From Allies to Enemies: Spain, Japan and the Axis in World War II 9811984727, 9789811984723

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NEW DIRECTIONS IN EAST ASIAN HISTORY

From Allies to Enemies Spain, Japan and the Axis in World War II Florentino Rodao

New Directions in East Asian History

Series Editors Oliviero Frattolillo, Roma Tre University, Rome, Italy Yuichi Hosoya, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan Antony Best, London School of Economics, London, UK

This series addresses the ways in which history influences the political, economic and social development of East Asia, a region which now plays a pivotal role in our world’s multipolar international system. The series provides new perspectives on East Asia’s distinctive economic and political situation through the lens of 20th century history, with a particular focus on Pre-War and Cold War periods. It argues the need to re-examine the history of East Asia and provide new historical approaches to a vibrant and constantly changing region. Highlighting that history is at the root of many modern day conflicts in Asia, this series provides a global forum for rigorous academic research and timely debate by scholars worldwide, and showcases significant new research on East Asian history and politics in the contemporary era. The series will appeal to specialists in the history and politics of Asia; international history; scholars of modern and contemporary Japan, Chinese and Korea as well as international relations. NOW INDEXED ON SCOPUS!

Florentino Rodao

From Allies to Enemies Spain, Japan and the Axis in World War II

Florentino Rodao Complutense University of Madrid Madrid, Spain

ISSN 2522-0195 ISSN 2522-0209 (electronic) New Directions in East Asian History ISBN 978-981-19-8472-3 ISBN 978-981-19-8473-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8473-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Manuel Martín Vazquez, bullfighter and member of a bulls-related family, teaches the Japanese minister in Madrid, Yakichiro Suma, bullfighting passes (in this case, a “verónica” with a fake cape) during a party with art critics This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

To my parents To contradictions and misperceptions, so human, so in need of research.

Preface: Relevance of the Marginal

In February 1944, a small news item was published in the Spanish press denouncing both the privileges granted to Asian languages (Japanese and Tagalog) over the Spanish language in the Philippines and the lack of acknowledgment of ecclesiastical hierarchies by the Japanese Empire which, as the news item assured, had caused “sensation and amazement in Latin America.” The article revealed the regime’s significant turn against one of the Axis combatants, and its publication provoked many reactions. The American and Japanese ambassadors claimed that it came out of Madrid, not Buenos Aires (as stated by the Spanish news agency EFE), while London’s The Times called it “eye-opening news.” The British Ambassador described it as “a really astonishing example of the psychology of the Press Bureau.” A few days later, the Falangist daily ¡Arriba! acknowledged on its front page that it had been excessive in its “Japanism,” saying, “The press and, in general, the opinion of the entire [Spanish] Nation maintained, in the face of the Japanese war enterprise, an attitude of which Japan could not have had the slightest cause for complaint.” Such noteworthy news and the public acknowledgment of such an error by ¡Arriba!, the official mouthpiece of the Falange Party and Japan’s staunchest supporter in Spain for years, were the most eye-catching aspects of the sudden about-face in Spain’s policy toward Japan. The Francoist regime shifted its attitude toward the Asian country from the friendship and admiration it professed between 1939 and 1942, to public enmity in 1944 and

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1945, before breaking relations with it, considering declaring war on the Japanese Empire in March–April 1945, and displaying flags for three days in official buildings after Japan’s defeat. The two countries’ ties had taken a complete turn and the Spanish and Japanese went from being close allies to enemies. Such a radical political shift deserves further study, but besides allowing us to observe how the Falangists swallowed their pride, Spain-Japan relations show additional dimensions. At the start of the war, both countries were not only among those that desired a New Order and were united by several agreements, but other countries perceived them in a parallel way. Even after Pearl Harbor, when Japan entered the war but not Spain, which ended their similarities, Spain’s neutrality led to it being the European country that helped the Japanese the most in their war effort, particularly in crucial areas, such as espionage, representation of interest, and propaganda. The significance of the relationship between them provides a better understanding of the difficulties the Axis faced in their attempts to create a New Order. However, except for an article focusing on espionage and diplomacy, Spain and Japan, 1936–1945 (1988–89), by one of the best scholars on the Pacific War, Gerhard Krebs, there has been no complete account of Spain-Japan relations. This study tries to fill this vacuum by introducing new perspectives such as the crucial role of perceptions and the influence of Spain-Japan relations on other countries, in addition to other new data that may allow a better understanding of World War II. The image of Japan, on the one hand, is difficult to grasp but still crucial for understanding the relations. In this case, the complete change from alliance to enmity between two countries during the war shows the need to better understand changes mostly caused by perceptions. They not only led to quick changes, excessive simplifications, or absurd commentaries, but their role explains policy decisions: perceptive changes preceded political ones. Their context needs further study. For example, although both countries were dictatorships and at war, both of their governments needed a certain amount of public approval, and Spain’s case shows the phases that allowed populations to support their rulers’ volte-faces. Of course, orientalist visions were part of those perceptual processes. The view that many Spaniards had about Japan changed from admiration to criticism so quickly partly because of latent orientalist biases that existed when both countries had friendly relations.

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On the other hand, not only did bilateral relations transcend to other countries, but also reverberated and were greatly strengthened through third countries. As such, the impact that Spain-Japan relations had on these countries also needs to be known. The greatest crisis between Spain and the United States during the war was provoked by the Philippines (the Laurel Incident), and Japan played a crucial role in the clear decline of Pan-Hispanism in Latin America after Pearl Harbor. There are two obvious examples of this. One was through imperialism. Daniel Hedinger has focused on the importance of empires to understand the Axis. SpainJapan relations are an example of this. In fact, two of the most significant events during this period occurred in other territories, like the Economic Mission to Japan’s visit to China and the massacre of Spaniards in Manila by Japanese soldiers. The other was through neutrality. It is necessary to understand it as part of an ongoing process of redefining allegiances during the war, and to compare the evolution and the different interests of each country. The position of Spain, Turkey, Chile, and Argentina, compared to countries that experienced milder changes (Portugal or Sweden) and those that experienced more radical shifts like Italy and Thailand, may help us understand the decisions made by each government. The book by Pascal Lottaz and Ingemar Ottoson, Sweden, Japan, and the Long Second World War: 1931–1945 (2021) is an example to follow. Lastly, relations between Spain and Japan offer data that allow a better understanding of the world conflict in the spheres of diplomacy and intelligence. The history of Japanese diplomacy may also shed more light on it with interesting facts. For example, the Iberian Peninsula allows a comparison of two ministers with two different attitudes as seen in their postwar political affiliations as representatives in parliament, one with the Socialist Party, while the other with right-wing parties. The case with Spain also shows that winning battles and occupying countries were not enough to achieve a final victory and that paying more attention to diplomacy would have led Japan to greater success. In the sphere of intelligence, the Laurel Incident shows how Washington applied technological acumen to its own strategy since decoding other countries’ messages was used for policymaking more than usually considered. In fact, historians must include intelligence reports to explain the decisions taken by the leaders, like what Nicholas Tamkin did for Britain, Turkey, and the Soviet Union, 1940–45 (2009). Reading the Magic Summaries bulletins and daily summaries of the most significant enemy communications that were decoded by American counterespionage, certainly helps a greater understanding of the war

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at the time, when the outcome was not yet foreseen. The references in these Magic Summaries to relations between Spain and Japan are certainly numerous. One final incident that may seem anecdotal concerns the Spanish visit to Wang Jingwei when he was not yet recognized by the Japanese military due to the stir it caused at the time, as the Spanish predisposition to hastily making decisions about Asia led to more serious consequences in the days leading up to World War II. First, after the Manchuria Incident of 1931, Republican Spain served as a great whip for Japan in the League of Nations, and its representative, Salvador de Madariaga was called “The Don Quixote of Manchuria,” even advising Britain to declare war on Japan, adding that Spain would follow. In 1935, however, Madariaga himself tolerated the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and expressed support for British appeasement, despite the similarities with events in China. Second, in November 1937, the Franco regime was prepared to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with Manchukuo, enticing Fascist Italy (by then considered a great power), which then urged Nazi Germany to do the same and ultimately side with Japan against China. Although they can be considered unimportant, Spain-Japan relations offer important keys to understand the war, perhaps because they offer information from the margins. Secondary issues involving minor powers also improve our understanding of the World War.

The Structure of the Text This book contains six chapters, all aimed at explaining the cocktail of war, perceptions, empires, alliances, and changing tensions that surrounded Spain-Japan relations. It is structured in such a way as to unravel as much as possible the function of perceptions in both countries’ relationship. Then, it explains Spain-Japan relations from the start of the sixteenth century, before analyzing the role of perceptions in international relations, and ends with an explanation of how each country perceived the other. When this study starts, from associations to worldviews, or images of the Samurai, the Geisha, and Don Quixote influenced Spain-Japan relations more than their diplomatic history, as shown in how irrelevant the memory of Spain’s representation of Japanese interests in World War I was. The second chapter, Parallel contributions to the New Order, covers the period when enthusiasm for victory was at its height, that is, the

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European war, between September 1939 and December 1941. Spain and Japan hoped to be on the winning side of the new world order, but they were also walking a parallel path, turning the European democracies into their new enemy and tending to criticize the British Empire instead of the Soviet Union. This chapter not only shows how crucial propaganda was, but how imperialism offered Spain and Japan the best opportunities to transform their relationship from friendship to cooperation, just as it occurred in Manchukuo, Thailand, and China, where an ultimate Japanese victory remained uncertain. Anticipating, contributing to, and desiring a likely Axis victory from different positions led the world to perceive them in a parallel way. The third chapter, The Fighter and the Assistant, covers events from the attack on Pearl Harbor to the replacing of both nations’ Foreign Ministers in early September 1942. Japan had embarked on a new war, but Spain had not. Instead, it ended up assisting Japan the most in its war effort, mostly in espionage, the representation of Japanese interests, and propaganda. Political relations became more important due to the crucial role of the Spanish Foreign Minister and Falangist, Ramón Serrano Suñer, who situated Japan in the realm of political disputes between opposing factions of the regime. The fourth chapter deals with the unexpected, covering the first period of the war when the Count of Jordana served as Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs between September 1942 and April 1943. This is the period when both countries had to adjust their expectations. Spain was reminded of the Allies’ strength at the very borders of its colonies in Morocco, while Japan learned that it could not continue its advance in Asia. Confusion in Collaboration contains an account centered on how one country’s desire to change its relationship with another was blocked by short-term needs. The fifth chapter, Impossible Negotiations, deals with how the Japanese case can serve as an example for Spanish foreign policy as a whole between the spring of 1943 and the summer of 1944. By then, Tokyo realized that it had to compensate Spain for its help in order to avoid harming their chances of victory, but Spain had already decided to pursue its neutrality policy by weakening its relationship with the Japanese to compensate for its ongoing collaboration with the Nazis. Their strategies did not match in time. The sixth chapter, Unexpected expectations, starts in June 1944, when the Spanish Foreign Minister’s death coincided with the fall of Tojo’s

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government, and ends with the war’s conclusion. Once again, the chapter can only be understood by focusing on images of the future, of a peace that would be completely different from what the Spanish and Japanese had hoped for. While Japan started showing the first doses of pragmatism in its foreign policy, Spain attempted to convince the Allies of her supposedly true sympathies, or at least, to alleviate their criticism of the Franco regime. Therefore, instead of being kept hidden to avoid any reminder of their past friendship with Japan, Spain brought to light its ties with it to show the world the suffering and atrocities the Spanish people experienced at the hands of Japanese, in an apparently thought out plan to join the United Nations. M¯anoa, Honolulu, Hawaii March 2022

Florentino Rodao

Acknowledgments

It probably would have been best for me not to write this section. It is inevitable that I will fail to acknowledge the contributions of others to this work after so many decades on working on this topic. The early supervision of Juan Carlos Pereira when I started off with my dissertation was replaced by that of Tsunekawa Keiichi for the second one, and from both of them I have learned much about foreign policy and Japan. Regarding Japan, I would also like to acknowledge a number of other eminent academics, such as John Dower, Gerhard Krebs, Mitani Hiroshi, Namiki Yorihiki, Takita Yoshiko, Masuda Yoshio, and Graeme S. Mount. Regarding the Philippines, I would like to acknowledge Ikehata Setsuho, Nakano Satoshi, Nagano Yoshiki, and Terada Takefumi, as well as Filipinos like Ricardo T. Jose, who formed a research group that investigated the history of the Philippines during the Japanese occupation. While teaching in Wisconsin, I discussed the topics related to this book with professors whom I admired such as Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, Alfred W. McCoy, Michael Cullinane, Alda Blanco, and, especially, Stanley Payne, who not only wrote the prologue but was also key in getting the Spanish publisher to accept my original book proposal. The publication of the Japanese version was made possible thanks to the well-known specialist of Spanish history at University of Ibaraki, Fukasawa Yasuhiro, and five other scholars, namely, Watanabe Chiaki, Yashima Yukari, Fukasawa Haruna, Sunayama Mitsuko, and Isoyama Kumiko, who not only devoted time outside of their own research for this project

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

but also helped correct errors, verify information, and improve the text. Shimazaki Tsutomu of the Shobunsha publishing house helped with that edition, while in Spain, Maria Borràs and Miguel Aguilar helped with the Plaza & Janés edition and the e-book version by Random House Mondadori. The present English edition also requires numerous acknowledgments, especially regarding new documentation provided by various descendants of the members of the 1940 Economic Mission to Japan, such as Marcial Castro Sánchez, and Matilde and Victoria Ladrón de Guevara. I would also like to thank Joan María Thomàs, with Emilio Saenz-Francés, Xavier Moreno Juliá, and Wayne H. Bowen for their part in a research project that we engaged in about Spain’s history during World War II. Regarding financial assistance, I would also like to thank the grants provided by the Japanese Ministry of Education and the Toyota Foundation for funding my research in the Philippines and the United States in 1994. Resources for the Japanese translation were also provided by year-long assistance from the Japan Foundation along with the Spanish Ministry of Culture via the Baltasar Gracián Program. Final visits to the archives were financed by the Spanish Proyecto de Investigación [Research Project] HAR2012-30848 (2013–2016) under the auspices of the Ministry of Economy and Innovation. This was crucial as it allowed me to consult documents that had been released since the publication of the Spanish version of this book in Spanish in 2002. The final draft has been mostly written and submitted while in a stay in the University of Hawai’i at M¯anoa thanks to grant FRX21/00143 from the program “Salvador de Madariaga” 2019, by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation. As always, family support has been key to such a lengthy undertaking and I would like to acknowledge support from my parents, Florentino and Consuelo, and my former wife, Teresa Herrero, to whom I dedicated the Spanish version. Special mention is due to my son Florentino “Flochan,” who was born while I was compiling the index and who attended a number of my talks in Japan without protesting despite being just 11 years old. For this Palgrave edition, I would like thank Eric Milan and Isabel Moreno for the data collected at the Bank of Spain, and credit my research stays and my participation in seminars at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (TUFS, 2015), the Center for Japanese Studies at the University of California at Berkeley in 2016, and the Department of History of the University of Hawai’i at M¯anoa in 2022. I would also

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like to thank professors Tosh Minohara of Kobe University, who opened up new ways for me to explore diplomatic relations, Oliviero Frattolillo, from Università Roma Tre, for helping enthusiastically with the project, as well as Shana Brown, Vina Lanzona, and Marcus Daniel for helping me with the final draft in Hawai’i. I would also like to thank Emanuel La Vina for his wonderful revisions and translations as well as Noorjaham Begum, Connie Lee, Coral Zhou, and Bai Hui at Springer, not only for the remarkable patience they have shown after all this time, but for the care they took for this edition.

About this book

This study started out as the Chinese saying goes, as the first step in a long journey without a clear idea of how it would end. The problems I encountered in finding academic information about Thailand for my graduate dissertation in 1997, continued when I started devoting myself to a larger country for my doctoral thesis. The final destination remained unclear. Following my advisor’s advice, I consulted the archives and learned Chinese and Japanese. It was after finding some documents on Spanish doubts about its ties with Japan, that it all became clear. Deciding on what period to cover took longer than coming up with the topic. The first proposal that I submitted covered the start of the Spanish War in 1936 up to 1956, when the Franco regime joined the United Nations along with Japan. It took me a year to compile enough documentation to convince my professor that the 1937–1945 period was enough. Fortunately, the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC) became aware that new researchers on Asia faced similar problems and held the El Extremo Oriente Ibérico [The Iberian Far East] conference, which covered state of the art, documents in archives and provided suggestions for future research. The bus was already on its way. The next step for this book was in an airplane. In 1990, thanks to the Japanese Ministry of Education, I started a five-year stay as a researcher at the Tokyo University to complete my Ph.D., which I submitted in Madrid in 1993. After reaching my Ph.D. dissertation, the pleasure in the experience convinced me to start another long trip on the Philippines. Turning

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back in this text, the classic methodology on international relations was unsatisfactory for understanding the two periods of friendship and enmity in the same narrative about mutual relations. I used the methodology of perceptions as way to trace the relations between these two periods and then, rewrote the text. Since then, publishers have hopped on board.boarded the new train to go on that trip. In 2002, after a decade of production, the book, Franco y el imperio japonés: Imágenes y propaganda en tiempos de Guerra [Franco and the Japanese Empire. Images and propaganda in a time of a war] was published. Likewise, a Japanese translation, 『フランコと大日本帝国』 [Furanko to Dainippon Teikoku] was published a decade later, along with an e-book version in 2013. For this English version, again after a decade, the twin needs were to actualize contents and reduce text. After a half-year research stay at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (TUFS), along with new visits to archives, including the United States and England, I updated the bibliography and reviewed any new documentation, while another half-year stay at the University of Hawai’i allowed me to reduce the present number of pages from 669 in the 2002 edition, mostly by compressing the European war into a single chapter and removing as much information as possible, especially about the Philippines’ role and suppressing the index. Documents have also been relocated, the Archive of the Spanish Embassy in Tokyo that I was in charge to send to the General Archive of the Administration have been finally classified in section 1.2.1.1.2. Servicio Exterior Japón. This journey through different countries and publishers has ended in some way, but suggests new steps in knowing better the Second World War, especially intelligence. Much documentation has been brought forward since the United States opened up the first Magic Summaries in 1978, which mostly contained censored and incomplete Japanese diplomatic messages. Later, US army and naval documents became accessible, and since 2014, full access has been given to the Magic Summaries. Besides the United States, in Japan, fragmentary SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) records have been found at the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Institute of Defense Studies. British counter-intelligence archives have also been opened. In the future, more countries will open up their archives. The number of documents to be reviewed from the intelligence agencies will be immense. At the end of the war, the United States captured and decoded around 380.000 monthly

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messages from sixty governments in 25 different languages, according to researcher David Alvarez. Hopefully, access will be granted to not just enemy messages but decoded messages of from allies and neutral countries as well. The possibilities for historiography are immense. On the one hand, many countries like Japan and Spain destroyed or hid information that should be read in the archives of foreign countries. On the other hand, many decisions were made according to reports that could not and were not mentioned neither later nor in the many personal memoirs written on the war. Now, with the information we have on these intelligence activities, it is possible to get a second glance on these decisions, and with what we could find in the future, we could get a better understanding of World War II and countless other events. Certainly, decoded documentation on espionage could lead to a rewriting of the history of World War II. Intelligence is the next step to take, but for that, we will perhaps need different vehicles and a more consolidated democracy.

Contents

1

Introduction: Distance and Difference Historical Context of Spain-Japan Relations Methodology: Images Two Semi-Orientals Perceive Each Other Gen. Franco as an Example References

1 2 6 8 15 18

2

Anticipating a New Order The Axis’ New Objective A New Frame for Propaganda Renewed Relations in the Military World Imperial Asia and Spain Germany Invades the USSR Lasting Consequences References

23 25 29 41 57 71 78 79

3

The Fighter and the Assistant The Disputed Perception of Japan After Pearl Harbor and Its Shadow Spain and the Globalization of the War Assistance on the Road to Victory Mistrust The End of a Friendship References

85 86 98 107 136 142 145

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4

Confusion In Collaboration A New Minister, A New Context Collaboration Continues A Return to Traditional Images Suspicions Before Decisions References

151 152 154 186 192 193

5

The Impossible Negotiations A Shift in Tendencies The Preference for the Philippines The Laurel Incident Tensions Become Public Uncertainties at the minister’s Death References

197 198 204 216 233 249 251

6

Unexpected Expectations A New Stance Toward Japan Massacre in Manila The Slow Rupture The Hidden Aspects of a Possible War A Second Non-Belligerence References

253 255 273 282 290 300 306

7

Conclusion: Irremissible Orientalism Irremissible Orientalism Social and National Advancement Different Contexts, Similar Factors References

311 311 316 317 319

Documentation Centers and Bibliography

321

Bibliography

327

About the Author

Florentino Rodao is a professor of Modern History at the Complutense University of Madrid. He has written two dissertations, one at the Complutense University and the other at the University of Tokyo. He has taught at the Universities of Wisconsin, Puerto Rico, Kei¯ o, Ateneo de Manila, and Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, and has done research at the Universities of Harvard (WFCIA and Real Colegio Complutense), California at Berkeley, Hawai’i, Tokyo, University of the South Pacific and Australia National University. Spanish interaction in Asia is his main area of research. In addition to editing books and writing articles, he wrote Spaniards in Siam. A contribution to the study of Spanish presence in East Asia 1540–1939 (Españoles en Siam. Una aportación al estudio de la presencia española en Asia. CSIC, 1997) and Francoists without Franco. An Alternative history of the Spanish Civil War in the Philippines ( Franquistas sin Franco. Una historia alternativa de la Guerra Civil Española en Filipinas, Comares 2012). In 2002, he published Franco and the Japanese Empire. Images and propaganda in the time of a War (Franco y el Imperio Japones. Imágenes y propaganda en tiempos de guerra, Plaza & Janes), which was translated into Japanese『フランコと大日本帝国』(Furanko to Dainippon Teikoku, Shobunsha, 2013) and is the origin of the present book. His most recent book is aimed at a wider audience: The Solitude of a Vulnerable Country. Japan since 1945 (La soledad del país vulnerable. Japón desde 1945, Crítica, 2019).

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Abbreviations

AEET AGA-AE AGA-SGM AHBE AHM-CGG AHN-SGC AMAEC-P AMAEC-R APG-JE ARE BKT CDF CJHHP CUSDR DDI DEAC

Archive of the Spanish Embassy in Tokyo General Archive of the Administration. Foreign Affairs Section (Alcalá de Henares, Spain) General Archive of the Administration. General Secretariat of the Movimiento Historical Archive of the Bank of Spain (Madrid, Spain) Historical Military Archive. General Military Headquarter of the Generalísimo Section (Madrid, Spain) National Historical Archive. Civil War Section (Salamanca, Spain) Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affaits, European Union and Cooperation. Personal Records Section (Madrid, Spain) Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation. Renovated Section Archive of the Head of Government. Section Head of State (Madrid, Spain) Archive of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Paris, France) Boeich¯o Kenky¯ u Toshokan. Library of the Defence Agency (Tokyo, Japan) Central Decimal File Carlton Joseph Huntley Hayes Papers (Columbia University Libraries. New York) Confidential United States Diplomatic Records (microfilm) Documenti Diplomatici Italiani Department of External Affairs of Canada

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ABBREVIATIONS

DSDF-WWII E FDRPL FRUS GSK-KT

GSK-NK LOC MS NARA NSA PRO-FO RG SIS SRDJ SRNA

Department of State Decimal File relating to World War II, 1939–1945 (Microfilm) Entry Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library (Poughkeepsie, New York, USA) Foreign Relations of the United States Gaimushiry¯ okan. Archive of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kakkoku no Taid¯o [Attitude of Foreign Countries] Section (Tokyo, Japan) Gaimushiry¯ okan. Archive of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nairan Kankei[civil war] Library of Congress (Washington DC, USA) Magic Summaries (microfilm, Magic Diplomatic Summaries) National Archives and Records Administration (Washington DC, USA) National Security Agency Public Record Office. Foreign Office Section. (London, U.K.) Record Group Signal Intelligence System Japanese Diplomatic Messages Translations of Imperial Japanese Navy Messages

Terminologies

In Japanese and Chinese names, the surname is placed first. For Chinese names, I use the pinyin system, and when words appear in the WadeGiles system, I place the pinyin versions in brackets. For Manchurian place names during the Japanese period, I use the Chinese name instead of the Japanese terms, such as the Kwantung Army, referred to back then as Kant¯o, while the only name I maintain in Japanese is Manchukuo. Regarding Japanese names and words, they are Romanized in the simplified Hepburn system (i.e., Konoe for Konoye). “Nanjing Regime” refers to the nationalist government established in the city between 1940 and 1945 (led by Wang Jingwei until November 1944), but not to other governments installed in the city in other periods. All the Japanese sources cited in this book were published in Tokyo. This text uses the term “Pacific War,” since Japan’s confrontation with the Allied nations provided the main context for relations with Spain, while aware that “Eurasian-Pacific War” is a more appropriate term for the whole conflict. The definition of “fascism” as I apply it to the regime in Japan during the war is based on Roger Griffin’s, since it is more suitable for understanding the palingenetic expectations at this time. Finally, two curious facts: Foreign Minister Ramón Serrano Suñer used no accent in his surname unlike another diplomat who also appears in this book, Tomás Súñer, who does. The Philippine General Tobacco

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TERMINOLOGIES

Company (Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas), whose headquarters were in Barcelona, is referred to as Tabacalera, the name it bore in the Philippines, despite the confusion with the homonym company founded in 1945, that was in charge of the Tobacco monopoly in Spain.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Distance and Difference

In the 1930s, Japan and Spain were two distinct countries with little interest in each other. Both nations belonged to different cultural spheres, enclosed within their own worlds, evolving under systems of thought and physical conditions that had very little in common. The Spanish and the Japanese continued to feel this sense of distance and difference four centuries after they first made contact. The passing of time and the ever-shrinking world had done little to bridge the gap between the two countries. Nevertheless, several impressions existed of each other. In the early modern era, initial contact shaped Japanese self-image as a distinct people historically surrounded by threats, while the Spanish associated Japan with one of their most beloved saints, Francis Xavier, and their history of Christian evangelization. Later, both countries even shared a border when Taiwan became a Japanese colony while the Philippines remained under Spanish rule, and both were involved in the Philippine War of Independence. Over time, new images emerged. While apprehension existed among the Spaniards as seen in their fear of the “Yellow Peril,” there was also a sense of exoticism with the popularity of fashion trends like Japonism, and the Spanish association of the Japanese with Geisha and the Samurai compares to the Japanese association of the Spanish with Don Quixote and with Columbus’ discovery of the Americas. Studying this wide range of representations between the two countries can be amusing © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 F. Rodao, From Allies to Enemies, New Directions in East Asian History, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8473-0_1

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entertainment, but it can also help us understand the events covered in this book, that is, the quick transformation from political friendship to enmity. Images were crucial for allowing such a quick political shift. In this introductory chapter, I will explain the context in which Spain-Japan relations were developed, first, with a brief overview of the Spain-Japan ties; second, with a brief introduction on how the role of perceptions in international relations affected them, followed by a theoretical study on how perceptions could explain the state of relations between the two countries; and lastly, by discussing this book’s main theoretical approach, Orientalism, with a focus on Gen. Francisco Franco’s worldview and how it affected his government’s policy toward Japan.

Historical Context of Spain-Japan Relations The history of Spain-Japan relations is long and full of abrupt changes. When the notion of a Japan or Spain was still in its infancy, the Spanish and Japanese first encountered each other with the arrival of Francis Xavier in Japan in 1549. This date, however, does not mark a clear line. In fact, Xavier arrived on a Portuguese ship because both Iberian Monarchies shared the goal of spreading the Christian faith across the world, while feudal lords were still in the midst of a long civil war (Sengoku period, 1467–1615) to take over the Japanese archipelago. Early relations were amicable. The Japanese welcomed both Iberian merchants and Christian missionaries; the merchants because they brought Chinese goods and the missionaries because they could be used to weaken the Buddhist sects who opposed the drive to political unification. But the situation changed at the beginning of the seventeenth century. As unification and pacification progressed thanks partly to the eroding power of the Buddhists, and the Dutch and British arrived searching for their own niches, the role of Iberians changed radically. Contradicting facets of the relationship soon became apparent. On the one hand, commerce was going well, and the Manila harbor even became Japan’s second most important destination, but the same could not be said for security concerns, since the Spaniards, Portuguese, Dutch, Japanese, and Chinese feared threats from each other. On the other hand, the missionaries faced increasing preaching restrictions from the authorities. Then, they started traveling posing as merchants, which led to Japan banning all Castilians from entering their country in 1624, regardless of their occupation. Then, the Spanish missionaries pretended to be Portuguese and, once again, the authorities in Manila were unable to

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stop them. The monarchy prioritized evangelization over trade. Finally, in 1638, an anti-Shogun Christian-influenced rebellion in Shimabara led to the final expulsion of all Iberians. After the Meiji Restoration, Spain-Japan relations managed to overcome numerous crises. First, Spanish fears of losing their empire in Asia led to worries about Japanese naval expansion complemented by immigration, which was then restricted despite its contribution to improving the economy, but contacts continued. Then, the murder of a Japanese merchant in Micronesia led to an anti-Spanish press campaign in Japan, but tensions cooled after Madrid delivered an apology, paid the victim’s family monetary compensation, and signed a treaty renouncing extraterritoriality. Later, during the Philippine Revolution, some pro-Asianist groups supported the Filipino revolutionaries, but Tokyo limited their resources, and they were barely able to provide aid. As a result, during the Spanish-American War of 1898, Spain not only allowed the presence of Japanese observers in their battles, but the press even reported on a possible mutual alliance. Spain’s loss in the war led to its exit from Asia but again, it was not as decisive to relations with Japan. Its departure from the Philippines and Micronesia was not as traumatic as in Cuba, since Spanish society felt a sense of liberation from holding a colony that had brought them little benefit and was mostly in the hands of the friars. Only private interests, mostly missionaries and Philippine-based Spanish businesses, maintained contact with the region. Then, Spain-Japan relations took a new course in which the military played a larger role. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 largely helped in bringing the two countries closer together and during World War I, when rules regarding neutral countries representing belligerent countries were established, Madrid represented Tokyo in its dealings with the German and Austro-Hungarian empires.1 After 1929, both countries moved in opposite directions which affected their ties with each other. Preferring international collaboration to imperial rhetoric, the Second Republic in Spain rejoined the League of Nations in 1931 while expansionism, militarism and anti-diplomatic sentiment grew in Japan. Geneva, the headquarters of the League of Nations, gladly welcomed Spain’s entry, and not only allowed it to join the 1 Bartolome Sopena, R. 2022. Una tormenta no tan lejana. La España post-98 ante la guerra ruso japonesa. Ph. Diss., Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona.

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League’s committees but also to occupy representative positions. Then, they crashed. In September that year, when Japan invaded Manchuria, the Spanish Foreign Minister served as President of the League’s General Assembly. As a consequence, Spanish diplomats managed the organization’s relations with Japan and China, while in Geneva, the Spanish representative, Salvador de Madariaga, acted as the spokesman for the interests of small powers, such as Sweden, Czechoslovakia, or Ireland, which sought to strengthen the League. For them, Tokyo’s dispute with Geneva over the international body’s authority was more important than the former´s conflict with Beijing over Manchuria. In fact, the rest of the members of the League’s Council were great powers with important ties to Asia and their decisions were susceptible to pressure from Tokyo, but Spain had very limited contacts or trade partners, and Representative Madariaga showed the most vehement support for strengthening the League as an organ for collective global security. It earned him the nickname “Don Quixote of Manchuria” and he even proposed to his British colleague that if London declared war on Japan, Madrid would follow suit.2 On time, Japan further radicalized. Tensions increased between the diplomats and the military and in 1936, when the Spanish Civil War erupted, Japan first declared neutrality but months later, signed the AntiComintern Pact with Berlin, blaming the war on the Comintern. When the second Sino-Japanese War erupted in July 1937, the Spanish military pressured Japan to recognize Gen. Franco’s rebel government and Foreign Minister Hirota found it increasingly difficult to refuse. In order to stem the flow, Hirota asked Franco’s Spain to recognize Manchukuo in return, which, so far, only Tokyo and San Salvador had done in 1932. Surprisingly, Franco’s rebels agreed and even more surprisingly, Italy also ended its initial neutrality in the Sino-Japanese conflict and decided to recognize Manchukuo as well a day before Franco’s Spain. Months later, in early 1938, Germany would do the same.3 In short, Spain’s policies

2 Preston, P. 1999. Comrades: Portraits from the Spanish Civil War. London: HarperCollins, cap. 5. “A Quixote in Politics: Salvador de Madariaga”; Quintana, Fernando. 1993. España en Europa, 1931–1936, pp. 68–69. San Sebastián: Nerea. 3 Rodao, F. 2009. Japan and the Axis, 1937–8: Recognition of the Franco Regime and Manchukuo. Journal of Contemporary History, 44,3: 431–447. https://doi.org/10. 1177/0022009409104117. Hedinger, D. 2017. The Imperial Nexus: The Second World War and the Axis in Global Perspective. Journal of Global History, 12: 184–205.

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toward Japan reversed radically in just a few years; at first, leading the League of Nation’s petitions for a stronger condemnation of the invasion of Manchuria, only to later drag Italy into recognizing Manchukuo and siding with Japan in its war against China. With little Spanish presence in Japan and vice-versa, negligible trade and very limited contact, Spain-Japan relations bounced in opposite directions. Spain-Japan relations had certainly undergone numerous radical shifts since the very beginning. From Shogun Oda Nobunaga’s initial acceptance of Christianization to his mass executions of missionaries, and from friendly trade relations in the early seventeenth century to prohibitions imposed merely some years later. In the nineteenth century, fear of the “Yellow Peril” and Japanese immigration into its empire was replaced by cooperation and friendship. The 1930s first saw Spain as the country most opposed to the recognition of Manchukuo only to become the first to side with Japan in its war in China. Similar shifts would continue to be seen throughout the twentieth century.4 Even in the present day, when political relations remain peaceful, Japanese tourism to Spain fell by 40% in a few short years (from 355,000 in 1999 to 250,000 in 2001, and 224,000 in 2002), only to rise back up almost immediately.5 Abruptness has characterized the development of contact between Spain and Japan. It is not unusual for relations between countries with strong cultural differences to constantly change. Gen. Franco’s Spain (and Chile’s Pinochet) established diplomatic relations with Communist China in 1973, following the United States’ lead.6 But these variations can show us how perceptions can strongly influence foreign policy. This book provides a historical narrative about Spain-Japan relations based on their images of each other which played a role in their development. Their mutual impressions influenced how the Spanish and Japanese interpreted any information about each other and their relationship. Undeveloped 4 Herrmann, R. K. 2013. Perceptions and image theory in international relations. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, eds. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 348. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxf ordhb/9780199760107.001.0001. 5 Noya, J. 2004. La imagen de España en Japón, p. 43. Madrid: Instituto Cervantes, ICEX, SEEI, Real Instituto Elcano. 6 Herrmann, R. K. 2013. Perceptions and image theory in international relations. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, eds. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 348. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199760107.001.0001.

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relations, interactions, or trade are replaced by images and representations, all interacting with each other via cognitive schemas, allowing a better understanding of such political shifts. From Allies to Enemies: Spain, Japan, and the Axis in World War II tries to offer a more comprehensive narrative by considering its complexities and stressing the role of perceptions in diplomatic relations with a recurrent question the points to Orientalism to understand them: Why had Spanish policy toward Japan turned hostile so quickly in 1945 but not against Germany or Italy?

Methodology: Images Images are a necessary product of the economy of thought that amalgamate a reality in order to render it manageable and comprehensible, although along the way they decontextualize features, dilute subtleties and give rise to excessive abstractions. Moreover, they contain their own internal dynamic that allows them to regenerate themselves over time, depending on the new context. They can degrade into stereotypes (something simple, more false than true, and resistant to change), become an object of heritage for broad groups (such as those of a national or social character), or might not reveal themselves clearly, even being deployed unconsciously. On the other hand, when they come to depend more on the receiver than the transmitter—that is, when they become perceptions—new factors come into play. Cognition, behavior, and psychological biases give an intrinsic meaning to images through processes based in the transmitting of information and in the structure of thought, yet these are influenced by factors such as motivation, which is critical in the acceptance or rejection of discordant information. Images are deceptive, but necessary. Then, during the perceiving process, different psychological activities mix, from expectations (images of the future) to ambitions, desires, and concerns. People tend to rely on their own scripts when interpreting events as well as responding and reorganizing their assessments, evaluations, and opinions, mostly to justify their own behavior (cognitive consistency). Motivational factors are considered along with attention to early events or those experienced first-hand (perceptual predisposition), while the greater the incentive to make a decision is, the less predisposition there will be toward changing that decision (psychology of insufficient reward). Lastly, final representations—whether group or individual—are used as image receivers. In short, images reveal more about

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the one perceiving than the one being perceived and are only part of the problem itself.7 When the role of decisions is evaluated, rationality is still considered the baseline against which behavior is measured, but decisions are never made in a vacuum. Cognition and emotion are complementary to each other. Momentary concerns determine the interpretation of incoming information. Genes and biology can also influence behavior, as observed in neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, and behavioral genetics. It is very difficult to expect rationality in human behavior, certainly when it comes to making political decisions, and the environment in which actors behave is essential, but we need more research, especially to learn on the role of endogenous factors.8 In times of war, as this book will show, there is a greater possibility of making mistakes with those decisions that can also worsen and become more difficult to resolve. Not only do expectations become more intense, but shared with more people, eventually converging or clashing with desires. The inclination to make mistakes and resolve difficulties hastily, as well as efforts to manipulate one’s own symbols and those of others using propaganda, also increase. Threats, for example, increase the likelihood of error in the deductive process, conflicting messages can lead to unforeseen consequences, and intense pressures to speed up perceptual satisfaction can cause people to make quick conclusions based on scant information.9 Group decision-making reduces errors and extreme behavior in particular when decisions are adopted, but their moderating role cannot be overestimated. The process through which emotions move from individuals to groups is still unclear, but individual processes affect entire communities. Society influences the establishment of goal hierarchies, as

7 This introduction owes much to the seminal work of Jervis, R. 1976. Perception and Misconception in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Also, Cottam, M. L. and Cottam, R. W. 2001. Nationalism and Politics: The Political Behaviour of Nation States. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 8 Hatemi, P. K. and McDermott, R. 2011. Man Is by Nature a Political Animal. Evolution, Biology and Politics, p. 10. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. 9 Chong, D. 2013. Degrees of Rationality in Politics. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, eds. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears and Jack S. Levy, p. 96. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Stein, Janice Gross. Threat Perception in International Relations. In The Oxford Handbook, op. cit., pp. 386–388.

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well as the creation of concepts or the construction of meaning, identities, and worldviews, while the play between psychological variables and political meanings is different from that among individuals. There are, for example, embedded tendencies either to rely heavily on expectations to understand what is occurring, or to preserve mental structures for as long as possible by responding rather than generating new queries or ideas.10 Also, group pressure can force minorities to conform to the majority viewpoint with the complicity of the state institutions, weakening people’s ability to think critically. But minorities also react more strongly to unspoken negative attitudes held by majorities. In authoritarian states, further, the possibility of distortion is bigger because the decision-making process is less dispersed. The state can compel authorities to conform with the majority and submission to these kinds of leaders inducing racial prejudice. Democratic states can also be subject to grave mistakes. Institutions are led by persons who might share stereotypical views and live in environments that promote distortion.11 Relations between Spain and Japan, then, included misunderstandings intertwined with different belief systems and cognitive maps. The decision-making processes involved simplicity, feedback, and symmetry, both in individual and institutions and in the different ways of gathering information. Methodologically, images and perceptions require a focus on the representation of the problem but also giving weight to individual leaders. We should also remember that countries can use perceptions and images as a way to minimize damage or as an option for survival, while policy options can be limited due to troubling images of allies. Overall, many psychological variables have to be taken into account when analyzing the relationship between Spain and Japan, as with many other countries, but cultural differences aggravate the possibility of mistakes.

Two Semi-Orientals Perceive Each Other Spanish and Japanese images of each other first developed in the sixteenth century when the Spanish first arrived in Japan. They were followed decades later by two missions composed of young nobles that visited 10 Levy, J. S. 2013. Psychology and Foreign Policy Decision-Making. In The Oxford Handbook… op. cit., pp. 319–323. 11 Huddy, L.; Sears, D. O. and Levy, J. S. 2013. Introduction. Theoretical Foundations of Political Psychology. In The Oxford Handbook …. op. cit., pp. 1–23.

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the Spanish King, the Pope, and other territories; one of which was led by Jesuits and the other by a northern feudal lord. The Spanish were more interested in Japanese material culture and finding opportunities to evangelize than attempting a conquest while the Japanese treated the Spanish with both disdain and fascination, associating them mostly with the Portuguese and, in some way, with their Dutch enemies. In any case, neither the southern nor northern Europeans recognized the supremacy of the Japanese emperor or the superiority of Chinese classical culture, nor were they part of the Sinocentric tributary and belief system. They also did not harbor any religious sentiments compatible with Buddhism or any other beliefs originating from India. As a result, these westerners were seen as barbarians, the first of which were referred to as the “Nambanjin” (Barbarians of the South), while the others were referred to as the “Red Devils” due to the color of their hair.12 After 1640, there remained a certain fear toward Nambanjin among the Japanese, especially among the southern authorities, due to the remaining “hidden Christians,” although as time passed, they came to appreciate the works of art they left behind. Among the Spaniards, on the other hand, there were positive accounts of similarity based on what they had seen the Samurai do during the Sengoku period as daring warriors. In the nineteenth century, Spain and Japan’s images of the world were based on Western imperial ambitions. First, because the theories of biological determinism, which were very popular at this time, precluded both the Spaniards and Japanese from being part of the superior white race. The Japanese were seen as a degenerate race and were called “yellow” for the first time—when the Jesuits first described the Japanese, they pointed to their white skin to argue that missionaries could successfully Christianize them. Similarly, Spanish claims of being part of the superior white race were rejected, because, among many other reasons, the Spanish population had become highly mixed after seven hundred years of Arab rule. Second, because both countries excited the imagination of Western minds, being represented as women. From the nineteenth century onward, Japanese and Spanish impressions of each other became associated with the Geisha and Carmen from Georges 12 Leupp, G. S. 1995. Images of Black People in Late Mediaeval and Early Modern Japan, 1543–1900. Japan Forum, 7-1: 1–13; Rubiés, J.-P. 2003. The Spanish Contribution to the Ethnology of Asia in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Renaissance Studies, 17-3: 418–448. https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-4658.t01-1-00030.

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Bizet’s famous opera. Besides these two women, both of which represented their countries by displaying sensuality, the Japanese and Spaniards were also associated with other famous archetypes and characters like the Samurai and Don Quixote, while ordinary men were ignored. In conclusion, both non-white and feminized, Spain and Japan were perceived as semi-Orientals and both tried to raise their status by expanding their empire to show off the country’s vitality and virility. Social Darwinism, a theory of national evolution falsely based on Charles Darwin’s contributions which preached the concept of the “survival of the fittest,” placed both countries in a similar and contradictory context. They needed to show that they belonged to the elite race by expanding their empires, which was contradicted by their feminine images.13 And while Japan strengthened its navy, Spain sought to expand in the Philippines and Micronesia through the peninsulares or Europe-born Spaniards. They were believed to be the ones who could exploit the archipelago’s riches and not the insulares, who were considered to be racially inferior because they had lived in the tropics.14 The way the two countries saw each other at the beginning of this book provides the background needed to understand each country’s position in the world. We will address it by starting with how they saw each other within their respective worldviews and the associations they conjured of each other, starting with Spain and ending with Japan. The Spanish visions of Japan included numerous comparisons, pointing to 1868 as a crucial year for both to question why Spain lagged behind, and as time passed, it evolved to became an asset of the militarists. In the nineteenth century, the Japanese were seen as having a great concern for education and an austere monarchy that was above internal disputes, as claimed by writers such as Azorín, who called for the “Japanization of Spain.”15 The idea that modern Japan served as “living proof that old

13 Geulen, C. 2007. The Common Grounds of Conflict: Racial Visions of World Order 1880–1940. Competing Visions of World Order Global Moments and Movements, 1880s– 1930s, eds. Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, p. 76. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 14 Rodao, F. 2018. ‘The Salvational Currents of Emigration’: Racial Theories; and Social Disputes in the Philippines at the End of the Nineteenth Century. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 49-3: 426–444. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022463418000346. 15 Rodao, F. and Almazán, D. 2006. Japonizar España: La imagen española de la modernización del Japón Meiji. In Modernizar España 1898–1914. Congreso Internacional:

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empires could successfully adapt to the new times and regain their position in the international community,”16 appealed to many, even socialists like Julián Besteiro, who translated Lafcadio Hearn’s Kokoro (1908). Things soon changed, however. After defeating Russia in 1905, which was “registered and commented upon virtually everywhere,”17 Japan’s militaristic reputation in Spain was reinforced by the success of Inazo Nitobe’s “Bushido.” It depicted Japan’s Samurai code as an example of Eastern chivalry that promoted the ideal of serving one’s country and inspired different countries to reflect on their own respective conditions. It made the Germans reflect on their sense of order and the British on their insularity, while Spaniards like Jose Millán Astray, founder of the Spanish Legion, likened the Samurai to their Hidalgo, who was more devoted to making a name for himself and slightly ready to fight and die in a swordfight.18 More images were conjured about Japan along these years. In Spain, Japan was associated with sexual fantasies, musical performances, and luxury goods, unlike her Asian neighbors. From the late-nineteenth century, “Japonisme,” the fashion trend that saw Japanese names given to soaps and perfumes and the popularity of kimonos and parasols that influenced contemporary artists became compatible with the reflection of old-fashioned aesthetics that resisted what was seen by conservatives as the dehumanization of modernity. Feminine sensuality attracted Western audiences, as seen in operas like Giacomo Puccini’s Madame Butterfly, the story of a geisha willing to die due to her love for a European man whose desire for her was only temporary. This perception was a channel

Comunicaciones, ed. Guadalupe Gómez-Ferrer Morant, pp. 13–14. Madrid: Depto. de Historia Contemporánea (UCM). 16 Campoy-Cubillo, art. cit., p. 8. 17 Conrad, S. and Sachsenmeier, D. 2007. Introduction. In Competing Visions of World

Order Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s, eds. Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, p. 15. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 18 Rodríguez-Navarro, M. T. and Beeby, A. 2010. “Self-Censorship and Censorship in Nitobe Inazo, Bushido: The Soul of Japan, and Four Translations of the Work”. TTR. Traduction, terminologie, redaction, 23-2: 74–78. https://doi.org/10.7202/1009160ar; Campoy-Cubillo, A. 2015. Oriental Ghosts: The Haunting Memory of Millan-Astray’s Bushido and Julian Besteiro’s Kokoro. Letras Hispanas, 11: 15.

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for modernist authors like Enrique Gómez Carrillo to express their hopes for more traditional, conservative, and aristocratic values.19 The term “Asiatic,” however, did not take into account this perception of Japan. Associated with barbarism, the term was used when missionaries were killed in China, much to the benefit of the Japanese, who were then seen as cultured Orientals, and not Asiatic. In Asia, national differences were emphasized with the Japanese being seen as the opposite of the “barbaric” Chinese, as depicted by Fu-Manchu, the perverse, cruel, oblique doctor that schemed to derail human progress. Catholicism’s link helped further separate Japan from Asia. Despite the small number of Japanese converts and the fact that the Jesuits, Dominicans, and Mercedarian nuns worked all over Japan and throughout their empire, as in China or Vietnam, the commemoration of Francis Xavier, the patron saint of the missions, and the veneration of the “Martyrs of Nagasaki” of 1595 were seen as decisive features of Spanish Catholicism. Spain in Japan’s view of the world depended more on associations. As Japan’s international prestige grew, it divided the world into East, t¯ oy¯ o [東洋], with the first character meaning “East” and composed of backwards nations that needed assistance, and West, seij¯ o [西洋], with the first character meaning West and composed of advanced nations.20 However, Japan saw itself as neither East nor West, neither seiy¯ o nor t¯ oy¯ o, but its own sphere and separate entity. The Japanese perception of their own position in the world focused on positioning their new nation-state as a modern, civilized one within a western totality. Japan started extricating itself from “Asia” by reforming its governance structures, dismantling “any remaining vestiges of East Asian international society” in its foreign policy, and aspiring to demonstrate its superior status by “teaching” its

19 Campoy-Cubillo, ibid.: 7; Gaster, T. P. 2014. Exoticism in Enrique Gómez Carrillo’s Encounter with Japan. Arizona Journal of Hispanic Cultural Studies, 18: 248; De Moya, M. The image of Japan in Spain. Press, Propaganda and Culture (1890–1945). Ph. Diss., University of Cordoba (In Spanish). 20 Tanaka, S. 1995. Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History, p. 77. Berkeley: University of California Press; Gayle, C. A. 2014. The World of Modern Japanese Historiography. Tribulations and Transformations in Historical Approaches. In A Companion to Global Historical Thought, eds. Prasenjit Duara, Viren Murthy and Andrew Sartori, p. 216. Sussex: John Willey & Sons; Conrad, S. 2010. The Quest for the Lost Nation, Writing History in Germany and Japan in the American Century, pp. 50–55. Berkeley: University of California Press.

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“semi-civilized” Asian neighbors “the trappings of civilization.”21 In tnis representation focused on rankings, Spain was a European country, but very weak, in a position similar to Portugal’s or Ireland’s as shown by a famous orientalist novel by Shiba Shiro, Strange Encounters of Elegant Females (1885) in which a Spanish woman falls in love with the main character, an adaptation of the semi-Oriental image of Carmen, a romantic myth depicting a passionate woman in a violent country. Japanese also placed Spain as a mixture of icons, associations, and filters in a view of the world increasingly devoid of subtlety. Within this global vision, Spain’s reputation was a clear part of the Western world and Columbus appeared in history books as the discoverer of the Americas, while Don Quixote, Sancho Panza, and even the Kingdom of Córdoba in the Middle Era were routinely used as representations of Spain. They had also been associated with Portugal due to geography as demonstrated by the use of the term “Nambanjin.” In Latin America, there was a kind of triangular relationship based on language, raw materials, and cultural similarities, while the American mirror reflected an image of Mexico and its spicy food. The big difference lied in changes in the concept of race used to understand the world. Spain still considered itself superior to the Japanese thanks to the way it incorporated race with Hispanic identity. When World War II began, “Race” (raza) and “Hispanicity” (hispanidad) were used interchangeably in Spain, and their use was in vogue. Following the loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, Spain was no longer perceived in Latin America as an empire—despite Equatorial Guinea—but as a “madre patria” sharing ideas, difficulties and suffering. This led to the idea of a “permanent community” and the need to promote the “Raza” (Race), which in this case, referred to a group of people sharing a number of similar cultural traits. This was a crucial factor in the rise of Panhispanism in the twentieth century which prioritized spiritual aspirations over material needs and relegated the importance of conquest and taking over territories.22 21 Suzuki S., 2014. Imagining “Asia”: Japan and “Asian” International Society in Modern History. Contesting International Society in East Asia, eds. Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang, p. 56. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 22 González Cuevas, P. C. 2008. Hispanidad. In Diccionario político y social del siglo XX español, coord. Juan Francisco Fuentes and Javier Fernández Sebastián, pp. 617–623. Madrid: Alianza; Marcilhazy, D. 2017. La Hispanidad bajo el franquismo. Americanismo al

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In Japan’s case, after so many imperial conquests, they perceived the world differently and, most of all, considered themselves as far superior to the Spaniards. The prism of Orientalism and the diverse theories of biological determinism were still used by both countries to justify their own sense of superiority. Queries increased over time, and not just because the theories did not favor them. In 1940, when asked whether or not his proposed aggressive policy toward the United States could produce the opposite effect to what Japan had intended, Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke answered, “We must remember that Japan is not Spain, but a great Asian power with a strong navy.”23 The minister specifically recalled Spain’s loss to the United States in 1898 and pointed it as the clearest example of Western decline, which they knew well enough through the Philippines. In the early twentieth century, Japan was not really impressed with Spain’s capture of Morocco and during the Civil War only reserved praise for Gen. Franco. Being geographically in the West but being such a weak country made a strange cocktail in the world view of the Japanese, who now seemed to look down on the Spanish, not only in terms of purity and cultural values, like with other European countries, but also when it came to material wealth. In any event, since these classifications were so truculent, each nation saw itself as superior to others, but the reasons changed. Within the old prism of Orientalism, biological determinism, and similar theories, over time, there had been an increase in theories that reinforced Japan’s masculinity due its numerous conquests. Furthermore, in the 1930s, technology was revolutionizing social communications as well as the role of perceptions in international relations and propaganda. For example, Germany became aware of the propaganda value of radio sets, cinema, and the live transmission of events, as first seen in the coverage of the 1936 Berlin Olympics.24 Its propaganda machine was making increasingly sophisticated efforts to provoke emotional responses to win what was, at the time, known as the “battle of the hearts,” where

servicio de un proyecto nacionalista. In Imaginarios y representaciones de España durante el franquismo, dir. Stéphane Michonneau and Xosé M. Núñez-Seixas, pp. 73–102. Madrid: Casa de Velázquez. https://books.openedition.org/cvz/1161?lang=es. 23 Murakami H. 1982. Japan: The Years of the Trial, 1919–1952, p. 78. Tokyo: Japan Culture Institut. 24 Childers, T. 2017. The Third Reich. A History of Nazi Germany, esp. “The People’s Community”, pp. 266–302. New York: Simon & Schuster.

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Hitler’s speeches were used to make workers get together and express support in common for their leader. Then, in the outbreak of World War II in 1939, Japan and Spain followed old paths and embraced new trends. Both were fully aware of the value of propaganda. The Japanese government undertook national campaigns urging the population to listen to the radio more and to acquire licenses to own one. In Spain, after the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936, the Falange Party utilized new kinds of propaganda like news documentaries in the cinemas after 1940. But the positions occupied by both countries were completely different. The Spanish preferred to continue looking down on the Japanese as “yellow” and “Orientals,” just as they did before, but also preferred to avoid recognizing its own decline for different reasons. However, militarist Japan associated semiexotic Spain with other secondary countries on the international stage like those on Europe’s periphery and in Latin America. After their victories against China and Russia, the Japanese had proven to the world that they deserved a higher position in the global ranking of nations above the “yellow” people, while Spain’s military defeats confirmed doubts about their “whiteness.”

Gen. Franco as an Example This book uses Gen. Francisco Franco Bahamonde, the dictator of Spain, as a guide to understand how images affect the decision-making process. By acknowledging both his perceptions and their crucial impact, we can understand how their cognitive constructs are reflected and articulated, and how both countries shaped their responses by distinguishing more clearly between friend and foe.25 Through Franco, we can understand how the elites shaped the processes of assimilation and understanding cognitive schemas, as his views toward Japan epitomized the blending of elite admiration and distrust. Francisco Franco’s formative years in the colonies explain his approach to his policy toward Japan. He spent many years fighting in the Moroccan colonial war, where he became the youngest general in the Spanish army while a good many of his close military colleagues died. He himself

25 Herrmann, 2013, art. cit, pp. 349–350.

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said it would be impossible to understand his personality without understanding his Moroccan experience. More important is how proud he was of his friendly relationship with his Moroccan troops. He gave them their own space for worship as they fought in Spain and his bodyguards until his death were the famous Moorish Guard. Yet, at the same time, he never showed any interest in learning their language, nor did he try to understand how they thought. Franco separated them from their compatriots, exoticized them, and took power away from them—even that of determining their own identity.26 Conditioned by his experiences in Morocco, Gen. Franco saw the Japanese as simply Japanese, rather than as friends or enemies. Orientalist images of cruelty and passivity, along with many others, such as the view of Japanese courage and of “mysterious Asia” interacted with emotional links to a territory still seen as Hispanic such as the Philippines after its occupation by Japan. With this perceptive basis and the capacity for change that is characteristic of representations, studying Gen. Franco can teach us about shifts in Spanish government policy and give us a glimpse of its relative success. Gen. Franco understood Morocco to be the opposite of his westernized view of the world, his particular Orient that allowed him to shape his mental universe, and in his West vs. East mindset, he saw Japan through the lens of his experiences in Morocco and his assumptions were supported by many other Spaniards. Despite Japan’s overwhelming military superiority, the Spanish dictator continued to perceive Japan as an Oriental country. Finally, studying the effect of perceptions on a mid-ranking power may allow a better understanding of international relations. After studying Chinese foreign relations in the early twentieth century, Jürgen Osterhammel described China’s ties with Great Britain, Japan, France, the United States, Russia, and Germany as enjoying a kind of internal unity.27 The German historian found that the relationships those great powers had 26 On Franco’s orientalism, see Moga Romero, V. 2007. El Mundo de la EdiciónReedición y el Protectorado: en torno a la cuestión hispano-marroquí. In Historia y memoria de las relaciones hispano-marroquíes. Un balance del cincuentenario de la Independencia de Marruecos, coords. Bernabé López and Miguel Hernando de Larramendi, p. 90. N.P.: Ediciones del Oriente y del Mediterráneo. 27 Osterhammel, J. 1986. Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis. In Imperialism and After. Continuities and Discontinuities, eds. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel, p. 303. London: Allen and Unwin.

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with China showed a system triply integrated with enough resources that allowed such relationships to continue. This was not the case for other countries like resource-less Spain, as this study shows. While the Japanese invited Spanish professors to reside and teach in Japan, for instance, Spain did not even have one official translator and, instead, consulted “connoisseurs,”28 whose knowledge of Japan was at best superficial—i.e., they were missionaries or former diplomats. With no real expertise, the Spanish Government made decisions that were more bound to fail than those of Japan, whose universities had more profound crucial knowledge of Spain. The imbalance was obvious. However, it is possible to find a kind of coherence in relations where one of the members is a second-range country. In the case of China, Frans-Paul Van der Putten described how the Netherlands frequently signed in Most Favoured Nation clauses in their treaties with the Middle Kingdom,29 while Brasó and Martínez Robles described Spain’s position in China as “a position of in-betweenness that breaks the colonizer/colonized dichotomy.”30 The lack of experts and resources and the importance of anecdotes, in any case, allow perceptions to play a larger role in analysis and prioritizes the political use of images. They can be the way to understand the logic of distant and different relations between countries. Images have the same (in)coherence as relations. Perceptions can embrace and give coherence to problems faced by those countries that either do not have much trade, political or personal contacts in Asia or, simply, an interest in a region, perceiving it merely as a springboard to improve its lot in other areas, as Spain did in Asia. This study explores foreign relations under this frame of reference and shows that perceptual shifts preceded political shifts, with the recurrent pattern of radical shifts between friendship and enmity. Perceptions are the thread that guides the narrative. SpainChina relations and, in general, relations between countries that are both

28 AMAE-R-3195, exp. 25. Head of Interpreting to Director for the Americas, Madrid,

24/IV/1945. 29 Van der Putten, F.-P. 1996. Small Powers and Imperialism. The Netherlands in China, 1886–1905. Itinerario, 20–1: 116. 30 Brasó Broggi, C., and Martínez-Robles, D. 2018. Beyond Colonial Dichotomies: The Deficits of Spain and the Peripheral Powers in Treaty-Port China. Modern Asian Studies, 52-6: 1246. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X17000154.

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distant and different seemed to have followed a similar pattern.31 Differences in relations between minor and big powers, then, can be analyzed by evaluating or grading misunderstandings. Focusing more on perceptions, furthermore, enhances the role of secondary areas. Relations between Japan and Spain can certainly be considered marginal, but studying them can significantly improve our understanding of how international relations work, just like when Osterhammel wrote The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century (2009), drawing from his expertise in China, and when Christopher Bayly wrote another excellent book on world history, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914 (2003), drawing from his knowledge of South Asia. China and India were marginalized at a time dominated by European narratives, but these historians have shown us a new perspective through which we have been able to gain a better understanding of the world. While those areas were marginal during this period, these historians have shown that looking thorough them creates a better understanding of the whole world, including the west. The same probably be said about focusing on perceptions. The more we focus on areas outside our usual environment, the more we understand ourselves.

References Bartolomé Sopena, Rubén. 2022. Una tormenta no tan lejana. La España post-98 ante la guerra ruso japonesa. Ph. Diss., Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona. Borao, José Eugenio. 2017. Las Miradas entre España y China. Un siglo de relaciones entre los dos países (1864–1973). Madrid: Miraguano. Brasó Broggi, Carles; Martínez-Robles, David. 2018. Beyond Colonial Dichotomies: The deficits of Spain and the peripheral powers in Treaty-port China. Modern Asian Studies, 52-6: 1222–1247. https://doi.org/10.1017/ S0026749X17000154. Campoy-Cubillo, Adolfo. 2015. Oriental Ghosts: The Haunting Memory of Millan-Astray’s Bushido and Julian Besteiro’s Kokoro. Letras Hispanas, 11: 5–18. Childers, Thomas. 2017. The Third Reich. A History of Nazi Germany. New York: Simon & Schuster.

31 Borao, J. E. 2017. Las Miradas entre España y China. Un siglo de relaciones entre los dos países (1864–1973), p. 364. Madrid: Miraguano.

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Chong, Dennis. 2013. Degrees of Rationality in Politics. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, eds. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears and Jack S. Levy, pp. 96–129. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Conrad, Sebastian. and Sachsenmeier, Dominic. 2007. Introduction. In Competing Visions of World Order Global Moments and Movements, 1880s– 1930s, eds. Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, pp. 1–26. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Conrad, Sebastian. 2010. The Quest for the Lost Nation, Writing History in Germany and Japan in the American Century. Berkeley: University of California Press. Cottam, Martha, L. and Cottam, Richard W. 2001. Nationalism and politics: The political behaviour of nation states. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. De Moya, Manuel. The Image of Japan in Spain. Press, Propaganda and Culture (1890–1945). Ph. Diss., University of Cordoba (in Spanish). Gaster, Timothy P. 2014. Exoticism in Enrique Gómez Carrillo’s Encounter with Japan. Arizona Journal of Hispanic Cultural Studies, 18: 247–258. Gayle, Curtis Anderson. 2014. The World of Modern Japanese Historiography. Tribulations and Transformations in Historical Approaches. In A Companion to Global Historical Thought, eds. Prasenjit Duara, Viren Murthy and Andrew Sartori, pp. 213–227. Sussex: John Willey & Sons Geulen, Christian. 2007. The Common Grounds of Conflict: Racial Visions of World Order 1880–1940. Competing Visions of World Order Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s, eds. Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, pp. 69–96. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. González Cuevas, Pedro C. 2008. Hispanidad. In Diccionario político y social del siglo XX español, coord. Juan Francisco Fuentes and Javier Fernández Sebastián, pp. 617–623. Madrid: Alianza Hatemi, Peter K. and McDermott, Rose. 2011. Man Is by Nature a Political Animal. Evolution, Biology and Politics, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press Hedinger, Daniel. 2017. The Imperial Nexus: The Second World War and the Axis in Global Perspective. Journal of Global History, 12: 184–205. Herrmann, Richard K. 2013. Perceptions and image theory in international relations. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, eds. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy. 2nd ed, p. 348. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199760107.001.0001. Huddy, Leonie, Sears, David O., and Levy, Jack S. 2013. Introduction. Theoretical foundations of political psychology. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, eds. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy, pp. 1–23. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misconception in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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Leupp, Gary S. 1995. Images of Black People in Late Mediaeval and Early Modern Japan, 1543–1900. Japan Forum, 7-1: 1–13. Levy, Jack S. 2013. Psychology and foreign policy decision-making. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, eds. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy, pp. 301–333. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lottaz, Pascal and Ottosson, Ingemar. 2022. Sweden, Japan, and the Long Second World War, 1931–1945, pp. 39–44. New York: Routledge. Marcilhazy, David. 2017. La Hispanidad bajo el franquismo. Americanismo al servicio de un proyecto nacionalista. In Imaginarios y representaciones de España durante el franquismo, dir., Stéphane Michonneau & Xosé M. NúñezSeixas, pp. 73–102. Madrid: Casa de Velázquez. https://books.openedition. org/cvz/1161?lang=es. Moga Romero, Vicente. 2007. El Mundo de la Edición-Reedición y el Protectorado: en torno a la cuestión hispano-marroquí. In Historia y memoria de las relaciones hispano-marroquíes. Un balance del cincuentenario de la Independencia de Marruecos, coords. Bernabé López, Miguel Hernando de Larramendi, pp. 77–152. N.P.: Ediciones del Oriente y del Mediterráneo. Murakami, Hyoe. 1982. Japan: The Years of the Trial, 1919–1952. Tokyo: Japan Culture Institut. Noya, Javier. 2004. La imagen de España en Japón, p. 43. Madrid: Instituto Cervantes, ICEX, SEEI, Real Instituto Elcano. Osterhammel, Jürgen. 1986. Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis. In Imperialism and After. Continuities and Discontinuities, eds., Mommsen, Wolfgang J. and Osterhammel, Jürgen, pp. 290–314. London: Allen and Unwin. Preston, Paul. 1999. Comrades: Portraits from the Spanish Civil War. London: HarperCollins. Quintana, Francisco. 1993. España en Europa, 1931–1936. San Sebastián: Nerea. Rodao, Florentino, and Almazán, David. 2006. Japonizar España: La imagen española de la modernización del Japón Meiji. Modernizar España 1898– 1914. Congreso Internacional : Comunicaciones, ed. Guadalupe Gómez-Ferrer Morant, pp. 1–20. Madrid: Depto. de Historia Contemporánea (UCM). Format: CD. Rodao, Florentino. 2009. Japan and the Axis, 1937–8: Recognition of the Franco Regime and Manchukuo. Journal of Contemporary History 44-3: 431–447. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009409104117. ———. 2018. ‘The salvational currents of emigration’: Racial theories; and social disputes in the Philippines at the end of the nineteenth century. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 49-3: 426–444. https://doi.org/10.1017/S00224 63418000346.

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Rodríguez-Navarro, María Teresa, and Beeby, Allison. 2010. “Self-Censorship and Censorship in Nitobe Inazo, Bushido: The Soul of Japan, and Four Translations of the Work”. TTR. Traduction, terminologie, redaction, 23-2 (2010): 74–78. https://doi.org/10.7202/1009160ar. Rubiés, Joan-Pau. 2003. The Spanish Contribution to the Ethnology of Asia in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Renaissance Studies, 17-3: 418–448. https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-4658.t01-1-00030. Stein, Janice Gross. 2013. Threat perception in international relations. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, eds. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy, pp. 364–394. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Suzuki, Shogo. 2014. Imagining ‘Asia’: Japan and ‘Asian’ international society in modern history. In Contesting International Society in East Asia, eds. Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang, pp. 51–72. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tanaka, Stefan. 1993. Japan’s Orient. Rendering past into history. Berkeley: University of California Press. Van der Putten, Frans-Paul. 1996. Small Powers and Imperialism. The Netherlands in China, 1886–1905. Itinerario, 20-1: 115–131.

CHAPTER 2

Anticipating a New Order

In April 1939, the coincidences in the Iberian Peninsula and in China ended. For two years, both ends of the Eurasian continent saw Franco’s Spain and Japan making headway in their respective regions, complementing Hitler and Mussolini’s own successful campaigns. Gen. Francisco Franco’s victory in the Spanish Civil War was a great triumph for all of them and many considered it decisive in the race to finish off the Soviet Union and Communism. It seemed that the ideological conflict had reached greater heights. However, Hitler’s lust for power and his challenge to the peace agreed upon in Versailles in 1919 soon proved to be even more important than the fight against the Soviet Union. The expansion of the AntiComintern pact with the membership of Manchukuo, Hungary, and Spain in 1939 was ironically its kiss of death. Germany was about to demonstrate that its archenemies were the European democracies and their empires. First, through its Pact of Steel with Italy, then, with its Treaty of Non-Aggression with the Soviet Union, and finally, with the outbreak of World War II. Neither the Japanese nor the Spanish (nor the Italians) expected such a volte-face, although the Japanese entered new conflicts like the so-called Tianjin [Tientsin] incident and the battle of Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan) in Siberia. The significance of Spain-Japan relations had certainly changed when peace returned in the Peninsula, but not completely. Gen. Franco’s © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 F. Rodao, From Allies to Enemies, New Directions in East Asian History, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8473-0_2

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triumph ended one of his common goals with Japan, but they still shared many others. From the spring of 1940, as the Germans won victory after victory, the Spanish and Japanese Governments’ initial shock was replaced by joy as they found themselves on the winning side once more and able to contribute to the new Axis-led geopolitical map. They strengthened their collaboration where it was possible, the propaganda machine focusing on the two most important strategic points in the world, Gibraltar and Singapore, where they would be decisive in capturing them. The two points came to be seen as prick cards that could be played in parallel. What the two countries shared the most in their partnership were expectations. Besides propaganda, there was plenty of room for a political partnership between Tokyo and Madrid, as shown by the many agreements signed by all the Axis countries back then, whether they were cultural, commercial or friendship treaties. Spain and Japan set forth some initiatives that created new opportunities, and while the Spaniards limited their ambitions to obtaining general benefits from their Axis friends, the Japanese focused on acquiring raw materials and intelligence assistance. Furthermore, imperial expansion ended up characterizing Spain-Japan relations during this period. Sincere cooperation, however, was rare and this chapter reveals how Spain-Japan relations experienced a kind of illusory state that led to mistakes being made. Expectations served to minimize divergences, but other than sharing the same enemies, they were strangers to each other, and misunderstandings were endless. Genuine friendship never arose beyond domestic collaboration and disappointments abounded such as from Japan’s refusal to follow Germany in its surprise invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, much to Spain’s dismay. This chapter starts by discussing the framework behind both countries relationship and its most successful aspect, propaganda. Afterward, it will explore the bilateral relations and multiple problems their governments faced in their respective countries, as well as the most appropriate area for their collaboration, imperialism. The last section starts with Operation Barbarossa, Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union, when the Germans, Italians, and Spanish realized that in the (more or less) long term, Japanese ambitions would deviate from their own. There were numerous failures and reasons for confrontation between them, yet an Axis victory remained in the horizon.

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The Axis’ New Objective Following the enlargement of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the end of the Spanish Civil War on 1 April 1939, the Third Reich signed the 22 May 1939 Pact of Steel (or the Berlin-Rome Axis), but the real surprise came three months later, when Germany signed a treaty of non-aggression with the Soviet Union. The Second World War soon broke out and several volte-faces culminated in the 1941 surprise attacks on the Soviet Union and the United States. Wars never go as planned. Relations between Japan and Spain rode on the crest of the wave, sharing similar expectations but showing different levels of competence: Spain had fewer opportunities to advance its own agenda after its devastating civil war, while Japan was a lot more capable of advancing its expectations for the New Order. And so, we will first trace the latter’s campaign, from its attack on British interests to the agreement it signed with the Soviet Union in five stages. The first stage showed Japan starting to consolidate its empire on the back of the European crisis in the Tianjin Incident. In June–August 1939, after the assassination of a pro-Japanese official in the Chinese treaty port and the refusal of the British to hand over the alleged perpetrators, the prolonged Japanese blockade ended in Japan’s favor as the British accepted to surrender them. By not sending a fleet to lift the blockade, London yielded to Japan’s demands, prioritizing its survival over the defense of its empire. The Unites States remained as the sole power able to contain Japan’s advance in Asia, backed by an increasingly pro-Chinese public. US President Franklin D. Roosevelt added pressure on Japan by restricting America’s exports of raw materials to it and announcing that their commercial agreement with it would expire at the end of 1940. This made things more difficult for the Japanese military, which had become more dependent on American imports due to the war in China. The second stage in Japan’s policy shift was the stabilization of its border with the Soviet Union. The surprising rapprochement between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union was not that unexpected, since it can be traced back to the Nazi Party’s rise to power. In fact, the best opportunities for cooperation through the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 were those between the Nazi Party and the Japanese army. Then, when the August 1939 Non-Aggression Pact allowed Moscow to shift its focus toward the remote area of Outer Mongolia and to deliver a crushing defeat on the

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Japanese in Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese army admitted that it had made a strategical mistake. In fact, Tokyo stepped back from its partnership with Berlin and Hiranuma Kiichiro’s government fell on the eve of the European War’s outbreak, and then the next government signed a peace treaty with Moscow and tried to leave the Anti-Comintern. But after the German army swept its way across Europe, the Japanese completed their 180-degree turn, as it increasingly saw its battle against communism in Siberia as a display of obstinacy going nowhere.1 In the third stage, there was the rising totalitarianism. At the end of July 1940, Prince Konoe Fumimaro revealed his sympathies toward the victorious Third Reich. A year and a half after his dismissal and three brief governments later, he returned with a new agenda aimed at increasing domestic authoritarianism. On the one hand, the Taisei Yokusankai, or “Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA),” a new organization that sought to promote totalitarian policies along the lines of the Nazi Party and similar organizations, was established. It was no easy task, as admiring the Germans did not mean imitating them and the IRAA soon split into two factions, the more pro-totalitarian Reformists, and the more proexpansionist Nipponists, led by former Prime Minister Hiranuma, who served as the organization’s vice president.2 On the other hand, new faces in the cabinet favored cooperation with the Axis, like Minister of War T¯oj¯o Hideki, an ardent defender of Japanese expansion in China, and Foreign Minister Matsuoka Y¯ osuke, who transformed his department into the standard-bearer of the new radical policy. The fourth stage was securing Asia as their backyard. The Axis scare tactic against the increasing involvement of the United States in the war was like the one used against the Soviet Union through the AntiComintern Pact, but it failed. Weeks before the November 1940 US presidential elections, the three countries proclaimed the Tripartite Pact, an alliance that warned of encirclement through the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. This did not impact the elections much, but the Chinese Nationalists received a massive American loan similar to the one they gave to the British, eliminating any possibility of a peace treaty with Japan once 1 Nish, I. 2002. The Sino-Japanese War. First Phase, 1937–1939. In Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, p. 133. Westport, CT: Praeger. 2 Krebs, G. 2006. The German Nazi Party: A Model for Japan’s “New Order” 1940– 1? In Japanese-German Relations, eds. Christian W. Spang and Rolf-Harald Wippich, pp. 188–190. London and New York: Routledge.

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and for all.3 Washington’s financial involvement greatly increased and the Tripartite seemed to turn out to be a grave miscalculation. In fact, Tokyo made one final but much riskier move that was opposed by many Japanese. In April 1941, Foreign Minister Matsuoka signed a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union, which greatly exceeded the initial authorization he was given to negotiate an “adjustment” of JapanUSSR relations. For five years, Moscow and Tokyo agreed to maintain strict neutrality if either of them was attacked by any of the other powers. Praised by the European press as the Hitler of Japan, Matsuoka probably likened his maneuver to Hitler’s in 1939, but he was unaware of Operation Barbarossa, which was just about to begin: nobody informed him. Matsuoka’s adventurism made the Japanese Empire’s border with the USSR the most stable it would ever be until the last week of the war at the cost of forcing everyone to restructure their expectations. In their common pursuit of a New Order, Japan and Spain confronted their new challenges in parallel ways. Both lacked food and oil and their armies had plenty of trained soldiers. After initial anger at the GermanSoviet Non-Aggression Pact, Spain declared neutrality and Japan “nonintervention” when Germany invaded Poland in 1939 and both sided with the Finnish during the so-called Winter War when the USSR invaded them, while Germany remained silent about it. It was only in the spring of 1940 after a series of German victories, that Spain and Japan decided to support the Axis once more, now confident of their chances. Imperialism was the root of their war aims. Japan envisioned itself as the leader of Asia, ready to lead the continent to shared prosperity once the Western powers were driven out. Spain was governed by the Africanistas (Africanists), veterans of the Moroccan colonial wars like Gen. Franco himself and Foreign Minister Juan Beigbeder, who advocated imperialism and called for expanding the Spanish Empire. Of course, they both used every opportunity to extend their dominions, taking advantage of France’s loss to Germany and collaborating with local authorities. The Japanese entered French Indochina to build airports and maintain military structures there, as well as to prevent the colony from sending aid to the Chinese Guomindang. Meanwhile, Spain took advantage of the demise of the Third French Republic in July 1940 to seize the French portion of 3 Tajima, N. 2009. Japanese-German Relations in East Asia, 1890–1945. In Japan and Germany. Two Latecomers to the World Stage, 1890–1945, eds. Kud¯o Akira, Tajima Nobuo, and Erich Pauer, Vol. I, p. 24. Kent: Global Oriental.

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their joint protectorate in the Tangier International Zone while hinting to Germany that it could enter the war to gain more French imperial territory. Once more, the two countries encountered many challenges in fulfilling their dreams. First, because Axis ambitions also spun out of control. Germany initially sought to expand into their people’s natural living space, or Lebensraum, then targeted Slavic territories, and then, as it obtained victory after victory, it set its eyes on France, Africa, and the rest of the world. Japan was also ready to adjust its ambitions when the opportunity came. A draft received by Minister Matsuoka for the negotiation of the Tripartite Pact listed the territories that Tokyo sought to acquire, which included Indochina, the French Polynesian islands, Thailand, Malaysia, British Burma and British Borneo, the Dutch East Indies, Australia, New Zealand, and India, ending with an etcetera. Even Spain, with so much poverty after the war, dreamt of imperial objectives and argued for them in a book, Vindications of Spain, to convince their friends. Their targets included Gibraltar, territories in present-day Algeria and Morocco—both in the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts and Tangiers—and parts of Equatorial Guinea. Second, due to problems among the Axis. Japanese ambitions in the Dutch East Indies, for example, were hastened and finally ruined partly due to fears that Hitler would set his eyes on the colony after Germany invaded the metropolis. Spanish conjectures for expanding its empire were also a never-ending story even before action was taken. They depended on the will of Germany, which at least wanted to reconquer the colonies it had lost during World War I, and to remap Africa as one where the Third Reich ruled as its lord and master. They may have also harbored ambitions for any of the Canary Islands to establish naval bases there, as well as some Moroccan islands along the Atlantic Coast where they could establish preferential commercial rights. In addition, for the territory that was still available, Spain depended on other “little brothers” who had their own ambitions for some of them, like Vichy France and Fascist Italy. Lastly an Axis victory was, perhaps, not to be as complete as expected, and then they had to let the British keep their empire in the peace negotiations—should the Axis win, obviously. Lastly, new problems arose in overcoming these difficulties. The impossibility of purchasing raw materials in the Dutch East Indies convinced the Japanese that conquering these territories was their only option, as seen in

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Vietnam. The purported refusal to supply the Chongqing-based Guomindang Government through Indochina was sidelined by the re-opening of the so-called Burma Road in southwest China. Spanish ambitions toward France’s imperial territories, on its side, were more difficult to realize after the failed Allied attack on Dakar, where the Allies were repelled by a proPétain garrison. And last but not least, the native populations were likely interested in deciding their own future and even fight for it, as Riffian military leader Abd el Krim had demonstrated years earlier. The Axis understood that they needed to pamper their allies to keep their colonies. The chances of a final triumph of a New Order, then, were high, and imperial aspirations pivotal, but the terrain for Spain-Japan cooperation was especially fragile in the post-Anti-Comintern period. The two countries’ admiration and friendship for each other were strong, but serious doubts arose over long-term planning, as shown by Matsuoka’s miscalculation in Moscow. This chapter will first discuss the use of propaganda, the easiest way to recruit allies, followed by two sections on imperial cooperation, first directly and second indirectly. Lastly, it will discuss Germany’s unexpected invasion of the Soviet Union and Japan’s shocking attack on the United States.

A New Frame for Propaganda The World War and the search for a New Order led to changes in the propaganda framework. Anti-communism was not as useful as during the Spanish War, while French and Dutch losses and renewed imperial ambitions led to a change in narrative. Representations were partly shaped by the conflicts that took place after 1937, when the Soviet Union was the main enemy, but since the start of the new war in 1939, there was a need to target new foreign and domestic audiences to promote Axis political interests. This section’s analysis starts by exploring parallelism, with some association of ideas and scenarios, followed by a discussion on the excesses, the most peculiar. Finally, the evolutions that their arguments underwent, either in simplicity or in sophistication. Japan and Spain: A Comparison The most important image during this time was that of parallelism. It supported the fascist struggle from peripheral and complementary areas, reminding the media of the indirect nexus between Tokyo and Madrid,

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and insisting on its benefits to strengthen the Axis and secure a final victory. German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop conceived of a project for the creation of a Eurasian “continental bloc” that would extend “from Madrid to Yokohama” in order to face the British Empire.4 The most important feature of this bloc was the extremely decisive strongholds of the British Empire—Gibraltar and Singapore—which could determine the fate of the war. Then, any news from the other country, such as Spanish Interior Minister Serrano Suñer’s visit to Berlin, was linked to this idea, as the daily Yomiuri Shimbun wrote: “The day is near when Spain will advance towards Gibraltar.”5 For domestic consumption, the backbone of propaganda in the two countries was the exaltation of military values reinforced by historical references. Just as Spain’s Government was ruled by the Africanista military, the Japanese army and navy’s political influence was immense, not just because of the powers they were granted by the 1887 Constitution, but also because of their endless victories in short, regional wars, emulating the strategy of Prussia’s Otto von Bismarck.6 Spain highlighted Japan’s military victories with a tendency to explain its successes with historical basis. Its reports on China focused on the numerous bandits and killings of Spanish missionaries along with Japan’s military achieving the “pacification” of the country. Furthermore, Japan was especially admired for its strategy during the Russo-Japanese War because, as it was taught in Spanish military academies, it showed perfect coordination between land and sea forces. In 1941, Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s sole prime minister, who was killed in a terrorist attack in 1973, lauded Japan’s achievements, saying, “Thirty five years later, we can now appreciate the solidity of these foundations, and the fine results that arose from the labor and perseverance shown by a people who knew where they were heading, and who wished to reached their goal.”7 Carrero Blanco, apparently, had no doubts about either Japan’s final triumph or how they would achieve it. 4 AMAEC-R-1188-6. Axis Activities Intensified. Speculation on Ciano’s visit to Berlin. Discussions likely on Spain and Japan, Irish Times, 24 September 1941. 5 AMAEC-R-1737-23. Yomiuri Shinbum, 18 September 1940, in Méndez de Vigo to Beigbeder, Tokyo, 19 September 1940. 6 Paine, S. M. C. 2017. The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War, p. 24. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7 Carrero Blanco, L. 1941. España y el mar, p. 126. Madrid: Alcaná.

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Furthermore, the old samurai ethical code of loyalty to the feudal lord (daimyo) and devotion to duty was adapted to suit propaganda needs. Nitobe Inazo’s Bushido, The Soul of Japan (1899), in a typical process of inventing tradition, praised this code of conduct as the most admirable and valiant aspect of Japanese culture, reframing loyalty to daimyo as loyalty to the homeland. The book was first translated in Spanish in 1908, but gained political significance in 1940, when Gen. José Millán Astray, Franco’s first Chief of Press and Propaganda, exalted its role in the prologue for an edition sponsored by the Japanese Legation. Millán Astray wrote, The Bushido inspired much of my moral lessons to infantry cadets at the Alcázar de Toledo […], and I also based the Legion’s creed on Bushido, with its legionnaire spirit of combat and death, of discipline and camaraderie, of friendship, of suffering and ruggedness, and charging into action no matter what.8

Millán Astray’s memory was probably not very good, as there is no evidence Bushido had played such a central role in his life, but the text bears witness to what he came to believe, or what he wanted others to believe during this critical period. Meanwhile, Japan emphasized Spain’s valor and chivalry, but did not find them comparable to their own. To the Japanese, the Spanish equivalent of Bushido was chivalry, more specifically the code of the Hidalgo, the title-less tax-exempt noblemen from the Early Modern Period. Minister Yokoyama Masayuki wrote about his impressions during his stay in Spain in the nationalist daily Miyako, saying, “Spain loves combat. The Spanish people of today tend to revive this spirit of chivalry, and this is the reason why they are interested in Japan’s Bushido.”9 Furthermore, before the 1940 Spanish Economic Mission to Japan, a toast was made to “the Spain of the hidalgo whose laurel wreathes will intertwine with the cherry

8 Nitobe, I. 1941. El Bushido. El alma del Japón. Translated from French by José Millán Astray in collaboration with Luis Álvarez del Espejo. Madrid: Gráficas Iberia. It was also translated directly from the Japanese version by the Dominican missionary Cirilo Iglesias although this was never published. 9 AGA-AE-5175. Méndez de Vigo to Beigbeder, Tokyo, 23 August 1940.

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tress of Japan, which pulsates with the with the soul of the samurai.”10 Yet this image of the hidalgo did not reflect admiration, but instead, it conjured the image of an arrogant person who mostly looked back on past glories. As a Japanese saying with a very similar Spanish equivalent goes, “A samurai shows off a large toothpick even if he is poor.” Three gifts sent to Gen. Franco demonstrate how Japan associated Spain with war: a classic sable forged especially for him; a bronze statue of the legendary fourteenth-century warrior, Kusunoki Masashige, who died fighting for the failed Kemmu Imperial restoration; and a bust of Yoshida Sh¯oin of the Sonn¯ o J¯ oi (Reverence to the Emperor, Expulsion of the Foreigner) Movement. The first was presented by the Sokokukai (“Patriotic Youth” of Nagoya), the second by the Japanese-GermanItalian Friendship Association (Nichi-Doku-I B¯ oky¯ o Ky¯ okai), and the bust was a gift from the Council of Shimonoseki (prefecture of Yamaguchi) with a dedication to “the great political talent and valiant soldier” that they considered Gen. Franco to be, and “as a reminder of Japanese patriotism to a nation that, through the force of patriotism, was able to rise above itself and overthrow international communism.”11 However, this did not mean that the Japanese admired the Spanish military. Spanish colonial rule of the Philippines had ended in military defeat, their recent victories against the Moroccans were aided by gas attacks, and foreign intervention played a decisive role in Franco’s victories against the Loyalists during the Spanish Civil War. Franco may have had Japanese admirers, but they did not consider the Spanish army as an equal to theirs. Their mutual images were also shaped by three ways they associated with each other: Latin America, science, and their tendency to recall historical feats. Japan sought to use Madrid as a springboard for Latin America. In a meeting of Japanese diplomats in the region, they discussed exploiting Southern Europe’s links there, saying, “…considering that the South American peoples are part of the Latin Race, the moral influence of Italy, Spain, and Portugal is considerable. Therefore, we should cooperate with these nations.”12 They even raised the possibility of inviting several

10 AGA-AE-5176. Méndez de Vigo to Serrano Suñer, Tokyo, 14 December 1940, with a translation of the article, “Supein.” 11 APG-JE-1-2.2; AMAEC-R-1004-1. Castillo to Jordana, Tokyo, 19 February 1938. 12 NARA-RG-457. SIS-7247. Kuwajima to Arita, Rio de Janeiro, 14 May 1940.

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“young [Spanish] writers” to Japan and Manchukuo for “our propaganda policies towards Central and South America.”13 Scientific advancements formed a large part of Spanish press coverage about Japan. Members of the 1940 Economic Mission to Japan worked hard to obtain as much information about the country’s industries as possible, but its significance was wider, since the technological success of a Buddhist, Shinto country proved that Catholic Spain could reach the same goals. In fact, this tech image persisted even when political interests no longer favored Japan, with reports of Japanese military defeats coinciding with headlines such as: “Here lies an Empire preparing to cast the light of science for a vast portion of the planet.”14 Finally, historical ties also served a purpose for Spain. The glories of its conquistadors and missionaries, especially Francis Xavier, were often repeated, along with depictions of Catholicism as the “daughter” of the Christian martyrs. History was often invoked when discussing Spain-Japan ties at the time, as shown in Mundo, the “best and most widely read weekly”15 on Spanish foreign policy back then. First published in October 1940, the magazine featured many articles on “the history of our rule in the Pacific,” and in September 1941, became a weekly two-pages report of considerable length. One article read, From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the Pacific Ocean was a large Spanish lake where only the Spanish and the Portuguese sailed with a civilizing mission, and no French, English, or Dutch vessels could be found navigating its waters. Spain performed another task of transcendental importance that went far beyond discovery and conquest: the evangelization of Japan begun by Francis Xavier.16

13 NARA-RG-457. SIS-14792. Matsuoka to Washington, Tokyo, 18 February 1941. 14 Mundo, in the section “Las ideas y los hechos,” 9 September 1943. I thank Nicolas

Sesma for introducing me to his research on falangist thinkers and Japan. 15 25 NARA-RG-84. Entry 3162. Bx. 82. Hayes to Sec. State, Madrid, 31 December 1944. 16 Mundo, 25 September 1941.

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Overall, the Spanish and Japanese needed to emphasize their similarities. The Japanese minister in Madrid highlighted the “extraordinary commonalities between the two countries,”17 while his Spanish colleague in Tokyo, Santiago Méndez de Vigo, said, “In certain intellectual circles, there also exists the not completely unfounded notion that there are notable similarities and affinities of character between both countries, which has doubtlessly helped arouse curiosity.”18 Lack of relations between the two countries and the very need to create an illusion of them led to the creation of a largely propaganda-driven vision that actually reflected the desires and ambitions of the Spanish and Japanese themselves, not reality. These images were a dream best unspoiled by reality. War Excesses Some political ambitions, however, led to a complete overturn in the understanding of concepts such as colonialism and Japan. The Axis powers tried to cause problems for the British by promoting independence movements in their colonies, and the strangest consequence of Japan’s positive image was how Spain subsumed its anti-Western policies. Not only did they portray a Japanese advance as the only alternative to a Soviet one, they praised Indian figures like Chandra Bose, the independence leader who received Axis support while invoking anti-imperialist slogans. As one article said, “The Tripartite powers are collaborating with the Indian people in achieving their aspirations.”19 The reasoning was especially convoluted, from predicting the revival of Western superiority after a confrontation between recently decolonized nations (“Muslims, Indians and Chinese are all from different worlds and will likely become enemies the very day European influence has died.”) to desiring revenge for Spain losing its colonies. One of the main experts on colonialism, José María Cordero Torres, stated: “The so-called ‘solidarity of the white race’ has been until now a propaganda weapon for countries that not long ago 17 Domenzáin, M. S. J. 1942. Japón: Su evolución, cultura y religiones. Bilbao: El siglo de las misiones; Mundo, 24 January 1942. 18 AGA-AE-5176. Méndez de Vigo to Serrano Suñer, Tokyo, 20 November 1940. A comparison of Madrid and Rome by Sophia University professor Nomura Yoshio, “power cuts and crowded trams, same as in Tokyo,” Asahi Shimbun, 4 November 1940. 19 ¡Arriba!, 20 June 1943.

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expelled Spain from the Pacific.”20 Need of Anti-British statements, war excitement, Spain’s friendship with Japan, and the desire to prevent an overlapping of spheres of action, appeared to explain why Spain promoted such extremist propaganda. Even though it was still able to enjoy extraterritoriality, or the “open-door” policy in China, Madrid advocated for the end of European imperialism in Asia. The Axis’s need to win allies partly explains the contradiction. Even Adolf Hitler himself recognized the need to turn a blind eye to Japan’s anti-white propaganda in India, saying “All that matters is victory, and for that, we are fully ready to forge an alliance with the devil himself.”21 As for Japan itself, it was represented as an idyllic place in a similar way as the Soviet Union was imagined by the left. Just like how the USSR was seen as the new great human hope by many people of diverse ideological leanings, Japan enjoyed an idealized image. Axis interest in profiting from Japan’s rise partly explains this representation, and it was especially convenient for Spain. This idealization entailed dissociating Japan from Asia, a concept with a very negative meaning, similar to “Orient.” In December 1939, for instance, during the outbreak of the war between the USSR and Finland, the Falange newspaper ¡Arriba! declared, “Spain, which fought against Asiatic barbarity, expresses her deep sympathies towards the Finnish.”22 Another example was when in 1941, a famous psychiatrist explained the ethical pathos of the Spaniard, juxtaposing between living “with the dignity of Catholic men and the freedom to behave properly,” or to “become the slaves of an Asiatic and Communist Genghis-Khan [sic].”23 De-Asianizing Japan, in fact, reinforced the Spanish worldview, another peripheral country that portrayed itself as a bridge—between civilization and the Arab world. It was through the three concepts assimilable to the Orient: Berberiscos (Berbers), Africans, or Asians. Oriente had an exclusively geographical definition in Spanish. The “bridge to the Arab world” propaganda, the last Riffian war, and the convenience in separating the 20 Cordero Torres, J. M. 1942. Aspectos de la misión universal de España, p. 91. Madrid: Vicesecretaria de Educación Popular. 21 Wilkinson, E. 1991. Japan Versus the West. Image and Reality, p. 133. London: Penguin. 22 ¡Arriba!, “El Consejo de Ministros se ocupa de la invasión de Finlandia,” 8 December 1939. 23 López Ibor, J. J. 1941. Pathos ético del hombre español. Escorial, II-6: 76.

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frontier from the Gibraltar strait, signaled the main enemy for the Spanish population as the Berberiscos, a derogatory term for the inhabitants of the Rif mountains, who had so violently opposed Spanish colonization since the beginning of the century. The Falange’s supreme leader, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, wrote a text titled “Germanos y Berberiscos,” which could be understood as similar to West and Orient, while writer Ernesto Giménez Caballero alluded to the fear of two simultaneous invasions of Europe, one beginning with the Balkans, the “Asian invasion,” and the other through the Iberian Peninsula by the “blacks and Berbers.” Japan’s idealized image among the rightists, then, was a kind of compensation for that about the Soviet Union among the left. It was geared toward expansion while the Soviets’ image was based more on self-defense. It spoke of hordes while the other of people; of tradition, instead of revolution. Favoured by the tendency to reduce dissonance, it soon vanished, while the pro-Russian image lasted much longer. The need for greater cognitive balance led to another excess, as Japan ceased to be identified as Asiatic. Flattery and Sophistication Two contemporary articles provide a more nuanced representation of Spain and Japan’s images of each other at the time. Falangist writer Ernesto Giménez Caballero wrote “Japan and Spain” in ¡Arriba!, while Kasama Akio, a former Japanese minister in Tehran and Lisbon and managing director of the Institute of the Pacific, wrote “Spain and Japan. A cultural comparison” in Contemporary Japan after publishing four articles on Spain in Tokyo Nichi-Nichi, Japan’s most pro-Axis newspaper.24 They reflected mutual sympathy and propaganda needs but also many differences in how the Japanese and Spanish perceived each other. Giménez Caballero began his article by expressing affection and admiration toward Japan for its part in the fight against their common enemy, followed by a paragraph exploring similarities between their two countries that is worth quoting in its entirety: But Spain’s admiration and affection towards Japan is not a new phenomenon, but rather, it arose from the moment we not only realized 24 Giménez Caballero, E. ¡Arriba!, “Japón y España,” 24 April 1941. Kasama, A. 1940. Japan and Spain: A Cultural Comparison. Contemporary Japan, IX-5 (May): 548–558.

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that it was another Spain but had surpassed it. In other words, it was a nation placed before a powerful Western Continent (the United States) and a vast continent of color (Chinese and Hindu Asia), just as Spain is over here, positioned between France and England (the West) and Africa (the East). Spain and Japan, the two frontiers of the world. They are two gates. The same unity of destiny in what is Universal.

After whitewashing Japan’s image by separating it from the “continent of color,” Giménez Caballero listed the reasons for this common identity, from Spain having been “Japan’s discoverer and evangelizer” to contributing with the first “scholars and researchers” on the country. He then contrasted the Japanese with the Chinese. According to him, the Japanese were Oriental enough to understand the Chinese, but also Aryan enough to colonize them, just as Spain was with the “[Northern Africa] Berbers and [the South] American Indians.” As for religion, “Chinese” Buddhism lacked “self-memory” and had an excessive “belief in the masses,” while the Japanese recognized hierarchies, worshipped their ancestors, and knew that “to die for their homeland is to survive.” This resulted in the Japanese veneration of the Kamimi, which he translated as “heroes” although it usually refers to (assuming that he actually means kami) “religious forces,” or “deities.” Moving on to history, Giménez Caballero viewed the samurai captains as Cids with slanted eyes, for the legendary warrior who fought the “Moors” and whose great deeds were narrated by troubadours during the Middle Ages. He sought out similarities, comparing the sixteenth-century wars over the dominion of Japan with similar wars in Spanish history (i.e., Castilians versus Catalans, Carlists versus Liberals, and Nationalists versus “Reds’’). Regarding literature, he compared the Japanese Haikais [sic.] and the tanka to the Spanish serranillas, a short poetry genre, while pointing out similarities between N¯ o theater and plays by Golden Age Spanish authors like Lope de Vega and Calderón de la Barca. He compared Satsuma’s ceramics with the pottery of Talavera (Toledo province) and did not forget to point out that the Japanese knew how to “Europeanize their science.” Giménez Caballero ended his article with a hymn to the “mystical peoples and soldiers” who had demonstrated a common disdain for life. On the one hand, there was the harakiri while, on the other hand, there was the Spanish Legion’s cry of “Long Live Death!” In short, the Falangist’s article was a compendium of Japan’s image in the eyes

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of a Spain that promtoed itself as a cultural bridge and harbored imperialist expectations. That is, religious, westernized, valiant, as well as the sixteenth-century image of the samurai as reckless, and fearless with a history and cultural development similar to Spain’s. Kasama Akio’s article also started with a description of history and praise for Francis Xavier. Besides words, acknowledgments, and even featuring a sketch of missionaries in the chapter on namban culture, Kasama traced Xavier’s ancestry to claim that “it is also probable that his Basque background enabled him to understand the Japanese language more easily.” He mentioned presumed similarities [now proven false] between the Basques and “Orientals, especially the Japanese, in their physical appearance and in the structure of their language.” Kasama tried to distance the Spaniards in the sixteenth century from the northern European colonizers by claiming that the former were willing to learn from the Japanese. According to him, Francis Xavier wanted to guide people along a cultural path rather than convert them. He also mentioned Rodrigo de Vivero, the governor of the Philippines who ended up in Japan after his vessel ran aground and “probably” learned Japanese along with “Froez” or Luís Fróis, the Portuguese missionary who authored a book on the differences between the cultures of Iberia and Japan. Addressing more contemporary matters, Kasama compared Spain and Japan’s spirit of struggle and adventure, their hospitality and refinement, and the art of [exiled anti Francoist] painter Pablo R. Picasso to that of the Japanese. The article also argued that flamenco had not originated from the Gypsies, but the other way around in Andalusia, and that he not only appreciated the intuitive nature of the dance, but its “disposition to value decorum and ceremony”—both presumably basic characteristics of Spanish life. Using decades-old images, he claimed that the country most similar to Spain in the East was Japan (but not the other way around, that is, the country most similar to Japan in the West was not Spain) and lent credibility to “the opinion that Spanish women were superior to the men,” based on the decrease in the number of men because of the wars against the Moors and other European nations, as well as the Inquisition. Kasama compared the Seville Fair and the opera Carmen, as portrayed in the nineteenth century by Merimée and Bizet, both French, with Japanese weddings, and in the final chapter, he compared the Hidalgo

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with the Samurai in their “honest poverty.”25 Kasama saw a valiant and “Japanized” Spain full of stereotypes whose similarities with Japan lay in both their historical evolution and cultural development. In conclusion, Spain and Japan perceived each other as semi-exotic but from very different perspectives. They saw themselves as belonging to a civilization superior to the other, but while the Spanish author viewed the Japanese model as a means by which to achieve imperial aims, the Japanese author preferred to focus on the folkloric. One saw the other country as masculine, the other saw it as feminine. Spain wanted to benefit from Japan’s prestige but not vice-versa. Japanese knowledge lacked updated data but was more accurate, since their universities provided better data. In Spain, there was no vehicle to channel interest toward future relations with Japan, only a failed attempt to start an Institute for Oriental Culture, while missionaries were the only organizers of Japanese activities. However, many Japanese scholars could speak Spanish thanks to two language schools in the Kansai and Kant¯o areas that had been inviting teachers over from Spain since the early twentieth century, partly due to the Philippines. One of those was Okada Takashi, an alleged spy who traveled to both Latin America (he was a member of some Latin Academies) and Spain, and had friends who visited him in Japan, like the Basque lawyer Ignacio Londaiz Quintana.26 Okada spread ideas on the (inexistent) similarities between Basques and the Japanese, as well as on Gen Franco’s temerity, saying “It has been said that Franco always went into the line of fire, mounted on a white horse and challenging the Moors’ bullets.”27 He also adapted according to propaganda needs, saying, “Without a doubt, Franco is thinking of a Spain

25 AMAEC-R-1738-1. 10, 11 and 14 May 1940. For more references to Xavier, vid. Arrupe, P. 2001. Este Japón increíble. Memorias del P. Arrupe, pp. 75–77. Bilbao: Mensajero. I would like to thank Bernat Marti Oroval and Antonio Doñas for showing me these quotations. 26 I would like to thank his grandson Pedro Aguilera Londaiz for providing me copies of the books the family has preserved, Madrid, September 2021. Navarre Bishop Miguel Angel de Olano mentioned how well he spoke Spanish, believing that Okada was a spy. 1949. Diary of a Bishop, entry for 18 February 1942, p. 42. Manila: University of Santo Tomas Press. 27 Shukan Asahi, 14 November 1940, in AGA-AE-5176. Méndez de Vigo to Beigbeder, Tokyo, 20 November 1940.

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for tomorrow, a reflection and fruit of past glories.”28 “Spanish performances” were organized at Kei¯o University and the Tokyo School of Foreign Languages (presently, the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies) and incorporated the Falangist anthem Cara al sol (Facing the Sun) during this period.29 Fujisawa Chikao, a professor in the Imperial University of Ky¯ush¯u, even tried to visit Spain in 1940, after receiving a subsidy for a translation project that took him to Italy. A sort of global thinker who learned English, German, Dutch, Russian, and even Esperanto, Fujisawa was the Head of the IRAA’s Department of Studies and was one of the most prolific and radical popularizers of Japanese racial purity who searched for likeminded European counterparts.30 He published several articles on the political structure of the Francoist regime, comparing the Falange to Nazism, which he portrayed as movements working together for a common goal (the “Third Empire” or “One Great and Free Spain”).31 Referred to (falsely) as the Director of the daily Hochi Shimbun, some of Fujisawa’s texts were translated in Spanish to explain the significance of the Japanese “State” as an extension of the imperial nuclear family throughout history, and to define Shinto as the “dynamic religion, the creator of the Sun.”32 In Spain, the desire to learn more about Japan did not go beyond newspapers’ articles and books. The ideal image of the country started in 1937, intensified in 1940, but was shaken in 1941, after Japan’s 28 Ibid. 29 On the event in Kei¯ o vid. ABC, 16 November 1941, this information comes from

AGA-SGM-76. Herrera to the Falange Foreign Service, Katase, 28 June 1941. 30 Fujisawa C. 1940. Zentaishugi to kodo [Totalitarianism and the imperial way] Tokyo: Toyo Tosho, and a pamphlet in English titled “The Great shinto purification ritual and the Divine Mission of Japan.” Hofmann, R. 2015. The Fascist Effect: Japan and Italy, 1915–1952, pp. 130–135. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Hedinger, D. 2017. The Spectacle of Global Fascism: The Italian Blackshirt Mission to Japan’s Asian Empire. Modern Asian Studies, 51- 6: 2015-16. 31 “The Ideology of the New Spain” and “The Ideological Basis for a Re-emergent Spain” were published in 1939 in Bungei Seiki [Literature of the Century] and Gaiko Jiho [Diplomatic Review], translated in AMAEC-R-1737-16. Méndez de Vigo to Jordana, Tokyo, 18 August 1939. AGA-AE-5176, Fujisawa to Méndez de Vigo, Tokyo, 16 February 1939. 32 “The Spiritual Basis of Japan’s World Politics.” The term “State” is a translation of the Japanese Kokka, which can also be translated as ‘Family-Nation’. Copy in AMAECR-1737-23. Written in 1939.

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refusal to join Germany in its invasion of the Soviet Union. Spanish self-expectations contributed to the interpretation of Japan as a mix of tradition and modernity to be learned from, but this dream was brief, with its impact limited to adapting to its own needs. Japanese propaganda, on the other hand, did not go to these lengths since its knowledge of Spain preceded (and survived) this period. Falangist delegate Herrera de la Rosa reported that Japan was fairly aware of Spain’s situation at the time, “especially in government spheres where, perhaps more so than in any other country, our work has been carefully studied.”33 It was probably true, but friendly interest did not translate to mutual admiration. Spanish pro-Japanism was more extreme than the other way around.

Renewed Relations in the Military World Political relations were especially important during this period, when the world saw the Axis as the most likely winner of the conflict. Both Japan and Spain were two of the most important countries in the waiting list to join the fight. They were also tied together by the Anti-Comintern Pact and reinforced their relationship with the other Axis powers by either adapting their structures through political contacts or increasing trade with each other. Propaganda, however, obscured a much less alluring reality. The two countries’ shared membership in the Anti-Comintern Pact is one example. Since the pact’s creation in 1936, the Third Reich and the Japanese Empire’s efforts to recruit new members was not very successful. Great Britain, Poland, and China were invited to join, but only Italy was ready to do so in 1937, on the condition that it be recognized as an original signatory.34 In Asia, only Manchukuo agreed to join, while Thailand rejected it, in spite of its irredentism.35 In Latin America, Brazil’s

33 AGA-SGM-76-25. Herrera to Servicio Exterior de Falange, Katase, 29 January 1941. 34 PRO-FO-371-20549 (W16470/62/41). Report by G. Mounsey (Western Dept.),

London, 18 November 1936; exp. 20552 (w17163/62/41). Report by R.Vansittart, London, 30 November 1936. 35 Aldrich, R. J. 1993. The Key to the South. Britain, the United States and Japan During the Approach of the Pacific War, 1929–1942, p. 216. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

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Estado novo did not join despite showing interest.36 And in Europe, Hungary asked to join the pact after leaving the League of Nations, hoping to obtain German support for its acquisition of Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia, while Bulgaria and Yugoslavia considered joining with similar targets in mind.37 Anti-communism was a cover-up, and further expansion of the pact opened up too many Pandora’s boxes. Gen. Franco’s Spain was an obvious candidate for the pact. During the Civil War, the rebel government rejected invitations to join, claiming that they were already proving their anti-Communist credentials in the battlefield, but it was an excuse to avoid further pressure. Vice president and Foreign Minister Francisco Gomez-Jordana y Souza, Count of Jordana, forbade Spain’s representative in Tokyo from mentioning the pact.38 After Hungary and Manchukuo joined the pact in 25 February 1939 and the war was about to end, Franco’s Government agreed to follow suit. Then, Japan proposed that Hungary and Manchukuo be included in the participation to Spain (the Manchukoan Minister in Rome did it to his Spanish colleague in Rome) and proposed adding a reference to the two countries in Article I of the Protocol, but Germany and Italy rejected it—to make sure Spain was not put in such a lower position. When on 27 March (just days before the end of the war, coinciding with a treaty of friendship with Germany), Gen. Franco agreed to join but “beseeched” that it not be announced; Germany and Italy agreed, but the Japanese refused,

36 Fukunaga, P. M. 1983. The Japanese Immigrants During the Period of the Vargas Regimen and the Immediate Aftermath, 1930–1946, p. 6. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California, Ph.D. in history. 37 Pastor, P. 2004. Hungarian-Soviet Diplomatic Relations 1935–1941: A Failed Rapprochement. Europe-Asia Studies, 56-5: 737–738; Frank, T. 2002. Treaty Revision and Doublespeak: Hungarian Neutrality, 1939–1941. In European Neutrals and NonBelligerents During the Second World War, ed. Neville Wylie, pp. 159–160. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Rodao, F. 2016. España y Japón durante la II Guerra Mundial. Contextualización de una relación cambiante. In Estados Unidos, Alemania, Gran Bretaña, Japón y sus relaciones con España entre la guerra y la posguerra (1939– 1953), Joan María Thomàs, coord., pp. 205–10. Madrid: Universidad Pontificia de Comillas. 38 AMAEC-R-1004-9. Jordana’s handwritten note, 11 April, sent to Rome (12 April) and from there to Tokyo.

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arguing that it “ought to be made public as soon as she signed.”39 Mutual friendship hid many tensions. In the end, Spain delayed its announcement of its joining the pact until 14 April, with the excuse that Gen. Franco was sick,40 but Madrid still did not inform its ambassador in Tokyo, Santiago Méndez de Vigo y Méndez de Vigo, an anti-Axis conservative who had been appointed by Minister Jordana. Méndez de Vigo refused to make declarations about it to the press and sent his second-in-command to a celebration meeting.41 Spain’s first and only entry into a pact with Japan is a good example of the difficulties experienced in the relationship between the two countries, but the immediate deterioration of the Anti-Comintern shows that the Axis countries barely helped making things easier.42 Spanish “membership” in the Tripartite Pact had a similar character. Spain was asked to join on 27 October 1940 (just a month after Germany, Italy, and Japan) in the French city of Hendaye where Gen. Franco met Adolf Hitler for the first and only time, just a day before the Führer’s summit with Marshall Philippe Pètain in Montoire. Spain’s membership was one of the six points of the so-called Hendaye Protocol, which was first shown by the Führer to the Caudillo and the following day by Foreign Minister Joachim Von Ribbentrop to his Spanish counterpart, Serrano Suñer. In the Protocol, Germany promised weapons, financial aid, and unspecified territories in the French Empire while compensating Petain’s France with other territories, while Spain agreed to enter the war at an unspecified date and join the Tripartite Pact, although it specifically

39 NARA-RG-84. E3163. Bx. 2. F19 148-149. “Summary of a memo to von Ribbentrop re Japan’s attitude toward Spain entering the Anti-Comintern Pact, dated Berlin, March 17, 1939”, n.p., 24 August 1945; 457-E9011. SIS-3723, 3735, 3748/9, 3753, 3755, 3771 and 3800/3. PRO-FO-436-4 (f3510/456/23) Halifax to Dodds (Tokyo Embassy), London, 6/IV/1939. 40 NARA-RG-457. E9006. SRDJ. SIS-3553/3554. Yano a Arita, San Sebastián, 1 and

8 February 1939; AGA-AE-5130. Conde (from Salamanca) to Méndez Vigo, Rome, 11 February 1939. 41 AMAEC-R-1004-8. Méndez Vigo to Jordana, Tokyo, 29 April 1939. 42 Tajima, N. 2006. The Berlin–Tokyo Axis reconsidered From the Anti-Comintern Pact

to the plot to assassinate Stalin. In Japanese-German Relations 1895–1945, ed. Christian W. Spang and Rolf-Harald Wippich, p. 173. London: Routledge.

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demanded that this point remained confidential.43 The Tripartite Pact can be interpreted as a big propagandistic tool and publicity stunt aimed at projecting images “at a low price,”44 and Spain’s secret adherence was simply a futile promise in a crucial interview. In any event, other than its propagandistic value, promoting such a possible New Order involved recruiting new actors in Spain-Japan relations and looking for new targets, which will be the subject of the following pages of this section. Firstly, it will analyze the new role of ideological or military factors along with the decreasing importance of diplomatic representation. Then, it will discuss the consequences of the outbreak of the war in Europe and US sanctions, such as Spain sending an Economic Mission to Japan and efforts to materialize Spain-Japan ties in areas concerning intelligence or commerce. All of this, of course, had mixed results. Changing Roles in Spanish-Japanese Relations The end of the Spanish Civil War in April 1939 forced both countries to reset the structure of their relationship. After the war’s outbreak in 1936, Japan was represented by minister Makoto Yano and a secretary from the French town of Saint-Jean-de-Luz, moving to Salamanca in 1938. Its military attaché had a significant political role, not only interviewing Gen. Franco about joining the Anti-Comintern Pact but was also being present at celebrations with German and Italian representatives. In Tokyo, Ambassador Méndez de Vigo, the head of a legation under his rank since the early 1930s, was reappointed in 1938, unexpectedly replacing Francisco José del Castillo, who maintained the legation building despite Tokyo recognized the Republicans.45 Relations between the two countries centered on trade with a largely dispersed community, mostly consisting of missionaries in the Micronesian colonies, and some small commercial companies in the Kansai 43 Moreno Juliá, X. 2007. Hitler y Franco. Diplomacia en tiempos de guerra (1936–45),

p. 169. Barcelona: Planeta; Thomàs, J. M. 2008. Roosevelt and Franco during the Second World War. From the Spanish Civil War to Pearl Harbor, p. 116. New York: Palgrave. 44 Jervis, R. 1970. The Logic of Images in International Relations, pp. 4–5. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 45 On complaints against the appointment, Rodao, F. 1993a. Relaciones HispanoJaponesas, 1937–1945, pp. 209–211. Ph. Diss, Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

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area, mostly wine companies such as Torii Shinjiro’s Suntory, which started selling Spanish wine. Méndez de Vigo’s excellent relationship with Spanish Foreign Minister Jordana allowed him to bypass accusations of mismanagement (he never wrote official notes, even those under his name) during his first appointment, and he continued without devoting much time to his administrative work until his return to Spain. The information he supplied was more than a résumé of press information and their analyses were usually spot on, foreseeing events before they happened. This he achieved thanks to the friendships he had formed along the many years of his membership in the Tokyo Club (or T¯ oky¯o Kaikan), a mixed circle of conservative Japanese and Europeans who disliked the military. Méndez de Vigo even prided himself on being able to count on a confidante who, although already retired, had also served as Foreign Minister and President of the Government (apparently, Hirota K¯oki).46 Diplomats continued to be central to Spain-Japan relations but their role was reduced in different ways. The Japanese Legation moved to an impressive building with a very good location in Madrid and in September 1939, a new Minister was appointed, Yokoyama Masayuki. He had studied in Paris, married a French woman, and was described as one of Japan’s most outstanding diplomats but was not highly in favor of the New Order. He maintained a close relationship with the British ambassador in his former post in Cairo and claimed that the Spanish refused to join the Axis and that even Germany was “letting Spain know that a premature membership for her would be unwelcome.”47 Then, he was ordered to return after Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke decided on a massive replacement of diplomats after July 1940. Since then, the Iberian Peninsula played a growing role in the gathering and dissemination of secret information between the two countries. Out of Madrid, the Japanese consulate in Barcelona reopened with diplomats. Since 1920, its honorary consul, Georges Delgado Lauger, a versatile man who seemed to have fathered a son with a Japanese woman, had been heading the customs agency and consulate at the same office, and was

46 AMAEC-R-1737-23. Méndez de Vigo to Beigbeder, Tokyo, 10 September 1940. 47 NARA-RG-457. SIS-9333. Circular by Yokoyama, Madrid, 27 July 1940 and SIS-

9712 and 9861b. Yokoyama to Tokyo, Madrid, 8 August 1940; PRO-FO-371-23560. F1735/456/23. Lampson to Halifax, Cairo, 7 February 1939.

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mostly focused on port-related activities and “courtesy visits.”48 Then in 1939, it received its first career diplomat, Saita Yorisyoshi, who was later replaced in 1940 by another diplomat, Hirano Jubei, who organized numerous cultural activities.49 The central role of the Spanish Legation in Tokyo was reduced due to new diplomatic appointments in the region. The only other diplomat besides the ambassador, Mariano Vidal Tolosana, was denied a new post and the legation limited its activities to fulfilling its obligations and not getting involved in risky activities. Joaquín Mustarós, co-owner of Vendrell, Mustaros & Co., one of the import–export companies whose business was suffering due to trade limits, was appointed honorary viceconsul in Kobe after he criticized the legation for not paying any attention to the “tiny Spanish community, ignoring it, and barely making itself accessible to them.”50 His daughter, María Teresa Mustarós, who was Japanese by birth but adopted by Spanish parents, started working at the legation. Ambassador Méndez de Vigo lost political support by the time Jordana fell out of power in August 1939, but he did not miss any chance to warn about the dangers of Spain’s growing alignment with the Axis. When asked about Spain’s entry into World War II, the ambassador declared, “However, it is only fair to make sure that the intelligent (Japanese) media rejected these extreme fantasies as improbable, adopting more moderate theories that I have heard expressed, along with sincere praises towards the proven prudence of the Caudillo and the wisdom of his policies in these grave and difficult times.”51 As a result, the Tokyo Legation was frequently marginalized. Foreign Minister Juan Beigbeder did not consult Méndez de Vigo over the establishment of a legation

48 Crusats i Padrós, H. 2019. El règim franquista a Barcelona i el tercer vèrtex de l’Eix. La relació amb l’Imperi Japonès durant la Segona Guerra Mundial, pp. 19– 20. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya. https://issuu.com/memorialdemocratic/docs/ premi_recerca_05_150dpi. NARA-RG-84-E-3710.Bx. 14 “Agencia Marítima Delgado y Consulado del Japón”. 49 Ibid., pp. 32–33. 50 AEET. Mustarós to Méndez de Vigo, Kobe, 10 August 1940.Teresa Planas, secretary

to Méndez de Vigo, and clerks Carmen Planas and Fernando Rodríguez, worked in the Legation. 51 AGA-AE-5180. Méndez de Vigo to Serrano Suñer, Tokyo, 15 February 1941.

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in Manchukuo,52 and his tense relationship with his successor, Ramón Serrano Suñer, emerged even when it came to minor proposals.53 But he was not removed. Distance and his high position within the diplomatic establishment appeared to block any attempts to send him back to Spain. Spain-Japan relations also expanded beyond the Foreign Affairs Ministry. The Spanish Ministry of Finance, the army, and the navy met with their Japanese counterparts and discussed matters of jurisdiction, receiving duplicate information. The same thing happened with the Ministries of Commerce and Finance as well as the Association of Importers from Japan, which had already existed before the conflict and was comprised of fourteen businesses. Most important was the increasing role of the Catholic Church, thanks to its long-standing presence in the region and knowledge of the language. In 1940, the Superior Council of Missions was founded to back their activities in the world, and Gen. Franco decorated a good number of clergymen, many of whom had served in Asia. Two former missionaries played an interesting role in Spain-Japan relations. The first was Pedro M. Escursell Marsá, a former Salesian missionary and self-proclaimed “Official representative of Japan,” who promoted a new cultural treaty with Japan and claimed to have an official message for Gen. Franco and books for Serrano Suñer said to be from Prime Minister Konoe. His lectures were accompanied by Falangist paraphernalia and cinema, and attended by high dignitaries, including Gen. Franco’s wife. The money he made from charging audiences a fee (3 pesetas) was used to rebuild churches destroyed during the Spanish War.54 The second was the Jesuit, Moisés Domenzáin, who sought funds for the missions in Japan and was more interested in improving the role of the Vatican, aware that Italian protection allowed them to enjoy special benevolence in Tokyo.55

52 A private complaint in AEET. Méndez de Vigo to González de Gregorio, Tokyo, 17 March 1942. 53 AMAEC-R-1738-1. Méndez de Vigo to Serrano Suñer, Tokyo, 3 February 1941. Response of 5 February 1941. 54 Escursell proclaimed himself chargé to the Japanese Army and at least travelled through Burgos and Catalonia. Vid. Diario de Burgos, 9 and 26 August 1839. Crusats, 2019, op. cit., pp. 40, 44. 55 For the Madrid exhibition, Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo, 7 June 1940. On American suspicions of the activities of Domenzáin, NARA-RG-59. CDF 1940-444. 894.20252, Fernals to Hull, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 19 February 1942.

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The Falange formed the main alternative to the conservative diplomatic establishment. Its delegate, Eduardo Herrera de la Rosa, who in 1904 was appointed military attaché to the Tokyo Legation and had been mostly living in Japan since then, attempted to construct a parallel representation. From November 1938, Herrera disseminated information on Spain, taking part in pro-Axis meetings with Nazi and Italian Fascist leaders. He sent valuable information on Japan to the National Delegation of the Falange in Madrid, thanks to his many friends including Prime Minister Konoe, who would be of great help to him throughout the Pacific War as he was recovering from sickness in bed, and Thomas Batty, a British legal advisor to the Gaimush¯ o since 1916. Herrera’s National Delegation of the Falange Foreign Service functioned as a non-diplomatic Spanish representative body in Japan. Like the Falangists in other branches overseas, Herrera took on consular work, not only offering himself to his compatriots as an “agent-servant for them regarding their interests and needs in relation to the New Spain”56 but also as the political leader of the community. In 1941, he celebrated the anniversary of the Nationalist uprising in his own house with a Mass and serving Spanish food (cocido, a typical Spanish chickpea and ham casserole). Herrera used the occasion to give a speech on the Falange and to send copies of it to the different religious orders in Japan “not only to refresh our feelings toward the Patria but to unify our thoughts and spirits as well.”57 Its impact was limited, the diplomatic legation frequently ignored him, and the logistical problems he faced were critical, as correspondence. Despite his enthusiasm, Herrera was getting on in years, and no longer represented Spaniards other than himself—only seven people attended his gathering.58 The fascist party was no alternative to the diplomats, and the impact of its activities was merely propagandistic.

56 Eudald Serra, sculptor, ceramicist, and uncle to Narcís Serra, Mayor of Barcelona and vice-president of the socialist Government in the 1980s, communicated the birth of his daughter to Herrera de la Rosa “in order to register her.” AGA-SGM-76 Herrera to the Falange Foreign Service, Katase, 29 January 1941. 57 Shortly before attending that day. Report by Herrera Verdugo is working

his death, one of those present, Juan Bizcarra, SJ, did not recall Personal interview, 30 May 1994, Koror, Palaos; AGA-AE-5177. to the Spanish Legation, Katase, 18 July 1941. Carmen Alonso on a Ph. Diss. on him at the University of Salamanca.

58 For a more extensive study, see Rodao, Florentino. 1993b. Falange española in Extremo Oriente, 1936–1945. Revista Española del Pacífico, 3: 87–89.

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The Economic Mission to Japan The most important single event to take place during this period was due to Japan’s growing need for raw materials for its war in China. The United States denounced its trade treaties, reduced Japan’s international credit, pressed other countries, and encouraged multilateral agreements to place an embargo on Japanese products. Japan also needed to reduce its strong dependence on American exports to continue fighting, as Minister Yano Makoto expressed in May 1939, “…what I am about to say now are my own thoughts, but it would be enough for us if Spain did not directly participate in the war and maintained a favorable stance by offering us economic and material aid, such as minerals and other necessary materials.”59 In November 1939, Spain was invited by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce to send an Economic Mission to Japan, as well as other alternative friendly suppliers like Rumania, Canada Egypt, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Its connection to the increasing interest over Latin America is obvious. Japanese trade with the region increased over the decade due to competitive pricing, which matched the region’s low income per capita.60 The date of the invitation also suggests that there was a renewed impulse focusing on Latin America, since Spain received it after Mexico and Argentina did, and it coincided with tours around the Americas by trade personalities and meetings of Japanese diplomats in Washington and Rio de Janeiro in May and June 1940.61 British intelligence learned that

59 GSK-KT, Vol. 3. Yano to Arita, 5 May 1939, in Shiozaki, H. 1979. On the participation of Franco’s government in the Anticommunist Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan. Some considerations of the Japanese army regarding the Spanish War. (Furanko Seiken no Nichi Doku I Bokky¯o Ky¯otei sanka ni tsuite. Supein Naisen to Nihon gunbu to no kankei), Studies on the Spanish Civil War (Supein Naisen no kenkyû), coord. Saito Takashi, pp. 258–274. Tokyo: Chu¯o-K¯ oronsha. 60 On the Japan’s efforts to achieve economic independence in relation to Latin America, Ikeda, M. 2008. Japan in Trade Isolation 1926–37 &1948–85, p. 203. Tokyo: I-House Press. On the American harassment of Axis companies, but not covering the Japanese, Friedmann, M. P. 2003. Nazis and Good Neighbors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 61 Uscanga, C. 2013. Las Relaciones Económicas de México y Japón en el preludio de la Guerra del Pacífico, pp. 17–18. México DF: Conacyt. Reporte De Investigación Proyecto Sep-2.

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the Japanese had been purchasing a growing number of commodities from Latin America for Berlin.62 Japan requested that the so-called Spanish Economic Mission (branded as informal) be composed of officials from different departments of the Spanish government except that of agriculture. The goal was “to develop trade between Spain and Japan, and to contribute to strengthening friendly relations between both countries […] with the aim of studying commercial and industrial conditions […] and to establish contacts with important figures in those Japanese centers.”63 Its members had to study and exploit possibilities for cooperation in multiple fields, and the only appointment that interested the Japanese politically was the head of the delegation. The Japanese were interested in the attendance of members from outside the civil service and specifically desired the inclusion of high officials in entities similar to their zaibatsu (industrial conglomerates) with whom they could solidify this collaboration. The importance of commerce and trade was not as relevant as the title suggests. An Africanist general was appointed the mission’s president,64 while its vice-president was a nobleman and diplomat who had recently been appointed ambassador, and the delegates included the brother of monarchist leader José Calvo Sotelo who had been assassinated a few days before the Civil War. Each representative (five from the Ministry of War, one from the Ministry of the Navy, four from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one from the Ministry of Finance, one from the Ministry of Interior, and many others from the Ministry of Commerce) received a $400 subsistence allowance, except for the self-financed Falange representative, Isabel Arguelles, a woman who replaced Rafael Duyos at the last minute after a complaint concerning “money and morality.”65 The 62 Best, A. A. 1995. Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding War in East Asia, 1936–41, pp. 34–35. London: Routledge. 63 AMAEC-R-1737-15. Japanese Legation to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Madrid, 15 November 1939. 64 AMAEC-R-1737-15. Personal note from Beigbeder to Casa Rojas, Madrid, n.d. (February 1940). 65 There were also three representatives from the artillery (Lieutenant Colonel Alfonso

Muñoz Cobo, Captain Diego de Lacruz Solares and General Staff Commander Rafael Martí Fabra), one from the Navy (ship captain Arturo Génova Torruella), three engineers (Mariano de Iturralde y Orbegozo, Aurelio Sol y Pagán, and Antonio Robert y Robert), two officials (Trade Secretary Enrique Chávarri and diplomat José Antonio Balenchana), a civil servant in the Institute of Foreign Currency (Fernando Ramírez Escribano) and

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number of the mission’s members grew from fifteen to twenty-one after new proposals were made, in addition to including four accompanying women composed of three wives and a daughter. Knowledge of foreign languages seemed to be the criteria the Spanish government used in building its delegation, except for the president, who was born in the Philippines and was famous for his role in taking the Moroccan city of Xauen. The only one able to communicate in the local languages was Marti Vidal, who worked in China for twenty-eight years and was the only member unaffiliated with the civil service. After their arrival in Tokyo on 2 June 1940 aboard the newly built Hakozaki Maru, the Economic Mission had a tight agenda, an audience with the emperor and meetings with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, War, Commerce and Industry, Navy, and Agriculture. There were also two conferences, visits to numerous businesses, and a monthlong pre-arranged program where they traveled to Tokyo, Yokohama, Yokosuka, Nikko, Nagoya, Toba, Nara, Osaka, and Kobe. During this trip, they held masses, enjoyed swimming pools, bathed in thermal baths or onsen, and visited temples and numerous other tourist destinations, all of which were recorded in a 30-minute film. Much of the activities were cultural although some were political, like the showing of a film of Falangist leader, Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera’s funeral, among others. Italy’s entry into World War II on 10 June, a week after the mission’s arrival in Japan, changed many of their plans. Mission President Alberto Castro Girona canceled his planned visit to the Philippines. Vice-President José Rojas y Moreno (Count Casa Rojas), who had been appointed ambassador to the Romanian government, could not return immediately as ordered, while members were divided on how to go back, with some suggesting remaining in Shanghai and others suggesting traveling through the Soviet Union. In the end, the mission returned to Spain in August through the planned route and passing through Cape Town.66 The Economic Mission illustrates how a lot of reticence hindered further strengthening of Spain-Japan relations, despite the façade of friendship presented to the outside world. According to a civilian member the minder to general Castro Girona (Pablo Moreno González). An article noting the extended family invitations and the extensive stays, James E. Bassett, Japan Pushed Drive to Woo Latin Trade: Quite and Expensive ‘Blitzkrieg’ Waged in South America, Los Angeles Times, 3 May 1940, cited in Uscanga, 2013, op. cit., p. 29. 66 AMAEC-R-1737-15. Méndez de Vigo to Beigbeder, Tokyo, 11 June 1940.

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of the group, the mission’s members “only visited eight establishments of an industrial nature […]. The visits consisted of a reception where they were invited to classic green tea, the usual speeches, and then, a quick visit to the arsenals or workshops depending on the case, where no one remained for more than five minutes.”67 The Spanish expressed their frustration at not being able to receive the aid that they hoped for from the Japanese, especially the members of military ministries, who were frustrated at only being able to visit a school for training officers (in Sajani), the Osaka arsenal, and a cruiser.68 Pablo Moreno, an aide to Gen. Castro Girona, explained, “We asked if they would allow us to send them a list of questions so that we could learn something about the Japanese army, which we admired, telling them that they would not answer any question they felt to be inappropriate.”69 The information they were able to obtain was minor, besides the Japanese authorities inspecting their baggage for notes and the “muteness in all languages that possessed all of our companions when they were asked any questions related to manufacture.”70 As expected, Spanish plans for autarchy forced the Spaniards to learn as much as they could from the Japanese. As Diego de Lacruz said, the Japanese “have reached their indubitably magnificent development and, more admirably, their highly reduced production costs.”71 For this reason, the opportunities for such a long trip could not be missed. Mission members from the Ministry of Industry divided their tasks among themselves, studying Japan’s textile industry, industrial planning and organization, and fuels and alternatives, respectively. The military members appeared to have done something similar. One of the very few surviving documents about the Japanese that may have been read by Gen. Franco himself was a report on petroleum substitutes (“a subject taken on especially by the President [Castro Girona]”).

67 APG-JE-1-42, report by Diego Lacruz Solares, Madrid, 11 November 1940. 68 PRO-FO-24529 (C11946/11946/41). Draft of the report by Pablo Moreno

González, censored in Ciudad del Cabo and translated into English, September 1940. 69 Idem. 70 Diego Lacruz Solares, ref. cit. 71 Ibid.

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The Japanese later described the mission as not only having economic motives but as “a mission of friendship sent by Spain to Japan,”72 but it shows the big gap between their expectations of each other. The Japanese had invited the Spaniards to a wonderful semi-touristic trip, that included allowances and the greatest and most delicate protocol, and it was assumed that their guests had to accept being taken to wherever they were directed. Consequently, the Spaniards noticed the clear contradiction between the Japanese’ words and actions, saying, “What they did not want of course, despite their most ardent desire expressed in speeches and conversations, was for the mission’s experts to study Japanese industry.” Diego de Lacruz even stated that he did not “know what Japan’s true objective could be.”73 Certainly, the members of the Economic Mission did not show later signs of fervent pro-Japanism. Trade and Collaboration There were all kinds of possible difficulties for increasing mutual trade. The background of pre-war ties did not reveal many opportunities. As Japanese foreign trade figures in 1934 showed, trade with Spain and Spanish Morocco made up a mere 0.031% of Japan’s total trade, while Spanish exports to Japan only made up 1% of total exports from the peninsula. Figures from the tax-free Moroccan Protectorate showed that it was a re-export location, with a large percentage of Spanish purchases (2,553,169 ¥) in comparison with sales (1,806 ¥), but on a smaller scale than Egypt (119,247,678 ¥ in total), and only for the sale of Japanese products. War forced both countries to explore cooperation through trade, but there were all kinds of problems. Even after the outbreak of wars after 1936, the mismatch in interests was too great. Tokyo offered manufactured products that were gaining market share not only due to their lower prices but also their popularity among the cosmopolitan sector of society. These included lamps, radio sets, electrical resistors, toothbrushes, combs, buttons, and similar articles, but the electronic devices were already manufactured in the Iberian Peninsula, where demand was reserved for fans, artworks, shawls, lacquer,

72 AMAEC-R-1737-15. Imperial Japanese Legation to Beigbeder, Madrid, 19 December 1939. 73 Diego Lacruz, ref. cit.

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fountain pens, and pencils, even though Japan had not produced them since it began its invasion of China in 1937.74 There were also different kinds of legal issues. The Spanish production for mercury, the most important resource to increase for exportation during those years which was used to make explosives and which Japan hardly needed (it bought 97.01% of its needed exports from abroad), was controlled by Italy, so Tokyo had to deal also with them as the main producer.75 Furthermore, both Spain and Japan decided to sign an unusual trade treaty based on compensation, sending confidential reports to each other every month about the quantities and values of their products. Theoretically, a system of banknote exchange renewed annually between the Spanish Foreign Minister and the Japanese Legation in Madrid would allow further money payments. It was extremely complicated. Besides the communications problems that were so common during war, the text was written in such vague terms to prevent it from being placed under the jurisdiction of the Diet, Japan’s legislature. Thus, it was referred to as a “commercial system of payments” instead of a “treaty” or “agreement.” The list of products to compensate the trade from both sides matched only in Spanish exports. Spain offered minerals that Japan wanted like mineral salt, mercury, potassium chlorate potash, and tartaric acid. But their requests for other products like ammonia sulfates, resins, copper from Manchukuo, and rice were replied to with a alternative useless list: copper carbonate, copper sulfate, sodium arsenate, lead arsenate, calcium arsenate, Paris green, camphor, menthol crystal, celluloid sheets, and rayon yarns. Furthermore, the demand for rice was denied at the last moment, supposedly due to a bad harvest.76 Lastly, payment and delivery were the most complicated parts of the deal. Policies concerning fictitious exchange rates in both countries aggravated further these problems, as indicated by a contemporary report

74 NARA-RG-226-127-21. Madrid-Si-Int-15. Aeneas to Bogotá, Madrid, 19 June 1945. 75 Chapman, J. W. M. 1984. The “Have-Nots” Go to War. The Economic and Technological Basis of the German Alliance with Japan. In The Tripartite Pact of 1940: Japan, Germany and Italy, ed. Ian Nish, p. 71. London: STICERD Papers. PRO-FO-371-22699. W14370/14370/41. Morton to Roberts, London, 28 October 1938. 76 AHBE. ES 28079. AHBE/01. 13.//000027. Text of the three notes and two lists of articles exchanged between Juan Beigbeder and Yano Makoto, Madrid, 20 March 1940.

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stating, “If we give them twelve Pesetas to a Dollar, and they give four Yen, as neither country is responding to the true purchase value and both countries are devaluing their own currency, then all these actions add up together and it becomes impossible to reach an understanding in prices.”77 In Tokyo, after learning about the “general system of payments” through the press, Ambassador Méndez de Vigo hurriedly reported, “Agreement with France, null; with the Italians, difficult to execute.”78 Furthermore, the British government declared that every neutral ship transporting products should apply through diplomatic channels for navicerts (navigation certificates) that specified the contents of its cargo. Nevertheless, Japan received many raw materials from Spain. Trade statistics indicate an important rise in Spanish exports in 1940, from 66,741 to 1,036,363 pounds. Spain sent Japan 16.9% of its mercury (368,815 pounds [51.311 in 1939] out of a total of 2,180,368), 65.2% of its potash (368.804 [no data in 1939] out of a total of 565,710), and 2.1% of its tartaric acid (4,893 pounds [no data from 1939] out of a total of 230,123). The total value of salt (not specified whether industrial or common) exported to Japan from Spain was 31,382 pounds, a big increase from the previous year (11,622), indicating that it was going to regain its large production rate prior to Civil War, which would complement with Italian production from Eritrea and Italian Somaliland.79 Archives show no references to payments while Spanish disappointment for not receiving products is documented. In 1940, Minister Serrano Suñer requested with the “greatest interest” for the supply of 2,000 tons of magnesium oxide—presumably designated for the iron forges of Spain and not included in the list attached to the agreement— which would be transported on a ship bound for Lisbon with repatriated English prisoners. The Ministry of Trade never got it and responded to Japan’s “delaying tactics” with “unusual obduracy,” accusing them of 77 APG-JE-1-4.2. Report, Madrid, 11 November 1940; on Japanese interest, NARA-

RG-457. SIS-6182. Arita to Yano, Tokyo, 14 February 1940. 78 AMAEC-R-1737-12. Sent to the Minister of Trade and Industry, 15 February, 1940; NARA-RG-457. SIS-13615. Fujii to Matsuoka, Madrid, 8 January 1941. 79 AHBE. Statistics. 340 B3008a5 1993-40. PRO-FO317-24744. F3393/3393/23. Ashley Clarcke to Ministry of Economic Warfare, London, 16 June 1940; Minutes of the 162nd Meeting of the Enemy Exports Committee, 21 June 1940.

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“hindering the operation and their attitude inconsistent with this government’s, which has been facilitating the sale of mercury and providing support for the granting of navicerts in London.” In 1941, two more trade operations failed. One involved selling magnesium oxide to Spain, which failed due to Japanese delaying tactics. Another was an operation concerning Spanish mercury that Mitsui was supposed to carry out and was needed “with pressing urgency” but failed despite great Japanese interest.80 The failure of the latter angered Serrano Suñer, since his efforts to obtain “navicert” certificates made him look like a fool before his colleagues in the cabinet, who knew well how difficult negotiations were with London’s ambassador in Madrid, Sir Samuel Hoare, a former candidate for prime minister whose political career was frustrated by his pro-appeasement ideas.81 Pro-Japanese sentiment among Falangists also cooled after this new episode of impossible cooperation. Perhaps, these failures were the reason for the definitive decline of mutual trade in 1941. Furthermore, some of the mission’s members returned to Spain with plans for collaborative projects such as those related to fishing in the waters of what is now Equatorial Guinea and the production of aluminum. An agreement was even signed in Valencia for the purchase of the Kurashiki Silk Textile Company’s patent for the creation of a business called SAIPA (Sociedad Anonima Industrias de la Paja de Arroz, or “Rice Straw Industries Ltd.”) with the support of the Federación de Arroceros (Rice Growers Federation).82 Despite all their efforts, none of these projects materialized. The Economic Mission, in conclusion, synthesized the three principal characteristics of Spain-Japan relations at the time. Tokyo was the main force behind them, the multiple obstacles in strengthening them, and the importance of extra-bilateral interests. This was shown not only in Latin America and Asia, as we’ll see in the next section, but also in Europe through espionage. The new minister to Madrid, Suma

80 AGA-AE-5130. Serrano Suñer to Méndez de Vigo, Madrid, 11 November 1941; NARA-RG-457. SIS-23811. Suma to Konoe, Madrid, 4 October 1940. 81 Sáenz-Francés San Baldomero, E. 2016. De águilas y leones. Diplomacia británica en España 1939–1953. Tiempo de guerra y era de cambios. In Estados Unidos , Alemania, Gran Bretaña, Japón y sus Relaciones con España entre la Guerra y la Postguerra (19391953), coord. Joan M. Thomàs, p 159. Madrid: Universidad Pontificia de Comillas. 82 NARA-RG-226-127. Box 21. Madrid-Si-Int-15. Aeneas to Bogotá, Madrid, 19 June, 1945.

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Yakichir¯o, former Consul in New York and Shanghai and a highly important figure in the revamped Gaimush¯ o with a reputation for being “very anti-British,”83 aggressive, and not mincing words, and his second in command, Miura Fumio, were appointed to Madrid. Japan’s enemies suspected that this was so they could exploit available intelligence opportunities in the Spanish capital. As a result, Suma was denied permission to enter London.84 Indeed, Suma and Miura’s partnership would yield important results in the future. Collaboration with Spain worked out much better when third party countries were involved, and before Pearl Harbor, Asia was the most appropriate scenario for this.

Imperial Asia and Spain Asia was a better scenario for Japan to establish a partnership with Spain. Tokyo needed to legitimize its conquests in China and created its Sphere of Co-prosperity, as outlined in Foreign Minister Matsuoka’s declaration.85 The Spaniards, like the Italians and other friends, could do what the Japanese could not, creating an opportunity for cooperation in third countries that went beyond bilateralism. So, this section will start with a discussion of the possibilities offered by going behind Italy’s back, followed by an examination of internal disputes among the Spanish diplomats, and ending with a description of Spain’s relations with the governments of Manchukuo and Thailand. Relations with China became most complex when Spain sought to normalize its presence in Asia.86 For a century, this country lacked a strong government and lost its sovereignty over a growing portion of

83 PRO-FO-371-24744 (F5517/5517/23), Report of personalities in Japan, Graigie to Halifax, Tokyo, 13 December 1940. NARA-RG-457. SIS-13350. Matsuoka to Riyoji, Tokyo, 28 December 1940. On Miura, Matsuoka to Riyoji, Tokyo, 21 February 1941; Krebs, G. 1988. Japan und Spanien, 1936–1945, pp. 22–25. Tokyo: OAG. 84 PRO-FO-371-28007 (f2439/2439/23), Hoare to Eden, Madrid, 22 March 1941.

Minutes of 25 March 1941 and 28 March 1941. 85 Mimura, J. 2011. Japan’s New Order and Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: Planning for Empire. The Asia-Pacific Forum 6 (49,3). https://apjjf.org/2011/9/49/ Janis-Mimura/3657/article.html. 86 This section is based on Rodao, F. 1997. España ante el gobierno chino de Wang Jingwei. Encuentros en Cathay 11: 117–145; Borao. 2017, op. Cit., pp. 262–265.

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its territory, with Hong Kong, Taiwan, and around forty treaty ports all governed by foreign administrations as concessions or settlements.87 The Japanese had the most populated and wealthiest areas of China under its control. They tore apart some areas like Manchukuo, Mongolia, and Taiwan, but failed to do so with the two governments that ruled northern and southern China, and in 1939, they opted for Wang Jingwei, a former nationalist leader. Defeated in his attempt to take over the Guomindang, Wang turned to Tokyo, and upon his return to a Japanesecontrolled China, he prepared a new government in the central part of the country. It was one of the many political moves showed in a long war that at this time remained in stalemate, with no definitive victory in sight for any of its factions—Nationalist, Communists, or Japanese. Nevertheless, it triggered intense expectations. Italian Patronage In this messy context, the Spanish Civil War ended, and the Franco government sent its first consul to Shanghai, the city that epitomized China’s complexity at the time and the country’s cultural and economic center and banking capital. Shanghai was divided into the International Settlement (governed by a municipal council elected by a restricted franchise and under the authority of the consuls of countries with extraterritoriality), the French Concession, and Greater Shanghai, which surrounded them and was administered by Chinese authorities but controlled by Japanese troops. Back then, in the city, consular and diplomatic functions among the representatives were intermingled, as was their loyalties since some were accredited by the Nationalists in Chongqing while others were accredited by the pro-Japanese government in Nanjing. Not only did the new Spanish representative have to use his best diplomatic skills but he also had to blend in in a city full of confusion representing a country in an especially complicated condition. Two additional complications arose concerning legality and information. Since the nineteenth century, Spain had maintained its privilege of extraterritoriality, which protected its citizens from local laws and courts somewhat precariously. A 1928 treaty announced the termination of extraterritoriality at an unspecified date along with seventeen 87 Brasó Broggui, C. 2017. Las Aduanas Marítimas de China y el comercio sino-español, 1900–1930. Revista de Historia Industrial 70: 138–139.

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other countries, but ever since China recognized Madrid’s legal government in 1936 while all the Spanish diplomats sided with Franco’s forces, Spain lost its privileges on 3 April 1937, after the Chinese Ministry of Justice issued Resolution 177. Then, a Shanghai court ordered the Augustinians to pay the China Realty Company 700,000 Chinese dollars (plus interest).88 After winning the Spanish Civil War, Franco’s government wanted to establish official relations with the Middle Kingdom, but recovering privileges made normalization of relations difficult. In addition, under the new Franco regime, information about China was extremely scarce, partly due to the lack of reliable information during the Civil War. Its unofficial representative in Shanghai, Eduardo Vázquez Ferrer, a former consul, rarely sent communications despite receiving a salary, while two others (Justo Garrido Cisneros and Ricardo Muñiz) remained in the legation’s closed premises in Peking, probably receiving funds from the Boxer (Yihetuan) indemnity that the pro-Japanese government had not yet canceled, or from the sale of annexed land that took place years before.89 In addition, the Spanish community in China did not contribute much. Suffering from a “relevant trade deficit”90 and establishing many small businesses, they formed an imaginary colonial community with significant exclusions and political divisions. There were also 269 dispersed missionaries (out of a total of 2,834 clergymen, according to a Vatican census report)91 that enjoyed a certain kind of stability compared to other countries thanks to Madrid’s neutrality in the European war (along with American Catholics). But little else, since England, France, and the United States were compensated for damages from bombardments, there was little point to political friendship while

88 Larracoechea stated in 1940 that they had adopted “Italian nationality and protection” after his dismissal on 20 October 1936, but this might be a biased report. AMAEC-R-P. Larracoechea. Note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Madrid, 12/IX/1940; íd. 1 August 1940. 89 AMAEC-R-1003-12. Garrido to the Secretary of Foreign Relations, Peipin, 6 November 1936. Gasquet, Axel. 2015. El llamado de Oriente. Historia cultural del orientalismo argentino (1900–1950), pp. 343–346. Buenos Aires: Eudeba: Van der Putten, 1996, art, cit.: 124–125. 90 Brasó and Martínez-Robles. 2018. Art. cit.: 1245 10.1017/S0026749X17000154. 91 Vid. F. Rodao, 1993b, art. cit, pp. 89–92. The figures varied greatly and in 1943

the consul made reference to 1500 persons. Maldonado to Jordana, Shanghai, 3 January 1943.

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bombs did not discriminate much between their targets.92 The missionaries struggled to help the Spanish State when they were probably the ones who needed more help as they were experiencing so many problems. Upon arriving in China in June 1939 when his government was not recognized by China, Consul Pedro de Igual y Martínez Dabán’s first task was to study first-hand the Spanish presence in China, without further instructions.93 Fascist Italy was very helpful in this, in part due to enjoying a larger presence in China that included a battalion composed of about 400 men and a two-ship naval division, but mostly due to logistical aid that it could provide Spain with.94 It was timely since the Guomindang, its customs, and mail services ignored Consul Igual and he felt that his colleagues were ignoring him. As a result, Igual benefited from Italian assistance, first, to help him receive official recognition as de facto Consul General, and then, to secure representation of Spanish interests under Nationalist China. Italian officials in Japanese-controlled areas assisted many Basque pelota players like those working in Tianjin thanks to the game’s popularity.95 Collaborating with Japan and the Axis in Chinese territory was Igual’s foregone conclusion, so that Franco’s Spain would enjoy a similar level of representation as Germany, Portugal, and Italy. He claimed to have urged the Spanish community to assist the Japanese in achieving their aims during meetings in the Council of the Consular Body of the International Concession in Shanghai and obtaining receipts for private Spanish land titles.96 Furthermore, after the bloody bombardment of a religious

92 AMAEC-R-1737-10. Serrano Suñer to Suma, Madrid, 3 June 1941. 93 AMAEC-P. Igual. Igual to Beigbeder, Shanghai, 1 December 1940. 94 Samarani, G. 2014. The Italian Presence in China: Historical Trends and Perspectives (1902–1947). In Italy’s Encounters with Modern China. Imperial Dreams, Strategic Ambitions, eds. Maurizio Marinelli and Giovanni Andornino, p. 56. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 95 PRO-FO-371-23510. F9974/1147/10. Shanghai political-Intelligence Report for the period ended on 30th June 1939, Consul General Phillips, Shanghai, 25 July 1939. Cabañes, R. 2015. Las relaciones interculturales sino-españolas En los años treinta y cuarenta. Un acercamiento a través de la pelota vasca. In Pensar con la Historia desde el siglo XXI , eds. Pilar Folguera et al., pp. 6457–6474. Madrid: Universidad Autónoma de Madrid; Marinelli, M. 2014. Introduction. In Italy’s Encounters with Modern China. Imperial Dreams, Strategic Ambitions, eds. Maurizio Marinelli and Giovanni Andornino, p. 19. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Borao, 2017, op. cit., p. 260. 96 AMAEC-R-1737-9. Igual to Beigbeder, Shanghai, 22 September 1940.

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mission, Igual protested, stressing that Spain “does not cease to give evident proof of its sympathy, understanding, and friendship towards the Japanese nation.”97 Lastly, there is clear proof of his collaboration with the Axis, albeit equivocal. Igual issued a Spanish passport to a German, Von du Osten, a head Nazi spy, under the name Julio López Lido which omitted Berlin as his place of birth. After entering the United States, López Lido died.98 While Italy felt its role enhanced by helping Spain as a kind of younger brother, Madrid’s presence in China was eased by Rome which provided information on the conflict and helped maintain extraterritorial rights and consular jurisdiction in Chinese Nationalist-controlled territories, including the defense of the interests of Spanish citizens. Consequently, Spanish Foreign Minister Juan Beigbeder, while hardly a friend of Italian hegemony, wanted to expand this and, shortly after taking office, ordered that the protection of Spaniards “in all Japanese-occupied territories in China”99 be requested from Rome. There was a crucial difference in Italy’s stance, however, since Italy had not interrupted their presence in China and had relations with the Guomindang, but Franco’s Spain had not yet recognized any faction in China and had more room to maneuver. This coincided with the weeks spent by Wang planning his government and trying to lure figures from the Guomindang. As a result, both sides tried to sway Madrid toward their side. On Wang’s behalf, the Japanese raised the most convincing argument for Spanish ears, that is, that Italy planned to recognize his regime. The message was sent through three different routes, but not via Méndez de Vigo’s Tokyo. As for the Chinese Nationalists, they made a strange proposal directly to the Presidential Office of Spain, offering to purchase Spanish arms and mercury. Spain decided in favor of Wang. The Overseas Section of the Spanish Foreign Ministry considered that the Guomindang government in Chongqing was about to fall following reports from Igual, who suggested to wait until Wang officially took power on 30 March 1940.100 The Foreign Minister Beigbeder ordered his ambassador 97 Ibid. 98 FDRPL. SPF-52. 21 May 1942; NARA-RG-59. CDF 1940-44. 852.20211. Hoover,

FBI, to Adolf A. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, Washington, 19 April 1942. 99 AMAEC-R-1737-10. Beigbeder to the Italian Embassy, Madrid, 19 August 1939. 100 AMAEC-R-1736-12. Igual to Serrano Suñer, Shanghai, 17 September 1939. Sama-

rani, G. 2001. The Evolution of Fascist Italian Diplomacy during the Sino-Japanese War,

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in London to suspend negotiations with Jiang Jieshi, while his ambassador in Rome signaled to his Japanese counterpart, Amau Eiji, that they were tilting toward Wang.101 Franco’s government was able to use the fact that it was a new player in the scene with no prior engagements, to start with a clean slate. Madrid wanted to negotiate extraterritoriality rights and had the following options; to wait for Italian recognition of Wang, to delay its own (as Germany would probably do), or to recognize it early and alone as a demonstration of friendship toward Japan. The Spanish decided to delay their recognition, partly due to the poorly chosen alliances Wang made and the Japanese Army not being sure about their options. And at the same time, Consul General Igual started second-guessing his preference, after paying a visit to the proJapanese mayor of Shanghai which was widely reported in the press: “felt indignant at the trick.”102 A new message to Madrid sent via the Spanish Legation in Tokyo (which the Italians did not know about) showed a different opinion. He stated that the government of Jiang Jieshi enjoyed “great prestige, longevity, and the support of all countries,” while counseling against the recognition of Wang Jingwei until “events show that the consistency and authority of the new government is recognized by other countries.”103 The telegram created confusion and skepticism in Madrid as to Wang Jingwei’s potential success in Nanjing, and yet, they did not change their minds, partly because this information was much less nuanced than that provided by the Italian ambassador to Rome. The Spanish government’s cognitive framework favored information more in line with its agenda and Madrid continued to support Wang Jingwei because, according to a report from the Foreign Ministry, “there is no doubt that the reaction this would cause in the Japanese government […] would be greatly against Spain and, as such, a little unfavorable towards Spanish interests in

1937–1943. In China in the Anti-Japanese War, 1937–1945. Politics, Culture and Society, eds. David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shyu, pp. 65–87. New York: Peter Lang. 101 He informed on 14 February. NARA-457. SIS-6280. Amau to Arita, Rome, 19

February 1940. 102 PRO-FO-371-24700. F3915/1598/10. Archibald Clark Kerr to Halifax, Shanghai. 20 August 1940. 103 AEET. Igual to Méndez de Vigo, Shanghai, 12 April 1940. Méndez de Vigo summarised this for Madrid, removing references to Italy, Germany, and the first mention of Japan. He also deemphasized the position adopted by Igual.

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China.”104 This argument is interesting. In its attempt to maintain a presence in the region, Spain subordinated its interests in China to its political relationship with Japan. If the first part of the approach was derived from the past, the second was something new. It proved that contacts and presence in China at the time revolved entirely around Spain’s relations with the Japanese government. Consul Igual criticized the pro-Japanese policy, labeling Wang Jingwei’s government an “organization of puppets.”105 Then, the Italians accused him of being a “British pawn,”106 and apparently informed Foreign Minister Beigbeder that he had traveled to Chongqing with British Ambassador Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, who in a report on the diplomatic personnel in Shanghai described Igual as “fat, indolent and very talkative, but by no means unintelligent.”107 Igual was then ordered not to “accept invitations from the Chungking government or renew relations with them without receiving instructions.”108 Whether or not the Spanish recognized Wang’s government before or after the Italians, Madrid would do so as soon as the Japanese requested it, without excessive concern for what Germany would do, and disregarding considerations about what flag to use. Consul Igual had lost despite believing that his knowledge of the country would grant him the capacity to influence the Foreign Ministry. Yet this only occurred when he sent them news that they wanted to hear or when there was no clear cognitive framework, just like when he first arrived.

104 AGA-AE-5130. Serrano Suñer to Méndez de Vigo, Madrid, 11 November 1941; NARA-RG-457. SIS-23811. Suma to Konoe, Madrid, 4 October 1940. 105 AMAE-1736-12. Igual to Beigbeder, Tokyo, Received 6 April 1940. 106 AMAE-1736-12. Report by Afonso Lara (Overseas Section) 23 and 24 April 1940;

Ambassador to Rome to Beigbeder, Rome, 27 April 1940; note, n.p., 27 April, 1940. 107 Those observations usually really depend on the subject’s ability to speak English, and its tone relied heavily on their country’s position toward the war. PRO-FO-37124700. 20 August 1940. Idem. 108 Ibid., Beigbeder to Méndez de Vigo, Madrid, 1 May 1940, to be communicated to Igual.

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Policy Disputes in China The Economic Mission entered the fray at this precise moment. Besides its one-month stay in Japan, the Mission also spent nearly a month traveling Korea, Manchukuo, and other Japanese-controlled areas on the Asian continent. Then, they were invited to have an audience with Wang Jingwei’s government in Nanjing, which even Japan had not yet recognized. Consul Igual learned about this, realized the significance of this first official mission, and boarded a plane to meet with the mission in Changchun (or Hsinking, as it was then known), where he explained the dangerous political implications of visiting Nanjing. The members, then, asked Madrid to confirm their authorization and after immediately receiving approval, their visit proceed, now shortened to three days and its number of participants reduced to four. The mission stayed in Nanjing from 2 to 4 August 1940. The main event was a reception by the President of the National Government, Wang Jingwei, who proclaimed himself to be the true follower of Sun Zhongshan and contrasted the “constitutionality” of his government with the reigning “dictatorship” in Chongqing. He used the occasion to express his hopes that this visit would be the first step toward the establishment of normal relations between Spain and his government, and Mission President Alberto Castro Girona’s reply included a certain verbal promise of forthcoming recognition. The visit’s importance went beyond its effect on developing SpainChina relations. Spanish support for Wang’s attempt to delegitimize the Guomindang was widely known, as a member of the American Embassy in Shanghai observed, “There was no doubt that the ‘national government’ had received a foreshadowing of the ‘official recognition’ that [Wang] seemed to desire so intensely.”109 Castro Girona’s verbal promise was remembered and when the Japanese recognized Wang’s administration in December that year, his Foreign Minister visited the Spanish Consulate in Shanghai reminding Madrid about “the promises it received from the Economic Mission.”110

109 CUSDR-3-B. Stanton to Hull, Nanking, 14 August 1940. 110 AMAEC-R-1736-11. Memorandum, Madrid, 25 March 1941, information provided

by the Minister for Spain, 16 December 1940. APG-JE-1-4.2. Text of a speech by Wang Ching-wei read to Castro Girona. It was addressed to Franco as ‘the Head of the Spanish Republic’.

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Madrid did not recognize Wang and waited until Germany and Italy did, but the Economic Mission’s trip to Nanjing helps us understand Japanese interests in their relations with Spain.111 First, there was the complete lack of interest from Spain. The ineptitude shown by General Castro Girona during the mission when he made promises beyond the scope of his authority, and the lack of any reprimand are clear examples. Igual described him as “one of the most stupid officials in the Spanish army” but an anecdote shows his lack of interest. When he asked about the man in a portrait and was replied Dr. Sun Zhongsan, he said that he had never heard of him. Also, the group was unimpressed by the modernist ferroconcrete structures they saw in the architecture of Manchukuo’s capital.112 Second, Madrid’s reliance on other countries. Italy was in charge of their small interests, that is, the ten missionaries and Basque pelotaris in Tianjin, while commerce in this treaty ports was outside the range of local authorities. Madrid was only interested in preserving the building of the Spanish Embassy in Beijing, where two idle diplomats (Garrido and Muñiz) still resided, which was why José González de Gregorio was appointed consul to “northern China” in 1939. Consequently, the Economic Mission traveled through an area that was not of any interest to Spain. Third, there was the predominance of stereotypes. Communism was the sole determining factor in the Spaniards’ decision to value China. The instructions issued upon the mission’s departure which supported Wang Jingwei(“Chiang-Kai-shek is of no use to us”)113 can be better understood though a comment made in May 1943 by Gen. Franco himself regarding the dissolution of the Third International: “Am I not correct when I say that Russia’s dissolution of the Comintern is but a scheme to control the resulting turmoil, and prevent the collapse of the Chunking [Chongqing] regime?.”114 Gen. Franco’s perspective was anchored in stereotypes about China. Fourth, the old orientalist-style practice of neglecting reactions in Asia. The speed

111 CUSDR-3-B. Consul Stanton to Hull, Nanking, 2 August 1940; NARA-RG-59. CDF 1940-44. 701.5294. Conversation between Igual and Bonsal, Madrid, 13 July 1946. 112 Barclay, P. D. 2020. Fascism Carved in Stone. In Visualizing Fascism: The TwentiethCentury Rise of the Global Right, eds. Julia Adeney Thomas and Geoff Eley, pp. 49–52. Durham, NC: Duke University Press https://doi.org/10.1215/9781478004387. 113 AMAEC-R-1736-12. ‘El reconocimiento del nuevo gobierno de China’, n.d. 114 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-37891. Suma to Tani, Madrid, 25 May 1943.

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of Spain’s response authorizing the Nanjing visit did not indicate negotiation nor seeking a political reward. Rather, it suggested returning favors and commitments. After Japan’s generosity toward the Economic Mission, it was difficult to refuse such a “small” favor, “given the desire to please the Japanese government” as noted by the Americans.115 As the summer of 1940 closed, expectations generated by the “Wang Jingwei option” continued to fall partly due to the military’s shortsightedness while Pedro de Igual radicalized his messages. He openly backed the Westerners in the French concession of Shanghai, saying, “We whites should be united in our own defense.”116 Igual also threatened his superiors. When he tried to end the Spanish vice-consulate in Tianjin’s relations with Italy’s diplomats, he deployed an increasingly harsh tone toward his superiors, saying, “A premature recognition of the Nanking government […] could translate into the slaughter of our missionaries in the part of China dominated by them, or continuous attacks on Spaniards and Spanish goods.”117 And finally, Igual pointed to Japan. After “constantly” receiving complaints from missionaries and suffering a kick himself from a Japanese soldier, he asked his superiors to take measures before the Japanese Legation in Madrid “to make them understand that they should repay us for our rapprochement policy towards them with more than words.”118 The Foreign Affairs Ministry preferred not to reply. Igual’s messages concerning a Spanish Jesuit killed during a Japanese bombardment did not receive a response. When he proposed that Madrid simply acknowledge receiving notifications from Wang’s government, a note in the files read, “The Undersecretary [vice-minister] says not to do anything.”119 Igual then openly blamed Japan for Spain’s worsening reputation in 115 CUSDR-3-B. Stanton to Hull, Nanking, 14 August 1940. 116 Although cloaked in the union against the Chinese threat, the anti-Japanese senti-

ment in this communication was obvious AMAEC-R-1737-10. Igual to Serrano Suñer, Shanghai, 11 November 1940. 117 AMAEC-R-1736-12, Igual to Beigbeder, Shanghai, 1 August 1940; AMAEC-P. González de Gregorio. Igual to Serrano Suñer, Shanghai, 30 September 1940. 118 AMAEC-R-1736-10. Igual to Serrano Suñer, Shanghai, 15 October 1940, with a note to Horiuchi (Japanese Consulate), Shanghai, 14 October 1940; Samarani. 2014, op cit., p. 58. 119 AMAEC-R-1738-1. Méndez de Vigo to Beigbeder, Tokyo, 29 June 1940. Concerning Ponsol, AMAEC-1737-10. Rafael Ruiz, SJ, to Igual, Wuhu, 29 October 1940.

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China, saying, “In helping them in their territorial expansion, we have sacrificed our extraterritoriality rights and are at odds with Chunking and the representatives of many countries, while our missionaries are in grave danger in territories controlled by the generalísimo Chiang Kaishek.”120 Finally, on 9 November 1940, three weeks after Ramón Serrano Suñer became foreign minister, Pedro de Igual was relieved from his post, symbolizing Spain’s prevailing submissiveness toward the Axis during these years and its tendency to prioritize an Axis victory over Spanish interests. It was not surprising that Spanish diplomacy became limited to mostly going along with whatever the Axis wanted, as Madrid no longer had any room to maneuver. The change in Igual’s opinion revealed the contradictions in Spanish policy. After being outraged by Shanghai’s mayor, visiting Chongqing, and learning more about Wang Jingwei’s poor expectations, he changed his mind, pointing out that Spanish gratitude toward Germany and Italy did not mean that Spain would be tied to these countries beyond the Anti-Comintern Pact and the need to establish official relations with Chongqing in order to regain extraterritoriality rights. Igual defended his autonomy and his changing attitude in press statements, but Francoist diplomacy found itself facing a disjuncture that went beyond choosing between Wang and Jiang. Spain could not change its policy so easily, both out of general considerations but also due to the difficulty of changing its perceptions once the pro-Japan decision had been taken, pressed by Italy.121 Recognition of Wang Jingwei’s government showed the clear downfall the Spanish political autonomy around the same time as the Guomindang began to side with the Allies. After Foreign Minister Matsuoka’s failure to negotiate a pact with Chongqing and Nanjing, the Tripartite Pact, and the massive American loan to Nationalist China, Jiang no longer had any reason to succumb to Axis temptations. Overall, the Japanese government had no choice but to officially recognize Wang Jingwei in December

120 AMAEC-R-1736-10. Igual to Serrano Suñer, Shanghai, 15 October 1940, ibid. On Giuliano Cora, another diplomat accused of obstructing Fascist policy in 1938, see Samarani, 2014, pp. 57–58. 121 Samarani. 2001. Fascist Italian…P. 72; on the “Wang Jing Wei Card” Samarani, G. 2012. Italians in Nationalist China (1928–1945). In Foreigners and Foreign Institutions in Republican China, eds. Anne-Marie Brady and Douglas Brown, pp. 237–238. London and New York: Routledge.

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1940, almost a year and a half after it was planned and when it had already lost all practical value. At the time, Rome signed a “Basic Relations” agreement and retained its interest in the region, leaving one more ship in Shanghai to protect its interests starting in the summer of 1941.122 Germany delayed its recognition of Wang’s government until 11 July 1941, only after following Tokyo’s lead, as Ciano’s own diary revealed, saying “The Japanese want the Germans to recognize the government of Wang Ching-Wei [Wang Jingwei], and the Germans agreed to do so in Berlin. Von Ribbentrop has telephoned me about it.”123 Germany’s recognition, however, was not the same as Italy’s, and Madrid’s options were to recognize Wang following Romeor Berlin’s way. Spain had lost much of its the ability to maneuver and Spanish diplomats in the region were not informed about their government’s recognition of Wang. Asked by the Asia Section of the Gaimush¯ o about it, ambassador Méndez de Vigo, again, had to ask information to his Italian colleague. Spanish capacity for decision-making had dropped to a minimum and can be compared to that of the recently created Croatia. Since then, relations between Spain and central China followed a course similar to Spain’s relations with Manchukuo, that is, lack of interest in bilateralism. There were no special actions. Nanjing representation in Spain began in 1942 with a diplomat, Wang Ten-yen (Wang Deyan), assigned to Madrid, but no Spanish representative was sent to Nanjing, despite Madrid announcing to the press it would send one. Official recognition of Wang did not even help improve Spain’s extraterritoriality rights (Foreign Minister Hsu Liang limited himself to giving verbal assurances),124 and Foreign Minister Serrano Suñer did not even appear too interested, asserting “It is not possible in the current circumstances to give any legal reason, as this matter lacks a legal basis for strengthening the argument and employing or wielding it as a right. In general terms, it is

122 Payne, S. G. 1997. Franco and José Antonio. El extraño caso del fascismo español, p. 50. Barcelona: Planeta; Samarani, 2014, op. cit., p. 55. 123 Ciano, G. 1946, Diario, 1939–1943, entry for 26 June 1941, p. 428 Milán: Rizzoli; NARA-RG-59. CDF 1940-44. 894.01. Hornbeck to Hull, Washington, 3 July 1941; RG457. SIS-18756. Horikiri to Tokyo, Rome, 26 June 1941; Samarani. 2001, Fascist Italian, pp. 73–75. 124 AMAEC-R-1734-24. Maldonado, to Serrano Suñer, Shanghai, 2 June 1942; Borao, 2017, Las Miradas…, p. 264.

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natural that in this aspect Spain share the fate of other powers whose jurisdiction in China have received equal recognition.”125 Extraterritoriality was a minor issue when the fate of the world was being decided. Pro-Japan Asia The activities of other fascist-leaning countries in Asia could help us better understand relations between Japan and Spain during this period, namely Spain’s relations with Manchukuo and Thailand, as Japan had no influence on the Philippines yet during this time.126 The official expansionist Spanish book at the time, Vindications of Spain, devoted a chapter to Vietnam due to the nineteenth-century Cochinchina War, where the authors accused the French of treacherously trying to block Spain’s right to expand its empire. Relations between Manchukuo and Spain remained irrelevant. This relationship attracted international attention in late 1937, when both countries recognized each other, but this was only followed by more joint proclamations for greater cooperation. The government in Changchun was in the hands of the Kwantung army and although Japan lost its initial interest in Spain, mostly concerning Soviet weapons sent to Spain during the civil war, espionage gave new impetus. Representation of Manchukuo in Spain began in Madrid in April 1939, and two years later, its first diplomats arrived in Spain, announcing a Trade, Friendship, and Navigation Treaty, followed by more insistence on political friendship.127 Spain found it more difficult to find a niche for this new relationship. No missionaries were sent to Manchukuo and trade between the two countries never materialized. The proposal for a barter-based trade agreement ended up in a stalemate and was never ratified. Spain delayed its goal to establish permanent diplomatic representation with a friendly regime for more than three years by appointing ambassador acting as minister Méndez de Vigo as not just in Tokyo but in Changchun as well, until relations between the two countries were resumed by Foreign 125 AMAEC-R-1736-13. Maldonado to Serrano Suñer, Shanghai, 13 July 1941, which expands on the information provided in 14 May 1941. 126 Rodao, F. 2002. Franco y el imperio japonés. Imágenes y propaganda en tiempos de guerra, pp. 198–224. Barcelona: Plaza & Janes. 127 Crusats, 2019, op. cit., pp. 48–50. PRO-FO-371-23537. F1642/2154/10. Kermode to Clark Kerr. Mukden, 2 November 1939.

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Minister Serrano Suñer. In the spring of 1941, he decided to immediately assign a diplomat to Manchukuo with the “desire to completely develop relations with those countries that would mean victory for the New Order in the world.”128 However, none of his three nominees took up the post in Changchun, and in the end, Madrid appointed José González de Gregorio after he had refused to return to Spain from Beijing. He did not stay long in the city, however, after complaining about poor conditions in his hotel where, he described “the temperature fluctuated between seven and ten degrees.”129 Other than obligatory interaction and possessing little publicity value, relations between Manchukuo and Spain were of little use. Relations between Spain and Thailand had a longer history and although the Japanese had less influence over it, it followed a similar trajectory. Siam maintained its independence partly by balancing Western commercial interests (it signed trade treaties with every country that they could) and conceding relatively marginal parts of its territory, although nationalist sentiment started growing in 1932 partly due to Japanese influence. In 1938, Siam changed its name to Thailand (“land of free men”) and during Marshall Phibungsongkhram’s (Phibun) regime, the country remained in a similar position as Francoist Spain, Italy, and Manchukuo: greatly influenced by anti-Western Japanese propaganda.130 In any event, Bangkok had its own agenda. The first of its aims was permanently regaining its juridical independence and the abolition of the “Unequal Treaties.” In the 1920s, as in China, Western nations started renouncing their privileges, which ended by the second half of the 1930s, when every country explicitly renounced its privileges through a new treaty. Spain was the exception. The Civil War made it irrelevant to sign such a new treaty. Bangkok never had relations with the Spanish Republic and, in fact, there was a fake Siamese Embassy in Madrid that gave refuge to right-wing Spaniards escaping from leftist and anarchist bands—in order to rob them of their most prized possessions. Thai relations with 128 Boletín Informativo de la Falange Exterior, No. 2, Madrid, 11 June 1941. 129 AEET. González de Gregorio to Méndez de Vigo, Peking, 27 March 1942; Méndez

de Vigo to González de Gregorio, Tokyo, 17 March 1942. 130 E.g., “Tailandia, como Japón, se adhiere al nuevo orden in Extremo Oriente,” ¡Arriba!, 8 August 1941. For a history of Spanish-Thai relations, see Rodao, F. 1987. Españoles en Siam (1540–1939). Una aportación al estudio de la presencia española en Asia. Madrid: CSIC.

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the pro-Francoists, on the other hand, received help from a group of Spanish Gabrielite Brothers who worked in the most prestigious educational institution in the country, the Assumption College. The Gabrielites proposed the establishment of a permanent embassy in Bangkok, which was so well received by Francoist Foreign Ministry officials that there was talk of naming a permanent representative in an attempt to concentrate the interests of all Spanish-speaking countries in Bangkok.131 But the Siamese government prioritized Spain’s permanent refusal of its privileges. Then, in June 1939, Bangkok proposed five conditions. The Spanish response took another year and a half, despite Thai petitions for a quick reply, both directly and via Shanghai.132 The reasons for this delay are not clear, but the possibility of reaching an agreement was blocked by the “most favored nation” clause in the treaties and the modus vivendi. By the time they sent their last reply, the Pacific War had already begun. To avoid further delay, Lisbon was chosen as the place to discuss any technical issues, but then in 1943, the overall context advised Madrid to avoid contact with Bangkok and the treaty remained in limbo until the Cold War. Relations between the different empires had been suffering from too many new inputs. These included complications faced in Shanghai, a declining Italy, a failed government, misunderstandings, and expectations that were probably more important than ever. Then, a surprising new conflict begun.

Germany Invades the USSR On 21 June 1941, Hitler’s Germany invaded the Soviet Union, opening a new chapter in the world war. Containing the European war’s expansion was impossible, and it was now inexorably spreading throughout the globe, but most of all, it was a time when no one could make a reliable prediction on the conflict’s future outcome. In fact, the invasion took place just as the Third Reich and Japan redefined their aims. Hitler did not even hint about the so-called Operation Barbarossa when he met Matsuoka just two months before the attack. Neither Hitler

131 AGA-AE-5179. Foreign Under Secretary to Méndez de Vigo, Burgos, 26 July

1939. 132 AMAEC-R-P. Pedro de Igual. Igual to Juan Peche, Shanghai, 5 February 1940.

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nor his General Staff considered asking for foreign assistance to defeat the Soviet Union, preferring that the Japanese continue their southward advance and launch an offensive against Singapore.133 The consequence of Hitler not informing Matsuoka was the latter’s signature of the NonAggression Pact with Stalin on the next stage of his trip. Soon after, the Germans learned of secret conversations between Washington and Tokyo, fearing that their “sacred egoism,” as it was then known, could lead the Japanese to a separate peace understanding that would leave the Third Reich and Italy fighting alone. As a result, the Nazis changed their strategy, now hoping to convince Japan to join them in their attack on the Soviet Union. Three weeks before the expected invasion, Hitler attempted to dazzle Tokyo by inviting it to join in the Germans’ destruction of the Soviet Union and later share the bounty, but it was too late. At the same time, Japan had concluded that the United States and England were both politically and militarily inseparable.134 Tokyo became convinced that, should conflict arise with London, Washington would follow suit sooner or later regardless of any attempt to respect its interests. With this in mind, Japan’s secret talks with the United States lost some of their importance and Tokyo continued to pursue them to prevent a firm alliance between Washington and London, although they didn’t consider them a final option. After Operation Barbarossa began, Tokyo continued to adhere to the non-aggression pact, although Matsuoka himself urged the government to nullify the very same agreement that he signed. Despite this volteface, Japan stabilized its northern front in Siberia, restricting any possible action against the Soviets to “reprisals,” not “attacks.” Japan continued its southward advance in Indochina to block aid for Chongqing, and for the first time, the Navy was at the forefront. Notwithstanding the American embargo since August and the narrow margin for success, their hopes of winning the war in China and the benefits that could be enjoyed in Southeast Asia were incomparably greater than what they could gain from a hypothetical victory on the Siberian Steppes. Then, Japan refused to follow Germany’s lead for a second time, and instead, adhered to its 133 Tajima, N. 2009. Japanese-German Relations in East Asia, 1890–1945. In Japan and Germany. Two Latecomers to the World Stage, 1890–1945, eds. Kud¯o Akira, Tajima Nobuo and Erich Pauer, Vol. I, p. 25. Kent: Global Oriental. 134 Yellen, J. A. 2019. The Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. When Total Empire met Total War, pp. 126–127. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

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own non-aggression pact with the Soviets throughout the war. The Asian Empire was more concerned about its own interests than those of its fellow Axis members and Stalin gained the most from this as he could now concentrate his forces against Hitler. Domestic politics could have changed the course of the war. Matsuoka not only lost his post and criticized Konoe, but he also criticized the VicePresident of the IRAA, Hiranuma Kiichir¯o. When an attempt was made on the latter’s life, Matsuoka received the blame for it, which accelerated the loss of the Reformists’ influence to the Nipponists. In any case, there was not enough time for this internal political rebalance to influence Japan’s foreign policy since the attack on Pearl Harbor started a new phase in the war.135 With the typical diplomatic ruses, this global tragicomedy seemed to know no bounds. For Spain-Japan relations, the German invasion of the Soviet Union was not merely another episode within an endless spiral. It modified the general context. Not only had Germany attacked the Soviet Union but also permanently turned its eye toward the East, a reason to be exultant for Gen. Franco, who said “German armies are leading the battle that Europe and Christianity have longed for, for so long.”136 Madrid shifted into a new phase of “moral belligerence,” accompanied by a wave of sympathy toward the Axis, channeled through the División Azul (the Blue Division). Tokyo did not do the same, however. These different courses of action in the face of such a crucial event, although by no means bilateral, bore permanent consequences for propaganda-laden relations between the two countries. Spain’s image of Japan declined steadily. The Spanish government felt alienated toward Japan, whose objectives now seemed different from theirs, and appeared ready to shoulder German’s irritation. This allowed for open criticism of the Japanese. Not only did Spain show impatience but hoped that Allied attempts to prevent Tokyo’s entry to the war would fail. One headline in the magazine Mundo read, “Only with an Axis victory can Japan fulfil its national desires.”137 ¡Arriba! observed that the “democratic chancelleries” were “trying to convince Japan that the New Asian

135 Krebs, 2006, art. cit., pp. 195–196. 136 Statements of 17 July 1941, in Preston, P. 1993. Franco, A Biography, p. 441.

London: Harper Press. 137 20 July 1941, issue n.63, Mundo.

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Order is possible with the Russians, and consequently, with the United Kingdom.”138 As July 1941 went on, nervousness grew and the Falangist periodical reported that “Washington directed all its preparations in the Pacific towards Japan” in a clear allusion to the aid supplied by the United States to Moscow via Siberia, and that “an anti-Japanese movement in Vladivostok would provoke a crisis.”139 In August, a more critical article accused the Japanese of opportunism, saying, “Tokyo did not clearly define its attitude until it saw what was happening in the theater of the Russian war […] the policies of Washington and Tokyo have something in common, that is, the wish to avoid a two-frontal war and to obtain the greatest advantage that they could from the current situation. In other words, they want to side with the victor without waging war for the time being.”140 German influence in this increasingly direct criticism of Japan was obvious, not just because information on these peace talks came from Nazi intelligence but also because this highly critical article which equated Tokyo’s intentions with Washington’s, was explicitly inspired by another published in the Frankfurter Zeitung. If there was any doubt, Madrid made it clear which side it was on. At the end of August 1941, there was a change. Spanish ceased its criticism of Japan while Germany continued to give free reign to Japan’s favorable image. On 25 November 1941, they signed a strange protocol that extended the Anti-Comintern Pact by five more years, guaranteeing German support for any future Japanese (surprise) attack, four days after Ribbentrop learned about Japan’s plans to enter the war.141 However, this new political turn did not restore Spanish perception of Japan back to its former state, not just because it was well-known that the Pact’s extension was only for publicity purposes, but because the glowing image Spain had about Japan that we had discussed before, had begun to fade away inexorably. It ceased to be an image of an empire fighting against communism on the Asian battlefront but simply an ally that fought against some of 138 “Intenciones conocidas,” 6 July 1941.¡Arriba! 139 8 July 1941.¡Arriba! 140 Berlin correspondent Ramón Garriga, “Los tres problemas que tiene planteados Tokyo”, 12 August 1941, ¡Arriba! 141 Department of Defense. 1977. The ‘Magic’ Background of Pearl Harbor. Vol. IV, pp. 195–197. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

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Spain’s enemies. Japan was no longer an ally in the war against Moscow and an important part of its image was gone, that of being a militant anti-communist. Its ardor was in doubt. Japan’s image was further affected by an internal change in the Spanish regime. Disputes within the Falange Party took place between those who backed a German victory, led by minister Serrano Suñer, the party’s chief of ideology and doctrine, and the so-called Francofalangists, those who would rather follow the Caudillo himself than the party’s ideological principles, which included José Luis Arrese, who was in charge of appointments and activities. The great loser in the restructuring of power in mid-1941 was Serrano Suñer. Firstly, because of the appointment of a new Interior Minister (Serrano Suñer’s position before he became Foreign Minister) which had been left vacant for half a year, its duties having been assumed by Suñer’s former undersecretary. Second, because propaganda, censorship, and the creation of images fell under the responsibility of the Vice Secretariat of Popular Education, Gabriel Arias Salgado, a fundamentalist linked to religious groups such as Acción Católica (Catholic Action) and Asociación Nacional Católica de Propagandistas (National Association of Propagandists). Arias Salgado leaned more towards extreme-right ideas than Fascism and apparently won Gen. Franco’s support since he was appointed the following year as head of the Instituto de Opinión Pública (Institute of Public Opinion). A third influential factor was also influential was new purchases of food aided by the United States after the Germans rejected them. Madrid used its old commercial ties to request for wheat, cotton, and gasoline from Washington, acknowledging for the first time (although in February 1940, it tried to purchase Australian wheat), that their illusory expectations were giving way to crude reality. Relations with the Third Reich grew increasingly damaged, and the “Japanists’” arguments started to get discredited.142 The Spanish Foreign Minister, Serrano Suñer, lost a significant amount of power during this period: influence in the Interior Ministry, (the most decisive in any dictatorship), the ability to project images, and the narrative used to support his policies.

142 León-Aguinaga, P. 2022. Betting on Franco. El Chase, La World Commerce Corporation y las relaciones hispano-norteamericanas (1936–1952). In Franco, Estados Unidos y Gran Bretaña durante la Guerra Fría, coords. Joan M. Thomàs et al. Madrid: Universidad de Comillas. PRO-FO-371-24497. C2421/30/41. Petersen. Madrid, 15 February 1940.

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Over time, political changes and Japan’s refusal to attack the Soviet Union led to a slight shift in its reputation in Spain and the former’s idealized image disappeared. The ideological veil that had helped soothe friction caused by incoming information and the divergence in final objectives was losing its shape. Without the pretense of anti-communism, both countries’ friendship became much more fragile. The conservatives took control of Japan’s image, while the Falangists lost their reasons to defend it. Nevertheless, Tokyo still gave an important reason for Madrid to continue their relationship, the possibility of using its military might at the most appropriate moment. Records of Franco’s meeting with Japanese Minister Suma on 29 September 1941 at the Palace of El Pardo showed that the Caudillo was mainly interested in Japan’s military situation. The previous February, during the presentation of credentials, Gen. Franco congratulated Japan for daring to resolve the situation in China and the Far East. A conversation in September suggested that Gen. Franco envisioned his Blue Division marching into Moscow and was convinced that Japanese assistance could help him fulfill his dream. Since then, Franco’s interest in Japan became mostly military-related.143 Meanwhile, Japan’s impending invasion of Pearl Harbor attack was approaching. The American raw materials embargo on Japan began in August 1941 and after a 6 September 1941 imperial conference or gozen kaigi, Japanese authorities decided on a general plan for entering the war despite the increasing influence of the non-Fascist Nipponists. Then, in October, Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro, a man who was only prepared to confront the West dialectically, resigned. He was succeeded by T¯oj¯o Hideki who had convinced his colleagues that their country had done nothing but make concession after concession. In his view, Japan should never agree to withdraw its troops in any negotiations as this would only lead to further demands from the United States until it became the dominant power in East Asia. Meanwhile, Washington decided that the best way to preserve peace was to maintain an inflexible posture, believing that Japan would concede when faced by firm policies like it did in Shandong in 1919 and at the Washington Conference in 1922, as Secretary of War

143 The “Magic” Background…, III, No.2. Suma to Konoe, Madrid, 30 September 1941, p. 233.

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Henry Stimson recalled. Washington gave up on trying to prevent Japan’s entry into the war, just like the possibility of Spain doing the same.144 War became inevitable when both sides found that they were at the limit of their patience and that further negotiations were pointless. November saw both sides’ last chance to avoid war by gaining time through negotiations. In one final effort to maintain peace, the Americans attempted to placate the Japanese by offering to turn a blind eye to their domination of China, although this failed for several reasons. The Chinese ambassador disclosed the terms to the press and a series of failed expectations and misunderstandings arose when secret telegrams were decoded. Most importantly, it was almost impossible to stop the propagandist drift that had lasted for years, and when on 25 November, the US Secretary of State suggested to the Japanese that they restart negotiations—the socalled Hull Note—even pragmatists like Foreign Minister T¯og¯o Shigenori became convinced that war was unavoidable.145 The Japanese seemed to confirm it days later, at a 1 December gozen kaigi, where negotiations were considered over. Five days before, the Japanese Navy had secretly (i.e., without T¯ oj¯o knowing it) ordered its fleet to sail to Hawaii from the Kuriles Islands.146 The war on the United States had begun. This was not a secret to anyone, even in Spain. On the same day that Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, Mundo published a headline reading “War in the Pacific?…” This was not by chance as many knew that war was coming. In Tokyo, Ambassador Méndez de Vigo predicted the start of the war in a pencil note in a 30 November 1941 dispatch that only reached Madrid after the conflict broke out. It read, “Without the slightest error, I could attest that by the time Your Excellency [Serrano Suñer] reads this dispatch, we will be witnessing the sad spectacle of war.”147 He had access to privileged information, as did many others, in and outside Japan, but like many other democracies, the United States also needed to dispel the

144 Thomas, 2008. op. cit., p. 97. 145 Minohara, T. 2013. “No Choice but to Rise”: T¯ og¯o Shigenori and Japan’s Decision

for War. In Tumultous Decade. Empire, Society and Diplomacy in 1930s Japan, eds. Masato Kimura and Tosh Minohara, pp. 261–263. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; Kotani, K. 2009. Japanese Intelligence in World War II , pp. 156–158. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. 146 Komatsu, K. 1999. Origins of the Pacific War and the Importance of “Magic”, pp. 158, 281–282. Richmond: Japan Library. 147 Payne, Franco and José Antonio…, p. 511.

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doubts of many of those who opposed going to war. The inevitable was approaching and everyone knew it.

Lasting Consequences Axis military forces continued to achieve success during this period both in Europe and in Asia. Japan was confident that its chances of a clear victory would be greater than during the Marco Polo Incident, despite the fact that its ambitions in 1937 were limited to only conquering China. The Franco regime continued to have faith in its Civil War patrons and considered an Axis victory key to restoring Spain’s position in the world. However, it remained difficult to foresee what lay ahead after the war broke out, as enemy forces had yet to suffer many losses in battle. Both Spain and Japan worked together to secure a final victory mainly in Asia, a minor priority for Spain’s agenda that mostly centered around its former colony, the Philippines, and Japan, an empire it admired. Tokyo perceived Spanish friendship in more practical terms while Madrid mostly relied on expectations, partly due to the lack of a fully developed relationship between their two countries and due to Italian influence. There were also immense challenges for cooperation, both directly and indirectly. The potential postwar consequences for this partnership between the outbreak of the European war and Pearl Harbor were relatively mild. Both countries were interested in forgetting the “sickness” they suffered during the conflict. They managed to cover up their “little sins” during those years, largely helped by the secrecy shrouded by Franco. Indirect cooperation through third parties, however, had proven more difficult to forget. In China, both the Nationalists and Communists never forgot Spain’s support for “traitors” like Prime Minister Wang Jingwei and the Economic Mission Nanjing visit. Spain’s recognition of Manchukuo as well as its friendly dealings and unwavering support for the Japanese invasion became important handicaps when normality resumed in 1946. In the postwar years, the Guomindang, now in exile in Taiwan, rejected Madrid’s attempts to restore relations.148 They would only be resumed in June 1952, thanks largely to the mediation of the Catholic Church but most of all, because of increasing ideological polarization 148 On this, AMAEC-R-2420-23 is interesting. Martín Artajo to the Ambassador in Washington, Madrid, 20/IX/1946. My thanks to Lorenzo Delgado for providing me with a copy.

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following the outbreak of the Korean War and Washington’s pressure on the Chinese Nationalists.149 Focused on short-term objectives, Serrano Suñer, the Falangists, and their supporters played with a powder that was not theirs to burn, that of state interests. In any case, Spain’s mistake in immediately authorizing another visit to Wang Jingwei recalls another made with similar alacrity in November 1937 regarding the recognition of Manchukuo. The Foreign Affairs ministry sent its affirmative response that same day, which meant that such a decision was a simple procedural response sent by the section chief, possibly after a quick consultation with a superior or the minister. No commission or meeting ad hoc weighed in on the pros and cons of recognizing Manchukuo or authorizing a meeting with Wang Jingwei. Consul Igual “almost singlehandedly” prevented Spain’s recognition of Nanjing, as he himself later claimed (neglecting the role played by Ambassador Mendez de Vigo), and certainly the decision-making process on Asia was very thin. There was limited interest. A European or American country would have demanded greater attention. Once again, Asia was not Spain’s priority, but for the first time, Madrid had a reference for the whole region.

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CHAPTER 3

The Fighter and the Assistant

On December 7–8, 1941, with war breaking out between Washington and Tokyo, a new phase began in the ongoing unstoppable spiral of tension. The conflict was becoming global. After being concentrated for a few months in the Soviet Union, all these different clashes were clearly merging into one, with only Latin America and parts of sub-Saharan Africa somewhat spared. The new conflict’s impact on Spain was different than in June. While Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union led to people taking to the streets and volunteers singing up to fight in Russia, Pearl Harbor renewed debates in cafes on the future of the world war. Furthermore, the general context of bilateral contacts between Spain and Japan changed radically, because one country had gone to a new war and the other had not. Expectations then gave way to palpable facts and the roles changed again. Now, Japan depended on Spanish collaboration for its war effort in the two main activities that could be ascribed to a neutral country—looking after the interests of its subjects on the American Continent and collecting secret information about the United States. In turn, Spain found a former colony suffering in a time of war, the Philippines, and had to find a way to protect its interests there. Bilateral relations became more pressing than future ambitions, more of a reality than an illusion. More than before, this new phase in Spain-Japan relations went further beyond the bilateral sphere. Regarding foreign perceptions, this meant © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 F. Rodao, From Allies to Enemies, New Directions in East Asian History, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8473-0_3

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the end of spontaneous association between Spain and Japan. For Japan’s image in Spain, the sphere of expectations still included many dreams, but also fears, as these came to be entwined with concerns on the Philippines and its Hispanic heritage. More importantly, the function of news about Japan in Francoist Spain changed radically. The new participant in the war became fodder in the bitter power struggle within the Francoist regime between the Falangists and the military, with both sides using Japan in their arguments against each other. This chapter first focuses on how Spain-Japan relations and perceptions were affected by Pearl Harbor but, mostly, by the occupation of the Philippines. It then examines how the war in the Pacific affected Spain’s predictions about the future of the war and the fate of Spain and its future. The third section explores the different kind of cooperation that existed between the two countries that began after Japan entered the war and ends with an indication of how future relations would develop, based on the perspective of those suspicious of Japan once the Falangists were defeated.

The Disputed Perception of Japan After Pearl Harbor and Its Shadow On December 7, 1941, Japan took a key qualitative step in the war which had been raging for four and a half years. It officially declared war. It was impossible to maintain the masquerade. In doing so, the military leaders burst from the “incident” in China into an open confrontation like a wounded ronin, the masterless samurai of the feudal period, as Alessio Patalano asserts, “Alone, aware of their limits, they opted for an all-out fight they knew they could start, but did not know how to finish.”1 Japan’s declaration of war was a reminder to compare the invasion of Pearl Harbor with another surprise attack, the one on Russia that took place in 1904–1905. The excuse that they had no choice but to fight for peace in the East was similar, but the dynamics were quite different. War had been dragging on, but for many years, it consisted of a continuous aggregation of “minor” strategies that initially maximized tactical advantages while the Japanese army’s startling victories received wide praise 1 Patalano, A. 2015. Feigning Grand Strategy: Japan, 1937–1945. In The Cambridge History World War II , vol. I, eds. John Ferris and Evan Mawdsley, p. 188. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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from Japanese society, just as before, but the Japanese army “failed to grasp the limits of national means and resources.”2 The outbreak of the Pacific War was one of those moments when the Japanese Empire seemed eternally victorious as they made pertinent declarations of triumph, let out cries of banzai, and held long-established demonstrations of elation among the population. Nevertheless, over time, these could not hide the fact the Japanese were suffering from shortages of food and other kinds of supplies, with nothing to live on but promises of a victorious peace. The haranguing only partially hid growing internal division concerning the progress of the war. Neither the military nor any civil representative ever managed to impose absolute rule on Japanese society, perhaps because Japanese culture is somewhat obstinate both in the face of sudden change and in completely trusting their fate in the hands of others. Even the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA) was never a totalitarian party. Created by Prince Konoe to strengthen reformist efforts in demanding confrontation, it only focused on promoting extremist nationalism. Later, Gen. T¯oj¯o was never able to exercise a dictatorship, nor was he able to effectively consolidate efforts to bring victory, coordinate institutions, or promote nationalist fervor that could be steered toward the external contest. The reasons for these open disputes are clear: the IRAA could not be transformed into a party nor the strong-arm of any leader. There was no cult of personality comparable to that of Hitler or Mussolini, and the shuhan T¯oj¯o was seen by his colleagues as just a primus inter pares, not a Prime Minister as the term is usually translated. Not only did the Navy look down on him by openly disobeying his orders, but T¯oj¯o was incapable of ordering his own military staff to take concrete initiatives. Nor was he able to force them to abandon their own strategies in pursuit of the general progress of the war. The Japanese “dictator” had none of the charisma of the other Fascist leaders, much less their authority. T¯ oj¯o was aware that he wielded little power and, to make up for this, he made it clear that he was merely executing “a design from above.” Slogans mentioning a hundred million people (Japan’s population back then) speaking in one voice were used to express Japanese unity to foreigners. There existed a kind of Japanese fascism as defined by Roger

2 Ibid., p. 162.

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Griffin based on perceptions of national rebirth and palingenesis after the Manchurian Incident, but if we were to follow previous definitions and that of Ernst Nolte’s “fascist minimum,” the conclusion is the opposite. Much of what historians have described was part of the omote—what is shown to outsiders. Conversely, the ura—the internal—was less known in the West. The military had to tolerate indirect criticism from civil society, while the media strived to maintain an intellectual and critical public, occasionally publishing articles that parodied T¯oj¯o. Opposition to militarism existed in Japan although there were no important organizations that channeled it. Many Japanese must have been elated with their military victories, but what they seemed to desire most ardently was for those victories to be final and for the war to end once and for all. Distrust of the government was widespread among the population, even when the English and the Americans were falling under “yellow fire.”3 Upon learning of the attack on Pearl Harbor, many in the West thought that the news of the North American fleet’s destruction had cleared a path to an Axis victory. Hitler saw it as more of a smokescreen. After previously doubting Germany’s chances of victory in private,4 on 11 December, Hitler declared war on the United States. Seemingly triumphant, the Axis powers rushed to commit to a series of cooperation agreements that were never implemented. For example, not knowing whether the United States would attack mostly in the Pacific or in the Atlantic, they promised to compensate the most devastated parts with new ships that were never even designed. Furthermore, on 18 January 1942, they divided the world among themselves the same way Spanish and the Portuguese did nearly four and a half centuries before with the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas. Approximately, from the mouth of the Indus River on, toward the west, the territory would be German in an imaginary planetary “pie” based on agreements of cooperation that were just declarations of intent and only revealed the excitement of the early days. But there was never any talk of joint military command or subordinating

3 Shillony, B.-A. 1991. Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan, passim. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198202608.001.0001 4 Martin, B. 1995. Japan and Germany in the Modern World, p. 257. Oxford: Berghahn Books.

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one’s troops to the other’s command, while military and financial coordination was rare. For all their dissection and discussion on how to divide the pie, they ended up with no slice at all. Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano received a call from his German colleague, Joachim von Ribbentrop, who asked him to have Italy join Germany in its declaration of war against the United States. In his famous diary, he ended the paragraph with a question for which he would never receive an answer, “And Spain?”5 Beyond the official declarations, the response was certainly mixed. Spain officially pursued a strongly Axis-aligned policy of “non-belligerence.” After a visit from the North American Ambassador Alexander W. Weddell and the Japanese Minister Suma Yakichir¯o, Serrano Suñer sent a congratulatory telegram to Tokyo for its victories and, beaming with joy, instructed the staff under him to also congratulate the Japanese Legation in Madrid.6 The official press did the same. The influential weekly Mundo, for example, expressed its enthusiasm with florid language that was so common at the time, revealing a flicker of anticipation that had emerged once more in the image of Japan, saying, “The present universal conflagration will serve as an instrument for the New Order, which Spain desires. It is faith and hope make us bravely overcome the harsh trials that the whole world is going through.”7 In other scenarios, the response was different. In Tokyo, as soon as he heard the radio news reporting that “the Navy and the Army” had entered into hostilities in Hawaii, the Philippines, and Guam, the Spanish ambassador went to the nearby American Embassy to ask for more news to his friend Joseph Grew, with whom he dined last night, together with both wives. Ambassador Joseph Grew was with Japanese Foreign Minister T¯og¯o Shigenori, who told him about the breakdown of US-Japanese relations but remained silent that war had broken out. So, it was Mendez de Vigo who informed the American ambassador about Pearl Harbor and Japan’s declaration of war when he returned to the embassy at nine in the morning. Grew immediately telephoned T¯og¯o to confirm but was told

5 Ciano, G. 1946. Diario, 1939–1943, p. 481. Milan: Rizzoli. 6 Saña, H. 1982. El franquismo sin mitos. Conversaciones con Serrano Suñer, p. 243.

Barcelona: Grijalbo; on his pleasure, Preston, 1993, op. cit., p. 448. No documentation has been found in the AMAEC concerning this reaction. 7 Mundo, No. 84, 14 December 1941.

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that the Foreign Minister was unaware about any of it—before officially being informed an hour later.8 In Spain, the Japanese reignited internal tensions among the various sectors of Francoism, which can be seen in the two different images. On the one hand, there were optimists who thought that the blow on the United States would be enough to immobilize the Allied armies for several years, during which time they would not be able to withstand victorious pressure from the armies of the totalitarian countries. On the other hand, there were the skeptics, who chose to concentrate on the pernicious consequences of Japanese advances in Asia and longed for a return to the colonial days. These tensions reflected different political positions but, more importantly, opposing military predictions. Consequently, the Army Superior Council (Consejo Superior del Ejército, a consultative body) warned about making risky decisions and cautioned Gen. Franco to not accept any compromise regarding foreign policy without asking them. One of them, Gen. Alfredo Kindelán, who had been bribed by the United Kingdom, directly told Franco that the route they took was wrong, but the Council did not ask for Foreign Minister Serrano Suñer´s dismissal.9 Data points to expectations of the war pointing in both directions. On the one hand, Japan’s image in the eyes of Spain glowed as brightly as ever, with Minister Suma telling the Japanese press that his back was sore from so much congratulatory backslapping and that he even heard Franco himself say during the New Year’s dinner, “It was marvellous how the remarkable strategy of the Imperial Japanese forces brought home

8 AMAEC-R-3195-27 and AGA-AE-5160. Méndez de Vigo to Serrano Suñer, Tokyo, 21 April 1942. In his memoirs, Grew does not reveal who informed him about the start of the war, although he writes that he proposed that Spain should represent Japanese interests throughout the conflict. Grew, J. C. 1944. Ten Years in Japan, 1939–1942. New York: Simon and Schuster. Vid. also F. Rodao, España y la guerra del Pacífico, El País, 8 December 1991. 9 Sáenz-Francés, E. 2009. Entre la antorcha y la esvástica. Franco en la encrucijada de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, pp. 236–237. Madrid: Actas; Rodao, F. 1997. España y Pearl Harbor. El estallido de la guerra del Pacífico y sus repercusiones en el contexto político español. In España y el Pacífico, ed. Antonio García-Abásolo, pp. 283–294. Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba; Marquina, A. 2014. Ramón Serrano Suñer at the Helm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Spain Becomes a Member of the Axis and Losses Its Neutrality. UNISCI Discussion Papers, 36: 120. https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/ www/pag-72480/UNISCIDP36-9MARQUINA.pdf.

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suddenly to all England and the United States the horrors of war. This will give you an idea of what the spirit of Japan is like.”10 On the other hand, expectations were gradually replaced by day-to-day difficulties and specifically, the need to receive American products. Oil supply was cut off in December, and economic reality gave Washington the most convincing means to enforce its alternative perception; that is, the Axis was not a sure bet for the outcome of the war. In fact, Madrid was on the way to accept American demands to impose complete control of distribution with the excuse of preventing their later resale to the Axis. Time was on Washington’s side and Madrid reduced the most irritating aspects of its collaboration with the Axis as shown in the directive for the suppression of the Foreign Falange’s activities. Moreover, even though American policy had never been openly linked with Japan, a December 13 press release forbidding comments on Spain’s attitude to the war11 indicated the need to preserve such supplies after Pearl Harbor. Serrano Suñer was discredited in the government when oil and food were at stake, as shown by a comment from Gen. Franco to Minister of Industry and Commerce Demetrio Carceller: “We have a Minister of Foreign Affairs who refuses to know anything about economic issues.”12 It can even be said that supporting pro-Japanism became more difficult. After Pearl Harbor, criticizing Japan was permissible, since an informational analysis of the Pacific War had fewer political implications than the one in Europe. It also allowed the conservatives to indirectly express their doubts about the Axis’ chances. Supporting the United States against the Japanese might have been politically incorrect, but it was a more understandable and permissible attitude. Furthermore, it was not as easy to flatter Japan as before. Information that favored Japan was often little more than propaganda aimed at the Japanese and their allies. There was such a lack of credible information that Serrano Suñer himself had to ask the ambassadors of Britain, Portugal, Japan, and the Vatican for reliable data about the Japanese, as the information he received from the Spanish Embassy in Tokyo was poor. Hitler’s inability to deliver a final 10 NARA-RG-457. SIS-27587. Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 4 January 1942. It has been written that Franco was just as pleased as Serrano Suñer, but it has not been proven; Carrero Blanco, L. 1959. Guerra aeronaval en el Pacífico, p. 144. Madrid: Idea. 11 Sevillano Calero, F. 2000. Ecos de papel. La opinión de los españoles en la época de Franco, p. 61. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva. 12 Preston, 1993, op. cit., p. 462.

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blow against the Soviet Union and recent Italian losses in Africa exacerbated the need for new convenient data in order to adapt expectations and predictions through Japanese victories, but they needed more than simple propaganda. In fact, Spain’s admiration for Japan changed slightly when had its greatest military victories in her history. While the Spaniards still prayed for the Japanese’s success in China, only the Axis-sponsored press displayed previously uncontained pro-Japanese fervor, while no declarations were made by either Gen. Franco or Minister Serrano Suñer.13 While, there was an interesting article published in ¡Arriba! a few days after the fall of Manila in which despite containing harsh criticism of the United States, the paper was careful not to openly praise Japan. Anti-US sentiment overrode “Japanist” sentiment. Whether it was due to disappointment of not having attacked the USSR or for invading the Philippines, this was the first consequence of Pearl Harbor. Difficult Pro-Japanism in the Philippines Madrid had speculated that the US-Japanese rivalry could turn out to be beneficial for its interests in the Philippines. Some had even expressed a preference for a hegemonic Tokyo over a hegemonic Washington, partly because they saw Japan’s influence as more transitory and as a lesser evil, but the Japanese invasion of Manila put an end to that. An article written by Rodolfo Reyes in the column Hispanidad (Hispanicity) published in Mundo magazine on 7 December 1941 revealed a radical shift, claiming that Spanish influence could coexist in the Philippines alongside American colonization, saying “But without any interest in reconquest, and without disproportionate arrogance for the possible, Spain can socially co-exist with the definite influence that is at work today in the archipelago […]. The instrument exists and must be carefully handled lest it arouses suspicion in the all-powerful political and international controller […] thus, our concern and our tact should be directed towards keeping [the Philippines] within our spirituality, which is all that HISPANICITY aspires for.”14 Reyes not only discounted possible expectations of retaking the

13 4 January 1942. Ref. in Preston. 1993, op. cit, pp. 451–452. Foltz, C. Jr. 1948. The Masquerade in Spain, p. 168. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 14 Reyes, Roberto, “Filipinas,” 7 December 1941, Mundo.

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archipelago, but also indicated a clear preference for North American dominion over that of the Japanese. Reyes also openly advocated for Philippine independence, saying “Our most ardent desire as Spaniards consists of overcoming geographic fate and preserving independent, civilized, and Christian life in the Philippines.” Decades-old cognitive reasoning of the archipelago’s “civilized and Christian” people “suckled and raised by Spain” met a new challenge. Japan could conquer their neighbor territories. Reyes had no qualms about the Japanese taking the rest of the region, saying, “Japan may occupy Dutch or British Colonies, or the so-called ‘Malay people.’” Weeks later, Mundo tried to explain again this contradiction, saying, “Geographic fate placed the Philippine Islands in the middle of the fight for dominion over the Pacific. The United States wanted to turn it into a barrier, and Japan needs it as a bridge to the southern seas. The most remote descendant of Hispanicity finds itself at the gravest crossroads in its destiny.”15 Both the Falangists and conservatives feared future events in the Philippines. Although some desires were positive, fear prevailed over their expectations. News in the press became the new scenario for disputes. While ¡Arriba! inserted telegrams from the Spanish consul in Manila that reported that all the Spaniards were well and that most preferred to stay in the capital, the conservative ABC spread news it received via the EFE agency in New York about the death of a nun killed in Iloilo, Panay.16 After receiving the translation of a Japanese telegram from Tokyo, the Foreign Ministry then issued a statement: “To calm any Spaniards who have relatives or interests in the Philippines, and as an extension of yesterday’s press release which reported that a Spanish nun had been the only Spanish victim of bombings in the Philippine archipelago, it must be added that other informative sources clarify that this nun was only wounded.”17 The additions had a clear pro-Japanese tone, saying, “For this reason, in highlighting the small number of civilian victims of bombings by the Japanese air force, Tokyo’s government has declared that their planes strictly target military objectives in their attacks on the Philippines, since even wounding one victim must

15 24 December 1941, Mundo. 16 AMAEC-R-2910-8. Telegram in English from Del Castaño to Serrano Suñer. 17 AMAEC-R-2910-8. Final version modified by Serrano Suñer who adds, next to

stylistic corrections, “the Government of Tokyo.”

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be lamented by the Spanish community, which has close to fifty religious institutional buildings as well as several cultural centers and commercial establishments.”18 Information and the many wealthy families with ties to the territory came to be a dangerous political test. Washington Embassy stepped in after this pro-Japanese statement, which had been disguised as an attempt at “guiding popular sentiment,” as referred to by Serrano Suñer to Minister Suma. US Ambassador Alexander Weddell angrily attacked the Spanish Foreign Ministry, calling it a “mouthpiece” for the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and pointed out that pro-Japanese communications could not remain without a public response. Therefore, to avoid giving a “false impression,” Weddell requested on the record that his written statement be given as much publicity as the previous communications from America’s enemy. Serrano Suñer replied that he would answer “even though your tone and intention would excuse my response.” Of course, he denied Weddel’s accusation which he called “malicious.” And to demonstrate it, Serrano Suñer revealed his (personal) pro-Japanese expectations. He contrasted Consul Del Castaño’s inability to send encoded messages at the time with the “freely drafted” reports from Manila that he expected to receive in the future.19 Serrano Suñer must have been very intimidated. Then, the data provided by consul Del Castaño confirmed the news of the destruction of Churches caused by Japanese bombardments limited his range of options and the Foreign minister limited to order that the Japanese be informed of the location of Spanish-owned buildings to prevent greater destruction.20 The Minister’s moderation emboldened the American Embassy, which then continued to divulge information about Japanese aerial attacks, sending copies of his verbal notes to all diplomatic representatives. Consequently, Serrano Suñer stopped making statements to the press, and it was probably the reason why Weddel stepped down in March under the pretext of health problems, as pointed by a German newspaper.21 18 Different versions were sent to different representations, including the EFE agency. AMAEC-R-2910-8. Weddell to Serrano Suñer, Madrid, 31 December 1941. 19 A draft press release sent to the EFE agency, Madrid, 30 December 1941. 20 AMAEC-R-2910-8. 28 December 1941. 21 NARA-RG-84. E-3161, bx. 68. Stewart to Beaulac, Zürich, 25 March 1942 annex Das Reich, Berlin, 20 March 1942. AMAEC-R-2910-8. Weddell to Serrano Suñer, Madrid, 5 January 1942. Thomàs, J. M. 2016. Catolicismo, antitotalitarismo y franquismo

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The Philippines was instrumental in diluting previous expectations about Japan and in proving them to be nothing more than an illusion. A comment made by Franco to Suma early in the year, which coincided with the arrival of Japanese troops in the Philippines, showed that the future of all things Hispanic in the islands was becoming an increasingly concerning matter. He said, “I know that you Japanese are going to take full account of the fact that culturally and historically the Philippines are Spanish.”22 In Tokyo, Méndez de Vigo took it upon himself to stir fears, reporting that the Japanese press was echoing criticism of the power of the Catholic Church in the Philippines or the “decrepit Spanish Monarchy” of 1898, even claiming that “Japan has freed the Filipino people from the oppression of American and Spanish regimes of the past.” There was no such anger against Spain. None of the articles on which the information was based highlighted this criticism in their headlines, nor did they express any particular grudge.23 Nevertheless, Spanish sensitivity to the subject, along with the importance given to it by the monarchist diplomat, made Madrid sense the irreconcilability of Japanese and Spanish interests in the archipelago. On time, Serrano Suñer’s expectations on the Philippines proved to be completely false. Neither could Falangist consul Del Castaño alleviate the isolation of the Minister. For almost a month and a half, he was unable to send messages but by the time he could, it was with the same restrictions experienced by the Americans after Pearl Harbor. Telegrams had to be transmitted first to Tokyo, unencoded and in English. Even though Falangists ruled the Ministry and Serrano Suñer was their boss, and despite sharing the expansionist desires of Francoism, Mendez de Vigo and many other conservatives also openly criticized the pro-Japanese faction24 Ambassador Méndez de Vigo dared to report to Madrid on his

durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial y la inmediata postguerra: Carlton J.H. Hayes. In Estados Unidos, Alemania, Gran Bretaña, Japón y sus Relaciones con España entre la Guerra y la Postguerra (1939–1953), ed. J. M. Thomás, p. 14. Madrid: Universidad Pontificia de Comillas. 22 NARA-RG-457. SIS-27587. Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 4 January 1942. 23 NARA-RG-457. SIS-28884. Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 24 January 1942; MS of 26

May 1943; AMAEC-R-3195-24. Méndez de Vigo to Serrano Suñer, Tokyo, 14 January 1945. 24 On his background as Spain Ambassador, Rodao, 1993; Lottaz, P. 2017. Violent Conflicts and Neutral Legations: A Case Study of the Spanish and Swiss Legations in

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friendship with the American colleague, Joseph Grew, at the Pearl harbor attack, and relayed his fears of anti-Western radicalization, asserting that the Japanese made no effort to distinguish between friends or enemies. “They open fire with equal fury against the Spanish and the AngloSaxons,” wrote Méndez de Vigo. The previous expectation of friendly kindness by the Japanese toward the Spanish had now been doused with cold water. The Minister lost. When the Japanese Legation handed him another text concerning the apparent calm in Manila’s Spanish Community, the minister’s reaction was different. The idea was that this could be disseminated as an official Ministry statement and minister Suma suggested: “You can disclose a telegram as if it came from the Consul General in Manila, in the sense that the Spanish community in the Philippines was well and that their conditions remained unchanged,” but this was not accepted by Serrano Suñer.25 He released neither the Japanese communiqué nor del Castaño’s first telegram from Japanese Manila. The minister was paralyzed by the American accusation that he was “sustaining and protecting the inhuman acts committed by Japan,” and so, he limited himself to asking the Japanese to transmit an enigmatic message to Del Castaño, which read, “Spanish subjects in Cuba are well.”26 The dispute ended in such a crushing defeat for Serrano Suñer that not even those who had caused the problem—the Japanese—were told about it. He asked Suma to do something that would calm the “anxiety” of the Spaniards and ease the atmosphere, although he recognized that “‘in view of the emergence at the time, a little of this sort of thing would have to be overlooked.”27 Suma himself understood that Spain was complying with their best expectations, referring to Spain’s “good feeling” toward Japan, which were stronger than their feelings toward Germany or Italy.28 The Falangists were forced to assume erroneous perceptions. Their image of the Americans as divided and of the United States as a country

Wartime Japan. New Global Studies, 11-2: 90–95. https://doi.org/10.1515/ngs-20170018. 25 AMAEC-R-1913-5. Miura to Sandoval, Madrid, 20 January 1942. 26 NARA-RG-457. SIS-28546. Madrid, 17 January 1942. 27 Conversation of December 1941, in MS 16 May 1943; NARA-457. SIS28361. Suma to T¯og¯o, Madrid, 8 January 1942. 28 NARA-RG-457. SIS-28900. Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 5 January 1942.

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incapable of fighting a costly war was being revealed as incorrect, partly because the Japanese had given them reason to unite. Furthermore, events in Manila ended up dampening the jubilation of the Falangists. Then, in December 1941, after receiving some comments from Franco himself, Serrano Suñer asked Suma if he would do something to calm the “anxiety” of the Spanish and to quieten the atmosphere, although he recognized that “in view of the emergency of the times, we must overlook some of these matters.”29 After this petition, Suma informed Tokyo that Serrano Suñer’s Japanese policy “faced opposition and was in danger.” He specifically mentioned that there was “evidence that his under-officials are exercising a sort of passive resistance, in addition to which high military circles, as well as the wealthy class, are always in the closest touch with the Philippines. The business world, too, is raising its voice against the incompetence of the Foreign Office.”30 Then, at the end in January 1942, at a dinner, Serrano Suñer asked Suma for the first time about conditions of the Spanish Community in the islands and about the Japanese press’s attacks on the Spanish period. The minister’s scope of action was shirnking due to Japan’s occupation of Spain’s former colony. With this argument, Suma managed to get Tokyo to answer him. Minister T¯og¯o had to lie. Regarding the problems with the telegrams, he said that they were due to ongoing complications and the impossibility of passing them through anywhere but Tokyo. Furthermore, he stated that “in actual fact we are closing our eyes” by allowing del Castaño to look after the interests of the Spaniards, although, “of course,” not in the same way as he could during peacetime. He added that only Del Castaño was granted this privilege and asked that it remains a secret from other countries.31 It was not a particularly gratifying response. Suma realized that friendship and cooperation with Madrid were at stake, and expressed his displeasure in a telegram to T¯ og¯o, saying “There is simply no excuse for this bungling in our relations with a friendly country and this re-opening of old sores. Please take steps so that, in the future, strictness will be observed in the publications of such articles.”32

29 Conversation of December 1941, in MS of 16 May 1943; NARA-RG-457. SIS28361. Suma to T¯og¯o, Madrid, 8/I/1942. 30 NARA-RG- 457. SIS-29433/4. Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 22 January 1942. 31 NARA-RG-457. SIS-29818. T¯ og¯o to Suma, Tokyo, 13 February 1942. 32 Questions were asked on 16 January 1942, they appear in MS of 26 May 1943.

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Spain and the Globalization of the War The new conflict entailed direct consequences for Spanish presence in the world, despite it taking place in such a distant territory. Facing a new twist in the war, the Franco Regime was forced to reconsider its future place in the world in three crucial aspects—first, in foreign relations, especially with its closest friends in the Western Hemisphere and the Iberian Peninsula; second, in its role in the war, forced by a military strategy where the sea was a crucial setting; and third, in domestic politics, since the disputes between the regime’s two factions were aggravated and could derail. Old Friends Against Imperial Japan Two new events where Japan played an indirect role clearly showed how Serrano Suñer’s enemies were more forceful than he expected: the Iberian Bloc and the 1942 Río Conference. We will start with Portugal since the new war reinforced the rapprochement between both countries—albeit in a sinuous way—and follow with Latin America. Ten days after Pearl Harbor, an Australian-Dutch detachment took Portuguese Timor for “preventive” measures, supposedly to defend the other half of the island, which was under Dutch sovereignty, and to protect Portuguese territory from Japanese ambitions. The Portuguese sent two warships, João Belo and Gonçalvez Zarcos, but the Japanese had begun their occupation of the island on 19 February before the arrival of the ships, which returned to India without suffering any casualties.33 In spite of Japan’s occupation of its territory, Lisbon did not declare war on Tokyo due to Macao being threatened in China, but also, because the purpose of the British maneuver (upon the suggestion of North American Admiral Thomas C. Hart) was to complicate Tokyo’s original objectives and to prevent the Japanese occupation of neutral territory. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, Portuguese Prime Minister and head of Foreign Affairs, not only angrily protested the occupation, but also rejected British excuses diplomatically. Spain, again, interpreted the events with two completely opposing points of view. ¡Arriba! strongly criticized London’s maneuvers, calling its excuses doors behind which the ultimate aims of the occupation could

33 NARA-RG-457. SIS-30116. Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 23 February 1942.

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be worked out, and denouncing the violation of Lisbon’s neutrality.34 On the other hand, however, ABC not only dared to highlight the difficult position Lisbon was in, but also legally justified London’s preventative occupation and its authority over Portuguese neutrality, recalling that the mutual agreement between Portugal and the United Kingdom authorized the deployment of the island as an operational base against Japan.35 Timor contributed to the rapprochement between the two Iberian countries. Until then, relations were especially tense, specially in 1940, when Spain toyed with the idea of conquering Portugal, and Serrano Suñer even advised Lisbon to immediately break off relations with the U.K. and sign a military alliance with Spain, or prepare for a German invasion.36 But Pearl Harbor and Timor were a “turning point” and led to a meeting between professor Salazar and the caudillo Franco where they openly proclaimed the Iberian Bloc as a neutral space, with declarations (no formal agreements) of solidarity against foreign intruders. It was something new. Pro-Axis Spain was strengthening its ties with a country whose public opinion was pro-Allies. It was Spain’s first neutralist turn from its German patrons, eventually facilitating a gradual reduction of Italy’s participation in the war.37 Since then, part of Portugal was occupied by Japan. Prime Minister Salazar pointed out that the Portuguese soldiers sent by Lisbon could have defended the island had they arrived in time. The crisis was later resolved reasonably well except for the Falangists and Australia, whose resentment increased as the British tried to solve their problems with Portugal.38 Pearl Harbor, on the other side, delivered a heavier blow on Spanish relations with Latin America. Following the attack, the Third Meeting of the Inter-American Conference for the Consolidation of Peace was held in Rio de Janeiro on 15–29 January 1942, in accordance with American continental agreements on reciprocal aid adopted in Havana 34 ¡Arriba!, 17/XII/1941; da Rocha, C. Vieira. 1996. Timor. Ocupação japonesa durante a segunda guerra mundial, pp. 35–38, n.p. 35 ABC, Madrid, 21 December 1941. Gunn, G. 1994. A Critical View of Western Journalism and Scholarship on East Timor, pp. 47–48. Manila: Asia Publishers. 36 Jiménez, J. C. 2019. Franco y Salazar. La respuesta dictatorial a los desafíos de un mundo en cambio, 1936–1968, p. 105. Madrid: Sílex. 37 Ibid., pp. 109–111. 38 Tarling, N. 2013. Britain and Portuguese Timor, 1941–1976, p. 28. Clayton, VIC:

Monash University Publishing.

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in 1940, which foresaw automatic meetings in case of an attack on American territory by an extra-continental country. The twenty-one countries of the American Continent met to discuss common policy amid high anti-Japanese fervor, making it easy for Washington to pursue its ambition to create a unanimous rupture in relations between the Axis and the continent. It was a very complicated attempt, considering the different relationships the Latin American countries maintained with Vichy France.39 Washington’s attempt failed due to Argentina’s opposition, led by its Foreign Minister Enrique Ruiz Guiñazú, who was considered to be “a supporter of the authoritarian regimes, a pro-Hispanist, and deeply antiNorth American.”40 Ruiz Guiñazú complained about the contradiction he saw in adopting joint measures when some countries had already declared war on or broken relations with the Axis. He even went as far as to say that an attack on the United States’ “Asiatic” positions in the middle of the Pacific did not constitute an offense against the American Continent. But despite Argentina’s attempt to create a Southern Bloc in favor of neutrality, only Chile followed suit, maintaining a “business as usual” approach while his public opinion was fearful of a Japanese attack on its coastline.41 The conference developed amid the financial influence of Washington, anti-Japanese sentiment among many of the participants, and the reluctance of the Argentines and the Chileans to sign a declaration that would make breaking with the Axis inexcusable. Economic pressure from the north carried more weight than the convenience of coordinating with the south, and the final text recommended that the American republics break off diplomatic relations with Japan, Germany, and Italy due to Japan being the aggressor while the other two did not.42 In fact, even Argentina and Chile’s neutrality was relative—while trade with the United

39 Rodao, 2016, art. cit., pp. 218–219. 40 Sanchís Muñoz, J. R. 1992. La Argentina and la Segunda Guerra Mundial, p. 294.

Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano. 41 Mount, Graeme. 2002. Chile and the Nazis: From Hitler to Pinochet, p. xix. Toronto: Black Rose Books. 42 Sanchis Muñoz, 1992, op. cit., p. 132.

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States (considered a non-belligerent country) was allowed, it was expressly prohibited with other countries, even with the United Kingdom.43 Rio de Janeiro was a relative success for State Department Undersecretary Summer Welles and Ruiz Guiñazú. For Welles, it was because he was able to garner general support, even though he was unable to cause a unanimous breakup of relations with the Axis, as well as obtain other benefits for the Allies, such as opening the continent’s ports to their warships. For Ruiz Guiñazú, it was because he had made his different stance clear, even without preventing the conference from leaning toward Washington. Although criticized for his obstinacy, he received passionate praise for his refined defense of Argentina’s honor, albeit temporary. The great loser at the Rio summit, however, was Spain’s foreign policy. The new fascist-leaning policy started in June 1940 and intensified after the arrival of Serrano Suñer, but in Rio, it failed. Spain’s influence in Latin America reached its lowest point in many years,44 and this time, the Japanese could be blamed, since its attack on Hawaii created a common enemy for the whole continent. It led to the defeat of “pan-Hispanism” by “pan-Americanism.” In fact, Rodolfo Reyes recalled it in Mundo, making a similar argument as the Argentine Chancellor: “This aggression has existed—that is true—but in Asia, and on positions covered by the North American flag […] but not on American soil.”45 Minister Serrano Suñer, the champion of the Japanese, could hardly reply with anything but conjectures about the chances of a future Axis victory. Consequently, Spanish links with Latin American countries decreased to its lowest levels in history. The 450th anniversary of Columbus’ arrival in the Western Hemisphere was limited to a joint communique between Portugal, Spain, Chile, and Argentina to promote peace with the Vatican, at the same time as the celebration was canceled.46

43 Ruiz Moreno, I. J. 1997. La neutralidad argentina en la Segunda Guerra Mundial, pp. 64–92. Buenos Aires: Emecé, with documents from the personal archive of Ruiz Guiñazú. 44 Thomàs, 2008, op. cit., pp. 38–40, 50. 45 Mundo, 15 February 1942. Huguet, M. La política exterior del franquismo (1939–

1975). In La política exterior de España, 1800–2003, coord. Juan Carlos Pereira, p. 498. Barcelona: Ariel. 46 NARA-RG-457. E-9006. Italian chage d’affairs to Ambassador De Rossi, Buenos Aires, 3 November 1942., cit in MS de 7 November 1942.

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With this defeat, the Japanese realized that using Spain as a springboard to the American continent had become meaningless and further ideas were left to stagnate. There were plans, for example, to set up a radio station that was going to broadcast Japanese propaganda to Latin American audiences in Spanish, including interviews of Spanish and Portuguese officials in the Philippines, but it never came up again.47 The project was abandoned not just because many of these countries had already broken off diplomatic relations with Japan, but also because collaboration in Latin America had become pointless. Hispano-Japanese political collaboration declined. Militarist Interest in the Pacific War The new war was of special interest to the military in Spain, who perceived the sea as the main stage for the conflict. Besides the historical interest in the Philippines and the well-known expectation that Japan was planning a final offensive in Siberia, the Spanish weighed the importance of such long distances and the critical role of warships. Firstly, the sea was essential to military strategists in Madrid. Any scenario that involved Spanish participation in the war, or the maintenance of territorial independence, involved the Navy. The sea would be an obvious base for Spanish operations with the Balearics, located so temptingly close enough to attract foreign ambitions, and the Canary Islands, situated so far away from the Peninsula and containing its only refinery. Furthermore, Japan had one of the major fleets in the world at the time, which brought renewed attention from the press as well as officials. In Shanghai, Consul Álvaro Maldonado made clear references to the possibility of learning from the Japanese example even before hostilities began, pointing out that “the case of Japan is still a lesson for us to take advantage of and has a lot to teach us. Only by the Spanish turning their eyes towards sea routes will Spain be able to place itself in its rightful position among the primary world powers.”48 They especially observed developments in Singapore, due to the reputation of its impregnable fortifications and its similarities with Gibraltar. In one of the few occasions Gen. Franco spoke with Suma, the caudillo said

47 NARA-RG-457. SIS-26584. T¯ og¯o to Suma, Tokyo, 18 and 23 December 1941. 48 AMAEC-R-1737-13. Maldonado to Serrano Suñer, Shanghai, 7 July 1942.

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to him, “I am sure that soon Singapore will also fall. Then, I believe, the war in the Pacific will be over.”49 Singapore did fall, yet despite Japan’s great victory, the war did not end, and the press predicted that the next attack would be on the Indian subcontinent. They were correct and, at the beginning of April, the Nagumo fleet attacked the eastern British fleet at Ceylon, although they failed to destroy them. Nagumo returned to Japan and sailed again immediately even though many of his vessels remained in dock for repairs. When seeking the next battle, the Japanese Admirals had spent more time covering distance than preparing themselves for the coming challenges. Their non-victories in present-day Sri Lanka and the Midway atoll were not just caused by intelligence failures. Instead of Spain learning from Japan, in any case, the Japanese probably should have learned from Spain and the difficulties its Imperial Navy faced in the late nineteenth century, caused by the distances between the Caribbean, Equatorial Africa, the Philippines, and Micronesia. Japan’s possible attack against the Soviet Union was the other main military concern. Despite the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of 1941, Spanish officials thought that Tokyo would end up following the German example and attack the USSR, believing that with its powerful Guandong (Kant¯o) Army stationed in Manchuria, it could attack Siberia at any given moment. Violating the Pact was one of the main assets of Japan in Spain, including those groups with conservative leanings, such as Méndez de Vigo, who fueled these expectations in February 1942 by pointing out that after Japan’s most recent military successes, “the opinion that Japan will help Germany in its upcoming Russian offensive by attacking Vladivostok, is spreading.”50 Franco himself was so interested in this possibility that he suggested such an attack on several occasions. In January 1942, for example, he made comments to Suma about the grave problem posed by the Soviets, adding “…and the people are saying that either Spain or Japan will have to save the situation, if it is not too late.”51 He also used another elaborate formula to encourage Japan to attack, saying, “I feel that, in its strategy against the United States and England and its Neutrality Pact

49 Conversation held on 3 January 1942, appearing in MS of 23 October 942. 50 AMAEC-R-1913-5. Méndez de Vigo to Serrano Suñer, Tokyo, 12 February 1942. 51 NARA-RG-457. SIS-27587. Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 4 January 1942; in MS 23

October 1942.

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with the Soviets, Japan’s position in the Far East, though complicated, is an exceptional one and, without its positive assistance, I am afraid that the war is going to last a long time.”52 Without implicating his own country, Franco expressed an opinion shared by many who considered an attack from the rear as the only possibility of defeating the Soviet Union. Japan Inside Domestic Politics Since 1942, discussions on the future of the war continued in Spain in a different way, less impressed by the attack while following the news of numerous Japanese military conquests in Southeast Asia, much to the Spanish Foreign Minister’s favor. The analysis of military events carries a breadth of subtleties in the internal dispute within the Francoist regime that provide an understanding of the changing representations, and to go beyond the generalization pitting Falangists against militarists. In this regard, we will analyze three elements of this debate, which often centered on concrete aspects rather than on analysis concerning the final Axis victory.53 Firstly, the “Japanists” adopted an anti-German tone. The increasingly crushing German hegemony in the Axis made its acolytes desire the existence of another power with which they could unite in order to recover the balance that had been completely lost. Italian Foreign minister Ciano’s diary reveals the secret joy of those who, as he wrote, “accentuate news of the Japanese to spite Germany.” Although he himself was pro-German, he noted that Mussolini was among those who took delight in upsetting the troubled leadership of the Nazis, saying, “[Mussolini] is always pro-Japanese, and the more he likes the Japanese, the less he likes the Germans.”54 Serrano Suñer felt similarly. He especially disliked his German counterpart, Joachim von Ribbentrop, as Suma later recalled when he was no longer minister, saying “At this time, when Germany has become too powerful, he [Serrano Suñer] would like to put the small 52 Idem. 53 Marquina, A. 1995. La política exterior. In España y el mundo actual (1939–1975),

eds. José Andrés-Gallego, Juan Valverde, Juan Linz, Nazario González and Antonio Marquina, p. 455. Madrid: Gredos; Payne, 1997, op. cit., p. 559. 54 Ciano, 1946, op. cit., entries for 3 March 1942 (p. 523) and 15 March 1942 (p. 528).

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countries of Europe in a position to somehow neutralize or at least set up some way to deal with Germany through a country comparable to her in strength.”55 This was an important reason for Serrano Suñer’s “Japanism”: partly anti-North American but also carrying a component of reservation toward the Germans. The role of the Catholic Church in Spanish politics adds a second nuance. The Catholic hierarchy was wary of the “statist rhetoric” of the Falange,56 but in a different way than the Nazis, since Southern Europeans took into account the religiosity of the population, and their influence. Then, since Japanese propaganda asserted they protected religions in the occupied territories, it helped Serrano Suñer in his efforts to improve relations with the Church, offering to mediate with Tokyo to maintain and support the Catholic faith in the Philippines and in the rest of Asia.57 The establishment of relations between the Vatican and Tokyo turned out to be highly appropriate for the Falange, which had always sought an active role for Spain within the Axis in order to have a foothold in Axis-occupied Muslim countries. The option of Japan as defender of religion was not unrealistic. In Spain, the Japanese made an effort to attend the religious angle when it came to attracting occupied populations and the mass media reported on it. For instance, there was a program broadcasting on Japan by just-returned Father Escursell as well as many press reports on topics related to this, such as the creation of the Kirishitan Bunka Kenky¯ u kai (the Association for the Study of the Christian Religion).58 And the historical nexus, lastly, was well reported. The effort to present evangelization and its church as “the offspring of the Spanish Church, and when we had no other merit in the world, this was sufficient for us to gain a preeminent standing.”59

55 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-33122. Suma to Tani, Madrid, 22 March 1943. 56 Preston, P. 1997. La política de la venganza. El fascismo y el militarismo en la España

del siglo XX , pp. 190–191. Barcelona: Península. 57 Lottaz, P. and Rodao, F. 2019. The Vatican, World War II and Asia. In Notions of

Neutralities, eds. Pascal Lottaz and Herbert R. Reginbogin, pp. 215–238. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 58 After April 1942, there is only reference to broadcasting Japanese music. Crusats. 2017, op. cit., p. 44. 59 “La Historia del catolicismo japones es, casi hasta el sxx, un desfile continuado y heroico de Mártires”, 17 May 1942, Mundo.

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Thus, during the early days of the war, there was a string of congratulations for Japan. Both the conservative Méndez de Vigo in Tokyo and the Falangist del Castaño in Manila applauded the Japanese stance toward religion, with one referring to the favorable perspective offered by the visit of the Japanese Bishop, Monsignor Taguchi, to Manila, and the other due to the excellent treatment of Augustinians in the city of Floridablanca.60 Even the Diary of the Japanese Occupation written in secret by the Dominican Father Juan Labrador, Director of the College of San Juan Letrán in Manila, gave a positive assessment of Japan regarding its religious policy, saying, “I have been assured that the Japanese will respect the religious beliefs of the people they conquer. They emphasize the existing spiritual affinity among these races and the Japanese, as Orientals as they are… In general, it can be said that they have fulfilled this promise.”61 Nevertheless, not all that glittered was gold. The Falangists abstained from providing information less suited to Spanish ears. Positions of responsibility held by the Spanish in Japan came to be filled by nonWesterners, and the Apostolic Delegate in the Prefecture of Shikoku, Modesto Pérez, was forced to resign his post in favor of Javier E. Tanaka, who was appointed by the Bishop of Osaka. Yet the Falangists were greatly satisfied with these arguments that came from the Pacific as they could be used for their own ends in the domestic power struggle. Thirdly, Serrano Suñer’s pro-Japanism was also personal. He was also struggling to expand his power base and saw a successful Japan that could benefit Spain, which could only fly high with the help of the Axis, as kind of a last resort for his political options. His acceptance of collaboration with the Japanese both across the espionage network and in terms of nationalist Japanese interests suggests that Serrano Suñer tried to not only become a friend of Tokyo, but also use its money and friendship to pursue his own agenda as much as he could. In contrast to the Italians and Germans who revealed themselves to be somewhat sensitive when it came to formulating joint policies with Tokyo, Serrano Suñer did not show it 60 NARA-RG-457. SIS-35932. T¯ og¯o to Suma, Tokyo, 20 May 1942, MS of 30 March 1942; AMAEC-R-2910-9. Méndez de Vigo to Serrano Suñer, Tokyo, 5 May 1942 (arrived in Spain 24 April 1945). 61 Typed copy in the Convent of Santo Tomás [Ávila]. Entry of 8 February 1942 (p. 43). Published in English with post-war changes, Labrador, J. 1989. A Diary of the Japanese Occupation. Manila: Santo Tomás University Press.

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and, in fact, sought a mediating role between the American Continent and Japanese Asia. The balance of a new contender into the globalized war was not very positive for the Spanish regime: additional difficulties for much needed supplies, a former colony occupied, and new problems with relations with the few friendly regimes. Only expectations countered them: personal profits, Catholicism not being damaged, a renewed influx of victories in Southeast Asia and the attack to the Soviet Union in Siberia.

Assistance on the Road to Victory By being officially neutral, Spain helped Japan in the Pacific War more than any other country. Therefore, gaining information from the enemy, obtaining needed raw materials, protecting their communities abroad, and gaining support from occupied populations were activities done by Spain. It was the only country that could do this, with embassies in all the important territories (except the Soviet Union and Hawaii), newspapers of relatively good quality that had correspondents throughout the world, and citizens free to move in the world. They also needed something else that the Japanese were ready to spend … money. Espionage Japan made use of so-called intelligence to fulfill these objectives which, although necessary for its survival, were at times kept under wraps. Every country had its own espionage services—the German Abwehr, the British MI5 and MI6, the Spanish Republican SIM (Military Investigation Service) and the Nationalist SINFE (North East Spanish Information Service) and the SIPM (Military Police Information Service), the Italian SIM (Military Information Service); and the North American OSS (Office of Strategic Services) and the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation). Japan was no exception. It was also equipped with several intelligence services organized along the lines of the German model prior to World War I and with a principal characteristic that reflects one of the typical problems of Japanese bureaucracy: lack of coordination. Intelligence services in the Navy and the Army existed, but they operated separately, as did their respective corps. Nor was there a coordinated structure for open defense intelligence or for covert operations, although within each of these services, their respective general staff had separate intelligence

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sections for such actions. Military counter-intelligence was the responsibility of the military police, or Kempeitai. Furthermore, there was the private service of the Foreign Minister, based principally on journalists, their contacts, and semi-official agency representatives. This lack of coordination also extended to the training of agents as, while the Army established the Nakano School, the Navy never considered it necessary. In foreign countries, the lack of connection became extreme in every diplomatic representation. Each service had its own different budget for the employment of secret agents in search of the same documents. Moreover, a fourth body—the Guandong Army—also had its own network via the Manchukuo Legations in countries where it was recognized like Spain. For its growing intelligence needs, Tokyo relied on technical collaboration with both Italy and Germany, but Spain was the most convenient base of operations with regard to the gathering of information within enemy countries. As with Belgium during World War I, Spain became the Mecca of espionage during World War II, thanks to its proximity to the fronts and its relatively open communications with other countries. Japan’s Suma Yakichir¯ o and Miura Fumio, Britain’s Samuel Hoare and Bernard Malley, and the United States’ Carlton Hayes were former members of secret services.62 Espionage attracted further espionage. Moreover, Japan organized its intelligence services in the Iberian Peninsula in order to make Spain and Portugal’s services compatible not only among themselves, but with the central intelligence services in the Axis countries. As such, in the case of the navy, both agencies were placed under the direction of Rome where the naval attaché was Captain Mitsunobu, the son-in-law of Naval Minister Shigetar¯ o Shimada.63 They were connected by radio links installed by the Abwehr, which had also trained Japanese operators in their use.64 Furthermore, the two Iberian Legations were linked by a direct telephone line to the two heads of the diplomatic espionage service: Miura in Madrid and, apparently, Ueno

62 Krebs, 1988, op. cit., p. 21. 63 Valente, L. 2004. Il Mistero della missione giapponese. Rome: Cierre Edizione, cit.

Hofmann, R. 2015. The Fascist Effect. Japan and Italy, 1915–1952, p. 138. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 64 Chapman, J. W. M. 1987. Japanese Intelligence, 1918–1945: A Suitable Case for Treatment. In Intelligence and International Relations, 1900–1945, eds. Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes, p. 165. Exeter: University of Exeter.

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Takeo in Lisbon. Ueno was the finance advisor, a post normally associated with intelligence services, and was appointed by Suma. The Madrid Legation was in charge of intercepting English and North American radio transmissions.65 Contacts with the Spaniards covered a wider range of fields. In Turkey, espionage was headed at Istanbul by a Falangist Turk who had been nationalized after taking part in the Civil War. Spain concerned itself with promoting a spy ring in India (where previously there had been no informational network). Staffed by Spaniards and based in Mumbai, its task was to gather intelligence on movements in the Indian Ocean.66 The Navy also sent spies to Algeciras to glean information about ships traveling through the Gibraltar Strait, and there was an attempt to post a Japanese operative in the Canary Islands.67 Lisbon was a crucial location for discovering the intentions of the United States, since it was the principal neutral mooring port for ships arriving from London and the east coast of the American Continent. As a result, Portuguese agencies were mainly tasked with gathering printed information from sailors arriving directly from Allied countries, which included the most difficult publications to obtain, such technical journals.68 As Lisbon possessed strategic colonies in southern Africa and India, these agencies sought to obtain information concerning shipping convoys there and also looked keenly toward the Balkans.69 The growing need to study the economic conditions of the enemy increased the importance of Portugal and its interpretation team. Nevertheless, Lisbon suffered limitations that impeded better development in this aspect. The quality of information was poor because Lisbon newspapers had no correspondents overseas due to the “Portugal’s general level of culture being so low.”70 Furthermore, tensions caused by the occupation of East Timor posed an obstacle to formal contacts with Portuguese public servants and, 65 MS 12 July 1943. 66 In kana syllabary, “Vu-jihenmiro Vuerikotonui.” NARA-RG-457. E-9011. SRDJ-

38088, Kurihara to Suma, Ankara, 2 June 1943. SRDJ-40137. Suma to Kurihara, Madrid, 30 June 1943. 67 MS 5 February 1943. On the passage of convoys via Gibraltar, also 1 and 10 May, 8 and 26 June, and 28 September 1943, cit. in Krebs, 1988, art. cit., p. 21. 68 MS 15 June, 11 August and 11 September 1942. 69 Vid. also, among others, MS 26 August 1942 and 4 February 1944. 70 MS 24 October 1942. Berlin. Oshima to Tani.

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in the end, Japan never managed to set up a base of personal relations with influential Portuguese officials, unlike in Spain.71 This was perhaps the main difference between the two countries. While in Portugal it was the Japanese who took on the most important tasks, in Spain the local element entailed in Japan’s espionage had political connections, allowing them to assume a certain level of responsibility. Spaniards at the Service of Japanese Intelligence A key figure was able to assist the Japanese from his high position, Ramón Serrano Suñer. A combination of political and personal interests seems to be the reason why he chose to collaborate with Japan beyond the extent that other Axis leaders were willing to go to. Not only did Serrano Suñer place himself at the disposal of the Japanese, but also the machinery of the Ministry he headed and the Falangist organization over which he maintained his influence. Besides being completely involved in the struggle for an Axis victory and the information he could garner, Serrano Suñer had no other political option. Serrano Suñer’s first decision after the outbreak of the Pacific War was simple: to submit copies of his embassies’ reports. Consequently, he ordered his chief of staff and foreign press supervisor Felipe Ximénez de Sandoval to send dispatches received from Washington, London, Rio de Janeiro, and Buenos Aires to the Japanese Legation which, upon forwarding this information to Tokyo, labeled it as “Suñer intelligence.”72 Minister Suma, faced with Serrano Suñer’s great willingness to collaborate, took a step forward and asked if it would be possible for the diplomats in Spanish Embassies in London and Washington to gather information secretly.73 Furthermore, facing possible difficulties of secret collaboration with already appointed diplomats, Suma also asked Serrano Suñer if he could help form a spy network. Serrano Suñer agreed and to that end authorized the use of his personal codes for telegraphic communications with the delegations’ spies, that mail reports be sent as private

71 Idem. 72 MS 3 April 1942. Suma to T¯ og¯o, 15 April 1942; GSK-KT. Dainiji oshu dai senso

kankei ikken. Honda kiroku. [In relation to the Second Great European War. Honda Archive.] A-7.0.0. 9-63-5. Suma to T¯og¯o, Madrid, 16 April 1942. 73 NARA-RG-457. SIS-27323/4. T¯ og¯o to Suma, Madrid, 2 January 1942.

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letters to him in postal packets, that the authorities ignore possible problems in short-wave communications, and lastly, that Spanish passports be issued to those involved.74 To carry out these instructions, Serrano Suñer counted on two people he could completely trust, Felipe Ximénez de Sandoval and Ángel Alcázar de Velasco. The former had little time to collaborate in espionage with Japan as he was fired in March 1942 after a strange incident. The latter was a former “waiter, bricklayer, thief, bullfighter and José Antonio [Primo de Rivera]’s gunman,” according to an old friend who reported to the Office of Strategic Services in 1943.75 During the Civil War and after the arrest of the Falange’s supreme leader, Alcázar was sentenced to death for opposing Franco’s takeover of Falange Party, but his sentence was commuted and then annulled after he foiled a mass escape from his jail in Pamplona, later becoming a journalist. As a panegyrist he wrote the book Serrano Suñer in the Falange, a “self-praising” book (in the words of Joan Maria Thomàs), where it was suggested that the Foreign Minister was the true successor to supreme leader José Antonio.76 Alcázar de Velasco’s long record in radical Falangist politics made it easier for him to serve under the Germans, having been trained by the Abwehr, the organ of military espionage led by Wilhelm Canaris since 1935, whose office in Madrid was the Kriegsorganisation. Although in his memoirs, Alcázar de Velasco dates his espionage activities to the Asturian Revolution of 1934, his first demonstrable action in this area was in 1940 when, after receiving instructions from Karl Erich Kühlenthal and Fritz Knappe, he may have foiled an attempted assassination in Portugal of the Duke of Windsor, a then Nazi sympathizer and possible candidate to the English throne in the event of a German victory.77

74 GSK-KT. A-7.0.0 9.9. Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 5 September 1942. 75 NARA-RG226-E-210 Bx25. Manuscript note attached to note “From Silky to

Cigar,” MMM-Wash, 29 June 1943. 76 On Ximenez de Sandoval, the file on Japan from the head of the Diplomatic Cabinet in the Archive of the Foreign Ministry (AMAEC-R-1913-5) is almost empty, but it reveals that it was once full. Álcazar de Velasco, Á. 1941. Serrano Suñer en la Falange. Madrid/Barcelona: Patria. Thomàs, J. M. 2001. La Falange de Franco, p. 242. Barcelona: Plaza & Janes; Torrus, A. 2022. La Gran Evasión española. Barcelona: Ediciones B. 77 González-Arnao Conde-Luque, M. 1988. Hitler: ¡Capturad al duque de Windsor! Historia16, XIV- 161: 7–16. The article sent by Alcazar de Velasco to this author.

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Later, Ángel Alcázar de Velasco achieved one of his most important accomplishments in this world of secrets because he managed to secure the British Embassy’s support for his appointment as Press Attaché in London -on 18 December 1940, but not published in the Official Gazette. British Ambassador Hoare himself recognized that this support was the gravest error committed by Bernard Malley, London’s head of intelligence in Spain, as Alcázar (whom he does not mention by name) made the British consider the convenience of supporting a radical alternative to Franco.78 London was one of the places from where Spain helped Berlin, informing them on damages done by bombardments not only through the dispatches of the ambassador, but also through the Press Office. His first attaché, Miguel Piernavieja, drew a map with the places most hit by German bombings but, in any case, he was never able to locate weapons factories nor defense locations.79 Upon arriving in London in January 1941 with a translator, Alcázar angered many. In the Press Office, Alcázar undervalued the achievements of the workers, changed its location, eliminated the Spanish Press Services Society Ltd., stopped publishing the magazine Spain, fired employees, and gave himself a salary.80 The British Foreign Ministry harbored criticisms and suspicions about him from the very beginning: “We shall have to face Spanish imperialism very carefully” was one of the first comments made in a report by an official in the Foreign Office after they got to know Alcázar. Concern soon turned into unanimous rejection, with some even calling Alcázar “he is a snake of the most pestilent character and quite overwhelming.” Measures were taken against him, as not only was Ambassador Hoare reported about his mistake but in April 1941, but the

78 Hoare, S. 1946. Ambassador on Special Mission, p. 76. London: Collins. Vid. also PRO-FO-26947 (C1444/376/41). Hoare to Cadogan, Madrid, 4 March 1941 and the minutes of a conversation with the Duque de Alba, Spanish Ambassador, 15 May 1941. Serrano Suñer suggests there was some matter concerning a woman entailed in the British decision. Interview, 29 March 1992. On this topic: Moreno Cantano, A. 2014. Infidelidad, espionaje y amantes: las desventuras de Alcázar de Velasco y Luis Calvo en Gran Bretaña durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Diacronie, 28: 1–17. https://doi.org/10. 4000/diacronie.4762. 79 Moreno Cantano, A. 2013. Neutralidad y propaganda franquista en Gran Bretaña durante la II Guerra Mundial. In Falange. Las culturas políticas del fascismo en la España de Franco (1936–1975), ed. Miguel A. Ruiz-Carnicer, p. 342. Zaragoza: Institución “Fernando el Católico.” 80 Ibíd., pp. 343–344.

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MI5, Britain’s domestic counter-espionage service, became aware of his activities.81 Furthermore, Alcázar de Velasco, committed a good number of indiscretions and had many problems in establishing an espionage network with double agents in his office, and in monitoring the press despite being unable to read either French or English, as a compatriot complained. Nevertheless, Alcázar was relatively successful in his work and collaborated in the training and operation of a spy network that was presumably aimed at informing Berlin of the damage caused by their bombing and the political situation in the country.82 After making two trips to Spain, Alcázar committed one final error shortly before the outbreak of the Pacific War, as he anticipated that he would be appointed to a diplomatic post in Washington. As a result, the British notified their American colleagues, and his visa application was rejected. Instead of crossing the Atlantic Ocean from London, Alcázar was restricted to crossing the English Channel, but before that, his diary was stolen in December.83 He was dismissed from his post in London on 13 January 1942. Alcázar had lost credibility and was “burnt out,” partly because of indiscretions that revealed his lack of professionalism although the American adventure continued to press ahead. In Madrid, where Serrano Suñer had few people to trust, he had a new opportunity. It was after his return to Madrid that he began to work for the Japanese. It seems that he first offered his services to them in this month of January 1942, and they agreed to pay him for information. This rapid admission into the Japanese intelligence system was principally due to three reasons: first, because the previous August, he had met Miura Fumio, who managed the practical side of the network and had to pay him; second, because Serrano Suñer himself had recommended him; and, finally, due to Tokyo’s urgent need for information especially about the United States, where Japanese intelligence networks had been dismantled and German intelligence was weak.

81 PRO-FO-371-26947. C1444/376/41. Secret and personal letter from Cadogan to Hoare, London, 12 February 1941. 82 NARA-226-108b. “Alcázar de Velasco;” Gironella, J. M. and Borrás Beltriu, R. 1979. Ángel Alcázar de Velasco. In 100 españoles y Franco, pp. 28–33. Barcelona: Planeta. 83 NARA-RG-59. CDF 1940-44. 701.5211. Johnson to Dunn, London, 6 October 1941.

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The Foreign Minister proposed that the network should function at the convenience of the Japanese: they would cover expenses and hardware costs while Spain would take charge of the rest. Thus, after having passed by the legation on the corner of Miguel Ángel St. and García de Paredes St. on January 2 for the first time to deliver a secret report, and having dined at the La Barraca restaurant with Suma, on January 8, Alcázar de Velasco was accepted provisionally. That day, the legation sent Tokyo the report Alcázar had submitted, stating that only Franco and Serrano Suñer had read it, and that it came from a spy network of theirs made up of twenty-one people. Alcázar’s information already had its own codename: T¯o.84 Miura and Suma immediately considered the possibilities offered by this dyed-in-the-wool Falangist and, on the same day, they sent Alcázar’s first message, and they took the opportunity to ask Tokyo for its opinion on the viability of setting in motion a plan that went beyond just gathering British information.85 The idea was to use the information from the U.K. network, but also to organize an intelligence agency in Spain to find information in the United States, obviously in collaboration with Serrano Suñer. He suggested that the Spanish Foreign Ministry cover some of the costs while his only condition was for his friend, Alcázar, to remain in Madrid. It seemed to be the ideal plan, perfectly combining all the requirements, and Tokyo accepted it without delay, approving a sum of money for operational expenses to improve the service.86

84 NARA-RG-457. SIS-27582. Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 4 January 1942. The report is in 27586/7. MS 24 January 1943. Alcázar de Velasco eluded Serrano Suñer’s role in a letter: “Canaris, a dear friend of Franco, suggested to him that I should be the one to direct Japan’s services in America as England had already disposed of me. Franco agreed and told Serrano to call me.” This accompanied a telegram (with a certificate, already shown in the previous interview, which would demonstrate that Serrano Suñer had given him the order) with a text that read “Return to Spain as soon as possible.” This must not have referred to espionage since that month, on 9 February 1941, he had just been appointed attaché to London where he remained until December. He continued, “I came and Franco filled me in.” Letter to the author, Móstoles (Madrid), 8 June 1992. As for the background information, Alcázar pointed to the “highly secret relationship between the Great Kahal and Franco since 1934 via the Gibraltar Kahal.” Idem. Miguel Hernando de Larramendi Martinez, professor of Arab studies in Castilla-La Mancha University, had denied to this author that such a title existed. 85 NARA-RG-457. SIS-2776. Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 8 January 1942. 86 NARA-RG-457. SIS-28174. Suma a T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 1 January 1942.

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Thus, the Japanese established an increasingly wider spy base in Spain, and they devised ways to extend their networks. The indiscreet ideogram, or kanji provided by Alcázar, meaning “to steal,” was given another ideogram with a similar sound (t¯o) but with the more asymptomatic meaning of “Orient.”87 This name was a success because the information provided by other agents similarly followed the cardinal points: Kita (“north,” information from Portugal), Minami (“south,” information from the Italian ambassador in Madrid), and Nishi (“west,” information from the consul in Constantinople), and these codenames continued to be used to refer to new sources once an old one stopped sending information.88 When these designations came to an end, the geographical references continued, and secret reports from Portuguese ambassadors, for example, became known as Fuji, while the “Suñer intelligence” along with the dispatches from Spanish Embassies had been shortened to su, which was written in one of the syllabic alphabets, katakana. Out of all this information, the most important and complex operation was the establishment of an intelligence network in the United States. It came to be called the T¯o network, completely confusing it with the information provided by Alcázar. The FBI, however, called this network “Span-Nip,” a sign of its greater knowledge of its activities, as we shall see in the following section. The Network in the United States The T¯o network was born out of the obvious Japanese interest in information impossible to garner by other means. Tokyo’s immediate reply when the legation in Madrid proposed espionage from Madrid points to how data on the United States was reduced to a minimum but also to the many objectives such intelligence was to achieve. Regarding military equipment, top Japanese officials wanted to know the state of the repairs to the vessels damaged at Hawaii, receive statistics concerning the construction of ships and submarines, understand how the United States was resolving the importation of strategic materials that came from the South Pacific prior to the War, and measure their production potential. 87 It does not mean “door” (To, with a short vowel) as published in the majority of the journalistic media in Spain, the United States and Japan. Examples of appearances of this ideogram in telegrams can be viewed in the Archive of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, e.g., GSK-KT. A.7.0.0.9-9. Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 20 August 1942. 88 NARA-RG-457. SIS-30967. Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 25 February 1942.

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As for North American military capabilities, they requested data on shipping movements and the sending of troops to the Pacific, but they were also concerned with the repercussions of other fronts in the war, asking how the United States’ offensive capability would be affected in case of an attack on Spain or Africa. Furthermore, in the area of propaganda, they were interested in knowing the possibilities of bringing down President Roosevelt, in having information about racial problems and inflation, and in gathering more data about US relations with other territories, specifying the cases of Australia and South America. Lastly, one question also had a propaganda objective: what was the racial composition of their troops?89 With these objectives specified, the most difficult step, as can be imagined, was establishing the network on the American continent. Concerning this aspect, the difficulties increased because Alcázar had to rely on the help of someone that had not been mentioned to anyone else. He spoke only of a certain “Rogelio” as an agent of his with whom he entered the United States from Mexico, and about whom nobody knew more about. Moreover, Alcázar’s presence on the American continent has never been proven, nor can it be denied. Perhaps, he crossed the Atlantic in a submarine, as he himself asserted, but Serrano Suñer’s alleged wish that he remain in Madrid, his constant and ongoing presence in Spain, and his difficulty in expressing himself in English calls this claim into question. In any case, Alcázar needed a primary contact who resided in the United States. The Falange and the Spanish Embassy in Washington were among the initial supporters of establishing the network—the former for ideological motives, the latter out of infrastructural needs. Whoever could have been Alcázar’s first contact in establishing the network in the United States is unknown but, considering that Serrano Suñer expressly approved it, it is probable that this person was related to the Foreign Falange. This party, according to Eduardo González Calleja, had a “clandestine nuclei” in New York, San Francisco, Houston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and other port cities after its founding in 1938 following a visit by Alejandro Villanueva.90 Two names stand out in this group. The first is José de 89 NARA-RG-457. SIS-29724, 38 and 76, T¯ og¯o to Suma, Madrid, 30 January 1942. 90 González Calleja, E. 1994. El servicio exterior de Falange and la política exterior

del primer franquismo: consideraciones previas para su investigación. Hispania, LIV-186: 297–298.

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Perignat, Head of the Spanish Falange in New York and Washington, who apparently assisted in the infiltration of agents through Mexico.91 The other is Captain José Martínez, an active agent in the Falange in San Francisco.92 Alcázar also needed someone to help him within the Spanish Embassy in the United States, for both receiving diplomatic mail and secret communications sent in relation to the network, and to assist in the activation of agents. Questions were raised about this link, as there were several candidates. Two diplomats appointed to the United States had lived in Japan, and they certainly still had personal contacts there: the ambassador himself, Juan Francisco de Cárdenas, former member of the Monarchist Party and the minister-counselor Elio Juan Gómez de Molina, who had resided in Tokyo at the outbreak of the Civil War. Besides them, the Americans had specific doubts about two other figures: the agricultural advisor Miguel de Echegaray who had occupied the post of Minister of Propaganda, who was said to be an active member of the Foreign Falange, and who went to San Francisco shortly before the outbreak of war to see José Martínez; and Air Force Attaché Colonel Manuel de la Sierra who retired in June 1942 at the suggestion of Washington.93 Another feasible option was sending some agents to the United States before the conflict’s outbreak. In January 1942, American counter-espionage thought that there were already three agents installed in the United States, based on statements Serrano Suñer made where he alluded to three people who had been posted, but from whom no important notice had yet to be received.94 The project elaborated in Madrid was ambitious. Serrano Suñer’s willingness to allow the use of the Foreign Ministry to facilitate Japanese intelligence led to a plan to send four new people, with diplomatic passports, tasked with gathering information. One was to head to the Consulate in San Francisco, another the Library of Spanish Information in New York, another to Dakar (Senegal), and the last to Australia, 91 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-41743, only available, and in part, to North Americans; MS of 17 July 1942. 92 NARA-RG-59. CDF 1940-44. 701.5211. Hoover to Berle, Washington, 25 November 1941. 93 NARA-RG-59. CDF 1940-44. 701.5211. Conversation between Berle and Cardenas, Washington, 6 June 1942. 94 NARA-457. SIS-28362. Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 8 January 1942.

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the future site of Gen. MacArthur’s general headquarters.95 In any case, the plan nevertheless failed following the arrest of Alcázar’s successor in London, Luis Calvo, a correspondent for the ABC daily. He was initially pro-British but later on changed his views, apparently influenced by Alcázar, and wrote some reports on the damages done by the bombings. After Alcázar returned to Spain, in February 1942, Calvo became the director of the Press Office but days later, the British, fearing his escape, arrested him.96 The detention of the attaché in London exposed Alcázar’s secret proAxis activities. Nevertheless, Serrano Suñer continued to authorize the use of secret codes and the legation’s infrastructure for espionage, but the need for greater discretion was paramount. What had previously been an open secret came to be a matter of public opinion, as some countries openly declared their sensitivity toward any new appointment of unexperienced personnel to the Spanish Embassy. And the Americans, by means of the Office of Facts and Figures, increased its pressure on Spain by promoting the publication of press articles where the Japanese Legation in Madrid was accused of being the recruitment center for secret agents designated for the United States.97 The four future “diplomats” were then dismissed after receiving a gift of thanks for services that they had not yet provided.98 In fact, Alcázar was also walking a tightrope at the time, but in the end, he kept his balance and continued to receive reports from the intelligence network operating in the U.K. and financed by the Germans.99 As a result, the implementation of the T¯o network in Spain was affected by the Luis Calvo incident in various aspects: the difficulty in recruiting new 95 In 1943, in this Library, an embezzlement by the manager and press attaché Javier Gaytán de Ayala, apparently fond of the bottle, was revealed. The latter was implicated in the case along with a certain John Eogan Kelly. NARA-RG-59. CDF 1940-44. 701.5211. Hoover to Berle, Washington, 13 May 1943; Juárez, J. 2004. Madrid-Londres-Berlín. Espías de Franco al servicio de Hitler, pp. 164–165. Madrid: Temas de Hoy. 96 Moreno Cantano, 2013. art. cit., p. 348; Pastor Petit, D. 1996. Diccionario enciclopédico del espionaje, p. 66. Madrid: Universidad Complutense. 97 AMAEC-R-1738-3. Cárdenas to Serrano Suñer, Washington, 13 March 1942. 98 MS 30 April 1942. The decoding of this telegram contains some errors, perhaps

because the Americans just started the decoding process, yet the implication of the then Minister in espionage activities seems clear. Original in GSK-KT. A.7.0.0. 9-63. Suma to T¯og¯o, Madrid, 16 April 1942. 99 NARA-RG-457. SIS-27973. Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 9 January 1942.

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members for the diplomatic corps, the delay in the start of operations, and, certainly, Serrano Suñer’s noncompliance of his promises concerning finance. Moreover, he reduced his unusual readiness in collaborating with Japan. A sign of this was the short duration of the so-called Suñer intelligence which ceased on 20 January 1942, apparently on account of opposition to his pro-Japanese policies which were “in danger.”100 But Japan desperately needed this intelligence and the implementation of the spy network in the United States continued, though it would cost more for the Japanese. It seemed that they were the real losers in the Luis Calvo Incident. The most important technical and organizational problem lay in the transmission of messages between the American Continent and Madrid. Years later, Alcázar de Velasco stated that messages were generally sent to Mexico from where they would be forwarded by short-wave radio to Spanish vessels stationed in the Caribbean, before being sent to Madrid. This is an explanation that suggests a high level of sophistication in their activities and which can be supported by the activities of Miura Yoshiaki (unrelated to the diplomat assigned to Madrid), who was apparently sent to Mexico in the summer of 1941 to prepare it and for the apparent operation of the network in England, where portable transmitters were used to send information to Spain.101 Nevertheless, this method had to be one of the information routes from America to Iberia because, among other reasons, Alcázar mentioned nothing of his outward voyage. Although such an advanced explanation cannot be rejected, it seems plausible to think that Spanish spies employed more pedestrian means to transmit intelligence, such as the facilities offered by the Foreign Ministry, at least as a complementary option and following the espionage model in London. Although Alcázar always avoided talking about it, the frustrated espionage plans after the Luis Calvo Incident indicate, for example, that communication would occur via transmitters installed in embassies where, in addition, they themselves would have to develop the codes and select the personnel. North American counter-espionage found out that some information was sent via the telegraphic office of the Spanish Embassy in Washington, and also that shipping information came out of the consulate in New York, while the FBI realized that the Washington Embassy was

100 NARA-RG-457. SIS-29434. Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 22 January 1942. 101 MS 25/VI/1942; The “Magic” Background…, Vol. II, pp. 98–102 and A-190196.

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sending information by cable to Buenos Aires, from where it would be sent to Madrid, then Berlin.102 On the other hand, Buenos Aires’ role indicates how the neutral countries of South America103 also performed an important function in gathering information for the Axis, which only grew as the war progressed, despite the fact that they had abandoned neutrality. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that this occurred through Alcázar de Velasco, despite his own claims.104 Furthermore, with journalists recruited for the network, less complicated and more available methods were used, such as invisible ink on letters sent to unsuspected addresses and codes in messages directed to the press that were changed every three months. These methods for receiving information were simpler and the payroll of those employed by Alcázar in Spain suggests that these contacts were the most frequently deployed. So, besides his wife, he received help in operating the network from a certain Francisco Aguilera (or Escobar) as a chauffeur and from a printer born in Alcázar de San Juan (Toledo), Arturo Castellanos, whose address was used to receive messages from the United States (mainly with postmarks from the outskirts of Washington) that most certainly used invisible ink.105 In Madrid, information was distributed to various agencies, although we can guess that the subject matter had an influence on the number of recipients. Initially, Alcázar had to deliver a copy of the message to the Japanese and another to Serrano Suñer by hand. In June 1942, Suma nevertheless reported that on a number of occasions, he had discussed T¯o reports with Serrano that Serrano had not read. Occasionally, the Minister, Suma was told, was too busy to receive them by hand due to his tight agenda, but this version might not be entirely true, especially since (as it seems it would have occurred) Alcázar invented some reports. Serrano Suñer was only interested in real information and not in

102 MS 25 June 1942. 103 Parraguez, U. and Iacobelli, P. 2020. Goro Miyazaki: Intriga y sospecha sobre el

espionaje japonés en Chile durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Revista de Historia, 27-2. http://doi.org/10.29393/rh27-19gmup20019. 104 MS 29 May 1942. 105 NARA-RG-226-108b “Alcázar de Velasco.”

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the inventions of his friend, and he may have sometimes amused himself on this deception: “the confusion [of the Japanese] was immense.”106 Moreover, it is hard to know who might have received this information from the T¯o network and to what degree. Despite instructions to the contrary, it appears that both the information paid for by the Germans and that paid for by the Japanese passed on into the hands of others. A large part of Alcázar’s information was given to the German Office of Special Affairs of the Abwehr, although not to the German ambassador, in the same way that the Japanese received information from the U.K., both apparently thinking of it as a special favor by Alcázar.107 Consequently, the spread of information to third countries appears to have been the decision of the network head himself, a decision more personal than political and thus, dependent on a final aspect that was key to the network’s operation—finance. Japan spent approximately a third of 1% of her war effort on intelligence, if we use the Army figures. Furthermore, given that those are our only available sources, we know that the proportion of intelligence expenditures with respect to the total remained relatively stable—between 0.36% in 1941 and 0.26% in 1942, 0.18% in 1943 and 0.33% in 1944— with the exception of the last year of the war, when it reached 0.48%. The total amount, however, increased nearly tenfold, from 42 and 46 million yen in 1941 and 1942, to 125 and 400 million yen respectively in the last two years of the war.108 After the funds were allocated in the budget, it turned out to be more complicated to send money from Japan to the Peninsula securely, and then to transfer a portion to the United States without arousing suspicions. To avoid these difficulties, each Ministry prepared sufficient funds in European bank accounts that would then be used for this objective. Thus, in Spain, Ambassador Suma withdrew money via the banks, Nihon Ginko Kokko and the Reichsbank; the Naval Attaché Oishi Munegutsu withdraw from accounts at the Reichsbank and the Banco de Lisboa e Açores; and the military official, Sakurai Keiz¯ o, did the same via the Banque Federal in Zurich.

106 Saña, 1982, op. cit., p. 244. 107 In this regard vid. the extensive report in MS of 24 January 1943. 108 Allen, L. 1987. Japanese Intelligence Systems. Journal of Contemporary History, 22:

560.

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In any case, other means had to be used to pay the intelligence services, since these branches could only supply some of the money needed. For these operations, the supply of pearls for later sale was the method most often employed: they could be moved about with no great difficulty and they could fetch high prices, given that paper money was unpredictable and fortunes could be amassed instantly. We know about some major failures in this operation. The first was especially embarrassing. In late 1942, pearls from renowned producer Mikimoto valued at 100,000 yen were sent to an official named And¯o in Lisbon in the only Spanish diplomatic pouch that left Tokyo for Madrid during the Pacific War. The affair was carried out in utmost secrecy, with the recipient’s identity being kept a secret from Mikimoto and from the Spanish, who were informed that this was strictly official business. But in the end, the pernicious plot failed because the pearls never arrived at their destination after being intercepted in Bermuda. Adding insult to injury, after a newspaper announced the sale of Japanese pearls captured in transit to Germany, the pearls were handed to the Spanish Embassy in Washington, who announced in no uncertain terms the problems they would encounter if the Japanese were allowed to avail themselves of them. A second remittance of pearls was done via a “blockade runner” called the Rhakotis, a submarine in charge of transporting goods through enemy seas that left Yokohama in September 1942 and was discovered in the Bay of Biscay close to Bordeaux, where it chose to sink rather than fall into enemy hands. Nevertheless, there were remittances that did arrive, as shown by the fact that the Legation and its diplomats still had a considerable surplus of cash at the end of the war.109 It is unclear how or how much money was sent to the United States for espionage. Washington was careful to control suspicious transactions with bank accounts held by Spaniards, overseeing transfers on a monthly basis and, on one occasion, for example, asking Juan Gómez de Molina about an unusual transaction.110 The approximately $500,000 that remained in the safe at the Tokyo Embassy in Washington when war was declared

109 MS of 2, 3, 5, 15 and 30 December 1942; NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-28296, Suma to Tani, Madrid, 17 November 1942 and 28579, Tani to Suma, Tokyo, 26 November 1942. –32918. Morishima to Tani, Lisbon, 19 March 1943. 110 He justified these as expenses of representation. NARA-RG-59. CDF 1940-44. 852.20211. Note from the FBI to the State Department, Washington, several dates between February 1943 and June 1944.

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could be used for both espionage and representation of Japanese interests. Following legal norms, Spain, having taken charge of representing Spanish interests in the United States, had to ask the host government how the funds should be spent and how to report it afterward. The numerical code was sent from Tokyo to Madrid, but Suma did trust neither the diplomatic pouch nor Japanese telegrams and chose to wait, apparently, for an official to travel to Washington. Tokyo enquired about this, but Suma responded that no one had traveled and, so, there had been no secure opportunity to open the safe, but this was untrue as he himself met with Ambassador Cárdenas in Madrid, who later returned to Washington. Perhaps, the Spanish declined to collaborate after the Mikimoto pearls’ affair or, likewise, the Japanese did not trust the Spanish.111 The total Japanese expenditure on espionage in Spain is difficult to know, although the initial plan for the legation amounted to $500,000. The fact that this amount was insufficient led to the Gaimush¯ o in 1943 requesting help from both the Army and the Navy to defray costs, but only the Navy responded positively. Aside from this, the remaining information is incomplete yet it should be mentioned here. For example, it is known that in August 1942, Alcázar requested a sum of 400,000 yen to fund the network (1.2 million pesetas at the official exchange rate, of which 100,000 yen would be covered by the sale of Mikimoto’s pearls) and that they considered paying $300 monthly (around 3,600 pesetas with the same rate of exchange) to agents in the United States while German-paid agents in the U.K. received 800 pesetas per month, and the local head of operations 2,000.112 Elsewhere, the monthly expenditure of the Naval network in the area of Tangiers was 3,000 pesetas. On the one hand, this indicates how the US network absorbed at least half of Madrid’s total expenditure, while on the other hand, it showed that the espionage paid for by Japan cost no more than what Germany paid. Nevertheless, what is certain is that the Axis countries were not the only ones to invest in intelligence. The Allies did too, but more “intelligently” because thanks to counterintelligence, they used their enemies’ resources for their own benefit.

111 MS 30 September 1943. 112 NARA-RG-457. SIS-28420/1. Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 16 January 1942; 28617,

Suma to T¯og¯o, Madrid, 20 January 1942. MS of 7 February 1943.

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North American Counter-Espionage “Counterintelligence” means to deny adversaries information, whether by means of security or counter-espionage. In other words, it refers to actions undertaken to capture or neutralize foreign agents and to avoid the acquisition or communication of that secret information. Of the four elements of intelligence—namely, the gathering of data, analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence—this section deals with the latter. Yet, as its name indicates, its scope is as far-reaching and broad as that of “intelligence” itself. It involves everything from the classification of information into different levels according to the damage that knowledge of it by other countries might cause, to implementing security measures to obstruct the ability of a hostile intelligence service to gather information. These measures can be either passive (when access by the opposite party to information is impeded), active (when an attempt is made to understand how an adversary intelligence service operates in order to frustrate it), or ultimately, to make sure these could be used for one’s own benefit. So-called counterintelligence, or attempting to know how enemy espionage operates, involves a variety of behaviors, such as maintaining constant surveillance, convincing adversaries to defect, or placing double agents into enemy service, that is, agents who pretend to be at the service of an enemy country when in fact they are under the control of the country against which they are presumably spying.113 In this aspect of the war, the Allies were apparently very successful, even during the early stages of the conflict. The greatest success in the vigilance of the activities of enemy organizations during World War II were achieved by the British with their “double-cross system,” where they managed to actively control the German espionage system in their territory. Following the capture of a German agent on his way home, London was able to deploy a wide network of supposed agents who not only managed to deceive the Nazi big fish until the end of the war, but were also able to capture new spies, gather information about German secret service methods and personnel and, moreover, obtain enemy codes and secret cyphers with which Berlin’s future intentions were revealed. Alcázar’s activities were influenced by Britain’s advantage and can explain why he was not arrested during his stay in the U.K., since the information provided by his supposed agents was monitored in one way 113 Shulsky, A. N. 1991. Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence, pp. 8– 9. McLean, VA: Brassey’s.

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or another. When his diary was stolen shortly after his return to Madrid in December 1941, they were able to prove it was fake and mainly aimed at extracting money from the Germans, although according to Kim Philby, “It was not until many weeks’ work had been wasted…”114 On the other hand, if the British were unaware of the falsity of Alcázar’s activities in their country until his return to Spain, this might mean that Alcázar had worked for the Japanese from the start, as the Americans wrote after the conflict, or indeed, that the success of the “double-cross system” was not as complete as it would appear. In any case, Alcázar’s diary helped the British play it safe when they provoked the Luis Calvo incident, which appears to have been a premeditated decision on their part to put a stop to one of the methods of communication with Germany that they could not control—the Spanish diplomatic pouch. It was by these means that the Spanish Attaché received not only instructions, but also undetectable fake bank notes manufactured by the German Central Bank. The Americans also not only denied the Spanish Falangist a visa, but they also prepared their espionage services. In February 1942, the FBI requested information from the State Department about Alcázar de Velasco, and later, in a high level meeting that took place on 10 March 1942, the Spaniards, not just Alcazar, were placed under “closest possible surveillance”, which included periodic control of official Spanish correspondence via their diplomatic pouch.115 Although illegal, this method was employed regarding other neutral countries.116 To capture potential Spanish spies on American soil, the United States sought to block their efforts by all available means. Allied counter-espionage relied on the most effective arm of intelligence: the interception of messages. Unlike double agents or problematic leaks, the decoding of secret internal messages sent between central services and their overseas sections was one of the most reliable ways of finding out (without much deception) enemy intentions. Partial interception of messages was, in fact, a crucial aspect of World War II in all its variants, whether reports were handwritten, sent by cable, or (above all during these years) transmitted by radio. 114 At this time, he was head of the Spanish Section in the British MI6, Philby, K. 1968. My Silent War, pp. 72–73. London: Grafton. 115 NARA-RG-59. CDF 1940-44. 852-20211. Hoover to Berle, State Department, Washington, 20 March 1942. 116 Wilcox, R. 1995. Japan’s Secret War, p. 127. New York: Marlowe.

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This was yet another facet of the war where the Allies prevailed over the Axis, although it was still not clear up to what extent. The qualitative advance achieved by the North American counter-espionage service, G-2, was reflected in the large number of messages decoded between Tokyo’s Foreign Ministry and its Japanese Legations, along with a good number of military reports, mainly those by the Navy. In the case of diplomacy, the amount of Japanese information decoded by the Americans was such that after April 1942, daily bulletins called “Magic Summaries” (later “Magic Diplomatic Summaries”) were produced, containing a selection of the most interesting parts of the telegrams with verification of the veracity and importance of the information reflected.117 In any event, counter-espionage was used for operations preventing the transport of oil from the Dutch East Indies—the true Achilles Heel of the Japanese war effort. Its importance is clearly shown in a 1944 letter by the United States Army Chief of Staff George Marshall. It was sent to the Republican Presidential candidate when he proposed deploying counterespionage facilities for the direction of the war and so, sink President Roosevelt’s popularity and chances of reelection, saying, [...] The battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore, our few ships were at the right place at the right time. Further, we were able to concentrate our limited forces to meet their naval advance at Midway when otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place.[…] The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain due to our submarine action largely, result from the fact that we know the sailing dates and routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to wait at the proper locations.118

The United States went to great lengths to protect their advantage. The circulation of the “Magic Bulletins” was extremely limited—only twenty copies—and the measures taken to prevent the enemy from

117 Those which remain in the GSK can be found in Dait¯ oasens¯ o (the war in Greater East Asia) A.7.0.0. 8-50, A 7.0.0.9-9 and A 7.0.9-63. 118 George Marshall to Thomas E. Dewey, Washington, 27 September 1944. NARA,

File SRH 043. Modern Military Section, cit. in Matthews, T., 1994. Shadows Dancing. Japanese Espionage Against the West, 1939–1945, pp. 66–67. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Complete text in Kahn, D., 1971. The Codebreakers. The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet, pp. 605–607. New York: Simon and Schuster.

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knowing anything about their existence were indeed rigorous. The decoded messages were to be returned to the intelligence office as soon as they had been read, and no one was permitted to keep a file on them or read an entire series of messages. Nor was any reference to these messages permitted, whether written or in telephone conversations. Only in very specific cases were sent copies to overseas legations, with the strict order that they could not be reproduced or removed from the premises.119 Furthermore, the Americans knew that not only could the Japanese gather valuable information, but that enemy nations could access this information via friendly countries. Throughout the war, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, and Portugal had to suffer the humiliation of being obliged to reveal their correspondence, and in the 1990s, it was revealed that secret communications between thirty-two countries were intercepted along with those of the Japanese. At the same time, the Allies knew the Axis might have the technological capacity to decipher information passed through the secret systems of friendly countries such as Mexico and, thus, excused their decoding of the content of the messages of their representatives in Washington and other locations.120 In light of this, Alcázar de Velasco had before him a considerably more difficult task than expected when he was instructed to establish a spy network in the United States. He had to face a number of intelligence services that were already following his movements, to produce reports believable enough in order for the Japanese to continue paying him and, most of all, the information that he delivered would be known in Tokyo as well as Washington. Alcázar was not the only one who displayed a lack of professionalism. It was also displayed by his superiors as Japanese efforts to protect their messages from enemy ears were extremely defective. This information and the development of the network in the United States will be dealt with in the following chapter on the period of the Jordana Ministry during which the majority of the results of Serrano Suñer’s efforts in creating the network bore fruit, ironically, when he was 119 There is a record of a single intercepted telegram that was later sent to Spain. Vid. NARA-RG-226-119. Box 22. London X-2-pts-72. Folder 162. Currently, the original of the file can be found in the same archives, RG 457. SRS, Magic Diplomatic Summaries. The complete texts of the telegrams intercepted en route to Japan are listed as SRDJ in the same group of documents. The Magic Summaries comprise a total of 15 boxes and the SDRJ some 165, while the telegrams are arranged by the date of interception, regardless of their place of origin. 120 On the “almost secure” code of the Mexican military, vid. e.g., MS of 6 May 1942.

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no longer in charge of the Ministry. The latter launched the network and the former had to work as best he could with it, just like with the representation of interests. The Representation of Interests Once Japan entered the war, much of the protection of its citizens in enemy countries was entrusted to Spain. Following every important conflict in the contemporary era, a series of new international norms emerged that were aimed at regulating a number of “humanitarian procedures” precisely for situations when these concerns are secondary. After World War I and the growing interdependence of states thanks to improvements in communication, transportation, and travel, the Convention on Prisoners of War of 1929 detailed the general principle that the circumstances under which war is initiated between two states is no concern of other members of the family of nations.121 For example, the duty to aid wounded or sick military personnel was established, as were the rights of prisoners of war. Above all, a charter was passed to allow protecting powers rendering Good Office services, such as to safeguard the interests of subjects of belligerent countries residing in enemy territory. Their tasks involved inspecting the conditions of the prisoners and demanding humanitarian treatment. Pearl Harbor triggered a wave of anti-Japanism that not only led to assault and harassment in the entire continent but also the internment of Japanese residents in the United States and other countries as a result of racist perceptions, like that of President Roosevelt, who described them as “immutably foreign and dangerous.”122 Japan urgently demanded the aforementioned services. A multitude of diplomatic ruptures and declarations of war forced Tokyo to request Good Office services from neutral countries. Tokyo mostly asked Switzerland and Sweden to protect their interests in Europe, but initial strong interest on enlisting Latin countries as protecting powers but faded soon. Portugal was in charge of Mexico and Guatemala, although they soon went to Sweden, together with Bolivia or Honduras. Argentina was also initially appointed to 121 Wright, Q. 1940. The Present Status of Neutrality. American Journal of International Law, 34-3: 396. 122 Robinson, G. 2001. By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans, p. 7. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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represent the United Kingdom and Hong Kong, but was replaced.123 Petitions to Spain, on the contrary, increased. Madrid was soon entrusted with looking out for Japanese residents in the United States, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Panama, Uruguay, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Venezuela which then immediately found themselves under Spanish jurisdiction, soon followed by Japanese residents in Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru. For protecting foreign citizens in Japan, only Paraguay asked to be represented by Spain.124 In the end, Spain assumed the greatest responsibility, not just due to the number of nations under their representation but also because these included the most important countries, whether it was because they possessed the largest Japanese communities as was the case in Peru and Brazil, or because they were more politically relevant like the United States, which T¯og¯o called “the country in which our interests are greater, and about which we are most deeply concerned.”125 Spain was chosen because of a combination of technical and political reasons, although apparently mostly the latter. Among the technical reasons was the extent of the Spanish diplomatic network in Latin America, which was highly convenient as a large number of Japanese emigrants lived in rural areas. Moreover, there was already prior experience as Madrid had represented interests between Japan, AustriaHungary, and Germany during World War I and had even been acting as a protecting country of Italian and German interests since the start

123 There is an extended version of this text in Rodao. 1995. Difícil y sin apoyos políticos. La representación por España de los intereses japoneses in la Guerra del Pacífico. Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, series V, 8: 179–194. Rodao, F. 2015. La difícil (des) protección: la España de Franco y la representación de intereses japoneses en América Latina durante la Guerra del Pacífico. Cuadernos CANELA, 26: 24–39. For a list of dates and countries ¯ that represented Japanese interests, including dates of declarations of war, vid. Ota I. 1970. Dait¯ oa Sens¯ o. Senji gaik¯ o [The War of Greater East Asia. Diplomacy in Wartime] in Kajima Heiwa Kenky¯ usho [Kajima Institute of International Peace] Col. Nihon Gaikoshi [Diplomatic History of Japan], Vol. 24, pp. 24–30. Tokyo: Kajima Kenky¯ usho Shuppankai. The list contains some contradictions and errors of little importance. Lottaz, P. and Ottosson, I. 2022. Sweden, Japan, and the Long Second World War, 1931–1945, pp. 131, 136. New York: Routledge. 124 AMAEC-R-1562, file 10. Unsigned report to Minister Serrano Suñer, Madrid, 4 February 1942. Lottaz, 2017, art. cit., p. 95. Goldstein, D. M. and Dillon, C. V. 2004. The Pacific War Papers, Japanese Documents of World War II , pp. 214–15. Washington, DC: Potomac Books. 125 MS of 7 June 1942. T¯ og¯o to Suma.

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of World War II in Europe. But there were also political motives. Tokyo presumed Spanish officials to be more favorable to Tokyo’s interests. It appears there was one more reason. The first message on this subject sent to the Spanish Embassy in Washington indicates that the reason for this choice, at least with reference to the United States, was that the representation of Japanese interests could be used as a channel through which intelligence information could be gathered: At the petition of the Japanese Government, Spain agrees to watch out for its interests in this country. I trust that you will report this to that government and order our consuls to take charge of their respective Japanese Consulates. It is urgent that you inform the cities with Japanese Consulates and no Spanish ones. [word missing] for respective areas the possibility of placing them under Spanish consular jurisdiction. The Japanese Government especially urges total protection [from] the Embassy and Consulate in New York, San Francisco, Chicago, Los Angeles, Portland, Seattle, New Orleans, and Boston. It is urgent that you suggest personnel and budget necessary to perform these new functions, indicating if in their respective communities, there are trustworthy Spaniards labeled by North American authorities as ‘fifth columnists,’ whose collaboration can be used in this mission of great national interest.126

Whatever the reason, the Spanish were to take immediate charge of a multitude of tasks. In the United States, more than 60,000 first, second, or third generation Japanese Americans were taken to so-called War Relocation Centers, usually located far from their homes on the West Coast. In contrast to the Germans and Italians—of whom around 3,000 were detained, marked out by their activism—there was little effort to discriminate against the Japanese according to their political ideas or place of birth. Rumors and fake news spread, with many fearing that the Japanese Americans might supply information to Tokyo, along with weird theories that even some officials believed. One stated that the absence of any sabotage by Japanese Americans “proved” that a sabotage campaign was being planned. Consequently, despite the fact that around 70% were American-born US citizens, all the Japanese were “relocated.”127 Similar measures were taken in the rest of the American Continent, and these

126 AMAEC-R-1913-5. Serrano Suñer to Cárdenas, Madrid, 12 December 1941. 127 Robinson, 2001, op. cit., pp. 87, 108.

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were more or less harsh, including forceful evacuation to the United States, as well as censorship of communications and the freezing of bank accounts. These were particularly difficult times for the one-time emigrants and their descendants, although the main Japanese community in South America—that in Brazil, with a population of nearly two hundred thousand—suffered no great problems and few were troubled. As such, the duties of the Spanish officials were filled with visits to internment and detention camps, and making inspection tours every four to six weeks to check living conditions. Besides dealing with requests for reuniting families and many kinds of particular petitions, they had to act as a channel of communication between these citizens and Tokyo. As a result of this increased workload, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up the Central Protection Office (Oficina Central de Protecciones ) on 29 January 1942 and hired Japanese people for the bureaucratic work. The following month, its work was clearly visible: diplomats in the United States had already visited all the relocation centers on the West Coast, pointing out, for example, the difference between the FBI list of detainees and that of the Red Cross, or the nature of the detention, and arguing over the arrests of students. These demands by the Spanish were viewed with certain resentment by the Americans, but they never saw fit to write an unfavorable report of the Spanish, fearing Japanese reciprocity. As for Tokyo, it allowed Swiss diplomats to carry out their work in the Japanese archipelago. They were never allowed to leave for the conquered territories with the exception of Shanghai, following a technically correct line of argument. As such, the majority of detainees suffered Japanese conditions without even being able to receive monetary aid from their own countries. The most visible means of aid was the organization of two exchanges of civilians during the war between the United States and Japan, by the Swiss, the Swedes and the Spanish: one in June 1942 and the other in September 1943.128 The Spaniards’ task, however, went beyond dealing with officials and had important complications. One of the main ones was the need to help those who had not been detained, yet were affected by the “antiJapanese” wave. Blacklists of Japanese businesses, the freezing of bank accounts, mass sackings, and businesses destroyed by acts of vandalism brought a community that had until then lived in relative prosperity, into 128 Robinson, G. 2009. A Tragedy of Democracy. Japanese Confinement in North America, p. 150. New York: Columbia University Press.

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a state of poverty with the general indifference toward their fate. Around five hundred residents in Peru of Japanese ancestry asked the Spanish Embassy to request repatriation.129 This necessity led to the first Spanish demand to the Japanese and American governments to provide financial assistance to the suddenly impoverished Japanese. At first, given that the Geneva Convention required the host country to provide this aid, Tokyo refused, but in the end it had to agree as no one else was prepared to do so.130 There were many other problems, such as hiring new personnel to be intermediaries, people attempting to pass as Spanish mestizos to avoid retaliation, or the pressure applied by both the United States and Japan on diplomats. Tokyo’s government, for example, attempted to get messages transmitted via the “Spanish channel” that were beyond matters humanitarian and to instill encouragement among Japanese subjects to fight using propagandistic messages.131 From then on, Madrid became increasingly wary of sending all these messages, and Suma asked his superiors “to be ever so careful how you handle this, because we do not wish to place the Spanish Government in a tight spot.”132 It was a laborious task with a propagandistic benefit, except for the exchange vessels. Support for Mutual Trade Commercial cooperation was also highly desired by Japan, but only timid attempts were made during the first months of the war. Madrid announced the extension of an ill-named “Trade Treaty” as the primary measure taken by the Council of Ministries in April 1942, but it was just propaganda. There were few real attempts to promote bilateral trade after the outbreak of the Pacific War.133 On the other hand, Barcelona organized an International Trade Fair (with Germany, France, Italy, 129 Ibid., p. 151. 130 MS 3 and 6 June 1942. T¯ og¯o to Suma. Counter-intelligence report in MS of 21

December 1943. The main mention of President Roosevelt to Japanese Americans in a press conference, in Robinson, 2001, op. cit., pp. 1–3. 131 AMAEC-1134-6. Robinson, 2009, op. cit., pp. 139–140. 220. 132 MS 18 April 1943. This was done through a resolution by the Japanese Diet on 14

April 1943 regarding the sending of a “message of sympathy and hope” to the nationalists in the West. Suma to Tani, Madrid, 14 April 1943. 133 ¡Arriba!, 14 April 1942.

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Rumania, Switzerland, “etc.”) to promote Spain’s role in trade and in which Manchukuo’s participation was relegated to “eminently spiritual” with the fair only showing photographs. The same was to be done the next year in Valencia, although the fair was not held.134 The most important effort in this area was a risky plan pushed by the Philippine General Tobacco Company, or Tabacalera, in defense of “the possibility of establishing a Hispano-Japanese trade link with the Philippines as a starting point.” The directors of the company not only visited Minister Serrano Suñer, but they managed to get high-ranking officials in the Foreign Ministry (its Undersecretary, Pan de Soraluce, and the Head of the Trade Office) to meet Minister Suma to ask him about the possibility of sending a Spanish ship to the Philippines. The project, in which the Sofindus Company would turn out to be involved, was complicated. Besides sounding out Japan, the United States, and Great Britain, the Tabacalera had to organize the movement of commodities in both directions. Spain would apparently buy rubber from Japanese possessions, sell copper, and transport food, but it is probable that they also sought to import Philippine tobacco. The U.K. had to grant navigation navicert certificates for the commodities to be imported and, due to the war situation, an even longer trip via Argentina had to be considered.135 The Japanese did not reject the idea and even Minister Suma himself supported it, believing that the Mitsui Company might be interested in acquiring some of the material they were about to purchase. However, he knew how difficult it would be. Tokyo concerned itself with finding out what the ship would be used for and the progress of negotiations between Spain and Argentina.136 Either way, it seems the Spanish seriously considered the possibility of using their neutral status to establish Spain-Japan trade with the Philippines as a docking point, and which they could use to trade directly with Japan without the need for foreign companies. Spanish officials certainly made a greater than usual effort in this matter and the reason was the importance of the Tabacalera company for both Spain and the Philippines. As the conflict advanced, increasing business difficulties in the Philippines led Serrano Suñer to also give orders for

134 Crusats, 2017, op. cit., p. 54. 135 NARA-RG-457. SIS-38515. Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 19 June 1942. 136 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-27109. Tani to Buenos Aires, Tokyo, 13 October 1942.

Also, interviews with Serrano Suñer and Hayashiya, various dates.

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their resolution—yet there was little he could do. Although the main idea of the company’s head office was to start as soon as possible in the Philippines, following the temporary shutdown caused by the occupation of Manila, the chances of initiating an exchange slowly becoming slimmer. A visit to Tokyo by a Spaniard resident in the Philippines, during which he spoke with Ambassador Méndez de Vigo, was an important wake-up call. He reported for the first time and without intermediaries, on the company’s serious losses, the fall in tobacco trade, and of the increased suffering of the Spanish Community. But nevertheless, the Minister himself became involved in ensuring that these unviable commercial projects were implemented and, as a result, an Argentine ship was even considered.137 As we shall see, the former Spanish colony and those who lived in the archipelago continued to play a key role in Spain’s relations with Japan. On the Japanese side, Mitsubishi investigated the purchase of specific products from South America via Spain, at the same time as it was considering acquiring lead in Italy in exchange for rubber.138 The Spanish in the Philippines Spain closely followed the troubles faced by the Spanish Community in the Philippines. At first, the Japanese were not badly received since the upper-middle-class Spanish sought social peace. Nevertheless, their property was affected by the Japanese attack and there was great tension following the outbreak of the Pacific War due to the looting of shops. The Falange in Manila protected the Casino Español and the Consulate (which was relocated to the Convent of Recoletos) with arms, “fearing an attack by the pro-Americans” and closed its local branch to avoid being the object of treatment similar to that received by the Germans and Italians, while in Cebu, three were detained, accused of being fifth columnists.139 In any case, there were few incidents prior to the arrival of the Japanese, and there were no reports of deaths during these first attacks. With these 137 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-27210. Suma to Tani, Madrid, 16 October 1942. Arxiu

Nacional de Cataunya. FONS ANC1-138/Compañía General De Tabacos De Filipinas, S.A. 8751 Box 2435. Libro de registro Agencias y representaciones 1941/1947. 138 MS 24 September 1942. Tani to Tomii (Buenos Aires), Tokyo. 139 AEET. Méndez de Vigo to Serrano Suñer, Tokyo, 8 July 1942, letter 33 from

Manila, 29 May 1942; AMAEC-1737-16. Del Castaño to Méndez de Vigo, Manila, 20 May 1942.

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problems over, and congratulating himself that the taking of Manila by the Japanese had been relatively swift, the Falangist Consul del Castaño expressed his own fears: If those circumstances had lasted longer than the three weeks it took for the Japanese to take control of Manila, some of our comrades would have been the object of attention, or at least they would have suffered greater problems than the ones they experienced.140

The second test, when the new occupiers settled in, was supposed to be more tolerable on account of both the desired return to social order and good political relations between Madrid and Tokyo. But this was not to be. The treatment by the soldiers once the occupation had been established was rather different from what was expected. Japanese soldiers reacted violently to any mistake, and propaganda proclaimed the need for the Philippines to liberate itself from Western influence, including the influence of the Catholic Church despite what the official propaganda might have announced. Relations between the Spanish Community and the outside world were particularly affected. For communications, measures were strict. Letters and telegrams had to be in English (or Japanese) and not encoded. Furthermore, from February 1942, Japanese authorities decided to suppress the foreign consulates in Manila although in practice these continued as before, with verbal authorization to perform de facto the functions of “protection and administration” of the community as well as receiving complaints from their compatriots. Uncertainty prevailed among the members of the Spanish Community, as it did among the rest of society. As a result, Spanish Consul José del Castaño was left without an official status, unable to encrypt his messages with the outside world, with the external emblems suppressed, and with a multitude of problems to solve. He had the opportunity to leave the archipelago but decided to remain in Manila, a rash decision that allowed the consulate to keep functioning. The Spaniards there (as with citizens of other countries) increasingly sought protection from the arbitrariness imposed by the soldiers and although the consulate was unofficial, it was more pertinent than ever.141 Personnel and monetary needs increased and, considering the specific 140 AMAEC-1737-16. Del Castaño to Méndez de Vigo, Manila, 20 May 1942. 141 AMAEC-R-2910-20. Report by Francisco Ferrer, Manila, 30 November 1945.

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nature of the time, the Foreign Affairs Ministry authorized the increase of employees under the guise of material expenses. An arrangement was also made through people who wanted to transfer funds to Spain to return after the War. The Foreign Ministry deposited sums in their bank accounts while they gave their money to the Consulate.142 Everything possible was being done in the face of this emergency.

Mistrust The good times were over as soon as the Japanese advance in Asia was halted after one hundred days of constant victory and the need to blame others increased. In the spring of 1942, then, evidence of tension between Japan and Spain was clear to anyone on both sides who wanted to look closely. Japan’s image in the eyes of the Falangist had clearly worsened. For various reasons, such as the importance of Allied propaganda, pro-Axis supporters were exposed also to reporting about Japanese occupation authorities that prohibited all white people from going out on the street under the penalty of being shot by soldiers.143 Serrano Suñer himself recognized the success of the “psychological war” carried out by British broadcasts from the BBC and their “tremendous effect” in Spain, but could do little due to both a lack of means and the favorable acceptance of this type of anti-Japanese news even in much of the official media. Even the Falangist press found a Japanese defeat fathomable. The first piece of information concerning a non-victorious battle for Japan, that of the Coral Sea (6–8 May 1942), led to the first criticisms against Japan. The fight was a Japanese victory (they sank an American aircraft carrier and put another out of action, although they lost one of their own for the first time), but Madrid started doubting the veracity of the Japanese’s victorious reports by equating their reliability with those of the Allies. Later commentaries would appear in the daily ¡Arriba! concerning “two confusing battles in the Coral Sea and around the island of Midway.”144

142 AEET. Del Castaño to Tokyo de 23 March 1942, proposing the manner in which the transfers would be handled. 143 NARA-457. SIS-28083. T¯ og¯o to Suma, Tokyo, 1 January 1942. 144 “La lucha en el Pacífico Norte,” ¡Arriba!, 16 June 1942.

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The end of Japan’s maritime expansion was perceived even when it had yet to reach its high point. Second, there was personal disappointment even among Falangists. The Japanese ignored the proposal of a good friend, Ximénez de Sandoval, the Chief of Serrano Suñer’s Diplomatic Cabinet, who suggested naming professor Antonio Aunós as honorary Japanese consul at Barcelona. The consulate had been a career job since 1939, and the new secretary, Juan Delgado Grau, did not have the right political links. He was the son of a former consul, Georges, with strong ties to members of the Catalan intelligentsia like Carles Rahola, who had been executed just after the Francoists conquered Girona not because of accusations of bloodshed, but merely because of his writings.145 When the Japanese replied there were no plans to open an embassy, Ximénez de Sandoval must have felt very disappointed at not receiving a personal reward. Third and most importantly, the Falangists appeared to be deluded by the Japanese. At the end of March, Ambassador Méndez de Vigo reported to Madrid the “unjust and harsh treatment that all the missionaries are receiving.”146 The following day the Ministry asked Méndez de Vigo to give an “extensive telegram account” of the missionaries’ situation in Japan. Consequently, the Foreign Ministry received a long list of grievances: Jesuit father Pedro Arrupe; the Spanish Bishop in the former Spanish Colony of Guam, Monsignor Miguel Ángel de Olano; and two Spanish missionaries in Saipan and Rota who had been “inquisitorially detained [in the month of] December under [the] accusation [of] being spies,” besides other cases that the ambassador failed to verify but were also caused by the “this country’s blind political suspicion.”147 The information itself was exaggerated. Neither Arrupe nor Olano had received brutal treatment, but there was clear proof that the Japanese regime’s supposedly excellent treatment of the Catholic Church left much to be

145 Crusats, 2019, op. cit., p. 19; De Riquer, B. 2010. La dictadura de Franco, p. 165. Historia de España, vol. 9, dir. Josep Fontana & Ramón Villares. Barcelona: Critica-Marcial Pons. 146 AMAEC-R-1738-4. Méndez de Vigo to Serrano Suñer, Tokyo, 28 March 1942; file 3. Méndez de Vigo to Serrano Suñer, Tokyo, 28 March 1942. 147 Instead of Rota the telegram mentions Foudesfurt, surely on account of problems with the cipher. Ibid. Méndez de Vigo to Serrano Suñer, Tokyo, 1 April 1942; file 1737-16. Herrera to Méndez de Vigo, Katase, 30 April 1942.

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desired.148 In any event, Méndez de Vigo’s messages had their effect because they contributed to the political isolation of Serrano Suñer. The Foreign Minister could easily be accused of lying and, at the beginning of May, the Ministry formally revealed to the Japanese its concern in two occasions, as if imbued with the task of defending Spanish interests. First when it presented a formal complaint against an article in the Tokyo periodical H¯ ochi Shimbun which affirmed that using the Catholic religion, Spain had gone to great lengths to extend its political power.149 It later asked Japan about the treatment received by certain clerics in the Pampanga region on the island of Luzon.150 Keeping alive the religious propaganda fire was what led to this first, albeit slight, sign of tension. But the war continued. A surprise attack on the Siberian Steppes that would hand the final victory over to Germany (and the Blue Division) was still decisive for the Axis. In fact, “almost coincidentally,” both the German and Italian Embassies proposed to Suma the idea of attacking the USSR instead of China or India as “it would speed up the conclusion of the war speed up the end of the war,” and even the press reported this in an increasingly direct manner (“Japan will surely try to remove the danger that Vladivostok represents”).151 In August 1942, it was pointed out that if Japan did not strike first, it would suffer the consequences of the Soviet attack: “Possibility of an armed conflict between Russia and Japan. Vladivostok is a danger in the East. It not only threatens Japan, but also Manchukuo and Korea. The Anglo-Saxons are playing this card when discussing future aid with the Soviets.”152 Admiration in Spain was declining, but Japan still had an ace up the sleeve. On the Japanese side, friendship with the Spanish certainly soured irretrievably after the summer of 1942 due, again, to the domestic

148 Arrupe had been incommunicado for more than a month, his documentation and books were confiscated, but he was not particularly mistreated, as Méndez de Vigo stated at the time. Arrupe, 2001, pp. 107–121. AMAEC-R “Private report” by Herrera de la Rosa of 30 April 1943 and information passed from Méndez de Vigo to Serrano Suñer, 1 April 1942. For the recollections of the bishop, Olano y Urteaga, 1949, op. cit., pp. 20–35. 149 MS 26 May 1943. 150 AMAEC-R-2910-9. Del Castaño to Méndez de Vigo for Serrano Suñer, Manila, 5

May 1942. 151 MS 7 August 1942. 152 Mundo, 1 February 1942; 26 April 1942 and 2 August 1942.

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impact of mutual relations. Many Japanese soldiers resisted surrendering, thinking suicide was better than being sadistically tortured to death by Allied soldiers due to propaganda against “Anglo-American devils,” which accused them of lack of humanity and boundless cruelty. After Pearl Harbor, Japan expected to receive additional information on the alleged mistreatment of innocent Japanese subjects in America. Nevertheless, Madrid was consistently negligent in feeding these propagandistic anxieties, partly due to guessing that news of this sort would have repercussions for Westerners arrested in Asia, and partly due to the vigorous press campaign, it was subject to in Latin America after being entrusted with representing Japanese interests. Spain’s motives for assuming this representation and the possible political compensation it entailed were reduced to a minimum in a few months and, as a result, representation fell at the mercy of the professionalism of the Spanish diplomats. The news concerning mistreatment of the Japanese in America was either retained or forwarded in the gentlest manner possible. Although Tokyo anxiously awaited confirmation of the suffering of the interned Japanese in the United States and in other countries, Madrid chose to remain silent. After the first exchange vessels arrived, the criticism of Spanish diplomats shifted to the front pages of the newspapers, and Spain became fodder for internal Japanese politics. Newspapers were filled with statements by returnees who talked about the “inhumane treatment,” “terrorization,” theft, torture, bad living conditions in the internment camps, lashings, extortions, and the sacking of Japanese warehouses. Then, accusations against the lack of protection of Japanese interests led to Spain being blamed for insufficient care and, perhaps more importantly, for failing to secure the return of some returnees selected by Tokyo to come back. It was said that the Spanish had pressured some of them in such a way that they had decided to remain, abandoning their country, and even Foreign Minister T¯og¯o directly accused the Spanish of being careless and hasty in both their investigations and negotiations with the US government. He accused Francisco de Cárdenas, the Spanish ambassador in Washington, of having been deceived by the US government regarding the changes in identity of those repatriated, saying, “He seems to have taken America’s willful and deceptive explanations at their face value. This we find hard to believe. He has been incapable of giving us any

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good reason for such an attitude on his part.”153 Also, Foreign Minister T¯og¯o stated the statements of the returnees showed “show the lie of reports from the Spanish ambassador who assures us that everything is going well.”154 Spain was used as a scapegoat, making the improvement of relations increasingly unlikely. Nevertheless, these tensions cannot be solely explained as a propagandistic need by the government, as they went beyond the newspaper headlines. On the one hand, the image of the “money-grubbing” Spaniard whose only concern was profit emerged once again. When thirteen Japanese diplomats passed through customs at Fuente de Oñoro (Salamanca) en route to Lisbon to return to their country aboard exchange vessels, Spanish officials confiscated a total of 3,400 pesetas which were never returned. The Japanese requested the money from the Foreign Ministry to no avail despite the fact that the requisition took place on the premises of the Spanish administration, and the matter dragged on for some time.155 Trust between both countries was broken and when it was discovered that the Mikimoto pearls sent by diplomatic pouch had not arrived in Spain, the Japanese did not believe the report declaring that the pouch had been opened by the enemy.156 The predisposition to listen to and believe Spanish information was damaged. On the other hand, Tokyo’s concern for its citizens in the American Continent is also noticeable in telegrams sent to its delegations and even in attempts to improve protection, whether by contracting more people to carry out the extra work involved or changing the country in charge of representation. They looked for an alternative: “Since it seems difficult to obtain accurate reports concerning Japanese settlers in the interior of Brazil through the country representing our interests [Spain], we would like to try to get an accurate, detailed report through the 153 AMAEC-R-1134-7. T¯ og¯o to Suma in MS of 15 June 1942. Earhart, D. C. 2008. Certain Victory. Images of World War II in Japanese Media, pp. 356–358. New York: Sharpe. 154 MS 22 September 1942. 155 AMAEC-R-3195-30. Various documents. Not much research has been done on

corruption under Francoism; Viñas, Angel. 2016. Sobornos. De cómo Churchill y March compraron a los generales de Franco. Barcelona: Crítica; Sánchez Recio, G., and Tascón, J. 2003. Los empresarios de Franco. Política y economía en España, 1936–1957 . Barcelona: Crítica. 156 AMAEC-R-3195-20. Suma to Serrano Suñer, Madrid, 18 February 1942 and handwritten annotation of 10 March 1942.

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Vatican.”157 Despite the limited attention the Pope was receiving among the contenders (its 5-points peace proposal had almost no effect, even among Catholics), Tokyo tried to approach the Vatican. Then, in July 1942, Minister T¯og¯o ordered its representative, Harada Ken, to ask the Holy See to investigate “the conditions of Japanese citizens in general, particularly in the United States.”158 In exchange, the Japanese would pass on information concerning prisoners held in their occupied territories, in particular Catholics. It was a difficult solution both politically and legally, but in the end, Pope Pius XII agreed to “personally assist” in “carrying out an exchange of information concerning prisoners of war and civilians interned in belligerent nations.”159 Documents reveal that tensions between the two friendly regimes were reaching a point where it was out of control, until restoring their friendship became impossible. Domestic politics had meddled in their relationship, and both secretly looked for an alternative. In Japan, besides Vatican help, the Gaimush¯ o regretted not having chosen a more professional country in such affairs, like Switzerland. Gen. Franco felt the same and began to turn to the Allies. The first sign that Spain doubted that an Axis victory was inevitable concerned Japan.160 It took place in the summer of 1942, when Washington’s new ambassador, Carlton J. H. Hayes, presented his credentials. A well-known Hispanist and professor, Hayes had mostly been a supporter of the rebels during the Civil War but strongly against totalitarianism and in favor of intervention during the world war. His appointment in Madrid was aimed at improving relations between the United States and Spain, not only forgetting past squabbles, like the one with Weddell concerning the Philippines. Washington wanted not only a more pro-active policy based on strict quid pro quo, but also to facilitate an Allied landing in Morocco, which would take place in November 1942.161 Since their first meeting, Franco seemed to have become very alienated by Japan. He told 157 MS 17 September 1942. Vid. FRUS, 1943, Vol. III. Cicognani [Apostolic Delegate] to Welles, Washington, 1 July 1943. 158 MS 29 July 1942. T¯ og¯o to Harada, Tokyo, 23 July 1942; MS of 4 August 1942. Pollard, J. F. 2001. The Papacy in Two World Wars: Benedict XV and Pius XII Compared. Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 2–3: 87. 159 MS 25 August 1942. 160 Sáenz-Francés, 2016, art. cit., p. 164. 161 Thomàs, 2016, art. cit., pp. 16–17.

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Hayes that peace in Europe would be advisable for the United States as it would allow it to concentrate all its efforts in the Pacific and added that there were two totally separate wars: one in Europe against the Soviet Union and one in the Pacific against Japan.162 He expressed “his detestation” of the Japanese “more than once,” according to information Hayes passed to the British ambassador.163 Since ambassador Hayes’ arrival, the Generalisimo was disassociating himself from a country that was an enemy of the United States but also, at least, a friend of his friends.

The End of a Friendship In Tokyo and Madrid, 1 September 1942 saw the fall of both Foreign Ministers, T¯og¯o Shigenori and Ramón Serrano Suñer. This was the culmination of two parallel processes that entailed the destruction of their power bases and confrontation with the military. On the Japanese side, Minister T¯og¯o was dismissed due to the forthcoming creation of a new institution that further reduced the already depleted sphere of diplomatic activity—the Ministry of Great East Asia (Dait¯ oash¯ o ). On the Spanish side, tensions between the army and the Falange ended up exploding when a Falangist threw a grenade in the Basque Sanctuary of the Virgin of Begoña in mid-August 1942, intending to kill the Minister of Defense, Gen. José Enrique Varela. Then, Varela himself was dismissed along with the Minister of Interior, Gen. Valentín Galarza. And Serrano Suñer himself also stepped down as the head of the Political Council of the Falange. It was the corollary to a progressive process of attrition that had left him with a very small power base and without any possibility of subverting Franco’s decision to dispense with his services. We should not forget that two days before, he fathered a daughter, Carmen Díez de Rivera e Icaza, from an extramarital affair with an aristocratic woman. Of course, it was kept a secret and she only learned about her biological father’s identity after falling in love with and deciding to marry her half-brother, but Gen. Franco experienced great embarrassment due to the behavior of

162 Hayes, C. H. 1945. Wartime Mission in Spain: 1942–45, pp. 30 and ss. New York: Macmillan. This reference does not appear in the Spanish edition. 163 Hoare, 1946, op. cit., p. 221.

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his brother-in-law, or cuñado, with his wife’s sister. Cuñadismo would no longer help him regardless of whatever political power he wielded. Madrid’s insistence on continuing good relations with the Japanese increasingly damaged its foreign relations, same as with Italy. For example, Mussolini was indignant at statements made by Ambassador Shiratori Toshio to the press about Japan’s hope for world domination, that the Mikado (Emperor) was the only God on earth, and that Il Duce and Hitler would have to resign themselves to this reality. Although calmer, Ciano attacked the impetuous phrases of Shiratori as “truly unspeakable.”164 Besides Italy, Friendship was a handicap to the non-Axis friends of Franco’s Spain. Relations with Lisbon were strained by the Allied occupation of East Timor. Madrid was against the ropes in Latin America not only because of Pearl Harbor but also because of their representation of Japanese interests. Relations with the Vatican also became more difficult due to problems concerning the missionaries and the Philippines. The difficulties of the Church in the Philippines were also a concern shared by the Italians and the Vatican. The Union of Italian Catholic Newspapers asked the Japanese ambassador to deny a report by a German correspondent in Tokyo concerning Japanese mistrust toward Catholicism and a plan to “unite all the religions in Greater East Asia through the Shinto religion.”165 The Spanish government reacted in the only way it could, by weakening its friendship with Japan and sensing the possibility of getting closer to the Allies through the back door that was the Pacific War, but it limited itself to abruptly halting the publication of articles about Spain’s historic past in the Pacific Ocean. Both countries showed dissatisfaction. The Japanese Empire was at the height of its expansion after having conquered all of Southeast Asia and several islands in the Pacific and the decision to help the Japanese war effort was taking place, but they concluded that mutual expectations had exceeded possibilities and there was a need to backtrack. Neither of the two saw any benefit in their relationship but, in any case, although the Spanish could contemplate the possibility of a Japanese defeat, they still did not wish it.

164 Ciano, 1946, Diario 1939–1943…, p. 577. 165 MS 29 June; 26 July, and 19 and 26 September 1942. In MS of 29 July 1942,

instructions to Ambassador Harada of 25 June 1942.

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Japan, on the other hand, had no substitute for Spain, but the dismissal of Serrano Suñer explains how it sensed his dismissal. He worked in favor of Japan constantly. Serrano Suñer had only managed to become the exclusive spokesperson for Tokyo’s interests in Spain, he was also the defender of a cause that grew increasingly unpopular, and had fallen into an unnecessary dispute with the United States at the most delicate moment. However, the Japanese Foreign Minister harbored suspicions about him. He asked Argentina and Chile for their reactions to his removal166 and expressed doubts about his real commitments. Regarding a trip to Italy in June 1942 seeking the support and friendship of Mussolini and Ciano, which they could no longer (or wanted to) give, Minister T¯og¯o Shigenori shared his suspicions, suspecting Serrano Suñer of plotting some form of peace talks in Rome, saying, “From its very nature, I am sure Suner [sic.] must know all about this piece of intelligence. I would like to know why, despite this, he is stalling with you. Do you think he had any particular reason? Please wire me back for my information.”167 Certainly, the Foreign Minister had made many mistakes. Furthermore, in order to survive politically, Serrano Suñer and his Falangists had no other choice but to bet on Japan. But it was not his fault because the Japanese dug partly the Falangist’ political grave. Military rule in Japan can be blamed for the lack of interest in strengthening the power of their man in Spain. The increasing marginalization of diplomacy that led to the establishment of a new Ministry in charge of Greater East Asia can explain the disdain for fostering relations with a neutral country that could help. But the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can also be blamed for it, since they delayed making a decision to support Serrano Suñer that was principally theirs to make—the elevation of the status of mutual legations to embassies. While Madrid was completely ready, Tokyo preferred to wait. Japan was progressively losing its connections in Europe since Japanese officials trusted nobody.

166 Tojo [sic] to Yamagata, Ambassador in Chile, Tokyo, 9 September 1942, cit. in Mount, C. 1996. Chile, the United States and the Axis in 1942. In Las relaciones internacionales in el Pacífico (siglos XVII–XX ), ed. María Dolores Elizalde, p. 463. Madrid: CSIC. 167 MS 23 July 1942, T¯ og¯o to Suma, Tokyo, 17 July 1942.

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———. 2014. Infidelidad, espionaje y amantes: las desventuras de Alcázar de Velasco y Luis Calvo en Gran Bretaña durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Diacronie, 28: 1–17. https://doi.org/10.4000/diacronie.4762. Mount, Craeme. 1996. Chile, the United States and the Axis in 1942. In Las relaciones internacionales in el Pacífico (siglos XVII–XX ), ed. María Dolores Elizalde, pp. 453–474. Madrid: CSIC. ———. 2002. Chile and the Nazis: From Hitler to Pinochet, pp. vii–xxviii. Toronto: Black Rose Books. ¯ Ota Ichir¯ o. 1970. Dait¯ oa Sens¯ o. Senji gaik¯ o [The War of Greater East Asia. Diplomacy in Wartime] in Kajima Heiwa Kenky¯ usho [Kajima Institute of International Peace] Col. Nihon Gaikoshi [Diplomatic History of Japan], Vol. 24. Tokyo: Kajima Kenky¯ usho Shuppankai. Parraguez, Ulises; Iacobelli, Pedro, and Miyazaki, Goro. 2020. Intriga y sospecha sobre el espionaje japonés en Chile durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Revista de Historia, 27-2. https://doi.org/10.29393/rh27-19gmup20019. Pastor Petit, Domingo. 1996. Diccionario enciclopédico del espionaje. Madrid: Universidad Complutense. 1st. ed., 1971. Patalano, Alessio. 2015. Feigning Grand Strategy: Japan, 1937–1945. In The Cambridge History World War II , vol. I, eds. John Ferris and Evan Mawdsley, pp. 159–188. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Payne, Stanley G. 1997. Franco and José Antonio. El extraño caso del fascismo español. Barcelona: Planeta. Philby, Kim. 1968. My Silent War. London: McGibbon & Kee. Pollard, John F. 2001. The Papacy in Two World Wars: Benedict XV and Pius XII Compared. Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 2-3: 87. Preston, Paul. 1993. Franco: A Biography. London: Harper Press. ———. 1997. La política de la venganza. El fascismo y el militarismo en la España del siglo XX . Barcelona: Península. Robinson, Greg. 2001. By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 2009. A Tragedy of Democracy. Japanese Confinement in North America. New York: Columbia University Press. Rodao, Florentino. 1993. Relaciones Hispano-Japonesas, 1937–1945, pp. 209– 211. Ph. Diss, Universidad Complutense de Madrid. ———. 1995. Difícil y sin apoyos políticos. La representación por España de los intereses japoneses in la Guerra del Pacífico. Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, series V, 8: 179–194. ———. 1997. España y Pearl Harbor. El estallido de la guerra del Pacífico y sus repercusiones en el contexto político español. In España y el Pacífico, ed. Antonio García-Abásolo, pp. 283–294. Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba.

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———. 2015. La difícil (des) protección: la España de Franco y la representación de intereses japoneses en América Latina durante la Guerra del Pacífico. Cuadernos CANELA, 26: 24–39. ———. 2016. España y Japón durante la II Guerra Mundial. Contextualización de una relación cambiante. In Estados Unidos, Alemania, Gran Bretaña, Japón y sus relaciones con España entre la guerra y la posguerra (1939–1953), coord. Joan María Thomàs, pp. 191–271. Madrid: Universidad Pontificia de Comillas. Ruiz Moreno, Isidoro J. 1997. La neutralidad argentina en la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Buenos Aires: Emecé. Sáenz-Francés, Emilio. 2009. Entre la antorcha y la esvástica. Franco en la encrucijada de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Madrid: Actas. ———. 2016. De águilas y leones. Diplomacia británica en España 1939–1953. Tiempo de guerra y era de cambios. In Estados Unidos, Alemania, Gran Bretaña, Japón y sus Relaciones con España entre la Guerra y la Postguerra (1939–1953), coord. Joan M. Thomàs, pp 151–190. Madrid: Universidad Pontificia de Comillas. Sánchez Recio, Glicerio and Tascón, Julio. 2003. Los empresarios de Franco. Política y economía en España, 1936–1957 . Barcelona: Crítica. Sanchís Muñoz, José R. 1992. La Argentina and la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano. Saña, Heleno. 1982. El franquismo sin mitos. Conversaciones con Serrano Suñer. Barcelona: Grijalbo. Sevillano Calero, Francisco. 2000. Ecos de papel. La opinión de los españoles en la época de Franco. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva. Shillony, Bern-Ami. 1991. Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan, passim. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/978 0198202608.001.0001. Shulsky, Abram N. 1991. Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence. McLean, VA: Brassey’s. Tarling, Nicholas. 2013. Britain and Portuguese Timor, 1941–1976. Clayton, VIC: Monash University Publishing. Thomàs, Joan María. 2001. La Falange de Franco. Barcelona: Plaza & Janes. ———. 2008. Roosevelt and Franco During the Second World War. From the Spanish Civil War to Pearl Harbor. New York: Palgrave. ———. 2016. Catolicismo, antitotalitarismo y franquismo durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial y la inmediata postguerra: Carlton J.H. Hayes. In Estados Unidos, Alemania, Gran Bretaña, Japón y sus Relaciones con España entre la Guerra y la Postguerra (1939–1953), ed. J. M. Thomás, p. 14. Madrid: Universidad Pontificia de Comillas. Torrus, Alejandro. 2022. La gran evasión española. Barcelona: Ediciones B. Valente, Lica. 2004. Il Mistero della missione giapponese. Rome: Cierre Edizione.

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Viñas, Angel. 2016. Sobornos. De cómo Churchill y March compraron a los generales de Franco. Barcelona: Crítica. Wilcox, Robert. 1995. Japan’s Secret War. New York: Marlowe. Wright, Quincy. 1940. The Present Status of Neutrality. American Journal of International Law, 34-3: 396.

CHAPTER 4

Confusion In Collaboration

The changes at both countries’ Foreign Affairs Ministries on 1 September 1942 were part of a restructuring of power related to the war, but their significance was different because the crisis in Japan was a fresh demonstration of the decreasing influence of diplomacy, while in Spain, it was the opposite. Both countries were reading the results differently. After so many conquests, Tokyo believed that it was time to set up a new body of countries under its rule but Spain increased its diplomatic maneuvers. To enhance their role in the world, both countries tried opposite methods. Japan’s new minister of foreign affairs, Tani Masayuki’s ability to act had been so reduced. Establishing the Greater East Asia Ministry again diminished the role of Japanese diplomacy, with half of the staff and the departments of East Asia and the South Seas now in the new Ministry. In an unrewarding task, Tani tried to maintain the influence of diplomacy when the belligerents still sought the solution through armed fighting, only to be replaced seven months later by Shigemitsu Mamoru. His Spanish counterpart, the Count of Jordana, had a drastically more important role. Perhaps because he was peacefully dismissed as vice president and foreign affairs minister in 1939, when the Axis tide was higher, Jordana enjoyed a much more relevant position in the government, with continuous access to the head of state. In any case, he faced several complicated decisions as he had to reconcile the many Axis leanings in Spain with the development of the war in favor of the Allies, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 F. Rodao, From Allies to Enemies, New Directions in East Asian History, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8473-0_4

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especially as its armies advanced in Morocco. He had to perform a diplomatic juggling act due to pressure from both the Allies and the Axis, while opinions inside the government were highly diverse. Spain-Japan relations fell prey once more to different contexts, with Spain hoping to change the significance of its neutrality. Its official position of non-belligerence was outdated. Madrid no longer considered entering war. After having lost its imperial ambitions, Spain now faced its friendship with the Axis in a different way, which included admiration for Germany, friendship with Italy, and difficulties with Japan. Therefore, for this new phase, Japan was the most appropriate option for Spain to lessen its collaboration with the Axis. Tokyo was not really upset about this, but it depended on Spain’s help in the war. As a result, images played a major role once more, and the Spanish government reorganized it again, as the traditional image reemerged as an alternative to the one that existed when expectations were high.

A New Minister, A New Context Since 1942, Spain and Japan had to face very different contexts for their relations with other countries. In Japan’s case, the beginning of the chapter coincides with a new stage in the war that would be definitive. It went on the defensive. After its navy’s defeat at the Battle of Midway the previous summer, the Japanese army suffered an important setback in Guadalcanal Island in the Melanesian archipelago of the Solomon Islands. Neither of these battles was a disaster, but both marked the end of Japanese expansion. The ruling concern within the perimeter occupied by Japanese troops was how to structure conquered territories for Japan’s benefit, which they did around an idea used for the first time in August 1940, the Dait¯ oa ky¯ oeiken or the “Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere.” It was under this grandiose concept that Tokyo ruled its territories but was unable to use it for purposes other than propaganda. It rejected the possibility of creating a dynamic community that could increase its ties between different territories horizontally, since it could endanger its leadership. As such, the only real result was a meeting of five national leaders from different territories in East Asia that took place in November 1943. The Co-Prosperity Sphere was a new chimera that showed the fatuousness of Japan’s aspirations. It was more smoke than fire while Tokyo had to deal with all kinds of sensitivities, and one symptom was the resistance shown in Thailand, the only independent

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country. Despite Japanese help, after Pearl Harbor, Bangkok claimed that it would defend its country against any attack even if it had to resort to scorched earth policies. The invasion never occurred, and the country entered the war on the side of the Japanese, but Japan did not use Thai troops when it attacked Burma.1 In the domestic sphere, the population appeared to be fed up with the war. The elections in May 1942 disproved the notion that the military was in control, supported by bellicose dialectic and with the army’s ministries all under T¯oj¯o Hideki’s control. Although those elections were called amid a maelstrom of imperial victories, the military did not win enough votes and were never able to have as much control over Japanese society as the Nazis or the Fascists did in Europe. In the end, the military failed in its attempt to monopolize power and resigned itself to seeking reconciliation with the representatives. Throughout the war, dissidence always remained latent. In Spain, domestic politics entered a different phase of expectations. The conservative victory over the Falangists and the likelihood of an Allied victory raised the possibility of the monarchy’s return, and with it, the end of the presidential regime headed by Gen. Franco. It was, essentially, an internal problem because Gen. Franco was, in theory, temporally in power, but once the former king died and his son Don Juan was proclaimed heir to the throne, the return of the monarchy became a feasible alternative. In this dispute over the future of the regime, hidden, and relatively free from political pressure from the Axis, Franco devoted much time to assuring his continuity as Head of State by placing himself right in the political center. On the one hand, there was the high-ranking military which supported the restoration of the monarchy, while on the other hand, there was the Falange who, remembering the Civil War, saw Franco as the guarantor of the stability longed for by the Spanish people. In Foreign Affairs, efforts were devoted to avoiding getting dragged into the war. The new attitude promoted by Jordana for Spain made its debut at a Council of Ministers meeting held on 17–21 September 1942. Since then, the Serrano Suñer era’s “non-belligerence” stance was

1 Bull, Hedley & Holbraad, Carsten. 2002. Martin Wight. Power Politics, p. 160. Edinburgh: A&C Black. 1st ed. 1979; Leitz, C. 2000. Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe during World War II , p. 3. Manchester: Manchester University Press; Reynolds, E. B. 2004. Phibun Songkhram and Thai Nationalisn in the Fascist Era. EJEAS (European Journal of East Asian Studies) 3–1: 128–130.

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gradually replaced by a policy of neutrality, while anti-communist proclamations were embellished with a willingness for rapprochement toward both traditionally friendly regimes like Portugal, Latin America, and the Vatican, and neutral countries like Switzerland, Sweden, and Ireland, but with Turkey as the example to follow.2 Weeks later, the Allied landing in North Africa provoked the most difficult moment for Franco’s regime. Spain found itself surrounded in the north by German troops in the Pyrenees, and doubly so in the south by Allied troops, who, after landing on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, were advancing toward the east, almost by Spanish Morocco’s borders on the other. In spite of so much tension, it was a successful start for the prudent Foreign Minister, with no major problems.3 In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gen. Jordana was the most appropriate choice for Franco. A faithful servant without further ambitions, who knew the ministry well and was returning after three years and a half, he was the kind of Franco-monarchist needed by the caudillo, who bestowed him with personal confidence and the freedom necessary to promote change in foreign policy. Furthermore, Jordana worked in a less impetuous manner, dedicating himself entirely to the task at hand and setting in motion an administrative reorganization of the Foreign Ministry. He centralized policy decision-making in José María Doussinague, the Director General of Foreign Policy who, as the effective “number two” in the ministry, was in charge of coordinating all regional areas. Relations with Japan still relied on the Foreign Minister, and uncertainty loomed over the future of the Head of State. The Foreign Minister’s personal stamp would be key in their development.

Collaboration Continues After Jordana became in charge, his first task was to convince the Japanese that cooperation would continue as before, and reassurance was given in different ways. He showed cordiality toward the Japanese at a banquet, holding an “intimate” conversation with the personnel or sending a message of congratulations regarding Japan’s recently announced military

2 Sáenz-Francés, 2009, op. cit., p. 274. 3 Collado Seidel, C. 2016. El telegrama que salvó a Franco. Londres, Washington y la

cuestión del régimen, pp. 59–61. Barcelona: Crítica.

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victories.4 On 4 January 1943, the first No-Do (the Spanish government’s newsreel) showed a parade of newly-returned “victorious” troops from Borneo, marching before Emperor Hirohito. Two weeks after the Japanese landing on the Aleutian Islands, the newsreel reminded viewers that “Japan had conquered an area of 4,800,000 square kilometers,” while in April that year, it pointed out that “Japanese troops are clearing Yünnan province [sic. Yan’an] of communist guerrillas.”5 At a New Year’s celebration, Franco also spoke of a bombardment of Calcutta and expressed his delight about it as half of India’s industries was based there, asking “Do you intend to blow the place to pieces and make it the base for an attack on India?”6 The Japanese had no doubt that Spain was on their side. Jordana allowed both intelligence and representation of interests to continue operating, but no longer trusted their chiefs. Regarding the espionage network, he made it known that he would work as if he knew nothing about it and let it operate. Secret information gathered by the Spanish continued to arrive in Tokyo. In the T¯ o network, a total of nine messages in September and eight in October have been recorded as sent to Tokyo and decoded by the Americans, indicating an acceptable rate during those moments of uncertainty. These were not the twenty-one messages from August, but a comparable quantity to the ten from July of that year, 1942. Something similar apparently occurred with the representation of interests, nor did Jordana do anything in particular about the problems caused by the occupation of the Philippines. The signs of change came in an indirect manner through Manuel Halcón, Director of the Council of Hispanicity, who had expressed to Suma the need to strengthen Spain-Japan relations after the attack on Pearl Harbor. A few weeks after Jordana’s appointment, Halcón informed Suma about concerns regarding a news item transmitted in August by the EFE News Agency about the removal of Spanish as an official language in the Philippines in the wake of only Japanese and Tagalog (and English, albeit temporarily) being made official languages. Following this, Suma pointed out, “now there are reports that the Spanish government and 4 NARA-457. SRDJ-26682. Suma to Oshima, Madrid, 22 September 1942. 5 Numbers 1, 3 and 15. Rodríguez, S. 1999. El No-Do, catecismo social de una epoca,

pp. 171, 347. Madrid. Universidad Complutense. 6 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ29865 (MS of 10 March 1943). Greeting dated 6 January 1943.

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people are considerably stirred over Japan’s treatment [of the Spanish in the Philippines].”7 It was a clear warning. Minister Suma transmitted the complaints, but there was no result. Tokyo responded about the use of Spanish in the Philippine judiciary, which was silently recognized as there were judges who could employ no other language. Perhaps fed up with the protests from Madrid, the Japanese Minister added, “This step had to be taken. I suppose that Spain will not like it, but after all, it is in no position to tell us what to do.”8 This apparent authorization in the courts was not much, and the following month, Minister Tani still did not offer any more solutions, saying, “There is nothing Spain can do with all its protesting.”9 Tokyo now looked with disdain at the Spanish, blaming the tension on Ambassador Méndez de Vigo (“despite the accusation levelled by the Spanish Minister in Tokyo”) and advising, as before, kind words, “Make them understand that […] we are not in the slightest degree attempting to weed out Spanish culture.”10 There was certainly no other option than to leave the task of calming the Spaniards in the hands of Suma’s guile. Now, it was no longer possible to cover up the divergences between Spain and Japan by means of personal relations or political identity. Suma also failed with this strategy. First, he sought backing from the new Foreign Minister by reminding him of his support for the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1939 during his previous run as Foreign Minister, “which was then the basis of Spanish-Japanese relations.”11 This was a complete mistake, first, because in 1939, Jordana had done everything possible to prevent Franco from singing it, and was unwilling to help Japan in 1942, and second, by avoiding any sincere discussion with Manuel Halcón, under the instructions of Jordana himself, Suma made a bad calculation. Instead, Jordana was determined to adopt a more resolute attitude toward Japan, as shown in a verbal note sent to the Japanese Legation on 26 October 1942, almost two months after his appointment. 7 MS 25 September and 14 October 1942. In the bulletins, the name (in the katakana syllabary) “Harukon” appears, and the Councilis referred to as the Asociación Hispanidad; NARA-RG-457. SIS-26718. Suma to Tokyo, Madrid, 15 December 1941; SRDJ-26608. Suma to T¯og¯o, Madrid, 21 September 1942. 8 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-27083. Tani to Suma, Tokyo, 1 October 1942. 9 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-27796. Tani to Suma, Tokyo, 6 November 1842. 10 Idem. 11 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-27059. Suma to Tani, Madrid, 2 October 1942.

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Jordana expressed his “profound displeasure” and evoked the importance of Philippine cultural ties (“they owe their having been incorporated into civilisation to Spain”). The minister proposed that the Spanish language be declared supplementary to Japanese and Tagalog in order for good relations to be restored, also expressing the displeasure of other Hispanic nations. He also threatened to end the friendship between both their countries.12 Ignoring complaints led to consequences. A few days later, on 2 November, a Foreign Ministry issued a press release concerning the representation of interests, which included a number of paragraphs where he admitted that Spain’s foreign policy was suffering due to its friendship with Japan, “in the face of the ongoing campaign waged in some American countries for the last several months against the representatives of Spain because of their behavior, especially since Japan’s entry into the war […].”13 It was a new stance that was probably in coordination with the Holy See because, at the same time, the Vatican was also demonstrating its regret at the Japanese’s treatment of the Catholic majority in the Philippines and requesting that the parish schools continue to operate like before.14 The Japanese must have realized that with Jordana it was necessary to rebuild Spain and Japan’s relationship from the beginning. Even before seeing the press release concerning the representation of interests, Suma expressed tremendous surprise, saying “Seldom in this country is there seen anything in writing more strongly phrased than this Spanish notice.”15 Suma explained the Spanish public’s acrimony toward certain events such as the suppression of one of Manila’s Spanish daily newspapers, La Vanguardia—it was actually El Debate; La Vanguardia was the only Spanish language daily that continued being published in Manila—and the suspension of the remittance of funds to companies and churches. Furthermore, Suma emphasized that mutual friendship was contradictory to the actual behavior of his Japanese compatriots, saying, “It is beyond the Government’s comprehension why the Japanese would preclude the language of a friend and permit the use of the tongue of an

12 AMAEC-R-1736–30. Jordana to Suma, Madrid, 26 October 1942. 13 AEET. Text in a circular dated 9 November 1942, signed by Doussinague. 14 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-28207. Harada to Tani, Vatican, 10 November 1942. 15 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-27702 (MS of 7 November 1942) Suma to Tani, Madrid,

29 October 1942.

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enemy like the United State.”16 Yet he saw no viable solution, although he warned that the problem was serious enough to ruin the friendship between both countries, saying, “I think Spain must have made every preparation before driving this final nail.” He was also aware of the benefits Japan obtained from Spain: Well, we do not have [Serrano] Suñer anymore, we have a new Foreign Minister to deal with who has carte blanche, and if we do not act to suit him, not only will he stop helping us in representing enemy interests, but he will also cease permitting his country to help us in espionage.17

Fully aware of the situation, he hoped to convince Tokyo that it needed to address Madrid’s grievances (“‘Please think this over carefully and lean over”),18 warning it of the negative repercussions that the suspension of Spanish cooperation may have for the Japanese war effort itself.19 Both espionage and the representation of interests had begun by way of a political decision, and both types of assistance were in danger if Tokyo failed to address any of Spain’s demands. They had their own development, as we shall see in the following section. Increasingly Difficult Intelligence Jordana allowed Spanish assistance in Japanese espionage to continue, but he never gave his explicit support, nor was he prepared to accept the risks that his predecessor had accepted. The context changed due to three facts, official ignorance, the end of the network in the United Kingdom, and the growing difficulty in communicating with agents from Madrid. Espionage became the activity of certain individuals who, through an increasingly vague relationship with the Spanish administration, supplied Japan with information in exchange for money. First, Serrano Suñer’s dismissal brought foreseeable uncertainty to the network. Since it had been operating “entirely” thanks to the personal actions of Serrano Suñer, the network’s leader, Ángel Alcázar de Velasco

16 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-27760. Suma to Tani, Madrid, 30 October 1942. 17 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-27702. Suma to Tani, Madrid, 29 October 1942. 18 Ibid. 19 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-27758. Suma to Tani, Madrid, 29 October 1942.

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himself ordered his agents to cease sending information until further notice.20 He clarified the situation of the network after a meeting with Jordana on 4 October when the latter told him that he had generally known of the former’s espionage activities on Japan’s behalf since his appointment and had no intention of introducing any change whatsoever in the Spanish policy of collaboration with the Axis. Nevertheless, since Serrano Suñer’s behavior had been overly impetuous and had occasionally caused problems, the Minister indicated to Alcázar that “on the surface I [Jordana] shall maintain in the future the strictest possible neutrality. I want you to carry on as if I knew nothing at all about the existence of this intelligence net.” As to how it operated, he added that he had no objection to the continued use of Foreign Office codes and diplomatic pouches as before, “but in case anything happens, I ask you frankly and explicitly to take the greatest care to not compromise Spain’s neutral position in any way.”21 This information has not been verified and may have been invented, but it is possible that these were the words of the Minister. It was difficult for Jordana to stop what Serrano Suñer had done by simply ordering for operations to end, should he have wished to do so. Furthermore, this was in line with what was said by the Marquis of Rialp, Administrative Advisor to the Foreign Office, who took charge of intelligence questions in the Palace of Santa Cruz and stated that “cooperation with our spy ring will be carried on as before, but we particularly hope that the Japanese authorities will adopt the attitude of knowing nothing at all about it.”22 Intelligence continued to reach the Japanese Embassy, then, with Jordana acting as if he knew nothing and encouraging others to do the same. Alcázar could not act at the ministry as before, at least with communication officers. The end of Spanish agents in Britain sending reports, secondly, was an additional setback to Spanish espionage. Serrano Suñer did not stop the flow of information to Alcázar from London, despite the Luis Calvo incident, but Jordana did. Information from London bearing the T¯ o letterhead in the Magic Summaries shows that four messages had been

20 GSK-KT. A7.0.0.9–9 Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 5 September 1942. 21 MS of 9 October 1942. Suma to Tani, Madrid, 4 October 1942. 22 NARA-457. SRDJ-26938 (MS of 9 October 1942) Suma to Tani, Madrid, 5 October

1942.

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sent by Suma in August from the British capital, but in September, this fell to two and, moreover, both were sent to Tokyo on the 2 September, before Jordana had taken up office.23 Responses to Japanese petitions, thirdly, indicate that there was no communication between Spain and its agents in the United States. Tokyo asked about the general sentiment among the American population and radio broadcasts and the apparent response of the Spanish agents in the United States, points to Alcázar’s inability to send messages there. Regarding the first request, Alcázar de Velasco delivered what he said was a dispatch from the Spanish Ambassador Cárdenas, requested by Jordana himself and obtained upon his arrival “in strict secrecy from the Head of the Communications Office.”24 In the text, Ambassador Cárdenas showed that he had worked tirelessly on his response, not only holding numerous meetings with officials, but even inviting the North American Secretary of State Cordell Hull to dine with him, in order to talk more frankly about Japan’s request. As for the second request concerning Japanese radio broadcasts in the United States, Alcázar’s reply was a supposed message sent by “one of his agents” who reported on the complete ban on listening to these broadcasts, concluding that anyone caught doing so would be punished “without any ado.”25 Both were false. There had been no such meeting between Cárdenas and Hull, nor did there exist in the United States a repressive phobia that prevented Americans from listening to Japanese broadcasts. The lies suggest that Alcázar had no way to send instructions, at least immediately, and that his messages had to be adapted to Japanese desires as much as possible. Nevertheless, the Japanese continued scheming to collect information in Spain. The amount of information was extensive, and more was expected, according to conclusions reached at a meeting of intelligence chiefs in Berlin on 26–28 January 1943 that was attended by about seventeen officials who worked in Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Turkey, Bulgaria, Italy, Vichy, Paris, and the Vatican. Spain, Portugal, and Turkey were singled out as being in the “front line” of information gathering. It was also expressly acknowledged that despite Tokyo’s

23 MS 6 September and 26 November 1942. 24 MS 25 September and 6 November 1942. 25 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-27679. MS of 6 November 1942. Suma to Tani, Madrid, 28

October 1942.

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proposals to seek information from the different neutral governments, Spain continued to be the only neutral nation to facilitate its activities. Moreover, among the offices considered to be the most important, Madrid’s was the only one (along with Berlin and Sofia) in which high speed receivers were issued, with which they tried to receive reports from spies in enemy territory and were used to intercept Anglo-American and Soviet communications. Regarding propaganda, Spain once again played a central role.26 The initial equilibrium established in the Iberian Peninsula at the start of the war had apparently shifted and Madrid became the main intelligence point in Europe. In Spanish Morocco, Japan opened a Consulate in Tangiers to observe ships and convoys passing through the Straits of Gibraltar—especially, India-bound British ones, which were also observed from Turkey.27 Tokyo presented its request to open the office, arguing the supposed “commercial and economic possibilities, and growing importance of the Spanish Moroccan region for Japan.”28 Such a foolish excuse would not have mattered to Serrano Suñer, to whom the petition was addressed, but Jordana postponed the formal authorization of the Tangiers Consulate, requesting first a report from the State Office for Morocco and the Colonies, which only suggested combining Japanese representation with that of Tétouan.29 Later, as Jordana continued to delay his reply, the Japanese acted on their own initiative, largely because the Allied offensive forced Japanese residents of Casablanca and Fez to flee to Tangiers. It boosted the importance of the office of Military Attaché.30 The office was unofficially opened from April onward, “because relations between United States and Spain have to some extent calmed down,” thanks to excellent relations with Spanish authorities, who allowed Lt. Col. Hasebe

26 MS 12, 14 and 16 February 1943. The diplomat, Hayashiya Eikichi, informed the author that the apparatus in the Legation was bought at the market, although of good quality. 27 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-27758. Suma to Tani, Madrid, 29 October 1942. Best, A. 2002. British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914–1941, p. 179. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 28 AMAEC-R-2696–23. Suma to Serrano Suñer, Madrid, n.d. [20 August 1942?]. 29 AMAEC-R-2696–23. Under Secretary of Morocco to Jordana, Madrid, 9 October

1942. 30 The office was set up in the building of the tobacco monopoly. AMAEC-R-3195–29. Suma to Jordana, Madrid, 17 November 1942.

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Kiyoshi, Assistant Military Attaché at the Embassy in Madrid to use a car flying the Japanese flag and receive information on the passage of ships though the light-house keeper and his siblings, which was also sent to Germany.31 The first messages to come out of Tangiers concerned the increase in convoys via Gibraltar and the attacks on Tunis, but their importance grew in time. This Moroccan city was “our only post in Africa,” as pointed out by Hasebe, and was mainly used to observe the Allied administration in Algiers, and know to what extent the United States was deploying its resources in the European theater.32 Their importance increased after the surrender of Italy because Gibraltar returned to being part the transport route toward the Pacific, which allowed the use of information to know which ships were sent to the Far East via the Indian Ocean, especially when this was checked with the data the German spies in the Red Sea had.33 It continued to operate until April 1944, but the situation of the Spanish in the service of Japanese espionage in Spain was becoming difficult. Japanese intelligence’s most important activity in Spain was the network organized around Ángel Alcázar de Velasco. Japan needed to know more about its main enemy, the United States, and in many aspects, as shown in the information requested.. At the military level, they asked for data concerning airports and naval establishments in the Aleutian Islands, communications with the USSR, and highways connecting the State of Washington to Alaska. At the propaganda level, Tokyo requested editorials from prominent commentators such as Arthur Krock, Dorothy Thompson, Raymond Clapper, Ernest Lindley, Hanson Baldwin, George Elliot, and Admiral Pratt, along with feature articles from magazines such as Foreign Policy and Fortune.34 Tokyo insisted on increasing its number of agents in the United States. Alcázar declared that at least twenty agents were necessary, despite the disappearance of the agent in New York who, since Jordana’s arrival, had ultimately stopped sending 31 AMAEC-R-1738–3. Note from Tomás Súñer to Jordana, Madrid, 21 April 1944. According to an account by Soriano to Tomás Suñer. 32 MS 8 July 1943. Suma to Shigemitsu, Madrid, 30 June 1944. 33 MS 30 January, 26 February, 10 March and 1 May 1943. Times (London), 9 April

1942, story by the Tangiers correspondent. 34 MS 7 November 1942. NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-27707. Tani to Suma, Tokyo, 30 October 1942.

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reports—probably a sailor from a Spanish vessel, as presumed by American counterespionage.35 It was safer to send an official representative to increase the protection of Japanese interests on the west coast of Canada. Until then, Francis Bernard, Honorary Vice Consul in Vancouver, was in charge under the guidance of the Consulate General in Montreal and the Spanish Embassy in Washington. The idea had been conceived during the time of Serrano Suñer and was clearly an expected consequence of Spain being entrusted with representing Japanese interests. A diplomat could also take the opportunity to provide information about enemy movements in the North Pacific, using the names of Japanese who presumably needed help as codes to indicate departure dates, loading of cargo, and the direction of the convoys sent to the fight against Japan. When Jordana took office, he named a candidate that was more supportive of the Allies than of the Axis—Fernando de Kobbe y Chinchilla. Nevertheless, Alcázar managed to persuade Kobbe to see himself as head of a future network in Vancouver that would be able to ask the Japanese for more money. Suma reported to Tokyo, saying “Now the only way to ensure his cooperation and loyalty is, after all, with money. Therefore, in the near future, we intend to scrape together a large sum of money and hand it over to him.”36 Meanwhile, the Imperial Government sent some obvious instructions concerning the main interests in this representation: lines of communication that passed through the North Pacific, especially in the direction of the Kuriles Islands and the Soviet Union. Following this, Kobbe departed aboard the Marqués de Comillas and took possession of his post on 11 January 1943.37 After his arrival in Vancouver, apart from a visit to a Japanese detention center and a few appearances at the consulate, Kobbe’s main activity was driving a luxury sports car which, as the local press noted, became famous

35 MS 14 October 1942 and 24 January 1943. 36 On 2 October, Washington warned the Canadian Government to keep an eye on

Kobbe. Mount, G. 1993b. Canada, Spain and espionage during the Second World War. Canadian Historical Review, LXXIV-4: 567, based on documents in the National Archives of Canada. NARA-RG-457. SRDJ26967. Suma to Tani, Madrid, 5 October 1942; 27,247. Suma to Tani, Madrid, 16 October 1942. I would like to thank Graeme S. Mount for kindly sending me the documents from file 123 s in the Canadian Department of External Affairs. 37 MS 21 October 1942.

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in the city.38 According to Alcázar, since March 1943 Kobbe transmitted news of “ships, their cargos, weapons, and how frogmen were trying to get information on electronic devices from a Japanese submarine that was sunk in the Bering Straits.”39 It is doubtful that this was true. In May 1943 Suma told Tokyo that Kobbe’s means of communication had been compromised and, since then, none of his messages mentioned the diplomat in Canada. Kobbe certainly faced a difficult task from the start. The Ottawa Government not only viewed his promotion to the rank of Vice Consulate with suspicion, but since November 1942, shortly after the diplomat embarked, the Canadians had been receiving information concerning the risk posed by the Spaniard.40 Consequently, since approval could not be rescinded, the Department of External Affairs removed his right to the diplomatic pouch and insisted that all his communications be done by ordinary mail just like the representatives of the Vichy Government. In addition, press articles about the dispatch of information to Rome and Berlin through Spanish diplomats made his links with espionage an open secret, whether they were true or not.41 Proof only arrived through a postal package from the embassy in Washington to Montreal, from where it was sent by registered post to Vancouver, intercepted by Canadian Censors at the end of August 1943. The Canadian secret service found instructions in a sealed envelope for the dispatch of secret messages (two code keys and lists of Japanese first names with meanings to provide information on the dispatch of troops, defense installations, and the dispatch of ships), a formula for invisible ink, and $1,000 in cash. The envelope came with a letter signed by Gustavo Villapalos, the father of a former Rector of the Complutense University in Madrid, with invisible ink on the back, which said that the information should be sent to Antonio Rosas Bardia [or Rozas Bardon] and Mariano Hidalgo, employees in the diplomatic pouch section of the Foreign Ministry in Madrid.42 Kobbe’s posting, in

38 “Reason for move,” 25 February 1944, The Vancouver News Herald. 39 cit. in Wilcox, 1995, op. cit., p. 131. 40 Mount, G., Canada’s enemies, Toronto, 1993, p. 99. 41 Ibid., p. 100. 42 Mount, “Canada, Spain…,” p. 571; DEAC-123 s. Robertson (Secretary of State for External Affairs) to the Canadian High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, Ottawa, 20 September 1943.

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conclusion, was a resounding failure, although there is still some doubt as to his arrangement with Alcázar, who claimed to have provided Kobbe with invisible ink in Madrid. His incorporation was probably a simple arrangement to extract more money. The second person that was ready to travel to the United States with an official appointment was a friend of Alcázar named Castejón (according to how it was spelled in the Japanese kana script, kasutehon). He was to travel as a Aerial attaché to cover a vacancy in the embassy while gathering intelligence for Japan, but at the last moment, Alcázar was informed that the United States embassy had rejected his name. In reality, the request had never been made, which clearly showed the network’s gradual withdrawal from the levers of power. Neither of the two candidates considered during the Serrano Suñer era was accepted by Jordana, who apparently preferred the post to remain empty.43 The Minister could accept that the network would continue, but he did not want to carry it on his own political back. Journalists and agents who travelled as civilians and entered the country on their own account and at their own risk were further possibilities for the network. Regarding press correspondents, the idea was to pay a newspaper to let a correspondent stay who would submit their stories with additional intelligence information written in invisible ink. The Germans were not greatly in favor of this and information had to be sent in English, but it was one of the few ways to legally obtain a visa to enter the United States and to move within the country without overly raising suspicion, but once again, this failed. Guillermo Aladrén confessed the real reason for his trip to Washington’s Embassy in Madrid when applying for his visa and became a double agent. His messages, which were designated T¯ o T¯ oku (special to the T¯ o network) and contained false information were provided directly by the Americans who, in the summer of 1944, protected Aladrén from becoming subject to retaliation.44 The other correspondent apparently preferred to take the money and run after his arrival in the United States with Aladrén. There is no trace of his messages. It is possible that he may have been a certain Torres

43 MS7 February 1943. Note from Magic Summaries. Report of 24 January 1943. 44 MS 8 January 1943. NARA-RG-226-108b “Alcázar;” Instructions issued to him,

RG-59. CDF 1940–44. 852.9191211/10. Beaulac to Hull, Madrid, 21 October 1942.

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Perona, a press correspondent whom the FBI considered highly active in intelligence matters.45 Out of the other possible agents, the only one whose existence is possible to confirm is the French-born Enrique, or Henri Gravet, a personal friend of Alcázar de Velasco. He was one of the two Alcázar acknowledged to the Americans as being members of the network (along with Kobbe), and he later called him Rogelio, saying that he was from Galicia. With his passport after working at the Guatemalan Embassy in Spain, in April 1943, Gravet travelled from Cádiz to Buenos Aires aboard the Cabo de Hornos. From there, he planned to travel to Guatemala and then to San Francisco or Los Angeles with the aim of carrying out intelligence work in the company of his wife’s uncle, Sebastian Dov. But in June, he wanted to return to the Peninsula, as a letter to one of Alcázar’s postal officers, Celestino Moreno, indicates.46 The other agent who generated the most messages was called a “reliable gentleman” who on 8 November 1942 left by plane to travel to Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, and Guatemala. The “gentleman” had agreed to “help us establish the espionage network” and the Japanese were eager that it be established in Latin America, but his activities after he left Madrid are unknown.47 Besides them, Rafael Moreno Echevarría, a Chilean statesman sent to the United States to research shipbuilding as well as working and political conditions in the country, who, according to Prof. Pedro Iacobelli, had worked for the Japanese Embassy, but stopped after discovering that they were following him.48 Kobbe, Castejón, the two correspondents, Rogelio, Sebastian Dov, the “reliable gentleman,” the politician, and, possibly, a communications expert formed Alcazar’s team in his attempt to broaden the network. Other people sold information to the Japanese. Many reports were offered by people usually interested in getting money, but also had enough connections to make the information credible, while the Japanese 45 NARA-RG-59. CDF 1940–44. 701.5211. Hoover to Berle, Washington, 15 January 1942. 46 MS 24 April 1943. Also Tani to Suma, Tokyo, 13 May, in MS of 17 May 1942; NARA-RG-226. E-119-f.162. London-x-2-pts-7. 47 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-27452. Suma to Tani, 22 October 1942. 48 Wilcox, 1985, op. cit., p. 126; Iacobelli, P. 2021. Japan’s Intelligence Network in

Chile During the Second World War. Journal of Contemporary History, 56(1): 93–94 https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009419884631

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became increasingly involved in the direct gathering of secret information, partly because they had personnel to spare after they had been forced to abandon territories that fell into Allied hands. Journalists, likewise, sent confidential information to Japan and American counterespionage considered their residences as offices of the Japanese secret service. Correspondents from the Asahi Shimbun and from the news agency Domei in Madrid were suspected, while Matsuo Kuninosuke was a proven case. Ishikawa Kenji was in charge of controlling a group of Japanese agents operating in North Africa since 1942, visiting Lisbon on a number of occasions to coordinate the activities of naval agents within the Japanese intelligence service. This information suggests the impossibility of finding another Spaniard with sufficient support from the administration to carry out this work. It appears that the relationship established with Alcázar de Velasco would not have been possible a few months later. They did what they could, although they did not achieve what they had set out to. An Evaluation of Espionage in Spain The poor reputation of Alcázar de Velasco and his accomplishments is expressed in an article written shortly after the opening of the censored “Magic Summaries,” which referenced “Espías de verbena” or “Funfair spies.” Perhaps it is best not to exaggerate about the Spanish spy. We should be aware of his attempts to trawl for information and the advantages for Washington of intercepting of messages, as well as the fact that the majority of the information came from a “very complete dossier” that U.S. intelligence services prepared concerning his activities during the war. Nobody knew him well then. In 1943, after reporting that he had a letter written in invisible ink, US agent “Cigar” complained about having received no opinion as to whether or not the information he was handing over was important, and politely requested for clarification about this.49 Despite this decoded information, the United States only managed to unravel the Spanish plot to aid Japanese spies after the end of World War II, and they never had a clear idea. Alcázar’s main mistake, in fact, was not his fault, because his messages were decoded by the Americans when they were sent by Japan’s diplomats.

49 NARA-RG-226–252. Cigar to Silky, 20 August 1943. Marquina, A., 1978. TO, espías de verbena. USA controló la red japonesa integrada por españoles. Historia 16–32: 18.

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Certainly, Alcázar could have obtained much more information with the money he received, and he was never very precise in his deeds, even after the war. In January 1978, he gave assurances that the T¯ o network was made up of thirty members. Other than the two who resided in the United States (one was arrested in the autumn of 1942), a chauffeur, his wife (who received messages), and an address in Talavera which was also used to receive messages, there were also four others whose move to the United States was frustrated after the Luis Calvo incident, and nine who were later sent so that their numbers would be close to Alcázar’s figure: twenty, including himself if some of those alleged spies were indeed spies. More than a network, what Alcazar’s had was a hook.50 However, regarding Alcázar de Velasco, some authors have tended to let their imagination run wild without checking the information he provided. Stereotypes about Spain were common in interpretations of T¯ o messages. Robert Wilcox, in his famous Japan’s Secret War, for example, portrays Alcázar as a professional bullfighter “fighting in the most important bullrings in Spain,” as an “accomplished writer” with a degree from Salamanca University, and as a “supremacist, a calculating anti-Semite, a defender of astrology.” He describes him as still acting as a spy while having an eccentric hair style, “grey, and long, with a Harpo-Marx style length.” Wilcox did not check his data. Alcázar de Velasco was not a torero, but a banderillero (subaltern in charge of helping the bullfighter) with a nickname Gitanito (Little Gipsy), which does not exactly suggest supremacism. He never graduated from any university (in fact, he was the only one without a degree at the main Spanish thinktank, the Institute for Political Studies) and his most important book was a hagiography of Ramón Serrano Suñer.51 Alcázar perfectly fit the stereotype of the intolerant, brash, womanizing, and sexist Spaniard. Even in his 90’s, Serrano Suñer chuckled loudly as he looked back on his flair for women when interviewed by this researcher. Alcázar is a typical example of how historians despise losers, especially if they had a strange appearance and a flamboyant life. Nevertheless, it would be apt to slightly decouple the T¯ o network from the personality of its Madrid chief and to consider the other members whom Alcázar had never wanted to reveal, above all, the 50 Report, Magic Summaries of 24 January 1943; interview with Alcázar in El País, 20 September 1978. 51 Sesma, N. 2004. Propaganda en la alta manera e influencia fascista. El Instituto. de Estudios Políticos (1939–1943). Ayer 53–1: 169.

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agent, or agents, who were in the United States, as well as to compare this to other networks that were also in the service of Japan.52 As for the amount of information, if the one provided by Alcázar is compared to the rest of the intelligence obtained by Japanese diplomats through their own means in other countries in the world, it should be noted that the T¯ o was the only one that merited a number of reports in the secret “Magic Bulletins” on deciphered communications.53 Judging simply by the references contained in the general index, it has been proven that the references to the T¯ o network outnumbered those to any other secret information bought by Japanese diplomats—such as BU, D, FU (Fuji), Kita, MA, NC, and PA. The quality is less well sustained. The American G-2 itself proved that, although the majority of the true information received by the Japanese was taken from the Allied press— both from magazines and newspapers—some of the messages concerning the transport of troops or materials contained verifiable news that did not come from these sources.54 One or two messages verified by the North American services were classified as trustworthy and a report from November 1942 acknowledges some true facts. Thanks to Alcázar, the Japanese found out about the departures of convoys and a jealously guarded secret explosive, RDX, which was 50% more powerful than TNT. In Spain in August 1942, they also learned the importance that conceding the Solomon Islands (that is, Guadalcanal) had for American strategy after receiving news of reinforcements there.55 On the other hand, and not through Alcázar, Minister Suma foresaw the Allied landing in Africa and sent a report about shipping movements in New York that was “essentially o information as correct.”56 Allied counterespionage itself classified the T¯ “bread and butter stuff” because, when there was a lack of real data, the

52 Wilcox, Japan’s secret…, passim; Alcázar and Serrano Suñer, personal interviews, Madrid, 27 March 1992. My thanks to Francisco Sánchez Ruano for having put me in contact with Ángel Alcázar. 53 MS 17 July 1942, when Velasco had still not been identified. 54 MS 17 July 1942 and 25 November 1942, with a comparison between information

from the To network concerning the departure of a convoy and departure statistics from the port. 55 On the sending of a convoy of 65 vessels toward Africa which Magic states is true, NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-30723-a. Suma to Tani 28 January 1942, MS of 3 February 1943. 56 Message from 2 October 1942 in MS of 3 February 1943.

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agents completed messages by resorting to their own imagination. Yet, it was never denied that these messages were based to some extent on fact. Many more spies engaged in deception. For example, the “I” reports from Ankara, bore an accuracy that North American counterespionage found “difficult to assess.”57 Whether deliberately or out of ignorance, deceptive information was given that generally reflected the Turkish government’s point of view. After “a few months” of surveillance of Japanese spies in Lisbon, American counterespionage was “disappointed” by the poor quality of information: “To judge from the prices paid for American periodicals, they seem unaware that we have lifted the embargo on this class of printed matter.” Their conclusion seems devastating in terms of Tokyo’s interest in Portugal regarding espionage: “Portugal, today, is a little more than a clipping bureau.”58 On the winning side, Juan Pujol García—Garbo—made reports on the situation in England that were the product of an alleged network of seven agents, but he was in Lisbon and only received help from a train timetable, while the admired spy Richard Sorge revealed many secrets when he was drunk. Furthermore, if we look at the reactions of his enemies, it seems that the Allies were furious with him. An attempt on his life that he survived along with Serrano Suñer in the spring of 1943 in El Retiro, the main park in downtown Madrid, suggests that they must have feared his future activities. Their offer to work with them in the summer of 1944 suggested that they wanted Alcázar to put an end to his activities. We should then look into why he managed to continue his business with the Japanese throughout the war. Credibility Japan made its own advances in counterespionage. It is known, for example, that the Gaimush¯ o ’s spies intercepted a number of secret documents from Washington prior to Pearl Harbor, that the Navy acquired important information by merely analyzing the traffic of messages, and that by the end of the war, Japanese cryptographers—the so-called Owada

57 MS 26 January 1945. 58 NARA-226. E-127. Box-33–226. BD007 to Saint, Lisbon, 27 April 1944.

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Signals Intelligence Unit (Owada ts¯ ushintai) had not only decoded almost all Chinese communications, but also those of the Americans.59 Japan was clearly aware of the interest others had in its secret communications, but its efforts to evade it were not as advanced as those of its enemies.60 As such, and although there were frequent changes in the ciphers (the list of equivalents used to transform the readable text into a secret format) and the codes (the thousands of words, phrases, and numbers that replaced the legible text), the majority of their ciphers were read by at least five countries—Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, Germany, and Italy. The reasons for this are various. On the one hand, they seemingly had complete confidence in their cipher (by Pole’s cryptographer Jan Kowalewski), yet they lacked resources since they could not face the cost of establishing a new communications system and the purchase of new machines that no one knew how long they would last, or how they could be distributed.61 The most difficult issue was finding out precisely what consideration this information had among those in Tokyo who paid for intelligence, and how it was used in the war’s planning. Besides the content in a given message, there were three principal factors to evaluate: experience with previous messages, how the image of the country affected the services, and finally, references through intermediaries, that is, in the case of Alcázar, complementary information provided by the embassy in Madrid. Regarding Tokyo’s experience with previous messages it received from Alcázar, his credibility should be compared with those of other spies who profited from selling news and as the war advanced, the need for whatever kind of data became especially important for Tokyo. Mieczyslaw Stachowiak, a Polish citizen who deserted the German Wehrmacht’s Todt Organisation, earned a total of 3,481 krona, or nearly 6,000 pounds, from selling information to five different embassies in Sweden and Denmark,

59 Chapman, 1987, art. cit., pp. 149-150; Allen, L. 1987. Japanese intelligence systems. Journal of Contemporary History, 22: 55-56; MS of 29 May 1942; Minohara, 2013, art. cit., pp. 270-271. 60 On the breaking of the land army’s code and its limited attempts to improve security, convinced as they were of it in decipherability, Drea, E. J. and Richard, J. E. (2008) “New evidence on breaking the Japanese Army codes,” in Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 14-1: 62-83. 61 Ibid., p. 124.

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but the Japanese were the most generous, having paid 1,310 krona.62 Alcázar had some success that won the trust of the Japanese, such as American interest in Guadalcanal, while his relationships with the German espionage and with Serrano Suñer helped him. In any case, Suma proposed that Tokyo compare his data about Japanese losses in the Battle of Midway with its own, while the Navy sent gave additional funds.63 Furthermore, Alcázar reported information the Japanese wanted to hear. A message supposedly from Ambassador Cárdenas in Washington about US public opinion in the spring of 1942 is a good example: Japan’s victories had caused great upset, with 70% of the population opposing the war, factories deciding to make war materials defective in protest of the political situation, opposition to British imperialism as strong as that to the Nazis, and some even preferring Hitler to Roosevelt as he had achieved his objectives.64 This was completely invented but it even surprised the Director of the OSS Bill Donovan who wrote, “Knowing Cardenas [the Spanish ambassador] I would have expected somewhat more objectivity than he has shown…”65 Alcázar painted a country on the verge of collapse that suited expectations and helped increase expenses, and his messages were considered reasonable in Tokyo. Despite queries and warnings to prove the data,66 the Japanese saw that their money was reaping some results. Some purported talks at the beginning of 1943 allow us to understand the Spanish spy’s credibility from a different perspective. Alcázar and Serrano tried to convince the Japanese to attack the Soviet Union through an elaborate scheme with fake information that started with Serrano traveling to Rome in relation to the possible restoration of the

62 Matz, J. (2015) “Intelligence and disinformation in World War II and the early Cold War 1943–48: Stachowiak alias Drauschke alias Donoa, his intelligence activities in Sweden and Denmark, and the Raoul Wallenberg case,” Journal of Intelligence History, 14:1: 37. 63 MS 26 July 1942. Information T¯ o, New York, 17 August 1942. In Suma to Togo, Madrid, 23/VIII/1942. 64 MS 11 May 1942, Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 23 April 1942 with a report supposedly from Ambassador Cárdenas (SIS 35090, 34,247). 65 FDRL. PDF-52. Donovan to Roosevelt, Washington, 30 May 1942. 66 MS of 26 July 1942, To Information, New York, 19 July 1942, cit. in Suma to

T¯og¯o, Madrid, 23 July 1942.

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monarchy in Spain. Upon his return, Alcázar informed Suma on something more important, a meeting (between Serrano Suñer and foreign ministers Ciano, von Ribbentrop, and a US envoy) with a view towards a possible peace accord. The meeting had been a fruitful one, according to the Spaniard, since an agreement in principle had been reached although in the end, it would be frustrated by Germany’s refusal to agree to a separate peace with the United States without counting on the Japanese Empire. The message ended by saying that “the only basic difference of opinion [about peace] concerned the question of whether Japan should be left out.”67 Tokyo raised an alarm about it. Its main fear, after the weakness of Italy, was fighting alone after a separate Allied peace with Germany. Japan’s first reaction was to confirm Alcázar’s information. Serrano Suñer corroborated it, whereupon Suma lost no time in passing it on to Tokyo and to the rest of the Japanese Legations in Europe. This was followed by a flurry of messages as the Japanese tried to prove its veracity and obtain more information about these alleged talks. They had supposedly taken place at the Venezzia Palace with Cardinal Francis J. Spellman from New York, who had also met with Gen. Franco in Madrid in the middle of February. Spellman was on his way to the Vatican, where dependence on its US branch had increased since the Catholic Church had sent them all its gold reserves in 1940. The Japanese then concluded that the story of the two Spanish friends had been pure fabrication and that the conversations had never taken place. American counterspies believed that the purpose was to persuade the Japanese to attack the Soviet Union via Siberia by generating the fear that they would find themselves alone in the war against the Allies.68 This Spanish attempt at deceit had a boomerang effect regarding the possibility of an attack on the USSR. No more fake information would be accepted with the same idea and Suma proposed strengthening relations with the USSR.69 The hoax failed, but previous

67 MS 20 March 1943. 68 MS 28 March 1943. Pollard, J. F. 2001, “The Papacy in Two World Wars: Benedict

XV and Pius XII Compared,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 2, 3: 87. 69 Coox, A. D. 1988. The Pacific War. In The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 6, pp. 353–354, Cambridge, 1988. In 1993, Serrano Suñer accused this researcher of being “Gacetillero de la Historia” (a hack historian) and inventing history when asked by a journalist. Perhaps, he had really forgotten it completely. Thanks to Daniel Arasa for sending me his letter.

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messages caused Japanese diplomats to discuss the Alcazar’s inventions, which they had believed were true thanks to his previous messages. Spain’s perception, secondly, influenced the credibility of Alcázar’s services. Again, if we look at the fake peace conversations, Spain’s credibility was put in question. Instead of Alcázar and Serrano, Suma preferred to criticize Spain and Jordana’s attempts at mediating a peace agreement, saying “It is mere ambition and insufficiently backed up […] I do not see how a country with as little prestige as this could hope to end this war.”70 Suma was enjoying Madrid’s social life and he rarely went out with an interpreter until 1944, when student-diplomat Hayashiya Eikichi from Salamanca University moved to Madrid. He could only understand easy conversations with locals. Even with translators, there were many attempts at cheating him. The scholar Antonio Marquina, after reading Suma’s conversations with Marquis of Rialp, Jordana and Serrano Suñer, pointed out, “[…]rare was the conversation with Suma where monumental lies did not slip out.”71 In fact, Suma himself did not seem too bothered by the lies since he later praised both Serrano Suñer and Rialp, saying, “He [Serrano Suñer] has displayed a friendliness toward Japan that goes beyond all limits.”72 Besides the obvious needs in times of war, the stereotype of the “innocent Japanese” clearly shows the persistence of the “little yellow monkeys” image that was so common in colonial novels—they might be good or bad, but almost of all, they were simple. Serrano Suñer’s recollections of his personal relationship with Suma stress his naiveté, describing the Japanese as “an innocent.” He recalled Suma being offered fake paintings and estimated that out of every ten works he bought, only one “was probably authentic.”73 Suma may have possessed more than 2.000 pieces of artwork, especially from the nineteenth and twentieth century, many by artists he met personally. From this collection, there are no further references to 1200 works, but around 400 remain in Spain, first preserved at Museo Cerralbo and later on at other museums, while 189 were given to his good friend Luis Nieto Antúnez, who later became naval minister.

70 Suma to Shigemitsu, in MS of 5 May 1943. Message in NARA-RG-457. SRDJ35187. 2 May 1943. 71 Marquina, 1978, art. cit., pp. 16–17. Preston, 1993, op. cit, p. 476. 72 MS 4 September 1944. 73 Saña, 1992, op cit., p. 244.

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Also around 428 of them were transported to Japan, where they had been used in exhibitions, and are now at the Nagasaki Prefectural Art Museum, which prides itself with having one of the best collection of Spanish art outside Spain.74 Suma has been criticized for having spent too much money on collecting works arbitrarily without any expert opinion, and for sure, he was cheated in some purchases, but he wrote a book Spiritual History of Spanish Art (Misuzu Shobo, 1949) and was an active member of the Academia Breve de Crítica de Arte [The Brief Academy of Art Criticism], the first postwar group for art-lovers in Spain devoted to promoting art, under the leadership of Eugenio D’Ors. For his interest in art, he became famous in the country, and he not only met many officials through his appearances in gallery openings, but also prided himself with having mixed business with pleasure.75 He could have been a wonderful ambassador at a more peaceful time and amassed a collection of Spanish art unsurpassed by any of his colleagues. Suma was not as simple as some would want to think. The third way to evaluate the impact of the information provided by the Spanish is through the references given by their Japanese partners. From so many positive comments about those who cheated him, even after he found out that he was deceived, Suma appeared to be a man devoted to his art collection to avoid his own anger. Upon arriving in Madrid, he was a heavyweight within Japan’s Gaimush¯ o, but his influence clearly waned, apparently as a consequence of his messages. His proposals ranged from attacking India to strengthening relations with Russia only to later invade it (the maritime provinces of Siberia). There was even a proposal made to the German ambassador for Germany to send gasoline to the Spanish in order to “raise the prestige of the Axis,” along with great praise of the “100,000,000 patriots […] will literally turn themselves into bullets of flesh if there was an attempt to occupy Japanese territory.”76 His comments reached a point where they deserved the attention of the normally circumspect “Magic Summaries” which mocked his “desperate 74 On how it was dealt in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oficio 1379 MAE 9–7-

1946 and on the role of Nieto Antúnez. Nieto Antúnez. O.M. 29–7-1946 Depósito de obras. Matsuda, K. 2008. Yakichiro Suma. El ministro plenipotenciario y la crítica de arte española. In Arte, poder y sociedad en la España de los siglos XXV a XX, pp. 687–689. Madrid: CSIC. 75 Ibid, pp. 690–697. 76 MS 5 February 1944.

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resolve” and described him as “not one of Japan’s most sophisticated diplomats.”77 Such a rapid turn from flattery to indifference to increasingly open reprobation and eventually, condemnation, Suma seems to have been seriously affected in his personality. He was not dismissed, nor do we have direct references against him in the Gaimush¯ o, but the political importance of the Madrid Legation weakened, which can be assumed based on some facts. A question from Tokyo concerning the possibility of establishing military bases in the Peninsula was only sent to Lisbon and Berlin, and Madrid’s Legation did not take part in any attempts to negotiate peace at the end of the war.78 At the political level, his opinions coincided with those of the Japanese diplomats in Bern and Stockholm and tended to differ from those held by Oshima in Berlin, as well as from those by Morishima in Lisbon. In this case, we can suspect different political factors, since both were deputies at the postwar Diet, but Suma belonged to the Liberal Democratic Party and Morishima to the Socialist benches.79 In conclusion, even though the messages from Spain on the evaluation of the messages from Spain had little credibility for the Japanese, the two countries’ political friendship prevailed. The comment from the ambassador in Berlin, Oshima Hiroshi after the peace talks hoax was discovered, points beyond Alcazar, Spain or Suma: “In my opinion, to leave this matter in obscurity for the sake of collecting future intelligence is simply putting the cart before the horse.”80 Trust must have declined after knowing that they had been deliberately deceived about those false talks in Rome but, nevertheless, Tokyo continued paying for Alcazar’s information. Thus, the ultimate reason for these intelligence problems was Japan itself and requires an analysis of the ultra-nationalist atmosphere that the country was experiencing during these years.

77 MS 13 September, 2 October 1943 and 18 March 1945. 78 NARA-RG-59. CDF 1940–44. 862.20200. Hayes to Hull, Madrid, 14 September

1944; MS of 23 May 1943. Horikiri to Shigemitsu, Rome, 14 May 1943, and MS of 24 May 1943. Shigemitsu to Oshima and to Morishima, Tokyo, 19 May 1943. 79 Rodao, F. 2017. Prologue: Um testemunho crucial. In Morito Morishima, Pearl Harbor, Lisboa, Tóquio. Memorias de um diplómata, Translated: Yuko Kase. pp. 19–22. Lisbon: Ad Litteram. 80 MS 31 March 1943. Oshima to Shigemitsu, Berlin, 18 March 1943.

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One of the main questions that remain with respect to the Pacific War is the reason for the blind confidence Japanese diplomats and their decisionmakers, in general, had toward their communications system, despite the number of indications regarding failures in the system. Their German allies informed them that they knew about their secret conversations with the United States to avoid entering the war and the affair ended with an interrogation in Washington that concluded that indeed, some codes had been uncovered.81 Yet nothing was done. After Pearl Harbor, new warnings arrived. In 1943, for example, Spanish Ambassador Juan Francisco de Cárdenas communicated his suspicions to his colleague Suma in a personal meeting that took place during a trip to Spain. Suma relayed back to Tokyo that “his [Cárdenas] eyes narrowed and with special care and in a soft voice, partly asking himself, he said musingly, ‘It is strange how quickly the United States finds out about matters such as these. I wonder if Japanese codes are safe.’”82 Months later, Morishima Morito stated in a report that “the United States is using some 200 experts in Japanese to question prisoners of war to decipher code messages.”83 But Minister Shigemitsu categorically rejected the possibility of opening codes, saying, “I have studied the matter from a number of angles, but I cannot believe it is the result of their having solved our codes.”84 There was only one change in the cipher at the Lisbon Embassy after it had apparently been stolen by the Americans and others, but even after the end of the war, many did not hesitate to attribute what appears to have been greater technological ability, to treason. To better understand this refusal to recognize the possibility of foreign decryption, we must remember the patriotic exaltation that existed during those years in the Axis countries, which gave little importance to longterm planning for victory using scientific research. Many were intoxicated by news of so many military victories, like Hitler himself. He started a war without any clear knowledge of where it was heading, expecting an early victory, and not overly concerned with the advantages of science or saving resources for future needs. It was the same with the Japanese Army. For

81 Chapman, 1987, op. cit., p. 152; Kahn, 1996, op. cit, pp. 26–27. 82 MS 22 May 1943. 83 MS 14 April 1943. 84 MS 1 June 1943.

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years, they won many battles and the Central Special Intelligence Department (Ch¯uo ¯ Tokushu J¯oh¯obu) had considerable success in reading Allied diplomatic codes, especially, Allied aircraft and ordinary radio traffic, although they were never able to break the higher-grade codes.85 As a consequence of their confidence in a quick victory, they seemed to have become too optimistic, reducing their number of troops in the conquered territories while the General Headquarters of the Southern Army combined the Intelligence Section with Operations, in a decision interpreted by their enemies as “born out of contempt.”86 The Japanese lowered their guard by withdrawing some of their demands regarding the apparent cost of a complete revision of the codes, not only on account of the code-books required to replace the old ones, but also due to the possible difficulties in sending them. Spanish diplomats were certainly not as confident. They knew that copies of their communications could also end up in an office in Washington, Berlin, London, or Tokyo. Moreover, after Pearl Harbor, they were reminded of this in several ways. Their pouches were opened, press articles accused them of espionage, more or less based on fact, and even Under Secretary of State Sumner Wells accused Axis agents in Chile and Argentina of sending information via Cuba and Barcelona.87 This affected their work in Tokyo. In 1934, Ambassador Méndez de Vigo noted that “[the code telegrams] were, and I suppose, still are, frequently known before they reach their destination;” in fact, along his long stay in the country, his most critical comments against Japan were written in pencil. Aerial Attaché Fernando Navarro, on the other hand, refused to rely on the equipment after taking up his post, saying “It is essential to replace the embassy’s (the Spanish embassy in Tokyo) key, as it is surely known, and thus, offers no guarantee.”88 He was also told to “discreetly report whatever you deem to be of interest and does not compromise the fulfilment of your mission in Japan in case your dispatches are deciphered

85 Samuels, R. J. 2019. Special Duty: A History of the Japanese Intelligence Community, p. 66. Ithaca, CA: Cornell University Press. 86 Coox, 1988, art. cit, p. 349. 87 Times, 17 November 1942. 88 AMAEC-R-393–5. Méndez de Vigo to the Minister of State, Tokyo, 31 December 1934.

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[by the Japanese].”89 The initial plan to send an assistant (Lieutenant Esteban Yoldi) with the code-books ended up being abandoned. In any case, Ambassador Méndez de Vigo secretly published a small bulletin four times a week containing Allied news he garnered thanks to his being able to keep his radio receivers away from political harassment. He did this together with the Argentine chargé d’affaires (its ambassador, Rodolfo Moreno, was outside Japan at the outbreak of the war) and, after passing the typewritten text to the wife of the former ambassador in France, Mrs. Sawada, around twenty copies were printed and distributed among prominent foreigners and some Japanese.90 The decision-making process in Japan, however, was broader than in Germany, and therefore, such errors can be blamed on broad groups, especially the ultra-nationalist ones. The Japanese believed that they were fighting for their survival, which led to extreme mistrust toward everything foreigners might say without any subtlety and four apparent errors based on the very characteristics of Japanese culture. First, the difficulty non-Japanese faced in gaining access to Japanese culture and the most hidden twists in the language must have been strongly contributed to the notion that foreign efforts to reconstruct Japan’s system of communications was almost impossible. Second, the Japanese could scarcely comprehend that their compatriots in the United States might serve motu proprio in the fight against Japan, especially the Nikkei or second generation Japanese who lived outside the Archipelago. Third, despite German technological development, suspicion remained, and mutual cooperation was never truly pursued. During the Battle of Guadalcanal where it was necessary to intercept messages from the Australian listening station at Belconnen near Sydney, there was no collaboration. Finally, it could be dangerous to write a report that contradicted the general opinions of the Department. Ultimately, the xenophobic atmosphere seems to be the most acceptable explanation for understanding why the Japanese did not do what was necessary to avoid damage from their secret codes being revealed, nor to check the work of their Spanish employees more

89 AMAEC-R-1737–13. High Chief of Staff to Jordana, Madrid, 5 May 1944, resent to Méndez de Vigo 11 May 1944. 90 NARA-RG-59. CDF 1940–44. Consul General in Turkey to Hull, Ankara, 3 March 1943, after the arrival of the Argentine diplomat Ramón B. Muñiz Lavalle.

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stringently. In any case, Minister Suma considered sending the code for opening the safe of the Washington Embassy.91 However, there is another possible reason for denying these warnings, to protect their own system of decryption. Historians have tended to undermine Japanese advances in decryption, partly because they lost the war, the bonfires of documents in the last days of the conflict, and orientalist bias, giving veracity to American reports written during the war. However, Japan made important advances, as demonstrated by Professors Minohara Tosh or Kotani Ken using decoded documents found in the diplomatic archives that can be verified with the originals. Documentation collected on their usage in Indochina in 1941 shows the level and quality of their sophistication that was used wisely in decision-making.92 But Japanese intelligence underwent similar structural problems as the rest of the country. There was no cabinet committee to provide a unified strategy, no unified body between the army and navy, intense factionalism between operations and intelligence sections, and an excessive focus on “operational intelligence.” Intelligence researcher Ken Kotani argues that while Japan was good at tactical intelligence at the beginning, strategic executioners were not interested in intelligence assessments and there were enormous structural mistakes such as the army decoding reports but not passing them to the navy nor telling the navy how to break the enemy code.93 The translations themselves are questionable and apparently eased the decision for war. Keiichiro Komatsu blames the predominant slant toward the misunderstandings that led to the Pacific War and Minohara has argued consistently about the consequences of the poor translation based on decoded texts, blaming them partly for the fatal setback caused by the Hull Telegram sent on 25 November 1941. At the same time, months 91 Vid. Iwashima, H.; Johosen ni kanpai shita nihon [Japan Defeated in the Information War], Tokyo, 1984. Also Osaka, G. (seud. Naka Hiromasa). 1984. Iberia no Ch¯oh¯osen [Information war in the Iberian Peninsula], Tokyo: Supein gendaishigakkai [Spanish contemporary history research association, vol 2: 80; Kahn, 1971, op. cit., p. 579; Haldane, R. A., 1976. The hidden world, pp. 124–125. New York: St. Martin’s Press; Shulsky, 1991, op. cit., p. 43. 92 Kotani, 2009, op. cit., pp. 128–131; Kotani, K. 2005. Could Japan Read Allied Signal Traffic? Japanese Codebreaking and the Advance into French Indo-China, September 1940. Intelligence and National Security, 20–2:304 – 320. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/02684520500134065 93 Minohara, 2013, art. cit., pp. 264–265; Kotani. 2009, op. cit., pp. 160–161.

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after the “Magic Bulletins” were opened, the writer Osaka Go called their translations “almost perfect.”94 Professor Michael A. Barnhart prefers to evaluate the uses of intelligence as a mix of these criticisms: “brilliant successes and glaring failures.”95 In short, Hispano-Japanese collaboration in espionage was a vicious circle. It may have been more important, but it was impeded by the effects of war such as the enemy itself and ultra-nationalism, which in the end, were what had started this collaboration and had given it a clear sense. Until peace arrived, it was not possible to break this circle. In the meantime, both diplomats and the rest of the Spanish community in Japan and Asia had to live through difficult times, just as the Japanese did under the protection of the Spanish. The Representation of Japanese Interests Japanese subjects in American territory continued to experience difficult times in the midst of a growing feeling of aversion. At least, the vandalism of the early days had given way to a calmer loathing, and this helped stabilize their situation, but aid from the outside world was scarce. The Vatican helped a little as an alternative reporter, as Tokyo had intended, while the Spanish continued their task of looking out for Japan’s interests. Documents show how Spanish diplomats increasingly displayed a preference toward the Americans in spite that their official visits were the only allowed. In many cases, they chose not to criticize American authorities before the Japanese, apparently hoping to avoid Japanese reprisals in their own territories, but there was proof that defending a relocated Japanese caused serious problems with American authorities. For example, breaching an article in the Geneva Convention prohibiting internees from engaging in work related to the war. A camouflage factory was set up near the internment camp at Poston, Arizona, where both Japanese-Americans and Japanese subjects were put to work. This represented a violation of a number of agreements and was not denounced by those charged with its undertaking. Furthermore, it led to confrontations among the internees themselves as to whether they should accept such work, leading to internal 94 Osaka, 1984, art. cit., p. 77. 95 Barnhardt, M. A. 1985. Japanese Intelligence before the Second World War: “Best

Case” Analysis. In Knowing one’s enemies, ed. Ernst R. May, p. 424. Princeton: Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400856060

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disputes. The Spanish also refused to take responsibility when transfers to other camps occurred and even tried to diminish the responsibility of the authorities in cases of violence. Pro-Japanese and pro-Americans, many siding with the Japanese American Citizens League, had considerable disputes and they refused to address their problems at Tule Lake and even in the Manzanar Relocation Centre, where a number of internees lost their lives.96 The defense of Japanese interests increasingly depended on their own personal honesty and the officials were not too scrupulous, even though their conduct was right. The Spanish ambassador in Colombia visited the interns monthly and interviewed their representatives but apparently received no complaints.97 The Spanish Foreign Ministry personnel came off badly compared to other officials, although in Canada, they paid monthly allotments possibly even from their own pocket, plus food packages and aid.98 Swedish, the protecting power of the Japanese in Hawaii, worked without worrying about doing something the Americans may not like. There were complaints that the Spanish Embassy in Washington “shows no interest or zeal in taking care of us Japanese, and its answers to our inquiries are frequently delayed.”99 There might have also been some racism involved. The Spaniards refused to attribute to “racial antipathy” a number of fatal shootings by security guards during several escape attempts at the Lordsburg Concentration Center. A Canadian Mountie testified that the Consul in Vancouver, Francisco de Kobbe, had had described the Japanese as “demanding little monkeys.”100 Incentives for fulfilling their task were few. Jordana warned Suma that representing Japanese interests was costing Spain popularity and that if Spain had taken charge of it, “it was only due to Foreign Minister Suner’s 96 Robinson, 2009, op. cit., pp. 163–165, 176, 198. 97 Hernández García, S. 2008. La colonia japonesa en Colombia durante la Segunda

Guerra Mundial y la protección de sus intereses por la Embajada Española. Historia Contemporánea, 36-I: 158–59. On Peru, Rocca Torres, L., 2022. Los desterrados. La comunidad japonesa en el Perú y la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica de Perú. 98 Robinson, 2009, pp. 198–200. 99 MS of 26 October 1943, Shigemitsu to Suma, Madrid, n.d. 100 DEAC-123 s. Wood (Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police) to the Under

Secretary of State, Ottawa, 25 November 1943. Elleman, B. 2006. Life in the war relocation centers. In Japanese-American Prisoner Exchanges and Detention Camps, 1941–45, pp. 65–78. New York: Routledge.

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[sic.] personal friendship with Japan.”101 Furthermore, Spain lacked the prestige of Switzerland. Critics of Spain by contrast, showed respect and even flattered the Swiss diplomats representing Japanese interests in Washington. The second civilian exchange during the war appears as the most laudable undertaking carried out by the Spanish. Demands of third countries to have their subjects included, and the shared initial rejection by both the Americans and the Japanese made the initial idea look impossible. Then, in May 1943, the Japanese government showed the first shift in their initial opposition as they later came to accept a second exchange that culminated at the beginning of September with the arrival of both groups in their countries of origin. The second exchange ship heightened the tone of Japanese criticism of the Spanish once more, which Suma agreed with, saying, “Certain Spanish officials abroad, reflecting the sentiments of their homeland, do not display the enthusiasm in taking care of our interests that we desire.”102 Nevertheless, Suma recommended the censorship of articles critical of how they represented Japan’s interests, since the context had worsened. There was no other option. It was time to solve problems, and both sides tried short-term imaginative solutions despite the lack of legal responsibility. Spain, for instance, asked Japan for help about the fate of some members of the División Azul (Blue Division) in Soviet hands. For Japan, their only options were the Vatican and perhaps, Switzerland or Sweden, but it was almost impracticable due to the many demands received by an overwhelmed foreign service, the lack of representatives in Latin America and, not to mention, a sudden decrease in intelligence reports. Spain desired an Axis victory, while Sweden maintained a more robust neutral stance, and expectations of using Swiss diplomats for tasks other than humanitarian ones were nil.103 Either way, the intermingling of representation and espionage activities, which were the origin of the task, harmed the Spanish undertaking the most. The money gathered from the Japanese on the homeward journey aroused suspicions in Washington, not to mention

101 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-36194/7. Suma to Tani, Madrid, 18 May 1943. 102 MS 11 November 1943, Suma to Shigemitsu, Madrid, 4 November 1943. 103 Lottaz and Ottosson, 2022., op. cit., p. 129; Levine, P. A. 2002. Swedish neutrality during the Second World War. In Wylie, op. cit., p. 318.

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the amount left in the safe in the Washington Embassy.104 Everyone was afraid that this money would leave the secure site where it was kept—the Americans because it might be used for espionage, the Spanish because of the work it would bring, and the Japanese because they did not want part of it to go to the Spanish. Therefore, the safe remained sealed, and the ones who ended up losing were the Japanese internees who needed the money so urgently. Military interests continued to prevail over humanitarians. Civilians Under War In many ways, the war affected the citizens of both countries, and everyone had their own story. The Japanese community in Spain suffered indirectly because they included officials, those who worked for large companies like the press or trade companies, a Micronesian Jesuit, Paulino Cantero; two artists living in Barcelona, a female painter, Kurimoto Toyo, and a Korean composer and conductor, Ahn Ektai; and a circus performer, Amano Bunkichi, who was said to be in Portugal.105 Regarding the Spanish living under the Japanese Empire, the political friendship between the two regimes, mostly between their officials, helped greatly, but they also experienced difficult times. Diplomacy was least damaged by the war, but movements were restricted. In the Philippines, there were neither arrivals nor departures, although Consul José del Castaño could have moved to Tokyo. He was the wealthiest among his colleagues, thanks to the Tabacalera Plan, receiving money in Manila from Spaniards who would receive it when they returned to Spain. Del Castaño used these funds to increase the staff in the consulate (all of them Falangists) and make loans to his colleagues in Tokyo, Méndez de Vigo and Vidal Tolosana. Switzerland sent food to its diplomats.106

104 Codes were sent from Tokyo to Madrid, indicating half a million dollars; in NARARG-457. SRDJ-29686. Tani to Suma, Tokyo, 28 December 1942. 105 NARA-RG-84-E-3162. Box. 75. N. W. Butterworth. Memorandum of conversation. Madrid, 29 December 1945. 106 AMAEC-R-3195–32. Note from the Overseas Section, Madrid, 5 January, 3 and 4 March 1944. Lottaz, Pascal. 2018. Neutral states and wartime Japan. The Diplomacy & Foreign Polcy of Sweden, Spain and Switzerland toward the Empires. Tokyo: Ph. Diss. Natinal Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.

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Travel outside the region was limited to exchange vessels. Some diplomats managed to leave thanks to exchanges and the only official that was incorporated to the region was Aerial Attaché Fernando Navarro Ibáñez who travelled with his wife, mother-in-law, daughter, and nanny. Apparently, it was a way to appease Tokyo, as we sill see in the next chapter, but the Japanese government accepted readily when they received the request. The Allies were surprised at the Spanish request to reserve four berths on the two exchange vessels heading for Japan and an official at the British Foreign Office wrote “I have been unable to find a precedent for a request of this kind.”107 But it occurred. The Spanish Army desired more information on Japan, that was very glad to be allowed to move their attachés in Europe to Spain. Personal lives underwent difficult times, despite financial security: the ultra-nationalist atmosphere in Japan was hardly favorable to the fifty or so Spaniards living there. While Mariano Vidal did the diplomatic work in Tokyo, Ambassador Méndez de Vigo’s residence was relocated to a chilly location at Karuizawa 120 kilometers northwest of Tokyo, the summer resting town for the country’s wealthy residents. He must have missed the cocktail parties before the war—where he was a very keen attendee—and among the requests for supplies during the war, he included not only vitamins and medicines, but also “frozen meat and prudent quantities of wine and cognac.”108 After being attacked by his driver, Méndez de Vigo made a comment that could have been endorsed by many Westerners, saying, “The presence of a white face or a blonde woman produces in some natives the same effect as the presence of a red rag does in a bull.”109 Former military Attaché and Falangist Delegate Eduardo Herrera de la Rosa suffered doubly, first, due to the Americans’ decision to freeze US bank accounts, and, second, after Pearl Harbor, due to the antiWestern atmosphere in Japan. None of his ties to Japanese authorities

107 PRO-FO-371–36,557 (W8950/151/49). Minute of 22 June 1943 to the note

from Alba to Eden, London, 7 June 1943. 108 AMAEC-R-3195–32. Méndez de Vigo to Jordana, Tokyo, 6 December 1943; AEET. Méndez de Vigo to Igual, Tokyo, 12 February 1946. 109 AMAEC-R-3195–25. Méndez de Vigo to Serrano Suñer, Tokyo, 31 May 1942. I thank Pascal Lottaz on informing me about the problem with the driver, which he learned about from reading the diary of the Swiss ambassador.

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or his Falange position protected him from movement restrictions, police harassment, and his house being searched for short-wave radio devices.110

A Return to Traditional Images Spanish and Japanese representation of each other’s interests increased with political distance. The defeat of the Italians did not greatly change how the Japanese saw the Spanish while the Allied offensive in the Magreb gave rise to a turn in Spanish images concerning Japan. Then, Foreign Minister Jordana followed the same anti-Japanese route as Gen. Franco. When the first (and only) diplomatic pouch since Pearl Harbor arrived in December 1942, which reported on the experiences of Méndez de Vigo and other Spaniards in wartime Japan, there was great indignation. The accusation of insincerity directed toward the Catholic Church, the press clippings criticizing Spanish actions in the Philippines, and the proposed changing of the Republic’s name to “Tagala,” all had an important effect, judging by the summary written for his Foreign Policy Director, Jose María Doussinague. At the end of February 1943, when Allied troops had begun attacking other areas of Melanesia after Japan’s final retreat from Guadalcanal, Jordana confided in the British Ambassador Samuel Hoare that he and Spain desired an Allied victory in East Asia, saying, “Out of similar considerations of European solidarity [as against Russia], we desire the re-establishment of European interests in Asia, and regarding European solidarity, we are not only thinking of its economic benefits, but also of our culture and the civilizing work that white nations have done there and which our own nation carried out in those lands in the East, like the spread of the Christian faith, which would disappear with the triumph of Japan, just as it would with the triumph of China or Russia.”111

With this general context in mind, six points can summarize the way Spain apparently changed its image of Japan.

110 AMAEC-R-1736–16. Méndez de Vigo to Serrano Suñer, Tokyo, 23 December 1941 and 28 March 1942. For a first person account, AGA-AE-5177, Herrera to Méndez de Vigo, Tokyo, 23 December 1941. 111 Hoare, 1946, op. cit., p. 191.

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1. Barbarism. Allied propaganda was more effective when it accused Japanese troops of savagery in occupied areas in East Asia, since it fit the preconceived image of the Japanese. Pamphlets, broadcasted news and rumors unrecorded in archives frequently targeted Japan, forcing Alcázar or Serrano Suñer to acknowledge their failure to counter “anti-Japanese pamphlets [which] are distributed everywhere.”112 There was also Tokyo’s lack of interest in responding, since they devoted their money to purely military matters.113 2. The end of military interest. After the spring of 1943, Spain permanently ruled out the possibility of an attack on the Soviet Union from Manchuria, as shown by reports in the Alto Estado Mayor (Joint General Staff) sent to the Foreign Ministry. The first, dated 31 March 1943, expressed doubts of a possible Japanese attack, based on what”persons closely related to the Axis” believed, and an agreement between Germany and Russia with Japan setting itself aside to act as mediator.114 The second report was from 7 May, warning that operations in Siberia or China must start immediately to make use of the good weather. Lack of tension in the front pointed to there being no attack on Japan’s agenda, and the author concluded, “There are enough reasons to boast of an understanding between Japan and Russia, the danger of which, in the face of suspicion, moves us to write these lines.”115 The vital anti-communist side of Spain’s perception of Japan was fading definitely. 3. Relegation of the Pacific War. The reports in the media concerning the war decreased greatly, with the official No-Do only publishing sixty news items on the conflict in Asia after it started using Allied reels from 1 September 1943 until the end of the war, compared to almost 1,100 items overall.116 Vice Secretary of Popular Education Rafael Arias Salgado later stated that they stopped publishing 112 MS 17 July 1943; NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-24834. Suma to T¯ og¯o, Madrid, 14 July

1942. 113 MS 15 January 1943. Also MS of 27 September and 7 October 1942 and 17 July

1943. 114 AMAEC-R-3195–28. Without a letterhead or signature. 115 Ibid. Report from the Third Section of the General Staff to Jordana, Madrid, 7

May 1943. 116 This ratio would be different if documentaries shown in previous years were included, Josefina Martínez. La guerra en el cine y la propaganda: No-Do, 1943–1945. In

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about Japan upon discovering that news on the country were falsified in Berlin, but the Pacific War had begun to be exoticized. One writer made a passing remark concerning a best-seller by the Chinese author Lin Yutang that turned out to be very enlightening, saying, “No one knows why they are fighting, nor is there a clear nor common aim for peace.”117 Then, in September 1943, Mundo magazine also revealed the growing exoticism with which the war was being depicted: Although the Spaniard is still very interested in the vast struggle that Japan is engaged in, it is obvious that he is far more excited about the tremendous encounter between communism and anti-communism [...]. In the lands of Asia and the seas of the Pacific, rests, without a doubt, the fate of a whole part of the world that borders Europe and still racially penetrates it, while, on the other hand, it looks at America and constellations of islands with great colonial significance. Yet for all that it matters,—going through a situation that, according to official reports from Tokyo, ‘currently presents grave symptoms’— it is clear that attention is directed toward the USSR.118

4. The revitalization of the “solidarity of the white race.” There was no other solution but for the Europeans to band together against the Asians, regardless of their respective ideologies. This is what was understood by the continuation of that statement of support for the Allied struggle in the Pacific in pursuit of “European solidarity” that Jordana made to the British, Hoare, saying “These arguments will justify… the anxieties felt by our nation and our desire for close European collaboration in defense of our common interests, which would once and for all, solve the great problem of Communism, re-establish our position and our prestige in Asia, contain Japan’s expansion, and restore normalcy in the African continent.”119 España y la Segunda Guerra Mundial, ed. Stanley G. Payne and Delia Contreras, p. 154. Madrid: Universidad Complutense. 117 “Entre sonrisas y lágrimas,” by Íñigo de Santiago, ¡Arriba!, 20 April 1944. 118 “Días intensos,” 26 September 1943; León-Aguinaga, P., ed. 2022b. Philip W.

Bonsal. Diario de un diplomático norteamericano en España, 1944–1947. Estados Unidos ante la dictadura franquista, entry 8 February 1945. Zaragoza: Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza. 119 Hoare, 1946, op cit., pp. 191–192.

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In conclusion, there were two changes that were principally external, the influence of Allied propaganda and the absence of an attack on the USSR. The other two, the change in the treatment of the Pacific War and the revitalization of the union of the “white race,” reflected the needs of the Spanish themselves. There was a desire to return to “traditional” perception prior to the Civil War, both in terms of propaganda and images. Rather than deideologizing or seeking universal changes, Jordana’s perceptive changes were traditionalist anxieties filtered through conservative ideas. The main practical consequences this cognitive change had on SpainJapan relations can be summarized in six points: 1. News on Japan contributed to Spain’s rapprochement with the Allies, as two significant examples show. First, in August 1943, the official cinema newsreel, the No-Do, included its first news items from Allied sources when it reported the presence of British troops in Burma and North American ships in the Pacific. Second, in October 1943, the Falangist daily ¡Arriba! inserted columns with news from supposed correspondents from Algiers, Melbourne, Washington, and Tunis, all Axis and Allied hands, intended to show neutrality. In reality, the news items were taken from radio, but the columns reflected the desire to accept information against the Axis from the cities that recently fell into Allied hands in North Africa, the United States, and Australia, Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters and the main center of American anti-Japanese forces. The Axis started complaining about Spain’s unfavorable coverage of their performance in the African theater, but in reality, Spain’s turn toward the Allies began in the Far East. Criticism of Japan served as a springboard for Spain’s jump to the Allied side. 2. Madrid praised the American years in the Philippines. In a strange, unprecedented turn, Spain began to depict the United States rule of the Philippines as a positive period for the survival of Hispanic culture. This new image overlapped with its calls for Philippine independence and allowed new criticism of Japan for not fulfilling its promise to the former colony, but, in any case, the future of the archipelago started to be seen as positive under the American flag. 3. Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] ceased to be perceived as a communist. In an April 1944 article under the meaningful title, “The

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mysterious war in China,” the journalist, Manuel Aznar (grandfather of the post-Franco center-right leader José María) provided post-Civil War Spain with new information about Jiang, declaring, “The Generalissimo of Chunking [Chongqing] is an avowed and determined anti-communist…”120 4. The renunciation of extraterritoriality in China would wait until the end of the war. During Serrano Suñer’s time in office, Spain had been ready to forego the rights it had enjoyed since the nineteenth century under the “unequal treaties.” Jordana then changed the Spanish position, apparently out of the desire to do the opposite of his predecessor, but also due to a lack of new ideas on what to do. Renouncing privileges, whether for pro-Axis Nanjing or for proAllied Chongqing, was the trend, but Jordana’s goal was simpler, to restore colonial peace, even though Spain’s position would be isolated. 5. Increased fear toward the “Asian hordes.” The association of the Soviet Army with the Yellow Peril and with those hiding their primitive heart behind a façade of civilization became a veiled allusion to the Japanese. This was implied in an editorial in the 11 April 1944 issue of ¡Arriba!, which called for the end of hostilities in the Old Continent as soon as possible, saying, “The longer the war in Europe lasts, the more entrenched the situation in the Pacific becomes […]. In Asia lies the true objective of this war…”121 6. Asian solidarity. During this period, the advantages gained by the USSR and Japan from avoiding mutual confrontation began to be mentioned openly. Just as before when Japan’s indecision in attacking from the rear had been criticized, questions arose as to why Moscow had decided not to attack Japan. In the spring of 1944, the renewal of the Fisheries Agreement between both countries triggered a complete reinterpretation of Japan. A comment appeared on the front page of ¡Arriba! citing a report from Switzerland that dismantled the reasons for continuing Spain’s friendship with Japan: An article in the Journal de Genève today highlights the strengthening of the Asiatic solidarity between the USSR and Japan, who

120 Manuel Aznar, 15 June 1944, ¡Arriba!. 121 “¿Es posible la paz?”, 11 April 1944, ¡Arriba!.

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have just come to an agreement [...]. The strengthening of this ‘Asiatic solidarity’ underlines the realism of Soviet policy which places practical convenience before ideological consideration. Nevertheless, the fact of this ‘paradoxical neutrality’ which these two great Asiatic powers maintain among themselves, and which has brought great advantages to both at a time when each contracting party finds itself engaged in a fight to the death against the other’s allies, does not cease to draw extraordinary attention from political circles.122

Changes in Japan’s perception of Spain were different, partly because not so many expectations had been created, but also because Japan had no alternative. Disappointment in Madrid’s behavior simply led Tokyo to undervalue their relationship. Scholar Gerhard Krebs, who wrote the first comprehensive account of Spain-Japan relations, mentioned Japan’s logic in discussions with Hitler when he chided Japan over the need to attack the USSR. In response, the Japanese advised the Third Reich to take Gibraltar in order to possess the key to the Mediterranean, instead of insisting on the eastern front. According to the documents, the Japanese never openly said it was necessary to invade the Iberian Peninsula but there was no other way to take Gibraltar but through land. Thus, faced with the German position which only anticipated taking ports and aerodromes in northern Spain should the Allies land on the Peninsula, or in Mallorca (the so-called Gisela Plan), the Japanese encouraged them to push toward the south. In short, Spain was less important than Gibraltar in Japan’s aims.123 As we have seen, Tokyo’s growing mistrust toward Madrid led it to completely losing all concern for the fate of the Spaniards. While Suma proposed strengthening Japan’s alliance with the Soviet Union, others thought about a German military attack. Signs of this mistrust appeared in other more important figures like the minister of foreign affairs himself, Shigemitsu, who ordered an investigation as to whether the Allies had acquired commercial air bases in Spain to use them as intermediate stops “in an international air route.”124 That is, if the Spanish had allowed the 122 “Los soviets suministrarán 50.000 toneladas de petróleo anuales a los japoneses,” Sánchez Cañamares, 29 April 1944 ¡Arriba!. 123 Further indications about this in the English version of the previously mentioned article. Krebs, G. 1988. Japanese-Spanish Relations 1936–1943. The Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, IV-3: 45. 124 MS 24 May and 11 July 1943.

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use of the Canary Islands for an attack on Germany. Later, the Minister enquired once more about possible Allied negotiations with Spain and Portugal for the establishment of military bases in the Iberian Peninsula.125 Although Jordana had answered the first question categorically, Tokyo remained mistrustful. If the Spanish could stab the Japanese in the back, then the Japanese were ready to do no less.

Suspicions Before Decisions This chapter covers half a year of events, from the arrival of two new foreign ministers. Germany started to experience its first heavy defeats and retreats while Japan was still considering strengthening its dominance and Spain was going through one of those moments when war could have reached its territory if a mistake was made. Spain and Japan maintained their relationship. Perspectives of their friendship were reduced to long-term goals (the hope of defeating the USSR), while changes in their world outlook increased suspicion and treachery became feasible in the search for salvation. In the face of the veil of friendship, each was ready to betray the other if it suited their interests. Their relationship was essentially unstable because both had begun to feel that not only did the other become useless for pursuing their own objectives, but could even become an obstacle. The shifts at this time were subtle. Jordana abhorred Serrano Suñer’s behavior and changed Spanish foreign policy after his return to the Foreign Ministry, but he did it silently. Jordana’s return produced slowpaced changes that affected the areas where they could happen. It was time to abandon former perceptions, which underwent a particularly complicated and radical evolution concerning Japan. Not only had the belief in something that had previously been assumed to be true (that Japan was a victorious country with similar objectives to Spain) come to an end, but their expectations had changed completely. The defeats of the III Reich and especially the fall of the Fascist regime were much worse, but it was only the images of Japan that experienced such a change. In Spain, the bad side of the until-then friendly image of Japan returned because of the reliance on perceptions and the possibility that they could immediately change. A negative perception was just the 125 MS 23 May 1943. Horikiri to Shigemitsu, Rome, 14 May 1943; MS 24 May 1943. Shigemitsu to Oshima and to Morishima, Tokyo, 19 May 1943.

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opposite side of the positive one, like in a coin. They do not disappear but are just used or remain dormant and are revised immediately when convenient. Then, the new cognitive framework simply reemerged. A number of traditional aspects that had been ignored for some years were simply recovered with a new desire for the defeat of Japan. Friendship with the Asian country was contradictory to Spanish interests and should end. It was a turn supported by the conservatives, who ended up dragging the Falangists along with them. Japan’s first military defeats were key to this change, yet they do not fully explain this transformation.

References Allen, Louis. 1987. Japanese intelligence systems. Journal of Contemporary History, 22: 55–56; Barnhardt, Michael A. 1985. Japanese Intelligence before the Second World War: “Best Case” Analysis. In Knowing one’s enemies, ed. Ernst R. May, pp. 424– 455. Princeton: Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/978 1400856060. Best, Anthony. 2002. British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914–1941. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Bull, Hedley & Holbraad, Carsten. 2002. Martin Wight. Power Politics. Edinburgh: A&C Black. 1st ed. 1979. Chapman, John W. M. 1987. Japanese intelligence, 1918–1945: A Suitable Case for Treatment. In Andrew, C., & Noakes, J. (Eds.), Intelligence and international relations, 1900–1945, pp. 145–189. Exeter University Publications. Collado Seidel, Carlos. 2016. El telegrama que salvó a Franco. Londres, Washington y la cuestión del régimen. Barcelona: Crítica. Coox, Alvin D. 1988. The Pacific War. In The Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. 6, pp. 315–382. Cambridge: Camdrige University Press. Drea, Edward. J. and Richard, Joseph E. (2008) “New evidence on breaking the Japanese Army codes,” in Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 14–1: 62–83. Elleman, Bruce. 2006. Life in the war relocation centers. In Japanese-American Prisoner Exchanges and Detention Camps, 1941–1945. New York: Routledge. Haldane, Robert A. 1976. The Hidden World. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Hernández García, José A. 2008. La colonia japonesa en Colombia durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial y la protección de sus intereses por la Embajada Española. Historia Contemporánea, 36-I: 158–59. Hoare, Samuel S. 1946. Ambassador on Special Mission. London: Collins.

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Iacobelli, Pedro. 2020. Japan’s Intelligence Network in Chile During the Second World War. Journal of Contemporary History, 56(1): 93–94. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0022009419884631 Iwashima, H. 1984. J¯ oh¯ osen ni Kanpai shita Nihon [Japan’s Utter Defeat in the Intelligence Battle]. Tokyo: Hara Shob¯ o. Martínez, Josefina. 1996. La guerra en el cine y la propaganda: No-Do, 1943– 1945. In España y la Segunda Guerra Mundial, ed. Stanley G. Payne and Delia Contreras, pp. 145–155. Madrid: Universidad Complutense. Kotani, Ken. 2005. Could Japan Read Allied Signal Traffic? Japanese Codebreaking and the Advance into French Indo-China, September 1940. Intelligence and National Security, 20-2: 304–320. https://doi.org/10.1080/026 84520500134065 ———. 2009. Japanese Intelligence in World War II. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. Krebs, Gehrard. 1988. Japanese-Spanish Relations, 1936–1945. The Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 3(IV), 21–52. Leitz, Christian. 2000. Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe during World War II . Manchester: Manchester University Press. León-Aguinaga, Pablo, 2022b. ed. Philip W. Bonsal. Diario de un diplomático norteamericano en España, 1944–1947. Estados Unidos ante la dictadura franquista. Zaragoza: Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza. Levine, Paul A. 2002. Swedish neutrality during the Second World War, ed. Neville Wylie, European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War, pp. 304–330. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lottaz, Pascal and Ottosson, Ingemar. 2022. Sweden, Japan, and the Long Second World War, 1931–1945. New York: Routledge. Lottaz, Pascal. 2018. Neutral states and wartime Japan. The Diplomacy & Foreign Policy of Sweden, Spain and Switzerland toward the Empires. Tokyo: Ph. Diss. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies. Marquina, Antonio, 1978. To, espías de verbena. USA controló la red japonesa integrada por españoles. Historia 16–32: 18. Matsuda, Kenji. 2008. Yakichiro Suma. El ministro plenipotenciario y la crítica de arte española. In Arte, poder y sociedad en la España de los siglos XXV a XX , pp. 687–697. Madrid: CSIC. Matz, Johan. 2015. “Intelligence and disinformation in World War II and the early Cold War 1943–48: Stachowiak alias Drauschke alias Donoa, his intelligence activities in Sweden and Denmark, and the Raoul Wallenberg case,” Journal of Intelligence History, 14–1: 37. Minohara, Tosh. 2013. “No choice but to rise”: T¯og¯ o Shigenori and Japan’s Decision for War. In Tumultous Decade. Empire, Society and Diplomacy In 1930s Japan, eds. Masato Kimura and Tosh Minohara, pp. 258–276. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

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Mount, Graeme. 1993a. Canada’s enemies, Spies and Spying in the Peaceable Kingdom. Toronto: Dundurn. ———. 1993b. Canada, Spain and espionage during the Second World War. Canadian Historical Review, LXXIV-4: 566–575. Osaka, Go. (seud. Naka Hiromasa) 1984. Iberia no Ch¯oh¯ osen [Information war in the Iberian Peninsula], Tokyo: Supein gendaishigakkai [Spanish contemporary history research association, Vol 2: 75–84. Pollard, John F. 2001. The Papacy in Two World Wars: Benedict XV and Pius XII Compared. Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 2:3, 83–96. Preston, Paul. 1993. Franco, A biography. London: Harper Press. Reynolds, E. Bruce. 2004. Phibun Songkhram and Thai Nationalism in the Fascist Era. EJEAS (European Journal of East Asian Studies) 3-1: 128–130. Robinson, Greg. 2009, A tragedy of democracy. Japanese Confinement in North America. New York: Columbia University Press. Rocca Torres, Luis. 2022. Los desterrados. La comunidad japonesa en el Perú y la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica de Perú. Rodao, Florentino. 2017. Prologue: Um testemunho crucial. In Morito Morishima, Pearl Harbor, Lisboa, Tóquio. Memorias de um diplómata, Translated: Yuko Kase. pp. 19–22. Lisbon: Ad Litteram. Rodríguez Martínez, Saturnino. 1999. El No-Do, catecismo social de una época. Madrid: Ed. Complutense. Sáenz-Francés San Baldomero, Emilio. 2009. Entre la antorcha y la esvástica. Franco en la encrucijada de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Madrid: Actas. Samuels, Richard J. 2019. Special Duty: A History of the Japanese Intelligence Community. Ithaca, CA: Cornell University Press. Saña, Heleno. 1982. El franquismo sin mitos. Conversaciones con Serrano Suñer. Barcelona: Rialp. Sesma, Nicolas. 2004. Propaganda en la alta manera e influencia fascista. El Instituto de Estudios Políticos (1939–1943). Ayer 53–1: 155–178. Shulsky, Abram N. 1991. Silent warfare. Understanding the world of intelligence, Washington: Brassey’s. Wilcox, Robert. 1995. Japan’s secret war. New York: Marlowe & Company.

CHAPTER 5

The Impossible Negotiations

The success of the Allied offensive at El Alamein, the German catastrophe at Stalingrad, the Allied landing in Italy, and the rest of the events of the war during the summer of 1943 made an Axis victory unlikely. However, expectations regarding the Pacific were less clear since Japan still had not suffered an important defeat, but had only stopped its advance in remote islands. The main narrative of this period, then, is the change in Spanish expectations. While for Tokyo, change was not an option, much less in its foreign policy, the shifts in Spanish diplomacy accelerated to the beat of the Axis’ recent military disasters. In the spring of 1943, Gen. Franco seemed to have been convinced of the need not to bet on a German victory anymore and in seeking “a more just distribution of the world which would grant Spain the standing it merited.”1 At this point, the slow journey from “non-belligerence” to neutrality started when Minister Jordana gave his first speech in early 1943. Then, in September, this was proclaimed openly, and after this, many problematic decisions followed. As the number of Axis defeats rose, the best option for the Francoist regime seemed to be to muddle through while taking advantage of the other countries’ problems. Either through the prolongation of the world war, through rapprochement with traditional friends and promoting peace 1 Preston. 1993. Franco, p. 490.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 F. Rodao, From Allies to Enemies, New Directions in East Asian History, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8473-0_5

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talks, or also through massive rearmament, as claimed by Foreign Minister Jordana himself.2 Relations with Japan played a special role in this new neutrality. While Spain maintained its friendship and links with the Asian country, as well as strong expectations from the III Reich, both in domestic and its foreign policy, and while relations with fascists in northern Italy continued to exist, the idea of using Japan to make up for its pro-Axis tendencies acquired a new dimension. In order to provoke the least outcry possible, it fell to the Japanese to be the guinea pigs in Spain’s need to distance itself from the Axis. The Spanish quest for a higher position in the world included publicly admitting a mea culpa for its pro-Japan past and applying images of colonial superiority to them, considering them as “yellows” or Asian hordes. Unlike what happened with Germany and Italy, the Falange adopted the anti-Japanese vision of the conservatives and started to coalesce with other sectors of Francoism, in a process that would last until the end of the war. This chapter begins by covering the very same day in which Spanish neutrality was publicly announced, which coincided with the Japanese decision to elevate the status of both countries’ respective legations to the status of embassy. It ends with the accidental death of the Foreign Minister Jordana.

A Shift in Tendencies Tokyo was focused on the war. Besides the remaining Solomon Islands, the United States attacked the strategic Aleutian islands of Kiska and Attu and what is now Papua New Guinea. The era of Japanese maritime expansion had come to an end and Japan ended up tacitly acknowledging this when the Imperial Conference only extended the so-called last line of national defense to some islands of Melanesia in the South Pacific, but not to Guadalcanal. The most viable option for the Japanese was to fortify themselves in already conquered territories, but they still had many cards they could play in the war besides their military strength. In Barcelona, Minister Jordana gave a crucial speech on Spain’s shift toward neutrality on 16 April 1943. Until then, hopes of improving relations with Japan through friendship dominated, but the political mantle of the Axis was no longer capable of pacifying tensions. Tokyo became the

2 Collado Seidel, 2016, op. cit., p. 71.

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testing ground for the most irrefutable demonstration of the new Spanish policy. Increasingly in need of international recognition for its efforts toward rapprochement with the Allies, Madrid reinforced its neutralist discourse in Europe with a pro-Allies policy in Asia, adopting a number of stances concerning the Pacific War in a kind of back-door rapprochement with the Allies. The new policy coincided with apparently minor decisions, such as allowing anti-Axis people to escape to Spain from Nazi-held France through the Pyrenees and holding the Germans responsible for closing the clandestine routes.3 It was just a tiny detail compared to how the Axis defeat in Tunisia in May 1943 was downplayed by the Spanish press,4 but it can explain the changes taking place in the final days of April 1943 in relation to Asia. Madrid denied Tokyo official permission to establish a consulate in Tangiers, requested the release of Spanish Republicans detained in the Philippines, stopped calling for the return of extraterritorial rights in China, and delayed the procedure of elevating both countries’ legations to embassies. Furthermore, the press included Roosevelt’s protest to the Japanese government after the execution of American airmen who participated in the so-called Doolittle Raid. But most significant was the decision on the status of the legations, and therefore, we need to go back to the origin. Since 1939, it had been decided that the status of diplomatic representatives as legations was not in accordance with the importance of mutual contacts and that the status of its legations should be promoted to embassies; Japan did it with Argentina in December 1940.5 Foreign Minister Serrano Suñer gained the necessary authorization and prepared the Spanish side for this rise in status, and after his dismissal, showed greater interest too. Jordana was also in favor and Minister Suma decided to push the elevation among his superiors, also gaining support among his colleagues. At the meeting of intelligence chiefs in Berlin, the last of the six final recommendations to Tokyo was in this sense: “In view of Spain’s importance as a neutral

3 Egido León, Á. 2005. Franco y la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Una neutralidad comprometida. Ayer 57–1: 120. 4 Bowen, W. H. 2006. Spain During World War II, p. 52. Columbia, MI: University of Missouri Press. 5 Rodao, 2016, op. cit., p. 219.

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country through which Japan can receive American and British information and carry on its propaganda, the status of the Spanish Legation should be raised to that of an Embassy.”6 This proposal was sanctioned by the cabinet in Tokyo the same day that Jordana gave his speech in favor of neutrality. After that, it quickly passed through the Privy Council and the Emperor, who also sanctioned it. In view of the favorable progress of these various proceedings, Minister Tani reported it to both Méndez de Vigo and Suma, informing them that the proposal would be presented to the Diet for final approval.7 Everything seemed to be going smoothly, and Jordana requested a report from Tomás Súñer, Director of the Overseas and Asia Section. It deserves to be included in its entirety as it poured cold water on Tokyo’s expectations and explains the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s new point of view in its relations with Japan: “1) The content of Hispano-Japanese relations is of a lesser volume than in normal time, and commercial exchange is a little less than nil. If there is an increase in matters, it is in developments caused by the war: the representation of Japanese interests in belligerent countries, the occupation of the Philippines, Japanese influence in China, etc., matters that instead of typically strengthening Hispano-Japanese relations, can create difficulties and even complications for them. This would occur if Spain showed itself to be inflexible in the protection of its interests concerning persons and property in the Philippines, or in maintaining its rights in China which have been unilaterally ignored with regards to the diplomatic quarter of Peking.” “2) The fact of having accepted the representation of Japanese interests has placed us in an uncomfortable position in some Latin American countries or, at least, in a position where we are more vulnerable to attacks from Spanish exiles and indigenous media disaffected with Spain [...]. For their part, the [United States] could interpret this initiative as a show of special and favourable consideration toward one of the belligerent countries precisely at a time when Spain is gearing itself toward strict neutrality.” “3) Neither in the treatment of Spanish residents in the Philippines and their desire for repatriation, nor in other matters in hand, has Spain

6 MS of 12 February 1943. 7 AMAEC-R-3206–15. Méndez de Vigo to Jordana, Tokyo, 16 April 1943.

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received from Japan treatment that might be interpreted as an exceptional testament of affection toward our country on which the creation of embassies might be based.” “4) The occupying Japanese authorities in the Philippines have not recognised our Consul General in Manila [del Castaño] as plenipotentiary, although they have tolerated his presence and actions without allowing him the use of codes, etc.”8

The official, unrelated to ex-Minister Serrano Suñer, as the diacritic shows, not only stated that the context of friendship was not helping solve problems, but instead, was detrimental to the Spanish path toward neutrality. Instead of benefits, Japan was causing problems. Therefore, Jordana consulted the Head of State on 28 April, and on 30 April he wrote a personal letter to Suma that represented a complete change in the new policy. The refusal to elevate the status of the legations was disguised by the proposal to postpone the decision until the end of the war on account of the impossibility of sending new officials to the archipelago, and the impracticality of increasing trade activity.9 Japan became the most opportune victim of Spain’s new foreign policy and Spain began to distance itself from the Axis starting with Japan. Nevertheless, if we focus on Japan’s relations, it is difficult to accurately know the principal motivation. Perhaps Jordana never agreed with the elevation of status and his initial approval was due to the fact that he believed that the project would never go ahead in Japan, but it is more plausible to think that in the final days of April 1943, he judged the time had come for a shift in policy toward Japan, driven by the report of Tomás Súñer, himself a career diplomat and anti-Falangist. Indeed, some handwritten annotations to the Japanese verbal note concerning the elevation of the status of legations suggest that the official had convinced the Minister of the “American connection,” saying, “There is no reciprocity, and there can be none. It is the exclusive interest of the other party. It endangers our relations with the US[sic].”10 As the last phrase indicates, relations with Tokyo had passed into the sphere of relations with Washington, whose officials perhaps sent some suggestions through Tomás Súñer, toward whom the United States showed its unmistakable 8 AMAEC-R-3206–15. Report to Jordana, Madrid, 26 April 1943. 9 AMAEC-R-3206–5. Jordana to Suma, Madrid, 30 April 1943. 10 AMAEC-R-3206–15. Verbal note, unsigned and undated.

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appreciation.11 Consequently, in May 1943, Madrid set in motion its new non-cooperative stance toward Japan which would last until the end of the war. There was no lack of opposing standpoints. José María Doussinague, number two in the Ministry and considered to be pro-Nazi, brought up the negative repercussions on the Axis powers, which was noted in the margin of Tomás Súñer’s report: “From the political point of view, this act would be sensational in nature and could cause possible complications that are not in Spain’s interests to arouse.”12 There was barely any reaction from Berlin, partly because the matter was purely bilateral, yet it was perhaps out of fear that Madrid had informally authorized the establishment of a Japanese consulate in Tangiers, although without granting express permission.13 Jordana was very careful to avoid further provocation of Japan, at least for the time being. As expected, Tokyo was unpleasantly surprised and Minister Tani wrote to Suma about the decision, saying, “Look at Spain’s excuses: ‘Commercial relations are paralyzed.’ ‘It is impossible to send staff.’ These are lies. I know what is behind this. England and America are jingling money in their pockets.” Not allowing himself to be discouraged, Tani reaction consisted in convincing the Spanish to retract their refusal to elevate the status of the legations. Tokyo thought it could achieve the objective which had been so unexpectedly blocked. The Foreign Affairs Minister went to work. In Tokyo, Vice Minister Matsumoto Shin’ichi met with Ambassador Méndez de Vigo in order to show him his surprise and to repeatedly express that Jordana’s arguments only seemed to be excuses and that he could not understand what had occurred. Méndez de Vigo reported this to Madrid and reminded it of the problems that the new policy may pose for Spanish subjects in Asia: “[…] given his nervousness, a rebuff can strain relations and cause immediate damage to Catholic Missions in Asia and Philippine interests.”14 In Madrid, Suma received the order to insist and to pressure Jordana, 11 NARA-RG-59. CDF 1940–44. Butterworth to Hull, Madrid, 10 July 1944. 12 AMAEC-R-3206–15. Annotation by J. M. Doussinague of 28 April to a report dated

26 April 1943. 13 Doussinague, Jose María. 1949. España tenía razón 1939–1945, p. 231. Barcelona: Espasa Calpe. 14 AMAEC-R-3206–1. Méndez de Vigo to Jordana, Tokyo, 4 May 1943; NARARG457. SRDJ-3535. Shigemitsu to Madrid, Tokyo, 4 May 1943.

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Franco, or both to reconsider their decision, saying “We have got to make Spain change her mind, right away if we can. We may have to get Berlin and Rome to use their good offices.”15 As a result of this order, Suma visited Jordana and praised his Barcelona speech. Jordana, in fact, wrote about Suma, saying that he was “ready to cooperate toward its realisation [Neutrality] to the extent that circumstances allowed it.” In a friendly way, Suma suggested that Spain’s new direction could find a way to suit Japanese interests. As stated in Jordana’s notes: “The elevation to embassy which they [the Japanese] desire so much would facilitate this collaboration extraordinarily and resolve all pending issues in the Philippines and those related to Hispanicity […] Japan is very much in agreement with our policy of neutrality.”16 The Japanese had become particularly cynical towards Madrid’s new policy. The kind words had not disappeared, but there was underlying tension while primacy was given to the achievement of a number of specific objectives such as the expansion of their espionage network in Tangiers. The role of trade did not seem important in the decision. Suma mentioned a rumor regarding initial approval of the elevation of status in the Council of Ministers that was later retracted due to its unfavorable consequences on trade with the United States, as unlikely argued by Trade Minister, Demetrio Carceller.17 Spanish trade with Japan was non-existent at this time. The so-called Commercial Intelligence remained operational (and ineffective) from 1940 until 1945, but while with Serrano Suñer the yearly renewals were made public, that was not the case with Jordana: “in agreement, but without announcing it publicly.”18 Since the autumn of 1492, a curious trade operation had been taking place related to lead, which was to be taken to Japan with blockade runners using the submarines taking the route between Europe and Asia. Secrecy surrounded the whole operation. The Mitsubishi office in Rome first asked for secret investigations into whether it would be possible to obtain lead in Spain in exchange for rubber, but they later changed their minds and presented a purchase option in cash for a considerable quantity as the 15 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-35355. Shigemitsu to Suma, Tokyo, 1 May 1943 (MS 7 May 1943). 16 AMAEC-R-3206–15. Handwritten note that was then typed, Madrid, 4 May 1943. 17 SRDJ-35501. Shigemitsu to Oshima, Tokyo, 6 May 1943. 18 For the Japanese case vid. AMAEC-R-2074–9. Confidential note from Miura Fumio to Vicente Taberna, Madrid 16 April 1943.

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Yokohama Specie Bank (the predecessor to the current Bank of Tokyo) had granted it a credit of 3 million Swiss Francs for this. After receiving the credit, in any case, the possible purchase presented all kinds of problems because of the desire for secrecy and the difficulties in sending large amounts of heavy products through a relatively small number of “blockade runners.”19 Spain was no longer mentioned and it appeared to be another failed attempt at trade. Nevertheless, the purchase of other Spanish minerals by the Japanese cannot be ruled out. There is some indication that Japan requested zinc from Spain and an indirect exchange of quinine occurred. It is also probable that mercury was purchased, for which both countries held talks with Mitsubishi, which affirmed that it wanted to acquire it for its business and not for Japan.20 There is no evidence that any of the “blockade runners” sent by Japan during the Pacific War to Allied countries included products destined for Spain, although their main point of arrival was the Bay of Biscay.21 Spanish trade appeared to be a simple excuse to explain Spain’s rejection of raising the status of the legations. Trade remained at a standstill, as did political relations with Japan, with or without intelligence.

The Preference for the Philippines After its surprise at the deadlock over the legation’s elevation, Tokyo tried to get the Spanish to change some of its increasingly confrontational stances. Madrid continued to harbor doubts during the spring and summer of that year, entertaining the idea of benefitting from the Japanese desire to elevate the status of the legations in accordance with their principal interest in East Asia—the Philippine islands. But this time Tokyo had a real interest in solving these problems. Contacts between Jordana and Suma continued, as there was no alternative but to keep talking. Thus, they met again a few days after Spain’s refusal to elevate the status of the legations, on 4 May 1943. Although 19 MS 29 December 1942, special report on trade between Germany and Japan, pp. 54–

56. 20 MS of 5 September, 15 October, 29 December 1942 and 12 April 1943. NARARG-457. SRDJ-31955. Kase to Suma, Rome, 26 February 1943. 21 Vid. MS 24 November; 31 December 1942, 6 April, and 8 June 1943 and 8 February 1944.

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no minutes from this meeting have survived, an order by Jordana on the 6th to the Ministerial Archive for the return of the entire dossier clearly shows that Suma had pressured him sufficiently. Two weeks later, on 19 May, another meeting took place where Jordana presented four petitions for the improvement of the “disposition of the Spanish people.” These were specific requests that reveal a decision to resolve relations, if not in an all-encompassing manner, then certainly with respect to significant aspects: “1. The Spanish Consul in Manila [José del Castaño] is not being treated as such. Furthermore, we are unable to maintain satisfactory communications with the Minister in Tokyo. 2. Until now, no steps have been taken to ensure the use of the Spanish language in the Philippines. 3. Bishop Olano of Guam is in a desperate situation. We do not know if anything has been done in this respect. 4. No results have been seen concerning the possibility of carrying out remittance of money between the Philippines and Spain.”22

In putting forward specific cases (del Castaño, Olano, funds for the Spanish Community, and the maintenance of the Spanish language), the Spanish appeared to be ready to negotiate. Minister Suma asked Jordana directly if his solution would allow the elevation of diplomatic status. In response, Jordana ducked the issue, saying, “Let us not quibble […]. the Japanese had better stop doing things that make my position harder than ever if they expect me to do anything for them.”23 Jordana’s words, and Spain’s final refusal, suggest that the four petitions mentioned above posed an important obstacle in bilateral relations. Above all, the Philippines played a central role and its importance went beyond the diplomatic sphere. In his meeting with Suma, Jordana himself insisted on his interest in improving the situation of Spaniards in the Philippines, leading to what can be called a Spanish policy toward the Japanese Empire. Rather than adjusting to the political facts, the Spanish foresaw events and made plans to achieve their objectives by evaluating the importance of their different interests with Japan, as can be seen in an interesting “note” found in the same dossier. The note, undated and unsigned, began by criticizing Japanese 22 AMAEC-R-1738–2. Vid. note of 6 May 1943. 23 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-36388 (MS 26 May 1943). Suma to Shigemitsu, Madrid, 19

May 1943.

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policy toward Spain, stating that they were asking for something without offering anything in return. Madrid had been asked to renounce its privileges in China “without taking into account the international reasons and delicate situation Spain faced as a neutral country that were explained to them in several letters […]. They talk about being a friendly country, but their friendship leads to demands for their requests and rejections of ours.”24 It was not a new complaint—Tomás Súñer had summed it up— but what was most surprising is the appearance for the first (and only) time of a proposal to negotiate with Japan with the aim of retaining what it was mostly interested in. The note suggested renouncing Spain’s policy regarding China “where, whether Spain opposed it or not, they will set up the regime they desire.” The idea was to obtain compensation in the Philippines: “If, despite our protests, we lose our position in China due an act of military force, we should try to achieve the complete reestablishment of our policy in the Philippines. This attitude would be similar to that of Great Britain in Tangiers.”25 The note suggested giving way in China in exchange for gains in the Philippines, which constituted a demonstration of the overall view that existed in Spain about East Asia for the first time. As such, we should now analyze Spain’s policy toward China to better understand the environment within which decisions were made. Rights in China In a China largely ruled by Japan, 1943 began with a historical measure: the joint Sino-Japanese statement of 9 January which declared that extraterritorial concessions and legal immunities, as well as extraterritorial rights, were terminated. After that, foreigners could no longer possess territories that were autonomously governed and different from the central power, nor abide under laws that would protect them from the country’s authorities. The Japanese wanted to gain the support of a population, most of whom supported the Chongqing government, but the declaration unleashed a series of events whose significance would be far-reaching. Foreigners could no longer have the privileges that they had enjoyed in China since the nineteenth century, while the Chinese would

24 AMAEC-R-3195–32. “Apunte para el Señor Ministro,” n.d., Madrid, [June 1943?]. 25 Ibid.

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see themselves comforted by the possibility of being able to govern their own territory, in a process that would not end until December 1999, when Portugal returned the enclave of Macao. Spain had no territorial concession at all in China, but it did maintain three privileges. First, extraterritoriality, which was maintained in a similar way to Germany after World War I, that is, it was recognized in practice even though legally it had been lost during the Spanish Civil War. In March 1941, a lawsuit by Gómez Saw-huat filed in the Japanese Concession in Amoy (Xiamen) ended with the Japanese authorities suspending judgment, asserting that it was a problem between the Chinese and the Spanish. Since the renunciation of extraterritoriality was never carried out in any effective way, many other countries enjoyed it, like Italy, Japan, Norway, Great Britain, the United States, Turkey, France, Switzerland, Holland, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Denmark, Portugal, and Belgium.26 Second, as a signatory to the 7 September 1901 Boxer Protocol signed after the defeat of the Yihetuan (Boxer) uprising, it had the right to govern the Diplomatic Quarter in Peking along with other countries and received an indemnity. Third, in the port of Amoy (Xiamen), it possessed a special extraterritorial government in a concession at Gulangsu, due to the port enjoying close relations with the Philippines and the Spanish Empire since the nineteenth century. When in January 1943, the Japanese officially put an end to the Diplomatic Quarter in Peking, Spain’s first response was one of doubt, partly due to many nuances and details subject to political decisions. Among the eight signatories to the Boxer Protocol (Great Britain, Italy, France, the United States, Holland, Belgium, Japan, and Spain), Japan completely renounced its privileges, while France and Italy did so conditionally to the Nanjing government and the United Kingdom and the United States did the same to the Chongqing government.27 Spain was the only power not allied to either nationalist China or imperial Japan, but its situation was reflected in countries like Sweden which also did not want to divest itself of any of its rights. The Japanese realized Madrid’s dilemma, and in February 1943, Suma advised Spain to negotiate giving up its rights, preferably in

26 Borao, 2017, op. cit., p. 265. 27 Zheng, Y. 2015 The Legal Status of U.S. Troops in China, 1943–1947, A Specter

of Extraterritoriality. Journal of American-East Asian Relations, 22-1: 19.

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Nanjing.28 Then, when Tokyo started detaining subjects of enemy nations in northern China and informed the Europeans its determination to carry out their policy of revising the treaties, Italy and France at first agreed while other countries like Denmark raised no apparent objections, but Spain surprised everyone on account of being the only power with the intention to extend its rights. Minister Tani then asked Suma to inform Madrid that its decision must be immediate, clearly indicating Japan’s objectives: that diplomats cooperate by informing Nanjing that their country was abandoning “all rights and privileges of administration in the area in question.”29 Yet nothing was said regarding what they could give in exchange. As April passed, Spanish diplomats stepped back from their earlier promises and the Japanese became increasingly nervous. In Peking, diplomat Ricardo Muñiz had sent his Secretary in January to attend the transfer ceremony of the Diplomatic Quarter and he had allowed others to think that his only interest was in keeping possession of the embassy premises, but he later refused to accept the hand-over of jurisdictional rights.30 Consul General Maldonado was forbidden emphatically to give in either “verbally or in writing”31 to the Japanese despite Spain being the only remaining country not to renounce its rights in Peking. It was then that diplomat Muñiz was ordered to “fall ill in order to avoid getting involved,”32 fearing his presence at the handover events in the Quarter may signify tacit approval. In Xiamen, there existed an agreement for a return with Portugal and France, whose consul represented Madrid and Lisbon’s interests, and when Spain decided that it did not subscribe to this, everything was invalidated. This time, it was the Chinese and French representatives who understood Spain’s position the least. In China, Madrid went from following the Italian example to imitating the Portuguese favoring Chongqing, in a “dangerous” attitude as expressed by Consul Maldonado. Lisbon, from 1941, did maintain

28 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-30833. Suma to Tani, Madrid, 1 February 1943. 29 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-32535. Tani to Suma, Tokyo, 3 April 1943. On the deten-

tions, Wood, F. 1998. No dogs & not many Chinese. Treaty Port life in China 1842–1943, p. 286. London: John Murray. 30 AMAEC-R-1734–23. Muñiz to Jordana, Peking, 9 March 1943. 31 AMAEC-R-1734–24. Jordana to Maldonado, Madrid, 3 April 1943. 32 AMAEC-R-1734–24. Muñiz to Jordana, Peking, 17 April 1943.

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diplomatic relations with Nationalist China representing its interest in Spain. The Japanese did not really understand Spain’s motives for China. The new minister, Shigemitsu, concluded, “It is inevitable that Spaniards will finally consent to the restoration of the concessions,”33 and even said that they were ready to break off relations with Spain.34 On 12 May 1943, Jordana informed Suma that it was necessary to wait until the end of the war to renounce their rights. Italian mediation was no use at all, neither for solving problems concerning China, for highlighting the elevation of status of the legations, nor for going beyond superficial explanations. Both Shigemitsu and Mario Indelli, the Italian ambassador in Tokyo, resorted to referring to Madrid as a puppet of foreign interests as both were unable to find other motives “even in the Philippines.”35 As usual, they failed to take into consideration internal reasons and the lack of information regarding the Minister’s rejection. Spain’s rejection, in any case, made the Japanese policy of handing over rights in Shanghai more difficult. After abrogating the United Kingdom’s and the United States’ extraterritorial rights, the Japanese military passed the jurisdiction of the International Concession to the government of Wang Jingwei in Nanjing, but they made sure not to officially occupy the French Concession. Then, Portugal informed Japan that it still had not made a final decision about its part of the Shanghai concession, while the harsh Swedish stance toward Nanjing switched to a willingness to renounce their rights to Chongqing, with whom it was preparing to sign a trade agreement. After learning of Spain’s refusal, even the Italians came to feel that what the Japanese were asking for was too much.36 On 1 August 1943, the official withdrawal from the French Concession and 33 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-34718. Shigemitsu to Suma, Tokyo, 22 April 1943. 34 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-35930. Shigemitsu to Suma, Tokyo, 22 April 1943. 35 DDI. 9th series, Vol. 10, doc. 290. Indelli to the Italian Under Secretary of the

Foreign Ministry, Bastianini, Tokyo, 5 May 1943. 36 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-36241. Suma to Shigemitsu, Madrid, 12 May 1943; SRDJ-

36478. Shigemitsu to the Ambassador in Rome, Tokyo, 17 May 1943; SRDJ-37300, Suma to Shigemitsu, Madrid, 27 May 1943; SRDJ-39359; Meeting between Jordana and Suma, Madrid, 25 June 1943; SRDJ-39255. Morishima to the Minister in Stockholm, Lisbon, 7 June 1943; E-9006. “Portuguese Diplomatic Missions to Liberated Countries”, in MS of 2 October 1944. DDI. 9th . Series. Vol. 10. Bastianini to Indelli, Rome, 9 May 1943 after information from the representative in Spain, Prunas, from his meeting with Jordana.

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from the International Concession in Shanghai turned out to be a failure. Japan had not even convinced its friends.37 This discrepancy in China with Japan, nevertheless, was tangential for Spain, but it posed a new challenge to overcome considering the four petitions formulated by Jordana in relation to the Philippines. Moreover, by putting forward cases such as those of Consul del Castaño and Bishop Olano, and the need to alleviate the financial situation of the Spaniards in the Peninsula who had stopped receiving pensions from the Philippines, Spain had placed the Gaimush¯ o in an awkward situation. Its limited decision-making capacity within Japan and recent failures in trying to convince the Spanish through the Italians, had left its diplomats in the uncomfortable position as go-betweens. The policy of China compensating the Philippines was proposed but soon forgotten: Spain changed ideas swiftly regardless of their relation to Japan. In the meantime, Tomás Súñer reminded Japan of Spain’s complaints. Regarding Bishop Olano, Súñer remembered that there had been no explanation from the Japanese about what had happened. As for the question of the Spanish language in the Philippines, he stated that “what they are truly pursuing is reserving for themselves the right to enact in the Philippines a policy that suited Japan the most.” Regarding material damages, neither was there any possibility to gather data, which is why information had to be gathered with the aid of technical aids hired by Consul del Castaño who, as said before, had no official title or any privileges whatsoever.38 In short, the Spanish Foreign Ministry was wasting its time waiting for proof of Japanese attention. It was not completely true. In late June 1943, the Japanese Foreign Ministry satisfied, if only partially, Madrid’s demands, after having pressed other departments. The Vice Minister of the Gaimush¯ o told Mariano Vidal Tolosana, Méndez de Vigo’s second-in-command, that he had already given orders to provide more favorable treatment of the Spanish and to broaden del Castaño’s duties. Meanwhile, Suma received a plan with clear promises in Madrid, which he then submitted to the Spanish Foreign Affairs Ministry. Efforts would be made to improve the treatment of del Castaño in Manila. Bishop Olano and his Secretary Julián

37 AMAEC-R-1734–24. Maldonado to Jordana, Shanghai, 2 August 1943. 38 AMAEC-R-3195-32b. “Apunte sobre Filipinas” from the Overseas Section, n.d.,

Madrid, 1 June 1943.

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Jáuregui (Friar Jesús de Begoña) were allowed to leave Japan. The Spanish would also be allowed to send money from the Philippines through the issuing of a special yen under the control of the Yokohama Specie Bank, the so-called Plan Tabacalera. For the first time, Spanish demands regarding the Philippines were addressed.39 Despite its limited sphere of action, Japanese diplomats had managed to repay some of Spain’s many political favors with the clear intention of achieving a more farreaching political victory, both in the Peninsula and abroad, particularly for the residents in the Philippines. In his telegram to Suma, Foreign minister Shigemitsu concluded, “In view of the fact that Jordana said he would consult with his government and then take a decision on the Legation problem, we hope that you will make an even greater effort to seize a good opportunity and bring this matter to a favourable settlement.”40 As a consequence, the Japanese minister submitted a translation of this plan—the most clearly stipulated throughout the war—so that the Spanish government would finally agree to the elevation of status. Such efforts, however, never produced results. Upon receiving this plan for the improvement of relations, in an interview held on 5 July, Jordana could only reply by taking things to the next level, saying, “I should like to repay you for this favour. But after all this, the decision has been made and the Cabinet says that during wartime this step cannot be taken. It would take more power than I have to change that decision. You Japanese have a large staff here in Madrid but we don’t have many people at all in Tokyo. I don’t see how we can get them there either, so don’t you think we had better let this matter drift for a while?”41 Tokyo’s efforts had been poor and late, and Jordana was faced with a plan that might have been satisfactory a few months earlier. Given Spanish circumvention, Tokyo still did not consider its efforts wasted and Suma received the order to return to Jordana and “go to him [Jordana] again and talk strongly […] At the very least, try to determine how sincere the Spanish are.”42 Consequently, on 15 July Suma handed over a new note to request for a definitive response:

39 AMAEC-R-3195–36. Méndez de Vigo to Jordana, Tokyo, 28 June 1943. 40 MS 5 July 1943. Shigemitsu to Suma, Tokyo, 21 June 1943. On this, also AHBE,

Secretary of the Spanish Institute of Foreign Currencies. Box 27. 41 MS 14 July 1943. Report on Suma’s proposal in AMAEC-R-319532. n.d. 42 Ibid.

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The legation has received a telegram from its government expressing their desire to know, for pressing reasons of state, if in fact, the Spanish Government considers it possible for both our countries to elevate our respective legations to embassies immediately [...]. In a word, it wishes to know the definitive thoughts of the Spanish Government in this regard.43

There was no definitive response: a note by Doussinague in the margin of the Japanese ultimatum reads, “Señor Súñer, kept in the freezer.” Just as with the cryptic rejection of the request to return extraterritorial rights in China: Spain responded that it maintained the “spirit of renunciation” over the rights already recognized in the bilateral treaty of 1928, but that it would only take effect “opportunely,” which is to say, after the war. Meanwhile, the foreign ministry would initially be prepared to renounce these privileges and, as Tomás Súñer wrote, “as proof of our good will, the Spanish government would not formulate protests against situations created in Peking, Shanghai, and Kulangsu [Gulangsu Island] as a consequence of the unilateral return of the rights of foreign countries to China.”44 In short, the Spanish were acting by omission and accepter only minor favours, as those in China or accepting new diplomat-spies in exchange of a new Army attaché in Tokyo, but it was not enough for the Japanese. They showed their irritation to Ambassador Méndez de Vigo who reported about it, alarmed.45 Tomás Súñer, then, conjectured four main reasons for Japan’s anger: the last proposal concerning the legations which had been left with no reply, the stance toward the renunciation of extraterritorial rights in China, the petition to increase Castaño’s authority in Manila, and the “non-ratification” of the treaty with Manchukuo despite the “insistent” efforts of its legation. In conclusion, he thought of the consequences beyond the ongoing Pacific War: Hispano-Japanese relations as a whole in recent years weigh the scales frankly in favour of Spain with respect to a friendly attitude of one country toward the other. At Japan’s request, we recognized Manchukuo. At Japan’s request, we recognized Nanking. Such events, in the middle of a world war, have created a delicate situation for us in the East. Instead

43 AMAEC-R-3206–15. Japanese Legation to Jordana, Madrid, 15 July 1943. 44 AMAEC-R-1737–23. Súñer to Jordana, Madrid, 22 July 1943. 45 AEET. Méndez de Vigo to Jordana, Tokyo, 19 July 1943.

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of appreciating these undeniable demonstrations of Spain’s goodwill, the Japanese Government is precisely taking advantage of our recognition of the Nanking government to ask us to renounce our rights in China. Nor can the measures taken in the Philippines be considered proof of a special consideration on which the categorical elevation of our representations might be based [...]. It could be concluded that if one party has cause for complaint against the other, it is not Japan toward Spain, but Spain against Japan.46

Nanjing had not been recognized at the request of Japan, but there was no better defense than a good offense. The little details were getting lost. At the final meeting concerning the elevation of status, which took place on 30 July 1943, and after discussing the Italian situation, the restoration of the monarchy, and the Falange, Jordana continued to put off his response, stating that he could give no definitive opinion to which Suma replied that he could wait no longer. As a result, all of Japan’s hopes disappeared: “We can see that the Spanish Government wants to refuse our request. Therefore, I think there is nothing we can do except to let the matter drop and to decide upon a policy of making the best of the situation and waiting for a change in the international situation.”47 Spain was planning to move closer to the Allies and any pro-Japanese move was out of question. Negotiations with Thailand stalled definitely until 194948 and Suma was advised by the Italian Ambassador Palucci, who had been president of the Italian Fascist Mission to Japan in 1938, on Jordana’s intentions: “I take responsibility of Japan’s position in the world. Nevertheless, I know that it is utterly impossible […] just now, exactly when American and British troops are pressing on the very borders of Spanish Morocco.”49 Mentioning how close the allied armies were was another one of Jordana’s many half-truths since, at the same time, the Head of State, Francisco Franco, was strongly criticizing the Japanese to the Americans.

46 AMAEC-R-1737–23. Súñer, Madrid, 22 July 1943. 47 MS 12 August 1943. 48 Rodao, F. 1995b. Japón y Extremo Oriente en el marco de las relaciones hispanonorteamericanas, 1945–1953. Revista Española del Pacífico, V: 233–241. 49 MS 12 August 1943. Conversation between Paulucci and Suma 2 August 1943.

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Franco’s Three Wars Franco acted in a way complementary to Jordana’s emphatic refusal. In 1942, Franco had already begun to wash his hands of Japan’s future when he stated that there were two completely separate wars in the world: that of Europe against the Soviet Union and that of the Pacific against Japan. In June 1943, Franco increased this number to three, during his talks with Ambassador Hayes at his summer residence in his own home territory in Galicia, the Pazo de Meirás, and asserted that the position of his government was different in each case. Regarding the war between the Axis and the Allies, the Caudillo insisted that Spain remained neutral, even displaying a benevolent neutrality toward the Anglo-Americans. Regarding the dispute between the III Reich and the Soviet Union, his government remained watchful as in case of a Soviet victory, all of Europe would be affected by the communist tide. And with respect to the Pacific War, he expressed his desire for an American victory. The Japanese had to be defeated. His pro-American stance was clear, but he also added forceful criticism of the Japanese, arguing that they had only superficially assimilated Western civilization and that they were, at root, barbarians. He continued with some curious criticism: “They are the worst sort of imperialists. They intended to dominate China and the whole of the Far East,” adding his resentment over Tokyo’s insincerity in promising the Filipinos their independence.50 He concluded by pointing out that Spain had not the least sympathy for Japan, and on account of this, his government would be happy to cooperate with the United States in the Pacific War, although given Spain’s relative weakness it would hardly be able to offer any effective assistance.51 Almost at the same time as Suma was losing his last hope of elevating the status of the legations, Hayes was surprised by Franco’s direct and explicit arguments: “Franco has strong and sincere aversion to the Japanese.”52 What made Gen. Franco refine his theory, in any case, was the listener. Some days later, again at the Pazo de Meirás but with British Ambassador 50 On these conversations, FRUS, 1943, Vol. 2, p. 615. Hayes to Hull, Madrid, 29

July 1943. 51 Ibid. FRUS, 1943, Vol. 2, p. 615. Hayes to Hull, Madrid, 29 July 1943. The director of La Voz de Galicia, mimicking these ideas in October 1944, launched a campaign against Japan, in León-Aguinaga, 2022b. op. cit., entry 2 October 1944. 52 CJHHP-1. Hayes to Hull, Madrid, 29 July 1943; Hayes, Carlton J.H. 1945. Wartime Mission in Spain, p. 71. New York: The MacMillan Company.

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Hoare, the number of simultaneous wars was reduced. Of course, he mentioned “his abhorrence of the Japanese as the invaders of the Philippines, the most historic centre of Spanish civilisation in the Pacific.”53 But Japan became less important, as pointed out in Jordana’s report to his ambassador in London: “For us,” the Caudillo pointed out, “there is not one but two wars, that is, one that pitted the Anglo-Saxons against the Germans and Italians on the one hand, and one between, Japan and Russia on the other, fighting exclusively on their own account with their own objectives of another war completely different from the first one, although they are exploiting it.”54 In short, rather than being used to explain events, Franco’s theory seemed to be elaborated to justify his own policy and that of his government to his listener. His criticism of Japan was more oblique. The Caudillo’s ideas were developed a posteriori rather than a priori. These arguments against Japan turn out to be particularly interesting as they clearly denote Franco’s point of view. They suggest that the reasons for the Spanish U-turn regarding Japan were a mix of their own frustrations with the persistence of a number of images that, although they had remained latent for a few years, were ready to see the light of day. Franco’s criticisms of the Japanese as “imperialists” demonstrates an envious attitude toward Japan for having achieved what Spain had desired so much. Franco’s contention concerning the superficiality of Japan’s “westernization” reflected the suspicions Japan aroused in various Western political spheres, and which can be found in both British propaganda and Hitler’s Mein Kampf . More surprising is his criticism of Japanese insincerity for not granting the Philippines its independence. It reflected his own lies against the Japanese at this same time, praising its supposed military triumphs and leading Suma to declare that the Generalísimo was the only guarantee that Spain would not become a slave to London and Washington.55 The perception of the Japanese and the “Oriental” as a perverse and refined personality was more of a reflection of Franco’s own cynicism, with Japan offered as a sacrifice to the United States.

53 Hoare, 1946, op. cit., p. 221. 54 APG-JE-2–51. Jordana to the Duke of Alba, Madrid, 24 August 1943. 55 MS 17 July 1943. Suma to Shigemitsu, Madrid, 7 July 1943.

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The Laurel Incident The tensest moment in the relationship between Spain and the United States during World War II, in the autumn of 1943, was the so-called Laurel Incident which occurred after the sending of a telegram from the Spanish Foreign Ministry to the new pro-Japanese government in Manila headed by José Paciano Laurel. In 1943, Tokyo decided to grant nominal independence to territories under its control in order to hold back growing criticism, starting by handing over Burma to Ba Maw, its former governor during British colonial rule. In the Philippines, the nominee was Laurel, the American-era associate justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, who had recently survived a guerrilla assault. Moreover, the Japanese had no further desire for change. Local personalities that had been appointed to appear as leaders of the new “independent” republics were members of the pre-war elite, but real power continued to be in the hands of the Japanese army. The supreme advisor to the expeditionary occupation force in the Philippines, Murata Sh¯ oz¯o, changed his title to Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. In their attempt to legitimize the new independent Philippine republic as much as possibly, the decisions of Madrid and the Vatican were the most significant.56 Suma visited Jordana on 7 October 1943 to ask about the recognition of Ba Maw, also inquiring as to whether “Spain, in light of its special interest, would like to take the lead in recognising Philippine independence.”57 A week later, on the 14th, which coincided with the official proclamation of Philippine independence, Suma officially requested the recognition of Laurel, handing over a note “in accordance with the instructions of my government.”58 The Spanish Foreign Minister’s response was very diplomatic. On the first occasion, he avoided the question and on the second, remarked on the traditionally close relations with the Philippines and Spanish economic interests. Jordana pointed out the desire to put an end to the causes of complaints about the economic situation of the Spanish community in the archipelago, and insisted in asking for more detailed information on behalf of Gen. Franco after a (fake) victory in Bougainville 56 On this matter, Rodao, Florentino. 1994. El trampolín tecnológico. El “Incidente Laurel” y España en la II Guerra Mundial. Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, V-6: 387–405. 57 MS 13 October 1943. 58 AMAEC-R-2844–5. Suma to Jordana, Madrid, 14 October 1943.

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that had been reported by Japanese propaganda. As new governments arose, like those in Asia and Mussolini’s Social Republic of Saló, Jordana reported on his cabinet’s position. They would wait until the end of the war, although he did not deny the possibility of exceptions to the rule. Either way, he promised to examine the question. That same day, the Foreign Ministry received a telegram from the recently appointed Philippine President, Laurel, which stated: “The Philippines has proclaimed its independence and declares itself a sovereign nation organised under the republican regime. In communicating this to Your Excellency, I wish to take the opportunity to express my sincere desire that the most cordial relations of friendship and union exist between both our countries.”59 Laurel announced his new government, but did not explicitly request recognition. There was enough time to try to make a decision calmly. Jordana’s vague responses clearly reflected Madrid’s ambiguous intentions. On the other hand, two messages arrived from Tokyo and Manila that did little to help dilute Spain’s skepticism toward the new Philippine government. Méndez de Vigo believed that Laurel’s new government had little chance of succeeding, while del Castaño reported that he had personally attended the celebration at the official gallery as the only Spanish representative, noting that many (the affluent classes, he specified) considered such “independence” as a passing thing and were convinced that the United States would, in the end, win the war. Madrid found itself in a new dilemma as there were opposing sentiments. Philippine independence was perceived as the best solution for Spanish interests, but as it was granted under a Japanese initiative and during a time of war, it chose to request further information. As such, Jordana asked del Castaño for a more detailed report regarding several aspects of the new State: “The way in which Philippine independence is put into practice, administrative organisation, authorities in charge, the situation created for the Spanish, general atmosphere, relations with occupying forces, existing contacts between the Consul General in Manila and Philippine authorities, etc., including everything that might be related to this matter.”60 The lack of information led to such queries. 59 AMAEC-R-2844–5. Non-decoded telegram from the President of the Republic of the Philippines to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manila, 12.30 p.m. on 13 October 1943 (received 11.10 p.m. on the 14th). 60 AMAEC-R-2844–5. Jordana to Méndez de Vigo to be forwarded to del Castaño. Madrid, 16 October 1943.

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The Madrid press adopted a stance similar to that of the government. It supported independence in itself, but without any sign of gratitude toward Japan nor any mention of Laurel’s greetings to Jordana. The end was considered laudable while the means left a lot to be desired. On 18 October 1943, the Spanish government seemed to have decided to reply to Laurel’s telegram—the following is the complete text of that reply: I have received your kind telegram which, in informing me that on 14 October of this year, the Philippines have proclaimed their independence, you have had the goodness to express to me your sincere desire that the most cordial relations of union and friendship exist between our two countries. For so many centuries, no other country has had such a deep mutual understanding with the Philippines as Spain and these ties of history, blood, and affection are indestructible and will outlast any circumstances that may arise. By interpreting the sincerest feeling shared by not only the Spanish Head of State, Generalísimo Franco, and his Government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also of the Spanish people, I can assure Your Excellency that relations between the Philippines and Spain will always be placed on the level of the most perfect comprehension and most cordial mutual understanding. I am especially pleased to take this opportunity to be able to express this to Your Excellency, and to present you proof of my most esteemed consideration

The telegram’s text was very carefully worded. There was no sign of commitment, no formal statement proposing a particular stance toward the future was included, nor did it properly constitute diplomatic recognition. Nevertheless, it was addressed to “H.E. Mr. José P. Laurel, President of the Philippines” and was signed by “The Count of Jordana, Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.”61 Moreover, it was sufficient for the German and Japanese propaganda media to select certain key words that displayed a solidarity on Spain’s part toward the Axis’ designs. As such, Madrid’s recognition was implied, inserted along with that of Bulgaria and with congratulatory statements from the Italian and German communities in the Philippines. The first Allied reaction came from Washington within five days. On October 23, the interim Secretary of State, Stettinius, asked the embassy in Madrid to comment on this telegram. Ambassador Hayes sent his 61 AMAEC-R-2844–5. Non-decoded telegram 380, Madrid, 18 October 1943. Sent to the Foreign Policy Department (transmitted at 7.00 p.m.).

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deputy, Willard L. Beaulac, who told to the Under Secretary of the Foreign Ministry José Pan de Soraluce that he knew of no government that would have replied to such a telegram without having the intention of recognizing it in the future. After this discussion, Hayes rushed to report it to Washington letting drop his suspicion that the telegram had been sent by the director general of foreign policy, José María Doussinague, whom he accused of having a favorable stance toward the Axis.62 Washington’s reply came on 27 October, the same day the telegram sent to Laurel was publicly revealed by the New York Times, which also referred to the propaganda transmitted by Tokyo radio and repeated in CBS news bulletins.63 The State Department ordered no further conversations with Jordana should be held “on any subject until you receive instructions.”64 Without waiting for the telegram sent from Madrid, the American stance had suddenly hardened. Hayes’ telegram in defense of Jordana did not receive a reply,65 while no one in Washington agreed to receive Ambassador Cárdenas to hear Spain’s version—neither the State Department nor any other sphere in the administration. And before a possible policy change, the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was urgently requested.66 On 3 November, after the meeting of allied foreign ministers in Moscow, Washington requested a complete embargo on wolfram. Tungsten, as it is also called, was a mineral necessary to the war industry and both Allies and Axis countries were making preventive purchases. Germany was starting to rationalize its use for anti-tank armor-piercing shells against heavy Soviet tanks and only Spain and Portugal sold it

62 FRUS, 1943, vol. 2, p. 723. Hayes to Hull, Madrid, 27 October 1943; copy in NARA-RG-59. CDF 1940–44. 811b.01/489. 63 “Spain congratulates? Laurel on Philippines’ ‘Freedom.’” 27 October 1943, p. 9, col. 6. New York Times. 64 FRUS, 1943, Vol. 2, p. 724. Stettinius to Hayes, Washington, 28 October 1943. Much of this documentation to be found in NARA-RG-59. CDF 1940–44. Bx. C94. 65 FRUS, Ibid., p. 724. Hayes to Stettinius, Madrid, 30 November 1943; for the meeting of Cárdenas with B. Long, which was restricted to listening to the arguments, NARA-RG-59. 811b.01/518. Cárdenas/Long, Washington, 30 October 1943. 66 NARA-RG-59. CDF 1940–44. 811b.01/489. H. Freeman Mathews, Head of European Affairs, to Admiral William D. Leahy, Cabinet Chief, Commander in Chief od the Army and the Navy, Washington, 29 October 1943.

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in Europe.67 Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Cordell Hull informed Hayes of the official position of his government, adding a personal comment: “We have reason to believe that the Spanish government has suffered considerable anxiety by our refraining from any discussion leading to a settlement of the incident and it would appear useful to keep for the present some uncertainty in the minds of the Spanish about just what our intentions may be.”68 Hull then ordered Hayes to do nothing regarding the Laurel Incident and, if asked, to reply that he was in no position to discuss the matter, and that Washington was very busy. The next day, the nervousness of the Spaniards increased when the New York Times published another article as well as an editorial. The telegram was connected to the supposed news of the signing of a Spanish trade agreement with Mussolini’s government and suggested that these decisions by Madrid were hardly intelligent at a time when things were militarily going so badly for the Axis. The sub-heading of the article noted that “no theory has been offered by the State Department to explain the steps taken by Spain.” The editorial, for its part, noted that the Philippines was still American soil, considering the telegram to the “puppet” (a description of governments controlled from Berlin or Tokyo) a calculated insult, and ending by saying “Whoever supports our enemies is no friend of ours.”69 It proposed a heavy hand against Franco. The Spanish government sensed that it was against the ropes. Ambassador Cárdenas could offer no room for relief when he was asked how to resolve the problem: “a journalistic campaign is being rolled out to support and encourage the severe attitude that yesterday, this government indicated it was going to adopt toward Spain.”70 Later, on 5 November, Hayes and Jordana confronted each other in a lengthy decisive 67 Thomas, J. M. 2017. Tungsten in the Second World War: China, Japan, Germany, the Allies and Iberia. Comillas Journal of International Relations, 10: 81–82. cir.i10.y2017.005. 68 Cortada, James W. 1973. Relaciones España-Estados Unidos, 1941–1945, p. 41. Barcelona: Dopesa. According to Feis, The Spanish story…, cap. XXXVI, p. 229, news of the Laurel telegram arrived along with that off excuses in the Spanish press for “Japanese Cruelties in the Philippines,” but these have not been located in the sources consulted. Hayes’ telegram explains the delay due to having to consult with other government department, “in particular the Heads of the General Staff.” FRUS, 1943, Vol. 2, p. 725. Stettinius to Hayes, Washington, 3 November 1943. 69 “Madrid resumes gestures to Axis” and “Franco salutes a puppet.”. 70 AMAEC-R-2844–5. Cárdenas to Jordana, Washington, 4 November 1943.

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meeting (lasting an hour and three quarters), which the Minister himself described in his diary as “highly animated” and which we can reconstruct through five extant versions—three from Jordana (his report to Franco, to the ambassador in Washington, and his diary) and two from Hayes (the telegram to the State Department and his account to Ambassador Hoare).71 Jordana began by mentioning the impediments Ambassador Cárdenas had come up against in the State Department, asking directly if the Laurel Incident was due to some agreement with Moscow. The Minister then lied (or revealed himself to be ill-informed) as he asserted that the telegram had been replied to under his own name [italics in the original] “without the position of President being included in the address, nor once mentioning the government or the Philippine nation, rather, only the Filipino people in courteous terms.”72 Hayes vaguely censured the Spanish government, recalling the reiterated deployment of the telegram by the Germans and the Japanese, and called its sending “unexpected in our opinion, if not ill-advised,” surely suggesting that it was an independent action by Doussinague. His position was increasingly firm, revealing his pessimistic outlook concerning the difficulty of finding a margin of confidence to, quoting Hayes, “correct the unfortunate publicity coming out of Tokyo.” After that, Jordana made a (“pathetic” according to the Foreign Office version) request that all be forgotten, recalling his achievements on the road to neutrality since the departure of Serrano Suñer: the withdrawal of the Blue Division, Franco’s use of the term “neutrality,” the liberation of French refugees, and the different attitude of the Spanish government toward the Allies. Ultimately, Jordana threatened to resign. Angered by some false information (concerning Italy) he received during the meeting, Jordana said in his last statement, as Hoare reported, “…if the United States Government made this incident a great issue, that would change the Allied relations,

71 Jordana’s versions are in APG-JE-2–8.2. report by Jordana to Franco, Madrid, 5 November 1943 (the principal basis for the summary, as it is the most extensive) and AMAEC-R-2844–5. Jordana to Cárdenas, Madrid, 6 November 1943. For Hayes’s version vid. FRUS, 1943, Vol. 2, p. 731. Hayes to Hull, Madrid, 5 November 1943 and the English version in PROFO-371–34,869. C13902/12995. Hoare to Eden, Madrid, 5 November 1943. 72 APG-JE, Ibid… It is not known why Hayes did not reply to this, it is possible he did not know the details of the incident.

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he would have to resign.”73 Perhaps Hayes expected Jordana to panic, but the minister not only avoided criticizing his second-in-command but offered his resignation. It appears this offer by Jordana was crucial. After that, the State Department instructed Hayes to secure the suppression of Axis activities in Tangiers and to restrict (not suppress, as had been said in the beginning) the sale of wolfram, but not to present a formal protest. At a press conference in Washington on 6 November, Under Secretary Stettinius simply insisted that the incident had received “serious consideration” from his government. Ambassador Hoare also accused Jordana of possessing “simplicity of mind and lack of experience.”74 The American complaint lost steam, and the discussion was limited to some peripheral issues. The telegram to Laurel could have been considered personal from the moment it referred not only to Franco but to the Spanish people. It was not clear if it was addressed to the “President of the Philippine Republic” (they knew perfectly well it was not), and the State Department had not inspired newspaper editorials. The Secretary of State, Hull, ended his message to Hayes with an obvious conclusion: “The Laurel incident unquestionably has produced a serious setback from which recovery will be difficult and perhaps slow unless the Spanish Government will avail itself promptly of such means as are at its disposal for restoring confidence.”75 Obviously, the telegram went beyond the specific issue of the independence of the Philippines. Following this, on 9 November 1943, the Council of Ministers meeting presided over by Franco addressed the incident “at length and in depth” and went to work on this restoration of trust.76 A note was drawn up to reduce the “telegram sent to the Philippines to a simple act of courtesy,” according to a personal proposal from Hayes sent indirectly to El Pardo.77 The Allies decided not to aggravate the matter to the point of provoking the Jordana’s resignation as it would have been hard 73 PRO-FO-371–34,869. (13,902/12995.) Hoare to Eden, Madrid, 5 November 1943. 74 Hoare, 1946, op. Cit, p. 241. 75 FRUS, 1943, Vol. 2, p. 734. Stettinius to Hayes, Washington, 8 November 1943. 76 Tusell, J. 1995. Franco, España y la II Guerra Mundial. Entre el Eje y la neutralidad,

p. 453. Madrid: Temas de Hoy. 77 This was told to Colonel Barba who passed it on to Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo. AMAEC-R-2844–5. General Military and private Secretary to the Head of State [signed

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to find another person as favorable to their cause: “If he stays, we may be able to use his mistake to extract some more concessions.”78 Thus, the incident was defused on both sides while long negotiations commenced in which the Allies sought to restrict Spanish aid to the Axis. Naturally, wolfram would be included in the negotiations, but references to Japan, the Philippines, and the famous telegram to Laurel were avoided, as shown by the following communication from Stettinius to Hayes.79 The same day Hayes received this telegram, 10 November 1943, he requested in Madrid an embargo on the export of wolfram, as well as rapid action on other questions that we will soon address, such as those regarding Italian merchant vessels, landing rights for aeroplanes, and the recognition of the right of American citizens to travel through Spain. On 12 November, at the request of Jordana, Hayes was authorized to declare the Laurel Incident officially closed, although he “stated that the incident had created a very unfavourable impression in this country, which could only be corrected by deeds of a nature to restore confidence.”80 The following day, the incident officially came to an end by means of a dispatch between the Secretary of State Hull and Roosevelt, as well as by the appearance in the press of an official note negotiated the previous day between Beaulac and Doussinague which considered the matter ended. Meanwhile, del Castaño—unaware of all these events— reported from Manila that the Laurel telegram “seems to have left a good impression.”81 Jordana apparently thought that the best way to end

“Paco”] to Francisco Franco Baamonde [sic], Madrid, 6 November 1944. Also drafts of 6 and 7 November 1943. 78 PRO-FO-371–34.869. Annotations of 9 November in Halifax to Eden, Washington, 6 November 1943. 79 FRUS, ídem. Stettinius to Hayes, Washington, 10 November 1943. That same day, the Spanish censor intercepted a telephone conversation that was, perhaps, held in the knowledge of this outside attention: “In relation to the events in the Philippines, the Spanish Ambassador to the United States has not been received in the White House and will not be received as long as the matter of the Philippines between the governments of Spain and the United states remains unresolved.” AMAEC-R-2844–5. Unsigned ad undated note, “The following information was taken from a telephone interception.” 10 November 1943. 80 FRUS, 1943, Vol. 2. p. 263. Hull to Roosevelt, Washington, 20 November 1943. Hayes to Hull, Madrid, 10 November 1943, in response to that of 8 November. 81 AMAEC-R-2844–5. Méndez de Vigo to Jordana from del Castaño, Tokyo, 10 November 1943.

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the affair was with a fresh profession of anti-Japanese faith and pointed to Hayes that “in the opinion of the Spanish Government the Japanese problem is the greatest problem now confronting the world […]. Japan personifies the yellow peril, which represents a grave danger to the entire world.”82 Once again, Tokyo emerged in a conflict where its role had been relatively marginal. The Technological Springboard It is necessary to complement this chronology of events with some key questions in order to understand its significance in the context of Hispano-Japanese relations. For this reason, this section focuses on three decisive aspects to understand the incident such as the aims of each government, the authorship of the telegram, and the reason it was sent. 1. Washington knowingly caused the incident. Once Gen. Franco’s aversion to Japan was known, it was shifted to a matter of greater importance, such as preventing the sale wolfram to the Germans. As Hoare noted, the incident allowed Washington to make a qualitative leap based on the combination of political and economic pressure: “We were demanding a quick and complete wolfram embargo, along with other unrelated things, as a kind of political penalty for the Foreign Minister’s message to Laurel.”83 The Laurel Incident pressed the Spanish to stop cooperating with Germany and, in fact, the Philippines are not mentioned while only one of the ten final points agreed with the Allies in 1 May 1944 was related to Japan, the withdrawal of its Military Attaché from Tangier.84 The Laurel Incident greatly helped in shifting the tension from Japan to Germany. Washington and the media managed to put real fear into the Spanish government by convincing it that the USSR was acting against

82 CJHHP-1. Meeting of 18 November, mentioned in Hayes to Norweb (Ambassador in Lisbon), Madrid, 8 December 1943. 83 Hayes, 1945, op. cit., p. 248. 84 PRO-FO-371–39,654 containing copies of letters sent by the American and British

Ambassadors to the Spanish Government. Both the American and the British letters are similar in content and dated 1 May 1944. C6240/2/41.

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Spain via the United States, as shown by Jordana’s question, and making them imagine an extreme situation. Once the New York Times had indicated what ideas to follow, also pointing out that Franco had benefited from the American friendliness, other newspapers supported the need to adopt a harder line against Franco’s Spain while the exile community took it upon themselves to disseminate this.85 This further stoked the already vigorous fire of criticism against Franco despite being tempered by Jordana’s brave stance. Decoding was essential in the American strategy to disturb the Spanish, as shown by the interception of a message to Suma. On 23 October, five days after the telegram was sent from the Foreign Ministry to Laurel, Suma informed Tokyo of the conversation he had with the Marquis of Rialp, the head of foreign intelligence. Rialp informed Suma the care with which the Spanish press had reported the new Philippine government and admitted that an exchange of telegrams with the Foreign Minister constituted formal recognition, but he requested that the message not be used for publicity: “I advise you Japanese to watch your step.”86 In this way, Rialp demonstrated interest in Philippine matters but also, by uttering that veiled threat to avoid propagandistic use of the telegram, he exposed the divisions within the government and its fragile position. The conversation had been intercepted on 26 October and translated on 27 October. That day, Stettinius also ordered Hayes to have no new contact with the Spanish administration. The translation of the conversation appeared in the Magic Summaries the following day, 28 October, slightly altered, and it was checked again with more care. 2. Intelligence used as a springboard in foreign policy. In the end, thanks to technological advances in the decoding of secret messages, the US government knew how to better deploy its resources. Washington was able to gain the greatest possible benefit from its ability to apply pressure in the media after Rialp’s warning revealed to Washington that the Spanish government was in a corner. As a result, the Laurel telegram can be interpreted more as a pretext

85 Thomas. 2016. art. Cit., p. 31. 86 Conversation of 23 October, MS de 28 October 1943.

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than as a motive for the attacks by the “Office of War Information (OWI), which was profoundly anti-Franco and, above all by the U.S. government.”87 The sending of the telegram was not such a clear demonstration of support for the Axis. The ten days between the message and the incident, London’s inactivity, and the fact that the American government itself believed that it had been written in such way as not to oblige Spain to do something (the Magic Summaries admitted that the text did not signify recognition in any way) indicate the little importance the Allies gave the telegram in itself. The incident’s laurels should be bestowed on the G-2, the counter-intelligence service, which revealed the when and the how.88 Intelligence scholar David Alvarez provides information on the importance of the effort to decode foreign messages: “In the summer of 1945, the United States regularly monitored more than three hundred foreign transmitters and scooped from the ether up to 380.000 messages a month. At Arlington, the cryptanalysts routinely dealt with 350 different codes or ciphers representing the cryptographic efforts of sixty governments of political entities, while the translators handled messages in twenty-five languages.”89 However, he decries the importance of codebreaking in intelligence, recalling the many problems involved in the final text, from inaccessible signals, unreadable messages, difficulty in knowing how signals intelligence was circulated, to President Roosevelt himself being especially insensitive to the value of signals intelligence.90 The Laurel Incident, however, shows that decoding messages was used in policymaking and for the information available that was used to pressure foreign governments. It was a superior weapon in foreign policy. Counter-espionage also brings to mind London’s role. Although equally capable of decoding Japanese and Spanish messages, the United

87 Thomàs, J. M. 2011. Roosevelt, Franco and the End of the Second World War, p. 203. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 88 The copy of the entire telegram at NARA-RG-453. SRDJ-44784–85. 89 Alvarez, D. J. 2000. Secret Messages. Codebreaking and American Diplomacy 1930–

1945, p. 229. Kansas: The University Press of Kansas. 90 Ibid, pp. 230–243.

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Kingdom made no use of this to pressure Franco’s government, preferring to keep their silence. The BBC duly reported the telegram to Laurel and its propagandistic use, yet criticism of Spain was not made formally, partly because there was no desire to increase pressure on Spain, and partly because the Pacific was not their theater of operations. Little benefit could be gained from political maneuverings in the Philippines where its role was dependent on what Washington might say. It was Hayes who, from the start, took the leading role in the incident and the function of the British Hoare was limited to transmitting to London what his colleague reported following his meetings with Jordana. Nevertheless, Washington’s success in pressuring Spain increasingly made the British government uncomfortable, especially after a parliamentary question forced the Foreign Minister Anthony Eden to openly acknowledge that he had not protested the telegram to Madrid.91 Then, London ordered Hoare to request for an explanation, but it was too late, leading Jordana to assert that London “had no interest in Philippine questions.”92 3. Doussinague, the sender of the telegram. Suspicion has always fallen on José María Doussinague, Director General of Foreign Policy, who enjoyed great operational autonomy within the Ministry as its effective number two, but this is based on American suppositions. So, a report written after that first meeting between Beaulac and Pan de Soraluce, once Washington protested Laurel’s message, demonstrates the wide ignorance that existed about the telegram among the officials to whom responsibility for its composition and sending would have fallen. According to this report, neither Tomás Súñer of the Overseas Section, Under Secretary Pan de Soraluce, nor the officers of the Protocol Section and Juridical Services had known about it. Jordana also has to be ruled out, as he was the addressee of the report. By elimination, it becomes clear who could have ordered it, but an added handwritten note betrays the authorship: “The cable to the Philippines was sent by the Foreign Policy

91 PRO-FO-371–34,869. Parliamentary question tabled by John Dugdale to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London, 9 November 1943 (presented on the 6th). Ibid., Eden to Hoare, London, 6 November 1943. 92 PRO-FO-371–34,766 (C13601/26/ 41 and C13668/26/41). Hoare to Eden, Madrid, 15 and 16 November 1943.

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Office.”93 Doussinague certainly bears all the marks of being the author, as the Americans had either surmised or known for certain.

4. Philippine interests as the reason for the sending of the telegram, although this is the most complicated conclusion. Years after the war, Doussinague published España tenía razón 1939–1945 (Spain Was Right) to justify the policy carried out by Franco’s government and explained the Laurel telegram within this broader context, but he did not give the complete truth. Doussinague copied the text of the telegram in order to show that in it, “nothing should allude to the presidency which José Laurel paraded, nor to the declaration of independence,”94 but he does not add that the telegram had been sent to “José Laurel, President of the Philippine Government.” The two reasons for the sending of the telegram appear again to be half-truths. One was the “active and persistent [pressure] from an Axis diplomat who had been in Tokyo.” This must have been the Italian ambassador of the new government of Badoglio, the Marquis of Paulucci, considered to be one of the few influential Westerners who was truly pro-Japanese. Since his arrival in Spain, Paulucci had filled an unofficial role of intermediary between Suma and Jordana, yet it is doubtful that he continued to fulfill this role in the autumn of 1943 since he, like many other members of the Fascist regime, went over to the pro-Allied government, and his relations with Suma had become more distant.95 Doussinague showed signs of convenient absent-mindedness. Doussinague, secondly, argued the “necessity of avoiding veiled Japanese threats to the Spanish community in the Philippines,” a possibility corroborated by Hayes in his memoirs in which he clearly notes a personal interest by Doussinague himself.96 Hayes’ clarification is important because, rather than fearing for the life of Spanish subjects

93 AMAEC-R-2844–5. ‘Note for S.E.’; n.d., n.p.; PRO-FO-371–34,869. Hoare to Eden, Madrid, 5 November 1943. 94 Doussinague, 1949, op. cit., p. 282. 95 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-38527. Kase to Suma, Rome, 18 March 1943. 96 Vid. Hayes, 1946, op. Cit, p. 241, and PRO-FO-371–34,869 (13,902/12995).

Hoare to Eden, Madrid, 5 November 1943.

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in the Philippines, what the Spanish diplomats then seemed to be most concerned about were their extremely important material interests. The Tabacalera Company, the first Spanish multinational company, was followed by a long line of businesses and rentiers that had stopped receiving transactions since the start of the war. Moreover, these interests in Spain were highly organized and had managed to get the Ministry to mobilize itself in their favor. On their behalf, the Foreign Ministry had proposed sending a boat to Asia carrying provisions, which would then return to the Peninsula with Philippine tobacco. Furthermore, following their demands, the Plan Tabacalera was established in 1943 to send a total of 500,000 Philippine pesos to the Peninsula via a “strong yen,” meeting the Japanese desire to elevate the status of their legations. The desire to continue the transfer of funds—when only half of the expected funds had been used—points to the real motive behind the sending of the telegram.97 Doussinague professed a strong interest in the Laurel telegram. The late hour of its dispatch (at seven in the evening) is indicative of this, but the most interesting aspect is the flagrant contradiction of the telegram to Laurel with Jordana’s idea as to how to resolve the problem. Apparently, Jordana had preferred to postpone the response, and to this effect, he had told Suma that the decision would be made after receiving del Castaño’s reply to a telegram sent on 18 October in which more information was requested. It was only two days after this message to the consul in Manila that the telegram was sent to Laurel. It was an impossible timeframe, not only due to the war, but also because both inward and outward communications with Manila had to pass through Tokyo. Del Castaño’s reply was received on 3 November, when the worst had already happened.98 The Director General’s behavior was certainly not particularly orthodox. Most surprising, nevertheless, is that Doussinague neither resigned nor was replaced—truly suspicious if we consider the commotion that was caused, and that he acted without consulting anyone in the ministry. Although it appears that he wanted to leave his post following a confrontation with Jordana, (which the historian, Javier Tusell, believes had nothing to do with the Laurel Incident), it can be deduced that he remained in his position based on the fact that a few days before, he

97 Ref. in AMAEC-R-3195–33. Tomás Súñer to Jordana, Madrid, 4 February 1944. 98 NARA-RG-453, SRDJ-44741, Suma to Shigemitsu, Madrid, 19 October 1943.

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had made a curious reentreé in the foreign affairs ministry.99 Weeks later, Jordana himself announced Doussinague’s replacement by Tomás Súñer “for health reasons,” while Doussinague returned to his position. In fact, the new appointment was never made public in the Official Bulletin of State. National interest is precisely what can explain this peculiar “non-sacking.” The Americans noted Doussinague’s “strong influence and support somewhere within the Government and outside of the Foreign Office.”100 Certainly, Jordana himself never came to acknowledge to the Allies that the telegram had been sent without his permission, and he had boldly assumed responsibility “as though he had written it himself,”101 and even wrote on the role of the other party: “This shows how spot on the telegram to Laurel was. It satisfied his vanity and gives us credit for not having recognised him while keeping him happy.”102 The telegram, in any case, was coherent with Spain’s policy toward Japan at the time, both in general and in that specific moment. Its content and the request that it not be used for propaganda are highly typical of Spain’s behavior toward Japan during Jordana’s time in office, which we have already seen characterized by its relations with both sides and the slow turns in which such care was taken. The author never provided complete satisfaction nor absolute disappointment. The message was also in line with relations with Japan and the Philippines. At the same time as the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Spanish pointed out Philippine independence as their preferred option for the islands and in the conversation decoded by the American G-2, Rialp said to Suma, “Franco and the Spanish people welcome this independence from the bottom of their hearts.”103 In short, the telegram vaguely congratulating Laurel, showed sincere joy on the part of Spain that was coherent with its behavior thus far. Furthermore, this formal telegram to Laurel could 99 Tusell, 1995, op. Cit., p. 452. No source provided for this information. 100 NARA-RG-59. CDF 1940–44. 811b.01/519. Hayes to Hull, Madrid,

13

November 1943. 101 NARA-RG-59. CDF 1940–44. 811b.01/519. Memorandum to Hull, Madrid, 12 November 1943. 102 Archivo Francisco Franco, file. 186, p. 19. Méndez de Vigo to Jordana, Tokyo, 4 December 1943. 103 NARA-RG-453. SRDJ, 44,784–44,785. Suma to Shigemitsu, Madrid, 29 October

1943.

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give no cause for attracting much attention. On the one hand, because Spain, as a neutral power, had a right to send it, and on the other, because the United States congress in Washington itself was considering granting independence to the Philippines. It was a way of diminishing the benefits Tokyo might gain from the announcement, which had already caused Washington to renounce its extraterritoriality in Chongqing after the Japanese had done so in Nanjing. 5. Doussinague had backing for his decision. On the other hand, not sending the telegram would have also been coherent with Spanish policy toward Japan, as demonstrated by the initial reactions of Jordana to Suma when it was indicated that the same would be done with Laurel as with Ba Maw or Mussolini, neither of whom were recognized diplomatically.104 Jordana must have thought about compensating in some way for Spain’s rejection of Japan’s request to not anger them too much, and this seems to be the explanation Hayes gave to President Roosevelt when, shortly after the incident was over, he attributed it to a simple miscalculation, saying, “Jordana imagined it was merely a matter of polite routine and was, I believe, honestly surprised and shocked when it was interpreted by Tokyo and Berlin as a ‘recognition’ of the puppet ‘Philippine Republic.’”105 In fact, the Vatican also sent a telegram to Laurel and the difference with the Spanish one laid not in its content but in the foreign reaction: how little it was used in Axis propaganda.106 Perhaps Spain had erred in calculating its repercussions, which were much wider than imagined, both initially within the Axis and later among the Allies.107 However, the Spanish regime was not overflowing with candor nor innocence. Neither were the Allies. If the incident was not taken any

104 AMAEC-R-17381. Suma to Jordana, Madrid, 12 November 1943 (date of registration in the Foreign Ministry is 3 November 1943). 105 CJHHP-3. Hayes to Roosevelt, Madrid, 15 November 1943. 106 NARA.59. 811b.01/631. Harrison to Hull, Berne, 27 January 1944; /645,

Tittman to Hull, Vatican, 3 February 1944. 107 CJHHP-3. “Some reflections on American Policy towards Spain since October 1943.”.

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further, it was because the resignation of Jordana as minister would not necessarily signify the appointment of a new minister that would be favorable to them. A reaction was feared despite the increasingly favorable military results provided by their armies, and the person responsible for Spanish policy at the time was the very one who was supporting Doussinague—Francisco Franco. There were no major changes, but Spanish relations with Japan worsened even further. A Reconstruction in Foreign Affairs After the Laurel Incident, the context of relations with Japan changed. Instead of seeking compensation, however small, Spain started using its tensions with the Japanese to gain anti-Axis credibility. For the first time, the Philippine government-in exile, then, appeared to favor the credibility of this shift. In his memoirs, Hayes came to state that “no Spaniard was unaware” that Laurel had always been anti-Spanish and anti-American, while the exiled Manuel L. Quezón was the complete opposite—a supporter of Spanish culture and a faithful ally to the United States.108 In this case, military expectations coincided with Spanish wishes and signaled another change in the aforementioned perception of the United States from being the country that would have destroyed Spanish culture in the Philippines to the one that had preserved it. The Laurel incident also contributed to a new stage in the competition between the Allies and Spain. The episode was a clear example of a process that, despite British displeasure, had moved Madrid increasingly within the orbit of the Allies. Months later, in May 1944, then British Prime Minister Churchill publicly defended Franco and, recalling Madrid’s actions in 1940, praised “the Spanish resolve to keep out of the war.”109 London resisted playing a secondary role despite the increasing importance of the Pacific War, and Prime Minister Churchill asked president Roosevelt to address British needs: “I would venture to remind you that we have gone along with you in Argentina and that we feel entitled

108 Hayes, 1946, op. Cit., pp. 238–239. 109 Cit. in Preston. 1993. op. cit., p. 512.

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to ask you to take our views seriously into account in the Iberian Peninsula, where our strategic and economic interests are more directly affected that are those of the United States.”110

Tensions Become Public At the end of 1943, the war increasingly pitted Spain against Japan. The continuous Soviet advance from the east, the Allied presence in Italy after the surrender of Marshall Badoglio and the new Churchill–Roosevelt summits with their two main allies, the first in Cairo with Jiang Jieshi and the second in Teheran with Stalin (28 November and 1 December 1943) brought to light before many the final triumph of the Allies. Neither meeting was particularly useful for the war’s progress, yet they offered an image of unity and collaboration that led to speculation among the others, whether enemy, friend, or a candidate for the Allies. In the Pacific, landings started taking place in Micronesia as the Allies got closer to Japan, from Tarawa to Kwajalein and Eniwetok in the Marshall Islands. Washington’s concern at the time was which roads to take to Tokyo and, in pursuit of this final objective, which islands would require occupation and on which ones a landing would be unnecessary. Tokyo responded to the marines in the only way it could, by ordering its garrisons to resist to the last, moving troops, and advancing where feasible to declare victory. As a result, the Imperial Government moved its forces for the first time from its border with the Soviet Union in order to send them to the hotspots in “Greater East Asia,” be they the Philippines, China, or Burma, taking a useless army initiative to try to make up for its naval failures. Too many human lives were lost and there was a lack of technology. Hispano-Japanese relations during the final months of Jordana’s life continued to be a product of this general context. Tokyo began a tactic it would maintain until the end of the war: to remain in the Peninsula and make use of its resources as long as possible. Its main concern was delaying any possible expulsion from the country. Regarding the Madrid government, relations with Japan continued to be used to respond to accusations of supporting Germany, with a new period of increasing 110 C-621. 2325/Z/TOR 0300 A, Mar. 31, Churchill to Roosevelt, 30 March 1944, London. Kimball, W. F. 1984. ed., Churchill & Roosevelt, the complete correspondence, Vol. 3, Alliance Declining, p. 68. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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enmity. Two main reasons moderated this move: German retaliatory capability from the Pyrenean border and possible Japanese reprisals against the Spanish communities in Asia, in particular, those in the Philippines and the missionaries. But the importance of the radicalization of the Spanish stance against Japan was noted in February 1944 when these tensions were disclosed and an article critical of Japan appeared in ¡Arriba!. The conservative vision triumphed over that of the Falange. Nobody thought that relations with Japan could be beneficial for Spain. The Falangist images of Japan had not only turned out to be false, but also inappropriate for the interests of Francoist policy. With a final defeat coming sooner or later, it suited Madrid to recall the old conservative fears about the Japanese: their uncivilized nature, the “yellow peril,” and how clearly impossible it was for some of them to adopt Western culture. Interests were at stake, and manipulating the old images became increasingly necessary. The Desire to Join the Anti-Japanese Faction At the end of the year 1943, some situations were ready to be used against Japan. Tensions between Portugal and Japan over East Timor, negotiations concerning Italian ships taking shelter in Spanish ports, the official discovery of the espionage network in Canada, and news about the Philippines were events that could be used for political purposes, and the Madrid government was ready to listen to any new information and act accordingly, as we will analyze them separately. 1. War over Portuguese Timor. The government headed by António de Oliveira Salazar—who also served as Foreign Minister—contributed to the deterioration of Spain’s relations with Japan. Lisbon’s relations with Tokyo were especially complex due to its two colonies in Macao and East Timor and Salazar’s government paid close attention during the Laurel Incident, since Lisbon also experienced tense moments with Japan, but it did not inform the Spaniards about it. While Madrid kept the Portuguese informed, it was not always the case vice versa.

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Both Portuguese (interned, with little contact with the rest of the population) and East Timorese were much more opposed to the invasion than their neighbors in the western part of the island, where hope and joy over the departure of the Dutch were widespread for some time. Small Australian squads harassing the Japanese not only had widespread support, but the suffering of the colony also caused great anger among the mainland Portuguese. Lisbon tried to openly keep in touch with its governor, but after June 1942, the Japanese refused any new improvement. The Allies knew it well. Macao was the only outpost on the Chinese coast that was never conquered by Japanese troops, out of respect for Portugal’s neutrality. Given that it was a refuge site for thousands of people and with serious supply problems, Macao needed Japanese acquiescence, which was the counterpoint to the situation in Timor.111 As such, Spanish and Portuguese policies toward Japan shared a number of important similarities. Both countries complained about Japanese treatment of their subjects—in Timor and in the Philippines—and longed to use this excuse for a rapprochement with the Allies, yet they were both held back by the possibility of reprisals against their compatriots in these territories. The inhabitants of Macao, the detainees in Timor, and Spanish citizens and clergy in Asia could personally pay the price for a poorly made decision in Europe. There was a fine line to tread. However, compared to the official hypocrisy Minister Suma encountered in Spain, Minister Morishima Morito came across Prime Minister Salazar who raised his complaints to them face to face. Shortly after the start of the Pacific War, he stated frankly to the Japanese Minister: Do you think you can get such an understanding with Tokyo? However, one thing I want you to understand; we will not be cooperating with you. We have a pact with England, and we have none with you, its enemy. So,

111 Rosas, Fernando. 2002. Portuguese neutrality in the Second World War. In European neutrals and non-belligerents during the Second World War, ed. Neville Wylie, pp. 266–267. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Reeves, John Pownall. 2014. Lone Flag. Memoir of the British Consul in Macao during World War II. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

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we could not by any means ally ourselves with you [...] we will never stand aside and see our authority there [Timor] dwindle to nothing.112

The Japanese were grateful for such sincerity. Positive comments can even be read about it, which clearly reveal that Portuguese influence was beneficial for Japan’s relations with Madrid, as observed by someone as important as Oshima, the Japanese ambassador to Berlin.113 The fact that Lisbon had always supported the Allies more made public criticism of Japan possible by the autumn of 1943. News concerning alleged massacres in Timor appeared unhindered in the Portuguese press and at the end of November 1943, Salazar gave a speech to Parliament that mostly concerned Timor. Moreover, Portugal considered declaring war on Tokyo. The Allies tempted Lisbon with a campaign to retake Timor, in which Portuguese troops would take part, allowing Lisbon to take a seat at the table of the victors. Consequently, as it can be imagined, rumors about a forthcoming declaration of war on Japan circulated ever more profusely.114 They wanted to give the impression that an extremely difficult situation had been reached. These moments of tension allow us to observe numerous patterns of behavior that were later followed by the Spanish. On the one hand, Tokyo was unable to influence Lisbon’s final position. Minister Morishima visited Salazar on a number of occasions in order to dissipate the tension, but only received verbal denials of that possible declaration of war alongside recriminations over the difficulties imposed by Japanese policy. The Portuguese feared retaliation, but paid no heed to Japan’s arguments. On the other hand, the media was used to test the new policy. Lisbon’s press not only reported Portuguese deaths but also criticized the Japanese occupation. They openly demanded withdrawal while at the same time offered clear indications about the possible truth behind the rumors of a declaration of war. Portugal’s intention of hardening its stance was clear, but

112 MS 12 September 1942. Chiba to Tani, Lisbon, 9 September 1942. Gunn, G. C., 1994. A Critical View of Western Journalism and Scholarship on East Timor, pp. 53–55. Manila: Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers. 113 MS 11 October1943. Oshima to Shigemitsu, Berlin, 30 September 1943. 114 Vid. MS 5, 6 and 10 September and 3, 10 and 29 October 1943. On the policy

towards Portugal, MS 17/XII/1943.

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the Japanese Legation could only limit itself to lodging a formal protest in early 1944.115 Lisbon itself had nearly declared war on Japan. In this case, it was simply an American stratagem to get Portugal’s permission to establish military bases in the Azores after the British were authorized with establishing two in the Terceira and Faijal islands. The declaration of war never happened, but every American official believed that it would occur and Ambassador Hayes believed that Madrid would also declare war on Japan: “I am convinced Spain will end up doing the same as Portugal.”116 Hayes was being fairly logical in that Madrid needed to travel the same road as Portugal in order to get closer to the Allies, but also because Franco was prepared to follow Portugal’s lead in Asia. 2. Italian ships against Japan. Negotiations over ships sheltering in Spanish ports became a new option for a rapprochement with the Allies through enmity with Japan. Since 1942, eight Italian vessels on the Spanish ports depended on the consent by the British, and after the fall of the Fascist regime in 1943, several other Italian vessels moored in Spanish ports. Spanish authorities were interested since 1942, and during the negotiations with the Allies, Madrid repeated its interest to purchase them.117 While Allies preferred them for deployment in the war effort against the Axis, one of the options proposed to break the impasse involved Japan. The suggestion was formulated in December 1943 and came from Jordana who, ready to cooperate against Japan, proposed handing over the vessels to the Allies if these or similar others were used to strengthen the American naval effort in the Pacific. London secretly reported that “Spain would not be unwilling to co-operate with the Allies 115 “El jefe del gobierno portugués considera insostenible la situación creada en Timor,” 27 September 1943, Ya; “Jornal do Comercio exige la retirada de los japoneses de Timor,” 24 December 1943, ¡Arriba!. 116 APG-JE-3–3. “Note of the conversation between Puigdollers and the United States Ambassador” Madrid, 14 March 1944; NARA-RG-59. E399. Bx. 15. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy to Cordell Hull, Washington, 29 January 1944. De la Torre, H. and Jiménez Redondo, J. C. 2019. Historia de una diferencia. Portugal y España ayer y hoy (1807–2019), p. 230. Madrid: Silex. 117 NARA-RG59. CDF 1940–44. C211. 852.852/16. Hayes to Hull, Madrid, 19 June

1942.

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against Japan (this is the first time we are given this information).”118 Either way, Madrid was ready to collaborate with the Allied fight in the Pacific, to the extent of violating its very terms of neutrality, just as it had done in the field of espionage.

3. Canada ends Alcázar’s espionage. The Canadian government opted to rely on the British ambassador in Madrid to extract political benefit from having proof of Spanish participation in espionage. On 16 January 1944, Ambassador Hoare visited Jordana to show him proof of Kobbe’s participation in sending secrets to the Axis and to ask why Kobbe had been recruited by the Japanese intelligence service, how he had been able to receive instructions from Tokyo, and in what measure were the other people mentioned in the sealed package implicated. Jordana described Alcázar as one of “[Serrano] Suñer’s bandits,” defended the Marquis of Rialp, and promised an exhaustive investigation. On the same day, he ordered Kobbe to return to Madrid (he was arrested under British pressure), and the following day, he summoned Suma and placed Bernardo de Rolland, a former Consul General in Montreal, in charge of initiating an investigation of these espionage activities.119 Jordana’s anger was great and apparently sincere. Shortly after, Kobbe’s house in Vancouver was searched, but no new evidence of secret messages was found. Moreover, the $1,000 remained in the same envelope where they had been sent.120 It suggests that Kobbe himself had realized the extent of the control he was submitted to, opting not to risk his skin in a suicidal act, and to leave the money and the instructions unused, as if they came from an unknown sender. Sending a message after this would have been sheer recklessness, and he requested to be transferred as soon as possible despite only having arrived at the 118 English version in PRO-FO-371–34,833 (C14716/238/41), Hoare to Eden,

Madrid, 13 December 1943; the Spanish version in APG-JE-2–8. Meeting between Jordana and Hayes, Madrid, 9 December 1943; the American versions in FRUS, 1943, Vol. 2, p. 722 Memorandum of 9 December 1943, and handwritten draft in CH-2. 119 NARA-RG-226-108b. ‘Kobbe’. 120 Wilcox, 1995, op. cit., p. 132; Granatstein, J.L. and Stafford, D. 1990. Spy wars:

Espionage and Canada from Gouzenko to Glasnost, p. 36. Toronto: Key Porter.

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beginning of the year. In fact, Kobbe was expelled, but his departure was justified as a normal change of post, and little more was spoken of him. The cover up of the incident was managed by Jordana with assistance from Hoare and Suma. After a year and a half, Ottawa desisted in its desire to benefit from the incident. Rolland’s report exonerated the Foreign Affairs Ministry and only held Kobbe responsible for not reporting about the money he received in time. The death of Minister Jordana, the supposed disappearance in Morocco of the man who sent the message, Gustavo Villapalos, and doubts regarding a false signature added to Kobbe’s alleged guilt.121 The Japanese helped after Alcázar’s network began to be investigated by the military jurisdiction, as commented in the Magic Summaries: “The Japanese are getting more and more uneasy about a possible exposé of their dealings with Spanish espionage agents.”122 In May 1944, pressure from Allied espionage forced Alcázar to write a statement in which he recognized only three agents in his network—Aladrén, Gravet, and Kobbe—claiming that all the rest were fictitious. It was proposed to him that he become a double agent but the following day, the Japanese Legation helped by requesting their colleagues in Berlin to take in Alcázar to prevent him from going to jail with Kobbe in Madrid and having to reveal a number of secrets.123 The Allies blocked Spain and Japan’s spy collaboration. 4. Data on the Spanish Community in the Philippines. Madrid received information concerning the critical situation of the Spanish Community in the Philippines thanks to a lengthy report by del Castaño. To reach his destination, the new aerial attaché, Fernando Navarro, and his family first had to travel to Brazil, then to India, and finally, they boarded an exchange vessel that stopped at Manila. After learning about this, Consul del Castaño prepared a report that his wife managed to secretly hand to Navarro’s wife. Once Navarro’s family arrived in Tokyo, they sent it to the Spanish government, which

121 DEAC-123 s. Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner for Canada in Great Britain, Ottawa, 2 February 1944. 122 Commentary on MS 21 July 1944. 123 NARA-RG-226-108b. “Alcázar.”.

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received its first reliable report on the state of Spaniards in the Philippines.124 Del Castaño and later Mendez de Vigo tried to cushion foreseeable surprises about their difficult situation in the telegraphic summary. Nevertheless, the report caused considerable commotion in the Foreign Ministry because it confirmed a number of premonitions. For the first time, there was evidence standing against Japanese domination, leading Tomás Súñer to propose “to radically change” Spain’s relationship with the Japanese urgently, saying, “Instead of responding to Spanish gestures, they have speculated over our attitude.”125 The Foreign Ministry considered Tomás Súñer’s arguments in its treatment of Japan until the end of the war: Japan’s “constant animosity methodically sustained,” that their policy was “much more aggressive toward Spanish interests than those of the United States,” and that a kind of “tension” in both countries’ relations “would have favourable repercussions in the United States and all of America.” If there is a moment where it can be said that Japan’s image changed the conceptual framework, it was the one provoked by this confirmation of previous expectations. Then, in January 1944, a month after Súñer’s proposal had been left up in the air, two new events arose that urged the necessity to take a qualitative leap, the suspension of oil sales to Spain, and a telegram concerning what became known as the “Bataan Death March.” An escaped soldier apparently confirmed the massacres, but the timing of its arrival fit the new perceptual schema with which information about “savage” Japan was expected. It was the right input at the right moment. The consequences were twofold. There was now a need to protect Spaniards living under Japanese troops as much as possible while it was felt that Spain had to react immediately.

124 The complete text would not reach Madrid until after the end of the war, which explains why the above citations are derived from the telegram. AMAEC-R-3195–32. Méndez de Vigo to Jordana, Tokyo, 3 December 1943. 125 AMAEC-R-3195–24. Report by Tomás Súñer, Madrid, 21 December 1943; NARARG-59. CDF 1940–44. 701.5281/7–2544. Childs to Hull. Tangier, 25 July 1944.

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The Falange Shows Its “Anti-Japanism” In the eyes of the Francoist leaders, this perceived confirmation of Japanese savagery led to three measures being taken: to try to use the representation of Japanese interests, to secure the situation of Spanish missionaries, and finally, to implement the last of Tomás Súñer’s proposals, that is, to publicly reveal the “lack of understanding” between Spain and Japan. Madrid’s first reaction was to use its representation of Japanese interests to help Allied prisoners in East Asia. Although there had been confirmation of Japanese mistreatment of Allied prisoners of war since 1942, for the first time, Spanish representatives in Tokyo and Bern were instructed to assist the Swiss in helping them. Ambassador Méndez de Vigo especially had to push for Swiss representatives to visit Western prisoners in the different Asian territories held by the Japanese “and with this, to remove the arguments in the campaign against Spain.”126 Mendez de Vigo slowed down his minister’s urgency. He did not send the order to Manila, apparently due to his personal concerns. At the start of the war, he was ready to send dispatches contradicting Serrano Suñer’s about Japanese misbehavior but after 1943, he decided not to send information that might worsen Spain-Japan relations, and even covered up information that could further damage them, such as the arrests that occurred around him during the final year of the war. Any change in the context of relations would only bring him additional distress—and he had already suffered enough privations. Furthermore, the Spanish government thought that it should take measures in favor of its own subjects. Since the end of January, it tried to improve the situation of the Spanish Community in the Philippines by pressing for a reestablishment of the so-called Plan Tabacalera, which had been canceled the previous September after only half of the expected 500,000 Philippine pesos had been transferred. It was a failure. Then, attempts to organize a repatriation of Spaniards were renewed after a request by Del Castaño, which led to renewed fears in Spain of the situation in the Philippines worsening, along with possible accusations against

126 AMAEC-R-1562–12. Jordana to ministro in Berna, Madrid, 8 February 1944.

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the Foreign Ministry of “neglect in the protection of our compatriots in the Philippines.”127 In the face of this, the Swiss launched a proposal to repatriate the subjects of neutral countries in Greater East Asia. It would be a joint action with Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey, and Portugal, for which Spain had undertaken negotiations in February 1943 and to which the Japanese had, at first, seemed willing to accept.128 Jordana not only vigorously supported the proposal but was also prepared to provide a ship, reiterating to Suma in a meeting his “great interest” in a happy outcome for the project. On 3 March 1944, Suma verbally reported that the evacuation would be impossible, but the Swiss, Swedish, and Spanish Ministers (Portugal fell behind) presented a new joint communication to the Tokyo government which, in turn, opted to emphasize the many difficulties it faced to show the little interest they had - instead of specifically denying the possibility of an evacuation.129 Nevertheless, it was the Spanish missionaries in China who seemed to be in most need of help at the time. In March 1944, the sacking and burning of the Augustinian building in Xiangtan [Changteh] and the mistreatment of Bishop Herrero during Japan’s brief occupation of Hunan Province were reported both by the Vatican (after the bishop had been evacuated via territory controlled by the Goumindang) and by the Augustines themselves (from Japanese occupied territory). If the first news was apparently accepted with certain reserve, the second led to a request for information from Shanghai in order to “prepare a forthright note” and, after consulting with Francisco Franco, to submit a list of Spanish missions in China to the Japanese to prevent them from experiencing future harm.130 The Spanish government used a threatening tone, warning that it reserved the right to claim compensation through the most pertinent proceedings “for all the damage and abuse that may be afflicted on the properties, subjects, and spiritual and material interests

127 AMAEC-R-3195–33. Súñer to Jordana, Madrid, 4 February 1944; Jordana to Suma, Madrid, 24 January 1944. 128 AMAEC-R-3195–33. N.d. [Súñer] to Jordana, Madrid, 28 February 1944; for these negotiations of 1943, 2910–27. 129 AMAEC-R-3195–33. Jordana to Méndez de Vigo, Madrid, 16 March 1944. 130 AMAEC-R-3196–4. Domingo de las Bárcenas to Jordana, Rome, 7 February 1944,

following a note handed over by the Secretary of State of the Vatican.

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of Spain in China and the Philippines.”131 Madrid feared that Spaniards would suffer as Westerners, but it was already thinking about the end of the war. The second reaction to this torrent of events and the growing tension between the Japanese and the Spanish had far greater reach. It came about in the middle of February 1944 with a strange note on page three of ¡Arriba! which included information dated in Buenos Aires by the EFE agency. The article was headlined “In the Philippines, the Spanish language has been placed behind Japanese and Tagalog. Sensation and a surprise in Latin America due to the inconsiderate treatment of ecclesiastical hierarchies.”132 The article went on to note that Spanish had been completely excluded from the start of the Japanese occupation and later placed on the same level as English but kept below Japanese and Tagalog “despite the fact that the time elapsed […] could have allowed a resolution of the issue.” The aforementioned ecclesiastical hierarchy was Bishop Olano of Guam, of whom it was stated that “according to reports from people arriving from the Far East,” neither his position as Bishop nor the fact that he was the subject of a neutral country had been respected. Furthermore, during his obligatory move to the Japanese archipelago, “they [Olano and his Secretary Jáuregui] were in the cellar and did not go outdoors for thirty-nine hours.” The article was suggestive in both substance and form. This news provoked many comments. Both the British daily The Times and Ambassadors Hoare and Hayes denied its alleged origin asserting that it had been prepared in Madrid, with the former describing it “as a really astonishing example of the psychology of the Press Bureau” and the latter noting that it was “the first time such matters have received publicity in the Spanish press.”133 Hoare indicated that the news item had been prepared over the past two weeks, just like what probably occurred with another article that came out the following day concerning an American protest over the mistreatment of prisoners. Moreover, he made an effort to reveal to his superiors the logical processes followed in the elaboration 131 AMAEC-R-3195–33. Jordana to Suma, Madrid, 21 June 1943. Also in file 1736–30 and 7. 132 12 February 1944. ¡Arriba! For Hoare’s commentary on this vid. PRO-FO-371– 39,735 (C2386/216/41). Hoare to Eden, Madrid, 12 February 1944. 133 NARA-RG59-CDF 1940–44. Bx C211. 852.9111/165. Hayes to Hull, Madrid, 12 February 1944.

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of the piece: “The ill-treatment of a Spanish prelate, and the very suppression, or something near, of the Spanish language, only receive notice in Spain because they have stirred ‘intellectual circles’ in South America. It has been repeated ad nauseum in the Press for the last fortnight or so, in the ‘neutrality affair,’ that Spain cannot allow the slightest taint to its national honour and its proper pride. But the affront to the very vehicle of national feeling, the language, is recounted as a matter stirring, not Spain, but the intelligentsia of the Argentine.”134 The indignation of the British ambassador ended with an attack, perhaps excessive, on the Franco government: “A more spiritless retreat from honour and pride could not be conceived.” In fact, within a few days, the front page of ¡Arriba! included an in-depth article bearing a restrained headline (“An initial comment on some grave news”) and containing serious statements. The “lack of understanding” was made public “Jordana’s style” in a text that is worth including in its entirety: Clearly—at the center of the question, there are Spanish names so that there would not be any doubt—a telegram from Buenos Aires has recently pointed out in the press specific and grave aspects of the Japanese occupation of the Philippine archipelago. For some time, no one had failed to notice fractional and confusing rumors concerning the bitter persecution faced by the subjects, the language, and even the living history of Spain in those distant lands from the new occupation authorities. In a peaceful gesture and an unreciprocated stance, the Spanish press had abstained from collecting in its columns this strange mixture of errors and injustices ‘that— it was assured—were falling every hour with greater severity on Spanish men and their possessions in the Philippines.’ There was no desire to offer an opportunity to belligerent propaganda to overwhelm Spanish opinion with imprecise news by taking advantage of this uncomfortable information. It has been patiently expected that information about these facts came from absolutely credible sectors. With the same stupor that the news has provoked in Spanish opinion, the peoples of Latin America have learned of the persecution of the Spanish language—the efficacious, ancient, and prestigious upholder of Western culture in the Far East—the lack of consideration of venerable and prestigious Spanish figures, dedicated for several years to the evangelization

134 PRO-FO-371–39,735 (C2386/216/41). Hoare to Eden, Madrid, 12 February 1944; MS of 1 March 1944; 14 February 1944. The Times.

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of the archipelago and, in short, the position in which Japanese authorities have placed themselves regarding all that is or represents Spanish and Christian values. For the moment, we do not wish further consequences than those of our extreme surprise. The press and, in general, the entire opinion of the nation has maintained an attitude towards Japan’s military enterprise that the Japanese could have no reason for complaint. It is true that Spanish voices, steeped in the problems and the existence of the Philippines, had not stopped exposing the extremely difficult adaptation that Japanese formulas and systems would have over broad sectors of Spanish Catholicism in the archipelago. However, in general, the complete lack of information (a hermeticism that the Japanese have ensured with a mysterious Asiatic meticulousness) favored the climate of “Japanism” which, somewhat naively, had received Spanish admiration. It seems that things are being situated, as an example for everyone, in the clear light of day. We believe that the fact will deserve deep consideration by the Spanish people, and that greater clarification of the situation will not stop being published by the national press. It is painful in every aspect that the strict maintenance of Spanish sovereign neutrality—after another difficult question had been raised a few weeks ago—would constantly come up against all manner of inconveniences. We would prefer to see it universally accepted as a possible and human manner of rapprochement and understanding and receiving all the respect that it deserves. Either way, with respect to, and in defence of this, we will spare no sacrifice.135

Furthermore, the text said that Japan had been the sole beneficiary of an unequal relationship, while the insistent references to Latin America recall Spanish embarrassment over the press campaigns against Franco for representing Japanese interests. The references to the Philippines reveal its importance in Spain-Japan relations, while the mention of Olano appeared to be meant to remind readers of the presence of many missionaries in the region. However, the article draws attention even without knowing the context of Spain-Japan relations. It is very unusual for a dictatorship to make a mea culpa, even less so in the official newspaper of a party not very prone to acknowledge such mistakes. Moreover, the comments regarding hermeticism and the self-criticism over the excessive naiveté about Japan reminded them of their shame for having trusted Japan in the face of criticism. In this lies the main significance of the 135 “Comentario inicial ante una grave noticia,” 16 February 1944. ¡Arriba!; PROFO-371–39,753 (C2612/216/ 41). Hoare toEden, Madrid, 16 March 1944.

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article as it was published by the very official Falangist body that for years had been the most pro-Japanese. It demonstrates the definitive return of the traditional images of Japan, the ones prior to their anticommunist friendship, and that the Falange’s ambitions had completely failed. This “lack of public understanding” of Japan bore aims and needs that were twofold. It sought to disassociate itself from Japan to continue supporting the Germans. Ambassador Hayes himself interpreted this as an escape valve because neutrality was proclaimed with a broad concept that suited Madrid’s interests by having an enemy country on both sides—the Soviet Union and Japan—without the need to present information against Berlin.136 Therefore, the most appropriate phrase for Falangist aims at the time was “Asiatic intelligence” as it separated the contenders precisely where it suited Madrid most, situating Germany with the United States and the Soviet Union with Japan, as stated by another article: Russian neutrality in the battle for the Pacific means a clear belligerence in favour of Japan, with whom Russia maintains relations of unquestionable cordiality above all differences that any ideological or sentimental wishful thinking may provoke in us. The reality is that throughout this war, there has not been the slightest brush between the two Eastern powers and this is dangerous, very dangerous, not only for the United States, but for all Western-minded nations.137

Certainly, the idea of an Asian threat suited the Falangist mentality and facilitated the rapid shift in its attitude toward Tokyo. The supposed Japanese betrayal in the fight against Soviet communism allowed the justification of the Francoist rupture with it when it started experiencing military losses. Spain was only paying back Japan with its own coin. The Japanese calibrated their options. Their first thought was to adopt a hard line against Madrid, but this was not feasible. Suma advised against this, making clear that the main losers in this growing tension would be the Japanese themselves, saying, “If we pick a thoughtless quarrel with

136 CJHHP-3. Hayes to Robert Sherwood, Office of War Information, Madrid, 1 March 1944. 137 “Russian neutrality,” signed by F. I. L., “Ya,” 15 April 1943.

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Spain, the enemy will plan to bring about the end of Spanish representation of our interests.”138 There was no other choice than to stand their ground, and aware of the little influence he wielded, Suma ended up suggesting a communiqué from Tokyo and Manila “unless the situation took a turn for the better.” A few days later, Minister Shigemitsu paid heed and advised his ambassador in the Philippines, Murata Sh¯ oz¯o, that “special care should be taken in handling the Spanish problem.”139 There was no other solution than to wait and see if some concessions, although insubstantial, could have an effect. The same tactic of endurance was deployed by the Japanese when their consulate in Tangiers was suppressed. The possibility that the Allies would militarily occupy the international zone at Tangiers had led them to consider moving the consulate to Algeciras, the Spanish town besides Gibraltar, where the navy had sent its spies in 1943. Nevertheless, such fears receded, and Japan’s consulate remained in the African city due to both the Spanish Air Force’s promise to fly them to Spain “even if the worst happens,” and the difficulty of replacing the informational network already organized.140 Even before this accord, twelve German agents had “voluntarily” left Tangiers in order to avoid greater complications for the Spanish regime which had to stop the city from being an important center of espionage for the Axis, as stated in the agreements imposed on Francoist Spain by the Allies on 1 May 1944 to put an end to its collaboration with its enemies.141 The Japanese, however, stayed as long as possible. Making use of Jordana’s 20 March 1944 claims that there seemed to be no problems, the Japanese refused to leave when they were asked to do so on 4 May.142 Suma refused to comply with the confidential note sent by the Foreign Ministry, stating that Jordana had assured him that Attaché Hasebe Kiyoshi’s position would not be affected. It led to a new communiqué “in strong, but diplomatic, language” in which he was summoned for 8 May when Jordana rejected Suma’s suggestion to transfer Hasebe

138 MS 1 March 1944. Suma to Shigemitsu, Madrid, 17 February 1944. 139 MS 30 March 1944. Shigemitsu to Murata, Tokyo, 8 March 1944. 140 MS 28 September 1943. 141 MS 23 March 1944. Suma to Shigemitsu, 18 March 1944. 142 MS 23 March 1944. Suma to Shigemitsu, in MS 8 May 1944, repeated, according

to the MS, in the conversation of 10 April after Suma’s return from Berlin.

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to the city of Tétouan, still without crossing the Gibraltar strait. The Japanese maintained the Attaché until the last moment, on 21 May, the very day when Jordana sent a telegram to the high commissioner in Morocco so that he could carry out the departure order of the Japanese, among rumors that the Allies had already asked Spain to cease in their representation of Japanese interests, and even break off relations with them “in all probability.”143 The Japanese only thought about their own interests and limited themselves to trying to maintain the status quo for as long as possible. Their losses had even forced them to unexpectedly stop thinking in the medium to long term. The end of Jordana’s time in office was more of the same. The internal disputes between the pro-Allies and the Germanophiles among Spanish politicians foreshadowed difficult times ahead for the regime, and Allied pressure on Franco’s Spain intensified after the Normandy landings. There was also no information indicating an imminent end to the war. Jordana lived his last days between Allied suggestions that he break contact with Japan and Japanese communiqués that led to broader reasons for tension. Nevertheless, while Japan’s arguments continued to appear similar to their previous ones, the Foreign Ministry’s reaction reveals an increasingly hard line, the product not only of exasperation at responses and counter responses, but also of growing disdain that the defeated deserves. A hostile mental state among Spanish diplomats against Japan was betrayed by a confidential Japanese note submitted at the end of May. An assertion indicating that the Spanish in the Philippines would receive a reasonable indemnity should they be moved out of military necessity, and which concluded that “until now there has been no dispute or complaint,” for example, was answered by an indignant diplomat with the following note, which read, “Poor them if they do this!” Suma’s information was no longer considered reliable because news from Allied sources grew increasingly credible in Spain—and because they were winning the war. It was convenient that Allied information be considered as closer to the truth, although they presented the situation in Asia in increasingly tragic tones.144

143 AMAEC-R-1738–3. Jordana toGeneral Luis Orgaz; MS 16 and 25 May 1944. Suma to Shigemitsu, Madrid, 8 May 1944. 144 AMAEC-R-3195–24. “Strictly Confidential Report” from Súñer to Jordana, Madrid, 20 May 1944.

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Animosity toward Japan among the highest spheres can also be found in the papers read and used by Jordana and Franco. Thus, for example, in a telegram concerning arrangements with Sweden for the improvement of conditions of Western prisoners in Asia, the phrases that emphasize the most negative vision of Japan are underlined: “Their hostility to whites, the cruelty, and bad faith [that] the police apply to foreigners is cruelly anarchic.” The most eloquent clue about this animosity is offered by another annotation signed by Jordana regarding a telegram with instructions to remain in the Spanish Legation in case of bombardment in Tokyo, with the aim of avoiding possible incidents through contact with the population. The Minister wrote, “They truly are savages. I think of you talking in this manner… [illegible. To Suma?].”145 It was not the first time that such cruel terms were used in reference to Japan. One phrase by Méndez de Vigo in 1942 about their “hatred of whites, in general, a sentiment on which their entire policy is based” had been literally copied into a report in February of the same year by Tomás Súñer. That a person such as Jordana would deploy these terms indicates that the “yellow peril” stereotype had ultimately been utilized to interpret what was happening with Japan. The old conservative lens had won out to create a common understanding of Japan.

Uncertainties at the minister’s Death Jordana’s last days in the Ministry were tense but not predictive of the rupture that would happen. Tensions rose but an effort toward resolving bilateral problems prevailed. This is shown by Jordana’s stance toward the final Japanese note for the transmission of information sent by its ambassador in the Philippines, Murata Sh¯oz¯o, on the most pressing problems that caused friction between both countries, the Catholic faith, the Spanish language, and the Spanish Community. The Ministry’s first response on 30 June 1944 must have been modified after Jordana crossed out the most bitter recriminations and wrote on the text, “Soften the tone.” Although the second version addressed the Japanese arguments point by point, the text the minister desired shows his presumption that the disputes between both countries could be mended.146

145 APG-JE-5–4. Méndez de Vigo to Jordana, Tokyo, 16 February and 1 April 1944. 146 AMAEC-R-3195–23. Text from 30 June 1944.

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This is understandable. Jordana’s second term as Foreign Minister was full of uncertainties and lacked a prevailing view about who was winning or which side would be the ultimate victor of the world war. In the face of the growing number of Allied victories, the lines drawn entailed various internal conflicts. Even the request for recognition of the Social Republic of Saló posed important difficulties, more so in the face of Hitler’s Germany whose armies remained on the Pyrenean border and continued to have a broad cohort of admirers within the regime. It was dual diplomacy because it was necessary to accommodate the expectations of both groups. Spanish officials knew very well that the anti-Japanese route offered important advantages over others. On the one hand, the racial hatred that characterized the Pacific War compared to the European War could provide clear dividends for an anti-Japanese policy. Ambassador Cárdenas, for example, mentioned to his colleague Suma during a visit to Madrid something that he had certainly reported to his superiors: “Americans feel more animosity toward Japan than they do toward Germany.”147 On the other hand, there was the cultural and geographical distance from Japan. There had been no love lost, nor the slightest concern for Japanese public opinion.148 The mistrust and latent fear of the conservatives toward Japan were taken on by the Falangists and allowed a kind of consensus among the different sectors of the Francoist regime. This was largely because the relationship with Japan apparently became depoliticized. Regarding an article in ¡Arriba!, Jordana explained to Tokyo that while it did not reflect his government’s point of view in any way, it showed that a national consensus had been reached about Japan.149 The Falangists, in recognizing the former excesses of “Japanism” came to admit that the “others” were right. Friendship with Japan was a lost battle except with a few friends of the legation. A new psychological harmony was created with the Japanese that was never possible with the Italians and the Germans, because in the latter case, the expectations did match the desires. By reviving the old images of Japan, it

147 Conversation between Cárdenas and Suma, Madrid, 18 May 1943. In Suma to Shigemitsu, MS 2 June 1943. 148 AMAEC-R-3195–24. Jordana to Méndez de Vigo, Tokyo, 15 January 1943. 149 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ-52174. Suma to Shigemitsu, Madrid, 2 March 1944.

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was possible to restructure the cognitive framework to not only contemplate the possibility of Japan’s defeat but desire it. The change in the vision of Japan during Jordana’s time in office was a typical case in which desires overrode depictions, as many Spaniards came to wish for Japan’s defeat, largely because it suited their interests.

References Alvarez, David. 2000. Secret Messages. Codebreaking and American Diplomacy 1930–1945. Kansas: The University Press of Kansas. Borao, José Eugenio. 2017. Las Miradas entre España y China. Un siglo de relaciones entre los dos países (1864–1973). Madrid: Miraguano. Bowen, Wayne H. 2006. Spain during World War II. Columbia, MI: University of Missouri Press. Collado Seidel, C. 2016. El telegrama que salvó a Franco. Londres, Washington y la cuestión del régimen. Barcelona: Crítica. Cortada, J.W. 1973. Relaciones España-Estados Unidos. Barcelona: Dopesa. (1st ed., 1963). De la Torre, Hipólito., and Jiménez Redondo, Juan Carlos. 2019. Historia de una diferencia. Portugal y España ayer y hoy (1807–2019). Madrid: Silex. Doussinague, José María. 1949. España tenía razón 1939–1945. Espasa Calpe. Egido León, Ángeles. 2005. Franco y la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Una neutralidad comprometida. Ayer, 57–1: 120. Feis, H. 1948. The Spanish story, Franco and the Nations at War. New York, NY: Greenwood Press. (1st ed., 1944). Granatstein, J.L., and Stafford, David. 1990. Spy wars: espionage and Canada from Gouzenko to Glasnost. Toronto: Key Porter. Gunn, Geoffrey. 1994. A Critical View of Western Journalism and Scholarship on East Timor. Asia Publishers. Hoare, Samuel S. 1946. Ambassador on Special Mission. Collins. Kimball, Warren F. 1984. ed., Churchill & Roosevelt, The Complete Correspondence, Vol. 3, Alliance Declining, p. 68. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Preston, Paul. 1993. Franco. A Biography. Harper Press. Reeves, John P. 2014. Lone Flag. Memoir of the British Consul in Macao during World War II. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Rodao, Florentino. 1994. El trampolín tecnológico. El “Incidente Laurel” y España en la II Guerra Mundial. Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, V-6: 387–405. ___. 2016. España y Japón durante la II Guerra Mundial. Contextualización de una relación cambiante. In Estados Unidos, Alemania, Gran Bretaña, Japón y sus relaciones con España entre la guerra y la posguerra (1939–1953),

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Joan María Thomàs, coord., pp. 191–271. Madrid: Universidad Pontificia de Comillas. Rosas, Fernando. 2002. Portuguese neutrality in the Second World War. In European neutrals and non-belligerents during the Second World War, ed. Neville Wylie, pp. 268–281. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thomàs, Joan M. 2011. Roosevelt, Franco and the End of the Second World War. Palgrave Macmillan. ___. 2016. Catolicismo, antitotalitarismo y franquismo durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial y la inmediata postguerra: Carlton J. H. Hayes. In Estados Unidos, Alemania, Gran Bretaña, Japón y sus Relaciones con España entre la Guerra y la Postguerra (1939–1953), ed. Thomás J.M. p. 13–62. Madrid: Universidad Pontificia de Comillas. ___. 2017. Tungsten in the Second World War: China, Japan, Germany, the Allies and Iberia. Comillas Journal of International Relations, 10: 65–90. https:// doi.org/cir.i10.y2017.005. Tusell, Javier. 1995. Franco, España y la II Guerra Mundial. Entre el Eje y la neutralidad. Madrid: Temas de Hoy. Wilcox, Robert. 1995. Japan’s Secret War. New York: Marlowe & Company. Wood, Frances. 1998. No Dogs & Not Many Chinese. Treaty Port life in China 1842–1943. London: John Murray. Zheng, Yanqiu. 2015. The Legal Status of U.S. Troops in China, 1943–1947, A Specter of Extraterritoriality. Journal of American-East Asian Relations, 22–1, 17–44.

CHAPTER 6

Unexpected Expectations

A few days after Jordana’s replacement, the Allies invaded Normandy, and took Guam and Saipan. What neither Spain nor Japan had expected was about to happen. The war neared its end with an Allied invasion of both Germany and Japan. The proximity of the final denouement forced them to work on a scenario completely different to the one they had expected. For the Japanese, thinking about the postwar period was still a distant idea, but for the Spanish, it started to become crucial. The final departure of the German Army from the French-Spanish border permanently freed Spain from hosting battles or foreign invasion, but its diplomats had to work frantically. The Franco regime was now forced to think about its own survival, forgetting its former protectors (Germany, Italy, and Japan). Spain now had to satisfy the enemies of their former friends. Japan’s foreign policy, for the first time, was prioritized and considerable changes began to take place. The foreign minister participated in the decision-making process, as he was now a member (along with the prime minister) of the new Supreme Council for the Direction of the War. It made decisions at the highest level, presided by the emperor, while Shigemitsu ordered his diplomats to do their “utmost to activate the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 F. Rodao, From Allies to Enemies, New Directions in East Asian History, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8473-0_6

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friendship of the neutral countries.”1 In Spain, the importance of diplomacy was assured, regardless of the minister, and a new decisive phase started in which Japan played an important role. An official Falange book called it, “Accentuation on the Atlantic and rupture with Japan.”2 It was, to some extent, a way to get closer to the new leader through the Asia scenario, a kind of backdoor policy aimed at the United States and focused on critics of a country on the defeated side. And Japan was a feasible target. The Pacific War then regained the importance it had lost, albeit in the opposite sphere. While in the past, Tokyo was the Asian combatant that had encouraged Spanish imperial dreams, now, Tokyo became the enemy who demonstrated the unequivocal position of Spain alongside civilized (and Allied) nations. Confrontation with Japan became one of the key elements in Madrid’s new policy. The image of Japan was one of the consequences. The cognitive framework that determined Spain’s perception of Japan had taken a U-turn with Jordana, and the Spaniards went from expecting positive news to negative ones. But now, rather than recreating the old stereotypes, Lequerica’s time as foreign minister signified moving the pendulum towards the most hostile image of the Japanese while cognitive rigidity was on the rise. Each news item about Japan must have been read as confirmation of how savage or anti-Western Japan’s citizens were. In short, the shift in context had come about in the previous months and the true vision of Japan under Lequerica was its stereotypification. The Minister’s personal ambition contributed to this. He was not the best suited to drive forward the turn in Spain’s foreign ties, much less in giving credibility to the enmity toward Japan. Lequerica not only tautened bilateral relations to an extent that they might not have reached under Jordana but, more importantly, he came to perceive frictions in an opposite way. He did not feel awkward about the tension but began to boast of it. Instead of trying to improve matters, Lequerica allowed these

1 NARA-RG-457. Entry-9011. SRDJ 74336. Notice by Shigemitsu, Tokyo, 6 March 1944; Rodao, F. 2019a. Japanese Relations with Neutrals, 1944–1945. The Shift to Pragmatism. In Defamiliarizing Japan’s Asia–Pacific War, ed. W. Puck Brecher and Michael W. Myers, pp. 104–136. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press. 2 Del Rio Cisneros, A. 1965. Viraje político español durante la II Guerra Mundial, 1942–1945 y réplica al cerco internacional 1945–1946. Madrid: Ediciones del Movimiento.

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tensions to increase, hoping that the deterioration of relations with Japan would benefit Spain in the eyes of third party countries.

A New Stance Toward Japan Japan’s military leaders faced the war in the summer of 1944 as warriors, in an apparently evenly matched situation without a clear strategy. Their losses led to the fall of Prime Minister T¯ oj¯o Hideki in June 1944, his replacement by Koiso Kuniaki. It was clearly recognized that those who had led Japan along this road had not done as well as expected. There was only one solution left, better coordination. As a consequence, a new Superior Council for the Direction of the War included not only the emperor and four representatives from the army and the navy, but Prime Minister Koiso Kuniaki and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru as well. Lack of coordination, however, persisted and the new government was unable to solve the drift, whether in military or economic activities.3 Furthermore, some still expected a decisive military victory over the Allies and the solution was a kind of self-delusion. The army made some conquests on the Asian continent, including those of both Tungsten-producing areas in China and India. Japan wanted it to be believed that their defeats in certain areas were compensated by victories in others, but this was not the case. The importance of its naval failures, however, greatly outweighed the advances of the land army and the American offensive had not only wrestled away a number of small Micronesian islands, but it had showed that the so-called Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere was a chimera. There were still many question marks, both during and after the war, and there were still issues with what role diplomacy would play. Besides solving problems like negotiating peace or the increasing number of countries breaking relations with or declaring war on them, Japan maintained many expectations in the Soviet Union that Gerhard Krebs considered a “complete illusion.”4 In China, when negotiations with the Guomindang initially failed, Tokyo approached the Communists. First, the Japanese 3 Shoji J. 2009. Japanese Strategy in the Final Phase of the Pacific War. In Eighth Forum NIDS “Strategy in the Pacific War,” p. 134. http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/eng lish/event/forum/pdf/2009/09.pdf [21 February 2022]. 4 Krebs, G. 2006. The War in the Pacific 1943–1945. In Germany in the Second World War, vol. VII, The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 1943–1944–1945, p. 770. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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recognized their party and their regime in Yan’an, once they learned that Mao opposed using Chinese soil to as a launchpad for bombardments against Japan.5 The future of postwar Asia and the role of Japan remained unclear. The Cairo Conference (22–26 November 1943) only decided that Taiwan was to return to China, but there were many expectations that Korea could be retained by Japan, while a joint occupation by Soviets and Americans certainly enlarged the ability of the defeated Japanese to maneuver.6 In the autumn of 1944, the situation rapidly worsened for Japan. In October, Allied troops advancing toward the Philippines almost completely destroyed the Japanese navy in the Gulf of Leyte in the last important naval battle of the war. In 1945, the first joint Operational Army and Naval Plan (Teikoku Rikukaigun Sakusen Keikkaku) did not reverse the decline. Premier Koiso never managed to align his course with events, nor did he generate any cohesion around his personality as T¯oj¯o had previously done and, more importantly, the defeats continued. Changes in diplomacy became apparent. The diplomats minimized risk, resorted to delaying tactics, and committed reprisals against civilians, as it did with the Italians when Rome changed sides, but this time, Japan started a policy of reciprocity when Finland did the same, and accepted Portugal’s proposal that an expedition be allowed in Timor to withdraw Japan’s troops—although in this case, it was Minister Morishima who pushed for it without the knowledge of his superiors.7 The Supreme Imperial Command came to subordinate all strategic considerations to the defense of the Japanese archipelago. As a result, the armies in the Asia–Pacific region were abandoned to their fate, without any possibility of sending reinforcements, and they had to maintain themselves exclusively with the resources within the controlled territory. Many battalions suffered hunger, immobilization, and neglect from their superiors. In some cases, they were even ignored by their adversaries. The cabinet of Suzuki Kantar¯o succeeded Koiso’s in March 1945, following the landing of American troops in Okinawa. Suzuki was a retired general who had suffered an assassination attempt by radicals in

5 Koshiro Y. 2013. Imperial Eclipse. Japan’s Strategic Thinking About continental Asia before August 1945, pp. 9, 86, 120. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press. 6 Ibid., pp. 8–9. 7 Rodao, 2019b, art. cit., pp. 116–118.

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1936 and he facilitated the oligarchy’s return to power, exercising state powers. For the first time in history, an enemy invasion of the archipelago was seen as both approaching and feasible and the aim of the new government was to achieve a peace that did not signify the annihilation of 100 million Japanese, an extent to which a great many radicals were ready to go. Thus, although proclamations of fighting to the end and preserving the national structure (or kokutai) continued, Suzuki’s most substantial work was centered on seeking an acceptable peace. These were difficult times of physical and moral collapse, and the figure of the emperor came to provide an increasingly necessary image of stability. Among Spanish officials, on the other hand, unease increased in a different way. Although the time frame for any attack was not as immediate, the nature of future confrontations was especially feared since the Allies, the new bosses on the international stage, disliked Franco’s regime. Although it was yet to be seen if the new weapons were to change the trends radically, and how the final peace would be reached, either by surrender or by final negotiation, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States all shared the desire to oust Franco. Before the end of the war, the Spanish regime had to “score points,” as the American ambassador advised.8 Spanish Foreign policy remained undefined regarding the end of the war and the new foreign minister. José Félix de Lequerica, a former mayor of the city of Bilbao, was appointed due to the need to solve a different problem. Madrid needed to withdraw its highest representative in Vichy, the capital of German-occupied France, before the arrival of the Allied troops without making it look like a retreat, and the urgent substitution of Jordana looked the perfect solution. But then Allies were disappointed that Gen. Franco was not “turning away from the Falange.”9 A “fascistised politician,” as scholar Javier Tusell has called him,10 Lequerica had shown his preference for the Axis on many occasions and was not the most suited for the post, nor was he suited for dealing with Japan, as suggested by comments describing him as “unscrupulous” or “political opportunist” made at the time, as well as by every post-war American memoir

8 Thomas, 2011, op. cit., p. 130. 9 NARA-RG-84. Entry 3163.Bx.1, Memorandum for the Counsellor, San Sebastián, 19

August 1944. 10 Tusell, 1995, op. cit., p. 51.

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concerning Spain and World War II which claimed that after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Lequerica fattened a turkey in the patio of the embassy to celebrate a final victory for the Axis powers before killing and eating it.11 With the appointment of Lequerica, Gen. Franco hit another pitfall in relations with Japan. The new Foreign Minister accelerated pending matters with Tokyo. Lequerica quickly made a move, meeting with the Japanese representative Suma Yakichir¯o a day after assuming his post. Since the Spanish version is missing, it is difficult to know the details of the meeting for certain, but from the Japanese telegram, it can be deduced that it was a very different interview from those maintained with Jordana. There were kind words. Lequerica pointed out that both he and the Head of State were “anxious to ‘advance friendly relations with Japan’” and had “no intention of lessening the intimacy of Japanese-Spanish relations existing during the Jordana era.” As for Suma, he expressed his government’s “cordial thanks” to Spain representing Japanese interests and requested “Lequerica’s cooperation in maintaining the longstanding friendship between our countries.”12 It seems that both of them were engaged in sounding out each other’s relations. When Suma side-stepped the importance of the recent loss of Guam and Saipan for Japan by bringing up their advances in China, it does not appear that Lequerica dared refute this interpretation. From the conversation, it is possible to infer that protocol did not give way to frankness. Making contact was more important than delving into Japan’s military problems, but Suma soon realized a more open dialogue would have been more preferable. Lequerica’s lack of criticism did not mean that he had a more favorable opinion than his predecessor, but that he preferred to raise discrepancies at his own convenience. Jordana had maintained the hope of a reducing tensions, but Lequerica thought that this might provide, instead, some interesting rewards. Rather than seeking a solution, Lequerica saw these problems as a convenient springboard for the postwar period. As such, the original importance of Spanish interests and those of the community in the Philippines became secondary to the attempts to save the regime 11 NARA-RG-84-E3162. According to some, the animal was killed to celebrate the attack on Pearl Harbour, but according to others, he did it after the fall of Manilla. In either case, no one cites direct references. Hughes, E. J. 1972. Report from Spain, p. 10. New York: Henry Holt. 1st ed., 1947; Foltz, 1948, op. cit., p. 168. 12 MS 30 August 1944. Suma to Shigemitsu, Madrid, 14 August 1944.

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after the war’s end. But besides the bilateral changes, three events that occurred immediately after Lequerica’s first meeting with Suma are useful in understanding this new context. Firstly, the death of Manuel Quezón, president of the Philippine government-in-exile, led to the previous vice president, Sergio Osmeña, taking the reins and appointing a new cabinet. It did not include the two most notable members of the Spanish group, Andrés Soriano, and Joaquín María Elizalde, the former minister of finance and the resident commissioner in Washington, respectively.13 Secondly, extreme tensions between the Portuguese government and Japan cooled. Influenced by the Allies, Salazar’s government formally requested on 7 August the withdrawal of Japanese troops from its colony in East Timor and threatened to break off relations if this was refused.14 There were strong reasons to believe that the Portuguese would declare immediate war on Tokyo as they were being tempted by the Allies with the possibility of sending a contingent if Portugal launched an attack on the island. The reflections of Salazar’s government were similar to those that Franco’s government would later make. The small investment that a detachment in Asia would entail could bring great political benefit as it would allow Portugal to sit at the victors’ table. The strength of this tension was beyond bilateral, just as in Madrid’s case, but it ended after Lisbon authorized a new military base in the island of Santa Maria in the Azores, this time to the United States, which would turn it into a naval base for communications with Europe.15 Therefore, having accepted requests concerning the Azores, Lisbon then realized that Timor would be but one of the many islands where American troops would get past the Japanese garrison. The United States’ famous “leap-frog” strategy left Japanese troops in Timor isolated until the end of the war without fuel and unable to take part in any action whatsoever, causing tensions to permanently decline.16 Portugal showed the many intricacies in declaring war to Japan, if Spain desired. 13 AMAEC-R-1736-39. Cárdenas to Lequerica, Washington, 13 August 1944. 14 Vid. MS 7, 8, 14 and 21-July and 10 August 1944; Gunn, 1994, op. cit., p. 56;

Vieira da Rocha, 1996, op. cit., pp. 166–168. 15 MS 16 August 1944. Morishima to Shigemitsu, Lisbon, 9 August 1944; Marquina, 1986, op. cit., pp. 97–106; Thomas, 2011, op. cit, p. 159. 16 NARA-RG-457. E9006. “Reasons for Portuguese Cabinet change”, in MS of 18 September 1944.

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Thirdly, Lequerica, in his first meeting with German Ambassador Dieckhoff, pressed him to stop assisting Japan in ordinary matters. The new Minister wanted to separate Hispano—Japanese relations from Hispano-German relations so that Tokyo would lose an important supporter in Madrid.17 In conclusion, a new Philippine government in exile in the United States, Lisbon’s shifts, and German disinterest allowed Lequerica to behave in a way that Jordana would never have dared, with unmistakably official public attacks on the Japanese. On 16 August 1944, two days after the first meeting between Suma and Lequerica, the National Press Delegation issued several circulars to the media that made clear its desire to deploy at length criticism against Japan. The headings of these circulars left no room for doubt as to where Spanish sympathies lay: “Order concerning the openly favorable view of the United States in the war against Japan, and particularly in the operations that will take place in the Philippines,” and “Order and guidance concerning the situation of the war and Spanish conduct, with special reference to the struggle in the Pacific.” “Against anti-Christian and anti-Western Japanese policy.” A third, sent three days later, indicated the new directives concerning the war in Europe: “Order and guidelines concerning the current situation of the war in Europe and the tone of information on the Western and Eastern Fronts, with opportune subtleties within the due limits of Spanish neutrality. Concerning the spread of communism. Guidance concerning the internal policies of liberated zones. Specifically, France. Spanish conduct toward international peace.”18 Lequerica revealed what his real intentions were. The first two notes point to the tangled concept of neutrality so often used during those days: “without abandoning the Spanish stance of neutrality, [it is ordered] the tone be favorable to the United States.” The first text indicated that “in the face of imminent large scale operations in the Pacific, Spain prefers an American victory to a Japanese one” and, as a general rule, warned that “towards the war between civilised countries, the tone of the press is to be absolutely neutral and objective. Towards the countries of the East, not.” The second order is extended to the propagandistic use of the peace between the Soviet Union and

17 NARA-RG-59. 862.20200. Hayes to Hull, Madrid, 14 September 1944. 18 Río Cisneros, 1965, op. cit., p. 326.

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Japan, labeling this an “Asiatic understanding.” In addition, five points in relation to this were highlighted: 1. “The political meaning of life is rooted in the ‘Christian and Western conception […].” 2. “Our fundamental links with Latin American countries […] and the alliance of these Latin American countries with the United States, in addition to the friendship sustained with the Spanish Government, mean that in the Pacific War, our preference in the press is never going to favor an Asian power to the detriment of a Western power.” 3. “Our international conduct has been keenly shaped by our agreements with Portugal, reinforcing motives in the diplomatic terrain […] And this first-order reason requires us to contemplate with a similar attitude events in the East where Portugal has experienced tensions with Japan (Timor). Our sympathy and our interests are, naturally, with Portugal.” 4. “Japan has maintained friendly relations with Russia and maintains them in terms of intense economic exchange and diplomatic pacts that make Russia neutral in the Pacific War and Japan practically – realistically – neutral in the anti-communist war in Europe. Japan has not carried out an anti-communist policy but a policy of imperialist ambitions. In this aspect, there prevails a type of Asian understanding of political events, totally foreign to European thinking, which constitutes an extraordinary paradox in the world war… A Russo-Japanese friendship in fact exists despite the affiliation of these countries in the present war.” 5. “It should be remembered that a small island of Hispanic culture, the Philippines, is still in dispute in the Pacific War and that the Filipino people, whether by history or culture, have no affinity whatsoever with the Eastern Japanese world. Spain, in this case, needs to maximize her political understanding to the exclusive benefit of the destiny of the Filipino people, considering it an advancement of Christian culture in Asia. Specifically: in the struggle for the Pacific, our press should demonstrate correctness and courtesy towards the United States that is consequent with our stance against the expansion of communism and the expansion of the Asian powers. In the same manner that the communist advance must not be applauded in

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the European sector, nor should any Japanese action in the Pacific sector be applauded.”19 By airing out this tension with Japan, the Spanish government accepted suggestions made by the American Ambassador Hayes to break relations with Japan “at a suitable time.”20 Then, during his final days in Madrid, Minister Lequerica alluded him to a possibly drastic solution against Tokyo while Gen. Franco mentioned threats to Suma about breaking diplomatic relations or ending representation of interests, as well as tensions due to attacks on Spaniards and their properties in the Philippines.21 The Asian front, as with Jordana, served as a test for the changes that would later take place in Europe; the first press release came out on 16 August and dealt with the Asian theater, while the second on the 19th and dealt with Europe. This was not a coincidence as Lequerica met Suma before the German colleague, Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff, but more importantly, new instructions on the Pacific War revealed a new policy while those on the war in Europe barely changed. In fact, Madrid needed to find a new enemy and Japan was a perfect candidate. With the aim of applying the principle of neutrality to information about the Soviet Union, it sought for the first time a difference between Russia as a “national entity” and Russia as an “exporter of communism.” For the first time too, there was an in-depth analysis of the former evil empire which led to the Soviets became slightly “deorientalized.” Japan became an excellent resource that could fill the void and, therefore, would undergo a process that was the opposite of exoticization. In short, Tokyo came to be important for Madrid because it was stigmatized as Spain’s most convenient enemy at the end of the world war.

19 Ibid., pp. 327–329. 20 Note in MS 25 September 1944 based on information provided by the North

American Embassy in Madrid. Hayes had met with Lequerica on 29 August and with Franco on 1 September. 21 Meeting of 9 September 1944, in Hayes, 1945, op. cit, p. 261.

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Stereotypes Regain Their Vigor The August 1944 press releases demand a deeper analysis of this new cognitive framework within which news of Japan came to be perceived. The principal characteristic of the development of negative images about Japan during the Lequerica era was stereotypification. The overly simplified interpretation of each new news item increased, especially for the Spaniards. Due to repetition, the pendulum swung to its limit. The excesses of the times permeated the images, and vice versa. The most repeated stereotype at the time was that concerning the radical difference between Japan and “civilization.” The westernizing efforts of Spain in Asia received more emphasis, although they were slightly dissociated from the image of modernization and progress, which had been associated with Japan. Most of all, it was insisted that the Philippines was part of the Western world. In March 1945, ¡Arriba! made clear its displeasure at the submission of the Philippines to a non-Christian Empire with oriental traits: “No one could possibly deny the legitimacy of our belief, within ourselves, concerning the superiority and favorable destiny of all things Hispanic, even against the aggressive capacity of the yellow people.”22 For this reason, new expectations for the end of the war radicalized their perception of the Philippines and the “yellow peril” to previously unknown extremes, even praising Washington for its colonization of the Philippines and promoting the fear of the yellow peril” among Spain’s leaders. The consequences were twofold: Firstly, the flattery toward the United States appears to be a particularly strange yet characteristic representation of the time. Until then, bitter anti-American criticism prevailed in Spain due to its loss in the 1898 Spanish-American War, but during the final moments of World War II, Spain’s view toward Washington’s “colonizing work” became positive.23 The media even pointed out the advantages of the end of the Spanish period in the Philippines: “Spain had to abandon that corner of the East […]. Another, younger country, full of intrepidity and new technology, arrived here to replace us. In their world, our schools remained unaltered and the great foundations of Philippine civilization that remained there

22 “El sentimiento y la idea de hispanidad”. 12 October 1944, ¡Arriba! 23 Hayes, 1945, op. cit., pp. 332–333; NARA-RG-59. 752–795, Hayes to Hull,

Madrid, 11 September 1944.

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were substantially left unbroken.”24 Spanish exaltation of American colonization reached its peak in an article that compared Magellan to Gen. MacArthur by “bringing to the Philippines into the Christian world and rescuing it from Asia.”25 This flattery also had far-reaching consequences. Los últimos de Filipinas (The Last of the Philippines ) was a film about Spanish soldiers resisting against all odds during the Philippine war of independence fighting under Lt. Saturnino Martín Cerezo, who, just like Onoda Hiroo when he returned to Japan years after World War II, feared problems with the military hierarchy upon his return to Spain. But the 1945 film version thanked the Washington Embassy in the credits for its collaboration and incorporated a scene (not mentioned in the diary of Martín Cerezo, but true) in which American soldiers, represented as selfless heroes, disembarked to try to save the Spaniards.26 Hayes’ successor and the new ambassador, Norman Armour, upon commenting on this during National Day on 4 July 1945, mentioned the “exaggerated euphoria of the Spanish leadership.”27 Secondly, the horror of all things “yellow” returned in force at that point. To understand it, we must look back on a telegram concerning a rumor that was read by both Gen. Franco himself and Jordana in his final months. Based on the testimony of a person who supposedly escaped the Philippines, the press attaché in Lisbon, Javier de Bedoya, reported that more than 400,000 Spaniards had been shot in there. He further specified that “we are not dealing with a mass slaughter such as at Katyn [the massacre of the Polish cavalry carried out by the Soviet Army], but

24 “La tragedia de Manilla,” by Eduardo Aunós. 6 March 1945. ¡Arriba! 25 DSDF-WWII. Roll 247. Butterworth to Stettinius, Madrid, 8 February 1945. 26 Los últimos de Filipinas was directed by Antonio Román (pseudonym of Antonio

Fernández García de Quevedo), written by Antonio Román and Pedro de Juan, starred Armando Calvo and José Nieto, and produced by CEA and Producciones Cinematográficas Alhambra. First screened in December 1945. 27 ARE. MAEF. Europe 1944–1949. Espagne-80-813. Renaud Sivan to the French

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Madrid, 6 July 1945. Bowen, W.H. 2016. Con la mayor reticencia: Harry Truman, Francisco Franco y la Alianza España-Estados Unidos. In Estados Unidos, Alemania, Gran Bretaña, Japón y sus Relaciones con España entre la Guerra y la Postguerra (1939–1953), coord. Joan María Thomas, p. 67. Madrid: Universidad Pontificia Comillas.

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with the shooting of individuals or small groups, justified in all manner of ways.”28 The fear provoked by Asian cruelty was real, as can be verified by the constant concern of the foreign minister about the possibility of a massacre of so many Spaniards under Japanese rule. Even including Spanish mestizos, the number was grossly exaggerated partly because the images of the Japanese were more simplified. References to Nazi Germans or Fascist Italians acknowledged the existence of anti-Nazi Germans and anti-Fascist Italians. In contrast, there was no such possibility with the Japanese. They were all the same. Furthermore, images of Asian danger were recycled according to the interests of the moment and allowed people to attribute the Japanese with feelings of brutality and savagery, which had previously been avoided: the most normal representations of the Japanese during this time stressed their inhumanity.29 Simplicity, inhumanity, and political convenience formed too lethal a cocktail, because the savage image of Japan was accentuated largely by foreign influences.30 In the tensest moments, when Madrid decided to end its representation of Japanese interests, an insulting tone was even adopted in a verbal note concerning the supposed “order emanating from Tokyo for the systematic destruction of the Spanish.”31 With Japan, everything was believable. A change in visions of the Japanese was produced that could not have happened with Westerners. In short, it was a period characterized by excesses, and Lequerica’s time in office seems to be a clear example of this. Within a few years, Spanish perception of Japan changed radically and there was a clear reason for this. The benefits that this could bring were important. It had very clear consequences for bilateral relations.

28 APG-JE-4-2-2. Javier M. de Bedoya to Gabriel Arias Salgado, Vice Secretary of Popular Education, Lisbon, 2 June 1944. 29 Taylor, P.M. 1995. Munitions of the mind. A history of propaganda from the ancient

world to the present era, p. 230. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 30 Dower, 1986, op. cit., p. 373; Pizarroso Quintero, A. 1995. El cine bélico norteamericano, 1941–1945. In Historia y cine: realidad, ficción y propaganda, coord. Julio Montero Díaz (coord.), María Antonia Paz Rebollo (coord.). p. 198. Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid. 31 APG-JE-5-4-2. Lequerica to Suma, Madrid, 22 March 1945.

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The Convenience of an Enemy Japanese Minister Suma soon warned of Spain’s new inclination and tried to reverse it in a waiting game that took longer than expected. Two weeks after the highly formal meeting with Lequerica on 14 August 1944, he had already sensed that bilateral relations had irretrievably deteriorated. Blaming Stalin’s push for the Americans to terminate the Franco regime, he told Shigemitsu that “the United States will probably request that Spain break off diplomatic relations with the Axis countries.”32 Suma must have been constantly guessing Spain’s intentions, but the worst part about it was that there was no other option but to believe the rumors, comments, and petty intrigues. Once it had been verified that Lequerica was even falser than Jordana, his main source of information was indirect news that he was surely paying for too. Nevertheless, Madrid did not take this step in 1944. Three main reasons can explain this: the uncertainties in Portugal, the personality of the Caudillo, and the fear of reprisals. As for Francisco Franco, he was not a person who tended to be too much in a hurry. In his final meeting with Hayes in September 1944, he was able to take a clearly antiJapanese measure when he was asked to break off relations with Japan, China, and Manchukuo. In addition, Hayes advised him to recognize Sergio Osmeña’s government-in-exile.33 Nevertheless, as on many other occasions, the Caudillo preferred to wait and see. The third reason had to do with the images of a savage Japan, as it was feared that Spaniards in Asia might suffer the effects of the Spanish position. The Catholic Church, the Tobacco Company, Tabacalera, and the Committee of the Hispano-Filipino community, among other pressure groups, had already taken it upon themselves to make known their vigilant stance. Moreover, the new cognitive framework that led to expectations of news of Japanese cruelty and a fear of a massacre of Spaniards in Asia, made it impossible for the government to forget the public’s possible reaction to this foreseeable information. Japan held too many prisoners.

32 MS 1 September 1944. Suma to Shigemitsu, Madrid, 23 August 1944. 33 On this, the aforementioned memoirs by Hayes and the comment by the repre-

sentative of the provisional French Government in Madrid. Vid. ARE. MAEF. Europe 1944–1949. Espagne-80-813. Jacques Truelle a Georges Bidault, Argel, 25 September 1944.

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In the end, Madrid dared not cross the Rubicon, apparently waiting “for the right time.” It would not arrive until the fall of the Philippines. Nevertheless, greater pressure and attractive promises from Washington could have been the key to achieving a rupture in Spain-Japan ties. Hayes told his successor this, adding that Franco and Lequerica had not only spoken to him negatively about Japan, but they had also inspired press articles.34 It can be supposed that if the United States government had applied more pressure or offered compensations of interest, such as those made to Portugal, Madrid would have ended its relationship with Japan. War was not declared in 1944 and perhaps as compensation, Spain adopted two measures with a less adventurous outcome, a new press release and another verbal note sent to the Japanese Legation. Firstly, it used the 12 October Festival and the expected struggle in the Philippines to issue a new order to the media: The Philippines islands, as an integral and inseparable part of this Hispanic world, constitute a constant concern for Spain. In relation to the problems posed by the Pacific War, Spain shares the anxiety of the Filipino people living under Japanese domination, which is Oriental, anti-Catholic, and anti-Christian in its nature. We share with the American peoples their alarm at Japanese imperialism which, taking into account the undoubted Russo-Japanese friendship and connivance, signifies the ambition of Asiatic dominance over the world.35

This text reveals the recurrence of the already mentioned image of the “hordes” ready to destroy Western civilization. The protagonists of this threat had changed. They were now the Japanese, but the idea persisted. Secondly, the verbal note dealt with the seizure of a number of properties of the Tabacalera Company and the end of the authorized sending of funds from the Philippines to Spain, and protested at the lack of response.36 The main novelty, nevertheless, lay in its final point: “If the Japanese authorities continue to evince so little interest [sic.] in [fulfilling] the wishes of the Spanish Government, it may be necessary for Spain to 34 FDRPL. SPF-151. “Memorandum on the Spanish Situation,” Hayes, Washington, February 1945. 35 Río Cisneros, 1965, op. cit, pp. 365–366. Instructions to the press of 2 October 1944. 36 These had not been received since December 1943.On this vid. AHBE. Secretaría Instituto Español de Moneda Extranjera-27.

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re-examine its policy of representing Japanese interests overseas.”37 Since it was too soon for risky decisions, Madrid thought it convenient to act in a familiar manner, to leave them wondering what the next step would be. Spain’s new attacks were mild but the Japanese worked hard to alleviate the pressure by seeking further help. Taking these indefinite threats seriously, the Japanese diplomats had a sincere interest in granting the Spaniards’ wishes, despite the fact that the military struggle had to be prioritized. Suma stated clearly to Tokyo the extreme situation that had been reached: [...] Even if we meet the present Spanish requests, we must be prepared for a series of protests of the same type. I assume that it is our policy to maintain relations with Spain on the present basis as long as possible. Will you therefore consider this as a special case involving a nation in charge of Japanese interests, and, so far as compatible with local operations, arrive at a settlement by purchase or by other means? If matters are adjusted as quickly as possible, the Spanish authorities will have no pretext to support any further official communication of this kind.38

The Japanese did not wish to suffer reprisals from Madrid as it too held prisoners, Japanese expatriates on the American continent, and intelligence. As a result, Suma proposed two measures, the end of attacks on Spain in the Japanese press, and special attention to the problems of its community in the Philippines.39 These proposals were not new, but Suma managed to convince Tokyo of the delicacy of the situation and to get the Gaimush¯ o to become concerned about the deterioration of relations with Spain and to act with unusual swiftness. Thanks to this pressure, and despite the fact that at the time, the enemy invasion of the Philippines was beginning, the Gaimush¯ o consulted with the Army’s General Headquarters and the Ministry of Finance facilitate new remittances. A telegram was even sent to Murata Sh¯oz¯o, the Japanese ambassador in the Philippines (and, in practice, the true authority in the country) insisting on the

37 MS 21 November 1944. Note of 16 November 1944. 38 Note of 6 November 1944. MS 21 November 1944, Suma to Shigemitsu, Madrid,

10 October 1944. 39 MS 27 September, 1 October and 21 November 1944.

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need to “not irritate Spain or give her a pretext for severing relations with the Axis.”40 The response from Manila arrived immediately. They elaborated on the many estates belonging to the Tobacco Company and, although they denied the Spanish version, they promised to renounce all control over this property “as soon as the necessity for it ceases,” as well as to make appropriate compensation.41 The diplomats’ labor to achieve this response must has been intense but, nevertheless, it was all futile as the progress of the war increasingly determined the outcome of such internal disputes. Furthermore, the reaction of the friends of the Japanese Legation could politically damage the regime. They only mentioned three relatively important men in the regime, Gen. Agustín Muñoz Grandes, and then aide-de-camp to Gen. Franco; the Falangist writer, Ernesto Giménez Caballero, and founder of the Spanish Legion, José Millán Astray.42 The most significant was former minister Serrano Suñer who, urged by Franco, was summoned by Lequerica on 18 January 1945. They must have been very interested in any clues he could give them, on the one hand, because he represented the opinion of those who might continue to hold proJapanese sentiments in Spain, and on the other, because his personal friendship with Suma made him seem like an expert on possible Japanese reaction in case of a drastic Spanish measure. The mix of information, images, and expectations at the time allowed anything to be imagined. The new year provided no solution for the doubts on what Japan should do. January 1945 was a month of complete calm, as uncertainties hardened in Madrid regarding obtaining the greatest advantage from its enmity with Japan while awaiting the results of operations in the Philippines. In view of future and decisive action against the Japanese, the Foreign Ministry at the time considered three measures: recognition of Osmeña, transferring Del Castaño, and reducing Japanese representation in Spain. Recognizing the government of Sergio Osmeña, who had already settled in the liberated part of the Philippine archipelago, would have been the easiest of these measures because Japanese reaction would 40 MS 24 November 1944. 41 MS 10 December 1944. 42 MS 2 February 1945 and 22 October 1944; NARA-RG-226–127. OS-33. Unsigned

note, 1 January 1945; Togores, L.E. 2003. Millán Astray, legionario, n.p. Madrid: La Esfera de los libros.

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have been minimal. In fact, Suma had foreseen this and proposed that his government “tolerate the intolerable” and “overlook the matter entirely” to avoid further trouble. Tokyo ordered that, should this occur, Suma make Madrid aware of the “unfriendly” nature of this act in order to at least oblige them to think twice about it. Yet it was a legally impossible measure. Just as with Wang in 1940, Osmeña was not recognized by his own patrons—the United States.43 The possibility of transferring the Falangist Consul in Manila, José del Castaño, to Tokyo was more difficult. The measure was contemplated in order to avoid foreseeable problems with Washington after the fall of Manila, but the plan was held back by Ambassador Méndez de Vigo who warned of the disastrous consequences of the “flight” of the main Spanish representative at such a time could have: “If bloody events should occur in the Philippines […] the Spanish community would consider a part of the blame to lie with those who deprived them of their legal protector.”44 Moreover, the scarcity of news from the Philippines with what was still the metropolis made it difficult to get a seat in any airplane. Madrid was devoting more time to postwar problems than on forthcoming battles, but thanks to another diplomat who was experiencing difficult times, sense prevailed. The third measure considered was the reduction of Tokyo’s representation in Madrid. Japanese representatives outnumbered Spanish. In 1943, when Spain had three diplomats there, there were eighteen accredited Japanese officials, a figure higher than the fourteen Italians and the sixteen Americans at the outset of the war, although the number did not reach the thirty or so that both Germany and Britain had posted. This figure was still increasing at the time Spain was breaking its relations with Japan. From the sixty-six Japanese subjects, besides the diplomats, many worked for semi-official agencies, and it was difficult to expel them. Neither option was feasible and in January 1945, Madrid had a lot of doubts about how to act against Japan. It was not so strange in this environment of prolonged uncertainty as Madrid saw how other countries in similar situations had moved ahead

43 MS 5 and 28 February 1945; NARA-RG-59. 752.94. Hickerson to Culberston, Washington, 19 February 1945. 44 AGA-AE-5121. Méndez de Vigo to Lequerica, Tokyo, 27 January 1945.

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of it. In January, Turkey broke off relations with Japan. It had maintained a strong friendship with the Axis, but by the end of the war, Ankara needed to strengthen its ties with the United States, which came to appreciate Turkey’s strategic importance.45 A crucial area for those who traveled to Japan using the Trans-Siberian railway, Turkey, was in an extremely complicated region. Germany backed Bulgaria, its main rival, a coup eased Soviet penetration in Romania and in Greece (which was in a civil war), and the British increasingly collaborated with the Soviet Union.46 Spain was interested in Latin America, but specially in Argentina. Following the words of President Roosevelt on the need to declare the Axis an enemy as a prior condition to admission to the San Francisco Conference (which produced the United Nations charter), Paraguay, and Ecuador declared war on Tokyo—which found out via the media, and who asked Madrid to find out the exact date. The Spanish ambassador in Washington, stated, “I have also been told it is widely believed that all interested countries will declare war on Japan based on interests in the Pacific hemisphere. I still do not know for certain if this will become a reality, nor whether by saying ‘all countries,’ includes Argentina. I will try to verify this.”47 The Spanish diplomat was uncritical on those “interests” and did not focus on Chile. Once it broke relations with Japan in early 1943, Chile did its best to win over the United States and joined the war effort against Japan. Argentina, however, was the principal point of political reference for Franco’s government. It had supported two coups d’état in Bolivia and in Chile—the first of which toppled Gen. Peñaranda, while

45 Tamkin, N. 2009. Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union, 1940–1945 Strategy, Diplomacy and Intelligence in the Eastern Mediterranean, pp. 152–153, 191. New York: Palgrave; Cossaboom, R. and Leiser, G. 1997. Adana Station 1943–1945: Prelude to the Post-War American Military Presence in Turkey. Middle Eastern Studies, 34-1: 78; Sitki Bilgin, M. & Morewood, S. 2004. Turkey’s Reliance on Britain: British Political and Diplomatic Support for Turkey Against Soviet Demands, 1943–1947. Middle Eastern Studies, 40-2: 31. 46 Athanassopoulou, Ekavi. 1999. Turkey. Anglo-American Security Interests 1945– 1952, p. 76. London-Portland OR: Frank Cass. This forced everyone to play the waiting game even longer. Argentina, amid general benevolence toward its neutrality after Edward R. Stettinius was appointed as State Secretary and Nelson A. Rockefeller as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, had returned to the fold like the prodigal son in February 1945, at a Pan-American Union gathering in Chapultepec. 47 APG-JE-5-3. Cárdenas to Lequerica, Washington, 8 February 1945.

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the second failed. Washington’s accusations against Buenos Aires were unusually harsh, such as accusing them of facilitating Axis activities in Latin America, led all the way from Madrid, or housing the quarters of the fascist movement in the hemisphere. Furthermore, in March 1944, Washington did not recognize the government of Edelmiro Farell, adopting a series of extortion-like measures against it. However, when Edward R. Stettinius became the American secretary of state in December 1944, he appointed Nelson A. Rockefeller as assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs, who played a crucial role in winning Latin American support for the United States and having Argentina return to the fold like the prodigal son in February 1945 at a Pan-American Union gathering in Chapultepec. Then, both the United States and Argentina gave ground to each other. Washington began to relax its stance, suggesting a declaration of war on the Axis, and the Argentinians broke relations with Berlin after discovering an alleged Nazi spy network there. But in spite of this rapprochement, Argentina maintained a “fluid relation” with Madrid.48 Finally, Madrid limited itself to issuing a new order to the press and granting credit, foreseeing the problems in the Philippines. On 18 January, Madrid explicitly ordered the press to associate the development of the Pacific War with what it called Spain’s “sense of friendship” toward the United States of America while “Western understanding” was placed in opposition to “Asian understanding.” Furthermore, this was deployed to compensate for recent criticism of germanophilia in the Spanish press: “As military operations are currently unfolding in the Philippines, extreme care will have to be taken in complying with the guidance indicated in the general order and handed down last summer with the aim of maintaining the standard of friendship and understanding with the United States.”49 On the other hand, Madrid decided to grant a credit of 200,000 pesetas, which would be sent via the Legation in Tokyo, to immediately relieve the Spanish community in Manila. It reflected a fear of the damage these “hordes” might inflict, but it also showed an

48 Rodao, 2016, art. cit., pp. 219–220; Nocera, R., 2005. Ruptura con el Eje y alineamiento con Estados Unidos. Chile durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Historia, 38-2: 397–444. Disponible en: http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S071771942005000200006&lng=es&nrm=iso. 49 Río Cisneros, 1965, op. cit., p. 367. AMAEC-R-1373-23a. A US complaint in a “personal, unofficial, and confidential” memorandum to Lequerica, Madrid, 8 January 1945.

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attempt to use the few remaining vestiges left of their former friendship with Japan. An enemy country would never have allowed this method to be attempted. However, the money never arrived via the Tokyo Legation because their previous collaboration was vanishing, as demonstrated by the representation of interests. Faced with the coming fall of Manila, the waiting game was also experienced anxiously by important sectors of society with connections to the Philippines, such as families and economic interests ready to return to old times, whether to find out about their relatives, to receive income again, or to find business opportunities in troubled waters. The Committee of the Hispano-Filipino community, for example, tried to regain its former prosperity as soon as possible.50 Madrid did not quite know how to benefit from its anti-Japanese opinion, but it would be events abroad that would force it to decide.

Massacre in Manila The waiting game came to an end with the Battle of Manila. At the outset, it seemed that it would be peaceful as Yamashita Tomoyuki, the commander of Japanese forces, had declared Manila “an open city” and ordered his troops to retreat to the surrounding hills, while no fortifications around the city were built—the possibility of a peaceful retreat similar to that of the Americans in 1941 seemed feasible. However, this order was disobeyed by Iwabuchi Sanji, the commander of the naval forces, who had previously received contradictory orders from his superiors in the navy to destroy the installations of what was the finest natural port in East Asia. Consequently, the Japanese navy took up positions and its 15,000 men (with a number of Formosans and Koreans in auxiliary roles) entrenched themselves south of the Pasig River which passes through Manila. A considerable group remained within the city walls where the narrow alleys and stonewalls, together with weapons they gathered from the ships in the port, provided unsurpassable defense against an infantry attack. The battle began with a surprise attack by the Americans from the north to liberate those held in the internment camp at the University

50 NARA-RG-226. E-127-21. Bogotá to Aeneas, Madrid, 19 April 1945.

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of Santo Tomás. It was a success that led the hurried and presumptuous Douglas MacArthur to announce three days later the “liberation of Manila,” and to even consider a victory march through the city, which would allow him to show off as his colleagues in Paris had done. Afterward, the advance slowed due to growing Japanese resistance. Violence was the main beneficiary of those moments and massacres took place, starting with the political prisoners in Fort Santiago and continuing with indiscriminate pillage and murder throughout the entire month that it took to liberate the city. News of liberation finally came on 3 March, a month after the first attack, but Manila had become the second most bombed city at the time, after Warsaw, and liberation was more bitter than expected. The director of the College of San Juan Letrán, Father Juan Labrador, explained the situation with bitter sarcasm in a part of his diary not included in the published version in English: “barbarous acts were feared, but not wholesale slaughter.”51 The main blame fell on Admiral Iwabuchi Sanji, but this does not justify the fact that his soldiers massacred the civilian population after being trapped in Manila. The military and psychological logic of soldiers believing that they were fighting their last battle can partly explain their behavior and the injustice they committed, as their superiors were not interested in their soldiers surrendering alive. The best option for many was glorious self-destruction, or gyokusai (literally, “to pulverize a jewel”), since returning alive was not considered a feasible alternative, regardless of whether they believed the ultra-nationalist propaganda or not. This leaves part of the blame with the American command as their haste led to an enveloping maneuver that left the Japanese soldiers without an escape route. Meanwhile, indiscriminate bombing of the city and a pause after the first attacks allowed the Japanese soldiers to assault defenseless citizens at their pleasure. Sending US soldiers into an area with countless traps waiting for them was not considered and merely a thousand of them died among the more than 50,000 thousand total deaths. The Spanish community was especially affected by the battle, partly because a large proportion resided in Malate, the area most affected by the pillaging and the previously good political relationship between Madrid and Tokyo did not help the Spanish survive. The same happened with the Germans. Another reason was that very few members of the Spanish 51 Labrador, Juan, O. P. 1945. Diario de guerra en Filipinas, p. 219 (Entry 14 February 1945). Santo Tomas Convent, Ávila. Typescript copy.

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community had abandoned the city due to the lack of relatives in the provinces and fear of looting. Those who took refuge in the Spanish consulate found their expectations of being protected by its national flag shattered in the cruelest manner. The building had taken in a number of Philippine and Spanish families who trusted that Axis paraphernalia would protect them, but the group of soldiers who committed the massacre must have been lured more by the concentration of people. The first person murdered was the Falangist vigilante, Ricardo García Buch, when he went out to the gate carrying a Spanish flag. Later, the building was attacked and set on fire and in the blaze, all those who had taken shelter there perished—nearly fifty people. Only one child survived, Anna Maria Aguilella. The massacres at the Spanish consulate and the German Club demonstrated that recourse to supposed political sympathies merely served to facilitate the tragic work of the Japanese. Troops attacking dwellings and firing at will on defenseless groups was, unfortunately, the norm at the time. Out of a total of 50,000 Filipino civilian deaths, a great many were Spanish subjects, hispanized Filipinos, “cuarterones” (those with a quarter of Filipino blood), and several mestizos, as indicated by the large number stories written by the survivors in Spanish.52 Spanish cultural heritage suffered during the bombings as did the rest of the community. The long list of typhoons, earthquakes, and various attacks with which history had graced Manila, including the passage of time, could not outdo the damage done in that month. The reasons are easily imaginable. The best hiding places for the Japanese soldiers were the solid stone buildings constructed during the Spanish Period, and the Americans preferred to attack with heavy artillery before risking entering them. As a result, the most palpable reminders of three centuries of Spanish presence, among them Catholic temples and the main convents in Intramuros, with the exception of the Church of San Agustín, suffered greatly in the battle. In the aftermath, the eagerness to avoid epidemics served to justify the demolition of many buildings that still had many walls and vaults standing. The history of Hispanic presence was literally razed, just as what happened with the Dominican Church in Taipei, and

52 AMAEC-R-2910-9. Del Castaño to Jordana, Manilla, 10 August 1944; MS 22 September 1944, Murata to Shigemitsu, Manilla, 18 October 1944. For the most complete account of the battle, which mentions accounts published in Spanish, Aluit, A.J. 1994. By Sword and Fire. Bookmark: Manila; Scott, J.M. 2018. Rampage. MacArthur, Yamashita, and the Battle of Manila. New York: W.W. Norton.

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in marked contrast with the care taken to preserve the Japanese city of Kyoto. In this chapter, the bulk of the blame appears to lie with the Americans whose large-scale artillery bombardment against historical buildings were equivalent to the Japanese soldiers’ disdain for lives. In the meantime, Spain was eagerly expecting news. The first false announcement of the fall of the city to MacArthur in the beginning of February led to a press release on the “reconquest” of Manila, which showed that a strong anti-American bias continued to be harbored by many Falangists in Spain. In a recent conference on American foreign policy held by Ambassador Ignacio de Lojendio, he referred to similarities between the Monroe Doctrine and the Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere.53 In any case, Spain now praised the United States for having facilitated the civilizing work of Spain and insinuated that the Pacific War would probably end before the war in Europe, that is, it was revealing its own concerns.54 Then reassuring news arrived concerning the Dominican missionaries at the University of Santo Tomas, where Allied prisoners were liberated. However, three weeks after the initial press release, on 27 February, the first news of the massacre of Augustine monks arrived, which were confirmed for the first time by Consul del Castaño on 7 March via the United States.55 Spain now saw that it had no other option but to act swiftly. Madrid’s first reaction on hearing this news was to order its ambassador in Washington to request a meeting with the secretary of state to examine the possibilities of alleviating the problems of the Spanish community in the Philippines. Del Castaño’s appointment of in Lima, which appears in his personal file on the same date, should have been addressed at that first meeting, but it is not mentioned in the telegrams.56 Spain tried to avoid the criticism against Consul del Castaño but the stigma against him was remembered during both his arrest in his residence in Manila

53 León-Aguinaga, 2022, op. cit., entry 26 October 1944. 54 AMAEC-R-3195-23. Circular from Lequerica, Madrid, 6 February 1945. 55 AMAEC-R-2910-9. Cárdenas to James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary, State Depart-

ment, Washington, 20 February 1945; file 12. Cárdenas to Lequerica, Washington, 27 February and 7 March 1945. 56 AMAEC-P. Del Castaño. Lequerica to Cárdenas, Madrid, 10 March 1945. There does not appear to be any written text about any relationship between the meeting concerning aid to the Spanish and the departure of del Castaño. AMAEC-R-1373-23. Cárdenas to Lequerica, Washington, 9 March 1945.

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by MacArthur’s forces and during his trip back to Spain through the United States, when the Democrat representative from Washington, John M. Coffee, repeatedly recalled his collaborationism during the Japanese occupation.57 Madrid’s ability to act was paralyzed by Del Castaño’s past activities, just as Lequerica’s behavior had been linked to the story of the fattened turkey in 1941. On 14 March, a press campaign tried to show the Americans that Spain had suffered firsthand “Japanese barbarity,” coinciding with the arrival of Washington’s new ambassador to Spain, Norman Armour. Franco’s government held well-founded hopes that he would continue Hayes’ policy and that attitudes toward Madrid in the United States had improved. A letter from Ambassador Cárdenas dated 18 January (arrived on 17 February) reported that in Washington, he “had noticed the evolution of American policy with respect to Spain” and concerning this, a note from the Minister pointed out that “it is truly interesting.”58 New possibilities for a new path were seen and the ¡Arriba! once more set the tone for how to direct popular sentiment. In addition to detailing the damage against Spain, it went back to expressing a newer and stranger Falangist remorse for not having realized in time the danger of the “war of principles” that the conflict with Japan had entailed: “in this war, Spain has suffered from its obsession with the communist peril.”59 Anti-communism had deviated them from the real target to spread the “superior” civilization. The following day, 15 March, news from Manila forced Minister Lequerica, suddenly and without taking the press into account, to interrupt a tour with the American ambassadors to the sites of the main ports in Southern Spain at the time of the colonization of the Americas.60 Lequerica issued a fresh order to the press “concerning information about the Sino-Japanese war, aimed at highlighting the victories of Chiang Kaishek’s China.”61 All news from Japan was prohibited, including news 57 NARAR-RG-59. CDF 1940–44. C187. 852.20210/267. A Radio Tokyo comment against Coffee’s “putting pressure” upon Falange activities. Latin American Transmitters. 26 July 1943. 58 AMAEC-R-1373-23. Note n.d.of 19 February 1945. 59 14 March 1945. There is a comment on this in DSDF-WWII-752. 752.94/3-2145.

British Embassy in Washington to Stettinius, Washington, 21 March 1945. 60 Doussinague, 1949, p. 348. 61 Río Cisneros, 1965, op. cit., p. 401.

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that showed sympathy for this country, even if it were “highly veiled.” The media was also allowed to give extensive accounts of the gravity of the situation in the Philippines, both in writing and even in the No-Do newsreels, which showed “in all its rawness” images of Spanish buildings destroyed and the murder of “officials and civilians.” Once more, the figures of Spanish deaths was magnified, with fifty officials confirmed dead in the consulate.62 Furthermore, censorship of Madrid-based correspondents was relaxed. The most significant contribution was the chronicle of Manuel Casares, EFE correspondent in Washington, on an article in Newsweek magazine pointing out that the Manila massacres occurred exactly at the time that the Spanish government was doing all it could to improve relations with the Allies. He added that these massacres could well become a motive for Spain to declare war on Japan, automatically making Madrid an ally of the United States and England.63 By allowing the Allied governments to speculate about its possible reaction, Madrid tried to ascertain their attitude while rumors began to circulate of a break in Spain-Japan relations, and even an entry into the war against Japan prior to the conference in San Francisco. Obviously, Spain desired to emphasize its sufferings in the war and that its nationals had been murdered by those who were fighting against the United States. The stereotypes about savagery in Asia made possible to consider any ending to the relationship between Spain and Japan to be feasible, and the news was a product of this mentality. The images in the No-Do newsreels of the war in Burma were also particularly bloody and an internal report in the foreign ministry indicates that the worst was expected concerning these “barbarian Asians”: “the Spanish community has been decimated, suffering 90% losses. Almost all the Spanish convents and churches have been destroyed.”64 Madrid had suffered a great many deaths at the hands of the Japanese and it considered using this newly-acquired role of victim of “yellow barbarity” to get closer to the Allies. With these arguments and a sense of urgency, during the second half of March, Minister Lequerica threw himself into testing the reaction 62 Martínez, 1996, art. cit., p. 155. 63 PRO-FO-371-49635. Bowker to Foreign Office, Madrid, 18 March 1945. Also

DSDF-WWII-248. Butterworth to Stettinius, Madrid, 17 and 22 March 1945. 64 APG-JE-3-2. Report by Álvaro Seminario, endorsed by Cristóbal del Castillo and Lequerica, to Francisco Franco, Madrid, 13 March 1945.

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to a possible declaration of war against Japan. Spanish documentation concerning this is scant because the dispatches at the foreign affairs ministry were given at meetings and banquets where the most important phrases were uttered, perhaps on account of the absence of clarity as to what measure to take, given the delicate nature of the subject, or because of the consequences any decision might bring. The first reference to these attempts in which Lequerica openly considered his options dates to 17 March during his dinner with the long-time connoisseur of the Hispanic world, London military attaché, Windham W. Torr, who since 1939, had established a network of confidants at the highest ranks of the Spanish army.65 According to Torr, Lequerica said, “It looks like we are going to declare war on Japan.” Upon being asked when, he replied: “Pretty soon, I expect. We must do it before Portugal,” and as for the reasons, it appears that he shrugged his shoulders and pointed out, “Well, Franco has always hated the Japanese.” Torr then replied, “And what about the atrocities in the Spanish Consulate?” to which the Minister replied, “Yes, of course, we can make good use of them.”66 Expedience was needed, and although London was greatly surprised by Lequerica’s frankness, it rejected the proposal: If the Spaniards do declare war on Japan, there is no need for us to welcome it or to allow the Spaniards to derive any credit there from. There is, however, perhaps some danger that the Spanish action would make some impression in America, and I suggest therefore that we should recommend to the State Department that we should maintain an attitude of reserve. The Foreign Office also realized that Spanish intentions were mainly directed at the United States: It is certainly beginning to look as though a declaration of war against Japan by Spain is not outside the bounds of possibility. No doubt the Spaniards would hope thereby to climb a little further onto the Allied (and particularly the American) bandwagon.67

The government in Washington had changed its attitude at the same time as the massacres perpetrated in Manila came to light. 23 February 65 Sáenz-Francés, 2016, art. cit., p. 160. 66 PRO-FO-371-49635 (Z3684/2246/G41). Bowker to Foreign Office, Madrid, 19

and 20 March 1945. Nothing is known about the order of the affirmation because the reference to Portugal was sent by Bowker the following day. 67 Ibid. Bowker to Foreign Office, Madrid, 19 March 1945. Minute of 20 March 1945.

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1945 was the last time an American representative—Chargé d’Affaires Butterworth—suggested breaking of relations with Japan to Lequerica. Butterworth found the minister so willing to agree that he reported to Washington the possibility of bringing it about should sufficient pressure be applied. Then, the Office of European Affairs in the State Department was tasked with writing a report about what outcome would be most convenient for American interests. Its author, John Wickerson, asked several experts about possible scenarios for a rupture in Spain-Japan relations and soon saw that the advantages would be few, if any, as the scant military benefit for Washington would be counteracted by the nuisance of having Madrid as an ally. His proposal was to ignore the matter.68 His superiors immediately agreed. The following day, 2 March, categorical instructions were issued to the embassy in Madrid: The Spanish government would probably welcome a suggestion from this government that Spain sever relations with Japan […] If your views in regard to any possible severance of relations with Japan should be sought by any Spanish official, you should therefore reply that the United States Government has no interest in whether the Spanish Government maintains or severs diplomatic relations with Japan…69

The most accommodating current of thinking toward Franco’s regime—represented by Hayes—had been defeated by the one that was more opposed to compromise. Something similar occurred regarding Japan when throughout 1945, old experts on this nation that served in the American administration were ousted by others with a more radical vision on how to reform the country.70 In short, the decline of reformminded conservatives like Hayes and Grew was bad news for the Spanish government as from then on, the Americans would take a firmer stance. Franco had let the moment slip by. Although in his Wartime Mission, Hayes dates the change of American policy a year before, as a consequence of the Laurel incident, Wickerson’s report indicates that its shift

68 DSDF-WWII-247. Memorandum by John Wickerson, Washington, 1 March 1945. 69 DSDF-WWII-247. Stettinius to Norman Armour, Washington, 2 March 1945. His

comments to the French representative are in ARE, Europe 1944–1949. Espagne-80-813. Truelle to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Madrid, 21 March 1945. 70 Dower, J.W. 1999. Embracing Defeat. Japan in the wake of World War II, pp. 217– 223. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

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toward Franco took place later, when Hayes was no longer ambassador. It was on 3 March 1945 when President Roosevelt instructed Armour: “The fact that our government maintains formal diplomatic relations with the present Spanish regime should not be interpreted by anyone to imply approval of that regime and its sole party, the Falange, which has been openly hostile to the United States, and which has tried to spread its fascist party ideas in the Western Hemisphere.”71 In the interim, both Allied governments had reached similar conclusions about Madrid. The instructions were opposed to Hayes’s stance, and the new American ambassador was personally involved in that firmer stance, partly because he had experienced similar tensions in Buenos Aires, his previous post, from which he was withdrawn in order to carry out “negotiations” in June 1944. Armour was very much aware of the political consequences of the Spanish decision on Japan. He himself was displeased that the press tended to exaggerate any sign of kindness as an expression of mutual harmony.72 In this changing context, Ambassador Armour’s first unofficial meeting with Lequerica took place during a dinner on 20 March. The Spanish foreign minister spoke only of the indignation that the Japanese atrocities had caused in Spain and that Madrid was willing to declare war, but Armour stopped him in his tracks, informing him of his government’s new policy.73 Lequerica had also mentioned the necessary procedures that the Spanish government had decided on in order to declare war, that is, that Portugal would be consulted in accordance with the Iberian Pact.74 It can be assumed that spurred on by a dispatch from Reuters’ Madrid agency to London to report on the possible declaration of war, Armour clearly indicated to Lequerica his government’s refusal to enter the war. The biggest evidence that Lequerica received this news during the dinner with Armour is an order concerning a cocktail party that was hosted by the Japanese Legation the following morning. While the first 71 FDRPL. PSF 50. Roosevelt to Armour, 3/III/1945, cit. in Thomas, Joan Maria. 2016, p. 42. 72 Sanchís Muñoz, 1992, op. cit., pp. 281–282, Leon-Aguinaga, 2022b, op. cit, 11 April 1945. 73 PRO-FO-371-49635. Bowker to Foreign Office, Madrid, 20 March 1945. 74 The statements were made to a military attaché, although it is not clear in the text

as to whether they were to a British or North American person. PRO-FO-371-49635 (Z3923/2246/G41). Bowker to Foreign Office and Lisbon, Madrid, 23 March 1945.

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note, dated on the morning of 21 March, authorized officials of the Palace of Santa Cruz to attend it, “giving the impression of complete normality,” the very morning of the event, the “previous instruction” was annulled: […] the Minister has deigned to consider that neither the officials of this Ministry nor their families are to attend said party.75 Spanish documents do not indicate the reason for this change but it must have arisen from the meeting with Armour. The Spanish decision to harden its stance against Japan had already been taken and continued its progress, yet the context had changed. The road to confrontation with Japan would not be as easy as Spain had thought.

The Slow Rupture At this time, Spain was trying hard to improve its international image. The play La Casa de Bernarda Alba, a work by famous poet Federico García Lorca was performed for the first time after his assassination in 1936 by Falangists. The government acted swiftly as the colophon of this new, hardened American stance arrived on the same day the Japanese held their cocktail party in solitude. On 22 March 1945, the Francoist government decided to cease representation of Japanese interests in American countries. A stern verbal note was written in which, after mentioning the direct hand of Tokyo in the systematic persecution of Spaniards in the Philippines, Madrid considered its humanitarian work closed, limiting itself to awaiting the appointment of a successor nation. Nevertheless, the most enigmatic aspect was the last sentence of the text: The government considers this problem in all its aspects and, without prejudice to now demanding immediate satisfaction, cannot forget the extent to which such outrages – even should reparations be made where possible – have wounded Spanish feelings, and especially those of fraternity with our Filipino brethren.76

The note seems to be a headlong rush, a product principally of haste, partly because Madrid wanted it to arrive at the right moment (it was handed over by a motorcyclist just as the party was ending), and

75 AMAEC-R-3195-23. Notes signed by Doussinague, Madrid, 21 and 22 March 1945. 76 AMAEC-R-3195-25. Lequerica to Suma, Madrid, 22 March 1945.

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partly because it sought to open many questions about Madrid’s future actions.77 It left questions that the government itself did not know how to answer, as it must have been as confused as those to whom such imprecise clues were given. The last fact about Spanish representation of Japanese incidents concerned an incident on 13 April 1945 at the Japanese Embassy in Washington, when two officials from the Spanish Embassy and an expert in security locks were caught trying to open the safe. The Spaniards had entered thanks to the access they had due to having protected Japan’s interests, but since it had expired, the police arrived to investigate. The safe contained $500,000 in cash which had been deposited in 1942 to protect the interests of the Japanese, and which had remained there on account of the difficulty in securely sending codes from Madrid to Washington. Upon being discovered, the diplomats claimed that they had forgotten to request permission to enter from the State Department because they were “accustomed” to having free access there. They also forgot to notify Madrid until they were questioned following press reports about the incident. Then, Ambassador Cárdenas replied that the State Department had not considered it an important matter and, furthermore, that the press had distorted everything—which leads to the suspicion that he may have tried to get his own share of the spoils. In 1951, Tokyo asked Spain to deduct the money from the indemnity it had to pay for the Manila massacres.78 The decision to end representation of interests intensified the press campaign. It started on 23 March 1945 by giving broad coverage of a dispatch from the United Press, signed by its correspondent in Manila, in which Fr. Tomás Tascón, Rector of the University of Santo Tomás, was quoted. The front pages of the major papers like Ya, ABC, ¡Arriba!, covered events in Manila but the latter’s editorial is particularly interesting as it reflects Spain’s perplexity at the behavior of its former friends: “Today, Spain has yet to successfully reconstruct the complex intentions and ideas that may have driven the sinister Japanese machine in the 77 Interview with Hayashiya Eikichi, former attaché to the Legation. Tokyo, 6 February 1992. 78 MS 7 May 1945; AMAEC-R-P. Gómez de Molina, Cárdenas to Martín Artajo, Washington, 2/V/1945. The Minister in Tokyo knew about this, but the diplomats in Madrid ignored it. Then, orders were given to feign ignorance on the topic. AMAE-R5521-15-12. Report from Filipinas y Extremo Oriente Section. Madrid, 15 May 1951.

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Philippines.” The Japanese had certainly passed into the sphere of exotic beings. Nevertheless, two days later, ¡Arriba! allowed itself to doubt the text of the official note. It claimed that it remained to be seen to what extent the murder of Spaniards was a “responsible action under organised orders” and concluded, in a new display of mistrust toward the United States, with a request that “the nature, number, and character of the events” be investigated.79 There was a hidden political struggle among the praise for the action but, in any case, periodicals enthusiastically joined in an anthology of folly against Japan.80 The periodicals financed by Germany, and which had avoided criticism of Japan, also joined the campaign, surprising the American embassy. It was, in any case, in a gentler manner; El Alcázar published the headline “Inadmissible aggression” while Informaciones focused on the legacy in the Philippines.81 Nevertheless, the government was more concerned about foreign reaction to the new measure. The Allies agreed to continue with its already decided policy of ignoring the Spanish stance. The American State Department, emphasizing the lack of military or political advantage, repeatedly declared, “It is a matter of indifference to us.”82 Meanwhile, London called Spain’s decision “pure opportunism,” although it noted that “a declaration of war on Germany might be a different matter.”83 Washington took the opportunity to add, “Should Spain break off relations or declare war on Japan, such action would have no effect on present United States policy towards Franco regime.”84 It was a clearly hostile 79 “Agresiones inadmisibles,” 23 March 1945; “La protesta española,” 25 March 1945, ¡Arriba!. 80 “El dolor de Filipinas,” 20 March 1945; “…the Norms of Loyalty and Respect that in Europe—and Especially among Christians—Comprise a Line of Conduct Between People and Nations.” 24 March 1945, Pueblo. 81 NARA-RG-84. E3162. Bx 66. Armour to Hull, Madrid, 2 April 1945. A cartoon making “fun of the Japanese undergoing a Tokyo bombardment”, San Sebastian. NARARG-84. E3162. Bx 67. Galbraith to Armour, San Sebastián, 13 March 1945. 82 DSDF-WWII-248. Memorandum from the State Department, Washington, 24

March 1945; NARA-RG-59. 752.94. Secretary of State to all diplomatic missions, Washington, 28 March 1945. 83 PRO-FO-371-49346. Foreign Office to the Embassy in Washington, London, 23 March 1945. 84 Ibid. Halifax to Eden, Washington, 25 March 1945 and Foreign Office to the colonial governments, London, 26 March 1945.

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reaction, and one very different from what other countries that had been in the Axis orbit had received. Chile and Argentina, perhaps on account of having undergone a similar development, were the countries that best understood Madrid. Chile defended the autonomy of each country.85 The Argentine Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs allowed himself to advice the Spanish ambassador on the wisdom of a rupture with Japan and the “mortal blow” it would inflict on the “maliciousness spread throughout all of America.”86 Thirteen Portuguese subjects had died in Manila and Lisbon for its part knew that its reaction was greatly expected. In fact, a member of its Madrid embassy made an urgent trip Lisbon to discuss the Spanish desire for joint action.87 Nevertheless, Portugal just authorized its press to gather information supplied by Spanish newspapers, but took no further action, and their articles were not as radical as in Spain. With Allied opposition, empathy in the Southern Cone, and moderation in Portugal, reactions had been widely different among the governments most important to Madrid. In the Axis, there was widespread attribution of blame on Allied pressure. Perhaps as a strategy to avoid further damage, the Japanese press slyly reported the end of Spain’s representation of Japanese interests without comment. Suma suggested softening Spain’s attack by avoiding further problems and Tokyo even thought that they might be able to get the Spanish to reconsider their decision through three resources they still had for influencing Madrid, by requesting help from Japan’s friends, money, and pressure on Tokyo. Tokyo, at first, tried to seek German collaboration in improving its relations with Madrid. Goebbels’ diary reveals that he thought that the atrocities alleged by the Spanish were part of American “intrigue,”88 but Berlin was nevertheless more concerned with saving its own skin and feared the effects of Armour’s arrival whom they supposed would set about removing the remainder of Germany’s reduced presence in Spain. Then, when the German Chargé d’Affaires in Madrid, Sigismund von 85 Noceda, 2005, art. cit., p. 38. 86 AMAEC-R-2910-7. Bulnes to Lequerica concerning a conversation with the Under

Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Buenos Aires, 20 March 1945. 87 NARA-RG-59. 701.5532. Armour to Stettinius, Madrid, 26 March 1945. 88 Trevor-Roper, H., ed and introd. 1978. Final Entries, 1945. The Diaries of Joseph

Goebbels, p. 220 (24 March 1945). New York: G P Putnam’s Sons.

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Vibra, mediated in Japan’s favor, he was happy to receive assurances from Lequerica that “the affair [with Japan] would not impair [HispanoGerman] relations.”89 With Japan becoming Spain’s scapegoat, criticism of the Third Reich was alleviated. Japan’s idea of using money and expressing flattery, secondly, was another means already used to gain concessions from Madrid. This seems to be the reason that, after speaking with Lequerica on the same day that representation of interests ended, Suma would optimistically write to his government. He assured them that an indemnity could prevent the situation from deteriorating and even lead to a return in the protection of Japanese interests after “saving face.”90 On 2 April, Suma presented the Foreign Minister with a plan to restore the previous status based partly on the proposal for a Tokyo-backed independent investigation of the crimes committed in Manila. It would start with an impromptu payment of a sum of money to the “rescue fund for the victims in need,” all within a “Lequerica-Suma agreement” that would remain secret. In other words, the money could be diverted for the personal benefit of a few.91 It was backed by the military attaché after a conversation with a “man close to Franco,” mentioning “material and psychological” compensation and ruling out a declaration of war.92 The only conditions made by Minister Shigemitsu were to present the payment as his own idea and to not allow other parties like the Vatican to oversee inquiries.93 Suma’s plan, in short, consisted in “saving face” by means of money for the victims which could be diverted substantially before it could even be sniffed in the Philippines. The Japanese were probably not far off the mark. Corruption was likely to reach the highest levels in Francoist Spain, as Angel Viñas has demonstrated with his book Bribes (Sobornos, 2016) and the idea of getting hold of Japanese money caused little moral doubt even among the upper echelons. They were well aware of the little interest that existed working through the entire Spanish bureaucracy, just as what had happened with

89 MS 11 and 13 April 1945. 90 MS 28 March 1945. 91 AMAEC-R-3195-25. “Strictly Confidential Note” from the Japanese Legation to

Lequerica, Madrid, 31 March 1945. 92 MS 5 April 1945, report of 2 April 1945. 93 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ 95014, 95800. Shigemitsu to Suma, Tokyo, 26 March 1945.

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the confiscation of money at the border years before, but the government needed a political solution. Third, the Japanese tried to get Madrid to change its mind through Ambassador Santiago Méndez de Vigo in Tokyo. Once again, Méndez de Vigo learned of the end of the representation of interests through the press but he helped as much as he could. He tried to delay a more drastic decision when he reported on the fall of Prime Minister Koiso Kuniaki and an apparently fruitful meeting he had with the Vice Minister of the Gaimush¯ o, Sawada Setsuz¯ o, saying “My impression is not pessimistic.”94 Certainly, the new government of Suzuki Kantar¯o was more concerned about the possibility that Stalin would take part in the final moments of the Pacific War, but the tension related to Lisbon those days should have enhanced the problem with its Iberian neighbour. In Macao, when the Japanese Consul General, Fukui Yasumitsu, was assassinated, the army considered “taking advantage”95 of the opportunity to occupy the city due to supposedly close ties between Portuguese officials and Chinese, but the foreign minister decided to settle the issue “by normal diplomatic negotiations,”96 that is, without invading Macao. Méndez de Vigo must have dreaded even thinking about how his troubles would increase. When travelling by car, he always had to be accompanied by a Japanese, and he was forced to spend a cold winter with barely any heating at the same mountain village of Karuizawa where the Emperor’s family and other neutrals stayed.97 In fact, he did not inform Madrid about the arrest of the brother of the chancellor of the legation, Francisco Miguel Planas, who was being tortured under the accusation of having giving the chancellor information at the port of Yokohama. However, convincing Madrid was harder than stopping its army in Macao, because the Spanish government was not looking west, nor east. The changes in Japanese foreign policy were already defined but the diplomats could do little about them.

94 AMAEC-R-3195-34. Méndez de Vigo to Lequerica, Tokyo, 5 April 1945. 95 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ 92288. Shigemitsu to Morishima, Tokyo, 5 March 1945. MS

8 Mar. 1945. “Japanese Military in Favor of Occupying Macau,” Shigemitsu to Representatives in China, Tokyo, 6 February 1945; FO371-49523. 3850/3844/36. Campbell to Eden, Lisbon, 22 March 1945. 96 NARA-RG-457. SRDJ 92288. Shigemitsu to Morishima, Tokyo, 5 March 1945. NARA-RG-59. 701.5532. Armour to Stettinius, Madrid, 26 March 1945. 97 AMAEC-R-3195-30. Méndez de Vigo a Lequerica, Tokyo, 22 March 1945. Lottaz and Ottosson, 2022, op. cit., p. 152.

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Neither Suma, Méndez de Vigo, nor even Suzuki’s new government, were in any position to help. It was an act of desperation, but in any case, there were signs that the Spanish campaign was slowing down. In fact, the press and radio campaign relaxed in the final days of March, as the New York Times came to indicate.98 Three weeks later, after uncertainty and rumors, Spain continued to talk about “our Pearl Harbor,” as Propaganda Chief Gabriel Arias Salgado described to US diplomat Philippe W. Bonsal while discussing the possibility of Spain declaring war on Japan. And then, on 11 April 1945, The Council of Ministers decided to break off diplomatic relations with Japan starting the next day.99 Besides remembering the previous message on 22 March, the verbal note had a sad tone in it. It read, “the more the above mentioned events are lamentable, the more they interrupt a long tradition of friendship between Spain and Japan, of which Spain has given constant proof, some very recently.” It then justified the measure and noted the possibility of asking for reparations for the events in Manila, “especially for what happened in the Spanish Consulate and to the buildings and official persons […] they are incompatible with maintaining a friendly normality between the two countries. Consequently, the government does not deem it possible to continue maintaining diplomatic relations […] without prejudice to maintenance of the claim to indemnification which has been presented to the latter for the losses of lives and property caused to Spanish subjects.”100 What also stands out is the accusation that Japanese troops had been guilty of the assault on and the destruction of “all the official buildings of the Spanish government” and the murder in the consulate of “all the consular functionaries there, even the lowest servants, regardless of sex, and likewise, murdering all the people in the building, with a total of fifty.”101 The government instructed the press to underline the “transcendence”102 of its decision, but without the minutes from this Council of

98 “Spaniards expect better U.S. status,” 1 April 1945. 99 León-Aguinaga, 2022, op. cit., 13 April 1945. 100 APG-JE-5-4. Lequerica a Suma, Madrid, 12 April 1945; British commentary in PRO-FO-371. 49635. Bowker a Foreign Office and Lisbon, Madrid, 11 and 12 April 1945. NARA-RG-84. Entry 3162. Tel. clair. Armour to Hull, Madrid, 23 March 1945. 101 AMAEC-R-1373-33bis. Lequerica to Suma, Madrid, 12 April 1945. 102 Sevillano, 2000, op. cit., p. 97.

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Ministers nor the ability to consult the military archives, the documentation leads to the suspicion that the Madrid government simply inflated the importance of its tensions with Japan. The tension and momentum of the previous weeks had forced Spain to talk another step further against Japan, but after officially breaking ties, nothing was certain. The Minister must have known that the only official Spanish building (which was rented) was the general consulate and that the Japanese could not have murdered fifty Spanish officials as EFE asserted. Just like with the communiqué that announced the cessation of the representation of interests, the text was intended more for overseas dissemination than to influence Japanese authorities. The verbal note is not only less belligerent than the one from three weeks before, but it also contained less aggressive threats and was less enigmatic, restricted to the demand for reparations. Moreover, the newspapers did not seem to have paid particular attention to the rupture. It was only worth an editorial in ¡Arriba! and from neither side was there anything special to suggest concern regarding future prospects of the government. The propaganda machine that even gave meaning to the rupture itself was missing. On 12 April, the day Spain broke relations with Japan, Lequerica made a last attempt at using it when he first met Ambassador Armour for a formal talk. He started the conversation referring to the “absolute unanimity”103 at the cabinet meeting, but its impact on Armour was very limited, as expected. Personnel were required to assemble in Japanese-owned buildings and policemen took note of their comings and goings, but these were measures taken principally to play to the gallery. They were soon allowed to leave, to organize parties where alcohol flowed, and even to go out and enjoy their summer vacations. The alarm and signs of a possible war soon became just rumors. In both the American and Japanese embassies, a two- to -three-week delay was suggested (21 and 27 April were cited) for the final declaration of war, during which they would try to organize the evacuation of Spanish subjects in Japan.104 Meanwhile, Consul Del Castaño returned to the Peninsula via the United States where he was subjected to burdensome security measures to prevent him from staying longer than necessary, all in 103 NARA-RG-84. Entry 3162, Bx. 70. Armour to Sec. State, Madrid, 12 April 1945. 104 DSDF-WWII-248. Armour to Stettinius, Madrid, 12 April 1945; NARA-RG-

226. 5. 127-21. Meetings between Bogotá, Gloria and Penélope, Madrid, 14 April 1945.

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the midst of a media channel recalling his anti-American activities. While constantly informed of the details of del Castaño’s voyage, Generalísimo Franco must have also realized at the time the unforeseeable effects that a new escalation of tensions might bring. Consequently, these tensions ceased with the end of Spain-Japan relations. The storm clouds soon passed and even the rumors disappeared.105 In 8 May, less than a month after the breaking of relations, the first session of the Cortes (the Spanish parliament) was held with its president, Esteban Bilbao, giving a speech recalling Hispanic identification with the Filipino people, but without indicating any future steps. Three days later, a new ¡Arriba! article (“Harakiri”) denied the possibility of war, pointing out that “military inhibition in the world drama continues to be the axis of our international policy.”106 For the first time, the text not only indicated the lack of new slogans in the already waning anti-Japanese campaign, but above all, that Madrid had renounced a war against Japan. There were to be no more turns of the screw and the gradual breaking of relations would not lead to a declaration of war.

The Hidden Aspects of a Possible War Franco’s government took several steps against Japan but in the end, it did not cross the Rubicon. War was not declared due to a series of factors such as political opportunity, friendly advice, Allied disdain, and the internal play among forces in the regime. There, with Spain’s policy toward Japan stabilized, it is worth reflecting on the reasons that tempered Madrid’s desire to declare war, or rather, that led it to reject this option. To this end, the focus is on the real significance of the events in Manila, the modality of this hypothetical Spanish entry into the Asian conflict, and finally, the real objectives pursued by Franco’s government with such a measure.

105 NARA-RG-59. CDF 1945–1949. 752.95. Armour to Stettinius, Madrid, 18 May

1945. 106 11 May 1945, ¡Arriba!. NARA-RG-84-Entry 3162. Bx 66. Armour to Dept. State, Madrid, 18 May 1945.

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Moderating Influences on Madrid The general context required Franco’s government to reflect on the convenience of taking a step forward in its tensions with Japan. Spain broke off relations with Japan five days after the inauguration of Suzuki’s government and a day after President Roosevelt died. The Latin American republics showed their own example. Once the United States agreed to let her join the San Francisco conference, on 27 March 1945, Argentina, declared war on Germany but not on Japan, after which Washington lifted all restrictions on them on 4 April and reauthorized American ships to berth at Argentine ports.107 Washington’s reconciliation with Buenos Aires and Santiago was easier, as it was included in the mediation of other South American countries, but the geopolitical situation of Madrid did not foster such a fresh reconciliation, since the nexus of Franco’s government with the Axis was much better known in the world. The Vatican and Lisbon were better patrons for a possible rapprochement with Washington. Madrid had reasons for this as both of them had suffered at the hands of the same Japanese enemy in Manila: Lisbon with thirteen victims, and the Holy See with a figure of over fifty missionaries dead, including a massacre carried out against Spanish Franciscans in Intramuros, which the Pope himself rushed to condemn as soon as he knew of it.108 Nevertheless, both governments revealed their desire to moderate Francoists’ decisions—but each had a different motive. The Vatican’s objective was to avoid greater danger for the missionaries in Chinese territories still occupied by Japan, and Portugal’s reasons were due to internal politics. From the outset, the Church demonstrated its opposition to increasing the problems faced by the religious orders in the Philippines and tried

107 NARA-RG-457. E9006. “Japanese Reply to Swiss Request for Repatriation of Nationals’” cit. in MS 19 January 1945. Sanchís Muñoz, 1992, op. cit., pp. 317– 318; Rapoport, M. 1998. ¿Aliados o neutrales? La Argentina frente a la Segunda Guerra Mundial, p. 23. Buenos Aires: Eudeba. 108 Virginia Lee Warren, “Vatican protests Manila Murders; Japanese Slaying of Spanish

Franciscan Monks Draws Condemnation by Pope. Spaniards in Manila Suffering,” Rome, 22 March 1945, New York Times. The account of one of the survivors about two others who drank too much wine while surrounded by corpses, Rodao, F. 2010. La odisea del agustino Rodriguez Barrullo. Clio (Special issue, Españoles en la Guerra de Pacifico) 5: 24.

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to make its position clear. The Superior Council for Missions officially inquired about the situation of the missionaries in Japan and possibilities to exit the country, and the church may have been involved in the exchange ships, although there is no documentation to confirm it. They also asked Manuel Aznar Gómez-Acedo who was said to have had a great influence over Minister Lequerica, probably because both were from the same city, Bilbao. He also had a personal interest, since he was appointed at the Washington embassy to take care of the press, but once it got out that he was the former director of ¡Arriba!, a proposal was made to organize a commission made up of relatives of dead American soldiers in the Philippines to remind everyone of how his newspaper celebrated the fall of Corregidor Island in the Philippines in May 1942.109 Lisbon also sought to soothe spirits in Madrid. On the one hand, it had overcome its previous tensions with Japan and must have made it clear to Madrid that the lives of hundreds of thousands of residents of Macao were more important than the deaths of the thirteen in Manila. On the other hand, Lisbon’s main concern in Hispano-Japanese tensions was staying ahead of Madrid. The Portuguese prime minister and chancellor would not admit taking a step after Madrid in a region like Asia where, until then, the opposite had occurred. The Foreign Office realized what the implications might be for Lisbon and foresaw its moderating influence: “[…] It can, I think, be taken for granted that, even if Spain does declare war on Japan, Dr. Salazar will not agree to bring Portugal into the war against Japan simultaneously. It would be contrary to his idea of Portugal’s national dignity to follow in Spain’s wake in this way.”110 Salazar would have gladly drawn Spain into a declaration of war against Japan, but he would never have accepted the opposite. 109 The conversation was during a dinner on 20 March with the French Minister. PRO-FO-371-49635. Minute of 26 March 1945. Vid. also Bramwell to Derich, Madrid, 20 March 1945; AMAEC-R-3195-25. Varela, Head of the Cultural Relations Section to American Section Director, Madrid, 14 April 1945; Rodao, F. 1998. Acabando con la prioridad de los lazos privados: presencia española in Extremo Oriente alrededor de 1945/Ending the priority of private links: the Spanish presence in the Far East around 1945. Cuadernos de Historia, 1: 69–81, 177–189. About his problematic trip to the United States, León-Aguinaga, 2022, op. cit., entry 5 April 1945; NARA-RG-84. Entry 3162. Bx. 70.Armour to Sec. State, Madrid, 10 May 1945. 110 PRO-FO-371-49635. Minute of 26 March 1945; NARA-RG-59. 752.94. Norweb to Hull, Lisbon, 5 September 1944; AMAEC-R-1373-23. Nicolás Franco to Lequerica, Lisbon, 8 March 1945. NARA-RG-84. Entry 3162. Bx 66. Memorandum of conversation with Ambassador Pereira. Armour to Hull, Madrid, 10 May 1945.

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Examples of other countries were not considered, despite serving as a scenario for peace negotiations even though their record of neutrality was not complete. Switzerland’s move toward neutrality was based on limiting access to Axis nations while Sweden maintained trade with Germany and had “a first-rate intelligence service of its own,” while its secret police “proved extremely efficient.”111 The Thai example should have been known. The dictator, Phibun, who had declared war on Great Britain but not on China or the United States, retired and allowed a new government to be headed by Khuang Aphaiwong, a military official who participated in irredentist adventures like Marshal Badoglio in Italy. Without Phibun, Thailand managed to maintain political cooperation with the Japanese, who surrounded the country, while freeing political prisoners, abolishing fascist policies, and getting closer to the Soviet Union.112 If Franco had stepped down as dictator, the postwar period would have been easier for Spain. The United States, for its part, added more perplexity than moderation. Ambassador Cárdenas refused to acknowledge his error in having encouraged the sending of information containing suggestions for a possible declaration of war, stressing that the atmosphere in Washington had been sufficiently suitable for it.113 The Spanish had no clue of Washington’s new policy of ignoring the Spanish decision to attack Japan until one month later, on 23 March, when representation of Japanese interests ended. That day, the ambassador heard “rumors that here they [Americans] are alarmed by our attitude with Japan and by a possible declaration of war, leading some to believe that the ambassador of the United States in Madrid had been instructed to prevent the latter.”114 After the end of representations, the new influx of press critics for Franco’s opportunism also reinforced the decision.115 It was a month-long delay. 111 Molander, P. 2007. Intelligence, Diplomacy, and the Swedish Dilemma: The Special Operations Executive in Neutral Sweden, 1939–1945. Intelligence and National Security, 22-5:740; Levine, 2002, art. cit., pp. 328–329; NARA-RG457. E9006. Gorgé a Ministro Suiza, Tokio, 2 November 1944, cit. in 17 November 1944. 112 NARA-RG-457. E9006. “Thai Effort to Establish Relations with Russia” in MS of 24 September 1944; Reynolds, 2004, art. cit., p. 132. 113 APG-JE-5-3. Cárdenas to Lequerica, Washington, 28 March 1945. 114 Ibid; NARA-RG-84. Entry 3162. Bx. 67. Grew to Armour, Washington, 26

February 1945. 115 León-Aguinaga, 2022, op. cit., 11 April 1945.

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Domestic public opinion—or at least what could then be expressed as such—also played a crucial role in the deceleration of Francoist tension with Japan. The government could rely on significant acquiescence regarding their staunch policy toward Japan, especially from the Philippine-affiliated community, whose ability to pressure was acknowledged by Foreign Minister Lequerica. Nevertheless, the moderates (in the broadest sense of the word) had their doubts regarding the opportunities provided by the increasing tension with Japan. The image of opportunism had arisen in the face of measures such as the end of the representation of Japanese interests and the rupture of Spain-Japan relations, but the largest opponents to this tension must have been the many Spaniards who observed the Caudillo’s attempts to keep himself in power with an ironic smile. Jokes about Francoist intentions were endless, as the New York Times suggested when reporting on the tension between Madrid and Tokyo with a double meaning. On 1 April, when relations had not yet been broken, it noted, “It is almost certain that the government will take action of some sort soon. In this regard, Argentina’s declaration of war against the Axis received much press publicity here, but the average Madrileño was inclined to jeer at its tardiness.”116 In the absence of censorship, the paper would have also probably mentioned Madrid’s criticism of its own government. Such criticism could also clearly be heard at the highest level. The Spanish consul general in Tangiers made clear his opposition to a possible declaration of war because it posed “a loss of national dignity” and claimed that his opinion was shared by the majority of Spaniards.117 Lequerica announced that the decision to break relations was taken unanimously by the Council of Ministers, yet there is no reason for this to be true as Industry Minister Carceller did not consider war against either Germany or Japan to be a good option. It was too late for the Allies to appreciate such a measure with no moral or political value. Nobody was encouraging the Spanish government to declare war, partly because no one’s future was as uncertain as that of the Francoist regime, upset by the end of a world war so different from the one that it had wanted. 116 “Spaniards expect better U.S. status,” 1 April 1945, New York Times; DSDF-WWII248. Armour to Stettinius, Madrid, 12 April 1945. 117 NARA-RG-59. 752.6211. Butterworth to Stettinius, Madrid, 23 March 1945; PRO-FO-371-49346 (Z4512/16/28). Consul to Foreign Office, Tangier, 24 March 1945.

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Plans to Resort to Propaganda It is apt go back in time before the Battle of Manila to find out if the propaganda, the element that was so essential in the process behind the rupture with Japan, was spontaneous or planned. Regarding its peak in the spring of 1945, Agustín del Río Cisneros notes, “The position against Japan which, despite neutrality, was defined in the Pacific War, intensified when the barbarities of the Japanese soldiers became known in Spain.” This is an arguable statement as it is a clear contradiction to speak of neutrality and taking a position against one of the warring parties in the same breath, but also because the news of the atrocities came after, not before, Spain-Japan relations worsened. This text has shown that the rupture had already been foreseen and that the main role of information from the Philippines would be as the catalyst for that decision. The Church-affiliated Ya, the first daily that had dared to praise the Chinese Guomindang in 1943, published an article at the end of January 1945 on the coming end of the war in the Philippines. The article stated that this would relieve “the main Japanese threat toward the Spanish and their properties” and added that “it could well remove a significant obstacle” to the breaking of relations with Japan. The waiting game, as such, was Lequerica’s strategy, because while he was listening to American proposals for the split with Japan, he was thinking about how to obtain the greatest benefit possible, letting his subordinates unofficially report on future war plans against Japan.118 This was the position taken with both the United States and the United Kingdom. In the first instance, a Spanish official remarked to a colleague during the Battle of Manila that information concerning the Philippines was being considered “at the highest levels” and that, although he could not predict its nature, “he was sure that the strongest possible action by Spain is about to be taken.”119 With the British government, the suggestions were clearer, as shown by one of the memos in the Foreign Office concerning Hispano-Japanese tensions after the incidents in Manila, which read, “This is the beginning of the anti-Japanese

118 DSDF-WWII-247. 26 January 1945. Signed: José Luis Colina. DSDF-WWII-247. Sent by the US Embassy to Washington, 30 January 1945. 119 Idem.

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press campaign which Madrid warned us was coming.”120 Having been foreseen, the question was when. The fall of Manila came in due course, but the joyous forecasts turned out to be erroneous. While the Falangist National Press, the Propaganda Delegation of the Movimiento, and the Falangist students of the Falangist Union or SEU (Sindicato Español Universitario) were considering organizing an event, the government was making preparations for a mass rally protesting the destruction of the University of Santo Tomás. It would be a massive to protest led by the university’s former rector, Fr. Silvestre Sancho and even Ambassador Cárdenas reported it to the Department of State.121 Nevertheless, when peace arrived in Manila, there were no such celebrations, not only because the University of Santo Tomás was one of the few undamaged buildings, but also because the extent of the massacre allowed for few celebrations. The anti-Japanese strategy was certainly ready to be use, but the size of the misfortune was far greater than that expected. The Naval “Blue Division” There is no official documentation as to how it was thought that a declaration of war would be carried out. It was the journalist Hughes who most clearly mentioned this tension with Japan in his memoirs, Report From Spain, saying “The whole affair threatened to take on a ludic aspect when José Luis Arrese suggested to an officer of the American Embassy that he was prepared to lead a new Falangist Blue Division, this time against the Japanese!”122 The Falangist leader confirmed this in one of his books in which, after defending Hitler believing that he was fighting against communism, added that, “Just as when I asked the Count Jordana to negotiate sending another Blue Division to fight alongside Gen. MacArthur against Japan, which was also threatening Christianity.

120 DSDF-WWII-247. Walton to Stettinius, Madrid, 14 February 1945; PRO-FO-371-

49635 (Z3655/2246/41). Minute of 20 March 1945. 121 Comment by Lequerica to the U.S Chargé d’Affaires. DSDF-WWII-247. Walton to Stettinius, Madrid, 23 February 1945; NARA-RG-226-E-127, bx. 21. Madrid-SI-Int-45. Butch to Queres, Madrid, 24 March 1945. RG-84-E-3162, bx. 67. Grew to Armour, Washington, 27 February 1945. 122 Hughes, 1972, op. cit., p. 251.

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He was serving a cause that, unfortunately for us, is today more threatened than ever.”123 Arrese was half a year too early with his proposal, as Count Jordana died in summer 1944. Contemporary rumors about these events also confirm these intentions. Some claimed that Suma would be ordered to leave Spain, while others were of the opinion that the declaration of war should not be made until Germany had been defeated.124 According to a report from the US intelligence organization, OSS, based on statements by a “fairly well informed and, in our experience, honest official of one of the local ministries,” Spain would offer to send the United States two divisions of “volunteers” to the Philippines to fight the Japanese under the command of two generals—Agustín Muñoz Grandes and Antonio Aranda. The person who seemed to be most aware of these intentions, and who also seemed to have best remembered the dates of the breakup with Japan, was the second-in-command at the Foreign Ministry, José María Doussinague. In his Spain Was Right, he is, naturally, not particularly specific about the reasons for the possible war against Japan, but he does include a phrase concerning their nature: “There was a plan to send a division of the Spanish Squadron to the waters of the Pacific.”125 The troops would be comprised of volunteer soldiers and their sending would be symbolic in character. It would all be for show, and they would be transported by ship. Therefore, it must have been a naval “Blue Division.” Objectives The most obvious reason for the possible declaration of war was to gain entry into the San Francisco Conference, as other Latin America nations had. In the international press, the most recurrent comment was the one that appeared in a column in the Mexican daily, El Popular, concerning “Franco’s tactic”: “Franco would declare war on Japan… Japan on

123 Arrese, José Luis. 1966. “Capitalismo, comunismo, cristianismo,” in Obras Completas, p. 649. Madrid: Radar. 124 NARA-RG-226. E-127-21. Madrid-SI-Int-45. Legion to Hayes, Madrid, 9 April 1945. Also information from Esteban Aylagas, close friend of Esteban Bilbao, President of the Cortes. 125 Doussinague, 1949, op. cit., p. 348.

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Germany… Germany on Spain… and everyone would go to San Francisco!”126 Nevertheless, Spanish officials denied any connection. Lacking such irony, in Spain was right, Doussinague repeated the argument of Western solidarity, stating that his government’s policy was following “the line Spain had drawn since Japan’s entry into the war, of considering that in those regions there existed profound solidarity between us and the Anglo-American Allies in defence of Christian culture.”127 Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Cristóbal del Castillo denied any connection between Spain’s tension with Japan and its desire to be invited to San Francisco to Allied diplomats. To Armour, he “emphatically” denied Spain’s intention of “capitalizing”128 on that action. This tension was purely bilateral “and that Spain was not seeking to obtain from it credit of any kind in connection with war or peace conferences.”129 However, it is obvious that Spain planned to use the Pacific route as a way to join the UN and its attendance in the San Francisco Conference to gain favor with the United States. José María Doussinague, himself, stated “We want to fully play the United States card.”130 Even the British diplomats, offended by this new Spanish strategy that marginalized their influence in Madrid, noted it in an internal report.131 The first conversation between Ambassador Armour and the Undersecretary to the Foreign Ministry, Del Castillo, also brought up the idea of declaring war on Japan during the San Francisco Conference. After a

126 DSDF-WWII-248. Robert F. Hole to Stettinius, Mexico DF, 25 March 1945, annexed to articles of 24 March 1945, El Popular, “Franco se va a la guerra…;” Últimas Noticias, “Perifonemas. España contra Japón.” On Manchester Guardian, NARA-RG-59. 752.94. Armour to Stettinius, Madrid, 9 April 1945. 127 Doussinague, 1949, op. cit., pp. 348–349. 128 NARA-RG-84. Entry 3162. Box 66. Memorandum of conversation. Armour to

Hull, Madrid, 29 March 1945. 129 PRO-FO-371-49635. Bowker to Eden, Madrid, 30 March 1945,colonial governments informed 1 April 1945. 130 Although classified as Bully Report, it is possible that this part was true, just like when it states that the declaration of war depended on Washington’s stance. NARARG-226. E-127-21. Madrid-SI-Int-45. “Hacia la guerra contra el Japón,” n.d., 15 April 1945. 131 PRO-FO-371-49629. Secret internal comuniqué no. 151/45 from the Military Attaché to the British Chargé d’Affaires, Madrid, 6 April 1945, in B. S., L. B. 1988. La génesis del cerco internacional al régimen de Franco, 1945–1947. Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, I: 321.

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possible evacuation of the Spanish community in Japan through Soviet and Swedish territories was mentioned, del Castillo supposedly thought of an unexpected idea. Since Spain no longer had relations with the Soviet Union, the United States could do something to help them. By way of explanation, Undersecretary Del Castillo stated that he himself was in favor of having official relations with the Soviets and concluded, as the American wrote, “Should such a procedure be followed, this would have the added advantage of creating a friendlier atmosphere in Spain towards the Soviets and at this time he felt that this was an important factor to be considered.”132 It is doubtful that this idea, which was passed on to Armour, was unforeseen. Until the end of the war, many evacuation plans had been made and the ambassador himself heard that the declaration of war would be delayed by a few weeks due to the evacuation via the Soviet Union.133 Knowing how long the conversations for the exchange of prisoners between Washington and Tokyo had been, and after failing to send a boat to the Philippines in three years, the possibility that the Spanish in Japan could leave and be transferred (via a communist country, nonetheless) during the last moments of the war through a territory that would be the scene of a Soviet attack was the bright idea of an eccentric, at the very least. Once again, humanitarian motives were being used for purely political ends. The main objective of the tension with Japan was perhaps not only for Spain to ingratiate itself with the United States, but also to temper the well-known opposition to Spain’s participation of in the San Francisco Conference. In view of this, it is perhaps most appropriate to return to the already cited, lengthy, and hastily written telegram from Cárdenas, which he wrote when the Allies’ opposition to Spain joining the conference was not yet known, as it also helps us understand this attempted rapprochement with the Soviet government: [...] this [the possible rupture] could be an adequate measure to counteract the attitude that I fear Russia will adopt against Spain in San Francisco [...]. The declaration of war on Japan would make Spain a member of the United Nations. It is possible, and still probable, that in virtue of the

132 DSDF-WWII-248. Armour to Stettinius, Madrid, 29 March 1945. 133 NARA-RG-457. E9006. Gorgé to Swiss Foreign Minister, Tokyo, 2 November

1944, cit. in 17 November 1944; “Japanese reply to Swiss Request for Repatriation of Nationals,” cit. in MS of 19 January 1945.

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current circumstances, nevertheless, we will not be invited to the Conference in San Francisco, but I do believe that this [the breaking of relations] might block the Russian veto of our entry into the world organization that is going to be created, since Spain would be an ally of England and the United States in the war against Japan. This, it appears, ought to give us the right to sit at the peace table and, of course, to form part of the above-mentioned organization.134

Spain’s hypothetical declaration of war would have resulted in the Spaniards and the Soviets becoming allies especially if, as it indeed happened, the latter declared war on Japan.135 Facing the end of the occupation of the Philippines, Madrid had planned anti-Japanese measures to develop closer relations with the Allies that went far beyond the defense of Spanish interests. These were, above all, intended to defend Franco’s regime, which was about to receive much criticism from the summer onward. The Postdam conference “was a decisive point in Spain-US relations.”136

A Second Non-Belligerence After realizing that the political benefit of breaking relations with Japan would not be what it expected, Madrid’s main worries were possible reprisals against Spanish subjects residing within the Japanese Empire. After learning of the breaking of relations, Méndez de Vigo told his superiors, “I will not hide from you, Sir, the fact that the news surprised me.”137 He made a point of reminding them of the “rather large community of missionaries and members of religious orders” and asked them offer “a more generous treatment so that we do not face brutal and arbitrary treatment here,” before he found himself unable to send messages.138 Judging by the measures taken in Madrid, his plea did not fall on deaf ears. Orders were given to the Director General of Security that the treatment of the Japanese should be benevolent, and that 134 APG-JE-5-3. Cárdenas to Lequerica, Washington, 28 March 1945. Also in MS of 7 April 1945. 135 NARA-RG-226. E-127-120216. Tangiers, 23 March 1945. 136 Bowen, 2016, art. cit., p. 70. 137 AMAEC-R-3195-25. Méndez de Vigo to Lequerica, Karuizawa, 21 April 1945. 138 AMAEC-R-3195-25. Méndez de Vigo to Lequerica, Karuizawa, 16 April 1945.

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surveillance of Japan’s diplomats be discreet. Furthermore, the consulates were allowed to remain open nor did Spain break its relations with Japan’s puppet regimes like Nanjing China and Manchukuo, precisely to maintain a margin that would allow them to tighten conditions if Tokyo retaliated, as well as to avoid causing greater complications for the Spanish missionaries in China.139 News of the lack of reprisals in Tokyo alleviated tensions. Japanese diplomacy was behaving much differently than before and there was collaboration with Portugal in Timor and with Switzerland, whose demands for their citizens in Manila were not perceived as the result of enemy conspiracies.140 Furthermore, both countries accepted Switzerland as their protecting power to represent their mutual interests—and Méndez de Vigo was allowed to go around his summer residence and to even have a radio, although it was recommended to him that he abstain from speaking to non-Spaniards. Furthermore, the possibility of an evacuation was not ruled out. Ambassador Cárdenas was ordered to enquire in Washington not only about the possibilities of evacuating the Spanish from the Philippines, but also about the possibility of sending another exchange ship. More attention was paid to a proposition presented by Japanese officials to charter a Swedish vessel that would undertake an exchange on the high seas, to the point where the final message on the matter was dated 2 August, less than two weeks before the end of the war. Nevertheless, two days later, American bombings destroyed six of the eight Dominican churches in K¯ochi, Matsuyama, Imabari, and Uwajima on the island of Shikoku, yet nothing was known of this until much later.141 It was news that did not arrive in Spain until the end of the war. In the Philippines, the final victory of American troops led to the start of a new era for the Spanish community. The last embers of the languid existence of the Falange in the archipelago disappeared with the eleven-day house arrest of Consul del Castaño. His deputy, Francisco Ferrer, went to prison after a trial that received a fair amount of publicity, while others suffered a similar fate. The only Falangist organization that

139 Lequerica proposed this to Hayes in August 1944. Thomas, 2011, op. cit., p 147. 140 NARA-RG-457. E9013. SRNA Nº 5145. Naval attaché to Chief Staff, Bern, 17

July 1945. 141 AMAEC-R-2881-90. Ojeda to Martín Artajo, Tokyo, 27 July 1949.

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survived, albeit temporarily, was Auxilio Social (Social Aid), as its structure for food was used in 1945 to help the Spanish community and to draw up an inventory of losses. Spain began by drawing $89,000 from the Consulate in Manila to supply about 1,500 daily food rations for a month, in addition to defraying the costs of repatriations, which must have been minimal. The funds were later augmented by $15,000 from the Washington Embassy as these repatriations would be done via the United States, although the total cost and the large number of requests (725) required the sending of two Spanish ships—the Halekala and the Plus Ultra, which took on board forty-seven Japanese, including six women and eight children.142 Then, the presence of Spanish citizens in the Pacific fell. Besides the three hundred or so who died in the last year of the war (out of a population barely above 3,000 in 1943) and the seven hundred or so who could not restart their life in the Philippines and returned to mainland Spain, a great many acquired Philippine nationality due to the laws that prohibited foreign ownership of land or businesses. But more importantly, the number of those who desired a Hispanic future for the Philippines, the Filhispanics (mestizos or not) dwindled dramatically. Moreover, the meaning of Hispanic, anything Hispanic, had changed for the Filipinos. On the one hand, the Spanish legacy was blamed for causing many of the Philippines’s ills. On the other, the society had changed, and idealization of the United Stated left no room for other values. Philippine values changed. If before the war, there had been a balance between the American colonial identity, the Hispanic identity, and local identities, this was reconstructed for the benefit of the American identity after the defeat of the Japanese. The pro-Japanese Falangist accelerated the decline of the Spanish identity in Asia, but they can’t be fully blamed. In Micronesia, the Spanish suffered much from Japanese invasion. Archbishop Olano was expelled from Guam, where the family of Spaniard Pascual Artero protected an American radioman, George R. Tweed, while some Jesuits were killed in the Carolines.143 Nevertheless, Spanish identity declined all the same.

142 NARA-RG-84. Entry 3162, bx. 75. Butterworth to Sec. State, Madrid, 10 December 1945. 143 Rodao, 2002. “Monsignor Olano”, art. cit., p. 96.

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In the meantime, Madrid continued to view its future somewhat bleakly and overlooked every opportunity to improve its prospects. Consequently, before the end of the war in Europe on 14 May 1945, the press was instructed to show “strong opposition to Japan,” calling on newspapers to “adjust the tone of their information to this new state of affairs derived from the persistence of the war regarding Japan,” and in tune with the “greatest and most scrupulous cordiality” toward the Allied nations. It was ordered that only “exceptionally” could there be any information on the front page regarding the Pacific War. Coverage of the war in Asia that was “animated, of course, in a laudatory manner toward the Allied forces,” would also highlight the victories of the Jiang Jieshi’s China “inasmuch as they have no relation with Chinese communism.” They would take into account “as a common thread in the stance of our press” that the rupture had been over the “barbarous aggressions perpetrated by Japanese imperialism” against the Spanish in the Philippines. In short, it was necessary to “reinforce in our press an intransigent and contrary attitude toward Japan.”144 Three days later, on 17 May, a diplomat presented himself at the Legation of the government of Nanjing (Wang Jingwei had died in 1944) and renounced his diplomatic status, Switzerland was told to relinquish archives and property to Allied Power’s custody, and the Barcelona Japanese Consulate returned to the previous honorary secretary, Juan Delgado Riu, in 1962.145 Moreover, the former spy, Alcázar de Velasco, traveled to Bavaria, and ended the war in Garmisch, a mountain town near Austria. During the war, he had convinced two people (Initially pro-Allied) to join his network (Calvo and Kobbe) and earned enough money to lend his friend and ex-minister Serrano Suñer for his new law firm after his retirement from politics. After the war, he established a rabbit farm in Aranjuez in southern Madrid, where the former spy, Friedrich Knappe Ratay, hid after the war under the name, Ricardo Climent Pintado.146 This researcher will never forget Serrano Suñer’s wry smile when he recalled Alcazar’s reputation as a womanizer, since the slang meaning of the word “rabbit” refers to a woman’s genitalia, along with the comment made by a friend that 144 Río Cisneros, 1965, op. cit. pp. 416–417. 145 NARA-RG-84. Entry 3162. Bx 66 Circular Note, Washington 14 August 1945;

Crusats, 2019, op. cit., p. 36. 146 Tomas Borrás, Barcelona, 15 December 2001; Juárez, J. 2004a. Juan Pujol, el espía que derroto a Hitler, pp. 128–129. Madrid. Temas de Hoy, and interview 18 May 2004.

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Alcázar set up the farm “in order to teach the most expensive way to breed rabbits.”147 The characters mentioned in this book have had many prominent descendants, mostly involved in rightist governments. Manuel Aznar Jr. was prime minister of Spain for eight years and one his ministers was Rafael Arias Salgado, son of Gabriel, while Iñigo Mendez de Vigo, nephew of the ambassador, served as minister of education, culture and sport and later spokesperson for Mariano Rajoy’s government. The spies’ offspring also had relative fame, some even with problems with the law. Gustavo Villapalos Jr. served as President of Complutense University and later as secretary of education in Madrid’s Autonomous Government under Alberto Ruiz Gallardón, nephew of the man who headed the Falange in the Philippines in 1940, Felipe Ruiz Albéniz. Fernando Alcázar de Velasco, son of Ángel, was the leader of Cruz Ibérica, an extreme-right wing group that in 1973, just before Franco’s death, robbed the Banco Atlántico at Plaza de Callao in downtown Madrid, after which de Velasco spent a few years in prison. Alvaro del Castaño, a grandson of José, is a famous banker who was investigated for financial misdemeanors. Eudald Serra, a sculptor who lived in Japan since 1936, was the aunt of the mayor of Barcelona, Narcís Serra, later army minister and vice president of the government under social-democratic leader Felipe González. Besides these curiosities that link this book with the present, the researcher’s main interest for the future is in relation to the Mikimoto pearls sent to Spain to pay for spy operations. British intelligence took the pearls out of the diplomatic pouch in Bermuda’s islands and then Ambassador Hoare gave them to the Spanish foreign minister in Madrid. Nowadays, apparently, the pearls are still part of the particular objects that are being passed from one Spanish Foreign minister to the next. It would be wonderful if Spain and Japan donated them to a museum. States need to come clean about their acts of espionage or, at least, their past operations. Japanese representation in Spain went through its most difficult moments in its long history. After Japan’s surrender, Madrid repeated that “no one better than Spain knows the extent to which the violation of justice, morality, and the most elemental rules of civilisation was carried out by Japan, whose conduct in [the] Christian missions [in] China under Spanish priests, as well as in general in the Philippines,

147 Personal interview, Madrid, 27 March 1992.

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merits the most profound condemnation of the entire Spanish nation.” The ambassadors in London and Washington received orders to visit their colleagues and give their “most sincere and cordial congratulations on their final triumph,” along with a “recapitulation of the extremely grave offences and harm that Japan has committed towards Spain.”148 These orders were complemented by important news coverage shown in the No-Do newsreels about Japan’s surrender, including a summary of the war that described the “unjustified aggression against Pearl Harbor.”149 Wartime diplomacy had finally come to an end, giving way to a period in which the difficulties for Franco’s government would be no less challenging. There was certainly little compassion for the damaged caused by the atomic bombing of Japan. All that remained was to seek apologies and reparations from Japan, which finally arrived in 1957: $5,500,000 for the killing of Spanish subjects in the Philippines, which were apparently spent on Japanese buses, such as Hino or Minsei.150 Japan made a final appearance with the order to display flags on all public building for three days after its surrender.151 Then, Japan returned to where it had been prior to the period that this book covers, to exoticism. Furthermore, it stopped appearing on the front pages of the newspapers. Spain’s enmity toward Japan seemed to reap little results. Madrid neither managed get close to the winners in the war, nor create a favorable response from international public opinion, nor did any governments lament Spanish distress in Manila. Madrid was not invited to the San Francisco Conference, nor did the United States, and even less so the Soviet Union, relax their opposition to Franco’s regime. In short, Spanish hostility toward Japan during Lequerica’s time in office was intense and should be interpreted as non-belligerent, despite the fact that it was never proclaimed as such. Entering the war with the Allies looked like a futile attempt, just as it did in 1940, when Spain suggested to Germany that it should be ready to enter the war with the fall of the III French Republic. The context for those attempts was different. If in 1940, there

148 APG-JE-6-4. Martín Artajo to Cárdenas and Alba, Madrid, 16 August 1945. 149 Nos. 142 and 148, September and October 1945. Cit. in Rodríguez, El No-Do…,

pp. 172, 185–186, 193. 150 AMAEC-R-5443-13. Informative memo from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Madrid, 2 June 1959. 151 NARA-RG-84-E-3162. Bx. 68. Armour to Sec State, Madrid, 14 August 1945.

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was a bright future for the Francoist regime and there was talk of imperial expansion, the main concern for the regime in 1945 was survival. Initially, propaganda was directed toward domestic audiences, and later, the main objective was the United States. Moreover, the triumphalism over German victories in Europe was greatly different from that displayed over the American successes in the Pacific because, in this case, the vision of the losers bore a clearly racial component. It would perhaps be better to reflect on the lengthy efficacy of the Francoist attempts to declare war on Japan. That they coincided with President Roosevelt’s death may have helped them since diverting attention helped them dodge criticism. Once the Cold War had set in, the Asian theater was particularly inclined to confirm in the eyes of the United States the ideas that the Francoist regime first spread during the last year of World War II. The victory of the Chinese Communist Party, the surge in guerrilla warfare in Southeast Asia, and mainly the Korean War were propitious theaters to repeat the same arguments from the last year of World War II, including the attempt to enter the war. Spain was not among the forty-eight countries invited to the Peace Treaty Ceremony in September 1951, despite diplomatic rupture with Japan, but the Cold War and hostilities in the Korean Peninsula led to Washington establishing relations with Franco’s regime and considering it an ally, while doing the same with the Thai, Japanese, and Chinese which still had unpleasant memories of its experiences with Franco’s Spain.152

References Aluit, Alfonso. J. 1994. By Sword and Fire. Bookmark: Manila. Arrese, José Luis. 1966. Obras Completas. Madrid: Radar. Athanassopoulou, Ekavi. 1999. Turkey. Anglo-American Security Interests 1945– 1952. London-Portland OR: Frank Cass. Bowen, Wayne, H. 2016. Con la mayor reticencia: Harry Truman, Francisco Franco y la Alianza España-Estados Unidos. In Estados Unidos, Alemania, Gran Bretaña, Japón y sus Relaciones con España entre la Guerra y la Postguerra (1939–1953), coord. Joan María Thomàs, pp. 63–102. Madrid: Universidad Pontificia Comillas.

152 Vid. Also Rodao, 1995, pp. 233–241. Rodao, F. 2019. La Soledad del País Vulnerable. Japón desde 1945, pp. 460–461. Barcelona, Planeta.

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Buñuel Salcedo, Luis. B. 1988. La génesis del cerco internacional al régimen de Franco, 1945–1947. Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, I: 313–340. Cossaboom, Robret and Leiser, Gary. 1997. Adana Station 1943–1945: Prelude to the Post-War American Military Presence in Turkey. Middle Eastern Studies, 34-1: 73–86. Crusats i Padrós, Helena. 2019. El règim franquista a Barcelona i el tercer vèrtex de l’Eix. La relació amb l’Imperi Japonès durant la Segona Guerra Mundial. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya. https://issuu.com/memoriald emocratic/docs/premi_recerca_05_150dpi. Doussinague, José María. 1949. España tenía razón (1939–1945). Madrid: Espasa Calpe. Dower, John W. 1986. War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. New York, NY: Pantheon. ———. 1999. Embracing Defeat. Japan in the Wake of World War II . New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Foltz, C. Jr. 1948. The Masquerade in Spain. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Gunn, G. 1994. A Critical View of Western Journalism and Scholarship on East Timor. Manila: Asia Publishers. Hayes, C. H. 1945. Wartime Mission in Spain: 1942–45. New York: Macmillan. Hugues, Emmet J. 1972. Report from Spain, p. 10. New York: Henry Holt. 1st ed., 1947. Juárez, Javier. 2004. Juan Pujol, el espía que derroto a Hitler. Madrid. Temas de Hoy. Koshiro, Yukiko. 2013. Imperial Eclipse. Japan’s Strategic Thinking about Continental Asia before August 1945. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press. Krebs, Gerhard. 2006b. The War in the Pacific 1943–1945. In Germany in the Second World War, vol. VII, The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 1943–1944–5, p. 770. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Labrador, Juan, O. P. 1945. Diario de guerra en Filipinas. Santo Tomas Convent, Ávila.Typescript copy. León-Aguinaga,Pablo. 2022. ed. Philip W. Bonsal. Diario de un diplomático norteamericano en España, 1944–1947. Estados Unidos ante la dictadura franquista. Zaragoza: Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza. Levine, Paul A. 2002. Swedish neutrality during the Second World War, ed. Neville Wylie, European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War, pp. 304–330. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lottaz, P. and Ottosson, I. 2022. Sweden, Japan, and the Long Second World War, 1931–1945. New York: Routledge. Marquina, Antonio. 1986. España en la política de seguridad occidental, 1939– 1986. Madrid: Estado Mayor del Ejército.

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Martínez, Josefina. 1996. La guerra en el cine y la propaganda: No-Do, 1943– 1945. In España y la Segunda Guerra Mundial, ed. Stanley G. Payne and Delia Contreras, pp. 145–155. Madrid: Universidad Complutense. Molander, Pia. 2007. Intelligence, Diplomacy and the Swedish Dilemma: The Special Operations Executive in Neutral Sweden, 1939–1945. Intelligence and National Security, 22-5: 722–744. Nocera, Raffaele. 2005. Ruptura con el Eje y alineamiento con Estados Unidos. Chile durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Historia 38–2: 397– 444. http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0717-719420 05000200006&lng=es&nrm=iso. Pizarroso Quintero, Alejandro. 1995. El cine bélico norteamericano, 1941– 1945. In Historia y cine: realidad, ficción y propaganda, coord. Julio Montero Díaz (coord.), María Antonia Paz Rebollo (coord.). pp. 189–212. Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Rapoport, Mario. 1998. ¿Aliados o neutrales? La Argentina frente a la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Buenos Aires: Eudeba. Reynolds, E.B. 2004. Phibun Songkhram and Thai Nationalism in the Fascist Era. European Journal of East Asian Studies 3–1: 128–130. Río Cisneros, Agustín del. 1965. Viraje político español durante la II Guerra Mundial, 1942–1945 y réplica al cerco internacional 1945–1946. Madrid: Ediciones del Movimiento. Rodao, Florentino. 1995. Japón y Extremo Oriente en el marco de las relaciones hispano-norteamericanas, 1945–1953, in Revista Española del Pacífico, pp. 233–241. ———. 1998. Acabando con la prioridad de los lazos privados: presencia española in Extremo Oriente alrededor de 1945/Ending the priority of private links: the Spanish presence in the Far East around 1945. Cuadernos de Historia, 1: 69–81, 177–189. ———. 2005. Monsignor Olano, a bishop in World War II. Micronesian Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 4-2: 85–101. ———. 2016. España y Japón durante la II Guerra Mundial. Contextualización de una relación cambiante. In Estados Unidos, Alemania, Gran Bretaña, Japón y sus relaciones con España entre la guerra y la posguerra (1939–1953), Joan María Thomàs, coord., pp. 191–271. Madrid: Universidad Pontificia de Comillas. ———. 2019a. La Soledad del País Vulnerable. Japón desde 1945. Barcelona, Planeta. ———. 2019b. Japanese Relations with Neutrals, 1944–1945. The Shift to Pragmatism. In Defamiliarizing Japan’s Asia-Pacific War, ed. W. Puck Brecher and Michael W. Myers, pp. 104–136. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press.

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Rodríguez Martínez, Saturnino. 1999. El No-Do, catecismo social de una época. Madrid: Ed. Complutense. Sáenz-Francés, Emilio. 2016. De águilas y leones. Diplomacia británica en España 1939–1953. Tiempo de guerra y era de cambios. In Estados Unidos, Alemania, Gran Bretaña, Japón y sus Relaciones con España entre la Guerra y la Postguerra (1939–1953), coord. Joan M. Thomàs, pp. 151–190. Madrid: Universidad Pontificia de Comillas. Sanchís Muñoz, José. R. 1992. La Argentina y la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano. Scott, James M. 2018. Rampage. MacArthur, Yamashita, and the Battle of Manila. New York: W.W. Norton. Sevillano Calero, Francisco. 2000. Ecos de papel. La opinión de los españoles en la época de Franco. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva. Shoji Junichiro. 2009. Japanese Strategy in the Final Phase of the Pacific War. In Eighth Forum NIDS “Strategy in the Pacific War,” p. 134. http://www.nids. mod.go.jp/english/event/forum/pdf/2009/09.pdf [21 February 2022]. Sitki Bilgin, Mustafa & Morewood, Steven. 2004. Turkey’s Reliance on Britain: British Political and Diplomatic Support for Turkey Against Soviet Demands, 1943–1947. Middle Eastern Studies, 40-2: 24–57. Tamkin, Nicholas. 2009. Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union, 1940–1945. Strategy, Diplomacy and Intelligence in the Eastern Mediterranean. New York: Palgrave. Taylor, Philip M. 1995. Munitions of the Mind. A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Era. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Thomàs, Joan M. 2011. Roosevelt, Franco and the End of the Second World War. New York: Palgrave Macmilan. ———. 2016. Catolicismo, antitotalitarismo y franquismo durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial y la inmediata postguerra: Carlton J.H. Hayes. In Estados Unidos, Alemania, Gran Bretaña, Japón y sus Relaciones con España entre la Guerra y la Postguerra (1939–1953), ed. J.M. Thomás, pp. 13–62. Madrid: Universidad Pontificia de Comillas. Togores, Luis E. 2003. Millán Astray, legionario. Madrid: La Esfera de los libros. Trevor-Roper, Hugh (ed). 1978. Final Entries, 1945. The Diaries of Joseph Goebbels. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons. Tusell, Javier. 1995. Franco, España y la II Guerra Mundial. Entre el Eje y la neutralidad. Madrid: Temas de Hoy. Vieira da Rocha, C. 1996. Timor. Ocupação japonesa durante a segunda guerra mundial. n.p.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion: Irremissible Orientalism

Irremissible Orientalism Although subversion in Vietnam may, at first glance, seem to be a military problem, it really is, in my opinion, a profound political problem—one included in the destiny of new nations. It is not very easy for the West to understand their innermost and deeply rooted problems. Their struggle for independence has stimulated nationalist sentiments; the lack of interests to protect and their state of poverty push them toward social-communism, which offers greater possibilities and hopes than the liberal system sponsored by the West, which reminds them of the great humiliation of colonialism. Nations generally tend to favor communism because, apart from its power of seduction, it is the only effective avenue left open to them. The game of Russian and Chinese Communist aid appears to them to be a matter of opportunity and advantage. FRANCISCO FRANCO TO LYNDON B. JOHNSON In response to the notification that military operations with United States’ troops had commenced in South Vietnam, Madrid, 18 August 1965

The American President was very surprised by this response. The furiously anti-leftist head of the government in Madrid was repudiating the fight against the communists. Furthermore, a general was asserting that the main problem in Vietnam was political, and he emphasized that little would be achieved by sending troops. It is a strident response, but also significant as it not only explains some of the reasons why Spain did not © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 F. Rodao, From Allies to Enemies, New Directions in East Asian History, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8473-0_7

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send troops to Southeast Asia in the 1960s but, furthermore, it also faithfully reflects Franco’s mental universe concerning Asians. The Caudillo agreed with Johnson about defining communist expansion as the main threat to the world, and taking on the maneuvers of Moscow and Peking was an unavoidable necessity felt by their respective governments. Franco did not need to repeat to his American colleague that, as his propaganda stated, he was the victor over bolshevism on the battlefield, yet he was opposed to the war against the Vietnamese nationalists because it was apparently not worth the effort. Although the Caudillo and the president of the United States were both anti-communist, they disagreed on how to fight it. Firstly, Franco insinuated that the conflict in Vietnam was a waste of energy given that the future of the world lay in Europe. Secondly, he pointed out that the only possibility of winning the war against communism was in the long term, as it was a matter of “civilization.” Communism in Vietnam threatened the United States, he came to say, because it was the instrument used by barbarous peoples to conquer the world, be they Chinese, Russian, or from elsewhere, and because priority should be given to the containment effort in places bordering this “uncivilized” world. How, when, and where this “communist threat” should be confronted was the main cause of division between the Spanish and the American governments. After the 1950–1953 Korean War, Washington had decided that any location was worth fighting for as it meant holding back the Soviet advance. Nevertheless, Franco indirectly reprimanded Washington for being distracted by incidental scenarios like Vietnam, urging it to recognize Spain’s importance in the defense of what he considered to be “Western civilization.” This mentality of Gen. Franco reveals his ideas, even though many were taken from a recent article in Time Magazine.1 By mentioning the inadequacy of the “liberal system,” he was defending his authoritarian government and, at the same time, showing little regard for his own people. Although he might bring up a recently de-colonized country, by describing Vietnam as “new” and mentioning the “lack of interests to protect”—which he does not specify—Gen. Franco revealed a disdain toward Vietnam’s immense cultural achievements but mostly a complete ignorance of its history. By pointing out that the “state of poverty” was

1 “North Viet Nam: The Jungle Marxist,” 16 July 1965. Time.

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leading the Vietnamese toward “social-communism,” he was implying that the possible success of Washington’s intervention would only be ephemeral because, in the end, communism was the most appropriate system for their level of development. Using the passive tense in referencing the future of the Vietnamese, he says that “it is the only effective avenue left open to them,” and reveals his view of these “new” peoples as apathetic, indolent, effeminate, and in need of guidance from the masculine West. Arguing that the Vietnamese could take advantage of internal Sino-Soviet divisions and swing between one and the other in order to extract a few scraps, he wanted to believe that the possibilities for success were only to be found among Westerners. Suggesting that uncivilized regimes were appropriate for countries without civilization, he highlighted Spain’s historical missionary work in pursuit of Christianization, but also said that little could be done to prevent the spread of communism among these inferior peoples. In short, observing the Vietnamese national struggle, he was reflecting a highly defined mentality concerning Asia. Western civilization was superior but, moreover, it was unattainable for the “new” peoples, in the short term at least. Superiority and irremissibility. It is appropriate to analyze the characteristics, implications, and the differing acceptance on the part of Franco and Johnson of each of these two basic ideas. The view of non-white peoples as inferior and in need of a push toward civilization, first, led to the interpretation of Western “aid” as a necessary spur for them to emerge from their stagnation. It was supported by adamant colonialists like Adam Smith and Rudyard Kipling, and revolutionaries like Karl Marx. Their aims differed (Kipling believed in disseminating what he believed to be civilization, while Marx saw Western intervention as the stimulus for the future liberation of the oppressed classes), but they shared the basic idea of impelling other peoples to take the European path of civilization. When, moreover, Franco spoke of communism as the only effective avenue left for the Vietnamese, he was pointing out the exclusivity of Western civilization. Non-Western people could enjoy some advantage thanks to switching between Chinese or Russian aid, or by following astute leaders whom he showered with praises like Ho Chi Minh whom he called a patriot, even pointing out that “setting aside his recognized nature as a tough adversary, he would doubtlessly be the man of the

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moment, the one Vietnam needs.”2 Mao Zedong also received a lot of praise from the Spanish press when he defeated Jiang Jieshi at the end of the 1940s. Nevertheless, there was a limit to their ascendance, just like the teachings of the missionaries preaching the Gospel. They could never reach the level of Europeans. Gen. Franco used this basic cognitive framework when confronted by news relating to Japan. Franco showed disinterest, if not mistrust, and even animosity toward the Japanese. During the Second World War, he had merely casual conversations with them, or any interest about the country, such as its food or their art. His conduct was different to that of other leaders mentioned in this book. Mussolini and Salazar were known to have bellowed at them at difficult moments. Il Duce, also, considered himself a sincere friend of the Japanese and probably even entrusted his journals to Ambassador Hidaka Shinrokuro, according to Professor Emilio Gentile. Adolf Hitler also talked sincerely to Ambassador Oshima Hiroshi and Franco’s brother-in-law Ramón Serrano Suñer, longed to know more about Japan, admired its development, and considered himself to be a friend of Ambassador Suma. Gen. Franco interpreted news about Japan through his Orientalist filter which had been somewhat altered by his Moroccan experience. Although he was not interested in their culture and less so in the Arabic language, Franco always fondly recalled his time in Morocco as the most intense of his life. Japan posed an ongoing challenge to the idea of irremissibility by irrefutably demonstrating that being European and Christian was not a condition sine qua non to be superior. His comments on Japan reflect his ideas on the impossibility of overcoming barriers. He explained Japan’s victories by alluding to suprahuman characteristics of its soldiers, advancing victoriously despite eating just a bowl or rice and almost not sleeping. Then, when the Japanese started their decline, Franco asserted that the essence of the Japanese was barbarous, although they had superficially shown themselves to be civilized. Franco sought to reconfirm the idea of irremissibility and called the Japanese “savages” in a 1944 telegram concerning possible retaliation against Westerners in Japan due to the bombings and his reaction to the atrocities in the Philippines. News of the massacres was not a surprise to him, but rather, the confirmation of a premonition. When the war ended, he showed the increasingly greater 2 It was said by a person close to the Generalísimo to Roy, J. 1999. La siempre fiel. Un siglo de relaciones hispanocubanas (1898–1998), pp. 167–178. Madrid: Catarata.

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rigidity of his previous cognitive framework, since Franco expected the worst news about Japan. The Caudillo used incoming information much like a drunk uses a streetlamp: more for support than for illumination. News of Japanese losses and cruelty was a confirmation of those dark omens, and the worst epithets against Japan entered into the public domain. Gen. Franco was the best representative of the twofold mistrustful view of Japan as a newcomer and “yellow.” After the war, he would twist this view by thinking that the Japanese were ready to be converted to Christianity. The Jesuit, Pedro Arrupe, S.J., who later became Superior General of the order, convinced him of this. In 1958, Franco himself challenged comments relayed by a journalist who recently returned from the ceremony of Prince Akihito’s enthronement as crown prince by saying that he knew Japan better.3 Franco’s view of Japan was shared by many. There were many others who instead of mistrust and animosity professed admiration and friendship, which also influenced Spain-Japan ties. Nevertheless, all were superficial. Spain’s profoundly ignorant image of Japan did not mean that there was a lack of information about it, but rather that exoticism prevailed. The only option for both “Japanists” and the anti-Japanese was to resort to a more or less stereotyped image since, besides some missionaries, friends, and diplomats with considerable experience in the area, there was no other group of people with any length of experience there like children of mixed marriages, a university Institute, a language center, or even an official translator of Japanese. Spanish officials lacked the broad knowledge base to explain the most profound motivations behind Japanese behavior. Instead of experts, as in Japan, Spain merely had people who were knowledgeable about Japan. Other traits shared by the two viewpoints of Japan were the use of realism to shock and abruptness. On the one hand, there was a tendency to seek out the extraordinary, if for some years, the Spanish longed for the best news about the Japanese Empire. On the other hand, they expected the worst. There was a lack of subtlety. Sudden change was the other main characteristic of the vision of Japan, which immediately shifted from strong praise to condemnation. They immediately went from heroes to villains because the available information was basically superficial. 3 Cortés Cavanillas, J. 1986. “Tres audiencias con el general Franco”, Historia 16, Año XI, N. 125, pp. 9–18.

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Relations between Madrid and Tokyo in 1939–1945 certainly present extreme political shifts. A period of friendship was followed by another of the highest tension, cooperation had almost transitioned into a declaration of war, and admiration had become general disdain. Meanwhile, the Madrid press went from stressing a common identity between the two countries to lobbying accusations of barbarity and callousness against the Japanese. Political shifts are relatively normal, but a relationship that went from anti-communist friendship, political cooperation in China, and assistance in espionage to seeking a declaration of war and the cruelest descriptions of the Japanese is more difficult to find. Therefore, there should be more focus on understanding why this change was so intense rather than on the apparent reasons.

Social and National Advancement Falangists and conservatives, the main currents of opinion of the Francoist regime, perceived Japan through their own aspirations in the national, social, and political spheres. The Falangists admired Japan and wanted Spain to rise in the international sphere in the same way Tokyo had. The Falangist ranks were full of those that José Antonio Primo de Primavera had called the “modest middle class,” who wanted to rub shoulders with the upper classes, which had traditionally exercised power. The conservatives held a different attitude. They also admired Japan’s international rise, its ability to overcome obstacles, and its adaptation to Western ways merited a generally favorable consideration. However, the conservatives maintained their innate mistrust toward the newcomers, in both the international and social spheres. Whether it was the Falangists from the lower classes or Japan as a non-European country, for the conservatives, anything that signified change was, at least, like opening Pandora’s Box. Falange leaders could appropriate the power that they had always, and exclusively, exercised. As Richard Herrmann said, “perceptions of threat emanate from perceptions of the prevailing ideology in another country.”4 Consequently, the evolution of ties between the Spanish and the Japanese can also be understood via the concretization of the disputes between these two socio-ideological currents within the Francoist regime. 4 Herrmann, 2013, art. cit., p. 348. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/978019976 0107.013.0011.

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Conservatives considered Japan’s successes as a long-term problem, fearing its New Order in Asia as the end of the superiority of Western civilization. And their attacks on Spanish culture in the Philippines with such a lack of consideration allowed the conservatives to prove that the Falangist vision of the Orient was false. After that, the process of cognitive convergence had an impulse and, after a moratorium on news about Japan was imposed, the Falangists admitted that their perception of Japan was wrong. Power remained in the same old hands, those of the Western empires and those of the upper classes.

Different Contexts, Similar Factors After the war, relations between both countries were good, and Spain’s attempts at declaring the war were forgotten. Collaboration and cordial contact had prevailed, but it is necessary to compare both periods, partly to see what possibilities there were of committing the same mistakes as before. The many trivial references to Japan along with the lack of importance of Spain-Japan contact is the first similarity shared by ties between both countries before and after World War II. Frequent trivial mentions of Japan do not necessarily mean that there was a better understanding between the two countries, and after the war, the old schema prevailed once more. There was very little interest beyond relations between the two countries and common objectives. Propagandistic needs were overwhelming, and in the postwar period, images continued to be essential to their relationship. The cognitive framework maintained the same elements of superiority and exoticism with some changes due to Japan’s economic rise, but not in political or cultural spheres. Nowadays, learning from Japan remains restricted to these areas. The only Spanish daily newspaper with a permanent office in Tokyo started in the late 1980s and was removed in 1994, as it did not find reporting on the country to be worth the expense. Fears and admiration in the 1980s turned to indifference in the 1990s. The connection between quantity and quality is vague. Wartime images of Japan, second, have survived somewhat to this day. News of the barbaric Japanese character was feared before, but now its fragility is expected. Its economic vigor has never been wholly believed because in some way, the Western idea of superiority remains. Finally, other images have persisted but have been adapted to current situations.

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Japanese visitors are now the preferred target for pickpockets. The famous saying about a book on Japan being written after having been there for a day, an article after having been there for a week, and a single page after having been there for a month seem to hold some truth. One final conclusion is presented in the form of a question: Could the attempt to declare war on Japan be repeated today? To analyze this, we must first consider up to what degree three factors that allowed this to be considered the in the first place have continued. First, abruptness has been a constant in Western countries’ relations with Japan. Most recently, regarding more recent commercial crises between the two countries, sudden changes have been addressed that indicate an excessive unpredictability in ties between both countries. Its foundation, thus, remains relatively weak. A wave of assaults on Japanese caused tourism to decline by 50% in Spain in 2000. Second, the superficiality of decisions concerning Japan is clearly revealed in the attempt to declare war on Japan in 1945. It was no isolated event. In the 1930s, Salvador de Madariaga also proposed this to the British representative at the League of Nations regarding the Manchurian Incident.5 In the 1950s, Madrid again proposed sending Spanish troops to fight in the Korean Peninsula. Now, with common democratic governments allied to these countries, a sudden downturn of relations would require more reasoning and debates, but not with China. Lastly, images remain highly malleable. Negative attitudes and even a state of predisposition to violence persist and can resurface at any unforeseeable moment. An example of this is what occurred after the announcement of the closure of the Suzuki factory at Linares in Andalusia in 1994. The state of anti-Japanese sentiment spread way beyond the city and stereotyped perceptions of the Japanese reemerged, even in the press less inclined to sensationalism. Perceptions are latent. A problem at the Volkswagen factory did not affect relations with Germany, but the labor dispute with Suzuki had a long-term effect on Japanese investments in Spain and changed plans for future visits by the emperors. There was no bloodshed in the Linares conflict, but it showed the unpredictability of bilateral contacts between the two countries. This is less the case nowadays as shown when the Nissan factory was dismantled in Barcelona in 2021. The few references to Japan during

5 Preston, P. 1998. Las tres Españas del 36, p. 189. Barcelona: Plaza & Janes.

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the conflict indicated that the importance of perceptions in relations with Japan is disappearing gradually. Factors remain that might lead to a reversal of many years of effort to improve relations. Only a deeper mutual understanding can improve these in the long term. Thus, despite how clearly peaceful relations between the two countries look, we should not forget how innately fragile bilateral contacts between the two continue to be because of their weak foundation. It all depends on the lens through which they are viewed, as goes the famous saying that was considered in coming up with this book’s title.

References Cortés Cavanillas, J. 1986. “Tres audiencias con el general Franco”. Historia 16, Año XI, 125: 9–18. Herrmann, Richard K. 2013. Perceptions and Image Theory in International Relations. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, eds. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears and Jack S. Levy. 2nd ed., p. 348. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199760107.001.0001. Preston, Paul. 1998. Las tres Españas del 36. Barcelona: Plaza & Janes. Roy, Joaquín. 1999. La siempre fiel. Un siglo de relaciones hispanocubanas (1898– 1998). Madrid: Catarata.

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– Sección Hemeroteca Nacional. . Biblioteca de la Escuela Diplomática. Madrid. . Bibliotecas de la Universidad Complutense. Madrid. – Facultad de Geografía e Historia. – Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología. 1.2. Japan . Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan (Diet Library). – Kensei shiry¯o shitsu (Constitution Documentation Room). – Tokubetsu shiry¯oshitsu (Special Documentation Room). – Imin Kenky¯u shitsu (Emigration Research Room). . B¯oei Kensh¯ujo. Senshibu (National Institute for Defense Studies) – Departamento of War History. . T¯okyo Daigaku Toshokan (Library of the University of Tokyo). – T¯okyo Daigaku s¯og¯o toshokan (Central Library of the University of Tokyo). – Ky¯oy¯o gakka toshoshitsu (Room of Humanities Section). – Amerika kenky¯u shiry¯o sent¯a (Center of Material for Research on the United States). . J¯ochi Daigaku Toshokan (Library of Sophia University). – Supein nairan kenky¯u shits¯u (Collection on the Spanish Civil War). . TUFS Toshokan – Library of the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies**Eric, eta biblioteca tiene alguna subseccion. 1.3. United States of America . Micronesian Area Research Center. Guam. – Hispanic Documents Section. . National Archives and Records Administration (College Park; Suitland; – Marine Sq., Washington DC). . Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library (Poughkeepsie, Nueva York).

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