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English Pages 314 [328] Year 1985
From the Ashes of Disgrace
From the Ashes of Disgrace A Journal from Germany
1945-1955
byHansSpeier
T he U niversity of M assachusetts Press
Am herst, 1981
C opyright© 1981 by The University of Massachusetts Press A ll rights reserved Printed in the United States of America ISBN 0 -8 70 *3-1 3 $-9 l c 80-21 $99 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Speier, Hans. From the ashes of disgrace. Includes index. i. Germany, West—History—Sources. 2. Ger many—History—Allied occupation, 1945— —Sources. I. Title. 00259.563 943.087*4 80-21599 ISBN 0-87023-13 s-9
For Sybil and Steve
Contents
A uthor's N ote
xi
Introduction 1
One. Letters First V isit: 1945 17 Arrival in London: Karl Mannheim 18 First Days in Germany: Frankfurt, Bad Homburg 18 Berlin: Search, Carl Hofer, Chaos 24 Bad Homburg: Waiting 29 “The M ills o f Death" 30 Contrasts 33 M annheim and H eidelberg 34 Karl Jaspers 35 1979 Postscript on “Inner Emigration“ 40 D olf Stem berger 41 Nuremberg: Opening o f the War Crimes Trial 43 Thanksgiving and a Personal Note 44 Salzburg, Linz, Vienna 45 Return to Munich 49 Marburg: Max G raf zu Solms and Rudolf Bultmann 50 Second V isit: 1946 55 London 55 Paris, Frankfurt, Berlin 58 Berlin: American Party and German Hunger 60 Lucius D. Clay, Munich, Nuremberg, Luxury in Vienna 62 Later V isits: 1950-1955 Paris 66 Bonn and Berlin 66
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vin O ld Friends, the French, and Pastor Niem öller 68 Paris and W iesbaden 69 H eidelberg R evisited (November 1951) 71 M elville in Germany 72 The Diary o f Anne Frank 72
Two. Recollections 1947-1948; Report 1950 P refa ce
77
T hree R ecollections 82 G reta: 1946-1947 82 Escape from Berlin, 1948 86 Easter 1948, at Chiem Lake 88 Report of V isit in 1950 90
Three. Conversations and Observations, 1951-1952 P refa ce 109 A lfred Toppe: M ilitary Pride and Pension 111 Dr. R eibert: A Candid Soldier 113 Form er Nazis in the German Foreign O ffice 116 P olitical C abaret 116 A Young German Painter 119 A m ateur M achiavellianism and Erich Mende 119 Changing German Behavior tow ard Americans 122 Im pressions o f Public Life 123 A Sunday Dinner 125 A Fam ily o f Former Nazis 126 Evening at a Publisher’s House, and the Next Morning 132 W eekend at the M osel 134 Erich D ethleffsen: German Political Attitudes; Soviet Strategy in World War III 139 O tto Klepper: The Importance o f the Third World 146 G erhard G raf von Schwerin: Military Critic o f Rearmament 149 Opinions about Ernst Reuter 159 A dolf Heusinger, the First Soldier 159 A German Postwar Boy 169 Kurt von Tippelskirch, a Historian 171 A nxiety about the Russians 179 On A nxiety about A ttacks from the Air 180 A nxiety in Germany: A Panel Discussion 181
Frido von Senger vnd Etterlin: Soldier, Scholar, Educator 185 Max H orkheim er and Frederick Pollock 190 The C om m ittee o f Free Jurists 193 The Socialists and Rearmament: Willy Brandt and Otto Suhr 196 R einhard G ehlen: Director o f the German CIA 202
Four. Observations and Conversations, 1954-1955 P refa ce 213 Socializing w ith Businessmen 215 A fterthought on M alicious Joy 217 Tax Evasions 218 H ans-Rudolf M üller-Schwefe 218 German Television 223 Building A ctivities and Rentals 223 Sense o f Duty 224 Theodor Steltzer: A Study o f German Youth 225 W ilhelm Meinberg, A Neo-Nazi 226 Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg: Military Self-Criticisms the Middle East and World War III 231 Günther Blumentritt: France and EDCs History o f the German O fficers’ Corps 234 Georg von Sodenstem : “New Look ’’ and China 238 D em ocracy in Germany 239 Karl Silex: N eutralist 240 A Journalist: Anti-Americanism: Writing betw een the Lines 244 R udolf Pechel: Writing under Threats o f Persecutions German Overtures to the East: The Danger o f Renazification 245 Louis M uller: German-French Relations 250 Franz H aider: Political and Military Views 252 O bservations on Inform al Communications and the Blank O ffice 267 A delbert Weinstein and Karl Heinrich Heifer 269 Fraternization 1955: The Com m ittee for European Security o f the German Bundestag 276 German Reactions to Adenauer’s Meeting w ith Khrushchev 284 Franz Josef Strauss 288 A Young O fficial in the D efense Ministry 293 W olf G raf Baudissin: The Spirit o f the German Army 297 Fritz Berendsen: Upper Class Juste Milieu 302 West Germany in 1955 305 In d ex
309
Author's Note T he title of this book—a phrase coined by Keats in O tho th e G reat, v, $—was also used by the Italian Admiral Franco Maugeri as title for the story of his nation, beginning w ith Italy's entry into World War n in June 1940 and ending in 1947.1 Because the entries in the journal provide little sense of historical continuity and context, I have added Prefaces to Parts Two, Three, and Four. Each Preface briefly sets forth the major political events transpir ing during the years in question. Footnotes have also been added to identify persons and events mentioned in the text. In gathering som e of the required inform ation, Maria Paasche was of great help. I am grateful for her untiring efforts in this country and in Germ any. The German Information Center in New York, the M il itä ra rch iv in Freiburg i. Br., and, above all r ia s in Berlin responded helpfully to inquiries; their services are gratefully acknowledged. Finally, I want to thank Margit, my wife, for her sensitive reading of the journal, her encouragement extending over several years to trans form it into a book, and for many hours of patient help. 1 Ed. Victor Rosen (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 194S).
The past is not a package one can lay away Emily Dickinson
Introduction
On the Sense o f Discretion In O ctober 194 $, I was waiting at the airport near London for the de parture of a m ilitary aircraft for Frankfurt am Main. A much-decorated A m erican officer noticed my special uniform identifying me as an A m erican civilian, and approached me to ask what I was going to do on the C ontinent. I told him that in connection w ith the forthcoming trial of m ajor war crim inals, I was going to the Information Control D ivi sion of o m g u s (O ffice of M ilitary Government) located at Bad Hom burg. Had I personally insulted the officer, my reply could not have caused a more explosive outburst. He was furiously indignant about A m erican policy and, by association, about me either as its represen tative or as one of its appointed critics flagrantly derelict in the per form ance of his duty. He said that he had been a bomber pilot over G erm any and he knew the war from personal experience, not from sit ting behind a desk. He had lost friends and seen Americans killed by the Germ ans. He had killed hundreds, if not thousands, of German civilian s on his bombing runs. The Germans had fought and lost the war. W e had fought and won. Had Germany won the war, he would now be an Am erican war crim inal. 'T o hell w ith Nuremberg! The trial disgusts m e." He did not w ait for an answer but turned away as though I had a contagious disease. I was stunned. I was not upset by the fact that I was evidently a con venient target for the officer's rage, nor did it help me to know that he was factually wrong, in that no German bomber pilots were to be tried at Nuremberg. W hat unnerved me was the unexpected assault on my sheltered hot-house feelings about American m orality during World W ar O. I had regarded the British policy of using area bombing to force
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Germ any to surrender as a grievous and cruel m istake, in that only governm ents or the commanders of armed forces—not whole popula tions—can surrender. I had deeply deplored the Yalta agreement. N ever having shared the delusion that the alliance w ith Stalin—the recent partner of H itler—would outlast the war against the common enem y, I considered the Yalta agreement a politically disastrous sur render of Eastern Europe and parts of Central Europe to Communist rule. But my belief in the crim inality of the H itler regime had never been shaken for an instant since its assumption of power in Janu ary 1933 . Nor was I ever persuaded that the regime would crumble ex cept by defeat in war. Now, an American officer, unquestionably patriotic, w ith a personal share in the bloody victory over the Reich, left m e gasping for a breath of m orality. I was seized by a desperately intense desire to prove to him that he was wrong. I wanted him to realize that in this war, w ith all its carnage and destruction, the forces of evil had been beaten down by the forces of righteousness. But the pilot had disappeared. M y encounter w ith the American officer in London was not the only assault on the sheltered life I had been leading in the United States. W hen I first arrived in Berlin, early in November 194 $, I had no close relatives to visit. Both of my parents died shortly before the war broke out in Europe. Both had been confined to wheelchairs when I left Ger m any in 1933 . A few of my w ife's German relatives had emigrated, others had perished. My correspondence w ith two friends and their fam ilies had been disrupted since the beginning of the war. I was anxious to locate them as w ell as some other persons, unknown to me, whom Am erican friends had asked me to look up. T o my distress, I succeeded only in a single instance. I often shared an army vehicle w ith two colleagues who had never been to Berlin. One day, our business completed, I asked them if they would like to com e w ith me to Friedenau to see what had happened to the house in w hich I was bom. Friedenau is a western suburb where my parents lived after they married, and where I had last seen them before I left Germany. It was a fairly ugly neighborhood. M ost houses had been built at the turn of the century and were inhabited mainly by civ il servants of middle rank and by w hite-collar workers. All the streets were named after artists and w riters: Rembrandt, Cranach, Thorw aldsen, Dürer, Lenbach, Körner, Hauff, Rubens. When we reached my birthplace—once a four-story apartment house on Kömerstrasse—I saw that the building, like so many other houses, was razed
INTRODUCTION
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to the ground. Having alm ost expected to find it destroyed I remarked dryly, "R igh t here, at the com er, it used to stand. I can now claim that I w as bom in m id-air." At this point one of my colleagues, who had know n m e for years, snapped back, "Feeling sorry for yourself?" Again I was stunned, as I had been in London. Did the young man th in k that to prove my political loyalty I must act indifferently to the sight of destruction? I replied that I felt sorry only for the children. I s till regret th is accom modatingly heartless answer. Death of civilians of w hatever age or nationality in war is nothing to feel indifferent about. Nor was the involvem ent of many German civilians in the Nazi cause a reason for joy or indifference at their death. And clearly, every dw elling that had collapsed was more than a site of destruction: it was a token of death. T he last incident I want to m ention in this Introduction occurred during my second visit to Germany in 1946. At that tim e, the Depart m ent of State wanted to determ ine if the Voice of America, originating in New York, could be broadcast to Iron Curtain countries by means of a relay station located somewhere in Europe. Obviously, this question required both technical and political answers. The group that was to investigate the m atter consisted of two engineers, myself, and another p olitical representative. A fter several weeks of exploring possible sites in various European capitals, we decided that the best location for the relay station would be in M unich. General Lucius D. Clay, of course, had to be informed. He objected strongly because he thought it wrong to use "h is " zone of occupation, which included Munich, to broadcast against our allies, the Russians. But eventually our recommendation was accepted in W ashington. At our m eeting in his office, General C lay proved to be w ell informed about my background, and remarked bluntly that Am ericans of German birth were poorly qualified to ap preciate Am erican interests. Knowing that German-bom Americans were among his consultants, I replied that I was sorry to learn that he had been disappointed in some of the men who worked for him. N either Ambassador Robert Murphy—General Clay's political advis or, who attended the m eeting—nor my colleague, who was a Foreign Service officer, opened his mouth. Perhaps they realized, as did I, that G eneral C lay referred to my German background as an opening gambit to oppose our recommendation, insofar as it had not originated in his office, but in W ashington. A fter the m eeting, Mr. Murphy remarked, "N ow you know what I am up against." I replied disingenuously that I regarded Clay's remark
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not so m uch as an attack on me but rather as an excuse to snipe at the State Departm ent. A fter all, the department had hired me and sent me on th is errand. The truth is that I was as much annoyed about Mur phy's and my colleague's silence as about Clay's calculated rudeness. T h at it was calculated became unmistakably clear later, at a sm all luncheon at General Clay's house, where he was a most charming and considerate host behaving toward me as though nothing had happened. It is widely believed that in the United States the m ilitary are ul tim ately subject to civilian control. Indeed, the president is command er in chief, and it was Trum an who eventually prevailed over General Douglas M acArthur. In World War n,however, there was no effective political control over the conduct of the war. The supreme war aim was not derived from a political conception as to which international order would be desirable in the postwar world. The supreme war aim was victory. N either the Department of State nor Congress concerned itself w ith the political conduct of the war. Thus in the "crusade" in Europe, Berlin was not taken, Vienna was not taken, Prague was not taken. Instead, the Red Army was allowed to lay the foundation for the Soviet em pire in Eastern Europe. The United States incurred a mo m entous and lasting m ilitary disadvantage by default of the political authorities. Early in the war, an indication of things to come was the appoint m ent of Robert Murphy as the president's representative in North A frica. It was General George C. Marshall who insisted that Murphy report to General Eisenhower as theater commander. Had Murphy reported directly to the president, he would have been politically in dependent. M arshall prevailed. T h is arrangement carried over into the early occupation period in Europe. T he U .S. political advisor to Lucius Clay played second fiddle. He even had difficulties sending a cable to Washington in State Depart m ent code. Conversely, any instruction that the Department of State forwarded to Lucius Clay was "cleared" in advance w ith the War De partm ent. And the War Department in turn would not act without prior approval of the draft by o m g u s , the m ilitary authority "in the field ." T he political advisor's position in the British zone of occupation was different, ju st as the British Foreign Office had not surrendered its authority to the m ilitary during the war. Sim ilarly, the French and Russian arrangements, of course, reflected the supremacy of political power.
INTRODUCTION
5
T he silencing of political reason in wartime America had been con founded by the fact that the president and his closest advisors expected the alliance w ith the Soviet Union to last. Moreover, toward the end of his life, Franklin D. Roosevelt was incapacitated by poor health. Before Robert Murphy was sent to Germany to assume the highest political office there, Roosevelt saw him at dinner but was too ill to give Murphy any instructions. "H e talked for an hour, but aim lessly," Murphy reports in his memoirs. "Roosevelt scarcely mentioned the Russians; the Germans were on his mind. He reminisced about his v isits to Germ any during his student days, and told how arrogant some G erm ans had been in their uniforms. He said the important thing was to keep the Germ ans out of uniform because 'the uniform does some thing bad to them , especially to the young m en.' During my early trips to Germany I was jolted by men who felt for personal, or possibly other, reasons that my German or Washington background m ight mar my judgment. In fairness I should add that neither before nor after these incidents was I ever confronted with this issue w hile in government service. Nor did it take these incidents to m ake m e aware of my background. I always felt that my prolonged ex posure to two different cultures had heightened my perception of dif ferences in Germ an and American life. To this day I have considered th is sensitivity—if indeed I may rightfully claim to possess it—a great advantage in my work. Prior to my emigration I considered m yself a European first and a German second; that is, I was no nationalist. And when I cam e to the United States I was young enough not to look back too often at what I had left behind, as older men and women are prone to do; I m et the challenges of life in America gratefully and w ith curi osity. Tw elve years later I revisited Germany curiously and with the old gratitude growing. The bomber pilot in London, my colleague at the v isit to Friedenau, and Lucius Clay—none of them really knew how seriously I took their unneeded challenges.
The Origin of This Book M ost of th is book was w ritten in Europe in the decade following World War II, during nine extended visits to Germany and Austria. It is 1 Robert Murphy, D iplom at am ong Warriors (New York, 1964), pp. >77- 78-
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a kind of travel diary consisting of letters, reports, summaries of con versations, observations and, occasionally, reflections on the social scene—all w ritten w ithout the intention to publish them later. During the process of editing these old pages for publication, I asked m yself what made m e come so close to keeping a journal on my early postw ar visits to Europe. I had never taken notes on any other phase of m y life. W hatever the motive for keeping a diary may be—practicing one's sk ill in writing, loneliness, the exploration of feelings, narcis sism , getting even w ith enemies, arresting the passage of tim e by cel ebrating a few of its pregnant moments—none but perhaps the quixotic fight against impermanence prompted me to w rite the pages of th is volum e. I wrote them, above all, either as letters to a particular person—in all cases but one, to my first wife Lisa, who unbeknownst to m e kept them bundled in a chest, where I found them after her death in 1965— or as notes to help me remember and to inform a few friends and associates about what I had learned of life in postwar Germany. O n m y visits to Europe I was professionally concerned with Ameri can policy toward Germany and w ith German political and social life. In addition, I was very curious about what had happened to Germany since H itler's ascent to power. Both my first wife and I had been bom in Germany. We had m et as students in Heidelberg and married in Berlin. At that tim e she was an intern in a Berlin hospital. When H itler became chancellor in 1933 , we lost our jobs: my wife, a pediatrician in Berlin's welfare service, was dism issed because she was Jewish; and the H ochschu le fü r P olitik in Berlin where I was a lecturer in political sociology was closed and taken over by the new M inistry for Propaganda. I emigrated to the U nited States early in September, two weeks after our daughter was bom ; my w ife followed w ith the child a month later. From 1933 to 19 4 2 1 taught sociology at the so-called U niversity-in-Exile—the grad uate faculty of the New School for Social Research in New York. Shortly after the United States entered World War U, I took a leave of absence and moved to W ashington, D.C. My fam iliarity w ith political and social conditions in Germany was known to a sm all number of academ ic colleagues, and I was considered an experienced analyst of N azi propaganda. T o this reputation I owed my first job in the Federal C om m unications Com m ission. Later I moved on to the O ffice of War Inform ation and finally to the Department of State. I remained in gov ernm ent service until 1948. In O ctober 194 $, when I was policy adviser to the director of the In-
INTRODUCTION
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terim International Inform ation Service of the Department of State, I revisited Germ any for the first tim e. I was sent on a special m ission to London and Germany. My letter of instruction stated: "You w ill sub m it advice on Germ an intelligence m aterial in connection w ith the operation of the Inform ation Control Division in Europe. W hile in London, you w ill also consult w ith our General Representative who is Special A ssistant to the American Ambassador. General Robert M cC lure and Justice Robert H. Jackson 2 3 have expressed their consent to your acting especially as consultant of the Interim International In form ation Service on inform ation policy regarding the trials of major G erm an war crim inals at N urem berg." It sounded more important than it actually was, but it gave me an opportunity to travel widely in the U .S. zones of occupation in Germany and Austria. A t that tim e all American civilians were required to wear uniforms and were not supposed to fraternize w ith Germans, so I bought m yself a m ilitary ou tfit in W ashington and wore a uniform for the first and only tim e in my life. I did fraternize w ith Germans, although my uni form made it a little harder for them to talk freely w ith me. Several m onths later, early in 1946, 1 went to Europe again. On this trip I m et w ith many American and British officers and civilians in positions of power and influence. I have no records of my first two v isits to Germ any in 194 $ and 1946, except personal letters to my wife. T hey are reproduced as w ritten at the tim e, except for m inor editorial changes and the deletion of personal or fam ily m atters. My letters of 1946 say very little about official meetings, because I made it a prac tice to be reticent on m y views of colleagues and superiors. My letters w ritten during my trip sin 1947 and 1948 are lost, and I did not keep any notes. (The three pieces for these years were w ritten from m em ory m uch later, in 1979 .) At the tim e I was still working for the Departm ent of State, but by 19 4 71 had become definitely opposed to th e U .S. policy of "reeducation," w hich had never appeared viable to m e, and I was concerned lest the disunity in Allied policies toward oc cupied Germ any be exploited by German nationalists .3 My main polit2 Brigadier General Robert A. McClure was chief of ic d (Information Control D ivi sion) of M ilitary Government in the U.S. zone of occupation; former Federal Justice Robert H. (ackson was the U.S. chief prosecutor at Nuremberg. He died in 1954. 3 For my political views on U.S.-German relations at the time, see Hans Speier, " 'Re education' —the U.S. Policy," and "The Future of German Nationalism " (both written in 1947), in S ocial O rder an d th e R isks o f War (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), chaps. 30 and 3 1.
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ical preoccupation at the tim e was not Germany but the future of Europe. T he trip in 1948 occurred shortly before the onset of the Berlin blockade. The m enacing Soviet move delayed the projected change over from m ilitary government to the civilian O ffice of the High Com m issioner, a changeover that had prompted a group of State De partm ent representatives to travel to Germany. The Russian challenge to the Am erican presence in Berlin, and to American policy in Ger m any and Europe at large, indicated that it was not a propitious tim e for G eneral Clay to step aside for Mr. John McCloy—who later became the U .S. high com m issioner and, eventually, the first U.S. ambassador to the Federal Republic. So we all went home without having accom plished the preparations we had come to make. In 1948 I left government service to return to academic life. But in late 19 50 1 traveled once more to Germany via Paris, this tim e as a con su ltant to the State Department. I went in the company of Wallace C arroll, who had been my immediate superior as deputy director for Europe of the overseas branch of the O ffice of War Information during W orld War n .4At the tim e, the econom ic upturn of West Germany had begun. Shop windows invited custom ers to eat chocolate and cake, re furbish their apartments, replenish their wardrobes, and buy books and travel tick ets. I interviewed many people in different cities. Yet, because Carroll and I had to w rite a report which the High Com m issioner's Office (h ic o g ) expected to receive before we returned to the United States, I had no tim e to send many letters or keep detailed notes. I wrote the sum m ary of my impressions—which is included in this book in ab breviated form—im m ediately after my return to the United States. T he few letters I did send home are included in Part One, below. O ur report for Mr. M cCloy was classified 'T o p Secret," because it contained policy recommendations. I do not know whether the high com m issioner read them , and I doubt that he did. But Shepard Stone, director of the O ffice of Public Affairs in h ic o g , who had arranged for C arroll's and my visit to Germany, used our report when writing at least one of Mr. M cCloy's speeches. In a complimentary letter to me, dated January 19 , 19 51 , he enclosed the text of "th e little speech in Germ an w hich Mr. M cCloy made over r ia s (Radio in the American Sector, in Berlin) at New Y ears." In it, the high commissioner added— 4 Wallace C an oll's Persuade or Perish (Boston, 1948), is a good account of American wartime propaganda to Germany.
INTRODUCTION
9
to the usual American pledge to support German reunification—a statem ent w hich followed one of our recommendations: "N or can we forget that m illions of Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Hungarians, Ruman ians, Bulgarians and other peoples fervently seek a return to Europe and to a European com m unity of freedom and peace." I have only scanty records of my visit to Europe in 19 $ 1 , which I made in the company of W. Phillips Davison, a colleague and friend. O n th is trip I m et General Lauris Norstad, later supreme Allied com m ander in Europe, whom we visited in his Paris headquarters. Shortly thereafter I went to Heidelberg to deliver a talk on psychological war fare. Davison, having never been to Heidelberg, asked me to show him the sights. I took him through the old part of town and up to the famous castle. We stood at exactly the same spot where I had been the very first day of my arrival in Heidelberg as a student. Two months later, I re called this experience in a letter to Kurt Riezler,5 an older former colleague of m ine whom I admired; the letter is included in Part One. During my v isit in November 19 51 , 1 kept notes on the first two con versations w ith former m ilitary leaders, conversations sim ilar to those w hich were to occupy much of my tim e on subsequent trips in 1952 , 1954 , and 195 5. Since 1950, German rearmament and German partici pation in W estern defense had become major foreign policy issues in both the United States and the Federal Republic. I wanted to study these issues, and discussed them with many German political and m il itary leaders beginning in 1952 , prior to the publication of two books in 19 57.6D etailed records of my conversations, along with other observavations, com prise Parts Three and Four of the present volume. Part Tw o—m aterial from 1947 to 1950 —functions as the transition from Part O ne, w hich consists entirely of letters, to Parts Three and Four, w hich are m ainly the records of selected conversations, observations, and reflections from the last years of the journal. By and large, a tem poral order has been kept, except for a few cases when chronology was disregarded because of the identity or close affinity of themes. Perhaps it should be mentioned that w ith the exception of the s On Kurt Riezler (1882—195$), diplomat and philosopher, see "Vorwort" to Kurt Riezler, Tagebücher. A ufsätze, D okum ente, ed. K. D. Erdmann (Göttingen, 1972); and Leo Strauss, "Kurt Riezler," in What Is P olitical Philosophyi (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press» 1959), chap. 10. 6 Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison, eds., West German Leadership and Foreign Policy (Glencoe, 01., 1957); and Hans Speier, German Rearm am ent and Atom ic War (Glencoe, 01., 1957)-
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round-table discussion on June 5- 6, 1952 , none of the conversations and interview s was recorded. In m ost cases I made notes immediately after the event and, whenever possible, dictated or personally wrote the entry in the journal on the same day. I was astonished when I grad ually developed an ability to recall the course of the conversation and even certain characteristic phrases I had heard. But needless to say, I used quotation marks in the journal solely for stylistic reasons without claim ing literal accuracy.
Them es In a journal one usually finds only chronological order and no other unity except that provided by the temperament of the author. Yet there is a certain progression of them es in this book, and perhaps it w ill be useful to m ention som e of them at the outset. ( 1 ) T he first them e can best be designated by a phrase that occurs several tim es in Part One. It is repeated again in a letter w ritten in W iesbaden later, in May 1952 , but not included in this book. The pas sage reads: In the flowershops you can see the most precious orchids, and the park is full of lilac, tulips, pansies, daisies, and innumerable other flow ers whose names you know and I forget. Even in the opera last night there were large bunches of fresh white lilac on the stage! I don't know why it exhilarates me so; perhaps because I have not seen Germ any in spring for nineteen years, perhaps it is the reassertio n o f life and colors and scents a fter I h a v e p a ssed s o m an y ru in s— W hen I arrived in Germany for the first tim e in the fall of 1945, urban life as I had known it seemed well-nigh extinguished. In the cities the sm oke of battle had hardly lifted, and in city after city I saw ruins— fields and m ountains of rubble—where once houses had stood. The early letters abound w ith descriptions of the nightmarish, malodorous debris of war that overwhelmed me and of the struggle for physical and spiritual survival in w hich so many people were involved. By contrast, the countryside—unmarred except for the damaged modem roads
INTRODUCTION
II
w hich cu t through it—made me feel that I lived on another first day of creation. Here it was: L ife reassertin g itself! I thought that the dif ference between total war and peace was visible in the contrast be tw een the m ountains of urban rubble and the dark earth w ith men and oxen plowing the fields, until I recalled that in the preceding total w ar—the T hirty Years War—the German countryside had been devas tated and often people had fled into the towns for safety. I recalled also th at the proportion of the population which had perished in the seven teenth-century war was much higher than that killed in World War II; but th is was not true of the Jews. T he early letters are full of these conflicting feelings of urban des pondency and rural euphoria, as it were. Almost passionately I tried to becom e fully aware of my feelings by describing the world which aroused them . I recall how urgent was my need to tell somebody close to m e what I saw; many of the letters I wrote as in a fever. O nly seven years later did I see detailed statistics about the extent of urban destruction at the end of the war.7Then I was actually surprised at the "lo w " figures, because my visual impression in city after city w as of a loss larger than the figures indicated. The following percen tages indicate how many W ohnungen ("apartm ents and one-family dw ellings") were actually destroyed in 194 $, in a few of the cities that I visited in 194 $ and 1946 : Würzburg, 75 ; Kassel, 68; Cologne, 64; Nuremberg, $ i ; M unich, 48; Frankfurt, 44. For West Berlin, con sistin g of the Am erican, British, and French sectors, a composite per centage of 22 percent was calculated. However, due to the fact that the cen ter of Berlin was virtually laid waste (while some of the western suburbs had escaped large-scale destruction), I had a stronger sense of total annihilation in central Berlin than in alm ost any other city. Although I had spent m ost of my life in Berlin prior to my emigra tion, I failed to find some well-known streets in the vast expanse of dusty rubble. In general, it may be noted that five destroyed houses in a sm all village may amount to 30 percent destruction and yet not be perceived as such, whereas when you fly low over a metropoli tan center w ith a destruction rate of 2 a percent, the eye perceives it as a veritable sea of chaos. (2 ) Another them e evident in these pages is that of the relationship 7 K riegsfolgen-K arte W estdeutschland, 1939- 1950, ed. by Karl-Otto Gassdorf and Dr. Manfred Lanhans-Ratzeburg (Verlagsbuchhandlung Karl-Otto Gassdorf: Frankfurt/ Main-Höchst), n.d. (English title: Map of the Consequences of War, i939-t9$o.}
12
FROM THE ASHES OF DISGRACE
betw een Germ ans and Americans. The observations on this subject are not the result of a determined search but rather of happenstance, casual experiences in the street, at social gatherings, in offices, in per sonal conversations, and on other occasions. As one would expect, the nature of these relations changed over the years. As tim e passed, Ger m an insecurity and subservience abated; there seemed to be less strain in social intercourse. On the other hand, new unpleasant features cam e to the fore: efforts on the part of Americans who could no longer sim ply give orders to the Germans, but manipulated them instead; and on the part of the Germans, certain resentm ents and an apparently ir repressible insistence that they knew best. The only subject about w hich m any Germans in the early years would readily profess to know nothing was life in the concentration camps. As tim e passed, middleclass Germ ans expressed continued surprise at American fam iliarity w ith G oethe or Fontane, but now also ventured to correct Americans when they predicted the outcom e of the next presidential election in the U nited States. (3 ) A journal not only reflects the tim e during which it is w ritten but also shows the interests and preoccupations of its author. I was aware of the fact that during the Nazi period some writers and speakers— w hether they spoke from the pulpit, in a cabaret, or during private get-togethers—had used language that enabled them to express forbid den thoughts w hile evading censorship or denunciation; they wrote or talked "in code," as it were, using allusive language and imagery. W hile I knew that outw itting the censor and communicating under threats of persecution was a practice as old as tyranny and taboo, I thought that my sojourns in post-Nazi Germany might give me a chance to talk to some successful practitioners of this art of noble cun ning. I succeeded in gathering some inform ation that deepened my understanding of this writing between the lines. Although nobody w rote that way any more in postwar Germany, I m et many persons who at som e tim e in their lives had to practice the art of double-talk for reasons other than telling off-color jokes, and these persons added to Germ an life a dim ension not to be found in liberal societies with perm issive codes of behavior.8 8 In 1977 I published an essay using material I had collected in 1952 in Germany: "The Communication of Hidden Meaning," Social Research 44 (Autumn 1977)- The essay is an abridged version of a chapter in Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lemer, and Hans Speier, eds., C om m unication an d Propaganda in World History (University of Hawaii Press, 1979), vol. 2.
INTRODUCTION
13
(4 ) Another recurring them e is that of German fear. Beginning in 19 $ 1 1 noticed that anxiety was frequently mentioned in newspapers, journals, and books, and surfaced spontaneously in conversations. In June 195 2, I requested that "an xiety " be one of the subjects on the agenda of a weekend panel discussion I had helped to arrange. It took place in H attenheim on the Rhine. M ost of the sixteen people who at tended that m eeting were either theologians or had in some way been connected w ith the Evangelical academies or the Catholic lay move m ent. Perhaps this accounts for the fact that at that meeting, fear of death and "ex isten tia l" anxiety were so often mentioned. But other conversations revealed that past experiences (some haunting ones in the Soviet Union during the war) and apprehensions about the future (especially fantasies concerning atom ic bombs) rather than the human condition at large, often explained why people suffered from deepseated fear. Nobody I asked about the subject ever denied that people were so affected. ($) Germ an rearmam ent, a focus of political attention since 1950, was a m ajor topic of the conversations reported in the last two parts of th is book. A t the tim e, I was especially interested in the strategic views of Germ an m ilitary experts. In editing my notes, many of these views have been deleted, but I have retained all geopolitical and strategic opinions on the Middle East and the Third World. Sim ilarly, opinions and observations on "social class" and the m ilitary as a profession have been retained. These opinions shed some light on the structure of West Germ an society. I have also included allusions to moral problems of special concern to the persons I m et—for example, the question of "w ar crim es" and "high treason" involved in opposition to H itler, of the recruitm ent of "o ld " officers for the "n ew " German aimed forces, and so on. I had explored as best I could the views the m ilitary held of th e civilian world after defeat and dem ilitarization: dom estic politics, dem ocracy, public opinion. What was their understanding of the Ger m an m ilitary tradition and its corruption by Hitler? Were they capable of planting new roots in post-H itler Germany? In short, I noted at the tim e and have included in this book what seemed relevant to the social psychologist and the social historian and even the m oralist. Hence, the em erging them e: the German m ilitary class and its recent history. In 19 $ i, I began to m eet many representatives of this m ilitary class. I had had no prior personal contacts w ith them comparable to those w ith m em bers of the civilian professions, of the middle and working classes, and even of the rural population—which so often is the social
14
FROM THE ASHES OF DISGRACE
terra in cog n ita of observers living in the cities. The new exposure to m em bers of the German aristocracy and to many German m ilitary leaders led m e to discover various shades of grey where I had previously seen only black or w hite. (6) I asked questions related to German rearmament in my talks w ith civilians as w ell: politicians, journalists, publishers, businessmen, academ icians, and others. These talks also influenced my views on p olitical and social stability in Germany and on foreign policy issues, such as reunification. Q uite apart from inform ation on the overt sub je cts of conversation, I gained a better understanding of the social real ity that had been reconstituting itself since the immediate postwar years of rubble and hunger and disorientation. T h is brief list indicates the range of my experiences and reflections as an observer of social and political life in Germany from rç 4 $ to 19 5 $. T he list could be lengthened by m entioning other them es: traces of the Nazi era in behavior and thinking, in guilt, silence, denial, and accusation; views of the future of Europe,- ethnocentricity and selfcriticism ; the frequent evocation of remembered history. A journal— even a mere selection from it—shows life to have many strands.
One Letters
First Visit 1945
Arrival in London; Karl M annheim London, O ctober 14 Traveling from New York to London was not easy. Our ''clipper" flew to Newfoundland and proceeded to Ireland where it landed on the Shannon River estuary at Foynes. From there through the sunny Irish countryside, we w ent by bus to Kyanna Airport on the other side of the river. Finally, a sm all aircraft was to take us to London, but my group was flown to Hum, an important American bomber base during the war, about 80 m iles or so west of London. Croydon, the London air term inal, was fogged in. The last stretch of the way from Christchurch to London I traveled by train. W hile w aiting for the train in Christchurch, I had a long talk with a sergeant in the British Air Force who had been in uniform for five and a half years. He had been to Canada training American pilots, but not to the U nited States. Now he would like to visit New Jersey, because for three years he has been corresponding w ith an American girl there. O nce she had sent him a package with woolens. He also found a note asking the recipient to w rite to her. So he wrote, and she answered him. Then they exchanged pictures. Now he wants to see her in the flesh. Recently, she wrote that the Americans don't like the British Labor governm ent, but he replied that she did not know conditions in Eng land: m uch had to be changed.
i8
FROM THE ASHES OF DISGRACE
London, O ctober 15 Last night I saw Karl M annheim 1 and his wife again. She served a very good dinner w ith all sorts of vegetables. Mrs. Mannheim contends that they are available, although the British don't appreciate them. I wonder w hether this is true. Oust as I am writing this, my breakfast is being brought in; it consists of two fried tom atoes on toast for the hot dish.) M annheim has changed little, and the old controversy seems forgot ten .12 He was nervous, but cordial. So was she. N either of them has changed m uch in appearance. They inquired about you and the chil dren. W e listened to Elisabeth Schumann singing Brahms over the b b c . M annheim edits a prestigious series of books, and asked me whether I would let him have the British Empire rights to a book I could freely m arket in the United States. Alfred Weber gave him a manuscript titled A b sc h ie d von d er bish erig en G esch ich te .3
First Days in Germ any: Frankfurt, Bad Hom burg Bad Homburg, October 28, 194 $ G etting from London to Frankfurt was much more complicated than traveling from New York to London. I was hanging around the airport in Bovington near London for three nights and two days; I once went 1 Karl Mannheim (1893-1947), an eminent sociologist at Heidelberg (1923-29) and Frankfurt am Main (1929-33), was bom in Budapest, where along with George Lukics and other young intellectuals, he belonged to the so-called Sunday Circle (see the remi niscences of his friend Arnold Hauser, Im Gespräch m it Georg Lukâcs (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1978)). After his dismissal in 1933, when Hitler had come to power, Mannheim joined the London School of Economics, and in 1941, the Institute of Education at the University of London. 3 Reference to my review of the 1936 English edition of Mannheim's ideology and U topia. After hearing Mannheim's inaugural lecture in Heidelberg in 1923 , 1had be come his student. In fact, I was his first doctoral candidate. But by the time I wrote the review (reprinted in S ocial O rder and the Risks o f War, pp. 190-201), I had come to be critical of the fundamental aspects of Mannheim's sociology. 3 Published under the title Farew ell to European History (London: International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, 1947). Alfred Weber (1868-1938), a dis tinguished German sociologist at Heidelberg, was forbidden to teach after 1933.
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back to London by bus (one-hour ride) in the hope that I would be able to rid m yself of the nausea caused by listening to the American Forces Radio for tw elve hours in the officers' club at the airport. I had been reading Evelyn Waugh's S coop—a strange com bination of incessantly sw eet m usic and terse prose. T he last night at the airport I did not get out of my clothes, and ar rived in a state of m ild drowsiness. The plane landed at Hanau on Thursday, O ctober 2$. I was so tired and for the next two days so busy and overwhelmed that I found no tim e to write. From the airport at Hanau you go to Frankfurt by bus. (Whenever I say "b u s" or "c a r," I am referring of course to m ilitary transportation.) T he roads are full of field-grey m ilitary vehicles and German bicyclists and pedestrians, people pulling a little cart w ith wood for the w inter or carrying a rucksack w ith wood or riding a bicycle with wood and a baby in front. O ccasionally, you pass a German vehicle drawn by a horse or an ox. In the fields you som etim es see people plowing without a plow, using nothing but a spade for large tracts of land. The people look shabby. T here is so m uch destruction that you wonder how so many people did survive. N ot a single factory seems to have escaped damage or dem olition. As you enter Frankfurt, rains, heaps of rabble and rocks and rusty iron parts line both sides of the road. Then you get to the I. G. Farben Building: it is untouched and serves as the headquarters of u s f e t (U.S. Forces European Theater). A large and rather undamaged section of Frankfurt around the I. G. Farben Building is fenced off with barbed wire. T here is an abundance of flowers on the I. G. Farben grounds—roses, rock gardens, and water lillies. T his contrast stayed with me during the last days wherever I went, and I suppose it w ill continue to do so wherever I go: destruction all around you and extrem e comfort when you get into an Am erican compound behind barbed wire—the dif ference between defeat and victory. W hile the jeep was waiting for an Englishman who was supposed to go w ith us to Bad Homburg, I had my first conversation with a German boy. He was perhaps thirteen years of age and he looked starved; his hunger made his lively eyes seem very large. He circled slyly around the w aiting jeep, sm iled, and tried to catch the eyes of somebody in the vehicle. We were smoking. It soon became apparent that he was after the cigarette butts we would throw away. Every tim e he picked one up to deposit in his little tin box, he leaned for a moment against the jeep
20
FROM THE ASHES OF DISGRACE
lik e a cat about to purr. On his cap he wore the insignia of the Edel* w eiss m ovem ent, an anti-N azi youth movement that had made life d ifficult for the Nazi youth leaders. O f course, there was no way of tell ing w hether he thought the em blem a clever stratagem in dealing with A m ericans or whether he had really belonged to the Edelweiss organ ization. A fter a few m inutes, as soon as I had faintly smiled at him , he cam e close and said in good English, "D o you have a cigarette for my fath er?" And he continued, "O r perhaps some chocolate or soap or perfum e?" (I don't know what his father would do w ith perfume, ex cept use it on the black m arket.) Then I asked him in German where he had learned his English. "I bought a little book." Now he smiled and persisted, "C igarettes all kaput?" Apparently my question had made him self-conscious, but there was really no way of telling. His sm ile and especially his movements had something uncanny, a m ixture of innocence and corruption. There is in Germany such a widespread black m arket among children, that school children do not get their food ration cards unless they can prove regular attendance at school. Bad Homburg is about half an hour's ride from Frankfurt. The vil lages you pass through are untouched and lovely. So is the countryside. Bad Homburg itself is very attractive. I live in a house w ith all the com fort of civilization (heat, hot and cold running water, radio, two living rooms). I share the house w ith Max A scoli's1 brother-in-law. Looking out of the window in the morning or stepping out on the balcony, there lies before you the m ost lovely country w ith the foliage turning and the Taunus M ountains looking even more beautiful than our mountains in New Hampshire. It is sunny and clear. Every morning I rub my eyes and can 't believe that I am here. On Friday, I spent the evening w ith a German couple who are friends of a colleague. Both of them are physicians, obviously rather well-todo, acquainted w ith Bnining's secretary of finance (whose name es capes m e).1 2 Both of them speak English fluently, but the conversation was in Germ an. We stayed for four hours. They talked freely, and ap parently w ithout restraint. They are said to have been anti-Nazi, and th is seem ed quite possible to me, although one never knows. One of th eir rooms was heated. In Frankfurt you see signs on all the Litfass Säulen (advertisem ent pillars), "E s ist zu warm zum Heizen, m it Koh 1 A friend and colleague of mine at the New School for Social Research, later editor of T he Reporter. Ascoli died in 1978. 2 Heinrich Brüning was Chancellor from March 30,19 30 to June a, 193a. In his first cabinet, Moldenhauer was secretary of finance; in his second cabinet, Dietrich.
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len m uss man geizen" ("It is too wann for heating, be stingy with your coal"). They offered us an apricot brandy, som ething quite unat tainable for people w ithout connections. I was told that these people represent the politically desirable, dem ocratic, elem ents among middle classes. They are terribly grateful when they get a N ew Y ork T im es or an English book to read. She is reading Partington's M ain C urrents o f A m erican Thought, which she had borrowed from us. She is delighted w ith it. "So interesting! So thorough!" They talked about the food situation, which is rather des perate. Average calorie intake in the American zone is way below the m inim um of 2,000; in the United States it is about 3,000. He said that they had always been privileged in their circum stances, but now at four o'clock , one does not know what w ill be in the house for dinner. They eat potatoes and cabbage w ithout any fat and (in this season) an apple for dinner. On a good day they have a little m ilk, enough for mak ing mashed potatoes w ith cabbage. Potatoes are fried in a brew of roasted acom s: ersatz coffee serving as ersatz fat. His wife interrupted him . "W e know all this and it can't be helped." I remember sim ilar deprivations from my childhood during the First World War in Berlin. It really was not hard on the children, who accept anything as normal; it was hard only for the mothers. He w rites m edical reports for the public health authorities. He told us that his reports stressed the fact that except for the very high inci dence of venereal diseases, the health conditions of the displaced persons are m uch better than those of the Germans. T he food situation is freely blamed on the Americans, e.g., not by our hosts, but according to them, by Germans they talked to: Nazi Flü ster p rop ag an d a ("whispering propaganda"). D espite their anti-N azi feelings, they retain certain reactionary at titudes: they have contem pt for the common people, and they plead for an A m erican inform ation policy using Nazi methods of not allowing any freedom of expression. They readily believe the many reports of rapes by Russians. They question whether the Americans really mean business w ith their policy of denazification, citing cases sustaining th eir doubts. At the same tim e they feel sorry for a colleague who has lost his license to practice m edicine because he joined the party in 1932 and has had a Nazi record ever since. He came to their house and wept. I don't think they have any idea of what the Nazis have done in Europe. They are confused, ill-inform ed, and terribly eager to talk about their
22
FROM THE ASHES OF DISGRACE
own problem s. They are entirely unaccustomed to discussion. When you contradict them , they keep silent or apologize as though they sud denly realize in fear how much they depend on American friends. They gave m e a. good idea of the problem of German youth: demilitarized soldiers com ing back from Athens and Paris or Norway or Poland, who have lived like princes and are now unable to work; they loaf in their uniform s (which as civilians they must dye), blaming the Americans for their unem ployability. "If someone forces them to work, they w ill w elcom e it, because they don't know how to be free without power and w ithout being bossy." In Frankfurt, I went to see a performance of Lehar's D as L an d d es L äch eln s. Because the opera house was bombed, a stage has been put up in the stock exchange. W atching your step, you use a flashlight to go through ruins into a damaged building. There in a large unheated room a C hinese prince declares his love to an Austrian dutchess, and so on. T he m usic was pleasant, and the actors tried their best to entertain the responsive audience. Mimeographed programs sold out quickly. We had reserved seats in the first row affording a good view of the make-up and the em aciated faces in the orchestra. During the interm ission I was relieved to be preoccupied w ith looking at the program. I was in Bad Nauheim tw ice, once for a conference and once for a concert given by the Oberhessische Symphonie Orchestra and broad cast by Radio Frankfurt. A ll members of the orchestra—the conductor, a student of W eingartner, and the soloists—were screened regarding th eir p olitical past. The program was am bitious: Berlioz, M ozart's Vio lin C oncerto in A Major, Stravinski's "Firebird," and Beethoven's P as to ra l Symphony. The performance was quite good, though not flaw less. K ultu r is visibly struggling to reassert itself. A ll concerts, which are arranged every week, are sold out, 650 tickets to German civilians now being sold through the m ayor's office, because the American au th orities were accused of giving tick ets to Nazis, g i ' s sit in the last five rows, and there are reserved seats for U.S. officers in the loges. Part of the C oncerthall in the Kurhaus was bombed so that the room had to be shortened and a new stage built. Inside you don't notice it. People are grateful and so are the g i ' s . Some weeks ago they were so enthu siastic that they whistled after a performance of the "N ew World Sym phony." The German audience as well as the orchestra thought that th is m eant disapproval. There was a com m otion; somebody fa m iliar w ith the custom s of both countries had to rush backstage to explain.
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Bad Homburg, O ctober 31,194$ Today, in the afternoon, I went to Frankfurt to search for M aria's3 sister. W ill you be good enough to send her a note, because I don't have her address, to tell her what follows? Sister and nephews seem to be alive. They did live at the address Maria gave me but the w h o le street is in ruins. My driver refused to drive through the narrow paths left by the rubble piled up on both sides of the street. Only one and a half houses in the street are standing. I found an old woman who told me th at M aria's sister "le ft Frankfurt about two years ago. . . and then, you know, we burned." They went to Offenbach near Frankfurt, then to southern Bavaria somewhere. The woman knew also that they had th eir furniture stored in the cellar and got it out to Offenbach, appar ently before the fire. I asked tw ice whether she was sure that they were all alive and she said, "Y es, quite su re." Unfortunately, that is all. Tonight I m et the Com m unist leader of the Obertaunus district. Everybody at the party was terribly excited, because the news had just reached them that 31,000 refugees from the East w ill have to be housed in the d istrict (which has about 60,000 inhabitants). Bad Homburg w ith now 25,000 people w ill have to take 12,000 or so (Germans, of course). A doctor who was present said he knows every house in town,it would be im possible to find two dozen extra beds anywhere. There are not enough beds in the hospitals. No soap, no drugs, no threads to mend the old doctor's garments (so that he performs operations in his business suit), no gas to heat the water to sterilize the instrum ents. W hen electrical appliances break down, they cannot be replaced. N ot enough coal, not enough potatoes, no kettles for communal kitchens, no spoons, no paper, no clothing, no lumber to build barracks, no nails to build barracks if there were lumber. Everybody (except the Com m unists) was in despair. And everybody seemed to be unable to imag in e that it w ill have to be weathered somehow. T he children of the doctor go to school in Frankfurt (getting there by trolley car). T he schooling consists of one morning and one afternoon session a week—Latin and Greek, respectively—in the house of a pupil, because the public school buildings are m ostly w ithin the Amer ican compound and hence inaccessible to Germans. There are not enough teachers, not enough schoolbooks—one for every four pupils.1 1 Maria Roesch, a German-bom friend in the United States, one of many who in 1945 asked me to inquire into the whereabouts of relatives in Germany.
24
FROM THE ASHES OF DISGRACE
N otebooks are obtained chiefly on the black market. The m ajority of the children have not been to school since spring last year.
Berlin: Search, Karl Hofer, Chaos Bad Homburg, November 4,194$ I ju st returned this afternoon from a three-day trip to Berlin. First let m e say that I found out about some people I was looking for. No trace of the R /s .1 T heir house is com pletely destroyed, like most other dwell ings in Langestrasse. A neighbor told me that the house was destroyed by an aerial m ine in August 1943. (Everybody seems to have an ac curate memory regarding the dates of destruction.) Many people were killed in that house, but the man did not know the R /s. I went to the K a rten stelle ("office of registration") where one can som etimes find the addresses of people who have moved, but there I was told that the w hole index was destroyed by fire, and there is no paper to start a new index. T h is does not necessarily mean that the R. 's are no longer alive. T he sam e story about G reta.1 2 The house she lived in (like the house at Köm erstrasse 48 where I was bom) is now a heap of rubble. I asked perhaps ten people in the neighborhood, and in such cases everybody is extrem ely cooperative. Nobody remembers her and everybody has tens to add, "She may w ell be somewhere else." T he sam e story about the friends of Erich Rinner's3 parents. No trace of the house in Poschingerstrasse, the address he gave me. W ill you be good enough to tell him this and also m ention that I may have to go to Berlin once more and shall try again. W ill you also drop a note to Hans Simons4 at the New School to the effect that I delivered his letter to his friend in person (Hohenzollemdamm). She seem s to be in rather good spirits. I could stay only for about tw enty m inutes, for a cup of tea. She sends her regards. She did not read the letter I was carrying, while I was there. Simons has had news from her, but he w ill want to know that his letter was delivered and that his friend is w ell. She lives in a house w ith a gaping hole in 1 The only dose friends left behind in 1933. 2 See "G reta: 1946-1947," p. 82 below. 3 A colleague in Washington, D.C. 4 A former colleague at the New School (1893-1971)-
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front. You would never think that anybody stays there, but several fam ilies do. Her apartment is com fortable; she appeared to be well. I talked to Karl Hofer.5 As you know, in the tw enties he had publicly attacked the Nazis, and soon after we left Germany he was removed by them from his post as professor at the academy. In 1931 we still had seen an exhibition of his work at the Gallery Flechtheim in Berlin. In 1938, he and O scar Kokoschka, two of Germ any's foremost artists, were ousted from the academy and more than 300 of his works were removed from Germ an museums. The failure to find a safe place to work and live pushed him to the brink of despair. In 1943, a fire de stroyed his studio along w ith all his paintings from the past ten years. He resumed work at once in a room in his apartment, only to be com pletely bombed out and lose everything in November 1944. Thereafter he finally found refuge in a sanatorium in Babelsberg near Berlin, where the N azis were hiding the French politician Herriot; four Ges tapo agents, guarding the latter, lived under the same roof with Hofer. Now he owns no furniture, and he is hungry. Nor has he suitable quarters for doing his work. However, as president of the academy, w hich has been reconstituted, and as a prominent member of the Kul tu rk a m m er ("Cham ber of Culture"), of which Paul Wegener is presi dent, he is quite busy. I was alm ost awed merely by seeing the expres sion on his face, and by his reserve and his dignity. His wife did most of the talking. O nly once did he grow eloquent: he remarked very sharply that the policy of not distinguishing between the Nazis and the other G erm ans sim ply m ust be changed. If one has eyes to see and ears to listen , it takes less than three days to find out that Hofer is right. A fter considerable difficulties I finally located Frau Gieser, M aria's friend. I spent an evening w ith her and the rest of her delightful and charm ing fam ily. Her daughter is an interpreter for the m ilitary gov ernm ent, and her son, after two years in the German army, sculpts. T hey have no recent news of Christian, M aria's son, but they know th at he was not in the aimed forces. C hristian's father died in an ac cident; he was run over by a German tank. T he G iesers' "h ou se" consists of a sign, "N o. 3 9," on a pile of rubble on w hich weeds are growing. I thought I would never be able to locate them ; later I found them in a room, which is not theirs. I heard that by sheer luck the whole fam ily was outside when the shelter of the house w as destroyed by a bomb. You should have seen the expression of hap-* * I1878-19SS)
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piness on their faces when I brought them some chocolate. The chil dren are wonderful. I was glad to see again “N icky'' Nabokov, the Russian-bom com poser, whom I had m et at St. John's College. He is now working for the U .S. Inform ation Control Division on theater, music, and film .6 In another office I heard about a youth magazine we are going to launch. When I inquired who was going to edit it, I learned that it w ill be G ünther Birkenfeld.7 You may remember that he was a schoolmate of m ine w ith whom I went rowing when I was sixteen years old. I got his address and saw him (and his red-cheeked second wife) for two hours. N ext day he gave me some of his novels and a snapshot taken tw enty-three years ago showing him and me rowing (enclosed). T h is m eeting was moving in many ways, and I liked seeing him again. Among these ruins one rapidly develops an urgent need for m eeting people one knew a long tim e ago; it seems a natural anxious longing for life to assert itself. The first impression in Berlin, which overpowers you and m akes your heart beat faster, is that anything hu man among these indescribable ruins must exist in an unknown form. T here rem ains nothing human about it. The water is polluted, it sm ells of corpses, you see the m ost extraordinary shapes of ruins and more ruins and still more ruins: houses, streets, districts in ruins. All people in civilian clothes among these mountains of ruins appear m erely to deepen the nightmare. Seeing them you alm ost h op e that they are not human. T he infant m ortality is at present about $o percent. In August, $8,000 people died and 8,000 were bom. The British are sending 1,000 children a day, to the British zone. Why we did not do likewise, I don't know. Black-m arket prices are skyrocketing: $0 marks equals $ dollars — for a 5-cent chocolate bar! 100 marks equals 10 dollars for a p a ck of cigarettes—and 1$ dollars for Pall Mall because they are longer. Cig arettes are not only a commodity but also a currency, a substitute cur rency. In front of the state chancery, a German offered large photos of Berlin sights before their destruction; five photos for ten cigarettes. O ur driver, a twenty-year-old corporal, did not take the pictures be cause he found the price “exorbitant"; he pays 4 cents a pack at the p x but gets 10 dollars for them on the black market. 6 Nicolai Nabokov (1903-78) later became general secretary of the Congress for Cul tural Freedom, and cultural advisor to the senate of West Berlin. 7 German novelist (1901-66).
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A few streetcars are running, as are a few underground trains. The m ail service is operative. You hear the dynamiting of ruins you don't see. People look dazed, many of them as though they are still walking about in a trance (this is not only m y observation). There is no class distinction visible any more. (You remember how we tried to guess the occupation of people in the subway?) Everybody seems to look like everybody else, namely n o t like a member of the occupation forces or of the German police. T he Tiergarten consists of tree trunks w ithout branches and leaves, like a forest of gigantic wooden bayonets. Near the Brandenburg Gate, a huge picture of Stalin and outdoor posters are all along the Avus with Stalin quotations: "T h e Heroism of the Red A rm y.. . "T h e Achieve m ents of the Red Army___" N ear W annsee is the monument of a Russian tank shining like sil ver: "T o the Eternal Glory of the Members of the Tank Detachment of G eneral-------- , Who Died a Hero in the Liberation of the Soviet Fatherlan d ." T he gun of the tank is pointing west. Everywhere in town you see the bucket brigades, long rows of people standing on piles of bricks reaching to where there was once a second floor. Very slowly, buckets filled w ith bricks are being handed down. People who work in this way get a No. i card entitling them to 700 calories of food (No. $ equals $00 calories: the fastest way to starvation). The Germans I talked to are glad about the black market, because it enables them to get something additional, for example a package of dried m ilk in exchange for a valuable glass of crystal. W ithout the use of a car I would not have been able to take care of all the official business and to see so many people. W ithin three days I was in W annsee, Zehlendorf, Südende, Steglitz, Friedenau, Schöneberg, Schmargendorf, Wilmersdorf, Halensee, Kreuzberg, Tempelhof, Mari endorf (though not at our former house), N ikolassee, Wedding, Char lottenburg. But I was not in Frohnau, in the French sector. N ever before have I felt so intensely how wonderful a house is, w hich provides shelter w ith its w alls and doors and windows intact. At night you lose this feeling; walking in Zehlendorf through the dark streets (with a flashlight) you see ever so often the dim sky through the w alls of a building: the filigree of chaos. Then it seems beautiful in a weird way and you forget that houses are good only when they protect people from rain and cold. I did not sleep much but I read when I got home in Eckermann's
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G esp rä ch e m it G oeth e, Reclam edition, which I found in the library of the house where I am billeted. Then around three o'clock I fell asleep, not w ith G oethe on my mind, but with children waiting for a piece of chew ing gum or a cigarette, lingering near a parked car. It is unbelievable that the countryside is so untouched as I saw it everywhere from Frankfurt to Berlin (we went on the "approved route"), through the British and Russian zones; Frankfurt-Kassel by passing G oettingen-N ortheim along the edge of the Harz Mountains to Seesen-Braunschweig and to Potsdam-Berlin. Everywhere you see battered streetcars in the cities, locomotives w ith their heads tilted because a few wheels are missing, rusting rail road cars, parts of tanks; here and there a forlorn antiaircraft gun. People move on foot or on bicylces while the other means of locomo tion rot on the wayside. But there are cattle and sheep and horses—not many, but you see them , and it makes you feel good when you have left a city behind. O n the Autobahn you m eet long convoys of horse-drawn Russian wagons w ith Asiatic-looking soldiers, two horses in front and two trot ting behind each wagon. O nce in a w hile a soldier falls asleep while his wagon moves along. One wagon had lost a wheel and the others moved ahead w ithout stopping—alm ost a half-m ile long. Once at night, a convoy of tanks w ith blinding bright lights down to the horizon moved toward us w ith a steady roar right on into a war that had ended. Once Russian guards saluted us as we raced by on our way back to Bad Homburg. In Bad Homburg, tonight, I listened to a concert of old Italian songs and lieder by Schubert and Brahms. The pianist was a Jew liberated from a concentration camp where he had finally landed after losing his w hole fam ily and successfully evading the Nazis for many years with false passports. The singer was a German Jewish girl w ith a fine con tralto voice. T he concert was given in the house of a colleague, for about tw enty Am ericans, all in uniform. Roast beef sandwiches and M oselle wine were served after the m usic. The pianist is very happy because he has his m usic, a meal a day in the American mess hall (where he plays for dinner), and a new suit—in short, everything except an overcoat. He even has his life. Among the listeners was the director of the New York Philharmonic Society. When I heard "T h e Death and the M aiden," I was close to tears.
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Bad H om burg: Waiting November 7 ,1945 I spent last night in the house of a German lawyer in Bad Homburg. He was in Yugoslavia during the war and has rather interesting views on the present situation in Germany. He thinks the Germans much too im m ature for taking over responsibility from us and deplores the early withdrawal of American m ilitary government from the district level of government. He favors a hereditary monarchy! T he m ain troubles are shortages everywhere and, in his view, the unw illingness to work, in that people still have plenty of money, don't believe in the stability of the currency, and are still dazed. Thus, in this situ ation of unemployment it is hard to get a maid! "First, I want to take a re st." T h is is the com m ent you hear. A t night, trying to avoid the officers' club where much drinking and card playing is going on, I play some ping pong, visit Germans, write and read "a t hom e" where it is comfortable and warm. Almost all the requisitioned houses have large libraries. In mine, I found a complete set of the Ja h rb ü ch er d es d eu tsch en H och stifts, and read in one of the volum es a long essay on "T h e Elective A ffinities in the M irror of 19th C entury C riticism ." I saw an impounded German film the other day w ith lovely Viennese m usic, and today, a film on Nazi atrocities made by the ow i (O ffice of War Information) in Munich. T here are many m eetings to be attended, documents that must be read, and constantly new people to be talked to. I'm always glad to get out of Bad Homburg because for all its comfort and attractiveness, it is fenced in: an ivory tower. In the m eantim e I have visited two castles here in the neighborhood, one of them Schloss Friedrichshof, once belonging to the Kaiser's fam ily . It is now an officers' club, where you dine and drink champagne and dance if you feel like it. It is a most atrocious building and one doubts the wisdom of the gods in letting this place survive the bomb ing w hile perm itting the destruction of so much that was beautiful. T h e place is filled alm ost to the rim w ith a collection of spacious trash w ithout any value, but w ith all the trimmings of museum pieces. Yesterday I visited another castle near Wiesbaden, which is not m uch better except for its location. It affords a view to the mountain ranges around the building. The place is referred to here as S chloss S c h r e c k lic h k e it ("C astle Horror"). It is the headquarters of one of our so-called o is c c (D istrict Com m unication Center) teams.
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Wiesbaden is badly mauled. There was a raid lasting three-quarters of an hour, killing allegedly 20,000 people. I w ent from Wiesbaden to Frankfurt where I visited the newly estab lished Am erican library. The head librarian is Mr. Headrick, who gave m e my first lessons in English back in 1933. We went to a German bookstore whose owner is a friend of Karl Mannheim! In the evening I visited the opera and saw a performance of T he M arriage o f Figaro. It is astonishing what can be done in the absence of alm ost any stage dec oration m erely w ith a great deal of enthusiasm . The performance takes place in the stock exchange, because the Frankfurt Opera House is un usable, as I believe I told you before. People have to walk over the ter ribly damaged Börsenplatz to get in. The hall is packed, people keep th eir coats on because there is no heating, and they applaud as if they listen to Caruso.
“The Mills of D eath” Bad Homburg, November 14,194$ Yesterday I went to Frankfurt in the evening where we had a test show ing of the first film about concentration camps ever presented to G erm ans in a movie house. The Oberbürgermeister ("chief mayor"), the heads of the political parties, a number of licensed newspaper edi tors, a Protestant m inister, a few ladies from the O ffice for Displaced Persons, etc., all were present upon special invitation. The invited G erm ans were asked to leave the theater inconspicuously after the film had run in order to attend a discussion w ith us in the back room of a restaurant. I was the leader of the discussion. T he picture had been screened first, a few days ago, to ic d personnel here in Bad Homburg, and it was then decided to have a few test show ings. A few Am erican soldiers were placed in the audience to listen in on conversations, etc., w hile the invited guests, seated on the balcony, were the only Germans who knew that they were attending a test showing. T he film is called D ie T odesm ü hlen ("The M ills of D eath"). It shows the conditions in the concentration camps when they were liberated by the A m ericans;1 Eisenhower visiting them ; the people of Weimar 1 See Report of the Joint Congressional Committee, "Atrocities and Other Condi tions in Concentration Camps in Germany" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945}.
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visiting them ; corpses, em aciated bodies, buckets full of gold teeth broken out of the mouths of the victim s, gas chambers, and all the hor rors we are now fam iliar w ith. All pictures were selected from Allied m ilitary photographs taken on the spot, w ith a special German com m entary w ritten for the German edition. Toward the end of the film , you see thousands of Nazis from Nuremberg Parteitag meetings, while the com m entator says, "You remember I was there, you were there. . . . " It ends, as it begins, w ith a procession of people carrying white wooden crosses. T he film is alm ost unbearably powerful, because it is factual with out any attem pt to preach or to arouse and express hatred or pity-—far better than the atrocity pictures or newsreels (Russian or American) I saw in New York. I had been going to Frankfurt in a jeep. It was dark and we had lost our way, w ith ruins and gaping holes all around us. Finally, w ith the help of G erm an policem en and civilians (who are unfailingly courteous, by the way), we found the theater in a dark street mainly by spotting a row of jeeps and m ilitary cars all half-parked on the sidewalk. W hen the title D ie T odesm ü hlen appeared on the screen (after a very poor new sreel, American-made), I noticed that I was trembling. The docum entary lasts for twenty m inutes. Not one person walked out. T h e audience sighed audibly at the worst scenes of horror. It laughed sarcastically once when a German officer hesitated to visit the dun geons and was com plim ented into them (gently) by a g i . Now a word about the discussion. Everybody talked freely and with out any fear. I had several votes taken. Should this film be shown? (The question was asked after prolonged discussion.) Unanimous Yes. (At the ic d showing, we had been doubtful about the advisability of show ing the film to Germans.) Should it be shown now or in connection w ith the war crim es trials? Or after the winter, when people w ill be less concerned w ith food and fuel? Answer: As soon as possible (again, unanim ous). Should it be shown to children (which some of us had wanted to do)? Answer: Unanimous No. One woman said softly: "C hildren are always innocent." Everybody, with the exception of the pastor, favored com p u lsory attendance. "Anyone who cannot prove that he has seen this film should not get his food ration cards." We had to point out that we would not have enough theaters to pursue that policy. Among the discussants were three former inm ates of concentration cam ps. One of them claim ed he had been present when some of the
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FROM THE ASHES OF DISGRACE
pictures were taken. Tw o of them were Com m unists. One of them at tacked the mayor for som ething that had nothing to do w ith the film , and was quite irritated when I asked him to speak about the film . He then attacked the m ilitary government for its "p olicy," that is, for not showing what happened in sid e the camps prior to their liberation (as though we could have done it w ithout staging the scenes); for not men tioning in the com m entary that many of the people shown in the film fought against H itler before they were imprisoned, and continued to fight inside, and so on. The Com m unists were most vocal and often quite articulate. They definitely dominated the scene. T he m inister pointed out that the brutality and honor we had just seen were not merely political m atters. When the most pitiable rem nants of what were once healthy people were shown, the commentator had said, "And these were once God's children." "W hen you forget," the m inister said, "th at men are God's children, then you have reached the en d ." Strangely, he did not appear to preach. "It staned before the N azis got into power, and it can happen wherever men lose sight of G od ." O f course, you would expect a m inister to speak like that. N evertheless, it sounded definitely relevant. It was free of hatred. And in the circum stances in which it was said, it assumed more meaning than it m ight have when you read it. I wonder w hether there is a genuine new religiosity in Germany to day. I have no doubt that some people turn to religion or did so during the war (just as Englishmen were reported during the bombing to have developed a lively interest in astrology). You find a faint suggestion of it even in som e newspapers these days. For example, the R hein -N eckar Z eitu n g in Heidelberg, of which I have read all issues from the first to the last page, gives you this impression, although it does not contain any serm ons. It carries poems by M atthias Claudius [all papers publish poetry, old aphorisms, essays, etc., in every issue!), and an article by Alfred W eber titled, O rientierung und A u fgabe ("O rientation and T ask ") in w hich you read: We saw ourselves shrouded in a darkening that had overcome us and we faced the transform ation of man by spiritual forces, the like of w hich we no longer knew. We were confronted with decisions about these forces. And we felt that we could reach these decisions to save our souls only if we evoked contravening, also objectively existing—let us not hesitate to dub them (how ever cautiously)—d iv in e forces of light and entrust ourselves to them ___
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Now, Alfred W eber was anything but a preacher when I knew him. (Incidently, even he resorts to m ystification when talking about the Nazi regim e: 'T ransform ation of man by spiritual forces . . . and so on. N either was man transformed in any sense, nor were the forces at w ork of a spiritual kind!) During the discussion of the film , which lasted about two hours, a few subtle suggestions were made indicating, to me at least, that m isery does not necessarily blunt the mind or darken the heart beyond hope. And everybody listened patiently, even to his political adver sary: they were all united in a sense, although it would be wrong to say th at nobody was affected by the totalitarian way of thinking. Some of them definitely were (in the way they talked about "th e Germ ans"). A ll of them , as I said, wanted people to be fo rc ed to see the film . Final ly, all of them may have felt the need to prove where they stood by aggressive anti-N azism —a symptom of the difficulty any German has today in finding his m oral bearing, in using his freedom, in proving his w orth—particularly when Americans are watching him ; or a sign of understandable self-consciousness in the presence of American uni form s on the other side of the table. The self-consciousness, however, was not shown overtly, except by the protests, "I was in these cam ps!" and toward the very end, by the question that an elderly woman asked. She said, quietly, "M ay I ask you a question? When this film is shown abroad, it w ill deepen the hostility against the Germans, w ill it not?" A Com m unist snapped back, "O f course, it w ill." I replied, "I believe it as difficult to know the reactions to this film abroad as it is to be sure about the Germ an reaction to it. If it were easy, we would not have needed th is discussion. Everything depends on the people who see it, th eir past experience, their beliefs, their ability to grieve."
Contrasts Bad Homburg, November i$ , 194$ I am reading Z ur G en esun g d es d eu tsch en W esens, a thoughtful book by Karl Barth, the Swiss Protestant theologian (1886-1968). I shall try to get a copy to bring home. Did I tell you that I had a long talk w ith Benno Frank, whose name you may rem em ber as the intendant of the theater in Darmstadt, a rather w ell-know n and gifted man. He was a lieutenant in the Ameri
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FROM THE ASHES OF DISGRACE
can arm y and distinguished him self at the front. He is now serving as a civilian w ith ic d . He has a unique knowledge of the German theater, past and present. In G iessen, there is the first performance today of the U rfaust. I wanted to go but had to wait here for a telephone call from Berlin. T he m ost bewildering impressions are the contrasts and contradic tions w hich constantly m eet your eye: ruins and mess halls; Nazis and form er inm ates of concentration camps; policies and conflicting policies; even the behavior of people—I mean to say that the same per son behaves or seem s to behave inconsistently and contradictorily. Today I talked w ith a Swiss journalist who hikes through the coun try in civilian clothes, eating C-rations. He said the Germans in the trains often com plain about American bureaucracy, and are contra dicted only by Germ ans coming from the East: "You don't know any b etter."
M annheim and H eidelberg Bad Homburg, November 16,1945 I have ju st com e back from Heidelberg. I left this morning after breakfast and returned for dinner—two hours' drive each way in a jeep, on the Autobahn m ost of the tim e. We drove through Mannheim on tw o different routes—that is, we came back a different way. The de stru ction is terrible, as in most other cities. Ruins, ruins, mountains of ruins. Houses w ith signs "Beware! Danger!" A forlorn antiaircraft gun dug in to the pavement. German prisoners of war behind a stockade. O nly one bridge built by the Americans is intact in Heidelberg across the N eckar, and traffic over it is slow and dense. German policemen are in charge. T he bridge is continuously crowded with American tanks, jeeps, staff cars, weapons carriers, all moving in both directions, and a stream of German civilians trodding slowly across, three abreast on each side. Looking out of your jeep window on the bridge you see collapsed bridges on both sides of the river. The bridge on which we crossed the N eckar struck me, like Berlin M itte, as one of the most graphic scenes of life after defeat. W hen you com e to Heidelberg, approaching the center of the town alongside the N eckar from Bensheim, you may be misled to think that you w ill see ju st another destroyed town. Because the Germans blew
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up the bridges, all traffic goes across the Am erican-built bridge, and all vehicles slow down as they approach it. Again, there is the fam iliar pic ture of green Am erican vehicles of all kinds, German bicycles and Germ an trolley cars w ith two or three cars drawn by one “real" car, and people in bunches or hives, as it were, hanging on outside. But soon you realize that Heidelberg is overcrowded, as we never knew it when we studied there, yet different from other places in Germany, because it is not destroyed. A German lady whom I m et later told me that she just arrived and keeps expecting to see destruction: she is so used to it. W alking on the Hauptstrasse (“Main Street"), one gets the impres sion that every third store is a bookshop, w ith the strangest exhibits in the windows: 'T h e Protestant M inister in Badensia during the Second H alf of the Eighteenth C entury," "Handbook of M usicology," "T h e People of Indonesia, "and so on. In the m usic stores there are exhibits of piano, cham ber, and vocal m usic by Bach. Everywhere in town one finds announcem ents of concerts, theater performances, and recita tions.
Karl Jaspers N ovem ber 18,194$ I had to stop Friday night and did not continue this letter yesterday. So today, Sunday morning, I have the first chance to go on. As I walked around in Heidelberg it astonished me to see how much of it seem ed unchanged. I expected to m eet m yself in the park, or you com ing out of the hotel E u ropäischer H of, or to see you in front of the O d eon , as in 1927. People in Heidelberg do not have the dazed look which impressed m e so in Berlin. Everybody is poorly dressed, but one would be sur prised if it were otherw ise. The stores are closed for three or four hours around noon, but there are som e windows in the Hauptstrasse faintly suggesting elegance. These are shops for officers, however; it appeared significant to me that among officers in the western district, the quar term aster stores in Heidelberg are reputed to be better stocked, for som e unknown reason, than stores in the destroyed cities of W ies baden or Frankfurt. I could not find my driver after lunch, which I had in the officers' m ess hall w hile a band played serenades and waltzes. So I decided to
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look up Karl Jaspers.11 had really come to visit Alfred Weber, but I did not know his address, and the m ilitary office where I could have in quired was closed, the personnel having their siesta. I remembered that Jaspers used to live on the Ploeck near the university on the left-hand side when you com e from the university. (Pretty good memory, I thought, having been at his house only tw ice in my life, sixteen years ago. T he last tim e I saw him was during my exam ination in philosophy as a "m in o r" for my doctorate.) W hen I rang the bell, Jaspers opened the door, tall and stooped, his hair quite w hite. He was just having his dinner, which consisted of turnips. There was a big tureen on the table, which Frau Jaspers carried out after the m eal, still three-quarters filled, enough to feed a family lik e ours for half a week. Only we have som ething in addition, and they have not. Frau Jaspers (who is, as you may recall, Gustav Mayer's1 2 sis ter) did not fail to call my attention to the fact that they had but turnips to eat, and Jaspers said quickly, 'T h e y are very good." I remarked, T ate them as a child day in and day out in Berlin during the First W orld W ar." T he lady of the house interested me little. She said she was glad to m eet an Am erican, because she hated the Germans. I remarked, "But I was bom in G erm any." Undeterred, she inquired as to when I had left the country. W hen I told her, "Soon after H itler came to power," she said, "A h, you left w ith m oney!" I replied, "But I had none." Frau Jaspers was dissatisfied that her brother was in Oxford instead of re ceiving a pension at home, now that things had changed. None of this made m e feel quite com fortable. I did not m ention that 1had m et Gus tav M ayer in Berlin in the late tw enties and that he had introduced me to Karl Korsch.3 There was also the silly fact that Jaspers speaks Ger m an the way it is spoken in Hamburg or Hannover: "H err S-peier s-tolpem Sie n ich t___" (I had forgotten his dialect.) I got over these distract ing irritations, and eventually, after Frau Jaspers had retired to rest, we had a long talk in the library. Jaspers did not inquire about anybody in the United States or any where else, for that m atter. Perhaps he did not want to waste tim e on 1 Eminent German existentialist philosopher (1883-1969); he was working at the time of m y visit on his treatise “D ie Schuldfrage’’ ("The Question of Guilt"), published in Zurich in 1946. 2 Gustav Mayer 11871-1948), author of the biography of Friedrich Engels, was profes sor of history at Berlin University until 1933. 1 A M arxist (1886-1961).
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sm all talk or had been w ell informed by others. He wanted to know w hat I thought about Thom as M ann's letter in which he refused Wal ter von M olo's4 invitation to return to Germany. (I suppose you have read it.) I replied that I had never liked Thom as Mann as a political w riter, neither when he contributed his share to the weakening of lib eralism in the Kaiserreich, nor later when he embraced Republicanism in the im age of N ovalis. Now he condemns the Germans wholesale. From a man like him one would hope for a statem ent that did more than reflect widespread American opinions about "th e G erm ans." I asked Jaspers for h is view on the m atter; he talked fluently, as though he had prepared him self for the conversation. He broadened the question to that of German "g u ilt." "O f course, there is collective liability [H aftung), but there never can be collective gu ilt (S ch u ld ) of a whole n ation." He pointed out that the Nazis—not "th e G erm ans"—have com m itted crim es, for which they must be pun ished, not by the enem ies, by the way, but by the neutrals. "I regret that the W estern powers have not seen fit to make the great moral gesture of presenting the crim es of the Nazis as prosecutors at Nuremberg and of asking the Sw iss and the Swedes to ju dge.” (Incidently, Jaspers did not even m ention the Russians as prosecutors.) "A sm all m inority" of th e Germ ans, the Nazis, anyway, are g u ilty ; in fact, he may have m eant "a sm all m inority of the N azis." Yet, all Germans are lia b le for w hat th eir S taat, their O b rig keit ("governm ent") has done. They must suffer the p olitical and m aterial consequences now that another O b rig k eit has taken over: namely, m ilitary government. T hese were his "accen ts" in the conversation. He criticized Thomas M ann for his wrong "accen ts," w hile he—Jaspers—believed that he w as setting the right ones. He did not speak about what the Germans— as distinguished from the Nazis—had done,* that is to say, he did not dw ell on what they had done or left undone to make it possible for crim inals to prosper and command respect or at least enjoy impunity. N or did he talk at all about the m illions of Germans who shared in the looting of Europe. I have asked m yself many tim es why I was so dissatisfied w ith Jas pers's discourse on "g u ilt" and "lia b ility ." I think he irritated me by assum ing the stance of an instructor who teaches the ignorant, as though he could not possibly be a man him self worn down by doubts on th is issue, if not silenced by grief and horror. He knows the answers 4 German author (1880-1958).
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and you had better listen or else you w ill get a poor grade. I may be too sensitive, but I was even irritated by his speaking of the "co llectiv e liab ility " of the Germans. There is no m erit in recognizing facts: a spade is a spade, loot is loot, defeat is defeat. Yet he spoke as though the recognition of collective liability made the denial of collec tive guilt m ore acceptable, and an admission of collective shame un necessary. Finally, he used the word O brig keit ("m agistrate, govern m en t") too often for my taste. It seemed to me that his protestant no tion of political authority (m ilitary government now) may have served him not to burden the Germans w ith too much responsibility for the continued existence of the Nazi regime once it had come to power. In the m eantim e, however, I have read Jaspers's answer to an article by Sigrid Undset5 w hich was published on November 4 in D ie N eue Z eitu n g, a paper issued in M unich by the m ilitary government for the U .S. zone. Undset has denied the possibility of any German reeduca tion. Jaspers's article somewhat modified the impression I had gained in our talk inasm uch as he goes a little further in acknowledging Ger m an responsibility for Nazism. And yet my main impression remains: Jaspers does not face the moral problem of German behavior at the tim e of H itler's rule, that at issue was not merely the rigoristic and un realistic alternative of heroic resistance to the regime and possibly death vs. support of the regime. Indeed, this alternative was not the real dilem m a for the vast m ajority of the Germans. Between these ex trem es lay the im portant questions for those people not made of the stuff of heroes or villains: When did I make an unnecessary compro m ise? W hen did I look away? When did I endorse something the Nazis did because I thought it was not so bad after all, or in fact, quite good? As far as Jaspers him self is concerned, I would have liked to ask him, "O n e does not expect a philosopher to join a conspiracy against tyran ny, but why did you not leave Germany in 1933? Any university in any country of your choice would have extended a welcome to you, and y ou r exile would have been a symbol of resistance." Again, even men like Jaspers—who probably were among the best G erm ans we left behind us in 1933, or at least the most thoughtful ones—appear not to have realized what the Germans did to Europe. In stead, they concentrate on what the Nazis have done to Germany. 5 A Norwegian novelist (1882-1949). Undset was awarded the Nobel Prize in litera ture in 1928.
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Pat A llen6 told me she gave a pair of stockings to her maid, here at Bad Homburg. The woman, a displaced Lithuanian, takes care of her laundry and room. She wept because she could not believe that anyone would give her, and that she would own, a pair of new silk stockings. Such stories mean more to me than Jaspers's distinctions between " li a b ility " and "g u ilt." I asked Jaspers w hether he had hopes for a moral regeneration in Germ any. "M an cannot live without a little hope. But had you asked m e what facts sustain that hope I would have been at a loss to answ er." He thinks elections should not be held too soon. "T h e American prin ciple of starting from the bottom w ith communal elections is sound. But the general elections held early next year w ill not produce any sound results. Chance w ill prevail. There should be tim e, he thinks, for G erm ans to rise from obscurity and to grow into positions of responsi b ility. Thus, they would become known, but you need freedom of as sem bly for that, and tim e; tim e above all. Q uite sound. T he day before I visited Jaspers, he had given his first lecture at the university after eight years of enforced silence—as he emphasized (al though he was able to p u b lish , as far as I know). The theological faculty has been reopened, and had invited him to offer a course. He said, " I thought it right not to make any general statem ent, but to begin my lectures as I used to d o." In the little room, the students had only the chairs the Am ericans had left. (There is a m ilitary school in Heidel berg for w hich chairs were requisitioned.) "I wanted to turn on the light, but the bulb, w hich had been screwed in ten m inutes before the beginning of the lecture, was stolen. Insofar as nobody helped me—you know, the Germ ans are not very polite—I had to look for the superin tendant m yself to get another bulb. When I finally was ready to begin, I said to the students, 'G entlem en, this is a good illustration of our situ atio n ,' and then I began, as I had intended to do. It was only a little thing, but it was so sobering." Now, I really don't know what he thought the missing bulb illus trated: the lack of goods in Germany, presumably, rather than lack of respect for public property in consequence of German behavior in Germ any and in Europe during the Nazi period; or more generally, the erosion of m oral standards because of war and defeat. To Jaspers, it was 4 Mildred Allen was a colleague traveling with me in Germany. She died in Zurich in 1978.
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probably also an illustration of the lack of order, and an inconvenience. In any event, I found it irritating that he failed to indicate precisely what he had in mind, allowing me to assume that he felt sorry for him self, because he, the Herr Professor, had to search for an electric bulb. Compare the dism al tale of the search for the missing bulb with the ioy of the Lithuanian woman, weeping for having been given a pair of silk stockings. You see, his "accen ts" were false. W hen I left, I gave him a few bars of chocolate—w ith some embar rassm ent on my part. He said, " I'll give them to my wife. She w ill be very glad because she knows some children that are fond of sw eets." He asked m e to com e again, "But would you mind announcing your v isit som e tim e in advance?" He never asked what had happened to me in the U nited States. In fact, none of the Germans I m et has asked this question. Nor did he inquire about any of his former colleagues who left Germ any.
1979 Postscript on "Inner Emigration” In the im m ediate postwar period, whereas some of the German em i grants, like Thom as Mann, waxed eloquent on collective guilt, other G erm ans who had remained in the fatherland claimed to have be longed to an "in n er em igration." This curious term was used to de note, if not active opposition to the Nazis in power, at least isolation from them and the m illions of Germans who tolerated, accepted, sup ported, or executed Nazi policies. These "inner em igrants" soon began to feel m orally superior to the refugees, because the latter were thought to have left the fatherland for the com forts abroad. A very early instance of the righteousness displayed by an "inner em igrant" was the com m ent on W alter von M olo's letter to Thomas Mann by the novelist Frank Thiess (1890-1978), published in the H essische Post and reprinted in the F ran kfu rter R undschau of August 25,194$. Thiess w rote: "I, too, have been asked why I did not emigrate, and have always given the same answer: if I were to succeed in surviving this terrible ep o ch . . . I would gain thereby so much for my intellectual and human developm ent that I would emerge richer in knowledge and experience than I could possibly become by observing the German tragedy from seats in the loges or orchestra stalls of foreign countries." And again, "A tsarist general, encouraged to flee from Russia in the year 1918, re plied, 'O ne does not leave one's m other when she is stricken w ith ill
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n e ss/ We don't expect a reward (or not having left our ill mother Germ any. It was natural for us to stay with her___ This is not to say th at I want to rebuke anybody who did leave." Karl Jaspers did leave Germany—when Adenauer had replaced H it ler. He accepted a teaching position in Basel, Switzerland.
D olf Stem berger N ovem ber 18,1945 Right after my visit to Jaspers, I went to see D olf Stemberger.11 rec ognized his face: both of us attended Jaspers's sem inar on Hegel in 1926 or 1927. Stem berger's wife is Jewish. He is the author of a good book, titled P an oram a (which we have in our library), a friend of Hans G erth,2 contributor to the F ran kfu rter Z eitung until 1943, and now the licensed editor of a new magazine, published by Lambert Schneider. W hen I arrived, about three o'clock in the afternoon, the Stem bergers had company. There was a former colleague of Stemberger's from the F ran kfu rter Z eitung, w ith his wife, who had gone to Vienna and from there, when the battle drew closer, to Bavaria; they had ar rived in Heidelberg two hours earlier and were transients. Then there was a young Germ an w riter who had come from the Lake Constance area; a m onk; an Am erican c i who did not understand German and for whom the m onk translated the highlights of the conversation into French, w hich the g i did understand. W hile we were talking, a former publisher arrived, also a transient. On the walls I noticed a few very pretty engravings. M ost astonishing was the black coffee served by the hostess. W hile we were talking a man installed a telephone! Being a licensed editor means privileges. T he conversation was m ost intriguing. M uch of the tim e people talked about w riters—not about their m erits or faults, but about their 1 D olf Stemberger, bom 1907, was coeditor of the journal Die Wandlung from 19451949, and of the magazine D ie Gegenwart, from i9so-i9$8. He has taught political sci ence at Heidelberg University since 19$$. 2 Hans Gerth, German-bom sociologist (1909-78), was a student of Karl Mannheim. He came to the United S ate s after Hitler's rise to power, and contributed greatly to the diffusion of Max Weber's work in America. He was professor of sociology at the Univer sity of Wisconsin, and, after his return to Germany, at Frankfurt am Main (1971-75)-
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w hereabouts. Who knew the present location of X? He had last been heard from when he was in Freiburg eight months ago, and so on. The m onk told a fantastic story about displaced persons at his monastery. Som e tim e ago, a group of Dutchm en arrived w ith two camels(!), w hich they had gotten from the Russians. In the evening the camels would be grazing in front of the German monastery while the hungry D utchm en were being fed by the monks before continuing their jour ney. T h is was one of the incredible stories translated into French for the Am erican soldier who had failed to understand it in German. P olitics was not discussed but, as though tim e had been standing still and this was the year 1926, a disputation took place about the rela tionship between an th rop os and civ is. Had the ancients known the value of an th rop os, or only that of civ is, which then by virtue of Chris tian influence had faded before the deeper concept of an th rop os? D er M en sch en soh n ("the Son of M an")! In die middle of this conversation Frau Stem berger excused herself, because she had to go out to get some potatoes. Everybody seemed to have unlim ited tim e. I explained that I had really only half an hour; I wanted to get back to Bad Homburg so that Bob, my driver—sitting outside the whole tim e in a cold jeep, reading Am erican history—would be in tim e for his dinner before the mess hall closed. I left w ith Stemberger for his office next door. We kept our coats on, because it was unheated and we could see our breath in the office. He gave m e the programmatic statem ent of his magazine, which I shall bring along. It was discussed in Heidelberg with Alfred Weber, W eizsaecker, Jaspers, M arianne Weber, and Frau Jaffé, in addition to the Am erican officer in charge of publications. Stemberger showed me the proofs of issue no. 1. The magazine is called D ie W andlung; 20,000 copies are to be printed. Because we allocate the paper, we control the size of the edition. Stemberger told me that he received inquiries from distributors who wanted alm ost any number of copies; one distributor w rote that according to a conservative estim ate, he would be able to sell 20,000-30,000 copies of the magazine in the greater Frankfurt area alone. T he first issue w ill contain articles by Alfred Weber, Jaspers, a "di ary" by Stem berger on a precarious trip he took through the American zone in July, a long poem by T . S. Eliot in English and in German trans lation, som e new lyric, an essay on som ething I forget, the Potsdam D eclaration, and a short piece by Franz Kafka. (I heard that an eight-
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volum e edition of Kafka's collected works was printed as late as 1936; th e last two volumes were printed in Prague in 1938. The Nazis ruled th at Kafka should be sold in Jewish bookstores; they did not ban the author, but succeeded in having the Germans forget him.) I saw the list of prospective contributors to the magazine. All names were well known before 1933 except two; this seems to be a pretty good illustra tion of the situation (to quote Jaspers). Stem berger told me that he agreed w ith Thomas Mann. "M olo's in vitation was crude." "For exam ple," Stemberger said, "take Thomas M ann's book L otte in W eim ar, which he wrote in exile and which il lustrates his indebtedness to the German tradition. My wife and I read a clandestine copy of it, as did many others. You don't know what it m eant to us. Why was it necessary for Thomas Mann to refer to letters expressing gratitude he had received from Germany? Why did not M olo express his appreciation and gratitude for this great and subtle work in his letter of invitation?" Stem berger wants to take up this question of the relation between G erm ans who stayed and Germans who left—which is also being dis cussed quite frequently in the newspapers—in the next issue of D ie W andlung. He intends to print the two letters and try to reconcile the two views. He asked m e for suggestions. I told him that this was his magazine and that I was but an intensely interested American observer. I did say, however, that he would have to w atch out: Heidelberg was an island, alm ost unreal in an ocean of devastation. Let it be a German magazine, not a Heidelberg one. On the way back, Bob said, "You know, Heidelberg is a lovely tow n."
N urem berg: Opening of the War Crim es Trial November 2 0 ,194s I arrived here last night by jeep after a six-hour ride. I had dinner in the barracks in Würzburg. Würzburg's and Aschaffenburg's destruc tion is again com plete. So is Nuremberg's. The water is poisonous, 82 percent of the city is destroyed. You brush your teeth in water puri fied by the U .S. Army and packaged in so-called Lister bags (as in Ber lin). I am staying in the press camp at Schloss Stein near Nuremberg,
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sharing the sam e room w ith three other men from ic d . The Schloss be longed to the Faber family— the pencil kings. U nfortunately, I did not see the man I came here to see because today the trial began, and I went to the opening session instead. It took place in the closely packed and closely guarded courtroom. Goring still is an actor, Doenitz—like all the other m ilitary men—is quite self-controlled. Goring nodded when the indictm ent against him was read to the effect that he contributed to the Nazi accession to power. But he shook his head noticeably when he was charged with having been an ss general. Sauckel, who appears like a stupid beer-hall owner, did likew ise at the same occasion. Streicher looks the worst of a ll: vicious and mad and dissolute. Ribbentrop has an alm ost distin guished appearance by comparison, but he has aged beyond recogni tion ; he has neuralgia. Hess quietly plays the lunatic. T he procedure is quite businesslike and free of any sensationalism . In town, people care little about the trial. They either say, "They should be shot right aw ay," or, "I have other w orries." German news papermen can report the trial "freely ," although they have a hard tim e getting here and getting som ething to eat. We brought two of them on a truck (that is, an open tm ck! ) w ith K-rations for them. Germans are not supposed to get K-rations; so we did something illegal in order to en able them to do som ething which some other part of the m ilitary bureaucracy w ants them to do. I don't think I shall stay here longer than a day, especially inasm uch as W illiam Benton, who was in Bad Homburg on Sunday and Monday morning (November 18-19), sug gested that I go to Berlin once more. He also wanted me to stay in Ger m any, but I declined. You know that Benton is the new assistant secre tary of state for public inform ation.1
Thanksgiving and a Personal Note Bad Homburg, November 2 2 ,194s Today is Thanksgiving. We are having turkey by candlelight in the officers' m ess. I hope you too celebrate the day. The other night I dream t that a German said to me "S ie sehen aber wohl genährt aus" ("B u t you look w ell fed"). In Würzburg I saw German girls w ith black soldiers in the street, 1 W illiam Benton (1900-70) later became U.S. senator from Connecticut.
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som e of them carrying packages for the girls. The most beautiful sight in Bavaria is no longer the cities but the oxen pulling a plough and breathing fog out of their nostrils against the dark and wet earth. N ovem ber 23,194$ Tom orrow I shall leave for Austria, provided the new clutch for the Dodge is installed this afternoon. The part arrived by train from Paris, where they have another Dodge. We also have three new tires. In the m eantim e I have been exposed to pressures to stay on in Ger m any. First by people here, then by W illiam Benton, with whom I had long discussions. I explained my situation to him . He said that he had asked Pat A llen to cable the gist of their conversation about me to W ashington, stating his wish that I remain in government service. He let m e read his cable. I laughed and said it was most flattering, but that it did not take account of what I had told him . He replied that it would be up to me to add what my difficulties were—which I did. He told me that if I had to go back now to the New School for Social Research in New York, there would still be a possibility of my coming back to Germ any for the State Department after June next year. Then, w hile I was in Nuremberg, two cables arrived from Washing ton, asking m e w hether I would consider a policy-planning job in the State Departm ent, at least for 1946 . 1 sent a Telecon message back to day requesting a delay on my decision until I return on December 15.
Salzburg, Linz, Vienna Salzburg, November 2 8 ,194s O n the drive from M unich to Salzburg the sun was setting, and whereas it was grey on the road, the m ountains were white and red like the snow and the sun. In the woods along the Autobahn you could see traces of snow. It was very beautiful. The little villages, all untouched by the war, w ith the houses herded around the village church; the church always visible long before the whole village emerged; the meadows w ith patches of snow; and the m ountains dark and golden and w hite. We drove in the Dodge from Bad Homburg to Salzburg on Novem ber 25. On the way, particularly from Nuremberg to Munich, we often had to get off the damaged Autobahn and follow a road through a val
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ley. By way of this circuitous route, we eventually rejoined the Auto* bahn and continued on our way. On these detours, where the roads are steep and muddy, you find m any vehicles stalled, their charcoal motors steaming and puffing un successfully in their struggle with nature. Helpless Germans stand by the roadside in dyed uniforms and Tyrolean hats. Salzburg is so charming that you forget all the destruction and m isery you have seen in Germany. Narrow, winding streets always lead to a place that affords a view of the high mountains beyond the river, or the Salzach itself, a picturesque square or an old house. I saw the house in w hich Mozart was bom. Many spots remind you that the tow n is proud of its connection w ith Mozart, which I am sure is also com m ercially valuable. Y et modem notes are not missing. When we arrived, loudspeakers were blasting forth an election speech which filled the narrow streets w ith superhuman noise. It was election night. Everywhere you saw posters and banners, red and red-white*red. The symbol of the Socialist party is the Three Arrows, a symbol invented in the early thirties by Carlo M ierendorff.1 Bookstores display campaign literature. In other shops you see all kinds of goods: attractive, colorful sweaters, bread and rolls, shoes, even a little meat here and there, and stamps in sta tionery shops. Austria has more paper, that is, newsprint, than Germ any, and stamps are valued as investm ents by Germans and A ustrians. In the first five m inutes you realize that Austria is a country different from Germany. People are better dressed, and there seems to be a little more com fort. There are quite a few attractive girls to be seen. M any people who fled from Vienna to Salzburg now look down upon the provincial natives, and try to make contact w ith Americans. We regard Austria as a liberated country in some sense (according to the M oscow D eclaration of November i, 1943). This means, among other things, that American officers may bring two Austrian civilians a week as their guests to the officers' mess. It also means that female Am erican personnel may wear civilian clothes. I find these distinc tions all rather arbitrary and not well deserved by the Austrians, but of course I do not begrudge them their advantages. Our offices are in the center of town. The radio studios in our build ing once housed the Gestapo. I visited the studios: they are perfect, be1 The young Social Democratic deputy of the Reichstag, Mierendorff (1887-1943) spent five years in a concentration camp. After his release, he was killed in an air attack on Leipzig in December 1943.
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cause they have soundproof, padded doors, an ominous arrangement th e Gestapo liked. On November 26, we went to Linz after lunch, a ride of about two and a half hours, again through very beautiful country for about an hour past Salzburg. Linz, an ugly industrial town, was destroyed by our bom bers com ing from Italy. It is different from Salzburg, which I was told was bombed because of some railroad cars, but suffered "o n ly " the loss of a beautiful church, a bridge, and a number of houses. A fter a cup of coffee in the Red Cross—where you always get coffee and doughnuts—we went to a reception at the American Information C enter, w hich was being reopened. The L an deshau ptm an n ("gover nor") of Upper Austria was present; so were many political, religious, and educational celebrities of the Land, officers from the m ilitary gov ernm ent including a one-star general. The ceremony was broadcast. C offee (very good coffee compared w ith the Red Cross brew) and Aus trian pastries donated by the staff of the American division in town were served. In the speeches you heard mutual assurances of the mu tual feelings of m utual friendship between the countries (U.S.A. and Austria), the need for m utual understanding, the need for knowledge and study, all of w hich w ill be taken care of by the pretty little Ameri can shop in Linz. The speeches were broadcast in English and German, or rather Austrian. We had dinner in town, and it seemed the Americans eat not quite such good m eals in Austria as they do in Germany, but the Austrians eat better than the Germans. In the last few days, I have had much spam and many frankfurters. A fter dinner we drove on to Vienna—three and a half hours by way of St. Pölten. A little beyond Linz, the Russian zone begins. People here seem to be a b it nervous about driving through the zone. One locks one's car, and hands the identification papers at the zonal border through the sm allest window. The Russian guards carry autom atic guns; ours do not. We had, of course, no difficulties whatever. But on the w hole route to Vienna when we passed through many villages and tow ns I had the m ost uncanny feeling of driving through ghost towns: no civilian to be seen anywhere, and altogether perhaps four windows show ing light. In village after village and town after town, everything w as com pletely dark and silent. N ext morning, I took tim e until lunch to look around in Vienna. If you have not seen Berlin you w ill probably be shocked by the destruc tion in Vienna, but after Berlin it is bearable. You recognize at least the
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buildings, because in many cases the façade is intact although the building behind it is burnt out. There are some signs of an effort to do som ething about restoration. I went into the Stephansdom, where m asons and other craftsm en have transformed the whole interior into a huge workshop. The Russians advertise their effort to repair the church. The opera is gone forever. And there is damage everywhere. I was in Schönbrunn, w hich serves as the headquarters building for the B ritish. As I was driving around for hours, it was snowing. Because I have never been here before, no sentim ental grief about damage to cherished memories overcame the feeling of happiness in seeing th is city . I left the car and walked around in the damp coldness, adm iring the ruins. As in Berlin, cultural life in Vienna is lively. Today Pat Allen and our driver picked up samples of about forty different magazines and news papers from newstands! Anything like this is unthinkable in any Ger man city. Last night, we went to the Volkstheater to see the première of Lunartscharski's The Liberated Don Quixote. The play is poor prop aganda exquisitely staged, and the main actor is as weak as his role. But I am assured that the opera is first-rate again. Today, I attended a conference in the M inistry of Education w ith a high official who has been a leading figure in the opera for twenty-five years. (He spent seven years in Dachau.) He said they w ill bring out Tristan and The Abduc tion from the Seraglio before Christm as, and "th e cast w ill be better than anywhere in Europe." T he theater was ice-cold and filled with enthusiastic people in their overcoats. They took their gloves off to applaud, and cheered. Everybody is, of course, very much excited about the election. The campaigns of all parties are retrospective in nature, each party trying to prove that its rivals were responsible for the Anschluss, and what they had said in 1934 and in 1938 . 1talked to the socialist mayor of Linz who was m oderately happy, and to a few other Austrians of the People's party, who said that their party had the highest number of leaders to have been in concentration camps. The Socialists are over aged. And the Comm unists? "N a bittschön. Vier Sitzä!" ("W ell, I ask you! Four seats!") We returned today in daylight through the Russian zone, seeing a few people in the streets. Then on an icy road and in rather deep snow, we drove slow ly to Salzburg. We sang Christm as carols in the car as we crept along.
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Return to M unich G eiselgasteig (near Munich), November 29,1945 T h is morning I went to see a few of the people in Salzburg who are in charge of the netw ork Red-White-Red, which is the American zonal broadcasting system (Salzburg-Vienna-Linz). They were w ith the ow i in Italy for several years; one of them fought w ith the Yugoslavs and was captured by the fascists in Italy, who sent him to an island for two years. He is a lawyer from Berlin, now stateless. T he Salzburg church that was destroyed, as I mentioned yesterday, was the cathedral. T his morning, quite early, I visited the Franziskaner Church, m ainly because of its beautiful madonna by Pacher. The studios of the network, housed in the former quarters of the Gestapo, are really located in the Franciscan monastery—a complex of buildings to w hich the church belongs. Monastery, Gestapo headquarters, A m erican broadcasting studios—all w ithin a few years. What tim es we live in! In Spain you have buildings that served as mosque, synagogue, and C hristian church, but not all in the span of one generation; and th eir religious function remained constant. W e left after lunch. The sun was so bright and the sky so blue that we decided not to go to M unich directly, but to drive first along the Sal* zach toward Berchtesgaden. There was deep snow on the meadows alm ost all around you; a skyline of high mountains—everything in per fect peace w ith glistening snowfields; a few houses w ith their protrud ing gables and brown wooden balconies; in the distant haze, the castle th at overlooks Salzburg; and then, at every turn of the slowly clim bing road, a new, even more m agnificent view! There were peasants walk ing and a young m other, w ith a baby in her lap asleep, sitting on a wall that led half-way up the held. She just sat and rested and looked at the m ountains. For a m om ent, there had never been any war. It was quite warm in the sun. Bob, our driver, took many snapshots. But we could not reach Berchtesgaden, because the road was getting too icy as we clim bed higher, and the m ountain ranges closed in on the road on both sides shutting off the sun. Bob refused to drive on. We had got stuck once last night behind Linz and had to push the car on the ice. Perhaps he rem embered that and the skidding bicyclist in front of us who had helped push the Dodge uphill. So we returned to Salzburg and went on to M unich. O n the Autobahn to M unich we m et a peasant dragging a little sheep
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FROM THE ASHES OF DISGRACE
behind him . At the Austrian-German border near Salzburg we had coffee and doughnuts, again at one of the numerous ambulant Red C ross units. A girl was handing a package of C hiclets down to the ex pectant kids who always gather around these units. The girl admon ished them to divide the gum evenly and not to start a quarrel. So, in the nam e of ju stice, the oldest boy bit the two C hiclets in half. O n one of the detours, a horse-drawn wagon could not get up th e steep, muddy road. The horses were patiently waiting behind th e wagon; four or five women and children had got out, like the horses w aiting for help. A m ilitary police jeep arrived and hauled the wagon out, w ith horses and folk happily trodding behind on foot. I rem em bered the Austrian bicyclist last night who had helped us push th e Dodge, and suddenly I felt alm ost joyous. Tonight I am staying in a villa belonging to the Bavaria Film kunst Studios, where the Am erican-British newsreel is now being cut. T h ere are flow ers in all rooms (this tim e of the year!) and fresh sheets on th e beds (as in Salzburg and Vienna). We had a very good dinner. A fter wards, I saw a Germ an film in the studio. We talked in the very large living room, admired the furnishings, and praised the good taste of th e evicted owner. W here is he, I wonder.
M arburg: M ax G raf zu Solms and Rudolf Buhm ann Bad Homburg, Decem ber 2,1945 I had so little tim e in M unich that I could not see Hans von Eckard t.1 He now w orks in the Bavarian M inistry of Culture (or Education). W e had to drive from M unich to Frankfurt leaving at noon. Even w ithou t fog and stops it was an eight-hour drive; we ate K-rations in the car on the way. However, on our way we passed through Freimann, w hich is a suburb of M unich, so that I did drop in for ten m inutes to see M aria's sister w ho lives there. I learned from her what you told me in your le t ter, nam ely that M aria's brother-in-law left for the U.S. Anyhow M aria's letter is now delivered and I left Trübel's2 two letters w ith M aria's sister, who w ill be very glad to get them to their destination. 1 Professor of journalism until 193 3 in Heidelberg 11890-1957). 1 Gertrude {"Trübcl") Lederer, a personal friend in New York; divorced Hans von Eck ardt and later married Emil Lederer ( 1882-1939). h«* Dean of the University-in-Exile at the New School for Social Research, New York.
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M aria's youngest brother Eduard, who was bombed out in Berlin, stays w ith h is sister in M unich. (I did not see him.) If you write to Maria tell her th at her sister seemed to me alm ost as charming as she. The house is undamaged, because it is far out in the suburb. And although it was b itte r cold in the house, everybody appeared to be in fairly good spirit. M aria's sister hopes that she w ill be able to come to the United States som etim e later. No word from M aria's son Christian. His stepmother has refused to give the address to M aria's relatives! He might be a Brit ish prisoner of war. He was last seen in Ratibor in August 1944; it was then certain that he would go to Stralsund, and this is all. Y esterday, I stayed in Bad Homburg, talking to a few newcomers in tran sit, hearing all the stories of what happened during the week of my absence. Bad Homburg is quite a place in this regard; every day, some body has com e from or is going to Berlin, Wiesbaden, M unich, the Brit ish zone, Paris, London, and so on. I told my story, and went through the many newspapers and maga zin es w e had picked up at Viennese newsstands. In the evening I saw N abokov, whom I had last seen in Berlin and who in the m eantim e has been to London, Oxford, Paris, and through the French zone. Today, Sunday, I went to Marburg—one and a half hours drive—to see T ed Hartshom e, a sociologist from Harvard, formerly ow i, now w ith th e education and religious affairs branch of m ilitary govern m en t. I cam e through Giessen, which is frightfully damaged, without stopping there, had a long talk w ith Hartshome about German univer sitie s in the Am erican zone, lunched w ith the local officers in the mess h all, and then visited both Graf Solms, a professor of sociology at Mar burg, and Professor Bultmann, the well-known theologian. G raf Solm s,3 a student of Toennies, is constructing a new system of sociology—no less. Entering his house, we were received by the friend ly G räfin who asked us to wait. Finally, her husband appeared and led u s through the kitchen and then through a room in which three little blond children were "sleeping," or rather, were whispering to one an o th e r as we went through, "M en ." The Graf apologized nervously and exp lain ed that they had received visitors, relatives from the East. "W e are a t present twenty-one persons in the house," Graf Solms said. His w ife la te r corrected him , "Tw enty-tw o." The house in not bigger than o u rs in W ashington. In So lm s's study there is a photographic portrait of Max Weber and a 3 M ax Ernst Graf zu Solms, bom 1910, since 19$ 1 professor at University of Göt tingen .
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framed page of the original manuscript of Weber's W irtschaft und G esellsch a ft. He has also on display a number of G em sen S ch äd el (please look this up in the dictionary), which stare down upon you from the shelves of the library. Rather eerie. (I believe the word for G em sen S c h ä d el is cham ois skulls.) I remarked that there is an unprecedentedly fertile field for socio logical studies in Germany today, but he seemed interested chiefly in sociology of art—"T h e Secession in M unich at the Turn of the Cen tu ry ," for example—and in his system . As to his system, one wall of the study was covered by an enormous chart showing various parts of it in huge headings: p r e c o n d it io n s — s t r u c t u r e s — d o g m a — s c a f f o l d in g — h is t o r ic it y — m e t h o d o l o g y , and so on. "Besides," he said, "w e can 't move about; excursions are im possible." I replied, "But why don't you confine yourself to Marburg? Housing, food, population shifts, status changes, political attitu d es... there is no end to the list of interesting problems that lie right on your doorstep." Answer: "Yes, I, too, have been interested in sociography." And later, "O ne ought to do th is, however, in a historical con text." T he v isit at Bultm ann's house was very worthwhile, as Leo Strauss had told m e it would be, and as I had expected.4 We found a few piles of linen and odd pieces of furniture in the entrance hall. The day before, a row of houses had been requisitioned by the U.S. quartermaster; the inhabitants were to move out w ithin a few hours without taking their belongings, except for a few m inor essentials. Bultm ann's house was the first on the street that was n o t needed. One more house and he would have been evicted as w ell, despite the frantic protests that Hartshom e had launched. B u ltm annisanold m an, sm all, limping; his eyes are penetrating and quietly observing. His voice is very clear. He gestures little when he speaks. H is face shows kindliness and intelligence. W hen we arrived, his daughter, who is an accomplished musician according to Hartshom e, led us into the living room from where you have an attractive view of the castle. Frau Bultmann appeared and M iss Bultm ann disappeared. A few m inutes later, Bultmann him self opened the door and Frau Bultmann disappeared. The reason for all this
4 Rudolf Karl Bultmann, eminent Protestant theologian (1884-1976); Leo Strauss, the political philosopher, a colleague and friend (1899-1973)-
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com m otion was that only one room in the house was heated, and we were Am erican guests who had come to see Professor Bultmann! The old gentlem an asked whether his wife might rejoin us in the warm room, and it took a few m inutes to live down this incident. Bultm ann is altogether upright without any trace of servility, mud* dleheadedness, or a pointed sense of self-importance. There is nothing cosm opolitan or sparkling about him , but he warms your heart by his polite reticence, his directness when he speaks, and his simple truth fulness. Later, Frau Bultm ann brought some tea—quite extraordinary—and a few pieces of dark, heavy cake. "I have baked a little cake, because today is the first Advent Sunday," she said rapidly. It is too early, Bultm ann contended, to know what w ill happen in Germ any—that is, to German students and universities. So many gift ed young m en died, and so very many did not know National Social ism , because they knew only the army and the ways of war. There is a n ationalistic opposition at the university. Some Protestant m inisters who give religious talks to students present humanism as the begin ning of all evil that led to nihilism and bolshevism. As to the Protes tant church, Bultm ann regards the development of pietistic orthodoxy as a real danger, a kind of religious escapism (a term he did n ot use, but m ight have used in English). Yes, people go to church more, but it is too early to say what th is portends. Bultm ann teaches. His lectures are held in the Institute for the Blind, because one room in that institute is heated. The old university build ing is requisitioned, and many books have been lost or damaged. A few volum es have been pulled out for the students so they can start reading before the library is in order again. As to the Nuremberg trials, both Bultmann and his wife said that they are never mentioned. There are only the insufficient accounts in the newspapers. Nobody, they said, talks about the subject. It would be good to publish the documents, according to Bultmann. As to Karl Barth, the only copy of his new book in Marburg is the one owned by Bultm ann; nobody else has the book. It is not available. He remembered Leo Strauss and was interested in hearing what had becom e of him . As I have mentioned before in one of my letters, such interest in somebody who has left Germany is m ost unusual. In fact, I do not recall another single instance. Bultm ann's rather dismal account of political attitudes among stu
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dents and faculty was confirmed later by Professor Julius Ebbinghaus,9 whom I visited briefly. He is openly anti-N azi and has difficulties among his colleagues for this reason. I do not know whether Marburg is better or worse than other provincial universities in its political ori entation. s Bom 1885, philosopher in Marburg, published a small but weighty volume of politi cal speeches in 1946, Zu Deutschlands Schicksalswende.
Second Visit 1946
London February 15,1946 Yesterday, in a hotel lounge, I ran unexpectedly into de los Rios.1He gave m e the Latin embrace and asked me to look him up in Paris. Then I had dinner, arranged by Butch2 in a British-Portuguese club, which I enjoyed. I drank pink gin and sherry brandy. There was a little m usic and sm all talk about Portugal. W hen I got home I continued reading Corvo's H adrian VII with everincreasing astonishm ent and delight. After B rid esh ead R ev isited you'd greatly enjoy it. It is the story of a dismayed modem Catholic in tellectu al who dreams he becomes pope; well w ritten and full of sur prises. I talked about the book w ith W heeler-Bennett,3 whom I ran into on the boat from New York. When I told him I was reading H adrian VII, he grew so enthusiastic as to appear alm ost un-English. He had read the book six tim es, he said, finding it more "fascinating" each tim e. T he London papers complain about the recent cut in British rations (fats and bread). It seems that the situation is tougher than it was in N ovem ber. You can't even get lunch in a good restaurant without booking in advance. People line up for their fish, and the housewives 1 Fernando de los Rios, last pre-Franco Spanish ambassador to the United States, 1887-19492 The colleague in the State Department with whom I traveled; see Introduction, p. j. 3 Sir lohn Wheeler-Bennett, British historian (1902-7 5)•
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are organizing to make them selves heard. At the same tim e, you read stories w ith headlines, "O nly U.S. E ats." The story gives the per capita consum ption of Americans—350 pounds of m eat per year (?), two chickens a week, and so on. From London, the United States does look a little unreal w ith its com fort and luxury. A colleague told me he would so m uch like to get back to Washington,- London depresses him. I replied, it gives m e som ething resembling a poor conscience because of the com fort I enjoy in the States. T he paper discovered that dismissed prisoners of war, that is to say, Germ ans, have turned up in the homeland w ith English suits, English children's shoes, and pound notes. The stories are said to be exag gerated, but the cool British blood is boiling so that you can hear it sizzling in the street.
February 2 0 ,1946 T he shoe pinches the Londoner wherever he turns. It is definitely worse than it was the last tim e I visited London, five months ago. The w orst calam ity in getting enough to eat is the stoppage of dried eggs from the United States. When they were available, the English did not lik e them very much. Now, the stoppage means great "inconven ien ce." Even the food you can get is difficult to obtain. You have to w ait in line for long hours. Prices go up. Taxes are much higher than in the U nited States; salaries are lower. A typist in the foreign office gets £3 8s. a w eek; for comparison, I pay £1 per night for my room with breakfast. The cheapest meal you can get in a restaurant is 5s. Your cousin told m e he paid $2s. for a shirt, and I have spent more that £ 1 for a lunch for two. Yesterday I picked up a H erald T ribune (Paris edition) at the embas sy canteen, where I often eat sumptuous m eals. On one page there were three disturbing stories: W alter Lippman arguing that we must adjust our foreign policy to Stalin's declared intention not to raise the Rus sian standard of living but to arm and arm; an item on Russian policy regarding Breton Woods1and the utter secrecy in which Soviet gold re 1 United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held at Breton Woods, N.H., July 1-2 2 ,19 4 4 , resulted in the establishment of an International Monetary Fund and an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. By 1946, forty-six nations had joined, but not the Soviet Union.
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serves are shrouded; finally, a story on the complete disintegration of the U .S. air forces in consequence of demobilization. I could not finish this letter yesterday, so I am now continuing it on a beautiful, cold, sunny Thursday, February 21. As I foresaw, I do not have much to do. Last night, I had dinner with Butch and som e people from our embassy. Tonight I shall go to the theater to see T h e T im e o f O ut L ife by Saroyan—which one British paper reviewed as typically American honky-tonk. (It was awarded the N ew York Drama C ritics' Award and the Pulitzer Prize.) I got tickets through a friend of K urt's,2 whom I telephoned. She turned out to be the w ife of the m ain actor in the new performance of the play and of fered m e two free tickets.
February 2 3 ,1 9 4 6 Yesterday, on W ashington's Birthday, the embassy was closed. I w ent down to Foyles, London's biggest second-hand bookstore, to look for G rim m elshausen, but did not find anything. Instead I bought a new book by Henry M iller, which I have started reading. A ll of M iller's books have been published thus far only in Paris, because the English and the Am erican moral watchdogs judge them to be pornographic. Now th is book, T h e C osm olog ical Eye, is not pornographic and could be published in England. In fact I think it w ill come out in the United States as w ell—in the same series that contained the Isherwood volum e you read. The first forty pages or so of M iller's book are rather dull: I returned to my beloved H adrian, which I finished yesterday. T he night before last, I saw the play by Saroyan. Much as I admired the performance, the play is trite. It is full of inarticulate and senti m ental observations on the meaning of life, full of emanations of the "m odem so u l," either incapable of expressing feelings or stammering self-consciously when they are supposed to be expressed—like the m ovie star who conveys the depth of his love by saying, "G osh, you are cute, baby." A fter the performance, I ate two real eggs and returned to the lucidity of H adrian VII. 2 M y friend Kurt Roesch—a painter and master student of Karl Hofer—left Germany, where he was bom, after Hitler came to power; long-time head of the art department of Sarah Lawrence College.
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Paris, Frankfurt, Berlin Paris, February 26,1946 T he day before we took the boat trip from New Haven to Dieppe, there had been such a gale that the boat returned in sight of Dieppe! So our boat was crammed to the rim w ith people, and the train from Dieppe to Paris did not leave for many hours. Butch's overcoat was stolen. Our trip from London to Paris took nineteen hours! We arrived at six o'clock in the morning w ithout having had much sleep, in that there were eight adults and a baby in our compartment. But we did get to Paris and now have a luxurious room right next to the embassy. We found a message waiting for us from General M cClure, asking us to be in Frankfurt tomorrow, which means leaving this afternoon: we have reservations on the night train. Now everything ought to be going according to schedule, and after last night's good rest the world looks fine despite the rain. Berlin, M arch 1,1946 In Bad Homburg, we stayed at the general's house. Our host had ar ranged a program for us which began alm ost immediately after our arrival, taking us to Bad Nauheim, then to a film screening, back to Bad Homburg, to conferences and a cocktail party. The first day ended with cognac som etim e after midnight, and after a rich dinner in the castle I told you about. I would have preferred seeing some Germans, but this could not be done. On the next day we went to Frankfurt with the gen eral to inspect Radio Frankfurt and see another general. We had exactly fifteen m inutes for lunch and rushed off to the airport, whence General M cC lure's personal plane took us to Berlin in one hour and forty m in utes. (The train m ight have taken eighteen hours.) We arrived at three o 'clo ck to continue "w ork." Here in Berlin I am staying in a comfortable house (in Zehlendorf), where breakfast and dinner are served "a t hom e." Breakfast is served in the room: it includes fruit and eggs (how, I don't know). My house m ate is N icky Nabokov. T he m onkey-business continues. We are already booked for three of ficial dinners w ith v ip ' s (for your inform ation, this means "very impor tant persons"). Tomorrow, we have luncheon w ith General Clay, and tom orrow afternoon we shall telephone the State Department in W ashington.
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Berlin is cold and invigorating, full of snow, but not sunny. At night, before falling asleep, I read in Cardinal Retz's M em oirs, an English translation of which I picked up in Paris, and in a Penguin book by A. J. A. Symons, In Q u est o f C orvo, which is a biography (first pub lished in 1934) of the author of H adrian VII. I hope to get to the C ab aret d er K om iker, where the Germans make fun of the Austrians because they are not permitted to poke fun at us.
Berlin, M arch 3,1946 Yesterday, Saturday at 10 a.m. your tim e, we had a trans-Atlantic telephone conversation on a so-called scrambler, to protect the con fid entiality of the exchange, w ith people in the State Department in W ashington. The voices sounded perfectly dehumanized. Gurgling sounds pervade the speech; while you try to think of something intel ligent to say, you imagine the poor man at the other end of the line to be in agonizing pain. I still have not seen any Germans, but w ill pay a visit this morning to M aria's friends. So far we have had conference after conference, and virtually every meal has been at an official function. Yesterday I had luncheon w ith General Clay in his house, and dinner in Cladow near Berlin w ith General Bishop, M cClure's British counterpart. (McClure begins to call m e "H ans," and I can now claim to know a general from W est Point whom I call "Bob.") T he British seem to be a race apart from the rest of the world. Their ability to com bine resolution, prudence, superciliousness, and selfassurance is unsurpassed. They drink too much, at least in Germany. Perhaps they do it w ith Americans for the reason the Russians are sup posed to do it, namely in order to put the guests off guard and then pump them all the more surely for inform ation. At the dinner, given by our British host, we had whiskey before the meal, three different wines w ith the dinner, and liqueurs, gin, beer, and more whiskey afterwards. (I cu t out the gin, the liqueurs, the beer, and the after-dinner highballs, and don't know how so many of those who were present could con sum e all of it.) In the evening I wear my civilian suit, which according to the new rules is perm issible. You probably read in the papers that the British cut the food rations in th eir zone. It w ill be very bad, and only God knows what w ill be
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com e of it all. How lucky we are! How unbelievably lucky everyone is who lives in Am erica and not in Europe as a ''n ativ e."
Berlin: Am erican Party and German Hunger Berlin, M arch 6 ,1 9 4 6 Tonight we have been at a dinner party w ith Ambassador Murphy as host for a large group of people. I asked that Günther Birkenfeld be in vited so I can see him again and get him to eat a good meal. We had a talk about the "m eaning of history," a theme he had chosen. It bored m e, but I also heard some interesting bits about life in Berlin. T he black m arket is flourishing. A loaf of bread costs 100 marks. It is not too safe for Germ ans to go out after dark in certain (western) dis tricts. The bittem ess, especially about Poland, seems very great. Ref ugees com e back, and like dismissed prisoners of war, carry tales of horror from regions 80 km north and east of Berlin, tales sim ilar to those of w hich the Germans stand accused at Nuremberg. The news papers do not w rite about it, but the people talk of it a great deal. T he deputy-mayor of Klein-Machnow (who knew Arthur Feiler1 w ell) told the tragic story of his town. Klein-Machnow had no occupa tion authority whatever for three months, because the Russians said it was Am erican territory, whereas the Americans regarded it as Russian, w ith the mayor frantically trying to persuade either of them to take over. (Now, of course, it's Russian.) Then there was Erik Reger, the author of U nion d er festen H and, the pre-1933 novel on Krupp, which you may recall. Reger, who was bom in 1893 (and died in 1954), is now one of the editors of D er T agesspie g el, the Am erican newspaper in Berlin. T he p olitical situation appears more tense than it was three months ago, as even C hurchill's speech indicates. Birkenfeld said he gets many reports to the effect that the youngsters still think of war against the Soviet Union. "T h ey don't like war. They really have enough of it. And yet___ " He him self is a religious pacifist of sorts who regards Spengler's D eclin e o f th e W est as one of the greatest books of the century. He does not share its cultural pessimism, though, because he thinks that replacem ent of morbid cultures, which has proceeded for the past m il1 Economist Arthur Feiler (1879-1942) was a colleague of mine at the New School for Social Research.
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lennia from East to W est, w ill now reverse its direction: from America toward the East (of course, after another interim war against Russia). From his readers he gets many poems, "about six every day," mostly sonnets. Today I drove to British headquarters at the Fehrbelliner Platz. My driver was in an American prison camp as a prisoner of war; he lost his w ife and two children to one bomb, which killed sixty people in a cel lar. He is sorry that there are so many new faces in the Information C ontrol D ivision. In his Berlin argot he told me, "O ne gets used to on e's m isters. T h is Mr. Strecker was a distinguished man. Is now in Nuremberg. I always knew when he wanted a cup of coffee. Then I al ways drove him to the Red Cross. W ell, and then he could always spare a cup for me and doughnuts. Makes a difference, given the caloric situ a tio n ." He lives in N eukölln. He now gets card no. i and "a spoon fu ll" for a m eal w ithout card from the m ilitary government. Later I drove hom e to get a piece of chocolate for him , and he said, "W ell, perhaps w e'll be riding around more often now ." Yesterday, I saw M aria's friends. They said people are very hungry, even those who get card no. i —which they do. Even potatoes are scarce. They have friends who eat only twice a day. In the street every body, or alm ost everybody, has the color of yellow paste. T he U-Bahn functions pretty w ell. It takes an hour to get from Thielplatz to Tem pelhof. Around seven o'clock in the evening, the whores com e by subway from downtown to Zehlendorf. There is bus service for "A m is." When you signal, the bus stops to take you from and to the office. T h e son of M aria's friends showed me his sculptures. He said that Hofer paints again, working so hard that he neglects his job as presi dent of the academy. We talked about German literature after 1933. T h e G iesers gave me three volumes by Josef Weinheber. The father had rescued one volume from the ruins of his house and gave it to his wife w ith a new dedication a second tim e. They also mentioned Max René H esse as an author of good books. T he m other inquired—quite charmingly, I thought—about what M aria had been wearing when I had seen her last. Tom orrow , I shall have another party w ith "th e natives" in the house of a friend. Who is there among the Americans on our staff to talk to? Nabokov, who is in bed w ith a sprained ankle, is an exception. A ll the others seem to work w ell; they live and tell jokes. Sometimes the jokes drive me crazy.
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Lucius D. Clay, M unich, Nurem berg, Luxury in Vienna Bad Homburg, M arch 20,1946 I forget w hether I mentioned that we saw General Clay tw ice in Ber lin. T he second session was a long and disappointing meeting, but in teresting nonetheless. [Later note: We recommended to him that the contem plated licensing of German newspapers be postponed for a w hile. Clay barely seemed to listen to the reasons for our recommenda tion and objected w ith unexpected vehemence. "If you send a message to the Departm ent of State w ith your recom m endation," he said, "I shall resign" (!). We withdrew our recommendation and he calmed down. T he next day, we left Berlin by car. On the Autobahn, I opened the Stars a n d Stripes to discover that General Clay had issued an order fully in accord w ith our recommendations! But he had not officially re ceived them from Washington, much less accepted them. Instead, he had made his own decision, independently.! Butch did not leave w ith me on the flight from Berlin to Munich, be cause he was ill for two days. So I went without him, in the company of G eneral M cClure. I stayed at an enormous castle at the Starnberger See, w hich serves as the headquarters of the colonel in charge of infor m ation control in Bavaria. The weather was perfect—sunny w ith the first wisps of spring in the air while there were patches of snow still on the ground outside M unich. I looked at all the "operations"—film , radio, newspapers, and so on—and yet had tim e for an hour w ith Hans von Eckardt. He is thin. I was quite shocked when I saw him again. He is going to Heidelberg in the spring, because he says that a non-Bavarian and a non-Catholic in his position is unacceptable in Munich. I also had a talk w ith W ilhelm Hoegner, the Socialist m inister-presi dent of Bavaria.1 Hoegner has many enem ies who hold it against him that he spent the H itler years in Switzerland. T he next day, I took a walk in Munich. At present, there is more rubble—though not destruction—in M unich than in Berlin. The Ber liners have made notable progress in cleaning up. Munich looks less orderly, if that term can be applied to the German mess. Some shops 1 Wilhelm Hoegner (1887-1980), a refugee from 1933 to 194$, had a distinguished political career after the war. He was minister-president of Bavaria in 1945-46 and I 9 S4- 57-
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are open, and people gather outside to look through the windows. U sually, there is only cheap stuff on display: a few color prints, book m arks, little dolls made of rags—you can buy them if you bring some rags and thread (this you are told on signs in the windows). You can also buy postage stamps, but hardly anything else. Whatever is on display, however, attracts the people like long-missed luxury goods. T he population, approximately 300,000, grows every day through th e influx of refugees from the East. This is the main problem in Ger m any today. Second in importance is probably youth. And the two problem s are interconnected. Because the young people know that Bavaria—w ith a total population of 8 m illion—w ill have to receive 2 m illion refugees, and because they have little hope left, they are bitter and v ersto ck t ("obdurate"). Conservatism in Bavaria is rampant. M ilitary government has li censed a B ay erisch e K ön igspartei (Bavarian M onarchist Party)! I was told that it is popular. The Social Democrats have not much of a follow ing in Bavaria, about is percent of the people. Thus Hoegner, perhaps the best of the minister-presidents, is not too popular. The C atholics dislike him , and that accounts for a large part of the popula tion. Hoegner gives the impression of an honest, skillful, but some what colorless man. T he Social Dem ocrats in the W estern zones oppose a merger with the Com m unists, whereas the Com m unists blast their trumpets in favor of it. In Berlin, the fight is wild and intense. The Communists in the w estern part of Germany attack the Socialists and point to the p olitical developments in Bavaria, e.g., the Königspartei, as proof of the reactionary trends in the W est. According to the Communists, these trends can be halted only by a united front of the workers, of course under Com m unist domination. It is difficult to m aintain that we are working toward the "reeduca tio n " of the Germans—whatever that may mean—or are making prog ress in a definite direction. In the W estern zones, the food problem alm ost seem s to be growing worse by the day; the Germans do not know what our policy is regarding the Ruhr, or what policy we pursue on the issue of a central government; Churchill makes speeches that cannot fail to alarm the people; finally, the Germans leam what is go ing on from the Swiss broadcasting station Beromünster, the Swiss W eltw och e, and from Stars an d Stripes, published for the U.S. occupa tion forces. In view of all this, the futility and naïveté of our efforts toward "reeducation" are apparent. It is quite a mess, and I cannot help
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fearing that the Com m unists may be the winners in the end. I did not get out of M unich as planned. After having located Butch in Nuremberg (after considerable trouble), I could not get to him . The plane did not take off. There was no gasoline to make it by car. My bag gage got lost (I recovered it later), so that I missed the train. Eventually I did get to Nuremberg, but only in the early morning hours on a train crammed full w ith Germans. They flooded the railroad station in Nur em berg w ithout being able to get out because of the curfew. There were women w ith black scarves around their heads, children, dismissed prisoners of war w ith rucksacks, old men w ith rucksacks, everybody keeping som e belongings in a rucksack—all these people m illing about inside the station, or half-asleep on their rucksacks waiting for the m orning. A youngster smoking a cigarette showed me the exit where tw o or three m p ' s were posted; their w hite helm ets flashed a light at m e. I walked across the square to the Grand Hotel; Butch had reserved a room for me. N ext day, we could not get out of Nuremberg because it was foggy. So we spent part of the day telephoning and sleeping and went for a w alk in the A ltstadt in the afternoon. Again, it seemed to me that 1had never seen so m uch destruction anywhere else, but Berlin was as bad. O f the A lbrecht Dürer Platz nothing is left to be recognized except a m onum ent, w hich has m iraculously escaped destruction. From som ewhere underground I suddenly heard a child crying and wondered what was happening to me, until I got a grip on myself and began to search for an explanation. It was, of course, quite simply that some people live in air-raid shelters underneath all the debris: somewhere an entrance exists to the subterranean life. We flew to Vienna the next day. I stayed w ith General M cChrystal in a m agnificently furnished house w ith a view overlooking all of Vienna. We had a strenuous tour arranged for us to "in sp ect" plants and offices, inform ation centers, and so on. C ocktails, champagne, shamefully good cuisine, generals by the dozens, and so forth. In the evening I went to the ballet w ith my host. Gossip, more champagne, and queues of underfed Viennese in the streets. I thought I must be mad when after a ride through the city I returned to the general's house with its three dogs, four servants, a parrot, and the suite of three rooms I inhabited. T he return to Bad Homburg, where the crocuses are blooming in the gardens and the air is soft, moved me like a homecoming. Everything seem ed more normal. Soon I shall really be home.
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T h is whole trip has been a red-carpet tour. I got too much to drink and saw many big shots. Together w ith my stay in Germany last year, th is trip has been very useful (except for the drinks and some waste of tim e), because in 194$ I had not reached the political stratosphere in Germ any and Austria. Y et I have hardly had an opportunity to talk w ith Germ ans and Austrians.
Later Visits 1950-1955 Paris November 5 ,1950 I have had three rainy and busy days in Paris and was free only at night, so that I have seen more of the night life than of the architecture. Everybody talks about German rearmament and nobody likes it. Volunteers, yes—but no German cadres! Many non-Communist Frenchm en use Com m unist arguments against German rearmament, evidently unaware of the fact that if Comm unists were to hear them they would applaud. Prices are very high and still rising. The simple man has little of the luxury that is on display for the tourists and the rich. Rents are con trolled, but the controls are being evaded, as they were in New York. You cannot rent anything unfurnished, and no leases are signed, be cause everybody tries to evade taxes, including the landlords. Of course the workers m ust pay taxes, because taxes are taken out of their pay envelopes. T he cafés are crowded. In some respects life seems quite normal, or in any case valued enough to cause intense dislike of war and—"con sequently"—som e distrust of the United States. By some strange logic, many people hold us responsible for the danger of war. The govern m ent is quite unstable.
Bonn and Berlin November 10,1950 We arrived in Bad Godesberg for lunch. In the afternoon, I listened to the foreign policy debate in the Bundestag for about two hours. Unfor
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tunately I m issed the speech by Schumacher, but it was interesting nevertheless. Everybody talks about G leichberechtigu n g ("equal rights of the Germ ans") as a condition for German participation in European defense. In th e evening there was a big dinner party lasting until one-thirty in the m orning, w ith German high-govemment officials and politicians attending. Again we heard a great deal about defense, the big issue. I sat next to a man who said he had read S ocial R esearch in the thirties. And had I not published articles in D ie G esellsch a ft in the late tw enties and early thirties? The man turned out to be a professor in Frankfurt; he is im portant in the s p d ("Social Dem ocratic party") in Hesse. He did not eat any m eat or vegetables or salad; he ate only bread. I learned later that for five years he was in Buchenwald concentration camp where his stom ach was m ined. For contrast, next to him sat a S taatssekretär ("state secretary"), who had returned from a Russian prisoner-of-war camp weighing 118 pounds, but had gained forty pounds since the cur rency reform in 1948. A fter dinner, I talked w ith a young man about "th e culture of the farm ers," and sim ilar nonsense. N ext morning (i.e., yesterday), I had a breakfast appointment in the hotel w ith Joseph W itsch, the publisher.1 Thereafter we drove on the Autobahn from Bonn to Berlin. At the border of the Soviet zone, there was considerable delay, especially for German tracks. The whole Autobahn is plastered w ith propaganda posters for about 100 m iles. Now in Berlin, I am staying very comfortably Im D ol, which is in D ahlem . Today, the m eetings began w ith various speeches. I ran into Wolfgang von Eckardt1 2—who wants to be remembered—and he asked me to stay w ith him . In the afternoon I played hooky and surprised G reta w ith a visit. She looks much better; W illy3 was not home yet. T heir boy has grown. They have enough to eat and get along, but it is not m uch. He makes d m i $ o per month, which is about sixty dollars, though more in real wages. They inherited some money but can't get it out of the Russian zone. Greta talks a great deal about money, which is only too understandable, but of course a little monotonous. I helped the boy w ith his English homework. I had changed your m other's five dollars into d m at a favorable rate and gave the money to Greta as 1 For reports on later visits to Witsch's house, see pp. 130 and 149. 2 Son of Hans von Eckardt, bom 1918. 1 Greta's husband; see pp. 84, below.
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m other's present. Greta is not supposed to have any dollars and does not know how to change them. Tonight, after another dinner w ith about twenty people, I drove down to Steglitz and then walked in the rain with Wally4 on the Schloss Strasse (which is the postwar equivalent of the former Fried rich Strasse). We also went to the Kurfürsten Damm. The new "pros p erity " is stunning. It is simply unbelievable how fast Berlin has risen from the ruins—on a few streets. Now it's m idnight. Some others went nightclubbing, but I had enough of that in Paris.
O ld Friends, the French, and Pastor N iem öller Frankfurt, November 16,1950 Berlin was strenuous but, as usual, full of life and interest. I talked to m any G erm ans holding important political positions and have a much clearer idea of what is going on in Germany than I had three weeks ago. T h e difference between the U .S. zone and Berlin is extraordinary. Ber lin appears politically alert; the rest of W est Germany is provincial by com parison. K urt's sister Hilde, who resembles her brother, was about to leave the house when I cam e to visit her. I m et her on the staircase with three children and recognized her at once! We went to a toy store, because one of her children was on his way to a birthday party. T his gave me an opportunity to buy a few toys—a great joy for the children and me. T hen I w ent w ith the m other to a Konditorei to drink coffee and eat T elchow chocolate cake w ith whipped cream. Two days later, I m et her once more, taking her to the Hebbel Theater for a German version (by Ferdinand Bruckner) of D eath o f a S alesm an , w ith Fritz Kortner. He was excellent, allaying through his acting the otherwise monoton ous depression the play presents. After the theater, we went to Sch lich ter1for a fine supper. Hilde is a nice woman, though quite bitter and toughened in a slightly frightening way, I suppose by experiences in the last years. Last night after my return from Berlin, I went to Wiesbaden to have 4 Wallace Carroll. See Introduction, p. 8, above. 1 Old Berlin restaurant.
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dinner at the house of the French observer to the Hesse government. He had invited me, because apparently word got around that I was go ing to see François-Poncet.2 Although the food was unsurpassed, the p olitical conversation appalled me. To many Frenchmen, Berlin is nothing but a liability, I was told, and the Soviet zone ought to be for gotten, i.e., left to the Com m unists. Even Pastor Martin Niemöller, who recently wrote to Adenauer that he opposes German participation in W estern defense—his letter has been posted by the Communists all over the Soviet zone—was dubbed by these Frenchmen as "a sincere p acifist," and warmly applauded. I said a few harsh words about N iem öller. Regardless of his opposition to H itler, which was rooted in his concern w ith religiou s freedom—as a Protestant he signed his let ters to the Führer w ith "H eil H itler"—he has always been an ardent nationalist. When he visited the United States in 1946 (upon John Foster D u lles's insistence), I heard him publicly malign the c i's in G erm any: "Look at them chewing gum. They have no m ilitary bear ing. T hey could never fight the Russians," and so on. Everybody here is concerned about the defense issue, which is very com plicated and, incidently, making W ally's and my job quite diffi cu lt. Today we started drafting our paper. In the afternoon, a German from Leipzig treated me to a stirring ac count of youth in the Soviet zone. In general, we have had access to in form ation that would have been impossible to obtain had it not been for virtually unrestricted official help. Tomorrow w e'll have an inter view w ith M cCloy. Tonight I'll go to bed early. My cold is still bothering me, as is sinus trouble, but it's not serious.
Paris and Wiesbaden End of November 1951 T h is morning, Phill Davison1 and I flew from Wiesbaden to Paris in order to see General Norstad at Fontainebleau at 11 a.m. We got up at 6 a.m . for the purpose, but the plane took off late, and when we ar rived the general was busy. He still is, while I am writing this letter in 2 French Ambassador André François-Poncet (1887-1978). 1 See Introduction, p. 9, above.
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his anteroom . We w ill not get back to Wiesbaden tonight as planned, but at best by tomorrow morning. It is tiresom e and wasteful. T he weekend w ith the R .'s was very enjoyable. Jürgen came home from Würzburg. Yesterday, Sunday, we rode by bus to Hattenheim , an old W ein dorf on the Rhine, and hiked for a few kilom eters to Eberbach — you w ill have received our postcard w ritten at the inn. Eberbach is a picturesque, old, well-preserved C istercian abbey, built in the twelfth century. There is a peaceful garden and an architecturally impressive dorm itory. Somebody asked the guide in the press house if the monks had always made wine here. The guide replied, “Oh no, they started only about 1350!“ The presses were in use from 1350 to 190$. I have moved into a German hotel in Wiesbaden, where I eat crois sants instead of toast every morning: “And some fruit, H en Doktor?“ “Y es, an orange, please___" [Here the letter was interrupted, as we did get to see the general.] A fter the m eeting, we checked into a hotel in Fontainebleau—at tractive and expensive. We telephoned a friend in Paris who came out to have coffee and cognac w ith us. The American soldiers, he said, are a problem in France because of their high pay. An American sergeant allegedly gets paid as m uch as a French colonel. We returned by air to W iesbaden next morning, again very early, because we had meetings all day. Instead of accepting an invitation for Thanksgiving, we went to Frankfurt and then to Bonn. It was a pleasant ride through the Taunus and the W esterwald in not too much rain. On Wednesday night, we traveled by train from Bonn to Düsseldorf. The Davisons stayed in a hotel, where the R .'s had reserved a room for them, and I slept on a couch in their apartm ent. I worked a little, and then we went to an ex hibition of Germ an expressionists (not too good). In the evening, the D avisons cam e for dinner. We returned on Friday morning by train and bus—traveling third class and buying rolls for lunch in the railroad station in Cologne in order to save money. Last night we invited two U.S. colonels, and the wife of one of the colonels, for dinner in a little country inn in Schwalbach, about twenty m iles from W iesbaden. There was a zither player; after T he T hird M an, zither players seem to be quite in vogue. The party was boring, but our guests enjoyed them selves. It is pathetic to see American officers and th eir w ives so isolated overseas; they have very little contact with Ger m any, m issing both the people and the sights. M ost of them do not
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speak the language, and few of them make an effort to learn it. I heard the story of an officer's wife going to buy two pounds of plums at the m arket after a few m onths in Wiesbaden: she pointed to the plums and asked for "ein und e in ," because she did not know how to say "tw o" in Germ an. Nor do I think that Americans in Germany see much of the scenery, because they neither care nor dare to go hiking. Today, Saturday, I have had several meetings again. There has been little tim e for me to prepare the speech I am supposed to give in Heidel berg on Monday. I did some work on it this afternoon and shall do some m ore tomorrow morning. Tom orrow is A ll Souls Day. The church bells w ill be ringing, a sound th at brings back disturbing childhood memories of loneliness.
H eidelberg Revisited (Novem ber 1951) W ashington, D .C ., January i$ , 1952 Dear R iezler:1 A few weeks ago I was in Germany again and spent a day or two in Heidelberg, where I had studied during the tw enties. I went for a walk along the N eckar, over the old bridge, through the narrow streets of the old city, to the Church of the Holy Spirit, the R itter, the university, and up to the famous castle. I stood looking down on the town at exactly the sam e spot where I had stood for the first tim e twenty-five years ago. N othing seemed to be different. The river, the hills, the rooftops, the very stones I touched—everything was what it had been. Only I had changed. I had grown older, and quite unreasonably I suddenly wished very m uch to be as young as I was when I first looked at the lovely valley. In th is mood, w hich stayed w ith me for a few days, it occurred to me that when one wishes to be younger than he is, one usually thinks of one's self. Apparently, the closest and most intim ate image of youth is one's past. In other, more pregnant moments, one looks upon the future as the tim e in which he w ill do things right or better than he has done them in the past. One wishes to be older or different from what he is. Then, of course, one's own life offers no help; it extends only into the past. Instead, the images of others rather than of the irrevocable 1 Letter to Kurt Riezler (see Introduction, p. 9, above), on the occasion of his seven tieth birthday.
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past self appear in one's mind. That, too, occurred to me in Heidelberg, and I thought of you at that moment. I am embarrassed to tell you this and w ill not say much more, for in speaking to you I am keenly aware of the fact that the rhetoric of admiration is treacherous. Let m e sim ply say that I have often been moved by your humane ness. I admire your lack of sentim entality, your urbanity, and the delicate balance of philosophical and political concerns which both your life and your work reflect. There are your writings, your efforts w ith students, and your conversations w ith friends. What you have done and what you w ill do in the future w ill be added to the record of W estern civilization, which however threatened it may be w ith de clin e today, w ill last in the minds of a happy few.
M elville in Germ any Bonn, April 23,1952 Had dinner w ith M. and K. and a German contessa who ate only potatoes—poor thing. Boring evening. Told K. that M elville is much m ore readily available in German bookstores than in Washington, D .C . T he point was lost, because K. had never heard of M elville despite the fact that he was head of the America House in Frankfurt. In Ger many, you see translations of M oby D ick, B illy Budd, the E ncatadas, W hite Ja c k e t, C eren o—all in attractive editions. W iesbaden, May 12,1952 T he W ashington office sent me several volumes by M elville, which I had ordered. I read T he C on fid en ce M an in the evening at the inn in the M oselle River Valley and shall return tonight to Pierre, which I'll send you when I have finished. You w ill like it: it is the most astonishing M elville yet.
The Diary of A nne Frank W iesbaden, O ctober 6,19$$ I ju st cam e home from a performance of C lavigo in the Kleines Haus of the W iesbaden Theaters. It is strangely removed from our concerns,
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but it was enjoyable—more so than are movies, of which I have not seen any as yet. I spent the last three days in Bonn. I had only one ap pointm ent on Tuesday, but it fanned out into nine of them in two and a h alf days. A fter m uch searching I found a simple, charming little hotel in Bonn facing the autumnal Hofgarten. I had dinner yesterday with count Baudissin.1H is wife, by the way, is a sculptress who knows Kurt R oesch's work2 and remembers seeing his paintings in Kassel where she visited the exhibition tw ice. I also talked to Franz-Josef Strauss, the youngest m inister in the German government.3 In the evenings I read T he D iary o f A nne Frank, which you m ust get for yourself. Sybil4 talked about it. It is the diary of a girl, w ritten when she was tw elve to fourteen years old, describing her life and that of other m em bers of her fam ily in Amsterdam w hile they were hiding from the N azis during the war. Do not m iss it! It is more important than C lav ig o, unfortunately. W iesbaden, O ctober 14,19$$ I am glad you like the T ales o f G en ii. As to Anne Frank, the diary is not so m uch a depressing account of persecution, as a m ost surprising, insightful story of an adolescent girl observing herself and the adult world around her—a deeply moving book, all the more poignant for the fact that the reader, but not the author, knows the terrible unwritten end of the story. ‘ 3 3 4
See p.297. See note on p. 17. See. p. a88. M y daughter.
Two Recollections 1947-1948 Report 1950
Preface to Part Two G erm ans used to refer to the first postwar years as “the black-market tim e ." In the big cities, many people would not have survived had it not been for food and “currency" in the form of cigarettes, obtained on the black m arket in exchange for urban “luxury“ goods. At that tim e, gifts from American soldiers or civilians stationed in Germany, or c a r e packages sent from abroad, transformed life with the power of m agic. The three recollections from 1946 to 1948, that open Part Two illu strate such magical transformations of reality. G iven the abysmal living conditions that existed when hostilities ended in 194$, and due to the westward flight of m illions of Germans driven by war and hatred from East Germany, Russia, Poland, Hun gary, and Czechoslovakia, progress toward reconstituting a viable so ciety was very painful; only in retrospect does it appear to have been rapid. It proceeded on three planes: in econom ics, by political con solidation, and in international relations. On May 4, 1946, Lucius D. Clay, deputy m ilitary governor in the A m erican zone, ordered the cessation of all further deliveries of repara tions to the Russians until they observed the agreement on the treat m ent of Germany as an econom ic unit. The British and French occupation authorities followed the American example toward the end of May. On January 1,1947, the British and American zones were com bined (France followed suit only in 1949); and on July 15, 1947, G eneral C lay received new instructions which replaced directive ic s 1067 that had governed the “punitive“ U.S. occupation policy in the early postwar period. Secretary of State George C. Marshall de clared that this change would enable Germany to participate in the
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European recovery program, which he had announced in his memo rable speech at Harvard University on June $, 1947. T he authors of the plan for the financial rehabilitation of Germany —the so-called Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith plan—recognized as early as May 1946 that improvement of the German economy depended above all on increased production of coal, better transportation, and a min im al supply of raw m aterials and foodstuffs. If industrial production in 1936 is taken as 100, it stood at 57 in the second quarter of 1948. But from then on progress was rapid, particularly after the currency reform of June 1948, when the German econom ic adm inistration initiated radical decontrol of the economy. Crude steel production amounted to $.6 m illion tons in 1948; it rose to 12 . 1 m illion tons in 1930. American M arshall Plan aid supplied much initial capital, but German profits ploughed back into German firm s helped considerably to augment econom ic growth. In 1949, the value of goods imported to West Ger m any was DM3.7 billion higher than that of the goods the Federal Republic exported. In i9$2 and 1953, there was an export surplus am ounting to DM0.7 billion and 2.$ billion, respectively. G erm any's political resurgence dates back to September 1$, 1949, when Konrad Adenauer was elected chancellor of the Federal Republic — his own vote being the deciding one. General free elections had been held in August. On September 21,1949, the Allied m ilitary governors were replaced by civilian high commissioners, and the Occupation Statu te becam e the legal basis of the presence of Western troops on Germ an soil. Konrad Adenauer, the former mayor of Cologne, had had trouble w ith the N azis before the war and had been in conflict with the British authorities after the war. A man without any experience in foreign af fairs and no knowledge of foreign countries, he had become the first chancellor as a septuagenarian. He remained in office for fourteen years as chief of five cabinets until October 1963. (The French had ten different governments from 194$ to 1949.) Adenauer led the Federal Republic out of its international isolation w ith the w itless assistance of the Soviet Russians. Adenauer achieved reconciliation w ith France, and although the political integration of W estern Europe was thwarted because of French resistance, he did succeed in m aking West Germany a respected member of the Western European Defense Organization, founded in September 1948, and of the A tlantic Alliance, founded in April 1949. Adenauer rightly be lieved that only as a reliable partner in a strong Western alliance—
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strong politically, econom ically, and m ilitarily—could the Federal Republic hope to regain international status and respect. More dubious was his claim that his policy offered a chance of regaining national unity as a result of negotiating w ith the Soviet Union from "positions of strength." Probably not even an acute crisis in Soviet-Chinese rela tions—w hich Adenauer expected to occur sooner or later—would have induced the Krem lin to surrender in negotiations the m ost important territorial gains it had made by force of arms in World War n and by the dism em berm ent of Germany. Like the Soviet Union and its satellites, Adenauer's dom estic op position fought him and his policy every inch of the way for more than ten years. Firm in his beliefs, thriving in the din of political battle, and obdurate, Adenauer never wavered in the face of: denunciation— "C hancellor of the A llies" (Schumacher); a constitutional crisis pre cipitated by the s p d , which contested the constitutionality of the De fense Treaty before the Supreme Court at Karlsruhe; virulent propa ganda against rearmament in the streets (O hne M ich—"W ithout M e"); and ceaseless Soviet activity to thwart his foreign policy. In 1946, President Trum an made an offer to the other "big three" powers of the wartime anti-H itler coalition: a pact guaranteeing the dem ilitarization of Germany for twenty-five years. Britain and France accepted at once, the Soviet Union did not, whereupon the offer was extended to forty years. Again, nothing came of it. According to C harles E. Bohlen, it was "probable that at that tim e the Soviets con sidered it a distinct possibility that all of Germany would become com m u n ist.. . (only) later they shifted to a policy of keeping Germany divided."1 T he Soviet Union not only had succeeded in consolidating its con trol over vast areas of Eastern and Central Europe occupied by the Red Army in World War n, but also it had attempted to go much farther. Among other things, it tried to participate in control of the Ruhr area, rem ain in Iran, and acquire part of M ussolini's empire. But the actions that really alarmed the W est were the support of the Communists in the G reek civil war, the coup d'état in Czechoslovakia (February 1948), the blockade of Berlin (June 1948 to May 1949), and the invasion of South Korea by North Korean forces in July 1950. O n August 11, 1950, in an address before the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, C hurchill advocated the establishm ent of a European army 1 Bohlen, Witness to History 1929- 7969(New York, 1973), p. 27S-
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w ith German participation. It was a sensational proposal, and both Carlo Schm id (s p d ) and Dr. Pünder (c d u —"C hristian Dem ocratic U nion") spoke against it in the debate that followed Churchill's speech. Many W est Germans, however, felt defenseless given the pres ence of strong Soviet forces in East Germany, the build-up of the East Germ an police to a combat capability in war, m ilitary weakness of the W estern powers in the Federal Republic, and the absence of a security guarantee. On August 29, in a m emoir prepared in the chancellery and pre sented to the U .S. high commissioner, Adenauer proposed a West Germ an contribution to the defense of Europe. T his offer was linked w ith proposals for a revision of the relations between the Allies and the Federal Republic so as to permit W est Germany to move toward equal status w ith the other W est European countries. McCloy took the in form ation to W ashington. T he die was cast in favor of German rearmament in New York at the N a t o council m eeting of the twelve foreign m inisters in September and O ctober 1950. The principal resistance to the American proposal to rearm the Germans was offered by the French (Robert Schuman and Jules M och). It was to take four years until the French agreed to the re arm am ent of Germany. But rearmament was inevitable once the U nited States had decided not to reconquer Europe in the event of war in its last phase, as had been done in World War n, but to d efen d it against attack at the beginning of a war: nations interested in their security m ust participate in efforts to safeguard it. On Septem ber 9, prior to the n a t o council meeting in New York, President Trum an had declared that American forces in Europe would be strengthened. Inasmuch as this decision was no longer pending, it could not be used effectively to obtain Allied consent to German re arm am ent. The plan of a German defense contribution had been developed in the U .S. Defense Department as a technical-organiza tional project w ith alm ost total disregard for the political im plications and consequences of the project in both Germany and Europe. Upon A cheson's request, "C h ip " Bohlen had examined the possibility that the Com m unist invasion of South Korea be repeated elsewhere, i.e., in Europe. Like George Kennan, he came to a negative conclusion, but Trum an, Acheson, th e Joint Chiefs of Staff, and many experts in the State Departm ent disagreed and were deeply concerned about the pos sib ility of Soviet political and m ilitary aggression. In the end, West
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G erm an rearm am ent could be stopped neither by the French nor by Soviet diplom acy: it resulted from irreversible Soviet actions from 194s to 1950. T he dom estic opposition to Adenauer failed to see that. T he report of m y visit in November 1950 reflects the mood in Ger m any (and to a m uch lesser extent in France) at a tim e when the politi cal efforts to rearm Germany were just beginning.
Three Recollections
Greta, 1946-1947 In Germany, a ''house-daughter" is a maid who is treated like a daughter. Instead of taking her m eals in the kitchen, she expects and is w elcom e to eat at the dinner table w ith her employers. Strangely enough, the employers are not termed "house-parents." Given tim e and good fortune, however, the house-daughter w ill be found to ad dress them as "m oth er" and—less frequently—"fath er." The substi tu te parents have a greater sense of responsibility for their housedaughter's physical welfare, her manners, and even her intellectual education than they would ever develop toward an ordinary maid. W hile the house-daughter is paid a wage, the new mother w ill see to it that part of it is saved, an effort any "m aid" would reject and resent. T he house-daughter w ill turn for advice to her new "m other" who, for better or worse, w ill gladly give it. I don't know what general considerations lead to the employment of a house-daughter in lieu of an ordinary dom estic servant. In the case of my parents it was my m other's poor health, which slowly but irrevers ibly had been deteriorating for several years. Greta came to help my m other as a H au stoch ter when she was fifteen or sixteen years old. At that tim e my m other was confined to a wheelchair most of the day. She suffered from m ultiple sclerosis. The help she needed even to get around the apartment required close physical contact, which could be accepted as a m atter of course only from a nurse or a member of the fam ily, but not really from a maid, except in a rural setting. Before G reta joined the household, I had carried my mother in my
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arm s tw o flights up and down the stairs to her wheelchair. The apart m ent in w hich I lived w ith my parents was a walk-up. Greta was strong and learned to perform this filial duty whenever I was not at home. Nobody could do it safely without mother putting her arms around the helper's neck. Rendering this help required some skill and tact, if not love, and in the absence of deep trust on my m other's part it would have been im possible for her to let herself be carried like a tired child. M y own feelings about carrying my mother up and down the stairwell were lost to m e for more than forty years. Then, dreaming one night, I sensed around my neck the arms of a sm all child—my daughter—who by that tim e had long been a grown woman. As I was carrying the little girl up a m ountain she grew and changed: suddenly I felt the warmth and w eight of my m other's body. G reta, I remember, was extrem ely shy at first. It did not help that she spoke incorrect German, w hich turned stilted when she tried to avoid m istakes; one had to force oneself not to laugh. She had large hands w ith th ick red fingers, a consequence of frostbite. Her face looked young but not in the least pretty. She came from the country east of Berlin and m ust have felt hom esick at first. I don't know anything about her real parents, but always assumed that they were poor for let ting their daughter live w ith strangers. My m other developed a deep affection for Greta, cheered her up when she was sulking or unhappy, gently corrected her speech, and did not try to change her sterling character. In the event of a quarrel with G reta, my m other never gave in merely because she was dependent on her. "G irl, " she would say, "you are as headstrong as I am, or rather, as I used to be at your age. What s h a ll we do?" As tim e passed, I don't think that G reta kept any secrets from my mother, but had she tried, mother would have noticed it and waited patiently for G reta's confidence. Perhaps the two women got along so well because Greta reminded my m other of her own youth in rural Pomerania. She came from a large fam ily and, according to scanty bits of inform ation that reached me over the years, she had traveled as a young girl in the company of an aristocratic lady "a s far as St. Petersburg." W hether she had been a house-daughter herself or a companion, she never told me, and I, unfor tunately, never asked. M y m other treated Greta as though she were my sister, but had she been her real daughter, Greta might not have felt as close to her as she did. As a real daughter she might have tired som etimes of the neverending drudgery of helping m other bear her ever-worsening affliction.
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G reta never tired. She had a genius for nursing. The bonds between the tw o women were bom, in part, of the girl's response to my m other's af fection, of her feelings of admiration for m other's courage and cheer fulness, but m ostly, I think, of G reta's gift of vitality to my m other's failing strength—a token of her own past. But there may have been som ething else. Greta may have felt something akin to gratitude for having exchanged the narrow circum stances of her home in the coun try for the conditions of undreamed-of city life. Not that my parents were rich, but compared w ith the rural dreariness in which Greta told us she had grown up, our modest habits may have appeared glamorous to her. In any event, Greta was devoted to my m other and cared for her w ith the com petence of a trained nurse, the compassion of a good Sam aritan, and the warmth of a strong, loving young woman. G reta eventually married W illy Burg, a draftsman at a big electrical concern in Berlin. He was presented to my mother, who looked closely at him . She liked his honest face, his modesty, and self-consciousness. She congratulated G reta on her choice. "N ever mind me. Of course, I'll find somebody to take your place. You get m arried." A nurse cam e to the house not long before I left Germany, and Greta moved virtually next door into an apartment which she tried to furnish so that it resembled the home of my parents. She even got a piano (be cause I had played the piano) long before her only son could take any m usic lessons. G reta continued to visit my parents regularly, but soon after my departure for the United States the nurse took command. My m other died in 1936, and w hile the nurse stayed with my father, an in valid like my m other, she no longer admitted Greta to the house. In her letters to me, G reta referred to her for a while as "th e w itch," but soon any reference to her became anathema. W hen I returned to Germany in 194$, G reta's apartment house, like that in w hich my parents had lived, was reduced to rabble, and I was unable to trace her. Since I no longer lived in New York City, but at a new address in W ashington, D .C., which Greta did not know, contact w ith her was disrupted until 1946, when a letter sent to the old address was forwarded by virtue of a New York m ailm an's ingenuity. N oticing that G reta's letters cam e from Germany, he eventually asked Leo Strauss, a form er neighbor of mine, who also received letters from overseas, w hether by any chance he knew me and my new address. Since Leo Strauss was a close friend of mine, contact w ith Greta was reestablished. I saw her again when I next visited Berlin. W illy was employed, but the fam ily had a very hard tim e, as had all
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Berliners w ithout goods to trade for food on the black market. Peter, G reta's little son, turned his back to me in a dark comer, because he did not want m e to w atch him eating the bar of chocolate I had brought for him . G reta herself looked haggard, but did not complain. She told me that the graves of my parents had not been disturbed by the bombing and said she visited them regularly. She inquired about my wife and children, and w hile a parakeet in a cage seemed disturbed by my pres ence, she apologized for W illy not being home. I remember that I left wondering why she had that bird, since my parents never kept a parakeet. A few m onths after my visit, in late autumn of 1946 , 1 received a letter from G reta w ith tidings I failed to appreciate. Coal was virtually unobtainable that w inter. Like many other Berliners, W illy and Peter had gone to the woods near the city to collect some firewood. A splin ter had lodged in his right hand, which had become infected. Although, or perhaps because, I knew that undernourished people get such infec tions easily, I did not pay any special attention to the news. Two weeks later, G reta w rote again. W illy had gone to a hospital for treatm ent of the infection. Then a third letter contained even more ominous news. W illy had begun learning to write w ith his left hand, because the infec tion had spread so that, according to Greta, the doctors were consider ing an am putation. If only they had penicillin, she wrote, but the drug could not be obtained by Germans except on the black market and only at a price she could not possibly afford to pay even if she had been w ill ing to break the law. Germans at that tim e were forbidden access to penicillin, allegedly because it was used by prostitutes to hide the sym ptom s of venereal disease. (The prostitutes, of course, got it anyway.) Now I was alarmed and upset, reproaching m yself for having been obtuse in disregarding the earlier warnings. I telephoned a friend—a physician—explained the situation, and asked for a prescription of a su fficient quantity of penicillin to be taken orally. I remember it was w orth tw enty dollars. I asked the friend also to give me a detailed ac count of dosage and tim ing in administering penicillin in a case like W illy's. T h is I translated into German. After a somewhat strenuous ef fort I succeeded in persuading a colleague in the War Department to con tact the pilot of a U .S. Air Force plane scheduled to fly to Berlin that sam e day. T he pilot was to take a package of unidentified content and a letter to a young girl, a U.S. citizen employed by m ilitary government in Berlin, who had worked in my office during the war. In the letter I
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urged her to take the package—again without identifying its contents — im m ediately to Greta, whom, of course, she had never met. In addi tion to the penicillin and the German translation of the prescription, the package contained a letter to Greta advising her to deliver the m edicine quickly to the doctor who was treating W illy. W illy's hand, on which his fob and the livelihood of his family de pended, was saved. Even the doctor, I learned, was stunned by the sud denness of the cure. Greta wrote to me in her characteristic way, "A n angel cam e from heaven to help us__ " On my next visit to Berlin I saw W illy, whose w rist was still a little stiff. Evidently, he had prepared a speech. "Y ou know, it was a m iracle. Now we would like to show you how grateful we are. We have thought about what we could give you. W e really don't know ." He moved the fingers of his right hand. "W ill you accept my wedding ring?" As Greta noticed my embarrassment, she brushed what W illy had said aside. "You needn't take the ring. You m ust feel pretty good. You really don't need the ring or anything— "
Escape from Berlin, 1948 M y old friends, the R .'s, who had managed to come from Hamburg to Berlin for two days w hile I was in the city, asked me to meet them at the house of the Luttkes. I went in the company of an American col league, bringing coffee and some other goods from the p x for the Ger m an fam ilies. T he two ladies, the hostess and our common friend from Hamburg, seemed to change before my eyes as I unpacked the presents. Each of them tried to grab quickly as much as possible before the other could take it; friendship and civility vanished for a moment—shining m etal corroded by the acid of misery. T h e Luttkes were a fam ily of four persons: husband and wife, the w ife's Russian-bom m other, and Katja the daughter, about ten years old, who was happy w ith the candies I brought. The conversation cen tered on an absent fifth fam ily member, Edith, Herr Luttke's sister. T he Luttkes becam e agitated as they were talking, but nobody ex plained what everybody but me seemed to understand fully. Only after a w hile did I gather the facts which caused their excitem ent. Edith, a chem ist, worked as a laboratory assistant at the university in the Soviet sector of Berlin, where her apartment was also located. A few days earlier, two men had followed her home in the evening, and they seemed to be w aiting for her when she left her house later. N at urally, she got very nervous about these men. N ext day, they caught up
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w ith her, one of them on each side. The shorter man told her to remain calm , not to worry and to com e w ith them. At this point, Katja sudden ly broke into the conversation. "W hat I don't understand is why they did not talk to her on the first day." Evidently, she had heard the story before and listened to it again, as children listen many tim es to the sam e bedtim e story. Except for her grandmother, who put a finger to her lips, the grownups disregarded the child. T he m en took Edith to a room two flights up in a nearby building. T he room was furnished only w ith a table, a few chairs, and an un shaded bulb hanging on an electric cord from the ceiling. The men asked Edith to sit down, w hile the taller man moved the bulb slightly so that it swang back and forth, w hich caused Edith—despite her in tense uneasiness—to notice the changing shapes of the shadows on the bare w all. T he Luttkes took it for granted that the two men were members of the Russian secret police, for the men proposed that Edith collect in form ation on the scientists in the laboratory where she worked. Edith pretended not to understand what kind of inform ation she was sup posed to gather. "Ju st pay attention to their conversation." In response to her question as to why she had been selected for this job, the men sm iled as they told her that she was an intelligent woman, antifascist, and no doubt supported the progressive forces in the new Germany. W ith increasing agitation the Luttkes gave a m inute and repetitious account of the conversation. I had remained silent throughout, as had my Am erican colleague, but now I interrupted to ask what Edith had replied. Edith insisted that she was only interested in her work, had very few social contacts w ith her coworkers, and lacked any experience in doing w hat she was asked to do. T his was m et by sm iles and silence, as though she had not said anything. But the tall man finally lost his patience, "O r pretended to do so ," Herr Luttke added. Raising his voice, the man asked, "You refuse?" But his colleague answered calm ly, " I don't think so. You want to think it over, don't you?" Edith agreed quickly, and the first man said, "You have until Friday. W e'll contact you. You may go now. D on't talk it over with your brother." M y friends explained to me that this warning was especially om i nous, because Herr Luttke, who lived in the American sector, did business in the Russian sector of the city. He traded in building ma terials. Like Edith, he and his wife were afraid that her refusal to co operate m ight have dire consequences for his business as w ell as for Edith's job and safety. "She m ust leave the city at once," said Frau
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Luttke, "before Friday, w hich gives her exactly two days." "But how ?" said her husband. "A t the border, the police w ill be alerted. You can be sure that they have Edith's name. She w ill not be allowed to leave Ber lin and get to the W est through the Soviet zone." M y colleague suggested that she might contact the American au th orities and try to obtain permission to leave the city on an American m ilitary plane. Herr Luttke replied, w ith a suggestion of anger in his voice, "T h e Russians are your allies, aren't they. It is too risky. Besides, Edith cannot prove anything." The grandmother interjected, without addressing anyone in particular, "Edith is no spy." It was the only thing she said. Frau Luttke repeated, "She must leave the city at once." M y friends explained to me that some Germans leave Berlin illegal ly, for exam ple hidden in empty herring barrels, but it is expensive to arrange and still by no means entirely safe. "Y e s," remarked Herr Luttke, " it costs alm ost as much as false papers." "How much do false papers co st?" I asked. "O h God, a thousand marks. Who can afford th a t?" I knew that in 1947, r m 1,000 had been the monthly salary of m y friend, who had an academ ic degree and worked in a fairly respon sible position for an association of house-owner organizations. "A thousand m arks," I repeated aloud. And suddenly I remembered that before com ing to the Luttkes, as I was buying them something from the p x , my colleague had bought his weekly ration of cigarettes—a carton for about one dollar. I knew it was worth r m 1,000 on the black m arket. Suddenly, as though he had read my mind, he reached into his briefcase and handed the carton to Herr Luttke. The grandmother re peated, "Edith is no spy," as everybody else had fallen silent looking at the tw o Am erican visitors. I merely nodded to encourage our hosts to accept the gift. Later that year I received a letter from my friends in Hamburg which contained a message in allusive language, either because of an in grained habit acquired in the Nazi era or because of irrepressible fear of the Russians. T he message read: "T h e girl we talked about in Berlin cam e to stay w ith us. Thank your friend once more for the cigarettes."
Easter 1948, at Chiem Lake In 1948, prior to the beginning of the Russian blockade, I left Berlin on one of the last trains to W est Germany. When I arrived in Munich w ith a num ber of other State Department officials, a colonel—whose
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nam e escapes me—m et us at the railroad station. It was the week be fore Easter. T he colonel had tried to make reservations for all of us to spend Easter in Garm isch-Partenkirchen, but the hotel had been short one bed. He offered to take one of us to a place at Chiem Lake, a beauti ful spot not too far from M unich, where he planned to spend the holi days w ith his wife and young son. I gladly volunteered, in that I did not care to go to a famous resort. The stay at the Bavarian farm with the colonel and his fam ily turned out to be an unexpected experience. W hen I asked how much we would be charged for room and board, the colonel replied that only the German guests paid. We would bring som e coffee and oranges from the p x and perhaps a few cakes of soap; that would be ample payment. Everything else—meat, eggs, m ilk, but ter, vegetables, bread—cam e from the farm, and I would be surprised at how w ell we would be fed. He had spent many weekends at the farm, w hich was run by a woman, and kept the address a secret. All other guests, about a dozen of them , would be Germans; " I assume you don't m ind eating w ith them at a large round table." Indeed, there was excellent food in abundance. In Berlin the standard of living had risen a little since my last visit in 1947, but by no means to a level of com fort. On the farm near M unich I was alm ost shocked by the heaps of food on the table. It reminded me of a childhood experi ence during the G reat War. I had been sent from Berlin to East Prussia w ith m any other undernourished children in the summer of 1917. One of the first things I saw on that farm near Gumbinnen was the axle of a wagon being lubricated—w ith butter! I had not tasted or seen butter or cream in Berlin for two years. But on the farm, axle grease was either in short supply or too expensive, and butter was not precious. O n the morning of Easter Sunday 1948, the colonel's wife hid a few oranges under the trees in front of the main house and told the children at the farm to look for Easter eggs. When they found them they were jubilant, and eagerly tried to taste the fruit. Never having eaten an orange in their lives, they failed to peel them, and trying to take a bite were at first bitterly disappointed. One of the mothers who had watched the children cam e to their rescue, showing them how good and juicy and sw eet oranges are.
Report of Visit in 1950
W ashington, D .C ., Decem ber 7 ,1950 From O ctober 31 to Decem ber 2,1950, W allace Carroll and I visited France and Germany as consultants for the Department of State.1
Paris: “C hip” Bohlen and Others We arrived in Paris on the evening of November r, and stayed for three days in order to get some impression of how the U.S. diplomats in France, and the French them selves, viewed the issue of European rearm am ent. C harles E. ("C hip") Bohlen (1904-1974), at that tim e so-called Ca reer M inister at our embassy, felt very strongly that U.S. policy had been pushed too hard on the issue of European rearmament, without due regard for European reactions. The French economy would be un able to endure a large increase of the defense budget. The effect would be accelerated inflation, increased pressure on the living standard of the w orkers, and new opportunities for the French Communists to in crease their large following. He foresaw trouble in Congress once it was realized that the French were incapable of m atching any large in crease in m ilitary aid that was being planned. Precisely the same kind of trouble would arise in Great Britain if we continued to advocate a strongly increased m ilitary contribution to European defense. Ameri can policy, in his view, was jeopardizing the econom ic rehabilitation 1 See Introduction, p. 8, above.
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in France and G reat Britain and, in fact, was risking the beneficial re su lts of the M arshall Plan in those countries. 1 asked him what, in his opinion, should be done in Germany to further Germ an support of European defense. He answered that the best thing Carroll and I could do would be to recommend that the issue be put on ice for six m onths. There had been altogether too much haste. "If you have a 40-ton bridge, it is nonsense to try to get a 6o-ton tank to go over it ." His opinion that the rearmament of Europe should not be pressed to the point where m ajor econom ic disruptions might occur was supported by his estim ate of Soviet intentions, which, he said, was shared by George Kennan.2 The Politburo intended to avoid general war, and there was no reason to assume that this intention would change in the foreseeable future. Jam es Riddleberger, who has been in his new job as political adviser to e c a (Econom ic Cooperation Administration) in Paris for only six w eeks, was som ewhat reluctant to generalize on the French situation. He did em phasize, however, the grave threat of further inflation in France, and stressed the instability of any French government, given th e p olitical situation in France and the consequent hesitancy of all m ajor politicians to make unpopular decisions on the defense issue. Like everybody else I talked to in Paris, Riddleberger mentioned that Ju les M och's intransigent attitude was conditioned by the fact that he had lost a son in a Nazi concentration camp; that René Pleven3 had no popular support in France whatsoever (somebody said "6 votes" in the cham ber); and finally, that the only man who could claim to speak in the nam e of France today was Schuman.4 According to a certain French Radical-Socialist deputy and m inister w ithout portfolio in a former government, every "responsible" French m an realizes that Europe m ust be united and that Germany must even tu ally be an equal partner in the European arrangement. Given French sen sitivities, the unification m ust start w ith political and econom ic 2 Diplomat and historian, one-time U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, bom 1904. 3 René Pleven, bom 1901, was French prime minister in 1950-51. The so-called Pleven Plan, according to which small German combat teams were to be incorporated into international divisions, was the initial French counterproposal to the announced U.S. policy of German participation in West European defense arrangements. 4 Roben Schuman (1886-1963), French premier in 1947-48, was foreign minister at that time (1948-5 3). He proposed the so-called Schuman Plan, drafted by lean Monnet in 1950, which became effective in 195a with the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community.
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integration, not w ith defense. O f course, the Germans w ill be impor tant in European defense. There must be safeguards, however, so that the Germ an armed forces do not "drag" Western Europe into a war for the recovery of the eastern parts of Germany! Such feelings of revanche are perfectly understandable, but political action inspired by them would be premature! •); it must wait "for one or two generations." The Germ an Social Dem ocrats can be discounted, inasmuch as West Ger many is really unified in support of Adenauer—a most amazingly cavalier statem ent. My informant was a friend of François-Poncet, the French high com m issioner in Germany. He wrote a letter of introduc tion to François-Poncet for me, but unfortunately I had no tim e in Germ any to visit him . In general, I got the impression that French suspicions of Germany are stronger than is reflected in official French pronouncements. It is entirely possible that much of this suspicion could be reduced if the French were more knowledgeable about Germany. W ith the exception of L e M onde, the French press is even more poorly informed about Germ any than is the American press. The United States information program in France suffers from lack of coordination w ith the operation in Germany.
W est G er m a n y In Germ any I talked to Mr. M cCloy, to his deputy, and to all division chiefs of H ico G . I attended one of M cCloy's large weekly staff con ferences in w hich the American Land Commissioners and the socalled Am erican observers in the German Lânder of the British and French zones are represented. Finally, I attended two meetings of the so-called p e p c o group (Political-Economic-Propaganda Coordinating C om m ittee) at h ic o g , which is an adm inistrative novelty, p e p c o holds a weekly m eeting in which the political officers, the chiefs of in telligence, public affairs, econom ics, and the c ia representative state their problem s for joint discussion. In Bonn the chief American representative is Charles Thayer ( 191069), a Foreign Service officer, formerly chief of the Voice of America and brother-in-law of Chip Bohlen. His main responsibility is, of course, to m aintain contact w ith the German government and mem-
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bers of the Bundestag. High-ranking members of h ic o g usually spend one or tw o days a week in Bonn. Thayer gave a dinner to which he had invited many leading German politicians. In Berlin I talked to General Taylor, the U.S. m ilitary commander. (He, too, attends p e p c o m eetings quite frequently.) I spent many hours w ith the Am ericans in charge of r ia s (Radio in the American Sector), and w ith many Am erican editors of German-language publications. Among the persons I did not see, but who were seen by Carroll, were G eneral Eddy, commander of the Seventh Army, in Heidelberg; M . Armand Bérard, deputy to François-Poncet; and Mr. Kirkpatrick, B ritish high com m issioner. I also conversed at length with several British officials I saw in Ger m any, including Peter Tenant, the British chief of the Berlin operation, Lindley Frazer of the b b c , and Sir Frederick Stacey of the British For eign O ffice, who cam e to Frankfurt to discuss with us the British in form ation policy on Soviet defection. Because Carroll speaks no German, I had to make most of the con tacts w ith the Germans we wanted to consult, and the problem soon becam e that of getting enough sleep rather than of seeing more Ger m ans. I did not m eet either Adenauer or Schumacher, since their views are know n from their speeches, and concentrated instead on some of the younger politicians, German newspapermen, publishers, radio com m entators, and so on. I talked to Mayor Reuter of Berlin, W illy Brandt (Berlin-SPD), Ernst Lemmer (Berlin-CDu), Ernst T illich (one of the m ost active members of the combat Group against Inhumanity, an organization engaged in political and rescue work in the Soviet zone), Erik Reger and several other editors in Berlin. I also had long conversa tions w ith the three German political commentators at r ia s . I saw several representatives of the f d p (Free Dem ocratic party) and a num ber of G erm ans living in the Soviet zone who were visiting West Berlin. It was also possible for me to talk at length w ith two Germanbom top operators in the field of intelligence. T im e was too short to gather all the inform ation that would have been desirable. For example, we had very few contacts w ith German industrialists and too few conversations w ith leaders of the trade union m ovem ent, although m eetings w ith younger leaders of the s p d partly plugged this hole. Sim ilarly, our contacts w ith the academicians were rather lim ited. Finally, we should have seen more people in the G erm an government, but at least we did talk to four or five leading of
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ficials in the government department mainly concerned with the Soviet zone. HICOG
M any of the foreign service officers in h ic o c are highly experienced. T he organization of p e p c o is in itself a testim ony to the progress in or ganized political thinking. The group has worked out an impressive plan in w hich its expectations about Soviet actions, U.S. moves, al ternative courses of action, tim etables, and so on, are set forth in detail. I know of nothing comparable in any other political government docu m ent. T he political division cooperates closely with the personnel responsible for econom ic policy, public affairs, intelligence, etc. Under G eneral Clay, speeches made by the m ilitary governor were never cleared w ith the general responsible for inform ation in Germany. By contrast, M cCloy not only discusses each public statem ent he makes w ith Shepard Stone, the director of Public Affairs, but Public Affairs frequently prepares the speech for the high commissioner. Different from G eneral Clay, M cCloy him self is in close contact with high Ger m an officials. On the debit side, it must be noted that M cCloy, and the U nited States in general, are regarded as backing the Adenauer gov ernm ent to a point w hich, in my opinion, is detrim ental to the flexibil ity of our political conduct, if not our interests. M cCloy occasionally invites Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the s p d , to a meeting. Whereas he discusses political business w ith Adenauer, he has in the past con sidered his contacts w ith Schumacher perhaps more as a social obliga tion. It is certainly difficult to think of two political personalities more different in temperament, aim s, and methods of operation than M cC loy—the affluent lawyer, businessman, top official—and Schu m acher—the crippled k z victim . In the last analysis, however, M cC loy's conduct m erely sums up United States policy toward Ger many, w hich has consistently neglected giving any support to the non-Com m unist Left in Germany. Som e of our conversations w ith U.S. officials in Germany upset C arroll and me. W hether it was the bad war news from Korea, the re calcitrance of both the government and the opposition concerning Germ an participation in European defense, or popular evaluations of Russian strength, such as the one contained in the November 27 issue of T im e, the fact rem ains that several U .S. officials were alarmingly pessim istic on the subject of the East-W est conflict. This pessimism
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took various forms. On the one hand some premises of U.S. foreign policy were questioned. It was said, for example, that the idea that we should build up positions of strength in order to be able to negotiate from such positions w ith the Russians has become, or is rapidly be com ing, obsolete. Sim ilarly, the premise of U.S. foreign policy that the Politburo w ill continue to avoid g en eral war in the foreseeable future w as seriously questioned by experts on the Soviet Union in h ic o g . On th e other hand, the conclusions drawn from these revisions of these prem ises were hazy and contradictory. At one point I asked bluntly, "A re you advocating preventive w ar?" The reply was, "I do not know w hat the term m eans." At the same tim e moderate and specific pro posals for lim ited actions were received with misgivings, because such actions were "to o d ifficu lt" to undertake, and so on. Thus, there were intim ations of radical, frantic action, as well as of inactivity: a fluc tuating attitude often associated w ith confusion and the milder forms of dem oralization. M alicious critics might say that Soviet propaganda had made inroads on the determ ination and confidence of some U.S. officials who daily profess that they are trying everything they can to com bat Com m unism . I believe that whatever diffidence there is re su lts m ainly from two facts: our m ilitary position in Germany is weak, and U .S. officials are exposed to psychological pressures which are dif ficu lt to guard against. When the world news is bleak, the wives of som e A m erican correspondents naturally begin to worry about their being in Europe. They talk to their husbands who then ask their ac quaintances in h ic o g about the latest plans for evacuation. Again, a day or tw o after the president's statem ent in which reference was made to the use of the A-bomb in Korea, the Public Relations O ffice of h ic o g sen t around a "C onfidential" release based on a "Confidential—Not for P u blication" u p dispatch to the effect that w ithin the next fortyeight hours it would be clear whether there would be general war. I was jocularly asked what plane reservations I had, and this by a high-rank ing m em ber of h ic o g . T o balance the account, it should be mentioned that General Taylor in Berlin gives the impression of firm ness, calm ness, and confidence. H e know s better than anyone else that Berlin is m ilitarily untenable in case of attack. But instead of reciting this fact as often as Germans in the W est (not in Berlin!) and many Americans do, he tries to make the best possible arrangements to m eet lim ited attacks. Sim ilarly, General Eddy is fully aware of our m ilitary vulnerability in West Germany. T h is vulnerability results not only from the sm all size of our forces,
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but also from the large number of dependents attached to them, from the inadequate supply organization which is not concentrated west of the Rhine, and various other factors. And yet, he, contrary to persons w ith lesser responsibilities, gives no inkling of diffidence. ECONOMIC LIFE
N either W allace Carroll nor I made any attem pt to study the econom ics of W est Germany in any detail. What follows are the im pressions of a traveler. First, the econom ic advance made since the stabilization of the currency is simply staggering. In the shopping dis tricts of W est Berlin or in Frankfurt, literally every consumer good can be purchased, from modem and antique furniture to airplane tickets, from barom eters to leather goods, from fur coats to French perfume, from radios and m echanical household equipment to books and pic tures. T he food stores and pastry shops seem stocked to the ceiling, and on Sundays the crowds are m illing through these shopping districts to see, if not to buy, the goods that have been absent from Germany for so m any years. It m ust be remembered, however, that about io percent of the W est German population is estim ated to buy between 30 and 4 0 percent of the consumer goods, and that middle-class fam ilies with a regular job and a fairly good incom e still eat m eat only tw ice a week. O f course, they spend a great deal more on concerts, legitim ate the aters, books, and records than does the comparable American family. A great deal of the rubble has been cleared away and considerable rebuilding has taken place. M uch of the building effort seems to have gone into restaurants, night clubs, and sim ilar installations. Efforts are being made to remedy this situation, for example, by obligating a per son who builds a store to build at the same tim e an apartment on top of it. And yet im m ediately above the lighted windows of many of the m ost glam orous shops you still see nothing but sky. German exports are still only a fraction of German imports (about one-fourth, I believe), and I was told, and could w ell believe from the evidence I saw, that a considerable part of these imports are luxury goods. You see Germans driving expensive American cars (with black-m arket gasoline). And the tou rist traps in Frankfurt are by no means frequented only by visit ing A m ericans: many of the patrons are German postwar profiteers. T he less fortunate population is bitter about the econom ic and social inequalities, no m atter how much they cherish steady employment.
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T he outcom e of the recent elections—w ith strong gains of the Social ists—is frequently attributed to Schumacher's negativistic stand on the defense issue. I believe that dissatisfaction with the social and econom ic policy of the Adenauer government contributed much to th is success. John Kenneth G albraith,1 w ith whom I talked briefly in Frankfurt, believes that the defense issue has nothing to do with the increase in the Socialist vote, and that instead this increase must be com pletely attributed to social dissatisfaction. He is probably wrong, but the opposite opinion—that of attributing socialist strength to Schum acher's discussion of the defense issue alone—seems to me equally erroneous. GERMAN DEFENSE
T he issue of German participation in European defense was, of course, m uch in the forefront of my political discussions w ith Ger m ans as w ell as Americans. Our policy was not skillfully timed or ex ecuted. T he issue was sprung on the Germans and the French without m uch concern over popular reaction in either country. Nor was there su fficient diplom atic preparation for the steps we took in New York in Septem ber and October. The German attitude toward defense can per haps be summarized as follows: (1) T he W est Germans do not want war and do not want an army. M ilitarism is thoroughly discredited in West Germany. The small groups w hich m ight welcome m ilitarization have no power at present. M any m en and women know the Russians from the war, Russian pris on cam ps, Russian occupation, and so on. There is evidence all around them of the destructiveness of modem war. In the first years after the war, the Germans suffered severe deprivations: ruins, insufficient housing, a starvation diet, demoralization, widespread misery, and the influx of m illions of expellees and refugees. Now that things are look ing better, the very idea of another war is doubly repulsive to the vast m ajority of the population. There are Americans who might easily attribu te th is attitude to the success of our "reeducation" policy, one of the basic tenets of which has been that democracy requires demili tarization. I am convinced that our reorientation policy has little to do w ith the present antiwar feeling in Germany—although some Ger1 Former U.S. ambassador to India; now professor of economics at Harvard Univer sity.
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m ans take pleasure in reminding us how we have told them for five years that establishing a dem ocratic wav of life in Germany must go hand in hand w ith dem ilitarization, whereas now our attitude is that the survival of democracy depends on rem ilitarization. In a sim ilar vein m any Germ ans remind us that it has taken us a long tim e to leam th at our Y alta policy and our trust in Stalin have been erroneous and naive. (2) Like the French, the Germans know that the German divisions w ith the support of other W est European and American forces cannot contain a Russian attack. W hile they still readily concede that in case of an all-out war the United States would win the final battle, they are even quicker to point out that Germany w ill be the field of the first bat tle and that this battle w ill surely be lost. T his kind of reasoning fosters an attitude of neutralism , if not defeatism. Thus, many Germans believe that they can only lose by rearma m ent, and they are not eager to make any sacrifices. T his mood is strengthened by foolish statem ents and publicity coming from France and the U nited States, and is fanned by Comm unist propaganda. For exam ple, Jules M och said some tim e ago that the Germans should de fend F ran ce east of the Rhine. The statem ent gained wide currency, and M och's substitution of "France" for "Europe" em bittered all Ger m ans regardless of party affiliation. Sim ilarly, a story in L ife magazine picturing A-bombs exploding along the Rhine in order to contain a Russian onslaught, did not help to dispel the notion that Americans regard the Germ ans as cannon fodder. (3) Finally, there is the political opportunity for exploiting the de fense issue in Germ any's favor. N ot only Schumacher, but also Ade nauer, have seized this opportunity. The existence of an Occupation Statu te, the absence of a peace treaty, the remaining American con trols, and, in fact, every little discomfort the Germans rightly or wrongly attribute to the presence of the occupying forces is regarded by the G erm ans as an obstacle to their participation in European defense. T he slogan is "equal rights." If they are expected to arm and fight for the W est, they claim they should be partners, not mercenaries, of su perior powers. One can also hear this argument: As long as you, the Am ericans, are in fact an occupying power, it is in your interest to defend the territory you occupy. Finally, Germ an political opposition to participating in Western defense was, of course, strengthened by our reverses in Korea.
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CULTURAL LIFE
Every visitor to Germany, I am sure, w ill be impressed by the live lin ess of Germ an "cu ltu re": the large number of publicly supported theaters and opera houses, of which there is one in every medium-sized tow n—w ith a repertoire of eight or ten operas a season; the many good con certs that are being given,* the large number of book stores that have reappeared. T ick ets for stage plays or opera performances are not very expensive and performances are usually sold out in advance, whereas programs at the movie theaters appear to be less attractive, to judge from th e attendance. However, the Germans are now in their second or third year of producing their own film s. As to books, a large number of translations of American, English, and French books are available, in addition to new editions of German classics, plus quite a few new books w hich are often insignificant and uninteresting. Germans who held high positions during the Nazi regim e publish their memoirs, many of which are exhibited in the show windows. W hile C hurchill's memoirs and Sherwood's R oosev elt a n d H op kin s are among the books translated into German, I was un able to find a single German who had read them. Q uite a few Germans had read F orev er A m b er in German, which is referred to as "W oolw orth baroque." However tenaciously the Germans cling to their cultural standards, w hatever they be, there is little creative life in this field. On previous v isits I had always regarded the political cabaret as an exception, par ticu larly in Berlin where you could see good political programs. The best w riters and actors have by now been absorbed by the film indus try, and the place of the political cabaret seems to have been taken by th e night clubs w ith their so-called beauty dances, i.e., displays of nudity. T h e num ber of magazines has decreased, but sales of the surviving journals have risen. Literary magazines are, on the whole, "reproduc tiv e " as w ell. M uch effort is devoted to discovering the world literature from w hich the Germ ans were cut off during the Nazi period. One of th e m ost sophisticated, esoteric magazines, D as Lot, publishes trans lation s of M acLeish and Connolly—and m ust even be credited with the first Germ an translation of St.-John Perse, who was introduced to th e sm all readership of this magazine by T . S. Eliot.
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THE AUTOBAHN TO BERLIN
I motored to Berlin on the Autobahn. Approaching Berlin from the W est, the checkpoint is at Helmstedt. As an American you carry a special perm it to enter Berlin, together w ith a Russian translation. These papers are inspected first by an American sergeant and then, ioo yards away, by the Russians. The American sergeant hands you a form on w hich you are supposed to enter the mileage shown on your car. If you get stuck in the Soviet zone on the Autobahn anywhere along the ioo-m ile stretch to Berlin, you w ill eventually be spotted by the Am erican m ilitary police patrol which passes by every three hours or so. They can then look at your mileage and take a message back to the W estern zone so that a comparison of the two mileage readings shows the exact location of your car in the Soviet zone. Prior to the Berlin blockade in 1948-49, we had two checkpoints in the Soviet zone along the Autobahn so that help could more readily be received by stranded m otorists. W ith the settlem ent of the Berlin crisis, these American aid stations were abolished upon Russian insistence. As we approached Helmstedt, we noted a very long row of trucks inching their way toward the checkpoint. We counted no less than 450 trucks. When we asked the sergeant what had happened, he said, "O h, the Russians have decided to let only 10 trucks per hour pass. They do th is every once in a w h ile." We calculated that this meant the last trucks in line would not clear the checkpoint until the evening of the next day. The sergeant confirmed this. T he Autobahn has many underpasses. From the moment you enter the Soviet zone you are bombarded w ith slogans at each underpass, and frequently w ith signs posted in between, like "D eath is permanent. Ban the A -bom b," "W e work for freedom, peace, and dem ocracy," "G erm an u n ity ," "For prosperity against the im perialist warmon gers." A ll this in English, French, and German, because members of all three nations travel on the Autobahn. On the way back from Berlin we were exposed to some of these posters from the other side, where they carried the same slogans, and I was m ost forcibly struck by the change in exposure to tw entieth-cen tury thinking when we reached the American stretch of the Autobahn beyond Helm stedt. Here you have sim ilar underpasses and also signs at each underpass. But instead of learning about freedom, democracy, prosperity, the A-bomb, and unity, you see signs like "H enschel Lokom otiven," "C ontinental T ires," "Germ an Sekt" (champagne).
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Strange to say, the com m ercial advertising struck me, after visiting East Berlin, as effective p o litic a l propaganda. Incidentally, when leaving the Soviet zone, we were held up for half an hour because the American m p patrol had just arrived at the check point. M uch to the disgust of the g i ' s , they have to present their papers every tim e they reach Helm stedt. A Russian enters the case—name, a g o number, etc.—into a book and stolidly carries on conversation in a m ixture of Russian, English, and German. Each tim e, the g i is sub jected to the same questioning, including the absurd "W here are you going?" And w hile the m p tells him for the nth tim e, "H elm stedt," w hich the Russian knows anyhow, the next m p in line says grimly, "W hy don't you draw him a picture?" BERLIN
T he situation in Berlin differs in many respects from that prevailing in W est Germany. Even opposition to German participation in Euro pean defense is much weaker in Berlin than it is in the West. Social D em ocrats in Berlin told me that they expected the Socialists to suffer losses in the elections on account of the recalcitrant stand Schumacher had taken on the defense issue. Berlin is the advance position in the cold war in Europe. Every in habitant of the W estern sector knows from daily experience what life behind the Iron Curtain is like, because the Iron Curtain is, as it were, across the street. The differences between the conditions of life in East and W est Berlin are visible and the conclusions to be drawn from this experience inescapable. The currency in West Berlin has seven tim es the value of the East Mark. Everything can be bought freely in the W estern sectors of the city, although at relatively high prices, whereas there is rationing in the Eastern part. At night West Berlin is alive with lights and traffic; the East is dark by comparison and people look sullen. T he political conditions in Berlin require continuous alertness and are not conducive to the complacency which is fairly widespread in W est Germany. Life in Berlin is dangerous, in the literal sense of the word, for anyone who has com m itted him self to the Western cause. There are still cases of persons being abducted, and not only those who are active in German resistance work in the Soviet zone are in jeop ardy. M any Berliners take pride in their courage and fighting spirit, w hich they indeed showed during the blockade, and which they have
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m any less spectacular occasions to use in their daily lives. Mayor Reuter—a form er Com m unist and friend of Lenin's, but now sternly anticom m unist—is very popular, even among Berliners who are not Socialists. And among the Socialists of Berlin his popularity exceeds that of Schum acher, the party leader. The active interest people in W est Berlin take in politics is illustrated by the fact that during the Berlin elections no less than 90 percent of the voting population went to the polls, despite all sorts of chicanery by means of which the C om m unists attem pted to induce people to stay away. By comparison, only about 60 percent of the voting population cast their votes in the election s in W est Germany. The unemployment rate is higher in Ber lin than it is in the W est, and the Com m unists make much of that fact. Berliners, however, take it in their stride. T h e follow ing story enjoys wide currency in W est Berlin and has often been used during the election campaign. The head of an s e d (Com munist-dominated) fam ily in the Eastern sector of Berlin is vis ited by an m v d agent: "W here are you working, M eyer?" " I am working for peace in the m unitions factory in Spandau." "G ood. W hat is your eldest son doing?" "H e signed the Stockholm peace declaration, fights W estern imper ialism , and is a fitter in a tank factory." "A nd your daughter?" "Sh e, too, fights for peace, sewing uniforms for the People's Police." "H ow about your w ife?" "M y w ife is the local chairman in the international women's organ ization for peace and democracy. She has been active in the leaflet cam paign of that organization." "A nd your youngest son?" "H e is unem ployed." " I am shocked to hear that a member of so loyal a family has no work and I w ill personally find him a jo b ." "For heaven's sake, don't do that. My youngest son is unemployed in the W est and the whole fam ily lives off his incom e."
Conditions in the Soviet Zone It is claim ed by everybody who knows the conditions in the Soviet zone that the overwhelming m ajority of the population is opposed to
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the present regime. (The—rather meaningless—estim ates I got from a large num ber of Germans varied between 80 and 90 percent.) When you ask people from the Soviet zone, or Germans in close contact with the zone, "W hat is it that people hope for," you get alm ost invariably the instantaneous answer, "W ar." This answer is given not only by persons active in the resistance but by others as well. The leader of the C hristian D em ocratic Union in exile told me he was shocked to hear from C atholics living in the Soviet zone that they kneel down at night to pray for war. T his horrible wish is, of course, partly rhetorical and perhaps not more than an extrem e expression of despair. There are nebulous notions that war might somehow bypass Germany. There are undoubtedly also cases where "w ar" merely signifies an inability to see any peaceful solution to the problem of Communist subju gation. A lm ost everybody I talked to pointed out to me that a careful dis tin ction m ust be made between youth (up to the age of 2 5) and the older generation. Those East Germans who are now 2$ years of age were 20 years old when the war ended, 15 when it started, and 7 when H itler cam e to power. They have no memory of democratic life, having passed from one totalitarian regime that began in their childhood into another w hich succeeded it during their late adolescence. The Com m unists m ake the m ost strenuous efforts, by way of indoctrination, organization, and little favors, to gain and m aintain a hold on youth. Allegedly, they are successful and as tim e passes their success might grow. Sim ilarly, strenuous efforts are made by the Communists to build up the so-called alert units of the People's Police into a m ilitarily efficient organization. T heir present strength is only $0,000 (which would, of course, be sufficient to overrun West Berlin); the plans are to increase these units to approximately 120,000 during 19$ r. Estim ates of the p olitical reliability of these units were alm ost unanimous: it was stressed that the alert units have lost all identification w ith Germany and would, in case of conflict, shoot at any West German as an agent of im perialism . In addition, the German Com m unists (referred to in Berlin and West Germ any as "Soviet D eutsche") have organized indoctrination courses for the adult population; they take large numbers of them out of factories and offices for a period of six weeks' full-tim e work. A G erm an living in the Soviet zone told me that after such intensive in doctrination, even members of the opposition are shaken in their con
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victions, and that it is dangerous to assume that one can talk to them as one did before they took the course. As to the land reform, I was told that it was quite unpopular even among its beneficiaries, both on the collective farms and among the socalled new settlers. D eliveries of reparations to the Soviet Union are badly in arrears and the products to be shipped East are of poor quality. Lack of initiative, too m uch red tape, and probably also subtle forms of undetectable sabotage contribute to this result.
Soviet Policy on West Germany T he primary aim of Soviet policy in Germany today is to prevent re arm am ent in the W est. There is evidence that the most virulent at tacks on W est German anti-Com m unists have been called off simply because these people have been critical of American defense policy. T he m ost notable illustration is Pastor M artin Niemöller, a submarine commander in the First World War, a courageous anti-Nazi, and pastor of the Confessional Church. He addressed an open letter to Chancellor Adenauer in w hich he denounced German rearmament in quite emo tional language and advocated a neutralist position. Although N iem öller's record shows that he is a nationalist, the Communists dis tributed m illions of copies of his letter in East Germany.1 Similarly, they have utilized the statem ents of one of their archenemies, Schu m acher, on the defense issue in support of their own policy. In short, th eir w orst political enem ies in West Germany are now being treated as allies, for tactical reasons. Sim ilarly, Communist measures which were expected to be taken against the churches and parties in the Soviet zone have been postponed in the interest of mobilizing all pos sible forces against efforts to arm West Germany. At the same tim e, of course, the attacks against the United States continue with unabat ed vigor.
Resistance in the Soviet Zone One of the m ost startling experiences on my trip was the discovery that there is no Iron Curtain separating East from West in Germany. 1 See also letter of November 10, 1950, p. 69, above.
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T here is traffic back and forth of goods, ideas, and people. Germans can travel w ith relative ease from the Soviet zone into the Eastern sector of Berlin and from there w ithout difficulty into W est Berlin. At the Amer ican Radio Station in Berlin, there is a continuous stream of East G erm an visitors who com e to ask for advice and help or to suggest what Ri a s should do on its programs. No less than four employees of R i a s work full tim e interrogating these visitors. The relationship of the top com m entators of r ia s w ith their audience is m ost direct and personal. I talked to one com m entator who told me the following story: R ecently two girls hiked for many days from Rostock to Berlin to com e to r ia s and ask his advice as to whether they should join the C om m unist youth organization, despite the fact that they were not C om m unists. They had nobody to turn to but this commentator who, to them , was the daily spokesman for the free world. Many other stories of th is kind m ake a visit to r ia s a moving experience. The men and wom en who operate r ia s are aware of their responsibility and know they are engaged in an enterprise unique in radio broadcasting. T h eir close contacts w ith people in the Soviet zone greatly help to put life, drama, and fight into their work. The intelligence they receive enables them to talk w ith directness and force. For example, one reg ular broadcast nam es particularly obnoxious secret police informers to its audience. Apart from r ia s , there are many organizations in West Germany and Berlin active in what they like to refer to as resistance work. They spread propaganda, obtain inform ation, rescue people, and so on. All th e p olitical parties have Eastern bureaus engaged in this kind of ac tiv ity , w ith the Socialists the m ost successful. The so-called Kaiser M inistry of the Bonn government has the official responsibility for keeping W est Germany informed about conditions in the Soviet zone and for spreading inform ation in the Soviet zone about the policies of the Bonn government. In addition the trade unions are active, and there are organizations of jurists and other professional groups which along w ith the churches, m aintain contact between West and East. Som e of these organizations are supported by h ic o g , which also at tem pts to unify the efforts of these various groups. Finally, quite a bit of clandestine work goes on. W hile all th is activity is impressive, it should be added that it is not ideologically united, it lacks a common strategy, and it suffers from th e m utual distrust custom ary in activities of this nature. People so engaged like to talk about "th e resistance." In fact, much of the resis-
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tance work exhausts itself in m aintaining a mood of opposition in Soviet Germany rather than in promoting action. T his is perhaps in evitable, inasm uch as no resistance movement can become fully active unless it is supported and animated by the approach from abroad of liberating armed forces. Thus one might w ell say that the present activ ities of the opposition groups inside and outside the Soviet zone present a powerful p o ten tia l resistance movement.
Three Conversations and Observations 19 51-19 52
Preface to Part Three In 19$ i several new steps were taken toward the international re habilitation of W est Germany. The Federal Republic joined the Coun c il of Europe and the Coal and Steel Community. Since March 19s 1, the Federal Republic had a M inistry of Foreign Affairs and could estab lish diplom atic relations w ith other nations. In July 19s 1, the three W estern powers declared the state of war w ith Germany to have ended. T h is change made it necessary to term inate the Occupation Statute and put the presence of foreign troops on German soil on a new con tractual basis. T he result of negotiations to that effect were incorporated in the G eneral Treaty ("Germ any Treaty"), to which Adenauer affixed his signature in Bonn on May 26, 1952. According to this treaty Allied troops were stationed in Germany to defend the free world, "to which the Federal Republic and Berlin belong." Certain prerogatives of the A llied powers remained unchanged, however, so as to safeguard the possibility of their continued participation in four-power decisions (w ith the Soviet Union) on Germany as a whole or on Berlin. The treaty proclaim ed as a common aim of all signatories a reunified Germany w ith a free dem ocratic constitution in a European com m unity.1 According to the treaty on the European Defense Community (e d c ) signed in Paris on May 27,1952, the Federal Republic was to contribute to the defense of the W est by participating in a supranational European organization. T his was tantam ount to integrating the nations of West1 See Wilhelm C . Crewe, D eutsche A ussenpolitik der N achkriegszeit (Stuttgart, i960), pp. 46-60 (first published in A ussenpolitik 7: 1951).
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em Europe by means of a m ilitary blueprint, before Europe was united politically. T he Soviet Union tried to prevent the international rehabilitation of the Federal Republic w ithin the Western alliance. On March io, 1952, a Soviet diplom atic note offered the unification of Germany at the price of its neutralization. The Soviet offer was predicated also on the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as a permanent frontier, and the form ation of a provisional government by the parliaments of the two Germ an states w ith large-scale participation of "dem ocratic organiza tio n s," as defined by the Comm unists. The Soviet note appealed to the nationalists in West Germany by proposing that Germany have her "ow n national armed forces (land-, sea-, and airforces)"; and it stated that "a ll former members of the German army, including officers and generals [and| all former Nazis (except those convicted of crimes| must have the same human and political rights as all other German c it izen s." In a second note, dated April 9,1952, the Soviet proposal of German "arm ed forces destined for defense" was compared w ith the Western plans; these were characterized as efforts "to put up mercenary troops of politicians bent on revenge led by H itlerite-fascist generals who are ready to plunge Europe into the abyss of a third world w ar." A third Soviet note was sent on May 24, two days prior to the signing of the General Treaty and the e d c treaty. Now, the W estern powers were accused of attem pting to "evade the conclusion of a peace treaty w ith G erm any" and to schem e w ith the Adenauer government which was alleged to be "preparing the instigation of a new war in Europe." At the sam e tim e, the note offered new ammunition to the neutralists in W est Germ any by insisting that despite the formal abolition of the O ccupation Statute in the Federal Republic, "W est Germany remains in a position of dependence upon, and subjection to the governments of the USA, G reat Britain and France." Soviet propaganda was not ineffective. It gave arguments to the Germ an neutralists and rendered the political debates in West Ger many more bitter and passionate. It confused many honest people. Even Dr. Schum acher delivered him self of political inanities. In a statem ent made to a u p representative, reported by u p on May 22, 19$ 2, Schum acher said that in order to get off dead center, "th e Ameri cans and Russians (should) begin a conversation and agree on the dis tribution of the w orld."3 After Schum acher's death on August 22, 1 Quoted in Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen, vol. 2 (Stuttgart, 1966), p. 89.
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III
1952, his successor Erich Ollenhauer continued the s p d policy of op posing Adenauer's efforts to establish close political, economic, and m ilitary ties w ith the W estern powers.3 T he French were not attracted by the idea of the supranational inte gration of Europe. Com m unist sympathies were widespread in France, and French popular distrust of German intentions, as well as French fears of Germ an capabilities, were strong for historically understand able reasons. Besides, the m ost virulent political ideas in postwar Europe—no less than in the so-called Third World—were generally nationalist, Com m unist, or neutralist. T he French parliam ent did not vote on the treaties during the period in w hich the conversations reported in Part Three, below, took place. In G reat Britain, the Labor party turned against the contractual agree m ents on August i, 1952, but the m ajority in Parliament voted for them . In the m eantim e, the ninth session of the n a t o council had m et in Lisbon, February 20-2$, 1952; n a t o had become a permanent or ganization w ith its headquarters in Paris. The council talked "airily of 50 divisions" in 1952 "and 100 in 1954," giving the impression, as the E con om ist said in its issue of March 1, 1952, "th at the Ger m an defense contribution has been settled when it clearly has n o t" and "pretending that Franco-German difficulties over a European D efense Com m unity are not so serious after a ll." It took more than tw o years a fte r the signing of the Bonn and Paris treaties in May i9$2 for W estern statesm en to realize that the E con om ist had been cor rect in its scathing criticism .
A lfred Toppe: Military Pride and Pensions Frankfurt am M ain, Decem ber 19s 1 Form er G eneral Toppe, about fifty years of age, comes from a Protes tant fam ily whose members have served in the army for generations. Since the end of the war he has been in the United States several tim es in connection w ith work for the H istorical Division of the U.S. Army.1 1 s p d policy changed only after Herbert Wehner's speech in the Bundestag on )une 30, i960. 1 Regarding his experience as a prisoner of war after the cessation of hostilities in Europe, see “ Afterthoughts on Malicious Joy," p. 217, below.
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Toppe is soft spoken, slightly pedantic, and could easily be taken for a higher civ il servant or a university professor. He speaks three lan guages. At present he lives on a pension near Wiesbaden and edits the W eh rw issen sch aftlich e R undschau, a professional magazine on m ili tary affairs to w hich former German senior officers contribute. The publisher of this magazine is Dr. Reibert, at whose house the conversa tion took place. Toppe treated him, somewhat conspicuously, as his boss. I would guess that for Toppe, order in his work, personal security, his career, and perhaps conventionally patriotic considerations m atter m ore than broader moral and political concerns. T he conversation opened w ith a very lengthy complaint about the Germ an law on pensions for former officers. Toppe detected in this law a great deal of discrim ination against officers and in favor of civil ser vants, and tried to prove in detail his contention that he could not live on his pension. At the same tim e, he took pride in the abilities of the Germ an general staff officers. He said that all of them have found fobs. W hen 1ventured to guess that many of them were employed in execu tive positions in German industry he agreed, but added that he knew m any younger officers who had learned a trade and had been successful in it. He stated his belief that a German general staff officer can do any thing he puts his mind to. The pleasure he took in this observation was evident when he said, 'I 'l l give you ten marks for every former staff officer you can name who today has no fob." 1 asked Toppe w hich former German general, in his opinion, could command wide respect and popularity at the head of a new German contingent in the European Defense Community, and would at the sam e tim e be com petent and experienced enough to hold such a fob. Toppe referred in passing to General Franz Haider,2 but dismissed the idea because of Haider's age. As to the Luftwaffe, he mentioned Field M arshal Albert Kesselring, but "you know that he is in Werl, the Brit ish prison for war crim inals."3 As regards the army, "T h e best man, of course, is Field M arshal Erich von M anstein,4 but you know, of course, th at he, too, is in W erl." Evidently Toppe mentioned Kesselring and 2 Seep. 15 2 ,below. s Kesselring ( 1885-1960) was convicted of war crimes by the British in 1947; his death sentence was commuted into life imprisonment. He was freed by an act of clemency in 19 5 1. 4 Manstein (1887-1973), according to B. H. Liddell Hart, was “ probably. . . the ablest of all the German generals" |77ie German G enerals Talk (New York, t948|, p. 63). Like Kesselring, Manstein was soon freed.
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M anstein not only because he thought highly of them but also because these nam es gave him an opportunity to state his grievance. In fact, he grew quite passionate and insisted that no German participation in European defense was possible until all war crim inals were released and u ntil th is "past phase" of occupation policy had terminated. Toppe urged the establishm ent of an advisory group composed of officers from the United States and all Western European countries to exchange experiences and give professional answers to the many ques tions raised concerning the organization of a European army. Tactical and strategic m atters would also be considered by such a group. It m ight be located in France and offer its advice to General Eisenhower. It should work permanently, not as an ad hoc com m ittee. Toppe said em phatically that only through such professional coop eration could the conflict of nationalist ideologies and interests be pushed into the background. Moreover, he regarded the German ex perience in the Soviet Union as invaluable and its utilization indis pensable in planning the defense of Europe. In the conversation on this subject, Toppe suggested by indirection that professional m ilitary com petence was more important than national rivalry. W hen I pointed out that General Eisenhower did have an interna tional professional staff, the argument was lost on him, evidently be cause the Germ ans are not represented on it.
Dr. R eibert: A Candid Soldier Frankfurt am M ain, Decem ber 1951 Dr. Reibert, a man in his fifties, is the publisher of M ittler, the Ger m an publishing house specializing in m ilitary literature. He is a form er colonel, and w ell known as the author of various training manuals for the Germ an infantry. These books were so successful that he amassed quite a fortune from the sales. A fter World War I Reibert fought the Communists in Thuringia; he vividly described some of these early experiences. I do not know w hether he stayed in the Republican Reichswehr, or when and where he acquired his academic degree. R eibert's career under the Nazi regime was frustrated because he was not a N ational Socialist—or so I had been told in h ic o g . Indeed,
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the bluntness w ith w hich he professed some anti-American views to m e suggested the difficulties he was able to create for him self by can dor. In bearing and thinking, Reibert struck me as the type of a compe ten t soldier who had risen in the army to a position of responsibility and knew what he was worth. Reibert was openly contemptuous of the fighting qualities of both the Italians and the French. "Good Lord, look at the war record of the French." Concerning the Italians he related various amusing incidents of unsoldierly conduct. "In the morning, the captain has a bellyache, the colonel has a hangover and nobody wants to fight------" Nor did R eibert think too highly of the fighting qualities of the American g i . "B u t th is does not m atter, because next tim e they w ill fight the Rus sians and it w ill be do or d ie." Reibert, of course, thought highly of the Germans as soldiers. Above all, they had experience fighting the Red Army ; and combat experience and training rather than organization are the essential prerequisites of a good army. He narrated a number of anecdotes vividly illustrating his point, and concluded that this German experience must be preserved and utilized if anything is to come of European defense. R eibert said that many Germans are opposed to the idea of creating G erm an infantry forces w hile "th e other n a t o forces" would travel about in tanks. (Thus, Reibert simply assumed German membership in n a t o !) " I disagree," he said. "Y es, infantry losses w ill be higher, but we are good infantrists. W e'll hold. W e'll be the K orsettstan gen 1at the front to stiffen the other contingents. Put a German infantry division to the right, another to the left, and I don't care what troops you put into the tanks in the middle—French, Belgian, Dutch, or what have you. T he tanks w ill advance if they know Germans are on the flanks. If any tanks turn about, w e'll shoot the bastards." Frau Reibert brought in coffee and cake and silently handed her hus band a letter, posted in Spain. It had been sent by a former German of ficer. Reibert read the letter aloud w ith much pleasure. The sender asked for a copy of Reibert's manuals, because he was writing sim ilar m anuals for the Spanish army. "You see," said the host, "w hat I mean by using practical experience of the past for the jobs of the future." He pointed out again how important it would be to prepare the many things that go into the making of a well-organized, well-trained Ger m an ground force. "T h is takes tim e, very much tim e, and cannot •ft 1 German m ilitary slang; literally, "corset-busks."
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be settled by a decree or an agreement. The real work begins after th a t." Like other former officers, Reibert suggested both his impa tien ce w ith the politicians and his conviction that their activities were not "w o rk ." A t the tim e I saw Reibert, there was much discussion in Germany as to w hether the new German contingents should be recruited from volunteers or through a draft. Volunteers seemed to be preferred in the circles close to the former Waffen ss. Reibert insisted that the German contingents should not be organized on a voluntary basis, but should be based on som e kind of conscription; otherwise the m ost valuable elem ents would stay away from the army and only the unemployed would flock to the colors. R eibert always referred to General Eisenhower as "Eisenhow er," w hereas he never called former General Toppe anything but "H err G eneral Toppe." He said there was a substantial m inority among Germ an officers (later he fixed the proportion at io percent) who w ill "never serve" under Eisenhower. At the end of the war Eisenhower had made a statem ent in w hich he failed to distinguish between the ss and the Germ an W ehrm acht. Reibert was still visibly scandalized. I re minded him that recently General Eisenhower had declared in Frank furt that the German soldier had not lost his honor during the war. "Y es, but th is does not elim inate the previous statem ent." I remarked th at he had a good memory, and that it might be embarrassing if the A m ericans, the British, or other Europeans had an equally good mem ory as to what happened six or seven years before. T o this Reibert replied, "T h e victor can afford to have a shorter m em ory." R eibert talked about the fact that Toppe, for all his broad m ilitary experiences and com petence, lacked journalistic expertise. The exchange-of-persons program w ith the United States does not include form er officers. Reibert suggested that Toppe be sent to the United States on the exchange program as a journalist. When I replied politely th at th is was an interesting idea, he added immediately: "But remem ber, I cannot possibly spare him in M arch. It must be done before that. " R eibert jokingly inquired whether I could give him a check for $100 in support of his publishing ventures, which he regards as supporting U .S. policy. (He has published a sm all book on General Eisenhower.) He was distressed that in the U .S., "natu rally," there are only eight subscribers to the W eh rw issen sch aftlich e R undschau, whereas in Europe the situation is different. "Even little Finland has fourteen sub-
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scrib ers." He gave me a com plete file of the journal. "T h at's advertis in g ," he said.
Form er Nazis in the German Foreign Office April 1 9 ,19s 2 A few w eeks ago the F ran kfu rter R undschau began to publish "dis closu res" that former N azis were employed in the German Foreign Of fice. T he m aterial was collected by a newspaperman who got much of his inform ation from the Nuremberg trial records. D ie N eue Z eitung, the official Am erican German-language paper, published some mater ial on the sam e issue. The chief of the O ffice of Political Affairs at H ico c persuaded the director of the O ffice of Public Affairs at h ic o g to te ll Hans W allenberg ( 1907-77), editor in chief of D ie N eu e Zeitung, to publish a retraction in one of the following issues, h ic o g is said to have taken th is position because it was felt that an extended public discus sion of nazification in the German Foreign O ffice might embarrass Adenauer w hile he was having a hard enough tim e in the Bundestag on th e defense issue. W allenberg did not resign, apparently because he was told that his resignation (which he is in the habit of subm itting at every possible op portunity) would be accepted this tim e. I heard that Wallenberg has lo st m uch face w ith German newspapermen for having published the retraction. He was still sm arting and fuming when I saw him on June 15.
Political Cabaret Düsseldorf, April 26,1952 I w ent to a political cabaret in Düsseldorf [D as K om (m )ödchen), a bricked-in cellar w ith a tiny stage, a piano, and about 120 straight chairs. A group of five actors play before a sold-out house every night (there is a poster at the tick et office, "Sold Out, Thank Goodness"). Re cen tly they gave guest performances in London. The main theme of the sixteen numbers—songs and dialogues—is rearmament; the title, "S te e l and M ining: Slightly Up. Trend: L istless."
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M uch of it is good political satire on armament for peace. The direc tor of the arm am ent works is greeted by his subordinates w ith the H itler salute and the words, "Pax Vobiscum ." Another num ber ridicules the wedding cerem onies in high-society fam ilies: Germ an illustrated papers report them with great relish and success—T itle : "M onarchist Yearnings." Then there is a monologue of an old school teacher reading aloud and, as he goes along, correcting the exam ination papers submitted w ith applications for membership in the frontier police. He reads, "D eu t-" (turning the page) "-sch la n d ." (Repeating) " D eu tsch lan d . O h, he m eans D eu tsch-lan d. Idiotic way of dividing it." T h e audience cheered every joke about rearmament. Good tunes, one borrowed from the 'T h ree Penny Opera."
A Young Germ an Painter1 Düsseldorf, April 26-27, i9$2 T h e early part of Sunday was m ostly uneventful w ith a walk along the R hine and through the city. On the Rhine there was much boating and canoeing. There were flocks of sheep on the Rhine meadows, virtually in the middle of the city. A child said, "M um my, look at the little co w ." T he shepherd was resting against a tree w hile cars and bicyclists passed by. Later, I m et a painter, tw enty-nine years old w ith imposing beard, evidently half-mad. He lives on DM40 per m onth plus money he bor rows from friends. He eats approximately every third day. His paint ings and drawings are very poor—endless repetitions of nudes praying. He served at the Eastern front near Leningrad and was finally dis m issed from front-line service because he beat up an officer and sim ulated m ental illness. (This according to friends through whom I m et him .) These friends also told the story that he was called a coward by h is com rades; thus challenged, he volunteered to prove his nerve by lettin g a live hand grenade explode on top of his steel helm et. Alleged ly, if you don't move the tiring explodes upward. T his feat he per form ed at an inspection after having been promised special leave for it. 1 Published in German translation in Texte + Thesen + Sottisen. Jubiliumsband 100. Edition Interfrom (Zurich, 1977)-
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He survived, but was then not given his leave. I can't vouch for any of this. He said to me, "A h, you come from America. I alm ost got there my se lf." He claim s he smuggled him self into a g i assembly camp in 1946 to be shipped home, but was discovered in the last m inute and then suspected of being an agent. He repeated over and over that he was an artist and that postwar Germany in his judgment was no place for artists. H is story broke off suddenly. " I don't want to tell you how they treated m e." A fter that (according to my friends) he lived with another painter in a ten t in the woods, nailing his paintings to the trees. At that tim e he grew his beard. On Sundays the girls came in groups from the nearby villages to look at the beard and the paintings and to bring him food. He has read a lot, and wildly: Pinder, Ortega y Gasset, N ietzsche, Toynbee. He despises civilization, which he equates w ith modem technology and industry. The plight is not Germany's alone but that of the w hole W est. He w restles w ith God and confesses freely to this w restling. He is not humorless. He has an alm ost disconcerting directness and speed. "D o you have tim e to read books?" 'T e ll me how you spend a normal day." "W hat would you do if you were free not to worry about money?" "Have you ever considered making less money to lead a life that would suit you b etter?" "W hat would you really like to do?" He asked many political questions, but claim s to read newspapers only in the custom ary window displays. (But he does buy books and goes hungry a day or two longer to do so.) "W hat does one think of Adenauer in the U .S .?" "Is he regarded as honest?" (He seemed to doubt his "h on esty ," because of the impression the chancellor made on him in newsreels.) "D oes anyone who thinks and is serious believe that arm am ent can lead to anything but another w ar?" T he conversation never faltered for four hours; even at the table when the poor man showed how famished he was, he kept talking and seem ed to forget his hunger over some rather exquisite comments on the m ink coats to be observed on Düsseldorf's main street, followed by rem arks on reproductions of prim itive art which he had cut out from various books and brought along in a folder, producing some of them w hile the huge heap of potatoes on his plate grew cold. It was all strangely mad yet serious, and his sad eyes which belied his sm ile made it im possible to dism iss him as a freak; so did his flashes of intelligence.
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A t one point he asked insistently, "W hat is it that m akes people like and do art, from the cave paintings on?" I suggested that he read Schil ler's A esth etisc h e B riefe and K leist's P u ppen theater (which w as duly produced later and read aloud). He insisted on the exact title of Schil ler's great w ork, "sin ce one cannot ask for anything by Schiller w ith out know ing the exact title ." When I told him about Schiller's theory of the S p ieltrieb ("in stin ct to play"), he m entioned his adm iration for H uizinga, the author of H om o lu den s ("Playing M an"). In order to get a specim en o f h is handwriting I asked him for a good book on modem art. He w rote a title in m y little notebook covering two pages, because h is letters are huge. He took as little account of the form at of m y note book as he did of that of the world. A t night, I read som ething by G ottfried Benn. Benn is clever w ith w ords-—diluted N ietzsche: "W e m ust live in the dark," etc. And I looked at reproductions of paintings by Klee. In the m orning, before breakfast, I read André G ide's journal on his m arriage. Q u elle m a la ise! The kind of esoteric literature I don't care for. I noticed that, despite his alm ost exhibitionistic passion for con fession, G ide h im self rem ains strangely opaque. For example, one does not believe that he really wept, except for the purpose of noting the in cident in h is journal. A t the sam e tim e it is evident that this w riter who is addicted to "con fession s" knew m ore than he confessed. Later, on Sunday, I also read Germ an poems in an anthology, "19 0 0 -19 5 0 ,"w ith the poem s selected by Germ an w riters. M artin Heidegger nominated on ly three poem s, although each "ju d ge" had been asked to name ten: H ofm annsthal's W eltgeheim n is. R ilk e's D ie S pan ische T rilogie, and Benn's A m B rü cken w ehr. M ost-frequently favored w as Gottfried Benn, w ith Loerke and R ilke being second and third respectively.
A m ateur M achiavellianism and Erich M ende
April 30,1952 T he host at the supper party in Bonn had told me that one of the guests, Dr. Erich M ende,1 w as a young and upcoming man in the f d p , 1 Erich Mende, bom in 19 16 of Catholic parents, studied law and political science. He was wounded and decorated during the war. He joined the fdp in 194$, became vicechancellor in Erhard's cabinet, but left politics to join 10s—Investors Overseas Service— in 1967. He was ousted from the mutual-fund empire in 1970. Since 1972, he has been CDU deputy in the Bundestag.
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close to industry. He turned out to be well-dressed, smooth, and hand som e. He continuously flashed his teeth in a broad smile, making strenuous efforts to be amiable regardless of his frankly expressed po litica l views—w hich he knew rubbed M icky Boemer, a well-known Am erican radio com m entator and official in Germany, the wrong way. When Boem er attacked him w ith much force and, in my opinion, not always w ith convincing arguments or in the gentlemanly way the oc casion called for, Mende would sm ile, tenaciously hold to his position, or in case of an ill-m annered repartee by Boemer, compliment the lat ter on his German. U nfortunately, both Mende and Boemer enioyed holding the floor— the former because he is expansive, socially domineering, and derives a kind of sensuous pleasure from hearing his own speech, the latter be cause he cannot resist the tem ptation to attem pt manipulating Ger m ans he dislikes, particularly when an audience is present. Boemer— quite flushed at the end of the evening—told me that he thought Mende would relay his (Boemer's) remarks to the f d p in the Bundestag. For manipulatory reasons Boemer had assumed the position that it m ight w ell be in the interest of the U.S. government and of h ic o g to accept a postponement of the contractual agreements with West Germ any2—a rather foolish way of playing cat and mouse w ith Mende, whose party opposes Adenauer because the chancellor works for the speedy ratification of the forthcoming treaties. Thus Boemer was try ing to take the wind out of Mende's and his party's sails in the belief that they would change their course if they felt that Washington was n o t interested in getting the treaties signed quickly; and Mende had of course any number of official American public statem ents which be lied Boem er's effort to convey inner-circle U.S. thinking. I don't think Mende fell for it for a moment, but Boemer played his amateur-Machiavellian role w ith a vengeance. It embarrassed me. When he asked me later how he had done (! ), I told him that I thought it was a good try. As I said, it was in fact a poor one. T he significance of all this is not trivial. Even well-informed U.S. of ficials like Boem er cannot continue the political tactics of the early occupation period since U.S.-German relations have changed strate gically. Boem er has been intoxicated by his power in a relatively un im portant field of action. He deals primarily w ith publishers and newspapermen, a job that involves disposing of funds, but has been 2 Refers to the General Treaty and the edc treaty; see Preface, p. 109, above.
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propelled into somewhat higher and more important spheres of Ger man politics. Now he enjoys the game of political manipulation with out having the necessary tact, humor, skill, and sensitivity. For exam ple, he cannot turn a contradiction to his advantage; he acts too bluntly because his own ego requires him to be aggressive. He told me at the end, I think quite revealingly, "You see now why I want to get out of Germ any: I never know any more what my real position is, since I m ust so often assume a position merely to get somebody else where I want him to b e." Mende left unruffled, and Boemer wiped the sweat of fu tile effort from his brow. I think if Mende were more sensitive than he is, he would have been amused; as it was, he may have been a little annoyed at best. M ende made several interesting observations during the evening. (1) He would not be surprised if business interests were supporting right-w ing radical groups and parties, like the Socialist Reich Party (s r p ).
(2) Referring to personal experiences in recent political meetings, he said the real danger was that the present parties, either those support ing the Adenauer government or the Socialists, w ill all be attacked in the future as "licensed parties" (i.e., licensed by the occupation author ities when they were organizing "dem ocracy" in West Germany). New right-w ing opposition parties, like the s r p , w ill boast about n ot having been licensed. (3) Mende reproached Adenauer for having informed the Bundestag too late about the content of the agreements. He claimed that he, Mende, had seen the text in Paris, where it was obtainable in the A ssem b lé. Boem er said later that the real f d p opposition to the agree m ent is provoked by the decartellization clauses; this is true, but not the exclusive reason for opposition. The complaint of the Bundestag not having been informed in tim e and now being told that speedy ac tion is vital seem s to me understandable. Open U.S. statem ents that speed is of the essence because of U.S. Senate approval are as true as they are politically awkward. (4) Concerning the second Soviet note,3 Mende expects two more notes in w hich increasingly large concessions w ill be made in order to encourage German disapproval of U.S. policy: The Soviets are likely to announce the release of German p o w ' s ( 50,000-80,000 men); they may accept certain W estern conditions concerning free elections; they may 3 On the Soviet notes, see Preface, p. 1 10, above.
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ultim ately concede certain frontier rectifications compensating Po land in the East for what they give to Germany in the West. Mende com es from Silesia and claim s that such an arrangement might well be acceptable to the Poles. Boemer, insisting on his Polish family back ground and knowledge, em phatically disagreed. This led to a spirited debate about the presumed Soviet attitude toward West European in tegration, Mende taking the position that the Soviets fear the German soldier and the German generals' knowledge of the conditions of war fare in the Soviet Union. If both were put at the disposal of the Euro pean army, this would surely be felt as a serious threat. Boemer again disagreed, saying that the Soviet objective was dissociating France from W est European integration. He did not even concede that M ende's point could also be true.
C h a n g in g G erm a n B e h a v io r to w a r d A m e ric a n s A pril 3 0 ,1952 My experiences in Bonn have suggested to me that a change in Am erican-Germ an relations has taken place in the last few years. From 194s to i9$o , it was easy for Americans to see Germans, not only because of the m aterial advantages the latter saw in such contacts but also because they were anxious to talk. Now there are fewer advan tages to be gained from such contacts, and self-respect seems to de mand that one makes sure to talk only to im portan t Americans. At the sam e tim e, status consciousness reasserts itself. There are other indications of a change in self-esteem on the part of Germ an officials. They go out of their way to stress that they, too, said th is or that "la st September in New Y ork," or that they w ill be "in P aris" on this or that day, or "I said so to General Landon1 as w ell." They om it the title of American officials, talking about "Eisenhow er" or "M cC loy " instead of General Eisenhower or the high commission er. In general, the willingness to speak with Americans has been re placed by some reserve and studied attem pts to impress visitors with o ffic ia l contacts abroad or with past conversations w ith important Am ericans. There are also more and more opportunities for Germans 1 Commanding officer of u s a f e |U.S. Air Force in Europe) with headquarters in Wiesbeden.
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to give an Am erican visitor a lift in a G erm an car, to offer h im ciga rettes, even to invite him for a meal. In such cases, not always w ill the opportunity be missed to point out—half-jokingly or w ith an ungra cious rem ark—that things are certainly different now. All this, of course, is only one of the various s o c ia l m anifestations of the p o litic a l change in American-German relations, of the criticism of U.S. policy, of the fight for equality (G leich berech tig u n g ) and sovereignty, and of th e criticism of Am ericans as sold iers. According to a h ic o g survey of January 2 8,1951, only 27 percent of the W est Germans expect Ameri can soldiers to fight w ell in the event of Russian aggression; 34 percent wager they would fight poorly, and 1$ percent, “So-so." When Ger m an, Am erican, British, Russian, and French soldiers are compared, the Germ an public's choice for the “w orst" soldier falls between the A m erican and the French (20 percent and 2$ percent, respectively). T h e British and the Russian soldier is less frequently named as “w o rst," the Germans not at all. Even as “second-best" the American m akes a poor showing. From an Am erican colonel I heard the following, probably apoc ryphal, stcry. A few weeks ago, General and Mrs. Landon went to the Laterne, a Germ an restaurant in Wiesbaden, General Landon being in uniform . They seated them selves at a table in the restaurant which w as half-em pty. The head w aiter came to inform them that they could not be served, because all tables were reserved. They left the res taurant.
Im pressions of Public Life M ay 1 -3 ,1 9 5 2 Thursday, May 1: In the restaurant in Bonn, a young, erect German, perhaps a student, was slowly sipping Coca Cola as though it were w ine. T he sight reminded me of another moment—bitter, rather than slightly com ical like the young man. On a Sunday, near the river in the silen t h ills I suddenly noticed that the sun had lured not only me out of doors. In the distance a girl was moving on a path toward me. I heard faint m usic that grew louder as she approached. When she passed I saw a pocket radio dangling from her pretty neck. Instead of listening to the wind, she was listening in these gentle hills to jazz on the Armed Forces Radio program. I felt that the German countryside was being
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Am ericanized. But now, seeing the young man, I knew that this urban scene was the token of Am ericanization, whereas the girl in the hills had been seized by modem technology. I returned to Mainz-Wiesbaden by train along the Rhine. The Ger m an holiday was evident by many bicyclists on the road and the steam ers on the Rhine. Only schools and public buildings were flagged black-red-gold. I was told that people are tired of all flags. Only here and there one of the many castles had raised a flag. The apple trees were in bloom .
Saturday, May 3: In the evening I went to the railroad station in W iesbaden for a train schedule. In hont of the hotel a German bicyclist w ithout looking collided w ith the American car that had partially pulled out of the parking lot and had come to a complete stop. The b icy clist apologized. A middle-class woman who was passing by said indignantly to me, "These Americans w ith their cars!" At the station restaurant, quite a few lonely German girls found company quickly. When lonely, they read illustrated papers which ap pear in profusion and have a large circulation. They are poor im itations of L o o k , w ith fashions, flesh, sports, and political alibis, the political note being provided by stories in installm ents about Magda Goebbels, Third Reich scandals—the form in which political memoirs are public ly perpetrated to attract readers—or about Werl, Landsberg, W ittlich, the prisons in w hich German war crim inals are being kept. D er S tem is going to publish an alleged eyewitness account of the April 22 A-bomb test in Nevada. In the restaurant, the woman going from table to table to offer cigarettes on the first round and cake the next, stopped at a table near m e to talk to two elderly ladies about the German girls who seem to have forgotten their m other tongue. "They speak only English. You know why. I could beat them up, all of them ." Again on war crim inals: Paget's book on M anstein is being serialized in D ie W elt, Hamburg. On April 25, the headlines read "D estructive Measures in Self-D efense"—"T h e Example of Korea"—"W hat Did Manstein Do D ifferently?"—"A lm ost Identical O rders." The text itself had no reference whatever to Korea. Colonel General Heinz Guderian (1888-1954) reviewed the book w ith fervor in the D eu tsche Soldaten zeitu n g, the most important w eekly of the veterans' organizations.
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A Sunday D inner M ay 4 ,1 9 5 2 T he guests at the dinner party near Frankfurt included the Greek consul from Frankfurt and his wife, an alm ost completely silent, lan guid beauty; another Greek on the consul's staff, who spoke German flu ently and behaved according to his fanciful notion of how a diplo m at should conduct him self; a lady employed by h ic o g ; and her son and daughter-in-law, both having just arrived from Paris, completing their one-m onth trip to see all of W estern Europe in order to get back quickly to C onnecticut. The consul took the daughter's-in-law address to send her G reek cigarettes which she liked so much. Referring to her hasty travel I told her that Goethe in the diary of his journey to Italy deplored the fact that by riding in a m ail coach instead of hiking he was exposed to many impressions too quickly. T h e hostess, who works for a radio station, handled the dinner party lik e a round table at w hich nothing could be pursued to the end and yet everything had to be covered before the next station break. The meal was excellent and so were the wines. The same cannot be said about the records of G reek folk m usic which the hostess had brought from her last trip to Athens and which her son, a student at the University of Frankfurt, was im periously ordered to tone down or up from tim e to tim e w hile the guests were having coffee on the patio. Her genial hus band was perm itted to show his m agnificent flower garden, and large bouquets were presented to the ladies. T he hostess—who is also quite active in party politics, and races from tow n to town to make speeches at c d u meetings—is strongly an ti-Socialist. She explained to the Greeks that the s p d is friendly toward form er N azis. She accused them of being irresponsible in their foreign policy, all their moves being inspired exclusively by their wish to overthrow the Adenauer government and attain power. "If they get to power, there w ill be compulsory m ilitary service, of course. Look at Schum acher's face: you can still see the Prussian officer." T h is Germ an lady has always been anti-Prussian. Like many mem bers of the middle class in W estern Germany, she thinks Asia begins cu ltu rally at the River Elbe. I remember her having made sim ilar re m arks to me in 1945 w hile talking about the German refugees from the East. She threw up her hands in despair at the inept c d u propaganda on the Germ an defense contribution; it takes too much trouble to repro
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duce the s p d arguments before trying to refute them. The c d u pam phlets she gave me bore her out. She is also patronizingly antidem ocratic. Her trust in the common people is frail, because they are "n ot reasonable" and do not share her tastes. At the same tim e she is genuinely grateful for living in the West, and says w ith conviction that one should do much more to inform the people in W est Germany about the conditions of life in the Soviet zone. Fundam entally, she is afraid of unification. Even the Saar issue is no concern of hers: "W e can live without the Saar." It is peace she wants above all. T he political meetings of the s p d remind her of Nazi m eet ings, and she is horrified. Like many other Germans who got into politics early after the end of the war, the lady is overworked and, for this reason, does less than she could if she had the strength to avoid doing too many different things, visiting too many countries, seeing too many people. She feels quite insecure when she detects a sm ile at her frantic pursuits. Remember ing suddenly the painter in Düsseldorf, I asked her rather rudely, "D o you ever have tim e to read a book?" She said, w ith a candor which was m ore disconcerting than disarming, "I would die if I did not read poetry now and th en ." Her husband, a physician, saw me to the station—the Greeks had left earlier—glad, finally, to have the chance to tell me about the grave m istakes the legal division of h ic o g had made in its policy regarding the Germ an M edical Association. The Nazis are back in power and the professional code of ethics is not enforceable. This is because the old m edical society has no legal status: h ic o g has promoted and recog nized only a socialist organization of doctors. All who are threatened w ith reprimand by the free but unrecognized remnant of the former m edical society join this new organization. T he doctor is a fine old gentleman who, in M elville's words, with th at "even am enity of true m ajesty can be kind to anyone without stooping to it" ; but his m ajesty is impaired by war and wife.
A Fam ily of Form er Nazis May 5,1952 I spent the evening in Biebrich near Wiesbaden w ith the Biel family, consisting of Herr and Frau Biel, Frau Biel's brother (Herr Fischer), and
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Peter, Herr B iel's twenty-one-year-old son from his first marriage. I had m et Frau Biel—then a widow—in 19SO. She had lost her husband and one of her children in the war. She was eking out a living for herself and her second five-year-old son by running a lending library. In 19 51, 1met her present husband, about forty-eight years of age, then a widower. He is a m inor executive in a chem ical enterprise. Frau Biel continues her business. Peter is a student of com m ercial art. Frau Biel's thirty-twoyear-old brother, whom I had not m et before, is a war invalid, who lim ps and w alks w ith a cane; he is a salaried employee. The whole fam ily is Lutheran and churchgoing. All were members of the Nazi party. Herr Biel told me that he ioined the party, after some uncertainty, upon the advice of his pastor. He claim s that he was attracted by the socialist aspects of the Nazi program. At present, his views of domestic Germ an politics are strongly antisocialist and antilabor. During the war he was taken prisoner by the Russians. W hile he did not talk much about these experiences, he mentioned at one point that "there are good and bad people among the Russians as well as in all other nations. There were Russian nurses who took care of me as well as any German nurse. Then there were others, of course___ " Frau Biel speaks French, English, and a Scandinavian language. Dur ing the war she was an interpreter w ith the German army. She comes from an upper-class fam ily w ith bourgeois preiudices, likes the British (having spent som e tim e in England)—perhaps not genuinely in any sense, but out of snobbery. Frau Biel is pleasant as long as her selfconsciousness does not interfere, which it often does,- then her eyelids flu tter and one is impelled to look away. She is not bright, and her lit erary taste lacks discrim ination: she likes everything—W iechert, Ernst Jünger, and R ilke's C ornett. She is completely incapable of managing her little son and is ashamed of it in a helpless, silly way. Her husband has no intellectual am bitions, and in this respect appears to feel inferior to his younger wife. He is handsome, a ladies' man, a flat terer, but has a coarse streak in his manner. I learned nothing about Herr Fischer's background. Peter gives the im pression of being retarded, but is probably merely suppressed by his father. He keeps silent for long periods and although he usually speaks only when spoken to, he w ill unexpectedly say something that startles the company, beginning in a loud voice which, as the sentence pro gresses, fades back into silence. These remarks are alm ost always strongly pro-American, and it is possible that he makes them to assert him self against his father. Herr Biel then says, "Peter knows all about
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the U .S.A .; he hangs around the Amerika H ouse." Or, 'T h ere you are. Peter is of a different opinion." Herr and Frau Biel live in a sm all, two-and-a-half-room apartment (w ithout Peter and Herr Fischer) overlooking the Rhine. We had a sim ple supper, and afterwards went by car (which belongs to the firm Herr B. works for) through the woods to the top of a hill to have coffee and wine in a little inn; the living room was turned over to us for the evening. Herr Fischer pointed out that the German interest in "Europe" was far greater in 1946 than it is now. I said that in 1946 certain Germans were "fo r Europe" because being for Europe meant advocating an im provement of the conditions of life in Germany. Now these conditions had improved. Besides, all the early and many of the present European leagues, associations, and so on, were middle-class affairs, without real popular backing. Herr Fischer denied at first that the European idea in Germany was a m iddle-class idea, and was somewhat shocked by my "cynicism ." I in sisted that even Em st Jünger1 was "for Europe" during the war while he was having a good tim e in France. Perhaps when he realized that the Germ ans could not win, he wrote D er F riede before the H itler regime collapsed. Herr Fischer said he felt that the enthusiasm for Europe had faded in Germ any for reasons other than those I had given. I asked him to be specific. Herr Fischer replied, "I am afraid I must now be im polite." I invited him to go ahead. He mentioned the Allied policy of disman tling industrial plants, the treatm ent of war crim inals, and the French efforts to "an n ex" the Saar region. These three policies, above all, have doused German enthusiasm for Europe. "N ot the trials of war crim inals as such, but the fact that they have dragged on for seven years after the w ar." Germ ans now feel that the other powers merely pursue their selfinterests, w hile the idea of Europe is being compromised. "W e Ger m ans are better Europeans, Mr. Speier, than the French. We have learned som ething. They have learned nothing. We are ready to make sacrifices; they are n o t." Herr Biel added, "And then there has been general disappointment in Germany. We were promised liberation and we g o t. . . well you know 1 German author, bom in 1885, contributed after World War I to the idealization of violence and war, wrote The Peace at the end of World War II.
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w h at w e g o t/' I asked who promised liberation. They all answered together, "T h e Am erican radio, the leaflets----- " "I thought the G er m ans were afraid of the Morgenthau plan ." "Everybody wanted to get rid of the w hole sw indle (i.e., the N azi regime), and everybody ex pected that when the A llies would com e things would be different." I w as about to reply that they were behaving like sulking children re fusing to play w ith their new toys under the Christm as tree and scold ing Santa C laus for having failed to bring them more presents. Instead I m erely asked w hether things were not different now from what they had been during the war. I insisted that the A llies had come as con querors in 194$ and in fact freed the Germ an people from N azi rule, but liberation had never been promised. A ll of them (except Peter) were most reluctant to view German par ticipation in European defense as a desirable step for Germany to take. Herr Biel, supported by Herr Fischer, said, "You must realize that no body in Germany is anxious to put on a uniform. We have had enough of it ." Besides, the German defense contribution may provoke the Rus sians. "W ho tells us that it w ill safeguard peace? Only the Americans. It is not their country that w ill be overrun." Peter interjected, "Maybe the Am ericans had better deal with the French. You don't need the Germ ans, do you, Mr. Speier?" Frau Biel said, "Before we do anything, we should know what is going to be done with the army. These are our sons and brothers. We don't want them to be sent to Indochina to fight for the French." (Allegedly, there are more than 80,000 Germans in the French Foreign Legion, many of them impressed in much the same way soldiers were enlisted in eighteenth-century armies. Herr Fischer: " I would like to know from Mr. Speier what he really thinks about German neutrality. Here, have some more wine and tell us what cannot be found in American propaganda." It turned out that these people, who support Adenauer, and vote the c d u ticket, were by no m eans convinced that neutralism was a bad policy. Instead, they had the feeling that Germany was being forced into siding with the W est at the risk of war. When I said that I would give Germany less than tw o years after unification and the withdrawal of troops to be com e a Soviet satellite, they simply smiled and said, "T h is just goes to show that you don't know Germany. We are not Com m unists." I re plied, "B u t the Russians are." I added that a German anny would be a sym bol of German sovereignty and national self-esteem . Herr Fischer, supported by everybody, countered with, "N ational self-esteem ! This is a notion w hich really belongs to the past."
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O nly when I pointed out that the Russians might seize upon any pre text to reoccu p y Germany when they wanted to, did I begin to cut any ice. But Herr Fischer said, "And where w ill be the Americans at that tim e? I presume in France, which would be good for the French in cid en tally ." (I presume he meant as a punishment.) Peter: "W hy should they be in France? They like th eir country." D espite its evident confusion, the conversation struck me as reflect ing true Germ an sentim ents, but I don't know how widespread they are. In addition to the instances of anti-Am ericanism I have noted, there were others. But the whole fam ily admitted that Ernst von Salom on's ( 1902-72] sharp attacks against the Americans in his widely read book, D er Fragebogen , were unfair and that his descriptions of the treatm ent of Germ an inm ates in American camps were exaggerated. I am sure they were sincere, if only because Salomon is so strongly anti bourgeois. Frau Biel said that she could not finish "th at vile book."
Evening at a Publisher's House, and the N ext M orning M ay 8 ,1 9 5 2 W hen I arrived at Dr. W itsch's1 house in Cologne, somebody was frantically practicing Grieg on the piano. Frau W itsch opened the door and said her husband had not yet returned to Cologne. W hile setting the table, she explained that the pianist was her sixteen-year-old daughter, "w ho hates G rieg." I asked what she liked. "O h, Mozart and Bach. She has been playing the piano only for two and a half years, but she practices three to four hours a day. W ith the war and all that, I often wondered w hether the children would not m iss what we learned when we were young and fail to apply them selves som etim e. But there you are. We could not do anything about it, the way we lived, and yet she practices regularly." Frau W itsch mentioned that the fam ily had lived in the Soviet zone from 1945 to 1948. She told an adventurous story of escape, pausing for a m om ent as she set the table. When she was at the railroad station anxiously w aiting for the truck w ith the furniture, a man ran up to her and told her breathlessly that the truck had caught fire and burned. "I 1 Joseph C. Witsch, one of postwar Germany's leading publishers (1906-67)-
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could not help m yself. I sat down in front of the railroad station and laughed. A fter all our trouble and worry—everything burned. But it turned out to be a different tru ck." "A t first, I found fault w ith many things in the W est. I didn't under stand the people here. I still don't. They complain too much. When I w ent shopping and heard somebody gripe—how much better life could be and how the Com m unists, if this were the Soviet zone, would have rebu ilt more—I always spoke up and got into furious arguments. The people here don't know what it means to live in the East. They w ill never leam . They are com placent; they are smug. They are not hungry." W hen I asked Frau W itsch how she liked Cologne, she said she was bom there. " It used to be a fine city. When we came back, I took my children through the streets. I thought they might still sense a bit of th e old atm osphere. The little one probably noticed that this walk m eant m uch to me. She said, "M um my, I have never seen more beauti ful ru bble." Frau W itsch spoke more about her children. "It is curious to think th at they don't know the Nazi regime. They hear about it, of course. T h en they ask us and we tell them . The other day, Barbara came home from school and said fiercely, 'M y geography teacher is a N azi.' It turned out that the teacher, having noticed how a girl had been coached by another girl, had admonished both of them and said, 'A G erm an girl does not do such a thing.' T h ere ,' said Barbara, 'she said: G erm an girl. If it is wrong, no girl an y w h ere should do it. The teacher m ust be a N azi.' When I told the story to my husband he said, 'She know s w hat N azism was about.' " Dr. W itsch is a publisher (Kiepenheuer and W itsch). He studied soci ology w ith Leopold von W iese3 and wrote a little book (as I remem bered suddenly) about the salaried employees in the early 1930s. As a student he was active in the socialist students' union. He has never ceased to resent the passivity of the Social-Dem ocratic and tradeunion leaders when the Nazis came to power. As he said later that sam e evening, "T h e organization was intact, and the rank and file were ready to strike, but the leaders failed us. I am still convinced we could have licked the N azis as late as January 1933. In 1945, W itsch was active in helping to reconstitute the Social D em ocratic party in the Soviet zone, but he left the party when it re1 Leopold von Wiese (1876-1970), sociologist at the University of Cologne.
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linquished its independence, forming with the Communists the Social U nity Party (s e d ). W itsch is strongly anti-Com m unist, and his pub* lishing house has issued a series of books about conditions in the Soviet zone. Like his wife, he is full of life and fire. His language is forceful w ith a sm attering of Rabelaisean words when the occasion calls for it, as though he feels there can be no vigor and joy in life without a bit of pro fanity. He is strong and forthright and could as easily be taken for a sailor as a publisher. Over his desk he has a painting by Karl Hofer, a tragic attem pt to defy tim e and recapture the past: he tries to repaint what was destroyed in the bombing raids. I told my hosts that I had visited Hofer in 194$, when he was bitter and very hungry and had no place to paint. They listened quietly. Then Frau W itsch said, "I like this picture. I hope you d o." Later she remarked, 'T h ere is so little that is worthwhile among the new books. The first book after the war was Herman Kassack's D ie S tad t h in ter d em Strom . Many people were quite taken w ith it. I thought it was nebulous and its depth merely pretentious. Then, there was som e ado about Langaesser. I cannot read her books. I cannot help it. She bores m e and I feel uncomfortable about her religiousness." I told her that I agreed w ith her on both Kassack and Langaesser. She said I should read Max Bense's critical book about Ernst Jünger. Max Bense, bom 1910, is a professor of philosophy at the Technische Hoch schule in Stuttgart. He apparently has quite a following among the students, but horrifies his colleagues because he writes and teaches not only logic and the history of m athem atics but also lectures about Kaf ka and G ottfried Benn. W itsch and he were students together, and W itsch has published a few of his books, including the one on Kafka and an anti-C atholic fable about the Garden of Eden. According to W itsch's description, Bense combines Voltaire's w it w ith Descartes's incisiveness—in all likelihood an exaggeration. W itsch said there are many signs of a darkening of the political scene. He mentioned a trial in M unich, in which anti-Sem itism had raised its head in public (most of the respectable newspapers were quite indignant); the attem pts to get Veit Harlan, the Nazi movie star, back into circulation (which led to student demonstrations and some public riots, pro and con); the reappearance of Nazi ideas in book re view s; the reappearance of Nazis in public office.
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O tto W esemann,3 who had been the other dinner guest, drove me to my hotel. Passing through the mined districts of Cologne, I remarked how very badly Cologne had been hit. He said, "Yes, it is not generally known that Cologne had the largest Altstadt of all German cities. Forty Romanesque churches, alm ost all gone, each one more beautiful than the Dom, that monstrous piece of pastry." He said also that even those Germ ans who hoped for H itler's defeat and for Allied victory during the war could not understand the incessant attacks on the cities. "T h ey asked, 'Why all this? Why? Why?' " When I said goodnight to Wesemann the dust from the ruins and the rabble blew into our faces. He said, "By the way, right around the com er, where you would not expect it, is the Church St. Pantaleon. It is not too badly damaged. D on't m iss seeing it if you have tim e tom orrow ." W itsch had told me that he would drive from Cologne to Mehlem next morning, and offered to take me along. At the tim e I was expect ing him , he telephoned to say that he was delayed for two hours. Would I wait? I w ent for a walk, looked at the church behind the hotel, and also w ent to see the ruins of St. Maria im Capitol, once Cologne's most beautiful church. In front of it, half-enclosed by walls and a tree, there is a sm all elevated square from which steps lead up to the church. There, a few yards from the traffic and yet secluded, a sculpture by Gerhard M arcks has been placed by the city. It is a simple, austere figure, an angel of an age in which angels have no wings. One arm is half-raised as though the figure is about to cover its face. It is called "T h e Mourning A ngel." Behind the sculpture some children were playing on the steps w ith loose rocks they had picked up in the churchyard. I w ent on to a bookstore and bought a German translation of Eras m us' C o llo q u ia F am iliaria and was glad to have found it, because I had been reading Huizinga's Erasm us at night. It was hidden in a large pile of unsorted, second-hand books. I opened it at random and noticed on page $01 the passage, " . . . a secret inclination which compels us with out any evident cause to shrink from certain things while attracting us to others w ith astonishing force." 3 Otto Wesemann (1903-76) was at that time chief of the West German Radio in Cologne.
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W eekend at the Mosel May 9 - i i, 1952 C olog n e: On Friday, May 9, around noon I called a taxi to take me to the station where I checked my bag. Then I wandered aim lessly through the city, which was quite depressing despite the repair work and noise in the streets. In front of a ruined church a group of children were sitting on the rubble. They were singing, but instead of watching their teacher who was keeping tim e, they were looking at the grown ups that passed by. It threatened to rain, yet the Germans did not take off their dark glasses, which seem to be very fashionable—a spurious token of doing som ething for oneself that is not necessary, and perhaps for this very reason cherished. Somewhere near the cathedral three men crossed my way. One of them was saying, "R ight there where the houses begin." I turned, and "right there" was about ten blocks of rubble away. D espite the signs of devastation, the city is impressively clean. No where do you see a piece of paper in the street; nothing seems to be thrown away. There are quite a few elegant shops, although nothing like the Kö (i.e., the Königsallee) in Düsseldorf. As everywhere in Germ any, there are good bookshops, many of them displaying only C atholic literature; also many newsstands, one window usually being reserved for the illustrated papers and the innumerable sex magazines that appeal to adolescents. The latter kind of literature probably wins the com petition w ith the crucifixes being sold in many stores. People are rather w ell dressed, and there is something obscene in their walking through streets lined on both sides w ith mbble. It is as tonishing how much better people look than in Wiesbaden. The Hes sians are an ugly tribe; in Cologne the girls reminded me oddly of the gracefulness of young Italians. D espite the clouded sky I sat down in an outdoor restaurant, but no less than four German waiters were so busy serving a party of three elegant Frenchm en that I decided after a few minutes to have dinner som ewhere else—inside. I ordered a cup of coffee (which is not served w ith German dinners) and asked to have it brought with the dessert. T he w aiter brought it instantly, before the soup. I protested, but the w aiter began to argue that I had not told him to bring the coffee later; he said that he could not possibly return it without paying for it him self. I finally gave in and drank the coffee like a cocktail, not w ith out asking the waiter, however, whether he had ever got an order for
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coffee b e fo r e a three-course meal. He said defiantly, "M any people have it that w ay." As I drank the coffee I thought, "Having the last word in an argument was always important to Germans, even before H itler, but th is is like European politics: getting a common defense before there is a com m unity." A t th e M oselle R iver: b i the afternoon the rain stopped. I left by train for Coblenz and went from there to Bullay on the M oselle. I have read som ewhere that the syllable la y or ley means (slate*) rock. Hence th e fam ous Loreley; Bullay has nothing to do w ith a bull lying around but m eans "rock for lovers," B u hle being an old German word for lover. In Bullay, I changed trains again to continue on the old narrowtracked M oselle railroad which is privately owned. It follows every bend of the river, passes under the orchard trees, and seems to brush against the w alls of the village churches. Every few m inutes it stops so th at you could easily accompany it on a bicycle. On the two-hour ride, village after village appears perched against the foot of the mountain ous vineyards that com e right down to the river. All houses have slate roofs, and many of them are built com pletely of slate. The villages are very old, w ith names here and there recalling either Roman civiliza tion , or lik e Cues—the birthplace of N icolaus Cusanus—more mod em , m edieval tim es. The gardens look like boxes where the gods keep th eir jew els—every square yard is utilized, m ile after m ile no single plant out of line. Everything is done w ith a stem sense of order; even w here laundry is laid on a meadow to dry it makes a faultless geometri cal pattem . I did not see a window that was not clean or a forgotten to o l. T h e people look up from their work in the gardens when the train passes and greet it like a person who walks by their gate. The sun had com e ou t and every village had its image reflected in the river. After th e destruction of Cologne, all this was deeply moving, a quiet and g en tle reassertion of life. But there is really nothing assertive about the v alley . It is rather the product of hard work applied to the rocks and the so il, w here man has grown wine for thousands of years and built his h o u ses w ith an unconscious sense of being at home both in the vine yard and under his roof. H ie villages seem to grow here, the m ountains are tra ces of culture, the ferry boats cross the river which m ight as w ell b e a liquid, man-made path. I stayed at a little inn at M ülheim which has about ten guest rooms, good w ines in the cellar, and sheep and geese on the meadow in front of th e p orch. I had com e w ith two German friends who had heard of this
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place. We were hungry and ordered M oselle-eel blue w ith spring pota toes and butter. N ext day, we went for a walk to Veldenz, a village about four m iles away, a Protestant enclave in this otherwise very Catholic part of the country (in w hich the bishop of Trier is God). The waitress advised us to go to nearby Bem kastel, because of a big celebration there. “High Com m issioner M cCloy, the American, is going to come, and there w ill be m any people and many flags. A new school built by the 'A m is' — think of it: in the French zone!—w ill be opened and High Commis sioner M cCloy w ill give a speech." We told her we might go to Veldenz ju st the sam e and she said, "W ell, that's also a very fine hike, but rather far if you want to be back for dinner. And you can't get anything to eat at Veldenz. There is no inn. You can't get anything at the castle eith e r." Veldenz in an old village in a side valley; we climbed up the h ill in whose shadow its m ain buildings lie. The village has a white tower of austere beauty that once was part of an eleventh-century church. Farther up, about a half-hour's walk and overlooking three converging valleys, are the ruins of the castle. We followed a serpentine road, w hich was lined w ith houses half-way up. T he gate was locked, but we discovered a weathered sign which said that one should ring the bell and pay a five-cent fee of admission. After a w hile a woman came w ith a large key to open the gate. She smiled and told us, as she took our money, to go ahead and look. "I shall join you presently." T he castle was built in the tenth and eleventh centuries. It is ruined by tim e, and such destruction somehow appears more decent than that wrought by bombs, perhaps because tim e is not human. The ramparts of the tower afford an imposing view wherever you look. Clearly, the castle dom inates all approaches and it must have been difficult to storm it. We ate oranges, bought in the village below—which looked like a toy of a giant's child—and sat down on a square where the grass was high. We were later told that it used to be the torture chamber right below the quarters of the ladies. And what was left of the chapel looked again like a torture chamber. Grass was growing there as well. W hen the woman cam e after a while, she leaned against the wall and told us in a half-serious, half-mocking way that there had never been any robber barons here "as in Bem kastel." She looked serene as she spoke, tanned and calm ; obviously she enjoyed having someone to talk to.
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W ith her was a little girl to whom we gave an orange. She took it silen tly and curtsied. The woman explained that the child was not hers but belonged to somebody living in the village who worked in the vineyards. "H er father was no good. " He had joined the French Foreign Legion. " I like g irls," she said; " I had one myself but she died of menin gitis. Boys leave you too soon, but girls are loyal, like dogs, and gentle. I am glad to take care of this little one. Barbara is her nam e." T he woman unlocked the door to a large room containing many old pikes and battle axes. "M y husband, who works in the vineyards, fixed the roof. He also put up the poles for the electricity two years ago. Now we have electric light, which is good. U ntil then we had only candles at night, w hich are cheaper than kerosene. My husband is the Burg w a rt ('guardian of the castle']." We asked who owned the castle. She said, "A lady down at Mülheim. She has two room s"—and she pointed w ith her head—"up there fixed n icely for the summer, when she comes up sometimes, but you cannot go in there, it is locked." "T h e lady," she replied to our question, "ow ns m any vineyards around here. She bought a Mercedes last year. She com es up to give a party about once a year. Then we roast meat over the open fire. She invites many people to those celebrations. I like th em ," she smiled, "because of the tip s." We had many more spears, but the 'A m is' came and took them away for souvenirs, although we have this sign here, T)o Not Touch.' " We asked where the w ell was. She said, "T h at's the trouble. There is no w ell. I carry the water up in buckets, two at a tim e, on a yoke placed on my shoulders. It takes tim e and is hard work. A little too hard for me. T he men—that is, my husband and my son, who is nineteen—work in the vineyards, as I said, and they don't like to do it. My mother lived here, down at the house which you passed coming up. For thirty years she stayed here w ithout water. She said we should live here when she died. So, we moved in. It's nice, quiet like, but there is no water. And one has to do one's laundry, one must wash and cook." I asked whether she could not have a pump installed by the lady. "I talked to her about th a t," she replied, "bu t it costs dm 1200 to do it ($400). Now, I know that is a lot of money, but she bought this new M ercedes, w hich is also expensive, and if she wants us to stay here, she should put the pump in. We take care of the gardens, and my husband repaired the roof and put in the poles for the electric line. Last year I had pains in my chest, and the doctor said I ought to stop carrying that w ater up the h ill three tim es a day. But then, I do need the w ater." My
i
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friend asked why she did not get a m ule. She replied, "A m ule needs feed and care. You can 't just get a m ule. You have to feed it." Later the woman showed us her house, which was imm aculately clean, as though she had all the water of the M oselle River to wash the floors and w alls. It had a kitchen and two rooms. "T h e lady," she said, "w ants to have one of the rooms for her guests in case it rains when they com e and can 't sit outside. She wants all of us to move into the large bedroom ." "B u t the guests com e only once or tw ice a year." "Y es, but we are to move into the big bedroom, all three of us. Now I say, that is not proper. My son is nineteen, and we are not old as yet. It would not be proper." She got a piece of newspaper. "C om e outside, let me show you. Stand here by the g rill." There was a strong grill covering a square hole about a yard in width. T he woman put a m atch to the paper and dropped it when it had caught fire. It slow ly descended until it came to a glimmer ing rest very deep down, it seemed in the very bowels of the mountain. "T h is is ," she explained, "th e entrance to the secret passageway that leads to the village." (I thought such things existed only in eighteenthcentury G othic tales, the equivalent of the modem dime novel.) We were thrilled like children, and she laughed happily about being able to show us the passage. "M any years ago, a young mason went down on a rope-ladder and he said, T h ere are stone benches and tables in the passage.' " T he wom an's husband was wounded in the war. "Som etim es, he is very difficult. But he has a splinter in his head and one must put up w ith his temper. The doctor at the hospital in Traben-Trarbach told him that he should have an operation. But, you know how men are: he is scared. I told him to have it done, but he does not want to, not be cause it's so close to the brain, but because he is scared of the an esth esia." We were silent, and like all people who are much alone and don't get restless when they are, she simply looked at us some more. I said, final ly, that her flow er bed was pretty and she replied that she liked it too. "G iv es you som ething to do." W hen we left she told us that we could walk downhill through the vineyard, "B u t it is quite steep." Later, the three of us came to a turn in the road where we sat down in the grass and looked at the rolling meadows below. It was warm in the afternoon sun and very quiet. My friend's wife sat between me and her
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husband. For a w hile, none of us said anything. Then the woman said, "H ow peaceful it is !" And after a pause, "You know, I was raped by a R u ssian." She had never mentioned it to me before.
Erich D ethleffsen: German Political Attitudes; Soviet Strategy in World War III Frankfurt am M ain, May 1$, 1952 Bom in 1904, Erich D ethleffsen became a soldier in 1923. He served on the G eneral Staff beginning in 1937 and was a captain at the begin ning of World War II. He was wounded and given the Knight's Cross, rose to the rank of Generalmajor, and ended up in H itler's headquarters on the army General Staff. From May 194$ to March 1948 he was in an A m erican p o w camp. Now D ethleffsen is executive secretary of W irtschaftspolitische G es e lls c h a ft von 1947 (w ip o g , the "Society of 1947 for Economic P olicy"), w hich takes a strongly pro-Westem position without follow ing Adenauer's policy blindly. By way of large public meetings, lec tures, and publications the organization is engaged in adult political education. D ethleffsen has made many political speeches in favor of e d c . On the issue of the war crim inals, his views are moderate despite the fact that his father-in-law, General Falkenhorst, formerly m ilitary com m ander in Norway, is still being held as a war crim inal by the Brit ish in W erl prison. In recent m onths, Dethleffsen has traveled much presenting his ideas on rearmam ent to German audiences.1When I m et him in Frank furt, he brought along the copy of a manuscript, dated March 12,1952, sum m arizing the impressions he had gathered in his public discus sions. T he selections set forth below represent the opinions he ex pressed to m e: W hile resentm ents have decreased, they still exist, especially among students and members of the middle classes. As was true after the First World War, the middle classes have been deprived of th eir possessions by inflation, are involved in a struggle for their 1 A German version of his article, "The Chimera of German Neutrality," Foreign A ffairs (April 1952), was published as Das Wagnis der Freiheit.
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existence, and are politically unstable. Easily victim ized by slog ans and ideologies, especially of a nationalistic brand, they are the group least capable of coining to terms w ith reality. Resentm ents m anifest themselves in various ways. Some people say, superciliously, "A s early as 194$ we knew that we were needed against the Soviet Union, but the Western powers were too stupid to understand th at." Others point to the contra diction between "reeducation," which devalued the m ilitary pro fession, and the new demand for rearmament. The defamation of the Germ an soldiers is continuously mentioned. Anger about this defam ation is directed at Germans more than at the occupation powers, to w hich one concedes the rights of the victor. Not entire ly w ithout justice, it is pointed out that those who were the loud est agitators against the soldiers in the first years after the capit ulation are today the keenest advocates of rearmament. T he o h n e m ich attitude2 bom of disinterest has been largely re placed by an o h n e m ich attitude resulting from considerations that " it is not worth it." O ne does not believe that the Western powers seriously intend to recognize Germany as an equal partner. The inability of the Germ ans to distinguish the essential from the nonessential leads them to magnify all psychological m istakes the Western powers have made. People are convinced that the French want neither the p olitical integration of Europe nor a European army; indeed, there is fear that we Germans would again acquire notoriety as m ilita rists if we were to pursue integration more forcefully than the French. There are widespread vague notions of American monopoly capitalism w hich is held to be interested only in finding markets in Europe and in exploiting German labor. "W e are good enough for becom ing American labor slaves." T he Adenauer government, held to be dependent upon Wash ington or Rome, is criticized for servility or haste, and "restora tio n " is feared. One does not believe in social recuperation, because one misses the required w ill for it among the entrepreneurs, and one distrusts the political parties because they have failed to establish contact w ith the people.1 1 See Preface of Part Two, p. 79, above.
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In our conversation D ethleffsen said that people in Germany talked about the defense contribution as though they were free to make up th eir minds. “Let me put it cynically. We are being subjected to extor tion, but at the same tim e it is in the German interest to be black m ailed. e d c w ill be our tick et of admission to the European clu b." I objected to the word “extortion.“ “W ell, you understand. The de fense contribution is our 'tick et of adm ission' to 'equal status,' but people do not see it." In accordance w ith the ideas of w ip o c , Dethleffsen believed not only that the Germ an defense contribution was politically and m ilitarily im portant for Germany, but also that it could lead to a solution of her social problem s as the economy expanded. His econom ic notions were som ew hat hazy. Arming the European defense forces m ust not be perm itted to lead to a lower living standard in Germany. “We don't w ant to produce arms. It would be much better if we stayed out of the arm s race and exported goods. Let's not have any German tank produc tio n ." He saw dangers for Germany in the possibility that European authorities may use their power to undermine German com petition in favor of “French" interests. "If a German firm producing sewing m achines were told to produce m achine guns so that the French firm w hich wanted to sell its sewing m achines could expand—that would be bad indeed. That m ust not happen." I asked D ethleffsen, as I had asked others, whether industry had "a p o licy ," i.e., whether there were signs of any long-range thinking in foreign affairs. "N one w hatever," he replied. “They do not even have w hat m ight be called an econom ic policy." He said that concern over East-W est trade was fed by German resentm ent of the fact that Great Britain was less restricted in her trading w ith the East than Ger m any was. I asked w hether he considered it possible that the s p d would order a m inority of its deputies to vote for the defense treaty, if the coalition parties (f d p and d p ) should vote against it. He was surprised: "Exactly w hat I have said m yself." He showed genuine scorn for phrases used by the opposition w ithin the Adenauer coalition in describing the Ger m an treaty, for example, “another V ersailles," and “a Treaty of Subjec tio n ." He said that M ûhlenfeldt, the leader of the d p (“German Party"), was "stu p id " and that the f d p wanted a R ückversicherun g—in other words, to insure itself against loss of votes by opposing e d c rhetorically. Am plifying a statem ent in his memorandum, Dethleffsen explained
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that the people's relation to government in Western Germany is decisively influenced by the feeling that there is no State. "In the popular view there are only managers of parties." Even if a law were passed w ith the votes of the opposition parties, the people would still feel that it was 'Bonn' that had acted, not 'the State' or 'their represen tativ es.' It would be entirely possible for a measure to be adopted unanim ously in Bonn, and next day you'd have popular demonstra tions against it." I asked why this was so. Dethleffsen replied that there was some continuity when the monarchy fell in 1918. The courts, the Landrat, even the Reichsw ehr were institutions that preserved the continuity of "th e S ta te." Again, when H itler came to power, the State did not seem threatened, but after the breakdown in 194$, things were dif ferent: the State seemed to have disappeared. I said that this feeling was perhaps not surprising, inasmuch as the governm ent disintegrated and a m ilitary government of foreigners took over. "Y es, but the present government is German. Never mind that it is not yet fully sovereign. It is built upon parties, but does not stand for a S tate." Couched in "Prussian" terminology ("no State"), Dethleffsen's ob servation refers to the lack of a political structure in Western Ger m any; too few people value or identify w ith the political institutions in their country. T his observation is another way of calling attention to p olitical apathy among the people. The fact was evident in a rela tively low turnout in voting for the German constitution, and was noted by some observers. Later it took the form of the oh n e m ich at titude, w hich now assumes somewhat different forms, but has not com pletely disappeared. All this, of course, is the result of the fact that democracy, or what the Germans call democracy, was imposed from above by the victors. The man in the street cannot identify with "th e S ta te" if the government is neither a traditional institution nor a sovereign agency. In this connection it is perhaps indicative of the sit uation that the German government is rarely referred to in conversa tions as "th e governm ent," but usually as "Bonn" (the choice of that sm all provincial town for the seat of the government was in itself a psychological blunder), or as "Adenauer" or as "th e old gentlem an." T he shifts in social stratification after 194$, the impoverishment of the educated middle classes and their enforced amorality (black m arket), the moral confusion on the way from H itler to denazification courts, the crisis (caused by war and occupation) of the family as an
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in stitu tio n —all these changes in the social structure have contributed to the disappearance of political identifications or of "th e State." The rem arkable econom ic com eback of W estern Germany has not "nor m alized " German society as yet. D ethleffsen wrote in his pamphlet: W e would underestim ate this "w ithout m e" if we believed that it confined itself to the rejection of a m ilitary contribution. It is sim ply the attem pt to withdraw from all responsibility. "W ithout m e " refers equally to the State, the Parties, politics and the neighbor.3 E m st Jünger, a more brilliant and less responsible writer, has discussed th is phenomenon in a broader context in a widely read book: O ne m ight say that the masses, at least in our country, are in a state of mind in w hich they hardly notice violations of the consti tution. O ne has the impression that they are more occupied with national football m atches than w ith their basic rights. W e have here a new feature of our world, and it is recommended to keep it always in view in a period which suffers from no lack of public injustice. Here one can acquire the sm ell of a collaborator through occupiers, there that of a fellow traveler through parties. In th is way situations arise in which the individual finds him self betw een Scylla and Charybdis; he is threatened by liquidation be cause of both participation and nonparticipation.4 T h e m ost interesting discussion of this phenomenon, however, is to be found in a book by Werner Weber, professor of public law at the U niversity of G öttingen.5 Weber is a student of Carl Schm itt's, and his opinions are colored by the antidem ocratic and antiliberal orientation of h is brilliant teacher. Weber attributes the lack of public influence upon p olitical m atters to the "m ediating" role that the "licensed " p o litical parties and other organizations—like the trade unions, busi ness associations, and churches—have assumed in postwar Germany. T h e functionaries of the parties and the managers of these organiza tion s have taken the place of government. They determine personnel policy and selection for political jobs down to the level of the com1 D as Wagnis d er Freiheit, pp. 8-9. 4 Ernst Jünger, D er Waldgang, 3d ed. (Frankfurt, 1951), pp. 106-7. s Werner Weber, Spannungen und K räfte im W estdeutschen Verfassungssystem (Stuttgart, 19$ 1).
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m unity. Instead of being responsive to public opinion, they manage public affairs in fact oligarchically; in their "esoteric circles,"6 vacan cies are filled by cooption. T he people are confronted with a political system that appears to them as an opaque, intangible, very mysteriously interlocking pluralism of bearers of political influence,- puzzled and estranged they let it operate___ The esoteric game of the bearers of influ ence and power in a strange sphere, in which none of the partici pants can identify him self w ith the state or the people, does not induce the people to give up its cool and distant reserve.7 W eber attributes this state of affairs to the destruction of Prussia, the disintegration of traditional political authority and political institu tions after H itler's downfall, and the weakening of the executive branch of the government in the new German constitution. I asked D ethleffsen about Dresden. Had he, in the discussions fol low ing his lectures, noticed that German feeling about Dresden was intense? D ethleffsen replied slowly, "N o, it is not important. It comes up only in connection w ith the so-called war crim inals. People say, 'If our generals are supposed to have conducted crim inal warfare, what about the Allied commanders who gave orders to bomb civilians in Dresden? ' One hears sim ilar statem ents about partisan warfare. People say, 'Look at Korea. D on't the 'A m is' have to deal roughly with par tisans there th em selv es?'" I repeated, "W hy Dresden? Why not Cologne, or Hamburg?" He said, rather dispassionately, "It was late in the war. And then, the particular circum stances! The second and third attacks—they really were a scandal. (T)as war ja w irklich eine Schw einerei')." D ethleffsen then asked if I knew that his father-in-law was in prison. I said I did. He went on, "W e do not want to have crim inals released. Of course they m ust be punished. But the others, that is a really important issue. One sim ply should forget some night to close the doors. I mean, dism iss them and state that the cases would be reexamined. Then th ey 'll be freed, and after a few years everybody w ill have forgotten about it. You w on't be embarrassed and the issue is eliminated right aw ay." I thought this was a rather characteristic suggestion. The legal and• • Ibid., p. 55. 7 Ibid., pp. 61-62.
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m oral issues w hich consume so much space in the press and in books and are, after all, very important, suddenly seemed less weighty than a quick, practical solution. Compared with the discussion of the war crim inals in General Heinz Guderian's passionate So g eh t es n ich t ( 1951), D ethleffsen is a model of calm ness. It is understandable that he was attacked by German audiences for his sober stand and for his refusal to share the wild righteousness of most German publicists on the issue. T he following are a few statem ents from D ethleffsen's publications on the subject of Soviet strategy in a future war. I have included them because his views were referred to in conversations w ith others: If the Russians want to force, by attack, a decision which is to render a continuation of the war in Europe impossible, they must not confine them selves to the occupation of Central Europe. They m ust occupy all those areas which are fit as bases for the employ m ent of air power against the most vital Soviet targets, i.e., rail roads running from east to west through Poland, the traffic center of M oscow, the oil at Baku, and the industrial centers around Kriwoirog and at the Donets. Furthermore, they m ust prevent the W estern powers from holding bridgeheads in Europe, North Af rica, and A sia___ A decision is reached only when the Soviets suc ceed in occupying and staying in Scandinavia, Germany, Holland, Belgium , France, Italy, Spain, the North African coast, the Suez Canal, the Balkans, Arabia, Turkey, and Persia. There are not suf ficien t Soviet divisions for this task.8 It is true, of course, that the farther west the Central European front is moved, the greater the Soviet disadvantage due to the in creasing distance,- however strenuous might be their efforts to base their supply service as largely as possible on the industry and agriculture of the German Soviet zone and the satellites, the Rus sians would constantly have to receive additional supplies from inner Russia. It is pointed out, rightly, that in this event, the "road of starvation" w hich was fatal first to Napoleon and then to H itler would becom e a problem to them in reverse, and that every further step the Russians took into W estern Europe would—so long as N orth Africa and the Near East were still in Western hands— stretch their flanks and damage their strategic position. There is * * Dethleffsen, in A rm ee ohn e Pathos, ed. Adelbeit Weinstein (Bonn, 19$ 1), p. 23.
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indeed som ething to be said for the theory that in another war the Soviets would once again try to turn to advantage Russia's vast depth and poor traffic system, and hence might base their strategy upon defense of their own territory. If they inclined to take pie* ventive m easures w ith a view to improving the conditions for such a strategy, these measures would consist of an attack in the direction of the Suez Canal—to break the claws of the Western pincers, to elim inate the air bases in the Near East which would otherw ise becom e particularly dangerous to Russian industrial centers, and finally to get possession of Persian oil.9 But let us remember, first, that this is theoretical; and second, that none of it means that in case of war the Soviets would refrain from any m ilitary action in W estern Europe, particularly under conditions of W estern weakness in the area between the EastW est zonal border and the A tlantic. A local and lim ited Soviet raid toward and across the Rhine w ill always have to be expected.10 T he m ilitary significance of a German defense contribution, even if it is confined to twelve divisions, consists in the fact that it w ill add to W estern strength in Central Europe; at a place which is strategically not decisive for the W est-Eastern conduct of the war, the W est w ill be so strong that a Soviet attack directed toward the R hine would mean com m itting too strong forces of the East, w hich would be lacking at the decisive point.11 Erich D ethleffsen died in 1980.
Otto Klepper: The Im portance of the Third World W iesbaden, May 16,1952 Dr. O tto Klepper is the president of w ip o g , w ith headquarters in Frankfurt am M ain. During the Weimar Republic, he promoted pro gressive agrarian policies and became m inister under O tto Braun in * For Heusinger's comment on Dethleffsen's ideas on the Middle East, see p. i«S, below,- see also Freiherr von Geyr on this subject, p. 233, below. 10 Foreign Affairs, pp. 307-8. These ideas are similar to those expressed by former General Georg von Sodenstem. • * Dos Wagnis der Freiheit, p. 3 5.
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Prussia. He is still addressed as "H err M inister" by the wipoc staff. In 1933 Klepper left for France, where he was active against the N azis. Later he became financial adviser to Chiang Kai-shek and spent several years in China. Then he went to M exico where he resided for four and a half years. He returned to Germany in 1946 or 1947. In the Federal Republic, Klepper's am bitions are thwarted by his age—he is sixty-four years old—and by the fact that, having been absent from Germ any for a long tim e, he is looked upon by many people as an out sider. He m ight have held the office of a secretary of a government departm ent; instead he finds him self in the position of a propagandist who attem pts to pull more wires than he can manipulate. There is a suggestion of political fu tility in his actions. But he is a man w ith a conception of world politics—and of Germany's place in them—that is both original and basically sound. He has excellent connections, not only in Adenauer's party but also among the opposition (including former Communists), former Ger m an generals (through Dethleffsen), German church leaders, and university professors. w ipoc , w hich receives some financial support from hicoc , is in terested in promoting an understanding of foreign, economic, and social affairs. The organization calls annual meetings to which out standing public figures are invited and at which speeches are made and discussions are held. The last meeting, on October z s-2 6 ,1 9 s 1, was devoted to the German political situation. George M. Schuster, the U .S. land com m issioner for Bavaria, Ernst Reuter, the acting mayor of Berlin, Erich Dethleffsen, and Klepper him self were among those who participated. In his speech of O ctober 25, titled "P olitics Bom of Classless Think in g ," Klepper talked at some length about the "third force" in the struggle between East and W est, defining the third force as an emer gence of the "colored w orld": Beginning in India, China, Indonesia, Korea, and now arising in Persia and Egypt, a far-flung movement is developing which is at first m erely directed at the emancipation of the colonial and half colonial peoples. If th is em ancipation movement of the colonial peoples were to assum e revolutionary character, this would mean a decisive shift in the distribution of world power at the expense of the Western world. It is apparently the prognosis of Russian politicians that
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th is is going to happen___ The hope that the Western system w ill disintegrate, and power w ill fall autom atically into the hands of the Com m unists has apparently gained new strength___ Follow ing the United States, which is no colonial power, we must treat the em ancipation of the colored world as our own political concern. As for German dom estic affairs, Klepper advocates progressive econom ic and social policy, but "in reforms the initiative which pre vents revolutions rests w ith the privileged." He advocates also a psychological reorientation: We m ust not cultivate the resentful idea that W estern policy, especially Am erican policy, cannot possibly do without us. W hether this is so or not, lack of our own activity could easily be com e quite disastrous___ We have the great fortune that we may pursue intellectually, and postulate as a practical aim, what in spired the hum anists as a wishful dream and still a generation ago looked like an unrealistic utopia: the solidarity of man beyond the borders of interest, class, and nation. Herr Klepper called for me in Wiesbaden, and we went in his car to K loster Eberbach, talking on the way and over the dinner table. I com plim ented him on his speech. He said again that in his opinion the developm ent of the half-colonial peoples and Western policy toward them is the decisive issue in the years ahead. "I would have to change th is prognosis only if I were convinced that the Soviet Union is ready to m ake war, but I don't think it is ." A t the sam e tim e he was concerned about the development in Berlin. (Many people are.) I told him that in my view the chance of a new Ber lin crisis becom ing the opening phase of World War inis very slight indeed, because I did not believe that the Soviet government would perm it itself to initiate moves from which it could not retreat. He m entioned that Alexander Ruestow1 held the same view and that he too derived some com fort from it. "But if you look at the history of wars, you w ill find that they always seem to break out over trifles." I asked his opinion about the political conceptions of German in dustry. W hat are they and who has them? He replied without qualifica tion that industry has no political conception. He said later that the sam e held true of the Social Dem ocratic party. Schumacher is a very 1 Professor in Heidelberg! 1885-1963).
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sick man, and perhaps on account of his illness his negative, domineer ing, and tyrannical qualities come to the fore. He believes that Reuter has, "o f course," am bitions to become a successor to Schumacher and for this reason is soft-pedaling his differences with Schumacher, "be cause he would need the support of the party functionaries who are now loyal to or afraid of Schum acher." As for Carlo Schmid, he agreed that he is a brilliant speaker and a dialectician of some stature.2 He added, interestingly, that Carlo Schmid is "basically a defeatist." Klepper told a story—and confessed to being a believer in "th e intel ligence value of anecdotes"—to the effect that in a recent private con versation about the defense contribution in relation to world politics, Carlo Schm id had said, "In the end, however, one must realize that everything is already lo st." According to Klepper, the meaning of the statem ent was that the West can no longer prevent the Russians from taking over W estern Europe. Klepper made some equally surprising, if not shocking remarks about the Adenauer government. He said that w ip o g can call meetings in any city in W estern Germany with the basic assurance that the dis cussion w ill be free and open. "T h e only exception is Bonn. There everybody is afraid of everybody else and nobody talks freely. You know, even the wires are tapped." I was incredulous and asked for am plification. "T h e telephone wires w ithin government departments and from one dépannent to another are tapped." I expressed disbelief. Klepper m erely added, "Very serious people say that this is so and that Adenauer him self is responsible for it." It is perhaps necessary to add that Klepper takes some pleasure in saying unorthodox things about the political process. It is my feeling that this pleasure compensates him for his lack of real power. O tto Klepper died in 1957.
G erhard G raf von Schw erin: M ilitary Critic of Rearmament Cologne, May 19,1952 Joseph W itsch, the publisher, had invited me, Graf Schwerin, and O tto W esem ann for dinner at his house. After dinner Frau W itsch retired and the rest of us talked until after two o'clock in the morning. 2 Carlo Schmid (1896-1979) was one of the leading German socialists.
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During the war Schwerin was a Generalleutnant in command of armored troops under Marshal Rommel, first in North Africa and later in the W est. According to Hans Speidel, Rommel planned to include Schw erin on a team of negotiators that would conclude an arm istice in the W est after H itler's arrest.1 An ss general is said to have prevented Schw erin from surrendering the city of Aachen. Schw erin was the first confidential m ilitary adviser to Chancellor Adenauer, but his function was never clearly defined. In September i9$o , the British high com m issioner criticized Schwerin for his work. D espite the fact that Schwerin was following instructions, Adenauer failed to back him . Schwerin talked to the press, but the confidential ity of the interview was not kept. Schwerin was permitted to resign and the chancellor relied on the Catholic parliamentarian Theodor B la n k 21 and on the Department of the Interior for the preparatory work on Germ an rearmament. Schw erin is fifty-three years old. He is reserved but always at ease. O nly once during the evening did he talk of him self. In fact, he gives the im pression of effortlessly avoiding the word " I." His speech is rath er slow , w ith a discrim inating choice of words, but without brilliance. (Brilliance is outside the aristocratic tradition,- in tellectu a ls may be brilliant, and then one may or may not listen w ith interest.) Schwerin highly values good taste, and even uses the word “taste" frequently. He com plim ented his host on a little statue by Gerhard Marcks; this, in fact, was the first thing he noticed upon entering the room. At the dinner table Frau W itsch observed that in Cologne although m any faces still show the old beautiful features for which the Cologne population is justly famous, in fact the substance is gone, because “the war destroyed not only buildings." Wesemann, in a lighter vein, gave a w him sical historical account of the Roman influence on Cologne, tracing the people he liked to the first Roman Legion, an elite group, and connecting the people he disliked with the 22nd Legion which, he said, consisted of the riff-raff of the Roman Empire and was also sta tioned in Cologne at the tim e. Everybody agreed that the moral fiber of the Cologne population has been tom asunder. Theft and robbery are more frequent. One must ex1 See Hans Speidel, Invasion 1944 (Chicago, 19*0), p. 72. See also Ebeihaid Zeller, G eist d er Freiheit. D er Zwanzigste luli 1944 (Munich, 1952), p. 204. 2 For a detailed account of Schwerin's activities in Bonn, see Amulf Baring, Aussenpolitik in A denauers Kanzlerdemokratie (Munich, 1969), pp. 2 1- 3 1. Theodor Blank: 190S-72.
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pect trouble in Cologne if one leaves one's car unlocked, and so on. All of th is is not typical of German cities at large. Schw erin said he had recently been visited by a man who wanted his advice on how to help the new refugees from the East. Turning to me, he said, "W e have old and new refugees by this tim e." The newcomers from the East are isolated in the W est. Luxury (and life in West Ger many does appear luxurious to them), lack of concern for East zone af fairs, com placency—everything conspires against rapport between the new com ers and the host population. The new arrivals are not treated w ith any warm th. Nor do the hosts learn from the newcomers much about life on the other side of the curtain. They are truly strangers. The only practical thing that can be done is to help by making arrange m ents for them to get together w ith "o ld " refugees. Som etim e after dinner the conversation turned to m ilitary-political affairs. I remarked that in my opinion the decisive "m oral events" in th e history of the German corps of officers were not m ilitary defeats in the last tw o wars. Instead, these "even ts" were the behavior of the top G erm an generals at the tim e of the murder of General Schleicher on June 30, 1934 and, later, of the Fritsch affair, when the generals ac cepted not only political defeat by the Nazis but also an infamous at tack upon their "honor." (Freiherr von Fritsch was falsely accused of hom osexuality by the Nazis in 1938.) Schwerin agreed, rather passion ately, and added, "Y es, Beck3 and Fritsch were the last two represent ing what was good in the tradition of the German officers' corps." Then he said that it is im portant to realize that the General Staff started its decline m uch earlier. "T h e real trouble began with Ludendorff in the First World W ar." I could agree readily enough.4 T his was followed by som e rather nice points on the Prussian tradition and its close associ ation w ith Germ an humanism at the tim e of Scham horst.3 W esem ann spoke about M oltke's letters, a selection of which was recently republished. He admired them, but asked—somewhat irrele3 Ludwig Beck (1880-1944) supported Fritsch when he was denounced by the Nazis, opposed H itler's plan to attack Czechoslovakia, and finally resigned. He was replaced in 1938 as chief of the General Staff of the army by General Haider. Beck was considered the head of the conspiracy against Hitler that led to the attempt to kill him. After its failure, Beck took his life on the evening of July 20,1944. See Wolfgang Foerster, G eneraloberst Ludw ig B eck (München, 1933); and Ludwig Beck, Studien (Stuttgart, 1935). 4 Hans Speier, S ocial Order and the R isks o f War. chap. 22, “ Ludendorff: The German Concept of Total W ar." 9 Gerhard |. D. von Schamhorst (1733-18 13) reformed the Prussian army. See note, p. 275» below.
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vantly—w hether they might not have been w ritten w ith the idea of later publication in mind. Schwerin said, "O h, I don't think so. One does not w rite letters for publication." Schw erin remarked that the loss of the great tradition cannot be at tributed to individual failings, but that it is part of a general loss suf fered by modem civilization. "O utside m ilitary circles as well you no longer find hum anists." I m entioned that I had read General Haider's (then-unpublished) diary4 and had been impressed by his enormous industry and grasp of detail. Schw erin said wearily, "Y es, he was very industrious but su b a ltern ('servile')." Encouraged by Schw erin's response I told him that I recalled how shocked I was to learn toward the end of the war that, after July 20, 1944, G eneral von Rundstedt had accepted the chairmanship of the m ilitary court of honor: H itler had appointed the court to expel from the armed forces German officers implicated in the attem pt to assas sinate him . Again, Schwerin responded w ith subdued indignation: "O n e m ust know that at that tim e Rundstedt stayed in Bad Toelz with his w ife. When H itler's telegram ordering him to assume this function arrived, his wife pleaded w ith him not to accept. Rundstedt squirmed, 'But I cannot refuse an order from my commander-in-chief.' This is Rundstedt." T he significance of Schw erin's remark is thrown into relief by G eneral Blum entritt's views of Rundstedt as an altogether upright grandseigneur, representing the best of German m ilitary tradition, and a m aster strategist who noticed H itler's amateurish conduct of the war and never hesitated to speak his mind. In his biography of Rundstedt, Blum entritt—Rundstedt's chief of staff—m entions the events and consequences of the plot against H itler on July 20, 1944, only in a few evasive phrases ("These were indeed difficult tim es"). Whereas Blum entritt goes out of his way to stress Rundstedt's lack of interest in p olitics and his moral principles, pointing out, among other things, that he "w ould never have broken his oath," Blum entritt treats with com plete silence Rundstedt's rôle as H itler's instrum ent in dishonor ing his m ilitary comrades.7 Regarding the subject of German rearmament, Schwerin expected• • Haider's diaries began to be published only in 196a. See Haider, Kriegstagebuch. vols. 1-3 (Stuttgart, 1962-64). 7 Günther Blumentritt, Von Rundstedt—The Soldier and Man (London, 1932), pp. 241, 279-
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that those former members of the German officers' corps who found it easy to cooperate w ith the Nazis, and many of whom owed their careers to them , w ill more and more come to the fore; the responsible, anti-N azi elem ents are already either being suppressed or they stand aloof in dismay. I questioned Schwerin closely, and he cited chapter and verse in sup port of his opinion. I am rather certain that he would never speak like th is in public, an impression shared by W itsch and Wesemann, with whom I talked about the conversation the next day. Turning to me, Schwerin said, tw ice, "W hy is American policy so double-tracked [doppelgleisig]! W hy?" I asked him to explain his ques tion more fully. He replied, "You have tried to promote democracy in W estern Germany. But at the same tim e you support the old m ilitary groups and cliques that either had power under the Nazis or managed at any rate to get along w ith them exceedingly w ell." Schwerin gave a detailed exposition of what he m eant by American support of these "o ld " groups. First, he talked about the organization headed by former General Reinhard G ehlen, w hich is composed of i, $oo former German officers, including 800 former German staff officers of the okw and okh (High Command of the W ehrmacht and High Command of the Army, re spectively). The Organization Gehlen, he said, is being supported by the U .S. Department of the Army at the rate of dm 20 m illion a year and has been in operation since 194$. It is a kind of German c-2 or cia , w ith the function of gathering intelligence on conditions behind the Iron Curtain. G ehlen is smart enough to make information available not only to the government but also to Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the opposition. The latter finds it valuable for the work of the spd in the Eastern zone. G ehlen's organization, he continued, has representatives in every im portant government department and performs a second function, w ith w hich it is not officially charged. It functions as an intelligence organization for Herr Globke, the man in charge of personnel policy in the chancellor's office. Both W itsch and Wesemann agreed that Globke, who shuns public ity, exercises a sinister influence on German politics.* Schw erin did not say that G ehlen's organization was composed of * On Hans Globke, see the balanced account in Am ulf Baring, A ussenpolitik in A denauers K anzlerdem okratie (Munich, 1969), and the literature cited in that book on P - 3J I .
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incom petent persons or fanatical Nazis. He rather stressed that it in cluded m any people who were and are opportunists. Its younger mem bers do not know anything but the German army under the Nazis, are proud of a past m ilitary organization which at one tim e conquered m uch of Europe, and hence cannot possibly be blameworthy. 'T h ey do not know anything else and do not care for what m atters now ." In ad dition, Schw erin said they would like to get back into m ilitary posi tions of im portance. They work w ith uncanny precision to impede aspirants outside their ranks and to undermine the reputation of per sons who disagree w ith their views. N one of th is should be understood as a result of connivance between G ehlen's organization and the U .S. Army, but rather as the inevitable outcom e of a failure on the part of the U.S. authorities to realize that an intelligence organization of this kind cannot possibly be controlled by its foreign sponsors. "T h e British have always kept their hands off. T hey do not use a foreign intelligence agency, because they know from experience or by political instinct that they could not control it." He repeated that he did not mean to accuse this organization of conscious double-dealing, but its members are opportunists. They owed their careers to the Nazi regime, adapted themselves to it, and now work for the Americans w ith the same kind of opportunism; m any of them would find it equally possible to cooperate w ith the Soviet Union, if need be. Because they are not democrats by convic tion, they can work for anyone who has power if they get their share. They have no principles. "They are useful and dangerous experts." I asked Schw erin how he accounted for the esprit de corps of an or ganization such as his description implied. In his answer he did not use the term esp rit d e corps which I had employed, but the word solidarity. He said that this solidarity was due to the good pay its members re ceived. W esemann asked precisely what that meant, and Schwerin explained that they were being paid at a rate corresponding to full tim e, regular m ilitary employment according to rank. Furthermore, Schw erin continued, this solidarity results from the fact that all mem bers of th is organization know they are being backed by the govern m ent and in particular by Herr Globke. Finally, it has been explained to all of them that they owe their positions to the initiative of the U .S. Army. T o illu strate the way the government depends on Gehlen's organiza tion, Schw erin mentioned the fact that General Heusinger goes to M unich every fortnight in order to get from Gehlen inform ation he
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needs and cannot get elsewhere. I find nothing wrong with this dependence. Later, Schw erin turned to the so-called Steltzer Com m ittee, which studies problem s connected w ith the German defense contribution. " It is, of course, known that Steltzer's organization in Frankfurt is financed by h ic o g and that the work of this particular com m ittee is h ic o g ' s brainchild." I rem arked that h ic o g was not responsible for initiating the project. (The project was initiated by the Blank office but w ith the knowledge of Public Affairs, h ic o g , where Steltzer, of course, is highly regarded because of his political record.) Steltzer was described by Allen Dulles as "undoubtedly one of the m ost im portant of the very few survivors of the anti-Nazi conspir a cy ."9 He is a form er German officer who when stationed in Norway during the war cooperated w ith the underground against the Nazis. He was arrested, and escaped execution by the skin of his teeth. Later Steltzer becam e m inister-president of the Land Sleswig-Holstein. He now is president of the In stitu t zu r Förderung ö ffen tlich er A ngelegen h e ite n e. V., Frankfurt am Main. T h e "co m m ittee" to w hich Schwerin referred is composed of civil ians and form er officers who m eet on various occasions to discuss problem s of the "in n er structure" of the future German m ilitary estab lishm ent, the relations between officers and men, education and train ing. A ll th is was done in an effort to safeguard the development of G erm an democracy in view of pending rearmament. Some of the dis cussions and resolutions of the "Steltzer C om m ittee" have been pub lished .10 (I talked to Steltzer and some of his closest collaborators several tim es, both in Frankfurt in May 1952, and on his visit to the United States in W ashington later that year. S till later he became active in or ganizing research and cooperation on Europe among businessmen in various European countries, and has attempted w ith the help of Pro fessor Karl Brandt at the Stanford Research Institute to win support for 9 Allen Welsh Dulles, G erm any’s Underground (New York, 1947), p. 92. Steltzer be longed to the so-called Kreisau Circle and was close to Bishop Beigrav in Norway during the war. 10 For example, Bürger und Landesverteidigung (Frankfurt am Main, 1952); also the prelim inary reports on the conferences in Andernach, March 19-20, 1952, on m ili tary structure, and in Wiesbaden, June 18 -19 , 1952, on problems of education mimeo graphed.
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his efforts from the Com m ittee for Economic Development and the Ford Foundation.I*' Schw erin did not regard as politically objectionable all of the advis ers whom Steltzer called on to participate in this work. “Of course, there are good people among them, but the opportunists are gaining in flu en ce." He named some of them. I spoke up for one of the members in two ways. I said that everything he had published recently would certainly indicate a true change of mind, and, were it not for the fact that he talked rather much of moral responsibility, he would appear to be a politically reliable person. Schw erin replied that he, too, did not like people who glibly used a m oralistic vocabulary. "O ne must look at action s." I insisted, how ever, that there is danger in being uncharitable on m atters of political m orality, m erely because unlike the church, which has an established way of forgiving sins, we have no recognized method of forgiving a p olitical sinner. Schwerin nodded, but his consent was merely to the general observation. I then took a position which I myself characterized as M achiavel lian. Assuming that there existed an opportunist who for reasons of expediency was w illing to serve a good cause, is one not forced today to use him , given the scarcity of blameless men? I expected that this would shock Schwerin, and it did. He firmly disagreed, and I admired him for it, although I am afraid his intransigence revealed the lim its of h is p olitical skill. Schw erin went on to explain that as a result of the prominence of som e of the politically objectionable men on the Steltzer com m ittee, the good people were beginning to withdraw from it. Thus the out com e of the work could be foreseen: instead of advice that might help attain desirable ends, opinions would be expressed—to all purposes backed by U .S. authority and funds—that are politically innocuous, if not undesirable. I asked about the role of the Blank office in the distribution of power. Schw erin remarked that Theodor Blank him self is not on good term s w ith all members of the Adenauer government, is inept in dealing w ith the Bundestag, and neglects or disparages public opinion. T here again, Schwerin was perhaps too harsh. The Blank office can not be too enterprising in attem pts to influence public opinion be u See also the section on Steltzer, p. 155, below.
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cause, strictly speaking, it is only an advisory—not a truly m inisterial —body. Nor did Schwerin recognize that the Blank office tries to safe guard dem ocratic interests against the influence of antidemocratic, "m ilita ristic" forces. Blank him self is a c d u deputy and former mem ber of a C atholic trade union and is on good terms with several leaders of the Social Dem ocratic party, including Fritz Erler. The main m ili tary advisers, w ith Generals Speidel (Rommel's former chief of staff) and Heusinger at the top, are men who are aware of the fact that a wrong political move may cost them their jobs. They were never activ e anti-N azis, but both of them published books after the downfall of the H itler regime in which they criticized H itler and the Nazis freely and portrayed them selves as determined opponents of the regime while serving it as officers during the war. It occurred to me that the task facing the Blank office is extremely difficult. Blank and his staff are to work out plans for the reestablish m ent of Germ an m ilitary forces. Much as they might try to create an organization dem ocratic in structure and loyalty, free from the ex cesses of Prussian drill, and w illing to accept civilian political control, they m ust eventually utilize some of the professional m ilitary leaders in whose lifelong experience adherence to democratic values has been tantam ount to violating the standards of many of their peers. It alm ost appears that U.S. policy of rearming West Germany has set men like Blank and his collaborators the task of squaring a circle: in Germ any, the m ilitary class has never cared much—and has known less—about democracy. T his situation is aggravated by the fact that only few of the anti-N azis among the m ilitary in Germany were dem ocrats at heart; moreover, many of the staunchest anti-Nazis were killed after July 20,1944. It seemed to m e that Schwerin, in his criticism of the Blank office, blamed this organization and U.S. policy for difficulties inherent in G erm any's social and political past, without giving the office credit for trying to overcome these difficulties. When I said so, Schwerin was un impressed. He stressed again that many of the true functions of the Blank office had to be performed by agencies outside its own confines, such as G ehlen's organization and the Steltzer Com m ittee. Schw erin's rem arks on this point seemed to me to betray the dis com fort of a Prussian who cannot possibly reconcile him self to the fact that governmental functions are not being performed by government agencies in the "proper, regular" way.
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T h is was evident also in com m ents I invited Schwerin to make on the Departm ent of the Interior and its role in the development of a Germ an defense establishm ent. I asked him in particular whether he felt that the departm ent's work in connection with civil defense was p olitically dangerous. He said that this was not the most important point, although former Nazis were getting back into harness in civil defense work as w ell as in other fields. He emphasized that the Depart m ent of the Interior had been given the responsibility of preparing the defense law. T h is was because the Blank office is not a government departm ent, and has only a sm all staff. The important and tim e-con sum ing work necessary for the preparation of any law requires a vari ety of special sk ills not available in the Blank office, and thus the work has been secretly allocated by Adenauer to the Department of the In terior. There the work is being overseen by R itter von Lex: a secret operation, hidden from the eyes of the people's representatives and beyond their control, is given work which should be the responsibility of a defense department. I was quite overwhelmed by the prospect of the rise of undemocratic institu tions, w hich Schw erin's comments suggested so strongly. I asked him , finally, what Germans like him self could do in a situ ation like this. Did not the dangers he saw call for action? Perhaps a group of like-minded persons could be assembled to point out to the public what ought to be done, what efforts should be made to create a dem ocratic army, and so on. Both Wesemann and W itsch chim ed in. Schw erin now seemed to change his tune. He observed repeatedly that the responsibility lies w ith the Bundestag. At the same tim e he conceded that w ith very few exceptions, the deputies—he named es pecially Franz Josef Strauss—are both ignorant and not interested in doing anything. As to public action by private citizens to arouse interest in th is important m atter, he felt that anyone daring to take such a step would risk defamation by Gehlen's organization and, if he were a former officer, would forfeit any chance of being assigned a position in the German army. T o put the dot on the i, he said, "If I were asked to join such a group I would have to refuse the invitation, be cause I wish to get a command position in the army when it is estab lish ed ." W esemann observed, courteously, that one could, of course, only hope he would indeed get such a position. Schwerin replied, "It is very kind of you to say th is." Schwerin died in 1980.
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Opinions about Em st Reuter M ehlem , May 20,1952 A t an inform al party w ith h ic o g officials, somebody talked pessi m istically about Berlin, criticizing Mayor Em st Reuter for the speech he had made in Holland to the effect that the Berliners could stand tw enty blockades. The French and the British criticize the U.S. for supporting Reuter without restraining him . The Berliners, they say, do not feel the way they did in 1948. Then they placed responsibility for the blockade clearly on the Russians; now many would feel that the U nited States policy led to the blockade, should it be renewed.
A dolf H eusinger: the First Soldier May 2 3 ,19S2 In World War n, Adolf Heusinger was chief of operations in the Su preme Command of the Army. He was wounded on July 20, 1944, when the bomb that failed to kill the Führer exploded. Heusinger was arrested in the hospital and interrogated by the Gestapo, but finally released. At the tim e of his arrest he wrote a memorandum about the disorganization and confusion at the top of the m ilitary bureaucracy and leadership. In his memoirs Heusinger reports a conversation with H itler in September 1944, in which H itler said: "I was sorry that you were im plicated in the investigations. But I could not interfere." H itler thanked him for the memorandum which he had "studied" and which he characterized as "th e only coherent critique of my measures during the war that has reached m e."1 Along w ith General Speidel Heusinger is now Adenauer's highestranking advisor on m ilitary affairs. Only three persons in the Blank of fice have a rank higher than colonel, and Heusinger is one of them. His position is politically sensitive, and much political skill is required to fill it. Heusinger is careful—at least he was during my visit to lüs Bonn office—not to criticize persons who are alive. He has a faint lisp and the suggestion of a tic in his lip. He talks flu ently, always to the point, and is adroit in avoiding statem ents that, if quoted, would embarrass him . He appears unusually energetic and 1 Adolf Heusinger, B efehlim W iderstreit (Tübingen and Stuttgart, 1950), pp. 365-66.
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industrious, thinks clearly, and in each reply to a question presents his answ ers in well-organized form and logical order. In doing so, he looks out of the window as if focusing on the problem. He does not repeat him self and stays away from clichés. When I saw Geyr von Schweppenburg a few days later, he described Heusinger in his vivid way as follow s: "H e could very w ell wear the cloak of the Jesuits. He has their coolness, intelligence, skill, and control. And being a Catholic myself, I do not m ean this altogether as a criticism ." H eusinger's book describes the development of the German army from 1923 u n til 194$, especially during the war in Russia, as seen from the view point of a general staff officer. The book, w ritten in 194$, con sists of dialogues based on notes and recollections, and of a number of im aginary letters and front-line scenes. In many of the dialogues Heusinger him self has a m ajor role. Although the book cannot be regarded as historical source material of indubitable reliability, it testifies to Heusinger's sobriety, reflects his postwar views of the relation between m ilitary and the political authorities in the Nazi era, and affords some insight into his character.2 1 asked Heusinger to com m ent on the principles that w ill be applied in selecting additional staff as the Blank office expands, and in select ing m en for the top positions in the new German army. Heusinger replied that in the Blank office these are politically sensitive positions and a man can easily be "torpedoed." He mentioned Graf Schwerin: "H e dared to advance too far, and, as you know, there was trouble." As to the former officers of comparatively junior rank in the Blank office, it should be remembered that those who were forty years old at th e end of the war would be generals now, had conditions been dif ferent. Seven years have passed. Furthermore, not all other people are capable of standing the strain of the work demanded of them. There are also tensions and conflicting views among the higher ranks. As the office expands, som e of these gentlemen may get in, because after a few years of additional service they w ill be eligible for higher pensions. T h eir knowledge w ill be needed; one of the greatest drawbacks of younger persons is that they lack the experience of the men who were in the First World War and in the Republic during the period when Germ any had a 100,000-m en Reichswehr. To tap the experience of these older men, Heusinger was thinking of attaching a Council of the Aged as an advisory body to the Blank office. 2 For a brief discussion of the book, see the conclusion of this entry.
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I said that business seem s to have absorbed many of the former of ficers and that I presumed these were the m ost capable ones. W ill it be easy to convince those who are desirable to rejoin the armed forces? H eusinger replied that it w ill be difficult for the following reasons: (1) Business is able to offer higher salaries than government. Men w ho have fam ilies w ill hesitate to forego higher incomes. After 1918, w hen the Germ an army was drastically reduced in size, officers were still accustom ed to accepting a low incom e. Now, however, pecuniary rem uneration has assumed increased importance for a second reason, w hich the general said he would state presently. First, he mentioned the case of a present employee who joined the office, coming from an industrial firm in Cologne. T his firm recently offered this employee a m onthly salary of d m 2,500 and special responsibility. In the Blank office he gets only d m 800 a m onth. He stayed. ''H is biggest conflict is w ith his wife, as you can im agine." (2) Before the ratification of the defense treaty by all parliaments concerned, an interim com m ittee without executive functions w ill be form ed to consider detailed measures to be taken after full approval. O n th is com m ittee German experts w ill m eet w ith French, Dutch, Belgian, Italian, and other foreign experts. It w ill be difficult to attract qualified personnel. These men cannot be offered positions as civil servants. They w ill be employees, and when they ask about security and status, they cannot be told that they are secure; their status w ill be that of advisers. In these circum stances one can foresee that people w ill be reluctant to serve. Heusinger stressed that he him self per formed his function w ithout having civil service status. (3) The other difficulty in recruiting capable men consisted in the fact that the m ilitary have been defamed and treated w ith scorn for seven years. For th is reason incom e has become relatively more impor tant. "T h is defamation has been more thorough than that of any pro fession at any tim e in history." (I didn't challenge the accuracy of this statem ent, but when Heusinger spoke of "h istory ," I thought of the low esteem in w hich sculptors, actors, and surgeons were held for m any centuries.) (4) Then there is the issue of the so-called war crim inals. U ntil it is settled one could not expect a normal supply of persons with m ilitary background and training. Heusinger offered all these points, not as his opinion, but as views regularly voiced when he approached people to join the Blank office. Som ew hat disingenuously, I asked about G ehlen's organization. Is
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th is not a pool from w hich to draw personnel? Heusinger seemed baf fled by my question, looked at me and then glanced out the window be fore he replied, "N o. These gentlemen are i-c specialists, correspond ing to your g -2 . They do not have the skills we need. We need primarily persons who are experts in [using his fingers to count the three cat egories] (a) organization, (b) inner structure, and (c) training." Heusinger explained what he considered to be the special political difficu lties of making an adequate personnel selection. 'T h ere w ill have to be a proper balance among the personnel between line and staff, infantry and artillery, Protestants and Catholics, noblemen and com m oners, East and W est Germans, and so on. You can imagine that it is not easy." I asked Heusinger to amplify a remark he had made earlier in the conversation about "schism in the officers' corps." He said, "There has not really been a corps of officers since 1933. There are various divi sio n s." First, there was the older generation. It can be divided into three subgroups: (a) "Those who followed H itler faithfully and fanatic ally. For exam ple—to m ention men no longer alive—Model and Sch öm er."3 (b) "Those who adapted them selves." (He singled this sub group out for special m ention, thus drawing a line between Nazis and "N a z is," i.e., fanatical Nazis and Nazis out of opportunism.) (c) "Those who resisted ." T he second group comprised the large number of officers who came in through the Nazis w ithout knowing the pre-Nazi m ilitary tradition. Then there was the group of men who rose from noncommissioned ranks to higher positions, because they were competent and had front lin e experience. "A ll of this is valid of the arm y." Things were different in the navy, where the old tradition was m ost strongly adhered to and preserved. Finally, as for the air force, "You have again a different situation there. The air force was entirely new ." He again avoided putting special blam e on the air arm, which was more thoroughly nazified than either the navy or the army. In this respect he differed consider ably in the degree of explicitness which Geyr von Schweppenburg and a few others show in their writings and in conversation. I remarked that in his account he made no reference to an East-West split in the orientation of the former officers. Was there one? Heusinger replied, surprisingly, "Y es, there is ." Then he explained—I 3 On Schömer, see footnote, p. 175, below.
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thought, again quite skillfully—that there were German officers in the East Germ an Volkspolizei and in the Soviet Union. Thus he suggested that he was not thinking only in West German term s but of the issue of Germ an unification. I asked, "But there is no spirit of this kind w ithin W estern G erm any?" Heusinger said that Com m unist attem pts to win over officers from W estern Germany have been increasing. "First, they made offers. W hen th is was of no avail, they started their ideological work by pro* m oting neu tralism ." One could say that these attem pts m et with some success. He had just read a report about a newly formed Führungsring D eu tsch er S old aten in M unich which clearly promoted a neutralist policy. "T h e idea of this orientation is strengthened by recollections of Tauroggen.4 Those people say, 'Let us first get neutrality/ then we w ill achieve, as tim e passes, m ilitary predominance in Europe." Heusinger added that the orientation in favor of Western Europe was definitely prevalent. And when I said that this too presented its difficulties, if only because the French did not appear to make things easy, he replied, "O h, it is of course easier for us to be European in outlook." (Usually, there is m erely agreement when one brings up the fact that the French are difficult. I thought Heusinger's remark showed his political ability as w ell as his objectivity.) I asked Heusinger if he could recommend any published account of the political orientation of the former officers. He mentioned Geyr von Schweppenburg's G eb roch en es Schw ert, but added that he had ad vised the author not to publish it because it would stir up old trouble among the officers. The full meaning of this remark was lost to me at the tim e of the interview, because I was not then fam iliar w ith Geyr's book. I did not know at the tim e that by advising against publication, Heusinger in fact had preferred to avoid controversy with the reaction ary elem ents among the officers over Geyr's analysis of their past m istakes. 4 The Convention of Tauroggen was signed on December 30 ,18 12. While Napoleon's Grande Armée was in retreat from Russia, and Prussia was an ally of France, General Yorck, commanding 14,000 Prussian soldiers, negotiated with the Russian enemy and agreed to neutralize his troops for a period of two months. In January 18 13, Yorck active ly assisted the Russians and promoted the rise of the East Prussian estates against the French emperor. Frederick William, the king of Prussia, who proclaimed Yorck at first a rebel, declared war on France only in March. Yorck—who had acted for patriotic reasons —was exonerated by a board of inquiry under the pretext that military necessity had forced him to act against the w ill of his king.
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I turned to my second m ajor interest, German strategic ideas, intro ducing the question, as usual, w ith the observation that there was such a dearth of published m aterial on this point. Heusinger laughed. Then he said (like General Blum entritt), 'T h ere is a wealth of material that has been contributed to the work organized by the H istorical D ivision of your Department of the Army. To be sure, this deals chiefly w ith tactical problem s." I said: "Precisely. But what about studies you call 'operational' or strategic analyses of the current situation?" T he general replied that the m ost secret thought cannot be pub lished for reasons of security. T his point had also been made by other persons I talked to. Heusinger referred to an article by former General von Sodenstem .9 "If you read it, you w ill sense how he labored not to say too m u ch." Heusinger m entioned that he had talked repeatedly w ith Eisen hower and G ruenther about his own ideas. O f course W estern Europe cannot be defended at its present western border, but the defense w ill have to be organized in W estern Germany itself, which w ill become a theater of war. In short, there w on't be a defense line but a defense area. "U nfortunately, these ideas became known and were discussed in the press as the so-called Speidel Plan. T his has done much harm to m e." (N ote the conciliatory way in which he complained that leaks had occurred, and his use of indirection as a method to suggest that the Speidel Plan really was a Heusinger Plan.) T he general said that for more than a year, Foreign A ffairs had been trying to convince him to w rite an article on the subject I had brought up. " I have consistently refused. The article is ready in manuscript form , but one m ust be cautious. I cannot publish it." I insisted that the lack of public discussion seemed to me deplorable from a political point of view. If the German people are supposed to participate in the defense of Europe, are they not entitled to a clear statem ent, however cautious in tone, on the change in the strategic situation which a Euro pean defense force m ight bring about? I also referred to my observation of the sparse treatm ent the A-bomb tests had received in the German press. Heusinger repeated, "But one cannot talk about these things." I pressed further, "T h en I m ust conclude that, as far as the people are concerned, the German contribution to European defense may be based upon a delusion." T his, of course, was language Heusinger neither likes nor adopts. He said, "You are using a very harsh word. I 5 i95t l-
"Strategische Gedanken zur Gegenwart," W ehrw issenschaftliche Rundschau (May
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presum e you mean 'ostrich p olicy/ which is harsh enough." He con tinued, "I have been often asked by deputies in the Bundestag, includ ing several women deputies, whether I could gu aran tee that Ger m any's contribution to European defense would mean there w ill be no war. I have always answered that I could not give such a guarantee and that nobody could do so ." He did not believe that there would be war, and he thought its possibility would be further reduced by a stronger defense in Europe. But there remains a risk. "O ne cannot do anything w ithout running a risk. One must be able to face risks." He then talked about "an xiety ," which, given the context, clearly m eant to him the opposite of the ability to take risks. He presented France as the country ridden by anxiety and thus reluctant to take risks and to act. "France is anxious about the Russians. France is anxious about Germ any. France is anxious about her loss of power. These are her three great an xieties." N ot only the French Communists, but in particular French officers are opposed to a European Defense Com m unity. I returned to the question of strategy, saying that in addition to the article by Sodenstem , I had noted Erich D ethleffsen's idea that Central Europe m ight not be the m ain theater of war in case of a Soviet attack, and that from the Soviet point of view the Middle East was more im portant.6 Heusinger laughed and said, "D ethleffsen came to discuss this issue w ith me. I told him if his analysis were correct we could only hope that the Krem lin thinks the way he does." Heusinger pointed out the great econom ic im portance for both belligerents of the Ruhr-Saar region— w ithout saying explicitly that in view of it D ethleffsen's conception was unsound. Then he took up the second main feature of Dethleff sen 's strategic speculation, again without specific reference to Deth leffsen. "O f course," he said, "th e oil in Persia is important, but one m ust realize that at the present tim e the Soviets could not transport it even if they had access to it." Earlier in the conversation I had deplored the fact that the political parties in the Federal Republic had failed to take a nonpartisan ap proach to the treaty on the European Defense Community. I said that in m y opinion both the treaty on Germany and that on e d c were m at ters not only of decisive importance for Germany and her future, but also pregnant w ith irreconcilable political schism if not backed from 6 See p. 146, above.
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the beginning by a large m ajority. In particular, it seemed to me that the Socialists had much to leam from the experience in the later years of the republic, when the Reichswehr became alienated from the people at large and from the Socialists in particular. As I expected, I struck a most responsive chord. Heusinger agreed that there is a great need to avoid the negative approach. "T h e new W ehrm acht m ust not become known as the 'Adenauer soldiers.' If I may use a phrase that may sound to you as though it came from the Krem lin, what we need is 'unity among peasants, workers, and soldiers.' " He said that he had talked to Schumacher, reminding him of the example of the republic and the Socialist attitude toward the 100,000-man Reichswehr. Schumacher admitted that the Socialists had made a m istake at that tim e. Heusinger's book vividly reflects the author's concern with m ilitary organization, a flaw less command structure, and efficient staff work. Although H itler's policy and character are criticized, the author's m ain grievance appears to be H itler's disregard for traditional prin ciples of command and staff work. "A world separates H itler and the G eneral Staff."7 H itler rejected the intellectual work the General Staff was accustom ed to doing. He put great stock in mere w ill power, whereas the m ilitary were trained to appraise objectively the hard facts and base their decisions on such appraisals. A man like Haider ap peared to H itler to be no more than a pedant; and Hitler, in turn, was an am ateur so far as Haider and many other German staff officers were concerned. Heusinger quotes H itler as saying, "T h e General Staff of ficers think too much. Things appear too complicated to them ."8 The traditional German cooperation between the Supreme Command of the Army (o k h ) and the commanders of army groups in the field was rejected by H itler as a "parliam entarian" failure to issue commands at the focus of power. According to Heusinger's account, the most fatal steps leading to the obstruction of Germ any's m ilitary power were the following: H itler's abolition of the so-called coresponsibility of the chief of staff, thus vesting accountability for decisions in the commanders alone (winter 1938); the establishm ent of two separate command and staff organiza tions for the W ehrmacht on the one hand and the army on the other, 7 Adolf Heusinger, B efehl im W iderstreit, p. 209. • Ibid., p. 16$.
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w ith the result that whole theaters of war became the exclusive con cern of the W ehrm acht; and the destruction of the independence of the G eneral Staff and the army commanders. Like other generals, Heusinger favored the tradition H itler dis carded. Like Beck, he wished to see the conflict between army and W ehrm acht resolved in a unified, interservice Wehrmacht staff dom inated by the army. Finally, like Haider, Zeitzler, Guderian, and others, Heusinger wanted to see freedom of action restored to the G eneral Staff and senior commanding officers. H eusinger's book reinforces the fam iliar German postwar pattem of the history of World War n,according to which all major strategic m is takes on the German side were committed by H itler and could have been avoided if expert m ilitary advice had been heeded. The often fu tile efforts to offer such advice to H itler are presented as ''th e strug g le." In recording wartime conversations between highly placed of ficers, H itler is often referred to as o b en (literally, "on top," equivalent to "th e front office"). C onflicts of competence between the Wehr m acht and the army are dealt w ith as though they were fights between hostile forces. The ambiguous phrasing of orders so as to comply with H itler's commands and yet permit their violation by field commanders is reported w ith curious satisfaction. In all these regards Heusinger's book suggests an author preoccupied w ith considerations of m ilitary com petence and efficiency, smooth cooperation, proper procedures, and professional loyalties: his concerns are ultim ately bureaucratic in nature. In the last pages of his book,9 Heusinger questions why Germany's high m ilitary leaders did nothing to end the war sooner. This question, w hich has been raised by many German m ilitary writers after the war, may be taken as evidence of guilt feelings: if the generals regarded their conduct as irrépréhensible or self-explanatory, they would not try so strenuously to justify it. Heusinger begins by saying that there were a lim ited number of generals who understood the whole situation. He implies that those who lacked such understanding could not have been expected to act against H itler. T his fam iliar argument can be pushed very far. Sieg fried W estphal, one-tim e chief of staff to Rundstedt and Kesselring, has pointed out that Field Marshall Rundstedt's failure to act against H it ler, or at least to resign his post as commander in chief in the West in * * Ibid., pp. $86-88.
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1944, resulted in part from Rundstedt's lack of inform ation about the situation of the war as a w hole.10 According to H itler's "Order no. i " of January 13, 1945, "no officer and no office" was to know more than was essential for the performance of duties. Westphal speaks of an abuse of secrecy by die Nazis, and Heusinger at least im plies a sim ilar opinion. There can be no doubt that the tight control over inform ation by H itler—and in m atters of foreign news by G oebbels—was a recognized method of exercising power in the N azi regime, as it is to a lesser extent in all bureaucracies. It is nevertheless quite incorrect to say that com plete inform ation was a necessary condition of resistance to H itler; the officers participat ing in the plot against H itler were distinguished less by inform ation than by concern about the consequences of Nazi policy, by resolu tion, and perhaps also by the fact that their activities left them m ore tim e for reflection. Those generals who were informed about the situation as a whole could follow either one of two courses in Heusinger's opinion. Honor ing their oath, they "could try to prevent the worst by giving expert ad v ic e ." In th is case everything depended upon the willingness of the highest leader to take that advice. Or "they had to use force against the suprem e war lord, disregarding the laws of m ilitary obedience." Heusinger him self belongs of course to the first group of officers "w ho warned H itler many tim es . . . attempted to prevent H itler's wrong decisions, wrestled w ith him , and made counterproposal after counterproposal." H itler "abused in an unprecedented manner their loyalty w hich was rooted in their soldierly ethos." As to the second group Heusinger makes the melancholy observa tion, "W ho knows whether the use of force (against H itler and the Nazi regime] was possible at all, after nothing had been done at the tim e of Schleicher's murder in 1934, and after Generals Beck and Fritsch were resigned ever since their dism issal in 1938." Heusinger concludes his book w ith an eloquent presentation of the m oral con flict the German officers faced during the war when the struggle against the external enemy overshadowed all disaffection w ithin the R eich. "There were only tragic, insoluble con flicts." 10 Siegfried Westphal, H eer in Fesseln (Bonn, 1950), p. 294.
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A G erm an Postwar Boy May 2$, 1952 Returning home to Wiesbaden from Bad Godesberg in the afternoon, I crossed the Rhine by taxi at Koblenz and continued the trip by train on the other side of the Rhine from Ehrenbreitstein. There was a boy in the com partm ent I entered. He was dressed in his Sunday best, wearing a light blue corduroy jacket. He was traveling alone although he was hardly m ore than nine years old. I asked him where he was going. He had been visiting his father in Bonn and was returning to his mother in W iesbaden. "M y father was transferred to Bonn. We have no apart m ent as yet in Bonn," he explained. He was an only child. In answer to my question he said that he would like to have a sister rather than a brother, because she would not want to play with his toys but would have her own. He smiled in a most engaging manner, as though he asked m e to bear w ith his preference. I asked him why he was not sitting at the other side of the compart m ent where he could watch the boats on the Rhine. "T h is is the third tim e I have been on this trip. Soon we w ill come to the Loreley." It turned out that he knew every town and village by name and quite a bit of local history; it seemed to surprise him that his knowledge was superior to m ine. I told him that he was good in geography, but he m erely replied, " I do not know what that word m eans." He counted the number of trains we met, saying that he had met more on the way to Bonn. When he said something a grownup person would not say, he always smiled. Later, when I asked him about school, he mentioned that he was not good at all in writing. ''But I like to read," he said, adding that he did not get the books from a library. I said "Then you must have quite a library of your ow n." "N ot a library. I have twenty-five books, perhaps. Fairy tales m ostly and some history books." It occurred to me that the boy, although in many ways true to his age, som etim es spoke like a child robbed of his childhood: it was quite disconcerting. A t one point, when we passed a large vineyard, he told me that the work of the wine growers was harder than that of the ordinary farmers and explained briefly why this was so. He asked me about the so-called Tow er of M ice at Bingen. "W hat a strange nam e." He knew the story of the rat catcher of Hamelin, but why call a tower, 'T ow er of M ice?" "It looks as if it is good enough for people to live in ."
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Evidently he distinguished between ruins and ruins: while he called som e of the castles we were passing “beautiful," he usually remarked upon w hether they appeared habitable to him. He would interrupt the conversation whenever he came to a railroad track that looked as though it were no longer in use. "I always watch the toten G leise ("dead tracks") to find out whether they are really dead." Again he smiled, but then the sm ile faded quickly. Every once in a w hile he looked at me searchingly. When I caught him at it he would continue for a moment or two before turning away. "W hat w ill you do when you are grown up?" He replied, without turning his head toward me, "T h is is too hard for me to answer. Per haps I w ill becom e a com m ercial em ployee." And as though he sensed that I was dumbfounded by his prosaic choice, he did turn his head say ing, "M y dad teaches me English. We don't have it at school yet, but it w ill be useful later. I can count to 9 9 9 ." He smiled. When I asked him to do a little counting in English, he replied, "N ot now ." Then as though feeling that he might have been discourteous he added in Eng lish, "M y m other is at hom e." Approaching Wiesbaden we passed through Eltville. Slightly agi tated, he said, "E ltville. There is a castle here that belongs to a coun tess. Yes, it is near Eltville. It is all grown over with roses. But the Amis took it and now the countess lives somewhere else." I said incredulously, "T h e whole castle is covered w ith roses?" He hesitated for a mom ent and replied seriously, "Perhaps not the whole castle, but the roses clim b very high up on the walls and between the w indow s." A few m inutes later, when we entered the outskirts of Wiesbaden, he said, "W iesbaden, not a beautiful sight." I replied, "N o, but don't you like the Kurpark, the flowers and trees and the lake with the swans?" He said, "Y es, but you cannot live there." W hen the train entered the station I wanted to be sure that he had his tick et. He felt for it in his shirt pocket, which was buttoned: "Yes, I have it." "N ow , you m ust be tired." "A little ." "Y ou w ill go to bed soon, I guess." He did not reply, took his sm all bag, and left the compartment before m e. On the platform he looked back over his shoulder. He walked with quick little steps, keeping pace w ith the crowd. For an instant I thought of approaching his mother and speaking to
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her about the boy, but then it seemed to me that he would prefer talk ing to her about me instead or not m entioning anything at all about our train ride together.
Kurt von Tippelskirch: a Historian May 2 9 ,1952 Kurt von Tippelskirch was bom in 1891 in Berlin, became a soldier in 1910, and was a captain in the infantry at the end of World War I. He started the Second World War as lieutenant general in the General Staff of the army, was commander of the Thirtieth Division, and command ing general of the Tw elfth Army group. In 1944, he became deputy commander in chief of the Fourth Army; airplane accident in 1944 and wounded; prisoner of war in British and American camps from 194$ to January 1948. Since then he has published a voluminous history of World War n, partly based on unpublished German sources. "For a year and a half I lived like a monk to write that book," he told me. Tippelskirch lives as a refugee, ordinarily in cramped quarters in Lüneburg. He occupies the very pleasant sm all house, in which I visited him , only for a brief period and seems to enjoy it like a vacation. W hen I arrived by taxi, Tippelskirch came through the garden to meet m e at the gate. He had replied to my letter that he was looking forward to m eeting another Berliner. Frau von Tippelskirch had prepared a cold supper, and beer was served; both of them were impressed by the fact that I had made such a long trip to visit them . H e told me later that he feels quite isolated and does not see many people. When I left, he repeated how much he en joyed the evening and its "intellectu al stim ulation." Som etim e after supper a younger friend of his, Herr von G., and his w ife joined us. Tippelskirch explained that G. was a former captain and now works in an industrial firm , so that he has much contact with workers and farmers. He lives in Elberfeld, but was back in town for a visit. Because the Tippelskirchs have only one room serving as dining room and living room, the ladies sat at one end of the table and carried on their private conversation w hile Tippelskirch, G., and I talked about m atters of interest to me. Several tim es in this conversation, G. expressed a radical view,
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w hich Tippelskirch w ith some skill would immediately modify so as to reduce any unfavorable opinion I might have formed. W hile G. often contradicted me and behaved altogether like a person who did not w ant to m iss an opportunity to educate me, he always accepted Tippelsk irch 's views, corrections, or admonitions with immediate com pliance. I was glad I m et G ., because he closely resembles the image of a pet aversion I have had ever since my school days—the arrogant, con ceited, provincial, and prejudiced Prussian officer or fraternity stu dent; and nobody likes to live w ith an intense aversion, the object of w hich has becom e historical: .1 now know that the object is still fully alive, and so is my aversion. Tippelskirch represents the old generation of Prussian officers. He is correct, a conform ist, thoroughly conservative, and not without a cer tain modesty. He is Protestant, and the one occasion during the eve ning when he perm itted him self to show some feeling was when he recalled a church service as a young officer, where new recruits had recited in unison the Lord's Prayer. This was before the First World War. Tippelskirch said, "A t that tim e German youth in the German arm y knew what they were doing." T he word in terestin g has a slightly negative connotation for Tippel skirch, as though statem ents that are true cannot be interesting. On tw o occasions I remarked in connection w ith som ething he said, "T h is is in terestin g." He countered, "Y es, but I think it is correct." I am rather certain that Tippelskirch is what might be called a "d ecen t" person, but his conformism and deep-seated dependence on authority probably contribute to a certain lack of courage when in dependent judgment is required. He could well be an excellent soldier in tim es of no political turm oil.1 Tippelskirch knows Liddell Hart and cites Fuller in his book, par ticu larly on the air war. I asked him why Liddell Hart and Fuller 1 Only many years after I made these observations, I learned of a note that Tippels kirch had written on a 1940 memorandum from Dr. Etscheit, a Berlin lawyer collaborat ing with the anti-Hitler conspirator Admiral Canaris. Etscheit had pointed out that the preservation of Greater Germany, the avoidance of the destruction of Europe, and peace with the Western powers were possible only after the Hitler regime was overthrown. Tippelskirch commented that the author "attributed too much importance to the es timate of the situation by the German intellectual who had always been a pessimist___ The threat of the destruction of Europe |! | appears to be at least as strong a means of pres sure for the attainment of peace as an |intemational| understanding which depends on a domestic upheaval." (See Peter Hoffmann, Widerstand. Staatsstreich, Attentat iMunich, 1969], p. 191.)
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were so widely read in Germany. He replied that Liddell Hart had taken a great deal of interest in the German generals, had arranged for a literary outlet for them in Ireland (C osen toir), and that Fuller had w ritten a history of the war; hence, Tippelskirch had read Fuller in preparation for his own volume. (It is rather interesting that none of the persons I interviewed showed fam iliarity w ith American books on m ilitary affairs, save for the memoirs of Eisenhower, Mark Clark, and Bradley.) My question on strategic literature first led Tippelskirch to reply that he did not believe the Soviets would go to war. Different from form er General Blum entritt, who had given me a concise account of the reasons for this belief, Tippelskirch merely said, 'T h ey have too m uch to lo se." Later he added that "th e Slavs prefer the defensive. They also are closely calculating their risks—look at the way they play ch ess." As for the dearth of German strategic literature, Tippelskirch made the follow ing points: There have been no books and library materials available for conscientious studies, and the sordid conditions of life have not been conducive to intellectual work. Furthermore, there has been extrem ely little interest in this kind of writing on the part of the reading public. "T h e debacle of 194$ is still in their bones. Some people would say that the generals have waged a war and lost it, and we don't want to hear from them about the n ext." Finally, potential authors are deterred by the defamation of the m ilitary—"th in k of the 'war crim in a ls'!"—a defamation in which especially the Germans have been active. Tippelskirch had asked various newspaper editors whether they wanted to publish m ilitary articles. He always was turned down. I m entioned as an exception the Frankfurter A llgem ein e Zeitung, w hich has a m ilitary editor, and Tippelskirch said, "It is probably the only o n e." He is giving French lessons so he can afford to subscribe to L e M on de; he thinks this one French paper contains more discussions of m ilitary interest than all the German papers he knows. I asked him w hether he knows Chester W ilm ot's book.2 He did not, and I promised him at the end of my visit that I would send him a copy. He was much interested in W ilm ot's support of Montgomery's plan to push on toward the Ruhr when Eisenhower disapproved. In his opinion, Mont gom ery's strategy would have been extrem ely risky on account of the supply problem. "I think Eisenhower was right; you needed a harbor." 1 The Struggle for Europe (London, 19 11).
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Regarding the invasion of the Balkans he also felt doubtful, but added, 'T h e s e things cannot be decided in retrospect. One has to sit down and calcu late the logistical requirem ents." Then he remarked that he had alw ays considered the invasion of Southern France to be unnecessary. I replied that Eisenhower wanted to protect his deep flank. He nodded: it is always easier to criticize than to make these decisions, but if the forces earmarked for the invasion of Southern France had been thrown into Italy, it m ight have been possible to push up the peninsula and to invade the Balkans after all, although not across the Adriatic. Returning to the question about German strategic literature, he re marked tw ice that he considered his book to be a contribution toward inform ing the German public of what had really happened. W hen I asked about the possibility of filling the top positions in the new Germ an army, referring to the difficulty of recruiting former of ficers now holding positions in German business, he did not answer him self but turned to G. and asked for his opinion. G. immediately said, " I would not rejoin: the way we have been treated since 194$!" He then dwelled upon the responsibility these officers have toward th eir fam ilies. "U nless one could get a guarantee that one w ill not be treated again w ith disdain after a couple of years or som etim e in the future, one would be foolish to put on a uniform again." Tippelskirch then softened the tone of the conversation by saying, "O f course, one would not need many, and I believe that those one needs one would g et." He called attention to the great importance of a com petent and efficient corps of noncoms, adding that one of the most distinguished features of the German army had been its able corps of noncom s. G. concurred eagerly. When I asked again about officers, as distinguished from noncoms, Tippelskirch said rather coolly, "I have no contact w ith Bonn, and I don't seek it. They know my address if they want som ething from m e." I asked w hether existing conflicts of opinion among the former Germ an officers would not create difficulties in building up the Ger man defense forces. Both Tippelskirch and G. looked curiously at me, and instead of replying, asked w ith faint surprise what I was talking about. I asked them to consider, for example, the conflict between staff and line officer. Tippelskirch immediately came back by saying, "O h, there was no such conflict. In the German army, officers w ith experi ence at the front were put into staff positions and vice versa." Later in the discussion, however, he mentioned in a different context that m any of the officers holding high staff positions "knew their war
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games but had insufficient front experience." Tippelskirch also point* ed out that the tradition of the German army was not broken. He called attention to the fact that Seeckt, who commanded a very small Ger man army in the W eimar Republic, succeeded in continuing the tradi tion at a tim e when many Germans were alienated from the m ilitary. I said that many things had happened since Seeckt; there was not only the expansion of the armed forces under the Nazis, but there were also such things as July 20, 1944, which I thought had affected the "trad itio n ." Tippelskirch brushed this aside without hesitation, say ing, "If I may use a Nazi word, the tw entieth of July was 'something u niqu e/ It really had no significance for the tradition we are talking abou t." I still insisted that regardless of the impact of July 20 and the con flict it signified, I had always thought that on the highest level cer tain men had been close to the tradition, while others had departed from it. G . cam e to the support of Tippelskirch and asked again what I had in mind. I replied, "For example, the difference between men like Schöm er3 and B eck ." Tippelskirch bounced back by saying with great anim ation, " I knew Schöm er very w ell. Many years ago, we were in the same general staff together. Schöm er was not promoted because it was evident that he did not m eet the character requirem ents." (In this sim ple way Tippelskirch wished to dissociate the "tradition" from those events in the history of the German officer corps which had con tributed to the rain of this tradition.) I said, "O r take two other well-known names: Guderian and Graf Schw erin—they do not seem to be of one m ind." Tippelskirch did not com m ent on Guderian but said, "O f course, Schwerin was unsuccess ful in Bonn. T h is has special reasons residing in Schwerin's personal ity. He was unsuccessful before. I know this, because it happened under my com m and." (I left it at this cryptic reference, in that he did not volunteer any specific information.) Tippelskirch then returned to greener pastures by saying that no m atter what antim ilitaristic slogans used to be and still are current in Germ any, he felt quite strongly that the average man looks back to his m ilitary experience in peace tim e w ith pride. "T h e army was a great 3 Ferdinand Schömer was advanced by Hitler to the rank of general field marshal. He came from a lower middle-class family, wanted originally to become a lower-grade teacher. Decorated in World War I, he became an officer in the Reichswehr, failed to pass certain examinations, and was linked to Hitler by his resentment of the aristocratic corps of officers.
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educational institu tion after all. A ll the talk about K om m iss (army drill] and stem discipline is greatly exaggerated/' G. fully agreed, and when Tippelskirch asked him about his own experiences when he becam e a soldier in '3s or '36, G. said, "W ell, of course we liked it. One sim ply felt that anybody outside was not a regular guy." Then he added, "W hen I now see these sad characters in the street, youngsters w ith disheveled hair leaning against the walls, I must say it som etim es occurs to m e that it would do them some good to be drafted." W hen talking about the international difficulties in negotiations over the Germ an defense contribution, Tippelskirch remarked that it was silly for France to worry about a German desire for revenge. "T he French have always been concerned w ith that and always without reason. T he real French trouble is of course that they are worried about losing preponderance in Europe. One can understand this, because they are being bled w hite through the war in Indochina. But the alleged fear of Germ an revenge is merely a pretext for other fears." I ventured to suggest that due to the war in Indochina and to some other reasons, it was possible that the French would have difficulties contributing fourteen divisions to European defense. Did he think that W est Germ any could contribute more than twelve, disregarding the fact that such im balance would probably create new and grave political difficu lties on an international scale? Tippelskirch said, "Y es, W est Germany could probably contribute m ore. There is the rule of thumb, according to which the number of divisions a country can put up is approximately equal to half the num ber of m illions of its population. Therefore, in the case of West Germ any w ith a population of about fifty m illion, twenty-five divi sions should be entirely possible w ithout straining the economy too m u ch ." T h is brought us back to the subject of whether people would be w ill ing to join. G . remarked that the rule of thumb might not apply to Germ any "because of the terrible misery in which we are living." Again Tippelskirch in a fatherly way quickly reminded G. that one should perhaps no longer speak of "terrible m isery." Except for the un employed and the recipients of sm all pensions, m isery did not seem to be a word that described W est Germany today. G. nodded. Then he said, "T h ere is of course also the discrim ination we have spoken abou t." A t th is point I asked Tippelskirch to specify which political extreme — that on the Left or that on the Right—he considered the greater
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threat to the stability of Germany. He replied, "O h, the L eft." G. said pensively that he was not so certain about that. Tippelskirch asked him why it was that the f r p [Freie R eichspartei [Free R eich party], Rem er's Neo-Nazi party) had so many followers, especially in the British zone. G. replied, w ith great affect, 'T a k e the farm ers around here. They hate the guts of the British. One has to have seen that to believe it. The British have ruined everything the faim er has, his fields and roads." I inquired indifferently, "You mean in m aneuvers?" G . said, "Y es, in m aneuvers." Tippelskirch remarked, "B u t I have not heard of any bad harvest." G. merely repeated with force, "Indeed not, but their fields are ruined. " T his was about the high point of absurdity in the conversation. As though he felt that himself, G . continued, "T h ere have of course also been many m istakes made by the occupying powers. Take denazification, or even worse, the pref erence given to the inm ates of concentration camps. When the A llies cam e to Germany, they simply didn't know that 90 percent of them w ere wearing dirty sh irts!" I said, " It seem s to be always difficult to behave prudently in a coun try one conquers," and I asked him to explain just what he meant by "d irty sh irts." G. replied, "W ell, crim inals, deserters, and people like that. You can see now what has happened. These men were put into positions of power, because one did not know that one had to distin guish betw een the 10 percent and the 90 percent, and now you have corruption wherever you look ." He referred to Josef M üller in Bavaria. "If he did not have a dirty shirt, I do not know what a dirty shirt is."4 I said, " I don't think you know what you are saying. Perhaps it is not too late for you as a German to inform yourself about life and death in the Germ an concentration cam ps." From then on, G. remained silent. Later, the conversation turned to the s p d , and I remarked that it seem ed to me only fair to laud the Socialists for their early, strong stand against Com m unism . Tippelskirch took exception to this state m ent by saying that he was inclined to attribute the relative weakness of Com m unism in W est Germany to the German experiences with the Russians and to the N ational Socialist past. He added that in his view the great m erit of the s p d was less its anti-Comm unism than the fact 4 Dr. Josef Müller, a Catholic attorney in Munich, was an important intermediary be tween the m ilitary opposition to Hitler and the British. He used his contacts with the Vatican for this purpose since 1939, and had the confidence of Oster, Canaris, Dohnanyi, and Beck. He was anested by the Gestapo as early as April 1943, but survived, being lib erated by the Americans in Dachau at the end of April 194$.
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that in the early years after 1945, when misery was indeed great, it kept the m asses away from strikes and riots. Tippelskirch was strongly critical of Roosevelt's foreign policy dur ing the war. T his came up when I mentioned that W ilmot has much to say on th is subject. Tippelskirch then remarked that criticism of Tehe ran and Yalta are now of course commonplace. He had w ritten in his book, he said, that when Churchill urged Eisenhower to push on to and beyond Berlin, Churchill used the wrong address. He should have talked to Roosevelt about that. I replied that he surely recognized the first task of a statesm an in a war of coalition, namely to ensure that the coalition does not fall apart. Tippelskirch said, 'T ru e enough, but from 1943 on, he should have realized that he was Stalin's fool." Perhaps the m ost interesting part of the conversation dealt with anxiety in Germany. Tippelskirch's interest in the subject came as a surprise to me, although in retrospect it seems understandable enough that a man w ith his character should be ready to say something on the subject. I believe that he would not have revealed him self if I had in quired about the subject directly. As it was, I asked him whether he thought the Germans were afraid of war, or more specifically, of cer tain disasters that might befall them. I am certain that he would have frozen, had I asked him anything more personal than that. As it hap pened, he brought up the subject him self in order to account for the fact that so many Germans do not want to put on their uniforms again. I felt that he h a d to account for it in some way, precisely because he cher ishes the idea that being a soldier is a fine and noble thing and that all good Germ ans feel the same way. Tippelskirch said, "O f course, the G erm ans are terrib ly afraid of being taken prisoners of war by the R u ssians." He explained that this was the result of experiences during the war and the "devilish system of ten o r" used by the Russians. "M ind you, we were never afraid to fig h t the Russians, but one must have good weapons. Being taken prisoner is a different story. Then you are tortured, m u tila ted , killed, starved, or sent to Siberia. But we were not afraid to fight them at the very end of the war. " I asked whether he believed th is is the strongest and most predominant anxiety among the G erm ans today. He said, "Y es, and through this devilish system of ter ror it is kept alive: so many have not yet returned." I asked whether he believed this anxiety was stronger than that of being occupied by the Russians. Said Tippelskirch, "Far stronger." I remarked that I had assumed there would be greater fear of mal treatm ent by occupation troops, and in particular of rape. He replied,
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"W ell, you see the people say, 'we w ill not be caught as soldiers and hence we w ill be treated b etter/ " I again asked, "But what about fear for w ives and daughters?"Tippelskirch said: "People say this w ill pass. T he Russians w ill go away again." In this whole extraordinary ex change, Tippelskirch continuously introduced his statem ents with the phrase, "People say— " I t was quite evident that he wished to pro tect him self by attributing his own strong feelings to others. I inquired about anxiety w ith regard to bombing. Tippelskirch con sidered this an entirely different m atter. "In that case, the feeling is rather that one cannot do anything at all. Air raid shelters? Completely in vain. If you get hit, you get h it." Then he added that people did not really believe that there w ill be war, and hence the anxieties do not center around the possibility of being bombed. I noted his unawareness of the fact that the alleged belief that there w ill be no war should also alleviate fear of the Russians. Tippelskirch died in 1957.
A n x ie ty a b o u t th e R u ssia n s Frankfurt am Main, June 9 ,1952 When I visited former General Georg von Sodenstem later in Frank furt am M ain, I mentioned my impression that many people in Ger m any were scared about the future, and that even in print the word a n x iety com es up fairly often. In this connection I mentioned that Tippelskirch had told me about the fear of the Russians that plagues form er German soldiers. What was his opinion? W ithout moving his head an inch, Sodenstem said, "Cowardice, cow ardice." A fter he had thus paid his tribute to his past, he continued, "A t the end of the war our soldiers were terribly afraid of the Russians. No orderly retreat was possible because of it." Then he added some thing that threw light on Tippelskirch's agitation about this subject. T he fear was "in part the result of the Russian way of waging w ar." He explained that even as early as 1941 advancing German soldiers found other comrades stripped naked, hung on the trees, their sexual organs cut off and, like a medal, hung around their necks on a string, while their real medals covered the ghastly wound. "W e didn't believe it at headquarters and had the reports verified on the spot. It was true." •He then said that he had traveled in Russia before the war and he had
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found the Russians kindly and helpful. When you could not speak Russian, they would run to the railroad station to get you hot water so you could m ake tea on the train. 'T h is is the way the Slavs are—kindly today and ferocious tom orrow ." He said that the longer the war lasted the m ore fanatical the Russians became, and fear spread among the Germ an ranks not of fighting but of being taken prisoner.
O n A n x ie ty a b o u t A tta c k s fr o m th e A ir
May 13# 1951 Londoners during the blitz experienced the horror of fire, death, and destruction, w hich American civilians were spared. The Germans had been subjected to far more powerful area bombing than the British and been exposed to firestorm s in several cities, including Hamburg, Kassel, and Dresden. Firestorm s were the disasters in Europe most closely resem bling the consequences of atom ic attack in Japan. Not long ago, a woman about forty-five years of age, who had been in Ham burg during the war, told me w hile preparing supper for her family that she would com m it suicide rather than try to survive another war. In the m eantim e, I have talked to several experts in and outside of the M inistry of the Interior concerned w ith planning civil defense. T h is is an activity which—prior to the com plete legalization of Ger man rearm am ent—is, strictly speaking, a violation of Control Council Law no. 23 prohibiting German air defense. One official I talked to was a form er general, an intelligent and likable man, with a great deal of experience in passive air defense in World War n. As he told me, "T he problem of air defense, if fully understood, is quite simple. A largescale attack on a city from the air causes a catastrophe on the ground. C ivil air defense cannot prevent it; it begins after the catastrophe has occurred. Help can come only from outside areas that have not been subjected to attack. The notion that the fire brigades of your own city can rush in to help is nonsense; the equipment w ill bum. (He saw this happen.] T he first thing about civil defense is, therefore, not organiza tion, but protection; i.e., air raid shelters and reinforced cellars (which were blown up in Germany after the war by order of the occupation authorities). In addition, people must know how to protect themselves u n til help can com e from the outside. Nowadays, there is too much
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preoccupation w ith organization and too little with protection; ap parently th is is so also in your country." Then the general spoke about the firestorm s, but he did not dwell on the scenes of horror described in the literature: suffocation in the shel ters, people burning like torches, their feet sunk in the m olten pave m ent. He spoke of som ething else. In a toneless voice he said, 'T h e storm is so strong, it tears the clothes off so that in the face of death, the people are—naked!" T o the general this was unsurpassed human deg radation and horror, and it left an indelible mark of anxiety in his heart: people in the street swaying in a storm of fire, undressed before they die. I was silent. After the shadow of doomsday had passed, he con tinued. He said that the air attacks did not win the war and the morale of the people was not adversely affected by them, nor was production u n til the last phase of the war. All this is correct. Later I thought of political decisions that degraded human beings in a m easure comparable to that caused by a firestorm. Jews were sent naked to the ovens to be gassed, and participants in the abortive at tem pt to k ill and overthrow H itler on July 20, 1944, were hanged on piano wire—naked. Such was the fate of Admiral Canaris.
A n x ie ty in G erm a n y , A P a n e l D iscu ssio n June 5 -6 ,1 9 5 2 In the first m onths of 1952, members of wipoc gave more than two hundred public lectures throughout W estern Germany on the subject of European integration. In the discussions following these lectures the speakers had an unusual opportunity to observe German attitudes toward edc , German rearmament, and other current political issues. Upon my suggestion, a m eeting of some of the most prominent speak ers was arranged by Dr. O tto Klepper for the purpose of exchanging view s on these attitudes. The m eeting was held on a weekend in a country inn at H attenheim on the Rhine. T he two m ain topics under discussion were the role of Germany in Europe, and anxiety in Germany today. The discussions of these two topics were subsequently published in summary form in German.1 1 "Z u r psychologischen Situation in Westdeutschland/' in M itteilungen der Wirtschaftspolitischen G esellschaft von 1947, Rundschreiben no. 22 (October 1952).
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On the eve of the conference the group m et in the garden of the inn at w hich we were staying. There were talks over the dinner table that continued u ntil midnight in sm aller groups whose composition often shifted. Thus by the tim e the conference was to begin the next morn ing, everybody knew everyone else quite well. On the day of the con ference the group lunched together in a private room; seating at each table was decided by lot. P rotestan t p a stor: "In Germany a clear 'understanding of human ex isten ce' has been lost. Many features of German behavior which sug gest restlessness are due to anxiety. The dog who is anxious bites. In th is situation an increase of the national income w ill be helpful, but it w ill not solve the problem. The main task in Germany is the examina tion of basic anxiety (L eben san gst). This basic anxiety is not fear of death but rather fear of life ." A gricu ltu ral eco n o m ist: "O ne must remember that the people have not yet assim ilated the Nazi past. But the basic anxiety to be found in Germ any is not specifically a German phenomenon; it is characteris tic of the whole West and a consequence of the mechanization of life." E con om ist: "A nxiety is the result of the fear of death. Hence anxiety can be alleviated only by religion. Faith 'dissolves' anxiety." P rotestan t th eolog ian : "W e are witnessing a transformation of the w hole of W estern feeling. We are in the midst of a brewing chaos." I remarked that although it is important to know that general anx iety is widespread, and whereas it may be true that it has a religious base, progress in the discussion could perhaps best be made if everyone present would attem pt to state what in his opinion is specifically feared. Precisely what are people anxious about? E x ecu tiv e d irecto r o f (C ath olic) C h ristlich e G ild e von K etteier: "T h ere is fear of unemployment and this is 'very Germ an.' There is fear of Comm unism . There is fear of the consequences the General Treaty may have. All these fears, however, are merely expressions of basic anxiety. In the social sphere this anxiety can be traced to the fact that the connection of man w ith his property, the product of his labor, has been severed. The forms of collective life which have been developed in modem civilization are no true substitutes for this con nection w ith property." Farm er, fo rm er co lo n el: He agreed with Klepper, who had parenthet ically remarked that it is not the relation to property but the distribu tion of incom e which is important. He added that there is fear of war—and the naked fear of being hanged at the zonal border.
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K lep p er: In an attem pt to talk the other participants into a more real istic approach to the problem, Klepper remarked that he, like every body else, did not want to die and in that sense would seem to be afraid of death. But when asked what he was specifically anxious about, he would not m ention the fear of death but rather that w ip o g , his organi zation, m ight fail. S tu den t o f theology, form er m a jo r on th e G en eral Staff: Aroused by Klepper, he said that Adam and Eve are always the same. The problem of modem anxiety cannot be divorced from that of the human situa tion in general. Man is in need of “the concrete" which can only come from "th e m iddle." Referring to a conversation he had had w ith me the night before on the subject of best sellers in Germany today, he called attention to the fact that Ceram 's book, G ods, G raves an d Scholars, was being read very widely not only in Germany but in many other countries. The fact that a book like this could be a best seller indicated to him that man was deeply concerned with the question of his pur pose on this earth. F orm er G en eral D eth leffsen : "Everybody is full of anxiety. The ob jects vary. There is anxiety of terror, of war, of unemployment. More generally speaking, there is an anxiety of 'the final goal' (Z ielan gst): people do not know where they were going but are nevertheless active in order to convince them selves that they are going somewhere." S o cio lo g ist: "Both N ational Socialism and Bolshevism created pseudoreligious bonds. The falseness of these ties is now exposed. A man like Ernst Jünger in Germany has contributed to clearing the way toward new, genuine bonds. Jünger's development and change of heart are significant. In general, Germany is ahead of other countries in ex periencing the crisis of which anxiety is a sign. One merely needs to read books like Norman M ailer's T he N a ked an d th e D ead in order to see how far anxiety has spread in the United States. In fact, this book indicates not only anxiety but an advanced stage of disintegration of Am erican society. The basic problem is religious in character. Anxiety m anifests itself in disorientation and lack of principle. Inasmuch as even the pseudosupport has vanished, we can observe that man in every sphere of life easily changes the course and direction of his con duct. We m ust learn how to endure the crisis, how to bear it." F orm er gen eral, ex ecu tiv e d irecto r o f E van gelical A cadem y B ad B o ll: "A nxiety is not confined to countries that have suffered depriva tions. There is anxiety in Switzerland, even more so than in Germany. T he Sw iss, I am told, are afraid of hunger. One may wonder why. When
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asked about this, they w ill reply that until now everything went well because of their traditional neutrality. But at present the protective value of neutrality and the possibility of m aintaining it in a future con flic t are being seriously questioned in Switzerland. N eutrality no longer is enough. Hence anxiety. The m anifestations of anxiety in clude restlessness and rushing, and the desire to make money quickly. In a sense, it m ight be said that anxiety has also a positive function inasm uch as it drives people to w ork." E x ecu tiv e d irecto r o f (C ath olic) C h ristlich e G ild e von K etteier: "Fu rther m anifestations of anxiety are sensationalism , the urge to enjoy life (carpe diem ), poor memory, overstressed sexualism ." P rotestan t p a stor: "T h e most important m anifestation is perhaps the rush of modem life. People have no more tim e for leisure, for the 'creative pause/ There is a reaction against the 'strength-through-joy' philosophy of the Nazis. People now listen to the radio or go to the m ovies when they have tim e, often because they don't know what to do w ith their tim e." (This rem ark reminded me of a joke I had heard in a cabaret in Düsseldorf. T he son says to the father, "T h e radio is broken. What are we going to do?" The father: "L et's go to bed.") E con om ist: “T here a re tw o m ain m an ifestation s o f an xiety: ( 1) Fear of m aking a decision. T his is due to the fact that the connection be tw een cause and effect is no longer visible in social life. Its intelligibil ity has been lost. Thus people develop a preference for doing things that do not require responsible decisions. They take flight in a 'job.' (2 ) There is general fear of the future, which gives rise to the carpe d iem attitu d e." A gricu ltu ral eco n o m ist: As in a personal conversation the night be fore, he called attention to the book by Helmut Gollw itzer,2 which describes in a deeply moving way the author's experiences in Russian prison camps. The book is important because it shows the aid religion gives in situations of deep anxiety. E con om ic jou rn alist (sp ecializin g in agriculture): "There is no anx iety in the countryside. The econom ic security enjoyed by the rural population is based upon the organization of political pressure groups in w hich influential parts of that population are represented. The m odels of these organizations are the industrial trade unions. Of course, now fanners or representatives of farm organizations that com e back from the United States where they have gone on the ex2 Helmut Gollwitzer, Und führen, wohin du nicht w illst (Munich, 1952).
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change program return w ith the idea that agriculture is 'the biggest industry.' T he more this notion—that agriculture is 'an industry'— gains im portance in Germany, the more likely it is that anxiety w ill spread to the countryside as w ell." S tu d en t o f th eo log y : "N ote the lack of solidity exemplified by wide spread installm ent buying." (This observation was quickly dismissed by the econom ists present.) E con om ic jou rn alist (sp ecializin g in agriculture): "Among the peasants the question is often raised, 'D o you think the Russians w ill com e ?' T h is may be taken as a sign of fear or anxiety. And yet they look ahead w ith courage and w ith a kind of calm ness not to be found in the citie s. Among them som ething is often present—one would alm ost lik e to call m ythical notions—of the eternal character of the land and the farm : it w ill last through the generations even though you and I w ill perish tom orrow ."
Frido von Sengei und Etteilin: Soldier, Scholar, and Educator Spetzgard near Überlingen, May 31,1932 Frido von Senger, who studied in England as a Rhodes scholar, is one of the best educated and scholarly former German generals. He was in command of the German forces at the tim e Sicily was invaded, w it nessed the Salerno and Anzio landings in a high command position, and is particularly w ell known as the defender of Monte Cassino. At present, Senger is head m aster of Spetzgard, a boarding school for boys affiliated w ith Salem , a progressive and exclusive educational enter prise dating back to the W eimar Republic. It is located near Überlingen on Lake Constance. On the morning of May 31 , 1 went by train from Zürich to Con stance, and from there by ferry to Meersburg on the northern shore of the lake. An old town clim bing up the h ill and boasting one of the oldest Germ an castles, Meersburg dates back to Merovingian tim es. T he clim ate is southern and mild, alm ost subtropical. This was Pente cost, and the region was sprawling w ith Germans on vacation. Because bus connections to Überlingen were poor, I took a taxi and had no tim e to v isit Bim au, the exquisite baroque church, on the way. Spetzgard lies three kilom eters beyond Überlingen and can be
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reached only on a dirt road going uphill. Senger's apartment is on the second floor of the large building that has been turned into a school. As we were standing on the terrace, the view of the lake and the Alps in the distance was such that I did not speak. Senger said, "Y es, one gets spoiled here; but it is too wann and there is too much light. Let us go back in sid e." "In sid e" was a large room w ith fine old furniture and m any old books in leather bindings—the first large library of this kind I have seen in a private room in Germany. Evidently, Senger had been w orking at the typewriter on the table. Senger said that he felt like an outsider, having few acquaintances in Bonn. He did have som e contacts w ith the Swiss, had been writing for Sw iss magazines and also for British publications, for he has many con tacts in England; he knows Liddell Hart. The federal government of fered Senger the command of the Frontier Police, but he declined: "W hat is there in commanding io , ooo men who are never assembled in one place?" He also pointed out that he was not a Prussian and had never been through any General Staff school. "I stayed in the Reichs w ehr in the Republic, because I like horses and horseback riding." Senger now is sixty-one years old. Steltzer* had approached him to join the com m ittee concerned with the structure of the future German army, but again Senger was not tem pted. There were too many "generals" on this com m ittee; and didn't I think that they concerned them selves w ith outdated prob lem s? I did not understand. He explained that they were interested in insuring the form ation of a d em o cra tic German army, but the real problem was the development of a sense of loyalty to Europe. The other countries start from a dem ocratic basis, but not Germany. How can you have a dem ocratic army if there is no dem os?" Equality and freedom ! Regarding freedom, he said that the British are superior to the French, not to m ention the Germans, to whom belief in authority has always appeared so terribly important. He attributed the British sense of liberty to the influence of die "C alvin istic" tradition. Senger is a C atholic. I asked him about German youth. The boys he knew were not a rep resentative group of youngsters, he replied. The idea behind the Salem schools was to create the equivalent of a British public school system, w hich provides education for membership in a political elite. But such * On Steltzer, see the conversation with Graf Schwerin, p. i$$ , above, and p. 225, below.
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institu tions take tim e to develop and need the proper clim ate in which to grow. 'T a k e this school. It is expensive to send a boy here—d m a$o a m onth. We get the sons of the wealthy people from the postwar years, who have too m uch money and no political interests." He went on in his detached and somewhat scoffing manner. "W e take the boys only up to age sixteen, but in Salem there are older ones. The other day, they had a discussion about the tw entieth of July. A man like Ernst Remer (who in Berlin helped to suppress the revolt against Hitler, was sub sequently promoted to the rank of general, and now plays a leading role in the neo-Nazi party] enjoys a certain amount of popularity with these boys, because as a young man he resolutely fought officers and generals conspiring against the Führer. I suppose there is something rom antically adventurous about a man like Remer, or so the boys th in k . T he principal asked me to talk to the boys. He thought it might be good for them to hear from a real general, so that they w ill look at th is event from a different viewpoint. I talked to them ." When we spoke about the selection of officers for the new German army, Senger made a nice point: there w ill not be many higher posi tions to be filled, so quite a few men who would like to be asked really have no chance and therefore feel better pretending to be noncommit tal or hesitant about accepting a position. It is people like this whom a new book, W ehrm acht im Z w iespalt, attem pts to win over with the m ost outrageously nationalistic arguments. Senger had just received a copy for review and said that he did not know who had w ritten it under the pseudonym of Hugo C. Backhaus.21told him that I knew the book. TTien we talked about the German General Staff. I said that many Germ ans, not to m ention Englishmen and Americans, fail to distin guish carefully the good features of the German m ilitary tradition from the deplorable aberrations. They seem still to be influenced by thè no tions of Germ an m ilitarism which General Bemhardi's book3 had in vited during World War I. But there had been a break in the tradition; I m entioned Ludendorff and the treatm ent of Fritsch. Senger agreed readily enough, m entioning that at the tim e of his surrender in Italy, G eneral G ruenther had told him that he, Senger, could expect few people on the Allied side to distinguish between good and bad aspects of the Germ an m ilitary class. 2 The book was praised highly in the Communist-sponsored Nation Europa (Sep tember I 9 $ a ). 1 Friedrich von Bemhardil 1849-1930), Germ any and the Next War (1911).
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Senger then commented on German General Staff training, compar ing it w ith that of the Italians. He considered the Italian training to be excellent. Its characteristic trait was extraordinary thoroughness in studying all im plications of a given situation, no m atter how long it took. "In Germany, great stress was put on rapid understanding and on the ability to reach decisions quickly: one situation a day, so to speak. Ingenious and resourceful leadership was developed. The need for reso lu te action was hammered in. So was the importance of organization, flexib ility, conquest of fatigue—all this was m ost im pressive." He be lieved that this training generated the notion that a good officer could never falter in his conviction; that no situation could ever find him at the end of his tether. "If you have twelve divisions, and the enemy m ore than ten tim es as many, you still believe that it is possible to solve the m ilitary problem effectively by cutting off exposed armored spearheads—little Cannaes, and so o n ."4 T h e m ain shortcom ing of the German General Staff m entality, w hich he said he had many occasions to admire during the war, was its exclusive orientation toward ground warfare. Naval strategy and its re lation to the outcom e of land battles were not understood. The Rus sians suffered from the same shortcoming. When I mentioned that the Russians are m aking great efforts to build up their submarine arm, w hich is now stronger than H itler's had ever been at its peak, he re plied, "T h e Russians are no sailors. There is no substitute for tradi tio n ." He referred me to Frank Thiess's T sushim a. He added that I should bear in mind his bias in this regard: he had watched three im portant landings in the last war. I asked him why he talked only about the army and the navy w ith out m entioning the air force. He at once conceded that the air force was an effective strategic weapon, but only because the navy could eith er furnish, establish, or protect overseas bases. Probably again in fluenced by his experiences in Italy he stressed, like General Roettiger,5 that the U .S. Air Force never succeeded in cutting German com m unications through the Po Valley. He had been asked often, after the war, how the Germans managed to bring up reserves and supplies. "A ir attack always is interm ittent, and you can do some4 Cannae, the village in Apulia, Italy, where Hannibal was decisively defeated by the Romans in 216 bc . s General Hans Roettiger (1896-1960) became Inspekteur o f the German army in 1956; I had talked to him in Frankfurt am Main earlier in 1952.
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thing during the pauses." I replied that the situation was different in Normandy and later when Germany was invaded; also in Korea, at the tim e of the United Nations retreat, it appears that interdic tion from the air had saved the day. Senger pointed out that the German General Staff also failed to appreciate the importance of econom ics in modem war. "Perhaps it would be best if German staff officers in the European defense setup w ill be sent to Fontainebleau so that they w ill learn about broader perspectives." Com m enting on the soldierly qualities of different nations, Senger spoke of the Red Army w ith the highest respect, in particular of the perseverance and hardiness of the Russian, his unusual propen sity for night actions, and his ability to endure the most severe deprivations. "H e can lie for hours in the snow without food, and attack when it gets dark." As to the Italians, one does not know how good they would be as soldiers if they were well trained and w ell equipped. Concerning the Americans he said that he had always thought that there were two aspects to be taken into account. "O n the one hand, there is the hardiness which may come from the pioneer tradition and is still to be found among men who live much outdoors. On the other hand, the great comforts of civilization soften m en and cannot fail to drain their substance. This, it seems to me, is a m ore general problem ." W hen I asked him about anxiety in Germany, he rather agreed with Tippelskirch's opinion, which I related to him, that the fear of capture by the Russians was strong, but I do not think that he would have made the point spontaneously or with Tippelskirch's em otional involve m ent; nor did he say anything on the fear of bombing. He rather seemed to adhere to the commonsense notion—which, be it remem bered, is not common in Germany—that there are situations in which fear and caution are reasonable, the "G erm an" attitude being either one of the following extrem es: fear is unheroic and caution is sugges tive of cowardice, or—more recently—anxiety is all-pervasive, an essential characteristic of secularized man, who fears life as well as death. I saw Senger again on other trips to Germany, and we became friends. He was my house guest in Washington, D.C., and in Palo Alto, C alifornia. In i9 6 0 , his book K rieg in Europa was published. He sent m e a copy inscribed, 'T o my dear friend." Senger died in 1963.
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M ax H orkheim er and Frederick Pollock Ju n e7# 1952 M ax Horkheimer (1895-1973), a social philosopher who was direc tor of the In stitu t fü r S ozialforschu n g at the University of Frankfurt prior to 1933, left Germany when H itler came to power. He became a U .S. citizen. A few years ago, he returned to Frankfurt and, retaining his Am erican citizenship, advanced to the position of rector of the uni versity soon thereafter. The Institut, which had been closed by the N azis, was form ally reopened in 1952. It is engaged, among other things, in an em pirical study of the survival of Nazi attitudes among the Germ ans. I had m et Horkheimer late in 1936 or early in 1937, at a party in New York given by Em il Lederer ( 1882-1939), dean of the so-called Univer sity in Exile at the New School for Social Research. After the members of the Institu te for Social Research found a haven at Columbia Uni versity, they continued publishing their monographs and their tournai, Z eitsch rift fü r S ozialforschu n g, in German, although their publisher was Librairie Felix Alcan in Paris. In 1936, the institute published a very am bitious book, alm ost 1,000 pages long, to which Horkheimer, Erich Fromm, and Herbert Marcuse, among others, made important contributions. The book, Studien ü ber A u torität und F am ilie, a fore runner of the later efforts by institute members to dissect what they term ed the au th oritarian p erson ality, was received w ith acclaim in Am erican and British professional journals. I had reviewed it at length in the November 1936 issue of S ocial R esearch. W hile I had written favorably about many contributions, for example those of Kurt Gold stein, Karl A. W ittfogel, Ernst Manheim, and Paul Lazarsfeld, I had been critical of Erich Fromm's effort to discover the essence of author ity in a "sadom asochistic character." Besides, I had been offended by an em pirical analysis of Americans out of work and their reactions toward relief. The analysts had divided the "m atricentric type" among the unemployed into the "baby type," the "parasite type," and the "activ e m otherly type." T o me this classification appeared as a piece of in tellectu al arrogance; I commented—rather mildly, I thought, "T h ese concepts do not deserve the attention which they arrest, and in view of the trial character of the study it may be premature to judge them ; but the reviewer cannot refrain from mentioning that he finds th is sort of psychology mildly com ic." Horkheim er took offense at my review, either because he could not
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tolerate criticism and like many men in positions of authority lacked a sense of humor, or because he suspected me of sinister designs against his in stitu te. In any event, he regarded the party at Lederer's house as an opportunity for reprimanding me furiously in public: I was not only wrong, I had betrayed the solidarity on which refugees from the Third R eich had to depend. In 1952 , 1wanted to see Horkheimer in Frankfurt, but only if he did not hold a grudge against me. I asked Leo Lowenthal, a friend of mine and a form er member of the institute, to inquire of Horkheimer wheth er he, like m yself, considered the old incident closed. Horkheimer replied that he would be glad to see me. I saw him in his large, oak-paneled office at the University. Later, I lunched w ith him and Theodor Adorno, whom I had also m et in the U nited States—I believe in 19$ 1 when he applied for financial support at the Ford Foundation, w hile I was serving for three months as a con sultant to its newly established Division of the Behavioral Sciences. Horkheim er talked about German industrialists, and painted an om inous picture of the German ruling class in his rather unominous, strong Frankfurt accent. Recently he had attended a banquet of indus trialists and bankers, at which he was struck by "th e enormous sense of pow er" these gentlem en had. Nothing like it existed before 1933. " It is ," he continued, "as though they are modeling themselves after the clichés which their critics produced in the tw enties." I felt a bit im patient about the lack of detail and concreteness in this discourse. The tone in which Horkheimer conveyed his views suggested that he was about to reveal some cold-blooded conspiracy perpetrated by a handful of scheming coal magnates against the estab lished political authorities of the m ajor powers. But he never got be yond the introduction to his story. I asked him how this sense of power showed itself and whether he m eant power at home or in international affairs as well. Horkheimer slow ly replied that one of the gentlemen whom he did not name had said—and here he whispered, "W e have more leverage" ("W ir sitzen am längeren Hebelarm "). I shuddered: "Really? That's probably true." "W e ll," said Horkheimer, raising his brows, "th at is an entirely dif ferent question. One would have to examine whether or not that is true ,-1 m erely spoke of the image they have of them selves." It was all very silly . Horkheimer did say, however, that these mysterious men spoke w ith real scorn of the complete failure of the U.S. decartelization policy.
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I asked again for h is explanation of their sense of power. He replied, 'T h e y say the German economy or at least their own business is healthy and the American economy is unhealthy." Big industry in Germ any was allegedly confident that in Europe, Western Germany would become what Belgium had become in Benelux: the dominating power because of her industrial preeminence. Answering another question of mine, Horkheimer did not think that th is group was now considering the possibility of playing East against W est and W est against East to serve their own interests. "N ot y et." T hey are still oriented toward the W est. But once an understanding be tw een the U .S. and the U .S.S.R. was reached, their policy would change; they would strike bargains w ith the highest bidder. I m et Friedrich Pollock (1894-1970) at the opera in Wiesbaden, and saw him again in Frankfurt. I had seen him last at his home in Pacific Palisades, California. Pollock, a close friend of Max Horkheimer, also belonged to the institu te before 1933. He now is visiting professor at Frankfurt University. He, too, painted a gloomy picture of the growing power of the social reactionaries in German society. He attributed this trend to the per m issive policy of the United States, which was interested more in re arm am ent than in the democratization of Germany. Like Horkheimer, Pollock is an illustration of my pet theory that ex perienced—and remembered—history of one's early manhood often has a lasting influence on political views in later life. Pollock's views contain elem ents that were popular in the tw enties and early thirties among progressive German intellectuals. Partly to tease h im and partly to expose m yself to criticism , I ven tured to suggest that neither the "perm issive" character of U.S. policy nor the strength of German reaction could be assumed to be immut able. I said that I could conceive of a political situation in which the U nited States m ight com e to term s w ith the Soviet Union roughly along the following lines: peace in Korea and Indochina and possibly agreem ent on Austria, at the price of giving up efforts to build up a European defense organization in which Western Germany partici pated. Com m unist pressure in Asia, and the pressure of American big business against the current rate of armaments and the extent of foreign aid, m ight become powerful enough to force us even to con cede recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as part of a general settlem ent w ith the Soviet Union. I mentioned some evidence of opposition
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among U .S. businessm en to the current American armament effort. Pollock regarded this speculation as utterly fantastic. "T h is is en tirely im possible." It seemed to me that rather than permit him self to consider the possibility of an American-Soviet settlem ent at Western G erm any's expense, Pollock preferred to indulge in general pessimism about the state of the world and the power of German reactionary forces. « T h e C o m m itte e o f F ree Ju rists June 13,1952 Dr. Friedenau1 is the head of the Investigating Com m ittee of Free Jurists, founded in late 1949. The com m ittee, which has grown into an im portant organization, carries on work in the Soviet zone. Its head quarters is located in Berlin-Zehlendorf. Friedenau's personality and the activ ities of his com m ittee were vividly described in an article w hich appeared in T he N ew Y orker some months ago. Friedenau now claim s a staff of 80 people in West Berlin, and approx im ately 10,000 contact men in the Soviet zone. His organization re ceives about 5,000 visitors per m onth from the Soviet zone. The in form ation gathered by Friedenau's organization is imposing. The files include fairly detailed personnel cards on the intermediate and lower levels of the Soviet zone German hierarchy or functionaries, totaling 25,000 cases. T his file, w hich I inspected, has been compiled mainly from the inform ation received through the contact men in the Soviet zone (some of whom are in high positions) and from the visitors. In addition to the personnel file, very detailed records are kept— Friedenau him self showed me some samples—of administrative orders, the development of economic, political, and administrative life, etc. Finally, there is a file organized according to region, district, city, and so on. Upon entering the building, you check in and immediately encoun ter a large sign, w ith the warning, "D o Not M ention Your N am e." V isitors are given a number and led to a large waiting room where liter ature of the organization is displayed. Friedenau led me into this room at the end of our interview. There were about thirty people waiting to 1 Dr. Friedenau, bom in 1919, operated under a pseudonym. He now lives in West Germany under his real name.
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be received. Perhaps even more striking than their sordid and alm ost lifeless expressions was the com plete silence in the waiting room. No* body talked. Friedenau whispered into my ear, "You see they don't talk. They do not know whether there is an agent among them ." Every once in a w hile a number is called over a loud-speaker and one of the w aiting clien ts rises and disappears through a door. I asked Friedenau what his organization could possible do for these people who cam e for help and advice, rather than for sympathy. Fried enau said that they are given practical advice on how to conduct them selves w ithin the Soviet law, how to stay out of even more trouble than they are in, and so on. He gave a few illustrations. The organization would learn of a possibility, say in Potsdam, of getting a state loan for certain purposes. His men would contact a farmer near Potsdam and apprise him of the fact that this possibility existed. A different case Friedenau m entioned was that of a man in danger of being sent to pris on for four years for a m inor offense; upon receipt of a letter from the com m ittee, the prosecuting attorney changed his demand and asked that the punishm ent be more lenient; the man actually got off w ith a d m 300 fine. Friedenau claim s that these letters, which are sent through ordinary postal channels, had led to breakdowns in the hierarchy of East Ger m an officials; to self-protective actions, such as sending their relatives to W est Germ any; to more moderate behavior; to attem pts to contact Friedenau him self or men of his organization in order to insure them selves against retribution. Friedenau remarked, "It is not rare for persons in high positions to m ake high-sounding Com m unist speeches, and later try to m eet me som ewhere at the zonal border in order to let us know where they really stand ." It is for these reasons that Friedenau feels that the Soviet zone m ay w ell develop into a political liability for the Soviet Union. He definitely has the impression that not only is the mass of the popu lation opposed to the regime, but also the German functionaries of the regim e are quite unreliable from the Soviet point of view. T he com m ittee in the Soviet zone does not confine itself to working only w ith those people who com e for help and advice. Rather, the or ganization also distributes printed m aterials (I asked for and received sam ples) offering practical advice on how to conduct oneself in the So viet zone in case one is approached by the secret police, advice on mak ing tax payments strictly w ithin legal lim its, and so on. Sim ilarly, the com m ittee distributes detailed blacklists of agents to guard against.
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Dr. Friedenau's collaborators are chosen from among the informants of the organization in the Soviet zone. He claim s that he has working for him the m ost capable specialists in various fields, and that he as w ell as his staff consider them selves as belonging to the Soviet zone, but residing in W est Berlin. Friedenau was brief in his general political comments. He stated that the current s p d policy is unpopular in the Soviet zone. The issue of re u nification is not seen in the same light in which the opposition in W estern Germany presents it. People in the Soviet zone feel that the W est m ust be strong, because the Soviets only respect strength. As to the future, there are only two ways to achieve reunification: either by means of war, or by applying so much pressure that condi tions are created w hich in the minds of the Soviet leaders outweigh the m ilitary advantage which occupation constitutes. I asked him what he m eant by pressure. He explained that the zone's economic advantages to the Soviet Union have already become sm all. If certain personnel are "w ithdraw n" from the zone, it may turn into an economic liability. In addition, he feels that it is possible to apply moral pressure by showing concretely—both to the people in the Soviet Union and to the world outside—the com plete lawlessness of Soviet rule. He said that al though there can of course be no certainty that the application of such pressures would result in a Soviet withdrawal from the zone, there is a good chance that it might. T h is conversation on the political situation in the Eastern zone took place before Friedenau explained to me the work he is doing and its successes. I m ust adm it that the skepticism I felt at the beginning was som ewhat lessened after having listened to an account of his work and to the practical results he claim s to have achieved. Although Friedenau probably incorrectly assesses the Soviet chances of withdrawal, his activity is very impressive. He is a man w ith a price on his head—he has sent his fam ily to the West. He does not conduct propaganda; he acts in a very practical way. He is disin terested in ideology, but has a firm conviction that beyond the conflict of all ideologies the fight against lawlessness is a rallying point for those who suffer from injustice. Friedenau's organization has been greatly helped by r ia s , where I learned that Friedenau him self is not too popular. His m erits are, of course, recognized, but his egotism and attem pts to control organiza tions that m ight help his work are strongly resented. I was also told by the Am erican director of r ia s that the American personnel who back
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Friedenau do not always possess the degree of political sophistication that work of th is kind requires.
T h e S o c ia lis ts a n d R ea r m a m en t W ILLY BRANDT
fune 14,1952 Having m et W illy Brandt on two previous trips to Berlin in 1948 and 1950 , 1visited him in his home in Berlin-Schlachtensee. Bom in 1913, he is one of the younger leading s p d deputies. Recently he lost the elec tion for the chairmanship of the Land organization of the s p d in Berlin, an election in which he was backed by Kurt Schumacher and Erich O llenhauer.1 Brandt is a member of the Foreign Affairs Com m ittee of the Bundestag and has made several major speeches in the parlia m entary debates on e d c . A slen tered the house, Brandt got up from a garden chair outside the French door of his house. He listened quietly without interrupting as I explained my interests. I said that the s p d did not appear to have a con structive foreign policy; that its fierce opposition to Adenauer may lead to a deepening of the conflict among the German political parties at the expense of German national interests; that the Social Democrat ic patty, it seemed to me, needed men like Theodor Haubach and Carlo M ierendorff, who at the tim e of the Weimar Republic had clearly recognized the danger of alienating the s p d from the Reichswehr. Why was it that Swiss papers but not the s p d press appreciated the states m anlike qualities of Adenauer? A fter I had finished, Brandt began to talk quietly. He said that he understood my position, but that the situation was more complicated than I had portrayed it. He made the following points in defense of s p d policies. It was m ost unfortunate that Adenauer had not seen fit to give out any inform ation to the Bundestag until the treaties were signed. This com plete silence was unnecessary and provocative. Brandt explained — w ith signs of exasperation—that now that the texts of the contrac tual agreem ents have been made available, it is of course necessary to ' Member o f the s p d Presidium, successor to Schumacher (1901-43).
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study them carefully, and to compare them with the Japanese peace treaty, the arrangements in Austria for the city of Vienna, and so on. Furtherm ore the suddenness of the Allied change in policy toward Germ any left no tim e for the people to catch up with the transition from one policy to another. He did not say so explicitly, but he implied clearly that the fact that the General Treaty and the defense arrange* m ents were being proposed at the same tim e deprived the General Treaty of m uch of the credit it would otherwise have received. He sug gested that the W estern A llies had made a m istake in not first changing the O ccupation Statute and then approaching the problem of common defense later. Nor had h ic o g shown any skill in initiating a real exchange of ideas w ith Schum acher, the leader of the strongest German party. Brandt added that he did not doubt the good w ill on the part of top h ic o g per sonnel, but the fact remained that no exchange had taken place. Evi dently, he felt that the s p d had been slighted. Some tim e ago, he said, M r. Harriman once visited Schumacher, and Schumacher had been so impressed w ith the fact that he had been visited by a high-ranking Am erican official "th at he still speaks of that v isit." W illy Brandt did not defend Schum acher's extrem ism —i.e., his statem ent that whoever were to put his signature to the agreement would cease to be a German. He did say, however, that such state m ents should not be taken too seriously. "They are preelection cam paign statem en ts." Schumacher had recently retraced his steps in this regard in another speech or interview. Sm iling disarmingly, Brandt reminded m e of som e of the statem ents Churchill had made in his 194$ campaign, when he more or less equated a future Labor govern m ent in Britain w ith Gestapo rule in Germany. Brandt said that Schum acher is really more interested in m ilitary m atters than is Adenauer, and has a greater understanding of them. He said that Schum acher's knowledge of the history of the First World W ar is extraordinary: he knows the record of virtually every German division. "W e som etim es sm ile about it." When I asked him about the s p d deputies who concern them selves seriously with m ilitary affairs, he suggested that I talk w ith Fritz Erler ( 1913-67). I followed his advice —and from then on saw Erler at every opportunity, both in Germany and the U nited States. Brandt put much emphasis on the issue of reunifying Germany. It is absolutely necessary, he said, to prove to the German people that a four-power conference w ill lead to no desirable results; only then will
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the people be convinced that the Russian offers cannot be taken seriously. U nification is terribly important, and no measure that m ight possibly bring Germany nearer to it can be overlooked. If a con ference were held and were futile, the s p d would feel that at least a serious effort had been made to prove this futility. The s p d cannot afford to be regarded as a party lacking in nationalism . In the past— after World War I—it had paid too high a price for negligence in th is regard. T he Am erican position is "negotiation from strength." "O ne some tim es wonders what is meant. How strong? And if strong, what would the negotiations be about?"2 But there is also apprehension that some tim e in the future an American-Soviet accord might be possible at W est G erm any's expense. As for the lack of a constructive foreign policy, Brandt said that one w ill be developed in the coming months. I remarked that the timing seemed to be poor, because it may well come too late. Brandt replied that w ithout knowledge of the terms of the General Treaty, it has not been possible to develop alternative courses of action. It is possible, for exam ple, that neutrality is by no means the only alternative to the present arrangements about integration w ith the W est. He had been in Sweden recently, and so had Ollenhauer. Sweden is not neutral in the nineteenth-century sense of neutrality. It is rather a "freedomfiom -allian ce" kind of neutrality. Sweden is strong and would un doubtedly fight well if attacked by the East. She would in all likelihood receive the support of the W est. Why should it not be possible to con sider a sim ilar solution for Germany? As to the effect of rearmament on the structure of German society, Brandt was not concerned about the m ilitarization of political life by the social ascent of a new corps of officers. He agreed that there was a new spirit in the Blank office. The positions of high rank (i.e., generals) w hich have to be filled w ill not be a serious problem, because the pool of available persons is large and the number of positions, sm all. The situation is different w ith regard to the lower-ranking officers and the noncom s: "Every second experienced and available man may have to be tak en ." 1 asked him whether he felt that political reaction was a danger that had to be guarded against in Germany, adding that the codetermina 2 For a good German critique of that policy see Wilhelm W. Schütz, D eutschland am R ande zw eier Welten (Stuttgart, 1951).
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tion law for heavy industry seemed to have lessened this danger. Brandt disagreed. He said that while codetermination in heavy indus try was a progressive measure, I had to realize that both the Schuman Plan and the envisioned arrangements for the European Defense Com m unity would enable the various European authorities to make the basic decisions without regard for the interests of the people at large. Brandt spoke in this connection of a general trend toward the form ation of transnational managerial elites. He said that de G aulle might be in power tomorrow, and if the basic decisions w ithin the European Defense Community can be made w ithout m uch concern for the people and are really beyond parlia m entary control, the concern about reactionary tendencies is not en tirely groundless. Apparently as a result of my reference to Haubach and Mierendorff, when I was about to leave Brandt asked me whether I had known Julius Leber, the s p d leader whom the Nazis killed in connection w ith the plot against H itler on July 20, 1944. Leber's diary and an interesting critical account of s p d policies has just been published posthumously.3 Brandt knew Leber w ell.
o t t o su h r
June I9$2 O tto Suhr, bom in 1894, is the Social Dem ocratic president of the Berlin parliam ent. (He later became mayor of Berlin, and died in 1957.) He is also president of the H ochschu le fü r P olitik in Berlin. Before the N azis cam e to power, Suhr served as assistant to Siegfried Aufhäuser, who led the Socialist trade-union movement of the white-collar work ers (Afa-Bund, A llg em ein er F reier A n gestellten Bund). After the war Suhr fought the establishm ent of the Socialist U nity party (s e d , S ozial is tis c h e E in h eitsp artei D eu tschlan ds) in Berlin, in which the Com m unists attem pted to absorb and dominate the Social Democrats. I had not seen Suhr since 1932 . 1m et him again at a social gathering in Berlin arranged by Dr. Frankel. Much of the conversation was a rath er sharp exchange of views between Suhr and myself. Suhr has grown som ewhat pompous and, like many other Germans I met, likes to parade his inside inform ation and his foreign contacts. He mentioned 3 Julius Leber, Ein Mann geht seinen Yleg (Frankfurt, 1952).
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repeatedly the immense amount of work he has to do, his travels abroad, and his conversations w ith foreign diplomats. Since the end of th e war, Suhr has been to the United States. He said that he was to leave for London in a few days to see Mr. Eden. T he points Suhr made in our conversation included the following: (1) T he political situation in Western Germany is drifting toward "Bonapartism ," i.e., a m ilitary dictatorship. Evidently, this was mere ly an exaggerated way of stating his deep dissatisfaction with the Adenauer government and its policy of ioining e d c . Suhr explained that th is policy would restore the m ilitary to positions of political power, and that m ilitarism in Germany would thus be resurrected un der U .S. sponsorship. Later in the conversation Suhr pronounced the issue of e d c to be in fact dead, because the treaty would not be ratified by all parliam ents concerned and the United States would be unable to resist W estern pressures in favor of a four-power conference w ith the Soviet U nion. (2) Suhr averred that U .S. policy on e d c was determined in "the Pentagon" rather than in the State Department. The exclusive concern in the Pentagon was the strengthening of m ilitary power in Western Europe rather than the political and economic consequences of arm am ent in the countries involved. Specifically, German political in terests were neglected in American plans, and American indifference toward democracy in Germany was complete. In support of his opinion that the Pentagon determined U.S. policy toward Germany, Suhr cited the case of the so-called Pfleiderer Plan.1 According to this plan Germany was to be divided into th ree parts, w ith a neutralized middle zone between her Eastern and Western regions. T he plan had been presented by f d p Deputy Karl Georg Pfleiderer and had caused some lively public discussion in West Ger many. Suhr claim ed that several months before, he had been ap proached by Americans (who were opposed to "th e Pentagon policy") 1 Karl Georg Pfleiderer (1899-1957) was in the German diplomatic service from 1923 to 194$. After the war he served as deputy for the fdp in the Bundestag from 1949 to 1957, when he became ambassador to Yugoslavia. He died in 1957. The ideas of the Pfleiderer Plan were first presented in a speech on June 6,1952. In this speech, he criticized the in ternational agreements on May 26 and 27,19 52, to which Adenauer had affixed his sig nature in Paris and Bonn and which were eventually transformed into the Paris treaties of October 1954 (see Preface, Part Three). For the text of Pfleiderer's speech, see K. G. Pfleiderer, P olitik für D eutschland. Reden und Aufsätze (Stuttgart, 1961), pp. 83-99.
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to present th is plan to the German public. He said that he had declined the offer and now congratulated him self on his caution, as it had be com e quite evident to everyone that any attem pt to present alterna tives to Am erican Pentagon policy was utterly futile. Suhr used this alleged and unlikely incident to evade my question as to what alternatives Social Dem ocratic opposition could offer to Ad enauer's policy. I had made the point that so long as his party failed to present any realistic alternative to Adenauer's foreign policy, impar tia l observers of the German political scene could only conclude that the opposition regarded the foreign policy issue merely as an oppor tunity to register gains in the dom estic struggle for power. (3) T he policy of rem ilitarizing W estern Germany by way of e d c would antagonize the Soviet Union and render the reunification of Germ any im possible. The United States was not interested in explor ing the possibility of coming to term s w ith the Soviet Union on the future of Germany, and had accepted the partition of his country as final. W hen I pointed out that the long record of four-power confer ences after the war had been anything but encouraging, Suhr merely repeated that the U .S. was not even interested in finding out what Soviet intentions toward Germany were: otherwise a conference would be acceptable. I said that Soviet policy was w ell known to everybody and the chance of changing it increased w ith increasing strength of the West. Suhr answered in the fam iliar socialist vein, leaving little doubt in my m ind that in his opinion the unification of Germany could and ought to be obtained at the price of renouncing the rearmament of West Germ any. In fact, Suhr advocated a policy of neutralism for Germany. He did not realistically face either the Soviet threat to a neutralized Germ any or the danger to the Soviet Union of a unified, non-Comm unist Germany. Instead he talked about the relationship between W est Germ any and the Soviet Union as though all German nationalist w ishes would be granted by the sweetly reasonable Comm unists were it not for the obstinate, anti-Soviet policy of the Pentagon. None of this should be regarded as characteristic of Suhr: it was rather the s p d party line, w hich Suhr followed, albeit without intellectual discomfort. (4) Like other Germans, Suhr bitterly resented the procedure of U.S. policy to offer the contractual agreement as a q u id p ro q u o of German participation in e d c . He insisted that the liquidation of the Occupa tion Statu te should have preceded any American policy of German re
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arm am ent and that the political unification of Western Europe, which would in its turn presuppose a fair (i.e., anti-French) decision on the future of the Saar region, should precede the formation of a European army. T he sam e point was made m ost forcefully by Carlo Schmid in "G erm any and Europe—The German Social Dem ocratic Program ,"2 an article published soon after my conversation w ith O tto Suhr: In particular, the s p d violently opposed one method of negotiation used frequently by the Western Powers—that of "Ju nctim ," signi fied by the fact that each tim e the Occupying Powers decide to dis continue some regulation which has become unbearable they m ake the action, entirely appropriate on its own merits, subject to the assum ption by the Germans of obligations which a free nation would not norm ally be asked to accept. The rate of industrial dis m antling, for instance, had come to be recognized by everybody as senseless and harmful; it was finally altered on condition that the Federal Governm ent accept the Ruhr statute. And now, as I write, W est Germ any's status as an occupied area is to be revised subject to its joining the European Defense Community .3 T he nationalist tendencies of the German refugees from the East and Czechoslovakia should not be underestimated. If they currently cause no trouble to W est German democracy, they are a politically explosive force. It was my impression that Suhr made this point chiefly to back up indirectly his insistence on Germany's reunification.
R e in h a r d G e h le n : D ir ec to r o f th e G erm a n C IA June 1 7 ,195a C ontact w ith this elusive gentleman was made by O tto Klepper, who in turn relied on Erich Dethleffsen, G ehlen's former comrade-inarm s. The m eeting place was a "hunting lodge" in the Taunus moun tains. G ehlen lives under an assumed name and most carefully controls all com m unications w ith the outside world. The arrangement of the visit did not come off until the last minute. Finally Klepper called up to give the details of the arrangement. He was to drive to the 2 Foreign Affairs (July 1951) 2 Ibid., pp. 535-36.
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railroad station at Oberursel where we would be m et by a forester driv ing another car. The person we were to visit was known as Herr Schneider. My respect for Klepper's persuasive powers became even greater when upon m eeting Gehlen, it turned out that he had m istaken the Rand Corporation, for which I worked at the tim e, for Sir Arthur R ank's film outfit. W hen we arrived at the railroad station, somewhat in advance of the appointed tim e, no forester was in sight, but directly in front of us a car was parked w ith a young lady sitting behind the wheel. After about ten m inutes she cam e to inquire whether there was a M inister Klepper among us. We changed cars and drove for about half an hour up into the h ills to a place w hich to my mind was considerably more formidable than a hunting lodge. In fact, we drove up to a beautiful, large house in the m idst of the woods. There was evidence of a sm all staff of house keepers, foresters, a tamed wild boar, and a little deer on the grounds near the house. G ehlen had arrived that day from his usual quarters near Munich where, according to Klepper, he has an even more impressive resi dence. He had driven up in a new Ford accompanied by Fräulein Schulz, the young lady who m et us at the railroad station; she seemed to function as his secretary-chauffeur. Her accent indicated that she cam e from Pomerania. O n the way up to the lodge, and later on the return trip to the station, she spoke alm ost without interruption about the car she was driving and about cars in general, showing a deep affection for engines, the m astering of road curves, and everything connected with motoring. T he engine of the new Ford she referred to as d as M otörchen ("the little m otor"). As we approached the lodge, Fräulein Schulz blew the hom twice, and a man about forty years of age opened the door. He was clean shaven, w ith a faint odor of eau de cologne, exceedingly well dressed. He welcomed us. It was Gehlen. He can perhaps best be described as neat. Even his eyes seemed polished, and throughout the conversation w hich followed I had the silly idea that he uses neatness to hide his pro fession: he could w ell be the chief of the sales department of a fine clothing store for men, if one were to judge him by his appearance. We settled com fortably in easy chairs around a coffee table, and soon a maid served coffee and tea, put a large plate of sandwiches on the table, and passed around a tray w ith strawberry tarts and whipped
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cream . It took a m inute or two for Gehlen to get over his embarrass m ent about having m istaken Rand for the Rank organization. I ex plained that Rand has never made any movies and in all likelihood would never make them . I started the conversation by asking Gehlen for his views on the pos sib ility and usefulness of estim ating Soviet intentions. Gehlen responded w ith visible interest. On his visits to the United States he had always found that the American officials want fa cts, whereas if he understood m e correctly I was interested in opin ion s as w ell. He then explained that under General Haider he had been encouraged to insist throughout the war in the East that his organization produce at regular, frequent intervals intelligence estim ates on enemy intentions, i.e., not only on what the enemy could do but on what he might want to do. He said there had been opposition to this practice in the ranks of his own organization, "because people are afraid of making m istakes in w rit in g ." However, he had insisted on this practice because of the benefits to be derived from it, in particular the intellectual clarification that the intelligence personnel was thus forced to achieve. "Besides, everybody can m ake m istak es." He added in a m atter-of-fact way, "During the war we have always been right, but this was perhaps due to accident or lu ck ." I asked w hether in his work he had developed a "cod e," i.e., general rules of typical Soviet m ilitary behavior. Referring to a statem ent I had made about the need for careful a n a ly tical work in formulating such a code of behavior, he said that the approach of his organization should rather be characterized as entirely "em pirical" in nature. "O ne must study closely what has happened in the past, evaluate this experience, and u tilize it in attem pts to foresee what might happpen." He was m ost cautious in formulating what he considered to be cer tain general traits of Soviet behavior, but made the following points: (i) T he Soviets more than other powers are always interested in m in im izing their risks. (2) In an attem pt to reach their ultim ate goal they approach it in stages, carefully calculating the situation at the end of each phase. (3) Their approach to political and m ilitary problems can be described as more "global" than that of most other powers: areas geographically distant are taken into account as parts of the same situ ation so that a decision in central Europe may be affected by aim s they pursue in the Far East. As G ehlen talked along these lines it seemed to me that he was under som e m inor strain, as though he felt he was able to say much
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m ore but had never found him self in a situation in which he was asked to give a form al account of the principles he in fact observed in his work. He referred several tim es to the need of using one's sense of touch in these m atters. And when I, acknowledging the need for this sense, still requested further generalizations which would permit this sense of touch to be translated into som ething like a doctrine, he finally said that he would be glad to have such a document prepared for m e. G ehlen was on safer grounds when he became more concrete,- he spoke w ith greater ease and w ith a sense of greater self-confidence dur ing the rest of the conversation. He made the banal point that the "Sov iet m entality" we were discussing must be understood as a Slavic trait, grounded in historic tradition and modified by Bolshevism. Concerning the situation in Eastern Germany, he said that the Red Army w ill not evacuate the Soviet zone unless forced to do so in war. T he East German police force represented the cadres of twentyfour divisions, w hich could be brought up to full strength by the spring of 19$ 3 and w hich, " if I remember correctly," are now heavily equipped w ith artillery at the rate of about 30 percent. He said, "C om pare th is w ith W estern strength." There are five U.S. divisions and five U.K. divisions, of w hich one may have to be discounted. No German forces to speak of w ill exist until 1934. The real danger to Berlin is an attack by Germ an forces som etim e in 1933, which could not be re sisted m ilitarily except in all-out war and which need not in the least involve Soviet forces. "W estern European defense efforts have been m uch too slow ." In drawing this balance, Gehlen did not mention the French, Italian, or other European forces in the West. G ehlen turned to a rapid survey of the world strategic situation in reply to my brief summary of D ethleffsen's argument that Central Europe may not be the m ain theater in another war. W ithout further am plification he said that the area in which the Soviet Union can be strategically defeated is the Black Sea. He attributed very great politi cal im portance to the Middle East in general. If the Soviets should suc cessfully gain ascendancy in Iran—for example, by solidifying M ohammedan opposition to U .S. policy—the presently strong posi tion of Turkey in the W estern defense system would crumble. A situation would be created in the Middle East comparable to the developm ents in the Far East, "w here you lost China not after the war but due to a short-sighted policy already during the w ar." Even at present, Soviet preponderance in Europe is such that only
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the Politburo's fear of a long and spreading war has contained aggres sive action. In this context Gehlen attributed prime importance to T ito 's defection.4 He went so far as to say that in his opinion T ito's de fection m ight have secured peace in Europe. "Clearly, it was the great est blow the Soviets received since the end of the w ar." G ehlen summed up his opinion in the statem ent that a weak Europe leads to war. I called his attention to the fact that this opinion might be said to con flict w ith his view that the Soviet leadership is most cau tious in calculating the risks of its actions. Even if the Red forces should succeed in overrunning Europe, the war would not come to an end, and the Politburo would surely expect the war to be fought to the b itter end. Things would be different if the Soviet Union could hope to divide World War ininto two separate wars: the war in Europe and the M iddle East, and a "Fourth World W ar" against the remainder of the free world at a later date. G ehlen replied that whereas there was m erit in my observation, one m ust ask oneself from which position the war could be efficiently pur sued by the W est once Europe had been overrun. He then paused and brought up the question of atom ic attack. (He was in fact one of the few generals I talked to who spontaneously brought up this subject.) He said that it would be foolish to m inim ize the importance of the Abomb, but its effect is not fully known, and in any case, "th e atom weapon does not decide the w ar." It w ill always be necessary to trans port soldiers "by foot, m otor or a ir" to the decisive places which must be occupied. . In the m eantim e, he continued, Soviet defense against strategic at tack is being strengthened. Furthermore it is not known whether the U .S. Strategic Air Force can reach its targets. Finally, there w ill of course be new types of aircrafts which may change the situation, "but you know more about this than I do." The peak year of U.S. armament w ill be 195$. On the whole, G ehlen's remarks did not imply great confidence that from a m ilitary point of view the situation was safe until 1955. He did not expect all-out war in consequence of a Soviet attack, but rather seem ed apprehensive that in the foreseeable future the Soviet Union m ight succeed in increasing its relative power vis-à-vis the West by political warfare and satellite actions. Later on, he stressed this ap prehension im plicitly by pointing to the lack of initiative in Western "p o litical w arfare." 4 The break between Moscow and Belgrade in (une 1948.
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I told G ehlen that I had gained the impression that many high* ranking form er German generals are land-bound in their strategic thinking and that possibly a good case could be made for the conten tion that this lim itation of German strategy contributed to Germany's defeat in the last war. He seemed somewhat stunned by this observa tion and said, "O h, you m ust talk w ith General Haider." All important decisions during the last war, Gehlen claimed, were taken against the advice of the General Staff. T h is sweeping statem ent, which in this form is m anifestly incor rect, may be taken as an indication of G ehlen's identification w ith the G eneral Staff, whose tradition and accom plishm ents he apparently considers to be flaw less. As further evidence, note his previous remark that his intelligence estim ates during the last war had never been wrong. Finally, his remark about the tw entieth of July made later in the conversation, further supports the inference that his views of Germ an strategic and operational leadership during World War n as w ell as his views of the German corps of officers, reflect strong profes sional pride and border on conceit. Not once during the conversation did he criticize German strategists, strategy, or the German officers' class. G ehlen talked about the lack of initiative in Allied political warfare against the Soviet Union. He mentioned that a couple of years ago he had prepared a plan on political warfare which was given to the Depart m ent of State (the so-called Gehlen Plan). In this plan he advocated a large-scale campaign to try to convince the people in Soviet satellite countries and in the neutral nations, as well as the U.S. allies in Europe, that W estern policy served peace and was designed to preserve it. N othing happened in consequence of this suggestion, but the Soviets started th eir peace campaign which Gehlen considers a success. He referred to the incident of a Swedish plane being shot down, and expressed approval of the Swedish reaction. "T h is is the way it must be done. One m ust be firm w ith the Soviets. The Swedes have an nounced that they w ill have fighters accompany the unarmed search ing planes." He also mentioned a suggestion he had received from "a R u ssian," nam ely that a hundred jet fighters be sent through the air corridor to Berlin as a demonstration of U.S. firmness. He said he had forwarded this suggestion to the Americans. "O ne could even an nounce in advance that the jets would be sent to Berlin in the course of m aneuvers; or one could send them to accompany regular courier and
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transport planes." G ehlen's proposals were rejected. Gehlen added that it is of course one thing to propose such an idea and another to m ake a decision to adopt it, which involves responsibility for possible failure. "A move like this may turn out to be a provocation." (Note that G ehlen argued his own case in the customary manner, neglecting what he had previously called "th e Soviet m entality.") It appears that Gehlen is very much interested in political warfare. He m entioned that he is now engaged in efforts to bring together a num ber of experts from universities and other places to work out a solution to the following problem: It takes a long tim e and much effort to place an agent of his organization in the proper spot. Once he is in it he may be exposed for many years to the influence of Soviet propa ganda; in all his contacts he is continuously subject to anti-W estern influence. "How can we be sure that he w ill remain immune? He must be thoroughly prepared for the ideological strain he cannot evade." O n the question of staffing the high-ranking positions in the future Germ an contingent of the European defense community, Gehlen felt th at it would not be difficult to recruit properly qualified personnel. Like other generals I talked to, he was m ost emphatic, however, in his insistence that the issue of the war crim inals would have to be re moved first. "A s long as a man like General M anstein is imprisoned at W erl, I shall not put on a uniform again. I know that Manstein is in n o cen t." (This was the only tim e in the conversation in which Gehlen showed strong affect and spoke so pointedly of him self in order to state his case.) He suggested that one should dismiss the generals from the A llied prison camps on the basis of good behavior pending a legal revision of the indictm ents. He felt that something must be done im m ediately. I expressed m ild surprise that he would be satisfied w ith a solution w hich would release the prisoners but not restore their honor, saying that either the previous decision was right and that it may have to stand or it was wrong, in which case it would have to be revised. Char acteristically (I thought) Gehlen answered that he was thinking of a solution that is politically possible. Since "th e prestige" of the West ern allies is involved, he did not think that a legal rectification should be insisted upon. Thus, Gehlen was perfectly prepared to put the moral issue of the war crim es trials aside,if actual release could be obtained. I found this readiness to compromise on the moral issue particularly in teresting in view of G ehlen's aggressive statem ent that he could not put on a uniform u ntil the case is solved. Nor was he in the least embar
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rassed in any sense by the (act that I raised the moral issue in his stead. I asked about the tw entieth of July. Like Tippelskirch Gehlen said that July 20 was a "unique" event (as though something unique was ir relevant for the "trad ition " and cohesion of the officers' class). He did add, however, that in Germany a distinction is made between the po litica l crim e of high treason (H ochverrat, which is punished by death but not considered to be dishonorable necessarily), and betrayal of country [L an desverrat, which is dishonorable). He suggested as cour teously as possible that those participants in the July 20 pu tsch who had com m itted not only high treason but had betrayed their country— for exam ple, by giving inform ation to the enemy during the war— could not be tolerated as members of the new German army. He men tioned O ster as a case in point. O ster's case became a moral cause célèbre among the m ilitary after the war. General Hans Oster, working for counterintelligence in Ad m iral C anaris's office, informed the Dutch m ilitary attaché in Berlin about the ever-changing date set for the German invasion of Holland and Belgium. The Dutch did not take the news seriously, so that they were surprised despite repeated warnings, and the Belgians alerted their forces too late. O ster, of course, wanted to save his country from destruction, not harm it—a fact never mentioned by his critics. G ehlen averred that the Social Democrats oppose Adenauer's foreign policy w ithout offering an alternative; and he regarded as a p olitical and m ilitary absurdity the Pfleideier Plan, i.e., the suggestion that Germ any be divided into three zones w ith a German armed neu tral zone as a buffer between the eastern and western parts. I did not tell him that O tto Suhr believed the plan had originated in the Pentagon. W hen I was about to leave, Gehlen asked me to call on him when ever I needed help or wished to make other contacts. We exchanged our addresses; his is that of a lawyer in Frankfurt. Finally he inquired w hether he should report our meeting to his American contacts. I re plied that th is was entirely up to him and that we had not discussed any sensitive inform ation. At this point Klepper said that he did not quite understand the problem. It seemed to him that the meeting had been entirely social. Gehlen agreed that he would so regard the conver sation and would not report to the unmentionable agency that he had talked to me. And yet a few days later, I was closely questioned by an Am erican official as to why I had seen the elusive general. I was told that nobody else "outside of official channels" has ever succeeded— probably an exaggeration.
Four Observations and Conversations 1954-1955
Preface to Part Four S talin d ie d in th e spring o f 1953, and Churchill believed for a mo m ent that the new Com m unist leaders might be inclined to revise Soviet policy. In a speech on May 11 ,1953, he suggested no less than a sum m it conference to explore the possibility of reconciling the Soviet need for security w ith W estern policy objectives. C hurchill's hope was soon dashed. The uprising of June 17,1953, in East Germany and Berlin was suppressed by East German police and Soviet troops. In Septem ber 1953, Adenauer approached the dom estic summit of his postwar political career. After a triumphant return from his first v isit to the United States, the Christian Democrats won an absolute m ajority in the general elections, and the new coalition government commanded a two-thirds m ajority in the Bundestag. This resounding success put an end to the bitter German controversy about the consti tu tionality of rearmament, which in the words of Erich Ollenhauer, Schum acher's successor as head of the s p d , had brought Germany close to a constitutional crisis. Now, after the elections, the govern m ent could m uster enough votes to change the constitution, if need be. T he third "reading" of the e d c treaty prior to its ratification took place on M arch 19,1954. Another conference of the foreign m inisters of the four major powers in Berlin from January 25 to February 14,1954, preceded the vote in the Bundestag. At that conference, the moot issue of the reunification of Germ any was discussed once again w ithout any progress. At this con ference, M olotov said to Eden in a private conversation that the four powers would, of course, have to agree on the composition of the allGerm an government to be formed on the basis of free elections! After
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all, Hitler had come to power on the basis of free elections. T he French government having waited for the German decision finally subm itted the e d c treaty for ratification to the Assemblé. The die was finally cast on August 19,1954. The French National Assem bly did n ot ratify e d c , thereby also arresting the development toward political unification of Europe. It was the most bitter disappointment of Adenauer's entire career. The chancellor blamed the outcome not only on Pierre Mendès-France, the French premier at the tim e, but also on the opposition and procrastination of the s p d in Germany. Irrepar able damage was prevented, however, by finding with extraordinary dispatch an alternative to e d c — chiefly due to Anthony Eden's effort. A t a conference in Paris, October 20-22,1954, the occupation regime in the Federal Republic was terminated, and subsequently West Ger m any becam e a member of both n a t o and the Western European U nion. T he Federal Republic now had a national army in n a t o , an ar rangem ent proposed by General de Gaulle as early as January 1952. Germ any pledged neither to produce any atomic, biological, and chem ical weapons nor to pursue the issue of reunification or the rectifica tion of its frontiers by any but peaceful means. The other n a t o powers recognized the government of the Federal Republic as the only legit im ate German government and reiterated their aim of establishing a free and reunified country. The German Bundestag ratified the treaties on February 27,195$, with 314 votes cast for and 157 against (plus two abstentions). Alm ost immediately thereafter, the Soviet Union re nounced the Franco-Soviet and the Anglo-Soviet treaties and con cluded the Warsaw Pact w ith its European satellites. In July 19$ 5, a sum m it conference was finally convened in Geneva, partly to assuage popular European anxieties about the cold war. Eisen hower made his "Open Skies" proposal, and for a short while hope— "th e spirit of G eneva"—seemed to pervade international politics. The Russians agreed to a four-power meeting of foreign m inisters to pursue the issue of reunification. As was to be expected, this meeting, held in O ctober-N ovem ber 195 5, was abortive. But before the euphoria of re laxation, w hich had seized many German journalists, reached its acm e, Adenauer visited Moscow in September upon Russian invita tion. He had to, so as not to be isolated internationally as the last cold warrior, after Eisenhower had shaken hands with the Soviet leaders. T he exchange of ambassadors between Moscow and Bonn was ar ranged, w ith the result that the governments of two German states were now accredited in Moscow. Thousands of German prisoners of
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war cam e hom e from the Soviet Union ten years after the cessation of h o stilities in World War I I .
Socializing with Businessmen M arch 2 8 ,1 9 5 4 At a party in Frankfurt am Main, a young German executive gave an account of a m eeting w ith U.S. Ambassador Conant the day before. T he young man was the junior partner of a bank in Frankfurt. He be longs to a circle of young businessmen who m eet once a month to dis cuss m atters of current political or economic interest. The group consists of about thirty people of all political persuasions—including one Social Dem ocrat—and of all denominations. They invite German and foreign guest speakers to start the discussions. One of their next speakers w ill be Raymond Aron. The last one was Dr. Conant. T he young m an's sister persuaded him by telephone to join the party for dinner. He had just returned from the golf course and did not feel like dressing. His sunburnt sister, back from two weeks skiing at Kitzbühel, told him he could come as he was, and he would be the center of attention for at least five minutes if he told his "Conant sto ry ." His senior partner, who was called "H .F ." by everybody, in ac cordance w ith the American custom of using initials for the boss, said ironically, "T e ll him one Count is already here." He was referring to another guest, the amiable owner of a stable of racing horses. Everyone called him "Fritzch en ," and he looked elegant and uninteresting. T he young man appeared soon with his wife. He wore a yellow leather coat and a blue silk scarf, adding a touch of California to the party. He appeared to be a ladies' man, spoiled, self-assured, with a con tinuous sm ile on his face. After receiving a scotch and soda he told his story. N ot knowing whether to buy a railroad ticket to board an ambassa dor's special train, he decided that a platform ticket probably would serve to get him beyond the checkpoint. So he spent ten pfennigs and eventually found his way to the special train that was waiting to take Dr. Conant, his American assistant, and a few guests to their destina tion—a castle near Eltville, owned by a member of the discussion group. There were unm istakable suggestions in the young m an's account
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that he regarded the ambassador as a great man for his willingness to address the group. Everybody was impressed by Conant's sim plicity, and altogether charmed by his unassuming, straightforward manner. Conant made his opening statem ent in German but asked permission to speak English in the discussion, although he could understand Germ an. The members of the group obliged by speaking English them selves. Dr. Conant compared the difficulties to get e d c ratified in France w ith Am erican experiences after the C ivil War: distrust and enm ity then as now. Things take tim e and one must be patient. Although he avoided all com m ent on the "New Look," the whole circle had been so taken by the ambassador that no feelings of disappointment ensued. O f course, Dr. Conant was asked about Senator McCarthy, who is m uch in the news, even in Germany. He replied that the investigating power of congressional com m ittees was very important in the United States: w ithout them democracy would not function properly. Later, the party adjourned to a restaurant for dinner. W hile waiting for food to be served, the members of the group exchanged perversely nostalgic recollections of the hard tim es everybody had had in 1945. O ne had to cope w ith the early curfew imposed by the U.S. occupation forces in Frankfurt. There was no food, "bu t we were drunk every n ig h t." "O ne had to drink because there was no h eat." H.F., the senior partner, cam e back from the Alps w ith two pairs of new shoes he had saved during the war for the day of liberation. On the long way to Frankfurt, they were stolen by French soldiers together with some cans of food. So, he had to wear his son's shoes which were too small and made it im possible for him to run when he wanted to evade the Ameri can m p ' s after curfew. The sunburnt lady summed it all up by saying it was im possible for children who are ten or twelve years old to grasp what life was like in 194$. W hen the w aiters brought the food, an incident occurred which struck m e as quite extraordinary. Like several others, "Fritzchen" had ordered lam b chops; they were exceedingly greasy. The count was at tacked by nausea and had to leave the table in great haste. He was evidently quite ill, but this caused no concern among his friends: in stead fun was poked at him, or rather his illness, and all sorts of jokes about it were exchanged with the waiter in the count's absence. For quite a w hile, nobody rose to look after the poor man: there simply seemed too much laughter to be missed. Finally, Fritzchen was seen com ing down the steps from upstairs where he had rested. Only then
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did the young man get up to follow him . It so happened that he had to drive him home. The young man reappeared after fifteen minutes, when the hilarious mood caused by Fritzchen's malady had barely sub sided. It should be added that everybody seemed to be quite genuinely fond of the count so that the prevailing mood did not strike me as m alicious: rather, among the people present it seemed that coarse, unrestrained enjoym ent of the "fu nny" aspects of the situation helped to nip any sympathy in the bud.
Afterthought on Malicious Joy For days after the incident I tried to understand the full meaning of w hat had happened. I wondered whether the incident was in some way an aftereffect of the war, an impairment, caused by catastrophe, of the capacity for feeling pity. I went back to my journal to reread notes made more than two years earlier. In May 1952 , 1was in Cologne visiting Herr Saurier, president of the Germ an Air Protection League. When I mentioned to the old gentle m an that I had m et former General Toppe in 19$ 1, he burst out laugh ing and asked whether Toppe had treated me to his "novel." "H is novel?" "Y es. L isten !" And he proceeded to tell me the following story w ith great relish. 'T ow ard the end of the war, H itler ('der H itler') wanted to have a new quarterm aster general, so he had someone in his h q go over the list of available generals. But something was wrong w ith everybody suggested. Finally he came across the name of General Toppe, who at that tim e had a command at the front. T oppe,' said Hitler. 'Who is he? I don't know Toppe. Anything wrong w ith him? Nothing was known about him . So the orders for Toppe were signed. "B u t in the m eantim e, Toppe was on leave to see his wife. Before the leave is over, the war com es to an end and Toppe lands in an American p o w camp. A fter a while, he is being told by the Americans, T o u have been H itler's quarterm aster general, you m ust know everything.' Toppe says, T was not quartermaster general, I was on leave. I don't know anything.' The interrogator does not believe him, because there it is in black and w hite: Toppe to be quartermaster general, signed Adolf H itler. He is being kept for three years in the camp and inter rogated forward and backward. They didn't want to release him, the A m ericans. And for three years Toppe didn't know what it was all
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about. He merely said, There must be a mistake/ Now, bless him, there was— " And Herr Sautier, like the company the other night in the restaurant, could not stop laughing.
Tax Evasions April i, 19 5 4 In Frankfurt, I told Otto Klepper of a dinner I had had at the Krone in AsSmannshausen, where the rather large bill provided, on its reverse side, space for all necessary notations to prove to the tax collector that you had—and with whom you had—visited the restaurant for business purposes. Klepper told similar stories about the attendants at gas sta tions who ask the customer, "What charge may I write down?" Or on Sundays, "What date do you wish me to put down on the bill?"
H ans-Rudolf M üller-Schwefe: Life in the Soviet Zone April 1 1 , 1 9 5 4 There are several Protestant academies (Evangelische Akademien) in West Germany. Associated with the Protestant churches, they at tempt to reach leaders of public opinion and, more generally, people in all walks of life by organizing congresses and smaller group meetings and by publishing books and journals devoted to the discussion of pub lic issues from the vantage point of Protestant ethics. Many academies have former German officers on their staffs. Dr. Müller-Schwefe is director of the Protestant Academy at Hofgeismar.1 1 mentioned to Otto Klepper that I should like to meet Müller-Schwefe and he offered to take me to Hofgeismar in his car. We had dinner on the way in Kas sel, a city which makes the impression that despite all efforts it will never recover from its destruction. 1 Müller-Schwefe became professor of theology at the University of Hamburg in 19$ 5. In 1959, he received an honorary doctorate from the University of Tübingen.
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T he academy at Hofgeismar is located in a castle of the former elec tor of Hesse in the m idst of a vast park. Our host m et us in the yard of his "c a s tle ." He is a man about forty-five years of age, but looks younger. He is personable, straightforward, self-assured, and unassum ing. He speaks like an intellectual who is used to conversation. I would not have surmised him to be either a m inister or an administrator, had I not known that he was both. He has retained some soldier's slang in his speech and does not shun expressions more common in barracks than in castles. M üller-Schw efe led us to a large room, as beautifully proportioned as all other rooms in the castle which he showed us later. Through the windows we could see the park w ith a pond in the middle—a spacious but delim ited, calm ing view. Frau M üller appeared to join us for coffee. She looked like a beautiful madonna and, like a madonna, said little. M üller-Schw efe has a distinguished war record. As a divisional chap lain he was long associated w ith Field Marshal Rommel. In October 1945, he found him self w ith the German spearheads at the gates of M oscow. Later on, the commander of the division to which he was at tached was killed in the Soviet Union. Several people told me the re m arkable story of M üller-Schwefe assuming command of that division in the general confusion which prevailed at the tim e of the German retreat. He led it to safety. M üller talked about Rommel. He described him as an uneducated m an who did not read much but was very industrious. It was difficult to engage him in conversation. But when talk was lagging one only had to ask about a technical detail of one of his m ilitary engagements, and he would use fork and knife to arrange the food on his plate in such a way as to dem onstrate topography and deployment of forces and thus com e to life again. Müller-Schwefe laughed. He said that Rommel did not know the difference between audacity and courage. Offering a characteristically nonclassical, modem explanation of the distinction he added that audacity, which Rommel possessed, was an alm ost phys iological predisposition, whereas courage required that one had faced one's fears and overcome them . I had heard that Rommel, like Mont gomery, was popular w ith his men but less well liked by his officers. I asked M üller-Schw efe whether this was true. "Y es, his men liked him very m uch because they sensed that he was lucky and had, as it were, a personal relation w ith fortu n a." He treated them well, demanded m uch, but never more than he him self would be willing to bear. By contrast, he was exceedingly rough w ith his officers. "And they some
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tim es deserved it ." (In the much-discussed novel 0815 , which is ex trem ely critical of German m ilitary drill under the Nazis, this same pattem of behavior—harshness toward one's immediate subordinates and chum m iness w ith the next lower rank—is described in great detail w ith m uch hate.) Both M üller and his wife have close relatives living in the Soviet zone, and he frequently visits East Germany. He told the following story about his young nephew. The boy, fifteen years of age, had been asked in school whether he knew who was embalmed and displayed on the Red Square in Moscow. He answered correctly, Lenin. The teacher then asked what had been used for the embalming, and the boy answered, according to the inform ation given in the textbook, that Lenin's corpse was embalmed in "Sp iritu s." T his reply caused the w hole class to laugh. The teacher was indignant. Because the boy knew a little chem istry he added in his consternation that petroleum, too, could have been used for the purpose. Another burst of laughter. This was too m uch for the teacher. A conference of teachers was called by the principal of the school and the boy was expelled. M üller went to see the principal, asking him what the parents should now do w ith the boy. (The parents them selves did not dare to ask.) The principal did not answ er in his office but asked M üller to step outside for a walk in order not to be overheard. When Müller-Schwefe repeated his question, the principal replied that it was useless for the boy to try to complete his education at another school. Nor would he be acceptable as an appren tice to learn a trade. The only future open to him would be employ m ent in the uranium m ines. The principal then broke down saying that every once in a w hile he had to sacrifice the one or the other pupil for p olitical reasons in order to keep his own position in the school. He was quite desperate and in a sense grateful that he could talk to M üller about his moral qualms. Shortly thereafter he was relieved of his posi tion, w hich was assumed by the very same young teacher who had managed the expulsion of the boy. M üller-Schwefe explained that the idea is of course to rid the high schools of boys coming from fam ilies that do not support the regime. He took the boy to West Germany. He said that this, too, raised a problem inasmuch as it was not altogether desirable to take out of East Germany youngsters who might grow up to be men opposing the regime. M üller then told another story of his eighteen-year-old niece who lives in another town. For her exam inations she had written a paper requiring a great deal of preparation, on American economic resources.
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He asked her what sources she had used. She showed him a stack of official propaganda pamphlets. When he asked to see her paper she refused, saying that she had used false information and was ashamed. "B u t why have you w ritten it the way you have?" She replied with glum determ ination that she wanted to study medicine and to do so she had to m eet political expectations in school. O ur host then began to generalize. He said the older generation in the Soviet zone is unhappy and disappointed with the West, i.e., both W est Germ any and the United States. T o my question as to whether they were afraid of war he replied, "O n the contrary, many of them wish for it ." An older man had told him that he hoped the Americans would drop A-bombs over Eastern Germany. When Müller-Schwefe said that th is would be terrible not only for the people who lived there but m ost likely for other nations as well, the man replied that it would be preferable to things as they are. T he younger generation is different. They have never lived as free people, and know only totalitarian conditions of life. 'T h ey have learned to speak two languages, one at home where one can try to be honest and frank, and the other in public where one must dissimulate and behave according to political expectations." M üller-Schw efe gave a graphic description of the low standard of liv ing in the Eastern zone; I assume that he was referring to people for m erly belonging to the middle class. He said that poverty and scarcity of m aterials are such that one's possessions disintegrate. W alls cannot be painted. The upholstery on the furniture may stand up for ten or tw elve years, but after fifteen years it begins to look very shabby in deed. There is not enough clothing to keep up appearances. The china breaks. So do the kitchen knives, and so on. After a while not only the environm ent but the people them selves seem to become "Eastern"
[östlich). Klepper asked our host whether in his opinion the Germans in the e d c contingents would fight if war came. He replied that they have no idea for w hich to fight. He then added that one could conceive of ef ficien t com bat troops if they were composed of young men divorced from civilian life before they entered the army, either because they had been fired in their jobs or because they were restless and adventurous. M en of th is kind might find comradeship and some meaningful exis tence in the m ilitary life that was ottered them. The bulk of German youth, however, would make poor soldiers. As the conversation proceeded he qualified his pessimism some
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what. For example, he said that many of the refugees from the East have such an intense hatred of everything Russian that they would fight in any event. Müller-Schwefe added that in his opinion antiRussian propaganda in case of war would find its most fertile ground among these refugees. As to students, he said that he had talked with m any teachers and students and had formed the opinion that 9$ per cent of the students do not want to become soldiers but would serve when called upon. I questioned his assertion that the "id ea" for which one fights was of such im portance to army morale. Perhaps comradeship and loyalty to one's leader were more important than the idea, although it could not be denied that the "id ea" can influence the nature of comradeship it self. In m aking this point I had to contend w ith Klepper, who quoted C lausew itz on m ilitary morale. M üller evidently related what I had said to his own wartime experi ences and declared that I might be right. He added that the comrade ship I had in mind is something that develops in battle rather than in training for war. Only when the men are tried and tested do they find out who in a given group is able to meet danger, who is resolute, resourceful, and so on. Three or four men in a company who had sur vived several campaigns together were still capable—toward the end of the war—of turning the whole company into a cohesive combat unit. M üller-Schw efe believed that German anxiety over the A-bomb is very strong, but that much of it is not conscious, and misleading im pressions would be gained if one were to ask people whether they felt anxious. At this point, Klepper said that he had recently felt quite tired and had, w ithout thinking much about it, considered it possible that his fatigue was associated w ith an increase of "radioactive dust in the atm osphere." He smiled. "I never mentioned this to anyone until I confessed to my fantasies the other day while talking to a younger man on my sta ff." T h is younger man promptly told Klepper that he had had exactly the same experience. Both agreed that this explanation of their fatigue was quite absurd. At the end of our visit Müller-Schwefe showed Klepper and me the academy, his beautiful study, the Commons Room, and in the base m ent, the chapel. He also led us into a sm all library which used to be the bathroom of the prince and his m istress. He made a joke which he would not have made in the presence of his wife. Before I left he presented me w ith some publications of the Protes tant academ ies, including a book of studies on Marxism, a booklet he
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him self had w ritten on Em st Jünger, and the last issue of the periodical published by his academy. It contained an article by Martin Niem öller; the sum m aries of various round-table discussions held during the past m onths on the tasks of the aristocracy in a democratic regime; the renaissance of church m usic; and an essay on guilt and penance as per ceived by physicians, lawyers, and theologians. It also contained the summary of a two-day round-table discussion with M artin Heidegger on the relation between theology and philosophy, and a sermon deliv ered by M üller-Schwefe him self at the tim e of that conference.
G erm an Television April 1 1 ,1954 On the way back from Hofgeismar Klepper and I stopped for supper at a roadside restaurant where we saw the first German television pro gram. It originates in Hamburg and is, I believe, on the air only a few hours one or two days a week. Everybody in the restaurant looked and listened w ith rapt attention. Several songs presented in the show were clearly antim ilitaristic and poked fun at the efforts at German re arm am ent. The audience seemed pleased and amused.
Building Activities and Rentals In a conversation w ith an econom ist in Frankfurt I mentioned that I was truly astonished by the large number of new buildings that had gone up during the last two years, adding that this activity must have lessened the housing shortage considerably. He said that it was begin ning to do so, but that the most noticeable consequence for the tenant was the reduction of the lump sum he had to pay prior to occupying the apartm ent. T his reduction consists not so much in the lowering of the am ount to be paid but in the fact that a part of it is now being amortized over tim e, whereas formerly it was lost altogether. He said that he him self had paid d m 8,000 a few years ago for a rather small apartment on the fifth floor. Today I saw an ad for a new one-room apartment ask ing for a lump sum of d m 3,750, w ith $0 percent of it to be amortized. Incidentally, the rents them selves are quite low.
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Sense o f Duty April 14,1954 Several tim es I heard expressed the opinion that the Germans might not m ake good soldiers and that it would be a m istake to assume the contrary m erely because they had been good soldiers in the past. I men tioned these views to a former lieutenant colonel whom I met in Wies baden. W ithout changing his expression he replied that he was afraid th is opinion was correct. German youth has no ideals, he said. He referred to a talk he had given recently in Mainz to junior-grade officers, men who are now between thirty and thirty-five years of age. During the discussion period they told him that they had "no ideals." O nce, when they were seventeen years old, they believed in H itler and what he stood for. Now, no other strong faith has been substituted. My inform ant told them , "G entlem en, this is nonsense. One either has ideals or one d oesn't." He added that he really did not understand these younger men. As a youngster he him self had been a Boy Scout, and the standards of the Boy Scouts he had taken seriously. "I still do." A ll th is was somewhat incoherent and inconclusive, except that it conveyed the former officer's malaise. Indifference, cynicism , and the lack of any com m itm ent—these attitudes he found widespread among his younger contemporaries. Later he attributed it all to the fact that the "sen se of duty" had been weakened everywhere. He pointed out that the sense of duty was part of a precious German- Prussian heritage, to be found in Kant's philosophy and in Lutheranism—by no means only in the m ilitary institutions of the past. Years ago, the "notorious Hans H abe," former editor of the American German language news paper, N eu e Z eitung, had w ritten in one of his editorials that in order to reeducate the Germans one would have to rid them of their sense of duty. T he N eu e Z eitung had been a "Com m unist paper" at the tim e, and Am erican reeducation efforts generally had done a great deal of harm to Germ an youth. One cannot build a new German army with out im planting in the souls of children favorable attitudes toward m il itary life and the m ilitary profession. T he form er officer repeated that the sense of duty had decayed everywhere in Germany. Even the productivity of the industrial work ers was affected. Whatever efficiency and morale still existed in the labor force was a leftover from the days when the substance was intact. How m uch sim pler life must have been for this man under the N azis.
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Theodor Steltzer: A Study of German Youth April 27, 1 9 5 4
Theodor Steltzer's Research Institute in Frankfurt am Main is sup ported by two American foundations.1 The institute studies various aspects of European integration, primarily politics and economics, and enjoys the cooperation of scholars in various European countries. I asked Steltzer to tell me about the findings of one particular study the in stitu te is undertaking in Germany. A few m onths ago an article appeared in the Frankfurter H efte, deal ing w ith a sm all number of papers w ritten by i7-year-old schoolboys on the topic, "W hat Do You Consider Worth Dying For?" Steltzer was so taken by this article that he arranged for the same question to be subm itted to a number of schools in various West German towns. He obtained about 1 $0 papers from boys and girls of this age group. On the basis of his notes he gave me a brief account of the findings. They con firm ed on the whole some of the more important results of Helmut Schelsky's study of the German fam ily .21 remember the following de tails of Steltzer's findings. Som e respondents resented the question, regarding it as an invasion of their privacy. Others suggested that it would have been more sensible to ask, "W hat Do You Consider Worth Living For?" I re marked to Steltzer that the two questions were identical. According to Steltzer, a very large m ajority expressed the view that n o idea was worth dying for. "T h e Fatherland" evokes no em otion whatever, nor does "Freedom ." Some of the writers indicated that they could not be lieve in any political ideas "because they change so often ." Others at least indicated the desire to believe in an ideal, but were incapable of m entioning any. T he only ties w ith other people that appeared to be "m eaningful" to th is m ajority were ties to the family. Interestingly enough, "friends" were hardly mentioned. T his seems to me quite extraordinary in view of the age of the w riters. T here was an alm ost complete absence of "m odels" to be emulated. But Steltzer remarked that the importance of the "history teacher" be com es quite evident when one reads the papers: this teacher may or may not convey to the youngsters the notion of greatness in the form 1 On Theodor Steltzer's background, seep, i t s, above.
1 W andlungen der deutschen Fam ilie in der G egenw art (19$ 3).
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of past figures. Opinions about politicians are definitely skeptical and occasionally indeed cynical. Politicians appear to live beyond the reach of im agination and are envisioned as “managers" whose deci sions are entirely influenced by self-interest. (Many German publica tions as w ell present the politicians as "m anagers.") Thus the attitude toward politics is negative. No sense of public responsibility or of dedi cation to a cause can be found in the m ajority of papers. A few students examined the question of why people should try to save the life of another person, for example, somebody about to drown. These respondents answered that the reasons for giving such assis tance would depend on whether the person trying to help had some thing to lose. If he had nothing to lose, he could of course be assumed to help somebody in distress more readily! Others answered that one could easily imagine a person rescuing somebody else in order to get in to the papers. As to the m inority, it is composed of two groups, and in both cases parental influence shines through the answers. One group is composed of N azis. T heir beliefs are still firm ly held. The other group in the m inority reflects religious views; they answer the question in a more conventional, "con stru ctiv e" way. Later, old Dr. Mende3 joined Steltzer and me for lunch in a little Italian restaurant. He spoke w ith great warmth about his trip to the U nited States, saying that he spent the two most memorable evenings in Phi 11 D avison's house in Washington, D.C. He was alm ost nostalgic about the evening when German songs were sung, and remarked with involuntary humor, "Im agine German officials in Bonn getting togeth er in the evening to sing cowboy songs!"
W ilhelm M einberg: A Neo-Nazi April 2 9 ,1 9 5 4 W ilhelm Meinberg, bom in 1898, is an old Nazi. He became a mem ber of the party and the sa (Sturm Abteilung, Storm Troopers) as early as 1929, and was a Nazi deputy in the Prussian parliament in 1932, be3 Not the FDP Deputy, but a staff member of the German Society for Foreign Policy in Bonn.
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fore H itler's assumption of power. In the Third Reich, he occupied various high positions in the government and in the ss. I m et Meinberg at the railroad station in Dortmund. From there we w ent to a restaurant in town. Meinberg looks like a fanner who has com e to town w ithout changing his shirt. His somewhat ruddy face often changes expression, som etim es faintly suggesting a streak of brutality—or so it appeared to me. His conciliatory manner did not strike m e as altogether genuine, perhaps merely because of a disturb ing habit: when listening, Meinberg squints—alm ost closing his eyes —w hich m akes him look sly. W hen m eeting somebody for the first tim e, I tend to be as interested in inadvertent m annerism s and characteristic expressions as in his stated views. For example, Meinberg frankly admitted to me his Nazi past—and there would have been little point in concealing it because it is generally known that he was close to Goring. However, he averred that in his association w ith Nazi bigwigs he had kept his independence as a headstrong W estphalian farmer whose fam ily had been in posses sion of their farm since the tw elfth century. Then he tried to prove his contention by telling me that on one occasion when he had a difference of opinion w ith Goring—whom he referred to as "th e Reichsmar schall, that is, G oring"—he said, "If we don't get along I'll return to m y farm and I shall set my dogs on the first Nazi stepping on my land w ithout an in vitation ." My point is not that he probably would not have commanded his dogs to attack any Nazi bigshot, or that he would not have dared to defy Goring. My point is rather that the way he talked indicated to m e that he was perfectly capable of commanding his dogs to attack a lesser man for trespassing on his land. M einberg knew President Hindenburg well, and Hindenburg liked him because of his old fam ily farm. Meinberg was sent to Hindenburg quite often in behalf of the Nazis, because it was known that the old m an had confidence in him . At the end of the war, Meinberg was ar rested by the A llies and held for twenty-two months, a fact he men tioned w ithout com plaint or elaboration. M einberg sum m arily called the Bundestag a sad bunch of people. O nce he had been in Bonn watching the deputies file by, and for him nothing else was necessary in order to know them. "You just have to w atch how they carry them selves." Then he noticed a man standing erect ten feet away looking the other way. He said to him self, "Look at th is man. He stands w ith his feet on the ground and holds his head
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h ig h ." It was Adenauer. In this way Meinberg tried to convey to me that he respected the chancellor. (No word about his policy.) He con tinued, "B u t Adenauer is more than seventy years old. One day he w ill die. W hat th en ?" M einberg said this was his first calculation, his second being that the current prosperity in Germany could not last. He attributed it alto gether to the war in Korea, from which the German economy had profited tremendously. (No word about U.S. econom ic help.) He told m e the story of three new ships used for transport to the United States. T he shipping rates so skyrocketed after the outbreak of the Korean War that after three trips the cost of the ships was amortized. He told sim ilar stories about other business firm s w ith which he is in contact. Prosperity cannot last. There w ill be a crisis, as there has been a crisis after every war. Debts are mounting in the agricultural sector of the G erm an econom y. If the recession reaches industry unemployment w ill increase and those workers who voted the government ticket in the last election w ill turn against the government. Where w ill they go? T he only opposition party is the Social Democrats, and they are infil trated by—if not in fact indistinguishable from—the Communists. At th is point I said that the Socialists seemed to have a very impressive anti-C om m unist and nationalist record in the postwar period. For ex am ple, he should not forget their policy during the Berlin blockade. M einberg nodded, but the argument was alm ost entirely lost on him, although he tried to save face by saying that the trad e unions were virtually Com m unist. T he third consideration bearing on current policies in West Ger m any, w hich M einberg presented to me as an inevitable source of future political discontent, had to do w ith alleged Catholic tendencies of the government. He spoke of "black reaction," mentioning that no less than thirty C atholic monasteries were being built along the zonal frontier despite the fact that the people living on either side of the border were Protestant. He summarized the situation as follows: ( i) One cannot base one's policy on one man (Adenauer), and the United States had better be com e aware of that fact. M einbeig had the gall to add that after all, the G erm ans know where such a course of action leads, since they too, once based everything on one man, namely H itler! (2) An economic crisis was inevitable: "T h is is, one might say, alm ost biological." (3) T he Germ an Protestants w ill not tolerate "black reaction" forever. For these three reasons the hour of his party, the d r p (Deutsche
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Reichspartei), w ill com e. Moreover, a political organization for the rightest elem ents of the German people must be provided, i.e., for men who have proved their anti-Comm unism by fighting the Soviet Union, w hether they were Nazis or not. Meinberg hastened to add that he did not want to have anything to do w ith the "fanatical N azis." He pointed out that they easily become victim s of Bolshevik ideas, developing along "national-Bolshevist" lines. (By this definition, H itler was not a fanatical N azi, whereas O tto Strasser was!) Occasionally, however, strange things happen. The other day, he had learned that a local party group was m eeting in the back room of a restaurant to study the P roto c o ls o f th e W ise M en o f Z ion. T his was the only reference to antiSem itism , and it was studiedly negative in the context of our con versation. He continued that the elem ents his party tried to organize—not through mass m eetings but in local party meetings—were former Germ an nationalists, "reasonable N azis." "And then we get, of course, many form er m ilitary." They are welcome. He said that he did not want to have anything to do w ith those officers who had either partici pated in the p u tsch of July 20, or who now approved of officers that broke their oath on that day. Meinberg was quite bitter in his criticism of Germ an generals, but did not m ention any names. He said that in the prison camp he had seen generals who stooped so low as to pick up discarded cigarette butts. The generals whom he approved of included Heinz Guderian, the ss Generals G ille and Hauser, and above all Hans U lrich Rudel (bom 1916). He came back to Rudel again and again. "H ere is a man who could really inspire German youth." He men tioned w ith bittem ess th a t Rudel's book, T rotzdem , had sold only 4,000 copies in W est Germany, whereas 40,000 copies were sold in France and 30,000 in England. Ram cke1 was also mentioned as an excellen t general for whom soldiers would go through fire. What Ger m any needed were generals of that sort, not the office generals who sat in Bonn. Meinberg dismissed Remer1 2 as a "w ild N azi," with whom he did not want to have anything to do. The general who together with the younger von Thadden and him self is in the directorate of his party is G eneral Andrae.3
I said disingenuously that insofar as he and his party were so strongly 1 General Bernard Ramcke (1889-1968). 2 On Remer, see p. 187, above. 2 Adolf von Thadden, a postwar, right-wing politician, bom 19 2 1.—Air Force General Andrae was the commander o f German-occupied Crete.
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anti-C om m unist, I assumed that he was supporting e d c . He snapped back, "N e in ." It is not possible, he explained, to organize an army prior to the creation of a m ilitary spirit among the people, and particularly among youth. Moreover how can anybody consider e d c a workable de fense organization for Europe so long as West Germany was lying be tw een Com m unist Russia and Communist France. "By the tim e the Soviets were at the Rhine, the French would have proclaimed a Soviet Republic in P aris." Things would have been different if a man like de G aulle were in power. Today nothing in the W est provides the cem ent for a "m ilitary" organization worthy of that name. There is only fear of the Soviets. Fear destroys,- it doesn't build anything. Finally, one must look at the num bers. Even if one were to assume that Germany had "12 or 2 0" divisions today, the Soviets have "about 240." He added, in a some what more conciliatory manner, "perhaps 12 or 20 divisions are a threat, but it is not much of a th reat." He said "th reat" [Bedrohung], not "d eterren t." A t th is point I asked him what he considered to be the proper alterna tive to e d c . He answered, "Reunification and perhaps some kind of neutralized Germany between East and W est." For a few m inutes I tried to find out more about his brand of neutralism , but Meinberg be cam e quite evasive and cagey. Approaching the subject of neutralism from a different angle, I asked how he envisioned the consequences of a hypothetical Soviet attack on a neutralized Germany. In M einbetg's opinion, the Soviets would think tw ice before invading Germany because they would know in ad vance that the Germans living in Soviet-occupied territory would be politically unreliable; and yet the Communist authorities would need th eir collaboration, if only for econom ic reasons. I pointed out that there is little reason to expect scruples to prevent Soviet occupation authorities from organizing occupied Germany. Meinberg did not doubt the ruthlessness of the Soviets, but he believed that they would have to be cautious w ith the Germans for econom ic reasons. The lines of com m unication w ill be long. A Soviet division with a value of 100 in Poland would be reduced to a value of 2$ on the Rhine. "They w ill have to be as careful w ith us as if they were handling raw eggs." M oreover the Soviets w ill be inclined to wait, as far as Western Europe is concerned. They have tim e. They always have tim e. They can w ait for tw enty years, if necessary. In their calculations Asia
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com es first. He said, "Perhaps they attack Asia first. This would be very fortunate for u s." When I called his attention to the fact that the W est had certain interests in common and that any growth of Soviet power anywhere in the world would be disadvantageous to all coun tries that are part of the W est, he hastened to agree with me but did not draw any conclusions from this agreement. He asked me what I thought about Senator McCarthy and expressed his adm iration for him . He thought that McCarthy was doing a great service not only for the United States but for the whole West, because he was ridding the United States government of Communist infiltra tion. He called this infiltration "R ote Kapelle," the name of a Com m unist underground organization that had infiltrated Göring's m inistry early in the last war. (He used this term not in the singular but in the plural form.) He then said that he had of course read what had been w ritten against some of M cCarthy's collaborators such as M essrs. Cohn and Shine, particularly in Der S p ieg el This was un favorable news about Cohn and Shine, "but then diese stories were planted by your Acting High Comm issioner Mr. Reber—or so I have heard." M einbeig invited me to attend as an honorary guest his organiza tio n 's Party Day in Dortmund, from May 8 to May 10. The next day he sent m e a w ritten invitation and the agenda. Since the d r p was de clared unconstitutional by the German government last fall—a deci sion M einberg has legally contested, asking for a judgment by the Supreme Court—I shall not attend. In a way this is a pity, because one could see som e of the more picturesque anim als of the German politi cal circu s in Dortmund on that day.
Leo Freiherr G eyr von Schw eppenburg: M ilitary Self-Criticism , the M iddle East, and World War III April 3 0 , 19 5 4 I m et Geyr in 1952 through O tto John, then head of the German f b i [B u n d esam t fü r V erfassun gsschu tz). Much of John's information about the political record of former German officers came from Geyr, one of the m ost outspoken critics of the German m ilitary tradition.
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G eyr was bom in 1886 in Potsdam, but he was not a Prussian, and made a point of not being one. He came from an old Catholic family and lives in Upper Bavaria. G eyr's book, D ie grosse Frage (19S2), contains some of his family history in the form of a diary of his grandfather, who traveled to St. Petersburg in 1849. Geyr him self spent some tim e in Russia and speaks Russian. In D ie grosse Frage, Geyr also discusses political and m ilitary aspects of the cold war. From 1933 to 1937, Geyr was m ilitary attaché in London. His book T he C ritical Years (London, 1952), with a foreword by Hore-Belisha, presents interesting material on his early fu tile warnings to the German* government—which made him unpop ular w ith Ribbentrop. He warned that Great Britain and the United States would go to war against Nazi Germany. He also discussed the occupation of Prague in March 1939, and the action of the German resistance against H itler on July 20,1944. In another publication, G eb roch en es S chw ert (1951), Geyr offers a scathing historical review of the development of the Prussian-German arm y and its General Staff. Finally, he is author of "W ill They At tack ?", a chapter in T he W estern D efen ses (J. G. Smyth, ed. (London, 19$ 1)), w hich presents his analysis of the m ilitary requirements for the defense of W estern Europe. During the war, Geyr was one of Germany's best generals of armored troops. He led the vanguard of Guderian's army that alm ost reached M oscow in 1941, and later was commander, Panzer Group West, under Rundstedt.1 I saw Geyr again at dinner at the Kranzler G rill in Bonn. He was more diffuse in his conversation than in 1952. He had come to Bonn from Bavaria for a few days, chiefly to attend the foreign policy debate in the Germ an Bundestag. We talked about this subject first. Later in the conversation I asked him about his books and their influence in Ger m any. He replied, w ithout any apparent resentm ent, that books criti cal of the former German army, its record, or its leading personalities w ill be silently excluded from the libraries of the veterans organiza tions. When I inquired about the book by Moriz von Faber du Faur, M acht u n d O hn m acht, Geyr was electrified: "W ho told you to talk w ith m e about th is?" Faber has been a close friend of Geyr's since they w ent to school together in Stuttgart, and Geyr is one of the few mem bers of the Germ an aristocracy who is mentioned with warmth and 1 There are accounts of von Gehr's exploits in Chester Wilmot's The Struggle for Europe (London, 1952), pp. 281-82, 301-3.
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favor in Faber's interesting account. N ext to Geyr's G ebrochen es S ch w ert, Faber's mem oirs contain the most searching, incisive, and fearless self-criticism of the German m ilitary class that has appeared in postwar Germany. I had indeed heard that the president of the German Johanniter Orden had peremptorily expelled Faber when his book first appeared in the Stu ttgarter Z eitung. Geyr had protested this decision im m ediately, declaring that he would resign his membership if the decision were to stand. Geyr said, "I have quite a fight on my hands be cause of my good friend Faber." He added, characteristically, that Faber's literary portrait of the former king of Württemberg contained traits that he, Geyr, had never discovered. "T h is king was one of the noblest monarchs I have ever know n." We touched upon many other topics in our conversation, including th e likelihood of war. In Geyr's opinion there is no immediate danger of war w ith the Soviet Union. He gave no specific reasons for this view. Instead, sensibly preferring a conversation to an interview, he asked m e tw o questions at once. Did I think that eventually war between the U nited States and the Soviet Union could be avoided, and which side would profit from the pass.' ge of time? I replied that I could answer his questions only if he understood that I merely expressed my personal view on these m atters. Then I said that I did not see how war could eventually be avoided, unless unforeseeable developments occur in the Soviet empire. As to the passage of tim e, the Soviet Union would profit from it relatively more than the United States. At this point som ething extraordinary happened. Geyr silently gave a m ilitary sa lute, apparently in order to express in the most econom ical way both com plete agreement w ith my estim ate and respect for my frankness. A fter he had lowered his hand, he remarked that Lenin once said that the way to Paris is via Singapore. "N ow ," said Geyr, "th is is a long road to travel. One m ust therefore ask oneself how one gets from Singapore to P aris." G eyr continued that this road leads through the Middle East. He told m e that w hile he was m ilitary attaché in London during the Nazi period, he had w ritten an imaginary war plan from the British point of view in order to indicate to the Nazi bigwigs in Berlin that the U nited Kingdom would resist H itler's expansion in Europe. Sim ilarly he had now w ritten an imaginary speech by a member of the Politburo, in w hich the importance of the Middle East was pointed up and an ad vance through Persia advocated in order to weaken the West at its A chilles' heel. He said that "P ersia" is excellent territory for armored
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advances, once the colum ns are through the passes. Sim ilarly it would be of the utm ost strategic interest to the Soviet Union to stir up trouble in the "A rab b elt" in Africa. Geyr said that he had offered this essay to various Germ an publications, but had been unable to place it any where because nobody cared to print it. Freiherr von Geyr died in 1974.
G ünther Blum entritt: France and EDC; History o f the German O fficers' Corps M a y s, 19 5 4 Form er General Günther Blum entritt was bom in M unich in 1892 and becam e a soldier in 19111. A first lieutenant at the end of World W ar I, he served after 1920 on the (then illegal) German General Staff for three years. In World War II he became chief of staff in Headquarters W est under General von Rundstedt whom he admired greatly. He is the author of a book on Rundstedt.1 2 I w rote Blum entritt that I would like to visit him again—as in 1952, in Marburg—to talk about m ilitary aspects of foreign policy. He in vited m e to his house and, a few days later, sent a lengthy exposé of tw enty-four typewritten pages on the subject of my interest. Much of our conversation repeated either the essay he had sent me or what he had told me in 1952. Later on, we talked about e d c . Blum entritt knows more about France than about the Anglo-Ameri can part of the world, although he has quite a few acquaintances both in G reat Britain and the United States. His opinions on France are sur prisingly moderate. It is possible that they were not wholly sincere, but it is perhaps more likely that Blum entritt's Bavarian background has a m oderating influence on his political views. He mentioned that Bavaria had always been much closer to France than had northern Ger m any. H is m other had always called an umbrella a p araplu ie and a young bachelor a garçon , and so on. Bavarian troops had fought under French generals, for example, in the Napoleonic Wars and earlier in European history. 1 He died in 1967.
2 Seep. i$>,above.
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Blum entritt attributed the French delay in ratifying the e d c treaty altogether to "th e politicians." In his mind, all politicians are the black sheep of the political zoo. He said that France is ruled by a hundred fam ilies, "fifty of w hich are lawyers. They pass the ball from one to the o th er." G eneral Speidel, who represents the Bonn government in Paris on m atters connected w ith e d c , had told him that all negotiations w ith France are easy so long as one has to deal w ith officers. "But then the politicians object and make trouble." In Blu m entritt's opinion the procrastination of the French is due to France's weakness. He said it would be preferable, also from the Ger man point of view, if France were strong. T his would increase the chances of e d c being ratified and generally dispel France's distrust of Germ any. " I can say this to you, but the man in the street does not like to hear it. He is im patient w ith the French." Blum entritt thought that Germany should make all possible con cessions to France in order to render ratification possible. Even the Saar issue should be resolved in this way, he added hesitatingly, but he did not specify the term s of a concession he would consider tolerable. Sim ilarly, he said, "If the French want a French general to command Germ an divisions—Juin or somebody—in God's name let them have the general." Like m any form er German generals, Blum entritt readily defends Germ an "m ilitarism ," claim ing w ith great facility that it was the Germ an generals who opposed H itler. It is difficult to decide whether he is disingenuous on the subject or whether he has indeed come to be lieve w hat he says. In our conversation he added a new note to what he previously has w ritten or said about this subject. He pointed out that "abroad " many people believe that it was the German aristocrats who were the m ainstay of German m ilitarism . T his is wrong according to Blu m entritt. The m ilitarists during the Second World War were com m oners like Model, Rommel, and Schömer, not men like Rundstedt. O n th is subject, Blum entritt lacks altogether the sophistication of m en lik e Geyr and Faber du Faur. Nor is he in the least capable of the self-criticism w hich these men have shown on this subject. N evertheless, Blum entritt did make a few insightful remarks on the history of the German officer's corps. We talked about Clausewitz and Bem hardi. I m entioned that his friend Liddell Hart had fostered the erroneous perception of Clausewitz as an advocate of Prussian m ilitar ism and of total war. Blumen tritt replied that in his youth, Clausewitz w as not being read by German officers either. He attributed this in part
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to the fact that C lausew itz's style was difficult and his ideas not easily accessible to a young officer. An officer used to read Schlieffen, and som e of M oltke's writings at best. Blum entritt him self read Clausewitz when he was sent w ith other G eneral Staff officers to Berlin University in his Reichswehr days. This practice of one-year university attendance for a sm all group of selected staff officers was discontinued under Hitler. M y host then gave a rather vivid description of the difference in in tellectu al orientation between a man like M oltke and those who followed his generation. M oltke still was a humanist. Half of his in tellectu al interests were not m ilitary in nature, as his letters prove. Blum entritt spoke w ith considerable and unexpected warmth about these letters, w hich are indeed quite impressive in precisely the regard he had noticed. "W hen you turn from M oltke to Schlieffen, everything becom es narrow. Only m ilitary m atters cou nt." The generation after Schlieffen turned ever more toward specialization, and the hum anistic heritage was com pletely lost. In fact, any nonm ilitary interests, w hether hum anistic or not, were frowned upon. Apparently, like O tto W esemann,3 Blum entritt had recently read the new edition of M oltke's letters. But unlike Wesemann he did not mention that fact, thereby trying to strengthen the impression that he was erudite. Blum entritt pointed out that broadness of interests does not render a man less capable as an officer. Rather, it adds to his competence. He then said that w hile he had become the first soldier in his family—his father was in the higher civil service in Bavaria—and had to overcome the resistance of his parents in doing so, he had always liked to occupy his m ind w ith other m atters as w ell. He loves to garden, is interested in zoology, geography, and history. Only once in his long m ilitary career was he com pletely absorbed by m ilitary studies, from 1921 to 1924. "A t the end I had no ideas whatever, because the best ideas one gets when working in one's garden." When the conversation turned to the Soviet zone, Blum entritt said that the two outstanding German generals under Soviet control are Field M arshal Paulus ( 1890-1957), captured at Stalingrad, and Vincenz M üller, who plays a leading role in the East zone People's Police Forces. According to Blum entritt, Paulus was an excellent officer, com petent, mild-mannered, well educated, and noble in spirit. In cap tivity, Paulus joined the Soviet-sponsored National Com m ittee for a Free Germ any and appealed to the Germans to surrender. "O ne simply 1 See the conversation with Graf Schwerin at Joseph C. Witsch's house, p. 15 1, above.
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does not know what happened. Did he have to accommodate him self or was he convinced by the Com m unists?" Paulus now lives in Dres den, in a m ost com fortable house. "H e has three cars at his disposal," and is being consulted by the Russians. Blum entritt added that in trying to understand Paulus, one must bear in mind that he has always been of delicate health. T his had been true even when Paulus was a young officer. T h is remark seemed to me characteristic of Blumentritt's general outlook on life, as I had sensed it in my first interview w ith him two years ago. To him political convictions are not a m atter of tradition or study, reasoning or personal preference. Rather, they are the outgrowth of less intangible factors such as power, ambition—and health. I believe that Blum entritt cannot conceive of a person with strong conviction who is physically weak. One is either strong or weak. Ethics are thus absorbed by physical forces. V incenz M üller by contrast, is quite a man: he is strong and healthy. Blum entritt seemed to imply that this man served the cause he had em braced w ith everything he had.4 There was no moral or political indignation in Blum entritt's account of either man. This absence of any m oral tone in his discourse, no m atter what he talked about—the N azis, the current W est German government, the Communists, form er Germ an generals now serving the Communists—was indeed one of the m ost striking traits of his make-up. At one point in the conversation Blum entritt remarked out of the blue that people do not dare to speak out in public. "It is not different from what it used to be under the N azis." When I asked him what reasons he could give for this fact (which I did not challenge, as though it is evidently an exaggeration), he thought for a moment. I asked fur ther w hether he would be inclined to attribute it to the Catholic Church. He replied, "N o, it is a m atter of national character." Then he w ent on to explain that this alleged trait of the German character had been formed during and after the Thirty Years' War! Prior to that war in the first half of the seventeenth-century, Germany still had men who were independent and courageous. He mentioned with some warmth the free burghers in the German towns, and the nobility. After the T h irty Years War, however, everything became narrow and prescribed by the State. I did not pursue this subject at all, but it seemed noteworthy and quite characteristic that Blum entritt attributed the lack of candor he 4 Vincenz M üller was bom in 1894 and, according to a report published in East Ger many, committed suicide in 1961.
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had observed neither to N ational Socialism nor to anything closer at hand than events in the seventeenth century.
Georg von Sodenstem : "New Look” and China May s, 1954 Since the end of the war, General der Infan trie Georg von Sodenstem {1889-19$ $ ) has published several articles, in which he points out that the balance of power in the postwar world and the geographical posi tion of the United States require that country to pursue a peripheral strategy. T he United States is a sea-and-air power. Western Europe m ust be defended by W estern European ground forces. These forces m ust fight “w ell and com petently." It is only reasonable for the United States to develop a strategy opposed to the global dispersal of American ground forces, relying instead on a strategic deterrent. I expected Sodenstem , therefore, to approve of the American strategy now being referred to as the "N ew Look," in that it is alm ost identical to Soden stem 's prescription. When I saw him again in Frankfurt he indeed "endorsed" the "N ew Look," but added that it is erroneous to stress m erely air power. If war between the East and W est cannot be avoided, sea power w ill play a very important role. Furtherm ore, once one accepts a peripheral strategy as sound, U nited States' policy in Asia becomes unintelligible, according to Sod enstem . "I do not understand your policy in Asia. I simply do not understand it ." The only correct policy, he said, would consist in the U nited States recognizing Red China and trying to use China against the Soviet Union. China needs capital for her development and the U nited States has far more to offer than the Soviet Union. I replied that he did not seem to attribute great importance to the political and ideological affinity between Comm unist China and Communist Russia. "Y es I do, but this does not mean that the United States should pursue a policy which tightens rather than loosens the bonds between the tw o pow ers." I suggested to Sodenstem that he might think better of British policy toward China than of the United States' policy. He disagreed rather vehem ently and turned out to be passionately anti-British. "The Brit ish have no commonwealth anymore although they pretend to have o n e." He then leaned forward and his face assumed a very intense ex-
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pression. "N ow , take Churchill. Can you tell me why he is supposed to be a great statesm an? He has led his country tw ice into misfortune. And recently he made his incredible pro-Soviet speech stabbing your country in the back___ " Sodenstem referred to the speech of May 11, I9S31
D em ocracy in Germany May 12,1954 At a party in Stuttgart somebody asked the hackneyed question, "H ow firm ly rooted is democracy in postwar Germany?" A German journalist pointed out that the grandfathers who still remember the Germ an em pire under W ilhelm n had lived through the Weimar Re public and the Nazi regime as well, so that the current republic was the fourth regime of their lifetim e, not counting the early occupation period. T he fathers formed their strongest political impressions later, at the tim e of the Weimar Republic, but subsequently experienced two (or three) more regimes. Today's children, of course, have no sense of the past except for what they acquired from the talk of their elders or from reading; and they read little. In short, the German political tradi tion has been broken three (or four) tim es w ithin the life span of the oldest persons. He contrasted this situation rather charmingly with that of an Am erican father or grandfather who takes his son or grand son by the hand to visit the Lincoln Memorial. The political differ ences in the United States between Republicans and Democrats, he concluded, cannot possibly be so trenchant as those found between the age groups in Germany today, because in the United States young and old alike share an unbroken political tradition. Somebody else commented on certain aspects of democracy "as a form of life ." German middle-class youth are more reluctant to do m enial work than is true, say, of American students. The boy who, at the age of twelve, earns money by delivering newspapers before school cannot be found in Germany. T his is in part due to legal prohibitions of child labor. Later, when these laws no longer apply, the belief that m enial labor lowers one's status still plays a role. An instance was m entioned where this clinging to outdated values had prevented a young and impoverished man from earning enough money to carry on 1 See Preface to Part Four, p. 2 13, above.
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his studies: his father, who had no means whatever, would sooner see his son starve than permit him to turn for a while to the profitable but "dishonorable" business of a bootblack.
Karl Silex: Neutralist May 13,1954 Dr. Silex is editor in chief and publisher of a sm all weekly, Deutsche Kommentare. He employs one m ale assistant and three women who seem to function as clerks and secretaries, the whole establishm ent be* ing housed in two rooms on the fourth floor of an apartment house in Stuttgart. The weekly does not carry any ads, and its edition is un doubtedly sm all. It is therefore impossible for the enterprise to be profitable: Silex m ust get a subsidy. During the Nazi regime, he was editor in chief of the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, w hich in the later phase of that regime, offered a N azified version of the old democratic Frankfurter Zeitung. Silex is a topflight journalist, who managed nicely under the Nazis. No doubt he either was a Nazi him self or a N ationalist who resembled a true Nazi w ell enough to hold the position he occupied. It would be futile to ask whether he still is a Nazi, if only because there are so few Germans now who ever were Nazis. He has remained a first-rate journalist whose weekly articles on foreign affairs are exceed ingly interesting. Many of his journalistic colleagues point out that he has no influence, or that he is apt to com plicate simple m atters— w hich I regard as a welcome contrast to the Nazi practice of simplify ing com plicated m atters, and as an equally welcome relief from the dreary provincialism of a great deal of present German editorial writ ing. Silex told me that his m ain sources of information are the New York Times, the London Times, and the Zürcher Zeitung: this is probably superior to the reading done by the m ajority of German ed itorial w riters. During the interview Silex sat on his couch in shirt sleeves smoking a pipe. He has a sharply cut, intelligent, and cold face. If it were not for the fact that he likes to hear him self talk, he could be taken for an Eng lishm an. He is aggressive in his speech, which flows from his lips with great self-confidence, and he gives the impression that he cares less about agreement than about making his point. He was not evasive.
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I opened the discussion by remarking that I had found the German press to give relatively little attention to the political implications of the m ilitary strategy which the m ajor powers either have announced or are capable of following. His weekly publication, it had seemed to me, was an exception in this regard. Entirely unabashed by this com plim ent, Silex replied, "Y es, I am the only one who concerns him self system atically w ith precisely these m atters." As to e d c , he declared it "dead." No new debate about it is possible. A fter the disaster in Indochina, the French could not possibly be ex pected to be in the mood to touch another hot iron with their burned hands. He added that in the past he had been in favor of e d c , because he believed it would provide the West with a bargaining instrument in negotiations w ith the East on the reunification of Germany. Thus Silex im plied that he had not favored e d c as a step toward European in tegration or as a measure of defense against the East, but rather because it m ight be advantageous to be able to abandon it sometime in the future in order to reach more important German objectives. He said that the Foreign M inisters' Conference in Berlin, held in January-February this year, certainly had not proved that the reunifi cation of Germany would not be conceded by the Soviet Union.1 The failure of the conference in this regard had to be attributed altogether to the W estern powers' unwillingness to negotiate seriously with the Russians about the conditions under which Germany could be unified. T h is view was expressed after the Berlin conference in many German papers and magazines which one would not have necessarily expected to be neutralist. They included not only D ie G egenw art, but also the influential m onthly A u ssen p olitik in its editorial column. In fairness to Silex it should be pointed out that his views on the Berlin conference were derived from a resumé of that conference by Joseph C . Harsch, published in the C hristian S cien ce M onitor. Silex re 1 At the Berlin conference, two plans were presented regarding Germany's future, one by A. Eden, the other by V. Molotov. The so-called Eden Plan proposed: the formation of an all-German constitutional assembly based upon the result of supervised free elec tions in both West and East Germany; the drafting of supervised free elections in both West and East Germany; the drafting by the assembly of an all-German constitution; and the formation of an all-German government which was to participate in negotiating a peace treaty. Molotov rejected this plan and proposed instead negotiations between Bonn and Pankow about: the formation of a provisional all-German government; with drawal of occupation troops from both parts of Germany; unsupervised “ free" elections; freedom for so-called democratic organizations; and prohibition of organizations which were “ fascist, m ilitaristic, or hostile to peace."
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published the whole article in the April 3,1934, issue of his weekly. In retranslation, the last paragraph of Harsch's article as reprinted in Silex's paper read as follows: T here was a sigh of relief in Paris, London and Washington as well as in Moscow about the nonliberation of Germany. On the part of the W est, the reason for this attitude is not lack of confidence in the Germ ans but the realization that a liberated Germany would be som ething too great and strong for the fragile structure of peace as it exists today. Peace m ust become a more solid state until one can demand of it to shoulder som ething so great and strong as modem Germany. [The mixed metaphor is either Harsch's or Silex's.) Silex continued that even if the free elections proposed by the Soviet U nion had not been "chem ically pure," it was simply ridiculous to assum e that the whole of Germany could not have lived with a vote from the present Eastern zone somewhat doctored in favor of the Com m unist tick et. Germany still would have had a considerably low er Com m unist representation than that prevailing in France or Italy today. Now that e d c has failed, only a policy of neutrality for West Ger m any m akes sense. T his is particularly true because "th e American policy of strength" has generally failed. Silex added at once that unfor tunately the word n eu tralism belonged to the vocabulary of defama tion: one could not use this term safely. I noted recently that the word d efa m a tio n —w hich I always thought had gained political currency in the early postwar period as a word of protest against reeducation and disarm am ent—really dates back to the Nazi period and was first used by H itler, thus becoming a favored word of Nazi political language.2 T he term Silex prefers to n eu tralism is arm ed in depen den ce. Armed independence dien, like Rauschning's "equally favored status," should be W est Germ any's world political aim. W hen I asked who should pay for German armament under the con ditions Silex had in mind, he threw up his hands, saying that this ques tion is often asked, and that he did not have enough of a feeling of inferiority as a German to be dismayed by it. I should not forget that H itler was capable of arming more than 300 divisions. Why should it 2 See Victor Klemperer, L T .I. [Lingua Tertii Im perii, "The Language of the Third Reich"| (Berlin, 1947), PP- » 5 1>»SJ-
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not be possible for German industry to equip twelve of them now? I asked w hether he was not apprehensive that after the withdrawal of W estern m ilitary power, the Soviet Union would be quite a dangerous neighbor. He answered this question in two ways. First, he was think ing of a m utual guarantee of Germany's neutral status to be given by all occupation powers. In case the agreement was broken by an act of ag gression, Germany would fight together w ith the nonaggressive guaranteeing powers against the aggressor, whoever he might be. Second, Silex made it perfectly clear that in his opinion the Soviet U nion did not want war. He went to considerable length to explain that the Soviet Union was surrounded by American air bases, and re sponded to this "encirclem ent" w ith the same anxiety and defense preparations w hich were fam iliar to him from recent German history. Silex approved of the "N ew Look" to the extent that it was oriented toward a peripheral strategy. He said that unfortunately, however, this term —;peripheral strategy—is often misunderstood. He had pointed out in his weekly that it did not mean a defense in peripheral areas, but a strategy that would have its bases near the periphery of the Soviet em pire. I believe that Silex "favored" the "N ew Look" because he does not take seriously the assertions of American diplomats that e d c is part of it. Rather, he believes that the peripheral strategy advocated in the "N ew Look" may develop to a point where his own notion of Ger m any's "arm ed neutrality" may be the more easily realized. Silex was scathing in his criticism of American policy in Indochina. He used the term fa n ta stic d ip lo m a cy in reference to a recent state m ent by John Foster D ulles that Indochina is after all not so impor tant. Equally fantastic, he thought, was the recent public announce m ent by a French general that Hanoi could not be held without foreign help. W hat better way was there to encourage further Communist aggression? He said that it was altogether deplorable that none of the W estern powers, and especially the United States, had succeeded in clarifying precisely what they would consider to be a casu s b elli. Nobody knows. Instead there are alarming threats of intervention today and ill-explained retractions tomorrow. Who can still speak of a "p olicy of strength"?
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A Jo u r n a lis t: A n ti-A m er ic a n ism ; W ritin g b e t w e e n th e L in es May 3 ,1 9 5 4 I had heard that Fräulein Renate Unkrodt was quite knowledgeable about the German resistance movement under H itler. I wrote to her and subsequently m et her at a hotel in Marburg on my way from Gen eral Blum entritt's house to the railroad station. She had studied philosophy at Marburg University and was for some tim e assistant to Professor Ebbinghaus, the first rector of the univer sity after 194$. (I had visited him tw ice, in 1945 and 1946.) He has just retired. Fräulein Unkrodt now is a journalist working for the Marburg newspaper. She has been in the United States, a beneficiary of the ex change program. A fter I told her about my interest in the tw entieth of July, I was taken aback by her blunt question: "W hy do you want to know all this?" It turned out that she was suspicious because she had read Robert Jungk's, T he Future H as A lread y Begun, a book containing biased in form ation about the Rand Corporation, w ith which I was then associ ated. T h is was not the first tim e on this trip that I m et with a certain am ount of curiosity, if not distrustfulness, on account of Jungk's book. I explained that his account of Rand was not reliable. Fräulein Unkrodt then told me she was giving a course on the United States, in som e institution for adult education in Marburg. She also produced the clipping of a long, critical review she had written of L. M atthias's book on the United States. This book far exceeds Jungk's intem perate condemnation of the United States. Both M atthias's and Jungk's books are being widely read in Germany today. Fräulein U nkrodt's review testifies to her fairness toward, and knowledge of, the U nited States. She said it was erroneous to believe, as is occasionally said in public today, that German politics currently suffered from a shortage of dem ocrats who could assume responsible positions in political life. The allegation that this shortage is due to the fact that so many participants in the July 20 revolt against H itler were killed by the Nazis does not stand up to scrutiny. Many people of the resistance, like the students Scholl, were idealists who were fundamentally disinterested in poli tics and would not have chosen political careers in the postwar period. O thers were doubtful democrats, no m atter how anti-Nazi they were. S till others were outright reactionaries.
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She spoke intelligently about the changing perspective in which one's own conduct assumes a different meaning as tim e passes. She had once believed that some of her writings during the Nazi regime had expressed rather dangerous thoughts quite courageously. Recently she had occasion to reread these articles. "I had difficulty finding the pas sages in w hich any criticism of the Nazis and their regime was ex pressed in som e oblique fashion." She concluded from this personal experience, I believe quite correctly, that one must be careful when evaluating present statem ents by Germans about their anti-Nazi activ ities. I found her candor refreshing. W hen I later visited Helmut T h ielicke1 in Tübingen (May 13), he made som e rem arks w hich corroborated Renate Unkrodt's observa tion on "w riting between the lin es" during the Nazi era. Only recently, he said, he had reread some of his old sermons. He found it extremely difficult to recapture the sense of daring and danger he had experienced when delivering them during the war. He hardly noticed the anti-Nazi allusions that everybody in church had readily understood at the tim e. T h ielick e added that in this regard, the intellectual clim ate in East Germ any, w hich he som etim es visits, resembles that of the Nazi past. T here it is necessary again to speak carefully, and the faintest hint of criticism is understood. The account of my conversation with Dr. Pechel, w hich follow s immediately, also contains information on th is subject.
R u d o lf P e c h e l: W ritin g u n d er T h rea ts o f P e r s e c u tio n ; G erm a n O v ertu res to th e E a st; T h e D a n g er o f R e n a z ific a tio n May 14,1954 Pechel is the editor of D ie D eu tsche R undschau, a literary-political journal distinguished in the annals of German literature. He lives in Stuttgart, where I visited him in the afternoon. Herr Pechel is seventyone years old. However, he is active professionally, and hearing him talk one w ishes that young people in Germany today would have his m ental agility and energy. U n til the Nazis came to power in 1933, Pechel was editor of a dis tinguished, somewhat conservative literary magazine. He had entered 1 Since 1954, professor of Protestant theology at Hamburg University (bom 1908).
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upon th is career after the First World War, in which he served as a naval officer. In 1933 Pechel was fifty years old. It was then that he entered the period of his life which he must now regard as the most important one and for w hich he w ill perhaps be remembered after his death. From 1933 u ntil 1941 he continued as editor of D ie D eu tsche R undschau, transform ing his magazine into a literary instrum ent to fight the Nazi mind. He was close to Goerdeler, who was killed after the twentieth of July 1944. In 1941, Pechel was arrested by the Gestapo and his journal was suppressed. He was imprisoned for three years—and, I believe, so was his wife—but he somehow survived the Nazis. Shortly after the war a Sw iss house published his book, D eu tscher W iderstand, in w hich he glorified the German resistance and gave vent to his indigna tion about the appeasement policy of the Western powers, which had strengthened H itler's tyranny, and about those who belittled the im portance of the German resistance movement in the early postwar years. In th is book Pechel transcended reason, claiming, for example, that the German resistance had shed more blood than the Americans in the war against Germany. Such extravagance, which is perhaps excusable, is probably bom of the sam e spirit that sustained Pechel in his fight against the Nazis dur ing his heroic years as a writer and editor. He still is sustained by the m em ory of this fight. In fact, due to his knowledge of the Nazi past, he view s the current political scene in Germany with an awareness of the danger of its revival. Copies of D ie D eu tsch e R undschau for the years 1933 to 1941 are difficult to obtain, because the print run was small. A selection of Pechel's articles from this period has been compiled in a book, Z w isch en d en Z eilen ("Betw een the Lines"). Also included in this book are excerpts from an article Pechel published after the war. They reveal som e interesting inform ation about the hazards he ran in edit ing D ie D eu tsch e R undschau under the nose of the Nazi authorities. Pechel presented me w ith a copy of his book. I asked about his experiences as an editor in the Nazi period. He ex plained that the model he kept in mind was Montesquieu's L ettres P ersan es, from w hich much could be learned about the art of oblique w riting. The techniques m ost frequently employed by Pechel were sim ple enough and by no means novel. He used historical events that paralleled the present. For example, he would criticize Napoleon's conduct—meaning H itler's behavior—and his readers would unfail ingly understand. In other cases he would criticize conditions in the
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Soviet Union, again making it clear enough to his readers that he had Germ any in mind. I had read somewhere the following story: One of the articles in D ie D eu tsch e R u n dschau ostensibly dealt with Siberia. It was read out loud by a German m inistry official who each tim e substituted "G er m any" for the "Soviet U nion." The result among the listeners was electrifying, because the article was a vitriolic attack on the Nazis. Subsequently, inquiries were made as to whether Pechel could be pros ecuted according to the law because of this article. The official answer —so characteristic of bureaucracy occasionally restraining modem tyranny—was that no evidence of subversion could be legally proved from the article. Nevertheless, this incident, together with his con tinued attacks on the regime that were barely hidden from view, in creased the danger in which Pechel lived, and the article presumably contributed to his subsequent arrest. Pechel told me this story again, evidently with some pride. He spoke warm ly about the gratification his work had given him and how it had am ply compensated him for the danger to which he exposed him self: som e articles from D ie D eu tsche R undschau would be copied and mimeographed by a worker, then passed from hand to hand in a factory. T he principle that guided him as an editor during those years, he ex plained, was that "every line must be against National Socialism ." T h is could be accomplished by failing to praise what the Nazis praised and by upholding the standards they attempted to destroy, all in a way w hich would evade the censor. Som etim es this was done merely by re printing quotations from German classics whose prestige was consid ered unquestionable but which had said things no Nazi would approve of. I asked him about specific policies of the controlling authorities. Pechel said that their crudest yet quite effective instrum ent was cut ting down the paper supply so that the circulation of the magazine would have been autom atically reduced had it not been for illegal shipm ents of paper from sympathizers. In addition, he said quite lightly, "C ensors always are stupid." They often missed the intended meaning, and they were neither fam iliar with the literary and political records of the contributors nor w ith the connections among them. Specifically, he told me that he had been interrogated by the Gestapo about G erhart Pohl, a contributor to D ie D eu tsche R undschau, who had been quite radical in the late twenties and early thirties when he
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had published an avant-garde literary magazine, N eue B ücherschau (in w hich, incidentally, my first literary essay was published). In the interrogation Pechel simply said that this must be a case of mistaken identity. Apparently the Gestapo official was confusing Gerhart Pohl w ith the radical w riter Heinz Pol (who had reached safety). Pechel got away w ith this stratagem. H is difficulties increased when some of his articles were reprinted abroad as a token of opposition to the Nazi regime. In one case the b b c broadcast an article reprinted in a Swiss paper. 'T h is sort of thing did not exactly help m e." At the same tim e, Pechel confessed to having com m itted the same political error. He had reviewed a book by Alfred von M artin, N ietzsch e und B u rckh ard t,1in such a way that its implied anti-N azism was called to the attention of the censor and the book was suppressed. "V on M artin forgave m e." Like Professor Thielicke and Renate Unkrodt,1 2 Pechel said that his readers' sensitivity to allusions, metaphors, and other devices convey ing anti-N azi intent was extrem ely high at the tim e. One read with considerably greater care than one reads now, and writers could count on being understood, no m atter how subtle the hint. Pechel rem inisced about his experiences in Berlin soon after the war when he had been an editor for a German newspaper in the Soviet sec tor. He resigned because of "incredible" difficulties. He considered the Soviet censors far worse than those of the Nazis. I told Pechel that I was surprised to see that a number of persons in the Germ an press, by no means only from the ranks of the f d p , were considering a new approach to the Soviet Union. He replied that this was an entirely new development. When I mentioned to him, however, that as early as the 1952 econom ic conference in Moscow some Ger man businessm en had shown considerable interest in being repre sented at that meeting, he said that West German businessmen unfortunately believed that it was possible to separate economics from politics. Later, he said that he objected particularly to the erroneous political calculations of a possible German-Soviet rapprochement, and to the clum sy way these m atters were aired in public. He added that he con sidered secret negotiations, say in Switzerland, perfectly possible "in order to feel out the Russians." 1 (Munich: Erasmus Verlag, 1947). 2 See p. 244, above.
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Pechei derived considerable comfort from his belief that German youth, i.e., the age group from 18 to 35, was immune to the danger of rem ilitarization and renazification. Sim ilarly, the new West German Republic had the backing of the trade unions. H itler could have been stopped if the trade unions had gone out on the streets in January 1933. They did not do so because their leaders were irresolute, and under estim ated the danger. Now the situation was different. Any political attem pt by reactionary elem ents to seize power would be answered effectively by the trade unions. According to Pechel, public life in Germany today suffers from a severe shortage of qualified and reliable men. He had often been asked for recom m endations and always had to answer that he could easily suggest som eone, had it not been for the afterm ath of July 20. So many of the m en who would have been highly qualified for positions of lead ership in postwar Germany were killed by the Nazis shortly before the surrender. At tw o points in the conversation, Pechel spoke of the "Fascist Inter n ation al." He gave me the current issue of his magazine which con tains m aterial on the international connections among some leading Fascists in various European countries and in Argentina. He said most of the Fascists who w rite are at one tim e or another represented in the magazine N ation Europa. Talking about the French delay in ratifying e d c , he attributed some responsibility for this reluctance, which he deplored, to the French press. He explained that as soon as a chauvinist like General Ramcke m akes one of his foolish speeches, the event is given banner headlines in the French press. O ther developments among former German m il itary officers that testify to the fact that there are reasonable and dem ocratic elem ents w ithin this group are not noticed. Pechel said that he had told French colleagues of his in Paris that there was a great need for more com petent and objective reporting in France of the polit ical situation in Germany. As to the selection of officers for future Germ an contingents, Pechel maintained that a number of sufficiently reliable persons w ith the wartime rank of lieutenant colonel or colonel were available their political reliability would be adequate. He laughed at Blank's idea of using a questionnaire to select reliable personnel—a m atter m uch discussed in the German press today. He said he had repeatedly told people in the Blank office that the answer to one ques tion would be sufficient to determine the political qualification of a candidate: "W hat is your attitude toward the tw entieth of July?"
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Pechel expressed a favorable opinion about Heusinger, but was more reserved about Speidel. "He joined the resistance very late, at the very last moment." When discussing Adenauer's current policy, Pechel deplored the in fluence of the Catholic Church upon German domestic politics. He recalled that during the war, elements from all churches, whether Catholic or Protestant, worked together with those elements of the opposition to the Nazi regime which had no particular ties to any church. The conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism in Ger many seemed at that time effectively suspended in the Una Sancta movement. By contrast, the conflict now is so intense that Pechel characterized it as a "counterreformation." Rudolf Pechel died in 1961.
L o u is M u ller: G erm a n -F ren c h R e la tio n s
May 14,1954 M. Muller, a public affairs officer in the French consulate in Stutt gart, has been in Germany continuously for the last nine years. He is Alsatian by birth and speaks German and French with equal fluency. His English, too, is excellent. According to the French system, policy in the field of public affairs is made by the official in charge of cultural affairs. M. Muller, the representative concerned with matters of the German press, has an "intelligence"—rather than a policy—function. His time is almost altogether devoted to studying public opinion in Germany. Muller has an uninterrupted record of observation which his American colleagues lack. I was told that the American consulate regards him as an especial ly well-informed person, and his company is sought during the daily coffee break in the American snack bar because of the invaluable intel ligence he is able to provide. I met Muller at a cocktail party and asked whether he could spare an hour the next morning. He was preoccupied with the possibility of an emerging German-Russian rapprochement. He referred to Pfleiderer's proposal that German deputies should visit Moscow. While this pro posal in itself might not be alarming, there were a sufficient number of other persons, especially journalists, who were blowing the same hom. He mentioned Hermann Rauschning, Klaus Mehnert, and Dr. Silex.
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M uller was particularly suspicious of M ehnert's political views. W hen M ehnert was covering the Berlin Conference for his paper, Mul ler said, he seized upon the opportunity to declare that the tim e had com e to offer e d c to the Soviets in exchange for reaching an agreement w ith them . M uller took a dim view of M ehnert's having hired Giselher W irsing, a former leading Nazi journalist, as editor of C hrist und W elt. A lso the interests of "certain econom ic business groups" in East-West trade made M uller uneasy. Furthermore, he was apprehensive that the developm ents in Indochina would strengthen anti-French feelings among the Germans. Finally, as a good Frenchman, he paid special at tention to signs of increased German interest in reunification. W ith a m ixture of am usem ent and irritation, he referred to alleged plans of the Bonn government to use propaganda in W est Germany in order to prom ote awareness of the need for German unification. In reading German newspapers, and particularly during some of my conversations in 1952 as w ell as now, I had noticed that instead of ac cepting a plausible explanation of political events, Germans often look for ulterior m otives, secret intentions, and possible conspiratorial m anipulations. I was reminded of this observation when M uller men tioned spontaneously, w ith an indulgent sm ile, that Germans are quite apt to search for special and hidden m otives whenever a political event of som e interest to them occurs. By way of illustration, he said that Adenauer's speech in Hamburg—in which he had declared that in the course of the year it might be possible to resume diplomatic rela tions between Germany and the Soviet Union—had been interpreted by som e Germ ans as the result of secret discussions between Adenauer and Am erican authorities about how to pressure France into ratifying e d c . I told M uller, who I thought was pumping me for information, that I had seen in the press various other "interpretations," all of which im plied that Adenauer had m eant more than he actually said. One in terpretation was that Adenauer was afraid that the opposition would gain popularity by advancing proposals on German foreign policy w hich would im plicitly criticize his own; in order to take the wind out of the sails of the opposition, he had made a moderate statem ent on a subject w hich he expected the opposition to discuss in more extreme term s. Sim ilar interpretations had been applied to Pfleiderer's some what more sensational statem ent that German deputies should visit M oscow. T he position of Pfleiderer's party, the f d p , on this issue had also been interpreted as an attem pt to gain votes in the forthcoming elections in N orth Rhine W estphalia.
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F ra n z H a id e r : P o lit ic a l a n d M ilita ry V iew s May 17,1954 On May 7 , 1had visited von der Heydte* near Mainz. He told me that G eneraloberst Haider—the head of the German group that worked for the H istorical D ivision of the U.S. Army in Karlsruhe—was quite oc cupied and, in fact, was at home in Königstein only on Mondays. Many people wished to see him , but he was reticent unless he was complete* ly assured of his visitor's discretion. Von der Heydte added, however, th at he was close to Haider and confident that he could arrange my visit. We agreed on a m eeting date of May 17, and von der Heydte asked m e to phone him the evening of May 16 to remind him of the appoint m ent. He offered to call for me in his car in Wiesbaden and to take me to H aider's residence. His wife added whim sically, "Y es, you better telephone, because we always forget things." I suggested that they w rite to m e in Überlingen because over the weekend I would arrange m y return in such a way as to m eet the May 17 appointment. There was no message in Überlingen for me, and when I phoned von der Heydte on May 16, after my return from Baden-Baden, there was no answer. I had given up all hope of meeting Haider, but on the morning of May 1 7 , 1 received a message that von der Heydte would call for me around 10 o'clock. He arrived around 11 o'clock with his wife and one of his little sons. T he "B u b " had to be taken to Frankfurt first so we were late in arriv ing in Königstein. Von der Heydte explained on the way that he had not announced m e to Haider, and would ask me to wait in the car with his w ife w hile he explained the situation to him . My heart sank, but then I had great confidence in the social skills of the aristocracy. W hile I was w aiting in front of Haider's house, the Frau Baronin told m e how difficult it was to bring up children. Her eldest son, who is fourteen, fails in his manners. His fingernails are not clean and he does not com b his hair. She wondered why it was that the simple things are so difficult to do at that age. "B u t th en ," she added, "I am sure the fault is partly ours. It is surprising how often one makes m istakes as one tries to educate one's children." 1 Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte, Professor, of Political Science and Inter national Law at the University of Mainz, taught later in Würzburg. In World War 0, Heydte was commander of the Second Parachute Division engaged in Crete and became Commandant of Candia, the capital of Crete. Heydte is the author of an excellent chap ter on the German paratroops in the symposium Bilanz des Zw eiten W eltkriegs (1954).
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Finally she got im patient waiting and honked the hom of the car, saying, "T h ey probably have started talking about something they consider im portant, forgetting that it is more important not to keep us w aiting." A fter a little w hile an elderly lady came out of the house who looked m uch like any German middle-class woman about to go to the m arket. Frau Haider was followed by von der Heydte and Haider him self. Haider was wearing a green suit; had it not been for his spectacles, he could have easily been taken for a retired forester. He is much sm all er and som ewhat heavier than I had imagined him from pictures I had seen. H is face had a tense expression. I would expect him to be quite choleric. At first glance his face is decidedly undistinguished, except for a keen expression of his eyes. He speaks w ith a strong Bavarian ac cent, like von der Heydte and his wife, and it is possible that their com m on Bavarian and Catholic background adds to the regard in w hich von der Heydte is apparently held by Haider. (It is possible, however, that Haider finds it gratifying to be associated with the younger Bavarian nobleman who treats him w ith a degree of deference —w hich cam e as a com plete surprise to me.) Evidently, von der Heydte had been quite successful during the five m inutes in private he had had w ith Haider; the general did not seem in the least cautious or calculating while talking to me during the two hours we were together. He has a strange way of shaking hands by ex tending only two fingers of his right hand, but this may have been the consequence of arthritis. He bowed deeply, and would unfailingly have kissed m y hand had I been a woman. I had previously asked von der Heydte if there were any topics one had best avoid when m eeting Haider for the first tim e, and whether there were som e subjects particularly close to his heart. Both von der Heydte and his wife explained that Haider som etim es was irritated by details in a conversation and that he liked to talk about large questions, concentrating on the essentials. (This was not much help.) Von der Heydte added that in his opinion Haider still was the greatest m ilitary m ind in Germany today. "You w ill notice his grasp of important prob lem s and the breadth of his interests. He is quite different from the stereotype of the German general one som etim es meets w ith abroad." Von der Heydte's wife explained further—and her husband agreed— that he is a bit "professorial," a judgment von der Heydte immediately toned down by adding that Haider was a combination of a general and a scholar. Von der Heydte did not tell me, but I knew that opinions on Haider
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were divided among the former generals. General Gehlen had spoken of him w ith great respect, as had General Toppe. Sim ilarly, in a widely read book containing conversations with Haider, an attem pt had been made to present the former chief of staff of the army as representative of an old pre*Hitler world in which honor and duty still counted. In this book Haider appears as the retired wise mentor of German youth.2 By contrast, Geyr von Schweppenburg had expressed him self w ith much the sam e reservation as had Graf Schwerin. In his memoirs, Geyr was in fact quite critical of Haider's political views and character. He de scribed him as "th e type of old army specialist___ Haider did not have the strength to do as Beck has done, and say 'no' to the demands of the 'unconditionally obedient.' " 3 G eyr's book G ebroch en es Schw ert also contained a few highly critical remarks on Haider. It poured scorn on Brauchitsch's and Haider's ignorance in the field of foreign affairs and on their belief that the war could be confined to a campaign against Poland. And he castigated both of them for having tolerated and col laborated in the violation of Belgian, Dutch, and Danish neutrality in 1940. Haider is being attacked, however, not only by the survivors of the anti-N azi tradition among the German generals and the protagonists of a new dem ocratic m ilitary establishm ent, but also from the opposite side, by those who disparage his conservatism in favor of the radical m ilitary and political views of men like Guderian. In the latter camp can be found many men from the former Waffen ss and armored troops. In addition, Haider has bitter enem ies among the German elem ents of what Dr. Pechel calls the Fascist International. I remember having read attacks on Haider in German magazines of the extreme Right, in w hich his attitude toward H itler was severely criticized and his moral integrity openly questioned. I also remember a factual and dignified reply that Haider published. T he attacks to w hich he has been subjected are, I believe, partly due to the fact that soon after the war, Haider published his pamphlet H itler a ls F eld h err; in it he attributed the failure of German arms to H itler's incom petent interference w ith the professional strategy for w hich he, Haider, was responsible.4 Several passages of this pamphlet 2 Peter Bor, G espräche m it H aider (Wiesbaden, 1950). * General Baron Geyr von Schweppenburg, The C ritical Years (London, 1952), pp. 17 2 ,1 97 . 4 See, for example, Erich Kern's derogatory remarks on Haider's anti-Hitler book, Hit ler als Feldherr (Munich, 1949), in Der grosse Rausch (Wels, 1950), pp. 168, 299.
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cannot easily be reconciled with Haider's diary, not as yet published, w hich shows him to have been less critical of H itler's m ilitary views than Haider's postwar pamphlet attem pts to make him appear. I be lieve that this distortion of his recollection is in part unintentional. In cidentally, he remarked at one point in our conversation that only now can the Germ ans begin to write serious m ilitary history, as the docu m ents of the last war are becoming available to them. He added that he was quite often surprised how important it is to check one's recollec tion against documentary evidence, because it seems inevitable that m istakes creep into one's mind. We drove to a large residence which turned out to be a luxurious restaurant owned by the Land Hesse, D as H aus D eu tscher Länder, near Königstein, which was once owned by a member of the family Rothschild. It lies in the midst of a beautiful park, and from its terrace one has a spectacular view opening between the trees of Schloss Kronberg. T he m om ent Haider appeared on the premises, the number of headw aiters in the establishm ent m ultiplied. Finally a gentleman who seem ed to be the supervisor of all of the headwaiters appeared to ex press his gratitude to Generaloberst Haider for honoring them w ith his v isit. T he general shook hands w ith the man. We ordered dinner and asked that it be served in an unoccupied room adjacent to the terrace,m eanw hile we would take a walk through the park. T he tw o ladies led the way, while Haider, von der Heydte, and I fol lowed at a distance. Haider remarked that he had just been in Munich to congratulate Crown Prince Ruprecht on his eighty-fifth birthday. According to the S ü ddeu tsche Z eitung it must have been quite a cele bration, w ith half of M unich participating and expressing its monarchistic feelings. The paper carried a detailed account which read like a description of an event taking place in the year 1912. Its headline read som ething like, "G lory under the Blue-W hite Sky"—blue-white being the old Bavarian colors. There were delegations of the Association of Bavarian Noblemen, student fraternities, m onarchistic organizations from other parts of the country, and so on. According to the paper, the crown prince's speech was interrupted by shouts, "O ur rightful king— m ay he live long!" The paper's editorial expressed with great warmth its adm iration for C hurchill's having volunteered as a pilot in a uni form on the barge that brought Queen Elizabeth back home on the Tham es. It commented that regardless of political events, the senti m ental ties between the British people and their monarchy have
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becom e closer since the end of World War I. Then the editorial con cluded that this would have been true of Bavaria as well had it not been for the revolution in 1918. Haider referred to the crown prince as "m ein hoher H err." Von der Heydte seemed crestfallen that he had not been there, m entioning that he was supposed to participate as a mem ber of the A ssociation of Bavarian Noblemen (B ayerische E delleute). H is wife, who overheard this part of the conversation, said that the actual birthday was a few days away, so "W e must send him an l /t ," i.e., a letter telegram . Haider chuckled, under his breath, "H e w ill get wagons full of th ose." Von der Heydte opened our discussion by saying that he became m ost disturbed whenever he opened a paper. T his could of course mean anything or nothing, but Haider nodded gravely, "m ost depressing." T h is sort of conversation went on for a few sentences more, so that I was com pletely at a loss to understand what the two gentlemen were talking about. O nly later did it become clear that they were referring not so m uch to the news reported in the press but to the unsatisfactory political views of the newspapers. T o the end, however, it remained a m ystery as to w hich particular papers they were referring to. To top it all, von der Heydte did not fail to remark after a m inute or so that he was very much delighted to hear that Generaloberst Haider was shar ing his views on the German press. He said this w ith such an abject expression of deference, using the old-fashioned form of addressing Haider in the third person, that I asked m yself whether I had seen and heard right. ("Es freut m ich ja doch ganz besonders, dass Herr General oberst m eine A nsicht über die Presse teilen.") Only later, I noticed th at von der Heydte did not once use the ordinary grammar which norm al m ortals employ when speaking to others: he never addressed Haider w ith "y o u ." And only then did I fully realize that I had under stood correctly from the beginning. I should add that von der Heydte's wife did not once employ this form of address. Her sim plicity and poise were in marked contrast to her husband's behavior at the dinner table. Von der Heydte was sitting next to Haider. The latter sat erect, and merely turned his head when von der Heydte spoke to him . However, von der Heydte assumed a strangely slumping posture when talking to Haider, his chin almost touching his chest, so that the Generaloberst, who was smaller than von der Heydte, could alm ost see the latter's crown. (It occurred to me later that the seemingly excessive measure of deference shown by von der Heydte may have been traditional in his circles in view of Haider's
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rank and age, and that it may not have been required of his wife, be cause she was a lady.) Von der Heydte was m ost helpful in introducing subjects into the conversation on w hich he knew I would like to hear Haider's views. Incidentally, he did so w ithout ever indicating to Haider that I had ex pressed such an interest, so that there was a slight suggestion of a per verse conversational conspiracy between von der Heydte and myself. I did not mind, of course, because von der Heydte was indeed helpful. Y et at the same tim e, this trickery increased my irritation at his defer ential conduct. Von der Heydte in fact turned me into a silent partner. I felt involved in an act of hypocrisy, which—had he been aware of it at all—von der Heydte might have regarded as permissible insofar as he did it to help me. T o illustrate, on May 7 1had asked von der Heydte to what extent the views attributed to Haider in the book, G espräche m it H aider, were notions of the eager author and to what extent they were really Haider's ideas. On May 17, toward the end of our conversation von der Heydte found an occasion to ask Haider, "M ay I ask the general what his opinion is of the author who----- " Haider answered, having had no inkling that I rather than von der Heydte was interested in his reply. At the dinner table, the ladies remained alm ost completely silent. Had it not been for an occasional word I addressed to Frau Haider and von der Heydte's wife, they might have been left out of the conversa tion entirely. Whenever Haider spoke, there was an aura of hearing "H im " speak. I derived a strange satisfaction from knowing that I paid the bill, including "H is." W hen we parted, the Haiders walked to Königstein where they oc cupy a sm all apartment. The house was once requisitioned by the Am erican occupation authorities. The owner still lives nearby. I had heard previously that there is considerable resentment in the com m unity that Haider occupies space in that house: it was assigned to him by the Americans on account of the fact that he was working for the H istorical Division. The rest of us left by car for Frankfurt. I was surprised once more that alm ost immediately after our departure, von der Heydte began to talk about Haider, evidently much interested in my im pressions. I m entioned some of the things that had favorably impressed me about Haider, and thus delighted von der Heydte and his w ife. I also thanked von der Heydte once more for having arranged the m eeting. He said, "Y es, he likes me and is always charming and friend ly toward u s." His wife laughed, "But he can be perfectly horrible with
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people he dislikes. He brushes them aside and w on't have* anything to do w ith th em ." As a Catholic d ie was especially taken by a remark Haider had made about the soldier's profession. He had said that it is not confined to m ilitary m atters. The beautiful thing about the profession of the soldier, he had said, is that it is by no means so specialized as the critics of "m ilitarism " seem to assume. It comprises everything that is life, "including the church." Frau Baronin recalled th is rem ark w ith som e em otion: " It is true of Haider, but how many are lik e h im ?" Haider belongs of course to the older generation of German generals, and som e of his views clearly reflect this fact. Von der Heydte is probably correct in saying that Haider is the greatest German general still alive. H is decisive contribution to the strategy of the German army during the Second World War, from the Polish campaign to Stalingrad —when he resigned over an intense quarrel w ith Hitler—is a m atter of h istoric record. Before turning to the specific subjects Haider discussed, I would like to say that in general, he is evidently a man not used to having his judg m ent questioned. He speaks, as it were, with natural authority. He does listen to arguments, however, and he gives the impression that he weighs each argument for what it is worth in his judgment, without re gard to his personal attitude toward the speaker. He does not express him self "diplom atically," but apparently says what he thinks to be true. He has the prejudices of his upbringing and his generation, but he is open-minded enough to consider that something may be right even though it does not support these prejudices. He struck me as a man whose opinions on current issues are not based upon what he has read, but are formed independently from the facts available to him . He thus gives a very pleasant impression of originality as w ell as firmness, and of intellectu al courage rather than of concern about the opinions of others. It is of course possible that my impression was in part created by the situation in w hich I found m yself: Haider evidently is a man who would feel contem pt for him self if he tried to say what I, as an Am erican, m ight like to hear. If anything, he would be inclined to lean in the other direction and express views of a somewhat shocking na ture. O n the whole, however, I believe that Haider does not care much how his views are received by the persons he talks to. He cares more about expressing him self articulately. He has strength of character, w hich in my opinion is not only the result of his background, career, and form er position, but also related to his faith. I was most pleasantly
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surprised by som e casual remarks he made when talking of m atters related to bureaucracy and ideology; these indicated to me that behind his som ewhat formidable façade of intellectual imperiousness and m ilitary bearing, he is a man capable of warm feeling. Any political ideology is to him som ething that hides what is "hum an"; and for all his appreciation of the organizational aspects of m ilitary life, he does not seem to lose sight of its human content. In this respect he strack m e as a greater man than Sodenstem, whom he resembles somewhat in other respects. Finally, I did not find him as dry as I thought he was from having read some of his writings and from having seen his pic* ture. H is speech is rather colorful and full of surprisingly jocular, folksy phrases. He can laugh all right, although his pince-nez seems in danger of falling from his nose when he does. (In the following notes, all views not specifically attributed to a par ticu lar speaker were expressed by Haider him self.) T he general world political situation is serious and is deteriorating chiefly in consequence of two factors. First, Germany was destroyed, and then Prussia. Turning to me Haider said, "You must know I am not a P russian." Now an icy wind is blowing from the East and there is no w all of protection. French foreign policy is unsatisfactory because the French fear Ger m any m ore than Russia and because their foreign policy is dependent upon dom estic political quarrels. As to the latter, it must be realized of course that the fatal dependence of foreign policy upon dom estic polit ical considerations is a general weakness of democracy. Again turning to m e at th is point Haider said that I should not infer that he was ad vocating a totalitarian regime. He did not indicate, however, what regime, if any, he was advocating. He simply availed him self of the privilege of a political observer, who has no responsibilities, to criti cize w ithout making constructive suggestions. Haider elaborated his point by saying that if a dem ocratic statesm an knows what ought to be done in foreign affairs he must explain and justify his policy to the people at home w ith an eye to the balance of power in parliament, to elections, newspaper opinions, and so on. Even if he honestly tries to do th is job, he is inevitably led in the process to falsify the issues at stake. In other words, Haider implied that democracy and effective foreign policy are incom patible. At other points in the conversation, when there was agreement around the table about certain aspects of the current balance of power in the world, Haider said several tim es,
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'T es, this is so. The only question remaining is how to get the people to see it." As to the French fear of Germany, it is rooted in large part in a feeling of econom ic inferiority, because the Germans are more industrious than the French. Haider cited figures he had read recently about build ing activ ities in Germany and France during the last year, according to w hich the French program amounted to less than one-fifth of the Ger man. He rem inisced that when he was a young lieutenant in the First World War, he saw houses in France that had been damaged in the French-Germ an War of 1870-71, which had not yet been repaired. Haider laughed when he told this story. He as well as von der Heydte rejected my suggestion that perhaps French political sentim ent was in fluenced by the defeat of France in 1940 and by the large number of col laborators during the last war whose presence in French society may be a subtle cause of moral confusion. (I made this point merely in order to hear Haider's reaction.) Haider replied that my opinion was not cor rect. He attributed greater importance to the fact that many members of the Resistance have entered the French corps of officers after the war. T h is gave von der Heydte an opening to amuse Haider by pointing out that the French Resistance had not been strong at all. He recalled having lived in a region in France during the war which, according to French postwar accounts, was an active center of the Resistance, but w hich at the tim e was perfectly quiet. Haider chuckled, "O f course, ju st the way it is w ith us in Germany: everybody now claim s to have been in the anti-H itler m ovem ent." Haider said the French fought bravely in Indochina. Adenauer m ust be credited w ith energy and determination. He is trying to steer a course without wavering. He must be admired for his m anliness. But he is not in control of the forces which determine the trends in world politics. Moreover, he is com pletely ignorant of m ili tary affairs. In addition, he is basically disinterested in them, regarding rearm am ent m erely as a means toward the political goal of European unification. "O urs is a century of means, and little means, but what has becom e of the ends?" W hen I suggested that Schumacher, in my opinion, had had more understanding for m ilitary affairs than many of the German politicians who now advocate e d c , Haider agreed by telling the following story: A friend of his had visited Schumacher two years ago and was so im pressed by what he had learned that he immediately traveled to König stein to tell Haider about it. Schumacher had said that if he were the
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head of a government working for rearmament, there would be no con scientious objectors and he would see to it that a labor service would be established. Haider looked at me w ith an expression of controlled trium ph on his face. He added that already under Bebel the German trade unions had been what is now called "m ilitaristic." At th is point von der Heydte asked Haider whether he knew that Adenauer had been a soldier. Haider seemed electrified but merely looked at von der Heydte expectantly. Von der Heydte continued sar castically, "H e advanced to the position of corporal." This brought him to his punch line, which he probably had used in other conversa tions before: "H e is the second corporal in this position" (Hitler having been the first). Haider shook w ith laughter and turned red because of it. W hile he was still laughing he said, "M y dear professor, this is some thing for my m alice." Haider said he had always been an opponent of e d c . e d c makes no m ilitary sense. The history of Germany contains proof that it is pos sible to form an effective army w ith national m ilitary contingents under a unified command. "W e had a Bavarian army, an army of Würt temberg, Prussia, e tc ." But e d c is simply a fantastic arrangement thought up by people who understand nothing about m ilitary organi zation. O ne had better hide what is being done in the Blank office "under the cover of Christian charity." The German expression used has an inim itably condescending ring which amused everybody at the table. Haider went on to say that in the Bonn office there were young m en but no experienced soldiers to do the necessary work. These young men have fallen prey to some notions about "m ilitarism ," no tions that occupy them more than their jobs. I interjected that there were som e outstanding general officers in the Blank office, including G eneral Heusinger. Haider replied that he of course knew Heusinger extrem ely w ell. "H e was chief of my Operations D ivision." According to Haider, Heusinger is industrious, competent, and unfailingly reli able. I should not forget, however, Haider said, that Heusinger has always worked w ith a man above him who made decisions and carried responsibility. "H e has never carried any him self. Never in his life." Then he continued to air his asperity about the efforts of the Blank office. It w ill be impossible to get young, junior-grade officers in suf ficien t number and w ith requisite abilities. The situation was entirely different when the 100,000-m an army was created in the Weimar republic, because at that tim e the resources of the old German army were available and the cream could be obtained. In view of this fact
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alone the whole palaver about the so-called inner structure (i.e., the relations between officers and men, democratic promotion, relations betw een civilians and m ilitary personnel, and so on) is entirely unin teresting. As to the prejudices concerning "m ilitarism ," one must realize that all the attacks at the German m ilitary organization are lop sided. The whole situation is seen from "below ." In judging an organi zation one m ust assume also the perspective "from above." The essential fact about m ilitary organization is not that there is drill and spit and polish. T o be sure, without drill no army can be effective, w hether German, American, or Russian. K om m iss ist K om m iss ("arm y drill is army drill"). He admitted that it may of course happen that a sergeant abuses his power. As far as the German army was con cerned, he attributed such occasional practices to the very fact that ac cording to the law the sergeant had very few disciplinary rights, and thus he was apt to create informal power for him self. But all this was not an essential trait of the German m ilitary organization. The deci sive point was "confidence." The men must have confidence in their officers. Haider had always found that severity itself on the part of an officer did not m ake him unpopular among his men. If his severity was m atched by his sense of justice the men would go through fire for him. A ll these facts seemed to be unknown in Bonn. They are concerned w ith paper, w ith theory, w ith plans. "It really is not the hum an ele m ent they are concerned w ith ." Haider spoke w ith considerable seri ousness. He did not explain, of course—and I did not prod him—why "con fid en ce" should be an attitude whose importance appears only when a m ilitary organization is looked at "from above"; he did not consider the fact that confidence is som ething that those with no power and authority m ust have in those who possess power and authority. Haider continued that one must see how these people in Bonn have to work. They sit behind their desks—young, former m ilitary gentle m en w ith little experience—and over each shoulder looks a civil servant to ensure that they concern them selves only w ith their nar rowly defined specialization. "T h e beautiful thing about the profes sion of the soldier is that it comprises everything, life as a whole, even the ch u rch ." No doubt Haider was serious and sincere. His distaste for political bureaucracy interfering with m ilitary m atters was equally evident. Von der Heydte raised the question of the "controversial" book 0815 . He pointed out that it was w ritten by a former officer who had
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risen from the ranks and who later became a National Socialist politi cal officer (n f o ) attached to the army. Evidently von der Heydte wanted to suggest—as has often been suggested in critiques of this book—that the author was a turncoat and that therefore his criticism of the Germ an army could be dismissed on this ground alone. I was not surprised that Haider did not adopt von der Heydte's position. Q uite possibly he regarded as inadm issible von der Heydte's sugges tion that the author was not to be taken seriously because he had risen from the ranks. In any case, Haider showed his fairness and independ ent view by reminding von der Heydte of the fact that quite a few n f o ' s had been appointed to their political tasks because one hoped that they would not make trouble for the commanding officers. Thus, many n f o ' s were anything but reprehensible Nazis. Von der Heydte did not pursue the subject after this lesson in fairness. I had been told that the publisher o f 0815 had received many letters, 90 percent in favor of the book. Haider agreed that he too had heard that. D espite his criticism of e d c and the preparation for German re arm am ent, Haider left no doubt that Western Germany must be rearmed. A people that does not want to bear arms extinguishes itself in history. W hen the conversation turned to the subject of the "New Look," Haider said he thought highly of Dulles, his energy and intelligence, al though, he added laughingly, "It is not exactly easy to find out just what Mr. D ulles's policy is: it changes so often." He said that he could only agree in principle with the basic idea of the "N ew Look" strategy, which he understood to be that the law of ac tion m ust not be dictated by the opponent. Haider then expressed doubts about the practicability of this strategy. In doing so he did not give the impression that he wanted to find fault w ith American policy. Rather, he examined the im plications of the New Look objectively, as it were. He said that it would simply be impossible for the United States to reply to a sm all peripheral aggression—perpetrated by proxy or masked as a civil war, but in fact engineered by the Kremlin—with action initiating a Third World War. One cannot throw A-bombs be cause of a little incident. He considered this fact one of the basic dilem m as of American foreign and m ilitary policy. Nor would the A m erican people, in his opinion, back such decisions. The dilemma is so serious, he continued, because the development of new weapons puts such a tremendous premium on surprise attack. At th is point, von der Heydte interjected a statem ent I considered
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rather clever: "If the United States starts World War init has half-lost it psychologically. If it does not start World War ID it has half-lost it m ilitarily ." Haider merely nodded. I had the feeling that while he agreed in general w ith von der Heydte's statem ent, he did not fully ap prove of the somewhat flashy way in which it was expressed. Perhaps von der Heydte's statem ent was too "jou rnalistic" for Haider's taste: he is a man of considerable sobriety. But perhaps he was annoyed by the fact that von der Heydte had disturbed his reflection. Throughout th is part of the conversation Haider was fully in his elem ent. No sen tim ent interfered w ith his thoughts, as was the case when he talked about the German situation. Nor did he seem the least reluctant to ex press his best judgment. He never qualified his views by using phrases like "in my opinion" or " it seems to m e." He conveyed to me the im pression that had he thought of him self, which he surely did not in this part of the talk, he would have come to the conclusion that he was the best expert on the m atter to tell the truth. Haider said that it is clearly against the interests of the United States to have any single foreign power dominate either the coastline of the A tlantic Ocean or the A siatic coastline of the Pacific and Indian O ceans. China now is ruled by Communists, and the control of the en tire Pacific coastline in Asia is in danger of falling to the Communists. It is therefore understandable that elem ents in the United States want the United States to contest Chinese power. But one must think fur ther. If the United States were to engage in a war against China, the Soviet Union would sit back, not only because it would welcome the U .S. engagement in this straggle but also because it would welcome the C hinese being locked in war. The day of the Soviet Union would com e after this war had lasted for a long exhausting tim e. "O ne knows from history that China cannot be defeated m ilitarily." Haider did not suggest an alternative strategy. I suggested that it is difficult to discuss this whole problem without reference to atom ic armament. Haider replied immediately that there are two schools in the United States concerning the A-bomb. He spoke as though he assumed, of course, that he could not possibly be wrong. T he first school exaggerated the efficiency of the A- and H-bombs. They create fear. They are the opponents of war, pacifists. The other school attem pts to create the impression that these new weapons are not so effective as others attem pt to make them out to be. The truth is secret and m ust remain secret. It probably lies somewhere in the middle.
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I interposed again that the Soviet Union was a land power, whereas the U nited States was a sea and air power. Haider corrected me, "A sea pow er." He explained that the Soviet Union had made great strides in becom ing an air power and may w ell m atch the United States in this respect. " I am not so sure about the outcome of an all-out war between the Soviet Union and the United States today." I replied that in any event the Soviet Union had developed an atom ic capacity w hich in tim e might for all practical purposes m atch that of the U nited States. In the past the atom ic monopoly of the United States was considered a guarantee of peace. If this view was correct one m ust ask oneself what consequences followed from the development toward atom ic parity. Haider replied that it was "only logical" to ask th is question if one "th in ks these m atters through." In fact, the "logic al consequences" of this consideration would be advocacy of preven tive war by the United States as long as full parity is not attained. He repeated, "T h is is only logical, but consider what tremendous respon sib ility rests upon those who have to a ct." There is no question, in my mind, that Haider did not mean to advocate preventive war. He merely "analyzed" the facts. He con tinued that he did not think any president could simply "push the b u tton ." Then he added, w ith a slight sm ile, "U nless he can do it again as it was done at Pearl H arbor." At first I did not understand him. But then it dawned on me that he subscribed to the theory according to w hich President Roosevelt pursued a policy of provoking the Japa nese to the point where they bombed Pearl Harbor, thereby giving the president the opportunity to put the onus of the war—which he wanted—upon the Japanese. I said that an "atom ic Pearl Harbor" m ight not be the beginning of a war but its end. Haider replied that "th eo retically " it might not be necessary to invite an atom ic attack upon the United States: a lesser incident might suffice as a new "Pearl H arbor." It seemed to me that we both were walking on very thin ice at th is point, and given the situation, chances were that I would break through first. I made a casual remark to the effect that one should neither overestim ate the skill of politicians nor underestimate the m oral scruples of American statesm en. The subject was then dropped. Haider was m ost em phatic when I brought up the subject of German anxiety. He explained it in some detail as a consequence of the last war, particularly bombing from the air. He said that one could not possibly overestim ate the long-term effects the air war had had on the morale of
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the civilians in Germany. People simply would not want to face up to it ever again. If another war broke out, m illions of people would take flight blindly toward the W est. They would crowd the highways and no m ilitary movem ent would be possible. "Your tanks could not operate and all m ilitary movement would be seriously disrupted. The Russians would not care. They would strafe the highways and clear them, but you would not do so ." One could not imagine German contingents fighting the Russians on the right-hand side of the Rhine while m il lions of civilians are stream ing toward the W est. Germ an m ortal fear of the Russians would also contribute to the exodus toward the W est. Thus he painted a picture of complete dis ruption and panic in case of war, without offering any suggestion as to how th is situation could be changed. A t th is point von der Heydte jumped into the breach. He said that he had always attributed great importance to "psychological warfare." By th is term he m eant American measures taken to tighten Western European ties to the United States. He did not think merely of propa ganda, but of practical measures as well. He said if United States policy toward France and Germany in the field of "psychological warfare" did not change, the "w hole of Europe" w ill be lost to the United States. T he situation is getting worse and worse. Haider nodded agreement. Von der Heydte continued that in order to improve matters, the first prerequisite for the Americans is to know France and Germany better. Haider broke in, " I have waited for this word. You are so right. I am glad that you said th a t." Von der Heydte continued w ith doubled intensity. If it goes on the way it is going now, the United States w ill lose Europe psychologically. I asked for specific reasons for his pessimism. Von der Heydte spoke about the atom ic artillery and the recent maneuvers in w hich atom ic guns had crossed the Rhine. He also mentioned that he him self had seen two atom ic guns near Mainz. He claimed that the re action to both the maneuvers and the display had been uniformly unfavorable. The people are all opposed to such measures. They are afraid of another war and attribute aggressiveness to the United States. O ne cannot do these things—i.e., the maneuvers or the special display of atom ic guns—in Germany today w ithout the most careful prepara tion. 'T h is sort of thing Goebbels knew better how to do." Later, in the car, I asked von der Heydte to amplify his opinion about anti-A m ericanism in Europe. He related how he had recently told a French colleague in Strasbourg that now more than ever it was neces sary for the French and the Germans to work together. The gentleman
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had replied, "Y ou are right. It is our common hatred of the Americans that unites u s." I asked him , "D id he say 'hatred'?" "T h is was the word he used." He said further that a great deal of ill w ill is created specifi cally by the way in which landowners are compensated for property that A m ericans purchase for building airfields. Although the people do get com pensation, as a rule they have to wait a year or more. In the m eantim e all of them have turned anti-American, regardless of the payment they eventually receive. Von der Heydte also referred to the film , "From Here to Eternity." Its being shown in Germany today is a major m istake in "psychological w arfare." How could I expect the Germans to accept rearmament, when Germ an youth are shown instances of abuse in the American m ilitary establishm ent, the likes of which even the worst German critics never attribute to the German army. Interesting as these opinions are, their relevance as a cause of Ger man dissatisfaction w ith the United States should not be overesti mated, in my opinion. I believe that the real causes of German anti-A m ericanism lie m uch deeper. But when people, no m atter how intelligent, are confronted w ith the request to explain anti-American feelings in Europe, they seize upon current incidents and attribute to them an effect, the real cause of which is often hidden from their sight.
O b s e r v a tio n s o n In fo r m a l C o m m u n ic a tio n s a n d t h e B la n k O ffic e Germ an newspapers carry medical advertisements on how to take care of the managerial illness, i.e., circulatory disturbances. M anagerial illn ess is a common term used and understood by everyone in the middle classes: it is the result of too much work done too hastily plus too m uch food and drink. Another fact I found quite striking is also related to overworking. Apparently the circle of persons attem pting to influence political decisions is so sm all that news w ithin it travels exceedingly fast. This net of com m unications is entirely informal and based on personal con tacts, letter writing, meetings, and conferences. Presumably, a great deal of gossip is trafficked this way, but important information which does not find its way into the newspapers also circulates in these chan nels. By way of illustration, at least half a dozen persons in different cities told m e about a m inor incident that occurred at a meeting in
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Königsw inter w hich was attended by British generals and politicians and by Germ an representatives of various parties, former generals, and so on. N ot a single word on this meeting was published. Yet, I heard from Germ an nonparticipants as w ell as a few persons who did partici pate that at that m eeting, a certain German Social Democratic repre sentative had said that it cannot be the task of the opposition to formu late alternatives to the government's foreign policy. A social situation in which conversations and personal contacts play such an im portant role lends of course great weight to communica tion s w hich do not reach the public at large. The situation also ex plains in part the rem ark one hears so often in Germany that the press does not reflect public opinion, the point being that only a relatively sm all num ber of journalists who can be named are informed about w hat is "rea lly " going on in the informal net of communications. The persons participating in the net do not necessarily do so as individuals but often have a primary job as educators, writers, lawyers, church m en, or even civ il servants. Many of them belong to some small or ganization that concerns itself w ith politics without necessarily pursuing a vested interest. Perhaps these observations are particularly true of the former m ilitary class which now is dispersed throughout various occupations. Many, though by no means all, members of this old class m aintain some contacts w ith their former comrades and thus w ith their past, perhaps even less through the large veterans' organiza tions than through such sm aller units as regimental associations. Oth ers have associated them selves in some form or other with the evangel ical academ ies. These organizations which are loosely connected with th e churches are in turn in contact w ith Bonn. In particular, persons employed in the Blank office have close contacts w ith the Evangelical Academy in Loccum . Another way in which the old m ilitary class is interw oven w ith the new social fabric, which is still full of holes and patches, is through parliamentary com m ittees, advisory com m ittees to the government, industrial organizations, and business interests. T he Blank office, w hich has increased in size during the last few years, still is an entirely anomalous organization. It is, as it were, the office that m akes blueprints for buildings that are not being built. Those who draw the blueprints have come from other civilian jobs or technological unemployment, all hoping, I suppose, that when the building boom begins their function, status, and security w ill increase. In the som ewhat sterile atmosphere of continuous preparatory paper work to w hich no reality corresponds, intrigues flourish. As one of my
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inform ants put it, "they are former soldiers and shoot; but in the cir cum stances they shoot at each other." T he spirit of the Blank office is democratic, and men like Blank him self—who com es from the Catholic Labor movement—as well as G enerals Heusinger and Speidel, enjoy the confidence even of the op position because of their efforts to promote a "People's Army" in opposition to the past "m ilitaristic" traditions in Germany. Those m em bers of the former m ilitary class who are outside follow w ith keen interest the internal happenings in the Blank office, including its in trigues and rivalries. They easily find fault w ith what is going on inside, take pleasure in the pastime of fault-finding. But many of them, I believe, would gladly participate in these rivalries and intrigues by accepting a job to restore their respectability: an office, however re m ote from reality, still carries considerable prestige. As it is, the inform al com m unications on the outside and the gossip about affairs in Bonn, spreading so quickly through the informal channels I men tioned, seem to provide vicarious participation in m atters of state. Inside inform ation about organizational plans for an army that does not exist becom es a substitute for membership in that organization, and offers at the same tim e many opportunities to prove to oneself that the past in w hich one was active is greater than the present.
A d e lb e r t W ein stein a n d K a rl H ein rich H e ife r M ay 2 0 ,1 9 5 4 W einstein, a former German staff officer, bom 1916, is the m ilitary specialist of the F ran kfu rter A llg em ein e Zeitung. W ith Helfer he is also coeditor of the S oldaten Post, the m ilitary weekly of the Kyffh äu serb u n d , the second- or third-largest German veterans organiza tion. W einstein edited and is coauthor of A rm ee oh n e P athos ( 1951). In th is book many features of the old German m ilitary organizations are criticized because of their "m ilitaristic" character, and a new German People's Army is advocated instead. The book caused some stir among m em bers of the former German m ilitary class, although its contrib utors included a few fairly important m ilitary figures such as Generals Blum entritt and Dethleffsen, and Admiral Heye. W einstein is a prolific w riter on m ilitary affairs. Although his opin ions are som etim es flashy, he is on the whole a solid writer. There are
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people who slight W einstein: a man who thinks he knows all the answers, talks too much, and should not be taken too seriously. But perhaps many people are envious of his success, and it is understand able that he should be disliked for his unorthodoxy by the generation of Germ an generals who are about sixty years of age. Heifer, his friend and colleague, offered to arrange a meeting be tw een us. The three of us rode in W einstein's car to Eltville am Rhein for a late dinner and a long night session, returning to Wiesbaden after m idnight. W einstein turned out to look surprisingly young, with a deceptively absent-m inded expression on his face. When he talks the sentences pour forth from his mouth in great haste, with syllables or even clauses half-swallowed. He breaks into silence as he broke into speech, again giving the impression that he has his mind on other m atters; but soon another flood of words swamps the listener. Different from Heifer, he is quite unm ilitary in bearing. T o judge from his experience and his m anner of speech, he could quite easily be on his way to the nearest café to w rite the review of a movie or to dash off a little sketch. He struck me altogether as one of those young literati who used to popu late certain cafés in Berlin in the 1920s. His hair is cut shorter, how ever, and I am sure he cannot easily waste tim e. W hen I entered his car the radio was blaring and every minute or two W einstein would nervously sw itch the station. Finally Adenauer's voice filled the car so that conversation became impossible.The chan cellor spoke in Strasbourg about Europe. After a little while, W einstein remarked—or rather outshouted Adenauer, "D o you want to hear him go on about the corpse of Europe?", and before I had answered he sw itched back to some jazz m usic on the Armed Forces Network. Like m ost Germ ans he drove much too fast and he accelerated jerkily. He is the type of modem young man who snobbishly accepts rather than re jects the advancement of modem technology. W hen we arrived at the Weinpump at Eltville, W einstein had a long discussion w ith the w aiter in order to compose—hastily but fastidi ously—a desirable meal. Then he picked up die last issue from the file of the S old aten P ost that Heifer had brought along for me; he quickly glanced at the headline, making a few remarks of approval or disap proval to his friend. When he put the paper down after a m inute he said w ith a rather engaging sm ile, "Excuse me. Being a journalist it is im possible for me not to look at a newspaper." M uch of W einstein's manner, I think, is a kind of bravado, half care-
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lessness and half design, to create the impression of perfect ease. There is no doubt, however, that ease is one thing W einstein has not attained. I think he is quite uncertain of him self. T his feeling was confirmed when I saw Heifer two days later; he asked me again how I had liked the evening, adding that W einstein had expressed apprehension lest I thought him an irresponsible fellow. In view of the opinions he ex pressed over the dinner table at Eltville, I do not wonder that he should have felt som e concern afterwards. Although he was quite serious and "responsible" at tim es, at other moments he let him self go with aban don. T he point is that W einstein not only is bright but also apparent ly needs to prove it to others; and given his verbal facility, he seems inclined to prove his brightness by expressing shocking views. I do not want to convey the impression, however, that he talks exclusively w ith an audience in mind. Rather, he is intellectually restless and would, I am sure, confide shocking views to his diary, if he had tim e to keep one. W einstein let off a considerable blast against the Blank office, and H eifer assisted him throughout. He accused the office of abetting the "restorativ e," i.e., reactionary, tendencies of the government. When I m entioned that Blank was considered quite acceptable to the opposi tion, W einstein retorted, "Because he is w eak." As I remained quite calm despite his verbal violence, and talked about the different complexions of various government departments in Bonn—thereby suggesting that I regarded his judgment on the Blank office as sim ply too undifferentiated—he suddenly changed his tune and am plified his opinion in a subtle way. He said that many individu als in the Blank office are perfectly acceptable from a political point of view and w ith respect to their individual intentions, so long as they are considered individually. But together they are all sucked into a bureau cratic m achine w hich has its own momentum and denatures their m inds. They are appointed only for three months. At the expiration of each quarter their contracts m ust be renewed. They have no security, but they have wives, many of whom value security even more highly than do their husbands. Thus they do not dare speak up to a superior on whom their future depends. If worse came to worst, they surely could quit, and quite a few of them have done so. Characteristically, these were relatively young men. Many others stay on so as not to spoil their present careers or future prospects, regardless of whether they plan to rem ain in government service or return to a job in business. In the lat ter case, they know that a remark from one of their superiors to the
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effect that they are inconvenient subordinates or critical of the current governm ent policy may w ell mar their career. "A general in the Blank office has publicly declared that whoever is against e d c cannot become an officer in the future. Imagine th a t!" In these circum stances, Wein stein continued, nobody dares say to anyone occupying a superior posi tion in the bureaucratic hierarchy, "M an, you are confused." I felt like an old man telling W einstein that some of this can be found in all organizations and is not by any means an exclusive characteristic of the Blank office. My sobriety did not irritate W einstein at all, but he redoubled his efforts by becoming even more serious. Many of the men who have joined the Blank office are the survivors of the twentieth of July, he said. We used to pin our hopes on them, but what has become of their ideals? W einstein suggested that as individuals they presum ably still have these ideals, and he did not want to attack their personal integrity at all. For office holders, however, their ideals have been rendered inoperative. I m entioned General Heusinger, and both W einstein and Heifer ex pressed the opinion that Heusinger and Haider are undoubtedly the tw o best strategic minds in Germany today. In both W einstein's and H eifer's opinion, however, Heusinger was wasted in the Blank office: h is place was in s h a p e (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe). Then W einstein added that regardless of Haider's unquestioned com petence one should not for a moment believe that he could not exercise his com petence in another political setting. He could work for the Russians as w ell, expert that he is on m ilitary strategy. W einstein made th is point w hich I consider w ell taken—I previously expressed it m yself, though not to any Germans—without questioning in the least H aider's personal "d ecency." W einstein merely recognized clearly the social type w hich Haider—like many other competent experts in modem society—represents, so that his "verd ict" pertained less to Haider, or to any other person for that m atter, than to the "de-human izatio n " of modem social organization. T h is observation was confirmed as the conversation turned away from the Blank office to the problems of modem m ilitary organization in war. Before reporting the opinions that were expressed on these sub jects, it is im portant to understand W einstein's and Heifer's decisive experiences out of which their views were bom. These experiences happened to both of them during World War 0 at the front. Both men saw lives sacrificed callously, or perhaps even worse, in the name of an unquestioned habit of giving and carrying out orders involving sense
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less sacrifices. The German soldiers' slang word that connotes this situ ation is verheizen . Again and again men were verheizt, i.e., used in battle in m uch the same way that wood is thrown into a wood stove. M en were v erh eizt at Stalingrad, and recently again at Dien Bien Phu. T he officers giving the orders for such sacrifices are safe in some head quarters, warming them selves over the m ilitary glory created by the infernal fire of the men who are killed at the front. It is difficult to convey the horror and subdued rage w ith which both W einstein and Heifer, especially the latter, spoke about the senseless suffering caused by the rem ote higher functionaries of the m ilitary m achine. As far as Indochina is concerned, their indignation was di rected at General Navarre and at Bidault ("who is always drunk," according to W einstein). When I asked them pointedly what should have been done at Dien Bien Phu, Helfer replied calm ly that General D e C astries1 should have been given the c h o ic e to surrender or to fight on. A t th is point, Heifer told a very impressive story. Some tim e in 1944 (if I rem ember the year correctly) he was at the Eastern front attached as a young staff officer to a German general whose units were at a posi tion adjacent to that of some Hungarian units. One day the Hungarian general, "a gentlem an and a soldier," called on his German comradein-arm s to inform him that his Hungarian troops were in bad shape. They lacked arms, were short of food and medical supplies. If condi tions did not change he would have to surrender to the Russians w ithin the next days. The German general, a Prussian, went through the roof, but tried his best to dissuade the Hungarian from carrying out his plans. T he latter remained adamant and went back to his headquarters. H eifer continued, "A t that tim e I still was a N azi." He said to his general that in a situation like this only one thing was possible: to arrest the Hungarian im mediately and to request of the Hungarian governm ent that he be replaced by another officer. "Those were Nazi m ethods." My own general did not arrest the Hungarian, "and I con sidered him w eak." A few days later, the Hungarians did surrender and the Germ ans barely saved their own skins in consequence of that act. "A s I said, I argued w ith the German general as a young officer and thought he was altogether wrong. Today, I think he was right and so was the general in command of the Hungarian units. There are condi 1 De Castries—the fortress commandant at Dien Bien Phu—and his staff were cap tured on May 7,1954.
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tions in w hich only surrender is possible, even to th e B olsh ev iks." H eifer said he had seen a copy of the forthcoming German Defense Law. In his opinon it added up to a resurrection of the past. A ll the de bates about a dem ocratic army that were encouraged by the Blank office and into w hich civilians were drawn in 1951-52 have come to nought. Again a m ilitary organization w ill be created, organized in such a way that the verh eizen w ill repeat itself in case of another war. T he new Germ an armed forces w ill be recruited according to the prin ciples of "com pulsion." No ideas w ill inspire it. No ideas w ill animate the soldiers. The m ajority of German youth is against compulsory m il itary service. O f course they w ill serve, because they would have to cope w ith the police if they refused. However, they w ill never be good fighters. In a war, "th ey w ill run." W einstein spoke of the alleged failure of the g i in Korea, the British in M alaya, where "only the G urkas" are fighting, and of the poor per form ance of m any French noncommissioned officers in Indochina, m uch of th is com m ent being exaggerated. T his w ill be the pattem from now on in war. T his is not a m atter confined to Germany; it is som ething characteristic of the whole of modem civilization. Our era has not found a new form of m ilitary organization corresponding to m odem technology w hich requires a revolutionary approach to the re lation between the social structure and its armed forces. By way of il lustration he referred to the crew of a modem bomber where frequently the m ost im portant function is not performed by the highest ranking officer but by somebody who is bureaucratically subordinate to him and thus supposed to carry out orders obediently. Tradition rules, so th at in all countries the top men in the m ilitary organization are the ones who have qualities which facilitate their promotion but bear no relation to the responsibilities that must be borne in combat. This is true of the Blank office as it is of the Pentagon, and there is little dif ference in th is respect between the Russian army and the British army. W einstein said that the German Defense Law should not only pro tect conscientious objectors, but also should uphold the right of the soldier to disobey senseless commands. "But what we say to you may soon be characterized as m ilitary subversion, and we may yet end up in a concentration cam p." He looked at m e somewhat whim sically. "D o not think that we ex press an opinion that is generally held. It is only Heifer and m yself who th in k like th is." (This is certainly not so.) He then changed his key again, saying absent-mindedly that it was unfair to attack the Blank
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office, inasm uch as it is no better anywhere else. And he made a crack against the "m ilitarism " of the United States Army. 'T o put it tritely, there is no Scharnhorst3 in Bonn today." I cam e back to W einstein's remarks on the relation between the so cial structure and its armed forces, asking him what he would consider a m ore appropriate form of m ilitary organization. He repeated first that it is a "h isto ric lie " to consider universal m ilitary service a democratic form of m ilitary organization. Being based on the principles of compul sion it is in fact the m ost undemocratic form possible. It is more undem ocratic than the standing armies of the A ncien R égim e because at that tim e conscription was not universal. I did not want to argue this m istaken notion w ith him and I had no tim e to do so, because he went on to suggest that modem technology and modem society require a sm all professional elite army and a prae torian guard, backed up by a m ilitia of larger size. The praetorian guard would have to be equipped and trained "to kill, bum, and rape"—he did say "rap e"! 1 m erely called his attention to the fact that such a m ilitary organiza tion would be w ell capable of seizing political power. How is it to be controlled? W einstein replied that he had expected this question and before answering it he wanted to say that the question applied as well to the supreme commander of e d c . A s though he realized that this opinion was far-fetched, he added, "O r he may make a pact w ith the Soviet U n ion ." W ith the help of Heifer he then explained that it should not be too difficult to build safeguards into the organization of the praetorian guard to elim inate the danger of a m ilitary coup d'état. The officers of this elite organization would have to be composed in part of officers transferred from the m ilitia! They went on to elaborate this fantasy in som e organizational detail and seemed quite happy w ith the crow ning idea that the supreme commander of the armed forces could very w ell be a civilian! W einstein proved to be an enthusiastic supporter of the "New Look" strategy, as he understood it. T his opinion was quite consistent with the views he had expressed previously. He considered it "thoroughly civilized " to prefer the expenditure of dollars and "m achines" to the expenditure of lives. From the American point of view it was therefore perfectly sound to attem pt to m inim ize the burden of sacrifice in blood 2 G erhard}. D. Scharnhorst (1755-1813), Prussian reformer, designed the system of m ilitary conscription for Prussia, abolished corporal punishment in the army, and pro moted the entry of commoners into the corps of officers.
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by shifting it to the American allies in n a t o , a Southeast Asia Pact, and so on, and to offer the more "civ ilized " financial and technological contribution in the form of modem weapons. H eifer understood the New Look strategy to mean especially that the U nited States was threatening the possible use of unconventional weapons to end a local aggression, but he seemed to be horrified by the prospect of the United States possibly starting an atom ic war. Even the concept of "retaliatio n ," w hich he regarded as the core of the New Look, caused him to be somber and pessim istic in this part of the discussion. W hen I mentioned the fact that United States atom ic superiority may one day disappear just as the atom ic monopoly had already dis appeared, W einstein responded rashly that it may be best to drop all available A-bombs upon the Soviet Union now. Heifer replied, "You w ill have to abolish Christianity in America first." T h is rem ark, made in a serious tone, seemed to sober down his friend. He sw itched again to a different tack, saying that he believed indeed that once parity in atom ic and hydrogen bombs is achieved the danger would not be mutual destruction by means of these unconven tional weapons but rather a series of peripheral wars, waged by proxies or in other sim ilar ways, in which the two main powers would care fully ration their participation so that total war would be avoided. For th is reason he considered as the greatest danger to Western Europe not that it would become involved in World War m , as it is usually en visioned in public discussion, but that West Germany may become the theater of a lim ited war: the danger was invasion by the m ilitary forces of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary. Ethnocentricity prevented him from considering the possibility of a war by proxy in areas outside Europe.
Fraternization 1955: The Com m ittee for European Security of the German Bundestag W ashington, D .C ., and New York, April 195$ In April 19$ 5, the Com m ittee for European Security of the German Bundestag visited Washington for about three weeks upon the invita tion of the Departm ent of State. The com m ittee was briefed by offi cials of various executive agencies including the W hite House staff,
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and received by the Armed Services Com m ittee of Congress; it visited also the N ational War College and Annapolis. After a week in New York the com m ittee traveled to California and visited several m ilitary establishm ents throughout the country before returning home. T he com m ittee cam e to the United States to obtain information and advice on ways to organize and m aintain civilian control over a defense establishm ent. At one of the briefings arranged for the com m ittee, its chairm an said: "W e Germans have had a good army in the past. We hope to have a good democracy. Our tragedy is that we have never been able to have both sim ultaneously. You Americans have both. We want to find out how you work it." T he task ahead of the com m ittee in the German Bundestag can best be stated in term s of the laws that must be enacted in order to establish Germ an m ilitary forces w ithin the framework of the Western alliance. Legislation is needed on: voluntary m ilitary service and general conscription (selective service); army pay scales; establishing the legal basis for the supreme commander, including description of his powers; establishing a new m ilitary-penal code (code of justice and code of discipline); authority for the production of arms; authorizing by constitutional amendment the use of m ilitary forces in case of national emergency; conscientious objectors; establishing cadre units of the future m ilitary forces; the soldiers' rights to lodge com plaints; procurem ent for the forces; extended m ilitary service and attendant rights; reem ploym ent rights of officers and nco candidates; restricted areas for m ilitary training (artillery practice, etc.); requisitioning land for m ilitary purposes; the lim its of property rights of real-estate owners in case of m ilitary necessity; the influence of the aptitude training program of the m ilitary forces on em ploym ent and civil service relationship; pensions and retirem ent benefits; paym ents and care for disabilities and accidents. Q uite an agenda!
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Following are some biographical data on com m ittee members who are politically important: Dr. R ich ard Jaeg er: csu , chairman of the com m ittee, vice-president of the Bundestag, bom 1913 in Munich. Studied law, admitted to the bar in 1940. Entered the Bavarian government as an official of the M in istry of Culture in 1947. Mayor of Eichstaedt in 1949. Elected to the Bundestag, August 1949; Bundestag vice-president since September 1953. Fritz E rler: s p d , vice-chairm an of the com m ittee, bom 1913 in Ber lin . A ctive in Berlin city government until 1938. Member of Socialist undergound during Nazi period. Arrested in 1938 and sentenced to ten years im prisonm ent in 1939. After the war, county manager (Landrat) in Biberach and later in Tuttlingen. Became an official of one of the Germ an state governments in 1947. Elected to the Bundestag in 1949. A Bundestag delegate to the Council of Europe since 19$ 3. Died 1967. H asso von M an teu ffel: f d p , bom 1897 in Potsdam. Became a profes sional officer in 1916 and participated in both world wars. World War n com m ander in chief of an armored army; severely wounded on several occasions. Since 1948, export manager for a German metallurgical firm . Joined the f d p in 1949, chairman of its security com m ittee. M em ber of the Bundestag since 19$ 3. Died 1979. Fritz B eren d sen : c d u , bom 1904. Cavalry officer from 1923 to 1936. Attended War Academy, Berlin. Member of General Staff, 1938 to 1945; reached the rank of colonel. Became a member of an important business firm in Duisburg after his release as prisoner of war. Elected to the Bundestag in 19$ 3. Sim ultaneously w ith the visit of the Bundestag com m ittee, three m em bers of the Blank office were in the United States and participated in som e of the briefings. These three officials were chaperoned by a m em ber of the high com m issioner's office who also functioned as an interpreter at one of the m eetings I attended. T he three officials were Dr. Wolfgang Cartellieri (bom 1901), Hell m uth Ferber (bom 1914), and Dr. Werner Knieper (bom 1909). All three were m em bers of the German delegation to the e d c Interim Com m it tee in Paris in 1953. C artellieri is the son of a fairly well-known Germ an historian, and more civilian in bearing than his two younger colleagues. In W ashington the com m ittee was on a strenuous schedule. At the briefings of the Department of the Army various assistant secretaries read prepared statem ents. A great deal of attention was focused on
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organization charts and adm inistrative detail. It was stressed that civilians and generals get along splendidly in this republic. The meet* ings w ith m ilitary officers did not disappoint the visitors. For example, they m et Admiral Radford, General Ridgway, and a number of other very high-ranking officers from all three services. Sim ilarly, the Armed Services C om m ittee gave the Germans a most cordial welcome, to judge from the unsolicited com m ents some of them made. One of them , Herr Paul, remarked one evening, "W e have not been treated as visitors, but as friends. No question about th at." Paul is a Social Dem ocrat and as such more skeptical of American politics than those m em bers of the com m ittee who belong to government parties. Manteuffel was especially pleased to m eet Admiral Radford: "A m ost im pressive-looking m an." At the cocktail party Manteuffel gave a glowing account to Generals Lindsay and Landon of his meeting with G eneral Weyland. Apparently General Weyland had reminded Man teuffel that he, Weyland, had destroyed many of M anteuffel's tanks (I believe, in the Battle of the Bulge), and had now expressed his hope that M anteuffel would no longer hold a grudge. I served as an interpre ter to G eneral Lindsay of M anteuffel's account, which prompted the general to swap some wartime experiences w ith M anteuffel right then and there. General Landon is a good friend of Berendsen, whom he calls by his first name. T he briefings were of course in English, which the majority of the com m ittee understood. M ost of the interpreters were adequate, al though one repeatedly injected his own opinions into the translation. T h is was noticed and later commented upon w ith amused disapproval by various members of the com m ittee who spoke and understood English. Conversations at the dinner and evening meetings were in German and consequently quite free. At a round-table conference in New York on April 27, English and German were spoken, w ith several speakers translating their own statem ents from one language into the other. There is nothing of the fierceness and acrimony of the German polit ical struggle in the way the com m ittee members treat each other. The group is surprisingly cohesive. A friendly tone prevails and some goodnatured teasing seems to have taken the place of the political fighting that is typical of the German scene. Dr. Jaeger is inclined to overdo the teasing, and quite a few members of the com m ittee, I know, think so, but nobody objects. Erler once testified to the inform ality that prevails in the com m ittee by saying, "H err von M anteuffel is a former general,
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but we have promoted him to a civ ilian ." This happened at a luncheon in New York in front of a great number of Americans. Manteuffel did not appear to mind. Later, the chairman of the meeting was about to propose a toast, when M anteuffel said loudly, "Paul has his birthday today." Everybody rose and, somewhat to Henr Paul's embarrassment, toasted his health in good spirit. D espite the fact that the group appears homogeneous in contacts w ith Am ericans, there is a perceptible differentiation according to social background rather than political persuasion. The Social Demo crats (w ith the exception of Fritz Erler), Johann Josten (c d u )— a former carpenter—and Josef Stingl (c d u ) are all less socially at ease, because they are of lower social origin than the other members of the com m it tee. The latter conduct them selves more as men of affairs. Manteuffel, Berendsen, Jaeger and, to a lesser extent, Erler act as though this visit to the U nited States interests them a great deal but excites them little, whereas the other members of the com m ittee more naturally show enthusiasm about their presence in the United States and do not at tem pt to hide it. Enthusiasm and tim idity seem to go together. The m ore bashful group of Social Democrats, in which English is less readily spoken and understood than by the "upper-class" members, raised fewer questions in the briefings and kept altogether more silent at the social affairs. V irtually all Americans who m et w ith the com m ittee were socially in the middle or upper layers of W estern society. They heard more from G erm ans sim ilarly placed than from those closer to labor. What was s a id by the Germans in public must have given the Americans a dis torted image of German thinking. By way of illustration, at one point Herr Berendsen remarked that they had been impressed by the trust that evidently prevailed between the civilians in our defense establishm ent and their m ilitary counter parts. In the briefings, various civilian officials had stressed the point that their offices were next to those of the generals, w ith whom they collaborate, and that the doors between the offices are always open. T h is fact seemed to impress Berendsen,- he referred to it repeatedly as a sym bol of mutual trust. I know that the Social Dem ocratic members of the com m ittee were not impressed by that open door, but they did not voice their doubts. However, when Berendsen spoke of the mutual trust, one of them once murmured to him self, "Stop admiring that m utual trust; the m ilitary ought to be distrusted." Only Erler managed
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to be more vocal on the relationship between civilians and the m ili tary. O nce he put it neatly: "In Germany, the generals usually lose wars. We have not come to the United States to learn how generals can win th em ." At a less formal occasion Herr Paul made a remark which sim ilarly reflected the socialist outlook. There was some discussion on the desirability of establishing research institutes in Germany that would concern them selves w ith m ilitary affairs. Herr Paul, who had been silen t for a long tim e, said quietly, "L et's not have such institutes. T hey would only try to prove that we never lost the w ar." T he "tim id " members of the group were grateful when they were spoken to in German. They expressed more readily the hope to be visited in Germany than the more reserved "upper-class" persons. As I m entioned, many of the Americans w ith whom the com m ittee came in contact inadvertently support this informal social stratification. I introduced General von M anteuffel to General Landon, calling him, as the Germ an com m ittee members do, " H en von M anteuffel." At this m om ent G eneral Lindsay joined us, and General Landon introduced M anteuffel to him as "G en eral von M anteuffel." The significance of such subtleties is not lost on a socialist, who is convinced that in any event generals of all nations fraternize easily. I for one recalled that ten years ago no Am erican civilian, g i , or officer was supposed to frater nize w ith an y German. T he com m ittee members were pleased that American civilians and A m erican generals did not give them identical accounts of the nature of civilian-m ilitary relationships. They regarded this divergence of view s as proof that they were being told the truth. In addition, they were pleased to discover that reality differed from the legal statem ents about its nature: as I noted before, the belief that the truth is hidden behind a verbal façade is much in favor among those Germans who concern them selves w ith the nature of political reality. Finally, the discovery that there were divergent views of the relationship between civilian and m ilitary authorities supported the German suspicion that A m erican democracy is not quite what it is purported to be. These at titudes, I should hasten to add, could be inferred but were not openly expressed. I regretted, therefore, that at a round-table conference in New York, W alter M illis, an American author of books on m ilitary matters, made irresponsible statem ents on the subject of civilian control of the m ili tary in the United States. Shepard Stone, the chairman, had promised
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th at h is Germ an guests would participate in a frank discussion of their interests w ith a group of American newspapermen, college professors, and m en of public affairs. Mr. Stone and his guests got more than they expected. Mr. M illis argued that the power of the m ilitary agencies had grown in the federal government ever since World War D, and he did not see any hope that the situation would change for the better. In West G erm any the problem was much less serious. There was hope for the Germ ans, but the United States was hopelessly saddled w ith "a m ili tary dictatorship." Several other American participants at the lunch eon spoke up against Mr. M illis, but probably some damage was done. During the com m ittee's stay in Washington Herr Raab, the federal chancellor of Austria, was in Moscow. I had occasion to ask the com m ittee what they thought about the agreement reached between the Soviet Union and Austria. As was to be expected, the responses dif fered widely according to the political affiliation of the speakers. Erler said that the agreement would lead to a wide movement in West Ger m any in favor of negotiating w ith the Soviet government about the withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany and about the reunifica tion of the country. Thus he expected the agreement on Austria to have consequences favoring the Social Dem ocrats in Germany. By contrast, Dr. Jaeger pointed out that the Austrian agreement must be regarded as the first fruit of Adenauer's foreign policy. W ithout the ratification of Germ an rearmam ent Mr. Raab would not have had a chance. T here was relatively little talk about German reunification. Per haps, the visitors felt that it would have been inopportune to discuss th is subject. Dr. Jaeger made some personal remarks, however, which he m ight or m ight not care to have quoted and attributed to him . He said bluntly that the importance of the issue should not be overes tim ated in the United States. Bavarians do not care about reunifica tion. Needless to say, Dr. Jaeger is a Bavarian. Berendsen, too, offered som e observations about reunification which could be interpreted as disparagement of the issue, were it not for the fact that he is an ex trem ely cool observer of the political scene and som etim es says things that appear to be shocking—if only because cool judgment is so rare that it easily shocks. In his opinion there is no strong popular desire for reunification in W est Germany. One might gain popular support for the idea if one could arouse the people w ith the prospect of resettling refugees from the East in the German territories now under Com m unist control. "Everybody wants to get rid of these refugees." But
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then it may be expensive to reunify the country, and nobody likes to pay higher taxes. Several members of the com m ittee were interested in research on various aspects of the m ilitary establishm ent in the United States. The study, T h e A m erican S old ier,1 was known to two members of the group. Apparently the Social Dem ocrats got hold of at least two voltim es and had a German summary of results prepared for use by the Social D em ocratic deputies. When Erler mentioned this, he was asked by the c d u and f d p members of the com m ittee whether they could see these sum m aries. Erler readily agreed. There was considerable curi osity concerning knowledgeable studies of the American forces in Korea. In particular, any account of the way the air force had supported the ground action in Korea, despite the fact that some of the bases were in Japan, appeared to be of special interest to the com m ittee. They felt th at parallels could be drawn, for the benefit of the German public, w ith the defense requirem ents of W estern Europe, where in the event of war, close tactical support of ground forces might also have to be provided from bases farther behind the ground battle than was cus tom ary in World War n. The degree of cooperation that existed be tw een the American forces in Korea and other national contingents, such as the Turks, was also of considerable interest to the Germans and m ight add m uch to overcome their doubts in the m ilitary efficacy of a m ultilingual n a t o alliance. Several members of the group were impressed by the cooperation be tw een the U .S. armed forces on the one hand and the universities and research agencies on the other. They were also impressed with the am ount of money going into research. In neither respect could West Germ any hope ever to do anything on a proportionate scale. Com plaints were voiced about the inadequate staff at the disposal of the com m ittee. It would be a great help if they could turn to an in stitu te, under the directorship of a lawyer, for research on the m any legislative tasks ahead of them . It was at this point that Herr Paul introduced a note of realism w ith the remark, quoted above, "L e t's not have such institutes. They would only try to prove that we never lost the w ar." Before the German com m ittee left for New York, I mentioned to Fritz Erler that the com m ittee might discover that political opinions 1 Samuel A. Stouffer, et al., The American Soldier, 4 vols. (Princeton, 1949-sol-
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about Germ any were not quite as favorable in New York as they were in W ashington. I added that there were Americans who believed that the policy toward German rearmament had been too precipitate. Erler replied calm ly, " I share this view ."
G ennan Reactions to A denauer’s M eeting w ith Khm shchev Septem ber 26,195$ O n m y first day in Wiesbaden, I looked at some of the newspapers and illustrated w eeklies that had accumulated in my office, in order to get a feeling for the way the German press was treating the results of the M oscow conference. My impressions, put down at night, were not based upon any system atically conducted survey. It may nevertheless be significant that I found only one comment critical of the chancellor, w ritten by M arion Gräfin Dönhoff in D ie Z eit, September 22,1955. All other press com m ents favored the agreement reached in Moscow, even as the Bundestag u n an im ou sly agreed to the establishm ent of dip lom atic relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union. ( 1) T h e ag reem en t in M oscow h a s brought govern m en t an d op p osi tion tog eth er. The government parties and the s p d are united in en dorsing the results of Adenauer's visit to the Soviet Union. The lead article in the F ran kfu rter A llg em ein e Z eitung of September 24 begins, "A com m on foreign policy is possible in the Federal Republic." A car toon showing Adenauer embracing a stout "sPD"-man, appearing in D ie Z eit, carries the caption " . . . reunification." D er Spiegel, Septem ber 21, reports that Carlo Schmid at one point saved the situa tion in M oscow by appealing to Soviet pity for the mothers of the Germ an p o w ' s and, pointedly renouncing any German "righ t," ad dressed him self to the "m agnanim ity" of the Soviet leaders—the mag nanim ity "w hich has always been a virtue of the Russian people" [Der S p ieg el allegedly paraphrasing Carlo Schmid). Khrushchev said after a long silence (allegedly), "T h is was a good statem ent. Now, we can continue to ta lk ." And after the session Konrad Adenauer allegedly w ent to Schm id in order to express his thanks. All this does not mean that the Socialists w ill stop attacking Adenauer's foreign policy, as O llenhauer's (rather measured) speech at the Bundestag debate on Septem ber 23 shows. Nor does it mean that the c d u w ill stop attacking
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the SPD, as Dr. Krone's’speech at the same debate indicates. There has been surprise at Krone's sharpness in view of Ollenhauer's mildness. O llenhauer declared that in the preparatory discussions with the gov ernm ent prior to the visit to Moscow, he had expressed the view that the Germ an delegation could not possibly raise the issue of the Paris treaties, as this would create doubts in the contractual loyalty of the Germ an government. T his meant, of course, that Ollenhauer did n o t identify him self w ith the radicals in his own party who criti cize Adenauer for not having brought up in Moscow the question of reunification through severing W est Germany's contractual contacts. Dr. Krone accused Ollenhauer of lack of objectivity, nonetheless, spoke of insufficient Socialist acknowledgment of the solution of the p o w issue, and so on. I consider it possible that Krone's and Adenauer's relatively sharp treatm ent of the s p d in the debate can be traced to concern inside the government about W estern reaction (especially U .S. reaction) to the results of Moscow and to eagerness to protest th eir unshaken affiliation w ith the West. (2) O n e o f th e reason s fo r "un an im ous”parliam en tary agreem en t to th e resu lts o f M oscow is th e n eed fo r a ll G erm an p olitician s n ot to a p p ea r a s opposin g th e return o f th e row 's. D er Spiegel attributes this m otive also to Adenauer him self. Only Marion Dönhoff writes openly about the exchange of the freedom of 10,000 row 's for putting the West Germ an seal upon the enslavem ent of 17 m illion Germans in the Soviet zone. For the Social Dem ocrats the question of the row 's was apparently more important in their dom estic political straggle than that of reunification. (3) When the Berlin conference in 1954 failed to make progress toward reunification, not only the s p d but many other speakers— including such a conservative organ as the monthly A u ssen politik— criticized the W estern powers for their "failu re." Now, after Moscow, when the Soviet leaders have made it very clear that reunification is not possible (w ith Germany in n a t o , that is) the result of the Moscow conference is accepted. G erm an rearm am en t h a s b een th e m o ot p oin t in th e rela tio n s b etw een th e govern m en t an d th e opposition , bu t on th e esta b lish m en t o f n orm al relation s b etw een th e F ed eral R epu blic a n d th e S ov iet U nion th ey can rea d ily agree. (4) A n oth er reason fo r th e resu lts in M oscow , an d th eir unanim ous p a rlia m en ta ry approval, is th e p rior su m m it m eetin g a t G en eva and.1 1 Heinrich Krone, leading cdu deputy, bom 1895.
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in g en eral, th e s o -c a lle d relax ation o f tensions. Note the reference by O llenhauer in the parliamentary debate—"O nly a large and cou rageous initiative of the Federal Republic can save us from remaining the last M ohicans of the cold war"—and Dr. Dehler's (FDP-leader) concern that the global relaxation of tensions among the big world powers could take place at Germany's expense. ( $ ) T h ere a re m an y G erm an com m en ts th at “th e p o licy o f strength " is ban kru p t. T h is had long been a somewhat disreputable argument of Social Dem ocrats and German mavericks. It now has become respect able to say so. Even defenders of that policy redefine it as "policy of secu rity" (thus Dr. Dehler in the debate). (6) A th ird reason fo r th e M oscow agreem en t an d fo r th e unanim ous ap p ro v a l it h a s m et in G erm an y lies in th e d esire fo r p ea c e an d in th e su p p ressed fe a r o f w ar. T his has been most openly expressed by a novelist who does not rank as a politician, Ernst Glaeser, author of the once much-read autobiographical novel, Jahrgang 1902. He writes in the F ran kfu rter Illu strierte, September 24, 19$$, that the meeting of the great conservative politician w ith the Soviet leaders was more than an im portant political event: "There lives in it, perhaps unconsciously for many, but w ith a certainty that can hardly be curtailed, the w ill of m ankind to peace, relaxation of tension and a slow solution of the ideological cramp (sic)—a w ill that cannot be restricted." Glaeser com pares the seriousness and importance of Moscow with "th e play ful foreground" of the rest of all politics. Sim ilarly, D er Stem , one of the m ost widely read illustrated weeklies, which gives the Moscow m eeting large coverage, says it is futile to ask who was victorious in M oscow : "Reason was victorious at the conference." (7) O llenhauer's thesis that G erm an foreign p o licy h as o tte re d a n ew p h a se, of course, is contested by the government. Dr. Krone pro tested that "in the free world not as much as the shadow of a doubt m ust arise that anything has changed in the orientation of the federal governm ent." The s p d thesis is shared, however, by non-Socialists. On Septem ber 18, Rademacher, the chairman of the Free Democratic Party in Hamburg and a member of the Bundestag, advocated that all parties should work toward a new conception of foreign policy. He com m ented on Adenauer's statem ent that the Soviet government would have been offended had he refused the establishm ent of dip lom atic relations, "W hat a change!" A new phase in German-Soviet relations has begun not only because the Soviet Union w ill now push harder for direct contacts between the governments of East and West
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Germ any, but also because it is likely to establish a large number of openly pro-Soviet cultural, economic, and other organizations in West Germ any. (8) There has already been a perfectly startling " n orm alization ” o f th e im a g e o f th e S oviet U nion in th e G erm an p ress.2 Moscow is shown in the illustrated w eeklies to be "lik e any Western capital." Adenauer shakes hands w ith Bulganin, Khrushchev embraces Carlo Schmid and calls him "M r. Great G erm any"; Carlo Schmid visits the embalmed corpses of Lenin and Stalin (perhaps because Adenauer had prohibited th is visit); Adenauer prays in a Moscow church; German and Russian leaders w atch Shakespeare's R om eo an d Ju liet, a performance which prom ptly assum es sym bolic significance (the Russians changed the announced performance of B oris G odu n ov to give Capulet and Mon tague a chance to shake hands over the corpses of their dear ones. Adenauer promptly got the hint and shook hands so momentously w ith Bulganin that he stole the show from the Soviet ballerina); Khrushchev called German K irschw asser "a drink for oxen"; Carlo Schm id drank vodka out of waterglasses; Adenauer lik e s the Soviet leaders (except for morose Molotov), or so it is claimed in the German press. In his toast he mentioned not only "norm al relations" but "friendly relations"—and the difference is found significant not only by Khrushchev but also by German commentators like Silex (in D eu tsch e K om m en tare). All this fills the German press, with the result that the conference has been a mighty first step toward the "frat ernization" of Germans and Russians. "Fraternization" was used (ironically?) in a caption of one of the conference photos appearing in D er S piegel. In short, the Bolshevists have rather suddenly become Russians. (9) Silex, one of W est Germany's best journalists, has long toyed with the idea of better relations between West Germany and the Soviet U nion. He was in Moscow at the tim e of Adenauer's visit. In D eu tsche K om m en tare of September 24, 1955, he writes that "no serious poli tician could now aver that it is heresy to think about possibilities of a solution outside the A tlantic P act." (D itto S ü ddeu tsche Z eitung, Septem ber 28,19$$.) In M oscow one has not discussed the crucial question, Silex says— w hat would one have to offer for free elections and freedom from al liances? He expects this to be discussed at Geneva. The German 2 Point 8 was cited in Speier, German Rearmament and Atomic War, p. 87t.
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ambassador to Moscow, in his turn, w ill have to see to it "th at we take better account than in the past of our geographical middle position in the preparation of international conferences." {io ) D er S piegel of September 2 1 ,195 s, asks (in its long commentary on Moscow) whether the Russians have made a fool of Adenauer: per haps, they had given E ast G erm any their word that they would release the Germ an row 's "w hen they sold them to the chancellor for his con sent to exchange ambassadors w ith M oscow ." The East German lead ers said later that they came to Moscow only in two-engine planes but brought home more than Bonn did. (Adenauer's party traveled in two superconstellations of the L u fthan sa.) ( 11) T h e S ov iet lea d ers fla ttered th eir G erm an coun terparts by call ing Germ any a great power, if not treating her so. Everything was done to convince the German guests that nothing could disturb the peace if the Soviet Union and Germany stuck together. Instead of recognizing such flattery for what it is—a technique of negotiation—D er Spiegel of Septem ber 21 commented, "T h e overevaluation of German strength apparently arose from the shock of the German advance to Leningrad, M oscow and Stalingrad, which has not been fully absorbed! When the chancellor once pointed out that in the age of continental power blocs Germ any was only of secondary importance, Marshal Bulganin inter rupted him brusquely, 'No, you are a big power.' " Such remarks, reported in the German press, w ill not be lost on those Germans who like to believe that Bulganin spoke the troth.
Franz J o s e f Strauss O ctober 5, 19$$ Strauss is the youngest member of Adenauer's cabinet. A few weeks ago, he marked his fortieth birthday. U ntil recently, he was m inister w ithout portfolio, but he has just been appointed "Delegate of the Federal Governm ent for Atom ic Q uestions," so that he is now referred to in the German press as "th e new Atom M inister." Strauss owes his career not only to his intelligence and eloquence—he is excellent in parliam entary debates—but also to the fact that as a Bavarian he has the backing of the csu in Bavaria. Strauss is a strong rival of Theodor Blank. T his is generally known in Bonn. I could readily understand why this is so, for in his conversation
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w ith m e Strauss did not attem pt to hide the fact that he thought little of Blank and Heusinger. At present, Strauss does not have much of a chance to replace Blank, and his opponents say that this is at least in part due to the rash and impetuous statem ents he som etimes makes. Strauss has a natural talent for politics. He is well educated (especial ly in history), quick, hard-working, full of vitality, w itty and colorful in parliam ent, and basically sound in his views on foreign policy. Like Dr. Jaeger—the chairman of the Security Com m ittee, who recently participated in the parliamentary revolt against the government (at the parliam entary debate of the bill on volunteers)—Strauss belongs to those c d u / c s u politicians who belie the assertion that Adenauer tolerates only yes men around him. In the parliamentary debate of July 1955, during which the atom ic N a t o maneuver "C arte Blanche,"3 and the question of Germany's position and role in case of war were discussed, Strauss was virtually the only speaker capable of defending Western strategy and thus, by im plication, the policy of his government. W hen I arrived at Strauss's office in the Koblenzer Strasse in Bonn, at nine o'clock in the morning, m atters seemed to be in a state of disarray. T he m inister's office is in an old apartment building, which also houses a number of nongovernmental offices. Painters were at work, the som ewhat flim sy and modernistic office furniture did not seem to be com pletely installed, and the secretaries moved about instead of working. It was all definitely unbureaucratic and refreshingly im perm anent for a government office. No dust had settled and the fresh paint looked like the first paint. Strauss agreed em phatically that Colonel von Bonin, who had criti cized W estern strategy, is "n ot a Com m unist."4 The m inister consid ered Bonin a com petent m ilitary man who is politically not to be taken seriously. It is Heusinger who is responsible for the whole affair. Heusinger is an "office general—not a leader." He never had a m ilitary command and is incapable of dealing w ith a man like Colonel von Bonin. Bonin requires, according to Strauss, stem treatm ent and con tinuous supervision. He did not get either in the Blank office from Heusinger. Strauss used a Bavarian profanity to make his meaning clear: "If you don't mind, Bonin needs a kick in the behind once a w eek ." * * See Speier, German Rearmament, p. i8 if. 4 On the "Bonin case," see ibid., pp. 75-83.
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Strauss attributed W einstein's journalistic attacks on the Blank of fice, for exam ple in connection w ith the atom ic n a t o exercise, to the fact that he had been very badly handled by that office. Strauss did not take W einstein too seriously, but rather used the occasion to criticize th e Blank office mice more. He claim ed that W einstein was simply angry because he learned that some people in the office had made in sulting rem arks about him . Allegedly, somebody had said, "I w ill not talk to that sw ine." Strauss said calm ly that everything would have been perfectly all right if the Blank office had arranged for W einstein to w rite a few pamphlets on m ilitary problems for the government. This indicates, of course, that Strauss has not much respect for journalists and indeed may be ready to doubt their integrity. O n the question of German rearmament, Strauss again sharply criticized the Blank office. He considered it short of scandalous that nothing had been done except delay m atters. He pointed out in particu lar that the August and September deadlines for the beginning of Ger m an rearm am ent according to the law for volunteers had not been m et. He continued his harangue against the office generals who have drawers filled w ith plans and take pride in putting their signatures under the eighth version of a new plan to be put into another drawer. In passing, he managed to slip in a more general dig against the German generals who, according to the picture he painted quite vividly and w ith terrific speed, are busy writing their memoirs in order to excul pate them selves, if they are not busy delaying m atters of national im portance in the Blank office. Strauss remarked that of course the U .S. may get tired of the interm inable delays: for four years nothing has happened. Instead of the beginning of the twelve divisions now, there are nothing but plans for a skeleton organization. He then divulged his own plan. Using the existing 14,000 men in the border police, who after all have had their m ilitary training, and send ing them through special officers' training schools, at least three divi sions can be put up alm ost immediately, if in addition to the border police the volunteers are drawn upon. I asked Strauss whether he believed that the Moscow conference w ill lead to a lessening in the readiness of Germans to rearm. In his reply, the m inister commented at some length about the Moscow and G eneva conferences. He turned out to be free of any illusions concern ing the conference at the sum m it in Geneva and the recent Adenauer conference in Moscow. He immediately connected the events at the tw o conferences, although I had asked him only about Moscow. He
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said one cannot be surprised that Adenauer and Bulganin looked each other deeply into their "statesm anly ey es/' if shortly before Eisen how er and Khrushchev had shaken hands. One should not be surprised that the Germ ans drink vodka w ith a vengeance in Moscow after Eisenhow er had bought gifts for Zhukov. Strauss continued that in p olitics it is som etim es necessary to shake "a bloody hand"; and he m entioned Germ an relations w ith T ito. But the consequences of the M oscow conference go much further: they have a kind of normalizing effect upon German public opinion about Soviet affairs. In this connec tion, Strauss m entioned the coverage of the Moscow conference in the new sreels, the illustrated papers, and so on. A ll this he deplored in view of the fact that neither Soviet policy nor the distribution of power in the world had undergone any change. Prior to the Geneva conference, he said, he had prepared an a id e m em o ire on the forthcoming negotiations, and this document had been made available to Americans as well. Strauss summarized its content for me. Starting from the diagnosis that Soviet long-range aims had not changed, he had proposed that the conference be used by the W estern powers to publicly address the following questions to the Soviet delegation: "H ave you, the Soviet leaders, departed from M arxist-Leninist-Stalinist philosophy and policy? If so, w ill you pub licly declare that you disavow the M arxist-Leninist-Stalinist line?" If they had been ready to make such a declaration, one could have used the conference to discuss the proofs of its truthfulness. If they had not been ready to make such a declaration, the conference should have been called off and everybody might as well have gone home. Instead, the Geneva conference has had undesirable consequences lik e its successor, the conference in Moscow. It has led the Western powers and W estern public opinion to embrace an unwarranted belief in a relaxation of tensions. In the Soviet satellite countries, it has led to a disheartening of the opposition to Comm unist domination; in Ger many, its consequences are undesirable because one can now ask "against w hom " should we put on a uniform. Once upon a tim e, it was "w ithou t m e"; now it may become "against whom, for Heavens sak e?" As I have mentioned, Strauss talks very quickly and fluently. At the point in the conversation at which he criticized President Eisenhower for his position at the Geneva conference, a characteristic slip of the tongue occurred. In order to soften his criticism , Strauss wanted to say we "resp ect" Eisenhower [achten)-, what he did say was "w e disre
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sp ect" Eisenhower (v erach ten ). Strauss was not much disturbed by th is slip of the tongue and tried to cover it up immediately by saying "w e respect and revere Eisenhower" {achten und verehren), and he added "m ore as president than as supreme commander of n a t o . " Strauss referred to the Soviet Union's interest in increased EastW est trade in Germany. He stressed that the Soviet Union had a politi cal interest in German trade w ith China, more particularly in routing it over M oscow in order to forestall direct trade relations between West Germ any and China. (The idea of a potential conflict between the Soviet Union and Com m unist China is an old German standby.) In Germ any, opinions "could be heard" to the effect that a higher standard of living in the Soviet Union would cause the Soviet govern m ent problems in case of war: a population that was better fed and better paid would not be as docile an instrum ent in the hands of the Soviet leaders as the people are today. Strauss considered this opinion u tterly foolish, and heartily agreed when I suggested that it might be characterized as "bourgeois m aterialism ." Ever since the Soviets exploded an H-bomb, " if only from a tow er," they need not worry, they have no fear. Strauss did not clarify—in view of his diagnosis that the Soviet government now is free of fear (and thus cannot be effectively deterred)—why the Soviet policy of coexistence has com e into being. Nor did he explain how his own proposal to treat the Russians sternly at Geneva could be reconciled w ith the view that they could no longer be deterred. A ll he said on this point was that the Soviet leaders "m ight have their problem s"; consolidation of the gov ernm ent at the top, increased output of consumer goods, "digestion" of the satellites. Then he reemphasized that the ultim ate aim of the Soviet leaders had remained unchanged. He regarded the Soviet policy of "sm iling diplomacy" as dangerous to the W est, if only because the desire for peace is strong and the expec tations for lasting peace are being heightened everywhere through "th e policy of sm iling." In the Soviet Union, however, the control of public opinion is considerably more severe than it was under H itler: " it can be sw itched anytim e." N ot so in the W est. Not only public opinion be com es more peaceable but also the political and m ilitary situation seem s to deteriorate. Strauss spoke of the "unstable situation" in the W est and said plainly that " n a t o is w eak." In what m ust be a record sentence or two, he reviewed the situation from Greece via France to the Scandinavian countries, concluding dram atically that West Ger
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m any seem s to be the European m ainstay of N a t o , and West Gennany is no m ilitary power at that. Tw o political remarks Strauss made may be cited out of context. He said that the s p d was rent by inner struggles and somehow kept to gether only by its fight against Adenauer. The utopian character of socialist foreign policy he characterized contemptuously as "political astrology." Regarding Adenauer, Strauss remarked that the chancellor could take opposition from any man who dared to stand up and talk to him : he was autocratic only w ith people who did not. W hen I left I gave Strauss greetings from Henry Kellerman.5 Strauss showed delight in remembering the big lobster he had eaten and the beer he had drunk w ith Henry at the wharf in Washington. Seeing Strauss in front of me, I could w ell believe that he was not only a good talker but also a big eater. He lived up to his Bavarian descent in another respect: he never mentioned the question of German reunification.
A Young O fficial in the D efense Ministry O cto b ers, 1955 Dr. Block1 is the German official in the Defense M inistry whom I had seen on my last visit to Bonn on April 30,1954. He turned out to be an ineffective man, a subject fit for a case study in the new German bureaucracy rather than a source of information. Somewhat to my sur prise, Count Baudissin, who did not know I had m et the gentleman, suggested that I see Block before we talked further. Block is responsible to Baudissin in the division of the Defense M inistry dealing with the so-called in n eres G efü ge ("inner structure"), of which Baudissin is chief. Block turned out to be considerably more amiable this tim e, which I attributed to the introduction. When we were alone, I called his atten tion to the fact that we had m et before. He remembered, and apol ogized disarmingly for our previous meeting by saying that at that tim e he had been quite new in the office. s A friend and former colleague of mine in the Department of State. 1 The name is fictitious.
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In the m eantim e, I had learned from Dr. Rohwer2 in Frankfurt that he and Block had studied in Hamburg together after returning from the war. Block, like Rohwer, is thirty-eight years old. Both are historians, Rohwer—according to Block—one of the best young naval historians in Germ any. Block him self—according to what he told me—is espe cially interested in the late Middle Ages. As a good German, he is not sim ply interested in that period, but claim s that without understand ing it, it is im possible to understand the significance of current events. T he sm all table at which Block sat was covered with a few office memoranda and a book by Theodor Haecker, an authority on Kierke gaard. Later in the conversation, I remarked how pleasant it must be for him , despite his important responsibilities, to find tim e to read not only m ilitary books, such as the Stu dies b y Ludw ig B eck (which he had m entioned in our talk) but also those by Theodor Haecker. I asked w hether he knew Haecker's T ag-und-N achtbücher, a book on the years of Nazi rule. He did not. Pointing to the memoranda on his desk, he made a disparaging gesture w ith his hand and said, "A ll these pap ers. One does not get to read anything im portant." He took off his glasses, as he had done innumerable tim es before, closed his eyes and, w hile an expression of great pain appeared on his face, pressed them w ith his hand without stopping to talk. Despite my efforts, the poor man did not feel com fortable and acted as if he had been asked to show extrem e fatigue on a provincial stage. In order to put Dr. Block at ease, I asked him at the beginning of the interview to talk about som ething he knew well, the schools that would be established for the education of German officers. He spoke at length about the plans for the establishm ent of two such institutions in Heidelberg and Hamburg, for officers of lower grade, and mentioned also the higher W ehrmacht Academy to be located in Aachen. I had read about those plans in the press and w ill not summarize this part of my conversation, except to say that he greatly stressed the plans for giving the officers a democratic education in civic and international affairs. I acknowledged the importance of such efforts but expressed doubt that any m ilitary establishm ent could be substantially better than, or different from, the society in which it functioned. If it appeared neces sary to educate young officers in this regard, was it not very important to m ake sure that the primary and secondary schools performed the 3 Then editor of the journal Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau.
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educational functions which would be lacking in an officer's educa tion? In his reply, Block mentioned contacts between the Defense M inistry on the one hand and youth organizations and schools on the other. I asked Dr. Block to comment on the difference in the current situ ation of Germ an rearmament from that which prevailed in 1950, suggesting that this difference could perhaps be traced to two or three factors: (1) the notion of a sharply reduced Soviet threat to the West; (2) the em ergence of tactical atom ic weapons; (3) the possibility that strategic atom ic and thermonuclear parity of the East and the West m ight be reached in the foreseeable future. Block seemed flattered by my wish to discuss so weighty a problem w ith him . As to the reduced Soviet threat, he addressed him self to the so-called policy of strength. W ithout criticizing this policy directly— w hich of course he could not do as long as he was an official in the Defense M inistry of the Adenauer government—he found a way to express his misgivings about it. During the war, Block had been in Soviet Russia. H ie extent of his personal experiences was apparently lim ited (even if one were to grant that his sense of observation was good, w hich I was not quite ready to do), but he suggested that his per sonal experiences had led him to believe firmly in the importance of self-confidence when dealing w ith Russians. No m atter how power less you m ight be and how exposed to arbitrariness on the part of the Soviets, they would respect self-confidence far more than deference or blind com pliance. Block concluded that a show of self-confidence rather than of strength would be respected by the Soviet leaders in world politics as w ell. How then could this self-confidence be developed? (Thus Block implied that the West was lacking selfconfidence now.) Correcting him self, he continued, "W hat must it be based upon?" The W est must know that its form of life is worth being defended. T his knowledge inspires self-confidence, and so on. I felt no doubt that Block felt critical toward the Western policy of strength. His argumentation might have been awkward, but his feeling was strong. Any doubts in this regard were dispelled when Block com m ented on the "atom ic problem ." He bared his soul. "O n th is subject, I w ill express some heretical opinions," he said, even changing his voice. The somewhat snappy tone of his speech be cam e softer. And w ith his unfailing sense for ham acting, he managed to convey the impression of a man who puts his workaday preoccupa tions aside and indulges in a Sunday dream. He was not sure, he said,
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that the W est should use the bomb. He looked expectantly at me. I said, "le t us suppose the Soviets use the bomb first. What then?" "Even then, it is questionable that the West ought to use the bomb in retali a tio n ." I asked him to explain. M odem war involves great suffering. It requires more strength to ac cept the suffering. Perhaps this strength should be "m obilized," and used as an instrum ent in fighting the enemy. "H ow ?" "It would put them in the wrong." I suggested that the Soviets have been in the wrong all along, and wouldn't mind being put there if they had not been in the wrong before, provided that they would win the war. Perhaps Block was only confused, a little more than others and a lit tle less than still others, who express themselves in public on these m atters. Perhaps, he presented merely an example of that fogginess of m ind w hich is so difficult for people to understand who lack fam ili arity w ith the heritage of German pietism and romanticism. His observations seemed remarkable to me, as they came from a former m ilitary officer, now working in the new M inistry of Defense, who would reject w ith equal vigor the suggestions that he was unmilitary in his orientation or poetical in his prose. Indeed, how can realism be expected from the German population at large or at least from the politicians, if officials in the Defense M inistry with m ilitary back ground, training, and experience are capable of such a helpless sur render of sobriety. Upon my request, Block showed me the figures of the statistics on Germ an volunteers that are being kept in his m inistry. The total num ber as of O ctober i, 19$$, was 125,686. Of these, 36,372 were officers; 72,015 were noncommissioned officers and soldiers; 17,299 had not served before. More interesting than these totals, however, were the figures showing the weekly fluctuations of applicants. The number of applicants had dropped considerably of late. In the week ending Oc tober i, 19 5 5, only 774 new applications came in, whereas as late as the w eek ending July 30, 1955, no less than 3,395 volunteers were newly registered, and 3,142 in the week ending June 11,1955. T he interpretation of these figures is difficult. Some informants, such as Mr. H ottelet and Herr H eifer,1and in part also Count Baudissin attributed the reduction to the changed political clim ate and the afterm ath of the sum m it conference at Geneva and Adenauer's Moscow 1 Richard Hottelet, the American correspondent for cbs, then stationed in Bonn; on Herr Heifer, see p. 269, above.
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conference. Others, such as Block and General Blum entritt, traced the recent drop in applications to the fact that the pay of m ilitary officers w ill be lower than that of corresponding civil servants in the adminis tration. (This would not necessarily explain the drop in the largest categories of private soldiers and persons who had not had any m ilitary training before.) Still others, like Fritz Erler, said disparagingly that the recent to-do about discrim ination in payment of m ilitary officers was blown up by veterans' organizations. Finally, it must be noted that the drop in new volunteers is not without precedent. I saw the trend curves in the Defense M inistry, based on weekly applications. They show strong fluctuations in the past as w ell. For example, shortly after the French refused to ratify e d c (August 30,1954), the flow of new applica tions was even sm aller than that upon which the German press com m ents at present. When I left Dr. Block, he told me how much he had appreciated the opportunity to clarify his own thinking. He accompanied me to Count Baudissin's office to whom he remarked that I was now in a position to tell him , Baudissin, whether he, Block, had been of use to me. Baudissin overheard this remark.
W o lf G r a f B a u d is s in : T h e S p irit o f th e G erm a n A rm y O cto b ers, 19$$ G raf Baudissin had invited me to his house in Römlinghoven for supper. He lives in a new settlem ent outside Bonn. From his house, he has to walk about five minutes to the streetcar which is usually crowded and takes him in a half-hour to the main railroad station in Bonn. When the weather is good, he walks to his office, another fifteen or tw enty m inutes. He is about to get a car because he finds the trans portation problem in crowded Bonn quite trying. He lives with his wife in a very sm all house with nothing but a kitchen, a staircase to the up per floor, a sm all entrance hall and one small additional room on the ground floor. T h is one room, which is quite charmingly furnished, serves as a living and dining room. The most prominent pieces of furni ture are a table, at which four or five people can be conveniently seated, and a big stove. There is no space for other chairs in the room, so that
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one rem ains seated at the table after supper, which is cleared by a very old lady who serves as cook and maid. C ountess Baudissin is a sculptress. Samples of her work are in the room . Her studio is somewhere in the neighborhood, she said. She com es from an aristocratic fam ily in East Prussia; her father was pro fessor of law in Heidelberg. W e stood very near the table—there was no place to sit down except at the table—and drank a glass of sherry while Baudissin changed his su it upstairs. We talked about common acquaintances we had had in Heidelberg in the rather distant past and about East Prussia. She seem ed glad and alm ost happy about the fact that as a child I had been to East Prussia. W hen Baudissin joined us, he pointed to a large watercolor on the w all—the sketch of a glass window that his wife was planning to put in the local Protestant church. W ithout the explanation, 1 might have taken the w atercolor for an illustration of Moby D ick, because a huge w hale either was trying to swallow or had spewed forth a somewhat stylized human being. From conversations 1had had with Baudissin in Santa M onica, California, I remembered that he and his wife pride them selves in understanding symbols. Behind me, the countess said, "Jonathan, Jonathan . . . there are so few symbols of resurrection." I turned toward her carefully in order not to smash any pottery, and she continued that the local parson had said he liked the sketch, but one did not know, of course, how the congregation would react. We sat down to a frugal supper, and Baudissin said a prayer. I asked why the flags were put out at half-m ast on the public buildings in Bonn. Nobody knew. Baudissin called in the old woman who served us to ask her, and she enlightened all three of us that Papagos1 had died. T h is shows how important it is for high officials of the Bonn govern m ent to have dom estic servants who listen to the radio! T he countess reminded her husband that "w e" have to write an article w ithin two days. At this moment the telephone rang, and when Baudissin returned, he said it would be hard to write the article because the next day he had to appear as a public speaker in a little town eighty kilom eters away. He would have to represent the Defense M inistry and talk on "rearm am ent." T his was the occasion for the countess to indulge in a rather temperamental outburst against the Defense M inis try. Apparently, Secretary of Defense Blank had recently declared that 1 Alexander Papagos, Greek Prime Minister, 1885-195$.
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Saturday would be a full working day. Baudissin's speaking engage m ent would make it im possible for him to spend all of Sunday at home, and she resented the invasion of her weekend by officials who "other w ise are not very quick in embracing his (Count Baudissin's] ideas." W ithout appearing gossipy, she said with slight amusement how dif ficu lt it had been for her to convince General Heusinger to agree to her husband's publication of "th e New German Arm y," an article that finally appeared in the October 19$$ issue of Foreign A ffairs. The clearance was pending when Baudissin left for the United States in July. He added that Heusinger had commented that the style in his article was too heavy, "suitable for publication in Germany, but not in the U nited S tates." "O ne can often be confident that if someone criti cizes the style, he dislikes the content." His wife finished the story by saying that, as a m atter of fact, no changes had been made by the editor of Foreign A ffairs, Mr. Armstrong, who was expected for supper the next evening. Baudissin is a man of considerable intellectual elegance who hides devotion to his work behind deceptive nonchalance and occasional self-deprecatory remarks. For example, when I phoned him and in quired in w hich building of the Defense M inistry he was located, he replied, "In the barracks." (He meant the temporary, one-story build ing of the com plex of houses which forms the Defense M inistry.) "In the barracks. You know, where the intellectuals liv e." At another tim e when I visited him , I noticed he was quite occupied. He said, "N o, no. Com e right in. N othing of importance ever happens in this office." I was surprised at his candor when he spoke to me. He told me that C hancellor Adenauer was impressed by the appearance of the United States M ilitary Police when he visited the United States. For this reason, he wanted sim ilarly "show y" uniforms for the new German contingents. In the same way, the chancellor was impressed by the parades of Soviet soldiers in Moscow. When I indicated incredulity, Baudissin insisted that he knew this to be true. W ith the same expres sion of annoyance he told me of a plan, which he traced again to the chancellor him self: the first two contingents to be established would be a m ilitary band, and one company that would be used at the Bonn airport for purposes of representation upon the arrival of foreign dig nitaries. In Baudissin's eyes, all this is, no doubt, symptomatic of a trend he considers harmful and dangerous: the restoration of m ilitar ism . He dislikes parades, ostentatious m ilitary symbols, and if he had
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his own say, he would accept into the new German army only people who unconditionally subscribed to the ideas of the tw entieth of July. (In Santa M onica he had told me that in the new German Republic there is only one tradition worth cultivating, that of the resistance against H itler, symbolized by July 20,1944.) Perhaps Baudissin's aver sion to Adenauer's "playing soldier" is deeply rooted in his Protes tantism . He may distrust Adenauer's newly discovered interest in m ilitary splendor because it reminds him, as a Protestant, of the "su p erstitiou s" pomp of the Roman C atholic Church. Baudissin said that neither his secretary (Blank) nor his general (Heusinger) dares to speak his mind when he talks w ith the chancellor. I remarked that I had heard it said that the chancellor does listen to objections and tolerates opposition. Baudissin disagreed, adding that th is was not the real problem. The chancellor, he said, is often in the position of a man who wants to buy a car and does not care whether he gets a Ford or a Studebaker. He doesn't know anything about cars and m ust rely upon an expert. It is up to the expert to make the choice. But neither the secretary nor the general tells him whether he should buy a Ford or a Studebaker. We talked about the sharp drop in the number of volunteers, follow ing the Geneva and Moscow conferences. Baudissin insisted emphat ically that an increase in National-Bolshevism had to do w ith this developm ent. He said that he had often been asked, while in the U nited States last summer, if there was danger of an increased rightist influence in Germany. He had always denied that there was. Now, after his return from the United States, he felt for the first tim e that there was indeed such a danger. He added, "M y instinct in these mat ters has been rarely w rong." He spoke of "Boninism ." Bonin had of course been Baudissin's antagonist in the Defense Min istry for years, so far as the so-called democratic structure of the future Germ an forces was concerned. Colonel Bonin held the opinion that there was no rhyme or reason to any m ilitary reform of the well-tried Germ an army. Answering my question, Baudissin said, however, that the "ca se " of Bonin who had gone over to the neutralists and, in fact, now serves the Com m unist cause,had enhanced Baudissin's prestige in the Defense M inistry. He attributed less importance to Werner Picht, who in his book, W iederbew affn u n g, had attacked the ideas on m ilitary reform for w hich Baudissin is largely responsible. (These ideas are summarized in a booklet, published in June 1950 w ith a preface by the chancellor,
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called V om kü n ftig en d eu tsch en S oldaten .) Many m ilitary officers of the older generation share Picht's ideas, according to Baudissin. By contrast, the younger generation, whether students, socialists, or trade union youth, have greatly contributed to strengthening Baudissin 's position in the Defense M inistry. When there was talk during his absence from Germany that his trip to the United States might be the prelude to his dism issal, the German youth organizations of various p olitical persuasions cam e forward in his support. Baudissin asked me pensively, "W hy is it that I have close contact w ith the young people in Germ any and find it difficult to be understood by a man like H eusinger?" T he inform ality w ith which Baudissin treats official business is per haps illustrated by the fact that he gave me a copy of the report of his v isit to the United States in July and August 19 5 5. It is quite a remark able document, as some of the following quotations may indicate: "T h e chancellor is surprisingly (! ) popular; his reliability as an ally is never doubted. It is true, his succession is a subject of great concern; one fears a 'recurrence' [of the political troubles at the end of the W eim ar R epublic!." (Baudissin evidently shares these worries. He also asked m e what would possibly happen after Adenauer's death, and said that the sam e question could be asked w ith respect to Eisenhower.) "A lthough Germany was never the main theme of political discus sion in the United States, the American interest in Germany has con siderably lessened after Geneva, especially that in quick rearm am ent." "A m ong m ilitary people [in the United States], I encountered rather frequently sim plified views.of the German problem. One is interested in Germ an soldiers—as soon, as many, and of as good a quality as possible." (This Baudissin contrasted w ith "th e more realistic view of Am erican civilians.") (Baudissin mentioned that the educational influence of the Ameri can schools is not great. Youth in the United States is dependent upon itself and apparently influenced most by other youngsters.) "If 'cooper ativeness' rem ains as a last human yardstick, only the average can dom inate; there w ill be an atrophy of that which is individual and creativ e." "T h e failing rules of traditional conduct are replaced by certain rights and formulae . . . they give the individual astonishing selfassurance, but deprive human contacts of many personal aspects. Thus, it is hardly possible to distinguish whether a stewardess in an airplane greets a stranger or an old acquaintance."
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In the United Sû tes, "given the stress on general equality it is de sirable to cultivate distance from the superior, whereas in Germany it is necessary to level barriers." P ostscript. In 1963, Lieutenant General Baudissin (bora 1907) be cam e commander of the n a t o Defense College for a two-year term. Later he accepted a position as director of the Institute for Peace Re search and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.
F ritz B e ie n d s e n : U p p er-C la ss Ju ste M ilieu O cto b ers, 195$ Fritz Berendsen, a former colonel in the General Staff1, has made a m ost successful adjustm ent to civilian life after World War II. His in dustrial background, in com bination w ith his political career and m ili tary history, make him a represenutive of the postwar ju ste m ilieu of the upper classes. His social contacts are excellent. He is a personal friend of General Landon. His wife told me of afternoon parties w ith Madame François-Poncet and spoke also of a party at Dr. and M rs. C onant's. The seventeen-year-old daughter of the Berendsens recently spent six months in the United Sû tes. I m et Berendsen on my last trip to Germany and saw him again in W ashington earlier this year, when the European Security Comm ittee of the Bundestag was in the United Sû tes. Berendsen invited me to attend a dinner party at his house—"in a dark business su it." He lives in m ost com fortable quarters, a newly built house in the outskirts of Duisburg w ith large rooms for luxurious entertaining. Frau Berendsen told me that they had "lo st everything in the w ar," but that she could now indulge again in her weakness for collecting old furniture. I recall few dinners superior in quality to the one served that evening (by a butler and a maid), and none at which better or a greater variety of w ines were served. There was no suggestion of the ostentatiousness of the n ou veau rich e, but merely a strong suggestion that here was a fam ily whose proper place in society had been restored. O ne of the persons whom Berendsen had invited on my account, as he told me, was former General Westphal. When the gentlemen, upon the host's suggestion, withdrew for awhile to the library after dinner, Berendsen pointed to a large painting of Scham horst on the wall, say• See p. »78, above.
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ing to W estphal, "O n December 12, he [Scharnhorst] has his two hundredth birthday, as you know. I have in mind to ask a few old com rades for a celebration, M anstein and others. Would be delighted if you could join u s." W estphal thought this an excellent idea, and an excel len t idea it probably was. Berendsen suggested that I might talk to General Westphal in the library. It was not the most congenial setting for a productive conver sation, yet it offered me an opportunity to ask Berendsen him self a few questions. I mentioned that the situation in Germany appeared to me less stable than it had on my last trip in the spring of 1954. Perhaps this was an afterm ath of the chancellor's visit to Moscow? Berendsen can be counted upon to present the official government view and do it intelligently. He denied, as I expected, that the situation in Germ any was unstable. He said quite peremptorily that rearma m ent has now been accepted by the population. There is no longer any trace left of the "w ithout m e" attitude which troubled German poli tics in 19$ i. As Berendsen explained the situation, it appeared to me that he was quite anxious to emphasize as strongly as possible the reliability of the Federal Republic w ithin the W estern camp, and that he was perhaps particularly anxious to do so in view of the fact that both London and W ashington showed some signs of uneasiness at Adenauer's conduct in M oscow. I asked him whether in his opinion German youth favored Western affiliation and rearmament in Germany as much as people with more m ature judgment—Berendsen em phatically insisted that they did— and then further challenged him by assuming the role of a troubled young worker w ith Social Dem ocratic leanings. T his youngster would believe, I suggested, that German rearmament now is unnecessary be cause there is no longer a Soviet threat to the W est; the tactical A-bomb at the disposal of n a t o would serve as an equalizer of ground strength in a contest w ith the East, and war would not break out any way because the two big powers deter each other with sufficient stock piles of strategic nuclear weapons. Berendsen maintained that in several m eetings w ith high school and university students and also w ith young workers, he had never had any trouble explaining the m ili tary policy of the government convincingly. The arguments in favor of that policy are so "lo g ical" that they are always effective. One might say, he m aintained, that one is "through w ith this lesson" very quickly.
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Upon my insistence, he then specified how he would deal w ith "th e atom ic argum ent." The Soviet Union opposes German rearmament. It is afraid of German rearmament. Why? Because of A-bombs? No. Germ any has no A-bombs. The Soviet Union is afraid of German divi sions. Why? Because these divisions could oppose a Soviet attack. Could these Germ an divisions oppose a Soviet attack single-handedly? No. T hey need the support of the other W estern powers. Hence Ger m any m ust be allied w ith these other W estern powers. 'T h a t is all. It is logical. Lesson finished." Berendsen is not a distinguished speaker in the Bundestag. He may be a politician all right, but he is not a rhetorician. He is a soldier in civilian clothes who has found it congenial and profitable to work in the industrial sector of German society. It seemed to me that the snap piness of his performance in answering me belied the democratic ur banity w hich his new political position requires of him . W hile he spoke he sought General W estphal's eye every so often, as though to check on how he was doing at this political exercise. Berendsen repeated this performance regarding the argument that W estern loyalty to the W est may no longer be an important require m ent, and that German national interest may rather point to attempts to play both ends of the cold war against the German middle. What do you eat? Bread. Where do you get the bread? From the baker. Does the grain grow in W est Germany? No. It must be imported. How do we pay for the imports? By exports. We have got to export. It is the Western countries that take our exports. Do these countries need them? No, they don't. It is in the German self-interest to trade w ith them. To do so, we m ust be on good term s w ith them. "It is logical. It is simple. It is effective. Lesson finished." T he conversation in the library was interrupted several tim es by telephone calls. Berendsen is a busy man. (He even had to leave the dinner table tw ice.) One call, he explained in the library, was from Dr. Krone, the chairman of the c d u group in the Bundestag. He, Berendsen, was to go to Friedland the next day to greet the row 's who returned from the Soviet Union. Berendsen said that the government had decided to m ake every ef fort not to talk or publish anything on the suffering of the German prisoners in the Soviet Union. They were equally interested in having the press publish as little as possible on the subject as long as any row 's were still in the Soviet Union. Evidently, they felt that premature ver acity m ight mar the joy of seeing more and more people return.
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Berendsen referred to this governmental tactic as a propaganda directive, using the Nazi term Sprachregelung ("language regulation"). Fritz Berendsen was bom in 1904. From 1959 to 1964, he was bri gadegeneral and generalmajor. From 196s to 1969, he was again c d u deputy in the Bundestag.
West Germ any in 1955: Excerpts from an Informal Talk Decem ber 9,1955 In early Decem ber 19$$, I talked to my colleagues in Washington, D .C ., about som e of the impressions I had gathered on a visit to Ger m any in O ctober and November: It is alm ost trite to observe that the signs of prosperity in West Ger m any strike the visitor even before he studies the economic situation. A ll Germ ans seem very busy and in a rush. Members of the middle class like to undertake business trips. A great deal of rebuilding is going on; it is noticeable wherever you go, though perhaps less so in Berlin than elsew here. In general, the econom ic progress in Berlin lags behind that found in W est Germany. There are fewer automobiles on the streets of Berlin then in W est German cities, and although there is per haps m ore elegance in some respects, it is an elegance pierced w ith jar ring shabbiness. You m eet a man on a cold day w ith nothing but a scarf around his neck, ju st as you have passed a lady in mink. There are beggars in Berlin___ T he chancellor got ill w hile I was in Germany. The news came as quite a jo lt to many Germans: they suddenly began to worry that som ething unforeseeable might happen if Adenauer should die. This was the first tim e that some Germans told me what had transpired on the East Germ an radio and in the East German press about Adenauer's state of health. Never (mce on any of my previous visits to Germany did I hear statem ents of the East German media repeated to me as in form ation. In this case the East Germans were mentioned with the im plication that only they would say publicly what was really wrong w ith the chancellor. For two or three days even the stock exchange was adversely affected— Among people voting the opposition ticket you find continued bit terness about the government. I attribute this feeling to the long-
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lasting exclusion of the Social Dem ocrats from power in the federal governm ent. Fritz Erler told me angrily that Adenauer appears to con sider the German state an object of exploitation for the benefit of his party. T he situation is aggravated by the fact that in quite a few of the G erm an Lander, of w hich the Federal Republic is composed, Social D em ocrats hold positions of power in the Land government. These m en cooperate-quite w ell w ith representatives of the same party they vigorously oppose in the Bundestag. In these circum stances all sorts of com plications arise, and exclusion from federal power appears all the m ore easily as the result of Adenauer's personal vindictiveness: indeed, the chancellor som etim es goes out of his way to assert his power even when it does not seem necessary for the attainm ent of his ends___ If Germ an democracy is unstable, one of the most important reasons m ay w ell be the power of pressure groups in Germany. Associations of businessm en and other pressure groups organized themselves prior to the form ation of the federal government. Today, about four hundred of these organizations are represented in Bonn. They have contact with the adm inistrative bureaucracy as much as w ith the legislature, if not m ore so. T he prestige and power of the m inisterial bureaucracy are greater than the esteem enjoyed or the influence yielded by the Bunde stag deputies. The average deputy shares an office w ith a colleague, works in very close quarters, and has neither tim e—if he has the ability —nor an adequate staff to prepare the bills his political party may present in the Bundestag. M ost of the bills come from the m inistries, and the pressure groups cultivate the m inistries for this reason. Some of the b ills com e from the bureaucracy of a Land1 where the party presenting a bill to the Bundestag happens to be in power and therefore disposes of a bureaucratic staff capable of preparing a federal bill. Thus everything conspires to favor the power and prestige of the m inisterial bureaucrat. T he citizen is estranged from politics, if only because he sees less of the workings of the m inistries than of the activities of the Bundestag. Many pressure groups have succeeded in placing their rep resentatives in the m inisterial bureaucracy, and it happens not infre quently that a Bundestag deputy asks a pressure group just what is going on in a particular m inistry. A ll of this may have som ething to do w ith the fact that m an ager is such a popular term in Germany. In particular, the Defense M inistry is 1 The Federal Republic consists of several states, like Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, etc. Each of these states is a "Land."
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said to be in the hands of managers. And in general when talking about p olitics you hear the word m an ager more frequently than the word d em o c ra c y . . . . As on previous visits to Germany I found that many people shun sim ple, straightforward explanations of political acts or events. I looked through my journal and came upon an entry, dated May 1954, w hich still seemed pertinent to me. Let me quote it: “Many Germ an observers of the political scene, being aware of the fact that W est Germany no longer is the center of the world, do not credit Bonn w ith the ability to pursue an independent foreign policy. D im ly or openly they resent the evident dim inution of German power. W hen discussing political decisions or events, they reject simple, plain explanations and suggest hidden causes and secret motives instead. Perhaps th is gives them the satisfactory feeling of having 'inside inform ation.' And insight, however spurious, can be cherished when power is beyond reach. Moreover, the 'discovery' of hidden motives fits in w ith the notion of politics as the arena of 'deals' where democra tic procedures are evaded. Politics is som ething being done in shadowy darkness by a sm all group of managers. By not accepting their pub lic utterances at face value, the clever observer lengthens the distance betw een him self and the people, whom he considers 'naive/ and he shortens in turn the distance between him self and those who do have power. T he tone in which such attributions of secret motives are made, or discoveries of hidden causes are announced, is not that of m uckracking, w hich receives its impetus at least in part from some sense of moral obligation toward the people. For there does not appear to be any need to serve the people by letting them know the 'truth' about politics: the observer regards them as 'simpleminded,' just as he regards the political managers as 'devious' and him self as 'clever.' Are such attitudes a sign of political instability in Germany, perhaps in consequence of the fact that liberation from Nazism was not ac com plished by the people, but resulted from defeat and collapse? Or are they symptoms of a disillusionm ent that has begun to engulf the W estern world at large?"
Index
Achcson, Dean, 80 Adenauer, Konrad, 78,79/ 8 0 ,8 1,9 1,10 9 , n on , 116, i n , 14 9 ,15 8 ,19 6 ,19 7 ,10 0 , 2 0 1,10 9 , 213, 214, 250, 2$i, 260, 261, 282, 289, 291, 293, »96. *99, 300, 301, 30$, 306; in Moscow, 193$, 284-88 Adorno, Theodor, 19 1 Allen, Mildred (Pat), 39,45 americanization, 123-24 Andrae (General), 229 anti-Americanism, 130,244,266-67 anti-Semitism, 132,229 anxiety: French, 16$, 176, 259, i6o; Ger man, 13, 18 1—85; about bombing, 179, 180, 222, 265-66; about war, 16$, 182, 286 Aron, Raymond, 215 Ascoli, Max, 20 atomic: armament, 264, 295; parity, 245; war, 9n, 106,276,19 5, 304 atrocities, 17 8 ,17 9 ,18 1 Aufhäuser, Siegfried, 199 Austria, 45-50,64-6$, 282 Autobahn (to Berlin), 2 8 ,10 0 -10 1 Backhaus, Hugo C , 187 Baring, Amulf, ison, i$3n Barth, Karl, 33,53 Baudissin, Wolf Graf, 73/ 293, 296, 297301 B ayerische Königspartei (Bavarian Mon archist Party), 63 Beck, Ludwig, in n , 16 8,175,254 Benn, Gottfried, 119 Bense, Max, 132 Benton, William, 44,440,45
Berendsen, Fritz, 278,280,282,302-5 Bergrav, Eivind, issn Berlin, 2 ,6 9 ,10 1-2 ,17 8 , 205, 306; block ade, 78; uprising, lune 17,19 53. *13 Bemhardi, Friedrich von, 187,235 Birkenfeld, Günther, 26,60 black market, 20,26-27 Black Sea, 205 Blank, Theodor, 150, 156, 157, 288, 289, 198,300 Blank Office, 155-57,16 0,19 8, 249, 261, 267-69 ,171,174, *90 Blumentritt, Günther, 15 2 ,15 in, 164, 1 7 1 , 134- 38,16 9 ,297 Boemer, "M icky," 120-22 Bohlen, Charles E. ("Chip"), 79, 80, 9091, 9* Bonapartism, 200 Bonin, Bogislav von, 289 Bor, Peter, 25411 Bradley, Omar, 173 Brandt, Karl, 155 Brandt, Willy, 93,196-99 Breton Woods Conference, 56, $6n Bulganin, Nikolai A., 280,287 Bultmann, Rudolf Karl, 51, 52-53 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 23 t Bundestag Committee for European Se curity, 276-84 bureaucracy, 262 cabaret, political, 59,99,1 16-17 Canaris, Wilhelm, 17m , 181,209 Carroll, Wallace, 8 ,8n, 68,69,90,93,94, 96 "Carte Blanche," 289
3io Caitellieri, Wolfgang, 278 censorship, 247 China, 20$, 238,264,292 Churchill, Sir Winston, 60, 63, 79, 178, 2 1 3 , 139, »S 3 civil defense, 180-81 Clark, Mark, 173 Clausewitz, Carl von, 222,235,236 Clay, Lucius D., 3,4 , 5, sn, 8, 58,59, 62,
77
Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith plan, 78 communication, informal, 267 communists, 6 3 ,6 4 ,10 3 ,17 7 Conant, James, 21$, 216,302 concentration camps, 30 -33,6 7,177 Conference in Berlin of foreign ministers, January-February 19 5 4 ,2 13 ,2 4 1,24m Conference in Geneva: of foreign minis* ters, October-November 19$$, 114 ; summit conference, July 19$$, 214, 28s, »90, 291 Conference in Moscow: on economic matters, 1952, 248; Soviet-German, September 19$$, 214,284-88,290,291, 296-97 Conference in Paris, October 20-22, 1954, » H conscientious objectors, 274 Cotvo, Baron, 55, 57, 59 Council of Europe, 79,109 currency reform (June 1948}, 78 Czechoslovakia, coup d'état of 1948,79 Davison, W. Phillips, 9 ,9n, 69,70,226 "defamation," 16 1,17 3 ,17 4 ,17 6 ,2 4 2 de Gaulle, Charles, 19 9 ,214,230 Dehler, Thomas, 286 de los Rios, Fernando, 55 demilitarization, 97 democracy in Germany, 153, 157, 239; and foreign policy, 259 denazification, 21, t77 Department of the Interior, German, 158 destruction: in Austria, 47, 49; in post war Germany, 11,2 2 ,2 5 ,26 -28 ,34 ,6 2, 6 4 ,1 3 1 Dethleffsen, Erich, 139 -4 6 ,14 7,16 5,18 3, 202,205,269 Dien Bien Phu, 273 dismantling of industrial plants, 128,202 Doenitz, Karl, 44 Dohnanyi, Hans, t77n
INDEX
Dönhoff, Marion Gräfin, 284 Dresden, bombing of, t44 Dulles, Allen Welsh, issn Dulles, John Foster, 69,243,263 East Germany, 102-6, t3t, 151, 193-95, 205, 220-21, 236-37; uprising in, June 1 7 , 1953, »*3 East-West Trade, 292 Ebbinghaus, Julius, 54,5411,244 Eckardt, Hans von, 50,62 Eckardt, Wolfgang von, 67 Eden, Anthony, 2 0 0 ,2 13 ,2 14 ,24m Eden Plan, 24m Eisenhower, Dwight D., 4 ,1 1 3 ,1 1 5 ,1 6 4 , t 73, » i 4,» 9*,» 9», 301 Eliot, T. S., 42,99 Erasmus, 133 Erler,Fritz, rs7, 197, 278, 279, »80, 28384,297,306 Etscheit, Dr., I72n Europe, 9,128; defense of, t6 4 ,165,176 European Defense Community (edc), iro, 14 1, 165, 181, 187, 199, 200, 201, 202, 230, 24t, 260, 26t, 272; British policy on, r r t; French policy on, 110, r6s, 2 14 ,2t6 ,233. » 34- 35, »49; as Ger man bargaining point with Russians, 251; German ratification of, 214 Evangelical Academies, 183, 218, 119 , 268 experts, in modem society, 254,272 Faber du Faur, Moriz von, 232-33,23 5 Far East, 205 Feiler, Arthur, 60,6on Ferber, Hellmuth, 278 firestorms, t8o-8r Foerster, Wolfgang, 15m François-Poncet, André, 69,92,302 Frank, Anne, 72-73 Frank, Benno, 33 Frankel, Max, 199 fraternization, 7,281,287 Frazer, Lindley, 93 Free Democratic Party (top), 9 3 ,12 1,14 1,
»5»
Free Reich Party (rap), 177 French Foreign Legion, 129 ,137 Friedenau, Dr. (pseud.), 193-96 Fritsch, Werner Freiherr von, r s 1, 168, 187
INDEX Fromm, Erich, 190 Führungsring D eutscher Soldaten. 163 Fuller, J. F. C , 1 7 1 ,1 7 3 Galbraith, lohn Kenneth, 97 Gassdorf, Karl-Otto, 1 in Gehlen, Reinhard, 133,202-9,254 Gehlen Plan, 207 Gehlen's Organization, 153, 134, 137, 13 8 ,16 1 General Staff: German, 167, 187, 189, 207, 232; relation of, to Hitler, 166, 167,236; training of, 188; Italian, 188 General Treaty. See Germany Treaty of
19s*
German-American relations, 12 ,119 -2 4 , 266-67, »79-84 German-British relations, 177 German-French relations, 230-31 German Party (D eutsche Partei, dp), 14 i German Reich Party (Deutsche R eichs partei. DRP), 228 Geiman-Russian rapprochement, 230, 284-87 Germany Treaty of 1932,109, i n , 198 Gerth, Hans, 41 Geyr von Schweppenburg, Leo Freiherr, 16 0 ,16 2 ,16 3 ,2 3 1-3 4 ,2 3 5 ,2 3 4 Gide, André, 1 19 Gille (Generali, 229 Glaeser, Ernst, 286 G leichberechtigung, 6 7 ,9 8 ,12 3 ,14 0 ,14 1 Globke, Hans, 13 3 ,13 4 Goebbels, Josef, 168,266 Goerdeler, Carl, 246 Goldstein, Kurt, 190 Gollwitzer, Helmut, 184 Goring, Hermann, 44,227 Greek civil war, 79 Grewe, Wilhelm G., ro9n Gruenther, Alfred M., 164,187 Gudcrian, Heinz, 12 4 ,16 7 ,17 5 , 229, 232, *54
guilt, collective, 37-38 Habe, Hans, 224 Haecker, Theodor, 294 Haider, Franz, 112 , is in, 132, 15m , 166, 167,204,252-67,272 Harriman, Averell, 197 Harsch, Joseph G , 241-42 Harts home, Ted, 5 1,5 2
3II
Haubach, Theodor, 196,199 Hauser, Arnold, t8n Heidegger, Martin, 119,223 Helfer, Karl Heinrich, 269-76,296 Hess, Rudolf, 44 Heusinger, Adolf, 134, 157, 159-68, 261, 272,289,299, 300,301 Heydte, Friedrich August Freiherr von der, 232,233, »SS-S«. 261-64 Heye, Hellmuth, 269 hidden meaning, 12, ran High Commissioner's Office (hicoc), 8, 92,94-96, rss, 197 Hindenburg, Paul von, 227 Hitler, Adolf, 2 ,15 9 ,16 7 ,16 8 ,2 17 , 242 H ochverrat. 209 Hoegner, Wilhelm, 62,6an, 63 Hofer, Karl, 25,6 5,132 Hoffman, Peter, I72n Horkheimer, Max, 190-92 Hottelet, Richard, 2316 Huizinga,!., 119, >33 Indochina, 176,241,243,250,273, »74 industrialists, German, 193,248,251 Information Control Division (icd) of OMCUS, I, 7 Institut für Sozialforschung. 190 Investigating Committee of Free Jurists, 193-96 Jackson, Robert H., 7 Jaeger, Richard, 278,279,280,282,289 Jaffé, Else, 42 Jaspers, Karl, 3 3-40,41,42 John, Otto, 231 Jünger, Emst, 128 ,14 3,18 3,223 Jungk, Robert, 244 Kafka, Franz, 42,43 Kaiser Ministry, 105 Kassack, Herman, 132 Kellermann, Henry, 293 Kennan, George, 80,91 Kem, Erich, 254n Kesselring, Albert, 112 Khrushchev, Nikita, 284-88 Klee, Paul, 119 Kleist, Heinrich von, 119 Klemperer, Victor, 242n Klepper, Otto, 146-49,181,183,202,203, 209,221,222
312
Knieper, Werner, 278 Korean War, 79» 94. 124, *44. * 74, 283 Korsch, Karl, 36 Kreisau Circle, r$$n Krone, Heinrich, 285,286, 304 K yffhäuserbund. 269 Landesverrat, 209 Lanhans-Ratzeburg, Manfred, 1 rn Lasswell, Harold D., tan Lazarsfeld, Paul, 290 Lebensangst, 182,189 Leber, Julius, 199 Lederer, Emil, $on Lederer, Certrude, $0, son Leramer, Emst, 93 Lenin, V. I., 213 Lemer, Daniel, tan Lex, Ritter von, i$8 Liddel Hart, B. H., rian, 172, t73, 186,
*35
Lippman, Walter, $6 Lowenthal, Leo, 19 1 Ludendorff,Erich, i $ i , i$in , r87 Mailer, Norman, 183 managerial illness, 267 managers, t4 3 ,226,306-7 Manheim, Emst, 190 Mann, Thomas, 37,40,43 Mannheim, Karl, 18, i8n, 30,4 m Manstein, Erich von, 112 ,12 4 ,2 0 8 Manteuffel, Hassovon, 278,280,28 t Mareks, Gerhard, 133, t$o Marcuse, Herbert, 190 Marshall, George C., 4,77 Marshall Plan, 77-78,91 Martin, Alfred von, 248 Mayer, Gustav, 36 McCarthy, Joseph, 2 16 ,2 3 1 McChrystal, A. J., 64 McCloy, John, 8,69,80,9*. 94.136 McClure, Robert, 7, $8,62 Mehnert, Klaus, 2$o-$ 1 Meinberg, Wilhelm, 226-31 Melville, Herman, 72 Mende, Erich, 1 19-22 Mendcs-France, Pierre, 214 Middle East, 145-48,165, *05, *33-34 Mierendorff, Carlo, 46,46n, 196,199 militarism, 23$, 261,262,275, *99 military: class, German, t 3 - t 4 ,157,162,
INDEX
187, 233, 234-36, 268; organization, * 55, *62, * 74- 75. *93j pensions, rtr Miller, Henry, $7 Millis, Walter, 28 t, 282 Moch, Jules, 80,91,98 Model, Walter, *62, 235 Molo, Walter von, 37,40,43 Molotov, Vyacheslav, 2 * 3 ,24 m, 287 Moltke, Helmut von, *51,236 Monnet, Jean, 9 m Montesquieu, Baron Albert de, 246 Montgomery, Sir Bernard L., *73,2*9 Morgenthau Plan, *29 Mûhlenfeldt, Hans, *4* Müller, Josef, r77, *77n Muller, Louis, 230-51 Müller, Vincenz, 236,237, *37n Müller-Schwefe, Hans-Rudolf, 2*8-23 Murphy, Robert, 3,4, $, 60 Nabokov, Nicolai, 26,26n, 58,61 National Committee for a Free Germany, 236 nationalism, *98 Nato , 78,2*4,292 Nato Council, 80, i * * "negotiations from strength," *98 neutralism, 98, 120, 129, 163, 201, 230, * 40- 45, 300 "New Look," 216,243,263,275 New School for Social Research, 6, 45, $on, 6on Niemöller, Martin, 69,104,223 Norstad, Lauris, 9,69 Occupation Statute, 7 8 ,9 8 ,110 ,19 7 ,20 1 Oder-Neisse line, 110 ,19 3 "Ohne M ich" ("Without Me"), 79. *40, *4*, *43, »91. 303 Oil, *43, *65 Ollenhauer, Erich, 1 1 1 , 196, 198, 213, 284,286 "Open Skies" Proposal, 2*4 Oster, Hans, i72n, 209 overwork, 267 Papagos, Alexander, 298 Paulus, Friedrich von, 236,237 peace treaty with Germany, 98 Pearl Harbor, 265 Pechel, Rudolf, 245-50,254 People's Police, East German, 103,205
INDEX peripheral strategy, 243 Perse, St.-John, 99 Pfleiderer, Karl Georg, 200,2oon, 232 Pfleiderer Plan, 200,20on, 209 Picht, Wemer, 300-1 Pleven, René, 91 Pleven Plan, 9 in Pohl, Gerhart, 247-48 Pol, Heinz, 248 “ policy of strength," 242,286,29$ political parties, 12 1,14 0 ,14 3 ,16 5 political warfare, 206,207,208,266-67 Pollock Friedrich, 192-93 praetorian guard, 273 pressure groups, 306 prisoners of war, German, 17 8 ,2 14 ,2 8 5 -
88 P rotocols o f th e Wise Men o f Zion, 229 PQnder, Hermann, 80 Rademacher, Willy Max, 286 Ramcke, Bernhard, 229,249 Rauschning, Hermann, 242,2$o rearmament, German, 9, 911, 12, 80, 9798, 116 -17 , 129, 14 1, 18 1, 196—202, 213, 263-66, 267, 295; constitutional ity of, 213,30 4 ; legislation on, 277 reeducation, 7 ,7n, 6 3,9 7,14 0 refugees from the East, 23, 63, i $ i , 202, 222, 282 Reger, Erik, 60,93 Reibert,Dr., 113 - 16 R eichsw ehr, 160,261 religiosity, German, 32, 172, 183, 184, 258,262,298 Remer, Ernst, 177 ,18 7 ,2 29 renazification, 116 ,13 2 ,2 4 9 resistance: in East Germany, 193-96] in France (World War II), 260; in Germany against Hitler, rsa, 157, 17 5 ,18 7 ,19 9 , 207,209,229,232,244,24s, »49# 300 reunification of Germany, 9, n o , 117 , *95» *97, » 0 1,214,230,282,285,293 Reuter, Ernst, 9 3 ,14 7 ,15 9 m a s (Radio in the American Sector of Ber lin), 8,93, ios, 19s Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 44 Riddleberger, James, 91 Riezler, Kurt, 9 ,9n, 71-72 Rinner, Erich, 24 Roesch, Kurt, 57, 57**, 68,73 Roesch, Maria, 23n, $0, $ 1,6 1
313
Roettiger, Hans, 188, i88n Rohwer, Jürgen, 294 Rommel, Erwin, 219,23$ Roosevelt, Franklin D., 5,178,265 Rudel, Hans Ulrich, 229 Ruestow, Alexander, 148 Ruhr Statute, 202 Rundstedt, Gerd von, 152,15211,167,168, * 3». *35 Ruprecht, Crown Prince, 253 Saar region, 126 ,128 Salomon, Ernst von, 130 Saroyan, William, 57 Sauckel, Fritz, 44 Schamhorst, Gerhard J. D. von, 1$ 1,27$, * 75*» Schelsky, Helmut, 225 Schiller, Friedrich, 119 Schleicher, Kurt von, 1 $ 1,16 8 Schlieffen, Graf Alfred von, 236 Schmid, Carlo, 80,149,202,284,287 Scholl, Hans, Inge, Sophie, 244 Schömer, Ferdinand, 16 2 ,17 5 ,17$n, 23$ Schumacher, Kurt, 67, 79. 94, 97, *10, 125, *48, * 53, *68, *96, *97,260-61 Schuman, Robert, 80,91 Schuman Plan, 9 m, 199 Schuster, George M., 147 Schütz, Wilhelm W., i98n Schwerin, Gerhard Graf von, 149-58, *6o, 175, »54 Seeckt, Hans von, 175 Senger und Etterlin, Frido von, 185-89 Silex, Karl, 240-43,250,287 Simons, Hans, 24 Social Democratic Party (spd), 63, 79, 12s, **6, 13*, *4*, *48, * 57, *66, 177, 196,20 r, 209,280-81,285,306 Socialist Reich Party (sap), 12 1 Socialist Unity Party (sbd), 199 Sodenstem, Georg von, 164, 165, 179, * 38- 39. *59 soldierly qualities: American, 123, 189; French, 1 14; German, 114 ; Italian, 114, 189; Russian, 189 Solms, Max Graf zu, 51-52 Soviet: behavior vs. intentions, 204; Chi nese relations, 238; diplomatic notes of 1952, rro, n i ; diplomacy of co-existence, 292; interest in East-West trade, 292; threat, 292,295,303
INDEX
314 Speidel, Hans, i$o, ison, 157, 159, »3S» 2$o
Speidel Plan, 164 Spengler, Oswald, 60 Stacey, Sir Frederick, 93 Stalin, (osef, $6 ,9 8 ,17 8 ,213 Stalingrad, 288 Steltzer, Theodor, 155, rs$n, 225-26 SteltzerCommittee, 155, is$n, 157,186 Stemberger, Dolf, 41-43 Stingl, |osef, 280 Stone, Shepard, 8,94,281,282 Stouffer, Samuel A., 2830 Strasser, Otto, 229 Strauss, Franz |osef, 73, i$ 8 ,288-93 Strauss, Leo, 9n, 52, 52n, 53,84 Streicher, Julius, 44 Suhr, Otto, 199-202,209 Symons, A. |. A., $9 Tauroggen, 163, i63n Teheran Agreement, 178 Tenant, Peter, 93 Thadden, Adolf von, 229 Thayer, Charles, 92 Thielicke, Helmut, 245 Thiess, Frank, 40,188 Third World, 146-47 Thirty Years War, 11,2 3 7 Tillich, Emst, 93 Tippelskirch, Kurt von, 171-79,189,209 Tito, fosip, 206,291 Toennies, Ferdinand, 53 Toppe, Alfred, 1 1 1 - 1 3 ,1 1 5 ,2 1 7 ,2 5 4 trade unions, 249,261 Truman, Harry S., 80 Turkey, 205 Una Sancta Movement, 250 Undset, Sigrid, 38 universal military service, 27$ University-in-Exile. See New School for Social Research Unkrodt, Renate, 244-45
Voice of America, 3 volunteers for military service, 125, »98- 97, 300 Wallenberg, Hans, 116 war: in future, 145-46, 206, 231, 233, 263-64, 276; peripheral, 276; preven tive, 265,276 War Crimes Trials, 2 ,7 , 43- 44, $ 3, »08 war criminals issue, 1, 113, 128, 161, 208. See also defamation Warsaw Pact, 214 Waugh, Evelyn, 19 Weber, Alfred, 18, i8n, 32, 36,42 Weber, Marianne, 42 Weber, Max, 51, 52 Weber, Werner, 143 Wegener, Paul, 25 Wehner, Herbert, i n n Weinstein, Adelbert, i4sn, 269-76,290 Weizsaecker, Victor Freiherr von, 42 Wescmann, Otto, 133, 149, 151, 154, 158,236 Western European Union, 78,214 Westphal, Siegfried, 167,168,302-4 Wheeler-Bennett, Sir lohn, 5 5 Wiese, Leopold von, 13 1 Wilmot, Chester, 173,178 wipog (Society of 1947 for Economic Policy), 13 9 ,14 1,14 7 wiretapping (in Bonn), 149 Wirsing, Giselher, 251 Witsch, loseph, 6 7,130 -32,14 9 ,158 W irtschaftspolitische G esellschaft von 1947. See wipog Wittfogel, Karl A., 190 writing between the lines, 244-45, »48 Yalta Agreement, 98,178 youth: American, 301-2; East German, 103, 220-21; West German, 22, 1697 1,18 6 -8 7 ,2 2 4 -2 6 ,3 0 1 Zeitzier, Kurt, 167 Zeller, Eberhard, i5on Zhukov, Georgy K., 291