From Paideia to High Culture 9783631811610, 9783631826782, 9783631826799, 9783631826805, 3631811616

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From Paideia to High Culture

PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURAL STUDIES REVISITED / HISTORISCH GENETISCHE STUDIEN ZUR PHILOSOPHIE UND KULTURGESCHICHTE Edited by/herausgegeben von Seweryn Blandzi

Advisory Board / Wissenschaftlicher Beirat: Manfred Frank (University of Tübingen) Kamila Najdek (University of Warsaw) Marek Otisk (University of Ostrava, Czech Academy of Sciences in Prague) Wojciech Starzyński (Polish Academy of Sciences)

VOL. 6

Imelda Chłodna-Błach

From Paideia to High Culture A Philosophical-Anthropological Approach

Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available online at http://dnb.d-nb.de. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress.

This publication was financially supported by the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin.

Cover Illustration : Clio, Muse of History. Source: Bertel Thorvaldsen, CC0, via Thorvaldsen Museum

Printed by CPI books GmbH, Leck

ISSN 2510-5353 ISBN 978-3-631-81161-0 (Print) E-ISBN 978-3-631-82678-2 (E-PDF) E-ISBN 978-3-631-82679-9 (EPUB) E-ISBN 978-3-631-82680-5 (MOBI) DOI 10.3726/b17161 © Peter Lang GmbH Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften Berlin 2020 All rights reserved. Peter Lang – Berlin ∙ Bern ∙ Bruxelles ∙ New York ∙ Oxford ∙ Warszawa ∙ Wien All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilization outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems. This publication has been peer reviewed. www.peterlang.com

Contents Introduction ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  9 Chapter 1 Classical culture – towards perfection ��������������������������������������� 17

1. From valour to magnanimity – the way of the Greeks �����������  17 1.1. THE OLD NOBILITY MODEL OF EDUCATION ����������  17 1.2. DEMOCRACY – THE POPULARISATION OF THE IDEAL ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  24 1.3. PAIDÉIA DURING THE TIME OF THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY ������������������������������������������������  30 1.3.1 Plato – from an ideal to an idea ���������������������������������  33 1.3.1. The Sophists – paidéia for everyone �������������������������  39 1.4. KALOKAGATHÍA AS THE CROWNING OF ALL VIRTUES ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������  43 1.4.1. Plato – the philosopher as a model ���������������������������  47 1.4.2. Aristotle – towards the moral beauty �����������������������  50 1.5. MEGALOPSYCHÍA (MAGNANIMITY) – THE CROWNING CULTURE ������������������������������������������������������  51

2. From paidéa to humanitas – the way of the Romans ��������������  57 2.1. CULTURE AS ANIMI CULTURA – TOWARDS HUMANITAS ��������������������������������������������������������������������������  57 2.2. THE MEETING OF CHRISTIANITY WITH THE GREEK PAIDÉIA AND THE ROMAN HUMANITAS �����  66 2.2.1. Does a Christian need paidéa? ����������������������������������  66 2.2.2. The significance and the limits of humanitas ����������  77

Chapter 2 The Christian Culture – from magnanimity to holiness ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  81

1. Greek aporias – a human or a person? �������������������������������������  81



2. Christianity – a new concept of man ���������������������������������������  88

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3. Virtues and culture �������������������������������������������������������������������  90



4. The meaning of the virtue of valour ���������������������������������������  96



5. Magnanimity and its components ������������������������������������������  100 5.1. CONFIDENCE ��������������������������������������������������������������������  100 5.2. HUMILITY ��������������������������������������������������������������������������  102



6. Faults contrary to magnanimity ���������������������������������������������  104 6.1. PRESUMPTION �����������������������������������������������������������������  105 6.2. AMBITION �������������������������������������������������������������������������  106 6.3. VAINGLORY �����������������������������������������������������������������������  107 6.4. PUSILLANIMITY ��������������������������������������������������������������  108





7. Magnanimity and Other Components of Valour �����������������  112 7.1. MAGNIFICENCE ��������������������������������������������������������������  112 7.2.  PATIENCE AND LONGANIMITY ���������������������������������  112 7.3. PERSEVERANCE ���������������������������������������������������������������  114



8. The Subject of Magnanimity: The Great and Difficult Good �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  115



9. Valour as a Gift ������������������������������������������������������������������������  116



10. Holiness as the Culture of Man ���������������������������������������������  121

Chapter 3 Contemporary Culture: Low Culture or High Culture? ����������������������������������������������������������������������  127

1. High Culture: A New Paradigm? ��������������������������������������������  127 1.1. UNIVERSALISM OR ELITISM? ��������������������������������������  127 1.2. MATTHEW ARNOLD AND THE CRISIS OF HIGH CULTURE ����������������������������������������������������������������  131



2. The Reasons for the Decline of High Culture �����������������������  134 2.1. INDUSTRIALISM AND URBANIZATION �������������������  134 2.2. IDEOLOGY AGAINST HIGH CULTURE ���������������������  138



3. The Peculiarity of Mass Culture ����������������������������������������������  143 3.1. THE CRITERION OF QUANTITY AND STANDARDISATION ��������������������������������������������������������  143

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3.2. FORMALISM AND REIFICATION ��������������������������������  144 3.3. HOMOGENISATION ��������������������������������������������������������  147



4. The Characteristics of the “Mass-Man” ����������������������������������  150 4.1. EDUCATION WITHOUT IDEALS ��������������������������������  150 4.2. DOMINANCE OF QUANTITY OVER QUALITY �������  155



5. For a Return to High Culture ��������������������������������������������������  157 5.1. THOMAS STEARNS ELIOT: THE POET’S VOICE �����  157 5.2. ROGER SCRUTON: THE PHILOSOPHER’S VOICE ��  163



6. High Culture as an Inalienable Context of Human Life ������  167 6.1. THE EXISTENTIAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF CULTURE (KAROL WOJTYŁA AND SAINT JOHN PAUL II) �������������������������������������������  167 6.2. THE METAPHYSICS OF CULTURE (MIECZYSŁAW ALBERT KRĄPIEC) �����������������������������  177



Conclusion ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  185 Bibliography ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  193 Index ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  207

Introduction Culture appears to be an extraordinarily diverse phenomenon, which does not easily fit within conceptualizations. Thus, there is a widespread belief that it is difficult, or even impossible, to provide its univocal definition. Indeed, the term “culture” itself, just as any other term from the field of the humanities, belongs to the class of so-called “open” terms. Such terms not only tend to be used in an unspecified or vague sense but they also refer to objects which may have no common properties.1 In this situation, we are often left helpless and, confronted with a great variety of propositions, or cultural facts, we find ourselves disoriented and devoid of clear criteria to discriminate between the valuable and valuable and the worthless. However, most of us are aware of the importance of culture, which pervades all our life as human beings. Moreover, cultural works leave their mark on our experience: some of them influence us in a positive manner, sometimes to the point of elevation, while others appear as disheartening or even harmful. This is all a broad realm of human experience in which various themes and motifs intersect. And in spite of numerous difficulties on the way, it is worth examining this field. This book deals with those issues by analysing different cultural works in order to answer the question concerning the essence of culture, its place, and the role it plays in the personal life of the human being as both its subject and purpose. Although this question is not easy to answer, it seems particularly pressing today, when various tendencies to separate culture from its primary objective – human improvement – continue to prevail. As a consequence, the need for high culture is denied, or the differences between high and low culture are utterly removed, which makes them indistinguishable. In fact, these tendencies are an expression of a particular image of the human being created on the basis of philosophical, or even ideological, premises. Turning to the past, we notice that the consequences of such premises often exceed the field theoretical speculation and permeate into social life. This, in turn, affects the way in which culture influences human development. The purpose of this book is to show the philosophical and anthropological foundation of the dispute about culture, especially in the perspective of the disputed opposition between high and low culture. In the analysis of key steps of Western philosophical reflection on culture, we shall draw on its original 1 See: W. Tatarkiewicz, A History of Six Ideas, trans. Ch. Kasperek, Warsaw 1980, p. 37.

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Introduction

understanding, i.e. the ancient times, when Greek thinkers began to find the answers to the vital, philosophical questions: who is the creator and subject of culture, what is culture in its essence, and what is its superior purpose? Later, I will present the circumstances in which that idea was adopted by Roman culture, and finally, the impact of Christianity on the intensification of the reflection on culture, which was possible, on one hand, thanks to the enormous Greek cultural heritage and, on the other hand, due to the new anthropology suggested by Christianity and depicting the human being as an entity which exists in the perspective of a particular purpose – not death but eternal life. It is not by accident that the title of this book contains the term “high culture.” For thanks to referring to the history of the philosophical understanding of culture, I shall demonstrate that it is based on three interconnected concepts: paideia, humanitas, and magnanimitas (magnanimity). All of these concepts emphasise an important aspect of the development of the human being oriented toward a certain ideal model of humanity. To be sure, this model went through modifications over time, but it was always based on an examination of human nature and its potential for development. It is the denial of these essential elements that constitutes what we call “low culture,” one which aspires to satisfy only the needs created by the lowest human desires and feelings. The very term “high culture” was not formulated until the second half of the nineteenth century, when Matthew Arnold’s essays appeared as a collection titled Culture and Anarchy (1869). It was only after the publication of this book that the term entered the English vocabulary and became increasingly popular. This does not mean, however, that the issues defined by the notion of high culture had not appeared before. In the context of those ambiguities, it appears highly important to differentiate between the very expression (term) “high culture” and the concept it designates. At the very beginning, it needs to be said that the notion of “high culture” appeared much earlier than the expression itself, namely – in the times of Ancient Greece. When analysing the issue of education, the Greeks have discovered its ideal model, which was the shaping of a perfect man. In their opinion, education and culture had a similar goal. As pointed out by Werner Jaeger, that ideal appeared already in the works of Homer, and even though it referred to the world of knights, the court, and aristocracy, it was characteristic not only of aristocratic nature but also of all human beings. Therefore, Greek culture quickly acquired universal character thanks to the fact that it laid its foundations on human nature. It gained popularity along with the proliferation of democracy. The Greeks described this cultural ideal in terms of kalokagathía (moral beauty).

Introduction

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Christianity adopted this ideal model of Greek culture but it completed the Greek understanding of culture thanks to the new ideal of the human being seen as a person, i.e. a being created by God in His image and likeness. Christianity set a new goal for the human being, which consisted in transcending nature and culture toward God. Thus, the very understanding of high culture underwent an important modification, while still maintaining its universal nature. However, this original, ancient and Christian meaning of the term “culture” went through further changes at the end of the nineteenth century, when the term became popular in philosophy and humanities. As its popularity grew, its meanings diversified depending on the context of a particular scientific discipline, trend, and philosophical system. This is why, over time, “culture” became one of the most ambiguous terms. Contemporary definitions of culture are limited to highlighting only some of its aspects. They usually emerge in such fields as sociology of culture, cultural anthropology, cultural psychology, semiotics. Thus, they focus on points of reference such as: value (M. Weber), meaning and symbol (C. Geertz, D. Schneider), interpretation, group identity (R. Williams), lifestyle, beliefs, and attitudes (Encyclopaedia Britannica), mental and physical reactions and activity (F. Boas), complex of behaviours (W. Roseberry). Indeed, a closer analysis of these definitions reveals that they arbitrarily take into consideration only selected causes-reasons constitutive of culture. All such definitions emerge within the framework of philosophical debates concerning the relation between man and society, on the one hand, and the relation between culture and reality, on the other hand. The meanings that they attribute to culture come from a subject or a given community, which makes them a kind of projection rather than examination of existing reality. In fact, terms such as “reality” or “objectivity” never appear in contemporary definitions of culture. This is an evidence of a subjective approach to this phenomenon, which makes it impossible to reach its essence. As a result of failure to understand what culture is, there is a growing tendency to remove the difference between high and low culture. Due to the variety of approaches, it is justified to determine a point in time when culture became culture. To that end, and despite the complexity and diversity of culture, it is necessary to indicate its main subject, goal, and nature. This task becomes feasible within the framework of a philosophy which prioritizes the role of metaphysics; for it is metaphysics that helps us understand categories such as: subject, substance, person, nature. It includes the general theory of being and presents the ultimate factors causing something to be a being rather than a non-being. Having started from this foundation, the point of reference for the study of culture still needs to stay with the realistic vision of being and

12

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man – philosophical anthropology, which provide answers to the most fundamental questions concerning the human way of being, which falls under the common name of “culture.” Using the theory of being developed within metaphysics, philosophical anthropology reveals the fundamental structure of man as a personal being. Thus, it gives us an objective tool to explain the fact of culture. For this reason, I shall discuss culture using the categories of realistic metaphysics, both in the historical and systemic spheres, while taking into consideration the explanations provided within philosophical anthropology. This approach will make it possible to indicate the important factors decisive for the human mode of action. It will also allow us to notice the actual causes, which explain human action and give it purpose. Thus, I  shall demonstrate that the essence of culture rests upon the actualization of man’s personal life against the backdrop of experience of the world, and that culture itself is an effect of such a rationalisation of reality; that it is a quality (perfection) of the human being, while cultural artefacts are an image and expression of that perfection, an external sign and a manifestation of culture. The historical approach will help us reach the roots of theoretical reflection about culture, which can be traced back to Ancient Greece. In what follows, I shall demonstrate that the emergence of the very term “culture” is one thing, while the origins of the theoretical thought about that way of existence, which is characteristic for human beings and differentiates them from the natural world, is quite another thing. In the first part of the book, I shall explain the meaning of the term “culture” in Ancient Greece and Rome, exposing the Greek origins of what we describe today as “high culture.” Therefore, I shall reach back to the roots of the Greek understanding of culture, which can be found as early as in the works of the great poet, Homer, who understood culture as a consciously nursed ideal model of human perfection. He claimed that culture is expressed through the entirety of man’s character – not only through his external behaviour and actions but also through his internal attitude. And neither the way of conduct nor the internal attitude is accidental; in fact, they are consciously shaped toward a particular goal. It was Homer who noticed that such preparation begins in a small social group, the nobility, aristoi, of a given nation. Therefore, we should look for the beginnings of so-called high culture in Ancient Hellenic noble culture, to which the term areté (virtue) was closely linked. This vision, initiated by Homer, finds continuation in the concept, or rather, cultural process, called paideia, which emerged at the time of Athenian democracy. I shall explain the meaning of this term and discuss important contributions to its understanding, especially the

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13

thought of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates, who discussed ethical aspects of the emerging ideal model of education. Next, I  shall present the circumstances in which this ideal model was first described in terms of kalokagathía. I shall explain its moral-personal aspect, as well as its social aspect. I shall analyse the way in which the understanding of the term changed in Plato’s thought. Finally, I shall discuss the next, even higher, level of culture, which was described by Aristotle. That level is expressed by a kind of greatness and strength of the soul, which Aristotle calls magnanimity (Greek: megalopsychía, Latin: magnanimitas, literally: “greatness of soul”). This distinctive feature of the human being representing high culture consists in the ability of making correct judgments about great and small goods. As Aristotle observes, the search for greater goods poses numerous difficulties, which are easier to overcome for the “great-souled” being. Thus, magnanimity appears as an indispensable condition of genuinely human high culture. Finally, I  shall point to the moment when that Greek ideal model met the Roman ideal model of education. I  shall discuss the circumstances in which people began to use the word “culture” to describe the rational process of individual and social upbringing of the human being. I shall explain how these two terms, which may well designate the entirety of Greek and Roman civilisations as opposed to barbarism, came to be seen as identical. The second part of this book discusses the way in which the Christian ideal of culture stemmed from Hellenic culture. Here, I shall indicate the roots and characteristic features of the specifically Christian understanding of culture, while also explaining how Christianity both complemented Greek philosophy and drew new conclusions from it. The primary link between the ancient heritage and the achievements of medieval thought was the thought of the Early Church Fathers. Therefore, I shall present the contributions to the humanities of: Saint Clement of Rome, Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen, Marcus Minucius Felix, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, Saint Ambrose, Saint Jerome, Cassiodorus, Saint Gregory the Great. Their great contribution consisted in the strengthening of a positive bond between Christianity and Hellenism. However, it is important to remember that their understanding of the Christian paideia was based on the so-called Christian philosophy, which did not distinguish between philosophical and theological aspects but rather saw them as standing in a mutually inspiring relationship. I shall describe this approach in terms religious personalism. Next, I shall prove that the theological and philosophical aspects were separated when philosophy became autonomous, which finally took place in the thirteenth century, thanks to Saint Thomas Aquinas.

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Introduction

The research perspective adopted for this part of the book will allow us to shift from historical discourse to metaphysical, or more precisely, anthropological discourse. I shall demonstrate that Saint Thomas’ emphasis on the role of the existence of beings in the world made philosophy more realistic and thereby provided philosophical cognition with more direct view of the world and empirical verifiability. I shall present St. Thomas’s notion of the person. I shall explain what it means that the human being is disposed towards personal life and point to those elements which should be actualized within that being. Finally, I shall demonstrate that is thanks to the knowledge of those elements that the human being can rationally and responsibly choose the ultimate purpose of his or her life and form it according to this purpose. In the third part of the book, I shall present, on the one hand, the reasons and circumstances of the emergence of so-called popular culture, and, on the other hand, the views of the selected authors from the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, who opposed those tendencies and championed high culture. As we shall learn, they employed the term “high culture” in a variety of contexts. Among the thinkers who devoted a great deal of work to the issues of high culture is Matthew Arnold (1822–1888), whose collection of essays, Culture and Anarchy, is considered to be one of the first works in English addressing these questions. In turn, authors such as José Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955), Thomas Stearns Eliot (1888–1965), and Dwight Macdonald (1906–1982) believed that because of the tendency to remove the division between high and low culture, high culture is virtually brought down to the level of low culture, and, consequently, the former falls apart. Another advocate of high culture was Roger Scruton (1944–2020), who noticed that now, more than any time before, it needs to be saved and preserved. High culture was also addressed by Walter Benjamin (1892–1940), whose 1935–1936 essay The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction became very influential, and later by Theodor Adorno (1903–1969). After discussing their views, I  shall analyse the anthropological and philosophical approach to culture represented by the members of the Lublin School of Philosophy  – Karol Wojtyła (the future Pope John Paul II; 1920–2005) and Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec (1921–2008). Although both those thinkers approached the idea of culture using slightly different philosophical perspectives, each of them defined culture as a way of existence characteristic of human beings, which makes it possible to bring the human capability for action to a level on which it is revised to the greatest possible degree, to the optimum potentiae, the highest level. Even if their approaches differ in details, both these thinkers define the human being as the creator of culture. Thus, they meet at the point which

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appears to be the centre of the reflection of culture, namely – the conviction that culture is an indispensable context of human life. In the Bibliography, I provide both source literature and auxiliary literature. The listed publications include both source texts (of Greek and Roman authors) and later contributions (from the nineteenth century and later). I  also list numerous Polish, English, German, French, and Spanish studies concerning the issues discussed in this book. It seems that no one other book so far has provided such a comprehensive elaboration of the problem of philosophical and anthropological foundations of the dispute about culture. The analyses and insights presented herein can be inspiring for contemporary research on the issues concerning culture. This is even more important given the fact that contemporary studies of culture are dominated by sociology (cultural anthropology) and psychology, which lack a deeper philosophical perspective, let alone one stemming from the realistic tradition. The metaphysical and anthropological perspective presented in this book provide a new philosophical explanation of high culture as the crowning form of culture as such. I shall demonstrate that, in order to resolve the dispute about culture, one needs to ultimately resolve the dispute about the human being, that is, to find the answer to such questions as: What is the actualization the human being’s potential? And what does it mean to live in a human way? The emphasis on the existential structure of the human being equips us with an objective criterion with which to assess various cultures and cultural forms. This way, we obtain a very elaborate tool for the study of human culture. This tool shall allow us to meaningfully answer the question, which of those forms make us more human, and explain which are a threat to us and why. Therefore, the issues analysed in this dissertation are crucial for the understanding of culture, its various definitions and theories, both contemporary and those developed in the past.

Chapter 1 Classical culture – towards perfection 1. From valour to magnanimity – the way of the Greeks 1.1. THE OLD NOBILITY MODEL OF EDUCATION What we call culture today has its beginning as early as with the Greeks. They were distinguished by the extraordinary skill of inquiry into the laws governing reality. This skill is visible in all aspects of their lives – in the way they thought, spoke and acted, in various directions of artistic creativity. The Greeks looked for laws in the essence of things and tried to follow them in their lives. They comprehended particular facts in the light of a single vision, which in turn explained their place and purpose as a part of a certain whole. It can be clearly seen in one of the greatest achievements of the Greek genius, namely philosophy. It is an expression of that very ability to notice the unchangeable order which is the basis of everything that happens and changes in nature and in the human world. The philosophical sense of the Greeks consisted in the fact that they were able to discover the universal laws at the basis of human nature and point to the norms stemming from those laws in the fields of personal actions and in the order of the society. The Greeks used their knowledge of the natural rules of human life and the inherent rights governing its physical and spiritual forces when studying the issues of culture and education. Both of the indicated terms were of similar meaning for the Greeks. At that point, education started to be understood as a type of effort aimed at the specified – everlasting and universal ideal model of man. That ideal model was achieved through the development of all fields of human life (the so-called integral education), which was supposed to be made possible by culture. Hence, the main purpose of culture was to perfect the human being. Initially, the Greek ideal model of humanity developed within one – aristocratic class and later acquired a universal meaning. As Werner Jaeger indicates, the Greeks were the first to believe that education must be a process similar to construction. At the same time, the greatest work of art for which that nation heard a calling was the living human.1 Therefore, 1 See W. Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. G. Highet, Oxford 1946, vols. I–III. It is worth noting the anthropocentric attitude characteristic for the Greeks – man is the main motif, on which their entire world is focused.

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Classical culture – towards perfection

they compared education to artistic, plastic shaping while taking into consideration the model of the idea existing in the artist’s mind. Only after understanding education this way can we refer to it using the term “formation” in its actual meaning, in which it first appears in Plato’s works for the first time, as a visualisation of education procedures.2 The transmission of culture hinged upon the creation of an ideal model which had certain characteristic features. There was a certain ideal model of man, at which the entire process of education was aimed. The characteristic feature of those times was the fact that the focus was not on the practical aspect of that process. The Greeks distinguished the “transmission of culture” from “education” understood as techné – professional skills and abilities, craftsmanship. These two processes stem from different sources.3 Here, culture is seen as a consciously nurtured ideal model of human excellence. Culture understood in this way is expressed in the entire human character – both in his external behaviour and actions and in his inner attitude. That line of conduct, as well as the internal attitude are not caused by accident, but are the result of conscious effort leading towards a specific goal. Such preparation begins in an inner social circle, within a noble layer of a given nation. In terms of aristocratic origin, the Greek – classical kalos kagathos resembles the English ideal model of a gentleman.4 Initially, both those terms referred to an ideal representative of a higher class of a chivalrous character. The history of the Greek culture, i.e. the process of shaping the Greek national personality begins within the old Hellenic nobility with the formation of a specific ideal model of man of the higher rank, which the education of the nation’s elite aims at. Over time, when the place of the upper class of knights started to be occupied by a middle-class society, adopting the same ideal model, it became a universal good and a generally followed formula. In addition, the beginnings of an old Hellenic noble culture are closely related with the concept of areté.5 It was the best expression of the then views concerning 2 C.f. Plato, Republic 377 b and Laws 671 c. All English translations of Plato are taken from Perseus Digital Library: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/ 3 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 3. 4 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 4. 5 To obtain information on various meanings and types of areté in the ancient Greeks see:  J.-P. Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought, trans. from the French, Ithaca, New York 1982; M. Krasnodębski, Zarys dziejów ateńskiej historii wychowania. Paideia od Sokratesa do Zenona, Warsaw 2011; Z. Pańpuch, W poszukiwaniu szczęścia. Śladami aretologii Platona i Arystotelesa, Lublin 2015; “Areté,” in: Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 1, Lublin 2000, pp. 318–325.

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an ideal of a human and a citizen. Its beginnings are associated with the way of life of the chivalry nobility. Areté is a proper expression appertaining to a noble man.6 The Greeks understood it primarily as efficiency, an ability to do something. It was an indispensable condition to occupy the chief position. In the works of Homer, it denoted the heroic valour which combined the moral value with the physical strength. It had a similar meaning as the terms agathos and áristos.7 The indicated expressions refer to people combining the knightly bravado with the aristocratic origin. Areté indicated a man of noble birth who had to obey certain rules of conduct, both in everyday life and in war, non-existent for ordinary men.8 A  simple man has no areté. This notion in the aristocratic concept is therefore a natural feature, associated with the excellence of a family (eugeneia) and the possession of an estate (plutos).9 According to the then ethics, man does not become agathos, he is agathos (or is not) by nature.10 Thus, the code of conduct applying to a knightly state, the so-called noble moral code became the foundation of the Greek education. Moreover, the aristocratic ideal included such features as: the harmonious development of the body and soul, mind and heart, the refinement of custom and an impressive way of life. The indicated synthesis of physical and spiritual virtues constituted the essence of the ideal embodied in the phrase: kalos kagathos anér.11 The fullness of

6 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 7. 7 Áristos, used only in plural, is the common definition of the old aristocracy. See: E. Heza, “Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia areté. Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej,” Etyka 10 (1972), p. 62. 8 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 5. 9 “According to the notions of those times, areté was inherited, the role of education in its development and enhancement could be only auxiliary. Without prejudice to the diligent efforts of Phoenix, it was believed however that Achilles had become what he had become, primarily because he was Pelida: even Phoenix himself could create nothing good from the son of Thersites. It is not so much about training the soul as about providing technical knowledge: how to drive horses, standing on a chariot, how to cast a javelin, how to compose a speech to make it convincing. The natural or inherited abilities of man decided about the fact that he was brave or cowardly, wise or stupid regardless of whether he was brought up in the indicated way” (T. Zieliński, Ideał wychowawczy w starożytności i u nas, Warsaw 1929, pp. 2–3). 10 E. Heza, “Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia areté. Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej.” 11 As Z. Heza notes: “This expression does not occur in the works of Homer but it must be very old” (“Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia areté. Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej”, p. 63). The oldest known text in which this expression appears is a passage from Solon (E. Diehl, Anthologia Lyrica Graeca, Leipzig 1925, passage 1, 39–40). The

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areté (kalokagathía) is achieved only by man fully aware of his worth. Therefore, the sense of self-worth denotes a higher level of areté.12 It is significant that nobility imposed certain obligations on those who were entitled to it. An educative aspect of nobility was realized in instilling a sense of duty with regard to the ideal by which man was guided. Additionally, the concept of areté was closely connected with reverence expressing itself by evaluating the community to which a given person belonged. The reverence (timé) and publicity (kleos) were the natural consequences of acquiring primacy. The reverence was regarded as an objective social manifestation of the universal appreciation (charis) that man deserved for the performance of excellent deeds, for which no adequate, material award could be found.13 Hence, areté was measured by appreciation that a given person enjoyed among equals.14 It was on that recognition and respect that the social position of nobility was based. The sources of reverence or disgrace were praise and reprimand. They pointed to the existence of objective evaluation criteria in social life. The reverence constituted therefore a natural standard of measuring the level of being near the ideal of areté. It is necessary to add at this point that a characteristic feature, an ethical virtue distinguishing the noble man was the recognition of self-esteem, namely the justified pride. However, it must be underlined that the true self-esteem was regarded as the most difficult feature to achieve by man. The sense of aristocratic pride (aidós) boosted a constant heading in this direction. The opposite action aroused the righteous anger in the environment (nemesis).15 The sense of pride prevented man from performing acts regarded as despicable (aischron) and from doing something that might compromise him in the eyes of his fellow citizens. Thus, the two concepts (aidós and nemesis) were the typical concepts of the aristocratic moral code in Homer. It is worth noting here that there was a change, in the later philosophical thought, based on the fact that man looked for acceptance in his own conscience.16 Over time, people started to consider reverence (timé) as

full bibliography on this topic is included in a dissertation by H. Wankel, Kalos kai agathos, Wϋrzburg 1961. 12 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 6. 13 Heza, Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia arete. Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej, p. 6. 14 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 8. 15 Heza, “Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia areté. Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej,” p. 63. Cf.: C. E. von Erffa, Aidôs und verwandte Begriffe in ikrer Entwicklung von Homer bis Demokrit, Leipzig 1937. 16 That breakthrough was made in the ethics of Democritus, who in place of the term aidôs in the old meaning “to be ashamed of others” introduces a new concept of “being

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a mere reflection of the inner value of an individual person in the opinion of a human community. In Homer’s works, however, man was dependent – as far as self-esteem was concerned – solely on the judgement of the community to which he belonged.17 Due to the fact that he was a member of his state, he measured his areté by an appreciation of others. Homer’s ethics was therefore the ethics of reverence. For the aristocracy of his time, no reverence given by the environment was the greatest tragedy that man could encounter. Praise (epainos) and reprimand (psogos) were the sources of reverence and disgrace.18 The aforementioned characteristics of the early stages of the Greek culture are included in the works of Homer. He is regarded as one of the first and greatest creators who shaped the Greek ideas of humanity.19 His poems are the source of knowledge on the oldest Greek society and its ideals20. He immortalized the world of great demands and proud traditions in them. He presented the principles governing the operation of the high noble culture that expressed universal ideals. Therefore, those epics became the core of ubringing and education of not only the nobility, but with the advent of democracy, of the whole youth – initially in Greece and then in other countries influenced by Hellenism21. The very word areté – virtue, perceived as having the highest quality feature, presented by Homer, is crucial for the understanding of culture. In culture, the central place was occupied by human areté (valour), for the appearance of which education was indispensable.22 It is through education that man gains the skills and qualities necessary to be fully human. Homer, speaking through the mouth of Phoenix – the tutor of Achilles – expresses his opinion on the two most important skills being the goal of education: “to be both a speaker of words and a doer of actions.’23

ashamed of oneself (aideistkai seauton); cf. E. H. Diels, W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6 ed., 3 vols., Zürick 1966, passage 264. 17 To obtain information on this topic, see: G. Steinkopf, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Ruhmes bei den Griechen, Halle 1937. 18 Heza, “Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia areté. Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej,” p.64. 19 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, pp. 35–57. 20 See:  Heza, “Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia areté. Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej”. 21 See: P. Jaroszyński, “Rola Homera w kulturze śródziemnomorskiej,” in: Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 4, Lublin 2003, p. 562. 22 Jaroszyński, “Rola Homera w kulturze śródziemnomorskiej.” 23 Homer, The Iliad, IX 443, trans. R. Merrill, Ann Arbor 2010, p. 170. The master of the word in Homer’s poem was Odysseus, while the man of action was Ajax.

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We can find a description of an ideal model of heroism and an irreversible destiny of a great warrior in The Iliad. The author presents the figures of heroes, who are typical representatives of knighthood, against the backdrop of the Battle of Troy. They are characterized by a militant temperament and a passionate pursuit of glory. They fight, competing for the wreath of the highest areté.24 A  brave man in this poem is at the same time a highborn man. The fight and the victory constitute the proper content of his life, the highest distinction. It is therefore a man of noble birth who, both in everyday life and during the war, is guided by certain rules of conduct which do not apply to a simple man, defined as kakos as opposed to agathos. There is a constant competition for the wrath of areté among people called aristoi.25 The fight is a true test of male virtues. The victory is not only a physical defeat of the opponent but also a condition of winning areté. On the other hand, a description of the noble culture and custom was included by Homer primarily in the Odyssey. The work is a source of information about the conditions in which the older noble culture was shaped.26 It was the ionic culture. The work presents a description of life of the nobles at their courts and in country estates. The author gives a detailed description of the characteristic features of courtly manners and aristocratic custom during peace. The nobility in the Odyssey is a closed state with a strong consciousness of its privileged position, its refined manners and a mode of action. It is distinguished by a certain uniform lifestyle. The relations among the people from this sphere are characterized by a high degree of sophistication. In addition to the knightly valour, the Odyssey displays an understanding for certain spiritual and social values. The conditions indispensable for the development of the noble culture are: the sedentariness, the land property and the tradition.27 They facilitate the transmission of a certain lifestyle from an older to a younger generation. Thereby, an aristocratic ideal included the environment’s appreciation and some external goods without which it was impossible to practise certain virtues significant for the man of noble birth. The condition for social recognition was the material independence provided by wealth based on the possession and land cultivation.28 24 Cf. A.W.H. Adkins, Merit and responsibility. A study in Greek Values, Oxford 1960, p. 30 ff. 25 Etymologically, the term areté comes from the adjective aristos, which in the highest degree is agathos. 26 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 7. 27 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p.7. 28 See Heza, “Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia areté. Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej,” p. 73. Cf. Hesiod’s Works and Days. Hesiod accepts the following order: work, wealth,

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In addition, it is indispensable to consciously implement specific courtly standards among young people, teaching them the specific internal discipline. The conscious education and the transmission of culture was significant for the nobles. The indicated education relied on the development of human personality through consistent advice and spiritual guidance. Specific demands, which could be fulfilled only under the condition of deliberate care given to certain essential qualities of character, were placed on the entire human person. The conviction of superiority and rights to occupy a leading position instilled the need among the nobles to teach the young representatives of their state the recognized patterns of noble conduct. It is in such circumstances that education served for the first time as the culture transmission – namely, shaping the entire personality of man according to a specific pattern. The presence of such a pattern is a core of the development of every noble culture29 Apart from the ideal model of the knightly valour, the importance of spiritual and social virtues is stressed. For a woman, such values included her beauty, as well as the purity of customs and cost-effectiveness.30 The woman was given respect and regards as she was the guardian of good manners and a cultivator of traditions. She had an educative and refining impact on the rough, militant and brutal world of men. In the two epics, both in The Iliad and in The Odyssey, one can find a description of the education methods used within the noble layer. An inexperienced, young man was in the company of an experienced tutor due to whom he could get acquainted with lofty ideals of male virtues passed on by the tradition.31 The element of particular importance with respect to the noble ideals was an areté, recognition. Hesiod aimed at setting the court culture against learning about the simple man’s areté. According to his concept of areté, not only the knight’s struggle with the opponent on the battlefield but also the silent and unyielding struggle of the working man with the earth and nature has a peculiar heroism in itself and profound educational qualities. 29 In case of the Greek culture it was kalos kagatos, in case of the medieval knighthood – cortesia. 30 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 8. 31 The figure of Phoenix, an educator and a teacher, may serve as an example here. He took care of Achilles, for whom he was a guide on his path to assimilating a particular moral discipline, for many years. It is in the figure of Achilles that the fullest ideal of masculine virtues, shaped by moral discipline typical of the noble layer, is embodied. See: Homer, The Iliad. On the other hand, in the Odyssey, the figure of Mentor, who was a friend and guide of Telemachus, was introduced. The mentor watches the young man, supports him, advises and helps him. Mentor has thus become the symbol of an older friend acting as tutor, a manager and a guardian. See: Homer, The Odyssey.

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educative meaning of an example. Thus, in addition to the impact of the environment, primarily the family, an example constituted the core of the education process. It strengthened the power of persuasion. Appealing to figures of famous heroes and to examples from legends was an inseparable part of the noble ethics and education. Over time, the ideals included in those two poems acquired the universal meaning. They expressed the fullness of not only the noble features but also of the human nature in general because every man should be able to articulate the wise thought and implement the right objectives32. The human education hinged upon the “bottom up” and not the “top down” principle. It was reflected in the ideal of noble competition. The possession of areté was the foundation of a healthy self-love (philautía) and required the fair respect and reverence from the environment. Thus, although the possession of virtues originally constituted the innate privilege of the noble layer, it gradually began to rely on the education within the framework of tradition and under the guidance of a respected, righteous person, who acted as a guide on the path of learning a definite moral discipline and was able to give good advice and illustrate it with an accurate example.33 Such model of culture and education became a characteristic feature of the Western culture: Greece, Rome and the Christianity.

1.2. DEMOCRACY – THE POPULARISATION OF THE IDEAL With the emergence of a new socio-political structure  – the city-state, called polis, the meaning of the concept of aréte went through certain transformations. Greece was divided into a number of independent small states, governed by their own rules. They were the centres in which the political, social, economic and cultural life of the then man was realized. The relationship between the man and the society started to be more clearly accentuated and a specific understanding of a political community, uniting all citizens, was developed. The framework for the statehood emerged along with the Greek polis (city-state). The polis became the source of all applicable standards.34 The appearance of polis had a fundamental importance for the transformation of ancient Greek court culture into the Pan-Hellenic culture. Under these conditions, the Greek culture reached its classical character.35 Over time, the 3 2 33 34 35

See Jaroszyński, “Rola Homera w kulturze sródziemnomorskiej,” p. 562. Jaroszyński, “Rola Homera w kulturze sródziemnomorskiej,” p. 563. Heza, “Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia areté. Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej,” p. 64. Heza, “Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia areté. Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej,” p. 64.

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urban culture began to replace the noble culture. The meaning of polis relied, among other things, on the fact that it constituted a social framework for a new, Greek culture and was the source of all forms of cultural life. It impacted the creation of new concepts regarding, among other things, the aims and methods of education and the transformation of the existing ideals. However, it is necessary to stress at this point an element which is typical for the Greek culture – it was developing and it did not destroy its previous forms. The indicated development took place through the transformation of what existed and the adaptation to the new current living conditions.36 With the appearance of a new ideal model of man, who regarded not only the nobility of deed but also the nobility of spirit as the supreme goal, the old chivalrous concept of aréte, signifying the heroic strength and bravery on the battlefield, turned out to be insufficient. As a result of the transformation of old noble traditions, the democratization of the Greek culture took place in the fifth and the fourth centuries BC.37 It became available to the entire society. In the course of the indicated transformations, its two characteristic features emerged, namely, the universalism and rationalism, due to which it became the culture of the whole Greek nation and finally, the universal culture.38 It was refined by

36 The democratic system was analysed by both Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle stressed that a properly shaped polis was a necessary condition for the fulfilment of man, his happiness (Greek: eudaimonia). As he wrote: “One’s own good will presumably not exist without the management of a household and without a political system.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1142 a 8–9, trans. R. Crisp, Cambridge 2004, p. 111. All further citations are given with the pagination of the Greek original. 37 Democracy was established in Greece at the turn of 508/507 BC by Cleisthenes (although the term “democracy” was not used at that time). The Greek democracy, called classical, was based on three pillars: freedom, equality of the citizens of polis before the law (Greek: isonomia) and inalienable right to be heard (Greek: isogeria). The Greeks understood the freedom positively as a natural and inalienable ability for man to choose the good. In the name of the so-called freedom, they demanded the right to participate in political debate and governance. The purpose of their active participation in politics was the realization of the common good. The Athenian democracy was direct: the citizens present at the Assembly (i.e., the people) created the law, elected (or drew) the officials and controlled them. See: Z. Pańpuch, “Problem demokracji w starożytności,” Człowiek w Kulturze 20 (2008), p.  178. See also:  P. Jaroszyński, “Demokracja,” in: Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 2, Lublin 2001, pp. 472–473. 38 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 6.

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the fact that it included a certain pattern of a higher form of life – the life consistent with reason. Therefore, the careful and purposeful education of the most talented citizens was paid attention to in the democratic Athens. The rulers were selected and trained to serve for common good. The expression of the changes taking place at that time was a new  – political and military – ideal proclaimed by the Greek poet Tyrtaeus.39 The subject of his poetry was the fight of Sparta with Messenia. The old Homeric ideal of a heroic areté was firmly contrasted by the author with the new ideal of love to the nation.40 He gave the final shape to the ideal model of civic areté, based on the new moral and political order. He perceived it as a readiness to fulfill the social duties of a citizen. He discovered a new concept of valour and perfection. The place of the Homeric ideal of a knight, whose areté manifested itself in the individual fight and personal success, in line with a new civic ethics, was seized by an ideal of undertaking action for the good of the society, the common good (koinon agathon).41 Areté was understood as a warlike fortitude displayed in a particular type of fight. Now, it was not about finding one hero but it was about raising the whole community of heroes, soldiers ready to sacrifice themselves for the country.42 In one of his excerpts, Tyrtaeus writes: “It is a beautiful thing to die fighting in a first row, as benefits a brave man, who fights for his homeland.’43 Following the principles of the civic ethics, the key measure of the true value is the country and what is beneficial to it. A man distinguished by bravery and valour, not aiming at gaining personal recognition but at defending the endangered freedom of polis, became a model.44 39 The essence of this ideal is explained in one of the fragments of his elegy; see: Diekl, Anthologia Lyrica Graeca, fragm. 9. 40 Heza, “Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia areté Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej,” p. 65. 41 Heza, “Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia areté Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej,” p. 66. 42 Jaeger, Paideia, p.  9. As Edmund Heza noted, the feeling of homeland’s love had no conditions to be established in great ancient states or within the Homeric aristocracy, it was born in polis and the first traces of it coud be found in the words from the Iliad:  aiônos aristos amynesthai peri patrés (XII, 243). See:  Heza, Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia aréte Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej, p. 66. 43 Diekl, Anthologia Lyrica Graeca, fragm. 6. 44 “The praise for collective valour, the full expression of which can be found in the poetry by Tyrtaeus, as well as in the literary testimonies and inscriptions from later period of time, is closely associated with the appearance of hoplites and the changes associated with it in the tactics of conducting war. The essence of this system did not rely, up till

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The ideal glorified by Tyrtaeus had a significant impact on education in the entire Greece at that time. It was also accepted outside the Spartan country. Tyrtaeus’ elegies became a solid foundation of the civic culture. At special moments of fighting for the preservation of freedom and national existence – both during the Greco-Persian wars and during the Peloponnesian War  – a common reverence was offered to a citizen, who while fighting against an enemy, distinguished himself by valour.45 The fact that a hero forever remained in the memory of the citizens, whose good he was fighting for, is meaningful because the early Greek thought did not know the concept of the immortality of the soul. At that time, there was a conviction that along with the death of the body, the whole man died. It was believed, however, that the sacrifice of life on the battlefield – in the name of the common good – ensured immortality.46 While analysing the changes that took place at that time, it should be noted that one of the important factors responsible for those transformations was the democratization of the military service – the former aristocratic privilege. Given the fact that in the Athenian polis every citizen was obliged to do a period of military service, the equality sign was placed between the concept of a “citizen” and a “soldier.” The changes related not only to the issues of the tactics of fighting but also to the sphere of morality, in addition, they significantly impacted the personality of the warrior himself. The civic ethics moved the values of solidarity and obedience into the foreground, in contrast to the chivalrous ethics of individual distinctions. Moreover, taking care for one’s dignity was closely connected with attention paid to the victory gained while defending others. According to the then ideal, the warrior’s valour could not be dependent on thymos – passion and the lack of control, but it was in a close relationship with sóphrosyné – the sense of moderation and discipline.47 then, on the individual confrontation of two opponents (monomachia), but on the clash of two compact ranks of hoplite soldiers, where the phalanx made them – as was the case for the state and the citizens – an organically integrated entity” (Heza, Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia aréte Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej, p. 68). 45 The epitaphs, inscriptions and literary works performed at that time point to an ideal model of the collective fortitude. Cf. S. Wenz, Studien zu attiscken Kriegergräbern, Münster 1913, p. 45 and n.; E. Buchner, Der Panegyrikos des Isokrates. Eine historischphilologische-Untersuchung, “Historia-Einzelschrift” (1958) vol. 2. 46 Heza, “Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia areté. Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej,” p. 67. 47 Heza, “Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia arete. Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej,” p.67. The association of areté with sóphrosyné was indicated by J.-P. Vernant in The Origins of Greek Thought, p. 90.

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By analysing this Greek term, it is possible to notice that it encompasses two dimensions of human life – moral and intellectual. They consist of the following elements: temperance, self-control, self-knowledge, inner balance and common sense. This is the essence of the intellectual freedom (mens sana, set against the powerlessness caused by the lack of control and passions.48 Due to the combination of areté – in the sense of valour with sóphrosyné, the ideal of strength and physical fitness was linked with the new ideal of spiritual perfection, according to which man’s behaviour had to be subordinated to the power of reason and law. Further transformations pertaining to the understanding of the term areté occurred in the fifth and the fourth centuries BC when the aforementioned ideal began to devaluate.49 The number of citizens able to serve in the ranks of the hoplites decreased significantly as a result of continuous wars since the end of the fifth century.50 With the advancement of technology and tactics of fighting, the army preparation requirements rose as well. They could be met only by the professional army  – the mercenary army.51 Valour based on physical fitness and patriotism (areté) was gradually replaced by the ability to apply the technical means of action (techné). The aforesaid changes significantly influenced the attitudes of the citizens of polis. They recognized that the city-state could be defended by others, even by the paid mercenaries who could be foreigners. The fact that citizens deviated from the indicated duty led to a deterioration of patriotism and citizenship of Athenians. In the face of that crisis, one could observe an increased activity of the then writers. The frequently selected leitmotiv of their works was showing examples of the ancestors’ valour, which was to exemplify some kind of paradeigma – a pattern and a principle of action52. This form of literary creation was incorporated into the education methods used both in the period of aristocratic and democratic education. Their core relied on using

48 Heza, “Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia areté. Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej,” p. 69. 49 Heza, “Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia areté. Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej,” p. 69. 50 Hoplites are the heavy infantry fighting in a tight formation, called the phalanx. 51 H. W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers from Earliest Time to the Battle of Ipsos, Oxford 1933; H. J. Diesner, “Das Söldnerproblem in alten Grieckenland,” Das Altertum 3 (1957), pp. 210–230; A. Aymard, “Mercenariat et Histoire grecque,” Etudes d’Archéologie classique. Annales de L’Est 2 (1959), pp. 16–27. 52 G. Schmitz-Kahlmann, “Das Beispiel der Geschichte im Politischen Denken des Isokrates,” Philologus Supplement 31 (1939) Hft. 4.

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two inseparable elements in the education process: paradeigma and mimesis – a model and imitation. Following the theorists’ considerations from the fourth century BC, we can see that the significance of arête was expanded. It included the following elements:  valour  – andreia, theoretical wisdom  – phronesis, caution and temperance – sóphrosyné, the sense of justice – dikaiosyné. Thus, areté understood in this way defined the moral perfection of man. The indicated features constituted the canon of civic virtues. Plato emphasized in particular the importance of justice (dikaiosyne).53 It was in justice, in his opinion, that the fullness of arête was included. By extension, striving for justice borne on the grounds of polis became the new force of human education, which was analogous to the chivalrous ideal of valour in war, favoured in the previous aristocratic society.’54 The concept of justice was henceforth at the forefront of civic virtues. It should be stressed at this point that the components of the former Spartan concept of excellence were not removed but were shifted to a higher level55. According to Plato, human happiness depends on whether man follows the principles of reason and justice in his way of conduct. Plato indicated that sóphrosyné and dikaiosyné were closely linked with the human happiness. Happiness was, as of yet, tied to the victory in battle and fame associated with it. Moreover, sóphrosyné and dikaiosyné were particularly valued by Isocrates among the four virtues. He claimed that they were the features of perfect citizens. The two remaining features – andreia and phronesis, may also be the attributes of bad people.56 The new ideal based on a strong sense of justice, penetrated all spheres of the Athenian state in the fourth century BC. The source of changes in the meaning of areté in the emerging Athenian democracy was also a changing attitude to wealth and the possession of material goods. A richer layer of demos began to grow, next to aristocracy, claiming power in the state.57 This change in ownership relations had also influence on the aristocratic concept of areté. Therefore, separating nobility from the possessed wealth became the more and more frequent practice. People were inclined to let the behaviour decide that a man of noble birth was simply a noble man. It was some kind of the nobility of the spirit. According to the ethics of the democratic

5 3 54 55 56 57

See Plato, Laws, 630 b–c. Heza, “Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia areté. Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej,” p. 72. See Plato, Laws, 630 b–c. Isokrates in Three Volumes, trans. L. van Hook, London 1944, III 43. Heza, “Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia areté. Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej,” p.74.

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polis, areté could not depend on the origin or wealth. The confirmation of this principle was isonomia – equal justice under law guaranteeing that all citizens could participate in the state management. Over time, the Athenian society was less and less stable and uniform. The economic changes that took place in Athens at that time caused that the position of a citizen was no longer determined by the originating status. It facilitated the stratification determined by economic factors and resulted in serious changes in morality. The differences between the old land aristocracy ad the new plutocracy started to blur. The Athenians became increasingly open to granting citizenship to the representatives of various social layers and different professions, however, they always drew their attention to the fact whether that person turned out to be chresimos té polei – whether he did something good to the nation or to the people.58 The terms areté or agathos have pragmatic meaning. Virtue is no longer associated with one origin or another but with an active attitude and acting for the benefit of the polis. In Greece, there was some sort of universal politicization of man, who was required to actively engage in the public life of the state and to be aware of his civic duties. Man had to divide his life into what was private (idion) and what was social (koinon). As of yet, the indicated duties rested on the nobility. It was the nobility that possessed the ability to exercise power. In the new conditions, there was still some reference to the old noble way of education. An ideal of being a speaker of words and a doer of deeds was still the most important goal of life for the citizen of the polis.59 The ancient Greek ideal model of noble culture found its deeper meaning just in the culture of the city-state. It was transferred to the general public there. An aristocratic education became a universally applied means of the formation of a man and a citizen. Thus, after the noble culture, the original polis constituted the next indispensable stage in the process of developing a humanistic ideal of the universal, ethical and political culture.

1.3. PAIDÉIA DURING THE TIME OF THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY One can look for the beginnings of the cultural process called paidéia  – the highest physical and spiritual perfection  – in the sense of the highest human arête, in the fifth century BC. From that time, the aforementioned perfection has also been quite consciously extended to the spiritual culture.60 The category of 5 8 Heza, “Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia areté. Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej,” p.80. 59 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 8. 60 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 61.

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paidéa is crucial for the understanding of the Greek culture sources because it was organized on a fundamentally different basis than other cultures. Paidéia (from the Greek word pais – a boy, a child; Latin: educatio, humanitas, cultura) was understood as a comprehensive “cultivation,” rational education of man in the individual and social aspect.61 This term occurred for the first time just in the fifth century BC in the plays of Aeschylus, where it was synonymous with “feeding,” education of children.62 In the broader sense, it denoted a general, human nature-oriented basis of education or an ideal model of education developed by Ancient Greeks and regarded as embracing the whole of mankind.63 This term was used to define both the course and the process of a child’s education as well as its goal and effect. It was about the formation of man from an early age through upbringing and education. The indicated process was closely connected with reading the human nature since the Greeks claimed that one’s susceptibility to education came from nature, whereas the application of appropriate methods, the so-called cultivation of nature  – was the work of man called culture. The proper education should help man achieve the superior goal of his life which is the activation of the supreme powers with regard to the supreme subject. This process is very long and difficult. Man, unlike the world of nature, is born as ill-suited to life, and even more to achieve the true purpose of life. Man must learn how to live in the manner tailored to him if he wants to develop the most humane features within himself. Due to the fact that it does not happen automatically, man needs help. It can be obtained through proper education – paidéa. It is therefore the human equipment in proper dispositions for proper action. Such permanent dispositions were called aretai, or virtues becoming like the second nature. The task of paidéa is just to fill the gaps of nature. The classical one had nothing in common with inventing the worlds of value. Culture included everything that man needed in order to pass through the broken passage from nature to a person at the level of action. Putting the crack together is made possible due to reason which enables man to recognize the proper means permitting the genuine personal life. Various inclinations that drive man in different directions are oriented by him at the ultimate personal good. Thanks to education and virtues, this direction takes permanent forms such as, for instance, the character. 61 See M. A. Krąpiec, “Kultura,” in: Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 6, Lublin 2005, p. 132. 62 See Aeschylus, Seven Against the Thebes (Hepta epi Tkebas), trans. A. Hecht and H.H. Bacon, Oxford1973, p. 22. 63 See P. Jaroszyński, “Paideia,” in: Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 7, Lublin 2006, p. 948.

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All spheres of human life need ordering. At first, it the sphere of reason itself that must be able to properly read the good, the hierarchy of goods and to select proper means that lead to good. That was the task of the virtue of prudence. Additionally, the emotional life must be ordered, both in the realm of desire (pleasure, unpleasantness)  – moderation, and in terms of the warlike feelings (fear, anger) – valour. Finally, our relationships with other people as well as with the society as such need to be organized. This is the place for three types of justice – distributive, commonly shared and replaceable. It is this harmonious cooperation of all the indicated virtues in man that ensured a complete, integral development of a person. Thus, the Greek culture-paidéia was an education of man, the work of the human reason oriented at an accomplishment of a certain ideal, the development of a more perfect man. The principle of the Greek culture was not individualism but humanism in the sense of shaping a proper human character and true humanity. It was only in the Greek culture that education was deliberately targeted at a specific human ideal and not only at the preparation for a profession or the formation of one social layer within a single nation.64 Over time, due to Thucydides, Aristophanes and sophists, the reflection on the notion of paidéia became deeper. It started to be identified with a comprehensive encyclopaedic education – énkýklos paidéia, providing with a practical preparation for living in a society. Isocrates, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle significantly contributed to the understanding of this concept by pointing to ethical issues of the arising model of education:  “[…] they put less emphasis on the practical aims of education but they valued ethical and, in a broader sense, philosophical education instead, which they regarded as the most effective instrument of shaping a perfect man. In this way paidéia became the central concept within the pedagogical reflection, with clear anthropological implications.’65 The educational trends that occurred under the conditions created by a democracy – in the writings of Plato, Isocrates and Xenophon – still referred to the old aristocratic tradition and the ideal model of areté characteristic for it.66 It is indicated in the postulate of Plato that the best education is the condition and the justification of elite governments and the indicated education requires

6 4 See Jaroszyński, “Paideia,” p. 948. 65 W. Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas’ ” in:  Humanitas. Projekty antropologii humanistycznej, p. 1: Paradygmaty – tradycje – profile historyczne, ed. A. NowickaJeżowa, Warsaw 2009–2010, pp. 177–178. 66 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. II, p. 10.

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in turn the best natural conditions as a basis for its development to take place67. Plato thought that birth was of significant importance during the formation of elites since only the best could give birth to the best ones. The indicated view had its origin in the old Greek noble ethics. The nobles believed in the existence of innate values, constituting the core of any true virtue and therefore they sought to preserve the priceless blood heritage.68

1.3.1  Plato – from an ideal to an idea Plato based his ideas concerning paidéa on a former, old, Greek concept. He claimed that the new elite, composed of the representatives of the highest areté, could be created through a purposeful natural selection.69 His philosophical interpretation of education can be found both in the works such as the State and the Laws. In the first of the works, Plato considered the highest level of paidéa, whereas in the second one, he analyzed the indicated process from the earliest childhood.70 In the Laws he observed that the main element of paidéa was a proper pre-school education.71 What is to be achieved and perfectly mastered by a grown-up person should be awakened in the soul of a child already at the indicated stage. He pointed to the dependence of the complete areté in every field from the conditions under which man was raised. Education denotes teaching areté. It begins in childhood and awakens in us the desire to become good citizens.72 Plato opposed the true paidéa to vocational training and he called it a training to reach spiritual perfection. Professional skills are only tools and means to higher aims. In the Laws he pointed out that the proper understanding of the nature of paidéa was the basis of all legislation. Considering its essence, Plato placed man within the state and related the value of individual education to his or her ability to cooperate with others. The precepts of law in the state are the signs of the operation of logos to which man should subordinate first of all. Paidéia relies on subordinating the soul to the logos.73 Therefore, the ideal of

67 In Plato’s time these ideas were spread by the sophists in their pedagogical theories, but they treated nature (physis) as something that existed, that was ready and did not require any special refinement. See Jaeger, Paideia, vol. II p. 25 ff. and p. 63. 68 See Jaeger, Paideia, vol. II, p. 73. 69 Plato, Republic, 459 a–e. 70 Plato, Laws, 643 b 5. 71 Plato, Laws, 643 c 8. 72 Plato, Laws, 643 e 3. 73 Plato, Laws, 645 b, 645 b 8 – c 3.

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paidéa is finally the self-control and not the control exercised by others (which was the case in Sparta).74 In Laws, Plato strongly emphasized the relationship between the word paidéia and pais – a boy or a child.75 He thereby indicated that the education starts at an early age, in childhood, when the process of harnessing desires through reason begins. He divided children’s education into stages. Children who are 3–6 years of age should be engaged in playing only. However, punishments should not be avoided at that time.76 Moreover, children should not be forced to play. Nannies should be employed to monitor their behaviour. Both boys and girls under 6 should be taught by women. Coeducation was obligatory by that age, later children were separated.77 When it came to exercise, Plato recommended dancing and wrestling, with the exception of everything that was not useful for later military training.78 All the recommendations were aimed at developing the free and refined style. Therefore, the tendency to underline the importance of the development of the military spirit dominated in Plato’s theory. The common military conscription was the legal basis for the civic life in the Athenian democracy. It was a natural condition of freedom enjoyed by every citizen of the state.79 The education in the early childhood was limited almost exclusively to controlling the feelings of pleasure and pain. Paidéia understood in this way became the pedagogy.80 Over time, Plato more and more strongly emphasized the belief that the success of later education depends on the effects of the first efforts taken in childhood to shape the character. It is necessary to start a possibly early shaping of the desires of a child so that he or she could learn to love good and hate evil as early as possible.81 Plato was inclined to believe that the first stage of areté, appearing already in childhood, is paidéia. In so doing, he strongly emphasized the role of education claiming that no one could get the best out of one’s own logos if he or she had not been earlier prepared for that by someone else’s logos – a teacher or a parent. Any areté is based on the harmony of a rational perception and habit. Paidéia denotes shaping an attitude towards pleasure and 7 4 Plato, Laws, 635 e, 643 a – 644 b. 75 See especially book II, 653 ff. 76 Plato, Laws, 793 d–e. 77 Plato, Laws, 794 c. 78 Plato, Laws, 796 a. 79 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. III, p. 36. 80 In Laws Plato uses the term pedagogia, too. The basic function of all education is the development of a proper relation to feelings and impulses in the soul. 81 Plato, Laws, 653 a – 653 b 1.

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pain, and thus, shaping the character, on which, in turn, the indicated harmony is founded.82 It therefore concerns the right relationship between desires and intellect. A general idea concerning the fact that the philosopher’s duty is to shape the character was expressed by Plato in the State, whereas the issue of building the character in the strictest sense of the word was tackled by him in the Laws. He wondered how the ethos should be shaped in the early adolescence. He paid attention to musical education – singing and dancing, as extremely important elements of the ancient Greek culture. Plato regarded them as the basic components of education since they were connected with accustoming children to the right pleasures from an early age. He emphasized that education took place by means of sensitivity to harmony:  “And further, because omissions and the failure of beauty in things badly made or grown would be most quickly perceived by one who was properly educated in music, and so, feeling distaste rightly, he would praise beautiful things and take delight in them and receive them into his soul to foster its growth and become himself beautiful and good.’83 A young man discovering the existence of rhythm and harmony develops moral and aesthetic sense in himself.84 According to Plato, the rhythmic movement and the harmonious choral singing provide the grounds for education. As he claimed: “the welleducated man will be able both to sing and dance well […] he keeps right in his feelings of pain and pleasure, welcoming everything good and abhorring everything not good.’85 Plato meant both the ethical and aesthetic beauty here. He strongly stressed the unity of ethics and aesthetics in art. Particularly, in dance that he considered to be a model of art.86 It should be emphasized at this point that the basis of beauty was the harmony of the soul, namely, the moral beauty and secondarily the beauty of appearance, i.e. the aesthetic beauty. According to Plato, such art, or more broadly – culture, that is to have an educational function, should be free of any interference by reformers or the restorers and of individual preferences or taste.87 He believed that the measure of artistic 82 Plato, Laws, 653 b.  As Werner Jaeger aptly notes, Plato reached the point where Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics began. For it also tackles the subject of ethos. 83 Plato, Republic, 401 e. 84 Plato, Laws, 653 e, 654 a. 85 Plato, Laws, 654 b–e. 86 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. III, p. 1164. 87 Plato, Laws, 655 d, 656 d 1, 658 a–d, 659 a–c. Plato sees the beginnings of the downfall of Athens in the corruption of music and poetry, destroyed by discretion and a lack of discipline. See also Laws, 700 a ff.

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value was not the pleasure given to a casual recipient but joy aroused in the best recipients, the ones who had been appropriately trained or even in man who is ranked the highest in terms of excellence and culture. The main assumption of education was the belief that moral patterns were immutable and that the institutions dedicated to creating good traditions were permanent. Plato emphasized that any change was dangerous (excluding the change of something wrong) both in the climate and in the physical, spiritual or mental constitution.88 Teaching music and gymnastics constituted an initial stage of paidéa. However, Plato indicated that they were insufficient as they referred to what was transient (gymnastics) and provided no knowledge (music). On the other hand, the professional skills supply only the purely artisanal information, not contributing to the formation of character at all. Therefore, the more perfect kind of knowledge to be acquired only by reason is the knowledge of numbers, namely arithmetic.89 The place it occupied in the educational system of Plato made him treat it as a humanistic science since without knowing it man was not man.90 Therefore, Plato stressed the educative qualities of both arithmetic and mathematics in general, including geometry or mathematically cultivated astronomy91. They were to stimulate thinking. Their practical use was less important for Plato than the theoretical function which relied on the development of mind. The high demands set up by mathematics for learners were the reason why it was treated as a tool for educating the intellectual elite. There was another level of knowledge in the system of Plato – the highest stage of paidéa, to which mathematics was a prelude, a preparatory exercise (propaidéia).92 That higher level was represented by dialectics (the art of conversation) which grew out of the Socratic discourse.93 It allowed, to reach the essence of every object and finally “the good in itself,” which was an end to what the mind could perceive, on the path of rational understanding. Moreover, it gave the possibility to justify one’s ideas. The period

8 8 Plato, Laws. 797 d. 89 Plato, Republic, 521 e – 522 d. 90 Plato, Republic, 522 e 4. 91 The novelty suggested by Plato was the introduction of stereometry into the lecture of mathematics. It was a new branch developed by an eminent mathematician Theaetetus, Plato proposed the following sequence in mathematical disciplines: arithmetic, (the science of numbers), geometry (the science of lines and planes), stereometry (the science measuring space volumes), astronomy (the science measuring space volumes capable of performing movement). See Plato, Republic, 528 a–b. 92 It should start already in boyhood. 93 Plato, Theaetetus, 186 c.

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of dialectical education should last fifteen years. The greatest advantage of the highest level of paidéa – teaching “the discipline that will enable one to ask and answer questions in the most scientific manner’94 – is, according to Plato, the fact that it teaches man to be conscious and intellectually sensitive. This is what, in the opinion of Plato, constitutes the higher education. Plato proposed the virtue of justice in place of the hitherto highest virtue, such as valour.95 The analyses of justice and its functions in an ideal state reflect Plato’s ideas on the soul and its parts presented in enlargement as the image of the country and its states.96 The principle of justice saying that everyone should do what he or she is supposed to do constitutes, according to Plato, the essence of areté, consisting of the fact that each element of the whole and every part of it perfectly fulfils its function.97 Plato refers here to individual parts of the human soul. Justice bases here on the fact that each of them performs its own duties.98 These parts corresponded to three states in the country. Each of the states had its characteristic virtue: the rulers should be wise99, the warriors should be brave100, whereas the workers ought to possess the virtue of wise self-control (sóphrosyné) because they were expected to be obedient to the higher states.101 Thus, they were supposed to voluntarily surrender to the better ones. Plato stressed that it was justice that made all other virtues valuable.102

9 4 Plato, Republic, 534 d 8–10. 95 Plato, Laws, 629 e – 630 c. 96 Plato, Republic, 369 a. 97 Plato, Republic, 370 a ff. Plato describes areté as the harmony of the “part” of the soul, the health of the soul. 98 Bad education causes disharmony or struggle between various elements of the soul, resulting in the degeneration of state systems (sequentially: timocratic [spartan], oligarchic, democratic, tyranny – the cause of which is the excess of freedom). Each of these systems corresponds to a specific type of man, because – as Plato emphasized – it is man that shapes the appropriate form of the system in his image and likeness. See Republic, 544 d. Plato pictured a democratic type of man who grew out of the uncontrolled increase of superfluous desires in Republic, 559 e – 560 d. See also Jaeger, Paideia, vol. III, p. 23. Speaking of the degeneration that the soul undergoes due to false education, Plato does not mean the education that a school gives. In the first place he primarily focuses on the educational influence of the father on the son. In the Greek tradition, the father is always a natural pattern that the son should imitate. 99 Plato, Republic, 428 b–e. 100 Plato, Republic, 429 a–c. 101 Plato, Republic, 430 d – 432 a. 102 Plato, Laws, 661 b 5.

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The implementation of Plato’s universal system of education was to take place in the state. The state is indispensable for the existence of education.103 He treats them as a framework and a background for the activities performed in the areas of education. There is a mutual dependence between Plato’s educational system and his concept of the state – without paidéa, there is no ideal polis, which, in turn, facilitates the formation of a perfect man in line with the principles of paidéa. Therefore, the entire structure of Plato’s state is based on the proper education.104 In Laws, Plato stressed the fundamental significance of paidéa in the state. The law constitutes the tool for education. The entire human nature, being the core of the full development of personality, is the model for that education.105 The proper ethos of the state should rely on a healthy spiritual structure of an individual. Plato stressed the primacy of paidéa over the practical policy. The first one is a prerequisite for the second one, and not conversely. Plato created a complete system of basic education which was the so-called paidéia of the people and the basis of a higher education. He emphasized the significance of travelling for cultural reasons. Their aim was to learn about other cultures and civilizations both in the aspect of science developed by them and everyday life. His programme was based on the former aristocratic ideal regarding the complete shaping of the human character. The indicated ideal model of areté was applied in the education of people in the changed social and political conditions of the classical Greek city-state.106 Moreover, Plato’s suggestion was the first systemically constructed educational project in the European culture.107

103 At the end of the considerations included in Republic, Plato admits that the real state is only a distorted reflection of the true human nature, but the righteous man should bear the real state in his soul, he should act and live with its system in mind. He writes: “the city whose home is in the ideal […] I think that it can be found nowhere on earth […]. perhaps there is a pattern of it laid up in heaven for him who wishes to contemplate it and so beholding to constitute himself its citizen. But it makes no difference whether it exists now or ever will come into being” (Plato, Republic, 592 b). 104 Plato, Republic, 423 d – 425 c. 105 Plato, Laws, 630 b 3, e 2. 106 Plato criticizes Athens and most other Greek city-states for failing to introduce a legal way of regulating education. See Plato, Laws, 788 c. 107 See D. Bremer, “Paideia,” in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, krsg. J. Ritter, K. Gründer, Bd. 7, Basel 1989, c. 37–38.

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1.3.1.  The Sophists – paidéia for everyone There occurred some changes at that time in the understanding of the ideal model of the human perfection. The old noble model of education was based on the belief that areté was available only to those who, in a certain way, kept it in themselves as given from above, inherited from their divine ancestors. Contrary to the aristocratic system, the new urban system brought with itself the concept of political arête independent of the noble origin. Therefore, the modern city-state firstly seized and universalised the physical areté of the nobles by providing all with gymnastic exercises and also – determined a goal to achieve the spiritual virtues that were inherited by the nobility from their ancestors, and which prepared it for the political leadership by means of appropriately structured education.108 Thus, as Jaeger observes: “[…] the great educational movement, which distinguished the fifth and fourth centuries and which is. the origin of the European idea of culture, necessarily started from and in the city-state of the fifth century.’109 At the beginning and in the middle of the fifth century, there was a concept of education which regarded knowledge – being the factor that dominated the cultural life of the epoch – as the force capable of shaping man. Thus, efforts were made to overcome the existing belief in the advantages of blood for the benefit of the postulate to base areté on knowledge.110 The initiators of this concept were the sophists, supported by public opinion, feeling the need to widen the horizons of an average citizen and raise the individual culture of individuals to a higher level.111 The sophists came to Athens in the epoch of the democracy development during the age of Pericles.112 The task of the sophists was to train political leaders (not the folk masses). In the past, it was the job of the noble class but the sophists introduced new rules. They especially emphasized the art of speech since they thought that the ability to speak in a persuasive way on each subject could be learnt. Jaeger, pointing to 1 08 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 288. 109 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 288. 110 “Until then, there was a belief in the inheritance of virtues in the already known meaning. It was in keeping with the idea of aristocratism but it did not fit in with the principles of democracy. It was not surprising then, that it was precisely in Athens that such success was found by people who maintained that virtue could be taught and that, consequently, they could teach it. Those were just the sophists’ (Zieliński, Ideał wychowawczy w starożytności i u nas, p. 8). 111 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 288. 112 See J.  Gajda-Krynicka, “Sofiści,” in:  Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 9, Lublin 2008, pp. 83–84.

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the ambiguity of the Greek word logos (speech – thought – reason), observed that the sophists’ way of teaching encompassed both the formal and material skills.113 The rationalisation of educating for the political life was at that time only one of the stages of rationalisation of the entire life.114 Facing the fact that the cult of knowledge and reason became a general phenomenon, the ethical values had to be moved to the background in favour of the intellectual values. The educational tasks at which the sophists aimed were therefore subordinated to the intellectual aspect of the human nature. They were convinced that they could teach areté. The important contribution of this epoch was the introduction into the ideal of areté of all the values that Aristotle later called in his ethics the intellectual virtues (dianoethical) – dianoetikai aretai115 – and tried to combine them with the ethical virtues of man into a whole of a higher rank.116 The ability to clearly differentiate between technical skills and knowledge from the proper culture is also due to the sophists. The famous sophist Protagoras placed the education of man at the centre of the whole life. The stress put on ethical and political elements should be emphasized here since it was important to link all the higher forms of culture with the idea of the state and the society in the classical period of the Greek history.117 Thus, sophistry formulated an ideal of culture called “humanism” based on the previous development of the Greek thought. As Jaeger notes, “our ideal of “universal” culture originated in the civilisation of Greece and Rome. In that sense, then, humanism is essentially a creation of the Greeks.’118 The most significant creation of the sophists is the fully conscious concept of culture per se. It resulted from the Greeks striving for – through poetry and philosophy – the formation of an authoritative ideal model of man.119 It made them realize the deeper meaning of the idea of education. The creation of an abstract concept of culture took place when the subject of the conscious educative work (paideuein) ceased to be solely a child (pais) but it started to be – primarily – an adolescent man, from the moment when people became aware of the fact that there was no definite age limit that, when reached, would stop the inner 1 13 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 290. 114 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 291. 115 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 291. 116 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1139 a. 117 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 301. 118 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 301. 119 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 302.

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development of an individual. It was the moment when the paidéia of an adult came to existence.120 Therefore, the paidéia proposed by the sophists differed in this aspect from the Greek education model that ended when a lad reached the age of majority. It included everything that positively shaped a human being – a citizen (polites)  – for a specific purpose, closely associated with a political activity.121 The sophists put great emphasis on the shaping of man, which underlined any rational organization of life. They attempted to synthetize two opposing models of education: the tradition of the noble nurture (based on the belief in the nobility of blood) and political and democratic concept of bringing up (based on a rationalistic point of view).122 The value of man was no longer constituted by blood inherited from gods since then, but by the human nature subjected to nurture. The sophists stressed the importance of the question: what is the relationship between the “nature” of man and the possibility of exerting a purposeful impact on it through education? The new concept of man, proposed by them, who was not shaped by nature (physis) or origin in a definite and positive way but by education, was crucial in that context.123 They maintained that nature (physis) constituted the basis on which any education had to be based. Education, however, took place through teaching (didaskalía), learning (máthesis) and by exercise (áskesis), due to which what had been learnt became the second nature. Basing on the medical perception of human nature, they worked out a concept according to which nature constituted the whole composed of a body and soul but a special focus was given to the spiritual organization of man. Protagoras noticed that every individual was subjected to a pedagogical influence from an early age. At school, in turn, a pupil learns by heart the works of good poets and music, which accompanies him when he is reciting the poems of lyrical poets, and gymnastics. When a young man graduates from school and enters the stage of practical life, the proper civic education began. The differences between the old noble paidéia and a new civic education are clearly seen at this point. The entire noble education, starting with Homer, is dominated by the concept of a model. There were two aspects of paidéa: substantial and formal. In the substantial aspect, the sophists taught what showed man his place in a social group, in polis,

1 20 Jaeger, Paideia, p. 302. 121 See Gajda-Krynicka, “Sofiści,” p. 85. 122 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 299. 123 See Gajda-Krynicka, “Sofiści,” p. 85.

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and, in addition, enabled him to act in a good, fair and beneficial way for polis, and thus for himself: what is the state, law, what are ethical and moral standards, what is their origin, what is the nature of man? In the formal aspect, they taught how to acquire and use knowledge to accomplish a goal being, which, by definition, is the welfare of the polis and one’s own prosperity.124 The following question should be asked: how did the sophists justify the possibility or even the necessity of education? First, by pointing to the necessary assumptions of the state and society (it was about, among other things, the civic education); second, they derived it from political and moral common sense. Protagoras proved that every man was trying to provide his children with possibly the most thorough education and that, in fact, everyone who did not even think about it, provided some education; third, they considered the problem in the context of the relationship between nature and art in general, in particular, the educative art. They pointed to its indispensable role in completing the existing nature. As they emphasized, on the one hand, it was necessary to know the human nature, on the other hand, however, it was important to have the knowledge on the proper methods of “cultivating” it. Moreover, they underlined that “the essential thing is to begin work at the right moment, the most educative moment, which in the human species is childhood, when nature is still pliable, and whatever is learnt is absorbed, easily but permanently, by the soul.’125 The essence of education perceived in this way was explained on the basis of land cultivation as a typical example of perfecting nature due to skilful human practices. Excellent yields can be expected only where the right conditions are met! Even the deficits of the poor nature can be removed at least partially when the suitable cultivation is applied in the form of education and exercise (and therefore the broadly understood culture). On the other hand, even the most beautifully equipped nature will fail if it lacks such cultivation. Aristotle pointed out that art compensated for the deficits of nature. Over time, the comparison of man with agri cultura entered the permanent set of notions of the Western peoples, creating the basis for a hyperbolic use of that word in the form of cultura animi and for imagining that the indicated education constituted a certain “spirit cultivation.” The etymology of the word “culture” itself points to its close relationship with education.

1 24 Gajda-Krynicka, “Sofiści,” p. 85. 125 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 313.

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Therefore, it was to the sophists, especially Protagoras, that we owe the association of pedagogy with the philosophy of culture. The idea of man formation is the highest stage of culture – namely, the so-called high culture.

1.4. KALOKAGATHÍA AS THE CROWNING OF ALL VIRTUES The sophists reinforced the concept of education to culture, which started to be a conscious orientation of a human being towards the defined – universal ideal of man rather than merely a preparation for the profession or forming one social layer within a single nation. The main motif of culture was the perfection of man. The indicated perfection was defined by the Greek term kalokagathía (beautygood, nobility, perfection).126 This term is a combination of two words – “beauty” and “good” – kalos kai agathos, the Greeks, however, treated them as one word. This ideal is one of the most specific features of the Greek culture, actually starting with Homer. It was in his works that beauty and good were connected for the first time.127 Later, they could be found in Solon128 and Thucydides.129 However, the complete theory could be observed in Plato and Aristotle. Therefore, the fact regarding the presence of kalokagathía at the dawn of the Greek culture is extremely important as it proves the extraordinary vitality of the word, which the subsequent philosophers tried to explain.130 The Greek term kalokagathía embodied in itself the earlier aristocratic ideal of a gentleman.131 Moreover, in the new political order kalokagathía increasingly defined the old ideal of areté, covering the entire man and all his powers. It was an obliging ideal that fostered imitation.132 It derived from the world of noble 126 The Greek culture therefore pioneered the basic pedagogical postulate, defining the two basic aspects of education, alongside the moral and aesthetic aspects of education: physical education, which covered the name gymnastika, and mental education, which was generally termed musike (Plato). The synthesis of these two elements was to be the classic balance of the body and soul, all physical and mental abilities – this kalokagathia (kalos kai agathos – beautiful and good). The concept of kalokagathía has evolved over the centuries to develop from the concept of a specific beauty of the body (kaloi – beauty) of those who were agathoi or of noble birth, to abstract moral beauty, abstract ethical qualities […]” (B. Bilinski, “Antyczni krytycy,” Meande 11 (1956) no. 9, p. 292). 127 Homer, Iliad, XXI V, 52. 128 Solon, Elegies, passages 39–40. 129 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, VIII, 4K, 6. 130 See P. Jaroszyński, “Kalokagathia,” Człowiek w Kulturze 2 (1994), pp. 31–42. 131 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 276. 132 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 37.

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terms but gradually gained a broader meaning. Finally, it started to be used for defining an ideal of every citizen seeking to attain a higher culture and, finally, the indicated term became a synonym of the “civic virtue.’133 The combination of both beauty and good in one ideal was possible due to a specific, not unambiguous but analogous understanding of both terms. Beauty was better defined by Plato in his Feast where he stated that it was something deserved not only by art but by science and beautiful laws and beautiful behaviour and beautiful bodies and finally the idea itself. Those were the things that the Greeks referred to as beautiful. However, the sense of good was explained by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics:  “Every skill and every inquiry, and similarly every action and rational choice, is thought to aim at some good; and so the good has been aptly described as that at which everything aims.’134 Thus, Aristotle claims that it was not connected with morality only since it was the aim of action and production as well as cognition. It was the goal pursued and strived for in various ways. It was not without reason that the Ancients were not satisfied with a mere definition of the “moral good” but they spoke of the “moral beauty.” They were not satisfied with the notion “good” itself since they could find good in other orders as well; the “moral good” was not enough either because there were such moral goods that did not deserve to be called beautiful.135 One should therefore consider various types of moral goods to indicate in them the morally beautiful aspect. These issues were discussed by Aristotle in Book II of Nicomachean Ethics: “ There are three objects of choice – the noble, the useful, and the pleasant – and three of avoidance – their contraries, the shameful, the harmful, and the painful. In respect of all of these, especially pleasure, the good person tends to go right, and the bad person to go wrong.’136 Man can therefore strive for something either because it is morally beautiful, which in the Latin tradition was defined as the

133 As Jaeger observes: “The early city-state was, in the eyes of its citizens, the guarantee of all the ideals which made life worth living. Politeusthai means “to take part in communal life”; but besides that it simply means to live” – for the two meanings were one and the same At no time was the state more closely identified with all human values. […] Aristotle […] is in fact identifying humanitas, “being human,” with the life in a state. His definition can be understood only by studying the structure of the early polis: for its citizens held their communal existence to be the sum of all the higher things of life in fact to be something divine.” (Jaeger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 113). 134 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094 a. 135 Jaroszyński, “Kalokagathia,” p. 33. 136 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1104 b.

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decent good – bonum honestum, or because it is useful – bonum utile, or because it is pleasant – bonum delectabile. The difference between them relies on the fact that we desire the last one due to the pleasure it gives us and the second one due to the fact that it serves something different and the first one is the aim in itself, we want it for its own sake. Morality is not limited only to the decent good but it refers to each of the goods. The aim of the virtuous man is a proper selection of a particular good, bearing in mind the existing hierarchy. Therefore, he should treat the decent good as an end in itself, as a pleasant good, which is not a real aim of morality, it must be measured by the real relationship with the good per se, however, the useful good cannot only become the goal but it must be decent itself, as a means leading to the good (the end cannot justify the means used to reach it).137 The above explanations point to the fact that only the good-aim is morally beautiful in the proper sense. The remaining goods however, are moral goods but they are not morally beautiful. The indicated considerations concerned the objective aspect, namely, the aspect to which our actions referred. When we approach the action from the perspective of the subject itself, it turns out that the activity related to any of the goods will be morally beautiful provided that it is proper138. Therefore, Aristotle wrote that acting in compliance with the requirements of virtue was morally beautiful.139 It is the way in which the twofold nature of the moral beauty – objective and subjective – is revealed. What connects them is the direct or indirect (in the case of a pleasant or useful good) subordination to bonum honestum – the decent good. This good is man himself. He is both the subject and the object of morality. Apart from the hierarchy existing in the context of various goods, there is also a hierarchy between particular “parts” of which man is composed. They include the material “parts,” i.e. hands, legs, the internal organs, the psychological and emotional sphere and spiritual powers to which the intellect and will belong. The latter ones are immaterial and subjectified in something immaterial that in the Greek and Latin tradition was called the soul. The spiritual life distinguishes man from other earthly beings. He transcends the world of nature due to it, living a personal life, in a spiritual way. Thus, the inner hierarchy of various “parts” of man finds its justification in the human spirit. Man exists to activate that spirit whereas the remaining parts and their actions must be subordinated to that spirit. In the light of the above

1 37 See Jaroszyński, “Kalokagathia,” p. 34. 138 See Jaroszyński, “Kalokagathia,” p. 35. 139 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1099 a 22.

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considerations we can conclude that finally our action is morally beautiful only when the inner hierarchy is respected with reference to both the acting subject and other human subjects. Only then is our action really oriented towards the good-aim.140 Therefore, the action we purse because of the goal in and of itself – is just the noble good, also called beauty. Aristotle defined it in the following words in the Rhetoric: “The beautiful is what merits recognition due to the fact that it is worthy of choosing as such.’141 The moral virtues of man targeted at the aim itself and at the decent good, were accentuated in the ideal of kalokagathía. That is why the term kalos related to the highest category in the moral order, to the good in itself which was the decent good, in contrast to the pleasant and useful good, which were goods due to the good in and of itself.142 The ideal of kalokagathía referred both to women and younger people, as well as the older ones. The ideal model was not only a beautiful woman in terms of looks but also the one who had the noble soul. It was emphasized that older people should remember to respect the high moral standards until the end of their lives, which was regulated by law. Kalokagathía was of great importance in public life – it was to characterize the ruler and be the opposite of laziness.143 What characterized the Greeks was therefore the combination of good and beauty with moral order, with human conduct in the broad sense of the word. We are dealing here with the primacy of the moral order over the sensual and aesthetic one and with the primacy of the spiritual order over the physical one.144 The word kalokagathía was used by Xenophon for the first time to describe the ideal guiding the activity of his master Socrates.145 The indicated ideal was mostly moral in character. As Xenophon wrote, Socrates claimed that only good and beautiful road led to true happiness.146 What makes man better and better is the moral improvement, in particular, the acquisition of the virtue of justice (dikaiosyné) and not the practical skills. The noble disposition was manifested by the religious cult.147 Xenophon himself was regarded as a representative of the

1 40 See Jaroszyński, Kalokagathia, p. 36. 141 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1366 a 33. 142 Jaroszyński, “Kalokagathía,” p. 445. 143 Jaroszyński, “Kalokagathía,” p. 445. 144 Jaroszyński, “Kalokagathía,” p. 447. 145 See Xenophon, Socrates, 1, 3, 11. See also Jaroszyński, “Kalokagathía,” p.  445. Xenophon remained in the circle of Socrates for nearly 8 years (409–401 BC). See: K. Głombiowski, Ksenofont. Żołnierz i pisarz, Wrocław–Warsaw–Cracow 1993, p. 25. 146 Xenophon, Socrates, 1, 6, 14. 147 Xenophon, Socrates, 3, 4, 49.

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aristocratic virtue placed by the Greeks at the highest level. His person reflected the combination of the physical beauty with the internal desire to reach what was beautiful.148 An ancient biographer  – Diogenes Laërtius called Xenophon “modest and extraordinarily handsome (kalos).’149 In Diogenes’ account, Xenophon was beautiful (kalos) by nature but he was to become good (agathos) only under the influence of the teaching of Socrates. Socrates was Xenophon’s teacher of good manners and his model of moral conduct. Thus such features as:  self-control, moderation, simplicity, inner harmony and fervent piety were attributed to Xenophon.150 However, his ideal was “a Doric hero with a beautiful, hardened, athletic body, able to cope with various situations, always full of good ideas, able to use the right word, humane in behaviour, faithful to friends, pious and brave.’151 He was the character resembling the characters from the works of Homer. Kalokagathía denoted general culture, based on the ability to relate to all people and gods in a proper way. It was mainly associated with the moral beauty and belonged to the virtues of a free man.152 As we can therefore see, apart from the moral  – personal dimension, the ideal of kalokagathía had also a social dimension. It referred to proper relations with other people, developed on the basis of a morally correct character. A society, contrary to a community, similarly to any individual person, should be internally ordered and organized. Only then does it deserve to be called a society. The indicated order is based not only on a certain type of unity but also on a hierarchy of goods. Therefore, there must be some chief good, called a common good that unites a given society. This is the social dimension of moral beauty.

1.4.1.  Plato – the philosopher as a model Plato gave a wider – cultural meaning to the term kalokagathía. The aforementioned word appears in his works in a decumulate form: kalos kai agathos. It is associated with an educational ideal promoted from an early age and primarily 148 Xenophon sympathized with the ideals of the Doric aristocracy. In his opinion a prerequisite to achieve virtue (areté) was practising sport (the only effort worthy of an aristocrat) combined with a noble origin. See Głombiowski, Ksenofont. Żołnierz i pisarz, p. 7. 149 Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, trans. P. Mensch, Oxford 2018, Book II: 48, p. 87. 150 Głombiowski, Ksenofont. Żołnierz i pisarz, p. 10. 151 Głombiowski, Ksenofont. Żołnierz i pisarz, p. 7. 152 Xenophon, Socrates, 2, 4.

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refers to morality. In Plato’s thought, Kalokagathía is the aim of paidéa. The character of the aforesaid kalokagathía is defined by Plato in opposition to injustice and wickedness and thus, it he provides it with a remarkably ethical colouring.153 In a narrower sense, it denotes an innate, natural openness to the truth that must be obeyed if one wants to become a philosopher, a beautiful, good man. In addition, it indicates an intuitive ability to recognize what is morally good and lawful and what is not, with no need to establish the law and improve the rights all the time. Moreover, it relates to the aristocratic layer. Beauty and good are also the features of thought which moves up to the Good in and of itself.154 Plato expressed the original sense of the “general” old Greek culture of the polis in the Laws. As he claimed, the essence of any true culture was to “training from childhood in goodness, which makes a man eagerly desirous of becoming a perfect citizen, understanding how both to rule and be ruled righteously.’155 Thus, culture is something general since the ability to be attuned to politics is the ability to understand general matters. The indicated ability is to a great extent possessed by a philosopher, referred to in the State by Plato as kalos kai agathos.156 It is the philosopher who has access to true cognition and true knowledge since he can notice the permanent in the reality, the universal and the immutable, namely its “idea.” He is the only one who can determine what is in fact truly fair and beautiful whereas the views of the general public revolve between a non-being and a true being.157 That is why Plato claimed that satisfying the tastes of the masses made the true education of man, based on the criterion of permanent values, impossible.158 He wrote that a philosopher was a man who carried a reliable paradeigma, namely an idea of good, in his own soul.159 Due to the ability to perceive the indicated norm, the philosopher outweighs an ordinary politician. He subordinates all his activities to the cognition of good as the highest goal of man. For Plato, it was an ideal of a perfect ruler.160 Additionally, the philosopher was

1 53 Plato, Gorgias, 470 e 9. 154 See Plato, Republic, 401 d – 402 a, 489 e, 425 d, 469 a, 505 b, 531 c – 532 b. 155 Plato, Laws, 643 e. 156 Plato, Republic, 489 e. 157 Plato, Laws, 479 d. 158 Plato, Laws, 493 a 7 and c 8. 159 Plato, Laws, 484 c, 540 a. 160 In the opinion of Plato, ruling is not based on personal, innate charisma but on the convincing force of truth to which everyone will surrender voluntarily in such a state because they will be brought up in its spirit. See Jaeger, Paideia, vol. II p. 87.

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also a man of high culture for Plato. The features characterizing him are: excellent memory, cleverness, quickness of mind, desire for knowledge and perseverance. He is not small-minded and he does not focus on details or external goods. He values the truth, justice, valour. He controls himself. The aforementioned features are crucial to achieve a higher intellectual culture. Education and a long experience play a vital role in the development of such a person.161 Among other things, the indicated factors provide a balance between the intellectual and moral side. It is important due to the fact that, according to Plato, the process of cognition must be accompanied by the development of character. An ideal form of a society which is indispensable for the complete development of an individual’s abilities called upon by nature to philosophy is an ideal state of Plato.162 It allows a philosopher to pass from contemplation to action. At first, he shapes his own character (heauton plattein) to be able to develop the characters (ethe) of others.163 The Platonic philosopher is an embodiment of kalokagathía – the highest ideal of humanity, typical for a classical era of the Greek culture. Plato transforms here the existing epic – a heroic ideal model of man into a new philosophical ideal. However, frequent references to the principles of the old chivalric ethics are very clear, as for example the requirement to be persistent (menein) in both learning and in fight. The aforementioned principles were transferred by Plato into the realm of the spirit. The similarity found here lies in the fact that just like the Greek education stemmed from the layer of ancestral nobility, Plato’s entire process of education aimed at the formation of a new aristocracy of the spirit. Through the conscious exploitation of education to implement a particular ideal model of man, the Platonic philosophy of education fell within the trend of humanism, characteristic to the entire Greek culture. Its purpose is the full development of man in man. Everything present in a human being is subordinated by it to his rational component, leading to a completely different notion of life – as bíos164 and a true human perfection. The Greek state thought 161 Plato, Republic, 487 a 7, 484 d. Experience is placed by Plato on par with the intellectual culture provided by philosophy. 162 Plato, Republic, 497 b–c. 163 Plato, Republic, 500 d. As Werner Jaeger points out, this place is extremely important because the first time in the history of education there appears the notion of shaping oneself ” and moreover, the ideal and the reality of philosophical paidéa in Plato’s perspective, are explained here. See Jaeger, Paideia, vol. II, p. 83. 164 The word bíos perceives life as an expression of a particular etkos – a spiritual attitude. It denotes one individual life, the end of which is death, and the livelihood that is the way in which the life of an individual differs from the lives of other people. It considers man as a whole. To describe what we call “life,” besides the word ‘bios,” the

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shaped the western concept of a free personality as well, that was not based on the human law but on the cognition of the eternal norm, which was the purpose of the entire Platonic philosophy of education.

1.4.2.  Aristotle – towards the moral beauty In the writings of Aristotle kalokagathía completes all virtues. It is reached when detailed virtues are achieved. It refers to decent good that is the goal in itself.165 Stagirite uses the following words to define man with the most perfect of virtues, namely the noble man: “A person is a noble person because of possessing those goods that are noble for their own sake, and because of doing noble deeds for their own sake. What things, then, are noble? The virtues and the works of virtue.’166 He mentions justice and moderation among the indicated virtues. Therefore, nobility is the complete perfection.167 It is the feature of young people who have the character and display thinking typical of free people.168 Kalos denotes the behaviour which complies with virtues, the highest happiness, everything that is to be done in line with one’s will.169 In Politics, Aristotle associates the term kalokagathía with people who belong to noble families.170 Additionally, he points out that it guarantees the good life in the state: “The end of the city-state is living well, then, but these other things are for the sake of the end. So political communities must be taken to exist for the sake of noble actions, and not for the sake of living together.’171 Thus, the realization of beauty is the accomplishment of the morally beautiful deeds that, on the one hand, allow to shape people who are friendly to one another, on the other hand, however, make it possible to activate the purely human acts in man.

Greeks used the terms: aion (life as a continuation and the entire period of life) and zoe (the natural process of life, the fact that one is alive). See Jaeger, Paideia, p. 937. 165 The goods which Aristotle places lower in the hierarchy of goods, i.e. good and pleasant goods, are not such goods. 166 Aristotle, The Eudemian Ethics, trans. A. Kenny, Oxford 2011, 1248 b, p. 40. Henceforth as Eudemian Ethics with the pagination of the Greek original. 167 Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1249 a. 168 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1134 a, 1179 b. 169 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1120 a 11–24, 1099 a 24, 27, 1120 a 9–1121 a 4. 170 See Aristotle, Politics, trans. C.D.C. Reeve, Cambridge 1998, 1270 b, p. 81. All further citations are given with the pagination of the Greek original. 171 Aristotle, Politics, 1281 a.

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1.5. MEGALOPSYCHÍA (MAGNANIMITY) – THE CROWNING CULTURE The possession of ethical excellence (kalokagathía) is a prerequisite for the sense of self-worth and a justified pride, called by Aristotle magnanimity172 (Gr. megalopsychía, Lat. magnanimitas). Magnanimity was known long before the appearance of Aristotle’s ethics. In Homer’s poetry, magnanimity appears as a feature of heroes (Achilles, Odysseus and others) in the form of the aristocratic pride. Homer does not know the word “magnanimity.” He speaks not of the “great spirit” but of the “great heart” (megas thymos) of his protagonists.173 The aim (duty) of knights of noble birth is to apply for the laurel of primacy. In consequence, they gain reverence and fame. The constant striving for the highest bravery and consequently for great fame is boosted by the very sense of pride. In addition, it guarantees integrity and moral perfection of a well-born man who could not deserve the highest honour if he behaved inappropriately in any sphere of life.174 Plato used the word megalopsychía to define “arrogance” (“ambition’) – Greek aphrosyne.175 For Aristotle, the term areté has a strictly moral connotation – it denotes every individual virtue, not only bravery. Despite the fact that there was a crisis of the 172 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1123 a – 1125 a. Sebastian Petrycy z Pilzna, Spaniałość. See also A. Krokiewicz, “O wielkodusznym człowieku Arystotelesa,” Meander 5 (1950), no. 1, p. 39–48. 173 The term “great heart” was used by Homer with reference to a volitional-emotional power directly connected with the body and manifesting itself in such its improvement that people endowed with it had far greater physical and active functions than those who were not endued with it so much. A hero with a great heart has enormous resources of this power that makes him capable of physical efforts several times higher than the normal human power. This power is revealed with all its strength in the immediate battle on the battlefield. The hero becomes “equal to the daimon” (deity) thanks to the “great heart” and its typical capability of creative zeal. Cf. e.g. The Illiad, V 438, 459, XVI 705, XXI 227. See also A. Krokiewicz, Moralność Homera i etyka Hezjoda, Warsaw 2000, pp. 107–124. 174 See Heza, “Kryzys arystokratycznego pojęcia arete. Z badań nad historią myśli greckiej.” Therefore, it is not an anachronism that the characteristics of the hero of the Homeric epic are reflected in Aristotle’s ethics, especially in his conception of magnanimity. 175 See G.  Downey, “The Pagan Virtue of Megalopsychia in Byzantine Syria,” in: Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, 76 (1945), pp. 279–286.

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heroic bravery in his times, thinking about the heritage of ancestors and their areté becomes a model of not only an aristocratic but also a democratic education. For Aristotle then, magnanimity denotes a sort of greatness and strength of the spirit. The justifiably proud man is the one who, while considering himself worthy of great things, actually deserves them (he thinks that he deserves what he is actually worthy of). The justified pride is a belief that one is able to do great things and it is the feature of the man who trusts his own power.176 Knowing oneself is a prerequisite of magnanimity. It constitutes the basis of the good self-esteem. As Aristotle writes: “[…] Vain people, however, are foolish, and ignorant of themselves quite obviously so.’177 In order to develop, one must therefore face the truth about oneself. Humility, which is a condition for the acceptance of truth, is very helpful at this point. It prevents us from striving for what is beyond our capacities. We must be aware of our own powers with regard to what is beyond their grasp. Therefore, magnanimity refers to great things. A magnanimous man has the ability to correctly evaluate great and small goods. The following questions arise here: what are the great things which make the soul great (magna anima)? What is the subject of magnanimity? Aristotle explains that great goods are the ones which are aimed at by a person who has the best disposition for it, namely, the virtue of magnanimity.178 It is necessary to recall the hierarchy of goods by Aristotle to understand what the great goods are.179 The goods mentioned by him include what is morally beautiful (bonum honestum), then what is useful (bonum utile) and subsequently what is pleasant (bonum delectabile). The decent good is ranked the highest in this hierarchy since it is most suited to the specific functions of man (it draws him closer to the ultimate goal). This specific human function is rational acting, whereas the specific function of a brave man is the same type of action performed in a particularly good manner.180 Thus, the subject of magnanimity is the decent good because it is the only good that can improve the soul (move closer to happiness). It is desired for its own sake, it is not easy but it is very honourable. Virtue constitutes such good because it is a perfection of a particular power,

1 76 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1389 a. 177 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1125 a 34. 178 Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1232 a. 179 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1104 b 30 ff. 180 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1098 a 12 ff.

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which realizes itself (improves) not through any action but through the great or difficult act.181 Striving for great goods is difficult, that is why the virtue of magnanimity is also helpful in overcoming the difficulties. Although Aristotle distinguished many virtues and grouped them according to the division of powers of the spirit, which they improve, he realized that moral conduct was marked by unity. All virtues are linked by the fact that the essence of each of them is constituted by the internal measure, the maintenance of which depends on a particular virtue of prudence. The indicated unity is also guaranteed by the attitude of the subject of virtues (man), a certain desire to act in line with this internal measure in every situation, which is beautiful according to Aristotle but rare at the same time and above all difficult. The greatest of all virtues is magnanimity. It is on top in two meanings: firstly, it consists of a set of human virtues, called kalokagathía, secondly, the awareness of man, who possesses it, of their value due to which the indicated virtues are brought to full bloom. Moreover, the consciousness makes the magnanimous man want only the great things and despise the small ones. Speaking of magnanimity, Aristotle has in mind the desire to possess the greatest external good, and this is what we give to the gods, what people holding the highest positions aim at and what constitutes a reward for the noblest deeds. This is reverence (timé). That is why the justified pride is associated with reverence,182 which is one of the most significant features of a magnanimous man. The benevolent man honours the virtue above all, and being aware of possessing it, he expects honour for his virtue and for himself from others. The reverence is the greatest external good.183 It is a kind of worship usually conducted by people 1 81 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103 a 31–35. 182 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1123 b. 183 Aristotle makes a distinction between external goods which are outside the human being and are not an integral part of man (e.g. wealth), and the internal goods, placed higher in the hierarchy, which are a real component of a human being (e.g., body health, skills, virtues). The scale of external goods corresponds to the scale of internal goods. The higher internal good gives entitlement to the higher external goods while the lower ones entitle to the higher ones. Reverence is placed at the top of the first scale whereas the virtue called magnanimity is at the top of the second scale. Reverence is therefore an external counterpart but also a kind of a virtue test: if someone honours somebody, he confirms his virtue, but if one refuses to give somebody reverence, his virtue is denied. Looking from the perspective of an honoured person, he has that virtue. If he does not experience reverence, he does not have such virtue. The characters of Homer’s epics claimed that “[…] the reverence belongs to the virtue as the light belongs to the sun” (Krokiewicz, Moralność Homera i etyka Hezjoda, p. 91).

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with reference to gods only. It is inseparably associated with “great deeds.” It is the greatest award for virtue. Proper attitude towards reverence and infamy is also a secondary object of magnanimity. Moreover, Aristotle emphasizes that the justifiably proud man is at the same time the bravest man in ethical terms. The more virtues we have the greater things we are worthy of. The man with the greatest number of virtues is worthy of the greatest things. The reverence is therefore a reward for ethical valour and is awarded only to those who are ethically brave. Thus, it is impossible to be justifiably proud without ethical excellence (kalokagathía).184 A justifiably proud man enjoys the privileges coming from noble men, however, he ignores the privileges coming from insignificant people and resulting from unimportant deeds.185 In addition, he disdains the symptoms of infamy because they are not just with reference to him.186 The man with a well-founded pride can be therefore recognized by, among other things, his attitude to privileges, wealth and power,187 success and failure in general. Such man will be primarily characterized by virtue of moderation. Thus, Aristotle strongly stresses the significance of ethical valour. He points out that people, who have external goods without ethical valour, easily become proud and impudent and additionally, they are wrongly convinced of their superiority.188 The man who is justifiably proud faces dangers when it comes to important things. He is also willing to make benefactions, he helps willingly and acts openly, tells the truth, he is not vindictive, he does not gossip, he does not complain and ask for things of small significance or the ones which are immutable.

1 84 Aristotle, Nicomaechan Ethics, 1124 a. 185 “But disdain seems particularly characteristic of the proud [magnanimous] man because he cares about few things only, and those, great [noble] ones, and he does not care what anybody else thinks. (Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1232 b). 186 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1124 a. 187 Power and wealth are desirable for the sake of honour that they awake and not in and of themselves. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1124 a. In Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle writes: “Of the things about which humans seem most to care, honour and life and riches, he appears to value none except honour. It would indeed grieve him to be dishonoured, and to be ruled by someone unworthy, and obtaining honour is his greatest joy.” (1232 b). 188 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1124 a.

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He is inclined to have rather beautiful things and not the ones that yield benefit or profit.189 The virtue associated with justified pride is ambition. As Aristotle writes, it does not have a Greek synonym (name). It is translated as a restraint with regard to the greed for reverence.190 When it comes to the consequences for the entire moral life, resulting from the reverence understood in this way, it must be stressed that it presupposes moral perfection (virtuous conduct in every sphere of life), since – in accordance with the definition of a magnanimous man – the one who does not follow virtue in a particular area (behaves badly) cannot be worthy of the highest reverence.191 This perfection is not to be understood in the current sense, as having an act of all virtues, but as an improvement to given acts (dispositions for them).192 Such striving for greatness in behaviour provides not only the unity of all virtues (is a prerequisite of this unity) but also, in consequence, the unity of a human character. Continuous striving for greatness becomes a permanent feature of character and adds a feature of perfection to each action. Therefore, the reverence is such a general feature which is a prerequisite for a full moral life, due to striving for what is great and the second feature, next to prudence, that unites all virtues as if from the interior, by maintaining a proper measure of reason in every act. A similar thought guided Marcin from Brakara (the sixth century), who replaced valour with magnanimity among the cardinal virtues in his treaty entitled Formula vitae honestae.193 The disadvantages corresponding to magnanimity are: presumption (vanity – chaunotes)  – when one considers himself worthy of great things, not being worthy of them, not having real achievements, and exaggerated humility (pusillanimity  – mikropsychia)  – when someone does not demand the reverence at all or regards himself as worthy of smaller things than what he deserves; and

189 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1125 a.  In turn, in Eudemian Ethics Aristotle writes: “Pride [magnanimity], then, is the best condition of character in relation to the choice and exercise of honour and other honourable goods, and it is these rather than utilities that we assign as the sphere of the proud [magnanimous] man” (1233 a). 190 Aristotle writes: “we can desire honour more or less than is right, and from the right source, and in the right way” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1125 b). 191 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1123 b 29 ff. 192 It is complemented by St. Thomas Aquinas in: Summa Theologiae, cura et studio P. Caramello, vol. 3, Taurini 1952, II–II, q. 129, a. 3, 2. 193 See J. Woroniecki, Katolicka etyka wychowawcza, vol. 1, Lublin 1986, p. 448.

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therefore he does not regard himself as worthy of something great, even though he has the features due to which he can be duly considered to be worthy of them; he is too shy.194 Pusillanimity is thus associated with cowardice and a lack of trust to one another, whereas vanity is associated with presumptuousness. For Aristotle, magnanimity was a typical virtue from the group of valour, characterized by striving for good associated with difficulties. It stems from the tradition dating back to the times of Homer, in which the feeling of the aristocratic pride forced one to undertake the greatest efforts in order to achieve fame, and the fame was for the Greeks some sort of immortality in a human dimension, it was the greatest thing. Magnanimity was a model of moral perfection; however, it was not accessible to everyone; it could be achieved only by few – nobly born individuals.195 It was the consequence of the ethical system by Aristotle for whom the aim (happiness) of man was to act in compliance with nature  – to act rationally. Living according to the precepts of reason guarantees the implementation of human potentialities and a self-improvement by a proper good. Therefore, someone deprived of intellectual development in any way would also be deprived of virtue, and even more, of absolute happiness.196 The indicated problem could be solved only with the advent of Christianity. The proper perspective for the indicated issues was introduced by the concept of the personal God, the creation ex nihilo, providing the basis for the understanding of a human being as a person.197

1 94 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1123 b. See also Eudemian Ethics, 1233 a. 195 “Nobility is nobleness. The one who has not been born as a noble man will never become noble” (T. Zielinski, “Rozwój moralności w świecie starożytnym od Homera do czasów Chrystusa,” lecture delivered at the public meeting of the Polish Academy of Skills on June 11, 1927; Cracow 1927, p. 4). 196 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1176 b – 1178 a. 197 It is in the philosophy of St. Thomas that magnanimity is understood as the virtue available to every human being. Reverence is due to a rational nature in which all people participate equally. Magnanimity is, however, inseparable from humility. Only when taken together, these virtues direct the proper pursuit of greatness, constantly bearing in mind the constant reflection on the contingency of man. Reverence and fame, which for the ancients was the principal motive for the pursuit of greatness, in Christianity gained a new dimension, just as the new dimension was gained by the greatness at which one should aim: “Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.” (Mt 5:48).

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2. From paidéa to humanitas – the way of the Romans 2.1. CULTURE AS ANIMI CULTURA – TOWARDS HUMANITAS Although both Plato and his disciple Aristotle strongly stressed the association between the term paidéia and politeia, their followers departed from that type of thinking. They did not subordinate education to the interests of the state any more, but above all emphasized the comprehensive education and the improvement of an individual according to a specified pattern. Paidéia gained the status of a specific way of human existence, facilitating the development of the entire spiritual and intellectual potential of man, leading to full humanity. This very concept of paidéa was absorbed by the culture of ancient Rome:  “The idea of paidéa understood in this way was developed in the works of the disciples of Aristotle and the stoics, spreading throughout the whole Greek world of that time and recovering through the ideas of Cicero and the Roman humanitas.’198 The meeting of the Greek paidéa with the Roman ideal of education took place at the end of the fourth century BC, when Athens lost the political power. As a result, the Athenians scattered all over the then world, spreading the Hellenistic culture and contributing to the emergence of new centres of philosophical thought. What the ancient Greeks called paidéia, understood as a universal “cultivation,” a rational human education in the individual and social aspect, found its continuation in the ancient Rome under the name “culture.’199 Cicero was the first to describe philosophy as the soul cultivation: cultura animi philosophia est.200 From Cicero, therefore, the term animi cultura started to be

1 98 W. Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku),” p. 179. 199 The etymology of the word “culture” goes back to classical antiquity. It comes from the Latin word colere, which literally means cultivating (the land), cherish, perfect. Therefore, in ancient Rome this word meant land cultivation. A speaker and a Roman writer, Cicero, noted that just as the earth needs cultivation to yield, so does the human soul need proper conditions for its development. Consequently, on the one hand, the importance of human effort, the work to be put into the process of development, the improvement were underlined and on the other hand, culture in this sense denoted the culture of something: the spirit, the mind, the worship of gods or ancestors. 200 “Philosophy is certainly the medicine of the soul, whose assistance we do not seek from abroad, as in bodily disorders, but we ourselves are bound to exert our utmost energy and power in order to effect our cure” (Cicero, The Tusculan Disputations, in: Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations: Also Treatises on the Nature of the God’s, and the Commonwealth, New York 1877, p. 93).

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used, understood as the “culture of the spirit” – refining the human mind, basically through philosophy.201 The theory developed by Cicero in his Tusculan Disputations had its origins in the thought of Panaetius of Rhodes – a stoic philosopher who lived in the second century BC. He impacted the circle of the philhellene aristocrats centred around Scipio Africanus the Younger (the so-called Scipionic Circle). The group played a major role in the adaptation and assimilation of the Greek culture. Its activity was an important stage in the development of the Roman idea of humanitas.202 In the works of Panaetius himself, the terms and ideas taken from the earlier period of the Greek thought, such as anthropinos (human), received additional meaning as elements of paidéa. Moreover, Panaetius often replaced the word paidéia by a new word: anthropismos (humanity). In this sense, the word was also used by his disciple, Poseidon, who, in turn, was to become a teacher of Cicero. Cicero was called one of the most brilliant successors of the Scipionic Circle.203 He personally knew the last members of that congregation and he felt obliged to familiarize the Roman society with the ideal of humanitas. Thus, due to Cicero, the Greek paidéia, through anthropismos of Panaetius and Poseidon, became humanitas (from Latin homo – man, humanus – human).204 From the semantic point of view, the term is difficult to define, at least due to the fact that it was perceived differently over the centuries.205 In Latin, the

2 01 See Krąpiec, Kultura, p. 132. 202 Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku),” pp. 171–172. See also: O. E. Nybakken, Humanitas Romana, “Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association” 70 (1939), p. 410; R. M. Brown, “A Study of the Scipionic Circle,” Iowa Studies in Classical Philology 1 (1934); J. E. G. Zetzel, Cicero and the Scipionic Circle, “Harvard Studies in Classical Philology” 76 (1972), pp. 173–179. To find more information on Panaitios see: I. Heinemann, Humanitas, in: Paulys RealEncyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Neue Bearbeitung, krsg. W. Kroll, Supplementband V, 5, Stuttgart 1931, c. 293–294. 203 See W. Warde Fowler, The Religious Experience of the Roman People, New York 1911, p. 371; E. G. Sihler, Cicero of Arpinum, New Haven 1914. 204 Cicero translated the term of paidéia as humanitas. 205 See: W. Schadewaldt, Humanitas Romana, in: Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, vol.  1, part  4, Berlin–New  York 1973, p.  44:  “The word humanitas and its derivatives is one of the most important positions in the spiritual mass of the succession that was left to us by the Roman antiquity. It still lives in all the languages of the western civilization (not excluding Russia), along with concepts such as religio, pietas, integritas, mores, auctoritas, dignitas, urbanitas, civitas, res publica co-create a highly respectful society in our modern life. While these terms are generally quite clear,

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indicated word has a variety of meanings, depending on the context: 1) “human nature,” “humanity;” 2)  “nobility of customs, culture, civilization, elegance;” 3)  “being human with respect to someone, kindness, graciousness, courtesy;” 4)  “education, good manners, culture, polish, elegance, aesthetic taste.” In the post-classical period, the following terms were added: 1) “mankind, humanity, people;” 2) “equity, rationale;” 3) “generosity;” 4) “treat, hospitality’.206 These are elementary explanations that raise awareness on the broad meaning of the term, for which it is difficult to find a precise synonym in both Greek and in modern languages.207 Apart from the Greek word paidéia, the Latin word humanitas corresponds in meaning to the Greek concept of philanthrôpía (love for what makes us human). The indicated terms express many qualities which make up the Romanian traditional, unwritten code of conduct (mos maiorum  – the custom of the ancestors). Cicero stressed the indicated fact at the beginning of his Tusculan Disputations:  “[…] our countrymates gained an advantage through valour or even more through discipline. Finally, what they attained due to the features of character and not by virtue of scholarship could not be compared with either Greece or any other nation. What nation was distinguished by such dignity, stability, magnanimity, reliability and fidelity glowing with such wonderful qualities of all kinds that could be compared with our ancestors?’208 Thus, the Greek words philanthrôpía and paidéia were close in meaning to the term humanitas. The first term referred more to ethical (virtus) and social values and was closer to today’s humanitarianism, whereas the second term was associated with intellectual values (doctrina) and a later notion of “humanism.’209 However, as Wiesław Pawlak indicates, none of the words –philanthrôpía or paidéia, because of a narrower meaning, can be treated as a synonym of humanitas. Although he admits that in structural terms (association with homo) humanitas is closer to the Greek philanthropy.210 Originally, philanthropy referred to deities and their particular friendliness towards people. The adjective philántropos was first used humanitas is like a chameleon, changing the colour, depending on the background. That is why Cicero described man as animal multiplex. 206 Słownik łacinsko-polski, ed. J. Korpanty, vol. 1, Warsaw 2001, pp. 844–855; Słownik łacińsko-polski, ed. M. Plezia, vol. 2, Warsaw 2007, p. 737. 207 See Pawlak, Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku), p. 168. 208 Cicero, The Tusculan Disputations, p. 152. 209 Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas (do XVII wieku),” p. 169. See also T. Sinko, Od filantropii do humanitaryzmu i humanizmu, Warsaw 1960, p. 6. 210 Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku),” p. 169.

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in the tragedy Prometheus Bound, attributed to Aeschylus. There was a reference there to the main protagonist’s spirit that was friendly to people (mortal). Similarly, Plato used the indicated adjective primarily with reference to gods. Then, philanthropy was used to define the virtue of the high-ranked people, especially the rulers who showed their mercy to the subjects. Philanthropy understood in this way was praised by Xenophon and Isocrates who thought that “who wants to reign, should be a philanthropist (philántropos) and should love his citystate (philópolin).’211 Additionally, Isocrates stressed the high culture of Athens that affected others, which was also a manifestation of philanthropy: “Now, our city has so far surpassed all the rest of mankind in political prulence and artful persuasions […] our city has caused the name of Grecian no longer seems to be a mark of a nation, but of good sense and understanding: those are called Greeks that have the advantage of our education, rather than the natives of Greece.’212 He thereby focused on the fact that the ideal of paidéa was realized in Athens and was understood as a constant striving for wisdom and knowledge and as a higher level of education or culture which was the effect of the indicated desire. In turn, a broader scope of use of the term philanthropy may be noticed in the writings of Demosthenes. As W. Pawlak notices, this concept started to change its meaning in the democratic Athens. It denoted: compassion, reckoning with others, courtesy or simply a broadly perceived kindness towards others. In the court speeches, it was often about the philanthropy of the judges against the accused and thus an attitude close to compassion and mercy. It was also the virtue of the accused as citizens manifesting itself in the participation in social life and bearing the burden for the benefit of the state. The word “philanthropy” additionally denoted friendly, kind interpersonal relations and even an attitude of the tamed animals towards human beings. However, the use of this noun usually indicates an attitude that assumes certain superiority or some advantage over another person. It has its roots in the original meaning of philanthropy, which in the first place related to deities.213 Going back to the term humanitas, among the Latin writers of the classical period, Cicero was the one who used the term most frequently.214 Around 80 BC, 211 Do Nikoklesa, 15; qtd. after: Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku),” pp. 169–170. 212 Isocrates, The Fourth Oration of Isocrates, Called the Panegyric, Cambridge 1875, p. 11 ff. 213 Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku),” p. 170. 214 In addition to Cicero’s works, the indicated term (cultus atque humanitas) it also appeared in the work by Julius Caesar entitled The Gallic War (1.1.3), where he calls the

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the term occurs in his speeches, letters, rhetorical and philosophical writings as one of the most important terms referring to man and thus as a key term within his anthropology.215 As Pawlak emphasizes: “The high rank attributed to humanitas by Cicero and the changes that he made in the semantics of the concept turned out to be fraught with consequences for the future of the indicated term since both the direct successors of Arpinata and later Roman authors as well as fifteenth- and the sixteenth-century humanists more or less referred to his very concept.’216 The term humanitas was for the first time certified in an anonymous Rhetoric to Herennius (ca. 86–82 BC.), where it denoted both humanity as such (characteristics typical of a human nature per se), and its particular aspect, expressed through the treatment of people, including enemies, in a manner that is worthy of man, so in a kindly, sympathetic and “humane” way. However, only in the circle of Cicero, did the idea fully develop. He used the term humanitas in various meanings:217 • In the most basic one – to define human nature (natura humana, natura hominis) in contrast to animals and gods; • characterising interpersonal relations relevant to human dignity (common humanity for all communis humanitas – is what requires us to save our opponents and do good to others; humanitas discourages from committing murder and constitutes an antidote to the horrors of civil war, which lead to the disappearance of all traces of humanitas in human hearts); • he also appealed to the humanitas of judges to raise their sympathy in the cases in which he acted as a defender or a prosecutor; • he used the term in the meaning of the royal virtue, worthy of rulers, chiefs and all those who exercised power. There is therefore the following advice given by Cicero to his brother Quintus – the governor of the Asia province: “[…] if fate gave you power over Africans, Spaniards or Gauls, the savage and barbarian

Celtic Belgian tribe the bravest of the inhabitants of the most remote southern France (Provence). See Julius Ceaesar, The Gallic War, trans. H. J. Edwards, New York 2006, 2012, p. 4. The indicated term is also used five times in the work entitled: Rhetorica ad Herennium, for centuries mistakenly attributed to Cicero, which in fact existed prior to him. However, the concept itself was actually best developed by Cicero, who used the word humanitas 299 times. 215 For more information, see J. Mayer, Humanitas bei Cicero, Freiburg 1951. 216 Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku),” p. 172. 217 Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku),” pp. 172–173.

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nations, you should still strive for their comfort, their needs and safety, due to your humanitas;”218 • while using the indicated term, he characterized the formation of an ideal speaker – rhetorician, who, as he claimed, should be equipped with a set of virtues that predisposed him both to active public life and to satisfactory private life. As Cicero writes, the goal of this formation should be a comprehensive education based on natural talents and continuous exercise. He underlined the importance of cultivating both moral and social values. However, his greatest merit was the significant expansion of the importance of humanitas. The words humanum and humanitas concerned not only the human nature and a friendly attitude towards other people but also what belonged to the specificity of man as man, not only in relation to others but with reference to himself and to his own talents as well.219 Thus, the aforementioned terms defined the essence of humanity, as nothing given but assigned by nature as a subject of constant development and improvement and as an ideal that one should aim at, making use of everything that man was inherently equipped. Human activities are here motivated by moral obligation (honestum) and the inner sense of decency (decorum), on account of which man is capable of sacrifice. Thanks to the fact that man is equipped with reason, he can attain the perfection placing him above the average. According to Cicero, human perfection does not consist in having any significant position or wealth but in being a wise man, restrained and just. He perceived wisdom as an ability to reach the truth, understand relationships and causes; temperance as a rational-minded ability to remain unaffected by passions and feelings; justice, namely, as the cooperation of all citizens for the benefit of common good and restraint in applying penalties.220 Cicero emphasized that all these virtues were based on reason, enabling one to discern the causes and effects of one’s actions, expand the activities and deepen social relations. Due to reason man acquires independence and courage, which are indispensable to face the life’s difficulties. Without reason and virtues humanitas would be extremely shallow and even meaningless. All the skills and studies facilitating the achievement of the fullness of humanity are called artes humanitatis propriae. Even though at a first glance it

218 Cicero, Ad Quintum fratrem, 1, 9, 27; qtd. after: G. Woolf, Becoming Roman. The Origins of Provincial Civilization in Gaul, Cambridge 1998, p. 68. 219 O. Hiltbrunner, “Humanitas,” in:  Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum, krsg. E. Dassmann, Bd. 16, Stuttgart 1994, c. 727. 220 Cicero, De officiis, II, 5, 18.

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resembles the Greek ideal of comprehensive encyclopaedic education (énkýklos paidéia), in Cicero the particular emphasis was placed on the skills connected with speech  – poetry and rhetoric. They constituted a certain core of the Ciceronian humanitas and proper studia humanitatis.221 Speech was treated by him as a discipline integrating all sciences and skills and constituting their finial. In this way, humanitas became primarily the ideal and the aim of upbringing and education (Bildungsideal), covering a large spectrum of ethical, intellectual, aesthetic and civic values expressed by Cicero and his followers through such terms as: “mansuetudo, cultus, doctrina, dignitas, fides, pietas, honestas, iustitia, gravitas, virtus, integritas, lepos, facetiae, elegantia, eruditio, urbanitas, hilaritas, iocositas, festivitas, sapientia, moderatio, modestia, aequitas, magnanimitas, comitas, benignitas, clementia, misericordia, benevolentia, facilitas, mollitudo, liberalitas, munificentia.”222 Cicero’s humanitas should be treated not only as an educational programme. As Pawlak indicates, it absolutely deserves the title of an anthropological project, extremely attractive for future generations223. The indicated project is described as a “qualified humanity.” It consists of two dimensions – both the humanitas, and the litterae – the refined education.224 As Wolfgang Schadewaldt’s work, Humanitas Romana, reads:  “The essence of the Roman humanitas is that it is one of the aspects of an ordered set of different, demanding values which were included in the Roman citizen code of conduct from the beginning and are in fact untranslatable into Greek:  Latin pietas (which differs from the Greek eusébeia), Latin mores (which do not fully coincide with ethos), Latin dignitas, gravitas, integritas, and so on. The idea of humanitas encompasses all the indicated values […] and simultaneously, blurs the differences between them, making them less rigid and more universal.’225 In turn, in one of the German encyclopaedias, where the term humanitas occurs,

221 J. Domański, “De Platonis παιδεία deque Ciceronis humanitate observatiuncula,” Eos 110 (2003), fasc. 1, 37–46. The term studia humanitatis appears in Cicero in Pro Archia poeta, 3; Pro Murena, 61; De oratore, III 58; Tusculanae disputationes, V 66. 222 R. Rieks, Humanitas, in: Historisches Wörterbuck der Pkilosophie, krsg. J. Ritter, Bd. 3, Basel–Stuttgart 1974, c. 1231; qtd. after: Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku),” p. 175. 223 Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku),” pp. 176–177. 224 See J. Domański, “O dwu Cycerońskich znaczeniach humanitas jako “człowieczeństwa kwalifikowanego,’ ” in Wielkość i piękno filozofii, ed. J. Lipiec, Cracow 2003, pp. 157–168. 225 W. Schadewaldt, Humanitas Romana, in: Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, krsg. H. Temporini, Bd. I, Tafeln 4, Berlin–New York 1973, p. 47.

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the author explains:  “Humanitas covers, in the full meaning of the word, the development and the activity of these spiritual (broadly understood) qualities, which characterize and distinguish man as man, and which, in the opinion of the representatives of this ideal, are not given to man by nature, but are only assigned.’226 Thus, humanitas expressed the possibilities determining the value of man:  magnanimity and fidelity, among other things, as well as refinement, intelligence and development in the field of arts. Pietas constituted the basis of humanitas and it denoted modesty, due to which man could properly measure the relations with all people and things, with friends, a spouse, parents or children, with different peoples and the state which had to conquer the world and then enable all people’s participation in the just rule of law. At the same time humanitas meant that man transcended what was too human in him through what constituted the essence of his humanity – through reason given to him by the nature itself, designing the divine and human law. Additionally, humanitas denoted liberating from a daily labour. That is why studying the great works of literature was treated as the most human and the most liberating mental entertainment, whereas people who had been shaped by that true art of humanity, should be regarded as the ones who realized the fullness of humanity. Both the Greek idea of paidéa and the Roman idea of humanitas found their places within the culture called Hellenism. Partial identification of the two terms occurred there and they became the synonyms of the entire GreekRoman civilization, juxtaposed with the barbarian world. Isocrates explained the meaning of the word Hellenes in the following words: “The word Hellenes has taken on the meaning that no longer denotes origin but rather a way of thinking, so the term Hellenes refers rather to those who participate in our education rather than to people of common origin.’227 In addition, the concepts of paidéia and humanitas were extended and deepened within the indicated civilization and were applied to all people. The recognition of the existence of an all-encompassing interpersonal relationship was something new in the ancient thought. Its advocates were the Roman aristocrat Seneca and the Roman emperor, Marcus Aurelius. However, one may observe a tendency to associate humanitas with the concepts close to the Greek philanthropy in the works of Seneca. As is observed by W. Pawlak: “[…] additionally, the humanitas of Seneca can, in the Platonic spirit, denote a persistent idea of mankind by which unsustainable

2 26 I. Heinemann, Humanitas, c. 283. 227 Isocrates, Isocrates orationes et epistolae, recogn. J. G. Baiter, Parisiis 1846.

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human beings are formed.’228 Pliny the Elder, on the other hand, pointed to the relationship between humanitas and doctrina, and thus, like Cicero, applied the term humanitas to an intellectual or literary formation. Pliny the Younger was the closest to the Ciceronian understanding of humanitas. With reference to Cicero, more than a century later, he defined humanitas as the ability to develop lower feelings without disturbing the higher ones.229 Like Cicero, he pointed out that both the concept and the idea of humanitas originated in ancient Greece.230 Over time, the concept of humanitas started to be identified with ordinary kindness. It was indicated by Quintilian, who under the influence of Cicero emphasized the special role of education in the formation of a person.231 An oversimplification of the concept of humanitas was objected to by the Roman poet Gellius who, in the second century AD stressed the ethical and also the intellectual (educational) aspect of both this concept and the concept of idea. He wished to restore its original meaning close to the Greek paidéa: “Those who created the Latin words and used them appropriately, gave a different meaning to the word humanitas than the common people expected and which was expressed by the Greek word φιλανθρωπία [philanthrôpía], denoting some kindness and friendliness towards all people without distinction, however humanitas denoted more or less the same as the Greek παιδεία [paidéia] or what we call education and assimilation of noble skills. Those who truly desire them and strive for them are to the greatest extent humanissimi.232 Gellius was of the opinion that the only true Latin equivalent of the word humanitas was animi cultura. The above considerations show that the meaning of the Roman humanitas was very broad. The idea involved various factors namely, universal human duties, broadly understood love and affection, the improvement of living conditions, the pleasure of experiencing literature, art, contemplation, learning, rational action improved by virtues. All of this was supposed to increase the good of both the individual and the whole community.

228 Seneca, Epistulae morales ad Lucilium, 65, 7; qtd. after: Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku),” p. 180. 229 G. Plinius Caecilius Secundus, Epistularum libri decem. Briefe, München 1968, IX 5. 230 “Cogita te missum in […] illam veram et meram Graeciam, in qua primum humanitas, litterae, etiam fruges inventae esse creduntur […] ad homines maxime homines […]” (G. Plinius Caecilius Secundus, Epistularum libri decem. Briefe, VIII, 24, 2). 231 Quintillian, Institutionis oratoriae libri XII, 2, 2, 10; qtd. after: Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku),” p. 181. 232 Gellius, Noctes atticae, 13, 17; qtd. after: Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku),” p. 181.

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2.2. THE MEETING OF CHRISTIANITY WITH THE GREEK PAIDÉIA AND THE ROMAN HUMANITAS 2.2.1.  Does a Christian need paidéa? The Greek ancient culture, whose ideals were concentrated in the term paidéia, had a significant impact on the thought and culture of the early Christianity, developed in the context of Hellenism.233 Christianity took over the foundations of the Greek culture as indispensable for the formation of man, although the anthropocentric perspective was replaced by the theocentric one. Christianity aimed not so much at the perfection of man on his own but at his openness to God in the perspective of the ultimate goal of the human life, the salvation. Christianity faced the Greek paidéia in the first centuries AD, especially through the Eastern Fathers of the Church raised in the Hellenic culture.234 The permeation of concepts, mental categories and the meaning of certain concepts into the Christian thought took place by means of the Greek language. The first phase of the Christian Hellenism began with the use of that language in the New Testament writings. It was the primary meaning of the word hellenismos.235 233 The author, who clearly emphasized the influence of Greek culture on the Christian religion, was Adolf von Harnack. See his Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, Bd. 1, Freiburg–Leipzig 1894, p. 121–147. He defines the Greek culture in this work as one of the most important factors in the formation of the Christian religion. See also H. A. Wolfson, Tke Philosophy of the Church Fathers, vol. 1, Cambridge 1956. This opinion is also shared by Jokann Gustav Droysen, who thought that without the post-classical evolution of the Greek culture, the emergence of the Christian world religion would be impossible; see Briefwechsel, krsg. R. Hübner, Berlin–Leipzig 1929, I, 70; Geschichte des Hellenismus, Hamburg 1836–1843. 234 J. Wilk, “Edukacja,” in: Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 3, Lublin 2002, p. 18. In the early Christian tradition, which was directly influenced by the Greek culture, the concept of kalokagathía was also preserved, with the addition of faith and love, alongside the already recognized virtues (among others, the Cappadocian Fathers and Clement of Alexandria). There was no a uniform equivalent of the expression kalokagathía in Latin and in the European languages (the term gentleman had a similar meaning). Jaroszyński, “Kalokagathía,” p. 447. 235 The Greek term hellenismos is a noun formed from the verb form – “I speak Greek” and originally denoted a correct use of the Greek language. The indicated term was, in that very sense, the first term to be used by teachers of rhetoric. The student of Aristotle – Theophrastus, who taught rhetoric at the Lyceum, was the author of the theory of perfect style, consisting of five degrees, which he called “the virtues of speech” (áretaí); the first and the most basic one was the word hellenismos, which was a grammatically correct usage of the Greek language, devoid of barbaric speech

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It took place in the era of the so-called “Apostolic Fathers.” It was the earliest archaic period of the Early Christian thought, which occurred immediately after the Apostolic Times. It began already in the end of the first century AD and continued until ca. the middle of the second century.236 The first Christian community in Jerusalem during the Apostolic Times used the Greek language. In the sixth chapter of the Book of Acts, its members were called the “Hellenists.’237 Those were the Hellenized Jews. After the martyrdom of their leader Stephen, they scattered throughout Palestine and started the missionary work of the next generation. Many efforts were made to reconcile the Hellenic culture and the Judeo-Christian beliefs. The Gospel of St. John is soaked with the classic thinking. Saint Paul conducted discussions with the Jews in the Greek language. The Christian writers of the Apostolic age, in addition to the Gospel, used a variety of the Greek literary forms such as: logia – collections of the sayings of Jesus, letters  – modelling the Greek philosophers, praxeis  – histories, namely the deeds and the teachings of the wise and famous people, told by their disciples: didache, the Apocalypse, speech, martyrology.238 The first Christian apostles or missionaries used the aforementioned Greek literary forms and the Greek teaching primarily with reference to the Hellenized and solecisms. Cf. J. Stroux, De Theophrasti virtutibus dicendi, Leipzig 1912, p. 13. As Werner Jaeger notices, “This requirement was characteristic of the time, in the fourth century Greece, when foreigners of every social status had become so numerous that they exercised a deteriorating influence of the spoken idiom, even on the language of the Greeks themselves. The word Hellenismos thus did not originally have the meaning of adopting Greek manners or a Greek way of life that it later inevitably assumed, especially outside Hellas where Greek culture became the fashion” (W. Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, Cambridge, MA 2002, p. 107). 236 The term “Apostolic Fathers” became widespread in the Patristics only of the eighteenth century. It was used with regard to the earliest Christian writers who were the disciples of the apostles or who knew the people closely related to the apostles. Already in 1672, a patrologist, J. B. Cotelier issued letters to Barnabas, Clement of Rome, Ignatius, Polycarp and Hermann Shepherd under the common title Patres aevi apostolici (Fathers of the Apostles). While calling Clement, Barnabe, Ignatius, Polycarp and Hermas the Fathers of the Apostolic Times, Cotelier was guided by the similarity between the apostles’ letters and the writings of the early Christian theologians. The texts of the Apostles were modelled on the letters of the apostles. See Pierwsi świadkowie. Pisma Ojców Apostolskich, trans. A. Swiderkówna, ed. M. Starowiejski, Cracow 2010. See also http://www.jednota.pl/index. pkp/artykuly2004/64-charakterystyka-okresu-ojcow-apostolskich -cz-4 [accessed: 06.01.2016]. 237 Acts 6, 1 ff. 238 See P. Wendland, Die urchristlicken Literaturformen, Tübingen 1912.

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Jews and then to pagans. It is worth noting that even the word “conversion” comes from Plato who used it in the context of philosophy. He compared it to turning the human face towards the light of the true Being.239 Werner Jaeger points to the analogy between the activities of the Christian missionaries and the Greek philosophers in the Hellenistic era. Among the similarities, he mentioned the fact that they dealt with issues concerning human ignorance and a better cognition and that they also referred to the master and a teacher who possessed and revealed the truth.240 Over time, the Christian apologists used the polemical speeches of the Hellenistic philosophers which included arguments against gods of the Greek and Roman folk religion. Saint Paul quoted fragments of the Greek poets during his appearances. The first author who paid special attention to this type of literary reference in the Books of the New Testament was Clement of Alexandria whose works were full of such references to the Greek poets. While analysing the letters of Saint Paul,241 we can see some similarity between gifts-charisms that each man received from the Holy Spirit and the exceptional virtues or perfections of a citizen described in the Greek thought. In both cases attention was paid to the way of using them.242 A certain influence of the stoic thought can be noticed in the oldest literary work of the early Christianity, the Letter of Saint Clement of Rome to the Corinthians, written in the last decade of the first century. The author of the letter paid attention to the consequences generated by the fights between various groups in that church, which was in conflict. The then Bishop of Rome used the ancient rhetoric art, including the figures of amplificatio or topoi, such as an example and the principles of the political rhetoric speech.243 He referred to the Greek tragedy, quoting Sophocles and Euripides, which proved the existence of the living tradition of the Greek paidéa in the Greek-speaking Christian community in Rome. In addition to the rhetoric, Saint Clement of Rome used rational arguments as well, that is, ideas characteristic of the philosophical thought:  for instance, the stoic moralism, the reference to the cosmic order of all things, which, when respected, guaranteed the peaceful co-existence and the ideas of the political philosophy of the ancient Greek city-state, according to which the existence of a true 2 39 See Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p. 111. 240 See Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p. 111. 241 1 Cor 12, 7. 242 See Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p. 39. 243 Clement, The First Epistle to the Corinthians; qtd. after Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p. 115.

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community demanded an internal discipline, resembling the discipline characteristic of a well-organized state.244 Thus, Saint Clement based his understanding of order and peace on the conscious philosophical reflection. Having the knowledge that the Corinthians, to whom he addressed his letter, were educated on the basis of the paidéa, he consciously referred to it, pointing out that the civic order in the Christian politea should be based on the political experience, the social ethics and cosmology. Similarly, the Greek paidéia derived the principles of the human and social conduct from the divine principles of the universe that was called “nature” (physis). One of many Saint Clement’s references to the Greek philosophical ideals is indicating the analogy between the Church unity and the Greek ideal model of the political unity called synkrasis.245 The word indicated a special kind of mixture based on mutual penetration. The Greek thinkers used it to present a healthy combination of diverse social elements in polis or the unity and order of elements or a part of the universe.246 Saint Clement drew a comparison between the natural unity of the Church he postulated and the discipline of the Roman army;247 he also compared the bond that unites the Church to the relationship between a human body and its individual parts.248 He stressed the importance of the smallest elements of a human body for the preservation of the life of the body as a whole. Completing his thought by the statement that: “They all breathe together and cooperate with one another in the unanimous obedience to preserve the unity of the body,’249 he utilized the Greek term sympnei. The verb sympneo denotes the possession of the common spirit – pneuma. Saint Clement’s reference to the Greek philosophica; thought is displayed by means of the Greek word employed with respect to the parts of the body to stress that the same spirit – pneuma, permeates and revitalizes the whole human organism.250 244 At this point, W. Jaeger draws attention to an interesting play of words: the Greek word ekklesia means church, and also – originally it denoted the assembly of citizens of the Greek polis. See. Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p. 15. 245 Clement, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 37, 4. 246 The word synkrasis (Eng. “blend’) comes from Greek word krasis. At the earliest, it was used in the Greek medical thought to denote a thing that, although it was composed of two elements, merged into an inseparable and well-balanced whole. See Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p. 23. 247 Clement, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 37, 2–4. 248 Clement, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 37, 5. 249 Clement, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 37, 5. 250 A similar statement is found in the work of Hippocrates titled On Nutrition. The idea, originally employed in the Greek medicine, was implemented by stoicism in their cosmology. The concept of sympnoia, originally used to explain the organic life within

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In this way, he expressed an idea of a certain Christian order – ordo christianus that indicated a proper place and a mode of action to each community member, taking into account his or her abilities. In the final part of his letter Saint Clement paid attention to the ideas of paidéa, which he perceived from a slightly wider perspective – as a Christian education. He speaks of a “paidéia of God” or a “paidéia of Christ,” as a great protective force in the lives of Christians. He incorporates common philosophical truths and observations of the Greek poets and thinkers into the indicated ideas. The letter of Saint Clemet, in addition to the Letter to Ephesians, the letter to the Hebrews, the Second Letter to Timotheus, belongs to the group of Christian writings, in which a new and expanded concept of paidéa, applied to the Christian way of living and thinking, emerges and develops. Over time, the references to the Greek paidéa and to philosophy became the common ground for a discussion between Christian writers and educated pagans, who accused them of atheism because the Christians did not worship the state deities and the Emperor himself.251 Examples of this type of discourse may be found in a Dialogue with Tryphon, a Jew, First Apology and Second Apology by Justin Martyr. His apologies display the references not only to the Greek-Roman religion, as was the case with his predecessors – Aristides of Athens or Tatian the Syrian, but to philosophy as well. He made efforts to defend the Christian faith, using the terms of the Greek philosophy in his justifications such as logos, which proved that he was influenced by stoicism and middle Platonism.252 Justin directed the First Apology to the Roman emperor Antonius Pius. In the indicated work, he criticized the condemnation to death of the Christians solely for the confession of their faith. He proved that Christians were not atheists and observed that the accusations against them were simply calumnies. We find here philosophical arguments which allowed the author to engage in the dialogue with the representatives of the Greek culture, who by reading these works aimed at obtaining more information on the early Christianity. After the first few centuries, the early Christianity still revealed a great understanding for the cultivation of the humanist traditions. Christianity was directly referred to as Christ’s paidéia in the fourth century AD in the apocryphal work of

the human body was used with reference to life in general – along the lines of the stoic understanding of physis. See Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p. 150. 251 See Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p. 28. 252 Pierwsi apologeci greccy, trans. L.  Misiarczyk, ed. J.  Naumowicz, Cracow 2004, pp. 183–194.

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Acta Philippi, in which the author put the following words into Philip’s mouth: “I have come to Athens to reveal Christ’s paidéa.’253 One can see here a clear intention of the Apostle to make Christianity manifest itself as a continuation of the classic Greek paidéa. On the other hand, the ancient paidéia became the tool of a new culture, in which Christ was in the centre.254 The references to the Hellenic paidéa were also made by Clement of Alexandria in his “trilogy,” which consisted of: Propreptikos (A Call), Paedagogus (A Teacher) and Stromata (Patchwork).255 It was supposed to be a three-volume handbook of the Logos initiation.256 He gained an extensive knowledge on the Greek philosophy due to a solid education received in Athens and at the Alexandria catechetical school. Over time, he became known as the first Christian philosopher and a theologian.257 Clement did not only compare the Greek philosophy and Christianity but he went a step further and “expressed the doctrine of Christianity in terms of the Hellenic philosophy,’258 and additionally, “used the ancient culture to impart the teaching of Jesus Christ to his audience.’259 He used the principle of chrésis (“usage, application,” “knowledge, familiarity’) in his works – relying on the use of pagan culture for the needs of the Christian religion. For this reason, his works – due to the use of ancient culture – not only referred to the ideal of 2 53 Acta Philippi, c. 8 (3); qtd. after: Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p. 12. 254 See Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p. 12. 255 Such a division is championed by Fr J. Grzywaczewski. See his O miłości. Program formacji chrześcijańskiej św. Klemensa Aleksanryjskiego, Niepokalanów 1996. 256 S. Łucarz believes that the third part of the “trilogy” was intended by Clement to be a work titled A Teacher (Pedagogus). This would correspond to the assumption of the author of the trilogy, who set it three goals: “encouraging,” “education,” “teaching.” See S.  Łucarz, “Inicjacja w ujęciu Klemensa Aleksandryjskiego,” in:  Kondycja chrześcijaństwa dzisiaj a inicjacja chrześcijaństwa w starożytności, ed. B.  Górka, Gdańsk 2005, p. 108. 257 A. Heszen, “Paideia Klemensa Aleksandryjskiego na przykładzie jego Hymnu do Chrystusa Zbawiciela,” Symbolae Philologorum Posnaniensium Graecae et Latinae XIX (2009), p. 121. To learn more on the topic see also: Łucarz, Inicjacja w ujęciu Klemensa Aleksandryjskiego, p.  106; L.  Rzodkiewicz, Jezus Chrystus w kulturze antycznej. Stanowisko Klemensa Aleksandryjskiego, Legnica 1999; H. Chadwick, Myśl wczesnochrześcijańska a tradycja klasyczna, trans. P. Siejkowski, Poznań 2000. 258 Łucarz, “Inicjacja w ujęciu Klemensa Aleksandryjskiego,” p. 106; qtd. after: Heszen, “Paideia Klemensa Aleksandryjskiego na przykładzie jego Hymnu do Chrystusa Zbawiciela,” p. 122. 259 Ch. Gnilka, CHRESIS, Die Methode der Kirchenväter im Umgang mit der antiken Kultur, Bd. 2: Kultur und Conversion, Basel 1993; qtd. after: Heszen, Paideia Klemensa Aleksandryjskiego na przykładzie jego Hymnu do Chrystusa Zbawiciela, p. 122.

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paidéa, but became its important elements as well. Clement achieved recognition for his great contribution into propagating the Christian faith and wisdom among the Greeks.260 In his works, he referred to stoics from whom he borrowed certain technical terms and definitions, and also to Plato, to whom he attributed great meaning in the history of the Greek philosophy.261 Referring to Plato’s statement in the Laws:  “ ‘God is a teacher of the universe” (ho theos paidagogei ton kosmon),262 Clement pointed out that this truth had been perfectly realized in Christ. He is the true and the highest paidagogós. Jaeger is right to observe that Plato strengthened the meaning and raised the rank of the term paidéia to the “philosophical dignity.” It enabled Clement to present Christ as the Tutor (Pedagogue) of all people.263 Through Christ (Divine Logos) the ultimate true paidéia is realized, and Christianity will henceforth be the largest educational force in the world.264 Clemens presented Christ in a new role – of a divine tutor, a teacher who provides people with real knowledge, a guide across different levels of life, “educating gnostics through mysteries, the believers through good hope and people with hardened hearts through punishment leading to improvement.’265 Just as a teacher He is a “doctor of the human kind who cures everything,’266 who grants immortality, similarly to knowledge.267

260 “The correct understanding of his broad evangelizing method shows that it is not about the Hellenization of Christianity nor the Christianization of Hellenism. Rather, it is an attempt to make the Christian wisdom understandable for the Hellenes’ (Rzodkiewicz, Jezus Chrystus w kulturze antycznej. Stanowisko Klemensa Aleksandryjskiego, p. 42). 261 “El pensamiento de Platon es la gran cantera que utiliza Clemente […]. Se apoya en el pensamiento platónico para senalar la importancia de la pedagogía” (J. M. Blázquez, “El uso del pensamiento de la filosofía griega en El Pedagogo (I–II) de Clemente de Alejandría,” Annario de Historia de la Iglesia III (1994), p. 58 and 77). 262 Plato, Laws, X, 897 b. 263 Clemens, discovering the spiritual rank of Plato’s philosophy, calls him the “Moses of Attica” (Moyses attikizon). See Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata, in: Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten [drei] Jahrhunderte, krsg. O. Stäklin, Bd. 2, Berlin 1960, I, 22. See also: Jaeger, Wczesne chrześcijaństwo i grecka paideia, pp. 76–77. 264 Wilk, “Edukacja,” p. 18. 265 Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata, 7, 2, 6.  See also J.  N. D.  Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, New York 1977, 5th ed., p. 91; B. Zgraja, “Chrystus Boski Logos – wzór i mistrz cnoty według Klemensa Aleksandryjskiego,” Studia Warminskie 47 (2010), pp. 49–69. 266 Cf. Clemens Alexandrinus, Paedagogus, in: Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten [drei] Jahrhunderte, krsg. O. Stäklin, Bd. 1, Berlin 1936, 1, 2, 6. 267 Cf. Clemens Alexandrinus, Protreptikos, 12, 120, 3.

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Moreover, Clement pointed to the Divinization (Theosis) of Christ: “The word […] has become man so that it is possible to learn from man how man can become God.’268 Christ as God forgives our sins and the function of His human nature is to serve as a model to prevent us from committing further sins.269 Following the Greek historians in differentiating between the philosophy of barbarians and the philosophy of the Greeks, the Greek philosophy on its own was regarded by Clemens as propaidéia – the less perfect work of man which was an introduction to the true paidéa – the Christianity coming from God.270 Drawing attention to Christ as a certain ideal of educator – teacher was an explicit reference to the Greek culture271 because the Greek-speaking world understood this kind educational programme as paidéia, an ideal of human existence, which educated people and every civilized nation aimed at. It was then significant for Clement to evoke associations with the poetry of Homer because it was a true paidéia for an ancient Greek. Referring to the Greek culture, the Christian thinkers simultaneously tried to show that their faith fulfilled the educational mission with regard to humanity to a degree higher than anything else up till then. Thus, we are dealing here with a beginning of a definite development of Christian aspirations striving to create the Christian civilization. Clement’s thought was continued by his pupil Origen, who further developed his master’s views in a more coherent and detailed way. Many scholars point to the profound influence of the Greek philosophy on the Christian theology

2 68 Cf. Clemens Alexandrinus, Protreptikos, 1, 8, 4. 269 Cf. Clemens Alexandrinus, Paedagogus, 1, 3, 7. 270 Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata, I, 20. 271 Moreover, in the final passage of the Pedagogue entitled Hymn to Christ the Savior, Clement describes Christ as a “children’s guide.” The term “guide” was derived from the pagan tradition, from Homer, who used the term with reference to war chiefs. This term was also used in the religious sense, in the form of the liturgical epithets of Zeus, Apollon, Aphrodite. Other Homeric epithets referring to Christ are: “taming everything,” “powerful.” Examples include also the titles given by Clement to Christ, i.e., the “Ruler of Wisdom” (the title given by Greek poets to Zeus) and “shepherd” – the classic word. It is worth paying attention to the unique metaphor showing the three realms of Christ’s world. This metaphor contains the following expressions defining Christ: the “bit of untamed foals” (earth), the “wing of birds/heavenly” (air), the ‘rudder of vessels” (water). Clement consciously used the terms derived from pagan literature to be understood by a pagan or a Christian, educated in Greek culture recipient. See Heszen, “Paideia Klemensa Aleksandryjskiego na przykładzie jego Hymnu do Chrystusa Zbawiciela,” pp. 125–126.

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of Origen.272 His way of thinking is characterized by a fundamental look at history. Therefore, he is regarded as one of the leading representatives of the Christian historical thought. In this aspect, he analysed the interpenetration of the Greek intellectual heritage and the Christian thought. The element of education that brought them together made people realize that both traditions had much in common. Origen perceived Christianity as the greatest educational power in history (paidéia), meeting the need to teach man the means of a proper differentiation between good and evil, truth and falsehood, being and nonbeing. Christianity was the fulfilment and a higher level of human education for him. Christ was pictured by him as a great teacher who incorporated in life the ideas expressed by the Greek paidéia. Moreover, he indicated that the difference between Christianity and philosophy relied on the fact that Christianity originated from the divine initiative – the embodiment of the divine Logos was accomplished in Christ. By compiling and uniting facts from the history of the Greek thought and the biblical history, Origen built the history in which he indicated the manifestations of the divine Logos and Providence in the human history. Therefore, in his opinion, paidéia was a gradual fulfilment of the Divine Providence and the realization of God’s will.273 Origen’s thought was one of the most radical attempts to interpret Christianity and its historical mission in terms of the Greek philosophy. The Greek concept of paidéa was a repetitive motif that determined the type of problems tackled by him. He built his theology in the style of the Greek philosophical tradition: “It [paideia] served as the ideological framework for the. systematic development of a Christian theology in which the. merging Christian religion and Greek philosophical thought reached its climax.’274 The Cappadocian Fathers  – the followers of the Origen School had a great recognition for the cultural heritage of the ancient Greece.275 Their contribution

272 The first author who drew attention to the idea of Origen’s paidéa and its functions in the philosophy of history was Hal Koch. He drew attention to the decisive role that this idea played in Origen’s doctrine of God’s plan for the salvation of mankind See: H. Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis, Berlin–Leipzig 1932; see also E. de Faye, Orige`ne, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée, vol. 1–3, Paris 1923–1928. 273 The concept of “Divine Providence” – pronoia – was introduced by stoics. it takes care of the world and the human kind. The evidence of its action was seen by them in the whole nature of the universe. See Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p. 67. 274 Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p. 93–94. 275 See H. Rondet, “The Cappadocians,” in: Original Sin. The Patristic and Theological Background, Shannon 1972.

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relied on the revival of a positive relationship between Christianity and Hellenism. They caused that Christianity took over, preserved and even revitalized what was worth keeping from the Greek tradition. It strengthened its position in the civilized word in this way. As Jaeger emphasized, the fourth century AD was a real renaissance during which the Greek East created a new culture through the activity of the Cappadocian Fathers.276 Two of them – Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzus, received the full classical education: liberal arts, rhetoric and philosophy, based on the readings of ancient authors. Their writings testify a broad spectrum of their interests covering additionally the exact sciences and medicine. They transferred their knowledge in the form of homilies which were perfectly refined in terms of rhetoric. They distinguished themselves by high rhetoric and poetic culture. They used rhetoric to explain and popularize Christianity, stressed the importance of literature and the Greek poetry in educating the Christian youth.277 A slightly different, deeper dimension of the Greek paidéa was attributed to the third of the Cappadocian Fathers, Gregory of Nyssa. He highlighted in it a conscious process of shaping a human personality, which was one of the fundamental elements of Christian education. He started with making a distinction between human education and the transfer of only educational content to him, which had already been done by the Greek thinkers. He emphasized that Christian education could not be solely a direct teaching of the Christian doctrine. The superior aim of that education should be making the child understand and accept the main principle of the Christian way of living. The issues associated with education perceived in the indicated way were included in his work called De instituto Christiano (On the Christian Education). He was inspired by the philosophy of Plato that he repeatedly referred to. He combined the Platonic concept of philosophy, which relied on becoming similar to God, with the Christian concept of man, whom God created in his image and whose aim was to return to God and the original human nature. The key idea of his works was the Greek concept of morphosis  – denoting the formation of man, human personality. Christian thinkers slightly modified this term by using the word  – metamorphosis.278 This spiritual process called 2 76 Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p. 75. 277 See, for instance, Saint Basil of Caesarea, Address to Young Men On Greek Literature, trans. E. R. Maloney, New York 1901, pp. 182 ff. 278 This term is used by St. Paul in the Letter to the Romans, asking them to undergo a process of a radical metamorphosis by means of the renewal of his spiritual life: “And be not conformed to this world: but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that ye may prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, will of God” (Rm 12, 2). St

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education was distinguished by Gregory from the bodily development. The spirit development is not something spontaneous, it requires constant care.279 To illustrate his considerations, Gregory invoked an image in which the education activity was compared to the creativity of an artist forming a certain shape in the human material. It is the similarity to God. We attain this similarity in the most perfect way only when we develop moral and intellectual virtues (areté) in us. While developing them, we have to consider both what the human being is equipped with by nature and the effects of education, too. The Christian religion looked at the complexity of the inner life of man in a new way, in the manner unknown to the classical Greek philosophy.280 According to Gregory, every Christian can attain perfection but he needs help from god’s grace. However, man has to cooperate in order to obtain this grace, which is reflected by the term synergia. The aforesaid cooperation relies on taking effort of the will so that it aimed at good. At this point, Gregory introduced a special, Christian concept of Divine favour into the classical scheme of paidéa. He saw it as a co-operation between the Divine Spirit and man himself.281 Evil was understood by him as ignorance, blindness, making man choose things not good to him. The most perfect metamorphosis (transformation) takes place inside the man, in his powers of desire, if he consequently persists with the good. This is evidenced by actions complying with the good which generate a gradual katharsis (purification) of the spirit. This, in turn, affects the quality of action perceivable externally. The Christian paidéia in Gregory’s understanding reaches its end in the final restoration of the perfect, original state of God’s creation. The belief in the good of man and the whole world, created by God as good, lies at the foundation of his

Paul also talked about the metamorphosis in the second Letter to the Corinthians: “But we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord” (2 Cor 3, 18). 279 See Gregorius Nyssenus, De instituto Christiano, in: Opera ascetica, ed. W. Jaeger, J. P. Cavarnos, V. Woods Callakan, vol. 8, part 1, Leiden 1952, p. 44, 27 and n. See also: Gregorius Nyssenus, “De perfecta forma Christiani,” in: Opera ascetica, vol. 8, part 1, p. 173. 280 Regarding the ancient Greek ideal of areté, the image of the poet Simonides of Keos is frequently quoted, who described it as a goddess sitting on the highest rocky cliff, inaccessible to ordinary mortals, achieved only by the most persistent and impatient, who strive to conquer the peaks. Cf. Simonides, passage 74 (579), in: Poetae me lici Graeci, ed. D. Page, Oxford 1962. 281 Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, pp. 93 ff.

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conviction.282 The Christian religion, which he called “the way of life” (bíos) – “the philosophical and contemplative life,” constituted for him the way to achieve this original state. The Bible, which fulfilled in the Greek paidéa the role analogous to the one performed by the works of the Greek literature in the Greek paidéa, was helpful in that matter. All the indicated works include the noblest norms governing human life and present an ideal – model picture of man. Therefore, studying the Bible, like studying the Greek literature before, is imitatio Christi (imitating Christ).283 The educational role of the Bible was very explicitly emphasized by Gregory.284 He compared the Holy Spirit to a wise educator who helped every human being in the manner that was suited to his cognitive abilities. The fulfilment of the Christian ideal was a life-long pursuit of perfection, approaching God that was within the ability of every human being. In view of the target of the human life perceived in this way, the Christianity began to take on the form of a specific model of perfect life, based on the contemplation of God and on the increasingly perfect union with Him.285

2.2.2.  The significance and the limits of humanitas Additionally, the early Christian literature referred to the ideas of humanitas but, as W.  Pawlak underlines, some differences between the understanding of the indicated idea by the Greek and the Latin fathers can be noticed. The first group, to which St. Paul, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Basil the Great, John Chrysostom belonged, wrote about philanthropy with reference to God – as a manifestation of His love for people.286 They were of the opinion that the philanthropy perceived in this way should be imitated by people: “As a manifestation of God’s love, philanthropy becomes an equivalent of the Greek agape (ἀγάπη) and appears in liturgical formulas, it is also recommended as an object of imitation in interpersonal relations.287 A specific tendency towards the Christianization of philanthropy can be observed here, the reaction to which was displayed in the 282 Gregory is of the opinion that the whole effort of human will and desires by nature aims at “good. He calls it an eros congenital to human nature and to its true essence. See his “De instituto Christiano,” in: Opera ascetica, vol. 8, part 1, p. 40, 6 ff. 283 See Gregorius Nyssenus, “De perfecta forma Christiani,” in: Opera ascetica, vol. 8, part.1. 284 It is indicated by, among others, the mere way of Gregory’s citing the Scriptures. The verb paideuein is used with regard to a given biblical author or Christ himself. 285 Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p. 94. 286 Cf. for example Tt 3, 4. 287 Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku),” p. 171.

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letters of Themistius, Libanius and Julian the Apostate, treating philanthropy as a traditional, Hellenic, royal and universal virtue.288 On the other hand, the Latin fathers used the term humanitas originally only with reference to interpersonal relations. Over time, they began to identify the concept of humanitas with specific Christian concepts such as the love of neighbour (dilectio, caritas). Here, one can point to the writings of Saint Cyprian, Saint Ambrose and Lactantius. The aforementioned authors stressed that humanitas understood in this way was the consequence of the formation of man as a rational being in the image and likeness of God. For this reason, man has a special commitment to the Creator and to his neighbours, such as: loving all people, not doing injustice to them, showing hospitality, releasing the captives, supporting widows and orphans, taking care for the sick, burying foreigners and the poor.289 In addition, it is important to note that relatively early humanitas was connected with the Christological sphere, by defining the human nature of Christ (in contrast to Divine – divinitas). In this sense it appeared in the Latin translation of Adversus haereses (3, 18, 3) by Saint Irenaeus of Lyon290 as a synonym of the Greek ἀνθρώπóῖης [ántropótes]. What’s more, the Christian writers drew attention to two more aspects and thereby extended the meaning of the term humanitas. The first of them was paying attention to the weakness, the frailty, the imperfection of the human nature (Saint Hieronymus, Cassiodorus, Tertullian, Gregory the Great). The term humanitas started to be used to define this side of the human nature. Secondly, the Christian authors pointed out that all people were children of the same God. That community, including all representatives of the human race, also non-believers, became known as humanity  – humanitas (Tertullian, Minucius Felix, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome).291 The work of the Fathers of the Church was a link between the ancient heritage and the achievements of the medieval thought. The medieval authors adopted many classical terms, also the concept of humanitas. The aforementioned concept 288 Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku),” p. 171. See also Sinko, Od filantropii do humanitaryzmu i humanizmu, pp. 7–20; G. Downey, Philantropia in Religion and Statecraft in the Fourth Century after Christus, “Historia” 4 (1955), pp. 199–208. 289 See Pawlak, Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku), p.  184. See also M. Cytowska, H. Szelest, Literatura rzymska. Okres cesarstwa, autorzy chrześcijańscy, Warsaw 1994, p. 90. 290 Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku),” pp. 183–184. 291 Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku),” p. 185.

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was used in the theological literature in the meaning of humanitas Christi – the human nature of Christ. Much attention was devoted to it by Thomas Aquinas in his work Quaestiones de quodlibetales, IX. On the ground of philosophy, the indicated term referred to human nature, the nature of the human race. It was exploited with emphasis put to the difference between the nature of man and that of other beings (Saint Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 3c). Among the essential characteristics of the human nature, much consideration was given to the features that indicated its frailty (fragilitas humana – Hildebert of Lavardin, miseria condicionis humanae Innocent III) or to the ones, which referred to a particular dignity of man (Ivo of Chartres).292 Moreover, the term humanitas was employed in the Middle Ages to define all representatives of the human race (Dante Alighieri, De monarchia, 1, 2), as a synonym of the Christian philanthropy or the love of the neighbour (Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae, X, 117). Additionally, Saint Thomas Aquinas used the term inhumanitas, denoting an offence against charity (Summa Theologiae, II–II, q.  118, a.  8). Humanitas often denoted the support given to the neighbours in the form of alms or food.293 Summarizing the above considerations, one should emphasize the significant influence of the Greek ancient culture, the ideals of which are concentrated in the term paidéia, and the influence of the Roman culture on the thought and culture of the early Christianity, developed on the ground of Hellenism. Therefore, it is not groundless to look for a synthesis between the ancient culture and the Christian world. We must not forget that the whole of today’s European culture is based on two great pillars: the ancient culture and the Christian tradition. One may of course wonder to what extent it is the continuation or the transformation of the indicated ideas but disregarding or omitting any of these elements is, in fact, a misinterpretation of the understanding of tradition per se.

292 Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku),” p. 186. See also J. Domański, Z dawnych rozważań o marności i pogardzie świata oraz nędzy i godności człowieka, Warsaw 1997. 293 Pawlak, “Z dziejów pojęcia “humanitas” (do XVII wieku),” p. 186.

Chapter 2  The Christian Culture – from magnanimity to holiness 1. Greek aporias – a human or a person? The moment when the Christianity appeared may be regarded as very interesting and complicated from a cultural point of view. Various cultural tendencies overlapped. On the one hand, it was the time of “late Judaism” but, on the other hand, it was characterised by a political affiliation to the area of the Roman Empire, which resulted in the presence of certain elements of Hellenism  – the culture developed after the conquests of Alexander the Great. The main source of that culture stemmed from the Greek culture.1 With the appearance of a new religion such as Christianity, there came the need for its development in confrontation with the theological and philosophical concepts of the pre-Christian world.2 In consequence, one can notice the following tendencies in the clash of Christianity with the “pagan” antiquity: a strong objection to everything which is pagan; the acceptance of what is good and true in the “pagan” ancient culture for a fruitful application in the Christian culture and the creative development of the Greco-Roman heritage.3 As was indicated in the previous chapter, Christianity gradually assimilated the Greek notion of paidéa  – education and the Roman humanitas. On the one hand, they were taken over as a heritage of the classical ancient culture and on the other hand, they unveiled something that the Greeks and the Romans could not fully explain or explained through mythology. Ancient thinkers discovered that the aim of culture was man but they faced the first true question of who that man was – a subject and a perpetrator of culture? It is the key question because the answer to it underlines the quality (purposefulness) of culture.4 The answer to it depends on the context of reflecting on it. The indicated context can be a myth, utopia, ideology or philosophy. Historically, the first vision of the human being was based on a myth.5 As was observed, man

1 2 3 4 5

W. Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p. 15. See A. H. Armstrong, R. A. Markus, Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy, London 1960. See P. Jaroszyński, Człowiek i nauka, Lublin 2008, p. 97. See M. Krąpiec, Ja – człowiek. Zarys antropologii filozoficznej, Lublin 1974. Myth was the first cognitive “grasp” of a European. It is defined as a cognitively useful assimilation of fiction to truth, confabulation to knowledge. He does not respect cognitive orders. He presents an integral picture of the world and man, whom he identifies

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was a “sum” or the resultant of external relations and tendencies and his life was determined by the superior “totality” (image). The sign of human identification was the mask (prosopon) that externalized that totality. It was a material picture and an expression of man and at the same time a record of his identity. It defined both his outward appearance and his worldview.6 The accomplishment of the mythological thinking was the Greek philosophy. Plato observed earlier that a myth served as a tool for explaining the reality but this explanation was insufficient since it utilized poetic constructions built on determinism, fatalism and pessimism. He pointed out that its place was religion and art as it did not meet the criteria of the theoretical (scientific) explanation. It led the Greek philosophers to discover the essence of man as a rational animal (zoon logikón). It is with them that we share an accentuation of the role of reason in the human life. Their life was not limited to the vegetative activities but it had other, higher forms.7 It was constituted by the sensual life and the highest manifestation of life – the rational life – bíos theoretikós. Its aim was the cognition for the cogition’s itself (scire propter ipsum scire), providing an understanding of the reality we cognize. Aristotle, in turn, concluded his analysis of human nature by claiming that man as the nature’s creation acted for some purpose assigned to him by this nature. In the case of man, at first the “physical part” of man is created and then the “spiritual part.” Finally, wisdom (phrónesis), which is a natural aim of man’s formation, appears in the soul itself.8 Wisdom is the knowledge of causes, the knowledge of the answer to the question why (diá ti).9 We can reach them through reason, due to which man becomes an autonomous subject of cognition

6 7 8

9

with the function of the primordial and superior whole, a higher and ontologically perfect sphere: the world of gods, cosmic forces (destiny, love and hatred) or ancestral systems. See H. Kieres, “Człowiek i cywilizacja,” Lublin 2007, p. 154; see also Kieres, “Mit,” in: Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 7, Lublin 2006, pp. 279–290. See Kiereś, “Człowiek i cywilizacja,” p. 154. See P. Jaroszyński, Człowiek i nauka, Lublin 2008, p. 23 ff. “A certain form of wisdom is by nature our goal, and practicing in it is the final act, for which we have come. Of course, since we came up with the idea of practising in wisdom and learning […], we also exist for this purpose. Therefore, other activities should be performed for the sake of the good that exists in the human being, and those which are good in the body, for the good of the soul; Moral perfection should be developed for wisdom, because wisdom is the supreme goal” (Aristotle, Exhortation to Philosophy, trans. D.S. Hutchison,17, 21). See: M. A. Krąpiec, Filozofia – co wyjaśnia?, Lublin 1998, pp. 37–38.

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and action. Aristotle expressed the specificity of human action in the following words: “Human race lives through art and reasoning” (To de ton anthrópon génos kai téchne kai logismoís).10 The emergence of philosophy and the discovery of the mindfulness of man as his essential property initiated the tradition of a person’s culture. It was created by the Greeks. They started using the source equivalent of the later term “person.” The first philosophers who used the term prosopon to define one of the categories describing and explaining the world were the stoics. The indicated term derives from the Helladic term pros ope, which originally meant:  around the eyes, as regards the face, at a glance.11 Over time, it began to denote a “theatrical mask’12 and also the character of the part played by the actor. With the emergence of the term prosopon basileos, meaning the mask of the king, people started to use it to denote a particular person in the literal sense. The term prosopon annexed by the stoics referred to man as an actor playing the role entrusted to him. Thus, the content of the indicated notion reflected a specific way of human existence. The stoics perceived man in the context of cosmic, biological, social and ethical order. In the second century BC, the Greek term prosopon was agreed, in terms of the semantics, with the Roman term persona.13 However, the word acquired a slightly different meaning which was the result of the differences between the Roman and the Hellenic culture. The representatives of the Roman culture started to use the term persona to define: a status of a citizen, a subject of a social and historical mission as well as a law body.14 In the first century AD, in the ancient Rome, the term persona was employed with reference to the character and the meaning of man in public life. Thus, it was the manner to stress the civic function of a given human person. The indicated understanding placed it in opposition to the terms of non persona or res (thing), used to denote, e. g. slaves. While gradually discovering the truth about who a person was, both the ancient Greeks and the Romans encountered problems looking for an answer to another question concerning the ultimate goal of human life. With only some intuitions, they claimed that it was constituted by a certain ideal that man could

1 0 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 980 a 1–983 a 30. 11 P. Tarasiewicz, Spór o naród, Lublin 2003, p. 17. 12 Z. Węclewski, Słownik grecko-polski, Warsaw 1869, p. 573. 13 Tarasiewicz, Spór o naród, p. 18. 14 See Cz. Bartnik, Personalizm, Lublin 1995, pp. 75–76. See also I. Dec, “Personalizm,” in:  Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, ed. A.  Maryniarczyk, vol.  8, Lublin 2007, pp. 122–127.

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accomplish by his own means, through the development of intellectual, moral and physical powers. However, the proper answer to this question was brought by Christianity that while adopting the most important resolutions of the Greek philosophy, developed them creatively, thereby completing the concept of man. What it owes to the Greek culture is particularly the philosophy and ethics. They helped Christianity discover the universal dimension of truth and good. The Greek language was also helpful as it facilitated the proclamation of the Good News not only in the native environment but also among many nations of the then world.15 It may be exemplified by the aforementioned Greek term prosopon, used in the New Testament of the Bible, taking into account the Septuagint patterns, 72 times and denoted: the face, the act of looking, mutual relations, particular individual and finally, man.16 Nonetheless, in view of the fact that the New Testament still did not have its own term to define a particular person – Jesus Christ, efforts were undertaken to find a word that could describe the relationship between His deity and humanity. The truth of Jesus Christ being one divine person of two natures:  Divine and human  – una persona in duabus naturis17 was confirmed only by the resolutions of the common councils in Ephesus and Chalcedon. Thus, the term persona was applied to the incarnated God which had important consequences for man himself. Each individual person was perceived by the prism of the person of Jesus Christ from that moment on. Thus, the novelty of Christianity involved primarily the anthropology it suggested, according to which man was a personal being, transcending the world of nature and the community in which he lived and a new, previously unknown, concept of personal God, the only one, transcendental, and all-powerful, the Creator of the entire universe and man. It is correctly reflected by the following words: “And only now does God appear as not solely the Absolute but is perceived as a person, He is also completely transcendent towards the world,

15 “It is no wonder that young Christianity owes to Greek culture the ability to define its own religious and cultural identity, as well as communicativeness – Greek as koiné was a common language for many nations and many religions of the world at that time […]” (Z. Grocholewski, “Człowiek jako osoba – przedmiotem i celem kultury,” in: Katolicy i kultura – szanse i zagrożenia, Toruń 2014, p. 14). 16 The term prosopon was used by St. Paul in the Letter to Galatians (2, 6)  to define man: “God does not act for reasons of a person” (prosopon). Cf. Bartnik, Personalizm, pp. 71–72; qtd. after: Tarasiewicz, Spór o naród, p. 20. 17 In Greek, the indicated thesis was formulated by the Eastern Christianity: mia hypostasis en dyein physein. See Tarasiewicz, Spór o naród, p. 20.

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and is also the Creator of all beings. At the same time the door to a full understanding of man opens. Man is not only a rich man or a free-born person, not only an animal rationale, but primarily A PERSON, namely the being created in the image (prosopon-persona) and likeness of God. The Christian understanding of God, the creation and man has a universal character. It completes the classical culture and simultaneously surpasses it in an immeasurable way.’18 Overcoming polytheism and pantheism, Christianity articulated the authentic theism. The new concept of God had important consequences not only in the realm of religion but also in the field of culture and civilization. It extended the perspective of human life to a supernatural dimension, putting emphasis on the fact that the ultimate goal of man – a person was the eternal life. The contribution of Christianity to the deeper understanding of culture was therefore significant because such a perspective had not been provided by any religion or culture so far. Thereby, the Revelation gave rise to a new culture, namely a new approach to man – the sense and the aim of his life. This new approach was primarily based on presenting human nature in a different light, indicating not only the original sin and its consequences but also stressing the fact that this nature was created in the image and likeness of God Himself. The original sin negatively influenced the mode of action but it did not change the essence of the human nature since man was still a person or the subject with dignity. God became the supreme reason and the ultimate goal of human life. Certain intuitions related to issues associated with religion or the divine being can be observed in the writings of the Greek philosophers.19 One can see some elements of criticism of the then polytheistic religion, overused for political purposes, in the works of Socrates.20 He represented the concept of religion deeply connected with human life, especially with morality. His view of the world was theological. He believed that the world was the work of the supreme Divine intelligence that ruled the world. His reflections on religion were in line with his philosophical views on man and the world. He was distinguished by 1 8 P. Jaroszyński, “Co to jest Europa?,” in: Polska i Europa, Lublin 1999, p. 15. 19 See Z. J. Zdybicka, Człowiek i religia, Lublin 1993, 37 ff. 20 As Xenophon reported in his memoirs, Socrates was thinking of gods differently than most of his contemporaries, and was therefore accused of atheism and sentenced to death. The indictment proclaimed that Socrates was “guilty of the crime of not recognizing the gods recognized by the state but introduced new daimons different from them” (Socrates, I, 1, 1). See Zdybicka, Człowiek i religia, p. 35. See also Ch. Schremff, Sokrates. Seine Persönlichkeit und seine Glaube, Stuttgart 1955.

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connecting the concept of God and religion with man and the moral conduct, and not only with the universe. Religion was treated by him as the ultimate justification for moral conduct (the basis of ethics).21 Plato, too, even though he was still on the level of metaphors and miracles, pointed to the builder of the world,22 inspired by the eternal ideas in his work, the creator of other gods such as the stars and human souls.23 According to him the world of ideas was a divine order. The supreme idea, the Idea of Goodness is like a quintessence of divinity.24 Plato said that the Idea of Good was the being itself, the pure good and justice – it is through which things exist and are good. A particular split between the mythological and philosophical thought was eliminated by Aristotle, who was the first one in the Greek philosophy to equate the supreme philosophical principle with the concept of the religious God. His reflection on divinity was included in the basic philosophical discipline of the first philosophy that he also referred to as the natural theology. On the grounds of it, he revealed the need for the existence of the “eternal, unchangeable substance,’25 the pure act, the immaterial principle constituting a prerequisite for the universal movement.26 It is a necessary being which is good per se and in this sense, it is the principle of everything. The indicated perception of the first substance was equated by Aristotle with God. As we can see, the views of the aforementioned Greek philosophers prepared the ground for the new religion, which was Christianity. Their inquiries led to the discovery of the truth about the only God, transcendent towards the universe, the human reason and the matter of the world. However, with the appearance of Christianity, the Truth, Good and Beauty became really connected with God himself, attributable to Him in absolute terms, however, due to the fact that God created the world as well as the man, the indicated categories became also his share, moreover, they became the most important determinants of the peculiar

21 As Zdybicka notices, Socrates has become the forerunner of linking religion and morality: “Socrates connected moral survival with religious sanction – a sense of transcendence. God is the justification of morality because he is good and goes beyond the conventional state systems. Man transcends mutable, material and social systems through his association with the daimonion” (Zdybicka, Człowiek i religia, p. 36). 22 Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 28 ff. 23 Cf. Plato, Laws, 889. 24 Cf. Plato, Republic, 509 b. 25 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1071 b 5. 26 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1072 b 11, 20. For more on the Aristotelian concept of God, see M. A. Krąpiec, T. A. Żeleźnik, Arystotelesa koncepcja substancji, Lublin 1966, pp. 62–77; R. Norman, “Aristotle’s Philosopher – God,” Phronesis 14 (1969), pp. 63–74.

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human life  – and thus, living through culture.27 Consequently, culture ceased to be a mere thinking of ideas or values, designing values cut off from the real world. Culture permeated human existence. Man, who was the creator of culture, became at the same time its raison d’etre, the supreme goal. The Christianity underlined the deepest and the most important level of being a human – in the universal and the individual dimension  – it drew attention to the exceptionality, the uniqueness of the existence of man as a person. This uniqueness of the human way of life is best illustrated by the Christian concept of culture, which makes the man and the person its subject and goal. As we see, the Greek philosophical thought was a certain support but Christianity presented a deepened, as it was revealed, sense of human life, which “starts in time but lasts forever.’28 It places its worshipper in the perspective of eternity possible to reach due to effort put into transcending of “the temporal domain of the biological life.” With regard to this new vision and the requirement looming out of it, the character of education, and thereby the culture, changed: “the classical paidéia was replaced by the fact that Christ became the centre of the new culture” and the “ancient paidéia became its tool.’29 Thanks to the new concept of God and man, the Christian culture was able to overcome the limitations of the Greek culture. The foundation of the Christian paidéa became the imitatio Christi. In contrast to the Greek-Roman paidéa – oriented anthropocentrically, individualistically or socially – the Christian paidéia adopted a theocentric character. Moreover, it continued the concept of the so-called general culture (Greek énkýklos paidéia), developed by the Greek–Roman tradition, which consisted of trivium (grammar, rhetoric, dialectics) and quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy), treated as the basis of education and thereby culture. In addition, Christianity adopted the classical theory of virtues (aretology) but complemented it in the framework of the new concept of the ultimate goal of human life.30 It should be noted at this point that the Christian paidéia was built on the so-called Christian philosophy, which did not distinguish the philosophical from the theological aspect, where the natural cognition and the revealed knowledge

2 7 See Grocholewski, Człowiek jako osoba – przedmiotem i celem kultury, p. 13. 28 M. A.  Krąpiec, “Chrześcijaństwo,” in:  Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 10: Suplement, Lublin 2009, p. 99. 29 Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p. 21. 30 See B. Kiereś, U podstaw pedagogiki personalistycznej. Filozoficzny kontekst sporu o wychowanie, Lublin 2015, p. 133.

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were united and inspired each other.31 As a result, we can speak here about the so-called religious personalism.32 With the autonomy of philosophy, which was developed for good in the thirteenth century by Saint Thomas Aquinas, theological and philosophical aspects were separated. It led to the development of a realistic concept of man (anthropology), which may be defined as a philosophical personalism.33 Indeed, this kind of anthropology preserved the cognitive heritage of the Greek and Roman tradition but complemented it in the context of a personal theory of man. It was inspired by the Revelation, Trinitarian and Christological disputes but the context for its justification was philosophical – respecting the necessary criteria for scientific explanation on the grounds of philosophy. Let us thus take a closer look at the realistic concept of man.

2. Christianity – a new concept of man The realistic interpretation of reality, including the realistic concept of man, was initiated by Aristotle. However, it was fully shaped only by Saint Thomas Aquinas. He made a real breakthrough in the perception of both the world and the man.34 He benefited from the wealth of Aristotle’s thoughts, developed by him in a creative and complementary way.35 He also drew on the rich accomplishment of the Greek and Latin Fathers of the Church. In the applied metaphysics, he adopted all the heritage of the realistic interpretation of reality, initiated by Aristotle and complemented it with what had not been noticed by that philosopher before.36 In the light of the realistic metaphysics the human person is the supreme entity in the hierarchy of natural beings. Saint Thomas defined a person in the following way: “a person denotes what is most perfect in all nature, namely – what, as the

31 See B. Kiereś, U podstaw pedagogiki personalistycznej. Filozoficzny kontekst sporu o wychowanie, p.142. 32 See H. Kiereś, “Kultura i osoba,” in: Człowiek i cywilizacja, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, p. 159. 33 This concept is based on the experience and philosophy of explanation, based on noncontradiction of the existential facts by revealing their causes. See: B. Kiereś, U podstaw pedagogiki personalistycznej. Filozoficzny kontekst sporu o wychowanie, p. 143. 34 See A. Maryniarczyk, Realistyczna interpretacja rzeczywistości, Lublin 2005, p. 13 ff. 35 See É. Gilson, The Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, trans. G. A. Elrington, Kessinger Pub Co 2003, p. 26 ff. 36 “For this reason, Thomas’ philosophy, as well as its modern approach – existential Tomism – will become the main – and the only one! – continuation of the tradition of the realistic philosophy” (Maryniarczyk, Realistyczna interpretacja rzeczywistości, p. 18).

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rational nature, exists in and of itself.’37 It is therefore a real substance, determined by the same act of existence from the moment of conception until death. We can distinguish three basic determinants of human existence: contingency, potentiality and transcendence.38 Man belongs to the group of contingent beings because he does not possess the ultimate reason of his existence either in himself or in other beings similar to him. Moreover, he is a potentialized being, which means that he is inherently equipped with a variety of powers, skills, potentialities, which he is supposed to actualize through personal development. The third determinant of human existence is transcendence defining the ultimate coordinates of human personal life.39 All these three factors interpenetrate in the human action. The transcendence, which refers primarily to human intellectual cognition, is crucial here. In addition, its constitutive factors are love and freedom. The character of the three indicated factors points to the transcendence of man against the world of nature. Human cognition is not only a function of physiology but due to the relationship with love and free will it exceeds the level of the stimulus response and adopts a selective form, natural to man. In turn, love fulfils itself in a proper (proportionate) way not in relation to things or animals but to another person. The human transcendence is complemented by free decision accompanied by individual responsibility. The acts of decision concern an acting entity and they constantly shape the human personality.40 Additionally, the human nature includes three inclinations – the constitutive factors of transcendence against human communities. They include:  the legal personality of man, which means that certain actions or lack of actions on the part of other people are due to him because of common good, constituted by a more and more complete updating of the personal potentialities of every human being. It goes hand in hand with the sovereignty of living which shows the significant difference in the living status of a human person and a community. The social life is a relational entity, lower in rank with respect to a person’s life. It does not therefore complement a human person as a substantial being but it can only 37 “[…] persona significat id quod perfectissimum est in tota natura, scilicet subsistens in rationali natura” (S. Thomae Aquinatis, Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, Parmae 1858, lib. I, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, resp.). 38 See M. Krąpiec, Człowiek jako osoba, Lublin 2005, pp. 113–145. 39 See M. Krąpiec, Człowiek jako osoba, Lublin 2005, pp. 113–145. 40 Tarasiewicz, Spór o naród, p. 23. See also: Krąpiec, Ja – człowiek; Krąpiec, Człowiek – dramat natury i osoby, in: Człowiek, wychowanie, kultura, ed. F. Adamski, Cracow 1993, pp. 11–24.

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enhance the complementation. The religious dignity, which ultimately results from the ontic relationship between a man and the Absolute, is also inscribed into human nature. Given the fact that personal human potentialities are actualized primarily through interpersonal relations, their most perfect type is the relationship that occurs just between the human person and the Divine person. The religious relationship is not, of course, symmetrical, sometimes it is unilateral (when for example we are dealing with an atheist), but it always happens, it is non-transferable. Thanks to it, every man has the right to dignity which makes him irreducible to any human community.41 Thus, man as a person transcends not only the world of nature but also every community in which he lives. In addition, we owe the discovery of existence and its role in the philosophical explanation of reality to Saint Thomas. The reinforcement of the role of existence in the world of beings made the philosophy more real, providing the philosophical cognition with directness in describing the world and the verifiability of its explanations.42 Moreover, the discovery of existence played a significant role in the theory of man. It gave an opportunity to show that man was the most perfect being in nature. Personal life is assigned to man and is formed by a set of the above-mentioned possibilities-inclinations, which are to be actualized in the process of human life. Knowing what they are, man can reasonably and responsibly resolve questions of the ultimate goal of his own life and taking this aim into account he is able to organize his life in a proper way.43 That is how the underlying objective of culture is fulfilled. Thus, culture can be called high when it respects the indicated aim providing man with the conditions for a proper personal development.

3. Virtues and culture The realist concept of man grows out of the description of his rational dynamism which constitutes personal life. The indicated dynamism manifests itself in the form of activation and development of the aforementioned human inclinations

41 Tarasiewicz, Spór o naród, p. 24. See also M. Krąpiec, Człowiek w kulturze; Warsaw, 1996; M. Krąpiec, “Osoba i naród wobec globalizmu,” Człowiek w kulturze 14 (2002), pp. 8–9. 42 See M. Krąpiec, Metafizyka. Zarys teorii bytu, Lublin 1978; M. Krąpiec, O rozumienie filozofii, Lublin 1991. 43 See H. Kiereś, Człowiek i sztuka, Lublin 2006, pp. 15–16. See also: I. Chłodna-Błach, “Wpływ koncepcji edukacji na kulturę społeczeństwa,” in: Sztuka i realizm, Lublin 2014, pp. 89–96.

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that include: cognition, love, freedom, subjectivity before the law, sovereignty – the uniqueness of being and religious dignity. The indicated features of personal life are “assigned” to man, which means that he should actualize them. On the one hand, this actualization depends upon the environment in which man lives. On the other hand, however, it relies upon his internal features. The characteristic feature of the picture of man presented by Thomas is the fact that he shows man through not so much “who and what he is,” that is, statistically, but in “how he acts and what he should do” in order to fully realize his humanity, namely, in the aspect of efficiency and purpose. That is why Saint Thomas devoted so much attention to the ethics of virtues so that in this context he could fully answer the question of: “who man was,” presenting him in his human performance.44 The life structured by virtues is the best portrayal of the nature of personal existence. Culture, being a specific niche in which virtues are developed and practiced and faults are eliminated, helps man in the accomplishment of this type of life. Such image of culture presupposes an ontic knowledge regarding the human being. It tells us that man is an entity equipped with reason and free will and moreover, with permanent dispositions in the sphere of existence (habitus entitativus) as well as skills related to action (habitus operativus). Saint Thomas quoted the definition of efficiency by Averroes in his works: “quo quis agit, cum voluerit” (something we use whenever we want) and the one of Saint Augustine:  “quo quis aliquid agit, cum opus fuerit” (something by means of which we act when necessary).45 The phenomenon related to efficiency is the habit (consuetudo, assuefactio) but it significantly differs from the first one. Habits occur unconsciously, mechanically, they act automatically, involuntarily, without awareness whereas the skills are the effect of a conscious effort, when man acts with their help he acts consciously.46 The indicated consciousness leaves room for freedom in the case of efficiency. Man can, but does not have to, make use of a given skill in a particular situation. However, there is no such freedom in the case of a habit. It makes man perform the same actions involuntarily all the time. Interestingly, alongside efficiency always generates some habits, which frequently operate independently.

4 4 Maryniarczyk, Realistyczna interpretacja rzeczywistości, Lublin 2005, pp. 114–115. 45 S. Thomae Aquinatis, “Quaestiones disputatae de anima,” in: S. Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici quaestiones disputatae, vol. 2, cura et sudio P. Bazzi [et al.], ed. 9 rev., Romae–Taurini 1953, III, c. 18. 46 See J. Woroniecki, Katolicka etyka wychowawcza, vol. 1, Lublin 1986, p. 334.

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In addition, it should be noted at this point that man has the potentials which require updating both in the physical and spiritual sphere. Saint Thomas paid attention to the differences between them, too.47 For this reason, we can point to four groups of the indicated skills: 1) physiological improvement; 2) theoretical and intellectual cognitive skills; 3) practical and technical cognitive skills; 4) moral skills – virtues and faults. The last three ones of the indicated groups express themselves within culture. The source understanding of culture shows that its essence includes the acts of receptive cognition, in which we cognitively perceive the already existing contents of the world of nature. It is defined as the internalizing or the intellectualization of the existing world.48 It constitutes a significant feature of culture, present in every cultural act. Thanks to the fact that man is enriched by this content, the acts of action and creativity are enabled. Culture is thus created by three types of human reasonable activities: 1) theoretical and informative cognition (theoría), firstly manifesting itself in a commonsense and then in a scientific way of cognition; 2) practical cognition (praksis), governing human behaviour and consequently, the entire moral order resulting from personal decisions of man; 3)  creative cognition (poiesis), as a result of which man transforms the world by introducing his creations into the existing nature. All spheres of our personal life require improvement and hence virtues.49 Therefore, these three areas of human reasonable action – the three areas of culture – correspond to three groups of skills: intellectual (dianoethical), moral (ethical) and technical (poietic).50 The mental power, without which we cannot speak of skills but of habits, is involved in the operation of all the three aforementioned groups. Cognitive theoretical skills improve the theoretical reason to learn about a certain, defined category of phenomena, that is objects. They improve the intellect and the cognitive powers. They include:  the theoretical wisdom, the understanding ability and the common sense. Their formation as well as their development is the fruit of learning and therefore they require experience and time. On the other hand, in the case of the practical and technical cognitive skills as well as the moral skills we deal with the improvement of reason in its practical function. On the border of intellectual and moral virtues, there is

47 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, transl. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, New York 1947, I–II, q. 50, a. 6. 48 M. A. Krapiec, “Kultura,” in: Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 6, Lublin 2005, p. 136. 49 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103 a. 50 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1138 b – 1139 a.

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a virtue of prudence, which improves the practical reason, the immaterial spiritual power, to make it able to read the justifiable good. The differences between upbringing and education are clearly seen against the backdrop of the aforesaid division. The first one refers primarily to the powers of desire, namely the will and the feelings. As a result of education, we improve reason but it takes place in its practical function – governing action. However, education deals mainly with the improvement of the cognitive power of:  the senses, memory, imagination and reason in its theoretical function. The proper course of education is possible only when the powers of desire are mastered.51 Thus, the cooperation between upbringing and education is indispensable. Then we can talk about man distinguished by high culture whom the Greeks would call kalos kai agathos. As we can see, man should be brought up with regard to high culture and therefore to the choice of higher goods. It is necessary to show him how to differentiate between good and evil and also explain that we distinguish higher and lower goods among the goods themselves. The process of education relies on equipping a young man with a set of indispensable skills which are meant to help him identify the real, legitimate good and strengthen his will so that he is strong enough to follow it. This is why, in the further part of the chapter, we are going to deal with virtues – moral skills because they are intended to develop and protect human good simultaneously accomplishing the aims set by various fields of culture. We shall pay special attention to the virtue of valour playing a key role in the context of high culture we are interested in. Virtues constitute such improvement of particular powers that their functioning is optimally subordinated to the justifiable, objective good, recognized by reason.52 The involvement of man should be strengthened through education so that virtues could reach the optimum potentiae, namely the fullness of perfection – not in and of itself but in the interest of man. It is based on the concept of the “golden mean” principle determined by reason (not a thing). Thus, the improvement of individual powers is to be oriented at making them compliant with reason in reaching appropriate means. According to Thomas Aquinas:  “Wherefore it belongs to human virtue to make man good, to make his work accord with reason.’53 It is the improvement

5 1 See Woroniecki, Katolicka etyka wychowawcza, vol. 1, p. 345. 52 P. Jaroszyński, Etyka. Dramat życia moralnego, Szczecinek 2013. 53 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, q. 123, a. 1.

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in power and possibility to act. It is the enhancement of power. Each virtue introduces moderation which is the indicated “golden mean” between two faults. The criterion determining the indicated “golden mean” is the right reason  – guided by the virtue of prudence.54 Disregarding the precepts of the right reason is the extreme in the field of virtues.55 Then the virtue transforms into a flaw. Virtue is the skill of an autonomous action in line with a moral code (Greek:  hexis proajretike). In the case of virtues, we have to re-identify good, we need to want it again because we constantly face various choices that we have to make throughout our lives. That is why education is so important. The acquisition of proper virtues by way of constant practising them in our everyday lives facilitates our easier and faster choice of the legitimate good even though initially it may be difficult and unpleasant. This is the principle that underpins the education with regard to high culture, relying on the choice of this type of goods. However, in order to make proper choices, man must display knowledge about the good, its different types, and in addition, he has to possess a properly shaped character enhanced by virtues, namely, the improvements for the goodoriented acts.56 People often stop at the common-sense perception of virtues without a deeper consideration of their meaning. In consequence, it often occurs that virtues are confused with faults. The knowledge of the classical concept of virtues is of crucial importance in the process of the proper education. Therefore, it should underpin the education of every man. This is also true for the condition of culture which largely consists of the choices we make every day. Aristotle pointed out that by nature no virtue was innate.57 We are capable of acquiring and developing virtues by nature. We acquire them in action while doing ethically positive things. The virtue which is not practised disappears when we stop performing certain activities. Aristotle stressed at that point that it was decisive to accustom to a certain type of behaviour from an early youth.58 That is why the proper education is so important similarly to the growth of man in the proper culture in which man learns how to experience goods facilitating his development and shapes his constant will to strive for such goods.

54 Thomas Aquinas, Summa teologiczna, vol. 21, trans. S. Bełch, London 1962, II–II, q. 123, a.1; explanatory notes, p. 176. 55 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 123, a. 4. 56 See Z.  Pańpuch, “Cnoty i wady,” in:  Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 2, Lublin 2001, p. 216. 57 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103 a 17. 58 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103 b 25–27.

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We acquire moral (ethical) virtues, which are perfecting our desiring powers, by way of habit. They include: • the virtue of justice – perfecting the will (the spiritual immaterial power), so that it considers not only our personal good but also the good of other people who as people have the same rights as we do. Therefore, it is the constant willingness to give back what is due to other people; • the virtue of valour and moderation (restraint) – refine the sensual striving powers (the sensual, irrational powers; they become rational only when connected with reason) for moral action, aim at achieving the goal indicated by reason. Thomas Aquinas invokes the words of Saint Augustine who said that “valour protects man from all non-essential pleasures’59 There are two things disturbing the will to follow the right precepts of reason: • being attracted by something pleasant, which may be overcome by the virtue of moderation; it disciplines the drive towards sensual pleasures and prevents them from obscuring a moral judgement and an operation of the principle of duty; • the difficulty associated with doing what is indicated by reason; man can resist such spiritual difficulties due to the virtue of valour. It is a virtue because it integrates human behaviour with reason. The role of valour is to remove obstacles preventing the will from subordinating to reason. Valour is one of cardinal (or principal) virtues60 (besides prudence, justice, and moderation) because it contains in itself the power of action – the feature which is the common condition of every virtue. The task of the virtue of valour is to support the human will in being directed by reason, notwithstanding the fear of physical evil.61 According to Saint Thomas, the virtue of valour reveals the fullness of its authenticity in the face of the most extreme of physical hazards, namely, in the face of death62. The essence of virtue is striving for good, therefore a brave man, does not divert from the peril of death to achieve good.63 Furthermore, the virtue of valour strengthens the conscience so that it does not retreat from obstacles on the road to morality, so that it fights instead of 5 9 Augustinus, De doctrina christiana, c. 7. 60 Cicero reduced all virtues to four, called cardinal virtues. See Z. Pańpuch, “Męstwo,” in: Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 7, Lublin 2006, p. 142. 61 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 123, a. 4. 62 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 123, a. 2. 63 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 123, a. 5.

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giving up, in order that the human spirit does not gradually become weaker on the way to the goal but rather undertakes difficult tasks. Thus, seen as virtue and a spiritual efficiency, valour can and should be developed (trained) by means indicated by the Christian prudence.64 The intrinsic qualities help or interrupt the acquisition and practising of the virtue of valour. The indicated properties (dispositions, character) are either physical (a strong organism, nerves), or mental (the cohesion, acuity, speed, clarity of judgement and decision, willpower). A natural foundation for the virtue of valour is created by taking proper care of them. The development of imagination, which makes the sound judgement of reality difficult or impossible, exaggerating or underestimating the danger, is of crucial importance here.65

4. The meaning of the virtue of valour Given the general considerations outlined above, the virtue of valour is distinguished as a unique virtue, different from other virtues due to the fact that its essence includes the power of spirit in general, in everything. Let us have a closer look at this virtue since it is in its elements that Saint Thomas mentioned magnanimity (Latin magnanimitas66), with which, on the other hand – as we have already mentioned  – Aristotle associated the greatness and the power of the spirit with reference to great things. The possession of the virtue of magnanimity is the indispensable prerequisite of ethical valour, the correct appraisal of great and small goods. In addition, it helps in overcoming difficulties connected with striving for this type of goods. All the indicated elements condition the existence of high culture in man. The term “valour” can be understood in two ways: 1) as some spiritual power in general – general constancy of mind; then valour is a general virtue, namely a prerequisite of any other virtue; 2)  as a special efficiency  – particularly the power to endure, persevere and overcome any difficulty and dangerous threats that make the preservation of constancy most difficult. Valour understood in this

64 Thomas Aquinas, Summa teologiczna vol. 21, trans. S. Bełch, London 1962 explanatory notes, p. 172. 65 Thomas Aquinas, Summa teologiczna, vol. 21, trans. S. Bełch, London 1962 explanatory notes, p. 173. 66 Magnanimity understood as the greatness of the heart, the generosity, the greatness and power of the soul. See S. B. Linde, Słownik języka polskiego, vol. 6, Lviv 1855, 296 a.

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way is a special virtue because its subject is a special domain.67 Valour helps to resist pressure from all faults (even as a special virtue). The proper – direct subject of valour is the fear of difficulties which are strong enough to prevent the will from following the precepts of reason. Valour refrains from them. In addition, the subject of valour is courage which is to be guided by it in order to overcome difficulties (in a disciplined manner).68 However, the indirect subject of valour is constituted by threats and difficulties since they induce fear and courage. Valour is more about overcoming fear than controlling courage. Subduing fear is more difficult. Withstanding difficulties is the act of valour resulting from controlling fear. Therefore, undisturbed perseverance with threats is the supreme act of valour.69 Saint Thomas noted that valour makes the possessor of it think before starting to act. Then, the person does not act in a reckless manner but is supported by the virtue of prudence.70 As Cicero wrote: “valour relies on facing risks and withstanding difficulties in full knowledge of the facts.’71 In order to grasp Thomas’ understanding of the virtue of magnanimity that is of interest to us, it is necessary to have a look at the virtues connected with valour, the subject of which are threats and minor difficulties. Saint Thomas discussed them while analysing the components of valour.72 He stressed that virtue could include three types of components: subjective, integral and potential.73 Valour – considered as a special virtue – has no subjective parts. However, it has the integral parts – that is, the elements which have to cooperate in order to perform the act of valour, and the potential parts, which are auxiliary virtues that mix with valour as the primary virtue. These are the virtues which perform the same function with respect to minor difficulties as valour does with respect to great difficulties (with reference to the life-threatening dangers). In addition, it should be noted that valour manifests itself in two acts:  assault (attack) and endurance (perseverance). When it comes to assault, there are 67 Cicero writes that “courage is a conscious and thoughtful confrontation with dangers and suffering” (2 De Invent. Rketor., 54). 68 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 123, a. 3 69 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 123, a. 6. 70 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 123, a. 9. 71 Cicero, 2 De invent. Rhetor, c. 54; qtd. after Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 123, a. 9. 72 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 128. 73 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 128, a. 1.

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two conditions which must be fulfilled: 1) spiritual preparation; 2) the execution (completion) of the undertaken task, without giving up the activity started with trust.74 If the two indicated conditions are associated with dangers of death, they will constitute the integral parts of valour. However, when they relate to situations in which danger, difficulties are minor. They will constitute virtues separated from valour, even though they will be connected with valour. In the case of the second act of valour – endurance (perseverance), one should also consider the following two conditions: 1) preventing the mental breakdown because of sadness caused by the difficulties aroused by imminent evil so that the mind could decide according to the greatness of the spirit;75 2) preventing man from getting tired by a long-lasting withstanding of difficulties so that he did not give up the execution of the undertaken task.76 Just as in the first case, the two factors applied to the matter typical of valour, namely, to the life-threatening dangers, will be its constituent parts, whereas, when related to any other difficult matter, they will be separate virtues that merge with valour as a primary virtue.77 In this respect, Saint Thomas relied on distinguishing four components of valour, made by Cicero in his work entitled De Invetione (about the rhetoric invention). Cicero pointed to:  trust, majesty (Latin magnificentia78), patience (Latin patientia79) and perseverance (Latin perseverantia80). Saint Thomas emphasized that the aforementioned components were accompanied by three extra ones, due to Macrobius, who mentioned them in his commentary to the work of Cicero entitled: The dream of Scipio. Macrobius put endurance in place of Cicero’s patience, inflexibility  – in place of endurance, and additionally, he added the following three components:  magnanimity (Latin magnanimitas),

74 Here, Cicero emphasizes the role of trust. Thanks to this condition, “the human spirit is self-confident and full of hope that he will do great and noble things” (Cicero, 2 De invent. Rhetor, c. 54). 75 According to Cicero, patience, which is a “voluntary and long-lasting resistance to difficult adversities for noble or useful purposes,” is responsible for that (Cicero, 2 De invent. Rhetor, c. 54). 76 Persistence protects against it, which, as Cicero writes, “is unwavering in what has been decided after the mature thought” (Cicero, 2 De invent. Rhetor, c. 54). 77 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 128, a. 1. 78 Virtue is to plan and carry out great external undertakings. 79 Patience, persistence over sorrows. It is also referred to as tolerantia – patience, endurance in withstanding annoyances, pain and nasty people. 80 Perseverance, tirelessness towards long-lasting difficulties; lenia – resistance of the spirit to overwhelming factors.

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self-assurance (Latin fiducia81) and constancy (Latin constantia82). Cicero placed magnanimity and self-assurance in trust. Saint Thomas explained that trust referred to the element of certainty in hope whereas magnanimity related to greatness of the expected thing.83 As he stressed, Macrobius added self–confidence there which excluded fear because fear was the opposite of hope. Thus, the virtue of magnanimity occurs at the stage of spiritual preparation. It was important for Saint Thomas from the point of view of education. Man has to develop many auxiliary and component virtues of the primary virtue such as valour in himself to become a truly valiant, “great” man. Apart from some intrinsic properties which can be helpful or disturbing in achieving it, Saint Thomas attached the utmost importance to his own work on himself.84 Therefore, Thomas Aquinas followed Cicero in accepting four component and auxiliary parts of valour but he put magnanimity in place of trust in his own powers. It is the virtue that makes man strive for great things, for expected goods, for great goods, such as spiritual goods, namely virtues.85 Magnanimity is thus a sign of high culture – originality, which consists of strong, but disciplined desires-drives, great and broad mind, governed by real and high truths. It differs from valour in that it relies on striving for good which is difficult to achieve, whereas valour aims at withstanding evil which is difficult to endure, requiring a greater power of the spirit.86 The common feature of valour and magnanimity is the fact that both of them take part in strengthening the spirit in difficult matters. Saint Thomas Aquinas treated magnanimity as part of valour, claiming that it combined with valour as a secondary virtue did with the primary one.87 Aquinas explains, completing Aristotle’s opinion, that great and difficult things can become the subject of improvement in two ways: firstly, in case of difficulty to determine a golden mean in some area (object) (such difficulty exists in the act of prudence and justice); secondly, another difficulty occurs with the object

81 Confidence in one’s own powers, the belief in success, self-confidence; eupsychia – good nature, cheerfulness, optimism, alacrity. 82 Stability, immutability of the will. It is also referred to as firmitas – durability, persistence, compactness, sturdiness with reference to adversities. 83 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 128, a. 1. 84 Thomas Aquinas, Summa teologiczna, vol. 21, trans. S. Bełch, London 1962 explanatory notes, p. 185. 85 Thomas Aquinas, Summa teologiczna, vol. 21, trans. S. Bełch, London 1962 explanatory notes, p. 172. 86 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 129, a. 5. 87 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 129, a. 5

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which by nature contradicts the decisions of reason, it is the case for the feelings (virtues of moderation and valour). Being up to the indicated difficulties is not only a matter of a reflection of reason but also of such improvement of the will that man was not discouraged or did not refrain from them. It is just the virtue of magnanimity that constitutes the aforementioned improvement of the will, whereas the proper subject of magnanimity- the aim is the great and difficult (the best) component present in every virtue.

5. Magnanimity and its components 5.1. CONFIDENCE Magnanimity has its own subject. It is constituted by the consequence of eminent – virtuous deeds, namely honour – reverence. Saint Thomas Aquinas justified it by saying that reverence is a direct subject of hope, which strives for the difficult good. That is why magnanimity directly refers to hope – as one of passions, but directly to reverence – as the subject of hope.88 It refers to hope because the subject of reverence is a difficult one but we hope to accomplish it; we believe that the good we are interested in is achievable. The power of hope is called confidence and this is why confidence is the component of magnanimity.89 Saint Thomas stressed that man was not self-sustaining and therefore he should first of all trust the Creator, then other people, ready to help him as well as be self-confident, basing on the knowledge of his own powers. In turn, reverence – honour is an attitude, man’s readiness to behave in the manner worthy of man – a Christian (venerability). According to Saint Thomas, it is the greatest of external goods, the award for virtue.90 At the same time, however, it is the testimony given by people to virtue and virtuous deeds. It is an external way of showing respect. The magnanimous man not only performs great deeds but is moderate with respect to honour given to him by others. In addition, such man is not discouraged when given no sign of acknowledgement.91 Thus, magnanimity brings order compliant with the principles of reason in the matter such as reverence. Due to the fact that reverence is the award of every virtue, magnanimity refers to all virtues provided it aims at performing great

8 8 89 90 91

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 129, a. 1. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 129, a. 6. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 131, a. 1. Thomas Aquinas, Summa teologiczna, vol. 21, trans. S. Bełch, London 1962 explanatory notes, p. 186.

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deeds in each of them.92 Saint Thomas shared the view of Aristotle who claimed that:  “whatever is great in each virtue belongs to the magnanimous […] the magnanimous is intent on doing great deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to what is worthy of great honors.’93 In this sense, magnanimity is a general virtue, it includes all other virtues. It aims at the spiritual greatness of man and so his high culture. Magnanimity combines all virtues into a single harmonious whole that takes on a strong, yet a living character, capable of adjusting to the changing circumstances of life. Thus, magnanimity constitutes one of the keystones of our moral life.94 The lack of care with respect to reverence or paying inadequate attention to it can be caused by a variety of factors, such as: a low level of mental development, which inhibits the understanding of the importance of spiritual good.95 Another reason may be a far-reaching immorality leading to the loss of the sense of personal dignity, and consequently, not noticing the recognition given to this dignity by others. Another cause is treating the reverence and human recognition with some disrespect, stemming from pride. Therefore, we are protected against taking an improper approach to the indicated reverence and recognition by the virtue of humility. Thus, we should treat the opinions of others concerning us seriously, as a guide, which, when controlled by the virtue of prudence, will show us the proper way of conduct.96 The above considerations indicate that magnanimity should be grounded in sound judgement pertaining to one’s own virtue, mental abilities, features of character or even one’s temperament. The judgement should be located centrally between what we think about ourselves and what others think about us. The magnanimous man dives into the greatest things in compliance with reason, considers himself to be worthy of what is proportionate to his dignity. Man strives for what is great, what is worthy of great reverence and thus what is higher than average but he avoids the average. His high culture is expressed through in it. As Saint Thomas emphasizes, mediocrity relied on the fact that someone overestimated some goods or external evils to such an extent that in 92 “[…] magnanimitas ad duo respicit: ad konorem quidem sicut ad materiam; sed ad aliquid magnum operandum sicut ad finem” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 129, a. 8). 93 Aristotle, 4 Ethic, c. 3; qtd. after Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 129, a. 4 ff. 94 J. Woroniecki, Katolicka etyka wychowawcza, vol. 2/1, Lublin 1995, p. 456. 95 Woroniecki, Katolicka etyka wychowawcza, vol. 2/1, p. 455. 96 Woroniecki, Katolicka etyka wychowawcza, vol. 2/1, p. 455.

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consequence he shirked from justice or any other virtue. Moreover, it also relies on hiding the truth because of fear of revealing it. The sign of mediocrity is also complaining since, as Saint Thomas explained, “it points to the fall of the spirit against the external evil.’97 A magnanimous man can be recognized by his external behaviour in which his inner attitude is reflected. That is why according to Saint Thomas “magnanimity is reflected in a specific way.’98 Man can enrich and order the world of thoughts and desires through the proper way of conduct, a conscious and deliberate selection of his environment, activities and reading. Everything that hinders it, leads to lessening and weakening of the spirit.99 This is where the differences between the high culture and the low culture are clearly visible. The first one aims at satisfying the higher-spiritual needs of man, whereas the low culture relies only on human desires and low feelings. Man should be brought up in a special way to be able to see the differences between them. It is not insignificant what the environment in which man lives is, what surrounds him or who the people he spends time with are. All this has an impact on shaping human character. On the one hand, man must be equipped with a criterion enabling him to distinguish between the higher and lower goods so that he is able to make the right choices. However, on the other hand, he must know himself, the possibilities inherent in his human nature but at the same time he has to know his possibilities and individual abilities.

5.2. HUMILITY Thanks to the virtue of magnanimity man regards himself as worthy of something great because of the gifts received from God.100 With this gift, man is conscious of his abilities, talents, possibilities and uses them with respect to matters of great importance. He is also grateful to the Creator for the gifts received from him. He is self-confident because the self-confidence removes discouragement.101 However, he is not conceited. That is why the virtue of magnanimity is accompanied by the virtue of humility, a magnanimous man is also aware of his deficiencies, shortcomings and imperfections. The humility in its core refers to human desires. It introduces moderation into them. As Saint Thomas wrote: “humility

9 7 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 129, a. 4. 98 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 129, a. 3 99 Tomasz z Akwinu, Summa teologiczna, explanatory notes, p. 186. 100 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, q. 129, a. 3. 101 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, q. 129, a. 7.

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has essentially to do with the appetite, in so far as a man restrains the impetuosity of his soul, from tending inordinately to great things: yet its rule is in the cognitive faculty, in that we should not deem ourselves to be above what we are.’102 Therefore man, while evaluating himself, should not overrate himself. He should not underestimate himself, either. He should not familiarize with the measure of perfection placed in him by God – the Creator. A humble man is aware of what he has received from God.103 For this reason, an attitude of humility has a reference to God – for, after all, it is the respect given to Him as the Creator of all beings and also human talents as well as an individual history of every person (God’s Providence).104 According to the teaching of Saint Thomas, God-Absolute is the only perfect being, he lacks nothing. In fact, He constitutes the fullness of existence in which there is no outdated potentiality or a lack of something (evil). God is perfect.105 He is the source and the model of any perfection. He is the summum bonum – the highest good.106 Thus, what is perfect in man is at the same time divine, even if the good (perfection) is (just like virtue or knowledge) the direct merit of the action of man.107 Therefore, a humble man recognizes his dependence on God. While discussing the relationship that a magnanimous man should have with others, Saint Thomas quoted Aristotle’s view: “it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards the middle class.’108 Thus, a magnanimous man does not pretend, he is authentic in the relationships with other people. As for the things he owns, he definitely prefers the ones that are good in themselves and not the ones that are useful. As Saint Thomas wrote: “the magnanimous man despises external goods, inasmuch as he does not think them so great as to be bound to do anything unbecoming for their sake.’109 As for external goods (the so-called gifts of fortune – bona fortunae), a magnanimous man does not regard them as unnecessary to perform virtuous deeds.110 They are helpful as

1 02 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1963, II–II, q. 161, a. 6 c. 103 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 161, a. 3 c. 104 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 162, a. 3 ad 1; and II–II, q. 161, a. 2 c. 105 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 4, a. 1 c. 106 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 6, a. 2 c. 107 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, t. 22, II–II, q. 161, a. 3, c; see also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 1, I, q. 4, a.2 c. 108 Aristotle, 4 Ethic, c. 3; qtd. after: Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 129, a. 3. 109 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 129, a. 3. 110 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 129, a. 8.

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they are tools. Therefore, Saint Thomas shared also Aristotle’s view in this respect claiming that the gifts of fortune contributed to magnanimity.111 As Jacek Woroniecki stresses in his Katolicka etyka wychowawcza, the virtue of magnanimity was well known from antiquity until the thirteenth century. The indicated term was forgotten with the fall of the scholastic school and the decline in the level of teaching moral theology.112 However, eliminating the term itself did not make the problems associated with it disappear. This virtue is still very important today in the field of education. It is placed in the very centre between ambition, which is too excessive, and a lack of it. Modern pedagogy employed the term “healthy ambition” to define what belonged to the essence of magnanimity.113 The “healthy” component of ambition lies in the fact that it constitutes the desire of reverence and honours that are due to what is the real good in the temporal life, namely to virtue and character. Thus, teaching ambition and thereby, magnanimity, will be based on greater care taken of what deserves reverence and what is the reason of reverence rather than the reverence itself, being only a reward.114 As Woroniecki notices: “The manifestations of ambition should not be suppressed but purified and put back on track so that over time they could generate the precious virtue of magnanimity in the soul.’115 That is why any innate desire for what is great, noble and beautiful should be developed in man. The way that leads to it is the love for perfection in everything one does, starting from the most ordinary duties of everyday life. Each activity should be accompanied by the conviction that: “the true greatness of man does not belong to this world and that no temporal goods can provide it because it comes from the domain of eternal things.’116

6. Faults contrary to magnanimity The virtue of magnanimity will manifest itself even more clearly when we display its corresponding faults. As any other virtue, magnanimity has its weaknesses.

111 “When we have wealth, power and friends, we have the capacity to act. Hence, it is clear that good fortune contributes to magnanimity” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 129, a. 8). Aristotle argued that “good conduct seems to promote generosity” (Aristotle, 4 Ethic, c. 3). 112 Woroniecki, Katolicka etyka wychowawcza, vol. 2/1, p. 449. 113 Woroniecki, Katolicka etyka wychowawcza, vol. 2/1, pp. 449, 472. 114 Woroniecki, Katolicka etyka wychowawcza, vol. 2/1, p. 472. 115 Woroniecki, Katolicka etyka wychowawcza, vol. 2/1, p. 472. 116 Woroniecki, Katolicka etyka wychowawcza, vol. 2/1, p. 473.

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By excess, such faults are presumption,117 ambition, vanity. However, by insufficiency, it is pusillanimity.118 There are several faults, because the subject of virtue is complex, including an attitude to the deeds themselves and to the reverence they bring.

6.1. PRESUMPTION It is based on man’s desire for what surpasses him. Presumption stems from the mind: from the inadequate cognition of oneself. While considering whether it was a sin, Thomas Aquinas indicated that the essence of sin included the lack of respect for the universal order of natural things. He claims that, “whatever is according to nature, is ordered by the Divine Reason, which human reason ought to imitate.”119 If our conduct complies with the nature of a given thing, we respect the law inscribed in it, which makes every deed match the powers of the doer. Therefore, we commit a sin against the order of nature when we undertake actions that surpass us.120 Thomas Aquinas emphasises that men should strive for what is immortal and Divine. Man is enhanced by the natural power, which is the intellect. Magnanimity is based on moderation (“the golden mean”) not because of the volume of the object of desire – as it aims at a very big object – but because of the relation of the object to the possessed powers: it does not strive for something that surpasses the powers. However, when it comes to presumption, exaggeration relies on the lack of proportion between the object of desire and the possessed powers.121 A presumptuous man overestimates his capabilities. He is convinced that he knows and can do more than his abilities permit. Of course, it is very difficult to see what the limits of each man’s capabilities are, so it is always better to exceed the border a little rather than not reach it at all.122 A lesser evil will be when – while performing a certain action – we misjudge our possibilities rather than avoid doing something we can do. It often happens that we 117 Aristotle writes that, “the “vain man,” i.e. a vaporer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a presumptuous man, “is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess” (2 Ethic. c. 7; 4, c. 3; qtd. after Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 130, a. 2, transl. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province). 118 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 130. 119 Ibid., II–II, q. 130, a. 1. 120 Ibid., II–II, q. 130, a. 1. 121 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 130, a. 2, transl. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. 122 Woroniecki, Katolicka etyka wychowawcza, vol. 2/1, P. 462.

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are not fully aware of our own abilities only to discover them while performing difficult tasks. This is how human development happens in various spheres of life. It is important not to hinder one’s enthusiasm in this respect, especially the enthusiasm of a young person who wants to do something that seems to surpass his capabilities. He should be allowed to demonstrate his abilities and receive support in the event of a possible failure. The fault of presumption is most detrimental to the one who possesses it. The impact is even worse when one is not very intelligent or – usually – detached from other people’s advice, thus unable to make use of the experience of others.

6.2. AMBITION Another weakness opposite to magnanimity by excess is ambition. The very name of the fault can be misleading today. The modern man links ambition with something that positively distinguishes a person. However, we are not accustomed to its negative meaning. Aristotle indicates in the Nicomachean Ethics that there was no Greek equivalent of the indicated disposition. He calls it descriptively:  a “disposition related to lesser honours.” There are Greek equivalents only for the excess of ambition – philóthimos – and the insufficiency of ambition, áphilóthimos. Thomas Aquinas used the Greek term ambitio in Summa Theologiae. Noteworthy, this Latin word has a pejorative connotation even in its purely philological sense, as it means:  1. circumvention (in Rome about candidates running for offices); 2.  a) wooing, chasing popularity, servility; b) greed for privileges, boastfulness, vanity; c) zealous striving for something, eager aiming at something. However, the related word ambitus means:  illegal running for offices, acquiring a position by wicked means, bribery.123 Father Jacek Woroniecki in the Catholic Ethics of Education, better defines the meaning of ambition Thomas Aquinas had in mind with the notions of “healthy ambition” and “false ambition.”124 With reference to presumption, ambition’s point of gravity shifts from deeds to the reverence they bring and seek. As Thomas Aquinas noticed, the desire for good should be governed by the rule of reason.125 When man does not follow the precepts of reason, he deviates from the route taken up to perfect the virtue. Ambition stems from will: the striving for honours, privileges, and great signs of recognition. Regarding this type of desire for reverence, wrongdoing occurs 1 23 See Słownik łacinsko-polski, ed. K. Kumaniecki, Warsaw 1982. 124 Woroniecki, Katolicka etyka wychowawcza, vol. 2/1, pp. 469–471. 125 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 131, a. 1.

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when man craves for undeserved reverence, when he longs it for himself with no reference to God, or desires reverence to satisfy lust and not to help others. In all the above cases, we deal with ambition: a fault or even a sin. It is responsible for an improper desire of reverence, not in line with the precepts of reason.126 A man with this flaw is primarily driven by selfish motives, by a drive to satisfy own needs and desires. This fault is often accompanied by arbitrariness, which is a wish to push forward one’s own will in every situation that occurs. It is a largescale stubbornness, not limited to details but one that covers bigger undertakings. It differs from persistence only because it does not aim at objective – personal or social – purposes but at satisfying one’s lust for power and recognition. The curious fact is that both presumption and ambition can constitute a driving force for action in one’s life, beneficial to society.127 To prove this, father Jacek Woroniecki invokes the examples of great scholars and statesmen like Napoleon, who displayed faults and often contributed to the development of knowledge or impacted the life of a given country in a significant way.

6.3. VAINGLORY The last fault that constitutes an excess of magnanimity is vainglory, understood as unjustified search for glory to reach complacency. Similarly to ambition, vainglory not so much enhances the performance of positive deeds as their consequences produced in the opinion of the environment. The aim of ambitious people is reverence and honour, whereas the target of vain men is publicity and fame-glory; namely, showing superiority. Publicity and fame-glory are easier to acquire than reverence and honour, because they may be gained through anything that is of interest in a given moment or that invokes public curiosity. A vain person wants to attract attention and he subordinates everything in his life to this purpose. The desire for glory in itself is not anything wrong. It becomes a fault when it is a drive for anything with no content. The room for such action is often constituted by low culture, which poses no challenges, tempting with a quick success that brings only the appearance of reverence and recognition. According to Thomas Aquinas, glory may become vain for three reasons: when the thing for which one seeks the glory is unworthy; when the judgement of people among whom one seeks the glory is not certain; and when one does not relate one’s own desire for glory to a descent purpose and, thus, to reverence for

1 26 Ibid., II–II, q. 130, a. 1. 127 Woroniecki, Katolicka etyka wychowawcza, vol. 2/1, p. 464.

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the Divine and to the good of neighbours.128 A vain man regards the glory he desires as something great and strives for it in a degree that is disproportionate to his worth.129 This flaw distorts the objectivity of judgements both about oneself and others. Vainglory stems directly from pride, which causes an unfair desire for superiority and is the “queen of all flaws”130 and the “beginning of every sin.”131 Man can display his superiority in a variety of ways:  disobedience, boastfulness, mendacity, hypocrisy, contrariness, persistence, naughtiness, disagreement, and faddism.132 The indicated types of behaviour are often accompanied by falsehood both in words and deeds. A vain person does not favour actions that represent any value. In this respect, the importance shifts to actions that attract attention and give publicity. The characteristic feature of the indicated attitude is the fact that it does not develop high culture, it does not lead to anything good, and even incidentally, it does not confer any benefits.133

6.4. PUSILLANIMITY Pusillanimity (Latin pusillanimitas) is a fault resulting from the insufficiency of magnanimity. A  mean-spirited man refrains from something of which he is worthy,134 he does not exploit his potential, he does nothing. Aristotle writes that, “he who deems himself less worthy than he is, is said to be fainthearted.”135 Aristotle stresses that pusillanimity makes man neglect good, which in his opinion is the worst thing.136 Thus, the flaw of pusillanimity manifests itself in the fact that man evaluates himself worse than he deserves and – contrary to the opinion of others – regards himself unable to do things to which he possesses sufficient capacity.137 Pusillanimity should be avoided, because it is a sin. Thomas Aquinas invokes here the Letter to the Collossans, in which Paul the Apostle speaks:  “Fathers, 1 28 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 132, a. 1. 129 Ibid., II–II, q. 132, a. 2. 130 Gregorgius Magnus, 31 Moralium (Moralia), c. 45; qtd. after Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 132, a. 4. 131 Ecclesiastes 10:15. 132 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 132, a. 5. 133 Woroniecki, Katolicka etyka wychowawcza, vol. 2/1, p. 465. 134 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 133, a. 1. 135 Aristotle, 4 Ethic., c. 3; qtd. after Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 133, a. 1. 136 Ibid. 137 Woroniecki, Katolicka etyka wychowawcza, vol. 2/1, p. 459.

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provoke not your children to anger, lest they be discouraged.”138 Saint Paul indicates here the source of pusillanimity, which may stem from (disorderly) anger. These are the harms suffered by man, which dampen his spirit of alacrity.139 This source may also be an excessive fearfulness, which is a fault contrary to valour.140 Saint Paul draws the attention of parents to the fact that they should not be too harsh on children, so that they do not quench the children’s spirit and lead to the development of pusillanimity. Excessive demands placed on children dampen their enthusiasm, discouraging them from taking further efforts. According to Thomas Aquinas, everything has a natural tendency to conduct actions that correspond to its capabilities. Mean-spirited people do not do and develop what they can by nature, refusing to strive for what corresponds to their powers.141 They are satisfied with small, often primitive things, offered by low culture, rather insignificant for their development. In this case, parents and other educators face a serious task to provide a child with a certain hierarchy of values and goods in order to develop a high culture in him, a desire to pursue something great. The role of parents today is often reduced to providing their children with material well-being. Parents, who themselves are not surrounded by people or things of value, are unable to set a good example for their children. Young people have few opportunities to experience high culture like true art or masterpieces, so in many cases, they cannot develop an artistic taste, or even worse, become aware of the fact that – as people – reasonable beings have abilities that enable them to perform great things above the average level. As Thomas Aquinas notices that man becomes mean-spirited when he can accomplish something great due to abilities and skills possessed by him by nature or an external success; however, he refuses to make use of these goods.142 Pusillanimity may stem from the lack of knowledge about oneself, which was noticed by Aristotle, who writes: “the fainthearted man knows not himself: for he would desire the good things, of which he is worthy, if he knew himself.”143 As Thomas Aquinas claims, the aforementioned ignorance does not result from stupidity but rather from laziness to cognise one’s own capabilities or perform 1 38 Collossians 3:21. 139 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 133, a. 2. 140 Ibid., II–II, q. 133, a. 2. 141 Ibid., II–II, q. 133, a. 1. Cf. also the Parable of the Talents (Matthew 25:14) and the following: Lucas 18:12 f. 142 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 133, a. 1. 143 Aristotle, 4 Ethic., c. 3; qtd. after Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 133, a. 2.

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activities within one’s abilities.144 Another reason may also be the pride masked by humility and modesty, manifesting itself by an excessive attachment to one’s own judgement about oneself. Thus, someone is excessively guided by his own opinion, which shows that he is too weak to do something that he is actually strong enough to do. Moreover, pusillanimity may also be caused by stupidity reflected in the lack of knowledge about the principles of duty. Thomas Aquinas analysed pusillanimity in three aspects: 1) the aspect of its essence, which is the opposite of magnanimity, as the weakness of spirit is contrary to the greatness of spirit, hence a mean-spirited man avoids great things; 2) the aspect of its cause which, on the part of the intellect, is the lack of knowledge about own capabilities, whereas on the part of the will, it is fear of failure, due to a wrong, diminished assessment of own strengths; 3)  the aspect of its effect, which is a departing from what is great but corresponding to possessed capabilities. Owing to the fact that we cannot determine the contrast between fault and virtue due to their essence, we may state that pusillanimity is the direct opposite of magnanimity.145 The frequent source of pusillanimity is laziness and aversion to work on possessed abilities and skills in order to develop them. Another, often omitted, source is pride. However, pride is based on fear of failure and disgrace, but also the anxiety about taking responsibility for own actions. A  dangerous aspect in such attitude is the fact that it may take the form of humility and modesty. Pride may be used to deviate from performing great tasks, even though difficult and responsible. Then, man is not interested in undertaking such tasks, and he cannot recognise the need to undertake them. Consequently, he becomes accustomed to small, insignificant things that obscure what he might accomplish with more effort. While describing such people, father Jacek Woroniecki notices that, “there is nothing great for them and  – when they face a great thing in life by chance – they hate it, since it distracts them from their little store in Galilee.”146

1 44 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 133, a. 2. 145 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 133, a.2. 146 Woroniecki, Katolicka etyka wychowawcza, vol. 2/1, p.461. Woroniecki refers here to the thought of Karol Hubert Roztworowski, who explains the betrayal of Judas by pusillanimity. As Woroniecki notices: “The great Apostle’s call did not capture his soul, it still longed for something small, for the store in Galilee … Judas revoked the Apostle’s responsibility and was a disgusting example showing the crime to which man could be pushed by pusillanimity when he was completely possessed by it.”

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Classical ethics draw our attention to the fact that such type of false humility is accompanied by a fault called suppleness, a specific excess of humility that means bowing to everything in fellow men that does not deserve such attention.147 One should not accept a sign of a sinful nature in another man. In modern culture, it is manifested through an uncritical acceptance of everything that we observe in the attitudes of other people or that is offered to us by the media. It is particularly visible in the customs extremely quickly change and adjust to what was once regarded as improper or even inappropriate. With the complete collapse of authorities, patterns of conduct, a frequent motive governing human behaviour is currently sensationalism, an unhealthy competition based on envy, gossip, libel, or slander. In this situation, one must work on the development of the virtue of magnanimity, which bases, among other things, on the elimination of associated faults. Magnanimity plays a key role in the process of education. In practice, the development of the virtue of duty for the creation of high culture in an alumnus is very helpful in this respect, so that he is ready to take on something difficult and assume the responsibility to finish the undertaken task. He should be given help in recognizing talents and making use of them in the best possible way. Obviously, the scope of the entrusted tasks must be adjusted to the possessed abilities and the current stage of his development. Unfortunately, today we deal with situations in which people, especially the young people, often fail to accomplish undertaken tasks. On the one hand, it may be the consequence of the fact that undertaken tasks are too difficult. However, on the other hand, many people lack the virtue of perseverance that facilitates the completion of a started task despite its difficulty. A healthy competition based on fair play facilitates the development of the virtue of magnanimity. At present, it is often distorted and leads to unhealthy competition and – in extreme cases – becomes the source of envy. Nevertheless, it is a crucial educational tool which, when used in a proper manner, facilitates the formation of a mature man, responsible and always aiming very high. Apart from the above methods of shaping magnanimity, what plays a very important role is example. Example is first given by parents, then by peers and teachers. Therefore, it is extremely important to provide a child with proper conditions of growth at every stage of his or her development.

147 Ibid., vol. 2/1, p.460.

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7. Magnanimity and Other Components of Valour 7.1. MAGNIFICENCE The difference between magnanimity and magnificence lies in the fact that magnificence (Latin magnificencia)148 pertains to external activities; that is, doing something in external or administrating (administratio). Whereas, magnanimity activates internal intentions (agitatio).149 Magnificence is the fitness of the spirit, providing man with the possibility to create great and wonderful external works and equipping him with the ability to plan and accomplish them.150 Therefore, the virtue of magnificence makes us use art for a great good purpose. It is responsible for the proper guidance of the mind. Magnificence performs a great external deed, especially to honour God. Therefore, magnificence is combined with holiness because its main fruit serves religion; namely, what is holy.151 As a secondary virtue, magnificence is part of the primary virtue of valour.152 Their common feature is that they both aim at something great and difficult. They differ in that valour opposes a danger that impends over a person (for example death) while magnificence refers to the loss of things (i.e. something smaller).

7.2. PATIENCE AND LONGANIMITY Beside magnanimity and magnificence, another virtue, which is part of valour, is patience. Patience enhances our perseverance in goodness, and it facilitates our efforts to endure adversities, control the spirit, drives, and feelings in a sad situation.153 It is a spiritual balance in worrying circumstances. Thomas Aquinas quotes Saint Augustine, who claims that, “A man’s patience it is whereby he bears evil with an equal mind,” i.e. without being disturbed by sorrow, “lest he abandon with an unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to better things.”154 While the role of valour is to endure the imminent danger of death, the role of 1 48 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 134, a. 1–2. 149 Cicero writes that “magnanimity is the activation (agitatio) of the spirit so that it strives for great and lofty things wonderfully and splendidly and performs them in this way” (2 De invent. Rhetor, c. 54; qtd. after ibid., II–II, q. 134, a. 2). The word agitatio refers to internal intentions. 150 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, explanatory notes on the text, p. 188. 151 Ibid., II–II, q. 134, a. 2. 152 Ibid., II–II, q. 134, a. 4. 153 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 136, a. 1. 154 Augustinus, De patientia, c. 2; qtd. after Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 136, a. 1.

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patience is to endure any other evil.155 Cicero defines patience in the following way: “it is a free and long-lasting endurance of arduous and difficult things for reasons of decency or benefit.”156 While discussing the virtue of patience, Thomas Aquinas characterises the virtue of longanimity-unwillingness (Latin longanimitas), which is an ability of perseverance in relation to a distant good, waiting, farsightedness, not becoming dispirited and discouraged because of long-lasting sad circumstances.157 He compares it to magnanimity by saying that, when facilitating our effort to achieve something great, longanimity-unwillingness strengthens us in our pursuit of something distant in time. It is difficult and requires both a personal effort and the knowledge of patterns, both tradition and education. Man rarely looks far ahead. He is often more willing to appreciate a lesser good that is easy to obtain than to value the greater good that is distant and uncertain. Moreover, such short-sightedness weakens the virtue of valour. It leads to discouragement and adjustment to an easy, undemanding mode of life. Therefore, the virtues of longanimity and foresight (providentia), which are the components of prudence, are of great significance in the process of education to high culture. It is connected with the fact that our actions are targeted at achieving some aim-good that refers both to what is to be accomplished and also to what we want to preserve. Longanimity is the virtue needed in every human work, which is to last longer and whose immediate effects cannot be predicted.158 The indicated situation requires the ability to develop a certain plan of action, in which we take into account both the circumstances favourable to our goal and those that may hamper us. The development of predictive abilities must be combined with strong imaginative work. The role of the virtue of longanimity is clearly underlined by Thomas Aquinas, when he describes the specificity of teacher’s work as the ministry of mercy.159 In order to perform this work well, among other things, a teacher must have a special attitude, distinguished by patience towards a student, along with longanimity

1 55 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 136, a. 4 156 Cicero, De invent., c. 54; qtd. after ibid., II–II, q. 136, a. 5. 157 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 136, a. 5. 158 Woroniecki, Katolicka etyka wychowawcza, vol. 2/1, p. 441. 159 To read more on the topic see: I. Chłodna-Błach, Nauczanie jako służba – na kanwie rozważań św. Tomasza z Akwinu, in: In rebus divinis atque humanis servire. Niektóre aspekty słuzby w rzeczywistosci Boskiej i ludzkiej, ed. W.  Guzewicz, A.  Mikucki, S. Strękowski, Ełk 2014, pp. 411–425.

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and magnanimity.160 According to Thomas Aquinas, longanimity and patience are part of the cardinal virtue of valour. Their task is to overcome discouragement in the face of obstacles. The significance of the virtue of longanimity in the work of a teacher is also stressed by father Jacek Woroniecki.161 Although longanimity is not primary, it is very important to the work of a teacher-educator. It is the prerequisite of toleration and gentleness. It allows one to counteract discouragement and impatient action. Longanimity facilitates the process of waiting for the fruit of the undertaken task, which is not immediate in this type of operation and sometimes makes one wait for it for a very long time.

7.3. PERSEVERANCE The last virtue discussed by Thomas Aquinas as one of the elements of valour is perseverance (Latin perseverantia), which means to last until the end, insist, stand in, never cease, continue to persist.162 It consists of two factors: attachment to a goal by thought and will  – the strength of perseverance depends on the power of persuasion and love for the goal – along with a deep rooting of this attachment in the soul, reinforced by the operation of many other virtues. Its essence is constituted by a long, undisturbed perseverance in a difficult good, despite the long endurance of what is difficult and cumbersome. This virtue by nature ensures the perseverance until the virtuous deed is accomplished.163 In the event of acts that concerning such virtues as belief, hope, and love, which refer to the ultimate goal of human life, actual perseverance is achieved only at the end of one’s life.164 Thomas Aquinas includes important educational indications in his considerations on the virtue of perseverance. A child is to be prepared since early childhood for hardships, inconveniences, and the rejection of pleasures and sensuous pleasure, so as to use them moderately. Children should learn how not to yield to themselves, how not to succumb to own caprices and whims. It is necessary to avoid two extreme dangers: on the one hand, spoiling the child, while on the other hand, raising the child in an atmosphere of depression and educational terror.165 It is important to develop in a child the ability to rest, which may be 160 See M. Szymonik, “Ideał nauczyciela w traktacie De Magistro św. Tomasza z Akwinu,” Śląskie Studia Historyczno-Teologiczne 38 (2005) b. 1, p. 160. 161 J. Woroniecki, Wychowanie człowieka. Pisma wybrane, Krakow 1961, pp. 190–191. 162 Linde, Słownik języka polskiego, vol. 6, pp. 633–634. 163 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 137, a. 1. 164 Ibid., II–II, q. 137, a. 1. 165 Ibid., explanatory notes on the text, p. 193.

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facilitated by the virtue of eutrapelia that controls the joy resulting from play.166 Education in the field of sport should not be neglected, as it provides the physical and mental foundation for the development of moral virtues. The entire process of formation is governed by the virtue of prudence, which in turn flows from God’s love, possible due to the virtue of faith and hope.167

8. The Subject of Magnanimity: The Great and Difficult Good Our foregoing considerations focused on magnanimity as the virtue that characterises the greatness and power of the soul as the indispensable condition of ethical valour. Thus, its subjective aspect was portrayed. The present analysis will be followed by indicating the object of magnanimity that is its objective aspect. It is in relation to the object appurtenant to the virtue of magnanimity that we can speak of high culture. Its high aspect includes the greatness and the effort appendant to good, which man aims to achieve. Like in every virtue, also here the object is good. However, in the case of magnanimity it is primarily the noble good, which is both great and difficult. The aforesaid properties of good are recognised by man through rational cognition and appropriate spiritual preparation.168 To be able to achieve such good, man needs support on the part of virtues that are perfected through education and God’s grace. Man is not self-sufficient. The earlier analyses of Aristotle’s views concerning the abovementioned subject revealed that he primarily associated this virtue with reverence constituting a reward for the noblest deeds.169 Thomas Aquinas Aquinas shares this view, but he additionally makes magnanimity more objective through conditioning it by the object, namely, the great and difficult good. Thomas indicates that this type of goods were spiritual goods. He further stresses that – due to the possession of the indicated virtue – man can distinguish between great and small goods.170 The former constitute the aim in itself, whereas the latter are the means to achieve higher goals and, thus, they are good due to their usefulness and functionality. Given the fact that the achievement of this type of goods is demanding, man is given support by, among other things, two main components of magnanimity: trust and humility. The task of the former is to uphold hope in man that 166 See Aristotle, 4 Ethic., c. 8; qtd. after Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 139, a. 1. 167 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, explanatory notes on the text, p. 193. 168 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 128, a. 1. 169 Aristotle, Ethic., 1123 b. 170 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 132, a. 2

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he will be able to accomplish the above-average goal pursued by him, that he can achieve the difficult good. However, the virtue of humility aims at maintaining the balance among self-confidence, the elimination of discouragement, and presumption, stemming from insufficient knowledge about ourselves. Finally, the virtue of humility relates to God the Creator and the gifts that he gave to man. Man who has the indicated virtue is aware of the things received from God. Among other things, this is what constitutes the basis of human dignity and self-confidence.171 When magnanimity is viewed from the perspective of its object, we can see the essence of the universally understood high culture: man sets himself against great goods through possessed virtues and received grace. He undertakes responsible tasks and does not confine himself to what is small, average, and insignificant. He bravely overcomes the difficulties on his path. Following the precepts of human reason, he undertakes the effort to work on possessed abilities and reaches high, bearing in mind the development of his potentialities to the highest possible degree. It is not easy but that is why man is by nature equipped with the ability to uncover his virtue of valour and – within its framework – the virtue of magnanimity that helps him make his life more noble and, thereby, more human.

9. Valour as a Gift Valour constitutes a certain constancy of the spirit,172 which is necessary both for doing good things and to withstand evil, especially when the good or evil is difficult. Man equipped with the virtue of valour does not depart from good based on the accomplishment of some difficult task or on eliminating a severe evil only because he finds it difficult. Our ability to finish an undertaken difficult task is explained by Thomas Aquinas, who indicates that valour is a gift. Thomas Aquinas quotes Isaiah, who includes valour among the gifts of the Holy Spirit.173 It means that the Holy Spirit provides man with the possibility to accomplish every task started by him and to avoid all dangers that threaten him. In many cases, man could not achieve it with the forces of nature. As Thomas Aquinas underlines, the Holy Spirit pours a certain belief in the eternal life into the human mind – the target of all good works and a shelter from all dangers – which freed him from the fears that stood 1 71 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 161, a. 3 c. 172 Ibid., II–II, q. 123, a. 2; ibid., vol. 11, I–II, a. 61, a. 3. 173 Isaiah 11:2.

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in his way. Valour understood in this way is a gift of the Holy Spirit, since this gift is the influence of the Holy Spirit on the soul.174 The Holy Spirit itself comes with help, gives support, and fills us with the feeling of certainty, trust, and willingness, which leads us to victory. Therefore, valour as received and acquired virtue is sufficient to undertake a difficult task. However, valour as a gift is necessary to perform this deed.175 The gift of valour links to the virtue of valour not only when dangers are suffered but in general – when difficult tasks are performed. For this reason, the gift of valour is guided by the gift of advice, which selects the best things out of all the good ones.176 Therefore, it helps man distinguish higher goods from the lower ones, thereby enabling him to create high culture. In order to understand the role of grace and the involvement of the Holy Spirit in the human behaviour, it is necessary to explain the notion of “gift.”177 There may be two causes of human activity: internal (coming from man) and external. The internal cause is the mind, whereas the external one is defined as inspiration, the inspiration of God. Virtues facilitate the accomplishment of the precepts of reason. Moral virtues predispose the forces, the lower powers to follow the reason and the intellectual virtues to improve the mind so that it could follow the relevant principles. Man must be properly equipped to act under the influence of impulses or inspirations coming from God. They constitute a rationale higher than the one provided by the mind. This very special disposition is given to man by God in the form of “gifts,”178 which “have something over and above the virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are Divine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1) above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of “heroic” or “divine virtue,” in respect of which some men are called “divine.”179 The indicated power is not possessed by all those who have the acquired moral virtues.180 They are given along with theological virtues. Enlightened and strengthened by the grace of divine virtues, the human mind is not enough either, because it does not use the virtues properly. Therefore, man is pushed towards the supernatural goal by something greater; namely, by the breath (instinctus in motio) of the Holy Spirit. It is only this breath that raises the importance of our culture towards living a full life in compliance 1 74 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 139, a. 1. 175 Ibid., explanatory notes on the text, p. 195. 176 Ibid., II–II, q. 139, a. 1. 177 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, explanatory notes on the text, p. 193. 178 Isaiah 50:5. 179 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 11, I–II, q. 68, a. 1 and I–II, q. 68, a. 6. 180 Cf. ibid., I–II, q. 68, a. 2.

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with the principles of faith, hope, and love. Only then are our actions and deeds more perfect, excellent, and heroic. They are called beatitudes (beatitudines) as they lead to the blessing of happiness in heaven and give the foretaste of this heavenly happiness.181 The fruit of the blessings is the fruit of the Holy Spirit.182 Among the ones that correspond to valour, Thomas Aquinas mentions patience, referring to the endurance of evil and unwillingness pertaining to the long-term expectation and good deeds.183 Due to the fact that man is a transcendent being, he cannot consider the aim of his life equivalent to an earthly aim. He has an immaterial soul that provides a rational basis for the recognition of human openness to immortality. This “final goal of human life indicates reason by following God’s rules. The knowledge of the highest truth gives movement and direction to powers of cognition and action, which in reality is only God.”184 If the natural knowledge and love of God are supplemented by the powers poured in by grace, the entire mechanism is raised to a new supernatural level. Then our inner activities and external actions display both the earthly-natural and supernatural value. Both the natural and the supernatural level complement each other. The former without the latter is unable to provide man with the guarantee to reach the aim for which he has been created. The latter complements and enriches the former in temporal actions and makes use of it in supernatural acts. It is associated with a mystery, complemented in life by religion and faith. Religion permeates all areas of rational human activity in a variety of ways.185 It is a bond between the person of man and the person of God. The essence of the bond is relation.186 Religion raises the entire life of man to a personal level – and not an object level. Thanks to religion, man discovers the ultimate justification

1 81 They are listed in the Mathew 5:1 f. 182 Fruit in the moral sense denotes the actions of man that are pleasant if they are performed in harmony with the human mind. The fruit of reason concerns the actions coming from reason. However, the fruit of the Holy Spirit is associated with the actions of man acting through the power of a superior being. Saint Paul the Apostle writes about them in the Galatians 5:22–23. 183 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 21, II–II, q. 139, a. 2. 184 Ibid., explanatory notes on the text, p. 171. 185 See Krąpiec, Kultura, p. 138. 186 This is indicated by the etymology of the word Latin origin of the word “religion,” religio, which stems from religare, “to bind, attach.” See Z.  J. Zdybicka, “Religia,” in: Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 8, Lublin 2007, p. 720.

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for all his personal decision-making acts, resulting from rational human life, in the existence of the person of God.187 Religion is closely linked to morality. It supplements the virtue of morality. The issue was tackled by Aristotle, who claims that we were debtors to gods whom we should worship, thus religion was included by Aristotle in the realm of morality.188 Taking into account the Christian religion, since it is required by justice to render what is somebody’s due, we are the greatest debtors to God. Given the fact that man is unable to repay this debt in full, he is at least obliged to show his gratitude to God, which is enabled through religion. It is manifested through specific actions, including religious worship, rituals, customs, and prayer. These are the forms of worship in practice, while their absence becomes morally wrong, because it breaches justice is breached.189 People frequently affirm the truth about the existence of God spontaneously, but they change their opinions, as they remain under the influence of various cultural traditions, pseudo-philosophies, or pseudo-sciences. Consequently, people try to explain their existence and the existence of the world in a human way, or they resort to some kind of religion, which does not accept the subjectivity of man, exploiting him as a tool for an ideological struggle. Then, man is reduced to an animal or a part of a society that is in complete contradiction with the personal nature of man and the task to be accomplished by culture in the life of every human being. The relationship of religion with morality manifests itself in the manner described above, when the dispositions or virtues possessed by man can be strengthened supernaturally. Thomas Aquinas indicates that it happens due to grace. It is his philosophical system that recognises the idea of man created by God as a divinely inspired nature perfected by virtues. However, man is unable to achieve the goal of life (full perfection) without supernatural grace.190 The grace comes from God and  – since it is grace  – it does not occur as a result of one or another human merit. In order to experience grace, man must make a personal contribution. It is prayer and contemplation. Justifying the need to open up to the supernatural order, Thomas Aquinas cites the dogma of original sin, whose results impact the human nature and whose overcoming is possible

1 87 See Krąpiec, Kultura, p. 138. 188 Justice is one of the cardinal virtues of morality. 189 Jaroszyński, Etyka. Dramat życia moralnego, p. 155. 190 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol.  14, translation and explanations by R. Kostecki, London 1973, I–II, q. 110, a. 3.

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thanks to grace. Thomas Aquinas simultaneously underlines that our nature was not completely destroyed by sin, hence every human being has a chance to rise to the transcendent purpose of life with the help of culture. However, culture is insufficient and  – therefore  – man needs the supernatural reinforcement of grace to improve the spoiled nature and attain higher goals.191 Moreover, Thomas Aquinas underlines that grace does not overwhelm or replace nature.192 There is no split between nature and grace. Man is guided by his rational nature to live and breathe with grace. Thus, high culture that is to ensure the perfection of man must be open to religion, because human nature seeks what cannot be achieved with the help of nature or culture alone. This is about the full truth, goodness, and beauty that man attains through religion. It sets ultimate prospects for human life, its purpose, and at the same time provides the means to reach that goal and become fully human.193 By nature, we are open to this purpose in an imperfect manner, so God’s help is needed in the form of grace. Only in cooperation with grace can man realise his destiny, which is the union with God by the supernatural love-holiness. Besides grace, the visible signs that aim at elevating man to what is spiritual, are sacraments: the sacrament of Baptism, Matrimony, Holy Orders, Confirmation, Penance, Anointing of the Sick, and the Eucharist. They play a significant role in the religious life of man. They are accompanied by a supernatural power that makes it easier for man to approach God.194 Moreover, religion provides some patterns of conduct. Their essence is included in the Decalogue, which stems from two sources: the natural and the revealed law. Christ himself is the model of conduct for us, as he shows each man where to go and which route to take through his life and teachings. The saints and the blessed make further role models. They show in a practical way that every man can reach perfection, as it is not an unreachable abstract goal. An extremely important task of religion is that, “it shows the aim of man’s life more clearly and in a supernatural way gives man strength to walk along the road leading to it.”195 The indicated goal is the unification with God. Our spirit is complete when we achieve it. It makes us achieve the proper goal-happiness. 191 “Virtutes autem infusae disponunt kominem altiori modo, et ad altiorem finem” (ibid., I–II, q. 110, a. 3). 192 “Gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit” (ibid., vol. 1, I, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2). 193 See Z. J. Zdybicka, “Religia,” 723. 194 See Jaroszyński, Etyka. Dramat życia moralnego, p. 157. 195 Ibid., p. 159.

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All other goods are losable and limited, whereas the aforesaid good is eternal and infinite. Man reaches his full potential and realises himself perfectly thanks to it. According to John Paul II, it is impossible to understand man without Christ: „man can only fully realize himself by accepting the grafting in Christ’s divinity. By rejecting the grafting … man condemns himself to incomplete humanity.”196 Therefore, every culture that neglects the supernatural order of reality reduces man by sterilizing his spiritual life. Experiencing the short term and ephemeral moments, leading to the spiritual emptiness in man, taking away one’s free time and giving nothing in return, is what is often suggested today in place of prayer or contemplation on the grounds of low culture. Therefore, it is necessary to emphasise that cultural factors can make the accomplishment of natural religiosity of man more difficult. This is the case primarily when they assume the form of atheistic or anti-theistic ideologies. As an example, we can indicate mental trends predominant in various periods of time:  materialism, scientism, pantheism, and relativism.197 They also include various forms of devastation of all signs of religiosity visible in culture and a depreciation of the principles of conduct contained in the Decalogue. Questioning the basic needs that result from the human nature, the indicated types of action deserve the name of low culture or even anti-culture. However, it has to be stressed that – despite the secularist trends evident in contemporary culture  – religion has not vanished from the cultural horizon. This is due to the fact that the natural religiosity of the human person transcends all concrete forms of religion, conditioned by the state of a given culture. This also indicates the genesis of religion: various forms of religion stem from God the Creator of nature and grace, but also from the rational human being – created by God – who is naturally equipped with openness to what is absolute.198 However, one should carefully let this religiosity actualize in a proper way, in line with its essence, because it will otherwise deteriorate into a certain ideology and its fanaticism.199

10. Holiness as the Culture of Man Using the tools developed by philosophical anthropology, we proved that man is a person, i.e. a conscious and free being. He is the subject, the perpetrator of 1 96 Jan Paweł II, Pamięć i tożsamość, Krakow 2005, p. 103. 197 See Zdybicka, Religia, p. 728. 198 See ibid., p. 728. 199 See Kiereś, Człowiek i sztuka, p. 17.

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various actions, through which he develops the ability to learn and love. This is the way in which is revealed the transcendence of man towards himself, towards all things, and even towards other people (communities). Moreover, man is a dynamic entity born as a person, who becomes more and more human by means of conscious free deeds. Therefore, man is a being constantly developmentoriented. The actions undertaken by him are motivated by a continuous desire for good, love and happiness. All this is ultimately a thirst for the infinity of duration, a desire for the Absolute, for God. There are two worlds combined in man  – the world of nature and culture. Man lives in nature and is associated with nature because of his body. However, man simultaneously is a culture-formative and a culture-genic being. Culture is a mode of human existence, which – as Thomas Aquinas writes – “lives and breathes reason and creativity.” Man has always cultivated culture: by discovering truth, doing good, creating artworks and tools, and by looking for justification for his entire life. As we have indicated, the aim of culture is to bring man to complete perfection; namely, to the achievement of the state – basing on the knowledge of human nature – which Aristotle called optimum potentiae. The realistic concept of a person revealed that – because of transcendence – the ultimate goal, the end of human cognition and love is perfection; namely holiness, based on the unification of man with God. Given the ontic status of man, Thomas Aquinas gives an explanation of holiness. He understands it as a complete accomplishment (actualization) of human capacities in relation to God: the most perfect person, who is an absolute being and the greatest value. The maximum actualization of the spiritual activity of man – especially the cognitive and volitional one, which is love – always constitutes the greatest perfection of a human person. If the indicated activity, cognition, and love refers to God, it constitutes a peculiar perfection: it is holiness. The holiness perceived in this way is synonymous to the supreme development of a human person and, thus, denotes a fully perfect state of man.200 The meaning of the term “holiness” covers two elements:201 • Purity (Greek hagios) denotes something that is “without land.” It is about purifying and liberating from what is imperfect and mutable. • Sustainability is why the ancients used the term holiness with reference to what is lawfully protected so that nobody could destroy (change) it; namely, it was something sanctified, hence established by laws. 2 00 Zdybicka, Człowiek i religia, p. 350. 201 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 19, II–II, q. 81, a. 8.

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Moreover, the word “holy” in Latin  – sanctus  – means something associated with purity. As Thomas Aquinas notes, “this word “sanctus” may be connected with purity, if it be resolved into “sanguine tinctus, since, in olden times, those who wished to be purified were sprinkled with the victim’s blood.”202 The word “holiness” is used in two meanings with reference to the reverence for God. “For purity is necessary in order that the mind be applied to God, since the human mind is soiled by contact with inferior things …. Now in order for the mind to be united to the Supreme Being it must be withdrawn from inferior things …. Again, firmness is required for the mind to be applied to God, for it is applied to Him as its last end and first beginning, and such things must needs be most immovable.”203 Thus, holiness denotes the surrender of the human spirit to God. Consequently, it does not differ from religiosity. Religion expresses the service to God, accomplished primarily in worshipping Him, for example through sacrifices. Moreover, holiness denotes the devotion to God not only by means of the reverence due to Him but also through all noble deeds and man’s preparation to reverence by good deeds. Considering holiness to be a special virtue, Thomas Aquinas formally (somewhat) identifies it with religiosity. Moreover, he indicates that some general features applied to holiness in the sense that it ordered all virtuous deeds to be directed to the Divine good. The fullest actualization of the human potential is made in the accomplishment of holiness. Man reaches the peak of his development and thus the highest level of culture when he is united with God. The human person, who is a potential being, realises the most perfect capacity through religious activity, the result of which is the fullest upgrade, namely its complete available perfection. The process of sanctifying man is a special process of development, in which a human person, being a spiritual-material entity, becomes more and more actualized and spiritually oriented in both the ontic and moral sense. For this reason, the indicated process can be called the spiritualization of man (overdeification) as his becoming similar to God the Highest Spirit.204 It is implemented through religious activity and involves three levels. 1) The ontic level, in which man, being a spiritual-material entity, develops to reach a more and more spiritualised level, even in the ontic sense. The form of the human body is the soul that needs the body to express, organise, and release through it. However, the more the spiritual

2 02 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 19, II–II, q. 81, a. 8. 203 Ibid., q. 81, a. 8. 204 Zdybicka, Człowiek i religia, p. 353.

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activity develops the more man frees himself from the determination of matter. 2) The level associated with action – man introduces spirituality into the whole of the real, material, and spiritual activity, thus providing all manifestations of human life and even the whole non-human reality with a new dimension and a new value. The dynamism of this type of human activity overwhelms and permeates a person on the inside. That is what the process of spiritualization of human activity essentially is 3) the moral level: while learning about the greatness and the perfection of God, man becomes increasingly aware of his own imperfection, especially moral, and recognises the need for inner transformation and the improvement of own conduct to be able to approach God.205 The highest level of human spiritual development may happen only when man consciously and voluntarily expresses the desire to establish and maintain the relationship with the personal, really existing God. Man must admit that he feels dependent on God in his existence and that he shall endeavour to reach God as the Highest Good. Then, God becomes the sense of the entire human life and the ultimate goal of all human actions. This bond between man and God becomes the ultimate perspective of his life and personal decisions.206 Apart from the natural foundations of religion, which may be pictured on the grounds of philosophy, the new truth about man and his relation to God was introduced by the revelation and – above all – the Christian revelation. It complemented, consolidated, and introduced new perspectives into the knowledge transmitted to us through philosophy: “The Judeo-Christian revelation on the basis of and in cooperation with reason introduces man into the Ultimate Truth and builds human confidence in the Timeless Good and Beauty.”207 The Christian culture revealed a new ideal, which everybody could seek. It is a personal God, a specific person of God-man, Jesus Christ. The essence of the indicated culture is just imitating Christ as the particular and perfect God– man.208 The conscious and voluntary bond between man and the person of God, in Christianity the person of Jesus Christ, is the ultimate justification of human life; namely, it provides meaning to the life of man. Thereby, it gives the ultimate sense to all human activities; that is, to the entire human culture. 205 For more on man’s imitation of God, see J. Salij, “Wielowarstwowość idei naśladowania Boga,” in: Powołanie człowieka, Poznań–Warszawa 1974, pp. 257–280. 206 Z. J. Zdybicka, “Rola religii w kulturze współczesnej,” Człowiek w Kulturze 15 (2003), p. 59. See also Zdybicka, “Rola religii w kształtowaniu osobowego modelu kultury,” in: W kierunku religijności, ed. B. Bejze, Warsaw 1983, pp. 283–295. 207 Zdybika, “Rola religii w kulturze współczesnej,” p. 59. 208 See M. A. Krąpiec, O chrześcijańską kulturę, Lublin 2000.

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Summing up, it is important to note that culture and religion are two basic dimensions of human life that interpenetrate each other and unite in the ultimate goal of human fulfilment. Therefore, religion is the most culture-formative element, in the sense that it is primarily focused on man, his development, and his fulfilment. Religion takes into account the complete good of the human person. In turn, culture – due to religion – reaches its soteriological dimension. Its final aim is to direct man towards the unification with God and – in consequence – to salvation. Man heads for God through culture, by developing truth, good, and beauty. Therefore, one can speak of a synthesis of religion and culture, as the goal set by religion makes all cultural efforts of man become a path to reach holiness. We must not identify religion with culture because religion transcends culture, even though it realises in it. While a vast variety and diversity of cultures is evident, religion establishes some permanent points of reference, such as human openness to God, the supreme dignity of a human being, God as the ultimate source of life, and religion as a way to the final fulfilment of man.

Chapter 3  Contemporary Culture: Low Culture or High Culture? 1. High Culture: A New Paradigm? 1.1. UNIVERSALISM OR ELITISM? A remarkable discovery of culture was made in ancient times. People noticed that the essence of culture cannot be identified only with the reality of human creations  – the works of man  – but primarily with what we call virtues, what makes man virtuous, and with virtuous life and deeds.1 It stems from the source understanding of culture as a cultivation of human soul. Therefore, it is essentially associated with the perfecting of a human person; that is, with education, in which the key role is played by virtues. Magnanimity has a special meaning among them. On the subjective side, magnanimity’s aim is to develop the spiritual potentialities that everybody has. It refers to individual, moral values:  to virtues and character. Magnanimity is on top of all virtues in two meanings. Firstly, it consists of a set of human virtues called kalokagathía. Secondly, the awareness of their value present in man who possesses it, due to which the indicated virtues are brought to full bloom. However, on the objective side, magnanimity seeks those goods whose acquisition is difficult. The effort oriented at obtaining them helps man to strive for greatness in a reasonable way and pay attention to the reverence that follows. It should be stressed at this point that the aim – both subjective and objective – which is to be met by the virtue of magnanimity, is the same as the aim of the source understood culture. In the previous part of our considerations we noted that the notion of magnanimity vanished with the appearance of modern ethics. The very word “magnanimity” is used very rarely and, when it does occur, it is understood differently than in the days of Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas Aquinas. It is now associated with such terms as mercy, consideration, good, humanitarianism, graciousness, favour to people, or even flexibility, permissiveness, indulgence, submissiveness,

1 These issues were tackled in the works of A. W. H. Adkins, Moral Values and Political Behavior in Ancient Greece from Homer to the End of the Fifth Century, New York 1972, and A. Macintyre, Dziedzictwo cnoty, trans. A. Chmielewski, Warsaw 1996. See also P. Skrzydlewski, “Kultura – czyli to, co doskonali osobę ludzką do osiągnięcia szczęścia,” Fides et ratio 4 (2015), pp. 32–56.

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tolerance, and acquiescence. Thus, it can be seen that the source understanding of magnanimity has been completely forgotten. In time, the term “high culture,” which to a certain extent reflects the meaning of “magnanimity,” entered the language of the humanities. However, the term “high culture” can be understood in two ways. In a broad sense (philosophical), as a universal, human virtue, the equivalent of magnanimity. This is the sense in which we apply the indicated term in the present work. In the second sense, (sociological) – a newer, narrower, and more popular one – “high culture” refers to the culture of the higher class such as aristocracy or intelligentsia, the elitist culture, created and received by a narrow group of people with relevant competencies. Such culture is created under the supervision of elites that operate within a certain aesthetic and intellectual tradition. These elites occupy the highest position in the system of education, art, and in the entertainment world. They implement the primal values of the indicated systems and provide normative models of action within their framework.2 What is meant here is the “high culture” understood as the elitist culture, characteristic only for a specific social layer. Such a narrowing of the concept “high culture” makes the impression that it is difficult, inaccessible, limited to a group of people. In the narrow sense, the indicated term is placed in contrast to notions like low culture, popular culture, mass culture, worse educated people, barbarians, the Philistines,3 or the masses. The term “high culture” is used today in a variety of ways, primarily in the academic discourse, in which its narrow, sociological meaning dominates. Colloquially, it most frequently denotes works, mainly the works of art of great importance to

2 See M.  Gruchoła, “Kultura w ujęciu socjologicznym,” Roczniki Kulturoznawcze 1 (2010), pp. 95–113. 3 “Philistine” is a word of German origin (German: Philister, Greek: Philistínos), which means a narrow-minded man, without higher aspirations, indifferent to the general public good, often morally greedy, who looks only for material and social stabilization. In the times of Young Poland, the philistine became a symbol of narrow-mindedness and conformism. As a representative of the “human mass,” a philistine perceives reality in a uniform manner, without exceeding the official social and moral norms. He is not interested in the spiritual sphere of life, he does not understand “high art,” he is afraid of changes and novelty. The philistine crowd surrenders to bureaucratic and political institutions, feeds on the repertoire of “mass culture,” relies on conventions and mediocrity. The “mass” is most frequently the bourgeois environment, the so-called “mental proletariat:” doctors, lawyers, priests, clerks, house and factory owners, or merchants. See Wielki słownik wyrazów obcych PWN, ed. M. Bańko, Warsaw 2005, p. 391; Słownik języka polskiego, ed. W. Doroszewski, vol. 2, Warsaw 1965, pp. 873–874.

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culture. The term was also used before the First World War to identify the representatives of the European culture.4 Our previous inquiries focused on revealing the sources and specificity of high culture perceived in a broad universal sense, corresponding to the virtue of magnanimity. As we showed in the first part of the work, the Western tradition recognises that the historical roots of high culture reach the intellectual and aesthetic ideals of ancient Greece and Rome.5 While discussing the birthplace of the problems connected with it, we indicated that high culture is the one that reaches the highest level of work, both in terms of content and artistic level. It is characteristic that works indicating high culture are produced or published in a small number of copies and access to them requires considerable effort. However, it does not mean that that they are only intended for few people. On the contrary, due to the fact that they are created according to specific principles, rules, and general knowledge  – different from simple experience  – they are accessible to everybody who feels the need to experience such culture. They have preserved a lasting position for hundreds of years and contribute to the cultural heritage of mankind. Among them are masterpieces universally significant for every culture. From the creator’s point of view, high culture was historically associated with so-called upper classes; that is, with the aristocracy and the

4 For centuries, both in Europe and the USA, high culture was considered to be an important part of the proper education of a gentleman. In various periods during its development, the Western notion of high culture was associated with the following elements: the study of “humanist literature,” especially the Greek and Latin classics, and more broadly, all works considered to be a part of the so-called “canon;” with a perfection of a refined etiquette and manners; with appreciation for the value of fine arts, especially sculpture and painting; with knowledge of high-class literature, theatre, poetry; with entertainment in the form of the European classical music and opera; with religion and theology, often particularly focused on the traditions of Christian Europe; with rhetoric and politics; with the study of philosophy and history; with delicious cuisine and wine; with traveling; with some high class sports such as polo, horse riding, fencing and sailing. 5 Within this classic ideal, some authors and their models of language were used as examples of high style and good form, such as – for e­ xample – the attic dialect of ancient Greek or Ciceronian Latin. Later, especially during the Renaissance, those values were rapidly absorbed by the culture of the upper classes, as depicted in works such as The Book of the Courtier by Baldassare Castiglione. The knowledge of the classics became part of the aristocratic ideal. Over time, the refined classicism of the Renaissance was embraced by the wider canon of modern writers, including Shakespeare, Goethe, Cervantes, and Victor Hugo.

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nobles. However, from the recipient’s point of view, high culture had a broader reception than the stratum or the environment in which it was created.6 This type of culture requires that both the creator and the recipient possess higher qualifications, thereby history views it as an elitist culture, a difficult one, intended for the selected few, incomprehensible for the average man, of interest mainly to art critics or specialists in a given field.7 The indicated conviction stems from the wrong perception of culture only through the prism of human creations or ready-made products, which carry definite meanings or values. It constitutes only one of its aspects. However, we cannot forget that – in philosophy – high culture was perceived at its source as the inner culture of man as a person. Culture understood in this way is perfection to which every person should strive in terms of cognition, action, production, and faith. The realistic concept of man explains that man is a subject with a variety of powers. For this reason, his task is to develop the indicated powers in the best possible way, and exactly this is the ideal of high culture. An analysis of sources of high culture readily reveals that  –from the very beginning – its significant feature was universalism and the elevation of men. It can be noticed in the works of Homer, although he describes a world of chivalry, courts, and aristocracy, he presents not only an aristocratic but also a universal ideal. Thus, culture was not to be ultimately limited to a single stratum, e.g. aristocracy, but was to encompass all strata. It could include artists from all strata, if they were talented and able to achieve an appropriately high level. The reason for that universality was the fact that the Greek culture could derive its basis from the discovery of human nature as a human being. Christianity raised the Greek culture ideal to an even higher rank due to the newly discovered vision of man as a person, namely, the entity created by God in his image and likeness. In this case, we also deal here with high and universal culture. The Christian culture firmly established the conviction that man transcended the limits of his nature and culture thanks to God’s grace. The motto of the life of man who represents high culture and, thus, a magnanimous man is conveyed by the words of Saint Paul the Apostle: “I can do everything in the One who strengthens me.”8 Cooperating with human nature, grace can flow towards 6 See P. Jaroszyński, Kultura masowa czy kultura wysoka? Ideologiczny kontekst sporu o kulturę w Polsce, in: Katolicy i kultura: szanse i zagrożenia, ed. M. Kacprzak, I. ChłodnaBłach, Toruń 2014, p. 22. 7 A. Kłoskowska, “Kultura,” in: Encyklopedia kultury polskiej XX wieku. Pojęcia i problemy wiedzy o kulturze, ed. A. Kłoskowska, Wrocław 1991, p. 45. 8 Philippians 4:13.

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every man. However, the aforesaid universalism did not mean mass quality in any of the above cases.

1.2. MATTHEW ARNOLD AND THE CRISIS OF HIGH CULTURE Although the issues associated with high culture have been dealt with since the times of Homer’s Iliad and The Odyssey, it is interesting that the expression itself did not appear until the second half of the nineteenth century. It was only in 1869 that the work of Matthew Arnold (1822–1888) Culture and Anarchy9 appeared, which is regarded to be one of the first English-language works on the aforementioned issues. Since then, the term “high culture” began to function and spread in English. Arnold’s theory was one of two main theories of culture, along with the theory created by Edward Burnett Tylor, which appeared at the end of the 1880s.10 An outstanding critic and a poet, Arnold was one of the most interesting figures in the Victorian literature. He began the discussion on the essence of high culture and the consequences of its disappearance. In his essay, he criticises the British society, in which he notices a lack of concern for centres of high culture. Arnold was one of the first thinkers who observed the origins of the disappearance of high culture by indicating the crisis of liberal-bourgeois civilization, justifying that it led to the materialization of social relations. He retained a critical attitude towards utilitarianism professed by the continuators of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill and also towards the liberal reforms introduced at that time. He divided the English society into three classes: aristocracy (Barbarians), the middle class (Philistines), and the masses, the people (Populace). The aim of high culture is  – in Arnold’s opinion  – reflection on perfection, which is why he used the example of Goethe, who was to be the ideal in its highest perfection.11 Arnold saw this ideal in a man following the path of 9 M. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, London 1960. 10 Arnold’s theory was largely related to the theory of E.  B. Tylor, who proposed a descriptive theory of culture, adopted by the then-emerging discipline of cultural anthropology. Tylor includes his views in Primitive Culture (1871). See P. M. Logan, “On Culture: Matthew Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy” (1869), in: BRANCH: Britain, Representation and Nineteenth-Century History, ed. D.  F. Felluga. Extension of Romanticism and Victorianism on the Net, kttp://www.branchcollective.org/?ps_ articles=peter-lo-gan-on-culture-matthew-arnolds-culture-and-anarchy-1869 [access: 03.02.2016]. See also P. Burke, Historia kulturowa. Wprowadzenie, trans. J. Hunia, Krakow 2012. 11 See Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 5.

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perfection, looking for attachment in culture to help him overcome adversities. High culture means cultivating the human spirit. It is sanctified by the hard work of human hands and is a path of civilizational development.12 High culture defines a harmonious ideal of our existence. Its trails are blazed by nonconformists who are the authorities in various fields. Culture of this type does not try to change the way of human thinking by force. It presents an ideal of man who makes choices as a free man. Arnold indicates that the indicated idea is selected by someone interested in own development and rejected by someone who prefers ready-made solutions and a materialistic vision of the world.13 High culture concentrates on expanding human intellectual horizons and shaping the spirit and the character. According to Arnold, culture means the improvement of man and his mind, as it brings light that shows us a specific direction. Culture also means doing the right things, but not however we like. Culture means order, a hierarchy of values, and the meticulous study of human nature and human experience; it also means harmonious growth of all our abilities that constitute the beauty and value of human nature. These all work for the benefit of man.14 It was also the way in which the Greeks perceived culture: as an accomplishment of a harmonious ideal representing our nobility. On the one hand, Arnold greatly appreciates the contribution of the Greeks in the development of our civilization. On the other hand, he opts for a society accepting the Christian principles of life and making use of the cultural resources of high culture in its broader, universal understanding.15 He stresses the necessity to take care of the best customs, to exercise the virtues constituting the basis of moral life, and look for the inspiring role of the Christian religion in culture. Christianity is to take what is best in the Hellenic and Hebrew cultures, providing the world with a new, integral vision of man. Arnold calls culture the study of harmonious perfection. He looks for its genesis in the curiosity of the world, natural for each man, and in the passion of cognition, the desire to see things as they really were. Culture perceived in this way is crucial in the formation of man. It supports him in his orientation towards becoming and not possessing.16 Arnold prefers activities targeted at spiritual development over those ones that only refer to our body. We should

1 2 Ibid., p. 36. 13 Ibid., p. 23. 14 Ibid. 15 See also ibid., pp. 32–34. 16 Ibid.

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perform the latter – he argues – only when indispensable for the preservation of life. They should not become our underlying objective. Games and sports constitute an exception at least to improve one’s health. However, material goods, including industry, lead man to discover the wild side of his nature, which – as Arnold notices – contradicts the Greek way of thinking. With reference to the Greek philosophy, Arnold asks:  what is greatness? He perceives greatness like the Greeks, as a prerequisite for nobility. He associates greatness with reverence, by stressing that a noble man prides himself with the interest and admiration of eminent noble people.17 The characteristic feature of high culture is the fact that it is not satisfied with mediocrity, austerity, and low-mindedness, but sets standards of excellence. While emphasising the role of tradition, Arnold indicates the necessity to use the thoughts of the greatest minds that existed in the history of mankind. Moreover, he upholds the integral vision of man developed by Christianity and criticises all reductionist tendencies noticed in the industrial society. Similarly to Aristotle, Arnold is of the opinion that aristocracy (Barbarians) should rule. The features characterising the aristocracy are, among other things, beautiful and morally right character, good manners, kindness, eminence, chivalry, a zeal for action, and a sense of responsibility. Its accomplishments are valuable, displays educational value, and should be passed down from generation to generation. As Arnold emphasises that the mission of aristocracy is to find and extract what is best in oneself and others.18 However, he does not mean any class division but a universal ideal whose accomplishment requires proper conditions of education and development. Arnold notices a danger in the disappearance of aristocracy, which may deprive society of a guide facilitating a clear differentiation between good and evil. He believes that philosophy, providing understanding, might help in the aforesaid matter. It provides tools in the form of independent and ordered rules of explanation enhancing proper action.19 Moreover, Arnold began the tradition of criticism of the so-called technical civilization. He opposed the rapid development of industrial organizations. He noticed the degradation of sensitivity, the cause of which might be associated with the decline of spiritual order and a disappearance of the integral development of man. The mechanisation of human spirit, the widespread technicisation, and a tendency to perceive all major issues in life as technical problems are the

1 7 Ibid., p. 54. 18 Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 29. 19 Ibid., p. 85.

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effect of the domination of the scientific worldview and utilitarianism. Arnold argues that they cause the emergence of the stratum of Philistines, a middle class devoid of ideals, focused solely on the pursuit of material goods. Arnold openly declares enmity towards such attitudes. He asks about the way in which those people live, spend their free time, analyses their habits, manners, and the literature they read or the words they use. He blames them for their conformism, degradation of cultural and national values, but also their hostility towards the Greek and Latin culture, treated by him as exemplary.20 He wonders whether any form of wealth was worth the sacrifice of the indicated ideals.

2. The Reasons for the Decline of High Culture 2.1. INDUSTRIALISM AND URBANIZATION What Matthew Arnold observed and described in his essays began in the middle of the eighteenth century. Such phenomena as industrialism and urbanization appeared at that time as a consequence of the eighteenth-century industrial revolution.21 What we observe at that time is the replacement of the universalism of high culture, having its origins in the Greek-Roman culture, complemented by the Christian concept of man, the peculiarity of masses. However, the massification, in the narrow sense, is associated with the invention of the mass means of communication. Its first visible sign was the implementation of the mechanical processes of printing. The mechanical press was used in 1810, which enabled the quadrupling of the number of copied sheets in comparison with the output of the manual press. It initiated a long-term development process of the mass distribution system of cultural content. Thus, on the one hand, the appearance of

2 0 Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 84. 21 This term is used to refer to the processes of the second half of the eighteenth century, related to the rapid accumulation of inventions and technical improvements, such as Hargreaves’ construction of an automatic hand-spinning machine in 1767; the patenting of the first steam engine model in 1769 by Watt; launching of the first railway line between Manchester and Liverpool in 1829. These inventions were accompanied by the start of standardized mechanical production and mass communication. Moreover, the demographic growth was noticeable at that time, and the rapid development of railway network caused the concentration of population in urban centres. On the changes and the new way of life of people moving from small towns and villages to big cities, see L. Mumford, The Culture of Cities, New York 1938; Mumford, Technics and Civilization, London 1934; B. Hammond, J. L. Hammond, The Town Labourers, London 1949.

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mass culture falls on a strictly defined historical epoch while, on the other hand, it spreads all over the world thanks to the advancement of technology. At first, the progress facilitated the production of books, magazines, pictures, and music, whose number matched market needs, and only subsequently contributed to the emergence of the new means of communication such as radio, television, and the Internet, which even better adjusted to the needs of the “mass man” and mass distribution. Hence, mass culture is often defined by reference to the means of its distribution. It relates to “the phenomena of contemporary transmission of identical or analogous content from a few sources to the large masses of recipients and to uniform forms of entertainment activities for large masses of people.”22 The indicated type of phenomena could occur only in a particular type of societies. It is about the specific properties of social bonds that are developed just in industrialised and urbanised societies.23 Their analysis reveals that the appearance and spontaneous development of mass culture are much more difficult in economically underdeveloped societies, broken up into traditional, local, and family communities, immersed in illiteracy. It is now necessary to distinguish between urbanisation and industrialisation. Urbanised societies are understood as: “the socio-economic domination of large urban centres in the life of the whole country and their direct influence on large parts of the country.”24 In this case, the culture typical of big cities begins to spread, covering with its range also small local communities. Industrialisation and especially the development of technology begin to play a significant role in the way of reaching large target groups with mass culture. In turn, the technical conditions of mass culture development must be viewed alongside changes occurring in social conditions. It is about the formation of a specific type of recipients, whose harmonised qualifications would facilitate the reception of mass-produced cultural goods. As Antonina Kłoskowska notices, the indicated process was enabled by the dissemination of education at an elementary level, running in parallel with the process of the relative democratisation of societies.25 2 2 A. Kłoskowska, Kultura masowa. Krytyka i obrona, Warsaw 2005, p. 95 23 The characteristic features of this type of community include heterogeneity, internal atomisation, the anonymity of its constituent units, the segmentation of social roles, the formal and material nature of social relations, the weakening of mutual social interest, and a sense of isolation. The mass media play a major role in the process of communication and uniformisation of such communities. See ibid., pp. 132–133. 24 Kłoskowska, Kultura masowa. Krytyka i obrona, p. 102. 25 Ibid., p. 104.

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Beginning with 1780, education initially mostly happened in Sunday schools, which was a good solution for the ruling classes that anxiously observed the revolutionising development of education. In order to increase the mass demand for culture, the broad masses were provided with time off work regarding the production. A certain similarity to the classical Greek thought can be found here. According to the Greeks, culture is the product of free time: it is created and received at times when the necessities of everyday life are set aside.26 The Western culture is historically the product of a non-working class, the product of the educated class of priests, prophets, and people of noble birth. The Greeks treated free time seriously, as evidenced in the later history of the word used by them to define it: the Greek scholé was transformed into Latin schola, from which the word “school” was derived.27 For Aristotle, free time was the aim of work. He writes that we work in order to enjoy our free time, because only in our free time can we lead a contemplative life, constituting the highest good for Aristotle.28 It was the true fulfilment of our humanity. It is not a means to an end but an end in itself. This type of activity includes neither physical work nor negotia (Greek ascholia: the lack of free time), which means commercial and industrial business.29 The classical concept of both free time and work took into account completely different priorities than the ones associated with free time and work in the times of industrial revolution and today. Rarely did and does one ask the question: what for? What is the purpose of his work and free time, and when is the aim accomplished? Aristotle defines work in a negative way as the lack of free time. However, free time has – in his opinion – an active character. He underlines its relationship with contemplative forms of mental life and its meaning when it comes to a true fulfilment of our humanity. In our free time, we perform activities that are not a means to an end, but which are ends in themselves. Unfortunately,

26 R. Scruton, Kultura jest ważna, trans. T. Bieroń, Poznan 2010, p. 31. See also: J. Pieper, Leisure. The Basis of Culture, trans. G. Malsbary, Indiana 1997. 27 Scruton, Kultura jest ważna, p. 31. The Romans also used the word otium, “a particular way of life worthy of a noble Roman,” which included, for example, the practice of philosophy, political activity, interest in art, study, and mental activity, even with some coercion. Thus, the term scholé means also “school.” There is no Polish equivalent for defining the state of devoting oneself to voluntarily selected activities. In French such a word is loisir, in English it is leisure. 28 Aristotle, Ethic., 1177 b 4–6. 29 For more on the distinction between mental activities and work in antiquity, see B. Farrington, Head and Hand in Ancient Greece, London 1947.

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the attitude towards work and leisure changed along with the transformations within the industrialised world. In the early period of industrialism in capitalist countries, a fourteen-hour and a sixteen-hour workday was introduced, which did not provide too many possibilities for rest. Workers moved from a workrelated activity to passivity, during which the human mind became a passive object of influence of various stimuli coming from the surrounding world.30 The then employers were even afraid of the effects of free time. In order to avoid them, the abovementioned Sunday schools were organised, and their task was not so much to spread secular education among “lower classes” but rather to provide the moral and religious teaching.31 Over time, various factors such as technological and socio-economic advancement, pressures from the developing labour movement, ruling classes” fears of a social revolution, or the activity of humanitarians and philanthropists facilitated the reduction of work time, which contributed to the development of a mass demand for culture.32 An elementary

30 This process, called “passivation,” takes place in the case of such media as television. While watching it, the viewer does not decide what will be the subject of his or her attention, and the images are displayed only as long as they are able to inspire this passing interest. Many forms of popular entertainment have a similar character: for a moment, they draw attention mainly with the use of sensory stimuli, while simultaneously paralysing thinking. It leads to the conclusion that free time, in the sense intended by Aristotle, disappeared from culture. See Scruton, Kultura jest ważna, p. 36. 31 This situation changed when, in 1870, England introduced the law on universal and compulsory education under the supervision and control of the state. Among other things, it was the result of the struggle of the English workers for political rights. A similar situation took place in America, where in the 1930s the organisation of trade unions was accompanied by the demand of free elementary public education put forward by the workers’ movement. However, indicated changes did not result in the fact that school became an expression of the interests of the masses. Both in England and in America, it was an ideological and political tool of the ruling classes. Nevertheless, it did play a role in spreading education. See Kłoskowska, Kultura masowa, pp. 114– 116. See also J. Chałasiński, Szkoła w społeczeństwie amerykańskim, Warsaw 1936; H. G. Good, A History of Western Education, New York 1960; I. Chłodna, Edukacja amerykańska. Drogi i bezdroża, Lublin 2008. 32 In the mid-nineteenth century, a ten-hour workday law was introduced in England. It was not until the twentieth century, after the First World War, that the eight-hour day began. In the context of the topic of leisure, it is worth mentioning that there now operates an additional factor against the extension of leisure, which is the employee’s possibility to perform extra paid work during the “free” hours. In English, it bears the name “moonlighting” for working in the moonlight; in French it is travair noir. See Kłoskowska, Kultura masowa, pp. 159–160.

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or slightly higher than elementary level of general education provided similar preparation for the reception of culture offered at that time. In the pre-industrial society, there was a place both for the high culture and also for the authentic folk culture having rural roots, which was something original and autonomous, and directly reflected the human lives and experiences. Such authentic folk culture never aspired to be called art, but its distinctiveness was accepted and respected.33 On the one hand, the ongoing process of industrialization irreversibly destroyed the folk culture and on the other hand. However, the existing socio-economic situation enhanced the emergence of a new type of culture, modelled after mechanical production, characterised by the specialised, mass, standardised production, and distributed on a large scale by the new means of communication.34 A new type of work and the experience of machines and standards imposed by them resulted in changes in the human mentality of the day. Their effect was, in many cases, a development of attitudes of subordination, submissiveness, passivity, avoiding the intellectual effort, susceptibility to superficial but expressive effects, passion for music of a vivid, quick rhythm, love for an absorbing action, especially the music presented in pictures that did not require the work of imagination. Moreover, the breakdown of community and human morality is mentioned as one of the effects of these processes: “individuals became isolated, alienated, and anomic, and the only link they had with one another became contractual-financial in character. The previously active people were included in a totally anonymous mass, susceptible to the manipulation of the mass media that constituted a source of a substitutive community and morality.”35 Over time, one could find ideological elements among the reasons of the disappearance of high culture associated with industrialisation and urbanisation.

2.2. IDEOLOGY AGAINST HIGH CULTURE The dominance or even promotion of mass culture has its roots in the materialistic perception of man, characteristic of modern philosophy. In accordance with its assumptions, man is only matter equipped with senses, with no immaterial

33 See D. Strinati, Wprowadzenie do kultury popularnej, trans. W. J. Burszta, Poznań 1998, p. 21. 34 Kłoskowska, Kultura masowa, p. 109. To read more on the birth and development of mass media and mass communications, see D. McQuail, Teoria komunikowania masowego, trans. M. Bucholc, A. Szulżycka, Warsaw 2007. 35 W. Daszkiewicz, “Charakterystyka kultury masowej,” Cywilizacja 33 (2010), p. 56.

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soul, immaterial will, and immaterial intellect.36 His cognition ends on the senses and the meaning of life ends with experiences; the sought-after pleasant experiences and the avoided sad experiences. Such way of thinking gave rise to the popularisation of utopian ideologies within whose framework man was brought onto the biological level and his life was mostly determined by political power. At the turn of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, Antoine Destutt de Tracy spread the idea that the drama of human life plays out along the axis of material conditions and the way of thinking constituted by ideology. Moreover, de Tracy added that material life determined the aforementioned way of thinking.37 This idea was referred to by Karl Marx in the “Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy” (1859) in the formula:  “Being determines consciousness.” He simultaneously states that ideology can serve as a tool to organise the base: the material sphere. From this view, Marx built a utopia of the so-called scientific socialism (communism) which included: materialism, collectivism, positivism, scientism, and progressivism in cognition, which constitute the base; and the history of communism and theory of revolution, which make the superstructure.38 These idease were implemented in life by the introduction of the so-called new social order, in which a collective  – the “proletariat” (from the Greek word proles  – child) was to be the subject – controlled by physical terror and intrusive propaganda. The new social order was to be divided into those who rule, those who guard, and those who work. The a-priori division of the society into classes became the seedbed of the proletariat revolutionary struggle against the so-called class enemies: capitalists and the bourgeoisie. Man’s affiliation with one of the social 36 The consequence of Cartesian dualism – according to which the human body and soul are two separate substances – was the appearance of two currents in philosophy: idealism, which reduced man to soul, and materialism, which reduced man to the material dimension only. The spiritual sphere (res cogitans) was negated within the trend of the British empiricism for the benefit of materialism (res extensa). Initially, it was developed by Locke and Hume, and continued by the French materialists. The sensualist and materialistic monism were represented by: A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy (one of the pillars of the French Revolution), J. O. de La Mettrie, E. B. de Condillac, and P. H. D. Holbach. They were of the opinion that man is a being on the border of a machine and an animal, whereas society is a collection of such animals-machines. See P. Jaroszyński, Człowiek i nauka, Lublin 2008, pp. 207–221; B. W. Head, Ideology and Social Science. Destutt de Tracy and French Liberalism, Lancaster 1985. 37 See A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy, Ėléments d’Idéologie, Paris 1798. See also H. Kiereś, Trzy socjalizmy, Lublin 2000, pp. 55–78. 38 See Kiereś, Trzy socjalizmy, p. 70.

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classes determined the type of culture represented by him. According to the image of man, who is a peculiar mixture of biologism and socialism, created here, a person is devoid of own subjectivity and aim of life, a person is deprived of transcendence and is told not to have the capacity to go beyond the social and earthly conditions. This type of man results from social relations accepted a-priori.39 It is not a person with own nature and dignity but a product of social relations and conditions. Human nature comes from the society and is totally determined by it, thereby, it is subjected to it.40 This reversed the classical order, in which human nature constituted the foundation on the basis of which culture was created. As a result of these changes, culture began to be understood as an accomplishment of the a-priori projects in all domains and man was deprived of the possibility to verify them. Along with questioning the existence of an objective human nature, within the framework of this type of ideology, there was a lack of a real criterion to facilitate the issue of justified evaluations. The nature of man was arbitrarily determined either by man himself or – in light of an arbitrarily approved criterion – society. In the history of Europe, there emerged another variety of socialism, not a new one, namely the liberal socialism (from Latin libertas  – freedom), after the failure of collectivist communism and totalitarianism. Its purpose was the same – unlimited material consumption – but the method changed. It was no longer collectivism, but individual entrepreneurship:  capitalism. The motto of the Great French Revolution, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,” was reinterpreted here to assume the form of “Liberty, Pluralism, Tolerance.”41 The inseparable relationship between collectivism and totalitarianism was replaced by economic liberalism (capitalism) and a relativisation of ideology. The highest good of man was represented by freedom, understood negatively as the “lack of obstacles and hindrances in action” (A. Schopenhauer), discretion, and independence of other people. Social life was organised on the basis of a social agreement (T. Hobbes, J.  J. Rousseau, J.  Locke, I.  Kant), whereas economic life assumed the form of unlimited entrepreneurship, free from state interference and moral judgement (A. Smith).42 It is possible to notice here a social structure, analogous to the 39 See Jaroszyński, Kultura masowa czy kultura wysoka? Ideologiczny kontekst sporu o kulturę w Polsce, p. 24. 40 M. Heidegger, List o humanizmie, in: Heidegger, Budować, mieszkać, myśleć. Eseje wybrane, selected, elaborated and provided with an introduction by K. Michalski, Warsaw 1977, p. 82 41 See Kiereś, Trzy socjalizmy, p. 71. 42 Ibid., pp. 71–72.

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previous one:  those who rule, those who organise the production, those who consume. However, everybody who is politically incorrect is a “social enemy.” When it comes to the sphere of culture, there is also a departure from any judgement or categorization, because  – firstly  – there are no objective criteria that would make it possible and – secondly – the main principle governing the political or scientific discourse is political correctness founded on relativism in the sphere of truth, good, and beauty. The third type of socialism was the twentieth century national socialism:  Nazism, fascism. It was designed in Italy by Benito Mussolini and realised in Germany by Adolf Hitler. It was based on the myth of the master race, super humans of Friedrich Nietzsche, and a tradition of “Kulturkampf,” according to which war constituted the way of existence of the German culture. The criterion of a particular culture affiliation in that system was race. There is no place for high culture within the framework of the indicated systems, because there is no room for anything that is spiritual. According to the adopted assumptions, man can be liberated and morally changed only after satisfying his material needs. The primary goal of high culture cannot be accomplished here, as it consists in the sublimation of matter in order to direct oneself to what is spiritual. We notice today that, on the one hand, the needs to be satisfied by high culture are negated and, on the other hand, the differences between high and low culture are eliminated, the former being levelled with the latter. It results in the decay of high culture. The new, modern, proletarian is a cosmopolitan, a consumer-tourist, whose main goal of life is consumption. Having a closer look at the indicated tendencies, we can see that they express a definite image of man shaped on the basis of philosophical or even ideological assumptions. The ideologization of culture is caused by forcing the idealised image of man. One of its consequences is telling man that the aim of his life and the sense of his work is unlimited material consumption. Reductionism lies at the heart of this view, as human dignity and the ethos of work are measured by the amount of money and access to consumer and material goods.43 Therefore, the principles of social life are in this case pragmatism and utilitarianism, efficiency in the attainment of goods and their interim usefulness, which pushes man to egoism. Socialism – as reductionism – not only appropriates but also restricts the scope of culture and destroys high culture. Totalitarian socialism debased culture to the sphere of art, mass entertainment, and “secular” or “folk” customs. However, modern socio-liberalism is characterised by standardisation, which leads to

43 See Kiereś, Trzy socjalizmy, p. 87.

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monotony and schematism, and thus to a cultural kitsch.44 It generates an artificial division into two extremes: low and high culture. The former is the so-called pop-culture based on sensation and vulgarity, while the latter, having nothing in common with culture regarding the source, is often referred to as the anti- or post-culture. The ideals it promotes are freedom and creativity. Their accomplishment leads to relativism, irrationalism, and finally to nihilism.45 Clement Greenberg, one of the most influential American art critics, paid attention to the use of culture, in particular, art for ideological purposes. His analyses refer to avant-garde art and kitsch. The theory presented in his work Avant-Gard and Kitsch significantly influenced the thinking about art in the middle of the twentieth century. Greenberg’s commentators stress that the style he used was cutting, despotic, and simultaneously getting right to the heart.46 He was a defender of modernist art. He defended it against “false friends,” against masses, and the Philistines. He thought that modernism facilitated our better perception of art as art, subjected to an evaluation of taste and an aesthetic judgment.47 Greenberg believes that in the twentieth century, the culture of artistic values was represented only by the art of the avant-garde, born as a result of a revolutionary protest against the bourgeoisie world but substantially socially uninvolved. It focused on the issues of the creative workshop, constantly looked for new forms of expression, and was characterised by directness, authenticity, and freshness. In Greenberg’s opinion, the true function of the avant-garde was to find guidance in an ideological chaos and violence.48 Today this art is opposed by academism at a higher level, among narrower societal circles, and at the level of mass reception  – kitsch  – which according to Greenberg is synonymous with mass culture. He indicates that kitsch is a product of the industrial revolution, the urbanization process, industrialism, and the introduction of universal education.49 On the one hand, people moving from the country to cities learned to read and write because of practical reasons, 44 See ibid., p. 88. See also: C. Greenberg, “Awangarda i kicz,” in: Kultura masowa, trans. and ed. Cz. Miłosz, Krakow 2002, pp. 37–52. 45 See V.  Possenti, Nihilizm teoretyczny i „śmierć metafizyki,” trans. J.  Merecki SDS, Lublin 1998. 46 See C.  Greenberg, Obrona modernizmu, trans. G.  Dziamski, M.  Śpik-Dziamska, Krakow 2006, p. 11. 47 See C. Greenberg, Art and Culture. Critical Essays, Boston 1961. 48 C. Greenberg, “Awangarda i kicz,” p. 39. 49 Ibid., p. 44.

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while on the other hand, due to a lack of free time, they did not learn traditional urban culture. Losing contact with folk culture from villages, they began to feel the need to have culture “fit for consumption.” That is why a new product of kitsch appeared for those who – insensitive to the values of true culture – craved for entertainment. This need was satisfied by kitsch that “ensured substitute experiences and counterfeit impressions.”50 It was created mechanically, and its supreme goal was to generate income.51 Greenberg includes a new type of artistic phenomena of the 1980s in this type of culture – namely pop art – primarily due to its predilection for simple things.52 Pop art was called “business art.” Greenberg indicates that the indispensable condition for the existence of kitsch was access to a higher, fully developed cultural tradition, whose achievements were utilised by kitsch for its own purposes. Moreover, Greenberg perceives kitsch as a tool of effective propaganda used by the fascists and the Stalinists. It allowed dictators to maintain a closer contact with the masses. Greenberg unmasks the sources of kitsch’s clear dominance in every field of culture. By analysing the mechanisms of culture management in totalitarian countries, Greenberg stresses that these were embedded in the assumption adopted by the powers of the time that, if official culture exceeded the reception abilities of the masses, there would appear a risk of isolation. In order to disallow the masses overtaking power, the rulers had to provide them with entertainment to move their attention away from current political events. Greenberg views Mussolini as an example of this kind of behaviour.53

3. The Peculiarity of Mass Culture 3.1. THE CRITERION OF QUANTITY AND STANDARDISATION Let us now consider the characteristic features of mass culture. It will help us identify how these features condition the specific ways of exerting influence on the “mass-man.” On the one hand, mass culture has a very wide range of influence. On the other hand, it is characterised by a lack of higher aspirations for development. By referring to the “lowest instincts,” mass culture reaches a broad 5 0 Greenberg, “Awangarda i kicz,” p. 44. 51 “Kitsch varies according to style, but it always remains the same. Kitsch is a blooming of everything that is false in the life of our time. Kitsch assures that it does not want anything from the buyers except their money – it does not even demand their time” (ibid., p. 44). 52 Greenberg, Obrona modernizmu, p. 35. 53 Ibid., p. 12.

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range of people thanks to the high level of technological advancement. It offers no place for sublimation or refinement of feelings, which normally occurs by referring feelings to the spiritual.54 Moreover, the mass means of communication enable the use of two basic criteria typical of mass culture:  the criterion of quantity and standardization.55 When it comes to the better quantification of the mass reception of culture, it is difficult to express it in concrete numbers. However, it can be approximated by paying attention to a certain characteristic feature of mass culture recipients. It is their spatial dispersion. This type of public is called indirect, in contrast to a direct public, which is gathered in one place and time, collectively receiving the same content, and influenced by mutual contacts.56 Direct public dominated in periods prior to the emergence of mass culture. In times of the ancient culture and in the Middle Ages, recipients were brought together by means of theatre, games, or religious ceremonies. The situation changed with the appearance of technical means of communication. While clarifying the concept of standardisation, we must pay attention to the fact that the content to be spread among such a spatially dispersed public must be properly multiplied. Hence the need for technical means, whose functioning is inseparably connected with the development of the mass culture.57 These include the print, mass production, and distribution of books, journals, photographic and film copies, reproductions, recordings, radio, and television. The cultural content is widespread due to the provision of standardised duplicated copies. It is interesting to note that, if we take into account the condition of fast wide range communication, it is also met by the technical means of communication in the common sense, falling within the scope of direct culture, which includes railways, cars, and planes.

3.2. FORMALISM AND REIFICATION Further determinants of mass culture are the formalisation and reification of transmission channels. Mass culture has no place for a direct, personal contact of a creator or performer with an auditorium, which – in the period prior to this type of culture – was one of the conditions of cultural experience, as in the case of the classical epic, a medieval chivalric poetry, or a folk fairy tale, transmitted

54 Jaroszyński, Kultura masowa czy kultura wysoka? Ideologiczny kontekst sporu o kulturę w Polsce, p. 23. 55 Kłoskowska, Kultura masowa, p. 96. 56 Ibid., p. 97. 57 Kłoskowska, Kultura masowa, p. 98.

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directly to the audience. Over time, there occurred significant changes in the nature of social bonds between the creators and recipients of culture. The changes were so far-reaching that the word “production” started to be used in regard to the production and transmission of mass culture content.58 Culture became a product created with the help of specialised institutions and distributed by a specialised system of distribution. It is a specific structural feature characteristic of this type of culture. One of the authors who juxtaposed the notion of mass culture against high culture by stressing the characteristic features of the former was an American writer and journalist:  Dwight Macdonald. In 1944, in the magazine Politics focused on political and cultural issues, he published an essay “A Theory of Popular Culture,” in which he characterises high culture as traditional culture captured in handbooks, which constitutes a component of the Western culture. He notices that the results of the work and thought of high culture are quite rare but sometimes enjoy general interest:  “Its wings are clipped by the mass culture permeating everything.”59 Macdonald underlines that the “high culture of masters” had a particular value and was something different than a spontaneous folk culture “growing bottom up.” He pays attention to the fact that the existing division into the high culture and folk art was once respected by both aristocracy and commoners. This division is eliminated today, while its absence leads to irreversible negative consequences. Modern high culture is forced to compete with mass culture or mingle with it into a single shapeless formation. Macdonald views a significant problem in the absence of cultural elites with high culture and no ability to sustain it. According to him, if the elites existed, they would look after high culture. However, in the absence of the elites, people with untrained taste and experience reduce high culture to the level of low, mass culture. A rescue for high culture is – in Macdonald’s opinion – a re-establishment of the elites as a community of educated individuals linked by work, tradition, and values.60 Macdonald indicates that mass culture is to partly a continuation of the old folk art.61 He simultaneously highlights significant differences between the two. Folk art grew spontaneously, bottom-up. It represents a spontaneous local 58 The term “cultural industry,” popularised by T. Adorno along with M. Horkheimer, is worth mentioning here. For more, see T. W. Adorno, Prismen. Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft. Wissenschaftliche Sonderausgabe, Frankfurt/M 1970–1986. 59 D. Macdonald, “A Theory of Popular Culture,” Politics (February 1944), p. 22. 60 D. Macdonald, A Theory of Popular Culture, p. 23. 61 D. Macdonald, “A Theory of Mass Culture,” Diogenes 1(3).

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expression of the preferences of the people who shaped it for their own needs without looking to high culture. Folk culture developed primarily in traditional local communities such as the village. The content transmitted by folk culture was usually simple and understandable, and it was the result of a close relationship between the creator and the recipients:  someone from the outside could not grasp its symbolic meaning. A typical feature of folk culture was originality stemming from spontaneous and free creation. Moreover, it was the source of inspiration for a nation-wide creativity.62 On the other hand, mass culture is imposed in a top-down fashion, “integrating the masses into a debased form of High Culture and thus becoming an instrument of political domination.”63 It is not creative and original. It only transmits and exploits the values that are widely recognised. Consequently, personal contact between senders and recipients of culture gradually disappears. Relations become formal and limited only to media communication of what is only slightly impacted by recipients. Another feature of mass culture that indicates the reification of its transmission channels may be the means of analysing its creators. It is not a reflection of the desires of individual artists or common people. Mass culture is produced mainly by technicians, who make use of social engineering that is a scientifically developed method of influencing recipients. They primarily aim at exploiting but not satisfying the cultural needs of the masses. The goals of this type of culture are political or commercial, making both its creation (production) and transmission purely formal and devoid of individual, personal references. High culture is forced to compete with kitsch, because there are no cultural elites in the modern world that could care for and promote high culture. Kitsch is an excellent example of the formalisation and reification of relations that high culture used to maintain and develop. It is most clearly seen in art:  “Clement Greenberg writes that the special aesthetic quality of kitsch is that it “predigests art for the spectator and spares him effort, provides him with a shortcut to the pleasures of art that detours what is necessarily difficult in genuine art.’ ”64 Kitsch employs a rationalised technique, borrowed from science and industry, due to which the differences between good and bad art are blurred. The simplicity of consumption and the ease with which kitsch is created place demands on the products of culture in order to make them simple in reception and undemanding

62 Kłoskowska, Kultura, pp.  42–43, qtd. after Daszkiewicz, Charakterystyka kultury masowej, p. 57. 63 D. Macdonald, “A Theory of Mass Culture,” p. 3. 64 Ibid., p. 4.

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any deeper reflection. Moreover, viewers’ reactions are taken into account in advance in the work itself, thus detracting them from the obligation to prove up to the task of having own experiences.65 Low demands made by kitsch make it ubiquitous and produced in huge quantities, so that it dominates high culture, leading to its gradual elimination.

3.3. HOMOGENISATION While characterising mass culture, we should mention the phenomenon of homogenisation. It relies on mixing various types of content in terms of quality or meaning in order to make them equal in the name of democracy, which rejects any manifestations of discrimination. Homogenisation is a synonym of blurring differences among elements of culture at various levels.66 Unfortunately, this type of unification is most frequently based on “equating top-down,” namely, reducing every type of content to the level of mediocrity and an easy assimilation by a mass recipient. Entertainment occupies the place of true art, quantity replaces quality.67 As Macdonald notices in his “A Theory of Mass Culture,” the effect of the homogenisation of culture blurs also age differences. Adults display an infantile regression whereas children tend to mature too fast, which is caused by too many objects of excitement.68 Before Macdonald, these issues were tackled by Rutherford Hamilton Towner and Karl Mannheim. Towner indicates the alarming effects of homogenisation as early as in the 1920s. He perceives the main threat in the unification, uniformity, and stagnation caused by the equalisation of all culture levels.69 On the other hand, Mannheim notices the sources of this phenomenon in the process of losing distance in modern societies, both in social relations and in the domain of culture.70 It is the principle of de-distancing, according to which the rank 6 5 D. Macdonald, “A Theory of Mass Culture.” 66 See A. Kłoskowska, “Homogenizacja kultury masowej a poziomy kultury,” Kultura i Społeczeństwo 7 (1963), no. 2, p. 43. 67 See A. Kłoskowska, “Ilość i jakość w kulturze masowej,” Zeszyty Argumentów (1963), no. 2, p. 89. 68 D. Macdonald, “A Theory of Mass Culture.” 69 R. H. Towner, La philosophie de la civilisation, Paris 1928. 70 “Our contemporary culture is characterized by a radical negation of “distance” both in social relationships and in the realm of culture. Our field of experience tends to become homogeneous, without the earlier hierarchical gradations between “high” and “low,” “sacred” and “profane.” In all earlier ages, such divisions were all-pervasive.… The homogenization of the field of experience is by no means a matter of the scientific

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of artistic creativity is influenced neither by the goal nor the presented object. Certain manifestations of this process are observed by Mannheim earlier, at the turn of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, but also in the Baroque period. Over time, people began to depreciate the hierarchy based on distance that permeated the system of social organization and all domains of culture. Mass culture intensified the phenomenon of homogenisation, so that products of a very unequal formal value and various artistic levels received equal status. Taking into account the content of messages spread by the technical means of culture massification, we may distinguish three types of homogenisation: simplifying, immanent, and mechanical.71 In the first category, the elements of a higher level of culture are subjected to certain modifications, aimed at their simplification, and then introduced into mass culture. This type of homogenisation – called vulgar – may take the form of plagiarism or travesty; that is, a modification of one’s words, a thought, a literary, or a musical piece. The danger that occurs at this point, relies on falsifying the work of high culture under the guise of democratisation and moving the mass viewer closer to great artworks. Consequently, however, the interest in high culture is gradually eliminated, because it is apparently satisfied by transformed and modified products. The immanent (internal) homogenisation involves the introduction of some elements, which are easily accessible to a wide range of people, into an artwork of a higher level by the author himself. This regards mainly works intended for mass reception. They feature combinations of attractive plot threads such as drama, sentimental, or comic elements with a beautiful form full of artistic refinement and sophistication.72 The most common and therefore especially important type of homogenisation in mass culture is mechanical homogenisation. The inner content of higherlevel artworks does not change in its framework, but it is transferred intact into the mass means of communication. The great ongoing demand for products from the field of symbolic culture and the resulting “goods” is something that drives this type of activities. Due to the fact that a large quantity and a diversity of content attracts the greatest number of recipients, mass culture producers use all available works, including the works of high culture. Therefore, there is a constant approach only. We can observe it also in everyday experience.… Analogous trends can be observed in art and philosophy.… The world of the objects represented is “homogenized’ ” (K. Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture, London 1956, pp. 227–228). 71 Kłoskowska, Kultura masowa, p. 335. 72 Kłoskowska, Socjologia kultury, ed. 3, Warsaw 2007, p. 204.

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yet curated flow of content between high and mass culture.73 Mechanical homogenisation is particularly typical of the means of communication characterised by a variety of transmitted content; namely, magazines, radio, television. The change of culture goals is easily visible here as a shift from those oriented at human development and education to those that are purely commercial. Dominic Strinati indicates this feature of mass culture: “It equally supports commercialization and consumerism, profit and market and suppresses other opposing opinions because it is the culture of foiling and passivity, contradicting intellectual challenge.”74 Mass culture organisers decide about the context and proportions in which they present some elements of high culture to the general public. The negative consequence of homogenisation designed for commercial purposes is the fact that high culture content is treated in the same way as any other content, which defines the firmly established borders of their quantitative involvement. Access to less approachable content is limited for the general public because of the fear of losing clients. The criterion that determines the proportions between the elements of high and low culture – included in the mass media – is the rise of the auditorium that receives the transmitted content.75 It leads to a huge disparity in the involvement of high culture elements in mass culture. Referring to this phenomenon, Dwight Macdonald formulates a thesis on the functioning of the Gresham’s law in mass culture, usually applied to money: “the bad coin pushes the good one out because the bad one is easier to understand and there is more pleasure thanks to it.” Macdonald compares it with a situation when a good play (serious content) competes with commercial formulae (kitsch).76 Kitsch must be accessible, which means that its level should be adjusted to the so-called average recipient, to reach its supreme goal, which is profit. Hence, in mass culture one deals with a top-down process, with the adaptation of content to the greatest number of recipients. By using socio-technical methods, it is possible to anticipate their reaction in advance, without even giving them an opportunity to gain own experiences and reflections. 7 3 Kłoskowska, Kultura masowa, p. 341. 74 D. Strinati, Wprowadzenie do kultury popularnej, trans. W.  J. Burszta, Poznań 1998, p. 25. 75 Scholarship confirms the notion that mass media audience is dropping sharply when entertainment programmes are interrupted by science-related programmes. See G. D. Wiebe, “Mass Communications,” in: E. L. Hartley, R. E. Hartley, Fundamentals of Social Psychology, New York 1961. 76 D. Macdonald, “A Theory of Mass Culture.”

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4. The Characteristics of the “Mass-Man” 4.1. EDUCATION WITHOUT IDEALS What are the characteristic features of the mass culture recipient, that is, the “mass-man?” We shall refer here to the analyses of the phenomenon of the masses and the mass-man by one of the most distinguished twentieth-century Spanish thinkers, José Ortega y Gasset.77 He starkly opposed the division into masses and selected minorities divided by social classes. The notion of “masses” was perceived by him as a way of being a human, irrespective of the represented class.78 Ortega was of the opinion that it is possible to identify both masses and authentic minorities in each social class. It is connected with the specificity of certain activities and functions performed by the members of the society for the performance of which one needs proper qualifications and special talents. In the past, such activities were performed by people with relevant qualifications acquired through a special type of education based on defined ideals. However, one notices today significant changes in the attitudes of the mass-man. They equally refer to politicians, educators, writers, industrialists, and scientists who – closed in the hermetic world of their own specialization – are ignorant in other domains. The aforementioned changes are also based on the fact that average people with no proper qualifications increasingly frequently occupy the place that belongs to a minority by adopting its way of life. Ortega calls this phenomenon a “hyper-democracy.”79 Masses act directly within it, disregarding the rule of law, by physical or material pressure, imposing their own aspirations and preferences on all people around them.80 The consequence of such action is the elimination of all manifestations of dissimilarity. Speaking of hyper-democracy, Ortega thought that history faced no other epoch, in which the crowd would so directly rule the world as in the days of his contemporaries.

77 Before Ortega, the phenomenon of the revolt of the masses was tackled by Irving Babbitt (1865–1933), Paul Elmer More (1864–1937), and George Santayana (1863–1952). 78 Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, New York 1957. 79 Ibid., p. 12. 80 “The characteristic of the hour is that the commonplace mind, knowing itself to be commonplace, has the assurance to proclaim the rights of the commonplace and to impose them wherever it will.… The mass crushes beneath it everything that is different, everything that is excellent, individual, qualified and select. Anybody who is not like everybody, who does not think like everybody, runs the risk of being eliminated.” (Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, p. 18).

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What we can see today is the fact that an average man has such possibilities in life that were once reserved only to minorities who occupied the highest positions of social hierarchy. It is associated with an increasing standard of living. When it comes to the awareness of legal equality, Ortega notices the differences between Europe and the USA, where the phenomenon was present from the very beginning of its existence. In Europe, it was the domain of selected groups for a long time. He rightly observes that the occurrence of this phenomenon in Europe had nothing in common with the so-called Americanisation of Europe. It resulted from internal reasons which, among other things, involved the introduction of universal education and the increase of society’s wealth. Therefore, as Ortega rightly admits, there was no possibility to speak about the impact of America on Europe, but rather an equating of strata and the styles of life between the two continents.81 With a raise in the general standard of living, the area of subjective possibilities of the contemporary man considerably expanded. It refers to a variety of fields of human activity:  intellectual, economic, state, legal, entertainment, technical, sports, and communication. It has a significant influence on the development of human attitudes and types of behaviour. It is revealed by, among other things, the feeling of superiority of the contemporary man with reference to the achievements of past generations and previous epochs. This false conviction makes people feel self-sufficient and separated from the past. They do not understand and do not respect the old classical epochs, their principles, or their ideals. They are unable to listen so that they do not recognise any authorities. Moreover, 81 Ortega did not link the immediate origins of radical change with the eighteenth-century industrial revolution but placed them a little later, in the nineteenth century, when, as he claims, human life received a new framework, both in the physical and social aspect. Specifically, three factors were involved: liberal democracy, scientific research, and industrialisation. The last two items mean “technology.” As Ortega emphasises, none of these factors were invented in the nineteenth century but earlier; however, it was in the nineteenth century that they were implemented. In his opinion, at that time, the human condition underwent a radical improvement. He mentions, among others, the widespread facilitation in material (economic) matters, the introduction of equality of all entities before the law, along with comfort and public order. Ortega indicates that, as a result of those factors, there were two basic qualities that emerged in man at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: “This leads us to note down in our psychological chart of the mass-man of to-day two fundamental traits: the free expansion of his vital desires, and therefore, of his personality; and his radical ingratitude towards all that has made possible the ease of his existence.” (Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, p. 58).

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such people are characterised by a lack of historical knowledge, which is the most significant condition for the preservation and development of civilization. Such ignorance makes them unaware of the principles that underlie civilization, in which they live. They focus only on what is here and now, they are interested neither in what was in the past nor what will happen in the future. The contemporary world seems to be devoid of intentions, expectations, or ideals. Moreover, expanding the field of human possibilities does not unfortunately go hand in hand with the improvement of the quality of life. Ortega expressed it in the following words:  “we live at a time when believes himself fabulously capable of creation, but he does not know what to create. Lord of all things, he is not lord of himself He feels lost amid his own abundance. With more means at its disposal, more knowledge, more technique than ever, it turns out that the world to-day goes the same way as the worst of worlds that have been; it simply drifts.”82 The number of potential possibilities grows, but it does not translate into actual choices made by an average person. It is associated with ignorance, a lack of thorough education, an inability to notice higher goods, and the fact that there are various quality goods among the products that surround us, not to mention the inability to persist in overcoming difficulties encountered in the pursuit of higher goods. In short, we notice the lack of the virtue of magnanimity. However, just as every virtue, the virtue of magnanimity must also be shaped in the process of education. It must be a process that is deliberate, long-term, and taking into account individual human possibilities. The features characterising a contemporary man – such as the lack of responsibility, ignorance, insecurity, and anxiety – result from no understanding of the place that should be occupied by the measures and goals, no ability to properly exploit what contemporary culture offers him. We may speak here about a specific barbarism, reflected in the lack of objective norms, courtesy, good manners, principles of law and justice, but also the lack of historical culture and respect for certain definite intellectual approaches, which constitute an objective point of reference in a dispute.83 8 2 Ibid., p. 44. 83 In this context, Ortega’s noteworthy observation is about the rebellion of the masses at the end of the 1920s, clearly recognizing the danger of the emerging political movements:  national syndicalism and fascism. By analysing the sources of those ideologies, Ortega indicates the fact that their creator was a new type of man, not interested in admitting that others were right or in finding a justification for his own beliefs but only interested in imposing own views on others. The only right that such a person has to obey is the right not to be right. On this basis, he decides to lead the society without any ability or qualification. Attitudes of this type are most often observed in the sphere of political activity, and their sources must be sought in a kind

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The indicated remarks are important, because the aforementioned factors are involved in human decision-making and the decisions made on a daily basis are entirely responsible for the quality of everybody’s life. The fact that two basic elements shape our everyday lives – circumstances (possibilities) and the solutions-choices that we make – was a very interesting idea noticed by Ortega. The circumstances are what we find and what we often have no influence upon. However, the choices we make depend exclusively on us. Our choices are impacted by our knowledge, acquired through specific education and also the broadly perceived character shaped in the process of education. It has its reference both to individual and social life. One can often speak about the character of a given community. The decisions made within this community depend on the dominant type of man. Today, there dominates the mass-man and he is the one who decides; and he frequently makes decisions without a clear aim, an action plan, far-reaching ideals, totally devoid of the virtue of longanimity. Ortega y Gasset was one of the first thinkers who noticed the dangers associated with the development of modern mass societies. Some perceive his views as exaggerated, elitist, and aristocratic. Among the words of his commentators, one can also find such opinions that refer to criticism expressed by Ortega with regard to the mass society: “it was presented from the position of a noble aristocrat.… he lacked talents and abilities facilitating his communication with the masses.”84 The criticism met by Ortega, was expressed mainly from democratic points of view. Moreover, he was accused that his observations are not supported by any rigorous research and that he did not observe the division of the society into classes existing at that time, focusing instead on psychological and ethical issues.85 In this context, we should notice that in his The Revolt of the Masses, Ortega frequently emphasises that his analyses do not stem from sociology or political science.86 He is interested in the aspect of culture and civilization concerning these issues. As he underlines, he does not aim at giving such interpretation of his times that does not notice the positive features embedded in the depth of the phenomenon of the domination of masses.87 Nevertheless, Ortega of intellectual hermeticism, the lack of understanding, the lack of skills, and the willingness to reach causes and sources of premonitions or ideas. In this case, the possibility of any discussion is rejected, and the only way to proliferate one’s ideas is violence. See Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, pp. 82–83. 84 E. Górski, José Ortega y Gasset i kryzys ideologii hiszpańskiej, Wrocław 1982, p. 105. 85 Ibid., p. 97. 86 Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses. 87 Ibid.

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does not share the opinion of those who unreflectively agree with this domination in various domains of life. He warns against the consequences generated by lowering the level of culture to the needs of the mass-man, an average man who is not interested in his own self-development and in seeking answers to important existential questions. Ortega tries to find an answer to the question of whether the crisis of the Western civilization is merely an ordinary stage in the historical development of the Western society or whether it is a manifestation of its ultimate demise.88 He does not share Spengler’s opinion regarding the inevitable end of the Western civilization. In Ortega’s view, the activity oriented at healing the European society should come from the social elite. It must rebuild the system of values and spread it among the masses, creating a vision of a joint objective that the new society could accomplish.89 Therefore, it is necessary to restore the point of support, the objective system of values. Ortega notices this phenomenon of shaping a new elite in the field of art. He does not conceal hope that everything that occurs in the field of art constitutes a beginning of a new discipline and order in Europe. As he writes: „There comes a time, when all fields of social life, from politics to art, will organise into two systems represented by two groups of people: the eminent and the commonplace. This salutary division will become an antidote to all failures and infelicities that worry Europe.”90 The new elites, in the opinion of Ortega, should commence their activity from education, relying not on providing but on shaping information. Based on the knowledge of history, they will be able to create a new vision of the future, attractive to the masses. Ortega does not perceive the crisis of the Western civilization as something negative. He maintains that it could develop into something inspiring and creative, provided that it is possible to rebuild the system of values that could become a common goal to be accomplished by the new society. The modern man who lives in a relativized world of culture must afresh find a certain point of support to direct his future actions.

88 See K. Polit, Kryzys cywilizacji Zachodu w myśli José Ortegi y Gasseta, Lublin 2005, p. 213 f. 89 J. Ortega y Gasset, Cosmopolitismo, in: Obras completas, vol. 4, 5. ed., Mardid 1962, pp. 471–491. 90 J. Ortega y Gasset, Dehumanizacja sztuki i inne eseje, trans. P. Niklewicz; selected and provided with an introduction by S. Cichowicz, Warsaw 1980, pp. 281–282.

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4.2. DOMINANCE OF QUANTITY OVER QUALITY As we highlighted above, Ortega notices the crisis of his times in the ubiquitous phenomenon of the reign of the masses; namely, the common people, devoid of morality and competences. He stresses that this phenomenon could not be limited to the political dimension, because its manifestations may be observed in many spheres of public life such as, among other things, intellectual, moral, economic, and religious activities.91 According to Ortega, the masses are the product of civilization and are typical for agglomerations. They are manifested by the ubiquitous overcrowding of cafes, trains, resorts, hospitals. It is the quantity (of recipients, viewers, listeners) and not quality, which is the main determinant of what kind of culture is promoted today. Ortega notices that people lived different lives in the past. They lived in small groups and were less dependent on one another. The privileged place in the society today is occupied by the crowd.92 Ortega draws attention to the specificity of each society, consisting in the fact that there are minorities among the masses. Minorities are individuals or groups with special intellectual and social abilities. Unlike the masses, people stand out in a minority for something special, they acknowledge hardship, effort, labour, and achievements of their ancestors and expect much from themselves. They seek to keep order and obey the law. They impose a certain discipline upon themselves, striving for perfection. Moreover, the difference is visible also in the reason for affiliation, for organising people. In the case of larger groups of people separate from the masses, the reason for their separation lies in their common aspirations, the sharing of common ideas, or the search for a common ideal. These are the goals in themselves that attract a large number of people. Ortega names this type of similarity a “secondary similarity,” which appears after an earlier separation of individuals from the crowd.93 The purpose of this type of integration into a minority is to oppose the majority, namely the mass. Ortega describes the masses as a group of people who are not distinguished by anything special. These are “average people.”94 In this case, quantity disagrees with quality. It is constituted by those who do not regard themselves as exceptional or distinguished but, on the contrary, as the same as others; and feel good about it. They are satisfied with the situation and they do not take any effort 9 1 92 93 94

Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, New York 1957, p. 4. Ibid., p. 6. Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, New York 1957, p. 8. Ibid., p. 7.

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towards self-improvement. Such people clearly display a lack of magnanimity, which makes man strive for perfection. He is willing to rise above the average; he is not satisfied with goods of low value but tries instead to recognise the highest goods and overcome difficulties in attaining them. Despite Ortega does not name magnanimity directly, he notices that the “mass-man” of his time lacks this characteristic. The criterion employed by Ortega to distinguish two types of people creating a society is significant. This criterion is constituted by the requirements that man should impose on himself regardless of the fact whether he will be able to meet them on his own or not. Thanks to it, we can distinguish exceptional people, namely those who expect much from themselves, assume responsibilities, and face dangers, from those who do not expect too much from themselves, for who to live means to remain the same with no goal of self-improvement; it is to go through life moved by the changing sea currents.95 Ortega underlines that exceptional people perceive the meaning of their lives in serving something transcendent. They impose discipline upon themselves by seeking their own development. This is the aim of noble life: to meet the requirements and fulfil the duties that result from the recognition of the meaning of life and not privileges.96 One does not receive private rights or privileges without effort. On the contrary, they determine the attempts made by a given person. That is why the noble man can at any moment defend them and feels personal attachment to them.97 It is different in the case of universal rights, such as “the rights of man and of the citizen.” They are the property of every human being but require no labour to be acquired. At the end of this part of considerations, let us consider the misunderstanding associated with the term “nobility.” Because its meaning became more common in the sense of inherited “nobility by blood,” it is perceived as a universal right

95 Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, p. 9. Ortega explains what the masses in the intellectual sphere are: “That man is intellectually of the mass who, in face of any problem, is satisfied with thinking the first thing he finds in his head. On the contrary, the excellent man is he who contemns what he finds in his mind without previous effort, and only accepts as worthy of him what is still far above him and what requires a further effort in order to be reached” (Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, p. 69). 96 As Goethe writes, “It is a common thing to live according to your own liking. The noble man strives for order and law.” (Goethes Werke, ed. J. Kunz, vol. 5, Hamburg 1952, p. 504). 97 Ortega presents his views on that subject in his work entitled: España invertebrada, Madrid 1922, p. 156.

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received and transferred passively. “Nobility” as a formal expression – not in the sense of something inherited – appeared in the Roman Empire as an opposite to hereditary nobility declined at that time. The etymology of the Latin term nobilis, nobile indicates its dynamic character. It denotes a person who is known to everybody, a famous person, someone who has become well-known for something that distinguishes him among others, but at the same time someone perfect who becomes what he is with own effort. Such man imposes duties upon himself on his own. He never feels fully perfect and complete, he is not vain. He places quantity over quality in every area of his life. In Polish, such attitude is expressed by the term “venerable” (czcigodny): a person worthy of reverence, gifted with virtues. Therefore, a certain effort that brings recognition constitutes the basis of nobility. This is what Aristotle means, when he says that the reward for ethical bravery is reverence given only to those who are ethically brave and, therefore, magnanimous.98 What is significant for magnanimity is striving for a difficult good associated with hardships. Thus, a magnanimous man is a noble man. The opposite of nobility – so the willingness to improve, overcome difficulties, and reach for higher aims and duties – are the masses, perceived as what is common, an inertia, passivity, and withdrawal to oneself. Therefore, we must indicate what is emphasised by Ortega; namely, that the criterion of quantity does not decide about the masses, but it is instead the criterion of quality; not the number of people but the quality of their lives.

5. For a Return to High Culture 5.1. THOMAS STEARNS ELIOT: THE POET’S VOICE The thought of Thomas Sterns Eliot, a literary critic and poet, constitutes a significant contribution to the development of reflection on high culture. Inspired by the essay of Dwight Macdonald, Eliot revealed his views on high culture in, among other works, “Christianity and Culture. The Idea of a Christian Society and Notes towards the Definition of Culture.”99 Eliot analyses culture primarily in its social dimension. He asks about the idea of Christianity and the Christian community; he addresses the problem of the Church authority and expressed his fear for the condition of modern democracy. According to Eliot, civilization and culture are constantly created, whereas the state of things that we can enjoy today is the product of work, thoughts, 9 8 Aristotle, Ethic., 1124 a. 99 Issued in Polish as: Chrześcijaństwo – kultura – polityka, trans. P. Kimla, Warsaw 2007.

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and aspirations of our ancestors, who ensured that we could live properly.100 He strongly underlines the significance of tradition and the duty to appreciate the efforts of those who created civilization and the existing culture. Eliot tackles the issue of a criterion to compare civilizations and possible crises or even a demise of civilization might be foreseen. In his opinion, we can indicate higher and lower cultures, but also those characterised by progress and those underdeveloped. He notices the symptoms of the fall of civilization, manifested by the lowering standards of culture in his time.101 Eliot observes them in every field, in every human activity. He stresses that culture could move to a higher level only in the right conditions for development. Most of his considerations are devoted to looking for the essence of this development. Eliot distinguishes the culture of an individual, a group, a class, and the whole society. He maintains that the culture of an individual depends on the culture of a group or a class represented by that individual and, in turn, they depend on the culture of the whole society in which a given group or class functions. Eliot uses the term culture in the latter meaning with reference to the way of life of a particular nation living together in one place.102 This type of culture is revealed in art, the social system, customs, rituals, and the religion of a nation. Therefore, to define the essence of culture – according to Eliot – we must take into account three meanings of the word “culture:” of an individual, a group, and society. Eliot criticises Matthew Arnold for being too selective in his approach to culture.103 As Eliot notices, Arnold limits his understanding of culture in Culture and Anarchy to the individual and his or her improvement, which was to be his or her goal. Admittedly, Arnold divides society into three classes – “aristocracy, philistines and commoners” – but stops only at the condemnation of certain faults and deficiencies, without indicating what the purpose or ideal of each of those classes should be. Eliot argues that, if we wanted to properly perceive “perfection,” we would need to account for both the culture of an individual, the culture of a group, and the culture of the entire society.104 Culture develops only when the interests and functions of particular social group members permeate. During the development and the diversification of these functions, there 100 T. S. Eliot, Christianity and Culture. The Idea of a Christian Society and Notes towards the Definition of Culture, New York 1940, p. 92. 101 Ibid., p. 98. 102 T. S. Eliot, “Jedność kultury europejskiej,” in: Kto to jest klasyk i inne eseje, trans. M. Heydel, Krakow 1998, p.260. 103 T. S. Eliot, “Jedność kultury europejskiej,” p. 236. 104 Ibid., p. 238.

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appear different cultural levels:  higher and lower. It is very important for the whole society. The emergence of increasingly specialised groups may lead to the development and the disintegration of culture. Eliot means here that cultures of two strata or classes move away to such an extent that, as a result, they become two different cultures; also when the culture of the higher stratum falls apart into two parts and each of the parts represents just one sign of culture.105 When Eliot was writing his text at the end of the 1940s, he already noticed signs of the cultural disintegration of Western societies. He perceives them in, among other things, the autonomy of various fields of culture, i.e. philosophy, art, religious practice, the impoverishment of artistic sensitivity by separation from religious sensitivity, and the disappearance of the principles of good manners. On the other hand, Eliot reminds us that the solution to the problem of what culture is or whether we can control and influence culture is at the heart of many difficult decisions made by us every day. For instance, it concerns the educational programs pursued or policies applied with reference to multicultural societies. Eliot is interested in the issue of the relationship between culture and religion.106 He claims that there is no culture that could be developed without any relation to religion. Eliot disagrees with Matthew Arnold, for whom culture is something much broader than religion, as it is to provide culture only with ethical values and emotional colouring. Eliot is of the opinion that it was also wrong to recognise religion and culture as separate spheres with no relationship or mutual identification of religion and culture.107 Therefore, we may suppose that Eliot treats religion as one of the domains of culture that simultaneously transcends culture. In the context of the integral development of spiritual life, Eliot emphasises its goal, which is holiness, and the role of grace that helps us attain that goal. Eliot also polemicises with the German sociologist Karl Mannheim about the vision of culture. Among other things, Eliot concentrates on the issue of the place of classes and elite formation. He refers to the famous collection of essays and sketches by Mannheim entitled Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction from 1940. According to Eliot, elites are groups of individuals that gather men of action. He distinguishes between a caste and a class. He indicates the danger that occurs when the dominant class is considered superior in terms of race. This

1 05 Ibid., p. 240. 106 T. S. Eliot, “Trzy znaczenia „kultury,” in: Kto to jest klasyk i inne eseje, p. 242. 107 Ibid., p. 248.

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leads to tyranny and degeneration.108 Eliot accuses Mannheim of not taking into account the problem of the transmission of culture in his considerations and that he is interested more in the notion of several elites rather than a single one. His thinking is dominated by a typical Marxist atomic model of society, in which there are many elites and groups forming a culture, without communicating with one another or providing one another with cultural content.109 Mannheim does not see the problem emphasised in Eliot’s deliberations, namely, the formation, development, protection, and maintenance of elites. Mannheim confuses an elite with a class. In Eliot’s theory, the understanding of elites implies an organic, holistic vision of the society, in which future elites will adopt the positive tasks of the class of the past. The development of culture also takes the form of an organic whole: as culture on a more conscious level but still the same culture. It must be understood as an autotelic value: valuable in itself and enriching lower types. Eliot presents culture as a whole that creates society. Of course, he notes that there are higher and lower cultures. In his opinion, higher cultures are more diversified in terms of function. Within a single society, one can distinguish layers that represent higher and lower cultural levels, but also individuals with a particularly high level of culture. However, the representatives of all these levels in a single community, such as a state, form one culture, and they impact each other. It should look like that but, as Eliot emphasises, the weakness of culture of his time stems from the growing isolation of political, philosophical, artistic, and scientific elites. The isolation leads to a cessation in the circulation of ideas, mutual contacts, and mutual influence. Eliot emphasises that culture is not merely a kind of activity or a sum of actions. It is more than that: it is the way of life of a human being, a kind of trace that one perpetuates in the world through existence. It is very important for Eliot to participate in culture. He underlines that – in order to understand a culture – one should understand its representants. A student should partly identify with the group of people who teach him. However, this identification cannot be too literal.110 Eliot was of the opinion that the whole society should be involved in its culture, though not in all activities and on the same level. However, the elites 1 08 Eliot, Christianity and Culture, p. 109. 109 Eliot, Christianity and Culture, p. 109. 110 In this section, Eliot quotes The Heart of Darkness by Joseph Conrad, in which the latter describes the situation of a man who, in order to understand foreign culture – the inner world of a tribe of cannibals and the laws that govern – partakes in the practice of cannibalism. However, he eventually goes too far in the process of understanding a foreign culture and could no longer return to the state from before this event. In this

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should lead. It is the interaction between society and the elites on which the communication and development of culture depend.111 The task of the elites is to communicate with the rest of the society and pass on the patterns and standards of behaviour, which are the basic elements that constitute group culture.112 One of the most significant experiences of Eliot’s life was the revolt of the masses.113 While observing this phenomenon, he became sceptical about unrestricted democracy. For this reason, he was convinced of the necessity to exist and preserve the elites. Eliot notes that in a system ruled by liberal democracy, the society is mass-driven and classless.114 He describes the following manifestations of the functioning of liberal principles in a society: the destruction of traditional customs, the distribution of the natural collective consciousness into the individual consciousness, the sanctioning of stupidest opinions, the replacement of education by instructions, the dominance of cleverness over wisdom and careerists over qualified people, and the priority of getting along.115 In his view, no real democracy can survive unless it has diversified degrees of culture. Eliot disagrees with viewing absolute equality as common irresponsibility.116 In Eliot’s understanding, individual freedom involves bearing full responsibility by a citizen for himself. Eliot emphasises that a critical attitude and a democratic approach to democracy should be developed in a democratic system. He attributes this role to intellectual elites. He thinks that the functioning of the aristocracy of the spirit, namely the elites, is indispensable in a society. Thus, Eliot calls for such a society in which the aristocracy would have singular essential functions

way, he abandons his own culture, distorting human nature by consuming one of his ancestors. See Eliot, Christianity and Culture, p. 114. 111 Eliot, Christianity and Culture, p. 111. 112 Ibid., p. 110. 113 See P.  Kimla, “Elitaryzm w demokratycznych czasach (Wstęp),” in:  Eliot, Chrze­ ścijaństwo – kultura – polityka, pp. 7–19. 114 It should be noted here that Eliot’s views on democracy are not immutable and evolve over time. At the end of the 1920s, Eliot defended a limited democracy (oligarchy). In the 1930s, his scepticism about the effectiveness of the democratic system is reinforced. He notes that the material security begins to dominate Western democracies at the cost of life focused on ethos and lofty ideas. The characteristic feature is that the issue of democracy and liberalism most often appear in Eliot’s texts on education. See ibid., p. 10. 115 T. S.  Eliot, “Idea społeczeństwa chrześcijańskiego,” in:  Chrześcijaństwo – kultura – polityka, p. 33. 116 Eliot, Christianity and Culture, p. 121.

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to preserve the social order, transfer culture, and remain a point of reference for lower classes. Eliot argues for the foundations of a class society that we should to defend. He suggests a specific line of defence by foregrounding the family as a special place for the education to culture and its transfer. The memory of the past should be cultivated in the family. It is the family in which begins the transmission of traditions, ideals, and values, such as responsibility, affection, and respect. It is in the disappearance of tradition that Eliot views one of the symptoms of the crisis of modern culture. He claims that without tradition we cannot realise our place in history, understand our own destiny or, finally, precisely define our goals as a community. The disappearance of tradition is linked to the lack of external convention, the absence of something that could be called a “fixed point of reference.” Another area in which culture is transmitted is education, especially university education; it should not be limited only to teaching. Eliot emphasises the great significance of the knowledge of classical languages and literature, particularly when it came to theologians, historians, clerics, teachers of modern languages and literature, and literary critics. He claims that the common European heritage is constituted by Christian beliefs and classical languages. He regards them as two inseparable roots of the European culture.117 Moreover, he defends a certain canon of objects and readings, which every person in search of education must learn. Eliot especially emphasises the immense contribution of Christianity to the European culture. Hence, in the 1930s, he proposed an original project to create a Christian society as an alternative to totalitarian regimes. Eliot places its foundations in a common Christian tradition that was at the heart of emerging Europe. As he indicates, the heritage of Christian culture includes the development of art, the Roman law, universal literary models like the Greek and Roman literatures; this all shaped the European thought and the modern man as its heir. In Eliot’s opinion, Christian culture represents and could decide about the unity of the Western world. The following words prove how seriously he treats it: “If Christianity disappears, all culture will disappear as well.”118 He emphasises that no political or economic organisation could ensure what is provided by cultural

117 T. S.  Eliot, “Literat a nauki klasyczne,” in:  Eliot, Szkice krytyczne, trans. M. Niemojanowska, Warsaw 1972, p. 365. 118 See Eliot, “Jedność kultury europejskiej,” in: Kto to jest klasyk i inne eseje, p. 262. See also: R. Kirk, “Eliot i kultura chrześcijańska,” trans. L. S. Kolek, Ethos (1989), no. 8, pp. 73–75.

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unity. Therefore, Eliot warns against the rejection of shared cultural heritage. As a prominent poet, he emphasises that the special responsibility for preserving and handing down of culture – common in Europe – lies on the shoulders of writers. Their creative output should be accompanied by an understanding of the relationships among Europeans.

5.2. ROGER SCRUTON: THE PHILOSOPHER’S VOICE The author who repeatedly refers to T. S. Eliot in his works is Roger Scruton. He calls Eliot his “Conservative Mentor.” Scruton presents his interpretation of high culture in Culture Counts: Faith and Feeling in a World Besieged. Scruton refers to Eliot’s interpretation from Christianity and Culture. The easiest way to understand Scruton’s theory of culture is to juxtapose the characteristic features of communal culture, whose key experience is that of the sacred and high culture constituted by the aesthetic experience.119 Religion belongs to the essence of culture perceived in this way. Religion is the precondition for membership in cultural community. In Scruton’s opinion, the roots of high culture grow from religious experience. Like Eliot, Scruton set himself the target of defending high Western culture, which he defines as, “the literary, artistic, and philosophical inheritance that has been taught in departments of humanities both in Europe and in America, and which has recently been subject to contemptuous dismissal,”120 but also as “the accumulation of art, literature, and humane reflection that has stood the “test of time” and established a continuing tradition of reference and allusion among educated people.”121 High culture is associated with the human need to belong to a given social group. It should strive for preserving and strengthening the experiences in which human life is raised to the level of ethical reflection and subjected to rational evaluation. Thus, high culture is based on the scheme of participation. It can be observed, tested, and contemplated, but none of the activities ensures our membership in it. In order to belong to high culture, one needs access to its constituting experiences.122

1 19 R. Scruton, An Intelligent Person’s Guide to Modern Culture, Indiana 2000. 120 R. Scruton, Culture Counts: Faith and Feeling in a World Besieged, 2007, p. v. 121 Ibid., p. 2. 122 See J. Winnicka-Gburek, Edukacja w koncepcji kultury Rogera Scrutona, kttp://www. animacja.kulturalna.us.edu.pl/Winnicka/Teoria%20kultury%20Rogera%20Scrutona. html [access: 20.03.2016].

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Scruton disagrees with the suggestion that cultures cannot be judged with objective criteria neither from the inside nor from the outside. He demonstrates that culture is in a sense made up of evaluations and exists in order to convey the habit of judging from generation to generation: “This habit of judgment is vital to moral development, and is the foundation of the rites of passage whereby young people leave the state of adolescence and undertake the burdens of adult life. A healthy society therefore requires a healthy culture, and this is so, even if culture, as I define it, is the possession not of the many but of the few.”123 Artistic criticism plays an important role in ensuring proper participation in culture. Scruton emphasises that the role of criticism is particularly important in the times of the crisis of culture. It is criticism that should defend us against the life-impoverishing cheap sentimentality, false expression, and kitsch in all its manifestations. Scruton says very clearly that we actually offer young people access to high culture only if we teach them criticism.124 The indicated task should be performed by humanistic education. Scruton indicates that modern educational institutions of the West privilege those who disparage old values, hierarchies, and forms of social order, hidden in the curriculum that we receive from the previous generations. These people think that there is nothing worth teaching in culture, that there are only prejudices of ancient epochs. This opinion is defended by various arguments supported by philosophical scepticism. They proclaim the view that there is no objective procedure, authority, or established canon of classics that would allow us to regard one product of culture as superior over another. They reason that everything is allowed in the field of culture and, at the same time, nothing is allowed. Scruton notes the phenomenon of destroying high culture, namely the works of literature and art that survived the test of time and are valued for their spiritual and emotional content. Therefore, he asks whether we are epigones of high culture or whether we lost faith in culture? What suggests a positive answer to this question is the crisis that he finds in every area of culture. The new curriculum in humanities  – relativistic and absolutistic in its rejection of authority  – is regarded by Scruton as the greatest obstacle to the renewal of culture. One kind of antidote is, in his opinion, the critical analysis of artworks and literature that allows for the discovery and transfer of the legacy of moral knowledge. As Scruton claims, it could be provided by humanistic or

1 23 Scruton, Culture Counts, p. v. 124 Scruton, An Intelligent Person’s Guide to Modern Culture, p. 151.

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liberal education.125 These constitute the context for one to ask the following questions. What is culture? How is it transmitted and what happens to those who receive it?126 Scruton underlines that the special quality of culture lies in the fact that it is shaped around a canon.127 Every culture has a canon or tradition of works that not only “stand the test of time” but also serve as a model and inspiration for successive creators. It is the canon of masterpieces. They indicate that culture is the object of evaluation and that some kind of assessment – that we unceasingly apply – lies at its heart. This evaluation is subjected to educational development and is morally important. High culture strives to preserve and strengthen experiences in which human life is raised to a higher level: the level of ethical reflection.128 Its purpose is to stimulate our ability to evaluate ourselves and other people. The paradigm of culture is provided by artistic and philosophical traditions. There are principles that guide the creation of masterpieces, whose understanding and appreciation is the very purpose of humanistic education.129 When it comes to literary education, Scruton suggests that students should as soon as possible assimilate the idea of a classic work; namely, a work read by successive generations that provides a comparative measure for other, less perfect works. This idea enables students to treat culture as a universal value: a reference system that facilitates the perception of new works and communication between all those who recognise the existence of culture. Specifically, it is about memorising the classics of lyrical poetry, reading epic works aloud, performing classical plays on stage. Scruton refers to Shakespeare’s works as an example. When we experience them, we have an opportunity to experience in our imagination good and evil, nobility and meanness, innocence and villainy. Scruton writes: “The art of this kind captures the meanings of communal culture and preserves them for the age devoid of faith.”130 Unfortunately, contemporary teachers are forced to discuss texts that are regarded “current.”

125 The term “liberal” is used by Scruton in the sense of “liberal arts” (artes liberales), whose purpose is not utility but the principles of reason. In a similar sense, Allan Bloom writes about education in his The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today’s Students, New York 1987. 126 See Winnicka-Gburek, Edukacja w koncepcji kultury Rogera Scrutona. 127 Scruton, Kultura jest ważna, p. 77. 128 Ibid., p. 28. 129 Ibid., p. 29. 130 R. Scruton, “Doświadczenie estetyczne a kultura,” Estetyka w Świecie 3 (1991), p. 117.

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Scruton notices that the same applies to music. Many often assume that music is not a depictive art, so it does not contain a moral content. Many educators who share this view believe that students should be allowed to develop their tastes independently.131 However, music occupies the most important place in the remarks on the aesthetic education in Plato and Aristotle. According to them, music “imitates” states of mind and character, while we assimilate these states when we move to its rhythms. Therefore, we should ensure that children listen to music that instils virtue into them. Music is organised movement that shapes our inner life. Moreover, dance music is a symbol and reference to social forms and good manners.132 Musical education has a great role to play in ensuring the duration of culture. Young people, who play together, sing in a group or choir prepare, for what is made impossible by the pop music – the transition from adolescence to adulthood. They learn the ins and outs of social coexistence, in which prevail discipline and order. We may also apply this approach to fine art. By teaching young people to appreciate fine art and create their own works, we introduce them to the model of life, in which the master is the guide and authority. We show them a form of social affiliation that is totally different than the one they know from their peers. Scruton warns that, “just as pop music blocks the ears to that world, so does television screen it from the eyes.”133 The human eye shaped by this experience is poorly prepared for the encounter with fine art. Under the influence of commercials and moving images, many young people glorify kitsch, characterised by what is cheap, constructed of ready-made elements, and employs striking forms and bright colours. We also find here a refusal to enter the world of adults. The young should learn to recognise the value of masterpieces, differentiate between important and unimportant details, distinguish the appearance of colour and of light, which reveals the essence of something from obscuring trash. Scruton reasonably foresees that it will be difficult to restore high culture to its rightful place. He notes that modern educators and teachers find it much more difficult to reach young people who favour negotiations over rational arguments.134 Teenagers turn to the world of free choice and freedom of opinion, in which there is no authority, and nothing is objectively right or wrong. The postmodern world is a playground, in which everyone has the right to own

1 31 R. Scruton, Kultura jest ważna, p. 79. 132 Ibid., p. 80 133 Ibid., p. 66. 134 Ibid., p. 104.

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culture, lifestyle, and opinion. Nevertheless, we should remember that culture is significant and – more importantly – we should constantly fight for its survival.

6. High Culture as an Inalienable Context of Human Life Our considerations will be complemented by the anthropological and philosophical approach to culture presented by the representatives of the Lublin Philosophical School: Karol Wojtyła (later Pope John Paul II) and Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec. Although these two thinkers consider the issue of culture from different philosophical perspectives, each of them explains culture as a specifically human way of existence, which enables the potential of human activity to actualize at the highest possible level in order to reach optimum potentiae, i.e. its highest level. Although the two approaches stress slightly different elements, by placing the creator of culture – a person – at its core, these standpoints meet at the very heart of the reflections on culture, including high culture; namely, in recognizing the fact that culture is an inalienable context of human life.

6.1. THE EXISTENTIAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF CULTURE (KAROL WOJTYŁA AND SAINT JOHN PAUL II) What we should accentuate in Karol Wojtyła, later Saint John Paul II, is his explaining of the fact of culture as the vision of man as a person, postulated by Wojtyła, among other places, in his philosophical dissertation Osoba i czyn (Person and Act; 1969). Wojtyła’s anthropology denotes not so much a formalised discipline of knowledge and academic education but rather a specific attitude towards the essence of humanity, the empirically acquired knowledge about man as an individual in the context of his relationship with what is physical and metaphysical.135 Founded on philosophical anthropology, the understanding of culture as perception of reality is important both in texts written before his pontificate and in encyclicals, apostolic exhortations, numerous letters, and speeches delivered during his pontificate. Wojtyła spoke about culture in double understanding also as the Pope. During meetings with artists and people of culture, he spoke about culture in a narrow sense, as one covering human creations as cultural facts, which focuses on the artistic and symbolic aspect of culture. However, in works like Przekroczyć 135  For more, see http://www.kulturologia.uw.edu.pl/page.php?page=esej&haslo=wojtyla [access: 16.02.2016].

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próg nadziei (Crossing the Threshold of Hope; 1994)  and Pamięć i tożsamość (Memory and Identity; 2005), Wojtyła characterises culture as the most primitive dimension of human existence. This definition of culture includes the recognition of the visible reality as subjected to human domination, formed by him, and expressing his capabilities and intentions.136 In the second, broader sense, Wojtyła emphasises the close link between culture and human life. The essence of culture is that it comes from man and thus penetrates into one’s interior:  nature and existence. Culture constitutes an expression of one’s life. This fact justifies the importance of the following questions. What culture does man create? In what culture does man live? Why do people create culture? Karol Wojtyła admits that the word “culture” is one that most closely refers to man, which defines his earthly existence, and in some way points towards its very essence.137 As Wojtyła indicates, every man lives and breathes culture, is involved in a culture, depends on it, and is under the influence of the culture of his time. On the other hand, man also creates culture, needs culture, and shapes himself with culture. Man expresses himself for himself and for others, in the best possible way, by means of culture. Due to culture, a specific way of human existence is accomplished: that of constant openness to secrets and an unquenchable thirst for knowledge.138 Hence, each culture hides and expresses a desire for fullness. In order to express the essence of culture, Wojtyła recalls the Book of Genesis, in which God directs tells men to “replenish the earth, and subdue it.”139 It means that earth is a gift but simultaneously a task for men, which results in culture. Man is its creator, recipient, and organiser, whereas culture is the environment into which man transforms the world that surrounds him by encompassing all the spheres and aspects of human existence as integrated (i.e. irreducible) and intentional. Here, we should stress that the discussed concept of culture presupposes a vision of nature other than the most significant trends in contemporary humanities.

1 36 See ibid. 137 K. Wojtyła, “Chrześcijanin a kultura,” Znak (1964) no. 124 (10), p. 1154. 138 “At the heart of every culture lies the attitude man takes to the greatest mystery: the mystery of God. Different cultures are basically different ways of facing the question of the meaning of personal existence. When this question is eliminated, the culture and moral life of nations are corrupted. For this reason, the struggle to defend work was spontaneously linked to the struggle for culture and for national rights.” (John Paul II, Centesimus annus, no. 24). 139 Genesis 1:28. See Jan Paweł II, Redemptor hominis, in: Encykliki Ojca Świętego Jana Pawła II, no. 16.

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Nature is not understood as the opposite of culture here but as culture’s foundation that includes objective laws, which offer the foundation for culture. Culture is a human (rational and free) way of complementing nature, which per se does not reach any goal and perfection. However, the separation of culture from nature leads to different forms of anti-culture, because culture that disregards reality impacts the latter in a destructive way: “Any human act aimed against nature or the perception of culture in a manner that confronts it with nature, questions its pre-human, all-encompassing, and absolute order, thereby exposing nature to the temptation of arbitrariness in the interpretation of axiological orders and the lack of solid, fixed points of reference in their determination.”140 In regard to the works of culture, Wojtyła indicates that what lasts longer than man bears witness to him, the witness of spiritual life. Human spirit lives and breathes content only available to and meaningful for it: it lives in truth, good, and beauty and can externalise its inner life and objectify it in its works. Works of culture are the fruits of man as an oeuvre. Therefore, man the creator of culture bears special witness to humanity. Wojtyła admits that the greatest work of culture is man himself. This is the deepest, most intrinsic meaning of the word “culture.”141 In turn, when Wojtyła became the Pope, he emphasised in a speech delivered at the UNESCO headquarters that only culture that pursues its first and fundamental goal – the education of men – deserves the name of true culture. Wojtyła explains that the first and basic cultural fact is the spiritually mature man himself; namely, a person fully educated and capable of educating himself and others.142 In the case of education, the point is that “man becomes more human, that he would “be” more and not just “have,” so that – through all that he

140 See kttp://www.kulturologia.uw.edu.pl/page.pkp?page=esej& haslo=wojtyla [dostęp: 16.02.2016]. For more, see P. Jaroszyński, Filozoficzne koncepcje kultury, in: Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 6, Lublin 2005, pp. 138–140. 141 Wojtyła, Chrześcijanin a kultura, p.  1154. See also Jan Paweł II, “Kultura służy wyniesieniu człowieka i rozwojowi współpracy między narodami. Przemówienie do intelektualistów, Coimbra, May 15, 1982,” in: Jan Paweł II, Wiara i kultura, ed. M. Radwan SCJ, S. Wylężek, T. Gorzkula, Rome–Lublin 1988, pp. 137–145. 142 Jan Paweł II, “Przemówienie w siedzibie UNESCO, 2 June 1980,” in: Jan Paweł II, Przemówienia i homilie Ojca Świętego Jana Pawła II, Krakow 2008. Wojtyła additionally focuses on the tendency appearing in education to identify bringing up only with education, a dangerous consequence which might end with complete alienation of education. Ibid., no. 13.

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“has” and “owns” – he could be more fully human; that is, so that he can not only “be” more “with others” but also “for others.”143 In this context, Wojtyła draws attention to the role of self-education, which involves discovering and developing in oneself the talents that every human being received from the Creator in order to realise his or her vocation, which is the ultimate goal of culture: holiness.144 In the context of education to culture, Wojtyła emphasises that culture as the growth of man in all capacities and dimensions does not only mean development of thought and activity but also the shaping of conscience. A badly formed conscience can give rise to pseudo-cultures that base on misconceptions of humanity.145 Wojtyła very clearly emphasises that culture is closely related to the human way of existence: “Man, who in the visible world is the only ontic subject of culture, also is its only proper object and goal. Culture is what man as the human being becomes more human: he “is” more…. The experience of different eras, including our own, supports the view of culture as primarily in a constitutive relationship with man, and only secondarily and in a mediated manner with the whole world of his creations.”146 Moreover, Wojtyła notes that although man always existed in a particular culture, he is not exhaustively defined by that culture. The mere fact of the development of cultures proves that there is something in man that exceeds culture. It is the human nature. It is the measure of culture, thanks to which, “man does

1 43 Ibid., no. 11. 144 Speaking to young people, Wojtyła indicated that: “This truth is essential for self-education, self-realization, the development of humanity and Divine life, instilled in baptism and strengthened in the sacrament of Confirmation. Self-education aims at “being” more human and Christian, at discovering and developing the talents received from the Creator and at carrying out the proper vocation to holiness. The world can sometimes be a dangerous element – it is true – but a man living with faith and hope has in him the power of the Spirit to face the dangers of this world. “(John Paul II, “The Homily during the liturgy of the word addressed to the youth gathered in Mickiewicz Square, June 3, 1997,” no. 4, in: John Paul II, Pilgrimages to Homeland, Krakow 2012, no. 4). 145 John Paul II, “God made a covenant with man in the work of culture. The speech addressed to the representatives of the cultural world. Rio de Janeiro, July 1,” in: John Paul II, Faith and culture, p. 71. See also: John Paul II, “The formation of conscience is the task of the representatives of the cultural world. The speech addressed to the European intellectuals arriving in Rome on the occasion of the Jubilee of the Redemption, Rome, December 15, 1983,” in: John Paul II, Faith and culture, p. 221. 146 John Paul II, “Speech in the UNESCO headquarters.”

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not become the prisoner of any of his cultures, but asserts his personal dignity by living in accordance with the profound truth of his being.”147 Culture can enrich or threaten the human way of existence. The many cultures do not automatically generate a culture that strengthens and enriches man in his humanity; namely, in his being a person. The equality of cultures does not result from their multiplicity. There are anti-human cultures and civilizations that systematically destroy people by taking away their right to live, the right to family, the right to truth, the right to freedom, and the right to authentic culture. If culture is against man, it becomes an anti-culture, because culture’s raison d’etre is man.148 Therefore, the existence of objective norms of morality, founded on the immutability of natural law, applying to every human being without exception, is very important. Wojtyła aptly states that it is wrong today to doubt the existence of permanent structural elements of man, also those linked to his corporal dimension.149 The creation of culture must correspond to the actualisation of the human nature, whose objective point of reference is the structure of human existence. In Wojtyła’s view, we should ask today even more about the meaningful, constitutive relationship between culture and the human way of life. Wojtyła associates the diagnosis of culture with a description of the condition of contemporary men. He consistently analyses contemporary culture’s signs of times, thereby revealing its condition. He admits that the transformations occurring in culture have “cultural” sources, i.e. are connected with specific visions of man, society, and the world.150 Moreover, while analysing the situation of modern man, Wojtyła reflects on the essence and purpose of progress. In his first encyclical Redemptor hominis, he asks: progress or threat? He refers to the task to “subdue the earth,” which man received from his Creator.151 This task was confirmed by the Second Vatican Council, whose documents include a record of the participation of man in the

147 John Paul II, Veritatis splendor, in: Encykliki Ojca Świętego Jana Pawła II, no. 53. See also: Jan Paweł II, “Kultura „królewska droga” wyzwolenia z różnych form zniewolenia. Przemówienie do przedstawicieli świata kultury, Florencja, 18 października 1986,” in: Jan Paweł II, Wiara i kultura, pp. 365–375. 148 See Z.  Grocholewski, “Człowiek jako osoba  – przedmiotem i celem kultury,” in: Katolicy i kultura – szanse i zagrożenia, Torun 2014, p. 13. 149 John Paul II, Veritatis splendor, no. 53. 150 For more, see ibid., no. 98. 151 Ibid., no. 16.

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royal mission of Christ himself.152 According to Wojtyła, the meaning of this “royalty” and “reign” of man on earth lies in the primacy of ethics over technology, in the dominance of the person over things, and in the priority of spirit over matter.153 Wojtyła means the respect given to the principles of the civilization of life by meeting the need to protect man and his community in the face of various threats.154 He claims that one should look carefully at every aspect of modern development from this perspective. The goal is thus to develop people and not multiply the things that people can use. He indicates a danger in the fact that – along with the enormous progress in mastering the world of things – man subordinates his humanity to things and becomes the object of manipulation by the whole organization of collective life, the system of production, and the pressure of the means of social communication.155 In such a situation, man becomes the slave of things, economic relations, and his own creations. These are the consequences of building a civilization of death, founded on a utopian vision of humanity.156 Based on this vision, the civilization of death claims the 152 Cf. The Second Vatican Council, a Dogmatic Constitution on the Church Lumen gentium, in: Sobór Watykanski II. Konstytucje, dekrety, deklaracje, a new trans. Poznań 2002, 10, 36. 153 John Paul II, Redemptor hominis, no. 16. 154 Popes Paul VI and John Paul II appealed for the creation of such civilization. This type of civilization opposes the so-called civilization of death, referred to as materialistic, utilitarian, or consumerist. The image of these two types of civilizations competing with each other remains in culture and, although shaped in the context of faith, is an inspiration and subject of philosophical research. See P. Skrzydlewski, “Cywilizacja,” in: Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 2, Lublin 2001, pp. 342–343. 155 John Paul II, Redemptor hominis, no. 16. 156 In turn, this vision is based on an anthropological error, the dangerous consequences of which were indicated by Wojtyła: “European culture gives the impression of “silent apostasy” on the part of people who have all that they need and who live as if God does not exist. / This is the context for those attempts, including the most recent ones, to present European culture with no reference to the contribution of the Christian religion which marked its historical development and its universal diffusion. We are witnessing the emergence of a new culture, largely influenced by the mass media, whose content and character are often in conflict with the Gospel and the dignity of the human person. This culture is also marked by a widespread and growing religious agnosticism, connected to a more profound moral and legal relativism rooted in confusion regarding the truth about man as the basis of the inalienable rights of all human beings. At times the signs of a weakening of hope are evident in disturbing forms of what might be called a “culture of death.” (John Paul II, Ecclesia in Europa, no. 9).

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right to decide on the life of man by taking away his sovereignty, the ability to decide about himself. The civilization of death is one of the most conspicuous manifestations of the moral confusion caused by a detachment of the basic way of human existence  –culture  – from the most existential source that is God. This state of affairs is caused by man’s rejection of truth, the lack of reference to reality.157 This is followed by false creative and moral actions, which ultimately lead to agnosticism and nihilism. The examples of such activities are the ideological and political systems that accepting euthanasia, abortion, and unlimited freedom of sexual choices, or “the culture of nihilism” that promotes extreme liberal attitudes in the sphere of morality, consumerist and rationalistic attitudes in the sense of total abandonment of theocentrism for the benefit of anthropocentrism and deistic attitudes, which make religious life a hermetic area and object of individual commemorative engagement, without a real impact on the course of daily existence and ethical decisions.158 Wojtyła emphasises that – in order to prevent these threats – it is necessary to return to the sources of culture and begin from answering who man is and where he comes from; which has no purely abstract answer. It impacts the whole dynamism of everyday life – both the individual and social one – along with the assumptions underlying many civilizational, political, economic, social, and structural programmes. The situation of man in modern culture  –  the so-called post-modern culture  – is  described by Wojtyła in the encyclical Redemptor hominis, as one that was far removed from the objective requirements of moral order and the requirements of justice and social love.159 In his view, the reasons for this state of affairs lie in the recognition of human self-sufficiency, which results in the rejection of God as the Creator and Saviour of the world.160 This approach impacts 157 The importance of truth in human life is explained by Wojtyła with the following words: “the splendour of truth” is so important by contrast, because the development of modern civilization is linked to scientific and technological progress, often in a unilateral way, in a purely positivistic perception of development. The fruit of cognitive positivism is agnosticism, and in the field of action and morality – utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is the civilization of the effect, the use – the civilization of “things” and not the “people,” the civilization in which persons become the subject of use.” (John Paul II, “List do rodzin Gratissimam sane z okazji Roku Rodziny 1994, Częstochowa 1994,” no. 13). 158 See http://www.kulturologia.uw.edu.pl/page.pkp?page=esej&kaslo=wojtyla [access: 16.02.2016]. 159 John Paul II, Redemptor Hominis, no. 16. 160 Wotyła writes on the topic in the following words: “At the root of this loss of hope is an attempt to promote a vision of man apart from God and apart from Christ. This sort

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the understanding of man who ceased to be the image of God, imago Dei. He became a result of social or economic projects, the product of instinctual drives or the effect of simple expression of genes. Such reductionist concept of man is promoted by many trends of contemporary humanities, such as structuralism, existentialism, or Marxism.161 The dispute about the shape of culture and the place of God in the sphere of human life was also tackled by Wojtyła in the encyclical Evangelium vitae.162 He warns against secularism, as a result of which man loses the sense of own transcendence, comes down to the level of one of many living beings, secludes himself within his physical nature. Life becomes a “thing” for him, which he regards as his exclusive property, remaining under his rule, and susceptible to

of thinking has led to man being considered as “the absolute centre of reality, a view which makes him occupy – falsely – the place of God and which forgets that it is not man who creates God, but rather God who creates man. Forgetfulness of God led to the abandonment of man”. It is therefore “no wonder that in this context a vast field has opened for the unrestrained development of nihilism in philosophy, of relativism in values and morality, and of pragmatism – and even a cynical hedonism – in daily life.” (John Paul II, Ecclesia in Europa, June 28, 2003, no. 9). 161 Denying the subjectivity of human being, structuralism only recognises man as a unit subordinate to a superior primordial structure. Existentialism, represented, for example, by Heidegger, shows man as “an existence thrown into the world,” whose inevitable goal is absolute nothingness. Human life was treated by J. P. Sartre in terms of total absurdity-nothingness. In turn, dialectical materialism treats the human individual as an exclusive product of historical and social processes, conditioned by the material basis. In all of these cases, we deal with the reductionistic concept of man, which consists primarily in negating the possibility of the transcendence of the human spirit, which on many occasions led to tragic consequences for culture. See Z. Grocholewski, “Człowiek jako osoba – przedmiotem i celem kultury,” in: Katolicy i kultura – szanse i zagrożenia, pp. 15–16. 162 “In seeking the deepest roots of the struggle between the “culture of life” and the “culture of death”…. We have to go to the heart of the tragedy being experienced by modern man: the eclipse of the sense of God and of man, typical of a social and cultural climate dominated by secularism, which, with its ubiquitous tentacles, succeeds at times in putting Christian communities themselves to the test. Those who allow themselves to be influenced by this climate easily fall into a sad vicious circle: when the sense of God is lost, there is also a tendency to lose the sense of man, of his dignity and his life; in turn, the systematic violation of the moral law, especially in the serious matter of respect for human life and its dignity, produces a kind of progressive darkening of the capacity to discern God’s living and saving presence.” (John Paul II, Evangelium vitae, no. 21).

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all manipulations. The indicated attitude is supported by technical and scientific rationalism that prevails in the modern culture by rejecting the truth about creation. This leads to practical materialism that fosters individualism, utilitarianism, and hedonism.163 In turn, Wojtyła underlines the necessity to develop a strong critical sense that facilitates the recognition of real values and authentic needs. It is possible only through education based on an objective point of reference, such as human nature. Man learns to differentiate between good and evil or truth and falsehood as a result of this type of development, by simultaneously becoming more human and developing correct interpersonal relations. Another reason for the crisis of contemporary culture, indicated by Wojtyła, is consumerism that stems from the surplus of goods needed by man. On the one hand, there exist rich and highly developed societies while, on the other hand, there are communities of the poor and hungry. This phenomenon is reinforced by the abuse of freedom by those who represent consumerist attitudes, while simultaneously limiting the freedom of other, poorer people. Those entangled in the structures and mechanisms associated with finances, production, and exchange are unable to face modern challenges and ethical imperatives. In this situation, the place of goals is taken by the means, while man loses sight of the criterion that allows to distinguish between cultural and the culture-forming facts. He falls into frustration and bitterness, unable to meet his needs constantly boosted by big companies, aiming solely at financial gain. Wojtyła indicates here the existence and operation of a specific individual instinct or collective interest, the instinct of fight and domination, often confused with freedom.164 He stresses that those instincts should be directed and subdued by deeper forces in man, those constituting true culture. Such force is human reason, which facilitates the creation of culture and the sense of moral responsibility that should accompany our every action. Wojtyła indicates the important role of religion in culture by emphasising that it reveals our ultimate goal. He underlines that the eschatological dimension of the Christian religion should be the measure for and justification of human activity, but also our responsibility.165 Speaking in 1964, at the end of a session devoted to culture and its relation to Christianity and the Church, still as the Archbishop of Krakow, Karol Wojtyła recalls that Christianity became a source of great culture during the period of 2000 years of its existence.166 He stresses 1 63 Ibid., no. 23. 164 John Paul II, Redemptor hominis, no. 16. 165 Ibid.,16. 166 Wojtyła, Chrześcijanin a kultura, p. 1154.

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that everyone may participate in this culture by professing the Christian faith. It is closely linked to the creation of culture in its deepest and most internal meaning, in which the work of culture is simply a human being. The consequence of professing faith is that it inevitably transcends the works created by the followers. Wojtyła calls this process, “the main test of culture of the Christian interior.”167 Therefore, religion is a source of inspiration for culture  – both in its innermost and profound sense as a human culture, and in the derivative – narrower sense – as the culture of the works of man. Wojtyła draws attention during his entire pontificate, on the one hand, to the fundamental importance of culture in the life of the integrally understood human being while, on the other hand, to the threats that culture faces from various ideologies, materialistic visions of man, and ethics without God, in which man seeks to create and save himself. This problem still remains a highly topical issue in the culture created by man in the twenty-first century. In the encyclical Fides et ratio, Wojtyła emphasises that philosophy is of crucial importance, as it is responsible for the formation of thought and culture.168 He perceives it as a way of learning the basic truths of human life. Repeating after Thomas Aquinas Aquinas, Wojtyła admits that this unique contribution to philosophical thought based on the fact that it enabled one to recognise – both in different conceptions of life and in cultures  – “not what people think but what the objective truth is.”169 Thus, philosophy should constantly call for seeking the truth, indicating the foundations for building the personal and social life. Philosophy is directly involved in formulating the question about the sense of life and looking for an answer to it. Aware of the existence of a variety of trends in thinking, Wojtyła emphasises the existence of a knowledge that may be regarded a spiritual heritage of mankind. It is a collection of philosophical truths that is permanently current, despite the passage of time and the development of knowledge. Wojtyła mentions among these truths the principle of non-contradiction, purposefulness and causality, the idea of the person as a free and rational subject, able to discover God, truth, and good, and some universally recognised, elementary moral principles.170 The particular task of philosophy consists in shaping the right reason in man

1 67 Wojtyła, Chrześcijanin a kultura, p. 1155. 168 Jan Paweł II, Fides et ratio, Krakow 1999, nos. 1–6. 169 Thomas Aquinas, In libros Aristotelis De caelo et mundo exposition, in:  Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, vol. 3, Roma 1886, 1, 22. 170 Jan Paweł II, Fides et ratio, no. 4.

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(Greek: orthos logos; Latin: recta ratio), a task which is to help man grasp and formulate the first, universal principles of existence and draw correct conclusions from them through logical and deontological nature. Finally, Wojtyła reminds that the pursuit of reason makes human existence even more perfect, thereby enriching culture, which is an external sign of that existence.

6.2. THE METAPHYSICS OF CULTURE (MIECZYSŁAW ALBERT KRĄPIEC) At this point, Wojtyła’s considerations on culture meet the analyses of another representative of the Lublin Philosophical School, those of Father Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec. Krąpiec perceives culture from a slightly different, metaphysical perspective, but he always positions man at its centre, as the creator and recipient of culture. Krąpiec writes that everything covered by the term “culture” is connected with the proper understanding of man and his creativity.171 Krąpiec explains that the discovery of the sense of being a man through the rational actualization of human potentialities by means of education constitutes the broadly understood cultural creativity. This actualisation occurs due to the specific structure of man in whom the dominant role is exercised by reason. Therefore, only man is the creator of culture that originates in him and is attributed to him.172 The human being is also the only mediator through whom culture has a chance to survive and has its eschatological dimension. Krąpiec emphasises that the fact of human culture is something beyond any doubt.173 In his philosophical reflections on culture, he is especially interested in answering the question of what the basic, fundamental understanding of culture is. As he underlines, it is extremely important to reach culture’s sources, as they constitute a “non-contradiction” of culture’s understanding, hence a discovery of its rationale, whose the negation would by necessity cause the negation of the object subjected to the explanation, namely, the negation of culture itself.174 1 71 M. A. Krąpiec, Człowiek w kulturze, Lublin 1999, p. 105. 172 Idem, Człowiek twórcą kultury, in: Wiara i życie, ed. B. Bejze, Warsaw 1985. pp. 99–131. 173 Idem, Człowiek w kulturze, p. 112 174 M. A. Krąpiec, U podstaw rozumienia kultury, Lublin 1991, p. 7. Emphasising the importance of reaching the source of understanding culture, Krąpiec indicates that there is a need for coherence between the primary understanding of culture and secondary manifestations of culture, also known as “culture.” The fact that there are different concepts of culture and different cultural sciences indicates that there is a root, primary understanding of this expression. This understanding is the first and most important manifestation of culture, occurring wherever the name “culture” is

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Moreover, this is the starting point for detailed approaches to culture in such sciences as sociology, ethnology, ethnography, and anthropology of culture.175 In order to find an answer, Krąpiec addresses the significant manifestations of the activities of man as a human being. He emphasises that these manifestations include interiorisation (intellectualisation) of existing nature through human cognition. The interiorisation constitutes the first cultural fact, which lies at the heart of what man later adds to the world of nature as a result of his diverse human activities.176 According to Krąpiec, this original act of cognition is the decisive moment for understanding culture itself in its most basic sense. In this act, man assimilates the existing content of the world-nature and enriches himself with the content of reality so captured. However, before, the existence of being impacts our cognitive apparatus  – the intellect  – directly and nonsemiotically. The cognition of existence does not provide man with information about the content of the cognised thing. It is only in the next stage that the intellect makes an intellectualisation, which expresses itself in signs-concepts, which determine the so-called “sign character of culture.” It is here that the content of a thing is understood through a transparent (clear) idea or concept. This sign-concept is not the object of human cognition, but only an intermediary that enables cognition and understanding of the content of things. It allows man to use the cognitive content and transcend himself in acts of action and creativity. Hence, man transfer to others the assimilated content included in signsconcepts. Content is interiorised by man selectively, according to the needs of his nature and existing culture. The images created in the human mind, “concepts” or “ideas,” exist by human existence because they are produced by his cognitive acts. This way of existence of the cognised real-world content is called by Krąpiec reality’s intentional existence. Through cognition, man provides content with a

used. It is an act of receptive cognition, in which one cognitively grasps the existing contents of the world-nature. 175 Krąpiec indicates that it is a mistake to reduce culture to a single dimension, for example, a sociological one. Today, culture is often associated with the society. At present, sociological definitions of culture became dominant. We should not forget that this sociological aspect is its secondary and derivative understanding. All source studies on culture indicate the source of its understanding to lie with the philosophy of culture. The latter determines the essential factor, due to which we are dealing with culture. See Krąpiec, Człowiek w kulturze, p. 174. See also Krąpiec, “O filozofię kultury,” Znak 16 (1964) no. 7–8, pp. 813–825; Krąpiec, “O kulturę prawdy,” Człowiek w Kulturze 15 (2003), pp. 154–159. 176 Krapiec, U podstaw rozumienia kultury, p. 5.

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new intellectual, rational, and spiritual existence. It is defined as primary intentionality. It is the raison d’etre of the secondary intentionality, which occurs when the intentional content is embodied in the non-psychical material like paper, canvas, stone, and bronze. Then, contents gain their secondary intentional existence in the entities into which they were “embodied” by the productive work of man. Their real existence is the existence of their subjects, which per se are unable to shape specific cognitive content within themselves. Therefore, primary intentionality (in the intellect of the creator) is a prerequisite for the existence of secondary intentionality (in the external material).177 This is rational activity, which begins with the cognitive contact of man with the content of things by means of the creation of concepts. As a result of this process, as a being that understands the world, man is introduced into the world of nature, which he assimilates and then processes to make use of it, simultaneously designing a plan and a model for his actions.178 Thus, as Krąpiec argues, if this impersonated sign-concept-image becomes a pattern-model of cultural activities, then culture is initially an intellectualisation of nature. Hence, beings are by their nature intrinsically rational and intelligible-cognizable (thanks to being derived from the First Intellect).179 The social and individual ideals of human life like paidéia, kalokagathía, humanitas, sanctitas – discussed by us in the first and second part of the dissertation – are just an expression of such intellectualisation of nature, also of human nature, an expression of a plan, a pattern created by the human spirit, which – due to its original maladjustment to the natural environment – can be developed only in the cultural niche.

1 77 See Krapiec, Człowiek w kulturze, p. 114. 178 See M. A. Krąpiec, “Intencjonalny charakter kultury,” in: Logos i ethos. Rozprawy filozoficzne, ed. K. Kłósak, Krakow 1971, pp. 203–219. 179 Here, Krąpiec opposes the views of such philosophers as N. Hartmann, who did not recognise the intrinsic intelligibility of beings themselves. As a result of this assumption, Hartmann admits that reality is only as rational as it is humanly known; therefore, it is man who imposed his rationality on being. According to Krąpiec, this attitude, on the one hand, contradicts the very receptivity of the human cognition and, on the other hand, does not reveal where the rational order came from. As he writes: “Therefore, we must state that it is the very existence that is rational and intelligent; and this is due to it being derivative of the First Intellect. Internalised by our reason, the rational contents of being constitute in ourselves this rational order as receptions of rational (intelligible) contents of being. … The basis of all our interference in the existing nature is its primal intentional manner of existence in the acts of our cognition” (Krąpiec, Człowiek w kulturze, p. 113).

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Similarly to Wojtyła, Krąpiec repeatedly refers to nature in his analyses, stressing that it is the foundation upon which the “human cultural world” is structured. In his belief, the cooperation between the cultural sphere of human life and the natural environment is indispensable.180 This relationship is inseparable in the existential dimension. It is already visible at the level of mere etymology of the word “culture.” It comes from the Latin words colo, colere, which mean “to cultivate [land], cherish, improve.” According to Krąpiec, cultivation implies an originally human work, so the work of reason. All actions undertaken by man are ultimately directed by reason, they are conscious activities. Moreover, there are other actions which are either unconscious or not subject to realisation. For example, these include all biological processes that occur in us without our will and intellect. This is the foundation for the differentiation made by Krąpiec between “man’s activities” (actiones hominis) and human activities (actiones humanae).181 Human activities are conscious and voluntary, they originate in reason that identifies them directly, as purely cognitive acts, or indirectly, as any other human actions driven by reason (cognition). Taking into account the source understanding of culture, Krąpiec clearly emphasises that human cognition is subjected to a specific “cultivation:” “Reason is like a field that can produce weeds; reason and its action should also be improved.”182 There are different ways of this improvement, for instance, through individual life experience or in the context of the experience of one’s society. Both spontaneous common-sense cognition and organised scholarly learning are in play here. This is the moment when culture begins. As the rational activity of man ultimately resulting from the human cognition that interiorises the existing world-reality, this basic understanding of culture became for Krąpiec the starting point for reflections on the major themes of culture and its manifestations. Following Aristotle and the classical tradition, Krąpiec includes in them the field of knowledge (both pre-scientific and scholarly), morality with customs, art and technology, but also religion in its individual and social dimension.183 It is in these dimensions, penetrating one another, that the specificity of human existence manifests itself.

180 Krąpiec, U podstaw rozumienia kultury, p. 5. See also: Krąpiec, “Człowiek – dramat natury i osoby,” in: Człowiek – kultura – uniwersytet, Lublin 1982, pp. 15–41. 181 Krąpiec, Człowiek w kulturze, p. 107. 182 Ibid. 183 See Krąpiec, “Kultura,” in: Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 6, Lublin 2005, pp. 137–138.

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Through theoretical and informative cognition (theoría), man enables his reason to further learning and work, simultaneously enriching himself with the rational content coming from the surrounding reality. The principal criterion for this type of cognition is truth; namely, the rational, reflected, performed in the acts of judgment consensus with cognised reality. This truth is at the same time the goal of the described type of cognition, whereas its object is existence. At first, there happens a pre-sign coverage of the act of existence of being – in common-sense cognition – and then in scientific cognition.184 The second layer of culture is practical cognition (praxis), which governs human activities. Here, the purpose and object of action is goodness. It is both the aim and the decisive cause for the occurrence of an action rather, rather than its non-occurrence. For this reason, practical cognition means noticing beinggoodness as both an object and motive of human action. It is significant, because this type of cognition lies at the heart of human behaviour and, thus, the whole moral order derived from the personal decisions of man: “decision-making acts include self-determinations of human actions through the free choice of the content of practical judgements about good, which must be accomplished in action towards a goal and in the context of acquired human attitudes (theoretical judgments) about the world-reality and their own human existence; namely, in light of the so-called conscience, which is the connected acts of self-cognition (“knowing oneself ”).”185 Thus, the decision-making acts manifested by all personal actions (rational or free) create a field of morality and customs and constitute the social expression of moral life. 184 “Establishing a contact – the first contact – between the existing world and the existing cognitive subject, the human being, evokes a first “cognitive flash” that the world-being exists. The existing being strikes with the “blade of its existence” at the cognitive man and imposes on him its real content through cognitive contact; its basic intelligibility which – along with human cognition – is expressed in the form of the primary laws of reality, in the form of the elementary rational order: the principle of identity, the principle of non-deniability, the excluded middle, the raison d’etre. And this first encounter with being and the first “reading” of being is called intelligence (Greek nous)…. This “acceptance-reception” is achieved through the conscious creation of cognitive signs: concepts that are signs of the very thing and simultaneously the meaning of our general expressions. It is the creation of the basis of language itself as a system of signs that serve to know things and communicate with each other. But language, as a sign system, is a consequence of cognition!” (Krąpiec, U podstaw rozumienia kultury, p. 19). See also Krąpiec, Metafizyka. Zarys teorii bytu, Lublin 1978, and Krąpiec, Język i świat realny, Lublin 1985. 185 Krąpiec, “Kultura,” p. 137.

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The third level of culture is creative cognition (poiesis). Based on this type of cognition, man transforms the reality that surrounds him by introducing into it the products of his art or technology. Man creates things on the basis of the material he accumulates as a result of theoretical and informative learning. He transforms the content or uses it to create new works of art and technology, that did not exist so far. The criterion and norm of this type of cognition is beauty; understood analogously, as a vision of existence that incites fascination. The rationale for the existence of artistic and technical creativity is a natural consequence of the fact that man is born as a “being with inadequacies.” Therefore, man must adapt through cultural activities to the surrounding reality and provide himself with the means indispensable for life and development. The field of human creativity is manifold. It refers to ordering – according to defined principles and rules – the human knowledge, communication, body movements, literary works, plastic arts, technological products, but also social forms of life, such as family, municipality, nation, state, or social organization.186 As stated by Krąpiec, the three areas of human rational activity are not mutually exclusive but complementary. However, the starting point for each is theoretical and informative knowledge, which provides cognitive content, on the basis of which man acts or produces. Moreover, cognition constitutes the end of the human rational action when existing and transformed reality causes selfless contemplation.187 The three aforementioned areas of human activity are in a different way permeated by religion, singled out by Thomas Aquinas Aquinas as the fourth area of culture. It is a relationship between the human person and the person of the Absolute, God as the source, purpose, and model of human life. The foundation and commencement of the fact of religion is the “experience of contingency:” man’s awareness of his existential contingency, due to which he refers in personal acts to the person of God as the ultimate rationale of his existence. The important function of religion in culture is the fact that it raises the entire human life to the personal level by indicating that the ultimate justification for personal decision-making acts – resulting from rational human life – is in the entity which is the person of God.188 Krąpiec emphasises that religion joins all themes of culture, i.e. science, art-technique, and morality. Religion is culture but it simultaneously transcends towards the source of not just culture but nature as well. On the one

1 86 See ibid., p. 138. 187 Krapiec, U podstaw rozumienia kultury, p. 17. 188 See Krąpiec, “Kultura,” p. 138.

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hand, religion involves human activity but, on the other hand, it transcends nature and culture to strive for divinity. Holiness complements the categories of truth, goodness, and beauty by lifting them to the supernatural dimension. This is the way in which holiness fulfils the potential of human nature – reason and will – to their limits. Hence, Krąpiec notes that there could be no truly human culture without religion.189 Religion is the only reasonable reaction to the understanding of one’s insufficiency. In the ultimate sense, by transcending the three dimensions of culture religion indicates not only the natural but also the ultimate potential, justifying the possibility of the accomplishment of holiness. On the mental side, this is manifested in the human desire for happiness, whose fulfilment is finally guaranteed by the person of the Absolute. In conclusion, we should emphasise that Krąpiec’s reflections on culture foreground its perception as a necessary context of human life. The existential structure of man inhibits him to live like animals in nature. The dynamic nature of human existence and, consequently, the need for human improvement require a specific cultural niche, in which man can realise himself as a human; thus, survive biologically and develop spiritually. Therefore, culture is a human-derived reality, derived through his personal experiences and actions, both individual and social. Personal means conscious and voluntary:  cognitive and volitional. Such personalised activities are implemented within the framework of the three main trends: theoretical, practical, and creative cognition. Thus science, morality and art-technique are the integrative factors of culture. They are complemented by religion, which finds its justification in the metaphysical explanation of the specificity of human existence. In his structure and action, man is open to infinity in terms of cognition and love. He cannot reach this state on his own and, therefore, he expects to be complemented by God. The fact of culturality is most evident in the social life of man, because cognition, morality, and creativity are impossible without a community. Moreover, Krąpiec indicates the ultimate, eschatological dimension of culture, based on the fact that it is the way through which man can achieve development and complete personal life in eternity.190 It is thanks to the creations of culture that the human spirit can improve and achieve completeness. These creations ultimately gain 1 89 Krapiec, U podstaw rozumienia kultury, p. 258. 190 Krąpiec underlines that, “all human culture lasts forever in the eschatological dimension: in man (his spirit) and through man. Whatever managed to inspire at least a single man, never dies, even if it is a gesture in theatre or a movement in dance, a song or a performance of a piece of music. All culture lasts forever through human spirit and in that spirit” (Krąpiec, Człowiek w kulturze, p. 190).

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existential value only by man – to whom they are addressed – so as to develop him and liberate his personal action. The most perfect are those that facilitated man’s personal development and the actualisation of his personal potential. They have an eternity lasting meaning. They deserve the title of masterpieces. Pointing to the work of Euripides as an example of high culture, Krąpiec emphasises that, “these masterpieces continuously awake the human spirit, delight us and  – as men are bettered by their reception – last for eternity.”191 The meaning of being human liberates the action of the human spirit, building one’s personal interior through experiencing such culture that enriches and nurtures.192 The above analyses show that the understanding of culture is closely connected with the perception of being and nature, subject and person. Culture is not something autonomous, detached from its creator, nor is it merely an effect of biological or social factors. Culture should be explained primarily by reference to the key categories of metaphysics and philosophical anthropology, because it is an expression of a specifically human way of existence.

1 91 Krąpiec, Człowiek w kulturze, p. 117. 192 See Krąpiec, “O właściwe rozumienie kultury i wychowania,” Służyć Prawdzie (2003) no. 1, pp. 17–20; Krąpiec, “Bez wychowania nie ma kultury,” Służyć Prawdzie (2007) no. 20, pp. 12–14.

Conclusion The question about culture remains open. However, it does not mean that all approaches and responses are equally valid or completely invalid. As I show in this book, there are permanent contexts that allow us to unveil the meaning of high culture in its non-elitist and universal dimension. The modern discussion narrows the understanding of culture to its historical and sociological understanding. However, this discussion has an anthropological and philosophical dimension. Thus, this book sought to present the philosophical and anthropological foundations of the debate about culture, especially in the context of high and low culture. I accomplished this task in several stages. At the beginning, I proposed the thesis that the settlement of the debate about culture ultimately requires the resolution of the discussion about man and the answer to what are the actual factors that actualise his potential and make him more human. This book shows that the discussion about man can only be settled on the basis of philosophy, which refers to the human existential structure to answer the question about the essence of culture, its place and role in the personal life of man as its subject and goal. Culture was presented in this paper by means of metaphysical categories, both in the historical and systemic dimension, taking into account the explanations made on the basis of philosophical anthropology. By drawing upon the sources of theoretical reflection on culture  –ancient Greece  – I  characterise its ideal of humanity, which was initially developed within one, aristocratic stratum, only to gain a universal meaning over time. The fact that the Greeks could find universal laws fundamental to human nature and indicate the norms that arise from them in the area of personal behaviour and in the organization of society was helpful in developing the ideal of humanity. The basis of the Greek understanding of culture was a code of conduct applicable in the context of chivalry, the aristocratic moral code. The Greeks included the following features in the aristocratic ideal: the harmonious development of the body, soul, mind, and heart, the elegance of custom, the impressive way of life, the sense of duty, the recognition and respect enjoyed by such person among equals. I overviewed the characteristic features of the early stages of the Greek culture included in the works of Homer. He is considered to be one of the first and the greatest creators who shaped the Greek idea of humanity. He presented the principles governing the functioning of high aristocratic culture by expressing universal ideals. That is why Homer’s epics became the basis for the training and

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education of not just the aristocrats but, with the emergence of democracy, all youth; first in Greece and then in other countries influenced by Hellenism. Its ideals gained universal significance over time. The book underlines the emergence of two distinct features of the Greek culture in the course of time; namely, universalism and rationalism, which became the culture of the entire Greek nation and, finally, the universal human culture. It was refined by the fact that it contained a certain pattern of a higher form of life: life in compliance with the precepts of reason. By showing the historical dimension of the term “culture” while analysing the culture of ancient Greece, Rome, and the beginnings of the Christian culture, I observed that – although the name itself denotes a specifically human way of life changed (paidéia, kalokagathía, megalopsychía-magnanimitas, humanitas) – there is no change in the meaning of the notion of “culture.” The essence of “culture” includes the development of a human person, oriented at a specific ideal of humanity, determined on the basis of the recognition of the human nature and its inherent possibilities of development. Moreover, with the change the names, the understanding of what culture is changed as well. Thus, paideia stresses the aspect of integral – spiritual and physical – education, understood as an effort consciously targeted at a definite, everlasting, and universal ideal of man, whose implementation begins in childhood; hence paidéia, from pais, “child.” This ideal was achieved through the development of all spheres of human life, enabled by culture. Therefore, the main motive of culture as paidéia is the improvement of the human person. On the other hand, the term kalokagathía describes the ideal of every citizen who seeks to achieve higher culture, which over time became a synonym of the “civic virtue.” In the ideal of kalokagathía, the moral qualities of the human being directed towards the goal itself and the decent good were accentuated. In consequence, the emphasis was put on the primacy of moral order over sensual and aesthetic order and the dominance of spiritual order over the physical one. Apart from the moral-personal dimension, the ideal of kalokagathía has a social dimension. It refers to proper relationships with other people, shaped on the basis of the morally righteous character. Another term that appeared was megalopsychía (magnanimity, Latin magnanimitas). Aristotle claims that it is an indispensable condition for self-esteem and justified pride. Therefore, it denoted a greatness and strength of the soul. The justifiably proud man is the one who, by claiming to be worthy of great things, really deserves them (he thinks he deserves what he is worthy of). While using this term, Aristotle means the desire to possess supreme external good. It is what we return to the gods or what people who hold the highest offices seek and which constitutes a reward for the noblest

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of deeds. Thus, as Aristotle claims, megalopsychía is reverence (timé). Hence, justified pride is always in relationship with reverence. At the end of the fourth century BC, the Greek paidéa encountered the Roman ideal of education. However, only with Cicero, around the first century BC, did the Greek paidéia assume the form of humanitas. Cicero greatly expanded the meaning of humanitas. The words humanum and humanitas concerned not only the human nature and a friendly attitude to other people but also what belongs to the specificity of man as a human being, not only in relation to others, but also in relation to himself and his own abilities. Thus, these terms define the essence of humanity, not given but assigned by nature as the object of constant development and improvement, and as an ideal to be pursued using all that man is naturally equipped with. The Romans believed that human actions are motivated by a moral duty (honestum) and an inner sense of decency (decorum), on account of which man is capable of sacrifice. Furthermore, man can achieve perfection by lifting himself above mediocrity, because he is equipped with reason. This perfection is called humanitas. The indicated ideals were assumed by Christianity as indispensable for the formation of man, although the anthropocentric perspective was replaced by the theocentric one. Christianity seeks not so much the perfection of man per se but rather his openness to God in the perspective of the ultimate goal of human life:  salvation. The newly developed religion displayed a great understanding of the cultivation of the humanist tradition. The ancient paidéia became a tool of the new culture, in which Christ was placed at its centre. Drawing attention to Christ as the ideal of a teacher and educator by the Fathers of the Church was a clear reference to the Greek culture. Moreover, the early Christian literature referred to the idea of humanitas. Relatively early, humanitas was linked to the Christological sphere that defined the human nature of Christ (contrary to the divine one: divinitas). The activity of the Fathers of the Church constituted a link between the knowledge of antiquity and the achievements of medieval thought. Medieval authors adopted many classical terms, including the concept of humanitas. In theological literature, this term appears in the meaning of humanitas Christi: the human nature of Christ. On the ground of philosophy, this term means the nature of the human race. It is applied to underline the difference between the human nature and other beings. I  clearly emphasised the significant influence of the ancient Greek culture, whose ideals emerged jointly in paidéia, and the Roman culture on the thought and culture of the early Christianity developed in the context of Hellenism. Moreover, I  also showed that Christianity, through the adoption of the most important ideas of the Greek philosophy, developed them creatively, thus

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completing the concept of man. The novelty of the Christian approach consists primarily in the suggested anthropology, according to which man is a personal being that transcends the world of nature and the communities in which he lives, and the new, unknown concept of the personal, transcendent, and omnipotent God, who is the Creator of the entire universe and man. By overcoming polytheism and pantheism, Christianity articulates authentic theism. This new concept of God had important consequences not only within a religion but also in cultural and civilizational dimension. It expanded the perspective of the human life to a supernatural dimension by emphasising that the ultimate goal of man as a person is eternal life. This book shows the important contribution of Christianity to an in-depth understanding of culture by justifying that none of the previous religions or cultures introduced such a perspective ever before. However, the Christian paidéia was built on the so-called Christian philosophy, which does not differentiate between philosophy and theology, in which natural knowledge and revealed knowledge form a unity and inspire one other (religious personalism). With the autonomy of philosophy in the thirteenth century, due to Thomas Aquinas, theological and philosophical aspects separated. As a result, Thomas Aquinas developed a realistic concept of man (anthropology), which may be called philosophical personalism. This anthropology preserved the cognitive heritage of the Greek and Roman traditions and complemented it in the context of the personal theory of man. Anthropology derived its inspiration from the Revelation, from Trinitarian and Christological disputes, but the context of justification was philosophical: one respecting the necessary criteria for the scientific explanation on the grounds of philosophy. While explaining who the person in light of Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysics is, I indicated the important factors that influence the man-specific type of action. These include the contingency, potentialisation, transcendence, and inclination of the human nature: cognition, love, freedom, subjectivity before the law, existential uniqueness, and religious dignity. These elements allow us to see the real causes that explain human behaviour and make it reasonable. Personal life is assigned to man and formed by a set of these capacities-inclinations, which undergo actualisation in the process of human life. Hence, we see that the essence of culture involves an actualisation of the personal life of man in the context of world experience, which simultaneously is the fruit of such rationalisation of reality; it is the perfection of human existence, while its products are the image and expression of this perfection. The characteristic feature of Thomas Aquinas’s image of man is the fact that he presents man not so much in “who and what he is,” which is a static presentation, but in “how he acts and what he should do” to fulfil his humanity, which

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means an aspect of efficiency and purpose. That is why his ethics of virtues create a context for providing a complete answer to the question – “who is man?” – by showing man in the perspective of his activities. Living according to virtue best reveals the nature of a personal being. As a peculiar niche in which virtues are developed and practised while defects are eliminated, culture is helpful in the accomplishment of such life. The main emphasis rests on the moral virtues and, among them, the virtue of valour, because it is among its components that Thomas Aquinas mentions magnanimity (Latin magnanimitas). The virtue of magnanimity is an indispensable condition for ethical valour, the correct assessment of great and small goods and, in addition, the help in overcoming difficulties associated with the pursuit of this kind of goods. All the above elements determine the existence of high culture in man. Therefore, magnanimity is a sign of high culture: an extraordinariness that consists of strong yet disciplined pursuits, a great mind guided by real and high truths. In this context, I had to show that – by supplementing Aristotle’s thought – Thomas Aquinas moved the balance from the subject to the object, to which the virtue refers. The reference to the object appendant to the virtue of magnanimity allows us to speak about high culture. Culture becomes high due to greatness and effort appurtenant to the good that man wants to achieve. Similarly as in the case of every virtue, also here the subject is good; however, in the case of magnanimity, this virtues is noble good, which is great and difficult at the same time. These qualities of goodness are recognised by man through rational cognition and proper spiritual preparation. Man needs the support of virtues – whose improvement happens through education and the grace of God – to be able to acquire this kind of good. Man is not self-sufficient. Thus, Thomas Aquinas additionally objectifies magnanimity in such a way that he conditions it by the object of great and difficult good. As he indicates, those goods were spiritual. Moreover, Thomas Aquinas emphasises that  – thanks to the possession of the aforesaid virtue – man can distinguish between great and small goods. The former constitute an end in themselves, while the latter are means to achieve higher goals, so they are good because of their usability and functionality. Looking at magnanimity from the perspective of its object, the essence of universally understood high culture means that man – by the possessed virtues and received grace – faces great goods; he undertakes responsible tasks without being limited to what is small, mediocre, and irrelevant. Man bravely overcomes the difficulties that stand in the way. Following the precepts of reason, he makes the effort to work on his abilities, he aims high, bearing in mind the development of his potentialities to the highest possible degree, which Aristotle calls optimum potentiae. Moreover, the grounds of a realistic theory of a person

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that – due to transcendence – the ultimate goal, the end of human cognition and love is perfection; namely, holiness based on the unification of man with God. The definition of holiness proposed by Thomas Aquinas is complete realisation (actualisation) of the human potential with reference to God as the absolute and the most perfect being. The maximum actualisation of the spiritual activity of man, especially the cognitive and volitional one – that is, love – constitutes the greatest perfection of the human person. If this activity – cognition and love – refers to God, it is a peculiar perfection of only holiness. Such understanding of holiness is synonymous with the highest development of the human person, hence meaning the state of man that is fully perfect. Man reaches the peak of his development potential, the highest level of culture, when he is united with God. With the advent of modern ethics, the notion of magnanimity sank into oblivion and, consequently, the perception of high culture changed. Culture acquired a narrower, sociological meaning. The term “high culture” began to denote the culture of the higher classes – such as aristocracy or intelligentsia – an elitist culture created and received by a narrow group of people with specific competencies. The narrowing of the notion of “high culture” resulted in the fact that it started to be perceived as something difficult, inaccessible, confined to a limited circle of people. At the same time, this process was accompanied by the appearance of the so-called mass culture, stemming from the ongoing industrialism and urbanization, which in turn were the effect of the eighteenth-century industrial revolution. It initiated the replacement of the universalism of high culture – with origins in the Greek-Roman culture complemented by the Christian concept of man – by a peculiar mass culture. The mass character in the strict sense was also caused by the invention of the mass means of communication. It started the longterm process of developing the mass system of culture content distribution. This part of my book involves the presentation of the characteristics of this culture and of the “mass-man,” a peculiar “product” of mass culture’s influence. Moreover, my book indicates another source of domination and even the promotion of mass culture, embedded in the materialistic perception of man characteristic of modern philosophy. I explain why such thinking gave rise to the spread of utopian ideologies in which man is reduced to biology, while politics most frequently decide about his life. To that end, I discuss such ideological systems as collectivist communism, totalitarianism, national socialism, fascism, and liberal socialism. Such systems exclude high culture, because they offer no room for what is spiritual. For these ideologies, man can be liberated and morally transformed only after satisfying his material needs. Hence, it is impossible to implement the – universally understood – primary goal of high culture, which is the sublimation of matter for the sake of the spiritual.

Conclusion

191

The views of such cultural theorists as Matthew Arnold, Thomas Stearns Eliot, Clement Greenberg, José Ortega y Gasset, Dwight Macdonald, and Roger Scruton offer an antidote to the above tendencies. All these authors indicate the need to return to high culture in the face of dangers associated with the development of mass societies. They warn against the consequences resulting from the reduction of the level of culture to the needs of the mass-man, an average man, one disinterested in own development and the search for answers to important existential questions. Some of them even indicate the symptoms of the decline of the Western civilization such as the lowering standards of culture. These authors emphasise that the solution to the problem of what culture is and whether we have the ability to consciously control and impact culture lies at the heart of many difficult decisions we make every day. It is of great importance in the field of education and politics, or in the problem solution concerning the multicultural societies. All those thinkers underlined the necessity to rebuild the cultural, scientific, philosophical, political, and artistic elites that would represent high culture and could maintain it. The culmination of my deliberations shows high culture as a space necessary for the development of every human being. Hence, I referenced the anthropological and philosophical approach to culture presented by the representatives of the Lublin Philosophical School: Karol Wojtyła (later Pope John Paul II) and Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec. These two thinkers show different philosophical perspectives:  an existential-anthropological and a metaphysical one, respectively. I reveal that both of their approaches meet at the core of cultural considerations – including high culture – in the recognition that culture constitutes a non-transferable context of human life. These are the most important problems relevant to the philosophical explanation of high culture as an analogous culmination of culture in general. In the course of my analyses, there emerged other questions that exceed the scope of this book. For example, these concern the problem of preparation to high culture or the condition of contemporary art as one of the manifestations of the crisis of high culture. These are open issues worthy of further development, yet possible only with the background prepared by this book. Noteworthy, my solutions and explanations allow for the avoidance of ideological disputes, which I signal throughout the text so as not to deal with them, because they frequently disturb a deeper reflection on culture, not to mention the possibility of the cultivation of high culture. This book sought to isolate the dispute about high culture for the benefit of culture itself. I hope that my analyses tackle matters important for further deliberation by those, who deal with theoretical and practical aspects of culture.

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Index A agathos 19 aischron 20 ambition 106–107 andreia 29 animi cultura 57–65 aphrosyne 51 Apostolic Fathers  67 Apostolic Times  67 aretai 31 –– dianoetikai 40 areté (kalokagathía) 20 areté (valour)  21 areté (virtue)  12, 18–19, 24–26, 28, 51 aristocratic moral code  20 aristocratic pride (aidós) 20 aristoi  12, 22 áristos 19 Aristotle  13, 32, 42 –– high culture  133 –– human nature analysis  82–83 –– kalokagathía 50 –– megalopsychía (magnanimity) 51–56 –– Nicomachean Ethics  44, 106 –– optimum potentiae 122 –– in Politics 50 –– pusillanimity 108 –– towards moral beauty  50 –– virtue 94 –– work 136 Arnold, Matthew  10, 14, 131–134, 158 artes humanitatis propriae 62 artistic criticism  164 assault (attack)  97 Athenian democracy  30–43

Athenian polis 27 Athenian society  30 Aurelius, Marcus  64 Avant-Gard and Kitsch (Greenberg) 142 B Basil of Caesarea  13, 75 beatitudes (beatitudines) 118 Benjamin, Walter  14 Bentham, Jeremy  131 Bishop of Rome  68 bona fortunae 103 bonum delectabile  45, 52 bonum honestum  45, 52 bonum utile 52 business art  143 C Cappadocian Fathers  74–75 Cassiodorus 13 Catholic Ethics of Education (Woroniecki) 106 charis 20 Christian civilization  73 Christian culture –– concept of man  88–90 –– Greek aporias  81–88 –– holiness 121–125 –– magnanimity 100–116 –– valour as gift  116–121 –– virtue of valour  96–100 –– virtues and culture  90–96 Christianity 56 –– adopting model of Greek culture 11 –– concept of man  88–90 –– Greek paidéia 66–77

208 –– and Hellenism  13 –– on intensification of reflection  10 –– the Letter of Saint Clement of Rome to the Corinthians 68 –– New Testament of the Bible  84 –– pagan antiquity  81 –– Roman humanitas and  66–79 Christian paideia 13 Christian theology of Origen  73–74 Chrysostom, John  77 Cicero  57–65, 113 Clement of Alexandria  13, 68, 71 cognitive theoretical skills  92 collectivism 140 communis humanitas 61 communism 139 confidence 100–102 conscience 181 contingency 89 creative cognition (poiesis)  92, 182 cultivation of nature  31 culture. See also  high culture; mass culture –– as animi cultura 57–65 –– anthropological and philosophical approach to  14 –– anthropological dimension of 167–177 –– Christian. See Christian culture –– civilization and  157–158 –– contemporary definitions of  11 –– existential dimension of  167–177 –– Hellenic 83 –– human reasonable action  92 –– metaphysics of  11, 177–184 –– of nihilism  173 –– post-modern 173 –– reality/objectivity 11 –– religion and  159, 175 –– Roman 83 –– transmission of  18 –– virtues and  90–96

Index

–– Western philosophical reflection on 9–10 Culture and Anarchy (Arnold)  10, 14, 131, 158 Culture Counts: Faith and Feeling in a World Besieged (Scruton)  163 D de-distancing principle  147–148 De Invetione (Cicero)  98 democracy, popularisation of ideal 24–30 de Tracy, Antoine Destutt  139 Dialogue with Tryphon, a Jew (Martyr) 70 dianoetikai aretai 40 dikaiosyné 46 The Dream of Scipio (Cicero)  98 E Early Church Fathers  13, 66 education –– integral 17 –– nobility model of  17–24 –– transmission of culture vs. 18 Eliot, Thomas Stearns  14, 157–163 –– caste and class  159–160 –– civilization and culture  157–158 –– holistic vision of society  160 –– integral development of spiritual life 159 –– religion and culture  159 elitism 127–131 endurance (perseverance)  97–98 énkýklos paidéia 32 environment (nemesis) 20 eugeneia 19 F fascism 141 Felix, Marcus Minucius  13 First Apology (Martyr)  70

209

Index

folk art  145–146 folk culture  146 formalism 144–147 Formula vitae honestae 55 G glory 107–108 golden mean principle  93–94 Great French Revolution  140 Greco-Persian wars  27 Greco-Roman heritage  81 Greek aporias  81–88 Greek culture-paidéia 32 Greeks –– early stages of culture  21 –– history of culture  18 –– ideal model of humanity  17 –– literary forms  67–68 –– philosophical sense of  17 Greenberg, Clement  142, 146 Gregory of Nazianzus  13, 75 Gregory of Nyssa  13, 75 Gresham’s law  149 H habitus entitativus 91 habitus operativus 91 Hebrew culture  132 Hellenic culture  132 Hellenism  21, 64 –– Christianity and  13, 66, 79 high culture  10, 14. See also culture –– in Ancient Hellenic noble culture 12 –– Aristotle 133 –– Arnold and  131–134 –– Eliot and  157–163 –– elitism 127–131 –– ideology against  138–143 –– as inalienable context of human life 167–184

–– industrialism 134–138 –– Scruton and  163–167 –– universalism 127–131 –– urbanization 134–138 Hitler, Adolf  141 Hobbes, T.   140 holiness 121–125 –– human spiritual development  124 –– purity  122, 123 –– sanctifying man  123 –– sustainability 122 Holy Spirit  116–118 Homer  22, 131 homogenisation 147–149 human existence, determinants of  89 humanitas –– communis 61 –– importance of  62 –– in Middle Ages  79 –– paideia to 57–65 –– Roman 63–65 –– significance and limits of  77–79 –– value of man determination  64 Humanitas Romana 63 human potentialities  90 human transcendence  89 humility  52, 102–104, 116 hyper-democracy 150 I ideology vs. high culture 138–143 The Iliad (Homer)  22, 131 immanent (internal) homogenisation 148 industrialism 134–138 integral education  17 intellectual virtues  40, 92–93 interiorisation (intellectualisation) 178 Isocrates  13, 32

210

Index

J Jaeger, Werner  10, 17 justice (dikaiosyne) 29

–– sign character of culture  178 –– theoretical and informative cognition 181

K kakos 22 kalokagathía (moral beauty)  10, 127 –– Aristotle and  50 –– definition of  43 –– moral-personal and social aspects 13 –– Plato and  47–50 –– in public life  46 –– virtue of justice  46 –– Xenophon and  46, 47 kalos kagathos anér 19 kalos kai agathos 93 Kant, I.   140 katharsis (purification)  76 Katolicka etyka wychowawcza (Woroniecki) 104 kitsch  142–143, 146 koinon agathon 26 Kłoskowska, Antonina  135 Krąpiec, Mieczyław Albert  14, 177–184 –– conscience 181 –– creative cognition  182 –– experience of contingency  182 –– human cultural world  180 –– impersonated sign-concept-image 179 –– interiorisation (intellectualisation) 178 –– man’s activities vs. human activities 180 –– non-contradiction of culture  177 –– practical cognition  181 –– primary intentionality  179 –– religion 182–183 –– secondary intentionality  179

L Laërtius, Diogenes  47 Locke, J.   140 longanimity 112–114 low culture  10 M Macdonald, Dwight  14, 145, 147, 149, 157 magnanimity –– ambition 106–107 –– Aristotle 13 –– confidence 100–102 –– faults contrary to  104–111 –– great and small goods  115–116 –– humility 102–104 –– longanimity 112–114 –– magnificence 112 –– patience 112–114 –– perseverance 114–115 –– presumption 105–106 –– pusillanimity 108–111 –– Saint Thomas  102 –– subject of  115–116 –– vainglory 107–108 –– valour and  99 –– virtue of  99–100, 104–105 magnificence 112 Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (Mannheim)  159 Mannheim, Karl  147, 159 Martyr, Justin  13, 70 Marx, Karl  139 mass culture. See also culture –– definition of  135 –– dominance/promotion of  138 –– formalism 144–147 –– Gresham’s law in  149

211

Index

–– homogenisation 147–149 –– quantity criterion  143–144 –– reification 144–147 –– standardisation criterion  143–144 mass-man characteristics –– education without ideals  150–154 –– quantity over quality dominance 155–157 mechanical homogenisation 148–149 megalopsychía (magnanimity) 51–56 –– Aristotle 51–56 –– definition of  51 –– reverence (timé) 53 mens sana 28 mental power  92 metamorphosis 75–76 metaphysics –– culture  11, 177–184 –– realistic 12 Mill, John Stuart  131 moral virtues  92–93 morphosis 75 Mussolini, Benito  141 N nazism 141 Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle)  44, 106 Nietzsche, Friedrich  141 nobility 156–157 noble moral code  19 O Odyssey (Homer)  22 On the Christian Education 75 Origen 13 –– Christian theology of  73–74 Ortega y Gasset, José  14, 150–154 –– average people  155 –– hyper-democracy 150

–– The Revolt of the Masses 153 –– secondary similarity  155 P paidéia –– Athenian democracy  12, 30–43 –– Christian 13 –– Christianity and  66–77 –– definition of  31 –– énkýklos 32 –– to humanitas 57–65 –– Plato and  32–38 –– sophists and  39–43 paradeigma 28 patience 112–114 Pawlak, W.   60, 77 Peloponnesian War  27 perseverance 114–115 philanthropy 59–60 philautía 24 philosophical personalism  88 phronesis 29 Pius, Antonius  70 Plato 13 –– in kalokagathía (moral beauty) 47–50 –– paideia and 32–38 –– philosopher as a model  47–50 Platonic spirit  64 plutos 19 polis 24–27 Politics (Aristotle)  50 pop art  143 pop-culture 142 post-modern culture  173 potentiality 89 practical cognition (praksis)  92, 181 praise (epainos) 21 “Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy” (Marx) 139 presumption 105–106

212 primary intentionality  179 propaidéia 36 Protagoras 43 publicity (kleos) 20 purity  122, 123 pusillanimity  55–56, 108–111 Q Quaestiones de quodlibetales (Aquinas) 79 quantity criterion  143–144 R realistic metaphysics  12 reification 144–147 religion with morality  119 religious dignity  90 religious personalism  88 reprimand (psogos) 21 reverence (timé)  20, 53 The Revolt of the Masses (Ortega) 153 Roman culture  83 Roman humanitas  63–65, 81 –– Christianity and  66–79 –– citizen code of conduct  63 –– Hellenism 64 Rousseau, J.J.  140 S Saint Ambrose  13, 78 Saint Augustine  112 Saint Clement of Rome  13, 68 Saint Cyprian  78 Saint Gregory the Great  13 Saint Irenaeus of Lyon  78 Saint Jerome  13 Saint John Paul II, 167–177 Saint Lactantius  78 Saint Paul  68, 109 Saint Thomas Aquinas  13, 14, 79, 88, 90, 93–110, 112–120, 122, 123, 176, 182

Index

Schadewaldt, Wolfgang  63 Schopenhauer, A.   140 scientific socialism  139 Scipionic Circle  58 Scruton, Roger  14, 163–167 –– artistic criticism  164 –– Culture Counts: Faith and Feeling in a World Besieged 163 –– high Western culture definition 163 –– literary education  165 –– new curriculum in humanities 164 –– Shakespeare’s works as example 165 Second Apology (Martyr)  70 secondary intentionality  179 secondary similarity  155 Smith, A.   140 social enemy  141 socialism 141 social order  139 Socrates  13, 32, 46, 85 sophists, paidéia and  39–43 sóphrosyné  27–29, 37 soul cultivation  57 spirit cultivation  42 standardisation criterion  143–144 Strinati, Dominic  149 summum bonum 103 sustainability 122 synkrasis 69 T technical civilization  133 Tertullian 13 theatrical mask  83 theoretical and informative cognition (theoría)  92, 181 theoretical wisdom  92 “A Theory of Popular Culture” (Macdonald)  145, 147 thymos 27

213

Index

totalitarianism 140 totalitarian socialism  141 Towner, Rutherford Hamilton  147 transcendence 89 transmission of culture vs. education 18 Tusculan Disputations (Cicero)  58, 59 Tylor, Edward Burnett  131 Tyrtaeus  26, 27 U universalism 127–131 urbanization 134–138 V vainglory 107–108 valour –– vs. bravery  26 –– definition of  95 –– as gift  116–121 virtue(s) –– Aristotle 94 –– and culture  90–96 –– of eutrapelia 115 –– of justice  95 –– of magnanimity  104–105 –– of morality  119 virtue of valour  95–96 –– components  97, 98 –– magnanimity 96 –– magnificence 112 –– meaning of  96–100 –– and moderation  95 –– perseverance 98

–– Saint Thomas and  95 vulgar homogenisation  148 W Wojtyła, Karol  14, 167–177 –– anti-human cultures and civilizations 171 –– Book of Genesis  168 –– crisis of contemporary culture 175 –– culture and human life  168 –– culture of nihilism  173 –– definition of culture  168–169 –– diagnosis of culture  171 –– measure of culture  170–171 –– Osoba i czyn (Person and Act) 167 –– Pamięć i tożsamość (Memory and Identity) 168 –– post-modern culture  173 –– Przekroczyć próg nadziei (Crossing the Threshold of Hope)  167–168 –– Redemptor hominis  171, 173 –– religion in culture  175 –– secularism 174 –– utopian vision of humanity 172–173 The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction (Benjamin) 14 Woroniecki, Jacek  104, 106, 110 X Xenophon  32, 46, 47

Philosophy and Cultural Studies Revisited / Historisch-genetische Studien zur Philosophie und Kulturgeschichte Editd by/herausgegeben von Seweryn Blandzi Band

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Dorota Muszytowska / Janusz Kręcidło / Anna Szczepan-Wojnarska (eds.): Jerusalem as the Text of Culture. 2018.

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Dorota Probucka (ed.): Contemporary Moral Dilemmas. 2018.

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Ján Zozuľak: Inquiries into Byzantine Philosophy. 2018.

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Marek Piechowiak: Plato’s Conception of Justice and the Question of Human Dignity. 2018.

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Dorota Probucka: Ethics in Ancient Greece and Rome. 2019.

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Imelda Chłodna-Błach: From Paideia to High Culture. A PhilosophicalAnthropological Approach. 2020.

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