial issue,” which posed “one of the most difficult prob­lems in the US relationship with the new nations.” Unable to abandon its Western Eu­ro­pean allies in ser­vice to “the desire to show sympathy for the aspirations of the non-­ committed,” the United States had, however, “tried recently to follow a ­middle road by abstaining increasingly in UN voting on critical colonial issues”—­a symbolic gesture, to be sure, but one that US officials had hoped would net some mea­sure of appreciation from the newly in­de­pen­dent nations. With ­those issues assuming greater prominence at the United Nations, US officials now determined that a more aggressive posture was in order, not necessarily in defense of Western colonialism but in an effort to reveal the hollowness of Soviet claims to support in­de­pen­dence and self-­government.22 Propaganda efforts also formed part of the British government’s preparations for the Fifteenth General Assembly, particularly when it came to the subject of Soviet colonialism. An April  1960 exposé titled “Colonisation and Sovereignty in the USSR” used evidence from the 1959 Soviet census (the first national census since World War II) showing the steady increase in ethnic Rus­ sians in many of the USSR’s republics to conclude that “while the dissolution of Western colonial empires continues Rus­sia is engaged in extensive colonial expansion.” This brief piece, and its conclusion that “the Soviet Union is shown by its own census figures to be the new colonialist power of the 20th ­century,” played up the claim that absorbing or exerting control over contiguous or adjacent territory was no less a colonial enterprise than d­ oing so over territory separated by distance or ­water. In October 1960 Arthur Bottomley, an expert on Asian and African affairs in the L ­ abour Party, published a pamphlet titled “Facts about Soviet Asia” that rebutted Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev’s 1958 claim that “ ‘our country has not taken part in colonial plunder’ ” by pointing out that “since 1939 the Soviet Union has acquired 265,170 square miles of new territory in Eastern Poland, the Baltic States, Rumania [sic], Czecho­slo­va­k ia, Finland, East Prus­sia, and the Far East, together with an additional population of nearly 23 millions.” In addition to exposing the Soviet Union as a colonial power, Bottomley also sought to lay bare the hollowness of its claims to

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support the non-­self-­governing ­peoples. “Soviet leaders,” he noted, “see nothing contradictory in inciting the ­peoples of less-­developed countries elsewhere to revolt against ‘colonialism’ while at the same time exploiting e­ very dark aspect of it among their subject ­peoples.” As was normally the case in ­these kinds of treatments, Bottomley also took pains to paint a positive picture of the evolution from empire to commonwealth for Britain’s colonial territories, contrasting the devolution of Britain’s imperial holdings with the consolidation of the Soviet Union’s.23 British preparation for the Fifteenth General Assembly revealed as well the importance that policymakers placed on convincing US officials that Britain deserved to retain its position as “the first ally of the United States.” Britain’s position as a colonial power was a potential challenge to a close transatlantic relationship, especially in the face of what the Foreign Office in January 1960 called “the inborn tendency of Americans to distrust colonial rule.” That sentiment, coupled with Washington’s “desire to keep in with the Africans and Asians,” could generate pressure for British flexibility on colonial questions at the United Nations, a point, of course, revealed in internal US planning for the Fifteenth General Assembly. Without pledging to adopt the wider vision that officials in Washington seemed to advocate, British policymakers did at least indicate an intention to pursue a “skillful pre­sen­ta­tion of our steady pro­ gress t­owards agreed goals” in the non-­self-­governing territories. In other words, in addition to planning for a propaganda campaign to expose the ills of Soviet colonialism, British officials w ­ ere also preparing a positive campaign 24 to tout their own accomplishments. Anglo-­American discussions in advance of the Fifteenth General Assembly incorporated both of ­these ideas. For a variety of reasons, the usual bilateral talks on colonial and trusteeship questions in advance of the new UN session ­were replaced in 1960 with a series of wider ranging discussions that included at times ­either Canadian or French officials and focused on broader issues than simply colonial questions at the United Nations, particularly developments in Africa. The upcoming US presidential election was one reason for altering past practice; another was the British conviction that regular contact between the two nations’ del­e­ga­tions in New York obviated the need for dedicated colonial talks, a retreat from their previous preference for exclusively bilateral talks. Instead, at least for the current year, colonial issues at the United Nations ­were considered within broader talks designed to plot out strategies for achieving what Britain’s Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar described as “the objective of our operations in the GA this year . . . ​[of] get[ting] the uncommitted countries on our side.” To this end the British and American del­e­ga­tions ­were to pursue “serious and constructive debate [at the United Nations] despite all rudeness

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and provocation” from the Soviet Union and its satellites. While “refus[ing] to treat the United Nations as a propaganda forum,” they w ­ ere to “rebutt [sic] the thesis that the Soviets are true friends of the emergent countries in Africa, Asia, ­etc.” through the use of “statistics of Britain’s rec­ord in setting nations on the road to in­de­pen­dence.”25 Between the conclusion of the Committee on Information and the opening of the Fourth Committee, and a­ fter the vari­ous Western discussions, a six-­ member committee, directed by Resolution 1467 (XIV) “to enumerate the princi­ples which should guide Members in determining ­whether or not an obligation exists to transmit information called for in Article 73 e of the Charter,” conducted its business. Comprised of India, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, what was dubbed the “Committee of Six” was to deal with the controversy that arose when Portugal (and ­later Spain) refused to admit responsibility for territories that should be considered non-­self-­governing.26 Guiding the committee’s work ­were two lengthy compilations prepared by the secretary-­general, as well as a number of working papers submitted by the Indian del­e­ga­tion. One of the secretary-­general’s papers was a long recounting of international interest in colonial questions through the 1945 San Francisco Conference, UN treatment of ­those questions through 1956, and renewed interest in ­those ­matters ­after the massive expansion in UN membership in 1956, as well as a summary of what member-­states and ­legal treatises had said in the past about the princi­ples that could be used to identify a non-­self-­governing territory. More a resource or reference work than a prescriptive paper, this compilation could be used to back both sides of the competence question, which was likely the Secretariat’s intent. The Secretariat’s other paper contained the responses of member-­states regarding the princi­ ples that should guide a state in determining ­ whether a territory was non-­self-­governing or not. The responses ranged from the brief to the detailed, and enumerated a good many f­ actors that might be used to determine when a territory could properly be considered non-­self-­governing. A number also dealt with the question of competence. Specifically, Bulgaria, Byelorus­sia, Guinea, Iran, Mexico, Poland, the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Yugo­slavia all explic­itly endorsed the idea of UN competence to determine a territory’s status, while Brazil, France, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom categorically opposed such a prospect. With so many states supporting the idea of UN competence, the British and American representatives on the committee w ­ ere determined to curtail both discussion of this issue during the committee’s meetings and inclusion of it in the committee’s final report.27 India’s C. S. Jha, selected as Committee of Six chairman by acclamation, performed his duties in a “firm and business-­like” manner that proved most

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satisfactory for British policymakers. Jha “avoid[ed] polemics and contentious issues” and ensured that the question of competence was “scrupulously” avoided, both during the committee’s discussions and in its final report, which provided an innocuous list of princi­ples for determining when a territory was non-­self-­governing. British representative G. K. Caston expressed overall satisfaction with the work of the Committee of Six, which he believed had been most useful “in showing the Africans and Asians that we can get together with them in discussing this kind of prob­lem in a constructive and realistic way, provided that certain of our susceptibilities are respected.” The very moderation that made the Committee of Six’s work acceptable to the British, however, was likely to generate criticism in the Fourth Committee, where anticolonial sentiment predominated.28 That sentiment was largely fueled by seventeen former dependent territories that ­were participating for the very first time in UN debate. Cameroun, Somalia, and Togo had all been trust territories. The o ­ thers—­the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Upper Volta—­had all fallen u ­ nder the auspices of Chapter XI. Unlike most previous years, when new states had been admitted at the end of the General Assembly’s session, too late to take part in the work of that session, in 1960, ­those admissions took place in September, which meant that new members would be full participants in all standing committee and General Assembly discussions. Their presence at the Fourth Committee gave further fuel to the anticolonial faction, with opening statements hinting at the confrontations to come. Numerous del­e­ga­tions deplored the lack of po­liti­cal information in the secretary-­general’s pro­g ress report, an omission that might have squared with the letter of Article 73(e) but not with ­either the Charter’s charge that the administering states should encourage self-­government in the territories for which they ­were responsible or Resolutions 327 (IV), 848 (IX), and 1468 (XIV) urging administering states to provide such information. It was also out of step with UN treatment of the trust territories, a point Jordan’s Zaid Rifai made when he noted that “unfortunately the victorious nations [in World War II], with their military strength, had assumed the right to keep their own colonies, so that, by a strange paradox, the colonies of the defeated Powers [that had gone on to become trust territories] had enjoyed a happier lot than ­those of the victors”—an assertion that reiterated prevailing beliefs that international supervision was more acceptable to dependent p­ eoples than administration by an individual nation. Ghana’s Alex Quaison-­Sackey built on that idea and called for expanding the terms of reference for the Committee on

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Information and extending its term u ­ ntil all non-­self-­governing territories w ­ ere independent—­proposals that US officials opposed and that would result in British withdrawal from the Committee on Information, thereby rendering that body “completely in­effec­tive.” Many members also expressed concerns about the Committee of Six’s rather milquetoast list of princi­ples that might be used to guide members in determining ­whether a territory was non-­self-­governing as well as the committee’s refusal to specifically mention Portugal and Spain in its report.29 Stoking the anticolonial fires still further was the fact that the Fourth Committee was meeting concurrently with the General Assembly, where Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev had just called for an immediate end to colonialism. A clear effort to circumvent the Committee on Information, with its balanced membership devoid since 1953 of Soviet or Communist membership, Khrushchev’s proposal colored the Fourth Committee’s discussion of all ­matters related to the non-­self-­governing territories. Indeed, when a Bulgarian proposal to delay formal consideration of pending draft resolutions ­until the General Assembly had had a chance to consider the mea­sure failed to gain serious consideration, the Soviet bloc indicated its intention to “­either abstain or vote against all ‘colonial resolutions’ in [the Fourth] Committee u ­ ntil ­after the plenary debate” on Khrushchev’s proposal. As we ­will see, not only did that proposal thus affect the final voting in the Fourth Committee on colonial ­matters, it also led to the General Assembly’s most aggressive stance to date against colonialism.30 Given the general dissatisfaction with the non-­trust dependent territories’ pro­g ress ­toward in­de­pen­dence and self-­government as expressed in opening statements, the Fourth Committee’s discussion of how that pro­g ress might be accelerated should not have been surprising. Specifically, the committee came to consider a draft resolution, eventually sponsored by eigh­teen nations, that insisted that “­under no circumstances should in­de­pen­dence be delayed on the ground of inadequate economic, social and educational standards prevailing in the Territories” and “urge[d] the Administering Members concerned, once again, to extend their full co-­operation to the General Assembly in per­ for­mance of its functions by transmitting information of a po­liti­cal and constitutional character on developments in the Territories u ­ nder their respective administrations.” The first ele­ment of the draft resolution was a direct challenge to the prevailing Western position that premature in­de­pen­dence, before a territory could stand on its own eco­nom­ically and defend itself from outside aggression, was to be avoided and, as we w ­ ill see, accorded with the Soviet proposal to the General Assembly for immediate in­de­pen­dence for all

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remaining non-­self-­governing territories. The second reflected long-­standing sentiment among the nonadministering states that transmission of po­liti­cal information should be mandatory.31 Due to the extensiveness of opening statements, a­ ctual discussion of the draft resolution was relatively brief, stretching over only three meetings. In a representative pronouncement, Guinea’s Camara Maurice, whose nation was participating in its very first UN session, spoke for many when he hailed the proclamation that lack of economic, social, or educational development should not prevent the granting of in­de­pen­dence, asserting that “no consideration should be allowed to delay the in­de­pen­dence of ­people still ­under colonialism,” who, he said, “preferred poverty with freedom to prosperity with servitude.” In explaining the need for the transmission of po­liti­cal information, Najmuddine Rifai of the United Arab Republic expressed the widely shared view that “the failure to provide po­liti­cal information had always handicapped the United Nations in the discharge of its duties ­under the Charter.” “Since all agreed that in­de­pen­dence or self-­government should be achieved as soon as pos­si­ble,” he maintained, it was inexplicable that “the Administering Members did not co-­operate with the United Nations with a view to the early achievement of that goal.” Opposition to the draft resolution was minimal, and its approval was never in doubt. In the end, it passed on a roll-­call vote of 61 to 0, with 24 abstentions; the United States voted with the majority, while the other administering states and the Soviet bloc abstained, the former ­because the mea­sure went too far, the latter in protest of the refusal to delay the Fourth Committee’s work ­until the General Assembly had considered Khrushchev’s declaration. In explaining their abstentions, the del­e­ga­tions of France and the United Kingdom specifically cited the draft resolution’s call for transmission of po­liti­cal information.32 The m ­ atter of transmitting po­liti­cal information occasioned considerable bilateral Anglo-­American discussion outside the confines of the United Nations and painted in bold relief the continuing differences in the ways Washington and London approached the question. Although the United States had voluntarily transmitted po­liti­cal information on the nation’s non-­self-­governing territories from the start, seeing such a move as proof of its commitment to pro­g ress in that area and as a demonstration of its transparency as an administering state, ­until 1960 it had not actively supported UN efforts to encourage other states to follow suit. The inevitable push by the growing anticolonial majority ­toward greater UN involvement in the non-­self-­governing territories and the relentless effort to accelerate pro­g ress ­toward in­de­pen­dence and self-­ government, however, occasioned a reconsideration that culminated in US support for the draft resolution encouraging the transmission of po­liti­cal in-

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formation in the Fourth Committee. This shift did not come easily, as the Eu­ro­pean Affairs Division of the State Department cautioned against a concession on the transmission of po­liti­cal information that might be merely the first step down a slippery slope that could culminate in extending to the Chapter XI territories the same sorts of UN supervisory rights that applied to the trust territories. Officials with a broader perspective on the US role in the world, however, pushed for the change, fearful that continued “ambivalent inaction” would sow the seeds of discontent among the anticolonial majority at the United Nations.33 Despite their efforts to convince the British to support the transmission of po­liti­cal information—­thereby “remov[ing] one of the issues that tend[ed] to divide [the United States and Britain] in the Fourth Committee discussions” and allowing the British to highlight their “brilliant rec­ord” in fostering “the development of Non-­Self-­Governing Territories ­under [their] administration”—­ the US del­e­ga­tion made no headway. The Foreign Office feared that agreeing to transmit po­liti­cal information “would make it virtually impossible to resist po­liti­cal discussion in [the] Committee on Information and would prob­ably strengthen [the] tendency in [the] Fourth Committee to discuss affairs of par­ tic­u­lar territories.” The best the Foreign Office could promise was to consider an abstention on any draft resolution calling for the transmission of po­liti­cal information, which was in the end the stance the British del­e­ga­tion took.34 The Committee of Six’s report and suggested princi­ples to guide member-­ states in determining ­whether specific territories ­were non-­self-­governing generated a fair amount of discussion in the Fourth Committee, most of it focused on the a­ ctual application of the princi­ples, particularly to the territories administered by Portugal and Spain. Yugo­slavia’s Josip Djerdja well expressed the sentiment of many del­e­ga­tions when he noted “that the Fourth Committee should be concerned less with the determination of princi­ples than with appropriate action leading to the early attainment of full in­de­pen­dence by all Non-­Self-­Governing Territories and to the rapid elimination of colonial relationships in general.” In other words, it was time for the committee, and by extension the larger General Assembly, to move beyond the mere enumeration of princi­ples to the development of strategies for putting t­ hose princi­ ples into practice. For many del­e­ga­tions, the entire princi­ples exercise had been necessitated by the refusal of Portugal and Spain to acknowledge their status as administering states, an act of “chauvinistic machiavellianism,” as Mali’s Demba Diallo put it, that “could no longer protect them” from the ire of the anticolonial majority in the General Assembly. Criticism of Portugal and Spain also extended to the administering states within NATO, which several del­e­ ga­tions accused of aiding and abetting the refusal to accept the obligations

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spelled out in Article 73(e) regarding information transmission—an accusation that both British and American officials had worried would come and one they ­were anxious to dismiss. Shaking f­ ree from the stigma of being associated with Portugal had, in fact, been one of the driving reasons for Britain’s support of Resolution 1467 (XIV), which had created the Committee of Six, in the first place. And as representative Wayne Morse pointed out in explicating the US position, ­because “Spain and Portugal had made no reservations at the time when they had become Member States, they ­were not, in [Washington’s] view, on very firm ­legal ground when they claimed that they themselves should decide to which territories Article 73 e referred.”35 The Fourth Committee ultimately considered two draft resolutions related to the report of the Committee of Six, only one of which dealt with general precepts. Sponsored by Iraq, Ireland, Nigeria, Venezuela, and ­later Bolivia, it endorsed the princi­ples set out by the committee and called for their application “in the light of the facts and the circumstances of each case to determine ­whether or not an obligation exists to transmit information u ­ nder Article 73 e of the Charter.” If the draft resolution itself was relatively straightforward, opposition developed over an amendment proposed by the del­e­ga­tions of Togo and Tunisia that called for UN supervision of local elections in instances where non-­self-­governing territories w ­ ere voting on ­whether to integrate themselves into the metropole or other entity. The administering states saw the amendment as a challenge to their good faith as well as an interjection of the United Nations into the pro­cess of supervising developments in the Chapter XI territories to a degree not provided for in the Charter. Support for the mea­sure was considerable, though, and it easily won approval on a roll-­call vote of 38 to 24, with 26 abstentions; all of the administering states and their Western Eu­ro­pean allies voted nay. The margin of approval for the draft resolution as a w ­ hole was 62 to 3, with 19 abstentions. Again, both the administering states and the Soviet-­bloc states abstained, the former ­because of the inclusion of the provision regarding UN supervision of integration elections in non-­self-­governing territories, the latter as part of their protest at the decision not to delay the Fourth Committee’s work u ­ ntil the General Assembly had considered Khrushchev’s declaration.36 Fourth Committee activism when it came to pushing for a more expansive UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories generated no small mea­sure of concern for American and British policymakers—as well as no small degree of disagreement. The former worried, with justification, that the “tide [was] turning” against efforts to hew strictly to the Charter’s distinction between the trust and non-­trust dependent territories and advised a ­wholesale reconsideration of the ­matter at the highest levels, even if that meant accepting target

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dates for in­de­pen­dence or making other modest concessions to the anticolonial majority. The US del­e­ga­tion to the United Nations was especially vocal about the need to maintain a flexible policy in the wake of the changes wrought on the organ­ization as a result of decolonization. Opposing majority-­supported efforts to establish greater UN responsibility over the non-­self-­governing territories, warned representative James Wadsworth, “[would] be extremely costly to US prestige,” with the result that the “US w ­ ill pay [the] bill in forthcoming assemblies.” It would also “permit [the] Soviets [to] continue [to] . . . ​ pose as [the] g­ reat champion of dependent ­peoples.” British policymakers certainly agreed that “the atmosphere on colonial questions at [the Fourth Committee’s 1960] session [was] worse than hitherto, and seem[ed] to be deteriorating further.” Rather than bow to US calls for flexibility, however, they seemed to focus their efforts on appealing to the United States for continued support of their hardline position. As the UK mission to the United Nations noted, “Our position . . . ​is likely to be difficult enough even with American support. Without it we ­shall be in very ­g reat difficulty.”37 ­Great difficulty for Britain—­and for the administering states in general—­ had, in fact, already come, in the form of the Soviet declaration on the granting of in­de­pen­dence to colonial p­ eoples that Premier Khrushchev had personally introduced to the General Assembly on 23 September.38 Khrushchev’s attendance at the Assembly aroused considerable consternation in the United States, where officials saw it as a cynical ploy to compel attendance by other world leaders, including ­those from the developing world, as well as an effort “to turn the . . . ​session into a spectacular propaganda circus.” It also occasioned a protracted debate within the Eisenhower administration about ­whether the president himself would attend the Assembly during Khrushchev’s presence. Although US officials at first rejected the president’s attendance as “undignified,” they eventually changed their tune. Not only did Eisenhower attend in the end; he also introduced a concerted plan for development in Africa in a clear, but largely unsuccessful, attempt to c­ ounter the Soviet declaration on ending colonialism. Despite hints beforehand that Khrushchev would emphasize disarmament when he appeared before the Assembly, colonial questions actually figured quite prominently in his address, in which he specifically called on the United Nations to urge the administering states to undertake negotiations with local governments in the non-­self-­governing territories to effect in­de­pen­dence and self-­government at the earliest pos­si­ble moment and suggested UN “assistance, moral and material,” to facilitate moves t­oward in­de­pen­dence and self-­government if the administering powers dragged their feet. The Soviets deliberately sought consideration of the proposal in plenary session of the General Assembly rather than by one of its

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functional committees in order to highlight the mea­sure’s importance as well as their role in bringing it to the fore. In this way they hoped to maximize their propaganda gain, both within the Assembly and in the wider world.39 Khrushchev’s speech, delivered at a General Assembly session attended by numerous heads of state and government anxious to mark the fifteenth anniversary of the organ­ization’s founding, began with a long diatribe against the evils of Western colonialism, which drew heavi­ly on Marxist precepts to denounce the Western powers’ “shameful” history of “exploiting the indigenous population[s]” of their colonies “and plundering the[ir] natu­ral wealth.” “The colonial system,” it maintained, “deliberately and artificially perpetuates the economic backwardness of the colonies, hindering their industrialization and the rational utilization of their resources.” Moving from ideology to present-­day conditions, Khrushchev went on to claim that “many of the most impor­tant foci of the pre­sent international tension—in the M ­ iddle East and the Far East, in Africa and in Latin Amer­i­ca—­are to a considerable degree the outgrowth of colonialist policy. Colonies and other so-­called ‘non-­self-­ governing’ territories are often used as military bases of foreign Powers, as proving grounds for atomic tests.”40 This critique, of course, was predominantly aimed at the United States, which by this time had jettisoned its formal empire but had emerged during the fifteen years since the end of World War II as the foremost exponent of the informal empire of influence. Khrushchev also decried the control the US-­ led “military-­colonialist North Atlantic bloc” exerted over much of the developing world and exhorted the other members of the United Nations to rise up against that control. To that end, Khrushchev issued three “demands”: (1) “complete in­de­pen­dence and freedom” for all remaining trust and non-­trust dependent territories; (2) the elimination of “all strongholds of colonialism in the form of possessions and leased areas in the territories of other States”; and (3) strict “re­spect for the sovereign rights and territorial integrity of all States without exception.” And lest the members of the United Nations refuse to act on the Soviet proposal, Khrushchev closed with the claim that “it is the sacred duty of each State and each Government to promote an early and full implementation of this Declaration,” thereby making the “complete and final elimination of the colonial regime in all its forms and manifestations” an international responsibility.41 US officials tried to undercut Khrushchev’s declaration, depicting the Soviet Union itself as a colonial power. “Inasmuch as ­there ­will be [a] clear majority in [the General Assembly] for any statement condemning colonialism,” Secretary of State Christian Herter advised the US del­e­ga­tion to the United Nations, “[the] best course we can follow is to seek [to] turn [the] declaration

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against [the] Soviets themselves by portraying them in true colonialist colors.” “We should not neglect [any] opportunity” to “condemn Communist colonialism to [the] fullest,” he instructed, “pointing out [that the] Soviet Union is not only [the] largest existing colonial power, but [the] only colonial regime that is still expanding and [that] has never granted in­de­pen­dence or self-­ government to any subject ­people.” In an effort to avoid the appearance of a strictly superpower set-to, US officials ­were determined to enlist other del­e­ ga­tions in the attack on Soviet imperialism. “It [was] impor­tant,” the State Department asserted, to “secure as much support as pos­ si­ ble . . . ​ for [the] proposition that [the] USSR remain[ed a] major colonial power while other former colonial empires have been largely liquidated.” To help this effort along, the department was prepared to supply other UN del­e­ga­tions with materials outlining Soviet domination of the Baltic states, Central Asia, and even Eastern Eu­rope, although consultation with other del­e­ga­tions prompted State Department officials to judge this last area off-­limits.42 As US officials had hoped, General Assembly discussion of the prospect of issuing a declaration on the ending of colonialism, which commenced on 28 November 1960, included numerous criticisms of Soviet colonialism, both implicit and explicit. For example, Colombian representative Antonio Alvarez Restrepo noted that “while po­liti­cal colonialism, for the greater good of humanity, moves rapidly t­owards its close . . . ​another type of colonialism has arisen to take its place”: “the colonialism of souls” that “keeps watch over man’s conscience, suppresses his freedoms and utterly destroys the life of the spirit.” Frank Aiken of Ireland and Turgut Menemencioğlu of Turkey also issued veiled condemnations of Soviet colonialism. The former noted with dismay that although many ­peoples who lacked the “right to enjoy a full mea­sure of in­de­pen­dence” had never had such a right, “­others—­and their fate is not less tragic—­had their in­de­pen­dence and lost it.” Menemencioğlu echoed Aiken’s sentiment, lamenting that despite the “happy trend” of ­peoples attaining “freedom and in­de­pen­dence through evolutionary pro­cesses . . . ​quite a number of tragic cases in the opposite direction have existed in recent years and some continue to exist.” Other states ­were much more direct in condemning the Soviet Union. Honduras’s Francisco Milla Bermúdez declared that “the nation least morally qualified to propose [a declaration on the ending of colonialism was] the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” Guatemala’s Alberto Herrarte expressed much the same sentiment, questioning the legitimacy of the Soviet Union’s introduction of the issue insofar as Moscow “has obdurately opposed any consideration of the case of the nations which have fallen victim to Rus­sian neo-­colonialism.” “In condemning all forms of colonialism,” he professed, the Guatemalan del­e­ga­tion “also condemns all its disguised forms,

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imposed upon countries which once ­were in­de­pen­dent, . . . ​countries in which re­spect for the dignity and freedom of the individual and for ­g reat spiritual values has been suppressed.” Statements such as t­ hese resulted in part from US lobbying b­ ehind the scenes and supported Washington’s desire that Moscow not take control of the anticolonial cause at the United Nations.43 That they all came from states closely tied to the United States demonstrated the limits of the campaign against Soviet colonialism. A second US line of attack focused on countering the Soviet declaration on ending colonialism with an alternative proposal, preferably to be drafted by the Asian and African states (though possibly with Western assistance or input), which condemned both the sort of colonialism the Soviet Union had practiced in the Baltic states and Central Asia and “the more commonly experienced mercantile colonialism which has been primarily of Eu­ro­pean origin.” A balanced declaration against all forms of colonialism, argued John  M. Steeves of the State Department’s Far Eastern Division, had the best chance of securing broad support within the General Assembly, which was certain to vote overwhelmingly for a general anticolonial statement. Such an approach also fit well with the fervent desire of the African and Asian states to prevent the sort of politicization of the colonial issue that characterized the Soviet draft declaration. The Afro-­Asian bloc at the United Nations was anxious to take the lead itself in drafting an anticolonial resolution that avoided outright Cold War divisions and set about this task with enthusiasm and dedication even as Soviet diplomats tried to claim that “this [was] their item.”44 Borrowing heavi­ly from the Bandung final communiqué of 1955, the draft resolution ultimately cosponsored by forty-­three Asian and African states, twenty-­two of which had, in some form, attended the Bandung Conference, was an effort to eliminate explicit Cold War considerations from the issue of declaring an end to colonialism and to focus instead on the broad goal of seeing the fulfillment of the UN Charter’s pledge that all p­ eoples deserved the chance to govern themselves. Condemning “colonialism in all its forms and manifestations,” the draft resolution avoided the shrill tone of the Soviet declaration, made no mention of dismantling foreign bases, and did not call for specific timetables or target dates. Instead, it spoke broadly about self-­ government and in­de­pen­dence as “fundamental ­human rights,” affirmed the right of all ­people to “freely determine their po­liti­cal status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development,” declared that “inadequacy of po­liti­cal, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying in­de­pen­dence,” and directed that “all armed action or repressive mea­sures of all kinds directed against dependent p­ eoples ­shall cease.”45

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The US del­e­ga­tion to the United Nations strongly supported this more balanced approach to the colonial prob­lem and worked ­behind the scenes to shape the language of the draft resolution. Numerous delegates, even many who expressed their appreciation for the Soviet effort to bring the issue of ending colonialism before the General Assembly, nevertheless favored the Afro-­ Asian draft resolution instead. Mohieddine Fekini of Libya, for example, asserted that the draft resolution’s sponsors ­were motivated by the desire “simply to ensure that this question was considered objectively and without reference to m ­ atters irrelevant to its essential purpose,” such as the superpower conflict.46 Tunisia’s Mongi Slim, whose del­e­ga­tion was among the more than two dozen original sponsors of the draft resolution, was even more direct in expressing the widespread dis­plea­sure many of the Asian and African del­e­ga­ tions felt at the prospect that the drive to end colonialism would be subsumed ­under the Cold War, as was the case with Khrushchev’s draft declaration. Slim cautioned, “We do not want to give this debate” or, by extension, “this w ­ hole pro­cess of decolonization, an ideological character, which would link it to the strug­gle at pre­sent ­going on between East and West. . . . ​If this debate took on an east-­west, partisan, ideological character, we should be liable to get off the subject, to introduce emotion and to make the question a propaganda issue.”47 For the co-­sponsors of the draft resolution the ­matter of ending colonialism was much more than mere propaganda; it was a ­matter of “exceptional historical importance,” as Ira­nian representative Mehdi Vakil noted, and General Assembly action on it had to be ­limited “to ­those aspects of the question having an essential and exclusive connexion with the prob­lem of colonialism.” Although US officials viewed the draft resolution’s intent to eradicate “colonialism in all its forms and manifestations” as a victory for their efforts to spur UN action against Soviet colonialism—an explic­itly Cold War goal—­the resolution’s sponsors took a dif­fer­ent view, choosing such broad language specifically to remove Cold War considerations from the m ­ atter of decolonization. Reconciling the two positions proved that the devil is indeed in the detail.48 The submission of two proposals to end colonialism created a minor fracas within the General Assembly. Despite the hopes of the Afro-­Asian bloc that the Soviets would e­ ither withdraw their mea­sure or agree that it could be voted on second, they refused on both scores, thereby earning the opprobrium of the forty-­some sponsors of the draft resolution by insisting that, b­ ecause their proposal had been submitted first, it should be voted on first. Given the significant criticism of the Soviet declaration’s contentious tone voiced during General Assembly debate, its failure to win approval should not have been surprising. For final voting purposes, the declaration was divided into two

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parts, one comprising the long discursive portions containing the harsh, accusatory anti-­Western language, and the second the three “demands” for ending colonialism. Both ­were rejected handily. Reaction to the forty-­three-­power draft resolution was much more positive, and, as its sponsors had hoped, it won General Assembly approval without a dissenting vote. That is not to say that all del­e­ga­tions voted to approve it, however: Nine, including G ­ reat Britain and the United States, abstained.49 The US decision to abstain on the forty-­three-­power resolution reveals much about both the Eisenhower administration’s thinking on international involvement in the non-­self-­governing territories as well as the importance of maintaining good relations with the major Western Eu­ro­pean countries, particularly G ­ reat Britain, and the difficulty of squaring the US relationship with Western Eu­rope with the growing importance of the developing world. The decision to abstain had not been easy for the administration. A ­ fter a ­g reat deal of internal consideration and input from the US mission to the United Nations, the initial inclination was to vote in the affirmative and issue a detailed explanation qualifying US support for each paragraph of the draft resolution. Although no US policymaker believed that the draft resolution was ideal—­ Secretary of State Christian Herter described it as “exceedingly badly worded”—­all agreed that it was preferable to the Soviet declaration, in no small part ­because “it [was] a declaratory resolution and [did] not call upon the respective states to do other than abide by the Charter provisions.” The forty-­ three-­power resolution was also a product of US behind-­the-­scenes lobbying with the Afro-­Asian bloc, the members of which would likely respond unfavorably to a lack of US support when the resolution came to a vote. Fi­nally, the mea­sure was certain to win approval by a huge margin, and Washington’s failure to join with the majority might redound negatively on its overall world position. Despite ­these compelling reasons to support the draft resolution, President Dwight Eisenhower succumbed in the end to direct pressure from British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who dismissed the resolution as having “no connection with real­ity” and issued a plaintive plea that Britain and the United States “stand together.” Reluctant to go against the country’s “strongest ally,” particularly when US officials had themselves noted many shortcomings in the draft resolution, Eisenhower instructed the US mission to abstain.50 In choosing to abstain rather than vote yes, the administration, and above all Eisenhower himself, de­cided that maintaining harmonious relations with key allies, and particularly G ­ reat Britain, was more impor­tant than the symbolic step of supporting an end to colonialism at the United Nations. B ­ ecause the resolution was bound to pass handily even without US backing, the prac-

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tical effect of the vote was nil. But the “audible gasp of surprise followed by [a] diminishing murmur of whispered comments” that erupted ­after US representative James J. Wadsworth cast the abstention made clear the symbolic importance of the US failure to vote yes. Wadsworth warned the State Department straightaway of the likely repercussions of siding with the “colonial powers which even we recognize as such” over the “Asians and Africans.” The “immediate, strong, sometimes emotional, and invariably negative” reaction to the abstention justified his fears, as he reported in comments relayed to Washington. “How could you vote this way?” asked Ghana’s Alex Quaison-­Sackey. “Are you trying to commit po­liti­cal suicide?” wondered Nigeria’s Chukuemeka Okeke Ifeagwu. Turkey’s Menemencioğlu called the vote “unbelievable and incomprehensible.” Adding to the general disbelief was a clear appreciation for the way the vote played into Soviet hands in the General Assembly. Liberia’s T.  O. Dosumu-­Johnson lamented that the United States had “handed [a] propaganda victory to [the] USSR without reason,” while Tunisia’s Zouhir Chelli predicted that the vote would give “ammunition to [the] USSR across the board.”51 Washington’s concern that the abstention would have deleterious effects on the US position abroad was such that the State Department felt compelled to send an instructional circular to all diplomatic and consular posts emphasizing “that our abstention was based on the language and certain concepts of the draft resolution and did not represent any change in our basic position on ­human freedom, or our support for the provisions of the UN Charter relating to the advancement of dependent ­peoples to self-­government or in­de­pen­dence.”52 Although the declaration on ending colonialism was without question the most impor­tant initiative to come out of the Fifteenth General Assembly, that body also took up the Fourth Committee’s recommended resolutions on pro­ gress ­toward self-­government and the princi­ples that should be used to determine ­whether a territory was non-­self-­governing or not. B ­ ecause ­those mea­sures (and indeed, the ­whole of the Fourth Committee’s work) came up for discussion at the very close of the session, ­actual debate was non­ex­is­tent. Instead, members merely voted. The resolution on pro­g ress ­toward self-­ government, which affirmed that “inadequate level[s] of economic, social and educational development . . . ​should never serve as a pretext for deferring [a territory’s] accession to in­de­pen­dence” and “urg[ing] once again” the transmission of “information of a po­liti­cal and constitutional character,” secured approval on a nonrecorded vote of 69 to 0, with 20 abstentions; it became Resolution 1535 (XV), “Pro­g ress Achieved in Non-­Self-­Governing Territories.”53 The princi­ples mea­sure won approval on a roll-­call vote of 69 to 2 (Portugal and South Africa said nay), with 21 abstentions. In joining twenty other states

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in abstaining on what became Resolution 1541 (XV), “Princi­ples Which Should Guide Members in Determining ­Whether or Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for ­under Article 73e of the Charter,” the United States continued the stance it had taken in the Fourth Committee, largely for Cold War reasons. As the State Department explained, “the new nations of Africa and Asia all feel power­f ul sentiment on so-­called colonial questions.” “And [the] US, while not accepting all their premises and arguments, feels it necessary for all metropoles to take that sentiment into account and not to force them to look solely ­toward [the] Soviet bloc for understanding or support.” Not surprisingly, the Portuguese reaction to the US vote was unfavorable: “It [was a] source of ­g reat disappointment to [the Portuguese] government that allies such as [the] US could not support Portugal on this occasion when [the] terms of [the] UN charter itself ­were being distorted and challenged by [the] Afro-­ Asians and the Soviet bloc.” The Portuguese government also made clear that it would not only ignore the resolution calling on it to transmit information on its overseas provinces but also reassess its overall relationship with its NATO allies.54 The years 1959 and 1960 w ­ ere pivotal when it came to UN involvement in the non-­self-­governing territories and w ­ ere marked by significant gains for the anticolonial faction. Changing orga­nizational membership, most prominently the entry of seventeen formerly dependent territories, provided the critical margin needed to overcome the administering states’ ability to manage a blocking third in the Assembly. The Soviet Union, which since 1953 had lacked a seat on the increasingly moribund Committee on Information, took the lead in 1960 in making colonialism a prominent UN m ­ atter—­a development that led the United States and Britain to formulate an aggressive campaign against Soviet colonialism that generated some support from other nations, but not nearly as much as the by-­now widespread campaign against traditional Western colonialism. In this way, the Cold War played an impor­tant role in UN discussions of the non-­self-­governing territories, despite the newly in­de­pen­ dent nations’ avowed indifference to the East-­West conflict. As the approval of Resolution 1514 (XV) made clear, the tide had turned at the United Nations where the appropriate level of international involvement in the decolonization pro­cess was concerned. No longer satisfied with a pro­ cess driven by the administering states according to their own timetables, the nonadministering majority unequivocally declared the elimination of colonialism an international goal. “The pro­cess of liberation [was] irresistible and irreversible,” the resolution proclaimed, as evidenced by “the emergence in recent years of a large number of dependent territories into freedom and in­

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de­pen­dence.” “The increasingly power­ful trends t­ owards freedom in such territories which have not yet attained in­de­pen­dence,” it went on, had to be satisfied by the “speedy and unconditional end [of] colonialism.” Unlike the Charter’s Declaration Regarding Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, which the administering states readily admitted was framed as a statement they made regarding their responsibilities to the territories u ­ nder their control, the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples reflected the position of the non-­self-­governing territories themselves and revealed a sharp shift in the focus of the UN role in the nontrust dependent territories over the course of the organ­ization’s first fifteen years. If the language of anticolonialism as expressed in Resolution 1514 (XV) was clear, however, that mea­sure lacked concrete implementation provisions, and thus opened the door to administering-­state re­sis­tance, as well as to a concerted push at the next General Assembly to rectify that omission with concrete machinery for making the promise of international accountability for all dependent territories a real­ity.55 Meeting the challenge the resolution posed on the US side would be a new presidential administration headed by Demo­crat John F. Kennedy. The Kennedy campaign in 1960 had emphasized activism, energy, and strength, arguing that t­ hose qualities had been in short supply during Dwight D. Eisenhower’s eight years at the helm and suggesting that Vice President Richard M. Nixon would merely bring more of the same. Although US policy at the United Nations did not figure directly into the 1960 campaign, the Kennedy team’s overall disparagement of the Eisenhower years certainly extended to that area and implied a more aggressive and determined posture moving forward.56 What seemed unclear as the new administration planned its transition, however, was how precisely it intended to deal with the post–­Resolution 1514 (XV) environment at the United Nations, where the virtual war on colonialism could spell serious trou­ble for the nation’s most impor­tant allies and open the door to Soviet propaganda gains with the nations of the developing world that ­were increasingly the target of US attention.

C h a p t er  7

Crossing the Rubicon Proponents of Accountability Take Control

Approval of Resolution 1514 (XV) signaled the start of new UN activism t­ oward the nontrust dependent territories as anticolonial ele­ments at the United Nations sought to push the organ­ization t­ oward direct action to eradicate colonialism. Specifically, they worked for the creation of a body that would have powers vis-­à-­vis the Chapter XI territories akin to ­those the Trusteeship Council held. The growing power of the anticolonial bloc at the United Nations, enhanced during 1961 by the admission of former nontrust dependent territories Mauritania, Mongolia, Sierra Leone, and Tanganyika, facilitated the campaign to give Resolution 1514 (XV) teeth. Altogether, the Asian, African, and Latin American states, which ­were mostly anticolonial, numbered seventy in an organ­ization of 104. More than two dozen member-­states had at some time been dependent territories and ­were united in a determination to bring in­de­pen­dent nationhood—­and the power and legitimacy that came through subsequent membership in the United Nations—to t­ hose territories that still lacked it.1 Growing UN involvement to eradicate colonialism occurred concurrently with the creation of the Non-­Aligned Movement (NAM), which held its first conference in Belgrade in September 1961. An outgrowth of the 1955 Bandung Conference, the NAM eschewed the Cold War confrontation and sought instead to address the real prob­lems that faced the developing world, such as rampant poverty, profound economic underdevelopment, and the lack of po­ 16 0



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liti­cal in­de­pen­dence for still dozens of dependent territories. Although the NAM was not directly involved in the work of the United Nations, its call for a world that transcended the East-­West divide and efforts to redress North-­ South inequalities paralleled the sentiments of the Asian-­African draf­ters of Resolution 1514 (XV). So did the movement’s faith in the power and promise of the United Nations to work for global equality. At the same time, Cold War tensions continued to shape the course of UN involvement in the nontrust dependent territories. Soviet-­American clashes in Cuba, Berlin, and elsewhere spilled over into the United Nations and seemed to confirm the NAM’s belief in the larger dangers of the East-­West conflict.2 Electoral politics in the United States also played a role in the way colonial ­matters ­were dealt with in New York. Among the new directions for US foreign policy ­under the administration of John F. Kennedy was a growing emphasis on Africa, both in general terms and in the specific context of the United Nations. In the zero-­sum environment of the Cold War, officials in the new Demo­cratic administration in Washington ­were determined not to lose the newly in­de­pen­dent nations of Africa to the Soviet Union and worked much more diligently than their Republican pre­de­ces­sors to woo ­those states, even if it meant alienating traditional Eu­ro­pean allies in the pro­cess.3 As we w ­ ill see, this approach did not always succeed, particularly given the negative international press generated by Jim Crow segregation. But it did signal a realization that the world was changing in ways that US officials could not always control. Internal British discussions in preparation for the 1961 UN session, which ­were long and difficult, revolved around how to deal with the clear move ­toward greater UN competency when it came to the non-­self-­governing territories. As we have seen, anticolonial ele­ments within both the Committee on Information and the Fourth Committee had sought over the years to erase the distinction between the trust and nontrust dependent territories. ­Little had come of ­these efforts ­until 1960, largely ­because the administering states could muster the all-­important blocking third in the General Assembly to prevent passage of resolutions that would have provided for greater UN authority when it came to the non-­self-­governing territories. The changing composition of the General Assembly as a result of the growth in membership from Africa altered the situation dramatically, as evidenced by the intense debate over what became Resolution 1514 (XV). With colonial questions now entering “the main stream of United Nations affairs,” Britain and the other administering states had to expect, as C. G. Eastwood of the Foreign Office predicted in January 1961, that “­things [would] get more rather than less difficult in the next

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year or two.” Discussion of po­liti­cal conditions in the non-­self-­governing territories of the sort that characterized much of the debate over what became Resolution 1514 (XV) would surely continue. So, most likely, would calls to follow that resolution with some sort of implementation plan, such as the setting of target dates for in­de­pen­dence.4 The challenge for London was formulating an approach to colonial questions that highlighted Britain’s considerable accomplishments in the area of colonial administration and avoided unacceptable UN involvement in the non-­ self-­governing territories, which meant for the most part preventing the establishment of target dates for in­de­pen­dence or resolutions aimed at par­tic­u­lar territories. Should the United Nations move forward and set target dates against British objections, the course was not at all clear, but at least during 1961 British officials explic­itly ruled out the prospect of withdrawing from UN debates on colonial questions or refusing cooperation with the Committee on Information. Britain’s position as a permanent member of the Security Council could “be gravely weakened” by such a move, which would in any event only play into the hands of extreme anticolonial ele­ments, including the Soviet bloc, by enabling them to pass resolutions that Britain would find impossible to accept.5 Renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories served as a touchstone for much of the British government’s discussion of how to approach colonial questions at the Sixteenth General Assembly. Last renewed in 1958, the committee was completing the final year of its current three-­year term in 1961, and while British officials had never been particularly enamored of it, they had come over time to appreciate its generally moderate tone, owing largely to the parity that governed its membership. As had been the case since the committee’s inception, its purview was l­imited to consideration of information on economic, social, and educational conditions in the dependent territories Chapter XI covered. It was not empowered to discuss information on po­liti­cal or constitutional conditions in t­ hose territories, the transmission of which the British correctly noted the Charter did not require. Nor had previous efforts to make transmission of that sort of information mandatory succeeded. Internal British discussions during the early months of 1961, however, revealed a stoic attitude when it came to the likelihood of maintaining this situation, and officials in London ­were resigned to the difficulty—if not the impossibility—of securing renewal of the Committee on Information with the same sort of ­limited terms that had governed its work since 1946. They ­were also agreed that it would be wise to avoid consideration of the committee’s renewal during its 1961 session and instead to take up that question in the Fourth Committee. By holding out the prospect that unfavor-



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able terms would lead to Britain’s withdrawal from the committee, even though as we have seen officials ­were determined to prevent such an eventuality if pos­si­ble, this course would, it was hoped, strengthen Britain’s bargaining power for acceptable terms of reference for the committee, a tactic that had succeeded in the past.6 In an effort to prevent proposals for extreme UN involvement in the non-­ self-­governing territories, British officials agreed to make two significant concessions. Beginning with the upcoming Sixteenth General Assembly, they would abandon their long-­standing refusal to transmit information on po­liti­ cal and constitutional conditions in the non-­self-­governing territories Britain administered and acquiesce to general discussion of po­liti­cal conditions, which had, in fact, already occurred during the Assembly consideration of what became Resolution 1514 (XV). T ­ hese decisions, especially the new willingness to transmit po­liti­cal information, w ­ ere not made lightly and came only a­ fter months of intense discussion. Nor did they signal any fundamental shift in thinking when it came to the responsibilities Britain faced as an administering power, as officials still believed that they w ­ ere on solid l­egal ground in refusing to transmit po­liti­cal information ­because the Charter did not require it. At the same time, however, they well appreciated the growing tenuousness of that posture and the likelihood that the ever-­g rowing anticolonial majority would mandate such transmission, a development that would pose grave dangers for Britain’s overall position in the United Nations. Formal announcement of Britain’s new stance, which Hugh Foot of the British del­e­ga­tion to the United Nations dubbed “Information Yes, Intervention No” and which was to be described as a voluntary move rather than “an act of compliance with the U.N. Charter,” was most likely to come in Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-­ Home’s speech during opening debate of the Sixteenth General Assembly. It was hoped that ­these concessions would demonstrate Britain’s goodwill when it came to colonial questions and exert at least some moderating influence on anticolonial members.7 At the same time, British officials remained consistently focused on the necessity of countering Soviet efforts to use colonialism for Cold War purposes at the United Nations. In the eyes of British and American officials this was certainly the primary—if not the only—­reason for the Soviet proposal that morphed into Resolution 1514 (XV) during the Fifteenth General Assembly. As Patrick Dean of the British del­e­ga­tion to the United Nations made clear in January 1961, “The Rus­sians have clearly de­cided that the remaining colonial territories are among the most fruitful areas in which to fight the Cold War, and that the United Nations provides another excellent battleground for this purpose.” To prevent the Soviets from making propaganda points in the

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upcoming Sixteenth General Assembly, British policymakers w ­ ere determined not only to defend what they saw as their “own liberal colonial rec­ord” but also “to reply to [Soviet] criticism by directly attacking the Soviet Union’s very vulnerable colonialist and ‘satellite’ rec­ord.”8 For its part, the administration of John F. Kennedy was determined from the start to move beyond the public relations fiasco of the US abstention on Resolution 1514 (XV) and demonstrate unequivocal opposition to colonialism, a position that reflected Kennedy’s own commitment to anticolonialism while in the US Senate. In 1959, a year a­ fter the creation of the Bureau of African Affairs within the State Department, Kennedy had become chairman of the African Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He also endorsed African in­de­pen­dence movements during the 1960 campaign, referring to the continent almost five hundred times in vari­ous stump speeches that castigated the Eisenhower administration for “neglect[ing] and ignor[ing] the needs and aspirations of the African p­ eople . . . ​[for] fail[ing] to foresee the growing importance of Africa . . . ​[and for] fail[ing] to ally [the United States] with the cause of in­de­pen­dence and freedom.”9 The administration was also intent on formulating a strong anti-­Soviet message at the United Nations that hit hard on the issue of colonialism by highlighting the differences between the West and East while downplaying the argument that the Soviet Union was imperialist or colonialist. That is, it set out to paint the West as a land of freedom, opportunity, and choice, in contrast to the East, where oppression, despair, and lack of choice ­were the norm. The twelve million ­people who had fled Communist-­controlled areas since World War II and the recent construction of the Berlin Wall gave credence to US claims regarding the repression of Soviet rule. Such realities therefore became part of the new US propaganda effort to deflate Soviet claims of supporting self-­government and in­de­pen­dence for colonial p­ eoples by pointing directly to the oppression inherent in Communist socie­ties in an effort that would become full-­blown once the Sixteenth General Assembly got ­under way.10 The Kennedy administration planned its activist agenda regarding colonialism at the United Nations against changing realities for the organ­ization, which grew to 104 members in 1961 with the admission of Mauritania, Mongolia, Sierra Leone, and Tanganyika and was likely to begin moving beyond the goal of securing in­de­pen­dence for non-­self-­governing territories t­ oward a focus on helping new countries build effective domestic institutions, h ­ uman rights, and similar issues. Officials in Washington ­were of two minds concerning the consequences of ­these changes for the United States. Allan Evans of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research spoke for t­ hose



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who worried that as the United Nations became “a vehicle for the underprivileged and pigmented to get back at the privileged and white,” it would sanction “an era of ‘soaking the rich’ ” that would drive home to the United States and its Western allies “that we whites w ­ ere the distinct minority in the world.” ­Others expressed a more sanguine view, arguing that although the United Nations of 1961 was very dif­fer­ent from the organ­ization the United States had helped to found in 1945, this was not necessarily cause for trepidation. The new administration’s “open world” propaganda effort at the United Nations was expected to demonstrate what the US-­led Western system had to offer the developing world and serve to defuse anti-­US sentiment. By working at the United Nations, the United States could bridge the gap between North and South and ultimately weaken the Soviet position. The trick was to take the lead at the United Nations, something the United States, Kennedy administration officials lamented, had not done often enough in recent years. “The luxury of sitting out ­every second dance,” a Bureau of International Affairs memorandum proclaimed in the fall of 1961, “is not for leaders.”11 If the new administration was determined to pursue a more vigorous posture at the United Nations, w ­ hether specifically with regard to colonial questions or more generally, however, it was not prepared to do so in lockstep with the British government. When it came to the former, Assistant Secretary of State for Eu­ro­pean Affairs Foy Kohler asserted that the US “position should not be de­cided in terms of winning public kudos with ­either our Eu­ro­pean allies or the Afro-­Asian states.” Rather than bidding for the affection of e­ ither side, the United States had to assume “responsible” positions in the United Nations that “command re­spect, regardless of the degree of their popu­lar appeal.” To be sure, US officials reacted positively to the British intention to transmit po­liti­cal information on their non-­self-­governing territories, which they believed “would do something ­toward mollifying the non-­Administering Authorities, though far from satisfying them.” Yet they doubted that such a move would be sufficient to quell anticolonial sentiment, and, in an effort to reverse the damage to “US influence and prestige” the British-­instigated abstention on Resolution 1514 (XV) had caused, the US mission to the United Nations advised Washington to at least consider support for the princi­ple of setting target dates, which was expected to be a touchstone of the debates at the Sixteenth General Assembly. Standing firm with the British in opposition to target dates would not prevent their implementation, but some modicum of support could ensure that any resolution dealing with them was reasonable and one with which the British and Americans could themselves comply. In short, as the opening of the Assembly approached, US officials ­were hopeful

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that they could somehow convince their British counter­parts to see the wisdom of a moderate and thoughtful approach rather than a hostile and negative one.12 The series of short, primarily expository discussions between British and American officials during the first half of 1961 that replaced the longer, dedicated discussion of colonial issues that had been the norm for previous administrations revealed the limits of the new administration’s persuasive power and resulted in what US ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson called “a dialogue with the deaf.”13 British officials not only spelled out their opposition to target dates but also explained why that issue was such a flash point for them. “As a territory advances step by step t­ owards in­de­pen­dence,” Sir Andrew Cohen of the United Kingdom del­e­ga­tion to the United Nations explained, “the power of the United Kingdom to influence developments is progressively reduced. It is therefore very impor­tant,” he went on, “that we should retain such means as we have to influence events; by far the most impor­tant means is the power of fixing a date for in­de­pen­dence.” Allowing the United Nations to interfere precipitately in Britain’s relations with non-­ self-­governing territories on the brink of in­de­pen­dence would compromise its authority and jeopardize the chances of post-­independence stability. Notwithstanding their e­ arlier hopes that they could sway the British on the ­matter of target dates, US officials w ­ ere ultimately forced to admit defeat on that m ­ atter and to face the start of the new UN session without Anglo-­American accord. As the State Department’s Harlan Cleveland made clear, however, American officials ­were determined “to repair the damage they considered that they had inflicted on themselves by their vote on the recent declaration on colonialism,” which had resulted in a “growing estrangement from the Afro-­Asian group, and [a] loss of influence among it.” As the new administration formulated its approach to colonial questions at the United Nations, it was “most concerned to reshape the image the United States presented to t­hose nations,” even if that meant disagreeing with G ­ reat Britain. Restoring US “prestige and power” by supporting “reasonable target dates for self-­determination” was a far better course than “blind subservience to [Britain’s] w ­ ill.”14 The only ele­ment of the 1961 session of the Committee on Information (expanded to include Portugal and Spain as administering states with nonadministering members Argentina, Ceylon, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, India, Iraq, Liberia, and Mexico) that dealt with the broad question of UN authority in the nontrust dependent territories was discussion of the committee’s own renewal.15 In a break with past practice, the committee neither considered nor introduced a resolution on the subject, and individual del­e­ga­tions instead merely expressed their views. Predictably, the administering states argued for



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renewal for another three-­year term with the same terms of reference. John C. Pool of the US del­e­ga­tion maintained that “despite the unspectacular nature of its activities,” the committee “had afforded an opportunity for useful exchanges of views and constructive, frank and disinterested criticism” of the administering states in developing “better policies, which had made for greater pro­g ress in the Territories concerned.” As it had done in the past, the British del­e­ga­tion emphasized the lack of a Charter mandate for the committee, reminded committee members that its participation had been governed by certain previously articulated conditions, and raised the specter of ceasing to participate if ­those conditions ­were breached.16 ­Those nonadministering states that expressed opinions on the committee’s renewal couched their remarks in the context of Resolution 1514 (XV), insisting, as Argentina’s Enrique Jorge Ros put it, that the committee “should remain in being as long as the vestiges of the colonial past continued to exist in the international community.” Ros maintained that it should also be granted expanded terms of reference that would “make it pos­si­ble for the Committee to exercise, in re­spect of the Non-­ Self-­Governing Territories, functions similar to ­those of the Trusteeship Council in re­spect to the Territories with which it was concerned,” which was another way of saying international accountability for dependent territories.17 It was no won­der, then, that British ambassador to the United Nations Sir Hugh Foot ­later lamented about the likely terms of the committee’s renewal, “I only wish the Committee with its existing terms of reference had not been ­limited to a three year period!”18 Given their determination to prevent UN consideration of decolonization questions from spiraling out of control, as they believed had happened during debate over the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples, US officials worked between the conclusion of the Committee on Information’s 1961 session and the opening of the Sixteenth General Assembly itself to develop a more activist strategy. “The United States [was] still the number one power in the United Nations when it want[ed] to be,” the Department of State’s Bureau of International Organ­ization Affairs advised President Kennedy in July, but “too often in recent years, it [had not] wanted to be enough to be fully effective.” That had to change on all manner of issues, the bureau maintained, and it offered a variety of recommendations. When it came to colonial questions, one called for Washington to use its still considerable influence at the United Nations “to mobilize the moderate ele­ ments in the Assembly . . . ​to deflect the initiatives of the Soviet bloc and other extremists.” Another was “to dramatize in speeches . . . ​the advantages of [an] open society versus [a] closed society,” a recommendation that went to the heart of the new “­free world community” propaganda theme officials had

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developed ­earlier.19 State Department officials also now well recognized the importance of using the United Nations as a “po­liti­cal propaganda forum,” provided that propaganda was “sophisticated,” something administration figures seemed to believe had not always been the case in the past.20 In early September, as US officials w ­ ere wrapping up their planning for the Sixteenth General Assembly, representatives of more than two dozen states gathered in Belgrade, Yugo­slavia, and officially created the Non-­Aligned Movement (NAM).21 Unlike the 1955 meeting at Bandung, which had brought together states on a regional basis and thus included some that had overtly taken sides in the Cold War conflict, the gathering at Belgrade included only true neutrals that had eschewed outright identification with e­ ither of the Cold War superpowers; fifteen of the Bandung states ­were pre­sent in Belgrade.22 India’s Nehru, Indonesia’s Sukarno, and Egypt’s Nasser reprised the leading roles they had played at Bandung; they ­were joined by Yugo­slavia’s Josip Broz Tito, who served as host. Given the tense state of world affairs at the time—as Robert Rakove notes, “Khrushchev, on the eve of the conference, broke a three-­year atomic test moratorium, exploding a massive nuclear device at the Semipalatinsk test range, in present-­day Kazakhstan”—it was not surprising that nuclear fears ­were high on the conference agenda. Indeed, one of the meeting’s most notable outcomes was a direct message to President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev calling for the resumption of superpower disarmament discussions.23 The attendees also sketched a broadly anticolonial platform that affirmed the right of self-­government, mutual re­spect for differences in po­liti­ cal and economic systems, and national self-­determination.24 As at Bandung, the conferees at Belgrade issued a final declaration at the conclusion of their work, but rather than constituting it as a mere statement of princi­ples, they cast it as “A Program of Action for the United Nations General Assembly,” thereby revealing their faith in that organ­ization’s singular ability to “lay a firm foundation of cooperation and brotherhood between nations” that was built on “freedom, equality and social justice for the promotion of prosperity.” In a nutshell, the “Program of Action” affirmed the right of self-­determination, called for an end to colonialism, and advocated economic equality among nations. In keeping with the Cold War focus of the conference itself, the “Program of Action” devoted much attention to the current state of global tensions and implored the superpowers to adopt a “constructive approach” to resolving their differences, including the negotiation of “a general, complete and strictly and internationally controlled disarmament.” Rejecting the view that “war, including the ‘cold war,’ [was] inevitable,” the attendees touted nonalignment as “the only pos­si­ble and indispensable alter-



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native to the total division of the world into blocs and the intensification of cold war policies” that ­were “likely to result in world conflagration.”25 Far from simply endorsing ­these princi­ples in the abstract, however, the attendees included specific references to con­temporary conflicts that embodied what they believed was wrong with the world—­setting themselves in opposition to the United States and its Western allies in the pro­cess. The conferees, for example, unequivocally supported the wars of national liberation then ­under way in Vietnam, Algeria, and Angola, wars backed implicitly if not explic­itly by the Soviet Union and opposed implicitly if not explic­itly by the United States. Endorsement of ­these conflicts gave US officials reason to be concerned that the NAM seemed to lean in ­favor of the Soviet Union. The Belgrade Conference’s opposition to explic­itly Cold War–­oriented or originated entanglements was also directed more against the United States than the Soviet Union. By 1961, the United States was a member of or had played a major role in creating a number of anti-­Soviet military alliances, most prominently the North Atlantic Treaty Organ­ ization (NATO), the Southeast Treaty Organ­ization (SEATO), and the Central Treaty Organ­ization (CENTO). Some members of ­those alliances, specifically Iran, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Turkey, had attended the Bandung Conference but ­were not invited to Belgrade. Neither ­were Japan, a close US ally, or the Republic of Vietnam, a US client, nor w ­ ere the Communist states of the ­People’s Republic of China or the Demo­cratic Republic of Vietnam. Given the avowedly anti-­US tilt of the NAM’s basic princi­ple, Washington’s skepticism was understandable.26 With the Belgrade Conference as a backdrop, the Sixteenth General Assembly opened on 19 September, with the plenary session occurring concurrently with meetings of UN standing committees. As a result, the work of the Fourth Committee occurred a­ fter Foreign Secretary Lord Home’s announcement to the General Assembly on 27 September that the British w ­ ere “now ready to provide full information to the United Nations on the po­liti­cal and constitutional steps [they w ­ ere] taking in the territories which remain[ed] u ­ nder British administration.” As we have seen, this was a concession the British had agreed to ­earlier in the year, and one that they hoped would forestall moves ­toward more extensive UN involvement in the nontrust dependent territories, such as the setting of blanket target dates for in­de­pen­dence and extending to the Committee on Information such functions presently reserved only for the Trusteeship Council as hearing petitioners and sending missions to individual non-­self-­governing territories. It was also designed, as British ambassador to the United Nations Sir Hugh Foot had explained to US officials in early

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September, “to show that [Britain was] not in the class with Portugal and the Union of South Africa with re­spect to colonial questions.” Although the foreign secretary described Britain’s new willingness to transmit po­liti­cal information to the General Assembly as being “of the first importance,” at the same time he cautioned that it did not mean that Britain was prepared to “share” or “shift” its colonial responsibilities. More than mere rhe­toric on Lord Home’s part, this was an impor­tant point that got to the heart of British thinking regarding the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories: while interest in conditions in the non-­self-­governing territories, now extended even to po­liti­cal conditions, was acceptable, involvement in t­hose territories was not to be tolerated.27 A major Soviet initiative in the General Assembly to implement the Declaration on Colonialism, Moscow’s second such move on behalf of the non-­ self-­governing territories in as many years, overshadowed London’s new willingness to transmit po­liti­cal information on the territories it administered.28 The Soviets made their case in a long memorandum to the president of the General Assembly, which moved through the vari­ous ele­ments of Resolution 1514 (XV) that had been ignored, such as halting all vio­lence in suppression of colonial in­de­pen­dence movements, ceasing racial discrimination, and taking immediate steps to transfer power to indigenous ­peoples. (Many of t­ hese same complaints ­were included in the Belgrade Conference’s “Program of Action.”) Given the wars of national liberation then ­under way in Africa and Southeast Asia, apartheid in South Africa and other state-­sanctioned racial discrimination, and foot dragging on w ­ holesale decolonization, the Soviets w ­ ere not necessarily wrong, and had the memorandum ended ­there, it likely would have generated considerable support. It did not, however, and the bulk of it followed the course set in the Soviet colonialism declaration from the previous session by vilifying the United States as “the main bulwark of present-­day colonialism,” “the chief gendarme and oppressor of the colonial p­ eoples,” and “an accomplice in all the bloody atrocities perpetrated by the other colonial Powers in their colonies.”29 The Soviet memorandum insisted that the United States and its colonialist allies would never comply with Resolution 1514 (XV) and called for a sweeping overhaul of the UN approach to decolonization that went beyond “mere statement[s]” to include a proclamation that all colonialism be liquidated in the year 1962, sanctions against states that refused to cease aggression against colonial in­de­pen­dence movements, and the immediate dismantling of all foreign military bases in colonial territories. To ensure that ­these mea­sures ­were implemented, the Soviet memorandum proposed the creation of a commission with equal repre­sen­ta­tion from “all three main groups of States—­the socialist States, the countries that are members of the



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Western military blocs, and the neutralist States,” a breakdown that mirrored the USSR’s ­earlier failed troika proposal for three UN Secretaries General.30 To ­counter Soviet charges against the West and generally defuse Moscow’s attempt to shape debate over colonial ­matters, US officials worked on a variety of fronts, although largely without success. As had been the case with what became Resolution 1514 (XV), direct lobbying paid off in a host of speeches in the General Assembly critical of Soviet efforts to intertwine decolonization and the Cold War, a move that would likely subsume the former u ­ nder the latter, thereby negating the UN Charter’s intonation for “the paramountcy of the interests and the well-­being of the inhabitants of the dependent territories” and, as Nigeria’s Jaja Wachuku warned, “dragg[ing Africa] into the cold war.” For states across Africa, Asia, and Latin Amer­ic­ a that spoke in this vein, the most impor­tant issue to be considered in the decolonization debate was the plight of the non-­self-­governing ­peoples, not the Cold War propaganda ­battle.31 Other del­e­ga­tions turned the ­tables and made a direct case against Soviet imperialism, endorsing the princi­ples contained in the Universal Declaration of H ­ uman Rights in the pro­cess.32 Nationalist China’s Chieh Liu, for example, claimed that Soviet “overland expansion” had “forcibly annexed, exploited, enslaved and sometimes annihilated” the “non-­Russian populations,” yet lamentably such actions barely entered into UN discussions of colonialism. “While the colonialism of the Western Powers is being rapidly brought to an end,” he declared, “it is being replaced by a new form of colonialism more embracing in scope and more brutal in its methods.” Britain’s Joseph Godber made a similar point, noting that “the Soviet Empire” was, “of all the g­ reat empires which existed in the nineteenth c­ entury, [the] only one [to have] actually expanded as a result of recent territorial aggression.” And Livio Theodoli of Italy mocked the delegates from the Communist countries for having the “audacity . . . ​[to] pos[e] . . . ​as champions of liberty, democracy, justice and pro­g ress,” when in real­ity they represented nations where “­there [was] no freedom of speech, no freedom of the press, no freedom even to travel.” Once again, such statements w ­ ere generally l­ imited to close US allies, thereby making clear the lack of widespread support for the campaign against Soviet colonialism.33 As in the past, US officials also continued to work ­behind the scenes to influence the shape of an emerging counterproposal to the Soviet draft that the African and Asian contingent at the United Nations was preparing. This time they relied on a trio of key “moderates” within that contingent—­the del­e­ga­ tions from India, Iran, and Japan, which constituted “a united front against [the] more extreme views of ­others.” Maintaining close contact with the US government, ­those del­e­ga­tions ensured that the final Asian-­African draft

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resolution on the implementation of Resolution 1514 (XV) did not contain ele­ments that would have made administering state compliance impossible, such as e­ ither individual or blanket target dates for in­de­pen­dence, explicit provision for sending missions to or hearing petitioners from the non-­self-­ governing territories, or the right to make recommendations on individual territories. They also helped to advance key concepts that ­were essential to policymakers in Washington, most notably the importance of avoiding direct reference to UN competence to intervene in the non-­self-­governing territories, a contested point that would have prompted the opposition not only of the United States but also of “many other del[egation]s from Latin Amer­i­ca and Eu­rope and some from Asia.” Thus, when the Asian-­African group presented its own draft resolution on implementing Resolution 1514 (XV) on 20 November, it was designed to elicit the cooperation of the major administering states rather than alienate them, as the Soviet proposals ­were destined to do.34 Five days a­ fter the introduction of the relatively moderate Asian-­African-­ bloc resolution, the US government completed its planned activist approach to colonial questions by transmitting a long written message to the president of the General Assembly, a tactic that David Kay has attributed to a desire not to interject Cold War hostility into the General Assembly debate.35 Rather than refuting the litany of specific allegations against the United States and its Western Eu­ro­pean allies that the Soviet and other Communist del­e­ga­tions had raised throughout the plenary session debate, the message instead briefly reaffirmed the long-­standing US opposition to colonialism, “wherever and whenever it occurs,” and launched a multifaceted anti-­Soviet assault. Perhaps more importantly, the memorandum sought to induce a more robust UN interest in “the Soviet colonial system,” “the largest colonial empire which has ever existed in all history,” “the only imperial system which is not liquidating itself, as other empires have done,” and “the only modern empire in which no subject p­ eople has ever been offered any choice concerning their f­uture and their destiny.” “­Because the world cannot long remain half-­slave and half-­ free,” the memorandum asserted, “the United States expect[ed] that the United Nations [would] focus its attention as carefully on the ‘colonialism’ of the Soviet Union as it [did] on that of  . . . ​any other nation.” With this document, which reflected the Kennedy administration’s ­free world/slave world dichotomy and made manifest its continuing—­yet generally unfounded—­ belief that the world was as troubled by Soviet conduct as it was by Western Eu­ro­pean colonialism, the United States called on the United Nations to expand its interest in the plight of non-­self-­governing ­peoples to include the millions who had fallen ­behind the Iron Curtain.36



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Soviet-­bloc rebuttals of the US memorandum, delivered in writing to the president of the General Assembly rather than during plenary debate, ­were biting. The brief statements of Poland and Romania condemned the “unscrupulous” and “worn-­out anti-­Soviet and anti-­communist slanders” the Americans had launched “for the purpose of diverting the attention of the General Assembly from one of the most impor­tant questions facing the United Nations ­today—­the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of in­de­pen­ dence to colonial countries and p­ eoples.”37 For its part, the Soviet Union roundly rejected the “flagrant fabrications and slander” contained in the US memorandum, asserting that “anyone who [was] at all familiar with the history and policy of the Soviet State” would understand their absurdity. Moscow also assailed Washington’s call for the United Nations to take an interest in what Soviet officials called the “relations of friendship, co-­operation and mutual assistance . . . ​between the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries,” which ­were domestic Soviet ­matters not open to UN scrutiny. US annoyance with the relations between Moscow and the other socialist states did not justify interference in t­ hose relations, the Soviet del­e­ga­tion asserted, any more than Soviet outrage at “the racial discrimination practised against the Negro population in the United States” allowed for Soviet interference in that instance.38 In making explicit reference to US racial conditions, the Soviet memorandum homed in on what was by late 1961 a significant international prob­lem for the United States, particularly when it came to the opinions of new countries in Africa and other parts of the developing world. As a growing host of scholars has pointed out, the ever-­more-­vigorous civil rights movement—­and the vio­lence it generated—­tarnished the US image overseas. Incidents such as the Montgomery bus boycott, the L ­ ittle Rock crisis, and the early sit-­ins had marked the l­ater years of the Eisenhower administration. Just a few months before the United Nations took up discussion of the Soviet call to implement Resolution 1514 (XV), the Kennedy administration had been forced to offer federal protection to Freedom Riders seeking to end segregation in interstate bus transportation, a move the international press actively covered. When such unfavorable publicity was coupled with the personal discrimination some African diplomats experienced when in the United States, the result was a public relations prob­lem of the highest order. Kennedy administration officials already feared that the United Nations would in time shift its gaze from decolonization itself to the conditions faced by racial minorities around the globe. Such a move was fraught with danger for the United States, which could u ­ nder no circumstances allow US race relations to be placed u ­ nder international scrutiny. Given the need to guard against global condemnation of the gap

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between US words and deeds on the m ­ atter of equality of opportunity, the campaign against Soviet colonialism was at least in part motivated by a desire to shift the focus of world opinion away from US shortcomings and t­oward ­those of the Soviet Union.39 In contrast to the vituperative nature of the General Assembly debate on the implementation of Resolution 1514 (XV), the ­actual voting on the proposed resolutions was anticlimactic. ­Under pressure from other del­e­ga­tions, the Soviet Union withdrew its resolution without a vote, escaping the invective of the previous session. The Soviet retreat cleared the way for approval of the more moderate resolution put forth by thirty-­eight African and Asian governments, thirty-­two of which had also been among the sponsors of Resolution 1514 (XV). Whereas the Soviet proposal was framed as a harsh prescriptive ­toward the administering states, the Asian-­African draft resolution was mild and almost totally lacking in specifics. Rather than a target date for full implementation of the colonialism declaration, it merely called on the administering states to act “without further delay.” It also eschewed the confrontational and accusatory tone of the Soviet draft resolution in ­favor of universal goals. Fi­nally, although it echoed the Soviet proposal for a new committee to monitor implementation of the colonialism declaration, it avoided the potentially divisive Soviet formula for membership by saying only that members would be “nominated by the President of the General Assembly.” Although the new committee was permitted “to meet outside the Headquarters of the United Nations whenever and wherever” necessary, it was not specifically authorized to make site visits to the non-­self-­governing territories. Nor was it empowered to hear petitioners or make recommendations about specific territories. Approval of the mea­sure, which became Resolution 1654 (XVI), was never in doubt, and it passed on a vote of 97 to 0, with France, South Africa, Spain, and the United Kingdom abstaining; Portugal was pre­sent but did not vote. By voting with the majority, the United States avoided the ignominy it had experienced a­ fter its abstention on what became Resolution 1514 (XV). It failed, however, to push the General Assembly ­toward the sort of assault on Soviet colonialism proposed in its November memorandum.40 The composition of the seventeen-­member committee Resolution 1654 (XVI) established to oversee implementation of the colonialism declaration was a potential fly in the ointment for British and American policymakers. The administering states ­were not likely to have more than a handful of the committee’s seats and certainly nothing approaching the full membership they enjoyed on the Committee on Information. The absence of specific guidelines for the committee’s membership gave General Assembly President Mongi Slim of Tunisia complete latitude, and although he solicited suggestions for



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both membership formulas and ­actual members from a broad cross-­section of UN del­e­ga­tions, British ambassador to the United Nations Sir Patrick Dean noted that Slim was likely u ­ nder “pressure [from] the extremists and the Rus­ sians” to select a slate that was “pleasing to his [anticolonial] friends” rather “than . . . ​stand on princi­ple” and propose the sort of “balanced” and “reasonable” repre­sen­ta­tion the British government sought. Francis P. Plimpton of the US del­e­ga­tion to the United Nations also worried that the committee would be a “stacked deck” against the administering states, indicating the importance that both London and Washington placed on the new committee’s composition.41 In the meantime, the Fourth Committee deliberations on colonial questions, which had taken a backseat to the plenary debate, revealed substantial support for the more activist UN role in the nontrust dependent territories that Resolution 1654 (XVI) embodied. Many del­e­ga­tions lamented the slow pro­ gress ­toward achieving in­de­pen­dence for ­those territories during the committee’s discussions. Iran’s Parviz Mahdavi, for example, expressed regret that “advancement [in the non-­self-­governing territories] had not kept pace with events” and urged “the United Nations [to] do its utmost to accelerate the attainment of self-­government by the colonial ­peoples.” Marof Achkar of Guinea made much the same point when he exclaimed that “nothing could justify the slightest delay in the application of the decolonization mea­sures provided for in General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV).”42 ­Others questioned the accuracy of the information the administering states had transmitted and suggested that UN missions to or the hearing of petitioners from the non-­self-­ governing territories w ­ ere in order to ensure that the United Nations was receiving a true and complete picture of conditions t­ here. “The facts and figures reported could easily be manipulated,” Ghana’s H. K. Yomekpe noted, “to give a very wrong impression of the pro­gress achieved in Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” and first-­hand information was therefore essential.43 ­Because of the concurrent timing of the Fourth Committee’s 1961 session and the Sixteenth General Assembly, the specific subject of the renewal of the Committee on Information was discussed in the former only ­after the latter had approved Resolution 1654 (XVI). That mea­sure requested vari­ous UN bodies, including the Committee on Information, to assist the new seventeen-­ member special committee in its work, a call that seemed to assume the committee’s continued existence, even if such a move had not yet won General Assembly approval. Najmuddine Rifai (Syria) made this point forcefully, claiming that mentioning the Committee on Information in Resolution 1654 (XVI) “constituted a decision, by implication, to continue [it].”44 And indeed, most del­e­ga­tions supported the committee’s renewal, noting the “valuable ser­vices”

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it had performed in the past as well as the impor­tant support role it could play for the special committee.45 Yet ­after General Assembly approval of Resolution 1654 (XVI), ­there was no question about which was the more prestigious body. J. N. Khosla’s statement of India’s rationale for renewal was typical: “In view of the impor­tant role which the Special Committee of seventeen members would be called upon to play, it seemed advisable not to make its work more difficult by assigning to it a ­whole series of routine ­matters which the Committee on Information was used to and handled very well.” In other words, while the special committee would be engaged in the impor­tant work of implementing the declaration on ending colonialism, the Committee on Information would toil in the shadows at “routine” tasks such as conducting studies and writing reports.46 Khosla’s imputation that the new special committee would henceforth play the main UN role in decolonization was certainly prescient—­, a fact that robbed the 1961 debate over the Committee on Information’s renewal of most of the bite that had characterized previous discussions. As had been the case during the Fourth Committee’s early debates, the Committee on Information’s balanced membership drew the ire of several del­e­ga­tions.47 Aside from Soviet delegate V. I. Oberemko’s declaration that the committee “had ceased to serve any purpose and should consequently be dissolved,” however, t­ here was no groundswell for its termination.48 Consequently, the Fourth Committee without much fanfare approved a draft resolution renewing the Committee on Information “on the same basis as hitherto” with two primary exceptions: it would remain in operation “­until such time as the General Assembly has de­cided that the princi­ples embodied in Chapter XI of the Charter and the Declaration on the granting of in­de­pen­dence to colonial countries and ­peoples have been fully implemented” and it would henceforth be empowered to consider po­liti­cal and constitutional information. A curious sixteen-­member combination of Western Eu­ro­pean administering states and the Communist bloc abstained, while sixty states, including the United States, voted yes.49 The General Assembly considered the work of the Fourth Committee in a hurried meeting u ­ nder Rule 68 of the Rules and Procedures, which meant no substantive discussion, merely a pre­sen­ta­tion of recommended resolutions, voting, and explanations of votes if desired. By a roll-­call vote of 77 to 0, with 16 abstentions (virtually the same group that had abstained at the Fourth Committee), it approved the Fourth Committee’s recommended mea­sure on the Committee on Information’s renewal, thereby ensuring that that body would remain active ­until the General Assembly dissolved it. (Ec­ua­dor, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Upper Volta ­were subsequently elected to join returning members Argentina, Ceylon, Liberia, and Mexico.) Renewal of the Commit-



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tee on Information, accomplished by what officially became Resolution 1700 (XVI), was decidedly a secondary move, however, as the real focus of UN efforts on behalf of decolonization g­ oing forward would come in the new seventeen-­member committee Resolution 1654 (XVI) created.50 Resolution 1654 (XVI) provided the mechanism for turning the promise of Resolution 1514 (XV) into real­ity By laying the groundwork for real UN involvement in the nontrust dependent territories through the creation of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples, it indicated clearly that the tide was turning away from the sort of national control over dependent territories that had been enshrined in the Western-­ drafted UN Charter ­toward a more universalist and globalist conception. The road to the creation of the Special Committee had been long and difficult, marked by harsh rhe­toric on all sides, procedural maneuvering on the part of the administering states, and ultimately t­ hose states’ admission that they could no longer resist international responsibility for the nontrust dependent territories. Although a variety of ­factors prevented the Special Committee from leading immediately to the sorts of gains its supporters had expected, it was undeniably a symbol of the dawn of a new era in international relations, which gave the voices of the developing world a place at the United Nations that far outstripped the expectations of the Western draf­ters of the Charter. Hence, they had no choice but to watch as the organ­ization they had created for their own purposes became instead an instrument of change that challenged what they saw as their national interests.

C h a p t er  8

Activism Triumphant Achieving International Accountability for All Dependent Territories

By the conclusion of the Eigh­teenth General Assembly, the campaign for international accountability for dependent territories was complete. The Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­ eoples had grown to twenty-­four members and was pursuing an activist agenda that signaled the dawn of a new era when it came to the UN role in the Chapter XI territories. This was so b­ ecause the rise of what came to be called the “Committee of Twenty-­Four” meant the demise of the Committee on Information. If the administering states w ­ ere not sad to see the committee abolished, they did appreciate—­perhaps a tad too late—­ what its balanced membership and l­ imited terms of reference had meant over the years. The culmination of the drive for international accountability occurred within several large global contexts. One was the continuing Cold War, which heated up considerably in 1962 and 1963 over such issues as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the deepening US commitment to the non-­Communist government of South Vietnam. Superpower tensions extended to the United Nations, where harsh rhe­toric remained the norm in Soviet-­American interactions, including discussion of ­matters related to the Chapter XI territories. Conflict was even more evident as the Soviets attempted to consolidate their position as champions of the anticolonial cause against both US efforts to woo 17 8

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newly in­de­pen­dent nations to the Western camp in the Cold War and mounting activism from the ­People’s Republic of China in supporting anticolonial movements.1 As this suggests, the consequences of decolonization w ­ ere also impor­tant. Nine nations joined the United Nations during 1962 and 1963, all of them previously dependent states of some sort—­Burundi, Rwanda, and Zanzibar had been trust territories; Algeria, Jamaica, K ­ enya, Kuwait, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda had been Chapter XI territories. Along with the dozens of other new nations that gained in­de­pen­dence ­after 1957, they not only altered the course of the United Nations by making North-­South issues, such as the idea of international accountability for dependent territories, more prominent but also highlighted the growing desire of the developing world to break ­free from the bipolar paradigm through the nascent Non-­Aligned Movement.2 The vio­lence that often accompanied so-­called wars for national liberation in Africa and Southeast Asia also played a role. Although ­those protracted conflicts do not figure directly into the final act of the strug­gle for international accountability for dependent territories, they constitute an additional layer of the larger overall story of decolonization of which that strug­gle was a part. The same was true of the growing re­sis­tance to state-­ sanctioned racial discrimination of the sort that characterized South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique and stepped up efforts to achieve Pan-­African solidarity. Approval of Resolution 1654 (XVI) and creation of the Committee of Seventeen convinced British officials that preventing UN involvement in the Chapter XI territories would be difficult, if not impossible. Government experts deemed the l­egal basis for Britain’s long-­standing opposition to UN intervention, based on the strict letter of the Charter, “respectable” but “untenable.” Indeed, as the Colonial Office’s T. C. Jerrom admitted in April 1962, “What­ ever front we may put on publicly we must ourselves accept the position that in world po­liti­cal terms colonial prob­lems are an international free-­for-­all and that Article 2(7) [concerning domestic jurisdiction] has gone for a burton.”3 As internal discussions in the early months of the year made clear, however, British policymakers ­were not of one mind when it came to formulating an approach to anticipated UN intervention in the nation’s non-­self-­governing territories. One policy option, as in the past centered in the Colonial Office, was some level of disengagement, ­whether in the form of full withdrawal from the United Nations or noncooperation when it came to initiatives related to decolonization. “If we are ­going to reject their right to make . . . ​ recommendations” about the non-­self-­governing territories Britain administered, Colonial Secretary Reginald Maulding argued, “I ­don’t see how we can

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consistently take part in debates designed to produce such recommendations.”4 Officials in the Foreign Office, whose portfolio encompassed the w ­ hole of British foreign policy, disagreed. A far wiser course, they argued, was to stick it out in the United Nations, “playing a positive and constructive part in the Organ­ization” and “explain[ing British] policies on all questions patiently and reasonably.” As Foreign Secretary Lord Home astutely noted in March, the United Nations would “discuss [British] territories and hear petitioners from them ­whether [the British] like[d] it or not. The prob­lem therefore [was] not how to stop [it], which [they could not], but how [they could] keep it as harmless as pos­si­ble.”5 As was the case elsewhere, the generally more realistic Foreign Office position, and particularly the views of head of the British del­e­ga­tion to the United Nations, Sir Hugh Foot, prevailed. Given the unlikelihood of keeping the Committee of Seventeen occupied with some sort of busy work, discussion of individual territories was certain. And when such discussion occurred, Foot recommended that the British del­e­ga­tion participate fully, “lest [the nation’s] good case go by default.”6 In addition to their ongoing campaign of positive propaganda about the British colonial rec­ord, officials also considered how they might once again highlight the hy­poc­risy of the Soviet Union’s anticolonial posturing. Internal discussions suggested a wide anti-­Soviet propaganda net that included the Eastern Eu­ro­pean satellites and the Baltic states as well as Central Asia. To make the most of what­ever propaganda opportunities presented themselves, British officials compiled a forty-­one-­page exposé titled “Soviet Imperialism” and agreed to make it available to any del­e­ga­tion that requested it.7 US planning for the Seventeenth General Assembly included consideration of the place of the United Nations within the nation’s overall foreign policy and revealed agreement that it was still pos­si­ble to minimize the damage Soviet interest in anticolonialism had caused. As representative to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson reminded the National Security Council in June, Soviet “diplomatic maneuvering” at the United Nations was “rigid and often clumsy,” and while the United States could normally agree with the UN majority, the Soviet Union could not. On the specific issue of colonialism, Stevenson dismissed “the impression that the Afro-­Asians lean[ed] t­ oward the USSR.” If their votes corresponded with ­those of the Soviet bloc on colonial issues, that was ­because the Soviets w ­ ere supporting them, not vice versa. Stevenson also emphasized the importance of remembering what the United Nations was, and was not. “It [was] not a world government,” “ha[d] only recommendatory powers,” and could not “impose any settlement on ­either the g­ reat or small powers against their ­will.” It could, however, “on occasion, exercise a potent persuasive force” and constitute “a place to ‘blow off steam.’ ” ­These ­were pre-

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cisely the functions it performed on colonial questions, and Stevenson recommended that the best course forward was recognition of the impor­tant positive role the United Nations could play in facilitating decolonization and working ­toward a rapid completion of the pro­cess, so that relations between Eu­rope and Asia and Africa, poisoned by colonialism, could be improved.8 Had it not been for the Committee on Information’s consideration of po­ liti­cal information for the very first time, the newly created Committee of Seventeen might have completely overshadowed it. ­Because most of the other administering states had been transmitting po­liti­cal information for some time, the committee’s real interest was in the information the United Kingdom had provided on the forty-­two territories still ­under its administration. Not unexpectedly, ­there w ­ ere complaints about the extent of that information. Liberia’s Nathaniel Eastman lamented the absence of target dates for in­de­pen­dence. Pakistan’s I. A. Akhund noted the difficulty of determining the extent of indigenous repre­sen­ta­tion on local administrative and judicial bodies. And Luis Valencia of Ec­ua­dor expressed regret that “the goal of universal adult suffrage had been achieved in very few Territories.”9 On the ­whole, however, committee members admitted that most territories w ­ ere making pro­g ress ­toward self-­government. The task now was “to accelerate the pace of development” and bring self-­government and in­de­pen­dence to all remaining non-­self-­ governing territories.10 British post-­mortems of the Committee on Information’s 1962 session praised its “peaceful atmosphere” compared to what we w ­ ill see was the “more rumbustious” concurrent session of the Committee of Seventeen.11 Yet, British officials w ­ ere not convinced that the time and effort they put into it yielded a sufficient return. Initial hopes that it might moderate the Committee of Seventeen did not bear fruit, and John Sankey of the UK del­e­ga­tion noted that “­there would seem no reason why [the British] should lament the passing of the Committee on Information, if such a course was de­cided upon by the [General] Assembly.” To speed this outcome along, the US del­e­ga­tion to the United Nations reported that the British w ­ ere even singing the committee’s praises to nonadministering del­e­ga­tions with the expectation that ­those del­e­ ga­tions would then turn around and abolish the committee, since it was something the British apparently wanted to keep.12 Opening statements at the Committee of Seventeen signaled its activist intentions.13 Nonadministering del­e­ga­tions of all po­liti­cal stripes emphasized the need for a speedy end to colonialism and the widespread implementation of self-­government and in­de­pen­dence in all territories that presently lacked them, lest the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples “remain” what Soviet representative Valerian  A. Zorin

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called “a dead letter.” Tanganyika’s V. K. Kyaruzi made the case for international intervention as well as any representative when he declared simply: “The colonial Powers did not necessarily know best.”14 And when it came to the specific issues of petitioners and visiting missions, Yugo­slavia’s Pavicevic spoke for many in asserting that “­there could be no question of conferring any kind of veto power upon the Administering Powers or of making their authorization a sine qua non for the decisions of the Committee.”15 As the Committee of Seventeen charted a highly activist course ­toward international accountability, internal divisions within the British government about how to respond resurfaced. Colonial Secretary Maulding continued to argue forcefully for complete withdrawal from the committee’s activities. It “[was] spending practically the ­whole of its time,” he contended, “on precisely that form of activity which we have said from the start was wrong, namely, the hearing of petitioners and the making of recommendations about individual territories. If this is not intervention in individual territories,” he went on, “I do not know what would be.” Although Maulding admitted that the committee would do as it wished regardless of British objections, he also asserted that continuing to participate in or assist the committee’s work by voluntarily providing it with po­liti­cal and constitutional information would constitute a challenge to the nation’s “dignity and self-­respect.” “We are being put in the dock,” Maulding lamented, and “We must make up our minds, now, w ­ hether we are prepared to accept that the United Nations should treat us in this fashion. If we are, we must accept the consequences. If we are not, we must make our position clear by ceasing all co-­operation with this misguided, interfering and, indeed, mischievous Committee.”16 If Maulding’s hardline stance was not new—it could have come from Winston Churchill—­neither was the Foreign Office’s staunch opposition. For J. G. Tahourdin, Maulding’s position was the result of seeing only “the repercussions [of the Committee of Seventeen’s work] within our Colonial territories.” By contrast, the Foreign Office took “into account the wider considerations of the effect on our general international position within the U.N. and elsewhere, and on the Commonwealth, all of which [­were] likely to be serious.” As C. T. Crowe of the British mission to the United Nations noted, withdrawal from the committee “would play straight into Soviet hands.” “If we walk out and show ourselves unable to bear what in the pre­sent atmosphere most Afro-­ Asians consider to be reasonable criticism,” he maintained, “then the Soviet thesis ­will appear to a ­g reat extent to be vindicated. Furthermore, the case we hope to build up during the next year or so against Soviet colonialism w ­ ill be impossible if we refuse to undergo the scrutiny we hope to impose on Rus­ sian colonialism.”17

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Ultimately, the British participated in and cooperated with the Committee of Seventeen for the w ­ hole of its 1962 session. They continued to believe it was a “tiresome,” “thoroughly unsatisfactory body,” yet in the end they w ­ ere forced to admit that the committee’s bark was worse than its bite. On the ­whole, the resolutions the committee approved relating to individual territories ­were more moderate than the British had reason to expect; they ­were also, ­after all, merely recommendatory, which meant that Britain was ­free to ignore them. Although the committee’s very existence may have annoyed British officials, they conceded that what­ever its symbolic significance for larger UN involvement in the non-­self-­governing territories, its first session did not result in any serious challenges to their colonial administration on the ground.18 US assessments of the first session of the Committee of Seventeen, largely if not exclusively colored by the Cold War, ­were decidedly less upbeat. From the State Department’s perspective, the committee repeatedly “demonstrated an unjustified doctrinaire extremism and impracticality in its proceedings and recommendations,” which the United States traced directly to Soviet machinations. Seeking to embarrass and discredit the West in the eyes of the world, the Soviets took an extreme position that often pushed the Afro-­Asian states to adopt a more radical posture than they would have on their own for fear of appearing soft or weak in comparison with the Soviets. In this way, the Soviets ­were responsible, at least in US policymakers’ view, for interjecting Cold War considerations into the Committee of Seventeen rather than utilizing it for its “legitimate purpose of contributing to the orderly termination of colonialism.”19 ­Because the Committee of Seventeen’s report was to go directly to the General Assembly for discussion in plenary session, the Fourth Committee was charged only with considering the report of the Committee on Information. Discussion focused on the po­liti­cal and constitutional information the administering states had transmitted. As had been the case in the Committee on Information, praise for Britain’s transmission of po­liti­cal information was mixed with complaints that the information was too skimpy. H. K. Yomekpe of Ghana spoke for virtually ­every nonadministering del­e­ga­tion that participated in the debate in wishing that information had been provided on local po­liti­cal parties or groups as well as on indigenous participation in territorial po­liti­cal, administrative, and judicial institutions. Absent that sort of information, he maintained, it was difficult to determine how much a­ ctual pro­g ress ­toward self-­government had been made.20 Soviet bloc commentary bemoaned the committee’s forced reliance on information the administering states themselves had transmitted, which Soviet representative V.  A. Brykin claimed “distorted real­ity” and “gave too sanguine a picture of the po­liti­cal situation.”

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Cuba’s Laura Meneses de Albizu Campos agreed, accusing the administering states of “pre­sent[ing] an idealized picture of po­liti­cal development which was not borne out by the facts.”21 Clearly frustrated with relentless Communist bloc criticism of the information the administering states had provided, Spain’s Jaime de Pinies regretted that the Soviet Union had not “transmit[ted] information on the territories ­under its administration.”22 In light of the General Assembly’s creation of the Committee of Seventeen to oversee the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­ pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­ eoples, the issue of the Committee on Information’s f­uture also came ­under discussion. To be sure, that body had its detractors. U Tin Maung of Burma, for example, asserted that it “had outlived its usefulness” and was “no longer suited to the needs of the pre­sent world.” Tunisia’s Slaheddine Abdellah concurred, recommending that “the Committee on Information . . . ​be dissolved and the task of examining conditions in all Non-­Self-­Governing Territories . . . ​be entrusted to the Special Committee.”23 Yet majority sentiment was favorable. Uruguay’s Aureliano Aguirre argued that while “the time when the Committee on Information could be dissolved was not far off,” it was still needed ­because non-­self-­ governing territories continued to exist. Argentina’s Enrique Ros spoke along similar lines, claiming that the Committee of Seventeen and the Committee on Information ­were “complementary in function and that a po­liti­cal organ like the Special Committee would not be the most suitable body for the tasks which had been carried out with objectivity and patience by the Committee on Information.”24 When they expressed a preference regarding the committee’s ­future, the administering states merely noted their readiness to go along with the majority sentiment; a number of other states took the same position.25 Although Resolution 1700 (XVI) had not charged it with recommending a resolution on the Committee on Information’s continued existence, the Fourth Committee, on a vote of 70 to 0, with 5 abstentions, nevertheless approved the committee’s continued existence and provided for a reconsideration of its ­f uture at the Eigh­teenth General Assembly.26 ­After some wrangling over the desirability of retaining geo­graph­i­cal balance on the Committee on Information, the committee elected Honduras to fill the seat Argentina was vacating. Ec­ua­dor, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Upper Volta continued on for what turned out to be the committee’s final session. (Given the in­de­pen­dence of Dutch New Guinea in 1962, the Netherlands left the Committee on Information as it was no longer considered an administering power, and the number of nonadministering members was reduced to seven.)27 The Fourth Committee’s discussion of the report of the Committee on Information, however, was decidedly a sideshow, with consideration of the

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report of the Committee of Seventeen in plenary session the undisputed main event when it came to UN intervention in the non-­self-­governing territories. Not surprisingly, the debate was long and lively, stretching over nineteen meetings from early November through mid-­December. Substantive comments largely addressed the procedures the committee had a­ dopted for meeting its charge and how to better facilitate UN involvement in the non-­ self-­governing territories in the ­f uture. Some of the discussion, however, had less to do with the subject at hand—­implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples—­than with the ongoing East-­West strug­gle. The Soviet Union and its satellites accused the Western nations of deliberately delaying implementation of Resolution 1514 (XV) for their own selfish gain, while proclaiming their own unwavering commitment to the universal abolition of colonialism. Repeating ele­ments of the Soviet proposal to implement Resolution 1514 (XV) from the previous Assembly, they also condemned what Bulgaria’s Yordan Tchobanov termed an “Unholy Alliance” of colonial powers at the United Nations. The Soviet Union’s A. K. Gren was more specific, denouncing the US policy of “support[ing] the colonial Powers in their fight against the oppressed nations” by providing the NATO allies with military equipment that was being used to suppress in­de­pen­dence movements across Africa. He also rebuked the United States for “attempt[ing] to intensify the cold war atmosphere in the United Nations and to distract the Assembly from discussing the liquidation of the colonial system,” an attempt that he predicted would not succeed.28 At the same time, a variety of anti-­Communist states spoke out just as firmly against what they termed Soviet imperialism. In a typical intervention, US representative Jonathan B. Bingham accused the Soviets of employing a double standard when it came to assessing what did and did not constitute colonialism, likening them to Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty, for whom the meanings of words could shift at ­will. “Where the Soviet Union is master, ­there is no colonialism,” asserted Bingham. “Where the Soviet Union is not master and perhaps seeks mastery, ­there the cry of colonialism is raised.” China’s Yu-­ chi Hsueh insisted that “Rus­sian colonialism [was] real” and as proof called the General Assembly’s attention to the headquarters of the Assembly of Captive Eu­ro­pean Nations located just across First Ave­nue from UN headquarters in Manhattan. Atop the “­little building” that served as the assembly’s base, “the flags of nine captive Eu­ro­pean countries [­were] hoisted at half-­mast . . . ​ as a daily reminder to the General Assembly that the Declaration on colonialism [had] yet to be implemented in Eu­rope.” Surely, Hsueh implored, “the claim of the freedom-­loving p­ eoples who hoist their flags at half-­mast is not

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less valid than that of the Angolans in exile in the Congo (Leopoldville).” Heath MacQuarrie of Canada also drew the General Assembly’s attention to “the 96 million ­people ­under Soviet rule who have never been permitted to exercise the right of self-­determination which the Soviet Union so loudly proclaims for ­others.” Why, “when the United Nations [was] examining situations in many other areas of the world, . . . ​should it not turn its attention at some stage to the areas of darkness ­under Soviet rule,” he wondered. The call clearly struck a nerve with Soviet representative Gren, who “walked out of the Assembly during [MacQuarrie’s] speech, blushing furiously.”29 Following the conclusion of general debate, the Assembly considered a proposal ultimately sponsored by thirty-­four Asian, African, and M ­ iddle Eastern nations that contained three key provisions. One merely reiterated support for the princi­ple of decolonization as embodied in Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1654 (XVI). A second called for enlarging the Special Committee by seven members in order to speed up its work. The third called upon the General Assembly “to fix an appropriate time-­limit” for full implementation of Resolution 1514 (XV).30 The first two propositions w ­ ere relatively straightforward and generated ­little discussion or opposition. The third, however, which the State Department termed “the most odious feature of the resolution for [the United States],” sparked spirited debate that split the Assembly along now well-­ worn lines and revealed the depth of disagreement that still reigned when it came to the appropriate UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories.31 The call for UN-­mandated target dates seemed logical to supporters, who regretted that the administering states had not implemented the sorts of “ ‘immediate steps’ ” to in­de­pen­dence that previous UN resolutions on decolonization had advocated. As Indonesia’s L. N. Palar, who had served as rapporteur of the Special Committee, noted testily when he presented the draft resolution to the General Assembly, “The colonial Powers [had not acted] as one might have expected from looking both words up in the dictionary, namely, [through] direct action to be taken up instantly, at once, now.” The Soviet Union’s Gren voiced the Communist bloc’s usual anticolonial criticisms, moving beyond the resolution’s call for the General Assembly to set target dates in its next session to advancing the idea that the resolution itself should propose them. Guinea’s Diallo Telli, one of the draft resolution’s almost three dozen sponsors, even suggested that states opposed to the setting of target dates sought “to prolong colonialism.”32 Opponents of a UN-­imposed target date for the eradication of colonial control represented a variety of perspectives. Sweden spoke for a number of nonadministering states in arguing that a blanket target date failed to take account of differences among vari­ous territories and might unduly hurry some terri-

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tories ­toward in­de­pen­dence that they ­were ill-­prepared to ­handle. Jonathan Bingham of the United States termed the timetable proposal an “over-­ simplification of  . . . ​a very complex prob­lem” and sneered that its supporters had not identified even one “specific way . . . ​[that] setting an over-­all target date” would speed up decolonization. The Cambodian, Japa­nese, Danish, and Italian del­e­ga­tions also voiced their opposition.33 ­Those portions of the draft resolution dealing with time limits for implementing the anticolonialism declaration w ­ ere deleted ­after US-­initiated separate votes, but only ­because Assembly President Muhammad Zafrulla Khan ruled the entire draft resolution an impor­tant question ­under Article 18 and thus requiring a two-­thirds margin of approval. Although the inclusion of time limits received majority support, the margin did not meet the two-­thirds threshold.34 Final General Assembly voting on resolutions pertaining to UN ­handling of general m ­ atters related to decolonization was not contentious. The draft resolution the Fourth Committee had sent forward regarding the continuation of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories secured overwhelming approval on a non-­roll-­call vote of 96 to 0, with 5 abstentions. It became Resolution 1847 (XVII).35 And once stripped of the language relating to target dates, the thirty-­four-­power draft resolution on the implementation of Resolution 1514 (XV) won easy passage on a roll-­call vote of 101 to 0, with 4 abstentions (France, South Africa, Spain, and the United Kingdom).36 In explaining the British abstention on the resolution regarding implementation of the colonialism declaration, which became Resolution 1810 (XVII), Sir Patrick Dean emphasized London’s commitment to decolonization, saying it “require[d] no declarations, resolutions or committees to confirm the rightness of [its] policy.” It remained willing to cooperate with and serve on the Special Committee on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­ eoples, which was now to be expanded to twenty-­four members (Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Iran, Iraq, and former Chapter XI territories Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone joined the seventeen original members), ­under two conditions: that the committee not seek to intervene in any territory that remained ­under British administration; and that “in due course, [it would] consider, among other t­hings, the question of ­those territories in Eu­rope and Asia which have been occupied, some of them during the past thirty years, by [the Soviet Union].”37 Dean’s clamorous call for UN action against Soviet colonialism was certainly in keeping with London’s mounting determination to challenge Moscow’s position as a champion of self-­determination. As he reported from New York, “quite a few of the Africans” had been moved by the attacks against Soviet imperialism, expressing the belief that “if t­ here ­really was a case against

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the Rus­sians for their colonial policy, it should certainly be considered.” This was precisely the sort of reaction that British and American policymakers had been seeking to their efforts to tar the Soviets with the imperialist brush, and they believed that by the close of the Seventeenth General Assembly, their propaganda campaign was beginning to bear fruit. The task ahead, as Dean well recognized, was “to build on the small foundations we have now laid,” capitalize on apparent Soviet sensitivity to the question, as evidenced in Gren’s walkout during MacQuarrie’s speech, and “make life rather uncomfortable for [the Soviets].” The Cuban Missile Crisis had already weakened Moscow, Dean asserted, and the time was right for a massive propaganda campaign that would “show [the Soviets] up for the liars that they [­were].” Dean made it clear, however, that while he was calling for a campaign to “make the Rus­sians feel a ­little uneasy,” he was not calling for an effort to “dismember the Soviet Union or liberate the Baltic Provinces.” In other words, the British intended merely to wage a war of words against Soviet colonialism, not engage in any action to actually end it.38 US officials also saw opportunity for a larger assault against Soviet colonialism. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk informed US diplomatic posts throughout Eu­rope in early December, several Asian, African, and Latin American del­e­ga­tions had expressed support for a UN investigation of the issue during the Eigh­teenth General Assembly. He reported the same general success in a year-­end summary of the Seventeenth General Assembly to President Kennedy, noting with pride that “­there ­were more references to Soviet colonialism and imperialism, with fewer Communist rebuttals and less neutralist yawning, than in recent years.” Moreover, during the just concluded Seventeenth Assembly “some ten del­e­ga­tions [out of a total UN membership of 110] made a point of referring to the dependent status of Soviet satellites, and to the subject p­ eoples inside the Soviet Union itself.” This was good news for US officials, who joined their British counter­parts in the determination to build on this development in the coming 1963 UN session. The fact that one hundred del­e­ga­tions remained ­silent on the issue of Soviet colonialism did not seem to faze them.39 Although initial British assessments of the treatment of colonial questions at the Seventeenth General Assembly w ­ ere generally positive, officials in the Foreign and Colonial Offices ­were not optimistic about their prospects for the Eigh­teenth. On the plus side, the Committee of Seventeen’s focus during 1962 on the crisis spots of Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and the Portuguese territories had left “­little time for debates on ordinary Colonial questions,” a development that certainly worked to Britain’s ­favor. Nor was ­there

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much interest in the Assembly’s plenary session discussion of the Committee of Seventeen’s report. “Attendance was always poor,” “few heads of state ­were pre­sent,” and the debate “aroused considerably less emotion” than previous colonial discussions—­all signs that British policymakers took to mean that colonial ­matters ­were not of primary importance to the majority of UN member-­states. And given the committee’s slow pace of work in 1962 and its 1963 charge to report on “all Colonial territories,” British officials expected that they would be able to “avoid a detailed investigation of ­every one of [Britain’s] territories,” an eventuality they certainly w ­ ere not keen to encounter.40 Despite their generally rosy assessments of UN h ­ andling of colonial ­matters during 1962, both the Foreign and Colonial Offices well appreciated the difficulty they ­were likely to face in 1963, particularly ­because the presence on the committee of the Soviet Union and two of its satellites (Bulgaria and Poland) made dispassionate discussion unlikely.41 In developing a strategy for h ­ andling the work of the Committee of Twenty-­ Four, British officials made several modifications to the approach they had taken in 1962. Perhaps most broadly, they admitted the futility of threatening to withdraw from the committee if it pursued actions that Britain opposed, an approach that had done nothing to curtail the committee in 1962 and that might open the British up “to the charge by the Communists that [they ­were] attempting to blackmail the Committee.” Second, they resigned themselves to the committee’s continued receipt of petitioners in 1963—­deciding ultimately that they would register a s­ imple objection to the practice as not mandated in the Charter and then “question the petitioners [themselves] where . . . ​ tactically desirable” as a way of limiting the effect of their testimony or even discrediting it altogether. Third, although British officials remained adamant that the United Nations lacked competence to determine ­whether a par­tic­u­ lar territory was non-­self-­governing, they recognized the usefulness of building on the criticisms of Soviet colonialism that had been launched during the Seventeenth General Assembly by insisting that any effort to draw up a list of non-­self-­governing territories include Moscow’s “colonial” holdings.42 Concurrent US discussions of issues related to the UN role in the non-­self-­ governing territories focused broadly on the Committee of Twenty-­Four, particularly the question of ­whether to participate. US goals for the committee included “keep[ing] Cold War issues” out of its work, and officials warned during “corridor conversations” at the United Nations that they w ­ ere prepared to withdraw from the committee if it “degenerate[d] into a sounding board for the Soviet bloc . . . ​and ­others who place a higher value on strident anti-­ colonial propaganda than they do on serious and constructive initiatives.” The US determination to prevent Cold War issues from hijacking the committee’s

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work reflected concern that the Soviets ­really w ­ ere making headway with the newly in­de­pen­dent nations and remaining dependent territories.43 That neither British nor American internal discussion devoted much, if any, attention to the Committee on Information made clear how irrelevant that body had become, and its 1963 session was effectively a reprise of its immediate pre­de­ces­sor. Still hamstrung by its terms of reference, the committee undertook its regularly scheduled in-­depth discussion of economic conditions as well as cursory treatment of the other functional areas, including po­liti­cal and constitutional conditions. When it considered its own ­f uture pursuant to Resolution 1847 (XVII), t­ here was l­ ittle doubt of the outcome given the existence of the much more power­f ul Committee of Twenty-­Four. British representative J. A. Scott characterized what turned out to be the committee’s final session as “remarkably dull and uncontroversial,” an accurate assessment of a body whose balanced membership and l­imited terms of reference w ­ ere out of touch with a General Assembly that was moving t­ oward an activist approach to colonial questions.44 The Committee of Twenty-­Four, of course, represented that activism, though its 1963 session, which ran from 19 February to 21 October, was more show than substance. The General Assembly had tasked it with considering how best to bring all remaining non-­self-­governing territories to in­de­pen­dence. But a variety of f­ actors resulted in consideration of only twenty-­six of the sixty-­ four territories on its agenda. Although it continued its pre­de­ces­sor’s practice of hearing petitioners and dispatching visiting missions to vari­ous territories, its ­limited coverage of the remaining nontrust dependent territories, and particularly ­those u ­ nder British administration, meant that it proved to be far less problematic than officials in London had anticipated.45 If the overall outcome of the Committee of Twenty-­Four’s 1963 session was relatively benign, its proceedings revealed continuing tension over the proper UN role vis-­à-­vis the non-­self-­governing territories. In a veiled criticism of the committee’s 1963 session, Australia’s J. D. L. Hood averred that “the Committee should not be used for the expression of merely po­liti­cal points of view. . . . ​It should keep strictly to its task of objectively examining conditions in par­tic­u­lar territories.” Sreten Ilic of Yugo­slavia disagreed, describing the committee as “an impor­tant po­liti­cal organ” that “should not be allowed to become a mere study group.” “That function,” he went on, “was already performed by the Committee on Information.” A second point of contention, though not as widely discussed in the committee as in the Assembly’s plenary meetings, was the question of how the United Nations should address the issue of Soviet colonialism. At the conclusion of a long opening statement outlining British colonial policy, C. E. King lamented that “the members of the

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Committee had referred to only one type of colonial situation, i. e. the colonial role of what w ­ ere usually called the Western Powers.” While admitting the logic of addressing that type of colonialism first, he also noted that “­there ­were States who ­were responsible for dependent territories for which they had neither acknowledged responsibility nor shown any willingness to carry out their obligations ­under the Charter.” Lest the cryptic character of his comments be lost on his audience, he drew on the United Nations’ alphabetical seating arrangement in continuing that “the representative of the most power­ ful of t­hose States was seated on his left.” As had been the case previously, Poland’s Kazimierz Smiganowski and representatives from other Communist bloc states denounced such efforts “to divert the Committee’s attention from its task by invoking questions relating to the cold war.”46 British officials cheered what they considered the Special Committee’s second consecutive unimpressive session. As Sir Patrick Dean reported to the Foreign Office, it earned notoriety “less by what it ha[d] done [than] by what it ha[d] left undone.” To Dean’s way of thinking, “The most striking feature of the committee [was] the air of lassitude and boredom which usually surround[ed] it. “At times,” he proclaimed, “it remind[ed] one of a ­whale stranded on a beach, imposing in its bulk but helpless in action.” In other words, “Although [the] committee [was] an unqualified nuisance, it [was] not a serious threat to [Britain’s] position in the United Nations.” Nor did Dean believe it was “regarded as a serious threat in any of [Britain’s] colonial territories.” For that reason, he advised that Britain continue to participate in the committee, a position echoed throughout the Foreign Office. Colonial Office objections to Britain’s continued participation on the committee ­were once again overruled.47 Washington’s assessment of the 1963 session of the Committee of Twenty-­ Four was rosier than expected. Despite US officials’ expectation that the committee’s “lopsided” composition of nineteen “Afro-­Asians, Latin Americans and Soviet bloc” members to only five Western representatives would spell disaster, they w ­ ere pleasantly surprised that the session was marked by “unusual moderation.” Still, US officials did believe that the committee had, on occasion, displayed a “lack of realism” in pushing almost universally the goal of immediate in­de­pen­dence without regard for conditions on the ground, a point, of course, that had been a feature of US policy on decolonization since World War II.48 As the Committee of Twenty-­Four was completing its first session, representatives from thirty-­two African nations ­were gathering in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for the Conference of African Heads of States and Governments, where they overcame internal differences over the Congo to found the Organ­ization

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of African Unity (OAU). All but four of the nations represented had been dependent when the United Nations was founded, and of ­those, twenty-­five had secured in­de­pen­dence in or ­after 1960—­a fact that demonstrated the unquestioned overall success of the pro­cess of decolonization and the determination of the new African nations to utilize their power in the international arena.49 Like ­earlier such gatherings at Bandung (1955), Accra (1958), and Addis Ababa (1960), the 1963 conference took a firm stand against colonialism. But the very pro­cess of decolonization that made that conference pos­si­ble also made that issue less urgent than it had been previously. As a result, the Addis Ababa conferees emphasized instead broader economic and social issues of importance to the continent, including the elimination of state-­sanctioned racism. It was axiomatic that South Africa’s apartheid policy was a major target of their ire. “Explosive” vio­lence throughout 1963 fueled already existing anti-­ apartheid sentiment and inspired the conference attendees to pledge support for UN efforts to eradicate apartheid as well as to impose economic and po­ liti­cal sanctions on South Africa. Racially inspired vio­lence in Birmingham, Alabama, however, also drew their attention to Jim Crow segregation in the American South, a development that worried US policymakers anxious to establish and maintain good relations with the new African nations. A ­ fter much discussion about how strongly the conference’s opposition to Jim Crow should be conveyed, its final resolution expressed “deep concern” about “mea­sures of racial discrimination taken against communities of African origin living outside the continent and particularly in the United States of Amer­i­ca” and warned that the US government’s failure to take action against “­those intolerable malpractices” would have a deleterious effect on US relations with the African states. Beyond the conference’s stance on vari­ous issues relevant for the international accountability campaign, its pledge to work at the United Nations t­ oward “closer co-­operation and better coordination in m ­ atters of common concern” suggested a united front that would be difficult to oppose.50 In linking the fallout from domestic racial discrimination to US Cold War foreign policy goals, the Addis Ababa conferees hit on a key Achilles’ heel for the Kennedy administration: the pall Jim Crow cast across US efforts to sway the newly in­de­pen­dent nations in Africa to the Western side in the Cold War. As a growing body of scholarship has demonstrated, Southern segregation caused significant harm to the nation’s international reputation. Accordingly, US officials worked to develop countermea­sures, particularly ­because likely consideration of a Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination would keep racial issues on the UN agenda. Conceived as a broad condemnation of “discrimination on the grounds of race, color, or ethnic origin as a denial of the princi­ples of the UN Charter,” the draft declara-

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tion called for “all states to revise government practices and to rescind laws and regulations which have the effect of creating and perpetuating racial discrimination.” US officials “expect[ed] to be able to support the Declaration” when it came up for a vote in the General Assembly, despite the difficulties posed by the nation’s “domestic situation,” coded shorthand for Jim Crow segregation, and to point to recent advances in civil rights as evidence that the nation did not need a UN declaration to inspire action on racial issues. ­Because the US media had “already focused the world’s attention on race prob­lems in the United States,” officials’ reasoning went, making h ­ uman rights a more prominent issue in the United Nations “might have the advantage of spotlighting ­human rights prob­lems in closed socie­ties as well.” In other words, officials hoped to use the debate over the draft declaration as a way of spotlighting the prospects of progressive change in a demo­cratic society like the United States as opposed to the immutable nature of life ­behind the Iron Curtain.51 Kennedy himself, in fact, had already foreshadowed this line of thinking in speeches to a variety of forums. During his first appearance before the General Assembly in September 1961, a month ­after construction of the Berlin Wall began, he lamented that “the tide of self-­determination” that was sweeping the formal empires of the Western Eu­ro­pean colonial powers “ha[d] not yet reached the Communist empire.” ­There, he went on, “a population far larger than that officially termed ‘dependent’ live[d] u ­ nder governments installed by foreign troops instead of ­free institutions—­under a system . . . ​which builds a wall to keep truth a stranger and its own citizens prisoners.”52 Kennedy’s 1963 State of the Union address made many of ­these same points, arguing that “the issue in the [current] world strug­gle [was] not communism versus capitalism, but coercion versus f­ ree choice.” The president went on to assert that “new nations asked to choose between two competing systems need only compare conditions in East and West Germany, Eastern and Western Eu­rope, North and South Viet-­Nam.” And he again pointed to the physical division of the city of Berlin as vis­i­ble proof of the oppression of the Soviet system.53 Kennedy’s famous speech near the Berlin Wall in June of that year, just two weeks ­after he had called for sweeping civil rights reform at home, drove that point home. That domestic context made its way into his speech, as he admitted that “freedom has many difficulties and democracy is not perfect.” The United States, however, “never had to put a wall up to keep our ­people in, to prevent them from leaving us,” in the way the Soviet Union had been forced to do in Berlin.54 US preparations for the Eigh­teenth General Assembly built on ­these ideas as well as a desire to ­counter anti-­US sentiment coming out of the Addis Ababa Conference in seeking to prevent “African issues [from] occupy[ing] an undue

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proportion of the Assembly’s time and attention” and “moderat[ing] increasing demands on the organ­ization for severe action against South Africa and Portugal.” The US position on such issues was “weak,” warned Robert Komer of the National Security Council in mid-­August. The State Department’s Bureau of International Affairs agreed and therefore supported any “pro­cess that enable[d] the UN to treat the continuing southern African trou­ bles as only one of several major [UN] concerns” rather than the organ­ization’s most impor­tant one. State Department officials also advised that the United States work to discourage precipitate African action on colonial questions, such as “a pos­si­ble . . . ​walk-­out or other disruptive parliamentary tactics directed against the presence of Portugal and South Africa in the Assembly” while at the same time “prob­ably hav[ing] to go beyond [its] past positions in the absence of significant movement [on race issues] by [­those states].” In other words, officials advocated the same sort of “honest broker [role] between extreme positions” that had characterized the US stance on colonial questions at the United Nations since 1945, “pleasing no one entirely, [but] hopefully alienating no one totally.”55 Meanwhile, internal British planning for the Eigh­teenth General Assembly focused on how to deal with the expected high UN interest in colonial ­matters, not only insofar as it could affect Britain’s colonial position but also the role it could play in winning—or losing—­British support among the Asian and African states for its interests in other areas. As had been the case previously, the Foreign Office view was much broader than the Colonial Office’s. On one level, Whitehall asserted that a hardline approach to UN competence with regard to the non-­self-­governing territories would neither prevent developments that Britain opposed nor earn Britain any points with the United Nations’ anticolonial majority. On another, it suggested that given the press of decolonization, resisting UN involvement in the non-­self-­governing territories was likely futile, which made a magnanimous and flexible approach by far the wisest course of action—­and indeed, only a short-­term burden in any event, since pro­g ress ­toward decolonization reduced the number of remaining territories, and the opportunity to criticize British policy.56 The Fourth Committee’s brief discussion of the substantive aspects of the Committee on Information’s report, which occurred concurrently with the plenary session of the Eigh­teenth General Assembly, dealt less with what the report actually said about conditions in the non-­self-­governing territories than with the administrative mechanisms that ­shaped the committee’s work and ­whether it should continue beyond the conclusion of the current Assembly. Without exception, members participating in the Fourth Committee’s debate praised the dedication with which the Committee on Information had

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approached its task. Yet they also recognized the constraints that its terms of reference placed on its overall effectiveness. It depended on the information the administering states transmitted ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, which the Committee on Information’s own report had admitted was often lacking. It could not undertake site visits to non-­self-­governing territories, hear petitioners, or make recommendations regarding specific territories to the administering states. And its balanced membership between administering and nonadministering states was out of sync with the makeup of the United Nations as a w ­ hole. At a time when the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories had moved beyond the mere gathering and analy­sis of information, Indonesia’s Sasmojo Karseno lamented, the Committee on Information had simply “outlived its usefulness.” U ­ nder the circumstances, members such as Ec­ua­dor’s Luis Valencia, who supported the committee’s continuation as a “primarily technical” body and deemed its “balanced composition” an asset “for analyzing the information submitted u ­ nder Article 73 e of the Charter,” ­were minority voices in an organ­ization where consideration of colonial questions now emphasized the po­liti­cal.57 A second f­actor militating against continuation of the Committee on Information beyond the conclusion of the 1963 session was the desire to avoid duplication of UN effort and resources when it came to the question of decolonization. As the Secretariat made clear in a pair of statements delivered during the Fourth Committee’s debate on the Committee on Information’s report, that body’s consideration of po­liti­cal information, authorized in Resolution 1700 (XVI), meant that it was essentially duplicating the work of the Committee of Twenty-­Four, which was specifically charged with “examin[ing] po­liti­cal and constitutional developments” in the non-­self-­governing territories. ­Because the latter committee had access to “more up-­to-­date information,” including “written and oral petitions and reports of special missions,” and possessed broader terms of reference, it stood to reason, the Secretariat argued, that it be the entity to survive.58 With two significant reasons to dissolve the Committee on Information and no compelling reason to see it continued, seventeen del­e­ga­tions ultimately sponsored a draft resolution terminating it at the end of the Eigh­teenth General Assembly and transferring its functions to the Committee of Twenty-­Four. Sixteen of the sponsoring states w ­ ere part of the Asian-­African group at the United Nations; the lone exception, Yugo­slavia, had emerged as a leader of the Non-­Aligned Movement, having hosted its founding conference in 1961. The final roll-­call vote on the draft resolution was 52 to 0, with 28 abstentions. All ­those states that had admitted responsibility as administrators of non-­self-­ governing territories cast abstentions. The entire Communist bloc was in the

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affirmative majority. Although the East-­West split evident in the vote did not dominate the Fourth Committee’s debate, Spain’s José Luis Pérez Ruiz sought to deflate the Soviet Union’s pretensions as the champion of decolonization by suggesting that “if [it] ­were ­really interested in [that issue] it would be occupying the seat which was its right in the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories and would apply General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the Territories ­under its administration.”59 In the lead-up to the Eigh­teenth General Assembly, US officials had assessed the benefits that might be derived from President Kennedy’s personal appearance in plenary session. Kennedy had last appeared before the United Nations in September 1961, when he had supplemented his remarks about Soviet colonialism by highlighting ongoing global conflicts in Laos, Vietnam, and Berlin, offering a host of disarmament proposals that made direct reference to the NAM’s Belgrade Conference, and proposing that the 1960s be designated the United Nations’ “De­cade of Development.”60 The likelihood that numerous world leaders would attend the opening of the Eigh­teenth Assembly in person in 1963 was one reason that Kennedy’s presence made sense. Another was that with 1964 being an election year, if he did not attend in 1963, he would not be able to do so u ­ ntil 1965, “a gap of four years in the President’s appearance, which would not be consistent with this Administration’s avowed support for the United Nations.” Although the United States had no new policy initiatives to pre­sent to the Eigh­teenth General Assembly, a presidential speech that stressed “the need for further pro­g ress ­toward world peace” could well direct “the work of the Assembly [in] a healthier direction.” Specifically, officials in the State Department recommended an address that “[spoke] of the ­g reat common interests of man.” Ambassador Stevenson agreed, advising the president that a broad-­based speech “could give some balance to an Assembly that [would] be largely an ‘African session,’ by demonstrating that anti-­ colonialism [was] not the only prob­lem the world face[d].” It would also “afford an opportunity to reaffirm emphatically [the US] policy on colonialism, self-­ determination and h ­ uman rights, and perhaps temper the next assault by the Africans and the Soviets.”61 Kennedy’s September 1963 speech to the General Assembly met many of ­these goals. It emphasized the US commitment to self-­determination, “in Eastern Eu­rope as well as Western, in Southern Africa as well as Northern, in old nations as well as new.” In a nod to domestic racial issues in the United States, it also argued that the American ­people ­were “working to right the wrongs of [their] own country,” in contrast to the static and unchanging nature of the Soviet system. Kennedy also took note of the Universal Declaration of ­Human Rights, which was marking it fifteenth anniversary that year. If that document

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was “to have full meaning,” he proclaimed, “new means should be found for promoting ­free expression and trade of ideas.”62 The Eigh­teenth General Assembly considered two broad issues related to UN ­handling of colonial questions—­the report of the Committee of Twenty-­ Four and the recommendation to terminate the Committee on Information. The former occupied far more attention in the Assembly than the latter, with praise of the Special Committee’s work in the face of considerable administering-­ state obstruction dominating discussion. The debate also included a fair dose of criticism of colonialism in general, as well as attacks on Soviet imperialism. By contrast, the treatment of the Committee on Information was brief and almost pro forma. Taken collectively, the Assembly’s discussion and actions regarding ­these two ­matters signaled its final move away from the mere interest in the non-­self-­governing territories the Committee on Information represented to the international accountability for ­those territories the Committee of Twenty-­Four epitomized. As we have seen, that committee’s work fell far short of its mandate of considering all remaining non-­self-­governing territories, a fact its defenders in the General Assembly laid squarely at the administering states’ feet. Despite what India’s Birenda Narayan Chakravarty described as Britain’s “commendable rec­ord . . . ​in bringing its numerous colonial territories to in­de­pen­dence and freedom,” he decried its refusal to fully open its territories to examination by the Committee of Twenty-­Four. As British representative C. E. King made clear in response, although his nation was “willing to co-­operate with the Committee . . . ​to provide it with information and . . . ​to join in its discussions,” it “had no intention of abdicating its responsibility” for the territories it administered and could u ­ nder no circumstances accept the dispatch of committee missions to any of t­ hose territories, an act that it deemed “an intervention in their administration.” Speakers during Assembly debate roundly castigated this position. Yemen’s Moshin Ahmed Alaini termed it “defiance”; Ceylon’s E. R. S. R. Coomaraswamy saw Britain’s stance as an attempt “to conceal from the rest of the world what was r­ eally happening in its territories”; and Librado D. Cayco of the Philippines contended that Britain’s position was “no better than Portugal’s claim that its colonies [­were] ‘overseas provinces.’ ”63 The anticolonial majority in the Assembly also devoted considerable attention to denouncing the Western powers for their continued adherence to what Romania’s Ion Georgescu termed “all that is most retrograde in the world.” Much of this criticism came from the Soviet bloc, which attacked the administering states’ “delay and procrastination” in complying with UN directives regarding decolonization, “rapacious exploitation of [the] wealth and

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natu­ral resources” of the non-­self-­governing territories, and deliberate efforts to “deprive the p­ eoples of the colonies of their social and po­liti­cal rights and keep them in backwardness and darkness.”64 Yet much of it came as well from other quarters, including most prominently states from Asia and Africa.65 And critics from all sides drew on previous Soviet bloc statements in lambasting the NATO states for making it pos­si­ble for Portugal, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia to continue to resist calls for majority rule.66 At the same time, the United States and its allies again made the case against Soviet colonialism. China’s Hsueh insisted that “colonialism [was] colonialism no m ­ atter where it [was] practiced” and called upon the General Assembly to include “all territories still ­under colonial rule” in what he termed its effort to “go all out to end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.” Vasco Garin of Portugal, whose own country was u ­ nder attack for refusing to accede to UN involvement in its non-­self-­governing territories, took the organ­ization to task for failing to take up “questions of real colonialism in its most damnable form, where nations once ­free [­were] subjugated by force.” Sidney R. Yates of the United States took on the Soviet Union itself, calling it “the world’s greatest imperialist Power” and challenging it to “point to [even] one territory that it [had] surrendered” at a time when “the United Kingdom, France and other colonial Powers have been relinquishing their control over their colonial territories.” Britain’s C. E. King was less direct but no less determined when he condemned the Soviet bloc for engaging in a “cold-­war communist exercise that [flew] in the face of facts” and warned that “if [that] artificial campaign continue[d Britain would] not hesitate to make use of a considerable dossier of information to show that the boot [was] on the other foot.”67 The final product of the General Assembly’s debate, Resolution 1956 (XVIII), which addressed noncompliance with—or even outright defiance of—­UN efforts to accelerate decolonization, certainly disappointed the United States and its allies. It said nothing about Soviet colonialism but “deplor[ed] the negative attitude of certain administering Powers and their partial or complete refusal to co-­operate” with the Committee of Twenty-­Four, as well as “the assistance given to some administering Powers by certain States, which enable[d] t­hose Powers to persist in their refusal to apply the Declaration.” Although the resolution named none of ­these offending nations, Britain, Portugal, and South Africa ­were clearly the targets of the first charge while the second was aimed squarely at the United States. The resolution won overwhelming support on a 95 to 0 roll-­call vote, with Belgium, France, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States abstaining.68

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What became Resolution 1970 (XVIII) brought the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories to an ignominious end. ­Until Resolution 1654 (XVI) created the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­ dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples, that body had been the organ­ ization’s sole entity dealing with the nontrust dependent territories. The Fourth Committee had recommended its dissolution at the conclusion of the current UN session, its functions to be transferred to the more broadly conceived and empowered Committee of Twenty-­Four. No member-­state spoke on the mea­ sure, which was approved on a non-­roll-­call vote of 84 to 0, with 26 abstentions. Committed to “the immediate ending of colonialism,” the General Assembly thereby set about consolidating its decolonization efforts and charting a clearly activist course for the ­f uture.69 British representative to the United Nations Sir Patrick Dean’s assessment of the Eigh­teenth General Assembly’s h ­ andling of m ­ atters related to the non-­ self-­governing territories not surprisingly focused on its immediate effects for ­Great Britain. To be sure, he roundly criticized the Committee of Twenty-­ Four’s proceedings and deemed its recommendations “mostly unacceptable.” Yet, as he appreciated, “­There was no prospect of our being able to reverse any decisions reached by the Committee or having them amended in some way favourable to us.” If t­ here was l­ittle the British del­e­ga­tion could do to improve the situation, however, several f­actors came together to shape an outcome that was not nearly as negative as it might have been. Considering the Committee of Twenty-­Four’s report in the “more rarified atmosphere of the General Assembly” rather than “the emotional hot­house of the Fourth Committee” was a real plus. So was the speed with which the general debate proceeded, with “some 50 del­e­ga­tions” being “squeezed” into just five days of debate. Dean also asserted that the Committee of Twenty-­Four’s “proceedings had become somewhat institutionalised and formalised; in other words, something of a bore.” From his perspective, it continued to be an “irritation” but did not seriously imperil Britain’s interests; therefore, he advised continued cooperation with its work as a way “to emphasise the difference between our position on colonial and racial questions and that of Portugal and South Africa, to put our case forward in regard to each of the territories examined more effectively than would other­wise be pos­si­ble and to exploit tactical opportunities in the committee for delay and confusion.”70 US officials placed the Committee of Twenty-­Four in a larger, more comprehensive context, setting it against concurrent General Assembly consideration and ultimate approval of the Universal Declaration against All Forms of

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Racial Discrimination. The overall success of decolonization had in some ways fueled that declaration. As the number of territories gaining self-­government and in­de­pen­dence increased, UN efforts shifted from effecting decolonization to racial issues, particularly the suppression of black majorities by white minority populations.71 Mounting African opposition to “the hard-­core racial issues in the southern third of [the continent],” the State Department’s Harlan M. Cleveland had noted in November 1963, was rapidly replacing calls for self-­government and in­de­pen­dence—­and making UN sanctions against racist regimes such as South Africa and Portuguese Angola more likely. Holding firm in its traditional opposition to such a course might cost the United States African backing on other questions, such as the still-­vital question of the admission of Communist China to the United Nations.72 As we have seen, it would also shine a spotlight on racial discrimination in the United States itself, an unpleasant real­ity that numerous African diplomats had experienced first-­hand and one that the administration feared could harm the nation’s global position.73 Apartheid became “the real gut issue” of the Eigh­teenth General Assembly for what US representative to the United Nations William Attwood in November  1963 described as “the dark-­ skinned del­ e­ ga­ tions,” exposing Washington’s heretofore reluctance to speak out against South Africa and convincing him of the need to alter course, just as the nation had recently done when it came to domestic civil rights. “We have tended to treat the apartheid issue in the U.N. as an exercise in parliamentary tactics,” he averred. “But it is more than ever an emotional issue that can no longer be side-­tracked or dispelled by maneuvers, no m ­ atter how skillful.”74 To put it another way, the administration needed to adopt a more progressive and forthcoming stance on racial questions at the United Nations if it was to maintain any modicum of credibility with the anticolonial majority—­and with the nonwhite world writ large. Ultimately, the US del­e­ga­tion did support the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, a­ dopted two days before Kennedy’s assassination, but made clear in the pro­cess that the United States intended “to carry out its terms in accordance with [US] constitutional pro­cesses.”75 In other words, support for the general princi­ple of racial equality would not mean w ­ holesale implementation of that princi­ple at home. Shielded ­behind the domestic jurisdiction clause of the UN Charter, the United States would continue to insist that what happened within its own borders was not a legitimate UN concern. For US officials, the growing UN focus on issues such as racial discrimination and ­human rights signaled an impor­tant and not entirely welcome shift in the organ­ization’s orientation and makeup, largely as a result of the admis-

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sion since 1960 of thirty formerly dependent territories. Reflecting by 1963 the concerns of the “underdeveloped ‘south,’ ” debate in the General Assembly was increasingly revolving around the differences between the haves and the have-­ nots and to presenting new challenges for the United States when it came to protecting its core interests. US officials often found it difficult to break out of the East-­West mindset that had dominated foreign policy thinking in Washington since the conclusion of World War II. And even when they did appreciate how disinterested much of the rest of the world was in the Cold War, their own policy choices remained ­shaped by the superpower strug­gle.76 The first two years of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­ eoples marked the final stage of the UN move from the nation-­centric system embodied in Chapter XI to true international accountability for dependent territories. When Resolution 1654 (XVIII) created the original Committee of Seventeen and set it effectively on par with the Trusteeship Council, anticolonial ele­ments at the United Nations hoped it would become a vehicle for moving the remaining Chapter XI territories ­toward self-­government and in­de­pen­dent nationhood. Although its first two sessions did not result in the immediate attainment of that objective, they did illustrate that the tide at the United Nations when it came to responsibility for the non-­self-­governing territories had turned. The demise of the Committee on Information, which the administering states had prevented from effecting that sort of internationalism, revealed clearly that on ­matters pertaining to the nontrust dependent territories the Western nations could no longer direct UN policy. If the Committee of Twenty-­Four’s ­actual rec­ord during its first two years of operation did not significantly challenge Western colonial control, as American policymakers well recognized, it represented a sea change at the United Nations. Once the anticolonial majority achieved international accountability for dependent territories, activists moved the organ­ization’s focus ­toward other issues that ­were impor­tant to them, including racial in­equality, economic development, and other ­matters that played upon North-­South differences. Along with the growing Non-­Aligned, Pan-­African, global h ­ uman rights, and anti-­apartheid movements, the greater UN involvement in the Chapter XI territories that the Committee of Twenty-­Four pursued signaled the shift away from Western control of world affairs t­ oward a more globalist orientation that prioritized the interests of the developing world.

 Conclusion International Accountability Assessed

The UN campaign for international accountability for dependent territories chronicled in Fulfilling the Sacred Trust can be seen as a microcosm of the larger forces as work in the early postwar period. The g­ reat powers that had won World War II came out of the war expecting to exert their w ­ ill over world affairs. And they drafted the UN Charter, including its two-­track approach to dependent territories, to maintain a global status quo that served their national interests. That scenario, however, was not to be. Unlike the post–­World War I period, when nationalist aspirations across Asia, Africa, and the ­Middle East w ­ ere squashed, nationalism flourished ­after 1945, bringing about the in­de­pen­dence of dozens of states that saw membership in the United Nations as the culmination of their nationhood. T ­ hose new states w ­ ere especially keen on assuming active roles in the egalitarian General Assembly, where increasingly large majorities approved a succession of resolutions that chipped away at the Charter’s two-­pronged system for managing dependent territories. They also made good use of the Fourth Committee, whose responsibilities included issues related to decolonization. It was in that forum, more than any other UN entity, that the anticolonial states made their case for the injustice of subjecting the nontrust dependent territories to less stringent international accountability than prevailed in the trust territories. The moral aspect of their appeal became especially impor­tant ­because it

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connected the campaign for accountability to other contemporaneous movements for greater international equality. The campaign for international accountability’s success was not guaranteed. Indeed, as we have seen, for the United Nations’ first de­cade, the Western colonial powers ­were able to prevent significant action in that direction. Although calls to expand the UN role in the non-­self-­governing territories dated back to the First General Assembly, the administering states, with ­Great Britain and the United States playing prominent roles, w ­ ere able to use a variety of tools, including parliamentary maneuvering, to prevent real pro­gress in that direction through the mid-1950s. Growing global support for the universal right to self-­government, however, made theirs a rearguard fight. The 1955 Bandung Conference placed that idea, along with many o ­ thers that would soon represent the consciousness of a rising Global South, center stage for all to see. From then on, changing international realities put the administering states at odds with prevailing sentiment at the United Nations. Heady on their own propaganda, confident that their past experience uniquely qualified them as experts in what constituted an in­de­pen­dent nation, and determined to shape in­de­pen­dence movements to serve their own interests, they worked assiduously both to control the pro­cess of decolonization and to limit international involvement in it. As we have seen, they also waged a comprehensive public propaganda war on what they termed Soviet colonialism, which gained ­little traction beyond close US allies. The result was increasing alienation at the United Nations, where the vast majority of member-­states by 1960 firmly supported immediate in­de­pen­dence as well as international accountability for all dependent territories, not merely t­ hose that fell u ­ nder the auspices of the Trusteeship System. Concrete evidence of the power of the developing world, and especially the new nations of Africa, as well as the degree to which British and American thinking was out of step with majority sentiment at the United Nations, came at the end of 1960 in Resolution 1514 (XV) containing the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­ eoples. Although that resolution condemned all forms of colonialism, it did not lead to the sort of UN assault on Soviet control of Central Asia and the Baltic states that the United States and its allies had hoped for. ­After its passage, the die was cast when it came to international accountability for dependent territories. Resolutions 1654 (XVI), 1810 (XVII), and 1956 (XVIII) created the infrastructure for erasing the Charter’s distinction between the trust and nontrust dependent

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territories, righting the wrong that proponents of international accountability believed had been perpetrated at San Francisco and placing the nontrust dependent territories ­under a sort of shadow Trusteeship System. In this way, ­those mea­sures might be seen as fulfilling the promise of Article 77(1)(c) of the Charter, except that rather than waiting for the administering states to “voluntarily” place their nontrust dependent territories u ­ nder UN supervision, the General Assembly assumed the right to do so itself.1 Much of the impetus for the campaign for international accountability for dependent territories came from the new nations in Asia and Africa, which ­were created as a result of decolonization. Drawn together by their shared colonial experiences, they developed a broad collective identity based on social justice and h ­ uman rights. That identity had first been expressed at the Asian-­ African conference at Bandung in 1955 and the smaller, but arguably more consequential First Conference of In­de­pen­dent African States at Accra in 1958, which expressed an African personality in international affairs. The Second Conference of In­de­pen­dent African States at Addis Ababa in June 1960 confirmed it. And in May 1963, the creation of the Organ­ization of African Unity served notice to the world that the in­de­pen­dent nations of the continent intended to join forces to push the United Nations ­toward a host of reformist mea­sures, including an end to colonialism. British and American policymakers had difficulty adjusting to the growing UN interest in international accountability for dependent territories and other issues impor­tant to the Global South. They also consistently demeaned both the non-­self-­governing p­ eoples themselves and their champions at the United Nations. Convinced of the rightness of their position, they dismissed anticolonial sentiment as emotionally driven, questioned the fitness of t­hose who sought to expand the UN role in the nontrust dependent territories, and expressed doubts about the overall readiness of many of the non-­self-­governing territories for in­de­pen­dence. By demonstrating the way that race and racial assumptions w ­ ere intertwined with the campaign for international accountability for dependent territories, this book links that effort to the international campaign against apartheid, which grew to prominence following the brutal Sharpeville Massacre in March 1960. In fact, the two b­ attles became directly connected when the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Decolonization Committee, began approving resolutions that included recommendations for sanctions against white-­ruled member-­states, such as South Africa, which employed race-­based laws to discriminate against majority black populations. In fact, the overall success of decolonization fueled the General Assembly’s interest in apartheid, and the domestic treatment of specific populations in gen-

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eral. As the number of territories gaining self-­government and in­de­pen­dence increased, UN efforts shifted from effecting decolonization to other issues, such as economic and social questions. Demonstrations of the shifting orientation of the General Assembly abounded by the early 1960s. One was the UN Development De­cade, introduced in President Kennedy’s speech to the General Assembly in September 1961 and formally proclaimed in Resolution 1710 (XVI) that December. The official General Assembly proclamation, “United Nations Development De­ cade: A Programme for International Economic Co-­ operation,” asserted that “promot[ing] social pro­g ress and better standards of life . . . ​of the eco­nom­ically less developed countries [was] not only of primary importance to ­those countries but [was] also basic to the attainment of international peace and security and to a faster and mutually beneficial increase in world prosperity.” In other words, the Assembly made a case for the interrelatedness of all nations and pledged the resources of the organ­ization in ser­ vice to the broad goal of international social and economic development.2 Despite the fanfare surrounding the Development De­cade’s launch, its tangible accomplishments ­were meager, as the gap between the per capita incomes of the developed and developing countries actually widened.3 Yet its importance, at least in the context of the campaign for accountability and the shifting priorities of the General Assembly by the early 1960s, lay less in what was actually accomplished than in the fact that the Development De­cade, with its explicit acknowl­edgment that the needs of the Global South had to be addressed, was ever proclaimed at all. The rise of the Non-­Aligned Movement and approval of the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination gave further proof of the awakening of the Global South. The NAM, which encompassed twenty-­five nations at its founding in 1961, sought a m ­ iddle ground in international affairs that eschewed alignment with ­either side in the Cold War. In addition to calling for universal disarmament and advocating for economic equality among nations, the NAM’s inaugural conference in Belgrade, Yugo­ slavia, affirmed the right of self-­government, mutual re­spect for differences in po­liti­cal and economic systems, and national self-­determination. For its part, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination proclaimed that “discrimination between h ­ uman beings on the ground of race, colour or ethnic origin [was] an offence to ­human dignity,” to be “condemned as a denial of the princi­ples of the Charter of the United Nations, as a violation of the h ­ uman rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of ­Human Rights, as an obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations among nations and as a fact capable of disturbing peace and security among ­peoples.”4 What ­these efforts, as well as the accountability

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campaign, signaled was a rising desire to even the global playing field—­ economically, socially, and politically—­and to reshape the United Nations from an organ­ization designed to protect the interests of the ­great powers that had founded it to one that better reflected the world as it was in the early 1960s. That world was increasingly nonwhite, eco­nom­ically underdeveloped, and uninterested in the East-­West Cold War. In other words, status quo politics was giving way to revolution. General Assembly interest in decolonization continued—­and even accelerated—in the years to come, as did the Assembly’s belief that shepherding the remaining dependent territories t­ oward self-­government and in­de­pen­dence was an international responsibility. A series of resolutions between 1965 and 1967 denounced the continued existence “of colonial rule and the practice of apartheid as well as all forms of racial discrimination” as threats to “international peace and security and . . . ​a crime against humanity,” condemned the colonial powers’ efforts “to suppress national liberation movements by repressive activities and the use of armed force,” and “urge[d] all States to provide moral and material assistance” to ­peoples seeking “to exercise their right to self-­determination and in­de­pen­dence.” ­These resolutions, all of which ­were approved with margins greater than 90 ­percent, set the Assembly at odds with the United States, South Africa, and the major Western Eu­ro­pean colonial powers. Some of ­those states, such as Portugal and South Africa, ­were complicit in implementing racially discriminatory policies in territories they administered. ­Others, such as the United States and France, w ­ ere actively resisting national liberation movements, in contravention of UN policy. As the unrelenting—­and increasingly popu­lar—­demands for a real international role in fostering decolonization made clear, the Western administering states continued to swim against the tide of international opinion as represented in the United Nations even ­after the ­battle for accountability for dependent territories had been concluded.5

A c k n o w l­e d g m e n t s

This book owes its existence to a 2004 conference on intra-­bloc conflicts held at Kent State University and or­ga­nized by my then-­colleague Victor Papacosma. When Victor approached me about participating in the conference and co-­editing a planned conference volume, I was working on a larger—­and still ongoing—­proj­ect on Anglo-­American conceptions of empire. Research for that proj­ ect yielded some in­ter­est­ing archival material on how colonial questions at the United Nations strained the transatlantic special relationship, and I de­cided to pull that material together for my contribution. That small essay, which offered some very preliminary thoughts about the way the United Nations handled decolonization during its early de­cades and how the results of UN interest in decolonization affected Anglo-­ American relations, led me to further research on the subject. The specific direction of my work on the United Nations and decolonization changed many times. The end result is this book, which retains my original focus on the transatlantic relationship but places it within a much larger international and institutional framework. I have incurred numerous debts, tangible and intangible, during the many de­cades of this book’s evolution. Audiences at conferences large and small in Kent, Ohio, Houston, Texas, Lexington, Kentucky, New Orleans, Louisiana, and Nottingham, ­England, offered constructive feedback on vari­ous papers that collectively helped to make this a better book. I am especially grateful to Victor Papacosma, Maurice Jr. Labelle, Hugh Wilford, Aurora Almada e Santos, Nikki Eggers, and Jessica Pearson, and Bevan Sewell and Maria Ryan for inviting me to join vari­ous panels and conference programs. I am also beholden to helpful archival staffs at numerous repositories. Long stints at the National Archives II in College Park, Mary­land, and the UK National Archives in Kew, ­England, ­were enhanced by ­those institutions’ unparalleled rec­ords experts. The same is true of my work at the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy Presidential Libraries. A string of librarians facilitated my research over a number of years in the UN rec­ords at the Cleveland Public Library. When t­hose rec­ords contained gaps, Thomas Twiss of the University of Pittsburgh quickly and graciously got me what I needed. My professional home since 1992, Kent State University, has generously supported this book in a number of impor­tant ways. Release time in the form of both a sabbatical and a Research and Creative Activity Appointment gave me invaluable writing time at a critical moment in the preparation of the manuscript. Sincere thanks to Department Chairs Kenneth Bindas, Brian Hayashi, and Kevin Adams, as well as to Dean James Blank for supporting my work. The Kent State University Research Council also 207

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provided vital assistance. My thanks as well to colleagues and students who listened to me talk about this book over more years than I would have liked. I am extremely fortunate to be publishing this book with Cornell University Press, and particularly to be ­doing so ­under the superb editorial guidance of Michael J. McGandy. As other scholars before me have noted, Michael is an editor par excellence. His support for this proj­ect was unfaltering, and I am forever grateful. My thanks also go out to the external readers for the press, who convinced me that less sometimes ­really is more, and that forests are ultimately more impor­tant than individual trees. One, known to me only as Reader A, went above and beyond in her/his critiques and improved this book in countless ways. It would be even better if I had followed all her/his suggestions. Additional thanks to Mary Gendron for expertly shepherding the manuscript through production, Tatiana Holway for improving its readability, and Enid Zafran for preparing the index. Historical scholarship is often a lonely and solitary endeavor. It can also be all-­ consuming. I am grateful to my ­family for understanding my obsession with this book as it evolved. My late parents, Mary Ann and Edward, unflaggingly supported my academic pursuits from the moment they dropped me off for my freshman year at Miami University in the fall of 1979. I can never repay my debt to them. My siblings, Donna and Glen, their spouses, Terry and Wendell, and my Larchmont ­family, Alan, Enrique, Roxie, and Velma, each contributed something dif­fer­ent to this proj­ ect. So did the succession of Siberian Huskies who filled my days with walks and woos over the years: Chief, Cher, Scully, Paxton, Nona, Nash, and Stormi. Fi­nally, my husband, Clarence Wunderlin, has put up with this book, my dogs, and me for a very long time. The book may be finished, but the dogs and I are staying.

Notes

Introduction

1. See United Nations Charter, “Chapter XII: International Trusteeship System,” 26 June 1945, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­sections​/­un​-­charter​/­chapter​-­xii​/­index​.­html, and “Chapter XIII: The Trusteeship Council,” 26 June 1945, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​ /­sections​/­un​-­charter​/­chapter​-­xiii​/­index​.­html. 2. See United Nations Charter, “Chapter XI: Declaration Regarding Non-­Self-­ Governing P ­ eoples, Article 73e,” 26 June 1945, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­sections​/­un​ -­charter​/­chapter​-­xi​/­index​.­html. 3. See United Nations, “List of Former Trust and Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” https://­www​.­un​.­org​/­dppa​/­decolonization​/­en​/­history​/­former​-­trust​-­and​-­nsgts. 4. For general treatments of decolonization, see, for example, Martin Thomas, Bob Moore, and L. J. Butler, The Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Eu­rope’s Imperial Nation States, 1918–1975 (London: Hodder Education, 2008); and Elizabeth Buettner, Eu­rope ­after Empire: Decolonization, Society, and Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 5. David A. Kay, The New Nations at the United Nations, 1960–1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 148. On the idea of international responsibility broadly, see Sergio Armando Frazão, “International Responsibility for Non-­Self-­governing P ­ eoples,” Annals of the American Acad­emy of Po­liti­cal and Social Science 296 (January 1954): 56–67. 6. See Yassin El-­Ayouty, The United Nations and Decolonization: The Role of Afro-­Asia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971). 7. For Western domination of the organ­ization generally, see Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations, Vol. 1, The Years of Western Domination, 1945–1955 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982). 8. The new direction of the United Nations a­ fter 1955 can be followed in Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations, Vol. 2, The Age of Decolonization, 1955–1965 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989). 9. See United Nations, “Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945–­Pre­sent,” http://­w ww​.­u n​.­o rg​/­e n​/­s ections​/­m ember​-­s tates​/­g rowth​-­u nited​-­n ations​ -­membership​-­1945​-­present​/­index​.­html. 10. Resolution 1514 (XV), “Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­ eoples,” 14 December 1960, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​ /­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­1514(XV). 11. For the US campaign against Soviet colonialism, see Mary Ann Heiss, “Exposing ‘Red Colonialism’: U.S. Propaganda at the United Nations, 1953–1963,” Journal of Cold War Studies 17, no. 3 (2015): 82–115. 209

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TO PAGES 4 –7

12. See Resolution 66 (I), “Transmission of Information u ­ nder Article 73(e) of the Charter,” 14 December  1946, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​ ?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­66(I). 13. For decolonization and membership, see United Nations, “List of Former Trust and Non-­Self-­Governing Territories”; and “Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945–­Pre­sent.” For impor­tant questions, see United Nations Charter, “Chapter IV: The General Assembly,” “Voting: Article 18,” 26 June  1945, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​ /­sections​/­un​-­charter​/­chapter​-­iv​/­. 14. See Jessica Lynne Pearson, “Defending Empire at the United Nations: The Politics of International Colonial Oversight in the Era of Decolonisation,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 45, no. 3 (2017): 525–49. 15. See Pedro Aires Oliveira, “Live and Let Live: Britain and Portugal’s Imperial Endgame (1945–75),” Portuguese Studies 29, no. 2 (2013): 186–208; and Bruno Cardosa Reis, “Portugal and the UN: A Rogue State Resisting the Norm of Decolonization (1956–1974),” Portuguese Studies 29, no. 2 (2013): 251–76. 16. For decolonization of the British Empire generally, see John Darwin, Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-­War World (London: Palgrave, 1989); and Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonization, 1918– 1968 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 17. Resolution 66 (I), “Transmission of Information u ­ nder Article 73(e) of the Charter.”; “Trust and Non-­Self-­Governing Territories (1945–1999).” The Chapter XI territories that secured in­de­pen­dence between 1960 and 1963 joined the United Nations as Cyprus, Nigeria, and Somalia (1960); Sierra Leone (1961); Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda (1962); and ­Kenya and Zanzibar (1963). See “Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945–­Pre­sent.” 18. See Frank Heinlein, British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945–1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind (London: Frank Cass, 2002). 19. See, for example, El-­Ayouty, United Nations and Decolonization; and S. Hasan Ahmad, The United Nations and the Colonies (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1974). Vrushali Patil, Negotiating Decolonization in the United Nations: Politics of Space, Identity, and International Community (New York: Routledge, 2008), utilizes a so­cio­log­i­cal framework. 20. Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). See also Michael D. Callahan, Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914–1931 (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1999); Michael D. Callahan, A Sacred Trust: The League of Nations and Africa, 1929–1946 (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2004); and Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 65–69. 21. The limits of the Mandate System are well covered in Sluga, Internationalism, 52–55. 22. See, for example, Paul Kennedy, The Parliament of Man: The Past, Pre­sent, and ­Future of the United Nations (New York: Vintage Books, 2006). 23. See Wm. Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006), ix, 28. Subsequent works that answer his call include Roland Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International ­Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 2010); Steven L. B. Jensen, The Making of International H ­ uman Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization, and the Recon-

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struction of Global Values (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Alanna O’Malley, The Diplomacy of Decolonisation: Amer­i­ca, Britain and the United Nations during the Congo Crisis, 1960–1964 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018); and Meredith Terretta, “ ‘We Had Been Fooled into Thinking that the UN Watches over the Entire World’: ­Human Rights, UN Trust Territories, and Africa’s Decolonization,” ­Human Rights Quarterly 34, no. 2 (2012): 330–60. Although not strictly speaking about the United Nations, Daniel Maul, ­Human Rights, Development, and Decolonization: The International ­Labor Organ­ization, 1940–1970 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), also fits ­here. 24. See, generally, Imanuel Geiss, The Pan-­African Movement: A History of Pan-­ Africanism in Amer­i­ca, Eu­rope, and Africa (London: Africana Publishing Com­pany, 1974); and Ryan M. Irwin, Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 25. See Jeffrey James Byrne, Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 26. See, for example, see Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, eds., Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-­African Conference for International Order (Singapore: National University of Singapore, 2008); and Christopher J. Lee, ed., Making a World a­ fter Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Po­liti­cal Afterlives (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010). 27. See, for example, Kay, New Nations, 86–89; Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi, ­Human Rights at the United Nations: The Po­liti­cal History of Universal Justice (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 212–21; Burke, Decolonization; A. W. Brian Simpson, ­Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the Eu­ro­pean Convention (New York: Oxford, 2001), 300–8; and Jensen, Making of International ­Human Rights. 28. For the outlines of apartheid, see, for example, Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948–1968 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985), 18–21; and Irwin, Gordian Knot, 21–29. For African American opposition, see Nicholas Grant, Winning Our Freedoms Together: African Americans and Apartheid, 1945–1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017). 29. One exception was India, which successfully pushed the United Nations to condemn South African discrimination against p­ eople of Indian origin and was the first state to formally refer to apartheid at the United Nations. See UN Department of Public Information, The United Nations and Apartheid, 1948–1994 (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1994), 9–10. 30. The details of the anti-­apartheid campaign can be followed in Irwin, Gordian Knot; Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation, 15–33, 126–54; and Jensen, Making of International ­Human Rights, 102–37. 31. On the moral fervor of the new African nations generally, see Kay, New Nations, 67, 85–89. 32. On ­these themes, see Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International H ­ uman Rights: Visions Seen, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 176–82; and Normand and Zaidi, ­Human Rights, 127–28, 134–35, 215–18. 33. Patrick J. Hearden, Architects of Globalism: Building a New World Order during World War II (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2002). 34. Steven Alexander Wertheim, “Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy in World War II” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2015).

21 2 NOTES

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35. See Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (New York: Penguin, 2012); and Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2009). 36. See G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2011); and Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: Amer­i­ca’s Vision for ­Human Rights (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005). 37. The fullest account of how the Cold War played out at the United Nations is Ilya V. Gaiduk, Divided Together: The United States and the Soviet Union in the United Nations, 1945–1965 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012). 38. John Fousek, To Lead the F­ ree World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), provides an excellent discussion of the US self-­conception during the immediate postwar period. For discussion of the dichotomous nature of early US Cold War pronouncements, see, among o ­ thers, Laura A. Belmonte, Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 24, 40, 96; and Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 81. 39. See Denise M. Bostdorff, Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2008); and Ernest R. May, ed., American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68 (Boston: St. Martin’s Press, 1993). 40. The development of the post–­World War II US propaganda system can be followed in Belmonte, Selling the American Way; Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency; and Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda ­Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006). For a focus on propaganda targeting the developing world in par­tic­u­lar, see Jason C. Parker, Hearts, Minds, Voices: US Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 41. On t­hese points generally, see James H. Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans: Black Americans and Africa, 1935–1961 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 69–72, 166, 169. 42. For British efforts to control the narrative of decolonization and promote the positive aspects of their colonial rule at the United Nations and elsewhere, see Frank Füredi, Colonial Wars and the Politics of Third World Nationalism (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994). 43. See Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (London: Macmillan, 1961). 44. See David Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 1945–1961 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); and Stephen Howe, Anti-­Colonialism in British Politics: The Left and the End of Empire, 1939–1964 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 45. John Karefa-­Smart, “Africa and the United Nations,” International Organ­ization 19, no. 3 (1965): 765. 46. For the United Nations as a “borderland” where multivariate actors and ideas came together, see Amy L. Sayward, The United Nations in International History (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 2, 7–8. 47. Kay, New Nations, 184.

NOTES TO PAGES 1 3 – 2 1

213

48. Sayward, United Nations in International History, 25. See also Robert S. Jordan, “United Nations General Assembly Resolutions as Expressions of H ­ uman Values” International Studies Quarterly 20, no. 4 (1976): 647–54. 49. For the classic rendering of this term, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Strug­gle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1948), 21–25. 1. Laying the Groundwork

1. “President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, 8 January 1918,” http://­avalon​ .­law​.­yale​.­edu​/­20th​_­century​/­wilson14​.­asp. For consideration of the related term “self-­ determination,” see Glenda Sluga, “What Is National Self-­Determination? Nationality and Psy­chol­ogy during the Apogee of Nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism 11, no. 1 (2005): 1–20; and Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 58–59. 2. Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-­Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 3. “Covenant Text in the Treaty of Versailles,” in The Drafting of the Covenant, ed. David Miller Hunter (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1928), 2:737. 4. “Covenant Text in the Treaty of Versailles,” 2:737, 739. 5. Benjamin Gerig, The Open Door and the Mandates System: A Study of Economic Equality before and since the Establishment of the Mandates System (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1930), 123. See also Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 77–95. 6. Pedersen, Guardians, 405–6. See also Gary B. Ostrower, The League of Nations: From 1919 to 1929 (Garden City Park, NY: Avery Publishing Group, 1996), 113; and Yassin El-­Ayouty, The United Nations and Decolonization: The Role of Afro-­Asia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 8. 7. Readers looking for a complete account of Anglo-­American ideas on colonial issues during the war should consult Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977). 8. “Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1941,” http://­avalon​.­law​.­yale​.­edu​/­wwii​/­atlantic​.­asp. 9. Churchill quoted in Louis, Imperialism at Bay, 130–31. For more on the ­limited British view of the Atlantic Charter’s applicability, see also Louis, Imperialism at Bay, 223–24, 247, 254; and Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: Amer­i­ca’s Vision for ­Human Rights (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 29–30, 34–35. 10. For FDR’s anticolonialism, see John J. Sebrega, “The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roo­se­velt: A Reappraisal,” Po­liti­cal Science Quarterly 101, no. 1 (1986): 65–84; Warren F. Kimball, “ ‘In Search of Monsters to Destroy’: Roo­se­velt and Colonialism,” in The Juggler: Franklin Roo­se­velt as War­time Statesman (Prince­ton: Prince­ton University Press, 1991), 127–57; and Paul ­Orders, “ ‘Adjusting to a New Period in World History’: Franklin Roo­ se­ velt and Eu­ ro­ pean Colonialism,” in The United States and Decolonization: Power and Freedom, ed. David Ryan and Victor Pungong (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 63–84. 11. See Marika Sherwood, “ ‘Diplomatic Platitudes’: The Atlantic Charter, the United Nations, and Colonial In­de­pen­dence,” Immigrants & Minorities 15, no. 2 (2010):

21 4 NOTES

TO PAGES 2 1 –2 3

135–50; James Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans: Black Americans and Africa, 1953– 1961 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 69; Penny Von Eschen, Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 25–28; Borgwardt, New Deal for the World, 34–36, 60; and El-­Ayouty, United Nations and Decolonization, 12–13. 12. “Declaration by the United Nations, January 1, 1942,” http://­avalon​.­law​.­yale​ .­edu​/­20th​_­century​/­decade03​.­asp. For the absence of colonial questions from the war­ time conferences, see US Department of State, Office of Dependent Areas “Fact Sheet,” “The United States and Non-­Self-­Governing Territories u ­ nder the United Nations,” 9 July 1946, transmitted with Chase memo for Lockhart, 26 July 1946, Rec­ord Group 59, decimal file 501BE/7-2646, National Archives II, College Park, MD (hereafter RG 59, with decimal number); and Robert C. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 37, 51, 56–57, 171–81. 13. For the fullest available treatment of t­ hese internal discussions, see Louis, Imperialism at Bay, 134–224. 14. Hull, memorandum for the president, 17 March 1943, with attachment, “Declaration by the United Nations on National In­de­pen­dence,” 9 March 1943, in Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945, ed. Harley L. Notter, Department of State Publication 3580 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1950), 471, 472, 473. See also Louis, Imperialism at Bay, 225–42. 15. Meeting notes, Mr. Attlee (deputy prime minister), Mr. Eden (foreign secretary), Lord Cranborne (lord privy seal), Col­o­nel Stanley (colonial secretary), Mr. Jebb (FO), Mr. Eastwood (CO), 3 May 1943, Dominions Office and Commonwealth Relations Office: Original Correspondence, Rec­ord Class DO 35/1897, National Archives, Kew, ­England (hereafter DO 35, with piece number). See also Ruth B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940–1945 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1958), 88–89; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: The Macmillan Com­pany, 1948), 2:1234–38; and Louis, Imperialism at Bay, 243–58. 16. “Extract from Note of Meeting with Dominion High Commissioners,” 10 May 1943, DO 35/1897. 17. Stettinius quoted in Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter, 541; Charles Bohlen minutes, “Sixth Plenary Meeting, 9 February 1945, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], Malta and Yalta (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1955), 844 http://­digicoll​.­library​.­wisc​.­edu​/­cgi​-­bin​/­FRUS​/­FRUS​-­idx​?­type​=­turn&entity​ =­FRUS​.­FRUS1945​.­p0940&id​=­FRUS​.­FRUS1945&isize​=­XL; “Protocol of the Crimea Conference,” 11 February 1945, FRUS, Malta and Yalta, 977, http://­digicoll​.­library​.­wisc​ .­e du​ /­c gi​ -­b in​ /­F RUS​ /­F RUS​ -­i dx​ ?­t ype​ = t­ urn&entity​ = F ­ RUS​ .­F RUS1945​ .­p 0940&id​ =­FRUS​.­FRUS1945&isize​=­XL; Sebrega, “Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roo­se­ velt,” 82. 18. For general overviews of t­hese frequently contentious discussions, see ­Stephen C. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations: A Story of Superpowers, Secret Agents, War­time Allies and Enemies, and Their Quest for a Peaceful World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 232–36; Louis, Imperialism at Bay, 512–73; and El-­Ayouty, United Nations and Decolonization, 17–28. 19. Chapter XII of the UN Charter, “International Trusteeship System,” in Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 3rd ed., ed. Leland M. Goodrich, Ed-

NOTES TO PAGES 2 3 – 2 6

215

vard Hambro, and Anne Patricia Simons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 478. For the Australian and Filipino proposals, see Summary Report of Second Meeting of Committee II/4, 10 May 1945, in Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organ­ization, San Francisco, 1945, Vol. 10, Commission II, General Assembly (London and Washington: United Nations Information Organ­izations, 1945), 428–29; Carlos Romulo with Beth Day Romulo, Forty Years: A Third World Soldier at the UN (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), 33–45; and W.  J. Hudson, Australia and the Colonial Question at the United Nations (Honolulu: East-­West Center Press, 1970), 22–30. 20. Chapter XII of the UN Charter, “International Trusteeship System,” 466. 21. Chapter XIII of the UN Charter, “The Trusteeship Council,” in Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 3rd ed., ed. Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro, and Anne Patricia Simons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 534, 524. 22. Sergio Armando Frazão, “International Responsibility for Non-­Self-­Governing ­Peoples.” Annals of the American Acad­emy of Po­liti­cal and Social Science 296 ( January 1954): 56. 23. US Department of State, Office of Dependent Areas “Fact Sheet,” “The United States and Non-­Self-­Governing Territories ­under the United Nations,” 15; Article 73 of the UN Charter, “Declaration Regarding Non-­Self-­Governing ­Peoples,” in Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 3rd ed., ed. Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro, and Anne Patricia Simons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 448. 24. Article 73 of the UN Charter, “Declaration Regarding Non-­Self-­Governing ­Peoples,” 448, 449; Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations, Vol. 1, The Years of Western Domination, 1945–1955 (New York: St.  Martin’s Press, 1982), 62. See also Borgwardt, New Deal for the World, 188–89. 25. Bernard J. Firestone, The United Nations u­ nder U Thant, 1961–1971 (Landman, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2001), 56. See also Borgwardt, New Deal for the World, 189–93. 26. See Carol Anderson, Eyes off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Strug­gle for ­Human Rights, 1944–1955 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 40–55; Carol Anderson, Bourgeois Radicals: The NAACP and the Strug­gle for Colonial Liberation, 1941–1960 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 62–68; Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans, 64–65; and Von Eschen, Race against Empire, 78–83. 27. See Manu Bhagvan, India and the Quest for One World: The Peacemakers (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 36–49; Marika Sherwood, “India at the Founding of the United Nations,” International Studies 33, no. 4 (1996): 407–28; and Marika Sherwood, “ ‘­There Is No New Deal for the Blackman in San Francisco’: African Attempts to Influence the Founding Conference of the United Nations, April–­July 1945,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 29, no. 1 (1996): 71–94. 28. Article 73 of the UN Charter, “Declaration Regarding Non-­Self-­Governing ­Peoples,” 448, 449. 29. See John Foster Dulles (US) remarks to the Fourth Committee, 24 January 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/6. 30. General support for the US draft resolution can be followed in the representative remarks to the Fourth Committee of two nonadministering states: V. K. Wellington

21 6 NOTES

TO PAGES 2 6 –2 9

Koo (China), 24 January  1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/6, and 28 January  1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/18; and T. T. Krishnamachari (India), 28 January 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/18. 31. For this point, see the remarks of Sir Kenneth Hamilton Bailey (Australia) to the Fourth Committee, 24 January 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/6, and Henri Ponsot (France) to that same body, 28 January 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/18. 32. See rec­ord of the 8th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 28 January 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/18. 33. Resolution approved by the Fourth Committee, in Kerno, “Non-­Self-­Governing ­Peoples (Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the Charter),” draft report of the Fourth Committee to the General Assembly, February 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/23. 34. See rec­ord of 8th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 28 January 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/18; and annex 1a, “Addition to the United States Amendment Proposed by the Del­e­ga­tion of China,” January 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/10. 35. Kerno (Czecho­slo­va­k ia) and Dulles (US) remarks at the 27th plenary session of the UN General Assembly, 9 February 1946, UN Doc. A/PV.27. 36. Creech Jones (UK) remarks at the 27th plenary session of the UN General Assembly, 9 February 1946, UN Doc. A/PV.27. 37. See Resolution 9 (I), “Non-­Self-­Governing ­Peoples,” 9 February 1946, http://­ www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­9(I). 38. See Resolution 29 (I), “Date of the Next Meeting of the General Assembly,” 9 February  1946, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​ /­29(I). 39. Falla to Heathcote-­Smith, with enclosure, 2 August 1946, Colonial Office and Commonwealth Office: International and General Department and Pre­de­ces­sors: Original Correspondence, Rec­ord Class CO 936/1/4, National Archives, Kew, E ­ ngland (hereafter CO 936, with filing information). 40. Dean Acheson (acting secretary of state) memorandum for the president, 29 April 1946, Harry S. Truman Papers, White House Central Files—­Official File, 85-­H, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, In­de­pen­dence, Missouri (hereafter Truman Papers, WHCF—­OF, with filing information). 41. UK ambassador to Washington tel. 5389 to FO, 28 August 1946, CO 936/1/4; Benson to Poynton, 3 July 1946, CO 936/1/4. 42. A. Hilton Poynton minutes, 25 March 1946, CO 936/1/4. See also Poynton to Benson, 14 June 1946, CO 936/1/4; and Benson to Poynton, 3 July 1946, CO 936/1/4. 43. A. Hilton Poynton to Benson, 14 June 1946, CO 936/1/4. 44. A. Hilton Poynton minutes, 25 March 1946, CO 936/1/4. 45. Report of the Secretary-­General, “Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Transmission of Information by Members u ­ nder Article 73(e) of the Charter,” 21 October 1946, UN Doc. A/74, 1. 46. Report of the Secretary-­General, “Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 13; Secretary-­General, “Working Paper on Prob­lems of Transmission and Organ­ization in Re­spect of Information u ­ nder Article 73(e) of the Charter,” 1 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/29, 3; Supplementary Report of the Secretary-­General on the Work of the Organ­ization, 26 October 1946, UN Doc. A/65/Add.1, 694. 47. See Rajah Sir Maharaj Singh (India) remarks to 15th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 5 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.15, 71.

NOTES TO PAGES 2 9 – 3 1

217

48. See Liu Chieh (China) remarks to the 16th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 7 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.16, 78; and K. H. Bailey (Australia) remarks to 18th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 11 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.18, 94. 49. José Luis Mendoza (Guatemala) remarks to 17th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 8 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.17, 86. 50. See summary rec­ord of 20th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 14 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.20, 120. 51. Memorandum prepared by the Secretariat, “Fourth Committee; Sub-­Committee 2 (Chapters XI and South West Africa): Composition of the Sub-­Committee and Proposed Procedure,” 14 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/Sub.2/2, 1, 3. 52. Decision reached during 2nd meeting of Sub-­Committee 2 of the Fourth Committee, 18 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/Sub.2/7, 4. See also discussion during 3rd meeting of Sub-­Committee 2 of the Fourth Committee, 20 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/Sub.2/11, 2–5. 53. See discussion during 2nd meeting of Sub-­Committee 2 of the Fourth Committee, 4–6; and decision reached during 3rd meeting of Sub-­Committee 2 of the Fourth Committee, 20 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/Sub.2/11, 5. 54. Singh (India), Stanislas Ostrorog (France), and Ivor Thomas (UK), remarks at the 2nd meeting of Sub-­Committee 2 of the Fourth Committee, 18 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/Sub.2/7, 7. See also remarks of Pierre Ryckmans (Belgium) and Bailey (Australia) at the 2nd meeting of Sub-­Committee 2 of the Fourth Committee, 18 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/Sub.2/7, 7–8. 55. Memorandum prepared by the Secretariat, “Fourth Committee; Sub-­Committee 2: Chapter XI: Draft Text Submitted as a Basis of Discussion Concerning Prob­lems of Chapter XI as Now before the Sub-­Committee,” 20 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/ Sub.2/10, 1. 56. Boris E. Stein (USSR) remarks at the 4th meeting of Sub-­Committee 2 of the Fourth Committee, 21 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/Sub.2/15, 20–21. 57. See Singh (India) and Liu (China) remarks at the 4th meeting of Sub-­Committee 2 of the Fourth Committee, 21 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/Sub.2/15, 3–4; and Abdel Hamid Badawi (Egypt), Henry Rodrigues Valle (Brazil), and Tadeusz Kassern (Poland) remarks at the 5th meeting of Sub-­Committee 2 of the Fourth Committee, 22 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/Sub.2/19, 1–3, 4–5. 58. Hoo (UN Secretariat) remarks at the 5th meeting of Sub-­Committee 2 of the Fourth Committee, 22 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/Sub.2/19, 9. 59. General Carlos P. Romulo (Philippines) remarks at the 6th meeting of Sub-­ Committee 2 of the Fourth Committee, 25 November  1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/ Sub.2/25, 6. Romulo served at the United Nations u ­ ntil 1983; his c­ areer can be followed in Romulo with Romulo, Forty Years. 60. See Benjamin Gerig (US) remarks at the 7th meeting of Sub-­Committee 2 of the Fourth Committee, 26 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/Sub.2/26, 2. 61. Thomas (UK), Ryckmans (Belgium), and Naggiar (France) remarks to the 5th meeting of Sub-­Committee 2 of the Fourth Committee, 22 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/Sub.2/19, 6, 8. 62. The eight administering states ­were Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

21 8 NOTES

TO PAGES 3 2 –3 7

63. Sub-­Committee 2 of the Fourth Committee, “Report Submitted to the Fourth Committee,” 5 December 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/68, 3, 28. 64. See Cisneros (Cuba), Liu (China), Stein (Soviet Union), Singh (India), and Toufik Huneidi (Syria) remarks at the 21st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 8 December 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/74, 77–79. 65. Thomas, Naggiar, Gerig remarks at the 21st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 8 December  1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/74, 77, 78. See also Cote (Canada) and Ryckmans (Belgium) remarks at the 21st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 8 December 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/74, 78, 79. 66. Report of the Fourth Committee, “The Transmission of Information by Members ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter,” 11 December 1946, UN Doc. A/249, 1, 4, 5. See voting results in summary rec­ord of the 21st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 8 December 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/74, 79. For continuing opposition, see Naggiar, Thomas, and Ryckmans remarks at the 25th  meeting of the Fourth Committee, 11 December 1946, UN Doc. A/C.4/87, 155–57. 67. Cisneros (Cuba) remarks at the 64th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 14 December 1946, UN Doc. A/PV.64, 1368, 1365, 1366, 1367. 68. Blom, Thomas, and Dulles remarks at the 64th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 14 December 1946, UN Doc. A/PV.64, 1359, 1362, 1368. 69. Decision and roll-­call information, verbatim rec­ord of the 64th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 14 December 1946, UN Doc. A/PV.64, 1369. 70. See Resolution 66 (I), “Transmission of Information ­under Article 73e of the Charter,” 14 December  1946, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​ ?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­66(I). 71. See discussion of agenda item 197, “Transmission of Information ­under Article 73e of the Charter (document A/249), Election of Eight Members of the Ad Hoc Committee,” at the 65th  plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 14 December 1946, UN Doc. A/PV.65, 1390–92; and discussion of agenda item 203, “Election of the Eighth Member of the Committee for Studying Information Submitted by States Administering Non-­Self-­Governing Countries,” at the 66th  plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 15 December  1946, UN Doc. A/PV.66, 1418–19. 72. C.P. Cabinet Paper(47)5, Creech Jones memorandum, 16 January 1947, Cabinet Memoranda, Rec­ord Class CAB 129/16, para. 3, 21, 19, 23, National Archives, Kew, ­England (hereafter CAB 129, with filing information). 2. Fits and Starts

1. A general treatment of Soviet policy at the United Nations can be found in Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations: An Inquiry into Soviet Motives and Objectives (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962). 2. Amy L. Sayward, The United Nations in International History (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 21. 3. Resolution 66 (I), “Transmission of Information ­under Article 73e of the Charter,” 14 December 1946, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​ /­RES​/­66(I).

NOTES TO PAGES 3 7 – 3 9

219

4. See “Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee,” 18 September 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/Annex 4a, 206. 5. See Benjamin Gerig (US) remarks at the 2nd meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 28 August 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/SR.2, 4; Abbas Ammar (Egypt) remarks at the 4th meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 29 August 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/SR.4, 5; and W. J. A. Kernkamp (Netherlands) and William Forsyth (Australia) remarks at the 5th meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 2 September 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/SR.5, 3. 6. See William Forsyth (US) remarks at the 5th meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information u ­ nder Article 73(e) of the Charter, 2 September 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/SR.5, 4, and at the 6th meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 2 September 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/SR.6, 9; Sir Hilton Poynton tel. 131 Saving to FO, 9 September 1947, Foreign Office: General Correspondence: Po­liti­cal Department, FO 371/67541, National Archives, Kew (hereafter FO 371 with filing information); general discussion during the 12th, 13th, and 14th meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 9 and 10 September 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/SR.12, /SR.13, /SR.14; and “Information from Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73e of the Charter: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee,” 18 September 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/Annex 4a, 207. For the Trusteeship Council questionnaire, see James N. Murray Jr., The United Nations Trusteeship System (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957), 131–49. 7. For this argument, see, for example, W.  J.  A. Kernkamp (Netherlands) remarks at the 12th meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 9 September 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/ SR.12, 1–2. 8. See, for example, Roger Garreau (France), W. J. A. Kernkamp (Netherlands), and Albert de Vleeschauwer (Belgium) remarks at the 3rd meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information u ­ nder Article 73(e) of the Charter, 29 August 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/SR.3, 2, 3, 4. 9. Sir Hilton Poynton (UK) remarks at the 5th meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information u ­ nder Article 73(e) of the Charter, 2 September 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/SR.5, 7. See also Poynton remarks at the 11th meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 9 September 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/SR.9, 7. 10. For this argument, see Roger Garreau remarks at the 4th meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 29 August 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/SR.4, 2; and Benjamin Gerig remarks at the 14th meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information u ­ nder Article 73(e) of the Charter, 10 September 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/SR.14, 7. 11. Carlos P. Romulo (Philippines) remarks at the 1st meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information u ­ nder Article 73(e) of the Charter, 28 August 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/SR.1, 4. See also Taha el-­Sayed Nasr (Egypt) remarks at

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the 2nd  meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 28 August 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/SR.2, 2. 12. See Jacob Lomakin (USSR) remarks at the 2nd and 3rd meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 28 and 29 August 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/SR.2, p. 4 and /SR.3, 3. 13. See “Joint Proposal by the Representatives of China, Cuba, and India,” 9 September 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/W.26; and “Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee,” 18 September 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/Annex 4a, 205. 14. See “Draft Recommendation. Proposed by the Representative of India,” 9 September 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/W22. 15. Albert de Vleeschauwer (Belgium) remarks at the 16th meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Information on the Transmission of Information ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 11 September 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/SR.11, 5. See also Benjamin Gerig, William Forsyth, and Sir Hilton Poynton remarks at the 16th meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 11 September 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/SR.11, 5, 6–7. For the insidious nature of Article 2(7), see Carol Anderson, Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Strug­gle for ­Human Rights, 1944–1955 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 46–50; and Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi, ­Human Rights at the UN: The Po­liti­ cal History of Universal Justice (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2008), 135–36. 16. See P. P. Pillai (India), Cheng Paonan (China), Guy Pérez Cisneros (Cuba), and Abbas Ammar (Egypt) remarks at the 16th meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 11 September 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/SR.16, 5, 6. 17. “Draft Resolution Concerning the Creation of a Special Committee,” in “Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee,” 18 September 1947, UN Doc. A/AC.9/ Annex 4a, 214. 18. W. J. A. Kernkamp remarks at the 42nd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 11 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.42, 77. 19. Sir Hilton Poynton remarks at the 36th  meeting of the Fourth Committee, 3 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.36, 33; Francis B. Sayre (US) remarks at the 37th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 3 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.37, 43. See also René Mayer (France) remarks at the 36th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 3 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.36, 36. 20. Taha el-­Sayed Nasr (Egypt) remarks at the 36th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 3 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.36, 30. See also Raja Sir Maharaj Singh (India) and Boris E. Stein (USSR) remarks at the 36th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 3 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.36, 30, 34–35; and Alexei D. Voina (Ukraine) remarks at the 37th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 6 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.37, 39. 21. See “Fourth Committee: Amendment to the Last Paragraph of the Third Daft Resolution of the Ad Hoc Committee: Amendment Proposed by the Representative of France,” 6 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.4/105; “Fourth Committee: Amendments to Draft Resolution III Suggested by the Ad Hoc Committee: Amendment Proposed

NOTES TO PAGES 4 0 – 4 3

221

by the Representative of Brazil,” 7 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.4/106; “Fourth Committee: Resolution on the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee: Amendment to Draft Resolution III, Submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee: Amendment Proposed by the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” 8 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.4/111; and summary rec­ord, 42nd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 11 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.42, 72–76. 22. For the Indian proposal, see “Fourth Committee: Resolution on Trusteeship Agreements from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Resolution Proposed by the Representative of India,” 27 September 1947, UN Doc. A/C.4/98. 23. See Raja Sir Maharaj Singh remarks at the 43rd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 13 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.43, 78–79; and Singh, Abdus Sattar Pirzada (Pakistan), Joaquin E. Meyer (Cuba), and Boris E. Stein (USSR) remarks at the 44th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 14 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.44, 86–89. 24. See Arthur Creech Jones, John Foster Dulles, W. J. A. Kernkamp, René Mayer, and Pierre Ryckmans remarks at the 43rd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 13 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.43, 79–82, 83, 84. 25. See “Trusteeship Agreements for Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Report of the Fourth Committee,” 27 October 1947, UN Doc. A/423. 26. Frol P. Shmigov (Byelorus­sia) remarks at the 37th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 3 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.37, 41. See also Alexei D. Voina (Ukraine) remarks at the 37th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 3 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.37, 40. 27. Sir Hilton Poynton remarks at the 36th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 3 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.36, 30, 31, 32. 28. John Foster Dulles remarks at the 106th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 1 November 1947, UN Doc. A/PV.106, 668; Benjamin Gerig memorandum, “US Position on the Attached Tele­g ram Regarding the ­Handling by the General Assembly of Information on Non-­Self-­Governing Territories Submitted ­under Article 73(e),” 15 October 1947, Rec­ord Group 59, Bureau of United Nations Affairs: Subject File, 1941–1951, lot 55 D 323, box 15 (hereafter RG 59, lot 55 D 323, with box number). 29. See Gary B. Ostrower, The United States and United Nations (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1998), 21; and Ernest L. Kerley, “Voting on Impor­tant Questions in the United Nations General Assembly,” American Journal of International Law 53, no. 2 (1959): 324–40. 30. Francis B. Sayre remarks at the 108th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 3 November 1947, UN Doc. A/PV.108, 721. 31. Boris E. Stein remarks at the 107th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 3 November 1947, UN Doc. A/PV.107, 686. See also Raja Sir Maharaj Singh remarks at the 108th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 3 November 1947, UN Doc. A/PV.108, 711. 32. See rec­ord of the 108th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 3 November 1947, UN Doc. A/PV.108, 732. 33. Hector McNeil (UK) remarks at the 108th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 3 November  1947, UN Doc. A/PV.108, 738, 737. See also René Mayer and Francis B. Sayre remarks at the 108th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 3 November 1947, UN Doc. A/PV.108, 735, 736.

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34. Raja Sir Maharaj Singh remarks at the 108th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 3 November 1947, UN Doc. A/PV.108, 742. See also “Information on Non-­ Self-­Governing Territories: Resolution V Proposed by the Fourth Committee: India: Amendment,” 3 November 1947, UN Doc. A/446. 35. See rec­ord of the 108th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 3 November 1947, UN Doc. A/PV.108, 743–44. 36. John Foster Dulles and Hector McNeil remarks at the 106th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 1 November 1947, UN Doc. A/PV.106, 658, 661, 664. 37. See Liu Chen (China) and Raja Sir Maharaj Singh (India), remarks at the 106th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 1 November 1947, UN Doc. A/ PV.106, 653–54, 655–57. 38. See rec­ord of the 106th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 1 November 1947, UN Doc. A/PV.106, 666–67. 39. Resolution 142 (II), “Standard Form for the Guidance of Members in the Preparation of Information to be Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73e of the Charter,” 3 November 1947, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­142(II). 40. Resolution 144 (II), “Voluntary Transmission of Information Regarding the Development of Self-­Governing Institutions in the Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 3  November  1947, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​ /­144(II). 41. Resolution 146 (II), “Creation of a Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73e of the Charter,” 3 November 1947, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​ /­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​ /­ RES​ /­ 146(II). For the membership of the Special Committee, see “Constitution of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73e of the Charter: Report of the Fourth Committee,” 7 November 1947, UN Doc. A/451. 42. Cabinet Paper (48)36, Arthur Creech Jones memorandum, “United Nations General Assembly, 1947—­The Colonial Question,” 30 January 1948, Cabinet Memoranda, Rec­ord Class CAB 129/24, National Archives, Kew, ­England (hereafter CAB 129, with filing information). 43. Shiva Rao (India) remarks at the 3rd meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73e of the Charter, 3 September 1948, UN Doc. A/AC.17/SR.3, 3; “Working Paper Submitted by the Representative of India,” Appendix B, I, in “Report of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73e of the Charter,” 29 September 1948, UN Doc. A/593, 12, 13. 44. “Working Paper Submitted by the United States Representative,” Appendix B, II, in “Report of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter,” 29 September 1948, UN Doc. A/593, 13. 45. Characteristic of the administering states’ reactions to the US paper w ­ ere John Fletcher-­Cooke (UK) remarks at the 11th meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter, 9 September 1948, UN Doc. A/ AC.17/SR.11, 7–8. 46. Hermod Lannung (Denmark) remarks at the 11th meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter, 9 September 1948, UN Doc. A/AC.17/SR.11, 8. See also Pierre Ryckmans, John Fletcher-­Cooke (UK), J. W. de Stoppelaar, and Roger Garreau remarks at the 11th meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter, 9 Septem-

NOTES TO PAGES 4 6 – 4 8

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ber  1948, UN Doc. A/AC.17/SR.11, 4, 6–7, 11–14; and Garreau remarks at the 13th  meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter, 10 September 1948, UN Doc. A/AC.17/SR.13, 2. 47. A. G. Kulagenkov (USSR) remarks at the 12th meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73e of the Charter, 10 September 1948, UN Doc. A/AC.17/SR.12, 5. See also summary rec­ord of the 13th meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73e of the Charter, 10 September 1948, UN Doc. A/AC.17/SR.13, 11. 48. “Report of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter,” 29 September 1948, UN Doc. A/593, 9. For the constitution of the drafting subcommittee, see summary rec­ord of the 13th meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73e of the Charter, 10 September 1948, UN Doc. A/AC.17/SR.13, 11. For copies of the drafting subcommittee’s proposed resolutions, see Gerig tel. 1267 to State Department, 14 September 1948, RG 59, 501.BE/9-1448. 49. A. G. Kulagenkov remarks at the 16th meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter, 15 September 1948, UN Doc. A/AC.17/SR.16, 6. See also “Draft Resolution on the Transmission of Information ­under Article 73e of the Charter,” in “Report of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter,” 29 September 1948, UN Doc. A/593, 10, 16–17. 50. See “Draft Resolution Concerning a Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter,” in “Report of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter,” 29 September 1948, UN Doc. A/593, 10–11, 17; and summary rec­ord of the 16th meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73e of the Charter, 15 September 1948, UN Doc. A/AC.17/SR.16, 9–12. 51. For a sampling of Soviet bloc criticism at the 1948 Fourth Committee, see Karol Lapter (Poland) and A. G. Kulagenkov (USSR) remarks at the 54th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 11 October  1948, A/C.4/SR.54, 15–18, 20–22; A.  I. Galagan (Ukraine) remarks at the 55th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 12 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.55, 32–34; and Vladimir V. Skorobogaty (Byelorus­sia) remarks at the 56th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 13 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.56, 48–50. 52. J. S. Reid (New Zealand) remarks at the 54th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 11 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.54, 26; J. D. L. Hood (Australia) remarks at the 57th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 14 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.57, 54; Grantley Adams (UK) remarks at the 56th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 13 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.56, 43. On the administering states’ claims regarding the declarative nature of Chapter XI, see Yassin El-­Ayouty, The United Nations and Decolonization: The Role of Afro-­Asia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 29–63. 53. Hector  A. Gerona (Uruguay) and Karol Lapter (Poland) remarks at the 58th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 15 October 1948, A/C.4/SR.58, 64, 65. See also “Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Draft Resolution,” 12 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.4/134; and summary rec­ ord of the 58th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 15 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.4/ SR.58, 68.

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54. See summary rec­ord of the 58th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 15 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.58, 69; summary rec­ord of the 59th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 16 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.59, 70–73, 76–77, 78–79; and summary rec­ord of the 60th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 18 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.60, 79–80. 55. See “Report of the Special Committee (A/593): India: Proposal for a Draft Resolution V,” 12 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.4/133; Shiva Rao (India) remarks at the 57th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 14 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.57, 58–60; “Report of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter: India: Proposal for an Amended Draft Resolution,” 16 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.4/133/Rev.1; and Shiva Rao remarks at the 60th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 18 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.60, 80–81. 56. Grantley Adams (UK) and Francis B. Sayre remarks at the 60th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 18 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.60, 82, 83. See also Shiva Rao, J. D. L. Hood (Australia), and René Mayer (France) remarks at the 60th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 18 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.60, 80–81, 85, 86–87. 57. See summary rec­ord of the 60th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 18 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.60, 92–95. 58. Summary rec­ord of the 155th  plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 3 November 1948, UN Doc. A/PV.155, 393–94. 59. Resolution 218 (III), “Transmission of Information ­under Article 73e of the Charter,” 3 November  1948, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​ ?­symbol​=A ­ ​/­RES​/­218(III); Resolution 219 (III), “Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter,” 3 November  1948, http://­www​.­un​ .­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=A ­ ​/­RES​/­219(III). For elections to the Special Committee, see summary rec­ord of the 74th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 8 November 1948, A/C.4/SR.74, 267. 60. Resolution 222 (III), “Cessation of the Transmission of Information u ­ nder Article 73e of the Charter,” 3 November 1948, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​ _­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=A ­ ​/­RES​/­222(III). 61. Arthur Creech Jones confidential circular, “Transmission of Information ­under Article 73(e) of the United Nations Charter; Proceedings in the Special Committee and in the General Assembly during 1948,” 11 April 1949, Colonial Office and Pre­de­ces­ sors: Confidential General and Confidential Original Correspondence, Rec­ord Class CO 537/4587, National Archives, Kew, ­England (hereafter CO 537, with piece information); C.P.(49)24, Arthur Creech Jones memorandum, “United Nations: Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories and Trusteeship,” 7 February 1949, CAB 129/32 pt. 2. 62. For Soviet bloc voting, see Thomas Hovet Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 47–54. 63. For general coverage of the UDHR, see Normand and Zaidi, ­Human Rights, ­177–96; Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International H ­ uman Rights: Visions Seen, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 195–226; and Steven L. B. Jensen, The Making of International H ­ uman Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization, and the Reconstruction of H ­ uman Values (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 28–37. 64. Charles Malik, “Speech of Thursday, 9 December 1948,” in The Challenge of ­Human Rights: Charles Malik and the Universal Declaration, ed. Habib C. Malik (Oxford: The Center for Lebanese Studies, 2000), 117; Eleanor Roo­se­velt and Carlos Romulo

NOTES TO PAGES 5 2 – 5 5

225

remarks to the 180th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 9 December 1948, A/PV.180, 862, 867. 65. See, for example, Mary Ann Glendon, “The Deep Freeze: The Declaration in the Cold War Years,” in A World Made New: Eleanor Roo­se­velt and the Universal Declaration of ­Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2002), 193–219; and Anderson, Eyes off the Prize, 108–11, 130–35, 189–90. 66. See Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of ­Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 96–101. 67. Article 2, Resolution 217 A (III), “Universal Declaration of ­Human Rights,” 10 December 1948, http://­www​.­un​-­documents​.­net​/­a3r217a​.­htm. 68. See Lauren, Evolution of International H ­ uman Rights, 228–40; and Normand and Zaidi, ­Human Rights, 212–22. 69. “United States Policy t­ oward Colonial Areas,” 27 July 1949, RG 59, lot 55 D 323, box 18, folder: Appraisal of Colonial Policy United States. 70. See Benjamin Gerig memorandum for the files, “United States Policy t­ oward Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 22 August 1949, Rec­ord Group 59, Subject Files of Benjamin Gerig: Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs, 1944–1959, lot 60 D 257, box 18 (hereafter RG 59, lot 60 D 257, with filing information); State Department, “Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter (August–­September  1949): Position Paper on the Continuation of the Special Committee,” 24 August 1949, RG 59, 501.BE/8-2449; State Department, “Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter (August-­ September 1949): Position Paper on Pos­si­ble Means of Increasing the Effectiveness of the Special Committee,” 24 August 1949, RG 59, 501.BE/8-2449; and State Department tel. 437 to USUN (Gerig), 25 August 1949, RG 59, 501.BE/8-2449. 71. J. M. Martin (CO) to Sir Alan Burns (UKUN), 14 March 1949, CO 537/4590. See also FO United Nations (Po­liti­cal) Department to Chancery, 7 February 1949, CO 537/4590; and John Fletcher-­Cooke (UKUN) tel. 160 to CO, 16 August 1949, CO 537/4585. 72. See John Fletcher-­Cooke, Roger Garreau (France), and J. D. L. Hood (Australia) remarks to 2nd meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 26 August 1949, UN Doc. A/AC.28/SR.2, 5, 7, 8, 9. 73. Ahmed M. Farrag (Egypt) remarks to the 2nd meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 26 August 1949, UN Doc. A/AC.28/SR.2, 4. 74. Resolution 144 (II), “Voluntary Transmission of Information Regarding the Development of Self-­Governing Institutions in the Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 3 November 1947, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=A ­ ​/­RES​ /­144(II); Roger Garreau remarks at the 12th meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 2 September 1949, UN Doc. A/AC.28/SR.12, 3; “Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73e of the Charter: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Amendment to the Indian Proposal Regarding the Transmission of Information on Organs of Self-­Government in Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 2 September 1949, UN Doc. A/ AC.28/W.16. 75. Resolution 219 (III), “Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73e of the Charter,” 3 November  1948, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​

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/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­219(III). See also John Fletcher-­Cooke (UK), Sven Grafström (Sweden), and Roger Garreau remarks at the 16th meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73(e) of the Charter, 7 September 1949, UN Doc. A/AC.28/SR.16, 4–11; and Garreau remarks at the 18th meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 8 September 1949, UN Doc. A/AC.28/SR.18, 3–4. 76. See “Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73e of the Charter: Venezuela, China, Egypt, and India: Joint Draft Resolution Concerning a Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter,” 7 September 1949, UN Doc. A/AC.28/W.19; “Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter: United States: Draft Resolution Concerning the Establishment of a Special Committee,” 7 September 1949, UN Doc. A/AC.28/W.20; “Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73e of the Charter: Belgium: Amendment to the United States Draft Resolution Concerning a Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter,” 7 September 1949, UN Doc. A/AC.28/W.22; and summary rec­ord of the 18th meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 8 September 1949, UN Doc. A/AC.28/SR.18, 5, 7. 77. See “Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter: India: Revised Draft Resolution Concerning International Collaboration in Regard to Economic, Social and Educational Conditions in Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories,” 7 September 1949, UN Doc. A/AC.28/W.18/Rev.1; “Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter: Draft Report of the Rapporteur,” 12 September  1949, UN Doc. A/AC.28/W.23  A/ AC.28/W.23/Add.1. 78. John Fletcher-­Cooke to J. M. Martin, 15 September 1949, CO 537/4586; Galsworthy (CO) to Martin, 26 October 1949, CO 537/4586. See also Cecil Parrott to A. N. Galsworthy (CO), 21 October 1949, CO 537/4586. 79. For this idea, see Frank Füredi, Colonial Wars and the Politics of Third World Nationalism (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), 88–90, 104–5; and A. W. Brian Simpson, ­Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the Eu­ro­pean Convention (New York: Oxford, 2001), 294–97. 80. Guy Pérez Cisneros (Cuba) remarks at the 115th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 3 November 1949, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.155, para. 21. See Pierre-­Olivier Lapie (France) remarks at the 116th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 4 November 1949, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.116, paras. 1–20; and Lapie remarks at the 117th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 5 November 1949, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.117, paras. 5–9. 81. Voting results can be followed in the summary rec­ord of the 117th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 5 November 1949, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.117, paras. 10–61. 82. See summary rec­ords of the 120th–122nd meetings of the Fourth Committee, 9–10 November 1949, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.120-­/SR.122. 83. “Fourth Committee: Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Draft Report of the Fourth Committee,” 23 November 1949, UN Doc. A/C.4/L.59, para. 63; John Fletcher-­Cooke remarks at the 124th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 14 November  1949, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.124, para. 32. See also summary rec­ord of the 125th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 16 November 1949, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.125, para. 68.

NOTES TO PAGES 5 7 – 6 2

227

84. See summary rec­ord of the 263rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 2 December 1947, UN Doc. A/PV.263, para. 49; summary rec­ord of the 142nd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 5 December 1949, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.142, paras. 3–7; and Resolution 332 (IV), “Establishment of a Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter,” 2 December  1949, http://­www​.­un​ .­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­332(IV). 85. See Resolution 333 (IV), “Work of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73e of the Charter,” 2 December 1949, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​ /­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­332(IV). 86. See summary rec­ord of the 263rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 2 December 1947, UN Doc. A/PV.263, para. 51; and Resolution 334 (IV), “Territories to which Chapter XI of the Charter Applies,” 2 December 1949, http://­www​.­un​.­org​ /­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=A ­ ​/­RES​/­334(IV). 87. See summary rec­ord of the 263rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 2 December 1947, UN Doc. A/PV.263, para. 44; and Resolution 327 (IV), “Voluntary Transmission of Information ­under Part I of the Standard Form Concerning Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories,” 2 December 1949, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​ _­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=A ­ ​/­RES​/­327(IV). 88. K. W. Blackburne memorandum, 9 December 1949, CO 537/4589; FO circular tel. 452, 9 December 1949, CO 537/4589; John Fletcher-­Cooke paper, “The ‘Colonial Question’ at the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly, Lake Success, 1949,” enclosure from Fletcher-­Cooke to N.  D. Watson (CO), 12 December  1949, CO 537/4589. 89. Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations, Vol. 1, The Years of Western Domination, 1945–1955 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982) 3. Orga­nizational Foundations

1. See Ilya Gaiduk, Divided Together: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations, 1945–1965 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 177–80, 203–5. 2. Margaret Joy Tibbetts memorandum, “Colonial Questions and the United Nations,” enclosure to US Embassy, London, despatch 2535 to State Department, 24  May  1950, Rec­ord Group 59, decimal file 741.022/5-2450, National Archives II, College Park, MD (hereafter RG 59, with decimal number). 3. C. C. Parrott (FO) memorandum, “Brief for Foreign Office/Colonial Office Meeting on F ­ uture Policy with Regard to Colonial Questions at the United Nations,” 4 April  1950, Foreign Office: General Correspondence: Po­liti­cal Department, FO 371/88543, National Archives, Kew, ­England (hereafter FO 371 with filing information); Colonial Office draft white paper, “Memorandum by the Colonial Office on Proceedings Relating to Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 17 April 1950, Colonial Office and Pre­de­ces­sors: Confidential General and Confidential Original Correspondence, Rec­ord Class CO 537/6568. National Archives, Kew, ­England (hereafter CO 537, with piece information). 4. C. C. Parrott (FO) memorandum, “Brief for Foreign Office/Colonial Office Meeting on ­Future Policy with Regard to Colonial Questions at the United Nations.” 5. D. H. T. Hildyard (FO) minute, 6 June 1950, FO 371/88544; “Covering Brief for the Colonial Talks,” enclosure to unsigned note for Minister of State, 30 June 1950,

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FO 371/88545; Foreign Office paper, “Anglo-­American Talks on Colonial Questions, Washington—5th–12th July: General Instructions for the U.K. Representatives,” undated [circa June 1950], FO 371/66545. 6. See “US Summary Rec­ord of Colonial Policy Talks with the United Kingdom: 11:00 a.m.–1:00 p.m.,” 5 July 1950, Rec­ord Group 59, Rec­ords of the Office of Assistant Secretary and ­Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 1941–48, 1950, box 13, folder: Colonial Talks (British) (hereafter RG 59, Acheson Files, with filing information). 7. John M. Martin and John D. Hickerson in “US Summary Rec­ord of Colonial Policy Talks with the United Kingdom: 3:00–5:00 p.m.,” 5 July  1950, RG 59, Acheson Files, box 13, folder: Colonial Talks (British); FO tel. 2686 to U.K. Embassy, Washington, 10 June 1950, CO 537/6568. 8. Oliver Franks despatch 568 to FO, 13 July 1950, FO 371/88545; Dean Rusk in “US Summary Rec­ord of Colonial Policy Talks with the United Kingdom: 3:00.-5:00 p.m.,” 5 July 1950, RG 59, Acheson Files, box 13, folder: Colonial Talks (British); John D. Hickerson in “US Summary Rec­ord of Colonial Policy Talks with the United Kingdom: 3:00.-5:00 p.m.,” 5 July 1950, RG 59, Acheson Files, box 13, folder: Colonial Talks (British); John M. Martin (CO) minute, 26 July 1950, CO 537/5699. 9. John Fletcher-­Cooke (UK) remarks at the 1st meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 18 August 1950, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.1, 6. 10. See Gaiduk, Divided Together, 150–94. 11. Fletcher-­Cooke and Victor Hoo (Secretariat) remarks at the 29th meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73(e) of the Charter, 12 September 1950, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.29, 7, 9. 12. John Fletcher-­Cooke (UK) remarks at the 21st meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73(e) of the Charter, 5 September 1950, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.21, 4; Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, “Resolution on the Revision of the Standard Form (A. AC.35/L.23) as ­Adopted by the Special Committee,” 9 September 1950, UN Doc. A/ AC.35/L.25. See also general discussion at the 20th and 27th meetings of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73(e) of the Charter, 5 and 8 September 1950, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.20, 18–22, and /SR.27, 2–7. 13. Ahmed M. Farrag (Egypt) remarks at the 25th meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73(e) of the Charter, 5 September 1950, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.25, 7. See also general discussion at the 25th meeting of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73(e) of the Charter, 5 September 1950, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.25, 6–11. 14. H. Rodriguez (Cuba) remarks at the 184th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 20 November 1950, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.184, para. 21; Qazi Mohammed Isa (Pakistan) remarks at the 185th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 22 November 1950, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.185, paras. 28, 29. 15. For wider efforts to implement the UDHR and its linkage to self-­determination, see Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International ­Human Rights: Visions Seen, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 228, 234; A. W. Brian Simpson, ­Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the Eu­ro­pean Convention (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 300–308; and Roland Burke, De-

NOTES TO PAGES 6 6 – 6 9

229

colonization and the Evolution of International H ­ uman Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 7. 16. Lauren, Evolution of International ­Human Rights, 234. See also “Draft Resolution III: Information on H ­ uman Rights in Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” in “Agenda Item 34: Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” UN Doc. Annexes (V) 34, 11; “Document A/1638: Report of the Fourth Committee,” in “Agenda Item 34: Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” UN Doc. Annexes (V) 34, 8–10; and general debates of 183rd and 185th–188th meetings of the Fourth Committee, 20, 22, 24, 28 November 1950, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.183, /SR.185, /SR.186, /SR.187, and /SR.188. 17. See “Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the Secretary-­General of the United Nations,” 15 August 1950, in “Agenda Item 34: Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” UN Doc. Annexes, Fifth Session; “India: Draft Resolution on Development of Self-­Government in Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 1 September 1950, UN Doc. A/C.4/L.115; T. F. Cook (UK) remarks at and voting results in the 190th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 29 November 1950, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.190, paras. 13, 15–17. 18. Resolution 446 (V), “Information on ­Human Rights in Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 12 December 1950, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​ =­A​/­RES​/­446(V). For voting, see the plenary rec­ord of the 320th meeting of the UN General Assembly, 12 December 1950, UN Doc. A/PV.320, paras. 23–25. 19. See Resolution 448 (V), “Development of Self-­Government in Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories,” 12 December 1950, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​ _­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=A ­ ​/­RES​/­448(V); and plenary rec­ord of the 320th  meeting of the UN General Assembly, 12 December 1950, UN Doc. A/PV.320, paras. 23–25. 20. See Colonial Office paper, “Anglo-­American Talks on Colonial and Trusteeship Questions in the United Nations: Agenda Item III: Review of Tactics in Dealing with Colonial and Trusteeship Questions in 1951,” [August 1951], FO 371/95696; and James Griffiths (CO) memorandum, “Transmission of Information to the Secretary-­General of the United Nations ­under Article 73(e) of the United Nations Charter,” 23 February 1951, FO 371/95700. 21. Colonial Office paper, “Anglo-­American Talks on Colonial and Trusteeship Questions in the United Nations, 1951: Methods of Combating Soviet Propaganda in the Fourth Committee,” 28 September 1951, FO 371/95696. 22. Colonial Office paper, “Anglo-­American Talks on Colonial and Trusteeship Questions in the United Nations: Agenda Item III.” 23. Unsigned discussion brief for colonial talks, “Item IV (b) 2—­Handling of the 1951 Special Committee . . . ,” 3 October 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1951 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1979), 2:636; unsigned discussion brief for colonial talks, “Item IV [(a)] 3(a)—­Prob­lems in Connection with the Definition of the Concept of ‘Non-­Self-­Governing Territory,” 31 August 1951, FRUS, 1951, 2:630. 24. State Department paper, “Soviet Participation in United Nations Specialized and Other Multilateral Agencies, in Connection with United Nations Discussions of Dependent Area Questions,” enclosure to Gerig memorandum for Sander and Taylor, 10 January 1951, RG 59, 350/1-1051; State Department paper, “Soviet Allegations of United States Violations of the Charter of the United Nations, in Connection with United Nations Discussions of Dependent Area Questions,” enclosure to Gerig

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memorandum for Sander and Taylor, 10 January  1951, RG 59, 350/1-1051; Porter McKelver (director of information, USUN), “Memorandum on Public Information Staff Needed for Paris Session of the General Assembly,” 3 August 1951, enclosure to McKelver to Gordon Gray (director, National Psychological Strategy Board), 3 August 1951, Harry S. Truman Papers, Staff Member and Office Files: Psychological Strategy Board Files, box 26, folder: 334 United Nations, Truman Library, In­de­pen­dence, Missouri (hereafter Truman Papers, SMOF: PSB, with filing information); unsigned discussion brief for colonial talks, “Item IV (b) 8—­More Effective Mea­sures to ­Counter Soviet-­Inspired Propaganda Activities in Colonial Areas and Soviet Exploitation of the Theme of ‘Western Imperialism’ in Their Propaganda,” 4 September  1951, FRUS, 1951, 2:643. 25. John M. Martin and Benjamin Gerig (State Department) in FO memorandum, “Anglo-­American Colonial Talks: Opening Meeting,” 10 October 1951, FO 371/95699. For discussion of Gerig’s claim regarding African American anticolonialism, see Penny Von Eschen, Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). 26. William Sanders (special assistant to Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs John D. Hickerson) in FO memorandum, “Anglo-­American Colonial Talks: Third Meeting,” 12 October 1951, FO 371/95699; John M. Martin in FO memorandum, “Anglo-­American Colonial Talks: Third Meeting.” 27. “United States Del­e­ga­tion: Amendments to the Revision of the Standard Form,” 26 September 1951, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SC.1/L.6. For the subcommittee’s discussion of the Standard Form, see summary rec­ords of the 1st–5th meetings of the Standard Form Sub-­Committee, 27–28 September and 2 October 1951, UN Doc. A/AC.35/ SC.1/SR.1-­/SR.5; “Second Report of the Standard Form Sub-­Committee,” 2 October 1951, UN Doc. A/AC.35/L.67; “Draft Report on Revision of the Standard Form,” 16 October 1951, UN Doc. A/AC.35/L. 69/Add.1; and W. A. C. Mathieson (CO) to W. G. Wilson (CO), 28 September 1951, FO 371/95739. 28. A. A. Soldatov (Soviet Union) remarks at the 39th meeting of the Special Committee on Information, 15 October 1951, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.39, 6. For voting results, see the 39th meeting of the Special Committee on Information, 15 October 1951, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.39, 21, 22. 29. A. A. Soldatov (Soviet Union) remarks at the 44th meeting of the Special Committee on Information, 22 October 1951, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.44, 24. For pre-­meeting consultation on this ­matter among the administering states, see W. A. C. Mathieson (UKUN) to W. G. Wilson (CO), 15 October 1951, FO 371/95740. 30. “Report of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter (2–27 October 1951): Part Four: Report on F ­ actors Which Should Be Taken into Account in Deciding ­Whether a Territory Is or Is Not a Territory Whose ­People Have Not Yet Attained a Full Mea­sure of Self-­Government,” November 1951, UN Doc. A/1836, 42. 31. W. A. C. Mathieson, “Report on 1951 Session of Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73(e) of the United Nations Charter,” 30 October 1951, FO 371/95740. For voting, see summary rec­ord of the 47th  meeting of the Special Committee on Information, 25 October 1951, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.47, 15, 23. 32. Georges Mavros (Greece) remarks at the 208th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 22 November 1951, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.208, para. 2; Gladwyn Jebb (UK) re-

NOTES TO PAGES 7 3 – 7 5

231

marks at the 211th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 26 November 1951, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.211, para. 9. The entire opening debate of the committee can be followed in the summary rec­ords of its 205th–211th meetings, 19–26 November 1951, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.205-­/SR.211 For internal British discussion of this ­matter, see C. P. Hope minute, “Attempts by the Fourth Committee to Assume the Right to Consider the Po­liti­cal Affairs of Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 21 November 1951, FO 371/95754; FO tel. 1030 to Foreign Secretary (Rome), 26 November 1951, FO 371/95754; Commonwealth Relations Office circular tel. 660, 28 November 1951, FO 371/95755; and A. T. Lennox-­Boyd to Selwyn Lloyd, 30 November 1951, FO 371/95755. 33. W. A. C. Mathieson (UK) and U Tun Shein (Burma) remarks at the 214th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 28 November 1951, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.214, paras. 6, 7. See also the entire summary rec­ord of the 214th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 28 November 1951, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.214; and “Report of the Fourth Committee: Revision of the Standard Form,” 3 December 1951, UN Doc. A/1991. 34. Channing H. Tobias (US) remarks at the 216th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 1 December 1951, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.216, para. 47. The Fourth Committee’s full consideration of the f­ actors question may be found in summary rec­ords of its 215th– 218th meetings, 29 November–3 December 1951, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.215-­/SR.218. 35. “Denmark, Guatemala, Pakistan, and Venezuela: Draft Resolution: Sub-­ Committee to Study the ­Factors Which Should Be Taken into Account in Deciding ­Whether a Territory Is or Is Not a Territory Whose P ­ eople Have Not Yet Attained a Full Mea­sure of Self-­Government,” 3 December 1951, UN Doc. A/C.4/L.155; Perez Cisneros (Cuba) remarks to the 1st meeting of Sub-­Committee 9, 4 December 1951, UN Doc. A/C.4/SC.9/SR.1, 15 January 1952, p. 3; Perez Cisneros (Cuba) remarks at the 421st meeting of Fourth Committee, 9 January 1952, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.241, para. 50. See also “Draft Report: Territories to Which the Provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter Apply,” 19 December 1951, UN Doc. A/C.4/SC.9/L.14; and “Report of the Fourth Committee,” 15 January 1952, UN Doc. A/2057, 2–6, 13–19. 36. See plenary rec­ord of the 361st meeting of UN General Assembly, 18 January 1952, UN Doc. A/PV.361, paras. 99–123. 37. Resolution 551 (VI), “Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Revision of the Standard Form,” 7 December 1951, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​ /­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­551(VI); and Resolution 567 (VI), “­Future Procedure for the Continuation of the Study of ­Factors Which Should Be Taken into Account in Deciding ­Whether a Territory Is or Is Not a Territory Whose ­People Have Not Yet Attains a Full Mea­sure of Self-­Government,” 18 January 1952, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​ /­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­567(VI). 38. For the committee’s new name, see Resolution 569 (VI), “New Title for the Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73e of the Charter,” 18 January  1952, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​ /­569(VI). 39. See Lauren, Evolution of International H ­ uman Rights, 235; and Resolution 545 (VI), “Inclusion in the International Covenant or Covenants on H ­ uman Rights of an Article Relating to the Right of ­Peoples to Self-­Determination,” 5 February 1952, http://­ www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­545(VI). 40. See Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonization, 1918–1968 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 168–70; and Frank Heinlein, British

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TO PAGES 7 5 –7 8

Government Policy and Decolonization, 1945–1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 87–147. 41. Anthony Eden (Foreign Secretary) memorandum, “­Handling of Colonial Questions at the United Nations: The Question of Withdrawal in Certain Circumstances,” 8 July 1952, C. (52) 232, Cabinet Memoranda, Rec­ord Class CAB 129/53, 219, National Archives, Kew, ­England (hereafter CAB 129, with filing information). 42. D. I. Dunnett (CO) minute, 24 March 1952, FO 371/101376; CO memorandum, “Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: 1952 Session: Brief for United Kingdom Representative,” enclosure to W. G. Wilson (CO) to D. I. Dunnett (FO), 22 August 1952, FO 371/101378. 43. See Ruth Bacon (Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs) memorandum, “The Fourth Committee of the General Assembly with Special Reference to the Sixth Assembly,” 17 July 1952, RG 59, 320.14/7-1752; Working Group of Colonial Prob­lems, ­Future of the UN Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” CP D-9, 28 July 1952, RG 59, lot 60 D 257, box 18; Working Group of Colonial Prob­lems, US Position in Ad Hoc Committee on F ­ actors,” CP D-13, 27 August 1952, RG 59, lot 60 D 257, box 18; State Department position paper, “Transmission and Discussion of Po­ liti­cal Information u ­ nder Article 73(e),” SD/A/C.4/99, 6 October  1952, RG 59, 320/10-2952; and State Department circular airgram to certain American diplomatic officers, 18 October 1952, RG 59, 320/10-1852. Committee membership can be followed in “Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter (1950–52), Third Session: List of Representatives,” 29 September 1952, UN Doc. A/AC.35/Inf.6/Rev.1. 44. John M. Martin (CO) to Paul Mason (FO), 7 October 1952, FO 371/101386. See also FO memorandum, “Summary Report on Anglo-­American Conversations on the United Nations Held in Washington, 22nd to 24th September 1952,” undated, enclosure to Sir Oliver Franks (UK ambassador, Washington), despatch 466 to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, 13 October  1952, FO 371/101386; “United States Informal Minutes of Meeting between the United States and United Kingdom Groups (Third Session), Washington, September 23, 1952, 3:20 p.m.,” undated, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1952–1954 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1979), 3:26–29; “United States Informal Minutes of Meeting between the United States and United Kingdom Groups (Fourth Session), Washington, September 24, 1952, 3:20 p.m.,” undated, FRUS, 1952–1954, 3:29–31; and “Informal Minutes of Colonial Policy Talks with the United Kingdom, Washington, September 1952, 10 a.m.–1 p.m.,” 30 September 1952, FRUS, 1952–1954, 3:1258–63. 45. Muhammad Asad (Pakistan), Pierre Ryckmans (Belgium), Léon Pignon (France), W. A. C. Mathieson (UK) remarks at the 67th meeting of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 2 October 1952, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.67, 3, 7, 10, 5, 11. 46. A. A. Roschin (USSR) remarks at the 67th meeting of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 2 October 1952, UN Doc. A/AC.35/ SR.67, 17; William I. Cargo (US) remarks at the 68th meeting of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 2 October 1952, UN Doc. A/AC.35/ SR.68, 3. See also summary rec­ord of the 69th meeting of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 3 October  1952, UN Doc. A/AC.35/ SR.69, 3–6.

NOTES TO PAGES 7 9 – 8 3

233

47. “Draft Resolution IV: Renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-­ Self-­Governing Territories,” in “Agenda Item 33: Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories Transmitted ­under Article 73 e of the Charter: Reports of the Secretary-­ General and of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: (a) Information on Social Conditions and Development: (b) Information on Other Conditions; (c) Transmission of Information,” Annexes, Seventh Session. The full Fourth Committee discussion, including opening statements and general debate, can be followed in the summary rec­ords of the 251st–260th and 264th–267th meetings of the Fourth Committee, 23–31 October and 5–8 November 1952, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.251­/SR.260 and /SR.264-­/SR.267. 48. For the ad hoc committee’s report and related documents, see “Agenda Item 36: F ­ actors Which Should Be Taken into Account in Deciding ­Whether a Territory Is or Is Not a Territory Whose P ­ eople Have Not Yet Attained a Full Mea­sure of Self-­ Government,” UN Doc. Annexes, Seventh Session. 49. “­Factors Which Should Be Taken into Account in Deciding ­Whether a Territory Is or Is Not a Territory Whose P ­ eople Have Not Yet Attained a Full Mea­sure of Self-­Government: Joint Draft Resolution of Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Guatemala, Iraq, and Venezuela,” 13 November 1952, UN Doc. A/C.4/L.231. The entire discussion of the ­factors question can be followed in the summary rec­ords of the 271st–279th meetings of the Fourth Committee, 12–19 November 1952, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.271-­/SR.279. 50. Indian proposal presented in the official rec­ord of the 402nd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 10 December 1952, A/PV.402, para. 142. See also official rec­ ord of the 402nd plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 10 December 1952, A/PV.402, paras. 8–146; Resolution 646 (VII), “Renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 10 December 1952, http://­www​.­un​ .­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­646(VII) (also contains membership information); and Resolution 648 (VII), “­Factors Which Should Be Taken into Account in Deciding ­Whether a Territory Is or Is Not a Territory Whose ­People Have Not Yet Attained a Full Mea­sure of Self-­Government,” 10 December 1952, http://­ www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­648(VII). 51. For the 1952 campaign, see John Robert Greene, The Crusade: The Presidential Election of 1952 (Lanham, MD: University Press of Amer­i­ca, 1985). 4. Rhe­toric and Routine

1. For the “package deal” that led to the new member-­states’ admission, see Ilya Gaiduk, Divided Together: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations, 1945– 1965 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 210–15. 2. Eisenhower’s overall psychological warfare policy can be followed in Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda ­Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006). 3. The Soviet anticolonial campaign at the United Nations can be followed in Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations: An Inquiry into Soviet Motives and Objectives (New York: Praeger, 1962), 116–29. For Soviet thinking regarding the Third World and decolonization in general, see Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 39–72.

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4. See Caroline Pruden, Conditional Partners: Eisenhower, the United Nations, and the Search for a Permanent Peace (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998), 66–69, 305–6. 5. On t­hese themes, see, for example, Carole K. Fink, Cold War: An International History, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2017), 92–94; and Philip E. Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist Leaders (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 5–9. 6. See George White Jr., Holding the Line: Race, Racism, and American Foreign Policy ­toward Africa, 1953–1961 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 1–39; and Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 86–104. 7. For the new administration’s general propaganda approach, see Pruden, Conditional Partners, 70–72, 74–76, 176; and Gaiduk, Divided Together, 208–10. 8. See, for example, H. S. Craig memorandum for the rec­ord, “Conversation with Ambassador Lodge,” 4 May  1953, C.  D. Jackson Rec­ords, box 4, folder: Lodge, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter Jackson Rec­ords, with filing information); Wallace R. Irwin Jr. (Office of Evaluation and Review) memorandum for the rec­ord, “ ‘­Human Rights’—­Consultation with Ambassador Lodge and USUN Staff,” 22 May 1953, Jackson Rec­ords, box 4, folder: Lodge; A. P. Toner, “Notes on Ambassador Lodge’s Meeting with Contributors to GA Proj­ect,” 4 August 1953, Psychological Strategy Board Rec­ords, box 23, folder PSB 334 UN (6), Eisenhower Library (hereafter PSB Rec­ords, with filing information). 9. Unsigned memorandum, “COSMOS,” 13 July 1953, enclosure to Richard Hirsch memorandum to Byron K. Enyart (acting assistant director for plans, PSB), “COSMOS,” 27 August 1953, PSB Rec­ords, box 23, folder PSB 334 UN (9). 10. Arthur M. Cox memorandum to Mr. Mallory Browne, “Mr. Irwin’s Attached Draft Paper on the Lodge Proj­ect,” 3 June 1953, PSB Rec­ords, box 23, folder PSB 334 UN (2). For additional criticisms, see Gaiduk, Divided Together, 209–10. 11. For historical accounts that support Cox’s assessment, see Matthew Connelly, “Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-­South Conflict during the Algerian War for In­de­pen­dence,” American Historical Review 105, no. 3 (2000): 739–69; and Jason C. Parker, “Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Reperiodization of the Postwar Era,” Diplomatic History 30, no. 5 (2006): 867–92. 12. US memorandum to the Secretary-­General of the United Nations, 30 April 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1979), 3:1310. 13. M. S. Williams (FO) to Sir Christopher Steel (British embassy, Washington), 17 June 1953, Colonial Office and Commonwealth Office: International and General Department and Pre­de­ces­sors: Original Correspondence, Rec­ord Class CO 936/1/4, National Archives, Kew, E ­ ngland (hereafter CO 936, with filing information). See also W. G. Wilson (CO) to C. L. S. Cope (FO), 23 July 1953, CO 936/96; Michael S. Williams (CO) to Sir Gladwyn Jebb (UK del­e­ga­tion to UN), 4 August 1953, CO 936/96; and Gladwyn Jebb (UK del­e­ga­tion to UN) to Michael S. Williams (FO), 24 August 1953, CO 936/96. 14. “Communication Addressed to the Chairman of the Committee [on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories] by the Acting Permanent Representative

NOTES TO PAGES 8 5 – 8 8

235

of Belgium to the United Nations, 18 August  1953, UN Doc. A/AC.35/L.142, 2; W.  A.  C. Mathieson memorandum, “Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories, Fourth Session, 1953: Report by United Kingdom Representative,” 10 September  1953, Foreign Office: General Correspondence: Po­ liti­ cal Department, FO 371/107072, National Archives, Kew (hereafter FO 371 with filing information). See also “Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: List of Documents Issued,” 25 September 1953, UN Doc. A/AC.35/Inf.7/Rev. 1, 4. 15. See remarks of R. Piracha (Pakistan) at the 87th meeting of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 3 September 1953, UN Doc. A/ AC.35/SR.87, 12–13. 16. Remarks of Sergio Armando Frazão (Brazil) at the 82nd meeting of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 31 August 1953, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.82, 3; Resolution 448 (V), “Development of Self-­Government in Non-­ Self-­Governing Territories,” 12 December  1950, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​ /­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­448(V). See also summary rec­ords of the 81st– 84th meetings of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 28 August–1 September 1953, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.81-­/SR.84; and “Report of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” UN Doc. A/2465, paras. 27–67. 17. “Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on F ­ actors (Non-­Self-­Governing Territories),” in Agenda Item 33, “­Factors Which Should Be Taken into Account in Deciding ­Whether a Territory Is or Is Not a Territory Whose P ­ eople Have Not Yet Attained a Full Mea­sure of Self-­Government: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on F ­ actors (Non-­ Self-­Governing Territories),” UN Doc. Annexes (VIII) 33, para. 50. 18. Remarks of Ahmed S. Bokhari (Pakistan) at the 323rd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 1 October 1953, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.323, para. 32. The Fourth Committee’s full debate on the ­factors question can be followed in summary rec­ords of the 322nd–331st meetings, 1–12 October 1953, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.322-­/SR.331. 19. Frances Payne Bolton (US) remarks at the 336th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 19 October 1953, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.336, para. 28. For the committee’s general debate, see summary rec­ords of the 332nd–343rd  meetings of the Fourth Committee, 13–26 October 1953, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.332-­/SR.343; and “Report of the Fourth Committee,” in Agenda Item 32, “Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories Transmitted u ­ nder Article 73 e of the Charter: Reports of the Secretary-­General and of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” UN Doc. Annexes (VIII) 32. 20. For broad discussion, see Ernest L. Kerley, “Voting on Impor­tant Questions in the United Nations General Assembly.” American Journal of International Law 53, no. 2 (1959): 324–40. 21. Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto (Mexico) remarks at the 459th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 27 November 1953, UN Doc. A/PV.459, paras. 19, 25, 30. See the full plenary rec­ord of that meeting for the vari­ous votes and general confusion regarding the Mexican proposal. 22. See the 459th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 27 November 1953, UN Doc. A/PV.459 (voting results in paras. 73, 160); Resolution 742 (VIII), “­Factors Which Should Be Taken into Account In Deciding ­Whether a Territory Is or Is Not a Territory Whose ­People Have Not Yet Attained a Full Mea­sure of Self-­Government,”

23 6 NOTES

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27 November  1953, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​ /­RES​/­742(VIII); Resolution 748 (VIII), “Cessation of the Transmission of Information ­under Article 73 e of the Charter in Re­spect of Puerto Rico,” 27 November 1953, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=A ­ ​/­RES​/­748(VIII). 23. Unsigned memorandum, “Colonial Questions in the United Nations, 1954: Brief for Conversations with the United States and Canadian Officials in Washington and Ottawa, July 26th to 28th and 29th to 30th, 1954,” enclosure to D. M. Cleary (CRO) to Neal Pritchard (UK embassy, Ottawa), 26 July 1954, Dominions Office and Commonwealth Relations Office: Original Correspondence, Rec­ord Class DO 35/6952, National Archives, Kew, ­England (hereafter DO 35, with piece number). 24. Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) memorandum for the Operations Coordinating Board assistants, “Topics for Exploitation in Ninth General Assembly,” 26 May 1954, White House Office Files, National Security Council, Operations Coordinating Board Central Files, box 103, folder: UN File 1 (8), Eisenhower Library (hereafter WHOF, NSC, OCB Central Files, with filing information); Operations Coordinating Board staff, “Information Briefs for United Nations Working Group,” 14 July 1954, WHOF, NSC, OCB Central Files, box 103, folder: UN File 1 (9). 25. State Department memorandum, “US-­UK Colonial Talks, July 26, 1954: Item 2. Review of the Basic Princi­ples Motivating Our Respective Attitudes to Colonial Questions in the UN,” [summer 1954], RG 59, lot 60 D 257, box 18; State Department memorandum, “US-­UK Colonial Talks, July 26, 1954: Item 3. Possibility of Discussion in the Fourth Committee of the Po­liti­cal Affairs of Par­tic­u­lar Territories,” [summer 1954], Rec­ord Group 59, Subject Files of Benjamin Gerig: Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs, 1944–1959, lot 60 D 257, box 18 (hereafter RG 59, lot 60 D 257, with filing information). 26. See Office of Dependent Area Affairs memorandum, “US-­UK Colonial Talks Held in the Department of State, July 26–26, 1954,” FRUS, 1952–1954 3:1399; and Colonial Office memorandum, “Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: 1954 Session, Brief for the United Kingdom Representative,” [summer 1954], FO 371/112411. 27. Avtar Singh (India) remarks at the 102nd meeting of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 8 September 1954, UN Doc. A/AC.35/ SR.102, 9; Allan H. Loomes (Australia) remarks at the 103rd meeting of the Committee on Information, 8 September 1954, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.103, 10; Benjamin Gerig (US) remarks at the 104th meeting of the Committee on Information, 9 September  1954, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.104, 6. See also the full rec­ords of the 103rd  and 104th meetings of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 8 and 9 September 1954, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.103 and /SR.104; and “Report of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 1954, UN Doc. A/2729, paras. 47–65, which notes that Australia, Denmark, France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom joined the United States in deeming responsibility to determine a territory’s status to rest solely with the administering state. 28. I. Z. Shtokalo (Ukraine) and A. M. Kuchkarov (USSR) remarks at the 415th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 28 October 1954, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.415, paras. 45, 11; C. D. Jackson (US) remarks at the 412th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 25 October 1954, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.412, para. 10. The entire debate can be followed in the summary rec­ords of the 410th–422nd meetings of the Fourth Committee, 20 Oc-

NOTES TO PAGES 9 2 – 9 5

237

tober-5 November 1954, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.410-­/SR.422; and “Report of the Fourth Committee,” in Agenda Item 31, “Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories Transmitted ­under Article 73 e of the Charter: Reports of the Secretary-­General and of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” UN Doc. Annexes (IX) 31. 29. Discussion of the proposal can be followed in summary rec­ords of the 422nd– 424th meetings of the Fourth Committee, 5–8 November 1954, UN Doc. A/C.4/ SR.422-­/SR.424. See also B. O. B. Gidden (UKUN) memorandum, “General Assembly Ninth Session: Report of the Fourth Committee,” December 1954, CO 936/313. 30. Lannung (Denmark) remarks at the 431st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 12 November 1954, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.431, para. 19. See also “Cessation of the Transmission of Information u ­ nder Article 73e of the Charter in Re­spect of Greenland—­ Brazil, Guatemala, India, and Peru: Draft Resolution,” 11 November 1954, UN Doc. A/C.4/L.354; “Uruguay: Amendment to Draft Resolution A/C.4/L354,” 11 November 1954, UN Doc. A/C.4/L.358; summary rec­ords of 429th–432nd meetings of the Fourth Committee, 11–12 November 1954, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.429-­/SR.432; and “Cessation of the Transmission of Information ­under Article 73 e of the Charter: Report of the Fourth Committee,” 19 November 1954, UN Doc. A/2795, paras. 1–8. 31. Aleksandar Bozovic (Yugo­slavia) remarks at the 433rd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 15 November 1954, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.433, para. 19; J. V. Scott (New Zealand) remarks at the 434th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 15 November 1954, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.434, para. 1. See also “Consideration of Communications Relating to the Cessation of the Transmission of Information u ­ nder Article 73 e of the Charter: Greece, Indonesia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Syria: Draft Resolution,” 10 November 1954, UN Doc. A/C.4/L.356; C. W. A. Schurmann (Netherlands), A. M. Ade Johnson (US), and Daniel Massonet (Belgium) remarks at the 433rd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 15 November 1954, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.433, paras. 10–11, 23–25, 57–58; and “Cessation of the Transmission of Information ­under Article 73 e of the Charter: Report of the Fourth Committee,” 19 November 1954, UN Doc. A/2795, paras. 9–20. 32. Resolution 848 (IX), “Voluntary Transmission of Information on Po­liti­cal Development in Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 22 November 1954, http://­www​.­un​ .­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­848(IX). See also Anthony Nutting (UK), Léon Pignon (France), Sir Percy Spender (Australia), and Pierre Ryckmans (Belgium) remarks at the 498th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 22 November 1954, UN Doc. A/PV.498, paras. 70–78, and voting results in para. 81. 33. Resolution 849 (IX), “Cessation of the Transmission of Information u ­ nder Article 73 e of the Charter in Re­spect of Greenland,” 22 November 1954, http://­www​ .­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=A ­ ​/­RES​/­849(IX). See also the full debate in the verbatim transcripts of the 498th and 499th plenary meetings of the General Assembly, 22 November 1954, UN Doc. A/PV.498, paras. 68–96, and A/PV.499, paras. 111–96; and Resolution 850 (IX), “Consideration of Communications Relating to the Cessation of the Transmission of Information u ­ nder Article 73 e of the Charter,” 22 November 1954, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=A ­ ​/­RES​ /­850(IX). 34. H. T. Bourdillon (CO) memorandum, “Her Majesty’s Government’s Policy ­towards the F ­ uture of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing

23 8 NOTES

TO PAGES 9 5 –9 7

Territories,” enclosure to Bourdillon to Ivor T. M. Pink (FO), 20 January 1955, FO 371/117426. 35. I. T. M. Pink minute, “United Kingdom Policy on Colonial Questions at the United Nations,” 8 January 1955, FO 371/117416. 36. The nonadministering members w ­ ere Brazil, Burma, China, Guatemala, India, Iraq, and Peru. See “Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, Sixth Session: List of Representatives,” 2 May 1955, UN Doc. A/AC.35/Inf.12/Rev.2. 37. See the ­whole debate on renewal, including voting results, in the summary rec­ ords of the 123rd–124th and 127th–128th meetings of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 9 and 11 May 1955, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.123­/SR.124, /SR.127-­/SR.128; “Question of the Renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Continuation of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Draft Resolution: Burma, India, Iraq,” 5 May 1955, UN Doc. A/AC.35/L.209; “Question of the Renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Brazil: Working Paper Relating to Amendments to Draft Resolution A/AC.35/L.209,” 9 May 1955, UN Doc. A/AC.35/L.211; and “Question of the Renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Continuation of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: China and the United States of Amer­i­ca: Amendments to Draft Resolution of Burma, India, Iraq (A/AC.35/L.209),” 11 May 1955, UN Doc. A/AC.25/L.215. 38. Mason Sears (US) remarks at the 124th meeting of Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 9 May 1955, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.124, 4. 39. Olcott H. Demig memorandum to Francis O. Wilcox, “The 10th General Assembly from a Public Relations Point of View,” 21 December 1955, Rec­ord Group 59, Office Files of Francis O. Wilcox, 1954–1957, lot 60 D 113, box 43, folder: 10th General Assembly (hereafter RG 59, lot 60 D 113, with filing information). 40. See Justin Hart, Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 163. 41. See, for example, Michael H. Hunt, “Conclusions: The Decolonization Puzzle in US Policy—­Promise versus Per­for­mance,” in The United States and Decolonization: Power and Freedom, ed. David Ryan and Victor Pungong (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 207–29. For indications that some US officials recognized the difficulty of their position, see Parker, “Cold War II,” 885–89. 42. Full coverage of the conference can be found in Chris Tudda, “The Bandung Conference: The Rise of the Developing World,” in Cold War Summits: A History, From Potsdam to Malta (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 37–66. 43. UN member-­states Af­ghan­i­stan, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen and non-­UN members Cambodia, Ceylon, the Gold Coast, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Nepal, the ­People’s Republic of China, Sudan, the Demo­cratic Republic of Vietnam, and the State of Vietnam attended the conference. 44. “Speech by President Sukarno of Indonesia at the Opening of the Conference,” in National Committee for the Commemoration of the Thirteenth Anniversary of the Asian-­African Conference, Asia-­Africa Speaks from Bandung, National Committee for the Commemoration of the Thirteenth Anniversary of the Asian-­African Conference ( Jakarta: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1985), 6; Nasser speech, in

NOTES TO PAGES 9 8 – 1 0 1

239

Asia-­Africa Speaks from Bandung, 54; Nehru speech, in Asia-­Africa Speaks from Bandung, 165, 166. 45. Roland Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International H ­ uman Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 33, 34. 46. Bandung Conference final communiqué, 24 April 1955, http://­fds​.­oup​.­com​ /­www​.­oup​.­co​.­uk​/­pdf​/­bt​/­cassese​/­cases​/­part3​/­ch18​/­1702​.­pdf. 47. Burke, Decolonization, 27. For discussion of t­ hese speeches, see Burke, Decolonization, 27–33. For the US role in encouraging them, see Parker, “Cold War II,” 876, 881. 48. See Sir John Kotelawala, An Asian Prime Minister’s Story (London: George G. Harp, 1956), 186–87; and Burke, Decolonization, 32. 49. Burke, Decolonization, 32–33. 50. Bandung Conference final communiqué, 24 April 1955. See also Burke, Decolonization, 33; and Parker, “Cold War II,” 881–83. 51. Bandung Conference final communiqué, 24 April 1955. 52. On this point and the evolution of the Asian-­African group, see Thomas Hovet Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1959), 78–91; Thomas Hovet Jr., Africa in the United Nations (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1963), 24–26; and Ryan M. Irwin, Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3–5. 53. Bandung Conference final communiqué, 24 April 1955. 54. Colonial Office memorandum, “Colonial Questions in the United Nations, 1955: Brief for Conversations with United States and Canadian Officials in Washington and Ottawa, August 23rd–24th and 25th–26th, 1955,” summer 1955, CO 936/318. 55. Henry Cabot Lodge, “An Informed Amer­i­ca and a F ­ ree World,” Address to the Benjamin Franklin Magazine Awards Dinner, 11 May 1955, Henry Cabot Lodge Papers, box 25, folder: UN Speeches and Press, 1955, Mas­sa­chu­setts Historical Society, Boston. For reaction within the Eisenhower administration to Bandung, including debate on how best to respond, see also Parker, “Cold War II,” 881–83. 56. “Item 2: Effects of the Bandung Conference upon the Attitude of Del­e­ga­tions ­towards Colonial Questions,” enclosure to Benjamin Gerig (Office of Dependent Area Affairs) memorandum, “Forthcoming Talks with the United Kingdom on Certain Colonial Questions Arising in the Next General Assembly,” 17 August  1955, RG 59, 321.4/8-1755; “Item 3: Review of Basic Princi­ples Motivating Our Respective Attitudes on Colonial Questions,” enclosure to Benjamin Gerig (Office of Dependent Area Affairs) memorandum, “Forthcoming Talks with the United Kingdom on Certain Colonial Questions Arising in the Next General Assembly,” 17 August  1955, RG 59, 321.4/8-1755. 57. British rec­ord, “Pre-­General Assembly U.K.-­U.S. Talks on Colonial Questions,” autumn 1955, CO 936/317. 58. B. O. B. Gidden (CO) memorandum, “General Assembly—­Tenth Session: Report on the Fourth Committee,” fall 1955, CO 936/314; Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto (Mexico) remarks at the 473rd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 10 October 1955, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.473, para. 56. 59. Gonzalo Apunte (Ec­ua­dor) remarks at the 487th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 26 October 1955, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.487, para. 2. The full debate on this resolution may be followed in summary rec­ords of the 485th and 487th meetings of the

24 0 NOTES

TO PAGES 1 0 1 –1 0 5

Fourth Committee, 25 and 26 October 1955, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.485 and /SR.487. See also “Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories Transmitted ­under Article 73 e of the Charter: Reports of the Secretary-­General and of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Cuba, Ec­ua­dor, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Syria, and Yugo­slavia: Draft Resolution,” 21 October 1955, UN Doc. A/C.4/L.397. 60. The entire debate on ­matters related to the non-­self-­governing territories can be followed in summary rec­ords of the 487th–489th meetings of the Fourth Committee, 26 and 27 October 1955, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.487-­/SR.489. 61. Laird Bell (US) remarks to 474th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 12 October 1955, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.474, para. 54. 62. E. G. Hanrott (CO) to B. O. B. Gidden, 5 November 1955, CO 936/342; Gidden to J. E. Marnham, 13 January 1956, CO 936/314. See also verbatim transcript of the 541st plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 8 November 1955, UN Doc. A/PV.541; Resolution 932 (X), “Pro­g ress Achieved by the Non-­Self-­Governing Territories in Pursuance of Chapter XI of the Charter, 8 November 1955, http://­www​ .­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­932(X); Resolution 933 (X), “Renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 8 November  1955, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​ /­933(X); verbatim transcript, 549th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 29 November 1955, UN Doc. A/PV.549, para. 51; and Committee on Information membership list, 10 May 1956, UN Doc. A/AC.35/Inf.14/Rev.3. 63. See Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations, Vol. 1, The Years of Western Domination, 1945–1955 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982). 5. Taking Off the Gloves

1. See United Nations, “Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945–­Pre­sent,” http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­sections​/­member​-­states​/­growth​-­united​-­nations​-­membership​ -­1945​-­present​/­index​.­html. 2. For coverage of the growing power of the African states at the United Nations, see Thomas Hovet Jr., Africa in the United Nations (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1963); and Yassin El-­Ayouty, The United Nations and Decolonization: The Role of Afro-­Asia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971). 3. Ilya Gaiduk, Divided Together: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations, 1945–1965 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 215. 4. For overviews, see Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the M ­ iddle East (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); William Burr, “Avoiding the Slippery Slope: The Eisenhower Administration and the Berlin Crisis, November 1958–­January 1959,” Diplomatic History 18, no. 2 (1994): 177–205; and Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). 5. See, for example, Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-­Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2008); and Jeremy Friedman, Shadow Cold War: The Sino-­Soviet Competition for the Third World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015).

NOTES TO PAGES 1 0 6 – 1 0 9

241

6. Adnan Pachachi (Iraq) remarks at the 144th meeting of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 10 May 1956, UN Doc. A/AC.35/ SR.144, 10, 11; Pachachi remarks at the 146th meeting of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 15 May  1956, UN Doc. A/AC.35/ SR.146, 4. 7. Mason Sears (US) remarks at the 146th meeting of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 15 May  1956, UN Doc. A/AC.35/ SR.146, 5. 8. “Brief for Conversations with United States and Canadian Officials in Washington and Ottawa, October 1956: Colonial Questions in the United Nations, 1956,” October  1956, Dominions Office and Commonwealth Relations Office: Original Correspondence, Rec­ord Class DO 35/6953, National Archives, Kew, E ­ ngland (hereafter DO 35, with piece number); “Statement of Mr. Phillips (U.S. State Department) at Colonial Talks, on October 11, 1956,” 11 October 1956, Colonial Office and Commonwealth Office: International and General Department and Pre­de­ces­sors: Original Correspondence, Rec­ord Class CO 936/318, National Archives, Kew, E ­ ngland (hereafter CO 936, with filing information). 9. Eisenhower quoted in Peter L. Hahn, The United States, ­Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945–1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 232. 10. See Gaiduk, Divided Together, 215–20. 11. See Gaiduk, Divided Together, 219–22; and Roland Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International ­Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 46–48. 12. Wm. Roger Louis, “Public ­Enemy Number One: Britain and the United Nations in the Aftermath of Suez,” in Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 696. See also Louis, “American Anti-­Colonialism, Suez, and the Special Relationship” and “The United Nations and Suez: British Ambivalence ­towards the Pope on the East River,” in Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, 589–608, 665–88. 13. V. D. Carpio (Philippines) remarks at the 605th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 21 January 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.605, para. 24. See also the full general debate, in 601st–605th meetings of the Fourth Committee, 18–21 January 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.601-­/SR.605. 14. N.  G. Maksimovitch (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) remarks at the 606th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 22 January 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.606, para. 13; T.  T. Tazhibaev (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) remarks at the 607th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 22 January 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.607, para. 41; B. O. B. Gidden (UK) remarks at the 609th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 24 January 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.609, para. 16. 15. Robert Bargues (France) remarks at the 612th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 25 January 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.612, para. 34. For the full debate, see summary rec­ords of 612th  and 613th  meetings of the Fourth Committee, 25 and 28 January 1957, UN Docs. A/C.4/SR.612 and /SR.613. See also “Report of the Fourth Committee [on agenda items 34 and 35],” in “Agenda Item 34: Information from Non-­ Self-­Governing Territories transmitted u ­ nder Article 73 e of the Charter: Reports of

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the Secretary-­General and of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” UN Doc. Annexes, Eleventh Session, 1956–1957, paras. 28–36. 16. For an outline of Portuguese policy, see Franco Nogueira, The United Nations and Portugal: A Study in Anti-­Colonialism (London: Tandem Books, 1964); and Bruno Cardosa Reis, “Portugal and the UN: A Rogue State Resisting the Norm of Decolonization (1956–1974),” Portuguese Studies 29, no. 2 (2013): 251–76. 17. Adnan Pachachi (Iraq) remarks at the 615th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 29 January 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.615, paras. 6, 11. See also “Note by the Secretary-­ General,” 20 November 1956, in “Agenda Item 34.” 18. A. B. Perera (Ceylon) remarks at the 618th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 31 January 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.618, paras. 38, 39. See also five-­power draft resolution contained in “Agenda Item 34,” 17. 19. Allan Henry Loomes (Australia) remarks at the 621st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 4 February 1957, UN Doc. A/AC.4/SR.621, para. 39; Juan Pablo de Lojendio (Spain) remarks at the 619th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 1 February 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.619, para. 1. 20. Critical commentary on the draft resolution may be followed in B. O. B. Gidden (UK) and Allan Henry Loomes (Australia) remarks at the 625th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 6 February 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.625, paras.18–24, 35–36, 48– 52; Franck C. Nash (US) remarks at the 626th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 7 February 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.626, paras. 6–7; and William G. Thorp (New Zealand) remarks at the 627th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 7 February 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.627, para. 3. See also “Agenda Item 35: Pro­gress Achieved by the Non-­ Self-­Governing Territories in Pursuance of Chapter XI of the Charter: Report of the Secretary-­General,” UN Doc. Annexes, Eleventh Session, 1956–1957; and draft eight-­ power resolution contained in “Agenda Item 34,” 18–19. 21. Robert Bargues (France) remarks at the 612th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 25 January 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.612, para. 34; Alfred Claeys-­Bouuaert (Belgium) remarks at the 622nd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 3 February 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.622, para. 28; Claeys-­Bouuaert remarks at the 626th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 7 February 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.626, para. 4. 22. For the resolutions sent on to the General Assembly, see “Report of the Fourth Committee,” in “Agenda Item 34,” 20. 23. Vasco Garin (Portugal) remarks at the 656th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 20 February 1957, UN Doc. A/PV.656, para. 69. 24. For the Swedish proposal, see Brita Skottsberg-­Ahman remarks at the 656th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 20 February 1957, UN Doc. A/PV.656, para. 120. See also verbatim rec­ord of 657th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 20 February 1957, UN Doc. A/PV.657. 25. See verbatim rec­ord of 656th and 657th plenary meetings of the General Assembly, 20 February 1957, UN Doc. A/PV.656 and /PV.657; Resolution 1051, “Procedures for the Consideration of Communications Relating to the Cessation of the Transmission of Information u ­ nder Article 73 e of the Charter,” 20 February 1957, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­1051(XI); Resolution 1053 (XI), “Pro­gress Achieved by the Non-­Self-­Governing Territories in Pursuance of Chapter XI of the Charter,” 20 February 1957, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​ /­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­1053(XI); “Agenda Item 34”; and “Agenda Item 35.”

NOTES TO PAGES 1 1 4 – 1 1 9

243

26. Gerig memorandum to Walmsley, “Issues Arising in Committee Four of the Last General Assembly Where We Attained or Did Not Attain Our Objectives,” 18 March 1957, Rec­ord Group 59Office Files of Francis O. Wilcox, 1954–1957, lot 60 D 113, box 43, folder: 11th GA, National Archives II, College Park, Mary­land; McGregor (ODA) memorandum to Nunley (EUR), “Portuguese Reporting ­under Article 73(e) of the UN Charter,” 28 February 1957, Rec­ord Group 59, 321.14/2-2857, National Archives II, College Park, Mary­land. 27. See, particularly, Louis, “Public ­Enemy Number One.” 28. H. T. Bourdillon (CO) to I. T. M. Pink (FO), 7 November 1956, CO 936/321. 29. “Extract from Minutes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in the Mid-­Ocean Club on Saturday, March 23, 1957, at 10:30 a.m.,” CO 936/546; Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Secretary) tel. 10 to UKUN, “Rec­ord of Conversation at Mid-­Ocean Club, Bermuda, Saturday, March 23, 1957,” CO 936/546. 30. “Extract from Minutes of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers Held in the Mid-­Ocean Club on Saturday, March 23, 1957, at 10:30 a.m.,” CO 936/546. See also Philip E. Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist Leaders (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 6–8. 31. “Colonial Questions in the United Nations, 1957: Brief for Conversations with United States and Canadian Officials in Washington and Ottawa, September 9th– 11th and 12th and 13th 1957,” CO 956/544. 32. Sir Pierson Dixon (UKUN) to I. T. M. Pink (FO), 31 January 1957, CO 936/547; S. H. Evans, “Report by Mr. S. H. Evans, Chief Information Officer, Colonial Office, on a Visit to the United Kingdom Del­e­ga­tion to the United Nations, January 1957,” attachment to Sir Pierson Dixon (UKUN) to I. T. M. Pink (FO), 31 January 1957, CO 936/547. See also meeting minutes, “Colonial Publicity in the United Nations,” 15 February 1957, CO 936/547. 33. Alan Lennox-­Boyd, British Colonial Policy T ­ oday (London: Central Office of Information, 1957), 4–5. 34. “Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: 1957,” [summer 1957], Foreign Office: General Correspondence: Po­liti­cal Department, FO 371/129879, National Archives, Kew (hereafter FO 371 with filing information). 35. See James B. Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans: Black Americans and Africa, 1953–1961 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 150–80; and George White Jr., Holding the Line: Race, Racism, and American Foreign Policy ­toward Africa, 1953–1961 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 67–90. 36. US Position Paper, “Part III: Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, Item 10: Committee on Information: Transmission ­under Article 73(e),” enclosure to Gerig memorandum, “Papers on US-­UK Colonial Talks,” 29 August 1957, RG 59, 321.4/8-2957. 37. See “Draft of Anglo-­American Discussions on Colonial Topics (September 9, 10, and 11, 1957),” CO 936/544; and US State Department position paper, “Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories Transmitted ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter: General Questions Relating to the Transmission and Examination of Information,” 8 October 1957, RG 59, UN Del­e­ga­tion Position Papers, box 57. 38. For the Committee on Information’s membership, see “Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, Seventh Session: List of Representatives,” 10 May 1956, UN Doc. A/AC.35/Inf.14/Rev.3; and “Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, Eighth Session: List of Representatives,” 29

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July 1957, UN Doc. A/AC.35/Inf.16/Rev.1. For its work in 1957, see “Draft Report of the Committee on Information from Non-­ Self-­ Governing Territories,” 12 August 1957, UN Doc. A/AC.35/L.264. 39. See the discussion in 679th–681st meetings of the Fourth Committee, 24–25 October  1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.679-­/SR.681. Voting results in summary rec­ord, 681st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 25 October 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.681, para. 61. 40. Tawfik Chamandi (Yemen) remarks at the 691st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 4 November 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.691, para. 23. See also “Transmission of Information u ­ nder Article 73e of the Charter—­Burma, Ceylon, Costa Rica, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Liberia, Nepal, Panama, Syria, Tunisia, and Yugo­slavia: Revised Draft Resolution,” 2 November 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/L.604/Rev. 1. 41. A. Franco Nogueira (Portugal) and Pierre Ryckmans (Belgium) remarks at the 691st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 4 November 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.691, paras. 5, 11; Irene Dunne (US) remarks at the 692nd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 5 November 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.692, paras. 44, 46; Pierre Ryckmans (Belgium) and Benjamin Cohen (Secretariat) remarks at the 691st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 4 November 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.691, paras. 13, 31, 18; Aleksandar Bozovic (Yugo­slavia) remarks at the 690th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 4 November 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.690, para. 3; Sir Andrew Cohen (UK) remarks at the 693rd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 5 November 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/ SR.693, para. 36. For voting results, see summary rec­ord, 693rd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 5 November 1957, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.693, para. 84. 42. See “Report of the Fourth Committee,” 14 November 1957, in “Agenda Item 35,” 28–32. 43. See verbatim rec­ord of 722nd plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 26 November 1957, UN Doc. A/PV.722. US officials knew in advance that Colombia would introduce a motion to consider the draft resolution an impor­tant question requiring a two-­thirds majority for approval and even had a supporting statement prepared for delivery in the plenary session if necessary; see Lodge (USUN) tel. 470 to State Department, 25 November 1957, RG 59, 320.4/11-2557. 44. “Request by the Fourth Committee for an Opinion by the Sixth Committee on the Majority Required for the Adoption by the General Assembly of Resolutions Relating to ­Matters Concerning Non-­Self-­Governing Territories in Accordance with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations: Resolution A ­ dopted by the Sixth Committee at Its 544th Meeting on 2 December 1957,” in “Agenda Item 35,” 28. 45. Jeffrey James Byrne, Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 69; Alex Quaison-­Sackey, Africa Unbound: Reflections of an African Statesman (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1963), 138. See also Hovet, Africa in the United Nations, 26–34. 46. See Catherine Hoskyns, “The African States and the United Nations, 1958–1964,” International Affairs 40, no. 3 (1964): 466–69; and Isaac N. Endeley, Bloc Politics at the United Nations: The African Group (Lanham, MD: University Press of Amer­i­ca, 2009), 13. 47. Colonial Office, “Notes for Guidance in Preparing Transmissions of Information u ­ nder Article 73(e) of the U.N. Charter,” January 1958, enclosure to Alan Lennox Boyd (Colonial Secretary) circular dispatch 137/58, 30 January 1958, CO 936/393; Alan

NOTES TO PAGES 1 2 5 – 1 2 8

245

Lennox Boyd (Colonial Secretary) circular dispatch 137/58, 30 January  1958, CO 936/393; A. B. Cohen memorandum, “The Transmission of Information u ­ nder Article 73(e),” 20 May  1958, enclosure to A.  B. Cohen to H.  T. Bourdillon (CO), 20 May 1958, CO 936/393. 48. Sir Andrew Cohen (UK del, UN) to H. T. Bourdillon (CO), 7 May 1958, CO 936/544: Bourdillon to Cohen, 28 April 1958, CO 936/544. See also British Embassy aide memoire, “Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 14 April 1958, RG 59, 320.14/4-1458. 49. UK mission, UN, and British colonial attaché, Washington, “Rec­ord of Anglo-­ American Discussions on Colonial Topics Held in Washington on September 9th and 10th, 1958,” 25 September 1958, DO 35/10628; H. T. Bourdillon (CO) to A. D. M. Ross (FO), 21 October 1958, DO 35/10628. 50. Rikhi Jaipal (India) remarks at the 182nd meeting of the Committee on Information, 1 May 1958, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.182, 11. See also Ismat T. Kittani (Iraq) and Y. Duraiswamy (Ceylon) remarks at the 182nd meeting of the Committee on Information, 1 May 1958, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.182, 12; Carlos Urrutia Aparicio (Guatemala) remarks at the 183rd meeting of the Committee on Information, 2 May 1958, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.183, 4; summary rec­ord of 184th meeting of the Committee on Information, 5 May 1958, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.184, 7–9; “Renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Ceylon, India, United States of Amer­i­ca: Draft Resolution,” 1 May 1958, UN Doc. A/AC.35/L.289; and “Report of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 1958, UN Doc. A/3837. 51. Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto (Mexico) remarks at the 821st meeting of Fourth Committee, 28 November 1958, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.821, para. 6. 52. V. N. Bendryshev (Soviet Union) remarks at the 826th meeting of Fourth Committee, 2 December 1958, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.826, para. 23; Irving Salomon (US) remarks at the 824th meeting of Fourth Committee, 1 December 1958, UN Doc. A/C.4/ SR.824, para. 1. 53. Adnan Pachachi (Iraq) and Aleksandar Bozovic (Yugo­slavia) remarks at the 830th meeting of Fourth Committee, 4 December 1958, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.830, para. 36, 41; V. N. Bendryshev (Soviet Union) remarks at the 833rd meeting of Fourth Committee (provisional summary rec­ord), 10 December 1958, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.833, 2; K. T. Kelly (Australia) remarks at the 830th meeting of Fourth Committee, 4 December 1958, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.830, para. 49; Kelly and Irving Salomon (US) remarks at the 832nd meeting of Fourth Committee, 5 December 1958, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.832, paras. 8, 20. For the proposal itself, see “General Questions Relating to the Transmission and Examination of Information, Af­ghan­i­stan, Burma, Ceylon, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, and Yugo­ slavia: Draft Resolution,” 4 December  1958, UN Doc. A/C.4/L.569; for voting results, see summary rec­ord, 832nd meeting of Fourth Committee, 5 December 1958, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.832, paras. 69–71. 54. See summary rec­ord, 835th meeting of Fourth Committee, 8 December 1958, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.835, paras. 63–65; summary rec­ord, 836th meeting of Fourth Committee, 9 December 1958, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.836, paras. 5–8. 55. Sir Andrew Cohen (UK) remarks at the 789th  plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 12 December 1958, UN Doc. A/PV.789, para. 274; Ronald Walker

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(Australia) remarks at the 789th  plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 12 December 1958, UN Doc. A/PV.789, para. 287. For voting results, see verbatim rec­ ord, 789th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 12 December 1958, UN Doc. A/PV.789, paras. 266–68, 290. For the mea­sure itself, see Resolution 1332 (XIII), “Question of the Renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 12 December  1958, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​ ?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­1332(XIII), which contains membership information. 56. See verbatim rec­ord, 789th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 12 December 1958, UN Doc. A/PV.789, paras. 185–269. 57. “Voting on Questions Relating to Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Ghana, Iraq, Liberia, Mexico, and Morocco: Draft Resolution,” 12 December  1958, UN Doc. A/L.259; Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto (Mexico) and W. V. J. Evans (UK) remarks at the 790th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 13 December 1958, UN Doc. A/ PV.790, paras. 14, 42. The Assembly’s entire debate of the mea­sure can be followed in verbatim rec­ord, 790th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 13 December 1958, UN Doc. A/PV.790, paras. 1–93. 58. Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations, Vol. 2, The Age of Decolonization, 1955– 1965 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989). 6. Power Shifts

1. Nikita Khrushchev (USSR) remarks at the 882nd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 3 October 1960, UN Doc. A/PV.882, para. 21. See also Stanley Meisler, “The ­Battles of Katanga and the Crash of Hammarskjöld,” in United Nations: The First Fifty Years (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995), 115–34. 2. N. T. D. Kanakaratne (Ceylon) and J. Goedhart (Netherlands) remarks at the 200th meeting of Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 10 August 1959, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.200, 7, 8. See also “Report of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 1959, UN Doc. A/4111. 3. State Department instruction 525, “­Fourteenth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” 7 August 1959, RG 59, General Rec­ords of the Department of State, 320/8-759, National Archives II, College Park, Mary­land. For the larger geopo­ liti­cal consequences of decolonization, see “Briefing Note for PB Mtg 3/13/59: New In­de­pen­dent Countries and US Policy,” 12 March 1959, with attached “Trea­sury List of Sample Questions,” White House Office, Rec­ords of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 1952–1961, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, box 14, folder: Newly In­de­pen­dent Countries, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter WHO, OSANSA, NSC, Briefing Notes, with filing information); unsigned, “Pos­si­ble Additional Questions,” 30 March 1959, WHO, NSC Staff Papers, Special Staff Papers Series, box 6, folder: Newly In­de­pen­dent Countries, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter WHO, NSC Staff Papers, Special Staff Papers, with filing information); “Briefing Note for PB Mtg 3/31/59: New In­de­pen­dent Countries and U.S. Policy,” 30 March 1959, WHO, OSANSA, NSC, Briefing Notes, box 14, folder: Newly In­de­pen­dent Countries; “Trea­sury Draft: Proposed Substitution for Paragraphs 7 through 10,” undated [spring 1959], WHO, OSANSA, NSC, Briefing Notes, box 14, folder: Newly In­de­pen­dent Countries; “Briefing Note for PB Mtg 4-7-59: New In­de­ pen­dent Countries and U.S. Policy,” 6 April 1959, WHO, OSANSA, NSC, Briefing

NOTES TO PAGES 1 3 5 – 1 3 8

247

Notes, box 14, folder: Newly In­de­pen­dent Countries; “Briefing Note for the NSC 4/23/59: New In­de­pen­dent Countries and U.S. Policy,” 22 April 1959, WHO, OSANSA, NSC, Briefing Notes, box 14, folder: Newly In­de­pen­dent Countries. 4. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Proclamation 3303—­Captive Nations Week, 1959,” 17 July 1959, http://­www​.­presidency​.­ucsb​.­edu​/­ws​/­​?­pid​=­107400. 5. See, for example, Laura A. Belmonte, Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 100–102; and Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda B ­ attle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 113–50. 6. Henry Cabot Lodge (US ambassador, UN) tel. 123 to State Department, 4 August 1959, RG 320/8-459. 7. A. B. Cohen (UKUN) to W. L. Gorell-­Barnes (CO), 29 July 1959, Foreign Office: General Correspondence: Po­liti­cal Department, FO 371/145265, National Archives, Kew (hereafter FO 371 with filing information). See also C. G. Eastwood (CO) to C. D. W. O’Neill (FO), 24 July 1959, FO 371/145265; and H. Beeley (UK del, UN) to A. D. M. Ross (FO), 29 July 1959, FO 371/145265. For the history of British policy regarding withdrawal, see Colonial Office paper, “Intervention by the Fourth Committee in the Affairs of British Colonial Territories: U.K. Policy on Withdrawal,” July 1959, enclosure to R. A. Browning (CO) to K. J. Uffen (FO), 17 July 1959, FO 371/145265. 8. Colonial Office paper, “Transmissions of Information ­under Article 73e of the United Nations Charter: The Position at the XIV Session of the U.N. General Assembly,” [autumn 1959], Colonial Office and Commonwealth Office: International and General Department and Pre­de­ces­sors: Original Correspondence, Rec­ord Class CO 936/545, National Archives, Kew, E ­ ngland (hereafter CO 936, with filing information). 9. “Rec­ord of Anglo-­American Discussions on Colonial Items at the 14th Session of the General Assembly Held in Washington on September 14th, 1959,” CO 936/545. 10. Pedro Zuloaga (Venezuela) remarks at the 974th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 28 November 1959, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.974, para. 18. See also Angie Brooks (Liberia) and Ismael Touré (Guinea) remarks at the 976th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 30 November 1959, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.976, paras. 10–35. 11. Angie Brooks (Liberia), Ismael Touré (Guinea), and Mohammed Alwan (Iraq) request to 970th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 25 November 1959, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.970, para. 28; Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto (Mexico) remarks at the 971st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 26 November 1959, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.971, paras. 8, 12, 9. See also Abdulla El-­Hassan (Sudan) remarks at the 974th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 28 November 1959, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.974, paras. 1–6; and Faiz Ahmad Zikria (Af­ghan­i­stan) remarks at the 975th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 28 November 1959, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.975, paras. 13–16. 12. “Pro­g ress Achieved by the Non-­Self-­Governing Territories in Pursuance of Chapter XI of the Charter: Ceylon, Ghana, India, Iraq, United Arab Republic, and Yugo­ slavia: Draft Resolution,” 27 November 1959, UN Doc. A/C.4/L.622. See also summary rec­ord of 977th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 30 November 1959, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.977, paras. 20–34. 13. “General Questions Relating to the Transmission and Examination of Information: Canada, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Mexico, and Yugo­slavia: Draft Resolution,” 30 November 1959, UN Doc. A/C.4/L.627. See also summary rec­ord

24 8 NOTES

TO PAGES 1 3 9 –1 4 1

of 981st and 982nd meetings of the Fourth Committee, 2 December 1959, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.981 and /SR.982; and “Report of the Fourth Committee,” 9 December 1959, in “Agenda Item 36: Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories Transmitted ­under Article 73 e of the Charter: Reports of the Secretary-­General and of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” UN Doc. Annexes (XIV) 36, 118–19; John Dorman (CDA) memorandum for Wallner (Bureau of International Organ­ization Affairs), “General Questions Relating to the Transmission and Examination of Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 15 February 1960, RG 59, Subject Files of the Assistant Secretary for International Organ­ization Affairs, box 9, folder: Trusteeship Council (hereafter RG 59, IOA Subject Files, with filing information). 14. M. K. Rasgotra (India) remarks at the 984th meeting of Fourth Committee, 3 December 1959, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.984, para. 19; “Information on Po­liti­cal Developments in “Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Iraq: Amendment to Draft Resolution A/C.4/L.624,” 3 December 1959, UN Doc. A/C.4/L.634; Clement J. Zablocki (US) and K. T. Kelly (Australia) remarks at the 984th meeting of Fourth Committee, 3 December 1959, A/C.4/SR.984, paras. 27, 59. See also “Information on Po­liti­cal Developments” in “Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Ghana, India, and Yugo­slavia: Draft Resolution,” 30 November 1959, UN Doc. A/C.4/L.624; “Report of the Fourth Committee,” 9 December 1959, in “Agenda Item 36: Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories Transmitted ­under Article 73 e of the Charter: Reports of the Secretary-­ General and of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” UN Doc. Annexes (XIV) 36, 120–21; and summary rec­ord of the 985th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 4 December 1959, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.985, paras. 1–15. 15. See Resolution 1461 (XIV), “Pro­gress Achieved by the Non-­Self-­Governing Territories in Pursuance of Chapter XI of the Charter,” 12 December 1959, http://­www​ .­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­1461(XIV); Resolution 1468 (XIV), 12 December 1959, “Voluntary Transmission of Information on Po­liti­cal Developments in Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​ _­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=A ­ ​/­RES​/­1468(XIV); Resolution 1467 (XIV), “General Questions Relating to the Transmission and Examination of Information,” 12 December  1959, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=A ­ ​/­RES​/­1467(XIV) (the resolution notes that India, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States ­were subsequently elected to serve on what came to be called the Committee of Six); and, for vote totals, verbatim rec­ord of the 855th plenary meeting of General Assembly, 12 December 1959, UN Doc. A/PV.855, paras. 10–11. 16. Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto (Mexico) remarks at the 855th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 12 December 1959, UN Doc. A/PV.855, paras. 36, 34. See also verbatim rec­ord of the 855th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 12 December 1959, UN Doc. A/PV.855, paras. 1–69. 17. Alex Quaison-­Sackey (Ghana) remarks at the 205th meeting of the Committee on Information, 23 February 1960, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.205, 3, 4. See also “Report of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Part I,” 1960, UN Doc. A/4371. 18. “Report of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Part II,” 1960, UN Doc. A/4371, paras. 13–51. See also “Observations and Conclusions on the Report on Pro­g ress in Non-­Self-­Governing Territories (1960): Draft

NOTES TO PAGES 1 4 1 – 1 4 4

249

Report of the Sub-­Committee of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories,” 18 April 1960, UN Doc. A/AC.35/L.324. 19. C. S. Jha (India) and Michel de Camaret (France) remarks at the 223rd meeting of the Committee on Information, 12 April 1960, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.223, 5, 8. 20. Department of State circular instruction, “Fifteenth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” 4 August 1960, RG 59, 320/8-460. See also John Dorman (Office of Dependent Areas) memorandum to Robert L. Funseth (Office of United Nations Po­liti­cal Affairs), “Memorandum from Mr. Wilcox to Mr. Merchant, ‘Mea­sures to Prevent Afro-­Asian Bloc Voting in the UN,” 10 June 1960, RG 59, 320/61060. For Soviet-­American tensions during this period, see, for example, Deborah Welch Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-­Soviet Relations during the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Victor Rosenberg, Soviet-­American Relations, 1953– 1960: Diplomacy and Cultural Exchange during the Eisenhower Presidency ( Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2005). 21. President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad paper, “The United Nations as a Public Relations Forum,” undated [fall 1960], 13, 11, 10, Rec­ords of the U.S. President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee), 1959–1961, box 21, folder: PCIAA #18 (2), Eisenhower Library (hereafter Sprague Committee, with filing information). For the Soviets in the United Nations, see Ilya Gaiduk, Divided Together: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations, 1945– 1965 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012); Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations: An Inquiry into Soviet Motives and Objectives (New York: Praeger, 1962); George A. Brinkley, “The Soviet Union and the United Nations: The Changing Role of the Developing Countries,” Review of Politics 32, no. 2 (1970): 91–113; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, The Soviets in International Organ­izations: Changing Policy t­ oward Developing Countries, 1953–1963 (Prince­ton: Prince­ton University Press, 1962); and Richard W. Mansbach, “The Soviet Union, the United Nations, and the Developing States,” in The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations, ed. Roger E. Kanet (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 237–64. 22. President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad paper, “The United Nations as a Public Relations Forum,” 6, 36, 37. See also W. Kotschnig (Office of International Economic and Social Affairs) memorandum, “Meeting the Communist Challenge in the Economic and Social Field: United States Posture and Policies in the United Nations and Other Multilateral Organ­izations,” enclosure to Kotschnig memorandum to Wilcox, Wallner, Cargo, and Phillips, 8 June 1960, RG 59, Subject Files, Assistant Secretary for International Organ­ization Affairs, box 9, folder: Soviet Use of United Nations System, Archives II; “Discussion Paper on New In­de­pen­dent Countries and U.S. Policy,” undated [summer 1960], WHO, NSC, Special Staff Papers Series, box 6, folder: Newly In­de­pen­dent Countries; and David A. Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960–1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970). 23. “Colonisation and Sovereignty in the USSR,” Fact Feature piece, April 1960, FO 371/160907; Arthur Bottomley, Facts about Soviet Asia, October 1960, pp. 8, 20, FO 371/160907. 24. Foreign Office paper, “The F ­ uture of Anglo-­American Relations,” 5 January 1960, CO 936/668. See also Harold Beeley (minister, UK del UN) to P. E. Ramsbotham (CO), 13 January 1960, CO 936/668; and Ramsbotham to Ian B. Watt (CO), 19 April 1960, CO 936/668.

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TO PAGES 1 4 5 –1 4 6

25. State Department memorandum of conversation, “Secretary’s Del­e­ga­tion to the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 19–24, 1960: Draft Resolution on Berlin, Tactics in the UN, and Soviet Tensions,” 22 September 1960, RG 59, 320/9-2260; “How to Deal with the Soviet Propaganda Offensive in the United Nations,” enclosure to State Department memorandum of conversation, “Secretary’s Del­e­ga­tion to the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 19–24, 1960: Draft Resolution on Berlin, Tactics in the UN, and Soviet Tensions,” 22 September 1960, RG 59, 320/9-2260. See also Andrew Cohen (UK del, UN) to C. G. Eastwood, 9 June 1960, CO 936/668; FO to A. D. M. Ross (FO), 27 June 1960, CO 936/668. 26. Resolution 1467 (XIV), “General Questions Relating to the Transmission and Examination of Information,” 12 December 1959. See also “Special Committee of Six on the Transmission of Information (Non-­Self-­Governing Territories): Draft Report,” 19 September 1960, UN Doc. A/AC.100/L.1; “Transmission of Information ­under Article 73e of the Charter: Brief for U.K. Representative to the ‘Committee of Six,’ ” [1960], Dominions Office and Commonwealth Relations Office: Original Correspondence, Rec­ord Class DO 35/10633, National Archives, Kew, E ­ ngland (hereafter DO 35, with piece number); Kohler (EUR) memorandum to Francis O. Wilcox (IO), “Instructions to US Representative on Committee of Six Re Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 1 September 1960, RG 59, Subject Files, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, box 9, folder: Trusteeship Council, Archives II. More on the U.K. position can be found in Colonial Office, “Draft U.K. Memorandum for Committee of Six on Transmissions of Information ­under Article 73(e) of the U.N. Charter,” 3 May 1960, DO 35/10633; for more on the US position, see Austin Acly (ODA) memorandum to Wallner (IO), “Draft Position Paper for Special Committee of Six,” 23 August 1960, RG 59, Subject Files, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, box 9, folder: Trusteeship Council, Archives II; and State Department position paper, “Special Committee to Enumerate the Princi­ples which Should Guide Members in Determining ­Whether or Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for in Article 73(e) of the Charter of the United Nations,” 31 August 1960, RG 59, IOA Subject Files, box 9, folder: Trusteeship Council. 27. See “Special Committee of Six on Transmission of Information (Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories): Replies of Governments Indicating Their Views on the Princi­ples Which Should Guide Members in Determining ­Whether or Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for in Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations,” 1 July 1960, UN Doc. A/AC.100/1; and “Special Committee of Six on Transmission of Information (Non-­Self-­Governing Territories): The Application of Chapter XI and the Obligation of Members to Transmit Information ­under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations: An Account of Discussions Prepared by the Secretariat,” 3 August 1960, UN Doc. A/AC.100/2. 28. G. K. Caston to W. S. Ryrie (CO), 26 September 1960, FO 371/153539. The committee’s full meeting rec­ord may be followed in summary rec­ords of the Special Committee of Six on the Transmission of Information (Non-­Self-­Governing Territories), 2–22 September 1960, UN Doc. A/AC.100/SR.1 to /SR.14. For the committee’s report, see Special Committee of Six on the Transmission of Information (Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories), “Draft Report,” 19 September 1960, UN Doc. A/AC.100/L.1.

NOTES TO PAGES 1 4 7 – 1 5 0

251

29. Zaid Rifai ( Jordan) remarks at the 1015th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 18 October 1960, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1015, para. 35; Wadsworth (USUN) tel. 1019 to State Department, 15 October 1960, RG 59, 321.4/10-1560; Larry Williams (EUR) memorandum to Kohler (EUR), “Your Appointment with Lord Hood at 2 p.m. T ­ oday,” 28 October 1960, RG 59, 321.4/10-2860. See also Alex Quaison-­Sackey (Ghana) remarks at the 1009th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 13 October 1960, UN Doc. A/C.4/ SR.1009, para. 19. The entire corpus of opening statements can be followed in summary rec­ords of the 1006th–1019th meetings of the Fourth Committee, 10–21 October 1960, UN Docs. A/C.4/SR.1006 to /SR.1019. 30. B. M. Grinberg (Bulgaria) remarks at the 1020th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 21 October 1960, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1020, para. 9. 31. “Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories Transmitted ­under Article 73 e of the Charter: Pro­gress Achieved in Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Burma, Ceylon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Togo, United Arab Republic and Venezuela: Revised Draft Resolution,” 24 October 1960, UN Doc. A/C.4/L.640/Rev.1 (Morocco and Somalia subsequently signed on as sponsors). 32. Camara Maurice (Guinea) remarks at the 1025th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 27 October 1960, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1025, para. 12; Najmuddine Rifai (United Arab Republic) remarks at the 1024th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 26 October 1960, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1024, para. 23. See also “Report of the Fourth Committee,” in UN Doc. Annexes (XV), 37, 39, 40, 41, paras. 13–30. 33. John M. Steeves (Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs) memorandum to Wallner (IO), “EUR Position Regarding UN Role with Re­spect to Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 7 October 1960, RG 59, 321.4/7-760. See also USUN tel. 1132 to State Department, 26 October 1960, RG 59, 321.4/10-2660; US embassy (London) tel. 1979 to State Department, 26 October 1960, RG 59, 321.4/10-2560; Foy D. Kohler (EUR) memorandum to Wallner, “UN Role with Re­spect to Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 27 September 1960, RG 59, 321.4/9-2760; and USUN tel. 1180 to State Department, 28 October 1960, RG 59, 321.4/10-2860. 34. Benjamin Gerig (ODA) memorandum to Wallner (IO), “Brief for Your Talk with British Minister re Transmission of Po­liti­cal Information Regarding Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories,” 24 October 1960, RG 59, Office of UN Po­liti­cal Affairs, Country Files, 1946–1968, box 1, folder: Non-­Self-­Governing Territories Committee (hereafter RG 59, UN Po­liti­cal Affairs, with filing information); FO tel. 5273 to UK embassy, Washington, 27 October  1960, FO 371/153539. See also UK embassy, Washington tel. 2144 to FO, 26 October 1960, FO 371/153539; and UK del to UN tel. 1102 to FO, 27 October 1960, FO 371/153549. 35. Josip Djerdja (Yugo­slavia) remarks at the 1031st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 1 November 1960, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1031, para. 32; Demba Diallo (Mali) remarks at the 1033rd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 2 November 1960, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1033, para. 30; Wayne Morse (US) remarks at the 1041st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 8 November 1960, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1041, para. 22. The Fourth Committee’s full general debate of the Committee of Six’s report may be followed in summary rec­ords of 1031st to 1042nd meetings of the Fourth Committee, 1–9 November 1960, UN Docs. A/C.4/SR.1031 to /SR.1041.

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36. “Study of the Princi­ples Which Should Guide Members in Determining W ­ hether or Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for in Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations: Adoption of the Princi­ples Contained in the Report of the Special Committee of Six on the Transmission of Information (Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories): Iraq, Ireland, Nigeria, and Venezuela: Draft Resolution,” 7 November 1960, UN Doc. A/C.4/L.648. See the committee’s full debate in summary rec­ord of the 1042nd–1045th meetings of the Fourth Committee, 9–10 November 1960, UN Docs. A/C.4/SR.1042 to /SR.1045. For explanations of voting on the draft resolution, see summary rec­ord of the 1046th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 11 November 1960, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1046, paras. 1–7. 37. Christian Herter (sec state) tel. 721 to USUN, 20 October 1960, RG 59, 321.4/101560; James Wadsworth (USUN) tel. 1132 to State Department, 26 October 1960, RG 59, 321.4/10-2660; UK del to UN tel. 1115 to FO, 19 October 1960, FO 371/153539; UK del to UN tel. 1185 to FO, 27 October 1960, FO 371/153539. See also memorandum of conversation, “Attitude of the Two Governments If a Resolution on Target Dates or Timetables for Non-­Self-­Governing Territories Is Presented to the General Assembly,” 28 October 1960, RG 59, 321.4/10-2860; Larry Williams (EUR) memorandum to Kohler (EUR), “Your Appointment with Lord Hood at 2 p.m. ­Today,” 28 October  1960, RG 59, 321.4/10-2860; FO tel. 5280 to UK embassy, Washington, 28 October 1960, FO 371/153539; and UK del UN tel. 1198 to FO, 28 October 1960, FO 371/153539. 38. Khrushchev’s appearance before the General Assembly can be followed in Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev in New York: A Documentary Rec­ord of Nikita S. Khrushchev’s Trip to New York, September 19th to October 13th, 1960, Including All His Speeches and Proposals to the United Nations and Major Addresses and News Conferences (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1960). 39. Secretary of State Christian Herter memorandum for the president, “Your Attendance at the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” 2 September 1960, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, Dulles-­Herter Series, box 13, folder: CH September 1960, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas; memorandum of conversation, “US Reaction to Khrushchev’s Intention to Attend the UN General Assembly/Soviet-­Chinese Communist Relations,” 2 September 1960, RG 59, 320/9-260; “Soviet Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­ eoples, Submitted by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the 869th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly,” 23 September 1960, in “Agenda Item 87: Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples,” UN Doc. Annexes (XV) 87, 6. See also Thompson (US embassy, Moscow) tel. 734 to State Department, 12 September 1960, RG 59, 320/9-1260; memorandum of conversation, “UN General Assembly,” 12 September 1960, RG 59, 320/9-1260; Bureau of Intelligence and Research paper, “Recent Indications of Soviet Tactics at the UN,” confidential enclosure to Walter J. Stoessel Jr. to Andrew Goodpaster (White House), 13 September 1960, WHO, Office of the Staff Secretary: Rec­ords of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher  H. Russell, 1952–1961, International Series, box 16, folder: UNGA—­ September 1960 (1), Eisenhower Library (hereafter WHO, Staff Secretary, with additional information); memorandum of conversation, “Discussion at Dinner Meeting of the Three Foreign Ministers—­Soviet Aggressive Tactics,” 23 September 1960, WHO,

NOTES TO PAGES 1 5 2 – 1 5 4

253

Staff Secretary, Subject Series, State Subseries, box 4, folder: State 1960 (August–­ September) (3); and Dillon (acting secstate) topol 409 to US embassy, Paris, 27 September 1960, RG 59, 320/9-2760. 40. “Soviet Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples, Submitted by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the 869th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly,” 23 September 1960, in “Agenda Item 87: Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­ eoples,” pp. 2, 3, 4, 5. Additional Soviet thinking regarding colonialism may be found in “Letter Dated 21 October 1960 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations to the President of the General Assembly,” transmitting “Speech Delivered by N. S. Khrushchev at a Meeting of Working P ­ eople of Moscow Held on 20 October 1960 and Devoted to the Work of the Soviet Del­e­ga­tion at the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” 26 October 1960, UN Doc. A/4550. Historic Soviet anticolonialism is discussed in Roger Kanet, The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 1—50. For a detailed discussion of Khrushchev’s declaration and subsequent developments, see Kay, New Nations, 150–72. 41. “Soviet Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples,” 5, 6, 7. 42. US embassy, Moscow tel. 617 to USUN, 6 October 1960, RG 59, 321.4/10-660; State Department tel. 804 to USUN, 1 November 1960, RG 59, 321.4/10-2560. See also State Department tel. 502 to USUN, 26 September 1960, in RG 59, 320/9-2660; USUN tel. 1011 to State Department, 14 October 1960, in RG 59, 321.4/10-1460; and State Department policy information statement IO-78, “The Colonial Issue in the United Nations General Assembly,” 28 November 1960, enclosure to Acting Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon circular instruction CA-4808, 29 November 1960, RG 59, 511.00/11-2960. 43. Antonio Alvarez Restrepo (Colombia), remarks at the 929th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 30 November 1960, UN Doc. A/PV.929, paras. 81, 83; Frank Aiken (Ireland), remarks at the 935th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 5 December 1960, A/PV.935, para. 91; Turgut Menemencioğlu (Turkey), remarks at the 932nd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 2 December 1960, UN Doc. A/ PV.932, para. 27; Francisco Milla Bermudez (Honduras), remarks at the 930th  plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 1 December 1960, UN Doc. A/PV.930, para. 17; Alberto Herrarte (Guatemala), remarks at the 933rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 2 December 1960, UN Doc. A/PV.933, para. 137. See also Akira Miyazaki ( Japan), remarks at the 933rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 2 December 1960, UN Doc. A/PV.933, paras. 90–91; and Lorenzo Sumulong (Philippines), remarks at the 933rd  plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 2 December 1960, UN Doc. A/PV.933, para. 177. 44. John M. Steeves (FE) memorandum to Wallner (IO), “Soviet Draft Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­ eoples,” 10 October 1960, RG 59, 321.4/10-1060; USUN tel. 1518 to State Department, 24 November 1960, RG 59, 321.4/11-2460. See also James Wadsworth (USUN) tel. 926 to State Department, 7 October 1960, RG 59, 321.4/10-760; UN tel. 1117 to State Department, 25 October 1960, RG 59, 321.4/10-2560; Wadsworth (USUN) tel. 1138 to State Department,

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26 October 1960, RG 59, 321.4/10-2660; State Department tel. 804 to USUN, 1 November 1960, RG 59, 321.4/10-2560; Wadsworth (USUN) tel. 1547 to State Department, 26 November  1960, RG 59, 321.4/11-2660; and State Department policy information statement IO–78, “The Colonial Issue in the United Nations General Assembly,” 28 November 1960, enclosure to Dillon circular instruction CA-4808, 29 November 1960, RG 59, 511.00/11-2960. 45. “Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples: Af­ghan­i­stan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, and Turkey: Draft Resolution,” 29 November 1960, UN Doc. A/L.323. Additional states eventually signing on w ­ ere Cameroun, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Laos, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, United Arab Republic, and Upper Volta. For additional sponsors, see UN Doc. A/L.323, Add.1–6. 46. Mohieddine Fekini (Libya), remarks at the 929th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 30 November 1960, UN Doc. A/PV.929, para. 28. 47. Mongi Slim (Tunisia), remarks at the 929th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 30 November 1960, UN Doc. A/PV.929, para. 28. 48. Mehdi Vakil (Iran), remarks at the 926th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 28 November 1960, UN Doc. A/PV.926, paras. 139–40. See also Dillon (acting secstate) tel. 1006 to USUN, 30 November 1960, RG 59, 321.4/11-2860; USUN tel. 1616 to State Department, 2 December 1960, RG 59, 321.4/12-260; and USUN tel. 1640 to State Department, 6 December 1960, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, Dulles-­Herter Series, box 13, folder: CH December 1960 (2). 49. Roll-­call voting rec­ords and del­e­ga­tion statements on the anticolonialism mea­ sures can be followed in verbatim rec­ord 947, plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 14 December 1960, UN Doc. A/PV.947, paras. 1–163. The other states abstaining ­were Australia, Belgium, the Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, and South Africa. Resolution 1514 (XV), “Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­ eoples,” 14 December 1960, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​ /­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­1514(XV). 50. Rec­ord of telephone calls, Thursday, 8 December 1960, Christian A. Herter Papers, Series I. Chronological File, 1957–1961, box 10, folder: Pres Tel Calls, 7/19591/20/1961, Eisenhower Library (hereafter Herter Papers, with filing information); Secretary of State Herter, memorandum for A.  J. Goodpaster, 8 December  1960, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, Dulles-­Herter Series, box 13, folder: CH December 1960 (2); Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to President Dwight Eisenhower, 9 December  1960, FRUS, 1958–1960 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 7, pt. 2, 876; and rec­ord of telephone calls, Friday, 9 December 1960, Herter Papers, box 10, folder: Pres Tel Calls, 7/1959-1/20/1961. See also US mission to UN tel. 1640 to State Department, 6 December 1960, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, Dulles-­Herter Series, box 13, folder: CH December  1960 (2); Secretary of State Herter tel. 1093 to US mission to UN, 8 December 1960, RG 59, 321.4/12-660; Secretary of State Herter tel. 1116 to US mission to UN, 10 December  1960, RG 59, 321.4/12-1060; and Eisenhower to Macmillan, 10 December 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. 7, pt. 2, 876.

NOTES TO PAGES 1 5 7 – 1 6 1

255

51. Wadsworth (US mission to UN) tel. 1775 to State Department, 15 December 1960, RG 59, 321.4/12-1560; Wadsworth (US mission to UN) tel. 1744 to State Department, 14 December 1960, RG 59, 321.4/12-1460. 52. Department of State instruction CA-5377, “US Position on Colonialism Resolution at 15th General Assembly,” 20 December 1960, RG 59, 320/12-2060. 53. Resolution 1535 (XV), “Pro­g ress Achieved in Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 15 December 1960, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​ /­1535(XV); voting results, verbatim rec­ord of 948th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 15 December 1960, A/PV.948, para.79. 54. State Department tel. 270 to US embassy, Lisbon, 15 December 1960, RG 59, 321.4/12-360. See also US embassy, Lisbon (Elbrick) tel. 275 to State Department, 2 December 1960, RG 59, 321.4/12-260; memorandum of conversation, “Portugal and the UNGA,” 7 December 1960, RG 59, 321.4/12-760; State Department tel. 258 to US embassy, Lisbon, 8 December 1960, RG 59, 321.4/12-860; voting results, verbatim rec­ ord of 948th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 15 December 1960, A/PV.948, para. 88; Department of State instruction CA-5466, “U.S. Position on General Assembly Resolutions Concerning Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 22 December 1960, RG 59, 320/12-2260; US embassy, Lisbon (Elbrick) tel. 310 to State Department, 22 December 1960, RG 59, 321.4/12-2260; and Resolution 1541 (XV), “Princi­ples Which Should Guide Members in Determining W ­ hether or Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for u ­ nder Article 73 e of the Charter,” 15 December 1960, http://­research​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­docs​/­ga​/­quick​/­regular​/­15. 55. Resolution 1514 (XV), “Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples,” 14 December 1960. 56. W. J. Rorabaugh, The Real Making of the President: Kennedy, Nixon, and the 1960 Election (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009); Gary A. Donaldson, The First Modern Campaign: Kennedy, Nixon, and the Election of 1960 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); David Pietrusza, 1960: LBJ vs. JFK vs. Nixon: The Epic Campaign that Forged Three Presidencies (New York: Union Square Press, 2008); Edmund F. Kallina Jr., Kennedy v. Nixon: The Presidential Election of 1960 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011). 7. Crossing the Rubicon

1. See United Nations, “Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-­Present,” http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­members​/­g rowth​.­shtml. See David A. Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960–1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), for the new states’ overall anticolonialism. 2. See Alexsandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a ­Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York: Norton, 1997); and Hope Harrison, “Driving the Soviets up the Wall: A Super-­Ally, a Superpower, and the Building of the Berlin Wall, 1958–61,” Cold War History 1, no. 1 (2000): 53–74. 3. The administration’s African outreach efforts can be followed in Philip  E. Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist Leaders (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). For the administration’s general policy ­toward decolonization, see Robert B. Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 94–97, 132–34.

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4. C. G. Eastwood (FO) to Sir Andrew Cohen (UKUN), 10 January 1961, Foreign Office: General Correspondence: Po­liti­cal Department, FO 371/160902, National Archives, Kew (hereafter FO 371 with filing information). 5. A. B. Cohen (UKUN) to C. G. Eastwood (FO), 18 January 1961, FO 371/160902. 6. See CO memorandum, “Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Brief for the U.K. Representative at the Twelfth Session, 1961,” enclosure to G. K. Caston (UK del UN) to W. S. Ryrie (CO), 25 April 1961, Rec­ord Class DO 181/41, Commonwealth Relations Office and Colonial Office: United Nations Department and Successors: Registered Files (UND Series), National Archives (hereafter DO 181, with filing information); and Ryrie tel. 95 to Caston, 28 April 1961, DO 181/41. 7. Hugh Foot, untitled confidential memorandum, 17 July 1961, DO 181/43; memorandum of conversation, “U.K. Policy in the United Nations on Target Dates and Colonialism,” 26 July 1961, FO 371/160906. 8. Patrick Dean (UK del UN) to Sir A. Clutterbuck (Commonwealth Relations Office), 26 January 1961, FO 371/160902; British high commissioner in Delhi tel. 550 to CRO, 28 February 1961, FO 371/160903; British high commissioner in Delhi tel. 4 to CRO, 17 January 1961, FO 371/160902. 9. Senator John F. Kennedy, speech in City Hall Square, Bowling Green, KY (Advance Release Text), 8 October 1960, http://­www​.­presidency​.­ucsb​.­edu​/­ws​/­index​.­php​ ?­pid​=2­ 5712. See also Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948–1968 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985), 58; and Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 138. 10. See National Security Council Action Memorandum No.  61, “An Effective Countertheme to ‘Peaceful Coexistence,’ ” 14 July 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, vol. 25, Organ­ization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific M ­ atters (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), no. 126, http://­history​.­state​.­gov​/­historicaldocuments​/­frus1961​-­63v25​/­d126; and “The Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­ pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­ eoples: Letter Dated 25 November 1961 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of Amer­i­ca to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the General Assembly,” 25 November 1961, UN Doc. A/4985. For the Kennedy administration approach to the United Nations see Gary B. Ostrower, The United States and United Nations (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1998), 98–115. 11. Jenkins memorandum to McConaughy. “Secretary’s Policy Planning Meeting This Morning Concerning the United Nations,” 1 June 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. 25, no. 170, http://­history​.­state​.­gov​/­historicaldocuments​/­frus1961​-­63v25​/­d170; Bureau of International Organ­ization Affairs memorandum for President Kennedy, “United States Strategy at the Sixteenth General Assembly,” undated [fall 1961], FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. 25, no. 174, http://­history​.­state​.­gov​/­historicaldocuments​/­frus1961​ -­63v25​/­d174. 12. Foy D. Kohler (EUR) memorandum to Mr. Cleveland (IO), “US Position at Resumed Session of the UN General Assembly on Establishment of Target Dates for Self-­Determination by Dependent Territories,” 1 March 1961, RG 59, UN Po­liti­cal Affairs, Country Files, 1946–1968, box 1, folder: Resolution 1514; Benjamin Gerig (Office of Dependent Areas) memorandum for Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “New United

NOTES TO PAGES 1 6 6 – 1 6 8

257

States Approach on the Colonial Question at the United Nations,” 28 April 1961, RG 59, UN Po­liti­cal Affairs, Country Files, 1946–1968, box 1, folder: Colonial Issue, National Archives II, College Park, Mary­land; Gerig memorandum to Harlan Cleveland (IO), “Briefing Paper for Talks with Sir Hugh Foot—­Terms of Reference of Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 30 August 1961, RG 59, UN Po­liti­cal Affairs, Country Files, 1946–1968, box 1, folder: NSGT Committee; Stevenson (USUN) tel. 2182 to Secretary of State, 11 February 1961, RG 59, 321.4/2-1161. 13. Stevenson quoted in Alanna O’Malley, The Diplomacy of Decolonisation: Amer­ i­ca, Britain, and the United Nations during the Congo Crisis, 1960–1964 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018), 88. 14. “Anglo-­United States Talks on African Questions, Held at the State Department, February 24th, 1961, at 11 a.m.,” FO 371/160904; Sir Harold Caccia (UK ambassador, US) tel. 655 to FO, 15 March 1961, DO 181/42; Jonathan Bingham (USUN) memorandum, “Comments on EUR Position Concerning Establishment of Target Dates,” 6 March 1961, enclosure to William C. Burdett (Office of British Commonwealth and Northern Eu­ro­pean Affairs) memorandum to Foy D. Kohler (EUR), “The Secretary’s Talks with the British Ambassador, March 14,” 11 March 1961, RG 59, 321.4/3-1161. 15. For the committee’s membership, see “ ‘List of Representatives to the Twelfth Session of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 8 May 1961, UN Doc. A/AC.35/Inf.24/Rev.1. 16. John C. Pool (US) remarks at the 240th meeting of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 18 May  1961, UN Doc. A/AC.35/ SR.240, 3. 17. Jorge Ros (Argentina) remarks at the 240th meeting of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 18 May 1961, UN Doc. A/AC.35/ SR.240, 4, 12. 18. Sir Hugh Foot (UK ambassador to UN) to A. D. Wilson (FO), 2 September 1961, FO 371/160906. 19. Department of State, Bureau of International Organ­ization Affairs, memorandum for the president, “United States Strategy at the Sixteenth General Assembly,” 24 July 1961, John F. Kennedy Papers, National Security Files, Series 5, box 310, folder: Subjects UN (United Nations) 1/61-7/61, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Mas­sa­chu­ setts (hereafter Kennedy Papers, NSF, with filing information). 20. Marcus G. Raskin memorandum, “U.S. Initiatives and Policy at the 16th UN General Assembly,” enclosure to Arthur Schlesinger  Jr. memorandum for Harlan Cleveland, 26 August 1961, RG 59, 320/8-2661. 21. See Robert Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 77–82. 22. Attending ­were Af­ghan­i­stan, Algeria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yemen, and Yugo­slavia. 23. “Belgrade Conference Appeal for Negotiations between the Heads of Government of the United States and the Soviet Union,” 6 September 1961, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 (Washington: US Department of State, Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1965), doc. 271, http://­hdl​.­handle​.­net​/­2027​/­mdp​ .­39015010323460. See also Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World, 79.

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24. Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World, 77. 25. “A Program of Action for the United Nations General Assembly: Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-­Aligned Countries, Approved at Belgrade, September 5, 1961,” in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, doc. 39, http://­ hdl​.­handle​.­net​/­2027​/­mdp​.­39015010323460. 26. See Ilya Gaiduk, Divided Together: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations, 1945–1965 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 253; and Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World, 80–82. 27. Lord Home (UK) remarks at the 1017th plenary meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, 27 September 1961, UN Doc. A/PV.1017, para. 114; memorandum of conversation, “New U.K. Policy re Providing Po­liti­cal and Constitutional Information to the United Nations,” 1 September 1961, RG 59, Office of UN Po­liti­cal Affairs, Country Files, 1946–1968, box 1, folder: Colonial Issue. 28. For the general contours of this story, see Kay, New Nations, 172–80. 29. “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Provisional Agenda of the Sixteenth Session,” 29 August 1961, UN Doc. A/4859; “Letter Dated 26 September 1961 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Addressed to the President of the General Assembly, Transmitting a Memorandum from the Government of the USSR on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples,” 27 September 1961, UN Doc. Annexes (XVI) 88 and 22, paras. 28, 29, 31. 30. “Letter Dated 26 September 1961 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” paras. 47, 58. 31. Gunapala Piyasena Malalasekera (Ceylon) remarks at the 1048th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 7 November 1961, UN Doc. A/PV.1048, para. 103; Jaja Wachuku (Nigeria) remarks at the 1047th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 6 November 1961, UN Doc. A/PV.1047, para. 102. See also Jonathan Bingham (US) and Frank Corner (New Zealand) remarks at the 1061st plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 22 November 1961, UN Doc. A/PV.1061, paras. 99–164, 168–69; Jacques Koscziusko-­Morizet (France) and Vasco Garin (Portugal) remarks at the 1065th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 27 November 1961, UN Doc. A/PV.1065, paras. 25–26, 275–76; and J. K. Uys (South Africa) remarks at the 1066th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 27 November 1961, UN Doc. A/PV.1066, para. 20. 32. See Resolution 217 A (III), “Universal Declaration of H ­ uman Rights,” 10 December 1948, http://­www​.­un​-­documents​.­net​/­a3r217a. 33. Chieh Liu (China) remarks at the 1055th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 15 November 1961, UN Doc. A/PV.1055, paras. 188, 190; Joseph Godber (UK) remarks at the 1056th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 16 November 1961, UN Doc. A/PV.1056, para. 147; Livio Theodoli (Italy) remarks at the 1064th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 24 November 1961, UN Doc. A/PV.1064, para. 108. 34. USUN tel. 1739 to State Department, 21 November 1961, RG 59, 321.4/11-2161. 35. See Kay, New Nations, 177. 36. “Comments by the United States Del­e­ga­tion on the Memorandum of the Government of the USSR (A/4889),” enclosure to “Letter Dated 25 November 1961 from the Representative of the United States of Amer­i­ca Addressed to the President of the General Assembly,” 25 November 1961, in “Agenda Item 88: The Situation with Re-

NOTES TO PAGES 1 7 3 – 1 7 6

259

gard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples and Agenda Item 22: Aid to Africa,” UN Doc. Annexes (XVI) 88 and 22, 16, 18, 19, 20. 37. “Letter Dated 27 November 1961 from the Chairman of the Del­e­ga­tion of Poland Addressed to the President of the General Assembly,” 27 November 1961, in “Agenda Item 88,” 20; “Letter Dated 7 December 1961 from the Chairman of the Del­ e­ga­tion of Romania Addressed to the President of the General Assembly,” 7 December 1961, in “Agenda Item 88,” 21. 38. “Statement by the USSR Del­e­ga­tion on the Subject of the Comments by the United States Del­e­ga­tion (A/4895),” enclosure to “Letter Dated 20 December 1961 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Addressed to the President of the General Assembly,” 20 December 1961, in “Agenda Item 88,” 22, 23. 39. On ­these issues generally, see, for example, Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2001); and Borstelmann, Cold War. Specific discussion of the experiences of African diplomats may be found in Michael Krenn, “The Unwelcome Mat: African Diplomats in Washington, D.C., during the Kennedy Years,” in Win­dow on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1988, ed. Brenda Gayle Plummer (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 162–80. 40. “The Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­ eoples: Af­ghan­i­stan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and United Arab Republic: Draft Resolution,” 20 November 1961, UN Doc. A/L.366. For the resolution itself, see Resolution 1654 (XVI), “The Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples,” 27 November 1961, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­1654(XVI). 41. UK mission to UN tel. 2627 to FO, 19 December 1961, CO 936/725; UK mission to UN tel. 2668 to FO, 22 December 1961, CO 936/725; FO tel. 5968 to UK mission to UN, 21 December 1961, CO 936/725; USUN tel. 2268 to State Department, 28 December 1961, RG 59, 320/12-2861. 42. Parviz Mahdavi (Iran) remarks at the 1183rd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 25 October 1961, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1183, para. 4; Marof Achkar (Guinea) remarks at the 1186th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 26 October 1961, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1186, para. 27. 43. H. K. Yomekpe (Ghana) remarks at the 1182nd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 24 October 1961, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1182, para. 23. 44. Najmuddine Rifai (Syria) remarks at the 1251st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 15 December 1961, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1251, para. 25. 45. Adolfo Raúl Taylhardat (Venezuela) remarks at the 1250th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 15 December 1961, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1250, para. 24. 46. J. N. Khosla (India) remarks at the 1249th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 14 December 1961, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1249, para. 4. See also L. N. Palar (Indonesia) and Marof Achkar (Guinea) remarks at the 1250th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 15 December 1961, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1250, paras. 26–27, 45; and Najmuddine Rifai

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(Syria) remarks at the 1251st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 15 December 1961, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1251, paras. 24–32. 47. See H. K. Yomekpe (Ghana) remarks at the 1250th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 15 December  1961, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1250, paras. 13–19; and Sidi Baba (Morocco) remarks at the 1251st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 15 December 1961, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1251, paras. 34–35. 48. V. I. Oberemko (Soviet Union) remarks at the 1251st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 15 December 1961, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1251, para. 55. 49. “Question of the Renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories: Argentina, Ghana, India, Philippines, Syria, Venezuela: Joint Draft Resolution,” 14 December 1961, UN Doc. A/C.4/L.725. See also summary rec­ ord of 1251st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 15 December 1961, UN Doc. A/C.4/ SR.1251, para. 60; and Report of the Fourth Committee, 18 December 1961, UN Doc. A/5047. 50. See verbatim rec­ord of the 1083rd meeting of the General Assembly, 19 December 1961, UN Doc. A/PV.1083, paras. 174, 247–48; and Resolution 1700 (XVI), “Question of the Renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 19 December 1961, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​ ?­symbol​=A ­ ​/­RES​/­1700(XVI), which contains membership information. 8. Activism Triumphant

1. See, for example, Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-­Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2008); and Chen Jian, Mao’s China & the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 2. See United Nations, “ Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-­Present,” https://­w ww​.­u n​.­o rg​/­e n​/­s ections​/­m ember​-­s tates​/­g rowth​-­u nited​-­n ations​ -­membership​-­1945​-­present​/­index​.­html. For nonalignment see Mark Atwood Lawrence, “The Rise and Fall of Nonalignment,” in The Cold War in the Third World, ed. Robert J. McMahon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 139–55; and Robert Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 3. F. A. Vallant minute, “Non-­Self-­Governing Territories: Competence of the General Assembly,” 25 January  1962, Rec­ord Class DO 181/40, Commonwealth Relations Office and Colonial Office: United Nations Department and Successors: Registered Files (UND Series), National Archives (hereafter DO 181, with filing information); T. C. Jerrom (CO) minute, “UN Intervention,” 6 April 1962, Colonial Office and Commonwealth Office: International and General Department and Pre­de­ces­sors: Original Correspondence, Rec­ord Class CO 936/727, National Archives, Kew, E ­ ngland (hereafter CO 936, with filing information). 4. Colonial Secretary Reginald Maulding memorandum to Foreign Secretary Lord Home, “Discussion of British Colonial Territories in Committees of the United Nations,” 26 March 1962, DO 181/50. 5. Sir Hugh Foot in meeting notes, 2 January 1962, FO 371/166819; UKUN tel. 403 to FO, 2 January 1962, Foreign Office: General Correspondence: Po­liti­cal Department, FO 371/16689, National Archives, Kew (hereafter FO 371 with filing information); Foreign Secretary Lord Home minute to Colonial Secretary Reginald Maulding, “­ Discussion

NOTES TO PAGES 1 8 0 – 1 8 3

261

of British Colonial Territories in Committees of the United Nations,” 19 March 1962, enclosure to J.  O. Wright (FO) to J.  T.  A. Howard-­Drake (CO), 19 March  1962, DO 181/50. 6. Sir Hugh Foot (British ambassador, UN) to T. C. Jerrom (CO), 13 February 1962, CO 936/725. See also UK mission to UN tel. 236 to FO, 2 February 1962, DO 181/46. 7. “Exploitation of Soviet Colonialism at the United Nations,” 1962, FO 371/172593. 8. Outline of Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson pre­sen­ta­tion at the National Security Council, “United States Foreign Policy as Seen from New York,” 26 June 1962, John F. Kennedy Papers, National Security Files, Kennedy Papers, NSF Series 5, box 311, folder: Subjects UN (United Nations) General, 7/62/8/62, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Mas­sa­chu­setts (hereafter Kennedy Papers, NSF, with filing information). 9. Luis Valencia (Ec­ua­dor) remarks at the 252nd meeting of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 7 May  1962, UN Doc. A/AC.35/ SR.252, 12. See also Nathaniel Eastman (Liberia) remarks at the 252nd meeting of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 7 May 1962, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.252, 7; and I. A. Akhund (Pakistan) remarks at the 253rd meeting of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 8 May 1962, UN Doc. A/AC.35/SR.253, 6. 10. “Report of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 1962, UN Doc. A/5215, para. 55. 11. UK mission to UN to W. S. Ryrie (CO), 25 May 1962, DO 181/41. 12. John Sankey (UK mission to UN) memorandum, “Committee on Information for Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 18 June 1962, FO 371/166804. See also Ryrie minute to Sir John Martin, 27 August 1962, CO 936/729; Stevenson (US mission to UN) tel. 2188 to State Department, 7 December 1962, Rec­ord Group 59, 321.4/12-762, National Archives II, College Park, Mary­land. 13. The committee’s members w ­ ere Australia, Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, the Soviet Union, Syria, Tanganyika, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugo­slavia. 14. Valerian A. Zorin (USSR) remarks at the 2nd meeting of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples, 27 February 1962, UN Doc. A/AC.109/SR.2, 14; V. K. Kyaruzi (Tanganyika) remarks at the 3rd meeting of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples, 28 February 1962, UN Doc. A/AC.109/SR.3, 6. 15. Miso Pavicevic (Yugo­slavia) remarks at the 7th meeting of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­ eoples, 5 March 1962, UN Doc. A/AC.109/SR.7, 7. 16. Colonial Secretary Reginald Maulding to Foreign Secretary Lord Home, 21 May 1962, CO 936/728. 17. J.  G. Tahourdin (FO) minute, “Colonial Issues at the United Nations,” 22 May 1962, FO 371/166826; C. T. Crowe (UK mission to UN) memorandum, “The Committee of Seventeen,” enclosure to Sir Patrick Dean dispatch 18 to Foreign Secretary, 25 May 1962, FO 371/166826. 18. Sir Patrick Dean dispatch 18 to Foreign Secretary, 25 May 1962, FO 371/166826.

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19. Department of State circular airgram CA-2368, “Committee of 17 in the Seventeenth United Nations General Assembly,” 30 August 1962, RG 59, 320/8-3062. 20. See H. K. Yomekpe (Ghana) remarks at the 1422nd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 13 December 1962, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1422, para. 57. 21. V. A. Brykin (Soviet Union) remarks at the 1422nd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 13 December 1962, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1422, para. 40; Laura Meneses de Albizu Campos (Cuba) remarks at the 1423rd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 13 December 1962, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1423, para. 21. 22. Jaime de Pinies (Spain) remarks at the 1423rd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 13 December 1962, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1423, para. 61. 23. U Tin Maung (Burma) remarks at the 1421st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 13 December 1962, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1421, para. 15; Slaheddine Abdellah (Tunisia) remarks at the 1423rd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 13 December 1962, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1423, para. 3. 24. Aureliano Aguirre (Uruguay) remarks at the 1422nd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 13 December 1962, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.4122, para. 6; Enrique Ros (Argentina) remarks at the 1421st meeting of the Fourth Committee, 13 December 1962, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1421, para. 41. 25. See Jonathan B. Bingham (US) remarks at the 1416th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 10 December 1962, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1416, paras. 44–51; L. R. McIntyre (Australia) remarks at the 1420th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 12 December 1962, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1420, paras. 103–11; and Luis Valencia (Ec­ua­dor) remarks at the 1422nd meeting of the Fourth Committee, 13 December 1962, UN Doc. A/C.4/ SR.1422, paras. 44–54. 26. See summary rec­ord, 1425th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 14 December 1962, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1425, para. 16; and “Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ceylon, Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, India, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mala, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syria, Tanganyika, Togo: Joint Draft Resolution,” 14 December 1962, UN Doc. A/C.4/L.771. 27. See summary rec­ord, 1425th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 14 December 1962, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1422, paras. 17–41. 28. Yordan Tchobanov (Bulgaria) remarks at the 1178th meeting of the General Assembly, 28 November 1962, UN Doc. A/PV.1178, para. 151; A. K. Gren (Soviet Union) remarks at the 1171st plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 20 November 1962, UN Doc. A/PV.1171, paras. 176, 226. 29. Jonathan B. Bingham (US), remarks at the 1171st plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 20 November 1962, UN Doc. A/PV.1171, paras. 48, 49; Yu-­chi Hsueh (China), remarks at the 1172nd meeting of the General Assembly, 21 November 1962, UN Doc. A/PV.1172, paras. 65, 70; Heath MacQuarrie (Canada), remarks at the 1174th meeting of the General Assembly, 23 November 1962, UN Doc. A/PV.1174, paras. 41, 50; UK mission to UN tel. 2151 to FO, 23 November 1962, FO 371/166841. See also Asa McKercher, “The Trou­ble with Self-­Determination: Canada, Soviet Colonialism, and the United Nations,” International Journal of ­Human Rights 20, no. 3 (2016): 355–56; and Mary Ann Heiss, “Exposing Red Colonialism: US Propaganda at the United Nations, 1953–1963,” Journal of Cold War Studies 17, no. 3 (2015): 112–13. 30. “Af­ghan­is­ tan, Algeria, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dohomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Indonesia, Iran,

NOTES TO PAGES 1 8 6 – 1 8 8

263

Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, Syria, Tanganyika, Togo, Uganda, United Arab Republic, and Upper Volta: Draft Resolution,” 11 December 1962, in “Agenda Item 25: The Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­ eoples: Report of the Special Committee Established u ­ nder General Assembly Resolution 1654 (XVI),” UN Doc. Annexes (XVII) 25. 31. “Harlan Cleveland (Department of State) memorandum for Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (White House), “United Nations Weekly Forecast #11,” 14 December 1962, RG 59, 320/12-1462. 32. L. N. Palar (Indonesia) remarks at the 1192nd meeting of the General Assembly, 14 December 1962, UN Doc. A/PV.1192, para. 51; Diallo Telli (Guinea) remarks at the 1194th meeting of the General Assembly, 14 December 1962, UN Doc. A/ PV.1194, para. 104. 33. Jonathan B. Bingham (US) remarks at the 1194th meeting of the General Assembly, 14 December 1962, UN Doc. A/PV.1194, paras. 59, 61. See also Gunnar Helen (Sweden) remarks at the 1192nd meeting of the General Assembly, 14 December 1962, UN Doc. A/PV.1192, paras. 96–112; Voeunsai Sonn (Cambodia) and Katsuo Okazaki ( Japan) remarks at the 1194th meeting of the General Assembly, 14 December 1962, UN Doc. A/PV.1184, paras. 44–49, 66–76; and Frode Jokobsen (Denmark) and Ludovico Carducci-­Artensisio (Italy) remarks at the 1195th meeting of the General Assembly, 17 December 1962, UN Doc. A/PV.1195, paras. 4–18. 34. See Diallo Telli (Guinea), L. N. Palar (Indonesia), and Adebayo Adeyinka (Nigeria) remarks at the 1194th meeting of the General Assembly, 14 December 1962, UN Doc. A/PV.1194, paras. 95–128; and Diallo Telli (Guinea) remarks at the and voting results in 1195th meeting of the General Assembly, 17 December 1962, UN Doc. A/PV.1195, paras. 2, 24–34, 52–54. 35. See voting results, plenary rec­ord of 1198th meeting of the General Assembly, 19 December 1962, UN Doc. A/PV.1198, para. 110. For the final resolution, see Resolution 1847 (XVII), “Continuation of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories,” 19 December 1962, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​ _­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=A ­ ​/­RES​/­1847(XVII). 36. See voting results, plenary rec­ord of 1195th meeting of the General Assembly, 17 December 1962, UN Doc. A/PV.1195, paras. 58–91. For the final resolution, see Resolution 1810 (XVII), “The Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­ eoples,” 17 December 1962, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​ /­1810(XVII). 37. Sir Patrick Dean (UK) remarks at the 1195th meeting of the General Assembly, 17 December 1962, UN Doc. A/PV.1195, paras. 74, 75. 38. Sir Patrick Dean (UK mission, UN) to Sir Harold Caccia (FO), 1 December 1962, FO 371/166842; Sir Patrick Dean (UK mission, UN) to Sir Harold Caccia (FO), 17 December 1962, FO 371/166843. 39. Department of State airgram #CA6109, “UN Developments,” 4 December  1962, RG 59, 320/12-462; Secretary of State Dean Rusk memorandum for the president, “The 17th General Assembly: A Summary Round-­Up,” 24 December 1962, RG 59, 320/12-2462.

26 4 NOTES

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40. J. M. Martin UKUN) circular letter, 5 February 1963, Rec­ord Class DO 183/220, Central African Office and Commonwealth Relations Office: Central Africa: Registered Files (CAO and 2-­CA Series), National Archives (hereafter DO 183 with filing information); FO intel. 6, “The United Nations Committee of Twenty-­Four on Colonialism,” 25 January 1963, DO 181/56. 41. FO intel. 6, “The United Nations Committee of Twenty-­Four on Colonialism,” 25 January 1963, DO 181/56; J. M. Martin (UKUN) circular letter, 5 February 1963, DO 183/220 (emphasis in original). For membership of the committee, see Resolution 1810 (XVII). 42. Sir Patrick Dean (UKUN) tel. 34 to FO, 27 January 1963, DO 181/56; S. Falle (FO) minute, “United Nations Committee of Twenty-­Four,” 13 February 1963, FO 371/172593. 43. Samuel F. Belk memorandum for Mr. Kaysen, “Status of U.S. Participation in the Committee of 24 (Old Committee of 17),” 20 March 1963, Kennedy Papers, NSF Series 5, box 311, folder: Subjects UN (United Nations) General, 1/63-4/63; William H. Brubeck memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, “U.S. Participation in the UN Committee of 24,” 18 March 1963, Kennedy Papers, NSF Series 5, box 311, folder: Subjects UN (United Nations) General, 1/63-4/63. 44. J. A. Scott (UKUN) to Miss June Cook (CO), “Committee on Information,” 17 May 1963, DO 181/41. See also “Draft Report of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 10 May 1963, UN Doc. A/AC.35/L.383; and Resolution 1847 (XVII), “Continuation of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories,” 19 December 1962, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​ _­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=A ­ ​/­RES​/­1847(XVII). 45. For the committee’s work, see “Draft Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples,” 14 October 1963, UN Doc. A/ AC.109/L.92. 46. D. J. L. Hood (Australia) and Sreten Ilic (Yugo­slavia) remarks at the 122nd meeting of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­ eoples,” 4 March  1963, UN Doc. A/AC.109/SR.122, 5–6; C.  E. King (UK) remarks at the 122nd meeting of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­eoples,” 4 March  1963, UN Doc. A/AC.109/SR.122, 12; Kazimierz Smiganowski (Poland) remarks at the 123rd meeting of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples,” 5 March  1963, UN Doc. A/ AC.109/SR.123, 4. 47. Sir Patrick Dean (UKUN) to Foreign Secretary Home, “United Nations Committee of Twenty-­Four,” 6 August 1963, DO 181/57. 48. William H. Brubeck (executive secretary, Department of State) memorandum for McGeorge Bundy (president’s special assistant for national security affairs), “U.S. Participation in the UN Committee of 24,” 18 March 1963, Kennedy Papers, NSF, Series 5, box 311, folder: Subjects UN (United Nations) General, 1/63-4/63. 49. States in attendance: Algeria; Burundi; Cameroon; Central African Republic; Chad; Congo; Demo­cratic Republic of the Congo; Dahomey; Egypt; Ethiopia; Gabon;

NOTES TO PAGES 1 9 2 – 1 9 4

265

Ghana; Guinea; Ivory Coast; Liberia; Libya; Madagascar; Mali; Mauritania; Morocco; Niger; Nigeria; Rwanda; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Somalia; Sudan; Tanganyika; Togo; Tunisia; Uganda; Upper Volta; and Zanzibar. For in­de­pen­dence information, see United Nations, “List of Former Trust and Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” https://­ www​.­un​.­org​/­dppa​/­decolonization​/­en​/­history​/­former​-­trust​-­and​-­nsgts. 50. Organ­ization of African Unity, “Resolutions ­Adopted by the First Conference of In­de­pen­dent African Heads of State and Government Held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, From 22 to 25 May 1963,” https://­au​.­int​/­sites​/­default​/­files​/­decisions​/­32247​-­1963​ _­cias​_­plen​_­2​-­3​_­cias​_­res​_­1​-­2​_­e​.­pdf. See also Ryan M. Irwin Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 56; Mary L. Dudziak, “Birmingham, Addis Ababa, and the Image of Amer­i­ca: International Influence on U.S. Civil Rights Politics in the Kennedy Administration,” in Win­dow on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1988, ed. Brenda Gayle Plummer (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 181–99. 51. State Department paper, “United States Strategy at the 18th General Assembly,” 30 August 1963, enclosure to Dean Rusk memorandum for the president, “Strategy for thee Eigh­teenth General Assembly,” 30 August 1963, Kennedy Papers, NSF, Series 5, box 311a, folder: Subjects UN (United Nations) General, 9/1/63-9/8/63. For some of the lit­er­a­ture linking racial concerns to foreign policy, see Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2001); Carol Anderson, Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Strug­gle for H ­ uman Rights, 1944–1955 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). 52. “Address by President John F. Kennedy to the UN General Assembly,” 25 September 1961, http://­www​.­state​.­gov​/­p​/­io​/­potusunga​/­207241​.­htm. 53. John F. Kennedy, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” 14 January 1963, http://­www​.­presidency​.­ucsb​.­edu​/­ws​/­​?­pid​=9­ 138. 54. John F. Kennedy, “ ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ Speech,” 26 June 1963, http://­millercenter​ .­org​/­president​/­speeches​/­speech​-­3376. For the civil rights speech, see John  F. Kennedy, “Civil Rights Address,” 11 June 1963, http://­dubois​.­fas​.­harvard​.­edu​/­sites​/­all​/­files​ /­JFK%20Civil%20Rights%20Speech%20June%2011,%201963​.­pdf. 55. John A. McKesson (acting executive secretary, Department of State) memorandum for George McGhee, “The President’s Attendance at the Eigh­teenth General Assembly,” 10 August 1963, Kennedy Papers, NSF, Series 5, box 311a, folder: Subjects UN (United Nations) General, 8/61; Robert W. Komer (NSC) to McGeorge Bundy, 13 August 1963, Kennedy Papers, NSF, Series 5, box 311a, folder: Subjects UN (United Nations) General, 8/61; Bureau of International Affairs (IO), Department of State paper, “United States Strategy at the 18th General Assembly,” 9 August 1963, enclosure to Mose L. Harvey (acting counselor and chairman of the Policy Planning Council) memorandum to “Planning Group Members,” “Planning Group Meeting, Tuesday, August 13, 1963, 12:00 noon, room 7261, Department of State,” 10 August 1963, Kennedy Papers, NSF, Series 5, box 311a, folder: Subjects UN (United Nations) General, 8/61; State Department paper, “United States Strategy at the 18th General Assembly,” 30 August 1963, enclosure to Dean Rusk memorandum for the president, “Strategy for the Eigh­teenth General Assembly,” 30 August 1963, Kennedy Papers, NSF, Series 5, box 311a, folder: Subjects UN (United Nations) General, 9/1/63-9/8/63.

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56. See FO draft paper, “The U.N. and Colonial Questions,” undated, enclosure to Sam Falle (FO) to S. J. G. Cambridge (UK mission, UN), 21 August 1963, FO 371/172599; and C. W. Squire (FO) minute, “United Nations and Colonialism,” 10 August 1963, FO 371/172599. 57. Sasmojo Karseno (Indonesia) remarks at the 1510th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 11 December 1963, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1510, para. 37; Luis Valencia (Ec­ua­ dor) remarks at the 1509th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 10 December 1963, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1509, para. 25. 58. “Statement Made by the Under-­Secretary for Trusteeship and Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories at the 1501st Meeting of the Fourth Committee, on 4 December 1963,” 4 December 1963, UN Doc. A/C.4/630, p. 2. 59. José Luis Pérez Ruiz (Spain) remarks at the 1511th  meeting of the Fourth Committee, 11 December 1963, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1511, para. 13. For the vote on the draft resolution, see summary rec­ord, 1511th meeting of the Fourth Committee, 11 December 1963, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1511, para. 40. See also “Report of the Fourth Committee,” 14 December 1963, UN Doc. Document A/5673. The draft resolution itself is “Question of the Continuation of the Committee on Information from Non-­ Self-­Governing Territories: Cambodia, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Ghana, Guinea, India, Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Toga, Uganda, and Yugo­slavia: Draft Resolution,” 10 December 1963, UN Doc. A/C.4/L.786 and Add. 1. 60. See “Address by President John F. Kennedy to the UN General Assembly, September 25, 1961,” http://­www​.­state​.­gov​/­p​/­io​/­potusunga​/­207241​.­htm. 61. John A. McKesson (acting executive secretary, Department of State) memorandum for George McGhee, “The President’s Attendance at the Eigh­teenth General Assembly,” 10 August 1963, Kennedy Papers, NSF, Series 5, box 311a, folder: Subjects UN (United Nations) General 8/61; State Department paper, “United States Strategy at the 18th General Assembly,” 30 August 1963, enclosure to Dean Rusk memorandum for the president, “Strategy for thee Eigh­teenth General Assembly,” 30 August  1963, Kennedy Papers, NSF, Series 5, box 311a, folder: Subjects UN (United Nations) General, 9/1/63-9/8/63; Adlai Stevenson (US representative to United Nations) to President Kennedy, 19 August 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961– 1963, vol. 25, Organ­ization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific ­Matters (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001) doc. 262, http://­history​ .­state​.­gov​/­historicaldocuments​/­frus1961​-­63v25​/­d262. 62. John F. Kennedy, “Address to the UN General Assembly,” 20 September 1963, http://­millercenter​.­org​/­president​/­kennedy​/­speeches​/­speech​-­5764. 63. Birenda Narayan Chakravarty (India) remarks at the 1272nd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 4 December 1963, UN Doc. A/PV.1272, para. 75; C. E. King (UK) remarks at the 1273rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 4 December  1963, UN Doc. A/PV.1273, paras. 143, 142; Moshin Ahmed Alaini (Yemen) remarks at the 1266th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 28 November 1963, UN Doc. A/PV.1266, para. 90; E. R. S. R. Coomaraswamy (Ceylon) remarks at the 1267th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 29 November 1963, UN Doc. A/ PV.1267, para. 69; Librado D. Cayco (Philippines) remarks at the 1272nd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 4 December 1963, UN Doc. A/PV.1272, 15.

NOTES TO PAGES 1 9 8 – 1 9 9

267

64. Ion Georgescu (Romania) remarks at the 1269th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 3 December  1963, UN Doc. A/PV.1269, para. 129; L.  D. Alexeyev (Ukraine) remarks at the 1266th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 28 November 1963, UN Doc. A/PV1266, para. 124; S. A. Azimov (Soviet Union) remarks at the 1267th  plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 29 November  1963, UN Doc. A/PV.1267, para. 105; P. E. Astapenko (Byelorus­sia) remarks at the 1271st plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 4 December  1963, UN Doc. A/PV.1271, para. 83. 65. See E. R. S. R. Coomaraswamy (Ceylon) remarks at the 1267th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 29 November 1963, UN Doc. A/PV.1267, para. 44; Mahmoud Riad (United Arab Republic) and Adam Malick Sow (Chad) remarks at the 1270th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 3 December 1963, UN Doc. A/ PV.1270, paras. 37, 103. 66. See S. A. Azimov (Soviet Union) remarks at the 1267th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 29 November  1963, UN Doc. A/PV.1267, paras. 101–13; Tumbashiin Purevjal (Mongolia) remarks at the 1269th  plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 3 December  1963, UN Doc. A/PV.1269, paras. 33–63; Danilo Lekic (Yugo­slavia) remarks at the 1271st plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 4 December 1963, UN Doc. A/PV.1271, paras. 33–51; P. E. Astapenko (Byelorus­sia) and Milko Tarabanov (Bulgaria) remarks at the 1271st plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 4 December 1963, UN Doc. A/PV.1271, paras. 75–106, 107–29; and P. U. Okeke (Nigeria) and Jiri Hajek (Czecho­slo­va­k ia) remarks at the 1272nd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 4 December  1963, UN Doc. A/PV.1272, paras. 86–127. 67. Yu-­chi Hsueh (China) remarks at the 1268th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 2 December 1963, UN Doc. A/PV.1268, paras. 11, 14; Vasco Garin (Portugal) remarks at the 1270th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 3 December 1963, UN Doc. A/PV.1270, para. 19; Sidney R. Yates (US) remarks at the 1272nd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 4 December 1963, UN Doc. A/PV.1272, para. 10; C. E. King (UK) remarks at the 1273rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 4 December 1963, UN Doc. A/PV.1273, paras. 168, 170. 68. Resolution 1956 (XVIII), “The Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples,” 11 December 1963, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​ /­1956(XVIII). See also Agenda Item 23, “Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­ de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples,” UN Doc. Annexes (XVIII); and verbatim rec­ord, 1277th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 11 December 1963, A/PV.1277, paras. 14–165. 69. Resolution 1970 (XVIII), “Question of the Continuation of the Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­Governing Territories,” 16 December 1963, http://­www​ .­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=A ­ ​/­RES​/­1970(XVIII). See also verbatim rec­ord, 1281st plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 16 December 1963, UN Doc. A/PV.1281, para. 149. 70. Sir Patrick Dean (UK representative, UN) to R. A. Butler, “XVIIIth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations Debate on the Committee of Twenty-­four,”

26 8 NOTES

TO PAGES 2 0 0 –2 0 4

23 December  1963, DO 181/57. See also Colonial Secretary circular 41/64, “18th Session of the United Nations General Assembly—­Report of the Committee of 24,” 30 January 1964, DO 183/220. 71. Harlan M. Cleveland (assistant secretary of state for international organ­ization affairs) memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “Current Issues before the United Nations,” 27 November 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 25, doc. 282, http://­history​ .­state​.­gov​/­historicaldocuments​/­frus1961​-­63v25​/­d282. See also David A. Kay, “The Politics of Decolonization: The New Nations and the United Nations Po­liti­cal Pro­cess,” International Organ­ization 21, no. 4 (1967): 786–811. 72. Harlan M. Cleveland (assistant secretary of state for international organ­ization affairs) memorandum for Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “Current Issues before the United Nations.” 73. See Michael Krenn, “The Unwelcome Mat: African Diplomats in Washington, D.C. during the Kennedy Years,” in Win­dow on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1988, ed. Brenda Gayle Plummer (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 162–80. 74. William Attwood (US representative, United Nations), “Memorandum on Apartheid,” 7 November 1963, enclosure to Attwood memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, “Memorandum on Apartheid,” 8 November 1963, Kennedy Papers, NSF Series 5, box 311a, folder: UN (United Nations) General 10/63-11/63. 75. George Ball (acting secretary of state) memorandum to the president, “The Current Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” 13 December  1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 25, doc. 289, http://­history​.­state​.­gov​/­historicaldocuments​/­frus1961​ -­63v25​/­d289. For the declaration itself, see Resolution 1904 (XVIII), “United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,” 20 November 1963, http://­www​.­un​-­documents​.­net​/­a18r1904​.­htm. 76. Harlan M. Cleveland (assistant secretary of state for international organ­ization affairs) memorandum for Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “Current Issues before the United Nations.” See also Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations, Vol. 2, The Age of Decolonization, 1955–1965 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 5–11. Conclusion

1. Article 77(1)(c) of Chapter XII of the UN Charter, “The International Trusteeship System,” http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­sections​/­un​-­charter​/­chapter​-­xii​/­index​.­html. See also Resolution 1654 (XVI), “The Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples,” 27 November  1961, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​ /­RES​/­1654(XVI); Resolution 1810 (XVII), “The Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples,” 17 December 1962, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​ ?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­1810(XVII); and Resolution 1956 (XVIII), “The Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples,” 11 December  1963, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​ /­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­1956(XVIII). Voting results ­were 74-6-27 (92.5 ­percent), 76-7-20 (91.5 ­percent), and 86-6-17 (93.4 ­percent), respectively.

NOTES TO PAGES 2 0 5 – 2 0 6

269

2. Resolution 1710 (XVI), “United Nations Development De­cade: A Programme for International Economic Co-­operation,” 19 December 1961, http://­www​.­un​.­org​ /­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=A ­ ​/­RES​/­1710(XVI). 3. See D. I. Ajaegbo, “First Development De­cade, 1960–1970: The United Nations and the Economic Development of Africa,” Transafrican Journal of History 15 (1986): 1–17; and Jacques Fomerand, “Agent of Change? The United Nations and Development,” in The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society, ed. Jean E. Krasno (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 163–91. 4. Articles 1 and 4, Resolution 1904 (XVIII), “United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,” 20 November 1963, http://­www​ .­un​-­documents​.­net​/­a18r1904​.­htm. 5. Resolution 2105 (XX), “Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­ eoples,” 20 December 1965, http://­www​ .­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=­A​/­RES​/­2105(XX); Resolution 2189 (XXI), “Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and P ­ eoples,” 13 December 1966, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​ /­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​=A ­ ​/­RES​/­2189(XXI); Resolution 2326 (XXII), “Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples,” 6 December 1967, http://­www​.­un​.­org​/­en​/­ga​/­search​/­view​_­doc​.­asp​?­symbol​ =­A​/­RES​/­2326(XXII).

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Index

Abdellah, Slaheddine, 184 Accra Conference. See Conference of In­de­pen­dent African States Achkar, Marof, 175 activism, 7–9; Committee of Seventeen and, 181–82; Committee on Information and, 77, 104; Fourth Committee and, 14–15, 40, 60, 81, 88, 95, 108; on opening Trusteeship System, 43–44; San Francisco Conference and, 24–25; United States and, 167–68 Adams, Grantley, 48 Addis Ababa, 8, 191–94 Ad Hoc Committee on ­Factors (Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories), 86 Ad Hoc Committee on the Transmission of Information ­under Article 73(e) of the Charter, 35–39, 42, 43. See also Article 73(e); Committee on Information; Special Committee on Information administering states, 217n62; Article 73(e) information review and, 31–34, 36, 38–40, 46–50, 54–55, 65–67; cessation of information transmission from, 49, 59, 61, 66–67, 80–81, 85–86, 89–93, 109–11, 114; Committee of Seventeen and, 182; Committee on Information and, 78, 85, 95–96, 106; competence questions and, 86–87, 94, 121–23; f­ actors questions and, 72, 73, 79, 80, 236n27; Fourth Committee and, 41–43, 48, 57, 88, 91–93, 100–101, 110–13, 122–23, 128–29, 147–48; procedural maneuvering of, 15, 37, 45, 129–30, 203; Resolution 1956 (XVIII) on, 198; Soviet bloc and, 50–51, 102–3, 203; Special Committee on Information and, 53–54, 58, 63–65; Trusteeship System and, 23–27, 43–45. See also specific countries Africa: Anglo-­American coordination on, 115–16; Bandung Conference and, 99;

Conference of In­de­pen­dent African States and, 124, 130–31; East-­West paradigm and, 83, 97–98; in­de­pen­ dence movements in, 141, 170, 179; international accountability and, 204; Mandate System and, 19–20; membership expansion and, 134–35, 146, 160, 161, 240n2; Soviet declaration to end colonialism and, 154–55; Trusteeship System and, 24; United States and, 142, 173. See also Afro-­Asian bloc; specific countries Afro-­Asian bloc: British stance ­toward, 194; Committee of Seventeen and, 183; Committee on Information and, 195–96; forty-­three-­power resolution and, 156–57; Soviet declarations to end colonialism and, 154–56, 172, 174; United States and, 166, 180–81; on Western colonialism, 197–98. See also Africa; Asia; specific countries Aguirre, Aureliano, 184 Aiken, Frank, 153 Akhund, I. A., 181 Alaini, Moshin Ahmed, 197 Albania, 105 Algeria, 169 Allen, Roger, 58 Alvarez Restrepo, Antonio, 153 Anderson, Carol, 24 Anglo-­American relations: Allied war­time rhe­toric and, 20–21; Bandung Conference and, 99–100, 187–88; Bermuda Conference and, 115–16; Cold War and, 106, 144–45, 188; Committee on Information and, 76; decolonization and, 53, 58, 59, 61–63, 84–85, 90, 106, 144, 166, 213n7; forty-­three-­power resolution and, 156–57; France and, 125–26; Mandate System and, 21–22; po­liti­cal information transmission and,

281

28 2 I nde x

Anglo-­American relations (continued) 34, 49, 148–49; Portuguese item and, 125, 136–37; Soviet anticolonialism and, 158; UN activism and, 69–70, 88–89, 150–51, 165–66 Angola, 109, 127, 169, 200 anticolonialism: Anglo-­American discord and, 61–63; Atlantic Charter and, 21; Bandung Conference and, 98; Britain and, 75, 136; Committee on Information and, 104; Communist bloc and, 21; Fourth Committee and, 53, 59, 60, 65, 81, 82, 91, 94–95, 104, 111–12, 119, 202–3; India and, 37, 45–46; member-­ state expansions and, 8, 12–13, 15, 82, 103–5, 132–35, 146–47, 160, 164, 202; NAACP and, 24; OAU and, 8; Portugal’s territories and, 130, 242n16; Soviet Union and, 41–42, 68, 133, 135, 147, 151–55, 158, 170–73, 180, 233n3, 253n40; Special Committee on Information and, 53–54, 58; UDHR and, 8–9; UN Charter and, 18–19 apartheid, 8, 9, 170, 179, 194, 199, 200, 204–6, 211nn28–29 Argentina, 50, 166, 176, 184 Article 2(7), 39, 179, 220n15 Article 18(2) and (3), 42, 44, 45, 59, 88, 120, 129, 187 Article 22. See League of Nations Article 73(b), 39 Article 73(e): cessation of information transmission and, 49, 59, 61, 66–67, 80–81, 85–86, 89–93, 109–11, 114; decolonization and, 4, 6; ­human rights and, 65–70, 73, 81; international accountability through, 26–35; permanent committee for consideration of, 43, 45, 49, 55, 76–78, 80, 95, 101; UDHR and, 65–67; United States and, 118. See also po­liti­cal information transmission; Standard Form; specific committees and countries Article 76, 23 Article 77(1)(c), 43–44, 204 Asad, Muhammad, 77 Asia: Bandung Conference and, 99; decolonization and, 131, 204; East-­West paradigm and, 83, 97–98; in­de­pen­dence movements in, 170, 179; membership expansion and, 134–35, 160; Soviet declaration to end colonialism and, 154–55; United States

and, 142. See also Afro-­Asian bloc; specific countries Atlantic Charter (1941), 20–21, 35, 213n9 Attlee, Clement, 11 Attwood, William, 200 Australia: Article 73(e) reporting and, 30, 32, 33, 49, 50, 140; Committee of Twenty-­Four and, 190; ­factors subcommittee and, 73; Fourth Committee and, 73, 92, 93, 138, 139; San Francisco Conference and, 22; Special Committee on Information and, 58 Austria, 105 Baghdad Pact, 97 Bandung Conference (1955), 8, 15, 97–99, 118, 154, 160, 169, 203–4, 238n42 Bargues, Robert, 109, 112 Belgium: Article 73(e) reporting and, 30–33, 46, 49, 50, 118, 140, 141; Committee of Twenty-­Four and, 198; Committee on Information and, 77–79, 85, 128; Congo and, 132; ­factors subcommittee and, 71, 74; Fourth Committee and, 56, 73, 92, 93, 121, 139; Special Committee on Information and, 55, 57–58, 65; Trusteeship System and, 41 Belgrade Conference. See Non-­Aligned Movement Bell, Laird, 101 Bendryshev, V. N., 127 Berlin Blockade, 36, 193 Bermuda Conference (1957), 115–16 bilateral discussions. See Anglo-­American relations Bingham, Jonathan B., 185, 187 blocking third, 135. See also Article 18 Blom, N. S., 33 Bokhari, Ahmed S., 86 Bolivia, 150 Bolton, Frances Payne, 87 borderlands, 212n46 Borgwardt, Elizabeth, 10 Bottomley, Arthur: “Facts about Soviet Asia,” 143–44 Bourdillon, Henry, 114–15 Bouuaert, Claeys, 112 Bozovic, Aleksandar, 121, 127 Brazil: Article 73(e) information and, 33, 50; Committee on Information and, 76, 80, 92, 140–41; Special Committee on

I n d e x Information and, 50, 57, 64, 70; on UN competence, 145 Britain. See ­Great Britain Brykin, V. A., 183 Bulgaria, 105, 145, 147, 187, 189 Burke Roland, 97–98 Burma: Committee on Information and, 102, 119; ­factors subcommittee and, 74; Fourth Committee and, 79, 91–92; UN membership and, 37, 49 Byelorus­sia, 48, 50, 74, 145 Byrne, Jeffrey James, 8, 124 Cambodia, 99, 105, 187 Canada, 92, 93, 144, 186 Carpio, V. D., 108 Carreño Mallarino, Gabriel, 122 Caston, G. K., 146 Cayco, Librado D., 197 Central Powers and Mandate System, 19 Central Treaty Organ­ization (CENTO), 169 cessation of information transmission. See Article 73(e) Ceylon: Bandung Conference and, 99; Committee on Information and, 119, 126, 134; Fourth Committee and, 110; UN membership and, 105 Chakravarty, Birenda Narayan, 197 Chamandi, Tawfik, 121 Chelli, Zouhir, 157 Chile, 187 China: anticolonialism and, 179; Article 73(e) information and, 30, 33; Bandung Conference and, 97, 98; Committee on Information and, 80, 85, 95–96, 102, 119; communism and, 200; Fourth Committee and, 44; NAM and, 169; Soviet Union and, 105; Special Committee on Information and, 50, 55; Trusteeship System and, 24, 43–44; UN seat of, 61 Churchill, Winston S., 11, 20, 22, 75 Cisneros, Guy Pérez, 32–33, 57, 74 civil rights. See apartheid; Jim Crow system; race and racial equality Cleveland, Harlan M., 167, 200 Cohen, Andrew, 121, 166 Cohen, Benjamin, 121 Cold War, 4; accountability campaigns and, 15, 36–37; Committee of Seventeen and, 183, 189–90; Congo intervention and, 133; decolonization and, 52–53, 105, 161, 171–73; East-­West

283

c­ onfrontation in UN, 36–38, 41, 48, 50–51, 60–61, 81–83, 96–97, 127, 141–43, 161, 178–79, 212n37; propaganda and, 10–11, 14, 51, 83–84, 96, 103; racial discrimination and, 193; Soviet declarations to end colonialism and, 154–55, 158, 163–64, 170–71 Colombia, 42, 44, 244n43 Colonial and Dominions Offices (UK): Article 73(e) reporting and, 27–28; disengagement strategies and, 179–80; Foreign Office and, 56, 62, 75, 180, 182, 191, 194; Fourth Committee and, 56; on General Assembly competence, 125; propaganda from, 116–17; Special Committee on Information and, 62 colonialism: Anglo-­American discussions on, 21–22, 99–100, 105–6; Bandung Conference and, 8, 15, 99; Britain on, 41, 62, 63, 100–101, 108, 114–16, 144, 163–64; Churchill and, 20; Creech Jones on, 34; East-­West confrontation over, 170–73, 185–86, 190–91, 203; Fourteen Points and, 19; Khrushchev’s declaration to end, 151–55; member-­ state growth and, 143; Permanent Mandates Commission and, 20; Stevenson on, 180–81; Trusteeship System and, 41; UN Charter and, 18–19, 23–25, 27, 99. See also anticolonialism; Soviet colonialism Committee of Seventeen. See Decolonization Committee Committee of Six, 145, 147, 149–50, 248n15, 251n35 Committee of Twenty-­Four. See Decolonization Committee Committee on Information from Non-­Self-­ Governing Territories: cessation of information and, 85–86, 90–91, 106, 114; Cold War and, 126–27; Committee of Seventeen and, 184, 194–95, 199; competence questions in, 93; decolonization and, 2, 3, 14–15, 243n38; evolving membership of, 119; permanent basis for, 76–78, 80, 95–96, 101, 102, 146–47, 166–67, 175–77; pro­gress report on non-­self-­governing territories and, 133–34, 140–41; resolution creating, 74–75; termination of, 195–97, 199, 201. See also specific countries communism. See Cold War; Soviet bloc; Soviet colonialism; Soviet Union

28 4 I nde x

competence in determining non-­self-­ governing territories: Britain on, 136, 161–63, 189; Committee on Information and, 90–91; East-­West discord over, 102–3; Fourth Committee on, 73–75, 79, 80, 86, 92–94, 104, 109, 121–22, 127–28; General Assembly on, 79, 93–94, 102, 122–23, 139–40; member-­state expansion and, 130; Portuguese item and, 145–46. See also ­factors question; self-­government Conference of In­de­pen­dent African States (1958, 1960), 8, 105, 123–25, 130–31, 204 Congo, 132–33 Cook, T. F., 66 Coomaraswamy, E. R. S. R., 197 Costa Rica, 120 Cox, Arthur M., 84, 234n11 Creech Jones, Arthur, 27, 34, 44–45, 50 Crowe, C. T., 182 Cuba: Article 73(e) reporting and, 32–33, 46–47; Committee on Information and, 76, 80; ­factors subcommittee and, 71–74; Fourth Committee and, 44, 56, 79, 100–101; India’s non-­self-­governing territories and, 41; Special Committee on Information and, 70 Cuban Missile Crisis, 188 Czecho­slo­va­k ia, 48, 50, 51, 74

186–87, 190, 201; noncompliance with, 198; po­liti­cal information and, 181–82; resolution expanding, 186 Demo­cratic Republic of the Congo, 132–33 Denmark: Article 73(e) reporting and, 33, 46, 49; Committee of Seventeen and, 187; Committee on Information and, 95; ­factors subcommittee and, 71, 73; Fourth Committee and, 57, 92, 93; Greenland and, 90, 92–94; Special Committee on Information and, 55, 58; on timetables for decolonization, 187 dependent territories: accountability campaigns and, 12–14, 16; Fourteen Points and, 19; Mandate System and, 18; member-­state expansion and, 15, 103; Trusteeship System and, 24, 25, 28–30; Yalta Conference and, 22. See also non-­self-­governing territories; Trusteeship System Development De­cade, 196, 205 discrimination. See race and racial equality Djerdja, Josip, 149 Dominican Republic, 50, 55, 128, 166 Dosumu-­Johnson, T. O., 157 Double V campaign, 24 Douglas-­Home, Alec, 11, 163, 169–70, 180 Dulles, John Foster, 25–27, 33, 42, 43, 115 Dunbarton Oaks, 42 Dunne, Irene, 121

Dean, Patrick, 163, 175, 187, 191, 199 Declaration on Colonialism, 170–71 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 192–93, 200, 205 Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­ dence to Colonial Countries and ­People: Britain on, 163; Committee of Seventeen and, 175, 177, 181–82; decolonization and, 15, 16, 167; East-­West confrontation over, 170–72; ­human rights activism and, 9; international accountability through, 3, 7, 133, 203–4; Soviet Union on, 185; timetables for, 186; United States and, 159, 165. See also Resolution 1514 Declaration Regarding Non-­Self-­Governing Territories, 23–24, 159 Decolonization Committee: Britain on, 187–90; creation of, 174–77, 179, 201; global context for, 178–79; international accountability and, 3, 16, 178,

Eastman, Nathaniel, 181 Eastwood, C. G., 161–62 economic development: Bandung Conference and, 98; decolonization and, 12, 205, 206; in­de­pen­dence movements and, 22; Organ­ization of African Unity and, 192; Standard Form for communicating, 38; Trusteeship System and, 24, 28 Ec­ua­dor, 76, 80, 100–101, 181, 184 Eden, Anthony, 11, 75 educational development, 24, 28, 38, 57–58, 85 Egypt: Article 73(e) information and, 33, 40; Committee on Information and, 76; ­factors subcommittee and, 71, 72; Fourth Committee and, 44, 57, 79, 91–92, 101, 109; Special Committee on Information and, 50, 54, 55, 57, 64–65, 70; Suez Canal crisis and, 107 Eisenhower, Dwight D.: civil rights and, 83; colonialism and, 5; foreign policy and, 81, 233n2, 239n55; Hungarian crisis

I n d e x and, 108; Soviet relations and, 151–54, 156–57; Suez Canal crisis and, 107 Eisenhower Doctrine, 105 elections supervision, 150 El-­Hassan, Abdulla, 137 El Pharaony, Fouad, 70 El Salvador, 101 empire. See colonialism; imperialism enforcement of resolutions, 13, 51, 66, 107–8. See also specific resolutions Entezam, Nasrollah, 67 Espinosa y Prieto, Eduardo, 87–88, 100–101, 126, 129, 137, 140 Ethiopia, 8, 124 Evans, Allan, 164–65 Evans, S. H., 116 Evans, W. V. J., 129 ­factors questions: Ad Hoc Committee on, 86; Committee on Information and, 90–91; Fourth Committee on, 64–65, 71–74, 76, 80, 84. See also competence in determining non-­self-­governing territories Farrag, Ahmed M., 54, 64 Fekini, Mohieddine, 155 Ferguson, C. Vaughan, Jr., 125 Finland, 105, 143 Firestone, Bernard J., 24 Fletcher-­Cooke, John, 46, 54, 55, 57, 63, 222n45 Foot, Hugh, 163, 167, 169–70, 180 Foreign Office (UK), 6; Article 73(e) reporting and, 27, 149; Colonial Office and, 56, 62, 75, 180, 182, 191, 194; Fourth Committee and, 56; on United States, 144; on world opinion, 58, 62 forty-­three-­power resolution to end colonialism, 156–57 Fourteen Points, 19 Fourth Committee, 14–15, 226n83, 231n32; anticolonialism and, 53, 59, 60, 65, 81, 82, 91, 94–95, 104, 111–12, 119, 202–3; Article 73(e) review and, 28–34, 40–42, 44–49, 54, 55, 101, 111, 150, 158, 195; cessation of information transmission and, 92–93, 109–11; Cold War and, 108–9, 111–12, 126–27; Committee of Seventeen and, 184–85; Committee on Information and, 78–80, 94, 106, 128, 175–76, 184–85, 194–95, 199; competence questions in, 73–75, 79, 80, 86–87, 91–94, 104, 109, 121–22,

285

127–28; decolonization and, 25–27, 59, 202; Portugal’s administering state status and, 110–11, 138, 149–50; Resolution 1654 (XVI) and, 175–76; Special Committee on Information and, 56–57; Standard Form and, 39–40, 70, 73; UDHR and, 66–67. See also specific countries France: Article 73(e) reporting and, 30–32, 33, 38, 40, 46–47, 49, 50, 140, 141; Committee of Twenty-­Four and, 198; Committee on Information and, 77–79, 95–96; ­factors subcommittee and, 73; Fourth Committee and, 43, 54, 56, 67, 73, 92, 93, 138, 139, 148; Hungarian crisis and, 107–8; Indochina and, 96; San Francisco Conference and, 22–23; Special Committee on Information and, 55, 57–58, 64, 65; Suez Canal crisis and, 107, 108; Trusteeship System and, 41; on UN competence, 145 Frazão, Sergio Armando, 23, 85, 90 Gaiduk, Ilya, 105, 108 Gallagher, John, 11 Garin, Vasco Vieira, 113, 129, 198 Garreau, Roger, 46, 54, 55 General Assembly: anticolonial sentiment in, 12, 15, 26, 35, 206; Article 73(e) information review and, 32–34, 36, 37, 40, 61; cessation of information transmission and, 93–94; competence questions in, 79, 93–94, 102, 122–23, 139–40; decolonization and, 12–16, 113, 132, 158–59, 201, 204–6; ­factors question in, 80, 81; Fourth Committee proposals in, 42–43, 49–50, 67, 74–75, 87–88, 93–94, 102, 112–14, 122–23, 128–29, 139–40, 157–58, 176–77; ­g reat power control of, 42; ­human rights activism and, 9; opening of Trusteeship System in, 44; Soviet declaration to end colonialism in, 143, 147, 151–56; Special Committee on Information and, 57–58; First General Assembly, 14, 25; Second General Assembly, 44, 45; Third General Assembly, 50–52; Fourth General Assembly, 57–58, 62; Fifth General Assembly, 67; Seventh General Assembly, 80–81, 85; Eighth General Assembly, 88; Ninth General Assembly, 88–89; Tenth General Assembly, 82,

28 6 I nde x

General Assembly (continued) 94–95, 104–5; Eleventh General Assembly, 112–15, 122–23; Twelfth General Assembly, 117–18, 122–23; ­Fourteenth General Assembly, 134; Fifteenth General Assembly, 132, 133, 138, 142, 157; Sixteenth General Assembly, 162–63, 169–70; Seventeenth General Assembly, 180–81, 188; Eigh­teenth General Assembly, 188, 194–200. See also specific committees, declarations, and resolutions Georgescu, Ion, 197 Gerig, Benjamin, 20, 32, 38, 69, 91, 114, 118 Germany, 19, 51, 137, 143, 193 Gerona, Hector A., 48 Ghana: Committee on Information and, 140–41; Conference of In­de­pen­dent African States and, 8, 124; Fourth Committee and, 138–39; UN membership and, 5, 6, 105, 117–18, 130 Gidden, B. O. B., 100, 102, 108–9 Godber, Joseph, 171 Grafström, Sven, 55 ­Grand Alliance, 21, 51. See also Anglo-­ American relations ­Great Britain: accountability campaigns and, 6, 10–12, 88–89, 125, 203, 204; Article 73(e) reporting and, 27–28, 30–33, 40, 46, 49, 54, 67–68, 125, 136, 140, 141; Atlantic Charter and, 20–21, 213n9; Bandung Conference and, 99; Committee of Seventeen and, 179–83, 188–91, 197–99; Committee on Information and, 62, 75–79, 94–96, 100–101, 117, 126, 128, 136, 140–41, 162–63, 167, 181, 190; Fourth Committee and, 41, 43–45, 55–57, 73, 92–95, 100–102, 138, 148, 231n32; Hungarian crisis and, 107–8; Portuguese item and, 136–37, 145–46, 150; propaganda and, 11–12, 59, 89, 116–17, 143–44, 180, 188; San Francisco Conference and, 22–23; Soviet anticolonialism and, 151–52; Special Committee on Information and, 53, 55, 57–58, 64, 65; Suez Canal crisis and, 107–9, 114; Trusteeship System and, 27, 41; on UN competence, 71, 145–46. See also Anglo-­ American relations Greece, 92, 101, 110, 120 Greenland, 90, 92–94

Gren, A. K., 185, 186, 188 Guatemala: on Article 73(e) information, 29; Committee on Information and, 102, 119; ­factors subcommittee and, 73; Fourth Committee and, 79, 92, 101; US support for coup in, 96–97 Guinea: Fourth Committee and, 137, 148; on timetables for decolonization, 186; on UN competence, 145; UN membership and, 5, 105 Haiti, 50, 65, 109 Hammarskjöl, Dag, 133 Hanrott, E. G., 101–2 Hart, Justin, 96 Hearden, Patrick J., 10 Herrarte, Alberto, 153–54 Herter, Christian, 152–53, 156 Hickerson, John D., 62 Honduras, 153, 184 Hoo, Victor, 30, 64 Hood, J. D. L., 48, 190 Hsueh, Yu-­chi, 185–86, 198 ­human rights: accountability campaigns and, 9, 12, 16; Article 73(e) transmissions and, 65–70, 73, 81; Asian-­African unity on, 204; Bandung Conference and, 97–99; decolonization and, 8–9, 200–201, 204; East-­West confrontation over, 51–52, 69; racial discrimination and, 205–6; Trusteeship System and, 23, 25, 27, 44. See also Universal Declaration of ­Human Rights Hungary, 105, 107, 108 ICJ (International Court of Justice), 120, 129, 140 Ifeagwu, Chukuemeka Okeke, 157 Ikenberry, G. John, 10 Ilic, Sreten, 190 imperialism: Britain and, 11, 22, 56, 68, 108; Permanent Mandates Council and, 20; Soviet Union and, 4, 11, 153, 171, 185, 198; Suez Canal crisis and, 107; UN Charter and, 3–4; US propaganda on, 87, 89, 100, 135. See also colonialism in­de­pen­dence movements: in Africa, 141; Britain on, 167; Congo and, 132–33; Declaration on Colonialism on, 170; Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence and, 133, 159; Fourth Committee on, 147–48; General Assembly and, 18–19, 206; Kennedy on,

I n d e x 164; Mandate System and, 19–21; member-­state expansions and, 16, 135, 142; Non-­Aligned Movement and, 83, 169; Pan-­Africanism and, 7–8; pre-­World War II, 17; Roo­se­velt and, 21; Soviet Union and, 47, 84, 147–48, 152; Trusteeship System and, 23–25; United States and, 84, 100, 115, 191 India: activist role of, 2, 24, 37, 80; on apartheid, 211n29; Article 73(e) and, 29, 30, 33, 46–47, 49, 54–55; Asian-­African bloc and, 171–72; Bandung Conference and, 98; Committee on Information and, 76, 80, 102, 119, 126, 134, 140–41, 176; f­ actors subcommittee and, 71, 72; Fourth Committee and, 39–41, 44, 66, 79, 92, 109, 138–39; proposals for non-­self-­governing territories by, 40–47; Special Committee on Information and, 50, 55, 57, 64, 70, 71 Indonesia, 4, 61, 66, 76, 80, 86, 92 in­equality. See morality and equal treatment; race and racial equality information transmission. See Article 73(e) Ingles, José D., 70 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 120, 129, 140 internationalism, 7, 14, 16 Iran: Asian-­African bloc and, 171–72; Bandung Conference and, 97, 98, 169; Committee of Seventeen and, 187; Fourth Committee and, 175; on UN competence, 145 Iraq: Bandung Conference and, 97, 98; Committee of Seventeen and, 187; Committee on Information and, 80, 86, 102, 106, 134; ­factors subcommittee and, 73; Fourth Committee and, 79, 109–10, 120, 137, 139, 150; Permanent Mandates Council and, 20; US support for coup in, 96–97 Ireland, 105, 150, 153 Isa, Qazi Mohammed, 65 Israel, 37, 53, 107 Italy, 105, 137, 171, 187 Ivory Coast, 187 Jackson, C. D., 91 Jaipal, Rikhi, 126 Japan, 97, 105, 137, 169, 171–72, 187 Jebb, Gladwyn, 72 Jerrom, T. C., 179 Jha, C. S., 141, 156–57

287

Jim Crow system, 24, 161, 192–94 Johnson, A. M. Ade, 93 Jordan, 99, 105 Kanakaratne, N. T. D., 134 Karefa-­Smart, John, 12 Karseno, Sasmojo, 195 Kay, David A., 2, 12, 172 Kelly, K. T., 127, 139 Kennedy, John F.: anticolonialism of, 164–65; civil rights movement and, 173, 192–93, 196; foreign policy of, 5, 161, 164, 255n3; Resolution 1514 (XV) and, 159, 164; UN appearances of, 196 Kernkamp, W. J. A., 39–40, 72 Kerno, Ivan, 26 Khan, Muhammad Zafrulla, 187 Khosla, J. N., 176 Khrushchev, Nikita: on colonialism, 143, 147, 151–52, 155, 252n38; Congo intervention and, 133; Kitchen Debate and, 105; nuclear testing and, 168 King, C. E., 190–91, 197, 198 Kohler, Foy, 165 Komer, Robert, 194 Korean War, 51, 60–61 Kotelawala, John, 98 Kulagenkov, A. G., 45–48 Kyaruzi, V. K., 182 Lannung, Hermod, 46, 47, 92, 94 Laos, 105 Lapie, Pierre-­Olivier, 56 Lauren, Paul Gordon, 65, 66 League of Nations, 7, 14, 17; Covenant, 19, 20; Mandate System, 18–23, 35, 210n21 Lebanon, 91–92 Lennox-­Boyd, Alan: British Colonial Policy ­Today, 116–17 Liberia: Committee on Information and, 166, 176, 181, 184; Conference of In­de­pen­dent African States and, 124; forty-­three-­power resolution and, 157; Fourth Committee and, 110, 129, 137 Libya, 98, 99, 105, 124 Lie, Trygve, 28–29, 61, 133 Liu, Chieh, 171 Lloyd, Selwyn, 115 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 83–84, 89, 96, 100, 142 Lojendio, Juan Pablo de, 111 Lomakin, Jacob, 39 London Resolution on Non-­Self-­Governing ­People, 27–29, 31, 34

28 8 I nde x

Loomes, Allan H., 91, 110–11 loose vs. strict construction, 31 Louis, Wm. Roger, 7, 20, 108 Luard, Evan, 24, 59, 131 Luxembourg, 78 Macmillan, Harold, 11, 115, 156 MacQuarrie, Heath, 186 Mahdavi, Parviz, 175 Maksimovitch, N. G., 108 Malaya, 6, 105, 117–18 Malik, Charles, 51 Mandate System. See League of Nations Manela, Erez, 19 Marshall Plan, 36, 37, 51, 96 Martin, John, 63, 76 Massonet, Danile, 93 Mathieson, W. A. C., 72, 77, 85 Maulding, Reginald, 182 Maurice, Camara, 148 Mauritania, 160, 164 Mavros, Georges, 72 Mayer, René, 40, 43 Mazower, Mark, 10 McNeil, Hector, 43 member-­state expansions, 210n13, 210n17, 233n1; anticolonialism and, 8, 12–13, 15, 82, 103–5, 132–35, 146–47, 160, 164, 202; Fourth Committee and, 146; nonalignment and, 15, 143, 179; United States and, 142–43 Menemencioğlu, Turgut, 153, 157 Meneses de Albizu Campos, Laura, 184 Mexico, 57, 65, 70, 120, 129, 145, 184 Milla Bermúdez, Francisco, 153 Millar, Hoyer, 144 Mongolia, 160, 164 morality and equal treatment: activist positions on, 6–7, 9, 77; decolonization and, 204–5; international accountability and, 202–3, 206; new member states and, 211n31; Non-­Aligned Movement and, 161. See also h ­ uman rights Morocco, 105, 120, 124 Morse, Wayne, 150 Morsink, Johannes, 52 Mozambique, 109, 127 Munro, Leslie, 122–23 NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored ­People), 24 Naggiar, Paul-­Émile, 31

NAM. See Non-­Aligned Movement Nasr, Taha el-­Sayed Bey, 40 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 97, 107, 168 National Association for the Advancement of Colored ­People (NAACP), 24 nationalism, 52, 202. See also in­de­pen­dence movements; specific countries national sovereignty: administering states’ appeals to, 41, 53–54, 69, 130; Cold War rhe­toric on, 127; General Assembly competence and, 122; Portugal and, 130 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organ­ization Nehru, Jawaharlal, 97, 98, 168 neo­co­lo­nial­ism, 16, 153–54. See also colonialism Nepal, 99, 105, 110 Netherlands: Article 73(e) reporting and, 33, 38–40, 49, 54, 66, 140; Committee on Information and, 140–41, 184; Fourth Committee and, 56, 74, 92, 93, 138, 139; Indonesia and, 66; Special Committee on Information and, 55, 58; Trusteeship System and, 41 New Zealand: Article 73(e) reporting and, 33, 46–50, 54; Fourth Committee and, 92, 93, 138; Special Committee on Information and, 57, 58 Nicaragua, 44 Nigeria, 150 Nixon, Richard M., 105 Nkrumah, Kwame, 118, 124 Nogueira, A. Franco, 121 nonadministering states: Ad Hoc Committee on Transmission of Information and, 37–38; Committee of Seventeen and, 181–82; Committee on Information and, 75, 77, 85–87; East-­West confrontation and, 53, 158–59; ­factors question and, 73; Fourth Committee membership and, 40, 65; Indian proposals for non-­self-­governing territories and, 46; membership growth of, 37, 103; Special Committee on Information and, 48, 57. See also specific countries Non-­Aligned Movement (NAM): anticolonialism and, 16; Bandung Conference and, 97–98, 168; Cold War and, 8, 83, 168–69, 205; goals of, 5, 160–61, 168–69, 179, 205–6; Yugo­slav leadership in, 195

I n d e x non-­self-­governing territories: Ad Hoc Committee on Transmission of Information and, 35, 36, 38–39; ­factors constituting, 61, 64–65, 71–75, 79, 81, 84, 149, 157–58, 233nn48–49; Indian proposals on, 41–46, 49–50; petitions from, 3, 9, 47, 75–76, 108, 120, 136, 137, 195; secretary-­general’s report on, 114, 117, 120–21, 129, 133–34, 137–38, 140–41, 146; site visits to, 9, 47, 76, 92–93, 108, 174, 182, 190, 195; Special Committee on Information and, 53–54; Third General Assembly and, 50–51; Trusteeship System and, 24, 26–28, 30, 36, 40–44, 59; UDHR and, 52. See also specific committees and declarations nontrust dependent territories. See non-­self-­governing territories North Atlantic Treaty Organ­ization (NATO), 36–37, 51, 96–97, 130, 158, 169, 198 Norway, 78, 92, 93 nuclear weapons and disarmament, 8, 168, 196 Oberemko, V. I., 176 Organ­ization of African Unity (OAU), 8, 191–92, 204 origins and growth of international accountability, 3–7, 14–19, 22–24, 35 Ostrower, Gary, 42 Ottoman Empire, 19 Pachachi, Adnan, 106, 110, 127, 129 Pakistan: Bandung Conference and, 97, 98, 169; Committee on Information and, 76, 80, 85, 86, 184; India’s non-­self-­ governing territories and, 41; Special Committee on Information and, 70; UN membership and, 37 Palar, L. N., 186 Pan-­Africanism, 7–8, 179 Pant, Apa B., 71 Paonan, Cheng, 46 Parker, Jason, 98 Pavicevic, Miso, 182 Pedersen, Susan, 7, 20 ­People’s Republic of China. See China Perera, A. B., 110 Pérez Ruiz, José Luis, 196 Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC), 19–20, 23

289

Peru, 80, 92, 102 Philippines: Article 73(e) information and, 31, 33, 39; Bandung Conference and, 97, 98, 169; Committee on Information and, 184; ­factors subcommittee and, 71, 72; Fourth Committee and, 65, 91–92, 108, 109; San Francisco Conference and, 22; Special Committee on Information and, 57, 64, 70 Phillips, Christopher, 106 Pignon, Léon, 77 Pinies, Jaime de, 184 Piracha, R., 85 Plimpton, Francis P., 175 Poland, 48, 50, 74, 145, 173, 189 po­liti­cal information transmission: Anglo-­American discord over, 62–63, 69–70, 169; Article 73(e) and, 30, 32, 33, 38–39, 47, 48, 54–55, 125; Britain and, 163, 169–70, 181, 183–84; Committee on Information and, 85–86, 162–63; Fourth Committee resolutions on, 41–42, 54, 56, 72, 73, 91–94, 137–40, 147–48; Resolution 144 (II) on, 44, 54; secretary-­general’s report on, 114, 117, 120–21, 129, 133–34, 137–38, 140–41, 146; United States and, 68, 76, 84 Pool, John C., 167 Portugal: administering state status of, 15, 109–10, 113, 117, 121, 125–29, 138; Anglo-­American approach to, 136–37; anticolonial sentiment against, 194; Article 73(e) reporting and, 140, 158; Committee of Seventeen and, 188; Committee of Six on, 145, 149–50; Fourth Committee and, 138, 158; NATO and, 130, 149–50, 158, 198; on UN competence, 145 Poynton, Hilton, 38, 40, 41 propaganda: Bandung Conference and, 98; Britain and, 11–12, 59, 89, 116–17, 143–44, 180, 188; Hungarian crisis and, 108; Soviet Union and, 14, 16, 37, 41, 59, 68, 69, 133, 142, 151–52, 159; United States and, 10–11, 15, 16, 83–84, 87, 89–91, 96, 103, 108, 142–43, 164–65, 167–68, 188, 212n40; Western states and, 61, 82–83 psychological warfare, 83 Puerto Rico, 85–86, 92 Puig, Emilio Calderón, 70

29 0 I nde x

Quaison-­Sackey, Alex, 2, 124, 140, 146–47, 157 race and racial equality: accountability campaigns and, 16, 204–6; African diplomats and, 200, 259n39; Bandung Conference and, 99; Cold War and, 193; Conference of In­de­pen­dent African States and, 124; Declaration on Colonialism and, 170; decolonization and, 179, 200, 206; member-­state growth and, 143, 164–65; UN focus on, 12, 200–201; US civil rights movement and, 21, 24, 83, 173–74, 192–94, 196, 200, 230n25, 259n39. See also apartheid; Jim Crow system Rakove, Robert, 168 Rao, Shiva, 45, 54 Rasgotra, M. K., 139 Reid, J. S., 48 Resolutions: 9 (I), 27, 28; 66 (I), 33, 37; 142 (II), 44; 144 (II), 44; 146 (II), 44, 47; 218 (III), 50; 219 (III), 50, 55; 222 (III), 50, 66; 327 (IV), 58, 146; 332 (IV), 57; 333 (IV), 57–58; 334 (IV), 58, 64–65; 446 (V), 67; 448 (V), 67, 86, 106, 114; 545 (VI), 75; 551 (IV), 74; 567 (VI), 74, 79; 569 (VI), 74; 646 (VII), 80; 648 (VII), 80, 84; 742 (VIII), 88, 90–91; 748 (VIII), 88, 92; 848 (IX), 93, 94, 146; 849 (IX), 93–94; 850 (IX), 94; 932 (X), 102, 134; 933 (X), 102; 1051 (XI), 113–14; 1053 (XI), 114, 134; 1332 (XIII), 128; 1461 (XIV), 139–40; 1467 (XIV), 140, 145, 150; 1468 (XIV), 140, 146; 1514 (XV), 3, 7, 9, 15, 16, 133, 159, 163, 165, 167, 170–72, 175, 177, 181–82, 185, 186, 203–4, 254n49; 1535 (XV), 157; 1541 (XV), 158; 1654 (XVI), 3, 174–77, 199, 201, 203–4; 1700 (XVI), 177, 184; 1710 (XVI), 205; 1810 (XVII), 187, 203–4; 1847 (XVII), 187, 190; 1956 (XVIII), 198, 203–4; 1970 (XVIII), 199. See also Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence to Colonial Countries and ­People Rifai, Najmuddine, 148, 175 Rifai, Zaid, 146 Robinson, Ronald, 11 Rodriguez, H., 65 Romania, 105, 173 Romulo, Carlos P., 31, 39, 51, 217n59 Roo­se­velt, Eleanor, 51 Roo­se­velt, Franklin D., 21, 213n10

Ros, Enrique Jorge, 167, 184 Roschin, A. A., 77 Rule 67, 67 Rule 68, 93, 139 Rusk, Dean, 188 Ryckmans, Pierre, 31, 46, 77, 121 Salomon, Irving, 127 salt ­water fallacy, 41 sanctions for apartheid, 9, 192, 204 Sankey, John, 181 Saudi Arabia, 92 Sayre, Francis B., 40, 42, 43, 49 Sayward, Amy L., 13, 37 Schurmann, C. W. A., 93 Scott, J. A., 190 Scott, J. V., 93 Sears, Mason, 96, 106 SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organ­ ization), 97, 98, 169 Sebrega, John J., 22 Secretariat: Article 73(e) reporting and, 33, 46, 47, 137; on Committee on Information, 195; Portuguese item and, 145–46; pro­g ress report on non-­self-­governing territories and, 114, 117, 120–21, 129, 133–34, 137–38, 140–41, 146; Standard Form revision and, 70 Security Council: Britain and, 162; Cold War and, 12; General Assembly vs., 13; Hungarian crisis and, 107–8; Suez Canal crisis and, 107. See also specific resolutions segregation. See apartheid; Jim Crow system; race and racial equality self-­determination, 10, 154–55, 213n1, 228n15 self-­government: Bandung Conference and, 98, 203; British stance ­toward, 69–70, 101, 102, 136; Declaration on the Granting of In­de­pen­dence and, 133; Egyptian proposal on, 57; ­factors question and, 71–72, 81; Fourth Committee on, 65, 78, 87, 92–93, 157–58; global support for, 203; member-­state expansions and, 135, 146; Resolution 219 (III) on, 55; Trusteeship System and, 25, 26, 43; UDHR on, 52; in UN Charter, 39, 40; US stance ­toward, 61–63, 69, 76 Shanahan, Ross, 129–30 Sharpeville Massacre (1960), 9, 204

I n d e x Sherwood, Marika, 24 Shmigov, Frol P., 41 Sierra Leone, 160, 164, 187 Singh, Avtar, 90 Singh, Raja Sir Maharaj, 43 Sixth Committee, 122, 123, 140 Slim, Mongi, 155, 174–75 Smiganowski, Kazimierz, 191 social justice. See h ­ uman rights; morality soft power, 13 Soldatov, Aleksander A., 54, 70 South Africa: apartheid in, 8, 9, 170, 179, 194, 199, 200, 206, 211nn28–29; Article 73(e) reporting and, 140; Committee of Twenty-­Four and, 198; Committee on Information and, 78; Fourth Committee and, 92, 93; NATO and, 198 Southeast Asia Treaty Organ­ization (SEATO), 97, 98, 169 Southern Rhodesia, 188, 198 Soviet bloc: Committee on Information and, 104; decolonization and, 52–53; Fourth Committee and, 91, 223n51; isolation of, 50–51; UDHR and, 51–52; on Western administering states, 102–3, 197–98 Soviet colonialism: Britain on, 6, 143–44, 163–64, 182–83, 187–91; France on, 46; Hungary and, 107; United States and, 11, 15–16, 83–84, 87, 89, 95–100, 103, 163–64, 196–98, 203 Soviet Union: accountability campaigns and, 15–16; anticolonial claims of, 14, 41–42, 51, 53, 59, 68, 135, 147, 151–55, 158, 170–73, 180, 233n3, 253n40; Article 73(e) information and, 30, 33, 40, 46–48, 50; Bandung Conference and, 98; China and, 105; Committee on Information and, 76, 77, 80, 82, 85, 103; Congo intervention and, 132–33; Declaration on Colonialism by, 170–71; Fourth Committee and, 44, 74, 112, 147, 185; Hungarian crisis and, 107–8; member-­state expansions and, 135; propaganda and, 14, 16, 37, 41, 59, 68, 69, 133, 142, 151–52, 159; San Francisco Conference and, 22–23; Special Committee on Information and, 50, 57, 70, 71; Suez Canal crisis and, 107; Trusteeship System and, 24; UN boycott by, 61; on UN competence, 145

291

Spain: administering state status of, 15, 126, 127, 149–50; Article 73(e) reporting and, 140; Committee of Twenty-­Four and, 198; on UN competence, 145 Special Committee on Information Transmitted ­under Article 73(e), 223n48, 224n59; cessation of information and, 66–67; ­factors question in, 64–65, 71–73; permanent basis for, 53–54; powers of, 59; Soviet propaganda and, 69; Standard Form and, 56–57, 64, 70–71; two-­track treatment of dependent territories and, 45–50 Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on Granting of In­de­pen­ dence to Colonial Countries and ­Peoples. See Decolonization Committee Standard Form: creation of, 38, 44; Fourth Committee and, 39–40, 59, 70, 73; po­liti­cal information on, 47, 54, 56, 58; revision of, 70–71, 73, 74, 117; Special Committee on Information Transmitted and, 45–46, 56–57, 64, 70–71; United States and, 68 State Department (US): on apartheid, 194; Bandung Conference and, 98, 100; “Declaration by the United Nations on National In­de­pen­dence,” 21, 23, 25; forty-­three-­power resolution and, 157; on Kennedy’s UN appearances, 196; po­liti­cal information transmission and, 149, 158; on Soviet Propaganda in UN, 69, 153; “United States Policy t­ oward Colonial Areas,” 52–53 status quo powers, 13–14, 16 Steeves, John M., 154 Stein, Boris E., 40 Stevenson, Adlai, 166, 180, 196 Sudan, 105, 124 Suez Canal crisis, 105, 107, 108 Sukarno, Ahmed, 97, 168 Sweden, 44, 50, 78, 92, 93, 113, 186–87 Syria, 65, 92, 101, 110 Tahourdin, J. G., 182 Tanganyika, 160, 164, 182 target dates. See timetables for self-­government Tazhibaev, T. T., 108–9 TC. See Trusteeship Council

29 2 I nde x

Tchobanov, Yordan, 185 Telli, Diallo, 186 Thailand, 97 Thant, U, 2 Theodoli, Livio, 171 Third Committee, 51 Thomas, Ivor, 31, 33 timetables for self-­government: anticolonialism and, 154; British re­sis­tance to, 102, 162, 165, 169–70; Conference of In­de­pen­dent African States on, 124; Iraqi proposal on, 139–40; Resolution 1514 (XV) and, 186–87; United States and, 165–66 Tin Maung, U, 184 Tito, Josip Broz, 168 Tobias, Channing H., 73 Togo, 150 transmission of information. See Article 73; po­liti­cal information transmission Truman, Harry S., 5, 27, 81 Truman Doctrine, 36, 37, 51 Trusteeship Council (TC): Article 73(e) information and, 31–32, 38, 219n6; Committee on Information vs., 75, 78, 108; Decolonization Committee compared to, 16, 201; powers of, 1, 2, 9, 23, 25 Trusteeship System: Creech Jones on, 45; goals of, 23; in­de­pen­dence movements and, 1, 18; Indian resolutions for, 43–45; non-­self-­governing territories vs., 41, 47, 49, 64, 65, 76, 92–93, 112, 137, 146–47, 204; Roo­se­velt and, 21 Tunisia, 105, 124, 150 Turkey, 97, 98, 169 two-­thirds rule. See Article 18 two-­track approach. See non-­self-­governing territories; UN Charter UDHR. See Universal Declaration of ­Human Rights Ukraine, 48, 50, 74, 145 UN Charter: accountability campaigns amending, 7; administering states and, 77, 81, 88, 93, 150; apartheid and, 9; Britain and, 11, 90; Chapter XI, 1–2, 7, 21, 23–29, 45–46, 48, 56, 62, 66, 82, 122–30, 136–38; Chapter XII, 22–23, 55; Chapter XIII, 23, 55; drafting of, 3–4, 21, 23; Fourth Committee on, 176; in­de­pen­dence and, 7; San Francisco Conference and, 22–23; states’ rights

over rights of individuals in, 13; two-­track treatment of dependent territories in, 1, 2, 41–45, 48, 55, 58, 60, 64–67, 72, 87–88, 126, 137, 202. See also Articles by number UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force), 107 United Arab Republic, 124, 148 United Kingdom. See ­Great Britain United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), 107 United States (US): Article 73(e) reporting and, 27, 32, 33, 38–40, 46–47, 49; Chapter XI proposal of, 25–26; Committee on Information and, 76, 77, 95–96, 126, 140–41; credibility of, 96–97; decolonization and, 100, 114, 156–57, 164, 196–97, 204; Decolonization Committee and, 183, 189–91, 198–200; ­factors subcommittee and, 73, 76, 84; forty-­three-­power resolution and, 156–57; Fourth Committee and, 41, 43, 57, 73, 92, 93, 101, 121, 138, 139, 215–16n30; member-­state expansions and, 135; NAM and, 169; Portuguese item and, 130, 136–37, 145–46, 150; propaganda and, 10–11, 15, 16, 83–84, 87, 89–91, 96, 103, 108, 142–43, 164–65, 167–68, 188, 212n40; Puerto Rico and, 85–86; Special Committee on Information and, 55, 58, 64; Suez Canal crisis and, 107; Trusteeship System and, 41; UDHR and, 67, 68; West Berlin blockade and, 51. See also Anglo-­ American relations; State Department United States Information Agency (USIA), 10, 135 Universal Declaration against All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 199–200 Universal Declaration of ­Human Rights (UDHR): Anglo-­American disagreement over, 69; Article 73(e) transmissions and, 65–67; Bandung Conference and, 98–99; Conference of In­de­pen­ dent African States and, 124; international accountability and, 51–52; Kennedy on, 196–97; in non-­self-­governing territories, 68; self-­determination and, 8, 228n15; Soviet propaganda and, 171; Standard From and, 70 universalism, 10, 16, 21, 22, 24, 26–27, 28, 65 Upper Volta, 184

I n d e x Urrutia Aparicio, Carlos, 126 Uruguay, 33, 92–94 US Bureau of International Organ­izations, 11 USIA (United States Information Agency), 10, 135 Vakil, Mehdi, 155 Valencia, Luis, 181s, 195 Venezuela: Committee on Information and, 80, 102; ­factors subcommittee and, 73; Fourth Committee and, 79, 150; Special Committee on Information and, 50, 55; Trusteeship System and, 44; on UN competence, 145 Vietnam, 97, 99, 169 Voice of Amer­i­ca, 10 Voina, Alexei D., 40, 41 Wachuku, Jaja, 171 Wadsworth, James, 151, 157 Wertheim, Stephen, 10 West Berlin blockade, 51 Western states: accountability opposed by, 5–6, 13, 15, 36, 82, 203, 206; Allied zones of Germany and, 51; Atlantic Charter and, 21; Bandung Conference and, 98; Committee on Information and, 76; Decolonization Committee

293

and, 191; forty-­three-­power resolution and, 156–57; Fourth Committee and, 150; Israel and, 37; member-­state growth and, 143; NAM and, 169; NATO and, 96–97; propaganda and, 61, 82–83; South African apartheid and, 9; on Soviet colonialism, 112; Suez Canal crisis and, 107; UDHR and, 52; UN Charter and, 18–19, 23; UN dominance of, 2, 14–16, 42, 45, 59, 68, 81, 103, 115, 209n7 Wilson, Woodrow, 19, 35 World War II, 16–18, 87–88, 146, 202 Yalta Conference Protocol, 22, 23 Yates, Sidney R., 198 Year of Africa (1960), 9 Yemen, 37 Yomekpe, H. K., 175, 183 Yugo­slavia: Article 73(e) information and, 48, 50; Fourth Committee and, 101, 109, 120, 138–39; Non-­Aligned Movement and, 195; on UN competence, 145 Zablocki, Clement J., 139 Ziaud-­Din, Mian, 70 Zorin, Valerian A., 181–82 Zuloaga, Pedro, 137