Fuelling the World Economy: Seaports, Coal, and Oil Markets 3031325648, 9783031325649

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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN MARITIME ECONOMICS

Edited by Daniel Castillo Hidalgo Cezar Honorato

Fuelling the World Economy Seaports, Coal, and Oil Markets

Palgrave Studies in Maritime Economics Series Editors

Hercules Haralambides Erasmus School of Economics Erasmus University Rotterdam Rotterdam, The Netherlands Stig Tenold Department of Economics NHH – Norwegian School of Economics Bergen, Norway

Palgrave Studies in Maritime Economics is a new, original and timely interdisciplinary series that seeks to be pivotal in nature and improve our understanding of the role of the maritime sector within port economics and global supply chain management, shipping finance, and maritime business and economic history. The maritime industry plays an increasingly important role in the changing world economy, and this new series offers an outlet for reviewing trends and developments over time as well as analysing how such changes are affecting trade, transport, the environment and financial markets. Each title in the series will communicate key research findings, shaping new approaches to maritime economics. The core audience will be academic, as well as policymakers, regulators and international maritime authorities and organisations. Individual titles will often be theoretically informed but will always be firmly evidence-based, seeking to link theory to policy outcomes and changing practices.

Daniel Castillo Hidalgo  •  Cezar Honorato Editors

Fuelling the World Economy Seaports, Coal, and Oil Markets

Editors Daniel Castillo Hidalgo University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria Las Palmas, Spain

Cezar Honorato Fluminense Federal University Niterói, Brazil

ISSN 2662-6551     ISSN 2662-656X (electronic) Palgrave Studies in Maritime Economics ISBN 978-3-031-32564-9    ISBN 978-3-031-32565-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32565-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

This book is dedicated to Prof. Miguel Suárez Bosa (1952–2022) Scholar, mentor, and friend.

Preface and Acknowledgements

Steam shipping and maritime trade represent an essential element of economic and political global integration from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards. Its importance is represented in a considerable volume of scholarly literature as well as contemporary authors such as Jules Verne, who imagined future landscapes built on the technological advances of his time. The expansion of global trade by sea was one of the most distinctive features of the globalization process. Despite its key importance, and in a similar manner as the shipping industry, the coal business is a relatively unexplored topic. This assertion is even more evident in geographical contexts outside the United Kingdom and the United States. However, studying the international structure of the coal business also involves analysing North–South linkages. The Western global expansion led by the British fleet cannot be understood without the decisive support of maritime coaling stations around the world. Thus, port cities and their hinterlands were the places where local and global agents interacted, facilitating the diffusion of steamship technology that fostered seaborne trade and the subsequent consolidation of the international division of production and labour. This book is a collaborative effort by scholars of economic, business, and social history across disciplines, countries, and generations. This edited volume of essays aims to fill a gap in the literature by combining primary research and synthesis of secondary sources exploring neglected topics related to the coal and oil business from the second half of the nineteenth century up to the World War II aftermath. While it was not possible to cover every single country or region, the contributions included in this book prepared by historians, geographers, and economists make available vii

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in one volume of up-to-date research on the structure and functioning of the coal business in Europe, Africa, and South America. This volume addresses issues of concern to the scholarly community as well as the general reader interested in the globalization process. The idea to prepare an edited collection of essays on coal business took shape during long conversations with Prof. Miguel Suárez Bosa almost a decade ago. These dialogues led to the organization of a local workshop on this topic in Las Palmas in 2017. Then, we organized a session in the XIX World Economic History Congress, scheduled for July 2020 at Paris. The coronavirus pandemic delayed the celebration of the conference until 2022. In addition, we present preliminary advances in other conferences, such as the XIII International Conference of the Spanish Association of Economic History (September 2022) and the 15th International Meeting of the African Economic History Network (October 2022). We thank all participants for their valuable comments and suggestions, which have contributed to the ideas presented in this volume. We especially thank Prof. Miguel Suárez Bosa for his extensive comments and support on earlier drafts as well as the preparation of his chapter. Thanks, Miguel, for everything you gave us all these years. Our indebtedness is even larger to all academics and colleagues who introduced us through their works into the historical analysis of coal business. Moreover, we thank the IATEXT, PORMAR, the University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria and the Institute of History of the University Federal Fluminense for funding an essential part of our academic efforts. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (18KK0051) led by Prof. Kenmei Tsubota and the Canary Agency for Research and Innovation (ProID2020010056) led by Prof. Lourdes Trujillo. We gratefully acknowledge the help of everyone who contributed to the completion of this editorial project, especially the contributors who succeeded in delivering their chapters on schedule. Our special gratitude goes to our publishers, Palgrave Macmillan, and, especially, Wyndham Hacket, Arunaa Devi, Lauren Dooley, and Anette Weiss. We also acknowledge, on behalf of the contributors, the support of our respective research assistants and, above all, our families. Finally, we hope this volume will contribute to fostering new discussions and research on the topic. Las Palmas, Spain Niterói, Brazil  15 March 2023

Daniel Castillo Hidalgo Cezar Honorato

Contents

1 Introduction  1 Daniel Castillo Hidalgo and Cezar Honorato 2 The  Use of Coal in Maritime Transport and Maritime Station Networks: Routes, Stores and Companies, Circa 1850–1930 11 Miguel Suárez Bosa 3 Bunkering  in West Africa: The Case of Dakar 33 Daniel Castillo Hidalgo 4 The  Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate and the German Bunker Coal Business, 1905–1947 59 Eva-Maria Roelevink 5 Common  Destines: French Trading Ports and Oil in the Twentieth Century, 1914–1965 81 Bruno Marnot 6 French  Capital, Gdynia, and the Position of Polish Coal on International Markets in the Interwar Period 99 Jerzy Łazor

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7 Ports,  Coal, and Exports from the Argentine Pampas Region: An Evaluation of the Institutional Actors Related to Coal Circulation in the Agro-Export Period, 1860–1930123 Santiago Prieto, Miguel Ángel de Marco (h), José Luis Jofré, and Marcelo Weissel 8 The  Coal Economy in Brazil (1850–1889)149 Cezar Honorato, Luiz Cláudio M. Ribeiro, and Thiago Mantuano Index187

Notes on Contributors

Miguel Suárez Bosa  was Professor of Economic History at the University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Spain. He was the author of many books and articles on economic, social, and business history in the Atlantic context during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He was the editor of Atlantic Ports and the First Globalization, 1850-1930 (Palgrave, 2014). Daniel Castillo Hidalgo  is Associate Professor of Economic History at the University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Spain. He has published widely on African seaport development, especially on patterns of longterm port system evolution, dock labour, and port communities. He was the co-editor with Prof. Olukoju of African Seaports and Maritime Economics in Historical Perspective (Palgrave, 2020). Miguel  Ángel  de Marco  (h)  is an independent researcher tied to the Scientific Board of Argentina (CONICET). He is the head of the Núcleo de Ciudades Portuarias Regionales and main researcher of several grants funded by PICT and Ecosur about the history, development, and urban heritage of port cities in Latin America. He is a member of the National Academy of History (Argentina). He broadly published on port, economic, and urban history in South America. Cezar  Honorato  is Professor of Social and Economic History at the University Federal Fluminense, Brazil. His research interests include maritime, urban, labour, and business history. He is the coordinator of several research projects as well as a collaborator of different public national and

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international institutions engaged in social and economic development. He is widely published on different topics on the economic history of Brazil and Latin America. José  Luis Jofré holds a BA Degree in Sociology by the University Nacional de Cuyo, MA in Politics and Sociology, and a Ph.D. in Social Sciences by the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales. He is a specialist in the analysis of the economic structure of Latin America. He broadly published on urban and economic development. He is Associate Professor in Economics and Dean of the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences in the University of Cuyo (Argentina). Jerzy  Łazor  is Assistant Professor of Economics at Warsaw School of Economics. His research topic addresses the economic and social history of the twentieth century, especially the history of Polish contacts with foreign countries and the history of finance and migration. He is winner of the 11th competition “Historical Book of the Year” for the Oskar Halecki Award (2018) and the 1st competition of the Polish Society of Economic History for the Franciszek Bujak Award for the best book in the field of economic and social history (2018). He is founding member of the Polish Society of Economic History and the Institute of Economic and Social Studies and member of the Association for Slavic, East European, & Eurasian Studies. Thiago  Mantuano  is a lecturer at the Department of Philosophy and Human Sciences of the Universidade Estadual de Santa Cruz (Brazil). He is member of the Research Group “Ports and Cities in the Atlantic World”. He also belongs to the POLIS Laboratory and the Laboratory for Regional History from the University of Espirito Santo. He is associate member of the Governance of the Atlantic Ports networks. His publications focus on the urban, economic, and social evolution of Brazilian port cities during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Bruno Marnot  is Professor of Modern History at the University of La Rochelle (France) and member of the interdisciplinary laboratory LIENSs (Littoral, Environment and Society). He broadly published on technological changes and the economic history of commercial ports in Western Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He is currently exploring the history of the major French seaports between World War I and the 1960s.

  NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 

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Santiago  Prieto is a Ph.D.  Candidate at the University Nacional of Rosario (Argentina). He has a research fellowship from the National Research Council (Argentina), affiliated to the Institute of Economic and Social Research (IDEHESI). He is secretary of the Interdisciplinary Research Network of Water Management (RIEGA), and he is also a member of the Regional Port Cities Research Network (Argentina). Luiz Cláudio M. Ribeiro  is Professor of Economic and Social History at the University of Espirito Santo (Brazil). He is coordinator of the Research Laboratory “Regional History of Espirito Santo and its Atlantic Connections”. He is member of the CoopMar Research Grant and is associated with the Governance of the Atlantic Ports Network. His research focuses on the economic, business, and urban history of Brazil and Latin America. Eva-Maria  Roelevink  is Professor of Economic History since 2017 at the Johannes Gutenberg-University in Mainz, Germany. Before, she was an assistant professor at Ruhr University Bochum. Her research interests are the economic and business history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in particular cartelization and commodity markets as well as historical marketing and historical politics. Her dissertation on the German Coal Syndicate was awarded the GUG Prize for Corporate History in 2014 and published by the renowned C.H. Beck Verlag. Marcelo  Weissel  holds a Ph.D. in Archeology from the University of Buenos Aires. He is the director of the Heritage and Museum Department at Buenos Aires. He is Associate Professor at the Universidad Nacional de Lanús. He belongs to the Núcleo de Ciudades Portuarias Regionales. He is also a member of the International Board of Maritime Museums. He broadly published on cultural, urban, industrial, and maritime heritage in Argentina.

List of Figures

Fig. 4.1

Fig. 4.2 Fig. 6.1

Fig. 6.2

Fig. 6.3

DKD Turnover, 1900–1944 (in million tons). Sources: Author’s elaboration. Statistics of the Decade; Turnover DKD, 1900–1944, in: Annual Reports DKD, Hamburg, in: BBA 33/556, BBA 33/557 u. BBA 33/1022. The share of DKD business in total syndicate sales (including selfconsumption) was only between 1 and 2%, apart from the war years. Even in the peak year of 1926, when DKD helped make up for the shortfall of British coal because of the British General Strike, its sales only reached a good 2 million tonnes, while the syndicate volume was approximately 112 million tonnes65 Deposits and holdings from the DKD, 1943. Source: Author’s elaboration. DKD to members of the Supervisory Board, 23.01.1943, concerning DKD structure, in: BBA 33/1022 70 The volume of Polish exports to different international markets, 1924–1938 (in millions of metric tons). Sources: Author’s elaboration. Rocznik Handlu Zagranicznego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1924–1927; Rocznik Handlu Zagranicznego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Wolnego Miasta Gdańska 1928–1938103 The use of different modes of transport for Polish coal exports, 1928–1938 (in millions of metric tons). Sources: Author’s elaboration. Rocznik Handlu Zagranicznego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Wolnego Miasta Gdańska, 1928–1938 104 Indices of average export prices of Polish coal in złotys and shillings per metric ton, 1926–1938 (1929 = 100). Sources:

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List of Figures

Fig. 6.4

Fig. 7.1

Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2 Fig. 8.3 Fig. 8.4 Fig. 8.5 Fig. 8.6 Fig. 8.7 Fig. 8.8

Author’s elaboration. Prices in złotys: Rocznik Handlu Zagranicznego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1927; Rocznik Handlu Zagranicznego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Wolnego Miasta Gdańska 1928–1938; conversion to shillings based on the average annual exchange rate in Warsaw (Mały Rocznik Statystyczny 1939)105 Average prices of Polish coal in exports to different markets, average UK export price of coal, 1927–1938 (in shillings per metric ton). Sources: Author’s elaboration. Polish prices: Rocznik Handlu Zagranicznego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1927; Rocznik Handlu Zagranicznego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Wolnego Miasta Gdańska 1928–1938; conversion to shillings based on the average annual exchange rate in Warsaw (Mały Rocznik Statystyczny 1939); British prices taken from A. Sauerbeck‘s and Statist estimates (Editor of the Statist, 1939) 106 Exports from the port of La Plata, 1897–1904 (in tons). Sources: Author’s elaboration built on annual reports of the Administración General del Puerto de La Plata (1897–1903) and Carmona (1905) 137 Military Navy by driving force, (1850–1880). Sources: Author’s elaboration. Brazil. Ministry of the Navy. Proposal and Report. Rio de Janeiro: National Press, 1850–1880 154 Brazilian imports of British coal, 1870–1889. Note: annual average in pounds. Sources (annual average in pounds): Grahan (1973, p. 331) 155 State concessions for coal exploration works by province, 1850–1880. Source: Author’s elaboration. Brazil (1850–1889), various issues 156 World share of Brazilian coffee production, 1820–1889. Sources: Martins (1990, p. 39) 158 Calls of long-haul vessels in the Port of Rio de Janeiro, 1878–1888. Sources: Author’s elaboration. Brazil (1878–1888). Various issues 160 Coal imported in Rio de Janeiro, 1875–1889 (tons). Sources: Author’s elaboration. Retrospecto Commercial (1875–1889) 162 Coal imported in Rio de Janeiro, 1878–1888 (value). Note: Figures in thousands of réis. Sources: Author’s elaboration. Brazil. Ministry of Finance (1878–1888) 162 Higher and Lower prices of coal imported in Rio de Janeiro, 1872–1889. Note: in thousand réis. Sources: Author’s elaboration. Retrospecto Commercial (1875–1889) 163

  List of Figures 

Fig. 8.9 Fig. 8.10 Fig. 8.11

Foundries, shipyards, and machinery factories in Rio de Janeiro and the port district, 1870–1890. Sources: Author’s elaboration built on Almanak (1870–1890) Coal and coke importers in Rio de Janeiro, 1870–1889. Sources: Author’s elaboration built on Almanak (1870–1890) Registry of coal imported by the Brazilian Coal Company in Rio de Janeiro (1887–1889). Note: in tons. Sources: Author’s elaboration. Brazil. Ministry of Finance (1887–1889)

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 3.4 Table 3.5 Table 3.6 Table 3.7 Table 3.8 Table 4.1 Table 5.1 Table 8.1

Coal exports by country, 1850–1919 (in millions of tonnes) 15 Share of steamer traffic in total vessel traffic, 1880–1920 (% of calls)38 Tons of coal bunkered in Mindelo, Las Palmas, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, and Dakar (1880–1914) (in tons) 39 Regular steamship companies operating in Senegal, 1903 44 Call of steamship vessels to Dakar, Mindelo, and Las Palmas, 1906–191346 Average prices of bunkered coal in the main West African coaling seaports, 1910 (in francs) 47 Structure of coal prices in Dakar and Las Palmas (in francs), 1910 48 Factors affecting interport competition in West Africa, 1913 49 Call of vessels (units) and coal bunkered (in tons) in Dakar, Las Palmas, and Mindelo, 1913–1918 50 Annual purchases of bunker coal from Algeria depots (Oran, Algiers, Bone), 1928–1930 (in tonnes) 68 Distribution of oil traffic in the main French refining terminals (1965) 94 Entrepreneurial taxonomy of major coal traders in Rio de Janeiro, 1913 169

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction Daniel Castillo Hidalgo and Cezar Honorato

The long nineteenth century was a period of imperial expansion also known as “steam globalisation”, as John Darwin (2020) stated. The technological revolutions in the maritime sector were also pushed by emergent global security, where steamship shipping and telecommunications played a major role (Fichter, 2019; Gray, 2018; Kaukiainen, 2012). Hence, the diffusion of technology was closely related to the expansion of colonial empires around the world (Miller, 2012). Steamship navigation is linked to technological revolutions and the consolidation and further expansion of global economic and political systems broadly analysed by the academic literature (Boyns & Gray, 2016; Curry-Machado, 2013; Ducruet & Itoh, 2022; Gray, 2017; Huber, 2013; Suárez Bosa, 2014; Williams & Armstrong, 2012). Thus, the global port cities we study in this book were connected by a complex network of shipping connections whose edges were coaling stations, as Suárez Bosa presents in his contribution (Chap. 2). Hence, the

D. Castillo Hidalgo (*) University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Las Palmas, Spain e-mail: [email protected] C. Honorato University Federal Fluminense, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Castillo Hidalgo, C. Honorato (eds.), Fuelling the World Economy, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32565-6_1

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coaling sector—later oil companies—is a representative element explaining the functioning of these complex networks featuring Global North–South relations (see Chaps. 2, 3, 7, and 8). Port cities and their hinterlands were also integrated into these international commercial flows, impacting their port facilities, geography, economic activity, and urban culture (Mah, 2014). As Prieto et al. stated in their contribution, port activity and coal business also influenced the daily narratives and local vocabulary of people living close to the port areas (Chap. 7). Steam-powered seagoing ships require large quantities of coal for propulsion. Since coal was a bulky commodity compared to fuel oil, for example, which had only been used as a fuel since the end of World War I, the steamers were forced to stop and bunker coal again and again on their voyages. This technical constraint promoted the emergence of a global network of coaling stations where logistics strategies involved the participation of private and public partners. It was not only a pure commercial issue but also a military and geostrategic question. Thus, public institutions of leading industrial countries managed to find the way to promote maritime economic activity—as well as their naval defence—through different energy management policies related to coal that emerged as the key factor for economic growth in the second half of the nineteenth century (see Chaps. 4 and 6). Thus, possession of the largest fleet of ships and control of the stations were important factors for the colonial empires and more broadly for the British and French empires. The UK coaling companies led the world market, promoting the installation of coaling stations located in strategic positions around the globe (Suárez Bosa, 2004). Briefly, the scholarly literature provides compelling evidence that since the beginning of the age of steamships, coal has been vital in the growth of maritime transport and seaborne trade. Proportionally, coal exportation favoured British predominance in world trade, as it is exposed in every contribution in this book. Broadly, coaling companies also diversified their entrepreneurial activities to other essential port functions: shipbroking, ship construction and repair, insurance brokers, and so on. Depending on the historical pattern of development of the local port communities, the weight of those coaling companies will be more or less important. This aspect is related to the strength of local capitals and shareholders facing foreign competitors (see Chaps. 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8). All contributions in this volume analyse the structure of coal markets and a common trend to establish corporative entrepreneurial strategies driving oligopolies, trust, and cartel

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configuration. Hence, major coaling companies were able to influence the functioning of local and regional markets thanks to the control they had on global supply chains (i.e., ownership of main coal mines, special agreements with the owners of coal mines). As a response to those cartelizing strategies, other national responses also represent the struggle of the capitalist competition for international markets, as Eva-Maria Roelevink (Chap. 4) and Jerzy Lazor (Chap. 6) show. On the other hand, studying late nineteenth-century shipping routes and the structure of coal markets, it is worth understanding the pivotal role played by the Global North and its economic, military, and political agents. They were the centre of manufacturing and major industry suppliers. These economic centres required supplies of commodities from the Global South, and people living there also demanded foodstuffs and manufactured goods from the North. The extension of the international division of labour and production was fuelled and sustained by steamship navigation and the seaborne trade. The contributions in this volume partially analysed this dialectic between the local and global economic operators, as Honorato et al. proposed in their chapter (Chap. 8). The final stage of coal as fuel for shipping coincided with the end of World War I. There are several factors explaining the decline of coal and the emergence of liquid fuels during the 1920s. In this book, this transition is partially explored in different ways, but a specific study is provided by Bruno Marnot on his contribution to the implementation and expansion of liquid fuels in French seaports since the Great War (Chap. 5). Moreover, the scholarly literature has studied in depth the structural changes in the international political system caused by the progressive replacement of coal by oil and the increased influence of the United States as the main world producer. However, although coal returned to provide fuel for international shipping in the aftermath of the Great War, the golden days of coal business in seaports came to an end, as Castillo suggested in Chap. 3. The economic crisis of the 1930s and the unaffordable competition presented by liquid fuels for shipping companies (i.e., more space on board, reduced cost and speed of bunkering operations) made coal languished in the shipping industry after World War II, and it almost disappeared from the docks during the 1950s. This edited collection explores the long-term evolution of coal and fuel business in seaports running from the early wave of globalization up to the World War II aftermath. This book aims to fill a relatively neglected topic on economic and maritime history, where different regions around the

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world are analysed to provide an overall approach to this key sector for global economic integration. The essays focus on specific subjects, such as the settlement of the coaling business in the second half of the nineteenth century up to the technological and institutional shift fostered by the expansion of fuel in the shipping industry during the 1930s. This collection also introduces studies exploring Global South regions where foreign capitals were essential to building port facilities as well as pushing up seaborne trade. Thus, specific contributions from Africa and South America are presented altogether to other Western regions, providing a holistic approach to the role played by bunkering business on the configuration of the global economy. This contribution presents new case studies on this topic from different regions where economic, technological, entrepreneurial, military, and political factors are addressed. Each chapter introduces specific archival sources focusing on its case study that would be helpful for future academic discussions.

Structure of the Book This book is structured into seven main chapters combining regional, thematic, and historical perspectives. The first chapter after this introduction by Miguel Suárez analyses the main shipping routes and the role played by the coaling stations established there from the midnineteenth century until the decline of coal in the World War I aftermath. His contribution presents an overall introduction to the importance of coal business in the establishment of the well-known nineteenth-century “gentlemanly capitalism” suggested by Cain and Hopkins related to the close linkages between social networks and transnational entrepreneurial strategies (Cain & Hopkins, 1986). Thus, the international expansion of coal companies observed in the second half of the nineteenth century partially supported those pre-existent linkages between the financial centres and the Global South regions, as Prieto et  al. (Chap. 7) and Honorato et  al. (Chap. 8) suggested. Thus, Prof. Suárez paid special attention to the functioning of coaling stations in different regions of the world, but he focuses on the entrepreneurial strategies of British companies in the Canary Islands, one of the most important coaling suppliers in the mid-Atlantic routes. In addition, he observed the linkages between the coal companies and the major shipping lines of its time. The following chapter, prepared by Daniel Castillo, partially covers the Canary Islands but from a comparative perspective in relation to the

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emergence of the port of Dakar as a leading regional seaport. Castillo analysed how coal bunkering fostered port activity in a reduced number of seaports in West Africa, all those located along the most important shipping routes to South America, South Africa, and the Indian Ocean. His contribution investigates the evolution of coal markets in Dakar during the first stage of globalization that also coincided with the building of the Colonial State in Senegal. Castillo examines the long-term evolution of the coal market in Dakar and the way private and public agents managed to find solutions to increase port competitiveness. In that chapter, the study of port competition is related to the logistical capacity of coaling companies established in Dakar. In addition, Castillo presents a discussion around the strategic/defensive role expected to be played by Dakar as the node of the French Empire in West Africa and the need to improve port services and the quality of bunkering. Chapter 4, authored by Eva-Maria Roelevink, examines the German bunker coal business from a long perspective—from the entry of German coal into the international bunker coal business dominated by British coal—at the turn of the twentieth century until the Great War aftermath. She focuses on the institutional framework that the cartelization of the German coal market entailed. Although the bunker coal business was a niche business, the German Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate acted as a principal that bound its agent, the German Coal Depot, to strict and rigid rules. The powerful German overseas shipping companies united in the German Coal Depot were only able to defend themselves against this at a late stage. Thus, Roelevink presented how the German market for hard coal has heavily increased since 1893 and the institutional response represented by the establishment of the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate in the largest German coal-mining district on the Rhine and Ruhr. The Coal-Syndicate became a market giant because it soon began not only to cartelize the price and the production quota for the members involved but also to form a sales organization that was increasingly taking hold. The Coal-Syndicate focused primarily on markets that were so-called competitive markets. It was mainly British coal that the Coal-Syndicate wanted to push back, not only on the German coal markets but also far beyond. The bunker coal business was an important lever here to counter British coal on the world market. Deutsche-Kohlendepot GmbH (DKD) had already been founded in Hamburg in 1901 by the major overseas shipping companies. DKD initially operated its business exclusively with British coal. This was over when the syndicate and DKD signed a contract

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in 1905. The DKD was bound by the strict rules of the Syndicate, and the DKD was no longer allowed to trade in British coal. The evolution of the liquid fuel market in French seaports is the focus of the next chapter by Bruno Marnot. His contribution studies the shifts in energy markets that have occurred in French seaports since the Great War up to the 1960s. The chapter addresses a mid-term approach to the technological transformations of French ports also affected by war destruction. The author also explores the leading role of the government and public administration in terms of investments in port facilities. The author analyses the energetic policies developed by the French administration and the way in which foreign dependence on fuel modified the public agenda. Marnot presents the lessons learned by France during the war in terms of external dependence. France quickly lost its European providers, such as Russia and Romania, because of the closing of the Dardanelles by the Ottoman Empire, allied with the Central Empires. The United States found de facto their former monopoly again. Furthermore, Marnot analyses how the dependence on a sole supplier was reinforced by a logistic gamble, given that the crossing of the Atlantic was particularly dangerous with the surge in German submarine warfare. The war proved that oil was destined to become a necessary energy resource that had to take its place in France’s global energy policy. As the Great War demonstrated, with the new role of oil in the economy of France at the time of the Second Industrial Revolution, public authorities became conscious of the role of the ports as receipt, transformation, and exportation sites of oil and their derived products. In this respect, the national oil policy played a key role in promoting trading seaports as strategic tools of the French economy. The following chapter, prepared by Jerzy Lazor, also explores political issues related to energy and the role played by coal in the economic structure of Poland. After World War I, new Polish coal deposits, which had previously formed part of imperial Russian and German markets, now found their way to overseas European buyers and beyond. Lazor quantifies this process by looking at the changing geographical distribution of Polish exports, as well as the pattern of prices in different markets. The linkages between the Polish coal industry and the expansion of port facilities are also explored in that chapter. Lazor analyses the connection between the growing role of maritime coal exports and French investment in Poland, which allowed the creation of a port in Gdynia, and the railroad linking it to Silesia. Thus, Lazor places these investments, together with the entrance of French capital into coal companies in Poland, in a wider

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context of French security policy. Finally, the author investigates the role of coal companies with foreign (especially French) capital in Polish exports and their interactions with the foreign exchange-starved government in Warsaw, aiming to determine whether these connections had an impact on the pattern of prices of Polish coal. The next contribution transports the reader to South America. The chapter prepared by Santiago Prieto, Miguel de Marco (h), José Luis Jofré, and Marcelo Weissel analyses the linkages between the coal business and the expansion of Argentine maritime and river ports. As the authors remark in their contribution, little is known about it in the Latin America academic literature. This chapter helps to understand the dynamics of reception, circulation, and coal supplies as a predominant energy source for the Pampa region during the cash-crop export period of 1860–1930. The authors shed light on the impact of the coal-related economy and the history of the Argentinian ports. Thus, they propose a case-study analysis on the role played by coal and shipping companies in the Argentinian insertion into the dynamics of globalization. Thus, this chapter also explores the expansion of intermodal transport facilities tied to the growing export sectors. More broadly, the authors introduce a study on the structural port reforms in La Plata to adapt to the demands of steamship shipping. Then, they focus on urban-related aspects such as “coal cultures” tied to labour organization, popular language expressions, and the living conditions of coal labourers. The final chapter by Cezar Honorato, Luiz Cláudio Ribeiro, and Thiago Mantuano introduces an innovative analysis of the functioning and structure of the coal market in Brazil and the major role played by Rio de Janeiro as the main regional seaport until the expansion of Santos in the first decades of the twentieth century. The chapter they prepared represents a pioneering contribution to this topic in the Brazilian scholarly literature. Thus, they discuss the commercialization, use, and generalization of mineral coal in Brazil, a process coeval with the last decades of the Brazilian Empire. In their contributions, they present not only the economic impact of coal as an energy source but also its technological and entrepreneurial influence and the external economies it fostered through the establishment of firms in the urban and port areas of Rio de Janeiro. Thus, similar to Prieto et al. in the previous chapter, they analyse the urban impact of the increasing utilization of coal in the port area. The authors also explore the way in which the Brazilian economy managed to meet the demand for coal not only for shipping but also for industrial needs. Thus,

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the country has become an obsessed importer of coal, buying mainly from British suppliers and giving entry via Rio de Janeiro. Operating as a gateway for Brazil, important international coaling companies established their branches there. The authors analyse it in the structural process of Brazilian insertion into the world market. The energy dependency on that external supply and the centralization of fuel in the regional hub characterized the structure of the coal market in Brazil from the late nineteenth century up to the outbreak of the Great War. Finally, the authors focus on the functioning of the three major coaling companies established in Rio de Janeiro, highlighting the Brazilian Coal Company. It suffices to conclude that with the current energetic transition from fossil and polluting to renewable and clean sources, there is an important history to keep on learning about the importance of coal in the nineteenth-­ century economic expansion. This is also a North–South history where coaling companies from the industrial centres dominated the market, influencing prices through monopolies, cartels, or syndicates of producers. The companies we present in this book were powerful, acted overseas, and usually benefited from the support of public institutions as key tools for imperial expansion (Headrick, 1981). Conflict between local and foreign and expatriate capitals is also analysed in this book in different ways. The same goes for the splendid academic literature related to dock labour and the living conditions of stevedores working on the handling of coal. The multiplication of social conflicts in the waterfront during the 1930s is also related to significant changes that occurred during the transition from coal to liquid fuel. In addition to the international economic crisis, the technological transformation of the transport industry also impacted the social side among dockers and their families. That transition implied the progressive decline of coal as the main energy source for the maritime industry, but not at all, an abandonment of its utilization for urban and industrial purposes. Coal remains today at the top of the list of the most used and polluting sources of energy around the world. The environmental impact analysis of all this is very far from the goals of this book. However, this book reflects on the continuing importance of coal in the shipping industry and the key role played by maritime transport in the configuration of contemporary societies. The evolution of the “invisible industry” (Harlaftis et al., 2012) has a rich past to be learned for a better understanding of the functioning and structure of the international economic structure. We hope this volume will make a modest contribution to enlarge the knowledge about it.

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References Boyns, T., & Gray, S. (2016). Welsh coal and the informal empire in South America, 1850-1913. Atlantic Studies, 13(1), 53–77. Cain, P., & Hopkins, A. G. (1986). Gentlemanly capitalism and British expansion overseas. I.  The old colonial system, 1688-1850. Economic History Review, 39(4), 501–525. Curry-Machado, J. (Ed.). (2013). Global histories, imperial commodities, local interactions. Palgrave. Darwin, J. (2020). Unlocking the world: Port cities and globalization in the age of steam 1830–1930. Allen Lane. Ducruet, C., & Itoh, H. (2022). The spatial determinants of innovation diffusion: Evidence from global shipping networks. Journal of Transport Geography, 101. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2022.103358 Fichter, J. R. (Ed.). (2019). British and French colonialism in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Palgrave. Gray, S. (2017). Fuelling mobility: Coal and Britain’s naval power, c.1870-1914. Journal of Historical Geography, 58, 92–103. Gray, S. (2018). Steam power and sea power. Coal, the Royal Navy, and the British Empire, c.1870–1914. Palgrave. Harlaftis, G., Tenold, S., & Valdaliso, J.  M. (2012). The World’s key industry. History and economics of international shipping. Palgrave Macmillan. Headrick, D. (1981). The tools of empire: Technology and European imperialism in the nineteenth century. Oxford University Press. Huber, V. (2013). Channelling mobilities: Migration and globalization in the Suez Canal region and beyond, 1869–1914. Cambridge University Press. Kaukiainen, Y. (2012). The advantages of water carriage: Scale economies and shipping technology, c.1870-2000. In G. Harlaftis, S. Tenold, J. M. Valdaliso, & J.M. (Eds.), The World’s key industry. History and economics of international shipping (pp. 64–87). Palgrave. Mah, A. (2014). Port cities and global legacies: Urban identity, waterfront work, and radicalism. Palgrave. Miller, M. B. (2012). Europe and the maritime world. A twentieth-century history. Cambridge University Press. Suárez Bosa, M. (2004). The role of the Canary Islands in the Atlantic coal route from the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century: Corporate strategies. International Journal of Maritime History, 16(1), 95–124. Suárez Bosa, M. (Ed.). (2014). Atlantic ports and the first globalization, c.1850–1930. Palgrave. Williams, D.  M., & Armstrong, J. (2012). An appraisal of the Progress of the steamship in the nineteenth century. In G. Harlaftis, S. Tenold, & J. M. Valdaliso (Eds.), The World’s key industry. History and economics of international shipping (pp. 43–63). Palgrave.

CHAPTER 2

The Use of Coal in Maritime Transport and Maritime Station Networks: Routes, Stores and Companies, Circa 1850–1930 Miguel Suárez Bosa

Introduction When analysing a late nineteenth-century map, it is striking to observe the complex network of routes and coaling stations established across all oceans and continents. When steamships replaced the old sailing ships in maritime transport, fixed and permanent routes began to be established, and with the opening of the Suez Canal (1869) and subsequently of the Panama Canal (1914), the large shipping routes spanning the whole world were completed. There is little doubt that these routes played an important role in fostering trade during the first globalisation between the mid-­ nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. Indeed, maritime transport played an essential role in international trade once ships were able to use mineral coal as fuel (North, 1958; Ville, 1990, p. 1) (W.S. Jevons

M. Suárez Bosa (*) University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Las Palmas, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Castillo Hidalgo, C. Honorato (eds.), Fuelling the World Economy, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32565-6_2

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described it as “the mainspring of modern material civilisation” (Jevons, 1865, p. vii)). Similarly, the supply of coal was a key factor in the economy of countries with access to the sea until it was gradually replaced by oil. In the same way, companies that controlled the distribution of coal played a decisive role during the colonial expansion (Miège, 1975, p. 5). This chapter therefore aims to analyse the shipping routes and the role played by the coaling stations built along them from the mid-nineteenth century until the decline of coal as the main source of fuel used in shipping during the 1930s. Special attention will be given to the coal stores built on the African continent and adjacent islands by coaling companies. These were powerful entities with interests in coal mines and international trade, and they were frequently linked to the larger shipping lines that monopolised maritime traffic. Coaling stations needed to combine several favourable factors to be successful. These were geographic location in line with the range of the ships, adequate infrastructure, benign climate and market size, along with others such as the presence of the appropriate institutions allowing transaction costs to be reduced, as seen, for example, in exemptions and commercial freedoms (see Chap. 3). In addition, we can enumerate some aspects relating to labour organisation: the training and skills of the workforce as well as the labour costs, whether the port is unionised and the influence of those unions on the cost of supplies. To determine the influence of transport on the economy, the academic literature focuses on the geo-political factors of the location, running from the contributions of economic geography (Fujita et al., 2001; Krugman, 1991). Furthermore, institutional aspects must be considered (North, 1990), as prices and conditions of supply often depend on the agreements and coordination between the companies supplying different types of fuel. This chapter hypothesises that the ports housing the coaling stations underpinned shipping in the Atlantic and were vital in supporting the economy of empires, particularly the British Empire, to such an extent that they were crucial for the globalisation process during the analysed period. The use of coal as fuel for shipping became possible with the technological advances of the Industrial Revolution: high-pressure steam boilers, propellers and turbines. These advances allowed the implementation of this powerful energy source to be used effectively and made it possible to increase the range and cruising speed of vessels. During this period in history when free trade prevailed, coal was theoretically supplied in

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accordance with the law of supply and demand. However, it was a common practice in the business to agree prices among companies and suppliers. Long lists of prices, which would allow an overall understanding of these company agreements, are usually not available. The alternative to this is to reconstruct these lists port by port to subsequently compare them. The final section of this chapter offers a relatively extensive list of prices for Canary Island ports (see also Chap. 3 for a comparison between the Canary Islands and other regional seaports). Public and private documentation has been compiled for this chapter, building on the academic literature on international coal trade (Tortella, 2000). These sources include the business documents held in Companies House, along with numerous national and local archives that contain documentation regarding coal and the functioning of coaling stations. Given British primacy in this area, consulting the Public Record Office housed in The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom) is highly recommended, as the consuls of each city or port sent high-quality reports regarding the economic and business activity of each location. It is clear that to draw a representative picture of the coal trade, documentation from each station, port or country would be needed, along with documentation from the coaling companies. However, even if the scholarly literature provides some good examples of case studies (including this edited collection of essays), the degree of analysis that would be required for a specific study of each port is currently unattainable and would only be possible in a great research grant with the participation of various international research teams, even though much of the information is available online. The seminal works of Kirkaldy and Zimmerman continued to be interesting references, including prices and basic information about the functioning of coal business around the world (Kirkaldy, 1919; Zimmermann, 1921). Following the introduction, this chapter will offer an analysis of coal within the development of maritime transport in the context of capitalist expansion at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. Section “Shipping Routes During the Age of Coal” focuses on the companies in charge of supplying coal at these ports, while Section “Stations and the Price of Coal Supplies” analyses the conditions of supply, focusing especially on the agreements between businesses that sought to standardise prices. Finally, we offer some provisional conclusions.

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Capitalist Expansion and the Production and Supply of Coal World trade increased with the process of economic expansion from the second half of the nineteenth century and considering changes that originated during the Industrial Revolution. However, this process required suitable infrastructures along with faster methods of transport, as these were vital for the proper development of trade (Ville, 1990). The capital to finance the transport industry came largely from the savings of people from imperialist countries, looking for somewhere to spend them. This allowed significant investment abroad, as seen in the port infrastructures required by steam-powered sailing, among other sectors. Maritime traffic played an essential role within this economic framework, which was defined by the presence of an industrial mining trade centre, the heart of which was found in the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, in other European countries and the United States (Fraile Balbín, 1991, pp. 99–100). This epicentre was connected to the rest of the world through steelworks, electromechanical engineering companies, shipbuilding companies and shipping companies, which provided an important link between world trade and the producing regions of Wales and northeast England, where the best coal deposits were located. Why the new fuel source came primarily from Britain is explained by various factors, as Zimmerman explained (Zimmermann, 1921, p.  223): the country’s natural advantages for the extraction and exportation of coal; its industrial power; and the network of coaling stations that had been encouraged by the British Empire in ports of call. This was such that ownership of abundant coal, in addition to the short distances to travel overland for exportation and cheap ocean transport, made it possible to send British coal even to distant ports and to supply it at lower prices than other producer countries (Fletcher, 1975, p. 2). Possession of the largest fleet of ships and control of the stations were important factors that underpinned the British Empire (Minchinton, 1985, 1987). That these remained under British influence was due to the possession of colonies on all continents and was also in large part due to the political and economic control the United Kingdom exercised over numerous islands located in strategic positions. In short, since the beginning of the age of steamships, coal has been vital in the growth of maritime transport. At the same time, coal exportation favoured British predominance in world trade. British shipowners were also the first to use steamships for long maritime journeys.

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Table 2.1  Coal exports by country, 1850–1919 (in millions of tonnes) South Africa India Canada Australia New Zealand Japan Chile 1850 1860 1870 1885 1880 1889 1890 1895 1900 1905 1907 1908 1909 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919

United Kingdom 3.2 7.1 10.2

1.3 22.8 2.1 0.1 1.2 2.1 3.7

2.2 2.2 3.5 6.1 8.4

2.8

3.5

0.6

2.6

–

3.1 5.2 7.7

4.3 6.4 7.5

0.7 1.1 1.6

4.8 7.4 11.8

– – –

4.9 4.9 8.8 9.5 9.3 11.2 10.9 9.9

12.8 12.8 16.2 16.5 16.4 16.4 17.3

– 9.3 10.7 9.6 9.5 9.5 8.7

12.2 12.2 10.4 10.4 9.4 8.1 –

– 1.9 1.9 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.1

– 14.7 17.1 17.3 15.5 17.5 19.9 20.8

– – 1.3 1.1 1.7 1.4 1.5

36.8 55.9 82.2

94.4

43 50.5

Sources: Author’s elaboration building on Zimmermann (Zimmermann, 1921, pp. 226 and 231)

The figures included in Table 2.1 show the predominance of the United Kingdom in coal production and supply, both as cargo and as bunkering. The figures in Table 2.1 speak for themselves: coal exports increased from 3.2 million tonnes in 1850 to 94.4 million tonnes in 1913 and 50.5 million tonnes at the end of World War I (1919) (Zimmermann, 1921, p.  226). However, from the eve of the twentieth century, the British monopoly faced competition from other countries to the extent that the British presence in formerly monopolised markets fell drastically, as was the case of the stations at Aden (Yemen) and Natal (Brazil). The following figures demonstrate this growing competition, highlighting the increasing production in Canada, Australia, India and South Africa. In contrast, countries such as Germany were not competitive in the supply market, as they focused on internal consumption (see Chap. 4). However, there was competition from the United States, and although they initially restricted their supplies to a limited area close to their shores, the increase in the cost of freight allowed them to break into markets such as France and Italy.

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Given that most of the coal supplied in Atlantic ports came from England, it is not surprising that the companies in charge of its supply did as well. English coal merchants received coal from their mines in Wales, Hull and other coal mining areas, transported it in their own ships and supplied it along the shipping routes. Most of the major companies within this sector were founded or had branches in different African or South American ports (see Chaps. 3, 7 and 8). These companies were connected to significant international capital. For example, Elder Dempster had connections with commercial entities and cotton companies, and they established the Bank of British West Africa (Davies, 1973, 1978, 2000). On the other hand, the German company Woermann Linie was strongly backed by the Reichstag (Miège, 1975, p.  5). Furthermore, these companies signed agreements among themselves, exemplified by the two companies establishing the West African Shipping Conference in 1895 (Davies, 2000, pp. 72–78). Business agreements were also established regarding mining. In 1929, the companies that owned coal deposits in Wales merged, bringing the mines of Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds together with those of the David R. Llewellyn Group. This process culminated a year later with the agreement between the shareholders of 15 companies to establish Welsh-associated collieries, which was taken over by Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries.1 Another example of agreement between businesses is the Atlantic Islands Depot Agreement (AIDA), drawn up at the start of the twentieth century to establish a standard price among island ports, as is explained in the following sections (see also Chap. 3). This arrangement remained until the end of World War I, when an agreement was concluded for the creation of a corporate trade union under the name The Canary Islands Coal & Oil Depots Co. Ltd, with the aim of obtaining coal from Welsh mines under favourable conditions (Suárez Bosa, 2004). A qualitatively important next step was taken in 1930 when Condor Ltd holding company was formed in London with the following original shareholders: –– Lambert Brothers Ltd, a subsidiary of Trust Saving Bank and Hill Samuel, which had previously purchased Miller y Cía S.A. for a subsidiary of this name. 1  See “Welsh Associates Collieries”, Grace’s Guide to British Industrial History, https:// www.gracesguide.co.uk/Welsh_Associated_Collieries, information accessed on 18 April 2021.

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–– Cory Brothers Co. Ltd, proprietor of Cory Hermanos S.A. and a subsidiary of the Welsh Powell Duffryn group (1945–1946). –– Blandy Brothers & Co. (Port Division). –– Hull Blyth & Co. Ltd, proprietor of Compañía Carbonera de Las Palmas. –– Cory M. George-William Cory Ltd, which had shares in Hull Blyth & Co. Ltd. –– In 1946, Cory Brothers and Co. Ltd joined the group (William Cory owned 25% of Hull Blyth). Between 1970 and 1972, Ocean Shipping Ltd group bought the William Cory company and sometime later was left with control of Hull Blyth.2 This merger strategy allowed the economic crisis of the 1930s to be faced and allowed the structural transformations resulting from technological changes in shipping to be handled. These technological changes were driven by oil replacing coal as fuel. The generational shift that was taking place in the heart of these companies should also be considered. In general, coaling companies provided services required by all ports of call: supplying ships in transit, which needed quick and effective services related to coal, water and victuals; undertaking tasks relating to ship construction and repairs for domestic port services in their shipyards and dry docks; and even acting as consignees in the ports where they were established. The example of Cory Brothers Co. is significant. This was perhaps the largest exporter of coal in South Wales, where they owned various mines in Cardiff, specifically in Rhondda. This company offered services in several ports and following the opening of the Suez Canal (1869), they set up stores, offices and agencies along the trading routes to the extent that in 1913, they had 118 agencies and stores located on the most transited shipping routes. Moreover, they supplied Navy vessels at various Atlantic ports. They were present in an area that stretched from the Atlantic islands to several ports on the African continent, with an important base in Port Said from where its subsidiary companies Aden Coal Co. Ltd and Gueret, Llewellyn and Merrett Ltd branches operated. In 1942, the company was bought by the Powell Duffryn group, but it has maintained its identity as 2  Information regarding this process comes from the minutes book of the companies cited and from the interview given by the author Cayetano Cuyás Hidalgo, who was a member of the Miller company. The interview with Cayetano Cuyás took place on 5 June 2003.

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a shipping agent until today.3 As was the case for many others, the company changed hands and name when the coal boom reached an end, even combining its activities from extraction to supply. Another of the large coaling companies was Elder Dempster Line. This was a vertically integrated company, owning coal mines in Wales and a powerful shipping line with interests in northwest Africa and branches in Atlantic islands ports, where it adapted the business strategy of diversification by building dry docks and repairing facilities for vessels. The company acquired prestige during the Boer War, as it was involved in troop transportation and provision and had agreements with King Leopold II regarding his business activities in the Congo. Its primary activity in the coal trade was to supply ships on route to Western Africa, where Elder had significant colonial interests, primarily in Nigeria, with coal stores in Sierra Leone and Lagos (Davies, 2000; Olukoju, 2004). A large amount of the coal extracted from its mines in Wales (Oakwood and Garth) was exported by its shipping line and supplied to ships from the Elder Dempster stores on the Canary Islands and in Sierra Leone.4 On the other hand, the case of Wilson Sons is almost unique. The company was established in San Salvador de Bahía, Brazil, by its founder and first owner, a British expatriate (see Chap. 8). He opted to diversify his business, as exemplified by owning mines in Wales, the coal from which supplied ships out of the stores he owned along various routes. In Las Palmas, he owned dry docks and ship repair shops. The parent company, Wilson and Ocean Merthyr Ltd, had dealings in various ports on continental Africa (Dakar, Freetown) and on islands off the African coast (the Canary Islands, Madeira and Cape Verde) (see Chap. 3). In South America, in addition to the original company in San Salvador (Pernambuco), he had warehouses in Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, Maracaibo and so on. His strategy was to establish subsidiaries in the ports where he operated. He established his company in the Canary Islands in 1895 under the name of Compañía Nacional de Carbones Minerales and in Cape Verde, 3  Source: Glamorgan Record office/Archifdy Morgannwg dcb reference code(s): GB 0214 DCB Title: Cory Brothers & Co. Ltd, Shipping Merchants Records Creation Date(s): 1857–1943. https://www.gracesguide.co.uk/Cory_Brothers_and_Co, information accessed on 22 April 2020. 4  In 1932, Elder Dempster Lines was formed by Elder-Dempster Shipping, the African Steamship Co. and the British and African Steam Navigation Co (see “Elder Dempster and Co.” https://www.gracesguide.co.uk/Elder_Dempster_and_Co), information accessed on 22 April 2020.

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operating under the name of St Vincent, C.V.I. On the African continent, he had coal stores by means of the Compagnie Francaise de Charbonnages de Dakar (Castillo, 2014), in Freetown using the Sierra Leone Coaling Co. Ltd, and in Alexandria through Petsaly Coal Co. Ltd In all, he was able to offer services related to shipping in 26 ports across Europe, South America and Africa. In 1916, the company was sold to Ellerman Lines, and, subsequently, Wilson Sons & Co.—the owner of Cía Nacional de Carbones Minerales—was bought by William Cory Ltd in the 1920s. Although Wilson’s name remained (Ellerman’s Wilson Line of Hull) and the company continued for a few years, it never enjoyed the same degree of success, despite a brief resurgence in the 1950s. It finally shut down in 1973.5 Another British company, Oceanica, was belatedly established in Las Palmas (during the 1920s), displaying modern methods for supplying fuel and providing ships from its English parent company, the Compañía de Combustibles Oceanica, with coal. In the canaries, one of the few companies without a direct English connection was Woermann Linie, although this did not hinder its dealings with Elder Dempster during the West African Shipping Conference (1895–1914). Originating in Hamburg, it had the strong support of the Reichstag in its policy of penetration in Africa. Woermann was set up in Las Palmas in 1906 and in the neighbouring port of Santa Cruz in 1913 under the name Deutsche Kohlen Depôt Geselschaft. The Cía General Canaria de Combustibles (Compañía General de Carbones) operated in several Spanish ports (Las Palmas, Cádiz, Barcelona, Vigo and Bilbao). It was founded in Barcelona (1914) as an agency of the Anglo Spanish Coaling Co. Ltd (established in Cardiff in 1913) for the purpose of capitalising on the trade in coal and its storage, with the aim of supplying ships. Even though coaling companies integrated into large international financial capital were those that prevailed, it is also worth mentioning local entities, although in many cases, these were linked to or taken over by foreign companies. The case of local companies in the Atlantic islands, Africa and South America is known (see Chaps. 7 and 8). Companies based in the Canary Islands provide a good source of information on this 5  Source: “Wilson, Sons and Co”, in Grace’s Guide to British Industrial History https:// www.gracesguide.co.uk/Grace%27s_Guide, information accessed on 13 April 2021. The memorandum of association for the Spanish branch is held in the archives of the Bank of Spain. See Tortella (2000, pp. 46 and 287).

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matter. The oldest company established in Las Palmas was Miller y Cía (established there in 1854),6 while in Tenerife, Hamilton and Co. was the oldest and provided approximately half of the coal supplied in this port between 1903 and 1911 (Guimerá 1989). The Cía Carbonera de Las Palmas was established in this port in 1909 after ensuring that its business dealings were increasing. An example of a company with interests in several archipelagos in West Africa was Blandy Brothers.7 This company had been established in Madeira since 1811, where it was involved in the wine trade, and they obtained a licence for the supply of coal in the Port of Las Palmas in 1885. In 1838, the company opened a branch in London followed by a branch in Lisbon eight years later once they belonged to Lloyd’s maritime committee (Carnero Lorenzo & Nuez Yanez, 2010).

Shipping Routes During the Age of Coal8 Studying late nineteenth-century shipping routes, it is worth bearing in mind that although northwest Europe and the United States were the centre of manufacturing and major industry, these required supplies of raw material (commodities) from the rest of the world and that people from these areas also called for new food and manufactured staples. As production sites were in distant places—North and South America, India, Africa, China, Japan and Australia—these goods needed to be transported to consumer countries in the Northern Hemisphere, a vast area to which the majority of imports were directed and the origin of exports from Western Europe: United Kingdom, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries. The above allows attention to be paid first to the main routes that ships had to take and second to connecting these routes to the focal point of global maritime transport. The most travelled routes originated in the area between the south of Ireland, the Bristol Channel and the English Channel, from where they could go out to sea. The second large area 6  There is also the unique story of this company told by Rodríguez y Díaz de Quintana (1989), in addition to the family history written by Basil Miller, a descendent of the company’s owners (Miller, 1988). 7  There is a short text about this company, self-published by Blandy (1961). 8  A.  J. Sargent defines maritime routes as  “If a  considerable number of  ships, during an appreciable period of time, follow the same track, for similar purposes, we are justified in marking that track as a trade-route”. Quoted by Zimmermann (1921, p. 22).

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where shipping routes converged was between the Cape of Race (Newfoundland) and Long Island (New York), with most of trade between Canada and the United States passing through. A regular vessel would generally make a triangular journey, planning outbound and return journeys with intervening stops for refuelling in the stopover ports of Madeira, the Canary Islands, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia and so on, which was not necessarily an inconvenience despite what it may seem. In contrast, ships were able to take advantage of this to take on some “return freight” and, in this way, reduce the cost of freight. Even steamships, which operated along regular routes, used triangular or circular routes (Zimmermann, 1921, p.  31). One such route is exemplified below: –– If ships left from Cardiff loaded with coal, they usually stopped over in Las Palmas, where they refuelled before continuing towards Pernambuco or San Salvador de Bahia. On their return, they sailed in ballast to Galveston (Texas) and left for Liverpool with cotton. –– If ships left from Newcastle loaded with coal, they usually stopped over in Las Palmas to refuel or unload their cargo, continuing from there in ballast to the port of Durham (Natal) to take on coal and continue to Karachi, which at that time was a port in the British colony in the Indian Ocean, returning to London with wheat via the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean route. –– In the third example, ships left from Newport News loaded with coal and finished their outbound journey in Buenos Aires, returning in ballast to Iquique (Chile) to take on nitrate and continue to Savannah, passing through the Panama Canal (see Chap. 7). Therefore, from the focal point in the North Atlantic, there was the option of either following the routes along Africa or heading towards South America. This shaped a network of stations running parallel to the trade routes that passed along these continents (Castillo & Mohamed-­ Cherif, 2017). The route that passed through the Strait of Gibraltar, a transit area for most shipments heading to the east of Europe, reached the Suez Canal, from which they set course towards India to continue east. Routes heading to the South Atlantic passed by the Mid-Atlantic islands (Madeira, the Canary Islands and Cape Verde). They then split into two, with one travelling along Africa and passing by the Cape of Good Hope to reach the Chinese Sea or Australia and the other route heading to South

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America and passing through the main ports on this continent, bunkering coal in San Salvador, Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo and Buenos Aires, before going around Cape Horn and heading towards the coaling station at Coronel, Chile.

Stations and the Price of Coal Supplies The price of the coal supplied to ships depended on several factors: distance, quality, the institutional context, and the availability, skills and quality of the workforce. Other issues also had a sustained impact, for example, if the mine was conveniently located near the coast. General prices correspond only to specific years and were provided by Kirkaldy for 1912 (Kirkaldy, 1919, pp. 602–610). This author also provided complementary data regarding the type of coal and the conditions in which it was supplied. The alternative method would be to reconstruct lists of prices port by port to subsequently compare them, although this is not feasible given the current state of research.9 In the analysis of coal sales and of trade in general, the prevailing theory is that of a fully liberalised market in which suppliers competed to sell their products, with prices determined on the basis of variables such as the condition of supplies, transport to the dock, freight rates and customs duties, where applicable. However, despite operating in a market where officially, commercial freedoms prevailed, it can be deduced from the data of some ports, such as those of the Atlantic islands, that during the last third of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century, businesses adopted agreements and coordination strategies with a view to dividing the market. Moreover, the return system was an important factor within the freight market regulations (North, 1958). This is because it allowed prices to be altered, with the value increasing in correlation with the distance from the sources of raw materials and food products, which were imported for consumption in the United Kingdom and other industrial counties in north-western continental Europe. To supply ships travelling along the routes, coal needed to be transported a considerable distance. Logically, it was therefore necessary to opt for the most costeffective choice, which was not necessarily the cheapest, as the fuel had to be of a suitable quality to reduce the amount of space it occupied on the

9

 Appendix 2.1 shows the prices for the Canary Islands between 1891 and 1933.

2  THE USE OF COAL IN MARITIME TRANSPORT AND MARITIME STATION… 

23

ship. Thus, the highest quality coal was Welsh, and according to the sources studied, this was the most sought after at most stations. Vessels travelling the oceans needed to refuel in strategically located stations. Taking the example of the route running the length of the Mediterranean in 1912, ships usually stopped in Gibraltar to stock up with Welsh coal at a price of 23 shillings, and although they could stop at many ports along the Mediterranean coast, they usually continued until Suez to stock up at 36 shillings per tonne. If they continued to India or Australia, they needed to refuel in Port Said, where various coaling companies were established that could provide up to one and a half million tonnes in a year at a price, in 1913, of between 20 and 21 shillings. Ships could also procure supplies in Colombo, although here British coal faced competition from that from India and South Africa (Durban). From this port, they travelled directly to Australia, where ships stocked up with good coal from inland. However, while Welsh coal cost 25 shillings per tonne at these Indian and South African ports, local coal was considerably cheaper to the extent that the cost of the best local coal was approximately 10 or 16 shillings less per tonne, as in 1912, the price of Welsh coal was 35 shillings compared to 19 shillings for Bengali coal. If steamships were bound for ports in the Far East, they could take on coal in Sebang, Penang or Singapore, the latter being the main port in the region supplying close to one million tonnes per year to ships bound for Japan or China. There, Australian coal was 11 shillings cheaper per tonne and competed with coal from India and Japan. In turn, the price in Hong Kong, which usually had large stores of fuel, was 19 shillings per tonne, while it was four shillings cheaper in Shanghai due to the proximity of the inland supply sources, in addition to that from Japan and Australia. In Manila, Japanese coal cost 21 shillings and Australian coal cost 23, a price that competed with American coal while the country was under North American sovereignty, with Pocahontas coal (West Virginia) being highly appreciated. On return from Oceania via the Cape Route, ships refuelled in Durban, an important coaling station that was supplied by rich inland mines. When heading north, they went along the western coast where the most important coal stores in Africa—Saint Vincent, Las Palmas and Madeira—were located and which were all supplied with coal from Wales and other parts of Great Britain. There were other important coal stations on the African continent, such as Dakar, Freetown, Lagos and Luanda.

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M. SUÁREZ BOSA

On the Pacific coast, there were stores in Valparaíso, Iquique and Callao, where they supplied coal from North America or Europe. Fuel extracted from South America was of poor quality and could not be transported long distances, except for fuel from Coronel (Chili). When the Panama Canal was opened in 1914, ships sailed with coal from the mines at Pocahontas and returned in ballast or with local products such as nitrate. It can therefore be seen that the Atlantic archipelagos were in a region that was a necessary transit area for the main routes from Europe to other continents. A.W. Kirkaldy states that, for the maritime traffic of the beginning of the twentieth Century “(...) the important coaling with English coal, namely, Madeira, Las Palmas, and St. Vincent. On the outwards route Europe to South America, steamers bound for ports on the west coast, after coaling at Las Palmas (...)” (Kirkaldy, 1919, p. 465). Within this process, the growing participation of the Canary Island ports was significant, with these ports eventually establishing their predominance until the 1930s (see Chap. 3). Focusing on the stations located in the South Atlantic, Kirkaldy recorded that, of the 24 routes that passed by the islands, the majority were concentrated in the Port of Las Palmas (Kirkaldy, 1919, pp.  348–372). In this port, ships usually stocked up on enough of the highest quality coal to reach Coronel (Chili). They could also stock up in Montevideo (Uruguay) at a cost, in 1912, of 41 shillings per tonne. They could choose to refuel in other Chilean ports at a lower cost of 24 shillings, but the fuel was of an inferior quality. To understand why the Canary Island ports prevailed over the rest, various points must be considered. There was an institutional factor that contributed to explaining their regional leadership: their free port status and commercial freedom, which gave them a considerable comparative advantage over others in the area. In effect, the declaration of the Free Ports (1852)10 allowed coal to be imported tax free, the result being that ships taking on coal in the Canary Islands had to pay hardly any taxes if they came into port for “coal, water or victualling”. Fuel cost 25 shillings per tonne (1889) and there were also reduced tariff rates. In 1894, the cost of entering and leaving the port was only two shillings and four pences, the pilotage cost 28 shillings, and the consular fee was four shillings and two pences.11 The importance of island ports increased at the end of the nineteenth century, with them becoming the major Atlantic coaling stations. A report from the British Consul said, “It is for coal and for no other reason that  Real Decreto de Puertos Franco, 11 July 1852.  According to the British Consular Reports (1992, pp. 293, 307 and 476).

10 11

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the majority of ships decide to dock here”. This was because the Canary Islands had become a highly important coaling station for steamships on route to Cape Town, New Zealand and South America, as they were located on the direct route taken by all ships heading south. The other important coaling station in the South Atlantic was Saint Vincent in the Cape Verde archipelago. Located 800 miles south of the Canary Islands, it is a magnificent bay that is conveniently located on the Atlantic routes but whose tax model made operations more expensive and whose workforce lacked the necessary skills for coal-related tasks (see Chap. 3). However, their free-market status was also in force between the islands, as the majority of the time the prices were controlled by business agreements. Indeed, similar prices were established across the different island ports from the early twentieth century, with the creation of the Atlantic Islands Depot Arrangement (AIDA), although these prices could vary under certain circumstances (Suárez Bosa, 2004). The arrangement can be summarised as follows: (1) each company was assigned a percentage of the total amount supplied; (2) a compensation system was established, with the company that supplied the most coal each year compensating those supplying less, paying three shillings into a communal fund when they exceeded their quota; and (3) the funds raised were shared among the companies that did not meet their designated target. This agreement was temporarily broken between 1910 and 1912, when there was a price war. Although this did not last long, it caused significant upheaval. It seems the situation started when Miller put coal on the market for a lower price than that agreed upon in 1910, which was one pound, four shillings per tonne F.O.B. (free on board). They justified this based on the special circumstances they expected to arise because of the situation that had arisen. The other companies responded by lowering the agreed upon price to one pound, two shillings and six pence, then to one pound on 24 May and subsequently to 17 shillings, six pence per tonne F.O.B. on 23 September.12 Once peace had been re-established among the ­companies in 1913, the prices remained fixed as follows: one pound 12 shillings for the best Welsh coal and one pound and nine shillings for the best coal from Northern England (Newcastle). The strategy of unity continued in such a way that, after the end of the war, the British Consul reported that the trade agreement between

 See Miller (1988) and Rodríguez and Díaz de Quintana (1989, pp. 110–114).

12

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M. SUÁREZ BOSA

companies was in place in 1920.13 The head of Compañía General de Canarias de Combustibles, Mr Kendall Park, described “having been able to come to an agreement with our competitors in Las Palmas to join the coal union of those islands and of having signed a provisional three-year agreement”. The following text, which describes the dealings Mr Kendall Park, clarifies the companies’ strategy: (…) it is understood that during a recent visit and while exercising the power he had been given, he authorised The Canary Islands Coal & Oil Depots Co Ltd. to sign an agreement with other similar trading houses in the ports of Las Palmas and Tenerife. This was in order to regulate sale prices, having handed over our licences and properties in Tenerife to said trading houses, promising not to set up in that port and receiving payment from the alliance and a pledge for 75,000 pounds in cash, which has already been collected. We have also been guaranteed a share of 12% of all annual sales, receiving 3/6 d (dollars?) for every tonne that we fall short of this over the course of a year so that the amount we receive equates to the tonnage which represents 12%, with us in turn paying 3/6 d for every tonne that exceeds said percentage. The Board notes with pleasure the agreement signed by The Canary Islands Coal & Oil Depots Co Ltd. and congratulates Mr Park for the successful outcome of his management.14

The end of the age of coal as a fuel for ships coincided with the end of the Great War. The export data are conclusive, going from 75 million tonnes in 1913 to barely more than 30 million tonnes in 1919. Such a situation naturally led shipowners to turn to a replacement, which they found in oil. This was the cheapest fuel for several reasons, including that it required less manpower to use (Zimmermann, 1921, pp.  179–180). The state of war between 1914 and 1919 was the primary cause of this 13  This information is taken from the report submitted to the Compañía General de Canarias de Combustibles board of directors. Text from the minutes book of the Compañía General de Canarias de Combustibles, p.  4; see also “Acta de la sesión del Consejo de Administración, celebrada el 9 de febrero de 1925”. Minutes from the Board of directors’ meeting held on 9 February 1925, pp. 71–72. See also “Expediente en averiguación de la causa de retirada de líneas de vapores de este Puerto de La Luz” [Record of the inquiry into the cause of the withdrawal of steam shipping lines from Puerto de La Luz], Archive of the Cámara de Comercio Industria y Navegación de Las Palmas [Las Palmas Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Shipping], “Comunicaciones e infraestructura” [Communication and infrastructure] file, Box 200; as well as “The principal firms belonging to this association, known as the Canary Islands Committee, with their local representatives”. See also the report of Consul T. J. Morris (1921, p. 6). 14  Minutes from the board of directors’ meeting held on 9 February 1925, pp. 71–72.

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notable change, as it brought about an extraordinary shortage of manpower, and the new energy source was therefore enthusiastically adopted, as it required fewer men to handle it, and oil-powered ships were ideal for reducing the size of the crew. Furthermore, there was a political motive, as the United States wished to counter the primacy of the United Kingdom at fuel supply stations and consequently promoted widespread use of oil. Although steam shipping returned to its previous pace after the end of the war and coal supply resumed under normal conditions, these golden days were numbered. Finally, the economic crisis of the 1930s and the unstoppable competition of liquid fuel meant that the above languished after World War II until almost disappearing during the 1950s (Fletcher, 1975).

Conclusions The new circumstances generated from the mid-nineteenth century because of the First Globalisation, through the extraordinary stimulation of trade and commerce, required quicker and more efficient methods of transport. Steam maritime transport, along with the railway, emerged to meet this demand and gave rise to the age of coal as shipping fuel. Indeed, new technologies played a key role in the modernisation of transport, which was a key element in the economic globalisation triggered from the 1850s onwards. The new energy source—mineral coal—was ideal for running the boilers installed on ships, making it possible to increase their size and speed considerably. Great Britain produced the highest coal yield, which was also of the highest quality. From the very beginning, Britain dominated supply in such a way that it almost amounted to a monopoly, although there was increasing competition from other countries. The United Kingdom, which owned the largest coal fleet, positioned itself strategically in island supply ports and other key locations in the context of international shipping. The new entities sailing the oceans followed established routes, known as steam shipping routes, taking on supplies as required by their range. The stations met this need and were essential in controlling the economy. Theoretically, the price of coal was established by the market. However, companies would often reach agreements to regulate prices, as has been demonstrated through analysis of some specific cases, such as the AIDA, which was drawn up by companies operating in the Atlantic islands. This points to the need to conduct local analyses to compare them and to subsequently reach general conclusions on the coal supply trade and maritime port activity. With the passing of time, oil replaced coal as the fuel used by

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M. SUÁREZ BOSA

ships after the end of World War I. This took place from the moment when technological advances, which were once again crucial elements in economic processes, allowed the benefits of oil as a lighter and more powerful fuel to be enjoyed.

Appendix 2.1: The Price of Coal at the Main Stations in 1912 Coaling station Description of coal (port)

Price and condition of supply

Aden Algiers

Current 20/9 F.O.B. 19/9 F.O.B. 20/6 ex steamer F.O.B. 49/6 F.O.B. as Buenos Aires 16/6. If bunkering in stream in fine weather 6d per tonne extra, if during a monsoon 176 per tonne extra 39 F.O.B. 8 Rs F.O.B. and trimmed 35/- F.O.B. Trimmed 3d. per tonne extra (1910, 27/9) 21/6 25/ F.O.B. and trimmed 21 F.O.B. and trimmed 14 F.A.S. steamer at wharf (1910, 13/9)

Auckland Bahia Bombay

Welsh Welsh North country Coalbrookdale Welsh Best Deshurgur

Buenos Aires Calcutta Colombo

Welsh West Bengal Welsh Delmege (Indian) Best Natal

Durham Genoa

Best Utrecht large steam Welsh

Gulf ports

North country Alabama Pratt Cahaba

Hong Kong

Kaiping (lump)

Las Palmas

Welsh

Madeira Malta

23/3 F.O.B. Sunday, holiday and night labour 1/3 per tonne extra 6.67 $3.40 per tonne of 200 lbs. trimmed at pier Ex lighters in stream 25 cents per tonne extra. Night, Sunday or holiday labour 25 cents per tonne extra 19/3 F.O.B. and trimmed alongside wharves or in harbour 22 F.O.B. and trimmed. Sunday, night or quarantine labour extra 19. Idem

Durham (unscreened) Welsh 23 F.O.B. and trimmed Welsh 22 F.O.B. no extra charge if loaded at night. Durham (unscreened) 22 (continued)

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Appendix 2.1:  (continued) Coaling station Description of coal (port)

Price and condition of supply

Manila

Good Australian

Marseilles Melbourne

Welsh Southern or Newcastle (N.S.W.) Akaike (lump) Good Japan (lump) Welsh

23/9 F.O.B. and trimmed 21 25/6 F.O.B. (1910, 41) trimming 1 per tonne 19/6 Yarra or in Hobson Bay

Moji Montevideo New Orleans New York Penang

Pernambuco Philadelphia

Pittsburgh steam Pratt Best Clearfield bituminous steam Best Australian Bengala (Jardines navigation) Japanese

Port Said

Welsh Best Clearfield bituminous steam -Natal navigation -Klobane (screened) Welsh

Río de Janeiro St Vincent

Durham (unscreened) Welsh Welsh

Santos Shanghai

Welsh Kaiping (ump)

Singapore

Welsh Australia Japanese Bengal Welsh Welsh

Port Natal

Suez Tenerife

Durham (unscreened) Source: Kirkaldy (1919, pp. 602–610)

13 F.O.B. and trimmed 12 Idem 41 F.O.B. 1/ per tonne less if supplied in harbour $3.75 per tonne of 2000 ls F.O.B. and trimmed 3.50 Idem $3.15 F.A.S. 24 F.O.B. 19/6 F.O.B.

21/6 F.O.B. 49/6 F.O.B. Terms as at Buenos Aires $3.15 F.O.B. and trimmed 14/9 F.O.B. 14 26 F.O.B. and trimmed (1910 22/6), Sunday, holiday and night labour extra 22/6 Idem 36 F.O.B. as at Buenos Aires 31 F.O.B. at naval anchorage. Sunday, night and holiday or quarantine labour extra 44/6 F.O.B. as at Buenos Aires 15 F.O.B. and trimmed alongside wharf. In stream 1/ per tonne extra 35 F.O.B. alongside wharf 24 Idem 22/6 Idem 19/6 Idem 36 F.O.B. and trimmed 22 F.O.B. and trimmed. Sunday, night or quarantine labour extra 19 Idem

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Appendix 2.2: The Price of Coal and Freight in the Canary Islands Ports, 1891–1933 Year

British pounds/tonne

Pesetas/tonne

Constant pesetas

1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1900 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1933

0.66 to 0.6145 0.4722 to 0.416 0.4270 0.5104 to 0.5520 0.4270 to 0.4687 0.7708 1.375 to 1.4375 1.2 to 1.3 1.15 to 1.35 1.175 to 1.225 1.275 to 1.5 1.5 1.2 to 1.55 1.2 to 1.25 0.86 to 1.25 1 to 1.55 1 to 2.5 1.45 to 1.6 1.55 to 2.35 1.9 to 3.6375 3.2 to 5.3 4.5 to 10 4.9 to 6.65 7.3 to 8.05 3.8 15,253 1425

17.76 to 16.42 06.47 to 05.02 12.79 15.36 to 16.62 12.33 to 13.54 23.42 44.77 to 46.80 40.78 to 45.05 39.85 to 46.79 38.66 to 40.31 33.38 to 42.61 42.13 34.06 to 44.00 32.58 to 33.93 23.30 to 33.87 27.24 to 42.22 26.97 to 67.42 39.28 to 43.34 40.42 to 61.28 47.31 to 90.57 76.57 to 126.82 95.26 to 211.7 97.31 to 132.06 163.52 to 180.32 88.54 60.96 56.97

06.39 to 05.91 02.39 to 01.85 04.60 05.22 to 05.65 04.56 to 05.00 08.19 19.69 to 20.59 18.35 to 20.27 18.33 to 21.52 17.78 to 18.54 14.68 to 18.74 19.37 15.32 to 19.80 14.33 to 14.92 10.48 to 15.26 11.71 to 18.15 12.13 to 30.33 18.06 to 19.93 18.99 to 28.80 26.49 to 50.71 50.53 to 83.70 74.30 to 165.12 93.41 to 126.77 156.97 to 166.18 92.08 45.72 42.72

Sources: For 1891–1909 consular reports from various years; for 1910–1920 (Morris, 1921, p. 12); for 1933 information from the Archivo Cámara de Oficial de Comercio Industria y Navegación de Las Palmas Notes: (1) In 1900: prices are with a contract; without a contract they are 1–12-6; (2) between 1891 and 1895: F.O.B. prices, loaded in Cardiff; (3) The price for Welsh coal

References Blandy, C. (1961). The Blandy family of companies. Our first 150 years, 1811–1961. Self-Edition. Carnero Lorenzo, F., & Nuez Yanez, J. S. (2010). La empresa Blandy brothers. De Madeira a canarias, 1885-1936. Anuario de Estudios Atlánticos, 56, 311–334.

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Castillo, H. D. (2014). The port of Dakar: Technological evolution, management and commercial activity. In M. Suárez Bosa (Ed.), Atlantic ports and the first globalisation, c.1850–1930 (pp. 90–111). Palgrave Macmillan. Castillo, H. D., & Mohamed-Cherif, F. Z. (2017). La configuración de las redes de transporte marítimo en África Noroccidental (1880-1939). Investigaciones de Historia Económica, 13(2), 81–92. Davies, P. (1973). The trade makers. Elder Dempster in West Africa, 1852–1972. Alle and Unwin Ltd. Reprinted by International Maritime Economic History Association in 2000. Davies, P. (1978). Sir Alfred Lewis Jones, shipping entrepreneur par excellence. Europa Publications. Davies, P. (2000). The Trade Makers: Elder Dempster in West Africa, 1852–1972, 1973–1989. Researches in Maritime History. Fletcher, M.  E. (1975). From coal to oil in British shipping. The Journal of Transport History, 3(1), 1–19. Fraile Balbín, P. (1991). Industrialización y grupos de presión. La economía política de la protección en España, 1900–1950. Alianza Universidad. Fujita, M., Krugman, P., & Venables, A.  J. (2001). The spatial economy: Cities, regions and international trade. MIT Press. Jevons, W. S. (1865). The coal question: An enquiry concerning the progress of the nation, and the probable exhaustion of our coal mines. Macmillan. Kirkaldy, A.  W. (1919). British shipping: Its history, organisation & importance. Kegan Paul Trench, Trubner & Ltd. Krugman, P. (1991). Increasing returns and economic geography. Journal of Political Economy, 99, 483–499. Minchinton, W. (1985). The role of the British South Atlantic islands in sea-borne commerce in the nineteenth century. In Actas del IV Coloquio de Historia Canario-americano (pp. 543–576). Casa de Colón. Minchinton, W. (1987). The canaries as port of call. In Actas del VI Coloquio de Historia Canario-americano (pp. 273–300). Casa de Colón. Miège, J.  L. (1975). Expansión europea y descolonización de 1870 a nuestros días. Labor. Miller, B. (1988). Canary Saga. The Miller family in Las Palmas. Cabildo Insular de Gran Canaria. Morris, T.  J. (1921). Trade and economic conditions of the Canary Islands. Department of Overseas Trade, H. M. Stationery Office. North, D. C. (1958). Ocean freight rates and economic development, 1750-1913. Journal of Economic History, 18(4), 537–555. North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press. Olukoju, A. (2004). The Liverpool of West Africa: The dynamics and impact of maritime trade in Lagos 1900–1950. Africa World Press.

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Rodríguez y Díaz de Quintana, M. (1989). Miller y compañía: Cien años de Historia. Artes Gráficas Clavileño. Suárez Bosa, M. (2004). The role of the Canary Islands in the Atlantic coal route from the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century: Corporate strategies. International Journal of Maritime History, 16, 96–123. Tortella, G. (2000). Una guía de fuentes sobre inversiones extranjeras en España (1780–1914). Archivo del Banco de España. Ville, S.  P. (1990). Transport and the development of the European economy, 1750–1918. Macmillan. Zimmermann, E. W. (1921). Zimmermann on ocean shipping. Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd.

CHAPTER 3

Bunkering in West Africa: The Case of Dakar Daniel Castillo Hidalgo

Introduction The academic literature has analysed the expansion of steamship navigation services in West Africa in depth (Davies, 2000; Leubuscher, 1963; Lynn, 1989). In comparative terms, recent investigations have found compelling evidence of this technology being introduced and diffused along the African Atlantic Façade relatively early compared to other maritime regions around the globe (Ducruet & Itoh, 2022; Kaukiainen, 2012). This fact presents a counterintuitive assumption related to the limited degree of development of West African port facilities from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards (Hoyle & Hilling, 1970; Saupin, 2020). The transformation of the maritime industry during the second wave of the industrial revolution increased the demand for port facilities and specialized port services (Harlaftis et al., 2012; Marnot, 2020). The growth of port activity and the external economies they generated required important capital investments (Marnot, 2015, 2020). Public institutions therefore played a major role in fostering the massive investments required

D. Castillo Hidalgo (*) University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Las Palmas, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Castillo Hidalgo, C. Honorato (eds.), Fuelling the World Economy, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32565-6_3

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for dredging, erection of wharves, and the construction of basic port infrastructure. This transformation process was associated with the first global port reform (Marnot, 2020; Miller, 2012). Nevertheless, the improvement of port facilities and other transport infrastructure was hampered by the structural fiscal weakness of the African colonial state (Castillo & Ducruet, 2020; Frankema & Booth, 2019; Hoyle & Hilling, 1970; Oliete & Magrynyà, 2018; Olukoju, 2004). Investments in port facilities in West Africa during the second half of the nineteenth century were quite limited in overall terms. Until the turn of the twentieth century, most West African seaports remained underdeveloped, and in most cases, port operations continued through lightering services (Saupin, 2020). This is the case for coal bunkering services in the major stopover seaports of the West African façade. This chapter focuses on the evolution of the coal bunkering market in Dakar and the way that the Senegalese seaport emerged as one of the most important coaling stations in West Africa during the interwar period. The Port of Dakar was conceived as the spearhead for French colonization in West Africa and was a key naval base for military control of MidAtlantic navigation routes (Castillo, 2014; Charpy, 2011; Peterec, 1967; Seck, 1970). It was the capital of French West Africa (hereafter FWA) in 1902, so urban, economic, cultural, and military functions began to be concentrated in the port city (Seck, 1970). The construction of the Arsenal in 1898 represented the increasing importance of Dakar as the heart of the French colonial state in West Africa (Young, 1994). Nevertheless, until the eve of the Great War, the market share of Dakar in bunkering services in West Africa was relatively marginal. In this chapter, I provide an overview of how the regional coal market operated from the second half of the nineteenth century up to the interwar period, analysing the factors that fostered the emergence of Dakar as a regional leading coaling station. That process built on an important business concentration where the Compagnie de Charbonnages de Dakar (a subsidiary of Wilson & Sons Co.) led the bunkering sector until the late 1920s. Furthermore, this chapter analyses the relevance of the conjuncture of World War I as a driving factor for port reform in Dakar. The war fostered bunkering services for the French and British navies in West Africa (Castillo, 2014). It is important to note that the commercial Port of Dakar was inaugurated in 1910, reinforcing the urban clustering process in Senegal. From 1910 to 1918, commercial and bunkering throughput

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grew suddenly. In fact, the Senegalese port emerged as one of the main regional nodes both in commercial and bunkering terms. This chapter builds on the following question: how did the increasing importance of bunkering activities cause the commercial functions of the port (external economies) and the investment of public capital in its facilities to increase? It is clear that coal bunkering in Dakar contributed to the expansion of the port. Nevertheless, it is necessary to analyse this process by adopting a regional scope in which different nodes tried to continue attracting maritime traffic for bunkering. In this contribution, I analyse the factors affecting port competition between the leading bunkering seaports in West Africa from the 1850s onwards: Mindelo (Cape Verde), Las Palmas (Canary Islands), and Dakar (Senegal). The Cape Verdean and Canarian seaports acted as first movers in this market, while Dakar tried to reduce the existing gap by attracting international traffic, even if the colonial institutional framework hampered it. The academic literature on the structure and evolution of bunkering markets in West Africa is relatively limited. I found specific contributions on the emergence of Dakar as a regional gateway and the hub of the FWA transport network (Castillo, 2014; Peterec, 1967; Seck, 1970). In addition, the literature provides an analysis of the transformation of the shipping industry, the diffusion of disruptive technologies, and port-level adaptation in African seaports (Ducruet & Itoh, 2022; Kaukiainen, 2012; Marnot, 2020; Williams & Armstrong, 2012). This technological revolution faced financial constraints in colonial Africa due to the state’s limited fiscal capacity. Recent investigations have found compelling evidence on this topic for FWA (Cogneau et al., 2021; Huillery, 2014; McAlexander & Ricart-Huguet, 2022). Public investment in port infrastructure focused on fostering processes of massive port concentration at major seaports (Castillo & Ducruet, 2020). In terms of coaling markets in West Africa, the academic literature provides some references based on economic and business history (Castillo, 2014; Davies, 2000; Diouf, 2011; Leubuscher, 1963; Prata, 2014; Suárez Bosa, 2004). However, little is known about how the coal market in Dakar operated or its relative position within and development into the regional network. This chapter focuses on the analysis of the relative position of Dakar in the regional coal market from the late 1850s to 1914. This includes the creation of a database of coal imports where I introduce prices for selected regional seaports (St. Vincent, Canary Islands). In addition, I observe the impact of World War I on the improvement of port facilities and, more

36 

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broadly, on the bunkering sector. In that section, I analyse coal agreements between the French and British navies, as well as strategies to mobilize the African workforce exerted by the colonial rulers. The economic importance of coaling services during the war fostered further improvements to facilities. The works on modern infrastructure during the 1920s encouraged the introduction of liquid fuels by bunkering companies, including the establishment of foreign petroleum companies. This contribution builds on historical records collected from the French Overseas Archives (hereafter ANOM), the National Archives of Senegal (hereafter ANS), the British National Archives (hereafter NA), and the British Diplomatic and Consular Reports (reports on the coal trade and bunkering in West Africa). These qualitative sources contrast with quantitative data based on the literature on maritime traffic and coal supplies (Castillo, 2014; Prata, 2014; Suárez and Cabrera 2012). I construct a database from 1880 to the 1920s, in which I introduce figures for Dakar, Las Palmas, and Cape Verde relating to three variables: call of vessels, coal imported, and coal bunkered. I also have a series of prices for coal, which is incomplete; however, I was able to set milestones on prices to observe the competitiveness of each seaport in international shipping. In doing so, I expect to understand how private and public stakeholders in the port of Dakar tried to increase the operational capacity of the port and offer the best services possible for international shipping. This chapter is structured as follows. First, an overview of the structure of regional coal markets in West Africa from the second half of the nineteenth century up to World War I is provided (Section “The Structure of the Coaling Market in West Africa, 1880–1914”). Then, Section “The Evolution of the Coaling Business in Dakar” will focus on the case of Dakar and the beginning of coaling activities in the Bay as of the late 1850s. This part of the chapter studies the different stages of development of the local coal market until the outbreak of the Great War. Section “World War I and the Bunkering Sector in Dakar” focuses on the impact of World War I on the development of the bunkering sector in the context of military emergency. Each section of this chapter explores the action of public stakeholders in promoting port activity and investments in facilities. To conclude, I offer some final remarks in Section “Conclusion”.

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37

The Structure of the Coaling Market in West Africa, 1880–1914 The expansion of steamship navigation in West Africa from the 1850s is related to the progressive expansion of imperial powers (Headrick, 1981). The transition from the slave trade to the legitimate trade of commodities contributed to the advances in maritime connectivity between all Atlantic nodes. The boom in oil commodities (palm oil, kernels, and groundnuts) fostered the expansion of steamship lines operating in West Africa and the main producer regions (Hopkins, 2019; Lynn, 1989). The first regular steamship line connecting the United Kingdom to the Gulf of Guinea was established in 1852 (Davies, 2000). This line managed post and seaborne trade to and from the British coastal colonies in that region. Nevertheless, there was no port infrastructure in modern or industrial terms. Broadly, maritime trade occurred in open bays thanks to the use of local lighterage services (Olukoju, 2002; Saupin, 2020). This also represents obstacles to expanding port activity and seaborne trade. In fact, maritime exchange figures were relatively low in overall terms until the consolidation of the colonial state in the last decades of the nineteenth century. It also applies to the movement of coal on a regional scale. The slow expansion of the coal trade in West Africa meant that vessels operating in those regions had to reserve important space on board for coal storage. However, it is important to note that the transition process from sail to steam lasted several decades, not only in West Africa but also overall. Yrjo Kaukiainen (2012) pointed out that the specific nature of commercial exchanges in West Africa favoured its rapid insertion into global steamship networks. More recently, Ducruet and Itoh (2022) provided evidence on the degree of penetration of steamship technologies around the world. This helps to explain the structure of the bunkering sector in West Africa and the increased demand for port services and coaling supplies in the early twentieth century. The figures included in Table 3.1 show the degree of penetration of steamship navigation in West Africa compared to other European, American, Asian, and African regions. By the early 1880s, the maritime flows related to steam technology were relatively marginal in West Africa in aggregated terms, as was the case everywhere. Nevertheless, this also represents the importance of coastal shipping in African harbours, where sailing still operated until the 1930s. In contrast, it is important to bear in mind the importance of the steamship and its role as an overseas exchange facilitator, not only in terms of

38 

D. CASTILLO HIDALGO

Table 3.1  Share of steamer traffic in total vessel traffic, 1880–1920 (% of calls) Region

1880

1890

1900

1910

1920

West Africa North Africa East and Southern Africa Northwest Europe Southwest Europe Indian subcontinent Northeast Asia

5.1 5.5 1.3 3.5 5.0 5.8 4.6

36.3 33.6 19.4 29.6 34.1 36.8 30.3

72.2 72.7 57.0 63.9 67.8 74.8 67.9

89.2 88.6 81.7 83.9 83.1 89.9 89.2

93.8 96.5 94.8 96.0 91.6 96.2 97.7

Sources: Author’s elaboration, adapted from Ducruet and Itoh (2022)

goods and military purposes but also for passenger movements. Increasing figures on the share of steamship vessels in West Africa also represent structural shifts in the regional port network, including the transformation of facilities and the expansion of port services. From 1850 to 1880, Mindelo, on the island of Saint Vincent (Cape Verde), led the bunkering market. The Portuguese colonial government authorized the installation of the British coaling company Millers and the construction of warehouses and coaling depots in 1851 (Prata, 2014). The coaling station of Saint Vincent also operated as an advanced post for British expansion in West Africa, controlling the navigation routes. At this point, the Canary Islands seaports did not present competition with Mindelo. In overall terms, they were simply another coal supplier with competitive prices for vessels in that region until the late 1880s. In fact, the volume of coal handled in the main regional coaling stations rapidly increased from 1890 onwards because of the expansion of international shipping (Table 3.2). However, the rise of the Canary Islands seaports on the eve of the twentieth century modified the regional bunkering market structure. British capital disembarked in large quantities in Gran Canaria and Tenerife, where external economies tied to port activity expanded (see Chap. 2). During the second half of the 1890s, the Canary Islands seaports surpassed Cape Verde as the main regional coaling station (Da Sousa, 1891). This was the result of several endogenous institutional and economic transformations. On the institutional side, the Spanish government established a free trade status from 1852 onwards. It facilitated the movement of merchandise where British coal could be easily imported. In exchange, local landowners and foreign investors promoted the

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39

Table 3.2  Tons of coal bunkered in Mindelo, Las Palmas, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, and Dakar (1880–1914) (in tons) Year

Mindelo

Las Palmas

1880 1885 1890 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914

122 154 304 207 322 264 295 323 523 339 217 237 269 215 331 390 255 258 306 224 282 350 180

4 27 202 147 242 328 255 329 412 305 244 274 298 211 342 345 377 438 767 761 734 786 476

Santa Cruz de Tenerife 10 34 108 114 147 161 133 207 279 233 230 209 233 215 251 306 176 140 298 248 519 349 228

Dakar

14 15

19

29 59 88 93 142 197 227 267 158

Total

1880=100

136 215 628 483 711 753 683 859 1,233,000 877 691 720 829 641 983 1,041,000 896 929 1,513,000 1,430,000 1,762,000 1,752,000 1,042,000

100.00 158.09 462.30 355.46 522.79 553.68 502.21 631.62 906.85 644.85 508.09 529.42 609.65 471.32 722.87 765.44 659.45 683.24 1112.51 1051.47 1295.78 1288.24 766.18

Sources: Author’s elaboration. For Mindelo, see Prata (2014) and Suárez and Cabrera (2012). For Las Palmas and Santa Cruz de Tenerife, see Suárez Bosa and Cabrera Armas (2012). For Dakar, see Castillo (2014)

development of cash crops (tomatoes and bananas) that also functioned as outbound freight for coaling companies (Suárez Bosa, 2004). In addition, the Spanish government approved important investments in port infrastructure after the 1880 Port Act was passed. The Canary Islands also benefited from their relative proximity to Europe and their strategic geographical position at the core of mid-South Atlantic navigation routes. This also encouraged the settlement of an important British community, who established their households and businesses, acting as traders, shipbrokers, and bankers, as well as making other investments related to the agriculture and tourism sectors (Davies, 2000). The port of Las Palmas concentrated the lion’s share of this economic effervescence, where

40 

D. CASTILLO HIDALGO

bunkering played a key role. In fact, improvements in port services and increasing coal supplies partially explained the urban prosperity noted by Swanston, the British consul. The rapidly increasing prosperity of Las Palmas and its port of La Luz is to be traced directly to the very large amount of shipping calling here to take advantage of the harbour (now completed) with its coaling facilities, excellent repair works, etc.. The port of La Luz is now the only harbour or refuge between Cadiz, the Cape of Good Hope and South America. Four important British coaling companies are now established in the port and supply some 500,000 tons annually. Every effort is made to give rapid despatch to steamers both by day and night, and water and provisions are very promptly supplied.1

The leading four companies (Wilson, Cory, Blandy, and Grand Canary Coaling Company) succeeded in creating a coaling trust during the first decade of the century, trying to exclude competitors in the Atlantic Islands Coaling Depot Agreement (AIDA). As Wilson, Cory, and Grand Canary Coaling (a subsidiary of Elder Dempster) operated on a regional scale (Madeira, Canary Islands, Cape Verde, and, from 1904, Dakar), they tried to control the market through oligopoly entrepreneurial strategies (Suárez Bosa, 2004). This corporative agreement added to the West African Shipping Conference (1895) signed between the British Elder Dempster and the German Woermann Linie. That deal distributed the main traffic and freight along the African Atlantic Façade between both shipping companies (Davies, 2000). At the turn of the century, coaling supplies in Cape Verde experienced an important decline. The logistical capacity of the two coaling companies established in Mindelo (Millers & Cory and Wilson & Sons) stagnated. Wilson & Sons began to withdraw their investments in Cape Verde, reassigning them to the Canary Islands and Dakar (1904). The call for vessels increased in the Canary Islands seaports, generating incentives for additional investments there. On the eve of the Great War, Mindelo suffered further impact because of the decision of the Italian shipping companies to divert their stopovers from the island to Dakar (1913), where they established a coal depot in 1909. The emergence of Dakar as a first-rate coaling station just before the war complicated the economic situation in Cape Verde. The Portuguese 1

 Diplomatic and Consular Reports. No. 2830. Canary Islands (1901).

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41

colonial rulers tried to find solutions to its port crisis, with increased competition then coming from the Canary Islands and Dakar. Thus, if the coal business failed in Cape Verde, the entire economic structure of the islands would collapse (Prata, 2014). The means to improve port competitiveness required a number of features directly and indirectly tied to the port and coaling services, as Lopes de Figuereido stated in 1913: (a) Because taxes of 300 reis for each ton of imported coal in Saint Vincent impacted the final price, shippers preferred to go to the Canary Islands and Dakar, where taxes or even fiscal exemptions meant cheaper coal. (b) Because of the free-trade status of the Canary Islands and the modern infrastructure of Dakar, shippers preferred to go there instead of Saint Vincent. (c) Because of the technological revolution in shipping that increased the autonomy of vessels, they could now avoid the stopover in Saint Vincent. (d) Because of the inexistence of outbound freight in Saint Vincent for the coaling vessels, in contrast to the Canary Islands, important profits occurred through the exchange of coal for tomatoes. (e) Because of the insufficient urban development in Mindelo and Saint Vincent and the lack of urban services, affordable beer and other urban and port facilities, passengers preferred to go to the Canary Islands or Dakar, where prices were lower.2 At this point, we must explore how Dakar managed to climb the regional port hierarchy and how the Senegalese seaport emerged as one of the most important stopovers in West Africa.

The Evolution of the Coaling Business in Dakar The construction of the first port infrastructure in Dakar began in the early 1860s. In 1857, the Méssageries Impériales selected the Bay of Dakar as the stopover for their overseas routes covering Bordeaux and Brazil (Charpy, 2007). The company from Gironde obtained the right to transport posts, as well as civil servants and military staff, to Senegal. However, the external connectivity of Senegal had the old maritime towns 2

 Translated from the original Portuguese. Lopes de Figueireido (1913, pp. 9–10).

42 

D. CASTILLO HIDALGO

of Saint-Louis, Rufisque, and the island of Gorée (off the coast of Dakar) as nodes. Small steam vessels operated at Gorée and Rufisque, the re-­ export centres. Meanwhile, most import trade was concentrated in Saint-­ Louis (Charpy, 2011; Sinou, 1993). In 1857, the French Empire officially founded the city of Dakar as the spearhead of its colonization process in West Africa. However, the lack of port infrastructure prevented vessels from the Méssageries Impériales from passing through Dakar. The company refused to make calls in Dakar until port infrastructure was improved (Diouf, 2011). Hence, the company used Mindelo for its commercial operations in Senegal. Then, small sailing (or mixed) vessels operated coastal shipping from the islands to the main coastal seaports. However, that situation changed in 1866 with the completion of the first port infrastructure in Dakar. The company built a 3300 square metre esplanade for coal storage and a commercial office in the Senegalese port, but they still conducted bunkering operations in Cape Verde. This was a troublesome situation for the French Navy due to its dependence on foreign, more specifically British, coal. The establishment of Dakar as an urban and political centre in West Africa is accompanied by institutional shifts in terms of diplomacy and security. The colonial expansion to the inland regions of Saloum and Upper Senegal required a coastal stronghold, and it fell to Dakar to play that role. The French authorities asked for port facilities and bunkering services in Dakar to be improved during the 1860s. In 1868, the Méssageries Impériales bunkered 8700 tons of coal in Dakar, for a permanent stock of approximately 3000 tons. There was a permanent workforce of 21 people for coal bunkering in Dakar that year (20 Africans and a European supervisor).3 The structure of the coal business in Dakar remained almost unmodified until the end of the nineteenth century. Shipping companies did not conduct bunkering operations in Dakar, except for those vessels belonging to the Méssageries Impériales from 1871, as well as for small companies and the French Navy. In addition to the condition of the infrastructure, the company stored the coal outdoors, which meant its quality was affected by the sea’s humidity and episodes of heavy rain (Diouf, 2011). The company benefited from a de facto monopoly for coaling services granted by the French administration from 1866 to 1908. Higher coal prices in Dakar provoked complaints from shipbrokers as well as the French Navy. In 3  ANOM. 14MIOM/1461. Letter from the Coal Inspector to the Governor of Senegal, 22 January 1869.

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43

1883, the Navy ordered the establishment of a permanent stock of coal of 8000 tons for military purposes.4 Nevertheless, we found little change in this sector until the turn of the century, once the colonial state began to invest in land infrastructure (i.e., the Dakar-Saint-Louis railway) for the economic optimization of the territory. The construction of the Arsenal (1898) and the dry dock in Dakar anticipated the expansion of Dakar as an imperial seaport, as the British consulate stated in his annual report: It appears probable that Dakar is destined to hold an important position as the commercial centre and port of call, not only for Senegal but also for the whole West African coast.5

However, the consumption of coal in Senegal was quite limited until the establishment of Wilson & Sons (Compagnie Française des Charbonnages) in 1904. In 1903, the Senegalese economy required 40,000 tons of coal, where more than 30,000 were bunkered in the Port of Dakar.6 In comparative terms (see Table 3.2), the coaling business in the Senegalese seaport was small if we contrast it with the increasing importance in terms of external connectivity and commercial throughput (Castillo & Ducruet, 2020). By 1903, a very small number of foreign companies called at Dakar, and most of them bunkered in the Canary Islands (Santa Cruz or Las Palmas) (Table 3.3). In 1904, Wilson & Sons established themselves in Dakar, causing the bunkering sector to surge. In that year, the government of FWA started work on the future commercial Port of Dakar through a major loan of 65 million francs granted by the French government (Charpy, 2011). The Port of Dakar received a significant part of that loan, but the lion’s share was devoted to railway development in the whole Federation. Thus, the reform of port infrastructure would facilitate the increase in maritime connectivity at the port, fostering the establishment of companies such as Wilson & Sons. In fact, since its establishment, the company, named Compagnie Française des Charbonnages de Dakar, concluded contracts for the supply of coal to the Naval Department, to Woermann Linie and other French (Societé Générale des Transports Maritimes, Chargeurs 4  ANOM. 14MIOM/1461. Letter from the Ministry of Navy to the Governor of Senegal, 25 April 1884. 5  Diplomatic and Consular Reports (DCR). Report on trade and Commerce of the French Colonies, 1898. 6  NA. Foreign Office 27/3682 (1904).

44 

D. CASTILLO HIDALGO

Table 3.3  Regular steamship companies operating in Senegal, 1903 Company

Ports of call

Frequency

Devès et Chaumet

Inbound: Bordeaux, Saint-Louis Outbound: Saint-Louis, Bordeaux Inbound: Bordeaux, Corunna, Vigo, Lisbon, Dakar Outbound: Dakar, Lisbon, Bordeaux

Monthly from Marseilles

Méssageries Maritimes

Transports Maritimes

Cie. De Navigation Mixte

Chargeurs Réunis

Cie. Fraissinet

Woermann Linie

Inbound: Marseilles, Barcelona, Malaga, Tenerife, Dakar Outbound: Dakar, Tenerife, Marseilles Inbound: Marseilles, Tangiers, Las Palmas, Dakar Outbound: Dakar, Las Palmas, Tangiers, Marseilles Inbound: Le Havre, Bordeaux, Tenerife, Dakar Outbound: Dakar, Tenerife, Bordeaux, Le Havre Inbound: Marseilles, Las Palmas, Dakar Outbound: Dakar, Las Palmas, Marseilles Inbound: Hamburg, Tenerife, Las Palmas, Gorée, Dakar Outbound: Gorée, Las Palmas, Tenerife, Hamburg

Weekly (Sundays)

Weekly (Thursday to Saturday) Two monthly departures (1st and 20th of the month)

Trimestral departures (call in Tangiers depending upon commercial agreements)

Departures every 2 months

Monthly departures

Monthly departures

(continued)

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45

Table 3.3  (continued) Company

Ports of call

Frequency

British and African Steam Navigation Company and African Steamship Company (Elder Dempster)

Inbound: Liverpool, Madeira, Tenerife, Gran Canaria, Gorée, Dakar Outbound: Dakar, Gorée, Gran Canaria, Tenerife, Madeira, Liverpool Inbound: Hamburg, Rotterdam, Tenerife, Gorée, Dakar Outbound: Dakar, Gorée, Tenerife, Rotterdam, Hamburg

Weekly departures

British and African Steamship Company

Monthly departures

Sources: Author’s elaboration. NA. Foreign Office 881-8050X

Réunis) and British (Elder Dempster) shipping companies. The British Royal Commission on Coal Supplies stated, “Unhampered by competition and favoured with the advantages of a geographical position that places the depot [Wilson] within easy reach of some of the large ocean lines, there is every hope of an expansion of trade in the near future”.7 These early prospects were accurate. From 1906 to 1913, the maritime connectivity of Dakar doubled (Table 3.4), and coal supplies climbed from 59,100 to 267,000 tons (see Table 3.2). In 1910, the commercial Port of Dakar was inaugurated. The reform of port facilities (1904–1910) introduced commercial quays, new warehouses, and esplanades. On 30 June 1909, another coaling company established itself there. La Compagnie Italienne “Sénégal” obtained a 50-year concession for the supply of coal to the Italian merchant fleet that began to operate at the Senegalese port (replacing Mindelo). The Chairman of the Board and representative in Dakar was Philippe Delmas, a ship owner from Bordeaux (Delmas et Cie.). The company had to pay an annual fee of 100 francs to the Colony of Senegal, as well as assure the

7  Royal Commission on Coal Supplies. Final Report of the Royal Commission on Coal Supplies. Part XIII. Replies of H.M. consular officers in answer to a series of questions on the maintenance of the British coal trade in foreign countries (1905).

46 

D. CASTILLO HIDALGO

Table 3.4  Call of steamship vessels to Dakar, Mindelo, and Las Palmas, 1906–1913 Year

Dakar

Mindelo

Las Palmas

1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913

768 698 666 730 982 1.165 1.213 1.393

1.63 1.719 1.543 1.391 1.593 1.291 1.707 1.466

2.772 3.02 2.841 2.891 6.17 4.751 4.888 4.976

Sources: Author’s elaboration. For Dakar, see Castillo (2014). For Mindelo, see Prata (2014). For Las Palmas, see Suárez Bosa (2003)

bunkering of at least 25,000 tons of coal per year.8 Thanks to the establishment of this company, the operational capacity of Dakar notably increased, as did the demand for a permanent workforce (Castillo, 2021; Diouf, 2011). The construction of warehouses for coal and improvements to maritime connectivity helped reduce the gap in coal prices among regional coaling stations in West Africa. From 1895 to 1904 (before the installation of Wilson & Sons), coal bunkered in Dakar was 17–18 per cent more expensive on average than coal bunkered in Las Palmas. In the case of regular coal supplies (by permanent contracts), the difference was 12.65 per cent on average.9 By 1910, the price of coal in Dakar was quite like that in Mindelo (Table 3.5) and more competitive in overall terms. Figures for Las Palmas (1910) should consider the “coal war” among the coaling companies established at the Canarian port (Suárez Bosa, 2004). The coaling trust led by Cory Bros attempted to exclude competitors by establishing market quotas for each associate. However, Miller & Co (est. 1854) did not accept these conditions, and a price war started. The price of coal went from 22 shillings/ton to 16 shillings/ton. Newspapers in European seaports announced that coal prices were lower in Las Palmas than in Cardiff. Trust companies maintained the struggle through 8  ANOM. 14MIOM/1455. Report from Albert Dubarry, Secretary of the FWA government, presented to William-Merlaud Ponty, General Governor of FWA, 10 December 1910. 9  Royal Commission on Coal Supplies. Final Report of the Royal Commission on Coal Supplies. Part XIII. Replies of H.M. consular officers in answer to a series of questions on the maintenance of the British coal trade in foreign countries (1905).

3  BUNKERING IN WEST AFRICA: THE CASE OF DAKAR 

Table 3.5 Average prices of bunkered coal in the main West African coaling seaports, 1910 (in francs)

47

Port

Francs Las Palmas = 100

Las Palmas Funchal Santa Cruz de Tenerife Mindelo Dakar

31.87 32.50 33.12 36.25 36.50

100 101.97 103.92 113.74 114.52

Sources: Author’s elaboration. ANOM. 14MIOM/1455. Report from Albert Dubarry, Secretary of the FWA government, presented to William-Merlaud Ponty, General Governor of FWA, 10 December 1910

dumping policies to debilitate Miller. On one day in particular, 375 steamship vessels went to Las Palmas solely for bunkering purposes (see Chap. 2). Before contracts for 1911 were signed (December 1910), the coal war ended, and prices returned to 26 shillings/ton (32.5 francs). This price war cost coaling companies10 some four million francs. Increased competition from the Canary Islands and Dakar seaports reduced the regional market share for Mindelo. In 1913, Las Palmas represented 44.86 per cent of the coal bunkered. Sales in Dakar represented 15.16 per cent, and Mindelo fell from 42.41 (1900) to 19.98 per cent in that year. In addition to the installation of coaling companies and improvements made to its logistical capacities, the Port of Dakar also benefited from the enlargement of port facilities. Both factors permitted a solid reduction of freight rates and a relative convergence in terms of prices between Dakar and Mindelo (Table  3.5). At the end of the nineteenth century, a ton of coal bunkered in Mindelo was 23.65 per cent cheaper on average compared to Dakar.11 Several factors, including freight rates, handling costs, and taxes, determined the structure of coal prices (see Chap. 2). Distance from the production regions (i.e., Cardiff, Newcastle) would affect the final price, but it seems clear that contemporary agents perceived the existence of external economies in terms of scale as well as the institutional framework. The colonial officers, like the entrepreneurial agents, identified the two factors affecting the competitiveness of Dakar compared to Las Palmas early on. 10  ANOM. 14MIOM/1455. Report from Albert Dubarry, Secretary of the FWA government, presented to William-Merlaud Ponty, General Governor of FWA, 10 December 1910. 11  Calculations based on the United States Office of Naval Intelligence (1900).

48 

D. CASTILLO HIDALGO

The key issues were shipping freight and import taxes (Table  3.6). Economies of scale and the market dimension for Las Palmas allowed a relative reduction of profits by ton of coal, but major differences occurred in terms of shipping freight. In addition to their proximity to the European continent, the Canary Islands benefited from the outbound freights for coaling companies that encouraged reductions in prices. Mindelo did not develop any kind of successful outbound freight during that period. In the case of Dakar, colonial exclusivity and heavy customs duties for the exportation of groundnuts and other strategic commodities (i.e., palm oil) hampered the expansion of attractive outbound freights. In short, Albert Dubarry noted the importance of establishing outbound freight in Dakar as the best way to attract international shipping, increase external connectivity, and reduce the cost of freight. The current outbound freights we offer to the vessels calling Dakar is too weak and there is no a major reason for shippers to go there (…) The proposed solutions are: (1) Supplying coal at a cheaper price; (2) Assuring outbound freights for vessels calling Dakar; (3) Completing the port facilities, improving the communication between the port area and the town.

The report ended with a clear proposal directly addressed to the government of the FWA. They were permitted to conclude commercial agreements with mine owners in the United Kingdom to arrange the terms of economic exchange (coal traded for commodities, including those affected by the colonial exclusivity regime). Table 3.6  Structure of coal prices in Dakar and Las Palmas (in francs), 1910 Dakar

Exports from Cardiff Shipping freights Handling and storage Taxes and revenues Total

Las Palmas

Francs

%

Francs

%

18 12 1 4.5 36.5

49.32 32.88 2.74 12.33 100.0

19 9.19 1 2.68 31.87

59.61 28.83 3.14 8.41 100

Sources: Author’s elaboration. ANOM. 14MIOM/1455. Report from Albert Dubarry, Secretary of the FWA government, presented to William-Merlaud Ponty, General Governor of FWA, 10 December 1910

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49

The people interested in these businesses seem to agree that Dakar might be the great coaling seaport for the Equatorial Atlantic (…) The General Governor may send a representative to Cardiff to negotiate with a mine-­ owner interested in developing Dakar as a bunkering seaport.12

I have not found documentary evidence of this proposal or of the position of the companies already established in Dakar concerning this kind of commercial agreement. Nevertheless, the problems detected by Dubarry in his report continued to appear in the following years, as I discuss later. From the archival sources, I found that contemporary observers identified several factors that heavily affected interport competition and the development of local coal markets. The major constraint for Dakar and Cape Verde was their institutional status as colonies and, of course, their high customs duties for third countries. In contrast, the Canary Islands benefited from free-trade status, enjoying the inexistence of import and export duties. This seems to be a decisive element in understanding the rise of Canary Islands seaports (Cabrera Armas, 2014). Then, I summarize the major factors affecting port competition and the expansion of bunkering services between these three maritime nodes on the eve of World War I (Table 3.7). However, the outbreak of the war in 1914 generated an important shift in the configuration of regional maritime networks. The war represented Table 3.7  Factors affecting interport competition in West Africa, 1913

Coal import duties Customs duties Port facilities Main outbound freight Urban facilities Urban services

Dakar

Canary seaports

Mindelo

Low High Well developed Groundnuts Developed Developed

Very low (inexistent) Very low (inexistent) Well developed Tomatoes, bananas Well developed Well developed

High High Inadequate n/a Limited Limited

Source: Author’s elaboration. For qualitative analysis of the selected factors, see Lopes de Figueireido (1913) and Prata (2014). For Senegal, see 14MIOM/1455. Report from Albert Dubarry, Secretary of the FWA government, presented to William-Merlaud Ponty, General Governor of FWA, 10 December 1910. For the Canary Islands, see Cabrera Armas (2014) and Suárez Bosa (2004)

12  Translated from the original in French. ANOM. 14MIOM/1455. Report from Albert Dubarry, Secretary of the FWA government, presented to William-Merlaud Ponty, General Governor of FWA, 10 December 1910.

50 

D. CASTILLO HIDALGO

an important opportunity for the Port of Dakar, which acted as the sole coal supplier during the second half of the conflict. The events of the War and the naval blockade of the Atlantic Islands from 1916 onwards encouraged coal bunkering in the Senegalese port (Castillo, 2014). The security for the French and British navies also included the merchant fleet and the external reputation of Dakar as a first-rate seaport for international shipping lines.

World War I and the Bunkering Sector in Dakar The outbreak of the war altered the structure of shipping networks in West Africa. Disruptions to trade and military regulations (i.e., confiscation of vessels, movement, and trade restrictions) affected commercial operations at the main regional seaports. Militarization of trade fostered institutional changes related to the suppression of custom duties for basic foodstuffs, as happened in Senegal (Ndao, 2009). However, this context benefited the position of Dakar as a safe harbour for military and residual commercial navigation. The neutrality of Portugal (until 1916) and Spain did not eliminate the risks to the Allied navies operating in the Atlantic archipelagos. The situation worsened for the islands during the 1917–1918 period, once the German Reich declared extended exclusion zones for navigation in West Africa (Ponce Marrero, 2006). This situation reinforced the strategic role played by Dakar as a safe coaling station for military purposes (Table 3.8). Hence, it is important to Table 3.8  Call of vessels (units) and coal bunkered (in tons) in Dakar, Las Palmas, and Mindelo, 1913–1918 Year

1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918

Dakar

Las Palmas

Calls

Tons of coal

Calls

1.393 1.111 1.224 1.975 2.181 1.399

267 158 214.519 324.789 508.6 344.2

4.979 3.617 2.74 2.211 636 445

Tons of coal 786 476 299,196* 149,260* 29,952* 5960*

Mindelo Calls

Tons of coal

1.466 1.112 1.368 1.377 418 234

350 180 260,841* 397,051* 83,839* 41,758*

Note: *Figures for 1915–1918 refer to the import of coal Sources: Author’s elaboration. For Dakar, see Castillo (2014). For Las Palmas, see Suárez Bosa (2003). For Mindelo, see Prata (2014) and Boletim da Agência Gêral das Colónias (1925)

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note that commercial port activity in Dakar (and all of Senegal) suffered from a radical increase in freight. The lack of space on board for the exportation of cash crops depreciated the relative value of local productions, causing the deterioration of living standards (Ndao, 2009). This was the result of the military management of cargo spaces and the agreements for the transportation of strategic commodities shipped from West African colonies (Olukoju, 1992). During the first 7 months of the year, the commercial situation in all regions of the Federation was favourable because of a good harvest. However, the last 5 months diminished the rhythm of exchange and was the ruin of all hopes (…) From a general perspective, Senegal benefited from its proximity to Europe, from the concentration of its Administrative Services, from port facilities and the position of Dakar as foothold for the navy. The port recovered its animation and, despite difficulties, returned to receive the call of French, British and Italian vessels.13

The port needed to act as the core of the Allied navies’ strategy in the Mid-Atlantic. Between 1914 and 1916, the government of FWA and the French Navy increased the restrictions on navigation from Mauritania to French Guinea. In November 1916, only vessels authorized by the French Admiralty could call Dakar. Moreover, they also banned regular night calls to the port.14 These policies applied to other regional seaports such as Freetown, where the British set their naval base during the war. Furthermore, disruptions to maritime commercial networks heavily affected the structure of the regional coal trade (Table 3.8). The reduction in maritime traffic increased the price of coal, while the volume of available coal decreased. The main markets (Canary Islands and Cape Verde) could not meet the demand due to German harassment against the merchant fleet and the exclusion zones. Thus, the French and British governments agreed to coordinate their efforts to secure the supply of coal for the Allies. The first step in this strategy came after the sinking of the steamer “Inchmore” (5 March 1916). On 2 March 1916, the French authorized free entry to the Port of Dakar for British steamers transporting coal. The Compagnie Française des Charbonnages (Wilson) would manage supplies

13  ANS 2G14-23 (1914). Rapports annuels sur la situation économique. Commerce Extérieur. Translated from the original in French. 14  NA. Ministry of Transports. MT 10/1896, 1916.

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D. CASTILLO HIDALGO

for British and French military vessels, as well as the merchant fleet.15 From that agreement onwards, both Admiralties collaborated on increasing the operational capacity of the port. The British Consul in Dakar, P.H.  Stormont reported the increasing call of British vessels during the first half of 1916, warning about port services and the need to improve facilities and workforce management.16 One of the key issues was related to the stock of coal at Dakar. The institutions had to assure a sufficient stock for military purposes, and they had to negotiate the transfer of coal by private operators in the Canary Islands and Cape Verde to the main military bases in Dakar, Freetown, and other strategic locations. Transferring coal from Cape Verde to Dakar had priority due to the proximity to the Senegalese port and the amount of Welsh coal available (yet useless) in Saint Vincent.17 On 21 November 1916, the British government signed an agreement with the main coaling companies to organize the transfer of coal from their warehouses in Cape Verde, South Africa and La Plata to Dakar and Freetown. The convention set regular quotas to be shipped during the first semester of 1917. The increasing number of vessels calling Dakar for bunkering during 1916–1917 represented an important challenge for its port community (Table 3.8). The French colonial rulers faced two major constraints during that crisis: the first was the limited operational capacity in terms of port infrastructure. It was necessary to increase technical equipment as well as large warehouses for storage. The French Admiralty accepted the creation of temporary coal depots in the port zone for the British Navy from December 1916.18 These projects anticipated important works on port facilities executed during the aftermath of the war. The second matter to be solved by the colonial officials and the Admiralties was linked to workforce management (for a complete analysis of this question, see Castillo, 2021). The shortage of workers did not begin until 1917, when the policies for compulsory enlistment in Senegal increased pressure on the supply of workers. Male workers in Senegal, both in the urban and rural areas, disappeared to avoid the quota of soldiers by village. Antoni, Chief Inspector of Maritime Affairs at Dakar, noted the insufficiency of labourers at the port from 1917  NA. Ministry of Transports. MT 23/564, 1916.  NA. Ministry of Transports. MT10/1896. Report presented by P.H. Stormont to the British Foreign Office, 24 June 1916. 17  NA. Ministry of Transport. MT23/680/1, 1916. 18  NA. Admiralty. ADM1/9214, Dossier 18, 1917. 15 16

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onwards. He remarked on how African workers decided to accept or reject the job depending on the labour conditions, including wages and other allowances.19 The inspector suggested the creation of permanent staff of “professional” dockers hired by the port companies. However, due to the shortage of labourers, French officials decided to mobilize compulsory workers from inland regions, as well as gangs formed by Senegalese soldiers.20 Together, these men provided adequate coverage of the demand for bunkering services during the war. However, there were few changes in terms of labour regulations at the docks during the following decades. During World War II, the same issues related to labour shortages emerged (Castillo & Wélé, 2018). The crisis generated by the War on regional maritime networks and the emergence of Dakar as a regional leading seaport fostered the enlargement of port facilities during the 1920s. The engineer Ernest Noël, head of the Port Service, prepared an important technical report in March 1917. In this document, he recommends improving commercial wharves, as well as introducing electrical cranes for cargo handling and bunkering.21 The works executed during the aftermath of World War I followed his technical recommendations, including some prospects related to the expansion of liquid fuels and the need to adapt port infrastructure to that incumbent demand. Moreover, Noël also suggested institutional revisions to promote the regional position of Dakar as a stopover seaport. Again, he noted the importance of the institutional framework in the bunkering sectors. They compared the relative position of Dakar and the Canary Islands and the impact of colonial protectionism on coal prices. Thus, he defended the creation of attractive outbound freight for shippers, which would increase external connectivity and affect sales prices.22

19  ANS, K408. Carton 132. Letter from M.  Antoni to the Maritime Commandant of Dakar, 19 June 1918. 20  ANS K408, Carton 132. Letter from Bonnier to the General Governor of FWA, 29 June 1918. 21  ANOM.  Travaux Publics. TP Carton 515, Dossier 17. Technical report prepared by Ernest Noël, 3 March 1917. 22  ANOM.  Travaux Publics. TP Carton 515, Dossier 13. Note sur le mouvement de marchandises dans le port de Dakar, 8 November 1917.

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Conclusion This chapter provides compelling evidence on the structural shifts observed in the coaling market in West Africa from the second half of the nineteenth century up to the aftermath of World War I. We found that a combination of entrepreneurial strategies, as well as the relative impact of port reform, conditioned the evolution of this specific market among major West African seaports. Thus, historical patterns in terms of market share seem to be affected by the emergence of incumbent seaports with the capacity to attract maritime traffic in a better position. In this investigation, I analysed the role played by the bunkering sector and stopover services on the expansion of port activity in Dakar. The future capital of the FWA was a secondary node in the regional port system by the late 1880s (Castillo & Ducruet, 2020). However, investments in port reform in the Senegalese harbour contrasted with the lack of expenditure made by the Portuguese in Mindelo, the leading seaport in terms of connectivity and coal supplies. In the last decades of the century, the Canary Islands also benefited from investments made by the Spanish government in port infrastructure. Improved port facilities increased maritime connectivity in the Canary Islands and Dakar, while a relative but persistent decline in Cape Verde was observed (Prata, 2014). More broadly, this contribution focused on the specific factors explaining how Dakar emerged as a leading bunkering seaport in West Africa. I found that a combination of improved port infrastructure, urban services, and external economies linked to the capital effect would also influence the process. In addition, the lack of specific commodities in Cape Verde to attract traffic also exerted a negative impact on its capacities when faced with the emergence of the Canary Islands and Senegalese seaports. In terms of coal prices, I found that lower prices were important but not determinant in understanding how Dakar rivalled other regional competitors. Examining the sources, I argued that the level of port development in terms of infrastructure exerted a major influence on the establishment of regular routes in that region of the Atlantic. Hence, once the modernization process began in Dakar, increasing traffic reinforced the bunkering sector, increasing overall port activity. In a cumulative process, the increased capacity fostered port competitiveness that also benefited from the existence of export freights (regional commodities) to negotiate with the coaling companies. Even if prices for coal bunkered in Dakar were higher than those in Cape Verde, the Senegalese seaport was able to attract

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traffic from the islands to the mainland. It is true that this process was long and not consolidated until the late 1920s, when the transition from coal to liquid fuel emerged as a new phase of port development in West Africa. However, the port reform in Dakar in the aftermath of the Great War allowed rapid adaptation to this new sector that demanded special facilities and the adaptation of wharves and the local workforce. The Great Depression heavily impacted the declining operative capacities of Mindelo, and the port virtually disappeared from the regional port network (Castillo & Ducruet, 2020). Dakar completed its ascension into the regional hierarchy during this decade, replacing Rufisque as the export centre for groundnuts and concentrating most external trade for Senegal. In the 1930s, the coal market declined in Dakar in favour of liquid fuels, where former companies struggled to compete with new French and international companies (i.e., Shell).

References Almeida de, Joao (1925). O Porto Grande de San Vicente de Cabo Verde, Plano de melhoramentos para valorizar este porto e atrair a Cabo Verde a navegaçao de longo curso, Boletim da Agência Gêral das Colonias, 88–111. Cabrera Armas, L. G. (2014). The ports of the Canary Islands: The challenges of modernity. In M. Suárez Bosa (Ed.), Atlantic ports and the first globalisation, c.1850–1930 (pp. 19–48). Palgrave Macmillan. Castillo, H. D. (2014). The port of Dakar: Technological evolution, management and commercial activity. In M. Suárez Bosa (Ed.), Atlantic ports and the first globalisation, c.1850–1930 (pp. 90–111). Palgrave Macmillan. Castillo, H. D. (2021). No dockers, no empire. The labour question at Dakar during world war I. The International Journal of Maritime History, 33(2), 364–381. https://doi.org/10.1177/08438714211017272 Castillo, H. D., & Ducruet, C. (2020). Port systems and regional hierarchies in Africa in the long term. In A. Olukoju & D. Castillo (Eds.), African seaports and maritime economics in historical perspective (pp. 45–80). Palgrave Macmillan. Castillo, H. D., & Wélé, M. (2018). Les dockers dakarois: L’organisation du travail dans un port ouest-africain, 1910-1990s. Canadian Journal of African Studies, 52, 183–203. https://doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2018.1483832 Charpy, J. (2007). Dakar. Naissance d’une métropole. Les Portes du Large. Charpy, J. (2011). Aux origines du port de Dakar. Outre-Mers, 99(370–371), 301–317. Cogneau, D., Dupraz, Y., & Mesplè-Somps, S. (2021). Fiscal capacity and dualism in colonial states: The French empire 1830-1962. The Journal of Economic History, 81(2), 441–480.

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Da Sousa, M. J. (1891). Estudo sobre o Comercio do Carvao ao Porto Grande da Ilha de S.  Vicente (Archipelago de Cabo Verde) e no Porto da Luz em Gran Canaria (Archipelago das Canarias). Imprensa Nacional. Davies, P. (2000). The trade makers: Elder Dempster in West Africa, 1852–1972, 1973–1989. Liverpool University Press. Diouf, A. (2011). Fondation du port de Dakar: acteurs et enjeux: 1855–1918. PhD. Dissertation, Université du Havre. Ducruet, C., & Itoh, H. (2022). The spatial determinants of innovation diffusion: Evidence from global shipping networks. Journal of Transport Geography, 101. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2022.103358 Frankema, E., & Booth, A. (2019). Fiscal capacity and the colonial state in Asia and Africa, c.1850-1960. Cambridge University Press. Harlaftis, G., Tenold, S., & Valdaliso, J. (Eds.). (2012). The World’s key industry: History and economics of international shipping. Palgrave Macmillan. Headrick, D. R. (1981). The tools of empire: Technology and European imperialism in the nineteenth century. Oxford University Press. Hopkins, A. G. (2019). An economic history of West Africa (Second Edition. First edition 1973 ed.). Routledge. Hoyle, B., & Hilling, D. (Eds.). (1970). Seaports and development in tropical Africa. Palgrave Macmillan. Huillery, É. (2014). The black Man’s burden: The cost of colonization of French West Africa. Journal of Economic History, 74(1), 1–38. Kaukiainen, Y. (2012). The advantages of water carriage: Scale economies and shipping technology, c.1870-2000. In G. Harlaftis, S. Tenold, & J. Valdaliso (Eds.), The World’s key industry: History and economics of international shipping (pp. 64–87). Palgrave Macmillan. Leubuscher, C. (1963). The West African shipping trade 1909–1959. A.W. Sythoff. Lopes de Figueireido, A. (1913). O carvao na economía de Cabo Verde. Uniao Colonial Portuguesa. Lynn, M. (1989). From sail to steam: The impact of the steamship services on the British palm oil trade with West Africa, 1850-1890. The Journal of African History, 30(2), 227–245. Marnot, B. (2015). Les villes portuaires maritimes en France: XIXe-XXIe siècle. Armand Colin. Marnot, B. (2020). Pour une histoire des modèles techniques portuaires (XIXe-­ XXIe siècles). Revue d’Histoire Maritime. https://hal.archives-­ouvertes.fr/ hal-­02937587 McAlexander, R. J., & Ricart-Huguet, J. (2022). State disengagement: Evidence from French West Africa. International Studies Quarterly, 66(1). https://doi. org/10.1093/isq/sqab040 Miller, M. B. (2012). Europe and the maritime world. A twentieth-century history. Cambridge University Press.

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Ndao, M. (2009). Ravitaillement de la ville de Dakar de 1902 à 1945. Dakar. L’Harmattan-Sénégal. Oliete, J. S., & Magrynyà, F. (2018). Patchwork in an interconnected world: The challenges of transport networks in sub-Saharan Africa. Transport Reviews, 38(6), 710–736. Olukoju, A. (1992). The maritime trade in Lagos in the aftermath of the first world war. African Economic History, 20, 119–135. Olukoju, A. (2002). Getting too great a grip: European shipping lines and British West African Lighterage services in the 1930s. Afrika Zamani, 9-10, 19–40. Olukoju, A. (2004). The Liverpool of West Africa: The dynamics and impact of maritime trade in Lagos, 1900–1950. Africa World Press. Peterec, R. J. (1967). Dakar and West African economic development. Columbia University Press. Ponce Marrero, F. J. (2006). Logistics for commerce war in the Atlantic during the first world war: The German Etappe system in action. The Mariner’s Mirror, 92(4), 455–464. Prata, A. (2014). Porto Grande of S. Vicente: The coal business on an Atlantic Island. In M.  Suárez Bosa (Ed.), Atlantic ports and the first globalisation, c.1850–1930 (pp. 49–69). Palgrave Macmillan. Saupin, G. (2020). African seaports in transition. In A.  Olukoju & D.  Castillo (Eds.), African seaports and maritime economics in historical perspective (pp. 17–44). Palgrave Macmillan. Seck, A. (1970). Dakar, Métropole Ouest-Africaine. IFAN. Sinou, A. (1993). Comptoirs et villes coloniales du Sénégal. Saint-Louis, Gorée, Dakar. Karthala. Suárez Bosa, M. (2003). Llave de la fortuna. Instituciones y organización del trabajo en el puerto de Las Palmas, 1883–1990. Caja Rural. Suárez Bosa, M. (2004). The role of the Canary Islands in the Atlantic coal route from the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century: Corporate strategies. International Journal of Maritime History, 16(1), 95–124. Suárez Bosa, M., & Cabrera Armas, L. G. (2012). La competencia en los servicios portuarios entre Cabo Verde y Canarias (1850-1914). Anuario de Estudios Atlánticos, 58, 363–414. United States Office of Naval Intelligence. (1900). Coaling, docking, and repairing facilities of the ports of the world, with analyses of different kinds of coal. Government Printing Office. Williams, D.  M., & Armstrong, J. (2012). An appraisal of the progress of the steamship in the nineteenth century. In G. Harlaftis, S. Tenold, & J. Valdaliso (Eds.), The World’s key industry: History and economics of international shipping (pp. 43–63). Palgrave Macmillan. Young, C. (1994). The African colonial state in comparative perspective. Yale University Press.

CHAPTER 4

The Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate and the German Bunker Coal Business, 1905–1947 Eva-Maria Roelevink

Introduction The first wave of globalisation is unthinkable without coal and coal business institutions. Coal was not only the means of propulsion with the transition from sailing ships to steamships but was also quantitatively the most important transport commodity. Coal was not the first bulk commodity to be traded via sea routes, but the use of coal brought about a reduction in overseas transport costs. However, this effect was not independent of the production areas. The availability of coal undoubtedly exerted a considerable influence on sinking freight formation, but the location of the production areas was also of particular importance during the first wave of globalisation. The most important coalfields were in England, close to the coast. Of the 63.5 million tonnes of coal mined in

E.-M. Roelevink (*) Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Mainz, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Castillo Hidalgo, C. Honorato (eds.), Fuelling the World Economy, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32565-6_4

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England in 1855, 4 million tonnes were already exported. On the eve of World War I, England produced 292.1 million tonnes and exported almost a hundred million tonnes. However, the pure export figures do not indicate British market dominance (Harley, 1989, pp. 311–338). Of central importance for British dominance on the trade and transport routes were the coal depots and bunker stations, which supplied the steamships on their voyages with new steam coal, which not least made it possible to increase the cargo space of the transport ships (see Chap. 2). It is therefore not surprising that approximately one-third of British coal exports were bunker coals (Fremdling, 2003, p. 96). The globalised bunker coal business was practically dominated by British coal until the turn of the century. It was not until around the turn of the century that German overseas shipping companies tried to revive the business through competition. They turned to the German Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate (hereafter RWKS), founded in 1893, for this purpose. The RWKS, established in 1893, was probably the most powerful cartel in the German economy until it was forced into liquidation by the Allies after World War II. Countless legends surrounded the RWKS, which was celebrated by some as a model cartel and criticised and judged by others as a dangerous power agglomeration. Founded by the Ruhr coal mines to “fight for the elimination of unhealthy competition on the coal market”, the RWKS developed a complex institutional setting and organisation that was essentially based on the establishment of production quotas (Beteiligungsziffern), a centralised price setting and a joint syndicate sales organisation (Syndikatshandelsgesellschaften). Since 1896, with the establishment of the first syndicate trading company, the sales organisation of the syndicate became the centrepiece of the cartelised Ruhr coal industry, which made the market power of the coal syndicate visible to the outside world and, in addition to the markets in which the syndicate held a dominant position, also included those in which the syndicate coal encountered competition and had to deal with British coal. Only with the successive formation of the differentiated sales organisation was the RWKS able to become a market giant that, through a mix of granted exclusive rights, narrow contractual clauses (contract rights) and shareholdings in companies (property rights), succeeded in dictating the sales course to the trading companies and exercising market power proverbially. Only in one case, the syndicate trading company for the Dutch coal market authorised by the RWKS, did a company

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“dependent” on the syndicate manage to free itself from the dictates of the RWKS at an early stage (Roelevink, 2015). Apart from this case, the RWKS was clearly the overpowering headmaster in the relationship with the numerous sales and trading companies (agents). The principal-agent theorem, which has gained increasing importance in economic and business history research in recent years, addresses such commissioned relationships within economic institutional systems. In this context, the designation of principal and agent assumes a contractual hierarchisation of the relationship: while the principal (in this case, the RWKS) assigns tasks, the agent is responsible for the execution of the tasks and is thus subordinate to the principal. Conflicts of interest develop almost inevitably, especially since there is information asymmetry between principal and agent and the principal cannot comprehensively control his agent. This analytically creates the possibility to look at business relations beyond ownership-based hierarchical differences, whereby the exclusive rights that characterise the syndicate structure of the RWKS can be considered. The essential question is then whether the agent, in this case the trading company, can gain advantages by exploiting its informational advantages (opportunistic behaviour) or is able to restructure the relationship for its own purposes. At the same time, by looking at the relationship as a principal-­agent construct, the effect of the contractual rights developed by the RWKS can be analytically grasped (North, 1988). While the Coal Syndicate was so influential until 1945 that even the smallest price changes were announced and discussed in the national newspapers, not to mention the veritable flood of literature that contemporary national economists and lawyers presented on the RWKS, at the end of the war in 1945, it became quiet around the RWKS practically overnight. This was certainly due to the occupation of the Ruhr area by British and American troops but also because the syndicate stopped its information and press work so as not to raise any additional dust. The Allies had already formulated the destruction of the RWKS as an excessive concentration of power as one of their central concerns during the war (Kurzlechner, 2008, p. 66). Nevertheless, it would be naïve to assume that this powerful institutional framework of the German coal industry disappeared in a while. In fact, the RWKS cartel system continued to operate for some time, not least because unbundling the syndicate’s holdings turned out to be a downright Sisyphean task. Especially for the companies that had been in the service of the syndicate until 1945, it remained

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difficult to free themselves from the syndicate’s grip even after 1945. Little is known about the RWKS liquidation process itself, a process that extended well into the 1960s. In the following, the relationship between the RWKS and its bunker coal company, the Deutsche-Kohlen-Depot (DKD) between 1905, the year in which the RWKS entered the circle of shareholders of the DKD, and the first phase of the post-war period will be presented. The RWKS is indeed well known as a powerful syndicate of the Ruhr coal industry, but the relationship between the syndicate and its sales organisation companies, which gave the syndicate its “market power” in the first place, has hardly been dealt with thus far. The influential syndicate trading companies in the individual sales areas are as unknown as the shipping and transport companies employed by the syndicate and its trading companies. The focus in the following sections is therefore particularly on the shift within the relationship between RWKS and DKD.

RWKS and DKD Between 1905 and 1913–1923 Deutsche-Kohlen-DepotGmbH (hereafter DKD) was founded in Hamburg in 1901 by the major German overseas shipping companies to enable the companies involved to reliably bunker German coal.1 The purpose of the company was “the establishment and operation of coal depots and shipping agencies, as well as the operation and performance of all commercial and other legal transactions serving this purpose”.2 Steam-­ powered seagoing ships required large quantities of coal for propulsion. Since coal was a bulky commodity compared to fuel oil, for example, which had only been used as a fuel since the end of World War I, the steamers were forced to stop and bunker coal again and again on their voyages. At first, DKD operated its business with British coal. In 1905, the 1  The shipping companies participating in the DKD included Norddeutscher Lloyd, Bremen; Hamburg-Amerika Linie, Hamburg; Deutsche Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft Hansa, Bremen; Hamburg-Südamerikanische Dampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft, Hamburg; Deutsche Levante-Linie, Hamburg; Deutsche Ost-Afrika-Linie, Hamburg; Woermann-­ Linie, Hamburg u.a., Aufstellung (1941), in: Montan.Dok beim Deutschen Bergbaumuseum Bochum, (hereafter BBA) BBA 33 [Rheinisch-Westfälisches Kohlensyndikat]/1611. 2  Cit., “die Errichtung und der Betrieb von Kohlen-Depots und Schiffsagenturen, sowie der Betrieb und die Vornahme aller diesem Zwecke dienlichen Handels- und sonstigen Rechtsgeschäfte”, § 1, Gesellschaftsvertrag, DKV, 1912/13, in: BBA 33/556.

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DKD’s shareholder base was decisively expanded with the entry of the RWKS.3 Immediately upon joining DKD, RWKS acquired half of the share capital, and it was also stipulated in the articles of company that at least half of the seats on DKD’s supervisory board were to be filled by representatives of RWKS.4 Additionally, in 1905, Frachtcontor GmbH Hamburg was founded as a company for the transport of DKD bunker coal.5 The bunker coal business itself, into which Syndicate thus entered, differed significantly from the core business of Syndicate with coking coal for iron and steel works or the business with domestic coal, especially in terms of quantity. Overall, the bunker coal business of the RWKS remained a niche business until 1945, despite the steady increase in turnover, but it nevertheless had enormous significance for the syndicate. The DKD’s establishment of more and more new depots not only enlarged the sales radius of the syndicate’s coal, but the DKD also provided detailed material on the behaviour of its worst competitor on the export markets—British coal. As the syndicate’s agent for bunker coal, it was the DKD that provided the RWKS with important reports on the situation on the world coal market.6 Until the outbreak of World War I, the RWKS was intent on tightly centralising the sales organisation, which now included the DKD, and obliging the various trading companies (agents) to play by the rules of the syndicate. In 1896, the RWKS had begun to bundle the Ruhr coal sales business for defined sales districts via the Glückauf syndicate trading company (Kassel). As with the DKD, this was achieved through the RWKS’s participation in the individual syndicate trading companies, but much more important in this phase was the binding of the wholesalers grouped in the syndicate trading companies through exclusive rights. The syndicate trading companies were given the “exclusive distribution rights” to trade Ruhr coal in their sales territories defined by the syndicate. Sales beyond the boundaries of the sales area were prohibited. In return, the RWKS did not conclude any other contracts for these sales areas. However, the 3  See one of the few contemporary works that mention the DKD at all (Muthesius, 1943, p. 224f.) 4  Transcripts of the General Assemblies of the DKD since 1905, in: BBA 33/556. 5  RWKS and DKD each held 37.5%, WTAG (Westfälische Transport AG) 25%; Material on participations of the RWKS, 1941/44, in: BBA 33/1050; see also Fig.  4.2 and Domizlaff (2005). 6  In addition, various reports of the DKD for the RWKS, in: BBA 33/1611.

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syndicate trading companies were obliged to refrain from trading in coal of other origins and to sell only Ruhr coal. This prevented the trading companies from buying coal from other producers and thus gaining a stronger negotiating position vis-à-vis the RWKS. The syndicate’s trading agents were forced to act entirely at the syndicate’s service to obtain exclusive distribution rights. By means of the rights granted and the enforcement of the narrow contractual rights, the syndicate succeeded in structuring the sales policy, the sales prices and the margins of the trading companies for these territories and directing them in the interests of the syndicate and its members (Roelevink, 2015, pp. 69–74). Similar to the syndicate trading companies, DKD was forced into a tight regulatory corset by the RWKS: the prices and the quantities to be purchased were set by the RWKS. If DKD also wanted to sell British coal, as was the case before 1905, permission had to be obtained from the RWKS. Any expansion of the business, the opening of new bunker coal stations, investments and the opening of new branches and subsidiaries had to be submitted to the RWKS for a decision. The exclusive distribution agreement was concluded anew every year. The exclusive rules that had been in force since 1912 bound the participating overseas shipping companies so firmly to the DKD bunkering stations that they had to explain themselves if they bunkered with other suppliers. For example, they had to put up with the fact that their share of the DKD’s profits was significantly lower if they bunkered coal from other sources and not Ruhr coal. Until the outbreak of the Great War, strong centralisation of the German bunker coal business was achieved in this way. The potential conflict that resulted from the heterogeneous shareholder structure—in addition to the participation of RWKS as a coal supplier, it was large overseas shipping companies that wanted to bunker as cheaply and safely as possible that were involved—did not even erupt due to the dominance exercised by the syndicate.7 The RWKS styled itself directly as the overpowering principal, and the DKD and the overseas shipping companies involved were forced into the role of dependent agents. While opening a whole series of coal depots, the DKD succeeded in extending its radius further, starting from the first Mediterranean depots. Despite the considerable increase in German bunker coal sales (Fig. 4.1)—when the RWKS joined DKD as a shareholder in 1905, DKD’s turnover was just 7

 For example, minutes of the DKD General Assembly, 14.12.1909, in: BBA 33/556.

4  THE RHENISH-WESTPHALIAN COAL SYNDICATE AND THE GERMAN…  0 1900

0.5

1

1.5

2

65

2.5

0.023373

1902 1904

0.210695

1906

Participation of RWKS in DKD (50%)

0.925532

1908 1910 1912

1.493918

1914 1916 1918 1920 1922

Admission of the coal mine trade

1924 1926

2.08839

1928 1930 1932 1934 1936

2.163084

1938 1940 1942 1944

0.092934

Fig. 4.1  DKD Turnover, 1900–1944 (in million tons). Sources: Author’s elaboration. Statistics of the Decade; Turnover DKD, 1900–1944, in: Annual Reports DKD, Hamburg, in: BBA 33/556, BBA 33/557 u. BBA 33/1022. The share of DKD business in total syndicate sales (including self-consumption) was only between 1 and 2%, apart from the war years. Even in the peak year of 1926, when DKD helped make up for the shortfall of British coal because of the British General Strike, its sales only reached a good 2 million tonnes, while the syndicate volume was approximately 112 million tonnes

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under 211,000 tonnes, whereas in 1913 it was almost 1.5 million tonnes— the bunker coal business remained rather modest compared to British bunker coal deliveries. In 1905, British bunker coal deliveries amounted to 17.7 million metric tonnes, and in 1913, British bunker coal sales had risen to 21.4 million metric tonnes (Muthesius 1943, Table 16, p. 216). The trade blockade during World War I as well as the complete change in the trade situation due to the seizure of power by the National Socialists and World War II were important events in the history of DKD (Fig. 4.1). However, the trade conflict within the syndicate, which became apparent shortly before the outbreak of World War I, was decisive for the company. When the syndicate was founded, mine ownership and independent coal trade initially played a subordinate role. The sales organisation had been handed over to the established wholesale trade, which was strictly bound by the syndicate rules. However, at the latest, with the founding of the Kohlenkontor in 1903, the syndicate trading company that held the transport rights for the Rhine, it became increasingly important, especially for the vertically integrated and large syndicate members, to be involved in the coal trade with their own means of transport (Roelevink, 2015, p. 87f and 144f). Even before the outbreak of World War I, the DKD’s exclusive responsibility for bunker coal came under increasing criticism. The Thyssen group, one of the first syndicate members to call for the liberalisation of the coal trade in the syndicate, had already put out feelers in 1913, showing its intention to participate in the bunker coal business in Algiers and Port Said. For this purpose, Thyssen sent Carl Rabes to Algiers, who approached the management of the DKD branch there and expressed initial claims. Oscar Godeffroy, founder of the DKD and scion of an influential, yet impoverished Hamburg merchant dynasty, turned indignantly to the syndicate management: they saw no possibility of giving Thyssen a share in the bunker coal business: “We will not voluntarily cede part of our bunker business […].” Rabes, however, argued that the group intended to import ore and export coal in return8: “We also have to secure us a place in the sun.” The Thyssen group, Rabes continued, wanted to get into the

8  DKD to RWKS, 3.04.1913, concerning Gewerkschaft Deutscher Kaiser/Kohle Depot in Algiers and Port Said, in: BBA 33/1551.

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bunker coal business, but not to harm DKD, but “to make money”.9 This kind of “independent mines trade” became the virulent problem since World War I, when the next extension of the syndicate contract was pending, which in the medium term called into question the entire and established sales organisation of the syndicate and permanently put a heavy strain on the syndicated order of the RWKS (Roelevink, 2015, p. 144ff and 282 ff).

The End of Exclusivity: The DKD from 1923 to 1945 The Great War overshadowed the syndicate’s internal, fundamental discussion of the independent mine trade question.10 Even immediately after the end of the war, the situation of the syndicate members was initially uncertain, so it seemed as if the syndicate-internal trade conflict was off the table. As early as 1920, however, the first members again set out to challenge the joint sales organisation of the RWKS. Again, it was mainly the Thyssen group that advocated a liberalisation of the sales organisation, above all to use its own trading capacities and the direct location of its own mines on the Rhine. Thyssen did not confine itself to demanding a share in the large sales areas of the syndicate trading companies. Thyssen also wanted to see the bunker coal market freed from the “syndicate fetters”.11 With the admission of the so-called independent mines trade in 1923–1924, the sales rights granted by the RWKS to the trading agents lost their market-regulating function. All at once, it became possible for the syndicate members to appoint their own trading companies at the syndicate, which took over the distribution and sales of their own coal (Roelevink, 2015, pp. 145–150). This did not only affect syndicate trading companies with their large, interconnected sales territories; DKD was also permanently affected by this change in the contractual situation (Table 4.1). Whereas DKD had previously had sole rights to a whole 9  Cit., “Wir müssen uns auch einen Platz a der Sonne sichern”. Ibid. Enclosure to the letter DKD to RWKS, 3.04.1913: N.N. (DKD, Branch Office Algier) to DKD, 26.03.1913 concerning Gew. Deutscher Kaiser (confidential), in: BBA 33/1551. 10  On the effects of the First World War on the DKD’s depots: List: Information on DKD branches in “enemy countries”, Sept. 1918, in: BBA 33/556. 11  Compañía Thyssen Limitada, Buenos Aires to NV Vulcaan, 16.07.1920, in: Thyssen-­ Krupp-­ Konzernarchiv, Duisburg [TKA], A [August Thyssen-Hütte/Thyssen Krupp AG]/650/3.

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Table 4.1  Annual purchases of bunker coal from Algeria depots (Oran, Algiers, Bone), 1928–1930 (in tonnes)

Total DKD Raab Karcher Haniel SHV Vulcaan Essener Steinkohle

1928

1929

1930

3,35,297 59,018 64,926 6020 1,11,128 93,712 493

3,09,663 58,337 1,23,037 – 1,05,142 23,147 –

3,05,819 50,172 1,27,966 43,150 67,162 14,818 2551

Sources: Listing (Abt. Va, 28.01.1931), in: BBA 33/1611. Raab Karcher = Raab Karcher & Cie GmbH (Trading Company of the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-AG); Haniel = Haniel & Cie GmbH (Trading Company of the Gutehoffnungshütte Aktienverein für Bergbau- und Hüttenbetrieb, and Bergwerksgesellschaften Jacobi, Neumühl and Rheinpreußen); SHV = NV Steenkolen-Handelsvereeniging (Syndicate Trading Company of the RWKS for the Dutch market (1896–1924), since 1924: Trading Company for a number of Syndicate Mines for the Dutch market, since 1932: Syndicate Trading Company of the RWKS for the Dutch market; Vulcaan = NV Handels- en Transportmaatschappij Vulcaan (Trading Company of the Thyssen-Group, since 1926 of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG/Heinrich Thyssen-­ Bornemisza-­Group); Essener Steinkohle = Collective term for various trading companies of the Ess Linden Kohlenhandelsgesellschaft mbH u. Linden-Rhederei GmbH)

series of bunker coal markets, the company was now only one supplier of syndicated coal among several. In addition, it now only had equal status among the mine trading companies authorised by the syndicate, but DKD was no longer given preferential treatment. The “independent mine trade”, the trading companies Raab Karcher, Haniel, Vulcaan (Thyssen Group) and Essener Steinkohle as well as SHV, now intervened massively in the bunker coal markets formerly exclusively reserved for DKD (Table 4.1). DKD managing director Oscar Godeffroy insisted several times and pressed the syndicate management for the restoration of the “old organisation”, which would have meant the withdrawal of the coal mine trading right and thus the exclusive responsibility of DKD for the bunker coal markets. However, the DKD was not able to get its way.12 In the course of the next few years, a reconciliation of interests was achieved at least for some markets, which formed the basis for the cooperation between DKD and the mines trade, but DKD remained far from being able to meet the heterogeneous mines trade even on an equal 12  Correspondence Godeffroy and Russell, January 1925, December 1928, April 1938, in: BBA 33/1611.

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footing. Instead, it became increasingly clear that syndicate management was trying to give in to the pressure within the syndicate by sacrificing some markets to the independent mine trade. These included the DKD’s formerly exclusive bunker coal markets. As a result, the DKD’s position could in any case no longer be considered “exclusive”. DKD made some attempts to use the existing independent mines trading rights for itself and to expand beyond the bunker coal business, obtaining supply contracts for the overseas markets (domestic markets) as well. However, these requests were rejected and usually not even discussed in the responsible syndicate committee.13 This clearly showed the company its position in the sales organisation of the RWKS. Overall, the admission of independent mines trading on the bunker coal markets also had consequences for the per se existing asymmetry of information between the syndicate and DKD. Since the syndicate members were behind the coal mine trading, who could now obtain their own first-hand knowledge of the bunker coal markets and above all the British competition, the coal mine trading movement in the syndicate strengthened significantly. At the same time, and this made the DKD increasingly dispensable for the RWKS, the information about the world market and competitive situation provided by the DKD was now increasingly less important. It was already given to the relevant committees by the syndicate members themselves, or else they procured advantages for themselves based on this information without informing the syndicate and the remaining members.14 Until 1945, DKD remained bound by the contract clauses to the specifications of the syndicate. The introduction of the mines trading law did nothing to change this but rather deprived the company of its exclusive position on the bunker coal markets. However, this did not give DKD any great freedom. DKD’s position on the bunker coal markets was severely restricted as a result. The DKD was unable to counteract this because the RWKS also held 50% of the DKD’s shares (Fig. 4.2). DKD remained a dependent agent of RWKS and had no possibilities to expand or otherwise diversify its own business. Only the “cooperation” with the mine trading companies was successful, but this was at the expense of DKD.

 For instance (Russell) and Godeffroy, Lange, 7.09.1942, in: BBA 33/1611.  Correspondence DKD and RWKS, 1924, in: BBA 33/1611.

13 14

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Chartering: Frachtcontor Junge & Co, Hamburg (RWKS: 37,5 %, DKD 37,5 %, WTAG 25%) Frachtcontor Junge & Co, Emden

RWKS

Frachtcontor Gesellschaft mbH, Safeguarding the interests in: Nederlandsche Agentuur- en Bevrachtings-Onderneming NV, Rotterdam; Frachtcontor (London) Limited, London; Frachtcontor (Cardiff) Limited, Cardiff

(50 %)

Spain, Spanish Atlantic Islands span.-atlant. Inselnde Tenerife Depósito de Carbones S.A, Depots: Madrid, Pasajes u. San Sebastian, Bilbao, Malaga, Cartagena, Barcelona, Tenerife, Las Palmas (0 %, or 50 % each of the island stations Las Palmas) Depósito Español de Carbones S.A Depot: Vigo (40 %)

Portugal and Portuguese Atlantic. Islands Sociedade Insulana de Transportes Maritimos Lda. Depots: Lisbon, Madeira [100 %]

South America Ribereña de Plata, Compañía Sudamericana de Comercio S.A Depots: Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Rosario, Santa Fe, Mar del Plata (100 %)

North America Domestic Fuel Corporation Depots: New York (35 %, ((Ribereña de Plata: 15 %, Vulcaan: 50 %))

Scandinavia Sjuröya Kull & Koks A/S Depot: Oslo (80 %)

Mediterranean Sea

DKD

Malta Bunkering Depot Limited Depot: Malta (50 %) Société Continentale de Combustibles S.A Depots: Algier, Oran (35 1/3 %)

Société Bôneise de Charbonnages S.A Depot: Bône (35 % (Société Continentale de Combustibles S.A: 35 %))

Société Marseillaise d'Importation de Combustibles S.A Depot: Marseille [n.a.] Luigi-Profumo S.A Depots: Genoa, Milan (100 %) La Carbonifera S.A Depot: Trieste (51 %) Germaniki Anthrakapothiki AE Emborias Karsimon Ylon Depot: Piraeus (100 %) Deutsches Kohlendepot SAE Depots: Port Said, Alexandria (50 %, 50 % (Ribereña del Plata))

Fig. 4.2  Deposits and holdings from the DKD, 1943. Source: Author’s elaboration. DKD to members of the Supervisory Board, 23.01.1943, concerning DKD structure, in: BBA 33/1022

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DKD and RWKS i.L. from 1945 Until 1947 The end of the war marked the end of the cartels in Germany. By order of the military government, the Headquarters North German Coal Control, the RWKS was dissolved on 5 September 1945 and the syndicate was soon “in liquidation” and was only run as “RWKS i.L.”. The British dismissed the leadership of the powerful Coal Syndicate and took the syndicate board into custody. Several new gentlemen were tasked with initiating the mammoth task at hand, the unbundling of the syndicate structure (Kroker, 2001, p. 213). The end of the war thus meant that the syndicated order, which had organised, centred and coordinated the Ruhr coal industry, its pricing and its sales organisation for over half a century, was to be abandoned. For the syndicate members, the end of the long-established syndicate order was a drastic experience. In addition, for contractually bound companies, such as DKD, in which RWKS had a 50% share, it remained completely unclear how business was to continue. The British occupation transferred the tasks of the syndicate to the “Kohlen-Verteilungsstelle Ruhr” with the aim of gaining comprehensive control of the Ruhr coal industry and at the same time breaking up the syndicate structure (Farrenkopf, 2013, p. 198). This was followed at short intervals by the formation of the Ruhrkohlen-­ Centrale (RC) and the North German Coal Control (NGCC). In November 1947, the Deutsche Kohlenbergbau-Leitung (DKBL) was founded, and it was not until July 1952, when the decision had been made to liquidate the DKBL, that the Gemeinschaftsorganisation des Ruhrkohlenverkaufs (Georg) was founded, which was further differentiated in 1953 by the foundation of six sales companies (Kroker, 2001, p.  213). The extent to which the tried-and-tested structures have been able to assert themselves and prevail here has not yet been further researched. During World War II, the situation for DKD had already become much worse. The bunker coal business continued to collapse as the war progressed (Fig.  4.1). To prevent a further loss of importance, DKD had attempted to expand its traditional Mediterranean sales rights even during the war. In 1942, Godeffroy asked the RWKS for the right to actively develop a bunker coal business in France. DKD argued that the company had operated a bunker coal terminal in Marseilles before World War I.  However, this was the argument put forwards by the syndicate, and DKD had not succeeded in re-establishing itself here after the end of the

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war. The French coal market had also been redivided by the “independent mines trade” after World War I, and the latter objected vociferously to the awarding of the “export right” to DKD because DKD’s participation would have been to the detriment of the mines trade. The syndicate management refused the DKD, whose influence in the internal syndicate context was only marginal.15 DKD was now also increasingly restricted in other bunker coal markets, not only because of the war and the worsening of the trade and transport situation but above all because of the continuing pressure from the independent mines trade. For Italy, for example, an agreement was concluded in February 1943 between DKD and the mines trading companies of the Stinnes mines and the Hibernia mining company, in which the bunker coal business of Genoa, Savona, Trieste, Venice, Civitavecchia (Rome), Naples and Messina were divided up. DKD was not simply restricted in its supply rights as it had been during the 1920s but was de facto deprived of its bunker coal rights during the war by giving the coal mine trade the right to participate in the business.16 The tie to the RWKS was increasingly less worthwhile for DKD, regardless of the war, due to the increasing curtailment of the business area. However, the company had no possibility of expanding its own position in the syndicate’s sales organisation. The coal mine trading right therefore meant for DKD in principle and for the first time the incentive to form its own, syndicate-independent, opportunistic behaviour. After the end of the war, but even before the order to liquidate the syndicate, DKD management very soon showed an interest in securing the future of the company. There was no doubt that the RWKS could not continue to exist in its old form. It was thus foreseeable for the bunker coal company that the effective syndicate rights would lose their market-­ regulating function. In addition, DKD’s foreign holdings had been transferred to the Allied Control Council. This applied to DKD’s Spanish and Portuguese holdings, and the Argentinian depots had also been confiscated.17 At the same time, however, and this was the real problem of the DKD, the RWKS’s shareholding of 50% in the DKD was so high that the 15  Memo, discussion RWKS (Russell) with Godeffroy and Lange (DKD), 7.09.1942, in: BBA 33/1611. 16  Agreement (copy), DKD, Fa. Hugo Stinnes and Fa. M. Stromeyer, 12.02.1943, in: BBA 33/1611. 17  Annual Report DKD 1945, in: BBA 95/2568.

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company continued to have a close relationship with the RWKS. Therefore, it was to be feared that the DKD—like the syndicate—was threatened with being broken up. As early as July 1945, Director Albert Lange contacted the syndicate and informed it that the DKD had survived the “fighting period” without any major damage, mainly due to the “foresight” of the Hamburg Gauleiter, who had handed over the Hanseatic city without a fight. Now everything must be done to find “work”, “because we want to do everything we can to keep the DKD alive until shipping and perhaps also coal exports experience such a revival that we can gradually resume our work”.18 Clearly, Lange shrewdly stated, they wanted to stay in the core business, the bunker coal business, but for the time being it would make sense to be put on an equal footing with the coal mine and syndicate trade. In this way, DKD could at least be active in Hamburg. The DKD thus attempted to achieve a higher ranking in the sales organisation based on the old syndicate rights to be freed from the syndicate’s restriction to individual bunker coal markets. Under the pressure of the events, the syndicate initially did not react at all to the request from Hamburg. Lange then wrote another letter only a short time later. This time, he asked more specifically for the syndicate’s permission to intervene in the Hamburg coal trade and held out the prospect of the DKD being able to participate in coal imports from England and the United States, above all to do something about the coal shortage.19 Once again, the RWKS took its time. In August 1945, it then announced that DKD’s participation in the Hamburg bunker coal business was out of the question. First, because of the “syndicate ties”, the Hamburg coal business had been placed by the syndicate entirely in the hands of the syndicate trading company “Westfälisches Kohlenkontor Naht, Emschermann & Co” (WKK). Additionally, the DKD had never been responsible for the “domestic business”, and the RWKS could therefore not grant the DKD a new trading right. Not a word, however, was said about the fact that the contractual rights of the RWKS could no longer be valid at all in the future according to the plans of the Allies. Instead, syndicate management held contractual and exclusive rights for the time being. This was to ensure that the significantly shrunken bunker coal company could continue to be directed and controlled by the syndicate.  DKD (Lange) to Rüdiger Schmidt (RWKS), 9.07.1945, in: BBA 33/1022.  Lange (DKD) to Schmidt (RWKS), 24.07.1945, in: BBA 33/1022.

18 19

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In essence, syndicate management was probably concerned with safeguarding coal-mining trade interests, which had long been granted generous rights for Hamburg as well: Above all, however, the trade in Hamburg, which is close to us and a friend of ours, the Westphalian Coal Office and the mines trading companies cooperating with it in Hamburg, has been so damaged and constricted in its sphere of activity by the consequences of the lost war that it cannot reasonably be expected to voluntarily relinquish any further part of its remaining activity in favour of another company which has hitherto had no established position at Hamburger Platz.20

The syndicate only held out the prospect of “staying in contact” with DKD management to support the (re)development of international business.21 In view of the completely unresolved situation—after all, the Americans in particular had already defined the decartelisation of the German economy and especially of heavy industry as an essential goal during the war—it is, however, remarkable that the RWKS continued to adhere to the syndicate order and in no way signalled a willingness to accommodate the bunker coal company. A softening of the syndicate rights could not be achieved by the RWKS in any case.22 The DKD continued to allow itself to be gagged by the syndicate; after all, the insecurity was considerable here too. It was not until September 1945 that a new phase finally dawned with the order to dissolve the RWKS. Rüdiger Schmidt, who until then had handled the relationship between DKD and RWKS, had been removed from the RWKS management, and Albert Janus, Herbert Kauert and Ernst Russell, who until then had represented the syndicate in the shareholders’ meeting of DKD, were no longer part of the RWKS. Werner D. Ahlers, General Director of Haniel’schen Kohlenhandel, who had been entrusted by the British occupation with the issues of rebuilding coal sales, and Walter Krähe were now responsible (Kroker, 2001, p.  214). Since December 1945, the DKD had been in contact with the RWKS i.L. Now that the RWKS was in liquidation, the DKD brought the pending question of RWKS participation to the table with vigour.23 The RWKS  Schmidt (RWKS) to DKD, 9.08.1945, in BBA 33/1022.  Schmidt (RWKS) to DKD, 9.08.1945, in BBA 33/1022. 22  Also: Holle to Russell, 28.07.1945, in: BBA 33/557. 23  DKD to Walter Krähe (RWKS i.L.), 6.12.1945, in: BBA 95/2568. 20 21

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i.L. denied that no liquidator had yet been appointed and that it was therefore not yet possible to foresee what would happen to the RWKS’s share in the DKD.24 DKD, however, did not want to be stalled any longer. In December 1945, the RWKS i.L. heard that the company had started buying tugboats to participate in the Hamburg coal business against the syndicate’s instructions. The RWKS i.L. reprimanded: “Since your company, in which we have a 50% share, is the subject of particular attention on the part of the military authorities and since your assets are also blocked in accordance with Law No. 52—as is well known, the assets of those companies are automatically blocked in which companies or persons are involved whose assets are themselves blocked, and we are one of these—we do not consider it appropriate for you to make any preparations in this direction.”25 However, DKD no longer adhered to the syndicate guidelines. This prompted the RWKS i.L. to send a letter, now marked “confidential”, to the DKD management stating that the start-up of the coal business in Hamburg had to be omitted for “tactical reasons”. “In the past you have not maintained such an operation in Hamburg. Although you have now been approved by the competent German authorities to take up such an operation, we do not consider it […] right for tactical reasons that you should at present appear as a competitor to other companies in this business, which is new to you. We would therefore like to ask you again to refrain from your actions.”26 In the meantime, however, the Hamburg bunker coal company vehemently refused to let the once overpowering RWKS continue to dictate to it. In contrast, the opposition behaviour was now visibly intensified. Godeffroy resigned from management, so it should also become clear to the military authorities that DKD was distancing itself from the syndicate.27 The fact that RWKS i.L. now needed the approval of the NGCC for every business step and thus lost control over the previously close-meshed network of controls and sanctions demoted the syndicate as headmaster to the role of a petitioner. Thus, it was W.H. Hembry of the NGCC who granted discharge to the board of the DKD for the financial year 1945; the RWKS i.L. itself was no longer entitled to do so. Ahlers informed Albert  RWKS i.L. to DKD, 10.12.1945, in: BBA 95/2568.  RWKS i.L. to DKD, 21.12.1945, in: BBA 95/2568. 26  Cit., RWKS i.L. to DKD, confidential, 7.01.1926, in: BBA 95/2568. 27  DKD to W. Ahlers, 8.01.1946; Godeffroy to Ahlers, 8.01.1946, in: BBA 95/2568. 24 25

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Lange, Godeffroy’s successor, of this and combined it with the request “that you inform the RWKS i.L. of the DKD’s intentions in good time”, so that the RWKS i.L. could comment on them. In fact, the RWKS i.L.’s power of disposal over the DKD just slipped out of its hands because no additional elections were allowed to be held for the dismissed former RWKS representatives in the DKD’s general assembly. The RWKS i.L. therefore no longer had any voting weight in the DKD general meeting.28 At first, however, the NGCC was visibly overwhelmed by the complexity of the syndicated Ruhr coal structures. Hembry apparently made attempts to speed up the liquidation process but was repeatedly pushed to his limits by the syndicate’s widely ramified and deep organisational structures. When Hembry indicated in September 1946 that he wanted to initiate the liquidation of DKD, the RWKS i.L. management pointed to the other shareholders of the company. The overseas shipping companies that held the remaining 50% in DKD would at least have to be asked. After all, it was conceivable that the shipping companies would be interested in acquiring RWKS’s share. Confronted with this proposal, Hembry then “backed out”.29 It is likely that Ahlers sent this information to DKD management as a kind of expression of trust and loyalty and to signal that although the syndicate’s hands were tied, the influence of the RWKS i.L. management was still enormous. As outlined, the RWKS i.L. no longer had the right to exercise voting rights in the general assemblies of the DKD. The RWKS i.L. leadership could therefore only send one observer to the scheduled DKD general assembly in 1946. The RWKS sent an employee, Joachim Gerloff, who summarised the meeting for the RWKS i.L. leadership. Despite the advice of the old syndicate, the DKD had bought harbour tugs and barges with which, as Lange put it at the general meeting, they wanted to “participate in some form in the business of the port of Hamburg”.30 Gerloff also noted that he himself had pointed out to Lange that DKD had to inform RWKS—“a shareholder who owned 50% of the capital”—about investments and about market entry. In fact, this clearly showed how much the RWKS had lost its influence. Before the end of the war, it would have been  Ahlers (RWKS i.L.) to Lange (DKD), 17.01.1946, in: BBA 95/2568.  Ahlers (RWKS i.L.) to Lange (DKD), 19.09.1946, in: BBA 95/2568. 30   Memo, Joachim Gerloff (RWKS i.L.) concerning the DKD General Assembly, 25.09.1946, in: BBA 95/2568. 28 29

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simply unthinkable for DKD to make investment decisions without syndicate approval or to ignore the restrictions on competition based on exclusive and sole distribution rights. In the meantime, however, the RWKS i.L. had no choice but to issue pleas and send “observers” to advise DKD management on how to proceed. At the end of 1946, the changes that culminated in the founding of the Bizone on 1 January 1947 became apparent. The DKD management now expected the liquidation efforts to accelerate and therefore it would become clear very soon how the DKD would be detached from the RWKS i.L. Lange stated that until now, it had always been assumed that the old RWKS holdings would have to be disposed of in some form, but now it was also possible to transfer the old holdings to the NGCC. DKD wanted to stay close to the “Ruhr coal sale” because “Our competitors, i.e., the companies Raab Karcher, Haniel, Stinnes, etc., had their support in the groups owning the mines, whereas we had our support in the RWKS. If this were to disappear, we would find ourselves in a much more difficult situation, purely in terms of purchasing, etc., plus the difficulty of rebuilding our foreign holdings. This does not play nearly the same role with the other companies as it does with us.”31 It would therefore be ideal if the NGCC took over the shareholding; this would create a new “pillar” for the DKD.  This would eliminate the coal mine trading problem. Krähe, however, saw things quite differently. He assumed that a restoration of relations on a new institutional basis had no future; it would be better to wait for Germany to get involved in “export” again.32 In the summer of 1947, the carousel of responsibilities continued to rotate. Lange therefore asked Dietrich Droste (RWKS i.L./North German Coal Distribution Office) whether there were any possibilities for DKD to resume the coal export business in view of the new trade agreement with Italy. Droste refused, saying that there was no real agreement between the British and the Americans regarding the coal industry. Even after the establishment of the “Deutsche Kohlenbergbau-Leitung”, nothing changed for the time being. The following continued to apply: “You know that from that side the opinion is now held that exports should no longer be exclusively in the hands of the trade associated with the mine, which

 Cit., Lange to W. Krähe, 18.12.1946, in: BBA 95/2568.  Krähe to Lange, 23.12.1946, in: BBA 95/2568.

31 32

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includes you as DKD. For this reason, I think it is right not to touch this subject for the time being.”33 The relationship between RWKS i.L. and the DKD was far from over. In September 1947, it was decided to postpone decisions on ownership issues for five years. In fact, unbundling, redistribution of ownership rights and the abolition of contractual rights were to last until the 1960s (Kroker, 1999, pp. 291–316). Until the founding of the six sales companies (Geitling, Mausegatt, President, Angelika, Finefrau and Sonnenschein) on 1st April 1953, the contractual rights of the old syndicate remained intact at any rate. Although the RWKS i.L. had long since lost its former influence, the Gemeinschaftsorganisation Ruhrkohlenverkauf (Georg) nevertheless retained its old structure. This structure was still powerful enough until 1953 to at least prevent “opportunistic behaviour” and thus the further development of DKD.

Conclusion DKD was one of the more subordinate trading companies in the sales organisation of the RWKS. The RWKS had installed itself as the directive-­ giving principal and bound its agent DKD closely to itself for the bunker coal business through a mix of syndicated contractual rights and ownership rights. The syndicate’s bunker coal business not only ranked as a niche business in terms of quantity but also structurally DKD was of secondary importance, whereas the trading ambitions of the syndicate members attracted far more attention. This was clearly demonstrated by the consequences of the trade conflict that had become virulent in the syndicate since World War I. The importance attached to the bunker coal business here was low. The syndicate therefore sacrificed the previously laboriously centralised bunker coal business to the coal mine trade to the detriment of the DKD. By the end of the 1920s, the turnover of the “independent mines trade” was much higher than the DKD’s bunker coal turnover. Nevertheless, DKD remained bound by the rules of the RWKS. The RWKS was the powerful principal in the relationship, exercising power not only through its 50% share in the company’s capital but also by setting the tone in the relationship through contractual regulations.

 Ahlers to Lange, 27.11.1947, in: BBA 95/2568.

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Until 1945, it was impossible for DKD to assert itself against the syndicate because of the syndicate’s property rights and the distortions on the international markets caused by the World Wars. However, the “syndicate ties” to which the company was bound and which continued to be important for the companies even in the “land of cartels” after 1945 had a clear impact. Only after the liquidation of the syndicate was decided did the Hamburg company indicate its own interests and become increasingly impatient. Sooner rather than later, the company wanted to be freed from the syndicate rules to participate in the Hamburg port business, among other things. DKD was now doomed by the fact that the liberalisation of the sales organisation of the RWKS after World War I had mainly favoured the coal mine trade. The DKD was hindered by the RWKS i.L.’s insistence on expanding its own business but was de facto eliminated by the established mine trading companies. In the 1950s and 1960s, substantial components from the DKD shareholding and especially also from the chartering companies were transferred to Montana Verwaltungs-GmbH, which was headed by Ludwig Holle, the liquidator of the RWKS. This and the collapse of the bunker coal business in favour of oil that occurred after World War II sealed the fate of DKD, Germany’s largest bunker coal company.

References Domizlaff, S. (2005). Frachtcontor Junge & Co. Shipbokers & Chatering Agents, 1905-2005. Selbstverlag. Farrenkopf, M. (2013). Wiederaufstieg und Niedergang des Bergbaus in der Bundesrepublik. In D. Ziegler (Ed.), Rohstoffgewinnung im Strukturwandel. Der deutsche Bergbau im 20. Jahrhundert (pp. 183–302). Aschendorff. Fremdling, R. (2003). European foreign trade policies, freight rates and the world Markets of Grain and Coal during the 19th century. Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte/Economic History Yearbook, 2, 84–98. Harley, K. C. (1989). Coal exports and British shipping, 1850-1913. Explorations in Economic History, 3, 311–338. Kroker, E. (2001). Das Bergbau-Archiv und seine Bestände. Aschendorff. Kroker, E. (1999). Heinrich Kost. Rationalisierung und Sozialbeziehungen im Bergbau. In P. Erker & T. Pierenkemper (Eds.), Deutsche Unternehmer zwischen Kriegswirtschaft und Wiederaufbau (pp. 291–316). De Gruyter Oldenbourg. Kurzlechner, W. (2008). Fusionen, Kartelle, Skandale: Das Bundeskartellamt als Wettbewerbshüter und Verbraucheranwalt. Redline Wirtschaft.

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Muthesius, V. (1943). RuhrKohle 1893–1943. Aus der Geschichte des Rheinisch-­ Westfälischen Kohlensyndikats. Essener Verlagsanstalt. North, D.  C. (1988). Theorie des institutionellen Wandels. Eine neue Sicht der Wirtschaftsgeschichte. J.C.B. Mohr. Roelevink, E.-M. (2015). Organisierte Intransparenz. Das Kohlensyndikat und der Niederländische Markt, 1915–1932. C.H. Beck-Verlag.

Archival References Bergbauarchiv im Montanhistorischen Dokumentationszentrum/Bergbau-Archiv beim Deutschen Bergbau-Musuem Bochum (BBA), Collection 33: Rheinisch-­ Westfälisches Kohlensyndikat. ThyssenKrupp-Konzernarchiv, Duisburg (TKA), Collection A: August Thyssen-­ Hütten/Thyssen Krupp AG.

CHAPTER 5

Common Destines: French Trading Ports and Oil in the Twentieth Century, 1914–1965 Bruno Marnot

Introduction France did not discover oil in the twentieth century. In 1914, French seaports imported it, ever since the discovery of the first oil fields in the United States in the late 1860s. The first customs legislation was also established before World War I to set oil importation regulations. Sometime after the first arrivals of petroleum, the law of 1873—and moreover the law of July 1893—encouraged the import of crude oil. This legislation tended to promote a new refining sector so that this primary resource became useable. However, these measures were nipped in the bud with the law of 1903, which increased the tariff on the import of crude oil. The effect of this turnaround was to promote from then on the import of refined oil, which was controlled by 10 companies, the so-called

B. Marnot (*) University of La Rochelle, La Rochelle, France e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Castillo Hidalgo, C. Honorato (eds.), Fuelling the World Economy, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32565-6_5

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Cartel of Ten (Beltran, 2018). If oil was a marginal resource in the French energy equation before 1914, it became increasingly important during the twentieth century: if it accounted for only 11% of the energy balance relative to 80% for coal in 1938, its share increased to 30% against 54% for coal in 1960. It attained an historical peak in 1973 of almost 70%, whereas coal only accounted for 16 of the energy imports. In summary, the respective shares of oil and coal inverted within 35 years (Eck, 2009). In other words, oil appeared as the “new coal” of the twentieth century and became a strategic resource both in economic and military terms. In this context, World War I showed the new and major role of oil. Successive French governments became aware of this new stake and shaped a new rules framework in the following decade. In this respect, French trading ports were required to play a leading role in the establishment of a genuine national oil policy. The first part of the chapter aims to recall the lessons that the Great War taught to the public authorities. The second part examines the different options for the settlement of oil terminals, and the third deals with the role of oil in the economics of the main French seaports.

Lessons from World War I Oil played a marginal role in French growth before 1914. With 805,769 tons in 1913, the importation of petroleum did not account for much compared to that of coal (25,323,000 tons), which, even so, accounted for only 38% of national coal consumption (Chancerel, 2015–2016; Le Dez, 2012). Oil was only used for domestic lighting. This “lamp oil” nevertheless showed its superiority in comparison with other lighting sources, such as whale oil, which is more expensive and less luminous. That is why its imports have multiplied by almost 22 since 1870. As has already been said, the law of 1903 encouraged the arrival of refined oil in French ports. If the United States was still the principal supplier for the French economy in 1914—two-thirds of crude and refined oil—they had lost their monopoly. Russia and Romania appeared as new provider countries. One of the effects of the law of 1903 was to reinforce the role of some ports in the import and transformation of oil, such as Rouen, Le Havre, Marseilles, Dunkirk, and Bordeaux. The 15 refineries, some of which were recent, as in Port-Saint-Louis-du-Rhône and Sete-Frontignan, were in fact simple distilleries for refining the “French crude”, a mix of lamp oil and crude oil

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that was imported to bypass customs legislation (Beltran, 2018; Le Dez, 2012). The military uses of oil were as limited as the civilian uses. Unlike other large war fleets, the French naval fleet did not initiate a conversion to fuel oil because the military and public authorities feared that France would become “dependant on foreign countries for oil”. Only a few small coastal ships were converted in 1914. By 1910, the government nevertheless decided to build some oil depots in the main war ports and to buy a supply tanker, the Rhône (De Préneuf & Vaisset, 2018; Le Dez, 2012). According to the Ministère de la Marine, oil was not considered a strategic resource, even considering the upcoming conflict. The strategic stocks were increased to only 400,000 tons, which corresponded to a mere four months of consumption. World War I revealed in fact the increasing role of oil over the initial months, either to supply new weapons, such as airplanes and tanks, or mostly to ensure logistics operations near the front. In 1918, for example, Allies considered the lorry as the special tool for conveying materials and munitions between the railway stations and the front line. They had approximately 200,000 motor vehicles versus only 40,000 on the German side (Nayberg, 2015–2016). The use of oil as a driving force explains the change in imported oil products. In 1918, the use of refined oil for lighting decreased by 25%, whereas fuel consumption increased by 250%, from 188,210 tons at the beginning of the war to 473,000 tons at the end. Nevertheless, in 1918, the monthly fuel consumption was 26,300 tons compared to 7600 tons in 1915. Oil has also become a component of some explosives, such as melinite and tolite. As a result, the imports of oil, which measured 800,000 tons on the eve of the conflict, reached 1.2 million tons in 1918 (Beltran, 2018; Nayberg, 2015–2016). The more France was dependent on oil, the more dependent on foreign supplies as well. France quickly lost its European providers, such as Russia and Romania, because of the closing of the Dardanelles by the Ottoman Empire, allied with the Central Empires. The United States found de facto their former monopoly again. However, even worse for France, over 90% of the oil supplies were provided by the Standard Oil Company—the remining imports coming from Borneo for the making of nitrate explosives. Furthermore, this dependence on a sole supplier was reinforced by a logistic gamble, given that the crossing of the Atlantic was particularly dangerous with the surge in German submarine warfare. The situation became especially critical at the time of all-out war in 1917, which

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provoked the loss of many ships (see Chap. 3). Between February and June, for instance, U-Boats destroyed six tank steamers that belonged to Standard Oil and two that were the property of the French Société Desmarais. As a result, 80% of the tonnage was out of service, which meant a collapse of imports (Beltran, 2018). This supply crisis, which culminated at the end of 1917, undoubtedly meant a first reaction in what retrospectively appears as a draft of a French oil policy. The senator of Guadeloupe, Henry Bérenger, was the first politician to express it as such when he introduced a bill on June 14, 1917. As it is well summarized by Roberto Nayberg, “it is not a circumstantial text but a founding text which displays an industrial view of the problem” (Nayberg, 2015–2016). The war proved that oil was destined to become a necessary energy resource that had to take its place in France’s global energy policy. Bérenger’s message was heard. On July 13, 1917, a General Committee for Oil was founded, directed by Bérenger himself, to coordinate state policy with private actors of the oil sector. The anxious situation at the end of 1917 led to state intervention. The Oil Consortium was created on March 29, 1918. The French State was now the only purchaser and provider for the 10 French refining companies, which bought and resold the goods at a price set by the government. In August 1918, Bérenger took the lead of the General Commissariat for Fuels, which was mandated to centralize all the supplying offices, until then dispersed among many ministries. The Commissariat exclusively ruled over oil activity in metropolitan France and its colonies (Murat, 1969). The outline of French oil policy was gradually sketched during the following decade of the war. Henry Bérenger remained the right man for the job, given that his mandate at the head of the General Commissariat was extended to January 21, 1919. Then, he was invested with a permanent delegation for dealing with every oil issue that also involved important diplomatic nuances (Nayberg, 2015–2016; Nouschi, 2002). At the heart of such diplomacy was the question of Iraqi fields. Henry Bérenger was the architect of the agreement with the British government, which allowed France to occupy a place in the Middle East (Nayberg, 2006). The treaties of peace signed in 1919 favoured the French State over Germany in the rights of Turkish Petroleum, an oil consortium run by British interests. The Pacte of San Remo (1920) gave 25% of crude oil produced by Iraqi fields to France. The French State retroceded its rights in the form of concessions to the newly created Compagnie française des Pétroles (hereafter CFP). French involvement in Iraqi oil exploitation

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became even more successful with the detection of important fields in Kirkuk in October 1927. From that time, the French government accelerated the process of legislation because it was necessary to secure French supplies of oil. The law of January 10, 1925, generated two major measures. The first was the founding of the Office National des Combustibles Liquides (ONCL), which was aimed at playing a fundamental role in the achievement of a national oil policy. The second measure was the establishment of a coercive mechanism: the law stipulated that every importation of crude and refined oil would be submitted to a prior authorization awarded by the Ministère du Commerce et de l’Industrie. A mandatory monthly statement was introduced to determine the quantities as well as the different varieties of available stocks. The holders of these permits were required to follow priority rules for the supply of oil products to public service. The aim of these measures was obvious: the French government did not want to again face a lack of resources as it had during the war. From 1925 onwards, oil officially became a strategic product. It was, however, the law of March 30, 1928, that fully initiated the national oil policy. It guaranteed enough long-term authorizations for the importers of crude oil to promote the development of a national oil-refining industry. In addition, the implementation of a quota system and restrictions on the number of refineries in the country contributed to the organization of the distribution of final products. The principle of the competition principle was maintained thanks to the licence system. The law of March 16, 1928, also encouraged the expansion of a refining industry because it cancelled the customs tariff in the case of the transformation of imported crude oil in French refineries. In April 1929, the CFP created a subsidiary—the Compagnie Française du Raffinage (hereafter CFR)—with the support of the French State and other French importers. A law of 1931 ratified the public financial contribution in this firm. The same law allocated a quota of 25% of refined oil in France to the CFR. This very protective legislative framework generated the founding of four new companies in 1929: the Société des Pétroles Jupiter, the Société des Raffineries de la Vacuum Oil Company, the Société Franco-Américaine de Raffinage (SFAR) and the Société des Raffineries de Pétrole de la Gironde. Moreover, two other firms appeared in 1931 with the Société de Raffinage des Huiles de Pétrole (SRHP)—which was a subsidiary of the Société Générale des Huiles de Pétrole (SGHP)—and in 1933 with Pechelbronn Ouest (Le Dez, 2012; Marnot, 2000). The decrees of 1

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April 1931 mention 11 companies or groups of companies that had to share the imports of crude oil and consequently had to install modern plants able to transform the quantities of raw materials corresponding to the quotas of refined products (Grebel, 1933). In 1931, the CFR decided to possess its own fleet to carry crude oil from the Middle East. It founded in turn a subsidiary, the Compagnie Navale des Pétroles (hereafter CNP), that it entirely controlled financially. Like some large foreign trusts, the CFP, run by the French senior manager Ernest Mercier, ultimately succeeded in achieving a vertical integration of the sector, from oil field exploitation to maritime transportation (CNP) and refining (CFR). However, France seemed at a disadvantage because almost all world oil tonnage has been concentrated in Anglo-Saxon companies since the end of the Great War. The CNP received its first offshore vessel at the end of 1933. In April 1937, the Chantiers de France de Dunkerque launched the Emile Miguet, which was, at the time, the largest tanker in the world, with 21,340 dwt. However, the CNP’s fleet was small, including only a riverboat, a coaster and a modest tanker of 2700 tons on the eve of World War II (Doessant, 2016). Nevertheless, the first years of the national oil policy presented a flattering balance sheet. Thanks to the proactive policy of the public authorities, France had a strong legislative framework that guaranteed oil supplies and promoted a new industrial sector. However, the French oil industry as such has not yet existed. Its future success implied the resolution of some technical obstacles and the ability to become profitable in the long run.

Seaports as Favourite Sites What was the interest in France to import crude oil and consequently to build refineries with little-known technology? Indeed, the inherent features of the refining industry in the 1930s were short-term amortization and very high funds, so quick were technological innovations and so important were initial investments and replacements of equipment (De Gasquet, 1957). From the end of World War I, American refiners conceived certain technological systems to produce more fuel for the booming car industry. In France, the percentage of fuel consumption exceeded half of all oil products used. In the 1930s, French refining companies needed US and even Romanian companies’ licences for refining the crude oil they were importing (Le Dez, 2012). However, the decision to build new refineries had more benefits than disadvantages, first because the

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refining operation added some value to the product. Moreover, the rise of a new industry could generate some positive effects in terms of employment. Finally, the state used all its influence because the major stake was the energy self-sufficiency of France. One previous question was the choice of locations for future refineries. As Morgan Le Dez noted, the geography of new plants erected in the 1930s was the same as the first equipment installed before 1914. Except for the refineries of Courchelettes, near Douai, and Merkwiller, Alsace, every other plant was constructed in proximity to the main seaports: Dunkirk, Le Havre, Rouen, Bordeaux, Marseilles and—this was new—the lower Loire valley. These favoured locations can be explained by the need to concentrate importations, storage and refining of crude oil in a few spots on the French shore, far away from land boundaries that were always under threat. Moreover, oil companies expected to reforward a part of their production by maritime routes. In addition, the location of refineries in the ports avoided the transportation of crude oil, which remained difficult and dangerous, over long distances. Finally, the ports chosen by the firms were located next to the great centres of industrial and domestic consumption, which were sometimes connected to the ports by inland navigation. Former depots and pseudo refineries were updated in accordance with the needs of oil importing firms. The same goes for the new companies founded after the law of 1928. The latter were always present in at least two ports located on different coastlines. For example, the SGHP, controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, owned a refinery in northern France—at Courchelettes—and built another plant, by its subsidiary SRHP, at Lavéra, near Marseilles. The Société des Pétroles Jupiter settled at Petit-Couronne (Rouen), then at Pauillac, not far away from Bordeaux, to receive its freight coming from Latin America. The CFR chose both the Atlantic shore, where it built the refinery of Gonfreville l’Orcher (Le Havre), and the Mediterranean shore. In this case, the deserted location of La Mède can be explained by the relative proximity of Marseilles and the import of oil from Iraqi fields. The latter were, in part, operated by the CFP, the parent company of CFR. For Pechelbronn, which transformed Alsacian oil in the Merkwiller plant, it sought a second location less exposed to a German invasion risk, which explains why it chose the site of Donges in the lower Loire Valley (Le Dez, 2012). Refining companies were not the only stakeholders in the choice of these new industrial settlements. Because of the different reasons

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mentioned in the previous lines, the French State remained a major decision-­ maker for strategic reasons. Since the early 1920s, military authorities, especially the Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale (CSDN), have expressed their concerns about the locations of futures refineries (Le Dez, 2012). In addition, the ONCL was empowered to validate the different proposals of settlement made by firms or port actors. The latter sometimes also played a proactive role in attracting the firms to their geographic areas. For example, the Compagnie Industrielle Maritime (CIM), one of the most important firms of Le Havre, aimed to develop an oil terminal in the middle of the 1920s, pursuing the objective of catching transit traffic in the North Sea and supplying the Paris region. Even before the building of the first refinery, the CIM multiplied equipment at a sustained pace: in 1928, it established a railway connection between its warehouse and the national railway network; it obtained an extension for its oil depot in 1931, and in December 1932, it put into operation a second basin for the accommodation of tankers (Le Dez, 2012). This complex represented a serious advantage at the time when the CFR envisaged building a refinery in the port of Le Havre—which finally happened with the opening of the Raffinerie de Normandie in 1933. In the near port of Rouen, the Chamber of Commerce requested authorization to establish a downstream auxiliary port. Indeed, the constraint of draught and the relatively small surface of available ground on the left riverbank did not enable the installation of an oil complex inside the urban port. The wide alluvial fields of Port-Jerôme, located between Tancarville and Quillebeuf, were therefore chosen. After obtaining the declaration of public interest, Port-Jérôme was chosen by the SFAR to establish a refinery. When it was put in operation at the end of 1933, the new plant was immediately considered the most modern in France and even in Europe. It could transform, at the start, one million tons of crude oil imported from every part of the world and could produce every kind of oil by product used in France (Croguennec, 1999; Lemaire, 1934). Port-Jérôme became the second auxiliary port of Rouen. It was located more downstream than the first, located at Petit-Couronne. The latter included a refinery launched in 1929, and then a larger new plant was built in 1932 (Grebel, 1933). The development of the oil function in the ports was one cause of the establishment of new auxiliary basins. Two reasons explained the building on specific sites dedicated to the receipt and transformation of oil. On the one hand, the public authorities were aware of the dangerous features of

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this raw material. In France, the first shipboard fires provoked by this inflammable freight entailed drastic legislation since the early 1870s. One of the cautious measures was, in practical terms, to set the oil terminals away from other basins (Marnot, 2011). On the other hand, the growth of traffic and the sizeable footprint of oil superstructures forced the harbour operators to look for vast and deserted spaces. The development of oil activity in the interwar period became one of the driving forces of port area expansion. At Bordeaux, the extra urban port expansion towards Gironde had just begun before 1914 and continued after the Great War. An observer wrote in an article published in 1919 that “the port of Bordeaux metamorphoses quickly” and noted, by the way, the new equipment installed or planned in the downstream basins of Bassens, Pauillac, Ambès and Le Verdon (Zimmermann, 1919). In fact, the current appearance of the port was sketched after World War I.  Since the early 1930s, Pauillac and Ambès were clearly the two oil ports of Bordeaux. The refinery of the Société des Pétroles Jupiter, which settled in Pauillac, covered an area of 53 ha. Its construction was rapid, as it often happened elsewhere: starting in August 1931, it was put into service at the end of the following year. Located at the junction of the Garonne and the Dordogne rivers, Ambès was developed between 1928 and 1932. Its vast alluvial ground and the stable and deep bottom of the two rivers allowed the accommodation of the largest tankers. Near the oil depot stood the impressive plant of the Société des Raffineries de Pétrole de la Gironde, which was fitted with the most modern technology of the time (Fischer, 1935; Grebel, 1933). The expansion of Marseilles harbour was physically constrained to the north of the town by the Estaque hills. Via the law of October 26, 1919, the port authorities obtained the ruling that the wide spaces surrounding the Étang de Berre were incorporated into its jurisdiction. Item six spoke about “the gradual equipment plans of Port-de-Bouc and of the Caronte and Berre Lakes” (Journal Officiel de la République Française). By 1916, the ship holder and secretary-general of the Chamber of Commerce, Hubert Giraud, underlined the potentialities of “the huge Berre basin, with its 68 coastal kilometres, which is like a wonderfully suitable field for the establishment of the most various industries […]” (Lambert, 1995). However, over 1920, the complex Caronte-Berre was languishing because its activity was limited to the storage of bulk or dangerous freight arriving at Marseilles. However, in 1932, the geographer Louis François noted that “near the Étang de Berre and Caronte shores a powerful industry of

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oil refining is growing” (François, 1933). Indeed, in 1931, a joint venture company of Saint-Gobain and Shell, called the Compagnie des Produits Chimiques et Raffineries de Berre (PCRB), finalized the building of its own refinery on the north bank of the lake. It was connected to port equipment installed at the Pointe de Berre. In 1932, the SRHP set its plant in the Lavéra valley and dug a sea basin of 3 ha. Then, the CFR built the Raffinerie de Provence at La Mède in 1934 on the southern riverbank of the Étang de Berre. These three refineries produced a quarter of importations by the end of the decade. Owing to these promising results, the Marseilles Chamber of Commerce voted a deliberation in July 1938 that approved the bill for the promotion of Port-de-Bouc-Martigues and the building of another oil basin (Ricard, 1989). Unlike the previous ports, Nantes did not have any oil establishment before 1914. The Donges site was established in 1917 to receive coal. Located 10  km away from the Loire mouth, the Donges oil vocation asserted itself in the late 1920s, when several firms decided to develop a complex devoted to the transformation of petroleum. The first was the Société des Consommateurs de Pétrole, which was a conglomerate of the six large French railway companies and several large shipping companies (Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, Chargeurs Réunis, Messageries Maritimes, Sud-Atlantique). Their goal was to have access to their own supply resources in oil products, lubricating oil and heavy-fuel oil. This new company launched its refinery in September 1932. Then, came the SGHP, which built 13 tanks, and afterwards, it had envisaged the installation of a refining unit in Brest; however, the Pechelbronn company finally chose the lower Loire valley in 1933 because this site presented more commercial guarantees (Amphoux, 1935; Barbance 1949 [1979]). The ports of Rouen, Bordeaux and Marseilles created auxiliary harbours either because they lacked space or because their basins did not have sufficient draughts. Other ports could avoid this spatial discontinuity, such as Le Havre—which was mentioned previously—Dunkirk and Sète. In the large port of northern France, a subsidiary of the Franco-Belgian group Petrofina (Société Financière Belge des Pétroles), called the Raffinerie de Pétrole de Nord, launched its refining unit in 1932. At Sète, and more exactly at Frontignan, it was the Compagnie Industrielle des Pétroles—a subsidiary of the North American group Vacuum Oil—that finished the building of its plant at the end of 1933 (Amphoux, 1935). This brief but not exhaustive background highlights two major facts. The first shows the rapid installation of the refineries. According to

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Morgan Le Dez, this was due to the decision made by the oil companies to entrust the construction of their transformation units only to public firms. For example, the CFR opted for the Société Générale d’Entreprises (SGE), which led the first preliminary studies and then the work of civil engineering since June 1931. The refinery was operative only 20 months later (Le Dez). The second fact was the launching of this first generation of refineries on a very short schedule. By 1935, the geography of the French oil industry was established and would remain so until the early 1960s—it changed later when continental refineries were erected, as in Strasbourg or Karlsruhe, which were directly supplied with crude oil via pipelines. The oil industry infrastructure was not only rebuilt after 1945 but also modernized and enlarged, always on the same sites. France counted 14 plants in the early 1960s, almost the same number as they were 16 in 1940 (Hoyle, 1961; Le Dez, 2012). The extension of the equipment in the port of Marseilles was remarkable. Begun before the Liberation, the establishment of the oil port of Levéra was operative from 1952 onwards, which could quickly accommodate the largest tankers in the world. Faced with the predictable growth of traffic, the Chamber of Commerce envisioned in the early 1950s the construction of new units in the Fos Gulf, which was located at the far west of the Etang de Berre. The Ministre des Travaux Publics agreed to this ultimate extension plan in 1964. However, as noted by the historian George Ricard, “the Fos project takes place in another scale which is the scale of land management and is included in a national context largely overlapping the first intention of facing the growth of oil traffic” (Ricard, 1989). Finally, it must be specified that the principal network of port refineries was doubled by a secondary network in ports of lesser importance, such as La Rochelle-La Pallice. Energy products accounted for more than 60% of the entrances to the port between 1919 and 1960. Coal dominated this kind of merchandise until 1938, but it decreased afterwards while the imports of petroleum took off. Furthermore, the traffic of oil products was multiplied by nine between 1919 and 1960. The port of La Rochelle installed new equipment to absorb these growing arrivals: 28 tanks were built in the outer port of La Pallice, and one pipeline tied the land and the breakwater built in front of the port in 1935. Lion’s share of La Rochelle oil traffic was in fact coastal traffic. The tanks were used for the storage of refining products from Donges or Ambès. Consequently, La Rochelle-La Pallice was a port of oil dispatching to its hinterland. Without a refinery,

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La Rochelle-Le Pallice did not belong to the elite club of ports that received and transformed crude oil (Baillard, 1998). The ultimate effect of the promotion legislation was that every French trading port tried to pick up the new and promising traffic of oil in one way or another.

An Increasing Role of Oil in the Economy of French Ports Oil became the referent traffic of several main ports between the 1930s and 1960s. As the geographer Brian S. Hoyle has noted, “oil refining is an activity which appears as one of the obvious signs of economic development in the great modern nations” (Hoyle, 1961). In the French case, oil tended to be a precious growth driver at the time when the French empire lost its substance. For a long time, the port of Sète had shaped its identity thanks to the importation of North African wines and spirits. Nevertheless, in the 1950s, it proudly proclaimed itself as an oil port. Petroleum accounted for 56% of imports and 48% of exports in 1958 (Daumas, 1960). The French ports increasingly considered oil as the most profitable merchandise. For this reason, each of them tried to receive a piece of the new windfall. Most of them attempted to obtain some equipment likely to attract this traffic stream. Ports with deep bays highlighted their natural advantages in drawing the most impressive tankers. Indeed, in the early 1950s, the first super tankers of 30,000 tons of deadweight appeared. In 1964, the first very large crude carriers (more than 100,000 tons) came into operation (Doessant, 2016). As during World War I, the port of Cherbourg continued to accommodate tankers in the west of the great bay on the Querqueville site, where a pipeline provided four tanks (Pawlowski, 1924). The port sought to erect an important oil terminal in 1957, enabling it to accommodate the largest tankers in the world. It failed, however, to obtain this equipment. The port of Brest missed the mark twice: once in the middle of the 1920s when the local authorities highlighted the good location of the British ports on the oil maritime routes and the available spaces for the installation of tanks (Pawlowski, 1925) and, second, in the early 1960s when the port authorities suggested the founding of a hub port. Finally, the Normand and British proposals were rejected, principally because of their remoteness to high consumption areas and the absence of refineries (Doessant, 2016). The latter stood out as the crucial element to attract the main traffic streams of oil.

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Hence, the refining operation generated two kinds of traffic. The refining ports were not simply crude oil importers and redistributors towards the French secondary ports. They were also exporters of refining products towards foreign countries as well. Thus, France imported more than 11,500,000 tons of crude oil in 1949 for domestic consumption of 8,950,000 tons (Beaujeu-Garnier, 1952). The objectives of the national policy were not only achieved but exceeded. France did not settle to secure its supplies, and it now became an exporter of refining oil. In other words, the sector was henceforth seen as a mainstay of the French economy. The exports at least balanced the oil purchases that were denominated in foreign currency (dollars and pounds) for more than 90% in the early 1950s (Beaujeu-Garnier, 1952). In this matter, France, like the United Kingdom, could put forwards the comparative advantage of this sectoral specialization relative to the European partners by the time of the construction of the Common Market. The economic agreements of the European Cooperation granted these two countries a leading role in the refining industry, which was necessary for all of Western Europe (Beaujeu-­ Garnier, 1952). Two major poles in trade and refining asserted themselves between the 1930s and 1950s. The first was the lower Seine valley oil complex. In 1938, its four refineries could transform approximately 3,550,000 tons of crude oil, twice as much as the Marseilles pole, the second complex in France at this time. Le Havre alone received more than one-third of the French needs for oil (Le Dez, 2012). The lower Seine valley’s prevalence can be explained by the proximity of the Parisian region, which is both one of the most important industrial basins and the primary urban pole in France. Moreover, it accounted for 28% of the French car fleet (Amphoux, 1935; Le Dez, 2012). In 1960, the refining capacities of the two major poles of the Seine valley (Le Havre and Rouen) and Marseille (Fos-Etang de Berre) significantly increased and tended towards a balance of approximately 14 million tons for each area (Hoyle, 1961, Fig.  2). However, Table  5.1 shows that petroleum traffic coming and going in 1965 was clearly higher in Marseilles than in Le Havre. In addition, these two ports overwhelmingly dominated the import traffic of crude oil in France, with approximately 90% of the debarked tonnage in each case. It was close to the figure in Nantes, while the entrances accounted for almost two-thirds of the oil imports at Sète and Bordeaux, half at Dunkirk and only a quarter at Rouen. In the middle of the 1960s, the main French ports became dangerously oil dependent.

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Table 5.1  Distribution of oil traffic in the main French refining terminals (1965) Entrances of oil Thousands of tons Dunkerque Le Havre Rouen and auxiliary ports Nantes and auxiliary ports Bordeaux and auxiliary ports Sète Marseille and auxiliary ports

6082 21,503 1480 6793 2858 1984 44,004

Exits of oil %

Thousands of tons

%

52 89 23.1 81 63.7 65.1 91.4

1075 1398 1192 1706 1527 219 4723

26.4 49.7 30 84.6 60.7 40 68.1

Source: Ministère de l’équipement-Direction des ports maritimes, 1965

The leading role played by the new oil terminals clearly shows this dependence. A careful observation of outstanding rates of growth between 1928 and 1964 in the auxiliary ports of Port-Jérôme (+12.1%), Donges (+20.8%), Ambès (+23.6%) and Port-de-Bouc (+15.2%) shows that the oil trade was a crucial component for the growth of their respective head-­ ports, namely Rouen, Nantes, Bordeaux and Marseille (Administration des Douanes, 1928–1964). By 1964, Port-de-Bouc accounted for 87% of Marseilles’ trade of goods, Donges 77% of Nantes and Ambès almost 42% of Bordeaux; however, Petit-Couronne and Port-Jérôme accounted for only 12% of Rouen seaborne trade. In fact, the two oil terminals of Rouen were overshadowed by the terminal of Le Havre. Notably, shifts surged in the geography of supplies as well. Before World War II, France imported more than half of its oil from the American continent, especially from Venezuela and the United States; the Middle East supplied 40%. In 1955, the percentage of the western hemisphere was reduced to a bare minimum because of the new hegemony of the Middle East in the extraction and supply of crude oil. The Middle East accounted for 16% of the bulk of the leading French ports in 1956 and 13% in 1962. From 1959 to 1960 onwards, France could rely on a new supplier, Algeria, which provided not only oil but also gas. If we add Libya and West Africa, the whole African continent supplied almost 40% of the crude oil for France in 1964 against 48% from the Middle East (Doessant, 2016).

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Conclusion In Europe, France was a pioneer in the construction of a complete petroleum industry—the United Kingdom followed a few years later (Hoyle, 1961). The national oil policy was surely one of the greatest achievements of the Third Republic during the interwar period. It took place in the proactive and ambitious energy policy after 1918, as the following examples show: complete electrification of the countryside, large hydroelectric dam construction and a project of a tidal power plant on the site of Aber Vrac’h in Britain. As the Great War demonstrated, with the new role of oil in the economy of France at the time of the Second Industrial Revolution, public authorities became conscious of the role of the ports as receipt, transformation and exportation sites of oil and their derived products. In this respect, the national oil policy played a key role in promoting trading seaports as strategic tools of the French economy. The counterpart was that most of them were submitted to rising dependence on the oil trade. This economic specialization became particularly dangerous with the coming of the two oil price shocks in the 1970s.

References Administration des Douanes. (1928–1964). Tableau general du commerce extérieur de la France. Imprimerie Nationale. Amphoux, M. (1935). Une nouvelle industrie française: le raffinage du pétrole. Annales de Géographie, 44(251), 509–533. Baillard, F. (1998). L’évolution du trafic de produits énergétiques du port de La Rochelle-La Pallice, 1919-1996. Écrits d’Ouest, 7, 191–221. Barbance, M. (1949 [1979]). Saint-Nazaire. Le port, la ville, le travail. Laffitte Reprints. Beaujeu-Garnier, J. (1952). La France et le pétrole. L’information géographique, 16(2), 65–71. Beltran, A. (2018). L’industrie pétrolière en France pendant la Première Guerre mondiale : une prise de conscience tardive. In P. Fridenson & P. Griset (Eds.), L’industrie dans la Grande Guerre (pp. 151–159). CHEFF. Chancerel, P. (2015–2016). Le rôle du charbon dans l’économie de guerre entre 1914 et 1918. Pour Mémoire. Revue des ministères de l’Environnement, de l’Energie et de la Mer, du Logement et de l’Habitat durable numéro hors-­ série, 53–55.

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Croguennec, M. (1999). L’aménagement du port de Rouen de 1800 à 1940: contraintes, techniques et stratégies, PhD thesis. Daumas, M. (1960). L’essor du port de Sète. L’information géographique, 24(4), 148–156. De Gasquet, G. (1957). L’industrie française du raffinage de pétrole. Évolution et structure. La Pensée universitaire. De Préneuf, J., & Vaisset, T. (2018). Préparation inachevée, adaptation partielle : la Marine nationale et le choc de la guerre en 1914. Etudes Marines hors-­ série, 11–20. Doessant, B. (2016). Le transport maritime d’hydocarbures. Les compagnies pétrolières françaises entre impératifs économiques et obligation de pavillon (1918–1998), PhD thesis. Eck, J.-F. (2009). Histoire de l’économie française de la crise de 1929 à l’euro. Armand Colin. Fischer. (1935). Le port de Bordeaux et ses annexes. Le génie civil, 1, 1–9. François, L. (1933). Les ports annexes de Marseille en 1932. Les Études rhodaniennes, 9(3–4), 259–261. Grebel, A. (1933). Les raffineries françaises de Petit-Couronne et de Pauillac. Le génie civil, 4, 77–83. Hoyle, B. S. (1961). L’industrie du raffinage pétrolier en France et en Grande-­ Bretagne, étude comparative. Revue de géographie de Lyon, 36(2), 117–137. Ministère de l’équipement-Direction des ports maritimes. (1965). Annuaire statistique des transports. Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques. Lambert, O. (1995). Marseille entre tradition et modernité. In Les espérances déçues (1919–1939). CCIM. Le Dez, M. (2012). Pétrole en Seine (1861–1940). Du négoce transatlantique au cœur du raffinage français. P.I.E. Peter Lang. Lemaire, E. (1934). La raffinerie de pétrole de la Standard franco-méricaine de raffinage à Port-Jérôme. Le génie civil, 26, 577–583. Marnot, B. (2000). Les ingénieurs au Parlement de la Troisième République. CNRS Editions. Marnot, B. (2011). Les grands ports de commerce français et la mondialisation du xixe siècle. Presses universitaire Paris-Sorbonne. Murat, D. (1969). L’intervention de l’Etat dans le secteur pétrolier en France. Technip. Nayberg, R. (2006). La politique française du pétrole à l’issue de la Première Guerre mondiale : perspectives et solutions. Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, 4(224), 111–133.

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Nayberg, R. (2015–2016). Penser une politique du pétrole pour la France entre urgence et nécessité (1917-1923). Pour Mémoire. Revue des ministères de l’Environnement, de l’Energie et de la Mer, du Logement et de l’Habitat durable numéro hors-série, 47–52. Nouschi, A. (2002). La France et le pétrole depuis 1924 à nos jours. Picard. Pawlowski, A. (1924). Les transformations du port de Cherbourg. Le génie civil, 18, 389–394. Pawlowski, A. (1925). L’évolution et l’extension du port de Brest. Le génie civil, 8, 181–185. Ricard, G. (1989). Marseille-sur-Fos ou la conquête de l’ouest. CCIM. Zimmermann, M. (1919). Le développement du port de Bordeaux. Annales de Géographie, 28(151), 76–77.

CHAPTER 6

French Capital, Gdynia, and the Position of Polish Coal on International Markets in the Interwar Period Jerzy Łazor

Introduction: Interwar Poland as a Coal Producer and Exporter When the borders of Poland stabilized in 1922, the newly reborn state gained control of the greater part (72%) of the Upper Silesian Coal Basin, sharing the rest with Germany (10%) and Czechoslovakia (18%). Polish holdings were divided into three regions: Upper Silesia proper, the Da ̨browa Basin to the north–east, and the Cracow Basin to the south– east. Politics rather than geography dictated this division: in a triangle made by Katowice in Polish Upper Silesia, Sosnowiec in the Da ̨browa

This work was supported by the National Science Centre, Poland, grant no. 2018/31/D/HS3/00405. J. Łazor (*) Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Castillo Hidalgo, C. Honorato (eds.), Fuelling the World Economy, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32565-6_6

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Basin, and Jaworzno in the Cracow Basin, the longest side is under 20 km. Nonetheless, before World War I, each belonged to a different empire: Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary.1 The best bituminous coal came from Upper Silesia, which also contained over 70% of all Polish deposits.2 Both quantity and quality decreased as one went east. Near Da ̨browa, the deposits were small but of medium quality, while in the Cracow Basin, coal was not as good but plentiful. Total annual production amounted to an average of 34 million tons, of which Upper Silesia produced almost 75% and Da ̨browa approximately 20%, with the remainder coming from Cracow (Jaros, 1969, pp. 12–13; Podolska-Meducka, 2016). In 1928, this made Poland the fifth-largest producer in the world. Approximately one-third of production, on average 11 million tons, was sold abroad each year, the third result in Europe after Great Britain and Germany (League of Nations, 1929, p. 21; Jaros, 1975, p. 245). In the 1930s, most coal found buyers overseas, especially in Sweden, Italy, and France, and was shipped there through the Baltic ports of Danzig and Gdynia. This geographical distribution of exports would have seemed unlikely before the war, when each basin functioned in the economy of its respective empire. Both in Austria and in Russian Poland, the mineral was mostly used domestically. Upper Silesia’s production was greater than local demand, but Russia and Austria-Hungary had high import tariffs, and the limited availability of waterways and railroads made overseas exports costly. Therefore, only 2% of total output was exported to Russia, 20% to Austria-Hungary, and 30% was consumed locally (Beyer, 2021, p.  25; Jaros, 1969; p. 25). The rest found its way to other parts of Germany, with some sent overseas via mostly North Sea ports. Gdynia did not yet exist. Once the borders of Poland had settled, the country’s coal exports broadly followed the pre-war pattern. Over 90% of sales went, by rail, to countries that had previously formed part of the three empires: Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary. Only after the 1925 Polish-­ German trade war did the orientation to overseas markets begin. The goal of this chapter is to chart the radical shift of Polish coal exports after 1925 and to explore the role played by France and the French capital. 1  In 1938, after the annexation of Zaolzie, the Poles also gained control over parts of the basin which had belonged to Czechoslovakia, but with only months to go before World War Two, this change of borders did not play a part in the processes I consider in the chapter. 2  This chapter deals with bituminous coal, as most active Polish coalfields at the time were of this type.

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It focuses on France due to the country’s significant expansion into the Polish economy after World War I, its role in Polish infrastructural development, and its position in the coal sector (mostly in Da ̨browa), which dated to before the war. My analysis is built on the assertion that while the post-war change of borders created the potential for the internationalization of Polish coal, four principal factors determined the shape it ultimately took (Łazor, 2017). The Polish-German conflict provided the initial push towards export reorientation. The 1922 Geneva convention regulated the division of Upper Silesia between the two countries and forced Germany to accept Polish coal. When the convention expired in January 1925, Germany started a trade war, blocking further coal transactions. The conflict, which lasted until 1934, aimed to destabilize Poland and weaken the country’s post-Versailles position. Soon, “German political demands grew fantastic” and included territorial claims on the Polish Corridor and Upper Silesia (Błahut, 1975, pp. 65–76; Spaulding, 1997, p. 158). Since coal played a pivotal role in Poland’s balance of trade, accounting for some 16% of all sales, authorities needed to look for new buyers to protect the country’s economic and political independence (Leszczyńska, 2013). Institutional limitations—the second factor—made shifting exports away from Germany difficult. They were primarily the consequence of the Poles’ inexperience in foreign trade. The mostly domestic character of Polish economic activity before World War I made international contact (and competition) difficult (Landau & Tomaszewski, 1967, pp. 323–324). Polish exporters struggled with foreign correspondence, exchange rates, and calculating freight costs. Internal competition among producers and between coal-producing regions (in practice, between Upper Silesia and the Da ̨browa Basin) made matters worse and undermined the viability of long-term foreign trade. National economic policy was the third factor. The government in Warsaw offered institutional and diplomatic support for coal exporters and promoted sales by instruments such as export premiums. To limit internal competition, it pushed for cartelization and increased scrutiny of the sector. After successfully protecting the currency in the 1920s, during the Great Depression, the government again found promoting exports necessary. They protected the country from financial collapse and were necessary for deflationary policies (Wolf, 2007). Even with willing buyers, diplomatic support from the government in Warsaw, and competent sales agents, coal exporters still had to surmount transport problems. Polish coalfields were in the southern part of the

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country, approximately 500 km from the sea, and badly connected to the ports because of the disjointed state of Polish railways inherited from the three empires. Moreover, while Poland received access to the sea in the Versailles Treaty, the region’s principal port, Danzig, became a free city at the insistence of the British. It lacked the loading capacity needed for Polish overseas exports, and Warsaw could not count on its availability due to its pro-German leanings. As a result, Polish authorities pushed for the creation of a new commercial harbour in Gdynia and the coal trunk railway—a major thoroughfare linking Polish coalfields with the Baltic. Three of these factors have definite or potential links to France. First, since French capital was not affected by the same institutional limitations as Polish companies, it is worthwhile to ask whether the companies it controlled adapted more swiftly to international markets. Second, as the French were poised to play an oversized role in the Polish coal cartel, thanks to their position in the Da ̨browa Basin, did they support or resent government actions? Did the French government intervene in this regard, as it did in the oil sector? Finally, the French built both the harbour in Gdynia and the coal trunk line. Did the French government or French-­ owned coal firms play a role in these investments? I start answering these questions by describing the position of Polish coal on international markets—its geographic distribution, patterns of prices and freight. I then move to the French role in Polish maritime infrastructural investment and analyse diplomatic sources of construction contracts. Finally, I investigate the role of coal companies with French capital in Polish exports and their interactions with the foreign exchange-starved government in Warsaw.

The Geography and Economics of Polish Coal Exports Figure 6.1 shows, broadly, the geographical distribution of Polish exports by dividing them into four European markets, as well as sales of bunker coal and exports to other continents.3 Initially, producers plugged the hole 3  The division into markets, used henceforth, is as follows: Central Europe includes Austria, Czechoslovakia, the Free City of Danzig, Germany, Hungary, Romania and Switzerland; Northern Europe comprises Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden; Western Europe covers Belgium, France, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom; Southern Europe consists of Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia, Spain, and British holdings in the Mediterranean.

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12

10

8

6

4

Central Europe

Northern Europe

Western Europe

Southern Europe

Bunker coal

1938

1937

1936

1935

1934

1933

1932

1931

1930

1929

1928

1927

1926

1924

0

1925

2

Other

Fig. 6.1  The volume of Polish exports to different international markets, 1924–1938 (in millions of metric tons). Sources: Author’s elaboration. Rocznik Handlu Zagranicznego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej  1924–1927; Rocznik Handlu Zagranicznego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Wolnego Miasta Gdańska 1928–1938

left in Polish trade by Germany by sales to Scandinavia and, briefly, to the United Kingdom, in the latter case thanks to the 1926 general strike. In the coming years, the Poles faced stiff competition on other markets in Central Europe, and by 1929, coal from Poland played a major role only in Austria (accounting there for some two-thirds of all imports) (Olszewski, 1936). Scandinavia became the most important Polish market. However, after the pound left gold standard in 1931, currency depreciation in the budding Sterling Bloc, coupled with British diplomatic action and better results of the British coal sector, undermined the Polish position in Northern Europe. Polish-British rivalry was only settled with a coal treaty, signed in 1934 and amended in 1937 (Kaliszuk, 1977). Meanwhile, exports to France, Italy, and other continents and sales of bunker coal allowed Poland to keep its trade balance surplus. The almost tenfold growth of the role of France between 1926 and 1936 is particularly notable. The country became the third-largest importer of Polish coal in

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8 7 6 5 4 3 2

Danzig

Gdynia

1938

1937

1936

1935

1934

1933

1932

1931

1930

1928

0

1929

1

Other

Fig. 6.2  The use of different modes of transport for Polish coal exports, 1928–1938 (in millions of metric tons). Sources: Author’s elaboration. Rocznik Handlu Zagranicznego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Wolnego Miasta Gdańska, 1928–1938

the last years before World War II, vying for second place with Italy. Moreover, it also imported mostly coal from Da ̨browa (68% of its imports from Poland between 1926 and 1931), which otherwise mostly catered to domestic clients (Mihout-Natar, 2002, pp. 657–658). Such changes could not take place without a revolution in transportation, captured in Fig. 6.2. As already mentioned, in the early 1920s, the majority of Polish coal exports left the country via rail, which was a viable choice for sales to Central Europe. Other markets required maritime shipping, which overtook rail transport in 1929. Initially, Danzig was the principal port, but by 1932, Gdynia surpassed it. By the end of the next decade, the new port dominated shipping.4 Polish authorities did not publish more detailed 4  Rail transport makes up the majority of ‘other’ in Fig. 6.2, although, especially in the early days, the category also includes exports through Hamburg, Stettin, and even the tiny river port in Tczew.

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120 110 100 90 80 70 60

Price in złoły per ton

19 38

36 19 37

19

34 19 35

19

19 33

19 32

30 19 31

29

19

28

19

27

19

19

19

26

50

Price in shillings per ton

Fig. 6.3  Indices of average export prices of Polish coal in złotys and shillings per metric ton, 1926–1938 (1929 = 100). Sources: Author’s elaboration. Prices in złotys: Rocznik Handlu Zagranicznego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1927; Rocznik Handlu Zagranicznego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Wolnego Miasta Gdańska 1928–1938; conversion to shillings based on the average annual exchange rate in Warsaw (Mały Rocznik Statystyczny 1939)

data, which would allow country-level distinctions between the use of Danzig and Gdynia. Competing on new markets required adapting to changing prices and exchange rates. Figure  6.3 shows the evolution of average Polish coal prices after 1936. It stresses the importance of Poland’s monetary policy and Britain’s departure from the gold standard in 1931. While prices in złoty kept falling until 1935, quotations in shillings remain relatively stable, mostly following world prices. The story becomes more interesting when disaggregated into distinct markets, as shown in Fig. 6.4. It combines three representative markets for Polish coal (Central, Northern, and Western Europe) and average UK export rates, serving as proxy for world prices. These series are not strictly comparable. I obtained Polish data from aggregate foreign trade statistics representing free-on-board (or free-­ on-­wagon) prices, self-reported by exporters. The British data constitute average monthly spot prices.5 Nonetheless, it seems consistent with 5  Rocznik Handlu Zagranicznego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Wolnego Miasta Gdańska 1934, xiii; Editor of the Statist, 1939; Federico and Tena-Junguito (2016).

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22

20

18

16

14

12

10

1927

1928

1929

Central Europe

1930

1931

Northern Europe

1932

1933

1934

Western Europe

1935

1936

1937

Average UK export price

Fig. 6.4  Average prices of Polish coal in exports to different markets, average UK export price of coal, 1927–1938 (in shillings per metric ton). Sources: Author’s elaboration. Polish prices: Rocznik Handlu Zagranicznego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1927; Rocznik Handlu Zagranicznego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Wolnego Miasta Gdańska 1928–1938; conversion to shillings based on the average annual exchange rate in Warsaw (Mały Rocznik Statystyczny 1939); British prices taken from A. Sauerbeck‘s and Statist estimates (Editor of the Statist, 1939)

interwar claims that Polish coal was, on average, cheaper than British coal by some 4–6 shillings per ton in the 1930s (Jaros, 1969, p.  222). The figure illustrates a bifurcation of Polish trade. Sales to sterling bloc countries closely followed the changes in average prices in British exports, while exports to other markets saw stickier prices. Here, as Central European states shifted to exchange control and some Western European nations (such as France and Belgium) stayed on gold, Polish exporters kept higher prices. This was especially true for Central Europe, where Polish cartels regulated sales (more on this in the last part of the chapter). Prices achieved on different markets translated into different outcomes for exporters. We can see this in the case of Polish State Mines in Upper Silesia Lease holding Company Inc., known as Skarboferm, a major

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Franco-Polish producer (Jaros, 1969, p. 59). Sales to Central European states, where coal got by rail, allowed the company comfortable profits, and pithead prices close to between 80 and 105% of the domestic price of coal in 1932. Going further required lowering the price, partially to compensate for freight. In markets such as Romania, Switzerland, or Yugoslavia, Skarboferm obtained 45% of the Polish domestic price. For overseas sales, the pithead price was, on average, under 30% of the Polish price and below production costs, with losses sometimes (as in Scandinavian markets) compensated by export premiums (Staniszewski, 2013, p. 347). A growing proportion of Polish overseas exports can thus be seen as dumping. As mentioned, this was partially because of the government’s push towards exports, aimed at supporting the Polish gold standard. On the other hand, the Great Depression caused an almost twofold decrease in domestic consumption between 1929 and 1933. As coal mines had significant fixed costs, dumping allowed them to keep per unit production costs down and profit from sales in Poland and Central Europe (Jałowiecki, 1935, p.  83). Improved transportation was another factor. The Poles reduced freight costs in the late 1920s and early 1930s. French investment in the coal trunk line resulted in a further significant fall, allowing coal producers to stabilize their returns, despite declining free-on-board prices (Jaros, 1969, pp. 68–70).6 Let us now turn to the origins of these changes.

Polish Infrastructure and French Capital7 After World War I, Poland searched for diplomatic support for its independence and border security and tried to bolster its worsening economic position. France, following the fall of tsarist Russia, also looked for partners to help protect the country’s eastern flank. Having cooperated at the Paris peace conference, the two countries signed a formal alliance in 1921.8 Poland became France’s “replacement ally” (allié de remplacement) 6  French Consulate in Katowice to Ministère des Affaires Étrangeres, 10 March 1927, no pagination, file 5, Archives des Postes, Consulat de Katowice, (hereafter CdK), Archives Diplomatiques, Nantes (henceforth: ADN). 7   The argument given here was  presented during the  conference “The Unwanted Compromise. The Free City of Danzig/Gdańsk,” (Gdańsk, 4–6 November 2021). A wider treatment of these issues is forthcoming as Jerzy Łazor, “Danzig, Gdynia, and French Capital in Interwar Poland,” which summarizes my more detailed studies (Łazor, 2021 and 2022). 8  There is extensive literature on Franco-Polish relations in the interwar period. See Soutou (1981); Hovi (1984); Wandycz (1962, 1988).

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and obtained military loans. French private capital used this opportunity to engage in Poland and, after displacing many Austrian and some German owners, became the largest foreign investor in the country. Paris’s help proved expensive. Warsaw needed to provide special treatment to French companies, sign unequal treaties, and buy overly expensive, often subpar military equipment. This was typical for French foreign policy in Eastern Europe; George-Henri Soutou called it the “imperialism of the poor” (imperialisme du pauvre), as it rested on shaky economic grounds. France expanded in the region not because of the competitiveness of its companies or the strength of its economy but rather due to the political support French businessman enjoyed from diplomats (Laforest, 2003; Soutou, 1976). On the other hand, private French companies, the management of which still felt the loss of their investment in Russia, were sometimes less eager to invest in Poland than the government wanted them to be. The French public works sector needed support. Powerful before the Great War, French firms of this kind now struggled to compete with their peers in the United Kingdom and the United States, armed with better technology and backed by stronger finances. As a result, they turned to their colonies, where they could enjoy preferential treatment. Central and Eastern Europe, thanks to France’s privileged position, was their only major foreign area of investment, with Polish infrastructural projects constituting the most important market (Barjot, 2006). As early as April 1919, Paris notified the French shipping enterprises that it was vitally interested in opening a connection to Danzig.9 Private companies, such as Société Worms et Cie. (itself a major coal-shipping operation) and Maison Maurice Vincke & Cie., were interested, as was the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas. The French still thought that the city would be allotted to Poland and so imagined the creation of a Franco-­ Polish shipping company, which would help counter the predominant German influence in Danzig. Due to the lack of rail connections, a second fluvial shipping company on the Vistula would then extend the service to the interior, while a new Franco-Polish bank would finance the other two enterprises. However, Danzig’s independence sabotaged these plans. While Worms et Cie. did indeed open a connection to the city, and other

9  J. Noulens to S. Pichon, 20 June 1919, p. 28–29, file 408, Correspondance politique et commercial, 1918–1940 – Pologne (hereafter CPC), Archives Diplomatiques, La Courneuve (hereafter AD).

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French investors did later try to return to the idea of fluvial transport, the idea of a Franco-Polish shipping holding never materialized. The creation of Danzig as a Free City also put a damper on Polish Baltic plans. The blockage of resupply transports during the Polish-Soviet war showed the difficulty of this position (Mielczarek, 2001; Segreto, 2021). As a result, authorities in Warsaw decided to build a new harbour in the small village of Gdynia on the meagre Polish coast. Due to insufficient funding and construction expertise, in 1923, they turned to the concession model, offering future profits from the port. In 1924, a Franco-Polish consortium obtained the concession. It united Société de Construction des Batignolles, Schneider, Société Anonyme Hersent, Entreprises de Travaux Publics et Maritimes, Polski Bank Przemysłowy and two Polish engineers (Mielczarek, 2001, p. 45). The group had been formed by the Poles, who, armed with an early project of the port, approached the Danish company Højgaard & Schultz. The Danish in turn suggested cooperation with the Belgian/Dutch firm Ackermans & Van Haaren and, crucially, Société Hersent from France. All companies had worked together before and had experience in harbour construction. The directors of Hersent then approached the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, asking for support—which in the early 1920s was the established way to gain preferential treatment in Poland. However, the events that followed strayed far from the customary path. Already in 1919, the French authorities realized that giving Upper Silesia to Poland would necessitate coal exports and thus put a proper port under the country’s control.10 Afterwards, Paris closely observed the first Polish steps in Gdynia and approved the creation of a new harbour to challenge the Germans in Danzig and strengthen Warsaw.11 Nonetheless, when Hersent approached Quai d’Orsay, authorities disliked the proposal. French military and government officials thought that the group was inadequate and potentially even posed a security threat since it included foreign companies. As a result, their representatives asked the Poles not to give the concession to any group including investors from other countries. At the same time, French officials started looking for suitable French firms and ended up choosing and convincing Schneider and Batignolles. Within weeks, the new group was organized, and in 1924, it received the 10  “Conséquences économiques de l’annexion de la Haute Silésie à la Pologne”, [May–July 1919], p. 84–98, file 238, CPC, AD. 11  E. H. A. Gérardin to R. Poincaré, 10 August 1922, p. 3, file 260, CPC, AD.

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concession. Later, when French companies had problems with financing the endeavour, banks in Paris were nervous about investing in Poland, and the government once again stepped in and gave formal guarantees based on earlier military loans. This was an extraordinary level of engagement, which Paris accepted grudgingly and thanks to the firm stance of the Minister of War, André Maginot.12 In other cases, the government never gave its guarantees to such private investments, an approach that cost the French some of their influence in Eastern Europe.13 In other words, the creation of the commercial harbour in Gdynia, crucial for the internationalization of Polish coal, was shaped by the French government and guaranteed by an intergovernmental loan originally earmarked for military expenses. This highlights the direct link between the position on Polish coal on overseas markets, the functioning of Poland’s ports, and French security policy in Central Europe. Let us now move to the coal trunk line. The original plan of Franco-­ Polish communications from 1919 envisaged shipping goods between the Baltic (in that case—the port of Danzig) and the Polish interior by the Vistula River. It proved impractical, and the Poles soon decided to extend their railway coverage. This was crucial since existing lines functioned to service pre-war empires. By 1923, Polish authorities were looking for offers to build a connection between coal-producing regions and the sea. The Polish engineering company Towarzystwo Robót Inżynierskich (TRI), coupled with individual Polish engineers, created a group with Schneider, this time joined by Société Général d’Entreprises. Together, they sought a concession for the line, and with the support of the French government, they received it. The support, however, was less enthusiastic than in the case of Gdynia. The French saw the railway primarily as a way of exerting further influence in Poland and of developing the country’s economy, which would make it a more useful ally for France. However, when private banks again proved unwilling to participate in the project, the French government refused to give them a formal guarantee. Consequently, despite winning the concession, the Franco-Polish group was unable to sign a contract. This was a significant blow to the Poles, who desperately needed better infrastructure during the trade war with Germany. As Franco-Polish relations soured 12  A. Maginot to M. Bokanowski, 9 May 1924, p. 210, file 260, CPC, AD; H.A. Panafieu to É. Herriot, 15 September 1924, p. 7, file 261, CPC, AD. 13  G. de Vaux to R. Poincaré, 9 May 1924, p. 194, file 260, CPC, AD.

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after the Locarno treaties, Warsaw grew more impatient with the consortium’s inability to muster funding and finally decided to renege on the concession. The coal trunk line (running along a slightly modified route) would be built by Poland and financed by its budget. French diplomats tried to intervene, but without a change in their country’s financial policy, no success seemed possible. The Great Depression, which quickly depleted Polish resources, put a stop to the line’s construction. With pressure from falling exports and prices, the existence of the railway was crucial for Poland’s economy. As a result, after consolidating its debt to France in January 1930, the government returned to talks with Schneider (this time working with Banque de Pays du Nord) (D’Angio, 2010, p. 46). Warsaw military circles saw the railway as crucial for the country’s defences and thus pushed for a deal. The French agreed, and André Maginot argued for finishing the construction quickly, calling it “a strategic interest of the first order.”14 For Bertrand Jochaud du Plessix, the French commercial attaché in Warsaw, while the harbour in Gdynia worked as “lungs, which allow Poland to breathe freely,” the railway would function as “airways, which must grow in parallel to avoid suffocation.”15 With both sides willing to agree, the only outstanding issue was, again, money. Due to the importance of the construction to the French government, the minister of finance Paul Reynard himself tried to find banks willing to organize the necessary bond issue of 900–1100 million francs. They were again anxious about possible losses and asked for a formal guarantee or at least a formal statement of intent. The government would not agree, but as a compromise, it authorized both the Comptables du Tresor and agents of the Banque de France to receive subscriptions for the issue.16 Despite some further hiccups, in April 1931, the Franco-Polish group received a concession to build and operate the railway until 1975 through the newly founded Compagnie Franco-Polonaise des Chemins de Fer.17 Based on this, the French followed up with the first planned bond issue of 400 million francs, and the construction began. Soon afterwards, however, the Great Depression reached European financial markets. With  A. Maginot to A. Briand, 18 August 1930, p. 37, file 408, CPC, AD.  B. Jochaud du Plessix to P. É. Flandin, 31 May 1930, p. 25, file 408, CPC, AD. 16  P. Reynaud to A. Briand, 8 November 1930, p. 55–55v, file 408, CPC, AD. 17  “Emprunt du chemin de fer Silésie-Baltique,” 8 January 1931, p. 68, file 408, CPC, AD; “Note sur la construction et l’exploitation de la voie ferrée Haute Silésie, Gdynia,” [April 1932], pp. 28–31, file 409, CPC, AD. 14 15

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the meltdown in Vienna and Berlin and the abandonment of the gold standard by Great Britain, the future of Polish bonds looked bleak. The market in Paris was unlikely to support the second issue, and soon Schneider and its co-operators ran out of money, which undermined the viability of the concession agreement.18 Despite multiple attempts, no solution was forthcoming, and the line remained half-finished, with no full two-track coverage and meagre throughput. This undermined the growing volume of Polish coal exports but was also unsatisfying to the French. The Franco-­Polish consortium would not gain control over the line if it could not satisfy the contract and so did not profit from its investment. The change came in 1936, with the Treaty of Rambouillet and the rapprochement between France and Poland. Rather than relying on private banks, now the French government would directly provide funding (910 million francs) to the Compagnie Franco-Polonaise. Works quickly resumed, with most of the construction finished before World War II broke out. The Compagnie took over the railway, which brought hefty profits (albeit for a short time) (Laforest,  2001, pp.  190–191; Mihout-­ Natar, 2002, p. 754). Polish coal exports picked up significantly, increasing by 40% between 1936 and 1938. In 1938, the volume of coal transported via Gdynia and Danzig was 30% higher than in 1929, with over 60% of the mineral shipped from the new Polish harbour.

French Companies in the Polish Coal Sector In the final section of this contribution, I analyse the French holdings in the Polish coal sector and their influence on the international position of Polish coal. Before World War I, French owners had significant interests in the Da ̨browa Basin as part of the Third Republic’s wider engagement in tsarist Russia (Girault, 1973). They controlled five companies, founded between 1876 and 1898, with a total capital of 70 million francs-gold in 1913. Their combined production amounted to 55% of the province’s output before the war. In the Cracow Basin, French holdings were more modest, with only two companies (founded in 1898 and 1903), which contributed over a quarter to the basin’s total output. The only holding in Upper Silesia was the Schlesische Aktiengesellschaft für Bergbau und 18  “Commencement des travaux de chemin de fer Silésie-Baltique,” 5 March 1932, pp.  20–21, and “Chemin de Fer Silésie-Baltique,” 6 June 1934, pp.  137–137v, file 409, CPC, AD.

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Zinkhüttenbetrieb (or the Zincs de Silésie), started in 1853. The total output of all French-controlled companies thus amounted to 8% of the entire Upper Silesian Coal Basin (Jaros, 1969, pp. 22–24). Coal from these mines partially fuelled French ironworks, such as Huta Bankowa. The company, with a total capital of 23 million francs, headed a major heavy-industry group in Russian Poland. Originally founded as a Russian joint-stock company in 1877, based on capital from the Lyon-St. Étienne region in France, in produced 29% of Congress Poland’s steel. To emphasize the relationship between the sector and France’s maritime policy, it is useful to remember that Huta Bankowa was initially designated to take over Danzig’s shipyards (together with other members of a French group). In August 1914, Germany took over the Da ̨browa Basin and divided it into German (northern) and Austro-Hungarian (southern) occupation zones. The occupation was disastrous for French-owned companies, but the entire province suffered. In 1914, the Germans dismantled or destroyed some equipment, fearing a Russian counteroffensive. Over the next two years, French companies were put under compulsory German administration, and by the end of the war, both occupants took control over coal distribution. Mines were also subject to military requisitions and plunder and became greatly decapitalized (Jaros, 1969, pp. 27–29). The result was a fall in production by a third. The central powers’ own production fared better, with the Cracow Basin falling by 20%. In all regions, per worker productivity dropped, with the worst result in the Da ̨browa Basin. Interwar ownership changes in the coal sector are somewhat surprising, considering the overall inflow of French capital into Poland. In the Da ̨browa and Cracow basins, French investment decreased. A few companies were either shut down or sold to new owners, which worried authorities in Paris, as they saw their country’s influence in the sector waning. Some commentators even saw the Polish expansion in Upper as a danger, rather than an opportunity for French capital, as it would put competitive pressure on companies in Russian Poland.19 Despite these fears, Polish control of Upper Silesia’s coalfields ostensibly opened the province to French investments. They took the form of 50% shares in the Franco-Polish giant Skarboferm and a minority stake of 7% in 19  “Conséquences économiques de l’annexion de la Haute Silésie à la Pologne,” [May–July 1919], pp. 84–98, file 238, CPC, AD.

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Zakłady Hohenlohego, created from the part of Hohenlohe Werke left on the Polish side on the border. In 1924, the Śla ̨skie Kopalnie i Cynkownie S.A. (created from a part of the Schlesische Aktiengesellschaft für Bergbau und Zinkhüttenbetrieb) returned under the control of French and Belgian capital. Despite the size of Skarboferm, which was at times the biggest Polish coal exporter, these were but remnants of two much greater designs from before the division of Upper Silesia. Both had roots in provisions of the Versailles Treaty, allowing forced takeovers of German property by allied states. One such design was concocted in Paris and entailed the Germans selling shares in the Silesian industry for “protection” against Polish takeovers. The other came from Poland and had its roots in the “Cieszyn lesson”—the experience of losing territory to Czechoslovakia despite the predominantly Polish ethnicity of its inhabitants (Milhout, 2002; Wandycz, 1962). The Poles saw this as the result of allied interests in the province and were willing to accept the same logic when faced with the Silesian question. According to an official from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they would offer preferential treatment to allied capital in Silesia “as a sort of bribe” (Landau & Tomaszewski, 1959, p. 37). Artur Benis, an economist and lawyer from Cracow, was sent to allied capitals with such a proposal but only found interested listeners in Paris. He suggested that the French should help the Poles take over certain German companies in return for co-ownership and other benefits. Both plans fell through. The province was divided, and the Geneva Convention of 1922 protected German companies from takeovers for 15 years. Without pressure, neither party was interested in dealing with the French, who in turn saw little benefit from actions in Silesia. This story highlights French priorities in Poland. In Silesia, the Quai d’Orsay attempted to weaken Germany and let French companies profit in the process. Supporting Poland came at a distant third place. When Silesia no longer offered opportunities to realize the first two goals, the French did not engage further. The total nominal capital of French-controlled coal companies in interwar Poland amounted to 90 million francs germinal or 150 million Polish złoty. Skarboferm added an additional half of its 12 million francs germinal (21 million złoty) capital. In 1926, among the 30 largest coalmining companies in Poland, French and Belgian investments accounted for 21% of all capital, ahead of Polish (17%, this included Skarboferm) and Anglo-­Saxon (18), but significantly behind German (37) (Jaros, 1969,

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p. 161). In 1938, French-controlled companies produced approximately five million tons of coal (up from four in 1913)—13% of Poland’s coal production and less than 8% of the entire basin, just as in 1913. Skarboferm added another four million (11% and 6%, respectively). The quoted data suggest that the French stake in the Polish coal sector did not meaningfully change after the war. This interpretation is true, but it ignores the companies’ decapitalization during World War I and the first years of Polish independence. Representatives of the Société Française & Italienne des Houillères de Dombrowa estimated that they lost approximately one-third of their company’s nominal capital; others seemed to fare even worse.20 As companies coped with requisitions, lack of adequate capital replacement, and the effects of Polish inflation and hyperinflation, they asked for support from investors in France. They, in turn, were willing to buy new stock, as before the war, these companies offered hefty returns (over 10% a year for some companies).21 In other words, the French invested in the coal sector but mostly to restart the production of companies they already owned. Their result—regaining pre-war levels of production and insufficient modernization—broadly mirrors the Polish experience in the interwar period. Investments in Silesia were different. They represented large industrial capital from France, willing to put money into already profitable enterprises, supported by the French government, who saw in these investments a way to undermine the German position. Thus, Skarboferm was one of the few companies in interwar Poland that increased its mining capacity (Jaros, 1969, p. 75). Since the outbreak of the commercial war with Germany, Polish coal producers have been cartelized into conventions, which fixed prices and divided production (and export) quotas. These organizations were modelled on the pre-war German cartel, the Upper Silesian Coal Convention (Oberschlesische Kohlen-Konvention), founded in 1898, which operated until 1920 (Beyer, 2021). In 1925, two new conventions were signed: one for Polish Upper Silesia and a joint convention for the Dąbrowa and Cracow basins. Then, the two organisms signed a nationwide agreement (the Polish Convention), which by 1926 united 20  Société Française & Italienne des Houillères de Dombrowa to S. Pichon, 15 February 1919, pp. 39–40; file 253, CPC, AD; H.A. Panafieu to A, Millerand, 3 June 1920, p. 47, file 238, CPC, AD. 21  J. Laroche to Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, 18 December 1933, pp. 110–112, file 404, CPC, AD.

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companies responsible for 98% of annual domestic production. Initially, it regulated only the so-­ called convention markets: Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary. Therefore, abstracting from transportation costs, Polish exporters consistently received the highest prices for their coal in Central Europe. In other markets they competed with each other, driving prices down, despite some government-led attempts to coordinate overseas sales (Wysocki, 2005, p. 167). French-owned companies seemed destined to play a bigger role in the cartel than their combined production would suggest. Although Upper-­ Silesian mines received some three-fourths of quotas and votes in the convention, decisions required a majority of 85%, which gave the French de facto veto power (Jaros, 1969, p. 62). This ability was, however, undermined by relationships within the cartel. German capital dominated the Upper Silesian Convention, while in Da ̨browa and Cracow, larger French-­ owned companies had to contend with each other and with Polish firms, which enjoyed government support. French firms found it difficult to find common ground among themselves. Skarboferm was more like other Silesian companies and often voted together with them.22 In Da ̨browa and Cracow, deep disagreements between companies undermined French unity. The group led by Huta Bankowa worked against other French interests, and in 1927 and 1930 threatened the existence of the convention.23 The position forced the Polish government’s hand, and in 1931, it pushed for the creation of a new Polish Coal Convention, with greater power allotted to authorities in Warsaw. Another agreement regulated export quotas (but not prices) to Northern and Western Europe. Differences in opinion between French companies were a function of their situation during the war and their financial standing. Skarboferm was founded in 1922 and enjoyed ample privileges, including the right to send payments and dividends to France before paying taxes (and hence by 1939 owed the Polish state almost 30 million złotys in arrears) (Jaros, 1969, p. 73). In contrast, companies in the Da ̨browa and Cracow basins had to adapt to a tougher environment. They suffered heavy losses during the war. Not all resumed operations immediately after the armistice, and their management bitterly resented Polish policies.24 Unable to export and  A. Briand to J. Laroche, 13 May 1927, pp. 225–231, file 253, CPC, AD.  “Note sur la nature de la convention charbonnière,” [January 1927], pp. 214–15, file 253, CPC, AD; Ministère des Affaires Étrangères to J.  Laroche, 27 February 1931, pp. 27–28, file 404, CPC, AD. 24  “État des mines de charbon et des hauts-fourneaux en Pologne russe,” 9 December 1918, p. 35, file 253, CPC, AD; “La situation dans le bassin de Dombrowa, en Pologne,” 22 23

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forced to sell at controlled prices, the companies could not send dividends back home, which undermined their purpose as vehicles for capital remuneration. When Poland took over parts of Upper Silesia, the owners’ fears of competition from German-owned mines came true. The latter had lower extraction costs and higher quality coal and could more easily access lucrative markets. Production and export quotas further limited the French-owned companies’ freedom of action and pitted owners against each other. Since Poland used exchange control for much of the 1920s (and after 1936), exports became tied to French companies’ ability to acquire foreign currency, needed to pay dividends and upper management salaries.25 As a result, French-owned companies focused on exports. Despite the difficulties caused by the trade war with Germany, owners in France again enjoyed dividends in the second half of the 1920s. The Great Depression undermined the position of the sector, which had to cope with falling prices and demand, and reported consistent losses throughout much of the decade. During this period, 16 large mines were closed in both Upper Silesia and the Da ̨browa Basin. French companies were again unable to send dividends back home, and some stopped their operations. On the other hand, at least to some degree, these losses were the result of window dressing aimed at transferring capital abroad. Even Skarboferm was accused of such practices (Jaros, 1969, pp. 57, 70, and 72). On average, French-owned companies exported a higher percentage of their production than their Polish counterparts. For Skarboferm, this amounted to as much as 55% of its total production between 1928 and 1937, compared with the sector’s average of 32%. Many of these exports were done at low or even dumping-level prices and often depended on export premiums (Jaros, 1969, p. 169). Companies in the Da ̨browa and Cracow basins also exported more, despite their products being of lower quality. While in the early 1920s, this amounted to only some 2–10% of their production, it rose significantly in the coming years.26 For instance, Hrabia Renard (Comte Renard, a subsidiary of Huta Bankowa) exported over a third of its production in the early 1930s, the vast majority by Danzig and Gdynia.27 According to an inside informant of the French ambassador Jules Laroche, French companies exported so much partially 26 March 1921, pp. 100–104, file 253, CPC, AD. 25  H.A. de Panafieu to A. Briand, 26 July 1921, pp. 108–109v, file 253, CPC, AD. 26  V. Vianney to H.A. Panafieu, 29 July 1923, pp. 82–83, file 230, CPC, AD. 27  Gwarectwo… 1934, p. 3.

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thanks to dumping, ordered by the management in Paris.28 This would confirm the link between losses and window dressing. At the same time, however, these exports were consistent with the broad logic of Polish financial policy during the Great Depression and the support of the country’s beleaguered Gold Exchange Standard. As I mentioned, France, using domestic intermediaries, purchased mostly coal from Da ̨browa, despite attempts to find more suppliers in Silesia.29 Exports made French companies interested in Polish infrastructure. Before they could send coal via Gdynia, some firms invested in Żegluga Wisła-Bałtyk, a new initiative aiming to use Tczew as a port.30 A town on the Vistula, some 35  km from the sea, it  had no handling facilities. Drainpipes hanging from wagons standing on the local railway bridge had to suffice (Jaros, 1969, pp.  55–56). The growth of Gdynia made the arrangement obsolete, but it shows the desperation the French faced. Nonetheless, judging from archival data, their circumstances did not significantly influence the French government’s decisions to engage in Polish infrastructural investment. Security considerations, rather than private profits, swayed officials more easily. French coal investments in Poland stand in stark contrast to engagement in the oil sector. After November 1918, the French expanded their position in Galicia oilfields, expecting significant profits and a boost to national security. As a result, their actions enjoyed broader support from the French government and more extensive privileges. Most importantly, an agreement from February 1922 guaranteed such firms free access to foreign currency. In comparison, coal, after the failure of Silesian takeovers, did not offer such promise. Diplomatic correspondence on this topic was not full of hope but rather concerned with defending existing French interests. The capital invested in older companies was replenished to regain pre-war profits, but this proved difficult. New investments took the form of existing, high profit companies. The important role played by the French in increasing the international position of Polish coal came not from the economic prowess of French mines but from their attempts to transfer more profits and dividends abroad.  J. Laroche to A. Briand, 22 January 1931, pp. 17–18v, file 404, CPC, AD.  E.  Lancial to B.J. du Plessix, 10 April 1931, no pagination, file 12, CfK, ADN; P. Bertherlot to J. Laroche, 14 October 1926, p. 211, file 253, CPC, AD. 30   The companies in question were: Towarzystwo Kopalń i Zakładów Hutniczych Sosnowieckich and Towarzystwo Bezimienne Kopalń Węgla “Czeladź” Piaski. 28 29

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Conclusion Coal continued to be interwar Poland’s principal export article, but the geography of its sales changed significantly. The reorientation began with the trade war started by Germany in 1925 and saw an important part of sales move from Central to Northern and Western Europe. The change depended on a revolution in transports, with rail giving way to shipping through Danzig and Gdynia, with the second port overtaking its venerable rival by 1932. While the Poles kept higher prices in sales to Central European markets (and, for a time, to parts of Western Europe), expansion to new markets often required dumping. France played a quadruple role in the new geography of Polish coal exports. First, French companies led the two consortia, which built the most important infrastructure—the port in Gdynia and the coal trunk line. It was good business for the beleaguered French public works sector and proved invaluable for Poland, significantly lowering transportation costs and increasing the throughput of connections to the Baltic. Second, French authorities supported and helped finance these investments as part of their country’s security policy, thanks to a concerted effort of the Quai d’Orsay and the French military. Third, French firms in Poland contributed more to exports than Polish-owned companies, partially since they relied on sales abroad for dividend pay-outs. Their wellbeing, however, was not a major factor in Quai d’Orsay decisions after plans for significant takeovers in Polish Upper Silesia fell through. Finally, France was an important importer of Polish coal, with a tenfold increase in purchases between 1926 and 1936, much of it coming from the French-controlled companies in the Da ̨browa Basin.

References Barjot, D. (2006). La grande entreprise française de travaux publics (1883–1974). Economica. Paris. Beyer, C. (2021). Cartelization and firm performance in upper Silesia 1880–1913. European Review of Economic History. https://doi.org/10.1093/ ereh/heab006 Błahut, K. J. (1975). Polsko-niemieckie stosunki gospodarcze w latach 1919–1939. Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich. D’Angio, A. (2010). Schneider et Cie face aux risques géopolitiques en Europe centrale et orientale (1918–1939). Les cahiers Irice, 2(6), 35–59. https://doi. org/10.3917/lci.006.0035

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Editor of the Statist. (1939). Wholesale prices in 1938. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 102(4), 267–284. Federico, G., & Tena-Junguito, A. (2016). World trade, 1800–1938: A new data-­ set. IFCS—working papers in economic history, no. WP 16-01. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Instituto Figuerola. Girault, R. (1973). Emprunts russes et investissements francais en Russie, 1887–1914: Recherches sur l'investissement international. A. Colin. Gwarectwo “Hrabia Renard” i Franko-Polskie Towarzystwo Górnicze, Sp. Akc. (1934). Sosnowiec. Hovi, K. (1984). Alliance de revers: Stabilization of France’s Alliance policies in East Central Europe 1919–1921. Translated by Kaija London and Gary London. Turun Yliopisto. Jałowiecki, A. (1935). Konkurencja węglowa polsko-brytyjska na rynkach skandynawskich. Instytut Popierania Nauki. Jaros, J. (1969). Historia górnictwa węglowego w Zagłębiu Górnos ́la ̨skim w latach 1914–1945. Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe. Jaros, J. (1975). Zarys dziejów górnictwa węglowego. Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe. Kaliszuk, M. (1977). Rokowana węglowe polsko-brytyjskie (1926–1939). Przegla ̨d Historyczny, 68(4), 683–698. Laforest, C. (2001). La stratégie française et la Pologne (1919–1939): Aspects économiques et implications politiques. Doctoral dissertation, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. Laforest, C. (2003). La stratégie française et la Pologne (1919–1939). Aspects économiques et implications politiques. Histoire, économie et société, 22(3), 395–411. https://doi.org/10.3406/hes.2003.2328 Landau, Z., & Tomaszewski, J. (1959). Misja Prof. A. Benisa. Teki Archiwalne, 6, 29–225. Landau, Z., & Tomaszewski, J. (1967). Gospodarka Polski Międzywojennej (Vol. 1). Ksia ̨żka i Wiedza. Łazor, J. (2017). Import and export of polish coal in the interwar period. Kwartalnik Kolegium Ekonomiczno-Społecznego Studia i Prace, 8(2), 33–48. https://doi.org/10.33119/KKESSiP.2017.2.2 Łazor, J. (2021). Pierwsza francusko-Polska koncesja kolejowa z 1924 r. Przyczynek do relacji finansowo-gospodarczych Polski i Francji po pierwszej wojnie światowej. Kwartalnik Historyczny, 128(3), 785–812. https://doi. org/10.12775/KH.2021.128.3.03 Łazor, J. (2022). Kto ma budować Gdynię? Wpływ władz w Paryżu na kształt konsorcjum francusko-polskiego Dzieje Najnowsze, 54(3), 5–26 https://doi. org/10.12775/DN.2022.3.01 League of Nations. (1929). The problem of the coal industry. Interim report on its international aspects by the economic Committee of the League of Nations. League of Nations.

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Leszczyńska, C. (2013). Polska polityka pienięzn ̇ a i walutowa w latach 1924–1936: w systemie Gold Exchange Standard. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Mielczarek, R. (2001). Budowa portu handlowego w Gdyni w latach 1924–1939. Instytut Kaszubski. Mihout-Natar, Mylène. (2002). L'intervention des capitaux français dans la Pologne de la Seconde République (1918–1939): contribution à l'histoire de l'impérialisme économique français en Europe centrale. Doctoral dissertation, Université Charles deGaulle - Lille III. Olszewski, A. (1936). Przesilenie w polskim przemyśle węglowym. Przegla ̨d Gospodarczy, 8, 256–260. Podolska-Meducka, A. (2016). Zagłębia Węglowe w II Rzeczypospolitej. In A. Jarosz-Nojszewska & W. Morawski (Eds.), Problemy Energetyczne Polski. Cz. 1, Surowce (pp. 11–31). Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH. Segreto, L. (2021). La Città Libera Di Danzica: Compromesso Ragionevole o Scommessa Impossibile? Passato e Presente, 39(114). https://doi.org/10.3280/ PASS2021-­114006 Soutou, G.-H. (1976). L’impérialisme du pauvre: la politique économique du gouvernement français en Europe Centrale et Orientale de 1918 à 1929. Essai d’interprétation. Relations internationales, 3(7), 219–239. Soutou, G.-H. (1981). L’Alliance franco-polonaise (1925–1933): ou Comment s’en débarrasser. Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique, 95(2–3–4), 295–348. Spaulding, R. M. (1997). Osthandel and Ostpolitik: German foreign trade policies in Eastern Europe from Bismarck to Adenauer. Berghahn Books. Staniszewski, A. (2013). Po dwóch stronach Bałtyku: polityczno-gospodarcze stosunki polsko-szwedzkie w latach 1918–1932. Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek. Wandycz, P.  S. (1962). France and her eastern allies 1919–1925: French-­ Czechoslovak-­Polish relations from the Paris peace conference to Locarno. The University of Minnesota Press. Wandycz, P. S. (1988). The twilight of French eastern alliances, 1926–1936: French-­ Czechoslovak-­ Polish relations from Locarno to the remilitarization of the Rhineland. Princeton University Press. Wolf, N. (2007). Should I stay or should I go? Understanding Poland’s adherence to gold, 1928–1936. Historical Social Research, 32(4), 351–368. Wysocki, A. (2005). In P. Jaworski (Ed.), Na placówce dyplomatycznej w Sztokholmie 1924–1928: wspomnienia. Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.

CHAPTER 7

Ports, Coal, and Exports from the Argentine Pampas Region: An Evaluation of the Institutional Actors Related to Coal Circulation in the Agro-Export Period, 1860–1930 Santiago Prieto, Miguel Ángel de Marco (h), José Luis Jofré, and Marcelo Weissel Introduction This essay presents a first approach to the coaling business relationship with Argentinian sea and river ports, entailing the challenge and opportunity of inquiring about a topic never addressed before by the scholarly literature in the region. We will present different thematic and disciplinary overviews which constitute an experience in development within the

S. Prieto Initial Fellow of the Agency I+D+i, IDEHESI CONICET, Rosario, Argentina M. Á. de Marco (h) (*) IDEHESI CONICET, Rosario, Argentina © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Castillo Hidalgo, C. Honorato (eds.), Fuelling the World Economy, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32565-6_7

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framework of the Núcleo de Ciudades Portuarias Regionales [Regional Ports Hub] (IDEHESI CONICET, Nodo IH), together with the Centre François Viète (EA 1161), Universitè de Bretagne Occidentale (UBO), Brest (France). We want to acknowledge the following institutions for funding1 our research project: Ciudades portuarias: Patrimonio histórico y desarrollo regional sustentable. El caso de los puertos pampeanos de ultramar [Port cities: Historical Heritage and Sustainable Regional Development. The Case of the Overseas Ports of the Pampas]. We aim to provide a historical view of the reception and circulation of mineral coal through Argentine ports during the agricultural export period (1860–1930) (Rapoport, 2009). We expect to obtain a preliminary overall portrayal of the influence of the coaling business in the history of Argentine ports, including its local, regional, and global connections. To this effect, we will survey the institutional actors involved, both public and private, concerning the supply and distribution of coal by examining different Argentine regions, a task involving an assortment of social aspects and dimensions. The focus of this chapter is to observe the supply of mineral coal as the predominant energy source for exports from the Pampas region. On this basis, we will identify three specific levels—the global, the regional, and the local—through which we will outline a field of study rich in its proportions and complexity. This approach includes different courses proposing a perspective from the general to particular. We start by considering that regional port cities are primary actors in international relations. The 1  Through the National Agency for the Promotion of Research, Development, and Innovation project PICT FONCyT (Scientific and Technological Research Fund) 2018/02951: ‘Ciudades portuarias: Patrimonio histórico y desarrollo regional sustentable. El caso de los puertos pampeanos de ultramar’, directed by Miguel Ángel De Marco (h) and supported by CONICET Executive Unit Project (PUE) 0003/2018: ‘El Estado argentino y sus gestores: trayectorias, identidades y disrupciones, 1852/3–2010. De lo disyunto a lo complejo’, directed by Beatriz Figallo. Both projects are based in IDEHESI CONICETNode IH. In addition to the authors, Analía Conte, Alicia Martín, and Ana Sellares were part of the research team that participated in the preparation of this chapter.

J. L. Jofré University of Cuyo, Cuyo, Argentina M. Weissel University Nacional de Lanús, Lanús, Argentina

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insertion of Argentina as an agro-exporting nation in the global distribution of labour involved several strategies devised by local and foreign agents to control the energy sources supporting the new system for goods production and trade circulation. Consequently, we analyse the logistical revolution that meant the introduction of railways in the national territory and its relations with ports’ ties to their agro-exporting hinterlands. Once this picture is drawn, we focus on three cases, making it possible to raise various issues connected to the existing relationship between ports and coal. First, we describe several historical sources addressing the functioning and structure of the coaling business in the port of Buenos Aires and other major hubs in the Río de la Plata region. Second, we identify the port of La Plata as one of Great Britain’s coaling stations in times of world hegemony, going from the nineteenth century into the twentieth century (see Chap. 2). Additionally, we carried out an economic analysis of the portfolio of products hauled through the latter during the 1890–1904 period. During these 14 years, changes and continuity in the supply of imported coal stood out in connection with the export of agricultural products and the installation of the refrigeration industry. Finally, we analyse the incidence of coal in the dynamics of the relations between port, city, and region, taking as a sample the concerns raised by the press of the time in Santa Fe city regarding the ongoing international conflicts during the second decade of the twentieth century. As a result of the approach mentioned earlier, we have noticed some urban footprints in the cited cases, which have built the sociocultural aspects forged by the daily consumption of coal. By analysing the term coal and its derivations, we explore the scope and meaning of this activity in the complex social fabric of port cities. Finally, in our conclusion, we present an overview of Argentine ports identified as coal receivers and depositories in records that account for global networks.

Regional Port Cities: Actors in International Relations Port cities occupy a predominant place in the globalisation process as pivotal nodes for capitalist expansion. In this sense, they were affected to a greater or lesser extent by the alteration of the pace of international trade, the rivalries between trade blocs, conflicts, and wars. Port cities’ institutional actors are part of these tensions, even more so in their role in

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organising the dynamics of the regional port to whom they belong as mediators of the respective hinterland and foreland, and therefore can be considered as key to understanding the ‘world-economy’ (Braudel, 2002, p. 28). To a large extent, the robustness of a prominent port and the system it controls is determined by the functional efficiency of its institutional actors: Stock exchanges, chambers of commerce, consulates, universities, and companies have done so since the Middle Ages. Globalisation processes contain ‘a predominance of behaviours, social relationships and organisational forms defined by specifical global contexts’ (Russell, 1998, p.  40). Ports and their institutions in the young Argentine Republic—constitutionally organised as such since 1853— entered the world of coaling from the very moment that their maximum legal instrument—a significant project pursuing the country longed for by its leaders—would guarantee alignment with the highest coaling powers that Argentina aspired to become. It was precisely this energy source that was essential to the three main phases featuring the globalisation process: the increasing interconnection degree (density), the inclusion of territories and societies (scope) and the impact on the nature and functions of the state (Russell, 1998). The extent of the implications of that Globalisation born of the Industrial Revolution—which laid the foundations of the coal circuits throughout the seas with its late nineteenth-century ports and cities, having an impact on industrial production, banking methods and international trade and the configuration of the networks linking Europe, Africa, and America (Suárez Bosa, 2014)—also reached the emergence and evolution of public and private institutions. In the case of Argentina, this situation is contemporary to the building of a state and a domestic market, which, in contact with the global market, could contribute to the successive expenditures and resource budgets of the nation and the provincial governments. Coal—which fed globalisation—affected almost all the institutional actors linked to ports’ operations since it was input into the port logistics supply chain. In this sense, identifying port actors and institutional agents might imply the intriguing and no less complex endeavour of understanding through their testimonies the extent to which coal was considered a strategic resource for the sake of efficiency and competitiveness. More specifically, to what degree coal did represent at the same time a stronger or weaker part in the logistics chain allowing the existence or development of a given port and its hinterland.

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The analysis of the relationship between port cities’ institutional actors and coaling networks would cover as many social and cultural realities as those comprised by the multiple actors of a port community and their families, those affected by direct operations and those within the business, industrial, and labour sectors who provided port services or the output channelled by them. As the study of port cities’ institutional actors is a tool for understanding the world of coal ports, just as a two-way artery, it is also a tool to improve the understanding of the dynamics between regional port cities and their main interface areas. In this chapter, we conduct case studies to detect and analyse actors from political, economic, social, and cultural institutions in overseas railways and port cities linked to coal trade channels. Hence, we would better understand the relationship between the State and private interests in the consolidation of the coal market, its supply, acquisition, speculation, and the construction of narratives in favour of increasing consumption and cultural representations (Mato, 2004, p. 67). In this way, we hope to contribute to building the network constellation powered by coal, which has existed since the mid-nineteenth century on both sides of the Atlantic: Corporations, private companies, shareholders, managers, and extraction infrastructure and logistics contractors that would change landscapes, means of transport taking the extracted material to commercialisation points; inventors, extraction machinery technicians and manufacturers; those responsible for keeping accounts for the coaling industry; trade union dispute mediators; and family businesses and their branches, among other aspects.

Buenos Aires and Coal Coal—Carbón—Charbon—Kohle—Carvão—Carbone is the title in the listings in several languages in the Buenos Aires business directory. In the early stages of the State organisation, the coaling business funded the Baring loan by collecting customs fees. Authors such as Ortiz (1971) and Astesano (1949) highlight the origin and kind of trade with Great Britain: Because the English trade found it comfortable to compensate for the tonnage of Argentine grains and meats with English black charcoal. The truth is that mineral coal was the protagonist of economic, commercial, and industrial history and reached all levels of society when it came to cooking, heating, and producing gas for lighting. (Astesano, 1949, p. 278)

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According to Boyns and Gray (2015), Welsh black coal served as an informal empire. As they put it, ‘Buenos Aires Great Southern and the Central Argentina Railway contracts regularly went to suppliers of South Wales steam coal’ (Boyns & Gray, 2015). The first news of the use of coal in energy production goes back to 1822 when the first steamer that ventured to the South Atlantic reached port in the Río de la Plata. The ship was the Rising Star, built in Brent, England, in 1817. With mixed propulsion (sail and steam), it was the first steam warship on the continent and the first one to sail the Pacific Ocean. A few years later, the steamer was sold to Winter & Brittain in Buenos Aires, who used it for commercial purposes. It is noteworthy that Brittain was the one who built the road and pier at the mouth of the Riachuelo.2 Circa 1825, the British schooner Druid—the first steamboat in Buenos Aires—arrived at the Río de la Plata after sailing from Gibraltar (Valiñas, 2011). In the times of Juan Manuel de Rosas,3 approximately 1837, Gosselman noted that ‘mineral coal is as cheap in Buenos Aires as in London, since it has been used by ships as ballast’ (1995, p. 18). The truth is that coal had been seen as a valuable good since the first half of the nineteenth century. It was so attested by the comments made by Woodbine Parish, chargé d’affaires of Her British Majesty in the Río de la Plata. Parish also highlighted the need to include the coal tax in the loan payment plan with the Baring Brothers (Parish, 1852). Indeed, coal was taxed, as noted in the customs laws of Buenos Aires in the coming years. The Customs Act of 1854 on Maritime Entries stated that ‘...fossil charcoal, firewood, charcoal will pay five percent of their value’ (p.  33). Likewise, the Patent Act of 1854 specified that ‘The houses in the city...that sell coal, firewood, corn, and groceries...will pay a patent of fifty pesos.’ It also said that ‘the sellers of...black coal...in the city within six blocks of the Plaza de la Victoria will pay four hundred pesos, the ones outside the six blocks three hundred pesos, and the ones in the countryside will pay two hundred pesos’ (p. 34). Similarly, the Customs Act of 1870 established: In the Subject of Maritime Entries. Art. 3. 10% of their value shall be paid by...black coal...Art. 6. Common salt, black coal...will continue to pay the 2  Translator’s Note: The popular name given to the Matanza River. It empties into the Río de la Plata giving its characteristic ambience to the popular La Boca neighbourhood in the city of Buenos Aires. 3  Argentine politician, army officer and warlord who was the governor of the province of Buenos Aires in the mid-nineteenth century.

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additional 5% established by the law of September 3, 1866, until the extinguishment of the loans taken with the Bank of the Province, whose reimbursement has been primarily affected by that tax. (p. 23)

The coaling business served financial and commercial globalisation, funding the state coffers, and enabling the energy for developing productive and transport activities, even fulfilling a central role in urban life. During the growth and boom of steam navigation, coal bunkering was crucial information for ship captains and shipping lines. Thus, we have a perspective on the availability of materials in the coaling business and bunkering in the globalisation process.

The Configuration of the Iron Roads in the Hinterlands The massive expansion of railways and coal consumption in Argentina in the second half of the nineteenth century laid the foundations for the definitive integration of its territory, its inclusion in the international division of labour, and the centralisation of political and economic power in the provinces with access to the Atlantic Ocean. However, it responded more to Britain’s trade needs than Argentina’s self-focused development initiatives. In particular, the Buenos Aires-Valparaiso port-railway connection promised ‘to be one of the largest trunk lines, not only in South America but in the world since it saves the long and dangerous journey of almost 2,000 miles around Cape Horn’ (Tilden & Clarke, 1903, p. 133). The arrival of the railway meant a rapid movement of muleteers and drovers to peripheral commercial connections. The conversion of the heat energy of coal into kinetic energy meant the increasing release of people and animals from the efforts of goods production and distribution. In Latin America...the first uses of coal were more related to transport than to the production of mines and industries. The era of kinetics in Latin America began with steamships, British ones for the most part. They carried coal cargoes which were indispensable for filling the bunkers where the fleet would get supplies from. (Yañez et al., 2013, p. 28)

The railway was also mainly responsible for triggering the consumption of mineral coal in Latin American countries. In the case of Argentina, the mere commissioning of the Buenos Aires-Flores route—which

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inaugurated the train as a means of transport in the country—significantly increased coal consumption from 1856 to 1857, going from an apparent consumption of 6492 tons to 15,891 tons of coal (Yañez et al., 2013). It also explained the tension that meant using imported energy sources for wagon displacement (Scalabrini Ortiz, 2010, p. 24). By 1870, there were 764 km of railways and the apparent consumption of 62,557 tons of mineral coal. In 1880, the railways increased their mileage to 2529 km, and coal consumption reached 75,677 tons. Argentina owned 9487 km of railway and consumed 566,352 tons of coal in 1890. By 1900, trains ran 16,659 km through the national territory, and the coal consumption rose to 789,838 tons. Furthermore, in 1909, there had already been 25,648 km of railway tracks in place when coal consumption climbed to 2,126,518 tons (Yañez et al., 2013). During the first 50 years of railways in Argentina, although they consolidated the Pampas agro-export model, they did not plan for any industrialisation process in the country: the supply of coal, locomotives, rolling stock, rails, and standard equipment for the day-to-day operation of the lines meant stable employment for many British workers and benefits for British companies. In turn, the working class of England consumed a relatively cheap diet containing large quantities of Argentine beef, lamb, and cereals. (Wright, 1936, p. 83)

The above testimony condenses the terms of Argentina’s insertion into the international division of labour as a supplier of agricultural-based raw materials and the complete dominance of British diplomacy for the benefit of the interests of their companies. Nevertheless, some local initiatives explored coal basins in the country seeking to replace Welsh coal, organised in the works of Luis Brackebush, who explored coal-bearing formations in the provinces of Mendoza and La Rioja (Janitens & Pezzutti, 2004, p. 367). San Juan-born professor Justino Thierry presented his memoirs at the 1900 Argentine Industrial Conference, whose cover predicted ‘sow black coal and power plants will sprout.’ In these texts, Thierry expressed his pride in running the first train heated with Argentine coal—extracted from the La Deheza mine—linking the provinces of San Juan and Mendoza in 1888, hence proving the latent possibility of initiating a path for the substitution of imported coal (Janitens & Pezzutti, 2004, p. 370).

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The story is very different during the World Wars. To the difficulties of supplying coal of European origin for local production and logistics, the technological progress that began to explore other oil-based sources of energy is added, generating the conditions for a possible decisive change in the country’s energy matrix. In 1915, Britain placed restrictions on coal exports outside the United Kingdom, except for ensuring the supply of coal for its merchant fleet, for British allies in the war, and for the countries whose return cargo secured the necessary provisions for that country, such as grains from Argentina (see Chap. 3). Only this protection prevented the complete shortage of coal in Argentina, which, even so, reduced its apparent consumption by more than one million tons between 1914 and 1915 and added a reduction of another 500,000 tons in 1916. The restoration of the flow of British coal during the World War I aftermath failed to reach pre-war levels, let alone its uninterrupted growth rate. The Wall Street stock market crisis and the consequent deterioration of raw materials prices counted as difficulties to the Argentine economy in the war period. Attempts to maintain British markets for chilled beef meant a significant compromise for British capitals, including reductions of almost 50% in customs fees on British goods and the free entry of coal. The shortage in the shipment of British coal to Argentina during the Great War repeated itself with the same characteristics in World War II. In this case, the government enacted strict restrictions on fuel use. These restrictions forced transport companies to burn corn kernels they bought from the government in the locomotives, thus disposing of the surplus acquired from landowners (Wright, 1936, p. 231). In short, both world wars crumpled the international coal trade for the United Kingdom, Germany, and other European exporters. For this reason, strategies to replace energy sources emerged in Argentina. Oil from the United States was the main alternative, positioning it as a hegemonic power in the region. This energy substitution was not only limited to coal for oil but also the new vehicles mobilising Argentina’s economy: cars, trucks, tractors, and railway locomotives, among them, as well as engines, auto parts, and fuels derived from petroleum (Yañez et al., 2013, p. 45). They proclaimed the end of the coal era as the primary energy source and its replacement by hydrocarbons.

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Neural Points of the Rioplatense Railway-Port Complex The renowned navigation guide by Lobo and Riudavets mentions that foreign steamers could count on coal warehouses in Rosario, Paraná, and Corrientes (Lobo & Riudavets, 1868). By 1875, the navigation guide of the Río de la Plata, edited by the United States of America Naval Service (Gorringe, 1875), indicates in the ‘Supplies’ category the availability of coal in Montevideo and Colonia. It also notes sound availability in Buenos Aires in Olivos Bay, noting 92,000 tons of coal imported in 1872. Towards 1911, ‘the amounts ranged from 1.83 million tons unloaded at Buenos Aires to 0.75 million tons at Montevideo and 0.74 million tons at Rio de Janeiro, to 0.33 million tons at Bahia Blanca, 0.25 million tons at Rosario, and 0.18 million tons at Santos’ (Boyns & Gray, 2015, p. 61). Later, they elaborated on the following: Montevideo nevertheless faced increasing competition from the development of port facilities on the southern side of the Rio de la Plata estuary at Buenos Aires and La Plata. The idea of constructing a port at Buenos Aires was first put forwards in 1882, with work commencing in 1887 and being completed in 1897 when it was reported that the “improved” dock accommodation here [in Buenos Aires] and in La Plata enables steamers to take in bunker coals very rapidly and in large quantities, which formerly would have been shipped on board at Montevideo or other ports of call on the voyage to Europe. (Boyns & Gray, 2015, p. 62)

Approximately 1920, it is said that Montevideo usually had a considerable amount of coal and that the facilities to put it on board were fine. Nevertheless, ‘Cardiff coal; can be obtained from the railway company’ (South America Pilot, 1919–1920, p. 434). In Río Santiago (La Plata), they keep the coal in the reservoir located on the east side of the Big Dock. In Buenos Aires, the coal supply is nearly 1,750,000 tons, imported annually. About 31,000 tons of coal are usually in stock, and 400 to 500 tons can be shipped during working-day hours or a thousand tons when working day and night. Rosario has 4000 tons of coal; it is usually in stock large enough to meet all ordinary bunkering demands. Transhipment is carried out with elevators, on barges or next to the docks (South America Pilot, 1919–1920).

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For the 1927–1930 triennium, there are data on the existence of coal in Buenos Aires. There is usually a provision of 25,000 tons of coal. They can load it to approximately 700 tons per day from barges or at the dock at Grand Dock Central (South America Pilot, 1927–1930). Coal served the creation of uses for urban, port, and industrial spaces, promoting the technological development of naval and railway means of transport. The Ruiz Guide, following a listing by sectors, addresses, and advertisements, refers to ‘Factories, Firewood, and Coal Warehouses’ documenting the presence of 150 coal shops in the city (Weissel, 2009). Circa 1910, the Guide, edited by Guillermo Kraft, mentions the existence of charcoal and wood warehouses, such as Barraca Britannia, which introduced coal; Barraca Worms, a charcoal warehouse; and the Cory Brothers coal depot (Weissel, 2009). William Cory & Son Ltd. was constituted in 1896 from a merger of eight companies in the coaling business. Most of the coal trade then was for industrial purposes, although some coal was for domestic use. At the time, steamer entrepreneur Nicolas Mihanovich, who had a fleet of 45 steamers and 60 sailing ships, introduced Cardiff Cory’s Merthyr coal.’4 With subsidiaries in Rosario, Buenos Aires, and La Plata, we can single out Cory Brothers Ltd., Mudd & Co. and Wilson Sons & Co Ltd.—all coal merchants (Kelly, 1903). For instance, ‘in 1906, Cory Brothers had seventy-eight depots located around the world, eleven of which were in South America: Bahia, Bahia Blanca, Buenos Aires, La Plata, Montevideo, Pará, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Rosario, and Santos’ (Boyns & Gray, 2015, p. 66). Cory had its bunkers seated at the Barraca Peña railway junction in Buenos Aires and carried on the Cory’s Merthyr coal trade well into the 1940s. The F.C.S.—Temperley Coal Conveying Plant, Ribera Sud, later called Compañía Ribereña del Plata Coal Unloader—a coal transporter that centralised and supplied coal to industries and transport—stands out in the iconographic memory of the time. The guide for ranch owners called La Rural (1912, p. 379) provides the following players in the business: –– Roma y Cía.5 Corralón Atalaya (founded in 1880), Cardiff coal, Glasgow [coal], forge [coal], ash, gas coke, foundry coke. 4 5

 Advertisement in La Ilustración magazine, N°68, 1895.  Translator’s Note: “y Cía.” Is a contraction which means “and Co.”

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–– Worms y Cía. Introducers of black coal of all kinds, Cardiff coal for industry; Glasgow coal for domestic use; forge coal for blacksmithing, and so on; anthracite coal for producer gas engines and stoves; English coke for smelting. –– Wood James y William y Lamond Ltda. Barraca Britannia, coal importers. –– German Coal Warehouse Company Ltda. Deutsches Kohlen Depot GMBH. Cardiff Coal, cooking coal, forge coal, gas coke, smelting coke, anthracite, briquettes. –– In short, we identify the presence of coal for home, commercial, infrastructure, and trading purposes, even in the popular language of Buenos Aires.

A Port for the Capital of the Province of Buenos Aires In this section, we will examine the presence of mineral coal as a relevant product to understand the economy of the port of La Plata, the capital city of the province of Buenos Aires. La Plata was built within a short distance from the brand-new capital of Argentina during the period from 1890 to 1904. Coal is not generally considered part of the port of La Plata’s economy, so we present our first systematisation of its volume to evaluate the incidence of coal. The port of La Plata may be placed as a sort of political initiative in the creation stage of the Argentine port system (Ortiz, 1943). It was devised as the first port of the republic during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and its works began in approximately 1883 (de Paula, 1987). The relevance of the port project is linked to the founding of the city of La Plata, which was erected as the new capital of the Province of Buenos Aires (Lázzaro, 1982a). The plan was to locate a riverbank capital supported, fundamentally, by the establishment of an economic centre around the port’s commercial activity overseas, which would be able to channel exports from Buenos Aires through its premises (Lázzaro, 1982a). In 1890, La Plata’s port operations officially started. However, shortly after, different problems emerged in its development. A predominant interpretation portrays the port of La Plata as uneconomic, seeing its purpose promptly frustrated. These problems have been explained through political and economic issues related to its proximity to

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the port of Buenos Aires. Namely, in 1896, the province of Buenos Aires’ jurisdiction over the railways was terminated. Consequently, the special rates that benefited the port of La Plata to receive cereals were annulled (Lázzaro, 1982a, p. 313). Therefore, the commercial performance of the port of La Plata has been considered an ascending curve in its activity up to 1896 and a descending curve from 1897 onwards. This pattern is linked to the fact that in 1898, the northern channel of Puerto Madero was set up (Lázzaro, 1982b, p.  8), further favouring port activities towards Buenos Aires. There were also obstacles presented by the railway companies and the decline in imports—enhanced by the shipping companies of Italian, French, Spanish, and English flags ceasing their operations in the port of La Plata—which aggravated towards 1903 (Lázzaro, 1987). The situation led to the crisis that justified the port’s transfer to the national administration in October 1904 (Barreneche, 1987). Governor Julio A. Costa, speaking about the port’s first year of operations—about 1891—suggested commercial activities related to cereal exports, flammables imports and varied goods, as well as coal, wood, stone, and sand (Vitalone, 2020, p.  46.) At the time, Mann George y Cía., Wilson Sons y Cía, and Worms Josse y Cía. were corroborated by official documents as ‘Port-based companies’ (Vitalone, 2020, p. 49). In November 1892, The Standard ran an advertisement campaign for La Plata Coal Depot, whose London agents, Messrs. Mann, George & Co., explained their links with La Boca, Puerto Madero, and Buenos Aires. They offered ‘a large stock of [the] best Welsh coals, nuts, and house coals’, adding that ‘Steamers calling at La Plata Port, and coaling only with the depot mentioned above, are free from all port dues.’6 In the same newspaper, Wilson Sons, and Co. present themselves to the public as merchants and owners of coal warehouses in La Plata, Montevideo, Bahía, Santos, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, and Saint Vincent (see Chaps. 2 and 3). With their headquarters in London and branches in Cardiff, they record addresses at these latitudes, both in Buenos Aires and Montevideo. They promise the best South Wales coal, tugboats in all ports with depots, and exemption from port duties for ships taking supplies with the firm.7 6  The Standard, N° 9067, year XXXII, p. 2. Buenos Aires, November 25, 1892. Max Von Buch Library, San Andrés Digital Archive, Universidad de San Andrés, available at https:// repositorio.udesa.edu.ar/jspui/handle/10908/12234, last accessed 10 January 2023. 7  The Standard, N° 9067, year XXXII, p. 2. Buenos Aires, November 25, 1892. Max Von Buch Library, San Andrés Digital Archive, Universidad de San Andrés, available at https:// repositorio.udesa.edu.ar/jspui/handle/10908/12234, last accessed 10 January 2023.

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To study the representativeness of coal in the economy of this port, we turned to the official sources available with their statistical records. The information provided by the Report of the General Administration of the Port of La Plata of 1894 allows us to estimate that coal is not yet a predominant product. In 1894, exports from the port of La Plata comprised a total of 40,096 head of livestock; 26,125 units of cowhide; 39,976 bales of wool, hides and grass; and 768,414 containers with guts, leather, and tallow. In turn, they registered 20 products measured in kilograms, among which wheat accounted for just over 75%, followed by linen at 6.83%, maize at 3.48%, bran at 2.91%, flour at 2.83%, and coal at 1.77%. In the same year, little more than two-thirds of imports were goods in transit to Buenos Aires. If we differentiate what entered through the Central Dock and Dock No. 1 at the port of La Plata, coal represented 11.6%, taking up second place in the products list after firewood. Although we do not yet have official records for 1895 and 1896, it is possible to build a statistical series of the volume of exports registered by weight covering 1897 to 1904. Our analysis presents a picture in which the economy of the port of La Plata starts to change its features, with coal becoming prevalent in its product portfolio. A representation of how this product becomes predominant in its share of total exports is displayed in Fig. 7.1, measured in kilograms.8 1897 presented a significant drop in exports; among the reasons acknowledged in official sources, it is relevant to point out the losses of wheat and corn crops in the province of Buenos Aires.9 The drop in exports was observed in a variety of products comprised in ‘Fruits,’ of whom ‘the export has been 165,695,044  kg against 429,821,054  kg reached in the previous year.’10 In this group, which leaves livestock out, mineral coal happens to represent the line with greater importance, consisting of 21.73% of the total, followed by corn, 17.85%; jerky, 11.50%; pasture, 10.65%; and bran, 8.54%, among 54 types of registered products. We must also note that all the coal exported that year refers to onshore warehouses. In this regard, we can identify the activity of the warehouses owned by Mann George, Cory Brothers, Wilson Sons, and Worms as 8  We do not include the lines relating to livestock exports, measured in units, if they are affected by the closure of the English market, and we consider that the passage from live animal trade to the installation of the refrigeration industry occurred. 9  1897 General Administration Report on the Port of La Plata, p. 3. 10  Ibid, p. 4.

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400000 350000 300000 250000 200000 150000 100000 50000 0

1897 1898 26756.91 44018.29 Agricultural exports 138938.134 136977.172 Coal

1899 35000 179000

1900 53000 121000

1901 49000 113000

1902 85000 169000

1903 41000 96000

1904 70000 297000

Fig. 7.1  Exports from the port of La Plata, 1897–1904 (in tons). Sources: Author’s elaboration built on annual reports of the Administración General del Puerto de La Plata (1897–1903) and Carmona (1905)

stated in the ‘General production of Coal Warehouses and Company Docks and Warehouses.’ That year, the first two firms paid fees for warehousing and steamers carrying coal, while all four companies did so for charges referring to steamboats coming in with the coal. The amounts represented by this last item might indicate the economic relevance of Wilson Sons, who paid a sum of M$N11 18,427.74; Mann George, M$N15,092.94; Worms, M$N3260.32; and Cory Brothers, M$N1136.94. Likewise, our analysis of the imports accounted for by the port of La Plata shows us a higher predominance of mineral coal. Although by 1894, coal accounted for approximately 11.6% of imports, in 1897, it was 46%. It is worth mentioning that the destinations of the port indicated different types of activities since it provided the warehouses located within the port

11  Translator’s Note: The Peso Moneda Nacional was the currency in force in Argentina between 1881 and 1969.

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as well as the Western Railway and La Plata Gas Company.12 In 1898, coal imports also included the Argentine War Office as one of its destinations. That year, the port administrator acknowledged that the increase in imports was related to ‘the large imports of black coal which increased over the imports of 1897 by 51,401,016 kilos.’13 In 1900 records, you can follow this dynamic in which coal imports predominate, along with materials for railway companies and goods in transit to Buenos Aires. By way of illustration, it is possible to estimate that the direct overseas import to La Plata was approximately 822 tons of goods, while black coal accounted for 93,000 tons.14 Thus, we are interested in emphasising that the participation of mineral coal in the port of La Plata exports and imports indicates a no minor incidence in understanding the port’s economy.  In 1899  the coal dropped in its share to 16.21%, but  the  prevalence of this product represented a third of the total exports measured by its weight between 1900 and 1903. Then, it went down to 19% in 1904 when the port’s economy outlined new activities with the establishment of refrigeration industries. This profile of the port linked to the activity of fuels, such as coal, oil, and other flammables, was considered by some officials and leading political actors at that time. In the context of the port’s conveyance to the control of the national administration, Governor Marcelino Ugarte valued the arrival of capital for ‘the construction of a large refrigeration establishment—the La Plata Cold Storage—and the licences on the land required to install oil tanks granted to two companies’ (Vitalone, 2020, p.  77). During his last legislative address, governor Ugarte deemed ‘favourable conditions to turn the port into the great coal market in the Río de la Plata’ region. At the same time, he promoted the extension of the railway network to meridian V and Trenque Lauquen (Vitalone, 2020, p.  77). Finally, the annexation of the port of La Plata as an extension of that of Buenos Aires was approved by Act No. 4436, sanctioned on September 24, 1904. It went into effect by decree on October 17 of the same year to grant better conditions to the movement of cattle and coal and the Navy workshops (Scoccia, 1950, p.  36). The province transferred, in return, part of its obligations for loans taken abroad.

 Ibídem, p. 6.  Ibídem, 1898, pp. 6–7. 14  Ibídem, 1900, p. 15. 12 13

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From this perspective, there are elements to consider that the port of La Plata redefined part of its characteristics and acquired the function of a coal supply station for the steamers that crossed the Río de la Plata basin. To support this interpretation, we can rely on the data recovered by Carmona (1905), which indicate that, according to our calculations, 29.93% and 18.09% of the exports of 1903 and 1904, respectively, corresponded to Charbon de Terre reembarqué pour la consommation des vapeurs (p. 327). So much so that there were records of the entry of 311 ships from overseas in 1904. Of that total, 135 took some coal and completed their cargo; 22 loaded products from the new refrigeration industry; the rest unloaded and carried cereals (Carmona, 1905, p. 326).

The Supply of Coal in the Heart of the Pampa gringa The instances of conflict that altered the dynamics of the regional port cities of Santa Fe and Rosario—both located in the province of Santa Fe at the heart of the Pampa gringa—especially the worldwide financial crises, the internal armed revolts, and the international war conflicts (particularly World War I), had an impact on the regular circuits of the provision of essential materials, such as coal. The first city we mentioned was the state capital (Santa Fe); the second city (Rosario) was the most prominent railway port conglomerate in the interior. Newspapers proliferated in both. They emerged as a source leading to the detection of public and private actors associated with the coal world beyond the aspects of its commercialisation. The newspaper Santa Fe, founded in the city of the same name in 1911, was one of the most relevant papers in those years. Salvador Espinosa, a young Spanish immigrant son of settlers, was its owner and director. In a short time, he made a fortune in rural and financial businesses, which led him to create Banco Popular. Espinosa founded the previously mentioned Santa Fe newspaper after graduating as a prosecutor. He did not join any political parties and had an excellent relationship with officials and leaders of different parties. He was an exponent of integrated leadership and favoured the dynamics of the port and the region since he had land in the central west part of the province.15 Therefore, his journalistic venture became a platform for the interests of local leaders, an interface bridge for 15  El Orden newspaper, Santa Fe, August 8 and 10, 1928; Santa Fe newspaper, Santa Fe, August 8–11, 1928.

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communications and connections, where ensuring the vigour of such dynamics was a priority. The regular supply of coal was the fuel for this market, as it was in most of the world’s cities related to the capitalist system. In this regard, any piece of information that put the coal supply at risk deserves special attention and a space in the newspaper’s columns. The Santa Fe regularly replicated telegrams dated in London with the latest news about coaling workers’ strikes and compiled the repercussions that could have affected port operations, boat movements, and the consistency of the lines in the Río de la Plata region. The alarm tone in those reports became more pressing as the cereal export period approached.16 The newspaper Santa Fe had The Anglo-Argentine Coal Co. among its main advertising contributors, a link in a complex network of British companies belonging to the same consortium. For overseas ships to complete their round trip, they required two mandatory things: an infrastructure that would speed up unloading and loading and the provision of coal. Taking the latter into consideration, agents of this logistical phase—also specialised in coal and steamships—emerged in different port cities of the world, with presence in the ports of all lines and routes since the mid-­ nineteenth century. The agents’ main concern was that coal would be available when ships needed it, and it would be of the best possible quality. Towards the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the globalisation process intensified. With a noticeable increase in the dimensions of steamships and a greater demand for coal to be used in other port activities, agents expanded the size of warehouses and inventory to supply occasional customers. It required agents to increase financial support and strengthen the business structure. As we have already mentioned, among the most influential firms that established offices in the Southern Cone were Wilson, Sons & Co., and Cory Brothers (Boyns & Gray, 2015). Amaral, Sutherland & Co. traded coal through agents in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. In the latter, it had representatives in Campana, Salto, Rosario, and Santa Fe and supplied South American railways and steam companies (Boyns & Gray, 2015). Cardiff Coals imported coal through the ports of Buenos Aires, Bahía Blanca and Rosario, through which they exported the most substantial volume of cereals in the country, and Welsh Coal did the same through the port of La Plata. Ports such as Santa Fe, which still presented connection problems until the inauguration of the new port in 1913, were a  Santa Fe, March 28, 1912.

16

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commercially vacant marketplace until the arrival of the Anglo-Argentine Coal. This expansion—settled in the furthest seaport to the north of the Paraná River—could reflect the expansive impulse of coal commercialisation, hand in hand with the new mergers of agents and coal mines, which, in turn, resulted in new groups with greater logistical capacity. It would become the summit of a process on the rise before the storm of a great war conflagration. The Anglo-Argentine Coal, with headquarters in Cambrian Buildings, Cardiff, and secondary offices in Buenos Aires, traded Cardiff coal, forge coal, anthracite, and Glasgow coal for affordable kitchens. They built their warehouses in the brand-new Dock 2 in the local port, from where they loaded their cargo directly to the wagons of the Central Argentino, Santa Fe, and Central Norte railways. In this way, the warehouses were located a few blocks from the heart of the city to conveniently serve consumers in general and, at the same time, provide services to the railways and port activities. It is important to remember that the directors of the UK companies in Argentina, who had a close relationship with those of the British coal companies in the homeland, bought produce only from their compatriots. Therefore, it is not surprising that one-third of the coal exported from South Wales reached Argentina and that it ‘was the largest market for railway materials outside the Empire’ (Fodor & O’Connell, 1973, p. 3). The Anglo-Argentine Coal local representative was Roberto E. Casanello, who, in different periods, provided fuel coal by contract for the various activities of the port of Santa Fe and participated in bidding processes to such an end. The company warehouses remained within the port facilities until early 1917. At the time, the Customs Office and the Ministry of Public Works prevented Anglo-Argentine Coal from continuing operations in this area, despite the complaints from trade leaders. They considered that the firm commercial enterprise also favoured the activity of a port that had to fight for its survival. They faced the lack of maintenance in the dredging of the Paraná River and the competition posed by other ports such as Rosario.17 What events intervened for this British firm to lose the possibility of operating within a modern port in just 4 years? It exceeds the scope of this work. Nevertheless, it cannot be separated from the political changes that marked the end of the 1880 regime and the beginning of the Argentina of  Ibid., March 1st, 1917.

17

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Radicalism. For its part, the newspaper Santa Fe, the local leaders’ voice, and the advertiser of the British firm, opposed the transfer at the time. The entrance of the United States into the Great War in April 1917 made the position of Santa Fe on the future of coal supply even more dire. In its own words, if until then, the leading states-people in the country did not find a solution to the complexity posed by the shortage of Great Britain fuel, even more so now that the Northern country seemed to suspend exports.18 The Yankee coal, as the newspaper called it to distinguish it from that coming from Great Britain, regularly entered through the local port to supply the city and surrounding area, and therefore, the chronicles closely followed the fate of the convoys. There had been rumours that the United States would stop exporting its coal to Latin America. These rumours and the impossibility of having ships on our own affected the cereal trade, with prices showing a downwards tendency. ‘Coal and warehouses are like the lung and legs for what our fields can yield,’ the newspaper sentenced. That is why Santa Fe hoped that Argentine diplomacy would change the situation and get the United States and the United Kingdom to send ships to load the harvests, thus avoiding farmers’ and banks’ debt and bankruptcy. However, Argentina was at the mercy of the countries with coal and warehouses in their hands, ‘the two factors of world transport.’19 Another relevant issue involving a wide range of local institutional actors (reflected in the newspaper and mentioned above) was the shortage of domestic consumption of coal and its consequences on business practices and the population’s quality of life. Because of the sum of causes reviewed, 1917 was a turning point. The newspaper began to pay attention to the incipient explorations supported by the authorities searching for coal deposits in the Patagonia and Cuyo regions. In turn, they motivated the benefit of having our fleet and a national system for railway supply. In turn, they boosted the usefulness of having our fleet and a national system for railway supply. It was a situation that put back on the table the discussion about authorities seeking increasing governmental intervention in the domains of industry and commerce, as happened in other countries.20

 Ibid., April 27, 1917.  Ibid., April 18, 1917. 20  Ibid., 27 April 1917. 18 19

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Urban Cultural Footprints In addition to the economic and political aspects of the coal circuits, we can see the newspapers of the analysed ports as a window into the sociocultural dimension forged by the daily consumption of coal. However, other published sources allow the reconstruction of that world. The word carbonero (coalman) is mentioned as a type of trade in the first national census of 1869 (Weissel, 2009, p.  267). Carbonero means ‘gossiper, instigator, scheming’ in the popular Argentine language. Carbonear means ‘to embroil, entangle, instigate, intrigue, warm the head with gossip’ in the same popular tongue. The inhabitants and workers of Buenos Aires, in their Lunfardo21 language, speak of the carbunín or carbonero; the retail seller of charcoal was popularly called carbunín, a diminutive of the Genoese carboné, carbonero (Gobello & Olivari, 1995). The coalman’s trade and workplace covered a wide variety: a coal yard, a coal room, a coal retail selling point, and a coal depot. About 1886, the Buenos Aires directory, edited by Hugo Kunz, announced the sale of black coal for cooking and forging (Cardiff coal, Cook coal, charcoal). It also included several associated businesses, such as the trades of the weigher and the coal broker, the sale of affordable stoves, stove charcoal, steam, and forge coal. We noticed the combination of coal enterprises with iron, corn, and salt materials. This assortment reflects the range of supplementary city-port businesses and retailers. By 1913, the Kraft directory announced 800 coal shops in Buenos Aires and promoted the sale of Cardiff coal for industrial purposes and Glasgow coal for domestic use. That same year, a journalist from Caras y Caretas22 reported, ‘A particular case was that of the coalmen or coal dockers, an indispensable input of merchant ships. From before sunrise until late at night, coalmen collected the combustible material from the barracks to the ship holds.’ According to the chronicles, they were particularly ‘silent, dedicated, sad men’ characterised by resignation and sweat due to the arduous task they fulfilled. La Boca, Isla Maciel, and Dock 4 were the main port coaling stations. There, hundreds of men came and went on planks and bridges, pushing away the coal dust and the 21  Translator’s Note: Lunfardo was an argot used by criminals and people from the lower classes around the turn of the twentieth century in Buenos Aires, later spreading to other social strata. It still exists today as Buenos Aires slang. 22  Translator’s Note: Caras y Caretas is an Argentine magazine that has been published since 1890. It contains political satire and humour visually displayed through cartoons and photographs.

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stone, filling sacks to load them in the horse carts or the electric utility rail carts, like an anthill blackening the middle of a wide grey stripe, only interrupted at lunchtime in search of some shade away from the sun in the taverns and corners of the neighbourhood (Caruso, 2019, p. 29).

Conclusions At the beginning of the twentieth century, the coal business was consolidated by the close ties forged between coal agents with mining companies and their offices in Great Britain ports, especially Wales, allowing the distances between the supplier and the customer to be shortened. In 1913, Wales’s second coal company merged with Wilsons, forming Ocean Coal & Wilsons.23 A new player in the industry emerged in the Cambrian Group, which under the direction and ownership of David Alfred Thomas (shortly after Lord Rhondda), knew how to build a network of mining companies and agencies that, strengthened by this union, also expanded and came to compete with another group that had already been operating in the Southern Cone: Cory Brothers, which in our country had warehouses in Bahía Blanca, Buenos Aires, La Plata (Ensenada), and Rosario (surveyed by the US report already mentioned). In addition, the Cambrian Group and Cory Brothers were coal producers and agents combined, and they also owned their ships. Not only did they supply their customers but also the Royal Navy, and thus secured their dominance over the seas.24 The United States Federal Trade Commission published a report in 1916 explaining the business strategy that allowed Lord Rhondda to establish Consolidated Cambrian in 1913. He did so by the union of four mining companies that produced between three to four million tons of coal annually. The alliances established by the tycoon with seven other companies where he was a partner ‘included lines of foreign ships, railways and depots.’ Among them, we could mention: L.  Gueret, where Lord Rhondda was vice president and which had headquarters in Paris; la Société Genérale d’Houilleries et Agloméres, with warehouses in the main ports of France (Le Havre, Saint Malo, Saint Nazaire, Nantes, Bizerte, Chantenay, Tours, Bordeaux, Marseille, and Tunis). L. Gueret also owned shares in Gueret, Gait & Co.—where Lord Rhondda was deputy chairman—and in the Societá Britannica Italiana Gueret—a company set up to  Federal Trade Commission, 1916, p. 83.  Ibid, p. 333.

23 24

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take care of his business in Italy, of whom he was director—with warehouses in Genoa, Savona, Leghorn, Naples, Venice, and La Spezia.25 On the other hand, L. Gueret was a shareholder in Amaral Sutherland & Co., a coal trading company, where Lord Rhondda was vice president. The company had warehouses and ship refuelling services in Río de Janeiro and Río Grande do Sul (Brazil). In 1913, the Anglo-Argentine Coal was created to extend its restocking business in the Río de la Plata. The brand-­ new company quickly became a supplier to the Brazilian and Chilean navies, several South American railway systems, and large steamboat lines. According to the US report mentioned earlier, the Cambrian Group, Cory Brothers, and other British firms had a logistical power in their warehouses and port facilities, which made it one of the main elements of their supremacy over the US coal exporters, as well as in the relationship with the coal consuming companies and industrial plants. The US report stated, as an example, that the Wilson firm—also a producer and exporter of coal, as it was said—was linked through a director it had in common with several railway companies in Argentina. The report concluded that for the United States of America to have positive results in its competition against Great Britain—who predominated in South America through Welsh coal—it should have, like the European country, greater participation in South American markets and the control of transport, mooring, storage, and distribution facilities there.26 River Plate Coal—owned by London companies Moxey Savon and Blandy Brothers—has stood out for its importance in Buenos Aires since 1900. It mainly imported coal and acquired warehouses and contracts to provide this product to ships and maritime agencies. It already had contracts signed to supply the steamers’ coal bunkers of the leading companies arriving in Argentina. In turn, the company provided coal for domestic and industrial purposes to different parts of the city and the country, especially to the barracks on the left bank of the Riachuelo, where it also had the Barraca Moxey—7000 square metres (75,350 sq.ft.) of storage capacity for 20,000 tons of coal. River Plate Coal also owned a flotilla of barges to replenish the ships’ coal pits.27

 Ibid, p. 333–336.  Ibid., p. 336. 27  W. H. Morton Cameron, Commercial Encyclopaedia, Third Published Section, British Supplement, London, 1922, p. 197. 25 26

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Identifying the institutional, economic, social, political, and cultural actors involved in the different interfaces in the dynamics of port cities and geographical regions—in this case, through the coal circuits—offers the opportunity to assess the density of international networks with greater accuracy and their mediating role in the possibilities for the development of the regions. In the case of this research, the topic presents favourable characteristics and considerable potential for interdisciplinary analysis.28 Finally, our interest is in settling our first inquiries into the subject and continuing to develop an agenda of issues regarding ports and bunkering.

References Astesano, E. (1949). Historia de la independencia económica: aporte a la formación de una conciencia industrial Argentina. El Ateneo. Barreneche, O. (1987). Política y realidad económica del puerto La Plata 1880-1904. In Primer Congreso Nacional de Historia de los Puertos Argentinos (pp. 31–54). Buenos Aires. Boyns, T., & Gray, S. (2015). Welsh coal and the informal empire in South America, 1850–1913. Atlantic Studies, 13(1), 53–77. Braudel, F. (2002). La dinámica del capitalismo. Breviario Fondo de Cultura Económica. Carmona, H. (1905). Ports de la Capitale et de La Plata. Description el mouvement comercial. Taller de Impresiones Oficiales. Caruso, L. (2019). Territorialidades portuarias. La experiencia obrera en perspectiva local en el Puerto de Buenos Aires, inicios del Siglo XX. Lo local en debate. Andújar y Lichtmajer (Comp.) Abordajes desde la historia social, política y los estudios de género (Argentina, 1900–1960) (pp. 23–54). : Teseo. de Paula, A. (1987). La Ciudad de La Plata. Sus tierras y su arquitectura. Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires. Fodor, J., & O’Connell, A. (1973). La Argentina y la economía atlántica en la primera mitad del siglo XX. Desarrollo económico, 3–65. Gobello, J., & Olivari, M. (1995). Diccionario del habla de Buenos Aires. Carpe Noctum. Gorringe, H. H. (1875). The Rio de la Plata. Government. Printing Office. Gosselman, C. A. (1995). Informes Sobre Los Estados Sudamericanos en Los Años de 1837 y 1838. Editorial Abya Yala. Janitens, M., & Pezzutti, N. (2004). Historia de la minería Argentina. Tomo 2. Servicio Geológico Minero Argentino. 28  Two historians, an archaeologist and anthropologist, a political scientist specialised in logistics, and two geographers have taken part in the present analysis.

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Kelly’s Merchants and Manufacturers of the World. (1903). Argentina. Kraft, G. Ltda, (1913) Guía de Forasteros para el Estado de Buenos Aires 1855. Anuario Kraft. (vol. 1). 1913. Lázzaro, S. (1982a). El Puerto de La Plata: Aspectos de su evolución histórica (1882-1904). Investigaciones y Ensayos, 32, 291–322. Lázzaro, S. (1982b). El proceso histórico del puerto de La Plata 1882–1982, Revista de La Bolsa de Comercio de La Plata. Lázzaro, S. B. (1987). Historia de los puertos argentinos 1880–1914 (Tesis de posgrado). Presentada en Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación para optar al grado de Doctora en Historia. Lobo, M., & Riudavets. (1868). Manual de la navegación del Rio de la Plata y de sus principales afluentes, con instrucciones para la recalada y derrotas de ida y vuelta á Europa, según los documentos más fidedignos, nacionales y extranjeros, por los Señores Lobo y Riudavets. T. Fortanet. Mato, D. (2004). Redes transnacionales de actores globales y locales en la producción de representaciones de ideas de sociedad civil. In Políticas de ciudadanía y sociedad civil en tiempos de globalización (pp. 67–93). Universidad Central de Venezuela. Ortiz, R. (1943). Valor económico de los puertos argentinos. Editorial Losada. Ortiz, R. (1971). Historia económica de la Argentina. Plus Ultra.ç. Parish, W. M. (1852). Buenos Aires y las provincias del Rio de la Plata: Desde su descubrimiento y conquista por los españoles. Imprenta Benito Hortelano. Rapoport, M. (2009). Argentina: economía y política internacional. Los procesos históricos, Diplomacia, Estrategia, Política, 10, 26–50. Rural, L. (1912). Guía general de estancieros de la república confeccionada para los miembros de las sociedades rurales argentinas. La Rural. Russell, R. (1998). La globalización: situación y proceso. Ciclos, 8, 38–50. Scalabrini Ortiz, R. (2010). Historia de los Ferrocarriles Argentinos. Editorial Fundación Ross. South America Pilot. (1919–1920). Hydrographic office under the authority of the secretary of the navy. Washington, Govt. Print. Off.. Scoccia, J. (1950). Puerto La Plata: definición, origen, evolución, realidad. La Plata, Argentina. South America Pilot. (1927–1930). Hydrographic office under the authority of the secretary of the navy. Washington, Govt. Print. Off. Suárez Bosa, M. (Ed.). (2014). Atlantic ports and the first globalisation, 1850–1930. Palgrave. Tilden, J. N., & Clarke, A. (1903). A geography of commerce for academies, high schools, and business colleges. Benj. H. Sanborn & Co. Valiñas, F. (2011). Druid. El primer vapor del río de la Plata. Ciclo de Conferencias año.

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CHAPTER 8

The Coal Economy in Brazil (1850–1889) Cezar Honorato, Luiz Cláudio M. Ribeiro, and Thiago Mantuano

Introduction In its early days, coal was the energy source most widely used for domestic consumption or for manufacturing production, a phenomenon that was repeated in many parts of the world. When, in the early eighteenth century, the calorific properties of coal were verified by British metallurgists as of superior qualities, the search for new deposits of the fuel

C. Honorato (*) University Federal Fluminense, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil L. C. M. Ribeiro University Federal of Espirito Santo, Vitoria, Brazil T. Mantuano University Estadual of Santa Cruz, Ilheus, Brazil © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Castillo Hidalgo, C. Honorato (eds.), Fuelling the World Economy, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32565-6_8

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increased—especially those types named lignite or hard coal, possibly convertible into coke.1 During the Industrial Revolution, the English bourgeois pioneers found in the coal properties of duration and calorific power elevation the possibilities for energy generation by burning the fuel to propel its vapours. At that time, the introduction of the steam machine in textile manufacturing made Spinning Jenny applicable on an industrial scale. Gradually, the arising English industry overcame the unpredictability of power generation by winds, river currents or animal traction and adopted the predictability of steam power, as well as the profitable coal trade—the “fuel of the revolution”. Modern machinery made of iron and steel and powered by steam turned coal into the most important industrial energy source (Hobsbawm, 2003). Throughout the nineteenth century, the possibility of using steam propulsion and the use of its gases in almost all productive applications became clear. In this sense, our chapter considers the period in which the use of steam became widespread in transformation activities, in services and even in agriculture and, especially, when it spread geographically, reaching the Empire of Brazil. This, of course, has to do with the expansion of capitalism and its mode of commodity production.

Brazil into the World Market Before analysing the use of coal in the Brazilian economy, it is important to briefly present the characteristics of Brazilian society, economy, and politics since its founding bases in the early nineteenth century, even though the process approached by this article takes place in its second half. The arrival of the fleeing Court from Bonapartist Europe between 1807 and 1808 to Brazil radically altered the existing metropolis-colony relationship in the Old Portuguese Colonial System. At the height of the 1  Lignite and hard coal were the most widely extracted combustible sedimentary rocks in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries due to their abundant availability, relative ease of extraction, superior calorific properties and chemical composition that allow for wide applications, such as the possibility of transforming these rocks into by-products. Hard coal coking was the most widely used process for transforming coal. The result was coke, a swollen and porous mineral residue obtained by confining the coal in a chamber with high temperatures and without oxygen. Coke was valued for its applications for direct use in metallurgy and the high control of its burning, due to the absence of gases expelled in the transformation process (Freese, 2004).

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colonial period, sugar exports, in addition to other products, set the tone for Brazilian production, while the rise of coffee production is a phenomenon of independent Brazil. The massive export of this product followed the construction of the Brazilian National State, marking its economy and insertion in the world market (Honorato & Ribeiro, 2014). First, the take-off of coffee production was based on slavery, the transatlantic slave trade, and the free appropriation of land. However, the demands of the world market led the manor class to seek to modernize the national infrastructure to improve coffee production, transport greater quantities with greater speed and quality, and finance the crop and the implementation of other needs for its expansion. These were the conditions for raising Brazil to the rank of the world’s largest coffee producer. This movement was coeval with the second phase of industrialization in Europe, whose most observable consequence was the reduction of space-­ time distances in the process of repeated combination of national economies, although structurally unequal between them. The International Division of Labour forced nations to seek their comparative advantages, and with that, the entire national economy was reorganized. Brazil, like the rest of Latin America, reaffirmed its socioeconomic structure for the agro-export model that, both due to the imperial fiscal policy and its dependence on the foreign trade in coffee, also pressured the State, companies, and people to import and consume foreign products. In this scenario, as it did not present—at least as far as it was known up to that moment—exploited or exploitable deposits of coal, Brazil found itself in the condition of importer-experimenter of the fuel. However, the unfolding of the historical process demonstrates that Brazil became a regular importer of fuel, especially after the end of the transatlantic slave trade in 1850. This increased to the point of energy dependence in the following four decades. As early as 1835, legislation was approved authorizing the construction of railroads in the sugar export regions (Pernambuco and Bahia)— although only in 1858, construction of the Recife-São Francisco Railroad began. In addition, in coffee producing areas, in 1850, São Paulo Railway started the connection between Jundiaí and Santos and, years later, the Estrada de Ferro Dom Pedro II (1855) connected the Court to the countryside of the province, in Vale do Paraíba, as well as Minas Gerais and São Paulo—aiming at the export of the main product of the Brazilian export basket.

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In this regard, it is important to note that first, the need to improve transportation was due to the strengthening of the agrarian-export economy, then the war in Paraguay/Triple Alliance (1864–1870),2 and, finally, the urbanization-industrialization of the capital were preponderant factors for the growing presence of coal in the Brazilian import basket. Brazilian coffee, processed by imported and domestic machines, transported by railroads and—as we can see from the various mentions of international routes of the great transoceanic navigation—by large steam packets, began to be consumed massively in the centre of capitalism (Ribeiro, 2021). On the other hand, several industrial productive activities emerged in Brazil, especially in the last third of the nineteenth century. In Rio de Janeiro, the expansion of construction, maintenance, and repair shipyards for steamers, including the military, due to the advent of war; pioneer factories; and urban expansion and densification, especially the implementation of gas lighting in the city, increased volumes and opened new prospects for coal consumption in the country. In Appendix 8.1, we highlight the numbers of the import basket that mark three different moments in the trajectory of coal in Brazil: the introduction of this fuel until 1850; the pressure for better and more comprehensive means of transportation and the Paraguay War until 1870; and the extension, increase of capacities and intersection of modes of transportation, urban expansion and densification and industrialization of the capital, still in process in 1890. Coal appears among the products with the greatest weight in Brazilian imports since the beginning of this time frame, establishing itself in the same period in which coffee exports grow—a basic product that consolidates Brazil’s insertion in the world market, generating a strong impact on obtaining foreign exchange. In reverse order, fabric and leather manufacturers decrease in the import basket, while imports of machinery, equipment, and tools appear and firm up, as well as iron and steel imports to Brazil.

2  Last border war involving Brazil, which faced the Empire, together with the Republic of Argentina and Uruguay, against the Republic of Paraguay.

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Energy Dependence: Coal in the Empire of Brazil A double movement of the introduction of coal in the Brazilian economy precedes our time frame. On the one hand, traders in Rio de Janeiro, especially the British, pressed for a greater and cheaper supply of coal for residential use, as well as for marketing the fuel that optimized factories. It was used in some commercial practices and introduced in new urban services in the Court. On the other hand, the imperial government was compelled to facilitate the entry of this fuel into the country due to the economic modernization it aspired to, especially in the means of processing and transporting exported coffee. This led to several legal measures on coal imports that allowed the introduction and generalization of this input, constituting a coal economy in Brazil. It is worth mentioning, first, the issue of Decree 376, of August 12, 1844, which regulated the tax bases for importing products—considered protectionist by scholars. In its 5th article, it determined that the tax for importing stone coal should be 5%, one of the lowest in the country (Brazil 376/1844). As early as 1855, when Estrada de Ferro Dom Pedro II—the main railway in the country—was incorporated through Decree 1599 of May 9, 1855, article 11 determined total exemption in the import of coal for that railway: The same exemption will be granted to wagons, locomotives, and other materials necessary for its construction. All stone coal and coke required for the service of the railway and its workshops will enjoy the same exemption for a period of 33 years. The enjoyment of these favours will be subject to fiscal regulations, which the government may establish to prevent abuse. An account will be organized for the amounts thus obtained from the National Treasury, which will have to be refunded by the Company to the Government in the cases declared below. (Brazil 1.599/1855)

According to Azevedo (2018), coal became totally exempt from customs duties throughout the country in the tax revision of 1857, which clearly aimed to expand the consumption of coal. Three years later, since the product was exempt from those taxes, the customs regulations guaranteed coal to be one of the goods with customs advantages—the so-called “dispatch on water”. A procedure that streamlined bureaucracy and loosened inspection for its importation (Brazil 2647/1860).

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Railroads were the main consumers of this new fuel, being used as key vehicles to distribute the product domestically. Ten years after receiving customs exemption for its own use of coal, the transportation of goods for consumption by third parties had become an important source of income for the main railroad in the country. In the same sense, another imperial decision defined subsidized prices for the transport of coal and charcoal on Estrada de Ferro Dom Pedro II (Dom Pedro II Railroad)—then state-­ owned—to its various stop stations (Brazil, 3.559/1865). An extra economic factor resulting from the strategic intentions of the Empire of Brazil regarding its borders, access to the River Plate and the full use of other large rivers that penetrated the Brazilian territory, of an eminently geopolitical nature—even though there were also elements of commercial and agrarian interest—leveraged not only state demand but also Brazilian coal imports themselves and matured the country’s arising energy dependence (Salles, 1990). This was the War of Paraguay or War of the Triple Alliance (Fig. 8.1). It is important to note that Great Britain interfered in the South American conflict to protect its interests. One of the expedients of the British Empire was the supply of everything necessary to the belligerents, including of course, the fuel that moved the Brazilian military vessels, English-made and steam-powered. According to Beaud (2001), British

Fig. 8.1  Military Navy by driving force, (1850–1880). Sources: Author’s elaboration. Brazil. Ministry of the Navy. Proposal and Report. Rio de Janeiro: National Press, 1850–1880

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mines were the largest coal producers in the world, and that nation also figured as the largest exporter of this fuel. In Brazil, the Paraguayan War only increased the predominance of the British in the coal market, which was already a result of the long-­established economic and political relations with that country. We will also see that dependence was not restricted to the supply from British deposits but also to transporters, financiers, insurers, importers, and distributors of coal in Brazil who were, for the most part, British or Brazilians of British descent or in partnership with the English. It must be said that this process was not exclusive to Brazil; Boyns and Gray (2016) show that there are clear parallels between the Brazilian and Argentinean cases. Soon after the war undertaken by Brazil against Paraguay (1864–1870), the annual average of Brazilian imports of British coal jumped to 1,541,715 pounds sterling, which made up 4.48% of the value of everything that was imported by Brazil from Great Britain. This meant an impressive 97.5% of Brazilian coal imports to British producers (Fig. 8.2) (Grahan, 1973). The Imperial government created all the conditions for the energy dependence of the Brazilian economy. However, there is still a historiographical discussion about when the supposed redirection of energy policy in the country took place. Pereira (2007, p. 86) points out the absence of systematic legislation that would guide the extraction of minerals from Brazilian soil and shows how several specific measures, such as decrees and isolated laws, weakened the possibilities of exploring Brazilian soil. The

Fig. 8.2  Brazilian imports of British coal, 1870–1889. Note: annual average in pounds. Sources (annual average in pounds): Grahan (1973, p. 331)

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author also highlights that this institutional environment has discouraged research for probing and projecting Brazil’s potential mineral wealth in various regions of the country: The little attention given to research that aimed to better understand the national soil and thus the country’s natural resources is strange when referring to a state that was under construction and forged an image of strength and opulence, largely based on the potential of its nature. After all, ­knowledge of a territory is an essential part of asserting power in each space. (Pereira, 2007, p. 117)

Brazil’s patent dependence on energy stimulated the search for coal deposits for private exploration. When reviewing the legislation, we found 121 authorizations from the Imperial government to individuals and companies interested in coal mining between 1852 and 1889. According to Fig. 8.3, the 1870s were a milestone in this impulse, but the accumulation of multifactorial demands and the prolonged weight of these imports in the Brazilian trade balance—which is expressed in the balance of payments itself, by the chain of services that the coal import raised—made this stimulus continuous through authorizations, especially in the provinces of Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Pará, São Paulo, Bahia, Santa Catarina, and Minas Gerais. Among these concessions, The Tubarão Brazilian Coal Mining Company Limited experienced the longest-lasting experience. The

Fig. 8.3  State concessions for coal exploration works by province, 1850–1880. Source: Author’s elaboration. Brazil (1850–1889), various issues

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English-owned company was founded in 1883 and aimed to explore coal deposits in Santa Catarina, but it lasted only four years (Goularti Filho, 2011). It perished due to the poor quality of the coal it obtained and the high cost of production, being uncompetitive compared to similar imported products. It is a fact that the search for new and internal sources of coal supply emerged in the Empire, as well as the first Brazilian hydroelectric plants were experimented with in the 1880s, but it is possible to verify that these solutions were limited or still experimental in the face of the growing and increasingly more varied reasons why the fuel was demanded. After all, the coal economy in Brazil was based on three basic assumptions that explain it: British imports and a tendency to strengthen British importers or those associated with them; the creation of socioeconomic conditions for the generalization of use—especially in its burning by steam engines—and the support of demand due to multiple factors that increased over time; and the centralization of the market in Rio de Janeiro, resulting in a concentration of capital in a few privileged and powerful companies, protagonists of the “coal business”, going far beyond mere imports.

The Question of Coal Consumption From the 1870s onwards, new factors linked to the great expansion of the coffee plantation and the needs regarding the transportation of this production and the sophistication and implementation of some urban economic activities, especially in Rio de Janeiro, boosted the growing consumption of coal in Brazil. Fuel imports grew, and prices tended to rise in the domestic market. The concentration of coal distribution to other provinces from Rio de Janeiro rose. As a result of this process, the largest coal dealers were much more powerful, centralizing imports and the capital resulting from the reproduction of the coal economy. The disparity between agents in the coal market in Rio de Janeiro began to point to a movement of monopolization that allowed them to carry out other businesses and other economic activities related to the main product of their companies, the so-called “coal business”. Before proceeding with this analysis, it is necessary to clarify the multiple factors that sustained the volume of demand formed during the Paraguayan War and, in addition, made the channels more sophisticated and shaped this market in the Empire of Brazil.

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Fig. 8.4  World share of Brazilian coffee production, 1820–1889. Sources: Martins (1990, p. 39)

Brazilian coffee production went from the status of world leader to the status of major compared to the rest of the world and ended up making Brazilian coffee producers and middlemen the product’s price makers worldwide (Fig. 8.4). Figure 8.4 shows how the Empire of Brazil became the largest coffee “farm” in the world, but it is possible to infer that the Brazilian economy was not limited to this production and, on the contrary, its strength unfolded in an important chain effect in other sectors of the economy. The rise and dominance of Brazilian coffee in the world market created a growing interest in the integration of its economy into central capitalism, as well as pressured the Empire to adapt its infrastructures, adapt its legal-­political framework, strain its social relations of production—in expansion, intensification and degradation of slavery, in the massive immigration of poor Europeans as legally free workers—and provided the window of opportunity for the Brazilian economy to be incremented with some sophistication, even if conditioned by its structural dependence. Transportation was certainly the subsector of services in which the imperial government, national and foreign capital were most engaged in expanding in the last decades of that regime. It was obvious that coffee was produced inland, far from the coast, and had to reach the seaport cities—first, Rio de Janeiro, and then Santos, in time and in conditions to be exported. In reverse order, the structure also transported the increasingly

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voluminous, varied, and essential import loads that entered the largest Brazilian seaports. It was no longer a question of implementing the railroad and steam navigation. The government, planters, traders, and all those in positions of power were under pressure to expand, diversify and, ultimately, create a Brazilian transportation network. It is evident that if this network was to be based on land and maritime steam transportation, having the fuel that would move them in abundance was fundamental. The railroad expansion that took place in Brazil was important for the rise in demand for coal in two ways: if, on the one hand, its construction and operation largely consumed fuel; on the other hand, each kilometre of railroad built inland meant new stations that optimized distribution and gave capillarity to the consumption of coal in the country. In 1890, the Brazilian railroads reached 16,225 km (Cole, 1957). In the middle of the nineteenth century, Brazilian navigation (or by sea and rivers in Brazil), in general, mostly wind and human-powered wooden vessels, which meant serious restrictions of space and capacity, in addition to the dependence on natural phenomena to ensure navigability and safe anchoring, both on the coast and on rivers. In the 1850s, after great debates and fierce conflicts of regional interests, the State finally decided to make the Public Treasury available for the development of national navigation through Decree 632 of 1851 (Brazil 632/1851), in which the imperial government would finance—with subsidy contracts and tax exemption to private shipping companies—the fastest, widest, most constant, and safe means of maritime and river transportation. In addition to the logistical, military, and political needs linked to the displacement of people and mail, the objective of the well-­ known subsidies was to give greater fluidity to the transport of cargo (El-Kareh, 2002). Initially, experimental, the subsidies became more appreciable in number and amount with the needs arising from the Paraguayan War. As we can see from Appendix 8.2, many shipping companies were created in the 1850s and 1860s throughout Brazil, especially in Rio de Janeiro. The annual contributions were individually substantial, but in general, they did not mean a third of the budget of the Ministry of Roads and Public Works or even 3% of the General Revenue of the Empire. The number of subsidized companies was restricted, and the contracts were focused on cabotage navigation of great maritime-commercial and fluvial interest on some rivers strategic to national sovereignty and regional

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integration. These contracts were extremely controlled by the government. The guarantee of the regularity of the trips was supervised by the governmental usufruct itself, as State employees and orders were frequently transported by these shipping companies, which, in most cases, were founded with the intention of fulfilling a contract with the State. Although the start of steam navigation in Brazil was marked by state incentives—and this evidently collaborated with the demand for coal in the country—the types of navigation chosen and the scope of these resources did not substantially change the nature of cabotage and fluvial navigation at that time. The change in the general picture of navigation in Brazil was slower and basically due to the country’s participation in the world market. In the last decade of our time frame, the first and final change can be stated in Fig. 8.5: larger, more powerful, more robust, stronger, safer vessels that had more capabilities in all terms—cargo, passengers, speed, autonomy, resistance and technology—began to attend Brazilian ports, especially Rio de Janeiro. These vessels were made of iron and later steel, and they needed constant maintenance and repair; these vessels were steam-­powered and needed constant refuelling (El-Kareh, 2003). At the end of the 1880s, the port of Rio de Janeiro needed not only to import but also to store coal for the long-distance steam vessels that were already the majority and became frequent on connections scheduled by

Fig. 8.5  Calls of long-haul vessels in the Port of Rio de Janeiro, 1878–1888. Sources: Author’s elaboration. Brazil (1878–1888). Various issues

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large companies that made shipping lines predictable and widely publicized, in addition to, of course, the extemporaneous freight that characterizes merchant navigation. The generalized use of coal in Brazil began, mandatorily, to conceive Rio de Janeiro as the biggest centre of importation, storage, pricing, negotiation, consumption, and distribution of the fuel for the country and even for the neighbouring countries on the River Plate. In addition to being the seat of the imperial government and its most prominent institutions, such as the Customs Office of Rio de Janeiro—the largest and most important tax office in the country, the Neutral Municipality of the Court was emerging as the main commercial and financial centre in the Southern Hemisphere, centralizing national and foreign capital. The port of Rio de Janeiro was the largest in the country and was adapted to be the most prepared to receive, store and ship considerable amounts of coal. The concentration of business in the city was further deepened with the installation of terminal stations for the main railways in the country, which was a mandatory stop for the main steam transatlantic ships, in addition to the pioneering industrialization and implementation of urban-industrial services. Furthermore, the city of Rio de Janeiro had long been the largest market for consumer goods and the first and best structured labour market in the country. The city demanded energy for its own consumption, and there were also economic agents interested in controlling the internal coal market throughout Brazil (Fig. 8.6). Therefore, at that time, the solution within reach of the ruling classes was to import fuel from British mines to Rio de Janeiro. According to the statistical maps of the Customs Office of Rio de Janeiro, 89% of the coal imported by the capital of Brazil came from British ports (Brazil 1888). Figure 8.6 shows how previous factors resulting from expansion and urban centrality in the Court of the Empire kept the tonnage of coal imports through the seaport of Rio de Janeiro always above 150,000 tons in the 1870s; in the 1880s, the great growth, which even jumped the imported values exceeding 400,000 tons in the final year of the monarchic regime, is due to the new factors linked to the unprecedented expansion of Rio itself, of the transports that ran or had a final stop in this city, and of the industrialization and the advance in the urban services it housed. The volumes of coal imported for internal consumption in Rio de Janeiro showed a similar tendency to the values imported for this fuel through the same port for distribution and consumption in the country;

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Fig. 8.6  Coal imported in Rio de Janeiro, 1875–1889 (tons). Sources: Author’s elaboration. Retrospecto Commercial (1875–1889)

Fig. 8.7  Coal imported in Rio de Janeiro, 1878–1888 (value). Note: Figures in thousands of réis. Sources: Author’s elaboration. Brazil. Ministry of Finance (1878–1888)

the proportion in the import basket at Customs in Rio de Janeiro also resembles this trend. However, Fig. 8.7 shows that the movement in the values involved in imports is more abrupt, both in absolute and in relative terms, and this happened because the coal used in the country obeyed the world market prices of the main fuel of its era.

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Fig. 8.8  Higher and Lower prices of coal imported in Rio de Janeiro, 1872–1889. Note: in thousand réis. Sources: Author’s elaboration. Retrospecto Commercial (1875–1889)

Figure 8.8 shows that the prices charged in Rio de Janeiro—and which served as a benchmark for the pricing of coal distributed throughout the country—varied, year after year, more abruptly at the maximum than at the minimum and at average, which are historically close and more stable. Typical of the 1870s, this phenomenon was due to speculators who manipulated stocks and information on the international fuel market. This lasted at least until the beginning of the 1880s, when the formation of larger inventories, both due to the capacity to import and the storage capacities at the port, contributed to the stabilization and approximation of prices practiced at both ends. It must be said that these prices were considered high, even after stabilization at the maximum prices practiced. The industrialists who claimed lower and more controlled fuel prices formed a significant group. The Industrial Inquiry Commission set up by the Ministry of Finance managed to list 136 industries in 1882—at the beginning of the industrialization process in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil, 1882). This first mapping already excluded manufacturers and smaller workshops. The Commission obtained information voluntarily and relatively completely on 95 of these establishments, which were divided into 6 broad categories by type of production: Machinery and Metallurgy (34), Furniture (24), Saddles, Harnesses and Bags (12), Textiles (10), Hats (9), and Shoes (6). Once their data were gathered, these industries reported employing 4432 workers.

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In another article, Mantuano (2018) was able to highlight the relevance and resilience of the metalworking industry—foundries, machine factories and shipyards, mostly—in the rising industrial park of the city and its umbilical relationship with the seaport of Rio de Janeiro. Not only in restricted productive terms, as the port and navigation at that time demanded directly from the metalworking industry for naval and port construction and repair. These factories depended on a prompt supply of coal on two fronts: working with metallic raw material and moving their steam engines. Being in the economic collar of the port, close to fuel stocks, was an advantage appreciated by the industrialists who started the first large factories in Rio. Some of them even operated the port directly on their marine land. The results of the industrial survey show the concentration of companies that carried out metal-mechanical activities in the urban parishes of the seaport of Rio de Janeiro: 47% of industrial establishments in this sector— including establishments with greater capital—represented 62.3% of this capital and concentrated most of the metallurgical and/or mechanical workers, 70.6%. The most pertinent data for the purposes of this article are those on the power and machinery of the metalworking industries: the Port Region housed 72.2% of the steam power of this sector, and all establishments in that region declared to be mechanized at some level. In a diachronic view, it is possible to see the quantitative increase in foundry units, shipyards, and machine factories in the city of Rio de Janeiro, in addition to the persistence of these factories in the Port Region (Fig. 8.9). It is necessary to emphasize the growth in size and the technical-­ technological progress experienced by these industrial companies, especially in the 1880s, in addition to the fact that some of them were already born large, with advanced organization of infrastructure and cutting-edge machinery. Much of everything that made up these factories was imported and was most likely transported by steamboats. In addition, the products or services of metallurgists and mechanics were dedicated, to a large extent, to other manufacturing, commercial, or service establishments—such as the flagrant case of transportation—which used coal as fuel and input. To assess the increase in coal consumption in the last decades of the nineteenth century, we must consider some alternative uses of the calorific properties of this fuel. We point to the significant increase in the supply of gas by public and private lighting concessionaires for heating and commercial and residential kitchens, in addition, of course, to supplying power

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Fig. 8.9  Foundries, shipyards, and machinery factories in Rio de Janeiro and the port district, 1870–1890. Sources: Author’s elaboration built on Almanak (1870–1890)

to manufacturing establishments. Between 1853 and 1886, 14 concessions for the exploitation of these services were authorized or renewed by the imperial government via decree or decree-law in the following cities: Rio de Janeiro (1853, 1862, 1865, 1879, and 1886), São Luís (1862), Fortaleza (1868), Niterói (1868), Maceió (1871), Olinda (1871), Campos dos Goytacazes (1872), Campinas (1873), Goiana (1874), Rio Grande (1878), and Santos (1881). In the case of Rio de Janeiro, the right to exploit gas lighting was initially granted to Irineu Evangelista de Souza, the Baron of Mauá, in 1853, creator of Companhia de Iluminação a Gaz. In 1865, Mauá transferred it to The Rio de Janeiro Gaz Company, a company with English capital formed by its former partners.3 In 1886, the concession was transferred to the Belgian Société Anonyme du Gaz of Rio de Janeiro, concessionaire of public and private lighting services, constituted with a capital of five million francs and headquartered in Brussels (Dumoulin, 1980). 3  Although it is not the object of our article, we would like to point out the participation of British investments in the gas lighting sector in some of the most important Brazilian cities, in addition to Rio de Janeiro, such as The Nictheroy Gas Company limited, in the Capital of the Fluminense Province, Campos Gas Company, a city that aggregated a large production of sugar and The City of Santos Improvements Company limited, which in the late nineteenth century was already the second largest port for coffee exports.

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This public service increased the burning of coal in Brazilian cities in such a way that its applications changed night habits in public and private spaces. The 1885 Almanak listed 84 bakeries and 65 pastry shops in the city of Rio de Janeiro (Almanak, 1885, pp. 527–530, pp. 784–790). The profusion of these establishments and the popularization and consequent gain in scale in the production of wheat bread in Rio de Janeiro, thanks to the growing Portuguese immigration to the capital of Brazil, would not be possible without the supply of gas to the ovens in bakeries and pastry shops (Lobo, 2001). To obtain an idea of the productive chain of the wheat market, we point to the emergence of two large mills—Fluminense and Inglês (1887)—at that time.

The Leading Companies of the Coal Economy in Brazil Until the Paraguayan War, it is possible to assert that the growing volume of coal consumption in Brazil represented commercial opportunities for an increasing number of traders who incorporated the coal trade into their businesses. The stocks were relatively small and were physically separated from the city because, according to the Customs and Income Tables Regulation, fuels, corrosives, explosives, and flammables should be stored away from the structures of the Customs House itself and the city in general to prevent landslides, explosions, and fires perceived as a risk inherent to that type of operation (Brazil 1860). At first, these products generated great business opportunities for bonded warehouses and customs warehouses on islands but also for import and export traders in general. Other companies also imported, bought, and sold, relying on third-party port units to deposit the fuel, thus ordering shipments from the islands, and delivering them to their customers in the cities. Owners of deposit and service infrastructure depended on loads from other traders and even from railway or shipping companies to prosper because the commercial capillarity of coal was in its infancy and supplies for consumption in general took place under relatively dispersed sales. It is important to emphasize that the coal dealer was not always an importer. Although this had happened fairly frequently since the introduction of the fuel, it became almost a rule with the generalization and diversification of its use. The fundamental point for this change was the needs resulting from the Paraguayan War and the expansion of the coffee plantation.

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During that war, the number of importers grew, and some of them came to dominate the market and fuel pricing more easily. The State itself tried to control the importation and commercialization of the product, but the energy dependence that was installed gave the fuel importers a high power over the entire economy that it raised. At that time, in addition to commercial channels, the most privileged of these importers also had their own infrastructure, both port and waterway and land transport, to ensure that they could buy and receive cargo, ship, and sell, distribute, and deliver to the end. Moreover, they had been buying and selling an imported product exempt from customs duties for over a decade. This occurred because, from the 1870s onwards, traders who had long participated in the “coal business” set up more complex companies and no longer needed third parties to occupy their operational and commercial capacity in the “heart” of their business. These companies began to plan their expansion by technically and technologically advancing their production units. Furthermore, they invested in new businesses, both in port and maritime services and in the transformation industry, resulting from these economic activities—especially in ship building, maintenance, and repair. At those times, when demand for stone and coke coal imports grew, these companies strengthened their position. However, they also saw competition disperse, which translated into a greater number of people interested in negotiating the fuel directly with British sellers. However, the logistical bottlenecks at the seaport of Rio de Janeiro and the need for significant capital to obtain marine land in a privileged position, set up basic infrastructure, maintain and operate expansion created the environment for a large concentration of this market in a few and oligopolistic companies. These companies played an undisputed role in the coal economy, especially when the volume demanded stabilized. It is necessary to say that this process was not exclusive to Rio de Janeiro at that time; Cabrera Armas and Suárez Bosa (2012, p. 387) recognize the same in the cases of the Atlantic islands of Cape Verde and the Canary Islands (see also Chaps. 2 and 3). Figure 8.10 only indicates what the combination of the end of the war and the continued expansion of coffee farming meant for the coal economy in Brazil: the radicalization of Brazilian energy dependence on imports from British firms, the deepening of the centralization of the market for this product in Rio de Janeiro and the concentration of the “coal business” in fewer companies, more privileged, more powerful and with deep accumulated knowledge about the product and the services they offered.

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Fig. 8.10  Coal and coke importers in Rio de Janeiro, 1870–1889. Sources: Author’s elaboration built on Almanak (1870–1890)

The rise in the number of importers during the 1880s took place in an environment of monopolization: most new importers entered the market in an auxiliary and functionalized way by the largest companies. The very diversification of demand reinforced this process, as it took place under the peculiar sophistication in new uses, which implied the emergence of new buyers on a large scale and, probably, on an increasing scale. Importers and traders on a smaller scale began to pay dearly to use the commercial channels and infrastructure of those companies, becoming hostages of their pricing, especially due to the sudden changes in the price rate of the product. Many times, they were not interested in paying the price stipulated for their coal and ended up consigning the goods to the holders of large deposits on the islands in Guanabara Bay as a way of eliminating storage costs more quickly. As we will see, the Brazilian Coal Company was a sizeable company founded to co-lead Brazil’s coal economy alongside the two long-­ established companies of the Lage and Wilson families (Table 8.1). Table 8.1 compiles and organizes fundamental information for understanding the powers that these companies embodied at the end of the analysed period, also presenting information on the origin, location, and amount of capital, among others. We will briefly move on to the case of the first two, based on articles of our authorship that have already been published and that serve as a comparative and relational accumulation between these companies in the historical process, for a slightly more

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Table 8.1  Entrepreneurial taxonomy of major coal traders in Rio de Janeiro, 1913

Family origins Country (city) Entrepreneurial origins Início da Atividade Comercial no Brasil (e no RJ) Foundation date (coal business) Location of warehouses (Islands) Exclusive suppliers

Headquarters Adress (Rio de Janeiro) Capital origins Capital in 1899 Legal organization Other entrepeneurial activities

Former slave owner

Lage Irmãos

Wilson Sons & C.

Brazilian Coal Co.

Brazil (Minas Gerais)

Scotland (Portsoy)

Ironworks 1799 (1810)

Traders 1819 (1840)

England (Bideford) Wales (Cardiff) Shipbrokers 1887 (1887)

1852

1837

1835

Ilha das Enxadas Ilha do Vianna –

Ilha de Mocanguê Ilha dos Ferreiros Pequeno South Wales Coaling Cory Brothers & C. Ocean Coal C. Merthyr Steam Coal Rio de Janeiro London London Rua Primeiro de Rua Primeiro de Praça das Março, 81 Março, 60 Marinhas, 2 National Expatriate Foreign 300:000$000 £ 99.038 £ 50.000 Limited society Company limited by Company limited shares by shares Trade (Trapiche) Port management Ship repairing (Dique do Comércio) Lightering services Trade (Trapiche) Lightering services (stevedoring) (stevedoring) Towing steamers Shipbroker Towing steamers Yes Yes n/a

Sources: Author’s elaboration

in-­depth analysis of the foundation and early years of the Brazilian Coal Company (Mantuano, 2017a, 2017b, 2018). A family of five generations of businessmen, the Lages, constituted their first enterprises during the period of Portuguese colonization in Brazil. Despite having gained notoriety for the construction of the National Coastal Navigation Company, in the last decade of the nineteenth century, the Lages forged their wealth in trade and port services: first, focusing on the negotiation of ferrous metals brought from Minas Gerais, then on salt, and, finally, on imported stone coal.

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One of the main assets of the Lages in this trajectory was having participated in the construction of the Brazilian National State in the post-­ Independence period. The inclusion of this family in the manorial class, combined with success in business, guaranteed access and great control over a vast captive workforce—even exploiting a squad of more than a hundred slaves—and an appreciable strategic advantage at that time: the occupation of Ilha das Enxadas island in Guanabara Bay. For 60 years and passing through three generations, the Lages used that stop as a captivity and, in a productive way, they built and equipped what was known as “the main emporium of stone coal in this area and port”. At least until 1882, Ilha das Enxadas Island was the main productive unit for port operation in Rio de Janeiro and concentrated a substantial part of the coal economy in the country. Exploring the “coal business” on that island not only enriched the Lages but also sophisticated their enterprises to the point of creating conditions for the transition to industrial capital. For the Wilson family company, its history is closely linked to the expansion of the British Empire towards South America. It was not by chance that the young Scottish shipowner Edward Pellew Wilson arrived in Bahia in 1819, leaving his younger brother Fleetwood in charge of the family business in Scotland. In Brazil, they enjoyed low customs duties and important privileges for the British, which made them accumulate wealth outside the United Kingdom. The impressive breadth of their business range paralleled their transit in the imperial government. In other words, the greater the Wilsons served the Empire, the richer they became. It is necessary to note that the Wilsons brought previously accumulated English capital to Brazil, but it seems inappropriate to classify it as foreign capital. Due to their business trajectory, it is fairer to think of them as a certain amount of capital that immigrated with their holders and found in Brazil conditions to reproduce on a large scale. In the 1840s, when stone coal was still being introduced in the country, the Wilson brothers not only supplied cities and ships but also became responsible for much of the transatlantic transport of fuel. They were even one of the biggest suppliers of coal for the Brazilian fleet in the Paraguayan War. Their main outside supplier was the Daves of Wales. This partnership guaranteed South Wales Coaling’s high-quality coal in the main Brazilian markets. Subsequently, the Daves formed the Ocean Coal Company and joined the Wilsons in several places in the Atlantic (Suárez Bosa, 2008).

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In Rio de Janeiro, they registered the firm Scott, Hett & C., still in the 1840s, as an import and export house. These agents were established in Rio de Janeiro through Edward Pellew Wilson Jr., son of the founder. In 1864, Edward Jr. obtains what would place his family’s company in a privileged position in the Brazilian coal economy: the lease to explore Mocanguê Pequeno Island, in Guanabara Bay. The family’s tradition of importing fuel was inherited by Edward Junior and remained at the heart of the Wilsons’ business. However, it was with their insertion in the transformation sector at the Court that the Wilsons established themselves in the restricted circle of businessmen with influence within the imperial family. In 1867, with the presence of Emperor Dom Pedro II, Dique do Comércio (Commercial Dam) was inaugurated, the first completely dry infrastructure for the observation and repair of ships in the Southern Hemisphere. At that time, the level of concentration of coal transportation to Brazil, as well as direct imports and services in Rio de Janeiro, was unparalleled in any of the markets in which the Wilsons operated across the Atlantic. The profitability of businesses based in Brazil was high, and investments did not stop. During the 1880s, the company began to offer transfer, freight, and towing services with its own fleet of steam vessels imported from England, which began to operate throughout Guanabara Bay, mainly transferring between long-haul vessels and the coast. The emergence of a new company that was similar in size and strength to these two giants of the coal economy is not surprising nor is it contradictory to the process presented here. Brazil entered the world market by importing ever-increasing quantities, and due to multiple and sustained factors, this fuel was demanded, transported, deposited, distributed, marketed, and consumed by channels concentrated in the capital. By that, we mean that, opportunely, the oligopoly admitted new, fragile, and disposable middlemen for imports; however, due to the new scale and prospects for sustaining demand, it also admitted the emergence of a company that was born large, a third one in a position of privilege—similar to the Lages and Wilsons—which was founded to operate from Rio de Janeiro. The creation of the Brazilian Coal Company is the result of the situation outlined by Castro (1976, p. 62): [...] in the period 1887–1889, alongside the expansion of the profit mass in the export sector, profitability in the industrial sector also increased. The drop in the exchange rate created an attractive market for the industry at a

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time when the capacity to import was under pressure and the mass of immigrants increased the demand for this type of product.

Negotiations for the foundation of a new giant company for the coal business in Rio de Janeiro began in 1886. The British firm Cory Brothers & C. proposed to the Brazilian businessman Antônio Fernandes Braga the creation of large coal deposits in Montevideo on River Plate. Braga resided in Uruguay, as he was director of the Companhia Nacional de Navegação a Vapor (National Steam Navigation Company), which operated a prosperous and subsidized river navigation line between the capital of Uruguay and Cuiabá (capital of the Brazilian province of Mato Grosso), in addition to being a partner of the commercial house Conceição & C. and president of the Camara Syndical de Commercio—a union for defending the interests of businessmen in Montevideo, whose composition was marked by a large proportion of Brazilians (Diário do Brazil 02/12/1883, p.  3; Almanak, 1885, p. 128). The Corys were a family of merchants from Bideford—a small port town located on the estuary of the Torridge River in southern England— who, in the early nineteenth century, on the initiative of Richard Cory, crossed the Bristol Channel and began to settle ship ware trading in Cardiff. In the 1830s, the Corys’ business had already grown to the point of becoming brokers for ship freight and tickets, also providing everything necessary for sea trips: from food through water, replacement parts, tools, and objects, which were usually disposable or subject to wearing. This supply to shipping companies in Cardiff led them into the “coal business” as this port became one of the largest shippers of fuel in the world. The leap into coal exports took place only in the following decade. In addition, when Richard’s son—John Cory—took the leadership of the business and in 1859, he founded Cory Brothers & C. At that moment, the company already focused on coal exports as its main business, acquiring mines in Wales and establishing warehouses in other parts of the world for the coal produced there: The firm’s shipping and coal-exporting business steadily increased, and the universal demand for South Wales steam coal for navigation led John Cory to conceive the idea of establishing foreign depots in all parts, one of the earliest being established at Port Said on the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. (Thomas, 1912, p. 423)

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From the 1870s onwards, the Corys manifested their intention to cover not only trade but also the services inherent in the commercialization of stone coal and coke in the ascending fuel consumer markets. With the Great Depression, the combination of vertical integration with internationalization in search of new and unexplored markets was the most common strategy of those companies that became even larger. The formation of prices in privileged positions in emerging markets became, then, a clear objective of Cory Brothers & Co. In 1887, the Corys set their sights on Brazil and the River Plate, having their first meeting with Antônio Fernandes Braga. The Brazilian merchant purchased ever-increasing amounts of coal from Cory Brothers & C. not only through his firm in Montevideo but also for delivery in Rio de Janeiro, where he supplied the vessels of the shipping companies he directed. Braga supplied stone coal to the Brazilian Imperial State itself, winning supply contracts for military vessels of the Brazilian Navy in Montevideo, Santa Helena, Corumbá, and Assunção for almost 20 years (Cidade do Rio, 01/14/1888, p. 1). The association between the Cory and Braga families must be understood within a framework in which those English capitalists began to experiment with the formation of companies—corporations or companies limited by shares—together with coal mine explorers, transporters, insurers, and traders of fuel throughout the world. The first experience, in this sense, happened when John Cory joined David Davies in the Barry Docks Company in 1883 (Wolfe-Barry, 1889). In his homeland, it was about raising capital to carry out undertakings of great scope and complex political articulation. In the consumer markets for its mineral coal, however, it was a matter of having a local reference close to the business, with extensive knowledge of regional issues, providing information collected at the top on that market and serving as executor of his British partners’ designs, in addition to the indispensable political skills and social insertion that a local partner could offer. Corresponding to this trend, Cory Brothers & C.’s plans for South America were redirected to Rio de Janeiro under the influence of Braga. As early as March 1887, even before being formalized in Brazil, The Engineer announced the new company registered in London and placed Braga in a prominent role among its shareholders. The publication reported that it was a limited liability company and had capital fixed at 50,000 pounds sterling, divided into 200 shares of which Braga owned 100, and six members of the Cory family shared the remaining shares. At

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first, there was no formal corporate relationship between Cory Brothers & C. and the Brazilian Coal Company, but most of the partners in the Anglo-­ Brazilian company were also partners in that English company. The new company would operate throughout South America, with an operational base in Rio de Janeiro. This is how the English engineering newspaper defined its objectives: In England, Rio de Janeiro, and elsewhere in South America, this company proposes trading as coal and fuel merchants, wharfingers, shipowners, ship chandlers, bankers, and as manufacturers and dealers in ice, distilled water and salt. (The Engineer 18/03/1887, p. 223)

We understand that structural and geostrategic issues influenced the decision to establish the company’s operational base in South America in Rio de Janeiro. Antônio Fernandes Braga presented the feasibility of acquiring land and transferring tenure from an island as something that could be obtained with relative ease but that would guarantee the company a strong entry into the stone coal market in Rio de Janeiro. Obtaining a port operation unit located on an island in Guanabara Bay was extremely advantageous, as (1) at that time, land in the mainland part of the city and close to large coal consumers had high prices; (2) land available in large extension and desirable format was disputed by fuel consumers themselves, especially industries; and (3) in the very urban evolution of Rio de Janeiro, the city had not been prepared for the reception, internal circulation and deposit of coal in the prospected volumes (Abreu, 2000). The experience they had was of using the islands to store and transport coal through the city directly to final consumers, in ready-made orders, as quickly as possible; (4) the possibilities of gaining land over the sea, intervening in nature and using its products, building, equipping, and exploiting the workforce on an island were more promising due to the relative isolation that those stops offered; (5) the possibility of being close to a calm and deep anchorage guaranteed better operational conditions in the loading/unloading logistics, without impediments in the circulation between the receiving bridges and the storing infrastructures (Mantuano, 2017a, 2017b). Furthermore, there were legal constraints that, considering the services that the “coal business” raised, made it necessary to use an island: (1) you had an obligation to explore an island in Guanabara Bay to obtain authorizations from the Port Authority to store large volumes of fuel; and (2)

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customs, so that the infrastructure set up by the company had the status of a bonded warehouse or even the customs itself would occupy4 part of the buildings on the island, which guaranteed them much broader business prospects (Brazil 1860). Braga acted quickly, chose Ilha dos Ferreiros Island, and conditioned the incorporation of the company in Brazil to dominance over that island in the bay (Chart 8.1). Ilha dos Ferreiros was further away from the main

Chart 8.1  Chart of the Ilha dos Ferreiros (1866). Source: Brazil. Ministry of Management. National Heritage Superintendence. Plan of Ilha dos Ferreiros (1866). Map Library 1, Drawer 3, Plank 1, Registry 387. Rio de Janeiro, National Heritage Superintendence 4  According to the Customs Regulations of the Empire of Brazil, the Bonded Warehouse had the characteristics of a deposit for outbound on-going goods, whereas turning warehouses, depots, etc., in customs was more a substitute for the jobs of loading, unloading, foremen quarters, storage and deposit that were required of Customs, unable or uninterested in doing so.

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commercial and financial parishes of the city, as well as from the most common anchorages for long-haul navigation and from the Maritime Station of Gamboa. However, the future looked promising: the parish of São Cristóvão and, within it, Ponta do Caju (Souza, 1882) were on the route of urban and industrial expansion in Rio de Janeiro; the terminal station of the Rio do Ouro Railroad was designed nearby; the island was relatively close to the mainland shore and had a wide, deep and uncrowded harbour on the bay side; for the most part, it was unoccupied and still preserved untouched nature, having an advantageous shape, easily modifiable relief and offering the extraction of stones, wood, and usable sand (Silva, 2021). Moreover, the small proportion occupied was residential, which, at least in theory, offered low resistance to its removal. At the beginning of 1887, Braga bought the largest houses on the island, managed to transfer some land tenure, and made an application to the Directorate of Listing and Works of the City Council of Rio de Janeiro for a permit to build two warehouses on those newly acquired lands (Jornal do Commercio, 07/04/1887, p.  2). In December of the same year, Braga’s proposal to the municipality was more aggressive: the managing director of the already incorporated Brazilian Coal Company offered to purchase the entire island and requested tenure of all marine land concerning it (Jornal do Commercio, 14/12/1887, p. 2). Very quickly, the municipality passed the Ilha dos Ferreiros emphyteusis to Antônio Fernandes Braga, who collected taxes and annual rent (Rio de Janeiro, c. F18, 1887–1888). Since then, that island has been occupied by the Brazilian Coal Company without any legal embarrassment. The company quickly began building the necessary infrastructure to offer the services it had planned (Gazeta de Notícias, 06/28/1888, p. 3). Antônio Fernandes Braga is listed in the 1888 Almanak as Managing Director of the Brazilian Coal Company; it was he who rented the office that would serve as the company’s commercial service point, in the heart of the city, Rua Primeiro de Março (Almanak, 1888, p. 1347). On September 17, 1887, the Brazilian Coal Company was authorized to operate in the Empire of Brazil through decree 9783. This authorization was a legal formality for that company based abroad and with foreign capital. Along with the company’s statutes, its legal representative in Brazil, Antônio Fernandes Braga, offered a revealing memorandum to the Business Section of the State Council of the Empire of Brazil, which confirmed information published in the newspapers and added, among its objectives:

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Build, assist and underwrite for the construction, conservation and improvement of roads, shelters, bridges, canals, railways, railroads, piers, and quays, which may be considered convenient or necessary to promote or develop the company’s business, or to buy, sell, lease, exchange or rent those; [...] Appoint, under the usual terms, Messrs. Cory Brothers & Comp., of London, to general agents of the company, in Europe, for the purpose of securing orders for the company, to which those agents shall have power to appoint subagents. [...] (Brazil 9.783/1887)

The company’s installation proposal in the country was unanimously approved. The memorandum made it clear that the owners of the Brazilian Coal Company were dealing with the possibility of diversifying and strengthening their businesses, starting with imports and services linked to the coal economy in Rio de Janeiro. The following year, the Corys promoted administrative restructuring in their parent company, founding Cory Brothers & C. with capital set at one million pounds sterling. The company began to absorb the personal interests of members of the Cory family in other companies, including the Brazilian Coal Company: The new undertaking acquires the interest of Messrs. Cory Brothers in the Galli, Tyngbodw, and other collieries in the Rhondda Valley, the coal wagons and railway rolling plant and shares in steamships and water works companies, and in the Aden Goal Company (Limited), and the Brazilian Coal Company (Limited). (The Marine Engineer and Naval Architect 01/05/1888. p. 61)

These measures allowed the Corys to send everything necessary for the construction and equipment of Ilha dos Ferreiros, as well as enabling the establishment of port services for the Brazilian Coal Company in Rio de Janeiro. Additionally, in September 1887, the Engineer reported the tests with the first of the orders placed by Cory Brothers & C. to the Edward Finch & C. shipyard, in Cardiff, for the service of the Brazilian Coal Company. It was the company’s first vessel, a high-powered tug, Victoria. On Wednesday, the 17th, the screw tug Victoria, built by Edward Finch and Co. for the Brazilian Coal Company, Cardiff, ran a very successful trial. Her dimensions are—length, 90 ft.; breadth, 17 ft. 6 in., by 8 ft. 9 in. depth of hold. She has a compound surface condensing engine, 16 in. and 30 in. by

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22 in. stroke, with a boiler designed for a working pressure of 100 lb. per square inch. She steamed down Channel for some hours, averaging 11 and a-half knots per hour, after which she entered Cardiff, from which port h sailed on the 22nd inst. for Rio de Janeiro, where she will be employed and for which service, she is specially designed and fitted with teak decks and covered with a permanent awing. (The Engineer 02/09/1887, p. 189)

Less than a year later, The Engineer reported another test with a new order from the same shipyard: a steamboat with an iron hull with the suggestive name, Antonio. On Sunday, the 21st inst., the steam launch Antonio, built by Messrs. Edward Finch and Co., of Chepstow, for the Brazilian Coal Company, of Rio de Janeiro, sailed in charge of their engineer for Swansea, where she arrived at 4 o’clock p. m., having run the whole distance from Chep- stow, 85  miles, in 8  h, or approximately 104  miles per hour. The hull is to be shipped whole (the engines and boiler being taken out) on board a steamer for Rio de Janeiro. (Engineering 26/10/1888, p. 414)

Our time frame covers only the first two years of the company’s activity. Even in this period of assembly, investment, and experimentation of its operation, it is possible to identify the fact that the Brazilian Coal Company was born large. The Customs Bulletins of Rio de Janeiro record, between November 1887 and December 1889, 40 vessels entering, directly and exclusively dedicated to importing coal by order of the Brazilian Coal Company, being dispatched by that customs authority in the capital of Brazil. Figure 8.11 is an expression of just one of the ways in which this company explores the coal business. It is true that the direct import of 40,354 tons of coal in the first two years of activity already included it in the select trio of the largest direct importers of the fuel, but the Brazilian Coal Company was founded to lead the coal economy in Brazil. In 1889, Braga managed, together with the Customs, that Ilha dos Ferreiros to be raised to the status of Bonded Warehouse (Brazil 23/11/1889, p.  3), when the first vessels used in port services were already in full operation (Almanak, 1889, p. 599) and the company already paid taxes “directly in the industry” on dividends distributed to its shareholders (Brazil 1890, p. 168).

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Fig. 8.11  Registry of coal imported by the Brazilian Coal Company in Rio de Janeiro (1887–1889). Note: in tons. Sources: Author’s elaboration. Brazil. Ministry of Finance (1887–1889)

Conclusion In this chapter, we connect the sources of production, the means of transportation and conservation, the forms of commercialization and distribution and the factors for the consumption of coal in Brazil between 1850 and 1889. Certainly, the introduction of fuel in Brazilian lands precedes our time frame, but we are interested in its generalization in a historical process permeated by economic and social changes that relied on the burning of coal to create the heat and power necessary for the technical and technological innovations that emerged due to Brazil’s participation in the world market. This participation was based on exports of primary products—coffee, in particular—but also on numerous and varied imports, of which we highlight the fuel that is our object of research, coal. Arising from needs focused on the most basic residential and commercial applications, the demand for coal became more sophisticated, and imports increased at the pace of the different historical processes they were going through. The Empire of Brazil, which unimpeded, facilitated, and relieved fuel imports as much as it could, ended up seeing itself enmeshed in a brutal energy dependence on British interests—major producers but also leaders in transportation, other services, and marketing of its stone coal in Brazil and in the world. In addition, it was these very British who built the

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centralization of this market in Rio de Janeiro, its commercial square and port. Multiple factors not only increased consumption but also created a coal economy in Brazil, clearly based in Rio de Janeiro. These factors, on the one hand, were circumscribed in time and were very powerful—as is the case of the Paraguayan War/Triple Alliance or the implementation of the first means of steam transportation in Brazil. On the other hand, they are part of the complexification and support of the demand for fuel—which involves the rise of coffee growing, the expansion/intensification of the means of transportation that served it, the growth of some cities, the first industrialization and the sophistication of the relevant urban services that were offered at the Court of the Empire, the city of Rio de Janeiro. The very world scenario of monopoly capitalism establishment can be identified in this process. The capital engaged in the coal market in Rio de Janeiro was concentrated and supported by the National State, shaping the characteristics of the coal economy in Brazil: privileged, dependent, and controlled by oligopolies. The last section of our contribution approximates the historical reality through the performance of companies with monopolistic tendencies in this market—Lage Irmãos, Wilson Sons & C., and Brazilian Coal Company—showing practical results and facts

Tobacco

Gums Gold

4.1

2.7

2 2

1.8 1.6 1.4

Wine

Iron manufactures Coal Fish

Meat Butter Tiles and glasses

1.4 1.3

2.5

6.6

3.5 Tobacco 3.2 Herb tea (mate) 3 Diamonds 2.9 Liquors 2.7 Timber

3.9 Gums

4.4 Leather

43 Coffee 6.6 Cotton 4.8 Sugar

Exports

1.7 0.6 0.4

3.9 2.2

6

Hardware Chemical products Drugs

Minerals (including coal) Drinks Iron and steel

49.6 Clothes 14.3 Animal products 10.6 Gold and silver manufactures 6.5 Flour and cereals

Imports

1890

Sources: Author’s elaboration. Brazil. Ministry of Finance, 1850–1890. Proposal and Report. Rio de Janeiro: National Press

Wheat flour Hardware Leather manufactures

Coal Iron and steel

Iron manufactures Jewelry

48.1 Clothes 23.1 Drinks 8.2 Meat

Diamonds 1 Timber 0.8 Cocoa 0.7

Leathers

41.5 Coffee 11 Sugar 5.4 Cotton

Clothes Currencies Wheat flour

Imports

Imports

Exports

1870–1871

1850–1851

5.2 Gums 4.1 Herb tea (mate) 2.6 Cocoa 2.2 Gold 1.2 Diamonds

5.3 Leather

8.9 Tobacco

22.8 Coffee 17.2 Sugar 14.1 Cotton

Exports

Appendix 8.1: Main Products in the Import and Export Basket of the Empire of Brazil, 1850–1851, 1870–1871, 1890

0.6 0.4 0.1

1.9 1.2

1.9

2.3

70.9 6.1 4.9

that evidence the development of the coal economy and the country’s own energy situation in the last moments of the Empire.

8  THE COAL ECONOMY IN BRAZIL (1850–1889) 

181

1854 1857

Aracaju São Luís

1858

1858

Salvador

Vitória

Caetano Dias da Silva

1853

Recife

Companhia de Navegação a Vapor Bahiana Companhia de Navegação a Vapor do Espirito Santo

Antônio Pedroso de Albuquerque Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque ? Leite & Irmão, José Pedro dos Santos & Irmão e Raimundo Teixeira Mendes Francisco Gonçalves Martins

1852

Vitória

Rio de Janeiro 1852

João Tarrand Thomaz Barão de Mauá

Rio de Janeiro 1836

Companhia Brasileira de Paquetes a Vapor Companhia de Navegação e Comércio do Amazonas Companhia do Mucury e Caravellas Companhia Pernambucana de Navegação Costeira Associação Sergipense Companhia de Navegação a Vapor nos Rios do Maranhão

Foundation Founders

Headquarters

Shipping company 1866

1876

131:208$326

–

30:000$000

84:000$000

–

84:000$000

12:000$000 7:000$000 120:000$000 120:000$000

84:000$000

89:500$000

720:000$000 720:000$000

57:000$000

84:000$000

12:000$000 192:000$000

155:599$986

–

816:000$000

976:000$000 1.024:000$000 –

1865

Capital (in Reis)

Appendix 8.2: Main Steam Navigation Companies Subsidized by the Brazilian State in the Nineteenth Century

90:000$000

195:000$000

16:669$354 192:009$000

155:600$000

–

520:000$000

–

1885

182  C. HONORATO ET AL.

– –

? Francisco Ferreira Borges e Guilherme de Castro Visconde de Figueiredo

New York/ 1866 Rio de Janeiro Rio de Janeiro 1871

–

–

200:000$000

–

–

84:000$000

–

200:000$000

48:000$000

–

–

–

436:000$000

589:250$000

1.147:499$000 708:750$000

200:000$000

–

–

–

–

Sources: Author’s elaboration. Almanak; BRAZIL.  Ministry of Finance. Proposal and Report. Rio de Janeiro: National Typography, 1865, 1866, 1876, 1885; Goularti Filho (2011)

–

24:000$000

?

1862

48:000$000

84:000$000

Teresina

José Rodrigues Ferreira

62:519$278

Francisco Teixeira de Miranda

1859

Desterro

José Antônio Soares

Rio de Janeiro 1860

1858

Cuiabá

Companhia Nacional de Rio de Janeiro 1873 Navegação a Vapor

Companhia de Navegação a Vapor do Alto Paraguay Companhia de Navegação Intermediaria a Vapor Companhia de Navegação a Vapor Macahé e Campos Companhia de Navegação pelo Parnahyba United States and Brasil Mail Steamship Companhia Brasileira de Navegação Transatlantica

8  THE COAL ECONOMY IN BRAZIL (1850–1889) 

183

184 

C. HONORATO ET AL.

References Abreu, M. d. (2000). Evolução Urbana do Rio de Janeiro. Zahar. Almanak Administrativo, Mercantil e Industrial da Corte e Província do Rio de Janeiro. (1850–1890). Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia Laemmert. Azevedo, J.  F. (2018). Política tarifária e indústria no Império Brasileiro (1840–1889). PhD thesis. São Paulo: University of São Paulo. Beaud, M. (2001). A História do Capitalismo: De 1500 aos Nossos Dias. Brasiliense. Brazil. Coleção das Leis do Império do Brasil. (1850–1889). Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional. Brazil. Ministry of Finance. (1883–1889). Boletim da Alfândega do Rio de Janeiro. Tipografia da Alfândega. Brazil. Ministry of Finance. (1882). Comissão de Inquérito Industrial. Imprensa Nacional. Brazil. Ministry of Finance. (1878–1888). Mapas Estatísticos do Comércio e Navegação do Porto do Rio de Janeiro. Tipografia da Alfândega. Brazil. Ministry of Finance. (1850–1890). Proposta e Relatório. Imprensa Nacional. Brazil. Ministry of Finance. (1860). Regulamento das Alfândegas e Mesas de Renda. Imprensa Nacional. Brazil. Ministério da Marinha. (1880). Proposta e Relatório. Imprensa Nacional. Castro, A. C. (1976). As empresas estrangeiras no Brasil: 1860–1913. MA thesis, Campinas: UNICAMP-IFCH. Cidade do Rio. (1888). Rio de Janeiro: José do Patrocínio & C. Cole, G. D. H. (1957). Introducción a la Historia Económica (1750–1950). Fondo de Cultura Económica. Diário do Brasil. (1883). Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia do Diário do Brazil. Dumoulin, M. (1980). Edouard Otlet. In Biographie Nationale de Belgique. T. XLI. Académie Royale de Belgique. El-Kareh, A.  C. (2002). A Companhia Brasileira de Paquetes a Vapor e a Centralidade do Poder Monárquico. História Econômica & História de Empresas, 2, 7–27. El-Kareh, A. C. (2003). O Rio de Janeiro e as Primeiras Linhas Transatlânticas de Paquetes a Vapor (1850-1860). História Econômica & História de Empresas, 3, 1–19. Freese, B. (2004). Coal: A human history. Basic Books. Gazeta de Notícias. (1888). Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia da Gazeta de Notícias. Goularti Filho, A. (2011). Abertura da Navegação de Cabotagem Brasileira no Século XIX. Ensaios FEE, 32(2), 409–434. Grahan, R. (1973). Grã-Bretanha e o Início da Modernização no Brasil (1850–1914). Brasiliense. Hobsbawm, E. (2003). Da Revolução Industrial Inglesa ao Imperialismo. Forense-Universitária.

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Honorato, C. T., & Ribeiro, L. C. M. (2014). The emergence of Santos as a coffee port—1869-1914. In M. Suárez Bosa (Ed.), Atlantic ports and the first globalisation, c.1850–1930 (pp. 170–195). Palgrave Macmillan. Jornal do Commercio. (1850–1889). Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia de J. Villeneuve. Lobo, E. (2001). Imigração Portuguesa no Brasil. Editora Hucitec. Martins, A. L. (1990). Império do café. A grande lavoura no Brasil 1850 a 1890 (4a ed.). Atual. Mantuano, T. (2018). A Região Portuária Segurou as Pontas: As Atividades Metal-­ Mecânica e da Construção e Reparo Naval no Porto do Rio de Janeiro (1868-1907). Espaço e Economia, 12, 1–22. Mantuano, T. (2017a). Comendador Antônio Martins Lage: Entre a Navegação e a Operação Portuária no Século XIX. MA thesis, Niterói: PPGH-UFF. Mantuano, T. (2017b). Os Wilson na Corte Imperial (1837-1888). História e Economia, 19, 177–202. Pereira, L.  L. (2007). Revisitando a “Moeda Colonial Restaurada”—A Comercialização e as Políticas de Exploração de Combustível no Brasil Imperial. MA thesis. Nitéroi: PPGH-UFF. Retrospecto Commercial—Jornal do Commercio. (1875–1889). Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia de J. Villeneuve. Ribeiro, L. C. M. (2021). Ofício criador: inventores e inventos na lavoura cafeeira no Brasil (1870–1910) (1st ed.). Appris. Rio de Janeiro (cidade). (1887–1888). Arquivo Geral da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro. Série Aforamentos. Caixa F18. Rio de Janeiro. Salles, R. (1990). Guerra do Paraguai: Escravidão e Cidadania na Formação do Exército (1st ed.). Paz e Terra. Silva, R.  C. B. (2021). O Dilema do Trem das Águas: A Estrada de Ferro Rio d’Ouro entre o abastecimento de água e o transporte de passageiros e mercadorias no Rio de Janeiro, 1875–1906. MA thesis. Nitéroi—PPGH-UFF. Souza, A. F. d. (1882). A Baía do Rio de Janeiro: sua História e Descrição de suas Riquezas. Imprensa Nacional. Suárez Bosa, M. (2008). Las Empresas Carboneras en los Puertos de las Islas Atlánticas. Vida Marítima. Suárez Bosa, M., & Cabrera Armas, L. G. (2012). La Competencia en los Servicios Portuarios entre Cabo Verde y Canarias (1850-1914). Anuario de Estudios Atlánticos, 58, 363–413. The Engineer. (1887). (Vol. 63 and 64) London: George Reveirs Limited. The Engineering. (1888). (Vol. 46) London: Strand W.C. The Marine Engineer and Naval Architect. (1888–1889). (Vol. 10) London: Paternoster Row E.C. Thomas, D. L. C. J. (1912). In S. Lee (Ed.), Dictionary of national biography (2nd supplement) (Vol. 12). Smith, Elder & C. Wolfe-Barry, J. (1889). The Barry Docks. Report of the Annual Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science.

Index1

A Aber Vrac’h, 95 Ackermans & Van Haaren, 109 Aden, 15 Aden Coal Ltd., 17, 177 African colonial state, 34 African Steamship Company, 45 Ahlers, Werner D., 74–76 Alexandria, 19 Algiers, 66, 66n8, 68 Alsace, 87 Amaral, Southerland & Co., 140, 145 Ambès, 89, 91, 94 Angelika, 78 The Anglo-Argentine Coal Co., 140, 141, 145 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 87 Anglo Spanish Coaling Co. Ltd., 19 Antoni, M., 52

Aracajau, 182 Argentina Barraca Britannia, 133, 134 Central Argentina Railway, 128 energy policies, 129–131 external trade policies, 129–131 Industrial Conference, 130 radicalism period, 142 Western Railway, 138 See also Buenos Aires; La Plata Associação Sergipense, 182 Assunção, 173 Atlantic Islands Depot Agreement (AIDA), 16, 25, 27, 40 See also Canary Islands Auckland, 28 Australia, 15, 20, 21, 23 Austria, 100, 102n3, 103, 116 Austria-Hungary (Empire), 100

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Castillo Hidalgo, C. Honorato (eds.), Fuelling the World Economy, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32565-6

187

188 

INDEX

B Bahia Blanca, 132, 133, 140, 144 Baltic Sea, 100, 102 Banco Popular (Argentina), 139 Bank of British West Africa, 16 See also Elder Dempster Banque de France, 111 Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, 108 Banque de Pays du Nord, 111 Barão de Mauá, 182 Barcelona, 19 Baring Brothers, 128 Barry Docks Company, 173 Bassens, 89 Belgium, 102n3, 106 Benis, Artur, 114 Bérenger, Henry, 84 Berlin, 112 Berre Lake, 89 Bideford, 172 Bilbao, 19 Bizerte, 144 Blandy Brothers & Co., 17, 20, 145 Boer War, 18 Bokanowski, M., 110n12 Bombay, 28 Bonnier, M., 53n20 Bordeaux, 41, 45, 82, 87, 89, 90, 93, 94 Borneo, 83 Braudelian capitalist expansion, 126 Brazil coal economy, 149–180 coal imports, 153–156, 161, 167 coal prospections, 152, 171, 175 coffee production, 151, 158 Dom Pedro II railway, 151, 153, 154 energy policies, 155 exports, 151, 165n3, 166, 171, 172, 179 Navy, 173 Recife-São Francisco railway, 151 São Paulo railway, 151

state construction, 151, 156 See also Rio de Janeiro Brazilian Coal Company, 8, 168, 169, 171, 174, 176–180 Bremen, 62n1 Brent, 128 Brest, 90, 92, 124 Briand, A., 111n14, 111n16, 116n22, 117n25, 118n28 Bristol Chanel, 20, 172 British and African Steamship Company, 45 British and African Steamship Navigation Co, 45 Brussels, 165 Buenos Aires Buenos Aires-Flores route, 129 Buenos Aires-Valparaiso railway, 129 custom laws, 128 Grand Dock Central, 133 Olivos Bay, 132 Patent Act, 128 Puerto Madero, 135 urban development, 133 Bulgaria, 102n3 C Cádiz, 19, 40 Calcutta, 28 Cambrian Buildings, 141 Campana, 140 Campinas, 165 Campos dos Goytacazes, 165 Campos Gas Company, 165n3 Canada, 15, 21 Canary Islands AIDA, 16, 25, 27, 40 bananas, 39 call of vessels, 50 coal import series, 46 coal supplies series, 46, 54

 INDEX 

coal war, 46, 47 free trade, 38, 41, 49 Las Palmas, viii, 18–21, 23, 24, 26, 35, 36, 39, 40, 43, 46–48, 50 outbound freights, 39, 41, 48, 53 Santa Cruz de Tenerife, 19, 39, 43 tomatoes, 39, 41 The Canary Islands Coal & Oil Depots Co. Ltd, 16, 26 See also Canary Islands The City of Santos Improvements Company Limited, 165n3 Cape Horn, 22, 129 Cape of Good Hope, 21, 40 Cape of Race, see Newfoundland Cape Town, 25 Cape Verde, 18, 21, 25, 35, 36, 38, 40–42, 49, 51, 52, 54, 167 Cardiff, 14, 16–19, 21, 23, 30, 46, 47, 49, 132–135, 141, 143, 144, 170, 172, 177, 178 Merthyr Coal, 133 Caronte Lake, 89 Cartagena (Spain), 70 Casanello, Roberto E., 141 Castro (de), Guilherme, 183 Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, Francisco de Paula, 182 Chantenay, 144 Chantiers de France de Dunkerque, 86 Chargeurs Réunis, 43–45, 90 Chepstow, 178 Cherbourg, 92 Chile, 21, 22, 140 China, 20, 23 Civitavecchia, 72 Colombo, 23 Colonia, 132 Commodities bananas, 39 cereals, 130, 135, 139, 140, 142 coal; Akaike, 29; Alabama Pratt, 28; anthracite, 134, 141; ash, 133;

189

Bengal, 23; bituminous, 100, 100n2; Cahaba, 28; charcoal, 127, 128, 133, 143, 154; Clearfield, 29; Coalbrookdale, 28; consumption, 82, 129, 130, 152, 157–166; Delmege, 28; Deshurgur, 28; Durham, 21; exports, 6, 15, 60, 73, 77, 100, 102–107, 109, 112, 119, 131, 172; foundry coke, 133; imports, 35, 73, 138, 153–156, 161, 167; Klobane, 29; Natal, 21; North Country, 28; Pocahontas coal, 23; price composition, 48; price series, 42, 46–48, 53, 54, 105; production, 15, 115; urban expressions, 7 coffee, 151–153, 157, 158, 165n3, 166, 167, 179, 180 cotton, 16, 21 diamonds, 181 gold, 103, 105–107, 112 groundnuts, 37, 48, 55 leather, 136, 152 livestock, 136, 136n8 melinite, 83 palm kernels, 37 palm oil, 37, 48 timber, 181 tobacco, 181 tolite, 83 tomatoes, 39, 41 wool, 136 Compagnie de Navigation Mixte, 44 Compagnie des Produits Chimiques et Raffineries de Berre (PCRB), 90 Compagnie Fraissinet, 44 Compagnie Française des Charbonnages de Dakar, 19, 34 See also Wilson and Sons Compagnie française des Pétroles (CFP), 84–87

190 

INDEX

Compagnie Française du Raffinage (CFR), 85–88, 90, 91 Compagnie Franco-Polonaise des Chemins de Fer, 111 Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 90 Compagnie Industrielle des Pétroles, 90 Compagnie Industrielle Maritime (CIM), 88 Compagnie Italienne “Le Sénégal,” 45 Compagnie Worms et Cie, 134, 135 Companhia Brasileira de Navegação Transatlantica, 182 Companhia Brasileira de Paquetes a Vapor, 182 Companhia de Iluminação a Gaz, 165 Companhia de Navegação a Vapor Bahiana, 182 Companhia de Navegação a Vapor do Alto Paraguay, 183 Companhia de Navegação a Vapor do Espirito Santo, 182 Companhia de Navegação a Vapor Macahé e Campos, 183 Companhia de Navegação a Vapor nos Rios do Maranhão, 182 Companhia de Navegação e Comércio do Amazonas, 182 Companhia de Navegação Intermediaria a Vapor, 182 Companhia de Navegação pelo Parnahyba, 183 Companhia do Mucury e Caravellas, 182 Companhia Nacional de Navegação Costeira, 182 Companhia Nacional de Navegação a Vapor, 172 Companhia Pernambucana de Navegação Costeira, 182 Compañía Carbonera de Las Palmas, 17, 20

Compañía de Combustibles Oceanica, 19 Compañía General de Carbones, 19 Compañía Nacional de Carbones Minerales, 18, 19 Compañía Sudamericana de Comercio S.A., 70 Conceição & Co., 172 Condor Limited, 16 Congo, 18 Coronel, 22, 24 Corumbá, 173 Cory Brothers Co. commercial activity in Brazil, 140 Cory Hermanos S.A., 17 Cory M. George-William Cory Ltd, 17 Cory´s Merthyr Coal, 133 John Cory, 172, 173, 177 Millers & Cory, 40 Richard Cory, 172, 173, 177 William Cory & Son Ltd, 133 Costa, Julio A., 135 Courchelettes, 87 Cracow basin, 99, 100, 112, 113, 115–117 Cuiabá, 172 Cuyás Hidalgo, Cayetano, 17n2 Cuyo, 142 Czechoslovakia, 99, 100, 100n1, 102n3, 114, 116 D Da ̨browa Basin, 99, 101, 102, 112, 113, 117, 119 Dakar Arsenal, 34, 43 call of vessels, 36, 50 coal agreements during World War I, 34, 36, 50–53 coal companies, 41–53 coal facilities, 36, 40

 INDEX 

coal imports, 35, 36 coal prices, 42, 48, 53 port competition, 5 port reform, 34, 55 shortage of labourers, 53 Danzig, 100, 102, 104, 105, 108–110, 112, 113, 117, 119 Dardanelles (Strait), 6, 83 David R. Llewellyn Group, 16 Davies, David, 173 Delmas, Philippe, 45 Denmark, 102n3 Depósito de Carbones de Tenerife S.A., 70 Depósito Español de Carbones S.A., 70 Deutsche Dampfschiffahrts-­ Gesellschaft Hansa, 62n1 Deutsche Kohlenbergbau Leitung (DKBL), 71, 77 Deutsche-Kohlendepot GmbH (DKD), 5, 6, 62–69, 71–79 Deutsche Levante-Linie, 62n1 Deutsche Ost-Afrika-Linie, 62n1 Devès et Chaumet, 44 Dias da Silva, Caetano, 182 Domestic Fuel Corporation, 70 Donges, 87, 90, 91, 94 Dordogne, 89 Douai, 87 Droste, Dietrich, 77 Druid (steamship), 128 Dubarry, Albert, 48, 49 Dunkirk, 82, 87, 90, 93 Durban, 23 Durham, 21 E Edward Finch & Co., 177 Elder Dempster, 16, 18, 19, 40, 45

191

Ellerman Lines, 19 Emile Miguet (tanker), 86 English Channel, 20 Entreprises de Travaux Publics et Maritimes, 109 Era of kinetics, 129 Espinosa, Salvador, 139 Essener Steinkohlenbergwerke AG, 68 Estaque hills, 89 Estonia, 102n3 Étang de Berre, 89–91 European Economic Communities, 86–92 F F.C.S.–Temperley Coal Conveying Plant, 133 Fernandes Braga, Antônio, 172–174, 176 Ferreira Borges, Francisco, 182 Finefrau, 78 Finland, 102n3 Flandin, P.É., 111n15 Fluminense e Inglês, 166 Fortaleza, 165 Fos (Gulf), 91 Frachtcontor Junge & Co GmbH, 70 France Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale (CSDN), 88 energy policies, 6, 84 Franco-Polish coal consortium, 109, 112 French Empire, 2, 5, 42, 92 French Navy, 42, 51 General Committee for Oil, 84 Office National des Combustibles Liquides (ONCL), 85, 88 Oil Consortium, 84 Quai d´Orsay, 109, 114, 119 Freetown, 18, 19, 23, 51, 52 Freights, see Shipping

192 

INDEX

French Guinea, 51 French West Africa (FWA), 34, 35, 43, 48, 51, 54 See also Dakar Frontignan, 90 G Galicia (Poland), 118 Galveston, 21 Gamboa maritime station, 176 Garonne, 89 Garth (mines), 18 Gdynia, 6, 99–119 Geitling, 78 Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-AG, 68 Gemeinschaftsorganisation des Ruhrkohlenverkaufs, 71, 78 Geneva Convention (1922), 101, 114 Genoa, 72, 145 Gentlemanly capitalism, 4 Gérardin, E.H.A., 109n11 Gerloff, Joachim, 76 German Coal Depot, 5 German Coal Warehouse Company Ltda, 134 Germaniki Anthrakapothiki AE Emborias Karsimon Ylon, 70 German Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate (RWKS) management, 74, 76 See also Syndicate of producers Germany, 15, 20, 71, 77, 79, 84, 99–101, 102n3, 103, 110, 113–115, 117, 119, 131 Reichstag, 16, 19 Gewerkschaft Deutscher Kaiser/Kohle Depot, 66n8 Gibraltar, 23 port, 23 Strait, 21 Giraud, Albert, 89 Glasgow coal, 134, 141, 143

Global North, 3 See also Imperialism Global South, 3, 4 See also Dependency and imperialism Glückauf syndicate, 63 Godeffroy, Oscar, 66, 68, 71, 75, 76 Goiana, 165 Gold standard, 103, 105, 107, 112 Gonçalves Martins, Francisco, 182 Gonfreville l’Orcher, 87 Gorée, 42 Grand Canary Coaling Co., 40 See also Elder Dempster Great Britain British coaling companies, 38, 40 British Empire, 12, 14, 154, 170 British General Strike, 65 British Navy, 52 British Royal Commission on Coal Supplies, 45 coal exports, 60, 131 coal mines, 59, 69 England, 16, 59, 60, 73, 128, 130, 171, 174 merchant fleet, 50, 52, 131 Great War, see World War I Greece, 102n3 Gueret, Gait & Co., 144 Gueret, Llewelyn and Merrett Ltd, 17 Guest (mines), 16 Gulf of Guinea, 37 Gutehoffnungshütte Aktienverein für Bergbau, 68 H Hamburg, 5, 19, 62, 62n1, 65, 66, 73–76, 79, 104n4 Hamburger Platz, 74 Hamburg-Amerika Linie, 62n1 Hamburg Gauleiter, 73 Hamburg-Südamerikanische Dampfschiffahrtsge sellschaft, 62n1 Hamilton and Co., 20

 INDEX 

See also Canary Islands Haniel & Cie GmbH, 68 Haniel’schen Kohlenhandel, 74 Hembry, W. H., 75, 76 Hibernia mining company, 72 Hohenlohe Werke, 113 Højgaard & Schultz, 109 Holle, Ludwig, 79 Hong Kong, 23 Hrabia Renard (Comte Renard), 117 Hull (city), 16 Hull Blyth & Co. Ltd., 17 Hungary, 100, 102n3, 116 Huta Bankowa, 113, 116, 117 I Iceland, 102n3 Imperialism imperial companies, 156 imperialism of the poor, 108 Inchmore (steamship), 51 India, 15, 20, 21, 23 Indian Ocean, 5, 21 International division of labour, 3, 129, 130, 151 Iquique, 21, 24 Ireland, 102n3 Isla Maciel, 143 Italy, 15, 72, 77, 100, 102n3, 103, 104, 145 J Janus, Albert, 74 Japan, 20, 23 Jaworzno, 100 Jochaud du Plessix, Bertrand, 111 José Pedro dos Santos & Irmão, 182 K Karachi, 21 Karlsruhe, 91

Kassel, 63 Katowice, 99 Kauert, Herbert, 74 Keen (mines), 16 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 102n3 Kirkuk, 85 Kohlenkontor, 66 Kohlen-Verteilungsstelle Ruhr, 71 See also Ruhr Krähe, Walter, 74, 77 L La Boca, 128n2, 135, 143 Labour, vii, 3, 7, 8, 12, 53, 125, 127, 129, 130, 161 stevedoring of coal, 8 La Carbonifera S. A, 70 La Deheza (mine), 130 Lage Irmãos, 180 Lagos, 18, 23 Lambert Brothers Ltd., 16 La Mède, 87, 90 Lancial, E., 118n29 Lange, Albert, 73, 75–77 La Plata coaling station, 125 cold storage, 138 export series, 136–138 gas company, 138 imports of coal, 137, 138 supply of coal, 139 La Rioja (Argentina), 130 Laroche, Jules, 117 La Rochelle-La Pallice, 91, 92 La Spezia, 145 Latvia, 102n3 Lavéra, 87, 90 Leghorn, 145 Le Havre, 82, 87, 88, 90, 93, 94, 144 Leite & Irmão, 182 Leopold II, 18

193

194 

INDEX

Le Verdon, 89 Libya, 94 Linden Kohlenhandelsgesellschaft, 68 Linden-Rhederei GmbH, 68 Liquid fuels, 3, 6, 8, 27, 36, 53, 55 See also Oil Lisbon, 20 Lithuania, 102n3 Liverpool, 21 Lloyd´s maritime committee, 20 London, 16, 20, 21, 128, 135, 140, 145, 173, 177 Long Island, see New York Lopes de Figuereido, Alfredo, 41 Luanda, 23 Luigi-Profumo S. A, 70 Lyon-St. Étienne, 113 M Maceió, 165 Madeira, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 40 Madrid, 70 Maginot, André, 110, 111 Maison Maurice Vincke & Cie, 108 Malaga, 70 Malta, 70 Malta Bunkering Depot Limited, 70 Manila, 23 Mann George y Cía, 135 Maracaibo, 18 Marseilles, 71, 82, 87, 89–91, 93, 94, 144 refinery, 87, 93 Matanza River (Riachuelo), 128, 128n2, 145 Mato Grosso, 172 Mauritania, 51 Mausegatt, 78 Melbourne, 29 Mendoza, 130

Merlaud-Ponty, William, 46n8, 47n10, 49n12 Méssageries Impériales, 41, 42 Méssageries Maritimes, 90 Messina, 72 Mihanovich, Nicolas, 133 Milan, 70 Millerand, A., 115n20 Miller y Cía S.A., 16, 17n2, 20 Minas Gerais, 151, 156, 169 Mindelo call of vessels, 46, 50 coal imports, 39 coal supplies, 40, 54 See also Saint Vincent Moji, 29 Montana Verwaltungs-GmbH, 79 Montevideo, 18, 22, 24, 132, 133, 135, 172, 173 Moxey Savon, 145 Mudd & Co., 133 N Nantes, 90, 93, 94, 144 Naples, 72, 145 Natal, 15, 21 Nederlandsche Agentuur en Bevrachtings-Ondememing NV, 70 Netherlands (the), 20 Nettlefolds (mines), 16 Newcastle, 21, 25, 47 Newfoundland, 21 New Orleans, 29 New York, 21 New Zealand, 25 The Nictheroy Gas Company Limited, 165n3 Nigeria, 18 Niterói, 165 Nöel, Ernest, 53

 INDEX 

Norddeutscher Lloyd, 62n1 Norway, 102n3 Noulens, J., 108n9 NV Handels, 68 O Oakwood (mines), 18 Oceania, 23 Oceanica, see Compañía de Combustibles Oceanica Ocean Merthyr Ltd., 18 Oil Cartel of Ten, 82 companies, 2, 87, 91 exports, 93 imports, 81–83, 86, 87, 91–93 lamp oil, 82 refineries, 82, 85–88, 90, 91, 93 refining, 81, 82, 85–87, 90, 92–94 supplies, 83, 85, 86, 93, 94 whale oil, 82 Oligopoly, 2, 40, 171, 180 See also Trust Olinda, 165 Oslo, 70 Ottoman Empire, 6, 83 P Pacific Ocean, 128 Pacte of San Remo, 84 Panafieu, H.A., 110n12, 115n20, 117n25, 117n26 Panama Canal, 11, 21, 24 Pará, 133, 156 Paraguay, 152n2, 155 Paraguay War, 152, 154, 155, 157, 159, 166, 170, 180 Paraíba Valley, 151 Paraná River, 141

195

Paris, viii, 88, 107–110, 112–114, 118, 144 Parish, Woodbine, 128 Park, Kendall, 26 Patagonia, 142 Pauillac, 87, 89 Pechelbronn Ouest, 85 Pedroso de Albuquerque, Antônio, 182 Penang, 23 Pernambuco, 18, 21, 133, 135, 151 Petit-Couronne, 87, 88, 94 Petrofina, 90 Petsaly Coal Ltd, 19 See also Wilson and Sons Pichon, S., 108n9, 115n20 Piraeus, 70 Poincaré, Raimond, 109n11, 110n13 Poland Baltic Plans, 109 borders, 99–101, 107, 114 Cieszyn lesson, 114 coal export series, 6, 100–107, 109, 112, 114, 119 German occupation (1914), 113 Polish-Soviet war, 109 Polish State Mines, 106 trade balance, 103 Polski Bank Przemysłowy, 109 Port cities and maritime networks, 49, 53 Port-de-Bouc, 89, 94 Martigues, 90 Port-Jerôme, 88, 94 Port reform, 7, 34, 54, 55 Port Said, 17, 23, 66, 66n8, 172 Port-Saint-Louis-du-Rhone, 82 Portugal, 50, 102n3 Powell Duffryn-Associated Collieries, 16 Powell Duffryn Group, 17 President, 78, 144, 172 Principal-agent theorem, 61

196 

INDEX

Q Querqueville, 92 Quillebeuf, 88 R Raab Karcher & Cie GmbH, 68 Rabes, Carl, 66 Raffinerie de Normandie, 88 Raffinerie de Pétrole de Nord, 90 Raffinerie de Provence, 90 Recife, 151 Reynard, Paul, 111 Rhine, 5, 66, 67 See also German Rhenish-­ Westphalian Coal Syndicate Rhondda (mines), 17 Lord Rhondda, 144, 145 Rhône (tanker), 83 Ribereña de Plata, 133 Rio de Janeiro call of vessels, 160, 173 coal import series, 8, 132, 160–163, 168, 171, 179 coal prices, 153, 163 coal traders, 169 companies, 8, 145, 171, 172, 174 Dique do Comércio, 171 exports, 171 Guanabara Bay, 168, 170, 171, 174 Ilha das Enxadas, 170 Ilha de Mocanguê Pequeño, 169 Ilha dos Ferreiros, 175–178 port area, 7, 161, 170 Rio do Ouro railway, 176 urban development, 7 The Rio de Janeiro Gaz Company, 165 Rio de La Plata (region), 125, 128, 128n2, 132, 138–140, 145 Rio Grande do Sul, 133, 145, 156 Rising Star (vessel), 128

River Plate Coal Co., 145 Rodrigues Ferreira, José, 183 Romania, 6, 82, 83, 102n3, 107 Roma y Cía, 133 Rosario, 132, 133, 139–141, 144 Rosas (de), Juan Manuel, 128 Rotterdam, 70 Rouen, 82, 87, 88, 90, 93, 94 Rufisque, 42, 55 Ruhr coal production, 5, 60, 62–64, 71 military occupation, 61 Ruhrkohlen-Centrale, 71 See also German Rhenish-­ Westphalian Coal Syndicate Russell, Ernst, 74 Russia, 6, 82, 83, 100, 107, 108, 112 S Saint-Gobain (company), 90 Saint-Louis (Senegal), 42 Saint Malo, 144 Saint Nazaire, 144 Saint Vincent, 23–25, 35, 38, 41, 52, 135 Saint Vincent C.V.I., 19 See also Mindelo Saloum, 42 Salto, 140 San Juan (Argentina), 130 San Salvador de Bahía, 18, 21, 22 San Sebastian (Spain), 70 Santa Catarina, 156, 157 Santa Fe, 139–141 Santa Helena (Brazil), 173 Santos, 7, 132, 133, 135, 151, 158, 165 São Cristóvão, 176 São Luís, 165 São Paulo, 151, 156 Savannah, 21

 INDEX 

Savona, 72, 145 Scandinavia, 103 Schlesische Aktiengesellschaft für Bergbau und Zinkhüttenbetrieb, 112, 114 Schmidt, Rüdiger, 74 Schneider, 109–112 Scotland, 170 Scott, Hett & Co., 171 Sebang, 23 Second Industrial Revolution, 6, 95 Senegal, 5, 34, 35, 41–45, 50–52, 55 See also Dakar Sete-Frontignan, 82 Shanghai, 23 Shell Company, 55, 90 Shipping, 15, 21, 22, 30, 40, 47, 48, 51, 54, 59, 87, 89, 101, 102, 107, 161, 171, 172 coastal, 37, 42 connectivity, 48 freights, 48, 172 lighterage services, 37 outbound freights, 48, 53 routes, 3–5, 11, 12, 16–18, 20, 21, 27 sailing, 11, 27, 37, 42, 59, 133 steamship diffusion, vii technological advances, vii, 12, 28 very large crude carriers, 92 Sierra Leone, 18 Sierra Leone Coaling Company, 19 See also Wilson and Sons Silesia, 6, 114, 115, 118 Singapore, 23 Sjuröya Kull & Koks A/S, 70 Śla ̨skie Kopalnie i Cynkownie S.A., 114 Soares, José Antônio, 183 Sociedade Insulana de Transportes Maritimos Lda, 70

197

Societá Britannica Italiana Gueret, 144 Société Anonyme du Gaz de Rio de Janeiro, 165 Société Anonyme Hersent, 109 Société Bôneise de Charbonnages S. A, 70 Société Continentale de Combustibles S. A, 70 Société de Construction des Batignolles, 109 Société de Raffinage des Huiles de Pétrole (SRHP), 85 Société des Consommateurs de Pétrole, 90 Société Desmarais, 84 Société des Pétroles Jupiter, 85, 87, 89 Société des Raffineries de la Vacuum Oil Company, 85 Société des Raffineries de Pétrole de la Gironde, 85, 89 Société Financière Belge des Pétroles, 90 Société Française & Italienne des Houillères de Dombrowa, 115 Société Franco-Américaine de Raffinage (SFAR), 85, 88 Société Générale d’Entreprises (SGE), 91 Société Générale des Huiles de Pétrole (SGHP), 85, 87, 90 Société Générale des Transports Maritimes, 43 Société Genérale d’Houilleries et Agloméres, 144 Société Marseillaise d´Importation de Combustibles S. A, 70 Société Worms et Cie, 108 Worms Josse y Cía, 135 Worms y Cia, 134 Sonnenschein, 78 Sosnowiec, 99 South Africa, 5, 15, 23, 52

198 

INDEX

South Wales Coaling, 170 Souza (de), Irineu Evangelista, 165 Spain, 50, 102n3 1880 Port Act, 39 Standard Oil Company, 83 Steenkolen-Handelsvereeniging, 68 Stettin, 104n4 Stinnes (mines), 72 Stinnes, Hugo, 72, 77 Stormont, P.H., 52 Strasbourg, 91 Stromeyer, F.M., 72n16 Sud-Atlantique (company), 90 Suez, 23 Canal, 11, 17, 21, 172 port, 17, 21, 23 Swanston, Pedro, 40 Sweden, 100, 102n3 Switzerland, 102n3, 107 Syndicate of producers, 8 See also Trust T Tancarville, 88 Tarrand Thomaz, João, 182 Tczew, 104n4, 118 Teixeira de Miranda, Francisco, 183 Teixeira Mendes, Raimundo, 182 Tenerife, see Canary Islands Teresina, 183 Texas, see Galveston Thierry, Justino, 130 Thomas, David Alfred, 144 Thyssen group, 66–68 Torridge River, 172 Tours, 144 Towarzystwo Bezimienne Kopalń Węgla “Czeladź” Piaski, 118n30 Towarzystwo Kopalń i Zakładów Hutniczych Sosnowieckich, 118n30

Towarzystwo Robót Inżynierskich (TRI), 110 Trade war, 100, 101, 110, 117, 119 Transportmaatschappij Vulcaan, 68 Transports Maritimes, 44 Treaty of Rambouillet, 112 Trieste, 72 Trust, 2, 40, 46, 76, 86 See also Syndicate of producers Trust-Saving Bank & Hill Samuel, 16 The Tubarão Brazilian Coal Mining Company Limited, 156 Tunis, 144 U Ugarte, Marcelino (Governor), 138 United States coal exports, 142 Pampa gringa, 139–142 See also Oil United States and Brasil Mail Steamship, 183 Upper Senegal, 42 Upper Silesia Lease holding Company In (Skarboferm), 106 Upper Silesian Coal Basin, 113 Upper Silesian Coal Convention, 115 V Vacuum Oil Company, 85 Vaux (de), G., 110n13 Venice, 72, 145 Versailles Treaty, 102, 114 Vianney, V., 117n26 Victoria (tug), 177 Vienna, 112 Vigo, 19 Viscount de Figueiredo, 183 Vistula, 108, 118 Vitória, 182

 INDEX 

W Wales, see Cardiff Warsaw, 7, 101, 102, 105, 106, 108, 109, 111, 116 Welsh-associated collieries, 16 West Africa, 5, 20, 33–55, 94 West African Shipping Conference, 16 Westfälisches Kohlenkontor Naht, Emschermann & Co. (WKK), 73 Westfälische Transport AG (WTAG), 63n5 Westphalian Coal Office, 74 Wilson and Sons, 34, 40, 43, 46 Canary Islands, 40 commercial activity in Brazil, 135 Dakar, 40, 43, 46 Edward Pellew Wilson, 170 Edward Pellew Wilson Jr., 171 Ocean Coal & Wilson, 144 Saint Vincent, 19, 135 Winter & Brittain, 128 Woermann Linie, 16, 19, 43, 62n1 Wood James y Williams y Lamond Ltd., 134

199

World War I, 3, 5, 6, 8, 26, 34, 36, 40, 55, 64, 67, 82, 86, 89, 95, 108, 131, 141, 142 coal agreements, 36 submarine warfare, 83 trade blockade, 66 U-Boats, 84 World War II Allied Control Council, 72 Headquarters North German Coal Control, 71 Liberation, 91 Worms y Cía, 134 See also Compagnie Worms et Cie Y Yugoslavia, 102n3, 107 Z Zakłady Hohenlohego, 113 Zaolzie, 100n1 Żegluga Wisła-Bałtyk, 118